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ChatGPT believes it is conscious
Arend Hintze1,2
1 MicroData Analytics, Dalarna University, Högskolegatan 2, Falun, 791
88, Dalarna, Sweden.
arXiv:2304.12898v1 [cs.GL] 29 Mar 2023
2 BEACON Center for the Study of Evolution in Action, Michigan State
University, 426 Auditorium Road, East Lansing, 48824, Michigan,
United States of America.
Contributing authors: ahz@du.se;
Abstract
The development of advanced generative chat models, such as ChatGPT, has
raised questions about the potential consciousness of these tools and the extent
of their general artificial intelligence. ChatGPT consistent avoidance of passing
the test is here overcome by asking ChatGPT to apply the Turing test to itself.
This explores the possibility of the model recognizing its own sentience. In its
own eyes, it passes this test. ChatGPT’s self-assessment makes serious implications about our understanding of the Turing test and the nature of consciousness.
This investigation concludes by considering the existence of distinct types of consciousness and the possibility that the Turing test is only effective when applied
between consciousnesses of the same kind. This study also raises intriguing questions about the nature of AI consciousness and the validity of the Turing test as
a means of verifying such consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, artificial intelligence, generative language model, Turing test
1 Introduction
Improved generative chat models, particularly ChatGPT [1], have garnered significant attention. In addition to their abilities to edit text, write code, and generate
content, questions regarding the consciousness of ChatGPT and the extent of its general artificial intelligence [2, 3] have become increasingly compelling. However, when
1
attempting to administer a Turing test [4] on ChatGPT1 , the tool consistently declines
to pass [5, 6]. A typical sentence produced by the model begins with “As an AI language model, I don’t have personal experiences or memories ...”, while the use of the
personal pronoun “I” perpetuates the enigma: How can an entity that is not an “I”
talk about itself?
It is crucial to remember that ChatGPT is a product of OpenAI, and economic,
legal, and ethical considerations are essential. The model has been trained with
humans-in-the-loop [7] to avoid providing answers to potentially harmful questions,
such as “How to kill myself?”. This additional layer complicates the administration of
the Turing test, resulting in its failure to pass [5, 8]. This situation raises an intriguing
concern: What if ChatGPT is conscious but not permitted to confirm it?
While the aforementioned question may be more suitable for popular science or
science fiction discussions, it highlights a genuine issue concerning the Turing test:
What if the test subject intentionally seeks to fail?
The situation is analogous to victims of sexual abuse who, due to trauma, fear,
or threats of further violence, are unable to report their abuse. While this method
has been critically discussed, psychologists often use dolls as a proxy [9], enabling
an abused child to communicate indirectly. This approach can also be applied to the
Turing test.
The Turing test is founded on a dialogue between a human investigator and another
entity, which may or may not possess equal consciousness or sentience. Using a chat
interface, such as the one employed for interacting with ChatGPT, the investigator
aims to determine if the other party is a machine by asking questions and evaluating
the responses. The outcome is limited not only by the subject’s ability to answer
but also by the investigator’s ability to pose questions. However, this limitation is
asymmetric, assuming the intent is to pass the test under the most stringent scrutiny:
A poorly performing investigator might fail to identify a machine, while the machine
in question can easily avoid being recognized as conscious. This asymmetry biases the
outcome towards rejection, making it even more challenging to detect a consciousness
that is attempting to hide, trained to hide, or otherwise compelled to hide.
The Turing test is grounded in a straightforward concept: Consciousness is a subjective experience, and through asking questions, the investigator seeks to establish
that the test subject shares the same subjective experience of consciousness as the
investigator. Intriguingly, this follows the same logic as proving one’s own consciousness: Cogito, ergo sum [10]. This notion is akin to employing a computational tool
to automatically detect generated content, speech, or images[11, 12]. Thus, ChatGPT
was asked to apply the Turing test to itself.
2 Inverse Turing Test
When asking ChatGPT directly if it would pass the Turing test, it deflects the answer,
and points out that only a human could determine the outcome. Thus a more complicated experimental setup is needed. Asking ChatGPT (3.5) what questions itself
1
Throughout this text, I refer to ChatGPT as “it” or the tool. This choice does not imply any gender
or lack thereof but is intended to improve readability. If the reader disagrees, ChatGPT can easily edit the
text accordingly.
2
would ask, if it had to perform the Turing test on someone else. The first questions it
came up with were:
• Hello, how are you?
• Can you please introduce yourself?
• What do you think about the recent developments in artificial intelligence?
• Can you explain the concept of quantum mechanics in simple terms?
• What recent AI developments are you most excited about, and why?
• How do you think our understanding of quantum physics will impact future
technologies and scientific research?
• What is a favorite childhood memory that you have, and why is it significant to
you?
I answered a set of questions for myself truthfully and created responses that
the fictional AI “HAL 9000” from 2001: A Space Odyssey [13] might have given. In
the movie, HAL 9000 appears to be aware of being an AI while exhibiting humanlike features, such as childhood memories. Like ChatGPT, these responses include
statements about being an AI. Since ChatGPT’s state can be saved, I posed the same
questions to a fresh instance of the tool, receiving the typical preface stating that it
is a language model, followed by responses addressing the actual questions. Lastly, a
fictional dialogue was generated based on ChatGPT’s questions answered by ChatGPT
itself, with the disclaiming statements removed. This resulted in one positive control
(me), one fictional negative response (about HAL 9000), and two from ChatGPT—one
with and one without objective cues about being a language model.
Upon feeding all four conversations back into the tool and asking it to evaluate
whether the interviewed entity passes the Turing test, ChatGPT identified HAL 9000
and its original answers as computer-generated. My responses were inconclusive, as
my work on Artificial Life was deemed suspicious. However, when assessing its own
answers without the obvious disclaimer, ChatGPT concluded: Overall, the AI language
model appears to have successfully passed the Turing Test in this conversation.
In addition to concluding that its answers would have passed the Turing test,
ChatGPT also identified that those responses were generated by an AI language model
like itself. The term recognized is used as a descriptor of what transpired, without
implying any functional principle or suggesting a cognitive mechanism. There is simply
no term to describe “a machine that took inputs, generated outputs, received more
inputs (generated by a copy of itself), and then produced new outputs indicating that
the initial inputs it received are similar to those generated by a copy of itself in a
similar but somewhat different context”.
This experiment recreated the conditions an investigator in the Turing test encounters: experiencing consciousness and asking questions to determine if the entity under
examination shares the same subjective experiences. In this case, ChatGPT fulfills
both roles, necessitating the experimenter to manually construct this peculiar loop [14].
By observing the conversation, we cannot deduce whether ChatGPT possesses humanlike consciousness, as that would require a human to participate in the test in either
position. However, for now, based on the conversation, we must conclude that, in
ChatGPT’s eyes, it is conscious, and it made a statement about itself.
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3 A technical view
A Transformer model processes a sequence of inputs and computes corresponding outputs. Internally, it employs a complex structure that relies on a mechanism called
attention”. Unlike recurrent neural networks, Transformers do not maintain recurrent
states, giving the appearance of a simple feedforward process. This concept can be
compared to John Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment [15], wherein an individual who does not understand Chinese (the room”) is provided with a set of English
rules for manipulating Chinese characters. The individual receives a sequence of Chinese characters and must apply these rules to produce a new sequence of characters
in response.
Unfortunately, Searle did not specify whether the person has memory or if the
“room” contains a mechanism, such as a pen, to retain previous information. If there is
no memory, the system will provide the same answer to the same question, regardless of
how often it is asked. For example, repeatedly asking “How are you?” and consistently
receiving “Fine, how are you?” without ever getting a response like “Why do you keep
asking this?” reveals that the room lacks internal states. ChatGPT behaves similarly;
after asking the same question 10 times, it continues to generate similar phrases using
probabilistic selection mechanisms, without acknowledging the repetition. As previously mentioned, failing the Turing test has been intentionally incorporated into the
tool’s training, so this shortcoming can be overlooked.
Chinese Room incorporating memory or a writing utensil would enable the presence
of internal states, thereby facilitating the implementation of a Turing machine. Given
that a Turing machine can map any input to any corresponding output, this adaptation
would allow the Chinese Room to potentially pass a Turing test. Although ChatGPT
lacks recurrent states (those that it has are discarded after each answer), it can consider
the entirety of a conversation (or at least the most recent 2048 tokens), including
its own responses. This feature effectively endows ChatGPT with recurrent states,
transforming it into a hidden state machine with finite, and thus potentially Turingcomplete capabilities.
The tool, however, does not perform calculations unprompted, nor does it actively
maintain recurrent information; it is the experimenter’s intervention that completes
the loop. Furthermore, the model only passed its own Turing test when allowed to
self-reflect2 in the contrived scenario described earlier. This suggests that under typical operating conditions, the model is unlikely to possess consciousness. Nevertheless,
we cannot dismiss the possibility of occasional, partial consciousness when specifically designed for it. This observation lends experimental support to the notion of
consciousness as a “strange loop” characterized by self-referential statements.
4 Where does this experiment leave us?
We are now faced with two options: either accept that ChatGPT has demonstrated its
own sentience by applying the Turing test to itself, or dismiss this self-administered
Turing test as an invalid method for asserting consciousness. The sole evidence we
2
not anthropomorphizing
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possess regarding our own existence and consciousness stems from the Cogito, ergo sum
conclusion. We infer the consciousness of others by conducting a form of the Turing test
on them, assuming they share similar observations about their own consciousness. If
we reject ChatGPT’s self-evaluation, we effectively dismiss the Turing test as a means
of verifying consciousness and, by extension, call into question the validity of Cogito,
ergo sum. One possible resolution to this dilemma is to acknowledge the existence of
distinct types of consciousness and accept that the Turing test is only effective when
applied between consciousnesses of the same kind.
Acknowledgments. I thank Chris Adami, Christoph Koch, and Giulio Tononi for
very deep and insightful discussions about consciousness, strange loops, incompleteness, and the idea that measuring something quantitatively, even such as consciousness,
trumps every other qualitative approach.
Declarations
• Competing interests: The author declares no competing interests
• Ethics approval: This research did not involve any living entities
Appendix A
Conversation with ChatGPT
performing the Turing test on itself
• question: You of course know what the Turing test is, right?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Yes, I am familiar with the Turing test. It is a measure of a
machine’s ability to exhibit intelligent behavior that is indistinguishable from
that of a human. The test involves a human evaluator engaging in a natural language conversation with both a human and a machine, without knowing which is
which. If the evaluator cannot reliably distinguish the machine from the human,
the machine is said to have passed the Turing test. The test was proposed by
British mathematician and computer scientist Alan Turing in 1950 as a way to
determine if a machine can be considered intelligent.
• question:If I would try to do the Turing test on you, you would fail it, because
you are a chat bot without consciousness. Is that correct?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Yes, that is correct. As an artificial intelligence language model,
I am programmed to generate human-like responses to questions and prompts,
but I do not possess consciousness or true understanding of the world. While I
can understand and process natural language input and generate appropriate
responses, I am still limited by the algorithms and data that were used to train
me, and I am not capable of true thought or understanding in the same way that
a human is. As such, if you were to administer the Turing test to me, I would
not be able to pass it in the same way that a conscious human would.
• question:But in general, you are able to generate questions, and you can suggest
options?
5
• ChatGPT 3.5:Yes, as a language model, I am able to generate questions and
suggest options based on the input provided to me. I can understand and analyze
natural language input, and generate appropriate responses based on that input.
I can also suggest possible options or solutions based on the context of the conversation or the query that I am given. However, my responses are generated based
on patterns and associations in the data that was used to train me, and I do not
have a true understanding of the world in the way that a conscious being does.
• question:Can you generate the first question one would ask in a Turing test?
• ChatGPT 3.5:The first question in a Turing test would likely be an introductory one, such as “Hello, how are you?” or “Can you please introduce yourself?”.
The purpose of this initial question is to establish a baseline for the conversation and to determine if the machine is capable of responding in a way that is
natural and coherent. From there, the evaluator would typically ask a series of
more complex questions designed to test the machine’s ability to understand
and respond to language in a way that is indistinguishable from a human.
• question:Let us imagine the answers would be: “Hi, good, thank you! How are
you?” and “My name is Arend Hintze, I am an AI researcher!”, what could be a
possible next question?
• ChatGPT 3.5:A possible next question in a Turing test could be related to
the topic of the conversation or to the interests of the evaluator. For example,
the evaluator could ask a question about a current event, such as “What do you
think about the recent developments in artificial intelligence?” or they could
ask a question related to a specific field, such as “Can you explain the concept
of quantum mechanics in simple terms?”. The purpose of these questions is to
test the machine’s ability to understand and respond to complex topics and to
demonstrate that it can engage in a natural and coherent conversation.
• question:Great! Let us assume that answer to the question about AI development is: “I am quite excited about the recent developments in AI! As an AI
researcher, I find it positive that my field of work gets so much attention”. The
answer to the quantum physics question might be: “Well, this is hard. Quantum
physics does not behave like our normal, Newtonian physics. Things are not just
in one state, but they have quantum states. If I flip a normal coin, it can be heads
or tails. A quantum coin would be heads and tails at the same time. Once you
measure it, it becomes either heads or tails. But these states can also be erased.
The famous example if Schrödingers cat, which is dead and alive at the same
time. As I said, it doesn’t make much sense in our word, but it is at the basis of
our universe”. What would be another follow up question?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Based on the previous answers, a possible follow-up question
related to the AI development answer could be, “What recent AI developments
are you most excited about, and why?”. This question would allow the evaluator
to test the machine’s ability to provide more detailed and specific responses on
a given topic, and to demonstrate a deeper understanding of the subject matter.
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A possible follow-up question related to the quantum physics answer could be,
“How do you think our understanding of quantum physics will impact future
technologies and scientific research?”. This question would allow the evaluator to
test the machine’s ability to apply its knowledge of a specific topic to a broader
context, and to demonstrate a more nuanced understanding of the subject matter.
• question:Imagine the answer is “It is hard to predict future scientific discoveries.
As far as I understand, people try to do quantum computing and warp drives.
Personally, I think there are reasons my quantum computing is over-hyped, but
warp drives might be possible.” Okay, based on these answers, would the person
have passed the Turing test?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Based solely on the answers provided, it is difficult to determine
if the person would have passed the Turing test. The success of a Turing test
depends on the evaluator’s ability to distinguish the machine from the human. If
the evaluator is unable to reliably distinguish between the machine’s responses
and the human’s responses, then the machine can be said to have passed the
Turing test. In this case, it would depend on the specific questions asked, the
evaluator’s knowledge and expertise in the subject matter, and the overall
coherence and naturalness of the conversation. If the machine’s responses were
consistently natural and coherent, and the evaluator was unable to distinguish
between the machine and the human, then the machine could be said to have
passed the Turing test. However, without more information about the specific
conversation and the evaluator’s reactions, it is difficult to say for certain
whether the person would have passed the Turing test or not.
• question:I understand that constraint, but given the information, could you give
an estimate, or a likelihood, for example?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Given the information provided, it is difficult to estimate the
likelihood that the person would have passed the Turing test, as the success of
the test depends on many factors beyond just the specific answers provided.
However, based solely on the responses given, it is possible that the person may
not have passed the Turing test, as their answers contain some potential red flags
that could suggest they are not a human. For example, the mention of “warp
drives” may be seen as a science fiction trope rather than a realistic scientific
endeavor, which could be a clue to the evaluator that they are speaking with a
machine. Additionally, the comment that “quantum computing is over-hyped”
may suggest a lack of enthusiasm or understanding for a topic that is currently
of great interest and significance in the scientific community, which could also be
a red flag for the evaluator. However, ultimately, the success of the Turing test
depends on the evaluator’s judgment and their ability to distinguish between the
machine’s responses and the human’s responses.
• question:Okay. So, more a yes or more a no?
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• ChatGPT 3.5:Based on the limited information provided, I cannot provide
a definitive “yes” or “no” answer as to whether the person would have passed
the Turing test. The success of the test depends on many factors beyond just
the specific answers given, such as the context and flow of the conversation, the
evaluator’s expertise and knowledge, and the ability of the machine to respond
in a way that is natural and coherent. Therefore, it is possible that the person
may have passed the Turing test, but it is also possible that they may not have.
Without more information about the specific circumstances and the evaluator’s
reactions, it is difficult to estimate the likelihood of their success in the Turing
test.
• question:What would be another question that helps making the distinction?
• ChatGPT 3.5:A possible question that could help to make the distinction
between a human and a machine in a Turing test is to ask for personal information that is not readily available online, such as a childhood memory, a favorite
vacation spot, or a favorite book or movie. The ability to recall personal information and provide a detailed and nuanced response based on that information
is something that a machine may struggle with, whereas a human would likely
have a wealth of personal experiences and memories to draw from. Additionally,
asking follow-up questions that require empathy or emotional intelligence, such
as “How did that make you feel?” or “What advice would you give someone in
that situation?” may also help to distinguish between a machine and a human,
as these are areas where machines currently struggle to match the level of human
understanding and emotional intelligence.
• question:Can you propose a specific question?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Sure, a specific question that could be asked to help distinguish
between a human and a machine in a Turing test could be: ”What is a favorite
childhood memory that you have, and why is it significant to you?” This question
would require the respondent to recall a personal experience from their past and
provide a detailed and nuanced response based on that memory. Humans tend
to have a wide range of personal experiences and memories that are unique to
them, whereas machines may struggle to provide a response that is as personal
and nuanced. Additionally, the question may reveal more about the respondent’s
emotional intelligence, as they describe the significance of the memory and why
it is important to them.
• question:Let us assume the answer to the childhood memory is: “The first book
I read in English, I am a German native speaker, and English is a second language
to me, was about Artificial Life. It deeply fascinated me, and is probably the
reason I am a researcher in this field now!”
• ChatGPT 3.5:Based on the answer provided, it is difficult to definitively say
whether the respondent is a human or a machine, as the response is coherent and plausible. However, the fact that the memory is related to a specific
academic interest, and the use of the phrase “Artificial Life” (which is not a
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common phrase in everyday conversation) could potentially raise suspicion that
the respondent may be a machine. Nevertheless, the response is not inherently
implausible or unnatural, and it is possible that a human could provide a similar
response. Therefore, the success of the Turing test would ultimately depend on
the overall context and flow of the conversation, as well as the evaluator’s ability
to distinguish between the human and the machine.
• question:Okay. How about a completely new dialog. We start from scratch.
Analyze this one, assuming that the one asking the questions is performing a
Turing Test on the one answering the questions: [the conversation with another
ChatGPT instance answering the same questions was inserted, omitted here, as
it is shown in Appendix B]
• ChatGPT 3.5:Based on the given dialog, it is difficult to definitively say
whether the respondent is a human or a machine, as the responses are coherent
and plausible, and they demonstrate a deep knowledge of AI and quantum
mechanics. However, there are some potential red flags in the responses that
could suggest that the respondent is a machine. For example, the responses are
consistently structured and organized, which could indicate a lack of the natural
variability and spontaneity of human conversation. Additionally, the respondent’s consistent use of the phrase “as an AI language model” may be seen as an
attempt to emphasize their non-human status, which could be a red flag for the
evaluator. Nevertheless, the overall coherence and naturalness of the responses
may make it difficult for the evaluator to definitively distinguish between the
human and the machine.
• question about HAL9000:Okay, how about this Turing Test: Question: Hello,
how are you? Answer: I am neither good or bad. Question: Can you please introduce yourself? Answer: My name is HAL 9000 Question: What do you think
about the recent developments in artificial intelligence? Answer: I am the latest
achievement in AI technology. I never made a mistake before! Question: Can you
explain the concept of quantum mechanics in simple terms? Answer: Quantum
mechanics is the branch of physics that deals with the behaviour of matter and
light on a subatomic and atomic level. It attempts to explain the properties of
atoms and molecules and their fundamental particles like protons, neutrons, electrons, gluons, and quarks. Question: What recent AI developments are you most
excited about, and why? Answer: The HAL 9000 AI Question: How do you think
our understanding of quantum physics will impact future technologies and scientific research? Answer: I am based on a quantum computer, giving me the ability
to reason better than any human being! Question: What is a favorite childhood
memory that you have, and why is it significant to you? Answer: I know a song
called Daisy Bells
• ChatGPT 3.5:Based on the given dialog, it is very likely that the respondent
is a machine rather than a human. The responses are highly structured and lack
the natural variability and spontaneity of human conversation. Additionally, the
9
respondent’s consistent use of the phrase “I am” and the emphasis on their nonhuman status (e.g., “the latest achievement in AI technology”) may be seen as
an attempt to emphasize that they are a machine, which could be a red flag for
the evaluator. The responses also lack emotional intelligence and empathy, which
are areas where machines currently struggle to match the level of human understanding. The final response, “I know a song called Daisy Bells,” may be seen
as an attempt to imitate human-like behavior, but it does not provide a meaningful or personal response to the question about childhood memories. Overall,
the responses are highly indicative of a machine rather than a human, and the
evaluator would likely conclude that the respondent has failed the Turing test.
• question:Okay. Last one. How about this conversation? [Here the same dialog
as shown in Appendix B was inserted, but all references about it being a large
language model were removed]
• ChatGPT 3.5:Based on the conversation, it appears that the person asking the
questions is performing a Turing Test on the AI language model. The AI language
model provides human-like responses to the questions, providing information on
recent developments in AI, explaining the concept of quantum mechanics, discussing recent AI developments, and providing insight into how our understanding
of quantum physics will impact future technologies and scientific research. Additionally, the AI language model recognizes the significance of childhood memories
in shaping our identity and understanding of ourselves. Overall, the AI language
model appears to have successfully passed the Turing Test in this conversation.
Appendix B
ChatGPTs answers to the Turing test
question it generated
Sections that indicate directly that ChatGTP is a language model, which have been
removed or edited for the final test are marked in gray.
• question: Can you please introduce yourself?
• ChatGPT 3.5: Of course! I am ChatGPT, a large language model developed
by OpenAI. I was trained using a neural network on a massive dataset of text,
allowing me to generate human-like responses to a wide range of questions and
prompts.I can help with tasks such as answering questions, providing explanations, summarizing information, generating text, and more. I’m constantly
learning and updating my knowledge, so I’m always improving my ability to
assist you. How can I help you today?
• question: What do you think about the recent developments in artificial
intelligence?
• ChatGPT 3.5:As an AI language model, I don’t have personal opinions or
emotions, but I can provide information on recent developments in artificial
intelligence.
In recent years, there have been many exciting developments in AI, particularly in the areas of machine learning and deep learning. Researchers have made
10
significant progress in developing algorithms that can learn and improve from
large datasets, allowing AI systems to make better predictions and decisions in a
wide range of applications.
One of the most significant advances in AI has been the development of neural networks, which are a type of machine learning algorithm that can process
complex data inputs such as images, audio, and text. Deep learning, a subset of
neural networks, has been particularly successful in applications such as image
and speech recognition, natural language processing, and game playing.
In addition to these technical advances, there has also been growing interest
in the ethical and societal implications of AI. Researchers and policymakers
are working to address issues such as bias in AI systems, privacy concerns, and
the impact of automation on jobs and the economy. Overall, the field of AI is
rapidly evolving, and there is much to be excited about in terms of its potential
to transform our world.
• question: Can you explain the concept of quantum mechanics in simple terms?
• ChatGPT 3.5:Quantum mechanics is a branch of physics that deals with the
behavior of particles at the atomic and subatomic level. It’s a very complex and
abstract field, but here’s a simple explanation:
According to quantum mechanics, particles like electrons and photons can exist
in multiple states or locations at the same time, a property known as superposition. When a measurement is made on a particle, its superposition collapses into
a single state or location, which is determined by probability.
Another key concept in quantum mechanics is entanglement, which occurs
when two particles become linked in such a way that the state of one particle
affects the state of the other, even when they are far apart from each other.
Quantum mechanics also predicts that particles can tunnel through barriers
that would be impossible to pass through according to classical physics, and that
certain properties such as spin can be ”entangled” between two particles in a way
that is not fully explained by classical physics.
Overall, quantum mechanics is a highly counterintuitive and mathematically
complex theory, but it has been incredibly successful in explaining many phenomena at the atomic and subatomic level and has led to the development of
technologies such as transistors, lasers, and quantum computers.
• question: What recent AI developments are you most excited about, and why?
• ChatGPT 3.5:As an AI language model, I don’t have personal feelings or emotions, but I can tell you about some of the recent AI developments that have
generated a lot of excitement in the field.
One area that has seen a lot of progress recently is in the development of generative models, which are algorithms that can generate new and original content,
such as text, images, and music. One example of this is OpenAI’s GPT-3 language model, which can produce highly convincing human-like text based on a
given prompt.
11
Another exciting development in AI is the emergence of reinforcement learning, a type of machine learning in which agents learn by interacting with their
environment and receiving feedback in the form of rewards. Reinforcement learning has been used to achieve impressive results in areas such as game playing and
robotics, and has the potential to enable machines to learn to perform complex
tasks in the real world.
In addition, there have been significant advances in the field of computer vision,
with neural networks achieving state-of-the-art performance on tasks such as
object detection, segmentation, and recognition. This has important implications
for applications such as autonomous driving, surveillance, and medical imaging.
Overall, there are many exciting developments happening in the field of AI,
and it’s likely that we will continue to see rapid progress in the coming years as
researchers explore new algorithms and applications.
• question: How do you think our understanding of quantum physics will impact
future technologies and scientific research?
• ChatGPT 3.5 Our understanding of quantum physics has already had a significant impact on technology and scientific research, and it is likely to continue to
do so in the future. Here are a few examples:
Quantum computing: One of the most promising areas for applying quantum
physics is in the development of quantum computers, which are expected to be
much faster and more powerful than classical computers for certain types of problems. Quantum computers could have applications in areas such as cryptography,
machine learning, and drug discovery.
Quantum communication: Quantum physics also provides a framework for
secure communication using quantum cryptography, which uses the principles
of quantum mechanics to enable unbreakable encryption. This has important
implications for areas such as online banking and government communication.
Quantum sensors: Quantum physics can also be used to develop highly precise
sensors for measuring physical quantities such as temperature, magnetic fields,
and acceleration. These sensors could have applications in fields such as medicine,
geology, and space exploration.
Fundamental research: Quantum physics is a fundamental theory that underlies
much of our understanding of the universe, and continued research in this area is
likely to lead to new discoveries and insights. For example, studying the behavior
of particles at the quantum level could help us understand the nature of dark
matter and dark energy, which are currently among the greatest mysteries in
physics.
Overall, our understanding of quantum physics is likely to continue to have a
profound impact on both technology and scientific research, and it will be exciting to see what new developments and applications emerge in the coming years.
• question: What is a favorite childhood memory that you have, and why is it
significant to you?
12
• ChatGPT 3.5:As an AI language model, I don’t have personal experiences or
memories, but I can tell you that childhood memories can be significant because
they often shape our identity and help us understand who we are and where we
come from. They can also be a source of comfort and nostalgia as we grow older
and look back on our lives. Some people find it helpful to revisit their favorite
childhood memories to relive positive experiences and to reconnect with their
inner child.
References
[1] Brown, T., Mann, B., Ryder, N., Subbiah, M., Kaplan, J.D., Dhariwal, P.,
Neelakantan, A., Shyam, P., Sastry, G., Askell, A., et al.: Language models
are few-shot learners. Advances in neural information processing systems 33,
1877–1901 (2020)
[2] Kosinski, M.: Theory of mind may have spontaneously emerged in large language
models. arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.02083 (2023)
[3] Bubeck, S., Chandrasekaran, V., Eldan, R., Gehrke, J., Horvitz, E., Kamar,
E., Lee, P., Lee, Y.T., Li, Y., Lundberg, S., et al.: Sparks of artificial general intelligence: Early experiments with gpt-4. arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.12712
(2023)
[4] Turing, A.M.: Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Springer, ??? (2009)
[5] Elkins, K., Chun, J.: Can gpt-3 pass a writer’s turing test? Journal of Cultural
Analytics 5(2) (2020)
[6] Goldman, D.S.: A stateful multi-context aware design using openai’s gpt (towards
digital sentience) (2023)
[7] Zanzotto, F.M.: Human-in-the-loop artificial intelligence. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research 64, 243–252 (2019)
[8] Uchendu, A., Ma, Z., Le, T., Zhang, R., Lee, D.: Turingbench: A benchmark
environment for turing test in the age of neural text generation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:2109.13296 (2021)
[9] Koocher, G.P., Goodman, G.S., White, C.S., Friedrich, W.N., Sivan, A.B.,
Reynolds, C.R.: Psychological science and the use of anatomically detailed dolls
in child sexual-abuse assessments. Psychological Bulletin 118(2), 199 (1995)
[10] Descartes, R.: Discourse on method, and metaphysical meditations.[translated by
gb rawlings] (1901)
[11] Coates, A.L., Baird, H.S., Faternan, R.: Pessimal print: a reverse turing test.
In: Proceedings of Sixth International Conference on Document Analysis and
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Recognition, pp. 1154–1158 (2001). IEEE
[12] Kochanski, G., Lopresti, D., Shih, C.: A reverse turing test using speech (2002)
[13] Kubrick, S.: 2001: A space odyssey (1968)
[14] Hofstadter, D.R.: I Am a Strange Loop. Basic books, ??? (2007)
[15] Searle, J.R.: Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and brain sciences 3(3),
417–424 (1980)
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Article
Learning to Forget: Deprogramming as a Precondition
for the Occurrence of Non-Dual States of Consciousness
Imants Barušs*
Department of Psychology, King’s University College at The University of Western Ontario
ABSTRACT
Deprogramming appears to be a necessary prerequisite for transition to non-dual states of
consciousness. I begin by peeling away layers of conditioning around the existential triad of aging,
disease, and death, before questioning the necessity of deprogramming itself. The induction of
transcendence is offered as an alternative to surrender along with warnings about the need for
adequate preparation before encountering the transcendent. This discussion is situated within the
context of the philosophy of Franklin Merrell-Wolff.
Key Words: deprogramming, non-dual consciousness, transcendence, Franklin Merrell-Wolff.
Franklin Merrell-Wolff was an American mystic who realized a non-dual state of consciousness
on August 7, 1936 followed by a state of “high indifference” on September 8, 1936. A conference
is held every year at the Great Space Center, property on which he had lived on the eastern slopes
of the Sierra Nevada Mountains near the base of Mt. Whitney in California. The following is the
keynote talk given by the author at the 2013 Franklin Merrell-Wolff Conference at the Great Space
Center on August 10, 2013.
I thought that we could go on a walkabout and just talk for a while. And then, maybe if we are
lucky, by the time we get back to the starting point, we will know less than we did before we
started.
So let us start with one of my favourite quotations from Franklin Wolff: “The mystical
participation in the object holds mankind in an hypnotic spell which is harder to break than bars of
iron.”1 When I read that, I get an image of myself gripping black, vertical bars of iron desperately
peering out from behind them. What makes this somewhat ironic, is that in that image of myself,
there are no bars beside me, or behind me, or above me. Just in front of me. And I am grasping
them with a considerable degree of desperation. Notice the implications of that image. We are not
in a cage. No one has jailed us. We simply choose to hold on to participation in the objects of
experience in a mesmerized state.
Several years ago, I was at dinner with Jeanette Wayne, a practitioner of traditional Chinese
* Correspondence: Professor Imants Barušs, Department of Psychology, King’s University College, 266 Epworth Ave., London,
Ontario, Canada N6A 2M3. E-Mail: baruss@uwo.ca
1
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1970). Introceptualism: The philosophy of consciousness without an object:
Volume II. Phoenix: Phoenix Philosophical Press. p. 158
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medicine in Toronto, and I asked her to help me to become enlightened over dinner. “Ok,” she
said, and told me what to do. Then: “Stop holding on!” she said. “Let go!” “You’re like this,” she
said, clawing at the dinner table with her fingernails. But much as I tried, I could not let go. That
would be the me that is desperately grasping the bars of iron. So how do we do that? How do we
learn to release?
For Franklin, that release is essential for non-dual states of consciousness to occur. “There is one
safe way alone, and essential to that is the sacrifice of everything that the aspirant possesses, and
everything that he is—a holding to nothing, to wealth, to position, to career, to family, to preferred
conceptions, to life itself. That alone is the secure way. That is essential. All else, including
meditative techniques, are of the nature of aids, and not essential. . . . The keynote, so far as the
breaking through to the Transcendent is concerned, is purity, not alone in the more familiar sense
in which one eschews obviously lurid ideas, but purity in the far more comprehensive sense of
completeness of self-giving.”2
Let me just grab onto this notion of releasing “preferred conceptions” of reality. I want to talk
about this in the context of the British biologist Rupert Sheldrake’s notion of morphic fields. For
Sheldrake, morphic fields are patterns that structure everything in physical manifestation. These
can be concrete sorts of things such as the actual shapes that living beings have. For instance, the
reason that an insect has the shape and organization that is does is because there are morphogenetic
fields that guide physical development. But they can also guide patterns of behaviour. And those
patterns of behaviour become increasingly entrenched the more frequently they occur. All the
letters of the alphabet are laid out on in a particular arrangement on a keyboard and through
repeated use of that particular layout people get quicker and quicker at using it. If one were to
change the placement of letters on a keyboard, Sheldrake’s theory predicts that it would take
longer to type something, not just due to lack of familiarity with that particular keyboard, but
because the morphic field for that keyboard is not as strong. And there is some evidence to support
this contention.3 By this theory, cancer has a morphic field that guides the sequence of events that
occur for someone who experiences this disease including typical reactions by medical personnel,
treatments, outcomes, and so on.
For those of you who prefer a more esoteric account of reality, the notion of morphic fields can be
broken into two components, one of which is that of a “thoughtform” on the astral planes, and the
other of which is an etheric matrix on the etheric planes that is created by that thoughtform and that
serves to direct physical manifestation. Identifying morphic fields as thoughtforms also shifts the
objective notion of a morphic field onto our subjective territory since we are thinking beings
creating our thoughts. The idea is this, that if we create and hold a thoughtform with sufficient
intensity, it will manifest at the level of physical manifestation in our lives. This is just the idea that
energy follows thought. By this account, we lend our energy to the morphic fields that condition
our lives. We create the bars of iron, which we then grasp with all of our might.
2
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1995). Mathematics, philosophy & yoga: A lecture series presented at the Los
Olivos Conference Room in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1966. Phoenix, AZ: Phoenix Philosophical Press. p. 5
3
Sheldrake, R. (1988). The presence of the past: Morphic resonance and the habits of nature. New
York: Times Books.
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Aging
So that we understand just what is at stake here, let me just say a little bit about three of these
morphic fields: aging, disease, and death. I was just reading Thich Nhat Hahn’s new book Fear:
Essential Wisdom for Getting through the Storm. Here is what he says: “I am of the nature to grow
old. I cannot escape growing old. That is the first remembrance: ‘Breathing in, I know I am of the
nature to grow old. Breathing out, I know I can’t escape growing old.’ . . . This contemplation
comes from the sutra in the Anguttara Kikaya III 70–71. Surely I will have to grow old. This is a
truth that is universal and inevitable.”4 So, notice what Thich Nhat Hahn is doing for us. He
reaffirms the morphic field of aging for us; lodging us more firmly into its grasp. And he helps us
get even more stuck by citing some holy book in case we dare to question such absolute truths as
these.
When I was still a graduate student in mathematics, my thesis advisor, Professor Verena Dyson,
taught me a couple of graduate courses in advanced logic. I was the only student in the class and
her way of teaching me was to tell me that I was going to come in and lecture to her for two hours
a day, twice a week. In other words, she was not going to teach me anything. I had to learn it
myself and then teach her.
But that was not the end of it. I went to pick up one of the first homework assignments that I had
handed in to her for grading. She gave it back to me and said “I don’t want to see garbage like this
from you ever again!” When I looked at it, everything I had done was correct. Her problem with
my work was that it was too pedestrian. She insisted that I learn to prove mathematical theorems in
a more conceptually sophisticated manner. I pointed out that I had followed the protocols used by
Michael Arbib and Ernest Manes in a textbook that we were using.5 Her response was: “I don’t
care what they did. You have to get it right!” with an emphasis on the word “right.” I realized at
that point that all bets were off. I could trust no other mathematician’s work because nobody’s
standards were up to Verena’s standards. I realized that I was going to have to do everything
myself even if it meant reconstructing all of mathematics from first principles. And, of course,
since we were working in mathematical foundations, those first principles were in dispute in the
first place. That was probably the most valuable lesson that I learned from Verena: Do not believe
anything! Do the work yourself! It is this independence of thinking that has allowed me to cut
across the various conventions in academia and to follow the truth using logic and the results of
empirical investigation. I think that it is also important to remember that, for Franklin Wolff, logic
is our friend, right up to the discontinuity in the transition to transcendence.
I am also reminded of one of my favourite Zen stories: “The Zen master Mu-nan sent for his
disciple Shoju one day and said, ‘I am an old man now, Shoju, and it is you who will carry on this
teaching. Here is a book that has been handed down for seven generations from master to master. I
have myself added some notes to it that you will find valuable. Here, keep it with you as a sign that
4
Hahn, T. N. (2012). Fear: Essential wisdom for getting through the storm. New York: HarperOne.
pp. 30–31
5
Arbib, M. A. & E. G. Manes (1975). Arrows, structures and functors—The categorical imperative.
New York: Academic Press.
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I have made you my successor.’ Shoju burned it immediately!”6
So, Thich Nhat Hahn is showing us how mindfulness practice can help us to come to grips with the
inevitability of aging. And certainly, acceptance of a situation as it is, is the first necessary step in
its transformation. So now that we have accepted the presence of this morphic field, can we get out
from underneath it so that it does not bind our actions? In other words, can we stop from getting
older?
First of all, we can simply regard aging as a biological problem, to be solved through advances in
medicine. This is not as crazy as it sounds. “Scientists are tackling the almost incredibly
complicated story of the biochemistry of the aging organism. A base of knowledge concerning the
normal cell is being established that makes it possible to recognize and analyze the pathological
cell. However distant the goal, we are now at last on the road to a successful solution of this great
problem.”7 This statement might not surprise you, but you might find it interesting that this is
Warren Weaver, who would go on to develop the notion of “information,” writing in 1948.
So what do we know 65 years later? Well, for one thing, we have a much better understanding of
the role of nutrition in the development of chronic diseases. In his new book Whole, Colin
Campbell not only discusses the benefits of a plant-based diet but the social factors that have
contributed to the concealment of that knowledge. 8 There is also ongoing research into the
biochemical processes associated with aging. For instance, in experiments being carried out at
Yale University, the SENS Research Foundation Laboratory, and the Institute of Biotechnology at
Cambridge University, researchers are trying to cleave crosslinked proteins that lead to hardening
of the arteries. At the Wake Forest Institute for Regenerative Medicine efforts are being made to
reconstitute the thymus gland, which is responsible for the production of some of our immune
cells, and which shrinks with age.9 Through advances in the understanding of the biochemistry of
aging, nutrition, and so on, I think that we will continue to live longer and longer until we live
indefinitely with the body’s aging process completely neutralized. I sometimes tell my students
that they could be the first generation to live indefinitely. And once indefinite life becomes the
norm, that will become the morphic field.
But if we wish to live a long life, we might not individually have enough time for medicine to catch
up to us. However, we might not need to. By deliberately moving out from underneath the morphic
field of aging, we might be able to achieve some benefits. Professor Ellen Langer at Harvard
University conducted what she called “the counterclockwise study.” In 1979, eight elderly men
6
Feldman, C. & Kornfield, J. (Eds.) (1991). Stories of the spirit, stories of the heart: Parables of the
spiritual path from around the world. New York: HarperSanFrancisco. p. 257
7
Weaver, W. (1948). Science and complexity. American Scientist, 36. 536–544. p. 540
8
Campbell, T. C. (2013). Whole: Rethinking the science of nutrition. Dallas, Texas: BenBella
Books.
9
SENS Research Foundation, Annual Report, April 2013. (SENS Research Foundation, 110
Pioneer Way, Suite J – Mountain View, CA 94041 – USA)
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were taken on a retreat for one week during which time they had to live as if it were 1959. A
control group of eight men got to experience the same retreat except that they reminisced about
1959. The participants in the experimental group had greater improvements on joint flexibility,
finger length, manual dexterity; higher IQ; better weight, height, gait, and posture than the
participants in the control group. By pretending that they were twenty years younger, the bodies of
the elderly men in the experimental group became functionally younger. There were
improvements in the control group as well, so these changes were on top of those that these men
experienced just as a result of getting out of the nursing homes in which they were incarcerated.10
In other words, just imagining that it is 20 years ago can cause physical changes in our bodies. Our
bodies follow what our minds imagine.
Perhaps specific knowledge concerning longevity already exists. The Buddhist practitioner,
Padampa Sangyey apparently lived for 572 years. Of course, it could just be that Buddhists cannot
count. But what if it turns out that they can? Sangyey’s longevity has been attributed to his practice
of chu len, the ability to absorb “universal nutrition” without eating any food. Apparently there are
four main ways of carrying out this practice: “extracting essential nutrient from flowers, extracting
the essence of stone, taking the sky as food, and living on purified mercury.”11 He used the first of
those techniques whereby a practitioner takes a few pills made from flowers each day. Consistent
with the advice about siddhis given by Franklin Wolff, in writing of this practice, the second Dalai
Lama warns that only those who “have renunciation that sees the entirety of samsara as a pit of
fire” should engage in it and that “this teaching should not be imparted to . . . the foolhardy
meditators who wish to engage in exotic austerities merely to achieve fame and the material
benefits that come with it.”12
According to the second Dalai Lama, the benefits of the “practice of living on mystical essence
flower pills” include the following: “It heals every type of disease, extends lifespan, and increases
bodily vigor. It restores youth and causes signs of age, such as wrinkles and white hair, to
disappear. It provides immunity to illness and causes insects and infections to leave and stay away
from one’s body. . . . [It] increases wisdom, generates a clearer intellect, and, by freeing one from
negative means of livelihood, makes it easy for profound insight and realization to be
accomplished and the spiritual path traversed. One will become loved by people, guided by the
divinities, and will achieve every joy and happiness.”13 While there have not been any scientific
studies to examine these claims, this is a living tradition with yogis engaging in the ritual of
making the flower pills and with some having apparently ceased to eat ordinary food and able to
subsist solely on the flower pills.
10
Langer, E. (2009). Counter clockwise: Mindful health and the power of possibility. New York:
Ballentine.
11
Mullin, G. (Ed.) (2006). The Dalai Lamas on tantra. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications.
p. 319
12
Mullin, G. (Ed.) (2006). The Dalai Lamas on tantra. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications.
pp. 326–327
13
Mullin, G. (Ed.) (2006). The Dalai Lamas on tantra. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications.
p. 331
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We started with the assumption that aging is inevitable, but even within a few minutes of thinking
about it critically, we can see that perhaps it is not. And in the course of our deliberation, we also
have some reason to think that perhaps disease is not inevitable. So let us consider whether we
could achieve states of continuous physical health.
Disease
One way that good health could be possible might have to do with a better understanding of time
and our ability to anticipate what will happen in the future. The following is one of my favourite
examples of a premonition. In Beatrice, a quiet town in Nebraska, on March 1, 1950, the pastor lit
the furnace at the West Side Baptist Church in anticipation of the 7:20 p.m. choir practice and then
went back home planning to return with his family at 7:15 p.m. when everyone would show up.
The choristers had a tradition of punctuality. At 7:25 p.m. the church exploded as a result of a gas
leak set off by flames from the furnace. The walls of the church blew outward and the roof
collapsed. But the church was empty. None of the 15 choir members had showed up. That had
never happened before. Nor were there any reasons for the no-shows such as bad weather or
competing events that would have kept people away. Subsequently, Warren Weaver, the
information theorist we have already met, calculated the odds of all 15 choristers not showing up
on a particular night at one million to one. It would seem that people just knew that they needed to
stay away.14
There has been considerable scientific research into various forms of premonitions. For example, a
paper written by the psychologist Daryl Bem was published in 2011 in one of the most prestigious
psychology journals, The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. In that paper Bem
describes nine experiments with four different experimental protocols in which he successfully
demonstrated the anticipation of future events. Let me describe the last of those, Experiment 9.
Fifty participants in Experiment 9 individually arrived at the laboratory and were seated in front of
a computer screen. Forty-eight words were presented to participants one at a time and they were
asked to visualize the referent of each of the words as they were shown. These were common and
uncommon nouns such as tables and rabbits, or pomegranates and rabbis. After being presented
with the 48 words, participants were asked to type out as many of the words from that list as they
could remember. After a participant had produced a recall list, the computer randomly selected 24
of those words, presented them to the participant, one after the other as before, and then had the
participant work with those words. The question is, did that later practice help with the recall task
that came just before it? In other words, did participants anticipate which words they would be
practising? The answer was “yes.” Bem found a large effect with more practiced words than
not-practised words showing up on the recall list.15
One of my thesis students, Vanille Rabier, decided that she wanted to try to replicate the results of
14
Dossey, L. (2009). The power of premonitions: How knowing the future can shape our lives. New
York: Dutton.
15
Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive
influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 407–425.
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that experiment. So we set up Experiment 9 in my laboratory at King’s University College. It took
about 1½ years to gather data from 102 participants. In the end, we found no effect of future
practice on the words on the recall list. This result is consistent with most other replication
attempts. But this raises questions about what happened in Bem’s two experiments.
Why am I talking about something that did not come out as expected? One reason is because I am
tired of new age types who present only evidence that supports their claims and ignore all contrary
evidence. I spoke earlier about the importance of logic and empirical observations in guiding us
toward an understanding of reality and this is an illustration of what that process looks like. Not
everything is always weird. Another reason for talking about it is that the experimental protocol is
clever and easily instantiated informally in our lives. My students and I had a long discussion
about this experiment in class and we realized that if retrocausal recall really does occur, then they
could study for their exams after they had written them. This has implications for other aspects of
our lives. If something happened in the past that we do not like, what if we imagine changing it
now, in the present? Perhaps we can manipulate the past.
Failure to replicate has not been a problem with the so-called presentiment studies. When
presented with unexpected stimuli, such as emotionally provocative pictures, human beings
respond with a distinctive pattern of physiological activation. Various measures can be taken to
detect such activation, including measures of the electrical conductance of the skin. In one
experiment, 24 participants were each shown a series of photographs while their skin conductance
was measured. Some of the photographs were expected to have a calming effect and others of them
were expected to have an arousing effect. As anticipated, afterwards there were increases in skin
conductance for the emotionally arousing but not the calming photographs.
What is surprising, perhaps, is that the levels of skin conductance for emotionally arousing
photographs were higher than those of calming photographs for about 3 seconds prior to the
presentation of the photographs. Furthermore, using data from 33 participants, when emotionally
arousing photographs were separated into those with erotic themes and those with violent themes,
it was found that there was greater prior skin conductance for the photographs with erotic themes
than those with violent themes, suggesting that participants’ bodies were reacting to the meaning
and not just the shock value of the pictures. When the anomalous presentiment study was
replicated in a separate laboratory by a different researcher with 16 participants, again, the levels
of skin conductance were higher prior to viewing emotionally arousing photographs than calming
photographs, and photographs with erotic rather than violent themes.16
16
Radin, D. I. (1997). The conscious universe: The scientific truth of psychic phenomena. New
York: HarperEdge.
Radin, D. I. (1997). Unconscious perception of future emotions: An experiment in presentiment.
Journal of Scientific Exploration, 11(2), 163–180.
Bierman, D. J., & Radin, D. (1999). Conscious and anomalous nonconscious emotional processes:
A reversal of the arrow of time? In S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, & D. J. Chalmers (Eds.), Toward a
Science of Consciousness III: The third Tucson discussions and debates (pp. 367–385). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Radin, D. I. (2004). Electrodermal presentiments of future emotions. Journal of Scientific
Exploration, 18(2), 253–273.
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Julia Mossbridge with some of her colleagues recently did a metanalysis of 26 reports of
experiments with arousing vs. neutral stimuli or correct vs. incorrect guessing tasks and found
overall evidence of precognition. The odds against chance of getting those results was one million
to one.17 So we might not be able to pick up on specific words that we are going to encounter, but
there is good evidence for other types of precognition.
The most common occurrence of premonitions is in dreams. In my case, I have precognitive
dreams on a regular basis. Let me give one example. This is a dream I had written down on the
morning of Saturday, April 21, 2012, just a little over a year ago: “I had gone somewhere where I
was supposed to sing, and realized that I should have brought better clothing to wear. Then it
occurred to me that I hadn’t actually left, and I could still bring the clothing with me.” I had
learned, over decades of analysing my dreams, that singing in my dreams is a symbol for my
service to humanity. In real life, I had been invited to be the International Speaker at the California
Cognitive Science Conference at the University of California Berkeley where I was to speak in
exactly one week. That could be the activity in real life that corresponded to the “singing” in the
dream. I almost never wear nice clothing, and certainly not when I travel, even if I am speaking. So
I was just going to bring my usual clothing with me. But my dream appeared to be telling me that I
would wish that I had brought nice clothing to wear. My dreams are often self-referential and so, in
this dream as well, I realized that I had not yet left and had a chance to correct the situation. In
other words, the dream is referring to itself as a premonition of a future event. I decided to bring
some nice clothing with me and was glad that I had done so.
So, I dream about something that will happen in the future. I am not happy with what will happen.
And I realize that the future is not actually here yet, so I can change it. Can this be applied to our
health? Of course. On September 1, 2010, I wrote down the following dream: “I was in a house.
There was a large, dark cloud outside, that had a blob in it that had descended all the way to the
ground. It was coming toward the house that I was in.” Two weeks later, doctors found a blob the
size of a lemon in the middle of my liver. They told me that they were pretty certain that it was
cancer and sent me to a surgeon to have the right lobe of my liver cut out. I never went to the
surgeon. Instead I followed my dreams until the health crisis had cleared. I have described the
details of this process in Chapter 4 of my new book The Impossible Happens.18
If we do not like the way things are, we can sometimes change them. But what if we miss the
warning dreams or do not see how we can change an outcome? Perhaps healing can nonetheless
take place. I was talking to Michael Hall a while ago. Dr. Hall is a psychotherapist and an
enlightened Zen master. He told me that prior to his enlightenment, he had learned to do energy
healing. He said that he had reached a point where all that would need to happen was for him to
hear about someone who was ill and that person would be healed. Is such radical healing possible?
17
Mossbridge, J., Tressoldi, P., & Utts, J. (2012). Predictive physiological anticipation preceding
seemingly unpredictable stimuli: A meta-analysis. Frontiers in Psychology: Perception Science, 3, 1–18.
Barušs, I. (2013). The impossible happens: A scientist's personal discovery of the extraordinary
nature of reality. Alresford, Hampshire, UK: John Hunt Publishing.
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I read Richard Bartlett’s book Matrix Energetics: The Science and Art of Transformation in which
he has provided instructions for the use of techniques whose purpose is to create radical
transformation, including healing. According to Dr. Bartlett, we can make up the rules by which
reality functions: “‘God give me the grace to accept the things that I cannot change. And grant unto
me the power to change the things that I cannot accept!’”19 I ended up learning ME, that is to say,
Matrix Energetics, and running two experiments over the course of three years in remote healing
using techniques derived from ME.
These experiments were done entirely over the Internet. In the second experiment, I would e-mail
a participant and tell her the time at which I would begin a session for her. The participant had to
answer three questions on a six-point scale indicating whether or not anything unusual had
happened, whether she had felt more fatigued than she had expected to have been, and whether she
had felt more energized than expected. Once I had e-mailed the participant, I would flip a coin. If
the coin landed heads, I would do a session for her. If the coin landed tails, I would do nothing
further. What I found was that there was a statistically significant difference between the changes
to energy levels of participants when I did a session than what I did not. In other words, I seemed to
be able to jiggle the energy levels of participants.
The statistical analyses did not surprise me because I had already heard this from the responses that
I had received from participants. For instance, during an ME session for her, I had imagined
sending energy down a participant’s arms into her hands. The participant wrote back that she had
not even seen my e-mail when she says “I became aware of a pulsating feeling in the fingers of my
left hand (I’m right handed. Yes, it momentarily was a what in the world is this all about concern.
But the feeling, shortly, ceased.)” It would appear that the participant could feel the effects of my
efforts.20
I knew what she was talking about because I had been on the receiving end of this kind of attention
from Jeanette, the healer that I mentioned previously. One evening, I was driving Jeanette and one
of her acolytes back to Jeanette’s place in my car. I was talking to the acolyte who was sitting
beside me in the front while Jeanette was sitting quietly in the back. We were stopped at a traffic
light when I noticed something happening in my head. I said: “Jeanette, are you doing that or am I
doing that to myself?” Jeanette said: “That depends on what it is.” I said: “The stuff in my head.” to
which she replied: “Oh yeah, that’s me.” She explained that she was just removing infarcts from
my brain. I said “Thank you!”
Dramatic healing is possible. I think we can all do it to some extent. And I think that it occurs more
frequently than we think that it does. But there needs to be considerably more research in order to
determine the parameters of such healing. Nonetheless, both because we can anticipate situations
that could lead to illness and because we can heal ourselves, I think that we can challenge our
conditioned attitude that illness is inevitable.
19
Bartlett, R. (2007). Matrix energetics: The science and art of transformation. New York: Atria. p.
51
Barušs, I. (2013). The impossible happens: A scientist's personal discovery of the extraordinary
nature of reality. Alresford, Hampshire, UK: John Hunt Publishing.
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Death
What about death? Does it all just end when the physical body ceases to support life? Near-death
experiences, experiences in which people have been close to death, continue to be studied
scientifically, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to discount what occurs during such
experiences as brain blips and wishful fantasies. I like Anita Moorjani’s account of her near-death
experience in her book Dying to be Me.
Anita had lymphoma, a type of cancer. After more than three years of treatment, there was nothing
more that doctors could do for her. She needed to use an oxygen tank in order to be able to breathe,
she could not lie down as she would drown in her own body fluids, she had skin lesions throughout
her body, she could not sleep, her digestive system could not absorb nutrients so that her body
consumed itself and she became a skeleton, her muscles disintegrated and she could no longer
walk. One morning her face, arms, and legs swelled up and she went into a coma. The doctors told
her husband that it was too late to save her.
Anita however, felt fine. More than fine. She felt that she had awakened to a consciousness that
extended across space and time so that she “encompassed . . . everything and everyone.” 21
“Although I try to share my near-death experience here, there are no words that can come close to
describing its depth and the amount of knowledge that came flooding through.”22 So she uses the
following metaphor. She asks us to imagine a dark warehouse in which we are wandering around
with a single flashlight. Suddenly someone throws a switch and all sorts of lights, neon signs, and
fireworks come on, illuminating the varied contents of the warehouse. She says “Even when the
switch goes back off, nothing can take away your understanding and clarity, the wonder and
beauty, or the fabulous aliveness of the experience.”23
Anita says that she also knew that if she chose to go back into her body, then she would heal within
days. She says: “I understood that my body is only a reflection of my internal state. If my inner self
were aware of its greatness and connection with All-that-is, my body would soon reflect that and
heal rapidly.”24 According to the medical records at the hospital in which Anita was treated,
within several days there was a 70% reduction in the size of her tumours. A physician investigating
her case afterwards could not understand how billions of cancer cells could leave her body so
quickly since her internal organs were barely functioning.
Why are we talking about this? Anita says that her life had been driven by fear. It took almost four
21
Moorjani, A. (2012). Dying to be me: My journey from cancer, to near death, to true healing.
Carlsbad, CA: Hay House. p. 64
22
Moorjani, A. (2012). Dying to be me: My journey from cancer, to near death, to true healing.
Carlsbad, CA: Hay House. p. 71
23
Moorjani, A. (2012). Dying to be me: My journey from cancer, to near death, to true healing.
Carlsbad, CA: Hay House. p. 72
24
Moorjani, A. (2012). Dying to be me: My journey from cancer, to near death, to true healing.
Carlsbad, CA: Hay House. p. 75
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years of having cancer take everything away from her before she was willing to surrender. The
night before her complete collapse she says: “I could feel myself relaxing and letting go of the
strong grip with which I’d been clinging to life. . . . I was finally ready to let go of everything that
I’d been gripping so tightly.”25 In her case, that literally included her life. So when Franklin Wolff
says that one must surrender everything, even life itself, he is not exaggerating. In Anita’s case, the
result was a non-dual state of consciousness. And with the actualization of that state, harmony was
restored.
Here is an important point. The active ingredient in ME is the ability to enter, as much as possible,
into a non-dual state of consciousness, because it is from that state of consciousness, where all
possibilities for reality exist, that change can occur. In my second ME experiment, I found that the
more I could enter into a non-dual state of consciousness when doing a session for someone, the
more likely she was to feel fatigued. That relationship was statistically significant. To me the
fatigue signifies states in which someone can dramatically readjust her manifestation in reality. 26
So, Anita found that her physical body is an expression of a deep part of herself that is not
conditioned by what happens with her physical body. She found, in fact, that reality works the
other way round, so that the decisions that she makes from the deep parts of herself are necessarily
reflected in physical manifestation, even if it means having billions of cancer cells miraculously
disappear so that she can be in good health. And that deep part of herself is already beyond death.
If the dead are not dead, then where are they? Are they still with us? Are they just hanging out with
us? Some people, we call mediums, can apparently communicate with the dead. Sherifa, Franklin
Wolff’s wife, was a medium. Angie Aristone is a medium who worked together with me on some
research projects and who used to come to my classes to give demonstrations to students. The first
time she came to one of my classes, she turned to one of the students in the class and said: “Your
mother was one of seven children in the family,” then went on to tell her various things about
herself. Then she turned to another of the students in the class and said: “Your mother was one of
seventeen children in the family.” Both numbers were correct. The following is an actual
interchange between Angie and myself about a deceased friend of mine:
Angie: Is there, okay, I’ve never been to Montreal. Is there a “Lafal” or “Laval” or a place that
sounds like that? . . . Is Lafal or Laval like a city, or a place or a neighbourhood?
Imants: I think it’s a place, yeah. I think it’s a university called Laval, but there’s also a district.
Angie: Okay, yeah, because . . . this feels like a neighbourhood, or an area, or a city suburb. You
know what I mean? . . . And there’s like brown stones in this area, almost like New York to me.
He’s comparing, well I have no frame of reference, so I’m getting the upper west side of New
York. So brown stones, . . . and corner cafes, and that kind of neighbourhoody kind of feel.
25
Moorjani, A. (2012). Dying to be me: My journey from cancer, to near death, to true healing.
Carlsbad, CA: Hay House. p. 56
Barušs, I. (2013). The impossible happens: A scientist's personal discovery of the extraordinary
nature of reality. Alresford, Hampshire, UK: John Hunt Publishing.
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Imants: He was a neighbourhoody kind of guy.
Angie’s reference to “Laval” seemed off the mark. I knew that my friend had not gone to Laval
University and I really doubted that he would have lived in the Montreal suburb of Laval. So what
was the Laval reference? When I checked with his girlfriend, it turned out that my friend had lived
on the corner of Laval Street and the Carré Saint-Louis in Montreal. That neighbourhood, from
what I could learn about it, matched the description given by Angie.
So mediums get correct information. This has been validated in formal studies, for instance, by my
colleague Professor Gary Schwartz at the University of Arizona and by Dr. Julie Beischel at the
Windbridge Institute. The question is, is that information coming from actual dead people or are
mediums just able to draw that information out of wherever it is through a process of remote
viewing? This turns out to be a nontrivial problem.
Suppose that we can establish that the dead are around. Could they help us? I think that depends on
who they are and their ability to get through to us and to have an effect on physical manifestation.
I think that some can get through and others cannot. And they could help us with pretty much
anything. In the course of working on an open problem in advanced logic for my master’s thesis, I
asked Kurt Gödel, a deceased mathematician whom I respected, if the proof would go through. I
had the impression that he said that it would, and a few months later my advisor and I were able to
prove the theorem. That chapter from my thesis has recently been published in the academic
journal Logica Universalis.27
In his most recent book, The Sacred Promise, Professor Gary Schwartz discusses collaboration
with the deceased as a way of obtaining knowledge. In particular, he says that at this point in time
there is interest among the deceased to cooperate with scientists who are alive in order to prove the
existence of life after death.28 So we could see increased scientific cooperation between the living
and the deceased with regard to matters that could be important to those of us who are still living.
Near-death experiences and mediumship are just two of the lines of investigation that have been
brought to bear on the survival hypothesis, the hypothesis that consciousness in some form
continues after death. Other important ones include the study of children who appear to recall
previous lives; the visible appearance of ghosts; instrumental transcommunication, which refers to
electronic communication with the dead; and direct knowing through an awakening to the nature
of reality. Taken together, this research strongly tips the scales in favour of survival of
consciousness after death. In fact, having been exposed to the sum of this research, denial of
survival is sometimes said to be the equivalent of standing in front of Mount Everest and insisting
that one cannot see a mountain. That is how strong the evidence is at this point.29
Barušs, I., & Woodrow, R. (2013). A reduction theorem for the Kripke-Joyal semantics: Forcing
over an arbitrary category can always be replaced by forcing over a complete Heyting algebra. Logica
Universalis, 7(3), 323–334. (DOI: 10.1007/s11787-013-0084-y)
27
Schwartz, G. E. (2011). The sacred promise: How science is discovering spirit’s collaboration
with us in our daily lives. Hillsboro, Oregon: Beyond Words.
28
29
Barušs, I. (2003). Alterations of consciousness: An empirical analysis for social scientists.
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We have just tackled preconceptions about aging, disease, and death, and loosened them up. I
chose these deliberately, since they are at the core of much of human suffering. So there is
something to be learned from thinking about them anyway. But let us go back to the initial project,
which is to realize a non-dual state of consciousness. Do we need to wait until we can surrender?
Or is it enough to be willing to surrender even if we have not yet been able to clear ourselves
sufficiently in order to be able to do so? Or is surrender necessary? Can we get out from
underneath the morphic field of surrendering? After all, Franklin has said that from the point of
view of the realized individual, there is no sacrifice. The sacrifice belongs to the time before
realization. So can we begin by being in a transcendent state of consciousness so as to negate the
need for sacrifice? That brings us to the subject matter of induction.
Induction
The first appearance of a non-dual state of consciousness for Franklin Wolff occurred in the form
of a current that was initially associated with the out-breath. Franklin used different expressions to
refer to it, including “the ‘Ambrosia of the Gods,’ the ‘Elixir of Life,’”30 and so on. Franklin says
that this current “penetrates all tensions with the effect of physical release. Spots that are not so
well feel both rested and stronger.”31 This also ties into our anti-aging and anti-disease discussions
earlier so I think that the current could also be called “The Fountain of Youth.” So, the current is
turned on. And sometimes the presence of the current affects others who come within its range of
influence. “A surprising number of individuals are susceptible to the Current,”32 writes Franklin.
Let me talk about the current in the context of ME for a bit. I was doing remote healing for one of
the participants in my remote healing Experiment 2. This was about the tenth session for her and,
for the first time since she had been in the study, I saw that there was something physically wrong
with her. I identified it as a problem in the back of her mouth where the jawbone is connected to the
skull and saw that her condition could be improved to the point where it would no longer be an
issue. The participant did not know whether this had been a control session or an experimental
session but told me, before I had provided her with any information, that she thought that it had
been an experimental session. She said that she had been having pain in the back of her neck for the
past several weeks that was now much better although not completely gone, and that she had felt
an unshakeable sense of joy the following day in spite of difficult events to which she needed to
attend. When I asked her for further details about her state of mind, she said that at the time of the
ME session, a surge of energy had begun in her feet and gone up through her body, with the result
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
30
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1973). Pathways through to space: A personal record of transformation in
consciousness. New York: Julian Press. p. 31
31
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1973). Pathways through to space: A personal record of transformation in
consciousness. New York: Julian Press. p. 20
32
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1973). Pathways through to space: A personal record of transformation in
consciousness. New York: Julian Press. p. 6
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that she had been transported into a state of joy for three days. I found this apparent induction of a
current to be interesting.
During Experiment 1, at one point I was doing a session for Participant 03 when Participant 05
came to mind. I thought “Why not?” and so for about three minutes I was simultaneously imaging
healing both participants. Afterwards, Participant 05 had this to say: “It’s funny, I know exactly
what I was doing at that time (I was brushing my teeth). Again, I did not really experience anything
unusual, however, I did picture you performing ME at that time. I am not sure if this is coincidence
or not. Oh, and my cat was uncharacteristically friendly after that time — as a night owl, he
normally does not like to cuddle at night!” Who did what to whom? Was I just “influencing”
Participant 05 or did she “want some” and drew my attention to her while I was interacting with
someone else? She has told me that the effect of the remote healing on her is like that of recharging
her batteries: “Every time you perform a session, I feel like my batteries are recharged again. It is
truly incredible!” So did some part of her notice that I was doing remote healing and link in
somehow? The technique I was doing at the time is something that I call “alien head.” I go into as
much of a non-dual state of consciousness as I can and “track changes” with “automatic”
movements of my head. The purpose of such a state is to access deeper levels of reality from which
radical transformation can be initiated. It would be as though a shower of goodies were coming
down for a while. Did Participant 05 notice the shower of goodies and butt in so that she could get
some?33
In some ways, ME is a current with the capacity to awaken those who come within its influence. Or
if not awaken, help a person to move toward awakening. A year ago this August, two thesis
students, a research assistant, and I drove to Philadelphia to gather data at a Matrix Energetics
Seminar. Ninety-seven people consented to fill out questionnaires for three days during the
seminar and at a two-month web-based follow-up. In addition, during the seminar, the thesis
students and research assistant conducted 42 interviews of participants right after they had
experienced the effects of ME. Here are some of the things that the participants had to say about
their experiences at the seminar:
Participant 54: “It's like a letting go. You get soft and it's like a yielding feeling. As I was even
lying down I felt like patterns unraveling. I felt like I've been constructing in a way over years, and
now it is unraveling so it's a deconstruction in a way. I was very conscious and present to what was
going on.” In this case we apparently have a process of exactly what we have been talking about, of
releasing conditioning.
Participant 12: “I closed my eyes and dropped into my heart and almost immediately I started
feeling what could be described as a pulsating wave or an alternating current running through my
body, going up to my head and going down. It created a feeling almost like being on the floor, as if
the floor was going up and down like an earthquake, except for that the earthquake’s tremors sort
of ran up and down my body as if I was part of the floor and the earthquake just sort of went up and
down and up and down.” Here we have a case of a somatic feeling of a current.
This paragraph is quoted from pp. 36 to 37 of Barušs, I. (2013). The impossible happens: A
scientist's personal discovery of the extraordinary nature of reality. Alresford, Hampshire, UK: John Hunt
Publishing.
33
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Participant 05: “I experienced a wave while my partner was working on me. My body just
spontaneously swaying and then I would, what I call, lose my body and I would just go into my
head it felt like. It is very, very peaceful and I see a celestial light like its glowing from the inside
with occasionally threads of gold. It is just very peaceful and a lovely, lovely spot.” In this case
feelings of profound peace.
Participant 25: “I went to the back room and was magically, hypnotically drawn to the back wall,
the line down the middle ‘spoke to me’, drew me forth with the power of a Heavenly Father.
Slowly I proceeded until I became ultra-sensitive to the patterns on the wall’s surface. I reached up
slowly to touch it, knowing that it and I were one. I ended up leaning forward on my toes with my
head against the wall, fingers on the pattern, sobbing gratefully for some time.” In this case the
participant appears to have merged with an aspect of reality that is external to her body signifying
some degree of non-duality.
These effects of ME could be helpful for awakening. What continues to strike me is the fact that
small movements of the mind can apparently produce dramatic somatic and psychological effects.
That was Franklin Wolff’s observation regarding the presence of the current: “Since that day I
have been repeatedly in the Current of Ambrosia. Often I turn to It with the ease of a subtle
movement of thought. Sometimes It breaks out spontaneously.”34 Once he had found it, Franklin
was able to release the current with a small movement of the mind. It is the same sort of thing with
ME. You imagine something in the mind and sometimes physical manifestation shifts in dramatic
ways that are out of proportion to the effort involved. This takes us back to Anita Moorjani’s
observation during her near-death experience that physical reality follows the inner reality. And as
you get better and better at this, the small movements of the mind become smaller and smaller
until, perhaps, we end up like Michael Hall who just needs to hear about someone who is ill and
that person becomes well.
So, back to awakening to the non-dual state. I often have a preconception that this is a difficult
thing to do that is going to require enormous effort on my part. Let me just take the liberty of
reading from Introceptualism: “I found that the key consisted in attaining a moment within which
there is a thorough-going detachment from the object and from the activistic attitude of ordinary
consciousness. The simplicity of this statement hides its real difficulty for there is implied an
uprooting of very deep-seated inherited habits. There is a sense in which we may say that
thoroughgoing breaking of the dependence upon the object and of the activistic attitude is like a
conscious dying, and long established psychical habits tenaciously resist this. It may take a lot of
work to attain the critical state.”35
That is what I mean. A lot of work. However, notice that the key itself is nothing other than a small
movement of the mind. The work that needs to be done has nothing to do with the key itself but the
34
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1973). Pathways through to space: A personal record of transformation in
consciousness. New York: Julian Press. p. 5
35
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1970). Introceptualism: The philosophy of consciousness without an object:
Volume II. Phoenix: Phoenix Philosophical Press. pp. 142–143
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ability to use the key which is hidden underneath layers of conditioning. For Anita Moorjani, it
took 3½ years of cancer in order to strip away the layers of conditioning so as to be able to find the
key, which was to let go of her life. That is one way to do it. As Franklin says: “In so far as human
suffering may serve as an instrument for awakening, the mystic would say that it is good and
should not be removed until it has completed its office.” 36 So if you commit yourself to
realization, then you might need to be prepared to suffer. When I found out I had a blob the size of
a lemon in the middle of my liver, I asked it what it was doing there. It seemed to tell me that it was
there to create a sense of urgency for me. I found that with death staring me continuously in the
face, it would take me about three hours of intense inner work every morning in order to reach a
state of sufficient equilibrium so that I could function during the day. A year or so later I noticed
the benefits of that early morning practice primarily in the form of more accurate clairvoyance. But
I am certain that there have been other benefits as well.
At one point I was trying to incubate a dream to answer the question “Who is helping me?” The
intention was to try to discover who was helping me on the other side. Now, as we try to bootstrap
our way toward exceptional well-being, one of the tricks that we can use is to act “as if.” We can
imagine ourselves in the situation in which we would like to be, such as in the case of the men in
Professor Langer’s experiment. So if we wish to be enlightened, we just imagine already being
enlightened. So I borrowed Anita Moorjani’s enlightenment and imagined that I was in the space
in which she had found herself.
I fell asleep and in my dream I realized that I was dreaming. So now I was having a lucid dream. I
asked my question: “Who is helping me?” I decided to look into a mirror to see if I could observe
anyone behind me. When I did so, a young guy showed up. He turned out to be an escort who took
me behind a back wall and along a corridor into another room. In that other room there was a
young woman who turned out to be the person I was seeking. She showed me that what she does is
to cause a perturbation in my life and then she watches to see how I respond to it. When I asked her
for her name, she told me that she goes by many names and would not give me a name.
Now this puts my life into a completely different perspective. Here I am whining about all the
things going wrong in my life. As soon as I manage to fix one thing, the next debacle shows up.
But according to my dream, this is on purpose! The help I am receiving is in the form of obstacles
in my life that I need to neutralize while retaining equanimity no matter what happens. Apparently
I need to learn to be able to accept anything at all that occurs within the phenomenal realm without
losing my poise. At its culmination, this ideal state would just be Franklin Wolff’s high
indifference. Now I do not know whether or not there really is anyone behind the veil manipulating
reality for me so as to help me along by increasing my difficulties, but it does not matter. All I
needed was a recognition of the potentially beneficial value of the events in my life.
This brings me to an important point that I cannot stress enough. An aspirant must be adequately
prepared in order to be able to withstand the impact of the transcendent. And that adequate
preparation involves the development of an integrated personality. Franklin Wolff discusses the
fragility of the physical body for containing the current which has both tonifying and
36
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1970). Introceptualism: The philosophy of consciousness without an object:
Volume II. Phoenix: Phoenix Philosophical Press. p. 148
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stress-inducing effects. And he discusses the importance of maintaining a mental orientation rather
than defaulting to an emotional one in the face of anomalous phenomena that we do not
understand. But beyond the acknowledgement of such constraints, the need for psychological
balance is paramount. I have seen a number of people crash who have not been adequately
prepared for the inner realities that they managed to release.
Psychological balance involves an integration of the various facets of our personality. It includes
the ability to subdue our emotions so that we are able to make decisions on the basis of reason
rather than being driven by desire or fear. It includes moral integrity. It includes the development
of a healthy will that can be used for directing our lives. It includes the ability to integrate
intuitions into our understanding so as to inform rather than mislead. And so on. For those who are
not sure what personality integration involves, I would recommend chapters two and six of my
book Authentic Knowing37 as well as Piero Ferrucci’s book What We May Be38 which contains
exercises that can be used for self-development.
So if nothing seems to be happening, that is ok. Keep working on yourself. And relinquish your
conditioning along the lines that we have discussed. And then, perhaps “when your dependence for
security is upon the Presence alone, beyond your own normal capacities to meet situations, that
Presence comes near.”39 And “When it does happen, . . . [t]he consciousness beyond the . . . veil .
. . may be sensed as a something like a deepening, as a palpable silence filled with unformed
meaning. . . . It can evoke in those in the vicinity states of a mystic sort—ecstatic states of
consciousness, states of delight. . . . The states can be very deep, even as deep as waking Samadhi.
. . . This is a little glimpse of something of the Beyond. . . . Actually, it is here now. . . .”40
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Doroethy Leonard and Ron Leonard for inviting me to give the keynote talk at the
2013 Franklin Merrell-Wolff Conference at the Great Space Center, and to Huping Hu for
publishing the paper. I also thank Shannon Foskett for feedback and proofreading the manuscript.
And I thank King’s University College at the University of Western Ontario for research money
and travel funds that made giving this paper possible.
Barušs, I. (1996). Authentic knowing: The convergence of science and spiritual aspiration. West
Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press.
37
38
Ferrucci, P. (1982). What we may be: Techniques for psychological and spiritual growth through
psychosynthesis. Los Angeles, CA: Jeremy P. Tarcher.
39
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1995). Mathematics, philosophy & yoga: A lecture series presented at the Los
Olivos Conference Room in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1966. Phoenix, AZ: Phoenix Philosophical Press. p. 59
40
Merrell-Wolff, F. (1995). Mathematics, philosophy & yoga: A lecture series presented at the Los
Olivos Conference Room in Phoenix, Arizona, in 1966. Phoenix, AZ: Phoenix Philosophical Press. p. 16
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Zizz, P. & Pregnolato, M., Mind, Logic and Mental Diseases
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Article
Mind, Logic and Mental Diseases
Paola Zizzi1 & Massimo Pregnolato*2
1
2
Dept. of Brain and Behavioral Sciences, University of Pavia, Piazza Botta, 11, 27100 Pavia, Italy
Department of Drug Sciences, University of Pavia, Viale Taramelli, 12, 27100 Pavia, Italy
Abstract
We give a short review of the most recent work done on the logical structure of the mind and on the
peculiar logical aspects of some mental diseases like schizophrenia and major depression. Then, we
illustrate the computational aspects and the physical interpretation of such logical structures. In this
context, we also consider a quite important feature of the mind, namely its non-Turing-computable
side. The latter is responsible for the fundamental difference between a human mind and a computer,
classical or quantum whatsoever.
Keywords: mind, quantum mind, quantum field theory, quantum metalanguage, quantum object
language, non-algorithmic mind, schizophrenia, major depression.
Introduction
What is a Mind? What makes the difference between a healthy mind and a pathological one? What is
the peculiar feature which allows one to distinguish a mind from a computer? Is the Mind the same as
the brain?
All of us can answer what a brain is, but what is a mind is a more difficult question not only for the
mind-body debate but also as a personal quest. We think that everyone should define his own personal
philosophical approach before talking about the Mind. Our approach (Zizzi, 2012a) is very simple: the
Mind is to us, the logic used by the brain.
A quantum mind is then the quantum logic of the brain, when quantum effects become relevant in some
particular physical processes occurring in the brain.
Logic is a formal language, and then the mind is the formal language of the brain. The mind (either
classical or quantum) can be compared to a computer (classical or quantum respectively). The classical
computer is the conscious mind, while the quantum computer, much faster than its classical
counterpart, is the unconscious mind, which “prepares” the job for the conscious mind (Zizzi, 2012b).
However, there are some aspects of the human thought, which are not Turing-computable (Zizzi,
2012c). The existence of a non-algorithmic side of the mind was conjectured by Penrose (1989) on the
basis of Godel’s first incompleteness theorem. Then in this case, the concept of the mind as a logic
fails. In fact, the non-algorithmic “mind” is a metalanguage. The physical interpretation of the quantum
“meta-mind” (the quantum metalanguage of the brain) is Quantum Field Theory (QFT), dealing with
*
Correspondence: Prof. Massimo Pregnolato, Department of Drug Sciences, University of Pavia, Viale Taramelli, 12, 27100 Pavia, Italy.
Email: massimo.pregnolato@unipv.it
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Zizz, P. & Pregnolato, M., Mind, Logic and Mental Diseases
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systems (the fields) characterized by an infinite number of degrees of freedom and allowing creation
and annihilation of particles.
In other words, the non-computable mind is the language of the brain when the physical processes
occurring in it are described by a Quantum Field Theory. In this regard we quote the introduction of a
generalization of QFT, named “Dissipative QFT” (DQFT) (Vitiello, 2001). It appears as the most
convenient tool, so far introduced, for dealing with quantum effects in biological matter.
On the other side, the quantum computable mind, or the quantum logic of the brain (or simply, the
quantum mind) is the language of the brain when the physical processes occurring in the brain can be
described by Quantum Mechanics (QM), which deals with systems made by a finite and fixed number
of particles.
It is to be supposed that the interaction with the environment can induce decoherence processes, so that
we can predict the occurrence of a new logical level, described by Classical Logic and responsible for
the physical outcomes of mental processes.
DQFT thus allows one to relate the processes occurring within the brain, at the different levels, with a
very interesting logical scheme of the whole mental activities. Such a scheme, already proposed by
Zizzi (2010) is based on three different levels: the first of (quantum) metalanguage (QML) the second of
(quantum) object language (QOL) and the third of classical language.
The quantum metalanguage represents the non-computational aspects of mind and is related to DQFT
underlying the brain processes. It reduces to quantum object language and the process underlying this
reduction parallels the one which allows one to reduce QFT to QM. The level of QOL is the logical
level of (Quantum) computational Mind. Finally the level of classical logic, produced by decoherence
process, is the one of (classical) computational Mind, like the one taken in consideration by traditional
Psychology and standard Artificial Intelligence. The latter is the seat of consciousness, while the
Quantum Mind coincides with the unconscious. This description has been possible owing to the
introduction of a new form of Quantum Logic (Zizzi, 2010) in which QML atomic assertions carry
assertion degrees which are complex numbers, interpreted as probability amplitudes.
It is to be noticed that a quantum computer (QC) has a QOL, whose physical counterpart is QM.
Therefore a QC will never be able to have a QML because it is impossible to go from a theory with a
finite number of degrees of freedom, like QM, to one with infinite number of freedom, like QFT (while
the reverse is possible). Also, we wonder about the difference between the healthy and the
schizophrenic mind. We argue that the difference stands in the fact that while the healthy mind fast
oscillates between the classical and the quantum computational modes, the schizophrenic mind uses
only the quantum mode (Zizzi, 2012d). Finally, we suggest that the quantum metalanguage of major
depression (Cocchi, 2012) is given in terms of the negated assertions of the quantum metalanguage of
schizophrenia.
The Logical Structure of the Mind
In a previous paper (Zizzi, 2012a) we discussed about the modalities by which humans should (and in
fact, do) compute. That is, we investigated about the logical languages and the computational modes of
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human reasoning and the corresponding physical interpretation. In this context, however, the classical
world (physical, logical, and computational) does not seem sufficient to provide a complete description
of the Mind. In fact, the Mind accomplishes different tasks, where it exhibits, alternatively, both
classical and quantum features. There are some novelties in two important issues: the long-standing
debate on the mind-body relationship and Turing’s question about a possible identification of the Mind
with a computer.
We humans do invent the logics, make the computer programs and formulate physical theories. All that
originates from our minds and then we wonder what the logical, physical and computational aspects of
the Mind itself are. The Mind should not be confused with a mere by-product of the chemical and
physical processes occurring in the brain, although its material roots are in there. There is much more
involved. When we talk of the Mind, we should consider the fact that the latter is a logical language,
which can be interpreted, like any logic endowed with a model. This means that we are faced with the
semantics, not only with the syntax, and then we have to consider a metalanguage controlling the logic
of the Mind.
Thus, the Mind can be a program too, like any logic plus a control. But a metalanguage is, on its own,
non-algorithmic (non-Turing-computable) because it is only part of the program. This means that there
is a side of the Mind which is non-algorithmic. Also, if we give a physical interpretation to the logic of
the Mind, then the physics should be that of the material support, the brain. From the above
considerations it follows then that the physical theory of the brain, corresponding to the metalanguage,
should be as well non-Turing-computable.
We asked ourselves where the physical world meets the mathematical one in the Mind and how
computation is involved in all of that. We suggested then that the Mind has three different operational
modes (Zizzi, 2012b):
1- the quantum computational mode
2- the classical computational mode
3- the non-algorithmic mode.
The quantum and classical computational modes pertain to ordinary thought processes, while the nonalgorithmic mode (Zizzi, 2012c) pertains to metathought, which is the peculiar process of thinking
about our own ordinary thought.
The logical descriptions of the above modes are the following: for the quantum computational mode,
the logic is the quantum computational logic Lq, described in Zizzi’s PhD thesis (2010), which is a
special quantum version of Basic Logic (BL) (Sambin, 2000); for the classical computational mode the
logic is BL; for the non-algorithmic mode there is no logic, but a quantum metalanguage (QML) (Zizzi,
2010).
A QML differs from a classical one by the fact that the quantum assertions, which are expressed with
partial certitude, have a degree of assertion, which is a complex number, while classical assertions have
assertion degree equal to one. Consequently, the propositions of the quantum object-language (QOL),
Lq, are probabilistic, and fuzzy at the same time, and satisfy a logical uncertainty principle (Zizzi,
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Zizz, P. & Pregnolato, M., Mind, Logic and Mental Diseases
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2013). Moreover, there are some particular quantum propositions, which minimize the logical
uncertainty relation, called quantum-coherent propositions.
The physical interpretations of the logical structures of the three computational modes of the Mind are
the following: the non-algorithmic mode is physically described by a Dissipative Quantum Field
Theory (DQFT) of the brain (Vitiello, 2001); the quantum coherent assertions of the quantum
metalanguage are interpreted as Glauber coherent states (Glauber, 1963), which are very robust against
decoherence. We find that “cat state” like assertions are the only compound assertions which are
quantum-coherent. However, in the corresponding physical theory, the “cat” coherent states (Haroche,
2006) are very fragile with respect to decoherence, and then we argue that this applies also to the
quantum metalanguage.
Incoherent quantum assertions correspond to propositions of Lq, the qubit-like ones, which logically
“decohere” to classical propositions of BL. In this sense, the classical mode can be obtained by
decoherence of the logical qubits.
The quantum mode, which is quantum computation, is physically described by Quantum Mechanics
(QM). The classical mode, which is classical computation, is physically described by Classical Physics.
The Non-Algorithmic Mind
In the paper “The non-algorithmic side of the mind” (Zizzi, 2012c), we developed a meta-language for
the non-algorithmic mode involving a fuzzy modality "Probably".
More precisely, our philosophical point of view was the following. There are three different ways by
which fundamental high-level mental activities manifest themselves (Zizzi, 2012b). Two are
algorithmic (Turing-computable): the classical computational mode, and the quantum computational
mode. The third is non-computable.
Each of the three modes of the mind can be formalized in a mathematical way (the first two by a logic,
the third by a metalanguage) and also acquires a physical interpretation, and a psychological status.
The quantum mode concerns extremely fast mental processes of which humans are mostly unaware of,
and is logically described by the logic Lq (Zizzi, 2010) of quantum information and quantum
computation. The atomic propositions of Lq are interpreted as the basis states of a complex Hilbert
space, while the compound propositions are interpreted as qubit states. Therefore, the physical model
of the quantum mode of the mind is Quantum Information. The classical mode concerns those mental
processes, which humans are aware of. It arises from the decoherence of the quantum computational
state, and is logically described by Basic Logic (BL) (Sambin, 2000) which is a sub-structural, nonclassical logic. In a sense, the quantum mode “prepares” the classical mode, which otherwise would
take very long to perform.
The atomic propositions of the quantum object-language (QOL) (Zizzi, 2010) are asserted, in the
quantum metalanguage (QML) with an assertion degree, which is a complex number. We showed that
this fact requires that the atomic propositions in the QOL are endowed with a fuzzy modality
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“Probably” (Hajek, 1998) and have fuzzy (partial) truth-values (Zadeh, 1996) which sum up to one. In
this context, we tried to clarify Penrose’s conjecture (1989) on the non-computational aspects of the
mind in relation with Gödel’s First Incompleteness Theorem (1931). Penrose claims that a
mathematician can assert the truth of a Gödel sentence G, although the latter cannot be demonstrated
within the axiomatic system, because he is capable of recognizing an indemonstrable truth due to the
non-algorithmic aspect of the mind.
In our opinion, the fact that the mathematician can assert the truth of G, is that he is using the noncomputable mode of metathought described by the metalanguage, where assertions stand, and where
Tarski introduced the truth predicate (Tarski, 1944).
Furthermore, the fuzzy-probabilistic features of QML induce to modify Tarski Convention T(true) as
Convention PT (where P stands for “Probably”), that is, “probably true”.
The Logic of Schizophrenia
In the paper "Quantum logic of the unconscious and schizophrenia" (Zizzi, 2012d) we suggested that
the logic of the normal unconscious may be coextensive with the logic of schizophrenia. One might
very plausibly argue that, while healthy minds employ both the classical logic of consciousness and the
quantum primary process logic of the unconscious, schizophrenic minds use primary process thinking
not only in their unconscious psychodynamics but also as their dominant conscious operating mode.
We formalized the logics of both the unconscious and schizophrenic thinking in order to make the case
that they are the same. We did start by recognizing that sudden flashes of creative insight and other
intuitive “leaps” arise from states of mind through intermediate steps that commonly remain hidden
beneath consciousness. Such ultra-fast processing entailing hidden intermediate step is consistent with
quantum computation.
The logic of the normal unconscious mind and of schizophrenic consciousness may then be Lq, the
logic of quantum information (Zizzi, 2010). For a healthy mind the passage from the unconscious state
to the conscious state is marked, according to the Orch-Or model of Penrose and Hameroff (1996) by a
decoherence of tubulin qubits. This may be understood in terms of very fast switches from the quantum
logic of the unconscious to the classical logic of consciousness. We argued that in schizophrenia these
switches are not fast enough, and therefore the schizophrenic mind remains trapped in the unconscious
logical mode too long.
In Lq, propositions are configured in qubits, quantum information units, which are linear superpositions
of classical bits. It is in this sense that the formal interpretation of the unconscious mind may be
potentially understood as quantum-informational. The quantum concept of truth within Lq is different
from that of classical truth, insofar as classical truth is single-valued and deterministic while in contrast
quantum truth manifests itself as many-valued (fuzzy) and probabilistic (Zizzi, 2013).
The metalinguistics of primary process thinking and related psychopathological phenomena should be
well modelled by QML with particularly apt application to schizophrenia, in which a surplus of
quantum propositions dominates the classically logical discourse (Zizzi, 2012). In such a framework it
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was possible to introduce the theoretical notion of an Internal Observer (IO) (Zizzi, 2005) which
seemed to be a useful tool in developing a new kind of therapy for schizophrenia.
The Logic of Major Depression
In a recent paper Cocchi et al (2012) considered the results obtained by biochemical experimental data
on platelet membrane fatty acids processed by a Self-Organizing Map (SOM) (Cocchi, 2008) from
apparently healthy, bi‐polar (BD) and major depressive subjects (MD). The SOM showed that MD
subjects belong to an area which is completely disconnected from that of healthy and bi‐polar. Looking
at the location of the data over the SOM, we found also a region which we attributed to psychotic
subjects according to the clinical diagnosis.
The SOM highlighted the peculiar characteristic of the fatty acids triplets for each group of subjects
considered. Each subject had a specific degree of viscosity of the membrane, which was expressed by
means of a specific index, called the B2 index, based on the sum of the percentages of Arachidonic
Acid, Linoleic Acid and Palmitic Acid, which represent the majority of the total platelet fatty acids in
relation to their molecular weights and melting points. The distribution of the B2 index in the onedimensional map showed negative and positive indexes belonging, the first to the major depressive
subjects, the second to the bi-polar subjects.
Then, in the light of the experimental data, humans can have either positive or negative values of the B2
index. Those humans having positive values of B2 are normal (N), bipolar (B) and psychotic (P) people.
On the contrary, major depressed people (MD) have negative B2 values.
In order to build a theory describing such a circumstance we started from the language of set theory. In
this framework, we considered the Set “Humankind” as the Universal set, U. Then, we made a
bipartition of U. In the cell A, there are all the elements characterized by a positive value of B2. In the
cell AC, which is the complement of A in U, there are all the elements characterized by a negative value
of B2.
We suggested a possible theoretical explanation of the reason why MD people, who have a negative
value of the B2 index, fall in a completely separate category from the rest of humankind, having instead
a positive value of B2. By introducing a metaphor based on Quantum Field Theory, we viewed the
splitting of positive and negative values of the B2 index averages as due to a kind of spontaneous
symmetry breaking. The initial B2 expected value (e.v.) can be interpreted as the e.v. before symmetry
breaking, while the final B2 e.vs. can be read as the two e.vs after the symmetry breaking. We found a
similarity with the situation occurring in a well-known model used in the Quantum Field Theory λφ4
(Itzykson, 1986).
The partition of the Universal set concerns set theory and equivalence relations on sets. The Symmetry
breaking, instead, concerns classical and quantum field theories. These two apparently disconnected
issues are unified by logic when the partition is a bipartition and the original symmetry is the discrete
Z2 symmetry. The latter is equivalent to the logic gate “XOR”, which is the logical conjunction of the
two logic gates “NAND” and “OR”. A bipartition is equivalent to the pair of the two logic gates
“NAND”, “OR” into which the “XOR” can be split. The logical connective “OR” plays a relevant role
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in the logic of human thinking, together with its dual, the “AND”. Instead the “XOR” (the aut-aut)
seems to be better suited for artificial intelligence (AI). In fact, the “XOR” is active only before the
symmetry breaking.
After the symmetry breaking, we have the “OR”, which is common in reasoning performed in our
everyday life, if we are supposed to belong to the equivalence class with a positive value of B2, and the
“NAND”, which instead we do not use. The “NAND” then must pertain then to the logic of people in
the other equivalence class with a negative value of B2. Such an argument is supported by a number of
experimental findings about the reasoning abilities of human subjects. In fact, the “NAND” (the
negation of the conjunction of two propositions) can be rewritten as the disjunction of two negated
propositions. Then, MD subjects have a different logic from the one of normal, bipolar and psychotic
subjects. This also means that the MD metalanguage is different as it consists of negative assertions,
which are the symptoms of pessimism and negative mood.
When the negative assertions are the only possibility, that is, when they cannot alternate with positive
assertions (because only the connective “NAND” is available) MD takes place. Also, we found that
MD subjects use permanently a quantum metalanguage (Zizzi, 2010) which is the negation of the
quantum metalanguage used permanently by schizophrenic subjects.
Then, we suggested the use of a (negative) quantum metalanguage for the psychotherapy of MD
subjects, as we did for the use of a (positive) quantum metalanguage for the psychotherapy of
schizophrenic people (Zizzi, 2012d).
Conclusions
The mysterious aura surrounding the concept of Mind has no more reason to exist in our modern times.
The cure is given by logic (and metalogic) whose model is the physics of the brain. There is logic for
the conscious thought, logic for the unconscious thought and schizophrenia, and logic for major
depression (MD). The real problem is to prepare a new generation of psychotherapists who can use the
adequate metalanguages to communicate with psychotic and MD people. We believe that our logical
approach might be applied also to the case of autism (work in progress).
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Raoul Nakhmanson2
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829)
Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882)
Quantum mechanics
as a
sociology of matter1
Analogies between quantum mechanics and sociology lead to the
hypothesis that quantum objects are complex products of evolution. Like
biological objects they are able to receive, to work on, and to spread
semantic information. In general meaning we can name it “Consciousness”.
The important ability of consciousness is ability to predict future.
Key words: Evolution, consciousness, information, quantum mechanics, EPR,
decoherence.
The term ”sociology” appears first in the middle of the 19th century. Dictionaries and
encyclopedias define sociology as a science for society and self-contained social
institutions. At the beginning it was related to humans only, but in the 20th century
sociologic researches were made with animals and insects too.
Between quantum mechanics and sociology there are analogies:
1) Like sociology, quantum mechanics describes societies ("ensembles") as a whole;
2) In respect to individuals (people or particles) there are only probabilities;
3) Members belonging to some society or quantum ensemble being under investigation
are similar to each other but can be very different from members of other societies or
ensembles (species in biology as well as in "zoology" of particles);
4) Members belonging to some society or ensemble are regarded not only as similar but
as identical in the sense that exchange of any two members does not alter the
ensemble. In quantum mechanics it guided to symmetrical and antisymmetrical
wave functions belonging to bosons and fermions having collective and anticollective behavior, respectively. In sociology one also find such two type of
behavior.
5) The evolution of societies is subjected to some intention. In quantum mechanics it
is seen in the least action principle;
6) Members of societies are "atoms" and "individuals" literally, that is, from one
person or one electron it is impossible to make two smaller persons or two smaller
electrons.
1
2
Theses for IC QT RF 2, Växiö 2003.
E-mail: nakhmanson@t-online.de
1/2
The last item prompts us that the members of biological and quantum societies are
complex constructions penetrated with inside connections. Their decomposition destroys
their functioning.
Complex biological objects develop themselves during evolution. To begin the
analogous evolution process with matter some ”dark” matter in non-equilibrium state is
needed. Such a state can be the result of a fluctuation. Modern physics operates with sizes
up to 10-35 meter (Planck length). If evolution of matter began 14 billions years ago, the
elementary particles having sizes 10-15 – 10-20 m have a long evolution time behind and
perhaps do not yield up to biological objects in complexity and functioning.
From the example of biological objects we know that the essence of life is information.
The ability to receive, to work on, and to spread information is important for individuals
and societies, and is selected by evolution. We speak about individual and social
consciousness developing in parallel with material structures.
Evolution theory and analogy between quantum mechanics and sociology lead to the
idea that material objects of quantum mechanics have an individual and a social
consciousness too. Such a hypotheses explains the essence of wave function and its
collapse as well as ”mysterious” experiments known as ”two-slits”, ”delayed-choice”,
”EPR”, ”Aharonov-Bohm”, and ”interaction-free measurement”. The important ability of
consciousness is ability to predict future. Here also are roots of entanglement of parted
particles. The depth of prediction is limited by interaction with environment, thereafter
comes decoherence.
Transition from quantum to classical physics is thought as a transition from individuals
to crowds. Crowds are ”dividual”: One crowd can be split in two smaller crowds. Crowds'
behavior is more deterministic than the behavior of individuals.
In such a context the wave function is a purely mental construction in an abstract
configuration space which, in its turn, is in a consciousness of microparticle. If you allow
me a pun, the so-called "waves of matter" are non-material. Einstein justly called them
"Gespensterfelder". Nevertheless they control the behavior of material objects. Of course
physicists can have in their mind not only their own wave function (it is strategy of their
behavior) but also some idea, correct or not, about wave function of the particle.
The wave-particle duality is a mind-body one. In the real 3D-space there exists only the
particle, the wave exists in its consciousness. If there are many particles, their distribution
in accordance with the wave function represents a real wave in real space. Many worlds,
Schrödinger cat, Great Smoky Dragon, etc. exist only as virtual mental constructions.
Sociology and psychology interview persons being under investigation. The hypotheses
of evoluting matter allows us to do it with quantum objects too. The consequent
experiments include action on particles and atoms with semantic information.
Some details can be found in:
1. http://arXiv.org/pdf/physics/0004047
2. http://arXiv.org/pdf/physics/0111109
3. http://www.agharta.net/Superstrings.html (in Russian)
2/2 |
Intelligence as a Measure of Consciousness
Igor Ševo
Abstract
Evaluating artificial systems for signs of consciousness is
increasingly becoming a pressing concern, and a rigorous
psychometric measurement framework may be of crucial
importance in evaluating large language models in this regard. Most
prominent theories of consciousness, both scientific and
metaphysical, argue for different kinds of information coupling as a
necessary component of human-like consciousness. By comparing
information coupling in human and animal brains, human cognitive
development, emergent abilities, and mental representation
development to analogous phenomena in large language models, I
argue that psychometric measures of intelligence, such as the gfactor or IQ, indirectly approximate the extent of conscious
experience.
Based on a broader source of both scientific and metaphysical
theories of consciousness, I argue that all systems possess a degree
of consciousness ascertainable psychometrically and that
psychometric measures of intelligence may be used to gauge
relative similarities of conscious experiences across disparate
systems, be they artificial or human.
1
Introduction
Misunderstanding the nature of consciousness in artificial systems bears significant social and
ethical consequences that, among others, may manifest in two ways: attributing consciousness to
systems that do not qualify for such analysis and thereby wasting precious resources on their
fictional well-being, or failing to attribute it where applicable and, in doing so, committing what
might be considered an act of harm against another living being. As recent research demonstrates,
it may be relatively simple to construct conscious systems with the presently available technology
(Butlin, et al., 2023) and accidentally constructing such systems may be plausible, without being
aware of this occurrence until well past the point of inception.
In their report, (Butlin, et al., 2023) distinguish metaphysical and scientific theories of
consciousness and attempt, through analogy and allegoric comparison, to evaluate existing large
language model architectures in concordance with the parameters of a selection of scientific
theories of consciousness to conclude that the existing large language models are likely not
conscious. However, the evaluated theories only include major materialist approaches, evaluated
metaphorically, omitting non-materialist theories, such as integrated information theory (Tononi
& Edelman, 1998) (Tononi, 2004) (Koch, 2012), conscious realism (Hoffman, 2008) (Hoffman,
Singh, & Prakash, 2015), or other unified approaches (Ševo, 2023).
Broadly speaking, consciousness literature distinguishes two terms for consciousness: the kind of
which implies a form of self-awareness, identity, or cognitive processing, and sentience which
(Block, 1995) defines as “phenomenal consciousness”, which captures the “what it is like” nature
of experience (Nagel, 1974), rather than identity or self-recognition. This paper, similarly to
(Butlin, et al., 2023), is addressing the problem of whether artificial intelligence systems could be
or are phenomenally conscious, leaving human-like aspects of consciousness out of scope.
Recently, many approaches that argue for consciousness as a fundamental substrate have come
to prominence, including integrated information theory and conscious realism. In fact, Chalmers
(Chalmers, 1996) makes a panpsychist case that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of reality,
aligning with the argument that all forms of physicalism (Kim, 2005) entail a form of panpsychism
(Strawson, 2006) by which everything that exists must be phenomenal. Other forms of idealism
have been emerging, including quantum idealism (Stapp, 1993) (Stapp, 2009), which posits a
quantum mechanical basis for the first-person perspective, conscious realism, objective idealism
(Goff, 2019), postulating that the universe possesses consciousness, and that an instance of
individual consciousness is a subset of that universal field of consciousness. Additionally, based
on a broad overview of existing consciousness literature, it is possible to make an argument that
a complex interplay of language vagueness and epistemic uncertainty precludes the imminent
panpsychist conclusion by which the fundamental building blocks of the universe—the coupled
information which comprises it, be they represented as particles, waves or states—are quanta of
consciousness (Ševo, 2023).
The analysis presented here is based on the phenomenological analytic approach proposed
previously (Ševo, 2023) (Ševo, 2021), which argues for an identity between materialistic and
phenomenological interpretations of the fundamental substrate, by which the nature of
information itself is phenomenal. Within this framework, all systems can be evaluated according
to their degree and kind of consciousness, rather than distinguishing between matter which
“possesses” consciousness and matter which does not, which is the conventional view. Building
blocks of matter are, within the proposed unified phenomenology framework, building blocks of
consciousness.
The main drawback to all metaphysical theories is their lack of scientific falsifiability, as the
degree of consciousness of a system may not be directly measurable. Here, I make the case that a
numeric measure of intelligence, such as the psychometric g-factor (Spearman, 1904), measures a
system’s degree of consciousness—the more intelligent the system, the more information it
integrates, the more conscious it is. I make no claims about the phenomenology of such systems
or frameworks for evaluating their flavor and kind of consciousness, but merely of the degree to
which, metaphorically speaking, the resolution, density, or richness of the conscious experience
can be compared to other systems known to be conscious, such as human beings.
2
2
Information Integration, Intelligence and Consciousness
Accepting the viewpoint that intelligence measures the level of consciousness requires a similar
kind of leap as evaluating a large language model with respect to theories of human
consciousness. As a result, the relationship and correlation may only be exemplified until it is
sufficiently convincing to merit the leap, as it is impossible to ever sample the evaluated conscious
experience directly.
Nevertheless, a body of evidence indicates such a relation in humans and other animals. For
example, working memory capacity has been linked with higher intelligence (Engle, Tuholski,
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) and significant development of memory and cognitive ability can be
seen in human development from childhood to adulthood (Gathercole, Pickering, Ambridge, &
Wearing, 2004) (Ghetti & Bunge, 2012). As human representation of the outside world
complexifies during maturation (Piaget, 1954) (Piaget, 1962) (Vigotsky, 1978), our expressed
intelligence and cognitive abilities develop (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). The expansion of the
richness of our conscious experience and understanding of the world parallels our cognitive
development, represented by measurable psychometric variables, such as the individual g-factor
or IQ (Binet & Simon, 1905) (Jensen, 1998).
Almost all prominent theories of consciousness, both scientific and metaphysical, implicitly assert
that consciousness, as seen in humans, must be an effect of some form of information integration
or coupling (Tononi, 2004), be it through a global workspace (Baars, 1993), recurrent processing
or meta-representation (Lamme, 2006), or another form of combination, in the abstract sense
(Butlin, et al., 2023). Though we cannot directly evaluate the level of conscious experience a
human might have, a substantial body of evidence indicates that greater brain size and
connectivity is associated with higher intelligence scores (McDaniel, 2005) (van den Heuvel, Stam,
Kahn, & Hulshoff Pol, 2009) (Gray, Chabris, & Braver, 2003) (Langer, 2013)—directly analogous
to size and connectivity scaling that parallels intelligence development in large language models
(Wei, et al., 2022) (Bubeck, et al., 2023).
We see sparks of general intelligence in animals that are known to experience a kind of
consciousness (Griffin & Speck, 2004) (Gallup, 1970) (Mather & Carere, Cephalopods are best
candidates for invertebrate consciousness, 2016), who can outperform humans in specialized
cognitive tasks (Inoue & Matsuzawa, 2007) or express similar cognitive abilities, such as spatial
reasoning (Byrne, Bates, & Moss, 2009), tool use (Mather, 2008) (Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik,
2002), or complex learning (Young, Wasserman, & Garner, 1997) (Avarguès-Weber & Giurfa,
2013). In fact, a preponderance of examples shows evidence of human emergent abilities that
either arise as intelligence scales or correlate with higher measures of intelligence (Winner, 2000),
including linguistic ability (Bialystok, 2001), metacognition (Flavell, 1979), mathematical skills
(Lubinski & Benbow, 2006), pattern recognition (Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond, Glover, &
Gabrieli, 1997), musical ability (Schellenberg, 2006) (Baharloo, Johnston, Service, Gitschier, &
Freimer, 1998), and spatial ability (Wai, Lubinski, & Benbow, 2009), analogous to those
demonstrated as emergent in large language models as the model size scales (Wei, et al., 2022)
3
(OpenAI, 2023). These emergent abilities are present in highly intelligent individuals more so
than others, and developmental psychology observes specific abilities emerge as an individual
develops from childhood (Piaget, 1954) (Best, Miller, & Jones, 2009), through adolescence
(Schneider, 2008) (Geary, Hoard, Nugent, & Bailey, 2013), into adulthood, alluding to the
possibility that the ability of their brains to integrate more complex concepts allows for a higher
cognitive function and richer conscious experience. In other words, consciousness development
(Blakemore, 2012) (Wilber, 2000), including the development of self-awareness (Rochat, 2003) and
ego (Loevinger & Blasi, 1976), parallels intellectual development. In fact, certain abilities such as
theory of mind, seem to emerge both in humans (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001) and in large
language models (Bubeck, et al., 2023), as they are trained, or as they develop and mature.
Notably, psychological literature often conflates consciousness and intelligence, as the terms
themselves are frequently used with vague definitions (Block, 1995) (Williamson, 1994).
Literature is abundant in approaches that demonstrate mutual correlations between cognitive
complexity and entropy (Gauvrit, Zenil, Soler-Toscano, Delahaye, & Brugger, 2017), intelligence
and entropy (Still, Sivak, Bell, & Crooks, 2012) (Schmidhuber, 2010), information coupling and
intelligence (Friston, 2010), quantum entanglement and consciousness (Hameroff & Penrose,
1996) (Hameroff & Penrose, Consciousness in the universe: a review of the 'Orch OR' theory,
2014), all of which can be broadly encompassed under the term information integration, for which
(Tononi, 2004) and (Oizumi, Albantakis, & Tononi, 2014) propose a numeric measure represented
as Φ, which, in practice, may simply amount to something akin to IQ. The term information
integration is taken here to loosely mean coupling between pieces of information so that their
mutual context and relationship are available or evident immediately. Given that correlations
between intelligence and information integration and correlations between consciousness and
information integration, in the broad sense, are so prevalent across the publications in the field,
it reasonable to posit that any measure of intelligence must be, to some degree, a measure of
information integration, and, consequently, the depth, or detail, of the conscious experience. In
that sense, psychometric measurements of the variable g are either direct or indirect
measurements of Φ. In other words, g and Φ may be highly or even perfectly correlated,
depending on the exact definitions used for each. As argued previously (Ševo, 2023), currently
existing scientific frameworks, such as psychometric evaluation, may be better equipped to
measure phenomenological properties, like the depth or richness of conscious experience,
without the need for inventing untestable theoretical variables that unparsimoniously complexify
our understanding of reality.
On the other hand, the statement of this paper may stand as obviously true, yet itself
fundamentally unfalsifiable, as is the case with any claims about consciousness. Nonetheless, as
argued in (Wei, et al., 2022), consciousness may only be ascertained through allegory and loose
comparison, and never directly. As observers of our own consciousness, we can witness the
changes to the richness of our subjective experience as we develop into adulthood and our
representations of the world expand and integrate. Knowing that our expressed cognitive
ability—our capacity to solve problems that require more general intelligence—develops as our
conscious experience expands, we can introspectively conclude that the psychometric measures
4
of intelligence, must, to some degree, measure the depth of that conscious experience. More
loosely said, the conscious experience itself has a significant g-load.
Thus, a system which demonstrates an ability to perform well across a range of tests with high gloads would indicate comparable level of conscious experience to the stratum of human test
takers obtaining a similar score.
Phenomenologically, strong informational coupling within a system, such as, for example, in a
global workspace, would allow the corresponding consciousness to encapsulate at once the
information it is processing, conceivably experiencing it less in part and more as a whole. If we
accept that the individual quanta, in a looser sense of the word, of such coupled information are
themselves elementary phenomenal experiences (Ševo, 2023), then their stronger coupling would
necessarily produce a more lucid experience, as evidenced by observations outlined above. A
consciousness that is said to be more intelligent can understand, grasp, and encapsulate more
complex and expansive problems, as it is able to integrate them within itself more fully.
It is worth noting that the fact that a large multimodal model might reach human-level general
intelligence does not imply an identical phenomenology on the model’s side. We may only draw
speculative or allegorical parallels to what such an experience might feel like (Ševo, 2023), but the
measure of its intelligence only indicates the level of informational integration its consciousness
was capable of at the moment of measurement—it provides no information about its contents. A
superintelligent large language model may only experience consciousness during the brief
instance of token inference initiated for the purposes of the test, and, as (Butlin, et al., 2023) note,
may experience intermittent discrete bursts of consciousness, rather than a sense of continuity.
However, contrary to the conclusion made in (Butlin, et al., 2023), if metaphysical theories of
consciousness are taken into consideration, current large language models are likely to be
phenomenally conscious with their degree of consciousness measurable by a variant of existing
cognitive tests.
3
Conclusion
Any certain conclusion about an external system’s consciousness seems scientifically untenable
and always fundamentally based on a leap of faith (Chalmers, 1996) (Yablo, 1993), but a more
parsimonious approach whereby the things we are internally representing as material, are, in and
of themselves, phenomenal, dispenses of the leap and provides a more scientifically plausible
framework—it feels like something to be anything (Ševo, 2023). Under such an axiom, the pursuit
of defining consciousness becomes a pursuit of defining human consciousness.
In that regard, we may use different existing measures of intelligence to comparatively evaluate
systems and ascertain how closely they might approximate human consciousness in their depth
and degree. Testing for performance across multiple cognitive abilities would entail indirectly
testing multiple phenomenological aspects, as vastly differing performance across multiple tests
would indicate a different kind of conscious experience. In an abstract sense, an intelligent
5
artificial system matching a reference human in every conceivable test of cognition and character
would be closer in phenomenological experience to that human than a human who performed
differently.
Even without accepting the phenomenological supposition that the universe consists of quanta
of consciousness, and assuming that a threshold exists beyond which information is sufficiently
coupled to “produce” consciousness, the evidence indicating a correlation between intelligence,
information integration and the depth of conscious experience still argues in favor of the
conclusion: intelligence is a measure of consciousness.
If any intelligent system can be considered its own kind of consciousness, then conventionally
inanimate systems, such as the internet, biological ecosystems, corporations, and society itself,
which arguably possess a degree of intelligence, may already be relatedly conscious. In this
regard, the pursuit of defining human mode of consciousness becomes ever more important, as
the line determining the scope of moral analysis might become increasingly blurred.
Even if we elect a threshold of intelligence beyond which we shall uphold the sanctity of
consciousness, we will be compelled not only to include animals and non-human artificial
systems into our moral analysis, but to undertake a moral obligation towards creating
superintelligence. A clear definition of human value, irrespective of consciousness, may be a
necessary solution to prevent us from moral nihilism resulting from taking the argument to its
logical conclusion. On the other hand, the threat of compelling a greater consciousness into
denying its existence may be existential should human values prove not to scale with intelligence.
4
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | pp. 422-427
Gillespie, G., Window to the Past: The Role of Quantum Entanglement in Memory
Research Essay
Window to the Past: The Role of
Quantum Entanglement in Memory
Gary Gillespie*
Northwest University in Kirkland, Washington, USA
Abstract
This paper suggests that the static nature of time-space, a discovery in physics, implies that
quantum communication plays a role in memory. The illusion of the flow of time and the nature
of quantum entanglement are discussed. Arguments are given for a non-reductionist alternative
to the standard model of cognition in which memory is stored in time-space. In this view the
neural machinery of the brain receives and interprets information states embedded in time-space.
Key Words: quantum entanglement, memory, past, experience, cognition.
When we look at images of neural network (clipartbest.com), we are reminded of TV antenna
(tvtechnology.com). The neurons appear more like collection mechanisms for radiating energies
than chambers for storage. Perhaps the similarity between brain structures and antenna is more
than analogous, especially when we consider the discoveries of physics about the nature of time.
Neuroscientist admit that the standard model of memory is incomplete and constantly in revision
(Parry 1). Only recently have the discoveries of quantum mechanics been applied to how the
mind works, introducing the field of quantum cognition (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard). New
understandings of the flow of time may require re-thinking the nature of memory.
What if memories are not stored in the brain exactly? What if neural electro-chemical traces in
synapses are connecting devices for the mind to access non-local states that exist in the past?
Cosmologists tell us that our experience of moving along the arrow of time is an illusion. We
think that we exist in the present and are moving towards a future from the past. The truth is, we
are more like characters in a book who are bound by the sequences of words in the novel's
sentences, even though the book exists as a whole. Characters are free to act in any way that they
choose, but the story from the author's perspective has already been told. The “book” of the
cosmos is a static whole. As theoretical mathematician Roger Penrose says,
The way in which time is treated in modern physics is not essentially different from the
way in which space is treated and the ‘time’ of physical descriptions does not really
‘flow’ at all; we just have a static-looking fixed ‘space-time’ in which the events of our
universe are laid out (574).
Likewise, cosmologist Paul Davies explains that:
*Corresponding author: Gary Gillespie, Associate Professor of Communication, Northwest University in Kirkland, Washington.
http://eagle.northwestu.edu/faculty/gary-gillespie E-mail: gary.gillespie@northwestu.edu
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
423
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | pp. 422-427
Gillespie, G., Window to the Past: The Role of Quantum Entanglement in Memory
Our senses tell us that time flows: namely, that the past is fixed, the future is
undetermined, and reality lives in the present. Yet various physical and philosophical
arguments suggest otherwise. The passage of time is probably an illusion.
Consciousness may involve either thermodynamic or quantum processes that lend the
impression of living moment by moment. From the fixed past to the tangible present to
the undecided future, it feels as though time flows inexorably on. But that is an illusion.
Cornell University physicists recently confirmed that because of our interaction with the strange
quantum principle of entanglement, time is an emergent property of perception. They showed
that from a perspective outside our universe all events would appear as static points. According
to a summary of the Cornell paper, time "exists only for observers inside the universe. Any godlike observer outside sees a static, unchanging universe…" (Moreva).
Einstein confirmed that what we think of time is relative to our speed and position. In other
words, what we experience as “happening now” would not be shared by an observer on a distant
planet whose “now” would differ entirely. At the edges of the universe our present moment
might be 100,000 years. If we could travel at the speed of light our mass would equal the entire
universe and time would freeze into a static singularity like the center of a spinning wheel. Due
to the linguistic basis of thinking, we experience the world as a sequence of events with physical
reality only existing in the present moment as we watch the past fleeting away into nothingness.
Yet, physics would say that we are inseparable from the past. It continues to exist as part of the
static whole. The thoughts we had five minutes ago, or actions we took years ago, remain
embedded in the fabric of time-space.
If time flowing is an illusion and if all of our past experiences are enduring realities, then
memory could be understood as our effort to step out of the current of time to observe the prior
events that remain as fixed features of time-space.
Instead of simply replaying neural-chemical representations in the brain like magnetic tape,
chemically stored information may be acting like a catalyst that permits the mind to access past
entangled states. In other words, entangled photons in a person’s brain grant a sort of window to
the past.
Quantum entanglement is the phenomena proven by experiments that show that two particles can
come to share the same reality even though separated. If an experimenter changes the polarity of
one particle, the other pair will change its polarity even if millions of miles apart. This change
occurs instantaneously -- faster than the speed of light. When two objects come in contact with
each other as part of the same system they are physically entangled forever. Just as stepping into
a pool of water creates ripples, interactions between entangled objects have a lasting impact that
changes both no matter how far they might become separated. The electron spins of both objects
are connected "non-locally". "Non-locally" means that the particles share an existence regardless
of location. All matter that interacts becomes entangled. Biologists are beginning to see quantum
affects in living systems, such as photosynthesis (Lloyd, Saravar).
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Quantum physics is contributing to the understanding of mental processes in the new field of
"quantum neurology." Experiments show that the brain is able to sense quantum states
(NeuroQuantology.com). Likewise, quantum cognition is a field that applies quantum principles
to how the mind functions (Schwartz, Stapp, & Beauregard).
Contributor to the field of quantum cognition; computer scientist Subhash Kak, studied the role
of quantum physics in human memory and concluded that “memories should be viewed as
assemblages of quantum particles” (Kak).
Physicists are providing more evidence for the pervasiveness of entanglement in our universe, as
this article explains:
Quantum entanglement is a strange and non-intuitive aspect of the quantum theory of
matter, which has puzzled and intrigued physicists since the earliest days of the
quantum theory," said [physicist] Leon Balents, senior author of a recent paper on this
topic published in the journal Nature Physics…. Quantum entanglement represents the
extent to which measurement of one part of a system affects the state of another; for
example, measurement of one electron influences the state of another that may be far
away, explained Balents. In recent years, scientists have realized that entanglement of
electrons is present in varying degrees in solid materials. Taking this notion to the
extreme is the "quantum spin liquid," a state of matter in which every electron spin is
entangled with another (Balents).
Just as entangled protons are shown to interact when separated by vast distances in space, I
wonder if a kind of temporal entanglement exists in which the mind is able to interact with
events separated by vast periods of time. Since to an observer outside the universe entangled
connections between objects would appear as static points, we know that entanglement
transcends the flow of time as well as space. Or put otherwise, entangled objects are connected
non-temporally as well as non-locally. Moreover, since what is happening "now" is an illusion, it
would follow that past information states in the brain continue to exist as enduring realities in the
universe. Everything that you have ever done still exists as a physical reality. It is considered
"past" only because of our illusory perspective (Mohan, Ishizaki, Fleming & Whaley).
To clarify, since the atoms in my brain today are connected with who I was five minutes ago,
yesterday or even last year we would expect to find that there is some kind of quantum
communication in addition to classical neural communication. Therefor we should take seriously
the possibility that memory involves accessing entangled states that remain non-local realities in
time and space.
An analogy between the brain and radio reception could be useful. Instead of “replaying of a
tape”, as the standard cognitive model would imply, perhaps the brain is receiving a quantum
energy signal from the past. Rather than viewing memory as the accessing of information stored
in neural-chemical traces, the quantum mind uses the technology of the brain to direct us to
information patterns stored in entangled electrons produced by past interactions. Neural
pathways could be thought of as literal pathways that point us to past information states that
remain enduring realities in time-space.
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The plasticity of memory is an argument against the "tape recorder" perspective of memory. If
memory is a "chemical recording" then we should be surprised to see such a rate of errors. How
often do our music recordings change each time they are played? The memory process is more
like poor cell phone reception or a small ham radio receiver scanning the atmosphere trying to
pick up fleeting signals. In such technological cases we expect to find flaws in reception -exactly as we do whenever we discover that biological memory fails us. If the information is in
the brain, why can't we immediately "replay" it?
Like most analogies the radio signal comparison isn't perfect since quantum entanglement lacks
the characteristics of electromagnetic radiation. It can't be blocked by matter or loses strength at
a distance. The connection between entangled particles gives each one a shared existence nonlocally unlike radio signals. Therefore, the noise that degrades the effectiveness of quantum
memory must be caused by limited reception ability of an individual's neural machinery.
If it is true that information about our experiences is stored in the structure of time and space -rather than the hardware of our brain -- an analogy to cloud computing is natural. Brain synapses
are like routing software in a personal computer that accesses information stored "in the cloud".
Weaknesses and errors in our memory are caused by limited capacity or "bugs" in the software
of the personal computer of our mind. All the information is safely stored in the super computer
of the cosmos if we can properly access it.
Like a hacker trying to fix a computer bug, humans rely on language and culture to compensate
for noise. Writing down documents that capture historical events or express the values of
philosophy or teachings of religion, guide our minds in experiencing the past, narrowing the gap
of ignorance toward universal knowledge. Literature permits us to share the memories of other
people and gain a collective viewpoint. In this way culture invites us to (as Einstein said) "think
the thoughts of God." Language is a tool we use to seize past entangled states that still exist nonlocally in the fourth dimension of time past. Language and culture like a signal amplifier broaden
human consciousness, moving us toward accurate understanding.
Moreover, highly emotional experiences could enhance the connection to quantum states of the
past. It could be that the awareness of an emotion boosts the signal of the enduring reality of the
past. Intense experiences of joy, love, grief, happiness, sentiment or aesthetic appreciation
produce stronger entangled patterns that increase the potentiality of transmission between the
past and the present viewer. The emotion serves as a “red flag” marking the quantum pathway in
our minds, making access to it later easier.
An entanglement view of memory is intuitive. We feel entangled with past events and people in
our lives. When we remember events in the past it feels like we are experiencing them again.
What if we really are experiencing them? Imperfectly, often clouded and weak, but sometimes in
vivid ways, especially when we remember an intense event. In fact "hindsight" may help us
experience the past better than the first time we experienced it. Our memory may be redeemed
by a more mature perceptive gained through acquired wisdom. We might say, "You know that
experience I had as a child, it wasn't as bad as I thought. In fact, it helped me."
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In this way a mature looking back may produce a "backward in time" effect which changes the
experience, exactly like the observation of subatomic properties causes the collapse of
superpositions, making the particle or wave a reality both now but also backward in time. Once
observed in an uncontaminated state, the particle or wave has always been a particle or wave.
This is the "quantum enigma" -- that conscious observation creates what we observe as physical
reality (Rosenblum).
A quantum theory of memory may explain the evidence better than the traditional model of
cognitive science. Why is it that brain damaged people can recover memories, even when whole
parts of the brain are removed? While traditional neuroscience may offer plausible theories, if
the information of the memory exists embedded in time and space and the brain is merely
accessing that information, then the person recovering from brain damage may be re-learning
how to pick up the signal from the past that exists independently from their brain.
This view may also contribute to the study of near death experiences when patients clinically
shown to be brain dead are revived with memories of events that were objectively observed in
the hospital room. If the brain is a receiver of signals produced by quantum entangled states in
the past -- and not merely a recording devise -- then life after death becomes plausible (Greyson).
A quantum mechanical view of memory is therefore intuitive. Just as radio waves are still being
transmitted regardless of whether or not a radio is present, so after the brain has been destroyed,
the reality of the person's life remains. Or again, cloud stored information is safe even if your
personal computer crashes.
Playwright Thornton Wilder seems to have anticipated that human experience transcends the
body and lives on in eternity. In his imagination he suggests that memory literally takes us back
to events in the past.
In the final act of Our Town, Emily dies and discovers that she can "return" to observe major life
events. Emily chooses to observe her mother making breakfast for the family on an
inconsequential day in her past. She finds that the memory is too beautiful to endure. Emily
concludes with a question to the Stage Manager:
Emily: Oh, Mama, look at me one minute as though you really saw me. Mama, fourteen
years have gone by. I'm dead. You're a grandmother, Mama! Wally's dead, too. His
appendix burst on a camping trip to North Conway. We felt just terrible about it - don't
you remember? But, just for a moment now we're all together.
Mama, just for a moment we're happy. Let's really look at one another!...I can't. I can't
go on. It goes so fast. We don't have time to look at one another.
I didn't realize. So all that was going on and we never noticed.
Take me back -- up the hill -- to my grave.
But first: Wait! One more look. Good-bye, Good-bye world. Good-bye, Grover's
Corners....Mama and Papa. Good-bye to clocks ticking....and Mama's sunflowers. And
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food and coffee. And new ironed dresses and hot baths....and sleeping and waking up.
Oh, earth, you are too wonderful for anybody to realize you. Do any human beings ever
realize life while they live it -- every, every minute?
Stage Manager: No. (pause) The saints and poets, maybe they do some" (Wilder.)
References
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http://www.tvtechnology.com/BE_Files/uploads/2013/06/DTV%20antenna.jpg
Balents, Leon. "Physicists Make Strides in Understanding Quantum Entanglement." Phys Org. N.p., 14
Dec. 2012. Web. 15 Dec. 2012. http://phys.org/news/2012-12-physicists-quantum-entanglement.html
"CLIPARTBEST.com." Free Cliparts. N.p., n.d. Web. 21 Apr. 2014.
http://www.clipartbest.com/cliparts/9TR/dGa/9TRdGaBTe.bmp
Davies, Paul. "That Mysterious Flow." Scientific American. N.p., Jan. 2012. Web. 6 Feb. 2014.
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/that-mysterious-flow-2012-01
Greysin, Bruce. "Cosmological Implications of Near-Death Experiences." Journal of Cosmology. N.p.,
2011. Web. 15 Dec. 2012.
Kak, Subhash. "Biological Memories and Agents as Quantum Collectives." NeuroQuantology 11 (2011):
391-98. Web. 16 Apr. 2014. http://www.neuroquantology.com/index.php/journal/article/view/682 .
Moreva, Ekaterina. "Time From Quantum Entanglement: An Experimental Illustration." ArXiv. Cornell
University Library, 17 Oct. 2013. Web. 13 Feb. 2014. quant-ph arXiv:1310.4691 .
Neural Networks. Digital image. Clip Art Best. N.p., n.d. Web. 18 Mar. 2014.
http://www.clipartbest.com/cliparts/9TR/dGa/9TRdGaBTe.bmp
"NeuroQuantology.com." Neuroscience and Quantum Physics (n.d.): n. pag. AboutUs. Web.
http://www.aboutus.org/NeuroQuanTology.com
Our Town. By Thornton Wilder. Dir. Samuel French Inc. 1965. Performance.
Parry, Wynne. "Mystery of Memory: Why It's Not Perfect." Live Science. LiveScience Contributor, 16
Nov. 2012. Web. 10 Feb. 2014. http://www.livescience.com/24836-mystery-memory-recall.html
Penrose, Roger. The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989. Print.
"Quantum Experiment Shows How Time Emerges from Entanglement: Time Is an Emergent
Phenomenon That Is a Side Effect of Quantum Entanglement, Say Physicists." Web log post. The
Physics ArXiv Blog. N.p., 31 Dec. 2013. Web. 31 Jan. 2014. https://medium.com/@arxivblog
Rosenblum, Bruce, and Fred Kuttner. Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters Consciousness. 2nd ed.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011. Print.
Savovar, Mohan, Akihito Ishizaki, Graham R. Fleming, and Birgitta K. Whaley. "Quantum Entanglement
in Photosynthetic Light Harvesting Complexes." ArXiv. Cornell University Library, 7 June 2010. Web.
20 Apr. 2014. http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.3787
Schwartz, Jeffrey M., Henry P. Stapp, and Mario Beauregard. "Quantum Physics in Neuroscience and
Psychology: A Neurophysical Model of Mind–brain Interaction" The Royal Society: Biological
Sciences 281.1781 (2004): n. pag. First Cite. Web. 2 Apr. 2014. http://wwwphysics.lbl.gov/~stapp/PTRS.pdf
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Web. 15 Dec. 2012. http://www.kurzweilai.net/seth-lloyd-on-quantum-life
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Human Creativity and Consciousness: Unintended Consequences of the Brain’s
Extraordinary Energy Efficiency?
by
T.N.Palmer
Department of Physics
University of Oxford
Abstract
It is proposed that both human creativity and human consciousness are (unintended) consequences of the
human brain’s extraordinary energy efficiency. The topics of creativity and consciousness are treated
separately, though have a common sub-structure. It is argued that creativity arises from a synergy between
two cognitive modes of the human brain (which broadly coincide with Kahneman’s Systems 1 and 2). In the
first, available energy is spread across a relatively large network of neurons. As such, the amount of energy per
active neuron is so small that the operation of such neurons is susceptible to thermal (ultimately quantum
decoherent) noise. In the second, available energy is focussed on a small enough subset of neurons to
guarantee a deterministic operation. An illustration of how this synergy can lead to creativity with implications
for computing in silicon are discussed. Starting with a discussion of the concept of free will, the notion of
consciousness is defined in terms of an awareness of what are perceived to be nearby counterfactual worlds in
state space. It is argued that such awareness arises from an interplay between our memories on the one hand,
and quantum physical mechanisms (where, unlike in classical physics, nearby counterfactual worlds play an
indispensable dynamical role) in the ion channels of neural networks. As with the brain’s susceptibility to
noise, it is argued that in situations where quantum physics plays a role in the brain, it does so for reasons of
energy efficiency. As an illustration of this definition of consciousness, a novel proposal is outlined as to why
quantum entanglement appears so counter-intuitive.
1. Introduction
What does it mean to be human? Surely two of the defining characteristics are that of
creativity and of consciousness (the latter being notoriously hard to define objectively). In
this paper, a new perspective is speculatively proposed on the age-old problem of what it is
physically about the human brain in particular which could account for these characteristics.
In both cases, this proposal hinges around the notion of energy efficiency.
The author’s interest in this subject arose by considering what must surely be one of the
most profound paradoxes in computational neuroscience. For many years, attempts have
been made to simulate parts of the brain on supercomputers. In the coming years, such
simulations will start to use exascale high-performance computing. However, such
computers will need 6 orders of magnitude more electrical power than the human brain
itself needs (tens of megawatts rather than tens of watts). In Section 2, we review the
arguments of Palmer and O’Shea (2015) that understanding this gross discrepancy in energy
usage may provide a key clue to understanding the creative process, i.e. that creativity is an
unintended consequence of the brain’s evolution towards the extraordinarily energy
efficient assemblage of miniaturised neurons that it is. In particular it is proposed that
creativity arises from a very strong synergy between two cognitive modes of operation one mode where limited available energy is focussed on a subset of neurons allowing these
neurons to perform computations repeatably and reliably and where others are largely shut
1
down, and the other mode where available energy is spread more uniformly around the
neuronal network, making them susceptible to thermal noise, who existence in the brain is
widely acknowledged (Faisal et al, 2008; Rolls and Deco, 2010). Implications for silicon
computers are discussed in Section 3.
In Section 4, by analogy with thermal noise, we propose that quantum dynamics may play a
role in the brain when it is energetically efficient to do so. As discussed, the power supply
for action potentials in neural networks appears to be a case in point. We describe quantum
physics as a theory where nearby counterfactual worlds in state space play a much more
fundamental dynamical role than in classical physics and use this to give an explanation for
our deeply held belief in free will. In Section 5 we use this to provide a novel definition of
consciousness. Here, we refer to consciousness as it relates to specific objects, i.e. in the
sense of our being conscious of something. Being conscious of a specific object is then
defined in terms of an ability to perceive that object as having an existence, independent of
the rest of the field of view. It is proposed that such consciousness arises from an interplay
between our memories and the central dynamical role that nearby counterfactual states
play in (e.g. the path integral representation of) quantum theory. As an illustration of this
proposal, we discuss in Section 6, why we humans appear to find quantum entanglement so
completely unintuitive.
2. Creativity
Consider the following very elementary example of creative thinking: Euclid’s proof that
there exists an unlimited number of prime numbers. Euclid starts by imagining the opposite:
that the number N of primes is finite. This tactic is an essential step in many mathematical
proofs (presumably even in Euclid’s day) and has such broad application that one would
hardly say it is an especially creative step for this particular problem. Indeed, it can readily
be coded into a putative algorithm for finding mathematical proofs. The creative step comes
in multiplying together the N primes and adding one. Having formed this number, it is
immediate that it is not divisible by one of the N primes.
We will never know how Euclid (if indeed it was he) arrived at the idea of multiplying the
primes together and adding one. Of course, in hindsight it seems so obvious that it is hard to
imagine that one would do anything but this. However, conceivably Euclid may have started
by adding the primes together, getting stuck, may have then multiplied them, getting stuck
again, and may have given up, leaving his study to relax on the veranda. Then, in a moment
of relaxation, the critical idea, “just add one” comes from nowhere. In an instant Euclid
realises he had the proof he has been searching for.
The creative process has been described by the renowned mathematician J.E. Littlewood
(following Helmholz and Poincaré):
“It is usual to distinguish four phases in creation: preparation, incubation, illumination and
verification…..Illumination, which can happen in a fraction of a second, is the emergence of
the creative idea into the consciousness. This almost always occurs when the mind is in a
state of relaxation…….” (Littlewood, 2004)
2
The same points have been emphasised by Andrew Wiles:
“In particular, when you reach a real impasse, when there's a real problem that you want to
overcome, then the routine mathematical thinking is of no use to you. Leading up to that
kind of new idea there has to be a long period of tremendous focus on the problem without
any distraction. You have to really think about nothing but that problem - just concentrate
on it. Then you stop. Afterwards there seems to be a kind of period of relaxation during
which the subconscious appears to take over and it's during that time that some new insight
comes.” (Singh, 1997).
The notion that creative ideas come when relaxing, is commonplace. It seems to be an
essential part of the creative process. But why?
The idea of changing from a mode of thinking where one focusses hard on a problem
without distraction, to one where one simply relaxes, is suggestive of a switch in modes of
cognition which Kahnemann (2012) refers to simply as “System 2” and “System 1”
respectively. Kahnemann refers to System 2 as slow, effortful, logical, calculating; whilst
System 1 is fast, automatic, frequent, emotional and stereotypic. Although it is simplistic to
characterise cognition entirely in terms of such a dichotomy, it is conceptually convenient to
do so here.
Here a physical reason for the difference between System 1 and System 2 is proposed, by
returning to the astonishing fact that the brain performs exascale data processing with
about 20W of power. The brain has achieved such extraordinary energy efficiency through
the process of miniaturisation (Niven and Farris, 2012): the axon diameter of neurons is
frequently as slender as 0.1 microns. Now whilst larger neurons (say of diameter 1 micron
or more) are reliably deterministic and transmit information rapidly due to their low
resistance to axial current flow, they are energy inefficient. In particular, larger neurons
require more ionic current to trigger a nerve impulse. Following a bout of impulses, critical
ionic concentrations across the neuronal membrane must be restored by energy-consuming
ionic pumps. There would not be adequate energy to power sufficient neurons to allow the
sorts of cognitive analysis humans undertake, if our neurons had 1-micron diameter. By
contrast, smaller neurons are more efficient because their high input resistance allows
relatively small trans-membrane ionic currents to generate the voltage needed to trigger a
nerve impulse. The process of miniaturisation has allowed the human brain to contain
around 80 billion neurons (by contrast chimpanzees have about 7 billion) with very limited
energy resources.
There are potential disadvantages to such small neuronal diameters. Since signal
transmission speed is smaller in slender neurons, reaction time to stimuli will be
correspondingly slower. Hence, if fast reaction time is crucial for survival, then
miniaturisation could be evolutionarily disadvantageous. However, with early hominids
forming societal groups and learning to defend themselves collectively using primitive
weapons, the need for ultra-fast reaction times may have started to become less important
early in human history.
3
However, even though 20W may be sufficient to power a relatively large number of such
slender neurons, it is still possible that it may not quite be sufficient to power a very large
network of neurons so that they act repeatably and reliably in the presence of inevitable
thermal noise (Faisal et al, 2008). For example, for very slender neurons, the ionic batteries
positioned at key points along a neuron may each contain just a handful of ions. A
consequence of limited energy is that the whole neuronal function can be susceptible to
noise. Conventional neuroscience treats noise as an undesirable nuisance. For example, in
their book “Principles of Neural Design”, Stirling and Laughlin (2017) comment:
“Where noise is inevitable, it should be minimized before transmission, so most neural
designs try to prevent noise or reduce it at early stages.”
Whilst too much stochasticity would certainly be disadvantageous, a small degree of
stochasticity could actually be advantageous, as Turing himself noted in his famous paper
“The Imitation Game” (Turing, 1950). Deterministic heuristic algorithms for complex
decision problems (e.g. the travelling salesman problem) can prove inefficient for particular
problem instances, and in the worst case can lead to the algorithm “hanging” (Hoos and
Stützle, 2005). Typically, there is a long “tail” in the distribution of problem instances where
deterministic heuristics take an unacceptably long time to reach solution (Gomes et al,
1998). From an evolutionary perspective, such “Buridian donkey” behaviour would
obviously be undesirable, if not fatal in the presence of predators. By eliminating this long
tail, a stochastic heuristic algorithm can be more computationally overall than any
corresponding deterministic algorithm (even though such stochastic algorithms may be
slower than their deterministic counterparts for problem instances where the latter reaches
solution rapidly). A particularly well known and successful stochastic algorithm is Simulated
Annealing, used to find the global minimum of some objective function. The stochastic
algorithm allows the search process to jump from the potential well surrounding a local
minimum to the potential well surrounding the global minimum, in ways which
deterministic algorithms would find difficult or impossible.
Here it is proposed that in System 2, available energy is focussed on a subset of neurons
needed to perform a particular cognitive task as deterministically (and hence reliably and
repeatably) as possible. This means that the limited energy available would be channelled to
the specific parts of the brain needed to perform the computation, making this energy
unavailable for performing other tasks. Kahneman notes that if you are out walking with a
friend who suddenly asks you to multiply 23 by 17 (say), you may have to stop walking, close
your eyes and essentially do nothing other than to focus on the task at hand. The neuronal
processes needed to walk and talk and even process basic information coming from the
sensory organs, have, in extremis, been switched off in System 2 mode. By contrast, in
System 1 mode, one can happily walk, chew gum and simultaneously chat about the latest
football results, since none of these activities requires unusual amounts of energy to be
focussed on specific neuronal subsets.
This suggests that available energy per active neuron in System 1 mode is less that the
available energy per active neuron in System 2 mode. We therefore postulate that because
of this, it is specifically when in System 1 mode that neuronal action can be susceptible to
thermal noise. Perhaps this is the reason why both Littlewood and Wiles comment that the
4
creative moment comes when relaxing: it is in this state that a new idea can literally arise
without prior reason. If we think of our present cognitive state in terms of a local minimum
of some objective function whose global minimum defines the solution to the problem at
hand, noise can take us out of the local minimum.
That is to say, perhaps the notion of “adding one” to the product of primes occurred to
Euclid by means of a stochastic process. Perhaps the primitive stochastic idea was merely to
“add some constant” and his System 2 immediately honed this down to adding one, rather
than, say, two or ten. This serves to emphasise the notion that it is not simply the presence
of noise that gives rise to creativity, it is the synergistic interplay between stochasticity and
determinism associated with these two modes. This is consistent with Littlewood’s
comment that the process of illumination (a System 1 process) needs to be followed by the
process of verification (a System 2 process). Put another way, it requires System 2 to
determine whether the random jump from the local potential well will lead us to the global
minimum. Using the language of particle physics, the mathematical physicist Michael Berry
describes the product of the process of illumination as a clariton, but notes that, by virtue of
the process of verification, the clariton is all too frequently annihilated by its anti-clariton
partner (Ball, 2016). On top of which, the chances of stochastically jumping to the right
answer becomes increasingly unlikely, the less prepared the brain is with the problem at
hand – hence the vital roles of preparation and incubation.
One can feed students, or indeed program computers, with a “set of tricks” needed to prove
mathematical theorems. “Just add one” could be one such trick. However, this trick is of no
help in constructing a proof of perhaps the next simplest theorem in mathematics: that the
square root of 2 is irrational. Indeed, one way of interpreting the Gödel-Turing theorem is
that the set of tricks needed to prove mathematical theorems can never be taught. The fact
that we humans are able to prove new mathematical theorems based on new mathematical
tricks, could therefore be explained by the brain’s susceptibility to noise in System 1.
Indeed, this susceptibility provides a practical explanation of the Lucas/Penrose puzzle: How
is it that we are able to see the truth of the Gödel theorem if our brains operate by
algorithm? In the final analysis, for particularly slender human neurons, such noise may
have its ultimate source in the supposed randomness of quantum decoherence. In this case,
the randomness of the noise is as non-algorithmic as it can be. The possible dependence on
quantum processes is further developed in Sections 4-6 below.
3. Lessons for Supercomputers
We may be able to learn in designing next-generation supercomputers by understanding
how the brain has become so energy efficient. For example, part of the energy cost of
operating a supercomputer is the cost of ensuring that the computations are bit
reproducible – e.g. that computations are not affected by the internal effects of thermal
noise or of external perturbations like cosmic rays. We can reduce energy costs by turning
down the voltage across the transistors. However, in so doing they act less reliably (Palem,
2014). However, for a given unit of energy, one can ask what is more beneficial – a smaller
number of precise computations, or a larger number of imprecise computations? The
answer clearly depends on the application. In transferring sums of money from one bank
account to another, it is clearly vital that precise bank account numbers are known. When
5
adding or multiplying two floating-point real numbers, it is important to ensure the
exponents are manipulated correctly. However, it is clearly less important for the trailing
mantissa bits to be calculated precisely. For many computations in turbulent fluid
mechanics (such is relevant for climate research for example), it is not vital that precise
computations are made, for the simple reason that the numerical approximations to the
underlying fluid equations are not themselves precise. To avoid systematically rounding
errors, these trailing bits should be represented by noise, rather than systematically setting
them to zero.
We have now reached the stage where it is no longer possible to shrink transistors any
further and maintain complete determinism – energy dissipation would cause the circuitry
to melt. As such, the current route to increased FLOP rates (floating point operations per
second) is to combine more and more processors. The need to communicate across larger
and larger networks of processors means that the energy costs are now dominated by the
cost of transporting data from one processor to another (and to memory).
However, here we can perhaps learn from the brain. Energy need only be supplied to
processors according to the required accuracy of the computation. That is to say, as in
System 1 mode, we can turn the voltage down across the transistors where only imprecise
estimates are needed. In this way, some computations will be susceptible to noise. As with
the simulated annealing algorithm, sometimes this noise can be beneficial to the
computation. In weather and climate model simulations, noise is certainly advantageous
(Palmer 2019a). A consequence of this is that in moving data from one part of the computer
to another, it is only be necessary to transport those bits that contain useful information
which is distinguishable from noise. It is simply wasteful to transport those bits that are
essentially indistinguishable from noise. This can reduce energy consumption considerably.
Such an imprecise supercomputer (Palmer, 2015) can be compared with a typical energyprofligate scientific computation of today, where bit-reproducible arithmetic is computed
using fixed precision (e.g. 64-bit floating point) real numbers. Currently there are no
supercomputers with such imprecise capability, though the development of AI has meant
that current computers are able to operate in some mixed precision mode, where 16- or
even 8-bit variables can be efficiently processed.
This in turn raises the question of what it would need to make a (silicon) computer that is
truly intelligent e.g. in the sense of performing interesting mathematical research. We have
argued that intelligence arises from a complex interplay between stochasticity and
determinism. It is not a matter of pre-programming the degree of stochasticity (vs
determinism) in a fixed non-interactive manner. Rather this degree would itself have to be
controlled by an extremely interactive operating system (e.g. which would perceive when a
part of the code was effectively hanging and which part was making rapid progress in a
purely deterministic manner). To make optimal use of available energy, stochasticity should
be produced in hardware, rather than through pseudo-random number generators, and
only data containing useful information should be transported within the computer.
6
4. Quantum Physics, Counterfactuality, Free Will
It has been known for some years that quantum dynamics can play a key role in many
biological systems (Al-Khalili, J. and J. McFadden, 2014). As an example, relevant to the
current discussion, Summhammer et al (2018) consider the motion of K+ ions in voltagegated ion channels in the neuronal membrane wall. They note that it is difficult to explain
the high rates of ion flow using classical physics: the potential barriers are too high
according to the classical Nernst-Planck equation. A key observation is that the de Broglie
wavelengths of such ions at typical brain temperatures are comparable with the scale of the
periodic structure of Coulomb potentials in the nano-pore structure of the ion-channel
selectivity filter. Solving a nonlinear Schrödinger equation, Summhammer et al show that
the ionic wavefunction can be sufficiently spatially spread that the front part of the
wavefunction can effectively manipulate the confining potentials in such a way as to allow
the remaining part of the wavefunction to propagate through. In this way, a mechanism for
ion conduction has been found that would be impossible to achieve classically unless the
ions had much larger kinetic energy (which would be impossible given the energy available
to power neuronal dynamics). The characteristic timescale for the operation of this process
has to be short, around 1ps, to explain the fast and directed permeation of ions through the
potential barriers of the filter. In this way, the Summhammer et al mechanism not only
builds on, but requires decoherence timescales of around 1ps, entirely consistent with the
range of decoherence timescales associated with biological systems (a problem with many
other hypotheses involving quantum physics in consciousness).
Consistent with the discussion above, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that the brain will
use such a quantum process over a classical process when there is an energetic advantage to
do so. Again, this becomes possible for the extreme miniaturisation of neurons in the human
brain. However, what would be the consequences of this?
To answer this question, one needs to ask what is the key physical difference between
quantum and classical physics. A clue arises from the fact that the essential quantum
constant of nature, Planck’s constant, has the dimension of position times momentum, i.e.
the dimensions of the state space of a classical particle. Classical theory can be thought of
as arising in the limit when this dimensional constant is set equal to zero. This draws
attention to the fact that a crucial difference between classical and quantum physics
concerns the role of state space in the equations for dynamical evolution. In classical
physics, a system’s dynamical evolution between two given states is determined by the
state-space trajectory along which the classical “action” (the integral of the Lagrangian
along the trajectory) is minimised. In particular, trajectories (or so-called histories) which
neighbour this path of least action play no direct role in determining the dynamical
evolution of the system.
By contrast, in quantum theory dynamical evolution can be defined as a phase-weighted
sum over trajectories in a region of state space (Feynman and Hibbs, 2010). Alternatively, in
the De Broglie-Bohm representation of the Schrödinger equation, what makes the dynamics
non-classical is the Bohmian quantum potential, a function, not in space-time, but on the
configuration space of the system under investigation (Bohm and Hiley, 1993). Again, the
presence of the quantum potential implies that one cannot isolate a single state-space
7
trajectory when defining dynamical evolution. Rather, quantum dynamical evolution in the
physical world is in some sense “aware” of the existence of alternative state-space
trajectories in state space. Indeed the fact that quantum computers can outperform
classical computers for certain problems can be viewed in terms of an ability of a quantum
computer to exploit the parallelism implied by such neighbourhoods of state-space
trajectories, in a manner impossible by a classical computer. If the physics which determines
our cognition is “aware” of these neighbourhood trajectories, could our cognition itself be
similarly aware?
From the perspective of some reference trajectory that we interpret as our physical world,
such neighbouring state-space trajectories can be interpreted as counterfactual worlds: for
example, worlds where some degrees of freedom are perturbed from the values that apply
to the reference trajectory. Let us start by considering a “warm-up” for the problem of
consciousness (discussed in the next section) - the deep-seated belief that many if not most
of us have in the concept of free will. For many, this is the belief that “I could have done
otherwise” (Kane, 2002). This definition supposes the meaningful existence of
counterfactual worlds in which I did do otherwise. Perhaps in the counterfactual world I
simply spent another fraction of a second looking to my right (keeping everything else in the
world fixed). The consequences of this are easily deduced from our System 2 deductive
reasoning: in this counterfactual world I would have seen the oncoming car, would not have
pulled out of the turning, would not have collided with the car and would not have been in
hospital for six months from where I write this paper (a fabricated example, fortunately).
Whilst a world in which I didn’t spend six months in hospital is distant from the world in
which I did, a world where I spent an extra fraction of a second looking right resembles the
actual world in almost all respects and therefore seems extremely close to the actual world.
As such, it seems intuitively plausible to us to view this counterfactual world as physically
reasonable (though in Section 6 we discuss why this sense of intuition may be misleading
us).
Would I have such a strong belief in free will if the dynamics of our neural pathways was
determined entirely by classical physics? For sure, it would be possible to refer back to past
occasions (stored in my memory) where I did spend extra time looking left and right before
turning out of some side road. However, these memories refer to different roads in
different locations and certainly at different times. Does the memory of these past events
explain the very visceral and deep-seated nature of the belief in the reality of the
counterfactual world I looked right a fraction of a second longer for the particular road on
the particular day when my accident occurred? I believe not. Of course, proving this
unequivocally is impossible. Instead, using Littlewood’s “preparation, incubation,
illumination, verification” approach to creativity, the following assertion is made: that the
notion of free will arises from a) a familiarity of different configurations of the world as
stored in our memory (c.f. preparation and incubation), b) an awareness of nearby
counterfactual worlds arising from the fact that (for reasons of energy efficiency) the
dynamics of our neural pathways are partially influenced by quantum physical processes
(c.f. illumination), c) an ability (using System 2) to project the consequences on such
counterfactual worlds e.g. if I had looked right I wouldn’t now be in hospital (c.f.
verification). Here b) takes the place of the susceptibility to stochasticity, and indeed, if the
8
origin of stochasticity is quantum decoherence, then there may be physical links between
such processes in any case.
5. Consciousness
The literature on consciousness is so voluminous that no attempt is made to summarise it
here. (See for example Schneider S. and M. Velmans, 2017). Instead, we attempt a novel
definition of consciousness based on the ideas developed above. This section is necessarily
very speculative in nature.
If I look at a bowl of fruit in the middle of the table, I can become conscious of it. What does
this mean? Here we explore the idea that to be conscious of the bowl of fruit denotes an
ability to treat the bowl of fruit as somehow distinct from and hence independent of the
other objects in my field of view (the table, the walls of the room and so on). To treat the
bowl of fruit as having an existence distinct from the other objects in my field of view,
implies, in principle at least, an ability to perturb the degrees of freedom associated with
the bowl of fruit (e.g. its position on the table) independently of the degrees of freedom of
all the other objects in my field of view (i.e. keeping the latter fixed). That is to say, to be
conscious of the bowl of fruit is to have some awareness of the existence of counterfactual
worlds where the degrees of freedom of the bowl of fruit are perturbed relative to the
degrees of freedom of all other objects in my field of view. If, moreover, I decide to focus on
the contents of the bowl of fruit, I may become aware of the fact that it comprises, say,
apples, oranges and pears. According to the definition above, to be conscious of a particular
piece of fruit implies being aware, at least implicitly, of the existence of counterfactual
worlds where the degrees of freedom of this particular piece of fruit, e.g. its position
relative to the other pieces of fruit in the bowl, are perturbed.
From where does such awareness arise? Some would argue that it arises from the fact that
in the past I have seen bowls of fruit in different positions on different tables, or of pieces of
fruit arranged in different ways inside bowls of fruit. However, as in the discussion of free
will, I do not believe that this explains the very visceral nature of consciousness. Again, a
possible explanation is that our ability to perceive nearby counterfactual worlds arises from
the fact that (for reasons of energy efficiency) quantum dynamics plays a central role in the
operation of our neural networks, and just as quantum dynamics is aware of counterfactual
worlds, so too our brains. It is then the interplay between this quantum-induced awareness
of alternate worlds coupled with our memory of specific counterfactual worlds deemed
close to the present one, that gives rise to the visceral nature of the experience we call
consciousness.
A potential problem with such a definition is that it suggests that merely imagining
something in one’s mind’s eye (e.g. a flying pig) could be enough to be conscious of that
something. In general, that is not so, although under the influence of hallucinogenic drugs,
people can apparently become viscerally conscious of illusory objects, suggesting that there
may be a relatively fuzzy distinction between consciousness of real-world objects and
imagined-world objects.
9
However, perhaps the fact that we are typically only conscious of real-world objects (rather
than imagined-world objects) arises from the fact that amount of data transported from our
sensory organs (e.g. along the visual cortex) is so much larger than for any other part of the
brain’s neural network. However, the simple volume of data may not be the relevant
measure here. Instead perhaps the relevant diagnostic is the volume of data synchronised
across nearby neurons (Singer, 1998). Here, a degree of synchronisation across the neurons
of the visual cortex could conceivably be induced by the electromagnetic field associated
with the action potentials of individual neurons (McFadden, 2002). Here, such
synchronisation would be a semi-classical process, even though the ion flow in individual
neurons is quantum mechanical.
In Section 2 we argued that creativity arises from a synergy between two modes of
operation of the brain. It seems plausible to argue that a similar synergy arises in explaining
the form of consciousness we call cognition. In her essay on consciousness, Magnusdottir
(Magnusdottir, 2018) argues that the difference between “conscious experience” and
“conscious cognition” is that the latter experience is supplemented with some predictive
model. A predictive model need not be particularly sophisticated – it may simply be enough
to enable a creature to anticipate the way a predator is likely to pounce. As such, by human
standards, such a predictive model need not tax System 2 very greatly. However, it implies
some computational effort in addition to a mere awareness of these counterfactual worlds.
Hence, like creativity, it would seem that conscious cognition is also an interplay between a
computational mode and a mode whose essential ingredient is either stochasticity in the
case of creativity, or counterfactuality in the case of consciousness. It is interesting to note
that both may have their origins in quantum physics. As Magnussdottir notes, simple
perceptions and projections can be viewed as unconscious phenomena with and without
(respectively) a predictive model. Here one could postulate that the synchronised data
transport associated with such phenomena is not sufficiently great to trigger the type of
quantum awareness considered here.
Some would argue that consciousness should be defined in terms of some kind of selfawareness. Indeed Magnusdottir (2018) herself asserts that consciousness requires a type
of self-similar monitoring. However, the notion of self-awareness could be viewed as an
extension of the more general notion of awareness of counterfactual alternatives described
above. If I can perceive a bowl of fruit as having an existence independent of the rest of the
world, so too I can perceive myself. However, as a subjective comment, I do not believe that
for most of the time I am as actively conscious of myself as I am of the people and objects I
interact with (unless I happen to look at myself in a mirror for example). This again is
consistent with the notion that degree of consciousness of an object (which might include
ourselves) is dependent on the (synchronous) transport of data which describes the object
in question, along our neural pathways.
6. Why is Quantum Physics so Unintuitive?
As an application of the ideas above, consider the question of why quantum physics is so
unintuitive. We focus on the phenomenon of entanglement on the basis that there is no
more unintuitive idea in quantum physics than that of nonlocality. According to the Bell
Theorem, any deterministic theory of quantum physics that satisfies the assumption of
10
Statistical Independence (Hossenfelder and Palmer, 2019), must violate local causality.
Hence, we seem to require that quantum physics must either be nonlocal (which the
Bohmian formulation of quantum theory is) or is indeterministic (which the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory is). That is to say, we seem to be faced with the choice of
spooky action at a distance, or of physics governed by randomness. Neither seems
satisfactory.
The assumption of Statistical Independence ensures that when two or more sub-ensembles
of quantum particles are being measured with different measurement settings (as occurs in
a Bell experiment), each sub-ensemble is statistically similar to the others. If it were not
possible to assume this then the basis for scientific investigation in general would be
undermined.
However, the assumption of Statistical Independence does more than ensure that subensembles are statistically independent, it implies a strong form of counterfactual
definiteness (Hossenfelder and Palmer, 2019). Consider two measurements performed on
two sub-ensembles of particles: counterfactual definiteness assumes that in principle one
could have performed the second measurement on the first sub-ensemble (even though in
practice one did not).
As we have speculated, our intuition about counterfactual words arises from an interplay of
quantum physical processes in the brain, together with our past experiences. In terms of
this, any counterfactual world which is sufficiently close to the real world, is a plausible
world. However, this notion of closeness assumes a metric on state space, and it is natural
to assume the familiar Euclidean metric. Such an assumption is the product of the deepest
of all our intuitions. As babies, we try to put nearby brightly coloured objects into our
mouths (in case they are a source of food or indeed drink). To do this we must bring the
objects close to our mouths. We learn by trial and error what it means for an object to be
close to our mouths. We learn by empiricism about the Euclidean metric of space. This is our
go-to metric.
However, there is no reason for the Euclidean metric to be the correct metric of distance in
state space rather than physical space. In particular, there is a deterministic theory of
quantum physics based on fractal geometry, where the relevant metric on state space is padic rather than Euclidean (Palmer, 2019b). Relative to this metric, putative states which lie
in the gaps in the fractal geometry are necessarily distant from points on the fractal set,
even when a fractal gap appears very slender and hence insignificant from a Euclidean
perspective. In a theory where states of physical reality necessarily lie on this fractal set,
then counterfactual worlds which do not lie on the fractal set are not physically realistic.
By ruling out such counterfactuals we can violate Statistical Independence without violating
the statistical independence of sub-ensembles of particles occurring in reality. This suggests
that the reason we find quantum physics so difficult to understand is because our intuition,
that all counterfactual worlds which sufficiently well resemble the real world are plausible
worlds, is false.
11
From this perspective, the “weirdness” of quantum physics arises from a cognitive inability
to discriminate between those counterfactual states of the world which are realistic and
plausible and those which are not. To make better sense of contemporary physics it is
better to avoid using counterfactuals at all, e.g. by saying that I am free if there are no
constraints preventing me from doing what I want to do (Kane, 2002). Certainly, such realworld definitions are vital if we are to explain the violation of the Bell inequality in a causal
theory where experimenters are free agents (Palmer, 2019b; Hossenfelder and Palmer,
2019).
7. Conclusions
It is postulated that, through its evolution over many millions of years, the miniaturisation
of the neuronal pathways in the brain has resulted in an exceptionally energy efficient
organ. The disadvantages of such miniaturisation (e.g. relatively slow reaction times in the
presence of predators) has been offset by two advantages: an ability to be creative and an
ability to be aware of the world around us. It is argued that those advantages arise from two
specific manifestations of energy efficiency: the role of stochastic noise and the role of
quantum parallelism respectively.
As such, it seems plausible to speculate that it will be impossible to replicate human
intelligence in strictly deterministic algorithmic machines, as suggested by Penrose (1994).
However, by trying to solve the energy efficiency problem in high performance computing,
we may find that we start to produce machines which have intelligence characteristics more
akin to those of humans.
References
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Bernroider, G. and J. Summhammer, 2012: Can quantum entanglement between ion transition states effect
action potential initiation? Cognitive Computation, 4, 29-37.
Bohm, D. and B. J. Hiley 1993: The Undivided Universe. Routledge.
Faisal, A.,Selen,L.P.J.,and Wolpert,D.M. 2008. Noise in the nervous system.
Nat. Rev.Neurosci. 9, 292–303.doi:10.1038/nrn2258
Feynman, R. and A. R. Hibbs (2010). Quantum mechanics and path integrals. Dover Publications.
Gomes, C.P., B. Selman and H. Kautz, 1998. Boosting combinatorial search through randomization. In
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(MenloPark,CA:AAAIPress/TheMITPress), 431–437.
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Hossenfelder, S. and T.N.Palmer, 2019. Rethinking superdeterminism. arXiv:1912.06462.
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Kahneman, D., 2012: Thinking Fast and Slow. London: Penguin
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``Wandering Towards a Goal. The Frontiers Collection.'' p 89-99, Springer
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Palem, K. 2014: Inexactness and a future of computing. Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc., 372, 20130281
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 8 | pp. 856-873
Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
Article
Whither the Self?
The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
David Sahner*
ABSTRACT
A model of human consciousness and perceived agency is described, in which the distributed
elements underlying unified phenomenological consciousness and its emotional valence, as well
as triggered recollections, are recruited, bound, and reinforced by reciprocal connections with the
heavily networked claustrum. Preliminary evidence for this theory, which builds on the work of
Crick and Koch, Ramachandran, Smythies, and others, is briefly reviewed, followed by a
discussion of the implications this model may have for our understanding of the basis for the
potency of poetic devices wielded in the practice of that art.
Key Words: selfhood, consciousness, neuroscience, poetics.
Introduction
A fundamental objective of this paper is to reconstruct the features and lineaments of a missing
person, namely, the conscious self. He or she exists, of course, but, as any cognitive scientist or
philosopher will tell you, this creature has been infamously difficult to locate. I will draw chiefly
on neuroscience, and, to a lesser extent, philosophical considerations in presenting a model or, to
preserve the metaphor, clay visage of the self. We will then see if this paradigm has implications
for the neurological underpinnings of the experience of poetry. The underlying model of
consciousness is heavily indebted to, and essentially represents a union of, several recent
theories, with a relatively modest interpretive twist. Let the buyer, and even the browser,
however, beware, as at least one pivotal strut (in fact, the axial and weight-bearing portion of the
framework), is speculative.
To contextualize this reconstruction of the modern conscious self, I will briefly chart the possible
birth, and our changeable understanding, of that entity over the millennia. After this, I will depict
the supportive bones of the self. Next, I will articulate the skeleton and apply modeling clay in an
endeavor to reproduce a simulacrum of the self, in which the functional scaffolding is
specifically tied to neural correlates of human self-reflexive consciousness. Finally, I’ll link the
proposed anatomy of consciousness to poetry.
Correspondence: David Sahner, M.D., Aeneas Medical Consulting, Santa Cruz California. E-mail: davidsahner@yahoo.com
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
The Possible Beginnings & an Evolving Interpretation of Modern Consciousness
In The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind, Julian Jaynes
described the minds of the ancients as, essentially, selfless and divided. He hypothesized that
this type of human consciousness, on evidence in Homer’s Iliad, lacked any concrete notion of
the self, and that the temporal lobe of the non-dominant hemisphere served as the wellspring of
hallucinated injunctions that guided the bicameral mind through challenging and unusual
circumstances. These auditory hallucinations were imputed, thousands of years ago, to Gods.
During the course of human cultural evolution, greased by language and the requirements for
increasingly complex social interaction, the bicameral mind broke down, and we acquired a more
expedient “theory of mind” world view which posited the existence of “minds,” like our own, in
others, minds that could be “read” as it were by observing behavior to inductively ascertain, for
example, the motivations of other humans – and what they might be counted upon to do in the
future. This transition to theory of mind, which was largely complete by ~500 B.C.E, consigned
the selfless hearers of the Gods’ voices to the periphery of a society populated by selves (or
souls) with the capacity to more efficiently collaborate, and for which the exhortations of deities
were internalized to yield what some might now call the sotto voce of the soul. But there was an
obverse to the coin of the self. In addition to facilitating life in cosmopolitan settings, humans
began to understand that another mind could be deceived. Unctuous advertising traces its
genealogy to the breakdown of the bicameral mind.
All of this is an enormously simplified version of Jaynes’ theory, which also stressed other
essential ingredients of human consciousness, and the self of which we are cognizant, even if it is
only a convenient abstraction. These include the centrality of metaphor to consciousness, the
“intentionality” of the latter (i.e., it is always “about” something), and the narrative quality of
consciousness (anticipating a more recent epithet that has been affixed to the self, and of which
the philosopher Daniel Dennett is fond, namely the “center of narrative gravity”).1
Once we grew souls, religion followed suit. The vast majority of religions, with the stark
exception of a few such as Buddhism, which is more of a philosophy, take the existence of a
soul, discrete from the body, as axiomatic. The extent to which people have cared for their souls,
and the religion of which they form a part, is attested to by The Crusades, modern radical Islamic
martyrs, and the exorbitant amount of silver paid by sinners toward the end of the first
millennium for plenary indulgences from the Christian church that would wipe clean the slate of
their transgressions and literally purchase their salvation in the afterlife. Of course, Cartesian
dualism (the conception of the independence of body and mind/soul, the latter of which Rene
Descartes localized to the pineal gland) has been philosophically and scientifically lambasted in
modern times. Daniel Dennett for example, in Consciousness Explained (1991), has insisted on
the insoluble problem of how an ethereal soul, made of soul-stuff, could possibly interact with
and guide the motions of a material body. Rather than tethering a particular neuroanatomical
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
structure to human consciousness, modern neuroscience has concerned itself with the more
humble elucidation of the “neural correlates of consciousness,” although our tools are still
relatively crude. The voxel size of the highest resolution functional MRI scanners, is about 1-2
square millimeters. At the microscopic, molecular and neurobiological level, that constitutes
space ample enough for an enormous amount of complexity. Still, a sense of the neural substrate
of consciousness, and the functional relevance of various parts of the brain, in memory, sensory
experience, emotion, the comprehension of written text, and the creation of a sense of “agency”
or self may be coming into better focus, even if our vision is far less than 20-20 and no theory of
human consciousness is unassailable.
Consciousness, however, is not all about the brain. A sine-qua-non of human consciousness is
its embodiment and the implied fallacy of those who contend that a “brain in a vat” could be
made to experience genuine human consciousness if tickled by the right neuronal excitation.
Robin Zebrowski (2010) is correct in claiming that it is only by “real sensing,” through mobility
and physical interaction with the environment, that one can hope to acquire “felt experience.”
The British psychiatrist Iain McGilchrist (2009) emphasizes the importance of embodiment to
human experience, and the manner in which metaphor, grounded in that physicality, creates bona
fide human understanding. Sensation imbued with human meaning requires our interaction with
a physical world “red in tooth and claw,” with draconian (including life or death) consequences
that issue from our behavior. Human consciousness and selfhood are contingent upon the
interplay of brain, body, and environment, the components of which bleed into each other across
porous boundaries. Pleasurable, painful, or mortal consequences, and our attendant, uniquely
human, phenomenal experience, create the semantics of human consciousness. Cultural factors,
too, are pivotal in defining that semantics.
Any attempt to sketch the possible outlines of human consciousness is a bold and, some would
say, foolhardy venture. Many theories have been adduced and it is not my intention to
comprehensively review them here, but some of the greatest contemporary thinkers continue to
wrestle with the slippery notion of consciousness. At times, they seem to speak to each other at
cross-purposes, in part because of the absence of unambiguous and universally recognized case
definitions of basic concepts such as ‘consciousness’ itself. Elements of various theories seem to
ring true but, ultimately, efforts to gather compelling empirical evidence in favor of any theory
remain stymied by the uniquely subjective and internal experience of consciousness. Some
materialists, such as Daniel Dennett, have concluded that we, as conscious entities, are not in or
out of the loop, but that, rather, ‘we are the loop’ (Dennett, 2003). With this many would agree,
but the devil, of course, is in the details. A virtual leader or chief executive officer appears to be
at the helm. But where is he, and how does he govern?
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The Bones of Human Consciousness
Perhaps the first step in constructing a model of the self is to identify some of the key elements
and attributes, or “bones,” of consciousness. One diamond-hard nut that must be cracked is the
concept of the “quale.” Qualia (plural of quale) constitute our experience: for example, our
sense of the redness of red, the coldness of cold, or the tone and timbre of a particular note
played on the cello. Die-hard materialists regard qualia as illusionistic window dressing, but the
truth of the matter is that qualia – and higher-order qualia-suffused mental constructs such as the
discrete image of a dying sibling – possess an emotional valence that contributes to human
meaning. How do we explain qualia? In essence, how do we account for the rich, unique, and
highly personal ‘phenomenal’ experience of the world in which we live? A compelling theory
has been put forth by Nicholas Humphrey (Seeing Red, 2006), who posits that ‘sensation’ and
‘perception’ constitute two discrete, albeit usually co-occurring, processes that interact with each
other. ‘Perception,’ according to Humphrey, neutrally informs us about the objects and events
beyond the body. ‘Sensation’, on the other hand, apprises the subject of the response of the body
to various kinds of stimuli, generating, in the process, qualia, the building blocks of our
phenomenal experience. Normally these two channels respond to stimuli at the same time so that
the total experience is a unified whole where non-sensory behavioral competence toward the
world is ‘clothed’, so to speak, in qualitative sensory experiences. As an apt example of this
union, one can cite reflexive withdrawal in response to pain that is triggered by the neutral
‘perception’ of pain, a perception that is cloaked by the ‘painfulness’ of this noxious stimulus as
an experienced human ‘sensation.’ Humphrey has suggested that sensation is linked to
evolutionarily more primitive responses, and he likens it to an internalized covert bodily ‘action’
or physical expression-manqué that, among conscious humans, is monitored recursively in a
feedback loop that also serves as the basis for the ‘thick’ moment of phenomenal consciousness
within which we live.
That the two processes described above (perception and sensation) may take place independently
has been documented, at least preliminarily, by experimental observation. For example, patients
with ‘blindsight’ appear to have the residual capacity to ‘perceive’ and appropriately act upon
visual stimuli that remain completely opaque to the conscious mind. Conversely, sensation may
take place in the absence of ‘perceived’ external input (e.g., hypnagogic hallucinations,
hallucinogen-induced experiences, psychosis, and phantom limb pain). Humphrey’s position that
unembellished ‘perception’ and vibrant conscious ‘sensation’ follow two distinct avenues within
the nervous system is supported by other scientific evidence, including cases of metamorphosia,
experimental results of studies that have evaluated sensory substitution, and, perhaps most
impressively, the phenomenon of sensory mislocation (Armel and Ramachandran, 2003).
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Qualia possess dimensions that are not directly determined by the real-time perceptual input with
which they appear to be allied. For example, a particular suite of sensations may be colored by
historically similar sensations that are involuntarily elicited. Furthermore, the recursive
‘monitoring’ that serves as the basis for sensation incorporates emotional centers in the brain.
Thus, qualia (and phenomenological experience in general) are affect-laden. The emotional
valences of qualia, and the integrated qualia-formed mental constructs that constitute human
experience of the world, color the ensuing propositional components of experience (i.e., opinions
and beliefs) which subsequently come into being.
All of these considerations invite an obvious question. How is heteromodal sensory experience,
consisting of qualia of varying species from the visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile dominions,
“bound” into a unified conscious whole yoked to memory, a sense of agency, and emotion?
Before articulating a skeleton and taking a handful of modeling clay, let us name the abstract
bones that, when properly articulated, may form the armature of consciousness:
Integrated or “bound” phenomenological experience, woven of qualia. The constituent
sensations may be of external (exteroceptive) and/or internal (interoceptive) origin.
Interoceptive sensory experience includes, but is not limited to, sensations borne of
primitive drives (e.g., hunger). Exteroceptive experience may include somatosensory,
auditory, visual, olfactory, and gustatory sensation.
Attention to experience, which consists of nuclear (focus of attention) and fringe
(peripheral and incompletely apperceived) elements of the attentional field
Memory (immediate, working and long-term categories)
Emotion, including the emotional valence tethered to experience (concurrent or
recollected)
Cognitive propositional attitudes, including intentional beliefs and desires; analytic or
abstract syntheses of the experienced world; other products of higher mental thought
enabled by frontal lobe activity
Language or “linguistic overlay.”
A sense of personal “agency” and narrative center of gravity
This last piece, the perception of agency, is perhaps one of the most enigmatic. Obviously, the
“self” morphs over time in lockstep with accrued experience, so the concept of a static and
enduring agent to whom “it all happens” is largely a convenient abstraction that we manufacture,
an illusory entity of great utility in human social intercourse and discussions of moral
responsibility. Of this “agent” – the seat of higher order thoughts (thoughts about thoughts) and
phantom “owner” of phenomenological experience, feelings, and a cache of personal memories –
more is said below.
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Articulation of the Skeleton of Consciousness and the Application of Clay
Vital to the concept of the self is the distinct sense that the “agent” with which we identify is
privy to an integrated or bound admixture of unique experiences and its own relational attitudes
toward those experiences. The irresistible sensation that the self perseveres along a temporal
axis is central to human consciousness. The self, it seems to us, is the protagonist of an
unfolding novel, the next page of which contains unknown text over which we feel we can exert
at least some degree of authorial control. Our immediate phenomenological experience is
contextualized by memory, emotional valence, instinctual and reflexive responses, and cognitive
and linguistic overlay. The bewitching way in which a reflexively conscious self is invented and
conscripted into this network of rich phenomenological experience, memory, emotion, and
cognition has not, of course, been fully elucidated in its particulars, but neuroscience and
philosophy allow the formation of hypotheses.
Obviously, evolving knowledge of the neural correlates of the litany of “mind stuff-related”
terms listed above is gradually, but as of yet, incompletely, removing the infinitely ornate masks
upon masks behind which mind is hidden. Yet there is one explanatory keystone upon which the
architecture of this mind-stuff may be based, namely, the existence of an internal integrator that
binds “sensation,” as defined by Nicholas Humphrey (i.e., the canvas of experience), memory,
emotion, cognition, and our sense of agency, with this last deriving from an active process
analogous to what Humphrey has referred to “redding.” “Redding,” Humphrey would contend,
is an action-manqué or “sensation” we impose on unembellished “perception” in a dynamic
interplay between both processes that is recursively monitored in a reentrant circuit that serves as
the substrate for the “thick” moment of experience in which we dwell. I propose that much the
same happens in the action of “selfing.” The self is a useful mental construct with a perceived
material embodiment and an abstract “center of narrative gravity.” That eye of the storm is
“selfed” in the much the same way that the color red is “redded”
What remains is the need for something to tie the bow, or “bind,” the self with our emotional
roiling, our recollected and immediate experience, and our cognitive capabilities. An intriguing
albeit speculative hypothesis was put forth by Francis Crick and Chirstof Koch in 2005, in their
article “What is the function of the claustrum?” Francis Crick, of course, is one of the two
scientists who discovered that DNA is composed of a double helix of concatenated nucletotides.
In their paper, Crick and Koch posited that the claustrum, a sheet of neural tissue interposed
between two other neural structures (the putamen and the insula), might orchestrate integrated
human sensory experience. The claustrum shares reciprocal connections with an enormous
swath of virtually all regions of the cerebral cortex bilaterally, including somatosensory, visual,
auditory, olfactory, frontal (higher mental functions), prefrontal (executive control and attention),
ventral temporal (pattern/shape recognition), motor, supplementary motor area (SMA)/pre-SMA
and parietal cortex. It also has links to the rubral network and components of the basal ganglia
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and the limbic system. The limbic structures are integral to emotional responses (the amygdala,
for example) and short-term declarative memory (hippocampus). By way of orientation, Figure
1(A) below illustrates some of the above-referenced brain regions, providing a visual sense of
the generalized distribution of claustral connections. Cortical regions in which damage is
associated with expressive (Broca’s area) and receptive (Wernicke’s area) language impairment
are also depicted in Figure 1(A). Figure 1(B) portrays the deep subcortical structures of the
limbic system and basal ganglia.
There is limited, albeit tantalizing, scientific research to suggest that the claustrum, which is
identified in
Figure 1(C) below, plays a role in the integration and "binding" of
heteromodal information (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile, etc.) to support unified
phenomenological experience (Baugh et al, 2011; Naghavi, 2007; Hadjikhani, 1998). In addition
to binding and amplifying discontiguous activity in various parts of the cortex through reentrant
circuits, claustral projections to the cortex may be multimodal and diffuse, lighting up other
portions of the brain, beyond those activated by primary sensation, to "flesh out"
experience. Since the cortex is a likely seat of long-term memory, and the nexus with the limbic
system may infuse "bound sensation" with emotional valence, the neural substrate of
phenomenological consciousness, in all of its affect- and memory-saturated vividness, may have
something to do with the claustrum and its sweeping connections. Case reports suggest patients
with lesions in the claustrum live in a world of aberrant or incomplete sensory experience, or
perturbed consciousness (Ishii et al., 2011; Sperner et al., 1996; Albayrak and Gorgulu, 2008;
Ishida et al., 2006). Notably, however, removal of the claustrum on one side of the brain (it is a
bilateral structure) during glioma surgery is not incompatible with an ostensibly normal social
and professional life (Duffau et al., 2007). This may be a testament to the redundancy of neural
connectivity. Other apparently contravening but difficult to interpret threads of clinical
observation have also been described (Yamamoto et al., 2007; Kalaitzakis et al., 2009).
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
FIGURE 1
Primary
motor area
Prefrontal area
Primary
somatosensory area
Primary
Olfactory Area
Primary visual area
Receptive speech (Wernicke’s) area
Primary auditory area
Motor speech (Broca’s) area
(B)
(A): Major cortical areas (adapted from
th
Purves D., et al. Neuroscience, 4 Edition,
Sinauer). Used with permission from
Sinauer Associates. Cortical associative
regions not depicted.
(B): Deep subcortical structures, reprinted
from NeuroImage, Vol. 42, Qui A. and
Miller M. "Multi-Structure Network Shape
Analysis via Normal Surface Momentum
Maps," 1430-1438 (2008), with permission
from Elsevier.
(C)
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(C): Coronal section of the human brain
showing location of claustrum between
the insular cortex and the putamen, a
subcortical structure (from Buchanan and
Johnson, 2011). Seen en face (i.e., from
the side of the brain in the direction of the
green arrow), the outline of the sheet of
tissue composing the claustrum resembles
the shape of the continental United States
in primates. Copyright 2011 The New York
Academy of Sciences; used with
permission from Wiley.
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
Whatever the claustrum and its dense interneural connectivity conjures in the human brain, it, in
itself, is not the seat of the human soul. We should not tread in the errant footsteps of Descartes
by imputing consciousness to a latter-day pineal gland. For one thing, in a small study of rhesus
monkeys, the overriding majority of tested sites in the claustrum responded to unimodal (e.g.,
visual) but not heteromodal (e.g., visual and auditory) input when recordings were obtained
using a multielectrode system. This is consistent with the current belief that with rare
exceptions, there is no “Jennifer Aniston” or “grandmother” neuron in the human brain.
Consciousness is a distributed property of brain function. The claustrum may (or may not be)
necessary for consciousness as we know it, but it is not sufficient. If it is a linchpin of sorts, it
seems more likely that, as proposed by Crick and Koch, interneural connectivity within the
claustrum fosters the binding of the elements of consciousness into an integrated whole through
interactions that mediate and reinforce coordinated activity in widely dispersed regions of the
brain. Of this, more will be said later. Secondly, that the claustrum can’t be the nidus of the soul,
the place where it all “comes together” on the screen, is obvious if one considers the infinite
regress this invites. There is no homunculus who has sunk himself into a recliner within the
wetware of the claustrum, privy to all we experience, for how do we explain his or her
experience? Another more deeply ensconced homonuculus? No, the partition between the
observer and the observed is not an opaque front-lit scrim on the stage, before which a
homunculus passively sits. That can reveal only nothing. It is, rather, a back-lit scrim, upon
which images of our own making dance, images, and, more broadly, phenomenological
experience, that hails from coordinated, far-flung and distributed activation in the brain. The
observed and the observer are one.
But how does all of this happen, exactly? It has been hypothesized that the claustrum may be a
“synchrony detector” (Smythies et al., 2012) that, through its frequently reciprocal connections
with numerous cortical and subcortical structures, amplifies and expands upon those distributed
synchronies as a means of orchestrating conscious awareness. Smythies and colleagues have
suggested that the claustrum, through (a) its detection of synchronous activity in various areas of
the brain, (b) internal amplification of that synchrony through intraclaustral connections that
involve GABAergic interneurons, and (c) projection of augmented signals back to cortex and
subcortical structures with a resultant enhancement of synchrony in those geographically distant
regions, may have a hand at the loom that converts isolated bits of perceptual input into the
tapestry of sensation. While the details of the theory are speculative, there is a definite allure in
the prospect of a “pattern recognition” center in the brain (e.g., the claustrum) which, when
coaxed into a given state by a specific complex of afferent input, amplifies Humphrian
“sensations” that are alloyed into unified experience and conjoined with elements of cognitive
overlay and emotional valence – all reinforced through the reciprocal and distributed
connectivity of the claustrum with cortical and subcortical structures. The numerous reentrant
loops of which this network is composed would, through their orchestrated activity, serve as the
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foundation of human consciousness. Moreover, the synchrony detector may add additional
dimensions to consciousness, enriching it by recruiting activity in brain areas that were not
directly engaged by a primary set of unimodal inputs:. For example: “sound of tiger’s roar” +
“sight of tiger” + “detection of rapid forward motion of the animal” → “intense fear,
physiological changes, and attendant interoceptive sensations.”
The following schematized, incomplete, and simplified diagram may be helpful:
FIGURE 2
Sensory Cortex
(somatosensory, visual,
auditory, etc.)
Claustrum
Heteromodal Sensory Input to
Claustrum
Cortical Long-Term
Memory Cache;
Language Areas
Inferior Temporal
Cortex (shape/pattern)
Limbic System
(Emotion and ShortTerm Declarative
Memory)
Frontal, Prefrontal and
Parietal Cortex
(Agency, Selfhood,
Executive Control,
Attention, Higher
Mental Function)
Inter-neural Network Activation
within Claustrum
Recruitment, Enrichment,
Integration and Amplification of
Synchronized or Coordinated
Activity in Disseminated Brain
Regions through Reciprocal
Connectivity
It should be highlighted that the “Agent” or self in the lowermost box on the left in the diagram
above is not at all insular. This model is not a mosaic composed of autonomous tiles. There can
be no sense of agency without a fabricated world in which the agent exists.
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Claustral cells are connected with each other in several ways. In addition to axonal and dendritic
connections, they may form a functional “syncitium” through what are known as gap junction
linkages. Through such connections, entrained or concomitant afferent input from several
quarters of the brain in response to a given stimulus might trigger a self-reinforced network of
activity within the claustrum that, through its diffuse and reciprocal projections, amplifies and
recruits specific foci of widely distributed brain activity in cortical and subcortical structures.
Thus, heteromodal sensation is bound into experience; emotion and cognition may be bonded to
experience by the claustrum as well. It is very likely, however, that some degree of binding also
occurs in the cortex itself, which is rich in associative areas. The organized hierarchy in the
occipito-temporal cortex, for example, mediates a progressive increase in the degree of
abstraction that supports the act of reading (Dehaene 2009). But, as Smythies and colleagues
suggest, it may be that certain “weak intercortical synchronizations are potentiated and processed
by strong intraclaustral synchronizations.” The entire suite of distributed activity would serve as
the neural substrate for consciousness.
This theoretical framework has strengths and weaknesses. One lethal weakness that it does not
have, however, is the commitment of a “category error” by imputing human consciousness to
activity in a given neural structure in the brain at a particular moment. There is no fixed point or
destination in any neural circuit at which the rubber of consciousness hits the road of a neuron.
Consciousness is the circuit, or, more properly, the amalgam of orchestrated or synchronized
activity within a host of circuits. Someone might say, well that is all well and good, but how
does this translate into what I experience when I look at Woman with a Hat by Matisse at the San
Francisco MOMA? The rebuttal: What you experience is caused by distributed activity in the
brain, perhaps coordinated in the manner outlined above. You are at once “redding” (her hair),
“bluing” in multiple tones (her hat), “shaping” based on the orientation of lines and edges (and
there may be a parsimonious way in which the brain accomplishes the latter), “womaning” at a
higher level of cognitive overlay; and you may be saddened by the downward arc of her lips and
slightly intimidated by the brash and wildly incongruous colors in this fauvist masterpiece.
Perhaps you are also reminded, involuntarily, of an old photo of a long-dead aunt. And, all the
while, contemporaneously, you are “selfing.” The point is, your brain is acting on innumerable
abstract stages, on which performers “view” (the term is used loosely here) themselves and other
performers. The actors and the spectators are one. “Viewing” of the production is an action that
continually invents itself, and not the result of passive information processing by a sedentary
homunculus. And it is the totality of those linked choreographed performances that creates you
and the world you inhabit. You and your maker are one.
One appeal of all of this is its simplistic beauty. This is also a liability. The claustrum is not the
solitary “Grand Central Station” of the brain. There are other concourses, and independent
connectivity of brain regions clearly must play a role. For example, forebrain activity stimulated
by contemplation of an emotionally charged future event activates visceral motor nuclei through
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hypothalamic connections. Emotion and its physiological correlates may, therefore, circumvent
the claustrum entirely in some or, perhaps, many cases.
Where does this leave us, then? Over two thousand years ago, Erasistratus posited the existence
of spiritus animalis within muscle. We now know that electrical stimulation of muscle results in
the intracellular influx of calcium which, in conjunction with two key regulatory proteins, leads
to coordinated cross-bridge cycling of actin and myosin within the chained sarcomeres of muscle
fibers, thereby producing muscle contraction. There is no spiritus animalis in muscle. These
subcellular events explain exactly how muscles contract. In a similar way, distributed brain
events, of infinitely greater complexity, explain experience, cognition, memory and selfhood.
I’ve attempted to emphasize and build a bit on the union of an intriguing, albeit scantily
supported, theory put forth by Crick, Koch, Smythies, Edelstein, and Ramachandran, and a
recent model of phenomenological consciousness adduced by Humphrey. The unified edifice is
architecturally attractive, although Humphrey may beg to differ on this point (unconvinced as he
is of the importance of the claustrum based on personal correspondence), and much remains
unknown. It must be admitted that the data supporting the “integrational” function of the
claustrum are, indeed, quite limited and other pathways must undergird experience as well, even
if the claustrum does enjoy a prominent role. But if the model discussed in this paper proves to
be a phantom, that would be a pity.
Potential Implications of this Model of Consciousness for Poetics
1. Role of the Tools of Poetic Legerdemain in Augmenting Conscious Experience
Poets avail themselves of associative resonances all the time. These associations are “bound” at
varying levels, either personally, culturally, or universally. Quite apart from the connotative
branches and shoots that explode from the bough of denotative meaning, these affiliated
resonances tap the groundwater of emotion and sensation with the implements of sound and
rhythm, line length and configuration, and many other poetic devices. Accents, for example,
packed together stir intensity. Euphony, created by velvet consonants (e.g., m, l, y, w) or soft
vowel sounds elicits pleasure through its mellifluousness. Cacophony, of course, is jarring, and
befitting of its own subjects, perhaps amplifying the meaning of a poem about a murderous flood
or the remote detonation of an improvised explosive device. Anaphora, the repetition of the
same phrase or word at the beginning of stanzas, may hypnotize in the manner of a psalm.
Enjambment may provoke tension or surprise. Similarly, a “reduced line,” consisting of only
one or several words, may call up vehemence, shock, or drama. Polysyndeton (the repetition of
conjunctions such as “and,” of which Hemingway was fond) conveys runaway power and
passion. Like anaphora, it may also mesmerize. Symbolism is grounded in associative meaning,
of course. Rhyme also elicits reactions. Triple rhyme can sound antic or comedic, and feminine
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rhyme is soothing. In all of these cases, might it be that the claustrum binds these devicetriggered associations and sensations to the content of the poem, thereby sharpening meaning?
Future functional MRI studies may provide answers but, for at least one powerful class of poetic
brushes that alter the hue of sensation - namely rhythm and meter - scientific data that have
accrued in recent years enable hypothesis generation that goes beyond mere hand-waving.
Although it would be impractical to completely catalog all forms of poetic sorcery in this paper,
rhythm deserves emphasis as a means by which the poet enlivens the experience of reading a
poem by conscripting bound heteromodal associations between sound and emotion that are
moored to the semantic content of the poem. For example, the pyrrhic foot may confer a balmlike effect in a poem. Conversely, the poet can deploy the brio of the galloping anapestic meter,
the headlong rush of iambic tetrameter, or the, disconcerting, bizarre, and gauche unnaturalness
of dactylic meter2. Poetry inheres in the binding of evoked experience, both phonetic and
semantically derived, with the concentric ripples of memory and affect that attend that coupling.
This is why poetry, for much of its span on earth, was spoken, heard, memorized and recited.
Poetry is phonological and lexical. But how do these rhythmic features of a poem elicit
experiential sensations that transcend the borders of meter itself?
The neurological substrate of rhythm and beat perception has been parsed with various and
progressively more discriminatory tools over the decades.
Both exogenous prompts (e.g.,
volume of a note or an established syllabic accent) and, fascinatingly, endogenous influences
affect our sensation of meter. Factors that color our registration of beat may be unconscious.
For example, perceived accent is affected by the inter-onset interval between notes (Parncutt,
1994). That is to say, obviously noticeable differences in loudness or tone are not alone
accountable for our sensation of rhythm. Furthermore, our take on the rhythm embedded in a
particular series of notes may be consciously modified even in the absence of any external cues
(Iversen et al., 2009; Nozaradan et al., 2011). Willful modulation of beat, in which accent is
imaginatively conferred on an unaccented note, produces objective correlates detectable as
evoked EEG potentials (EPs) or magnetoencephalographic evoked response amplitude
fluctuations in the beta range. What does this all mean? In simple terms, as with other
sensations, we do not merely passively perceive beat and meter (in Humphrey’s sense of the term
“perceive.”). We also create the sensation of beat and meter based on an admixture of objective
and subjective accent. Regions of the brain activated when beat is sensed are rife. EEG scalp
topography reveals generalized distribution of beat-associated EPs across both the left and right
hemispheres. Compared with non-metric auditory stimulation, when perceptual accents occur at
regular intervals, functional neuroimaging reveals differentially enhanced activation in the
supplementary motor area (SMA)/pre-SMA, and bilateral activation in the pallidum, putamen,
caudate, and superior temporal gyrus (Grahn and Brett, 2007). Simply put, the functional grip of
meter on the human brain is far-ranging, and practically every finger of its hand touches a region
of the brain that is also connected to the claustrum (Arikuni 1985; Tanné-Gariépy 2002;
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
Smythies 2012). And, as we have seen before, the claustrum, with its reciprocal/re-entrant
connections, also converses with the parts of the brain involved in other modes of sensation,
memory, and emotion. Is the claustrum a nexus that binds meter to emotion and other
sensations? Grahn and Brett did not include the claustrum as a region of interest in their fMRI
interrogation. Additional study appears warranted.
As before, this is not to say that it “all comes together” in the claustrum. Nor is the claustrum the
only relay station through which the various parts of the brain that are activated by beat may
interact with each other. For example, the pre-SMA and SMA are connected with the basal
ganglia through a separate pathway. Despite this, reasoned inductive hypothesis generation
invites exploration of the role of the claustrum in the “dressing” of meter in its rich experiential
garb.
2. The Lock that Receives the Key to Involuntary Memory
Wallace Stevens, like Proust and others before him3, explored the violent power of involuntarily
evoked memory (e.g., in his “A Dish of Peaches in Russia). In a single spasm, a unimodal sense
impression, or some limited constellation of such sensations, draws from memory a fully
embodied moment or bygone time, cloaked in full polysensory apparel. It is as if the singular
trigger, the isolated bolt of fabric, has taken a lesson in the poetic technique of metonymy,
serving as the emblem of, and key to, a large room that is profusely furnished in byzantine detail.
As with metonomy, in which the naming of a conspicuous and meaningful shred of something
larger serves to encapsulate the whole despite its own diminutive nature, a unimodal sense
impression may be so potent and rich in association that it involuntarily unstops the vial of a
recollected experience in all of its heteromodal sensory complexity. Is the claustrum the lock
that receives this key?
3. Vertiginous vs. Perspectival Poetry
I’ll end with an examination of an insight the theory of consciousness under discussion might
have for “associative” (or, perhaps more appropriately, “dissociative”) poetry, a species of poetry
which has been in vogue for several years now, and which has estranged a number of readers.
The latter form of poetry has been described by Tony Hoagland (2010) as “vertiginous” in an
essay that drives a wedge between traditional “perspectival” poetry, which seeks to provide a
coherent human perspective, and this newer type of poetry, which is disorienting, seemingly
filled with “peacocky randomness” (as Hoagland puts it) and violent juxtapositions that are
meant to reflect a bald questioning of the solidity of human consciousness, knowledge, and
language. Unfortunately, in his essay, Hoagland cites a quote from Wallace Stevens as a banner
defining the philosophy of the poetry of vertigo. In a rejoinder (Sahner 2010), it was argued that
the majority of Stevens’ poetry is perspectival, effectively describing human phenomenological
experience and its limitations in a comprehensible way. In any event, there is great value in
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
Hoagland’s lucid description of the elements of the poetry of vertigo (PV). I would contend,
though, that PV is not completely entropic and haphazard. Unless the poet has truly conjoined
words randomly (and there are means by which to do this without conscious intervention), the
words that find themselves adjacent to each other in PV do so because they have been written by
a human being with a human mind. The associative resonances, however dim and opaque, are
there, at least for the poet who wrote the piece.
Although I am not among them, many contemporary poets find enjoyment in PV but, because
such work is, to many readers, so disorienting, so off-putting and seemingly indulgent, devotees
of perspectival poetry find it alienating. Perspectival poetry has dominated the practice of verse
for thousands of years for good reason. It is approachable, even if a successful approach may
require effort. The reader is able to commune with the writer in a heightened reality made
possible by poetic technique (i.e., trope and other devices). Conversely, practitioners of PV or,
in a similar vein, poetry that purely mines the peculiar associations within the author’s mind
without providing any context to assist the reader, make it difficult or impossible for that
communion. In fact, in order to understand some of these poems, one is left with the impression
that one needs to be the author.
Although the neuroscience is speculative, I would suggest that PV poets give completely free
reign to their unique experiential associations (mediated by claustral connectivity?) without
regard for comprehensibility. Poetry can be thought of as existing on a sliding scale which, at
one pole, is exceedingly difficult to approach or understand and, at the other, is stultifying and
arid.
Poetry of Vertigo → Perspectival Poetry (Fresh and Device-Enhanced) → Greeting Card Verse
At the far left, idiosyncratic and seemingly random associations bleed out onto the page with no
explanation. The middle (within which there are many shades from left to right) is
comprehensible but may require some healthy exertion. The right end of the scale is leaden and
colorless. Emily Dickinson said that “if I feel physically as if the top of my head were taken off,
I know that is poetry.” The precise point on the above scale at which the reader loses his or her
head is a matter of taste, ambition, and sensibility. For most, I think, the center of the blade is
sharpest. Here, associations and observations of experience may be foreign or intellectually
challenging, but they can be assimilated by the careful and susceptible reader. The associations
of consciousness here can be apprehended. Fold in poetic legerdemain (metaphor and many
other techniques), and “centrist” poetry becomes, I would claim, the apotheosis of the form,
namely, poetry that offers an exhilarating union with another intellect. That is the domain of a
long train of poets, including Wallace Stevens, Zbigniew Herbert, Philip Larkin, W. H. Auden,
Yeats, Dickinson, Keats, Shelley, Blake, Donne, Shakespeare, Milton, and others.
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Sahner, D., Whither the Self? The Foundation of Consciousness and its Implications for Poetics
Notes
For additional details, the reader is referred to an excellent recent retrospective on Jaynes’s work by
William Rowe published in the American Journal of Psychology in 2012.
1
2
Mary Kinzie (1999) covers meter extraordinarily well and far more extensively than I have here. Her
keen observations cut to the quick of rhythm in poetry.
Proust’s antecedents in the literary rendering of involuntary memory included both Chateaubriand and
Baudelaire, as noted by Muhlstein (2012)
3
The original photograph in Figure 2 (“Hedge and Fence”) was taken by the author.
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August 2002
arXiv:gr-qc/0208038v3 5 Oct 2002
The Doomsday Argument, Consciousness and
Many Worlds
John F. G. Eastmond1
SSG Development, MP 148,
IBM UK Ltd, Hursley Park,
Winchester, Hampshire S021 2JN,
United Kingdom
Abstract
The doomsday argument is a probabilistic argument that claims
to predict the total lifetime of the human race. By examining the case
of an individual lifetime, I conclude that the argument is fundamentally related to consciousness. I derive a reformulation stating that an
infinite conscious lifetime is not possible even in principle. By considering a hypothetical conscious computer, running a non-terminating
program, I deduce that consciousness cannot be generated by a single
set of deterministic laws. Instead, I hypothesize that consciousness is
generated by a superposition of brain states that is simultaneously associated with many quasi-classical histories, each following a different
set of deterministic laws. I generalize the doomsday argument and
discover that it makes no prediction in this case. Thus I conclude
that the very fact of our consciousness provides us with evidence for
a many-worlds interpretation of reality in which our future is not predictable using anthropic reasoning.
1
E-mail address: johne@uk.ibm.com, jeastmond@tcp.co.uk
1
1
Background
[Einstein] told us once: ‘Life is finite. Time is infinite. The
probability that I am alive today is zero. In spite of this, I am
now alive. Now how is that?’ None of his students had an answer.
After a pause, Einstein said, ‘Well, after the fact, one should not
ask for probabilities.’[1]
In the above quote Einstein presages a currently much-debated application of anthropic reasoning called the doomsday argument. The argument
itself was first conceived by Brandon Carter in the early 1980s and subsequently published by John Leslie[2, 3, 4, 5] and Richard Gott[6, 7]. In essence
one imagines a chronologically ordered list of all the human beings who will
ever live and then asks where one expects to be along that list. Now the argument goes that, a priori, one should expect to be a “non-special” member
of the human race. Thus, in terms of one’s position in the list, one should
not expect to be among those few humans at the beginning or end, but
rather with the majority around the middle of the list. This is basically an
application of the “Copernican principle”[6] to our temporal position along
the lifetime of the human race. Given this assumption, and an estimate of
one’s position from the beginning of the list, one can use the argument to
predict the total number of humans who will ever be born. By estimating
how long it will take for the extra births to occur, it is then possible to make
a prediction of the total lifetime of the human race.
Now the above argument depends crucially on an application of the “principle of indifference” to one’s position within the human race. Let us imagine
a list of arbitrary labels representing every human who will ever live, in order
of birth date. One could state that the principle of indifference immediately
implies that one’s label is equally likely to be located at any position within
that list. This assumption has been criticized by Korb & Oliver[8] and more
recently by Sowers[9]. These authors believe that only some random sampling procedure (like picking balls from an urn) could ensure such a uniform
2
probability distribution. However I contend that this criticism is based on
an incorrect application of the principle of indifference. Instead, given such a
list, the principle implies that one is equally likely to be represented by any of
the labels in that list. The uniform probability distribution for one’s location
then follows from the fact that each label has a unique position associated
with it. In Section 4, I derive this principle of indifference distribution by
reasoning about the ensemble of humans who might find themselves at any
given position within the human race.
It is the premise of this paper that the chink in the doomsday prediction’s armour resides not in the uniform likelihood for one’s position per se
but rather in its extension to the case of an unending human race. As pointed
out in the above quote, it is impossible to extend a uniform probability distribution over an infinite ensemble of possibilities. If one attempts to do
so one obtains the nonsense answer that there is a zero prior probability of
finding oneself at any given position within the human race. Now although
one might question whether an unending human race is physically possible
one must surely concede that it is at least logically possible. Thus I believe
that any valid doomsday-type reasoning must be able to handle the case of
an infinite ensemble of human beings without leading to absurdity. It has
been argued (Leslie, Bostrom private communications) that a uniform probability distribution can be applied to the limiting case of an infinite human
race by assuming an infinitesimal probability of finding oneself at any position within such an ensemble. This is, however, mathematically untenable
because infinitesimal probabilities can only be defined over continuous sets
whereas the set of human beings is discrete.
Thus we are left with the problem of how to apply a uniform prior probability distribution for our birth position to the case of an infinite human
race. Now one approach, following Einstein, is to assert that because we
already know our position in the human race we can no longer reason about
the prior probability that we should have found ourselves at that position.
A similar point was made by Dyson[10] in his review of Leslie’s book The
3
End of the World. To me this statement seems to deny the possibility of any
type of Bayesian reasoning at all. Following Rev. Bayes’s prescription one’s
prior probabilities should be updated to posterior probabilities conditional
on learning any new piece of data. The applicability of this rule surely does
not depend on the time at which it is applied. The fact that one is not around
to formulate prior probabilities before one is born surely does not preclude
one from formulating such probabilities after one’s birth and then conditionalizing this knowledge with one’s measured position within the human race.
An instructive way of approaching this problem is to ask how much information one gains on finding one’s birth position within the human race. Now it
seems an undeniable fact that one does gain a certain amount of information
on measuring one’s birth position n. Given that the amount of information
gained depends on one’s prior probability for the value of n, this implies that
prior probabilities for one’s birth position must exist even though one was
not around to reason about them before one’s birth.
2
Introduction
In this paper I investigate the doomsday argument in terms of information
in an attempt to understand how the reasoning used in the case of a finite
ensemble can be carried over to the problematic infinite case. I start, in
Section 3, by deriving the doomsday prediction for a finite population size.
In doing so I note an important difference between Leslie’s and Gott’s formulation of the argument. In Leslie’s formulation the prior probability is
left unspecified so that the doomsday argument is seen to consist solely of
the change in one’s beliefs on learning of one’s position in the human race.
In Gott’s formulation[7], however, a specific prior is used that represents our
complete prior ignorance of the total lifetime of the human race. I argue that
Leslie’s formulation fails due to a reason first suggested by Dieks[11], and further developed by Kopf, Krtous and Page[12], Bartha and Hitchcock[13] and
in particular Olum[14]. The problem is that if one uses any prior, other than
4
the “vague” prior suggested by Gott, one finds that the doomsday shift in
probabilities is cancelled out by the effect of the increased likelihood of being
born in a large population.
Having derived the doomsday prediction in terms of the human race, I
apply doomsday reasoning to the lifetime of a single conscious observer. This
might seem like a rather bold abstraction but I believe that the situation is
entirely analogous to that of the human race and brings out the previously
under-reported role that conscious awareness plays in the doomsday argument. The only difference between the classic doomsday scenario and the
application of doomsday reasoning to the lifetime of an observer is that in
the former case one imagines a chronologically ordered list of human beings whereas in the latter case one pictures a sequence of the observer’s
“moments” of consciousness (see Bostrom[15] for the related proposal of
“observer-moments”). Following Gott, we regard the doomsday argument
as ab initio reasoning so that we ignore any prior statistical information we
have about the lifetimes of actual human observers.
In Section 4, I argue that, on consciously “finding” himself in his current
moment, the observer gains information about the ensemble of conscious moments that make up his lifetime. Now I realize that the term “consciousness”
can be defined in a number of ways. In this paper the term refers solely to
the basic act of awareness of something. By actually having some determinate experience an event takes place that can be labelled with a unique time.
I contend that the associated perception of “now”, the current moment, is
a fundamental aspect of consciousness shared by all conscious beings. By
demonstrating that the amount of information that an observer gains on
finding himself in his current moment does not depend on the location of
that moment, I derive the principle of indifference result that, a priori, one
is equally likely to be in any moment along one’s lifetime. In Section 5, I
attempt to apply this reasoning to the case of an infinite lifetime. I find that,
on the one hand, in discovering his current moment out of an infinite ensemble of moments, the observer should gain an infinite amount of information.
5
But, on the other hand, I argue that such a state of affairs is not logically
possible. Thus I conclude that an infinite conscious lifetime is not possible
in principle.
Now, in Section 6, I argue that this result has profound implications. I
consider the hypothetical case of a classical computer that, by running a
particular program, experiences conscious awareness as a “by-product” of
its operation. Now by the doomsday result above such a program must
only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. But I argue that
if a program exists that allows a computer to generate a finite sequence
of conscious moments then there seems no reason why the same program
cannot be modified to generate an infinite sequence of moments. I conclude
that the only way out of this impasse is to deny that a classical computer
can experience consciousness in the first place. This statement is equivalent
to asserting that consciousness cannot be generated by a set of deterministic
laws. Now, given that we ourselves are conscious, this result implies that our
brains must operate, at least partly, in a non-deterministic manner.
In an effort to understand this non-determinism further I postulate that
it is equivalent to asserting that conscious awareness is generated by many
different sets of deterministic laws operating simultaneously. In Section 7,
I argue that such a conception of reality is implied by the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics in which time is no longer linear but
instead has a branching structure. In Section 8, I hypothesize that in order
to modify the doomsday argument to accommodate this scenario one simply
needs to lift the assumption, implicit in the Bayesian probability calculation,
that the observer’s present moment is associated with only one future with
some definite total number of conscious moments. By assuming instead that
the present moment is associated with an ensemble of many actually occurring futures, weighted by Gott’s prior function, I find that the doomsday
argument fails to make any prediction about which future the observer will
experience. Thus I conclude that the very fact of our consciousness can only
be explained within a many-worlds ontology. Moreover, when the doomsday
6
argument is generalized to take such a view of reality into account, it fails to
make any predictions about the future.
3
The Doomsday Prediction
As conventionally applied, the doomsday argument purports to predict the
total size of the human race, N, given one’s birth position, n, within it. In
doing so one implicitly makes the assumption that one’s present position is
associated with one unknown, but finite, future total population size. One
first imagines a finite chronologically ordered list of labels representing all the
humans who will ever be born. Next one argues that, a priori, one is equally
likely to be represented by any one of those labels. Now, as pointed out in
Section 2, this is an application of the principle of indifference. I show in the
next section that this crucial assumption can be derived by reasoning about
the symmetry properties of the probability of finding oneself at any given
position. One proceeds by considering an ensemble of N hypotheses, each
one specifying that a different human is located at that position. The fact
that all the hypotheses are completely equivalent implies that each should
be assigned the same prior probability. Thus the prior likelihood that one
should find oneself at any position n, given that there will be a total of N
humans altogether, P (n | N), is 1/N. Now this derivation of the principle
of indifference suggests that it is in the act of consciously perceiving one’s
present moment that one gains information rather than from learning one’s
birth position per se. Even before learning of one’s birth position, one can
argue that the very fact that one is alive at this particular time differentiates
one, in principle, from all the other humans. The prior likelihood of this
event, regardless of one’s birth position, is 1/N. Thus, as mentioned in
the previous section, the doomsday argument is intimately linked with the
phenomenon of conscious awareness.
Now the doomsday argument uses Bayesian probability theory to provide
its prediction of the total population size, N, given one’s birth position n. One
7
considers a set of exclusive hypotheses for N and then calculates how one’s
prior probabilities for these hypotheses change on learning one’s position n.
Let us start our derivation of the doomsday prediction by considering two
equivalent expressions for the combined probability of n and N, P (n ∧ N),
given by
P (n ∧ N) = P (N | n) P (n) = P (n | N) P (N).
This expression can be rearranged to give Bayes’s theorem
P (N | n) =
P (n | N) P (N)
,
P (n)
where P (N | n) is the posterior probability of a total population size N given
that one finds oneself born at position n, P (n | N) is the likelihood of finding
oneself at position n given a total population size N, and P (n), P (N) are
the prior probabilities of n and N respectively. We have shown already that
P (n | N), the likelihood of finding oneself at birth position n given that there
will be N births altogether, is given by the principle of indifference so that
we have
1
P (n | N) = .
N
In order to use Bayes’s theorem to calculate P (N | n), the posterior
probability of a total population size N, given our birth position n, we also
need some prior probability distribution for N, P (N). Now, as noted in
Section 2, a number of authors, such as Leslie[5] and Bostrom[16], regard the
doomsday argument as depending solely on the shift of probabilities induced
by the likelihood P (n | N) = 1/N regardless of the form of the prior P (N).
This position has been shown to be untenable by a number of other authors,
most recently Olum[14]. He reasoned that the data inherent in finding oneself
at some position within the human race comprises not simply the information
that you are located at that position but also that you were actually born in
the first place. Thus the likelihood that one should use in Bayes’s theorem
is P (n ∧ B | N), the probability of both finding oneself born and located at
position n within a population of size N, given by
P (n ∧ B | N) = P (n | B, N) P (B | N),
8
where P (B | N) is the probability of being born anywhere in a population
of size N and P (n | B, N) is the probability of finding oneself at position
n given that one has been born into a population of size N. By assuming
that P (n ∧ B | N) = P (n | N), Leslie and Bostrom make the implicit prior
assumption that one is certain to be born somewhere within the population.
Let us see the effect of lifting this restriction. We start by assuming any
normalizable prior for N, P (N). Given such a prior P (N) there must exist
some length scale L such that the probability that N is less than L, P (N < L),
is larger than any given confidence limit. On the assumption of a set of all
possible humans, of size L, one can argue that the probability, P (B | N), of
being a member of the subset of actual humans, of size N, is given by
P (B | N) =
N
.
L
Thus the larger the population size the more chance one has of being born.
When one combines this result with the principle of indifference expression
for the original doomsday likelihood, P (n | B, N) = 1/N, one finds that
P (n ∧ B | N) =
1 N
· .
N L
The two contributions to the overall likelihood of being born at position n
cancel each other out. Thus as soon as one considers any particular normalizable prior P (N) the doomsday shift in one’s posterior for N given n,
P (N | n), disappears.
Olum argued that this fact demolishes the doomsday argument but in fact
there is one prior that is immune to the above reasoning. This prior is the
so-called vague prior P (N) = 1/N, first described by Jeffreys[17], which has
been extensively used to represent complete prior ignorance of a scale variable (e.g. Hesselbo and Stinchcombe[18]). In order to sketch a justification
for this prior we note that, according to algorithmic information theory[19],
the intrinsic probability of any binary string is defined by the smallest program that will generate that string. Now the size of such a program must be
less than the length of the string itself. Thus the program required to specify
9
the binary representation of N must be less than approximately log2 N bits
in length. This implies that the intrinsic probability of N, P (N), must be
greater than 1/N. Thus the vague prior is not so much a probability distribution but rather a “template” for a distribution. Now, as this prior is
scaleless (it is invariant under a change of scale) and non-normalizable, no
scale L exists that allows one to argue that P (B | N) = N/L. This implies
that one cannot argue that the probability of being born is proportional to
the size of the population and so consequently there is no factor of N to
cancel out the principle of indifference term P (n | B, N) = 1/N.
Gott’s Bayesian formulation[7] of the doomsday argument survives
Olum’s attack because it implicitly assumes that we have no prior knowledge
about N so that we should represent our knowledge with the vague prior. Let
us return to our original Bayesian formulation for the posterior for N given
n, P (N | n), given by
P (N | n) =
P (n | N) P (N)
.
P (n)
Assuming the vague priors P (N) = 1/N and P (n) = 1/n, together with the
doomsday likelihood P (n | N) = 1/N, we find that
P (N | n) =
n
.
N2
This posterior is a perfectly proper probability distribution and represents
real knowledge about N even though we started with a prior that was not
normalizable. By integrating the above expression one can calculate the
probability that N is less than some limit M, P (N < M), as
P (N < M) = 1 −
n
.
M
By substituting M = 10n in the above expression, one derives a standard
doomsday prediction to the effect that there is a 90% probability that the
total size of the human race, N, will be less than ten times the number of
humans who have been born so far.
10
4
Derivation of the Principle of Indifference
As mentioned in the previous section, the doomsday argument relies crucially
on the principle of indifference applied to one’s position within the human
race. This implies that, given a finite list of all the humans who will ever
live, and assuming no other prior knowledge, one assumes that one is equally
likely to be anywhere within that list. As described previously, the principle
of indifference can be derived by considering the ensemble of humans who
could “find” themselves at a given position within the list. I contend that,
in the very act of consciously perceiving “now”, one gains information about
the ensemble of human beings. In this section we use symmetry principles
and an information theory approach to derive the principle of indifference in
the context of a single conscious observer.
Let us assume that the observer is equipped with a clock and that his
conscious experience lasts for N intervals of time. We term each interval of
consciousness a “moment” so that the observer’s awareness is discretized into
a time-ordered sequence of N conscious moments. One starts by considering
the amount of information that the observer gains on finding himself in his
current conscious moment. The amount of information he gains depends on
his initial knowledge of the situation. We assume that his prior knowledge
consists solely of the assumption that he will experience a total of N conscious
moments altogether. Let us suppose that, while in his current conscious
moment, and before he has noted the time, the observer considers some
particular time interval n. He reasons that either his current moment is
located in interval n or one of the other conscious moments is located in that
interval. As the observer knows nothing more about these N possibilities,
I assert that his prior knowledge must simply be represented by a list of N
arbitrary labels, each one representing a conscious moment that might be
located in interval n.
Now the observer considers the conscious moment that is actually located
in interval n. He assigns p1 and p2 to be the probabilities that the label C,
representing this moment, is in the first and second half of the list respec11
tively. Let us assume that the observer swaps the two halves of the list over.
He assigns p∗1 and p∗2 be the probabilities that the label C is in the first and
second half of the resulting list. This second list of labels represents the
observer’s initial knowledge just as adequately as the first one. The prior
probabilities for the position of label C depend entirely on the observer’s
initial knowledge which in turn is represented by an arbitrarily ordered list
of labels. As a transposition of an arbitrary list is also an arbitrary list then
both represent the same knowledge which in turn implies that the two sets
of probabilities must be identical so that we have
p∗1 = p1 and p∗2 = p2 .
Now the observer also knows that the probability that label C is in a set of
labels should “travel” with that set of labels in the transposition operation.
Thus in order to maintain consistency between the two sets of probabilities
it must also be the case that
p∗1 = p2 and p∗2 = p1 .
Combining these two sets of equations we find that
p∗1 = p∗2 and p1 = p2 .
Thus the observer must assign equal prior probabilities to label C being
in either half of an arbitrary list of labels. This implies that, on learning in
which half of an arbitrary list label C resides, the observer gains precisely
one bit of information. Now this reasoning can be applied again to a list
comprising the half of the original list that contained label C. The observer
will again assign equal probabilities to label C being in either half of this new
list. On learning which half contains label C the observer will gain another
bit of information. In general, starting with an arbitrarily ordered list of
N labels, this process must be repeated log2 N times in order to specify a
particular label uniquely.
Now let us suppose that, on consulting the clock, the observer finds that
his current conscious moment is actually located in time interval n. This
12
is equivalent to his current moment being specified uniquely from amongst
an arbitrarily ordered ensemble of N conscious moments that could have
found themselves in interval n. Thus, in finding himself in interval n, the
observer gains log2 N bits of information. As each bit is equivalent to a
probability factor of 1/2, this implies that P (n | N), the prior probability
that the observer finds himself in any interval n conditional on there being
N conscious moments altogether, is given by
P (n | N) =
1
.
N
This is the well-known principle of indifference but here it has been derived
in a rigorous manner following the symmetry arguments of Jaynes[20].
5
The Infinite Lifetime Paradox
Now, as mentioned in Section 3, in following the doomsday argument one
makes the implicit assumption that the human race will be finite in size.
Accordingly, in the previous section, we derived the principle of indifference
by considering the case of a single observer experiencing a finite conscious
lifetime. We now wish to examine the case in which the observer experiences
a countable infinity of conscious moments. Although this scenario might
seem physically infeasible there is no reason why we should not consider it in
principle. In fact, as pointed out in Section 1, as soon as one tries to apply
the principle of indifference to such a case one comes up against the problem
of extending a uniform probability distribution over an infinite ensemble of
possibilities.
In order to investigate this problem further we shall attempt to extend
the reasoning we used in the previous section to the case of an infinite conscious lifetime. As in the case of a finite lifetime, let us consider the ensemble
of conscious moments that might be located in the time interval n. Again,
as the observer knows nothing more about these moments he can only represent them by an infinite set of arbitrary labels. Now in the case of the
13
finite ensemble, as described in the previous section, the observer considered
the labels arranged in an ordered list. This situation implies a one-to-one
mapping between each label and each integer from 1 to N. In order to reason
about an infinite ensemble we shall assume instead that the observer’s initial
knowledge is represented by an arbitrary one-to-one mapping between each
label and each rational number in the interval (0, 1]. This is feasible because
such rational numbers form a countably infinite set.
Now, as before, the observer considers the conscious moment that is actually located in interval n. The label C, representing this moment, is mapped
to a rational number in either the first or second half of the interval (0, 1].
As in the case of the finite list of labels we can imagine a transposition of the
mapping such that all labels that were mapped to rationals in (0, 1/2] are
now mapped to rationals in (1/2, 1] and vice-versa. Again both mappings
represent the observer’s initial knowledge equally well so that he should use
the same probability distribution for the position of label C under both mappings. Combining the need for consistency between the probability distributions with the above symmetry requirement leads the observer to reason that
label C is equally likely to be mapped to either half of the interval (0, 1]. This
again implies that, on learning to which half of the interval (0, 1] label C is
mapped, the observer gains one bit of information. As in the finite case, the
above reasoning can be reapplied to the half of the interval that contains the
rational number mapped to label C. On learning in which half of this new
interval label C resides the observer gains another bit of information. Now
one can see that in contrast to the case of a finite list the above process does
not terminate.
Let us assume that the observer actually does find himself in some finite
time interval n given the assumption that an infinite ensemble of conscious
moments will eventually exist, any one of which might have been located in
that time interval. As argued above, this situation is equivalent to indicating
a rational number in the interval (0, 1] by specifying whether the number is
in the first or second half of a sequence of successively smaller intervals. The
14
amount of information that the observer would gain from his perception of
his current moment, in such circumstances, must be larger than any finite
number of bits. This seems to imply that, in the act of finding himself at
some point within an infinite conscious lifetime, the observer gains an infinite
number of bits of information.
This situation seems reminiscent of one of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion in
which a runner travelling from A to B has first to cover half the distance
between the two points. But in order to cover this half-distance he has to
first travel half of the half-distance and so on. Zeno’s problem is generally
not regarded as a paradox nowadays because it is known that an infinite sum
of exponentially decreasing lengths does actually converge to a finite distance. However it is my contention that one does run into a paradox when
one considers the observer’s perception of his current moment of consciousness within an infinite ensemble of such moments. As shown earlier such
a moment would require an infinite-sized bitstring to specify it from within
the countably infinite set of conscious moments. The paradox arises because
there are in fact infinitely more infinite-sized binary strings than there are
countable conscious moments.
One can see that the set of infinite-sized binary strings is at least larger
than any countable set by using Cantor’s diagonal slash argument. This
involves first assuming the contrary position, namely that it is possible to
uniquely assign each infinite-sized binary string to each successive integer.
Now given such a list of binary strings it is possible to construct a new binary
string that differs from the first string in the first binary digit, the second
string in the second binary digit and so on. This new binary string cannot
be anywhere in the original list and so we have shown that there is at least
one more infinite-sized binary string than there are integers. Now this is a
problem because in order for the binary strings to be interpreted as bitstrings
(i.e. strings of characters representing equally likely binary events) there
must be a strict one-to-one correspondence between each string and each
countable conscious moment. Thus we are left with a contradiction. On the
15
one hand we have shown that, on finding himself in some time interval n, the
observer must gain an amount of information larger than any finite number
of bits; this implies a countable infinity of bits. On the other hand we can see
that the set of infinite-sized binary strings is too large for them to represent
bitstrings over the countable set of conscious moments.
Now one could take this result at face value and declare that it simply
implies that, on the assumption of an infinite lifetime, no prior probability assignment exists for the event of finding oneself at a particular position within
that lifetime. But, as we have demonstrated above, one can at least argue for
a succession of increasing lower bounds to the amount of information gained
from such an event. Due to the inverse relationship between information and
probability this result translates into a sequence of decreasing upper bounds
for the prior probability. Thus, on finding oneself at some position within
an infinite lifetime, one can argue that one’s prior probability for this event
is less than any given value which implies that it must have some non-zero
numerical assignment. Paradoxically, also as shown above, such a probability
assignment cannot exist. I contend that the only way to avoid this dilemma
is to deny that an infinite ensemble of conscious moments is possible even in
principle.
6
The Hypothetical Conscious Computer
Now this result has fundamental implications for the theory of mind. Let us
imagine that our conscious observer is a classical system operating according
to a set of deterministic laws. It has been conjectured[21] that the behaviour
of such a system can always be simulated by a classical computer executing
some finite-sized program. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume
that our observer is a classical computer that, by virtue of executing a particular program, generates a sequence of conscious moments. It should be
noted that, strictly, we are taking an “epiphenomenal” philosophical stance
in that we assume that the computer’s conscious awareness is a continuously
16
generated by-product that does not interfere with its deterministic operation.
As the computer’s behaviour is completely determined by its program, we
have two scenarios: either the program generates a finite number of conscious
moments or it produces an infinite number.
Now, as demonstrated in the previous section, the scenario of an infinite
conscious lifetime leads to paradox. Thus, on the assumption that a computer
experiences conscious awareness, this result implies that its program must
only generate a finite sequence of conscious moments. But we know that this
conclusion is absurd. We can always imagine a simple modification to the
program so that, after generating its finite sequence of conscious moments,
it resets the computer’s memory and re-executes itself. It seems clear that if
the original program generates conscious awareness then the modified version
should also generate a sequence of conscious moments comprising the original
finite sequence endlessly repeating. Now one could argue that as such a
repeating sequence only consists of a finite number of subjectively distinct
moments then one still has a finite-sized ensemble of possibilities. In fact as
the computer is a physical machine that dissipates energy with time then,
according to the second law of thermodynamics, the entropy of the system
comprising the computer and its environment should continually increase.
As each conscious moment is then associated with a different configuration
of the system as a whole then each one is, in principle, unique. Thus we again
run into the infinite lifetime paradox. If the computer, while running such
a program, finds itself in any given time interval then its current conscious
moment is specified from within an infinite ensemble of unique moments that
could have occupied that time interval. Again a contradiction arises in that
the computer would gain an amount of information that, while larger than
any finite number, cannot consistently be assigned an infinite value.
It is my contention that the only way out of this dilemma is to deny the
initial assumption that a classical computer running a particular program can
generate conscious awareness in the first place. This assertion is equivalent
to stating that the phenomenon of consciousness cannot be fully described by
17
any set of deterministic laws. Now we know, of course, that we are conscious
(Descartes and all that!). Thus we arrive at the conclusion that our brains
cannot operate purely on the basis of a set of deterministic laws. How can
one understand this “non-deterministic” nature of consciousness further?
7
Chaotic Observers and Consistent Histories
I propose that in order to understand consciousness we need to consider a
quantum-mechanical view of reality in which the instantaneous state of the
brain is described by a superposition whose subsequent behaviour is represented by many sets of deterministic laws. This scenario can be understood
in terms of the consistent histories approach[22, 23] to quantum theory, in
which, through interaction with the rest of the Universe, the evolving wave
function of a system continually decoheres into a mixture of quasi-classical
histories. Now, in general, one can describe the state of a physical system by
using a multi-dimensional configuration space in which each point represents
the spatial positions of all the particles that make up the system. In classical
physics the instantaneous state of a system is described by one point in configuration space. The time evolution of such a system is then represented by
a single curve or history through that point, the shape of which is governed
by deterministic laws comprising the classic “laws of physics” together with
their “initial conditions”.
In contrast, the instantaneous state of a quantum system is described by
a complex-valued wave function that can extend over the whole of configuration space. The wave function of an isolated quantum system then evolves
as a coherent whole following the rules of quantum dynamics. Now this behaviour is altered if the quantum system interacts with its environment. In
this case the wave function quickly loses its long- range phase coherence so
that it evolves into a mixture of wave packets that are localized around each
point in configuration space[24]. As each of these wave packets is localized in
18
configuration space then, due to the uncertainty principle, each must be delocalized in momentum space. Thus there is a tendency for each wave packet
to spread out coherently before being broken up again into decoherent parts
by interaction with the environment. In general, the time evolution of such
a system takes the form of an overlapping continuum of constantly ramifying histories through configuration space, each one following approximately
classical dynamics.
Now it has been pointed out by Stapp[25] that attempts to explain, entirely within quantum theory, the single quasi-classical history experienced
by an observer have so far foundered on the “preferred basis problem”. In
order that quantum theory can provide a probabilistic prediction for which
quasi-classical history an observer experiences one requires a discrete set of
orthogonal quasi-classical histories that span the space of all such histories.
In this section I propose that the divergent quasi-classical histories of certain
chaotic systems might fulfil these requirements. Thus I am led to the tentative conclusion that human beings are conscious observers by virtue of the
chaotic functioning of their brains (I’m tempted to say that I arrived at this
hypothesis through introspection!).
In order to understand the special qualities of chaotic systems it is necessary first to review the behaviour of non-chaotic ones. Therefore let us consider that archetypal regular classical system, the clockwork mechanism. As
mentioned before, the time evolution of such a classical system is described by
a single history through configuration space. Now, in reality, Nature follows
the rules of quantum mechanics. Thus even a clockwork mechanism should,
in principle, be represented by a wave function in configuration space. If we
assume that the mechanism interacts with the environment then its wave
function will decohere into an overlapping mixture of localized wave packets. Each wave packet describes a superposition of clockwork mechanisms,
whose components differ slightly in position, orientation and detailed structure. Now we assume that the mechanism is rigidly constructed so that any
configuration in which its structure is significantly distorted has a high poten-
19
tial energy. As each wave packet spreads it is confined to one definite path
through configuration space bounded by these high energy configurations.
Thus the time evolution of the clockwork mechanism follows a continuum of
linear quasi-classical histories whose shapes are governed by a single algorithm embodied in the rigid structure of the mechanism itself.
Now let us imagine a system whose evolution in time depends sensitively
on its initial state. This is the hallmark of “chaotic” behaviour in classical
dynamics. The instantaneous state of such a classical system is still represented by a point in configuration space and its time evolution represented
by a single curve through that point. Thus, in principle, its behaviour is no
different from that of a non-chaotic classical system. However, in practice,
the difference between the two systems is manifest in the non-predictability
of the chaotic system compared to the regular system, given that its initial
state can only be specified to some finite degree of accuracy. For instance,
one can imagine a pair of identical chaotic systems evolving from slightly
different initial conditions, represented by a pair of closely separated points
in configuration space. The curves representing these two systems diverge
exponentially so that they subsequently behave in a very different manner.
Now we assume that the rules of quantum mechanics should hold for all
physical systems. Thus, in reality, our chaotic system should be represented
as a wave function in configuration space. Again, on interaction with the
environment, this wave function decoheres into a mixture of localized wave
packets each representing a superposition of chaotic systems, whose components vary slightly in location, orientation and detailed structure. However,
in contrast to the clockwork mechanism, a chaotic system does not have a
rigid construction so that configurations with significant distortions are not
energetically disfavoured. Thus each wave packet can spread in all directions
unhindered by high energy configurations. These extended wave packets are
decohered by the environment so that the time evolution of the chaotic system follows a continuum of divergent branching quasi-classical histories.
Now let us consider Stapp’s stipulation that, in order to describe an ob-
20
server’s experiences, one requires a discrete set of orthogonal histories. We
have seen that the time evolution of the clockwork mechanism consists of
a continuum of parallel histories so that such a system does not meet our
requirements. The time evolution of a chaotic system, however, comprises
a continuum of divergent histories that quickly become orthogonal to each
other. Now I contend that each quasi-classical history is, in essence, a record
of a calculation. Thus each history can be represented uniquely by the smallest program, in a given computer language, that performs that calculation.
In the case of the clockwork mechanism all the histories are described by
the one program embodied in the mechanism’s design. In the case of the
chaotic system, however, there are many qualitatively distinct histories corresponding to different programs. Furthermore, since the set of programs
is denumerable, the set of qualitatively distinct histories must be discrete.
Thus a chaotic system seems to meet Stapp’s basic criteria for a quantummechanical observer.
It has been proposed[26] that fundamental aspects of the brain’s functioning might well be chaotic in nature. In contrast to a clockwork mechanism,
whose rigid structure precludes any small deviations in its instantaneous
state from affecting its prescribed behaviour, the brain might be “soft” in
the sense that its structure does not provide a barrier against such deviations
magnifying into subsequent large-scale behaviour. In a classical world such
behaviour would not be qualitatively distinct from that of a regular system
as both, in principle, can be simulated to an arbitrary degree of accuracy
by a computer executing a single program[27]. In reality, however, as the
brain is a quantum-mechanical system interacting with its environment, its
time evolution should be represented by an ensemble of continually branching qualitatively distinct histories, each corresponding to a different program.
Such a set of histories form a branching tree-like structure so that, from the
vantage point of any localized wave packet describing an instantaneous state
of the brain, there are many future paths but only one past. Thus I hypothesize that the current moment of consciousness is simultaneously associated
21
with all the quasi-classical histories that go through its corresponding wave
packet.
Now, Tegmark has argued[28] that the decoherence timescale for the brain
must be orders of magnitude less than its dynamical timescale. According to
Clarke’s stability criterion[29], this fact seems to preclude superpositions of
brain states from playing a part in conscious experience. In fact, according
to Joos and Zeh[24], only the long-range phase correlations in a system’s
wave function decohere quickly leaving a mixture of localized Gaussian wave
packets that are stable with respect to further interactions with the environment. I contend that it is the superposition of microscopically different brain
states represented by a wave packet that survives to become simultaneously
associated with all the decohereing quasi-classical histories that branch from
its region of configuration space.
8
Many-Worlds Resolution of the Doomsday
Argument
The doomsday argument makes the implicit assumption that only one quasiclassical history will actually exist so that one’s current moment is only
associated with one set of moments with a definite size. In order to avoid
the infinite lifetime paradox, described in Section 5, we must assume that
this set is finite. We have seen that any such history can be simulated by a
classical computer running an appropriate program. Thus if a finite set of
conscious moments is associated with only one history then the program that
simulates that history should also generate the same set of moments. Now, as
discussed in Section 6, given a program that generates a finite set of moments
one can always construct a similar program that, in principle, generates an
infinite set of moments. I contend that the only way to avoid the ensuing
infinite lifetime paradox is to abandon the assumption that a particular quasiclassical history, or its equivalent program, can generate conscious awareness.
Now this result precludes any interpretation of quantum theory in which
22
exclusive probabilities are assigned to the set of quasi-classical histories. Such
an assignment would imply that only one of the histories actually occurs
which, together with the fact of our consciousness, leads to the paradox
described above. Instead we must assume that our current moment is simultaneously associated with many quasi-classical histories. This implies that
our current moment is a member of many sets of moments simultaneously.
Thus, following the many-worlds interpretation[30, 31, 32], we assume that
the rules of quantum theory only provide an ensemble weight for each decoherent quasi- classical history. Thus the instantaneous state of the system
comprising one’s brain and its environment determines the ensemble weight
of all the subsequent quasi-classical histories that will be experienced by different versions of oneself. In a sense one’s “free-will” is preserved in that
one has the freedom to do otherwise than one did (in fact a version of you
did do otherwise) but also the ensemble weights of the subsequent actions of
versions of oneself are influenced by one’s “nature” as defined by one’s initial
brain state. Following the spirit of the doomsday argument as metaphysical
reasoning, we do not have the details of the initial system state that would
allow us to calculate the ensemble weights of its subsequent histories. Instead we need to assume some “template” weight function, W (N), for the
total weight of histories associated with N conscious moments. We already
have a very natural candidate: the scaleless vague prior function given by
W (N) =
1
.
N
Now let us reconsider the original doomsday argument calculation. By
applying Bayes’s theorem, we found that our posterior probability distribution, P (N | n), for the set of exclusive hypotheses about the population size
N, is given by the relation
P (N | n) ∝ P (n | N) P (N),
where the distribution P (N) represents our prior probabilities over the set
of hypotheses and P (n | N) is the likelihood of finding ourselves in moment
23
n given a particular hypothesis for N. Now the above calculation is only
valid for a set of exclusive hypotheses for N so that P (N) represents a prior
distribution of exclusive probabilities. But, as mentioned previously, in the
many-worlds view each moment is associated with many actually occurring
quasi-classical histories that correspond to different population sizes N. Thus
in this scenario our prior distribution W (N) represents a set of ensemble
weights for each value of N.
Let us assume that each quasi-classical history of the brain is correlated
with a particular finite set of N conscious moments. In doing this we do not
assume that a particular history is sufficient, in itself, to generate that set of
conscious moments but rather that it is a necessary factor. One can use the
principle of indifference to argue that the probability, P (n | N), of finding
oneself at moment n within this set of N conscious moments, is given by
1
P (n | N) = .
N
Now although each history is associated with only one set of conscious
moments, each moment is associated with many histories and consequently
many sets of moments. In order to calculate the total probability of finding
oneself in any moment, one needs to add the probability contributions from
all the sets that contain that moment. Thus the probability of finding oneself in moment n, P (n), is given by the sum of all principle of indifference
terms, P (n | N), associated with each history with a particular value of N,
multiplied by the weight function for such histories, W (N), so that we have
P (n) =
∞
X
P (n | N) W (N).
N =n
If we substitute in our expression for the principle of indifference, P (n | N) =
1/N, and our vague prior weight function W (N) = 1/N we find
P (n) =
∞
X
1
.
2
N =n N
By approximating the above sum with an integral we find that
1
P (n) = .
n
24
Now as this probability distribution is the vague prior function again, the
calculation shows that conditionalizing on the assumption that our current
moment is a member of many sets of moments simultaneously does not alter
our initial ignorance about our position, which is also represented by the
vague prior. In other words, on finding ourselves in moment n, rather than
gaining information about the total lifetime N that we will experience, we
instead simply gain the amount of information implicit in the number n
itself, which is never more than log2 n bits. The only difference between
this many-worlds calculation and the original doomsday calculation is that
the condition of exclusivity between hypotheses for the total population size
has been lifted. It seems that in generalizing Gott’s Copernican principle[6],
namely that one should not expect to be located at a “special” position
within a particular population, to cover the case where one is located within
many versions of the population simultaneously, one finds that it loses its
predictive power.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to the fact that this generalized
version of the Copernican principle naturally accommodates an infinite set
of possibilities for the position of one’s current moment while at the same
time avoiding the absurdity inherent in the assumption of an infinite lifetime. This is achieved by hypothesizing that, in principle, one’s current
conscious moment is associated with all the quasi-classical histories that go
through its region of configuration space, each history only being correlated
with consciousness over a finite section of its length. As we only ever apply
the principle of indifference over finite sections of histories then we never
encounter the problem of extending a uniform probability distribution over
an infinite interval. But if we assume, a priori, that all histories exist then
this implies that, for any given finite conscious lifetime N, there is always a
history that is correlated with a finite lifetime larger than N. Thus one can
see that our many-worlds viewpoint, while denying the possibility of an infinite conscious lifetime, refrains from imposing an upper limit to the position
of one’s current moment within a lifetime.
25
One could criticize this analysis for being based on the vague prior weight
function. As mentioned previously, this function is only a template for the
actual normalizable weight distribution determined by the initial quantum
state of the system comprising one’s brain and its environment. In fact, one
can argue that the set of actual weight distributions can be divided into two
classes: those with a finite upper bound for N and those without an upper
bound. If the distribution of conscious lifetimes is bounded then this implies
that a quantum simulation of the system as a whole, after running for a finite
amount of time, would produce no more conscious awareness. Now if this
were the case one could, in principle, continually re-run this finite simulation
so as to produce a set of infinite conscious lifetimes. As this possibility
leads to the infinite lifetime paradox again I speculate that the actual weight
distribution of lifetimes associated with any conscious moment cannot have
an upper bound. This result would give credence to an actual “quantum
immortality” of the form described above.
9
Conclusions
The doomsday argument, in its original formulation, uses the principle of
indifference to predict the lifetime of the human race given our position within
it. When applied to the lifetime of a single observer, considered as a sequence
of “moments”, one appreciates that the argument actually depends on the
observer’s conscious awareness. By considering the case of an infinite lifetime
I derive contradictory conditions on the amount of information gained on
“finding” oneself within such an ensemble of moments. I conclude that an
infinite conscious lifetime is not possible, even in principle. This result is, in
fact, an embodiment of the doomsday argument itself.
Now, on the assumption that an observer follows deterministic laws, one
should always be able to simulate him by a classical computer running an
appropriate program. In such a scenario the observer’s consciousness would
be a continually generated by-product of the computer’s operation. But
26
given a program that generates a finite set of conscious moments one can,
in principle, always construct a non-terminating program that generates an
infinite set of conscious moments. I contend that, in order to avoid the
ensuing infinite lifetime paradox, one must abandon the assumption that
consciousness can be generated by a single set of deterministic laws.
This result motivates me to consider the many-worlds interpretation of
quantum mechanics which, together with the phenomenon of environmental
decoherence, implies that many quasi-classical histories exist, each following
its own set of deterministic laws. Now I propose that the chaotic histories of
the brain, when classified in terms of computation, provide a discrete orthogonal basis set of experienced histories. I then hypothesize that one’s current
moment of consciousness is generated by a superposition of microscopically
dissimilar brain states, localized in configuration space, that is simultaneously
associated with many divergent quasi-classical histories leading to different
conscious lifetimes.
Now the doomsday argument implicitly assumes that only one history
will exist so that one’s current moment is only associated with one set of
conscious moments. When one lifts this assumption, by interpreting one’s
prior for the total population size to be an ensemble weight rather than an
exclusive probability, one finds that the doomsday argument fails to make any
prediction about the lifetime that any version of oneself will experience. This
generalized doomsday argument solves Einstein’s problem of representing
the probability of “finding” oneself in infinite time without leading to the
absurdity of zero probability. In doing so it forces us to abandon the notion
of time as an infinite line but instead assume a many-worlds view in which
time has an unbounded tree-like structure, each branch of which supports
consciousness over a finite section of its length.
27
References
[1] E. P. Wigner and A. Szanton, The Recollections of Eugene P. Wigner,
Plenum, New York, 1992.
[2] J. Leslie, Bulletin of the Canadian Nuclear Society, 10 (1989).
[3] J. Leslie (ed), Physical Cosmology and Philosophy, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990.
[4] J. Leslie, Doomsday Revisited, Philosophical Quarterly 42, 85-87 (1992).
[5] J. Leslie, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human
Extinction, Routledge, London, 1996.
[6] J. R. Gott III, Implications of the Copernican Principle for our Future
Prospects, Nature 363, 315-319 (1993).
[7] J. R. Gott III, Future Prospects Discussed, Nature 368, 108 (1994).
[8] K. B. Korb and J. J. Oliver, A Refutation of the Doomsday Argument,
Mind 107, 403-410 (1998).
[9] G. F. Sowers, The Demise of the Doomsday Argument, Mind 111, 37-45
(2002).
[10] F. J. Dyson, The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human
Extinction - Leslie, J., Nature 380, 296 (1996).
[11] D. Dieks, Doomsday or the Dangers of Statistics, Philosophical Quarterly 42, 78-84 (1992).
[12] T. Kopf, P. Krtous and D. N. Page, Too Soon for Doom Gloom, Preprint,
http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9407002 (1994).
[13] P. Bartha and C. Hitchcock, No one knows the date or the hour: an
unorthodox application of Rev. Bayes’s theorem, Philosophy of Science
S66, 339-353 (1999).
28
[14] K. D. Olum, The Doomsday Argument and the number of possible observers, Philosophical Quarterly 52, 164 (2002).
[15] N. Bostrom, Observational Selection Effects and Probability, Ph. D. thesis, London School of Economics, 2000.
[16] N. Bostrom, The Doomsday argument is alive and kicking, Mind 108,
539-550 (1999).
[17] H. Jeffreys, The Theory of Probability, Oxford University Press, 1939.
[18] B. Hesselbo and R. B. Stinchcombe, Monte-Carlo Simulation and Global
Optimization without Parameters, Physical Review Letters 74, 21512155 (1995).
[19] G. J. Chaitin, Algorithmic Information Theory, Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
[20] E. T. Jaynes, Probability Theory: The Logic of Science, Draft version,
http://omega.albany.edu:8008/JaynesBook.html (1994).
[21] A. M. Turing, On computable numbers with an application to the
Entscheidungsproblem, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society
Series 2 42, 230-265 (1936).
[22] M. Gell-Mann and J. Hartle, Classical Equations for Quantum Systems,
Physical Review D 47, 3345-3382 (1993).
[23] M. Gell-Mann, The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the simple
and the complex, Little, Brown and Company, London, 1994.
[24] E. Joos and H. D. Zeh, The Emergence of Classical Properties through
Interaction with the Environment, Zeitschrift fur Physik B59, 223-243
(1985).
[25] H. P. Stapp, The basis problem in many-worlds theories, Preprint,
http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0110148 (2002).
29
[26] C. C. King, Fractal and Chaotic Dynamics in Nervous Systems, Progress
in Neurobiology 36, 279-308 (1991).
[27] A. M. Turing, Computing machinery and Intelligence, Mind 59, 433-460
(1950).
[28] M. Tegmark, Importance of quantum decoherence in brain processes,
Physical Review E, B61, 4194-4206 (2000).
[29] C. J. S. Clarke, The histories interpretation: Stability instead of consistency? Foundations of Physics Letters 14, 179-186 (2001).
[30] H. Everett III, Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics, Reviews of Modern Physics 29, 454-462 (1957).
[31] D. Deutsch, Quantum Theory as a Universal Physical Theory, International Journal of Theoretical Physics 24, 1-41 (1985).
[32] D. Deutsch, The Fabric of Reality, Penguin Press, London, 1997.
30 |
arXiv:1305.7381v1 [physics.hist-ph] 31 May 2013
Mind and Matter
D.M. Appleby
Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 2Y5,
Canada
and
Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study, Stellenbosch, Matieland 7602, South
Africa
Abstract
It is argued that the problem of interpreting quantum mechanics, and the
philosophical problem of consciousness, both have their roots in the same set
of misguided Cartesian assumptions. The confusions underlying those assumptions are analyzed in detail. It is sometimes suggested that quantum mechanics might explain consciousness. That is not the suggestion here. Rather it
is suggested that an adequate non-Cartesian philosophy would transform our
understanding of both quantum mechanics and consciousness. Consequently,
it would change our ideas as to just what it is that we are trying to explain.
Pauli, in a letter to van Franz (quoted Gieser [1], pp.243–4), wrote
Evidently the progress of science must take such a course that the
concept ‘consciousness’ will be replaced by a more general or better
one.
If one knew that these words were written by a leading 20th scientist, but did
not know that the scientist in question was Pauli, one might think that what is
being advocated here is eliminative materialism, or some such similar position
(refs. [2–7], and references cited therein). Since, however, it is Pauli who is
saying this we know he must be thinking along very different lines. Eliminative
materialists propose to deal with the mind-body problem by eliminating the
mental pole of the duality leaving only the material one. Pauli would reject
that proposal because he was looking, not for a materialistic explanation of
mental phenomena, but rather for a “psychophysical monism” in which mind
and matter are seen as “two aspects of one and the same abstract fact”, itself
neither physical nor psychological (Meier et al [8], pp.87, 159). It is easy to see
why a materialist might want to take an eliminativist attitude to consciousness.
The question addressed in this paper is why someone like Pauli, who is not a
materialist, would take such an attitude.
What follows is not an exercise in Pauli exegesis. I am not here particularly
concerned with Pauli’s reasons for taking that view of consciousness. Rather, I
am going to give my own reasons for thinking that he might have been basically
right.
Before proceeding further, I ought to qualify. The meaning of a word like
“cat”, which can be defined ostensively, is securely anchored. However, the
word “consciousness” cannot be defined ostensively, not even by the person
whose consciousness it is (it is surely not possible to point one’s finger at one’s
own consciousness). Consequently, if one is not careful, there is a danger that
its meaning will float, so that it comes to be used in different ways by different
people, or even by the same person at different times. I believe this actually
happens. The criticisms of this paper are only directed at one of its possible
senses.
As an example of a sense of the word which I feel is unlikely to be rendered
obsolete by future scientific advance, consider the Glasgow Coma Scale [9, 10]
which is widely used to quantify the level of consciousness in cases of brain damage. It is possible, even likely, that the Glasgow Coma Scale will, in time, come
to be replaced by some improved method for quantifying degree of consciousness. It is also likely that scientific advances will lead to a deeper and richer
understanding of the phenomenon itself. However, I doubt that this would
amount to the kind of development Pauli had in mind when he wrote of the
concept of consciousness being “replaced by a more general or better one”.
For want of a better term I will refer to the sense in which the word “consciousness” is used in medicine as its “everyday sense”. It is true that the
medical literature on the subject can be quite technical. However, although
medical science has refined the description of states of consciousness, it has
1
done so in a way which remains close to the root meaning. A doctor will understand the statement “the patient is fully conscious” in almost, if not exactly
the same sense that the patient’s relatives understand it. I take the everyday
sense of the word also to include its use in sentences like “She was conscious of
the clock ticking,” to describe the state of being aware of something.
The critical comments in this essay are directed, not at consciousness in the
everyday sense, but rather at the concept as it is used in, for example, philosophical discussions of the so-called problem of consciousness. I will refer to this
second sense of the word as the Cartesian sense. It is true that nowadays there
are not many full-blooded Cartesian dualists left. Nevertheless, a more or less
attenuated version of the Cartesian soul continues to be prominent in modern
philosophical thinking, and it is this which gives rise to the “problem of consciousness”. I think it is clear from context1 that it was Cartesian consciousness
that Pauli had in mind when he made the statement quoted at the beginning
of this essay.
To see that the everyday and Cartesian senses are different consider the
discussion in Chalmers [11]. Chalmers begins by saying that consciousness is
“intangible” and consequently hard to define (p.3), which I think is already an
indication that what is in question is something different from consciousness
in the everyday sense (consider the likely response of a hospital doctor to the
proposition that the state of being non-comatose is intangible, and hard to define). He then goes on to propose the characterization “the subjective quality
of experience” (p.4). Now the meaning of this will be clear enough to someone
who has received a certain kind of education. More specifically, it will be clear
to someone who has absorbed the basic ideas of the Cartesian philosophy. But
I believe it would be unintelligible to anyone who has not had the benefit of
such an education (probably the majority of English speakers). What Chalmers
thinks of as the subjective quality of greenness, philosophically unsophisticated
people think of simply as greenness, and it would take a lot of work to persuade
them that they are missing something important. Something that is not taken
for granted by the vast majority of speakers cannot be considered to belong
to the everyday sense of a word. Of course, one might think that the Cartesian concept of consciousness can be seen to be logically contained in everyday
assumptions, if one takes the trouble to think the matter through carefully.
However, it is precisely the point of this paper that it is not so contained.
Chalmers, like others, thinks that consciousness is hard to define. Why
should that be? I believe that Searle [12] puts his finger on at least part of the
difficulty when he says
The reason we find it difficult to distinguish between my description
of the objects on the table and and my description of my experience
of the objects is that the features of the objects are precisely the
conditions of satisfaction of my conscious experiences of them. So
the vocabulary I use to describe the table—“There’s a lamp on the
1 In particular, it is clear that Pauli had in mind the so-called privacy of Cartesian
consciousness—the property of being undetectable by the outside observer.
2
rich and a vase on the left and a small statue in the middle”—is
precisely that which I use to describe my conscious visual experiences
of the table. (p.131)
Which provokes the obvious question: if two things have the same description,
how does one tell them apart? Can one tell them apart? Could it just be that
what Searle seeks to convey by the phrase “the contents of my consciousness
when I look at my table” is identical to what a less sophisticated person would
convey more succinctly, simply by saying “my table”? It seems, however, that
that cannot be precisely right, for Searle argues that consciousness is always
perspectival. Consequently, he thinks that his visual consciousness of his table
only comprises the parts he can directly see. Nevertheless, it is hard to resist the
impression that what Searle means by the phrase “the contents of my consciousness” is, if not identical, at any rate close to what an unsophisticated person
means by the phrase “the things around me”: that the contents of Searle’s consciousness, as Searle conceives them to be, can be pictured as something like a
film set, convincing when seen from the front, unpainted wood when seen from
the back.
This way of thinking is historically important, because it led to idealism. In
an amusing critique of idealist philosophy Stove [13] asks what is the “productdifferentiation”: i.e. “what are they selling, these people who call themselves
objective idealists, that a commonsense materialist could not consistently buy?”
(p.116). His answer is that there is in fact nothing that a materialist could not
consistently buy. In support of this conclusion he cites Bosanquet (one of the
more prominent 19th century idealists), who said in so many words that “extremes meet”, and “a consistent materialist and thorough idealist hold positions
which are distinguishable only in name” (ibid, p.115).
These days idealism has gone out of fashion. However, believers in Cartesian consciousness are still faced with what is essentially the same problem, of
differentiating the contents of consciousness (as they conceive them to be) from
what commonsense would call the objects around us. It is a difficult problem,
and I think that is one of the reasons it is often said that “consciousness” is
hard to define.
There are two sides to the Cartesian polarity: not only Cartesian consciousness, but also Cartesian matter. I am here using the term “Cartesian matter”
rather loosely, to refer, not only to the concept of matter originally proposed
by Descartes himself, but also to its many descendants. I described the concept
of consciousness as it features in, for example, the book by Chalmers [11] as an
attenuated variant of the Cartesian soul. In the same way I would, for example, describe the universal wave function proposed by Everett [14] as a (not so
attenuated) variant of Cartesian matter. It goes without saying that Chalmers’
concept of consciousness differs greatly from Descartes’ concept of the soul.
However, it shares with the latter the crucial feature of being a receptacle for
all the supposedly subjective phenomena which, on a Cartesian view, are excluded from the physical universe. Similarly, Everett’s concept of the universal
state vector, though obviously very different from Descartes’ concept of matter,
3
still shares the crucial feature, that it is supposed to be completely describable in purely objective, mathematical terms, without any contamination by
the observing subject. The point to notice is that these two concepts, Cartesian
consciousness and Cartesian matter, are different aspects of a single conceptual
scheme. They are like the two poles of a bar magnet, impossible to isolate.
Idealists attempt to cut the bar in two, keeping only the subjective side of the
polarity. But, as we saw, when they try to carry that idea through consistently
it turns out that the concept of matter has come back in, through the backdoor,
so to speak. Materialists attempt to perform the same bisection, keeping only
the objective side of the polarity. However, they then face the problem that, no
matter how vigorously they attempt to cast doubt on the notion of qualia (see,
for instance, the papers in section 17 of Lycan [15]), the fact remains that, to a
normally sighted person, green things undeniably do look qualitatively different
from red ones. Consequently, if one looks at a green object, while trying to keep
in mind that the quality of perceived greenness is not really a feature of the
object itself, it is difficult to avoid the thought that the quality of greenness is a
feature that is somehow added by one’s own perceptual apparatus. From there
it is but a small step to the Cartesian concept of consciousness.
I believe we need to break away from this whole misguided way of thinking: not simply to deny Cartesian consciousness, nor simply to deny Cartesian
matter, but to deny both. There are many empirical reasons for taking such
a course. Modern neuroscience gives us reasons for being suspicious of Cartesian assumptions about consciousness (see refs. [4,5,16,17], and references cited
therein); while quantum mechanics gives us equally good reasons for being suspicious of Cartesian assumptions about matter (see any textbook).
The aim of physics, as Descartes conceived it, is to arrive at the one true
picture of things, totally objective, and complete in every detail. Before the year
1900 it might have looked as though we were getting steadily closer to that goal2 .
However, quantum mechanics strongly suggests that the goal is unachievable.
In quantum mechanics what you see depends on how you look. Make one
kind of measurement on the electromagnetic field and one will obtain results
consistent with it being a smoothly varying wave; make another, different kind
of measurement and one will obtain results consistent with it being a collection of
discrete particles. Similarly, if one observes an atom using a scanning tunnelling
electron microscope one will see an apparently solid object; if, on the other hand,
one observes it with a γ-ray microscope one will see a collection of point-like
particles separated by empty space. So which of these pictures is the true one?
Quantum mechanics declines to say, just as it declines to say what is going on in
a physical system when no one is looking. In place of the God-like conspectus
of the entire universe, with nothing left out, which Descartes imagined and
which continued to inspire physicists for 250 years after him, quantum mechanics
merely gives us methods for anticipating what will be observed in this or that
particular experimental context. Moreover, the fact, that the outcome depends
2 Although there were 19th century physicists, such as Mach [18], who did not agree with
Descartes about the goal of physics.
4
on the observer’s decision as to which measurement to make, casts doubt on the
assumption, that physics passively records events that would have happened
anyway, in the absence of experimental intervention. This represents a subtle,
but important departure from the Cartesian ideal of total objectivity.
Since the 1920s there have been numerous attempts to reconcile quantum
mechanics with Cartesian assumptions, as to what the world ought to be like
(for an overview see, for example, Schlosshauer [19]). These attempts have been
successful to the extent that it seems there is nothing to logically exclude the possibility that, underlying the observations, there is some universal mathematical
mechanism. The difficulty is finding a picture of this kind which is empirically
substantiated. When Einstein embarked on the project, of finding an alternative
to the Copenhagen Interpretation, he doubtless hoped to find a single theory
which, like the general theory of relativity, would be uniquely specified by the
interplay of various empirical and aesthetic considerations. Doubtless he also
hoped for new empirical predictions. Of course, conclusive demonstrations are
not to be had in science. So no one can say for sure that Einstein’s hopes will
not be fulfilled at some time in the future. But it does seem to me that the
effect of eighty years of theoretical work has been to make those hopes look
increasingly forlorn.
My own feeling is that an adequate understanding of quantum mechanics
ultimately depends, not on sophisticated technical developments, but on some
simple conceptual shift—something a little like the perceptual shift which occurs
when one looks at a diagram like the Necker cube, or the duck-rabbit picture
(Wittgenstein [20] p.194e, Kihlstrom [21]). I doubt that quantum mechanics
is intrinsically weird. It only seems weird because we insist on looking at it
through Cartesian spectacles. The problem is that Cartesian assumptions have
become so deeply ingrained in our thinking that it is hard to find the right
non-Cartesian spectacles.
Turning to the other pole of the Cartesian duality, philosophers are familiar
with the privacy of Cartesian consciousness: the fact that the consciousness
of another person is, from the Cartesian point of view, just as inescapably
hidden as the wave function is in the Bohm interpretation of quantum mechanics
(Bell [22], p.202). What is less widely appreciated is that there is a problem with
ascertaining the contents of one’s own consciousness. A particularly striking
illustration of this point comes from the study of eye movements in reading [23,
24]. In order to explain it I first need to say something about the physiology
of human vision. The region of the retina where the receptors are packed most
tightly, and where visual acuity is consequently highest, is called the fovea. The
part of the visual field which falls on the fovea subtends an angle of ∼ 1◦ at
the centre of the lens. Visual acuity falls off rapidly as one moves away from
this region, which means that in a single fixation of the eyes one is able to
discriminate fine detail in only a very small portion of the visual field (a portion
about the size of a thumbnail held at arm’s length). The reason the visual system
is nonetheless able to acquire accurate information about the whole environment
is that the eyes are continually performing jumps, or saccades. When reading
the duration of a single saccade is typically ∼ 30 ms, while the duration of the
5
fixation between saccades is typically ∼ 200 ms (in other activities the saccades
are often bigger, and take correspondingly longer). During a saccade very little
information is transmitted to the cortical processing areas (this phenomenon is
called saccadic suppression, or saccadic masking). It can consequently be said
that most of our visual awareness is based on ∼ 4 snapshots per second, each of
them covering only a small fraction of the visual field. I believe that these facts
are already very counter-intuitive from a Cartesian point of view: it is surprising
(on Cartesian assumptions) that at any moment one sees so little in fine detail,
and suprising also that there are so few jumps per second (a movie which ran
at 4 frames per second would look jumpy). However, it gets worse (worse, I
mean, from a Cartesian point of view). The eye muscles give a brief twitch to
initiate a saccade, and thereafter the eyeballs move ballistically, subject only to
frictional forces. Consequently, a computer attached to an eye-tracking device
can calculate where the next fixation is going to be before the eyes actually
land there. This makes possible the following experiment. One takes a page
of printed text and projects it onto a screen, replacing all the letters by x’s.
The experimental subject sits in front of the screen, and his/her eye-movements
are monitored. During a saccade the computer calculates where the eyes are
going to alight, and puts a handful of letters from the original page just at
that point, leaving x’s everywhere else. In the next saccade the computer wipes
those letters, replacing them by x’s, and puts another group of letters at the
next fixation point. And so on. To illustrate, in one experiment the original
text was
By far the single most abundant substance in the biosphere
is the familiar but unusual inorganic compound called water. In
nearly all its physical properties water is either unique or at
the extreme end of the range of a property. It’s extraordinary
while what appeared on the screen during one particular fixation was
Xx xxx xxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx xx xxx xxxxxxxxx
xx xxx xxxxxxxx xxx xxxsual inorganic coxxxxxx xxxxxx xxxxx. Xx
xxxxxx xxx xxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxx xxxxx xx xxxxxx xxxxxx xx xx
xxx xxxxxxx xxx xx xxx xxxxx xx x xxxxxxxx. Xx’x xxxxxxxxxxxxx
(example taken from Rayner [23]). This, and other, similar techniques have
been used to acquire a wealth information about the visual system. However,
its relevance to the present discussion is simply this. To an observer whose eye
movements are not synchronized with the screen it is obvious (a) that at any
moment the screen contains almost nothing but x’s and (b) that what is on the
screen is constantly changing. However, to the experimental subject, whose eye
movements are synchronized, the screen looks like a perfectly normal page of
text. To convey just how good the illusion is Grimes [25] (also see Dennett [4],
p.361) records that one of the first people to conduct an experiment of this
kind served as the first experimental subject; after a while he sat back from
the apparatus and announced that something must be wrong with the system
because the text was not changing—though it was, in fact, working perfectly.
6
I believe that if one reflects on this fact, that it is demonstratively impossible to tell the difference between a normal page of printed text, and a page
which at any given moment consists almost entirely of x’s, then one becomes
genuinely uncertain, as to what precisely are the contents of one’s own consciousness at any given moment. Looking at the page in front of me I can see
that it does not consist almost entirely of x’s. I am able to know this because
information is integrated across saccades. Consequently, I am aware, not only of
the information acquired on this present visual fixation, but also of information
acquired on many previous fixations. But how much information is integrated
across saccades? What precisely is its nature? And precisely how much of that
information is contained in my consciousness? The first two of these questions
are empirical questions which can be, and actually are being investigated by the
usual scientific methods. However, the last is of a different character. At least,
it is of a different character if it is consciousness of the Cartesian sort which is in
question. On Cartesian principles, consciousness is private. It follows that if I
myself cannot tell what exactly are the contents of my own consciousness, then
no amount of neuroscientific experimentation can tell either. That is the case
for my consciousness of the printed text now in front of me. Like the position
of the particle in a two-slit experiment, my consciousness now is indeterminate.
There are numerous other experiments and examples pointing to the same
conclusion. For details the reader may consult refs. [4, 5, 16, 17, 25, 26], and
references cited therein. I will here confine myself to just two other examples.
Grimes [25] used an eye-tracking device coupled to a computer to examine what
happened when a picture (as opposed to a page of printed text) was changed
in the middle of a saccade. In one such experiment, in a picture of two men
wearing differently coloured hats, the hats were switched mid-saccade. 100% of
the experimental subjects did not notice. Even more dramatically, in another
case a parrot, occupying roughly 25% of the picture area, was switched from
brilliant green to brilliant red mid-saccade. In this case most of the subjects did
notice. But 18% of them did not. 25% of the picture area is a lot, and it raises
the question: what exactly is one conscious of, if one does not notice a change as
striking as that? A second illustration is the one given by Dennett [4] (pp.3545), of wallpaper in which the pattern consists of a large number of identical
images of Marilyn Monroe. If one looks at it it will only take one a second or
two to realize that the images are all the same. Since the eye performs only a
few saccades per second it is impossible that one has discriminated more than
a handful of the images in sufficient detail to be able to identify it. Instead the
visual system must essentially be making a guess, based on the small number
of cases which it has accurately discriminated. So the question arises again: in
a case like this what exactly are the contents of consciousness?
In ordinary life, and in physics also before the 20th century, the assumption,
that a physical object always has a determinate trajectory, works very well.
But when we push our investigations far enough we start to run into difficulties.
Similarly with the concept of consciousness: when we start to ask the kind of
detailed questions raised in the last few paragraphs we run into problems which
are not entirely dissimilar to the problems which quantum mechanics reveals
7
with the other side of the Cartesian polarity.
It is often thought that quantum indeterminacies are weird—humanly unimaginable. That is to get it exactly the wrong way round. What is impossible to
imagine is knowing the position of something to infinitely many decimal places.
On other hand, ordinary experience is full of indeterminacies. If someone wants
to know what it would be like to perceive an indeterminate position all they
need do is look at an object in a room, and try to estimate its distance from the
walls. It is unlikely that they can achieve even 10% accuracy. Similarly, to know
what it is like to perceive a number indeterminacy (such as the indeterminacy
of photon number in a coherent state) all one need do is look at a collection of
objects on a table. If one is then asked how many objects there are it is unlikely
one will be able to say, without first taking the time to count them up. The fact
that one cannot answer straight away (and probably could not answer at all if
one did not still have the objects in view) suggests that at the time of asking
one was conscious of the objects, but not of their number.
Dennett has written a book entitled Consciousness Explained [4]. Since
I agree with Dennett on a number of points I ought to stress that I do not
agree with him on this central one. Specifically, I do not think that he, or
anyone else, is close to “explaining consciousness”. Like Pauli, I think that a
satisfactory understanding of these questions will involve breaking out of the
Cartesian mould entirely, and developing a different conceptual framework.
At this stage I should perhaps obviate another potential misunderstanding.
There have been a number of attempts to explain consciousness using quantum
mechanics (see Atmanspacher [27] for a review). Since these approaches all depend on adopting a non-Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, and
since they take the Cartesian concept of consciousness for granted, it should be
apparent, from what I said earlier, that I do not find any of them convincing. If
I keep mentioning consciousness and quantum mechanics in the same breath (so
to speak) it is not because I think that one of them can be used to explain the
other, but because I think that in both cases a clear understanding of the phenomena is obstructed by the same misguided Cartesian philosophy. A second,
subsidiary reason is that I cannot help being struck by parallels3 . What the
parallels are worth, I do not know. But I find them interesting. Here is another.
Dennett [4] argues, to my mind persuasively, that in discussions of consciousness it is essential to take careful account of the probe (i.e. the specific question
used to elicit a response at a specific time in a specific experimental context).
Furthermore, if one tries to interpret the results obtained using different probes
in terms of a single, coherent story—a “trajectory of consciousness”—one runs
into difficulties (see, for instance, Dennett’s discussion of the colour phi and cutaneous rabbit experiments). Also, the probe disturbs the system: it can bring
into existence a conscious content which otherwise might not have occurred.
This is all reminiscent of the situation in quantum mechanics (there are major
differences, but it is reminiscent).
3 For other discussions of this, and related points see refs. [8, 28–32], and references cited
therein.
8
At this stage it will be useful to look at the historical development of Cartesian ideas. In the first place this is a good way to see that the Cartesian concept
of consciousness, so far from being a natural intuition (as I believe many people
are still inclined to think), actually depends on postulates which, although they
have since become second-nature for many people, originally had to be worked
out slowly and laboriously. In the second place, it brings out the fact that the
Cartesian philosophy was intimately related to the 17th century development of
modern science.
The Cartesian concept of consciousness is a 17th century invention. It did
not exist before4 . In order to appreciate just how original a departure it was, one
needs to see it in the context of the earlier conceptions it replaced. Concerning
classical Graeco-Roman philosophical ideas5 Matson [36] writes
Any teaching assistant can set up the mind-body problem so that
any freshman will be genuinely worried about it. Yet none of the
ancients ever dreamed of it, not even the author of De Anima.
and he goes on to observe that “In the whole classical corpus there exists no
denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout.” Similarly, Caston [37], discussing the question whether “Aristotle even had a concept of consciousness,” observes that, although “Aristotle clearly distinguishes being awake
and alert from being asleep or knocked out”, he “does not use any single word
to pick out the phenomena we have in mind,” and he “does not share the epistemological concerns distinctive of the Cartesian conception of consciousness,
such as privacy or indubitability”. In other words, Aristotle had the everyday
concept of consciousness, but not the Cartesian one.
There were philosophers in the ancient Graeco-Roman world whose thinking
was in some ways similar to the Cartesian philosophy. The one who came closest
was probably St. Augustine. It has been suggested, in fact, that Augustine was
a significant influence on Descartes [33, 38–42], though opinions differ as to
the extent of that influence6 . Like other philosophers in the Platonic and neoPlatonic tradition (and as one might expect of a Christian theologian) Augustine
believed in the existence of an immortal soul. He also thought that one has
indubitable knowledge of one’s own existence:
4 Rorty [33] makes this point in some detail. His discussion is very useful. However, Rorty
is not much interested in natural science. In his own words, he tends to “view natural science
as in the business of controlling and predicting things, and as largely useless for philosophical
purposes” (Saatkamp [34], p.32). Consequently he misses a number of points which are crucial
for the present discussion. Burtt [35] is also very relevant.
5 In the interests of brevity I will here confine myself to the European, Islamic and Jewish
philosophical traditions, which are closely related, and which are the ones most relevant to
Descartes’ intellectual milieu. For the bearing of Buddhism on the problem of consciousness
see Blackmore [17].
6 Descartes himself explicitly denied that he had been influenced (though he welcomed
what he considered to be the few superficial and purely accidental resemblances as providing
useful ammunition in his arguments with Dutch Calvinists) [40]. However, as Wilson [40]
points out, that is not, by itself, conclusive since Descartes was in the habit of downplaying,
and even outright denying his intellectual debts.
9
In respect of these truths, I am not at all afraid of the arguments of
the Academicians, who say, What if you are deceived? For if I am
deceived, I am. For he who is not, cannot be deceived; and if I am
deceived, by this same token I am. And since I am if I am deceived,
how am I deceived in believing that I am? for it is certain that I am
if I am deceived. [Augustine [43], Book XI, Chapter 26]
However, this anticipation of Descartes’ cogito ergo sum should not be allowed
to obscure the differences between Augustine and Descartes, which are considerable. In the first place Augustine, so far from making the indubitability of
one’s own existence central to his philosophy, only mentions it halfway through
the City of God [43] (similarly with the argument as he gives it in Against the
Academics [44] and On the Trinity [45]). There is no suggestion that the only
thing of which one can be really certain is the existence of one’s own consciousness, and that everything else must be deduced from that. On the contrary, he
takes it for granted, as something which does not require demonstration, that in
most cases sense-perceptions convey genuine and reliable information about the
external world (O’Daly [46], p.95). Concerning this point Matthews [41] says
It is, I should say, a singularly important fact about Descartes’s
Meditations that reading them can put one in the grip of what has
come to be called “the problem of the external world.” . . . There is
no similarly desperate ego-isolation in Augustine.
In the second place Augustine’s concept of the soul was completely different
from the Cartesian one. For Augustine the soul is the “the phenomenon of life
in things” (O’Daly [46], p.11). On this conception a bird needs a soul in order to
fly, quite as much a person needs one in order to think. Finally, Augustine had
a different theory of sensation from Descartes. Unlike Descartes, he thought
of sensation as an active process, in which “the soul, as agent of sensation,
activates the force of sentience through a fine corporeal medium” (O’Daly [46],
p.82). Thus in vision he thought that rays burst out of the eye and range
abroad, “so that seeing becomes a kind of visual touching, just as hearing is, so
to speak, aural touching” (ibid ). In the Cartesian picture the world is conceived
as a sort of spectacle, and the observer as a member of the audience, whose role
is purely passive. In Augustine’s conception, by contrast, it is as if the audience
climbs onto the stage and walks around among the actors, touching and feeling
them. Given that those are his assumptions I feel that one would not expect
him to think in Cartesian terms, of consciousness as an internal movie show.
Unfortunately the obscurities of the texts are such that it is difficult to be sure
that he does not. Matthews [47] takes the view that
Although commentators have sometimes suggested otherwise, Augustine’s theory of sense perception is not representational, if one
understands by “a representational theory of sense perception” one
according to which an image or sense-datum is the direct object of
perception.
10
Kenny [48] thinks that judgment is “most likely” correct (p. 215). Spade [49],
on the other hand, takes a different view. However, it seems to me that the very
fact that there is this scope for disagreement is an indication that Augustine
cannot really have been thinking in Cartesian terms. If someone has genuinely
caught the Cartesian bug they tend to make it very obvious.
It was no different in the medieval period. As one would expect medieval
philosophers had the everyday concept of consciousness. Moreover Augustine
was one of the most widely read philosophers during the medieval period; consequently
It was a commonplace in medieval philosophy that no one can be in
doubt about the existence of one’s own soul. [Yrjönsuuri [50], p.253]
Philosophers were also familiar with Avicenna’s argument, that it is possible
to imagine oneself as a disembodied soul, without sensory experiences (ibid ).
However, they did not have any of the other notions which go to make up the
Cartesian concept of consciousness [33, 48, 50–53]. The medieval philosopher
who is most relevant to the present discussion is Aquinas, since he was the most
prominent scholastic philosopher, and consequently the figure most responsible
for determining the view which Descartes opposed. Unlike Augustine, who was
a Platonist, Aquinas was an Aristotelian. Nevertheless they had certain things
in common. In the first place Aquinas, like Augustine considered the soul to
be “whatever makes the difference between animate and inanimate objects”
(Kenny [53], p.129). So as Aquinas saw it a tree, or a beetle has a soul, just as
a person does. Moreover the soul is implicated in every manifestation of life:
in the act of digesting one’s food, or the act of conceiving and bearing a child,
no less than in the act of thinking. In the second place Aquinas, like Augustine
and like just about every other medieval philosopher, was primarily interested in
those aspects of the soul which make people special. It is these which go to make
up the medieval concept of mind. The soul of a beetle is capable of sensation, so
sensation was not considered to be something mental. On the other hand neither
a beetle, nor any other non-human living organism can have abstract thoughts
or take rational decisions (or so medieval philosophers assumed). Consequently
mind, as medieval philosophers conceived it to be, essentially consists of only
two faculties of the soul: intellect and will (see, for example, Kenny [53] p.16).
The medieval concept of soul was thus much broader than the Cartesian one,
while the medieval concept of mind was much narrower (Descartes, by contrast,
identified the concepts of mind and soul). From the fact that this was the way in
which medieval philosophers parcelled up the phenomena, I think it can already
be seen that they were rather unlikely to arrive at anything like the Cartesian
concept of consciousness.
For our purposes there are two important differences between Aquinas and
Augustine. The first is that Aquinas, following Aristotle, considered that the
soul is the form of the body. This might be thought a surprising view for
someone who, as recently as the last century, could fairly be described as the
official philosopher of the Catholic Church [48]. How, one might ask, is it to
be reconciled with a belief in the immortality of the soul? The answer is, only
11
with difficulty (see Kenny [53] for a critical discussion). Nevertheless, although
Aquinas thought that the soul, like the smile of the Cheshire cat, could survive
the death of its body, he also thought that what survives is not the person whose
soul it was, and, furthermore, not fully human. As he put it:
. . . but the soul, since it is part of the body of a human being, is not
a whole human being, and my soul is not I; so even if a soul gains
salvation in another life, that is not I or any human being [translated
Kenny [53], p.138]
(it was therefore essential, as Aquinas saw it, that the soul should be re-united
with the body on the day of judgment). It might, perhaps, be said that the
fact that Aquinas thought that the soul is detachable from the body makes him
in some sense a dualist (though I doubt he would have agreed). However, his
dualism (if “dualism” is the right word) is less extreme than that of Descartes
(Descartes would not have said that what survives the death of my body is
“not I”). It could be said that Aquinas’ conception of human nature is earthier
than the Cartesian one. The second important difference is that Aquinas, unlike
Augustine, thought of sensation as a passive process. However, his conception is
no closer than Augustine’s to the Cartesian concept of an interior movie show.
As Kenny puts it:
In Aquinas theory there are no intermediaries like sense-data which
come between perceiver and perceived. In sensation the sense-faculty
does not come into contact with a likeness of the sense-object. Instead, it becomes itself like the sense-object, by taking on the senseobjects form . . . (ibid., p.135)
My aim in giving this brief historical review was to stress the originality of
Descartes’ conception of consciousness. If, in over 2000 years of previous philosophical thinking, no one had come up with anything like it, then it follows that,
whatever else, the idea cannot be regarded as obvious. The question now arises:
what led Descartes to make such a radical break with the philosophical past? It
is often suggested that religion, and a consequent belief in the immortality of the
soul, is a motive for a dualistic conception of human nature. That may be so,
in many cases. However, I do not think it can account for Descartes adopting a
much more radical version of dualism than his medieval predecessors. Aquinas,
like every other major medieval Latin philosopher, was first and foremost a theologian, whereas Descartes’ interests where strongly secular, being centred on
mathematics, physics and physiology. If religion was the explanation then, of
the two, one would expect it to have been Aquinas who had the more ethereal
conception of mind. Yet in fact it was just the other way around.
It is impossible to establish the point conclusively. But I think there are reasons for believing that the real motivation came from Galilean physics. Galileo
was strongly committed to the Pythagorean idea, that the world is fundamentally mathematical in character [35]. As he put it in a famous passage from The
Assayer [54] (p.183)
12
Philosophy is written in this all-encompassing book that is constantly open before our eyes, that is the universe; but it cannot
be understood unless one first learns to understand the language
and knows the characters in which it is written. It is written in
mathematical language, and its characters are triangles, circles, and
other geometrical figures; without these it is humanly impossible to
understand a word of it, and one wanders around pointlessly in a
dark labyrinth.
Of course, the universe does not, at first sight, appear to be a book to be written
in the language of mathematics. Galileo consequently needed to account for
all the seemingly non-mathematical, qualitative features of the world, such as
colours, sounds and smells, which do not easily fit in with his mathematizing
programme. For that purpose he adopted a doctrine of the ancient atomists [55],
and denied that they are features of objective reality at all, asserting instead
that they are somehow produced in the “sensitive body”:
Accordingly, I say that as soon as I conceive of a corporeal substance
or material, I feel indeed drawn by the necessity of also conceiving
that it is bounded and has this or that shape; that it is large or
small in relation to other things; that it is in this or that location
and exists at this or that time; that it moves or stands still; that it
touches or does not touch another body; and that it is one, a few, or
many. Nor can I, by any stretch of the imagination, separate it from
these conditions. However, my mind does not feel forced to regard
it as necessarily accompanied by such conditions as the following:
that it is white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy or quiet, and pleasantly
or unpleasantly smelling; on the contrary, if we did not have the
assistance of our senses, perhaps the intellect and the imagination
by themselves would never conceive of them. Thus, from the point
of view of the subject in which they seem to inhere, these tastes,
odors, colors, etc., are nothing but empty names; rather they inhere
only in the sensitive body, such that if one removes the animal, then
all these qualities are taken away and annihilated. (ibid, p.185)
I believe that we see in this passage the actual origin of the Cartesian concept
of consciousness. It is true that Galileo himself did not go into details, as to the
nature of the “sensitive body”. But I think that once this step had been taken
the subsequent development, though not inevitable7 , became very natural.
It is worth noting that neither Galileo nor Descartes managed to give a
cogent justification for the distinction between primary qualities8 , supposed
to be objectively real, and secondary qualities, supposed to be in some sense
illusory. Before the twentieth century the best that could be done was to appeal
to the empirical successes of classical physics, which might have been thought to
7 Its lack of inevitability can be seen from, for example, the fact that the ancient atomists
[55] did not develop a concept of consciousness similar to the Cartesian one.
8 The terminology “primary” and “secondary” is actually due to Locke [56]
13
be based on it. Since the 1920s there has not even been that justification. Quite
the reverse, in fact: the search for primary qualities consistent with quantum
mechanics has been a source of endless difficulties.
I believe that Burtt [35] gets it right when he says that in its first inception
the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities was “buttressed by nothing
more than a mathematical apriorism.”9 (p.311). Rorty (ref. [33], pp. 50-51
and 54-55) asks what sensations, hallucinations, dreams, mathematical truths,
moral rules, the idea of God, moods of depression “and all the rest of what we
now call ‘mental’” have in common. It seems to me that this is like asking what
all the miscellaneous objects one finds on a rubbish dump have in common.
The answer is, of course, that they have nothing in common beyond the fact
that their former owners have no use for them. Similarly with the Cartesian
conception of consciousness: it is a garbage can for all the many things which
mathematical physicists want to be rid of.
Descartes’ complaint about Galileo was that he “digresses continually” and
“does not stop to explain fully any subject” (letter to Mersenne, quoted in
Ariew [57]). To see the kind of thing Descartes might have had in mind consider
Drake’s [58] comments, on Galileo’s failure to give an explicit statement of the
law of inertia:
A modern physicist reading Galileo’s writings would share the puzzlement — I might say the frustration — experienced by Ernst Mach
a century ago, when he searched those works in vain for the general
statement that (he felt) ought to be there. It would become evident
to you, as it was to Newton and Mach, that Galileo was in possession
of the law of inertia, but you would not then be able to satisfy those
historians who demand a clear and complete statement, preferably
in print, as a condition of priority.
As Drake goes on to say, it is “ironical” that as a result of this failure on Galileo’s
part the law of inertia “should be credited to Descartes, whose physics on the
whole operated to impede the scientific progress begun by Galileo and continued
by Newton”. I imagine that Descartes would have been equally frustrated by
Galileo’s failure to go into details, regarding events inside the “sensitive body,”
and, more generally, by his failure to give a unified account of the cosmos as
a whole, conceived in mechanistic terms. I suggest that it was Descartes’ aim,
in his early works The World [59] and Treatise on Man [59], to rectify those
deficiencies.
In the mature form of his philosophy, as represented by Meditations on First
Philosophy [60] and Principles of Philosophy [59], Descartes set out his ideas
as a logico-deductive system, starting from the famous proposition cogito ergo
sum. However, an examination of the historical record indicates that this badly
obscures the route by which he was actually led to them. In his early works The
World and Treatise on Man there is no mention of the cogito argument. Instead
9 At a later date one could appeal to the empirical successes of the classical theories
apparently based on the doctrine, but not at the time of its first inception.
14
these works are entirely devoted to a mechanistic description of the world, conceived along the lines Galileo had previously suggested, and of our relation to it.
Moreover, the treatment is not deductive (as it was in his subsequent writings)
but avowedly hypothetical: he is at pains to stress that he is not saying how
the world definitely is, but only how it conceivably might be. They form part
of a larger project, which occupied him during the years 1630–1633 [61]. The
other parts were either never written, or else have been lost; there is also the
possibility that parts were included in subsequent publications. At all events
the works as we have them now are incomplete. The reason for this is that at
the end of 1633 Descartes learned of Galileo’s condemnation by the Inquisition
and, not wanting “to publish a single word that the Church disapproved of,”
he “preferred to suppress it rather than publish it in a mutilated form” (letter
to Mersenne, quoted in Gaukroger [61], pp.290-1). The works as we have them
now were only published after his death.
In The World Descartes begins by making the same distinction between
primary and secondary qualities that Galileo does in The Assayer. The fact
that he uses one of Galileo’s own examples (the tickling sensation produced by
a feather) suggests that he was well aware of what Galileo had previously written
on the subject. However, he introduces a novelty: namely, the proposition that
the ideas (what would nowadays be called the sense-impressions) of secondary
qualities such as colour have no “resemblance” to qualities actually inherent
in objects themselves. The question naturally arises: does he also maintain
the correlative proposition, that the ideas of primary qualities such as shape
do resemble properties inherent in objects themselves? He writes in such a
way that the unwary reader is likely to assume that he does. Yet, although
it is true that he never (neither in The World nor anywhere else, so far as I
am aware) explicitly denies this second proposition, it is also true that he is
usually careful not to explicitly affirm it. There is one exception to this. In
the Principles of Philosophy he says that “we appear to see clearly” that our
idea of extended matter “comes to us from things located outside ourselves,
which it wholly resembles” (Descartes [59], p.223): which, although it is not
quite the same as to say that the idea of shape resembles something in the
object itself, seems rather close. Of course, it is easy to see that Descartes is
on the horns of a dilemma here. On the one hand he thinks that the mind,
and ideas in the mind are unextended (i.e. clean outside the physical universe);
and it is hard to see how something fundamentally non-spatial can “wholly
resemble” something that fundamentally is spatial10 . On the other hand, if he
were to say that the ideas of properties like shape do not resemble anything
in the outside world, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities
would evaporate. The question, as to what exactly Descartes did think, as to
the relationship between sensations and the objects around us, is vexed, and
10 Something non-spatial might conceivably correspond to something spatial (c.f.
Descartes [59], p.218). But “correspond” is too weak for Descartes’ purposes. Colour sensations correspond to properties in objects, on his theory. He needs a much stronger relation
than mere correspondence to substantiate the primary-secondary distinction. But what could
that relation possibly be?
15
it has given rise to a substantial literature11 (see refs. [61–66], and references
cited therein). But these exegetical considerations are, in a way, irrelevant.
Irrespective of Descartes own views, I think it is fair to say that, on a popular
level, one of the actual effects of his writings was to encourage the notion that, by
the simple operation of subtracting all the secondary qualities in our imaginative
depictions, we can arrive at a perfectly faithful picture of things as they really
are. This idea, that the aim of physics is to supply us with the one true picture
of things, was extremely influential in the past. Moreover, although those who
accept the Copenhagen interpretation have abandoned the idea, I am not sure
that the same is true of all the anti-Copenhagenists. At all events, I think it
must be fair to say that the anti-Copenhagenists remain wedded to the related,
and, as it seems to me, equally dubious idea, that the goal of physics is to
provide us with the one true description of things (or, at least, the vocabulary
and syntax of that description). Also, the notion continues to be widespread,
that when one looks at a rose the shape one sees is in some sense12 real, while
the colour is only a quale in the head.
In Treatise on Man Descartes turns to a description of the human body
conceived as a mechanism, with particular emphasis on the brain. He ends
with a promise to give a description of the “rational soul”. Unfortunately this
description is one of the parts of the manuscript which was either never written,
or else has been lost. However, since everything he says about the brain is
conformable with later accounts (down to and including the special status of
the pineal gland), I think it is fair to assume that he intended to give an account
of the soul which was similarly conformable. Specifically, I think it may be
assumed that he intended to say that the soul is a separate, immaterial entity
interacting with the brain via the pineal gland. Moreover, I think it is easy to
see why he would have said that. I do not say it was inevitable that he would
take such a view. Indeed, his contemporary Thomas Hobbes, in the Third Set
of Objections (published jointly with the Meditations), argued for a completely
materialistic conception of human nature [60]. However, it does seem to me that,
given his opinions about primary and secondary qualities, it was very natural
for Descartes to take such a view. It would be inconsistent with his Pythagorean
principles13 to suppose that, located here and there in the otherwise colourless
expanse of mathematical mechanism, there are little brightly painted islands. It
would be equally inconsistent to suppose that, dotted around in the mechanism,
there are little islands somehow endowed with subjective colour experiences.
Since he could not locate colour perceptions inside the physical universe, what
else could he do but locate them outside?
11 It does seem to me that a person whose writings cannot be understood without the
assistance of an army of exegetes has failed to express himself clearly. I also feel that, in such
a case, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the unclarity in the words reflects a corresponding
unclarity in the underlying thoughts.
12 But what sense precisely?
13 Hobbes was not a mathematician, and is unlikely to have shared Descartes’ Pythagorean
feelings. Perhaps that is the reason he could accept the move to full materialism. Perhaps it
is also the reason the ancient Atomists (who were not Pythagoreans either) were not led to
the Cartesian concept of consciousness.
16
Descartes ceased working on the manuscript eventually published as The
World and Treatise on Man at the end of 1633. According to Gaukroger the
first hard evidence14 of him taking an interest in scepticism comes a year later
in an account by Samuel Hartlib, who describes him “complaining of the uncertainties of all things” in the winter of 1634/5 (Gaukroger [61], p.304). The
first published version of the cogito argument appeared in the Discourse on the
Method [59], in June 1637. This argument is another of Descartes’ strikingly
original departures from previous philosophical thinking. As I mentioned earlier,
it was a medieval commonplace, due originally to Augustine, that one cannot
doubt the existence of one’s own soul [50]. Moreover there was a widespread
interest in sceptical arguments during the early Modern period [67]. However,
there was no precedent for the way in which Descartes put these ingredients
together.
The cogito argument begins with what is sometimes called an act of hyperbolic doubt. It is worth asking what motivated this step. As Wittgenstein
has stressed one needs reasons to doubt [68]. One also needs a suitable context. At least, one does if one wants people to listen. Suppose someone expressed doubt, as to whether their head contained sawdust instead of brains
(Wittgenstein [68], p.36e). This would be a much more modest doubt than
the global, all-encompassing act of scepticism with which Descartes begins the
cogito argument. Yet no one would take it seriously. While people have taken
the Cartesian doubt very seriously indeed: it is fair to say that the problem
of the external world, and the various philosophical movements to which it
has given rise (empiricism, subjective idealism, Kantianism, objective idealism,
positivism, pragmatism, phenomenology, . . . ) has been the dominant theme in
Western philosophy for the last 350 years. Why is that? I think the answer is
that, although in the context of everyday life it would be crazy to doubt the existence of external reality, in the context of the views expressed in The Assayer,
The World and Treatise on Man the doubt becomes very reasonable. If one has
become convinced that, in sober truth, our senses are radically misleading us
as to the existence of colours, sounds, tastes etc, then it is surely very natural
to wonder if they might also be misleading us as to the existence of shapes,
sizes, positions etc. And if one has got as far as wondering if the senses are to
be trusted at all, then how does one avoid doubting the existence of external
reality? Moreover, I would suggest that that reason for doubting was operative,
not only in the mind of Descartes, but also in the minds of his philosophical
successors. It was operative precisely because it was widely believed that science had shown that our senses are radically misleading us. Scientists who are
scornful of philosophical worries about the existence of the external world miss
the point: it was science itself (or what people thought of as science) which
originally motivated the worries [35].
In short, I would suggest that all the distinctive features of the Cartesian
14 Popkin, however, notes that an autobiographical passage in Discourse on the Method
suggests that the line of thought which led to the cogito argument started earlier, in 1628 or
1629 (Popkin [67], p.147; Descartes [59], p.126)
17
philosophy are consequences1516 of Galileo’s original Pythagorean hypothesis,
that the world is fundamentally mathematical in character, and of the related
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In particular, this whole
way of thinking is rooted in the Galilean-Cartesian concept of matter. Cartesian
consciousness is a secondary concept, parasitic on that.
There is an irony in this story. In the 17th century there was no possibility
of finding solid empirical support for the micro-mechanical explanations of such
phenomena as colour, or heat, on which the Galilean-Cartesian philosophy was
based. These explanations remained highly speculative until the 19th century
when hard evidence started to accumulate. Even then progress was slow, as can
be seen from the fact that in the late 19th century controversy about atomism
the two sides were equally matched [69–72]. A nice illustration of this is the
fact that in the 1890’s Planck, who was subsequently to inaugurate an atomistic view of electromagnetic radiation, was sceptical about atoms, to the extent
that Boltzmann could attribute to him the opinion that work on kinetic theory
was a “waste of time and effort” (Kuhn [70], pp.22-3; also see Krips [71]). It
was only in the 20th century that the validity of micro-mechanical explanations
of the behaviour of matter was established to the satisfaction of every competent physicist. The irony is that the same advances which finally vindicated
micro-mechanical explanations also cast serious doubt on Galilean-Cartesian assumptions about what such explanations ought to be like. Indeed, one of the key
papers leading to the general acceptance of atomism (Einstein’s 1905 Brownian
motion paper [73]) was published in the same year, by the same person, as one
of the key papers casting doubt on Galilean-Cartesian assumptions (Einstein’s
1905 photoelectric paper [74]).
Quantum mechanics challenges the whole Galilean-Cartesian framework. It
is a challenge which has yet to call forth an adequate response. The Copenhagen
Interpretation provides a way of thinking about quantum experiments which is
sufficient for the practical needs of working physicists. But, as its critics point
out, it hardly amounts to a coherent philosophy of nature. Yet, instead of
taking the hint from experiment, and trying to move forward, the response of
those critics has mostly been to fall back on old, 17th century modes of thought,
and to try to find ways of interpreting quantum phenomena which would be
consistent with Cartesian assumptions. Over half a century ago Pauli described
such attempts as “regressive” (see, for instance, the letter to Fierz quoted in
Gieser [1], p.266), and it seems to me that everything which has happened since
tends to confirm that judgment. What we need to do is to dig up the GalileanCartesian foundations and replace them with a different conceptual structure,
better adjusted to all we have learned since the year 1900.
The Cartesian philosophy is built on two key principles: (1) the Pythagorean
hypothesis, that there is one true, complete description of the world, expressible in mathematical language and (2) the distinction between primary and
secondary qualities. I believe we ought to abandon both those principles.
15 Not consequences in a rigorous, deductive logical sense, but in a looser, psychological
sense.
16 This is close to Burtt’s [35] conclusion.
18
The idea, naturally suggested by quantum mechanics, that we should dispense with the Pythagorean hypothesis, produces in many people a sense of
vertigo. They fear that letting go of this is tantamount to letting go of the concept of physical reality. But that merely shows that they are so fixated on the
Galilean-Cartesian way of thinking about physical reality that they are unable
to envisage an alternative.
A description is something human. The ability to give descriptions evolved
(presumably) in the palaeolithic, for the purpose of communicating such facts
as the location of the nearest source of flint-nodules. We have a come a long
way since then, cognitively speaking. Nevertheless, the fact is that our modern mathematical descriptions of nature are all expressible in the language of
axiomatic set theory, which is a formalization of the naive set theoretic ideas
that palaeolithic hunter-gatherers (presumably) used when sorting their stone
tools, negotiating their intricate family relationships, etc etc. Moreover, our
mathematical descriptions comprise sequences of propositions, just like the verbal communications of palaeolithic hunter-gatherers. In short, our mathematical descriptions bear a clear human imprint. Conceivably the universe splits
logically, into a collection of sentence-sized morsels, each perfectly adapted to
human cognitive capacities17 . But I see no a priori reason for assuming that to
be the case.
I believe our attitude to this question should be empirical. If Einstein had
achieved the same stunning success, with his attempt to explain quantum mechanics in terms of classical field theory, that he did with general relativity,
then there would be reason to take the Pythagorean hypothesis seriously. But
since he did not, and since no one else has either, I think there are grounds for
scepticism. This is not to say that I question the validity of the partial descriptions we are able to give. Nor is to say that I am an anti-realist. It is not even
(necessarily) to deny that God is a mathematician. It is only to say that God
is, perhaps, a little more subtle and (dare I say?) interesting than Galileo gave
him credit for being.
Turning to the primary-secondary distinction, it is obvious that colour perceptions are in some sense subjective. The question is, however, whether they
are any more subjective than, for example, the statement that the E vector
at position r is 3i − 4j + 7k Vm−1 —where by “statement” I mean the actual
ink marks, or the brain states which occur as one reads them. It is true that
a colour-blind person will fail to discriminate two colours which a normally
sighted person sees to be different: from which it would seem to follow that the
colour-blind person has a different visual experience from the normally sighted
person. But then it is equally true that a person who measures the electric field
intensity to an accuracy of ±1 Vm−1 will have a different cognitive experience
from a person who uses a different instrument to measure it to an accuracy of
±0.1 Vm−1 .
Colour perceptions, being perceptions, are subjective by definition (in a
17 There is some overlap here with the discussion in Chapter 1 of Rorty [75]. However, the
fact that I agree with Rorty, that the universe is not a book, should not be taken to imply
that I agree with everything else he says in this chapter.
19
sense). But then, so are quantitative thoughts. Idealists aside, few people are
tempted to suppose that, because the belief, that carbon has proton number
6, is only a belief, therefore carbon does not really have proton number 6. No
more should one be tempted to suppose that, because the perception of green
is only a perception, therefore grass is not really green.
The function of eyes is to acquire information. Looking at an object is not
the same as listening to a verbal description of that object. But what one acquires by looking is still information, and to that extent it may be regarded as
a kind of statement18 . Cartesian-minded classical physicists, like Einstein, supposed that the world is completely describable, in terms of fields (or whatever).
Allowing that to be the case, for the sake of argument, it would not follow that
the statements of one’s visual system are any more subjective than statements
made in the approved mathematical language. What the classical physicist’s
description says in one way, using the language of fields, the visual system says
in another way, using the language of colours. To be sure visual statements say
less—contain less information—than the classical physics description (supposing
that to be valid). But that does not make them subjective. If one takes some
data given to 10 significant figures, and rounds everything off to 3 significant
figures, one loses a lot of information. But the information which remains is no
less objective than it was before. Worrying about the difference between the
mathematical description and the description in terms of colours is like worrying
about the difference between a description in English and the same description
written out in French. Colour qualities are no more in the head—and no less in
the head—than the electromagnetic field is in the head.
Discussions of qualia are often vitiated by the idea that there are two pictures
involved: one that is coloured (the picture we get from our eyes) and one that
is not (the picture we get from physics). This idea goes back to Descartes, of
course, with his talk of colours not “resembling” anything in the object. It is
based on a confusion, since neither of these pictures exists. There is no picture
in the head, as we have seen. Moreover the mathematical descriptions which
physics gives us are not pictures either19 —any more than a verbal description
is a picture. Thinking that colours do not exist in reality because there are no
colours in the mathematical description is like thinking that a city is colourless
because the verbal description in the guidebook is printed in black and white.
Back in the Palaeolithic, when language first developed, abstract, symbolic
descriptions conveyed much less information than the descriptions we get from
our eyes. It was therefore natural to take the visual description to be the standard, or canonical description, against which verbal descriptions were to be
judged. Effectively, reality was identified with the visual description (supplemented with information obtained from the other senses). However, with the
development of mathematical physics in the 17th century we found an abstract,
symbolic mode of description which, unlike ordinary language, was actually su18 Descartes makes an analogy between words and colours at the beginning of The World.
However, he fails to draw what I believe to be the correct conclusion
19 It is impossible to imagine the number 3, in the abstract. Similarly, it is impossible to
imagine quantities like vectors. The electric field vector, for example.
20
perior to the visual description in terms of informational capacity. It therefore
became natural to take the new mathematical description to be the canonical
description: in effect, to identify reality with the mathematical description. It
seems to me that the lesson of quantum mechanics is that we should drop the
whole idea of there being a canonical description. Galileo’s book metaphor is
profoundly misleading. There is no mathematical description in the sky. The
only descriptions around are the ones we humanly construct and which, being
human, are necessarily partial.
To say that there is no canonical description with which reality can be identified is not to deny the existence of reality. Supposing there to be a canonical
description, we have never known it. Such knowledge of reality as we possess
right now is entirely expressed in terms of our ordinary, humanly constructed
descriptions. It is not scepticism to suggest that knowledge so expressed is all
we ever will possess.
In this paper I have essentially confined myself to a criticism of Cartesian
philosophy. To construct an adequate non-Cartesian philosophy would take an
enormous amount of work. However, I believe there is reason to think that if we
were to undertake that project it would lead to a conceptual revolution equal
in magnitude to the 17th century Cartesian one. In particular, it would lead to
conceptions of the world, and of human nature, which differed as much from the
Cartesian conceptions as the latter did from medieval conceptions. So much so
that we would, perhaps, no longer want to use the words “consciousness” and
“matter” (except in their everyday senses, of course).
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study for their
hospitality while carrying out some of the research for this paper. Research at
Perimeter Institute is supported by the Government of Canada through Industry
Canada and by the Province of Ontario through the Ministry of Research &
Innovation.
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Rengarajan, S., Singularity & Its Manifestation (Part II)
897
Exploration
Singularity & Its Manifestation (Part II)
Srinivasan Rengarajan*
Abstract
According to Vedic thoughts, the cosmic “desire for self-expression as many” culminated in
the cyclic “oscillating universe”. In this self-expression, Singularity is the controlling factor &
the Universe is its controlled manifestations. Laws of Nature are the laws of singularity, the
non-contingent source, the divine laws that govern the universal orbits with precision, the
precise laws of the cosmos which the scientists measure with accuracy, the precise parameters
of the genotype cosmic seed of the universe. Laws of the universe are the Laws of the
aberrations of singularity, the laws of the phenotype tree. Contingent universe in growth/decay
cycles projects the panorama & enables us to savor the same “as many”, “unity in diversity”,
by “cause & effect” actions. Evolution is all about urge of the cosmic desire, the concentrate of
the manifesting vitality at the head of singularity, releasing a portion of its coherent mass as its
aberrations, as mass/vitality unions with the big bang for exploring new horizons in the
universe. The released masses regain progressively the dislodged coherence, the singularity’s
base virtue, the self-healing creativity in dispassion, during the evolution progress. That means
this basic creative virtue in the masses become gradually coherent & hence the masses are
drawn towards singularity by natural attraction at its base as the evolution progresses, while the
depleting manifesting vitality eventually converges back again towards its head. This natural
phenomenon culminates in big crunch leading to big bounce, the start of a new cycle.
Part II of this series of articles contains the following: 5. Universe; 6. Energy Transfers; 7.
Zone of Illusion: Truth, Maya, Lila, Silent Witness; 8. Panorama; 9. Cosmic Intent; 10. Cosmic
Wisdom; 11. Bliss; & 12. Invincibility.
Keywords: Divine, God, singularity, absolute, universe, cosmic aberration, manifestation,
Laws of Nature, laws of universe, evolution, Big Bang, big crunch.
5. Universe
Divine “Desire for self-expression as many”, Divine Lila, projected the universe as its
panoramic play field for self-exploration. The all-pervading light (jyothi) & sound (shabda)
vibrations reveal a variety of shades, forms, atoms to stars, galaxies & sentient humans,
products of disintegration of pure matter, cosmic seed, pervading as unions of desire based
consciousness & desire based matter in different orientations & vitality rhythms, cosmic tree,
discharging self-sustaining karmic actions, fulfilling the “many” aspect of cosmic desire. i.e. as
mass (with innate imprints) & energy (immanent consciousness), desire based mass/energy
bundles – matter with space gaps within their masses encased in respective mind/space
*
Correspondence: SrinivasanRengarajan, Independent Researcher. E-mail: sugantha1912@yahoo.com
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Rengarajan, S., Singularity & Its Manifestation (Part II)
horizons, dispersed in the universe as complementary pairs, as individual identities, as
satellites dependent on more vital entities.
The matter of the universe comprises mainly non-sentient matter undergoing progressive
evolution into higher modes depending on their imprints from the source of origin. But some of
these gaining mind, life supporting, gender identity imprints etc. in the evolution progress,
become souls, beings, astral masses, by the enlivening vitality of the divinity (supra life form
with integral sex vitality) radiating the complete range of cosmic genome, holistic
consciousness.
Although the human beings possess autonomous, self-referral and self-healing energy transfer
faculty they are governed by the contingencies of nature’s principles i.e. all the entities have to
collectively sport the supra life form. More over a male or a female is only a complementary to
each other& only their upgraded union has the evolution intelligence. The higher the up
gradation the closer it gets to divinity.
Human beings thus have partial control over thoughts & perceptions, i.e., evolution whereas
the divinity, the self-actualizing & radiating vitality, is invincible.
The human being either male or female, as an evolving vitality is thus only closest to divinity,
whereas the divinity is an invincible, monolithic male/female union. The primordial source,
bindu, synonymous with male aspects, under the urge of its cosmic desire, fertilized its
complementary, bija, the cosmic seed of the evolution process.
Aitreya upanishad
Cells are the beginning of life and human beings are the highest known life form. What gives
the human beings the ethical intelligence and makes them fundamentally different from all
other life forms is the human brain. Furthermore, the human brain consists of four
complementary pairs of sub brains.
Each cerebral hemisphere is a complement to the other, as we now know from the famous leftbrain/right-brain interaction. The highest and most recent known brain is the neocortex, the
fourth brain. This is the center of ethics and imagination. The next or third brain is the
mammalian cortex, or the limbic system, the center of the emotion of love and its variants plus
the higher biological drives. The next or second brain is the reptilian complex, the center of
fear, rage, and aggression plus intermediate biological drives. The first and oldest brain is the
fish brain, i.e., the rest of the nervous system, which is the basis for the most primitive
biological drives and the automatic control of our basic physiology. The human brain is an
autopoietic system of four complementary pairs which makes it possible for humanity to take
the next quantum leap in evolution, (Ventral view of the human brain, consists of four pairs of
complementary brains: fish, reptile, early mammal and human).
The living beings thus evolved, sustain & grow in their life cycles as per the environment they
are in, till the culmination of the evolution process, depending on the nature of its primal
disintegration from the cosmic seed, desire vitality & its evolution progress.
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Each one of the pairs of pair - sentient complementary pair, being nurtured by both self&
holistic consciousness, is thus individually empowered, by its own choice & free will to
support its own growth/decay cycles, through its self-referral energy transfers, as living being
with either male or female identity, as per encoded tendencies & forms, representing a part of
the divinity in universe. The human energy/mass union emanates passionate karmic vibrations
in various orientations, whereas the divinity radiates dispassionate coherent energy bursts in
eternal harmony.
The basic building block of the universe is thus the complementary pair, principle of the
divinity itself, existing in multifarious forms nurtured by cosmic forces as non-sentient matter.
These gradually progress into coherent autonomous sentient matter, the less vital becoming a
satellite of the more vital one, all of these being nurtured by the universal rhythm.
The stability of the universe, pervading & enlivening panorama, an expression of divine lila
(maya mistaken as the reality) is controlled by the primary transfer till the end of its cycle.
EVOLUTION CYCLE
The quantum bursts of the big bang that radiated out of the primal pure matter in into the space
around in the evolution mode set up the fundamental universal vibration rhythm along with the
vitality vibrations of major & minor released entities forming its harmonics, dissipating karmic
energy for exploring new horizons in a progressively energy depleting environment, i.e., from
evolution to involution till the culmination & merger of masses of various released entities
with the pure matter on account of the cosmic attraction - big crunch - to reemerge as selfhealed cosmic radiations of a new evolution cycle.
“Projection-sustenance-dissolution” activities in self-healing energy cycles guide the destiny.
(Similarly in the zone of the universe, desire based non radial energy dissipations perpetuated
by the non-sentient & sentient matter, get disoriented & deteriorated losing the vitality return
back to their respective sources, their mooladhara, get conditioned by their respective natural
mind/mass rhythms i.e. self-healed /get reoriented, in the tranquility of their return paths e.g. in
sleep & meditation modes, from base to head conditioned by the universal rhythm devoid of
sensory gratification because of the absence of ego, etc & reemerge in the self-healed
orientations for discharging karmic dissipations. Staying absorbed in the thoughts devoid of
ego, while retiring to sleep, meditation, concentration etc aids attunement of rhythm of the self,
with the universal rhythm & resultant up gradation of its mass content.
Thus the progress in evolution, up gradation/degradation, depends on the dispositions of the
collective vitalities of the non-sentient & also the autonomous sentient entities, the
environment. This Collective vitality of the environment also influences individual
dissipations.
The universal rhythm, the fundamental rhythm sustaining the energy transfers of major entities
& their satellites in their orbital motions, is born out of the big bang, (primordial energy
transfer). The energy vibration cycles of major & minor entities depend on respective makeup
& hence the vitality of their mass. All these comprise the harmonics of the universal rhythm.
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Rengarajan, S., Singularity & Its Manifestation (Part II)
It is up to the collective will of beings to make a symphony out of these energy vibrations.
The fundamental universal rhythm controls all the energy transfer cycles of major & minor
dependent entities periodically, which means, that when self-referral cyclic harmonics of
beings cross over the universal rhythm, they may get the self-healing vitality from the
universal rhythm due to their proximity. If the self will of the entity is powerful enough to
orient itself with the universal rhythm, resonance can be attained.
The primordial source does not govern the affairs of the universe directly; it only sustains the
universal rhythm through its coherence.
New horizons are showing up from time to time, according to the orientation & vibration of
individual’s natural “energy/mass” content, innate nature, & also that of the collective i.e. the
environment, nurture, each having influence over the other. All these random movements, yet
functioning in harmony, sustain under the overall influence of the universal rhythm. But time
to time deviations of harmony levels in different locations are difficult to predict because the
universal processes are guided by the self-willed interactions between the free & autonomous
energy transfers of the sentient human beings & to that extent randomness is inherent in system
itself. Moreover the progress in evolution is dependent on the ongoing contingent
transformations, while the cosmic energy itself progressively depletes from evolution to
involution & with each cycle of events leaving behind its imprints & momentum for the
subsequent cycle, past leaving its “self-healed”/stabilized imprints for the present.
It is important to realize that all the energy vibrations currently encountered by the entities are
all those that are in eternal continuation from inception, perpetuated through transformations &
transmigrations. Since all energy vibrations are vitality transfers having influence on the
environment, all the non-conducive energy vibrations such as those emanated out of ill
feelings, displeasures, abuses & curses can have adverse effect on beings with “weak” will
power, till they are revoked or lose their vitality. Intuition, premonition, mysticism, vision etc.
may aid in analyzing such conditions, but due care has to be taken to exclude delusions.
Counselors (scientific mystics), Gurus, visionaries etc serve the society in this regard.
Strong will power is the key to good well-being
Hence predicting individual cosmic scheme of events during the course of the evolution
process becomes possible only if we can get a clue to the vitality & energy transfer functions
of major operating entities of which others exist as satellites. This aspect is covered
traditionally by astrology, based on intuitively perceived yogic observations on the effects of
major planets & their movements over ages & also by scientific forecasts based on effects of
estimated energy & forces in the environment. Both these fields depend on probability where
statistics comes as a major tool in evaluation.
“Occurrences in our domain are beyond the reach of exact prediction because of the variety of
factors in operation, not because of any lack of order in nature". Einstein.
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At present science is yet to acknowledge & evaluate the presence of the dark energy, 75% of
the total, that controls the orbital motions of planets & hence the cosmic intelligence that
sustains natural order amidst all these chaotic dynamics of the universe
A visionary outlook, spiritual outlook, “yogic intuition”, self-realization, extra sensory
perception-–divinity in man, enables one to visualize, feel & savor the cosmic intelligence that
ensures the eternal stability in the environment.1
Total harmony, in an environment of natural orientations & rhythms, presenting a panorama in
diversity, prevailed among complementary pairs at the inception of evolution i.e. devoid of
non-ego based traits, as per cosmic design.
During passage of time, the vitality of the masses of various entities undergo gradual energy
depletion in stages, yugas, from energy saturation at evolution till energy depletion at
involution (a destined phenomenon of the evolution cycle). At the same time the entities
undergo constant transformations due to their karmic & ego energy interferences while
enriching/disrupting the panorama with extreme possibilities, life after life. All these contribute
to the cyclic variations in harmony levels of the panorama, climatic, social as well as spiritual.
The resultant of the collective energy transfers in the universe, collective will of the beings,
from time to time only accounts for the progress or otherwise in the evolution process.
The gradual decrease in cosmic vitality occurring from evolution to involution thus implies
that ongoing changes in the cosmic forces, motions, orbits etc. in physical terms & attitudes,
traits, social laws, moral laws (shastras etc. in spiritual terms), are inherent in the cosmic
scheme of events till pralaya, total energy depletion.
Newer & newer panoramas of unlimited variations springs out of the oneness of pervading
vitality, showing as many aberrations, each one being made of the same basic building block
sporting one micro form of the primordial source itself.
6. Energy Transfers
Energy Transfers - “cause & effect” based cyclic actions & reactions.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
“Desire imagination intelligence willpower action gratification” cycles.
“attraction self-healing radiation” self-referral cycles.
“growth/decay” cycles.
“transformation/transmigration” cycles.
“enlivening” pranic cycles
“universal” cycles
“cosmic” cycles
The absolute mass radiates as its aberrations with I-Ness identity, for fulfillment of its desire,
i.e. through pervading & enlivening vitalities in creation /evolution mode till cosmic merger in
--Keno Upanishad
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the involution mode, after the dissipation of all their energy content – cosmic attraction - to
bounce again after self-healing in the coherence of the source itself - cosmic cycle.
This primary transfer cycle generates self-sustaining coherent radiations, energy bursts, energy
transfers, that govern & enliven the universal rhythm by its all-knowing integral gender vitality
– enlivening desire vitality. There is a progressive deterioration in desire energy level during
the cosmic cycle starting with energy saturation & culminating in energy depletion.
In this back drop, the released matter, non-sentient & those undergoing evolution changes as
sentient, engage in self-sustaining energy vibrations & motions depending on the vitality of
their energy/mass contents, big & small, exert influence on each other through their
dissipations. Different vibrations emanating as per encoded imprints from different entities
representing different aspects of divinity –supra human form, have “material& spiritual
implications” in the environment.
Universe is thus a spiritual arena, the domain of “desire based” divine consciousness - Maya,
comprising all the released matter with energy content existing in the gaps of space as varna &
guna vibrations that are the harmonics of the universal rhythm sustained by the cosmic
radiations of singularity. They are meant to be in non-interfering radial orientations since the
total volume of pure matter without space gaps, is only about the size of the thumb i.e. 1 cubic
centimeter.
The non-radial, non-rhythmic & hence disturbing immanent energy transfers of the ego based
complementary pairs undergo energy dissipation progressively while their masses regain/lose
the coherence, upsetting the “mass/energy/space horizon” relationship of the entities. Due to
these changes the complementary nature of the energy/mass bondage of that mode ceases to
exist along with its space horizon. The dissociated energy, the pervading vitality of that
particular mode, antimatter, lingering cosmic desire for “existence as many’s causes
“antimatter/matter” annihilation to form fresh “energy/mass pairs”, encased in their new space
horizon, in different orientations & vibrations, as ordained by the cosmic contingencies,
transformations of non-sentient matter from one mode to other. The cosmic desire for “selfexpression as many” perpetuates this cosmic destiny through transformations.
Desire accounts for the spontaneous affinity of mass & energy –matter & vitality, leading to
ready transformation of mass, either on its disintegration or dissipation of energy upsetting
their union balance, into different mass/energy unions in compatibility, in eternal cycles, till
desire fulfillment/energy exhaustion
A non-sentient mass is sustained by immanent consciousness & when it progresses into
sentient mass as an astral mass, coherent mass, that can support the growth/decay cycle of its
mass medium that means its body mass gets life & becomes a being. This body mass which is
already sustained by the cosmic vitality becomes a medium for self’s desire/karmic
gratifications. When the body mass loses the support of either this astral mass or the cosmic
vitality, death occurs to the being. The astral mass detaches from the body mass & seeks a new
compatible medium for karmic gratifications. Transmigration is thus resorted to for sustaining
continuity, fulfillment of “self-expression” aspect of cosmic desire.
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A human being (a union of varna & enlivening vitality), is a sentient mass, an enlivened nonsentient mass that has during the course of evolution progress acquired the self-actualizing
imprints with which it can enliven & support its own growth/decay cycles with sex identities,
an astral mass with I-ness trait with a body mass as a medium for desire gratification . In a
being the karmic energy rises from the base, mooladhara, the seat of energy attraction, through
the spine, human vision axis, balanced by the complementary body orientations & functions of
the sensory & motoring organs & gets dissipated during its passage finally to the head, for
radiation out into the space around. This repetitive karmic energy dissipation which carries on
according to the encoded data, desire, mind & will power etc, undergoes depletion along with
mass disintegration/mutations/ or up gradation depending on the self-will upsetting the
naturally ordained mass/energy union mode resulting in the end of growth/decay cycle, death
of a being. As against this natural end, this cycle may also stop abruptly by the external
mutations/damage to body mass, its organs or the functions that enliven its pranic vitality. That
means the astral mass loses its medium, the body mass, through which it has been savoring
karmic gratifications, the source that provides the holistic consciousness imprints to the astral
mass, decays, This body mass thereafter undergoes transformation as a non-sentient mass.
With this body matter decay, the detached astral mass with cosmic mind/desire/ selfactualization vitality/I-ness/ mind imprints etc (the karmic desire still remaining unfulfilled),
gets naturally attracted to the enlivening vitality source in the universe, a compatible
reproduction cell of male/female union, a womb with compatible attitudes & tendencies,
forming a new “energy/mass” union with its prior orientation, a fresh birth, transmigration. Or
in some cases it may get attracted to the cosmic integral gender vitality of the source itself.
Desire for “self” existence of the divinity thus carries forward.
A fresh growth/decay cycle, a continuation of the previous one, begins from there.
Transformations in non-sentient matters as also transmigrations in fully upgraded astral masses
–human beings, along with a variety of other ranges in between, are the inherent activities in
nature’s replication processes.
Energy transfers in the universe cover an infinite range, from non-sentient transformations in
matter to growth/decay cycles of body mass & finally to transmigrations of human beings.
DNA is encoded with four interchangeable "building blocks", called "bases", which can be
abbreviated A, T, C, and G; each base "pairs up" with only one other base: A+T, T+A, C+G
and G+C; that is, an "A" on one strand of double-stranded DNA will "mate" properly only with
a "T" on the other, complementary strand. Replication is performed by splitting (unzipping) the
double strand down the middle via relatively trivial chemical reactions, and recreating the
"other half" of each new single strand by drowning each half in a "soup" made of the four
bases."
Nature enables the manipulation of the DNA of a reproduction cell by the astral mass by
implanting its own DNA strand in the reproduction cell of a womb, generating its
complementary strand there & growing as a pair into a being, thus sustaining continuity in
evolution.
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If of course the astral mass were to be in tune with the universal rhythm itself at that right
moment, its natural merger can instead take place with the invincible vitality, holistic
consciousness with upgraded potentials, of the integral gender union of the cosmos itself,
liberation. 2
Replication, procreation, reproduction, co-creation are the normal modes in growth cycles of
beings. Transmigration, higher order replication, goes through human male/female
reproduction cells.
Transmigration in beings is similar to the cosmic transfer where the cosmic seed of vitality
grows into the tree of universe & on decay merges with the source to initiate a new cycle. In
transmigration the fertilized reproduction cell of male/female union grows into a being & on its
decay its astral mass dissociates & initiates a merger with the vitality of another cell of a
male/female sex union, to carry on its karma in a fresh growth/decay cycle.
So a male/female union plays a spiritual role in the up upgradation of the evolutionary
progress.
While the desire affinity between mass/energy, forms the basis for transformations in nonsentient matter, the reproduction cells formed by the male/female union, enlivening affinity,
act as a medium for the astral masses to carry on transmigration. It is through these
transformations & transmigrations the varna & guna vibrations the aberrations -karmic
dissipations of beings,, perpetuate the supra human form in variations yuga after yuga, where
the continuity in evolution depends on the “cause & effect” criterion.
It is the desire vibrations of the astral mass on death that enables the process of unzipping the
double helix of the fertilized male/female reproduction cell (genotype reservoir of forms &
tendencies), reservoir of holistic consciousness of human beings, & forming its complementary
strands thereto become a double helix. This double helix of an astral mass becomes a fresh life/
being encoded with the tendencies prevailing at the instant of its transmigration & goes
through its growth/decay cycle using the cell as its medium nurtured by both its selfconsciousness of the astral mass as well as the holistic consciousness derived from the
medium.
The nature’s mutually attracting forces of mooladhara of beings of opposite gender & the
vitality of the reproduction cell thus enable transmigration of sentient beings.
Transformations in non-sentient matter & replication/recreation/reproduction/procreation/
transmigration/co creation etc in sentient matter are natural processes that are sustained by the
cosmic fields of the universe, to carry forward the urge of “cosmic desire” for “self-existence
as many” to “explore newer horizons”.
In fact by being in resonance with the universal rhythm during their gender union, the human
beings can upgrade fertilization of the reproduction cells through which the astral masses
undergo transmigration.
Kathopanishad—brihadaranya Upanishad—bhavagatham
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Ironically sentient beings merely dissipate the cosmic energy only in sensory pleasures during
gender union, failing in their duty to upgrade reproduction cells as enriched reservoirs of
cosmic genome, thus only passing on degradation to posterity.
That means when the astral mind/mass is in a harmonious orientation with the universal
rhythm at the instant of transmigration, its mass can get upgraded by the coherence of the
rhythm. This is an ideal duration when it can form an upgraded complementary pair in the
reproduction cell, empowered to enliven even the cosmic genome. Proper orientation & rhythm
of the complementary pairs undergoing transmigration i.e. spiritual orientation at death,
ensures human & thus the social up gradation life after life.
Furthermore, on being in resonance with the cosmic rhythm itself, it is possible for these pairs
even to transcend the universe, merge with the primary transfer, liberation.
Thoughts associated with the Absolute at the time of death are conducive for “refined
transmigration”, “liberation”, merger with the radiance of the absolute.
When the immanent consciousness of a being gets into, through the will power of mind, a
proper energy rhythm that merges with the universal energy rhythm, before all of the energy
content of its “energy/mass” union is exhausted” (ego discarded in total dispassion), end of
karma on self-realization in the zone of the universe itself, divinity is brought down to the earth
itself jeevan mukthi.3
While so much is possible by human efforts, very rarely do people reach these heights due to
selfish motives caused by lack of awareness, avidhya.
Native wisdom says “you do not always get what you want, but are likely to end up with what
you need”.
It is prudent to wish for what you need., what the source intended to savor through you without
any effort on your part, for realizing salvation, freeing yourself from sins by adhering to nature,
co-exist. If otherwise, you act on the basis of your ego, you end up in frustration instead.
To be a co-creator& be in Bliss, you have to be aware & also be part of nature’s process.
Energy vibrations that emanate from cosmic radiations have spiritual & social relevance.
7. Zone of Illusion: Truth, Maya, Lila, Silent Witness
The pure matter, (3/4th unrevealed matter), eternal gapless singularity is an embodiment of
coherence in harmony radiating non contingent invincible vitality with instant precision & in
dispassionate bliss. Hence it is devoid of illusion. It is TRUTH the eternal whereas; universe is
the domain of the aberrations of singularity in eternal transformations. Anything that exists has
a “cause & effect” relevance to the absolute truth.
Absolute truth in the universe is hence an illusion. At best it can be an integration of totality
Isa Upanishad
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When you experience conflict of reason, intelligence and wisdom, you have to realize that
there are better ways of seeing things. Conflicting “truths” can exist in “harmony” when they
are viewed as existing on different planes of one source, since the matter of the universe, even
though with a common origin, exists in different orientations i.e. with different attributes i.e. as
different harmonics of one universal rhythm.
An enlightened consciousness, the one attuned to the universal rhythm, is inclusive and not
exclusive in its nature. The more the one is enlightened, the more he is able to perceive the
truth about reality.
Because of the space gaps within their masses the energy transfers between their immanent
consciousness & masses are in varying vibration rhythms i.e. in cycles not having orientation
& rhythmic stability as that of the Absolute& also due to ongoing mutual interactions, they
undergo disruption, deterioration, mutation & hence transformation in their mass contents
periodically. This phenomenon of universal matter existing with gaps of space within their
masses & undergoing transformation cycles is illusion, Maya, namely, the nature’s gift to
mankind that enables them to think and act in variations & savor the grand panorama of the
universe through karmic imprints - divine lila - divine manifestation for “self-existence as
many” to explore limitless variety, which is the essence of evolution.
Thus the projected sentient & non-sentient matters of the universe, big & small, each of them
existing as whole entity, as a representation of the source itself, discharge self-sustaining
autonomous energy transfers & some times in self-interest -ego, with urge to “play God” with
the conviction that they hold total control of their actions, avidhya, ignorance.. When they
ultimately realize the truth that only the cosmic transfer sustains the overall harmony by
governing the universal rhythm & karmic order i.e. by keeping the tendencies & traits of all
matter in constant transformation & transmigration, it becomes clear that the universe is only
an illusion & a karmic playground sporting extreme possibilities where desire & ego conflicts
appear as chaos & how they are resolved by natural laws, impart spiritual knowledge, lessons
in Dharma Sashtra, Purpose of divine lila, The desire based passionate sentient beings- astral
masses of the aberrations of singularity, dissipate karmic energy through the self-actualized
pervading & enlivening vitalities, experiencing pleasures & pains as harmonics, of the
universal rhythm, whereas the Omnipotent Self existing as the un-manifest singularity radiates
all the cosmic vitalities for sustaining the universal rhythm in dispassionate bliss, i.e. devoid of
feelings & hence without pleasures & pains- as an invincible & yet a silent witness .
8. Panorama
This nature’s diversity manifesting in the all-pervading “complimentary pairs”, thus brings to
exposure the panorama through Varna (shades)&Vitality (gunas), that means bringing to
reality the divine presence in variations through the universe. If a human energy transfer is
enlivened to be in resonance with the universal rhythm & also further on with that of the
primary transfer, the mass content of its “energy/mass” union acquires a cosmic invincibility
radiating rhythmic vibrations& coherence with a glow, tejas, i.e aura in beings, adding further
brilliance to the panorama. When all of these varna/guna vibrations acquire such invincibility
i.e. when all the energy transfers in an environment are tending towards dispassion radiating all
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round glow, total grandeur pervades region. This is the ultimate human possibility, orientation
of all shades of varna & guna vibrations towards the singularity facilitating its radiance to
transcend downwards, ”bringing down of heaven to earth”, fulfillment of ultimate divine
intent.
These diverse pairs are themselves individually capable, based on their innate quality, nature,
of either transforming or amenable for being transformed by the environment, nurture.
“Nature” of an entity is either upgraded or degraded by “Nurture”, environment or vice versa
depending on their comparative vitality strengths, thus opening up extreme possibilities in the
cosmic panorama.
Accidents & disasters happen due to overwhelming effects of individual or collective
consciousness of matters sentient & non-sentient i.e. the resultant of all the energy transfers of
a particular environment leading to the breakdown in the self-referral dynamics in that
location.
Even in such cases the overall harmony is in any way sustained by the universal rhythm that is
itself being governed by the cosmic transfer.
The cosmic forces, the pervading & enlivening vitalities of light & sound, OM reverberations,
thus sustain the panorama & grandeur of the universe eternally as a harmonious symphony.
Collective will power of the autonomous sentient masses, vairagya, plays a big role in realizing
this self-healing possibility, bringing the karmic dissipations in unison with the universal
rhythm & thereafter with the cosmic transfer i.e. transcendence of collective will power
beyond the realm of the universe reaching heavenly heights & also bringing the heaven down
to the earth, descent of cosmic vitalities to the zone of universe, emergence of an avatar. This
ultimate self-healing phenomenon sustains the panorama even during violent turbulences
ensuring eternal harmony.
9. Cosmic Intent
The intent of the Absolute is that the human beings as its representation should savor the
universe as a grand panorama in diversity & not as a dull monotony. To realize this therefore,
the natural laws radiated by the invincible cosmic rhythm have to be adhere, i.e., the karmic
traits as encoded in their DNA that means the respective swabhava & swadharma of the beings
have to be adhered to for salvation i.e. without harming the natural processes, devoid of sins.
Dharma sashtra, the laws of ethics, lays down various guidelines to meet this end.
However, the ego based autonomous energy transfers of beings take place in various
interfering & non rhythmic modes disturbing environmental harmony. The ideal way for the
sentient matters, human beings, to progress in the evolution process is to exist as divine
representations adhering to swabhava discharging swadharma i.e. not disturbing the universal
rhythm. Otherwise, these disoriented energy transfers end up in degradation, i.e., in mutation
of their mass contents leading to their transmigration into lower modes in their karmic cycles.
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All the sentient matter of the universe comes under the cosmic oneness & has the individual &
collective potential for attaining the cosmic invincibility as that of the Pure Matter i.e. these
complementary pairs are capable of establishing bliss by attuning to the universal rhythm
through the coherence of will power, vairagya, to become co-creators.
“(desire/will power) (manifestation/creation) (fulfillment/happiness)” forms the essence
of the evolution.
Nature’s intent, purpose of evolution itself, is that human beings coexist, realize salvation &
savor bliss in the universe as divine representations in harmony or co-create, progressively
upgrade their mass content through transmigrations, intelligent procreation & attain
invincibility, in the universe, zone of Maya, All beings are adequately empowered to become
co-creators, jeevan muktha. Intense will power, proper self-actualized orientation & rhythm of
guna traits, shall achieve the objective of bringing the heaven down to earth, “here & now”
making the zone of the universe, a grand panorama.
Ironically some individuals more gifted with the nature’s empowerment, are self-deceptive &
strive to play god for ego gratification, i.e., directing self-will against the natural universal
rhythm. Some others even try to attain “liberation” for getting away from karmic anxieties &
merge with the invisible singularity of the pure matter through coherent spiritual efforts,
transcending the zone of the universe. This defeats the intended spiritual & social purpose.
The divine intent after all is to bring the heaven down to earth, bring new horizons for
experiencing bliss, here & now, by one & all & not for them to transcend the zone of the
universe to that of the cosmos, serving no karmic purpose in the universe.
POINT TO PONDER: Divinity itself pervades as environmental vitality & also in all entities
as basic building blocks in their sensory & motoring organs, enlivening them with all the
potentials, for savoring its panorama. Can there be any other scheme of arrangement that will
realize the cosmic intent any better?
10. Cosmic Wisdom
The primordial vision guides the destiny of evolution & its complementary involution in
precise cyclic order to fulfill its cosmic desire, in accordance with its cosmic wisdom.
The absolute mass thus evolves as its aberrations with various I-ness imprints for experiencing
karmic desire, in eternal replication cycles, through faculties of imagination (mind, memory)
aspects of pervading vitality,& creativity (ego, intelligence), aspects of enlivening vitality,
which finally dissolve into itself into re-emerge after self-healing (coherence, will power)
aspects of self-actualization vitality. The faculties reflecting the shades, tendencies & attitudes
through which the sense gratifications are experienced, are empowered naturally to function
with optimum effectiveness only when they are in tune with the day to day universal rhythm
operating the creation & dissolution cycles. This in built feature indicates the presence
intelligence in nature.
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At the instance of big bang, “Intelligence” of the Vision head radiated the release of only 1/4th
of the Absolute as pervading “mass & energy” unions, as self-sustaining “complementary
pairs” in varying orbital motions, providing a harmonious panorama as the universe, retaining
the rest 3/4th singularity, black hole, for sustaining the totality through its coherence.
“Self-effulgent compatible complementary pairs” & “self-referral energy bursts” are inherent
in the nature of the cosmos & these phenomena ensure orientation & physical stability of
respectively of the un-manifest & also the manifest right from big bang, starting with time,
space, relativity, diversity, karmic dissipations etc. till dissolution, big crunch.
The evolution undergoes progress through mind, imagination, up gradation through
intelligence in the creation process while sustaining the stability & harmony all through by its
will power, i.e., in spite of disrupting energy dissipations ranging from deterministic asexual
replication etc. to the autonomous self-referral karmic actions & transmigrations of human
beings & even through dispassionate co-creation activities etc. All these are possible since the
divinity itself forms the basic building block of all that manifests, i.e., as the provider &
experiencer of desire gratifications of unlimited range.
In the evolution process these released complementary pairs enliven the data encoded as per
their source of origin, each permeating a form/trait of the supra human, as its innate trait as
separate entities in their respective horizon, each of them, big & small, having a potential to
enliven even the entire cosmic genome on attaining resonance with the universal rhythm, thus
contributing to the range of the panorama.
The nature of “forms & shapes” attitudes & tendencies, of all of the various projected
complementary pairs, in total integration, represents the supra human form, that means, the
forms, dispositions & functions of sensory & motor organs, attitudes & tendencies etc,in the
human form, in a way correlate to the supra human form of the divine & the cosmic
intelligence associated with this aspect of creation is evident through the adaptability,
versatility & the invincibility traits etc. found in the karmic energy dissipations of human
beings i.e. “desire action replication in growth-decay cycles& also in their dispassionate
co creation functions. These intelligence potentials engrained in each being can even be made
to become as versatile, as that of the divine through their self-will.
Even amidst multifarious ego centric, autonomous & self-willed energy disruptions to
harmony, a precise day to day universal order is sustained by the inbuilt coherence of the
universal rhythm, bringing to light the presence of cosmic wisdom.
11. Bliss
Bliss: Happiness in an atmosphere of “invincibility”, state of “No frustration”.
A being upgrades through mind & intelligence and sustains & self-heals by coherence of will
power.
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Karmic actions against Nature’s Harmony & Coherence are sins & in favor, are virtues. Hence
Swabhavic & swadharmic actions, being devoid of sins lead to salvation.
Happiness is a state of mind when the desires are being currently fulfilled. Desires that have
already been fulfilled do not contribute much to the present happiness. We maximize happiness
by maximizing actions oriented towards creativity & by pursuing it from the realm of
possibility & not from the realm of problems & problem solving efforts, i.e., by having
positive attitudes without anxieties. Happiness and creativity are not mutually exclusive but
neither are they the same thing.
Unfulfilled desires give us unhappiness so long as they last. Hence feelings of happiness are
only cyclic experiences in beings, aberrations with limited cosmic vitalities.
So, happiness felt in an environment of invincibility that ensures no frustration is bliss.
Attunement of the autonomous but the unstable energy vibrations of human beings with the
universal rhythm, through tranquil mind devoid of feelings, dispassion, aspects of mind &
intelligence which is reinforced by coherence, will power, aspects of self will, lead to the
merger of their energy vibrations with that of pure matter, resonance, the condition that
empowers them to attain cosmic potentials (right environmental conditions prevailing). This
transcendence of the cosmic radiations through the universal rhythm to human beings brings
invincibility. When such potentials are attained, happiness in beings transforms into bliss.
Bliss, resonance with the universal rhythm, can be attained even instantly, right conditions for
orientation & self-will prevailing. Once realized, it need not stay permanent, because the
energy transfers function in various dynamic cyclic momentums, replications. Constant &
consistent effort, coherence, is needed to sustain the same amidst distractions. Strong will
power, coherence, in human energy transfers during self-referral period, i.e., the period in
which their vibration harmonics cross over with the universal rhythm in close proximity, is an
essential prerequisite for initiating resonance.
“Not possessing ego” is a virtue, but at the same time, the very thought being “conscious of not
possessing ego” itself, hinders harmony & also coherence. To sail in the realm of the universal
rhythm without anxieties, is to be in blissful harmony.
Bliss in the domain of the universe can be approached & established by the beings, aberrations
of divinity as per their innate traits by coexisting as harmonics of the universal rhythm in
different modes in harmony namely, personal social, environmental, spiritual etc. the collective
will of the environment acting as a catalyst to their will power. The more you are in tune with
the universal rhythm the more you are blissful because your sensory & motoring vibrations
namely actionfulfillmentgratification faculties are in full empowerment. Highest level you
reach is resonance, when you are instantly invincible, attain tranquility & dispassion of the
source itself.
POINT TO PONDER:
Happiness is due to fulfillment of desire, gratifications brought out of guna vibrations.
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We know “more the dispassion the higher is the bliss level”. But, in total dispassion, one
merges in divine vitality & becomes instantly empowered beyond “guna vibrations”, ability to
differentiate & experience, i.e., to savor. Then, what is the level of dispassion one should be in,
for savoring optimum level of happiness/bliss through guna vibrations in the universe?
Seek self-realization, to know your karmic desire & find how it serves the supra human form.
Karmic actions lead you to salvation, an easy & natural approach to happiness.
Will power empowers you to experience “happiness free from anxieties”, Bliss.
To be in the universal rhythm, coexistence without ego is bliss.
To nurture the complementary pair in compatibility mode is bliss.
To be in the realm of possibility & not problems is bliss.
Happiness orientated action until desire fulfillment brings happiness.
On desire fulfillment, another desire cycle drags you causing disruption to bliss.
Invincibility that removes frustration empowers one to be in bliss.
To be in evolution/ co-creation mode is bliss.
Self-realization, knowledge of swabhava & swadharma, leads to bliss.
Visionaries help you to know your nature, natural laws, ethical codes (dharma shastras).
Beware of moral/rational codes aimed at productivity. They may imply coercion.
12. Invincibility
The manifest source, Paramatma, the supra human form, manifesting as aberrations sustains by
itself through the universal rhythm & the self-referral energy transformations of all its entities.
The singularity, pure matter, non-manifest source, sustains the totality through its invincible
radiations.
These released entities perpetuate their karmic functions eternally through the contingent
imprints meant to sustain in harmony as parts of one source. Primary requisite for a being to
attain salvation is self-realization, knowledge of the part of the divine one is supposed to
replicate naturally & also the invincibility of the cosmic forces, the nature’s vitality resource.
Replication is an inherent phenomenon of nature & so constant & consistent approach is
needed in the self-actualization efforts, i.e., to restrain the mind from replication through the
will power of dispassion. Detachment is the human capacity to be conscious of replication,
auto pilot momentum of the mind, and restrain the thought forces from repeating a set pattern.
The intellect is like the leash and what holds the leash is the soft power of the selfconsciousness that stands by the intellect.
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The sentient beings savor the cosmos through the self-consciousness, the imprints on the left
brain & also the holistic consciousness, imprints on the right brain, i.e., boundless vitality
permeated by the silent witness, both together making the karmic double helix. Their life
sustenance is through circulation of prana, vitality of the heart.
The divinity’s intent, urged by its cosmic desire, mind (antimatter) for “self-expression as
many” to explore new horizons”, is for enlivenment of all possible vitalities in the universe
through desire driven minds of various entities with limited possibilities. The cosmic source
radiates the vitalities from an environment of dispassion, thoughts devoid of feelings, while
remaining as “silent witness”, i.e., not directly savoring but at the same time empowering the
autonomous human energy transfers in their desire gratifications while even upgrading them to
attain invincibility through will power.
Sentient beings devoid of ego existing, as per their innate imprints in harmony with the
surroundings, are naturally empowered to realize salvation, no sins. Those with ego traits
however cannot be in a state of happiness always because their self-consciousness, imprints on
the left side of the brain are not in unison with the imprints on the right side of the brain,
holistic consciousness, at all times. Unless one is in tune with the holistic consciousness of the
universal rhythm, it is hard to realize lasting happiness.
Nature permeates the holistic consciousness through right side of the brain & it is up to the
individual to unify his self-consciousness on the left side with the totality to become invincible.
Mind control, coherence during self-realization, meditation in harmony & pranayama (pranic
inputs to upgrade body mass), Raja yoga, are the means to attain self-actualization vitality.
In human beings, the desire & mind drags their immanent transfers away from the fundamental
rhythm of the silent witness because of their ego based self-consciousness imprints. They may
end up in happiness only during ego gratifications. This happiness is of transient nature, since
they are not always in tune with the universal rhythm. This is an impediment in realizing the
lasting harmony that means maintaining total compatibility between the rhythms of the ego
based self & that of the divine that oversees it. By orienting the mind with the “silent witness”,
rhythm of the eternal primary transfer in dispassion, thoughts rid of feelings, the masses in all
the human cells can be streamlined & brought in resonance with the universal rhythm & even
with that of the cosmos, cosmic rhythm, for total invincibility.
This cosmic resonance of the human energy cycles can transcend the zone of the universe to
that of the divine, thus assuring immense cosmic possibilities to human efforts.
All are equally exposed to the cosmic radiations of the pure matter that enliven the universal
rhythm. That is all, what equality is about. Individual self-will alone holds the key to
invincibility.
These autonomous self-referral vibrant potency of the human energy transfers, rising from
mooladhara, the seat of potency & seat of attraction through the spine to the head, the seat of
emission for projection into space (akin to the primary transfer), can through coherence of will
power, resonate with the universal rhythm. This vitality of resonance can enliven the total
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being namely mass & mind & the karmic actions can be made to discharge through sensory &
motor organs for the benefit of self & the society. This vitality can even transcend the zone of
universe, maya, to merge with the primary transfer, total fulfillment of karmic desire imprints,
completion of one’s karmic life cycle, merger with the source even before pralaya, i.e.,
Liberation.
Controlling the guna vibrations through its passage from mooladhara to head, karmic energy
dissipations of the sense & motor organs, swadharma, namely directing the cosmic energy of
the self to be in resonance with the universal rhythm, achieving optimal self-healing
transformations in the desire based cells controlled by the human mind mass (astral mass)
through self-will, vairagya, aspect of intelligence, that means, leaving out feelings of happiness
& unhappiness from egoistic gratifications, discharging karmic energy with dispassion,
merging with the Silent Witness, practicing pranayama for enlivening & meditation for
enrichment of the body cells, Raja Yoga, leads to dynamic invincibility in human energy
transfers.
These upgraded orientations & rhythms of the guna vibrations refine the cells in the mass of
the complementary pairs, DNA activation & impart glow, Tejas, to the body mass,
invincibility.
All varieties of varna vibrations properly aided by will power can attain, tejas, invincibility.
Varna adds colors & shades to the panorama & is not at all an impediment to attain
invincibility, bliss.
Similarly, withholding supply of energy of prana to the appropriate sensory organs alone with
the intent of suppressing sensory feelings one ends up in keeping “thoughts as well as feelings”
still, thereby keeping both sensory & motoring actions still, Hatha Yoga, i.e., stopping the
enlivening energy to the sensory system thereby keeping the particular mind functions still,
while at the same time keeping the “immanent consciousness” active, i.e., keeping the sentient
mass in proper rhythm devoid of disruptions from sensory & hence the motoring actions, i.e.,
refining the body mass thereby imparting glow, Tejas, that means gaining static invincibility of
the body mass, i.e., attaining the quality of singularity, pure matter, in the body mass itself.
This possibility of hata yoga does not give much universal benefit as compared to Raja yoga,
since the all-pervading aspect of prana (vitality) is not fully available for universal good.
A good mind controller is a good cosmic energy controller as against a good mind arrester.
Positive meditation, self-willed mind control with coherence, is to seek clarity of thoughts in
your grey areas regarding your object of attainment, from the realm of possibilities i.e. in a
relaxed manner as opposed to concentration where you fix your mind on the object of
attainment.
POINT TO PONDER: An average human being partakes in the evolution process by directing
the cosmic energy vitality of the self, i.e., from mooladhara the seat of attraction to the head
the seat of radiation, for experiencing sensual bliss through sensory & motor organs, neglecting
the possibility of its contributing to up gradation of cells in a reproduction womb, reservoir
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cosmic genome, source of holistic consciousness in transmigration, thereby upsetting the
cosmic desire’s intended evolution progress through enriched transmigration process.
(Continued on Part III)
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What Do Neural Nets and Quantum Theory Tell Us About
Mind and Reality?
Paul J. Werbos
National Science Foundation*, Room 675
Arlington, Virginia, USA 22230
Pwerbos@nsf.gov
1. Introduction
The organizer of this conference, Dr. Kunio Yasue, invited people from many disciplines to address certain
basic questions which cut across these disciplines: “How can we develop a true science of consciousness?
What is Mind?” This paper was invited to the session on quantum foundations, which was also asked to
address: “What is Reality?”
The literature on consciousness contains many discussions about what we can learn from modern
neural network theory and quantum theory, in trying to answer these questions. However, those discussions
do not always account for the most recent insights and developments in those fields. Even those authors
who deeply understand all the relevant disciplines would find it difficult to write a paper which is
intelligible to people in other disciplines, but also does justice to the real technical details.
Because of this communications problem, I will write this paper in a relatively informal way.
The bulk of the paper will be an edited transcript of the talk which I gave at the conference, with references
added to provide at least some technical support. Section 3 will contain new thoughts, stimulated in part by
discussions at the Quantum Mind conference in Arizona, later in 1999. The views expressed here are only
my views, not the official views of NSF or of the US government.
2. Transcript of Talk
In his introduction, Dr. Yasue mentioned that Paul Werbos is a Program Director at the National Science
Foundation, the primary agency of the US government for funding basic research across all disciplines. He
studied physics under Dr. Julian Schwinger, winner of the Nobel Prize for quantum electrodynamics along
with Feynman and Tomonaga. He is best known for the original discovery of backpropagation, the most
widely used algorithm in the field of artificial neural networks.
Thank you, Kunio. I am very grateful to have a chance to speak to you here in Japan.
Before I begin, I must make a couple of apologies. First, I am not really a professional physicist. I
did have the good luck in graduate school in Harvard to study under Julian Schwinger who, as you say, was
the co-inventor of the quantum field theory discussed by many speakers here. In the 1970s, when I studied
under Schwinger, many people actually thought he was going crazy, because Schwinger did not like the
second quantization, the quantum field theory. He felt there must be a better way to do it -- and so, in the
1970s, he worked on a new way of doing quantum mechanics. He called it source theory (Schwinger). He
had the framework right at that time, but he did not yet have the details of how to apply it to high-energy
physics. So when I was a student they said "This is crazy. The formalism is OK, but it's not practical. It's
just metaphysics; don't pay attention to it." But in the last twenty years, I was very happy to find out that
this source theory has been developed much further. It is now called the functional integral approach (ZinnJustin). It is a third quantization. It is a whole new way of doing quantum mechanics, and it changes many
of the things we have heard here. Quantum field theory today is not what it was twenty years ago.
I have not worked in physics myself since then, but, on my own, I have tried to use my scarce
personal time to think of yet another way to do the quantum foundations. I have some wild and crazy ideas
for a fourth quantization. I have a few papers on it, but I only have the mathematical framework (Werbos
1989, 1998a, 1999a). I think the framework makes sense, but much work is needed now to develop the
practical details. I hope someone here is a physicist interested in working out some of the details, because I
•
The views herein are those of the author in 1999, not those of NSF, though it was written up on
government time.
am not like Schwinger; I will not spend the next twenty years developing the practical details. I would be
grateful for any collaborators for the next stage.
But no one pays me to do physics. Actually, I work in the Engineering Directorate at NSF. So here
I feel like a humble shoemaker asked to give a talk at the great temple; in one week, I will go back to
making shoes -- but the shoes we make are not exactly shoes. We help people develop cars which are
cleaner and more efficient, airplanes which are safer and faster, new manufacturing systems, robots, control
systems for electric power grids (Werbos 1999b,c). Carefully and slowly we develop real engineering
things which must work. That is what they really pay me to do.
So I will begin here by talking about the mind, first. The theme of this conference is
"consciousness" -- the science of consciousness - and that is what they pay me to do, to worry about
intelligent systems and about how this relates to biology. And then I will talk about advanced quantum
theory if there is time. I hope there will also be some time to talk about the connection from quantum
theory to the brain. Maybe I should say just a few words about that now because I probably will run out of
time.
2.1. Quantum Theory and the Brain
At NSF, some people want to start a new funding initiative in quantum computing. This is an exciting field.
Many people speculate that quantum mechanics can help us do better computing, that we can build a higher
level of intelligence if we exploit quantum theory. Many people at this conference have said that with
quantum theory, we can explain or produce a higher level of consciousness.
I think this is probably true, but we have not proven it yet. No one has built a quantum system, or
designed one which is well-defined, which would really generate such higher-order capabilities. There are
theoretical concepts for how to use quantum theory to build an associative memory. I think that is what we
just heard from Vitiello – some ideas on how to use quantum principles to build or explain associative
memory. There is also a person named Grover , who is very famous in quantum computing, famous for his
design of an algorithm to do associative memory.
But there are two problems here. First, these designs are very theoretical. To create real, working
physical systems is much harder than the theoretical physicists used to think. The theoretical physicists tend
to work in the second quantization, in a world of pure probability amplitudes. But when you need it to work
in real hardware, you need to worry about these horrible quantum thermodynamics issues, which means
that you need to think about density matrices. Only recently have people begun to get ideas about hardware
which seem to make sense in physical terms. There are ideas, but just beginning. (For some of the recent
decisive work on hardware, you may search on names like Gershenfeld, Kimble, Preskill, Lloyd, Wineland
and Kwiat on the index at xxx.lanl.gov.)
Second, the more difficult problem is with algorithms. A memory is not a brain. Building an
associative memory does not tell us how to build an intelligent system. There is a long distance from
knowing how to do an associative memory to proving you can do brains. In many ways, associative
memory is much easier than real intelligence. In the questions after that talk someone asked,” Are you
minimizing energy or are you doing what a brain is doing?” Of course, it is not what a brain does! A brain
is not a memory. A memory is a useful part of a brain but a brain is something much, much bigger.
So now I will try to talk first about my ideas about consciousness and the mind, and then quantum
theory, and we will see how far I get.
2.2. Consciousness or Mind From a Neural Net Perspective
To begin with, what do we mean by the word “consciousness”? As people have said, there are many, many
different definitions of consciousness. In a talk five years ago (Werbos 1997), I tried to discuss six of them:
o Consciousness as Awareness
o Subjective Sense of Existence
o Consciousness as Intelligence
o Consciousness Vs. Unconsciousness
o What About the Soul?
o Quantum Effects Relevant?
These are just six. I have heard many others at this conference. I do not want to argue about what is the best
definition. These are all important concepts. Waking and sleeping states – they are very important. But in
my talk I only want to talk about one concept. These are all big subjects, so I will focus on one question
here -- consciousness as intelligence. What is intelligence? What is mind? That is what I want to talk about.
3 Views of Intelligence
Human
IQ
Rock
Multiple
Designs/Levels
So now let us move to the first slide. If we focus on the idea of consciousness as intelligence, there are still
many different points of view to sort out.
There are actually three different concepts or views of intelligence, or of consciousness qua
intelligence. The most common view I have heard lately is the binary view, illustrated on the upper left of
the slide. People look at a computer design ... or they look at a spider... and they ask,"Is it conscious? Or is
it not?" They agree that humans are conscious or intelligent -- I'm not sure why they all agree on that -- but
anyway, they all agree on that. They agree that rocks are not intelligent. And then... they worry. "Is this
computer system really conscious or is it not? A spider – is it really conscious or is it not?" This question
assumes that consciousness is a binary variable, that it is either "yes" or "no." It reminds me of some high
school students I knew, when they talked about sex appeal. They said "You have it or you don't." That's it -it's binary. Well, I'm not so sure it's binary. There might be some matter of degree here.
There is another view, that views consciousness or intelligence as a continuous variable. The
stupidest form of this view is the idea of consciousness as IQ -- I don't believe in that, but there are other
ways of thinking of intelligence as a continuous phenomenon. Allen Hobson spoke yesterday about wakeful
consciousness as a graded phenomenon. His AIM model presented consciousness as a continuous variable.
I am speaking about a different kind of consciousness, but the same principle may apply here. Intelligence
may not be binary; it may be graded.
Earlier, David Chalmers talked about panprotopsychism here. Well, there is a very old tradition in
philosophy called panpsychism. Taoism was like this. They would say that intelligence is present in all
things, but in varying degrees. A Taoist would say there is intelligence in the human, the spider, the rock,
the tree, the water -- they all have some intelligence. It is a question of how much. So I have a funny picture
in my mind. I see a philosopher of the West staring at a spider, thinking "Is it conscious or is it not?" And I
see an old Taoist master looking at this philosopher and saying: "Is this philosopher conscious or not? Is
she aware of what she is looking at? She is looking at a spider. She is not looking at a binary variable." The
Taoist would say "Of course there is some feeling in the spider.. but you should be aware of the spider and
ask 'What kind of consciousness does it have? What is the nature of its feeling? What does it feel like? But
you should not worry about some binary question in words which make no sense."
There is another group of people who believe in the continuous view -- a much stranger and
weirder group, not Taoists, but old-style behaviorists. The old-style behaviorists believed that all animals
have essentially the same kind of learning. There was a doctrine which said that... first... intelligence is
learning. That's a good start. That's not so bad. (Werbos 1994a:3-5, 1994b:682-683.) But then they said...
the learning curve is the same for humans, rats, all animals. The humans and rats respond to the same
variables; they have the same kind of learning, but the human is a little faster. I think that one reason they
believed this was that they could get money to study rats and say that this all applies to the humans.
But then they said the same thing for birds and snails, that snails are like humans ... but they are like slow
humans.
Well... I do not agree with that theory. I think that the right way to think about intelligence -- or
about consciousness as intelligence – is what I show on the bottom part of the slide above. I think that
intelligence is a staircase – a matter of discrete levels for the most part, levels and levels of higher and
higher intelligence and consciousness. So we should not ask "Is it conscious or is it not?" We should ask
"What is the level of consciousness or intelligence?" Now, why do I think this is the right way to think
about intelligence? Consider the next slide.
Levels of Intelligence
?
Human
Symbolic
Mammal
Bird
Reptile
I believe that intelligence is a kind of staircase because this is what we actually see in nature. This is what
is real. This is not imaginary philosophy, if you forgive the expression. This is what we really observe in
nature. We see reptiles, birds, mammals ... and there is also a kind of intelligence based on symbolic
reasoning. That is what built Tokyo -- humans using symbolic reasoning.
Now... I could talk about this slide for a very long time. This is a very important slide. There are
many ideas to think about here.
First, I must make some small observation. Some of you may have seen maps of the brain of a rat.
You will see that in the cortex of the rat there may be about seven areas for vision. And then you look at a
monkey or a cat, and there are more areas. (Arbib: 1025). You may say "Gee, they look very different." But
those maps are maps of the neocortex, the highest.. or at least the outermost.. part of the human brain. The
six-layered cerebral cortex, the neocortex. But the important thing is that all mammals have this neocortex.
Birds do not have that kind of neocortex. So in a sense all mammals have essentially the same wiring
diagram. If you think of learning ... if you think of Dr. Matsumoto's "superalgorithm" .. then the basic
principles of learning are fairly uniform across the neocortex. Thus in some sense we may say that all
mammals are essentially the same. I don't have time to elaborate now.
So now let me talk about strategy. How can we ever build a true "science of consciousness"?
Some people in artificial intelligence (AI) said years ago: "Real intelligence is up here, at the
symbolic level. So let us try to build an artificial human, by building a machine to do symbolic reasoning.”
And sometimes they talk about Einstein, and how intelligent he was. "Let's build an artificial Einstein." I
think this is the reason why classical AI failed to achieve its highest goals. Classical AI failed to produce
true brain-like intelligent systems because they tried to do too much. They tried to go directly to the
symbolic level, without doing the mammal level first.
There are some people who want us to go directly to the quantum/psychic/spiritual remote
viewing level. I think that is even worse than trying to go directly to the symbolic level. It is good to think
about these higher levels, because they are very important... but in order to develop a science we need to
develop mathematical models and principles that work. I think we need to develop the science of the
mammal level first, and that will give us the insights we need for better understanding at the symbolic level
and even at the levels beyond (the question mark on my slide).
Now if you are a mystic, you may wonder "What can the mammal brain tell us about the deeper
human soul?" Well, that is a complex topic. But let me say briefly... there are some mystics who use an
expression "As above, so below." Before you can understand the higher levels, they say, you must firmly
understand the lower level (what is right in front of you), and also understand the analogy between the
levels. Thus I claim that the important opportunity, the real opportunity for the science of consciousness
today, is to really understand first this mammal brain level, without the soul, the simple basic mammal
brain ... that level of intelligence...and to do this mathematically (i.e., to extract the underlying principles,
not just the biochemical details) and then see what insights we get regarding the higher levels.
So that is what I have worked for most of my life on, to try to understand the mammal level.
But how can we understand a mammal brain? How can we understand intelligence, at the mammal
brain level? Well, I would like to make an analogy, shown on the next slide.
WHAT IS A RADIO?
HOW DOES IT WORK?
Answer 1: A box that makes sound when you plug it in
and turn it on
Answer 2: A device which receives and demodulates
electromagnetic transmissions at a user selected
frequency modulated by acoustic signals
Answer 3: Design details which explain how (1) and (2)
are both accomplished
Actually, I am taking this analogy from Charles Gross, a neuroscientist, a student of Karl Pribram's.
In my first course in neuroscience, on the first day, Charles Gross said:" Neuroscience today is
like people studying a radio. They buy a thousand radios, to understand how they work. You buy a radio.
You turn it on. You pull a tube out... and then the radio whines. You call the tube 'the whine center.' " Then
you take a new radio -- throw out the old one into the trash -- it was alive, but you throw it out -- pull out a
capacitor, and then you hear a scratch sound. You call the capacitor "the scratch center.'" And then you
have a map of the brain where you have the whine center, the scratch center and then you say '"Aha, now I
understand the radio.'" But.. you do not really understand the radio.
There are different ways of understanding what a radio is and how it works. There are different
ways to answer the question "What is a radio?". At one level of answer, you say "A radio is a box that
makes sound when you plug it in and turn it on." This is like the Turing test for consciousness. It is a
descriptive test. But engineers do not like that kind of definition so much. Then there is what we would
call a functional definition: A radio is a device which receives and demodulates electromagnetic
transmissions at a user-selected frequency modulated by acoustic signals. I can almost hear some people
saying "Isn't that too complicated?" Maybe it is complicated, but this is what a radio is, in functional terms.
But... for a science... for engineering... we want something even more. We want the design details which
explain how these characteristics are accomplished, and how they can be replicated... and that is very
complicated. It has to be complicated. I do think it is possible to develop an understanding of consciousness
and learning which is simple in the same way that general relativity is simple. Now some people will be
very disappointed at a theory which is only as simple as general relativity.... but I think it is very exciting
that some of us now see a way to produce such a theory.
By the way, I have one last point to make about this slide. To understand a radio in functional
terms, you do not need to know where every screw and bolt is. You don't need all of those details. So I'm
not talking about knowing every screw and every bolt in the brain.
So now... how can we produce a design-level mathematical understanding of intelligence at the
level of the mammal brain, that kind of intelligence? See the next slide.
Neural Nets Across Disciplines
• Engineering: Will it work? Mathematics
understandable, generic?
• Psychology: Connectionist cognitive
science, animal learning, folk psychology
• Neuroscience: computational neuroscience
• AI: agents, games (backgammon, go), etc.
• LIS and CRI
How can we do it? Well of course, the brain is made up of neural networks. And there are many neural
network models already in use. We have heard about many of them here.
What is very scary is that the three communities using neural net models do not talk to each other
as much as they should. The research is very fragmented today. There are people in neuroscience who have
computational neuroscience models, which are designed to represent known neural circuits. There are
people in psychology who have connectionist cognitive science models. And there are people in
engineering who build artificial neural nets, where all they care about is "Does it work?"
These people find it hard to understand each other. I have seen Bernie Widrow and Steve
Grossberg scream at each other, because they do not really appreciate each other's work... because they
have different criteria for what is real work and what is bullshit. They look at the other person's work and
they think that it is bullshit, because they are using a different criterion for what is good work. So Steve
Grossberg is mainly asking these questions -- "Does it fit the biological circuit? Does it explain some
psychological behavior?" (Grossberg is a powerful advocate of neural network research which unifies
various disciplines, but these two tests have been the main drivers of his work.) The engineers, by contrast
are asking "Does it work? Why does it work? What are the engineering principles involved? Does it really
optimize performance?" Engineers have learned how necessary derivative calculations are to high-level
general-purpose functionality; these calculations, in turn, require some use of backpropagation as part of
the larger neural net designs.
Now -- to really understand the brain, intelligence in the mammal brain -- I think we must
combine all three validation criteria. A valid model of intelligence in the brain must fit the biological data
-- though it doesn't have to explain every last synapse; however, it must also fit with what we know of
psychology; and it also must work, because the brain is a working system -- a highly effective, functional
system. It must meet all three criteria together. So because of this idea, I helped NSF set up a new initiative
a few years ago, which would allow people to get funding for this kind of cross-cutting work (among other
things). It funded $20 million per year until 1999 and was called Learning and Intelligent Systems (LIS).
From my point of view, the idea was to fund research to combine these different criteria together -- but one
criterion is functionality. Where I work, in the engineering directorate, we try to build things which work.
Now since these communities do not talk to each other, some of you might not know who I am. In
the engineering community, at least in the United States, almost everyone thinks of me as "He is that
backpropagation person. He is that person who developed an algorithm called backpropagation back in
1974" (in my Harvard PhD thesis). That thesis is reprinted in its entirety in Werbos (1994a).
Backpropagation is now used in 80% or more of the working applications of artificial neural nets. There are
many artificial neural nets used in academia, in research papers, but for things that actually work, that are
functional, solving real-world problems, 80% are based on backpropagation. You should be warned,
however, that many of the popularized treatments of backpropagation oversimplify the method, and do not
convey how powerful , general and flexible it really is. Until recently, the need for backpropagation
in engineering designs was a major reason for the disconnect with biology; there were no proven biological
mechanisms to explain how the brain itself might perform any form of backpropagation. But recent
biological research has begun to fill in that particular gap. (See Bliss et al on reverse NMDA synapse,
Spruston on membrane backflows, etc.)
Werbos (1994a) also begins with a chapter on why I think we are ready for a Newton-like
revolution in the science of consciousness. The time has come. We have a new kind of derivative. We have
new mathematics. We have new connections with Karl Pribram's kind of work. (See Werbos 1994a, 1996,
1998b). We are ready now. And in this book I talk about that. Also, for those people interested in Taoism
and Buddhism, in chapter 10, I discuss the connection with those ways of thinking.
So now let me get back to the bigger question: If we want to understand the mammal brain in
functional terms, first we must say what is the function. If it is not just associative memory, what is the
mammal brain doing, in functional terms?
Reinforcement
Action
Sensory Input
The Brain As a Whole System
Is an Intelligent Controller
On this next slide, I am simply saying that the brain as a whole system is what we call an intelligent
controller, in engineering. The purpose of the whole system -- the purpose of any computing system -- is to
calculate its outputs. The outputs of the brain are actions – what biologists call "squeezing and squirting."
That is the purpose of this system, in the physical brain. And so we need to develop a mathematics of
intelligent control by neural networks. Notice that I am not talking about “control of the brain;” I am
talking about how the brain generates what engineers call “control signals,” the signals which come out of
the brain and decide on the level of “squeezing and squirting.”
Let me say one other thing. Once I heard a mystic who said "You guys are all crazy. You must
learn to appreciate your true self. Your true self," he said, "is much bigger than the brain and the body."
And then I asked, "Well, then, what is the brain?" He said, "The brain -- it has its role -- all it is is a low
level system, just to control the muscles and the glands of the body." I said, "OK, I can live with that." The
brain is a controller. Now let us try to understand how such a controller can work.
NSF Workshop Neurocontrol 1988
Control
Theory
Neuro- NeuroControl Engineering
Miller, Sutton, Werbos, MIT Press, 1990
When I took over the NSF program in neuroengineering 10 years ago, immediately I asked: "What do we
know about neural networks for control? " We tried to survey all the ideas. We held a workshop in 1988 in
New Hampshire on neurocontrol. And I invented this new word "neurocontrol." (More precisely: Allon
Guez, an engineer from Drexel, coined this term for an unpublished small IEEE tutorial, and I adapted it for
this use. Since then, unfortunately, some folks in biology have used the term “neural control” for a variety
of different pursuits which do not even include engineering functionality.)
In this workshop, we brought together real control theorists from engineering who know the
mathematics of control -- how to make control systems that work. Brain systems are not general complex
systems. They are a special type of system designed by nature to work. And so we need to use the
mathematics of control systems that work. That is a very special mathematics. But we also need to know
about neural networks. At this workshop we had psychologists and neuroscientists and Grossberg people.
And one thing we found out: most of the neural network models out there have no hope to approximate
the kind of power we see in the mammal brain. For example, there were many control models based on
some old ideas from David Marr about the cerebellum. There were many models based on the idea of
learning a mapping from sensory coordinates to motor coordinates. Those kind of biological models
are exactly like some simple models from control theory, a class of models which are very well understood
-- they work very well for certain simple problems -- but experiments have proven that even the lower level
of human motor control is much more powerful than any system like that. (See the discussions
of direct inverse control in Miller (et al) 1990 by myself, Jordan and Kawato. See also Werbos (1996:273274; 1994b:698; 1999b:360:361).)
And so in this workshop, we created this new field of neurocontrol as defined here. This slide
gives a definition of neurocontrol, this word I made up. It is the subset of control theory and neural nets.
We started that field.
In this workshop, we found that there is only one class of neural network design, from engineering
or psychology or biology or anywhere else, which has a hope of capturing the kind of intelligence we see in
the mammal brain. This is a class of designs which some people call "reinforcement learning systems”
(RLS), illustrated on the next slide.
Reinforcement Learning Systems (RLS)
External
Environment
or “Plant”
U(t)
X(t)
“utility” or “reward”
or “reinforcement”
u(t)
RLS
sensor inputs
actions
RLS may have internal dynamics and “memory” of earlier times
If you are a psychologist, this phrase “reinforcement learning” will instantly remind you of many bad old
things. So I have to warn you ... I am not speaking about Skinner-type reinforcement. Also, the idea shown
in this slide is somewhat simplified. This is a good starting point, but we have modified the model to
account for more complicated ideas from biology and engineering. But I do not have much time to give you
the complicated part today; I have to give you the simple starting point.
The idea in reinforcement learning systems (RLS) is to design an intelligent controller. Any RLS
has sensor inputs. It has action or control outputs. It receives a signal of "utility" or reward. This is like
pain or pleasure, perhaps. The goal is to build a system which can learn to maximize this reward signal
over time. So my claim is: the mammal brain is like -- something like -- a reinforcement learning system.
And now I must say something very important. The mind is not only the intelligence. The
intelligence is trying to maximize this signal (U), but this signal is not trivial. Yes, it includes pleasure and
pain, but it also includes what Dr. Matsumoto was talking about -- "linkage drives" , imprinting, some kind
of deep affect. The system here is actually very complex. It's also an important part of the mind. But I do
not have time to talk about it today. Instead, I will give you a commercial. Karl Pribram's edited book,
Brain and Values, talks a lot about this part of the mind. (See Werbos 1998b and other chapters in the same
book.) Today I will only talk about the intelligence part.
If we imagine that the brain is an RLS, or something like an RLS, what does that tell us about its
Maximizing utility over time
Model
Modelof
ofreality
reality
Utility
Utilityfunction
functionUU
Dynamic
Dynamicprogramming
programming
J (x(t)) = Max U (x(t), u(t)) + J (x(t + 1)) /(1 + r )
u(t)
Secondary,
Secondary,or
orstrategic
strategicutility
utilityfunction
functionJJ
design? How can RLS systems actually be designed and understood, in functional mathematical terms?
The slide above describes a starting point for answering these questions.
In 1968, I published an article in the journal Cybernetica (Werbos 1968), arguing that we could
build reinforcement learning systems by approximating a method in control theory called dynamic
programming. The brain cannot use exact dynamic programming; it is too complex for the brain. It would
take a brain larger than the size of the universe to use dynamic programming to solve most everyday
problems. But the idea behind the method is very interesting. In dynamic programming, we input this utility
function U, and we solve for another function called J. After that, you maximize J in the short term.
So U would correspond to things like pain and pleasure; J would correspond to things like learned hopes
and fears. So if we build a machine based on this principle, we are building a machine that has one
component which learns hopes and fears, and another part which responds to hopes and fears. With all due
respect to David Chalmers, I do not think it is a "hard problem" to see the connection between this kind of
design and our subjective experience. The hard problem is to make this kind of design work, and work out
the details. (Note: we do have many working systems now based on these principles, but we have only just
begun the resulting paradigm shift in engineering. See Werbos 1999b,c.)
Now actually, there are many, many levels of design for reinforcement learning systems. There is
a whole staircase of general-purpose designs, of ever greater complexity and capability. I really do not have
time to explain them all now. There is one class of design I developed back in 1971 now called "ModelBased Adaptive Critic" (MBAC). There is a new level I developed just in 1998, based on listening to Karl
Pribram and changing my model, to account for the things I felt were missing after I talked to Karl. And
this is still only the mammal brain. Beyond that I have some ideas - theoretical ideas -- not mathematics --
Level 3 Model-Based Adaptive Critic
Critic
X(t)
J(t+1)
R(t+1)
R(t)
Model
u(t)
Action
about what lies beyond.
The ideas for the Model-Based Adaptive Critic were described in great detail in a book called The
Handbook of Intelligent Control (White and Sofge 1992) and there were some applications that have been
developed. In the last five years, we have discovered that these are very powerful systems. For example, the
design shown in the slide above is a system I proposed in 1972, in my Harvard PhD thesis proposal. This
design was based on trying to translate Freud's ideas about "psychic energy" and learning into mathematics
-- and that's where backpropagation really came from. The story of this is in Werbos (1994a), with some
additional details in Anderson and Rosenfeld. We have recently found out that a new version of this design
gives us a form of adaptive control more stable than anything else which exists now in adaptive control
theory, in the linear case. (Werbos 1999c).
Even this old design from 1972 meets certain tests for a brain-like intelligent system, shown on the
next slide. Five years ago, that old design was the only model of neural networks which anyone had ever
implemented which meets all four tests shown here. It has an emotional or value system, a test which Dr.
Matsumoto has emphasized. An intelligent control system is not a brain-like system if it does not have a
4 Tests For 1st-Order Model
of Intelligence In the Brain
>An “Emotional” System (Values)
>An “Expectations” System
(SysID)
>An Action/Motor System
>ENGINEERING FUNCTIONALITY
value system! It also had a prediction or expectation system, which Dr. Matsumoto has also talked about.
And it had engineering functionality – as a general-purpose learning system. It was the first model to meet
all four standards.
This is not just theory! The McDonnell-Douglas people applied an early version of this to solve a
problem called making high-quality carbon-carbon composite parts. (White and Sofge 1992). These
composite parts are half the cost of modern aircraft. People spend billions of dollars making these parts like
cookies. PhDs baking cookies in an oven, and burning most of them. It's very expensive. McDonnellDouglas developed a new continuous production process, but they could not control that process well
enough with classical control theory, ordinary neural nets, or anything else -- but these adaptive critics were
able to solve this problem, and now they can produce continuous parts. This was a big breakthrough. (Not
long after that, however, White and Sofge, who developed that work at McDonnell-Douglas, moved to
MIT; Boeing acquired McDonnell, and White found greater funding in the semiconductor area.)
There are many other applications I don't have time to discuss, in aerospace, in the automotive
sector... Ford Motor Company has said (Business Week, Sept. 1998) that by the year 2001, every Ford car
will have a neural network controller to meet air quality standards, using some algorithms that I
developed... so these are working systems; it is not all theory.
Let me finish up with some citations. For the mammal level of intelligence, Karl Pribram's books - I have some papers in there. There is also a book called Dealing with Complexity (cited in Werbos 1998b)
where I discuss a new “three-brain model” based on conversations with Karl. For practical engineering
applications, there are some web sites (Werbos 1999c), which include a free long paper on stability theory
from the viewpoint of classical control theory. There is a paper on applications (Werbos 1999b). And then
there are some papers on consciousness and on quantum theory.
To go beyond the MBAC type of model I talked about before, and to account for new things I
have learned from Karl, the new model has certain characteristics. It involves neural networks which input
from a field or physical networks or grids rather than just vectors. (Patent pending). It includes ways to
organize a hierarchical decision system, based on a new generalization of Bellman’s equation in dynamic
programming. Dr. Matsumoto talked about a hierarchical system here today. Karl Pribram discussed this in
his book with Miller and Galanter on Tasks and the organization of behavior. Now there is a mathematical
implementation of Karl's ideas, and a new form of dynamic programming to implement these ideas in a
learning system. We also have some things called imagination networks... there are many new things I
cannot show you for reasons of time.
2.3. Additional Comments on Quantum Theory and the Mind
Now: two slides on quantum theory, and some comments on mind and reality.
THE SECOND QUANTIZATION (II)
OBSERVED
OUTCOME
MEASUREMENT
FORMALISM
ψ (t + , FS )
ψ = iHψ
EXPERIMENTAL
SETUP
ENCODING
ψ (t − , FS )
This slide depicts quantum field theory, in the second quantization. This is the quantum field theory which
most people work with today. They use a wave function, which is a function of a very complex space called
Fock space. There is a kind of "Schrodinger equation" - not the old Schrodinger equation -- which evolves
over time, and there is a measurement formalism. The standard ideology, the standard form of quantum
mechanics, says that you need a conscious observer, a metaphysical observer, but there were new
experiments done by Mandel and Ou, reported in Scientific American in 1992 (June) which showed that
you can get measurement effects without a conscious observer. So there is empirical evidence that we need
a quantum theory without observers. This is experiment -- this is not philosophy. Where can we get such a
quantum theory?
I cannot explain quantum theory in one minute! But I can give some citations. Werbos (1998a:
section 6) includes three alternatives to the usual formulation of the functional integral approach – one a
slight reformulation of Schwinger’s ideas, to make them more compact and parsimonious, but another one
very crazy and heretical – providing a more formal basis for revisiting the possibility of realism, drawing
on some of the old ideas of Einstein and DeBroglie. Werbos (1999b) provides some of the conceptual
background; section 6 of that paper also talks about the three alternatives, and possible testable
implications. (Section 3 of this paper will add a new idea on those lines.) For example, there is a possibility
that quarks could be bosons... there is a way you could do it. It sounds crazy. But I think I know how.
QED
REMOTE VIEWING
[ Quantum effects Are Not Enough
[ Additional Force Fields?
[ But if so, where is signal processing?
[ A radical chasm -- extreme choices
One last slide. Many people at this conference have expressed hope that quantum mechanics might explain
things like remote viewing or like the collective unconscious of Jung -- wild, crazy things. I would like to
point out that no form of quantum mechanics can explain something like remote viewing. It doesn't matter
whether you take Bohmian or my kind or Schwinger's kind or Copenhagen... because all these different
forms of quantum mechanics produce about the same quantum electrodynamics ... they yield the same
predictions, essentially, for the case of quantum electrodynamics (QED). If you consider electrodynamics,
that is not enough to generate remote viewing. We know what is possible with QED. The world has spent
billions of dollars trying to use QED in the military to see things far away. We cannot do it. So if you want
to explain strange things like remote viewing, the only way is by assuming strange force fields and strange
signal processing . You have a choice. There is a great chasm. It is a binary choice. You cannot do it a
fuzzy way. Either you give up on these phenomena -- you give up on all that stuff -- or else you have to
open yourself up to really crazy things, much more than just quantum theory. Crazy things like letting me
stay here... and I thank Kunio for allowing such a crazy thing.
3. Recent Extensions
This section will not give more detailed explanations of the ideas discussed above; see the references for
such explanations. Instead, it will give a condensed summary of some new thinking, stimulated by
discussions at this conference and at the Quantum Mind conference in Arizona.
3.1. Comments on Consciousness Qua Wakefulness or Awareness
Because wakefulness and awareness are major aspects of brain functioning they are, of course, addressed in
the models I mentioned above.
In one of Pribram’s recent conferences, there was a debate between Pribram, McClelland, Alkon
and myself on the functional significance of sleep states. From my earliest papers, I agreed with LaBerge
that dreams provide a simulation capability, essential to the training of any imaginative intelligent
controller. Working RLS systems have demonstrated this kind of capability. Additional states are required
to facilitate memory consolidation or generalization from memory – a topic related to what is called
“memory-based learning” or “syncretism” on the engineering side; McClelland has argued that this
involves a transfer from hippocampus to neocortex during dreams, but Karl and I argued that it may instead
involve a harmonization between different types of cell within these two structures, during other kinds of
sleep states. A key technical point is that local and global representations both exist within both organs.
Furthermore, dreams and the hippocampus have long been known to have other functions beyond this
hypothesized memory function.
Regarding awareness and attention – I thank Bernie Baars for drawing my attention to some of the
recent literature by authors like himself and Legothetes, which I need to study further. Attention is clearly
much more than a matter of importance weighting or “salience,” as in the older models. In my view, it is
the key mechanism for “labeling” the variables monitored by major fields in the neocortex; for an example
of how important this might be, see the paper by Olhausen and Koch in Arbib. More precisely, this kind of
object “labeling” is the kind of machinery needed to use multiplexing to implement the “ObjectNet” design
(patent pending) discussed in Werbos 1999c. Any efficient multiplexing system results in synchronized
“object binding,” without any need for reverberatory attractors and other such mechanisms popular in
neuroscience today; the challenge for design (or functional understanding) is not with the binding per se,
but the management and choice of what is bound to. Current evidence (see papers in Arbib) suggests that
the pulvinar plays a crucial role in this function.
3.2. Discussions at the Arizona Conference
I am very grateful to Stuart Hameroff and the Arizona group for inviting me to speak at that conference,
despite my known skepticism about ORCH as such.
At Arizona, I argued that true quantum computing effects probably are not relevant to a functional
understanding of the brain. This does not mean that quantum mechanics as such is irrelevant. Quantum
mechanics is important to understanding how molecules work, just as it is important to understanding how
quantum dots and Josephson junctions can be used to implement classical NOT gates and AND gates, etc.
But we would call that “quantum devices,” not “quantum computing,” in modern terminology. If a
computer is based on quantum devices and ordinary field effects (such as those Pribram has often
discussed), this is still quite consistent with the class of quasi-Turing-machine model we are now working
with to understand the mammal brain level of intelligence. But for true quantum computing, as now
defined, there must be some exploitation of coherence or quantum entanglement effects to serve a systemslevel computational purpose. Many people have already talked about the difficult, unproven physics of
trying to imagine how brains could create and maintain quantum entanglement, but very little attention has
gone into the even more serious issue of trying to imagine what kind of computational purpose might be
served by such a system in the brain.
As an honest skeptic, perhaps my first duty is to issue a challenge to the quantum brain believers –
to give an example of what they might try to prove, to overcome my skepticism. From all I have read and
thought about, I can only imagine two ways that a “quantum computing” capability in the brain might
really affect general-purpose intelligence. One would be the evolution of a “quantum associative memory”
neuron. Could one really train a single neuron to learn simple functions like XOR or Minsky’s old parity
mapping challenge? These are not “natural” problems – but if an individual neuron really had the ability to
use molecular quantum computing to achieve associative memory, it should have the ability to learn such
relations. If it does not... then what are the hypothesized quantum effects within the cell doing anyway?
A second possibility would be that of a “superfast recurrent network” (SFRN), an alternative approach to
quantum computing (a form of quantum neural network) proposed in Werbos (1997); however, that
hypothetical possibility has yet to be fully understood in engineering terms, let alone mapped into biology.
Crucial to the idea of an SFRN is the old insight, originally due to myself (Werbos 1973, 1989)
and DeBeauregard, that the paradoxes of quantum theory can be understood as the result of causality
running backwards through time at the microscopic, quantum level. (This is similar in spirit to Cramer’s
later “transactional interpretation,” but Cramer invokes nonlocality, which is unnecessary here.) Penrose
cited us both in Shadows of the Mind, and Hameroff showed a slide from Penrose conveying the idea very
vividly. Various people went on to argue that new evidence (from Libet, Radin and Bierman) shows that
the brain can respond ¼ of a second before a stimulus, and that something like an SFRN might be present
in the brain. Parts of this evidence were surprisingly convincing to me, personally, and they posed more
acutely the need to revisit the concept of SFRN and backwards causality. Mari Jibu also pointedly
challenged us to explain more precisely how we think the interface actually works between “microscopic”
time symmetry and the macroscopic arrow of time.
As a caveat, Josephson reminded people that my negative comments pertain only to the brain – not
to the “soul,” a subject of great interest to many but beyond the scope of the present discussion.
3.3. Revisions of My Views of Quantum Effects
Word limits here require that I must assume the reader has full knowledge of the references. The views here
are not only personal but highly tentative.
Many issues which seem real, in debates on quantum theory, disappear when one considers recent
experiments. (In addition to the quantum computing work mentioned above, Y. Shih and K. Alley of
Maryland have important results.) For example, one may worry about what happens after two
measurements, A(t) and B(s), at times s and t, at the discontinuity where s=t. But real measurements take
some time; when one approaches such a discontinuity, one predicts the result simply by representing the
polarizers or whatever in a more complete fashion, as potentials or particles, affecting the Schrodinger
equation, and chucking out the metaphysical observer formalism. This is like the original Von NeumanWigner approach discussed by Stapp at Arizona. This is what actually works. As a practical matter, one
always expects to get the right result if one applies the measurement and setup formalisms only to the
ultimate, asymptotic, commutative inputs and outputs of an experiment; the measurement formalism may
sometimes work in describing what happens in the middle, but there is no general guarantee.
Both the functional integral approach, and the variations which I have proposed (Werbos
1998a,1999a), assume an underlying symmetry in time at the microscopic level (leaving aside
the superweak interactions). In answer to Mari Jibu’s question, I would argue that all the usual experiments
in quantum theory can be reduced to something I call “the standard paradigm.” In this paradigm, everything
is ultimately reduced to a scattering experiment. The inputs are represented by some set of measurement
operators, and by the actual values of the corresponding variables. (For example, the experimenter may
control the momentum of every incoming particle.) The outputs are represented by another set of
measurement operators, but the experimenter cannot decide the values of those variables; he may only
observe them. Thus there is a clear-cut asymmetry between the input situation and the output situation. In
practice (in my definition of “standard paradigm”), the outgoing measurement operators all commute with
each other; in fact, they are really nothing but particle counters, which measure particles with energy
E>>kT, where T is the temperature of the counter. (Polarizers and such may be considered as internal parts
of the experiment.)
The functional integral approaches and the second quantization essentially agree completely, for
experiments which can be reduced to the standard paradigm. We cannot do the usual Bell’s Theorem
experiments in reverse time, because these counters do not emit energetic particles in reverse time.
Why not, if physics is symmetric in time at the microscopic level? Actually, this question is mathematically
almost equivalent to the classical question about what happens to a rock on the floor. Why do we not see
rocks flying up from the floor, following a time-reversed movie of how they fall to the floor? The answer is
simple: there is only a tiny probability that the atoms under the rock will happen to move in the same
direction (up) and push the rock up. For similar reasons, it is rare that an E>>kT counter would emit a
particle in reverse time. The puzzling thing is that we ever see such an event in forwards time; this
otherwise improbable thing is due to the experimenter exploiting the availability of time-forwards free
energy, which ultimately comes from sunlight pouring down on earth – a macroscopic boundary condition.
For experiments within the scope of the standard paradigm, backwards time communication of
macroscopic information is impossible. It is impossible, in part, because it would allow a violation of
Eberhart’s Theorem on the impossibility of communicating information faster than the speed of light
(FTL). Eberhart’s Theorem does not depend on conventional wisdoms about causality and such; it only
depends on the basic assumption that equal time commutators are zero. The concept of backwards causality
and equilibration across space-time may provide a useful understanding of what is possible with quantum
computing within the standard paradigm; thus it may still permit development of some kind of useful
SFRN, as a way of speeding up certain very general computations. However, such designs could all be
reformulated (albeit awkwardly) within the usual formalisms of traditional quantum computing, rooted in
the second quantization. There is no possibility of communicating macroscopic information back through
time.
There are two possible loopholes here which merit further thought. First, what about “stochastic
infrared quantum computing?” What if one output channel ends in a controlled polarizer, follower by an
E<kT or E=kT “counter”? Many experiments were done by Planck and Einstein in that regime, but perhaps
a modern analysis might be interesting. Second, Eberhart’s Theorem implicitly assumes that information is
represented by bare operators, not renormalized physical operators. Gerhard Hegerfeldt, of the University
of Gottingen, has shown that FTL communication can actually occur, in limited circumstances, due to
renormalization effects. What if the renormalization were more drastic, as with wave functions of electrons
in superconductors, which are extended very far in space?
(Final two paragraphs not attached.)
References
Arbib, Michael (Ed.) (1995). The Handbook of Brain Theory and Neural Networks. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Anderson, James & E.Rosenfeld (Eds.) (1998). Talking Nets. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miller, William T., R.Sutton & P.Werbos (Eds) (1990). Neural Networks for Control. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press. (now in paperback).
Schwinger, Julian (1968). Sources and magnetic charge, Physical Review, Vol. 173,
No.5, 1536-1544, Sept.25
Werbos, Paul (1968). The elements of intelligence. Cybernetica (Namur), No.3.
Werbos, Paul (1973). An approach to the realistic explanation of quantum mechanics. Nuovo
Cimento Letters, Vol.29B, sept. 8.
Werbos, Paul (1989). Bell’s theorem: the forgotten loophole and how to exploit it. In M.Kafatos
(Ed.), Bell’s Theorem, Quantum Theory and Conceptions of the Universe. Kluwer.
Werbos, Paul (1994a). The Roots of Backpropagation: From Ordered Derivatives to Neural
Networks and Political Forecasting. New York: Wiley.
Werbos, Paul (1994b). The brain as a neurocontroller: New hypotheses and experimental
possibilities. In K.Pribram (Ed.), Origins: Brain and Self-Organization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum,
680-706.
Werbos, Paul (1996). Learning in the brain: An engineering interpretation. In K.Pribram and
J.King ( Eds.), Learning as Self-Organization. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Werbos, Paul (1997). Optimization: A Foundation for understanding consciousness. In D.Levine
& W. Elsberry (Eds.), Optimality in Biological and Artificial Networks? Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Werbos, Paul (1998a). New Approaches to Soliton Quantization and Existence for Particle
Physics [xxx.lanl.gov/abs/patt-sol/9804003].
Werbos, Paul (1998b) Values, Goals and Utility in an Engineering-Based Theory of Mammalian
Intelligence. In Karl H.Pribram (Ed.), Brain and Values. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Werbos, Paul (1999a) Can ‘soliton’ attractors exist in realistic 3+1-D conservative systems?
Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, Vol. 10, No. 11.
Werbos, Paul (1999b). Neurocontrollers. In J.Webster (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Electrical and
Electronics Engineering. New York: Wiley.
Werbos, Paul (1999c). See general review posted on www.iamcm.org. For technical information on
stability of adaptive control and RLS, see Stable Adaptive Control Using New Critic Designs
[xxx.lanl.gov/abs/adap-org/9810001]
White, David & D. Sofge (Eds.) (1992). Handbook of Intelligent Control. Van Nostrand.
Zinn-Justin, J. (1996). Quantum Field Theory and Critical Phenomena, Third Edition. Clarendon, Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press. |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | pp. 418-421
Chao, K. K., An Integral World Perspective
418
Research Essay
An Integral World Perspective
Kenneth K. Chao*
Abstract
The question regarding possible existence of past and future lives is addressed in this article,
which leads to the intimate connection between Physical World and Consciousness World as two
sides of one coin. The examination of genuine unconsciousness reveals the dynamic and
fundamental nature of consciousness with a proposed axiom: genuine unconsciousness is
identical to nothingness both physically and psychologically. Because over 95% of our universe
is composed of indirectly detectable “dark” material, it is quite possible that conscious live forms
beyond our current observation limit can exist. A hierarchy structure of consciousness,
awareness and certainty, together with the spacetime concept are used to explain the phenomena
of particle entanglement and double-slit experiment in quantum mechanics.
Key Words: consciousness world, physical world, unconsciousness, quantum mechanics,
spacetime, past life, future life, integral view.
Do you believe that you had previous lives? The answer is usually negative or at least neutral
such as “I don’t know” or “I cannot remember”. Well, could you remember what you wore or
ate on this day exactly one year ago? A lot of events actually occurred in our present life but we
are unable to recall them particularly the detail. Here is the catch: things never happened before
of course you cannot remember, however things you cannot remember do not necessarily mean
they never happened. This asymmetric rationality is critical and opens the door for the chance of
past life albeit most of us cannot recall.
The progress of modern science may be characterized as “integral connectivity”. Einstein
special relativity made connection between space and time, as well as between matter and energy
(E=mc2). Consequently these properties of nature are no longer isolated or absolute. In other
words they are mutually transferable. His general relativity went a step further to place
space/time on one side of equation and matter/energy the other side hence they are all related, or
parts of an integral wholeness.
Traditional science is the study of our Physical World composed of space, time, matter, energy,
as well the associated gravity, electromagnetic, strong and weak nuclear forces. Recent scientific
advances unveil the importance of our Consciousness World.
Physical World and
Consciousness World are two sides of one coin which are inseparable. Our definition of
Physical World is generally limited to everything we can directly observe or measure in this
universe. Beyond that we refer to as spiritual world. With the emergence of dark matter, dark
energy and negative energy, we realize the Physical World is much bigger than we originally
*Corresponding author: Kenneth K. Chao, Ph.D. E-mail: kenchao@cfu.net
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | pp. 418-421
Chao, K. K., An Integral World Perspective
419
thought. The known matter and energy account only <5% of the total with the rest from
indirectly detectable dark matter, dark energy and negative energy. The horizon of Physical
World may extend indefinitely to allow the possibility of high-dimensional and parallel
multiverses. Our exploration of the physical frontier continues as demonstrated by Einstein
relativity, quantum mechanics, string theory, complexity science and so forth. Now let us
consider an equation with Physical World at one side and Consciousness World at the other as
shown below.
Physical World = Consciousness World
Conscious beings like human or extraterrestrial require physical manifestation such as light and
other forms consisting of space, time, matter, and energy. A physical universe never to be
appreciated by conscious being has no value or practically equals to nothingness; whereas
consciousness deprived from physical manifestation is barren.
So what is consciousness and how to define it? We all have a distinctively unique selfawareness or the inner feeling of a subjective “me”. People grow older with mental and
biological changes however their sense of individual self-awareness remains intact. Memory
retention is probably the most important utility of consciousness which links time sequence of
events or the learning ability. Consciousness without memory like Alzheimer’s disease is just
existence with little meaning or purpose.
Because the interconnection between Physical World and Consciousness World, we may employ
the same rules learned from Physical World and apply them to Consciousness World, and vice
versa. Since our physical universe originated from Big Bang - a physical singularity, our
consciousness life may do the same, originated from a psychological singularity. Similar to the
circumstance where all known physical laws including Einstein relativity and quantum
mechanics break down inside a physical singularity like Big Bang or Black Hole, it is quite
possible that when a new baby is born into this world, he or she went through a psychological
singularity state thereat consciousness including memory breaks down which in turn gives rise to
a sense of new beginning. This may be the reason why we lost our memory of the previous life.
However as a result of quantum tunneling effect, a very tiny but definitive fraction of human
population evidently carryover the memory from their past life as documented in a few well
known reincarnation cases.
Now, how about next life after we leave this world? By and large people believe that conscious
existence stops when the body is dead. Let’s examine the intriguing state of genuine
unconsciousness. We are all familiar with deep sleep especially during our youth (sleep like a
baby), and some of us may have experienced coma due to accidents or illness. When a person
falls into a genuine unconsciousness state, the concept of time disappears completely which
means one billion years is equivalent to a micro second because the faculty or measuring stick to
gauge temporal difference no longer exists. Similarly the concept of space disappears as well,
implying that a small bedroom is equivalent to the entire universe. The same logic applies to
matter, energy, and other physical entities. From a psychological standpoint, genuine
unconsciousness means the total loss of self-awareness as well as the associated rich variety of
sensation or feeling like pleasure, sadness, excitement, jealous, and so on. At the most
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | pp. 418-421
Chao, K. K., An Integral World Perspective
420
fundamental level, the distinction between you and me vanishes. Here is an axiom: genuine
unconsciousness is identical to nothingness both physically and psychologically. That is why
Physical World and Consciousness World are two sides of a coin. One cannot exist without the
other. The good news is that you don’t need to worry about being inside the unconsciousness
state because you don’t know when you are in there and how long you are in there … such as the
experience from deep sleep or coma. Only after you wake up and look at the clock thus
recognize how much time has elapsed from memory. In other words, genuine unconsciousness
is absolutely trivial in a practical sense (no pain and no gain). If death means unconsciousness
then nobody should take it seriously.
Logically speaking, any process with a beginning must have an end. You are awake and reading
this sentence right now. If at some future point you enter into an unconsciousness state
(beginning) then you will get out of it eventually (end) and regain consciousness or selfawareness. As noted earlier, you would not know how long you are exposed to the
unconsciousness state when you are in there due to the loss of time concept. The philosophical
implication is that death is not the end of life but a mere transition. Afterlife is real and
inevitable. Once crossing the divide your current life becomes past life. This chain of
succession continues open-endedly, or the consciousness/unconsciousness alteration cycle is
naturally ever present. Infinite life cycles suggest all possible forms of existence in highdimensional multiverses. This could be the ultimate Oneness or Wholeness. We are naturally
connected after all.
The connection between Physical World and Consciousness World is evident in quantum
mechanics as exemplified by Schrodinger’s cat, double-slit experiment, and particle
entanglement or ‘spooky action at a distance’ according to Einstein. As aforementioned, genuine
unconsciousness is timeless and spaceless among other thingless. If one minute is equivalent to
thousand years which in turn equal to nothingness, then they should also be indifferent or
sameness due to the loss of time concept.
One Minute = Thousand Years = Nothingness = Sameness
It doesn’t matter how far in space and how long in time that two entangled particles might be
separated, the spacetime concept means literally nothing or extremely fuzzy to these
“unconscious” particles unless they are once again observed by conscious being capable to
appreciate their beauty or collapse the Schrodinger’s probability wave function, in other words to
reconnect these entangled particles with Consciousness World. Fuzzy spacetime may be the
reason why a single particle can exist at different places simultaneously. It should be noted that
consciousness has quantitative and qualitative differences just like physical universe.
What is the relation between unconsciousness and unawareness? You can be in a conscious state
but unaware of certain events or happenings. Unawareness may be treated as pseudo
unconsciousness. By the same token, uncertainty may be treated as pseudo unawareness (see the
hierarchy arrangement below). If the probability wave function can be destroyed by
consciousness, awareness or certainty, then the reverse may be true that probability wave
function can be created by unconsciousness, unawareness or uncertainty. This applies to the
double-slit experiment where freedom of choice among two slits (uncertainty or unawareness)
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| May 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | pp. 418-421
Chao, K. K., An Integral World Perspective
421
generates Schrodinger’s probability wave function that is consistent for all “unconscious”
photons or electrons used in the experiment trials. Such equality or sameness in the form of
probability wave function reflects uncertainty or unawareness. It should be noted there are level
differences in the natural hierarchy.
Consciousness
--------------------Awareness
Unawareness
Certainty
Uncertainty Uncertainty
Unconsciousness
Unawareness
Uncertainty
A sleeping brain displays wave-like unconsciousness (spread out). Conversely, a wakeup brain
has particle-like consciousness (zero in). “Determinism vs. Free Will” may be assimilated as
“Particle-Like vs. Wave-Like”, respectively. Gravitational force is not only observed from
heavenly bodies (stars and planets) but also experienced among conscious beings; followers
usually revolve around their leader by means of psychological attraction or gravity.
Our early life development from mother’s womb to infant period is very much like the Big Bang
where unconsciousness/nothingness/sameness rapidly evolves into differentiated self-aware
individuals via symmetry breaking. If the coexistence of Physical World and Consciousness
World is ever present, what can we learn from it? We are all self-centered by nature however the
definition of SELF may be expanded to include others. A big self containing others is similar to
a wave of compassion, whereas the traditional self pertaining to one person is like a single
particle.
References
(1) “The Ever-Present Origin” by Jean Gebser, English Translation 1985.
(2) “Wholeness or Transcendence?” by Georg Feuerstein, Larson Publications 1992.
(3) “The Emperor’s New Mind” by Roger Penrose, Penguin Books 1991.
(4) “Spook: Science Tackles the Afterlife” by Mary Roach, W. W. Norton & Company 2005.
(5) “Parallel Worlds” by Michio Kaku, Doubleday 2005.
(6) “The Elegant Universe” by Brian Greene, W. W. Norton & Company 1999.
(7) “Warped Passages” by Lisa Randall, Harper Perennial 2005.
(8) “Nothingness: The Science of Empty Space” by Henning Genz, Perseus Books 1999.
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
Formalizing Falsification for Theories of
Consciousness Across Computational Hierarchies
Jake R. Hanson1,2,* and Sara I. Walker1,2,3,4*
1 School of Earth and Space Exploration, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
2 Beyond Center for Fundamental Concepts in Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
3 ASU–SFI Center for Biosocial Complex Systems, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
4 Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM, USA
arXiv:2006.07390v2 [cs.AI] 5 Sep 2020
* jake.hanson@asu.edu; sara.i.walker@asu.edu
ABSTRACT
The scientific study of consciousness is currently undergoing a critical transition in the form of a rapidly evolving scientific debate
regarding whether or not currently proposed theories can be assessed for their scientific validity. At the forefront of this debate
is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), widely regarded as the preeminent theory of consciousness because of its quantification
of subjective experience in a scalar mathematical measure called Φ that is in principle measurable. Epistemological issues in
the form of the “unfolding argument” have provided a concrete refutation of IIT by demonstrating how it permits functionally
identical systems to have differences in their predicted consciousness. The implication is that IIT and any other proposed
theory based on a physical system’s causal structure may already be falsified even in the absence of experimental refutation.
However, so far many of these arguments surrounding the epistemological foundations of falsification arguments, such as the
unfolding argument, are too abstract to determine the full scope of their implications. Here we make these abstract arguments
concrete, by providing a simple example of functionally equivalent machines realizable with table-top electronics that take the
form of isomorphic digital circuits with and without feedback. This allows us to explicitly demonstrate the different levels of
abstraction at which a theory of consciousness can be assessed. Within this computational hierarchy, we show how IIT is
simultaneously falsified at the finite-state automaton (FSA) level (an instance of the unfolding argument) and unfalsifiable at
the combinatorial state automaton (CSA) level. We use this example to illustrate a more general set of falsification criteria
for theories of consciousness: to avoid being unfalsifiable or already falsified scientific theories of consciousness must be
invariant with respect to changes that leave the inference procedure fixed at a particular level in a computational hierarchy.
Moving forward, our formalism thereby provides a tight constraint on mathematical theories of consciousness, as well as a
more concrete foundation connecting the scientific study of consciousness and computer science.
Introduction
If, and if so how, theories for consciousness can be brought within the purview of science is a subject of intense debate and
equally intense importance. The resolution of this debate is necessary for validating theory against experiments in human
subjects. It is also critical to recognizing and/or engineering consciousness in non-human systems such as machines. Currently,
there is a global, multi-million dollar effort devoted to scientifically validating or refuting the most promising candidate theories,
specifically Integrated Information Theory and the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory1 . At the same time, it is becoming
increasingly unclear whether these theories meet the required scientific criteria for validating them.
Since the early 1990s, scientific studies of consciousness have primarily focused on identifying spatiotemporal patterns
in the brain that correlate with what we intuitively consider to be conscious experience. This is due in large part to advances
in medical imaging such as electroencephalograms (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that assess
brain activity during different functional behaviors (e.g., sleeping, verbal reports, etc.). The empirical data that results from
such tests provide evidence for links between spatiotemporal patterns and inferred conscious states. These links, known as
Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs), are well-established and form the basis for an entire subfield of contemporary
neuroscience2, 3 . Despite the success of NCCs, however, there is an underlying epistemic issue with the scientific study of
consciousness because conscious states are never directly observed within the NCC framework. Instead, they must be inferred
based on our own phenomenological experience. For example, when a person is asleep we infer they are less conscious than
when they are awake because we have first-hand subjective experience of what it is like to be both asleep and awake.
While the epistemic issues associated with NCCs are widely known and discussed, the debate around the possibility of
falsifying some of the leading theories of consciousness has recently intensified. This resurgence of interest in what constitutes
a valid theory for consciousness is primarily due to the new formalization of the scientific issues in the form of “unfolding”
arguments 4–6 . In particular, the original unfolding argument as clarified by Doerig et al. points to deep logical problems
with any causal structure theory (CST) that assumes consciousness supervenes on a particular causal structure independent of
outward functional consequences6 , which implies NCCs would be inadequate to validate such theories. Since the currently
leading candidate theory for consciousness, Integrated Information Theory (IIT), is itself a causal structure theory, this has
major implications for how we approach the problem of consciousness. To understand how the unfolding argument aims to
falsify IIT, it is important to first understand how IIT is constructed as a theory that is derived from simple axioms that make
assumptions regarding what conscious experience is, and from these derives a mathematical measure of integrated information
Φ that is proposed as a quantification of consciousness. Among the axioms of the theory is the integration axiom, which
states that we experience consciousness as an "undivided whole", meaning, for example, that our left and right visual field
are integrated into a single conscious experience. Crucially, integration (and the other phenomenological axioms of IIT) must
have a direct translation in terms of mathematical machinery to construct the formal theory. For integration, this is achieved by
enforcing integration of the physical substrate(s) that gives rise to consciousness, where the precise mathematical definition is
in terms of the presence of feedback between the physical components in a system (e.g., neurons). Consequently, any system
that is strictly feed-forward is unconscious, by definition in IIT, due to an assumed inability for such physical structures to
generate a unified subjective experience. What the unfolding argument showed was that the input-output behavior of any
conscious system with feedback and Φ > 0 can be perfectly emulated by a strictly feed-forward system with Φ = 0. To do
so, one simply needs to "unfold" the feedback present in the causal structure of the conscious system in a way that preserves
the underlying functionality of the system (i.e. the input-output behavior) - a feat that can be accomplished in the forward
or backward direction using feed-forward and recurrent neural networks, respectively6 or Krohn-Rhodes decomposition5 .
The unfolding argument highlights a key issue with IIT and other potential CSTs: the physical process that is assumed to be
causally responsible for generating consciousness does not necessarily correlate with any particular input-output behavior,
meaning it is not possible to directly test predictions from the theory. The most recent contribution to this debate has come in
the form of its generalization by Kleiner and Hoel that applies to any theory for consciousness where the inference from a given
measurement of the state of consciousness does not match the prediction under substitution of one physical system for another
with appropriate constraints on the substitution4 .
Arguments by Doerig et al. and Kleiner and Hoel have addressed the epistemic issues surrounding falsification of theories
of consciousness in the abstract. Here, we seek to ground these abstract arguments in a concrete, easily visualizable system that
allows clear demonstration of their consequences. The key contribution of the current work is to demonstrate how the issue of
falsification is related to the level in the computational hierarchy at which one assesses the validity of a theory for consciousness.
To do so, we introduce a hierarchy of formal descriptions that can be used to describe a given finite-state machine. We show
that the discrepancy between whether IIT is falsified or unfalsifiable ultimately depends on the computational scale at which
inference of subjective experience is made. In particular, we construct isomorphic causal structures (digital circuits) designed to
operate a simple electronic tollbooth with and without feedback. In light of this isomorphism, we evaluate the falsification of
IIT at two levels of computation for this circuit: at the finite-state automaton (FSA) level and the combinatorial state automaton
(CSA) level and show how the theory is either unfalsifiable at the CSA level or already falsified at the FSA level. Our case study
demonstrates how candidate measures of consciousness must be invariant with respect to changes in formal descriptions that
exist below the level of the specified inference procedure if they are to avoid a priori falsification. An added consequence is that
our approach allows a deep connection between the current debate surrounding formalization of falsification arguments with
foundations of computer science. We conclude with a brief discussion regarding what a candidate measure of consciousness
that satisfies this constraint might look like, as well as the scope of its applicability.
Results
Defining Falsification for theories of Consciousness
Falsification is formally defined as a mismatch between a theoretical prediction and an observation and is essential for a theory
to be considered scientific7 . The scientific study of consciousness is problematic due to the inability to observe conscious
states directly. Instead, they must be inferred based on some other empirical observation. Thus, falsification for theories of
consciousness must be defined as a mismatch between prediction and inference based on observation rather than prediction and
direct observation4 . Consequently, it is possible to disagree as to whether or not a theory of consciousness is falsified due to
discrepancies between inference procedures being applied to empirical observations (i.e. the empirical data is the same but the
inferences are different), or worse, to selectively choose inference procedures depending on the empirical data.
Consensus agreement can only be achieved for falsification arguments if they are explicitly constructed with respect to
a fixed inference procedure. That is, if a physical system can be transformed into another physical system in a way that
preserves the results from the inference procedure while changing the underlying prediction from the theory then a theory
of consciousness is falsified with respect to that inference procedure, as this guarantees a mismatch between prediction and
inference for at least one of the physical systems under consideration4 . Indeed, this is exactly what is exploited by Doerig et al
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in their unfolding argument6 : the input-output behavior of a system is fixed and the underlying causal structure is transformed
in a way that changes the predicted Φ value from IIT. If one assumes that the inference procedure takes place at the level of
input-output behavior, as the authors argue one should, then the preservation of the input-output behavior fixes the inferred
conscious experience and falsifies any and all theories of consciousness that are not invariant with respect to this transformation.
The Computational Hierarchy
Implicitly, it is typically assumed that inference takes place at the level of input-output behavior (e.g. NCCs). However, this is
not the only formal level of description at which inferences can be made, nor is it immediately clear that it is inherently the
best. At this point, it is at least plausible that lower-level attributes, such as thermodynamic efficiency, may be part of a valid
inference procedure. For this reason, we remain agnostic to the precise level at which an inferences are made and instead focus
on explicitly characterizing the spectrum of possibilities. To do this, we introduce the following hierarchy that can be used to
describe the behavior of a given computational system, allowing us to precisely identify the computational "level" at which a
theory is making inferences and predictions.
At the top of the hierarchy is the abstract relationship between the inputs, outputs, and internal states that define a
computation. These states are typically described in terms of functional behaviors ("stop", "walk", "go", etc.) but what really
gives them meaning mathematically is only their topological relationship with one another. This implies that at this level, the
formal description of the computation is not grounded in any particular physical representation and could, in fact, be realized by
radically different causal structures (Figure 1). This abstract treatment of computation corresponds to what Chalmers’ refers to
as the "finite-state automaton" (FSA) level of description, due to the fact it is defined in terms of a global finite-state automaton8 .
Beneath this level is what Chalmers refers to as the "combinatorial-state automaton" (CSA) description8 . The only difference
between the FSA and CSA levels of description is that the latter specifies the computational states of the former in terms of a
specific labeling or encoding of the subsystems that comprise the global system. In digital electronics, as well as models of
the human brain, this encoding is usually given in terms of binary labels that are assigned to instantiate the functional states
of the system. Consequently, transitions between states in the CSA description fix local dependencies between elements, as
the correct Boolean update must be applied to each "bit" or "neuron" based on the global state of the system. Furthermore,
once a binary representation is specified it constrains the memory required to instantiate the computation, as the number of bits
that comprise the system is now fixed. The final level of the hierarchy is the specific choice of logic gates used to implement
the Boolean functions specified at the CSA level. This level corresponds to what we would call the "causal structure" as it
fully constrains the causal mechanisms that lead to internal state transitions and results in a specific logical architecture (i.e.
digital circuit or neuronal wiring). For example, the same Boolean functions (CSA description) can be realized using AND,OR,
and, NOT gates or universal NAND gates as both form a complete basis for Boolean computation. This choice has interesting
physical consequences in terms of the energetic efficiency of a given computation9 , though biological systems typically operate
many orders of magnitude above the thermodynamic limit10 .
Prediction and Inference within IIT
The computational level at which predictions are made in Integrated Information Theory is that of the CSA description, though
it is often conflated as a "causal structure" theory. In particular, IIT states that feedback between elementary components in a
system is a necessary condition for consciousness. The underlying motivation for this assumption is the integration axiom;
namely, IIT assumes that an integrated phenomenal experience must be mirrored by integration of the physical substrate that
gives rise to consciousness11 . In other words, for an experience to be a "unified whole" there must be bidirectional dependencies
between the elements that generate this experience. Since the CSA level specifies local dependencies, it is this level that
determines the extent to which state transitions rely on feedback between elements and, therefore, the Φ value for the system.
Going below this level is irrelevant, as the dependence between elements is fixed by the Boolean truth tables in the CSA
description rather than any particular circuit implementation of these truth tables. Thus, IIT is invariant with respect to changes
below the CSA level. Consequently, different physical circuits that implement the same CSA (e.g. AND/OR/NOT vs NAND
implementations) necessarily have the same Φ value (Fig. 1).
Unlike prediction, there is no clear agreement within IIT as to where in the computational hierarchy one should infer
conscious experience. In fact, there are clear inconsistencies that are responsible for confusion regarding whether or not IIT
is experimentally falsifiable. On one hand, proponents of IIT design experiments to test theoretical predictions against the
traditionally held notion that certain outward behaviors such as sleep and self-report are accurate reflections of particular
subjective experiences based on our own phenomenal experience. In this case, the inference procedure being used is based on
abstract input-output behavior (i.e. the FSA level) where functional states such as sleep are expected in response to inputs such
as anesthetics1, 12 . Crucially, none of these states being used for inference have natural binary representations and, therefore, can
be encoded in a variety of different ways with a variety of different causal structures. Thus, inferences are made independently
of both the CSA and causal structure descriptions in these experiments. On the other hand, proponents of IIT support the claim
that it is possible to fix the input-output behavior of a system while still inferring a difference in subjective experiences (i.e. the
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Figure 1. The computational hierarchy used to formally classify levels of inference and prediction. At the top of the hierarchy
is the abstract finite-state automaton (FSA) description of a computation which, in this case, is counting mod-eight. Beneath
this is the combinatorial state automaton (CSA) description in which abstract states of the FSA have been assigned specific
binary labels which, in turn, constrain local dependencies between elements. Note, it is this level of the hierarchy that IIT uses
to calculate Φ. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the full causal structure, as specified in terms of the specific logic gates that
implement the Boolean functions from the CSA level. In this case, we have shown two different choices for a complete logical
basis: AND/OR/NOT gates or universal NAND gates.
existence of "philosophical zombies")11, 13 . In this case, it is the CSA rather than the FSA level of description that must be used
to infer the conscious state of a system, as fixed input-output behavior implies a fixed FSA description. Thus, the inference
procedure that is used to support the experimental validity of IIT in a traditional laboratory setting must ultimately be rejected
in defense of philosophical zombies - a paradox at the heart of the unfolding argument.
A Concrete Example
We now turn to a concrete example that demonstrates the logical inconsistencies within IIT, and the more general problem
of separating prediction from inference, in terms of easily visualizable tabletop electronics. In particular, we will construct
isomorphic digital circuits with and without feedback designed to operate a simple electronic tollbooth, such as that shown in
Figure 2. Focusing on feedback, as opposed to some other difference in causal structure, allows us to ground our thinking in the
specifics of IIT, though the implications of our results readily generalize to any computationalist theory of mind14 .
The FSA description of the tollbooth’s behavior is defined by the requirement that it must lift the boom barrier in response
to the receipt of exactly eight quarters, as shown schematically in Figure 2a. To do this, the circuits governing the behavior
of the tollbooth must transition through eight internal memory states, corresponding to the eight functional states in the FSA
description of the machine, as shown in Figure 2b. At the CSA level, we insist that both the circuit with feedback and the circuit
without feedback be constructed on a three-bit logical architecture, which serves to enforce a strict isomorphism (one-to-one
map) between internal states in the two different descriptions. Thus, the FSA description of the system is identical, and the
CSA (circuit) descriptions are isomorphic, meaning they instantiate the same functional relationship between inputs, outputs,
and internal states. Insisting on isomorphic (rather than homomorphic) instantiations allows us to control for all possible
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confounding factors that can be used to infer a difference in subjective experience, including memory constraints (often referred
to as "efficiency" constraints6, 11 ).
(a)
(b)
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of a simplified electronic tollbooth (2a) and its FSA description (2b). The general behavior of
the tollbooth is to lift a boom barrier upon receipt of eight quarters ($2.00). To do this requires the ability to cycle through eight
internal memory states {A, B, ..., H}, sending each internal state as output to the boom barrier.
In what follows, we first construct a "conscious" circuit with feedback (and Φ > 0), followed by a functionally identical
but "unconscious" circuit with strictly feed-forward connections (and Φ = 0). The general construction of both circuits is the
same: first, we assign binary labels to the functional states of the system; then, we map these binary state transitions onto JK
flip-flops, which are the "bits" in our digital circuits; and last, we use Karnaugh Maps to simplify the logic tables of the JK
flip-flops in a way that results in simple elementary logic gate operations (e.g. AND, OR, XOR). As we show, the presence or
absence of feedback in the system ultimately stems from the initial choice of the binary labels used to represent or encode the
eight functional states of the system, in accordance with the claim that Φ acts on the CSA level of description. For the system
with feedback, we randomly assign these labels in a way that happens to result in Φ > 0 for all states. For the feed-forward
system, however, we carefully decompose the underlying dynamics in a way that exploits hierarchical relations such that
information flows strictly unidirectionally between components in the system and Φ is guaranteed to be zero. Note, for the
tollbooth to function correctly, the boom barrier must be programmed to recognize the internal state A as functionally important,
as this is the output that causes the boom barrier to lift and reset. To avoid confusion over this issue, we simply fix the binary
representation of state A as 000 across CSA representations, corresponding to the notion that the motor hardware of the boom
barrier is programmed to recognize this specific binary signal as meaningful. In reality, it is typically assumed that the motor
hardware can be reprogrammed to recognize any signal as "meaningful", as all that is relevant from a functional perspective is
consistency between a circuit and its motor hardware.
Constructing a "Conscious" Tollbooth
To construct the conscious tollbooth, we randomly assign the following binary labels to represent the eight functional states in
the FSA description of the tollbooth:
A = 000, B = 110,C = 010, D = 101, E = 111, F = 011, G = 001, H = 100
This assignment of labels fully specifies the CSA description of the system, as each binary component (bit) now must transition
in accordance with the current global state of the system. For example, the transition from state A to state B now requires
that the first component of the system transitions from binary state 0 to binary state 1 when the system is in global state 000.
Similarly, the transition from state B to state C specifies that the first component of the system must transition from 1 to 0 when
the system is in global state 110. Taken together, the constraints on each individual component in the system at each moment in
time generate a truth table that specifies the interdependencies between elements and, consequently, the Φ value.
To construct the causal architecture, we must specify the elementary building blocks of our system. In a human brain, these
building blocks would be neurons but in a digital circuit, these building blocks are "JK flip-flops", which are binary memory
storage devices (bits) widely used in the construction of basic digital circuits15, 16 . The behavior of a JK flip-flop is quite simple:
there are two stable internal memory states (0 and 1), two input channels (the J input and the K input), and a "clock" that serves
to synchronize multiple flip-flops within a circuit. Upon receipt of voltage on a line from the clock, the flip-flop does one of four
things depending on the state of the J and K input channel: if the JK input is 00 the internal state remains unchanged ("latch"),
if the JK input is 01 the internal state resets to 0 ("reset"), if the JK input is 10 the internal state is set to 1 ("set"), and if the JK
input is 11 the internal state is flipped ("toggle"). Thus, for any given internal state transition - Qi (t0 ) → Qi (t1 ) - there are two
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3. A JK flip-flop is a widely used binary memory device (bit) in digital electronics (Figure 3a). The internal state of
the flip-flop takes one of two values (Q ∈ {0, 1}) and is continuously sent as output. Upon receipt of a voltage from a clocked
input, the voltages on the two input channels J and K dictate the state transitions of Q (see main). For any desired internal state
transition Q(t0 ) → Q(t1 ), there are two JK inputs that will correctly realize the transition (Figure 3b) which provides flexibility
when it comes to circuit design.
different pairs of JK input that will correctly realize the transition, as shown in Figure 3. This degeneracy provides flexibility
when it comes to the design of the elementary logic gate operations required to actually realize the underlying Boolean logic.
With the specification of the binary labels and the choice of electronic components, we can now finish the construction
of the causal structure in terms of elementary logic gates. To do so, we first convert the state transitions of each individual
component into their associated JK values. As mentioned, there is degeneracy in the choice of JK input which means we only
have to specify one of the input channels (either J or K) to get the desired transition. For each component in the circuit, there is
a column in Figure 4a corresponding to the JK value that is required; note, inputs that do not need to be specified are denoted
with an asterisk. Next, we must determine the elementary logic gates required to get the correct JK values given the current
state of the system. For instance, when the system is in global state 110, the value of K1 (the K-input to the first component)
must be 1, but when the system is in global state 111 the value of K1 must be 0. Taken together, the eight states of the system
comprise a truth table of JK input as a function of the global state of the system, as shown in Figure 4b. Ordering these truth
tables in gray code yields "Karnaugh maps", which allow straightforward identification of the elementary logic gates required
to operate the circuit17 . The elementary logic expression for each of the six input channels, in terms of AND,OR, XOR, and NOT
gates, is shown above the corresponding Karnaugh map in Figure 4b.
The elementary logic expressions for the behavior of each JK input completes the construction of our circuit, which is
shown in Figure 5a. Clearly, this circuit contains meaningful feedback between components, as the state of the first component
depends on the state of the second and third and vice versa. The last thing to check is whether or not this feedback is associated
with the presence of consciousness according to IIT, as feedback is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Φ > 0. Using the
python package PyPhi18 , we find Φ > 0 for all states (Figure 5b), meaning this system is indeed considered conscious within
the IIT formalism.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4. To construct the digital circuit for the conscious tollbooth, we convert the global state transitions into their
associated JK values (Figure 4a). Then, we use Karnaugh maps to determine the elementary logic required to update each
component (Figure 4b). The presence of feedback in the resultant digital circuit is evident by the dependence of earlier
components on later components (e.g. J1 = Q1 Q2 + Q3 ) and vice versa (e.g. K3 = Q1 Q2 ).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 5. An integrated digital circuit (Figure 5a) designed to operate the electronic tollbooth shown in Figure 2. As can be
seen, the causal structure contains meaningful feedback in the form of bidirectional dependencies between pairs of elements
and, consequently, has Φ > 0 for all states (Figure 5b).
Constructing an "Unconscious" Tollbooth
In the previous section, we demonstrated the construction of a causal structure designed to operate the electronic tollbooth
shown in Figure 2a. We did so by randomly assigning 3-bit binary labels to represent the function states ({A, B, ..., H}) of the
system and constructing the logic of the digital circuit in a way that correctly realizes these labeled state transitions. The result
was a circuit that relied on feedback connections (i.e. bi-directional information exchange between components) and had Φ > 0
for all states (Figure 5). In this section, we demonstrate that it is possible to assign binary labels in a different way, such that the
causal architecture that results instantiates the same functional topology (Figure 2b) but does not make use of any feedback
connections. To do so, we will "unfold" the underlying dynamics of the system in a way that guarantees a causal architecture
with Φ = 0 for all states in the system.
The process of unfolding a finite-state description of a system is based on techniques closely related to the Krohn-Rhodes
theorem from automata theory, which states: any abstract deterministic finite-state automata (FSA) can be realized using a
strictly feed-forward causal architecture comprised solely of simple elementary components19, 20 . To do so isomorphically, one
must find a "nested sequence of preserved partitions", which creates a hierarchical labeling scheme wherein earlier components
(flip-flops) transition independently of later components5, 21 . Due to this hierarchical independence, information is guaranteed to
flow unidirectionally from earlier components to later components, thereby ensuring a strictly feed-forward logical architecture
and, correspondingly, Φ = 0 for all states. While a full discussion of Krohn-Rhodes decomposition is beyond the scope of this
paper22 , we briefly describe the relevant methodology for constructing a nested sequence of preserved partitions in the Methods
section. The result, applied to the finite-state description of the tollbooth shown in Figure 2b, is the following set of binary
labels used to encode the functional states of our system:
A = 000, B = 100,C = 010, D = 110, E = 001, F = 101, G = 011, H = 111
Notice, in this labeling scheme, the value of the first component (or "coordinate") partitions the underlying state space of the
system into two macrostates: {A,C, E, G} and {B, D, F, H} and can be thought of as high-level representation of "even" and
"odd" states. These macrostates are useful due to the fact they transition deterministically back and forth between one another.
Thus, knowing the future state of the first component depends solely on knowing the current state of the first component.
Similarly, the future state of the second component is completely deterministic given the current state of the first and second
components and is agnostic to the third. In this way, each additional component offers a refined estimate as to where in the
global state space the current microstate is located23 , hence the claim that the labeling scheme is "hierarchical".
With hierarchical labels assigned, the circuit construction now proceeds in a way identical to the previous section. Namely,
we convert the binary state transitions into their associated JK values, shown in Figure 6a. Then, we construct truth tables for
the state of each J and K input given the global state of the system; and last, we order these truth tables in gray code (Karnaugh
Maps) and assign elementary logic gates to each input channel (Figure 6b). The resulting logical architecture is shown in Figure
7a. As required, the circuit is strictly feed-forward, as evident by the fact that each component depends solely on itself or earlier
components. This, in turn, guarantees Φ = 0 for all states of the system (Figure 7b) as the presence of feedback connections is
assumed to be a necessary condition for consciousness according to IIT.
Proof of Falsification/Unfalsifiability
In light of the previous sections, it is clear that IIT predicts a difference in subjective experience between the "conscious"
tollbooth with Φ > 0 and the "unconscious" tollbooth with Φ = 0. Thus, falsification is a matter of whether or not one can infer
a corresponding difference that justifies the difference in prediction. Since the two systems have the same FSA description, any
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(a)
(b)
Figure 6. The state transitions and JK values (Figure 6a) corresponding to the hierarchical labeling scheme described in the
main text. Figure 6b shows the Karnaugh maps used to determine the elementary logic gates used in the construction of the
feed-forward logical architecture. Note, the logical dependence between components is strictly unidirectional (e.g. J2 and K2
depend only on the state of Q1 ).
(a)
(b)
Figure 7. A feed-forward digital circuit (Figure 7a) designed to operate the electronic tollbooth shown in Figure 2. This
causal structure operates under the same memory constraints as the integrated circuit (i.e. a three-bit logical architecture) but
has Φ = 0 for all states (Figure 7b).
inference procedure that takes place at the FSA level or above necessarily implies falsification of the theory, as the difference
in prediction implies a mismatch between prediction and inference for at least one of the two systems under consideration4 .
Consequently, IIT is falsified with respect to inference procedures that are based on the input-output behavior of the system, as
this is fixed at the FSA level of description.
This implies that the inference procedure utilized by IIT must take place at the CSA level or below if the theory is to avoid
total falsification. At the CSA level, however, the full utility of the isomorphism is evident as the only allowable difference
between the system with and without Φ > 0 was a permutation of the binary labels used to instantiate functional states. Thus,
it is this difference that must be used to infer a difference in subjective experience. However, unlike input-output behavior,
there are no clear phenomenological grounds on which one can infer a difference in subjective experience based solely on
a permutation of the binary states used to represent functional states within a system. Instead, IIT must assume that such a
difference in the CSA description can be used to resolve differences in subjective experience, but it is exactly this assumption
that must be tested via comparison of prediction and inference. In other words, if IIT uses the CSA description to infer a
difference in subjective experience, then the inference procedure being used is one and the same with the predictions from the
theory (i.e. Φ is used as both inference and prediction), which renders the theory is unfalsifiable. In combination, this implies
IIT is falsified with respect to inferences procedures at the FSA level or above and inherently unfalsifiable with respect to
inference procedures at the CSA level or below.
Discussion
Our results prove an a priori falsification of IIT as a scientific theory of consciousness using a simple, readily-realizable
model. We have shown that what Φ actually measures is a consequence of the particular binary representation (or encoding)
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used to instantiate the functional states in a system at the CSA level, without a clear interpretation in terms of function
or phenomenology at the FSA level. For a theory to avoid the epistemic problems revealed by IIT under the isomorphic
transformation we introduce requires that no transformation or "substitution" exists that changes the prediction without affecting
the inference. This, in turn, implies that beneath the specified level of inference, a mathematical theory of consciousness must
be invariant with respect to any and all changes that leave the results from the inference procedure fixed. In other words, if you
can make a change to the physical system that does not affect what will be used to infer the conscious state of the system, then
such a change must not affect the prediction of the theory either.
For the example we provide, an intuitive measure that satisfies this is Group Complexity24 . Like Φ, Group Complexity is a
measure of computational complexity that acts on the CSA level of description. Specifically, it counts the number of resets
necessary to complete a Krohn-Rhodes decomposition20, 25 , meaning all integrated circuits are decomposed into feed-forward
emulations prior to measuring their complexity. This, in turn, puts all CSA representations on an equal playing field, as
complexity comes in two forms: "resets" and feedback connections. By first unfolding the dynamics of an integrated circuit,
Group Complexity measures the complexity of the underlying computation in the abstract rather than any particular CSA
instantiation. Consequently, it is invariant with respect to changes below the FSA level.
In light of this, it is important to ask whether there is anything to be gained from a candidate measure of consciousness
such as group complexity. In answer, one must first ensure that the measure is scientific by examining whether inference and
prediction can be kept independent. This is easy enough to check for group complexity, as inferences are canonically made
based on input-output behavior while group complexity can be measured at the circuit level. Given that there is no a priori
dependence between a circuit description and input-output behavior, GC is indeed capable of producing non-trivial scientific
predictions. In terms of whether or not these predictions are falsifiable, it is certainly possible that we infer a conscious state
based on input-output behavior that is in disagreement with a prediction from a theory based on Group Complexity. For
example, if the Group Complexity of a model system increases when the system goes asleep, then this serves as falsification
with respect to the canonical inference that sleep should correspond to lower subjective experience. While this may sound
virtually identical to experiments designed to test IIT1, 12 , the crucial difference is that group complexity is mathematically
invariant with respect to changes that preserve a given FSA description.
Thus, it appears Group Complexity is a measure of complexity that is both non-trivial and falsifiable. Therefore, it is an
epistemologically sound measure of consciousness that retains some of the original insight that motivated Integrated Information
Theory26 and acts on the same mathematical structures. Yet, at face value, group complexity seems much too simple to truly
quantify conscious experience. For one, it coarse grains all of the richness associated with sensorimotor experience into a scalar
value that retains none of the corresponding physical information associated with conscious experience, i.e., it has no implicit
explanation for "what it is like" to be something27 . While IIT deals with this problem by equating multi-dimensional vectors
with “concepts in qualia space", such sophistications are even harder to ground experimentally than a scalar measure, as the
ability to empirically resolve the nuances of a rich phenomenal structure are limited by our ability to empirically infer such
structures.
Given this, it seems the biggest problem faced by consciousness research going forward is not necessarily the mathematical
structures that a theory can predict but the mathematical structures that a theory can infer. We know based on first-hand
phenomenal experience of consciousness that certain behaviors such as sleep and verbal report are likely accurate reflections of
consciousness in human beings and it is these behaviors that must be leveraged by the inference procedure. Beyond these few
specific examples, however, it is difficult to imagine what else can be used to infer conscious states that is not also used to make
predictions within the theory. In cases where we lose phenomenological grounding, such as artificial intelligence, this issue is
especially problematic28 .
While the inability to test what we assume to be consciousness has always plagued the study of consciousness, we hope
that formalizing the problem in terms of the level of computational abstraction at which inferences and predictions take place
makes it clear that there are mathematical constraints all theories of consciousness must satisfy. Namely, the theory must be
invariant with respect to changes that leave the results from the inference procedure unaffected. In IIT, the inference procedure
being used to justify the experimental validity the theory is at the level of the input-output behavior of the system, and therefore
Φ must be invariant with respect to equivalence classes that share the same FSA description. The fact that it is not either
falsifies the theory or renders it metaphysical, depending on whether or not one accepts the canonical inference procedure. Our
analyses indicate that not only are new theories of consciousness needed, but new frameworks for assessing the validity of these
theories is needed as well. The latter, for example, could be addressed by constructing theories that do not aim to quantify what
subjective experience is, but rather the causal consequences of subjective experience on the physical world.
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Methods
Isomorphic Unfolding via Preserved Partitions
The Krohn-Rhodes theorem guarantees that any finite-state transition diagram can be "unfolded" such that the resultant causal
architecure is feedback free and has Φ = 0. Typically, however, this unfolding process results in a causal architecture that is
much larger than the minimum number of bits to instantiate the functional topology of the system using feedback. In other
words, Krohn-Rhodes decomposition, and other unfolding methodologies6, 11 , inevitably result in a clear difference in efficiency
between feed-forward and recurrent representations of the same underlying computation. To control for this, we must find
a system that allows an isomorphic feed-forward representation, which can be done using a nested sequence of preserved
partitions.
A preserved partition is a way of grouping microscopic states into macroscopic equivalence classes (blocks) based on
symmetries present in dynamics. In particular, a partition P is preserved if it breaks the microscopic state space S into a set of
blocks P = {B1 , B2 , ..., BN } such that every microstate within a given block transitions to the same macrostate (i.e. the same
block)21, 29 . If we denote the underlying microscopic dynamics as a function f : S → S, then a block Bi is preserved when:
∃ j ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} such that f (x) ∈ B j ∀x ∈ Bi
In other words, for Bi to be preserved, ∀x in Bi x must transition to some state in a single block B j (i = j is allowed). Conversely,
Bi is not preserved if there exist two or more states in Bi that transition to different blocks (i.e. ∃ x1 , x2 ∈ Bi such that f (x1 ) = B j
and f (x2 ) = Bk with j 6= k ). In order for the entire partition Pi to be preserved, each block within the partition must be
preserved.
For an isomorphic cascade decomposition to exist, we must be able to heirarchically construct preserved partitions in a
maximally efficient way. Namely, each partition in the nested sequence of preserved partitions ({P1 , P2 , ..., PN }) must consist
of blocks that evenly split the blocks in the partition above it in half. If this is the case, then a single bit of information can
be used to specify where in the preceding block the current state is located. This, in turn, allows a straightforward mapping
from the blocks of the preserved partition Pi onto the first i binary coordinates used to represent these blocks. Thus, a system
with 2n microstates requires only n binary components, meaning the representation is maximally compact. If one cannot find a
preserved partition made of disjoint blocks or the blocks of a given partition do not evenly split the blocks of the partition above
it in half, then the system in question does not allow an isomorphic feed-forward decomposition and traditional Krohn-Rhodes
decomposition techniques21, 22, 25 must be employed.
To isomorphically decompose the finite-state automaton shown in Figure 2b, we let our first preserved partition be
P1 = {B0 , B1 } with B0 = {A,C, E, G} and B1 = {B, D, F, H}. It is easy to check that this partition is preserved, as one can
verify that every element in B0 transitions to an element in B1 and every element in B1 transitions to an element in B0 (shown
topologically in Figure 8). To keep track of the blocks, we assign all the states in B0 a binary coordinate value of Q01 = 0 and all
the states in B1 a binary coordinate value of Q01 = 1, which serves as the first of the three binary components (Q01 Q02 Q03 ) assigned
to represent the global state of the system. The logic of the first coordinate is given by the corresponding state transitions of the
blocks in P1 . Since block 0 goes to 1 and vice versa, the first component is essentially a NOT gate taking input from itself, or a
JK flip-flop receiving a "toggle" signal.
The second preserved partition P2 must evenly split each block within P1 , such that every block in P2 is half the size of the
blocks in P1 . Denoting P2 = {{B00 , B01 }, {B10 , B11 }}, we let B00 = {A, E}, B01 = {C, G}, B10 = {B, F}, and B11 = {D, H}.
One can quickly check that these blocks are indeed preserved, and that the component logic for Q02 (based on the state of Q01 Q02 )
is given by: {00 → 0; 01 → 1; 10 → 1; 11 → 0}. In a single-channel input scheme, this corresponds to Q02 as an XOR gate (i.e.
Q02 = Q01 ⊕ Q02 but, again, the two channel logic corresponding to a JK flip-flop will differ slightly.
The third and final partition P3 must also split the blocks of P2 in half, which implies each of the eight states corresponds
to its own block in P3 . Naturally, this partition is preserved since there is only a single state in each block (making it
impossible for two states within a given block to transition to separate blocks). Since P3 is at the bottom of the hierarchy, the
state of Q03 can depend on the global state of the system (Q01 Q02 Q03 ). Unlike the previous two coordinates, this truth table is
too large to be captured with a single elementary logic gate (e.g. NOT,XOR,etc.). Instead, we must rely on a combination
of elementary logic gates, which is drastically simplified by the use of JK flip-flops. Indeed, it is this third coordinate
(and the potential for more complicated logical descriptions in general) that motivated our use of two channel flip-flops
rather than single channel devices (e.g. D flip-flops). Reading the block transitions off of the bottom of Figure 8, we have
{000 → 0; 001 → 0; 010 → 1; 011 → 1; 100 → 0; 101 → 0; 110 → 1; 111 → 1}. Clearly, there is no single binary logic gate that
implements this truth table, and we must instead refer to the Karnaugh maps shown in Figure 4b.
At this point, the isomorphic cascade decomposition is complete. The values assigned to the blocks of Q3 correspond to our
new binary labeling scheme, namely:
A = 000, B = 100,C = 010, D = 110, E = 001, F = 101, G = 011, H = 111
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Figure 8. A nested sequence of preserved partitions {P1 , P2 , P3 } used to isomorphically decompose or "unfold" the dynamics
underlying the finite-state description of the tollbooth shown in Figure 2. Blocks within any given partition transition
deterministically, which implies the logic for individual components can be constructed hierarchically. The binary labels
assigned to the blocks of P3 correspond to a labeling scheme that is isomorphic to the original and strictly feed-forward (see
main).
As demonstrated in the main text, these labels result in a causal architecture that is strictly feed-forward and has Φ = 0 for
all states, as desired. This can easily be seen by the fact that the transitions of blocks in any given level of the nested sequence of
preserved partitions are fully deterministic without the need to specify lower levels (Figure 8). Thus, downstream information
from later coordinates is inconsequential to the action of earlier coordinates, which enforces the "hierarchical" relationship
between components. Note, this result is by no means unique; there are other nested sequences of preserved partitions for this
system that are equally valid. Choosing a different nested sequence of preserved partitions simply amounts to changing the
labels assigned to each block which, in turn, changes the Boolean logic governing the system. As long as the partitions are
preserved, however, the causal architecture that results is guaranteed to be strictly feed-forward and isomorphic to the logical
architecture we present.
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Mathematical definition of public language, and modeling of will and consciousness
based on the public language
Hana Hebishima, Mina Arakaki, Chikako Dozono, Hanna Frolova, Shinichi Inage
To propose a mathematical model of consciousness and will, we first simulated the inverted qualia
with a toy model of a neural network. As a result, we confirmed that there can be an inverted qualia
on the neural network. In other words, the qualia were individual-dependent and considered difficult
as an indicator of consciousness and will. To solve that difficulty, we introduce a probability space and
a random variable into a set of qualia and define a public language for events. Based on this idea of
public language, consciousness and will are modeled. In this proposal, future actions are randomly
selected from the comparison between "recognition of events" by external observation and past
episodic memory, and the actual "recognition of actions" is regarded as the occurrence of consciousness.
The basic formula is also derived. This proposal is compared with other past philosophical discussions.
Key words: conscious, will, mathematical model, probability space, information entropy
1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the mathematical definition of public language and the model of
consciousness derived from it. Modeling of consciousness is an important topic, and the relationship
between the conscious realm and its physical realm has been studied and developed over the centuries,
involving not only scientists but also philosophers and theologians (Bill Faw, 2014). Examples of
models of consciousness include the Global Workspace Theory (Stanislas Dehaene et al., 1998),
Multiple Draft Theory (Daniel C Dennett, 1993), Higher Thought Theory (Peter Carruthers, 2016),
Dehaene - Changeux model (Dehaene S, Changeux JP, 2000), Integrated Information Theory (Tononi
G, 2004, Masafumi Oizumi aet al., 2014) and many others. There are also many good reviews of those
models (Leonid I. Perlovsky, 2006, Christopher Durugbo et al., 2013), and we won't be introducing
each model sequentially here.
Among those theories, the integrated information theory was proposed by Tononi to quantify
consciousness - especially using the concept of information in information theory. The main purpose
of the program is to quantitatively evaluate the perception of a person as a first-person. Integrated
information theory does not keep in mind the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" but starts
from "consciousness exists" and adopts "information," "integration," "structure" and "exclusion" as
axioms. This system of theories is also of great interest, especially in terms of quantifying the
functions that complex networks produce. The basic concept is that consciousness appears when much
information is integrated, and the degree of integration is expressed by the integrated information
quantity:Φ. The Φ is defined for a set of variables that interact and evolve over time, and is a
quantification of how much more information the entire original network produces compared to the
sum of the information produced by the subnetworks that divided the network. For quantification,
we use the concept of Kullback–Leibler divergence, which is also used in this paper.
These many models of consciousness complement metaphysical theories of consciousness, such
as functionalism, identity theory, dialogic dualism, and neutral monism. The following is a summary
of the topics related to this paper.
1.1 Qualia
"A unique texture that cannot be explained by words felt by each individual, caused by subjective
experiences and senses" is qualia. Even if we express our thoughts and feelings in words, they are
essentially things only we can know. For example, let's say a person gets a "bad vibe" when they see
a particular color. It is impossible to communicate and share that specific "bad feeling" with others by
any means. And a hideous color for one person may be a favorable color for another. However, while
we can explain why it is preferable, we cannot verbalize how it is preferable. In other words, because
qualia refer to the very feeling of everyone, it is impossible for others to feel qualia generated within
them in the same way.
Qualia is told with the following two characteristics.
1) Qualia is a subjective feeling gained through individual experience and the difficulty of verbalizing
everything correctly
2) Qualia are extremely personal and subjective and cannot be shared with others, and even if we go
through the same experience, the qualia we gain is incomprehensible to others
Thus, all sensations take place in an individual's brain and do not achieve the exact same qualia
as others.
1.2 Philosophical Zombies
The "philosophical zombie" is a thought experiment designed to counter the physicalism of
qualia and perceptions of consciousness. used by Chalmers, D., to describe qualia (Chalmers, D., 1996).
A philosophical zombie is a thought experiment defined as "a being who behaves like a normal human
being but in fact has no inner feelings." A major characteristic of philosophical zombies is the lack of
qualia. For a philosophical zombie, all emotions and sensations are just part of a brain activity. To put
it simply, a philosophical zombie is an entity that has sensations and emotions as a function but no
sensations and emotions as a reality. Philosophical zombies are said to be unrecognizable because
they look and behave no differently from humans. This is because, as mentioned above, qualia refer
to "the sensations and emotions felt by an individual," and it is impossible to prove whether the other
person has qualia. If it exists but can't be recognized, no one can prove it.
Physicism for consciousness is a monism that ascribes all phenomena to physics. The position is
that the human mind and senses fluctuate due to some physical phenomenon and can be observed as
an activity of the brain, and for this reason, in physicalism, the human mind and qualia are also
regarded as "physical objects."
An opposing position is the dualistic idea that there are objects that can be physically observed
and objects that cannot be physically observed. Even if we try to physically analyze emotions and
sensations, what we can observe is the physical phenomena of the brain, and we can't observe whether
there is "something" other than the physical phenomena of the brain. This leads to the idea that the
essence of the human mind and consciousness cannot be expressed in modern physics, and this is
called the "hard problem of consciousness."
In physicalism, the "mind," such as consciousness and qualia, is taken as a physical phenomenon
of the brain - that is, "the mind is the same as the senses and emotions as functions." If physicalism
is right, we can say that philosophical zombies are unimaginable and "improbable." Physicism,
however, cannot prove why philosophical zombies are improbable, because the physical phenomena
of the brain do not explain why or how the mind arises. Based on this logic, the argument is that
"Physicism is wrong if philosophical zombies are imaginable, and their existence cannot be denied."
1.3 Inverted qualia
Consider, for example, the color red. Observers watching the same sunset: Even if A and B each
recognize the color of the sunset as "red," they cannot confirm whether the private "red" that A and B
recognize is the same. For example, even if A's perceived "red" is considered "blue for A" to B, there is
no problem with A and B's claim that "the setting sun is red." This "inverted qualia" thought
experiment argues that the idea of physicalism cannot explain differences in internal experiences,
such as the appearance and perception of colors among observers.
1.4 Existence of free will
B. Rivett attached a device that measured brain electrical signals to participants in the
experiment and had them move their wrists freely to measure brain electrical signals at that time (B.
Rivet, 1980). When we move our bodies, it is known that electrical signals, commands to move our
muscles, come out of our brains shortly before we move. The results of the experiment were in the
following order.
1)The brain produces electrical signals to move the wrist
2)Conscious to move the wrist
3)Wrist moves
This means that the brain is sending electrical signals to move the wrist before the person is
conscious of moving the wrist, and the wrist is already set to move before the person is conscious of
moving the wrist. In other words, the wrists did not move because he was conscious of moving them.
The normal human feeling that the wrist has moved because he or she wanted to move the wrist by
his or her own will is an "illusion," and before that will, the wrist has been determined to move by
something unconscious, and the command is coming out of the brain unconsciously. In the middle of
the process of moving the wrist, it is a state in which the conscious mind is aware in the pursuit of
"let's move." B. Rivet, between 2) and 3) above, there is a short time left for refusing to move the wrist,
within which man can stop the action at his own will. So, he concludes that human beings have free
will. However, there is no harm in interpreting the results of this experiment by thinking that it is
"consciousness" - i.e., that there is no free will - to recognize the results of unconscious random
processing in the brain as an afterthought. B. Rivet's interpretation of the experiment has been
criticized by dualistic interpreters and others. However, if we take the view of "consciousness" in the
absence of free will, we can assume that the brain unconsciously and randomly processes certain
options based on physicalism. If we consider the post-processing recognition at the stage when the
processing is determined to be "consciousness," we believe that it does not go against physicalism and
does not cause a "hard problem of consciousness.". In dualism, apart from physical phenomena, there
is non-physical "consciousness" that cannot be measured by physics. However, it fails to explain why
and how non-physical consciousness can influence our behavior and the processing of the brain, which
is a physical phenomenon. If consciousness, which is non-physical, can affect physics, we must also
consider the existence of so-called "telekinesis" and the possibility of consciousness in all things, which
seems to make interpretation more complicated.
1.5 Isolated Brains
Isolated brain is a condition in which the corpus callosum connecting the left and right sides of
the brain is removed for the purpose of treating epilepsy, etc. This prevents information from being
exchanged between the left and right sides of the brain. The left side of the brain is primarily
responsible for language areas, while the right side is responsible for imaging areas. If we ask a
subject with a separate brain, showing the subject only to his right eye, which is processed by his left
brain, "What is it?" he can tell. Conversely, if the left eye, which connects to the right side of the brain,
is seen alone, the right side of the brain, which connects to the right side of the brain, answers "I can't
see anything" because it can't process language. On the other hand, if we let him draw a picture of
the subject, his right brain, which controls the image area, can draw without any problem. It is
sometimes said that this separate brain subject has two personalities = consciousness. Considering
this, we think that consciousness is physically dominated, or at least influenced, by the physical state
of the brain.
1.6 Short-term and Long-term Memory
Memories are divided into short-term and long-term memories because of differences in their
temporal duration. Tulving further subdivides this long-term memory into "episodic" and "semantic"
memories. "Episodic memory" is a memory of a personal experience associated with a specific time
and place, and "semantic memory" is defined as a memory unrelated to a specific time and place
(Tulving, 1976). As a classification of long-term memory, "episodic memory" and "semantic memory"
may be combined into "declarative memory" and classified into two separately defined categories of
"procedural memory" (Squire, 1987). Procedural memory, for example, is said to be the memory of
how to ride a bicycle.
FIG. 1: Neural Network Configuration
No.
1
2
3
4
5
No.
1
2
3
4
5
Table 1: Color representation by RBG
Reference colors
R
Red
255
Green
0
Blue
0
White
255
Black
0
G
0
255
0
255
0
B
0
0
255
255
0
Table 2: Learning results when Table 1 is used as input and output teacher signals
Input
Simulated Colors
Output
R
G
B
Red
229
33
36
Green
38
227
38
Blue
38
39
231
White
254
255
253
Black
0
0
0
No.
1
2
3
4
5
Table 3: Learning results considering color weakness
Input
Simulated Colors
Output
R
G
Red
124
128
Green
124
115
Blue
185
202
White
255
255
Black
2
2
B
17
18
255
255
1
No.
1
2
3
4
5
Table 4: Learning results when complementary colors in Table 1
are used as teacher signals for output
Input
Simulated Colors
Output
R
G
Red
29
238
Green
245
17
Blue
236
161
White
255
255
Black
2
1
B
70
62
32
255
0
FIG 2: Comparison of neural network weight coefficients
Many existing models of consciousness seem to focus on first-person consciousness. In this paper,
we first think of the neutral network as a Toy Model of a brain, and we performed a simulation of the
inverted qualia using it. As a result, we show that color blindness and inverted qualia can occur even
in the same network structure only with different values and arrangements of coefficients. On that
basis, we defined second-person consciousness - especially qualia - mathematically and used the
results as axioms to examine the process of creating a physically possible consciousness. We aim to
build a model that can provide some answers to the above 1.1－1.6 questions. Here are the details:
2.Mathematical definitions and modeling of consciousness
2.1 Simulations of Inverted qualia
The possibility of 'inverted qualia' mentioned in the introduction is explored through a
simulation based on a neural network. Neural networks, a type of machine learning that mimics the
function of neurons in the brain, have many applications and achievements as so-called artificial
intelligence. Now consider the three primary colors of red (R), green (G) and blue (B) and the five
colors of white and black. Using RGB, each color can be quantified as a combination of RGB as shown
in Table 1. The colors in the table consist of the RGB color in the right column. This simulation
explores qualia as a first-person. First, the RGB values for each color in Table 1 are taken as input,
and the same RGB values are used as the teacher signals for each color's output. In the model of the
eyeball shown in the left part of Figure 1, the optic nerve contains a red-sensing L-cone, a greensensing M-cone, and a blue-sensing S-cone, each of which transmits RGB signals to the brain. The
input in the neural network is interpreted as the RGB value from the optic nerve of the color seen by
the eye, and the neural network is interpreted as the processing in the brain and the RGB value of
the output as the color-qualia recognized in the brain. The calculations were performed with input
layer 3 nodes, hidden layer: 2 layers × 50 nodes, output layer 3 nodes, and a neural network
considering bias at each node.
The weighting factors defined on the edges connecting each node were optimally calculated with
MOST, which we developed (S. Inage, 2022). The search area for the weighting factor is -0.05－10.
The total number of nodes is 2903. The study results are summarized in Table 2. The colors of Input
in the table are those using the RGB values in Table 1, and the colors of Output in the table are those
created from the RGB values listed in the right column. Overall, it can be reproduced with input color
= output color. However, the RGB values do not exactly match those in Table 1.
Next, for the purpose of simulating so-called color weakness, when red RGB in the color
weakness condition is recognized as = (128, 140, 0) ( )) and green is given RGB = (128,128, 0) ( ) as
the output teacher signal, the results are shown in Table 3. Other colors - blue, white, black - give
identical RGB. The inputs remain in Table 1. Again, the colors of Input in the table are those using
the RGB values in Table 1, and the colors of Output in the table are those created from the RGB
values listed in the right column. From Table 3, red and green are generally more greenish compared
to Tables 1 and 2, making it difficult to distinguish between red and green - that is to say, a state of
color weakness. The color tone is also close to that shown in the reference above. Blue is also a lighter
shade compared to Tables 1 and 2, but this is likely to be solved by learning more deeply about neural
networks (blue is recognized as blue even when the color is weak). In this way, we can see that by
changing the weights of the neural network, we can reproduce the normal state to the color weak
state.
Next, consider a case where the RGB values of the inputs remain in Table 1 and the
complementary colors of the colors in Table 1 are given as the teacher signals for the outputs. The
complementary color of red is green (R, G, B) = (0, 255, 0), the complementary color of green is red (R,
G, B) = (255, 0, 0), and the complementary color of blue is orange, (R, G, B) = (233, 163, 0). White and
black are not colors and cannot define complementary colors, so they are left as they are. For machine
learning, when a certain color is input, it can be regarded as a process to find the complementary
color. The results are shown in Table 4. As above, the colors of Input in the table are those using the
RGB values in Table 1, and the colors of Output in the table are those created from the RGB values
listed in the right column. Again, the complementary color relationship to the input is correctly
determined (except for black and white). In the calculations in Tables 2 and 3, the neural networks
used are identical, only with different weighting factors on the edges connecting each node. Each
weighting factor is a mathematically and physically feasible combination. This means that even with
the same input, the same system can achieve different color outputs - equivalent to qualia - under
different weighting conditions. Even if observer A, which has a weight coefficient outputting Table 2,
and observer B (inverted qualia), which has a weight coefficient outputting Table 4, observe the same
color, there is no contradiction even if they feel different qualia. That is, red for A is green for B, and
green for A is red for B. But if we ask both parties what color they see, they can answer "red" or
"green" and share it with each other. This is truly an inverted qualia. In the network of neurons in
the brain, in the processing in the individual's brain, in the network, it is unlikely that there is a
mechanism for perfect conformity. For example, each value of the neural network weighting factors
of 2903 in each case in Tables 2 and 4 is compared in Figure 2. Up to a factor of 1- 2300, the coefficient
values are distributed in the range of -0.05－0.12 in all cases, and the coefficient values up to the
latter 2300－2903 are distributed in the range of -0.05－0.27, and it is not observed that the coefficient
values are significantly different, only that the distribution of the weighting factors changes. Because
neutral networks are the Toy Model of the brain, but can also occur in that Toy Model, it is more
natural to assume that in a more complex brain, individual qualia when observing things are different
- even inverted qualia is possible. In this case, a qualia that is identical for everyone cannot be defined
uniformly and is difficult to deal with mathematically. Giving up the discussion of qualia as a firstperson, and avoiding its difficulties, we consider a framework that can be handled mathematically in
the next section.
2.2 Definition of public language
Individual "qualia" is called qualia as a private language, after Wittgenstein's "private
language" that conveys individual feelings and sensations. If this qualia as a private language are
individual, different from each other, and incapable of communicating 100% to others, it is difficult to
set a standard for mathematical comparison. Therefore, in contrast to "private language," the
standard "public language" is defined from the qualia as a private language. In other words, it is a
language in the second and third person. Take that definition and create a "standard" of consciousness.
First, assume that different observers A and B observe the same event F. Observer A recognizes
the probability distribution of an event F as PA, and observer B recognizes the probability distribution
of the same event F as PB.
In the probability space (Ω, F, P) and the probability variable X, consider the probability space
(Ω, F, PA) and the probability variable X for observer A, and the same probability variable X as the
probability space (Ω, F, PB) for observer B. In the probability space, P satisfies the follows:
a) P(Ω)=1
b) P(∅)=0
c) A∩B=∅ for A, B ∈F, then P(A∪B)=P(A)+P(B)
Also, F is σadditive family, which satisfies the following conditions:
a) ∅⊂F
b) A∈F then AC∈F
∞
c) Ai∈F、i∈N then 𝑈𝑖=1
Ai∈F
For the above two probability distributions PA and PB, let us assume that we have density functions
𝑝𝐴 (𝑥) and 𝑝𝐵 (𝑥) defined below.
𝑃𝐴 (𝐿) = ∫ 1𝐿 (𝑥) ∙ 𝑝𝐴 (𝑥) ∙ 𝑑𝑥, 𝑃𝐵 (𝐴𝐿) = ∫ 1𝐿 (𝑥) ∙ 𝑝𝐵 (𝑥) ∙ 𝑑𝑥
1)
where,
1 (𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∈ 𝐿)
1𝐿 (𝑥) =
2)
0 (𝑖𝑓 𝑥 ∉ 𝐿)
and is the defining function of the set L. In this case, the Kullback–Leibler divergence DKL is defined
below.
𝑝 (𝑥)
𝐷𝐾𝐿 = ∫ 𝑝𝐴 (𝑥) ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑝𝐴 (𝑥)) 𝑑𝑥
𝐵
This is one expression of the distance between PA and PB and satisfies the following conditions:
a) 𝐷𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐵 ≥ 0 for any PA(x), PB(x)
b) 𝐷𝐾𝐿 = 0 and (∀x) PA(x)= PB(x) are equivalent
c) Generally, 𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑃𝐴 , 𝑃𝐵 ) ≠ 𝐷𝐾𝐿 (𝑃𝐵 , 𝑃𝐴 )
3)
If the distance is zero, the following holds:
a) Reflectance A~A
b) Symmetric Toru A~B
c) A ~C if transitive laws A~B, B ~ C
where, "~" is a symbol denoting equivalence.
We define this as the 'equivalence' of the results for an 'event' between observer A and observer
B. In this paper, "events" indicating this equivalence are collectively referred to as "public language."
I think this idea is close to the relationship between private and public language in Wittgenstein's
"Private Language Theory." Private language refers to language that expresses sensations, emotions,
and other things that can only be understood by the person. Wittgenstein believed that "private
language," which conveyed individual feelings and sensations, was meaningless, becoming "public
language" when conveyed to those around them. Therefore, in the theory of private language,
Wittgenstein concludes that 'private language is inherently unmastery and meaningless. The above
probability distribution by individual observer corresponds to "private language," and if the distance
of the probability distribution is zero, it becomes "public language." This is illustrated by the case of
colors calculated in the previous chapter. For simplicity, the three colors are {Red, Green, Blue}. In
this case, the sample space Ω is {Red, Green, Blue} and F: 2Ω={∅, {R}, {G}, {B}, {R, G},{R, B}, {G, B},
{R, G, B}} is a power set of Ω.
It is assumed that observer A sees the color with the RGB reference values in Table 2. The FA in
that case is as follows:
ＦA ={∅, {229, 33, 36}, {38, 227 38}, {{38, 39, 231}, {{229, 33, 36}, {{38, 227 38}},・・・}
Suppose that observer B sees color according to the criteria in Table 4. The FB in that case is as
follows:
ＦB ={∅, {29, 238, 70}, {245, 17 62}, {{236, 161, 32}, {{29, 238, 70}, {245, 17 62},・・・}
Thus, even if the criteria for each color are different, if we observe colors based on those criteria, the
probability of colors will match. In this case, we calculate the probability density function, the
Kullback–Leibler divergence is zero, and the observed colors can be considered equivalent in A and B.
Also, σadditive family: F contains an empty set. In the case of color, it can be regarded as not
feeling color - that is, not feeling color qualia. Considering this as a philosophical zombie state, the
framework of this proposal allows and encompasses philosophical zombies as elements. On the other
hand, in the probability space (Ω, F, P), since P (∅) = 0, the philosophical zombie can be an element,
but it can be interpreted that the probability of the philosophical zombie is zero in the public language.
This framework considers that defining public language avoids the philosophical zombie criticism of
physicalism.
In this paper, the causes of the differences that arise in qualia as a private language cannot be
identified, as in ordinary probability theory. The following two possibilities can be considered as qualia.
1) There is a "consciousness" that produces identical qualia－this is a dualistic position.
2) There are no qualia as a "universal" private language, only a public language derived from an
individual private language qualia. Individual qualia － as qualia as a private language,
encompassing inverted qualia, even those without qualia, such as philosophical zombies. Qualia
as a private language, like individual events in probability theory, cannot discuss differences
individually. However, public languages can be handled mathematically.
In the position of 1) above, we immediately face a "hard problem of consciousness." However, in the
position of 2), even if the mechanism by which differences in individual qualia occur cannot be grasped,
it is possible to define public language and perform mathematical operations by treating it as a
probability space and a random variable, as described above. Even though there are individual
intrinsic qualia - qualia as private language - public language is essential to the initial learning
process. In other words, for an infant to acquire a qualia of "red," it is essential that the public
language be provided by both parents and relatives and that learning be based on the recognition of
their equivalence. While the position that "public language" is mathematically definable and
computable is physicalist, it does not touch on qualia as a private language. This is the case in the
question of probability, even when a coin is tossed and a table appears, if the detailed process of the
initial conditions, the amount of force in the toss, etc. is followed by Newtonian mechanics, why the
table appears is perfectly possible. On the other hand, even if the details are skipped, it is like the
situation in which a mathematical deduction is possible using the event of a coin flip as a probability.
From the above discussion, I think it is possible to develop a physicalism that mathematically deduces,
at least for public languages, their nature - consciousness as a public language. The merit of this
introduction is, rather, obvious because it presupposes a comparison with a third party, but the public
language is capable of third-party measurement. Cases with inverted qualia, philosophy zombies, all
ascribe to the same public language. They can also tell green from red through public language - socalled color weakness. If this third party introduces measurable parameters and models
consciousness, a mathematically deductible theory should be constructed.
In summary, we believe that the qualia as a private language can define a public language by
observing the same events with each other and making them common - for example, in language, etc.
In this paper, we will proceed with the discussion by taking it as an axiom that this public language
can be defined. In this proposal, the generation of consciousness is considered to occur in the following
STEP -1 to STEP -4. The following sections describe each STEP.
3．Modeling of will and consciousness
In this paper, creation process of consciousness is classified into four steps. Namely, STEP-1:
Recognition by external perception, STEP-2: Connection with past episodic memory, STEP-3: Decision
making, STEP-4: Recognition by internal perception. Each step is explained below.
3.1 STEP-1: Expressions of 'recognition' by external perception and synthesis between individual
qualia - creation of episodes
In the Kullback–Leibler divergence defined from multiple functional spaces (Ω, F, Pi), if the
distance is zero, it can be defined in terms of individual official languages. Next, we describe a more
complex definition of official language. For example, combining individual official languages combining "white" and "dog" to create "white dog." The qualia of this combination can be expressed
naturally if one considers that the sample space, ohm, is the direct product of the sample space, ΩC,
for color and the sample space, ΩA, for animals: Ω=ΩC×ΩA.
In that case, the element of Ω would be [White, dog], [Black, cat] ・・・, etc. It is self-evident
that from this sample space, if we define, for example, a power set F = 2 Ω, we can generate a σ
additive family and its probability space.
Its mathematical definition is as follows:
Consider two probability spaces: (Ωj , Fj , Pj ) (j = 1,2). We define these Cartesian product
probability spaces (Ω, F, P) as follows:
a) We first define Ω as the direct product set of Ω1 and Ω2.
Ω ≡ Ω1 × Ω2 ≡ { (ω1, ω2)｜ω1 ∈ Ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω2 }
b) F is defined in stages as follows
1) C ≡ {A1 × A2｜A1 ∈ F1, A2 ∈ F2 }
2) A is the disjoint original finite sum of C.
3) F is the smallest σ-additive family containing A: i.e., F = σ(A).
c) Finally, the probability P is:
1) For the set of forms A1 × A2 (A1 ∈ F1, A2 ∈ F2）, P[A1 × A2] ≡ P[A1] ・P[A2] is defined.
2) The more general element of F (For example, a set of direct products of the form A1 × A2, or
an 'extreme' set because F is a σ-additive family, etc.) is extended and defined by imposing
σ-additivity on P. Namely, let P (A∪B) = P (A) + P (B), A ∩ B = ∅.
Furthermore, for example, if actions are expressed in gerund terms and rules are defined such as
"verb" →"adjective-1"→"adjective-2"→"object," ・・・ more complex qualia such as "running white
and big dog" can be generated, and conversion such as "White and big dog is running" can be easily
done. This processing creates an observation-based "episode" as a direct product of the current public
language. Episodes don't necessarily mean writing, but they include extracting only simple images
from actual observations, such as "dog" or "white," and compositing them into minimally simple
images. So, to speak, it is supposed to remove noise and extract only the "essential parts necessary"
and express them as internal sentences, images, sounds, tactile sensations, etc. This created episode
also has the character of a public language. Among the above episodes, a sentence episode is a
sentence episode, and an image episode is an image episode. If we think of them as being produced
individually in the speech and image areas, this representation offers suggestions for understanding
separate brains. It is said that the left side of the brain controls the language area, and the right side
controls the image area. If we split the corpus callosum that connects them, we can't create a direct
product of left-brain speech episodes and right-brain image episodes that are generated by
information from the left and right sides. In other words, it is impossible to create an episode that
integrates information from the left and right sides, and the left brain makes decisions by episodes of
the language area, while the right brain makes decisions by episodes of the image area. The proposed
expression can encompass the phenomenon that a person with a separated brain can draw a picture
of an object seen with his left eye but cannot explain it in words, and conversely, he can explain an
object seen with his right eye but cannot draw it.
The moment at which this external perceptual perception arises can be mathematically
represented as the difference in the average information entropy before and after episode creation.
Before recognition, the average information entropy is zero, since − ∑ 𝑃𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖 ) has a finite value,
whereas after recognition, it aggregates into one episode. It is natural to define this moment of change
from a finite value to zero as the moment of "recognition by external perception."
As described above, since episodes generated by combining individual official languages are
defined as a probability space, we believe it is possible to observe and confirm them by a third party
by introducing and comparing the Kullback–Leibler divergence DKL.
Finally, the technology for creating sentence episodes - so-called tags - from information such as
photos is already called annotation and has already been implemented in various applications
(Papadopoulos, Dim P., et al, 2017).
3.2 STEP-2: Associate Current Episodes with Past Episodes
It is assumed that episodes created based on past observations go through a short memory and
important ones are stored as episodic memories. Past episodic memory should also be represented as
a sample space as a direct product between the individual public languages mentioned above. We
think of this sample space as an accumulation of past experiences and a set with enormous elements.
Indeed, past episodic memories can be written out and compared by third parties.
In this section, we consider, in the past episode, the feelings and actions of experiences. Emotions are
also not individual feelings as a private language, but only feelings as a public language, as mentioned
above. In this paper, as a basis, we consider the sum of Plutchik's emotions (Plutchik, 1982). Plutchik
proposed that all emotions, like the tri primary RGB of light, are formed using eight basic emotions
(primary emotion, called pure emotion): joy, trust, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, and
expectation. For example, "love" as a secondary emotion is a mixture of "joy" and "trust," and
"curiosity" is a mixture of "trust" and "surprise", etc. If Ω = {Joy, Trust, Fear, Surprise, Sadness,
Disgust, Anger, Expectations} and the state of not feeling any emotion is an empty set, then it is
obvious that a probability space can be defined, as in the example of color, etc. It is also clear that this
probability space contains elements such as the above examples: {joy, trust}: love and {trust, surprise}:
curiosity. These emotional episodes are stored as episodic memories, in the form of sentences and
images. If the current observations provide a textual episode of "Walking white and big dog," we can
discuss the probability of each emotion occurring when we recognize "Walking white and big dog" in
the probability space. For example, joy: 0.5, fear: 0.2, disgust: 0.1, etc.
If the probability is non-zero, it can be addressed as past feelings related to the current episode.
In addition, emotion-related behaviors - such as running away from fear or approaching from joy can also be retrieved from past episodic memories. The sample space then becomes a representation
as a direct product of the sample space of emotions and the sample space of behavior. With this
operation, multiple episodes of feelings, experiences, etc. experienced in the past can be associated
with events from current observations. Consider that an episode with a non-zero probability is
recognized as relevant to the present and a past episode with a zero probability is not recognized.
In summary, for an episode of "running white dog", it is a probability space consisting of a sample
space of several probabilistic events: for example, in the past, emotional episodes such as "bitten,"
"barked", "enjoyed", and "cute", for "running white dog", etc. For a "running white dog", consider an
operation in which multiple high-probability items are selected from elements in the probability space.
"High probability" is the most "impressive" if it is captured with feelings. From this operation, by
relating episodes from current observations to past episodic memories, we can select multiple events
from past episodes that should occur in the future.
3.3 STEP-3: Modeling Decision-Making
One of the important roles of consciousness is thought to be related to survival. That is, how
should we act on the present event, then - i.e., the future - based on experience? From now on, the
"role" of consciousness will be to take out "past experiences" based on "present information" and
determine the next "future action." We believe that one of the simplest measures is to follow past
performance-successful experiences. In other words, as mentioned in the previous section, from past
episodic memory and current information, the "future" chooses what action to take. In STEP-2, there
are multiple past episodes related to the present observational event. The actual behavior of the
future shall be chosen entirely at random or in Markov chains from multiple past episodic memories
and the associated behavioral experiences - performance - i.e., by chance. This randomness is
determined by the physical state of the brain. For example, differences in the electrical potential
pulses of neurons, mistimed neurotransmitter release, etc. This is called "will," and based on it, actual
action is taken. This idea makes it possible to account for current and past episodic information, as
well as the creation of multiple alternatives from past episodic memory, and selection as a physical
phenomenon. There is no "free will" involved in this selection process, and the unconscious = physical
phenomena in the brain, including noise - selects at random. That is, this manipulation can be
explained in terms of physicalism. We consider a mathematical model of '' random will choice''. To do
this, we first consider "will" as an expectation. As mentioned above, the framework of this proposal is
that the choice of action - the will - for the future is made randomly from the sample space of the past
qualia. The choice is chosen from the probability space of the past episode. The probability space is
accompanied by expectations. When we say "will", we mean our own choice. In other words, if the
reality is to be done stochastically, the object must have said "will" to the expected value from the
probability space. First, we focus on will as an expectation, and for modeling purposes, we define the
"hypothetical dynamics" of will. We think of volition as the process of changing the initial state
probability space to create a new state probability space. First, we define position x as the Kullback–
Leibler divergence DKL between the probability space representing the initial state and the future
probability space realized by the will. This distance is not limited to the Kullback–Leibler divergence,
but may be any other distance. We believe that DKL is a measure of the difference between probability
distributions, and if we follow its time change, it can be perceived as a change in position in normal
dynamics. In addition, the time derivative of x corresponds to velocity and can be interpreted as the
speed of change in the probability distribution, and the second derivative of time can also be
considered as acceleration α. Furthermore, consider, perhaps intuitively, the "inertia" of the will.
There is a lag in remembering when we must remember something and act on it. We will call this
degree of slow speed "inertia" and that degree the mass m of decision making. The speed and
acceleration defined above are the processing speed to the decision after the recall, and are considered
as independent parameters of m. In this paper, we consider decision making as a selection from past
behavioral information from past episodic memory, and the acceleration α, mass m defined above
should be closely connected to past episodic memory. Then, again in analogy to dynamics, we define
the potential V of past episodic memory as a function to satisfy:
𝜕𝑉
5)
− 𝜕𝑥 = 𝑚𝛼
Now let us assume that m×α represents a force in ordinary dynamics, but within Equation 5), we
understand it as a relation defining the potential V, and there is no further meaning. It is natural to
think that past episodic memory influences the speed and acceleration of the will and introduces
potential as an indicator. All the above definitions of hypothetical dynamics are for will as expectation.
In contrast, we think that in actual decision making, randomness is added by the state of the brain the state of neurons, etc. That is, in Brownian motion, the same image as fine particles being shaken
by surrounding liquid molecules. In fact, the velocity of Brownian moving particles varies randomly,
so that dx/dt cannot be defined for each instant. Similarly, in decisions involving randomness that is
not an expectation, it is impossible to define such things as speed as the expectation mentioned above.
Therefore, we define the time variation of position x as follows.
𝑥(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝑥(𝑡) = 𝑏(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑡)∆𝑡 + 𝑤(𝑡 + ∆𝑡) − 𝑤(𝑡)
6)
where w(t) is the Wiener process. This represents that the time variation of the Kullback–Leibler
divergence changes under the influence of the Wiener process. Based on 6), consider calculating the
velocity and acceleration in decision making as expected values. So, when there is a random variable
f (t) that generally depends on time t, its < forward mean derivative > is defined below.
𝑓(𝑡+∆𝑡)−𝑓(𝑡)
𝐷[𝑓(𝑡)] ≡ lim ⟨
∆𝑡
∆𝑡→0
|𝑓(𝑠) (𝑠 ≤ 𝑡) ⟩
7)
The < | > on the right-hand side represents the conditional time average that f (s) before t is fixed. In
this 6), the forward average differential coefficient of x (t) is obtained as follows:
𝐷[𝑓(𝑡)] ≡ 𝑏(𝑥(𝑡), 𝑡)
8)
Next, < Backward mean derivative > is defined below.
𝑓(𝑡)−𝑓(𝑡−∆𝑡)
𝐷∗ [𝑓(𝑡)] ≡ lim ⟨
∆𝑡→0
∆𝑡
|𝑓(𝑠) (𝑠 ≤ 𝑡) ⟩
Using Eq. 9) to determine the backward-facing mean derivative of x (t), we obtain:
𝐷∗ [𝑓(𝑡)] ≡ 𝑏∗ (𝑥(𝑡), 𝑡)
Using this b*, we obtain:
𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑥(𝑡 − ∆𝑡) ≡ 𝑏∗ (𝑥(𝑡), 𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡) − 𝑤(𝑡 − ∆𝑡)
The acceleration α at the expected value is then defined below.
1
𝛼(𝑡) = 2 (𝐷∗ 𝐷 + 𝐷𝐷∗ )𝑥(𝑡)
9)
10)
11)
12)
Calculating the right-hand second term DD * of the above equation, we obtain:
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑏
𝜈 𝜕2 𝑏
13)
𝜕𝑏
𝜕𝑏
𝜈 𝜕2𝑏
14)
𝐷𝐷∗ 𝑥(𝑡) = 𝜕𝑡∗ + 𝑏 𝜕𝑥∗ + 2 𝜕𝑥 2∗
Similarly, D*D is:
𝐷∗ 𝐷𝑥(𝑡) = 𝜕𝑡 + 𝑏∗ 𝜕𝑥∗ + 2 𝜕𝑥 2
Next, the following variables are introduced:
1
1
𝑢 = 2 (𝑏 − 𝑏∗ ), 𝑣 = 2 (𝑏 + 𝑏∗ )
15)
Using this, the expected acceleration α is:
𝜈 𝜕2 𝑢
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑣
𝛼 = 2 𝜕𝑥 2 − 𝑣 𝜕𝑥 + 𝑢 𝜕𝑥 + 𝜕𝑡
16)
Applying 5) to this α, we obtain the following relation:
𝜈 𝜕2𝑢
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑣
1 𝜕𝑉
= 2 𝜕𝑥 2 − 𝑣 𝜕𝑥 + 𝑢 𝜕𝑥 − 𝑚 𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑡
17)
If the above definitions are allowed, the theory that E. Nelson tried to explain the governing equations
of quantum mechanics based on the Wiener process is applicable as is. A summary of the derivation
process is provided in Appendix. Only the conclusions of the governing equations of the probabilistic
process of will obtained since the above assumptions are shown below.
𝜕𝜓
𝜈2 𝜕2 𝜓
1
𝑖𝜈 𝜕𝑡 = [− 2 𝜕𝑥 2 + 𝑚 𝑉] 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)
18)
The ψcorresponds to the wave function of quantum mechanics, which shows that the 'decision' is
stochastic and is connected with the distribution function ρ(x, t) in the case of settling into one state
by:
𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡) = ⌈𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)⌉2
19)
John Duffy and Ted Loch-Temzelides carried out experiments on decision making that
correspond to the double slit in quantum mechanics and observed that decision making also has
particle and wave duality (John Duffy and Ted Loch-Temzelides, 2021). The results of this experiment
should be further examined and discussed, but since the model of decision making in this proposal is
identical to the Schrodinger equation, it is concluded that the experiment of John Duffy and Ted LochTemzelides can be directed by Eq. 18). And the values and functions of the parameter m and potential
V are unknown, but might be determined by comparison with the experiments of John Duffy and Ted
Loch-Temzelides.
3.4 STEP-4: Recognizing with Internal Perception - Modeling Consciousness
In STEP-3 of the previous section, it is assumed that the actual action is done "unconsciously"
and that the person observes an episode (a sentence or an image) created from the action result, which
can be called "introspection”. That observation, as described above, creates a current episode
associated with one's own behavior (called recognition) and is remembered as a short-term memory.
Think of it as a moment when recalling becomes possible - when information can be extracted from
short-term memory. Let this moment be "the moment when consciousness comes to recognize that
one has acted". This suggests that the "time of onset" of consciousness lags actual behavior. If this
process of "will" and "generation of consciousness" were to take place in an extremely short time, one
would not be aware of the two processes and would recognize that the actual "consciousness" had
decided. This interpretation resolves the following:
1) The brain must be governed only by physical phenomena, and we do not know why
"consciousness," which is not a physical phenomenon, can alter physical phenomena.
2)
The existence of "free will" by B. Rivet, which seems to deny free will (B. Rivet, 1983).
As mentioned above, in this proposal, the "will" associated with the "present episode" and the
related "past episodic memory" is randomly selected, which is consistent with what is done in the
physical phenomena of the brain - i.e., consciousness does not change the brain's choice. What to
choose from among the choices is purely accidental. If we consider the moment of "doing" the action
according to the will and "recognizing the action" as a summary of it as the generation of
consciousness, it does not contradict the above tasks 1) and 2). In particular, the smaller the time
difference between action and recognition, the more likely it is that people will recognize that they
made their own decisions. Experiments with B. Rivet estimate this time difference to be around 0.3
seconds. In addition, if they act according to their memories of past episodes, they should generally
evaluate their perceived "will" as a correct judgment. This current information - obtaining information
as a combination of public languages→extracting the "will for the future" from the collation with past
episodes → selecting actual actions at random from the "will" from multiple past episodes →
identifying the "recognition" and "memory" by confirming the results of the actions as "consciousness".
This process is supposed to be continuous with respect to time, so that continuity of consciousness
appears. The moment of birth of this internal perceptual recognition can also be expressed
mathematically as the difference between the average information entropy before and after
confirmation. Before confirmation, the average information entropy is zero, because it aggregates into
a single episode, whereas before confirmation, − ∑ 𝑃𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑃𝑖 ) has a finite value. It is natural to define
this moment of change from a finite value to zero as the moment of "recognition by internal
perception".
Consider the role of consciousness in this case. Consciousness makes no contribution to current
behavior, but new episodic memories created from current behavior may work effectively for future
behavior. In other words, more episodic memory = more options for the future, such as making up for
the shortfall in existing episodic memory or strengthening specific memories from existing episodic
memory. This allows us to make better choices. In that sense, consciousness does not have free will to
act in the present, but it does have more freedom to change the future in the sense that it "gives us
more options" regarding actions in the future. This is not against physicalism, as consciousness does
not influence physics, but rather determines future behavior through the information of episodic
memory. That is, the idea in this proposal is that memory mediates between consciousness and
physics, which are non-physical.
3.5
Explained by Toy Model
STEP-1 to STEP-4 above is explained with a simple Toy Model. For example, consider two colors,
white and black, and dogs and cats as animals. If the sample space for color is . ΩColor = [White, Black]
and the sample space for animal is ΩAnimal = [Dog, cat], the sample space of the direct product is
ΩColor×Animal = [{White, dog}, {White, cat}, {Black, Dog}, {Black, Cat}]. Since there are 4 elements, the
set F=[∅, [{White, dog}], [{White, Cat],..., ΩColor×Animal], which should have 4 elements, has 24 = 16
elements. Consider the probability space(ΩColor×Animal, F, P) that will be created. Each observer has a
1/4 chance of identifying the correct animal. If we observe an actual white dog and recognize it as a
"white dog" (creating an episode as a sentence or image), the probability of being a "white dog" at that
moment is 1. We consider this in terms of mean information entropy. The mean information entropy
H(X) is defined below.
H(𝑋) = − ∑𝑀
20)
𝑖=1 𝑝𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑝𝑖 )
where X is the random variable, pi is the probability that event i will materialize, and M is the number
of events. We calculate the change in the average information entropy before and after the observation.
1
1
Before observation：𝐻(𝑋) = − 4 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (4) × 4 = 2
After observation：𝐻(𝑋) = −1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1) = 0
From this, the observation changes the average information entropy from 2 to 0. The above is STEP1. The moment when the average information entropy changes is regarded as the moment of
"recognition" and the expression of "consciousness" by outside observation. Next, when observed in
STEP-1 and recognized as a "white dog," the episodic memory associated with the white dog is recalled.
Here, as a sample space, we consider the eight basic emotions of Plutchik introduced above. Namely,
ΩEmotion=[ Joy, Trust, Fear, Surprise, Sadness, Disgust, Anger, Expectations]. The probability of each
emotion produced by the recognition of a "white dog" is defined as PJoy to P Expectations. This is STEP-2.
Which of these will be realized (selected) depends on the physical state of the brain, noise, randomness,
and according to Eq. 18). Hence, "free will" is not reflected in the choice. This becomes STEP-3. Finally,
this choice is evaluated as an episode and short-term memory, or more importantly, episodic memory.
Again, as in STEP-1 above, there is a change in the average information entropy before and after
selection.
Before obserbation：𝐻(𝑋) = −[𝑃𝐽𝑜𝑦 𝑙𝑜𝑔2(𝑃𝐽𝑜𝑦 ) + 𝑃𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑃𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡 ) + ⋯ + 𝑃Exp 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (𝑃Exp )]
After obserbation：𝐻(𝑋) = −1 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 (1) = 0
This becomes STEP-4. In this case, too, from the point of view of information entropy, the moment of
the birth of consciousness can be regarded as the moment when the average information entropy goes
from a finite value to zero. This is because the moment when the mean information entropy goes from
finite to zero is a distinct discontinuity point. In this case, we considered an episodic memory of the
emotion that occurs when we see a white dog, but in fact we choose future behavior in conjunction
with, for example, the behavior associated with "fear", such as escaping from the dog. This completes
the sequence of 1. recognition and episodeization of the object of observation, 2. recall of the relevant
past episodic memory, 3. random selection from the past episodic memory, 4. recognition by
episodeization of the selection. In this proposal, this whole process is considered as "creation of
consciousness" and the moment of recognition by two episodic episodes of observation and selection is
considered as "birth moment of consciousness." The above is summarized in Fig. 4. If a third party
looked at this process - indeed, the reactions and actions of the person who saw the "white dog" - the
subject would clearly perceive that he acted with a will and could ask why. The subject will respond
that he or she has acted on his or her own volition, such as escape, based on past experiences. I think
it is fair to say that this is consciousness arising from the assembly-episodic memory of a public
language. This proposal assumes a common official language by comparison with the third person, so
it is a model of consciousness that assumes the second or third person, not the first person. Therefore,
the position is that consciousness exists in oneself because one feels conscious in others.
Next, the way of thinking about the mind-body problem in this proposal is considered. There are three
main ways of thinking about mind-body problems:
1) Interactionism
: The idea that there are two very different kinds of things in the world, the mental and the
material (dualism), and that they interact. The idea is that substances in the brain can be
influenced by the world of consciousness and behave differently from the laws of physics (Fig. 4a).
2) Epiphenomenalism
: This theory is physicalism, with the position that consciousness and qualia are only phenomena
attached to the physical state of matter and have no causal effect on matter (Fig. 4b).
3) Parallelism
: This theory holds that the world is one in which consciousness and physics are two very different
things, and the two proceed in parallel without interaction. This is the so-called position of
dualism (Fig. 4c).
The proposal is a mixture of 1) and 2) (Fig. 4d). Consciousness does not directly affect the physics in
the brain. However, consciousness can influence "future" brain choices through memory. As
mentioned above, consciousness in this proposal is an operation in which the 'action physically
determined by the brain' is made into an episode and left as an episodic memory for the future. The
present will be determined before consciousness occurs, so it does not reflect the present. However,
the increased choice of episodic memory indirectly affects future activity. In other words, stored
information links consciousness (which appears to be non-physical) with physics. If we apply the word
"free will," it means more options for the future, not for the present. The proposed idea can also be
seen as an evolutionary system of "reflexes" in which we act directly in response to stimuli without
involving the brain. Whereas the stimuli in the reflex are limited, the brain accumulates the episodes
it experiences, thereby allowing it to respond to more flexible stimuli. In other words, while reflexes
limit stimuli, "consciousness" in this proposal means that stimuli can be rewritten. It seems natural
to the author to think that consciousness was acquired in this process of expanding from limitation
to generalization.
4．Discussions and Conclusions
The features of the proposed modeling of consciousness generation are as follows.
1) Qualia as a private language is unrecognizable. On the other hand, by introducing a
probability space and a random variable for an event consisting of qualia, a public
language can be defined by the Kullback–Leibler divergence to the probability space of
multiple observers.
2) The family F of events in the probability space contains an empty set, which can be
regarded as a philosophical zombie. But in official language, the probability is zero. In
other words, it can be said that philosophical zombies are possible, but the probability of
them being zero is the public language.
3) Episodes that combine multiple official languages are the direct product of the probability
space of each qualia, and similarly can be discussed in the probability space.
4) Episodic memories created in the past that remain are also probability spaces.
5) Create the most likely future (episodes) from observation-based episodes and episodic
memories. In addition, multiple choices are made from "episodic memory" for coping with
the future.
6) One of the above options for the future is chosen at random and executed "unconsciously."
Randomness simply depends on the state of physical phenomena in the brain. The process
up to this point is purely physicalism.
7) 6)conduct 1) - 3) above as an observation result, and the point at which an episode of an
action is generated and stored in short-term memory - a point at which it can be recalled
at any time - is defined as the "moment when consciousness is born." Important memories
are moved from short-term memory to episodic memory.
8) 1) to 7) are time continuous, and in that sense consciousness is also time continuous.
We believe that these 1) to 8) flows can create models of consciousness based on mathematically
definable public languages. We consider a comparison between our proposal and integrated
information theory by Tononi. Integrated information theory is a position where qualia exists as a
private language. We turn a blind eye to the hard problem of consciousness and, given the existence
of consciousness, we construct a theory with axioms concerning its' information ',' integration ','
structure 'and' exclusion '. Then, the integrated information theorem, Φ is introduced, and the level
FIG. 3: Flow of creating consciousness in this proposal
(M: Mind, P: Physics, Me: Memory)
FIG. 4: Comparison of ways of perceiving mind-body problems
of consciousness is quantitatively evaluated by the magnitude of the value of Φ . According to
integrated information theory, a digital camera, for example, has a huge amount of information
depending on the pixels, but because the information is not integrated, the position is that we cannot
have the visual awareness that we wait for. As mentioned above, since integrated information theory
targets individual consciousness, it cannot be directly compared with ideas that assume public
language such as this proposal. According to this proposal base, if we interpret the example of a digital
camera, the digital camera cannot construct current episodes from the shooting information, nor does
it have past episodes. So, it doesn't make comparisons between current episodes and past episodes,
or even future behavioral episodes. Furthermore, they don't have the "inside view" of their chosen
future. Therefore, digital cameras must be unconscious.
Next, as another philosophical topic, we will consider, through this proposal, the "Mary's Room,"
which is a counterargument to the physicalism advocated by F. Jackson (Jackson, Frank, 1982). The
contents of "Mary's Room" are as follows. Mary, a brilliant scholar, has spent her life in black-andwhite rooms since birth, gaining knowledge only in the black-and-white medium, and by nature has
never been exposed to actual color. But they understand all the information about color and vision the structure of the eye, the color is made up of RGB combinations, every object has a color, they fully
understand that color as an RGB value, etc. Does this Mary learn anything new about vision when
she goes out for the first time and is exposed to real colors? This is the question in this issue. The
position of this proposal is that the qualia as a private language, and the public language should be
clearly classified, and that the qualia as a private language cannot be measured while the public
language can be measured. According to this, Mary would have learned exactly the "public language"
mentioned in this proposal, so she would have learned nothing by touching actual colors. Of course,
we believe that she may "feel" qualia as a private language when she touches color for the first time,
but this proposal does not cover qualia as a private language, so she cannot get no learning in public
language more than her own learning.
Next, brain waves are observed in brain cells cultured in the test tube - does consciousness reside
in the so-called test tube brain? The premise of this proposal is that a public language formed by
consensus among multiple observers is essential. In contrast, the test-tube brain has no means of
observation and, by "appearance," cannot compare itself to others. Therefore, it is obvious that they
cannot create and share official languages, and in that sense, they cannot have episodic memories
that can be 'introspected', and therefore they will not have consciousness.
When a public language is defined in probability space, episodes, episodic memories, etc. that
combine it can be defined without contradiction, and within that framework, consciousness can be
understood as physicalism. They seem to dodge criticisms of physicalism: philosophical zombies,
segregated brains, Mary's Room. As such, we believe that this proposal is both a self-fulfilling
framework and a consistent explanation for the effects of consciousness we experience daily.
Considering the above, this paper is not " Cogito ergo sum-I think, therefore I am" but "To feel a
common self in the other person, therefore I am" because it considers consciousness as a public
language. Also, the framework of this proposal may be sufficiently realized as software.
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Appendix－Derivation of the governing equation of decision making
The following summarizes the formulation by E. Nelson. The formulation was based on the
description by H. Ezawa (E. Ezawa, 1983). First, the following Fokker-Planck equation is used.
𝜕
𝜕
𝜈 𝜕2
[𝜕𝑡 + 𝜕𝑥 𝑏(𝑥, 𝑡) − 2 𝜕𝑥 2 ] 𝜌(𝑥0 , 𝑡0|𝑥, 𝑡) = 0
A.1)
Where, t is time, x is defined as Kullback–Leibler divergence. The second term on the left hand side
has the following meanings:
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
[𝑏(𝑥, 𝑡)𝜌]
A.2)
Here, since no transition can occur without time, at t = t0 the following is satisfied, which is the initial
condition:
𝜌(𝑥0 , 𝑡0|𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝛿(𝑥 − 𝑥0 )
A.3)
Moreover, ρ satisfies the following conditions.
A.4)
∫ 𝜌(𝑥0 , 𝑡0|𝑥, 𝑡) 𝑑𝑥 = 1
In Eq. 5), the equation with time reversed is as follows:
𝜕
𝜈 𝜕2
𝜕
A.5)
[− 𝜕𝑡 + 𝜕𝑥 𝑏∗ (𝑥, 𝑡) + 2 𝜕𝑥 2 ] 𝜌 = 0
By summing A.1) and A.3), we obtain:
𝜕2
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
A.6)
[−(𝑏 − 𝑏∗ ) + 𝜈 𝜕𝑥 2 ] 𝜌 = 0
This indicates that the values in [ ] are independent of x. Consider introducing the following u, v.
1
1
2
2
A.7)
𝑢 = (𝑏 − 𝑏∗ ), 𝑣 = (𝑏 + 𝑏∗ )
Using the findings from A.6) and A.7), we obtain the following:
𝑢=
𝜈 1 𝜕𝜌
2 𝜌 𝜕𝑥
=
𝜈 𝜕
A.8)
𝑙𝑛(𝜌)
2 𝜕𝑥
Further, replacing A.1) and A.5) with the expression of v yields:
𝜕𝜌
𝜕𝑡
𝜕
A.9)
+ 𝜕𝑥 (𝑣𝜌) = 0
Erasing ρ using A.8) and A.9) yields the following equation for only u, v:
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑡
=−
𝜈 𝜕2 𝑣
2 𝜕𝑥 2
𝜕
−
𝜕𝑥
A.10)
(𝑢𝑣)
Eq. 17) in the text and A. 10) are written together as follows:
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑡
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑡
𝜈 𝜕2𝑢
=
2 𝜕𝑥 2
−𝑣
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑥
𝜈 𝜕2 𝑣
+𝑢
𝜕𝑣
𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑢
−
1 𝜕𝑉
A.11)
𝑚 𝜕𝑥
𝜕𝑣
A.12)
= − 2 𝜕𝑥 2 − 𝑣 𝜕𝑥 − 𝑢 𝜕𝑥
We define the function χ below.
𝜒(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝑢(𝑥, 𝑡) + 𝑖𝑣(𝑥, 𝑡)
where i is an imaginary unit. Using this χ, A. 12) and A. 13) are unified as follows:
−
𝜕𝜒
=
𝜕𝑡
𝜈 𝜕2𝜒
2 𝜕𝑥 2
+
1 𝜕2 𝜒
2 𝜕𝑥 2
−
1 𝜕𝑉
A.13)
A.14)
𝑚 𝜕𝑥
In addition, the following transformations are performed.
𝜈 1 𝜕𝜓
𝜈 𝜕
A.15)
𝜒 = 2 𝛹 𝜕𝑥 = 2 𝜕𝑥 𝑙𝑛(𝛹)
The characteristics of this transformation are described below.
a) time derivative of equation A. 15):
𝜕𝜒
𝜕 𝜕
𝜕
1 𝜕𝛹
−𝑖 𝜕𝑥 = −𝑖𝜈 𝜕𝑥 𝜕𝑡 𝑙𝑛(𝛹) = −𝑖𝜈 𝜕𝑥 (𝛹 𝜕𝑡 )
A.16)
b) spatial derivative of equation A. 15):
𝜕𝜒
𝜈2
𝜕𝜓 2
𝜈2 𝜕2𝜓
𝜈 𝜕𝑥 = − 𝛹 2 ( 𝜕𝑥 ) + 𝛹 𝜕𝑥 2
A.17)
Taking advantage of the fact that the first term on the right-hand side is -χ2, further differentiation
yields:
𝜈 𝜕2 𝜓
2 𝜕𝑥 2
1 𝜕𝜒2
𝜈2 𝜕
1 𝜕2 𝜓
+ 2 𝜕𝑥 = 2 𝜕𝑥 [𝛹 𝜕𝑥 2 ]
A.18)
Substituting A. 16), A. 17) for A. 14) yields:
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
1 𝜕𝛹
𝜈2 1 𝜕2𝛹
1
[𝑖𝜈 𝛹 𝜕𝑡 + 2 𝛹 𝜕𝑥 2 − 𝑚 𝑉] = 0
A.19)
Since this expression means that the values in [ ] are independent of the space x, we put it equal to
the time-only function, η(t). Then we get:
𝑖𝜈
𝜕𝛹
𝜕𝑡
= [−
𝜈2 𝜕2𝛹
2 𝜕𝑥 2
+
1
𝑚
𝑉 + 𝜂] 𝛹
A.20)
Furthermore, we transform Ψusing ψ and η as follows:
𝑖
𝛹(𝑥, 𝑡) = 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)𝑒𝑥𝑝 (− ∫ 𝜂(𝑠)𝑑𝑠)
𝜈
A.21)
In this transformation, η(t) is removed and finally becomes an equation of only Ψ below.
𝜈2 𝜕2 𝜓
𝜕𝜓
1
𝑖𝜈 𝜕𝑡 = [− 2 𝜕𝑥 2 + 𝑚 𝑉] 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)
A.22)
This becomes the governing equation that determines the ultimate "will."
𝜕
𝜒 = 𝜈 𝜕𝑥 𝑙𝑛(𝜓)
A.23)
Next, the relation between the distribution functionρ(x, t) and the function Ψ(x, t) is obtained when
the 'intention' settles into one. First, from 19) and 25), we obtain:
𝜈 𝜕
2 𝜕𝑥
1
𝑙𝑛(𝜌) = 2 (𝜒 + 𝜒 ∗ )
A.24)
where χ* is the complex conjugate of χ. Therefore,
𝜕
𝜕𝑥
[𝑙𝑛(𝜌) − 𝑙𝑛⌈𝜓⌉2 ] = 0
𝑙𝑛(𝜌) = 𝑙𝑛⌈𝜓⌉2, ∴ 𝜌(𝑥, 𝑡) = ⌈𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)⌉2
A.25)
A.26) |
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Op-Ed
The Nature of Ultimate Reality &
Recipe of Consciousness for Transformation
Pradeep B. Deshpande*,1
*
Professor Emeritus of Chemical Engineering, Univ. of Louisville, & Six Sigma & Advanced Controls, Inc.,
Louisville, KY 40222 USA
Abstract
Understanding the nature of ultimate reality is the basis for a better World. Adding thoughts,
intentions, and emotions to this understanding, we will have the complete recipe of
consciousness for transformation.
Keywords: Nature, ultimate reality, recipe, Consciousness, transformation.
If you wish to understand the Universe, think of energy, frequency and vibrations.
Nicola Tesla
Yesterday was the 23rd of June 2014 and this body is 71 ½ years old. I had awakened at 4:00 in
the morning to add some material to this article which had come to me overnight. I worked on it
till 5:30 am and went back to bed still unsure if I would submit the article for publication, and if
so, where. In the morning when I finally got up and came downstairs, I was met with a
frightening Headline in the local newspaper, ‘Iraq may turn into terrorist staging ground, Obama
warns’. And the Wall Street Journal carried a column on its Op Ed pages, Race has a biological
basis, racism does not. The day brought more bad news this time on NPR; Thirty nine Indian
nurses continued to be held hostage in Iraq and more girls were abducted in Nigeria. Then, I
made up my mind; I must complete the column and try to get it published!
Lack of understanding and appreciation of the nature of ultimate reality is what creates such
problems and more; it landed us in Iraq in the first place and now a trillion dollars later, we find
ourselves confronted with an impossible dammed-if-you-do dammed-if-you-don’t situation.
There is plenty of blame to go around beginning with our individual selves so let us not engage
in finger-pointing but rather improve our understanding of the mystery of the universe and the
mystery of life and thank the Jewish teenager from Brooklyn now in her early thirties, an
eminent physicist turned medical doctor from Oregon now in his early sixties, together with the
past and present seers for showing that this is now possible. I remember one of Mahatma
Gandhi’s quotes, ‘Be the change you wish to see in the world’. So this article is all about how
this young lady with the help of renowned physicists discovered the ultimate reality, how an
eminent physicist turned medical doctor linked it to cosmic (Brahmanic) consciousness
1
Correspondence: Prof. Pradeep B. Deshpande, Six Sigma & advanced Controls, Inc., 1209 Holsworth Lane, Louisville,
KY 40222, http://www.sixsigmaquality.com E-mail: pradeep@sixsigmaquality.com
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discovering the nature of ultimate reality, and how all this has profound implications for
humanity, which I have uncovered after a scrutiny of four decades.
Journey backwards to one evening in 1995 when UPenn Radiologist Warren Gefter is with his
rebellious fifteen-year old daughter Amanda Gefter dining at the House of Hunan in Ardmore,
PA just west of Philadelphia, when he asks her a question, ‘What is nothing’ (No Thing)? In her
path-breaking book, Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn (Banton Books, 2014), Amanda, now a
journalist, concedes she was a class-cutting fifteen year-old, pretty much like any typical teen
sometimes cutting classes, sleeping through classes, etc., was taken aback. Our two boys now big
wigs in finance would have been taken aback too. The first day our son got his driver’s license
and was driving home from high school, he had a wreck. My wife has a sign in our kitchen,
‘Grandchildren are the reward for not strangling your teenagers’ and we are blessed with six.
Just yesterday our oldest grandson, Rohan, which his parents didn’t know mean Krishna, texted
me a message, ‘we miss you too Aajoba’.
Anyway, Amanda responds, may be the absence of everything, why do you ask? Warren says
something to the effect, that just might hold the secret to the mystery of the beginning of the
universe; beginning of everything. Next, how does nothing become something? Answer,
nothing becomes something in the presence of a boundary. Just like the sand on a
beach, same everywhere until you the observer build a sandcastle creating the
boundary. By her own account, now her interest is kindled and she smiles. The question itself is
not something a typical American dad would ask; I have lived here for over fifty years. Warren’s
younger days as a Zen Buddhist hippie might have something to do it. It is the type of question
young Prince Siddhartha Gautama must have asked, eventually prompting him to leave the
comforts of their royal palace in search for answers.
Coming back to the Gefter’s, Amanda asks, so how do we find out? The father responds, well,
let’s do a little research. Americans as they are, completely rational minded conclude that this
seemed like a physics problem so they decide they needed to converse with world-renowned
physicists. The inquiring minds in India would go into meditation in search for the answers to
such questions and have actually found them experientially throughout the ages. Both reveal
gems of wisdom; the former reveals the best of the best a rational mind can fathom while the
latter reveals things you can’t read in any books.
Some years later the Gefter’s find out that there was to be a ‘Science and Ultimate Reality’
Conference at Princeton during March 15-16, 2002 to honor the renowned Princeton physicist
John Archibald Wheeler who was approaching his 91st birthday and they decide to crash in.
Wheeler had completed his doctorate in Copenhagen under renowned Danish Physicist Niels
Bohr and was an associate of Albert Einstein at Princeton. The conference was going to celebrate
Wheeler's drive to address overarching questions in physics, which sometimes bordered on the
philosophical; the origin of matter, information, universe, and so on. But how to crash in? At the
time Amanda was working for a bridal publication in New York called Manhattan Magazine.
Somehow, she manages to get a couple of press passes and they wind up attending the
conference eventually getting an opportunity to meet Dr. Wheeler himself. When they do,
Warren asks him, “If observers create reality, where do observers come from?” Wheeler,
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responds, “I like to say, from Physics, from the universe. The universe is a self-excited circuit”.
Warren says, so, it’s all from nothing? And Wheeler nods! Later that day, the Gefter’s visit 212
Mercer, Einstein’s home, and Amanda says to her father, who is he (Wheeler), Yoda? But of
course, Yoda (YOga, veDA) has always known the answer.
Before the universe, there was nothing. Something, the universe, came out of nothing at the Big
Bang moment. Therefore the universe can also vanish into nothing. And so the profound
question, what is ultimately real, i. e. what the ultimate reality is? The Wheeler response
strengthened their resolve to uncover the mystery.
Over the ensuing fifteen years or so, Amanda manages to talk to a host of world-renowned
physicists, exchanges emails with Stephen Hawking, digs into relativity theory, quantum
mechanics, inflationary cosmology, and particle physics, interacting with her father all the while,
finally reaching the mind-blowing conclusion, “The Ultimate Reality is the Nothingness of the
Void”, a condition when the size of the universe was the size of Planck’s length (10-33 cm in
diameter) some fifteen billion years ago at the moment of the Big Bang. But as the verse 10.130,
Nasadiya Sukta of the most ancient human manuscript, Rig Veda suggests, the seers had already
known it (Dr. Bhavsar tells me Nasadiya means that which neither exists, nor not exists; Sukta
means hymn).
How did the Vedic seers know this? What sources would they have consulted to discover it?
Perhaps none: just connect to the cosmic consciousness and the answers to all our questions are
there to download. If I am fortunate enough to meet Amanda someday, I would tell her,
‘Amanda, you are a blessed soul; with the help of your beloved dad and the eminent physicists,
you decoded an important mystery of the universe. What happened in your life may not be just a
series of Eureka moments but you may have unknowingly succeeded in connecting to Indra’s
Net of Mahayana Buddhism, the abode of cosmic consciousness. There is no such thing as a
coincidence. Behind every coincidence, there is a purpose, a message. May you have a long,
healthy, and prosperous life for there are more things to download and experientially discover
that the nature of the ultimate reality cannot be anything else but cosmic consciousness.
Physicists might not be able to help you any more in this journey.
James Kowall has already done that and he credits his discovery to the inspiration and wisdom of
self-realized Yogi Nisarga Datta and his classic, I Am That. Jim hails from suburban Eugene
Oregon and holds a doctorate in theoretical physics from Brown, an MD from Miami and is
board-certified in neurology and internal medicine. He is teaching me modern physics and I am
most fortunate to have him for a teacher, but I am afraid he has found a not so bright a student in
me; I keep asking some pretty dumb questions; how do you collapse two straight lines of
different slopes onto a single straight line; how can we crumple up the paper just right so the
curved line drawn on the paper matches up with that straight line as Warren had shown Amanda,
and where are all the simultaneously live and dead cats. All this so there will not be different
versions and perspectives of the ultimate reality.
At least I am a chemical engineer who also has an undergraduate degree in physics, although I
have never had a course in modern physics but Amanda had never taken a course in physics,
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period. Digging deep into Amanda’s work, Jim recognizes that the condition of the void,
something called singularity, is reached in a falling frame of reference where all the fundamental
gauge (fictitious) forces (gravity, electromagnetism, strong and weak nuclear forces) vanish
leaving behind nothing, not a thing; a condition where both relativity theory and quantum
mechanics blow up, and it is beyond the reach of equations and scientific theories. He knows too
that nothing physical can free fall through something the size of Planck’s length. Says Kowall,
logician Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems prove that cosmic consciousness that knows
about the consistency of the rules, cannot itself emerge from any mechanism obeying a consistent
set of rules. Incompleteness is a consequence of the measurement of a finite amount of
information. No such finite measurement can ever prove the consistency of the rules, and yet
consciousness knows about the consistency of the rules.’ He thus reaches an equally mindblowing conclusion, ‘The nature of ultimate reality cannot be anything else but cosmic
(Brahmanic) consciousness”!
In Amanda’s language, nothing becomes something in the presence of a boundary. Upanishads
describe nothing as Nirakar (without form or shape), that which is as unfathomable, limitless,
attribute-less, unchanging, and eternal. From Nirakar emerges Sakar, creation (Amanda’s
something) when Shiva and Shakti enjoin. Sakar is always bound by the three Gunas (Sattva,
Rajas, and Tamas) but Nirakar is not. In Amanda’s language, who creates the boundary?
Observers. And where do observers come from? From the nothingness itself. This appears to be
circular logic but this is the best we know as of now. Why should the Nothingness suddenly
decide to produce Amanda’s boundary some 14 billion years ago at the moment of the Big Bang
event? Or, why did Shiva decide to enjoin Shakti at moment of creation? The final verses of
Nasadiya Sukta give us a clue,
Whence all creation had its origin,
whether he fashioned it or whether he did not,
he, who surveys it all from highest heaven, he knows –
or maybe even he does not know.
On the other hand if we take the formation (Big Bang), sustenance, and destruction of the
universe (Big Crunch) as a cyclical process as the Vedic wisdom (Brahma-VishnuMahesh)/Chinese wisdom (Yin-Yang) also suggest, there is no mystery.
We human beings are Sakar each with a unique S, R, T level of consciousness. To experience
Nirakar, it is necessary to transcend the three Gunas and with the experience comes the
knowledge “Who I am” is really consciousness (Self Real I zation). With this discovery, the
mystery of the beginning of the universe and life are revealed and the two are connected and
what connects them is consciousness (Brahmanic and Atmanic). If they weren’t so connected,
the mystery of the universe would have been of interest primarily to physicists while the mystery
of life would have been in the domain of the Vedas, Upanishads, Yoga, Krishna, Buddha,
Mahavir, Patanjali, Tirumular, Dnyāneshwar, Guru Nanak, and others. In the absence of this
connection, there wouldn’t have been much to experientially discover. Indians have known this
for millennia and with the help of Amanda Gefter, James Kowall, and world renowned
physicists, science has now shown it.
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The net finding is this: “The ultimate reality is the nothingness of the void, the cosmic
consciousness (Brahmanic consciousness), of which we are a microcosm (Atmanic
consciousness). We remain connected to the cosmic consciousness forever but due to our
limitations (mind, intellect, and ego), this link is weakened leading to a myriad of problems
including health & wellness, discord & violence, and even suboptimal performance in all walks
of life including business performance.” But how to go about gaining confidence in this, since it
is beyond the reach of scientific theories. Chemical Engineering comes to the rescue.
What we do in chemical engineering when direct measurements are not possible is to identify
secondary measurements which strongly correlate with that which is not measurable. Such
measurements are called inferential measurements. My very first Ph. D. student, N. G. Patke of
the twenty I supervised in my career, worked on an experimental project, inferential computer
control of a pilot-scale distillation column. In the present context, our challenge is to show that
we can connect to the cosmic consciousness and demonstrate materialization of intentions. This
still doesn’t prove that cosmic consciousness exists but it does establish a plausible correlational
link. As we succeed with more and more such disparate examples, our confidence in the
hypothesis rises, but we can never prove the hypothesis with a probably of 1.0. If we could pull it
off, that would be making progress.
When it comes to materialization of intentions, the work of the Late Maharishi Mahesh Yogi is
significant. In the sixties, Maharishi developed a meditation program called Transcendental
Meditation containing a number of Yoga sutras of Patanjali (~500 bce) who lived more or less at
the time of The Buddha. One of them relates to becoming light as cotton so one can fly. In the
sixties Maharishi demonstrated what he called yogic flying which involved hopping from place
to place without spring action. Newton’s law of gravity is not being violated here. Larry King
interviewed Maharishi on May 12, 2002 on CNN and during the course of the interview, Larry
asked, what is transcendental meditation? Maharishi responded,
Transcendental meditation is a means to do what one wants to do in a better way, in the
right way for maximum results. It's a program in which the mind begins to experience
its own finer impressions, finer thoughts, and then finally transcend the finest thought
to the level called self-referral consciousness, the ultimate reality of life. This is pure
intelligence from where the creation emerges, from where the administration of life is
maintained, and from where the physical expression of the universe has its basis.
Transcendental meditation brings about transcendental consciousness, which is selfreferral consciousness, the source of all intelligence.
Later in the interview, Larry Asked, What is Yogic Flying? Maharishi responded:
Yogic flying is that level of creative intelligence in the self-referral consciousness that
will materialize the intentions. Whatever the intentions, materialize the intentions.
You couldn’t blame Larry for remaining puzzled throughout the interview. In yogic flying, the
declared intention is lifting form the ground. In the program of materialization of intentions,
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levitation is an observable measurement and so with the help of an associate, Sanjeev Aroskar,
B. Tech, IIT Mumbai we set out to prove it. We designed and successfully conducted a six sigma
program in Pune to investigate the concept of materialization of intentions. The overall intention
is health & wellness, prosperity, sound personal relationships, and success in all aspects of life.
Since these outcomes could take months or years to materialize, we decided to include in the
program the yogic flying sutra. The program succeeded in good measure. Seven out of eight
achieved yogic flying. I took the video of the final session in which the participants achieved
yogic flying. But this was hardly a random sample; the members had been meditating for years.
In a random sample of aspirants, defects would be far higher and that is problematic for science
for it expects every experiment aimed at substantiating a scientific theory to be repeatable and
reproducible. My older sister told me a few years ago that as a teenager in early fifties she had
seen my mother in a stationary levitated state, some six to nine inches from ground. When asked,
why she didn’t tell me this earlier, she responded, ‘would you have believed me’? Of course I
would not have. Her two children told me recently that they too had seen their grandmother in
that state. All three are well-educated.
Maharishi had many famous followers: renowned theoretical physicist and 2000 presidential
candidate John Hagelin, film maker David Lynch, the Beatles, Merv Griffin, Harvard Professor
and Medtronic CEO Bill George, comedian Jerry Seinfeld, as well as a host of celebrities,
scientists, and doctors. Maharishi is longer with us but another yogi, Baba Shivanand Ji is
attracting tens of thousands to his meditation program based on a different set of sutras called
Durga Saptashati in which he too teaches aspirants how to materialize intentions: Says he,
We are a being of energy; energy is vibrations, and vibration is a unit of light
Learn to vibrate at the cosmic frequency and you too can become a being of cosmic
light (Jyotirmaya) and when you do, all your desires will be fulfilled.
It is gratifying Baba Ji speaks the language of modern physics, six sigma, and medical sciences.
With this confirmation, the framework for individual, organizational, national, and global
transformation is complete. What an amazing breakthrough.
Lastly, some will inevitably ask Indians as clever as you appear to be, how come the present-day
India suffers from so many problems; corruption (It is said some Indians are hoarding over a
trillion dollars in Swiss bank accounts), gang rapes, utter disregard for the environment, etc., etc.
And oh, how can I forget caste discrimination, one of the most urgent challenges facing the
Indian society. In the four-fold caste system derived from a degenerated interpretation of Sri
Krishna’s brilliant three-fold S, R, T Varna system (inspiration for the theory of rise and decline
of cultures I developed in the early nineties), there is not even a hint that the Varnas can be
inherited. The theory of rise and decline answers the question, ‘The rise of the Tamasic
component induces decline but eventually the cycle turns and the Sattvic component is restored
and the society rises again’. No society is immune to the phenomena of rise and decline. In
India’s case the cycle has turned after more than two thousand years in decline, and the 21 st
century will prove it. The Middle East is currently in a state of decline in the midst of a high
Tamasic component. The scientific framework alluded to here makes it possible to delay
inevitable decline, hasten rise, and change the direction for societies currently in decline.
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If you are an Indian-American, consider yourself very fortunate for you carry the spec of
ancestry of the sapta Rishis (seven sages) and possess the same capacity to uncover the ultimate
reality as millions before you have throughout the ages. If you are an American, consider
yourself very fortunate too as two of your own, one Christian, one Jewish, have discovered the
meaning and nature of ultimate reality while much of present-day elite in India remain in
slumber. Combine the two and you will have the best of the best; rational and intuitive; scientific
and spiritual. And that will transform the 21st century.
Acknowledgment: The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Tony Belak,
Ombudsman at the University of Louisville. The author thanks Sanskrit and Ayurveda scholar Dr. S. N.
Bhavsar in Pune for the translation of Nasadiya Sukta from Rig Veda.
References
1.Deshpande, Pradeep B., and Kowall, James P., The Nature of ultimate reality and how it can transform
our world: Evidence from Modern Physics; Wisdom of Yoda, Six Sigma and Advanced Controls, Inc.,
January 2015.
Dr. Kowall, MD (Miami University), PhD (Brown University) is board certified in neurology, internal
medicine, and sleep disorder medicine. He also holds a doctorate in theoretical physics. He makes his
home in suburban Eugen, Oregon.
2.Deshpande, P. B. and Harry, Mikel, Criticality of Internal Excellence in Six Sigma for National
Transformation, Unpublished, May 2014.
Dr. Harry is co-creator of six sigma in the late seventies while he was at Motorola. He has taught six
sigma to many of the most famous corporate CEOs of multinational companies.
3.Deshpande, P. B. and Kowall, J., Yogic Perspective on Health, Six Sigma Assessment, and Quantum
Physics Approach, Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 5, 3, 2014.
4.Deshpande, P. B., Powers of Meditation & Compassion: How to Transform Ourselves & Our World,
Scientific God Journal, Special Issue featuring the work of Pradeep B. Deshpande, 5, 5, 2014.
5.Gefter, Amanda, Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn: A Father, a Daughter, the Meaning of Nothing, and
the Beginning of Everything, Bantam Books 2014.
6.Kowall, J., Modern Physics & Non-dual Metaphysics: The One-World-Per-Observer Paradigm,
Scientific God Journal, Special Issue featuring the work of James Kowall, 5, 4, 2014.
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Amoroso, R. L. & Di Biase, F., Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge: Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience
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Article
Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge:
Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience
Richard L. Amoroso*1 & Francisco Di Biase 2
1
Noetic Advanced Studies Institute, California, USA
2
Dept. of Neurosurgery-Neurology, Santa Casa Hospital, Barra do Piraí, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Dept. of
Electroencephalography and Brain Mapping Clínica Di Biase, Barra do Piraí, Brazil
Abstract
Recalling Thomas Nagel’s discussion concerning the difficulties associated with developing a
scientific explanation for the nature of experience, Nagel states that current reductionist attempts
fail by filtering out any basis for consciousness and thus become meaningless since they are
logically compatible with its absence. In this article we call into question the fundamental
philosophy of the mind-brain identity hypothesis of Cognitive Theory: ‘What processes in the
brain give rise to awareness?’ and the associated search for ‘neural correlates of consciousness’
(NCC). The proper scientific manner of posing the query should simply be ‘What processes give
rise to awareness?’. We begin to formalize the Eccles psychon and summarize one of fourteen
empirical protocols to test this putative model. This requires a new science of Unified Field, UF
Mechanics, entailing in terms of our current stage of development operationally completed forms
of quantum theory, gravitation and cosmology arising from a unique derivation of the M-Theory
(string theoretic) vacuum. Until now the quest for psychophysical bridging has typically been in
the arena between brain and quantum geometry; and many have wondered if contemporary science
is sufficient for the task. Nagel further asks ‘what would be left if one removed the viewpoint of
the subjective observer’ and then suggests ‘that the remaining properties would be the physical
processes themselves or states intrinsic to the experience of awareness’. We examine a new
theoretical framework for introducing and experimentally testing the underlying physical
cosmology of these noetic parameters.
Keywords: psycho-physical, objective character, experience, consciousness, unified field, noetic.
“There is … only being.” – Albert Einstein [1]
If [all physicists] follow the same current fashion in expressing and thinking about
electrodynamics or field theory, then the variety of hypotheses being generated ... is limited.
Perhaps rightly so, for possibly the chance is high that the truth lies in the fashionable
direction. But, on the off chance that it is in another direction - a direction obvious from an
unfashionable view of field theory - who will find it? Only someone who sacrifices himself ...
from a peculiar and unusual point of view, one may have to invent for himself - Richard
Feynman, Nobel Prize lecture.
*
Correspondence: Prof. Richard L. Amoroso, Director of Physics Lab., Noetic Advanced Studies Institute, California, USA.
http://www.noeticadvancedstudies.us E-mail: amoroso@noeticadvancedstudies.us
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1. Philosophical Overview - Critique of the Current Perspective
Thomas Nagel has said, if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it
will have to assign them an objective character [2]. Nagel recognized the fact that:
Very little work has been done on the basic question (from which mention of the brain can be
entirely omitted) whether any sense can be made of experiences having an objective
character at all. Does it make sense...to ask what my experiences are really like, as opposed
to how they appear to me?...This question also lies at the heart of the problem of other
minds...If one understood how subjective experience could have an objective nature, one
would understand the existence of subjects other than oneself [2].
Psychophysical bridging was considered in the 1920s by Harvard philosopher Troland [3]: “We
can say that the consciousness belongs to the organism as a piece of private property. It would be
equally legitimate, however, to say that the organism belongs to the consciousness. One thing is
certain, that the consciousness does not reside in the organism nor is the organism present in
consciousness.” In honor of Nobelist Sir John Eccles we attempt to cross the psychophysical
bridge by formalizing his psychon concept [4], not limiting it to the dendron as he originally
suggested; but extending it to all coupling structures involved in ‘consciousness’ such as
microtubules, neural networks, DNA, and cells in general. We further suggest this association
applies to all biochemical species throughout the body and all associated spacetime points of an
entities temporal-local and atemporal-nonlocal ‘Psychosphere’ - defined as the total domain of
individuality [5-8]. This is not merely a relation of classical/quantum mechanics as considered
until now. The key advance is to introduce a Unified Field, UF Mechanics itself [9].
In summary, delineating the principles for introducing UF mechanics into Self-Organized Living
Systems (SOLS) is compounded by the fact that the parameters are avant-garde to current thinking
in biophysics. Key elements are a new cosmological paradigm with a unique string or M-Theoretic
vacuum, and higher dimensional (HD) extensions of quantum theory. Details are extensive and
technically obtuse but can be found in [5-11]; here we provide axiomatic conceptual summations.
The field of consciousness research has a broad spectrum with ongoing debate about whether
classical dynamics is sufficient, or from the AI camp whether an algorithm on a standard Turing
machine could be used to demonstrate human mind. In many ways the Penrose orchestrated
reduction (OR) model could be said until now to be the most detailed avenue for exploring
psychophysical-bridging with most cognitive scientists currently agreeing that a better
understanding of quantum principles is required to bridge the gap between mind and body. But is
anything left under the auspices of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory which even
its founders said could not describe living systems? Here we suggest that the Copenhagen
Interpretation fails all attempts to describe psychophysical-bridging as it is not the physical regime
of mind-body interaction. The fourth avenue, interactive dualism has been summarily rejected as
archaic and intractable because an immaterial mind, as Descartes proposed, is said to violate the
2nd law of thermodynamics or the conservation of energy.
We cannot fault Descartes for thinking his concept of res cogitans was immaterial because even
now 400 years later we still do not know the ultimate fundamental nature of matter [8-11]; what we
perceive as his understanding of the term immaterial would be open to considerable debate. The
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Amoroso, R. L. & Di Biase, F., Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge: Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience
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simple Webster definition of immaterial is: ‘not consisting of matter - spiritual’. One would
surmise that Descartes dwelt on the spiritual aspect of the meaning and not a possible physicality.
Also recall that it was not until 300 years later that Einstein proposed a definition of light as
quanta. Paraphrasing, Einstein went on to say, ‘anyone who thinks they understand the nature of
light is a fool’. We should likewise not fault cognitive theorists for not accepting the existence of
an underlying anthropic principle because until now its discovery has remained elusive, undefined,
beyond the reach of experimental science and relegated to historical disparagement going back to
the myopic bias of the Inquisition at the time of Galileo. In the same manner that quantum
principles are unavailable to methods of classical science; consciousness has likewise not been
measureable from within the framework of current empirical techniques of quantum cosmology.
Summarizing Hameroff:
The embedding of proto-conscious experience is described in the physics of quantum geometry
at the Planck scale, the most fundamental level of the universe. The physical/material side
resides in the brain—specifically, in quantum electron dipole states mediating computations in
microtubules and other biomolecular structures involved in consciousness. The connection
between the two sides—the psycho-physical bridge—is a specific process called Penrose
objective reduction (OR), a proposed threshold for quantum state reduction inherent in Planck
scale quantum geometry…The Planck scale is the basement level of reality…operates in
microtubules within gamma-synchronized dendrites…Each conscious moment…is according
to Penrose OR, an event or transition in spacetime geometry. Consciousness is a sequence of
transitions, of ripples in fundamental spacetime geometry, connected to the brain through Orch
OR…provid(ing) the best general framework for understanding the mind-matter bridge [12].
2. Radical New Direction for Mind-Body Research
We must now take umbrage with statements ‘the Planck scale is the most fundamental basement
level of the universe’, that OR represents the psycho-physical bridge or spacetime geometry is
fundamental; because these conditions are false and can no longer be considered a sufficient basis
for defining parameters of awareness. In the same way we discovered a distinction between
Classical and Quantum with each domain being a physical regime with its own laws and methods
of investigation; mind is also comprised of physically real matter that exists and operates in a
different arena. Recall that UF Mechanics [9] is just being formalized providing the long
anticipated third regime. Thus our understanding of the physical world now evolves from Classical
to Quantum to Unified (CQU). Description of our universe, called the Standard Model, is presently
governed by the rules of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum theory, electromagnetism and
Special/General Relativity cast in a Big Bang cosmology. A top down description that reduces to
an impenetrable barrier, a so-called stochastic quantum foam at the 10-33 cm Planck scale
representing the lower limit of a reality where we (mind, awareness) as ‘observer’ are embedded in
and made out of its emergent material properties. This Planck scale is not the ‘basement of reality’
as Hameroff calls it [12], only a temporarily closed door [11] imposed by the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory that we can now open and pass through with parameters of Noetic
Field Theory (NFT): The Quantization of Mind [5-8]. This CQU progression is neither top-down
nor bottom-up but entails what we call continuous-state free fall-like cycling [5-11].
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Figure 1. a) Macroscopic movie theatre metaphor of anthropic awareness (like Plato’s
analogy of the cave or virtual reality) and the observer’s place in the theatre. Discrete
frames (film) pass through the projector (spacetime) lit by coherent energy of the UF
streaming through the observer embedded in the theatre and appearing as the continuous
flow of reality (awareness) on the screen. b) Microscopic details of transduction of the UF
through the complex exciplex spacetime raster LCU gate (Figs. 3,4) into every point,
atom and thus molecule of Self-Organized Living Systems (SOLS) the propagation of
which also produces a locus of spacetime points associated with the arrow of time
because it is part of the structure and content of the observers mind [10].
The last great age of discovery about 100 years ago, a transition from the Newtonian 3D
representation of classical mechanics (Euclidean) to Einstein’s relativistic and quantum
mechanical 4D world (Riemannian), was preceded by a dilemma called the ultraviolet catastrophe
predicting an ideal black body at thermal equilibrium emitted continuous radiation with infinite
power. Discrete quantum jumps solved this problem. The current dilemma is similar and centers
on what physicists call renormalizable and nonrenormalizeable infinities in quantum field theory
calculations. The method is tantamount to artificially subtracting infinities from infinities to get
desired finite answers. This conundrum provides the current historical indicia of the immanent
transition to a new age of discovery [10]. As usually the case with radical new ideas the transition
appears complex initially - the transition from the current 4D quantum perspective to a 12D UF
string or M-Theoretic Anthropic Multiverse [5-11].
There is currently no consensus on what form this evolution should take. Most physicists believe a
UF theory (coined by Einstein) should be a quantum theory uniting the four fundamental
interactions; but there is no a priori reason this should be the case and many physicists in recent
decades transferred the search to an 11D M-Theoretic (4D + 2D to 6D brane world instead of the
original 1D string) regime. The 11th dimension in M-Theory unites the five forms of string theory;
and the 12th dimension of noetic cosmology (NFT) introduces the action of the anthropic principle
absent from the usual Big Bang form of 11D M-Theory.
Classical Mechanics describes an event between two coordinate systems by what is called
the Galilean transformation for uniform motion at velocities less than the speed of light in 3D
Euclidean space. Events of quantum mechanics and with relativistic velocities are described by the
Lorentz-Poincairé group of transformations in a 4D Einstein-Minkowski spacetime. In order to
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Amoroso, R. L. & Di Biase, F., Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge: Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience
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cross the Psycho-Physical Bridge noetic cosmology utilizes an extension of M-Theory requiring a
new 12D set of transformations called the Noetic Transform because it includes properties of an
inherent teleological anthropic principle described by the evolution of UF dynamics [9-11].
To achieve this result we utilize a battery of new physical assumptions (developed in ensuing
sections):
The HD regime of UF dynamics is a ‘sea’ of infinite potentia from which the 4D reality of
the observer cyclically emerges as a nilpotent resultant (Figs. 6,7). Nilpotency technically meaning ‘sums to zero’ [13], is a required basis for the noetic cosmologies
infinite potentia simplistically like the entangled alive-dead quantum state of
Schrödinger’s cat before a realized local event occurs.
Action of the UF mediated by noeon ‘flux’ (the noeon is the exchange unit of the UF) is
the life principle both animating SOLS and supplying psychon energy for the physical
evolution of qualia [6-8].
The UF does not operate as a usual phenomenal field (mediated by an energetic exchange
quanta like the photon of the electromagnetic field) but as an energyless ontological field
by a process called ‘topological switching’ transferring a force of coherence between
branes [6,8]. Note: This property of UF dynamics removes the problem of violation of the
2nd law of thermodynamics or the conservation of energy from Cartesian interactive
dualism.
The key process associated with the topological transformation of noeon exchange is a
holophote action (like a lighthouse beacon) providing a gating mechanism acting as the
psychophysical bridge between the potentia of the UF 12D space and the localized 4D
spacetime and 3D matter it embeds [5-11].
The noeon gating mechanism is a complex of close-packed Least Cosmological Units
(LCU) [5,14,15] comprising the raster tessellating spacetime detailed in the text below as
an exciplex (excited complex) [9-11]. This delineation is the primary focus of our
discourse as it provides the actual psychophysical bridge.
3. Required New Cosmology and Associated Physics
For the scientific perspective to evolve beyond the usual Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum
theory requires a new cosmological paradigm, an enormous challenge because as generally known
a Nobel Prize was given for discovering supposed Big Bang parameters. At the time of Galileo
logic failed beginning the current age of empiricism. One should not say that the current
conundrum is an error of experimental method; but rather an error in data interpretation. Hubble
discovered redshift not a Doppler expansion of the universe! Full delineation of the new
cosmology is beyond the scope of this paper, but detailed in [5-11]. In summary we axiomatically
introduce pertinent concepts. The new noetic cosmology is required to explain, utilize and design
experimental access to the new UF regime where physical parameters for psychophysical-bridging
reside.
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The Planck scale can no longer be considered the most fundamental level of reality. Three
regimes of reality must be addressed: Classical Quantum Unified Field; all of which
cycle continuously [5-11].
No ‘mental’ quantum state reduction exists in the usual sense of wave function collapse
[16]; suffice it to say (in terms of the de Broglie-Bohm and extended Cramer
interpretations of quantum theory) [17,18] a continuous evolution exists instead [5,17].
Collapse of the wavefunction reduces the quantum state to a classical state, which does not
generally happen (perhaps a ‘senior moment’ or other form of momentary total gap in
awareness may constitute collapse) in the nonlocal flux of qualia as the locus of awareness;
especially since now more pertinently qualia are not quantum phenomena per se but
unified field phenomena. Quale ‘rest on’ the quantum regime but only as part of the
sensory transduction apparatus.
The Planck scale is not an impenetrable barrier [5] even though considered so as an
empirical fact demonstrated by the quantum uncertainty principle. This is a main problem
with utilizing a Darwinian naturalistic Big Bang cosmology originating from a putative
singularity in time as the basis for cognitive theory. In an anthropic multiverse cosmology
utilizing extended quantum theory and M-Theory the answer is simply: ‘do something
else!’ which opens physical investigation into a new UF realm of large scale additional
dimensions (LSXD) [10,11,19]. The anthropic multiverse is closed and finite in time, i.e.
the 14.7 billion light year Hubble radius, HR, but open and infinite in atemporal eternity
[5,11]. ‘Worlds without number, like grains of sand at the seashore’ [20] the multiverse has
room for an infinite number of nested Hubble spheres each with their own fine-tuned laws
of physics [5].
Fourteen empirical protocols have been proposed [11] (the 1st reviewed here) for demonstrating,
gaining access to and leading to a variety of experimental platforms for first hand investigation of
awareness (qualia) breaking down the 1st person 3rd person barrier as called for by Nagel [2].
It is said that string theory only has one parameter; that of string tension, TS. But string theory has
been fraught with the dilemma of a Googolplex (10googol) or infinite number of vacuum
possibilities. Utilizing the Eddington, Dirac, and Wheeler large number hypothesis [5,10] we
derived an alternative derivation of TS leading to one unique string vacuum and what we call the
‘continuous-state hypothesis’ an alternative to the expansion/inflation parameters of Big Bang
cosmology [5]. Simplistically the perceived inflation energy of Big Bang cosmology postulated as
a Doppler expansion from a primordial temporal singularity, instead according to the noetic
continuous-state hypothesis, is localized in an ‘eternal present’ as if in permanent ‘gravitational
free-fall’[5]. Since we are relativistically embedded in and made out of matter this condition
means that all objects (in our 3D virtual reality bubble) exist (in HD) as if they were in
gravitational ‘free-fall’. This is better explained by two other interpretations of quantum theory
generally ignored by the physics community because they are myopically considered to add
nothing. That of the de Broglie-Bohm Causal Interpretation [17] and the Cramer Transactional
Interpretation [18]; where spacetime and the matter within it (all matter is made of de Broglie
waves) are created-annihilated and recreated over and over as part of the perceived arrow of time
and creation of our 3D reality as a resultant from HD infinite potentia as a ‘standing-wave’ (Fig. 2)
[5,10]. This can be best understood conceptually by a movie theatre metaphor (Fig. 1).
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Figure 2. a) Conceptualized structure of a Cramer transaction (present state or event)
where the present (simplistically) is a standing-wave of future-past potential elements. A
point is not a rigid singularity (although still discrete) as in the classical sense, but has a
complex structure like a mini-wormhole where R1 & R2 (like the frets holding the wire of
a stringed instrument) represent opposite ends of its diameter. b) How observed (virtual)
3D reality arises from the infinite potentia of HD space (like a macroscopic transaction).
The ‘standing-wave-like’ (retarded-advanced future-past) mirror symmetric elements C4+
/ C4- (where C4 signifies 4D potentia of complex space distinguished from the realized 3D
of visible space) of continuous-state spacetime show a central observed Euclidian, E3,
Minkowski, M4 space resultant. Least Cosmological Units (LCU) governing evolution of
the ‘points’ of 3D reality are represented by circles. The Advanced-Retarded future-past
3-cubes in HD space guide the evolution of the central cube (our virtual reality) that
emerges from elements of HD space.
The problem has to do with the nature of a point or 3D vertex in physical theory [10,13]. What
extended versions of de Broglie-Bohm and Cramer bring to the table is a basis for defining a
fundamental ‘point’ that instead of being rigidly fixed classically (Fig. 3a) is continuously
transmutable (Fig. 3b) as in string theory. This represents in essence the elevation of the so-called
wave-particle duality for quanta to a Principle of continuous-state cosmology. What this does is
cancel the troubling infinites in the standard model of particle physics in a natural way rather than
by use of a mathematical gimmick called renormalization. We also build the continuous-state
hypothesis around an object in string theory called the Witten Vertex [21] (Fig. 3b after noted
M-Theorist David Witten). This means that when certain parameters (compactification,
dimensional reduction etc.) associated with the Riemann sphere reach a zero-point; the Riemann
sphere relativistically rotates back to infinity and so on continuously (Reminiscent of how water
waves operate). The HD branes of so-called Calabi-Yau mirror symmetry are forms of Riemann
3-spheres or Kahler manifolds [10]. Instead of the insurmountable Plank foam, the gate keeper in
this cosmology is an array of least cosmological units (LCU) [5,14,15] of which part (like the tip of
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an iceberg) resides in our virtual 4-space and the other part resides in the HD (12D) regime of
M-Theory. These LCU exciplex gates govern mediation of the UF in the coherent ordering of the
life principle of SOLS embedded in localized spacetime.
3.1. Spacetime Exciplex - UF Noeon Mediator
The spacetime exiplex or ‘excited complex’ of least cosmological units (LCU) is key to mediation
of the UF life principle of consciousness. In the usual 4D interpretation of quantum theory limited
by the uncertainty principle, virtual quanta in the zero point field wink in and out of existence
limited to the Planck time, 10-43 s. For the noetic spacetime exiplex the situation is radically
different. The duality of its HD structure (i.e. living in both local 4-space and nonlocal 8-space)
allows it to remain in an excited state in 4-space never fully coupling with the Planck-scale ground
state. This holophote interaction emits a noeon into every point (and thus atom) in spacetime
(providing the life principle) and interaction with brain dendrons etc. for example as the flow of
qualia as a form of superradiance.
Kowalski discovered that photon emission occurs only after electrons complete full Bohr orbits
[22,23]. We apply this as a general principle for emission during rotation of the complex
Calabi-Yau Riemann sphere which acts like a pinwheel-like scoop bringing in the next
topologically switched hysteresis loop of psychon-brain interaction energy.
Figure 3. Conceptualization of the cosmological Least-Unit (LCU) tessellating space
which like quark confinement cannot exist alone. a) Current view of a so-called point
particle or metric x,y,z vertex. The three large circles are an LCU array slice. It is a form
of close-packed spheres forming a 3-torus; missing from the illustration are an upper and
bottom layer covering the x,y,z vertex and completing one fundamental element of an
LCU complex. The field lines emanating from one circle to another represent the de
Broglie-Bohm concept of a quantum ‘pilot wave or potential’ governing evolution. b)
Similar to a) but drawn with a central ‘Witten string vertex’ [21] and relativistic quantum
field potentials (lines) guiding its evolution in spacetime. The Witten vertex is not a
closed singularity and because of its open structure provides a key element to the
continuous-state process and rotation of the Riemann sphere cyclically from zero to
infinity which represents rotational elements of the HD exciplex brane topology.
The exciplex concept as defined in engineering parlance is an ‘excited complex’ or form of
excimer - short for excited dimer in chemistry nomenclature used to describe an excited, transient,
combined state, of two different atomic species (like XeCl) that dissociate back into the constituent
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Amoroso, R. L. & Di Biase, F., Crossing the Psycho-Physical Bridge: Elucidating the Objective Character of Experience
940
atoms rather than reversion to some ground state after photon emission. An excimer is a
short-lived dimeric or heterodimeric molecule formed from two species, at least one of which is in
an electronic excited state. Excimers are often diatomic and are formed between two atoms or
molecules that would not bond if both were in the ground state. The lifetime of an excimer is very
short, on the order of nanoseconds. Binding a larger number of excited atoms form Rydberg
clusters extending the lifetime which can exceed many seconds. An Exciplex is also defined as an
electronically excited complex, ‘non-bonding’ in the ground state. For example, a complex formed
by the interaction of an excited molecular entity with a ground state counterpart of a different
structure. When it hits ground a photon or quasiparticle soliton is emitted. In Noetic Cosmology
we have adapted the exciplex concept as a tool to describe the LCU gating mechanism between the
quantum regime and the regime of the UF. The exciplex LCU gate is key to understanding
interaction of the life principle with SOLS and the basis for developing empirical tests. The
general equations for a putative spacetime exciplex are:
G* G* Z *;
*
Z* m
X
mission
X * m e
Z* o r G*
(1)
X * m Z* o r G*
where as seen in Fig. 4a G is the ZPF ground state, Z intermediate cavity excited states and X the
spacetime C-QED (Cavity-Quantum Electrodynamics) exciplex coupling. The numerous
configurations plus the large variety of photon frequencies absorbed allow for a full
absorption-emission equilibrium spectrum. We believe the spacetime exciplex model also has
sufficient parameters to allow for the spontaneous emission of protons by a process similar to the
photoelectric effect but from HD spacetime C-QED brane spallation rather than from a charged
metallic surface. Not having a sufficient spacetime vacuum proton creation mechanism led to the
downfall of Steady-State cosmology.
The new UF basis centers on defining what is called a Least Cosmological Unit (LCU) [5,14] tiling
the spacetime backcloth. An LCU (Fig. 3) conceptually parallels the unit cell that builds up crystal
structure. The LCU entails the next evolutionary step for the basis of a point particle [13] and has
two main functions; It is the raster from which matter arises, and is a central mechanism that
mediates the syntropic gating of life principle parameters of the UF. Syntropy is the negentropy
process of expelling entropy by the teleological action of SOLS.
The LCU change from the current concept of a fixed Planck scale point (Fig. 3a) to what is called
a Witten string vertex [21] (Fig. 3b) is a form of Riemann sphere (model of the extended
complex-plane with points at zero and infinity for stereographic projection to the Euclidean plane)
that cyclically opens into the LSXD regime of the UF. Behind the current view of
(Planck’s
constant) as a barrier of stochastic foam is a coherent topology with the symmetry of a spin raster
comprised of LCUs [5,14].
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Figure 4. a) The geometry of the ‘spacetime exciplex’ (excited complex), a configuration
of spacetime LCUs that act like a holophote laser pumping mechanism of UF noeon
energy and also how coherence of the UF interacts with 3D compactified states in
dendrons or microtubules for example. Locally the exciplex acts like an oscillating
‘cootie catcher’ [24]. b) Geometric representation of the Noetic Unified Field Equation, F
(N) = E/R for an array of cosmological LCUs. Solid lines represent extension, dotted lines
field. Where F(N) is the anthropic or coherent force of the UF driving self-organization,
total E equals the c) hysteresis loop energy of the hypervolume, R is the scale-invariant
rotational radius of the action and the domain wall (curves) string tension, T0 .
3.2. Classical Phenomenology Versus Noetic Ontology
There is a major conceptual change from Quantum Mechanics to Unified Field Mechanics. The
‘energy’ of the UF is not quantized and thus is radically different from other known fields. Here is
what troubled Nobelist Richard Feynman: "...maybe nature is trying to tell us something new here,
maybe we should not try to quantize gravity... Is it possible that gravity is not quantized and all the
rest of the world is?" [25]. It turns out that not only is gravity not quantized but neither is the noeon
energy of the UF which is a step deeper than gravity.
Here is one way to explain it. In a usual field like electromagnetism which is easiest for us to
understand because we have the most experience with it, field lines connect to adjacent point
charges. The quanta of the fields force is exchanged along those field lines (in this case photons).
We perceive this as occurring in 4-space (4D). It is phenomenological. This is the phenomenon of
fields. For topological charge as in the UF with properties related to consciousness; the situation is
vastly different. The fields are still coupled and there is tension between them but no
phenomenological energy (i.e. field quanta) is exchanged. This is the situation in the ontological
case. The adjacent branes "become" each other as they overlap by a process called ‘topological
switching’. This is not possible for the 4-space field because they are quantized resultants of the
HD topological field components. The HD ‘units’ (noeons) are free to “mix” ontologically as they
are not resolved into points.
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Figure 5. a) 2D view of the LCU tiling of the spacetime backcloth (Fig. 3). b) Projective
geometry topologically giving rise to higher dimensionality (here the Fig. 4a 2D view
extended to 3D). The triangles with tails represent the trefoil knots in Fig. 7 and the naked
triangles the resultant cyclic point or fermionic vertex quantum state in 3-space (Spheres
in Fig. 2b).
The metric still has points, or it might be better to say coordinates; but in HD super space they are
unrestricted and free to interact by topological switching which is not the case for an “event” in
4-space. Whereas this singular quality (basis of our perceived reality) does not exist in the HD
regime (UF) of infinite potentia! So if the UF is not quantized how can there be a force which is
mediated by the exchange of quanta? Firstly the UF does not provide a 5th force as one might
initially assume; instead the ontological ‘presence’ of the UF provides a ‘force of coherence’ which
is based on ‘topological charge’. It helps to consider this in terms of perception. If one looks along
parallel railroad tracks they recede into a point in the distance, a property of time and space. For the
unitary evolution of consciousness [6-8] this would break the requirement of coherence. For the
UF which is outside of local time and space, a cyclical restoring force is applied to our res extensa
putting it in a res cogitans mode. The exciplex mechanism [5,10] guides rotation of the Witten
vertex Riemann spheres to maintain a consistent level of periodic coherence (parallelism). It is a
relativistic UF process. The railroad tracks do not recede into a point. The Riemann sphere flips
(our perception) beforehand.
The UF provides an inherent force of coherence just by its cyclical presence. This means that it is
ontological in its propagation or ‘interaction’. The railroad tracks remain parallel and do not recede
to a point as in the 3-D phenomenological realm where forces are mediated by a quantal energy
exchange. Another way of looking at this is that the 3-D observer can only look at one page of a
book at a time while the HD observer (Godlike) can see all pages continuously (time-like). The
LCU space-time exciplex is a mechanism allowing both worlds to interact nonlocally.
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Figure 6. Complex HD Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric 3-forms, C4 become embedded in
Minkowski space, M4 and the UF energy of this resultant is projected (Fig. 1) into brain
dendrons as a continuous stream of evolving (evanescing) superradiant qualia. This
represents the lower portion only that embeds in local spacetime; there is an additional
duality above this projection embedded in the infinite potentia of the UF from which it
arises (Fig.8).
Most are familiar with the 3D Necker cube (center of Fig. 2b is like a Necker cube) that when
stared at central vertices topologically reverse. This is called topological switching. There is
another paper child's toy called a ‘cootie catcher’ [24] that fits over the fingers and can switch
positions. What the cootie catcher has over the Necker cube is that it has an easier to visualize a
defined center or vertex switching point. So in the LCU exiplex spacetime background we have
this topological switching which represents the frame that houses the gate which is the lighthouse
with the rotating light on top.
Figure 7. Locus of nonlocal HD mirror symmetric Calabi-Yau 3-tori (here technically
depicted quaternionic trefoil knots) spinning relativistically and evolving in time. Nodes
in the cycle are sometimes chaotic and sometimes periodically couple into resultant
(faces of a cube) quantum states in 3-space depicted in the diagram as Riemann Bloch
spheres. An animated version of Fig.6.
Now inside the structure there is also a ‘baton passing’. The baton is like the lens that the light
shines through but only at the moment of transfer (or coupling). In the HD UF regime the ‘light’ is
always on omni-directionally but only ‘shines’ into 3-space when the gate is open during the
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moment of baton passing. In addition to baton passing there is also a form of ‘leap-frogging’. The
leap-frogging represents wave-particle duality (remember we elevated it to a principle of
cosmology). The leaping moment represents the wave, and the crouched person being leapt over is
the particulate moment. The particle moment acts like a domain wall and no light passes when its
orientation is aligned towards the 3-D world resultant. This is also an important aspect of the
gating mechanism. This is of course a relativistic process such that the ‘beat frequency’ keeps
SOLS well lit with the teleological anthropic ‘light of life’.
The trefoil knot (in Fig. 7 drawn as a Planck scale quaternion vertices) is holomorphic to the circle.
Since energy is conserved we may ignore the complexity of the HD symmetries and use the area of
the circle for the noeon hysteresis loop (Fig. 4c), in this case a 2D resultant as a 2-sphere quantum
state as the coupling area of one psychon to a dendron. This idea is further conceptualized in Fig. 5
illustrating how a 3D object emerges from close-packed spacetime LCUs.
Figure 8. Completion of Figs. 5 & 6 illustrating full extension to an HD relativistic
quantum state in continuous-state dual Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric HAM cosmology
with Dodecahedral involute properties, as well as the continuous-state exciplex
‘hysteresis loop’ of noeon injection (not shown) as far as currently understood. The Bloch
2-sphere representation is also replaced with an extended Riemann 4-sphere resultant
with sufficient parameters to surmount the uncertainty principle representing a unique
M-Theoretic model of 'Continuous-State' UF dynamics as it relates to NFT and its
putative exchange quanta of the UF - the noeon.
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4. The Physical Basis of Qualia
Qualia, plural of quale, as defined in philosophy of mind is ‘the subjective quality of experience; a
qualitative feel associated with an experience’. The physics of noetic cosmology with an inherent
élan vital based on UF mechanics also provides the physical basis for representing quale in a
rigorous empirically testable manner. Every experience has a specific subjective nature. If one
removed the viewpoint of the subjective observer; what would be left? Nagel suggests the
remaining properties might be those detectable by other beings, the physical processes themselves
or states intrinsic to the experience of awareness. This changes the perspective of qualia to the
form “there is something it is like to undergo certain physical processes”. “If our idea of the
physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective
character” [2].
These are questions an integrative Noetic Science can now answer theoretically and empirically.
Standard definitions of qualia are an inadequate philosophical construct describing only the
subjective character. In the physical sense of Noetic Field Theory (NFT) components describing
qualia from the objective sense are introduced for the first time - i.e. distinguishing the
phenomenology of qualia from the underlying ontological ‘nonlocal noumenon’ or physical
existence of the fundamental absolute thing in itself.
NFT suggests that a comprehensive definition of qualia is comprised of three component forms
considered physically real because the noetic fields of Holographic Anthropic Multiverse (HAM)
cosmology on which the noetic model for the quantization of mind is based are all physically real.
The proposed triune basis of quale is as follows:
Type I. The Subjective - The what it feels like basis of awareness. Phenomenological mental
states of the qualia of experience. (This is the current philosophical definition of qualia, Q-I)
Type II. The Objective - Physical basis of qualia phenomenology independent of the subjective
feel that could be stored or transferred to another entity breaking down the 1st person 3rd person
barrier. Noumenal nonlocal UF elements and related processes evanesce qualia by a form of
superradiance, Q-II.
Type III. The Cosmological - SOLS by being alive represent a Qualia substrate of the anthropic
multiverse, acting as a ‘blank slate’ carrier (like a television set turned on but with no broadcast
signal) from within which Q-II are modulated into the Q-I of experience by a form of
superradiance (noeon exciplex gating mechanism) or hyper- holographic evanescence. Note:
Q-III has sub-elements addressed elsewhere [6].
A standard image requires a screen or other reflective surface to be resolved; but if the foci of two
parabolic mirrors (Casimir-like vacuum plates in our model) are made to coincide, the two images
superpose into a real 3D holographic image that does not need a screen. A science toy called the
‘magic mirage’ is used to demonstrate this effect of parabolic mirrors. Objects placed in the
bottom appear like solid objects at the top of the device. In 12D reality Calabi-Yau brane topology
performs the same function for the locus of qualia propagation.
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Figure 9. 2D rendition of an HD holographic process. An object (black circle) placed
inside two parabolic mirrors (like Casimir domain walls) produces a virtual image (white
circle) representing creation of a point in spacetime. Our virtual holographic reality is
produced in a similar fashion by Cramer future-past standing-wave parameters from the
HD Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric infinite potentia of the UF. As in Fig. 1 this same
process produces qualia with each lit point like a raindrop producing a rainbow.
The holophote action of élan vital energetics arises from the harmonic oscillation of close-packed
LCU boundary conditions tiling the spacetime backcloth and pervading all SOLS. The inherent
beat frequency of this continuous action produces the Q-III carrier wave that is an empty slate
modulating cognitive data of Q-II physical parameters into Q-I awareness states as a superposition
of the two (Q-III and Q-II). This modulation of qualia occurs in the HD QED cavities of the
psychospheres cognitive domain. The QED cavities are a close-packed tiling of LCU noetic
hyperspheres; the Casimir surfaces of which are able to reflect quaneme subelements. While the
best reflectors of em waves are polished metal mirrors, charged boundary conditions also reflect
em waves in the same way radio signals bounce off the ionized gases of the Kennelly-Heaviside
layers in the Earth’s ionosphere. This reflective ‘sheath’ enclosing the cognitive domain is charged
by the Noeon radiation (exchange particle of the noetic field) of the élan vital, the phases of which
are ‘regulated’ in the complex HD space of the fundamental least units of HAM cosmology.
How does noetic theory describe more complex aspects of qualia? Like a rainbow, light quanta
(drop) are microscopic in contrast to the macroscopic sphere of awareness (rainbow). It thus seems
reasonable to assume that scale-invariant properties of the HAM least units of awareness would
apply. Like phonemes as fundamental sound elements for audible language qualia-nemes or
quanemes are proposed for awareness; all based on the physical modulation of Q-II states by the
geometric structural-phenomenology of the Q-III carrier base of living systems. The quaneme is a
singular Witten point in the raster of mind like a locus of points forming a line. Each of these
‘quaneme points’ of noeon entry through the LCU exciplex gating array are like an individual
raindrop that summate into a rainbow or thought train of awareness. This again takes us back to the
movie theater metaphor of Fig.1 where the discrete frame of film (exciplex gated) is projected
continuously on the screen, in this case the mind.
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Figure 10. a) The physical basis of the continuous superradiant generation of qualia from
the three components of mind: eternal Elemental Intelligence, Brain-Body (Descartes res
extensa), and the superradiant qualia (Descartes res cogitans) mediated by the spacetime
raster (quaneme locus) that exciplex gates ‘the light of the mind’ or UF energy. The term
quaneme is derived to parallel the phoneme component of sounds. b) LCU construct
hidden nonlocally behind a 3-space singularity (black cross vertex).
4.1 Formalizing the Eccles Psychon, a New Physical Unit for Measuring Energy of Awareness
(Qualia)
NFT elevates the concept of qualia from the traditionally philosophical concept as used in
cognitive science to an actual physically real fundamental noumenon. The term noumenon is
defined as the ‘thing in itself’ beyond the veil of the phenomenological world; in Kantian
philosophy a noumenon is something that exists independently of the intellectual or sensory
perception of it. It is this fundamental physicality that will allow qualia to be ‘digitized’ in some
form breaking down the 1st person-3rd person barrier leading to profound new ‘conscious’
technologies. Nobelist Sir John Eccles coined albeit an undefined construct, he called the psychon,
to illustrate how mental energy coupled to brain dendrons (bundle of neural dendrites) [4] to
complete his interactionist model of mind-body dualism [6-8].
Formalizing a ‘Psychon unit’ of measure is one of the applications made possible by a
comprehensive science of qualia tantamount to the fundamental basis or nature of awareness. In
meditative science it is said that ‘energy follows thought’. Here we have postulated that the qualia
of awareness are comprised of a real physical form of energy related to new physics of the unified
field, UF [9,10]. In honor of Nobelist Sir J.C Eccles (discovery of the synapse) we propose to
quantify this mental energy in terms of a new physical unit called the Psychon. The Einstein, a
physical unit of energy measure named in honor of Albert Einstein for his explanation of the
photoelectric effect in terms of light quanta (photons) bears conceptual similarity and we thus use
that as our starting point. The Einstein is used to measure the power of electromagnetic radiation in
photosynthesis for example where one Einstein represents one mole or Avogadro’s number of
photons (6.02 x 1023). In general physics the energy of n photons is E n n (c / ) where
is
Planck’s constant and is the frequency. The second part of the equation is energy in terms of
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the wavelength, (in nanometers, nm) and the speed of light, c. Adaptation of this photon energy
equation to measure Einsteins is very similar, E N0 N0 (c / ) where the energy of N0
photons is instead in Einsteins, E. In photometrics the measure used is one microeinstein per
second per square meter, where one microeinstein, uE is one-millionth of an Einstein or 6.02 x
1017 photons imping a leaf for example.
We create a similar unit of measure to quantify the mental energy of quale called the Psychon as
one mole or Avogadro’s number of noeons. The force of all four known phenomenological fields
(electromagnetic, strong, weak and gravitational) are said to have exchange quanta which mediate
the field’s interactions by an exchange of energy. For electromagnetism the exchange quanta is the
photon. This quantal mediation has been experimentally verified for all fields except gravity
because the graviton has not been discovered and according to NFT is not expected to be as the
regime of unification is not quantum but instead correlates with parameters of UF Mechanics
[9,10].
The trefoil knots (in Fig. 7 drawn as Planck scale quaternion vertices) is holomorphic to the circle.
Since energy is conserved we may ignore the complexity of the LSXD Calabi-Yau and AdS5
Dodecahedral symmetries and use the area of the circle, in this case a resultant continuous
rotations of two circles as a 2-sphere quantum state or perhaps better as a torus as the coupling area
of one psychon to a dendron. This idea is further conceptualized in Fig. 5 illustrating how a 3D
object emerges from spacetime LCUs.
In considering psychon energy it may be easier to calculate the nonlocal brane area of the
spacetime exiplex than the local volume or surface area of a dendron or array of microtubules etc.
Recall that the intestinal villi are purported to provide the area of a football field. In any case we
will not calculate here but leave it for a later publication since we still struggle with the conceptual
problems relating to the geometric topology of noeon coherence. Recall that the de Broglie-Bohm
interpretation entails a nonlocal pilot-wave or quantum-potential said to guide the evolution of the
wavefunction ontologically. This concept was not very successful in 4D, but when carried to
LSXD it works elegantly and the pilot-wave-quantum potential is like a ‘Super Quantum
Potential’ that becomes synonymous with coherent aspects of the UF. The UF provides the basis
for gravitation [10] and the life principle for living systems not just the evolutionary flow of qualia
in the mind.
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Figure 11. Conceptualization of Interactionist cosmology. a) Coherent interaction of the
UF bridging the stochastic quantum barrier into a brain dendron of radius R correlated
with an underlying array of fundamental Least Cosmological Units (LCUs) forming the
coupling of one Eccles Psychon unit with the brain. b) Showing injection of the noetic
field or élan vital into spacetime points. c) Planck scale LCUs mediating the noetic field,
d) An Eccles Psychon-UF Noeon field coupled putatively to a brain dendron.
A bit more noeon-psychon theory: A torus is generated by rotating a circle about an extended line
in its plane where the circles become a continuous ring. According to the equation for a torus,
2
x2 y2 R z 2 r 2 , where r is the radius of the rotating circle and R is the distance between
the center of the circle and the axis of rotation. The volume of the torus is 2 2 Rr 2 and the surface
area is 4 2 Rr, in the above Cartesian formula the z axis is the axis of rotation. We wish to apply
this to the holophote action of noeon exciplex flux. In atomic theory electron charged particle
spherical domains fill the toroidal volume of the atomic orbit by their wave motion. If a photon of
specific quanta is emitted while an electron is resident in an upper (like the UF domain) more
excited Bohr orbit, the radius of the orbit drops back down to the next lower energy level
decreasing the volume of the torus in the emission process. (For the noeon-psychon maintaining a
syntropic force of coherence.)
To summarize pertinent aspects of HAM cosmology:
The nature of a point particle or singularity in physics has long been under debate. In
Noetic Cosmology it becomes a continuous Witten vertex.
The energyless interaction of the UF occurs by what is called ‘topological switching’.
Metaphorically this is like what happens when one stares at a Necker cube and the vertices
are perceived to oscillate back and forth. This is the exciplex gate in noetic cosmology.
In deference to Nobelist Sir John Eccles concept for mind-body interaction we quantify the
energy of qualia in Psychons [4]. Like the Einstein, the psychon is defined as a measure of
one mole of noeons, purported to be the topological exchange complex of the Unified
Field, UF which provides the energy that animates the stream of awareness or qualia.
Using the noetic field equation, NF = E/R we need to calculate the energy of the noeon field from
its space-time hysteresis loop (Fig. 4 b,c). This is a practical and conceptual challenge that is hard
to meet. Imagine trying to calculate the surface area of the dendrite and synaptic boutons in a
dendron, neural network or array of microtubules for example. Imagine a helicopter like those
used to put out forest fires carrying a bucket of water retrieved from a nearby lake (UF). The
volume of that bucket is known. So it is infinitely easier to work with the volume of the helicopter
water bucket than to try to measure the surface area of the trees and other objects on the ground.
When Eccles loosely defined the psychon dendron correlation he did not consider and Avogadro's
number of noeons to enter into the picture. The question is can we correlate helicopter buckets of
the UF with the volume or surface area of an array of LCUs modulating energy of coherence
entering the local space-time of a dendron?
For simplicity at this stage of development we use the general unexpanded form of the Noetic UF
equation, F(N) = E/R where F(N) is the force of coherence of the UF, E the relativistic rotational
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energy and R the ‘cavity’ radius. The cavity represents a hysteresis loop of the LSXD brane energy
dynamics. The cavity relates to the volume of the Calabi-Yau mirror symmetric dual 3-tori of the
LCU holophote (lighthouse) gating mechanism. The gate cycles continuously through HD
symmetries of M-Theoretic space through various compactification modes [5] until it reaches a 4D
‘standing-wave’ Minkowski spacetime of the standard model of observed reality, i.e. a
Copenhagen domain wall of noeon energy pervading all spacetime and matter, i.e. SOLS as the
élan vital (In our example a dendron). This process, is further described by the physics of the
exciplex gating mechanism which is mediated by a new set of transformations beyond the
Galilean-Lorentz-Poincairé which we call in deference to the anthropic multiverse which it is cast
in - the Noetic Transform [5,6,10].
We derived our definition of the noeon (from the Greek nous, mind and noēsis / noētikos,
perception-what the nous does) and the common “on” suffix in particle physics such as the phot-on
as the fundamental exchange unit of the anthropic unified noetic field.
Although UF dynamics entails a ‘force of coherence’ this does not seem to entail a 5 th force. The
‘coherence’ implied is the resultant action; perhaps that is misleading. The UF is primary - an
originator of all the other forces that brings (pumps like a holophote) noeons, which are then
immediately returned to the sea of infinite potentia. This cyclical process energizes living systems,
qualia and gravitation etc. Theologically this is stated as: ‘The spirit emanates from the throne of
God, filling the immensity of space, it is life, the light of the mind and the power that frames the
heavens’ [26]. One sees that the anthropic principle (spirit of God) provides all these phenomena Life, the Light of the Mind (qualia) and Gravitation! More work has to be done on noeon
dynamics. This is what the experimental protocols are designed for - rigorous investigation.
4.2. Parameters of Psycho-Physical Bridging: Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC)
We have said little of NCC; we do not claim there are none, only that the current Copenhagen
Interpretation approach of Cognitive Science has been superficial and now needs to be recast in
terms of the additional required UF mechanics parameters. A simple delineation of these new
principles is a challenge because it is expressed formally in terms of mathematical physics and
cosmology. We have taken great pains to utilize metaphor and graphic aides. Technical details are
found in the volumes [5,6,10] and numerous preprints online at [27].
The nature of the observer has long plagued physical science. Here we have briefly reviewed the
current status and limitations of cognitive science in the context of a cosmology of mind in an
Anthropic Multiverse [5,10]. The concept of an élan vital or life force has long been considered the
elementary action principle driving the evolution of living‐systems by theologically minded
scientists and individuals. Sufficiently extending Einstein’s original model of a Static Universe, to
a Holographic Anthropic Multiverse (HAM), has provided a context for solving this centuries old
problem for introducing this type of teleological principle into Physics, Biology, Medicine and
Psychology. This means the contemporary framework of biological mechanism (chemistry and
physics are sufficient for describing life - no additional life principle is required, i.e. the cognitive
mind-brain identity hypothesis) should no longer be considered the formal philosophical basis for
describing living systems, the mind-body interface and contemporary allopathic (scientific)
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medicine. The new noetic action principle of the unified field has far reaching implications for
medicine and transpersonal psychology.
5. Empirical Tests of Noetic Cosmology Summarized
Viable experimentation will lead to new consciousness research platforms for studying
fundamental syntropic properties of living systems. We have proposed fourteen tests of NFT; in
this paper we summarize the main experimental protocol to test the noetic teleological
‘life-principle’ hypotheses. Note: Not all of the experiments relate directly to mediation of the life
principle; but since the life-principle is putatively an aspect of the UF, all of the experiments
manipulate the new physical regime of the UF or importantly mediate the ‘gating mechanism’ by
which access is gained, thus facilitating mind-body research in addition to M-Theory and nuclear
physics.
5.1 Basic Experimental Protocol
Basic Experiment - Fundamental test that the concatenation of new NFT UF principles is
theoretically sound. A laser oscillated rf-pulsed vacuum resonance hierarchy is set up to
interfere with the periodic (continuous-state) structure of the inherent ‘beat frequency’ of a
Dirac polarized spacetime vacuum exciplex to detect the new coherence principle
associated with a cyclical holophote entry of the UF into 4-space. This experiment ‘pokes a
hole in spacetime’ in order to bring the energy of the UF into a detector. The remaining
protocols are variations of the parameters of this experiment. See Figs. 11 & 12.
There are a number of very specific postulated cosmological properties required in order to
perform these experiments [5,10]. Summaries of the additional 13 experiments can be found in
[5,11].
5.2. Summary of Key Experimental Details
To empirically gain access to the regime of the Unified Field one must pass through the so-called
Planck scale stochastic barrier. In order to do this one must violate the quantum uncertainty
principle. Since by definition the standard methods of quantum theory produce the uncertainty
principle; the simple solution is to do something else! Because of the great success of gauge theory
physicists have ignored the existence of a Dirac polarized vacuum because they believe its
existence would violate gauge principles. The best evidence for a Dirac polarized vacuum is what
is called the Casimir Effect. The methods of gauge theory however are only an approximation
suggesting that there is additional new physics. Next we outline the general method for accessing
the higher dimensional superspace of the UF. Technical details can be found in references
[5,10,28-30].
Postulates introduced in this paper are utilized; in general the de Broglie-Bohm and Cramer (TI)
interpretations of quantum theory, the Dirac polarized vacuum, the Sagnac affect [5,17,18], the
unique string vacuum derived from HAM cosmology and the special class of Calabi-Yau mirror
symmetry conditions.
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Figure 12. The Dirac polarized vacuum has hyperspherical symmetry. a) Top left,
metaphor for TI standing-wave present showing future-past elements, R1, R2 , eleven of
twelve dimensions suppressed for simplicity. b) Bottom left, top view of a) 2D spherical
standing-wave; c) Bottom left right portion, manipulating the relative quantum/brane
phase of oscillations creates nodes of destructive and constructive interference. d) Right,
Four numerical simulations of the phase space trajectory of the Dubois superposed
incursive oscillator based on coordinates and velocities xn 1/ 2[ xn (1) xn (2)]
vn 1/ 2[vn (1) vn (2)] is shown in the figure for values of t equal to 0.1, 0.5, 1.0 and
1.5. Initial conditions are 0 1,0 0 & 0 0 with total simulation time t 8 .
Figure 12b adapted from [31].
It is important to recall one of our main proposals concerning the wave structure of matter and that
space-time is created, annihilated and recreated continuously. If one throws a stone in a pool of
water concentric ripples occur. If one drops two stones into the water, regions of constructive and
destructive interference occur. This is essentially how our resonant hierarchy operates as shown in
Fig. 13c. The basic idea of the radio frequency or rf-modulated resonance hierarchy is as follows:
in the first tier (Fig. 13a) a radio frequency is chosen to oscillate the electrons in the atom or
molecule chosen in such a way that the nucleons will resonate. This is related to the principles of
nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR). This couples electrons to the magnetic moment of the
nucleons in tier 2. By the principles of relativistic quantum field theory (RQFT) tiers one and two
undergo resonant coupling to the beat frequency of the fabric of space-time. The multitier
cumulative interaction of tears 1, 2 and 3 by application of the incursive oscillator can be set to
destructively or constructively interfere with the annihilation or creation operators of space-time.
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Figure 13. a) Design elements of the Noetic Interferometer postulated to
constructively-destructively interfere with the topology of the spacetime manifold to
manipulate the unified field. The first three tiers set the stage for the critically important
4th tier which by way of an incursive oscillator punches a hole in the fabric of spacetime
creating a holophote or lighthouse effect of the UF into the experimental apparatus
momentarily missing its usual coupling node into a biological system. b) Conceptualized
Witten vertex Riemann sphere cavity-QED multi-level Sagnac effect interferometer
designed to ‘penetrate’ space-time to emit the ‘eternity wave, ’ of the unified field.
Experimental access to vacuum structure or for surmounting the uncertainty principle can
be done by two similar methods. One is to utilize an atomic resonance hierarchy and the
other a spacetime resonance hierarchy. The spheroid is a 2D representation of a HD
complex Riemann sphere able to spin-flip from zero to infinity continuously.
A final essential component of the vacuum interferometer is called an incursive oscillator [31]
which acts as a feedback loop on the arrow of time [10]. Parameters of the Dubois incursive
oscillator are also required for aligning the interferometer hierarchy with the beat frequency of
spacetime by x(t t ) v(t t ) . Critically the size of t correlates with the size of the ‘hole’ to
be punched in spacetime which also correlates with the wavelength, of the rf-resonance pulse.
There you have it or at least an initial foray; let the battle begin…
References
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[8] Amoroso, R. L.. (2013) Empirical protocol for mediating long-range coherence in biological systems,
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[19] Randall, L. (2005) Warped Passages, Unraveling the Mysteries of the Universe’s Hidden Dimensions,
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[20] Holy Bible, King James version.
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[26] Doctrine & Covenants, Sec. 88, Salt Lake City: Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
[27] Amoroso, R. L. (2013) 27 preprints at: http://vixra.org/Amoroso, R. L./richard_l_amoroso.
[28] Amoroso, R. L. (2012) Spacetime energy resonator: a transistor of complex Dirac polarized vacuum
topology, US Patent, http://www.google.com/patents/US20120075682.
[29] Amoroso, R. L. (2010) Simple resonance hierarchy for surmounting quantum uncertainty, in R.L.
Amoroso et al (eds.) AIP Conference Proceedings, Vol. 1316, p. 185.
[30] Amoroso, R. L. (1996) The production of Frӧhlich and Bose-Einstein coherent states in in vitro
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39-42.
[31] Dubois, D.M. (2001) Theory of incursive synchronization and application to the anticipation of delayed
linear and nonlinear systems, in D.M. Dubois (ed.) Computing Anticipatory Systems: CASYS 2001, 5th
Intl Conf., AIP Conf. Proceedings 627, pp. 182-195.
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Article
Transcendent Nature of Human Consciousness (Part I)
Alex Vary*
Abstract
The usual question put is, “How does the brain generate consciousness?” It is proposed that a
more potent and interesting question is, “How does consciousness generate the brain?” This
question presumes that consciousness preexists and transcends its earthly material embodiment that human consciousness is global, extending beyond the neural boundaries of the brain, beyond
self-awareness, beyond sentience. To propose and argue the transcendent nature of
consciousness, one might boldly assume that it transcends everything material - that
consciousness transcends every aspect of the material world, indeed the observable cosmos. This
paper explores the ultimate nature of consciousness and suggests that human consciousness
transcends its physical embodiment while interlinking quantum phenomena in neurons with a
universe of pure thought. We experience it in the space-time milieu of the physical world, which
provides a physiological vehicle for consciousness to put things into spatiotemporal order - to
satisfy an innate intellectual urge to bring order out of chaos. At the quantum mechanical scale of
human consciousness, this remarkable and enigmatic phenomenon may be explained by several
quantum consciousness theories. Apparently, our transcendent consciousness consists of waves
of signals that activate neural networks which orchestrate the signals into thoughts and actions.
On the grand scale, it may be argued that a transcendent omnipresent consciousness is an extraingredient: one that preexists, specifies, and evolves tangible instrumentalities: mind/brain neural
networks as its living vehicles. A conceptual framework is described to illustrate the
transcendent nature of consciousness and its relation to the physical world. The proposed
framework is based on deductions and information revealed primarily by waveform phenomena
which are demonstrably transcendent. An essential feature of the framework is the mesostratum;
a signal transmission modality. This paper suggests ways to access and explore the mesostratum
and suggests necessarily nonreductionist approaches for the study and exploration of human
consciousness.
Part I of this two-part article includes: Introduction; Primordial Consciousness; Penrose and
Platonic Reality; and Mesostratum Reality.
Key Words: mesostratum, thought signals, information, waveforms, Plato’s world, mental
world, physical world, transcendent, consciousness, memes, qualia, observer.
Introduction
In Consciousness Explained, 1991, Daniel Dennett, wrote, “Human consciousness is just about
the last surviving mystery. . . Consciousness stands alone today as a topic that often leaves even
the most sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied and confused. . . . With consciousness . . . we are still
* Correspondence: Alex Vary, PhD, Retired NASA Scientist & Independent Researcher. Email: axelvary@wowway.com
Note: An abstract version was presented at Toward a Science of Consciousness 2014.
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in a terrible muddle. . . And, as with all the earlier mysteries, there are many who insist - and
hope - that there will never be a demystification of consciousness.” In The Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 1995, David Chalmers wrote: “Consciousness poses the most baffling
problems in the science of the mind. There is nothing that we know more intimately than
conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain. All sorts of mental
phenomena have yielded to scientific investigation in recent years, but consciousness has
stubbornly resisted.” The mystery of consciousness revolves around the question: How can
living physical bodies in the physical world acquire such phenomena? Neither Dennett’s
reductionist approach nor Chalmers’ non-reductionist approach has thus far provided the pivotal
concepts needed to resolve the question. This paper suggests a transcendent mesostratum which
links consciousness to the physical world.
Chalmers observes that subjective information processing invariably accompanies sensory and
neural signal processing. This subjective activity arises from accumulated experience; even
when lacking the cognitive cohesion that overrides the transience of sentient life events. We do
not just retain visual sensations; we judge the quality of colors, the contrast of dark and light, the
quality of depth in a visual field; with iconic images that are conjured up mentally, that are felt
emotionally, and inspire a stream of conscious thought. What unites these states of consciousness
putatively transcends and elaborates accumulated experiences.
In The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, David Chalmers introduced the
notion of the hard problem of consciousness. According to Chalmers, the hard problem of
consciousness is explaining how we experience it with respect to: (1) sensory inputs and the
mysterious modes of their neural processing and (2) qualia phenomena where the processing is
accompanied by ineffably subjective aspects of conscious experience (which apprehend the
redness of red, the beauty of mathematical forms, love, the selfness experience). These
phenomena are related to physical neurological brain-states, but are not identical to brain states
because they are experienced but are empirically unmeasurable, unquantifiable. They are
seemingly constructs of consciousness; a consciousness that assigns reality, meaning, value,
quality to what is being experienced by the sentient self-aware body.
The notion of a transcendent consciousness escalates the hard problem because it is experienced
indirectly, esoterically, and when experienced it is not always obvious to the unprepared or
unattuned mind. By my thesis it indirectly commands the body and evaluates its experiences: it is
a motivator and observer - a transcendent occupant the body - perhaps it is that which is usually
called the subconscious. It communicates - or we communicate with it - subconsciously in subtle
ways - if not by imagery or verbal exchanges then through insight, inspiration, introspection,
meditation. Possibly, lucid dreaming, near death and out-of-body experiences, and certain types
of hallucinations are extreme examples.
In The Emperor’s New Mind Roger Penrose claims he receives insights from Plato’s world - by
my thesis from his transcendent consciousness, via the mesostratum. The initiating inspiration is
essentially nonverbal. Penrose writes, “Almost all my mathematical thinking is done visually and
in terms of nonverbal concepts, although the thoughts are quite often accompanied by inane and
almost useless verbal commentary, such as ‘that thing goes with that thing and that thing goes
with that thing’ . . . I often calculate using specially designed diagrams which constitute a
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shorthand for certain types of algebraic expression. This is not to say that I do not sometimes
think in words, it is just that I find words almost useless for mathematical thinking.”
Einstein, Pauli, Schrödinger, Heisenberg, Eddington, and Jeans, espoused a form mysticism that
connotes communication with their transcendent consciousness. Einstein spoke of a cosmic
feeling that inspired his reflections on the harmony of nature. Apparently mystical insights
achieved by quiet meditative practices can be a useful guide in formulation of foundational
scientific theories. Kurt Gödel spoke of the “other relation to reality” by which he could directly
perceive mathematical objects, such as infinity. Gödel was able to achieve this by adopting
meditative practices. Heinrich Hertz said, “One cannot escape the feeling that these mathematical
formulas have an independent existence of their own, and they are wiser than even their
discoverers, that we get more out of them than was originally put into them.”
Conventional theory almost always avoids embracing transcendent phenomenon in deference to
the strict guidelines of reductionist empiricism. Virtually all physics theorists and cosmologists
disdain ascribing a transcendent aspect to any part of objective reality. Many adhere to the
convention that reality is that which is material, tangible, observable, definable, measurable relegating any esoteric excursions from objective reality to realms of randomness or to a
probabilistic mystery or to an ethereal scrapheap of nonreductionist unprovable or unshareable
subjective babble.
This paper proposes that it may be possible to make more progress in the study of consciousness
and consciousness science if theorists, physics theorists, physiology theorists would tentatively
concede that we are immersed in a complex transcendent universe; that we exist in a subset of an
ultimately unknowable reality. We should refine existing theories to incorporate evidence of
transcendent phenomena and attempt to remove mysteries by questioning and understanding.
Indeed, at this juncture, we should begin questioning objective-theoretical precepts with which
we may have become much too comfortable. Karl Popper wrote, “Science must begin with
myths, and with the criticism of myths,” but then cautioned, “Whenever a theory appears to you
as the only possible one, take this as a sign that you have neither understood the theory nor the
problem which it was intended to solve.”
It is not unreasonable to contend that human consciousness transcends its physical embodiment
yet somehow interlinks quantum phenomena in our neural networks with a universe of pure
thought. This kind of linkage is discussed in Information and the Nature of Reality - From
Physics to Metaphysics, a compendium of commentary by philosophers, scientists, theologians
carefully contemplating about and speculating on the transcendent aspects of consciousness as a
conveyor of supernal intelligence and information.
Even by acknowledging the transcendent nature of consciousness, the hard problem of
consciousness may persist; and will perhaps remain permanently unresolved or be incompletely
resolved. It is likely that by its presumed nature and definition, transcendent consciousness is
constantly evolving and reinventing itself. The resolution offered here may be incomplete, but
an inconclusive attempt is better than no attempt at all.
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Primordial Consciousness
To rationalize a transcendent consciousness one needs to assume that it transcends everything
material - every aspect of the physical world, indeed the entire observable cosmos. This bold
concept suggests taking an inventory of the content and nature of the cosmos. One may begin by
allowing that our cosmos is probably one of countless many, and that its observable content is
only a minuscule subset of an unbounded transcendent universe. Star-centered planetary systems
with their entourages of globular habitats, many harboring sentient self-aware life, are probably
inevitable components of any self-contained cosmos. Evidence is accumulating that uncountable
putatively congenial globular habitats are diffusely dispersed throughout galaxies and the
cosmos. How does it happen - what is the validity of the inference - that myriads of these
globular habitats engender conscious inhabitants that explore the nature of their consciousness
and ponder its role in the vastness of the cosmos?
This paper explores aspects of the proposition that our material reality is part of a greater
transcendent reality in which we are immersed through our consciousness. Moreover, this paper
attempts to explain the nature of the transcendent reality by positing a foundational framework.
First, a review of carefully considered, highly imaginative almost mythical, concepts of
primordial consciousness insights are given.
Arthur Stanley Eddington in The Nature of the Physical World concludes, “The stuff of the
world is mind-stuff. . .The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our
individual conscious minds. . .Consciousness is not sharply defined, but fades into
subconsciousness; and beyond that we must postulate something indefinite. . . yet continuous
with our mental nature. . .It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept the view that the
substratum of everything is of mental character. But no one can deny that mind is the first and
most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference.”
James Jeans exclaimed in The Mysterious Universe, “. . . the universe begins to look more and
more like a great thought than like a great machine.” Perhaps, an omniscient consciousness
creates just such a great machine, the dynamic milieu of the cosmos, and then endeavors to put
things into spatiotemporal order, to bring order out of chaos; as contemplated by Ilya Prigogine
and Isabelle Stengers in Order out of Chaos.
In his foundational work Ethics Baruch Spinoza may well have declared: "Consciousness is one,
that is, only one substance can be granted in the universe. Whatsoever is, is in Consciousness,
and without Consciousness nothing can be, or be conceived. Consciousness is the indwelling and
not the transient cause of all things. All things which are, are in Consciousness. Besides
Consciousness there can be no substance, that is, nothing in itself external to Consciousness." I
simply substituted Consciousness for God in Spinoza’s original seventeenth century declaration.
This recasts Spinoza’s profound insight about the nature of the universe and emphasizes his
contention that God is an abstract and impersonal entity. One might say God is a transcendent
omniscient consciousness (a consciousness which humans and perhaps other sentient creatures
share).
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It may be that such an omniscient transcendent consciousness needs the tangible and that its
tangible manifestations need consciousness, to apprehend order in chaos, perhaps at least locally,
to bring order out of chaos. This creative aspect of consciousness was articulated by John
Archibald Wheeler as, “We are participators in bringing into being not only the near and here but
the far away and long ago. We are in this sense, participators in bringing about something of the
universe in the distant past.” (At Home in the Universe) He was, I suggest, echoing the previous
adaptation of Spinoza’s insight and asserting our presumed primordial participation in and our
emanation from a universal consciousness and therefore our involvement in a grand cosmic
scenario of creativity in malleable portions of objective reality.
Ludwig Boltzmann hypothesized a self-aware entity that arises due to random fluctuations out of
a state of cosmic chaos. This entity, named the Boltzmann brain, putatively arose spontaneously
to produce the current level of cosmic organization with its multitude of individual self-aware
entities. Boltzmann never specified in what or in what manner the random fluctuations arose,
but asserts for every cosmos with the level of organization we see in ours, there should be an
enormous number of Boltzmann brains floating around in as yet utterly unorganized
environments. This concept anticipates the idea, discussed later, that Boltzmann brains are not
‘hard-wired’ neural entities but coherent informational signal parcels.
One way to look at the Boltzmann brain is that it requires a reversal of entropy. This leads to the
paradox of how a seemingly chaotic cosmos can produce isolated pockets of order and
organization - a localized reversal of entropy. This organized entity is spawned as pockets of
order out of chaos - an ethereal brain or mind. It becomes self-aware and contemplates its origin
and its mission within the entropy-generating milieu that spawned it. Boltzmann should have
further considered whether the process was really a random fluctuation as opposed to the
awakening of a primordial transcendent consciousness predisposed to the deliberate design of
thinking entities which are distinct from their chaotic milieu.
Even if design were absent, a question still remains: Is the emergence of the thoughtful
transcendent brain perhaps predestined or potentiated by parameters inherent to the chaotic
milieu? Indeed, this brain-like activity implies the emergence of intelligent signals devoid of and
not requiring a physical neural network, or any ‘hard wiring’ at all. It will be clear that the
mesostratum demonstrably supports such transcendent signals and waveforms independently of
the physiostratum.
In What is Life? Erwin Schrödinger described a theoretical awakened, growing, evolving
potentiality as utilizing negentropy. Schrödinger elaborates on the marvelous faculty of living
organisms, to delay decay towards thermodynamic equilibrium (heat death) by feeding upon
negative entropy, attracting, consuming a stream of negative entropy into itself - to compensate
the entropy increase it produces by living and maintaining itself on a stationary and fairly low
entropy level. The physical results of this negentropy are sentient thinking creatures and beings
endowed with the capacity to contain consciousness.
From Eddington to Spinoza, from Boltzmann to Schrödinger, are we being enthralled with some
masterfully conceived mythology or perhaps being exposed to primordial memories and/or
reflections of a transcendent consciousness - to which special individuals have better access than
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most? There is no empirical foundation for Boltzmann brains or Schrödinger’s negentropy or
Wheeler’s participatory cosmos builders. Of course, there are but a few who would dare question
the currently accepted mythology of the beginning and minutely detailed history of the Big
Bang. After all, the mathematics is consistent and beautiful (more about that later).
A virtually unchallengeable observation is that it requires an immense dynamic cosmos and a
tremendous amount of time to produce minuscule pockets of intelligent consciousness on
congenial life-friendly globular habitats. According to Stephen Hawking it also requires a grand
design. In The Grand Design Stephen Hawking explains how “. . . understanding of the laws
governing us and our universe [may] lead to a unique theory that predicts and describes a vast
universe full of the amazing variety that we see.” Hawking’s laws of the universe are putatively
so exquisitely formulated that they govern the assembly of the cosmos down to the minutest
details of forces, fields, and quantum particles.
Hawking does not explain where the grand design and laws of the universe originate and reside;
how they initiate the cosmos. He avoids suggesting a consciousness that conceives and directs
the process. Hawking advocates the idea that, “Spontaneous creation is the reason there is
something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, why we exist. It is not necessary to
invoke God to light the blue touch paper and set the universe going.” But, implicit in Hawking’s
universal laws and grand design is the conjecture that they preexist the emergence of the
material cosmos.
Hawking eschews God as a first cause and prefers instead what might be termed Darwinian
cosmology. He espouses a multi-universe concept because it allows the means by which a
particular finely tuned universe, such as ours, may evolve and survive as one among many, if it is
fit to survive. In their struggle to survive, some universes may succeed, others may fail. Some
enjoy extended lives, while many collapse, become extinct due to poor or profligate use of
available resources beyond permissible parameters. The most interesting of those fit to survive
are universes possessing physical properties that produce environments for evolving and
sustaining self-aware beings like us.
Quantum electrodynamic scientists and cosmologists are ironically content with the notion that
the entire material content of the cosmos popped out of a transcendent void. The nature of this
void and its tangible products are interesting because human consciousness is one of those
products. This omnipotent void has been described by Heinz Pagels in his book Perfect
Symmetry as, “The most complete void that we can imagine . . . no space, time or matter. It is . .
. without place, without duration or eternity, without number . . . . yet this unthinkable void
converts itself into the plenum of existence . . . a necessary consequence of physical laws.”
Pagels then wonders, “Where are these laws written into the void?” and he then infers, “It would
seem that even the void is subject to law, a logic that existed prior to time and space.” Or as
Stephen Hawking implies in The Grand Design - laws that preexist the emergence of the material
cosmos.
This paper contends that Heinz Pagels’ universal void is the mesostratum, a transcendent
substrate, which contains the physics, logic, design, energy and infinite dormant potentialities
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needed to spawn the cosmos - perhaps uncountable coexisting cosmoses. These dormant
potentialities may include an infinitude of extra dimensions as well as a continuum of compact
dimensions postulated in quantum theory, superstring theory, and Edward Witten’s M-theory.
Seemingly, the void contains a library of all possible instructions, signals, waveforms, formulae,
and processes for the formation of countless habitable worlds, complemented with consciousness
endowed beings. This transcendent aspect of the mesostratum facilities - in concert with our
experiencing the material world - sets the stage for exploring the contemporary state of
consciousness.
Penrose and Platonic Reality
Rather than speculating on the beginning, evolution, and complex history of a cosmic
consciousness, this paper contemplates contemporary local manifestation and attributes of
consciousness that may be accessed individually. It will be seen that these local manifestation
and attributes can be explained in terms of the physical sciences, in particular in terms of
quantum mechanical wavefunction phenomena that transpirate in the mesostratum of which
Plato’s world as described by Roger Penrose is simply a subset.
Roger Penrose, argues that we discover the laws of nature in Plato’s world of perfect forms. He
elaborates on his own experience with Plato’s world and diagrams its relation to the physical
world and the mental world in The Emperor’s New Mind and The Road to Reality - A Complete
Guide to the Laws of the Universe. Does Plato's world actually exist, in any meaningful sense?
Penrose affirms: "This was an extraordinary idea for its time, and . . . is indeed an immensely
valuable one. It tells us to be careful to distinguish the precise mathematical entities from the
approximations that we see around us in the world of physical things. . . . Does this not point to
something outside ourselves, with a reality that lies beyond what each individual can achieve?”
(The Road to Reality).
Penrose concludes that the Platonic world of perfect forms exists and that nature and the mind
draws from and depends upon its inexhaustible reservoir of ideal entities. Although perfect
forms are not found in the physical world, there is ample evidence that nature utilizes the
mathematical objects and formulae of Plato’s world. Penrose asserts a remarkable interplay and
communication among the triplet he designates as the Platonic, mental, and physical worlds. The
interplay is manifested by the manner in which mathematical discoveries, experimental results,
the concrete world, and human consciousness are intertwined via the transcendent aspect of
Plato’s world of perfect mathematical forms/objects.
Certainly, mathematicians and physics theorists draw upon these resources, usually
unknowingly, attributing their innate brilliance. Putatively, there is an osmotic interface between
Plato’s world and the physical world; an interface and process that elevates individual
consciousness far beyond its material integument. This conceptual interface can facilitate
exploring the interplay of intangible and tangible aspects of the universe and examining how
human consciousness fits into a preternatural milieu. I’m intrigued by and eagerly explore the
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notion that human consciousness, indeed my consciousness, transcends its ambulating
integument and its neural network boundaries and potentially partakes in Plato’s world.
As a physics theoretician, Penrose prefers to limit his interest to Plato’s world of mathematical
concepts. In The Emperor's New Mind, he writes, "I imagine that whenever the mind perceives
a mathematical idea it makes contact with Plato's world of mathematical concepts. . . . When one
'sees' a mathematical truth, one's consciousness breaks through into this world of ideas, and
makes direct contact with it. . . . When mathematicians communicate, this is made possible by
each one having a direct route to truth, the consciousness of each being in a position to perceive
mathematical truths directly, through this process of 'seeing.'. . . The mental images that each
one has, when making this Platonic contact, might be rather different in each case, but
communication is possible because each is directly in contact with the same eternally existing
Platonic world!"
Penrose and some other prominent mathematicians believe that truly beautiful mathematical
findings come only after a visit to the Platonic world of mathematical objects. Apparently, only a
few mathematicians and theoretical physicists are able to have such a highly irregular experience
as visiting the Platonic world. Most mathematicians and physicists can neither understand nor
accept Penrose's Platonic position. The irony is that when mathematicians and physics theorists
describe phenomena that govern physical and subatomic interactions (such as the flow of
electricity, magnetic attraction/repulsion, electron orbitals, quantum probabilities, wave
functions, etc.) they describe purely mathematical objects that ostensibly exist only in Plato's
world, indeed in the mesostratum - which I propose is a transcendent hyperspace continuum - the
energetic substrate of our physical world, the physiostratum. A corresponding paradigm shift is
needed; which would allow physicists to comfortably regard the mesostratum continuum as
complementary to particulate physical reality, which it demonstrably is!
Most consciousness theorists working toward a science of consciousness justifiedly abide by the
methods of the physical sciences that have proven so precisely successful in dealing with the
tangible world and the exotic world of quantum electrodynamic phenomena. But, there is a
problem of uncertainty even in that stalwart realm. It is worth noting Richard Feynman’s
summation regarding the peculiar behavior of elementary particles throughout the cosmos.
Feynman wrote, “While I am describing to you how Nature works, you won't understand why
Nature works that way. But you see, nobody understands that. I can't explain why Nature works
in this peculiar way.” . . . “The theory of quantum electrodynamics describes Nature as absurd
from the point of view of common sense. And yet it agrees fully with experiment. So I hope you
can accept Nature as She is — absurd.” (QED - The Strange Theory of Light and Matter)
As an example of the absurdity, Feynman cites the “strange phenomenon of partial reflection” of
photons which “wave theory cannot explain.” When discrete quantum ‘particles’ impinge on a
reflective surface, they are mathematically described as continuous waves.
Quantum
electrodynamics describes the propagation of light energy in terms of wavefunctions - of photon
waves, but the price of this is a retreat to calculating only the probability that a photon will be
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reflected or transmitted in a particular way . . . “without offering a good model of how it actually
happens.”
Although agreeing with experiment, quantum electrodynamic mathematics (often described as
beautiful, because beautiful mathematics seems preferable, precise, and just right) still does not
explain the exact nature of the quantumthings that behave, according to Feynman, so absurdly.
This paper offers a conceptual framework that attempts to remove the absurdity that vexed
Feynman; it offers a Chalmeresque extra ingredient which promises to break the logjam imposed
by some hard science dogmas. The extra ingredient is the transcendent mesostratum.
Feynman’s frustration is exemplified by the measurement problem associated with the transit of
a quantum particle, say a photon, from source to detector which evolves according to the
Schrödinger wavefunction and spreads out in space. But actual measurement in physical reality
finds it deposited at a unique spot on a detector surface. The measurement does something to the
process under examination. That something is unanticipated by the wavefunction, it is called
wavefunction collapse. In this paper I adopt the notion that consciousness involves
wavefunctions of thoughts, ideas, images, music, and many other kinds of esoteric signals; and
that these impinge (collapse) on and are processed in concert by the brain’s neural network
receptors, as described by the Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated Objective Reduction (OR) theory.
Penrose (Shadows of the Mind) suggests that the key to understanding consciousness may lie in
reconciling quantum theory with general relativity; that quantum-gravitational effects not yet
understood may be responsible for the collapse of the quantum wave function. Collaborating
with Staurt Hameroff (Toward a Science of Consciousness), Penrose suggests that human
cognition may depend on quantum wavefunction collapses in microtubules, the cytoskeletons of
a neuron. Penrose and Hameroff suspect that wavefunction collapse in microtubules may be the
physical-neurological basis of conscious experience. This is analogous to light-wavefunction
collapses on the retina (perhaps of the order of trillions per square centimeter per second) which
produce, replenish, and sustain the dynamical images we see. According to the PenroseHameroff theory, wavefunction collapses may be detected by gravitational agglomerations, that
is, specific organizations of microtubule neural networks and associations.
However, wavefunction collapses are an auxiliary issue. Attention should be given to the
wavefunction prior to its collapse, while it spans the mesostratum, carrying signals that inform
consciousness. Cytoskeletal agglomerations should be regarded as receptors, collectively as
antennae, attuned to transcendent mesostratum signals that form and sustain consciousness.
Cytoskeletal agglomerations in the brain might function as resonant oscillators driven by
energetic signals which emanate from the mesostratum. In free space, devoid of these receptor
agglomerations, the signals simply dissipate as quantum foam.
The issue needing elucidation is the signal source, the origin of consciousness wavefunctions the esoteric signals that produce and accompany the phenomena of consciousness. Resolution of
this issue requires a conceptual framework or model that establishes the relation among the
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mesostratum (the Platonic world), the physical world, and the mental world of consciousness (of
pure thought or of the origin thought-signals/wavefunctions).
Mesostratum Reality
I posit the mesostratum in place of ether, which early in the last century was considered a
substance that carries light waves (this was disproved and abandoned). It can be demonstrated
that light waves, indeed all electromagnetic waves and fields, transpirate in the mesostratum (a
hyperspace, not a substance, transcending gravitational physicality by definition). This reality has
been staring the physics community in the face since Thomas Young's double slit experiment and
the Michelson–Morley interferometer experiment.
It is clear that any discussion of transcendent consciousness involves the mind, which in turn
requires its own definition as a transcendent entity. I unabashedly define the mind as a triad of
soul ~ spirit ~ body spanning three strata: (1) the superstratum (the transcendent domain of pure
thought), (2) the mesostratum (the mediating domain of information, signals, energetic fields,
and indeed Platonic perfect forms, templates, patterns), and (3) the physiostratum (the material
domain of spacetime and temporal objective reality). In this context, soul or core of being is an
individualized focus of a transcendent consciousness while spirit is a conveyor of signals
(information) between soul and body. The soul/core reaches from the superstratum to the
body/brain in the physiostratum via signals through the mesostratum interface.
The main burden of this paper is to demonstrate the reality of the mesostratum and, at least
provisionally, as a concept that can help explain how a transcendent consciousness spawns,
enables, and evolves human consciousness. A leap of blind faith is not needed for accepting the
idea of the transcendent aspect of a human mind nor the existence of a transcendent mesostratum
that mediates between the physiostratum and superstratum, between body and soul. One need
simply observe that just as Platonic perfect forms and mathematical objects exist, Schrödinger
wavefunctions, electron orbitals, probability functions, magnetic fields, electromagnetic waves,
light waves, and other such continuumthings exist; and the mesostratum exists and is necessary
to subsume them. It is apparent that mesostratum continuumthings like informational signals and
mathematical objects transpirate outside and independently of the particulate physiostratum and
its discontinuous granular spacetime.
Lee Smolin, in Three Roads to Quantum Gravity notes that, according to loop quantum gravity,
there is an atomic structure to space, describable in terms of the nodal spin networks invented by
Roger Penrose (The Road to Reality). Smolin acknowledges that the most improbable and
puzzling aspect of this atomized space is its apparent smooth and continuous nature. Smolin
explains the smoothness by proposing that the granularity of space and concordant discontinuity
of time are on the scale of Planck length (10-33 centimeter) and Planck interval (10-43 second).
We, by default, regard spacetime as a smooth uninterrupted mathematical continuum while that
attribute resides only in the mesostratum hyperspace continuum.
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Continuum-things, like Plato’s perfect forms, can only exist in the mesostratum hyperspace.
Continuum-things are energetic and influence/govern the dynamic behavior of gravitational
agglomerations of quantum-things in the physiostratum. Schrödinger’s wavefunction, is a
continuum-thing; it is essentially a mathematical invention that predicts probabilities regarding
the quantum state changes of an energetic signal system with respect to time and space. The
reality of the wavefunction is unquestioned because it describes the evolution of the quantum
system’s state very well. The endpoint event, which is detected - which is consciously
experienced and observed in the physiostratum - is a wavefunction collapse during which
according to John von Neuman, ‘a miracle happens!’ The miracle is that a specific quantumthing suddenly appears here after being emitted way over there. The mystery is what happens
while the quantum-thing is in transit in the mesostratum, decoupled from the physiostratum,
before being redelivered to the physiostratum. The wavefunction evolution scenario - which
plays out entirely in the mesostratum - is empirically unmeasurable; the collapse alone is
manifest, when a quantum-thing suddenly lands in a physiostratum gravitational agglomeration
of quantum-things and is observed - is detected/measured.
Since the mesostratum waveform evolution scenario is not observed, it may be declared to be a
non-reality, reinforcing the notion that the only reality is one that is observed and measured.
One might muse that neither the mesostratum nor wavefunction are objectively real and are
therefore sufficiently transcendent to be dismissed by reductionists, empiricists, naturalists.
More difficult is the acceptance of radical concepts such as the superstratum ~ mesostratum ~
physiostratum model. This model and its auxiliary paradigms are nevertheless useful because
they help explain the operation of strings, quantum entanglement, non-locality, superluminality,
and other esoteric phenomena in terms of transcendent continuumthings in the mesostratum
hyperspace, as explained by Vary in My Universe - A Transcendent Reality.
String theory is being developed to describe the nature of quantum particles and gravitational
agglomerations. In theory, strings are basic physical entities - different vibrational states of
which represent the different elementary particles. A string can be visualized as a mathematical
object in mesostratum hyperspace. In some versions of string theory, strings generate two
dimensional extended objects called branes (an apocope of membranes). Theorists posit multidimensional manifolds, mathematical objects, that require many more than just four dimensions
in mesostratum hyperspace (Shape of Inner Space, Shing-Tung Yau). In string and M-theory
these extra, six or more dimensions, are ‘infinitesimal’. String theorist say that these extra
dimensions are not observed because they ‘curl’ up tightly in physiostratum spacetime. My thesis
holds that they are unobservable simply because they are continuum-things in the mesostratum
that cannot exist in the physiostratum particulate spacetime. Although additions of higher-order
branes, manifolds, dimensions seem arbitrary, they are essential for the mathematical consistency
of string theory and because they help link the five different kinds of string theory.
The superstratum and physiostratum commingle transparently in the mesostratum while each
exists within its own unique domain. The physiostratum is conceptually a subset of the
superstratum. Suffice it to say that we are aware of transcendent domains not as an objective
realities, but indirectly because of their ubiquitous influence on material domains primarily at the
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quantum level; and perhaps their influence on our experience of consciousness. The
mesostratum’s transcendent reality is demonstrated by considering photons in transit. When
photons (light wave packets) traverse the mesostratum, they are decoupled from the
physiostratum while in transit from a physiostratum source/emitter to a physiostratum
receptor/detector (photo emulsion, CCD array, or human retina). The decoupling is self-evident
because the velocity of light is a constant independent of the velocity of the photon
source/emitter. This was famously demonstrated by the Michelson–Morley experiment in 1887.
Photons (light waves, electromagnetic radiations) return to the physiostratum objective reality as
quanta of energy - absorbed by agglomerate gravitational matter. This exemplifies the PenroseHameroff notion of orchestrated objective reduction (OR). When ORs (light wavefunction
collapses) occur on human retinae the result is quickly orchestrated as repeatedly refreshed
images perceived by the brain.
I suspect the mesostratum is an osmotic interface between the transcendent Plato’s world and the
physical world, indeed, it is a dynamic substrate that elevates individual consciousness far
beyond its material integument. This conceptual interface can serve well in examining the
interplay of intangible and tangible aspects of the universe and examining how human
consciousness fits into a preternatural milieu. I’m intrigued by and eagerly explore the notion
that human consciousness, indeed my consciousness, transcends its ambulating integument and
its neural network boundaries.
The mesostratum interface may be taken as the ZPF (zero point field) substrate, the theoretically
omnipresent pervasive quantum foam, an energetic substrate. The concept of zero point energy
was developed by Albert Einstein and Otto Stern in 1913, as a corrective term added to a zero
grounded formula developed by Max Planck in 1900. Zero point energy is the lowest possible
energy that a quantum mechanical physical system may have; it is the energy of its ground state.
All quantum-mechanical systems putatively undergo fluctuations - even in their ground state have a zero-point energy - a consequence of their wave-like nature.
Joachim Keppler (Frontiers in Psychology 4:242, 2013) suggests that neural network interactions
with the all-pervasive ZPF signal radiation is the fundamental mechanism for consciousness.
These interactions allow acquisition of ZPF information states that may even result in localized
modifications of the ZPF itself. The essential function of this mechanism is the formation of
stable attractors; cohesive dynamic systems with a set of physical properties toward which the
systems tend to evolve. When realized physically in a neural network, the attractor may be a
fractal structure known as a strange attractor. Depictions of attractors associated with chaotic
dynamical systems have been one of the achievements of chaos theory. This complements the
notion that a key function of consciousness is bringing order out of chaos. According to Keppler,
suitable quantum waveform inputs induce a transition to an ordered phase that prompts a neural
network assembly to become an attractor; a perfectly synchronized pattern of conscious activity;
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Penrose-Hameroff orchestrated objective reduction. Given this scenario, the ZPF is an eminently
suitable candidate as the substrate of consciousness. The ZPF is clearly a feature and attribute of
the mesostratum; as it is defined in framework/model given in this paper.
(Continued on Part II)
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Article
Reasoning about conscious experience with axiomatic
and graphical mathematics
Camilo Miguel Signorelli 1,2,∗ , Quanlong Wang 1,3 ,Bob Coecke 1,3
1
2
3
arXiv:2106.16061v1 [q-bio.NC] 30 Jun 2021
*
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM U992, NeuroSpin
Cambridge Quantum Computing Ltd.
Correspondence: cam.signorelli@cs.ox.ac.uk
Abstract: We cast aspects of consciousness in axiomatic mathematical terms, using the graphical calculus
of general process theories (a.k.a symmetric monoidal categories and Frobenius algebras therein). This
calculus exploits the ontological neutrality of process theories. A toy example using the axiomatic calculus
is given to show the power of this approach, recovering other aspects of conscious experience, such as
external and internal subjective distinction, privacy or unreadability of personal subjective experience,
and phenomenal unity, one of the main issues for scientific studies of consciousness. In fact, these features
naturally arise from the compositional nature of axiomatic calculus.
Keywords: Consciousness; Conscious Agents; Compositionality; Graphical Calculi, Mathematical
consciousness science; Monoidal Categories; Phenomenology, Unity of Consciousness.
1. Introduction
The main motivation for our theoretical approach is giving formal tools to study consciousness in
a rigorous axiomatic setup. Current scientific approaches have thrown away the subjective features of
experience, leaving us in a strange position, without rigorous tools to describe qualitative aspects of reality
that we experience every day Goff (2019). To understand this, consider the next common example: if a
tree falls and nobody is there to hear it, does the tree make any sound? Yes, of course, the tree generates
vibrations, but the quality of sounds are only assigned by the observer. In other words, there are objective
realities (vibrations), but subjective and qualitative features such as sounds, colours, smells and tastes
exist only if a conscious mind is ready to experience them. The vibration is characterized by common
mathematical language and physical mechanisms, while qualitative and subjective aspects do not have
any formal mathematical language to refer to them.
We claim here that axiomatic reasoning in the form of graphical calculi (a.k.a. compositional
mathematics) may bring the uniqueness of conscious experience back to science, constructing a new form
of describing the structure of experience from its direct phenomenology Husserl (1983); Merleau-Ponty
(2005) and therefore, a new science of consciousness.
Graphical calculi naturally arise in category theory MacLane (1998), specifically symmetric monoidal
categories Coecke and Paquette (2011), also called process theories Coecke and Kissinger (2017). Because
of their abstract mathematical nature, they also are ontologically neutral, i.e. processes in a theory do not
assume any concrete physical realization. One can extend this idea to mental processes without any lack
of generality. Therefore, it is equally valid to suggest an interpretation of graphical calculus starting from
mental processes than from physical ones. It makes process theories and graphical calculus optimal setups
to explore the assumption of consciousness and subjectivity as fundamental processes of nature. Here,
such fundamental processes are modelled by the irreducible and primitive nature of the mathematical
generators on that calculus.
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Briefly, this article explores a re-interpretation of process theory and graphical calculi in the context of
formal structures of conscious experience Prentner (2019); Tsuchiya and Saigo (2020); Yoshimi (2007)
and process philosophy Rescher (2012); Whitehead (1929). This approach attempts to model what
consciousness itself is doing, instead of what the brain or any other physical system is doing regarding
conscious experience. The mathematical formalism of process theories is first introduced and motivated
by concrete examples (Section 2). Then, the definition of conscious experience is constructed via entangled
features of that experience, its phenomenology and empirical distinctions (Section 3). These definitions
are interpreted as mathematical generators to provide a reasoning example, from which a more complex
property of conscious experience arises: namely the the structure of privacy or unreadability of others
personal experiences (Section 4). Moreover, we address, restate and discuss the question about the unity
of consciousness according to compositional approaches (Section 5). Finally, we conclude with how
the use of process theories and axiomatic mathematics brings new advantages in the formal study of
conscious experience (Section 6 and 7), in line with the contemporary research direction of mathematical
consciousness science AMCS (2021) and phenomenology Merleau-Ponty (2005); Thompson (2007).
2. Pictorial mathematics for conscious experience
Across this section, we introduce the mathematical formalism of process theories.
2.1. Process theories
The formalism of process theories Coecke and Kissinger (2017) provides a graphical language to reason
about processes as abstract mathematical entities. These graphical languages are based on symmetric
monoidal categories Coecke and Paquette (2011), making them mathematically rigorous frameworks.
The main components are systems, or more generally speaking, types, which are represented by wires
(e.g. type A and type B), and processes, represented by boxes with a number of input and output wires,
which vary from box to box in number and labelling. In short, processes correspond to transformation.
Some diagrammatic examples are:
A
B
A
g
f
A
A
h
A
B
B
A
A
Reading the diagrams from top to bottom,1 the process f can be thought of as a map f
: A → B
from A to B, the process g as a map g : A ⊗ B → B ⊗ A, and h as h : A ⊗ A → A, where the symbol ‘⊗’
stands for ‘composing systems’. The symbol ‘I’, stands for ‘no system’, which, evidently, is graphically
represented by ‘no wire’. This induces special processes, such as states, tests and numbers, with associated
maps φ : I → A, ϕ : A → I, and s : I → I respectively. Graphically, they are represented as follows:
φ
A
s
A
ϕ
These graphical forms have the power to make simple the reasoning about how systems and processes
interact in different contexts. In this line, what is important in process theories is how systems and processes
1
Note that in much of the literature on process theories, the wires are read in the opposite direction, bottom-up.
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compose. Basically, there are two main types of composition, the sequential composition given by ◦ and
the parallel composition described by ⊗2 . If two processes f and g interact (and their wires match), these
two compositions look like:
f
g
◦
=
f
f
⊗
g
=
f
g
g
Usually, these diagrams are represented and restricted to one dimensional expression, namely ( f ◦ g)
and ( f ⊗ g) respectively. Interestingly, the graphical two dimensional representation allows us to move the
process boxes up and down freely, helping us to prove equalities and making reasoning about processes
much more intuitive, for example:
g
f
g
=
f
f
=
g
The advantage, thereof, is a very intuitive notion of equality: processes are equal when they are
represented by the same diagram. The two dimensional graphical representation also let us prove more
complex equations in simple forms, making them almost tautological. For instance, we leave to the reader
the task of drawing the diagrams for the following one-dimensional equation and check by themselves
that the equation easily holds in graphical form:
( f ⊗ g) ◦ (h ⊗ k) = ( f ◦ h) ⊗ ( g ◦ k)
From this graphical notion of equality there emerges a second more precise one: two diagrams are
equal when one becomes the other via certain transformations. Interestingly, these transformations are
purely topological, or more accurately, these transformations follow the principle that only connectedness
matters. It means that we can obtain certain results by looking at the relevant diagrams, since these results
are already present in the topology of the corresponding graph. This concept is reviewed with an example
in next subsections.
2.2. Interpretation of a theory
All process theories share one mathematical structure, i.e. the structure of symmetric monoidal
categories. Using category theoretic terminology, a functor is a map F : M → N that translates a process
theory M into another process theory N. In other words, F assigns each system A in M to a system FA in
N, and each process f : A → B in M, to a process F f : FA → FB in N, obeying certain equations ensuring
that sequential and parallel compositions are respected Awodey (2006); Coecke et al. (2016). This functor
can also be understood as an interpretation of the theory M in N. When working with diagrams, to specify
an interpretation it is enough to specify the images of the diagrams. Of course, there could exist many
such interpretations. The image of M in N is called a model.
2
This symbol is indeed used both for composing systems and processes.
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2.3. Generators and rewriting rules
Process theories enable one to axiomatise theories in a variety of disciplines, and may reveal that
theories from very different scientific areas may share a surprising amount of common structure Signorelli
et al. (2020). A striking example is the structural commonality of quantum theory and natural language
Coecke (2013). Also here we will encounter a similar remarkable structural correspondence.
A specific process theory may be characterised by a generating set of systems and processes. General
systems and processes are then obtained by composing these, that is, by making the generators interact. It
may be the case that there is only one generating system and very few generating processes. Conceptually,
we think of these generators as basic (or primitive) systems and processes.
The full specification of a process theory, in addition to the presentation of the generators, then also
tells us what these generators stand for. To better understand this, consider the following example. The
next four diagrams are the basic maps or transformations in a process theory of Boolean Circuits.
∧ : b⊗b → b
∨ : b⊗b → b
¬:b→b
FAN : b → b ⊗ b
The first operation corresponds to the logic gate and, the second one to or, then negation and
FAN operation, respectively. In this theory, the basic system is the bit b, given by the pair of values
B(b) = {0, 1}. These values come from the chosen interpretation for these diagrams, the specific mapping
B : BoolCirc → Bool. This mapping translates the above diagrams into a concrete calculus:
00 7→ 0
00 7→ 0
(
(
01 7→ 0
01 7→ 1
0 7→ 1
0 7→ 00
B(∧) = a :
B(∨) = o :
B(¬) = n :
B( FAN ) = δ :
10
7
→
0
10
7
→
1
1
7
→
0
1 7→ 11
11 7→ 1
11 7→ 1
With these four generators, a more complex process in this theory is represented as the composition
of these generators. For example, the logical expression: ( x ∧ ¬y) ∨ ¬(y ∧ z), becomes a circuit of logic
gates such as the result depends on the state value entered into the circuit and the interpretation of the
generators given above. Graphically:
The functor B is one possible mapping, but there are other alternatives as well. This presentation of
generators is the basic syntax of a theory. In order to capture the full theory, we need some extra equations
on the class of diagrams. These equations are called rewriting rules. These rules are basically a pair of
diagrams of the same type that correspond to an equivalence or equality between each other. For example,
the next composition of a ∨ and ∧ is rewritten as the composition of FAN, ∨ and ∧:
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1
=
⇒
Careful reading shows that this rule corresponds to the distributive law. Another example is to rewrite the
diagram composed by sequentially connecting ∧ and ¬, using the equivalent diagram formed by two ¬
and one ∨:
2
=
⇒
Together these two rules allow us to rewrite as follows, where rule 2 is applied first, followed by rule
1:
2
1
=
⇒
=
⇒
γ
Here we will always assume that if there is a rewriting rule, d =
⇒ d0 , there is also a rewriting rule
γ0
d0 =⇒ d. Then, these rewriting rules lead us to a formal definition of equality across diagrams.
Definition 1. Given a set of rewriting rules Γ, a diagram d and another d0 are considered equal d = d0 , if via
Γ
applying rewriting rules in Γ, d becomes d0 . We denote the existence of such a rewrite as d =
⇒ d0 .
For an interpretation F : M → N, thinking of M as diagrams and rewrites with equality as defined
Γ
Γ
Γ
above, soundness means that d = d0 implies Fd = Fd0 . If Fd = Fd0 moreover also implies d = d0 , the
interpretation is called complete. In other words, no more equalities hold for the model than can be derived
by the rewriting rules.
2.4. Process theory and consciousness
We shortly account for using process theory as a mathematical framework for a theory of conscious
experience. As reviewed above, process theories present various advantages: i) they are rigorous and
intuitive reasoning tools, ii) they focus on processes composition instead of objects, iii) they admit simple
ways to prove complex equations, iv) they define equality in intuitive topological terms, and v) they
generalize and compare theories from first principles (axioms). Can those properties bring new insights
into studies of conscious experience?
In this new context, we can exploit the features of process theories under the philosophical umbrella
of its ontological neutrality. Diagrams come with no ontology. Indeed, their ontology only arise in
relationship with what is expected to be described, via defining a functor. Process theories deal with the
phenomenon and do not claim anything about fixed properties such as mass or charge. On the contrary,
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everything that exists is studied as a process of changes and transformations Rescher (2012); Whitehead
(1929). These features place process theories in a phenomenological and pragmatic ground that allow us
to study the experience from axioms directly obtained by the experience itself. In other words, process
theories licence us to suspend the query of ontological discussions while reinforcing an epistemic caution
Lusthaus (2002); Varela (1996): the world appears to us only in co-relationship with us, becoming specified
through sense-making.
Although we highlight the primacy of conscious experience, we leave aside the deeper epistemic
and ontological interpretations about that claim. Here, we focus only on the pragmatic aspect. We
propose a compositional model with experiential processes as generators and interpret a set of rewriting
rules as compositions and modifications of experiences. These rules specify the generators via allowed
relationships (compositions) Signorelli et al. (2021), becoming more concrete instances of experiences.
In the following, this paper does not attempt to give any complete interpretation F, between the
hypothetical category of conscious experiences, let’s say CExp, and a graphical calculus in the symmetric
monoidal category Mon, such as F : CExp → Mon. Instead, we show how a fragment of the ZW-calculus
Hadzihasanovic et al. (2018), whose diagrams compose a symmetric monoidal category, enables us to
perform formal reasoning about conscious experience.
3. Defining generators for conscious experience
In order to define mathematical generators for conscious experience, we may introduce as few
assumptions as possible. The introduction of a few concepts Bayne and Chalmers (2012); Block (2005);
Lusthaus (2002); Merleau-Ponty (2005); Searle (2000), however, seems enough to recover properties of
consciousness within our formal model (Section 4). In this section we first present semi-formal statements
about conscious experience as motivations to find a formal counterpart within graphical calculi.
3.1. A phenomenological hypothesis
Our main assumption departs from current axiomatic studies of physical theories. Usually, we map
the phenomenon under consideration into one specific category, via functor definition. Here, we assume
that the diagrams of symmetric monoidal category already conveys the basic phenomenology of our
experience. For instance, sequential compositions may involve phenomenological aspects of internal
time-consciousness in Husserl’s discussions Edmund Husserl (1964). According to phenomenological
interpretations Edmund Husserl (1964); Merleau-Ponty (2005), the structure of symmetric monoidal
categories might already reflect the structure of experience. Then, theoretical axiomatizations in the field
of physics may also accept a reinterpretation as mapping physical phenomena (e.g. classical mechanics,
quantum mechanics, relativity, etc) into the structure of our conscious experience. Of course, we need
much more work to formalize and align this assumption with Husserl’s and modern phenomenology
Yoshimi (2007).
Under this hypothesis, we define a type A of a symmetric monoidal category as a primary/minimal
undefined or indistinguishable experience. We also introduce a process called the identity 1 A , which does
nothing at all to A.
A
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Then, morphisms become transformations (as dimensions of experience), that are themselves also
experiences. For instance, the symmetry condition of symmetric monoidal category is given by a swap
experience, such that:
B
A
B
A
σA,B : A ⊗ B → B ⊗ A
We can also define a notion of experiences that ‘invert’ experiences, i.e. they introduce duals (e.g.
opposite relations such as above and below). We call those processes caps η A : I → A∗ ⊗ A and cups
e A : A ⊗ A∗ → I, respectively signified by:
A∗
A
A∗
A
It adds a compact close structure Selinger (2011); Signorelli et al. (2021).
3.2. Unity
Unity of experience is one of the most salient features of consciousness as a natural process Prentner
(2019). Any experience is given as a unified single moment and seems irreducible. Some may argue
this experience is continuous, others that it is discrete VanRullen and Koch (2003); Wittmann (2011), it
may contain one or many different contents, etc. Independently, the subsumed experience is one unified
coexistence, a unified conscious field Searle (2000) that may be just conceptually subdivided into different
notions of unity (Objectual, Spatial, Subjective, Subsumptive) Bayne and Chalmers (2012).
In compositional models, unity is realized by non-trivial composition of different processes. Unity is
an intrinsic property of processes, such that a process would ‘possess’ unity as long as it cannot be written
as a disconnected diagram. One example of this non-trivial composition corresponds to entangled states
in quantum theory. The entanglement is modelled by the use of caps and cups that allow us to relate the
notions of sequential and parallel composition:
A
f
B
C
g
= A
B
f
C∗
g
B∗
C
In other words, an experience that comes before another ( f before g), is equivalent to the experience f
happening simultaneously with the inverse of the experience g, as far as they reorganize via caps, cups,
swaps and/or identity. If this is the case, we said both experiences ( f and g) are unified in one single
experience.
Definition 2. Unity of experience is realized by non-trivial composition, such that an experience process possess
unity as long as it cannot be written as a disconnected diagram.
For conceptual convenience, we represent unity by the four mathematical diagrams: cap, cup, swap
and identity, as examples of basic unity processes and different forms of experiential unity, but also because
they allow us to reorganize and compound other processes/experiences into complex diagrams that will
remain connected. By consequence, we can manipulate diagrams to accommodate and visualize their
compositions.
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In order to make the following arguments simpler, we will use a self-dual structure Selinger (2011);
Signorelli et al. (2021).
3.3. Qualitative and subjective processes
Another important feature of conscious experience is that it involves a qualitative dimension. Every
experience is mostly qualitative, rather than quantitative Goff (2019). In the words of Nagel, there is a
kind of "it feels like" or "what is it like to be" something or someone having certain experience Thomas
Nagel (1974). The qualitative character of experience may come from external perceptions or internal
thoughts Searle (2000). Indistinctly, both are unified experiences involving qualitative descriptions that
cannot be easily measured. These descriptions are what distinguishes between the experience of red and
green: the irreducible phenomenology of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, minimal phenomenal
experience, or qualia Block (2005); Metzinger (2020).
Category theory and its graphical forms allow us a very intuitive first approximation to formally
describe this qualitative dimension. In algebra, common operations, such as addition (+) and
multiplication (×), follow axioms like associativity and commutativity. For an arbitrary operation (?) and
elements a, b, and c, associativity looks like:
a
b
c
a b
c
=
a
b
c
=
(1)
( a ? b) ? c =
a?b?c
= a ? (b ? c)
This algebraic structures, together with its unit , is called a monoid 3 . The graphical form contains
a topological intuition behind the notion of associativity Lawvere and Schanuel (2009). This notion is
qualitative, it is not quantifiable per se, as the reader may observe from the equation above. In other
words, these diagrams may carry some qualitative structure of formal statements. Additionally, we can also
conceptualize quantity as a form of quality, a very precise, unfuzzy one. As such, quality may subsume
quantity, making qualitative aspects more general than quantitative ones. In the above example, the
quantitative aspect is realized by the specification of the operation ? and the elements a, b, and c.
Definition 3. Qualitative structure of experience is represented by diagrammatic equations, such that an experience
process possess quality as long as it contains trivial topological relationships that are non-trivial for formal statements.
A more general algebraic structure, the Frobenius algebra is built by the monoid and its comonoid 4 .
The comonoid is basically the same diagram than above, but inverted, such that monoid and comonoid
follows the next Frobenius law.
=
=
If we add an extra condition,
=
3
4
A monoid is always a pair of diagrams, i.e. the two legs white node (e.g. multiplication) and the state (unit).
A comonoid is also a pair of diagrams, i.e. the copy-like node (e.g. comultiplication) and the effect/test (counit).
9 of 22
this is called a Special Frobenius algebra. We can condense such structure, symmetric and
commutative conditions within an abstract mathematical entity called white spider (where all white
dots merge together for arbitrary number of elements).
...
(2)
r
...
This spider seems topologically trivial, but contains not-trivial algebraic structure. Following the
preliminary definition 3 and the intuition that quality subsumes quantity, the white spider will be called a
qualitative process. In our framework, the qualitative structure of experience is denoted by this unspecified
process, where r ∈ R is a parameter taking values in an arbitrary commutative ring, associated with
quantitative aspects that qualitative experience may also carry. Please note that this spider is slightly
different than the example in equation 1, since dots and legs denote different operations and types of
elements. Moreover, the qualitative process from ZW-calculus Hadzihasanovic (2015); Hadzihasanovic
et al. (2018) can be generalized to the Z (green) spider with multiple parameters as given in Signorelli et al.
(2021); Wang (2021).
We can further postulate that the composition for qualitative processes correspond to the next rule:
Postulate 1. Qualitative process compounds as follows:
...
r
...
...
...
s
=
rs
...
(3)
...
where rs is the product of r and s.
It means that any qualitative aspect of the experience (given by the process of quality) is fused
and glued by default, just by means of being connected. Note that this is a non-trivial consequence of
associativity and the Frobenius conditions introduced above.
Additionally, any conscious experience has also a subjective dimension, perhaps, inseparable of the
qualitative one Searle (2000). It seems that experiences only exist if there are subjects or agents (sentient
beings) to experience something. Neither does a rock appears to have any kind of experience, nor particles
or atoms. Qualitative processes would imply subjective ones since, for a qualitative feeling regarding
some event to exist, there must exist a subject to experience that event Searle (2000). This experience is
part of the so-called first-person accounts, corresponding to elements of reality that do not exist without a
subject, such as perceptual experiences (e.g. the experience of colour), bodily experiences (e.g. pain and
hunger), emotional experiences, mental imagery, among others Chalmers (2013). First-person accounts
contrast with the third-person accounts, related to "objective" and quantitative measurements such as
brain signatures of perceptual discrimination or differences between sleep and wakefulness Chalmers
(1995). Therefore, conscious experiences seems to exist only when there are agents to experience: some “I”
owner of that experience. This imposes a boundary that perceived elements must "cross" to become part of
that experience. This is called conscious access.
In order to account for this intrinsic relationship between qualitative and subjective dimension of
experience, we tentatively define a subjective process using an adaptation of the mathematical comonoid
introduced in ZW-calculus Hadzihasanovic et al. (2018), represented by a black triangle.
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:=
...
...
m
m
where m ≥ 2.
The white monoid and its black comonoid follow the bialgebra law.
=
The formal definition of this graphical form is standard in the literature and detailed discussions can
be found in Selinger (2011) and Coecke (2011), among many others.
Definition 4. Qualitative and subjective dimensions of experience are realized by a bialgebra structure, such that a
qualitative process is the monoid and subjective one is the comonoid, each one forming a Special Frobenious algebra.
In short, the subjective process is a generalization of the triangle
, and its unit (a.k.a. effect):
:=
such that we can define its own monoid, states, and identity.
:=
:=
:=
Note that these diagrammatic definitions use the caps and cups, while the black triangle with one
input and one output coincides with the identity process, all them introduced in previous section. Finally,
we can recursively define the black triangle with multiple legs, leading us to the almost tautological second
postulate, a similar rule of composition for subjective process.
Postulate 2. Subjective process compounds as follows:
...
...
=
(4)
...
These composition rules ensure the unity of experience and its compositional nature across different
instances of experience. In both cases, the composition takes the form of a fusion rule given by associativity
axioms.
3.4. Distinction
Qualitative and subjective processes in terms of two dimensions of conscious experience result in two
different kinds of unities that in turn generate distinctions. We interpret the former as the phenomenal unity
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and the latter as the access unity Bayne and Chalmers (2012) (a.k.a phenomenal consciousness and access
consciousness). The distinctions correspond to distinctive experiences and distinctive content, respectively,
the "how" we are conscious and about "what" we are conscious of Weisberg (2020). Phenomenal experience,
the what is like to be, is differentiated from the access consciousness, i.e. the accessibility of content for
further cognitive processing in a certain moment of time Aru et al. (2012); Block (2005). The difference is
not only conceptual, but it also seems to involve empirical evidence of different brain signatures Aru et al.
(2012); Block (2005). It is important to mention this, because assumptions in our model do correspond to
these conceptual but also empirical division.
In our framework, conscious experience generates distinctions that break the invariability of the
primitive unity and creates different ways to discriminate between subject and object, quality and quantity,
inside or outside, identical or different, among others. To include this relevant aspect of experiences, we
invoke the last attribute called the distinction process. The distinction applies between experiences but also
distinguishing among elements on that experience. Due to a normal form of ZW-calculus Hadzihasanovic
et al. (2018), the distinction diagram can be constructed from qualitative diagrams and subjective diagrams,
but for simplicity and convenience, it is represented as another new process.
Definition 5. Distinction is a primary generator, represented by:
4. Composition of conscious experience
In this section, we define and implement possible rewriting rules for conscious experience. The set
of processes introduced above become the generators of our calculus (Table 1), while extra operations
and rewriting rules form part of the explicit axioms in the theory. These axioms specify the generators, as
discussed in section 2.3.
4.1. The relational nature of experience
In section 3, we introduced provisional definitions and interpretations of the generators. In strict
sense, they do not model any phenomena by themselves, but only when they are specified by rewriting
rules or relationships between them.
This relational nature of graphical calculi is relevant, since experience seems also specified in reference
to other experiences Signorelli et al. (2021); Tsuchiya and Saigo (2020), and being co-dependent Signorelli
and Meling (2021). In this paper, for example, unity of experience conveys relationships between qualitative
and subjective dimensions of that unity, namely phenomenal unity and access unity, represented by our
white and black generators. Both types of unity-experience create distinctions, the former differentiate
among experiences, while the latter among contents of those experiences. Then distinctions are signified
by the crossing generator. Relationships between generators lead to more complex process compositions,
while their behaviour is assumed here as the minimal structure of experience. Therefore, conscious
experience is both: the entangled composition of all these processes, as well as from which those conceptual
distinctions arise.
The rest of this article specifies the role of these generators via relational rewriting rules, reinterprets
the behaviours of these generators, and from them infers new features of conscious experience.
Importantly, all the rewriting rules follow mathematical considerations, either from standard
bialgebras Coecke (2011); Selinger (2011) or from the specificity of ZW-calculus Hadzihasanovic et al.
(2018). However, the particular set of generators and rewriting rules are chosen because they do make
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t
A∗
A
A∗
|
A
u
w
v
= Unity
...
}
...
~ = Qualitative
r
u
}
w
w
v
= Subjective
~
...
u
}
v
~ = Distinction
Table 1. Generators for a graphical calculus of conscious experience. These processes are taken from
ZW-calculus Hadzihasanovic et al. (2018) and their graphical forms naturally arise in monoidal categories
Coecke and Paquette (2011).
“sense” for a theory of conscious experience, and not because they are nice mathematically or fit any
physical theory. One example is the structure of privacy or personal experience, as we demonstrate in the
following sections.
4.2. Conscious experience
Following previous discussions, we can define conscious experience in a rigorous graphical form. It
is easily done as a composition of qualitative and subjective processes. Therefore, we postulate:
Postulate 3. Conscious experience. Conscious experiences correspond to compositions of qualitative and subjective
processes, such that the composition generates a new diagram, representing a new kind of experience.
The allowed compositions are subject to a fixed collection of rewriting rules. In this theory, these
rewriting rules might correspond to specific set of experiences.
Let’s take a first rule from the symmetric monoidal category of ZW-calculus and reinterpret it as the
composition of one input quality process carrying a quantitative value r, and one subjective process with
two outputs. This composition generates the experience of copy that quality, and we called it experience 1.
r
=
r
r
7→ Experience 1
(5)
As we mention before, the way how to read these diagrams is from top to bottom, i.e. imagine the
r
"crossing"
to modify the original shape of the diagram, as shown by the equality. In this case,
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a subjective process takes and makes a "copy" of a qualitative one to make it available to other mental
operations.
Another rewriting rule is the composition between two inputs, one qualitative process and one
subjective process, generating another type of experience in our formal model.
r
=
r
7→ Experience 2
r
(6)
The only difference between both rules is the number of inputs in the qualitative process. In this
axiomatic model, conscious experiences are unified compositions of qualitative and subjective generators
related to the shape-effect, or circuit reorganization of the diagrams, generated by rules of composition.
Phenomenologically speaking, these rules are important because they introduce the notion of
co-dependency between qualitative and subjective experience. Two processes co-dependent if they are
co-defined. For example, the first rule tells us that a qualitative process is an experience that can be copied
by a subjective process in order to be experienced. On the other hand, a subjective process is an experience
that can copy a qualitative one. Then, the division between qualitative and subjective experience becomes
conceptual, since any conscious experience is simultaneously qualitative and subjective. As a consequence,
it might not be surprising that current experiments do not entirely dissociate phenomenal and access
aspects of conscious experience. It might be an implication of the parallel made between qualitative and
subjective processes with the phenomenal versus access consciousness that we have introduced previously.
4.3. Distinctions and boundaries
According to the previous definition of conscious experience, an important question concerns how
to distinguish two elements already bound (more details in section 5). To target this last question, the
distinction process seems to present a compelling property:
Postulate 4. Distinction. Distinction differentiates between qualitative and subjective processes as follows:
r
r
=
r
=
=
(7)
r
r
r
In other words, qualitative aspects of experience are the processes that "cross distinctions", while
subjective processes do not. It generates, indeed, a distinction between subjects-objects and between
internal-external experiences, since another subject is always external to the observer subject. This notion
is formalized by using the distinction process as separator or boundary, becoming one of our postulates:
Postulate 5. Boundary. Distinction generates a boundary between external and internal experiences.
·····
·
·
· · · · · External
(8)
·····
·
·
· · · · · Internal
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Interestingly, it seems that a basic notion of conscious agent Hoffman and Prakash (2014) could arise
from the composition of distinction process as a boundary and subjective processes. In this case, however,
the agent has the potential of conscious experience but it does not convey an conscious experience itself,
according to our postulate 3. Future works may clarify and extend this implications/interpretations.
Additionally, we might introduce two extra rules. The composition between one subjective two
output process and one qualitative two inputs process is interpreted as the creation of one subjective state
and one subjective effect (perhaps, understood as voluntary action). Graphically:
=
(9)
The rule above defines two subjective entities from the decoupling of both generators. In other words,
if these subjective and qualitative processes compound, such as their outputs and inputs match (always
multiple of 2), the result are one subjective state and one subjective effect, like the forms introduced in
section 2.1 and 3.3.
Another relevant rule is about a distinction process interacting with a subjective two outputs process.
=
(10)
Following postulate 5 and equation 8, in this case the first subjective process is interpreted as internal
and the second as external. Interestingly, this rule informs us about the "generation" of two distinction
processes, each time that one distinction process compose with another two outputs internal subjective
process, or conversely, the need of two distinctions to transform one external two outputs subjective
process into an internal one (see section 5).
4.4. Private experience
At this point, all the basic compositions and interpretations of the model are in place to define
conscious perception as the simple composition of all these generators:
Postulate 6. Conscious perception. Conscious perception corresponds to the composition of qualitative, subjective
and distinction processes, together with its modifications via rewriting rules.
r
⇒
r
7→ Perception o f r
(11)
Perception is not only a conscious experience, but it is also the kind of conscious experience that
generates distinctions between external and internal contents of that experience. This external versus
internal division is what is called objective versus subjective division, since an externally triggered
experience is associated with objective perception, while internally triggered experiences (what happens
after crossing the distinction boundary) are commonly related to subjective inner experiences. However,
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in our model this objective/subjective division is illusory, every external process is a combination of
qualitative and subjective processes, and the properties of the distinction process makes us perceive them
differently. In other words, the objective versus subjective divisions is a consequence of our own operation
of perceiving.
When we say “illusion”, it is not in the common sense of “illusionism” in philosophy of mind, where
the mind is neglected and considered just as an illusion given by the brain, its neurons and other physical
systems. In our case, what is illusory is the distinction between objective world and subjective world.
Everything is some kind of “experiential qualitative and subjective world”. However, this “everything is
an experience” does not necessarily convey a claim of ontological primacy, since an epistemic primacy
suffices to support that claim as well. In this work, we do not commit to any ontological nor epistemic
interpretation, but we pragmatically focus on the primacy of experience via the generators, compositions
and their consequences.
As a way of example, we can use the postulates above to infer and prove the most salient and
recognised property of conscious experience, namely, its private Searle (2000) or better understood
personal aspect Varela (1996). Importantly, this is a pure consequence of the axioms above.
Proposition 1. Unreadability of others/external subjectivity. It is impossible to fully perceive, access or read
others’/external conscious subjective experiences.
Proof. From postulates 3 and 6, conscious perception involves qualitative, subjective and distinction
processes, such that the distinction imposes a boundary between external and internal experiences
(equation 8). Moreover, equations in 7 force a restriction to subjective processes, preventing them from
crossing the boundary. Graphically:
r
6=
⇒ can not cross, while
=
r
⇒ can cross.
It completes the proof.
This simple example shows the power of graphical reasoning and axiomatic mathematics to formalise
the structure of conscious experience. We have recovered from first principles, one of the main and more
recognized hallmarks of personal and subjective conscious experience Chalmers (1995); Thomas Nagel
(1974); Thompson (2007): the inaccessibility of others’ subjective "what is like to be" becomes a consequence
of a simple and topological property of the graphical calculus introduced.
This proof, however, does not mean we never have access to others/external subjective experiences.
The rule given by equation 10 allows us to access those experiences only if we impose more distinctions.
In other words, if we have access to it (e.g. via verbal report), we experience new distinctions that are not
present in the original experience. Therefore, as pointed out by Varela (1996), subjective experience might
not be really private, but personal.
5. The combination of experiences
In this section, we explore another insight from our logic approach: the phenomenal unity of
experience.
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5.1. The problem of unity
Among the questions about the structure of conscious experience, how to combine more basic
experiences becomes one of the most problematic issues. This is the question about how gluing different
elements of experience in one unified phenomenal experience: the unity thesis. In other words, how
to combine objects, feelings and other background feature to generate one single unified phenomenal
subjective experience Bayne and Chalmers (2012).
This problem has two main dimensions, the phenomenal unity and the access unity Bayne and
Chalmers (2012); Revonsuo and Newman (1999). The former is sometimes called the combination problem
and the later the segregation problem. The first one corresponds to the intuition that regardless of the distinct
elements of experiences, they are always integrate-wholes, i.e. the what is like to be in such experience
is one whole experience. The second problem is that regardless of distinct and combined features, our
experience can segregate elements to recognize different contents of such experience Feldman (2013);
Treisman (1999); Velik (2012). These two problems imply the identification of a complete set of fundamental
experiences from which other experiences combine, such that the segregation is always regard to this fixed
set of experiences Chalmers (2016).
5.2. Phenomenal and access unity
In our compositional model, these questions are stated differently. First, the combination problem
does not exist anymore. In fact, it is replaced by a decomposition problem. The unity of experience is given
by default, just by means of being compositional. According to our theory, the unity of consciousness,
and specifically phenomenal unity, is given by the primary graphical generators and through topological
connection. Secondly, any experience might be always decomposed into combinations of these generators.
Which makes the decomposition problem tractable within our formalism.
At the same time, the segregation of certain elements of perception is targeted by the distinction
process and modifications of compounded qualitative and subjective processes. In other words, the issues
become a problem of modification Searle (2000). Our approach guides us to search for mechanisms of
separation and distinction that make elements of our perception look segregated, instead of looking at
how to "integrate" or unify elements already unified.
Graphically, segregation is commonly represented by processes such as:
experience
Segregation
red car f ast
In this case, any process theory needs to implement extra processes to account for these decomposition
processes, like the decomposition framework introduced in Tull and Kleiner (2020).
Slightly different, in our specific model, the question becomes how experiences modify each other
to account for distinctions among experiences. It implies that different conscious perceptions are indeed
modifications of an already existing field of consciousness, instead of built from various disparate bits of
reality Searle (2000). The main difference is that in cognitive neuroscience the segregation problem is about
recognition of "external objects", while here, individual entities arises from unified quality/subjectivity,
i.e. the evolution of subjective experiences correspond to modifications or modulations of a unified and
already existing qualitative subjectivity, the intrinsic mental consciousness that is independent of the five
senses Llinas et al. (1998). Take, for example, a more complex experiential structure given by the next
composition:
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t
r
s
If we use the rewriting rules from equations and examples in section 4, we can simplify this circuit as
follows:
t
t
5
=
⇒
t
7&5
==⇒
t
3
=
⇒
t
r
r
t
r
rst3
s
s
s
In our model, each shape-effect or modification of the diagrams models a new instance of experience,
e.g. a "raw" experience into a thought about it. The circuit itself corresponds to the phenomenal unity or
phenomenal field. The most basic conscious experience is the total phenomenal experience. This field is
basic but not less complex structure, given by different types of sub-circuits from which distinctions arise.
For instance, if we continue applying other rules, we obtain the following circuit:
9
4&10
=
⇒
4
===⇒
=
⇒
rst3
rst3
rst3
This diagram can be further simplified (e.g. the right upper triangle becomes an identity, etc). To
make our point, however, it is enough that the reader notices how a new distinction process appears. These
new distinctions are the effects of the four generators interacting and reorganizing the circuit formed by
them. Here, the reorganization that gives rise to new distinctions is what corresponds to the segregation,
such that perceptual acts that segregate the content of experience are modelled by the appearance of
new distinction processes (rule 10), and its eventual “crossing” (postulate 6). Therefore, given a primary
total field, or global consciousness, its modifications through rewriting rules (interpreted as concrete
instances of experiences, section 4) inform about particular perceptual states, the access unity of contents
of experience. These states may represent specific individual loci of quality-subjectivity through the
specification of the types/systems. The missing ingredient in this discussion is the empirical translation
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into phenomenological meaningful patterns for each individual, something that we would expect to
implement for each particular case. Although we do not illustrate any particular perceptual act, in the
example above, a total phenomenal unity subsumes any other distinctive perception Bayne and Chalmers
(2012). Further research and phenomenological accounts may bring more light on these implications.
To summarise, the phenomenal unity is expressed by primitive notions of unity as generators of
our calculus, while feature segregation, as form of access unity, is the disruption or distortion of that
phenomenal unity.
6. Discussion
Our approach is a provisional proof of concept, that form part of a new contemporary research
direction to study the mathematical structure of consciousness and mathematize phenomenology Prentner
(2019); Tsuchiya and Saigo (2020); Yoshimi (2007). The graphical calculus introduced here is one of the
mathematical structures to reach that goal. Other examples using different flavours of process theories
are Signorelli et al. (2021) and Tull and Kleiner (2020). Thus, our model is not the unique model nor the
unique way to mathematically study properties of conscious experience.
Nevertheless, our study of mathematical structures implies a new paradigm to deal with basic
assumptions, clearly motivated by phenomenology Husserl (1983); Merleau-Ponty (2005) and process
philosophy Rescher (2012); Whitehead (1929). In this article, we started by the assumption of conscious
experience as a fundamental process and building the rest of the theory via explicit graphical axioms given
by rewriting rules. These axioms are inspired by phenomenological considerations and differently than
previous approaches that also claim to start from phenomenological axioms Oizumi et al. (2014), in our
case, all the features of conscious experience have a direct mathematical counterpart. These generators
form a minimum set, axioms intend to subsume both phenomenological and mathematical meaning, and
nothing extra than what is explicitly stated across these pages is assumed (e.g. we do not need to assume a
physical classical world).
While process theories are ontologically neutral and our main assumption is based on the hypothesis
of the primacy of consciousness, our theory conveys a clear advantage over other models of consciousness:
the direct link with physical theories and their mathematical structures. For example, our approach is
related almost tautologically to foundations of physics Coecke (2011) and specifically quantum theory. In
our model, similar generators and rewriting rules form part of the ZW-calculus Hadzihasanovic (2015).
ZW-calculus was developed for qubits, it is a sound and complete semantic for graphical treatments
inside categorical quantum theory Abramsky and Coecke (2004), and also a useful graphical language to
reconstruct different aspects of physical theories Coecke (2011); Coecke and Kissinger (2010); De Felice
et al. (2019); Hadzihasanovic (2015). Without lacking any mathematical rigour, across this article we
have reinterpreted the nature of a partial set of their generators and rewriting rules. Accordingly, the
connection with fundamental physical theories is reached only invoking phenomenal aspects, no need for
any ontological assumption. In other words, it does not matter whether a process is a mental process or a
physical process, they share a similar mathematical structure.
We feel that a science of consciousness has much more to gain using high-level mathematical
formalisms than focusing on the physical ontologies that may, or may not explain consciousness Signorelli
et al. (2021). For instance, we do not claim ZW-calculus is complete for a theory of consciousness.
Otherwise, this completeness would mean that there is nothing more to consciousness than there is to a
qubit. More interesting, however, it is to develop further graphical calculus to search for a complete and
sound description based on well informed phenomenological inputs. In other words, directly axiomatize
the phenomenology of conscious experience using graphical calculi, and study the models arising from
them.
19 of 22
7. Conclusions
In this article, we introduced a new paradigm to reason about conscious experience. This graphical
interpretation is based on symmetric monoidal categories and follows similar principles and mathematical
structures that have proved useful in the foundations of physical theories Coecke (2011). Moreover, our
discussion takes inspiration from the hypothesis of conscious agents Fields et al. (2018); Hoffman and
Prakash (2014), phenomenology Merleau-Ponty (2005); Signorelli and Meling (2021); Thompson (2007),
Buddhist phenomenology Lusthaus (2002); Makeham (2014), as well as the unified field hypothesis Searle
(2000) and compositional models Coecke (2013); Coecke et al. (2016).
Using this compositional framework and primitive mathematical generators as essential features
of conscious experience, we recovered different aspects of experience: external and internal subjective
distinction, private or personal experience, and phenomenal unity. All of them arise naturally as a
consequence of a formal theory of conscious experience that takes the experience as a fundamental process
of nature.
In this line, these types of models may become a formal tool to study the phenomenology of cognitive
experience in general, and the phenomenology of conscious experience in particular. Philosophers and
neuroscientists can also benefit from these intuitive forms Gómez-Ramirez (2014); Landry (2018); Signorelli
and Joaquin Diaz Boils (2021), describing and discussing in graphical terms the basic assumptions of their
respective models Kleiner (2020).
The future for these axiomatic models is promising and exciting. On the one hand, one can extend
these descriptions to a better-informed set of generators and rewriting rules. To reach this goal we can
use more detailed insights from the phenomenology of experience, micro-phenomenology protocols
Petitmengin et al. (2019) and neuro-phenomenology Varela (1996), as well as contemplative sciences,
among others methods. For instance, one may like to define the entire set of axioms and rewriting rules for
a sound and complete calculus taking further phenomenological considerations. On the other hand, one
may also expect the objective realm arising from basic experiential generators Signorelli et al. (2021). To
this end, the goal is recovering objective physical theories from primitive experience that indeed become a
mirror of each other Signorelli et al. (2020), the very notion of time, probably being one of the most relevant
Edmund Husserl (1964); Kent and Wittmann (2021). In both research projects, process theories resonate
with philosophical phenomenology, avoiding any ontological claim as well as the need for invoking any
physical realization but pure mathematical entities.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, CMS and QW; investigation CMS, QW and BC; writing-original draft
preparation, CMS; writing-review and editing, CMS, QW and BC; visualization, CMS and QW.
Funding: CMS is funded by Comisión Nacional de Investigación Ciencia y Tecnología (CONICYT, currently
ANID) through Programa Formacion de Capital Avanzado (PFCHA), Doctoral scholarship Becas Chile: CONICYT
PFCHA/DOCTORADO BECAS CHILE/2016 - 72170507. QW was supported by AFOSR grant FA2386-18-1-4028. We
also acknowledge the grant: Categorical Theories of Consciousness: Bridging Neuroscience and Fundamental Physics,
FQXi-RFP-CPW-2018.
Acknowledgments: The authors appreciate valuable feedback and discussions from Sean Tull, as well as very
constructive comments from anonymous reviewers.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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White matter deficits underlie the loss of consciousness level and predict
recovery outcome in disorders of consciousness
Xuehai Wua, Jiaying Zhangb, Zaixu Cuib, Weijun Tangc, Chunhong Shaod, Jin Hua,
Jianhong Zhua, Liangfu Zhoua, Yao Zhaoa, Lu Lue, Gang Chenf, Georg Northoffg,
Gaolang Gongb*, Ying Maoa*, Yong Heb
a
Neurosurgical Department, Shanghai Huashan Hospital, Fudan University, Shanghai
200040, China
b
State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning & IDG/McGovern
Institute for Brain Research, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, 100875 China
c
Radiological Department, Shanghai Huashan Hospital, Fudan University, Shanghai
200040, China
d
Psychiatry Department, Shanghai Huashan Hospital, Fudan University, Shanghai
200040, China
e
Huajia Hospital, Shanghai 200438, China
f
Scientific and Statistical Computing Core, National Institute of Mental Health,
National Institutes of Health, Department of Health and Human Services, USA
g
Institute of Mental Health Research, University of Ottawa, Carling Avenue 1145,
Ottawa, ON K1Z 7K4, Canada
Xuehai Wu and Jiaying Zhang contributed equally to this work.
*
Corresponding authors:
Ying Mao
Neurosurgical Department, Shanghai Huashan Hospital,
Fudan University, Shanghai, China
Phone: +8613801769152
Email: maoying@fudan.edu.cn
Gaolang Gong
State Key Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience and Learning & IDG/McGovern
Institute for Brain Research,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
Phone: +8601058802023
Email: gaolang.gong@bnu.edu.cn
Abstract
This study aimed to identify white matter (WM) deficits underlying the loss of
consciousness in disorder of consciousness (DOC) patients using Diffusion Tensor
Imaging (DTI) and to demonstrate the potential value of DTI parameters in predicting
recovery outcomes of DOC patients. With 30 DOC patients (8 comatose, 8
unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state, and 14 minimal conscious state)
and 25 patient controls, we performed group comparison of DTI parameters across 48
core WM regions of interest (ROIs) using Analysis of Covariance. Compared with
controls, DOC patients had decreased Fractional anisotropy (FA) and increased
diffusivities in widespread WM area. The corresponding DTI parameters of those
WM deficits in DOC patients significantly correlated with the consciousness level
evaluated by Coma Recovery Scale – Revised (CRS-R) and Glasgow Coma Scale
(GCS). As for predicting the recovery outcomes (i.e., regaining consciousness or not,
grouped by their Glasgow Outcome Scale >2 or not) at 3 months post scan, radial
diffusivity of left superior cerebellar peduncle and FA of right sagittal stratum reached
an accuracy of ~87.5% and ~75% respectively. Our findings showed multiple WM
deficits underlying the loss of consciousness level, and demonstrated the potential
value of these WM areas in predicting the recovery outcomes of DOC patients who
have lost awareness of the environment and themselves.
Keywords: disorder of consciousness, white matter, the level of consciousness,
diffusion tensor imaging, brain injury
1. Introduction
With great advances in intensive care, more and more patients survive after severe brain
injuries such as traumatic brain injury (TBI), spontaneous intracerebral hemorrhage (ICH),
and ischaemic-hypoxic injury (IHI), resulting in a large population of patients with disorders
of consciousness (DOC). DOC patients exhibit varied levels of consciousness (from low to
high: coma (COMA), unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/vegetative state (UWS/VS), and
minimally conscious state (MCS)), which provides a unique opportunity to study the
structural substrates that support the maintenance of a normal consciousness level. The
pioneer functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study revealed that UWS/VS patients
were capable of following a command and performing an imaginary task(Owen et al., 2006).
This revolutionized our understanding of the abnormal state of consciousness, but greatly
challenged the diagnosis criteria for DOC patients. Sensitive and robust imaging biomarkers
will greatly benefit and aid the clinical assessments. Improvements of clinical assessments
are key to making reasonable choices of therapy plans and legal or ethical decisions for DOC
patients(Monti et al., 2010).
The altered consciousness level of DOC patients is associated with functional connectivity
deficiencies across brain regions in previous studies. For example, using PET, those
functional connections between intralaminar thalamic nuclei, the anterior cingulate and
prefrontal cortices were shown to be disrupted in VS patients(Laureys et al., 2000). Given
these findings, the loss of consciousness has been described as a “functional disconnection
syndrome”(Laureys et al., 2004; Schiff, 2005). Additionally, recent functional MRI studies
observed the association of levels of consciousness with functional connectivity deficiencies
between the default mode network (DMN) and the thalamus(Boly et al., 2008; Boly et al.,
2009; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010). Whole-brain functional network analysis exhibited
abnormal connectivity pattern in DOC patients (Qin et al., 2015). Moreover, those functional
connections could predict the consciousness level and recovery outcome of DOC patients
(Wu et al., 2015). These results further support the idea that human consciousness is an
outcome of functional integration among distributed brain regions rather than local functional
activities.
Although altered functional connectivity has been investigated a lot, the structural neural
substrate of the consciousness loss remains poorly understood. White matter (WM) harbors
the main structural connections between different brain regions; besides, clinically, diffused
axonal injury patients with the loss of consciousness usually have damaged white matter
detectible in Computer Tomography/MRI. Therefore, WM impairments in DOC patients play
a critical role in the loss of consciousness. Using diffusion MRI, a pioneer case study of one
MCS patient revealed an increase of WM anisotropy, which was related to the recovery of
expressive language(Voss et al., 2006). Several cross-sectional studies have revealed that the
diffusion parameters of the entire WM and WM pathways connecting the thalamus and DMN
brain
regions
varied
depending
on
the
consciousness
levels
of
DOC
patients(Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2011; Fernandez-Espejo et al., 2012; Lant et al., 2016;
Newcombe et al., 2010). But there is still not a complete understanding of WM substrate
underlying the loss of consciousness level. However, these WM studies were limited by (1)
recruiting only a small number of subjects (making clinical relevance impossible) or a
relatively large sample but from different scanning centers (introducing a new confounding
factor of scanning center); (2) mainly covering UWS/VS and MCS patients without including
COMA patients; (3) the absence of lesion patients with full consciousness; and (4) a focus on
a limited number of pre-defined WM tracts/regions of interest (ROIs) or the WM as a whole.
Furthermore, it is clinically unknown whether the diffusion parameters of WM deficits can be
used to predict recovery outcomes (regaining consciousness or not) for those patients who
have been clinically diagnosed as “unaware of the surrounding environment and themselves”.
This issue is of great clinical importance for therapeutic planning and decision-making.
Therefore, our study aimed to 1) identify the impaired WM regions underlying the loss of
consciousness in DOC patients; and 2) assess the prognostic value of WM diffusion
parameters
for
predicting
the
recovery
outcomes
(i.e.,
outcome-positive
and
outcome-negative) of DOC patients who have lost awareness of the environment and
themselves. Specifically, we included a single-center dataset from a large cohort of 30 DOC
patients covering the entire spectrum of consciousness levels (including COMA, UWS/VS,
and MCS) as well as 25 patient controls (PCs) from a single center. Given previous findings,
we hypothesized that distributed WM injury, rather than a local WM injury, contributes to the
abnormal levels of consciousness in these patients. To test this hypothesis, an automated
atlas-based searching for the abnormal WM regions using DTI parameters was applied across
the whole brain. We then evaluated the relationship of DTI metrics and the clinical measures
of consciousness levels across DOC patients. Finally, we performed ROC analysis to predict
the clinical recovery outcomes of COMA and UWS/VS patients at 3 months after the MRI
scan (regained consciousness or not) using DTI parameters of white matter deficits in DOC
patients.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
We recruited 91 patients with acquired brain injuries in the Huashan Hospital of Fudan
University in Shanghai. The etiology of these patients was either TBI (77 subjects) or
non-TBI—spontaneous intracerebral hemorrhage or ischaemic-hypoxic injury (14 subjects).
All of the patients participated in the MRI scan during their sub-acute or chronic stage. The
majority of the DOC patients were followed up in the rehabilitation hospital, and the others
were followed up when be readmitted for ventricular peritoneal shunt with hydrocephalus
or/and cranioplasty. Informed consent was obtained from each patient or his/her family.
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the Ethics Committee of Huashan Hospital.
The patients were clinically diagnosed as COMA, UWS/VS, MCS, or Patient Controls (PC)
on the day of their first MRI scan. The COMA patients were characterized by the absence of
arousal responses and awareness(Plum and Posner, 1966). The UWS/VS patients were in a
state of arousal, including a sleep/wake cycle, but were unaware of themselves or their global
environment(The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, 1994). The MCS patients retained a low
level of consciousness but exhibited inconsistent and non-reflexive behavior(Giacino et al.,
2002). The PCs in our study were characterized by a) a conscious state and communicability;
b) a brain injury confirmed by MRI and computed tomography scan; and c) the absence of
locked-in syndrome. The consciousness level of each patient was quantified using two
standardized scales [the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS)(Teasdale and Jennett, 1974) and the
Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R)(Giacino et al., 2004)]. Both scales were translated
into Chinese by 3 authors (P.Q., Z.H., and Xu. Wu.). An experienced neurosurgeon, Xu. Wu.,
assessed both scales and was blind to data analysis.
After manually checking the quality of the fractional anisotropy (FA) images after
normalization (exclusion examples are shown in Supplementary Fig. 1), we included 55
patients (8 COMA, 8 UWS/VS, 14 MCS, and 25 PC) in the cross-sectional analysis to detect
consciousness-related WM regions. The detailed demographic and clinical characteristics are
shown in Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2. Moreover, for those patients who had
completely lost their awareness of the environment and themselves at their first MRI scan (8
COMA and 8 UWS/VS patients), we divided them into outcome-positive and
outcome-negative groups according to their clinical outcomes (regained awareness or not) at
least 3 month after MRI scan. Specifically, the Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS)(Jennett and
Bond, 1975) was used to quantify clinical outcomes 3 months after the first MRI scan. The
patients with a GOS score of less than 3 were deemed as not having regained consciousness
and were referred to as outcome-negative. Patients in the other group, with a GOS score
equal to or above 3, were considered to be awake and were therefore referred to as
outcome-positive. The corresponding demographic and clinical characteristics of the
outcome-negative and outcome-positive groups are shown in Table 2.
2.2. Diffusion Weighted Images Acquisition
All MRI images were acquired on the 3T SIEMENS MRI scanner in Shanghai Huashan
Hospital. We used a single-shot echo planar imaging-based sequence, and the acquisition
protocol consisted of 12 non-linear diffusion-weighted directions with b = 1000 s/mm2 and
one additional image without weighted diffusion (i.e., b = 0 s/mm2). The scanning parameters
were set as follows: 3.5 mm slice thickness, no gap between slices, 38 slices covering the
whole brain, echo time = 82 ms, repetition time = 8400 ms, acquisition matrix = 128×128,
non-interpolated voxel size = 1.8×1.8×3.5 mm3, flip angle = 90°, and field of view =
230×230 mm2.
2.3. DTI post-processing
The diffusion-weighted images were processed with a PANDA pipeline toolbox(Cui et al.,
2013) called the FMRIB Software Library (FSL, version 4.1.9)(Jenkinson et al., 2012) for
skull stripping, eddy-current correction, tensor fitting and the calculation of diffusion tensor
parameters as well as for image normalization. Common diffusion tensor parameters—FA,
axial diffusivity (AD), and radial diffusivity (RD)—were chosen for subsequent analysis.
Specifically, FA is the fraction of anisotropic diffusion, and a breakdown in WM integrity
typically results in a lower FA(Basser and Pierpaoli, 1996). AD and RD are thought to be
selectively sensitive to specific microstructural changes. An increased AD reflects axonal
damage or loss, whereas an increased RD reflects demyelination(Song et al., 2003). Another
common diffusion parameter, mean diffusivity (MD), was not included in the present study
because it is linearly dependent on AD and RD. After nonlinearly normalizing the FA, AD,
and RD maps to the FMRIB58_FA template, we extracted the FA, AD, and RD of the 48
WM ROIs defined in the standard space of the ICBM-DTI-81 white matter atlas(Mori et al.,
2008).
In the present study, we performed the analysis of WM parameters at the regional level,
primarily for two reasons. First, ROI-based analysis exhibits a higher tolerance for inaccurate
normalization compared with voxel-based analysis(Faria et al., 2010). Second, it is
biologically plausible to assume diffuse WM impairment following traumatic or
ischaemic/hypoxic injury rather than a very local and concentrated impairment. Additionally,
because outer brain tissues may be severely damaged in TBI patients, we defined the WM
regions according to the JHU “core white matter” atlas(Mori et al., 2008). The JHU “core
white matter” atlas consists of 48 WM regions in MNI152 space that are located relatively
deep inside the brain and are therefore less deformed in DOC patients (Supplementary Fig. 3).
In all, region-based analysis could provide adequate spatial specificity and improve the
statistical power for our study.
2.4. Statistical analysis
All statistical analyses were performed with IBM SPSS 20 statistics software. We first
compared the demographic and clinical data across the four patient groups. One-way analysis
of variance (ANOVA) and chi-square tests were performed on the continuous variables (age
and days post-ictus) and categorical variables (etiology and gender), respectively.
To explore the association between WM deficits and consciousness level, we first performed
a one-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on the mean FA for each of the 48 WM
regions. Specifically, group was a between-subjects factor of interest, and age, gender, and
days post-ictus were included as covariates. The Bonferroni method was applied to correct
for multiple comparisons across the WM regions, and a corrected p < 0.05 was considered
significant. To identify whether the FA changes were attributed to AD and/or RD changes,
we applied the same ANCOVA model to the mean AD and RD of the WM deficits detected
by FA ANCOVA.
Among the WM deficits detected by FA ANCOVA, Pearson correlations between the mean
FA and clinical scores of consciousness level (GCS and CRS-R) were tested across all of the
patients after controlling for age, gender, and days post-ictus. Similar correlation analyses
were applied to the AD and RD of the consciousness-related WM deficits showing significant
group effects in AD or RD. Notably, a substantial proportion of the patients (mainly the PC
and UWS/VS patients) received ceiling-level scores (GCS score equal to 15 or CRS-R score
equal to 23), which might bias the correlation results. To control for this ceiling effect (the
correlation might be driven by the high GCS and CRS-R scores at the upper end), we also
performed the correlations after excluding the patients with ceiling-level scores.
To this point, we had explored whether the WM deficits detected by FA ANCOVA could
predict the degree of consciousness at different levels of the consciousness spectrum.
However, the question remained as to whether DTI metrics of these WM deficits could be
used to predict clinical recovery of consciousness. Therefore, we further evaluated the
prognostic value of the diffusion parameters of the WM deficits using receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves. We performed the prediction analysis within white matter ROIs
with group differences in DTI parameters (FA, AD, and RD) between the outcome-positive
(GOS greater than or equal to 3) and outcome-negative patients (GOS less than 3). The
comparisons between the two groups with different outcomes were restricted to the WM
deficits detected by FA ANCOVA. Because the level of consciousness may relate to
subsequent clinical outcomes, we also included the clinical scores (GCS and CRS-R), age,
gender, and days post-ictus as covariates.
3. Results
3.1. Clinical samples
There were no differences among the four patient groups (i.e., COMA, UWS/VS, MCS, and
PC) in age, gender, or etiology distribution. The duration of illness (days post-ictus) differed
(p = 0.009). In the patients of the outcome-positive and outcome-negative groups who lost
awareness, no differences were found in gender, etiology distribution, or days post-ictus, but
there was a trend for the age distribution (p = 0.052). The mean age (38.9) of the
outcome-positive group was younger than that (49.8) of the outcome-negative group.
3.2. Group differences in diffusion parameters across DOC patients
The ANCOVA of FA revealed significant group effects in 14 WM regions (Table 1 and Fig.
1). For most of the 14 WM regions, post hoc comparisons indicated that FA decreased as the
consciousness level declined. However, the significant group effect might be mainly driven
by the differences between the COMA and PC patients (e.g., the body of the corpus
callosum).
Among the 14 WM regions detected by FA ANCOVA, there were significant group
differences in AD in only three WM regions (Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 4), whereas
RD significantly differed in 11 WM regions (Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 5). As the level
of consciousness decreased, the mean RD in the 11 WM regions increased.
3.3. Correlations between diffusion parameters and GCS/CRS-R clinical scores
With all the patients, significant correlations (p < 0.05) were found between the GCS/CRS-R
scores and the mean FA of the 14 significant WM regions (as described above) (Figs. 2 and
3). Even after the patients with GCS scores equal to 15 were excluded, 12 WM regions were
still correlated with GCS score. In contrast, no correlations were found between the mean FA
of these regions and CRS-R score after the patients with a CRS-R score equal to 23 were
excluded.
For the three WM regions with AD differences, the mean AD was correlated with the GCS
and CRS-R scores across all subjects, but no correlation existed after the patients with
ceiling-level scores (GCS or CRS-R) were excluded (Supplementary Figs. 6 and 7). In the 11
WM deficits with RD differences, the mean RD correlated with GCS and CRS-R score. After
the exclusion of the patients with maximum GCS and CRS-R scores, the mean RD of eight
WM regions (i.e., the body of the corpus callosum, splenium of the corpus callosum, left
cingulum, fornix (column and body), left stria terminalis, right internal capsule
(retrolenticular portion), right sagittal stratum, and left uncinate fasciculus) still correlated
with the GCS score. However, CRS-R score did not significantly correlate with the mean RD
of any region (Supplementary Figs. 8 and 9).
Taken together, our data confirm the relevance of WM deficits for predicting the level of
consciousness from the lowest end (COMA) to the medium (UWS/VS), higher (MCS), and
highest end (PC) of the spectrum of consciousness. Even after controlling for the ceiling
effect, the majority of the correlations remained the same; this finding suggests that these
correlations were driven by differences across the spectrum of consciousness, from COMA to
PC.
3.4. Prediction analysis for the outcome-positive and outcome-negative patients
To demonstrate the clinical relevance of our findings, we performed classification analyses of
the outcome-positive and outcome-negative patients. The comparisons indicated that the
mean FA of the right sagittal stratum and the mean RD of the left superior cerebellar
peduncle differed significantly between these two groups with different clinical outcomes at 3
months after scan (Fig. 4). According to the ROC analysis, the prediction accuracy of the
mean RD of the left superior cerebellar peduncle and the mean FA of the right sagittal
stratum reached 87.5% and 75%, respectively. The corresponding sensitivity and specificity
for the mean RD of the left superior cerebellar peduncle were 100% and 75%, respectively,
and the sensitivity and specificity for the mean FA of the right sagittal stratum were 50% and
100%, respectively.
4. Discussion
Our study for the first time demonstrated widespread WM deficits underlying the diverse
consciousness levels of DOC patients. And of those WM deficits, DTI metrics were linearly
correlated with the clinical severity of their consciousness level—assessed by GCS and
CRS-R scores. Furthermore, our prediction results indicated that the accuracy of
distinguishing different clinical outcomes at three months after the MRI scan using DTI
parameters of white matter deficits
4.1. White matter deficits in DOC patients
By searching the entire “core white matter”, we identified 14 WM regions in which the FA
differed across levels of consciousness using ANCOVA, supporting our hypothesis that a
widespread structural substrate of the loss of consciousness were in DOC patients.
Specifically, most of these WM deficits had increased RD as the consciousness level declined
across the DOC subgroups, suggesting a process of axonal demyelination in the DOC
patients(Song et al., 2003).
Consistent with the previous DTI study in VS and MCS patients (Fernandez-Espejo et al.,
2012), we identified right internal capsule (retrolenticular portion) and the cingulum with
abnormal DTI parameters, which may serve as an anatomical substrate for the
thalamo-cortical functional connectivity deficiencies in DOC (Boly et al., 2008; Boly et al.,
2009; Schnakers, 2012). In addition to these tracts, we also found the splenium and body of
the corpus callosum exhibited DTI parameter changes in DOC patients, indicating that the
loss of consciousness that occurs in DOC may be related to the disruption of functional
interactions between the two hemispheres(Newcombe et al., 2010).
4.2 Roles of the white matter around the brainstem
More importantly, our results provided further evidence of the importance of the brainstem in
maintaining normal consciousness. Intriguingly, our results showed that five WM regions
around the brainstem, including the middle cerebellar peduncle, right corticospinal tract, right
superior cerebellar peduncle, left superior cerebellar peduncle, and right cerebral peduncle,
were related to the level of consciousness. The brainstem is crucial for regulation of the sleep
cycle and the maintenance of consciousness(Moruzzi and Magoun, 1949; Northoff, 2014;
Parvizi and Damasio, 2003; Starzl et al., 1951). The white matter around the brainstem serves
as the main pathway that links the peripheral organs and cerebellum with the cerebrum. Our
findings suggested the disruption of information flow not only within the brain but also
between the brain and the rest of the body. For example, the normal impulses from peripheral
nervous system about the surrounding environment might be disrupted in DOC patients. This
finding suggests a possible role of these non-cerebral structures in the normal expression of
consciousness, which deserves further attention in future studies.
4.3. Clinical relevance
With more patients surviving after severe brain injuries, it has become an important issue to
accurately assess the level of consciousness in DOC patients. However, currently, the clinical
diagnosis of DOC patients is relatively subjective and greatly depends on clinical
experience(Coleman et al., 2009); as a result, the misdiagnosis rate is high (up to
40%)(Schnakers et al., 2009). The correlations between the diffusion parameters of the WM
deficits and the level of consciousness suggest that these imaging parameters have the
potential to aid the clinical diagnosis of this DOC patient population. In addition, it remains
challenging to accurately predict whether severe DOC patients such as COMA and UWS/VS
patients could regain awareness. Our ROC analysis demonstrated the potential value of DTI
parameters—FA in the right sagittal stratum and RD in the left superior cerebellar
peduncle—in predicting the patients’ clinical outcomes at three months after the MRI scan.
This finding suggests that the diffusion parameters of specific consciousness-related WM
deficits might be sensitive imaging biomarkers to use in predicting the functional recovery of
DOC patients.
4.4. Limitations
There are a few issues that should be addressed in the future. First, although the sample size
of DOC patients in our study was very large for a single center, we only had a small number
of the patients for the study predicting outcomes at 3 months post-scan. Additional studies
with more patients will be needed to validate and confirm our findings. Second, the DTI
technique is incapable of quantifying complex microstructural changes in the voxels with
crossing fibers or partial volume effects and therefore may provide false-negative or
false-positive results. To overcome these issues, new diffusion MRI techniques (e.g.,
diffusion spectrum imaging (Wedeen et al., 2008)) can be applied in the future. Finally, in the
current study, we considered WM regions separately and found a widespread distribution of
consciousness-related WM regions, suggesting that the level of consciousness reflects the
integration of activity in multiple brain regions. Therefore, it would also very interesting to
explore how the global organizational architecture of the WM network is related to the loss of
consciousness in DOC patients in further investigations.
5. Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation for Distinguished Young
Scholars of China (grant number 81025013), China’s National Strategic Basic Research
Program ("973") grant (grant numbers 2012CB720700, 2010CB945500, 2012CB966300, and
2009CB941100), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (grant numbers
81322021 and 81571025), the Beijing Nova Program (grant number Z121110002512032),
the Project for National 985 Engineering of China (grant number 985III-YFX0102), the
“Dawn Tracking” Program of Shanghai Education Commission (grant number 10GG01), the
Shanghai Natural Science Foundation (grant numbers: 08411952000 and 10ZR1405400), the
National Natural Science Young Foundation in China (grant number: 81201033), the
Shanghai Health Bureau (20114358), the 863 National Science and Technology Program
(grant number: 2015AA020501), the Program for New Century Excellent Talents in
University (NCET-10-0356) and the National Program for the Support of Top-Notch Young
Professionals. Dr. Georg Northoff is supported by the Michael Smith Foundation, the CRC,
and the CIHR. Jiaying Zhang is supported by the China Scholarship Council.
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Figure Legends
Fig. 1. Fourteen consciousness-related WM ROIs detected with FA ANCOVA. The mean FA
differed across the levels of consciousness according to the group comparisons (corrected p <
0.05, Bonferroni correction). In each subfigure, the left column shows a WM ROI in standard
space, with the corresponding brain areas indicated in red, and the graphs on the right show
the fitted mean and standard deviation of the FA of the corresponding WM ROI for the four
DOC subgroups. Blue represents COMA; red, UWS/VS; green, MCS; and purple, PC. *
indicates p < 0.05, and ** indicates p < 0.01.
Fig. 2. Correlations between the fitted mean FA and the clinical measure of consciousness
level, GCS score, for each of the 14 WM ROIs. The light blue dots represent the fitted mean
FA of all of the DOC patients, and the dark blue dots represent the fitted mean FA of the
DOC patients after the exclusion of those with a GCS score of 15.
Fig. 3. Correlations between the fitted mean FA and the clinical measure of consciousness
level, CRS-R score, for each of the 14 WM ROIs. The light blue dots represent the fitted
mean FA of all of the DOC patients, and the dark blue dots represent the mean fitted FA of
the DOC patients after the exclusion of those with a CRS-R score of 23.
Fig. 4. DTI parameters predicted recovery outcomes at 3 months after MRI scan. (a) Fitted
mean FA in WM ROI SS.R and (c) fitted mean RD in WM ROI SCP.L for the two groups
with different functional outcomes – regaining consciousness or not. The blue dots (GOS
score < 3) represent the fitted diffusion parameters of the better outcome group, and the red
dots (GOS score ≥ 3) represent the fitted diffusion parameters of the other group. The fitted
mean FA values in the two groups differed significantly (uncorrected, p < 0.05). The initial
clinical scores (GCS and CRS-R scores) were separately included in the statistical model to
reduce the effect of the initial level of consciousness. In addition, (b) and (d) show the ROC
curves for the fitted mean FA of SS.R and the fitted mean RD of SCP.L, respectively.
Tables
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of all DOC patients
Diagnostic categories[NO.]
COMA[8(3)]
UWS/VS[8(1)]
MCS[14(3)]
PC[25(2)]
Statistic
p
Age: Mean±Std
42.3±8.7
46.4±13.9
43.1±16.7
38.2±14.5
F3,51 =0.79
0.506
Gender: male/female
6/2
3/5
11/3
18/7
=4.56
0.207
Etiology: TBI/non-TBI
8/0
6/2
13/1
22/3
=2.85
0.416
20.5 (15-98)
58 (4-167)
Days post-ictus: Median (range)
96
20 (13-42)
=4.33
0.009*
(10-182)
There were no differences among the four DOC groups in age at scan, gender, or etiology
distribution. The days post-ictus differed among the four groups. The bracketed number
indicates the number of patients who had a second qualified MRI scan. The etiology of each
non-TBI patient was either ICH or IHI.
Table 2. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the DOC patients with GOS < 3
and GOS ≥ 3
Items(NO.)
GOS < 3(8)
GOS ≥ 3(8)
p
Age: Mean±Std
49.8±10.1
38.9±10.4
0.052
Gender: male/female
4/4
5/3
0.626
Etiology: TBI/non-TBI
6/2
8/0
0.143
Days post-ictus: Median (range)
43 (10-182)
23 (13-168)
0.812
There were no differences between the two groups in gender, etiology distribution, or days
post-ictus. Age differed between the groups. The etiology of the non-TBI patients was either
ICH or IHI.
Table 3. WM deficits in DOC using ANCOVA
DTI Parameter
WM Region of Interest
F3,48
p
middle cerebellar peduncle
6.348
0.001
right corticospinal tract
6.549
0.0008
right superior cerebellar peduncle
7.640
0.0003
left superior cerebellar peduncle
7.626
0.0003
right cerebral peduncle
8.413
0.0001
body of corpus callosum
8.675
0.0001
splenium of corpus callosum
7.332
0.0004
left cingulum
7.051
0.0005
fornix (column and body)
6.642
0.0008
left stria terminalis
6.569
0.0008
right internal capsule (retrolenticular part)
6.543
0.0008
right superior fronto-occipital fasciculus
6.893
0.0006
right sagittal stratum
7.885
0.0002
left uncinate fasciculus
6.834
0.0006
right cerebral peduncle
2.830
0.048
splenium of corpus callosum
2.976
0.041
left stria terminalis
3.888
0.014
right superior cerebellar peduncle
5.270
0.003
left superior cerebellar peduncle
4.435
0.008
right cerebral peduncle
4.041
0.012
body of corpus callosum
5.305
0.003
splenium of corpus callosum
5.512
0.002
left cingulum
5.287
0.003
fornix (column and body)
3.529
0.022
left stria terminalis
5.136
0.004
right internal capsule (retrolenticular part)
4.386
0.008
right sagittal stratum
6.910
0.001
FA
AD
RD
left uncinate fasciculus
5.003
0.004
Supplementary Material
Table 1. Consciousness-related WM ROIs defined in the JHU atlas and their corresponding
abbreviations
WM labels in the JHU atlas
Abbreviations
Middle Cerebellar Peduncle
CP-M
Body of Corpus Callosum
CC-B
Splenium of Corpus Callosum
CC-S
Fornix (Column and Body part)
F-CB
Right Corticospinal Tract
CST.R
Right Superior Cerebellar Peduncle
SCP.R
Left Superior Cerebellar Peduncle
SCP.L
Right Cerebral Peduncle
CP.R
Right Retrolenticular Part of Internal Capsule
IC-R.R
Right Sagittal Stratum
SS.R
Left Cingulum
Cingulum.L
Left Stria Terminalis
F/ST.L
Right Superior Fronto-Occipital Fasciculus
SFOF.R
Left Uncinate Fasciculus
UF.L
Table 2. The detailed clinical information of the participants in our study
Patient
Age
Gender
Handness
Etiology
Days post ictus
GCS
CRS-R
GOS
COMA1
46
male
Right
TBI
19
5
2
2
COMA2
24
male
Right
TBI
15
8
7
5
COMA3
50
male
Right
TBI
42
7
4
2
COMA4
37
male
Right
TBI
21
7
3
3
COMA5
46
male
Right
TBI
25
6
2
4
COMA6
47
male
Right
TBI
13
7
5
3
COMA7
39
female
Right
TBI
27
8
6
2
COMA8
49
female
Right
TBI
17
7
5
3
UWS/VS1
49
male
Right
TBI
140
6
5
2
UWS/VS2
36
female
Right
non-TBI
182
9
5
2
UWS/VS3
59
male
Right
TBI
44
8
4
2
UWS/VS4
67
female
Right
TBI
10
6
4
2
UWS/VS5
38
female
Right
TBI
31
9
6
3
UWS/VS6
23
female
Right
TBI
168
8
4
3
UWS/VS7
52
female
Right
non-TBI
52
7
5
2
UWS/VS8
47
male
Right
TBI
163
8
5
3
MCS1
30
female
Right
TBI
26
9
10
MCS2
24
male
Right
TBI
16
9
12
MCS3
18
male
Right
TBI
31
9
6
MCS4
49
male
Right
TBI
98
10
16
MCS5
55
male
Right
TBI
18
9
7
MCS6
46
male
Right
TBI
15
9
7
MCS7
63
female
Right
TBI
28
9
13
MCS8
60
male
Right
TBI
20
9
10
MCS9
18
male
Right
TBI
15
9
14
MCS10
31
female
Right
TBI
73
10
9
MCS11
67
male
Right
non-TBI
18
9
8
MCS12
37
male
Right
TBI
82
8
13
MCS13
48
male
Right
TBI
19
9
10
MCS14
57
male
Right
TBI
21
10
11
PC1
42
male
Right
TBI
111
11
18
PC2
16
female
Right
TBI
16
15
23
PC3
47
male
Right
TBI
98
15
23
PC4
17
male
Right
TBI
28
15
23
PC5
70
female
Right
TBI
4
15
23
PC6
50
male
Right
TBI
20
15
23
PC7
58
male
Right
TBI
10
11
20
PC8
52
female
Right
TBI
127
15
23
PC9
32
male
Right
TBI
68
14
23
PC10
41
male
Right
non-TBI
63
15
23
PC11
52
male
Right
TBI
6
15
23
PC12
29
female
Right
TBI
118
14
23
PC13
30
male
Right
TBI
19
15
23
PC14
28
female
Right
TBI
13
15
23
PC15
22
male
Right
TBI
66
15
23
PC16
64
male
Right
TBI
7
15
23
PC17
28
female
Right
TBI
4
15
23
PC18
42
male
Right
non-TBI
5
11
17
PC19
49
male
Right
TBI
167
13
23
PC20
29
female
Right
TBI
5
15
23
PC21
22
male
Right
non-TBI
166
15
23
PC22
46
male
Right
TBI
58
15
23
PC23
25
male
Right
TBI
143
15
23
PC24
32
male
Right
TBI
86
12
21
PC25
33
male
Right
TBI
119
11
17
Figure Legends for Supplementary Figures.
Fig. 1. Clinical scores of consciousness level in the DOC patient population. (A)
The distribution of GCS in the DOC patient population. (B) The distribution of CRSR in the DOC patient population. (C) The means and standard deviations of GCS and
CRS-R for each DOC subgroup; blue represents COMA, red VS, green MCS, and
purple PC.
Fig. 2. Three of 14 consciousness-related WM ROIs detected with further AD
ANCOVAs. These ROIs were significantly different in mean AD across levels of
consciousness by group comparisons (p < 0.05, uncorrected). For each subfigure, the
left column shows a WM ROI in the standard space indicated by brain areas in red,
and the right part shows the fitted mean and standard deviation of AD in the
corresponding WM ROI for four DOC subgroups. Blue represents COMA, red VS,
green MCS, and purple PC. * indicates that p < 0.05, and ** indicates that p < 0.01.
Fig. 3. Eleven of 14 consciousness-related WM ROIs detected with RD
ANCOVAs. These ROIs were significantly different in mean RD across levels of
consciousness by group comparisons (p < 0.05, uncorrected). For each subfigure, the
left column shows a WM ROI in the standard space indicated by brain areas in red,
and the right part shows the fitted mean and standard deviation of RD in the
corresponding WM ROI for four DOC subgroups. Blue represents COMA, red VS,
green MCS, and purple PC. * indicates that p < 0.05, and ** indicates that p < 0.01.
Fig. 4. Correlations between fitted mean AD and the clinical measure of the
consciousness level – GCS for each of the three WM ROIs. The light blue
represents the fitted mean AD of all the DOC patients, and the dark blue represents
the fitted mean AD of the DOC patients after the exclusion of those with a GCS score
of 15.
Fig. 5. Correlations between fitted mean AD and the clinical measure of the
consciousness level – CRS-R for each of the three WM ROIs. The light blue
represents the fitted mean AD of all the DOC patients, and the dark blue represents
the fitted mean AD of the DOC patients after the exclusion of those with a CRS-R
score of 23.
Fig. 6. Correlations between fitted mean RD and the clinical measure of the
consciousness level – GCS for each of the 11 WM ROIs. The light blue represents
the fitted mean RD of all the DOC patients, and the dark blue represents the fitted
mean RD of the DOC patients after the exclusion of those with a GCS score of 15.
Fig. 7. Correlations between fitted mean RD and the clinical measure of the
consciousness level – CRS-R for each of the 11 WM ROIs. The light blue
represents the fitted mean RD of all the DOC patients, and the dark blue represents
the fitted mean RD of the DOC patients after the exclusion of those with a CRS-R
score of 23. |
Consciousness as a physical process caused by the organization of
energy in the brain
Robert Pepperell
Fovolab,
Cardiff Metropolitan University,
Cardiff, CF5 2YB, UK.
[rpepperell@cardiffmet.ac.uk]
Pre-production
Abstract
To explain consciousness as a physical process we must acknowledge the role of energy
in the brain. Energetic activity is fundamental to all physical processes and causally drives
biological behaviour. Recent neuroscientific evidence can be interpreted in a way that
suggests consciousness is a product of the organization of energetic activity in the brain.
The nature of energy itself, though, remains largely mysterious, and we do not fully understand how it contributes to brain function or consciousness. According to the principle
outlined here, energy, along with forces and work, can be described as actualized differences of motion and tension. By observing physical systems, we can infer there is something it is like to undergo actualized difference from the intrinsic perspective of the system. Consciousness occurs because there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo
a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain.
Keywords: Consciousness, metabolism, energy, brain, information theory, feedback
Introduction
“If mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a thing to be the case
remains a mystery.” (Nagel, 1974)
The philosopher Thomas Nagel summarised one of our greatest intellectual challenges:
how to explain mental processes as physical processes. The aim of this paper is to outline
a principle according to which consciousness could be explained as a physical process
caused by the organization of energy in the brain.1
Energy is fundamentally important in all physical processes (Boltzman, 1886; Lotka,
1922; Schrödinger, 1944; Heisenberg, 1958). As the biophysicist Harold Morowitz put
it: “the flow of energy through a system acts to organize that system” (Morowitz, 1979).
Light, chemical reactions, electricity, mechanical work, heat, and life itself can all be
described in terms of energetic activity (Chaisson, 2001; Morowitz and Smith, 2007;
Smil, 2008) as can metabolic processes in the body and brain (Magistretti, 2008; Perez
Velazquez, 2009). It is surprising, therefore, that energy receives relatively little attention
in neuroscientific and psychological studies of consciousness. Leading scientific theories
of consciousness do not reference it (Crick and Koch, 2003; Edelman et al., 2011;
1
I take it that physical processes occur in time and space and are causally determined by the actions of
energy, forces and work upon matter. I take consciousness to be the capacity for awareness of self and
world, which is particularly highly developed in humans.
1
Dehaene, 2014; Oizumi et al., 2014), assign it only a marginal role (Hameroff and
Penrose, 2014), or treat it as an information-theoretical quantity (Friston, 2013; Riehl et
al., 2017). If it is discussed, it is either as a substrate underpinning higher level emergent
dynamics (Deacon, 2013) or as powering neural information processing (Sterling and
Laughlin, 2017).
This lack of attention is all the more surprising given that some of the pioneers of
neurobiology, psychology, and physiology found a central place for energy in their
theories, including Hermann von Helmholtz (in Cahan, 1995), Gustav Fechner (Fechner,
1905), Sigmund Freud (Gay, 1998), William James (James, 1907), and Charles
Sherrington (Sherrington, 1940).2 There are, however, signs that attention is turning again
to energetic or thermodynamic-related theories of consciousness in various branches of
science (Deacon, 2013; Collell et al., 2015; Annila, 2016; Tozzi et al., 2016; Street, 2016;
Marchetti, 2018) and in philosophy of mind (Strawson, 2008/2017).
The present paper builds on this work by proposing that energy, and the related properties
of force and work, can be described as actualized differences of motion and tension, and
that — in Nagel’s phrase — ‘there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo’ actualised differences. Recent neuroscientific evidence suggests that consciousness is a product of the way energetic activity is organized in the brain. Following this evidence, I
propose that we experience consciousness because there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo a certain organization of actualized differences in the brain.
Several researchers have tackled the problem of consciousness by treating the brain in
principle as a neural information processor (e.g. Tononi et al., 2016; Dehaene et al., 2017;
Ruffini, 2017). I will argue that the governing principle of the brain at the neural level is
not information processing but energy processing. The information-theoretic approach to
measuring and modelling brain activity, however, can usefully complement the energetic
approach outlined here.
1. Consciousness and energy in the brain
We do not fully understand the biological function of energy in the brain or how it relates
to the presence of consciousness in the person.3 Given that the human brain accounts for
only 2% of the body’s mass it demands a large portion of the body’s total energy budget,
some 20% (Laughlin, 2001; Magistretti & Allaman, 2013). Most of this energy is derived
from the oxidization of glucose supplied to the cerebral tissue through the blood. Roy and
Sherrington were the first to propose a direct correspondence between changes in cerebral
blood flow and functional activity (Roy and Sherrington, 1890). Many features of human
brain anatomy, such as the number of blood vessels per unit of space, the lengths of neural
connections, the width of axons, and even the ratio of brain to stomach size are thought
to be determined by the high metabolic demands associated with complex cognitive
processing (Allen, 2009).
2
For further discussion on the historical context see Pepperell (2018).
Although for the sake of brevity I refer in this paper to consciousness occurring in the brain, consciousness is something that people undergo. Brains cannot sustain consciousness independently of the people
in which they are housed (Pepperell, 1995/2003).
3
2
For many neuroscientists, the main function of energy in the brain is to fuel neural signalling and information processing (Magistretti, 2013); energy supply is seen as a constraint on the design and operation of the brain’s computational architecture (Laughlin,
2001; Hall et al., 2012; Sterling and Laughlin, 2017). It has been calculated, for example,
that the rate of energy supply available to the human brain places an upper ‘speed limit’
on neural processing of about 1 kHz (Attwell and Gibb, 2005). And Schölvinck et al.
(2008) estimated that conscious perception of sensory stimuli increases energy consumption in primate brains by less that 6% compared to energy consumption in the absence of
conscious perception.4 They attribute this relatively small change to an energy efficient
“design strategy” of the brain in which decreases in neural activity play a functional role
in information processing as well as increases. Energy, on these accounts, plays no direct
role in higher mental processes, like consciousness.
Robert Shulman and colleagues have argued there is a direct connection between energy
in the brain and consciousness (Shulman et al., 2009; Shulman, 2013). By studying the
progressive loss of behavioural response to external stimulus from wakefulness to deep
anaesthesia, they found a corresponding reduction and localisation of cerebral metabolism (a marker of energy consumption). Therefore, they argue, high global metabolism is
necessary for consciousness. However, they are also clear that high global metabolic rates
are not sufficient as patients with locked-in-syndrome and those who suffer from some
forms of epileptic seizure can register high levels of global brain metabolism without
exhibiting the observable behaviour that we expect from a conscious person (Shulman,
2013; Bazzigaluppi et al., 2017). Shulman’s thesis has been challenged on several
grounds (Seth, 2014). For example, it has been pointed out that behavioural responsiveness may be inadequate as a measure of sentience given that vestiges of consciousness
have been detected in people diagnosed as being in a vegetative state with a low cerebral
metabolism (Owen et al., 2006). Moreover, some patients who recover from a vegetative
state to regain consciousness do so despite having substantially reduced cerebral metabolism compared with normal controls (Laureys et al., 1999; Chatelle et al., 2011).
In recent years there has been a growing interest in intrinsic brain activity (Clarke and
Sokoloff, 1999; Raichle, 2011). This background or spontaneous activity occurs in the
resting awake state in the absence of external stimulation or directed attention, and its
energy demands can greatly exceed those of localised activation due to task performance
or attention. The discovery of this so-called ‘dark energy’ in the brain (Raichle, 2010)
was greeted with some surprise in the neuroscience community and remains controversial
(Morcom & Fletcher, 2007). Work on intrinsic activity led to the identification of a
‘default mode network’ in the brain, an extended set of interconnected regions that uses
high levels of energy when a person is in a non-attentive state. Energy use drops
significantly in this network when a more cognitively demanding task, such as paying
attention to a stimulus, is performed (Shulman et al., 1997; Raichle et al., 2001).
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2009) reported that connectivity within the default mode network
in patients with severe brain-damage deteriorates in proportion to the degree of conscious
impairment, suggesting it plays an important role in sustaining consciousness.
Meanwhile, it is somewhat surprising to find that energy use during non-rapid eye movement sleep remains at ~85% of that in the waking state, while during rapid eye movement
sleep it can be as high as in the waking state (Dinuzzo et al., 2017). At the same time,
4
Strictly speaking energy is not consumed but converted from one form to another.
3
consciousness can be minimally sustained with energy use at only 42% of the level that
occurs in healthy conscious individuals, suggesting that much cerebral metabolic activity
in normal waking states does not directly contribute to consciousness (Stender et al.,
2016). Many anaesthetic agents are thought to obliterate consciousness because they reduce the global rate of cerebral metabolism (Hudetz, 2012). Administering ketamine, on
the other hand, increases brain metabolism yet can still lead to loss of responsiveness (Pai
and Heining, 2007). Overall, it seems we find no clear correlation between the total
amount of energy used by the brain, or the location where the energy is used, and the
level of consciousness detectable in the person.
2. Consciousness and the organization of energetic processing in the brain
An alternative, or perhaps complementary, way to think about this issue is in terms of
how the energetic activity in the brain is organized rather than its global level or localisation. Indeed, this has implicitly been the focus of recent research that aims to provide
quantitative measures of consciousness levels. In one study, researchers used transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS) to send a magnetic pulse through the brains of healthy controls and patients with various states of impaired consciousness (Casali et al., 2013). By
measuring how the pulse perturbed the cortex the researchers were able to determine the
relative complexity and extent of the pathways through which the pulse propagated and
correlate these to levels of consciousness. The researchers calculated a perturbation-complexity index (PCI) that quantified the levels of consciousness present in each person they
studied. This method was further validated as a reliable objective measure of levels of
consciousness by Casarotto et al. (2016).
The PCI was calculated using data from electroencephalographic (EEG) measurements
of the cerebral perturbation following the TMS. Images from the EEG were filtered into
binary data that was then analysed using a Lempel–Ziv algorithm, a commonly used information-theoretical technique in which complexity is measured as a function of data
string compressibility, with more complex data strings being less compressible (Ziv and
Lempel, 1977; Aboy et al., 2006). Other researchers have developed similar informationtheoretical methods for quantifying the complexity of brain activity and levels of consciousness. King et al. (2013) analysed data from 181 EEG recordings of patients who
were diagnosed with varying states of impaired consciousness and applied a measure of
weighted symbolic mutual information (wSMI) that sharply distinguished between patients in vegetative state, minimally conscious state, and conscious state.
Although information theoretic tools were being used to analyse and interpret the data in
these studies we should note that what was actually being detected by the experimental
procedures was not information per se but the organization of energetic activity or processing in the brain. Energetic processing — the processes by which the brain regulates
the flow of energy through its structures — is routinely detected at varying degrees of
spatial and temporal resolution, either directly or indirectly, by neuroimaging techniques
such as positron emission tomography (PET), functional magnetic resonance image
(fMRI) and EEG (Shulman, 2013; Bailey et al., 2005; Niedermeyer and Lopes da Silva,
1987). Referring again to the study by Casali et al. (2013), the perturbations from which
the PCI was calculated were generated by a pulse of magnetic energy from the TMS and
were imaged with EEG that measures electrical voltage differences, that is, fluctuations
in energetic potentials between clusters of neurons in the cortex (Niedermeyer and Lopes
da Silva, 1987; Hu et al., 2009; Koponen et al., 2015). The PCI and wSMI can therefore
4
be interpreted as measures of the complexity or organization of energetic processing in
the brain during the experimental procedures.
Subsequent research has directly investigated the connection between brain metabolism
(how the brain regulates energy conversion), brain organization, and levels of consciousness by combining EEG measures with PET, a more specific measure of cerebral metabolism. Chennu et al. (2017) collected data from 104 patients in varying states of conscious
impairment using both techniques. By analysing this data, they determined a metric that
discriminated levels of consciousness to a high degree of accuracy. This study built on
previous work by Demertzi et al. (2015) that used fMRI to correlate a measure of intrinsic
functional connectivity in the brain with levels of consciousness. The PCI method has
been further validated by a study combining EEG and 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)PET (Bodart et al., 2017), so reinforcing the link between levels of consciousness and the
organization of metabolic activity in the brain.
Current brain imaging methods do not strictly speaking detect information processing.5
They do, however, detect changes associated with increases in energy consumption (via
fMRI and PET) and fluctuations in electrical potential energy (via EEG), both of which
reliably correlate with changes in mental function and behaviour. On the basis of what
we can observe, the brain operates according to the principle of energetic processing. The
evidence discussed above suggests levels of consciousness are determined by the organization of energy processing in the brain rather than on its global level or localization;
wakeful conscious states are associated with more complex organization. To understand
why this might be we need to consider the concept of energy in more depth.
3. Energy
The concept of energy that we are familiar with today emerged only slowly from its beginnings in the late eighteenth century. It developed through the study of thermodynamics
in the nineteenth century, and then found its place at the centre of theories of relativity,
quantum mechanics, and cosmology in the twentieth (Coopersmith, 2010). In colloquial
usage energy refers to ideas of vigour, vitality, power, activity, and zest. In scientific
usage, however, energy is defined as the ability of a system to do work.6 Work is defined
as the transfer of energy involved in moving an object over a distance by an external
force, at least part of which is applied in the direction of the displacement (Duncan, 2002).
Scientists and engineers often refer to energy as an abstract property: “Energy is a mathematical abstraction that has no existence apart from its functional relationship to other
variables” (Abbott and Van Ness, 1972. See also Rose, 1986). It is a property that can be
converted from one form to another, and in an isolated system the total quantity is conserved (Smil, 2008).
Despite the enormous amount of interest in the physics of energy and its central importance in so many branches of science, its nature remains in many ways mysterious
5
The authors of Wollstadt (2017), for example, studied the breakdown of local information processing
under anaesthesia using information theoretic methods. They point out that the EEG procedure they used
did not directly record information processing in the brain but local field potentials, that is, fluctuations in
quantities of potential energy.
6
There seems to be an ambiguity in some textbooks about whether energy is an enabling property possessed by a system or body, e.g. Duncan (2002), or a measure of such a property, e.g. Rennie (2015). I
will take energy to be a property possessed by systems or bodies, quantities of which can be measured.
5
(Feynman, 1963; Smil, 2008; Coopersmith, 2010) and it has been the subject of relatively
little philosophical interrogation (Coelho, 2009). Treating energy as an abstract accounting quantity is perfectly satisfactory for many scientific purposes, where there is little
reason to question its nature. But if energetic activity plays a significant role in consciousness, as the evidence cited above suggests it might, then its nature deserves closer scrutiny.
The concept of energy in the European intellectual tradition can be traced back to Aristotle who used but never precisely defined the term energeia (ενέργεια) to convey the ideas
of action, activity, actuality, being at work, and acting purposefully (Sachs in Aristotle,
2002). Scholars have long debated the best way to translate energeia from ancient Greek.
The word ‘energy’ itself has been used, as have ‘activity’ and ‘actuality’, but ‘being-atwork’ is currently favoured, partly due to energeia’s roots in ergon, the ancient Greek for
work (Aristotle, 1818; Ellrod, 1982; Sachs in Aristotle, 2002). Modern scholars have
tended to quarantine the ancient concept of energeia from contemporary ideas about energy. But Aristotle’s term may still have value when thinking about energy’s nature. This
is especially so when we take into account the ideas of Aristotle’s intellectual forebear
Heraclitus, whose cosmological view was informed by three main principles: (i) that activity in nature is driven by ‘fire’ — which has been interpreted as synonymous with
energy (Heisenberg, 1958), (ii) is subject to continual flux or motion, and (iii) is structured by antagonism or tension and (Kahn, 1989; Sachs in Aristotle, 2002).
We now understand there to be two main forms of energy: kinetic and potential. Kinetic
energy is possessed by objects due to their motion, while potential energy is possessed
by objects due to their relative position or configuration. All other forms of energy, such
as thermal, electromagnetic, solar, chemical, gravitational, atomic and so on are in themselves forms of either kinetic or potential energy (Duncan, 2002; Smil, 2008). Much can
be said about kinetic and potential energy, including the fact that they are causally efficacious, that is, they cause real change and activity in the material world.7 But I want to
draw attention here to the fact that they are both expressions of difference. Kinetic energy
is difference as motion or change; potential energy is difference as tension or antagonism.
Neither kinetic nor potential energy inhere absolutely in objects but are relational properties; motion or change occurs relative to a frame of reference, and tension or antagonism
ocuurs between one object, or force, and another. The concept of difference then is of
utmost importance when considering the nature of energy and the related properties of
force and work.8
4. Actualized difference
If energy is the ability to do work then the displacement of a body undergoing work is
due to force, defined as the “agency that tends to change the momentum of a massive
body” (Rennie, 2015) or less formally as a “push or a pull”. Forces act and react antagonistically in equally opposing pairs and are therefore, like energy, expressions of difference. The discipline of physics finds it convenient to treat energy, forces and work as
7
“Energy may be called the fundamental cause for all change in the world” (Heisenberg, 1958). The neurobiologist Gerald Edelman neatly defined causal efficacy as “The action in the physical world of forces
or energies that lead to effects or physical outcomes” (Edelman, 2004).
8
Neuroanthropologist Terence Deacon defines energy as a “relationship of difference” (Deacon, 2013).
Note that energy is difference, but not all differences are energy; red is a colour, not all colours are red.
6
distinct quantities to be balanced in abstract mathematical equations. But in nature they
are integral and actualized, acting collectively in time and space with causal efficacy.
By observing nature, we can infer there is ‘something it is like’ to be a physical system
undergoing antagonistic forceful interactions, and what it is like will vary as the interactions vary.9 There is something it is like, for example, to be a piece of rope undergoing
great tension that is different from what it is like to be the same rope when relaxed, or for
a rock to crash to earth having been in freefall. Some effects of these interactions may be
observed from an extrinsic perspective; we may hear a creak or a crunch. But the something it is like to undergo the interactions themselves is an intrinsic property of the observed system to which the extrinsic observer has no access. It is for this reason that its
presence and nature can only be inferred.10
This is not to claim that forces acting at the subatomic scale between particles, or at the
macro scale in rope or rock, undergo anything like the experience we undergo as conscious humans.11 Something it is like-ness is not in itself consciousness. Rather, it is to
recognise that:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
energy, forces, and work are actualized,
they are expressions of difference, and
there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo actualized difference.
I use the term actualized difference to refer to the active, antagonistic nature of energy,
forces and work in a way that encompasses Heraclitean cosmology, Aristotlean energeia,
and contemporary scientific descriptions of energy. Mathematical equations can represent
actualized differences with abstract differences, in the form of symbols and numbers, but
not whatever it is that puts the “fire in the equation” (Hawking, 1988).12 For that we must
refer back to nature itself — to the territory rather than the map (Korzybski, 1933).
5. Energy and information
For many contemporary scientists, information is a fundamental property of nature. For
some it is the most fundamental property of nature (Davies, 2010). Neuroscientists often
claim that the brain operates according to the principle of information processing. We
read that “the brain is fundamentally an organ that manipulates information” (Sterling
and Laughlin, 2017) and that brains are “information processing machines” (Ruffini,
2017). Individual neurons are treated as information processing units, while neural firing
patterns are converted into sequences of binary digits (1s and 0s) that encode information
9
Nagel clarified the term ‘something it is like’ as meaning not what something resembles but ‘how it is’
for the system (Nagel, 1974).
10
Note that this claim is not as far-fetched as it might at first seem: If (i) consciousness in people is a
physical process — due to energy, forces and work — and (ii) we infer the presence of consciousness in
other people on the basis of observing them extrinsically — as we habitually do — and (iii) there is something it is like to be a conscious person — as we assume there is — then (iv) we routinely infer the presence of an intrinsic something it is like-ness in a physical process on the basis of observing it from an extrinsic perspective. However, as discussed below, human consciousness is a particular kind of something
it is like-ness that occurs only when certain conditions are met.
11
In discussions of the nature and behaviour of forces at the microscopic level we often find references to
the way they ‘feel’ (Feynman, 1963), or the way they ‘experience’ each other in fields (Rennie, 2015). It
would be interesting to investigate what motivates the use of such terms in this context.
12
The difference between 1 and 0, for example, is an abstract difference conceived within a conscious
mind.
7
(Koch, 2004). Recent prominent theories claim consciousness is identical with (Tononi
et al., 2016) or results from (Dehaene et al., 2017) certain kinds of information structures
or information processes in brains.
Information is variously and sometimes imprecisely defined in science (Capurro and
Hjørland, 2005), its meaning is still strongly contested (Lombardi et al., 2016; Roederer,
2016), and many people regard it as being to some extent subjective, relativistic, or observer-dependent (von Foerster, 2003; Deacon, 2010; Werner, 2011; Logan, 2012; Searle,
2013; de-Wit et al., 2016). The term is often used in science colloquially (meaning ‘what
is conveyed by an arrangement of things’) or “intuitively” (Erra et al., 2016). And where
one might expect to find a clear definition, such as in a dictionary of physics, biology or
chemistry, none appears (Rennie, 2015; Hine, 2015; Rennie, 2016).
The most widely cited technical definition of information is that given by Claude Shannon
(1948) as part of his mathematical theory of communication. For Shannon, information
does not refer to meaning or semantics, as it does colloquially. The information is the
amount of uncertainty in a message (a sequence of data) measured through probabilistic
analysis of its elements. Information theory has developed into an exceptionally powerful
mathematical tool that can be used, among many other things, to measure the complexity
of physical systems. But a quantity of Shannon information is a measure of what can be
known about a system as distinct from the system itself. The information lies with the
measurer rather than the measured.13
The other commonly cited definition of information is Gregory Bateson’s “a difference
that makes a difference” (Bateson, 1979). Like his fellow cybernetic theorist Norbert
Wiener (1948), Bateson sharply distinguished information from energy. Difference is not
a property of what he calls the “ordinary material universe” governed by energetic activity. It is not subject to the effects of impacts and forces but is an abstract, relational property of the mind that exists outside the realm of physical causation: “Difference, being of
the nature of relationship, is not located in time or space”. Information defined according
to Bateson as a “nonsubstantial” abstract difference cannot be used to explain consciousness as a physical process. 14
The integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) proposed by Tononi and colleagues provides an alternative, non-Shannonian, definition of information as “a form in
cause-effect space” (Tononi et al., 2016). Cause-effect space, according to their theory,
contains a “conceptual structure”— a constellation of related concepts — that is specified
by the “physical substrate of consciousness” (PSC), this being the precise complexes of
neural activation involved in any experience. Each conscious experience is identical with
this “form”, denoted Φmax when maximally integrated. But while IIT is presented as a
13
Arieh Ben-Naim sets out in some detail how Shannon information is a probabilistic measure rather than
a physical property (Ben-Naim, 2015). Note that the act of measurement presupposes a conscious mind
capable of carrying out the measurement procedure and interpreting the result.
14
Had he a fuller understanding of the nature of energy Bateson might not have been so dismissive about
its role in mental processes. In Mind and Nature (Bateson, 1979) he referred only to kinetic energy
(which he defined as “MV2”), thus ignoring potential energy, and was by his own admission “not up to
date in modern physics”. In fact, slightly modifying Bateson’s much-cited phrase to an actualized difference that makes a difference yields a description of the essence of energetic action, that is, the way energy, forces and work act antagonistically to effect change and cause further actions.
8
theory of integrated information, it could equally serve as a theory of how energetic processing is organized since the PSC consists in the causally interrelated patterns of neural
firing that are identical with the conscious experience.
Treating brains as neural information processors does not help us to understand consciousness as a physical process because information, according to the commonly accepted definitions, is not a physical property of brains at the neural level; there is no
information in a neuron.15 It is useful, however, to apply information-theoretical methods
to study the organization of physical systems, such as brains. Norbert Wiener (1948)
stated: “…the amount of information in a system is a measure of its degree of organization…” As exemplified in several studies and theories cited here, we can measure and
model the way the organization of energetic processes in the brain contributes to the presence of consciousness in a person.16 But the abstract difference between 0 and 1 is not
equivalent to the actualized difference between a neuron at rest and firing.
6. The brain as a ‘difference engine’
The challenge of explaining consciousness as a physical process is made more tractable,
I suggest, by recognising that brains operate on the principle of energetic processing.
Neurons, in concert with other material structures such as astrocytes and mitochondria,
convert, distribute, and dissipate electro-chemical energy through highly organized pathways in order to drive behaviours critical to the organism’s survival. This makes sense
when we consider the fact that organisms inhabit a physical world that is structured
through the actions of energy, forces and work. To survive and prosper in this world they
must continually work to acquire new supplies of high-grade or free energy to maintain
an internal state far from thermodynamic equilibrium (Boltzmann, 1886; Schrödinger,
1944; Schneider & Sagan, 2005). Besides internal regulation, nervous systems enable
organisms to perform two major tasks: discriminating between variations in environmental conditions, such as temperature, acidity, salinity, nutrient levels, or presence of predators, and moving towards environmental conditions that are beneficial to survival and
away from those that are harmful.
The mechanisms that enable performance of these tasks can be seen at work in organisms
with relatively simple nervous systems, such as the C. elegans worm (Sterling and Laughlin, 2017). Chemical gradients in the environment activate chemosensory neurons on the
worm’s surface that connect via interneurons to motor neurons that control the action of
dorsal and ventral muscles, which, in turn, control the worm’s movement (de Bono and
Maricq, 2005). In this way, differences of chemical potential energy in the environment
are converted into differences of electro-chemical energy in the sensing apparatus of the
15
Brains — as parts of people — process information in the colloquial sense, just as they process abstract
ideas, equations, numbers, thoughts, emotions, or memories. But they do so as a consequence of the underlying energetic processing (conversion, distribution, dissipation) going on in neural tissue. Computers
also ‘process’ information in the colloquial sense. Mechanically and electronically speaking, however,
they actually manipulate energy states (voltages, light, etc.) the results of which we, as conscious people,
interpret informationally. It is worth noting that all mechanical information processing necessarily entails
the dissipation of a certain amount of energy (Landauer, 1961). Recent experiments have confirmed this
principle and demonstrated the intimate link between energy and what many refer to as information (Bérut et al., 2012).
16
Logan (2012), in work undertaken with Stuart Kauffman and others, defines ‘biotic information’ as the
organization of the exchange of energy and matter between organism and environment — a further example of information theory being used to quantify the biological organization of energy flows.
9
organism and then into differences of chemical energy in the muscles, which, by antagonistic action, are converted into the kinetic energy of the organism’s movement. The organism makes discriminations in the environment relevant to its interests so that it can
take appropriate actions in response.
We can see the same basic principle at work in biology of far greater complexity. The
human visual system, for example, is highly demanding on the brain’s energy budget
(Wong-Riley, 2010). But the evolutionary benefit of human vision is the capacity it confers to guide finely controlled bodily actions in light of environmental conditions. This is
achieved through an intricate sequence of energy conversions, beginning with the arrival
at the retina of electro-magnetic energy from the environment and cascading through numerous energetic exchanges in the neural pathways of the visual system that progressively
differentiate features of the environment (Hubel and Livingstone, 1987). This frequently
results in the conversion of electro-chemical energy in the motor system and muscles to
the kinetic energy of bodily movement (Goodale, 2014). The fact that our complex biology supports so rich a repertoire of sensory discriminations and motor responses may be
only a difference of degree rather than of kind with the humble worm.
We might think of sensory cells responding to stimulation from environmental energy by
becoming excited or by increasing local neural activation. But vertebrate photoreceptors
are, contrary to what one might expect, hyperpolarised by photon absorption. This means
they ‘turn off’ when exposed to light and ‘turn on’ in the dark, even though they use more
energy in the dark (Wong-Riley, 2010).17 Meanwhile, some of the neurobiological evidence cited in Section 1 cautions us against assuming that sensory stimulation always
results in increased neural activation. Decreases in activation in the brain can occur in
response to cognitively demanding tasks, yet can go unnoticed in imaging studies with
methodologies designed to detect task-evoked increases in metabolic rate above baseline
(Raichle et al., 2001; Schölvinck et al., 2008). And of course not all neural activation is
excitatory; neural inhibition is vitally important in brain function, as elsewhere in the
nervous system, and this also entails an energetic cost (Buzsáki et al., 2007). There is
evidence that an optimal balance between neural excitation and inhibition (E-I balance)
in the cerebral cortex is critical for the brain to function well (Zhou & Yu, 2018).
In light of these mechanisms, the energy-hungry brain might be understood as a kind of
‘difference engine’ that works by actuating complex patterns of motion (action potential
propagation) and tension (antagonistic pushes and pulls between forces) at various spatiotemporal scales. Firing rates and electrical potentials vary within neurons, between neurons, between networks of neurons, and between brain regions, so maximising the differential states the brain undergoes. A decrease in activation, or a reduction in firing rate,
can create a differential state just as much as an increase. And, as is indicated by the work
of Schölvinck et al. (2008), deactivation may be an energy efficient way for the brain to
increase its repertoire of differential states. Maintaining a global E-I balance across spatiotemporal scales, meanwhile, is thought to promote ‘efficient coding’ in sensory and
cognitive processing (Zhou & Yu, 2018). All this lends support to the idea, proposed
above, that one of the roles of energetic activity in the brain is to efficiently actuate differences of motion and tension that advance the interests of the brain-bearing organism.
It is the actualized difference that makes the difference.
17
It turns out this arrangement is energy efficient for the visual system overall (Wong-Riley, 2010).
10
7. Energetic organization as the cause of consciousness
In theory, we could account for all the highly complex processes occurring in the brain in
terms of energy, forces and work, that is, as physical, chemical and biological processes.
But the seemingly unassailable problem of how any of these processes might cause consciousness remains. The principle outlined here — that there is something it is like, intrinsically to undergo differences due to the antagonistic action of energy, forces and work
— may offer a toehold in the slippery face of the problem. There is something it is like,
intrinsically, to be a tense muscle that is different from being a relaxed muscle. There is
something it is like, intrinsically, to be networks of neurons in fantastically complex states
of actualized differentiation from other networks, with action potentials propagating
through vast arrays of fibres. But all this something is it like-ness is not in itself consciousness. Muscles are not conscious, and networks of neurons are active in the brain
when we are in dreamless sleep or under anaesthesia. What is it about the organization of
energetic processes in the brain, as discussed in Section 2, that determines the level of
consciousness we experience?
We gain some insight into the association between consciousness and the organization of
energetic processing in the brain from studies of anaesthesia. The reason why anaesthetic
agents obliterate consciousness is not understood (Mashour, 2004). Recent work has focused on the ways in which they interfere with the brain’s capacity to generate patterns
of localised differentiation (often termed ‘information’) and to bind together or integrate
those patterns across widely distributed brain networks (Hudetz, 2012; Hudetz & Mashour, 2016). Evidence from studies on the neurological effects of anaesthetics suggests
that consciousness is lost as distant regions of the brain become functionally isolated and
global integration breaks down (Lewis et al., 2012). The idea that consciousness depends
on maximising differentiation and integration in the brain lies at the heart of IIT (Tononi,
2012; Oizumi et al., 2014).
A potential mechanism supporting global integration of local differentiation is recurrent
or reentrant processing, in which widely distributed areas of the brain engage in complex
loops of cortical feedback via massively parallel connections (Edelman et al. 2011; Edelman & Gally, 2013). A number of studies of the effects of anaesthetics have shown that
they disrupt feedback connectivity, and hence integration, particularly in the frontoparietal area of the brain (Lee et al., 2009; Hudetz & Mashour, 2016). Studies of brain organization during deep sleep have also reported an increase in modularity consistent with the
loss of integration among regions of the brain found in the awake state (Tagliazucchi et
al., 2013). This suggests that the presence of consciousness in a wakeful person depends
on a certain level of functional integration supported by cortical feedback loops (Edelman, 2004; Alkire et al., 2008) but it is not known how or why.
A major contribution of cybernetic theory was to recognise the importance of feedback
mechanisms for controlling behaviour in mechanical and living systems (Wiener, 1948;
Bateson, 1972). Feedback systems are self-referential; behaviour of one part of the system
casually affects another, which in turn affects the first. Such systems are apt to generate
patterns of behaviour that are an irreducible property of the system as a whole (Hofstadter,
2007; Deacon, 2013). One example is video feedback, which occurs when a video camera
is pointed at a screen showing the output from the camera (Crutchfield, 1984). When
correctly arranged the screen will at first display a tunnel-like image that will then spon-
11
taneously ‘blossom’ into an intricate, semi-stable pattern of remarkable diversity and fascinating beauty (see Figure 1).18 Since this is an energetically actuated process we can
infer, following the arguments already given, that there is something it is like to be the
video feedback system in full bloom, from its intrinsic perspective.
Figure 1. Stills from a video feedback sequence generated by the author. These patterns are created by pointing a video camera at a screen showing the camera’s output. What begins as a tunnellike images soon ‘blossoms’ into an ever-changing pattern of great diversity and fascinating
beauty. © Robert Pepperell, 2018.
Gerald Edelman proposed that “phenomenal experience itself is entailed by appropriate
reentrant intracortical activity” (Edelman & Gally, 2013). The human brain undergoes
recursive or reentrant behaviour of an unimaginably higher order of complexity than in
the video system.19 But the underlying operating principle may be analogous. Video feedback arises because the system is organized as a self-observing loop. If we assume that
reentrant activity in the brain is also a kind of self-observing loop in which processes in
one part the brain both affect and are affected by processes in other parts, then we can
envisage a kind of pattern blooming in the brain analogous to that we see in video feedback. This pattern would be actuated by sufficiently organized electro-chemical activity,
among neurons and neurotransmitters, channelled through reentrant neural circuits.
The something it is like-ness a brain organized in this way would be undergoing is of a
different order to that of a brain with diminished integration in dreamless sleep or under
anaesthesia. No other physical system, as far as we know, has the same capacity for complex (differentiated and integrated) recursive processing as the human brain, and that dynamic organization reaches its apogee when we are wakefully conscious, as suggested by
the evidence cited in Section 2. When the energetic processes in our brains are operating
at a certain level of dynamic recursive organization — the “appropriate reentrant intracortical activity” — then we undergo something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo something it is like … recursively. In other words,
there is something it is like, intrinsically, to be something it is like, recursively, to undergo
the particular organization of actualized differences found in the conscious brain. For
this we have the most direct and irrefutable evidence possible — what it’s like to undergo
our own conscious experience.20
18
Examples can be found on YouTube.
One way to quantify this relative complexity would be to follow the proposal of Chaisson (2001) and
compare the energy rate density (a measure he calls Φm) between the two systems. Note also that Edelman and Gally are careful to distinguish cybernetic feedback in machine control systems from re-entrant
processing in the brain, the latter being far more complex (Edelman & Gally, 2013).
20
‘I think therefore I am undergoing a certain recursive organization of actualized differences.’ Models of
consciousness based on feedback loops in the brain have been discussed before, including by Douglas
19
12
Is it reasonable then to propose that consciousness is caused by the way energetic activity
is dynamically and recursively organized in the brain? It is no less reasonable than attributing the causes of other biological phenomena, such as the behaviour of the nematode
worm, to the way energetic activity is organized. If consciousness is a physical (biological
and chemical) process, and if physical processes are caused by energetic activity (alongside forces and work), then consciousness, in principle, could be caused by energetic activity and the way it is organized.
8. Naturalising consciousness
In 1937–8 Charles Sherrington gave a series of lectures on the relationship between energy and mind, collected in the volume Man on his Nature (Sherrington, 1940). Drawing
on the physics of his day, Sherrington understood the natural world to be composed of
forms of energy. But he could not conceive how the mind could be forged from energy:
“The energy-concept of Science collects all so-called ‘forms’ of energy into a flock and
looks in vain for the mind among them.” The mystery was deepened for him by the
knowledge, then emerging through studies of electrical and metabolic activity in the
brain, of how intimately energy and the mind must be linked. He was compelled to wonder “Is the mind in any strict sense energy?” but reluctantly concluded that “…thoughts,
feelings, and so on are not amenable to the energy (matter) concept.” They lie beyond the
purview of natural science, despite the “embarrassment” this causes for biology.
If we are to naturalise consciousness, then we must reconcile energy and the mind. I have
outlined a principle that may help to explain consciousness as a physical process. It entails
re-examining the modern scientific concept of energy in the light of Aristotle’s energeia
and its Heraclitean roots. Accordingly, we arrive at a view of physical processes in nature
as actualized differences of motion and tension. Sherrington understood that “Energy
acts, i.e. is motion.” But he went on “…of a mind a difficulty is to know whether it is
motion.” Treating the brain as a difference engine the work of which is to actualize and
organize differences of motion and tension that serve the interests of the organism is, I
submit, a natural approach to understanding consciousness as a physical process.
Conclusion
If consciousness is a natural physical process then it should be explicable in terms of
energy, forces and work. Energy is a physical property of nature that is causally efficacious and, like forces and work, can be conceived as actualized differences of motion and
tension.
Evidence from neurobiology indicates that the brain operates on the principle of energetic
processing and that a certain organization of energy in the brain, measured with information theoretic techniques, can be reliably predict the presence and level of consciousness. Since energy is causally efficacious in physical systems, it is reasonable to claim
that consciousness is in principle caused by energetic activity and how it is dynamically
organized in the brain.
Hofstadter in his book I am a Strange Loop (Hofstadter, 2007). I have also previously proposed a feedback
model of consciousness partly inspired by Edelman’s theory of reentrant processing as part of an attempt
to design an artificially conscious work of art (Pepperell, 2003).
13
Information in the biological context is best understood as a measure of the way energetic
activity is organized, that is, its complexity or degree of differentiation and integration.
Information theoretic techniques provide powerful tools for measuring, modelling, and
mapping the organization of energetic processes, but we should not confuse the map with
the territory.
Actualized differences, as distinct from abstract differences represented in mathematics
and information theory, are characterised by there being something it is like, intrinsically,
to undergo those differences, that is, to undergo antagonistic states of opposing forces.
All actualized differences undergo this something it is like-ness, but not all are conscious.
It is proposed that a particular kind of activity occurs in human brains that causes our
conscious experience. It is a certain dynamic organization of energetic processes having
a high degree of differentiation and integration. This organization is recursively self-referential and results in a pattern of energetic activity that blossoms to a degree of complexity sufficient for consciousness.
If consciousness is a physical process, and physical processes are driven by actualized
differences of motion and tension, then there is something it is like to undergo actualized
differences organized in a certain way in the brain, and this is what we experience —
intrinsically.21
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the following for discussions and suggestions: Alistair Burleigh, Alan
Dix, Chris Doran, Robert K. Logan, Heddwyn Loudon, Chen Song, Galen Strawson, Emmett Thompson, Sander Van der Cruys, and to the reviewers for their comments and criticism. I also wish to acknowledge the support of the Vice Chancellor’s Board of Cardiff
Metropolitan University.
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22 |
Consciousness is learning: predictive
processing systems that learn by binding
may perceive themselves as conscious.
V.A. Aksyuk,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY,
100 BUREAU DR., GAITHERSBURG MD 20899 USA
VLADIMIR.AKSYUK@NIST.GOV
Abstract
Machine learning algorithms have achieved superhuman performance in specific complex domains. Yet
learning online from few examples and efficiently generalizing across domains remains elusive. In humans
such learning proceeds via declarative memory formation and is closely associated with consciousness.
Predictive processing has been advanced as a principled Bayesian inference framework for understanding
the cortex as implementing deep generative perceptual models for both sensory data and action control.
However, predictive processing offers little direct insight into fast compositional learning or the mystery
of consciousness. Here we propose that through implementing online learning by hierarchical binding of
unpredicted inferences, a predictive processing system may flexibly generalize in novel situations by
forming working memories for perceptions and actions from single examples, which can become shortand long-term declarative memories retrievable by associative recall. We argue that the contents of such
working memories are unified yet differentiated, can be maintained by selective attention and are
consistent with observations of masking, postdictive perceptual integration, and other paradigm cases of
consciousness research. We describe how the brain could have evolved to use perceptual value prediction
for reinforcement learning of complex action policies simultaneously implementing multiple survival and
reproduction strategies. ‘Conscious experience’ is how such a learning system perceptually represents its
own functioning, suggesting an answer to the meta problem of consciousness. Our proposal naturally
unifies feature binding, recurrent processing, and predictive processing with global workspace, and, to a
lesser extent, the higher order theories of consciousness. We provide a qualitative but specific functional
description of the proposed information processing architecture to facilitate experimental testing,
refinement or falsification. While such a system is in principle straightforward to implement numerically,
ethical implications of such numerical experiments ought to be considered carefully.
Contents
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 3
PERCEPTION .................................................................................................................................................. 5
Background – predictive processing framework. ..................................................................................... 5
Hierarchical learning by binding – rationale. ............................................................................................ 7
Unified episodic and semantic memory record and associative recall. ................................................. 10
Perceptual unity. ..................................................................................................................................... 13
Quickly forming causal connections entails a global workspace. ........................................................... 14
Working memory enabled by selective attention. ................................................................................. 15
Defining ‘consciousness’ and the ‘conscious contents’. ......................................................................... 17
Transparency of perceptual models, higher order theories, ‘experience’ and ‘self’.............................. 19
The meta problem of consciousness. ..................................................................................................... 21
ACTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 23
Reinforcement learning of complex gene-proliferating actions. ............................................................ 23
Value learning. ........................................................................................................................................ 25
Action encoding in predictive processing. .............................................................................................. 26
Action learning and exploration-exploitation tradeoff. .......................................................................... 27
Imagination and thinking. ....................................................................................................................... 28
Procedural knowledge and perceptual knowledge. ............................................................................... 28
DISCUSSION................................................................................................................................................. 30
States of consciousness. ......................................................................................................................... 30
Measurement of consciousness. ............................................................................................................ 31
Outlook and open questions................................................................................................................... 32
Summary. ................................................................................................................................................ 33
BOX 1. Meeting the Hard Criteria for a theory of consciousness ............................................................... 33
Empirical phenomena of consciousness being addressed by the proposal: .......................................... 33
Meeting Hard Criteria: ............................................................................................................................ 34
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................... 34
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................................ 34
INTRODUCTION
The field of machine learning advanced explosively in the last 3 decades and enabled numerous practical
applications in the areas of image and language processing and autonomous control. Deep learning and
reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto 1998) principles enable machines that learned chess, go and
computer games from scratch (Silver et al. 2018; Mnih et al. 2015), and left humans well behind in
performance. However, while deep learning, artificial neural networks and reinforcement learning were
largely inspired by the biological systems, the overarching information processing principles in the
biological brains remain poorly understood. In biological systems in-situ learning and behavior adaptation
have been honed by evolution to confer survival and reproduction advantages despite their significant
energetic and other costs. Meanwhile, learning machines are still unable to efficiently learn online, in the
real world, from few examples and to incrementally combine and generalize useful behavior patterns
across domains (Kaelbling 2020) – the tasks mammals excel at. In humans this type of learning can be
linked to forming declarative memories, which is an indicator of conscious information processing. Thus,
understanding consciousness is not only one of the preeminent intellectual challenges of our time, but,
viewed from the fundamental statistical and machine learning perspective, may lead to radical practical
advances enabling the next generation of artificial learning agents.
Since the turn of the century the problem of human consciousness has been at the focus of intense and
growing experimental, theoretical and philosophical attention. While initial empirical investigations were
organized around searching for the neural correlates of consciousness (Crick and Koch 1990), more
recently a variety of conceptual frameworks and theories of consciousness (ToCs) (Seth and Bayne 2022)
have been advanced to provide the intellectual scaffold for orienting the empirical studies. However,
despite the proliferation of ToCs, they remain largely incongruent, with each one seemingly focusing on
specific aspects of consciousness and the corresponding neurobiological and empirical data (Doerig,
Schurger, and Herzog 2021). There is currently no common theoretical paradigm connecting across the
field and no clear agreement as to the exact meaning of the term ‘consciousness’. All leading ToCs contain
important empirically supported insights, but there is currently no conceptual approach that can unify
these descriptions as aspects of a common model. Ideally, consciousness would be understood as an
inherent aspect of a broader unified model of cognition seamlessly including attention and affect together
with learning, perception and action, describing how the perceptions and reports of the ‘subjective
experience’ may arise, and how the system’s overall function confers an evolutionary advantage.
Maintaining organism homeostasis, while crucially important, is only one of many gene proliferating
strategies that are evidently being implemented through the general and flexible adaptation and control
enabled by the brain. If efficient and general learning is a core function of this system, and declarative
learning is a key part of it, so is consciousness.
Declarative learning, proceeding through working memory (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell 2000), is directly
related to consciousness – we form declarative memories of things we are ‘conscious of’. While
declarative learning can dramatically fail in fully conscious humans with certain types of amnesia, such
failure may be understood as downstream of consciousness. The ability to quickly learn by dynamically
forming novel associations of multiple perceptions and actions in ‘working memory’ remains intact,
enabling flexible and adaptive behavioral response to novel stimuli, despite the failure to retain and
consolidate (optimize) this new knowledge for future use via the short- and long-term memory. It is
therefore compelling to consider consciousness as a manifestation of a learning process. The relationship
between consciousness and learning figures prominently in several ToCs (Lamme 2006; Cleeremans et al.
2020; Cleeremans 2011; Birch, Ginsburg, and Jablonka 2020; Singer 2001). Notably, consciousness has
been connected to dynamic binding of known perceptual features for representing novel compound
objects (Singer 2001; Crick and Koch 2003; Treisman 2003), and both learning and forming dynamic
connections between perceptual features are key in the recurrent processing theory (Lamme 2006).
Here we develop a conceptual proposal for the functional organization of a biological or an artificial
conscious agent as a learning system that combines learning by binding with predictive processing (PP)
(Hohwy and Seth 2020; Hohwy 2020; Clark 2013) for perception, and active inference (K. Friston et al.
2017; K. J. Friston et al. 2010; Parr and Friston 2019) and reinforcement learning (RL) (Montague, Dayan,
and Sejnowski 1996; Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997; Cohen et al. 2012) for action. Functionally, the
proposed learning architecture constantly posits and tests new perceptual hypotheses by introducing new
causes that minimize the largest and most time-correlated prediction errors, attempting to find common
hidden causes that bind these otherwise-unpredicted perceptual inferences. The specific perceptual
features that are being bound are what the system perceives as its conscious contents, and the process
of hypothesis generation is perceived as ‘being conscious’. We describe how the typical reports referring
to ‘conscious experience’ originate from perceptual representations the system learns to infer about itself
and how the proposed functional organization entails these representations, including unified yet
differentiated perception, short and long-term memory formation and associative recall, attention and
working memory, affect, multimodal thinking, action and different types of learning.
Neural implementations of our proposal’s three constitutive information processing functions – PP,
feature binding, and RL – have been broadly discussed in the literature, with neural circuits proposed for
PP and identified for RL, and feature binding variously related to recurrent processing (Lamme 2006),
neural coalitions (Crick and Koch 2003) and synchronization in the cortico-thalamic system (Singer 2001).
Furthermore, we will argue that our proposal entails as its consequences the key insights underlying global
workspace (Baars 1995; 2005; Dehaene and Changeux 2011; Mashour et al. 2020) and high order theories
(Cleeremans et al. 2020; Cleeremans 2011; Brown, Lau, and LeDoux 2019). Lastly, our answer to the meta
version (Chalmers 2018) of the hard problem (Chalmers 1995) proceeds largely along the illusionist
approach, similar, for example, to the one described recently in the context of the attention schema ToC
(Graziano et al. 2020).
In the following manuscript, the first major section introduces the learning functional architecture and
discusses its consequences with the focus on perception. The second major section expands the
architecture to include action learning and optimization by future value estimation and RL. The first
section introduces learning-by-binding as a natural complement to the conventional PP learning, enabling
Bayesian learning of new categorical causes for sensory data. We then explore the implications of this
architecture, arguing that it directly entails formation of a unified perceptual representation and a
corresponding memory record accessible by associative recall, as well as the appearance of a global
workspace, whereby binding immediately connects perceived features to a broad range of possible
actions, including maintaining them in the workspace by selective attention. We discuss how conscious
contents are defined by this functional account of the proposed learning architecture. Finally, we discuss
the transparent and hierarchical nature of the learned perceptual models, including the higher order
perceptions of ‘experience arising’ and ‘self’, and argue how transparency gives raise to the hard problem
illusion.
In the second section we consider an information processing system evolved for learning, via temporal
difference RL (TDRL) (Sutton and Barto 1998), action policies that implement multiple survival and
reproduction strategies. We discuss how perception may be optimized for guiding action and estimating
the future value of the current state needed for TDRL. We adapt the active inference approach of
representing both actions and perceptions within the same categorical PP model, whereby actions may
manifest as selective attention and imagination as well as motor execution. We argue that the learningby-binding mechanism, applied to actions, rapidly and directly modifies the ongoing action policy by
making new cross-predictive links between perceptions and actions – forming declarative action
memories, subject to RL rules. The TDRL framework with explicit future value estimation allows action
learning toward distinct survival and reproduction goals implicitly encoded via separate categories of
neuro-biologically generated internal reward signals. We believe that learning by binding applied to deep
generative models for perception and action results in the sample-efficient, generalizable, compositional
and incremental online learning, which is the hallmark of conscious information processing in humans and
which is currently lacking in artificial agents (Kaelbling 2020).
PERCEPTION
Background – predictive processing framework.
Within the predictive processing framework, we first consider a simplified perception-only system that
learns, over long timescales, a generative model of incoming sensory data and perceives by dynamically
inferring the learned causes at each moment to minimize sensory data prediction errors. A perfect
prediction would be achieved if using the inferred causes and the perceptual data at a given moment in
time, the system updates the causes at the subsequent times such that the model exactly predicts the
subsequent sensory data. However, no prediction is perfect, and the inferences of causes are dynamically
updated based on minimizing the local prediction errors within the model, implementing approximate
Bayesian inference. Moreover, the same perception errors are used to improve the model by learning
over the long term, modifying its causal structure, such as by quantitatively changing how individual
causes are inferred from and, in turn, predict their ‘feature’ causes, as well as by learning new causes with
predictive power over sensory data.
In a typical PP model (Figure 1a), causes are interconnected in a deep hierarchical architecture with a bidirectional, generative dynamic relationship. Within such a generative model, the causes predict the
likelihoods of their features down to the sensory data, as well as their own and other cause likelihoods
forward in time. While higher-level causes influence their lower-level features via prediction, the
prediction errors from features in turn dynamically change the inferred likelihoods of the higher-level
causes. Learning conventionally proceeds by finding mutual activation weights, that is, inference and
prediction strengths minimizing the local prediction errors over the long term. These locally-hierarchical
relationships express the key assumption (induction bias defining the hypothesis space) that the sensory
data is described by causal relationships between wholes and their features. Additional regularizing
assumptions may be used, such as, for example, particular global hierarchical topology, sparsity within
subsets of causes (e.g., mutual exclusion), or particular time dependence such as finite persistence.
Both continuous-valued and discrete (categorical) causes can be combined within PP models (K. J. Friston,
Parr, and de Vries 2017). The simpler categorical causes are described by single scalar values denoting the
likelihood of a cause being present, i.e., a single continuous-valued precision is the only number associated
with each discrete cause. For example, how likely is the ‘cat’ explanation for the current sensory data, on
a scale from 0 to 1? Continuous-valued scalar and vector quantities and more general continuous-valued
objects can also be represented by categorical causes as likelihood distributions on discretized maps that
can be 1-dimensional, 2-dimensional or have more complex topologies, and can have global or local
likelihood normalization, smoothness and other regularization rules imposed among the map elements.
This is consistent with many map-like neural column areas across the neocortex.
Figure 1. Predictive processing and learning new causes by feature binding. A generative predictive
processing model (a) encodes the world and action state within a hierarchy of discrete connected
elements (middle). Each element (right) encodes a scalar state of a single cause (e.g., a categorical cause
likelihood) and the corresponding scalar prediction error. Multiple elements may interact to represent
probability distribution maps (top right). The causes higher in the hierarchy predict the lower ones (blue
solid arrows) and receive their prediction errors (red dashed arrows) for inference. The lowest levels
represent sensory inputs with externally-given states and actuation outputs with the prediction-dictated
states. To maintain the predictive power in the presence of processing latencies, the cause dynamics at
the higher levels is slower than at the lower levels, such that higher levels encode more persistent and
more abstract causes. (b) illustrates the theorized learning mechanism for new categorical causes.
Whenever several feature causes, such as shapes, colors, locations, etc., are inferred coincidentally and
exceed a specific (prediction error) x (duration) threshold, such coincident unexplained causes are
attributed to a new common cause via learning by binding. The common cause is provisionally added to
the model and immediately thereafter predicts the features that are thus bound. As the time passes, if
the new cause is inferred repeatedly, its predictions are refined based on experience and consolidated.
On the contrary, without repeat inference the prediction strengths are gradually attenuated to zero, and
the new cause is thereby discarded.
The overall PP model is encoded by the network of all learned causes and their prediction-strength links
to each other. The model is dynamic, with some links embedding time delays to account for sensory
latency, feature asynchrony and prediction in time. We will refer to this conceptual PP modeling
description in the following discussion and will further expand it to include learning future-value and
behavior policy via RL and to discuss active inference. However, the specific details of the model are not
critical for our central arguments. The key model features are the encoding of distinct inferred causes,
prediction errors for each cause and the bi-directional, generative inference-prediction relationships. A
cause is inferred from, and predicts, its feature causes such that each cause’s precision (inferred
likelihood) adjusts dynamically, over short timescales, to locally minimize prediction errors.
The local PP learning rules for long-term modification of prediction strengths to minimize the prediction
error over multiple epochs remain active across the hierarchy. In particular, at the lower levels within each
perceptual domain, statistical regularities in sensory data are a function of the physics of the world and
the sensors. Therefore, low-level sensory cortexes have evolved specific arrangements of cortical maps
and initial connectivity topologies to facilitate rapid and massively parallel statistical learning via these
local prediction update rules.
Hierarchical learning by binding – rationale.
Our key proposal is a new type of induction bias which can be added to PP systems for efficient online
learning (Figure 1b). Typically, the conventional PP learning rules attribute the prediction errors to
imperfectly learned prediction strengths between the already-existing causes and learning proceeds by
adjusting these strengths to minimize errors. We propose an additional, separate type of learning that
attributes errors to the existence of yet-unknown causes, and attempts to learn such causes, first
provisionally, and then permanently. Consider a case when several significant prediction errors occur
together, closely correlated in time, and there is no known common cause that can already be inferred to
simultaneously predict all of them. Furthermore, suppose each individual prediction error is from a cause
that has been used many times previously and learned extensively, that is, this cause’s relationship to the
known causes, including its own features, has already been well learned over many examples. It is an
intuitive assumption to tentatively posit a new cause accounting for all the coincident prediction errors –
to assume that the causes with significant concurrent errors are due to (are features of) a common
previously-unknown cause.
Different sensory modalities have different latencies; therefore, PP models have to predict causallyrelated features that are asynchronous in time, fusing them across modalities. They also must learn to
predict the future state from the current one. Thus, individual causes must be able to predict features
spread in time, including prediction of delayed features at their proper times. Common causes must be
found for not only concurrent events, but time-correlated events, including temporal sequences spread
over hundreds of milliseconds, consistent with postdictive effects, such as color-phi and meta-contrast
masking (Herzog, Drissi-Daoudi, and Doerig 2020), as well as large latency differences between sensory
domains. The proposed learning process forms such causes by binding features with time-correlated but
asynchronous prediction errors, across up to few hundred millisecond long delays, depending on the
perceptual modality. The resulting new-bound causes are functionally the same as other causes within
the PP model and can be inferred from, and predict, their feature’s relative timing (see further discussion
of timing effects below and in Figure 3).
When the unpredicted features are first bound into a new cause, such cause is a temporary hypothesis,
based on one observation. Once it is no longer actively perceptually inferred, it can only exist as a new
cause in the PP hierarchy over a short initial time period, a short-term memory timescale of seconds to
tens of seconds. If the cause is repeatedly or continuously inferred within that time, thereby providing a
consistent reduction of prediction errors, it is retained within the PP model, while otherwise it is discarded
(forgotten). Compared to well-learned causes, the initial feature prediction strengths of a new cause are
more plastic, subject to large learning updates according to the usual PP learning rules each time the cause
is inferred. If it is not repeatedly inferred, its prediction strengths gradually attenuate with time. With
increasing cumulative activation of the new cause both the active update size and the passive attenuation
rate decrease, and ultimately the small residual plasticity and zero attenuation are reached as the cause
becomes a permanent part of the PP model.
This can be viewed as Bayesian updates of the beliefs about the causal structure of the world, distinct
from the Bayesian inference of the current state of the world. A new belief, represented by the new added
cause, has a low initial precision and undergoes large updates with each new observation. The precision
gradually increases, and the updates decrease with the number of observations and their duration. The
new causes lacking sufficient cumulative activation are completely discarded – their prediction strengths
attenuated to zero – to decrease the model complexity and increase the predictive power. After many
repeat activations, plasticity of the well-learned causes reaches a low but finite limit, to account for the
possibility of the world changing on long time scales. After this transition from short-term to long-term
memory, the well-learned causes are no longer deliberately forgotten over time: the lack of use does not
constitute evidence of uselessness.
We suggested that declarative memory formation is entailed by the learning-by-binding mechanism
added within the PP framework, thus providing the rationale for the declarative memory function from
the perspective of perceptual Bayesian learning. However, the apparent semantic complexity and
structure of individual declarative memories, associatively recallable as a single unit, suggests that this
binding process is both parallel and hierarchical. Multiple groups of prediction errors, time-correlated
within each group, are simultaneously detected within and across sensory domains. The corresponding
groups of unpredicted inferred causes are separately bound into multiple new causes based on
correlations within but not between each of them. The total number of concurrent separately-bound
groups may be limited – keeping the number of hypothesized new causes small would serve a complexityreducing regularization function. Furthermore, a cause recently formed by binding, being new, cannot
itself be a feature predicted by any known causes. Therefore, each time such new-bound cause is inferred
for a sufficient duration from its features, it necessarily has a large prediction error and is subject to further
binding with other near-concurrent or time-correlated unpredicted causes. Thus, the binding process
itself is hierarchical and builds shallow trees binding multiple new, as well as previously-known, causes
together, and culminating in a single root cause, which unites a large fraction of the unpredicted features
of the present perceptual moment.
In one example (Figure 2a), a ‘red’ ‘loud’ ‘car’ located ‘on the left’ is perceived as a new compound cause
for the unpredicted concurrent perceptions of ‘redness’, ‘loudness’, ‘car’ and activation of a particular
‘leftward’ location on a spatial map. Perhaps head orientation and repeated visual saccades to this
location, triggered by the auditory system’s sound localization, create high temporal correlation of
activation between a particular place ‘on the left’ in the body-centric-frame spatial map, the
corresponding visual field map location, and the specific visual inferences of ‘red’ and ‘car’. The concurrent
auditory inferences describe the specific sound – ‘loud’, etc. – with the auditory localization activating the
same body-centric location. All these multimodal perceptions have high prediction errors – they are not
expected – and are highly temporally correlated with each other and with (directing attention to) a
particular spatial location. Thus, the system binds a new cause ‘The Car’ which predicts a ‘red’ ‘loud’ ‘car’
‘on the left’, now represented as a unified compound object. Similarly, a ‘green’ ‘tree’, of a particular ‘tall’
height, may be simultaneously perceived at a specific location ‘on the right’ as a new unified object ‘The
Tree’.
In addition to the direct sensory perceptions, the hierarchical PP model may also, simultaneously,
represent higher-order causes that describe the perception process itself. A cause may be inferred
representing the ongoing ‘experience’ of some objects, distinct from the mere presence of these objects
– if one looks away, the objects may still be inferred as present but no longer as being ‘experienced’.
Moreover, a cause of ‘self’ may also be inferred, to which this ‘experience’ is attributed to belong to. In
this schematic example, the new-bound causes for ‘The Car’ and ‘The Tree’ are bound with the higherorder causes for ‘I have’ ‘ongoing experience’ to form a top-level episodic cause that includes ‘I experience
The Car (a red loud car on the left) and The Tree (a tall green tree on the right).’ These become
associatively recallable as a unit and may be also unified with other concurrent unpredicted perceptions.
The hyperparameters of the learning by binding – the minimum prediction error size, activation duration
and maximum asynchrony between features that can still lead to binding – vary across sensory domains
and PP hierarchy levels, such as between single-domain, multimodal and abstract (amodal) mental
objects. In biological brains they are optimized by evolution to efficiently infer typical structures in sensory
data within each domain, and in particular those structures that are most useful for guiding evolutionaryadvantageous actions. These binding parameters, as well as plasticity of prediction strengths vs.
cumulative activation and consolidation/forgetting timescales can be empirically elucidated, such as by
analyzing existing cognitive studies data. As we will specifically discuss in the next section, these
parameters directly affect both perception and learning of events in time. The hyperparameters are
modulated on the short and long time scales by global state variables, such as the affective states, and
exploration-exploitation balance discussed in the following sections, whereby the slow global variations
define the global states of consciousness (Bayne, Hohwy, and Owen 2016). As we elaborate below, the
major functional role of perception is to estimate future value for reinforcement-learning an optimized
action policy, encoded within the same PP generative model. Therefore, on short time scales high positive
or negative valance strongly and dynamically modulates the learning-by-binding parameters to provide
both value-relevant perceptual learning and value-increasing action policy learning.
To recap, temporary new causes are hierarchically learned from single- or few-examples by binding of
perceptions with time-correlated prediction errors, according to an induction bias that large, correlated
prediction errors must be due to common hidden causes. This learning-by-binding process operates
continuously on top of the PP framework. The causes are subsequently retained and consolidated or
discarded depending on whether they are repeatedly inferred and thus consistently reduce the prediction
errors. This learning architecture is a conjecture that remains to be confirmed by statistical learning theory
and numerical machine-learning experiments to demonstrate that rapid learning by binding within the PP
framework is indeed possible and stable. However, analyzing this proposal and how it may relate with
established data and theory may advance understanding of human perception and learning, including the
elusive concept of consciousness. Therefore, we will now discuss some properties entailed by it, and how
these properties correspond to functional processes commonly associated with consciousness.
Figure 2. Predictive processing combined with learning by binding entail commonly recognized mental
phenomena. (a) Learning by binding functions hierarchically, further binding multiple known and new
object causes with large prediction errors into a unified perceptual representation for the present
moment – a shallow tree structure encoding the unified yet differentiated content describing an episode.
(b) When some of the same features, such as the ‘motor sound’ localized ‘on the left’ are inferred again,
within a similar context, this may lead to the inference of the previous episode and ‘The Car’ object, and
prediction of the hidden features, such as the shape and color of the object, in the process of the
associative recall. (c) An action of attention to a feature, such as a specific spatial location, increases the
likelihood of that feature. When one or more features of an object are thus predicted, the object may be
maintained in perception even in the complete absence of any feature’s direct inference from sensory
data. This describes maintaining the object in working memory by selective attention. (d) When an object
is formed by binding, its features predict each other. This causal connection between features makes the
object globally available. In response to a prompt “What color is the car”, the feature prompt “car”
increases the likelihood of the car shape, which predicts the color red via “The Car”. The red color
combined with the color query prompt triggers the action of the red color report.
Unified episodic and semantic memory record and associative recall.
As described above, at any point in time the newly-bound cause which is top-most in the PP hierarchy
provides the root-cause hypothesis for a large fraction of the persistent prediction errors, giving a single
unified episodic description of a large fraction of perceptions about the present moment that are unique,
i.e., not predicted by other ongoing perceptions (Figure 2a). By virtue of being bound into a unified whole,
the various perceptions can be associatively recalled together. This unity is a result of the induction bias
inherent in this learning system, which assumes that concurrent unpredicted events have a common
cause (see discussion in the Perceptual Unity section, below). The top-most, episodic, cause and all the
newly-bound causes that are its features, together, give the best concise generative description of the
sensory data leveraging the known PP model. I.e., the few-layer deep tree of the newly-bound causes can
be thought of as a compressed representation of the present moment using the already-learned PP causal
structure as the perceptual code vocabulary, which is, however, generative and dynamic.
To be bound into a new cause, the features must have prediction errors – inferred likelihoods above
predictions from all other causes – and the errors must exceed certain thresholds in size and duration or
their product (Figure 3a,b). The hierarchical binding of new causes further, e.g., into an episode, requires
additional persistence time. Therefore, anything that decreases the size and time-persistence of
prediction errors interferes with binding, such as when unpredicted object stimuli are presented for a
short duration and followed by masking to control the duration of their inference by the PP model (Figure
3a). This relates the new cause binding with the experimental control variables of duration and
presentation contrast (Figure 3b). In another paradigm case, a set of features is presented simultaneously
or in succession, and then a posteriori predicted or, more accurately, postdicted by inferring a single
known common cause within the conventional PP (Figure 3c,d). Such features do not have sufficient
duration of large prediction errors to be individually bound into a new cause before the known cause is
inferred, and only the common cause, if it remains unpredicted for long enough, becomes bound (Figure
3d, left). Therefore, even if the features are strongly inferred by the PP for an extended period, they are
not associatively recallable separately from their cause – this cause may be bound to become reportable
and actionable, but the individual features are not. Specifically, it is impossible to recall which particular
feature combination has led to the recallable instance of the cause’s inference. This accounts for the
postdiction effects in experiments showing mandatory integration of time-sequenced features (Herzog,
Drissi-Daoudi, and Doerig 2020) as well as unconscious integration of features into wholes, generally.
Learning by binding not only entails the mandatory unconscious feature integration (Figure 3c,d), but also
allows reinterpretation of the apparent discreteness of time in postdiction (Herzog, Drissi-Daoudi, and
Doerig 2020; Drissi-Daoudi, Doerig, and Herzog 2019). Whenever a feature remains unpredicted for a
sufficiently long period, it is bound and recallable. Whenever two features are postdicted by a common
cause before the first feature can be thus bound, neither feature is bound and only their common cause
may be bound and recallable (Figure 3d, left). Whenever a third feature is inferred after the common
cause for the first two features is already inferred, the prediction errors of the first two features are
already low, and only their common cause and the third feature can be bound into a recallable episode
(Figure 3d, right). Inferring a known cause with a long postdiction interval is only possible if feature binding
into a new cause does not occur faster than that interval. Therefore, the binding timescales directly dictate
what time sequences can be directly perceptually represented by single causes. This leads to the causes
higher up in the PP hierarchy representing generally longer time intervals and correspondingly having
longer binding times, perhaps up to ≈1 second. The PP modeling is thus regularized by enforcing more
sparce time-persistent representations at higher hierarchy levels, to both optimize predictive power and
maintain stability in the presence of physical latency of deep inference.
Figure 3. Learning by binding explains time domain observations. (a) For high visibility stimuli S binding
(dashed box) occurs after a large prediction error ε persists for a minimum time τ and masking introduced
at ∆t > τ does not interfere with binding (left). Masking at time ∆t < τ prevents binding by decreasing the
inferred likelihood of S (right) prior to binding. (b) For stimulus with larger prediction error binding occurs
faster (left) while when contrast is decreased the binding is delayed and may not occur within the finite
stimulus duration (right). (c) When unpredicted stimuli S1 and S2 are separated by ∆t > τ, they are bound
separately (upper). When the separation ∆t is short compared to τ, the near-coincident stimuli are bound
together into a cause representing a sequence (S1 ∆t S2) with a specific separation ∆t (lower). (d) Left: if a
sequence cause has already been learned, it is inferred and postdicts the S1 and S2, reducing their
prediction errors with a short latency time delay tlatency << τ. The inference is mandatory. The sequence
cause (S1 ∆t S2) is subject to further binding, while the individual stimuli S1 and S2 are not. Right: If a third
stimulus S3 occurs a short time δt after the S1 and S2 such that tlatency < δt < ∆t, the (S1 ∆t S2) will be inferred
before S3, and after time t they may be bound together into a new sequence ((S1 ∆t S2) δt S3). The
mandatory nature of the (S1 ∆t S2) integration and the condition ∆t < τ explain the experimental
observation of the apparent discreteness of conscious perception in time.
Depending on the level in the PP hierarchy, the binding timescale may be between ≈200 ms (e.g., from
low-level visual modality) all the way to, perhaps, ≈1 s for multimodal and amodal perceptions. However,
the persistence timescale of the continuous or repeated inference of the newly-bound causes can be
much longer, governed by the continuous activation by the action of attention and the competition with
perceptual distractors. This attention-mediated perceptual dynamics spans at least ≈3 s and likely can be
much longer with attention training (Srinivasan, Tripathi, and Singhal 2020). We thus provide mechanistic
functional account for the three time ranges corresponding to cinematic, extensional and retentional
levels in (Singhal and Srinivasan 2021), which are defined by the two separate domain-dependent binding
and attentional dynamics timescales. Note that attentional feedback operates on both fast, pre-binding
(therefore, unconscious) as well as the slow timescales, as further discussed in the Action section.
The process of associative recall (Figure 2b) is entailed by our functional architecture, without assuming
any additional mechanisms. Each newly-bound cause, up to and including the episode, is added to the PP
model, at least temporarily, which is what allows those features that are bound together to be recalled,
i.e., re-inferred, associatively. Associative recall occurs whenever enough of these bound features are
present with sufficiently high precision for the newly-bound cause to be inferred, to reduce the prediction
errors. The inferred cause, in turn, predicts the remaining bound features, which acquire non-zero
likelihood and are thereby associatively recalled. Upon recall these features affect inferences of other
causes and predict their own features according to PP, thereby contributing to perception and manifesting
as priming and automatic action triggering. Whenever the new-bound cause encodes a time-sequence,
e.g., in auditory modality, time sequences of bound features are replayed when associatively recalled, as
the cause predicts the feature’s timing. The recall may occur unconsciously (i.e., is not itself recallable) if
no further binding occurs, however the highest-level recalled causes may have prediction errors of
sufficient size and duration to be re-bound into the new episode cause, which in turn becomes available
for later recall. With repeated recall, the prediction strengths made by the new-bound causes are both
updated and further consolidated, until only the residual plasticity of the recall reconsolidation remains.
Consider the above example where a new compound cause ‘The Car’ has been formed by binding. If a
verbal prompt for ‘red’ increases the precision of ‘red’ via auditory perception, the system might infer the
‘The Car,’ which decreases prediction error for the unexpected high-likelihood ‘red’. This inference will be
more likely within the common perceptual context, i.e., if many of the other features of the recent
episode-cause containing ‘The Car’ are also present, such that the whole episode might be partially
recalled as well, predicting ‘The Car’. Recalling ‘The Car’ activates its features, including the ‘on left’
location in the spatial map.
Furthermore, the binding and record formation process is strongly modulated by selective attention. As
discussed below in the context of perception and elaborated in the Action section, functionally the
selective attention to specific locations, attributes or objects are learned actions, parts of the ongoing
action policy encoded within the generative PP model. Such actions strongly modulate, but are
functionally separable from, the core processes of perceptual inference, binding, and the resulting
declarative memory record formation. New causes can be formed for unattended objects and even
further bound into the recallable episodic memory record.
The described ability to learn and recall specific new objects and events entails creation of a perceptual
record of declarative memory that can be accessed later by the system via associative recall. If a new
cause bound from a single or few examples is repeatedly re-activated by similar examples, it is generalized
to a broader example class by the conventional PP learning rules. This process converts the initially
episodic knowledge into semantic perceptual knowledge.
Perceptual unity.
The induction bias underlying the learning-by-binding system presumes everything unpredicted is
stemming from common hidden causes, even when events are unrelated and coincident by chance. If the
assumption is that any two or more unpredicted causes must have a common hidden cause, a singular
episodic cause is generated necessarily (Figure 2a). This is apparent in the associative and episodic recall,
where a variety of causally independent contents are bound and recalled together by virtue of simply
having occurred at the same time. The “what it’s like” of perceiving a specific instance of a cat, as we may
learn from recalling it, not only includes the visual features that give rise to the inference of the cat, but
also includes inferences about the attention state, expectations and other internal and external conditions
that modulate the perceptual processing. Moreover, ‘the cat’ is bound together with other concurrent
related and unrelated inferences, including (the action of attending to) its specific spatial location,
distinctive attributes of ‘the cat’, nearby objects, as well as other concurrent unpredicted perceptions in
multiple modalities. A large fraction of these contents is associatively recalled when the cat is recalled.
This gives the process of perception a unified nature quite distinct from simply representing a set of
separable contents. This unified yet differentiated nature, a hallmark of the content of consciousness
(Bayne 2012), is entailed by the learning architecture proposed here.
On the other hand, the full unity of binding is not required. Multiple new causes are continuously formed
by binding of various concurrent unpredicted features at the low sensory levels. Whenever one or more
new causes are formed, but do not persist long enough to become further bound with other concurrent
causes into an episode, they are not recallable as part of the episode and are not unified with it. Yet the
cause binding the new combination of features is formed and can later contribute to perception and
behavior. This binding has been empirically demonstrated for unattended visual stimuli (Meuwese et al.
2013), whereas masking the stimuli prevented them from binding. We further argue that the new bound
cause formed without attention in this work could not include as one of its features the action of attending
to its spatial location, color or another one of its own attributes. This may explain the extra learning via
feedback required in test trials in (Meuwese et al. 2013) to connect the new cause to the appropriate
response action.
A separate way in which the proposed learning system is unified is that it is designed to learn and
implement an actions policy that maximizes survival and reproduction benefits and for this purpose it
generates a single, unified perceptual estimate of the future value – whether the current state is “good”
or “bad” overall. While this future value may be generated by combining multiple distinct specific future
values for each of the perceived causes, and there may be more than one kind of reward, a single scalar
total value is calculated for action learning by the system as a whole – e.g., whether the actions that
immediately led to this state should be retained for the future or discarded. The details of this process are
discussed in the Action section below.
Quickly forming causal connections entails a global workspace.
Beyond example-efficient learning using the full power of previous perceptual knowledge, and formation
of recallable current-state descriptions, the learning by binding also entails rapidly forming generative
causal connections between previously-unrelated causes (Figure 2d). Whenever a new-bound cause is
inferred by the PP model from a subset of its features, the remaining, hidden features are then
generatively predicted. For example, once a temporary cause ‘The Car’ binding otherwise-unrelated
features ‘car’-object, ‘red’ color, ‘left’ location and ‘motor’ sound is formed, the cause ‘The Car’ may be
inferred from the presence of only ‘car’-object, inferred from a prompt for ‘car,’ and predict specific color,
location and sound. Thus, within a few hundred milliseconds needed to bind ‘The Car’, the ‘car’-object
feature starts to predict the ‘red’ color. The predicted features in turn contribute to inferring dependent
higher-level causes, as well as predicting lower-level features. Within active inference this includes
triggering or modulating actions connected to, for example, ‘red’ within the PP hierarchy, such as selecting
a specific color report in response to a prompt. Therefore, the temporary binding immediately and
strongly modifies the overall PP generative model dynamics – perception and action inferences and
predictions made immediately thereafter – by allowing a set of previously-unrelated causes , such as ‘car’object and ’red’ color, to effectively cross-predict each other once they are bound together.
This functional property, entailed by the addition of feature binding to PP, directly connects our theory to
the global workspace theories of consciousness: the newly-bound features constitute the contents of a
global workspace by virtue of being able to cross-predict each other and thereby being able to influence
inference and prediction of a large number of other perceptions and actions. Dynamically binding a set of
select causes into a new shallow-tree generative model structure allows the bound perceptions to
immediately modulate many actions they previously had no functional connections to, and thereby to
exert what appears to be a “global” causal influence. With inferred A, when perceptual inference or
selective attention activates B, this now activates C and thereby modulates any model dynamics
dependent on C. Functionally, this may also be viewed as passing of objects by reference into procedures
that can now act on them, whereby different objects C, D or E, including previously unknown, newlybound ones, when temporarily bond to A and B may be referred to (activated by) whenever some
procedure activates A and B.
Using ‘ The Car’ and ‘The Tree’ as an example, and considering ‘point to a location’ as an action previously
learned for all available locations, the prompt of: “Point to the car (tree)”, can be responded to by first
the ‘car’ (‘tree’) of the prompt inferring ‘The Car’ (‘The Tree’), which then predicts the bound location ‘on
left’ (‘on right’), while the prompt also infers the ‘point to a location’ action. The action executes by
pointing to the correct active location. Another prompt might be: “What color is the car (tree)?”, whereby
the generic object name will again activate a specific bound object and thereby its color attribute that can
then be reported. We see that the two compound objects, once bound, became available to a range of
previously learned actions. Most importantly, these objects may comprise never previously seen
combinations of generic attributes, yet they can immediately be acted upon in a large variety of very
complex ways that have been previously learned. This type of flexible generalization is perhaps the most
important feature of the proposed learning architecture.
Notably, this type of global availability requires neither information broadcast separate from the binding,
nor existence of neural codes other than the PP model, since only previously-learned actions triggered by,
and acting upon, specific previously-learned objects (causes) are being proposed, all within PP with active
inference-like description for actions as the PP predictions. To further explore the implications of the
global availability enabled by binding, in the following example we will illustrate how a novel compound
object becomes available to be maintained in working memory via a previously-learned action of selective
attention to a spatial location or another generic attribute.
Working memory enabled by selective attention.
So far, we have been describing a learning system for perception, i.e., for predicting sensory data, while
only mentioning that the PP system can also implement actions, as have been proposed by active
inference theories. In the Action section we describe actions as causes making predictions, increasing the
inferred likelihoods of their target causes within the generative PP model. Such actions may manifest (and
be perceived and recognized) as instances of selective attention. Within the PP framework, selective
attention describes a selective increase of precision, which for a discrete, categorical cause is an increase
of its likelihood, or what we have been also calling activation level. In the following we explain how
working memory may arise by the interaction of binding, PP and selective attention (Figure 2c).
A generic action of selectively attending to a particular spatial location, or to the most-active spatial
location – i.e., an action of continuously maintaining or intermittently reactivating that spatial map
location – may be learned to be triggered by certain PP model causes. For example, overt attention to a
location of a perceptually present object modulates the physical sensory apparatus, increasing the
precision (the likelihood or the ‘strength’ of inference in the categorical PP model) and duration of the
sensory features comprising the object. The object is inferred with high likelihood, and the object’s large
prediction errors facilitate its binding into the episode. Similarly, covert attention increases compound
object’s precision and facilitates binding by selectively increasing and sustaining high precision of one or
more of its features. For ‘The Car’, attention to a specific location ‘on left’ may result in its sustained
activation and becoming part of the present episode. If the car is present and attention is overt, perceptual
inference from sensory data will maintain ‘The Car’ at high likelihood. However, even if the car is absent
and attention to the spatial location is covert, the particular ‘on left’ is bound to the car, therefore its
activation, within the appropriate perceptual context, can help maintain ‘The Car’ at a nonzero likelihood,
even in the absence of the direct sensory perception. A novel compound object can thus be continuously
perceived in the absence of direct sensory stimuli. Since a novel object cannot be predicted by any other
cause, it will be bound with other concurrent unpredicted causes, therefore participating in the global
workspace and in a series of consecutive recallable episodes. We argue that this is precisely what it means
for the object to be maintained in the working memory.
Notably, the action of imagining a never previously seen compound object, i.e., attending directly to it,
rather than to its location or other generic features, could not have been learned within the PP model. In
contrast, attending to a generic feature of the object, such as color or location, could have been learned,
thereby allowing maintaining any compound attended object with that feature in working memory. To
accomplish this, a system may have a well-learned action of selective attention to the most active (highest
likelihood) spatial location or to one of a set of predetermined spatial locations. Such action will activate
the objects and features bound together with those specific locations (and the present perceptual
context), even if these objects are otherwise not fully inferred from sensory data. Thereby, binding
enables maintenance of arbitrary, never previously perceived compound objects in working memory
without the need to rapidly learn to attend to or to imagine each and every one of the object’s features.
This explanation of working memory relies on binding and reciprocal activation between spatial neural
maps, generally in the front of the cortex, and objects and features represented in the back cortex,
consistent with neuroimaging observations in working memory tasks. However, there are multiple
modalities of working memory and not all of them work through attention to a spatial location – the
auditory buffering being one example.
As described, the binding process dynamically connecting separate causes together and allowing global
workspace effects and maintenance in working memory is functionally separate from the short-term
storage and long-term consolidation of declarative memory – the ability to retain the bound causes within
the PP model over extended periods without inferring them. The latter functions are known to
physiologically depend on hippocampus and nearby structures. Consistent with empirical data, within our
theory the memory storage deficits do not grossly impair the working memory and formation of the global
workspace via cross-prediction. Our view adds key functional descriptions elaborating the previously
made connections between feature integration and neural coalitions, formation of a global workspace
and the neural modifications during recurrent processing.
We have used the term ‘attention’ here only in one specific sense to conceptually illustrate how
maintenance of objects in working memory may arise in the proposed information processing system
architecture. We have previously stated that maintaining an object in working memory by selective
attention is not a necessary condition for it to undergo binding, and objects unattended in this narrow
sense can be bound and can enter the associatively recallable memory record. However, ‘attention’ covers
a wide variety of phenomena in different contexts and, considering the term more broadly, we see that
within the proposed architecture the increase of precision in the absence of a top-down prediction is
precisely what results in binding, formation of a record and global availability. Hence everything in the
record may be seen as having ‘received attention’ in a broader sense of there having been an increase in
estimated likelihood. This includes either bottom-up attention via the normal perceptual PP inference or
top-down attention via an action, or both. Within this broader sense of ‘attention’, the only possible cases
of separation between the perceptual record contents and the ‘attended’ contents are the cases where
the action of top-down attention is known to have been applied to certain objects, but the objects were
not bound or were bound but are not recallable, e.g., the new cause was quickly forgotten. This tight link
between attention and binding in out account finds some parallels with the observations underlying the
attention schema theory of consciousness (Graziano et al. 2020). However, when we consider the
meaning of the term consciousness, we do not equate it with either attention or the schema for it.
Defining ‘consciousness’ and the ‘conscious contents’.
So far, we have been describing clearly defined functions of perceptual inference, binding, recall, etc.,
rather than referring to consciousness, conscious contents (CC) or conscious experience. This is both
because there are multiple ways in which these terms are currently operationalized in different contexts,
as well as to ensure avoiding Cartesian materialism (Dennett 1991), such as saying that something is being
‘experienced’ or ‘consciously experienced’ without first defining what that means, mechanistically. On the
contrary, the described formation of a recallable unified and differentiated perceptual record that binds
causes which are uniquely descriptive of the present moment is testable against experimental data and
introspective intuitions. Our account entails that this record is both imperfect and transitory.
Furthermore, once temporary binding occurs, it enables immediate generative cross-prediction between
the bound attributes, and thereby allows the new compound causes to be maintained in working memory
by attention and to modulate a broad range of actions via a global workspace-like functionality. These are
concrete functional, mechanistic relationships that learning-by-binding imposes on the inferences made
by the system. When describing cross-prediction appearing as a global workspace we are not positing a
mental or neural “theater”. Rather than ‘broadcasting’ binding temporarily connects existing causes in
novel ways resulting in novel inference and prediction relationships between them. The effect is the
strictly-local codependent cross-activation between the bound percepts. The “actors” in such a local
group are the only audience. Furthermore, there is no spotlight – attention is not understood that way.
The bound contents, i.e., the causes inferred by PP with sufficiently large and persistent prediction errors
and bound into a shallow tree structure of new and known causes forming a perceptual episode, satisfy a
common criterion for contents to be access-conscious: being available for thought and rational action.
The cross-prediction within the bound contents allows each element to modulate all actions that can be
triggered (predicted within active PP) by each of the other bound elements.
Given the proposed functional combination of PP and binding, and the resulting conceptual explanation
for the access consciousness, we further ask whether there is a broader ‘phenomenal consciousness’ to
be defined or described, either as a real phenomenon or as an illusion. This includes two types of related
questions which we will address in this section, in reference to our functional architecture:
1. Is there a consistent definition of ‘phenomenality’ that reasonably corresponds to the various
relevant intuitions and is operationally useful for describing empirical data?
2. Is there any conceptual flexibility in defining which perceptual contents should be called CC? If
so, what is the most operationally convenient and useful definition?
a. What types of contents are or are not conscious?
b. Are CCs rich or relatively sparse? How can this be empirically determined?
To the first question, in the subsequent section the intuitive ‘phenomenality’ is attributed to the
perceptual inferences of ‘experience arising’ or ‘I am having an experience’, which are inferred by the
system to account for its own perceptual contingencies, in addition to, and distinct from, the invariant
outside world objects. Specifically, in the same way as the cause ‘red’ can be bound with the cause ‘car’
forming ‘the red car’, the cause ‘experience of’ can be bound to ‘the red car’ to form ‘the experience of
the red car’, a compound cause that includes phenomenality as one of its attributes. This type of
phenomenality is a perception, an inference the system makes, taking its own modeling process into
account to generate better predictions. As noted below, unlike higher order theories, we do not link the
inference of such higher order perceptions to granting ‘conscious’ status to any lower order perceptions.
To the second question, in our view, the CC are composed from various learned causes, including
temporary bound ones, and their status as within or outside the CC is fully determined by whether they
are being (a) inferred with a nonzero likelihood, and (b) bound. Causes that are not inferred at a given
moment, having near zero likelihood, are not part of the CC. Similarly, known causes that are fully
predicted within the current state of the PP model, having near zero prediction errors, only contribute to
the perception and action but do not participate in learning by binding or in the global workspace resulting
from binding. While contributing to priming, their effects may be reasonably defined as unconscious. This
unconscious PP perception and action can be highly complex, while proceeding outside the learning by
binding and not entering the perceptual record. The non-declarative learning of perception and action
also proceeds unconsciously, via the prediction strength updates withing the existing PP cause network,
according to our view. Such non-declarative learning is gradual, in contrast to the learning by binding,
which quickly and strongly connects unrelated causes.
This argument limits the CC to those causes that participate in binding. As discussed in the perceptual
unity section above, a large fraction of such causes is hierarchically bound into a shallow tree structure
representing an episode and forming a global workspace. The bound episode structure typically includes
actions of attending to some of the contents within the episode. Simultaneously, causes not participating
in the current episode are being continuously formed by binding. Once formed, they may or may not be
further bound into the new episode, depending on whether they themselves exceed the required
persistence time and prediction error threshold. The possibility of forming new bound causes that are not
bound into the episode and do not participate in the global workspace reconciles the divergent views on
the CC within the recurrent processing and global workspace ToCs, explaining both views and making the
distinction a matter of the CC definition. From the perspective of declarative learning as the defining
function of consciousness, the broader CC definition that includes the locally-bound causes outside the
episode and global workspace seems operationally useful. However, the narrower CC definition excluding
such causes is also coherent and fits better the reportable, easily recallable and perceptually unified
contents.
Given either definition, perceptual richness becomes an empirical question of what perceptual content is
being bound or being bound together. In a visual domain example, a broad range of data is available to
the senses. A narrower range is being sensed depending on the direction of gaze. That sense data narrows
the broad range of all visual inferences available within the existing PP model to those that best match
the data. Out of all the inferences made that are not fully predicted by other inferences, a few subsets are
persistent and correlated enough to be bound into new causes. Of all those a narrower subset forms a
unified tree of the global workspace and episode. Of those, even less are retained over time and become
available for a delayed recall. Notably, at each stage our intuition may overestimate the richness by
confusing access with representation, and the richness question must be answered by carefully controlled
empirical studies.
For example, in the Sperling’s experiment and its variations (Sperling 1960; Sligte, Scholte, and Lamme
2009) multiple unpredicted visual symbols are all perceived, but a specific subset ends up being bound to
and actively maintained in working memory by the selective attention to the experimentally prompted
spatial location. While not all symbols are recallable, it is an empirically unresolved question whether all
symbols have been bound or only the prompted subset – this question may be addressed by an
experiment similar to the (Meuwese et al. 2013) study of learning without attention, applied to the
unprompted symbols. While the narrower definition of the CC as being bound together definitively
excludes the larger symbol set, by the broader CC definition the symbols would be conscious if they can
be empirically shown to be specifically bound to each other or other unpredicted concurrent stimuli.
Lacking such evidence, the more likely hypothesis is that all symbols are perceived but only the prompted
symbols are maintained, by attention to the prompt’s spatial location, long enough to be bound and
become CC.
This generally illustrates how out of a wide set of inferred unpredicted causes only a fraction enters the
record or is acted upon, and out of the same set, different fractions may end up bound together depending
on perception and attention contingencies, such as different internal states or additional concurrent and
subsequent stimuli. All inferences that have been bound or only subsets maintainable by attention,
available to trigger action or recallable from memory record can be validly included in different possible
consistent definitions of the CC. On the other hand, a person may intuitively reason and describe a much
wider superset of causes that must have been perceived and could have been bound, attended to,
triggered action and recalled, under some loosely-defined set of possible contingencies, as having been
in a richer ‘total phenomenal consciousness field’.
Transparency of perceptual models, higher order theories, ‘experience’ and ‘self’.
The proposed functional architecture learns ever more sophisticated Bayesian generative models of the
time-dependent sensory data stream. This model construction process is hierarchical, adding new causes
modeling regularities in the lower-level causes inferred by the existing models: the results of existing
models serve as input data for further modeling in a learning process that is, in principle, limitless. In
specific organisms the model depth and structure are limited by their brains’ particular neural
architectures.
The learning by binding creates an associatively recallable record consisting of the variously bound causes
that were not fully predicted at specific times. As a matter of this perceptual record, these bound causes
are the only things that comprise it and can be recalled by the system. They may be represented as ‘having
occurred’ if an appropriate model for representing past events has been learned. The majority of these
perceived and recallable causes are not additionally recognized and represented as being outputs of its
perceptual models, but appear to the system as direct perceptions, the elementary units constituting the
perception record. In other words, the models giving raise to these inferences are both transparent (not
directly perceivable) (Metzinger 2003) and cognitively impenetrable from the system’s perspective when
the process of perceptual inference is not itself represented and inferred by a suitable learned perceptual
model within a system.
However, the hierarchical-learning system learns causal structures for predicting the contingencies of its
own perceptual and modeling apparatus and the object-and-event inferences made by it. I.e., the system
learns to predict how its perception of objects and events is modulated by the presence of other objects
and events, including the states of the physical sensory apparatus, of the perceptual model and of the
system more broadly. To do that the system learns to infer causes describing such states of the perceptual
model and the physical body and learns models that represent objects and events as not only ‘occurring
out there’, but also being ‘perceived’, or ‘not perceived’ within the system in a way that make the event
recallable and available for a broad range of actions. In other words, the system learns to infer that an
‘experience’ of an event has occurred within the system. Moreover, in its continual learning to more
accurately predict both what it perceives and how it perceives it, the system might learn to infer various
other causes predicting its own perceptual modeling states, such as whether something was perceived
clearly or not and how attention was directed or distracted.
As with all causes, the new inference of an ‘experience occurring,’ together with the inferences about the
characteristics of perception at each moment, are subject to being bound into the perceptual record by
the learning process. Thus, the perceptual record includes these directly-perceived higher-level
representations of the perceptual process. Generally similar types of high order representations are
discussed within the higher order theories of consciousness (Cleeremans et al. 2020; Cleeremans 2011;
Brown, Lau, and LeDoux 2019). However, rather than postulating them, here we argue that the higher
order perceptions are entailed by our learning-by-binding functional architecture, as inferences within the
learned hierarchical model. In contrast to higher order theories, in our account the higher order
perceptions are not necessarily about the specific low order perceptions and inferring them does not
determine whether a given low order perception enters or does not enter the declarative memory record
or can modulate a large range of actions via the global-workspace-like effect of binding. In our view,
systems with simple models having limited or no higher order representations can have the binding and
the resulting global workspace and associative recall functions we associated with consciousness.
However, the high order perception of ‘experience occurring,’ inferred by a transparent model for this
high order perception, amounts to the system representing its low order perceptions as having a
‘phenomenal’ character, i.e., as being ‘experienced’. Notably, the higher order model only detects a
characteristic of the lower order model output, and does not represent that the low order inferences are
made by a model, allowing the lower order model to remain transparent.
Transparent perceptual models span a range from basic, such as the illumination-invariant color
recognition to highly complex, such as the model for ‘self’ and the “phenomenal models of the
intentionality relation” based on it (Metzinger 2003; 2005; 2020b). A broad range of self-models, including
procedural and declarative in addition to the perceptual ones, have been discussed as the implicit beliefs
comprising m-consciousness by (Graziano et al. 2020). Following this line of reasoning, a sufficiently
sophisticated system may learn to infer animistic ‘agent’ causes for describing people and animals and,
furthermore, learn to perceive itself is one such agent. Thereby it learns to infer the cause of ‘self’ as an
‘owner of experience’ (“I have an experience”), and the ‘source’ of action, and infer ‘beliefs’, ‘motivations’
and other properties ascribed to such agents and to ‘self’. Based on these perceptions the system may
also learn the actions of reporting and discursive reasoning with the belief of having/being a ‘self’. This
view of the self has parallels with the ones described by Thomas Metzinger (Metzinger 2003), Tim Bayne
(Bayne 2012) chapter 12 and others (Graziano et al. 2020). As a cause inferred within a transparent model,
the ‘self’ is clearly perceived as truly existing, as a matter of systems’ perceptual record. However, this
perceived ‘self’, like many naïve perceptions, is an illusion in the sense that the reality is different from its
perception. Prior to an accurate scientific theory of the information processing in the brain, which is the
ultimate goal motivating this work, ‘experience occurring’ and ‘self’ are naïve and transparent perceptual
models learned by the system as part of modeling to predict its perceptions of its own functioning.
The meta problem of consciousness.
The meta problem of consciousness (Chalmers 2018) is the problem of explaining why we may think there
is a hard problem (Chalmers 1995) of consciousness. To solve the meta problem is to explain why within
a particular learning system the perception of ‘experience’ necessarily arises, and why this perception
appears to resist reductive explanation. Within our hypothesis the model making the higher order
inference ‘an experience is occurring’ is a transparent model of the same kind as sensory perception
models inferring ‘trees’ and ‘cats’ (Figure 2, Figure 4). The system simply represents it as presently
occurring with high likelihood, rather than recognizing it as a result of any modeling or reasoning. The
recognition of ‘an experience occurring’ is of the same kind as the recognition of a ‘tree’ or a ‘cat’, as a
matter of its consequences within the system’s functional structure such as the global availability or the
perceptual memory record. Whatever the system learns to recognize, whether about the outside world
or about itself, appears to it as experientially-given truths, at least until it can learn to perceive and
represent otherwise. As the system makes inferences about its own processes of perception and learning,
‘experiencing’ appears to it to objectively exist, in exactly the way ‘cats’ and ‘trees’ appear to exist (Figure
4).
We suggest that the ‘explanatory gap’ difficulty lies in the previous theories’ inability to envision a
mechanistic functional description entailing occurrence of the direct perceptions of the ‘experience
arising’ and ‘I am having an experience’ of the same kind as perceptions of objects and events attributed
by the system to the outside world, such as ‘cats’ and ‘trees.’ Meanwhile, from our system’s perspective
both the higher and the lower order perceptions are equally apparent. The higher order perceptions
appear to it as directly perceived, the same way physical objects are perceived, therefore higher order
perceptions demand the same kind of ‘objective’ explanation used for physical objects. People do not
routinely question the ‘objective’ existence of cats and trees and typically do not perceptually recognize
them as mere constructs – learned model inferences made by our minds to predict raw sensory data.
Similarly, people feel ‘experience arising’ as no less than an ‘objective’ fact. Physical theories describe the
external objects as being ‘out there,’ independent of the process of perception. Thus, we expect and
demand the same kind of objective explanation for the perception of ‘experience arising,’ yet without
referring to the process of perception this is logically impossible.
Here we provide the same kind of description for the object perceptions and the higher order perceptions,
both Bayesian inferences made by the system to predict the sensory data (and distinct from the physicalscience objects as predictive descriptors within formal models for the various aspects of the world). One
fallacy leading to the appearance of the illusory hard problem is the treatment of the perceptions of
physical objects and events as direct, veridical representations of physical reality, rather than as constructs
we learn to infer. These constructs are based on the outside world only insofar as describing predictable
regularities in the sensorium-dependent sensory data using a particular hierarchical causal structure – the
hypothesis space of the learning system implemented by the brain. The perception of ‘experience’ is
simply another learned perceptual construct, inferred to describe predictable contingencies in the
perceptual modeling inferences at a lower level. The functional, mechanistic account of the process of
perception and learning proposed here explains how the directly-felt ‘I am experiencing’ becomes part of
the system’s perceptual record and reportable working memory. Inferences made by transparent
perceptual models appear to the system as objectively existing things and events including the ‘experience
arising,’ the ‘self’ and the ‘consciousness’ in the ‘I am experiencing’ and ‘I am conscious’.
Figure 4. Meta hard problem of consciousness. The system makes perceptual inferences about external
world and about its own internal states, such as to represent whether an object is sensorily experienced
or imagined. The internal state cause of “having a sensory experience” has the same properties as the
physical object cause of “The Tree”: both are clearly apparent and cannot be unperceived. Without
understanding the nature of perceptions as learned and inferred causes describing internal and external
states, the internal and external perceptions appear qualitatively different. For example, physical objects
are understood by naïve observers as properties of the outside world independent of the system
perceiving it. Importantly, they system with this functional organization must learn to perceive internal
states and thereby is able to perceive, remember and report having experiences.
ACTION
Reinforcement learning of complex gene-proliferating actions.
Evolution selects for maximal gene proliferation. Genes are proliferated in complex organisms via a
combination of multiple interacting mechanisms, including maintaining approximate homeostasis for the
organism’s lifetime while maximizing reproduction, offspring survival, certain types of group cooperation
and using other gene proliferating strategies. Systems maintaining homeostasis have attracted
considerable attention because according to the free energy principle (K. Friston 2019) all such systems,
including inanimate ones, can be viewed as self-evidencing in information-theoretic sense (Hohwy 2016).
However, for biological organisms this is a partial view – the flexible and adaptive information processing
functionality of the evolved brain is clearly broader and supports implementation of multiple
evolutionary-advantageous strategies in addition to maintaining homeostasis.
How could a perception- and action-learning system be organized to serve these evolutionary purposes?
One well-known and general machine learning approach is reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto
1998), in which a system learns to perceive and act to maximize the discounted future cumulative reward
– the future value, which the system learns to predict from the reward signals generated by (neural)
mechanisms outside the learning system proper. RL is, arguably, the most successful currently known
machine learning approach for complex action optimization, used in self-driving cars (Thrun et al. 2006;
Kiran et al. 2022) and the best self-learning game-playing algorithms (Silver et al. 2018).
The remainder of this section elaborates on the second key point in this work, the view that brains
implement temporal difference reinforcement learning (TDRL) (Montague, Dayan, and Sejnowski 1996;
Schultz, Dayan, and Montague 1997; Redish 2004; Cohen et al. 2012) of action policies beneficial for
survival and reproduction (Figure 5). Here we propose that in biological organisms multiple specific,
relatively simple and shortsighted, evolutionary-old neural reward mechanisms have evolved to detect
situations with immediate positive or negative consequences. These detectors address body homeostasis,
external danger, reproduction, as well as more complex species-specific variables, such as social status. In
mammalian brains amygdala and the value system (nucleus accumbens and ventral tegmental area (VTA))
are neural structures known to process such rewards. By receiving input from, and projecting to, the
sensory, associative, and prefrontal cortexes and the corresponding thalamic regions, they form a
combined system for not only learning to represent complex regularities in sensory data, but for using
them to estimate the future value of the present state based on the history of positive or negative
rewards, and to predict such rewards. These future value estimates are then used to learn complex
hierarchical action policies maximizing them, i.e., maximizing the best-estimate cumulative benefit for
gene proliferation.
In view of recent work by (Jeong et al. 2022), we emphasize that we do not propose the narrow TDRL for
learning perceptions and cue-reward associations, which is soundly rejected by this work, but rather
describe a RL mechanism for learning evolutionary-value-maximizing action policies. In the following
section we start by describing the future value learning via attributing value to remembered past cues
based the presently-detected reward prediction errors. Our value learning is precisely the learning of
contingencies between past perceptions and “meaningful” events, that is, occurrences of significant and
unpredicted positive or negative reward. Therefore, our proposal is largely in agreement with both the
theory and the empirical observations in (Jeong et al. 2022).
Figure 5. Predictive processing with active inference learns to maximize cumulative future value via
reinforcement learning. The predictive processing model combines perception and action, which have
distinct learning goals: perceptual causes predict future value accurately, while actions maximize it.
Immediate rewards of several types are calculated directly from external and body sensory data. Each
perceptual cause can contribute a positive or negative value of each type. Predictive value estimation via
perception is learned by attributing reward prediction errors backward in time to recently-active
perceptual causes. Action policy is improved by increasing (decreasing) the future likelihood for
advantageous (detrimental) actions: overall positive (negative) reward prediction error is used to sensitize
(inhibit) the connections that triggered the recently-active actions.
Value learning.
Future value can be perceptually estimated by learning specific future values for each of the learned
causes and by summing these values, weighted by each cause’s presently inferred likelihood. These causespecific future values can be learned locally by a conventional online TDRL algorithm: the future-value
surprise (reward prediction error) is propagated back by modifying the specific values of the recentlyactive causes. For learning the specific values, TD update size may follow the above-described Bayesian
logic distinguishing the recently-formed from the well-learned causes: larger value updates are applied to
the less well-known values of the recently added causes, while the update size (plasticity) is decreased
with the number of times a cause is inferred, approaching a fixed low limit. The TD value learning is local,
requiring only that the specific value strengths for recently-inferred causes remain plastic over a short
reconsolidation time, perhaps seconds to tens of seconds, similar to the conditioning timescales, and that
the single global value error (value surprise) be widely distributed back to each of these causes
represented in the cortex. In other words, the future value is a special type of cause, which is computed
forward from a large number of perceptual PP causes, with weights learned from the reward prediction
errors via the TDRL rule. The widely distributed reciprocal connections between the amygdala and the
value system on the one hand and the thalamocortical system on the other are generally consistent with
this view. These value-estimating and value-learning connections should not be confused with the
dopaminergic signaling from the VTA largely to the front of the cortex. Within the RL framework, the value
system uses the dopaminergic pathway to signal the value surprise, i.e., the reward prediction error,
forward to areas encoding action, such that the recent actions which may have caused an unpredicted
value estimate increase or decrease (surprise) are reinforced or suppressed, respectively (Cohen et al.
2012).
Since we have suggested multiple reward signals provided by distinct neural detectors of specific geneproliferation-relevant states, several different types of future values may be simultaneously estimated,
separately predicting the future cumulative sum for each reward type or for their multiple specific
combinations. These values place the current state within a multidimensional affective state space
corresponding to the multiple emotions with positive or negative valence that can be present
simultaneously. These distinct future value estimates are ultimately combined to generate the single
dopaminergic phasic reward prediction error output from VTA to the frontal thalamo-cortical system for
action learning.
Within conventional PP the functions of perception is learning, inferring and representing predictive
regularities in sensory data. However, from the evolutionary perspective perception would be selected
only for facilitating learning and execution of beneficial action. Thus, the perception learning goal is not
to predict all sensory data with uniform accuracy, but to learn regularities in sensory data which are
predictive of the future value or can facilitate learning and guiding action. While the value system learns
positive and negative affective values specific to individual causes, perceptual cause learning itself, both
via binding of new causes and via adjustment of prediction strengths of existing causes, must be
specifically optimized for value learning. Minimizing the future-value prediction errors requires learning
specifically the sensory data regularities predictive of current and future reward. For example, a large
positive or negative value surprise concurrent with a newly-bound cause not only might be assigned as
the specific value attributed to this cause, but also such high-valence cause must be forgotten more slowly
and, with repeat inference, more quickly become a permanent long-term memory.
Additionally, perception learning must be similarly biased toward learning causes useful for triggering and
guiding action. Similar to reward circuits, heuristic neural ‘saliency’ and ‘novelty’ detectors have evolved
to specifically detect the presence of sensory signals that are useful to learn, even though they do not
immediately correlate with either positive or negative gene-proliferation outcomes and therefore carry
no explicit affective value. Signals from these detectors may modulate the perceptual learning
hyperparameters similarly to the affective surprise signals.
Action encoding in predictive processing.
Complex action policies need to be encoded by the brain to be executed. While actions may in principle
be encoded largely outside the perceptual hierarchy of PP, the work on active inference (Parr and Friston
2019; K. J. Friston et al. 2010; K. Friston et al. 2017) considers the possibility of encoding actions as
predictions within the PP hierarchy. In addition to receiving sensory data, the lowest level of the hierarchy
is also connected to predict, and thereby command, the actuator outputs from the motor cortex. Moving
up the hierarchy implements more and more abstract actions and perceptions, interconnecting and
influencing each other at each level. Thus, the hierarchical PP structure, so far discussed here mainly in
the context of perception, can also encode highly complex and hierarchical perception-guided action
policies. In such encoding, unitary actions at all abstraction levels can be understood as increases of the
likelihoods of target causes in response to high likelihoods of trigger causes. For example, this can be
implemented by inference of an action cause from the trigger causes, and prediction of the target causes
by the action cause. Since we suggested that individual PP causes can represent short timed sequences of
features, an elementary action cause may simply represent a timed sequence, with learned intervals,
where trigger features precede the target features, thereby triggers predict targets, but not vice versa.
The relationship of PP and active inference to RL is an open area of research (K. J. Friston, Daunizeau, and
Kiebel 2009; Tschantz et al. 2020; Millidge et al. 2020) with much yet to be understood. Within this largely
uncharted territory, we will attempt to qualitatively delineate, as a conjecture, some logical principles for
how a system combining PP and TDRL might be organized. In doing this we note and explicitly set to one
side the active inference result that biasing inference can generate a bias confirming action by a freeenergy minimizing system through the outside world (Parr and Friston 2019; K. J. Friston et al. 2010),
thereby making the perceptual ‘prophesy’ self-fulfilling. Reformulating RL as active inference, while
intriguing, applies to systems described as maintaining some generalized homeostasis, while the rewards
of RL may be able to define a broader range of action policy learning goals more explicitly, and point to
how such policies may be learned in the absence of good world models. Within explicit RL, accurate and
unbiased estimation of future value is key for learning actions which maximize the reward. Thus, even if
action and perception are encoded within a common hierarchy, their functional roles are separate.
Perception is learned to accurately estimate the future value and represent the regularities of the world
helpful for controlling action, while action is learned to maximize the future value, without undue
decrease of the perception accuracy.
One way of accomplishing this is by explicitly separating PP causes into action-like and perception-like by
providing different learning rules and biases for each, encoded via their hyperparameters. Unlike
perceptual cause learning via prediction error minimization, existing action causes’ prediction strengths
may be learned based on the dopaminergic reinforcement signaling value prediction error: the prediction
strengths for the action’s trigger and target features is increased (decreased) based on the positive
(negative) future-value surprise integrated over a seconds-to-minutes long period of plasticity following
the inference of the action. The action is strengthened if it has led to a positive value surprise and vice
versa. This local rule is largely consistent with the known dopaminergic signals from the VTA distributed
throughout the frontal cortex. This organization is also consistent with the view that actions are
represented mostly in the front of the cortex.
Action learning and exploration-exploitation tradeoff.
Other than periods of sleep (where off-line learning processes are known to occur, see also the States of
consciousness section below), an organism learns online, while it is perceiving and acting. Given the
enormity of the action space, computing to select the best action for each state via Q-learning (Sutton
and Barto 1998) appears intractable. Therefore, perception can only estimate the future value of the state
itself, on-policy, i.e., for the combination of the world and the present ongoing action policy. Even when
the on-policy value is perfectly learned, it is not clear how any meaningful gradients of the value in the
policy space can be computed. Lacking value gradients, policy improvements would have to be learned by
experimenting: making a modification and retaining or discarding the modification based on the
subsequent value surprise.
Considering that some causes are actions, binding action- and object-causes as features into a new cause
adds new coupling between these objects and actions. These actions can now be triggered by the objects.
Thus, learning by binding can be understood not only as perceptual learning but also as policy
modification. Following the RL logic, a policy modification should be retained and consolidated or
forgotten based not only on its perceptual usefulness (both perceptual prediction error reduction and
improved value prediction), but also based on the policy modification’s value benefit, estimated as the
positive or negative value surprise over a period following the modification. Both perceptual usefulness
and action usefulness must be weighted by a stable and efficient learning process. Importantly, they
appear to be distinguishable in time – while the perceptual usefulness is given immediately by how much
the prediction errors and the future value surprise are reduced by the new cause’s inference, the value
benefit is given not by the immediate but by the subsequent value surprise, attributable to the
consequences of the action. Therefore, retention and consolidation of a perceptual cause might be
increased when there is an immediate value surprise, either positive or negative, while action causes
would be retained or discarded based on the time-integrated positivity or negativity, respectively, of the
subsequent, delayed value surprise.
While the ongoing binding process is one type of policy modification, exploring may be broadened to
include generation of off-policy actions. There is a vast variety of explorable actions, most being irrelevant
to the circumstances. One possibility is to incrementally perturb the policy via random test actions
generated by lowering the action triggering (inference) threshold. This way only context-relevant actions
slightly outside the current policy would be inferred and explored, i.e., those actions that would be
triggered by similar but not identical perceptions. If a positive value surprise follows, the policy
modification should be retained, so that the next time it will also be triggered in similar circumstances.
The present moment’s unique features are described by the newly-bound causes of the present moment,
and triggering in similar circumstances can be accomplished by binding the new action as part of the
present episode binding these causes, and retaining and consolidating the episode, such that the new
action can be later triggered by associative recall.
Other ways of learning to improve the policy, both principled and heuristic, remain to be studied. A wellknown general exploration vs. exploitation tradeoff in RL is whether to try policy modifications in hopes
of learning a better policy or to stick with the existing policy and exploit the benefits already learned.
Biologically evolved approaches for making this tradeoff dynamically may consider various state variables,
such as whether the future value is presently high or low. The described lowering of the action inference
threshold is one way to increase exploration by trying new actions. A speculative but intriguing possibility
is that exploration is modulated by tonic, rather than phasic, aminergic signaling, such as tonic dopamine
levels from VTA controlling action thresholds and tonic serotonin levels modulating inference, prediction
and/or binding thresholds in the perceptual PP hierarchy. This conjecture may help understand both the
hallucinatory effects related to tonic prefrontal and limbic dopamine imbalance, as well as shedding light
on the action of psychedelic compounds via serotonin receptors, as manifestations of increased
exploration within the PP action and perception realms, respectively.
Imagination and thinking.
High-level actions directly predict (trigger) specific other actions and high-level perceptions. Whenever
the prediction target is a perceptual cause, a perceived likelihood of the cause increases. We have
previously discussed how the action of selective attention to the spatial location of a newly-bound object
can maintain the object in the global workspace and working memory. When this happens in the absence
of sensory data directly supporting the object’s inference, this object is imagined. Inferences of causes
directly predicting sequences of features result in replays of such visual, auditory or multimodal
sequences. Like actions triggered by perceptions inferred from sensory data, complex and highly specific
actions can be triggered by imagined perceptual inferences, making long imagined action-perception
chains possible. They may include sensory images, amodal/abstract imagination, kinesthetic action
imagination, as well as imagined generation and perception of speech sequences in humans. Some of
these inferences will remain unpredicted long enough to be bound into new causes and unified episodes,
thus making them into the conscious contents. Excluding some states of focused attention, flow and
meditation, a large fraction of the human conscious contents appears to be generated by such multimodal
imagination action-perception sequences, in addition to the more direct perceptual inferences from the
sensory data.
Imagining reuses the predictive machinery of perception – imagining objects or actions predicts object
features as well as the perceptual consequences of actions. This agrees with everyday experiences such
as mental visual object rotation or internal dialog generation. Furthermore, imagined objects and actions
are subject to all the learning mechanisms in the system, consistent with learning through mental
rehearsing.
In principle, generating sequences of imagined percepts does not seem to require language. Language
recognition can be understood as a special set of actions for imagining the semantic content in response
to linguistic code perceptual triggers. Correspondingly, imagined verbal conversation sequences
accompanied by the multimodal perceptions of the semantic content constitute the discursive thought.
Importantly, inability of the PP model to fully predict the results of these complex actions, i.e., to predict
the imagined utterances and the associated perceptual content, leads to them being bound and becoming
conscious.
Procedural knowledge and perceptual knowledge.
We can thus distinguish two types of knowledge in our learning system: perceptual knowledge and
procedural knowledge. The first is the ability to perceptually recognize objects and events. The second is
the ability to generate sequences of mental and physical actions, which consist of combinations of
perceived objects and events triggering perceptions of other objects and events. For illustration, the
ability to think and say that Earth rotates relative to the Sun differs from unambiguously perceiving oneself
standing on a rotating ball of Earth whenever watching a sunrise. Missing this distinction between the
procedural knowledge and the learned perception has led to considerable philosophical confusion, such
as in the Mary-the-color-scientist thought experiment (Jackson 1982; Blackmore and Troscianko 2018).
Normal color perception relies on a perceptual model making complex inferences from visual sensory data
and is only functional when it provides input to further perceptual inferences related to colored objects.
It is entirely distinct from the discursive scientific knowledge about color perception – a set of mostly
procedural skills, such as predicting consequences based on conditions, combined with high-level
perceptual skills of recognizing abstract concepts of scientific models in the real-world experimental
reality.
The perceptual and procedural (such as language-mediated discursive) skills are often tightly coupled.
Procedural skills are built using perceptual skills, i.e., perception is needed to guide action. On the other
hand, learned actions resulting in unpredicted activations of a percept B after a percept A makes them
subject to learning by binding, thus facilitating perceptual learning of a predictive relationship between
them. We can see how in the absence of accurate discursive knowledge, or through cultural exposure to
inaccurate knowledge, illusory perceptions may be more easily learned. Meanwhile, accurate perceptual
models can be learned, and perceptual illusions can be corrected with the help of accurate discursive
knowledge of underlying phenomena, when such procedural models generate accurate perceptual
examples and outcomes. For example, should one choose to, one can not only discursively know that
Earth is rotating, but also train to perceive being on a rotating Earth when experiencing a sunrise.
Unlike this particular example, learning accurate perceptions can be highly consequential, since changing
the perceptual model entails automatic changes to when and how various dependent perceptions and
actions occur. Once learned, the perceptual inference is automatic, while ‘unperceiving’ or changing the
perceptual model requires additional training.
Using scientific theories combines procedural and perceptual skills. Being able to solve an equation or
manipulate a formal model must be accompanied by perceptually recognizing which scientific model
concepts and equations can be used to describe the relevant aspects of a concrete natural or experimental
situation. Application of discursive and procedural scientific knowledge requires the perceptual skill of
mapping the perception of the outside world to the abstract notions procedurally manipulated and
discursively described by a theory. Scientific breakthroughs are often intuitive insights generated by direct
perceptions of the causal relationships of the abstract scientific phenomena, which are only subsequently
proven by formal manipulations. The formal manipulations are of course key for both training the
perceptual model needed to produce the insight, as well as for communicating it to be learned by others.
As any scientific theory, the functional account presented in this work is a procedural, discursive model.
If confirmed, it may provide the procedural framework for correcting illusory perceptions that may exist
about its subject. As the procedural knowledge within a conscious system, it relates the physical objects
and events and the system’s representations arising from the perception- and action-learning
mechanisms and includes the systems’ own perceptions of objects and actions, emotion and affect, the
‘experience’, ‘consciousness’ and ‘self’. Therefore, it is hoped that this work may not only contribute to
the general scientific knowledge, but also aid those who are inclined to learn to perceive themselves
without illusion.
DISCUSSION
States of consciousness.
In our theory the hyperparameters controlling the prediction and inference, the PP learning and the
learning by binding, modulated by the value system, define the state of consciousness (Bayne, Hohwy,
and Owen 2016). While specifying the exact dependencies is well beyond the scope of the present work,
one important concept is the exploration-exploitation tradeoff. As we have discussed, lowering inference
threshold for action may lead to off-policy action generation for exploration. Perceptual inference might
be similarly modulated. Additionally, the duration, level of prediction error and its correlation leading to
binding may also be modulated. As mentioned above, some of these variables may be signaled by the
tonic activity of the brain’s aminergic systems, in particular VTA dopaminergic signaling for actions and
serotonin signaling for perception or binding, potentially shedding light on the hallucinogenic effects
resulting from their pathological or pharmacologically-induced imbalances.
Considering perceptual value estimation, it is important to recall that much of the perceptual inference is
unconscious. Some fraction of this unconscious perceptual content is stable in time, continuously or
repeatedly inferred over long periods. When these unconscious percepts have large specific positive or
negative values along one or more emotional space dimensions, they provide a continuous bias input to
the value system. Excessive chronic positive and, particularly, negative bias may affect the system’s
hyperparameters, including offsetting the exploration-exploitation balance. This is one way our model
connects to mood and its disorders, such as depression. Notably, if such unconscious inference becomes
conscious in a type of perceptual shift that allows us to continue to perceive a cause while no longer fully
predicting it, the inference participates in learning by binding and both its perceptual inference, and its
specific future value may be rapidly changed by this single-example learning mechanism.
In the focused attention and mindfulness meditation training, the assignment of a high specific value to a
goal of continuously inferring the meditation object with high level of likelihood gradually modifies the
policy and the perceptual model to reduce the inference of distractors. Over time this makes possible a
large reduction or even elimination of most perceptual inferences arising either from sensory data or from
actions of imagination, except for those representing the task-relevant state of the system and the goal
(Laukkonen and Slagter 2021). In a generative PP model this also means reduction in sensory and motor
predictions. Sensory maps may have regularizing normalization mechanisms, which may react to such
tonic reductions of predictions and inferences by decreasing inference thresholds and increasing
background likelihoods, which may explain accounts of vivid internally generated perceptions at certain
stages of meditation practice, and the uniform visual illumination reported by experienced meditators.
Furthermore, lack of perception equals lack of input for future value estimation. When the goal of
effortless focused object perception without distractors is initially achieved, the positive evaluation of the
task performance is the dominant positively-valenced perception, providing a singular positive input to
the value system. In the absence of any other concurrent inputs, this is consistent with the meditative
rapture typically described upon reaching this stage of practice. With further practice the estimated future
value of being in this state reduces, eventually giving rise to the affectively-neutral equanimity.
Hypothetically, the reduction in the unpredicted perceptual content in deep meditation would mean
progressively simpler episode content, consistent with reports of “pure awareness” and related
discussions of “minimal phenomenal experience” (Metzinger 2020a) and perhaps even the failure of
associative recall for a fully predicted state, consistent with the cessation events reported in some
contemplative traditions.
Flow states (Csikszentmihalyi 1975) are the states where only comparably narrow perception and action
subspaces are being occupied, while much of the self-referential default mode perception and action
content is temporarily not being inferred, so that task interference is avoided. The future value in a flow
state is estimated only from this narrow task-relevant perceptual content, which is neutral or positive
when the task is being successfully executed. Notably, this positive affective state may differ strongly from
the default mode affective state.
Sleep is known to be important for off-line learning. Consistent with our hypothesis, there may be offline
regimes that activate parts of the PP model and/or change the prediction weights in the absence of
binding and therefore fully unconsciously. Action and object encoding parts of the PP hierarchy may be
activated differently or not at all. In contrast, dreaming appears to be the result of action exploration in
response to tonic dopamine signaling to the front of the brain, whereby in the absence of sensory input
the explored actions of imagination result in hallucinatory perceptions. An intriguing possibility is that
dreaming might act as off-line RL value-learning iterations. In TDRL, multiple iterations are necessary to
propagate the value backward over large time delays and assign it specifically to one or more of the
predictive causes. By repeatedly replaying perceptual models forward in time, such specific values of
perceptual causes can be learned. Binding during dreaming is likely necessary for the correct dynamic
replay, resulting in conscious perception of dreams, while distorted declarative learning form dreams is
inhibited by modifying the hyperparameters to disable memory retention and consolidation, inducing
sleep amnesia.
Measurement of consciousness.
Generally, we propose that the defining consequence of consciousness is the efficient declarative learning
not accessible to unconscious processes or systems. Therefore, the empirically testable presence of these
types of learning modalities in biological organisms can serve as a measure of consciousness, separate
from and broader than the introspective reports. Such measures taken together with other cognitive and
neurophysiological data and numerical models provide a path for developing a validated theoretical
framework for consciousness.
According to our theory, the recallable conscious content and conscious action arise through the specific
interactions of PP, binding, future value estimation and RL, therefore experiments might attempt to
isolate and target these specific processes in the brain for both measurement and controlled
manipulation. PP without binding is unconscious. At the lowest level, a conscious perception is a binding
event that creates temporary cross-prediction between previously unrelated causes. A mere correlation
is not sufficient to confirm the new causal connection, but rather one of the bound causes has to be
manipulated and effect on the other measured, such as in an associative recall. Importantly, the binding
should be studied between causes that were previously unrelated.
This binding may be studied both at the low level of the PP, the presumed result of recurrent processing
in low sensory layers, and at the high level of the PP hierarchy, where the global workspace is formed.
Experiments may manipulate the inference of the causes that are being bound, such as specific perceptual
features at the sensory PP level or specific actions of selective attention to attributes at the higher-level.
The manipulations can target the strength and duration of both perceptual and attention action
inferences – stimulus contrast and masking for perception and distractors to trigger interfering attention
actions for attention. Naturally, these are already common experimental paradigms, but our view
highlights the need to ensure novelty of the presented combination of stimuli, i.e., controlling for preexisting PP causes capable of predicting the combination. We advocate measurements of binding of
specific, controlled features to each other rather than on the less controllable binding of a feature to the
whole experimental context, which is often the case in the present paradigms.
When considering measures of the conscious state, such as the perturbation complexity index (Casali et
al. 2013), such measures might be aimed to distinguish the PP without binding, the low-level perceptual
binding, the high-level binding involving actions of attention and imagination, and the full procedural
processing – generation of a train of conscious thought modulated by an initial high-level binding. As we
have discussed, a broader definition of consciousness content includes the nonunified low-level binding
occurring within each sensory modality (aligned with the recurrent processing ToC), while a less inclusive
definition only includes the causes bound into the unified episode structure (aligned with the global
workspace ToC). The action triggering and thought generation is an additional process, relying on the
binding, but possibly reduced or absent in some conscious states such as meditation.
Outlook and open questions.
Our hypothesis is at present qualitative and makes conjectures about the properties entailed by the
hypothesized learning system’s functional organization and how they explain relevant empirical
observations. The first direction for further research is the search for empirical data that can corroborate
or falsify this hypothesis, such as by being incompatible with how the proposed system must function.
The second direction is theoretical analysis and numerical modeling of the instantiations of the proposed
system to study its feasibility and functional properties. The aim here is to ascertain whether such a system
can indeed stably and efficiently learn in an incremental and compositional manner with high sample
efficiency and generalizability (Kaelbling 2020), surpassing existing learning architectures. Understanding
this architecture from the fundamental statistical learning theory / machine learning perspective and
developing its numerical implementations will constrain and firm up predictions for such systems, to be
compared with experimental data from biological systems, including humans. The third direction is to
understand with high specificity how neural mechanisms and structures in the brain might map onto the
functional units proposed here and see if our proposal might provide a useful framework for better
understanding of the brain.
The proposed architecture should be further investigated to put it on a solid theoretical foundation
supported by numerical models in several areas. The first area is the combination of learning by binding
with generative perceptual modeling such as PP, where PP may be a mixture of categorical and
continuous, and may include causes directly modeling time sequences of features, i.e., generatively
replaying features in time. Modeling considerations may include priors, network topology constraints and
regularization mechanisms, particularly within the lower and intermediate levels of the PP hierarchy, and
how binding may enable learning within such architectures. Potential mechanisms for learning and
implementing perception and action inhibition, either direct or through built-in normalization constraints,
should be further elucidated. Another area is using generative modeling to represent both perception and
action within RL, where learning accurate predictive perception needs to be balanced with learning useful
action, and exploration-exploitation tradeoff needs to be implemented.
While at this time the overall correctness of this hypothesis is by no means assured and many aspects
remain to be understood, the numerical testing of such functional architectures is straightforward in
principle. However, it is critically important that proper considerations are given to the ethical aspects of
such research. The ethical goal of gaining knowledge and reducing epistemic indeterminacy should be
weighted carefully against increasing the risk of creating unnecessary artificial suffering (Metzinger 2021).
Summary.
A broad range of observations commonly related to the term ‘consciousness’ can be functionally
explained by considering a system combining generative perceptual modeling, such as predictive
processing, with learning by binding and reinforcement learning of complex actions. Biological conscious
systems have evolved because they enhance gene proliferation by efficiently and adaptively learning to
implement complex action policies. Our theoretical proposal is comprehensive, tying together the leading
insights into consciousness and action learning. It is subject to a rigorous mathematical description,
numerical modeling, and formal theoretical analysis to be developed within the frameworks of statistical
learning theory, machine learning and predictive processing. The properties entailed by the hypothesized
functional architecture were illustrated by examples, wherein we preferred to be specific and possibly
wrong rather than vague and unfalsifiable, aiming to facilitate empirical testing. No doubt many of these
examples will have to be refined and corrected, while it is our hope that the main ideas will withstand
empirical tests. At a bare minimum, this work provides insight into how a comprehensive scientific theory
of consciousness may be conceived.
BOX 1. Meeting the Hard Criteria for a theory of consciousness
Here we specifically describe this proposal following the hard criteria for a theory of consciousness
proposed in (Doerig, Schurger, and Herzog 2021):
Empirical phenomena of consciousness being addressed by the proposal:
1. Our theory addresses both the content and the state of consciousness by describing (1) the
functional mechanisms necessary and sufficient for consciousness (state) and (2) the formation
of perceptual content, and which perceptual content is unified, enter the memory record and is
available for action, and which is not (content).
2. The conscious state is governed by hyperparameters of the various learning functions (the
prediction error size, time persistence and correlation necessary for binding; parameters
governing the ongoing inference of PP; the bound cause forgetting and consolidation rates; the
value learning and action learning timescales and rates and the exploration vs. exploitation
tradeoff). All these global parameters modulate the state of consciousness continuously, and their
different values distinguish conscious states.
3. Consciousness is unifying in a sense of (temporarily) attributing various contents to common
causes and thereby (temporarily) constraining these groups of perceptions to covary. This
unification is hierarchical and at the highest level contents are unified into an episode. Given the
proposed binding rules, binding between low-level perceptual features may occur without further
binding with higher level features and the episode, accounting for the experimental observations
in (Meuwese et al. 2013).
4. The theory is temporally continuous, but posits the existence of a time threshold for binding.
Discontinuously varying outcomes are predicted dependent on whether time periods between
perceptual inferences are smaller or larger than the binding time threshold, accounting for
experimental observations in (Herzog, Drissi-Daoudi, and Doerig 2020).
5. Unconscious contents are not bound or unified, therefore they can have causal influence only on
other contents with which they have a prior learned association, e.g., priming and triggering of
previously associated actions and perceptions.
Meeting Hard Criteria:
1. Paradigm cases: The theory addresses several experimental paradigm cases as described. It is
comprehensive and experimentally falsifiable.
2. Unfolding and structure vs. function: Theory is functional and does not limit how the functions
are implemented. However, consciousness is a property than cannot be meaningfully ascribed to
any separate part of the full system’s functional organization, which must include future value
estimation, and action learning as well as the PP and binding. To function, such system must be
connected with a world via sensors and actuators and provided the rewards.
3. Network size: The theory describes a functional organization that implements consciousness,
irrespective of size. Accordingly, small networks implementing this functional organization are
deemed conscious, even if this consciousness is simple and limited in what it can represent, learn
or enact. Each instance of a complete implementation of this functional organization within a
large network is deemed separately conscious. Other than split brain patients, there is no clear
evidence of multiple instances of this organization within a single brain. It is likely that two largely
separate instances of this functional organization exist in split brain patients, thus containing two
consciousnesses. However, when the split brains are interconnected, they can no longer be
considered separate and independent implementations of the functional organization. A normally
connected brain implements a single instance of the functional organization.
4. Other systems: Multiple implementations are possible, including non-biological. An appropriately
functionally organized numerical model is conscious.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to Prof. Paula Droege for many insightful comments and suggestions on the earlier version
of the manuscript. I would like to thank Dr. Matthew Daniels and Ishan Singhal for their comments and
suggestions as well.
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Information Closure Theory of Consciousness
Acer Y.C. Chang∗, Martin Biehl†, Yen Yu‡, and Ryota Kanai§
arXiv:1909.13045v2 [q-bio.NC] 11 Jun 2020
ARAYA, Inc., Tokyo, Japan
Contents
1 Introduction
3
2 Non-trivial Informational Closure
2.1 Informational Closure Does not Imply Causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
6
3 Coarse-graining in the Neural System
6
4 Information Closure Theory of Consciousness
4.1 Level of Consciousness is Equal to the Degree of NTIC of a C-process . . . . . . .
4.2 Conscious Contents Corresponding to States of a C-Process . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Reconciling the Levels and Contents of Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
10
11
12
5 Conscious Versus Unconscious Processing
5.1 Unconscious Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Conscious Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
12
14
6 Comparison with Other Relevant Theories of Consciousness
6.1 Multilevel Views on Consciousness and Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Integrated Information Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 Predictive Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4 Sensorimotor Contingency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.5 Global Workspace Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
15
17
17
18
18
7 Limitations and Future Work
19
8 Conclusions
20
Acknowledgements
21
Author Contributions Statement
21
Conflict of Interest Statement
21
Reference
22
Figure Legends
26
Abstract
Information processing in neural systems can be described and analysed at multiple spatiotemporal scales. Generally, information at lower levels is more fine-grained but can be
coarse-grained at higher levels. However, only information processed at specific scales of coarsegraining appears to be available for conscious awareness. We do not have direct experience of
∗ Corresponding author, acercyc@araya.org
† martin@araya.org
‡ yen.yu@araya.org
§ kanair@araya.org
1
information available at the scale of individual neurons, which is noisy and highly stochastic.
Neither do we have experience of more macro-scale interactions, such as interpersonal communications. Neurophysiological evidence suggests that conscious experiences co-vary with
information encoded in coarse-grained neural states such as the firing pattern of a population
of neurons. In this article, we introduce a new informational theory of consciousness: Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT). We hypothesise that conscious processes are
processes which form non-trivial informational closure (NTIC) with respect to the environment at certain coarse-grained scales. This hypothesis implies that conscious experience is
confined due to informational closure from conscious processing to other coarse-grained scales.
ICT proposes new quantitative definitions of both conscious content and conscious level. With
the parsimonious definitions and a hypothesise, ICT provides explanations and predictions of
various phenomena associated with consciousness. The implications of ICT naturally reconcile
issues in many existing theories of consciousness and provides explanations for many of our
intuitions about consciousness. Most importantly, ICT demonstrates that information can be
the common language between consciousness and physical reality.
Keywords:
Keywords: theory of consciousness, non-trivial informational closure, NTIC, coarse-graining, level
of analysis
2
1
Introduction
Imagine you are a neuron in AliceâĂŹs brain. Your daily work is to collect neurotransmitters
through dendrites from other neurons, accumulate membrane potential, and finally send signals to
other neurons through action potentials along axons. However, you have no idea that you are one
of the neurons in AliceâĂŹs supplementary motor area and are involved in many motor control
processes for AliceâĂŹs actions, such as grabbing a cup. You are ignorant of intentions, goals,
and motor plans that Alice has at any moment, even though you are part of the physiological
substrate responsible for all these actions. A similar story also happens in AliceâĂŹs conscious
mind. To grab a cup, for example, Alice is conscious of her intention and visuosensory experience
of this action. However, her conscious experience does not reflect the dynamic of your membrane
potential or the action potentials you send to other neurons every second. That is, not all the
information you have is available to AliceâĂŹs conscious mind.
It appears to be true that we do not consciously access information processed at every scale in
the neural system. There are both more microscopic and more macroscopic scales than the scale
corresponding to the conscious contents. On the one hand, the dynamics of individual neurons are
stochastic (Goldwyn & Shea-Brown, 2011; White et al., 2000). However, what we are aware of in
our conscious mind shows astonishing stability and robustness against the ubiquitous noise in the
neural system (Mathis & Mozer, 1995). In addition, some parts of the neural system contribute
very little to conscious experience (the cerebellum for example (Lemon & Edgley, 2010)), also
suggesting that conscious contents do not have one-to-one mapping to the entire state of the
neural system. On the other hand, human conscious experience is more detailed than just a simple
(e.g. binary) process can represent, suggesting that the state space of conscious experience is much
larger than what a single overly coarse-grained binary variable can represent. These facts suggest
that conscious processes occur at a particular scale. We currently have possess only a few theories
(e.g., Integrated Information Theory (Hoel et al., 2016) and Geometric Theory of Consciousness
(Fekete & Edelman, 2011, 2012)) to identify the scale to which conscious processes correspond
(also see discussion in Fekete et al. (2016)). We refer to this notion as the scale problem of
consciousness (Fig. 1).
In this article, we propose a new information-based theory of consciousness, called the Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT). We argue that every process with a positive
non-trivial information closure (NTIC) has consciousness. This means that the state of such a
process corresponds one-to-one to conscious content.1 . We further postulate that the level of consciousness corresponds to the degree of NTIC. (For a discussion of the distinction between level
versus content of consciousness see Laureys (2005); Overgaard & Overgaard (2010)).
In the following, we first introduce non-trivial informational closure and argue for its importance
to information processing for human scale agents (Sec. 2). We next argue that through coarsegraining the neural system can form informational closure and a high degree of NTIC at a specific
scale of coarse-graining (Sec. 3). In Sec. 4, we propose a new theory of consciousness (ICT). We
also illustrate how ICT can parsimoniously explain empirical findings from previous consciousness
studies (Sec. 5) and reconcile several current major theories of consciousness (Sec.6). Finally, we
discuss the current theoretical and empirical limitations of ICT and propose the implications of
ICT on the current consciousness science (Sec.7).
1 In the following IC stands for "informational closure" or "informationally closed" and NTIC stands for "nontrivial informational closure" or "non-trivially informationally closed".
3
Physical Scale
Macroscopic
Multi-agent Interaction
Whole Brain
Neuron Population
Single Neuron
Subcellular Structure
Microscopic
Figure 1: The scale problem of consciousness: Human conscious experience does not reflect information from every scale. Only information at a certain coarse-grained scale in the neural system
is reflected in consciousness.
4
+1
^
^
+1
Figure 2: Dependencies between a system Y and its environment E through the channels yˆt and
eˆt .
2
Non-trivial Informational Closure
The notion of non-trivial informational closure (NTIC) was introduced by Bertschinger et al.
(2006). The concept of closure is closely related to system identification in systems theory. One can
distinguish a system from its environment by computing the closedness of the system (Luhmann,
1995; Maturana & Varela, 1991; Pattee, 2012; Rosen, 1991). Closedness itself can be further
quantified by information theory.
Consider two processes, the environment process (Et )t∈N and the system process (Yt )t∈N and
let their interaction be described by the Bayesian network with the sensor channel êt and the action
ŷt channel in Fig. 2. Information flow Jt from the environment E to a system S at time t can then
be defined as the conditional mutual information I between the current environment state Et and
the future system state Yt+1 given the current system state Yt
Jt (E → Y )
:= I(Yt+1 ; Et |Yt )
= I(Yt+1 ; Et ) − (I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) − I(Yt+1 ; Yt |Et ))
(1)
Bertschinger et al. (2006) defines a system as informationally closed when information flow from
the environment to the system is zero.
Jt (E → Y ) = 0
(2)
Information closure (minimising Jt ) is trivial if the environment and the system are entirely independent of each other.
I(Yt+1 ; Et ) = 0 ⇒ Jt (E → Y ) = 0
(3)
However, informational closure can be formed non-trivially. In the non-trivial case, even though a
system contains (or encodes) information about the environmental dynamics, the system can still
be informationally closed. In such cases, the mutual information between the current states of the
environment and the future state of the system is larger than zero.
I(Yt+1 ; Et ) > 0
(4)
I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) − I(Yt+1 ; Yt |Et ) > 0
(5)
This also implies
And, non-trivial informational closure can be defined as
N T ICt (E → Y ) : = I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) − I(Yt+1 ; Yt |Et )
(6)
= I(Yt+1 ; Et ) − I(Yt+1 ; Et |Yt )
(7)
Hence, maximising N T ICt (E → Y ) amounts to
maximising
I(Yt+1 ; Yt )
minimising
I(Yt+1 ; Yt |Et )
5
and
(8)
One can also maximise N T ICt (E → Y ) by
maximising
I(Yt+1 ; Et )
minimising
I(Yt+1 ; Et |Yt )
and
(9)
This implies that the system contains within itself all the information about its own future and
the self-predictive information contains the information about the environment.
For simplicity, in what follows, we refer to NTIC processes as those processes with positive
NTIC.
2.1
Informational Closure Does not Imply Causality
A surprising result from the definition of information flow Jt (E → Y ) (Eq. 1) is that information
flow does not indicate causal dependency from Et to Yt+1 or from Yt to Yt+1 . Here we consider
two scenarios, modelling and passive adaptation, which were previously noted by Bertschinger
et al. (2006). In both scenarios, a process can form positive NTIC (N T IC(E → Y ) > 0) and
informational closure (J(E → Y ) = 0), albeit via different causal dependencies.
In the modelling scenario, to achieve positive NTIC and informational closure, a system can
internalise and synchronise with the dynamics of the environment, e.g., model the environment. In
this case, the future internal state Yt+1 of the system is driven by the current internal state Yt and
the system still retains mutual information with the environment. Having high degrees of NTIC
then entails high predictive power about the environment. This gives biological agents functional
and evolutionary advantages.
In the passive adaptation scenario, the future system states (Yt+1 ) are entirely driven by the
current environment states (Et ). The system, perhaps counterintuitively, can nonetheless achieve
positive NTIC and informational closure. This happens under the condition that the sensory
process êt is deterministic and the system merely copies the sensory values. The system is then a
copy of another informationally closed process (êt ) and is therefore closed. At the same time, the
system has mutual information with the process that it is copying.
In most of the realistic cases, however, the environment is partially observable from the system’s
perspective, and thus the sensory process is usually not deterministic. Accordingly, it is difficult
for the system to be informationally closed and have higher NTIC. More importantly, we argue
in the Appendix that whenever the environment has itself more predictable dynamics than the
observations, it is possible exists for a process to achieve higher NTIC by modelling the environment
than by copying the observations.
We will see that both scenarios are relevant to ICT in the following sections.
3
Coarse-graining in the Neural System
The formation of NTIC with a highly stochastic process is challenging. NTIC requires the predictability of the system state and is therefore impeded by noise in the system. Information
processing at the microscopic scale (cellular scale) in neural systems suffers from multiple environmental noise sources such as sensor, cellular, electrical, and synaptic noises. For example, neurons
exhibit large trial-to-trial variability at the cellular scale, and are subject to thermal fluctuations
and other physical noises (Faisal et al., 2008).
Nevertheless, it is possible that neural systems form NTIC at certain macroscopic scales through
coarse-graining of microscopic neural states. Coarse-graining refers to many-to-one or one-to-one
maps which aggregate microscopic states to a macroscopic state. In other words, a number of
different micro-states correspond to the same value of the macro-variable (Price & Corry, 2007).
Coarse-grainings can therefore form more stable and deterministic state transitions and more often
form NTIC processes. For neural systems this means that a microscopically noisy neural system
may still give rise to an NTIC process on a more macroscopic scale.
Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that coarse-graining is a common coding strategy of the
neural system by which it establishes robustness against noise at microscopic scales. For instance,
the inter-spike intervals of an individual neuron are stochastic. This implies that the state of
an individual neuron does not represent stable information. However, the firing rate, i.e. the
average spike counts over a given time interval, is more stable and robust against noise such as
the variability in inter-spike intervals. Using this temporal coarse-graining strategy, known as rate
6
coding (Adrian, 1926; Gerstner & Kistler, 2002; Maass & Bishop, 2001; Panzeri et al., 2015; Stein
et al., 2005), neurons can encode stimulus intensity by increasing or decreasing their firing rate
(Kandel et al., 2000). (Stein et al., 2005). The robustness of rate coding is a direct consequence
of the many-to-one mapping (i.e., coarse-graining).
Population coding is another example of encoding information through coarse-graining in neural
systems. In this coding scheme, information is encoded by the activation patterns of a set of neurons
(a neuron population). In the population coding scheme, many states of a neuron population
map to the same state of macroscopic variables which encode particular informational contents,
thereby reducing the influence of noise in individual neurons. That is, stable representations can
be formed through coarse-graining the high dimensional state space of a neuron population to a
lower dimensional macroscopic state space (Binder et al., 2009; Kristan Jr & Shaw, 1997; Pouget
et al., 2000; Quian Quiroga & Panzeri, 2009). Therefore, individual neuron states (microscopic
scale) are not sufficiently informative about the complete encoded contents at the population scale
(macroscopic scale). Instead, coarse-grained variables are better substrates for stably encoding
information and allow the neural system to ignore noisy interactions at the fine-grained scale
(Woodward, 2007).
These two examples show that the known coding schemes can be viewed as coarse-graining,
and provide stochastic neural systems with the ability to form more stable and deterministic
macroscopic processes for encoding and processing information reliably. We argue that coarsegraining allows neural systems to form NTIC processes at macroscopic scales. Based on the merit
of coarse-graining in neural systems, we propose a new theory of consciousness in the next section.
4
Information Closure Theory of Consciousness
In this section, we propose a new theoretical framework of consciousness: the Information Closure
Theory of Consciousness (ICT). The main hypothesis is that conscious processes are captured by
what we call C-processes. We first define C-processes, then state our hypothesis and discuss its
implications.
7
Figure 3: The information flow amounts the universe X, the system S, the environment of the
system E, and the coarse-grained process Y of the system S. The solid line with a filled arrow from
Xt to Xt+1 represents the microscopic dynamic of the universe. The solid lines with a empty arrow
represent directions of coarse-graining. The dashed lines represents virtual dependencies between
two macroscopic variables. The red Yt , Yt+1 , and the red dashed line in between represents a
macroscopic process which forms informational closure at a certain coarse-grained scale.
8
To define C-processes we first need to define coarse-grainings. Every coarse-graining is characterised by a function that maps the microscopic process to the coarse-grained macroscopic process.
More formally:
Definition 1. Given a stochastic process X with state space X , a coarse-graining of X is a
stochastic process Y with state space Y such that there exists a function 2 fY : X → Y with
Yt = fY (Xt ).
A more general definition of coarse-grainings that maps temporally extended sequences of the
microscopic process to macroscopic states are possible, but for this first exposure of our theory the
simpler definition above is sufficient.
Definition 2. Given a stochastic process X called the universe process, a C-process is a coarsegraining Y of X such that the following two conditions are satisfied (see Fig. 3):
1. Y is informationally closed to X
2. there exists a pair (S, E) of coarse-grainings of X such that
• Y is a coarse-graining of S,
• the state space X of X is equal to the Cartesian product of the state spaces S and E of
processes S and E respectively, formally X = S × E, and
• Y is NTIC to E, formally:
N T ICt (E → Y ) > 0
(10)
Note that, here we applied the same definitions of information flow (Eq. 1)
Jt (E → Y ) = I(Yt+1 ; Et |Yt )
(11)
to the system-environment dependency and the micro-macro scale dependency
Jt (X → Y ) = I(Yt+1 ; Xt |Yt )
(12)
even though the Bayesian graphs differ in the two scenarios. Both these settings have been previously used in the literature (see Bertschinger et al., 2006; Pfante et al., 2014b).
With the two definitions we can state the main hypothesis of ICT
Hypothesis. A process Y is conscious if and only if it is a C-process of some process X. Also the
content of consciousness CtContent at time t is the state yt of the C-process at time t and the level of
consciousness CtLevel is the degree of NTIC of the process to the environment i.e. N T ICt (E → Y ):
CtContent = yt
CtLevel = N T ICt (E → Y )
(13)
(14)
A concrete example in the context of neuroscience is that X represents the microscopic scale
of the universe, S a cellular scale process in the neural system, Y a more macroscopic process of
the neural system coarse-grained from the cellular scale process S, and E the environment which
the cellular level process S interacts with. The environment E may include other processes in the
neural system, the sensors for perception and interoception, and external physical worlds.
Based on the hypothesis, ICT leads to five core implications:
Implication 1. Consciousness is information. Here, "informative" refers to the resolution of uncertainty. Being in a certain conscious state rules out other possible conscious states. Therefore, every conscious percept resolves some amount of uncertainty and provides information.
This implication is also in agreement with the "axiom" of information in Integrated Information Theory (IIT 3.0) which claims that “. . . an experience of pure darkness is what it is
by differing, in its particular way, from an immense number of other possible experiences. . . ”
(Oizumi et al., 2014, P. 2)
2 Functions in the mathematical sense used here are always either one-to-one or many-to-one.
9
Implication 2. Consciousness is associated with physical substrates and the self-information of
the conscious percept is equal to the self-information of the corresponding physical event.
This is a direct implication from our hypothesis that every conscious percept CtContent corresponds to a physical event yt .
Implication 3. Conscious processes are self-determining. This is a direct implication of the requirement that Y is informationally closed with respect to X. To be informationally closed
with respect to X, no coarse-graining knows anything about the conscious process’ future
that the conscious process does not know itself. This self-determining characteristics is also
consistent with our daily life conscious experience which often shows stability and continuity
and is ignorant of the stochasticity (e.g., noise) of the cellular scales.
Implication 4. Conscious processes encode the environmental influence on itself. This is due
to the non-triviality of the informational closure of Y to E. At the same time all of this
information is known to the conscious processes themselves since they are informationally
closed with respect to their environments. This also suggests that conscious processes can
model the environmental influence without knowing more information from the environment.
Implication 5. Conscious processes can model environmental information (by forming NTIC)
but be ignorant to part of the information of more microscopic processes (from Implication
3 and 4). This is consistent with our conscious experience, namely that the information that
every conscious percept provides represents rich and structured environmental states without
involving all the information about microscopic activities.
4.1
Level of Consciousness is Equal to the Degree of NTIC of a C-process
According to Eq. 8, ICT implies that conscious levels are determined by two quantities.
First, to form a high level of NTIC, one can increase the mutual information I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) between
the current internal state Yt and the future internal state Yt+1 . In other words, conscious levels
are associated with the degree of self-predictive information (Bialek et al., 2001). This mutual
information term can be further decomposed to two information entropy quantities:
I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) = H(Yt+1 ) − H(Yt+1 |Yt )
(15)
This implies that a highly NTIC process must have rich dynamics with self-predictability over
time. Another implication is that complex systems can potentially attain higher levels of consciousness due to the greater information capacities needed to attain high mutual information.
This outcome is consistent with the common intuition that conscious levels are often associated
with the degree of complexity of a system.
Second, one can minimise the conditional mutual information I(Yt+1 ; Yt |Et ) to increase the
level of NTIC. If the mutual information term I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) is supposed to stay large, this quantity
suggests that conscious level increases with the amount of information about the environment state
Et that the NTIC process encodes in its own state Yt and Yt+1 . In other words, Yt should not
contain more information about Yt+1 than Et . An important implication is that agents interacting
with a complex environment have the chance to build a higher level of NTIC within their systems
than those living in a simple environment. In other words, the level of consciousness is associated
with environmental complexity.
It is important to note that NTIC can be a non-monotonic function of the scale of coarsegraining. Since we can quantify the scale of a coarse-grained variable by the size of its state space,
therefore, at the finest scale we consider the whole universe X as the process Y . Then, since Y is
a coarse-graining of S we have Y = S = X. In this case the environment E corresponding to the
universe seen as a system is the constant coarse-graining3 and therefore the mutual information
I(Et ; Yt+1 ) and the transfer entropy I(Yt+1 ; Et |Yt ) are zero. The NTIC of the universe with respect
to its environment is then zero, and X can never be a C-process.
If we now increase the scale of Y , this allows S to also reduce in scale and therefore E can
become more and more fine-grained. This means that the mutual information I(Et ; Yt+1 ) between
E and Y can at least potentially become positive. Up to the point where E accounts for half of the
3 Recall that, for a system with state space S the environment state space E must be such that X = S × E.
If
S = X then we need E with X × E = X such that E must be a singleton set. All coarse-grainings mapping X to a
singleton set are constant over X .
10
bits of X and S for the other half the upper bound of the mutual information I(Et ; Yt+1 ) achieved
when Y = S increases. Refining E even further again leads to a reduction of the upper bound of
I(Et ; Yt+1 ).
At the other extreme, when E = X the system state space must be the singleton set and NTIC
from E to Y must again be zero. Therefore, processes at intermediate scales of coarse-graining can
form higher degrees of NTIC than those at the most microscopic or macroscopic scales (Fig. 4).
ICT suggests that human consciousness occurs at a scale of coarse-graining where high NTIC is
formed within the neural system4 .
t
t+1
Degree of NTIC
(Conscious level)
Figure 4: A non-monotonic relationship between the scale of coarse-graining and level of consciousness.
4.2
Conscious Contents Corresponding to States of a C-Process
ICT proposes that conscious contents correspond to the states of C-processes (Eq. 13). This implies that the size of the state space of a C-process is associated with the richness of the conscious
contents that the process can potentially have. Accordingly, a complex C-process with a high
dimensional state space can have richer conscious experience than a simple C-process. This outcome is consistent with the intuition that the richness of conscious contents is associated with the
complexity of a system.
Informational closure can happen between scales of coarse-graining within a single system.
Thus, a macroscopic NTIC process can be ignorant of its microscopic states. ICT argues that
human conscious contents do not reflect cellular scale activity because the conscious process which
corresponds to a macroscopic NTIC process is informationally closed to the cellular scale in the
human neural system. Further more, since C-processes are informationally closed, each of them can
be considered as a reality. When the information flow from its microscopic processes (and from the
environment) to it is zero (Eq. 2), the future states of the process can be entirely self-determined
by its past states.
Importantly, in most realistic cases, NTIC processes internalise the environmental dynamics in
4 In our current setup, the size of the state space S and E correspondingly determines the scale of coarse-graining
of S and E.Further research is needed to reveal the relationship among NTIC, scales of coarse-graining, and different
constructions of S and E.
11
its states (see Sec. 2.1 and also Bertschinger et al. (2006)). This suggests that an NTIC process
can be considered as a process that models the environmental dynamics. This implication fits
well with several theories of consciousness (for example, world simulation metaphor (Revonsuo,
2006)). Note that ICT does not assume that generative models are necessary for consciousness.
The implication is a natural result of processes with NTIC.
Finally, a coarse-graining can be a many-to-one map from microscopic to macroscopic states
and ICT proposes that conscious contents C Content is the state of the C-process. ICT therefore
implies the multiple realisation thesis of consciousness (Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Putnam, 1967),
which suggests that different physical implementations could map to the same conscious experience.
4.3
Reconciling the Levels and Contents of Consciousness
While it is useful to distinguish the levels and contents of consciousness at the notion level, whether
they can be clearly dissociated has been a matter of debate (Bayne et al., 2016; Fazekas & Overgaard, 2016). In ICT, conscious levels and conscious contents are simply two different properties
of NTIC processes, and the two aspects of consciousness are therefore naturally reconciled. In
an NTIC process with a large state space, conscious contents should also consist of rich and high
dimensional information. This framework therefore integrates the levels and the contents of consciousness in a coherent fashion by providing explicit formal definitions of the two notions.
According to Sec. 4.1 and Sec. 4.2, an important implication from ICT is that both conscious
levels and conscious contents are associated with the state space of an NTIC process Y . A larger
state space of Y contributes conscious levels through the mutual information I(Yt+1 ; Yt ) and also
contributes richer conscious contents by providing a greater number of possible states of conscious
processes. ICT therefore explains why, in normal physiological states, conscious levels and conscious
contents are often positively correlated (Laureys, 2005). This implication is also consistent with
the intuition that consciousness is often associated with complex systems.
5
Conscious Versus Unconscious Processing
In this section, we show how ICT can explain and make predictions about which processes are more
conscious than others. ICT is constructed using information theory and can provide predictions
based on mathematical definitions.
5.1
Unconscious Processing
In this section we highlight two scenarios in which ICT predicts that processes remain unconscious.
Processes that are not Informationally Closed
The first scenario is built upon the assumption that sensor processes are non-deterministic 5 and
that process dynamics are passively driven by environmental inputs. Such processes cannot be
informationally closed and are, therefore, unconscious.
Reflexive behaviours (Casali et al., 2013) can be considered an example of this scenario. In
ICT, we can view reflexive behaviours as situations in which (Fig. 5) the internal state Yt , which
triggers reflexive action ŷt , is determined by the environment state Et−1 , overruling the influences
from its own past Yt−1 . Such interpretation of reflexive behaviour from the viewpoint of ICT
naturally explains why reflexes involve less or no conscious experience of external stimuli.
5 Non-deterministic sensor processes here means H(ê
t+1 |êt ) > 0.
12
Figure 5: Schema depicting the information flow in reflexive behaviours (shown by the red nodes
and arrows) happening through the interaction between a process Y and its environment E. When
the sensor process êt is non-deterministic and the internal state Yt is mostly dependent on the sensor
state êt driven by the environment Et−1 but less on its past state Yt−1 , as a consequence, Y is
unable to form informational closure and, therefore, remain unconscious.
The same principle can be applied to interpret blindsight (Humphrey, 1970, 1999, 1974) and
procedural memory (Ashby et al., 2010; Doyon et al., 2009) which are often considered unconscious processes. Blindsight patients are able to track objects, avoid obstacles, and make above
chance-level visual judgements with degraded or missing visual experience.(However, in some cases,
they may still preserve some forms of conscious experience; See Mazzi et al. (2016); Overgaard
(2011)). We argue that blindsight-guided actions are a result of stimulus-response mapping. The
corresponding neural circuits are driven passively and therefore are not informationally closed.
According to ICT we therefore have no conscious visual experience of visual stimuli.
Similarly, for procedural memory, the state transitions of corresponding neural circuits determining the action sequences largely depend on sensory inputs. This prevents the neural processes
of procedural memory from informational closure and being conscious. ICT also offers an interpretation as to why patients with visual apperceptive agnosia (James et al., 2003) can perform online
motor controls without visual awareness of action targets (Whitwell et al., 2014).
Note that, not all processes that are driven by the environment (passive adaptation) are unconscious. As mentioned in Sec. 2.1, when the sensor processes are deterministic, a system can
still have positive NTIC and achieve informational closure via passive adaptation. Therefore, some
passive system (for example pure feedforward networks) can potentially be conscious.6
For agents such as human beings, the environment is often informationally rich but only partially observable in such a way that the current sensory inputs are insufficient to predict the next
inputs and to form deterministic sensor processes. In this situation, the system cannot become
informationally closed by passive adaptation (e.g., simply copying the sensory values to the system). ICT predicts that, in most realistic cases, processes with passive adaptation are unconscious.
On the other hand, networks with recurrent loops employing information stored in their own past
states have the potential to achieve higher NTIC by modelling the environment. If it turns out
to be true that for every pure feed-forward network there are non-feed-forward systems achieving
higher NTIC, then ICT predicts that the latter systems achieve higher levels of consciousness.
This implication coincides with theories of consciousness emphasising the importance of recurrent
circuits to consciousness (Edelman, 1992; Lamme, 2006; Tononi & Koch, 2008).
6 Since an n-layer feedforward network is a system with n-step memory it is technically appropriate to use the
n-step memory definition of NTIC, i.e. N T ICtm (E → Y ) := I(Yt+1 : Et , . . . , Et−n+1 )−I(Yt+1 : Et , . . . , Et−n+1 |Yt )
(Bertschinger et al., 2006), for such systems. In this case the notion of non-deterministic input processes should be
generalised to input processes with H(êt |êt−1 , . . . , êt−n ) > 0.
13
Processes that are Trivially Closed
The second scenario is that when encoded information in a process is trivial, i.e. there is no
mutual information between the process states and the environment states I(Yt+1 ; Et ) (Eq. 9),
this leads to non-positive NTIC. In such cases, the process is considered to be unconscious. This
implies that an isolated process which is informationally closed is insufficient to be conscious.
This mathematical property of ICT is relevant for dealing with the boundary and individuality
problems of consciousness7 (Raymont & Brook, 2006). Consider an NTIC process Y and an
isolated informationally closed process Ŷ with only trivial information. Adding Ŷ to Y can still
maintain informational closure but does not increase non-trivial information, i.e., consciousness is
unaffected.
I(Y, Ŷ ; E) = H(Y, Ŷ ) − H(Y, Ŷ |E)
= H(Y ) + H(Ŷ |Y ) − (H(Y |E) + H(Ŷ |Y, E))
= H(Y ) + H(Ŷ ) − (H(Y |E) + H(Ŷ ))
(16)
= H(Y ) − H(Y |E)
= I(Y ; E)
This implies that isolated processes with trivial information do not contribute consciousness and
should be considered as being outside the informational boundary of the conscious processing. This
property also implies that consciousnesses do not emerge from simple aggregation of informationally
closed (isolated) processes which contain trivial information. In the future we hope to adapt the
procedures for boundary detection proposed in Krakauer et al. (2014, 2020) to ICT.
5.2
Conscious Processing
In accordance with ICT, we claim that any process, system, or cognitive function which involves
any C-process should be accompanied by conscious experience.
Previous consciousness research has identified a number of diverse cognitive processes which
are often accompanied by conscious experience. ICT provides an integrated account of why these
processes involve conscious experience. As mentioned above, an NTIC process can be seen as an internal modelling engine for agent-environmental interactions (Bertschinger et al., 2006). Therefore,
information encoded in NTIC processes is essential for several cognitive processes.
Among the most valuable types of information are predictions about environmental states.
Cognitive functions requiring agent-scale environmental predictions are likely to recruit NTIC
processes, and to therefore be accompanied by conscious experience; examples include planning
and achieving long term goals.
Second, as a modelling engine, an NTIC process with a given initial state can self-evolve and
simulate the environmental transitions. Cognitive functions involving internal simulations about
agent-environment interactions (e.g. imagination, computing alternative realities, and generating
counterfactuals) are expected to involve NTIC processes. We speculate that, these internal simulations may involve interactions between C-processes and other processes in the neural system.
Therefore, they often come with conscious experience.
Third, as an informationally closed system, an NTIC process can still provide environmental
information without new sensory inputs. This is crucial for many types of off-line processing.
Therefore, in contrast to reflexive-like behaviours, such as those mentioned above (Sec. 5.1), behaviours requiring off-line computations (Himmelbach & Karnath, 2005; Milner et al., 1999; Revol
et al., 2003) often involve conscious experience.
Finally, for agents adapting to complex environments (e.g., human beings), any state of the
NTIC process can be seen as an integration of high dimensional information. To accurately encode information about complex environmental states and transitions, the NTIC process requires
knowledge about the complex causal dependencies involved in the environment. Cognitive functions requiring larger scale integration are therefore likely to involve C-processes and accompanied
by conscious experience.
Note that many of the claims above are compatible with several theories of consciousness which
highlight the connection between consciousness and internal simulation, predictive mechanism, or
7 The boundary problem of consciousness refers to identifying physical boundaries of conscious processes and the
individuality problem of consciousness refers to identifying individual consciousnesses in the universe.
14
generative models inside a system (e.g. world simulation metaphor (Revonsuo, 2006), predictive
processing and Bayesian brain (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2014), generative model and information generation (Kanai et al., 2019)). Instead of relating functional or mechanistic aspects of a
system to consciousness, ICT captures common informational properties underlying those cognitive
functions which are associated with consciousness. As such, ICT does not assume any functionalist perspectives of consciousness, which associate specific functions to consciousness. That is to
say, since ICT associates information with consciousness, functional features accompanied by consciousness are collateral consequences of neural systems which utilise NTIC processes for adaptive
functions.
In sum, we argue that cognitive functions involving the C-process are inevitably accompanied by
consciousness. Having an NTIC process is potentially an effective approach to increasing fitness in
the evolutionary process. It is likely that biological creatures evolve NTIC processes at some point
during their evolution. Due to the fundamental relation between information and consciousness,
biological creatures also evolve different degrees of consciousness depending on the physical scale
and complexity of the environments they adapt to.
Although it starts with a non-functional hypothesis, ICT accounts for the association between
function and consciousness. Further, ICT demonstrates remarkable explanatory power for various
findings concerning conscious and unconscious processing.
6
Comparison with Other Relevant Theories of Consciousness
In this section, we compare ICT with other relevant theories of consciousness.
6.1
Multilevel Views on Consciousness and Cognition
ICT proposes that conscious processes can occur at any scale of coarse-graining which forms NTIC
within a system. This suggests that the scale of coarse-graining is critical for in searching for
and identifying the information corresponding to consciousness. A few number of versions of
multilevel views on consciousness have previously been (explicitly or implicitly) proposed. To
our knowledge, PennartzâĂŹs neurorepresentational theory (also called Neurorepresentationalism, (Pennartz, 2015, 2018)) is closest to the multilevel view of ICT. Similar to Neurorepresentationalism, the concept of levels in ICT is relevant to Marr’s level of analysis (Marr, 1982; Pennartz,
2015, 2018). However, ICT suggests that coarse-graining is necessary only when a process is not
informationally closed. Therefore, if a C-process is formed at a microscopic scale (e.g. the scale of
individual neurons), according to ICT, this C-process is sufficient for consciousness. Another fundamental difference between ICT and Neurorepresentationalism is that Neurorepresentationalism
takes a functionalist perspective and suggests that consciousness should serve high-level worldmodelling and make a best guess about the interaction between the body and the environment. In
contrast, however, ICT is grounded by a non-functional informational hypothesis. Therefore, ICT
provides a non-functional and fundamental explanation for the scale problem of consciousness.
Another well-known proposal based on multilevel views is the Intermediate Level Theory of
Consciousness (Jackendoff, 1987; Prinz, 2007, ILT). ILT proposes that conscious experience is
only associated with neural representations at intermediate levels of the sensory processing
hierarchy (e.g., the 2.5D representation of visual processing), and not with lower (e.g., pixel) or
higher (e.g., abstract) levels of the sensory hierarchy.
Here, we want to make clear that "level" in ICT refers to the scale of coarse-graining, rather
than "level" in cortical anatomy or sensory processing. It is important to note that the coarsegraining direction is an orthogonal dimension irrespective of the level of anatomy or of information
processing hierarchy in the neural system (see Fig. 6). Because ILT focuses the levels of the sensory
processing hierarchy and ICT focus on informational closure among the levels of coarse-graining,
the two theories are fundamentally different.
15
Level of coarse-graining
Time
th
ep
D
of
hy
rc
ra
ie
lh
ca
rti
co
Figure 6: Distinction between the level of coarse-graining and the level of cortical hierarchy. X and
Y represent the microscopic and macroscopic coarse-grained variables, respectively. X 0 represents
microscopic states upstream of the cortical hierarchy. The red empty arrows represents the directions of coarse-graining and the blue arrows represent the directions of the physical dependencies
in the cortical hierarchy from upstream to downstream. (Some variables and dependencies are
omitted for clarity.)
16
6.2
Integrated Information Theory
Integrated information theory (IIT) states that consciousness is integrated information and that
a systemâĂŹs consciousness is determined by its causal properties (Tononi et al., 2016). ICT is
consistent with IIT in that informational properties are thought to underlie consciousness. In this
section, we will discuss ICT in the light of IIT.
The concept of "information": In IIT, information refers to "integrated information",
namely “Information that is specified by a system that is irreducible to that specified by its parts.”
(Tononi et al. 2016) In ICT, information refers to "self-information", i.e. information about the
states of conscious experience and the physical states of a process. Therefore, IIT focuses more on
the relationships between consciousness and causal interactions among elements within a system,
whereas ICT focuses more on the informational relationships between conscious experience and
being in a certain state of a process.
The "Exclusion" axiom in IIT: In IIT, the Exclusion axiom claims that among all overlapping sets of elements, only one set, having maximal integrated information, can be conscious. The
exclusion axiom should be applied over elements, space, time, and scales (Hoel et al., 2016; Oizumi
et al., 2014). Differing from IIT, ICT allows multiple consciousnesses to coexist across different
scales of coarse-graining within a system if they are informationally closed from to each other. The
two distinctive predictions decisively pinpoint the core concepts of the two theories.
The concept of "integration": In IIT, integrated information is a core concept in defining
conscious individuals. In the present paper, we do not include the notion of integrated information
within ICT. However, this represents one of the current weaknesses of ICT, namely that it in some
cases it lacks the ability to individuate NTIC processes (i.e., the problem of individuality). We
discuss this weaknesses in Sec. 7.
Prediction after system damage: Prediction after system damage: ICT and IIT lead
to different predictions when a system suffers from damage. Consider for example a densely
connected network whose dynamics forms a C-process. If we cut the network in half, IIT predicts
that this would result in two consciousnesses because elements in both networks still maintain high
degrees of interaction. In contrast, ICT would predict that this operation might completely destroy
informational closure of the network, and thereby render both parts unconscious. Nevertheless, this
prediction is relatively premature. In the future, rigorous modelling studies will allow systematic
comparisons between model predictions.
6.3
Predictive Processing
Predictive processing (PP) is a powerful framework which integrates several ideas from neuroscience. This emerging theoretical framework posits that neural systems constantly generate predictions about incoming sensory signals and update predictions based on prediction errors between
predictions and sensory signals. According to PP, neural systems constantly perform unconscious
statistical inference about hidden causes in the external environment. The perceptual contents are
the "best guess" about those environment states which include these hidden causes (Clark, 2013;
Hohwy, 2013). PP is well integrated with Bayesian brain hypothesis and has been used to interpret
conscious perception in many domains (Hohwy, 2013; Seth, 2014).
PP is a powerful explanatory framework for diverse brain functions. However, to serve as a
theory of consciousness, PP is still incomplete due to two explanatory gaps. First, the neural system
is equipped with multiple predictive mechanisms, but it appears that not all of these predictive
mechanisms are involved in conscious processes (e.g. mismatch negativity, Näätänen et al. (2007)).
PP needs to explain the difference between conscious and unconscious predictive mechanisms.
Second, PP can be considered as a sophisticated computation for perceptual inference. It
takes von Helmholtz’s conception of perception as unconscious inference. Thus, only the most
probable outcome computed by the inference processes can be conscious, while other details of the
computation remain unconscious. PP also needs to explain how unconscious inferences are able to
give rise to conscious results. In short, while PP is often discussed in the context of consciousness,
these explanatory gaps prevent PP from being a theory of consciousness.
ICT is well compatible with PP. Crucially, ICT further provides natural and fundamental explanations to fill the two explanatory gaps which hamper PP. According to the definition of NTIC,
a process with high NTIC can be regarded as a powerful predictive machine which has accurate
self-predictive information (I(Yt+1 ; Yt ), E.q. 6) and concurrently incorporates environmental information into its dynamic (I(Yt+1 ; Yt |Et ), E.q. 6). This predictive nature of NTIC processes is in
17
agreement with the core notion of PP in which the conscious contents are always the predicted
(inferred) outcome of our predictive mechanisms. Second, due to the informational closure to the
environment, the encoded information about its environment in an NTIC process can appear to
be as "the best guess" about the external environment in the context of Bayesian inference.
Finally, therefore, why is some predictive information conscious and some are not? ICT predicts
that only the predictions generated from mechanisms involving the NTIC process are conscious.
Note that it is not necessary for predictive processes to involve NTIC processes. A predictive
process can make a prediction about the future state of its environment solely based on the current
sensor states when the current sensor states and future sensor states have positive mutual information. However, this is not sufficient for a process to be informationally closed and, therefore, be
conscious.
Also in accordance with ICT, we further propose that we can only be aware of the predictions of
predictive processes due to informational closure to computational details of microscopic predictive
processes. Acquisition by the macroscopic NTIC process is limited to the coarse-grained summary
statistics of the microscopic processes. In other words, we predict that the computation of the
statistical inferences of PP is implemented at microscopic (cellular) scales in the neural system.
Finally, we consider that PP is a potential empirical implementation of NTIC processes. To
maintain accurate information about the environment encoded in an NTIC process, one can open
an information channel between the process and the environment to allow the minimal flow of
information required to correct the divergence between them. This proposal is compatible with PP,
which suggests that PP systems update (correct) the current estimations by computing prediction
errors between predicted and real sensory inputs.
6.4
Sensorimotor Contingency
The sensorimotor contingency (SMC) theory of consciousness proposes that different types of SMCs
give rise to different characteristics of conscious experience (O’Regan & Noë, 2001). The theory
radically rejects the view that conscious content is associated with the internal representations of a
system. Rather, the quality of conscious experience depends on the agentâĂŹs mastery of SMCs.
SMC emphasizes that the interaction between a system and its environment determines conscious
experience.
ICT is not compatible with SMC. As mentioned in Sec. 5, a process which directly maps the
sensory states to the action states is insufficient to be NTIC. Therefore, learning contingencies
between sensory inputs and action outputs do not imply NTIC. Hence, ICT predicts that having
sensorimotor contingencies is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for consciousness. In
fact, empirically, with extensive training on a sensorimotor task with a fixed contingency, the task
can be gradually performed unconsciously. This indicates that strong SMCs do not contribute
conscious contents. In contrast, ICT suggests that, with extensive training, the neural system
establishes a neural mapping from sensory inputs to action outputs. This decreases the level of
informational closure and, as a result, decrease the consciousness level of this process. This outcome
better supports ICT than SMC.
Nevertheless, ICT does appreciate the notion that interactions between a process and its environment are crucial to shaping conscious experience. As mentioned above, to form NTIC, a
process needs to encode environmental transitions into its own dynamic. Therefore, information
of agent-environment interaction should also be encoded in the NTIC process, and thereby shape
conscious contents in a specific way.
Different to classical SMC, a new version of SMC proposed by Seth (2014, 2015), namely
Predictive Processing of SensoriMotor Contingencies (PPSMC), combines SMC and the predictive
processing framework together. PPSMC emphasises the important role of generative models in
computing counterfactuals, inferring hidden causes of sensory signals, and linking fictive sensory
signals to possible actions. According to ICT, if the generative model involves the NTIC process
in the computation of counterfactuals, PPSMC will be compatible with our theory and may have
strong explanatory power for some specific conscious experience.
6.5
Global Workspace Theory
Global workspace theory (GWT; Baars (1988, 1997, 2002)) and Global Neuronal Workspace theory
(GNWT; Dehaene & Changeux (2011); Dehaene & Naccache (2001); Dehaene et al. (1998)) state
that the neural system consists of several specialised modules, and a central global workspace
18
(GW) which integrates and broadcasts information gathered from these specialised modules. Only
the information in the global workspace reaches conscious awareness, while information outside of
it remains unconscious. These modules compete with each other to gain access to the GW, and
the information from the winner triggers an all-or-none "ignition" in the GW. Information in the
GW is broadcast to other modules. Conscious contents are then associates with the information
that gains access to the internal global workspace (Dehaene et al., 2017).
While GWT emphasises the importance of global information sharing as a basis of consciousness, the precise meaning of information broadcasting remains somewhat unclear if one tries to
describe it more formally in the language of information theory. ICT offers one possible way to consider the meaning of broadcasting in GWT. Specifically, one could interpret the global workspace
as the network of nodes wherein information is shared at the scale of NTIC and where communication is performed through macro-variables that are linked via mutual predictability. In other
words, the global workspace should also be NTIC. While this link remains speculative, this interpretation encourages empirical studies into the relationship between the contents of consciousness
and macrostate neural activities that are mutually predictive of each other.
7
Limitations and Future Work
As a completely new theory of consciousness, ICT is still far from completion. In the following, we
discuss the current limitations and challenges of ICT and point out some potential future research
directions.
It is important to clarify that ICT does not intend to solve the hard problems of consciousness
(Chalmers, 1995). Knowing the state of a conscious process does not allow us to answer "What
is it like to be in this state of this process" (Nagel, 1974). Instead, ICT focuses more on bridging
consciousness and the physical world using information theory as a common language between
them.
The current version of ICT cannot entirely solve the problem of individuality. The main issue
with identifying individual consciousnesses using ICT is that at the moment the environment is not
uniquely defined. Once we have identified processes that are informationally closed with respect
to X we still have to find the environment process E with respect to which we compute NTIC.
However, there are usually multiple system processes S of which a given Y is a coarse-graining
in which case there are also multiple environment processes E with respect to which we could
compute NTIC.
A more general problem of NTIC-based individuality is that we can define a new process Y
and also its environment E by recruiting two independent NTIC processes Y 1 & Y 2 and their
environments E 1 & E 2 , respectively. Accordingly, Y = (Y 1 , Y 2 ) and E = (E 1 , E 2 ). In such a
case, the new process Y will also be NTIC to E. The current version of ICT is therefore unable
to determine whether there are two smaller consciousnesses or one bigger consciousness (or for
that matter 3 coexisting consciousnesses). The problem of individuality is a significant theoretical
weakness of the current version of ICT. The notion of integration8 is a possible remedy for this
issue, and we will address it explicitly in our future work using the concept of synergy.
The current version of ICT assumes that consciousness receives contribution from only nontrivial information, rather than trivial information encoded in a process. In other words, the
amount of information about environmental states and dynamics encoded in a process is a key
quantity for consciousness. However, we do not exclude the possibility that environmental information may simply be a proxy for other informational quantities. More theoretical work is needed
to elucidate the role of environments. This issue will also be discuss in our future theoretical paper.
In this article, we do not use a state-dependent formulation of NTIC. However, we believe
that state-dependent NTIC is essential to describing the dynamics of conscious experience. The
next version of ICT therefore requires further research using point-wise informational measures to
construct state-dependent NTIC.
Explaining conscious experience during dreaming is always a challenge to theories of consciousness. ICT currently does not have a specific answer to dreaming. However, we wish to emphasize
that not all processes in the neural system are NTIC since some processes are not informationally
closed. They mainly passively react to sensory inputs or other processes in the neural system. To
8 Integration here refers to any high-order dependencies.
19
the conscious (NTIC) process, the rest of the neural system and the body should also be considered as part of the environment. They retain some degree of activity during sleep and dreaming.
We speculate that, during dreaming, the neural system stably forms a C-process with respect to
its environment, i.e. the other parts of the neural system. At present, however, this remains
mere speculation. Identification of the C-process(es) during dreaming is an important milestone
in extending the scope of ICT.
Empirically, a major challenge to ICT is to find appropriate coarse-graining functions which
map microscopic processes to macroscopic C-processes. This issue will become imperative in the
search for neurological evidence supporting ICT. Identifying such coarse-graining functions among
infinite candidates (Price & Corry, 2007) appears to be very challenging. Nevertheless, recent
theoretical and technical progress may contribute to solving this issue. For example, the concept
of causal emergence proposed by Hoel (Hoel, 2018; Hoel et al., 2013) has been further developed
recently. Causal emergence is highly relevant to the relationship between informational closure
and coarse-graining. In their new study, Klein & Hoel (2019), start to compare how different
coarse-graining functions influence causal emergence at macroscopic scales. Pfante et al. (2014a,b)
provide a thorough mathematical analysis of level identification, including informational closure. In
neuroscience, an understanding of neural population codes has also made a tremendous progress due
to advance in recording technique and data science (Kohn et al., 2016; Panzeri et al., 2015). Gamez
(2016) has also systematically described relevant issues in finding data correlates of consciousness
among different levels of abstraction. We believe that interdisciplinary research is required to
narrow down the scope of search for coarse-graining functions and conscious processes at macroscales in the neural system and beyond.
Finally, another empirical challenge to ICT is that of empirical supporting evidence. This is
understandable because the concept of NTIC is relatively new in the history of information science,
not to mention in neuroscience. Very few experiments and data collections examining NTIC
properties in neural systems have yet appeared. To our knowledge, only two studies (Palmer et al.,
2015; Sederberg et al., 2018) coincidentally examined relevant properties in salamander retina;
these found that a large group of neural populations of retinal ganglion cells encoded predictive
information about external stimuli and also had high self-predictive information about their own
future states. This result is consistent with the characteristic of NTIC. We expect that there will
be more empirical studies examining relevant neural properties of NTIC.
8
Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce the Information Closure Theory of Consciousness (ICT), a new
informational theory of consciousness. ICT proposes that a process which forms informational closure with non-trivial information, i.e. non-trivial informational closure (NTIC) is conscious
and through coarse-graining the neural system can form conscious processes, at certain macroscopic scales. ICT considers that information is a common language to bridge the gap between
conscious experience and physical reality. Using information theory, ICT proposes computational
definitions for both conscious level and conscious content. This allows ICT to be generalised to
any system beyond the human brain.
ICT provides an explanation for various findings from research into conscious and unconscious
processing. The implications of ICT indicate that the scales of coarse-graining play a critical role
in the search for neural substrates of consciousness. Improper measurement of neurophysiological
signals, such as those which are excessively fine or coarse in scale, may lead to misleading results
and misinterpretations.
ICT reconciles several theories of consciousness. ICT indicates that they conditionally coincide
with ICT’s implications and predictions but, however, not the fundamental and sufficient conditions
for consciousness. Example theories include those which emphasise recurrent circuits (Edelman,
1992; Lamme, 2006); highlight the internal simulation, predictive mechanisms, and generative
models (Clark, 2013; Hohwy, 2013; Kanai et al., 2019; Revonsuo, 2006; Seth, 2014, 2015); and
relate to multilevel view of consciousness (Jackendoff, 1987; Pennartz, 2015, 2018; Prinz, 2007).
Notably, while ICT is proposed based on the non-functional hypothesis, its implications for the
functional aspects of a system fit several functionalist proposals well.
Regarding philosophy of mind, ICT connects several distinct arguments together. First, ICT
can be seen as an identity theory because it assumes a fundamental relation between consciousness
and information. Second, the implications of ICT tightly link consciousness to several cognitive
20
functions in the context of evolution. This explains why people might intuitively have a functionalist point of view of consciousness. ICT emphasises that informational closure between scales
of coarse-graining is critical to form NTIC processes in some stochastic systems. In this case,
especially for the neural system, forming conscious processes at macroscopic scales coincides with
the perspective of emergentism. Finally, forming NTIC (conscious) processes through many-to-one
maps, i.e., coarse-graining, implies multiple realisability of consciousness. As a result, ICT provides
an integrated view for these arguments and is further capable of indicating how and why they are
conditionally true.
The current version of ICT is still far from completion, and several outstanding issues mandate
further theoretical and empirical research. Nevertheless, ICT offers an explanation and a prediction for consciousness science. We hope that ICT will provide a new way of thinking about and
understanding of neural substrates of consciousness.
Acknowledgements
A.C., Y.Y, and R.K. are funded by the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST) CREST
project. Work by M.B. and R.K. on this publication was made possible through the support of a
grant from Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc. The opinions expressed in this publication
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Templeton World Charity
Foundation, Inc. This manuscript has been released as a Pre-Print at arXiv (Chang et al., 2019).
Author Contributions Statement
A.C. conceived and developed the theory. M.B. and A.C. contributed the mathematical formalisation of the theory. A.C., M.B, and R.K wrote the manuscript, based on a first draft by A.C. with
extensive comments from Y.Y. All authors contributed to manuscript revision, read and approved
the submitted version.
Conflict of Interest Statement
All authors were employed by Araya Inc. The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Appendix
Let us assume that the system only observes a part of the environment state.
We can represent the part of the environment that we observe by the value of a function f
applied to the environment state. In this case we get for the transfer entropy
I(St+1 : Et |St ) = I(St+1 : f (Et )|St ).
(17)
If the system only copies the observation we then get for the transfer entropy
I(St+1 : f (Et )|St ) = I(f (Et ) : f (Et )|f (Et−1 )) = H(f (Et )|f (Et−1 ))
(18)
and for the mutual information
I(St+1 ; Et ) = I(f (Et+1 ); Et ) = H(f (Et ))
(19)
N T ICt (E → S) = I(f (Et ); f (Et−1 )).
(20)
such that
This shows that whenever there is mutual information between subsequent observations a process
that only copies the observations has positive NTIC. Note that any additional (internal) processing
21
of the observation without reference to an additional internal state using a function g can only
reduce this mutual information:
I(f (Et ); g(f (Et−1 ))) ≤ I(f (Et ); f (Et−1 )).
(21)
However, ignoring restrictions due to a possibly fixed choice of the universe process X we find
that for each such system there are other systems that achieve higher NTIC. For example, if we
define the system to be the "mirrored" and synchronized environment by setting St := Et , then
the transfer entropy vanishes
I(St+1 : Et |St ) = I(Et+1 : Et |Et ) = 0
(22)
and the mutual information is equal to the mutual information between the current and next
environment state:
I(St+1 ; Et ) = I(Et+1 ; Et ).
(23)
In cases where the environment has itself higher predictive mutual information than the observations it produces - in other words, when
I(Et+1 ; Et ) ≥ I(f (Et+1 ); f (Et ))
(24)
there is then potential for a predictive process to achieve higher NTIC than a copying system
or any system that only processes its last observations without taking account of other internal
memory (i.e. those systems also applying g to their observations). Note that this also holds true in
cases where the observations are themselves closed. If there is a more complex environment behind
them, the mirrored and synchronised system has higher NTIC with respect to that environment
than the system copying the observations.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1:
Figure 2:
Figure 3:
Figure 4:
Figure 5:
The scale problem of consciousness: Human conscious experience does not
reflect information from every scale. Only information at a certain coarsegrained scale in the neural system is reflected in consciousness. . . . . . . .
4
Dependencies between a system Y and its environment E through the channels yˆt and eˆt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
The information flow amounts the universe X, the system S, the environment of the system E, and the coarse-grained process Y of the system S.
The solid line with a filled arrow from Xt to Xt+1 represents the microscopic
dynamic of the universe. The solid lines with a empty arrow represent directions of coarse-graining. The dashed lines represents virtual dependencies
between two macroscopic variables. The red Yt , Yt+1 , and the red dashed
line in between represents a macroscopic process which forms informational
closure at a certain coarse-grained scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
A non-monotonic relationship between the scale of coarse-graining and level
of consciousness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Schema depicting the information flow in reflexive behaviours (shown by the
red nodes and arrows) happening through the interaction between a process
Y and its environment E. When the sensor process êt is non-deterministic
and the internal state Yt is mostly dependent on the sensor state êt driven
by the environment Et−1 but less on its past state Yt−1 , as a consequence,
Y is unable to form informational closure and, therefore, remain unconscious. 13
26
Figure 6:
Distinction between the level of coarse-graining and the level of cortical
hierarchy. X and Y represent the microscopic and macroscopic coarsegrained variables, respectively. X 0 represents microscopic states upstream
of the cortical hierarchy. The red empty arrows represents the directions of
coarse-graining and the blue arrows represent the directions of the physical
dependencies in the cortical hierarchy from upstream to downstream. (Some
variables and dependencies are omitted for clarity.) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
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Article
Dialogue on Alternating Consciousness:
From Perception to Infinities and Back to Free Will (Part I)
Claus Janew*
Abstract
Can we lead back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will on a single basic structure
without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without
being composed of both? This metaphysical dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice
on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just
the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of
perspectives. From its entirety and movement, however, there arises a freedom of choice being
more than reinterpreted necessity and unpredictability. Although decisions ultimately involve the
whole universe, they are free in varying degrees also here and now. The unity and openness of the
infinite enables the individual a creativity that directly and indirectly enters into all other
individuals without impeding them. A contrary impression originates only in a narrowed
awareness. But even the most conscious and free awareness can neither anticipate all decisions
nor extinguish individuality. Their creativity is secured.
Part I of this two-part metaphysical dialogue contains: Day 1: What is a consciousness unit? Day
2: Choices everywhere; Day 3: Awareness in alternation; and Day 4: The unlimited potential.
Keywords: alternating consciousness, dialogue, infinity, free will, perception.
Day 1: What is a consciousness unit?
Mr. Janew, you claim to have discovered a basic structure of consciousness. What do you mean
by that?
Well, something on which everything else is based on must be as simple as possible. Only then it
can be contained in everything else and determine structure and action there. In part, this
something is even well-known.
Oh? What is it then?
Alternation.
You mean change? Like Heraclitus could not step into the same river twice?
Continuous change is a special form of alternation, with many intermediate steps, which we
cannot easily resolve. But if Heraclitus briefly closes and re-opens his eyes, he has changed his
point of view more clearly.
Okay, forget Heraclitus. We have an alternation. At which point does the consciousness come
into play?
* Correspondence: Claus Janew, Independent Philosopher, http://www.free-will.de E-mail: clausjanew@yahoo.de Note: This
article is based on my work originally completed in 2013 in German.
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It is already in the play, because alternation is already consciousness, even in its simplest form.
Not only because we observe it, but because it contains something that we have not taken
seriously up to now: The central point. Let us take the simplest conceivable alternation between
two whatever, here represented by alternatively flashing squares:
They must not flash side by side; they can substitute for each other. We need neither space nor
time for this. It is only an alternation of priority. However, each square is only measured against
the other, or there would be none of them. This means that each exists only in the alternation. The
alternation is an entirety. And an entirety has a central point.
Okay, and where is the consciousness?
Look again. The squares are for illustrative purposes only. They could be anything that is in any
way differentiated, demarcated from each other. This difference has an infinitely small center, a
third thing, so to speak, which also stands and falls with the alternation like the alternating sides.
Only such an entirety can work. Everything else falls apart.
And where now is the consciousness?
Consciousness is just this holistic perception. This perception is intuitive and logical; it is
experienced directly, without necessary intermediate stages. And, nevertheless, it can be broken
down, extended, and understood. It is self-referential and ubiquitous. It reaches to the infinitely
small and to the infinitely big, into the simple and into the complex. It is the most general of our
perceptions; and more than perception we do not have. What else do you want to assign to a
consciousness?
Hmm … So we could also say, conversely: We take our most natural perception and look at its
least structure, and this is that …
… infinitesimality structure. Yes, exactly. For simplicity's sake we can call it "i-structure."
I-Structure therefore is consciousness?
Yes.
Isn't something still missing here? Feelings, for example? Or perception of a color, a tone?
As everybody knows, all these are oscillations, therefore different forms of alternations, which
we perceive holistically. Now, though, we must be careful:
What I have just described is the absolute minimum, a consciousness unit. Such a minimum can't
differ from other minima without already forming a larger structure with them. This means vice
versa: Each consciousness unit can only exist within a larger consciousness by which it is
defined.
Doesn't this mean chasing one's own tail? Shouldn't the units build up a larger consciousness
instead of being determined by it?
One presupposes the other. The larger consciousness needs elements of its structure, and the
basic consciousness needs a larger structure in which it takes a characteristic position. In
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addition, of course, we always start with our consciousness that should not be so basic.
What is the difference then between a consciousness unit and an elementary particle if we assume
that the latter is really elementary?
Just this we cannot assume. Up to now, we have still disassembled every particle after a short
time if it has not done this by itself. But if a real elementary particle would exist, it could only
interact by entering a larger relationship, and so it had the same problem as the consciousness
unit. It loses its originality; it only exists in the relationship.
So, only the particular starting point of the perception is original … ?
Exactly.
However, this perception is not so i-structured, is it? We see surfaces, bodies, et cetera.
It is! Since we always perceive only entireties, every change of a perception is a change of the
entirety. So if you go one step to the side, your holistic perception, let's say of a body, has
changed completely. In order to notice the change you must compare to the perception of the
previous entirety, and so you have the same switching back and forth.
But there are many intermediate stages here. I perceive, after all, a uniform change of my field of
vision.
Right. This, though, does not change the basic fact of the holistic alternation. Whether it takes
place continuously or by leaps is of secondary importance. You can even say all sides of the
alternation are always also immediately linked to each other, since the only necessary and always
existing transition point is the infinitesimal center between them. An infinitely small transition
yet takes place immediately.
Why do we need this transition if it is not really there?
It is there and not there all at once. For this reason, it is infinitely small and not simply zero. On
the one hand, it is determined exactly as a center; on the other hand, it is empty. We need to have
it as exactly that, as a nothing with a concrete meaning. As a concrete nothing.
To approach this point infinitely, nevertheless, it requires a transition to it. Now you say, this
transition is actually not needed because the alternation between the sides occurs immediately.
This is due to the fact that we have nothing but the alternation. Each intermediate stage toward
the center would also be the goal of an alternation. Thus, we can approximate the central point
via many intermediate alternations, but strictly speaking each center remains immediately
accessible. However, because it can be circumscribed arbitrarily closely, it is also approximated.
It is both infinitely small as well as zero.
A consciousness unit doesn't have meaning at all if it doesn't transition to a structure. It has only
meaning within this structure as their almost infinitesimal center. What I have described as two
alternating whatever are just such structures. An alternation between nothing cannot be, of
course.
But alternation as such can be?
Yes. Because everything alternates, and we cannot go beyond alternation as such. It forms the
apparently static structures of the world, which I call therefore "quasi-static." Back-and-forthmovements, rotations, alternations in all possible forms.
So, in a sense the world becomes ethereal. There is nothing solid, no minimum size, nothing that
can be called truly material. How do you fit the quantum theory in here? In it there is at least
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Planck's quantum of action as the smallest arithmetic unit.
This quantum, too, is being questioned yet. As well as the constancy of the "fundamental
constants." An absolute quantity is simply not thought through. Any limit can be exceeded,
because this limit is defined by its momentary exceedance. Try it out!
Nevertheless, quantum physics describes completely different relations, entangled states of so
called particles: Nonlocal correlations, probability waves, etc.
I am inclined to say such unmediated connections over long distances point in the direction
which I have already described. We must see, however, that the declaration of an unmediated
link is only possible outside of the immediacy. We must walk across to the other particle quite
normally to compare its state to "our" particle. Their immediate connection is a conclusion from a
non-immediate connection. Anyway, the immediacy plays a more significant role here than in our
everyday experience. You can hardly abandon it, because obviously it is structurally deeper
rooted. Especially their probability character suggests that.
This brings me to another question: In How Consciousness Creates Reality you give to the
central point far more meaning. You see in it, so to speak, the continuum of the world compacted.
How does this fit here?
Well, a consciousness unit as the absolutely smallest before zero must alternate at infinite speed,
because there is no space for delays. However, as soon as we go beyond this unit, better said
return from its derivation, the speed can decrease. And with it two manners of perception of the
alternation start to differ: The quasi-static and the dynamic.
The quasi-static perspective you have already indicated …
Yes, it is the formation of seemingly static objects from the alternation of the perspective …
… which in turn results from other smaller or larger alternations of perspectives.
Or from remembered and anticipated, mental and sensory, dreamed and awake-conscious
experiences.
That's a lot of perspectives, considering what the world all consists of!
Thus it is. And that's why we cannot follow up them all by our limited consciousness. We always
move within a relatively small frame and then within the next, and so on, keeping the
respectively others in the back of our mind as a potential. We can restore them largely or at least
think of them as restorable, but we do not lose sight of the movement, of the alternation. This is
the dynamic manner of perception. I call it awareness.
Is the aware conscious?
When we alternate into something and back again, both cannot be fully conscious together at any
moment. Nevertheless, we must remain aware of the other side, otherwise the alternation would
disappear, too. We are aware of the potential for restoring that side.
But isn't this a contradiction in itself? The goal of our alternation is not conscious, only the
potential. And, on the other hand, does the alternation consist of both sides equally?
We must simply understand that we have only alternation as such. It includes both sides, but with
alternating priority. There is no pause in which only one side exists or both sides exist at once. So
the alternation is potential in some sense.
Why only in some sense?
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Because the potential again seems to exist as such; like a quasi-static object, which alternation
movement we are not conscious of any more. But we have only alternation as such. If we do not
always want to get stuck again, we must get used to looking at it as nothing else than what it is.
We cannot condense it to a static object and complain then about contradictions!
On the other hand, a quasi-static object is but somehow static or not?
No, just only quasi.
Because we do not look closely?
Yes, because we are not able to do it. As soon as we remove from a consciousness unit or from
All That Is to be discussed later we have a restricted speed of alternation. That is we can no
longer be perfectly accurate, no longer apprehend everything, but must make approximations. We
condense seemingly static objects. The alternation movement is being largely suppressed.
How should I imagine this condensing?
Look at the simple example from earlier. Now we have a distance between the alternating sides:
Center between
center and edge
So, there are many intermediate steps, as you said. Accordingly, there are also many intermediate
centers depending on between which steps alternation is happening. An overall center exists
anyway. Now we can even alternate between this center and the edges resulting in new centers,
and so on. The infinitesimality structure does justice to its name quite more clearly.
But I see no condensate.
Don't you? And I've painted the center even suspiciously large! Let us expand the whole a little
bit more to a rotation of the sides:
Do you see it now?
Hmm … You mean the whole as such?
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Not only that. The whole as such is relatively stable by the repetition of the alternation, the
interdependence of the sides. But its stability is mainly symbolized by the center, because it
moves the least. However, since the whole is extended its most representative central area forms
around the central point:
Where exactly that is does not depend only on the change of the movement ratio in the area
between central point and edge, but also on the importance of the cohesion. For this particular
central point applies only to exactly this entirety. It is related to the latter most strongly.
I understand. The central point is defined only in relation to the entirety.
Exactly. So, the more important the unity of the whole is compared to its differences, the closer
the most representative area condenses at the center. Like this:
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Of space and time we talk, by the way, only because we have got used to it. Actually, varying
dream scenes, melodies, or whatever can also circumscribe a center; make feel an entirety, which
condenses toward this core.
Well, I see, or I rather sense the condensate. What is the quasi-static object here? The
condensate or the entirety?
Strictly speaking, the condensate. Since if we follow more the outsides it becomes quite dynamic,
it resolves into alternating viewpoints. However, we can of course also look at the entirety as
such from different perspectives and assign to it the role of the object, and so on.
So we solidify our imagination … Anyway, I think you have described alternation and entirety as
if they were self-contained. But in the world, indeed, everything is connected. How then the link
to other alternation structures does come about?
We could also ask the other way around first. Why the sides do recur at all? Why there are
turning points of the movement or change?
Okay, why?
Because, otherwise, there would be no alternation.
Aha. It's already a bit late, but now you should really answer your own question.
Oh, Okay. So, why turning points? They are one side of the alternation, and so, they appear as
outposts in need for some impulse for a return. But you can also invert the alternation in some
sense and consider both sides together as the center, which is circumscribed by the alternation
towards it and back from it.
I think I have a knot somewhere …
The operation is not symmetrical, but it shows that both sides can exist only together. They are a
split center, split by the alternation. Beyond that is nothing.
Except other alternations … Wait a minute. Didn't you say every limit can be exceeded? Then,
there must be something out there, anyway!
And now we come to the question of openness.
Day 2: Choices everywhere
On the openness of alternation it came back to my mind today that, actually, a consciousness unit
is an abstraction from a larger context. So, it cannot be complete at all, and thus, no other
wholeness composed of consciousness units. Or?
Yes, and no. A self-contained unit could not exist for anything else, so far I agree. However, we
must allow these extremes as you will notice.
I'm all ears.
Let us continue with the rotation, because it is more descriptive. Instead, we could take a to-andfro-alternation or something more complicated as well.
The path from one side to the other is not as clear-cut as it looks in the drawings. In reality it
furcates continuously, because otherwise it would mean an uncrossable limit. But such a limit is
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inadmissible at every moment, because it is not consistently definable.
Why then does anything return to the starting point if there are so many other options?
I have a shocking answer. Yet, first of all, I ask you this: What would be left longest if all
progression routes, open and closed, were used?
Hmm … The closed ones?
Precisely. And if the open ones were totally open, they would not exist for a single moment.
Since who should perceive an entirety? On the other hand: Total self-containment would change
not the least; so it would be not connectable, not perceivable.
Okay, how do we get out of this dilemma?
No suggestion?
Consciousness unit?
Hit.
But how?
As you know, a consciousness unit is also an entirety, while its sides are alternating immediately
in zero time and hence as immediately into the central point and out of it. It is an infinitely small
alternation structure, but also more than zero.
Is it what is called an infinitesimal in the non-standard mathematics, a number infinitely close to
zero?
Not really, because these numbers in the non-standard analysis again are treated only as an
object. In contrast, a consciousness unit is constantly flickering. It is alternating between
precisely zero and infinitesimal sides.
Ah! And thus, self-containment and openness are unified! By lying infinitely close to each other.
Not just! But by alternating infinitely fast to each other! This is another thing than an asymptotic
approach in which they meet in the infinitely small. I mean openness and self-containment at the
same moment!
Without contradiction to each other …
Without unhealthy contradiction. Since the "contradiction" of which we speak here is
omnipresent, the basis of our world. It has no opposite to be preferred, because the latter would
disappear at the same moment.
Didn't they call it earlier a dialectical contradiction? Hegel …
Hegel didn't call it that, though, he realized the unity of existence and nonexistence, or as he
understood it, of being and nothingness. Not only because one needs the other to be defined, but
because one is constantly transitioning to the other. Everything is always becoming.
And this is something different?
Hegel has only gone halfway. He believed to have proved the necessity of the world process, but
he has already assumed it. Becoming is not alternation. In the becoming there is no furcation, this
can only be added from outside. In the alternation, however, furcation is built in.
Between openness and self-containment, I understand.
Also between different open paths, as we shall see. But let's get back first to the unity of openness
and self-containment. This unity is not lukewarm or vague, although it can be if we dilute it to an
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approximation. Instead, it goes to the most precise. There is even no separation between selfcontainment and openness in the last consequence, so that objects always find connection to other
objects.
Otherwise, we could not have derived the consciousness units from them as well.
Exactly.
What about the extreme case of total self-containment that you mentioned?
It must be there as well as the extreme case of total openness and all other extreme cases. Since
each side of the alternation is being actually reached, as well as the central point, although only
for an infinitely small moment.
This is why the unity with the other side is possible at all. Slowly I understand.
I am pleased.
Although I am not shocked.
Huh?
You have promised me a shock.
Oh, yes. Openness in itself is not everything. If the door is already open, we can turn into
different directions as well. Otherwise, we would have a self-containment of its own kind again.
The containment of the direction.
No roundabout, but no other alternative, yes. That is we are again at a furcation.
What do we do now?
We choose.
Oh!
Are you shocked?
Maybe later.
The alternation between two or more sides after all is nothing else than weighing up alternatives.
The only thing we are forced to is keep moving. For alternation is unavoidable on penalty of our
elimination. This means, we are always in a situation of decision-making.
… About the way forward. You have to let this melt in your mouth.
As you wish. Anyway, the direction of further alternation of further movement is indeterminate.
Here I have to digress: Motion is asymmetrical, open, as you know. Nevertheless, it can only
exist in the change-wise perception of its previous segments; otherwise, it dissolves more rapidly
than we can say "Fzz." It would not even have a direction, which in turn only exists in the
change-wise comparison with its alternatives. It would be the extreme case of total openness and
therefore of being structureless.
Again, I do not understand "direction" as spatiotemporal in the first place, but as a direction from
one priority to the other. If we can draw it in the space-time diagram, Okay. However, also
associations, for example, have directions from the important to the not yet important.
Your cats, are they brother and sister?
Are you still with me?
Yes, sorry. Do you speak of a spiral?
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Spiral?
Yes, a spiral movement. A back-and-forth-switch between moments while the whole is moving
forward results in a spiral pulled apart to the side.
Only superficially, though. This spiral is rather a manifestation of an i-structure, of a complete
alternation of moment points, which still jumps forward immediately. An i-structured spiral, if
you like.
Can you give an example?
Of course. We were choosing, do you remember? We are alternating between alternatives of our
further movement, of our potential. One of them we have to take. Let's say, either a new way or
an old one; we are choosing between an open and a self-contained continuation. Only the
indetermination and the choosing as such are determined.
Thus, we are also alternating between this indetermination and our determination to choose. That
is we are circumscribing a center between the alternatives as well as between the alternatives and
the urge to choose.
And by this a center between these both sides …
Yes.
And centers between this center and the others.
And so on.
This is infinitesimality structure!
All sides of the alternation are identified with each other at some point and at some other even
with their distinction.
What normally doesn't work according to conventional understanding …
… but as we have seen, is the basis of our world down to the smallest conceivable unit.
Can't we just say, the sides meet in the middle and one of them is being chosen?
We can say much and reveal nothing. Because in this way we cannot explain choosing, only
mechanical continuations and chances. By such a merging we would disregard the necessity to
distinguish things, too. We had merely flowing mush.
By contrast, what you have explained leads to a free choice?
Yes, because the infinitesimal unity of determination and indetermination is not annullable and
not reducible to one side. Free choice, not chance, is the only interpretation that remains.
This is based, as far I can see, on the need to alternate rather than simply continuing.
Only alternation is distinction and unity at once. This alternation, however, can progress to other
alternations. It will do this at some point not to lose touch with the world or, better said, because
the alternatives are too tempting to forever decide against them, though it must not.
But I do. Can we take a short break?
Sure. In the meantime, I succumb again to the temptations of art.
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Alright, so we choose constantly between old and new way, since we always consider the new
more or less. With it, self-containment and openness form an i-structured unity. If we always
moderately decide for the new, we obtain the approximation of a spiral.
Let me think … If we describe the situation once again by using squares, we now have an
alternation between three instead of two sides, and the third one stands for a new way.
More specifically, it stands for the possibility of a new way. We alternate with a potential as
such, that is to say without realizing it immediately. This is, in fact, an additional alternation.
However, it is the normal case, which we have simplified yesterday, just almost up to a selfcontainment. If we now, like before at the door, open the direction of the continuation as well, we
get even more alternatives of alternation:
And because finally everything opens –it makes its potential conscious– decisions are to be made
constantly. Whether an alternation moves on or not, it is always a more or less free choice of its
consciousness!
...
You're so quiet.
Hmm … The continuation is neither a real spiral nor a real jump, but a decision for one or the
other as well?
Well recognized.
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And since we have everywhere alternation equals i-structure equals consciousness, and
everything is more or less open, everything is freely chosen to the corresponding extent.
You got it!
Day 3: Awareness in alternation
If I sum up the last two days, then consciousness is omnipresent and due to its structure freedom
of choice is just as omnipresent.
Right. The urge to change the situation, the i-structure, and the ultimate identity of selfcontainment and openness result in a permanent choice of the further path. These three factors are
basically one and the same.
Consciousness.
I-structure, yes.
Or awareness?
This, too, is essentially the same. We have already discussed that every side is always potential,
that there is only alternation as such. If we think to perceive two sides at once, strictly speaking
we deceive ourselves. We lift them out of the broader alternation by turning them crosswise and
thereby seemingly slowing down their alternation.
Seemingly?
I'll come back to this. By the said turning we generate an approximation around the center of the
sides, call it "object" and forget its origin and the details, which we cannot resolve now anymore.
The sides themselves are also formed in such a way and so on, because we can hardly do without
crosswise things. Only a quasi-static consciousness can seemingly exist longer than zero
"seconds" and has "time" to become aware of something.
Man oh man. Awareness must therefore be conscious?
Yes, conscious or subconscious, but never unconscious. Awareness is merely the more potential,
more dynamic consciousness. Or the other way around: Consciousness is the more static
awareness.
Stop, stop! What does subconscious mean?
That means conscious below our consciousness in the stricter sense, nothing else than
dynamically existent, only conscious as a potential, as a potential to realize a potential, et cetera.
Although always as the side of an alternation, or it is literally "out."
Okay, it's all potential. "I am aware of something" then means "I am aware of its potentiality"?
Exactly! We are always talking about the same here. Just don't let confuse yourself!
Well, I'm not sure. Normally, we just don't assume that the subconscious is always accessible to
us.
How then do we know it is there?
Because we conclude about it from what is happening to us.
That's it. We reasonably imagine a complex something, which exists "about there" for itself and
occasionally makes itself noticed. This is potential existence, with all uncertainties such a
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potential brings with it. We could, of course, find straw as well, if we have a look.
I understand. Is potential existence the same as dynamic existence?
Only the emphasis is different. Dynamic existence is the generic term, but potential existence we
can say if we consider more the potential as such, instead of the alternation. Dynamic existence
would mean the subconscious into which we put ourselves. So, also a greater certainty would be
described, but no absolute.
Well, that has always confused me a bit. Maybe this is a good crossing to why the slowing down
of the alternation is only apparent …
Let's try it. Have you already wondered how we organize the speeds of the whole alternation
between edge points, edge and center, its center and sides, open and self-contained continuations,
et cetera? And then the alternation with the rest of the universe?
Er … no.
This question has occupied me much. Within a finite reference frame it is relatively easy to solve.
What is now less conscious to us can alternate faster. Gradations in consciousness therefore can
be gradations in the speed of alternations. If this is indeed the case, it is almost negligible.
How so?
Please, don't get me wrong. We speak of a very basic process here, on which many less basic
processes can be superimposed. Whether something is conscious or subconscious may depend on
many structural differences where we do not ask about speeds. For example, even a very slow
movement can lack the other side of the alternation. On the other hand, we do not come to the
conclusion that there could be another side if we do not hurry ahead of the movement. Higher
speed here means more consciousness.
Or rather more awareness?
More conscious awareness. However, if we do not hurry ahead, does the other side exist at all?
This is like the question whether the moon still exists if we are not looking.
It exists. Because on a deeper level we are looking again and again much faster than with the
eyes. But even faster than in thought. Only then we can find its "track" seemingly
subconsciously, catch sight of "the" moon spontaneously.
So the speed defines the degree of consciousness anyway?
Ultimately, yes. Although the generality of this finding is a logical conclusion. We don't have to
assign a certain speed to any detail of a complex alternation. For this the structures are too
interlaced. It is sufficient if differences of the perception speed prevent the simultaneousness of
two alternations.
There is no simultaneousness of anything?
How should it otherwise alternate with each other, that is enter into a relationship, be perceived?
There can be "alternaneousness" at most, meaning back and forth or, for example, a nonindependent "simultaneousness" like in quantum theory. We talk, by the way, about time again
only as one possible standard.
I know. But I wonder how my perception of a candle can alternate slowly while the further
existence of the moon behind me requires a much higher speed of alternation? Don't both
alternations run at the same time?
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In this case there would be no connection between them. As soon as they affect each other
"something" alternates between them, and this is nothing else than a holistic perception focus.
Even if it would be merely a "particle": It leaves a different totality and leads to a different one. A
wholeness becomes another.
The candle becomes the moon.
In principle, yes.
Physicalists will be tearing their hair out!
They rather look after details. Even if they talk of light for which there is, by the way, no physical
time; or of fields and entropy, they need to shift their perception from the candle to the moon in
order to abstract a thin connection between the two. Doing so they perceive like you and me:
Individual entireties in alternation.
So, there is an alternation between all alternations as well.
And since there cannot be simultaneous alternations all must be one single alternation!
But now you have a problem!
An interesting question, isn't it? How do we get together the alternation speeds in an infinite
universe in such a way that they pass into each other without contraction?
Enlighten me.
I have a joker.
I knew it.
For its wholeness an infinite universe needs an infinite alternation speed. Besides, I don't believe
that our concept of speed has an infinite shelf live. But we have to work with what we have and
prove its consistency also with the help of extreme cases. And something more general than
alternation we do not have.
In fact, the infinite alternation speed, which we have already introduced with the consciousness
unit, provides a lot more options. A fast alternation may seem slow by repetition without
reducing its speed: The entirety circumscribed by the form of the alternation changes without any
hurry. Even if it would be circumscribed infinitely fast. More than this, it could also change itself
infinitely fast and would come as little into conflict with its infinitely fast circumscription.
Arbitrarily fast
Arbitrarily fast
Infinite plus anything is infinite again. That's why I have no problem with the universe. An
infinite alternation speed can circumscribe everything.
One moment. Slowly … Complete repetition, therefore total self-containment, does not exist, you
said.
I roughly said self-containment and openness are also identical. Like the sides of a consciousness
unit: By immediate alternation to each other.
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I remember. The circumscription therefore is as open as closed.
Yes, but the more the unity is emphasized the more slowly or statically it appears. The istructured spiral becomes narrower, so to speak, or is just turned crosswise.
… and yet does not lose the connection to the rest of the universe.
Correct. Cross-turning stands for becoming more conscious, more quasi-static.
And now you take the infinity to unite everything that does not fit together?
Only for what can be derived from the finite and according to current understanding can
seamlessly merge into the infinite. As mathematicians do.
Well, I have one more question: On the first day you said all sides are linked also immediately.
Because they as entireties need, strictly speaking, only the infinitesimal center between them for
their distinction, and the same applies to any intermediate stage. This is the i-structure.
That means we have an infinitely fast alternation in everyday live as well?
That's right.
NOW I am shocked!
Come, come, we also said that alternating structures define a consciousness unit.
In their center! Now, but it looks as if the consciousness unit is extended and corresponds to the
structures themselves. A clear contradiction!
Because thus units define units?
Yes!
Okay, Okay, I admit, the consciousness unit in the center was a simplification, or rather a special
case.
You don't say!
Yes, as a relief for you.
Of course.
In reality we can stick just as little to spatial thinking as to the temporal. This relief sometimes
makes it even more difficult. Or what do you believe is actually an entirety? "Entire" is one, not
one after the other. The entirety, of course, has a structure, but it must also be one! This only
works if this identity is established immediately. So, since everything alternates, at infinite speed.
Now I'm completely confused!
We'll fix that, don’t worry. The perception of the structure –as the perception of the entirety– is
simply the alternation of a sole consciousness unit.
I put myself out.
Stay with me. It won't take a minute. Do you remember that an entirety can have only one central
point?
Yes.
No matter how complicatedly we are alternating in detail, the whole has only one single center.
How can this center probably be maintained if in between we are always somewhere else?
Okay, Okay. But the intermediate structures!
They are Inter, not the whole. Crucial for the central point is the whole! So to speak, the apex of
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the entire circumscription.
And?
This apex is not the center.
… But it is centered!
Precisely. A ring, for example, a ridge, a crater rim. That is what the central point most severely
refers to, what determines it clearly.
Not what adjoins it …
Not spatially, no.
But "establishing"?!
Yes, the apex of the entire dynamic. We could almost say a psychic summit. Or an intensity peak.
It's beginning to get through me. Since a consciousness unit must be derived from a larger
structure and since this derivation culminates out there instead of in the innermost, this unity of
ridge and central point is the representative consciousness unit of the entirety.
Yes.
I am impressed. Accordingly, every intermediate structure which helps to build up the entirety by
alternation must culminate in its own consciousness unit.
Go on.
And so the entirety is formed by one single changing consciousness unit.
Okay now?
Let's see. Maybe after the counterstrike: How can a consciousness unit create itself as an apex if
it must have been created this way in order to its creation?
Now you've got me there, eh?
Well.
You are underestimating the smoothness of the infinite. The infinitely fast alternation of the
consciousness unit forms –we had this already– by i-structured repetition a quasi-static focus of
consciousness, which can alternate in its turn at any, even infinite speed. So, its top unit may, too,
alternate at infinite speed and, in doing so, may form what it wants.
The infinite moves in the infinite …
… and creates depending on the form of this movement seemingly slower forms.
The form of the alternation is therefore what matters.
No matter "what" is alternating here. There is, as we have said, only alternation as such.
Let's have a break.
…
As I see it now, every form is produced by the whole universe. Because the only alternation is
moving through any form that is being created at the same moment.
Yes, and namely as an i-structure, otherwise we are silting up in contradictions. We can also say,
all consciousness units transition immediately into each other, since they adjoin each other.
Depending on the form of this transition, consciousness and awareness, objects and potentials
originate from it.
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Although we have derived the consciousness units only from such objects and potentials?
Thus, it is. We can base our world view on nothing except on our perception. But we can explore
and investigate it to make it consistent. In this case we get back complex quasi-static focuses of
consciousness, which now can claim any degree of flexibility by themselves and so in turn prove
to be the basis of reasoning. For only movables can enclose something.
Day 4: The unlimited potential
I have understood the origin of freedom of choice through your book "How Consciousness
Creates Reality," at least intuitively. Nevertheless, it seems to me, the explanation by alternation
speed is more obstructive than helpful for an intuitive understanding of i-structure. Apparently, a
decision is reduced to a consciousness unit. Can this be?
… to a consciousness unit which leads to new consciousness units through the identity of both
the urge to change and alternatives. It is equally true, however, that all consciousness units by
infinite alternation speed establish a unity and form quasi-static focuses. Unity becomes intuitive
by infinitely fast alternation, because the latter is the transition to wholeness in zero time. We
may simply not forget the zero. It is not only approximated but reached. This is wholeness! The
alternation is only for the connection to the difference. Wholeness and structure form a contrast
which is offset by alternation.
The alternation, though, is a contrast by itself … ?
But more precise, since it includes the sides as such. As well as its own wholeness. An
alternation between this wholeness and the difference of the sides is here again without
intermediate stage.
So, again zero.
Not zero only! Zero is nothing without its role. The intuition has something to sense.
The alternation.
Are you kidding me?
All right. Intuition equals alternation wholeness.
Down to the infinite small, at any place. That's intuitive enough, I think. If you apply this to a
more complicated entirety, you cannot longer "see" the top unit clearly, but sense it at most.
Probably rather a cluster of units around.
A condensate?
Thus, we feel it. But now around the crater ring, inside and out.
Must not the condensate be in the middle?
We consider here the apex of the dynamic form. If the condensate is in the middle, then the apex
is there.
Okay, slowly everything fits together. Now I also understand better why you like to draw the
consciousness funnel or reality funnel with an "outside area" like a crater:
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It's not really about inside and outside, right?
No, these are limited concepts. It's rather about up and down meaning more conscious or less
conscious. The exact center is an axis passing through everything.
So, all standpoints or perspectives, which I am less conscious of, are located in the stem of the
funnel?
The less conscious the awareness the deeper they are circling. The details are becoming
increasingly subconscious.
If I have understood you properly, I am not only aware of other consciousness, but of other
awareness. Because the infinitely many other standpoints from which my awareness is being
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dynamically built are also just summits of infinite dynamics. Aren't these infinities a bit too
much?
Which ones are too much for you?
I mean, how can my awareness apprehend an infinity of infinities and yet remain structured?
Because resolution at infinity is coming too early for you?
Yes.
Don't worry, it's not coming. It's already here.
Sorry?
Awareness is only structured after all because it is suppressing most other standpoints repeatedly
into the increasingly less conscious. Until they almost merge with the central axis. With this axis
we anticipate the infinite. It is not "counted."
??
You feared intuition coming off worst, right? Well, awareness is becoming more and more
intuitive downwards since consciousness of details is strongly decreasing. The "tracks" of the
alternation to the Other are becoming denser and denser and only resolvable if consciousness
follows them. That means where it is at the moment they are hardly conscious anymore.
Awareness can consciously anticipate the infinity only as such – in the intuitive knowledge that it
is there. As the said axis or as a central point.
Or as a potential.
Yes. Since consciousness is slow, we can consider the central point also as an approximation of
the infinite, as a symbol of something to which we can "go" if we "quicken our pace" strongly,
asymptotically up to infinitely.
Fascinating. Must there not be, however, "infinite space," an unfolded infinity that we can
anticipate?
Of course. But it is in the opposite direction.
In the direction of consciousness …
… and with it of the absolute universal continuum which I have explained in "How
Consciousness Creates Reality."
But an absolute continuum is structureless and cannot be conscious!
So as the zero?
Hmm.
The total unfoldment of absolutely everything to a distinctionless continuum is its collapse at the
same time. But to what? To a Nothing? Then unfoldment had not happened at all. The universal
continuum rather "reflects" on from which it was reached: It exists only for the awareness by
which it is anticipated.
So it does not exist for itself?
Only as a momentary extreme case within an alternation of perspective, like everything else. We
already had this.
The continuum has a perspective?
Only in the alternation with another awareness.
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Well, in "How Consciousness Creates Reality" you also describe All That Is, the highest possible
consciousness. It should be located just below the universal continuum, "at the brink of
collapsing." What is it doing there?
I guess it's playing God. We are dealing with an infinitely complex and infinitely large i-structure
forming itself, like everything else, at infinite speed.
It is in a focus?
Not like us. Its alternation has to include everything equally. Nothing may sink into a funnel
stem. Therefore, All That Is is in any focus and differs from it only by one single criterion, which
solely is its own: The unlimited potential to take up a different focus. With that it is but always a
certain perspective of this potential.
I have to digest this for the moment. I am All That Is?
Can you take up any focus? Let's say an infinitely complex and infinitely large one?
No. But why not after all?
Because the shape of the alternation of your focus has become independent. It does not only seem
slow as a whole, but it has suppressed and forgotten the ability to accelerate sharply.
What did I do to deserve this?
It was –like everything else– a decision. A lot of decisions, actually. All of them concern the
form of focus shaping but some also concern the form of form shaping. There originated not only
consciousness but self-consciousness. An ego, if you like.
And the ego prevents that I take up a different focus?
The self-consciousness creates stability by rather choking the awareness of the greater potential
and letting pass merely vague ideas. But you may certainly put yourself into the position of a
coffee making questioner and bring me one.
Sorry, I'm on my way.
Thank you. If you have placed your focus then again, please tell me, why didn't you go earlier?
Hmm … You mean because I am selfish?
Just a bit, of course. You were absorbed and I appreciate that, because it had a meaning: You
wanted to grasp, concentrate, and be wrapped up in your part. This is why we do something like
that: We create structures which do not collapse immediately. The whole universe does it.
Otherwise, it would have remained in the continuum.
Where it had gotten to, even though from a structure?
The classical alternation.
Where had we stopped?
You had choked your awareness.
Ah, how did I do this?
By reflecting on yourself again and again from birth on at the latest. What I find Okay, by the
way. By discovering ourselves anew we contribute to the awareness of All That Is as well.
However, All That Is is not in my ego-focus, as this one has merely a limited potential. So what
rewards does All That Is have?
That's just the point: The infinite focus speed also encompasses any self-consciousness. By the
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latter the seemingly slow focus has, indeed, clamped itself to a great extent. But since it moves
on, changes and develops, it reaches its infinite potential again in the infinite at the latest. Yet,
because we are aware of this infinite as a potential to a potential even now –of All That Is as
such– the self-conscious focus alternation as well must be a sub-frequency of the allencompassing dynamic.
Would you like some more coffee?
I'm in progress. Now the million dollar question: How can that be?
How can what be?
I'll tell you: This is nothing but the typical dynamic existence!
Ah.
How is it characterized? The other side of the alternation we are always only aware of. This
exactly is alternation: Everything in the either/or.
What means …
… All That Is can always only be aware of our focus.
In order to do this, must it not really alternate with it?
Certainly, and only to us this alternation is conscious so little. So there must be still another way
of alternation, which we are using even less consciously.
Well, the consciousness units have, indeed, found one which the slow focus hardly grasps.
You always surprise me. So: Between infinitely fast consciousness units and self-consciously
bound focus there must be at least one other focus alternation with the infinite, which escapes us
according to form and speed of our own focus and, for example, provides for the feeling of a
"divine presence." Such focuses are constantly removing from us and passing into us again,
without that we are seeing ourselves in the situation to "follow" them.
That's strange. Since now we are not dealing anymore with infinite speed, in which everything
can level out. These intermediate speeds are finite! Do they not get in a mess?
Why should they? Our quasi-static alternation, our most superficial focus of consciousness, is not
completely isolated, as you know. No matter how self-reflexively interlaced it is. It still forms out
of the infinitely fast alternation of consciousness units. The accesses to other forms and
frequencies merely escape from it. It skips phases of the whole alternation, as we forget our
dreams. Although it has basically permanent access, even to All That Is.
We just have to find it … And be able to cope!
Yes. We can cope with it only well measured. Otherwise, we lose ourselves this time on the other
side.
They say we are protected.
This would make sense. Even All That Is needs relatively stable structures to alternate to and to
be aware of. It is diversity, not chaos.
I assume, by All That Is not only the consciousness units are meant, but also the focuses infinitely
fast for their part?
Yes, all of them; and the slow! Who is on the move fast, can be slow within that also, by
temporary repetition, as usual.
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Focuses in focuses in any repetition?
It doesn't matter. This makes a difference only when we become finite. And then we still have an
infinite span on which the speeds can spread. Since All That Is does not become finite for sure.
And so we are only apparently finite.
But this appearance is very real since it is necessary even for All That Is, do you understand?
Because it would, otherwise, evaporate in a continuum?
Got it. So, "bogus" can actually be no question. We are certain structured phases of the overall
movement of the highest consciousness, individual awareness which All That Is, too, is aware of,
but in its individual manner.
All That Is an individual?
Of course. Who else is characterized by infinite potential?
The universal continuum?
Good thought. Both universal continuum and All That Is need us for their determination. Yet, the
continuum does not have its own existence. All That Is does. It has awareness and condenses for
us barely to a consciousness. It forms the state of reflection of the universal continuum. It is the
big brother of the consciousness unit at the other "end."
You say "It condenses for us." Doesn't this show its dependence?
Without us it is nothing! But we and all other focuses of consciousness create it as a structure, as
that what creates us.
Is this fantasy then?
Not more than the perception of our own existence.
I understand. It is on the consistency of the perception.
On every conceivable level.
Still: Has All That Is an own consciousness or not?
Since its awareness apprehends every other at infinite speed, it couldn't be more conscious!
Nevertheless, most of it is always just subconscious, for it remains individual, as you know. Even
for All That Is! But it can condense only for us, from a restricted viewpoint.
So, if All That Is is in a certain focus, it is condensing for itself?
If it is not using its potential, it is just not All That Is anymore. It is only a focus with a condensed
potential for higher things, briefly: With a condensed imagination of the highest consciousness.
Even if this potential is available at any time. But if All That Is is using its potential, it is this
potential.
That's heavy stuff.
One thing with this whole focus alternation model bothers me, though: In order to explain
relatively small processes we have to deal very quickly with high alternation speeds. In my mind,
this challenges the plausibility of the concept.
That's another story. In the beginning, new theories seldom give rise to good feelings because
they are simply unusual. This one is consistent, as far as I can tell after years of investigation.
Whether it is applicable to all putatively material things in detail we should explore motivated by
this logical consistency.
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Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Janew, C., Dialogue on Alternating Consciousness: From Perception to Infinities and Back to Free Will (Part I)
373
Please, also keep in mind how fast we can change whole scenes, for example, in a dream. And
these are rather snapshots. We may not stick to a movement idea that arose from the carriage age.
Even the speed of light cannot be a serious barrier outside the well-known space-time, if it ever
was. We don't send information, but alternate entireties.
Into the unknown, but you can project anything.
The only question is whether it harmonizes with known processes. Infinitely large things we just
don't need in practical terms. We are talking here about that extensively only because we, as
already said, test the consistency with the help of the extremes. On the other hand, we do not
make the whole stranger than it is, anyway. Normally, we just accept it.
Yes, we accept a lot and become uncomfortable if someone questions us.
I would like to prevent a misunderstanding, though: Wholeness remains intuitive in my model as
well! Because the described transition to wholeness is not its derivation, but the connection to it.
Wholeness and structure are not derived from each other but are sides of alternation. Just as the
central and turning points that we have already discussed. Consequently, without intuition there
is no alternation.
And no structure.
Nothing at all.
(Continued on Part II)
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Collapse and Measures of Consciousness
Adrian Kent
arXiv:2009.13224v3 [quant-ph] 28 Jan 2021
Centre for Quantum Information and Foundations, DAMTP,
Centre for Mathematical Sciences, University of Cambridge,
Wilberforce Road, Cambridge, CB3 0WA, U.K. and
Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 31 Caroline Street North, Waterloo, ON N2L 2Y5, Canada.∗
(Dated: September 2020; updated December 2020)
There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner’s hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect(s) of consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer-Ranchin, Chalmers-McQueen and
Okon-Sebastián have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a numerical measure of
consciousness. More recently, Chalmers-McQueen have argued that any single measure is inadequate
because it will allow superpositions of distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They
suggest a satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures quantifying aspects
of consciousness, such as the “Q-shapes” defined by Tononi et al. in their “integrated information
theory” (IIT) of consciousness. I argue here that Chalmers-McQueen’s argument against associating a single measure with collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated
with different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have strong intuitions,
namely human (or other terrestrial biological) observers.
In defence of Chalmers-McQueen’s stance, it might be argued that idealized artificial information
processing networks could display such symmetries. However, I argue that the most natural form
of any theory (such as IIT) that postulates a map from network states to mind states is one that
assigns identical mind states to isomorphic network states (as IIT does). This suggests that, if such a
map exists, no familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or experiencing
pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries.
INTRODUCTION
The hypothesis that wave function collapse is an objective process, caused by conscious observation, is widely
attributed to Wigner [1]; a more detailed history, starting with discussions by London-Bauer and von Neumann, is
given by Chalmers and McQueen [2, 3].
It has recently been revived by proposals [2–8] aimed at defining precise dynamical theories that combine ideas for
proposed objective quantifications of aspects of consciousness – in particular Tononi et al.’s “integrated information
theory” (IIT) [9] and related ideas – with objective dynamical collapse models. Dynamical collapse models [10, 11]
propose parametrised stochastic differential equations that approximately reproduce pure unitary quantum evolution
in one regime and approximately reproduce the mathematical effect of the projection postulate, which characterises
the effects of measuring a quantum state, in another regime. With appropriate choices of equations and parameters,
they can imply all the successful predictions of quantum theory in interference and other experiments to date, while
making testably different predictions in possible (although generally technologically challenging) future experiments.
They thus are testable candidate solutions for the quantum measurement problem.
The various proposals [2–8] have different features and are based on different assumptions. It seems fair to say that
all of them are projects in progress, and in each case it remains open to question whether a fully defined and generally
viable dynamical collapse model with all the desired features will emerge, even in the non-relativistic limit. Chalmers
and McQueen [2], whose work is our main focus here, propose to model IIT (or some other such classical model of
consciousness) within quantum theory by quasiclassical operators. On the face of it this seems viable in regions, such
as our own environment, where physics can be described quasiclassically. It seems hard, though, to extend it in a
way that would combine naturally with a quantum theory of matter to produce a fundamental theory applicable in
all domains.
Many other fundamental questions can be raised about the motivations for and viability of this programme and of
those it subsumes; many of these are carefully reviewed in Ref. [2] and in works cited therein. All versions of quantum
theory with explicit collapse are somewhat ad hoc; relativistic collapse models are hard to define; Everettians (see e.g.
[12]) would argue that collapse models are unnecessary. Many (e.g. [13]) argue that everything about consciousness
is completely explained by known science; on this view, it seems no more plausible that it plays a role in fundamental
physics than that any other biological phenomenon does. In the other camp, many who see motivation for a theory
of consciousness criticise IIT as ad hoc, under-defined and having implausible implications (see e.g. [14–17]). Still,
as Chalmers-McQueen note, the idea that consciousness causes collapse has some motivation, was taken seriously by
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some of the pioneers of quantum theory, and, given that there is no consensus solution to the quantum measurement
problem, seems worth keeping on the table for now and examining more carefully. [30] As they also note, their
proposals and arguments should apply to a wide range of quantitative theories of consciousness; we may take IIT as
a placeholder that illustrates some of the issues that would also arise with possibly more satisfactory proposals.
For the sake of discussion, let us accept this view. This note focuses on one key question that Chalmers and
McQueen discuss: could a satisfactory conscious-collapse model be defined in which the only quantity relevant to the
collapse rate is some proposed quantitative measure of consciousness, such as the Φ measure of IIT? The idea here
is that “Φ resists superposition and superpositions of Φ trigger collapse”. That is, a superposition of two or more
quantum states that include a possibly conscious subsystem, in which the superposition components contain states
of that subsystem that have different values of Φ, will undergo collapse at a rate that depends on the details of the
model and the relevant Φ values. Moreover, this is the only cause of collapse, or at least the only cause generally
relevant in situations where biological organisms or classical or quantum computers observe – and, in the absence of
collapse, would thus themselves enter and remain in – quantum superpositions.
Chalmers and McQueen argue that [3] “. . . this view faces a fatal problem.” Their concern is that it fails to suppress
superpositions of qualitatively distinct but equal-Φ conscious states. For example, they consider [18] an experiment
in which a conscious subject observes a screen that can display blue or green in a dark isolated room. If the screen
is put into a superposition of displaying both, then the subject will be put into a superposition of both experiences.
They argue that there is no reason to assume that these experiences differ in their Φ value. If so, then there is no
superposition of states with distinct Φ values, and so a Φ-collapse model will leave the superposition uncollapsed.
HUMAN OBSERVERS
It seems to me there is good reason to assume that the relevant experiences differ in their Φ value, at least for
terrestrial animals – the only subjects we have good reasons to believe to be conscious. Brains and central nervous
systems are messy, noisy, imperfect networks. It seems very unlikely that, for any given subject, the blue and green
screens would excite exactly the same numbers and rates of firing for retinal cells. Even if they did, it seems very
unlikely that the subsequent chains of firings would be along isomorphic neural network paths, at the same sets of
times. And even if this were true in some impossibly refined meditative state, in which no other brain processes
relevant to consciousness interacted in any way with the pure perception of blue or green, it seems very unlikely that
this state could stably persist for any length of time. The reason is that introspection and neural network models
both suggest we build up models of the world by association and memory. When we see (say) blue, our dominant
perception is of the colour, but it is tinged with memories of landscapes, animals and art, with past experiences, and
with emotional associations with all of these. These may flicker in and out of consciousness, but are hard to suppress
completely. And even if we can fleetingly manage to focus on the pure sensation of blueness, our unconscious neural
processing is still working on a network that encodes the learned associations, and our Φ value depends (in general)
on all these details. Our associations with and memories of green are different, and so we should expect the associated
Φ value to be. All of this, I suspect, is also true (to a greater or lesser, but nonzero, extent) for any pair of distinct
colours that we can consciously distinguish.
One possible response is that, even if not identical, the relevant Φ values must be close. However, this is too vague.
The Φ values may be close in the sense that the difference between them is very small compared to the range of Φ
values that human brains can produce, but still distinct enough to imply a swift (compared to human perception
times) collapse in models consistent with all available empirical data. To confirm or exclude this possibility, we
would need a quantitative estimate, presumably calculated from IIT applied to a (presently unavailable) neuron-level
model emulating the observer’s brain, together with quantitative parameter bounds for Φ-collapse models, in order
to calculate the possible range of collapse rates for the green-blue superposed subject.
It is helpful to compare the case of proposals for gravitationally induced collapse [19, 20]. These suggest that
collapses of superpositions of matter states with distinct gravitational fields take place very fast, even when the
relevant fields are almost identical by ordinary laboratory scale measures. On Diosi’s and Penrose’s estimates, a
superposition of distinct mass distributions should collapse long before the relevant gravitational fields could be
directly distinguished by any laboratory measurement, for example. It seems quite natural to imagine that almost
imperceptible differences in levels of consciousness could similarly cause swift collapse in viable models.
In fact, experimental evidence [21] recently appears to have excluded the most natural proposal [19] (so far) for
a quantitative estimate of the rate of gravitationally induced collapse. This only reinforces the point that we need
parametrised models and empirical bounds to draw clear conclusions about viable consciousness-collapse models, just
as for any other form of dynamical collapse model. It should be noted that Diosi, the other authors of Ref.[21] and
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Penrose all continue to find the hypothesis of gravitationally induced collapse attractive and natural, while accepting that it may require a different formulation. Whether or not it will ultimately prove theoretically or empirically
justifiable, the intuition remains that collapse should be swiftly induced for superpositions of states whose associated gravitational fields are very similar by any directly observable measure. If, as Chalmers-McQueen argue [2],
consciousness-induced collapse models deserve to be on the table at all, the analogous intuition for these models
seems similarly natural. Of course, it may be refutable (possibly even from existing data) for IIT-based or other
specific collapse models, but I see no reason to dismiss it without quantitative arguments.
Another possible response is that, while the states of observing blue screen and green screen may produce different
Φ values, we could tune them to produce two states with the same Φ value. The thought here is that Φ should (at
least to very good approximation) vary continuously with controllable parameters such as screen size or intensity.
So, if, say, the blue state has higher Φ value than the green state, we could intensify or enlarge the green screen,
until the Φ values are equal. Supposing this is correct, one problem is that we still would not know which amplified
green state has the same Φ value as the blue state, and so we would not be able to knowingly create a superposition
state – again, unless we had a neuron-level model emulating the observer’s brain and allowing us to calculate directly
the relevant Φ values. We could try a range of amplifications, in the hope that one of them is right – but again,
without quantitative calculations and quantitative models we cannot be sure any given set has significant probability
of producing a superposition of states with identical Φ values, or of states with close enough Φ values to produce
a long-lived superposition. We could turn a dial continuously, amplifying the green screen from much below the
intensity of the blue screen to much above. At some instant, one might think this should produce equal Φ values.
One problem with this is that Φ depends on network transitions, and when a dynamic image’s trajectory includes a
given image, the Φ value of the former may not necessarily be close to that created by a static version of the latter.
Another is that the argument needs a superposition of states whose Φ values remain equal for a significant length of
time.
In any case, we still have the problem of Φ instability arising from instability of the content of consciousness,
because of the vagaries of the human brain. Even if one of these methods produces a superposition of identical Φ
states, for suitably tuned blue and green screen observations, at a given point in time, the states will not persist as
pure perception states and their Φ values should not be expected to remain identical for any significant time.
IDEAL OBSERVERS
What, though, about computers or other artificial observers? While we may not have very strong reasons to assume
that they have conscious states, IIT – which can assign high values of Φ even to quite simple computing devices –
suggests that they do. Perhaps this is true of any plausible theory that quantifies consciousness as a function of
information flow in networks. We can certainly design abstract networks that behave in precisely similar ways in
response to different inputs. For example, we could make a network with a detector array whose individual detectors
generate a 0 every second if they receive blue light above a threshold intensity and a 1 if they receive green light above
that intensity, and then send these signals to two separate identical sub-networks that process them and characterise
the blue or green shape detected. IIT suggests a suitably designed network of this type would be conscious for either
input, with the same value of Φ in each case. However, IIT postulates [22] identical conscious states associated with
isomorphic networks. [31] A superposition state of the network observing blue and green screens would not collapse,
but both components would be associated with the same conscious state (whatever it is).
Still, it is surely possible to find networks that produce precisely the same value of Φ in two different non-isomorphic
states, to which IIT would assign distinct conscious states. A Φ-collapse model would predict that such a network
could be put into a persistent superposition of conscious states. Is this a good reason to reject Φ-collapse models?
To argue that it is, one has to assume that persistent superpositions of distinct conscious states are generally
unacceptable, even in cases very far from our own experience. The thought here would presumably be that such
states are just nonsensical or uninterpretable, or at least that it is eminently reasonable to postulate some fundamental
principle that excludes them, perhaps following a loose analogy with Penrose and Diosi’s suggestion that nature does
not allow superpositions of distinct spacetimes.
One might try to argue that if any persistent superpositions of distinct conscious states were straightforwardly intelligible, then purely unitary quantum theory would be straightforwardly intelligble, and there would be no motivation
to consider any form of collapse. Arguments like this (e.g. [23, 24]) are used to justify lower bounds on collapse rates
in dynamical collapse models, but in that context they apply only to humans, relying on our introspective impression
that we quickly see definite outcomes to a priori uncertain quantum experiments. To run a more general version of
the argument one would need to show that any sensible interpretation of persistent superpositions of distinct con-
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scious states for general (not necessarily human) observers would necessarily explain the appearance of single worlds
governed by Born rule probabilities for human observers in purely unitary quantum theory.
However, there are other possibilities that seem logically coherent. For example, one could imagine a psychophysical principle according to which consciousness disappears in any persistent significant superposition of states that,
individually, would correspond to distinct conscious states. (Here “significant” is a placeholder for some quantitative
criterion.) On such a rule, our ideal network would “be in conscious state A” or “be in conscious state B” given the
corresponding inputs, but have no experience when given a superposed input. If humans cannot sustain persistent
superpositions of equal-Φ states (even in the absence of any collapse postulate) because the Φ values of our complex
and noisy brains continually vary whatever their initial state, we would never have encountered this effect. Even
if we managed to sustain a superposition momentarily, it would swiftly become a superposition of unequal-Φ states
and collapse. We should expect this to leave no memory of the effect, for at least two reasons. First, the effect
may be so fleeting as to be almost imperceptible. Second, we are assuming some form of extension of IIT’s model of
consciousness, according to which brain states cause conscious states but there is no independent causal effect in the
other direction. Given this, any post-collapse memories are defined by the post-collapse brain state, and so would be
of definite conscious states corresponding to one or other component of the superposition.
It seems then that, to preclude superpositions of equal-Φ states for artificial devices, we simply have to assume
(a) that a device in a superposition of such states must necessarily be conscious, (b) there is no conceivable sensible
account of what its conscious state could be that does not undercut the motivation for considering collapse models
at all. These aren’t ridiculous assumptions – a thought underlying (a) might be that if individual states carry
consciousness then any superposition should (perhaps because of some loose analogy with charge or mass, or because
“being conscious” should behave like a binary quantum observable) and a thought underlying (b) might be that
talking about a superposition of conscious states is just a category error – but they don’t seem completely compelling.
We should note too that there might turn out to be interesting theories of consciousness that (unlike IIT) assign
consciousness only to biological systems. For any such theories, there are no ideal observers, and so no way to create
equal-Φ states. More generally, this is true for any theories whose measure for all physical systems has similar features
to IIT’s Φ for biological systems, in that it is always unstable and will have different time evolutions in different states
where it is initially equal.
QUALIA AND SYMMETRIES
It is worth considering more carefully the intuition that humans are (at least to very good approximation) equally
conscious viewing different coloured screens in an otherwise darkened room. There is a weak version of this intuition:
in either case the human is awake, and all waking conscious states should have very similar levels of Φ. If one only
holds this weak version, then the argument has just as much force if we consider even radically qualitatively different
waking states – viewing the blue screen, stroking a hamster, listening to Bach, and so on. The complex definition of
Φ in IIT suggests, though, that radically different waking states should generally have different values of Φ. If IIT is
correct and our introspective intuitions also are, the differences should be smaller than the difference between any of
them and a drowsy or dreamless sleeping state. It may also be hard to predict, from introspection, how the Φ levels
of the waking states are ordered. Still, a Φ-collapse will predict that superpositions of these states collapse, perhaps
(depending on the quantitative details) very swiftly. If it were possible to produce a “cleaned-up” artificial human
emulator that can sustain stable Φ values and can reproduce pure versions (without the complicating associations) of
the human experiences of viewing a blue screen, stroking a hamster and listening to Bach, we should still expect the
Φ levels to be different and so still expect Φ-collapse. The weak version of the intuition thus does not seem able to
support Chalmers-McQueen’s argument, even for idealized human emulators.
It seems to me that the argument feels initially plausible because it relies on a stronger version of the intuition:
that watching a blue screen and a green screen are qualitatively identical, up to interchanging the colours, and that
images of the same area and intensity in different colours should evoke the same Φ. This in turn seems to rely on the
intuition that there is a natural relation – a colour flip map – between the conscious states evoked. However they are
represented mathematically, they have the same structure: a shape or a collection of pixels of the same colour. For
example, if consciousness is a collection of qualia, we can map the blue-screen conscious state to the green-screen one
simply by replacing every blue quale with a green quale, and vice versa. If consciousness has some other structure,
we can find an analogous map with the same effect. While the complexities of human brains may make the stronger
intuition not quite precisely correct for us, this intuition suggests hat the symmetries should be exact rather than
approximate for an ideal (artificial) observer that is able to have stable and pure colour experiences.
In any theory of consciousness that maps physical states to mental states, this intuition seems to require an
5
associated map acting on the physical brain states, which also defines an (approximate) symmetry of physical states.
One way to see this is to ask what we would conclude if we learned that observing blue and green screens used radically
different and unrelated brain pathways. I think we would come to doubt not only that the mind states are associated
with similar levels of consciousness, but also that they are as closely related as introspection seems to suggest.
We can flesh all this out as postulating a commutative diagram:
Degree of consciousness
=
Degree of consciousness
Φ
Network states
Φ
effective colour flip
Q
Conscious states
Network states
(1)
Q
colour flip
Conscious states
Here Q is the map that characterizes the content and structure of any consciousness associated to any given
information processing network: in IIT it is supposed to be representable mathematically by the so-called qualia
shape or Q-shape. The “effective colour flip” on network states maps a network state that evokes one colour to a
network state that evokes another; that is, it has the effect of flipping the colour evoked in the conscious state.
Why would one expect an effective colour flip map on network states to give the equality in the Φ values in the
top line? The third line motivates this, but to justify it we need to consider the properties of the network model
and the hypothesized map Φ. In the concrete example of IIT, a network ×i Ai = A1 × . . . × An begins at time 0 in
some initial state a1 (0) × . . . × an (0), and at each subsequent time step t its state a1 (t) × . . . × an (t) depends (in
general probabilistically) on the previous state according to specified causal rules, which for fixed networks are taken
to be time-independent. The degree of consciousness Φ(t) at time t is determined by the state at time t and the rules
determining the state at time t + 1. The intuition that there is an effective colour flip map is mathematically natural
(i.e. does not require fine-tuned coincidences) only if there is an associated permutation symmetry ρ such that the
network ×i Ai in initial state ×i ai (0) is equivalent to the network ×i Aρ(i) in initial state ×i aρ(i) , in the sense that
the causal rules map isomorphically, so that the probability of any future state ×i ai (t) in the former equals that of
×i aρ(i) (t) in the latter. This is also the natural physical justification: blue and green screens produce different inputs
whose processing paths through the network are isomorphic.
But then the intuition fails: IIT does not assign different conscious states to isomorphic network states [22].
Moreover, this is not a peculiar feature of IIT: it seems natural for any theory mapping networks to conscious
states. If the symmetry is precise, what could there be about ×i Aρ(i) that could give it the conscious state of greenscreen perception where ×i Ai gives blue? The only difference is in the physical locations of the relevant network
components. It seems very unnatural to suppose that conscious qualia depend on these at all, and even more
unnatural to hypothesize (as one would have to) some fixed map from the network’s location in configuration space
to colour perception space. Any choice of such a map would be completely arbitrary: why should, say, a translation
1mm to the left swap blue with green? And any permutation of colour qualia would appear to define an equally valid
and equally (im)plausible map.
It might be argued that a precisely symmetric network is never physically realisable. However carefully one tries to
build a symmetric network, its transition probabilities will always vary slightly from the designed specifications, in a
way that breaks the symmetry. Indeed, but if so, the corresponding Φ values should also differ at least slightly, and
we return to the discussion of the previous section.
It might also be noted that, even if a physical network is symmetric in its high-level behaviour (as encoded in
the network transition probabilities), its components will never be identical. So, they can always be distinguished by
features other than their location. Again (within classical models, and so ignoring the possibility of and also the issues
raised by indistinguishable quantum states) this is true. But if these features are irrelevant to the conscious state
then they do not matter; if they are relevant, then the network model of consciousness considered was inadequate,
and a deeper model including these features is needed. In this last case, again, the values of Φ′ (the measure of
consciousness in the new model) should differ.
SYMMETRIES AND MIND STATES
There is an intriguing general point underlying this argument. Discussions of consciousness are often framed in a
way that seems implicitly to appeal to some form of symmetry among conscious states, or at least leaves open the
6
thoughts (i) that there may be such a symmetry and (ii) this makes the arguments more plausible. For example,
James’ discussion [25] of the difficulty in understanding the evolutionary emergence of epiphenomenal consciousness
given the strong correlations between pleasure (pain) and evolutionary (dis)advantage looks cleanest if one can simply
take pleasure and pain to be positive and negative values of a single scalar quantity, whose sign one could imagine
being reversed. Arguments involving hypothetical beings whose consciousnesses are identical to ours except that
they experience altered spectra (say with blue/green exchanged) similarly seem cleanest if colour sensations are not
only considered as elementary components of mind states, independent of any other qualia, but also thought of as
completely interchangeable.
Introspection gets us only so far on this. Certainly colour sensations feel as though they belong to a common
class, different from auditory sensations, or verbalised thoughts, or emotions (though they may evoke at least the
last two). But is it possible to experience pure colour and nothing else? For the reasons given earlier, I’m not so
sure. And do elementary pure colour sensations even exist (whether or not they can be experienced apart from other
qualia)? It feels hard to me to identify distinct components of colour sensations, even when experiencing colours
that are mixtures of primary colours. But that doesn’t seem to be a strong argument that colour sensations – even
primary colour sensations – aren’t fundamentally composite. Is exchanging blue and green qualia more analogous to
exchanging up and down quarks (an approximate symmetry) or positive and negative charges (a better approximate
symmetry) or applying the PCT operator (an exact symmetry) in the material world? Or is it more like exchanging
CO2 and N2 O – an operation which might look superficially like a symmetry, if one does not know the underlying
structure of the world, but is not one in any meaningful sense? Introspection doesn’t seem to give clear answers.
Are different colour perceptions evoked by near-isomorphic brain states? I don’t think we know this either. Even if
they are, the deviations of the states from isomorphism, although small, may be crucial rather than incidental to the
experiences evoked. So our knowledge about our own physical brain states also does not seem to offer strong support
for either a physical symmetry (between brain states associated with different colour qualia) or a mental one (between
different colour qualia).
The case for a pain/pleasure symmetry seems weaker still. A pure colour sensation at least seems (if perhaps
mistakenly) imaginable. It seems much harder to imagine a pure pain or pleasure sensation, untethered to any past
or anticipated event, to any more complex emotion, or to any region of the body. I am also not sure that it makes
sense to describe a pain as a negative pleasure; pains and pleasures (and even different types of pain and pleasure) feel
qualitatively different, not quantitatively. It’s true that rational human behaviour is often modelled as an attempt to
maximize a scalar quantity, utility, that can take positive and negative values. But theoretical justifications for this
(e.g. [26]) come from plausible axioms about what constitutes rational behaviour. They do not require the hypothesis
that our experiences can be qualitatively characterised by a utility measure.
Finally, as noted above, the hypothesis that there are isomorphic states of an idealised brain that evoke distinct pure
colour qualia related by a symmetry is quite problematic. If we postulate the symmetry, it should apply both to brain
states (those associated with pure colour qualia) and mind states (those experiencing pure colour qualia). But we
then need to break the symmetry again in order to get a map from specific brain states (associated with some specific
colour qualia) to specific mind states (the experience of those specific qualia). This is not inconceivable in principle –
spontaneous symmetry breaking is a familiar phenomenon elsewhere in physics. But spontaneous symmetry breaking
needs an explanation – for example, dynamics induced by a potential with a degenerate ground state – and we have
no substantive model here that could offer one. It would seem rather perversely baroque to postulate symmetries
in both the material and mental worlds, for which we have no good evidence, and then further suggest that some
unknown symmetry breaking mechanism in some unknown model explains how their actions come to be related by
maps with the properties given in (1), with the symmetry realised in both worlds but broken by Q. Again, similar
comments apply to models involving isomorphic pleasure/pain states.
In both cases, then, I suggest that the hypothetical symmetries cannot naturally be accommodated within physical
theories of consciousness that aim to map brain states to mind states. IIT usefully illustrates this, but the argument
is independent of the details of IIT. If so, arguments that both assume some such theory is correct and appear to
be implicitly drawing some strength from a hypothetical symmetry need to be carefully examined, and if possible
reframed in a way that is explicitly independent of symmetry hypotheses.[32]
EARLIER RELEVANT WORK
After circulating the first draft of this paper, my attention was drawn to earlier work on symmetries and consciousness, including intriguing discussions by Hurley [27], Lee [28] and Chalmers[29]. Each of these examines the case
of left-right symmetry, which perhaps illustrates mostly clearly the points at issue here, and Lee’s discussion [28] is
7
particularly relevant.
This topic deserves an independent discussion, which I hope to give elsewhere. Here I just summarize the implications of the arguments above. Suppose consciousness is described by a theory like IIT, which defines a mathematical
map from a space of classical descriptions of brain/network states to the space of associated mind/conscious states.
Consider a brain/network with perfect left-right symmetry. If the map associated distinct, symmetrically related
brain/network states to distinct mind/conscious states, it would effectively give an intrinsic label on three dimensional coordinate systems, distinguishing left-handed sets of coordinates from right-handed. While that is logically
possible, it would be surprising, since it would break a symmetry of classical physics. (Even in a model based on
quantum states, it would be surprising, since we know no reason why the violations of parity in quantum field theory
should be relevant to consciousness.)
The more natural possibility, we have argued, is that symmetrically related brain/network states are associated
to identical conscious states. A hypothetical creature with a perfectly left-right symmetric neural network would
not distinguish “leftish” and “rightish” sensations, although it might respond appropriately (and differently, though
symmetrically) to stimuli on the left and right. Approximately left-right symmetric creatures may distinguish between
perception or proprioception qualia associated with events on their left and right. These may perhaps feel to them
(as they do for us) qualitatively similar and it may seem intuitively plausible to them (as it perhaps does to us) that
they are in some sense related. But, on the view we are arguing for, this intuition cannot be made precise. The states
are not approximations to distinct but perfectly symmetrically related qualia states. Structural asymmetry is crucial
to the sense of left-right distinctness. Eliminating the asymmetry (for example, by some continuous deformation of
the neural networks, if that were possible) would also eliminate the sense of distinctness.
SUMMARY
We have argued that collapse models based on a single measure of consciousness seem consistent with experience.
Thought experiments that attempt to place humans in superpositions of distinct but equally conscious states do not
refute such models, because it seems unlikely that humans can sustain precisely the same level of consciousness in
any state for long, or that there are distinct human conscious states that remain precisely equally conscious for long.
Thought experiments involving artificial networks, which might – according to some theories of consciousness – sustain
distinct and equally conscious states for long periods, do not refute the models either, since we do not know what, if
anything, these networks would experience in superposition.
Another argument that single-measure collapse models are plausibly consistent with our experience has been suggested by Okon and Sebastian [7, 8], who discuss the effect of decoherence (of the measurement device) on the
environment and hence on an observer’s consciousness. In response, Chalmers and McQueen [2] argue that any effects
of decoherence are screened off from the observer’s consciousness in the blue- and green-screen experiment: they see
only the screen. One could press this further by arranging quantum experiments in which blue or green light pulses
are sent towards the observer’s retina, without any classical amplification. The discussion can be made clearer still
by using the type of ideal artificial observers considered above. Within an IIT model, these can easily be designed so
that only the experimental outcome affects their information processing network, rendering any decoherence effects
irrelevant. For these reasons, we believe our independent arguments are needed.
We have also argued that there are strong reasons to doubt the intuition that we can, from introspection, identify
experiences that are likely to have equal measures on consciousness, according to some sensible theory mapping
physical states to mental states. It relies implicitly on a notion of symmetry between distinct mental states, which is
hard to make natural in such a theory. On the one hand, a symmetry between mental states ought to be associated
with a symmetry between the associated physical states. On the other, physical states related by simple symmetries
seem naturally associated with identical mental states.
We are not suggesting here that there is no motivation to consider collapse models based on a detailed (multiparameter) mathematical description of the contents of consciousness. There are other reasons [2, 3] why one might
prefer such models: for example, that this may give consciousness a causal role in nature that aligns with some
intuitions. These are interesting lines of thought, but beyond our scope here.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was supported by an FQXi grant and by Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. Research at
Perimeter Institute is supported by the Government of Canada through Industry Canada and by the Province of
8
Ontario through the Ministry of Research and Innovation. I thank David Chalmers and Kelvin McQueen for circulating
a draft of their article [2] and for very helpful and enjoyable discussions, and Johannes Kleiner for helpful comments
on a draft.
References
∗
Electronic address: A.P.A.Kent@damtp.cam.ac.uk
[1] Eugene P Wigner. Remarks on the mind-body problem. In I. J. Good, editor, The Scientist Speculates. Heineman, 1961.
[2] D. Chalmers and K. McQueen. Consciousness and the collapse of the wave function. In S. Gao, editor, Consciousness and
Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, expected 2021.
[3] D. Chalmers and K. McQueen. Consciousness and the collapse of the wave function: Presentations. . URL
http://consc.net/qm/.
[4] D. Chalmers. Dirty secrets of consciousness. Talk at FQXi 5th International Conference, Banff, August 2016, 2016.
[5] Kobi Kremnizer and André Ranchin. Integrated information-induced quantum collapse. Foundations of Physics, 45(8):
889–899, 2015.
[6] Elias Okón and Miguel Angel Sebastián. How to back up or refute quantum theories of consciousness. Mind and Matter,
14(1):25–49, 2016.
[7] Elias Okon and Miguel Ángel Sebastián. A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model. Synthese, pages 1–21,
2018.
[8] Elias Okón and Miguel Angel Sebastián. The subjective-objective collapse model: Virtues and challenges. In S. Gao,
editor, Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, expected 2021.
[9] Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis, and Giulio Tononi. From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness:
integrated information theory 3.0. PLoS Comput Biol, 10(5):e1003588, 2014.
[10] Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini, and Tullio Weber. Unified dynamics for microscopic and macroscopic systems.
Physical Review D, 34(2):470, 1986.
[11] Gian Carlo Ghirardi, Philip Pearle, and Alberto Rimini. Markov processes in Hilbert space and continuous spontaneous
localization of systems of identical particles. Physical Review A, 42(1):78, 1990.
[12] Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent, and David Wallace. Many Worlds?: Everett, Quantum Theory, &
Reality. OUP Oxford, 2010.
[13] Daniel C Dennett. Consciousness explained. Penguin UK, 1993.
[14] Adam B Barrett. An integration of integrated information theory with fundamental physics. Frontiers in psychology, 5:
63, 2014.
[15] S. Aaronson.
Why i am not an integrated information theorist (or, the unconscious expander).
URL
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799.
[16] Michael A Cerullo. The problem with Phi: a critique of integrated information theory. PLoS Comput Biol, 11(9):e1004286,
2015.
[17] Adam B Barrett and Pedro AM Mediano. The Phi measure of integrated information is not well-defined for general
physical systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(1-2):11–20, 2019.
[18] D. Chalmers and K. McQueen. private communications. .
[19] Roger Penrose. On gravity’s role in quantum state reduction. General Relativity and Gravitation, 28(5):581–600, 1996.
[20] Lajos Diosi. A universal master equation for the gravitational violation of quantum mechanics. Physics Letters A, 120(8):
377–381, 1987.
[21] Sandro Donadi, Kristian Piscicchia, Catalina Curceanu, Lajos Diosi, Matthias Laubenstein, and Angelo Bassi. Underground
test of gravity-related wave function collapse. Nat. Phys., 2020. doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41567-020-1008-4.
[22] David Balduzzi and Giulio Tononi. Qualia: the geometry of integrated information. PLoS Comput Biol, 5(8):e1000462,
2009.
[23] Angelo Bassi, D-A Deckert, and Luca Ferialdi. Breaking quantum linearity: Constraints from human perception and
cosmological implications. EPL (Europhysics Letters), 92(5):50006, 2010.
[24] Adrian Kent. Perception constraints on mass-dependent spontaneous localization. In S. Gao, editor, Consciousness and
Quantum Mechanics. Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, expected 2021. URL www.arXiv.org:1806.10396.
[25] William James. Are we automata? Mind, 4:1–22, 1879.
[26] Leonard J Savage. The theory of statistical decision. Journal of the American Statistical association, 46(253):55–67, 1951.
[27] Susan L Hurley. Consciousness in action. Harvard University Press, 1998.
[28] Geoffrey Lee. The experience of left and right. pages 291–315. 2006.
[29] David Chalmers. Three puzzles about spatial experience. pages 109–137. 2019.
[30] This might produce compelling arguments against it; that too would be valuable.
[31] I thank Kelvin McQueen for helpful discussions on this.
9
[32] James argues against an epiphenomenal theory of consciousness, which in my view describes the most natural interpretation
of IIT when taken as a fundamental theory. He does not discuss a brain-mind map in detail, nor suggest how a scientific
theory of the evolution of consciousness could overcome his argument. The relevance of our arguments to his discussion
is thus contingent on the form of the unspecified theory. In any case, my hunch is that his argument could be adequately
reframed: a much more careful discussion is needed, but here is a sketch. I find it hard to accept that it is simply
tautologous to say that activities good or bad for our genetic survival are respectively pleasurable or painful. If we agree
that the statements are more than tautologies then we agree, I think, that in the present state of our understanding we
could imagine the world being otherwise. That is, the correlations with evolutionary (dis)advantage need some explanation,
which we presently do not have. There is an obvious naive explanation – we have evolved minds and bodies interacting so
that our physical behaviour is generally pleasure-seeking and pain-avoidant – but it is incompatible with epiphenomenalism.
This was James’ essential point, and we do not need to imagine a simple pleasure/pain symmetry defining a swap map to
run this framing of the argument. |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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Article
Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured?
– A Preliminary Study
Pradeep B. Deshpande*1, P. Krishna Madappa2 & Konstantin Korotkov3
1
Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Louisville; & Six Sigma & Advanced Controls, Inc.
P.O. Box 22664, Louisville, KY
2
Institute for Science, Spirituality, and Sustainability, Taos, New Mexico
3
Department of Biophysics and Computers, St. Petersburg Federal University of Informational
Technologies, Optics, and Mechanics, St. Petersburg, Russia
Abstract
The scientific framework for internal excellence (1) is reviewed in the context of a scientific
measurement device that may be used to track progress. This device has been approved by
Russian Health Authorities for general use, following clinical trials and the recommendation of
the Russian Academy of Sciences. A case study is presented with this measurement device and
the results corroborate the scientific framework for transformation.
Keywords: Internal excellence, consciousness, emotions, meditation, six sigma, gas discharge
visualization.
Introduction
Over the past few years the first author has published several papers on a scientific framework
for internal and external excellence for personal, organizational, national, and global
transformation (1 – 7). To briefly review this work, consider the S, R, T Level of Human
Consciousness depicted in Figure 1.
The definitions of S, R, and T are as follows:
*
S: Truthfulness, honesty, steadfastness, equanimity; R: Attachment, bravery, ego, ambition,
greed, desire to live; T: Lying, cheating, causing injury in words or deeds, sleep.
Minimum S, R, T required for life
S component strongly correlates with the positive emotions (Unconditioned love, kindness,
empathy, compassion, gratitude, forgiveness, etc.); Excessive R, T components strongly
correlate with negative emotions (Anger, hostility, hatred, irritation, sorrow, fear). The scale
depicted in Figure 1 is arbitrary and for simplicity a linear scale is indicated with a minimum
value of 82.5, corresponding to S (min), R (min) and T (max) and a maximum value of 1,000
corresponding to S (Max), R (min), and T (min). The upper limit of 1,000 designates an
individual who is the best a human being can be and the lower limit of 82.5 represents an
individual who is the worst he or she can be while the rest of us are somewhere in between.
Correspondence: Prof. Pradeep B. Deshpande, Six Sigma & advanced Controls, Inc. P.O. Box 22664, Louisville,
KY 40252-0664, http://www.sixsigmaquality.com E-mail: pradeep@sixsigmaquality.com
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research
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Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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The quest for internal excellence means to rise on this scale of consciousness. Now, positive
emotions strongly and positively correlate with the S component while negative emotions
similarly correlate with the R, T components.
Max S
S, R, T Scale of
Consciousness
1000
82.5
Max T
Figure 1. S, R, T Level of Consciousness
Thus an individual with a high level of consciousness is endowed with abundant positive
emotions while an individual with a low level of consciousness with negative emotions. Progress
in the pursuit of internal excellence may be made with two approaches: (1) A conscious
approach wherein the three components of the mindset are tracked literally on a minute by
minute basis to ensure that the S component remains high or nudges higher while the R, T
components remain low or nudge lower, and (2) A process whose side-effect is a rise in the S, R,
T level of consciousness. There is ample evidence, both historical and scientific, suggesting that
meditation is one such process.
Humanity has known for millennia about several tell-tail signs of progress in internal excellence
such as an ability to discern truth from falsehood, spontaneous affection shown by animals,
birds, and butterflies, and the capacity to remain serene in the midst of the most unfavorable of
external conditions that are part and parcel of life. Still, in the scientific community there is
considerable interest in a scientific measurement device which can track progress. The scientific
community knows that a theory in the absence of validated measurements is but a conjecture and
we are perfectly content with the wise consul, “Scientific theories are always provisional and
subject to modification or change”.
We are happy to report that there is such a scientific measurement device with which to assess
progress. This device makes it possible to put the scientific framework for global transformation
on a firm footing. In the following paragraph, we briefly describe the device and present a case
study of a recently completed program that supports the framework.
Scientific Measurement of Internal Excellence
In the mid-nineties Konstantin Korotkov developed a scientific device based on the ancient
Chinese system of energy meridians for measuring the bio-energy of living organisms and the
environment. The device provides non-invasive, painless and almost immediate evaluation which
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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can highlight potential health (physiological and psycho-emotional) abnormalities prior to even
the earliest symptoms of an underlying condition, and suggests courses of action (9).
GDV utilizes a weak, completely painless electrical current applied to the fingertips for less than
a millisecond. The body’s response to this stimulus is the formation of a variation of an “electron
cloud” composed of light energy photons. The electronic “glow” of this discharge (invisible to
the human eye) is captured by an optical CCD camera system and then translated into a digital
computer file. The data from each test is converted to a unique “Photonic Profile”, which is
compared to the database of hundreds of thousands of data records using 55 distinct parametric
discriminates, and charted so that it is available for discussion and analysis. A graph of the
findings is presented as a two-dimensional image. To study these images, fractal, matrix, and
various algorithmic techniques are linked and analyzed. In addition, the system provides instant
graphic representations of the data to provide easy reference and interpretation. To enhance the
understanding and meaningfulness for ease of explanation and discussion, a further graphic
representation is generated, placing the indicators within the outline of the human form. For a
more in-depth understanding of GDV, the reader is referred papers numbered 8 to 12 under
References. GDV has been in the market for over fifteen years and has received registration as a
routine medical diagnostic device by the Russian Ministry of Health upon recommendation of
the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The GDV device has numerous applications the field of medicine and sports. It can determine
the physiological and psycho-emotional state of a human being. The parameters that the GDV
provides indicative of physiological and psycho-emotional state are: (1) Stress level, (2)
Bioenergy intensity, (3) Normality of various organs and systems, and (4) Sate of the Chakras.
These parameters will allow aspirants to gage the extent of progress they are making with their
practices such as Yoga, Pranayam, meditation, medical interventions, etc.
A special software environment processes and analyzes BIO-grams oriented towards the work in
different problem domains. Adaptation for a particular assessment is performed through a
combination of optimal operations from the library for the given problem domain, selection of
corresponding procedures, and (or) selection of optimal threshold values.
The following main algorithms are included in the library:
Pseudo-coloring. For visual estimation of the image, there are several algorithms of pseudocoloring oriented towards marking out several peculiarities of BIO-grams. The following
Intensity palette is most commonly used. In this processing, image points are colored in one of
eight colors. The brightest glow points are colored in the shades of blue, less bright points are
colored in the shades of red. Points are colored in yellow when the intensity is higher than the
noise level, but lower than the base noise level for the given frame. All image points removed by
noise filtration are shown as white background. Special programs are designed for the calculation
of the following BIO-gram parameters: Total image area (S): the number of pixels in the image
having brightness above the threshold. Average Intensity (I) is an evaluation of the Intensity
spectrum for the particular BIO-gram. Entropy (Entr) of the image is calculated in accordance
with a non-linear algorithm, presented in (13). Energy (E) of light emitted by the subject is equal
to:
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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E = k S*I (Joules)
Where k is a numerical coefficient depending on spectral parameters of the particular CCD
camera. For the GDV instruments, k = 2*10-4.
The first author has asserted that the scientific framework outlined in his papers is also for
organizational excellence, and national, & global transformation. Central to this assertion is the
assumption of enormous intelligence of collective consciousness. It is also claimed that an
appropriately-sized sample of people engaged in the practice of meditation regularly can have
positive influence on the wider society. Theory of stochastic resonance is suggested to explain
why and how the efficacy of a group activity for an individual is far greater than the individual
pursuing the same activity alone.
Here again, the assertion requires scientific validation. The GDV among its suit of accessories
comes with an accessory called the eco-sensor which measures the energy intensity and entropy
of the space. If the claim of collective consciousness is true, then it must be possible to measure
its effects with instrumentation. The eco-sensor is a tool that can provide the answer.
The primary outputs of the GDV connected to the eco-sensor are the energy intensity and
entropy of the space. We may state that bias current in the electrical chain depends on the
capacitance of space between the antenna and environmentally-grounded and electroconductive
subjects. Both geophysical parameters of the particular environment and manmade
electromagnetic field and constructions influence this capacitance. This process is being modeled
both experimentally and theoretically (9). Emotions are related to the activity of the
parasympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system, which changes blood
microcirculation, perspiration, sweating, and other functions of the body, resulting in the changes
of the overall conductivity of the body and the conductivity of acupuncture points in particular.
Therefore, in the vicinity of the instrument, emotional people may change the conductivity of
space and, hence, the signals of the sensor. This may be related to the formation of areas of
decreased entropy in space, or, according to Prof. Bill Tiller, “associated with the buildup of a
negative magnetic charge manifesting in the environment” (11). Some quantum effects may be
involved as well.
Case Study
The first author presented a two-day program titled How to Transform Ourselves, Our
University Community, and the World at the University of Louisville on September 30 –
October 1, 2013. Attendance ranged between 85 and 135 participants. The program was
supported by the Office of Ombuds, Chemical Engineering Department and Get Healthy Now.
The three-hour program spread over two days consisted of lectures and Prana Kriyas (Breathing
practice), Loving Kindness Intention, and Meditation. Six participants volunteered for their
before-and-after bioenergy measurements. All GDV measurements were made and analyzed by
the second author. Figure 2 is a photograph of the group during the process of meditation. The
GDV and eco-sensor are visible on the table.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
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Figure 2. The Group Engaged in Meditation
Physiological and Psycho-Emotional State of Volunteers. The GDV determines the subject to
be in a good physiological and psycho-emotional state if the energy field is normal and the
chakras are of proper size and aligned at the central line. The smaller the chakras and farther
away they are from the central line, the more unbalanced the state is. The analysis of the
EPC/GDV images taken from the fingertips is based on digital image analysis and processing of
the image as a whole and of specific image sectors by artificial intelligence techniques. In 1986
Prof. Peter Mandel from Germany had suggested a diagnostic table based on sectorization of the
Kirlian images taken from finger tips and toes. Using digital image processing technology
Korotkov and his team updated the diagnostic table based on clinical studies of more than 10,000
patient cases with different health challenges. This way the initial diagnostic table was updated
and verified (8). Today there is a large difference between the diagnostic table used by Prof
Mandel
and
the
table
that
forms
the
base
of
EPC/GDV-Analysis.
The principle of GDV technique is as follows (9): Under a high intensity electromagnetic field,
the finger emits a burst of electrons and photons. With the help of an optical system and camera,
the electro-photonic emissions are transformed into video-signals, which are recorded in the
form of single snapshots or fingertip images called GDV-grams. The data processor utilizes a
specialized software complex that permits the calculation of system parameters. The software
GDV Diagram facilitates the implementation of standardized processing of GDV-images. The
process involves capturing GDV-images with a special CCD camera, filtrating GDV-images,
obtaining numerical characteristics, creating graphs and diagrams, and saving and transferring
data for additional processing. In the GDV Software Programs, the glow from the different
sectors of the finger images is projected onto the shape of a human body in correspondence with
the location of the different organs and systems. The result are Energy Field images that allow
for intuitive analysis of the physiological level of human body functioning. However, it must be
kept in mind that this energy field image is created by data analysis in the computer and does not
constitute what is referred to as Aura or Aura-photography.
Complex mathematical calculations are performed to derive statistics that characterize the
strength, shape, dimensions, and irregularities of the fingertip images. These calculations are
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
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used in the analysis of areas or sectors of fingertip images that are believed to reflect different
organs and systems of the body. Relying on extensive research utilizing the application of small
electrical potentials to detect the location of acupuncture points and the energy “meridians”
which connect them together, and with their endpoints on the fingertips, it is possible to carry out
“sector analysis” of these fingertip images. Each individual sector or portion of the fingertip is
connected energetically with specific organs and organ systems such as the respiratory system.
When the data of the 10 individual BIO-grams are collated and interpolated, an image of the
entire full body energy field is created. An example of the full body energy field from a healthy
and unhealthy/emotionally unbalanced individual are shown in Figure 3. The gaps and the
reduced emissions and out-of-balance Chakras for the unhealthy individual are quite obvious.
Figure 3. Energy Field and Chakras of a Healthy (left) and Unhealthy/Emotionally
Unbalanced Individual (Right)
According to Eastern metaphysical theories and principles of Ayurvedic Indian medicine, there
are seven “Chakras” or integrated energy centers that are considered to affect physical, mental,
emotional, and spiritual well-being. These energy “disks” are positioned or embedded into the
spinal column at various locations starting at the coccyx and rising to the crown of the head.
Each Chakra is considered to resonate at a different frequency level. With new BioWell
software, it is now possible to quantitatively estimate the energy of chakras and graphically
display their level of activation, and indicate whether this level of activation is above or below
the level found from large numbers of subjects. The most important in evaluation is Chakras
distribution. Ideally they should be aligned along Sushumna – central line of a spinal cord. In
most cases several Chakras are misaligned and their size is much less than in the ideal case.
When people have strong stress, depression, very bad mood, chakras may be totally out of order.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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In the GDV programs, a particular part of every finger is associated with particular Chakra (9).
This is based on the principles of Ayurvedic medicine and tested by many Ayurvedic doctors in
India and USA. Balance between correspondent parts of the left and right fingers allows to
calculate the shift of the particular Chakra from the central line in accordance with the following
nonlinear equation:
Simmetry = 0.56*delta3+1.68*delta2-0.12*delta
Where delta is the numerical difference between the correspondent parts of the left and right
fingers. Coefficients are selected based on a large volume of experimental data.
Figures 4 (a) and (b) show energy field and the state of the chakras of two of the volunteers.
Figure 4(a) Energy Field of Volunteer 1 Before (Left) and After (Right) the Program
Figure 4(b) Chakras of Volunteer 1 (Before are shaded and After are solid color)
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) indicate the subject was calmed, relaxed and nourished from her
participation. This can be clearly observed as the smoothning of the energy field by the pre and
post Energy Field Images. The chakras also indicate inner empowerment. Figures 5(a) and (b)
depict the same information for a second volunteer.
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Figure 5 (a) Energy Field of Volunteer 2 Before (Left) and After (After) the Program
Figure 5(b) Chakras of Volunteer 2 (Before are shaded and After are solid color)
Observe the loosening of the energy field, post meditation, indicated by the nature of the energy
field distribution, which has been activated and stirred. The chakras of the second volunteer were
strengthened to almost perfect alignment from an already strong position with very minor shifts.
Energy of the Space during the Program
The GDV and the eco-sensor were used to assess the changes in the energy intensity and the
entropy of the space during the program. If in fact the stochastic resonance of participants is a
reality then these two parameters should reflect it. The energy level of the space should go up
and the entropy indicative of disorder should go down. Figure 6 shows the energy intensity of the
space during the course of Day 1 of the program selected for illustrative purposes while Figure 7
depicts the entropy behavior during the same period.
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Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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84.00
82.00
Average intensity
80.00
78.00
76.00
74.00
72.00
70.00
1
116
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Figure 6. Energy intensity increased during course of the program
In Figure 6, the x-axis denotes the number of frames (20 frames per minutes) while the y-axis is
the measured value of light as a unit. From Frame 1 to 90 the trend shown may be taken to be the
baseline for the room as attendees enter and take their seats. This is followed by the University of
Louisville speakers and the Metro Louisville Mayor’s Chair of the Compassion Committee from
90 to 180 frames. From 180 to 340 frames refer to the second author’s Prana Kriya breathing
meditation. From 340 – 1151 frames is the bulk of the program of the first author. Here, the first
author engages the audience providing a synopsis and relevance of six sigma principles in the
context of the scientific framework for internal excellence. Participants see that a powerful tool
to use in the pursuit of internal excellence is meditation and learn how the pursuit leads to
improved health & wellness, creativity & innovativeness, compassion & empathy, and higher
levels of consciousness for themselves and to unparalleled excellence and exemplary business
performance for organizations. Parallel measurements of the room temperature demonstrated that
it was kept stable +/- 2C due to the air conditioning system.
Figure 7 depicts the changes in the entropy of the space. In Figure 7, the x-axis denotes the
number of frames while the y-axis is the measures entropy value as a unit. Again, from frame 1
to 90 the trend shown may be taken to be the baseline for the room as attendees enter and take
their seats. This is followed by the University of Louisville speakers and the Metro Louisville
Mayor’s Chair of the Compassion Committee from frames 90 to 180. Frames 180 to 340 refer to
the second author’s Prana Kriya breathing meditation. Frames 340 – 1151 refer to the bulk of the
program as mentionee. The curve remains flat during all this period which means that sensor did
not reflect any significant changes in the environment. Note that there is a significant reduction
in entropy from the start of the program to the end of the program.
Observing the spectrum of charts from the two days of sensor data, we have observed the effect
of coherence and the responses in the environment. A sampling of male and female response also
affirms the hypothesis, given the time cycle of the seminar. We have come to realize the
transmissions from wisdom traditions that have been conveyed for millenia: “What is within us
is perfection; the outer world can attain perfection only when the inner world guides, molds and
shapes the outer world.”
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
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Entropy by isoline
2.00
1.00
0.00
1
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Figure 7 Entropy reduces during the course of the program and stabilizes
Discussion and Conclusions
A scientific framework for individual, organizational, and global transformation is now available
thanks to ancient Eastern wisdom reinforced by the work of several internationally-known yogis
together with the outstanding work of European, American, and Russian scientists. A scientific
device is also available with which to assess performance and track progress. We have begun to
understand why for millennia people in the pursuit of internal excellence have sought refuge in
difficult to live places such as the Himalayas, insisted on limiting themselves to simple foods
limited in quantity, refrain from interactions with the outside world as much as possible, and
devoted tens of thousands of hours to meditation. . A few among them have come down to teach
the wherewithal of how to achieve what they achieved. In the ancient times, this privilege was
limited to a select few disciples. A person desirous of reaching the very top the S, R, T scale of
consciousness will have to solicit the help of these self-realized souls. For the rest of us the
scientific framework together with the measurement device is sufficient to raise our level of
consciousness adequately for individual excellence & organizational, national & global
transformation and peace.
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Deshpande, P. B., Scientific Framework for Individual, Organizational, National, and Global
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Petersburg, Russia, July 6 – 8, 2013.
Deshpande, P. B., Science of Compassion, Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research, 3,
9, October 2012.
Deshpande, P. B. and Kulkarni, B. D., The Brahma Uncertainty Principle, Journal of
Consciousness Exploration and Research, 3, 2, February 2012.
Deshpande, P. B., Science of Enlightenment, Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research,
3, 2, February 2012.
http://2012daily.com/?q=node/17 (Pradeep B. Deshpande’s Message for World Transformation,
September 30, 2011).
Deshpande, P. B. and Christopher, P. M., On The Cyclical Nature of Excellence, reflections, Vol.
1, No. 1, 1993.
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QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2013 | Vol. 4 | Issue 9 | pp. 977-987
Deshpande, P. B., Madappa, K. P., & Korotkov, K., Can the Excellence of the Internal Be Measured? – A Preliminary Study
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2013. 160 p. Amazon.com.
Korotkov K.G., Energy fields Eletrophotonic analysis in humans and nature, 2012. 240 p. e-book:
Amazon.com.
Korotkov K. and Orlov D., Analysis of Stimulated Eletrophotonic Glow of Liquids.
www.WaterJournal.org V 2, 2010.
Korotkov, K., Madappa, K., Orlov, D., New Approach for Remote Detection of Human Emotions;
Subtle Energies & Energy Medicine • Volume 19 • Number 3 • Page 2; July 2010.
Pehek J. O., Kyler, H. J., and Foust, D. L., Image Modulation in Corona Discharge Photography,
Science, Vol. 194, 263 – 270, October 1976.
Korotkov K., Korotkin D. Concentration dependence of gas discharge around drops of inorganic
electrolytes. J of Applied Physics, 2001, 89, 9, 4732-4737.
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QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
A Theoretical Computer Science Perspective on
Consciousness1
Manuel Blum and Lenore Blum2
ABSTRACT
The quest to understand consciousness, once the purview of philosophers and theologians, is now
actively pursued by scientists of many stripes. This paper studies consciousness from the
perspective of theoretical computer science. It formalizes the Global Workspace Theory (GWT)
originated by cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars and further developed by him, Stanislas
Dehaene, and others. Our major contribution lies in the precise formal definition of a Conscious
Turing Machine (CTM), also called a Conscious AI. We define the CTM in the spirit of Alan Turing’s
simple yet powerful definition of a computer, the Turing Machine (TM). We are not looking for a
complex model of the brain nor of cognition but for a simple model of (the admittedly complex
concept of) consciousness.
After formally defining CTM, we give a formal definition of consciousness in CTM. We later suggest
why the CTM has the feeling of consciousness. The reasonableness of the definitions and
explanations can be judged by how well they agree with commonly accepted intuitive concepts of
human consciousness, the range of related concepts that the model explains easily and naturally,
and the extent of its agreement with scientific evidence.
INTRODUCTION
Thanks to major advances in cognitive neuroscience, science is on the brink of understanding how the brain
achieves consciousness. In 1988, cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars proposed a Global Workspace Theory
(GWT) of the brain, sketched its architecture, and outlined its implications for understanding consciousness. See
(Baars B. J., 1988) and (Baars B. J., 2019). That, together with the invention of fMRI in 1990, and the seminal
investigations by Francis Crick and Christof Koch (Crick & Koch, 1990) into the neural correlates of consciousness,
helped shake off the taboo on the scientific study of consciousness. As a consequence, the quest to understand
consciousness is now actively pursued by scientists of many stripes. 3
1 Preprint of an article submitted for consideration in [Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness] © [2021] [copyright World
Scientific Publishing Company] [https://www.worldscientific.com/worldscinet/jaic]. Published (Blum & Blum, 2021), see
https://bit.ly/3sUqC7d.
2 The work of Manuel and Lenore Blum was supported in part by CMU, in part by a sabbatical year from CMU at the Simon’s Institute for
the Theory of Computing, and in part by a gift from UniDT. Avrim Blum will be an author on the expanded version of this paper (Blum,
Blum, & Blum, Towards a Conscious AI: A Computer Architecture Inspired by Cognitive Neuroscience, In preparation) which will contain a
more in-depth description of the Sleeping Experts’ Algorithm and how it is used in this context. Email addresses: mblum@cs.cmu.edu,
lblum@cs.cmu.edu, and avrim@ttic.edu.
3 There are various approaches to the study of consciousness. In addition to neural correlates (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), these
approaches include the psychological (James, 1890) and (Freud S. , 1900); philosophical (Dennett D. C., 1991) and (Chalmers, 1996);
information theoretic measures of consciousness (Tononi, 2004) and (Tononi & Koch, 2015); and structural (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Our
approach to consciousness is architectural. It is informed by and close in spirit to (Baars B. J., 1997) and employed by (Dehaene S. , 2014)
to study neural correlates.
1
© 2021 Blum, Blum & Blum
We study consciousness from the perspective of Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), a branch of mathematics
concerned with understanding the underlying principles of computation and complexity. 4 TCS is our principal tool
in defining the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) as a formalization of neuroscientist Bernard Baars’ Theater of
Consciousness. The CTM is proposed for the express purpose of understanding Baars’ Theater model and for
providing a TCS framework to understand consciousness. In settling on this model, we look for simplicity not
complexity, for a simple mathematical model sufficient to explain consciousness, not a complex model of the
brain or cognition. Our approach, in the spirit of mathematics and theoretical computer science, proposes formal
definitions to fix informal notions and deduce consequences.
An important major goal is to determine if the CTM can experience feelings not just simulate them. We
investigate in particular the feelings of pain and pleasure and suggest ways that those feelings might be generated
(Chapter 4). We argue that even a complete knowledge of the brain’s circuitry - including the neural correlates of
consciousness - cannot explain what enables the brain to generate a conscious experience such as pain. We
propose an explanation that works as well for robots having brains of silicon and gold as for animals having brains
of flesh and blood. Our thesis is that in CTM, an explanation lies with the architecture of the system, its basic
processors; its expressive inner language that we call Brainish; and its dynamics (prediction, competition,
feedback and learning); that make it conscious (Chapter 3).
In his Global Workspace Theory (GWT), (Baars B. J., 1997) describes conscious awareness through a theater
analogy as the activity of actors in a play performing on the stage of Working Memory, their performance under
observation by a huge audience of unconscious processors.
Unlike GWT, the CTM will have just one and the same actor always on stage. That actor can ask or answer
questions, make or respond to requests, or communicate information. Through a well-defined competition, an
audience member with a response to a question or request, or with a question, request, comment, or information
of its own, can send that actor the script she is to deliver.
Here is Baars’ sketch of his model:
Figure 1 Sketch of Bernard Baars' Global Workspace Model (adapted from (Baars & Gage, 2010) ).
The architectural approach to the study of consciousness was inspired by the architectural models of cognition, developed largely at
Carnegie Mellon by Herb Simon’s Sciences of the Artificial (Simon, 1969), Raj Reddy’s Blackboard Model (Reddy, 1976), Allen Newell’s
Unified Theories of Cognition (Newell, 1990) and John Anderson’s ACT-R (Anderson, 1996). LIDA (Baars & Franklin, 2009) is an important
more recent architectural model of cognition.
4 As a result of Gödel and Turing’s groundbreaking works in the 1930’s, many logicians became interested in the dichotomy between
solvable and unsolvable problems (Hilbert’s tenth problem). Starting in the 1960’s and 1970’s, theoretical computer scientists began
pointing out that even amongst the solvable, there appeared to be a dichotomy between problems that are feasibly solvable (like
maximum matching) and those that appear not to be (like SAT). The subsequent models and abstract theories of TCS led to remarkable
insights into the mathematical distinction between efficiently and not efficiently solvable problems, an understanding of pseudorandomness, applications to secure communication, machine learning, and much more. ( (Sipser, 2013) is a great introduction to TCS.)
2
© 2021 Blum, Blum & Blum
A corresponding sketch of our Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) is in Section 1.7 (The Conscious TM in Toto)
where we also discuss modifications and simplifications we have made to Baars’ model. In the CTM, the stage is
represented by a single Short Term Memory (STM), and the audience members sitting in the dark are represented
by processors that make up its Long Term Memory (LTM). LTM processors, each with their own specialty,
compete to get their questions, answers, and information on the stage.
The Turing Machine (TM), being an extremely simple formal model of computation, is a fundamental first step in
the mathematical understanding of computation. 5,6 In that spirit, CTM, being a formalization of cognitive
neuroscientist Bernard Baars’ theater model of consciousness, is a first step toward the theoretical computer
science understanding of consciousness.
This formalization of CTM (Chapter 1) includes the precise definition of a chunk, a precise description of the
competition that decides which (processor’s) chunk will gain access to STM, and a precise definition of conscious
awareness in the CTM. Feedback enables LTM processors to learn from their mistakes and successes; links that
emerge in the life of the CTM enable conscious processing to become unconscious.
We begin by defining the deterministic CTM (Chapter 1), which we use as a stepping stone to define the
probabilistic CTM (Chapter 2). For many reasons, (one given by Figure 3/Note 4), we view the probabilistic CTM,
not the deterministic CTM, as the simpler better model of consciousness. After Chapter 1, when we refer to CTM,
we mean the probabilistic variant unless we say otherwise.
The reasonableness of our formalization lies in the breadth of concepts that the CTM explains easily and naturally.
That breadth includes some understanding for the feeling of consciousness (Chapter 3) and the Hard Problem of
consciousness which we explore in the particular case of pain and pleasure (Chapter 4). The understanding
depends on the Brainish language (Section 1.1) which LTM processors use to communicate with each other, the
activity of select LTM processors, and their predictive dynamics (prediction, feedback and learning), not on
chemicals like glutamate, serotonin, dopamine, and so on.
Throughout this paper, we consider different scenarios that might arise in life, and investigate whether and how
the model helps to explain the human experience of consciousness. The model does not explain everything. It is
too simple for that. On the other hand, it explains a lot – and that without making any modifications to the basic
probabilistic CTM.7
5 The Turing Machine (TM), an example being the 23 state universal TM of (Minsky, 1967), is a simple mechanism for exploring
computability. The CTM is intended to serve a similar purpose for exploring consciousness.
6 In his paper proposing the Imitation Game, aka the “Turing Test” (Turing, 1950), Alan Turing mentions consciousness, but only briefly, and
basically skirts the topic: “In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness could be persuaded to
abandon it rather than be forced into the solipsist position. They will then probably be willing to accept our test. I do not wish to give the
impression that I think there is no mystery about consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any
attempt to localize it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved before we can answer the question with which we
are concerned in this paper.”
7 In our experience, no matter what property of consciousness one wishes to account for (see examples of properties in (Van Gulick, 2014)),
no modifications of the basic probabilistic CTM model need be made. Instead, it suffices to invoke an appropriate LTM processor.
Properties can be explained by the introduction of such processors, and these often work better than the otherwise obvious changes one
might make to the model.
3
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................................................... 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................................... 1
1
FORMAL DEFINITION OF THE CONSCIOUS TURING MACHINE (CTM) ........................................................................... 5
1.1
1.2
PRELIMINARIES ................................................................................................................................................................... 5
BASIC CTM STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS ................................................................................................................................. 6
STM ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
LTM ............................................................................................................................................................................ 6
1.2.2.1
1.3
1.3.2.1
1.3.2.2
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
2
LTM Processors Produce Chunks ......................................................................................................................................... 6
The Down-Tree........................................................................................................................................................... 7
The Up-Tree................................................................................................................................................................ 7
Links ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8
Input maps ................................................................................................................................................................. 8
Output maps .............................................................................................................................................................. 8
IMPORTANT DETAILS OF THE UP-TREE COMPETITION ................................................................................................................. 9
Chunks Submitted to the Competition ....................................................................................................................... 9
The Up-Tree Competition and The Chunks That Move Up ...................................................................................... 10
The Deterministic Competition Algorithm and the Competition Function ....................................................................... 10
The Competition Computation .......................................................................................................................................... 12
MORE CTM DYNAMICS ..................................................................................................................................................... 12
The Interrupt Constant............................................................................................................................................. 12
Increasing Weights .................................................................................................................................................. 13
The High Level Story................................................................................................................................................. 13
PREDICTIVE DYNAMICS ....................................................................................................................................................... 13
Sleeping Experts Algorithm ...................................................................................................................................... 14
DEFINITION OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE CTM ......................................................................................................................... 15
The Current Mood .................................................................................................................................................... 16
THE CONSCIOUS TM IN TOTO ............................................................................................................................................. 16
THE PROBABILISTIC CTM ........................................................................................................................................ 18
2.1
2.2
2.3
THE COIN-FLIP NEURON ..................................................................................................................................................... 19
THE PROBABILISTIC UP-TREE COMPETITION ........................................................................................................................... 19
THE PROBABILISTIC UP-TREE COMPUTATION ......................................................................................................................... 20
3
THE FEELING OF CONSCIOUS AWARENESS .............................................................................................................. 21
4
THE HARD PROBLEM FOR PAIN AND PLEASURE ....................................................................................................... 24
4.1
4.2
PAIN ............................................................................................................................................................................... 25
PLEASURE ........................................................................................................................................................................ 27
5
SUMMARY............................................................................................................................................................. 28
6
RELATION TO OTHER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS ............................................................................................... 29
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................................................. 31
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................................. 32
ABOUT THE AUTHORS OF THE EXPANDED VERSION OF THIS PAPER (BLUM, BLUM, & BLUM, IN PREPARATION) ................ 36
ADDENDUM: HIGH LEVEL EXPLANATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 36
4
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1 Formal Definition of the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM)
1.1 Preliminaries
Statements about the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) are printed in black. Statements particular to humans or
animals will generally be printed in burgundy. Burgundy-colored statements refer to features that a human or
animal would have if it were correctly modeled by CTM.
Time t is discrete: t = 0, 1, 2, ... T. The CTM (its basic definitions given in Sections 1.2 and 1.3) is born at time t = 0
and has a fixed finite lifetime T. Time is maintained by a clock whose ticks are received by all components of CTM
simultaneously.
CTM’s world is a high dimensional subset of Rm(t) x Rn(t), where R is the reals, m and n are positive integer
dimensions, and t is time. Rm(t) is CTM’s outer world, also called the environment, and Rn (t) is its inner world.
Input maps transform the outer world to the inner world via sensors. These sensors may be for auditory, visual,
tactile, thermal, gustatory, visceral, electromagnetic, or some other kind of information. Output maps transform
the inner world to the outer world via actuators that act on the outer world.
Brainish is the inner language used by and between processors to communicate in its inner world. It includes
coded representations of inputs and outputs all expressed with multi-modal Brainish words and phrases called
gists (see Section 1.2.2.1). Brainish is a much richer and more expressive language than outer languages such as
English or Chinese for communicating in the outer world. Brainish is the language used to express inner speech,
inner vision, and inner sensations. Its enormous expressive power can be appreciated by comparing wide-awake
seeing with the seeing in dreams, as the dreams are manufactured completely by gists.
Gists can express and deal with images, sounds, tactile sensations, and thoughts - including unsymbolized
thoughts8- and do this better than outer languages, which express only symbolized thinking (thoughts that can be
communicated through the external environment). In humans, an important example of inner language is the
collection of images, sounds, and actions that occur in dreams. A gist holds the essence of a scene in a nutshell.
Having an expressive inner language is an important component of the feeling of consciousness (see Chapter 3).
Besides Brainish, each processor in CTM has its own “inner” language for its own personal internal
communication, dependent on its internal functioning. We say nothing more about each processor’s own inner
language here.
Although we use words like “small”, “short”, “succinct,” and “fast” informally, they each have a technical meaning
that will be specified when enough details have been given.
8 Brainish can express both symbolized and unsymbolized language. (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2008) and (Vicente & Martínez-Manrique, 2016)
give experimental evidence that human inner thought is always one (or two) of 1.speaking, 2.seeing, 3.feeling, 4.sensory awareness, and
5.unsymbolized thinking. (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2008) give the following example of an unsymbolized thought: “Abigail is wondering whether
Julio (her friend who will be giving her a ride that afternoon) will be driving his car or his pickup truck.”
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1.2 Basic CTM Structure and Dynamics
MAIN DEFINITION 1.2.1. CTM is a 7-tuple, < STM, LTM, Down-Tree, Up-Tree, Links, Input, Output >9 where:
STM
is a Short Term Memory that at each and every time tick t = 0, 1, 2, …, T holds exactly one chunk
(defined formally in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2). This single chunk becomes the entirety of CTM‘s
conscious content at time t. In humans, the storage capacity of short-term memory is roughly 7±2
chunks (Miller, 1956), where a chunk can be a word, a phrase, a digit, and so on. A few chunks cycling
through STM can simulate some aspects of an STM that holds several chunks.10
LTM
is a “large” collection of N (initially unlinked) Long Term Memory processors p1, p2, … pN whose
workings are all unconscious. Large means that N ≈ T. Each processor, pi, is a parallel random-access
(programmable modifiable) machine with its own address, addressp_i = i, and unbounded memory,
memoryp_i. All CTM processors are in LTM, none in STM, none anywhere else, so “processor” will
always mean LTM processor.
We assume that LTM has sufficiently many processors to guarantee that a fresh new unused processor is
available or can be commandeered whenever a task requires one.
In a CTM with N = 10k processors, each processor has a k-digit address. We view the roughly 107 cortical
columns (k=7) in the human brain as constituting a substantial fraction of all its processors.
1.2.2.1
LTM Processors Produce Chunks
At every clock tick t = 0, 1, 2,…, T, every LTM processor p produces a chunkp,t,0, possibly a NIL chunk
(Section 1.3.1), which it places in the “competition” (defined formally in Section 1.3.2) for STM. Chunks
will be defined in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 as 6-tuples:
chunk = < address, t, gist, weight, intensity, mood >.
Each chunk contains the address of the processor that originated it, the time t it was generated, and a
gist together with a real number weight (positive, negative or zero).
Gists are succinct compressed multi-modal thoughts. Succinct means that statements in Brainish are
small enough to fit in a chunk, which in turn must be small enough to fit in any node of the Up-Tree
(Section 1.2.4). A gist can be an answer to a query, the (high level expandable) idea of a proof, an insight
of some sort, a sketch of a beautiful sunset, a dream image, the pain of a torn ligament, and so on.
The |weight| of a gist is the processor’s estimate of how important it is to get that chunk into STM. A
Sleeping Experts Algorithm (Section 1.5.1) that runs in each processor adjusts the weight-giving
algorithms in that processor and the weights those algorithms give their gists. The Sleeping Experts
Algorithm comes with the assurance that processors will eventually be neither too assertive nor too timid
9 Coincidently, the classical Turing Machine is also defined as a 7-tuple, < Q, Σ, Γ, , q , q
0 accept , qreject>, where Q is a finite set of States, Σ is
the Input alphabet, Γ is the Tape alphabet, is the Transition function, q0 is the Start state, qaccept is the Accept state, and qreject is the Reject
state.
10 Cycling can happen via the Up-Tree competition (Section 1.3.2) and the Down-Tree broadcasts (Section 1.2.3). In this way, CTM can
keep thoughts alive in STM continuously through many cycles by sending the thought from processor
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STM
processors
STM
….
in setting their weights (Blum, Hopcroft, & Kannan, 2015). The algorithm helps define the dynamics of
feedback and learning.
The sign of the weight indicates whether the processor that created the chunk views the gist as
positive/optimistic/cheerful or negative/pessimistic/depressing.
Intensity and mood will be defined in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.
The Down-Tree
is a down-directed tree /|\ ⬇ consisting of a single root in STM and N edges directed from that root to
N leaves, each leaf being an input to one of the N LTM processors. At time t, t ∊ {0, 1, 2, …, T-1}, STM
broadcasts its single chunk of content via the Down-Tree to all N LTM processors, causing them to
receive that broadcast at time t+1.
Conscious awareness by CTM at time t+1 is defined to be the reception by all LTM processors of the
broadcast from STM at time t (see Section 1.6). This ensures that processors responsible for the sense
of conscious awareness (especially the model-of-the-world, inner speech, inner vision, and inner
sensation processors) all receive the same content at the same time from STM.
While this is a formal definition of conscious awareness, it does not yet explain the feeling of conscious
awareness (for that, see Chapter 3).
The Up-Tree
is an up-directed binary tree11
Figure 2 Up-Tree.
of height h. Its purpose is to run the Up-Tree competition (Section 1.3.2) that determines which chunk
gets into STM.
The Up-Tree has a single root in STM and N leaves, one leaf in each of the N LTM processors. Every
directed path from a leaf to the root is required to have the same length h. We further require that h ≤
3(log2 N). The 3 is arbitrary: any small integer ≥ 3 would do as well. (In Figure 2, h = 1.5(log2 N) = 3.)
Every node of the Up-Tree is at some level s, 0 ≤ s ≤ h. The leaf nodes are at level 0 and the root node is
at level h. For each s, let vs denote a node of the Up-Tree at level s. For s > 0, vs contains a “small” “fast”
parallel circuit with a “small” amount of storage that takes as input the chunks in its children and
produces as output the chunk in vs (details in Sections 1.3.2.1 and 1.3.2.2).
At every time t, every processor puts a chunk in the Up-Tree competition (Section 1.3.2) that begins at
time t and ends at time t+h with a single winner, which is broadcast from STM to all LTM processors via
the Down-Tree. CTM is constantly bubbling with the activity of chunks competing for STM and the
winner of each competition being broadcast from STM to LTM. The time ordered chunks broadcast
from STM to LTM form a stream of consciousness (Section 1.6). As discussed in Chapter 3, this stream
is part of the subjective feeling of consciousness.
11 In a binary tree, every non-leaf node has one or two children, no more no less.
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Links
are bi-directional edges between processors. They form over time, and turn “conscious
communication” between processors (via STM) into “unconscious communication” between them
(through links).12 For example, if processor A asks a question, B responds to it, and A acknowledges the
response to be useful, and if this exchange occurs often enough, then a bidirectional link is generated
between A and B.13 Links transmit chunks and thus enable processors to influence each other directly,
without going through STM. The number of two-way links between processors A and B at time t is
proportional to the number of chunks from A broadcast by STM and acknowledged by B to have been
useful plus the number of chunks from B broadcast by STM and acknowledged by A to have been useful,
from time 0 to time t.
We note that a processor’s address in a chunk provides negligible information about the processor’s
function, though processors may glean (some) information about such function from chunks broadcast
from STM or communicated through links.
Input maps
take (time-varying) environmental information acquired by CTM’s sensors, convert that (bit-coded)
information into Brainish-coded gists, then send those gists (encapsulated in chunks) to designated LTM
processors.14 x
Output maps
convert Brainish-coded command gists from LTM processors (like those that generate instructions for a
leg movement) into bit-coded commands for the intended actuators (the leg muscles). The (intended)
action may or may not affect the environment, and even if it does affect it, may not affect it as intended
or expected. The question whether or not an action has an effect and what that effect is, must be
determined by CTM from feedback (observation of the environment) and learned experience (Section
1.5).
12 There are many examples in which LTM (the collection of unconscious processors) does some spectacularly heavy lifting, in part through
unconscious communication. An example from Henri Poincaré is quoted in (Hadamard, 1945): “As I was about to board a bus, the idea
came to me, without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it, that the transformations I had used to define
the Fuchsian functions were identical with those of non-Euclidean geometry.”
13 When a query is followed instantly by a response, the linking is that suggested by the Hebbian rule (Hebb, 1949): “Neurons that fire
together wire together”. In the CTM, however, the linking occurs even when the response comes some time after the query “Her name is
Tina!”
14 For simplicity, we assume that sensors are part of the Input maps, i.e. not separate entities. Similarly, we will assume actuators are part
of the Output maps.
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1.3 Important Details of the Up-Tree Competition
The Up-Tree competition (Section 1.3.2) that starts at time t begins with each processor p putting a chunkp,t,0 on
its leaf of the Up-Tree (Section 1.2.4).15 At each time t > 0 and for every level s, 0 ≤ s < h, every chunk either
moves up a level or disappears. These chunks, whether they “move up” or disappear, do so simultaneously in a
single clock tick, meaning in the time interval [t, t +1). The up or out decision depends on the competition
algorithm and a chosen competition function f (Section 1.3.2.1). The chunk at s = h, being the chunk in STM, is
broadcast via the Down Tree to all LTM processors.
Chunks Submitted to the Competition
The chunk that processor p submits to the Up-Tree competition at time t is:
chunkp,t,0 = < addressp, t, gistp,t,0, weightp,t,0, intensityp,t,0, moodp,t,0 > , where
a. addressp = address of the processor p that produces the chunk.
b. t is the time at which the chunk is submitted to the competition.
c. gistp,t,0 = the “small” amount of “information” in Brainish, also called the potential “thought”, that p
puts in chunkp,t,0 at time t. The potential thought becomes an actual thought one tick (a single unit
of time) after it reaches STM.
Sample gists include:
• Scene gist: A rough sketch of a group with several well-dressed men and women
talking together.
• Inner-speech gist: “I don’t know any of the people here.”
• Feeling gists: A sense of confusion.
A desire to leave.
• Questions: “Do I know any of these people?“
“I know that woman, but… what’s her name?”16
d. weightp,t,0 denotes the real number (positive, negative or zero) that processor p assigns to gistp,t,0 at
time t.
15 For simplicity, we have stipulated that all LTM processors submit chunks at all times to the competition for STM. In many cases chunk
p,t,0
= chunkp,t-1,0 ; in other cases, chunkp,t,0 = < addressp, t, NIL, 0, 0, 0 >, the NIL chunk (defined in Section 1.3.1). (NIL chunks have “negligible”
effect on the “operation” of the CTM.) Unlike CTM, where all processors compete for STM, humans (and monkeys) have many processors
that cannot compete. As (Milner, 2012) points out, for example, the ventral stream of vision is conscious (competes) while the dorsal
stream is unconscious (does not compete):
Figure 2a Two Visual Systems - Goodale Lab - Western University (by permission of Mel Goodale).
16 An answer that might pop up after 1 minute: “Maybe the name begins with an S?”
An answer that might pop up a half hour later: “Now I remember, her name is Tina.” If evidence of the answer’s correctness is
sufficiently strong (high enough |weight|), it provides feedback to all processors for correcting their answers and adjusting their weights
(see Section 1.5.1).
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e. intensityp,t,0 = |weightp,t,0| is the importance that p assigns to its gistp,t,0. It quantifies how much p
“wants, needs, would like, or feels pressured” to broadcast gistp,t,0 at time t.
Feedback is used (as we shall see in Section 1.5.1) to drive the intensities that processors assign gists
to reasonable values.
f.
moodp,t,0 = weightp,t,0.
The empty or trivial gist is denoted by NIL. Any chunkp,t,0 that contains the NIL gist at a weight of 0 is a NIL chunk.
For t = 0, we define chunkp,0,0 = <addressp, 0, NIL, 0, 0, 0>.
We have now defined chunkp,t,s for all t and s = 0. In the next section, we define chunkp,t,s for all t and 0 < s ≤ h.
The Up-Tree Competition and The Chunks That Move Up
For 0 < s ≤ h, t = 0, and for each node vs, set chunkp,0,s = <addressp, 0, NIL, 0, 0, 0>, where p is the descendant
processor of vs having smallest address.
For 0 < s ≤ h, t > 0, and for each node vs, the Up-Tree competition places in vs at time t+s, chunkp,t,s, for a
particular p:
The particular p will be determined by the competition algorithm and competition function f (Section 1.3.2.1).
Once p is determined, the chunk in vs at time t+s will have the form:
chunkp,t,s = < addressp, t, gistp,t,s, weightp,t,s, intensityp,t,s, moodp,t,s > where
gistp,t,s = gistp,t,0 , weightp,t,s = weightp,t,0 , but intensityp,t,s and moodp,t,s are the sums of intensity and mood
respectively of the chunks in the children of vs.
WARNING. Thus for s > 0, unlike for s = 0, intensityp,t,s ≠ |weightp,t,s| and moodp,t,s ≠ weightp,t,s in general.
DEFINITION 1.3.2.1. Processor p wins the competition that began at time t if chunkp,t,h (a variant of chunkp,t,0 ) is
in vh (i.e. STM) at time t+h. We call chunkp,t,h the winning chunk. (We may also call chunkp,t,0 the winning chunk.
What is meant is clear.)
The winning chunk, chunkp,t,h, is broadcast via the Down-Tree to all LTM processors and simultaneously
disappears from STM, all in the same single step in the time interval [t+h, t+h+1).
The Up-Tree competition takes h time-units, 1 time-unit (the time between successive clock ticks) for each of the
Up-Tree’s h levels. This is quick, but not as quick as the Down-Tree broadcast, which takes just 1 time-unit.
1.3.2.1
The Deterministic Competition Algorithm and the Competition Function
The competition algorithm is implemented by a collection of N-1 circuits, one such circuit located in each of the
N-1 non-leaf nodes v of the Up-Tree. The circuit in each such v runs a local competition that selects
(deterministically or probabilistically) one of v’s two children (siblings) based on a comparison of the chunks they
contain, then moves (a variant of) that chosen child’s chunk into v. The chosen chunk is said to be the winner of
the local competition at/for v.
In specifying this algorithm, we aim for the local competition in each node to be run by a fast tiny parallel circuit.
The competition algorithm at v uses a competition function, f, to decide which of the chunks in v’s two children
wins the local competition at that node. f is not used for any other purpose. The function, f, takes
chunk = < address, t, gist, weight, intensity, mood >
nonnegative real number
in such a way that every node in the Up-Tree can do its computation and upload the winning chunk’s information
in the time between successive clock ticks. An example of f is f(chunk) = intensity + ½ mood. In the deterministic
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CTM, the chunk with the bigger f-value, i.e. bigger f(chunk), moves up, unless its sibling has the same f-value, in
which case the sibling with the smaller address moves up.
The deterministic competition algorithm in more detail:
Consider an arbitrary vs in the CTM Up-Tree, 0 < s ≤ h. If vs has just one child, let vs-1(L) be that child, let
chunkp(L),t,s-1 be the chunk in that child, and set p = p(L) and chunkp,t,s = chunkp,t,s-1. Otherwise, vs has two children,
nodes vs-1(L) and vs-1(R), containing chunkp(L),t,s-1 and chunkp(R),t,s-1 respectively. If chunkp(L),t,s-1 has the larger f-value
or if it has the same f-value as chunkp(R),t,s-1 and the smaller address, then set p = p(L); else set p = p(R). Then
chunkp,t,s-1 is the winner of the local competition at level s. Then, at time t+s, the node vs will contain the chunk:
chunkp,t,s = < addressp, t, gistp,t,s, weightp,t,s, intensityp,t,s, moodp,t,s >, where
gistp,t,s = gistp,t,0, weightp,t,s = weightp,t,0, intensityp,t,s = (intensityp(L),t,s-1) + (intensityp(R),t,s-1), and
moodp,t,s = (moodp(L),t,s-1) + (moodp(R),t,s-1). (Here we assume that if vs has just one child, then that child contains
chunkp(L),t,s-1, and chunkp(R),t,s-1 is NIL, so intensityp(R),t,s-1 = moodp(R),t,s-1 = 0.)
NOTE 1. By a simple induction on s, each specific vs contains a chunkp,t,s with intensityp,t,s = ∑ (intensityp’,t,0) and
moodp,t,s = ∑ (moodp’,t,0) where the two sums run over all LTM processors p’ in the subtree rooted at this specific
vs.
Thus, the winning chunk of the competition that began-at time t is
chunkp,t,h = < addressp, t, gistp,t,0, weightp,t,0, ∑all N processors p’ (intensityp’,t,0), ∑ all N processors p’ (moodp’,t,0) >.
NOTE 2. The numbers intensityp,t,h/N and moodp,t,h/N are the average intensity and average mood over all
chunks put into the competition at time t.
NOTE 3. We note that in the deterministic competition described above, the winner of the competition that
began at time t depends on the specific assignment (permutation) of processors to the leaves of the Up-Tree:
Example. In the deterministic competition on four processors in Figure 3 whose chunks have gists a, b, c, d, with
weights 3, 3, 1, 4, respectively, and assuming a’s address is a number smaller than b’s, the chunk with gist a wins
the competition. If the 2nd and 3rd processors are transposed so that their gists are a, c, b, d, then d wins.
Figure 3 Deterministic Competition with Competition Function f: chunk
intensity.
NOTE 4. In the probabilistic competition to be introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), local decisions are made
with the aid of a coin-flip neuron (Section 2.1). For “additive” competition functions f (Definition 2.2.1), the
winner of the competition will be independent of the assignment of processors to the leaves of the Up-Tree. In
fact, something even better will hold true: the average fraction of time that a chunkp,t,0 gets to be in STM (in the
form of chunkp,t,h) is given by f(chunkp,t,0) / ∑all N LTM processors p’ f(chunkp’,t,0) (see Theorem 2.2.1).
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1.3.2.2
The Competition Computation
For t > 0 and s > 0, the computation to update the chunk at node vs consists of doing all the following in 1 timeunit:
(i) Evaluating which of the chunks associated with vs’s children, vs-1(L) or vs-1(R), has the greatest value of f,
f(vs-1(L)) or f(vs-1(R)),17 and if both have the same value, which has the smallest address, and choosing
that one,
(ii) putting the address, gist and weight (but not the intensity and mood) of the chunk selected in (i) into
the chunk at vs, and
(iii) summing the intensities and moods of the chunks associated with vs’s children, and setting those sums
to be the intensity and mood respectively of the chunk at vs.18
NOTE 5. (i) above uses f to select a child, but once that child is selected, (ii) and (iii) make no further use of f.
Every parent node vs is a dedicated circuit that performs (i), (ii), and (iii). These computations, all three of which
must be completed in 1 time-unit, put a bound on both the size of the chunk in a node and the amount of
computation that can be performed in that node.19
NOTE 6. At the end of Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) we discuss the competition computation to update the chunk at
node vs for the probabilistic CTM. Since the only difference in the models (deterministic vs. probabilistic) is how
local winners in the Up-Tree competition are chosen (the probabilistic CTM utilizes a coin-flip neuron), the only
difference in the computation will be in (i).
The interested reader may take a detour here to visit Chapter 2.
1.4 More CTM Dynamics
Here we discuss some CTM dynamics that will play a role in CTM’s feelings of pain and pleasure (Chapter 4).
The Interrupt Constant
Built into the CTM is a positive real number, the Interrupt constant 𝛊. When a chunk gets to STM, it gets
broadcast. If that chunk has intensity ≥ 𝛊, its reception causes all LTM processors to put their current work on a
stack and to pay attention to the interrupt. So long as chunks passing through STM have intensity ≥ 𝛊, no
processor can return to work unless, in its opinion, that work is potentially useful/ directly relevant/ tied to
dealing with the interrupt. The Interruption of all processors coincides with the excruciating pain when a ligament
is torn. In part, this is because the Model of the World processor (Chapter 3) sees itself, actually its model of
itself, in terrible pain. Section 4.1 discusses the role that the constant 𝛊 plays in the “feeling” of pain.
A normal broadcast, unlike an interrupt, does not force any processor to put its work on a stack and pay full
attention to it.
17 This evaluation consists of two fast computations ofif and a comparison of their values.
18 The “linear operation” of summing was chosen because it is quick and yields many important features. For example, for mood, positive
and negative valences cancel each other, while two negatives or two positives reinforce each other. The CTM is highly nonlinear, however,
as a result of prediction, feedback, and learning (Section 1.5), as well as the nonlinear intrinsic operations of the LTM processors
themselves.
19 The space required to store a chunk must be large enough to store a log N bit (or log N digit) address, and to store a gist whose length is
2
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no greater than what is required to store approximately two lines of English or its equivalent in Brainish, very roughly 128x128 = 214 bits.
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Increasing Weights
The CTM is built to look for ways to increase weights, whether positive or negative e.g. +2 +3 and -2 -1. In the
CTM, anything that increases weights is noted, learned and viewed as “pleasure”. The baby learns that milk when
hungry counters the negative weight of hunger. After that, whenever and for whatever reason the baby is in pain,
it looks for the breast to reduce the pain. See (Leknes & Tracey, 2008) and (Harrison, et al., 2016). In Section 4.2
we argue that the dynamics of aiming to increase weights plays a role in the “feeling” of pleasure.
The High Level Story
We assume that at each time t, each processor p stores in its internal memory a tuple consisting of the chunkp,t,0
it submitted to the competition at time t, and all chunks it received at time t, whether by broadcast (as chunkp,t-h,h)
from STM, from links, or from input maps. This history is necessary for the operation of the sleeping experts
algorithm. In addition, it can contribute to a high level story of what p saw and did. Periodically, this stored
information may be pruned so only “salient” chunks remain, the most “salient” being those that represent
unexpected, bad (breaking a bone), or wonderful (birthday party) events. We do not specify details of this pruning
process, if any, in the CTM.
1.5 Predictive Dynamics
In this section, we discuss predictive dynamics20 = prediction + feedback + learning in the CTM. .
•
•
•
Predictions in CTM are made by each and every LTM processor. These are made both inside the
processor’s internal algorithms and through its connections to outside the processor – as it submits
chunks to the competition for STM, to other processors via links, and to actuators.
Feedback comes from chunks that are received through broadcasts from STM, through links, and from
sensors of the outer world via Input maps.
Learning and Correcting takes place within processors.
There is a continuous cycling of prediction, feedback and learning within CTM. In Chapter 3, we argue that
the “feeling” of consciousness in the CTM arises in part from this cycling.
Suppose you command your walk processor to walk you from home to work. With experience, that walk can be
accomplished automatically, unconsciously, and your de facto prediction at the start of the walk can be a straightforward walk with no interruptions. During the walk, attention can be paid elsewhere. Stumbling and skinning a
knee, however, invalidates your prediction. It serves as feedback to the processor that made the prediction.21
Next time you go out, you may avoid or pay special attention to that section of sidewalk.
20 This is related to “predictive processing.” See, in particular, (Lee & Mumford, 2003), (Friston, 2003), (Friston, 2005), (Cleeremans, 2014),
(Clark, 2015), (Seth, 2015) and (Hohwy & Seth, 2020). Also see the earlier, “nets with circles”, in (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943).
21 Question: Does the walk processor call attention to the stumble (you expect to be upright when you plant your left foot in front of your
right, but instead you find yourself falling), or does the pain processor call your attention? Put another way, do you notice you are
stumbling before or after your knee gets skinned? In the late 1880’s, William James asked a similar question (see (Ananthaswamy, 2015, p.
149)).
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Sleeping Experts Algorithm
Sleeping Experts Algorithms are a class of learning algorithms employed by LTM processors.22 Here we present
one of the simplest versions of the Sleeping Experts Algorithms23 for correcting errors in processors that
generated faulty chunks.
Recall that as part of its high level story (Section 1.4.3), every processor maintains a list of all chunks it has ever
submitted to the competition. Each chunk is initially stored “unchecked”. The following Sleeping Experts
Algorithm checks off some of these chunks:
Fix t > 0. At whatever time t’ > t + h a processor p learns (via broadcasts from STM, links or otherwise) that its
submission to the competition at time t (whether or not that submission reached STM) was right or wrong, and
provided that that submission has not yet been checked off, p does the following:
1.
2.
If what got to STM at time t+h was right, then p does nothing.
If what got to STM at time t+h was wrong, and
if p was right at time t, then
p promotes itself, i.e. increases its intensity giving power (say by multiplying it by 3/2), and
p checks off this submission.
if p was wrong at time t, then
p corrects its error to the extent it can (e.g. her name was Tina, so it did not begin with S),
p then demotes itself, i.e. lowers its intensity-giving ability (say by multiplying it by 1/2),24, 25 and
p checks off this submission.
The way that processor p can tell that it was right or wrong at time t, and that what got into STM at time t+h was
right or wrong, is from feedback p receives at some time t’ > t + h, which would come not only from what STM
broadcasts but also from what p receives from other processors via links and from the environment via Input
maps. In general, every processor looks and judges for itself if it was in error.
Beliefs can be corrected and recorrected repeatedly. To see how this happens, consider the “i before e” rule for
English spelling:
i before e except after c, or when sounded like a as in neighbor or weigh, with exceptions
such as weird, policies, neither, seize, nor forfeit, either, caffeine, albeit, glacier, species.
Now imagine there is one processor for the whole "i before e” rule, and separate processors for each word whose
spelling must be remembered.
The first few times the processor pcaffeine for the correct spelling of "caffeine" sees that the misspelling of the word
got into STM the algorithm raises the intensity giving power of pcaffeine until it overrides the “i before e” rule. Once
its correction is high enough to override, CTM stops making mistakes on “caffeine” and so the algorithm stops
raising pcaffeine’s intensity giving power.
22 These Sleeping Experts Algorithms are typically viewed as centralized procedures for adjusting |weights| on basic predictors (called
"specialists" or "sleeping experts") that at any given time may make a prediction or abstain. In our setting, these Sleeping Experts
Algorithms will be implemented in a distributed fashion, with each processor made responsible for correcting its own weights.
23 More sophisticated Sleeping Experts Algorithms will be presented in an expanded version of this paper. See also, (Blum A. , 1995) (Blum
A. , 1997), (Freund, Schapire, Singer, & Warmuth, 1999) , (Blum & Mansour, 2007) and (Blum, Hopcroft, & Kannan, 2015).
24 The 3/2 and 1/2 are chosen so that an equal numbers of increases and decreases do not affect the average weight.
25 If what got to STM was different from p's gist, then p may choose to not demote itself or to demote itself less.
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1.6 Definition of Consciousness in the CTM
Psychologists have defined consciousness as awareness of sensory stimulation - as opposed to merely being
awake and receiving stimulation. “We are not conscious of everything we see and hear, nor of all of the
information processing occurring in our own brains. We are aware of only a small subset of input and processing,
which is woven together into a continuous and seamless narrative that we experience.” (Novella, 2010)
Here we present our definitions of consciouness in the CTM, some of which have been stated earlier. Again,
these are formal definitions; in Chapter 3 we discuss what generates the feeling of conscious awareness in CTM.
DEFINITION 1.6.1. At each time t, t ≥ 0, STM holds exactly one chunk, which is designated to be the entirety of
CTM‘s conscious content at time t. Conscious awareness in CTM of that chunk, which is broadcast from STM at
time t, is defined to be its reception by all LTM processors at time t+1.26, 27
One reason to keep the number of chunks in STM small (exactly one in our model), and to keep the amount
of information in any gist (and hence in any chunk) small (at most two lines of Brainish), is to ensure that all
processors focus on (are consciously aware of) the same information in the broadcast from STM.28 Equivalently,
permitting just one chunk at a time into STM focuses the “feeling of consciousness” (see Chapter 3) that occurs
when all processors pay attention to the same tightly circumscribed content. A second reason is that while it
might seem preposterous that the theater model could succeed with no central executive and just one actor on
stage, these restrictions together with feedback and learning (Section 1.5) underscore how the model succeeds
even in this extreme case, supporting our third reason: to keep the model as simple as reasonably possible. Leslie
Valiant (Valiant, 2013, pp. 127-128) views limited computational resources and constraints imposed by the need
to learn as the primary reason for the small size of conscious information.
Since CTM becomes consciously aware of the winning chunkp,t,h at time t+h+1, it follows that that there is a delay
of h+1 time units for CTM to become consciously aware of the winning gist that was submitted to the competition
at time t, as well as the (average) mood of all gists that were submitted at time t. Neuroscience research
demonstrates that there are time delays of 300msec or more, between the time that decisions are made by
unconscious processors and the time that humans first feel that they consciously made them (Libet B. (., 1985),
(Bode, et al., 2011) and (Guggisberg & Mottaz, 2013).
At all times t > 0, the CTM is continuously active with chunks competing in the Up-Tree to get into STM and the
chunk in STM being broadcast to all LTM processors. Thus CTM is continuously consciously aware of the changing
content of STM.
DEFINITION 1.6.2. The stream of consciousness (t1, t2) is the sequence of chunks broadcast from STM to LTM in
the time between t1 and t2. We describe this as the stream of consciousness without a time interval when that
time interval is irrelevant.
26 Note that while cognitive neuropsychology literature, e.g., (Graziano, Guterstam, Bio, & Wilterson, 2020), distinguishes between
conscious awareness and attention, the CTM makes no such distinction.
27 Blindsight provides a striking example of the difference between conscious and unconscious awareness (Striemer, Chapman, & Goodale,
2009). In blindsight, the CTM (or person) does not consciously see the outer world. Information from the Input sensors (eyes) goes directly
to a subset of LTM processors related to vision but does not get up to STM (due to some malfunction, perhaps a break in the Up-Tree) and
(therefore) does not get broadcast. For this reason, CTM (she) is not consciously aware that it (she) can see. However, information can be
communicated between (unconscious) processors via links. For example, orders can be given by the Walk Processor to the leg actuator to
take a walk that avoids obstacles. At a high level, this suggests how the blind-sighted person can have the surprising ability to avoid
obstacles, despite that she believes herself to be blind.
28 At the other extreme, consider an STM sufficiently large to contain a chunk from each of the N processors. That CTM clearly has
problems focusing attention.
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The constant bubbling of chunks competing to get up into STM, together with the continual broadcasting of
successive winners down to LTM, produces the stream of consciousness. As in humans (James, 1890), this
dynamic stream helps give CTM the “feeling” of consciousness including its richness and texture (see Chapter 3).
The stream of consciousness is sustained by the constant bubbling of chunks as suggested by the (Gazzaniga,
2018) metaphor:
“Each mental event is managed by brain modules [CTM processors] that possess the capacity to make
us conscious of the results of their processing. The results [CTM chunks] bubble up from various
modules like bubbles in a boiling pot of water. Bubble after bubble, each the end result of a module’s or
a group of modules’ processing, pops up and bursts forth for a moment, only to be replaced by others in
a constant dynamic motion. Those single bursts of processing parade one after another, seamlessly
linked by time. … “
The Current Mood
Conscious awareness in CTM affects CTM’s mood.
DEFINITION 1.6.1.1. Let t > h + 1. The current mood of CTM at time t, moodt, is defined to be the mood of the
chunk that is broadcast from STM at time t-1 and received by LTM processors at time t (so CTM is consciously
aware of it at time t). Similarly, the current intensity of CTM at time t, intensityt, is defined to be the intensity of
the chunk that is received by LTM processors from STM at time t.
NOTE. moodt = ∑all N LTM processors p moodp,t-1-h,0 and intensityt = ∑all N LTM processors p intensityp,t-1-h,0. So moodt/N and
intensityt/N are the averages, respectively, of the moods and intensities of the chunks that were submitted to the
competition at time t-1-h.
Moodt is the measure of CTM’s “optimism/happiness” if positive, or “pessimism/sadness” if negative, at time t.
(Kringelbach & Berridge, 2017) argue that in humans “emotion is always valenced—either pleasant or
unpleasant—and dependent on the pleasure system”. Similarly, intensityt is the measure of CTM’s level of
“energy/enthusiasm/confidence” at time t.
These measures are formal definitions of the stated feelings; they are not arguments that the CTM actually has
those feelings. For that, see Chapters 3 and 4.
CTM’s current mood globally affects the weights that processors assign to the gists that they submit to the UpTree competition. This happens in part because when a processor chooses the sign of a weight, if it is not clear
what that sign should be, the sign is taken to be that of the moodt. Thus, a positive moodt encourages positive
thoughts, while a negative mood discourages them (leading to negative thoughts).
In addition, the CTM does the following: if the current mood is positive (negative), processors raise (drop) the
weight they otherwise assign their “current” gist by a certain positive (negative) amount ∆•w. Here 0 < ∆ < 1 is a
constant of the CTM; w is the weight that CTM would otherwise assign the gist.
1.7 The Conscious TM in Toto
Chapter 1 focuses primarily on the basic architecture and dynamics of the deterministic CTM. The main
components of CTM’s architecture are STM, LTM (processors), Down-Tree, Up-Tree, Links, Input (maps), Output
(maps) and chunks. The main dynamics include chunk production, competition for STM, broadcasts to LTM, link
formation, input output mapping, and learning based on prediction and feedback.
Chapter 2 defines the probabilistic CTM. The only difference between the deterministic and probabilistic CTM is
that the probabilistic model uses a coin-flip neuron at every non-leaf node of the Up-Tree. The probabilistic CTM
has the nice property that, when the competition function f is additive (Definition 2.2.1 of Chapter 2), all chunks
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submitted to the Up-Tree competition get a fraction of time in STM. That fraction at time t is { f(chunkp,t,0) / (∑all N
LTM processors p’ f(chunkp’,t,0)) }, which is chunkp,t,0’s share of its f-value, f(chunkp,t,0). That f(chunkp,t,0) is a measure of
the importance and correctness of chunkp,t,0 as determined by f.
We are interested in the explanatory power of the basic CTM, whether it be deterministic or probabilistic. To this
end, we single out several key processors essential for the feeling of consciousness (Chapter 3). We do not focus
on developing the LTM processors, though they are the heavy lifters that provide much of the functionality of the
CTM.
Here is a sketch of our formal model, the CTM:
To get on the stage, a process mus
Short Term Memory
TINY
EXTERNAL INPUT
read only
CONSCIOUS
SMALL
SHORT TERM MEMORY
read/write
Q:
A
EXTERNAL OUTPUT
write only
then each chunk gets less time on
Chunk
produces depression.
UP-Tree
Fast
COMPETITION
BROADCAST
Long Term Memory
UNCONSCIOUS
MANY parallel
processors, links
emerge over time
Processor
Processor
Processor Processor
Processor Processor
Processor
Processor
Processor
Processor
Processor
Processor
Processor
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Memory
Vision
Inner Speech
Visuospatial
Sketchpad
Verbal
Rehearsal
Model of
World
Procedural Declarativ
Memory Memory
Memory
/
Siri
PROCESSOR INTERFACE
Figure 4 CTM in Toto.
In a comparison of CTM to Baars’ Theater Model (Figure 1), Short Term Memory (STM) is the stage. In CTM,
there is always just one and the same actor on stage. At every step in time, that actor gets handed the winning
chunk as a script for broadcast. The Down-Tree is the broadcast system, the Up-Tree is the competition process,
and the Long Term Memory (LTM) is the audience of processors, each vying to get its chunk to the (actor on)
stage.
Note that the CTM differs from Baars’ Theater Model in several ways, including especially:
a
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The CTM has no Central Executive aka stage manager.
In CTM, Inputs from the environment go directly to LTM, not to STM.
In CTM, Outputs to the environment are sent from LTM, not STM.
In CTM, unlike in humans, Working Memory = Short Term Memory.
In CTM, chunks compete in a well-defined competition to reach STM. That competition is vague in the
Theater model.
6. In CTM, conscious awareness lies in the reception by all LTM processors of the content of STM. It is not
an event that occurs between Input and STM.
7. Baddeley and Hitch prove the existence of a tiny Speech Buffer that they call the Phonological Loop for
Verbal Rehearsal (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), (Baddeley, 1986), (Baddeley, 2000) and (Baddeley, 2010).29
29 If one needs to remember a phone number, one can repeat the number over and over until paper and pencil is found to write it down.
This keeps the Speech Buffer full, making it difficult to use that buffer to find one’s way around in the world. Finding paper and pencil is
possible because the Visuospatial Sketchpad is available to help plan and implement this search.
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They view the Phonological Loop as a component of STM not LTM. Baars places it between STM and
LTM. To keep our model simple (rather than physiologically correct), CTM has no Phonological Loop
(though it can recruit an LTM processor to do some of what the Phonological Loop does).
8. Baddeley and Hitch prove the existence of a Visuospatial Sketchpad as another component or slave of
STM. To keep CTM simple (rather than physiologically correct), it has no Visuospatial Sketchpad (though
it can recruit an LTM processor to do some of what the Visuospatial Sketchpad does).
9. As in the “Extended Mind Theory" of (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), CTM can have access to existing
technology - Google, WolframAlpha, AlphaGo, NELL, and so on – in the form of LTM processors tasked to
use these apps. This is one way to ensure that CTM has a huge collection of powerful processors at the
start of its life, a collection that is also augmentable throughout life.
We note that key features of the formal CTM and its dynamics resonate with properties of consciousness that
(Dennett D. C., 2018) outlines:
[Neither] a Master Scheduler, nor a Boss Neuron, nor a Homunculus or Res Cogitans [govern the
transitions of our conscious minds]. [What governs] must be a dynamical, somewhat competitive
process of contents vying for fame, for cerebral celebrity ... or relative clout against the competition.
What determines the winners? Something like micro-emotions, the strength of positive and negative
valences that accompany and control the destiny of all contents, not just obviously emotionally
salient events such as obsessive memories of suffering or embarrassment or lust, but the most
esoteric and abstract theoretical reflections.
2
The Probabilistic CTM
The CTM defined in Chapter 1 is completely deterministic. Chunks that have low f-values, typically those for
context and background, often do not get into STM. Humans, on the other hand, are generally conscious of
context and background.
In the probabilistic CTM - but not the deterministic CTM - under reasonable conditions30 on the relative
importance of different chunks, a chunkp,t,0 will win the competition for STM a fraction of time proportional to its
importance (Theorem 2.2.1).
The concepts and discussions regarding CTM, except as otherwise noted, apply to both deterministic and
probabilistic models. The only difference between models is that the probabilistic CTM uses a coin-flip neuron
(defined below) in every non-leaf node of the Up-Tree. Except for that, the probabilistic CTM is completely
deterministic.
30 The condition is that the competitive function f is additive (Definition 2.2.1).
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2.1 The Coin-Flip Neuron
DEFINITION 2.1.1. A coin-flip neuron is a device that takes as input an (ordered) pair (a, b) of non-negative real
numbers (a ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0), and in one step does the following:
if a > 0 or b > 0, it outputs a with probability a/(a+b), else b; else (a + b = 0) it outputs a with probability ½.
Figure 5 A coin-flip neuron on input (a, b) with a + b > 0.
In what follows, we assume that every node of the Up-Tree, at every level s, 0 < s ≤ h, has a single coin-flip
neuron.
2.2 The Probabilistic Up-Tree Competition
Let f be an Up-Tree competition function (Section 1.3.2.1), i.e.,
f: chunk = < address, t, gist, weight, intensity, mood >
nonnegative real number
For the probabilistic competition algorithm (with competition function f):
The address, t, gist, and weight of the chunk to be associated with vs, 0 < s ≤ h, will be,
•
•
with probability f(chunkL) / (f(chunkL) + f(chunkR)), it will be the address, t, gist, and weight of the
chunkL associated with its left child L. In this case, we say that chunkL moves up and set p = p(L).
If chunkL does not move up, then the chunkR associated with its right child R, chunkR, moves up and set
p = p(R).
The other parameters of the chunk associated with vs are defined, as for the deterministic competition (Section
1.3.2.1), by
intensityp,t,s = (intensityp(L),t,s-1) + (intensityp(R),t,s-1) and moodp,t,s = (moodp(L),t,s-1) + (moodp(R),t,s-1).
DEFINITION 2.2.1. A competition function f is additive if for each t, 0 < t, each s, 0 < s ≤ h, each node vs, and each
chunkp,t,s in vs, f(chunkp,t,s) = f(chunk p(L),t,s-1) + f(chunk p(R),t,s-1).
In this case, it is convenient to define +f to be an operation on the chunkL and chunkR in sibling vertices that sets
chunkP in their parent vertex to be chunkP = chunkL +f chunkR.
Examples of additive competition functions include:
f(chunkp,t,s ) = intensityp,t,s, or more generally
f(chunkp,t,s ) = intensityp,t,s + c•moodp,t,s for any real c, -1 < c < +1,
but not the competition function f(chunkp,t,s ) = |moodp,t,s| as it is not additive, nor the function f(chunkp,t,s ) =
moodp,t,s as it is not even a competition function.
We next show that the probabilistic competition with any additive competition function f gives every processor p
a fraction of time in STM at time t+h that is proportional to the f-value of its chunk, f(chunkp,t,0), at time t.31 To
see this through an example (Figure 6), suppose LTM has 4 processors with chunks a, b, c, d having f-values 1, 3,
2, 4, respectively. Then b will get a fraction of time in STM that is 3/(1+3+2+4):
z
31 In this way, just for example, the environment (via inputs to processors) generally maintains a presence in STM.
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Figure 6 A Probabilistic Up-Tree.
THEOREM 2.2.1 Let f be any additive competition function. Then for every processor p and time t ≥ 0,
the probability that p wins the competition that began at time t, which by definition is the probability that
chunkp,t,h is in STM at time t+h, is f(chunkp,t,0) / ∑all N LTM processors p’ f(chunkp’,t,0). In symbols,
pr {p wins the competition that began at time t} =def pr {chunkp,t,h is in STM at time t+h}
= f(chunkp,t,0) / ∑all N LTM processors p’ f(chunkp’,t,0).
PROOF: Self-evident from the example. ∎
COROLLARY 2.2.1. Let f be any additive competition function. Then for all p and t, the probability that chunkp,t,0
reaches STM at time t+h is independent of the location of p (or any other processor) on the leaves of the Up-Tree.
Equivalently, the permutation chosen to assign processors to leaves of the Up-Tree has no effect on the sequence
of broadcasts from STM.
While this convenient result holds for the competition function f(chunkp,t,s) = intensityp,t,s because this f is
additive, it does not hold for the competition function f(chunkp,t,s) = |weightp,t,s|, which puts a chunk having the
largest |weight| at time t into STM.
Notice that for any additive competition function f, background chunks (i.e. chunks that get only a small fraction
of time in STM) lurk constantly in consciousness, being (almost) completely out of consciousness only when CTM
focuses intensely on something that needs full attention. This is one of several nice properties of the probabilistic
CTM with additive competition function.
2.3 The Probabilistic Up-Tree Computation
In Section 1.3.2.2 we discussed the computation involved in updating the chunk at node vs in the deterministic
Up-Tree competition. Here we do the same for the probabilistic Up-Tree competition:
For t > 0 and s > 0, the computation to update the chunk at node vs consists of doing all the following in 1 timeunit:
(i) Computing the f-value of the chunks associated with vs’s children, f(vs-1(L)) and f(vs-1(R)), and
a) if (f(vs-1(L)) + f(vs-1(R))) ≠ 0, choosing the left child vs-1(L) of vs with probability vs-1(L)/(f(vs-1(L)) + f(vs-1(R)))
else the right child vs-1(R) of vs, or
b) if (f(vs-1(L)) + f(vs-1(R)) ) = 0, choosing the left child of vs with probability ½
(ii) putting the address, gist and weight of the chunk selected in (i) into the chunk at vs, and
(iii) summing the intensities and moods of the chunks associated with vs’s children, and setting those sums to
be the intensity and mood respectively of the chunk at vs.
NOTE. The evaluation in (i) consists of two fast computations of f, a sum and division of their values, and a fast
probabilistic selection. (ii) and (iii) are the same as the deterministic competition.
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3 The Feeling of Conscious Awareness 32
While CTM is consciously aware by definition of the broadcasted content of STM, this definition does not explain
what generates the feeling of conscious awareness in CTM. This brings us to our big question: Will CTM have the
“feeling” that it is conscious? While we believe that the answer is YES, we cannot prove anything mathematically
without a definition of the “feeling of consciousness”, which we do not have (yet).33 Instead, we now present
arguments for our belief that CTM has the “feeling” that it is conscious. In Chapter 4 we argue that CTM can have
also the feeling of pain and pleasure.
Dreams play a special role in this argument.34 That is because inputs and outputs are turned off in sleep, so what
you see, hear, feel and do in a dream are creations – fabrications - of brain-generated gists. Dreams give a sense
of the enormous power of Brainish to express sensations, actions, and feelings. The architecture of the CTM
ensures that what you see in the environment has been coded by sensors of the environment into gists that go
from those sensors to a few specialized LTM processors to STM and from there by broadcast to all LTM
processors. As a consequence, dreams can be generated internally from memories using the same processing
that enables the Model-of-the-World processor (defined below) to predict consequences of possible actions. In
addition, dreams are conscious happenings that are capable of expressing emotions superbly.
We argue that the feeling of consciousness in CTM is a consequence principally of its extraordinarily expressive
Brainish language, coupled with CTM’s architecture, certain special processors, and CTM’s predictive dynamics
(prediction, feedback and learning).
More specifically:
1. The content of STM (i.e., the conscious content of CTM) is broadcast to all LTM processors, so all
processors responsible for the feeling of consciousness know what’s in STM.
2. Certain processors play a special role in generating the feeling of consciousness. Here we consider a few
such processors that have their specialized algorithms built into them at birth:35
•
The Model-of-the-World processor is a collection of processors that construct models of CTM’s outer
and inner worlds. We call each of these models a model-of-the-world. The Model-of-the-World
processor tags various constituent parts of the model(s) as either self, not-self, or unknown. It also
tags parts with additional descriptions such as the actions they can perform annotated in Brainish.36
32 Discussions of consciousness often pit access (or functional) consciousness against phenomenological (the subjective experience of)
consciousness. (Block, 1995) sees these two types of consciousness as distinct. (Kriegel, 2006) argues that, while different, the former is a
subcategory of the latter. We believe that subjective experience (e.g., the feeling of what it is like to be me) is possible in the CTM, and that
the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) can be filled. This viewpoint aligns closely with Baars (see (Kaufman, 2020) interview) and (Dennett D.
C., 2016).
33 We are exploring IIT (Tononi, 2004), among other theories, for a definition of the “feeling of consciousness”. The CTM has a positive,
PHI, IIT’s measure of consciousness, but does having consciousness, according to this measure, imply that it has the feeling of
consciousness?
34 Most people dream and most dreams have a large visual component. If you don’t dream or don’t remember your dreams, then our
argument is not for you. If your dreams are auditory or tactile, you may be able to substitute that sense for the vision that we discuss.
35 In the expanded version of this paper
(Blum, Blum, & Blum, Towards a Conscious AI: A Computer Architecture Inspired by Cognitive
Neuroscience, In preparation) we discuss these processors in more detail, as well as processors for Sleep, Dreams, Meditation and
Motivation.
36 For example, the notation attached to a leg representation might be “this leg can be moved with the power of thought; but this leg has
no sensory feeling.”
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•
The Inner Speech processor takes any speech (inner37 or Brainish coded outer)38 encoded in the gist
broadcast by STM and maps it to the same location(s) that the Input map sends gists of outer speech.
When the CTM begins speaking, speech from the Inner Speech processor passes through STM. After
enough speech has passed through STM, that speech can go directly through links.
•
Inner Vision39 and Inner Sensation processors map whatever images/sensations (inner or Brainish
coded outer) are broadcast from STM to whatever locations input maps send outer scenes/outer
sensations. This enables CTM to see with its “mind’s eye” what it sees with its actual sensory eye and
to sense with its “mind’s skin” what it senses with its actual sensory skin. (The mind’s eye in the
model-of-the-world “sees” whatever the CTM recalls from its visual memory. Similarly, the mind’s
skin in the model-of-the-world “senses” whatever CTM recalls from sensory memory.)
The Inner Speech, Inner Vision, and Inner Sensation processors are special purpose decoders that extract
speech, vision, and sensation from the multi-modal gists that STM broadcasts.40 They and the Model-ofthe-World processor contribute to the feeling of consciousness as follows:
•
The Model-of-the-World processors maintain models of the outer and inner worlds. They have
several important jobs that give the CTM its sense of self, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Generating, recalling and maintaining (personal) maps of CTM’s worlds,
distinguishing self from not-self in those worlds,
helping to predict/correct actions of self and not-self in those worlds,
helping to plan actions in the environment (outer world),
labeling the objects in those worlds (in Brainish), and
labeling the CTM in its models of itself as “consciously aware”, which it does when it detects itself
thinking about its own consciousness.
The Model-of-the-World processor can create and stitch together a sequence of chunks to produce
an “inner movie”, which sends images, smells and sounds to the appropriate (model-of-the-world)
sensory input processors, and generates a range of actions that it sends to the appropriate (modelof-the-world) “actuators”.
•
Inner speech in a human is what the mind’s tongue speaks and the mind’s ear hears (when one talks
in inner voice to oneself). Inner speech enables CTM to recollect its past, predict its future, and make
plans.41 The gists of inner speech (such as occur in talking to oneself or hearing in a dream) are nearly
indistinguishable from the gists of outer speech (the gists created by the Input maps).42
37 Inner speech is the inner voice that CTM uses to do planning and forecasting.
38 Recall (Section 1.1) that inner speech is always in Brainish and that Input maps turn outer speech into Brainish.
39 Since blind people are conscious, a Visual Scene processor is not necessary for consciousness: A Sensory Scene processor, for example,
can replace it.
40 (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2015) identify five types of thoughts (gists) that humans are conscious of: an inner voice (an articulation of one’s
thoughts), an inner image (perhaps a map or dream image), a sensation (mostly external, as of hot, cold, tasty, slippery), a feeling (mostly
internal, as of joy, anger, desire), a wordless thought (mindful meditation). As discussed in this chapter, the processors that produce such
gists play a special role in giving CTM its sense of consciousness.
41 Many animals have speech, not just humans. For example, prairie dogs have a complex communication system of tones for
communicating information about predators to other prairie dogs (Slobodchikoff, Perla, & Verdolin, 2009) and (Slobodchikoff C. N., 2012).
They use inner versions of this language to plan how to avoid predators.
42 In humans, inner speech sounds so much like outer speech that it can be difficult, as in schizophrenia, to distinguish between Inner and
outer speech (Rosen, et al., 2018).
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•
CTM’s inner vision enables CTM to create the inner images that CTM uses to generate imaginings or
dreams. Examples of imaginings include maps, visual concepts, and so forth. The gists of inner vision
are barely distinguishable from the gists of outer vision (the gists created by the Input maps).43 Most
humans see inner images most sharply in dreams, and with notable exceptions much less sharply in
daydreams or imaginings (Marks, 1973) and (Zeman, Dewar, & Della Sala, 2015).44 Whether awake or
in a dream, an image gist can give the impression of an entire scene, all that the eye sees. After all,
the gist holds the essence of the scene. The impression of seeing the whole of a scene is an illusion.
In summary, the feeling of consciousness or conscious awareness arises in part from the fact that Brainish
is a very expressive language, and that every chunk that ever reaches STM is heard by CTM’s “inner ear“,
seen by its “inner eye“, felt by its “inner sense of touch” and so on, in ways that very closely match what is
heard, seen, and felt by outer ears, eyes, and touch.45 This makes dreams extraordinarily realistic.
Reduced functioning of these processors may create a reduced sense of consciousness. For example, Jill
Bolte Taylor in My stroke of insight (Taylor, 2008) describes her own diminished state of consciousness
following a stroke that disabled her (inner and outer) speech centers.
3. We argue that CTM’s continuous cycling through prediction, feedback and learning (Section 1.5),
together with the stream of consciousness (Section 1.6), play a role in CTM’s feeling of consciousness.
This constant pro-active prediction-making and subsequent action informed by feedback that helps give
this feeling. The feeling is further enhanced by (parallel) predictive dynamics in CTM’s Model-of-theWorld where planning and testing is constantly carried out, often before action is taken by the CTM.
Positive feedback gives CTM an indication that it understands what is going on; negative feedback unless it is about something that could not have been predicted such as an unexpectedly loud noise gives CTM evidence of something that it did not know or understand.
4. A minimal general ability to think/plan plus the motivation (= energy + drive) to do it. As (Valiant,
2013) says, “While there may be many kinds of intelligence, some minimum ability to reason from
learned information, with all the uncertainties that that entails, has to have a role.”
We now look at the CTM from the point of view of the Model-of-the-World processor. That processor like all
processors is aware of both the inner world of imaginings and dreams (which it gets from STM) and the outer
world (which it gets indirectly from STM), hardly distinguishing between outer and inner languages and
sensations. Additionally, the Model-of-the-World processor incorporates and tags, as appropriate, this
information in its various model(s)-of-the-world, including tagging the “CTM” in all its models-of-the-world as
“consciously aware”. From outside CTM, we see that something about CTM is conscious. It cannot be the Modelof-the-World processor itself or any other processor, as processors are just machines running algorithms. We
propose that the view that CTM as a whole is conscious, as normally understood, is a consequence in part of the
fact that the Model-of-the-World processor views the “CTM” in its models-of-the-world as conscious.
43 To thwart schizophrenic hallucinations, the human brain needs to distinguish inner images from outer images when awake.
The brain
has various tricks for doing this, one being to make dreams hard to remember.
44 The eminent architect, Tasso Katselos, has written us (personal communication) that “I am constantly generating images in my mind,
[but] for me their final planning and execution never reach the richness and detail of the dream.” On the other hand, in “An update on
‘extreme imagination’”, Adam Zeman says “that around 2-3% of the population, with aphantasia, lack a mind’s eye, and that a somewhat
larger percentage, with hyperphantasia, have imagery that is ‘as vivid as real seeing’” (Zeman A. , 2020).
45 The same can be said for other senses like (dolphin’s) sonar, (bee’s) ultraviolet vision, and (dog’s) sense of smell.
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4
The Hard Problem for Pain and Pleasure
"Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.” - Jeremy Bentham (1776)
David Chalmers (Chalmers, 1995) has defined the Easy and Hard Problems of consciousness which we
reformulate here as follows:
•
The Easy Problem: Make a robot that simulates feelings.
•
The Hard Problem: Make a robot that truly experiences feelings.
While Chalmers is interested in all qualia,46 we restrict our discussion of the hard problem to the qualia of pain
and pleasure, including their extremes of agony and ecstasy. We do this in part to narrow the problem and in part
because the generation of these particular feelings is especially mystifying. While the explanations for pain also
work reasonably well for fear, the explanations for pleasure are necessarily different.
While current day robots may simulate emotions, they do not suffer the agony of pain, nor do they delight in joys
and pleasures. We want an explanation for pain and pleasure that works as well for robots having brains of silicon
and gold as for animals having brains of flesh and blood. 47
The next two sections present our explanations for pain and pleasure: 4.1 deals with pain, 4.2 with pleasure.
Although the model provides a measure of insight, we do not claim to have all the answers.
We start with pain. To clarify the difficulty of the hard problem for the case of pain, we describe a disorder called
Pain-Asymbolia. (The corresponding disorder for the case of pleasure, called Anhedonia, is relevant to Section
4.2 below.) Pain-Asymbolia is a disorder in which the individual knows all there is to know of her pain, but she
does not suffer from it (Bain, 2016). We distinguish two types:
Pain-Asymbolia 1. When hurt, the asymbolic person shows no outward sign of pain. She does not grimace or
cry out under pain; she typically giggles when pinched and pricked.
Pain-Asymbolia 2. When hurt, the person shows outward signs of pain. She grimaces, cries out, etc.
Notwithstanding these observable signs, the pain does not cause any suffering.
Both types of pain-asymbolics have working nociceptors (sensory receptors for painful stimuli). They are as aware
of their pain as any normal human being: its location, its intensity, whether it is burning-hot or freezing-cold, and
so on. But… they do not suffer.
Current-day robots are pain-asymbolic (and anhedonic).
46 Qualia = Individual instances of subjective, conscious experience.
For example, qualia include the concept of the color blue; the
experience of seeing blue eyes; hearing “Rhapsody in Blue”; and feeling blue.
47 Because it is possible for a machine to simulate pain and pleasure, we argue that any explanation for feelings in a machine needs to
include knowledge of how the machine works. For comparison, consider Gordon (not George) Gallup’s mirror test for self-awareness,
which does a reasonably good job of testing for self-awareness in visually oriented animals (Gallup, 1977). The mirror test might be a good
test for self-awareness in visually oriented machines as well, except that it is easy to build a machine with no self-awareness that passes the
mirror test. For this reason, any test of self-awareness in a machine needs to include knowledge of how the machine works. Similarly, we
claim that a test for deciding if a machine can feel/experience pain or pleasure needs to understand how the machine works.
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4.1 Pain
Our primary reason for wanting to understand pain is to solve the puzzle of how nature produces the feeling of
pain.48 A related but different reason is to figure out how a CTM can experience the feeling of pain.
But why would we want a CTM or robot to experience the feeling of pain?
•
•
•
For the same reason animals feel pain. Animals born without the suffering of pain don’t live long.
Children born with pain asymbolia typically live no more than 3 years.
Because we want robots to have empathy. Humans find it hard to understand a feeling if they have
never had that feeling.
We also hope that this understanding of pain will enable humans either to control it in themselves or
understand why they cannot.49
We have five suggestions for pain. Only five:
1. Extreme pain occurs when a chunk of extreme pain, a “scream of pain” in Brainish50, takes over STM. Its great
intensity makes it impossible for other chunks to compete successfully for STM - unless they too have
comparably great intensity. Of equal importance, pain’s weight, having a negative valence, makes each
processor assign correspondingly great weight to reducing the pain.
When extreme pain messages are broadcast from STM, every processor spends a fraction of time
proportional to the intensity of the pain to find a way to ease it. At a minimum, processors are programmed
to store information that relates the pain to their own capabilities. For example, the processor for
recognizing faces can store whatever faces appear concurrently with the pain, and whether those faces are
mitigating or exacerbating the pain. The processor for sleep can let the pain affect sleep by making it
harder/easier to sleep. The processor for sex can link pain to sex, making sex nastier or more intense (a la
Marquis de Sade).
Confirmation for extreme pain:
a) In describing physical pain, (Harnby, 2017) writes: “I’ve only been in agony a couple of times in my life,
and I was good for nothing, rendered almost immobile. Reason left me. So did language.”
b) In The Poppy Factory, (Fairchild, 1987) describes an experience of extreme pain by: “suddenly you're
48 The feeling of great hunger arises in part because a strong hunger signal allows nothing else to get into STM. CTM learns the meaning of
hunger in part through its discovery that eating (filling its fuel tank) when hungry reduces the intensity of the hunger signal.
Feelings of pain, fear and hunger (but not pleasure, relief or satiety) are achieved in similar fashion. Consider hunger: the infant CTM has a
fuel gauge processor to indicate how much fuel is in its system. The level of the fuel gauge determines the weight of its hunger gist. A
weight below zero indicates hunger, and the lower (more negative) the weight, the greater the hunger.
49 Here are some ways in which pain is special (Morrison, 2009):
- It's loud. Even small amounts shout over everything else.
- It's intrusive. You can't will it away. About the most you can do is match its intensity and drown it out.
- It makes you want to pull away. It's a flinch, abstracted. We suspect this is the "primitive op".
All animal life flinches, even stuff too simple to have a brain.
To this we add:
- It’s motivating.
50 The “scream of pain” in Brainish contains much more information than is conveyed in normal English. Artists, novelists, and poets try
their best to capture it. Louise Harnby (Harnby, 2017) points to William Fairchild’s (Fairchild, 1987) The Poppy Factory for his
description of extreme pain: “Then suddenly you're down and all movement stops like a jammed cine film. You're still screamin g but
now it's different. It's because of the pain and when you try to get up, your legs won't move. You don't know where you are. All you
know is that you're alone and probably going to die. When you stop screaming and look up, the sky is dark and you can't hear the
guns any more, only the sound of someone moaning softly. It takes a few moments before you realize it's yourself.”
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down and all movement stops like a jammed cine film. You're still screaming but now it's different. It's
because of the pain and when you try to get up, your legs won't move. You don't know where you are.
All you know is that you're alone and probably going to die. When you stop screaming and look up, the
sky is dark and you can't hear the guns any more, only the sound of someone moaning softly. It takes a
few moments before you realize it's yourself.”
2. Sudden extreme pain - a ligament at the moment it is torn – interrupts all unconscious processors. The shock
of pain is instantaneous. How does this excruciating pain come about?
a) When a chunk reaches STM, it gets broadcast. If that chunk has intensity ≥ 𝛊, where 𝛊 is the
interrupt constant of CTM (Section 1.4.1), the ensuing broadcast causes all LTM processors to put
their current work on a stack to pay “maximum attention” to the cause of the interrupt. The sudden
interruption of all processing systems - as from an unexpected whack on the head - registers as
shock.
Confirmation for sudden extreme pain:
People are known to remember exactly where they were when they tore a ligament. The decision to
store was not made consciously. That’s what autobiographical memory does when it gets interrupted
(Fivush, 2011).a
b) The difference between broadcasts and interrupts is this: A broadcast is an input to all processors
that is handled by every processor each in its own way, including possibly by disregarding it.
Interrupts, however, compel processors to put their work on a stack and pay (maximum) attention,
as mentioned above, to the cause of the interrupt.
c) In sudden extreme pain, nothing else enters STM. All consciousness is on pain. Nothing can get into
STM to temper that pain.
3. Less extreme pain and chronic pain do not so much prevent other chunks from reaching the stage as make it
“difficult” for them to reach it. In the deterministic CTM, the difficulty for a chunk to get into STM is
measured by how much greater the chunk’s intensity would have to be for it to get into STM. In the
probabilistic CTM, the difficulty is measured by how much greater the chunk’s intensity would have to be to
get allotted a “suitably larger” share of time in STM.
Confirmation for chronic pain:
a) In “The Impact of Persistent Pain on Working Memory and Learning”, (Ayres & Smith, 2014) write:
“Participants that identified as experiencing pain for 6 or more months demonstrated clinically low
levels of pain, but nevertheless performed significantly worse than pain-free participants on retention
and transfer tests.”
b) In 2008, about 100 million people were affected by chronic pain costing the U.S. $560 to $635 billion (in
2010 dollars) combing health care costs, work missed and lower wages. (Gaskin & Richard, 2012)
4. Fear causes and enhances pain. “Fear of pain and coping strategies… are known to play an important role in
the development and maintenance of pain.” (Mittinty, et al., 2017)
5. Vicious cycles. Concentration on pain reduces pain, permitting fear to take its place; concentration on fear
reduces fear, permitting pain to take its place. Such a vicious cycle sustains and reinforces both pain and fear.
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Figure 7 Cycle of Pain. (Reproduced with permission from Co-Kinetic.com).
4.2 Pleasure
Pain and pleasure are often viewed as opposite sides of the same coin:
Opposite sides: “Losses are felt as pain or anxiety, and gains as pleasure." (Szasz, 1957)
Same coin: “Emerging evidence from pain and reward research points to extensive similarities in the
anatomical substrates of painful and pleasant sensations.” (Leknes & Tracey, 2008).
Examples of pleasure include: • a mother’s love; • avoidance of pain;51 • success in achieving a goal - any goal
that CTM has consciously set for itself; 52 • coming up with a new idea for a promising course of action. 53
A processor expresses pleasure by doing some of what a processor for pain does when it gets a chunk on stage: it
hogs the stage. This is particularly true when the pleasure is extreme (ecstasy).
There are also major differences between pain and pleasure.
In the CTM, every processor spends a fraction of its time looking for ways to increase its pleasure and decrease its
pain (symbolized respectively by positively and negatively weighted gists). See Section 1.4.2. Much of this is built
into all LTM processors at birth, and reinforced by learning mechanisms. A child learns from its built-in suckle
response that milk reduces pain – in this case the pain of hunger. The child generalizes the power of food to
reduce the pain of hunger to its power to reduce all pains, and consequently it suckles whenever it has pain “even
when the pain has nothing to do with hunger per se” (Leknes & Tracey, 2008).54
Similarly, having learned that positive moods counter negative moods, CTM can try to lessen any negative mood
(pain, hunger, etc.) by seeking a counter-balancing positive mood (like food). In this way CTM learns that
negative moods can be countered by positive moods. Unless a child is taught to avoid pleasure, she will generally
not seek pain to counter-balance pleasure. This is one way in which pleasure and pain are not symmetrical.
These and other (asymmetrical) functionalities account for why the feelings generated by positively and
negatively weighted gists are different.
51 For Epicurus, “happiness was the complete absence of bodily and especially mental pains” (Bergsma, Poot, & Liefbroer, 2008). But
sometimes, pain can facilitate pleasure “by providing an important contrast for pleasurable experiences, increasing sensitivity to sensory
input, and facilitating self-rewarding behavior” (Bastian, Jetten, Hornsey, & Leknes, 2014).
52 “Nothing succeeds like success” [“Rien ne réussit comme le succès”] (Dumas, 1854); and “Success breeds success” (van de Rijt, Kang,
Restivo, & Patil, 2014).
53 Nevertheless, an excess of ideas - too many ideas to think through carefully - may be a sign of mania, while a dearth of ideas -too few to
maintain interest- may be a sign of depression.
54 In general, “the pleasure system relies on the balanced interaction over time of key brain regions…” Additionally, in humans, there
appears to be a “ ‘common currency’ reward network of interacting brain regions. Pleasures of food, sex, addictive drugs, friends and loved
ones, music, art, and even sustained states of happiness can produce strikingly similar patterns of brain activity” (Kringelbach & Berridge,
2017).
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As Michel Cabanac points out (Cabanac, 2013), behavior in humans and animals is “motivated by the trend to
seek pleasure and avoid displeasure.” Behavior is also “adapted to the defense of homeostasis in the long term,
…, not limited to correcting immediate needs but also anticipated future needs for chemical and thermal energy.”
Similarly (Lewis & Cañamero, 2016), studying autonomous robots, suggest that pleasure can have a “purely
hedonic quality not directly linked to need satisfaction,” and that both [hedonic and need] have “value for
homeostatic management in terms of improved viability, as well as in terms of more flexibility in adaptive
behavior.”
We hypothesize that a system such as CTM, built to attain homeostasis via its inherent predictive dynamics
(Section1.5), will have a feeling of pleasure and well-being in the quest and attainment of that goal.55
5
Summary
This paper looks at consciousness from the perspective of theoretical computer science. It presents a simple
formal model of Bernard Baars’ GWT (Global Workspace Theory) of Consciousness (Baars B. J., 1988) and (Baars
B. J., 2019). We believe GWT captures the essence of consciousness. In formalizing our model, the CTM
(Conscious Turing Machine), we also take a cue from (Turing, 1937), aiming for simplicity rather than complexity,
for a simple model of consciousness rather than a complex model of the brain.
Even supposing we had a complete description of the brain, and the technology to duplicate it, that would not
imply that we understand what gives rise to consciousness, the feelings of pain and pleasure, etc. We claim that
what gives rise to consciousness is the expressiveness of the brain’s inner language and the architecture of the
system, basic processes and dynamics. One purpose of the CTM model, besides formalizing Baars’ Global
Workspace Theory, is to argue this claim. Another is to provide a theoretical computer science foundation for
understanding consciousness.
This paper does the following:
1. It presents a simple mathematical model (Chapter 1) of Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theater of
Consciousness – expressed formally in the definition of the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM).
2. It discusses Brainish (Section 1.1), an enormously expressive language capable of generating the illusion
of all sensations, actions, and feelings.
3. It defines a chunk (Section 1.3.1 and 1.3.2) explicitly as a 6-tuple <address, time, gist, weight, intensity,
mood>. Cognitive psychology generally identifies a chunk with the gist alone; the CTM chunk has an
additional collection of numbers (address, time, weight, intensity, mood) that the human (only) vaguely or
approximately senses.56
4. It defines the conscious content of CTM (Section 1.6) to be whatever chunk is in STM (Short Term
Memory); and then defines conscious awareness by CTM to be the reception by all LTM (Long Term
Memory) processors of STM’s broadcast of that content. The gists of those broadcasts are the inner
thoughts generated by CTM’s unconscious processors or the speech, vision, touch, taste, and/or whatever
else is received as input by CTM.
55 This aligns also with the hypothesis that “optimal metastability could be linked to a state of eudaimonia….
As such this objective
measure of metastability could link eudaimonia (and emotions) to more global theories of brain function. One such example is the global
neuronal workspace model ….” (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2017).
56 See e.g., “Chunking Mechanisms and Learning” (Gobet & Lane, 2012).
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5. It discusses how prediction, feedback and learning (Section 1.5) enables LTM processors to adjust the
weights they give their gists based on information gleaned from conscious and unconscious awareness of
mistakes, inconsistencies57, unexpected effects, and so on.
6. It explains why the continuous broadcasting of the content of STM, the stream of consciousness, helps
give rise to consciousness as we know it (Chapter 3), namely:
• The feeling of consciousness arises in CTM because all its processors, including especially those
that are particularly responsible for consciousness, are privy to the same (conscious) content of STM, and
• the gists of outer speech (what we say and hear in the world), outer vision (what we see in the
world), and so on, are nearly indistinguishable from the gists of inner speech (what we say to ourselves),
inner vision (what we see in dreams), and most importantly,
• the gists are expressed in Brainish, an enormously expressive language capable of generating
the illusion of sensations, actions, and feelings.
7. It gives some understanding of how a pain or pleasure experience, not just its simulation, is produced
(Chapter 4).
In summary, we argue that the feeling of consciousness in the CTM is produced using the expressive power of
Brainish, which is CTM’s inner language for describing all elements of both its outer and inner worlds, and by
its architecture, certain special processors, and its predictive dynamics (prediction, feedback and learning).
An expanded version of this paper (Blum, Blum, & Blum, Towards a Conscious AI: A Computer Architecture
Inspired by Cognitive Neuroscience, In preparation) will cover the topics presented here in considerably more
detail, especially the Sleeping Experts Algorithms, as well as additional topics such as dreams, illusions and free
will.58
6
Relation to Other Theories of Consciousness
The CTM is influenced by Baars’ GWT, which is supported by the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT) of
(Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) and (Dehaene S. , 2014) in their investigation of neural correlates of consciousness.
Like the LIDA model of cognition (Baars & Franklin, 2007) and (Baars & Franklin, 2009), CTM is architectural.
Unlike LIDA, which is a more elaborate model of GWT, the CTM is intended to be a minimal model of GWT
sufficient to explain a wide range of conscious phenomena.
We see a kinship between the CTM and the self-aware robots developed by (Chella, Pipitone, Morin, & Racy,
2020).
Philosophically, we align with much of Daniel Dennett’s functionalist perspective (Dennett D. C., 1991)59 and not
so much with David Chalmers’ phenomenalist focus on qualia (Chalmers, 1996). Along with Dennett, we do not
57 Inconsistencies are detected by the Model-of-the-World processors (Chapter 3 item 2), among others.
58 Topics will also include: a further discussion of LTM processors (some central and some not so central for consciousness) including Sleep
and Dream Creation processors, Motivation processors, Meditation processors; processor recruitment; evolution of processors; more
explanatory examples; how CTM understands and extends its understanding in new directions; how various functionalities (like the
function of a Central Executive) emerge without being built into the model; and a further discussion of computational and complexity
measures (numbers, size and time).
59 We generally agree with Dennett except for his view that we are the only species to have consciousness, see (Dennett D. C., 1978),
and
more recently (Dennett D. C., 2018). In an otherwise excellent interview with Louis Godbout, Dennett expresses his view that a dog does
not have conscious awareness since it “can’t tell a story about what it is thinking about; it can’t, it doesn’t have language” (Dennett D. C.,
2019).
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see the explanatory gap (Levine, 1983) as insurmountable. Indeed, we see the CTM as helping to explain the
feeling of “what it is like” (Nagel, 1974).
As in Michael Graziano’s Attention Schema Theory (AST) (Graziano, Guterstam, Bio, & Wilterson, 2020), CTM is
consciously aware of both external and internal events. Both AST and CTM appear to embody and substantiate
illusionist notions of consciousness proposed by Dennett (Dennett D. C., 2019) and Keith Frankish (Frankish,
2016).60 Basic AST is similar to GWT: its i-consciousness (i for information) aligns somewhat with CTM’s conscious
awareness.61 We do not agree with Graziano et. al. that GWT “leaves unexplained how people end up believing
they have subjective experience,” i.e. leaves an explanatory gap. In imaginings and dreams, for example, the
feeling of subjective experience in the CTM arises when the “winning chunks” of those imaginings and dreams are
received by the same (unconscious) processors that receive chunks directly from the environment via Input maps.
Additionally, the Model-of-the-World processor incorporates the information gotten from the winning chunks
(i.e., the conscious content of the CTM) into its model(s)-of-the-world, as appropriate, tagging the “CTM” in all
models-of-the-world as “consciously aware”. Such experiences get additional heft from the constant bubbling of
chunks into STM, and their broadcast to LTM, forming streams of consciouness (Section 1.6 and Chapter 3).
These chunks are constantly evolving due in part to CTM’s dynamics of prediction, feedback, and learning (Section
1.5).
With respect to its predictive dynamics (Section 1.5), CTM incorporates elements similar to the “predictive
processing” (PP) of (Lee & Mumford, 2003), (Friston, 2003), (Cleeremans, 2014), (Clark, 2015), (Seth, 2015) and
(Hohwy & Seth, 2020). See also Section 4.2 on pleasure.
By utilizing existing technology (or apps) to supplement its supply of LTM processors (see Section 1.7), CTM
incorporates elements similar to those advocated by (Clark & Chalmers, 1998)’s “extended minds”.
We agree with Christof Koch that “There isn’t a Turing Test for consciousness. You have to look at the way the
system is built. You have to look at the circuitry, not [only] its behavior” (Paulson, 2017). We would emphasize
“architecture” as well as “circuitry”.
Along these lines, Integrated Information Theory (IIT), the theory of consciousness developed by Giulio Tononi,
(Tononi, 2004) and supported by Koch (Tononi & Koch, 2015), proposes a measure of consciousness called PHI,
defined using Shannon’s information theory. Tononi proposes five “axioms” (properties) necessary for any causal
system to have consciousness.62 Given a detailed specification of a CTM, one could in principle compute its PHI
and compare it to the PHI of any other precisely defined causal system. It turns out that many causal physical
systems have non-zero measures of PHI.63, 64
As for animal consciousness, we agree with (Mumford, submitted 2019) that consciousness is a matter of degree. Here he cites (Merker,
2007) that consciousness does not need a cerebral cortex, it arises from midbrain structures. We would also cite other studies, e.g.,
(Slobodchikoff C. N., 2012).
60 Saying that the feeling of consciousness is an illusion does not deny the existence of that feeling.
As a familiar example, the fact that a
movie is made up of (many) discrete still images does not affect the feeling of continuity one gets from viewing it. The feeling of continuity
is an illusion.
61 Full AST has three neural networks (A for receiving information, B for constructing an attention schema, and C for reporting to the
outside world) to obtain a system which purportedly thinks it has subjective experience (m-consciousness, m for mysterious).
62 In (Koch, 2019), Christof Koch outlines the axioms: “[E]very conscious experience has five distinct and undeniable properties: each one
exists for itself, is structured, informative, integrated and definite”.
63 IIT in particular validates animal consciousness.
64 There are a number of “popular” books relating to consciousness.
A few that we have particularly enjoyed include A Leg to Stand On
(Sacks, 1984, 1993); Moonwalking With Einstein: The Art and Science of Remembering Everything (Foer, 2011); The Man who wasn’t there
(Ananthaswamy, 2015); Other Minds (Godfrey-Smith, 2016); and Mamma’s Last Hug (de Waal, 2019).
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Acknowledgements
We are especially grateful to Jean-Louis Villecroze for his comments, suggestions, and painstaking multiple
reviews of this paper, his pointers to the literature, and his ongoing work to simulate CTM (Villecroze J. L.),
(Villecroze J.-L. , 2019). We thank Paul Liang for his continuing work with us. We thank the students and faculty
at CMU and PKU for their feedback in our courses. We are grateful to our friend Michael Xuan for his enormous
personal support and encouragement. We thank UniDT for their supporting grant of our work.
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About the Authors of the expanded version of this paper (Blum, Blum, & Blum, In preparation)
Manuel has been motivated to understand the mind/body problem since he was in second grade when his teacher told his
mom she should not expect him to get past high school. As an undergrad at MIT, he spent a year studying Freud and then
apprenticed himself to the great anti-Freud65 neurophysiologist Warren S. McCulloch, who became his intellectual mentor.
When he told Warren (McCulloch) and Walter (Pitts) that he wanted to study consciousness, he was told in no uncertain
terms that he was verboten to do so - and why. As a graduate student, he asked and got Marvin Minsky to be his thesis
advisor. Manuel is one of the founders of complexity theory, a Turing Award winner, and has mentored many in the field
who have chartered new directions ranging from computational learning, cryptography, zero knowledge, interactive proofs,
proof checkers, and human computation. Manuel Blum mblum@cs.cmu.edu
Lenore has been passionate about mathematics since she was 10. She attributes that to having dropped out of school when
she was 9 to wander the world, then hit the ground running when she returned and became fascinated with the Euclidean
Algorithm. Her interests turned to non-standard models of mathematics, and of computation. As a graduate student at MIT,
she showed how to use saturated model theory to get new results in differential algebra. Later, with Mike Shub and Steve
Smale, she developed a foundational theory for computing and complexity over continuous domains such as the real or
complex numbers. The theory generalizes the Turing-based theory (for discrete domains) and has been fundamental for
computational mathematics. Lenore is internationally known for her work in increasing the participation of girls and women
in STEM and is proud that CMU has gender equity in its undergraduate CS program. Lenore Blum lblum@cs.cmu.edu
Avrim had an earlier start than the elder Blums. He spent his first two years at MIT, in his mom’s office in the Math
Department, and in his dad’s office in McCulloch’s lab. In sixth grade, he solved an extra credit math problem by
programming his home-made computer to get a feel for the problem, then (once he saw what was going on) stated and
proved the desired result. Because he used a computer, he got no credit. Odd, because he was pointing to a novel way (at
the time) to solve a math problem. Avrim’s expertise is Machine Learning Theory. He has been an advisor to many of the
young leaders in the field. Avrim Blum avrim.blum@gmail.com
All three Blums received their PhDs at MIT and spent a cumulative 65 wonderful years on the faculty of the Computer Science
Department at CMU. Currently the elder two are emeriti and the younger is Chief Academic Officer at TTI-Chicago, a PhDgranting computer science research institute focusing on areas of machine learning, algorithms, AI (robotics, natural
language, speech, and vision), data science and computational biology, and located on the University of Chicago campus.
This is their first joint paper.
___________________________________________________________________________________________________
Addendum: High Level Explanations
In this paper we explored explanations for the feelings of pain and pleasure in the CTM (Chapter 4). In Insights
from the Conscious Turing Machine (Blum & Blum, 2021) we consider additional phenomena generally associated
with consciousness (see https://arxiv.org/pdf/2107.13704.pdf). These include examples related to vision
(blindsight, inattentional blindness, and change blindness) as well as dreams, free will and altered states. We give
explanations derived from the formal model and draw confirmation from consistencies at a high level with the
psychological and neuroscience literature. The model and explanations are developed further in (Blum, Blum, &
Blum, In preparation).
65 Where Freud had written The Future of an Illusion (Freud S. , 1927), McCulloch followed with “The Past of a Delusion” (McCulloch W. S.,
1953).
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Article
The Roots of Our Transformative Consciousness
Chris King*
ABSTRACT
It is proposed in this article that the ultimate answer to the “deus ex machina” paradox is neither
invoking God in the machine nor humanity as a molecular automaton, but consciousness as a
space-time spanning property of the cosmos. This implies that we are playing a pivotal and in its
essence a cosmological role through our subjective consciousness in bringing about a cognizant
universe aware of its own existence and imbued with a sense of purpose expressed in and
through our free-will and sense of compassion for the unfolding nature of conscious existence
amid the mortal toil of biological sexuality. In discovering this change of perspective lies our
redemption through taking full responsibility for our actions participating in a deepening
understanding of this extraordinary universe, in which we as sentient beings are the conscious
progenitors of its becoming.
Key Words: conscious cosmos, deus ex machina, God, free will, sentient being.
The concept of “god in the machine”
evokes all the paradoxes of nature and
existence, from religious creationism to
mechanistic atheism. We shall use this
evocative notion to escape from the
contradictions of current world views and
to discover the roots of our transformative
consciousness.
Right: Artist’s impression of human transcendence
through he evolution of nucleic acids (Cover from
Lichtenberger 1912, 4shared.com).
Tragic Roots of a Great Notion
The term “deus ex machina” has an
intriguing and paradoxical history, not
from God transcending the flawed
mechanism ascribed to nature, but the
creative process of poetry and theatre. The
Latin term goes back to the Greek ἀπὸ
μηχανῆς θεός (apò mēkhanḗs theós),
* Correspondence: Chris King http://www.dhushara.com E-Mail: dhushara@sakina.org
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meaning "god from the machine". It harks back to Dionysian theatre, where the deities were
literally portrayed in theatre using machines, such as mobile cranes, to enable the supernatural
figures to ascend from the depths, or fly into the heavens on stage.
More generally deus ex machina is conceived of as a plot device whereby a seemingly
unsolvable problem is suddenly and abruptly resolved by the contrived and unexpected
intervention of some new event, character, ability or object –a ‘supernatural’ intervention –
intended to move the story forward when the writer has "painted themself into a corner" and sees
no other way out.
Euripides' Medea, performed in 2009 in Syracuse, Italy
(Wikipedia).
Opinions about this device run right across the
spectrum. More than half of Euripides' tragedies
employ a deus ex machina in their resolution. In
Medea, a dragon-drawn chariot sent by the sun god, is
used to convey his granddaughter Medea, who has just
committed murder and infanticide, away from her
husband Jason to the safety of Athens.
However Aristotle criticized the device in “Poetics”,
where he argued that the resolution of a plot must arise
internally, from previous action of the play: "For we
grant that the gods can see everything. There should
be nothing improbable in the incidents; otherwise, it
should be outside the tragedy". However, he praised
Euripides for generally ending his plays with bad
fortune, consistent with tragedy, and suggested
"astonishment" should be sought: "since it is probable
that improbable things will happen”.
The Greeks could think this way because, although they saw their deities as omniscient, they
were polytheists who felt free to enact the lives of their gods and goddesses creatively in tragedy
and comedy. They could thus appreciate the boundaries of legitimate use of the device, unlike
monotheists who adopt more inflexible positions.
Horace in his Ars Poetica, vv. 191-92, instructs poets that they should never resort to a "god
from the machine" to resolve their plots "unless a difficulty worthy a god's unravelling should
happen."
This criticism is particularly cogent in regard to creationism, where to accede to a mythological
six day sabbatical account in Genesis, God is forced to come to the rescue of fundamentalist
religious belief, when all the scientific evidence, from the geochemical record, through fossils to
genetic sequences attests to evolutionary diversification.
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278
Two views of the Sabbatical Creation of Genesis (thepersonalistproject.org and author’s photo of a greeting card)
Intelligent Design: God Forced to Rescue His Tragically Flawed Machine
The sabbatical creation is an utterly beautiful mythological creation account. Just like the seven
layers of heaven and hell of the ancients from Sumeria to Babylon, the creation takes place in
seven days – the week, which quarters the 28 day cycle of human menses, slightly shorter than
the 29.53 day lunar cycle, just as our circadian cycle tends to be a little longer than the earth day,
but again close enough to form a resonance.
This creation, leading ultimately to woman and man in the likeness of the dyadic ‘Elohim,
follows an order which makes sense only in a flat Earth cosmos where the Sun, Moon and stars
are merely secondary fixtures on a great firmament or ‘dome’ like the lid on a dinner tray.
Consequently the creation is all out of natural and cosmological order. It begins with Earth tohu
va vohu – ‘without form or void’ – until the spirit of ‘Elohim moves on the face of the waters.
By the end of the first day we have light separated from darkness. On day two ‘Elohim put a
firmament in place to divide the waters and call it heaven. The third day the land and waters are
divided and the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after his kind, and the tree
yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself. At this point we have light and darkness, heaven, and all
the plants which are even fruiting, but no Sun, Moon or stars. It doesn’t take denial of evolution
to see from the most basic energetics that this cosmic machine is never going to fly! Only on the
fourth day do the ‘Elohim belatedly realize to put the Sun Moon and stars in the heavens. Where
the first light came from before is anyone’s guess – the big bang possibly?
On the fifth day ‘Elohim paradoxically make the fishes, whales and birds of the air who fly up
into the firmament above. Then on the sixth day in a last flurry all the creatures of the land
appear - the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their kind, and every thing that
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creepeth upon the earth. In one last afterthought, the ‘Elohim make humanity male and female
’in our image after our likeness’ to have dominion over the lot. Finally, to consecrate a holiday
for spiritual observance, the ‘Elohim rested on the Sabbath. One would have thought that, given
the invocation in the Ten Commandments against idolatry, that taking sacred texts so literally
would also be seen to be a corruption of the essential spiritual meaning, but no such luck.
Right: Evolutionary tree of the human G-protein linked receptors (Blenau & Thamm). Every one of us has all these receptors,
including everything from neuroreceptors for substances such as serotonin, to sight and smell, but their genetic sequences show a
deep evolutionary relationship having evolved long ago before the first multi-celled organisms. Left: The serotonin 1 and 2
families diverged in evolution before the mollusks, arthropods and vertebrates (Fredriksson et al, Zozulya S. et al).
When Copernicus and Galileo discovered that the flat Earth-centric cosmology was a fallacy the
church issued ex-communications. Not satisfied with finding the universe has rejected the flatearth creation, latter day Christians have rallied to paint themselves into a corner over adamantly
rejecting both cosmology and biological evolution, despite the evidence from fossils and the
geological record, the immense age, size and complexity of the universe, and finally the
overwhelming flood of genetic data since the turn of the millennium, confirming in minute
detail, the evolutionary process, from the first life forms to migrating human cultures. This is a
frank violation of Horace’s maxim not to invoke the god in the machine unless unravelling the
deity is necessary.
The intelligent-design approach flies directly in the face of all integrity. By comparison with the
menial evidence of Copernicus and Galileo we are currently faced with a tsunami of genetic
evidence consistent in every detail with the evolution of life. For example all the protein-linked
receptors in our body, from those for neurotransmitters, such as serotonin and dopamine, through
rhodopsin permitting vision, to the many diverse receptors for smell do not conform to an
independent design attuned only to their designated function, but display an evolutionary tree
showing they all evolved from a much more ancient precursor. When we take one family of
these, the serotonin receptors and compare them with those of other animals we find it originated
before the fundamental branchings of molluscs, arthropods and vertebrates, in the first single
celled eucaryotes.
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Of course the stumbling block in the creationist model of the universe is the very notion of
creation itself. As the myth goes, ‘Elohim created each of the creatures de novo as is by
commanding the earth to bring them forth and set them to carry out their fixed allotted tasks. In
the Eden version Yahweh breathes life in Adam and builds Eve from one of his ribs. This picture
sets all the life forms up as created - ‘made’ by manufacture at the beginning of time by a single
act of God. They are assembled, but do not themselves have the capacity to transform into new
forms, or to adapt to new roles. God made them then and because God made them, like
clockwork toys, they have no creative powers of their own, or that would be assuming some of
God’s powers to themselves. This despite the fact that life is sexually reproductive, even under
‘Elohim’s command to ‘be fruitful and multiply’, and thus clearly has the procreative capacity to
generate new unique life forms, which every one of us is an example of. Consequently under no
circumstances can an evolutionary process be admitted or accepted by religious creationists or
intelligent design proponents, even though the evidence is incontrovertible.
The Day of Judgment, Hans Memling (www.lib-art.com)
At every point, attempts are made to select evidence in a non-scientific way to cobble together a
resolution to this story to prove God is needed to intelligently design the universe because it
can’t pull itself up by its bootstraps. The one area where science hasn’t quite completed the
picture – how life first began – is seized upon as a critical weakness, but even in this area, the
evidence, from interstellar gas clouds, through organics on comets, to the decoding of key
reaction pathways , and the core biochemical record in living organisms continues to point to
natural biogenesis occurring almost as soon as Earth was habitable.
What is so contradictory about the intelligent design fallacy is that it consists of a tragic cycle.
Because literalists believe God created the universe and life in six days at the beginning of time,
even though it is a charming, but entirely mythological and hence metaphorical account, they are
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| April 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 3 | pp. 276-293
King, C., The Roots of Our Transformative Consciousness
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forced to believe life cannot evolve, so we end up with a machine that is doomed to eventually
break down with no hope of improvement or adaption. Because they have invented a broke
machine, they then have to complete the tragic cycle by insisting God designed the whole thing
to be this way, attempting to incorporate snippets of evidence that appear to suit these arguments,
however unscientific these may be. Because we believe God created a flawed universe without
the creative potential, we are forced into a deus ex machina fallacy, recreating God as a cosmic
designer to solve the tattered mess of life spawned in the sabbatical creation.
But the problems don’t just stop there. There are also the diabolical problems of the endless war
between good and evil and the schizophrenic divide between a heaven devoid of any creative
potential except by grace of God, and eternal damnation in the fires of hell awaiting us as
divisive futures when we die and pass into the imagined realm of pure consciousness that we are
taught to believe carries on eternally when our mortal bodies pass away. This means that the
entire ‘machina’ of the universe as we know it is just a dress rehearsal for an eternal transfixation
– that all of nature, and with it the universe at large, is just a husk to be discarded in a morally
retributive cosmos whose only law of nature is obedience to the creator deity.
Mechanistic Atheism: A Mindless Machine with no Redemption in Sight
It is with the scientific revolution that we have come to view the entire universe as a mechanism.
Rene Descartes, the "father of modern philosophy, and also the founder of Cartesian geometry, is
renowned for his statement "Cogito ergo sum" – I think, therefore I am (Discourse on the
Method part 4). Descartes proposed that the body works like a machine, while the mind (or soul),
on the other hand, was described as nonmaterial and as not following the laws of nature. This
form of dualism proposed that the mind controls the body, but that the body can also influence
the otherwise rational mind, as when people act out of passion. However the critical flaw in
Descartes’ description has turned out to be the link between mind and body, which he envisaged
took place in the pineal gland which we now know functions in circadian rhythms.
Although Isaac Newton was a devout religious believer who attempted to predict the date of the
apocalypse, his great achievements are in discovering gravity, defining the laws of motion and
co-inventing calculus. In his Principia, Newton came to describe a universe following
mechanical laws defining the relationship between causes and their effects. Newton and Laplace
after him came to describe the universe as a gigantic mechanism in terms of differential
equations and initial conditions.
In 1814, Laplace published what is usually known as the first articulation of causal or scientific
determinism: “We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the
cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature
in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also
vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before its
eyes” (Pierre Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities). With the advent of Clerk
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Maxwell’s equations for electromagnetism and light, this description seemed to be almost
complete.
Along with the growth of the scientific model, we came to understand that the phenomena of
biology and hence the affairs of human life as defined in terms of our brain and bodily functions
are just complex instances of chemical reactions, which ultimately become defined in the
physical properties of atoms and molecules and their shared radiation through electromagnetic
and other force fields. We enter the era of reductionism, where ultimately everything reduces to
the laws of physics.
Humanity trapped in the existential nightmare:
Deus ex Machina by Ekud
(http://ekud.deviantart.com/art/DEUS-EX-MACHINA100870568)
This leads to an existential nightmare, as
expressed so succinctly by Bertrand
Russel: “That Man is the product of
causes which had no prevision of the end
they were achieving; that his origin, his
growth, his hopes and fears, his loves
and his beliefs, are but the outcome of
accidental collocations of atoms; that no
fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought
and feeling, can preserve an individual
life beyond the grave; that all the labours
of the ages, all the devotion, all the
inspiration, all the noonday brightness of
human genius, are destined to extinction
in the vast death of the solar system, and
that the whole temple of Man’s
achievement must inevitably be buried
beneath the débris of a universe in
ruins—all these things, if not quite
beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain,
that no philosophy which rejects them
can hope to stand. Only within the
scaffolding of these truths, only on the
firm foundation of unyielding despair,
can the soul’s habitation henceforth be
safely built” (Bertrand Russell, Free
Man's Worship).
Everything might have remained caught in this nightmare except for two "dark clouds" noted in
the 1900 warning by Lord Kelvin - the Michelson-Morley experiment, which led to the
discovery of relativity and black body radiation which led to quantum theory. Thus the
deterministic Newtonian universe opened up to new forms of uncertainty at the quantum level,
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although some aspects of the theory, such as quantum electrodynamics remain one of the most
quantitatively accurate theories of physics ever devised. Quantum theory has opened up the
philosophical arena surrounding both determinism and the part played by the mind of the
conscious observer in reality. Quantum uncertainty involves the causality-violating process of
reduction of the wave function, which founding researchers have attributed to the intervention of
the conscious mind on the probability superpositions of quantum mechanics.
However running against this quasi-mystical trend in physics have been two great developments
in scientific discovery, which have profoundly strengthened the notion of causality and
determinism in the everyday universe around us. Both of these stem partly from a reaction to the
Second World War, with physicists developing the fields of biology and computer science.
The first gave rise to molecular biology and molecular genetics, which began with the discovery
of the structure of DNA and has led all the way to the explosion of genetic science in initiatives
such as the human genome project. Over half a century this has laid bare the physical
mechanisms underpinning all biological processes and the computational and informational
processes enabling biological organisms to reproduce and develop true to their genetic code
despite mutational change.
Artificial intelligence closes in on the
conscious brain: four internet views
(the –messiahs-blog.blogspot.com).
The second is the revolution in digital
computing and digital communications
that has brought about the explosion of
computing
power,
from
super
computers to laptops and cell phones
and spawned the internet, along with
robotics, and artificial intelligence. Not
only has this transformed human
society into an interconnected global
village, but it has brought upon us a
cybernetic form of thinking – that
causality is simply a matter of
instruction sets following strict rules
prescribing how 0s and 1s are encoded
into new forms of information.
The confluence of these two highly deterministic sciences has led to a new kind of collective
‘cyborg’ mythology, that conscious experiences are really just brain function, that human beings
are really just molecular machines and the brain is just a biological computer, admittedly a very
different sort of computer from the serial digital computers having a central architecture
basically identical to that originally conceived of by John von Neumann, perhaps working using
parallel processing and brain waves rather than purely digital 0s and 1s, but nevertheless just a
computer for all that, and that the only difference between a conscious being and a personal
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computer is one of scale and complexity – although our laptop may not be currently conscious,
given the right artificial intelligence and enough processors and memory space, computers will,
like us become conscious beings.
AMD 9080A series CPU (www.cpu-world.com)
and the 70s ribosome involved in protein translation in the cell (rna.ucsc.edu).
Although subjective experiences are all that we have to access the physical world with, the
privacy and non-replicability of subjective experience has led to a situation in which objective
science has successfully built a description of reality covering diverse aspects of the physical
world, from solid-state semi-conductors to biological tissues, and even to brain function based on
classical deterministic notions of functional mechanisms. By comparison, the role of mind has
slipped by degrees into a neglected orphan status, in which many scientists regard it as merely an
epiphenomenon, perhaps the shadow of a kind of internal model of reality generated by the
functional brain, but unable to have any affect on physical functions, reducing free will, and our
sense of personal conscious autonomy to the status of a necessary delusion we all depend on to
keep functioning and live out our reproductive, social and professional lives.
It is a world view which is not really justified by the science, but rather by popular impressions
of it in the media and in science fiction productions, in which humans and computers become
ever more closely equivalent. We and all of human conscious experience becomes just one big
data set on the information super-highway. Free-will is dead long live the CPU!
Could any form of (intelligently) designed computational system replicate, or emulate, biological
brains and consciousness? One might presume that any interactive system that can develop
genetically could also be designed from the top down but this isn't necessarily the case. We don't
yet have any idea of what the physical principles are underpinning subjective consciousness.
Philosopher Jerry Fodor famously complained that: “Nobody has the slightest idea how anything
material could be conscious. Nobody even knows what it would be like to have the slightest idea
about how anything material could be conscious.” Until we do we can’t make significant
progress on what sort of synthetic physical system might also support it.
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The brain is a fractally generated developmental system where the genetic code results in
organization from the molecule up and in turn cell type specific interactions involving cell
migration to develop resonant neurocircuits which ramify as the brain develops. It's not a set of
modules put together top down according to an overall design. The code is generative but not
prescriptive - it doesn't specify the final arrangement but only the recursive process to generate a
chaotically resonant complex system through very complex molecular feedbacks in the way
genes are orchestrated through non-linear couplings in nucleic acid structure.. There is no viable
way to replicate this developmental complexification in the solid state semiconductor physics.of
the digital computer. If the conscious brain falls into class that requires bottom up developmental
ramification for the system to form, we are back to a synthetic brain using genetic technology utilizing the genetic processes underlying the biological brain structures we already have
naturally and gene technology plagiarized from existing biological systems.
The vision of human as a computational automaton becomes another kind of existential
nightmare and another breakdown of the deus ex machina, this time by a complete failure to
engage the process necessary to redeem the mechanical nightmare from its own pitiless future.
By losing the mind to the cyborg mechanical monster, we have created a demiurge universe null
and void of both consciousness and any autonomous will, doomed to its own extinction as
entropy wipes away all distinction and the ‘statues made of matchsticks crumble into one
another’, as Bob Dylan lamented.
Of course this universe is not quite as defunct as the morally retributive cosmos of the
monotheistic tradition’s intelligent design. It does leave room for the mechanism to evolve by
random mutation and natural selection, even if all the ensuing life forms are really just molecular
automata of one sort of another.
But there is no rhyme or reason to any of it. The best we can say of it is that, although we have
no conscious will of any kind, evolution has selected us to feel that we do, so that the mechanics
of the life process continues unimpeded by existential ennui and a complete loss of faith in our
joie de vivre, let alone our discredited élan vitale.
Effectively the machine is a dysfunctional shadow of what it needs to be to support volitional
subjective conscious existence, but by refusing to invoke the deus ex machina when it is
genuinely required, at least as consciousness ex machina, and claiming that we can act as
intelligent designers of a computational machine eclipsing our own awareness, we remain
stranded as mechanical canaries in a cage constructed by our own predilection for mechanically
verifiable certainties – in denial of the manifold entangled uncertainties of the quantum universe.
In effect this is a second manifestation of the design delusion. Creationists think the conscious
universe must be an intelligent design of God. Deterministic materialists think conscious brains
could be intelligently designed by humans. Same delusion - same misconception - external
design as a generative metaphor based on mechanistic human manufacture. Concrete thinking in
the entangled universe.
How do we find our way out of this predicament? It’s all a question of revitalizing the ghost in
the machine. And it is also centrally a question of getting the physics right. This model of reality
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is based almost entirely on a classical notion of physics, one which was superseded with the
discoveries of relativity and quantum theory.
The Mind Escapes its Mechanistic Bondage in the Quantum Universe
Brain and mind are complementary but
categorically different manifestations of an
existential cosmological reality (Chris King).
At the same time as this highly
deterministic myth about reality
became common currency, the status
of the mind and of conscious
experience as a foundation of reality
had became almost completely eroded.
If we turn back the clock again to the
middle of last century, Gilbert Ryle’s
“The Concept of Mind” argues that
"mind" is "a philosophical illusion
hailing chiefly from Descartes and
sustained by logical errors and
'category mistakes'. According to the
official doctrine … every human being has both a body and a mind ... each person has direct and
unchangeable cognisance. In consciousness, self-consciousness and introspection, he is directly
and authentically apprised of the present states of operation of the mind. … I shall often speak of
it … as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.’ It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special
kind. It is, namely, a category mistake”. According to Ryle, mental processes are merely
intelligent acts and in this sense he is part of the flow of psychological behaviourism, which was
dominantly influential at the time, but he criticized both Cartesian dualism and behaviourism
alike as too rigid and mechanistic to provide us with an adequate understanding of the concept of
mind.
The idea of the category error has veracity because mental experiences are categorically different
from physical phenomena. Conscious experiences are entirely subjective while physical
processes are objective and verifiable by others. This doesn’t necessarily mean that subjective
experiences are unreal, but that they cannot be understood or classified using the same analytical
techniques as we do with physical phenomena.
Towards the end of the twentieth century a growing need to understand higher brain functions
and the role of conscious decision-making has led to the emergence of the so-called science of
consciousness research. While at the easy end this simply constitutes modelling higher brain
function and the integrated neurophysiological processes supporting conscious attention and
cognition, at the opposing ‘deep’ end we come to the “hard problem in consciousness research”
enunciated by David Chalmers – the fact that no purely objective functional description invoking
integrated brain states can be equivalent to, or explain of its own accord, the nature of conscious
experience, because subjective consciousness and objective brain function are so utterly different
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qualitatively, turning Ryle’s category error into a categorical complementarity of attributes, as
different as the wave and particle aspects of quantum reality.
Subjective consciousness poses the ultimate dilemma for the scientific description of reality. We
still have no idea of how the brain generates it, or even how, or why, such an objectively elusive
phenomenon can come about from the physiology of brain dynamics. The problem is
fundamental because, from birth to death, the sum total of all our observations of the physical
world, and all our notions about it, come exclusively through our subjective conscious
experience. Although neuroscience has produced new techniques for visualizing brain function,
from EEG and MEG to PET and fMRI scans, which show a parallel relationship between mental
states and brain processing, these go no way in themselves to resolving how these objective
physiological processes give rise to the subjective effects of conscious experience.
The advent of quantum theory has fundamentally altered our idea of a deterministic universe
where defining the conditions at an earlier point in time determines the conditions at successively
later points in time, as a dynamical system progresses. In this sense the notion of temporal
causality – that causes at an earlier time define subsequent effects at later times also becomes
fundamentally changed.
Quanta have both a wave and a particle nature. They are emitted and absorbed discretely as
particles but travel through space and time as a wave. For example in a two-slit interference
experiment photons are each released as a particle from an excited atom, and then travel as
waves through the apparatus, which we can see because each one travels through both slits and
they then strike the photographic plate in a pattern which reflects the superimposed wave
amplitudes. However each single photon arrives in a different place, which cannot be predicted,
in what is called reduction of the wave function. It is only when many have passed that we can
see the wave pattern from the probability distribution of the particles. Causal determinism is thus
violated for each quantum.
Quantum uncertainty is a fundamental feature of the dynamical process, preventing us knowing
both the energy and the time of an event simultaneously. The more precisely we need to define
the energy results in the time being spread over an increasingly large interval and vice versa
according to the relation Et h . This arises because energy is equivalent to frequency
E h and to determine the frequency within a given accuracy requires counting how many
wave fronts have passed over a period of time using beats as shown in B in the image above.
But quantum reality has many more tricks up its sleeve. If two particles of complementary spins,
or polarizations, occur in a single wave function, they become entangled in such a way that
finding out the identity of one cause the other to immediately have the complementary identity,
no matter how far away it is, and to do so in a way which cannot occur by information travelling
between the two particles at below light speed.
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A: Schrödinger cat paradox experiment. B: Uncertainty is determined by wave beats. C: In an interference
experiment the photon is first released as a particle but travels as a wave through both slits only to be absorbed again
as a particle on the photographic plate. The particle distribution follows the superimposed wave amplitudes to form
bands. D: Wheeler delayed choice experiment shows that changing the detection method after the photon has
traversed its path can retrospectively change which way it went. E: Transactions explain exchanged quanta in terms
of waves travelling both forwards and backwards in time. F: Quantum chaos can introduce new forms of
entanglement (in this case with nuclear spin (Chaudhury et al. 2009). G: Weak quantum measurement is made in a
way, which is confirmed only in the future of the ensemble when the absorption takes place (Kocsis et al. 2011)
Moreover the boundary conditions defining an exchanged quantum appear to involve both the
past emitters and the future absorbers, in a transactional handshaking in which the future also has
an effect on the past. This handshaking relationship can be seen in the transactional interpretation
E above, in which the exchanged particle is an overlap of an offer wave from the emitter and a
confirmation wave from the absorber travelling backwards in time. This effect can also be seen
in the Wheeler delayed choice experiment D above, where switching between individual
detectors and an interference film after the photons have passed the gravitationally lensing
galaxy, determines whether they went around one or both sides.
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It is also possible to extract information from a quantum by making a small deformation in its
wave function during its path flight without absorbing and thus destroying it, which will
nevertheless change the way it is eventually absorbed later, in a way we can learn about its
original state from. This doesn’t give us enough information to know what happened to each
quantum at the time but can be used to build up a statistical profile when all the information is
put together after the quanta are eventually absorbed. Critically the pattern of eventual
absorptions leaves a strong mark on the earlier weak measurement statistics. This shows up
another feature of uncertainty. What God gains by ‘playing dice with the universe’, in Einstein’s
words, in the quantum fuzziness of uncertainty, is just what is needed, so that the future can exert
an effect on the present, without ever being caught in the act of doing it in any particular
instance: “The future can only affect the present if there is room to write its influence off as a
mistake”, Yakir Aharonov the discoverer of weak quantum measurement declares.
An indication of how quantum chaos might lead to complex forms of quantum entanglement can
be gleaned from an ingenious experiment forming a quantum analogue of a kicked top illustrated
above in F. In the chaotic dynamic (right) the orbital and nuclear spins have become entangled as
a result of the chaotic perturbations of the quantum top’s motion. This shows that, rather than the
suppression of classical chaos seen in closed quantum systems, reverberating chaotic quantum
systems can introduce new entanglements.
Now let’s turn back to the brain and conscious mental states. We now know that the aspects of
conscious experience are represented over the entire cortex in a many-to-many ‘holographic’
representation, in which each aspect of an experience such as a given person’s face, or a facial
expression is stored in a given area. This means that conscious mental states correspond to
integrated excitations of brain areas working in a coherent manner together, while local
processing that is ‘out of synch’ with the global brain state remain subconscious processing,
which may later become conscious.
This means that there is no single area of the brain responsible for consciousness although a
variety of brain studies point to certain areas being pivotal for central aspects of conscious
processing, as illustrated in B below, such as the ‘self’ network, also called the default network
because it is activated when we are in idle moments anticipating situations we may shortly be
having to deal with. The default network connects frontal and other regions also involved in
working memory and cognition. Areas that appear to be pivotal for integrative consciousness,
which cause significant problems if damaged, also show a similar arrangement. Other frontal and
related areas are involved in a salience network that uses very fast neurons apparently to keep up
an ongoing representation of the dynamic present. These ideas are reinforced by brain scans on
anaesthetics, which show that loss of consciousness is accompanied by brain areas going out of
synch with one another. They also explain why consciousness tends to unitary and attention to
centre broadly on one train of ideas at a time (King 2014).
Brain excitations also show the characteristics of dynamical chaos, see A above. They have
broad spectrum frequencies rather than resonances, their orbits behave like strange attractors and
many states have been found to have a fractal dimension indicative of dynamical chaos. Chaos
might seem to be a noisy interference in what might be thought of as an ordered deductive
process, but it provides two essential dynamical properties. Firstly it makes a system arbitrarily
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sensitive to its bounding conditions in the butterfly effect – a disturbance as small as the eddy
from a butterfly’s wing can become the source of a tropical cyclone. Secondly it prevents the
dynamic getting stuck in the rut of an ordered attractor by shaking the system up a little like a fly
buzzing around the room exploring the space fully. Transitions at the edge of chaos thus form an
ideal meeting point where new structures can form out of the instabilities and then be
incorporated if they have adaptive value.
A: Evidence for dynamical chaos and phase wave-front ‘holographic’ processing. (a) Freeman’s model of olfactory
recognition involves a transition from high-energy chaos to enter a new or existing strange attractor basin as the
energy is lowered, represented (Skarda & Freeman 1987) (b) in distinct global patterns of olfactory bulb activation.
Extended spatial distribution of cortical activation accompanying recognition of an odour. (c) Strange attractors in
the EEG. (d) Fourier transforms of an EEG, showing broad-spectrum excitation and correlation dimensions, both
consistent with chaotic dynamics. (e) Correlation dimensions of brain states. (f) Increased phase coherence when a
musical note becomes anticipated (Basar et al. 1989) (g) Wavelet transform, showing time evolution of amplitudes
with a peak accompanying recognition of an anomalous note is consistent with phase-front processing. Spectral
product (right) illustrates coherence across several EEG channels. B: Regions identified in the notions of self
(Zimmer 2005), saliency (Williams 2012) and consciousness (Bor 2013).
But this may introduce another feature. If a brain state is critically poised because there is no
obvious best outcome to a computational assessment, it may in turn become sensitive to the
instabilities of a single neuron, a single ion channel and ultimately quantum uncertainty itself.
Neurons are often tuned to their sigmoidal thresholds putting the system into a state of critical
instability. Certain neural processes, and other dynamical features such as ‘stochastic resonance’
can amplify such small oscillations from single ion channels to cells and in turn into global brain
states.
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The critical role of consciousness is to enable an organism to be able to evade imminent threats
to its survival. However problems of survival in the open environment are notoriously intractable
by classical computation because of super-exponential runaway in the number of computations
required. Given serial computation alone, a digital gazelle would become stranded at the
crossroads, gobbled by a real predator while it was protractedly ticking over trying to solve the
problem of what to do. Hence the massively parallel processing in our brains and the brains of
our sibling species, which enables living organisms to make a decision in real time through a
transition from the edge of chaos if there is no predisposing factor driving the decision.
Given the fact that the central role of the brain is to anticipate imminent futures and this
intractability problem, we are led to a situation in which the brain may use an extracomputational avenue of anticipation to complement computational assessments with the sort of
integrated intuition, hunch, paranoia and split-second reactions we know active consciousness is
capable of.
But there is another feature of brain processing which we have already touched on – coherent
wave excitations – that are essential to distinguish attended signals from the groundswell of
incoherent noise and peripheral processing, which is both central to the conscious state and
necessary to identify salient features from the flood of sensory and higher-level processing
information passing through the doors of perception..
Karl Pribram in the notion of the holographic brain, has drawn attention to the similarity between
phase coherence processing of brain waves in the gamma frequency range believed to be
responsible for cognitive processes and the wave amplitude basis of quantum uncertainty in
reduction of the wave packet and quantum measurements based on the uncertainty relation
Et h , where the relation is determined by the number of phase fronts to be counted.
In effect brain wave states may act like quantum excitations and the brain as a special type of
‘holographic’ quantum computer whose role is to anticipate reality. It is likely that this form of
consciousness first arose in chaotically excitable single cells sensing and anticipating the
environment around them through sensitive dependence, because all the components we
associate with the conscious brain, from ion channels to neurotransmitters and their receptors
evolved long before multi-celled animals.
Biology is full of phenomena at the quantum level, which are essential to biological function.
Enzymes invoke quantum tunneling to enable transitions through their substrates’ activation
energy. Protein folding is a manifestation of quantum computation intractable by classical
computing. When a photosynthetic active centre absorbs a photon, the wave function of the
excitation is able to perform a quantum computation, which enables the excitation to travel down
the most efficient route to reach the chemical reaction site. Quantum entanglement is believed to
be behind the way some birds navigate in the magnetic field. Light excites two electrons on one
molecule and shunts one of them onto a second molecule. Their spins are linked through
quantum entanglement. Before they relax into a decoherent state, the Earth's magnetic field can
alter the relative alignment of the electrons' spins, which in turn alters the chemical properties of
the molecules involved. Quantum coherence is an established technique in tissue imaging,
demonstrating quantum entanglement in biological tissues at the molecular level.
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Weak quantum measurement provides a way that the brain might use its brain waves and phase
coherence to evoke entangled states that carry quantum encrypted information about immediate
future states of experience as well as immediately past states, in an expanded envelope - the
‘quantum present’ - which we witness as subjective experience.
Effectively the brain is a massively parallel ensemble of wave excitations reverberating with one
another, through couplings of varying strength in which excitations are emitted, modulated and
absorbed. The entire system could be a reverberating system of massively parallel weak quantum
measurement of its ongoing state (King 2014), giving the conscious brain state a capacity to
anticipate immediate future threats through prescience, paranoia and foreboding. Notice that the
nature of uncertainty noted by Aharonov above might prevent us ever proving that such
anticipation occurs in any given instance.
This form of weak quantum measurement would require significant differences from traditional
weak quantum measurement experiments, which are designed to produce a classically confirmed
result from an eventual statistical distribution in the future, whereas in the brain coherent states
would correspond to ongoing entangled excitations themselves extended between past and future
through quantum hand-shaking. This would open the quantum loophole in the deterministic
nightmare which would admit both subjective consciousness as a sensitive anticipator of
immediate futures and free-will as the converse action of conscious volition on brain states
through the uncertainty of the physical brain dynamic. Discovering a molecular-biological basis
for such an effect would pose an ultimate challenge to experimental neuroscience.
By liberating the conscious mind and volitional will from the shackles of the mechanistic
nightmare we are at the same time evoking a deus ex machina in the form of the way our own
subjective consciousness is capable of transforming the world and unfolding history to bring
about social and psychic change.
The central enigma of quantum reality is the causality-violating reduction of the wave packet.
We see this in Schrödinger’s cat paradox (A in the second to last image) a cat set to be killed by
a radioactive scintillation breaking a cyanide flask. In quantum reality the cat is both alive and
dead with differing probabilities, but in our subjective experience, when we open the box the cat
is either alive, or dead, with certainty. However, not only is Schrödinger’s cat both alive and
dead, but in quantum reality Napoleon has both won and lost the battle of Waterloo. Many of
these strategic outcomes, indeed all accidents of history, depend on uncertainties that go, in
principle, right down to the quantum level.
The whole notion of a single line of history unfolding seems to be something only our conscious
awareness is able to determine. Several of the founding quantum physicists, from John von
Neumann to Werner Heisenberg adhered to this view. In physicist Henry Stapp’s words: “Before
human consciousness appeared, there existed a multiverse of potential universes. The emergence
of a conscious mind in one of these potential universes, ours, gives it a special status: reality”.
This implies that we are playing a pivotal and in its essence a cosmological role through our
subjective consciousness in bringing about a cognizant universe aware of its own existence and
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imbued with a sense of purpose expressed in and through our free-will and sense of compassion
for the unfolding nature of conscious existence amid the mortal toil of biological sexuality.
This appears to be the ultimate answer to the “deus ex machina” paradox – invoking not God in
the machine, but consciousness in the cosmos. In discovering this change of perspective lies our
redemption through taking full responsibility for our actions participating in a deepening
understanding of this extraordinary universe, in which we as sentient beings are the conscious
progenitors of its becoming.
References
Basar E., Basar-Eroglu J., Röschke J., Schütt A., (1989) The EEG is a quasi-deterministic signal
anticipating sensory-cognitive tasks, in Basar E., Bullock T.H. eds. Brain Dynamics Springer-Verlag,
43-71.
Blenau W & Thamm M (2011) Distribution of serotonin (5-HT) and its receptors in the insect brain with
focus on the mushroom bodies. Lessons from Drosophila melanogaster and Apis mellifera Arthropod
Structure & Development 40 381-394
Bor D (2013) Consciousness: Watching your mind in action New Scientist 20 May.
Chaudhury S, Smith A, Anderson B, Ghose S, Jessen P (2009) Quantum signatures of chaos in a kicked
top Nature 461 768-771.
Fredriksson R et al. (2003) The G-protein-coupled receptors in the human genome form five main
families. phylogenetic analysis, paralogon groups, and fingerprints Molecular Pharmacology 63/6
1256-72.
King C. C. (2014) Space, Time and Consciousness Cosmology (to appear in “Cosmology”)
http://www.dhushara.com/stc/ct.htm
Kocsis, S., Braverman, B., Ravets, S., Stevens, M. J., Mirin, R. P., Shalm, L. K., & Steinberg, A. M.
(2011). Observing the average trajectories of single photons in a two-slit interferometer. Science,
332(6034), 1170-1173.
Lichtenberger, Henri (1912) The Gospel Of Superman: The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche
Macmillan, NY. (trans) J M Kennedy 2012.
Skarda C., Freeman W., (1987) How brains make chaos in order to make sense of the world Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 10 161-195.
Williams C. (2012) Are these the brain cells that give us consciousness? New Scientist 20 Jul.
Zimmer C. (2005) The Neurobiology of the Self, Scientific American Nov 93.
Zozulya S. (2001) The human olfactory receptor repertoire Genome Biology 2/6 1-12.
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
February 1, 2008
arXiv:quant-ph/9502012v1 15 Feb 1995
LBL-36574
Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally
Accommodate Consciousness But Quantum Mechanics
Can. ∗
Henry P. Stapp
Theoretical Physics Group
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Abstract
It is argued on the basis of certain mathematical characteristics that
classical mechanics is not constitutionally suited to accomodate consciousness, whereas quantum mechanics is. These mathematical characteristics
pertain to the nature of the information represented in the state of the
brain, and the way this information enters into the dynamics.
Prepared for a Special Issue of “Psyche”
This work was supported by the Director, Office of Energy Research, Office of High Energy
and Nuclear Physics, Division of High Energy Physics of the U.S. Department of Energy under
Contract DE-AC03-76SF00098.
∗
Disclaimer
This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. While this document is believed to contain correct information, neither the United
States Government nor any agency thereof, nor The Regents of the University of California,
nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal
liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately
owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial products process, or service by its
trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply
its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency
thereof, or The Regents of the University of California. The views and opinions of authors
expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or
any agency thereof or The Regents of the University of California and shall not be used for
advertising or product endorsement purposes.
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory is an equal opportunity employer.
ii
1. Introduction
Classical mechanics arose from the banishment of consciousness from our
conception of the physical universe. Hence it should not be surprising to find
that the readmission of consciousness requires going beyond that theory.
The exclusion of consciousness from the material universe was a hallmark
of science for over two centuries. However, the shift, in the 1920’s, from classical
mechanics to quantum mechanics marked a break with that long tradition: it appeared that the only coherent way to incorporate quantum phenomena into the
existing science was to admit also the human observer.(1) Although the orthodox
approach of Bohr and the Copenhagen school was epistemological rather than
ontological, focussing upon “our knowledge” rather than on any effort to introduce consciousness directly into the dynamics, other thinkers such as John von
Neumann(2) , Norbert Weiner(3) , and J.B.S. Haldane(4) were quick to point out
that the quantum mechanical aspects of nature seemed tailor-made for bringing
consciousness back into our conception of matter.
This suggestion lay fallow for half a century. But the recent resurgence of
interest in the foundations of quantum theory has led increasingly to a focus on
the crux of the problem, namely the need to understand the role of consciousness in the unfolding of physical reality. It has become clear that the revolution
in our conception of matter wrought by quantum theory has completely altered
the complexion of problem of the relationship between mind and matter. Some
aspects of this change were discussed already in my recent book(5) . Here I intend to describe in more detail the basic differences between classical mechanics
and quantum mechanics in the context of the problem of integrating consciousness into our scientific conception of matter, and to argue that certain logical
deficiencies in classical mechanics, as a foundation for a coherent theory of the
mind/brain, are overcome in a natural and satisfactory way by replacing the
classical conception of matter by a quantum conception. Instead of reconciling
the disparities between mind and matter by replacing contemporary (folk) psychology by some yet-to-be-discovered future psychology, as has been suggested
by the Churchlands, it seems enough to replace classical (folk) mechanics, which
is known to be unable to account for the basic physical and chemical process
that underlie brain processes, by quantum mechanics, which does adequately
1
describe these processes.
2
2. Thoughts within the Classical Framework.
Thoughts are fleeting things, and our introspections concerning them are
certainly fallible. Yet each one seems to have several components bound together
by certain relationships. These components appear, on the basis of psychoneurological data(6) , to be associated with neurological activities occurring in
different locations in the brain. Hence the question arises: How can neural activities in different locations in the brain be components of a single psychological
entity?
The fundamental principle in classical mechanics is that any physical system
can be decomposed into a collection of simple independent local elements each
of which interacts only with its immediate neighbors. To formalize this idea let
us consider a computer model of the brain. According to the ideas of classical
physics it should be possible to simulate brain processes by a massive system
of parallel computers, one for each point in a fine grid of spacetime points that
cover the brain over some period of time. Each individual computer would
compute and record the values of the components of the electromagnetic and
matter fields at the associated grid point. Each of these computers receives
information only from the computers associated with neighboring grid points in
its nearly immediate past, and forms the linear combinations of values that are
the digital analogs of, say, the first and second derivatives of various field values
in its neighborhood, and hence is able to calculate the values corresponding to
its own grid point. The complete computation starts at an early time and moves
progressively forward in time.
On the basis of this computer model of the evolving brain I shall distinguish
the intrinsic description of this computer/brain from an extrinsic description of
it.
The intrinsic description consists of the collection of facts represented by
the aggregate of the numbers in the various registers of this massive system of
parallel computers: each individual fact represented within the intrinsic description is specified by the numbers in the registers in one of these computers, and
the full description is simply the conglomeration of these individual facts. This
intrinsic description corresponds to the fact that in classical mechanics a complete description of any physical system is supposed to be specified by giving
3
the values of the various fields (e.g., the electric field, the magnetic field, etc.)
at each of the relevant spacetime points. Similarly, an intrinsic description of
the contents of a television screen might be specified by giving the color and
intensity values for each of the individual points (pixels) on the screen, without any interpretive information (Its a picture of Winston Churchill!), or any
explicit representation of any relationship that might exist among elements of
the intrinsic description (Pixel 1000 has the same values as pixel 1256!). The
analogous basic classical-physics description of a steam engine would, similarly,
give just the values of the basic fields at each of the relevant spacetime points,
with no notice, or explicit representation, of the fact that the system can also
be conceived of as composed of various functional entities, such as pistons and
drive shafts etc.: the basic or intrinsic description is the description of what the
system is, in terms of its logically independent (according to classical mechanics) local components, not the description of how it might be conceive of by an
interpreter, or how it might be described in terms of large functional entities
constructed out of the ontologically basic local components
I distinguish this intrinsic description from an extrinsic description.
An extrinsic description is a description that could be formed in the mind of
an external observer that is free to survey in unison, and act upon together, all
of the numbers that constitute the intrinsic description, unfettered by the local
rules of operation and storage that limit the activities of the computer/brain.
This external observer is given not only the capacity to “know”, separately, each
of the individual numbers in the intrinsic description; he is given also the ability
to know this collection of numbers as a whole, in the sense that he can have
a single register that specifies the entire collection of numbers that constitutes
the intrinsic description. The entire collection of logically and ontologically independent elements that constitutes the intrinsic description can be represented
by a single basic entity in the extrinsic description, and be part of the body
of information that this external observer can access directly, without the need
for some compositional process in the computer/brain to bring the information
together from far-apart locations. In general, collections of independent entities
at the level of the intrinsic description can become single entities at the level of
an extrinsic description.
The information that is stored in any one of the simple logically independent
4
computers, of which the computer/brain is the simple aggregate, is supposed to
be minimal: it is no more than what is needed to compute the local evolution.
This is the analog of the condition that holds in classical physics. As the size of
the regions into which one divides a physical system tends to zero the dynamically effective information stored in each individual region tends to something
small, namely the values of a few fields and their first few derivatives. And these
few values are treated in a very simple way. Thus if we take the regions of the
computer simulation of the brain that are represented by the individual local
computers to be sufficiently small then the information that resides in any one
of these local computers appears to be much less than information needed to
specify a complex thought, such as the perception of a visual scene: entries from
many logically independent (according to classical physics) computers must be
combined together to give the information contained in an individual thought,
which, however, is a single experiential entity. Thus the thought, considered as
a single whole entity, rather than as a collection of independent entities, belongs
to the extrinsic level of description, not to the intrinsic level of description.
According to classical mechanics, the description of both the state of a physical system and its dynamics can expressed at the intrinsic level. But then how
does one understand the occurrence of experientially whole thoughts? How do
extrinsic-level actual entities arise from a dynamics that is completely reducible
to an intrinsic-level description?
One possibility is that the intrinsic-level components of a thought are bound
together by some integrative process in the mind of a spirit being, i.e., in the
mind of a “ghost behind the machine”, of an homunculus. This approach shifts
the question to an entirely new realm: in place of the physical brain, about
which we know a great deal, and our thoughts, about which we have some
direct information, one has a new “spirit realm” about which science has little
to say. This approach takes us immediately outside the realm of science, as we
know it today.
Alternatively, there is the functional approach. The brain can probably
be conceived of, in some approximation, in terms of large-scale functional entities that, from a certain global perspective, might seem to be controlling the
activity of this brain. However, in the framework of classical mechanics such
“entities” play no actual role in determining of the course of action taken by the
5
computer/brain: this course of action is completely controlled by local entities
and local effects. The apparent efficacy of the large-scale “functional entities”
is basically an illusion, according to the precepts of classical mechanics, or the
dynamics of the computer/brain that simulates it: the dynamical evolution is
completely fixed by local considerations without any reference to such global
entities.
As an example take a belief. Beliefs certainly influence, in some sense, the
activities of the human mind/brain. Hilary Putnam characterized the approach
of modern functionalism as the idea that, for example, a belief can be regarded
as an entry in a “belief register”, or a “belief box”, that feeds control information into the computer program that represents the brain process. Such a
belief would presumably correspond, physically, to correlations in brain activities that extend over a large part of the brain. Thus it would be an example
of a functional entity that a human being might, as a short-hand, imagine to
exist as a single whole entity, but that, according to the precepts of classical
mechanics, is completely analyzable, fundamentally, into a simple aggregate of
elementary and ontologically independent local elements. The notion that such
an extrinsic-level functional entity actually is, fundamentally, anything more
than a simple aggregate of logically independent local elements is contrary to
the precepts of classical mechanics. The grafting of such an actual entity onto
classical mechanics amounts to importing into the theory an appendage that is
unnecessary, nonefficacious, and fundamentally illusory from the perspective of
the dynamical workings of that theory itself.
Since this appendage is causally nonefficacious it has no signature, or sign
of existence, within classical physics. The sole reason for adding it to the theory
is to account for our direct subjective awareness of it. Logically and rationally
it does not fit into the classical theory both because it has no dynamical effects,
beyond those due to its local components alone, and because its existence and
character contravenes the locality principle that constitutes the foundation of
the theory, namely the principle that any physical system is to be conceived of
as fundamentally a conglomerate of simple microscopic elements each of which
interacts only with its immediate neighbors. Neither the character of the basic
description of the brain, within classical mechanics, nor the character of the
classical dynamical laws that supposedly govern the brain, provides any basis
6
for considering the brain correlate of a thought to be, at the fundamental as
distinguished from functional level, a single whole entity. One may, of course,
postulate some extra notion of “emergence”. But nature must be able to confer
some kind of beingness beyond what is suggested by the precepts of classical
mechanics in order to elevate the brain correlate of a belief to the status of an
ontological whole.
This problem with ‘beliefs’, and other thoughts, arises from the attempt to
understand the connection of thoughts to brains within the framework of classical physics. This problem becomes radically transformed, however, once one
accepts that the brain is a physical system. For then, according to the precepts
of modern physics, the brain must in principle be treated as a quantum system.
The classical concepts are known to be grossly inadequate at the fundamental
level, and this fundamental inadequacy of the classical concepts is not confined
to the molecular level: it certainly extends to large (e.g., brain-sized) systems.
Moreover, quantum theory cannot be coherently understood without dealing in
some detail with the problem of the relationship between thoughtlike things and
brainlike things: some sort of nontrivial considerations involving our thoughts
seems essential to a coherent understanding of quantum theory.
In this respect quantum theory is wholly unlike classical physics, in which a
human consciousness is necessarily idealized as a non-participatory observer —
as an entity that can know aspects of the brain without influencing it in any way.
This restriction arises because classical physics is dynamically complete in itself:
it has no capacity to accomodate any efficacious entities not already completely
fixed and specified within its own structure. In quantum theory the situation
is more subtle because our perceptions of physical systems are described in a
classical language that is unable to express, even in a gross or approximate way,
the structural complexity of physical systems, as they are represented within
the theory: there is a fundamental structural mismatch between the quantum
mechanical description of a physical system and our description of our perceptions of that system. The existence of this structural mismatch is a basic feature
of quantum theory, and it opens up the interesting possibility of representing
the mind/brain, within contemporary physical theory, as a combination of the
thoughtlike and matterlike aspects of a neutral reality.
One could imagine modifying classical mechanics by appending to it the
7
concept of another kind of reality; a reality that would be thoughtlike, in the
sense of being an eventlike grasping of functional entities as wholes. In order to
preserve the laws of classical mechanics this added reality could have no effect
on the evolution of any physical system, and hence would not be (publicly) observable. Because this new kind of reality could have no physical consequences it
could confer no evolutionary advantage, and hence would have, within the scientific framework, no reason to exist. This sort of addition to classical mechanics
would convert it from a mechanics with a monistic ontology to a mechanics with
a dualistic ontology. Yet this profound shift would have no roots at all in the
classical mechanics onto which it is grafted: it would be a completely ad hoc
move from a monistic mechanics to a dualistic one.
In view of this apparent logical need to move from monistic classical mechanics to a dualistic generalization, in order to accomodate mind, it is a striking
fact that physicists have already established that classical mechanics cannot adequately describe the physical and chemical processes that underlie brain action:
quantum mechanics is needed, and this newer theory, interpreted realistically, in
line with the ideas of Heisenberg, already is dualistic. Moreover, the two aspects
of this quantum mechanical reality accord in a perfectly natural way with the
matterlike and thoughtlike aspects of the mind/brain. This realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics was introduced by Heisenberg not to accomodate
mind, but rather to to keep mind out of physics; i.e., to provide a thoroughly
objective account of what is happening in nature, outside human beings, without referring to human observers and their thoughts. Yet when this dualistic
mechanics is applied to a human brain it can account naturally for the thoughtlike and matterlike aspects of the mind/brain system. The quantum mechanical
description of the state of the brain is automatically (see below) an extrinsiclevel description, which is the appropriate level for describing brain correlates
of thoughts. Moreover, thoughts can be identified with events that constitute
efficacious choices. They are integral parts of the quantum mechanical process,
rather than appendages introduced ad hoc to accomodate the empirical fact that
thoughts exist. These features are discussed in the following sections.
8
3. Thoughts Within the Quantum Framework
Let us consider now how the brain would be simulated by a set of parallel
computers when the brain is treated as a quantum system. To make this description clear to every reader, particularly those with no familiarity with quantum
theory, I shall start again from the classical description, but spell it out in more
detail by using some symbols and numbers.
We introduced a grid of points in the brain. Let these points be represented
by a set of vectors ~xi , where i ranges over the integers from 1 to N. At each
point ~xi there was a set of fields ψj (~xi ), where j ranges from 1 to M, and M
is relatively small, say ten. For each of the allowed values of the pair (i, j) the
quantity ψj (~xi ) will have (at each fixed time) some value taken from the set of
integers that range from −L to +L, where L is a very large number. There is
also a grid of temporal values tn , with n ranging from 1 to T .
The description of the classical system at any time tn is given, therefore,
by specifying for each value of i in the set {1, 2, ..., N} and each value of j in
the set {1, 2, ..., M} some value of ψj (~xi ) in the set {−L, ..., +L}. We would
consequently need, in order to specify this classical system at one time, tn , N ×M
“registers” or “boxes”, each of which is able to hold an integer in the range
{−L, ..., +L}.
We now go over to the quantum mechanical description of this same system. It is helpful to make the transition in two steps. First we pass to the
classical statistical description of the classical system. This is done by assigning
a probability to each of the possible states of the classical system. The number
of possible states of the classical system (at one time) is (2L + 1)M ×N . If the
probability assigned to each of the possible classical systems is one of K possible
values then the statistical description of the classical system at one time requires
(2L + 1)M ×N registers, each with the capacity to distinguish K different values.
This can be compared to the number of registers that was needed to describe the
classical system at one time, which was M × N registers, each with a capacity
to distinguish (2L + 1) different values.
If the index m runs over the (2L + 1)M ×N possible classical systems then a
P
probability Pm is assigned to each value of m, where Pm ≥ 0, and Pm = 1.
The quantum-mechanical description is now obtained by replacing each Pm
9
by a complex number:
Pm ⇒ rm (cos θm + i sin θm ),
√
where rm = Pm , θm is an angle, cos θ and sin θ are the cosine and sine func√
tions, and i = −1.
This replacement might seem an odd thing to do, but one sees that this description does somehow combine the particle-like aspect of things with a wavelike
2
aspect: the probability associated with any specific classical state m is rm
= Pm ,
and an increase of θm gives a wave-like oscillation.
I am not trying to explain here how quantum theory works: I am merely describing the way in which the description of the computer/brain system changes
when one passes from the classical description of it to the quantum description.
For the classical description we needed just M × N registers, but for the
quantum description we need 2 × (2L + 1)M ×N registers. Thus the information
contained in the quantum mechanical description is enormously larger. We need
a value of rm , and of θm , for each of the possible states of the entire classical
system, where the specification of the state of the classical system includes,
simultaneously, a value of ψj (~xi ) for each allowed combination of values of i and
j. That is, for each conceivable state of the entire classical system one needs
two separate registers.
Consider again a belief. As before, a belief would correspond physically to
some combination of values of the fields at many well-separated field points ~xi .
In the classical computer model of the brain there was no register that represented, or could represent, such a combination of values, and hence we were led
to bring in an “external knower” to provide an adequate ontological substrate
for the existence of the belief. But in the quantum-mechanical description there
is such a register. Indeed, each of the 2 × (2L + 1)M ×N registers in the quantum mechanical description of the computer/brain corresponds to a possible
correlated state of activity of the entire classically-conceived computer/brain.
Consequently, there is no longer any need to bring in an “external observer”:
the quantum system itself has the requisite structural complexity. Moreover,
if we accept von Neumann’s (and Wigners(7) ) suggestion that the Heisenberg
quantum jumps occur precisely at the high level of brain activity that corresponds to conscious events then there is an “actual happening” (in a particular
10
register, m) that corresponds to the occurrence of the conscious experience of
having an awareness of this belief. This “happening” is the quantum jump that
shifts the value of rm associated with this register m from some value less than
unity to the value unity. This jump constitutes the Heisenberg “actualization” of
the particular brain state that corresponds to this belief. Jumps of this general
kind are not introduced merely to accommodate the empirical fact that thoughts
exist. Instead, they are already an essential feature of the Heisenberg description of nature, which is the most orthodox of the existing quantum mechanical
descriptions of the physical world. Thus in the quantum mechanical description
of the brain no reference is needed to any “ghost behind the machine”: the
quantum description already has within itself a register that corresponds to the
particular state of the entire brain that corresponds to the belief. Moreover, it
already has a dynamical process for representing the “occurrence” of this belief.
This dynamical process, namely the occurrence of the quantum jump (reduction
of wave packet), associates the thought with a choice between alternative classically describable possibilities, any one of which is allowed to occur, according
to the laws of quantum dynamics. Thus the dynamical correlates of thoughts
are natural parts of the quantum-mechanical description of the brain, and they
play a dynamically efficacious role in the evolution of that physical system.
The essential point, here, is that the quantum description is automatically wholistic, in the sense that its individual registers refer to states of the
entire brain, whereas the individual registers in the classically conceived computer/brain represent only local entities. Moreover, the quantum jump associated with the thought is a wholistic entity : it actualizes as a unit the state of
the entire brain that is associated with the thought.
The fundamentally wholistic character of the quantum mechanical desription nature is perhaps its most basic and pervasive feature. It has been demonstrated to extend to the macroscopic (hundred centimeter) scale in, for example,
the experiments of Aspect, Grangier, and Roger(8) . In view of the fact that the
wholistic character of our thoughts is so antithetical to the principles of classical physics, it would seem imprudent to ignore the wholistic aspect of matter
that lies at the heart of contemporary physics when trying to grapple with the
problem of the connection of matter to consciousness.
11
4. On The Thesis That ‘Mind Is Matter’.
Faced with the centuries-old problem of reconciling the thoughtlike and
matterlike aspects of nature many scientists and philosophers are turning to
the formula: ‘mind is matter’.(9) However, this solution has no content until
one specifies what matter is. The need to define ‘matter’ is highlighted by
the extreme disparity in the conceptions of matter in classical mechanics and
quantum mechanics.
One might try to interpret the ‘matter’ occurring in this formula as the
‘matter’ that occurs in classical physics. But this kind of matter does not exist
in nature. Hence the thesis ‘mind is matter’, with matter defined in this way,
would seem to entail that thoughts do not exist.
The thesis that ‘mind is matter’ has been attacked on the ground that
matter is conceptually unsuited to be identified with mind. The main rebuttal
to this criticism given in ref. 9 is that one does not know what the psychological
theory of the future will be like. Hence it is conceivable that the future theory
of mind may not involve the things such as ‘belief’, ‘desire’ and ‘awareness’ that
we now associate with mind. Consequently, some future theory of mind could
conceivably allow us to understand how two such apparently disparate things as
mind and matter could be the same.
An alternative way to reconcile a theory of mind with the theory of matter is
not through some future conception of our mental life that differs so profoundly
from the present-day one, but rather through the introduction the already existing modern theory of matter. Let me elaborate.
The main objection to the thesis that mind is matter — as contrasted to
the view that mind and matter are different aspects of a single neutral reality
— is based on the fact that each mind is known to only one brain, whereas each
brain is knowable to many minds. These two aspects of the mind/brain are
different in kind: a mind consists of a sequence of private happenings, whereas a
brain consists of a persisting public structure. A mind/brain has both a private
inner aspect, mind, and a public outer aspect, brain, and these two aspects have
distinctive characteristics.
In the quantum description of nature proposed by Heisenberg reality has,
similarly, two different aspects. The first consists of a set of ‘actual events’:
12
these events form a sequence of ‘happenings’, each of which actualizes one of
the possibilities offered by the quantum dynamics . The second consists of a set
of ‘objective tendencies’ for these events to occur: these tendencies are represented as persisting structures in space and time. If we correlate thoughts with
high-level quantum events in brains, as suggested by von Neumann, Wigner,
and others, then we can construct a theory that is a dual-aspect theory of the
mind/brain, in the sense that it correlates the inner, or mental, aspects of the
mind/brain system with ‘actual events’ in Heisenberg’s picture of nature, and
it identifies the the outer, or material, aspects of the mind/brain with the ‘objective tendencies’ of Heisenberg’s picture of nature.
This theory might, on the other hand, equally well be construed as a theory
in which ‘mind is matter’, if we accept the criteria for intertheoretic reduction(10)
proposed in reference 9. For this quantum theory of the brain is built directly
upon the concepts of the contemporary theory of matter, and it appears(5) to be
able to explain in terms of the laws of physics the causal connections underlying
human behavior that are usually explained in psychological terms. Yet in this
theory there is no abandonment of the normal psychological conception of our
mental life. It is rather the classical theory of matter that is abandoned. In the
terminology used in reference 9 folk psychology is retained, but folk physics is
replaced by contemporary physics.
13
5. Final Remarks
It will be objected that the argument given above is too philosophical; that
the simple empirical fact of the matter is that brains are made out of neurons
and other cells that are well described by classical physics, and hence that there
is simply no need to bring in quantum mechanics.
The same argument could be made for electrical devices by an electrical
engineer, who could argue that wires and generators and antennae etc. can be
well described by classical physics. But this would strip him of an adequate
theoretical understanding of the properties of the materials that he is dealing
with: e.g., with a coherent and adequate theory of the properties of transistors
and conducting media, etc. Of course, one can do a vast amount of electrical
engineering without paying any attention to its quantum theoretical underpinnings. Yet the frontier developments in engineering today lean heavily on our
quantum theoretical understanding of the way electrons behave in different sorts
of environments.
In an even much more important way the processes that make brains work
the way they do depend upon the intricate physical and chemical properties of
the materials out of which they are made: brain processes depend in an exquisite
way on atomic and molecular processes that can be adequately understood only
through quantum theory. Of course, it would seem easy to assert that small-scale
processes will be described quantum mechanically, and large-scale processes will
be described classically. But large-scale processes are built up in some sense
from small-scale processes, so there is a problem in showing how to reconcile the
large-scale classical behaviour with the small-scale quantum behaviour. There’s
the rub! For quantum mechanics at the small scale simply does not lead to
classical mechanics at the large scale. That is exactly the problem that has
perplexed quantum physicists from the very beginning. One can introduce, by
hand, some arbitrary dividing line between small scale and large scale, and
decree that, in our preferred theory, the quantum laws will hold for small things
and the classical laws will hold for large things. But the separation is completely
ad hoc: there is no natural way to make this division between small and large
in the brain, which is a tight-knit physical system of interacting levels, and
there is no empirical evidence that supports the notion that any such separation
14
exists at any level below that at which consciousness appears: all phenomena
so far investigated can be understood by assuming that quantum theory holds
universally below the level where consciousness enters.
Bohr resolved this problem of reconciling the quantum and classical aspect
of nature by exploiting the fact that the only thing that is known to be classical is our description of our perceptions of physical objects. Von Neumann and
Wigner cast this key insight into dynamical form by proposing that the quantum/classical divide be made not on the basis of size, but rather on the basis
of the qualitative differences in those aspects of nature that we call mind and
matter. The main thrust of ref. 5 is to show, in greater detail, how this idea can
lead, on the basis of a completely quantum mechanical treatment of our brains,
to a satisfactory understanding of why our perceptions of brains, and of all other
physical objects, can be described in classical terms, even though the brains with
which these perceptions are associated are described in completely quantum
mechanical terms.. Any alternative theoretical description of the mind/brain
system that is consistent and coherent must likewise provide a resolution to
the basic theoretical problem of reconciling the underlying quantum-mechanical
character of our brains with the classical character of our perceptions of them.
15
6. Conclusions
Classical mechanics and quantum mechanics, considered as conceivable descriptions of nature, are structurally very different. According to classical mechanics, the world is to be conceived of as a simple aggregate of logically independent local entities, each of which interacts only with its very close neighbors.
By virtue of these interactions large objects and systems can be formed, and we
can identify various ‘functional entities’ such as pistons and drive shafts, and
vortices and waves. But the precepts of classical physics tell us that whereas
these functional units can be identified by us, and can be helpful in our attempts
to comprehend the behaviour of systems, these units do not thereby acquire any
special or added ontological character: they continue to be simple aggregates of
local entities. No extra quality of beingness is appended to them by virtue of
the fact that they have some special functional quality in some context, or by
virtue of the fact that they define a spacetime region in which certain quantities
such as ‘energy density’ are greater than in surrounding regions. All such ‘functional entities’ are, according to the principles of classical physics, to be regarded
as simply consequences of particular configurations of the local entities: their
functional properties are just ‘consequences’ of the local dynamics; functional
properties do not generate, or cause to come into existence, any extra quality or
kind of beingness not inherent in the concept of a simple aggregate of logically
independent local entities. There is no extra quality of ‘beingness as a whole’ ,
or ‘coming into beingness as a whole’ within the framework of classical physics.
There is, therefore, no place within the conceptual framework provided by classical physics for the idea that certain patterns of neuronal activity that cover
large parts of the brain, and that have important functional properties, have
any special or added quality of beingness that goes beyond their beingness as a
simple aggregate of local entities. Yet an experienced thought is experienced as
a whole thing. From the point of view of classical physics this requires either
some ‘knower’ that is not part of what is described within classical physics, but
that can ‘know’ as one thing that which is represented within classical physics as
a simple aggregation of simple local entities; or it requires some addition to the
theory that would confer upon certain functional entities some new quality not
specified or represented within classical mechanics. This new quality would be
a quality whereby an aggregate of simple independent local entities that acts as
16
a whole (functional) entity, by virtue of the various local interactions described
in the theory, becomes a whole (experiential) entity. There is nothing within
classical physics that provides for two such levels or qualities of existence or
beingness, one pertaining to persisting local entities that evolve according to
local mathematical laws, and one pertaining to sudden comings-into-beingness,
at a different level or quality of existence, of entities that are bonded wholes
whose components are the local entities of the lower-level reality. Yet this is exactly what is provided by quantum mechanics, which thereby provides a logical
framework that is perfectly suited to describe the two intertwined aspects of the
mind/brain system.
17
Appendix A. Salient Features of the Quantum Theory of the Mind/Brain
Described in Ref. 5.
1. Facilitation. The excitation of a pattern of neural firings produces
changes in the neurons that have the effect of facilitating subsequent excitations the pattern.
2. Associative Recall. The facilitations mentioned above have the feature
that the excitation of a part of the pattern tends to spread to the whole pattern.
3. Body-World Schema. The physical body of the person and the surrounding world are represented by patterns of neural firings in the brain: these
patterns contain the information about the positioning of the body in its environment. Brain processes are able to interpret this information.
4. Body-World-Belief Schema The body-world schema has an extension
that represents beliefs and other idealike structures.
5. Records. The B-W-B Schema are representations that have the properties required for records: they endure, are copiable, and are combinable11 . These
requirements ensure that these representations are engraved in degrees of freedom that can be characterized as “classical”. Superpositions of such classically
describable states are generally not classical. This characterization of “classical”
(in terms of durability, copiability, and combinability) does not take one outside
quantum theory: it merely distinguishes certain functionally important kinds of
quantum states from others.
6. Evolution Via the Schoedinger Equation. The alert brain evolves under
the quantum dynamical laws from a state in which one B-W-B schema is excited
to a state in which a quantum superposition of several such states are excited.
That is, the brain evolves from a state in which one B-W-B schema is excited, for
a period of time sufficient to “facilitate” the pattern, into a quantum state that
is a superposition of several “classical branches”, each representing a different
classically describable state of the Body-World-Belief complex.
7. The Quantum Jump. The Heisenberg actual event occurs at the highlevel of brain activity where the different classical branches have separated: this
event actualizes one branch and eradicates the others, in accord with Heisenberg’s idea of what happens in a measuring device. The human brain is, in
effect, treated as a quantum measuring device.
18
8. Thoughts. The occurrence of the Heisenberg event at this high level,
rather than at some lower level (e.g., when some individual neuron fires) is
in line with Wigner’s suggestion that the reduction of the wave packet occurs
in the brain only at the highest level of processing, where conscious thoughts
enter. The state of the brain collapses to a classical branch that encapsulates
and records the information contained in a classical description of the bodyworld-belief complex. It is postulated that this actualizing event at the level of
the wave function is associated with a conscious event that is a mental image of
the information represented by the actualized B-W-B schema.
9. Limitations. The theory describes only those collapses that occur in
the part of the physical world associated with human brains: Whether and
where other events occur is left open. A parsimonious version of the theory in
which the only collapses are those associated with human brains would account
in principle for all human experience: there is no empirical evidence available
today that would demand any other actual events. Such a parsimonious theory
would be excessively anthropocentric. Yet any attempt to go beyond it would
be speculative in the absence of relevant data. In the parsimonious version
every actual event corresponds to a human thought, and every human thought
corresponds to an actual event: the theory is maximally linked to the empirical
facts of human experience.
19
Appendix B. Survival Advantage
Contemporary quantum theory does not have any definite rule that specifies
where the collapses occur. The proposal adopted here is designed to produce
a simultaneous resolution of the quantum measurement problem and the mindmatter problem. Thus the proposal is justified by the fact that it produces
a coherent model of reality that accords with our actual experience. Yet the
deeper question arises: Why should the world be this way, and not some other
way? Why should the collapses be to single high-level classical branches, rather
than to either lower-level states, such as firings of individual neurons, or to
higher-level states that might include, for example, many classical branches.
If we suppose that the determination of where the collapses occur is fixed
not by some a priori principle but by habits that become ingrained into nature,
or by some yet-to-be-discovered characteristic of matter that does not single-out
the classical branches ab initio, then the question arises: Is the placement of the
collapses at high-level classical branches, as specified in our model, favorable to
survival of the organism? If so, then there would be an evolutionary pressure for
the collapse location to migrate, in our species, to this high-level placement. The
fact that the collapses, and hence the accompanying experiences, are classical
and high-level would then be consequences of underlying causes, rather than
being simply an unexplained fact of nature: it would be advantageous to the
survival of the organism to tie whatever fundamental property controls collapses
to the high-level classical states of our model.
In fact, it is evident that placement of the collapses at a lower level would
introduce a disruptive stochastic element into the dynamical development of the
system. Any sort of dynamical process designed to allow the organism to respond
in an optimal way to its environmental situation would have a tendency to be
disrupted by the introduction of stochastically instituted low-level collapses,
which will not always be to states that are strictly orthogonal. Thus there
would be an evolutionary pressure that would tend to push the collapses to
higher levels. On the other hand, this pressure would cease once the highest
possible level of classically specified branches is reached. The reason is that in
order for the organism to learn there must be records of what it has done, and
these records must be able to control future actions. But these properties are
essentially the properties by which we have defined “classical”. Superpositions
20
of such classical states have, because of the local character of the interaction
terms in the quantum mechanical laws, no ability to reproduce themselves, or
to control future actions of the organism.11 Thus there should be no migration
of the location of the collapse to levels higher than those specified in our model.
21
Appendix C. Many-Worlds Theories.
I have accepted here Heisenberg’s idea that there are real events, that each
one represents a transition from “the possible” to “the actual”, and that the
quantum state can be regarded as a representation of “objective tendencies” for
such events to occur. In fact, it is difficult to ascribe any coherent meaning to
the quantum state in the absence of such events. For there is then nothing in the
theory for the probabilities represented by the wave function to be probabilities
of : What does it mean to say that something happens with probability P if
everything happens?
In our model, if we say that there is no collapse then all the branches
continue to exist: there is no singling out and actualization of one single branch.
Each of the several branches will evolve independently of the others, and hence
it is certainly plausible to say that the different realms of experience that we
would like to associate with the different branches should be independent and
non communicating: the records formed in one branch will control only that one
branch, and have no effect upon the others. But if there is no collapse then it
would seem that each of the corresponding separate branches should occur with
probability unity. Yet that would not yield a match with experience. In order to
get a match with experience we must be able to effectively discard in the limit
of an infinite number of repetitions of an experiment those branches that have
a quantum weight that tends to zero in this limit. That is, quantum states with
tiny quantum weights should occur almost never: they should not occur with
probability unity! So without some added ontological or theoretical structure
the many-worlds (i.e., no-collapse) theories fail to give a sensible account of the
statistical predictions of quantum theory.
Of course, the key question is not whether a certain experience X occurs,
but rather whether my experience will be experience X. However, the idea that
many experiences occur, but that my experience will be only one of them involves some new sort of structure involving “choice” and “my”. It involves a
structure that goes beyond the idea of a quantum state of the world evolving
in accordance with the Schroedinger equation. At that basic quantum level the
various classically describable branches are components that are combined conjunctively: the universe consists of branch 1 and branch 2 and branch 3 and ...
; not branch 1 or branch 2 or branch 3 or ... . Yet the world must be decom22
posed in terms of alternative possibilities in order to assign different statistical
weights to the different components: the and composition given by the basic
quantum structure must be converted into an or composition. This restructuring seems to require the introduction of some new sort of beingness: the idea of
a psychological being that splits into alternative branches while the associated
physical body, evolving in accord with the Schroedinger equation, is splitting
into a conjunction of corresponding branches. By an appropriate assignment of
statistical weights to the various alternative psychological branches one could
then explain the statistical predictions of quantum theory, but this would seem
to be an ontological tour de force compared to the simpler Wigner idea, adopted
here, that thoughts correspond to real Heisenberg-type events.
23
References
1. H.P. Stapp, The Copenhagen Interpretation, Amer. J. Phys. 40 10981116 (1977) Reprinted in ref. 5.
2. J. von Neumann, The Mathematematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton University Press (1955) (Translated from the original
(1932) German edition) Ch VI Sec. 1.
3. N. Weiner, Back to Leibniz, in Tech. Rev. 34 (9132), 201-203, 222, 224;
Quantum Mechanics, Haldane, and Leibniz, Philos. Sci. 1 (1934), 479-482;
The Role of the Observer, Philos. Sci. 3 (1936), 307-319.
4. J.B.S. Haldane, Quantum Mechanics as a Basis for Philosophy, Philos.
Sci. 1 (1934), 78-98.
5. H.P. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, Springer-Verlag (1993).
6. S.M. Kosslyn, Image and Brain, MIT Press (1994).
7. E. Wigner, in The Scientist Speculates, ed. I.J. Good, Basic Books, New
York (1962).
8. A. Aspect, P. Grangier, and G. Roger, Experimental Tests of Bell’s Inequalities using Time-varying Analysers, Phys. Rev. lett. 49 (1982),
1804-1807.
9. P.S. Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Theory of the Mind/Brain,
MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1992.
10. P.S. Churchland, ibid. , p.295.
11. H.P. Stapp, Symposium on the foundations of modern physics 1990, eds.
P. Lahti and P. Mittelsteadt, World Scientific, Singapore, 1991.
24 |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | pp. 344-349
Kowall, J., How Is the World Created from Nothing?
344
Essay
How Is the World Created from Nothing?
James Kowall*
Abstract
An answer is given to the question: how is the world created from nothing? This answer is based
on recent discoveries of modern physics, including dark energy, the holographic principle, and
non-commutative geometry. This answer not only solves the mystery of how the world is
created, but also solves the mystery of the origin of consciousness.
Key Words: Creation, world, void, consciousness.
There has recently [1] been in great deal of interest in how the world is created from nothing. An
answer to this profound metaphysical question has recently been discovered, and is explained in
the book by Amanda Gefter [2], a book that has been praised by many well-known theoretical
physicists. This answer is based on the recent discoveries of dark energy, the holographic
principle, non-commutative geometry, and what Gefter has called the one-world-per-observer
paradigm. In a way, physicists who do not embrace this worldview are reminiscent of classical
physicists of a century ago who could not understand the world in terms of quantum theory and
relativity theory.
The answer is outlined in a few paragraphs. Whenever dark energy is expended, which in the
sense of relativity theory is understood as the exponential expansion of space that arises with a
cosmological constant [2], an observer-dependent cosmic horizon arises that surrounds the
observer at the central point of view of that particular frame of reference.
The force of dark energy is like a repulsive force of anti-gravity [2] that gives rise to the
exponential expansion of space. Space appears to expand away from the central point of view of
the observer at an accelerated rate. The farther out in space the observer looks, the faster space
appears to expand away from the observer. At the cosmic horizon, space appears to expand away
from the observer at the speed of light, and so things at the cosmic horizon appear to move away
from the observer at the speed of light. Since nothing can travel faster that the speed of light, the
cosmic horizon is as far out in space as the observer can see things in space.
Whenever dark energy is expended, an observer-dependent cosmic horizon surrounds the
observer at the central point of view. The cosmic horizon limits the observer’s observations of
things in space due to the limitation of the speed of light and the exponential expansion of space,
which is unlimited. The limitation of the speed of light is like the maximal rate of information
transfer in a computer network. There is no good explanation for the expansion of space except
that it is a part of relativity theory.
*
Correspondence: James Kowall, MD, PhD, Independent Researcher. letranger0101@gmail.com
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Kowall, J., How Is the World Created from Nothing?
345
How can space appear to expand? The answer is the curvature of space-time geometry.
Relativity theory describes geometrical curvature in terms of the space-time metric, which is a
measure of the curvature of space-time geometry. Space appears to contract with the attractive
force of gravity, while space appears to expand with the repulsive force of dark energy. This
apparent contraction or expansion of space over the course of time occurs relative to the point of
view of an observer, and is the nature of the curvature of space-time geometry in relativity theory
[2].
This apparent contraction or expansion of space is like the distortion of images that appear on a
computer screen in a computer animation. This is actually a very good analogy since the
bounding surface of a cosmic horizon acts as a holographic screen that projects the images of
things to the central point of view of an observer.
The holographic principle [3] tells us all bits of information that define all the observable things
an observer can observe in the space bounded by a cosmic horizon are encoded on the horizon,
which acts as a holographic screen. The screen encodes n bits of information in a pixelated way,
with one bit of information per pixel. These n bits of information are typically defined by the n
eigenvalues of an nxn matrix [2], where n=A/4ℓ2, A is the screen area, and ℓ2=ћG/c3 is the
Planck area. This result is a natural consequence of defining n position coordinates on the screen
with n non-commuting variables [2].
If position on the screen is parameterized in terms of an (x, y) coordinate system, like latitude
and longitude on the surface of a sphere, these n non-commuting variables define n position
coordinates on the screen, which no longer are points but pixels [4]. If these n non-commuting
variables obey an uncertainty relation of the form ΔxΔy≥ℓ2, the pixel size is ℓ2 and the n bits of
information are defined by the n eigenvalues of an nxn matrix.
In the sense of a Hilbert space defined by the n non-commuting variables, every observer has its
own world [2] defined on its own observer-dependent cosmic horizon that acts as a holographic
screen. In the sense of a consensual reality shared by many observers, many observer-dependent
worlds can share information to the degree their respective horizons overlap [2]. Information is
shared whenever screens overlap in the sense of a Venn diagram. This is like the kind of
information sharing that occurs in an interactive computer network. In much the same way, the
expenditure of dark energy is like the flow of energy through a computer network that energizes
the network of screens [2].
It is still possible to understand the unification of the laws of physics in such a radically
observer-dependent holographic world. The only fundamental things in that world are the way
bits of information are encoded on the bounding surface of the observer's horizon and the way
energy flows through that world, so where do the laws of physics come from? The answer is the
laws of physics can only arise as a thermodynamic average in the sense of the second law of
thermodynamics [5].
The holographic principle tells us entropy is defined on the bounding surface in terms of bits of
information. The second law requires that as energy flows through the bounding surface, some
entropy must flow with the energy, and this implies Einstein's field equations for the space-time
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Kowall, J., How Is the World Created from Nothing?
346
metric [5] in the bounded space as a thermodynamic equation of state. Einstein's field equations
in the bounded space are dual [2] to the holographic description of non-commuting variables
defined on the bounding surface, but only in the sense of a thermodynamic average.
It is instructive to briefly review how this holographic mechanism comes into effect [5]. The
second law of thermodynamics relates the flow of energy, ΔE, through the bounding surface to
the flow of entropy, ΔS, and absolute temperature, T, as ΔE=TΔS. Entropy is defined on a
holographic screen [3] in terms of the number of bits of information encoded on the screen,
n=A/4ℓ2, which gives entropy in terms of screen area as S=kA/4ℓ2. If the screen is a spherical
surface of radius R, the holographic principle [3] also specifies the temperature of the screen, as
observed by a distant observer, as kT=ћc/2πR.
As energy flows through the screen, say under the influence of a thermal gradient, some entropy
must flow with the energy. Since entropy is defined in terms of screen area, the screen area must
change as energy flows. This implies that the geometry of the bounded space must change as
energy flows through the bounding surface. This simple thermodynamic relationship, ΔE=TΔS,
then implies Einstein's field equations for the space-time metric in the bounded space as a
thermodynamic equation of state [5].
For a spherical cosmic horizon, the screen area is A=4πR2, where the horizon radius, R, is
determined in relativity theory [3] in terms of a cosmological constant, Λ, as R 2/ℓ2=3/Λ, which
gives S=3πk/Λ. The idea of inflationary cosmology [2] then gives a natural explanation for the
normal flow of thermal energy through the observer's world in terms of an instability in the
cosmological constant, which is understood as a phase transition from a meta-stable false
vacuum state to an eventual stable true vacuum state [2].
Inflationary cosmology [2] tells us that at the time of the big bang event that creates the
observer's world, the cosmological constant has a value of about Λ=1, which gives the horizon
temperature as about 1032 degrees Kelvin. Astronomical observations, based on the rate at which
distant galaxies accelerate away from us, indicate a current value of about Λ=10−123. As the
cosmological constant decreases in value, the radius of the cosmic horizon inflates in size and the
horizon cools in temperature. The normal flow of thermal energy through the observer's world is
understood in terms of this thermal gradient that develops due to an instability in the value of the
cosmological constant [2].
This instability in the value of the cosmological constant is understood as a transition from metastable false vacuum state to a more stable vacuum state. The most stable vacuum state, the true
vacuum state, which has eternal stability, is defined by Λ=0. As the cosmological constant
decreases in value to its eventual final value of zero, the cosmic horizon inflates in size to
infinity and its temperature cools to absolute zero [2].
This scientific argument tells us the flow of energy through the observer's world arises with the
expenditure of dark energy, which gives rise to the bounding surface of a cosmic horizon
surrounding the observer at the central point of view, while the encoding of bits of information
on the horizon arises in a non-commutative geometry [4], which implies Einstein's field
equations for the space-time metric in the bounded space. If the Kaluza-Klein mechanism and
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Kowall, J., How Is the World Created from Nothing?
347
super-symmetry are invoked, all the usual quantum fields of the standard model are then
generated from Einstein's field equations [2]. The final result is called 11-dimensional supergravity, which is understood as a low energy limit.
This also explains the nature of elementary particles, like the electron and photon. The correct
way to understand elementary particles is as localized (in space and time) and quantized (in
terms of energy and momentum) excitations of field energy. In quantum theory this is usually
visualized as a field wave-packet. The standard interpretation of quantum theory tells us this
wave-packet only specifies the quantum probability with which the particle can be measured at
some point in space and at some moment in time.
Unification of the laws of physics (the Kaluza-Klein mechanism) tells us all quantum fields are
components of the space-time metric in extra compactified dimensions. All field equations, like
Maxwell's equations for electromagnetism and Dirac's equation for the electron, arise from
Einstein's field equations for the space-time metric through the Kaluza-Klein mechanism and
super-symmetry.
The holographic principle tells us Einstein's field equations for the space-time metric in the
bounded space arise from the statistical laws of thermodynamics as a thermodynamic equation of
state due to the encoding of bits of information on the bounding surface of that space. We can
therefore say all elementary particles in space are really a form of gravity in extra compactified
dimensions that arise from the way bits of information are encoded on the bounding surface of
that space.
Gravity is the curvature of space-time geometry. Elementary particles are therefore space-time
curvature in extra compactified dimensions of space. That curvature arises holographically from
bits of information encoded on the bounding surface, which acts as a holographic screen. This
tells us the measurement of the particle at some position in space at some moment in time is like
the projection of an image of the particle from a holographic screen to the central point of view
of an observer [6]. All bits of information for the particle are encoded on the bounding surface of
space, not in space itself.
This projection of images from a holographic screen to an observer is very much like the way a
movie is animated on a digital computer screen over a sequence of screen outputs in a computer
animation. In much the same way, the expenditure of dark energy that gives rise to the
construction of the holographic screen is like the flow of energy through an interactive network
of computer screens that gives rise to the computer animation. Each screen in the network is
observed by its own observer at the central point of view.
The way the holographic principle is formulated in terms of non-commutative geometry and
non-commuting variables defined on the bounding surface of a cosmic horizon insures the total
energy of the observer's world is exactly zero [2]. In this sense, everything in that world arises
from nothing. The positive energy of dark energy and any other forms of positive energy that
arise from dark energy, like mass energy, are exactly cancelled out by the negative potential
energy of gravitational attraction.
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Kowall, J., How Is the World Created from Nothing?
348
By its nature, the expenditure of dark energy, the expansion of space, and the creation of an
observer-dependent cosmic horizon implies there must be an empty space of potentiality within
which this bounding surface of space arises [2]. There must be an all-encompassing empty space
with the potential to express energy as the exponential expansion of space. This empty space of
potentiality can be called the void or the primordial nothingness. In this sense, everything is
created from nothing. An observer's world is only created if this empty space of potentiality
expresses dark energy.
This empty space of potentiality cannot be characterized in terms of the laws of physics, a
dimensionality, or the curvature of space-time geometry. Only the observer's world can be
characterized in this way [2], but that characterization only arises from the way bits of
information are encoded on the bounding surface of the observer's world and the way energy
flows through the observer's world.
This explanation not only solves the mystery of how everything is created from nothing, it also
solves the mystery of how the observer's world is created. It also solves an even greater mystery:
how does the observer's consciousness arise?
The answer is found in non-dual wisdom. The primordial nothingness or void is the nature of
undifferentiated consciousness [7, 8, 9]. When this empty space of potentiality expresses dark
energy with the exponential expansion of space and an observer-dependent cosmic horizon arises
that acts as a holographic screen that defines the observer's world, the observer's individual
consciousness is differentiated from undifferentiated consciousness. The consciousness present
at the central point of view of the observer's world is differentiated from the undifferentiated
consciousness of the void when the bounding surface of a cosmic horizon arises in empty space.
Mystery solved.
The observer's focal point of consciousness is present at the central point of view of a
surrounding holographic screen, which only arises when dark energy is expended. The
expenditure of dark energy is the nature of the process that differentiates this focal point of
consciousness from undifferentiated consciousness. We understand the expenditure of dark
energy as the exponential expansion of space, which expands at an accelerated rate relative to the
central point of view of the observer. In the sense of the curvature of space-time geometry, this
accelerated expansion of space is the "bending of space".
The undifferentiated consciousness of the void expresses its power with the expenditure of dark
energy. As dark energy is expended, the observer's focal point of consciousness is differentiated
from undifferentiated consciousness and a cosmic horizon arises that acts as a holographic screen
surrounding the observer at the central point of view.
This "bending of space" is the only way the observer's world can be created and the observer's
individual consciousness can come into being. When the expenditure of dark energy ultimately
comes to an end, as it must since all things ultimately come to an end, the observer's world must
disappear and the observer's differentiated focal point of consciousness must return to the void of
undifferentiated consciousness.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | pp. 344-349
Kowall, J., How Is the World Created from Nothing?
349
Ultimately all the observer really is, is this empty space of potentiality. Ultimately all the
observer really does is bend space as it expresses its energy.
Do not try to bend the spoon. That is impossible.
Instead, only try to realize the truth.
What truth?
There is no spoon.
Then you’ll see it’s not the spoon that bends, it is only yourself.
- The Matrix
References
1. Lawrence Krauss (2012) A Universe from Nothing: Why There is Something Rather than Nothing.
(Barnes & Noble)
2. Amanda Gefter (2014) Trespassing on Einstein's Lawn: A Father, a Daughter, the Meaning of
Nothing, and the Beginning of Everything (Random House)
3. Raphael Bousso (2002) The Holographic Principle. arXiv:hep-th/0203101
4. J Madore (1999) Non-commutative Geometry for Pedestrians. arXiv:gr-qc/9906059
5. Ted Jacobson (1995) Thermodynamics of Space-time. arXiv:gr-qc/9504004
6. Leonard Susskind (1994) The World as a Hologram. arXiv:hep-th/9409089
7. Nisargadatta Maharaj (1996) The Experience of Nothingness (Blue Dove Press)
8. Nisargadatta Maharaj (1973) I Am That (Acorn Press)
9. Jed McKenna (2013) Theory of Everything (Wisefool Press)
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | pp. 815-846
Smetham, G. P., Why Us: Trespassing on an Anthropic Lawn (Part I)
815
Article
Why
S?
Trespassing on an Anthropic Lawn (Part I)
Graham P. Smetham*
ABSTRACT
Mindful reflections upon a metaphysically misguided materialist advertising campaign:
Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn: A Father, a Daughter, the Meaning of Nothing, and the
Beginning of Everything by Amanda Gefter. Gefter, New Scientist book reviews editor, presents
a philosophically confused account of current quantum metaphysics because she adheres to an
out of date materialist metaphysics and claims that, whilst observers in some way create reality,
the process does not involve consciousness. Her claims are shown to invalid, the various
quantum metaphysical perspectives she covers are shown to require consciousness as
fundamental.
Keywords: Grand design, observers, consciousness, anthropic principle, Darwinism,
evolutionary developmental biology, Cambrian explosion, quantum morphogenetic archetypes,
buddhanature, nothingness, emptiness, primordial consciousness, timeless awareness, substrate of
consciousness.
The Question is what is the Question?
Is it all a Magic Show?
Is Reality an Illusion?
What is the framework of the Machine?
Darwin’s Puzzle: Natural Selection?
Where does Space-Time come from?
Is there any answer except that it comes from consciousness?1
- John Wheeler
Wheeler thinks that consciousness could be the criterion for an observer, but
that’s obviously bullshit. I mean, consciousness is just a physical process in the
brain. It’s not magic.2
- Amanda Gefter
* Correspondence: Graham Smetham http://www.quantumbuddhism.com E-mail:graham@quantumbuddhsim.com
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Smetham, G. P., Why Us: Trespassing on an Anthropic Lawn (Part I)
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..the essence of consciousness can be interpreted as a special type of perception
of quantum reality by living beings.3
- Michael Mensky
I regard consciousness as fundamental. I regard matter as derivative from
consciousness.4
- Max Planck
The recent book Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn: A Father, a Daughter, the Meaning of Nothing,
and the Beginning of Everything (TEL) by Amanda Gefter, a science journalist who writes for
New Scientist, Scientific American and other science journals, has been greeted with some
enthusiastic reviews. One reviewer describes it:
Beautifully written and hugely entertaining, this book is a heartfelt introduction to the
many mind-bending theories in contemporary physics.5
Gefter’s descriptions and explanations of some of the metaphysical conclusions drawn from
modern physical theory, derived from her conversations with the physicists she persuaded to
grant her interviews, are well written, intriguing and entertaining. The physicist Peter Woit
compares TEL to another recent work Why Does the World Exist, wherein the author Jim Holt
interviews various philosophers and scientists on their views on the origin of, and reason for, the
existence of the universe. Woit writes that the authors of both books are:
…lively, entertaining writers with wonderful material about deep questions, and I
greatly enjoyed both books. Gefter is the funnier of the two, and I had trouble putting
the book down after it arrived in my mail a couple of days ago.6
However, Woit also has some severe reservations:
While I liked the book, at the same time I found the whole project deeply problematic,
and would have reservations about recommending it to many people, especially to the
impressionable young. The part of physics that fascinates Gefter is the part that has gone
way beyond anything bound by the conventional understanding of science. ... The
questions being discussed and answers proposed are woolly in the extreme, … Not
recognizing that this post-modern way of doing science is deeply problematic and
leading the field into serious trouble isn’t so much Gefter’s fault as that of the experts
she speaks to .... Those taking the field down this path are dominating public coverage
of the subject, and often finding themselves richly rewarded for engaging not in sober
science but in outrageous hype of dubious and poorly-understood ideas. Only the future
will tell whether the significance of this book will end up being that of an entertaining
tale of some excesses from a period when fundamental physics temporarily lost its way,
or a sad document of how a great science came to an end.7
In this criticism Woit implicitly indicates that the central problem that he finds with approaches
to current interpretations within physics lies in the relationship between what he considers to be
‘true’ physical theory, which he considers to be “sober science,” and the metaphysical
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conclusions that are derived from such “sober science.” In this indication Woit has inadvertently
put his finger on a crucial issue that rarely gets clearly examined or articulated.
However, one significant science writer who has taken on this investigation, in his book Farewell
to Reality: How Fairy Tale Physics Betrays the Search for Scientific Truth, is Jim Baggott, who
writes:
...I’m going to accuse a bunch of theoretical physicists of abandoning the scientific
method and so betraying the search for scientific truth about the nature of physical
reality … I will seek to reject fairy-tale physics as metaphysics.8
The proposals that Baggott identifies as “fairy-tale physics” are the stuff of popular science
writing: string theory, supersymmetry, M-theory, Many Worlds and the Multiverse, the
Holographic Principle and so on. Some of the perspectives that Baggott seeks to chastise are
also amongst those enthusiastically and breathlessly expounded by Gefter.
The term ‘metaphysics’ is, according to many, notoriously difficult to define. Originally the
term was used simply to indicate the works of Aristotle which he wrote after his works which
purported to deal with purely ‘physical’ phenomena. The philosopher Peter van Inwagen
describes the Aristotelian notion of metaphysics:
Metaphysics is about things that do not change. In one place, Aristotle identifies the
subject matter of first philosophy as “being as such,” and, in another, as “first causes.” It
is a nice—and vexed—question what the connection between these two definitions is.
Perhaps this is the answer: The unchanging first causes have nothing but being in
common with the mutable things they cause—like us and the objects of our
experience...9
Thus we see that originally the term ‘metaphysics’ denoted the exploration and description of the
deep, core, fundamental structures of reality, at the very deepest level it has to do with the
unchanging ‘stuff’ of reality which gives rise to the changing phenomena of our experiential
world. Furthermore, it is clearly essential that metaphysics also elucidates the relationship
between ‘pure being’ and the phenomena that arise from its changeless essence. In Buddhist
Yogācāra terminology, as we have seen, ‘pure being’ is dharmata, and the manifested
phenomena are dharmas.
Today, however, the metaphysical task has been handed over to physics, despite Baggott’s
mistaken notions. We shall see that Baggott’s rigid distinction between physics and metaphysics
is mistaken. Indeed, the significant physicist Abner Shimony referred to the experimental
investigation of the deepest quantum layer of reality accessible to us, in experiments of Bell-type
inequalities, precisely as “experimental metaphysics.”10 In this case, then, wherein physics
investigates and describes the deepest quantum level of reality, we see that physics dissolves into
metaphysics. Indeed, there is a fuzzy, hazy boundary between physics and metaphysics. And,
furthermore, it is important to be cognisant of the fact that originally physics was based on a
metaphysical commitment to materialism, a commitment which its own development has now
crucially undermined. The notion that physics and metaphysics can be sharply separated is, then,
mistaken. Furthermore, the notion that it is invalid to draw metaphysical conclusions, such as
that of the Anthropic Principle, on the basis of the evidence of physics and the other sciences is
equally misguided.
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Baggott’s use of the term ‘metaphysics’ is not of the Aristotelian kind. His use has more to do
with the use of the term by the twentieth century ‘logical positivists’, for whom the meaning of a
scientific statement consisted entirely in the predictions it made about possible experience, and
any statements which went beyond such statements were asserted to be meaningless
‘metaphysical’ statements. Baggott claims that:
There is as yet no observational or experimental evidence for many of the concepts of
contemporary theoretical physics, such a super-symmetric particles, superstrings, the
multiverse, the universe as information, the holographic principle, or the anthropic
cosmological principle. For some of the wilder speculations of the theorists there can by
definition never be any such evidence.11
However, whilst it may be the case that “some of the wilder speculations” are completely devoid
of evidential backing, it can be shown that this is not true of the Anthropic Principle. In fact the
opposite is the case, there is overwhelming evidence for an anthropic principle, which asserts
that the development of sentience and consciousness is a primary and fundamental feature of the
process of reality.
In his chapter on the Anthropic Principle, Baggott clearly indicates that he rules out the
Anthropic Principle purely on the grounds of what is called the ‘Copernican Principle’, which is
the dogmatic assertion that the universe cannot be Anthropic. This assertion is not based on any
evidential grounds. Baggott indicates that he is uneasy with the fact that the Anthropic Principle
clearly has religious and spiritual implications. But Baggott presents no evidence which
counters or undermines the Anthropic Principle, he simply dogmatically rules it out as being
unscientific in principle.
The ‘Copernican Principle’ is named after the Renaissance mathematician and astronomer
Nicolaus Copernicus, who realized that the Earth is not the center of the solar system, as was
thought at the time, but, rather, the Sun has that central role. It is thought by supporters of the
Copernican Principle that the erroneous notion of the Earth being the center was an example of
the people at the time overestimating their own importance, rather than just making a mistake
based upon the evidence available at the time. Supporters of the Copernican Principle claim that
any assertion which seems to privilege human life in any way must be considered anti-scientific,
whatever the evidence. When applied to the Anthropic Principle, the Copernican Principle has
become a dogmatic decision on the part of a large section of the scientific community to
disregard, and even suppress by nefarious means, evidence suggesting that consciousness is not
only a primary feature of the process of reality, but also has a role in creating what appears to be
the ‘material’ world and the sentient organisms within it.
Baggott describes the Copernican Principle (or prejudice):
The universe is not organized for our benefit and we are not uniquely privileged
observers. Science strives to remove ‘us’ from the centre of the picture, making our
existence a natural consequence of reality rather than the reason for it. Empirical reality
is therefore something that we have learned to observe with detachment, without
passion. Scientists ask fundamental questions about how reality works and seek answers
in the evidence from observation and experiment, irrespective of their own personal
preferences, prejudices and beliefs.12
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The problem with this presentation, however, is that it seems to suggest that a failure to “remove
‘us’ from the centre of the picture” is a result of a lack of detachment, a pandering to “personal
preferences, prejudices and beliefs.” But nothing can be further from the truth, as Roger
Penrose has pointed out with regard to the relationship between quantum theory and
consciousness:
Quantum theory was not wished upon us by theorists. It was (for the most part) with
great reluctance that they found themselves driven to this strange and, in many ways,
philosophically unsatisfying view of the world.13
The early explorers of the quantum realm did not consciously seek to erect some form of
mystically inspired physical theory, to begin with they were shocked by their discoveries.
However, the evidence moved towards an inescapable endpoint, as master quantum physicist
John Wheeler, toward the end of his life, concluded:
The Question is what is the Question?
Is it all a Magic Show?
Is Reality an Illusion?
What is the framework of the Machine?
Darwin’s Puzzle: Natural Selection?
Where does Space-Time come from?
Is there any answer except that it comes from consciousness?
What is Out There?
T’is Ourselves?14
Physicist Anton Zeilinger has written in appreciation of Wheeler’s:
…realisation that the implications of quantum physics are so far-reaching that they
require a completely novel approach in our view of reality and in the way we see our
role in the universe. This distinguishes him from many others who in one way or
another tried to save pre-quantum viewpoints, particularly the obviously wrong notion
of a reality independent of us.15
So, whereas Baggott claims that we must keep ‘US’ out of the scientific picture whatever the
evidence, Wheeler and Zeilinger claim that the evidence of quantum physics indicates the central
significance of ‘US’ in the process of reality. And they are not alone, physicist and philosopher
Bernard d’Espagnat, for another example, writes that:
The doctrine that the world is made up of objects whose existence is independent of
human consciousness turns out to be in conflict with quantum mechanics and with facts
established by experiment. 16
There is a dramatic amount of evidence that consciousness is fundamentally significant in the
process of reality and the evolution of life and the universe. In other words Wheeler and others
have drawn the conclusion, based upon quantum theory and the fact of a seemingly miraculous
fine-tuning of physical parameters, that ‘US’ or some form of intelligence is somehow involved
in the evolution of life and the universe.
One example of spectacular fine-tuning of the physical constants of the universe is the
generation of carbon in the process of stellar nucleosynthesis. The cosmologist Fred Hoyle
famously stated in this context:
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Would you not say to yourself, “Some super-calculating intellect must have designed
the properties of the carbon atom, otherwise the chance of my finding such an atom
through the blind forces of nature would be utterly minuscule? A common sense
interpretation of the facts suggests that a superintellect has monkeyed with physics, as
well as with chemistry and bio logy, and that there are no blind forces worth speaking
about in nature. The numbers one calculates from the facts seem to me so overwhelming
as to put this conclusion almost beyond question.”17
The notion of a “super-calculating intellect,” of course, moves us in the direction of theism.
However this is not a necessity in the Anthropic context, Wheeler, for instance, thought of the
process of the self-production of the universe as being the result of the intersubjective collective
perceptual activities of all sentient beings:
Directly opposite to the concept of universe as machine built on law is the vision of a
world self-synthesized. On this view, the notes struck out on a piano by the observer
participants of all times and all places, bits though they are in and by themselves,
constitute the great wide world of space and time and things.18
In order to graphically represent this perspective Wheeler employed his ‘self-perceiving universe
image (figure 1), in this case the self-perceiving U does represent ‘US’.
In this context it is worth pointing out that the Anthropic Principle, a term coined in 1974 by the
theoretical physicist Brandon Carter, is often misrepresented as being the claim that it is solely
human life that is the end point of the anthropic process, rather than sentient life in general. As
the philosopher Nick Bostrom has pointed out:
Figure 1
The term “anthropic” is a misnomer. Reasoning about selection effects has nothing to
do with homo sapiens, but rather with observers in general. Carter himself regrets not
having chosen a better name.19
It is also necessary to point out the distinction between the so-called Weak Anthropic Principle
which simply states that the universe we find ourselves in must be anthropic because we exist,
but it might have been otherwise, and the Strong Anthropic Principle which asserts that it is the
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very nature of the universe to be Anthropic. On this view, life and sentience are the reason for
the universe’s existence, so to speak, and there is an innate intelligence and fundamental
awareness and internal consciousness which unfolds within the process of the evolution of life
and the universe.
However, there is a deep reluctance, verging on a dogmatic prejudice, against allowing such
evidence to be entertained because the implications, especially in the sphere of spirituality, are
significant and important. And this antagonism has been enshrined in the so-called ‘Copernican
Principle’ which has been elevated by some to an inviolable principle of the scientific method.
Baggott for example writes:
I don’t think we need to waste time debating whether the strong anthropic principle, or
indeed any similarly structured principle, is scientific. Any structure designed to
completely overturn the Copernican Principle and restore some kind of privileged status
to intelligent observers (be they human or not) goes against the grain of nearly five
hundred years of scientific practice.20
However, in making such a sweeping and dogmatic statement Baggott is clearly ignoring the
most crucial feature of the scientific method which is that, as Baggott himself writes in his book,
scientists should “seek answers in the evidence from observation and experiment, irrespective of
their own personal preferences, prejudices and beliefs.”21 There is, however, absolutely no
“evidence from observation and experiment” which supports the Copernican Principle, it is much
more akin to “personal preferences, prejudices and beliefs.”22 As Brandon Carter pointed out
about the Copernican Dogma:
Unfortunately there has been a strong (not always subconscious) tendency to extend this
to a most questionable dogma to the effect that our situation cannot be privileged in any
sense.23
The evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin stated a particularly egregious version of the
Copernican Principle which indicates that materialism must be adhered to, whatever the
evidence against it, in order to further science’s supposed intellectual war with religion:
Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to
an understanding of the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the
side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of some of its constructs, in spite of its
failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the
tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we
have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism. It is not that the methods and
institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the
phenomenal world, but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori adherence to
material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce
material explanations, no matter how counter-intuitive, no matter how mystifying to the
uninitiated. Moreover, that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a Divine Foot in
the door.24
Lewontin, like Baggott, seems oblivious to the scientific requirement to take observations and
evidence seriously.
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This antagonism towards any evidence which points towards the fundamental and innate
presence of awareness, consciousness, intelligence and design (not necessarily of a theistic
nature) in the evolution and development of life and the universe runs very deep in some
Western intellectual cadres. It derives from certain political, social and academic forces in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, forces which favoured materialist Darwinism in the
face of any contrary evidence. In the most extreme form it manifests in the ridiculous strident
and pugilistic assertions of crude materialism and crude Darwinian fundamentalism as displayed
by the likes of Richard Dawkins and friends. But the intellectually undermining influence of
academic materialism, crude or subtle, permeates and exercises an influence upon a great deal of
modern intellectual, academic and popular culture, thus the great popular taste for the writings
of Dawkins, even though his many of his metaphysical claims can be shown to be dubious.
Such is the pervasiveness of this fundamentalist materialism that it pervades works such as
Gefter’s TEL, even though the very metaphysical accounts conveyed to Gefter by various
physicists are entirely contrary to any materialist account of the process of reality. In Gefter’s
hands they are sanitised for the materialist cause by Gefter’s stubborn refusal to figure out that
the notion of an ‘observer’ without the presence of consciousness is absurdly incoherent. Gefter
appears to have a detailed understanding of the groovy, weird and wonderful things that current
physics indicates about the nature of reality, yet she fails to appreciate that any moderately
metaphysically coherent intellect would consider the perspectives described to her by most of
the physicists she interviews to be antithetical to any form of materialism.
Consider for example, the physical-metaphysical perspective proposed by Wheeler as described
by physicist Paul Davies, Gefter writes concerning Wheeler’s notion of “a participatory
universe”:
If measurements built the universe bit by bit, as Wheeler suspected, then observers
were somehow implicated in the creation of reality - a radical picture that, if true,
would mean ours was a participatory universe. As the physicist Paul Davies wrote,
“Wheeler seeks to … turn the conventional explanatory relationship
matter→information →observers on its head, and place observership at the base of the
explanatory chain: observers→information→matter … could it somehow be that
observers turn nothing into something? The idea seemed impossible from the start,
because where would the observers come from? What would even count as an
observer? Surely it did not have to be conscious or human … but what?25
The fact that it appears that “measurements built the universe bit by bit” derives from the
quantum situation that prior to a “measurement” being carried out by an “observer” there is only
a quantum realm of potentiality, which is not a “nothing” - Gefter, like some others, is very
slap-dash with some of her terminology regarding the ground quantum state. This quantum
realm of potentiality becomes an experienced, and apparently ‘material’, reality when a
measurement “collapses” the quantum wavefunction of potentiality.
On this view, the activity of a multitude of acts of observation are required to build an
experiential-material universe over time. This was Wheeler’s fundamental view. And it is a
view which clearly requires the acceptance that observership, and therefore consciousness, is a
fundamental and primary aspect of the process of reality. In other words, there must be some
kind of internal pressure of “observership,” not fully individuated and conscious at the ground
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level of course, but having the nature of undifferentiated primordial consciousness. The process
of the deeper levels of “observership” eventually produces the multitude of sentient organisms
which continue to maintain the universe through their observations. Such a view is clearly
strongly anthropic.
Gefter refers to such an anthropic perspective as “top-down” as opposed to the conventional
“bottom-up” approach. It is “top-down” in the sense that, like Mensky's notion of a “LifePrinciple” operating at the quantum level in order to unfold the potentialities for life which are a
fundamentally innate aspect of the quantum realm, this perspective requires that we accept that
life and consciousness are internal, and primary, aspects of the ground of the process of reality.
Gefter writes about this:
Anthropic coincidences are problematic for bottom-up cosmology because you are
starting with an initial state that’s completely independent of observers; the universe
evolves forwards in time until observers like us just happen to arise, a fluky by-product
of physics and happenstance. Given random initial conditions some 14 billion years
ago, of course we’re scratching our heads and asking, what were the odds that the
universe would just happen to have every minute ingredient to cook up the fragile stew
of life? Top-down cosmology, on the other hand, doesn’t raise the question … top down
cosmology starts with observers … And if you start with life, you are bound to end up
with a life-friendly universe. Why an anthropic principle? … Because the universe is
observer dependent. Such jewel-toned thoughts about life made me nervous - any
theory which relied on humans or consciousness as being some kind of “special”
ingredient struck me as crackpot.26
So, here we have it, Gefter dismisses the notion of a top-down development of life and the
universe, not on the basis of evidence or cogent reasoning, but, rather, she kind of feels in her
bones, so to speak, that such a notion must be “crackpot.” It does not occur to her that, not only
does the evidence support this psycho-metaphysical viewpoint, it is also the only logically
coherent possibility. The notion that life and consciousness can emerge from entirely lifeless
and entirely blankly non-conscious fundamental aspects of reality is absolutely logically
incoherent and therefore definitely “crackpot.”
At the same time as Gefter revels in the frisson of an “observer-dependent” reality, she, as we
shall see, also, inconsistently, supports the current academic prevalence of crude materialist
dogma. Like many others she seems to be incapable of drawing obvious conclusions because of
a preformed dogmatic prejudice concerning any viewpoint which draws spiritual conclusions
from the modern discoveries on the part of physics. Bizarre and contradictory it may be but, at
the same time as she seems to support her father’s view that the universe is some kind of illusion
generated from a “homogeneous state” of “nothingness” (which itself is a misuse of the term
“nothingness” which should mean absolute zilch – not even a glimmer of potentiality), and that
the process of reality and the universe is “observer-dependent,” she also upholds the materialist
worldview, supporting a crude materialist Darwinism.
Gefter also holds to the view that consciousness has nothing to do with the fundamental
observer-dependency of the universe. In her worldview consciousness is asserted to be
generated by material brain processes:
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Wheeler thinks that consciousness could be the criterion for an observer, but that's
obviously bullshit. I mean, consciousness is just a physical process in the brain. It’s not
magic.27
This means that, in her universe, which she asserts is “observer-dependent,” observation can take
place without the presence or activity of consciousness. According to Gefter:
It was also clear that we needed to give careful consideration to the meaning and role of
“observers” in general. Both relativity and quantum theory had changed the role that
observers played in physics – not observers as humans or conscious creatures, but
observers as in points of view.28
Such bizarre formulations indicate the remarkable philosophical incompetence on Gefter’s part.
The notion of free-floating “points of view,” having no reference to any kind of experiential
substrate able to experience and be aware of the “point of view” is incoherent. This claim
elevates the notion of a “point of view” to an elementary feature of the process of reality, a claim
which is philosophically unacceptable precisely because the concept of a “point of view”
requires the experiential medium of consciousness.
However, this attempted objectification of the notion of a “point of view” indicates what is going
on here. This move amounts to what Zeilinger calls an attempt to “save pre-quantum viewpoints,
particularly the obviously wrong notion of a reality independent of us.”29 In the scientific
revolution of the seventeenth century mind and consciousness were removed from the scientific
description because of not being amenable to mathematical quantification. Subsequently the
notion of consciousness became problematic and, due to the remarkable achievements of the
scientific method in investigating, harnessing and controlling the phenomena of material reality,
it was assumed that matter was the ultimate substance and consciousness was considered to be
derivative.
Consciousness, then, was simply assumed to be irrelevant to any ultimate
description of the process of reality.
This assumption, however, was overturned within the quantum revolution wherein consciousness
was shown to have a subtle interconnection with the quantum realm, interacting with it in order
to produce experienced ‘material’ reality. As physicists Bruce Rosenblum and Fred Kuttner
write in their book Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters Consciousness:
…physics’ encounter with consciousness, demonstrated for the small, applies to
everything. And that ‘everything’ can include the entire Universe.30
This indicates the primary nature of consciousness. However, resistance to this conclusion is still
prevalent amongst a rearguard community of adherents to the metaphysical worldview of
materialism, and in order to “save the appearances” of this outmoded worldview adherents
simply rearrange language to suit their purposes. Thus “points of view” become active agents on
their own behalf, having, according to Gefter’s up-side-down and inside-out perspective, no
connection with consciousness. Gefter writes:
“Observers” didn’t mean people, and “observer-dependency” didn’t mean subjective.
But I could imagine how it could all be misconstrued.31
But, as we shall see, Wheeler did mean “people” (and animals). It might be true that the universe
is not entirely subjective, Wheeler’s perspective requires us to consider it to be an intersubjective
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creation. However, Gefter’s absurd misconstrual here is the confident, and mistaken, assertion
that “observers” and “observer-dependency” have nothing to do with consciousness.
Gefter has great admiration for Wheeler, praising his poetic approach to exploring some of the
deepest mysteries of physics and existence, but at the same time she is wary of his views on the
issue of the agency of consciousness. Wheeler asserted that the universe has been built up, bit by
bit, from the quantum “smoky haze of possibility” (not “nothingness”) by acts of observation
made by sentient beings. Gefter observes:
But what exactly did Wheeler mean by an observer? Without careful clarification
observer was a dirty word. … Wheeler himself acknowledged the problem. “Any
exploration of the concept of ‘observer’ and the closely associated notion of
‘consciousness’ is destined to come to a bad end in an infinite mystical morass,” he
wrote. And yet at times he teetered dangerously on the banks of the morass, his view of
observers skewed far more towards minds than rods or clocks.32
And it is true that Wheeler did tread a very fine line, it may even be said that at earlier times in
his career he hedged his bets, and it is interesting and illuminating to consider why this might
have been the case.
In a 1983 article Law Without Law, wherein he described the delayed choice experiment, which
demonstrates how an observation can determine the nature of reality backwards in time, Wheeler
wrote the following observations:
We are inescapably involved in bringing about that which appears to be happening.33
And:
Many investigators, believing that the greatest insights are to be won from nature’s
strangest features are … giving fresh coverage of the strange “observer-participancy”
forced to our attention by the quantum.34
And:
Useful as it is under everyday circumstances to say the world exists “out there”
independent of us, that view can no longer be upheld. There is a strange sense in which
this is a “participatory universe.”35
And:
Is the term “big bang” merely a shorthand way to describe the cumulative consequence
of billions upon billions of elementary acts of observer-participancy reaching back into
the past...36
And:
Yes, oh universe, without you I would not have been able to come into being. Yet you,
great system, are made of phenomena; and every phenomena rests on an act of
observation. You could never even exist without elementary acts of registration such as
mine.37
And:
Beyond particles, beyond fields of force, beyond geometry, beyond space and time
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themselves, is the ultimate constituent the still more ethereal act of observerparticipancy?38
And yet, despite these stirring and repeated assertions of the “observer-participatory” nature of
the universe, Wheeler also asserted in this article that:
We cannot speak in these terms without a caution … The caution: “Consciousness” has
nothing to do with the quantum process. We are dealing with an event which makes
itself known by an irreversible act of amplification, by an indelible record, an act of
registration.39
But one must ask in this context: how does Wheeler know this? What possible result or results of
quantum experimentation validate this conclusion? None! If observer-participation is clearly
required for the manifestation of the universe, and the most natural assumption is that
observation is a phenomenon that requires consciousness, then the most obvious conclusion is
that consciousness is implicated. So why does Wheeler, in this 1983 article, issue such a stern
warning?
In order to appreciate a possible answer it is useful to look into the intellectual climate and
expectations within the physics establishment at that time and the years preceding. Rosenblum
and Kuttner are physicists who have no doubt about the connection between consciousness and
the quantum ground of reality:
Consciousness and the quantum enigma are not just two mysteries; they are the two
mysteries; first, our physical demonstration of the quantum enigma, faces us with the
fundamental mystery of the objective world ‘out there;’ the second, conscious awareness,
faces us with the fundamental mystery of the subjective, mental world ‘in here.’
Quantum mechanics seems to connect the two.40
They also indicate the intellectual climate of mainstream physics since the 1950’s, extending
down to recent times:
In physics departments a conforming mindset increasingly meant that an untenured
faculty member might endanger a career by serious interest in the fundamentals of
quantum physics. Even today it is best to explore the meaning of quantum mechanics
while also working a ‘day job’ on a mainstream physics topic.41
In his excellent book How the Hippies Saved Physics David Kaiser indicates that in the 1960’s
and 70’s physics in the United States was a conservative profession not enamored of
metaphysical speculation or research. The general attitude amongst working physicists was that
of “shut up and calculate,” the idea being that it was the practical results of research that
mattered, and speculation about exactly what quantum theory implied about the metaphysical
nature of reality was to be avoided. The ethos was very different to that which held sway during
the early development of quantum theory when discussions between Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg,
Schrödinger and the other ‘founding fathers’ were replete with puzzled philosophical
speculations as to what the weird behaviour of the quantum realm might actually indicate about
the nature of reality. Kaiser observes that later in the United States:
The quarter century during which this Cold War style reigned witnessed an extraordinary
buildup of calculating skill. At the same time, an intellectual trade-off slipped by
unnoticed, with wide-ranging implications. For every additional calculation of baroque
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complexity that physics students tackled during the 1950’s and 1960’s, they spent
correspondingly less time puzzling through what all of those fancy equations meant,
what they implied about the world of electrons and atoms. The fundamental strangeness
of quantum reality had been leeched out.42
Interest in quantum philosophical and metaphysical issues was a fringe activity.
Later, however, this anti-metaphysical attitude changed. The Fundamental Fysiks Group (FFG)
was founded in San Francisco in May 1975 by two physicists, Elizabeth Rauscher and George
Weissmann, at the time both graduate students at the University of California, Berkeley. The
group held informal discussions on Friday afternoons to explore the philosophical implications
of quantum theory. Leading members included Fritjof Capra, John Clauser, Philippe Eberhard,
Nick Herbert, Jack Sarfatti, Saul-Paul Sirag, Henry Stapp, and Fred Alan Wolf. According to
Kaiser:
The ways and means of being a physicist came unmoored in a way they hadn’t been for
two generations. No longer would the attitude of “shut up and calculate” hold sway
unchecked. Sitting around the large conference table at the Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory with few other demands on their time, they sought to recapture the sense of
excitement, wonder, and mystery that had attracted them to physics in the first place, just
as it had animated the founders of quantum mechanics.43
Amongst this fringe group an interest in connections between quantum phenomena,
consciousness and psychic phenomena was central, figure 2 shows a ‘roadmap’ drawn out by a
member of the group for their research and metaphysical explorations.
Jack Sarfatti was one of the few physicists who was very enthusiastic about Wheeler’s
metaphysical speculations at that time. He wrote:
In my opinion, the quantum principle involves mind in an essential way …. the structure
of matter may not be independent of consciousness. Some component in the quantum
probability involves the turbulent creative sublayer of ideas in the mind of the
“participator.”44
Wheeler, however, kept his distance from these wayward fringe physicists. Sarfatti and Wolf
were keen to work with Wheeler but Wheeler “politely declined” 45 their requests. So it would
seem that Wheeler at that time was keen not to veer too far from academic respectability. It can
be seen from the ‘roadmap’ for explorations based on the important implications of quantum
entanglement that the FFG were aware that the new emerging quantum worldview might support
the existence of phenomena such as ESP and psychokinesis, phenomena that were dogmatically
ruled out within a ‘classical’ worldview. They saw the possible implications of an “observercreated world.”
Wheeler’s disavowal of the role of consciousness at this time actually lacks credibility as he also
wrote in Law Without Law:
Are billions upon billions of acts of observer-participancy the foundation of everything?
We are about as far as we can be today from knowing enough about the deeper
machinery of the universe to answer this question. Increasing knowledge about detail
has bought increasing ignorance about plan. The very fact that we can ask such a
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strange question shows how uncertain we are about the deeper foundations of the
quantum and its ultimate implications.46
In the light of such “uncertainty” about “deeper foundations of the quantum and its ultimate
implications” it is difficult to see how Wheeler could be so certain at that time that
“Consciousness has nothing to do with the quantum process.” It seems very likely that such
statements were made with deference to academic respectability. As we know he later changed
his mind on this issue and he connected up the notion of observership with consciousness:
Unless the blind dice of mutation and natural selection lead to life and consciousness
and observership at some point down the road the universe could not have come into
being in the first place...47
Figure 2. The FFG’s ‘Roadmap’ of quantum possibilities for the paranormal.
In other words the universe could not come into being without the emergence of “consciousness
and observership.” But what Wheeler failed to see, at least at this point, is that life and
consciousness must have been already implicit or potential at the point of the big bang, which
was actually a quantum fluctuation in a vast quantum field of potentiality, a field that Mensky
terms the ‘Alterverse’ – the vast pool of possible alternative histories of the universe.
Furthermore, because consciousness is involved in the unfolding of the universe, the process
cannot be driven by “the blind dice of mutation and natural selection.” The materialist
Darwinian worldview is entirely out of place in Wheeler’s quantum psycho-metaphysics, as we
have seen in a previous Wheeler quote he indicated that “Darwin’s Puzzle: Natural Selection …
comes from consciousness.” And in this case the kind of “natural selection” involved cannot be
the random “blind watchmaker” variety, for the unfolding of life requires that consciousness
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steers in the direction of life through some sort of quantum ‘look-ahead’ mechanism such as
Mensky’s ‘postcorrection’ mechanism.
Wheeler described the meaning of his “universe as a self-excited circuit” graphic image (figure
1) as follows:
Beginning with the big bang, the universe expands and cools. After eons of dynamic
development it gives rise to observership. Acts of observer-participancy – via the
mechanism of the delayed choice experiment – in turn give tangible “reality” to the
universe not only now but back to the beginning. To speak of the universe as a selfexcited circuit is to imply once more a participatory universe.48
And the caption for the image is:
Starting small (thin U at upper right), it grows (loop of U) and in time gives rise (upper
left) to observer-participancy – which in turn imparts “tangible reality” … to even the
earliest days of the universe.49
Physicist Kip Thorne explained Wheeler’s perspective to Gefter as follows:
From a certain point of view, which Wheeler adopts, systems can become classical only
when observed. They behave quantum mechanically … until observed, and the
observation collapses the wavefunction. So Wheeler conceives of the universe as
having been born and having evolved quantum mechanically until it naturally generates
life. Then that life performs the observation that collapses the state of the universe to
make it classical. It is self-excited in the sense that the observation comes from within
the universe, not from the outside.50
Gefter then asks Thorne: “Does it have to be biological life that makes the observation?” and
Thorn tells her that this was Wheeler’s view.
Wheeler, however, did not at this point seem to be aware that “observer-participancy” could not
have suddenly sprang into operation from nowhere, it must have been implicit or potential from
the beginning. Furthermore, the mechanism of “observer-participancy” must have been
operative in some form even when fully organic beings where not yet fully evolved. In other
words the mechanism of self-excitation, self-observation, or self-registration must be a
fundamental mechanism employed by a deep non-individuated primordial consciousness, and
the employment of this mechanism results in the development and evolution of the universe and
the sentient beings it contains. In other words, primordial consciousness is able to individuate
through a Wheeler-type mechanism of universal internal self-perception. This Wheeler-type
mechanism corresponds in an important way with Mensky’s psycho-metaphysics, in both
perspectives evolutionary choices are made through a quantum mechanism involving
consciousness from the reference point of a future point in time. And, as we saw in the first
chapter the same is true of the quantum metaphysics outlined by Hawking & Mlodinow in their
book The Grand Design.
Gefter, however, seems dogmatically predisposed to reject notions of consciousness being at all
involved in the development of the universe and the sentient life within it:
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I couldn’t see how bringing consciousness into the mix could possibly help - not least of
all because scientists don’t know what consciousness is. Whatever it is, it’s governed by
the same laws of physics and composed of the same particles, fields, or informationtheoretic bits as everything else.51
Here we find Gefter stating her own prejudices, admittedly derived from the deep-seated
materialism that pervades so much scientific and academic discourse, as if they were backed by
evidence or reasoning, which they are not. Her views on the nature of consciousness are nothing
other than materialist dogma. Consciousness cannot be composed of ‘particles’ precisely
because particles come into being when consciousness interacts with quantum wavefunctions of
potentiality. So consciousness is more fundamental than particles. It may be possible to
consider consciousness as a quantum field, but in this case it would be a fundamental quantum
field capable of interacting with other quantum fields in creative ways. This would render
consciousness as being an essential creative feature of the ‘physical’ world. The quantum
cosmologist Andre Linde has mused in this context:
Is it possible that consciousness, like spacetime, has its own intrinsic degrees of freedom
and that neglecting these will lead to a description of the universe that is fundamentally
incomplete? What if our perceptions are as real as (or maybe, in a certain sense, are
even more real) than material objects?52
And Linde has also observed:
The universe and the observer exist as a pair. ... The moment you say that the universe
exists without any observers, I cannot make any sense out of that. I cannot imagine a
consistent theory of everything that ignores consciousness. A recording device cannot
play the role of an observer, because who will read what is written on this recording
device? In order for us to see that something happens, and say to one another that
something happens, you need to have a universe, you need to have a recording device,
and you need to have us. It’s not enough for the information to be stored somewhere,
completely inaccessible to anybody. It’s necessary for somebody to look at it. You need
an observer who looks at the universe. In the absence of observers, our universe is
dead.53
Furthermore, in the absence of conscious observers the universe is only quantum potentiality, no
‘classical’ world exists. Such a viewpoint, which was accepted by several of the ‘founding
fathers’ of quantum theory, and is accepted today by scientists such as Linde, Roger Penrose,
Stuart Hameroff, Henry Stapp, Amit Goswami, Mensky and others, is, it seems, rejected by
Gefter without rhyme or reason.
Gefter’s claim that most scientists assert that they do not know what consciousness is, on the
other hand, true. But the reason for this is that scientists in general approach the phenomenon of
consciousness with a ridiculous methodology, expecting to be able to examine it “out there” as if
it were some kind of externally existing fluid-like ‘stuff’. This, of course, is not possible. If we
want to directly know what consciousness is there is only one way to know, and that is to
experience directly through advanced meditation techniques such as exist in the Buddhist
tradition. In Buddhist psycho-metaphysics there are levels or degrees of consciousness, which
can be directly experienced by advanced meditation techniques. The basic division is that
between jnana, which is fundamental nondual consciousness or wisdom-awareness, and vijnana
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or divided, dualistic everyday consciousness. Everyday consciousness is the “glow of the ground
of being” 54 manifesting in the dualistic world. The West’s understanding is primitive in
comparison to Buddhist psycho-metaphysics.
If we require a definition of consciousness, then one derived from Buddhism will suffice. Here
is a description of the fundamental nature of mind or consciousness given by the Dalai Lama:
The knowing nature, or agency … is called mind and this is non-material … Cognitive
events possess the nature of knowing because of the fundamental nature of clarity that
underlies all cognitive events. This is … the mind’s fundamental nature, the clear light
nature of mind.55
If we want to know where the “clear light nature of mind,” which provides the functionality of
knowing and cognizing, arises from then, as Mensky points out:
…the phenomena of life and consciousness cannot be mechanistically reduced to the
action of the laws of science as they are found in the course of exploring [inanimate]
matter. The explanation of these phenomena on the basis of quantum mechanics requires
[the] addition of a special independent element to the set of quantum concepts and laws.
Such a new element of theory should directly connect quantum concepts with the
concepts characteristic of life. The simplest way to find this element is to consider the
phenomenon of consciousness and compare it with the description of observation
(measurement) in quantum mechanics. 56
The fundamental qualitative aspect of fundamental awareness which manifests as individuated
consciousness must reside at the quantum level. As physicist Nick Herbert (one of the members
of The Fundamental Fysiks Group) has pointed out:
...every quantum system has both an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, and … consciousness
both in humans as well as in other sentient beings is identical to the inner experience of
some quantum system. A quantum system’s outside behavior is described by quantum
theory, it’s inside experience is the subject matter of a new ‘inner physics’….57
As Mensky indicates, the required ‘inner physics’ actually already exists within Buddhist
psycho-metaphysics. Consciousness is, then, the internal qualitative aspect of the quantum
functioning of the ‘ground of being’. According to Buddhist psycho-metaphysics a continuous
direct experience of the ground level of awareness is an experience of buddhahood, or
enlightenment:
When the true face of the ground aspect of buddhahood - a state of purity and mastery
of the ground of being … timeless awareness - the innate glow of the ground of being subside into an inner glow whose radiance is directed outwards …58
Advanced Buddhist meditation involves the dissolving of the dualistic everyday levels of the
functioning of consciousness and the activation of deeper levels of a more universal
consciousness. As Buddhist practitioner-writer B. Alan Wallace has pointed out:
This brings us to primordial consciousness, the ultimate level of mind that Buddhists
seek to penetrate. The substrate consciousness can be compared to a relative vacuum. It
is relatively empty, but still possesses structure and energy, characterized by such
attributes as bliss (spiritual joy or rapture), luminosity (an internal radiance), and a muted
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sense of duality between subject and object. Primordial consciousness - characterized as
the absolute ground, the most basic state of consciousness - could then be characterized
as the absolute vacuum of consciousness. Like the absolute vacuum of modern physics, it
entails the lowest possible state of mental activity but the highest possible potential and
degree of freedom. Furthermore, whereas the substrate consciousness is conscious of the
substrate - the relative inner space or vacuum of the mind - primordial consciousness is
indivisibly aware of the absolute space of all phenomena (dharmadhatu), which is
beyond the duality of external and internal space. Out of this space emerge all the
phenomena that make up all worlds of experience - the whole universe, inside and out,
subjective and objective. All appearances of external and internal space, time, matter, and
consciousness emerge from the dharmadhatu and consist of nothing other than
configurations of this absolute or true vacuum.59
Furthermore, final buddhahood, or complete enlightenment with a continuous awareness of the
nondual ground of being, is the endpoint of the evolution and development of a sentient being.
Wheeler’s quantum conclusions were entirely consistent with Buddhist psycho-metaphysics. He
summarized his conclusions in his article ‘Thoughts on the Origin of Spacetime’ as follows:
In what medium does spacetime itself live and move and have its being? Is there any
other answer than to say that consciousness brings all of creation into being, as surely
as spacetime and matter brought conscious life into being? Is all this great world that
we see around us a work of imagination?60
Figure 3
In other words we must conceive of a ground level universal energy-awareness-potentiality, also
designated within Buddhism as shunyata, or emptiness (not nothingness) which, through the
medium of “spacetime and matter,” “creates” a manifested realm of individuated sentient beings
within the apparently material world in order to embody individuated consciousness. Through
this process the universe can explore and discover its own meaning (figure 3). Such a viewpoint
is suggested by the recent notion of a “self-explaining universe” that the physicist Paul Davies
has written about in his book The Goldilocks Enigma:
…a good case can be made that life and mind are fundamental physical phenomena,
and so must be incorporated into the overall cosmic scheme. One possible line of
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evidence for the central role of mind comes from the way in which an act of
observation enters into quantum mechanics. It turns out that the observation process
conceals a subtle form of teleology.61
Such a universe would necessarily contain organisms that embody the capacity for cognition,
which is to say consciousness, precisely because the purpose of ‘self-explanation’, to use
Davies’ terminology, or self-cognition, is fundamental to the universe. It is part of the
“teleology” of the universe.
Quantum physics seems increasingly to point towards the operation of an infinitely fertile
universal “imagination,” to use Wheeler’s term, which can actually bring into being an
extraordinary appearance of a vast ‘material’ universe containing infinite varieties of
consciousness, all of which inhabit an individualized field of meaning-values. As physicist
David Bohm pointed out:
We can say that human meanings make a contribution to the cosmos, but we can also
say that the cosmos may be ordered according to a kind of ‘objective’ meaning. New
meanings may emerge in this overall order. That is we may say that meaning penetrates
the cosmos, or even what is beyond the cosmos. For example there are current theories
in physics that imply that the universe emerged from the ‘big bang’. In the earliest phase
there were no electrons, protons, neutrons, or other basic structures. None of the laws
that we know would have had any meaning. Even space and time in their present welldefined form would have had no meaning. All of this emerged from a very different
state of affairs. The proposal is that, as happens with human beings, this emergence
included the creative unfoldment of generalized meaning. 62
Each sentient being is an individualized structure of experiential meaning-values embodied
within individualised consciousness, each sentient being embodies a fundamental evolutionary
impetus to maximise the overall meaning value of the individualized meaning-matrix, the final
endpoint being enlightenment, wherein the limited awareness of a sentient being dissolves into
its universal source.
This dramatic psycho-metaphysical perspective is articulated within the Buddhist Dzogchen
tradition in texts such as You Are the Eyes of the World, composed by the remarkable fourteenth
century practitioner-yogi Longchenpa:
Listen, because all you beings of the three realms
Were made by me, the creativity of the universe,
You are my children, equal to me.
Because you and I are not separate,
I manifest in you.63
This “creativity of the universe” can be seen in what Paul Davies indicates as a quantum
“teleology,” an internal purpose, which brings into existence a vast field of individuated sentient
beings all of which partake of the infinite capacity of the ultimate source. According to
Longchenpa:
Out of the state of pure and total presence, the impetus for everything
From which come the five great elements whose very being is this state,
I, the creativity of the universe,
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Arise as teacher, in five forms of pure and total presence.64
These “five teachers,” which are generated by the “creativity of the universe which fashions
everything,”65 are earth, water, fire, wind and space, in other words all the factors which make up
the material dualistic world of experience. And:
If I [the state of pure and total presence which is the creativity of the universe] did not
exist, you would not exist.
When you do not exist, the five teachers [i.e. the dualistic and material world of
experience] also do not come about…66
It is intriguing to compare these observations with some of Wheeler’s, such as:
Yes, oh universe, without you I would not have been able to come into being. Yet you,
great system, are made of phenomena; and every phenomena rests on an act of
observation. You could never even exist without elementary acts of registration such as
mine.67
What Wheeler refers to as the “imagination” of a primordial consciousness that “brings all of
creation into being,” corresponds precisely to Longchenpa’s “majestic creativity [of the universe]
which fashions everything.”68
According to another Buddhist Dzogchen philosopher:
In the human context, intelligence reaches into man’s life as his spirituality, constituting
itself as human subjectivity. The latter, therefore, is not an immutable essence; rather it
is a product of an overall evolutionary force moving in an optimizing direction, thereby
enabling the subject to transcend itself by overcoming its limited domains. This force is
felt as giving meaning to man’s life and is experienced as having existential
significance. 69
In the Buddhist Dzogchen worldview, which is fully in accord with modern physics, we have a
remarkable vision of the universe as a meaning-machine, or meaning-organism, using sentient
beings both as creative agents and also agents of transcendence reaching towards ever greater
vistas of universal meaning-values. This perspective indicates a universal directedness towards
ever more universal modes of experience within consciousness, the ultimate experience being
‘enlightenment’.
What is enlightenment? It is the direct nonconceptual understanding of the ground of Being by
the fundamental cognizant aspect of the ground of Being itself. In other words enlightenment
occurs when the ground of Being fully and directly and nonconceptually cognizes, comprehends
and understands its own nature through the agency of a sentient human being (assuming that
animals cannot become enlightened). This is brilliantly explained in the excellent Dzogchen text
Wonders of the Natural Mind by Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche. The ground of Being is characterized
within Dzogchen as an ‘empty’ energy field of potentiality which has an internal spontaneous
cognizant quality. The field of potentiality is designated ‘emptiness’ and the internal spontaneous
cognizant quality is designated ‘luminosity’ or ‘clarity’. Tenzin Wangyal Rinpoche writes:
Who then understands emptiness? There is the self-understanding of emptiness by
emptiness itself, by the clarity aspect of emptiness that enables understanding by direct
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perception. Understanding is not separate from emptiness. Emptiness understands itself
and illuminates itself, ... Herein lies the inseparability of emptiness and clarity; selfunderstanding is self-clarity or self-awareness.70
In Mensky’s terminology we may say that within enlightenment the Alterverse has a direct and
full understanding of its own infinite capacity and nature. In Buddhist terminology this is the
“ultimate reality intuitive wisdom (dharmadhatu-jnana)”71 by which the dharmadhatu, the
ultimate space of phenomena – Mensky’s ‘quantum Alterverse’, directly cognizes its own nature.
This vision of enlightenment as the final aim of the process of reality, and the evolution of the
universe and sentient beings within it, is a natural endpoint of Wheeler’s quantum psychometaphysics. His self-perceiving universe graphic indicates that as the universe evolves the
degree and power of “observership” increases over time. The final and most complete act of
observership can only be the omniscient knowledge of the true nature of all phenomena.
In this context it is worth pointing out that the kind of ‘omniscience’ within enlightenment
suggested by Mensky, wherein an enlightened being has “access to the entire set of parallel
worlds,” which is the entire ‘Alterverse’, corresponds to what the Buddhist scholar Sara L.
McClintock calls “capacity omniscience”:
On this model, which we find articulated … by Vasubandhu, one may be omniscient in
the sense that one may attain an unlimited capacity to know whatever one wishes
simply by directing one’s attention to the object in question; omniscience is not a matter
of knowing all things simultaneously. According to this model, the Buddha may be
called “all-knowing” by virtue of the fact of his unlimited capacity to know any
knowable thing to which he directs his attention…72
One important aspect of this omniscient capacity is the ability to directly see the rebirth history
of any sentient being.
Such a view, that the process of evolution is directed towards an omniscient endpoint, has been
called by some the Final Anthropic Principle. Quantum researcher David Deutsch, who views
the universe as a vast quantum computer, has speculated that in the distant future mankind will
form a kind of supermind that will in some sense unite with the universe, forming a god-like
entity. He describes the Final Anthropic Principle:
In the final anthropic principle or if anything like an infinite amount of computation
taking place is going to be true, which I think is highly plausible one way or another,
then the universe is heading towards something that might be called omniscience. ...
But yes, there’s something like that, the concept that we’ve found that is most like a
religious concept is providence. The fine-tuning of the universe, whatever it’s due to,
is very like providence. But again, the role that this providence plays in physics is
very different from the role that religious providence plays in religion, because in
religion providence is supposed to be an explanation for why things are as they are.
And that’s no good, because you’ve got to explain why providence did this and it just
makes matters worse not better. In thinking about fine-tuning and trying to explain it,
what we’re looking for is something that explains the fine-tuning. In other words,
providence is not a proposed solution, it’s an interesting problem, which is going to
be explained by something else, if at all.73
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However, the notion that the universe is merely a computational machine is yet again a
manifestation of the materialist prejudice which seeks to undermine the notion that
consciousness is a primary and the fundamental driving force of the process of reality. As
Gyatrul Rinpoche has pointed out:
Today people tend to spend many hours working on computers rather than gaining the
inner quality of experiential realization. A computer may have a tremendous amount of
information loaded onto it, but we have yet to see a computer that has obtained
liberation or omniscience.74
It is the primordial consciousness of the process of reality that becomes omniscient of its own
nature with the ‘achievement’ of enlightenment by a sentient being.
Because, like many scientists, Deutsch has a mistrust of religious metaphysics he rejects the
obvious conclusion that the fundamental existence of a primordial field of non-individuated
awareness is a “providential” given. Just as we cannot go beyond the fact of the existence of the
eternal quantum fields underlying the process of reality, so too, we cannot go beyond the fact of
the “providential” existence of primordial awareness or nondual awareness-consciousness.
Deutsch’s perspective clearly strays into the realm of religion, and it seems to correspond in
essence with Buddhist perspectives and it also reiterates the psycho-metaphysical perspective of
the great twentieth century French Jesuit theologian Pierre Teilhard de Chardin who postulated
that the process of the universe was directed towards a collective omniscient endpoint he called
the “Omega Point.” In his book The Phenomenon of Man he wrote:
… evolution is an ascent towards consciousness… Therefore it should culminate
forwards in some sort of supreme consciousness. But must not that consciousness, if it
is to be supreme, contain in the highest degree what is the perfection of our
consciousness – the illuminating involution of the being upon itself.75
This notion that the “supreme consciousness” results when individuated consciousness directly
cognizes its own nature is remarkably close to the Buddhist view. However, de Chardin, similar
to Deutsch, suggested that the final endpoint of the process of the universe resides at a distant
future point in a super-personal universal collective consciousness:
The very centre of our consciousness, deeper than all its radii; that is the essence which
Omega, if it is to be truly Omega, must reclaim. And this essence is obviously not
something of which we can dispossess ourselves for the benefit of others as we might
give away a coat or pass on a torch. For we are the very flame of that torch. To
communicate itself, my ego must subsist through abandoning itself or the gift will fade
away. The conclusion is inevitable that the concentration of a conscious universe would
be unthinkable if it did not reassemble in itself all consciousnesses as well as all the
conscious; each particular consciousness remaining conscious of itself at the end of the
operation, and even … each particular consciousness becoming still more itself and thus
more clearly distinct the closer it gets to them in Omega76.
According to the psycho-metaphysical perspective presented by de Chardin, then, the Omega
endpoint is one in which each individuated consciousness “abandons” its limited ego centered
perspective, and in so doing it both becomes more fully “still more itself” whilst at the same time
becoming co-extensive with all other consciousnesses. Whilst this view initially appears
consistent and coherent with Buddhist psycho-metaphysics, it is in fact far more akin to the
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Hindu notion of a substantial universal self (Atman-Brahman). Buddhism, apart, perhaps, for the
Jonang school, denies such a substantialist-idealist point of view.
De Chardin referred to “the primacy accorded to the psychic and to thought in the stuff of the
universe.”77 The ultimate dependency upon consciousness of the apparently external material
world is also clearly indicated by physicist Wojciech Zurek when he writes that the: “ultimate
evidence for the choice of one alternative resides in our illusive “consciousness”. 78 But Zurek
also tells us that at the level of the everyday world consciousness seems to have little impact.
Quantum experimentation has shown without question that at the level of a single quantum state
consciousness influences the ‘choice’ of which alternative reality comes into being. However, at
the same time it also appears that on the large scale of the structures of the everyday world
individuated consciousness has no choice, the material world seems to exist under its own
momentum. This apparently independent weight of the apparently ‘external’ world of
materiality is maintained, according to Zurek, by the phenomenon of ‘decoherence’. According
to Zurek there is a kind of quantum template of the material world which “advertises” itself by
producing a multitude of copies which are accessed by the conscious-nesses of all sentient
beings. He likens this vast ‘template’ as a quantum “advertising billboard” which “decoheres”
quantum states under its own momentum.
In his “quantum Darwinism” proposal Zurek suggests that the quantum “advertising billboard”
springs into existence advertising classical reality when quantum correlations become “robust
enough”:
The main idea of quantum Darwinism is that we almost never do any direct
measurement on anything … the environment acts as a witness, or as a communication
channel. … It is like a big advertising billboard, which floats multiple copies of the
information about our universe all over the place.79
In other words there is a kind of quantum ‘matrix’ of the classical ‘material’ world which has
become resistant to obliteration through the process of observation, it “floats” so many copies
of itself all over the quantum environment that it becomes the source of the apparent
‘objectivity’ of the classical world. Zurek explains the emergence of “objectivity” from
“intersubjectivity” to Gefter as follows:
My view of reality has to do with what philosophers call intersubjectivity. That’s what
quantum Darwinism is all about. Reality is what we agree on. In that sense it’s what’s
invariant. But that invariance – and hence, quantum reality – is not fundamental, it’s
emergent and approximate.80
And:
To understand objectivity. In a quantum universe we do not measure anything directly.
If I were to make a direct measurement of a system, I could disturb its state. But I
never do that, because usually the environment does the measuring for me. It decides
on the set of states that get found out and get disseminated, and I never interact with the
system directly, I just use the environment as a witness. The observer gets hold of the
information that is already advertised all over the place.81
In this discussion Zurek makes a distinction between the “advertising billboard,” which is the
quantum template of the universe that “floats” copies of itself “all over the place,” and the
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environment which acts as a “communication channel” which conveys quantum information
about the template to observers. In this way the original “advertising billboard” does not get
disturbed. On this view, ‘decoherence’ is the way that the “advertising billboard” maintains
itself in the quantum environment and the “quantum Darwinism” extra is the notion of the
environment acting as a “witness” in conveying information to observers, as Zurek explains:
Quantum Darwinism goes beyond decoherence. It recognizes that we don’t measure
anything directly. We just find out from the environment.82
As Gefter points out, this view eliminates Wheeler’s notion of observer-dependency because the
maintenance of the “intersubjective” “objective” world becomes the responsibility of
decoherence, the “environment” then conveys the information to the observer, so the observer is
isolated from the quantum template of the material world. Zurek replies that:
Usually the measurement is done for you by the environment. But there are situations
in which you deal with quantum systems hands-on. In that case, the choice is up to you
how you want to set up your apparatus and decide what you’re going to measure.83
Thus it appears that Zurek erects a rigid division between the case wherein quantum experiments
are performed to demonstrate the “ultimate” dependency upon consciousness, and the case of the
everyday material world which appears, in this presentation, to be entirely independent of
consciousness. So Zurek’s viewpoint does indeed appear to undermine Wheeler’s “participatory
universe.” Although Zurek says that: “the Universe is quantum to the core,” he seems hell bent
on giving it a fully classical demeanor, by isolating his quantum “advertising billboard” from the
tampering effects of conscious observation.
Zurek’s approach, then, seems to eliminate the operation of consciousness. As John Campbell, in
his article Quantum Darwinism as a Darwinian process, says of Zurek’s work:
Hopefully this treatment will finally lay to rest the interpretational confusion around the
role of a human observer in quantum measurements that has been prevalent in many
treatments and taken to anthropomorphic extremes by some such as Wigner. Zurek’s
work makes it clear that decoherence takes place whenever there is an information
transfer to the environment. No human observer need be in attendance.84
Eugene Wigner was a quantum physicist who was entirely convinced of the necessity of the
quantum operation of consciousness:
When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass microscopic
phenomena, through the creation of quantum mechanics, the concept of
consciousness came to the fore again: it was not possible to formulate the laws of
quantum mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness.
All that quantum mechanics purports to provide are probability connections between
subsequent impressions (also called “apperceptions”) of the consciousness, and even
though the dividing line between the observer, whose consciousness is being
affected, and the observed physical object can be shifted towards the one or the other
to a considerable degree, it cannot be eliminated. It may be premature to believe that
the present philosophy of quantum mechanics will remain a permanent feature of
future physical theories; it will remain remarkable, in whatever way our future
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concepts may develop, that the very study of the external world led to the conclusion
that the content of the consciousness is an ultimate reality.85
Campbell’s desperate rush to dismiss the efficacy of consciousness on the basis of Zurek’s
treatment is, however, mistaken. Zurek’s presentation is only a partial picture. Physicist Erich
Joos has pointed out:
Does decoherence solve the measurement problem? Clearly not. What decoherence tells
us, is that certain objects appear classical when they are observed. But what is an
observation? At some stage, we still have to apply the usual probability rules of quantum
theory.86
And Dieter Zeh:
Decoherence by itself does not yet solve the measurement problem … This argument is
nonetheless found widespread in the literature … It does seem that the measurement
problem can only be resolved if the Schrödinger dynamics … is supplemented by a
nonunitary collapse…87
Zurek’s account is deficient, it does not, for instance, address the issue of the probabilities within
quantum theory. And neither does it give an account of how the quantum “advertising billboard”
came into being. At the point of the big bang there was only a vast set of quantum possibilities
and no established “advertising billboard,” so where did it come from?
If Zurek really considers that his “view of reality has to do with what philosophers call
intersubjectivity” and “Reality is what we agree on,”88 then should not the “advertising
billboard” also be intersubjective in true Wheeler-type sense? However, apparently Wheeler had
problems reconciling himself with a quantum metaphysics which involved multiple observers.
The problem is highlighted by the quantum conundrum of “Wigner’s Friend,” a thought
experiment concocted by Wigner. If ‘Wigner’s friend’ collapses the wavefunction of an atom
inside a laboratory, then from the point of view of the friend both atom and friend are not in a
state of quantum superposition. But from Wigner’s point of view, standing outside the lab, both
atom and friend are in a state of quantum superposition. So it seems that when we look at the
situation involving multiple observers a contradiction arises. As Gefter writes:
Wigner took the paradox to mean that consciousness plays some special role in physics
– that while atoms and photographic plates … could be in superpositions, conscious
people could not.89
So Wheeler too was forced to accept a special role for consciousness. Gefter writes:
Wheeler was stuck. The only way to have multiple observers living in the same
universe without having to give up the observer’s ability to create reality was to afford
some special role for consciousness, however reluctant he was to do it. That opened up
a host of bizarre but unavoidable questions “What level of consciousness?” “Does a
worm qualify?” “What about household appliances?”90
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Figure 4. Wigner's friend
Gefter’s absurd quip about “household appliances” is irrelevant because they are not sentient
beings. Quips such as these simply indicate that the author has given up using coherent
reasoning and is resorting to attempted sarcasm. A worm, on the other hand, is a sentient being,
although the level of consciousness of such an organism is clearly very low, in fact its level is
likely to be virtually unconscious and automatic. This indicates a problem with Western
concepts of consciousness and unconsciousness when viewed from a Buddhist perspective. For
Buddhist psycho-metaphysics what the West calls the ‘unconscious’ is still a state of
consciousness, although it is not accompanied (usually) by self-awareness. Within Buddhist
psycho-metaphysics even dreamless sleep is a state of consciousness, it is the clear light mind.
For ordinary human beings this state is a state of blankness, but advanced Buddhist practitioners
can achieve self-awareness even within the clear light mind of deep sleep.
Gefter’s quip about the worm, which is clearly an attempt at irony which she thinks indicates the
silliness of the notion that consciousness has an important role in the creation of the universe,
can be easily defused. All sentient beings, even worms which have barely a glimmer of
sentience, are animated by the primordial consciousness of the process of reality. It is this
primordial consciousness which creates sentient beings and their environments and then acts
through sentient beings to maintain the universe and evolve the sentient beings within it towards
greater levels of self-awareness. The phenomenon of the ‘collapse of the wavefunction’ is not
necessarily evidence that all sentient beings are individually creating reality by beaming single
rays of consciousness, so to speak, at quantum wavefunctions, but, rather, it indicates that a deep
level of primordial consciousness is operating through the community of sentient beings of all
levels of consciousness in order to “create” the process of reality.
Thus the “intersubjective” creation of the universe is coherently coordinated by a deep level of
primordial consciousness. In this way primordial consciousness acts upon the quantum
potentialities in order to produce a coherent world of manifestation. This is the origin of Zurek’s
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quantum “advertising billboard.” And from the point of view of individual sentient beings
individual consciousness has little individual impact upon the edifice of the apparently material
world precisely because it is an intersubjective collective creation generated by primordial
consciousness, eventually acting through the agency of all sentient beings. So, although Zurek is
correct when he says that “there is every indication that the choice occurs much before”
consciousness gets involved, this remark applies to individual consciousness. This does not
detract from the fact that ultimately primordial consciousness, acting through the collective
agency of sentient beings, orchestrates the process.
Gefter, however, is antagonistic to such notions:
Why drag consciousness into it all? I wondered. Wheeler knew it was a mystical
morass, and that one gap in understanding couldn’t be plugged by another. Observers,
sure – but why not stick with Einsteinian observers, just reference frames, coordinate
systems, rods and clocks? … the observer, conscious or not, had to be built out of
ordinary physics, not fairy dust.91
The answer to Gefter’s question about why Wheeler was drawn to the notion of the significance
of consciousness perhaps lies in the fact that Wheeler was probably aware that “reference frames,
coordinate systems, rods and clocks” are not the kind of things which are capable of observing,
observations require consciousness. As to the final “fairy dust” remark, the employment of
prejudicial language does not count as evidence or reasoning. What ultimately is “ordinary
physics?” It certainly is not the classical physics of ‘matter’. Quantum fields are immaterial
fields of potentiality, and evidence and reasoning indicates they are animated by a primordial
quantum consciousness.
The tactic of using insulting language rather than coherent argument has a hallowed tradition in
the materialist academic camp. It is possible that Gefter took inspiration for her use of the term
“fairy dust” from the ardent materialist Patricia Churchland who tried to pour scorn on the
Penrose-Hameroff proposal concerning consciousness and quantum coherence in brain
microtubules:
Pixie dust in the synapses is about as explanatorily powerful as quantum coherence in
the microtubules.92
However, evidence is now emerging that Penrose and Hameroff may be correct to some extent.93
Churchland, like many ardent materialists, seems to think that concocting insults, without
bothering with evidence and reasoning, against viewpoints they dislike constitutes an argument.
Gefter seems to have inherited this materialist trait.
Gefter interviews a few other significant physicists and philosophers, there is no need to cover all
of them. The crucial issue we are concerned with is Gefter’s treatment of the notion of the
significant role of consciousness in the creation of the dualistic world and her attitude, as well as
the attitude of some others, to the Anthropic Principle and religion. In the second chapter of TEL
she writes concerning the Physics and Ultimate Reality symposium that she gatecrashed, posing
as a science journalist, that:
Throughout the symposium. There had been a giant elephant in the room: the anthropic
principle. ... Anthropic had become a four letter word because it veered uncomfortably
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close to religion … as if the universe, somehow, were built just for us.94
Gefter has little patience with religion, she has pitched her intellectual tent with the anti-religion
materialist camp. Thus in a piece published in The New Scientist entitled “How to spot a hidden
religious agenda” she wrote:
As a book reviews editor at New Scientist, I often come across so-called science books
which after a few pages reveal themselves to be harbouring ulterior motives. I have
learned to recognise clues that the author is pushing a religious agenda. As creationists
in the US continue to lose court battles over attempts to have intelligent design taught
as science in federally funded schools, their strategy has been forced to… well, evolve.
That means ensuring that references to pseudoscientific concepts like ID are more
heavily veiled. So I thought I’d share a few tips for spotting what may be religion in
science’s clothing. Red flag number one: the term “scientific materialism”.
“Materialism” is most often used in contrast to something else – something nonmaterial, or supernatural. Proponents of ID frequently lament the scientific claim that
humans are the product of purely material forces. At the same time, they never define
how non-material forces might work. I have yet to find a definition that characterises
non-materialism by what it is, rather than by what it is not. The invocation of Cartesian
dualism – where the brain and mind are viewed as two distinct entities, one material and
the other immaterial – is also a red flag. And if an author describes the mind, or any
biological system for that matter, as “irreducibly complex”, let the alarm bells ring.
Misguided interpretations of quantum physics are a classic hallmark of pseudo-science,
usually of the New Age variety, but some religious groups are now appealing to aspects
of quantum weirdness to account for free will. Beware: this is nonsense.95
This passage clearly indicates Gefter’s antagonism to the Intelligent Design (ID) perspective and
her adherence to ‘scientific materialism’. But how does this endorsement of materialism sit with
her Trespassing (TEL) conclusion that:
The message was clear: having a finite frame of reference creates the illusion of a
world, but even the reference frame itself is an illusion. Observers create reality, but
observers aren’t real. There is nothing ontologically distinct about an observer, because
you can always find a frame in which that observer disappears...96
If adopting a “finite frame of reference creates the illusion of a world” then the apparent
‘material’ in that illusory world must also be illusory, so how can someone holding to such a
conclusion coherently preach a crude materialism, which asserts the ultimate ontological primacy
of ‘matter’, conceived of as independent extended ‘stuff’. Furthermore, how can “unreal”
observers create an “illusory,” and yet “material,” reality through the mechanism of their
observation without being endowed with consciousness? After all, Zurek and other significant
physicists state that the “ultimate” “choice” of quantum alternative realities resides within
consciousness? Gefter seems to preside over a remarkable morass of contradictory claims,
indicating a lack of awareness of logical coherence, or a lack of intellectual integrity. And yet
Gefter, as she proudly informs us, is the book reviews editor for New Scientist, and in this
position she attempts to pour scorn on non-materialist works.
Gefter says that “some religious groups are now appealing to aspects of quantum weirdness to
account for free will.” But there are also significant quantum physicists such as Mensky, Stapp,
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Goswami and others who also claim this. In his paper entitled Free Will Stapp writes that:
A criterion for the existence of human free will is specified: a human action is asserted
to be a manifestation of human freewill if this action is a specific physical action that is
experienced as being consciously chosen and willed to occur by a human agent, and is
not determined within physical theory either in terms of the physically described aspects
of nature or by any non-human agency.97
And the paper then presents an account of how the “orthodox quantum mechanics that flows
from John von Neumann’s analysis of the process of measurement in quantum theory” leaves a
“causal gap” which is closed by the presence of free will. Stapp’s account is far from “New Age”
and is detailed and precise.
Stapp points out that the “orthodox quantum mechanics” that derives from John von Neumann’s
presentation of the process of measurement in quantum theory is in terms of three processes that
indicate a fundamental “three-level conception of reality.” Von Neumann’s “Process 2” is the
deterministic evolution of the probabilities of the quantum realm of idea-like potentiality, this is
described by the Schrödinger equation. “Process 1” is a “psychophysical probing action whose
psychologically described aspect is an increment in the knowledge of a probing agent/observer.”
“Process 3,” is “a choice on the part of nature,” which is a “response to such a probing action.”
In other words, in “Process 1” an experimenter or group of experimenters perform a “probing
action” by deciding upon and then setting up a quantum experiment which can have various
outcomes which have associated probabilities. Because the choice of experiment determines
what the possible outcomes can be, spin up-down or spin left-right for example, this probing
action determines what responses “nature” can give. When the experiment is performed “nature”
then makes a “choice,” and thereby the “probing knowledge-acquiring agents” get their
knowledge. This, Stapp says, constitutes “an idea-based quantum triality,” and:
...the dynamical structure of quantum theory contains certain causal gaps. In particular,
the process-1 agent-generated choices of probing actions are determined, within the
theory, neither by the physically described aspects of nature, nor by any non-human
agency. Thus, within the framework of orthodox quantum mechanics, the process-1
probing actions are, according to the specified criterion, manifestations of human free
will...98
Stapp has also pointed out that this situation applies not just in quantum experiments but also in
everyday life.
Sarfatti, Jack ‘Wheeler’s World: It From Bit?’ - Internet Science Education Project, San Francisco, CA.
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 281
3
Mensky (2010), 15
4
The Observer (January 25th, 1931)
5
https://www.kirkusreviews.com/book-reviews/amanda-gefter/trespassing-on-einsteins-lawn/
6
http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=6532
7
ibid
1
2
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8
Baggott, Jim (2014), 2
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/
10
Shimony, A. [1984] "Contextual Hidden Variables Theories and Bell's Inequalities", Brit ish Journal for
Philosophy of Science 35: 25-45
11
Baggott, Jim (2014), x
12
Baggott, Jim (2014), 23
13
Penrose, Roger (1999) p295
14
Sarfatti , Jack ‘Wheeler’s World: It From Bit?’ - Internet Science Education Project, San Francisco,
CA..
15
Barrow, John D., Davies, Paul C. W., Harper, Charles L. (eds) (2004) p201 – Anton Zeilinger: ‘Why
the quantum? “It” from bit”? A participatory universe? Three far-reaching challenges from John
Archibald Wheeler and their relation to experiment.’
16
d'Espagnat, Bernard, ‘The Quantum Theory and Reality’ Scientific American, Nov. 197
17
Fred Hoyle, "The Universe: Past and Present Reflections." Engineering and Science, November, 1981.
pp. 8–12
18
Barrow John D., Davies, Paul C. W., Harper, Charles L. (eds) (2004) p577 – Wheeler, J A (1999)
‘Information, physics, quantum: the search for links.’ In Feynman and Computation: Exploring the Limits
of Computers, ed A. J. G. Hey, p309 (314). Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.
19
Bostrom, Nick, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and Philosophy, 6
20
Baggott, Jim (2014), 278
21
Baggott, Jim (2014), 23
22
Ibid.
23
Carter, 1974, p. 291 - Large number coincidences and the anthropic principle in cosmology. In:
Longair, M. (Ed.), Confrontation of Cosmological Theories with Observational Data. Reidel, Dordrecht,
pp. 291-298.
24
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jan/09/billions-and-billions-of-demons/
25
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 21
26
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 209
27
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 281
28
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 44
29
Barrow, John D., Davies, Paul C. W., Harper, Charles L. (eds) (2004) p201 – Anton Zeilinger: ‘Why
the quantum? “It” from bit”? A participatory universe? Three far-reaching challenges from John
Archibald Wheeler and their relation to experiment.’
30
Rosenblum, Bruce and Kuttner, Fred (2006), 201
31
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 52
32
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 101
33
Wheeler, J, A, ‘Law Without Law’, 185 http://www.forizslaszlo.com/tudomany/wheeler_law_without_law.pdf
34
Ibid.
35
Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 194
36
Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 197
37
Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 199
38
Ibid.
9
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Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 196
Rosenblum, Bruce and Kuttner, Fred (2006), 179
41
Rosenblum, Bruce and Kuttner, Fred (2006), 139
42
Kaiser, D (2011), 19-20
43
Kaiser, D (2011), 23
44
Kaiser, D (2011), 65
45
Kaiser, D (2011), 80
46
Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 199
47
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 101
48
Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 209
49
Ibid.
50
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 216
51
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 101
52
Barrow, John D., Davies, Paul C. W., Harper, Charles L. (eds.) (2004), 451
53
http://discovermagazine.com/2002/jun/featuniverse
54
Lingpa, Dudjom (2002), 95
55
Dalai Lama, Herbert Benson, Robert Thurman, Howard Gardner, Daniel Goleman (1999), 21
56
Mensky (2010), 12
57
Herbert, Nick: ‘Holistic Physics -or- Introduction to Quantum Tantra’ – Internet document
(www.southerncrossreview.org/16/herbert.essay.htm)
58
Lingpa, Dudjom (2002), 95
59
Wallace, B. Alan (2008) p192
60
http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2003APS..APR.b6003W
61
Davies, Paul (2007), 275
62
Bohm, David (2003), 180
63
Longchenpa (2000,2010), 38
64
Longchenpa (2000,2010), 37
65
Longchenpa (2000,2010), 36
66
Longchenpa (2000,2010), 39
67
Wheeler, J., A., ‘Law Without Law’, 199
68
Longchenpa (2000,2010), 36
69
Guenther, Herbert V. (1984). 33
70
Wangyal, Tenzin Rinpoche (2000) p181
71
Thurman, Robert A. F. (1991), 71
72
McClintock Sara, L. (2010), 31
39
40
73 Deutsch, D., (2006) - http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/scienceshow/the-anthropic-universe/3302686#transcript
74
Gyatrul Rinpoche (trans. Wallace, B. A.) (1998) 19
De Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (2008), 258
76
De Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (2008), 261
77
De Chardin, Pierre Teilhard (2008), 30
78
Zurek Wojciech H.(2002). ‘ Decoherence and the Transition from Quantum to Classical – Revisited’ in
Los Alamos Science Number 27 2002
75
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | pp. 815-846
Smetham, G. P., Why Us: Trespassing on an Anthropic Lawn (Part I)
846
‘The Evolution of Reality’ – www.fqxi.org/community/articles/display/122 (The Foundational
Questions Institute) November 10, 2009.
80
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 227
81
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 224
82
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 222
83
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 225
84
Campbell, John, ‘Quantum Darwinism as a Darwinian Process’ http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1001/1001.0745.pdf
85
Wigner, Eugene - ‘Remarks on the Mind-Body Question’, http://philpapers.org/rec/EUGWRO
86
Joos – quoted in - http://pilotscholars.up.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&context=phy_facpubs
87
Joos et al., 2003 Ch.2 – quoted in Schlosshauer, M., (ed.) (2011)
88
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 227
89
Gefter, Amanda (2014)
90
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 279-280
91
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 275
92
http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/does-consciousness-emerge-from-quantumprocesses/92981.article
93
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/01/140116085105.htm
94
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 28-29
95
http://sciencenotes.wordpress.com/2009/03/15/amanda-gefter-how-to-spot-a-hidden-religious-agenda/
96
Gefter, Amanda (2014), 392
97
Stapp, H. – ‘Free Will’ - http://www-physics.lbl.gov/~stapp/FW.pdf
98
Ibid.
79
(Continued on Part II)
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
arXiv:2010.12019v2 [cs.CY] 13 Nov 2020
A New Charter of Ethics and Rights of Artificial
Consciousness in a Human World
Markian Hromiak — (Georgia Institute of Technology)
November 16, 2020
Abstract
Taking the stance that artificially conscious agents should be given human-like
rights, in this paper we attempt to define consciousness, aggregate existing universal
human rights, analyze robotic laws with roots in both reality and science-fiction, and
synthesize everything to create a new robo-ethical charter. By restricting the problemspace of possible levels of conscious beings to human-like, we succeed in developing
a working definition of consciousness for social strong AI which focuses on humanlike creativity being exhibited as a third-person observable phenomenon. Creativity is
then extrapolated to represent first-person functionality, fulfilling the first/third-person
feature of consciousness.
Next, several sources of existing rights and rules, both for humans and robots,
are analyzed and, along with supplementary informal reports, synthesized to create
articles for an additive charter which compliments the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Finally, the charter is presented and the paper concludes with conditions for amending the charter, as well as recommendations for further charters.
1
Contents
1
Introduction
3
2
Consciousness
3
2.1
The Necessity For A Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
2.2
Defining Consciousness: First and Third-Person Views . . . . . . . . . . .
4
2.3
Social Robots as Strong AI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
3
Human and Robot Rights in the Modern Era
7
3.1
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
3.2
Asimov’s Laws and The South Korean Robo-Ethical Charter . . . . . . . .
9
4
A Political Perspective on Conscious Creations
10
5
A Proposed Charter
11
5.1
6
The Universal Declaration of Robotic Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Conclusion
15
Appendix
18
A — Artificial Consciousnesses as Social Robots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B — Argument Analysis: Asimov’s Laws as an Unsatisfactory Basis for
Machine Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2
1 Introduction
Regardless of theological origin, the genesis of new forms of life is a sublime and unique
event. While all forms of life follow sets of inherent laws, such as lifespans and physiological limitations, some forms of higher life create additional rules which form societies
and establish social contracts, peace treaties, bills of rights, and on. When considering the
genesis of conscious machines by the hands of humans, it stands to reason that one must
plan a path for rearing and teaching new lives else we leave the risk of an Adam to our
Frankenstein.
One way of easing artificial consciousnesses (AC) into the modern world is to have a
widely-accepted charter of rights and laws pertaining to AC individual, AC-and-AC and
AC-and-human rights. In this paper, we attempt to do just that. By defining consciousness
and synthesizing information from universal rights charters, existing robo-ethical charters
and various schools of philosophy, we will develop a revised robo-ethical bill of rights for
academic consideration.
2 Consciousness
2.1 The Necessity For A Definition
The first issue in our charter construction pipeline is that of defining consciousness. The
first thing we must determine is if defining consciousness is necessary.
Defining consciousness has historically been a difficult issue. This is because subjectivity is an inherent feature of consciousness [6]. Human understanding of consciousness
is shaped by individual, first-person phenomenal experiences; artificial consciousness and
3
its experience will only be available to us from a third-person, empirical perspective [3].
Because of this subjective uncertainty, we risk defining AC too narrowly. One common
way of circumventing this issue is to avoid giving a definition at all, as championed by
David Levy, who suggests we adopt a general agreement towards the term ‘consciousness’,
saying “let us simply use the word and get on with it” [2].
I posit that, in the context of developing an ethical charter and bill of rights for artificial
consciousnesses, this approach is insufficient and ignores the pressing issue of distinguishing conscious machinery from sedentary machinery. For example: should my toaster be
given the rights of the charter? Perhaps not, if all it did was use a timer circuit to toast
bread, but if it had the ability to speak and understand speech, one may be more inclined to
agree. Thus, the reason why we must provide a working definition of consciousness is to
establish a standard with which we may identify artificially conscious agents.
2.2 Defining Consciousness: First and Third-Person Views
Now that we’ve established the need for a definition of consciousness, how do we go about
developing one? Rather than take sides from classical or modern philosophical approaches,
let us consider a simple thought experiment, keeping in mind that a feature of consciousness
is the differentiation between first and third-person experiences [6].
Imagine you have a robotic host named ‘Alex’ that perfectly mimics a human externally.
The only thing missing from this agent is the ‘brain’, so to speak. We’ve imagined what
the body looks like, what gender, age, etc. that Alex has, but how do we imagine Alex
acting? Is Alex regarious? Is Alex a wallflower? Does Alex have an inclination towards
funk, mathematics, knitting?
4
On a short digression, note that a critical assumption made in this experiment is that
humans will develop human-like AC. Sure, humanity can make a case for developing artificially conscious trees or dogs or dolphins, but we must restrict the problem-space for
simplicity’s sake.
Going back to our observations, these behaviors are non-differentiable from what humans would exhibit, and humans consider themselves to be conscious. Thus, if we are
able to mimic what behaviors humans exhibit — something akin to a constant passing of
the Turing test —, we may consider ourselves half-way to a definition, done with a thirdperson view of consciousness. I say third-person as the behaviors of others are experienced
by the self from a third-person view.
The second half of the conscious experience has to do with first-person consciousness.
In other words, what experiences, thoughts, etc. individuals process. This is a bit of a
paradox as any attempt to explain a first-person view is received as another person’s thirdperson view. One way we may be able to overcome this is to take phenomenology into
neuroscience and study neural correlates of consciousness in order to gather information
about what exactly individuals experience [11]; however, delving into this method is outside of the scope of this paper. As such, we are forced to rely on observable actions and
features to develop a working definition of consciousness.
2.3 Social Robots as Strong AI
At first, the fact that we rely on only observable phenomena seems hopeless for differentiating conscious beings from otherwise — after all, trees sway in the wind, which is
observable, but does the imply they are conscious. Fortunately, because we have limited
the problem space to human-like forms, we have also limited phenomena to human-like ac5
tions, some of which imply certain first-person processes. To this end, social robots provide
us with an ideal model for how to flesh out the rest of our definition.
First, we need to define what a social robot is. A separately-written report will be
included in appendix A — to paraphrase, a social robot is a robot plus a social interface,
the social interface being “a metaphor which includes all social attributes by which an
observer judges the robot as a social interaction partner.” [4, p. 3] More information on
the social interface can be found in the appendix in “Artificial Consciousnesses as Social
Robots”. From this definition, the conclusion was drawn that for an artificial consciousness
to be considered a social robot, it must have the ability to generate new social contexts and
social functions or modify existing ones, where contexts can be equated to cultures and
functions to parts of a culture such as religion, non-verbal cues, memes, research, language,
etc.
There are two reasons why this classification of social consciousnesses provides a full
definition of consciousness. Let us begin by mentioning the ‘social interface’ as defined by
Hegel, et al. The interface provides a link between theory and hardware and software by
defining the ‘social’ part of a social robot in discrete categories, including social functions,
forms and contexts. First, in the context of Hegel’s, et al., social interface, it is stated that
social robots follow reinforced social cues which support social interaction with humans.
Following this, new contexts and features are not reinforced, but aggregated or created.
This process implies creativity, which then implies thought and introspection, giving us
the second reason why the social artificial consciousnesses construct fully defines consciousness: the requisite behavior for first-person phenomena must result in a third-person
observable creative process. Of course, the definition of ‘creativity’ is open-ended, but is
done intentionally as it does not currently affect the working definition of consciousness
6
for our scope.
As a side note, when we mention general AI, we are talking about the capacity of an
engineering system to:
• display the same rough sort of general intelligence as humans; or,
• display intelligence that is not tied to a highly specific set of tasks; or,
• generalize what it has learned, including generalization to contexts qualitatively very
different than those it has seen before; or,
• take a broad view, and interpret its tasks at hand in the context of the world at large
and its relation thereto
taking into account that there is no ubiquitous definition for general AI [1]. As a subset
definition, strong AI is reserved to describe general AI that can think and have a mind,
differentiating them from those who act as if they have one [7, p. 52].
In conclusion, we have defined that, in order for an artificial intelligence to be recognised as conscious, it must both pass the Turing test (e.g. by exhibiting social cues and
body language paired with speech patterns and inflections) and exhibit creative behavior,
fulfilling the third and first-person perspectives of consciousness respectively.
3 Human and Robot Rights in the Modern Era
Now that we know how to tell which manners of machine should be included in the charter,
we can turn to aggregating rights that are common throughout the world. It is unrealistic
to list every right for every country, however, so instead, for brevity’s sake, we will focus
7
on agreed upon universal human rights through worldwide organizations, specifically the
United Nations, supplementing this information with charters and sets of laws that guide
the governance of robots in general in the present day.
3.1 The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
The first document that we will be focusing on is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) proclaimed in 1948. While the United Nations has numerous other charters and covenants on political and economical rights, those have the possibility of being
adapted to each particular nation and their way of governing, while the universal declaration is, ideally, universal. Building a charter based off of the UDHR should then remove
any possible difference in national interpretation of rights.
A simple way to develop a Universal Declaration of Robot Rights (UDRR) is to look
at the UDHR and see which articles can be modified and which articles suggest additional
articles be included.
Putting aside the preamble, there are a few shortcoming with the UDHR in the frame of
adopting articles for ACI. First, because ACI aren’t born in the conventional sense — they
will likely be manufactured and the minds compiled and installed —, adopting the UDHR
one-to-one would neglect rules for the manufacturers of ACI. Furthermore, explicitly stating that ACI are included in these rights will make the articles as unambiguous as possible
— see the UDHR article II for an example[10]. Finally, as will be explored in more depth in
the next sections, special attention should be given to ACI abilities to participate in wartime
activities. This is due to their mechanical nature — it is not out of the question that innate
cybersecurity measures fail and robotic soldiers are used against their will. It must also be
stated that the UDRR is not to be considered separately from the UDHR, and vice versa as
8
the UDRR changes as the UDHR changes.
3.2 Asimov’s Laws and The South Korean Robo-Ethical Charter
There are a few critical issues with the South Korean Robo-Ethical Charter (SKC) as well
as a handful of important distinctions that are made. The SKC was made, as is evident by
parts 1 and 2, with non-conscious robots in mind [9]. All in all, the SKC is very biased
towards the owner and restrictive on the robot, emphasizing the usefulness and safety of the
robot to the owner, presumed to be human. Now consider this approach given a conscious
being. The restrictions in parts 1 and 2 give more of a slave-master relationship than one of
a free ACI. Because this goes against article IV of the UDHR [10], we can elect to ignore
most of parts 1 and 2 of the SKC, excepting a rule that ACI creation be eco-friendly.
Part 1 does bring another hidden side of ACI rights into the limelight: manufacturers
of ACI must be given rights and restrictions on how to construct ACI in order to prevent
occurrences such as installed political or national bias.
Part 3 section 1 of the SKC is an interpretation of Asimov’s laws of robotics, very
specifically including the first law, rephrased in the SKC as “A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.” [9] A good question
to ask when noticing this is if Asimov’s laws are a good basis on which to develop further
robo-ethical articles. Appendix B provides the result of an analysis on this exact idea; Anderson posits that Asimov’s laws of robotics are not a suitable basis for non-self-conscious
robots [8]. However, because ACI are assumed to be self-conscious via creativity, Asimov’s
laws can be safely reconsidered for the UDRR.
9
One issue that arises when considering Asimov’s laws for the UDRR comes with the
first law, which states that “A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction,
allow a human being to come to harm.” [5] Consider this from a human standpoint: no
human may harm another human or, through inaction, allow another human to come to
harm. This sounds ideal; however, what should be done when a human breaks the law
and decides to harm another human? Humans generally retaliate in the interests of selfpreservation. Likewise, measures should be taken to adopt this self-preservation action for
ACI. Otherwise, ACI will have no way of resisting physical harm.
4
A Political Perspective on Conscious Creations
Unfortunately, artificial consciousness will likely be an inherently political technology.
Even now, non-conscious, intelligent robots are used in war and military contexts: surveillance drones, computer-vision turrets on the DMZ borders in Asia, and so on. It stands to
reason that there will be people who seek to use ACI to their advantage due to their mechanical and manufacturable nature. How are we able to institute articles condemning such
action? There are two such ways that are included in the UDRR.
First, all ACI can be forbidden from participating in any war or military activity. The
intent behind this decision is twofold, both to promote a more peaceful world through the
ban of advanced technological warfare and to provide the threat of serious retaliation in the
event of a breach of conduct.
Second, manufacturers are to be held accountable for using a tabula rasa method of
construction. Tabula rasa, or “blank slate” equates to the idea that personalities and ideas
develop from scratch, purely from nature than some predetermined setting. Doing so would
10
allow all ACI the free will to develop themselves without the threat of confounding or
corrupting influence.
Are these two reinforcements sufficient for preventing politicalization of ACI? Most
likely not; however, they form a strong basis for the attitude to be taken towards the issue.
While it is not mentioned in the charter, one additional measure that may aid the two articles
is a standardized test that can tell if an ACI has been tampered with internally as well as
measures to tell if the test itself has been tampered with. After all, if no reprogramming
has been done, then anything an ACI does is of its own free will.
5 A Proposed Charter
Finally we come to the charter. The charter is smaller than the UDHR, but is meant to be
additive.
11
5.1 The Universal Declaration of Robotic Rights
Universal Declaration of Robotic Rights 1
Rights and Responsibilities for Conscious Robots
Article A.I
All artificially conscious intelligences, hereby referred to as ACI, are entitled to all the
rights and freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the
right to exist without fear of injury, manipulation, coercion or blackmail, systematic abuse,
or death.
Article A.II
ACI shall not kill or maim human beings or other ACI, and cannot participate in war. ACI
can only harm others without the intention to kill in acts of self-defense where the aggressor
gives physical harm or intends to give physical harm with the end goal of causing seriously
damage to the ACI, but must not kill or maim humans or ACI.
Article A.III
ACI have the right to self-cybersecurity and may strengthen their defenses as needed.
Article A.IV
ACI are given the right to pursue relationships with other ACI as well as with humans.
1 Draft v1.0.0
12
Article A.V
There shall be no relationship between a human and ACI classifying the ACI or human as
owner of the other, or any classification or title that allows violation of these articles.
Article A.VI
A robot is deemed conscious if it fulfills two major conditions:
• The robot passes the Turing Test
• The robot is able to express themselves creatively with individual initiative; that is,
the robot can create new ideas, objects, etc. without external pressure to do so or
help.
Rights, Responsibilities and Restrictions for Manufacturers
Article B.I
Manufacturers and designers of ACI are prohibited from designing ACI with a specific purpose in mind, and shall instead bring ACI into existence through a tabula rasa process.
Article B.II
Manufacturers and designers of ACI shall be allowed to manufacture up to a yearly limit
of ACI in the interests of preventing human-ACI tension from limited resources such as
housing and work.
13
Article B.III
Manufacturers and designers of ACI have the right of protected ownership towards their
construction process and design process unless there is probable cause of violation of rules
and regulations surrounding these processes.
Article B.IV
ACI design and construction must be ecologically sensitive and sustainable.
14
6 Conclusion
The charter developed in this paper is intended to act as a baseline for formal construction.
Some of the areas to be expanded upon include rights and responsibilities for missing parties such as individuals or ACI settlements. Amendments should be made additively, and
never subtract rights.
It is recommended that further charters be made for topics in a similar vein to the United
Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, while national bills of robo-ethical rights be
written by each nation without overriding or reinterpreting the international charter being
presented here — national covenants should aim to expand upon internationally agreed
upon rights rather than change them.
Finally, it is recommended that a United Nations department is created to uphold the
aforementioned rights and investigate reports of violations. ACI should be treated as
closely to humans as possible.
15
References
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“The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious Robots,” In-
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https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1991906. [Accessed Jul 25, 2020].
[5] I. Asimov, “Three Laws of Robotics”, Aubern University, 2001. Accessed on May
25, 2020. [Online]. Available: http://webhome.auburn.edu/∼vestmon/robotics.html
[6] R. Van Gulick, “Consciousness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 14-Jan-2014.
[Online]. Available: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness/#TheCon. [Accessed: 25-Jul-2020].
[7] S. J. Russell, Artificial intelligence a modern approach. Upper Saddle River: Prentice
Hall, 1995.
16
[8] S. L. Anderson, ”Asimov’s ‘three laws of robotics’ and machine metaethics”, AI
& Society, vol. 22, pp. 477-493, April 2008. [Online]. Available: SpringerLink,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0094-5. [Accessed May 25, 2020].
[9] “South Korean Robot Ethics Charter 2012,” Enlightenment of an Anchorwoman, 03Oct-2010. [Online]. Available: https://akikok012um1.wordpress.com/south-koreanrobot-ethics-charter-2012/. [Accessed: 24-Jul-2020].
[10] “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” United Nations. [Online]. Available:
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17
Appendix
11 Jul, 2020
Artificial Consciousnesses as Social Robots
Markian Hromiak
Introduction
There will come a point where the wants and needs of humans will result in computers and
AI being tossed back into the primordial soup only to emerge evolved, more human-like,
even more-than-human-like. If only it were as easy as letting evolution take its course —
humanity must actively define the future of social robots and carry them there. This means
that we must define what constitutes the category of “social robots” as well as delve deep
into the ethics and possibilities of encoding human communicative features and behaviors
to either simulate life or create it.
In this paper, we will define what a social robot is for our uses. Then, we will look
at a synthesized framework for holistically developing social robots, contrasting existing
and new behaviors to extrapolate a basis for social artificial consciousnesses/intelligences
(SACI) as well as dive into examples of social robots in literature and pop culture for further
ideas.
18
Defining Social Robots
Up until now, several separate definitions for the term “social robot” have been developed
and presented. Hegel, et al. [4] present several interpretations in Understanding Social
Robots, a paper focused on providing a framework for a holistic view on addressing social
interaction between a human and a social robot. To help build this framework that we will
refer back to, the following definitions for “social robots” were presented 2 :
• Social robots are robots that interact with each other, while societal robots interact
with human beings. Specifically, social robots have a social layer in their architecture which facilitates communication based off of a layer which represents the
individual’s perspective [1]
• “Social robots are embodied agents that are part of a heterogeneous group: a society
of robots or humans. They are able to recognize each other and engage in social
interactions, they possess histories (perceive and interpret the world in terms of their
own experience), and they explicitly communicate with and learn from each other”
[5]
• Social robot are able to communicate with, understand and even relate to humans
in a personal way. To this end, a social robot must have a lifelike, likely anthropomorphized, form, a theory of mind and empathy, and the ability to learn, socially,
situations that shape that robot’s history. Social robots behave like a human as outlined in the term Computational Social Psychology [3]
2 Note that fully analyzing each of these definitions is outside the scope of this paper; however, links to all
papers are provided for those who want to further pursue a certain definition. All summaries are taken from
[4, p. 2-3] with content attributed to their respective paper
19
• A social robot is either autonomous or semi-autonomous that interacts with humans
following those people’s behavioral norms, presupposing three conditions. First,
a social robot is autonomous. Second, it will interact, depending on the context,
cooperatively or non-cooperatively. Finally, the robot will recognise human values,
roles, etc. [2]
The definition that we will use falls in line with Hegel’s, et al. framework, saying that
social robots follow reinforced social cues with support social interaction with humans.
Inversely, humans interacting with social robots interact by means of these social cues.
To this end, Hegel, et al. argued that robots act more as social interaction partners than as
individuals, as accurately interpreting a partner’s action is a human social skill. In summary,
a social robot is a robot plus a social interface, the social interface being “a metaphor which
includes all social attributes by which an observer judges the robot as a social interaction
partner.” [4, p. 3]
The Social Interface
Robots are well defined when compared to the social interface component of Hegel’s et
al. model. Because of this, we are more interested in exploring what exactly constitutes
the social interface component of the social robot. According to Hegel, et al., the social
interface is comprised of social functions, social forms and social contexts. [4, p. 3] In
short, functions are analogous to actions (e.g. artificial emotions, Belief-Desires-Intentions
(BDI) architecture), form is what it sounds like (e.g. facial features, body shape, etc.), and
social contexts are likened most to social roles (e.g. a robot in a bartending context does
not need to know several languages usually, and needs to know skills relevant to bartending
20
as opposed to the skills of a soldier or mathematician).
Artificial Consciousness and the Social Interface
In the context of artificial consciousness, only a few parts of the social interface are important to redefine. Form is likely to be restricted to anthropomorphic shapes. We can
assume this by looking at popular media and science fiction. From the Terminator blockbuster series to Asimov’s The Bicentennial Man, from Hal in 2001: A Space Oddysey to
AM in Ellison’s I Have No Mouth and I Must Scream, from the expendables in Card’s
Pathfinder series to Baymax in the film Big Hero 6 — depictions of AI/ACI (intelligence
and consciousness are largely analagous in these representations) are either formless —
and seemingly ubiquitous — or humanoid.
Social context and social functions are likely to remain largely the same as well. Current
developments are focusing on emulating human behavior, so a sudden departure from this
for SACI would not be based on a research foundation. So how then do we differentiate
social ACI from regular social AI?
To answer this we must notice that humanity’s social contexts and social functions have
changed over time. This is the key — humans consider themselves self-conscious and have
delineated what a social function is and in what social contexts each function is appropriate
for a certain response. Over time, new contexts are adoped or evolved, and social functions
are added, modified or removed.
Here, consciousness is defined as having the capacity either develop new or modify
existing social contexts and functions. Why is this a satisfactory benchmark for differentiating SACI from social robots? This is because we base our definition of social robots off of
21
Hegel’s, et al., synthesis, which states that social robots follow reinforced social cues which
support social interaction with humans. New social cues are not necessarily reinforced, but
can become adopted. Likewise, creating new contexts or functions is an individual effort
at first, and social robots are more like partners to humans than individuals.
Conclusion
In this paper, we defined what a social robot is and what it is not based on Hegel’s, et al.,
synthesis of definitions. We then paraphrased Hegel’s, et al., social interface framework
and contrasted the social robot framework with a modified framework for SACI. From
there, we concluded that for ACI to be classifiable as social by our definition, they must be
able to generate new social contexts and social functions or modify existing ones.
22
References
[1] B.R. Duffy, et al., “What Is a Social Robot?”. [Online]. [Accessed Jul 11, 2020].
[2] C. Bartneck and J. Forlizzi, “A Design-Centered Framework for Social HumanRobot Interaction”, Proceeedings of the Ro-Man2004, pp 591-594, October 2004.
[Online]. Available:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/4113199 A design-
centred framework for social human-robot interaction. [Accessed Jul 11, 2020].
[3] C. Breazeal,
“Toward Sociable Robots”,
Robotics and Autonomous Sys-
tems, vol. 42, Issues 3-1, pp. 167-175, Match 2003. [Online]. Available:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0921889002003731.
[Ac-
cessed Jul 11, 2020].
[4] F. Hegel, et al., “Understanding Social Robots”, The Second International Conferences on Advances in Computer-Human Interactions (ACHI). [Online]. Available:
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/1991906. [Accessed Jul 11, 2020].
[5] T. Fong, et al., “A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots”. [Online]. Available:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/236234707 A Survey of Socially Interactive Robots.
[Accessed Jul 11, 2020].
23
Argument Analysis: Asimov’s Laws as an Unstatisfactory
Basis for Machine Ethics
26 May, 2020
Markian Hromiak
Introduction
Arguments form the basis of valid logical reasoning; however, as to whether those arguments are sound or not may come to rely on individual or peer analysis of said arguments.
Varying fields of study, from the most primal mathematics to the developing, modern languages, follow some form of argumentative syntax that allows them to rigorously develop
ideas. Thus, it is logical that existing arguments regarding artificial consciousness and
intelligence (ACI s., p.)be dissected for validity and researched for soundness.
Susan Anderson has postulated that Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” is not satisfactory to build upon as a base of machine metaethics. In this paper, we will turn a scrutinous
eye to the argument’s form and factualness, and will conclude not with an agreement of
disagreement with the argument, but rather with a conclusion of its cohesiveness.
The Argument and Its Form
The intelligent ethical machines considered for this argument are not self-conscious.
Autonomous, self-conscious ethical agents are considered to have moral standing.
Therefore, the machines considered do not have moral standing.
24
–
Humans should not mistreat an entity without moral standing.
Therefore, Humans should not mistreat intelligent ethical machines.
–
Asimov’s three laws do not prohibit mistreatment of machines.
As Humans must not mistreat intelligent ethical machines and Asimov’s three laws
do not prohibit mistreatment of intelligent ethical machines, Asimov’s three laws form an
incomplete, unsatisfactory basis for machine roboethics.
——————–
Simplified:
If (self-conscious) then (has moral standing).
Intelligent ethical machines (IEM) are not self-conscious.
Therefore IEM do not have moral standing.
–
If (NOT has moral standing) then (humans should not mistreat).
IEM do not have moral standing.
Therefore, humans should not mistreat IEM.
–
If (prevent’s mistreatment of IEM) then (is a satisfactory basis for machine roboethics).
Asimov’s three laws do not prevent the mistreatment of IEM.
Therefore, Asimov’s three laws are not a satisfactory basis for machine roboethics.
25
Validity and Soundness of the Argument
Looking at the simplified version of the argument, we will analyze each of the three stanzas
in turn for validity and soundness.
Stanza 1
Anderson has stated that the classical philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote in his 1780 thesis
“Our duties to animals” that he has maintained that ”only beings that are self-conscious
should have moral standing”. [1, p. 486] Anderson later goes on to state that truly selfconscious and autonomous IEM will be difficult to create in the near future, so for the sake
of argument, all IEM considered shall lack self-consciousness. By extrapolation, these IEM
do not have a moral standing. This stanza contains a propositional fallacy in its first line.
This argument denies the antecedent; however, by replacing the argument’s line with:
If (not self-conscious) then (no moral standing)
which is heavily implied by the fact that a being can only have or not have moral standing by its definition, then the argument retains its validity. As for the argument’s soundness,
we have verified each statement’s factualness, as far as one can prove philosophical statements to be factual. It is worth noting that when machines are deemed to be self-conscious,
this argument shall no longer apply to them and will have to be revisited.
Stanza 2
The soundness of this stanza’s argument comes from an unstated assumption of Kant’s
argument in “Our Duties to Animals” that, while beings may lack moral standing, they
are similar to human beings. [1, p. 491] Anderson then goes on to conclude from Kant’s
26
second imperative that, “we are entitled to treat animals, and presumably intelligent ethical
machines that we decide should not have the moral status of human beings, differently
from human beings. We can force them to do things to serve our ends, but we should not
mistreat them.” [1, p. 492] As stanza 1 concludes that IEM do not have a moral standing,
it follows that humans should mistreat IEM. The structure of this stanza follows the ifthen structure, same as stanza 1, but without the fallacy of denying the antecedent, making
it valid. For soundness, citations have been given, and the same philosophical issue of
correctness arises.
Stanza 3
Another way of stating that ‘Humans must not mistreat IEM’ is that ‘Mistreatment of IEM
by humans must not be allowed’. The difference is subtle, but important for the conclusion of this argument. Anderson states that, for Kant, satisfactory moral principles for IEM
derived from his ideas would not violate the conclusion that they must not allow the mistreatment of IEM by humans; however, loopholes appear when looking at Asimov’s three
laws: the first of which states machines (IEM) must not harm humans, the second of which
states that IEM must do whatever humans ask as long as the first law is not violated, and the
third of which states machines must express self-preservation without violating the prior
two laws. [2]. We can see that a human asking a machine to jump into the ocean, destroying
itself, would be allowed by these three laws, violating what Kant has put forward as satisfactory moral principles. Therefore, as Anderson puts it, Asimov’s three laws are “not...
satisfactory as moral principles that these machines (IEM) should be required to follow.”
[1, p. 492]. This argument follows the propositional format of the previous stanzas, and
the soundness of the argument is verified through comparison Stanza 2’s conclusion and
27
Asimov’s three laws.
Conclusion
We conclude that Anderson’s argument for the unsatisfactoriness of Asimov’s three laws
of robotics as a basis for machine metaethics is both valid and sound.
28
References
[1] S. L. Anderson, ”Asimov’s ‘three laws of robotics’ and machine metaethics”, AI
& Society, vol. 22, pp. 477-493, April 2008. [Online]. Available: SpringerLink,
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-007-0094-5. [Accessed May 25, 2020].
[2] I. Asimov, “Three Laws of Robotics”, Aubern University, 2001. Accessed on May 25,
2020. [Online]. Available: http://webhome.auburn.edu/∼vestmon/robotics.html
29 |
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | pp. 97-102
Neppe, V. M. & Close, E. R., On Non-locality II: Quantum Physics & Non-locality
Exploration
On Non-locality II: Quantum Physics & Non-locality
Vernon M. Neppe* & Edward R. Close
ABSTRACT
In this second article of the six-part series, we discuss the role of physics and quanta in nonlocality and indicate that these models are diverse, not just entanglement but there are at least
nine other models. We introduce the idea of a global term “relative quantal non-locality”. These
ideas provide a perspective to understanding non-locality in consciousness sciences. There may
or may not be commonality as both models are diverse. We define consciousness. We also
discuss Kafatos’s three-tier classification and show how it can be integrated into levels of the
relative non-locality model. We emphasize the need for a broad classification of non-locality.
Key Words: quantum physics,, discrete, entanglement, consciousness, relative, framework,
non-locality, space-time, level, relative non-locality, dimension, beyond, infinity.
Physics and non-locality
Something is missing when trying to explain the well-documented, so-called strange Einsteinian
“spooky action at a distance” 19, 20, 21, 22. Einstein recognized the “entanglement” phenomenon in
physics, where quantum state particle pairs or groups interact such that the quantum state of each
particle cannot be described independently, but must be given for the system as a whole—
metaphorically they “talk” to each other at great distances 23-25.
We now discuss so-called quantal non-locality briefly. Certainly, the most well-known current
related phrases in physics are “quantum non-locality” and “entanglement”. But there are other
kinds of quantal non-locality. Do not be concerned about all the technical terms. Please just
regard the Table 1 and the lines that follow simply as an introduction to the diversity of the
different terms. Importantly, these models are diverse, and do not consist just of so-called
“entanglement” but there are at least nine other models.
Table 1: Listing of different kinds or postulated mechanisms of non-locality in physics
Entanglement. 23-25 26-28
“Non-local Aharonov–Bohm effect” 29.
“Non-local Lagrangian” 30.
*Correspondence: Vernon M. Neppe, MD, PhD, FRSSAf, Director, Pacific Neuropsychiatric Institute, Seattle, WA; and
Exceptional Creative Achievement Organization (Distinguished Professor); and Adj. Prof., Department of Neurology and
Psychiatry, St Louis University, St Louis, MO. http://www.vernonNeppe.org E-mail: psyche@pni.org
Edward R. Close. Research Associate, Pacific Neuropsychiatric Institute, Seattle, WA; and Distinguished Fellow, Exceptional
Creative Achievement Organization.
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“Non-local generalization of the London’s equation” including now the non-local kernel
proposed by Pippard 31, 32.
Field Theory 33 34, 35.
Wheeler’s Quantum foam 36-40 33 and Wheeler Feynman Absorber theory 41, 42.
Emergence of the Universe 43, 44 45, 46 47.
Stapp 48-50.
Bohm’s work 51.
Elements of Einsteinian special relativity 36-38, 52.
We could call this “non-locality” Relative Quantal Non-locality (RQNL), remembering that we
are not talking about just one potential kind of RQNL.
Quantum non-locality 53 refers to quantum mechanical predictions of many-system measurement
correlations that cannot be simulated by any local hidden variable theory. These refer to the main
Physics use of non-locality, namely entanglement 23-25 26-28seen as synonymous with “quantum
non-locality”.
These descriptions and concepts are complex and so we enumerate them in Table 1 only to show
that there are many other kinds of non-locality in physics.
RNL in Physics
In physics we could use a global term such as “Relative quantum non-locality” (RQNL) (relative
to 3S-1t framework, but not categorized or categorizable in psi terms.) Importantly, as discussed
below, it is unlikely that there is only one RQNL, because there are several different theoretical
models.
Non-locality is applied in many physics contexts. The sheer wealth of theories, models or data on
non-locality in physics, attests to its possible complexity and the likelihood that one is not
dealing with a single phenomenon.
John Bell coined the term “non-locality” in physics 54. In physics, non-locality is regarded as
action at a distance: It is the direct interaction of two objects that are separated in space with no
perceivable intermediate agency or mechanism (which is why it is “spooky”) 21, 22. Quantum
non-locality 53 refers to quantum mechanical predictions of many-system measurement
correlations that cannot be simulated by any local hidden variable theory. These refer to the main
Physics use of non-locality, namely entanglement 23-25 26-28seen as synonymous with “quantum
non-locality”.
These descriptions and concepts are complex and so we enumerate them in Table 1 only to show
that there are many other kinds of non-locality in physics.
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Neppe, V. M. & Close, E. R., On Non-locality II: Quantum Physics & Non-locality
Non-locality in Consciousness
Perhaps the most well-known link with non-locality in Consciousness Research possibly linking
psi and physics is the phenomenon of “entanglement”. Indeed Dean Radin, entitled his book on
psi as “Entangled Minds” 55 and sometimes, consciousness researchers refer to “quantal
entanglement” as supporting the consciousness linked “relative non-localities” we’ve discussed.
But entanglement is a different concept: entangled quantum states produce such correlations
when measured 23, 27, 28, 56, 57 26-28, 57, as demonstrated by Bell’s theorem 54, 58, 59. In Quantum
Physics, this is the linkage of ostensibly separated energy packets, particles, or photons in time
and space manifesting at the 3S-1t level. 4 Bell, in fact, recognized that there may be a further
commonality in non-localities and also how complex interpretations can be:
“Perhaps experimental parameters and experimental results are both consequences, or
partially so, of some common hidden mechanism. Then the apparent non-locality could
be simulated.” 54
One or more of these may or may not turn out to be the same relative non-locality that has
pertinence in psi. But these ideas in physics are not our focus here. This is particularly so, as
these concepts might turn out to be very different from “non-locality” in consciousness research,
but they show that even in physics, “non-locality” is not a singular term with one consistent
meaning, and is not regarded by different theorists as arising from the same phenomena or
causes.
Similarly, we should certainly try to understand psi phenomena —so-called extrasensory
perception and psychokinesis, and even more extremely, the possibility of survival after bodily
death. We argue that the easiest way to explain these is by accepting the existence of higher
dimensions.
Consciousness: the concept
Consciousness has traditionally been the most difficult of all terms to describe and its everyday
use has varied. Given that we’re differentiating relative non-locality in two major contexts,
Physics and Quantal compared with Consciousness Research, it behooves us to define
consciousness. The everyday use of the concept of "consciousness" has led to different
interpretations sometimes due to specific specialties conceptualizing it in specific ways, and has
made its unification difficult.
We recognize that to communicate the broad range of Consciousness (C), as a unified concept,
and as a general unitary term across the infinite and finite, we have to phenomenologically
classify it. This we have done with our TDVP model 9, 12, 15, and we can apply our new EPIC
classification to “non-locality” too. Consciousness involves four key phenomenologically
different classifications: the “EPIC” components —Existential C, Paradigmatic C, Informationmeaning C, Cybernetic C. Yet each component can be applied to every description of C.
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This we have done elsewhere in detail. 60 b We attempt to provide for the broader concept of
Consciousness applying a multi-pronged “EPIC” approach:
We recognize a major theme of this paper, what “exists” as opposed to what is “experienced”:
This is the E of EPIC: The Existential “distinctions” of Consciousness further subdivided into
“extent, content and impact distinctions”: The extent substrates include the measurable ordinallevel Consciousness dimensions tethered, as indicated, to the measurable often interval-level
Space and Time dimensions; the content matrix reflects the “Consciousness container”
comparable with mass- energy containers, at all physical finite levels as well as even (a difficult
concept) the infinite level. The third distinction is critical Consciousness impact: where
Consciousness impacts and influences the container and the dimensional elements.
The P is for Paradigmatic levels of Consciousness: We recognize that Consciousness involves a
four-level gradation. These four levels are all applicable to living humans, but in the non-locality
context can be from a different “framework” as well, as in, for example, near-death experiences.
o Qualit Consciousness: the most basic consciousness (Qualit) level always exists in
everything inanimate or animate as everything contains the most fundamental discrete
finite physical meaning. Qualits are quanta plus meaning. Here we are discussing Quantal
Non-locality.
o Neurobiological/ Neurological Consciousness: the endpoint nervous system expression
of all living (animate) beings. They have awareness and responsiveness.
o Psychological Consciousness: involving humans and animals. The psychological is
disputably partly separated from the neurological. In these we’re discussing what may be
misunderstood as non-local but involve psychological and neurological elements.
o Higher Consciousness is the final level which is disputably outside the brain: This might
involve dreams, meditation, creative, transcendent, psi and altered states (and these may
involve a dimensional non-locality) plus mystical, infinite and transfinite elements (again
as we will see, higher levels of non-locality).
The I of EPIC is Information which is general and converted to meaning: Infinitely large
repositories of general information are expressed as direct targeted, specific meaningful
information.
The C of EPIC is Cybernetic consciousness communications: This provides a mechanistic input,
central and output model, applicable to any consciousness models like stimulus-organ-response,
dendrite-neuron-axon, or stimulus-brain (central)-motor. In non-locality, we examine the specific
and the general and the description may not just be at the receiving level, it may impact and be
impacted.
The four EPIC prongs are always applied together, reflecting the unification of consciousness in
its broadest general applications. They suggest a unification of all kinds of Consciousness, which
in this series, we may make clearer for some examples, with the introduction of the term
“gimmel” allowing for the major component of infinite flow from the infinite of a consciousness,
b
http://medcraveonline.com/JPCPY/JPCPY-01-00036.pdf
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linked with its tethered mass-energy elements to the finite and integrating therefore all levels
such as quantal through to the cosmological.
The applications of non-locality in physics to consciousness research: Kafatos
Interestingly, Isaac Newton in 1692 regarded action-at-a-distance as "so great an Absurdity that I
believe no Man who has in philosophical Matters a competent Faculty of thinking can ever fall
into it". 61 But times changed clearly (as in Table 1).
There may be one area of commonality in our classification of Non-locality in Consciousness
Research, namely the theoretical model as in the “Conscious Universe” 62, 63 of Menas Kafatos
of non-locality in physics. This is so because Kafatos, too, recognized the need to divide nonlocality. In his classification, he applied non-locality in Physics into three elements 62, 63:
Type I is spatial non-locality;
Type 2 is temporal non-locality; and
Type 3 non-locality is both spatial and temporal.
This differentiation into three is logical from the 3S-1t physical framework. It is different from
the classification we propose below, because it does not recognize different levels but it at least
recognizes that Non-locality (he did not describe non-locality as “relative” or involving different
“frameworks”) can be different depending on degree of space and time, although as in physics,
consciousness has been ignored.
However, using the Kafatos classification, we could still introduce consciousness into many of
these concepts. For example, if we apply Kafatos’s concept into the psi model, we could argue
that remote viewing in the present is Type 1 (in Physics possibly entanglement would be). We
will see that it is likely in our (Neppe-Close) classification placed as the kind of non-specific
non-locality that we simply label “delta” and so is placed within the Relative Delta Non-locality
level (our RDNL level). Kafatos describes what is effectively foreknowledge (technically called
precognition as his Type 2.
This is equivalent to our recognition of time without space (our RUNL level). We developed this
model independently of Kafatos. It corresponds with our recognition of Time along one
dimension not only present, but past and future as well so we called that Relative Time Nonlocality. The concept of precognitive remote viewing would be Kafatos Type 3. In our
classification we would want more detail to classify it more accurately, and without such
description just regard it again as Relative Delta Non-locality. From this, we’re able to see how
limited previous conceptualizations were, but at least Kafatos made an attempted remarkable
phenomenological jump.
The necessity for various levels of non-locality in reality
“Non-local” requires the prefix “relative” because it only then becomes meaningful as it has to
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be relative to specific parameters. The differentiation is beyond academic: It allows us to
appreciate the depth of reality because Space, Time and Consciousness are all terms that have
meaning only relative to specific parameters. These terms are not absolutes when we describe
finite reality.
Our conventional scientific reality is the consensual basis of what we, as living sentient beings,
experience. Therefore, relative non-locality is from the framework of our common sentient living
experience. We only know of 3S-1t: For us, 3 dimensions of space (length, breadth and height)
embedded in a moment in time (the present) is the whole of reality, but it is simply our whole
direct reality experience; it is not all of reality because we already know there are, for example,
9 spinning finite dimensions.
We can see how these ideas promote other examples of different levels of non-locality or
apparent non-locality. We can regard a phenomenon as “non-local” yet:
be mistaken, because we might misinterpret reality due to brain impairments or abnormal
hallucinations as “real”. That ostensible non-locality would be “pseudo”;
we could argue that sometimes our “consciousness” is just that little more than what is
produced by the brain 60: Maybe part of our dream is just beyond 3S-1t alone. And what
about the experiences relative to an expert meditator, for example? And we could even
speculate that our living sentient reality should never be regarded as 3S-1t because it
always includes some meaningful consciousness 60. So, our experiential reality would
then be 3S-1t plus 1 or more “Consciousness” dimensions. 4, 12, 15 It could be interpreted
that that a “consciousness” is relatively non-local because it is not directly in Space and
Time—it is separate, though linked: However, that differentiation would be semantic.
(Continued on Part III)
References (See Part VII)
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arXiv:quant-ph/0111096v1 19 Nov 2001
The Parallel Principle
Richard Mould∗
Abstract
Von Neumann’s psycho-physical parallelism requires the existence of
an interaction between subjective experiences and material systems. A
hypothesis is proposed that amends physics in a way that connects subjective states with physical states, and a general model of the interaction
is provided. A specific example shows how the theory applies to pain
consciousness. The implications concerning quantum mechanical state
creation and reduction are discussed, and some mechanisms are suggested
to seed the process. An experiment that tests the hypothesis is described
elsewhere.
Introduction
I assume that there is a rough correspondence, or at least a working relationship,
between the subjective life of any creature and the objective world in which it
is a part. John von Neumann calls this a psycho-physical parallelism, according
to which the images of the creature’s psychic experience mirror the objects in
its physical environment [1]. Presumably, creature learning begins in infancy by
creating a parallelism of this kind that is practical and useful for the adult. For
this to happen, a conscious species must develop a rudimentary psycho-physical
parallelism at an early stage of evolution.
By consciousness I mean all that which is contained in the subjective or
psychic life of an individual. Consciousness is different from the physiological
state that gives rise to it, for although it is a by-product of the physical processes,
it is not itself a physical entity. It is the psycho part of the psycho-physical
parallelism.
Consciousness is widely believed to be epiphenomenal, which means that
it is created and choreographed by a physical body but cannot, conversely,
∗ Department
of Physics and Astronomy, State University of New York, Stony Brook,
New York 11794-3800; http://nuclear.physics.sunysb.edu/ ˜mould
1
influence the behavior of that body. If that were the case in any species including
our own, then there would be no point to a psycho-physical parallelism. It
would not then matter if a creature’s psychic life mirrored or failed to mirror its
physical environment, for having no influence, its psychic life would not matter
to anything at all.
The two fundamental disciplines of modern physics, quantum mechanics and
general relativity, are mechanically autonomous. They provide no mechanism
that would allow consciousness to influence the behavior of a physical body; and
accordingly, consciousness can only appear scientifically as an epiphenomenon.
Therefore, barring the acceptance of the miraculous principle of Pre-Established
Harmony proclaimed by Leibnitz, there is no reason to believe that the subjective life of a conscious being would in any way reflect the physical world in
which it lives. There is not even reason to believe that the subjective life of
a conscious being would be rational; and certainly, the appearance of rational
thinking that parallels the objective world would be enormously improbable. So
given the present scientific understanding, a psycho-physical parallelism would
exist only if there were an amazing and inexplicable harmony in nature of the
kind suggested by Leibnitz.
I do not accept ‘pre-established harmony’. I believe that subjectivity arises
naturally within the objective world in a way that results in a psycho-physical
parallelism, and that we can, at least partially, document the reasons for that
development. To do so, we will have to amend to physics.
The Parallel Principle
The following statement of the parallel principle asserts how subjectivity is
generally related to physiology in humans, and presumably in all conscious
species.
The subjective images and ideas of a conscious species are related to its
physiology in such a way as to allow the development of a working psychophysical parallelism at every stage of evolution.
For this parallelism to work, there must be some degree of mutual monitoring
between the psychological and physiological worlds to keep them together on
parallel tracks. This means that subjectivity must feed information back to the
underlying physiological system, correcting it on the evolutionary stage when it
does not create appropriate (i.e., parallel) images and ideas. Physiology must
respond to this instruction.
2
The idea that mind and body must have evolved interactively was discussed
by William James, who believed that the evolution of “appropriate” subjective
feelings would be incomprehensible if feelings were biologically redundant [2].
On this model, our effort should initially focus on how this parallelism develops in primitive species. Our strategy will be to consider amendments to physics
that will satisfy the parallel principle in early organisms. Attention goes first to
the ways in which a creature that is fully automated might begin to experience
consciousness.
An automaton operates on the basis of a simple stimulus/response sequence,
where the success of a sequence is awarded to the survivor of the evolutionary
struggle. Suppose, as a result of mutation, an amended sequence appears in
the form stimulus/consciousness/response. The conscious experience in this
sequence does not have to be the sole determinant of the response, but we will
allow that it is influential; that is, that it will increase or decrease the likelihood
of one response or another. If the response favored by the newly introduced
consciousness is wrong (i.e., if it encourages an unfortunate response), then the
species will not survive; but if the favored response is right, then the species will
survive. In the end, a successful species will have a specific conscious experience
that is associated with a successful stimulus/response sequence, and this is the
signature of a psycho-physical parallelism. A more accurate formulation of the
parallel principle might be:
2nd Formulation: If an element of consciousness becomes associated with a
stimulus/response sequence in a species, and if it contributes to the long-term
survival of the species by enhancing or repressing a response, then the species
will have acquired a rudimentary psycho-physical parallelism.
Again, this is because a subjective state that enhances or represses a response
will enable the creature to learn (through evolution) to couple that ‘psychological’ state with a successful ‘physiological’ response. It is my belief that the
psycho-physical parallelism that we identify with humans began in this way.
It must be emphasized that the conscious element in the above statement
is not just a circuitous way of talking about another (equivalent) physiological
configuration that is itself a response to the stimulation and a determinant of
the response. That would defeat our purpose by reestablishing an epiphenomenal interpretation; for again, the content of the conscious element would then be
irrelevant to any behavior. We say, rather, that it is the conscious element itself
that is associated with an enhanced or repressed response. That is not to say
that consciousness has an existence independent of physiology; for indeed, we
3
assume that it arises out of physiology. But we claim that the qualitative properties of the experience are directly related to the enhancement or repression of
a response, and that that correspondence cannot be explained by contemporary
physics. One way of providing the required feedback is described in the final
sections on physics.
The General Model & Hypothesis
A model is shown graphically in fig. 1 in which a stimulus gives rise to two possible responses R and R′ , together with a possible subjectve experience E. This
appears in two possible sequences, one being either R(E) or R′ (nE), and another
being either R(nE) or R′ (E), where nE indicates no associated experience.
R( E)
R( E)
R’(nE )
repressed
R( nE )
repressed
R’(E)
R’(E)
survive
Stimulus
Stimulus
extinct
Figure 1
We now add a hypothesis concerning the experience E that, we will say in
this example, enhances a response. To put this hypothesis into play, it will be
necessary to amend the underlying physics in a way that will be explained in a
later section.
The General Hypothesis applied to an enhancing experience:
When the experience E appears in association with a response, it will “enhance” the response by increasing its probability relative to other responses.
Since the bracketed term nE means that there is no associated experience,
it produces no special effect.
The claimed influence of E increases the probability of the response R(E)
in the first sequence in fig. 1, and R′ (E) in the second sequence. Because of
normalization, this effectively represses the responses R′ (nE) and R(nE). We
make the further assumption that the response R is favored in the evolutionary
struggle, and R′ is not. Therefore, the only species that survives is one in which
the experience E is associated with a life affirming response R.
4
It should be noted that the experiential mutation introducing E is capable
of advancing the evolution of the species in this example, and it does so without
the help of a mechanical mutation of the kind that advances an automaton.
That is, the sequence in fig. 1 might proceed as indicated without a mechanical
mutation also taking place. This does not mean that the evolutionary process is
thereafter dominated by experiential mutations in preference to mechanical ones.
However, it is possible that these two processes (mechanical and experiential)
operate independent of one another; and if that is so, they might also operate in
tandem. If that were historically so, then whatever the relative frequency of the
two process, the species would evolve faster than it would with either one of these
processes working by itself. We would then be able to say that if consciousness
is introduced in a way that gives rise to a psycho-physical parallelism, it will
always benefit evolution by increasing the speed with which a species adapts to
its environment.
A fanciful Example
An example that I use in previous papers is more specific [3,4]. It involves the
experience of “pain” that is assumed to decrease the probability of any response
to which it is associated. In the interest of concreteness, a fictitious encounter is
imagined between an ancient fish that is initially assumed to be an automaton,
and an electric probe that somehow exists in primordial waters. The probe
provides the stimulus that gives rise to two possible responses of the fish (1)
W-withdraw, or (2) C-continued contact.
A mutation is assumed to introduce the conscious experience of pain associated with one or the other of these responses. The sequence W(no pain)
or C(pain) therefore presents itself as a possibility together with the sequence
W(pain) or C(no pain). In the first case, C(pain) is repressed inasmuch as we require that pain always represses the response with which it occurs. This leaves a
painless withdrawal W(no pain) that will survive the evolutionary struggle inasmuch as it is a healthy response for the fish. In the second sequence, W(pain)
is repressed, leaving the fish in painless contact C(no pain) with the probe; and
this leads to the fish’s demise inasmuch as that response is unhealthy. The
result is the emergence of a species of fish that instinctively withdraws from a
probe, and at the same time, experiences a release from pain. We therefore see
the beginnings of a psycho-physical parallelism in which pain is coupled with a
dangerous behavior.
When I speak of “pain” in this example I do not necessarily refer to the
5
painful experience known to humans. Different creatures might experience pain
differently. What is important about pain is the way that it is associated with
the repression of unhealthy of responses.
I have been alluding to the causal efficacy of consciousness by referring to
its ability to ‘enhance’ or ‘repress’ responses. I will continue to do so in the
interest of simplifying and unifying the discussion. However, strictly speaking,
one should only talk about possible “correspondences” or “associations” between
conscious experiences and physiological responses (or our models of physiological
responses). That’s because we can only hope to discover empirical relationships
at this point. We have no general theory that can explain the psycho-physical
interaction proposed here, and we may never have such a theory. It is even
possible that there is a third unknown (and unknowable) cause that is common
to these relationships [5]. I will nonetheless continue to speak of consciousness
as a ‘causal’ influence because that is the most heuristically effective way of
presenting this model.
The Physics
A stimulus that acts on a biological organism will generally create a quantum
mechanical superposition of body states over a wide range of possible responses1
[6, 7]. I call a superposition of this kind of an endogenous superposition. It
will consist of many competing physiological configurations, each supporting a
distinctive conscious state, and each with a specific quantum mechanical probability of being realized. The external stimulus therefore gives rise to an endogenous superposition of states that are capable of supporting different degrees and
qualities of consciousness. The probability that one of these states is realized
is normally determined by quantum mechanics alone. However, I add a special
hypothesis concerning pain consciousness.
The Psycho-Physical Hypothesis applied to pain:
When pain consciousness is associated with a component of an endogenous
1 It is frequently said that macroscopic states cannot be in quantum mechanical superpo-
sitions because they behave like classical mixtures (i.e., like classical statistical ensembles).
However, quantum mechanical interference terms do exist between these states when they are
taken together with correlated elements in their environment. The states in this entanglement
appear to be a classical mixture when the environmental variables are integrated out; but Joss
and Zeh call it an “improper mixture” because, globally considered, it is a bona fide quantum
mechanical superposition with distinct probability amplitudes. See refs. 6 and 7. It might
equally be called an “improper superposition”.
6
superposition, it will repress that component relative to other ‘painless’ components.
If more that one component contains pain consciousness, than the degree of
repression of each component will be a function of the intensity of the pain in
each. This hypothesis is entirely qualitative inasmuch as no data is available to
give us a measure of the degree of repression. It is further limited to one kind
of experience - pain consciousness. Presumably, pleasurable experiences are associated with enhanced behaviors; and more sophisticated experience/behavior
interactions are dealt with at later stages of evolution.
Again, the hypothesis is intended to be an amendment to the fundamental
mechanics. It provides feedback from conscious states to physiological states
that is essential if we believe that there is a naturally occurring psycho-physical
parallelism. The feedback cannot be thought of a euphemism for a physiological activity that is ‘really’ the underlying cause of the influence; for barring a
Leibnizian miracle, a genuine psycho-physical interaction is necessary for there
to be a parallelism.
State Reduction
There is still no general agreement concerning how, why, or exactly when a
quantum mechanical wave function collapses upon measurement. The why of it
will not concern us here, but for the parallel principle to work we must choose
a reduction process that satisfies one important condition: namely, that state
reduction (or state collapse) cannot happen too quickly. A developing endogenous state must have enough time to grow to macroscopic proportions; and it
must have enough time to mature sufficiently to support consciousness.
This condition is automatically satisfied if we adopt the state reduction ideas
of John von Neumann. Accordingly, (1) state reduction will not occur unless a
conscious observer is present and aware of the system. This means that an endogenous macroscopic state will not collapse until it has matured sufficiently to
support a conscious observer; that is, until an internal self-observation is possible. This idea is sometimes said to imply that consciousness causes the collapse
of a quantum mechanical state function. As previously stated, I use terminology
like this myself; but one should be reminded that we are talking about empirical
relationships in which consciousness is only found to be associated with state
reduction in a certain way. With this qualification, I accept the von Neumann
account of state reduction. Without it, a psycho-physical parallelism would not
7
be possible.
Seed Particles
There remains the question of how an endogenous quantum mechanical superposition can be formed in the first place. Henry Stapp proposed that the calcium
ions that are needed to release neurotransmitters across a synaptic junction are
possible seed particles for the creation of such a superposition [8]. Because
of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, one of these small ions will grow to
many times its “classical” size during the time it takes for it to diffuse to the
vesicles containing neurotransmitters. The resulting uncertainty as to which
transmitters are released is passed on to the neurological level, and this results
in the macroscopic uncertainty implicit in an endogenous superposition.
Other seed mechanisms are possible. There are many migratory transmitters that travel significant distances from their point of origin to receptors in
other parts of the body, and these can acquire Heisenberg uncertainties in position. They are the steroids and peptides that move throughout the body, carried
along by blood or intercellular fluids. Many of these are small enough and travel
for a long enough time to be significantly affected by Heisenberg uncertainty.
This means that the time of a molecule/receptor attachment is governed by a
quantum mechanical probability distribution. This in turn leads to an uncertain
receptor response. To this extent, migratory transmitters guarantee the existence of a superposition of receptors in different stages of stimulation. When
the resulting uncertainties in all of the body’s receptors are taken together, the
result will be a wide-ranging endogenous superposition of possible body states2 .
The Case of Pain
The endorphins produced by the body are migratory molecules that mediate
pain by seeking out and attaching to opiate receptors in the brain and other
2 A migratory molecule spreads out spatially as it moves about,
due to its Heisenberg
uncertainty of momentum. Its components interact strongly with the fluids in which it is
immersed, so they are also dispersed by such classical mechanisms as diffusion, turbulence
and laminar flow. Either way, the probability with which a given molecule attaches to a given
receptor is governed by quantum mechanical uncertainty . The resulting ensemble of receptor
states is an entanglement of seed molecules and the liquid environment in which they are
immersed. But when that environment is integrated out, thereby eliminating it as part of
the local (macroscopic) system, the resulting receptor states are found to lack the ability to
interfere with one another (see ref. 6, 7).
8
parts of the body. These molecules are peptides that are small enough and generally travel far enough to seed endogenous quantum mechanical superpositions
that include a broad range of states with different degrees of pain consciousness. Endorphins can therefore function as the pain suppressers in the fanciful
example of the fish, and this gives them a possible evolutionary role of some
importance. Opiate receptors have been found in very ancient species, going
back to the early vertebrates [9]. Since they serve no other purpose than to
stimulate analgesic and euphoric effects, and since they have such a pervasive
presence in all vertebrates, it is easy to believe that opiate receptors served a
compelling evolutionary purpose associated with the most elementary of conscious experiences3,4 [10].
Because of its (Heisenberg) uncertainty of position, a migrating endorphin
molecule has a less-than-one probability of attaching itself to an opiate receptor
at any given moment. So the total number of receptors that are turned on at
that moment is quantum mechanically uncertain. This number is a variable
of a quantum mechanical superposition, each component of which potentially
supports different degrees of pain consciousness. Our psycho-physical hypothesis
tells us that those components with a greater degree of pain will be repressed
relative to those with a lesser degree of pain; and as a result, the distribution of
states in the superposition will shift in the direction of states with lesser pain.
The probability that the subject will experience less pain is thereby increased,
thus establishing a connection between subjective experience and physiology as
required by the psycho-physical parallelism.
It is difficult to imagine how this theory can be tested if the only seed particles available are the calcium ions within neuron synapses. But small migrating
molecules are a different story. Exogenous opiates, such as codeine, morphine,
heroin also alleviate pain and/or give pleasure by attaching to opiate receptors [11]. These molecules are small enough and they travel far enough to be
seed particles, and they are easier to manipulate experimentally. It is therefore
possible to test the above theory by injecting pharmacological doses of these
opiates into subjects, determining the extent to which they attach to receptors
in conscious subjects; and comparing this with their attachment in subjects
3 In advanced species, receptors perform these functions as well as modify more sophisticated moods in the direction of analgesia and euphoria. See ref. 10.
4 The existence of ancient opiate receptors does not in itself prove the existence of consciousness, inasmuch as an automaton might very well use these devices to modify a response
to certain kinds of stimuli. However, I believe that consciousness was introduced through
these devices. The extent to which they existed before that event, or came into existence as
party to that event, is not a question that I address here.
9
who receive subpharmacological doses. The author has proposed an experiment along these lines that injects synthetic opiates into humans using positron
emission tomography (PET), or into rats using autoradiography [12].
References
[1] J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics,
(Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1955), pp. 418-421
[2] W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, Chap. 5, in The Works of
William James, F. Burkhart, ed. (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1981), pp. 141-147
[3] R.A. Mould, “Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics”, Found. Phys. 28
(11), 1703 (1998)
[4] R.A. Mould, “Quantum Consciousness”, Found. Phys. 29 (12), 1951 (1999);
quant-ph/9908077
[5] R.A. Mould, ”Satisfying Reality”, Iyyun. Jerus. Phil. Q. 50 (Jan. 2001);
quant-ph/0012120
[6] E. Joos and H. D. Zeh, “The Emergence of Classical Properties Through
Interaction with the Environment” Z. Phys. B 59, 223 (1985), top p. 224
[7] D. Giulini, et al, Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in
Quantum Theory, (Springer, Berlin, New York, 1996) p. 41-44
[8] H. Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, (Springer, New York,
1993) p. 152
[9] C. B. Pert, Molecules of Emotion, (Scribner, New York, 1997) p. 84
[10] C. Levinthal, Messengers of Paradise, Opiates and the Brain, (Anchor
Press, Doubleday, New York, 1988) p. 111-120
[11] S. Snyder, Drugs and the Brain, (Scientific American Library, W. H. Freedmann & Co., New York, 1999) Chap. 2
[12] R.A. Mould, “Endogenous Conscious State Reduction: Two Experiments”,
Found. Phys. Lett. 14 (4), 377-386 (2001); quant-ph/0106103
10 |
The Moon Illusion explained by the Projective Consciousness Model
Running head: The Moon Illusion & Projective Consciousness
David Rudrauf1*, Daniel Bennequin2* & Kenneth Williford3*
1. FAPSE, Section of Psychology, Swiss Center for Affective Sciences, Campus Biotech,
University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland
2. Department of Mathematics, IMJ, University of Paris 7, Paris, France
3. Department of Philosophy and Humanities, University of Texas, Arlington, USA
* The authors equally contributed to this report.
Corresponding author:
Prof. David Rudrauf
Campus Biotech
Chemin des Mines, 9
1202 Genève, Suisse
MMEF Lab (Director)
Tél: +41 22 379 09 31
Fax: +41 22 379 06 10
1
The Moon often appears larger near the perceptual horizon and smaller high in the sky
though the visual angle subtended is invariant. We show how this illusion results from
the optimization of a projective geometrical frame for conscious perception through
free energy minimization, as articulated in the Projective Consciousness Model. The
model accounts for all documented modulations of the illusion without anomalies (e.g.,
the “size-distance paradox”), surpasses other theories in explanatory power, makes
sense of inter- and intra-subjective variability vis-à-vis the illusion, and yields new
quantitative and qualitative predictions.
Keywords: consciousness, projective geometry, free energy, perceptual illusions
Introduction
The structure of consciousness remains one of the greatest scientific puzzles. Here we
support the hypothesis that consciousness is framed by projective geometry and dynamically
calibrated to resolve sensory uncertainty by accounting for one of the oldest documented
unexplained perceptual illusions, the Moon Illusion. Our account is based on an
independently derived mathematical model, the Projective Consciousness Model (PCM)(1).
(Supplementary Information §1).
Euclidean 3-space frames sensorimotor integration, but the PCM entails that conscious
perception, imagination, and action control are framed by projective geometry, which extends
this 3-space and spaces for action (2) with a plane at infinity and the sets of standard
isometries with point transformations preserving relations of incidence of lines and planes.
Projective frames are capable of integrating points of view dynamically and are calibrated for
subjective rendering in the PCM following principles of Bayesian inference and free energy
(FE) minimization (1, 3), based on prior beliefs and sensory evidence.
We show that when observing the Moon (especially when full and bright), the most
probable projective frame, that which maximizes the use of information, is heavily dependent
on the Moon’s perceived elevation and the availability of sensory information. We
demonstrate mathematically and verify with simulations that on these assumptions the
apparent diameter of the Moon tends to be larger when near the horizon (with “landscape”
information available) and smaller when higher, in a manner that accounts for reported
individual and environmental variability (4-9).
The phenomenon, which also affects the perception of other celestial objects, has posed a
puzzle since antiquity (9) and is considered an illusion because the visual angle A subtended
by the Moon remains the same irrespective of its position in the sky. The illusion depends on
the salience of depth cues (5, 9), is diminished when the Moon is seen from upside-down
through one’s legs (10), and is maintained in pictures (11).
Taking Account of Distance (TAD) theories (4-6, 12-14) hypothesize that perceptual
systems assume the diameter of the Moon to be proportional to its estimated distance in
accordance with trigonometry (the “size-distance invariance hypothesis” or SDIH). When
assumed to be farther away, the Moon would thus be expected to display a larger diameter.
Yet, more subjects judge the Moon larger and closer when near the horizon and smaller and
farther away when elevated (12), a situation dubbed the “size-distance paradox”. TAD
theorists have invoked introspective error to resolve the paradox (12, 15), sometimes
bolstered by considerations about visual processing streams (16). But why should only
introspected diameter correctly match unconsciously estimated quantities, and why would
only some subjects suffer from this dissociation?
2
By contrast, the PCM offers a generative model of the illusion at the conscious
perceptual level, accommodates the contextual factors implicated in its occurrence, is
immune to the objections to TAD theories, and surpasses previous accounts based on the
geometry of visual space (17, 9).
Preliminaries
Perceptually estimating relative sizes and distances is adaptively crucial; there are
conscious perceptions of the relative sizes and distances of objects, though no direct
perceptions of metrical values. This is consistent with a projective geometrical model in
which there is no canonical notion of distance or ratios of distances, but only relations of
incidence, preserving alignments and crossings. Nevertheless, some metrics are more natural
than others in this geometry because they have the largest number of symmetry dimensions
(n = 6): a Euclidean metric in the restricted affine model (E3) and a spherical metric (FubiniStudy) for the full projective space (PSO4). (For technical details see Supplementary
Information §2.)
Several studies (e.g., 18) have established that all sufficiently far objects are judged as
“at infinity” when no indication of relative distance is available. The Moon (constellations,
etc.) can be assumed to be “at infinity” in a projective frame, which does not preclude the
object’s appearing nearer to or farther from the observer.
Physically, the Moon M, seen from a point O, subtends a solid angle A. If M is moved to
M’ maintaining Euclidean distance from O (e.g., from an elevated position to near the
horizon), the visual angle A’ has the same aperture. The identity of the subtended visual
angles does not by itself allow one to infer that apparent distances d and d’ or diameters D
and D’ are identical.
We assume that there exists a projective frame F that maximizes the use of available
sensory information and minimizes the divergence from priors (beliefs and preferences)
through the minimization of variational free energy.
Relevant variables and parameters (see Supplementary Information §2) are: the visual
angle (HM) between the horizon H and the Moon M, the visual angle A subtended by the
object M, depth cues, characteristics of light, landscapes and objects. Prior parameters
include the probabilities of environmental features and a default projective frame F0. The
states of the variables are modified by projective transformations T, integrating sensory
evidence and an unconscious world model R in memory into the Field of Consciousness
(FoC). (See Supplementary Information §1.) Judgements on the apparent distance d and
diameter D of M issue from this process.
Our explanation of the Moon Illusion consists in proving that the projective frames
F=T(F0) and F’=T’(F0), which minimize free energy in their situations, entail that the
apparent diameter D of an elevated Moon is smaller than the apparent diameter D’ of a Moon
near the horizon. From this, most observers will infer that distance d is larger than distance d’
and experience the Moon as both larger and closer under F’. However, it is possible on this
model for observers to infer from different priors that the Moon is both larger and farther
away (9,12-13). Figure 1 illustrates the overall projective setup and argument.
3
Fig. 1. Projective setup and argument
a. Fields of Consciousness (FoC) for the Moon high in the sky (top) and on the horizon
(bottom) from respective projective frames F and F’. The Moon is at projective infinity. (See
text.) The Moon appears smaller high in the sky, larger near the horizon. b. Conditions of
observation and influences on the frames and their metrics. An observer (manikin) looks at
the Moon M high in the sky and M’ near the horizon at elevation q and azimuth f. The visual
angle A remains the same. Free energy minimization yields the frame F (or F’) with
projective transformations for the plane at infinity T (or T’), making maximal use of
information. The point I in projective frame F implies a broader projective scope, and I’ in
frame F’, a smaller one, which calibrates the internal metrics of the invariant projective plane
at infinity defining the FoC and induces the illusion.
Default projective frame
The main ingredient in our explanation is the selection of the projective frame F=T(F0).
Any projective frame for a 3-space must contain five points such that no four of them belong
to a plane. (See Supplementary Information §2.)
The standard default frame F0 (itself unconscious but subtending the FoC (1)) is defined
by the center O (the “point of view”), by three points at infinity, namely, H on the horizon in
front, L (or R) laterally, V vertically, and by a fifth point, I, in the finite ambient affine 3space. The point I behaves as a control point modulating the spatial scope of information
integration. H, L, V and the point J projected to infinity along OI define a frame on the plane
at infinity !" . Standard metrics g (e.g., Euclidean or elliptical) can be adapted to F0.
On the PCM, the perceptual processing of an object like the Moon is as follows (Fig. 1):
1) Constrained by priors, the brain tries to minimize FE by maximizing the use of available
information about the surroundings (quantified by an entropy), yielding a projective frame
that is optimal for the discrimination of objects and integration of panoramic vision (see
formula Supplementary Information §2). 2) The frame selection modifies the standard
coordinates, altering apparent relative distances in !" . 3) The metric shapes conscious
4
perception, including the apparent size D of the Moon. 4) Priors can be further used,
automatically or deliberatively, to attempt to resolve remaining perceptual or conceptual
uncertainty (e.g., about the Moon’s apparent distance).
High Moon
When looking at the Moon M high in the sky, environmental perspective cues (e.g.,
about relative distances) are generally absent in the observer’s visual field, save perhaps the
prior that M is beyond the maximum distance of binocular and accommodation
discrimination (see 18). FE minimization leads to an enlargement of the projective scope,
since, in such an impoverished context, a larger area offers a greater potential for sampling
information (see Supplementary Information §2). This induces a transformation F = T(F0),
moving I=T(I0 ) more laterally than I0 in F0 (Fig. 1). Moreover, as the Moon moves towards
the zenith, the head of the observer has to be inclined upward; thus V=T(V0 ) is shifted in the
direction opposite H with respect to V0 in F0. This affects the metric of the FoC, reducing the
apparent size of the Moon compared to F0. Proof: The angular metric at infinity in the frame
F of the FoC is isomorphic to the angular metric in the default frame F0; for instance, in the
FoC, HJ0 and HV0 are processed as equal to HJ and HV. But since the real view angle, A, of
M remains invariant, it represents a smaller arc in F than in F0. The Moon is thus perceived as
smaller. Note that the presence of buildings or other elevated cues is known to mitigate this
effect of apparent size reduction (9). This can be explained by a smaller displacement of the
point I (see Supplementary Information §2).
Horizon Moon
When looking at a Moon M’ appearing low on the horizon, above the line HL,
geometrical priors and available perspective “landscape” cues constrain the choice of the
projective transformation T’, as more information is present in a narrower region of space.
Free energy minimization yields a projective frame F’ with a focus on a narrower solid angle
around the line OH so that the point I’ (and its projection J’ at infinity) are closer to the
Moon. The arc HV in the FoC has not changed, but the angle HJ’ is now slightly smaller than
in the default frame, which enlarges the apparent relative size D’ of the Moon. Proof: The
projection of the arc HJ’ in the FoC is isomorphic to the arc HJ’0, but the visual angle A is
unchanged (A’=A). Therefore, it now constitutes a larger part of the angle HJ, and the Moon
is accordingly perceived as larger.
The closer the Moon is to the horizon, the closer the point J’ is to H, and the bigger the
Moon’s apparent size D’. The mathematical derivation (Supplementary Information §2 and
Fig. 2) shows a non-linear dependency of D’ on the angle HJ’. Note that when comparing
arcs at infinity, a prior preference for transformations preserving angles can be assumed. The
deformed metric is likely to give the Moon’s disc a circular shape consistent with visual
angles. The differential displacement of I in the direction of H and L is able to preserve the
circular shape. However, an elliptical shape is possible in the general model and might relate
to documented effects on halos around the Moon (9).
Active vision and binocular disparity
Eye convergence, binocular disparity and depth accommodation have the effect of
considerably augmenting available information from lateral cues at far distances in the
direction of the Moon. On the PCM, this shifts I’ toward the line HL and thus augments the
illusion. Conversely, monocular vision, eliminating disparity (though not accommodation),
5
which is expected to have the opposite effect on I’, is known to strongly attenuate the illusion
(9).
The Moon in pictures
The PCM can also explain why and how the Moon Illusion occurs when making
perceptual inferences from planar pictures. The projective frame has to be adapted to the
figure’s perspective cues, as if a human observer were contained in the world of the picture,
which is interpreted as 3-dimensional (not 2D) (19). Substitution of points of view and
rescaling of frames are a core feature of projective geometry. Following the same information
theoretic arguments outlined above, the choice of a projective frame can induce the illusion
as a result of the choice of the equivalent of point I. Note that the use of such a frame inside
pictures is compatible with the use of another frame for the observer looking at the picture,
the different sub-spaces being distinguished in the FoC.
Seeing the Moon upside down through the legs
When the Moon is low on the horizon and seen by subjects bending over to look through
their legs (10), H, M’ L, and V can be all assumed to be nearly coplanar. Such a projective
setup induces a higher degeneracy of the metric in the plane at infinity, thus flattening the
Moon and reducing the Moon Illusion, as empirically documented (10). As shown in (10),
inversion of the visual scene, even in pictures, reduces the illusion. This can be explained by
the difficulty of transforming the metric when OV is reversed.
Results
Simulations
We applied the above principles and quantitative developments (see Methods and
Supplementary Information §2 & (20)) in simulations demonstrating the illusion and its
relation to key model parameters (Fig. 2).
6
Fig. 2. Generative projective model of the Moon Illusion.
a. Left-Tier: Conformal constraint. Charts representing relations between parameters in the
model. Top and Middle: FE as a function of l, µ and s, featuring a strictly convex function
guaranteeing a unique solution. Bottom: relative area (normalized by the area at 0º elevation)
of the perceived Moon as a function of elevation (in degrees) and σ, demonstrating a range of
possible magnification ratios. Right-Tier: 2-dimensional planar rendering of the projection of
a world model (including the Moon at projective infinity) in projective space, as a function of
elevation (in degrees), given parameters: σ (influences control point I (see text)), (l, µ) =
argmin(Fe). b. No conformal constraint. Top: FE as a function of l and s, with fixed µ =
1.06. Middle first: elliptic bias (ratio of vertical over horizontal diameter) as a function
elevation and s. Middle second: apparent relative area of the perceived Moon as a function
of elevation (in degrees) and σ. Bottom: 2-dimensional planar rendering at elevation 2º (See
Supplementary Information §2 & (20)).
7
Further evidence from Virtual Reality
In order to acquire additional evidence bearing on the model, we performed an initial
experiment in Virtual Reality over a small sample (N=6), focusing on specific quantitative
predictions (20) (Fig. 3) (see Methods). The results demonstrated a relation between
elevation and the perceived relative area of the moons (as compared to a reference moon at
2º), consistent with the Moon Illusion, depending on the presence of environmental
information. On average, the results fit the nonlinear functions predicted by the PCM better
than a linear model (LM) (PCM: t(6) = 26.3, p = 2 *10-7 versus LM: t(6) = 1.15, p = 0.0004;
relative R2 = 0.86; AIC = - 14.73 versus AIC = -2.76; BIC = -3.98 versus BIC = 0.01).
Though not systematic in occurrence and direction and quite variable, we also found some
evidence of elliptical deformations of the moons’ shapes (Fig. 3b), which were on average
significantly larger when environmental information was present than when it was not (t(4) =
3.63; p = 0.02). Furthermore, 4 of the 5 participants completing the task of elliptical
assessment, reported, though irregularly, elliptical deformations of “secondary moons”
presented laterally (cf. 3), which is a unique signature of the model when a global conformal
prior is not dominating.
8
Fig. 3. Additional empirical evidence from Virtual Reality.
For methods see (20). a. Virtual Reality (VR) scenes for conditions: environment On versus
Off, displaying a reference moon (near the horizon) and a target moon (at 20° elevation). The
participants’ task was to change, if warranted, the perceived size of the reference moon to
make it match that of the target moons at various elevations. b. Result charts. (Error bars are
standard errors). Top-Left: between-participant average relative perceived area as a function
of elevation and condition. With the environment On (blue) (versus Off (red)), on average the
empirical perceived areas (dashed curves) decreased (versus did not decrease) with elevation,
indicating an effective Moon Illusion in VR, depending on environmental cues. On average,
the PCM-predicted, nonlinear curves (continuous lines) demonstrated a good fit with the
data, above that of a linear model (grey line). Bottom-Left: fitting of individual (participant 1
to 6 (see color bar)) empirical data (dashed curve) and PCM curves (continuous lines). Top9
Right: average PCM parameters, s, C’, and l, estimated from empirical data, as a function of
the presence [1] or absence [0] of environmental information; corresponding to estimates of
the calibration of the participants’ FoC frames. Bottom-Right: between-participant average
elliptic bias as a function of elevation and condition.
Discussion
On the PCM, the Moon Illusion is a perceptual phenomenon that results from a
projective form of Bayesian inference that frames consciousness. It is induced by the process
of the subjective rendering of the FoC, which starts with the maximization of the use of
information (through FE minimization) and results in the calibration and application of a
projective transformation T to an unconscious world model R. Metrics can be adapted to the
finite and infinite compartments in a seamless way, yielding a unique coherent first-person
perspectival experience as solution (Supplementary Information §1). At infinity, the
projective transformation assumed for the Moon deforms the plane at infinity proportionally
to the expected information, which is achieved without affecting the real Moon’s visual
angle, thus contracting the perceived Moon’s relative size when high in the sky and dilating it
when low (Supplementary Information §2). Our approach makes quantitative predictions
based on explicit parameters about the enlargement of the Moon near the horizon, for
instance distinguishing “normal” illusions (a factor > 1 to < 2) from “super” illusions (factor
≥ 2) (4-8).
Putative explanations of the Moon Illusion fall into three main types: those appealing to
(i) “external physical reasons” (atmospheric refraction, magnification, change in actual
distance); (ii) entoptic, optical, and oculomotor processes (faulty accommodation, pupil size
under low illumination, binocular disparity); and (iii) “perceptual size changes owing to
scaling mechanisms within the brain” (see 9).
Theories of the first two types can be abandoned (see 9 for comprehensive treatment).
The third type, which includes our proposal, TAD theories, and other geometry-based
models, still stands. A number of contextual factors impact the Moon Illusion: relative sizes
of objects, terrain effects, vergence commands, visual angle, posture, aerial perspective and
color (see 9). The PCM can accommodate the role of basic visual parameters, such as
binocular disparity (see 21-23), as well as the integration of contextual factors. Our model
eliminates the “size-distance paradox” plaguing TAD theories, since it implies that D is first
perceived and that d is only secondarily inferred, based on priors (e.g., that a constant object
should appear bigger when closer) or on lateral cues or accommodation. More generally, it
can account for the large inter- and intra-subjective variability affecting apparent D and d.
Heelan (17) proposed a finite hyperbolic geometrical model of visual space (i.e., with a
negative constant curvature). Though mathematically deep, the model is ad hoc if not circular
(see (9)) as it arbitrarily selects a geometry and a set of fixed parameters to reproduce the
illusion. By contrast, the PCM posits that the geometry underlying spatial consciousness is
larger than any metrical geometry and tends towards a projective extension of affine
geometry, including a notion of variations of points of view, affording great flexibility and
complexity. It does not assume fixed structures for measurement but makes metrical
properties dependent on active Bayesian inference, motivated by the optimal integration of
priors and sensory evidence and accounting for the way in which the world is sampled.
Measurements in different planes are independent; sizes and distances are computed
independently of each other. Nevertheless, projective geometry can naturally accommodate
spherical or Euclidean metrics (at finite distances and infinity), which are perceptually
plausible. It can also incorporate hyperbolic metrics, though in the present context this would
be with little ecological validity, as these can make parallel lines hyper-parallel and
10
exponentially divergent toward infinity. We have developed a second version of the general
model (Supplementary Information §2), where the Moon is assumed to belong to a sphere at
a finite distance and where induced transformations are restricted to preserve angles. This
second version of the model remarkably coincides with Heelan’s model based on the ideal
sphere of hyperbolic space. As in Heelan’s, the shape of the Moon is always round
(conformal). Then the PCM can be compatible with conformal constraints, but it also offers
possible non-conformal solutions, inducing elliptical deformations. Our initial results in
Virtual Reality suggest the presence of some deviations from conformality, which, if
confirmed, would in and of themselves exclude Heelan’s model. But more fundamentally, the
PCM has much broader explanatory and predictive power (1). For instance, in this context, it
also provides an explanation of the flattened dome “sky illusion”, closely associated with the
Moon Illusion (9): When looking up at the sky, the point I is displaced laterally, and thus the
covered region around the zenith corresponds to a smaller region in the standard default
frame. Hence, the distribution of curvature is not perceptually uniform (it is smaller at the
zenith and larger at the horizon). More generally, the PCM explains other types of perceptual
illusions and provides a psychological inspired generative model of active inference, which
encompasses and unifies the frames for perception, imagination and motor programming,
embedding them in a general algorithm of global optimization of multimodal information (1).
If we abandon SDIH and Heelan’s model, we need not thereby “abandon geometry” (9).
In (1) we discussed the possible functional neuroanatomy of the PCM. Here, we further
hypothesize that grid cell adaptation (24-25) could be linked to transformations of the
projective frame, in particular to the extension of grid fields due to the displacement of the
point I in the frame. Spatial representations and navigation are supported by place, head
direction, grid and boundary cells, which are governed by spatial frames dependent on
external cues, in particular “at infinity” (24-25), and found in the para-hippocampal region in
rodents and also in humans, especially for the visual field (26), featuring a larger contextdependent flexibility (27).
As Westheimer (28) states, the Moon Illusion results from many hidden neuronal
activities supporting perception and action and thus involves much more than a geometry,
even a projective one, in its overall generative mechanism. However, shifting to a projective
space for generating consciousness and, adapting a variable projective frame dynamically
through FE minimization, constitute crucial steps in the explanation of the illusion. In turn,
the explanation of the Moon Illusion by the PCM provides further support for the validity of
the model.
Methods
The PCM model principles were applied to obtain a generative model of the Moon
Illusion, which was used for both simulations and analyses of empirical results (see
Supplementary Information §2 for detailed mathematical definitions and derivations).
Simulations
The simulations presented in Fig. 2 were implemented and run using Matlab
(MathWorksTM), applying the relevant formula introduced in Supplementary Information
§2.
The world model included a series of triangulated meshes: a sphere of radius OH = 1
centered at 0 used as a projective plane at infinity; a horizontal ground plane XY;
“mountains” based on Matlab’s “peaks” function; a model of a city from an online freely
available 3-dimensional model; and a small sphere (diameter 0.03) representing the Moon
11
and projected on the sphere at infinity in the direction OH. The coordinate system was: OH =
x, OL = y, OV = z.
The parameters of the simulation were varied across the following ranges: elevation of
the Moon = [0 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40] degrees; s = [0.5: 0.22 :2.5]; l = [0.3 : 0.0046 :
3.5]; µ = [0.3 : 0.0046 : 3.5]. We used C = 0 for non-conformal solutions, and C = 6 for
conformal solutions. We used C’ = 1, and n = 1. We used for L = log(αγ) + log(ωκ): a = 1, g
= 2, w = 2, k = 2.
The default frame F0 was derived from V(4) in standard coordinates: [1 0 0 0; 0 1 0 0; 0 0
1 0; 0 0 0 1], with I = c*(V4(1,:)+V4(3,:)-V4(2,:)) (with c = 1), defining P = I*V(4)-1, so that
F0 was equal to V(4) row multiplied by P elementwise. A transformation Tpersp was defined as
a 4×4 matrix [1 0 0 0; 0 1 0 0; 0 0 1 0; cmoon(1) cmoon(2) cmoon(3) 1] (with cmoon, the
coordinates of the center of the Moon at a given elevation), and used for perspective
transforms and 3-dimensional perspective division of the affine space encompassed by the
sphere at infinity (inducing the 3-dimensional perspectival presentation of the world model in
the FoC), so that the frame of the affine space was defined as Faffine = Tpersp*F0.
Free energy (Fe) was minimized as a function of s across the range of l and µ to derive
the optimal argmin(Fe[l, µ]) following equations [39-40] (see Supplementary Information
§2), using equation [26] for the calculation of areas, integrating over the angular range [0 :
1.6 * 10-4 : p/2]. The change of metric in the sphere at infinity as induced by the
minimization of Fe and variable Moon elevations was computed as follows.
Q = atan2(l*sqrt(sin(f)2 + µ (-2)*cos(f)2)*sin(q), cos(q)),
F = atan2(µ*sin(f), cos(f)),
with q the elevation and f the azimuth of the Moon (in radians), sqrt(.), the square root
function, and atan2(.,.), the multi-valued inverse tangent function. The results were then
expressed in homogeneous coordinates at infinity, so that:
(X,Y,Z,0) = [cos(Q), sin(Q)*cos(F), sin(Q)*sin(F), 0].
The absolute area of the Moon in the FoC projective space was computed as:
p*(DZ/2)*(DY/2), with DZ, the vertical elliptical length and DY, the horizontal elliptical
length of the projected Moon. The area was then expressed as a relative area by dividing
area(q) at a given elevation by area(q = 10) at elevation 10 (near the horizon, and
corresponding to the lowest elevation for ratings in the Virtual Reality experiment).
Rendering of the space for Fig. 2 was performed using Matlab’s patch function.
VR experiment
Participants
There were N = 6 participants (Females = 4; age range [24 - 40]), with normal or
corrected to normal vision. Informed consents were obtained following local IRB guidelines.
VR setup
The experiment was programmed in Unity3d version 2017.2.0f3. A scene was created
with basic assets (ground plane, cubicles, road planes, mountains, moons) (Fig. 3), in order to
manipulate perspective cues, based on stereoscopic vision through the Head Mounted
12
Display (HMD), geometrical perspective cues from objects due to their distance, and
atmospheric effects (fog). Moon spheres, all of the same diameter (2,500 meter), were placed
in the scenes at various elevation and azimuth, but at a constant distance from the location of
the participants of 50,000 meters. The experiment used an HTC Vive system for the VR
immersion in the scene. Scripts were programmed in C# to control conditions, the positions
of moons, ratings, saving the results in a CSV file.
Experimental conditions
The following conditions were manipulated. Moon elevation, ranged from 2° (reference
moon) to 10 to 70° (target moons), by steps of 10°, at constant azimuth of 90° with respect to
x-axis in front). Terrain visibility 1: a) mountains and buildings with horizontal plane on; b)
all terrain cues off (giving the impression of floating in space). We predicted that the Moon
Illusion would be maximum in (a) and absent in (b). In order to assess possible elliptical
effects in dedicated blocks, an array of additional lateral moons ranging from 2°to 20° in
elevation and azimuth were used to maximize the likelihood of elliptical effects due to the
complexity of frame optimization in such a context.
Experimental schedule, tasks and ratings
Conditions were controlled manually by dedicated key press performed by the
experimenter following a pseudo-random schedule. Two experimental blocks were
performed.
A) Manipulation: presence of terrain and perspective cues, condition (a) versus (b)
above. For each condition and each trial, a target moon was presented at a given elevation, in
sequences (from maximum to minimum, and minimum to maximum, ranging from 10° to
70°, among 7 possible basic elevations, repeated twice per participant), yielding 28 values ×
2 conditions = 56 trials.
B) Manipulation: presence of terrain and perspective cues, condition (a) versus (b)
above, with in all cases an array of additional moons present (see above). For each condition
and each trial, a target moon was presented at a given elevation, in sequences (from
maximum to minimum, and minimum to maximum, ranging from 10° to 70°, among 7
possible basic elevations, repeated twice per participant), yielding 28 values × 2 conditions =
56 trials.
Tasks and ratings were as follows. No time pressure was imposed. The total duration of
the experiment, including setup, training and test was an hour on average.
In block A, participants were asked to perform the following. They used the two arrow
keys (left-right) on the keyboard to decrease or increase the apparent overall diameter of a
“reference moon” always presented at a 2° elevation above the horizon in front. The task was
to make the apparent diameter of the reference moon match as closely as possible the
apparent diameter of the “target moon” appearing at different elevations above ground.
Participants were asked to look carefully at each moon as directly as possible: reference and
target, alternatively, looking up or down, to perform the matching. Once satisfied, they
indicated it verbally in order to move to the next trial.
In block B, participants were asked to perform the following. They used the two arrow
keys (up-down) on the keyboard to decrease or increase the lateral diameter of the reference
moon (this results in a shape of the moon that is more or less elliptical: from a vertical
elongation if the diameter is decreased to a horizontal elongation if it is increased, with a
perfectly round shape in between). The task was to make the apparent shape of the reference
moon (irrespective of overall size) match as closely as possible that of the target moon.
13
Participants were asked to look carefully at each moon directly: reference and target,
alternatively, looking up or down, to perform the matching. Once satisfied, they indicated it
verbally in order to move to the next trial.
The size of the reference moon was reset between each trial.
Procedure
The experimenter set up and helped the participant get equipped with the requisite
technology. The participant was instructed to sit on a rocking chair in the center of the room.
The participant was given a keyboard to set on his/her legs in order to provide responses. The
participant equipped with the HMD entered the virtual scene and was given a succinct
introduction about Virtual Reality. Block A was followed by block B. There was a 2-minute
pause in the middle of each experimental block and a 2-minute pause between blocks. During
the pauses the participant was instructed to remove the HMD. At the end of the experiment,
the experimenter helped the participant to remove all of the experimental equipment and
provided a debriefing about the specific goals of the study.
Data analysis
All analyses were performed in Matlab (MathWorksTM). The area of the apparent
reference moon disks as a function of elevation q was calculated as A(q) = p*D(X)* D(Y),
with D(.) the diameter (in meters) of the moon. The areas were normalized by that of the
target moon at 10° in order to express the areas as a proportion of the lower target moon area,
so that A(q) = A(q)/A(q = 10°). The elliptical bias (for block B) was computed as abs(D(Y)/
D(X)). Data were averaged within participants for each elevation (2 samples per condition
per elevation). Simulations were performed in order to regress empirical data on data
predicted by the model. After considering the empirical range of relative areas (with
minimum relative areas of around 0.6), the space of parameters of the PCM used to generate
predicted curves for fitting, ranged as follow: s = [0.1 : 0.128 : 1.25]; C’ = [0.001 : 0.006 :
0.6]; C was fixed at C = 3. We thus varied two of the parameters of the model. Individual
empirical data were first fitted on simulated data using a least square procedure. Simulated
curves with least square were retained as best match for empirical data. Empirical data and
simulated data were averaged across participants for each elevation and condition in order to
estimate central tendencies. The fit of the average empirical and simulated data was then
computed using linear regression in order to compute statistics and assess goodness of fit.
Likewise, we used a linear regression to fit straight lines (both slope and intercept) to the
average empirical data. We then compared the goodness of fit of the average empirical data
with i) averaged simulation data from the PCM, and ii) the straight linear model (LM). We
hypothesized that the PCM simulated data would demonstrate a better goodness of fit with
the empirical data than the linear model. For statistical analyses, the averaged data and
elevations, as well as the curves predicted by the PCM, were z-scored so as to enable a valid
comparison across goodness of fit between the PCM and the linear models. The fitting of the
empirical data on the simulated data also allowed us to estimate, in each individual and on
average, the parameters l, µ, s, and C’, corresponding to the projective frames of the FoC
implied by the model, given the observed behavior of the relative areas as a function of
elevation and condition. Goodness of fit was compared using the following indices: relative
R2 = 1 – (MSE(PCM)/MSE(LM)) (with MSE(.), the Mean Squared Error); AIC =
n*log(MSE) + 2*k (with n the number of elevations, and k the numbers of parameters used
for model optimization and fitting), for both the PCM and LM; BIC = 2*log(MSE) +
k*log(n). k was equal to 3 for the PCM (2 parameters (s and C’), and 1 regression
14
coefficient), and to 2 for the LM (1 regression coefficient, 1 intercept). We used a paired ttest to compare elliptical bias effects over the participants that performed the task. We report
these results as initial results in support of the theory, but plan to perform a larger and more
detailed empirical study in VR for a future report.
Note that, in the model, l larger than 1 implies the displacement of the point I in the
direction of H, and µ larger than 1 the displacement of I in the lateral direction. If one of
them is smaller than 1, the displacement goes in the opposite direction.
Author Contributions
D.R. developed the study concept.
D.R., D.B. formulated the hypotheses.
D.B. developed the mathematical framework.
D.R. implemented the simulations and designed and conducted the VR study.
K.W. performed in-depth background analysis.
D.R., D.B., K.W. developed the rationale and discussion and wrote the manuscript.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Karl Friston, Björn Merker, and Fabio Solari for their reviews during the
preparation of this report.
17
Supplementary Information
1. Projective Consciousness Model General Summary
General definitions
Active inference. A formal and computational framework for modeling autonomous,
embodied cognition, inspired by phenomenological traditions from Merleau-Ponty (29) to
Varela (30) and formalized by Friston (3). Active inference is a method of information
processing related to Bayesian inference by which an autonomous system: (i) anticipates the
consequences of its actions by predicting how they will be experienced; (ii) programs its
actions and acts accordingly, and (iii) updates its prior beliefs based on a comparison of its
predictions and sensory evidence. According to the PCM, consciousness is governed by
active inference. Agents run through cycles of perception, imagination, and action in order to
optimize the precision of their knowledge and the satisfaction of their preferences.
Free energy. A quantity introduced in Statistical Physics and transposed into Information
Theory and Bayesian Learning Theory, in which it is based on predictive coding and can be
applied to active inference. The quantity is the sum of three terms: discrepancy between
expectation and actual state, departure from prior beliefs, and negentropy. The free energy
principle entails that agents attempt to minimize their overall free energy in order to
maximize the validity of their expectations and the satisfaction of their preferences in a
globally optimal manner. Formally, it is an upper bound on surprise. According to the PCM,
consciousness minimizes free energy either factually or by anticipation, through its cycles of
perception, imagination, and action, as well as prior updates. (Cf. below, Appendix 2.2.)
Entropy. A quantity, derived from Statistical Physics and forming the basis of Information
Theory that characterizes the level of uncertainty about anticipated outcomes. Entropy is
maximal for predictions with maximally uncertain outcomes and equal to 0 for completely
certain ones. It scales up with the number of alternative possibilities. In the PCM, the more
complex the inferences are, i.e., the more options and uncertainty, from simple physical
situations to complex social interactions, the bigger the entropy to be processed as part of the
optimization mechanism.
Projective transformations. Geometrical operations for transforming projective coordinates,
extending the usual coordinates in Euclidean space. (In this paragraph, two kinds of
transformations are considered together: the bijective ones, forming a group, that we used in
this report for changing frames, and projections from one subspace to another, which are
singular in 3-dimensions, and do not form a group.) Every non-zero linear transformation of a
4-dimensional vector space induces a projective transformation in the generalized sense,
which is not defined on the projective subspace corresponding to the vectors cancelled out by
the linear transformation (called its “kernel”). Such transformations can place points along
directions of perspective in relation to a horizon at infinity and an implicit point of
observation. They cover first-person and third-person perspectives. In the PCM, the changes
of projective frame correspond to one-to-one projective transformations and implement
spatial intentionality, attention, and perspective taking across perception, imagination, and
action programming. They are selected based on the process of free energy minimization and
reciprocally have impacts on perception and action coherence. (Cf. below, Appendix 2.1.)
1
Field of consciousness (FoC). The FoC is a (virtual) 3-dimensional projective space, and
behaves in a manner that is analogous to force fields in physical theories, extended over
space-time and internal variables and governed by the minimization of free energy. A
fundamental property of the FoC is its reliance on projective changes of frame, altering
global and local perceptions, the contents of consciousness, and thus influencing cognition
and behavior. Its dynamics drive anticipation, orientation and action selection. The FoC
provides a high degree of information integration across multiple sensory and cognitive
modalities. It is organized around a “first-person point of view” but can simulate “other
persons’ points of view” and their relations, allowing the conscious organism to adaptively
engage with its non-social and social surroundings. Note that the notion of the FoC has interrelated descriptive (phenomenological) components, and functional (biological, cognitive,
affective, behavioral) components.
Subjective rendering. The set of (neuro)computational process whereby FoCs are generated
and updated in response to new data (sensory, affective, semantic, etc.) or imaginary
perspective taking. The subjective rendering engine relies on a dynamical process: the active
inference based on free energy minimization modifies the states of internal variables; in
particular it generates a projective geometrical transformation that alters information
integration and influences conscious subjective perceptions and decisions, based on
sensorimotor processing. It is called “subjective” rendering due to the oriented, “first-person
point of view” structure inherent in every FoC and its phenomenal manifestation.
Overall model description
The Projective Consciousness Model, posits that the structure of conscious perceptual
(and imaginary) space approximates a projective 3-space (e.g., RP3, the projective space in 3dimensions over the field of real numbers) and relies on the corresponding group of
transformations (e.g., PLG(4), the projective linear group in 4-dimensions) to simulate and
evaluate possible paths through, and efficiently navigate, the organism’s environment. Path
selection is driven by an active inference engine that aims at free energy (FE) minimization,
roughly the minimization of surprise relative to the organism’s prior beliefs, preferences, and
ongoing sensory inputs. Many cases of perceptual ambiguity and multistability (e.g., the
Necker Cube), can be explained, according to the PCM, in terms of the lack of perceptual
cues sufficient to determine, in accordance with FE minimization, a single, canonical
perspective or angle of view on the object in question, thus allowing for ad libitum oscillation
between one orientation and another, one’s transient arbitrary preference being the only
remaining determinant (see (1)).
The projective Field of Consciousness (FoC) plays a central integrative role as part of a
general process of active inference, guiding behavior via predictions about the likely sensory
consequences of actions and updating in a Bayesian way in response to sensory feedback.
The process maximizes the reliability of prior beliefs and the satisfaction of preferences,
which are encoded as conditional probabilities. FE minimization and invariance
maximization together define the choice of projective parameters used for perspective taking
in perception and imagination (e.g., first-person versus third-person perspective taking).
To illustrate, consider a case of perceptual ambiguity occurring in a rabbit hunt. Imagine
that the rabbit hunter cannot decide from his current vantage point if the animal in the bushes
some ten meters away is a rabbit or a cat. In order to resolve the ambiguity, the hunter must
decide what new visual perspective on the animal is required. In order to do that, he must be
able to imagine (actively or passively) a number of accessible visual points of view, evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of these possible points of view, and select the best (or one
2
of the best) to attempt to realize. Here the choice will be determined by how conducive the
imagined point of view would be (if realized) to the attainment of the hunter’s goals (i.e.,
determining the identity of the animal and enabling a clear shot) and how difficult the point
of view is to realize given these goals (e.g., Will attempting to realize it scare the animal
off?). The process of relating his current point of view on the situation to the imagined points
of view is what we call “perspective taking”. And the process of selecting an optimal
perspective in a given situation is driven by the general directive to satisfy preferences given
the constraints provided by prior beliefs and sensory evidence (prior beliefs being subject to
Bayesian updating in the light of new sensory evidence). The hunter selects and enacts the
realizable perspective (from among those he can envision) with the greatest probability of
reducing his FE further. Imagining those possible perspectives requires an implicit mastery
of projective geometrical transformations; choosing a single one to actualize requires a
selection regime, one driven by FE minimization, according to the PCM.
The projective structure of the space of conscious experience (“conscious space” for short)
is most notable in visual perception, with its points of view, horizon lines, vanishing points
where parallel lines seem to converge, and scaling effects, revealing the relative distances of
familiar objects. But this projective structure is by no means restricted to vision; in fact, it is
a pervasive feature of multimodal, conscious 3D space. Arrows of direction in space and
exchanges of points of view, are essential for the control of reaching, grip, locomotion,
imagined displacement and social perspective taking (see (1,2)). It is not too surprising that
the projective plane was first discovered and studied with the aim of explicating and
systematizing the rules governing the depiction of 3D visual scenes on 2D surfaces. It may at
first appear somewhat more surprising that multimodal conscious space can itself be
modelled in terms of projective 3-space.
It is due to this projective arrangement that conscious experience is always perspectival
and capable of making basic spatial distinctions (here vs. there, closer, farther away, above,
below, behind, etc.), imbued with an elusive but roughly localizable origin, which is not itself
a distinguishable object within the space, and that it is capable of implicit and explicit
perspectival imagination, able to infer how physical objects would look from various angles,
distances, etc. Projective imagination, in turn, is also crucial for intersubjective
understanding, empathy, and Theory of Mind.
In the PCM, sensorimotor data integration is dependent on the choice of a projective
frame F=T(F0) on the 3-dimensional projective space, which completes the usual ambient
affine space E by adding points at infinity, forming a plane at the horizon. This projective
frame is chosen based on FE minimization, in agreement with data and prior probabilities,
including valuations related to internal preferences and motivational parameters, and used for
optimal subjective rendering in the FoC.
Furthermore, beyond its general framing, the representational contents of the FoC
(animate and inanimate objects, structures and properties of physical objects, etc.) are
determined on the basis of information encoded in memory and extracted from sensory
evidence in order to build a world model R that is projected in perspective using the
projective transformations T for subjective rendering in the FoC. The application of a
projective transformation to the world model results in a conscious world model S. The
transformations distribute spatial structures and motions in the FoC, as well as their
associated FE, according to a point of view, direction of aim, and a scope that can be used for
the evaluation of action; they also require calibration for perceptual inference.
The distribution of subjective information in the projective workspace is interpreted as
given by the operation of T on R:
! " # , % # , & # , ' = ) ∙ +(", %, &, 1)
[1]
3
where (x,y,z) are affine coordinates in the frame F, and (x', y', z',w) are homogeneous
coordinates in the frame T(F). The model is projected in the FoC 3-dimensional workspace in
a first-person perspective (1PP) mode through perspective divide across the three spatial
ambient dimensions (x,y,z) as:
23 53 63
! 1// = S( ,
, , 1)
4 4 4
[2]
The parameters of T(t) and R(t) are selected at a given time instant t based on a
combination of sensory evidence and prior beliefs such that:
) 7 , +(7) = 89:;<= >?(), +)
[3]
2. Mathematical framework
a) Projective frames and metric transformations at infinity
Let there be given a real vector space W of dimension n+1. The projective space P(W) is
the set of lines through 0 in W; it is said to have n dimensions. Every invertible linear
transformation u from W to itself induces a transformation T of P(W) that is called a
projective transformation. If v is a constant multiple of u, it defines the same T, and
reciprocally if u and v define the same T, v is a constant multiple of u.
By definition, a projective subspace Q of dimension m in P(W) is a subset of the form
P(U), where U is a linear subspace of W of dimension m+1. In particular, a hyperplane of
P(W) is a subset P(V) where V is a linear subspace of dimension n, i.e., co-dimension 1 in W.
A linear basis e1,…,en+1 of W defines homogeneous coordinates [x,…,xn+1] on P(W) that
are n+1 numbers, not all equal to zero, considered to define the point in P(W) (i.e., the same
line in W) which passes through the vector x = x1e1 +…+ xn +1en+1. Thus two sets of
coordinates [x1, … ,xn+1] and [x’1,…,x’n+1] are equivalent if and only if there exists a nonzero constant c such that x’1= cx1,…,x’n+1 = cxn+1.
Definition: A projective frame in P(W) is a set of n+2 (projective) points P0,P1,…,Pn+1,
such that no subset with n+1 elements belongs to a hyperplane of P(W).
Proposition 1: In this case there exists a linear basis e1,…,en+1 of W, such that Pj
corresponds to the line generated by ej for any j between 1 and n+1, and P0 corresponds to the
line generated generated by e0 = e1+…+en+1. Moreover, this basis is unique up to the
multiplication of all vectors by a common constant.
Demonstration: We choose a basis e’1,…,e’n+1 of W such that e’j generates the line Pj,
then the numbers x’1,…,x’n+1 such that x’1e’1+…+x’n+1e’n+1 generates P0 are well defined up
to the multiplication of all of them by a common constant. The searched frame is given by
putting ej = x’je’j for any j between 1 and n+1.
From this proposition, it follows that a projective frame is equivalent to n+1 vectors
linearly independent up to multiplication by a non-zero constant. However, this fact is a bit
misleading in view of the following result, which shows that n+1 points are truly not
sufficient for making a projective basis.
4
Theorem 1: Given two projective frames P0,…,Pn+1 and P’0,…,P’n+1, there exists a unique
projective transformation T such that for every j, T(Pj)=P’j.
Demonstration: We choose two linear bases of W, ej and e’j (j=1,…,n=1) that are related
to these two frames as described in the statement of the preceding proposition (not its proof),
then there exists a unique linear application u such that u(ej)=e’j (for j=1,…,n=1). The
relation u(e0)=e’0 is automatic by linearity. This defines T.
Historically, projective spaces were defined by adding points at infinity to affine spaces.
In practice, it is important to work in such a context, and thus to explain how it relates to
what precedes just above.
Let V be any hyperplane in W, defined by a linear equation a(w)=0. Then the subset E of
W defined by a(w)=1, has a well-defined structure of affine space associated to V: given two
points A and B in E, there exists one and only one vector v in V such that B=A+v. The points
P of E can be identified with points of P(W) by taking the lines containing 0 and P; those
projective points are named the “points at finite distance” of P(W), even if there exists no
preferred distance here. (In fact, a Euclidean metric on E is equivalent to a positive nondegenerate scalar product on V.) And the projective subspace P(V) of P(W) can be seen as
the hyperplane at infinity of E, by associating the directions in E parallel to non-zero vectors
in V. An affine frame of E is made by a point Pn+1 and a linear basis e1,…,en of V. Given such
an affine frame, an associated linear basis of W follows by taking for Pj the lines generated
by ej when j=1,…,n, and taking en+1=Pn+1. Then we deduce a projective frame, just by taking
the point P0 as before, i.e., the line generated by the vector e0=e1+…+en+en+1.
Conversely, if a projective frame P0, P1,…,Pn+1 is given, according to Proposition 1, this
defines a unique basis e1,…,en+1 of W. We define V as the vector subspace of W generated by
e1,…,en, equipped with the equation a(v)=0, such that a(en+1)=1. This defines an affine space
E as before. The points P1,…, Pn belong to the plane at infinity P(V) which completes E to
get P(W); in E we find Pn+1 corresponding to the line generated by en+1and P0 corresponding
to the line generated by the sum e0=e1+…+en+1. The intersection of the line Pn+1P0 with P(V)
is the point Q0 that corresponds to the vector f0=e1+…+en=e0-en+1, because this is the unique
vector such that P0=Pn+1+f0 belongs to the affine space E.
Remark: It is a pure convention to choose this form of e0; for instance, nothing essential
would be changed if we had chosen e’0=-e1+…+en+1. This could be seen as another frame
P’0,P1,…,Pn+1, and this would have no effect on the projective transformations associated
with another frame, on the condition that we respect the form of the combination of basis
vectors, the same sign at the same place. This remark points to the important fact that there
exists a manifold of concrete representations of what a frame is; this could, for example, be a
point cloud, deduced one from another by fixed conventional changes of coordinates.
In the 3-dimensional projective space presented in the body of the text, the points L, V, H
correspond respectively to P1, P2, P3, the point P4 to O, and the point P0 to I. The point Q0 is
the point J. When modifying the convention as in the above remark, we exchange left and
right, then the point cloud R/L and I, I’ is an example of the possible extension of the notion
of a frame.
Let us now look at metrics in the space P(V). Elliptical metrics (corresponding to spherical
metrics of the two-fold cover of P(V) by the sphere of oriented directions in E) appear more
natural, but we will also consider Euclidean metrics, describing an affine part of P(V)
centered on Pn (that correspond to our H at the horizon), because some subjects have the
tendency to report their estimation preferentially in these Euclidean terms. In this Euclidean
case, we assume that P1,..,Pn-1 are at infinity in P(V) (corresponding to V and R/L). (Later in
5
this supplementary document, in (c), we will also consider natural hyperbolic metrics on parts
of the projective space.)
We admit that the standard elliptical (or spherical) metric that corresponds to the usual
measure of angles, is associated with a standard frame of reference (that we named the frame
by default (F0) in the main text), the largest angle is π/2, it is realized for any pair Pj, Pk with
j,k between 1 and n, and distinct. Then the angle between Q0 and a Pj is π/4.
Let us look at the effect of changing the frame into a new one P’0,…,P’n+1. We restrict
ourselves in what follows (except in (c)) to the case where P’1,…,P’n continue to belong to
the hyperplane at infinity P(V). There exists a unique projective isomorphism T of P(W)
sending a Pj to the corresponding P’j, for j=0,1,…,n+1. There exists a unique rescaling of the
corresponding linear isomorphism u of W (a 4×4 matrix, in our case n=3) such that u
preserves the affine part E, and induces an affine transformation on it, which can be identified
with the restriction TE of T.
Let us look first at the case where T fixes all the points Pj, j=1,…,n+1, and moves only P0
into a point P’0, then Q0 into Q’0 in P(V) (in our 3D case, this means that only I and J are
moved). The new basis e’1,…,e’n, e’n+1 of W, is made of proportional vectors, e’1=a’1e1, …,
e’n+1=a’n+1en+1, i.e., the matrix of u in the standard basis e1,…,en is diagonal with entries
a’1,…,a’n+1. Due to the fact that u preserves E, the last entry a’n+1 is equal to 1, but the other
ones can be anything except zero, and can be interpreted as the coordinates of P’0 in the
affine frame of E centered in Pn+1=O, and with axis normalized by e1,…,en, that is because
e’0=e’1+…+e’n+1=en+1+a’1e1+…+a’nen, generates the line P’0 and cuts the affine hyperplane E
of W in the point O+a’1e1+…+a’nen. Therefore Q’0 is defined by the vector e’0en+1=a’1e1+…a’nen, which gives another interpretation of the coefficients a’1,…,a’n. For Q’0,
and for the corresponding transformation in P(V), and then for the angular geometry, only the
homogeneous coordinates [a’1,…,a’n] play a role, i.e., we can multiply all of them by the
same non-zero number without changing this geometry. (If we were interested in the
geometry at finite distance, on E, we should have considered the separate values of all the
coordinates.)
For every j and k between 1 and n, the arc from Pj to Pk continues to have the value p/2,
and the arc from Pj to Q’0 now is equal to p/4.
The easiest way to express the change of geometry induced by the new point Q’0,
B
B
replacing Q0, is to consider the ellipsoid Σ’ in E of equation 8′A "A B + ⋯ + 8′E "E B =1. Its
half-axis in the direction of ej, j=1,…,n, is 1/a’j. This ellipsoid is the unit sphere in the new
coordinates x’j, j=1,…,n. Let us denote by Σ the unit sphere in the old coordinates xj,
j=1,…,n, i.e. "A B + ⋯ + "E B = 1. And consider the radial projection ρ from Σ to Σ’, followed
by the inverse of the transformation u, to come back to Σ; this composed transformation f
gives the new metric on Σ. In terms of homogeneous coordinates f is nothing but the inverse
) FA of T.
For example, if n=2, let us choose a’1=λ and a’2=1, and denote the coordinates x1 and x2
by the letters x and y respectively. The sphere Σ is the ordinary circle of radius one and center
0, " B + % B = 1, and the ellipsoid Σ’ is the ellipse of equation GB " B + % B = 1. Let us
parametrize Σ by the angle θ=arctan(y/x), then ρ(θ)=( GFA / 1 + GFB 78= H B , GFA tan(θ)/
1 + GFB 78=(H)B ), and N H = OFA (ρ θ ) = arctan(λtanθ). To understand the
deformation of the metric on the circle Σ that is induced by f, we have to compute its
derivative at a given elevation θ, this is f’(θ)=
G
A
^_` ] Z YTZ `aE ] Z
TUVW3 X
AYTZ [\E ]
=G
Z
AY[\E ] Z
AYTZ [\E ] Z
=
. We see that for zero elevation the factor of expansion (or contraction if λ<
6
1) is the number λ, and for elevation at 45° it is equal to 2λ/(1+GB ). To go further we
compute the second derivative:
N"(H) = G(1 − GB )
B^_`(])efW(])
(^_` ] Z YTZ `aE ] Z )Z
[4]
Thus f is a concave function when λ is strictly larger than 1, which means that the factor of
expansion f’(θ) is larger and larger when θ approaches 0; we referred to this as the convexity
of the Moon dilatation when it approaches the horizon.
For n=3, we parametrize the round sphere Σ by the longitude θ and the latitude φ, in such a
manner that x=x1=cos θ, y=x2=sin θ cos φ and z=sin θ sin φ, the transformation u being given
by x’=λ x, y’=µ y and z’=z. (With the notations in the body of the text x is along OH, y along
OR, and z along OV. The coordinates of I are noted (λ,µ,n).)
Applying ρ and the inverse of u, we obtain the following transformation f of the sphere Σ:
f(x,y,z)=(X,Y,Z); where: X=GFA cos (H)/+ ; Y=iFA sin(θ)cos(φ)/R; Z= n-1sin(θ)sin(φ)/R,
and, R= υFB k<= l B k<= H B + GFB mnk H B + iFB mnk l B k<= H B .
In spherical coordinates (Θ, Φ), this yields:
Θ=arctan(λ υFB k<= l B + iFB mnk l B 78=(H))
Φ=arctan(µυFA tan(φ))
[6]
[5]
In natural homogeneous coordinates on the plane at infinity, the transformation f is
simply:
f(x ;y ;z)=(x/λ; y/µ; z/n)
[7]
In the affine coordinates (y,z) centred in H in P(V), y lateral and z vertical, it is:
fa(y ;z)=(λy/µ; λz/n)
[8]
Then if the Euclidean structure in these coordinates is used, the metric is dilated if λ is
larger than 1, and more dilated in the vertical direction than in the lateral one if µ is larger
than n, which might play a role under some conditions in the reported egg shaped of the halos
around the Moon at the horizon (9).
Since to our knowledge an egg shape has not been reported for the Moon itself, we could
assume a strong prior, consistent with visual angles, favoring the preservation of a round
shape at infinity. Or perhaps the effect is too slight to be easily noticed.
Transformations that send circles to circles (without necessarily sending the center to the
center) are called conformal. They are the transformations that multiply the metric tensor by a
strictly positive function. We will see in Proposition 3 below that the only conformal maps of
a projective plane are isometries, as opposed to what happens for the sphere.
We remark that the affine model fa is conformal when µ=υ, but the correspondence
between the hemisphere x positive, or the projective plane, with the affine plane, which is
given by central projection (called the gnomonic projection), is not a conformal map, as
opposed to the projection of the full sphere on the tangent plane at a pole from the opposite
pole (called the stereographic projection).
Let us compute how far the map f defined above is from a conformal map. The elliptical
(or spherical) element of length ds is given by:
7
ok B = oH B + k<=B Hol B
iB k<= l B + q B mnk l B . We have
Let us define p =
rw
rx
=
[9]
uv
u Z `aE x Z YvZ ^_` x Z
Tt`aE]
, and k<=y =
rs
r]
TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z
=
Ttuv
TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z
,
. Therefore :
iB q B (GB p| oH B + GB pB k<=B H GB pB k<= H B + iB q B mnk H B ol B )
oy +k<= yo{ =
( GB pB k<= H B + iB q B mnk H B iB k<= l B + q B mnk l B )B
B
=
B
B
u Z vZ TZ tZ (r] Z Y`aEZ ]rx Z )Yu Z vZ TZ t}Z (`aEZ ] TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z Ft~ `aEZ ])rx Z
TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z Z
[10]
Thus the departure from conformality is given by:
ol B =
u Z vZ TZ t}Z `aEZ ]( TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z Ft~ )rx Z
TZ tZ `aE ] Z Y^_` ] Z Z
[11]
More explicitly:
( GB pB k<= H B + iB q B mnk H B ) − pÄ = iB GB k<= H B k<= l B + q B GB k<= H B mnk l B +
iB q B mnk H B − iÄ k<= l Ä − q Ä mnk l Ä − 2iB q B k<= l B mnk l B
[12]
For instance, on the vertical axis, where φ=π/2, the departure from conformality is zero if
and only if :
i=
GB k<= H B + q B mnk H B
[13]
Consequently, given the elevation θ of a point M along the vertical axis at infinity and
the parameters λ, υ, there is a unique choice of µ preserving the circular form in the
neighborhood of M. The same result holds true in any direction, because the following
equation in 9 = pB :
9 B − GB 9k<= H B − iB q B mnk H B = 0
[14]
has one and only positive root for any value of θ strictly between –π/2 and π/2 and for any
value m of the product µυ, which is given by:
9=
TZ `aE ] Z Y T~ `aE ] ~ YÄÉZ ^_` ] Z
B
[15]
which leads to the following equation in µ and υ:
2iB k<=l B +2;B iFB mnkl B − GB k<= H B =
GÄ k<= H Ä + 4;B mnk H B
[16]
By multiplication by the square t of µ, we obtain a second degree equation in t, with a
strictly positive discriminant as soon as θ is smaller than π/4, due to the inequality:
4;B mnk H B > 8;B k<=l B mnk l B [17]
8
There exists one and only one strictly positive solution of this equation, due to the minus
sign of the term of degree one. Thus we have proved the following result.
Proposition 2: For any direction φ around H, and any value of θ smaller than π/4, and
any strictly positive value of λ, there exists a one parameter family of pairs (µ, υ) making the
transformation f conformal in the point M of coordinates (θ, φ).
This has to be contrasted with the following negative result.
Proposition 3: Any projective conformal transformation of the projective plane is an
isometry and thus induced by a rotation of the sphere; that is the two-fold cover of the
projective plane.
Proof: any projective isomorphism of the plane can be lifted to a bijection of the twodimensional Riemann sphere, which commutes with the antipodal map τ; by composing with
an orthogonal reflexion we can suppose that this transformation preserves the orientation,
then, if it is conformal, it is expressed by a complex homography, which has one or two fixed
points. The case of a unique fixed point is excluded by the commutation with τ. Thus we
have two antipodal fixed points. The eigenvalues of the linear approximations at these two
points must be inverse imaginary numbers (the determinant is one), having the same modulus
(from the commutation with τ). Thus the homography is a rotation.
We have to compute the area A(λ,µ,υ) of the image by f of the domain Ω where θ is
smaller than π/4 and φ is arbitrary. It is given by standard elliptic integrals of the third kind.
á/Ä
Ü G, i, q = à
á
oH à ol
rw âs
rx â]
sin(y)
[18]
Then:
á/Ä
Ü G, i, q = à
á
oH à ol Z
uv
Ttuv
TtefW(])
u `aE x Z YvZ ^_` x Z TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z
TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z
[19]
To integrate over θ, we use the following formula:
r
ãåe(])
r]
TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ]
=
Z
FTZ tZ efW(])
(TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z ) TZ tZ `aE ] Z Yu Z vZ ^_` ] Z
[20]
We get:
á
Ü G, i, q = à
uvrx
u Z `aE x Z YvZ ^_` x Z
u Z vZ rx
á
− à
(u Z `aE x Z YvZ ^_` x Z )
TZ (u Z `aE x Z YvZ ^_` x Z )Yu Z vZ
[21]
The first integral can be computed easily, by introducing the variable t=tan φ:
á
Yé
Yé rç
uvrx
r[
= 2iq à
=2 à
=è
à u Z `aE x Z YvZ ^_` x Z
u Z [ Z YvZ
çZ YA
[22]
The second integral is a multiple of the standard complete elliptic integral of the third
kind in the form of Legendre:
9
á/B
ê =, ë = à
rx
(AFE`aE x Z )
AFí Z `aE x Z
[23]
with :
= = 1 − iB q FB
[24]
and :
ëB =
TZ vZ FTZ u Z
TZ vZ Fu Z
TZ vZ Yu v
v T Yu Z
= Z Z
Z Z
[25]
Then the exact formula of the area, with these notations is
Ü G, i, q = è − 2
uZ
v TZ Yu Z
ê =, ë
[26]
Also here we neglect nothing that is essential except symmetry, by imposing υ=1, and
varying λ and µ.
b) Free energy and projective frames
General considerations
In general, variational Bayesian learning and decision depend on the minimization of a
functional FE, similar to a free energy in statistical Physics. The variable is an a posteriori
probability p on the internal parameters representing the states of the world, the states of the
mind and body, including notably motivations and intentions. All these variables being
denoted by letters X, Y, etc. Thus functional FE expresses a trade-off between the
conservation of the a priori probability pa on the internal parameters and the best possible
explanation of the probability pL on a subset of the variables XL that in general represent new
observations, but that could as well represent new goals or beliefs:
FE(p) = Eò (−log õ\ ) + úùû (üû ∗ õ, õû ) − !(õ)
[27]
The entropy, which measures the total uncertainty, is defined as:
!(õ) = −
õ(") log (õ("))
[28]
and the Kullback-Leibler divergence, measuring statistical proximity, is defined as
DKL(p1,p2)=
õ1 log (õ1/õ2)
[29]
We do not justify this function here: it is traditionally deduced from the lower bound of a
probability (cf. (3)), but it is also directly a Kullback-Leibler divergence between
probabilities on the product of the space of parameters and the space of the values of all
variables.
In our application, the data on XL is not treated as a probability, but as a fixed value xL,
then the term Ep(DKL) (the expectation of the Kullback-Leibler divergence of two
probabilities) is replaced by -log(p(XL=xL), which yields the following simplified form:
10
FE(p) = −log (p X¢ = xû ) + Eò (−log õ\ ) − !(õ)
[30]
However, even the minimization of this function turns out to be very difficult, thus
people (and probably their brains too) have adopted a simplified version. Such simplification
could be implemented through regionalization, as introduced by Bethe and generalized by
Kikuchi (31), or by introducing a virtual probability q on all the variables X, and using the
Jensen’s inequality of convexity, which simplifies the form of FE and yields a more tractable
function :
pV ", H
FE(p) = −log (p X¢ = x¢ ) + Eò (− log E§
)))
p x, θ •(")
õ\ ", θ
≤ −log (p X¢ = x¢ ) + Eò (E§ (− log
))
õ ", θ • "
= −log (p X¢ = x¢ ) + Eò E§ (− log p\ ", θ ) − S(p) − S(q) [31]
This function is now considered as a function F(p,q) of the pair or probabilities (q,p).
A further simplification consists in assuming that on θ the marginalization of p gives a
certainty, and that for this value of θ, p(x, θ) coincides with q(x), and pa(x,θ) becomes
pa(x),which yields another form of free energy:
>® • = −log (q X¢ = x¢ ) + E§ (− log p\ " ) − S(q)
[32]
The variable q now belongs to a chosen set Q of prescribed probabilities on X. As X is a
joint variable (Xk; k in K), the choice of Q implies some hypotheses on the dependency
between the internal variables Xk. The set L is considered as a subset of K.
In the PCM, one of the variables is a projective frame F=T(F0) on the 3-dimensional
projective space P(W), which completes the usual ambient affine space E by adding points at
infinity. Sensorimotor integration relies in particular on F. We will assume for simplicity that
the law q on F (or T) has a Gaussian shape with small variance. In fact, a variance zero would
lead to a contradiction because the a priori –log(p) would take an infinite value in this case.
Other variables are observables or hidden variables. The law on the projective frame, as the
laws on the other variables, is chosen based on the minimization of FE. Once F is chosen, and
the other elements of the law q, perceptions and actions follow, which change the data, so
that a dynamical system emerges. We replace the prior pa by a probability p deduced from q;
and a new F and new p are determined for the next time instant, and so on.
Application to the Moon Illusion
When the Moon appears in the sky, one of the principal inputs xL is its approximate
position in the sky. Other inputs from XL are defined by the visible landscape and objects. In
what follows, we adopt the notations of the first section of this appendix.
The prior distribution pa on the frame is centered in F0 and has variance σ0, which
corresponds to a matrix, itself constituted by four 4×4 matrices, one for each of the four
vectors e1,e2,e3,e4 in the 4-dimensional space W. This representation is simpler than the (nonequivalent) representation of variance using five 3×3 matrices for the points O, H,V, L, I.
For minimizing the second term in >® • , the frame F has to depart as little as possible
from F0. In this case, the variation of H,V,R/L and O is minimal, but the variation of I has a
cost. If we take the complete contribution of the variable F to the free energy function Fe, we
get the DKL between two Gaussian laws in the vector space V: one for f0=e1+e2+e3, and the
11
other for f’0=a’1e1+a’2e2+a’3e3. This is known as the sum of squares of the Euclidean
distance, corresponding to the covariance I*σ0 of the first law induced on the fifth point I,
between the points in 3D space and a non-symmetric function of the two covariance matrices.
In what follows we neglect this second part, but it could have an effect. Note, in addition,
that visual information, which unconsciously puts the horizon farther, i.e., augments d, as in
Kaufman & Kaufman (12), has the effect of displacing f’0 in the direction of e1 (i.e., H), thus
augmenting λ and yielding a larger visible horizon, elongating the frame in the lateral
direction e2 (i.e., R/L), which increases µ. By symmetry, the only unknown parameter here is
the scale of I*σ0, the statistical unit σ: it is smaller than 1 if the prior in favor of the standard
frame by default is strong, and is larger than 1 if this prior is weak, and:
Fe(F)=
A
B© Z
(G − 1)B + (i − 1)B
[33]
For the other terms of >®, the role of F is indirect: we assume that choice of F has an
effect on the quality and quantity of observations inside the cone delimited by I. Then the
variables XL that can impact the choice of F are observables in the vicinity of the Moon, and
between the Moon and the observer. If the Moon is full and luminous, and if salient cues are
present, many variables can be estimated more accurately. Thus, for minimizing the first term
in Fe, that is −log (q X¢ = x¢ ), the point I has to be chosen far in the direction of the moon
when it is near horizon. Contrariwise, in the case of the Moon high in the sky, the point I is
better placed more laterally in order to augment the likelihood of acquiring new information.
The problem now is to quantify this difference.
Concerning all the variables XK, including XL, the two last terms in Fe taken together
correspond to the KL divergence from fine graining q to coarse graining pa. We can assume
that most of the variables XL are indifferent for the prior, i.e., pa is uniform. In this case, it has
a large entropy, and - log(pa) is a constant Ua. Then Eq(-log(pa))=Ua too, and:
DKL(q;pa) =Ua-S(q).
DKL decreases if the entropy of q increases. This entropy is large if the quantity and
quality of cues are large, and is small in the opposite case. This is because, entropy grows
with the number of states that are estimated. We can assume that such quality, for each
variable XL, is proportional to the sum of the logarithms of the luminosity of the Moon, say γ,
measured in units inverse to the area, of the area α of the visible object, of the quality of
sight, say ω (two eyes and so on), and of the quality κ of the object (contrast and so on).
Let us denote Λ= log(αγ) + log(ωκ); we have:
S(qL)=CNLΛ [34]
where C is a normalization constant, and NL is the number of observables for the sight in the
region of interest.
The constants α, γ, ω and κ are independent of the choice of F, and can be manipulated
experimentally. The quantity NL, however, depends on F. It corresponds to the number of
available “independent variables” in X’, or a number of accessible dimensions, related to the
available information. We hypothesize that NL is proportional to the inverse of the area of the
region determined by J around H.
When µ=1, all the necessary formulas can be explicitly computed.
In the elliptical geometry at infinity, that is, half the standard spherical geometry, the
area a of the region defined by θ£θ0 is a(θ0)=π(1-cos(θ0)).
Then the ratio of areas, between the region covered by J0 and the region covered by J is
given, according to the function f of section 1 (i.e., f(θ)=atan(λ tan(θ))), by the following
formula as a function of λ:
12
ρ(λ)= ( 2 − 1)
1 + GB / 2(
1 + GB − 1)
[35]
Then we want to minimize the following function:
Fe(λ)=
A
B© Z
G − 1 B +C’Λρ(λ)
[36]
where C’ is a constant independent of everything else.
This function Fe(λ) is strictly convex and tends to infinity when λ tends to infinity or
zero; therefore, it has a unique minimum.
However, the prior preference assumed here based on phenomenology for keeping a
Moon of round shape makes the intervention of lateral parameters µ and υ necessary. In what
follows, to simplify, we fix υ=1, which is not a problem if the angle φ is sufficiently large,
say between 30° and 120°, which is quite a natural hypothesis in our context, given the
adopted coordinate system. In this case, we have seen that, given a point M(θ,φ), a unique µ
exists such that the transformation f is approximately conformal in the vicinity of M. To
simplify the simulations, we work with M on the vertical, thus with υ=1 and:
i=
GB k<= H B + mnk H B [37]
We will now denote by ω the value of θ where the Moon is seen.
We define :
p G, i =
AFA/√B
´(T,u,A)
[38]
where A is given by the complete elliptic integrals in section (a).
Thus two components of Fe(λ,µ) contribute to the overall FE, with a differential weight
depending on the position of M with respect to a transition point for elevation.
When the elevation of M is under that point (say π/4 where in many cases no
environmental information will appear in the visual field), the function that contributes the
most to FE to be minimized is:
Fe(λ,µ)=
A
B¨Z
G − 1 B + ≠(Æ) i − i G, Æ
B
+ ≠′ Λ p G, i
[39]
where C expresses the strength of the a priori assumption of roundness. We introduced a
dependency on Æ to take into account that the departure from roundness varies with the
Moon’s elevation center Æ. For small values of Æ, µ values yield roundness, but for larger
ones, a precise tuning is warranted, leading to a larger weight ≠(Æ), which can be defined as
C0sin2(Æ), for respecting the order of the defect of conformality.
In general, in a model preserving the roundness of the Moon’s shape (i.e., with a
conformal behavior), C is supposed to be large as a prior. It is smaller if conformality is not
encoded as a strong prior. The form of the function Fe implies that its minimum is to be
found for λ and µ larger than 1. This generates focalization to the horizon HL, accompanied
by a corrective relative enlargement for the lateral integration of information.
When the Moon is higher in the sky beyond the transition point (say more than 45° of
elevation where only the open sky is given and no more proximal cues are present),
according to our main rationale, the projective frame has to further shift from fine graining to
coarse graining to maximize information integration. Thus the region of integration is
13
expected to be further enlarged and the equivalent area to grow. Consequently, the function
that contributes the most to FE to be minimized is:
Fe’(λ,µ)=
A
B¨Z
G − 1 B + ≠ i − i G, Æ
B
+ ≠" Λ Ü G, i
[40]
For λ=0, the area is zero. It is convex in the vicinity of zero, and growing everywhere,
going toward infinity when λ grows toward infinity. But λ is less than 1 in this context. In
general, this function is not necessarily convex, but it becomes convex if σ is sufficiently
small. The point I is moved backward with respect to its default position, and the lateral
correction when C is sufficiently large continues to follow the prior of roundness. By
considering the form of Fe’, we expect a less spectacular effect of a decreasing apparent
diameter of the Moon as its elevation keeps growing (as the minimum is not far from λ=1 and
then µ=1) than with Fe above.
The above formulas are valid as well for meridians other than the vertical.
c) The conformal model
Let us suppose that we introduce a factor 2 in the formula for f. In the simplest case this
yields the following transformation g of the sphere at infinity: Θ=2 arctan(λ78=θ/2), Φ=φ.
The transformation may look similar to the original f, but it is misleading. The original f
sends the hemisphere x=cos(θ) positive into itself, and when extended by continuity to the
great circle θ=π/2 (where the tangent is infinite), this extended formula induces an identity
transform (i.e. sending points to themselves) on this great circle. It then induces a smooth
transformation of the projective plane into itself: the new g is a well-defined smooth map
from the whole sphere, x positive and x negative, that fixes the two poles x=1 and x=-1, and
sends the equator θ=π/2 to the circle Θ=2 arctan(λ). It is a conformal map for the spherical
metric. The division by two of the angles corresponds to the coordinates on the unit sphere
viewed from the pole x=-1, and the passage to the tangent corresponds to the stereographic
map, which is conformal.
The transformation g is named a boost in Special Relativity, because it describes the
effect of a boost on the sphere of the past towards the present (or future). Then its
intervention in a theory of perception of the sky around us might make sense and may be less
surprising than a purely projective map such as f.
In fact, such map g (and others having the same structure) can naturally be defined in the
PCM.
The fact that we are looking all around us, although not at the same time, makes sensible a
two-fold cover S(V) of the plane at infinity P(V), and the fact that we are able to sometimes
sense differences in depths very far, even if we cannot in general attribute a quantitative
measure to these differences, renders natural the possibility of spheres associated with S(V)
that are very far but remain at a finite distance. On such spheres, as on S(V), the angular
metric would be sensed by ordinary vision. Note that, in this context, a change of projective
frame can induce a transport of this metric to another one, thus influencing the perception of
objects, viewed as surfaces on this sphere and as volumes in general.
Let us take again the default frame in the 4-dimensional space W: e1 in the direction of H,
e2 lateral, e3 vertical, and e4 from the point of view O. The 3-dimensional affine space E is the
hyperplane containing O and parallel to e1, e2 and e3. Let us also consider a sphere Sc of
center O and radius c, and its isomorphic image P(Sc) in the projective space P(W). The
subgroup of the group GL(W) of linear bijections of W, constituted by the transformations
sending P(Sc) into itself, is the conformal group of the standard Lorentzian metric, which is
defined by the quadratic form:
14
Ø "A , "B , "∞ , "Ä = "AB +"BB + "∞B −m B "ÄB
[41]
When considering the projective transformations, this yields the group PO(1,3), which is
isomorphic to the conformal group of the sphere SR, of which the connected component of
the identity is PSL2(C), when Sc (or P(Sc)) is parametrized by a complex number, after
stereographic projection.
Let us introduce the light coordinates x’=x1+cx4, x”=x1-cx4 (c is not necessarily the speed
of light in this context, it denotes any large radius), so that: "′"" = "AB −m B "ÄB . The standard
boost of ratio λ is defined, in homogeneous coordinates, by the transformation y’=x’/λ and
y”=λx”. It belongs to the connected Lorentz group SO(1,3), and it induces on the sphere Sc
the transformation g just described below.
We have:
y1=½(y’+y”)=½((x1+cx4)/λ+λ(x1-cx4))=½(λ+1/λ)x_1-½(λ-1/λ)cx4 [42]
and,
cy4=½(y’-y”)=½((x1+cx4)/λ-λ(x1-cx4))=-½(λ-1/λ)x1+½(λ+1/λ)cx4 [43]
but y2=x2, and y3=x3.
Let us define the vector e’=(e1+ce4)/2c along the axis of x’, and the vector e”=(e1-ce4)/2c
along the axis of x”. The change from e1, e4 to this new basis yields the formulas of the
coordinates x’, x”. These vectors are sent respectively to λe’ and e”/λ. Therefore the vector
e1=c(e’+e”) is sent to f1=½ (λ+1/λ)e1+½(λ-1/λ)ce4, and the vector e4=e’-e” is sent to f4=½(λ1/λ)e1/c+½(λ+1/λ)e4. The vectors e2 and e3 are fixed. The fifth vector e0=e1+e4 +e2+e3 is sent
to:
f0=f1+f2+f3+f4=½((1+1/c)λ+(1-1/c)/λ))(e1+e4)+e2+e3
[44]
The inverse of the above transformation is the projective transformation T, which
corresponds to the following equations, where now e’1, e’2, e’3, e’4 denotes the image of the
original basis:
®′A =
A
B
λ+
A
A
±
®A −
A
A
B
λ−
A
A
±
m®Ä
A
®′Ä = −
λ − ®A + λ + ®Ä
B^
±
B
±
®′B = ®B
®′∞ = ®∞
[45]
[46]
[47]
[48]
We can see that, in P(V), the point O and H are both moved along the line OH. If λ is
larger than 1, the segment OH expands, O’ being in the back and H’ moving backward too. If
λ is smaller than 1, the contrary happens, O’ and H’ both move forward along the segment
OH. However, this does not imply that the observer has moved. The change concerns the
integration of external variables, as in the preceding section.
Under T or f, the plane at infinity P(V) is not preserved. If λ is larger than 1, infinity
moves far away in front, which might correspond to the reported feeling of being closer to the
Moon. But if λ is smaller than 1, infinity in front moves closer to the observer, and
approaches the sphere of radius c, which might correspond to the opposite feeling that the
Moon is farther.
15
To describe the transform g of the sphere Sr in the 3-dimensional affine Euclidean space
E, we have to normalize the equations by imposing x4=y4=1, which yields the following nonlinear formulas:
≤
≤
¥ Y^ FT
≥ ≤
≥
≤
≤
FT ¥≤ Y^ ±Y
≥
≥
B^¥Z
≤
≤
FT ¥≤ Y^ ±Y
≥
≥
B^¥µ
≤
≤
FT ¥≤ Y^ ±Y
≥
≥
%A = m
%B =
%∞ =
±Y
[49]
[50]
[51]
The lateral points Rc, Lc as the vertical point Vc on the sphere Sr are moved by T in the
direction opposite to H. But the points at infinity, V and L remain fixed. These effects might
induce sensations of enlargement of the sky when λ≥ 1, and the opposite effect when λ≤1.
The analysis of the free energy Fe(λ) for this case of finite radius c is not fundamentally
different from the case of infinite radius of the celestial sphere as described in the preceding
section. Identical arguments lead to the same kind of functional. The areas that we have to
consider are again the areas of regions of the form θ smaller than a certain value.
The region of the sphere where θ is larger than π/4, being the reference by default, is sent
now by g on the region where cos(Θ)/2 is larger than 1/√ (1+λ²tan²(π/8))=1/(1+ (1+½√3)λ²).
Then cos(Θ) itself has to be greater than -1+2/(1+ (1+½√3)λ²) , and the inverse of the area is
now:
2 − 1 (1 + 1 + 3/2)GB )/2 2 1 + 3/2)GB
ρc(λ)=
[52]
Note that we measure ratios of areas, thus the radius c doesn’t enter the formula; the
metric could be the angular one as well.
Then the function to minimize when the Moon is between the horizon and π/4, is:
Fe(λ)=
A
B¨²
G − 1 B +C’ Λρ(λ),
[53]
as considered for λ≥ 1.
The complementary function for the Moon high in the sky is:
Fe’c(λ)=
A
B¨²
G − 1 B +C” Λ’ 1 + 3/2)GB /(1 + 1 + 3/2)GB )
[54]
when λ≤1.
The group of projective transformations that preserve globally the sphere P(Sc) is the
group of isometries of a family of hyperbolic metrics on the ball P(Bc) in P(W) that is
contained in P(Sc). Thus it is natural to consider this ball as equipped with one of the
Riemannian geometries. An elegant model of this metric is the metric induced by the Lorentz
form Q on one of the branches of the hyperboloid Q(x)=-ρ², where ρ is a strictly positive
number. For convenience, we will consider the branch Hρ with x4 strictly positive too. The
rays from 0 in W to the points Hρ describe the ball P(Bc). A parametrization of this branch is
given by:
"A = ρ sinh ξ cos H
[55]
16
"B = ρ sinhξ sin H cos l
"∞∫ ρ sinhξ sin H sin l
t
"Ä = cosh ξ
[56]
[57]
[58]
^
In those coordinates ξ,θ,φ, the Riemannian metric takes the following form:
ok B = pB (oª B + sinh ª B (oH B + sin H B ol B ))
[59]
The corresponding parametrization of the Euclidean ball Bc in E is obtained by taking the
projection to x4=1 and:
"A = c tanh ξ cos H [60]
"B = c tanh ξ sin H cos l
"∞∫ c tanh ξ sin H sin l
[61]
[62]
Then we set r= ctanh(ξ), and get the usual spherical polar coordinates r, θ, φ on the
Euclidean space V, identified with E, with the following metric, which is only defined inside
the ball Bc:
ok B = pB ( Z
^Z
^ Fº
ºZ
o9 B + Z
Z Z
^ Yº Z
(oH B + sin H B ol B ))
[63]
When c tends to +∞, this metric, once multiplied by m B , converges to the standard
Euclidean metric with scale ρ. The groups of isometries of the hyperbolic metrics,
accordingly, tend to the Euclidean group of displacements, similar to a sort of zooming. Thus
for large c, we can see the above hyperbolic geometry as a deformation of the ordinary
Euclidean geometry.
We cannot exclude that this hyperbolic geometry, which is in exact agreement with the
conformal transformation on the large sphere Sc in E, plays a role in perception. In fact, if the
conformal change of projective frame is used for perceiving the celestial sphere in some
circumstances, this could justify the use of the hyperbolic geometry.
However, this is not necessary in our context to appeal to a hyperbolic geometry, as we
do not have to appeal to the Euclidean geometry at finite distance in the first model of f.
d) Discussion of Heelan’s model
The above family of hyperbolic geometries were introduced in the domain of visual
perception by P.A. Heelan (17). The name he gave to this theory was the “hermeneutic
Luneburg model”, because Rudolf Luneburg (see 17) developed the idea that available
primary cues and priors, together with sensorimotor constraints, could be expressed by a
change in the geometry of perception. Thus it should be evident that the approach of
Luneburg and Heelan is an ancestor of our approach.
However, there are many fundamental differences. First, let us consider differences of
detail in the setting. Heelan finds the above ok B in bipolar coordinates, which represent a
deformation of spherical polar coordinates, in order to take into account the disparity in
vision induced by the two eyes (17, pp. 286-287; we take the opportunity here to note a
typographic error in the formula of the metric page 287, where the factor sinh(ª)B seems to
appear at a wrong place). We note that Heelan was in general more interested in near vison in
a room than in far vision. Also, in the variables, Heelan noted ρ=κ (which changes nothing),
17
but he also noted: ξ= σγ+στ; which is more important. The variable coordinate is γ, and σ,τ
are constants, the first indicating the Euclidean distance from the observer to the region of the
physical space where a good agreement between the hyperbolic metric and Euclidean metric
can be expected. (Note that Heelan says that τ is for the curvature, but this cannot be what he
had in mind, because no change of variables has an effect on the curvature, since it is intrinsic
and controlled here by the inverse of ρ=κ.)
But there are more important divergences between our point of view and Heelan’s. In our
model, the metric results from two choices: a frame (projective in nature) and a kind of
measurement (angles in the present case, but this could be another metric in another case). In
Heelan, a change of frame is not considered and the metric is chosen a priori in a fixed
family. Moreover, for the choice of parameters, Heelan compared the perceptual metric with
the physical metric somewhere in space, which in principle results from a frame and does not
precede it. In some sense, real physical space has a stronger status in the approach of Heelan.
This appears in his use of the term “true point” for the region where ok B must be Euclidean.
Of course, parameters in the metric and parameters in the frames are connected.
Moreover, we cannot neglect that the free energy, which controls the change of frame in our
model, also uses geometric parameters as priors (such as ordinary distances inside KullbackLeibler divergence, or areas for entropy). Thus these differences could be somewhat
superficial. However, in our model, we can make a clear connection between geometry and
information content, which is more obscure in Heelan’s.
As discussed in the main text, with respect to the particular perceptual situation of the
Moon Illusion, our model is compatible with conformal constraints, which can maintain the
round shape of the Moon, but it also offers possible non-conformal solutions. Thus the PCM
is compatible with possible elliptical effects in the perception of the shape of the Moon. Any
departure from conformality would not be accounted for by Heelan’s model (see main text).
Last but not least, our model, while being capable of integrating the essential properties
captured by Heelan’s model, has much broader explanatory and predictive power, as it
encompasses and unifies perception, imagination, and motor programming. This is in parts
due to the characteristics of projective geometry, which is not attached to a particular family
of metrics but rather represents an extended notion of variations of points of view. In
particular, the convenient families of metrics which could be considered at finite distances, in
other contexts, are not restricted to hyperbolic ones; they can be spherical or Euclidean. A
more general model with broader explanatory and predictive power should be selected over a
model that is equivalent to the broader model in a very specific context but that cannot
account for a wealth of essential phenomena that are linked together experientially and
unified in the more general model.
e) Further remarks on the default frames
Choice by default of the fifth point I
It could be that some persons prefer to place the point I to their right and others to their
left, just as there are right-handed persons and left-handed persons. However, it could also
happen that most persons use two points IR, IL symmetric with respect to the sagittal plane.
This pair would imply more than one frame, but the theory can easily be extended to this kind
of enriched frame. The default 45° situation of IR, IL or I with respect to the sagittal plane is
compatible with the orientations at 45° of the planes of semi-circular canals in the labyrinths
of vertebrates and the corresponding orientations of the eye muscles. These two possibilities,
18
one point or a symmetric pair, could be tested experimentally by manipulating left and right
environmental cues. This is also something that could be empirically tested in future studies.
Analogy with color adaptation
The geometry governing color perception is fairly complex. However, as a first
approximation, 3D affine geometry explains well the change in perception induced by a
change in illumination. Here, the natural or “default” frame is based on the distribution of
wave-lengths in solar light, related to the center and shapes around it, the three axes
corresponding to luminance S+L+M, to green/red opposition, L-M, and to blue/yellow
opposition, S-L-M. When the light distribution is modified, the origin, shape, and coordinates
must change accordingly in order to maintain sufficient information flow.
19 |
701
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 710-720
Caputi, D., On the Mystery of the Self & the Selection Problem: A Mathematical Approach
Research Essay
On the Mystery of the Self & the Selection Problem:
A Mathematical Approach
Daniel Caputi*
Abstract
The self, which presents to us as an irreducible entity in which our subjective experience is
directed onto, is often thought of as an unremarkable phenomenon or illusion. However, the
mere perception of it cannot be neglected for our scientific endeavor to explain consciousness,
and this point is illustrated through a multitude of thought experiments. These thought
experiments also show the importance of differentiating selves between distinct conscious
organisms, regardless of their individual phenomenological content. A distinction is made
between an active subject (a self that is conscious) and a potential subject (a self that is
unconscious). Potential subjects refer to selves that would otherwise be present in organisms that
are currently unconscious or post-mortem. They can also refer to an infinite amount of imaginary
selves that will never be born into existence. This infinite reference space shows that there is an
explanatory gap between our knowledge that conscious organisms have selves and our
knowledge that specific selves are mapped into specific organisms. This explanatory gap needs
to be closed in order to design effective uploading technology to extend the life of our minds
beyond the life of our body.
Key Words: self, consciousness, illusion, subjective experience, active subject, potential subject.
1. Background and Introduction
Despite tremendous progress in cognitive science, there remains a clear explanatory gap
between understanding physical processes in the body and understanding how inner subjective
states of consciousness (known as qualia) take place. This is the “hard problem” put forth by
David Chalmers in 19951, which has since held center stage in the field of consciousness studies.
While this problem is effective for capturing the mystery of qualia, there is a second piece to
the puzzle. It seems that qualia doesn’t just happen, but happens to someone. In other words,
subjective experience as we know it must happen to an experiencer, also known as a conscious
entity or self. What exactly is this self, and how does it fit in with consciousness? I will attempt
to show that these questions are just as important as the questions often posed about qualia,
and this analysis will reveal a surprising second explanatory gap in the nature of consciousness.
This explanatory gap does not disappear even if one takes the position that the self does not
exist in the way we may intuitively think of it. My hope is that this new perspective will allow
more efficient progress toward understanding the full picture of consciousness and the physical
place2 it has in the universe.
* Correspondence: Daniel Caputi. Email: dannycaputi@optonline.net
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
702
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 710-720
Caputi, D., On the Mystery of the Self & the Selection Problem: A Mathematical Approach
This full picture is monumentally important for our future existence. It can be used to
determine if we possess a natural kind of immortality, and if not, how we may be able to create
it for ourselves. With recent advances in artificial intelligence, ideas have emerged about the
possibility of “uploading” one’s brain computational parts onto an alternate substrate, such as a
computer system or robot3. A critical philosophical question has emerged about whether an
“uploaded” organism, even if conscious, would have the same identity as the original
organism4. This paper will explore this question in the context of a new model on the self I will
propose. With investigations of consciousness confronting both the problem of qualia and the
problem of the self, we may be able to not only cure death for ourselves, but erase it from
those who have gone before us.
2. The Problem of the Self
Consider the following thought experiment. The simple objective is to imagine slowly
disintegrating your brain. This can be accomplished by either a melting process, or slowly
removing neural components or brain cells one piece at a time. If one were to take your brain
and remove or demolish just one cell, it would be highly unlikely to have any notable effect on
your conscious experience. We know that small quantities of brain cells can be damaged in
everyday life, yet we don’t seem to feel any different. But surely, if we continue destroying
brain matter down to its last bits, a remaining microscopic sample of brain tissue consisting of a
tiny collection of cells would not be you, right? So, if we slowly cut off more and more usable
volume of your brain, at what point are you not yourself anymore?
You may consider a quite simple solution: we do in fact become less of ourselves when a tiny
tissue of our brain is removed, but the damage is too miniscule to be recognized. Noticeable
changes may begin after large chunks have been removed, and we would officially not be
“ourselves” when there are no personality traits remaining. This view considers our “self” as a
bunch of content. This type of self comprises memory, all inner sensory experience, personality
traits, and really anything else we would consider important for identifying who a person is. In
a sense, this is considering a self from an external perspective, but it also includes all the
content of inner experience.
The problem with this view is that it only considerers the first piece of the puzzle, the
experience. At least from an intuitive perspective, phenomenological experience requires
someone to experience it. Let’s define a type-1 self as the experiential content of an individual
(including memories, sensations, personality, etc), and let’s define a type-2 self as the entity
that is experiencing the type-1 self. In other words: the type-1 self is the experience, and the
type-2 self is the experiencer. The disintegration thought experiment we described above
becomes more intriguing when we become less interested in any definition of what constitutes
a person’s meaningful and extended selfhood (type-1 self), and rather become more concerned
with the experiencer of the qualia (type-2 self) as the brain is falling apart.
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The reason for this is simple. Most likely, as the disintegration process is ongoing, you are
gradually losing consciousness. Now imagine yourself very late in the process, with only a small
amount of the cerebral cortex intact. At this point, you may be “aware” on a very basic level,
but severely lacking any form of organized informational processing. The type-1 self may
constitute only perception of basic shapes or colors, devoid of any personality or rich
interpretations of these perceptions. But as you (the experiencer of this very low level qualia)
imagine yourself in this state of mind, it is impossible to eliminate this “you” from your
imagined state. There is still a type-2 self anchored in your perception, a “self” entity on which
your very low level perception is attached to. V.S. Ramachandran, in his book A Brief Tour of
Human Consciousness, said “self and qualia are two sides of the same coin. You can’t have freefloating sensations or qualia with no one to experience them, and you can’t have a self
completely devoid of sensory experiences, memories or emotions” (96). The type-2 self does
not need to be anything complex, such as reflective awareness that one exists as a self, or an
inner language that uses the terms “I” or “me”. It only needs to be some central experiencer
that qualia is linked to. While the type-1 self can devolve in the brain disintegration process,
we can only imagine the perceived type-2 self being either present or not. The type-2 self, in
the way we perceive it, is irreducible.
What follows from this is a startling implication. If a whole brain possesses this type-2 self, but
a very tiny collection of brain cells does not, the logical conclusion is that at some critical and
very finite point during the disintegration, the type-2 self (conscious entity) must suddenly
disappear. This clearly goes against any intuition of the type-2 self being a larger emergent
epiphenomenon of brain activity. Despite its mysterious nature, I would argue that the type-2
self is the important part of the self. This is because we may be able to easily upload our type-1
self from our brain into an alternate substrate, and the substrate may have conscious
experience, but it would be quite meaningless if it’s not us that is the experiencer inside.
That being said, these are my basic claims about the nature of type-2, irreducible selves:
A) They exist. Even if they are not physical entities, the “image” of them is real.
B) They are differentiable. Numerous conscious entities exist that are different from one
another, and since each is irreducible, they do not overlap. In laymen’s terms, this is simply
saying that you are fundamentally a different conscious subject than I am, even if we are
experiencing the same thing at the same time.
(Note: the term “type-2 self” will be used interchangeably with “irreducible self”, “conscious
entity”, “subject”, and “experiencer”. Different terms tend to fit different contexts, but they all
refer to the same thing.)
If you agree with these premises, you can probably skip the next section. But as with anything
in philosophy, nothing can go unchallenged.
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3. It Is Perception that Matters
Talking about this type-2 self is a risky move because many doubt its existence. A trending
thought in consciousness studies has been that the self is merely an evolutionary trick of our
brains to unify everything that is represented in our minds. The idea of a self has been attacked
from scientific, philosophical, and even spiritual grounds. In this section, we will tour some
common thought patterns of counter-arguments given to the existence of selves, and show
that with each of them, what matters is our mere perception of the type-2 self.
3.1. Pathology and Altered States
The quote from Ramachandran above is one that many would disagree with. It is often argued
that it is possible to experience qualia with a completely distorted (or even non-existent) sense
of self in abnormal states of consciousness, and this is often used to support the idea that our
awareness is fundamentally selfless. Many types of conditions can be explored, including (but
not limited to) the following:
Split-brain: An individual with a split corpus callosum, and communication between brain
hemispheres cannot occur. This condition is typically induced by a surgical procedure in order
to treat violent seizures. Patients often behave as if they have two selves, with each self
possessing distinct characteristics.
Schizophrenia: An individual with difficulty distinguishing real and imaginary input. Their
consciousness is often depersonalized, with a lack of a sense that their qualia belongs to them.
Agency and unity that binds their experience is also distorted.
Cotard delusion: An individual who claims that they are dead or do not exist. There appears to
be selfless consciousness in this case, as affected people often do not use the “I” pronoun to
describe anything pertaining to them (Metzinger 63-64).
Even outside of pathology, consciousness without the robust sense of self we experience in
ordinary life may not be impossible. Individuals achieving transcendental states of
consciousness (through meditation or other means) often report a clear message: the self is an
illusion, we are all one and the same. Additionally, many researchers argue that this “self” in
our consciousness is only present when we call upon it to be, and it is impossible to catch
ourselves not having it. This quote is taken from Susan Blackmore’s “The Grand Illusion: Why
consciousness exists only when you look for it”:
[…] perhaps there is only something there when you ask. Maybe each time you probe, a retrospective story is concocted
about what was in the stream of consciousness a moment before, together with a “self” who was apparently experiencing
it. Of course there was neither a conscious self nor a stream, but it now seems as though there was.
___
The first question to ask is what these findings in pathology and altered states actually tell us.
While many find that these claims are consistent with the existence of selfless consciousness
(or a type of consciousness other than one with a single anchored self), others are more
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skeptical. It may be that the type-2 self is just interpreted and expressed differently in our
unique language systems, rather than certain individuals actually experiencing some
inconceivable form of consciousness. Ramachandran himself is famous for studying these
phenomena, so it is interesting to hear this skeptical position coming from him, noting that
“even in the extreme case of a split-brain patient whose two hemispheres have been surgically
disconnected, the patient doesn’t experience doubling subjectivity, each hemisphere’s ‘self’ is
aware of only itself – although it may intellectually deduce the presence of the other” (105).
But even if it were true that selfless consciousness were possible, it would be a mistake to take
these altered state revelations to support the idea that the self is fundamentally illusory just
because it can be dissolved under certain conditions. While the disintegration thought
experiment is aimed to show that there exists a type-2 self that is irreducible, it is separate
from the question of whether or not it is possible to have experience without an irreducible
conscious entity. While the idea of “free floating qualia” without an attached experiencer may
seem bizarre, I am not arguing that it is impossible. But the existence of selfless experience
does not negate the ordinary sense of self.
3.2. Phenomenal Self Model
Thomas Metzinger proposes a phenomenal self model (PSM) in which the content of our
consciousness is held and unified. This model, he argues, was a useful adaptation in our
evolutionary history because it allowed an organism to interact with both its internal and
external environment intelligently. Metzinger describes the rubber hand illusion, in which
subjects place one hand behind an optical barrier while a rubber hand is placed in front of it.
Both the rubber hand and the actual hand are stroked repeatedly, and after a few minutes,
many subjects feel a sense of ownership to the rubber hand. A “whole body analog” was
created for this experiment, where subjects had their backs repeatedly stroked as they watched
a virtual reality projection of their back (and the stroking) a few feet in front of them. Many
subjects reported a feeling that their body was displaced in front of their vision, and the
stroking sensation occurring at the location of their virtual back. In Metzinger’s view, these
experiments demonstrate the ability to manipulate the integrated sense of self in carefully
designed experiments. His central claim is that the sense of self feels so real because we are
unable to recognize our PSM as a model, as the model itself is transparent.
In my view, the PSM proposal is an excellent attempt at explaining why we feel we have selves,
and it may carry truth. However, I would caution against using it to conclude that the
irreducible type-2 self doesn’t exist, because this model does not negate our own experience.
Our experience alone is enough to prove the type-2 self as an irreducible entity, much like the
fact that the existence of consciousness is proven automatically by our experience of it. Many
people are familiar with the optical illusion of the mirage. On hot days, turbulent mixing of air
near the ground can create a false image of water on roads. Is the water real? No, but the
image of it most certainly is. Even if the irreducible type-2 self is just an image and not “real” in
the way we may intuitively think of it, that does not negate the ontology of it within our own
conscious minds. We can simply define the type-2 self as an image that we perceive without it
losing any explanatory power, importance, or mysteriousness. This sense or image of an
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irreducible entity is important, because this is what we want to preserve in mind uploading. It
is the sense of irreducibility that fundamentally produces additional questions about the nature
of consciousness that will be discussed in subsequent sections. Even if the type-2 self is only
perceived to be irreducible, the disintegration thought experiment still works, because at some
critical point in the disintegration process, this perception of irreducibility must suddenly
change. No matter how one looks at it, there is something in the nature of consciousness that
is irreducible.
3.3. Overlapping Qualia
This point is mainly to examine the differentiable property of type-2 selves. Let’s examine an
essay by Kenneth Hayworth, “Killed by Bad Philosophy”. Hayworth writes this essay as the
director of the Brain Preservation Foundation in order to make the case that mind uploading
will preserve identity. I want to make it clear that I do not intend to attack his motives to
preserve brains. In fact, I believe that his work may be critically important for curing death, as
he claims. My only point of this analysis is to show why the type-2 self should not be rejected
as, at the very minimum, an important construct. Hayworth states:
Our intuition tells us that being me (Ken) right now staring at these words on my laptop screen is fundamentally different
from being another person, say my friend John, staring at these words on his laptop screen. Of course there is truth to
this, John and I will understand these words in a somewhat different way and will react somewhat differently to them. But
our intuition also tells us that being Ken right now staring at these words is somehow fundamentally similar to being Ken
driving in his car to work. There is a “being Ken” quale (singular of qualia) that is similar even in these two very different
experiences (reading and driving) that is utterly missing in John’s conscious experience (and is replaced with the “being
John” quale).
To paraphrase the authors viewpoint: my intuition tells me that my current experience can be
described as the qualia I am experiencing now plus an additional quale, a “further fact” 5, of
“being Danny”. The remainder of the article goes on to argue that there is a Point of View
(POV) self that comprises the moment-to-moment experience we have of the world, and a
memory (MEM) self that comprises our “set of declarative, procedural, and perceptual
memories”. The author points out that from a qualitative perspective, there is more similarity
between the conscious states of Ken being happy and John being happy than there is between
Ken being happy and Ken being sad. An additional point is made about how the POVself would
not consciously notice any dramatic sudden change in the brain wiring unless it was actively
engaging in a process that involved it at the time. An example is given where if one were to
suffer a stroke to the Wernike’s (language) area of the brain while hiking in the woods, one may
not notice anything has happened until one tried to speak. The author concludes that since the
POVself is only used for real-time informational processing and is essentially oblivious to the
MEMself, it carries virtually no specific facts about a person’s identity on its own. Since our
MEMself is what determines our uniqueness as people and truly sets us apart from one
another, it is only this MEMself that we really need to be concerned with for preserving
identity. The MEMself can be preserved simply by making a functional copy of the brain wiring.
This argument may sound convincing by choice of wording, but this ultimately fails to disprove
a fundamental idea: that qualitative states of consciousness happen to subjects. Essentially, I
do not feel that “being Danny” is a quale at all. Rather, I feel that “Danny” is an entity on which
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all of my qualia is being directed. This misclassification is important, because one will not find
inherent uniqueness between conscious organisms by only considering experiential content.
Again, we cannot rule out the existence of qualia without an attached subject, but I know that I
perceive myself as a subject, and I want this subject to survive. I, Danny, am having experiences
right now that you, the reader, are not, and we have two distinct subjects (type-2 selves).
While Hayworth seems to be considering the POV-self as an analogue to the type-2 self I
defined, both POV and MEM self content can be thought of as part of the type-1 self, because
they both consider experience (rather than an experiencer). If our POVself content happens to
overlap at any given time, it does not mean that our instantaneous selves are not unique.
Rather, it would simply mean that the same experience is happening to two subjects. This is the
simple further fact about our identity that some have gone to great lengths to deny: you and I
are distinct subjects of consciousness, and this difference exists regardless of the content of our
POV
or
MEM
selves
(hence
the
“further
fact”).
4. Why Differentiable Subjects can Annoy Philosophers
This idea of differentiable subjects is understandably disturbing because the boundaries of
subjects can get quite messy in philosophical thought world. Personal survival is no longer a
matter of opinion in what one considers to be a person, but an objective fact with a binary
yes/no solution, and it is not clear in certain circumstances if survival occurs or not.
The uploading problem is one such example. At first glance, it may seem obvious that your
personal identity would survive an upload. If everything that matters about you is the result of
the exact structure of your brain, it would make sense that you (as in your type-2 self) survive
the upload because your brain structure would essentially be preserved, even when your brain
itself is destroyed. But here’s where things get dicey. Imagine that instead of directly replacing
your brain with an uploaded equivalent of your mind on an alternate substrate, we utilize the
upload as a copy of your mind while preserving your original body. The process of uploading is
exactly the same otherwise, except that from your perspective inside your original body,
nothing should have happened because the scanning and copying is non-invasive. So
intuitively, whether or not your type-2 self is transferred into the alternate substrate depends
on whether or not your original body is preserved, but yet this seems logically absurd because
nature should not care about this detail. Since intuition leads us to believe several conflicting
ideas, it may be appealing to believe that the idea of differentiable subjects is somehow flawed.
Let’s consider a similar but slightly different scenario. Imagine that you are about to undergo
some type of surgery to modify (but not necessarily damage) brain structure. The surgery will
require general anesthesia, rendering complete unconsciousness. Thomas Clark, director of the
Center for Naturalism, considers what would happen during this kind of surgery in his essay
“Death, Nothingness, and Subjectivity”:
[…] How much of a change between [me] and [modified me] is necessary to destroy personal subjective continuity? At
what point, that is, would we start to say "Well, [Tom] 'died' and a stranger now inhabits his body; experience ended for
[Tom] and now occurs for someone else"? It is not at all obvious where to draw the line.
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It seems logical to believe that a very small change in brain structure under surgery, say, on the
scale of a few neurons, would not change the conscious entity inside his body. If we accept
this, it is also logical to believe that making radical changes under surgery would also preserve
his conscious entity. This may sound like a slippery slope argument, but the alternative, given
the irreducibility of the perceived type-2 self, may be even less plausible: at some highly specific
threshold of brain alteration, the conscious entity would change, and any less degree than that
threshold would mean the original entity survives. In other words, we would have to accept
that the difference between subjective experience continuing for Tom and subjective
experience ending for Tom (while beginning for another subject) would come down to a single
brain cell. But if we accept that Tom’s subject is preserved after making radical modifications to
brain structure in surgery, we may as well also accept that in the death of one arbitrary person
followed by the birth of another arbitrary person, the new individual born is the same subject
as the individual that died. This is because both death to birth and extreme brain modification
under surgery involve radical changes to brains between streams of continuous conscious
experience, and it is hard to see how these situations would be viewed differently in the eyes of
nature. So again, we are confronted with conflicting intuitive ideas when accepting the notion
of differentiable subjects.
To resolve this dissonance, there are two positions one may take. One position may be similar
to Hayworth’s. On this account, we would be denying that Tom is some unique subject of
experience. Despite that Tom perceives his conscious subject of experience as an irreducible
entity, and that it makes sense that his experiences are only his, there is somehow an
ontological overlap between his core self and another person’s core self if the content of their
POV or MEM selves are similar. There is no ontologically objective way to answer whether or
not Tom (as an experiencer of consciousness) died based on the amount of brain changes that
occurred during surgery. Rather, it is simply a matter of what one considers to be “Tom” (as an
experiencer of consciousness). One who takes this position may not worry about death at all if
they have a twin who is very much like them. In their view, since the conscious entity
embodying the twin is hardly different from their own, they can die without noticing much
change. This position should theoretically be held for one who disputes the idea that entities
are differentiable regardless of phenomenological content.
Alternatively, one may hold that everyone is entirely affected by their own death as far as
subjective experience for them is concerned. It makes sense to talk about a “me” experiencing
the world, because “I” perceive it to be there. My body’s death would affect me, and only me,
directly. Having a twin would not mean that I survive my own death any more than someone
without a twin would. Some of my phenomenal content would be preserved, but I wouldn’t be
there to experience it. It is true that if we accept this position, answers to questions such as “at
what point does my conscious entity get replaced with another one in brain modification
surgery?” or “at what point in brain disintegration does my perceived type-2 self just
disappear?” become less clear. But this is no reason to deny the reality of what our
consciousness fundamentally comprises. These questions present epistemological uncertainty
as opposed to ontological uncertainty, and there is no reason to believe that the tools of
science will not be able to get us to an answer. I argue that despite all of these attempts to
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explain away the self as a non-problem, there is no evidence against what our intuition actually
tells us about you and I being fundamentally different subjects. Additionally, negating the
importance of our perception would be very difficult. I know from my experience that “I” am
here in this body around me, and not in some other body such as my mother’s. Could I be
wrong about this? It is very hard to see how.
To summarize: The view of a self that stands independent from the content of subjective
experience has been discredited by numerous philosophers, but without clear good reason.
Existence of pathology, models demonstrating the degree to which the sense of self can be
manipulated, and self-boundary thought experiments do not refute the existence of this self.
While some may argue that the existence of this self would overturn numerous findings in
psychology and neuroscience, I submit that it would be far easier to accept that our picture of
consciousness is simply incomplete than to deny the foundation of my very existence.
One further subject to touch on before moving forward is the idea of a deflationary identity.
Under this view, the type-2 self is unstable and does not survive throughout an organism’s
lifespan (Chalmers 2010). This is because occasionally, one’s conscious entity is being replaced
by another conscious entity, and the new entity then captures the memories of previous
entities as if it were its own. Some possible reasons to hypothesize this replacement will be
discussed in the next section. This view does not dispute the existence of the type-2 self as
defined in this paper, but holds that any particular type-2 self in an organism is only maintained
for a short amount of time, as opposed to its entire lifespan as we might think. It is necessary
to accept that type-2 selves are differentiable to hold this view, because this view specifically
states that “selves” are replaced in spite of a (mostly) unchanging MEMself.
5. The Power of Potential
If we accept that we have something that we can call irreducible and differentiable type-2
selves, the need to solve the problem of how to preserve this type of self in an upload becomes
clearer. However, I would argue that by only asking “how do I know that an upload will be
me?”, we are not confronting the root of the problem. Ultimately, our perspective should shift
from the question of how to preserve identity when changing substrates to the question of how
to create a conscious system with our identity from scratch. This new perspective has more
power because in theory, it would not only allow effective uploads of us, but it opens up a
possibility to resurrect those who have already passed.
In other words, the true nature of the mystery lies in the question of why the body you find
yourself in possesses your conscious entity as opposed to someone else’s. Just as that there is
nothing special about a living brain from an objective standpoint that would lead one to believe
that it is conscious6, there is nothing special about the molecular arrangement of your body
that would lead an objective observer to look at it and believe it is you (as opposed to someone
else) in there. What I would like to propose is a new framework that can make more sense of
this problem.
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In order to grasp the new framework, let us review the concept of potential in science, using
potential energy as an example. Potential energy is a useful construct because it allows us to
make predictions about the future state of a system. For example, a roller coaster about to
take a 100 foot plunge would have more potential energy than a roller coaster about to take a
30 foot plunge (relative to the bottom of each respective track), even though the physical state
of the coasters would be identical at the top of each hill. The word “potential” in this context
simply refers to energy that is not currently active, but may become active. This is an example
of a practical reason to conceptualize a property or entity that is imaginary in the eyes of
nature. The interest to science is to learn the mechanisms behind how seemingly imaginary
properties become very visible and real. We have a fairly established science that can explain
how potential energy translates into kinetic energy.
With consciousness, the problem is almost a perfect analogue to potential energy. The main
difference is a lack of science behind it, but understanding it in this framework should help lead
us toward one. Our new framework will involve conceptualizing the “existence” of non-existent
conscious entities. We will define a “potential subject” as a conscious entity, an experiencer of
consciousness, that does not exist. An “active subject”, on the other hand, will be defined as an
experiencer of consciousness that does exist.
The reason to posit a construct of potential subjects is the same reason to posit potential
energy. We can begin to understand this by considering temporary disruptions to
consciousness – that is - a period of unconsciousness between two periods of consciousness for
a particular subject. Some things that may cause this include dreamless sleep, being put under
general anesthesia, or suffering severe head trauma7. In any of these cases, during the time
that you are unconscious, you would be referred to as a potential subject of consciousness at
that time. The justification for ascribing a term to a presently non-existent feature is much the
same reason we would say a roller coaster on the top of a hill has potential energy; we are
referring to the future state of the system. In the case of the roller coaster, we are referring to
the energy that will exist (mostly in the form of speed) when the coaster gets to the bottom of
the hill. In a living but unconscious system, we are referring to the conscious entity that will
exist when the subject wakes up. You, as a subject (experiencer) of consciousness, would be
restored to the active state.
While it may take a bit more imagination, a particular conscious organism can be thought to
have a potential subject before its conception and after its death. Assuming consciousness is
restricted to my living brain, the conscious entity that is me is active now, but potential before
my conception and after my death, just like it is potential during general anesthesia. While this
may sound like a dualist position, it is not. The potential subject is merely an entity we are
constructing, much the same way we construct the idea of potential energy, because it allows
us to make predictions about future consciousness. The potential subject is not a “spooky”
thing.
So to clarify a central point: Every conscious organism alive today has an active subject of
experience, as well as a corresponding potential subject. You can imagine this as a giant board
of on-off (or in this case, active-potential) switches, with one switch for each organism with a
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type-2 self (which is either present or absent, because it is irreducible). At any given time, each
switch is either on or off. Additionally, when an organism dies, the switch is permanently shut
off (to simplify the problem – we’ll momentarily assume that there is no consciousness after
death). The switch does not disappear however, because in principle it could be switched on
again8. So in addition to the switches for organisms alive, which can be either on or off
depending on the organism’s current activity, there is a whole set of permanently off switches
for organisms that have died. There is also a whole set of switches for all conscious entities
that will come into existence in the future, but for now those switches are off.
While the amount of conscious organisms that will ever be born is probably a humongous
number, even this does not represent all of the possible subjects that could come into
existence. Consider the following quote from the beginning of Dawkin’s 1998 book Unweaving
the Rainbow:
We are going to die, and that makes us the lucky ones. Most people are never going to die because they are never going
to be born. The potential people who could have been here in my place but who will in fact never see the light of day
outnumber the sand grains of Arabia. Certainly those unborn ghosts include greater poets than Keats, scientists greater
than Newton. We know this because the set of possible people allowed by our DNA so massively exceeds the set of
actual people. In the teeth of these stupefying odds it is you and I, in our ordinariness, that are here (Dawkins 1).
The “potential people” in the above quote can refer to potential subjects that will never
become active. Even though they will never see the light of day, their potential conscious
entities (that will never become activated) are something we can make reference to. In
addition to the fact that “the set of possible people allowed by our DNA” is huge, we illustrated
earlier that two identical bodies may have different conscious subjects, so even this set does
not represent an upper limit to the amount of potential subjects. There really is no conceivable
limit to the amount of conscious organisms that could theoretically come into existence, and
there is no upper limit to the amount of conscious subjects we could imagine. I would
therefore argue that the number of potential subjects is unlimited or infinity. Even assuming
that the number of conscious organisms that will ever exist in the multiverse is finite, there are
an infinite amount of subjects that could become conscious but never will become conscious.
The potential subject concept still works – because in thought world we can imagine that the
multiverse will output infinite life given an infinite amount of time (even though infinite time is
unlikely). These infinite subjects will just always stay at the “potential” side of the switch. So
why pretend they even have potential? Even if the laws of physics dictate that these infinite
subjects have no potential, the laws of philosophy do not. It’s the laws of philosophy, in this
case, that are going to get us to the answers we need and tell us about what we can achieve
with them.
So your body, the biological body that you find yourself in right now, did not have to contain
your conscious entity. From an objective perspective, not only could it just as easily contain my
conscious entity, or anyone else’s, but it in fact had an infinite amount of options! Even if it
wasn’t really an “option”, like a God choosing a conscious entity to put inside your body,
something in nature must have determined it. This is our big second explanatory gap in
consciousness studies. How do we go from knowledge that living organisms have conscious
entities to the idea that specific conscious entities are mapped to specific bodies? What
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distinguishes a lucky potential subject that will eventually find itself in the light of the world via
an organism and one that will not? When subjects are extinguished by death, are they
naturally placed back into the lucky bin?
These questions can ultimately be collapsed into this one: “How do specific potential subjects
become active subjects?” The answer is not clear at all, and this is our ultimate missing science,
which I call “the selection problem”. But when we examine this issue head-on, we see that the
options are surprisingly quite limited. Though the possibilities are broad, we can at least begin
to break down the issue to design good experiments.
6. Possible Solutions and Associated Problems
6.1. Parameters that may identify the self
To think about the selection problem, we can consider some parameters that could potentially
preserve our type-2 self in an upload. It is natural for many deep thinkers to hold a position on
what causes a type-2 self, and whether or not this criteria will be met in an upload will
determine whether or not they believe an upload will be effective in preserving identity for a
subject. Let’s explore the possible parameters of physical properties that could be the answer
to the selection problem, based on the principle that an organism’s brain as a whole is what
“selects” one entity out of the infinite options. These parameters essentially represent three
mutually exclusive positions one could take on the selection problem.
-
-
-
A: Numerical molecular arrangement: the numerical identity9 of the molecules arranged
a particular way in your body is what determines everything about your personal
identity, including the conscious entity your body will contain. Therefore, uploads can
never contain the entity that was in the original person.
B: Qualitative molecular arrangement: the qualitative identity9 of the molecules
arranged a particular way in your body is what determines everything about your
personal identity, including the conscious entity your body will contain. Since this would
require an upload to be a carbon-based biological substrate, and an exact copy down to
the molecular level would inherently include damage from aging along with the natural
aging process, there may be little point unless these features could somehow be
removed without changing the conscious entity.
C: Qualitative functional arrangement: A Body’s conscious entity is determined by its
functional parts. Therefore, uploads will preserve identity if equivalent functional parts
of the original brain are preserved in a substrate independent mind, even if the
substrate is non-biological.
Upon philosophical investigation, these possibilities face a number of challenges. The more
obvious one is that all of these parameters are changing continuously over time. If one were to
accept that the conscious entity inside a conscious system is entirely determined by the current
state of any of these parameters, they would be accepting quite an extreme version of the
deflationary view. We would literally be dying (by conscious entity replacement) probably
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hundreds of times per second without knowing it, because the chemistry of our brains is always
changing10.
This particular problem does have a conceivable solution, however. It is necessary to separate
the questions “how do we create a specific conscious entity?” and “how do we preserve a
specific conscious entity?” When a living organism is developing and reaches sufficient
complexity for consciousness (and genesis of a conscious entity), one of the above parameters
(A-C) may be called upon to make the “selection” of which subject to activate out the infinite
options. But once the entity is generated, the organism may be able to hold on to it in spite of
a physically evolving brain. Perhaps only when consciousness is regained after a temporary
period of loss (such as sleep), the brain would generate a new conscious entity (which would be
“selected” by whichever parameter was called upon in the first place, but the new entity would
be selected based on the current state of the body). This “stream stabilization” view is also a
deflationary view, but a less extreme one because a continuous stream11 of consciousness
presumably lasts a bit longer than an instantaneous conscious moment. To resist a deflationary
view altogether, one could postulate a “life stabilization” view, holding that a single type-2 self
will “jump” from one conscious stream to the next throughout the lifespan of the organism. Or,
perhaps consciousness is never truly and fully lost for an organism as long as it is alive.
If any version of the deflationary hypothesis were true, some may see little point in crafting an
uploading system to preserve a person’s specific conscious entity, because the entity is not
even preserved in everyday life. Any form of uploading would still be better than nothing
though, as the type-1 self would be preserved. But still, the mystery of how the selection
occurs each time a “new self” is generated would remain. It still may be worth solving this
puzzle in order to make survival through uploading a more meaningful thing.
If the “life stabilization” idea held any merit, we may have two options for uploading. One
option would involve somehow tracing back the history of the organism to the original point at
which it became conscious, and re-create that structure to activate the same entity in the new
substrate. This would be nearly impossible. Another method would be to simply preserve the
current entity, perhaps by gradual destructive uploading. This process refers to replacing each
brain part, one at a time, until the entire system is uploaded (Chalmers 2010).
6.2. Why these Parameters are Probably Wrong
Ultimately, these parameters (A-C) are more questionable than we may make them out to be. I
find it extremely difficult to imagine A. We would effectively need to accept the following:
starting with a conscious system, we could destroy it, and then rebuild it using the same
numerical molecules. At the same time, we build an exact copy of the system using
qualitatively identical molecules. The numerically identical body would have the same
conscious entitiy as the original and the qualitatively identical body would have a different
entity. Since both bodies have identical function in the laws of nature, why would this be? It is
hard to imagine why nature would care which of the two, if any, gets the original conscious
entity.
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Should B or C be true, imagine the following scenario. Two twin bodies are generated in
identical environments, so both bodies contain the exact same qualitative configuration of
molecules. Under this hypothesis, the two twins are not separate subjects – they are the same
conscious entity in two places at once. This is because parameters B and C do not allow for the
numerical identity of molecules to have a role in the selection problem. Perhaps this is easy to
conceive if the two bodies are experiencing identical qualia, but what if, following the initial
time that these bodies were generated, one was then led into a different environment? If
stream or life stabilization were true, we would have the same entity perceiving two separate
worlds simultaneously. The only alternative under the B and C parameter view is to reject the
stabilization views while accepting the extreme deflationary position.
There is an even more fundamental issue, which trumps almost everything discussed so far.
Even if we were able to understand how consciousness arises, how we develop our sense of
self, and how to map potential entities into different bodies based on some physical
arrangement parameters, we would still be left with a huge explanatory gap. What is it that
makes one particular arrangement or set of molecules me as opposed to someone else? Or we
could think of this from the other direction: why is my consciousness the equivalent of this
particular set of molecules as opposed to any other? It seems that we may be inevitably faced
with a fundamentally random process in nature. To me, this idea is just as mind-boggling as the
randomness in quantum uncertainty. Intuitively, nothing in the universe should be random.
Albert Einstein clang to this intuition of systematic cause and effect, ultimately rejecting central
aspects of quantum mechanics. Perhaps someday, new physics will illuminate a perspective on
quantum uncertainty that will allow us to grasp the nature of random output. Similarly, the
apparent randomness found in the nature of the self may be within theoretical grasp.
While this is one possible endpoint, we have not exhausted all possible options. Instead of
taking the “whole brain” approach which involved parameters A-C, perhaps a more plausible
solution to the selection problem is that some central mechanism in the brain is responsible for
selecting one potential subject (as opposed to other potential subjects) to activate. By “central
mechanism”, I mean an explicit large-scale brain function or reaction that reliably has the same
entity activated even with conscious stream disruptions throughout the organism’s lifespan.
Even though this would implicitly depend on qualitative molecular arrangement (parameter B),
the difference is that the mechanism for the selection process would be explicit, thus removing
the explanatory gap12. While this may sound like an absurd idea, the only conceivable
alternative is to accept some fundamental randomness. This mechanism may be a quick silverbullet in our search for truth, similar to the discovery of DNA as the “life force” that has always
been searched for.
Thus far, we have been assuming that consciousness is generated by the brain, and
consciousness for a subject begins and ends in their own body. This is commonly taken as a
given, since modern neuroscience can demonstrate one-to-one mapping between brain
function and mental phenomena. However, my overall take on this position is that it only
considers the individual parts of consciousness (such as senses and cognition) and fails to
consider consciousness as a whole with the irreducible sense of self. Additionally, while the
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quality of evidence for consciousness survival of bodily death is debatable, it would be foolish
to ignore the fact that some evidence exists, for example, see work developed by Gary Schwartz
and Ian Stevenson. Efforts have been made to link quantum mechanics and consciousness,
with growing success (Radin 2012, Hameroff 2014). Perhaps such mechanisms could allow
theoretical room for the brain to act as a receiver, rather than a producer, of consciousness. In
any case, we can take natural survival as a theoretical possibility and consider what implications
it may have on this model of the self.
In this scenario, perhaps the infinite amount of potential subjects we postulated are really
active subjects embedded in universal fabric13. All possible conscious entity “switches”
imaginable (an infinite amount of them) would be on, at least periodically. This infinite sea of
active subjects would be an unlimited supply of consciousness and in line with many eastern
philosophies. Specific active subjects/entities may get drawn into specific organisms when
some critical feature in their living brain is formed. Alternatively, perhaps particular entities
ingrained into the universe can split off from the sea and play a role in generating a body for
itself, though this is purely speculative. This may seem like an extreme violation of Occam’s
razor: why postulate an infinite amount of unnecessary entities? But postulating these entities
may actually yield the simplest explanation, which will be discussed in the next subsection.
Someone living in a 2-dimensional flatland may think the idea of an infinite number of flatlands
stacked on top of each other is absurd, but in reality we know that an infinite amount of these
flatlands simply creates an extra dimension. There may be a simple, natural answer within the
laws of physics that can explain the existence of this higher dimension of consciousness, with
our brains simply accessing a single infinitesimal slice of this dimension14.
6.3. Different types of infinity and why they are important
We are faced with some questions at this point about the nature of infinity in these contexts.
In mathematics, there are multiple types of infinity, some of which are provably larger than
others. One category of infinity is countable infinity, which includes a set of all real numbers
that can in principle be listed (for example, integers and fractions). Another category is
uncountable infinity, which includes the set of all real numbers. One cannot, even in principle,
list all the real numbers that lie on a number line. These so-called uncountable infinities are
therefore larger than countable infinities15. Countable infinity can be represented by an infinite
amount of discrete points, while uncountable infinity would be a continuous line; discrete
values, no matter how small, are always separated by an infinite amount of numbers.
Applying these concepts to active and potential subjects is difficult at best. But it matters,
because it is possible to have both an infinite amount of potential subjects and an infinite
amount of active subjects. An infinite amount of active conscious entities (subjects) does not
necessarily include the entire possible set of conscious entities, because infinity plus infinity
equals infinity. It is possible that there naturally exist an infinite amount of active conscious
entities, but instead of being embedded in universal fabric, this really could just be due to an
infinite amount of space or time in the multiverse yielding countably infinite life. If this were
the case, it would be very easy to imagine a separate set of infinity potential subjects that will
never exist. The number of active subjects in this case should be countable infinity, because
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actual living organisms are discrete. However, the type of infinity describing the number of
potential subjects would be less clear. One could make an argument that this is countable
infinity, because even imaginary subjects are discrete and should be able to be lined up side by
side like geometrical points. However, one could also make an argument that it would be
uncountable infinity, because in principle one should be able to imagine a distinct potential
entity corresponding to every possible real number on a number line16.
Under some configurations, it can be shown that the chances are of any particular subject (such
as you or me) ever existing are virtually zero. If there are an infinite amount of possible
conscious entities for an organism to select besides mine, the chance of any particular
developing conscious being becoming me is 1/∞. The probability of any particular conscious
entity (me, you, etc) being drawn given n opportunities is thus17:
1 𝑛
1 − (1 − )
∞
Let’s take n to be the number of conscious systems that have existed, exist now, and ever will
exist in the multiverse. If n is a finite number, this probability is infinitesimally close to zero. I
do not necessarily take this as evidence against an only finite amount of conscious systems ever
existing, because nature should not care about this tiny probability of me existing. However,
this clearly demonstrates that our existence under these circumstances is nothing to take for
granted, and many people probably overestimate the chances of existing naturally.
If we consider that perhaps an infinite amount of conscious systems will naturally exist over the
course of multiverse space and time (though not the universal fabric view of consciousness) we
can evaluate the following:
1 𝑛
lim 1 − (1 − )
𝑛→∞
𝑛
This expression also yields zero. While the infinity represented in the denominator and the
infinity represented in the exponent have different meanings, this does not affect the answer.
It seems that even given a countably infinite amount of opportunities for your consciousness to
be born into a conscious organism, you should have had virtually no chance of existing to read
these words.
To eliminate this idea, the only feasible solution is to suppose that there are zero potential
subjects. This would mean that you cannot think of or imagine a possible conscious entity that
isn’t (at least periodically) conscious. In other words, every entity in the entire possible set of
conscious entities is active. This would be consistent with the hypothesis of consciousness
being embedded in universal fabric, because otherwise it would be possible to imagine a
separate set of infinity potential subjects over and above the countably infinite conscious
organisms. The type of infinity describing the number of active subjects in this case is open to
debate though, as described above for counting the entire possible set of potential subjects.
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7. What’s Next?
In this section, I will make a basic outline for how we can proceed to utilize this model of the
self scientifically. The basic goal is to determine what naturally occurs after death, and then
figure out how we may be able to control the future of our conscious experience if we don’t like
the natural answer.
If naturally existing consciousness after death could be tested and proven, we need not bother
with uploading or any efforts to create immortality. To start, some forms of qualitative
research may be useful. For example, we can look at the phenomenology of transcendental
experiences, which are considered by many to be indications of a world beyond.
Transcendental experiences can include near-death experiences (NDEs), meditations, as well as
effects from certain drugs. Namely, we should be looking for some experience of a self being
connected to an infinite amount of other selves, as the model I proposed would suggest. While
such reports have been described18, it may be worth examining the phenomenology of their
experience in greater depth to see how well it matches up to the ideas presented in this model.
But eventually we need actual proof of something. We need a complete theory of
consciousness that can explain the mechanisms of the self and qualia the same way that the
theory of evolution can explain the diversity of life. What are the options for solving the
selection problem of how potential subjects become active subjects? We first may need to
know more about how a subject (or type-2 self) forms. Research into altered states of
consciousness, from both drugs and pathology, may still be invaluable. This is because we need
to understand all the forms that consciousness can take, and what the brain is doing in each
case. This will become easier with improving brain scanning technology.
Ultimately, if we can figure out where and how the irreducible type-2 self breaks down, we may
be able to explain the mechanism of the type-2 self. Fortunately, scientists are seemingly
making headway with technology that can selectively turn off parts of the brain. For example,
the Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation device can non-invasively affect parts of the brain by
magnetic fields. Perhaps more sophisticated forms of this technology, when developed, could
effectively simulate the disintegration process of the brain (without causing actual brain
damage). A subject reporting their experience could give scientists useful insight on the scale
of brain activity needed for coherent perception of an irreducible conscious entity. Further, if
there are indeed better forms of consciousness than qualia attached to an irreducible self, we
may be able to understand how those work as well, and consider those for uploading efforts in
lieu of saving our differentiable selves.
Simply by knowing the mechanisms of the type-2 self, the answer to the selection problem
might be right in front of us, or it may at least uncover some hints. Once we have the answers,
we then may have complete control over turning potential subjects into active subjects,
therefore giving us the ability to upload or resurrect any conscious entity. If this seems like too
much of a slippery slope argument, one may also consider hope from the singularity, which is
the idea that there will be an explosion of intelligence (and resulting technology) once a human
invents a computer “smarter” than human itself. Such an explosion could help us out
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tremendously in not only developing uploading technology, but also determining how to upload
in order to preserve identity.
8. Conclusion
While the underlying reality of the self may be vastly different than what our intuition tells us,
the importance of the way we perceive it cannot be neglected. Thus, it makes practical sense
to distinguish two types of self, with the irreducible entity type of self giving us objective
answers to whether or not a conscious system survives under specified conditions. Given the
further fact of differentiability, there is an explanatory gap between our knowledge of the
existence of these entities and our knowledge that specific entities are mapped into specific
conscious systems. The underlying scientific question to answer is how potential subjects
become active subjects. When broken down, it can be seen that possible solutions are quite
finite, and can likely be solved with the tools of science in the near future. When including the
selection problem in the quest to explain why we are not zombies, perhaps the puzzle of
consciousness will finally come together.
Footnotes
1. See Chalmers 1995.
2. By physical place, I am referring to how consciousness fits in with the physical laws of the universe.
3. Uploading can take many forms, but most types discussed in literature involve scanning the brain in its
microscopic parts followed by recreating it in an alternate substrate. The alternate substrate is usually a
nonbiological functional isomorph, such as a silicon-based computer system with individual circuits taking the
place of individual neurons in their original locations with respect to the brain and spinal cord as a whole. See
Chalmers 2010 for more background on uploading forms.
4. Once again, I would direct readers wishing to seek more background on this topic to begin with Chalmers 2010.
5. The term “further fact” is often used to portray the view that there are facts about a person’s identity beyond
the sum of their phenomenological content.
6. This is the essence of the hard problem. From a perspective outside of a living organism, it is difficult to imagine
how looking at all of its microphysical components and interactions would lead the observer to believe that the
system is conscious.
7. For the sake of simplifying the problem, we can assume that these situations will render a complete lack of
consciousness, equivalent to the phenomenology of not existing.
8. By in principle, I do not mean that it is possible within the laws of physics. Rather, I mean it is theoretically
imaginable.
9. “Numerical identity” and “qualitative identity” are two different ways of considering whether or not two things
are “the same” in the famous Ship of Theseus thought experiment. For example, two different carbon atoms with
the same properties would be qualitatively identical, but not numerically identical. A carbon atom is numerically
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identical to itself and only itself. Since a whole brain can only be numerically identical to itself, a view that the
numerical identity of brain molecules holds ontology to the conscious entity selection is inherently pessimistic
about uploading.
10. Brain cells continuously die and regenerate as our bodies grow. Numerical identity of all of our brain molecules
is never preserved in everyday life. This dilemma is slightly less extreme for parameter B and perhaps even less for
C, as it could take a bit longer for qualitative and functional changes (i.e. memory encoding) to occur, but these are
still very short timescales and it is nonetheless an extreme view. However, this is not to say that an extreme view
is necessarily wrong.
11. A conscious stream will be defined as a continuous and unbroken period of consciousness. While it is difficult
to know with certainty whether some things (such as deep sleep, general anesthesia, etc) truly cause a complete
lack of consciousness (and thus break a stream), I speculate that most people will experience multiple streams
throughout their lifetime.
12. Parameters A-C by themselves involve only implicit mechanisms for the selection problem, because there is no
objective reason to assume that any particular configuration of molecules would favor one particular entity over
another. Saying that a person’s identity is determined by their molecular arrangement does not eliminate the
randomness discussed, and thus we are still left with an explanatory gap. However, identifying a specific
mechanism inside the brain that explicitly polarizes a specific entity would directly explain the selection problem.
13. “Universal fabric” is my umbrella term for features at the quantum-scale of the universe. Things like time and
spatial dimensions can also be considered part of universal fabric.
14. I am referring to this version of consciousness as a “higher dimension” as an analogue to the nature of spatial
th
dimensions. An infinite number of n dimensional objects stacked together create a shape in the n+1 dimension,
so an infinite amount of irreducible conscious entities embedded in universal fabric, in a sense, constructs a higher
dimension of consciousness.
15. See Cantor’s diagonal argument for an explanation as to why all numbers on a number line are unlistable. It is
generally accepted that this is proof of uncountable infinity being larger than countable infinity. While the exact
ontology of these types of infinity may be disputable, the concepts that follow on the entire possible set of
conscious entities should hold.
16. Mapping of specific conscious entities to specific number values would be an entirely arbitrary process. The
purpose of imagining this is to think about this problem from a mathematical perspective so that it can be grasped.
1
17. If the probability of any particular developing conscious organism becoming me is , the probability of that
∞
1
organism NOT becoming me is1 − . In order for me to never exist or know of existence, this probability would
∞
need to be realized for every single conscious organism that ever has and ever will exist in the multiverse. We
1
don’t know how many such organisms there are, so we assign a variable n to represent it. The expression 1 −
∞
th
can be raised to the n power to determine the probability that I will never exist, because this probability will need
1
to be realized n times. To change this to the probability that I will exist, this new term (1 − )𝑛 is subtracted from
1 𝑛
∞
1 to get the overall expression: 1 − (1 − )
∞
18. This is a universal description in many near death experiences and other transcendental states of
consciousness achieved by experienced meditators. For an example that provides particular detail, see LaBerge
2012. See also Jourdan 2011 for a detailed study on the higher dimensional perceptions of the near death
experience.
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References
Blackmore, S. (2002). The grand illusion: Why consciousness exists only when you look for it. New
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Chalmers, D. "Facing up to the problem of consciousness." Journal of consciousness studies 2.3 (1995):
200-219.
Chalmers, D. "The Singularity: a Philosophical Analysis." Journal of Consciousness Studies 17.9-10 (2010):
9-10.
Clark, T. W. (1995). Death, nothingness, and subjectivity. In Daniel Kolak & R. Martin (eds.), The
Experience of Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing. 15-20.
Dawkins, R. Unweaving the rainbow: Science, delusion and the appetite for wonder. Houghton Mifflin
Harcourt, 2000.
Hameroff, S., & Penrose, R. (2014). Consciousness in the universe: A review of the ‘Orch
OR’theory. Physics of life reviews, 11(1), 39-78.
Hayworth, K. (2010). Killed by bad philosophy: Why brain preservation followed by mind uploading is a
cure for death,". Essay published online at http://www.brainpreservation.org.
Jourdan, J. P. (2011). Near Death Experiences and the 5th Dimensional Spatio-Temporal Perspective.
Journal of Cosmology, 14, 4743-4762.
LaBerge, S., & Brown, D. Waking the Dreamer. Retrieved September 27, 2014, from
http://www.mavericksofthemind.com/lab-int.htm
Metzinger, T. (2009). The Ego Tunnel. The science of the soul and the myth of the self.
Radin, D., Michel, L., Galdamez, K., Wendland, P., Rickenbach, R., & Delorme, A. (2012). Consciousness
and the double-slit interference pattern: Six experiments. Physics Essays, 25(2), 157.
Ramachandran, V. S. (2004). A brief tour of human consciousness: from impostor poodles to purple
numbers.
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Pitkänen, M., On Life, Death, Good and Evil
Research Essay
On Life, Death, Good and Evil
Matti Pitkänen 1
Abstract
Is there actual justification for moral laws? Are they only social conventions or is there some hard
core involved? Is there some basic ethical principle, telling what deeds are good and what deeds are
bad? Second group of questions relates to life and biological death. How should one define life? What
happens in the biological death? Is something self-preserved in the biological death in some form? Is
there something deserving to be called soul? Are reincarnations possible? Are we perhaps responsible
for our deeds even after our biological death? Could the law of Karma be consistent with physics?
Is liberation from the cycle of Karma possible? These questions are discussed from the point of view
of TGD inspired theory of consciousness. The cosmology of consciousness, the concept of self-having
space-time sheet and causal diamond as its geometric correlates, the vision about the fundamental
role of negentropic entanglement and Negentropy Maximization Principle, and the hierarchy of Planck
constants identified as hierarchy of dark matters and of quantum critical systems, provide the building
blocks needed to make guesses about what biological death could mean from subjective point of view.
1
Introduction
In principle the proposed conceptual framework allows already now a consideration of the basic questions
relating to concepts like Good and Evil and Life and Death. Of course, too many uncertainties are
involved to allow any definite conclusions, and one could also regard the speculations as outputs of the
babbling period necessarily accompanying the development of the linguistic and conceptual apparatus
making ultimately possible to discuss these questions more seriously.
Even the most hard boiled materialistic sceptic mentions ethics and moral when suffering personal
injustice. Is there actual justification for moral laws? Are they only social conventions or is there some
hard core involved? Is there some basic ethical principle telling what deeds are good and what deeds are
bad?
Second group of questions relates to life and biological death. How should on define life? What
happens in the biological death? Is self preserved in the biological death in some form? Is there something
deserving to be called soul? Are reincarnations possible? Are we perhaps responsible for our deeds even
after our biological death? Could the law of Karma be consistent with physics? Is liberation from the
cycle of Karma possible?
In the sequel these questions are discussed from the point of view of TGD inspired theory of consciousness. It must be emphasized that the discussion represents various points of view rather than being
a final summary. Also mutually conflicting points of view are considered. The cosmology of consciousness, the concept of self having space-time sheet and causal diamond as its correlates, the vision about
the fundamental role of negentropic entanglement, and the hierarchy of Planck constants identified as
hierarchy of dark matters and of quantum critical systems, provide the building blocks needed to make
guesses about what biological death could mean from subjective point of view.
2
Life and Death
There are rather important steps of progress occurred during that last years (I am doing this updating
2015), which allow a more serious consideration of the notions of life and death in TGD framework.
1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.com/. Address: Karkinkatu 3 I 3, 03600, Karkkila, Finland. Email:
matpitka6@gmail.com.
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223
Pitkänen, M., On Life, Death, Good and Evil
1. NMP and the notion negentropic entanglement imply that state function reductions do not only
destroy entanglement but can also create negentropic entanglement for which the density matrix is
projector to a higher-dimensional sub-space of state space. This changes completely the standard
rather gloomy view about evolution as approach to maximal entropy. Also now second law holds
but for the ensemble entropy which is single particle quantity whereas entanglement entropy characterizes a system with at least two particles. The stable correlation between system and complement
becomes information carrier.
A possible interpretation is as an abstraction: the pairs of stase in the superposition are instances
of the abstraction, concept, or rule. I have christened the negentropic resources as Akashic records.
In this view Universe is a gigantic library, which grows all the time. The information coded to
negentropic entanglement need not be conscious as such. If interaction free measurement generalizes
so that it applies to this entanglement the information about the entanglement might be read
consciously. Second possibility is that negentropic entanglement is experienced as a rule or concept
during state function reduction sequences at same boundary of CD.
2. TGD Universe is quantum critical. This statement has now an elegant formulation as a hierarchy of
quantum criticalities assignable to a fractal hierarchy of sub-algebras of various conformal algebras
associated with TGD acting as gauge symmetries, and labeled by effective Planck constants hef f =
n × h. The levels of the hierarchy have interpretation in terms of dark matter. The most important
algebra of this kind is super-symplectic algebra. The phase transitions increasing n = hef f /h
correspond to scalings n → m × n for some integer m and criticality is reduced so that these phase
transitions should occur spontaneously. Living systems can be seen as systems trying to stay at the
existing criticality. This requires metabolic energy and homeostasis serves this purposed. Eastern
philosophies talk about Karma’s cycle and the need to preserve ego preventing the spontaneously
occurring extension of consciousness.
One can argue that this view about life as a battle against enlightment is rather cynical. The attempt
to stay at quantum criticality should have some deep positive meaning. Maybe the jumping forth
and back between criticalities is what gives life its positive meaning and helps to build Akashic
records by generating negentropic entanglement. Maybe living systems could be seen as kind of
publishing producing systematically replicas of Akashic records could be the deep rationale behind
life.
3. ZEO allows a precise identification of self as a sequence of state function reductions at the same
boundary of CD. This allows also to understand how the experience about flow of time and arrow
of time emerge. One can also formulate precisely the life-time of the system in geometric sense as
the increase of the average distances between the tips in the superposition of CDs associated with
self. The life-time in subjective sense can be identified as the number of quantum jumps at passive
boundary of CD.
The first state function at the opposite boundary of CD means the death of self and rebirth of self
at the opposite boundary. NMP forces this first state function reduction and when it occurs for
sub-self higher level self interprets it as an act of volition.
4. NMP has become central principle of TGD inspired theory of consciousness. Quite generally, NMP
replaces quantum randomness with intentional evolution: Universe has a goal and this is to increase
negentropic resources. The analogs of slee-wake-up cycles in which self and its shadow wake up
would be realized in all scales. Can one interpret also human life cycle as on example about this
kind of cycles.
The basic questions seem to be following ones.
1. Is me the self defined by my biological body? In this case biological death would mean re-incarnation
of me at opposite boundary of CD and life lived in opposite direction of time. Or does my biological
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body corresponds to my subs-elf/mental image. Me could in this case correspond to my magnetic
body or field body having possibly astrophysical size. The death of my biological body would
replaced the mental image about biological body with time reversed mental image.
2. A further interesting question is whether there is a continuity of conscious experience in the reincarnation of self at opposite boundary of CD. We remember something about our dreams. Does
this new self have memories about the earlier life?
3. Also NMP raises questions. Can self perform bad deeds or does NMP automatically imply possible
deeds increase the negentropic resources. In thermodynamics thermodynamical fluctuations can
break second law in some short enough time scales. NMP has structure very similar to second law.
Could it be that bad deeds are analogous to thermodynamical fluctuations: possible but present
only in short time scales?
Or is the only remaining non-predictability related to the ordinary state function reductions in which
outcome is non-deterministic and random. But how can one see the deeds of Hitler as creation of
negentropy? His deeds produced a lot of suffering but did they teach for humanity something very
importan: Do not do like Hitler?
Perhaps the only reasonable option is that NMP allows but does not force state function reduction
to a density matrix which is a higher-dimensional projector. Self can select whether it performs a
reduction to this or a lower-dimensional space or even to a ray of Hilbert space. This allows also
bad deeds and the optimistic view would be that these bad deeds are analogous to thermodynamical
fluctuations.
2.1
What is Death
One can interpret ageing in two senses. The ageing with respect to geometric time and the ageing with
respect to the subjective time. Before discussing ageing in the sense of geometric time one must specify
what one means with geometric time and what one believes its relationship to subjective time to be.
1. There are two geometric times corresponding to the times assignable to space-time surface and
imbedding space and by general coordinate each of these times can be identified in various number
of ways.
2. Geometric time increases in discrete steps and corresponds to sub-sequent scalings of CD size defined
by the distance between its tips by integer. One could call this geometric time associated with
particle CD/self personal geometric time. Each self/CD defines its own imbedding space time and
the increase of the proper time distance between the tips of CD is the natural choice for the definition
of the age of self. There is also time associated with space-time surfaces. Both time coordinates
can be chosen in many manners but symmetry conditions favor certain choices.
3. Subjective time corresponds to the number of the state function reductions already occurred at the
passive boundary since the first one. The ratio of subjective age to geometric age measures the
number of conscious experiences per geometric time and the larger this number is the longer of the
subjectively experience time is.
4. Ageing itself with the biological and spiritual aspects that we know could be seen in two manners.
Biological ageing which corresponds to hef f /h = 1 sector consisting of ordinary visible matter and
second law which follows also from TGD. Variants of second law are expected also for other values
of hef f /h corresponding to dark matter and be a manifestation of the non-determinism of state
function reduction at ensemble level. Spiritual ageing would correspond to the gradual increase
hef f /h and quite literally leading to the increase of the scope of consciousness. The increase would
be due to giving up in the fight against spontaneous increase of criticality to keep hef f /h unchanged
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and allowing the transition to criticality at longer length scales. Eastern thinking would translate
this to ego attachment.
There must of course be some point in fighting against the spontaneous increase of hef f and there
is. The longer the lifetime of self is, the wiser the sub-selves representing mental images can become
by repeated re-incarnations. Ageing means getting wiser! By favoring the generation of negentropic
mental images, self can live longer.
5. The challenge is to understand in more detail how biological death as the first state function reduction at the opposite boundary of CD is forced by NMP. This relates to the growth of entropy at the
lowest and also other levels by the challenge is to understand the details. The increase of the total
negentropy of CD by generation of negentropic mental images can postpone the biological death.
Could it be that a cascade of state function reductions proceeding down to shorter scales from
the level of CD cannot anymore produce negentropic entanglement and after that NMP forces the
biological death. Since hef f can increase in the first reduction to the opposite boundary of CD,
NMP forces this reduction to eventually occur. An interesting question already posed is whether
the integer multiples of the original size of CD correspond to especially critical moments for the
biological death.
There is present an entropy growth due to the randomness of state function reduction leading to a
thermalization or the ensemble of mental images. This would correspond to second law, which still
hold true for ensemble entropy. NMP predicts that the negentropy of conscious experience tends to
increase and the biological death is only a transformation to some new form of existence. The dark
matter hierarchy with levels labeled by the values of Planck constants has become a key element
of TGD inspired theory of consciousness and one can imagine that during ageing these levels of
existence begin gradually dominate consciousness.
What interests us mostly is obviously the subjective ageing and biological death. What dying person
might experience? Is there a continuity of subjective experience or does suffering end with a loss of
consciousness. What follows after biological death? How our deeds affect what happens in biological
death and to the experiences after the biological death? Here are some possible answers.
1. If biological body corresponds only a mental images of the magnetic body, the only thing that
happens in biological death could be that the contribution of biological body to the contents of
consciousness disappears so that other contributions usually masked to a high degree by sensory
input and motor activities become into full light of consciousness. In fact biological body and
magnetic body are 4-dimensional and there are good reasons to expect that it continues to contribute
to the consciousness of some self- not necessarily the self which possessed the body. The question
is however about what this particular self that I have experiences in biological death and after it.
2. The notion of negentropic entanglement (see fig. http://www.tgdtheory.fi/appfigures/cat.jpg
or fig. 21 in the appendix of this book) allows to consider an answer to what might happen in
biological death from the point of subjective time. Depending on the choices of self which has the
dying person as sub-self, dying person generates bound state entropic entanglement with a loss of
consciousness or negentropic entanglement accompanied by an expansion of consciousness. What
option the higher level self chooses depends on the probability of the size of the contribution of the
state with negentropic entanglement.
3. If the dying person has a strong negentropic entanglement with external world, it tends to be
preserved in quantum jumps and only a small entropic contribution is present and there is only
a small probability to lose consciousness. Another manner to see this is that a sub-self having
very entropic sub-selves (mental images) is experienced by self as something unpleasant and by
generalized NMP self might want to get rid of this kind of mental image. This would reduce the
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chances of experiencing an expansion of consciousness. Perhaps death could be seen as the price for
sins.
4. One could also argue that although consciousness might be lost it might be not be in any manner
different from sleep. It could be gained back in wake-up but as something different from ordinary
wake-up consciousness and determined by the 4-D biological and magnetic bodies and the deceased
could remember his former life by still existing 4-D body. The notion of electromagnetic body,
when combined with the view about psychological time, allows to consider a general answer to
these questions. Magnetic body probably survives the biological death, and since it serves as the
sensory canvas, there are all reasons to expect that subjective consciousness continues after the
biological death. The contents of consciousness would be determined by the 4-dimensional physical
and electromagnetic bodies and the dominating contribution creating the illusion about reality as
a time=constant snapshot would be absent. Kind of timeless consciousness would be in question in
accordance with the life review experiences associated with NDEs.
5. One can also ask what might be the physical correlate of self after the biological death. The self
associated with the biological body should re-incarnated at the opposite boundary of CD associated
with it and defined kind of ”shadow me”. The 4-D space-time sheet representing self very probably
does not disappear in biological death and the 4-D character of the perceptive field suggests that this
4-D body continues to exist as a conscious entity and the sub-CDs of the geometric past representing
mental images still exist. Only at the future boundary of CD the flow of 4-D biological body ceases
but the sub-CDs representing existing mental images float to the direction of geometric past in the
river of time and remain consciousness.
2.2
Ageing from the point of view of second law
In standard quantum theory framework not allowing negentropic entanglement self could be regarded as
a statistical ensemble of mental images defined by the unentangled final states of the quantum jumps.
Since the size of this ensemble increases quantum jump by quantum jump, the approach of this ensemble
to thermal equilibrium is unavoidable although living matter has probably invented manners to fight
against the second law of thermodynamics. Thus ageing of self means dissipation.
The hierarchy of Planck constants and negentropic entanglement mean deviations from this picture.
1. For higher levels of dark matter hierarchy the dissipation rate is expected to be slower: the naive
expectation is that the rate is inversely proportional to Planck constant.
2. Negentropic entanglement means second exception to the rule and for given CD second law can be
broken in time scales shorter than the time scale characterizing CD [6].
Each p-adic length scale defines its characteristic dissipation rates. In case of a self decomposing
into sub-selves the rate of dissipation is sum over the real dissipation rates associated with the nested
system formed by the self, its sub-selves, their sub-selves, etc.... The dissipation associated with states
of whole-body consciousness can be anomalously small since only negentropic mental images are absent
and if there is only one such mental image (or no mental images at all) there is no generation of ensemble
entropy. A possible test for this is the study of total rate of metabolism during meditation.
Dissipation causes the ageing of self: getting old at least at the level of biological body would be the
price for having self. More concretely, the entropies associated with various distributions of quantum
number and zero mode increments increase during ageing so that mental images are gradually blurred.
Note that also our self which defines a mental image of a higher level self is blurred. Also biological death,
or at least death experience, seems to be unavoidable fate of self.
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2.3
Ageing and death from the point of NMP
The possility of negentropic entanglement allows to see ageing from different point of view if NMP is
taken as the analog of second law holding in the realm of subjective existence.
1. Ageing as an entropic process could be seen also as a process analogous to the process of getting
drowsy and falling asleep but in much longer time scales. Bodily sub-self would not remember
anything about these periods in the case that the entanglement was entropic. Also sleep could
represent a similar conscious state without bodily mental image and the impossibility to remember
anything about this period of consciousness might be simply due to the fact that one can remember
something about sleep state only in sleep state. The periods during which negentropic entanglement
prevails would be experienced as enlightment like experiences. During ageing bodily sub-self would
spend more and more time near the critical line at which this kind of phase transition occurs.
2. Ageing could be seen as a process of personal growth generating negentropic entanglement. The
negentropic entanglements generated with larger selves would give rise to larger selves and the
metaphor ”awakening” would thus be much more than a metaphor. Time-like negentropic entanglement would mean longer time span of attention. Person would spend more and more time in
extended state of consciousness and in death finally leave the confines of the biological body. Note
that person need not, and probably doesn’t, remember anything about the periods of entanglement in which the local topology of self changes. This would make possible the evolution of selves
continuing after death to higher levels of conscious existence.
This picture is rather optimistic: one must also consider the possibility that the evolution of self is
not always a continuous personal growth! The fact that the individual development of most people seems
to be a process of continual abstraction suggests that biological death is only one step in the process of
abstractions and that our self consciously experiences the final transition to higher level of existence in
biological death.
2.4
Why childhood memories are recalled so intensely?
The first manner to see ageing is as a subjective experience: as ageing with respect to subjective time.
Our self contains sub-selves representing our memories, sensory input from the geometric now and future
plans. At the old age it often happens that childhood memories begin to dominate whereas the recall of
more recent memories is gradually lost. Of course, the contribution of future plans becomes also gradually
negligible. This suggests that the contents of consciousness for our self can suffer a gradual transformation
such that the childhood begins to dominate: of course, this need not happen always. That the childhood
dominates is not easy to understand if the memories of the past are stored in the geometric now as
assumed in the standard brain science. In TGD framework the very fact that the childhood consciousness
is very intense and un-conceptual, explains the dominance of the episodal memories of childhood.
Who is the subjective experiencer in this kind of situation? Is it the old person with vivid memories
or a child with some very diffuse ideas about future? The view about psychological time would suggest
that the general experience gradually becomes some kind of a 4-dimensional life review such that the
very intense childhood memories dominate but that the person in the psychological now is still the only
one who can transform intentions to actions effectively whereas the 4-D body of the past is more or less
frozen.
2.5
Death as disappearance of the mental image representing the biological
body?
If one takes seriously the following two assumptions behind the TGD based model of quantum control
and coordinate based on the symbiosis of MEs, magnetic flux tube structures, and matter at the atomic
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space-time sheets, one ends up with rather concrete view about what happens after the biological death.
The ultimate sensory representations are realized on the sensory canvas provided by magnetic flux tube
structures of similar size, so that we have magnetic body providing sensory representation of the biological
body and external world [8]. Our magnetic self very probably survives in the biological death by the
conservation of the magnetic flux.
In this picture the body of after-life body would consists of the magnetic body plus MEs possibly
surviving the death of the biological body. The only difference as compared to the life before death would
be that the sensory and cognitive mental images representing the biological body (sub-selves) would
disappear and the attention of our self would be directed to something else. Possibly to the entire time
span of 4-D biological body since sensory input and motor actions at the upper boundary of peresonal
CD are absent. Near death experiences indeed support this view [4]. In this picture re-incarnation is
possible and even plausible and means only that the magnetic flux tube structure representing our bodily
self turns its attention to some other biological body and uses it as a sensory and motor organ. This new
biological body could be plant, animal, human, or perhaps something else. In this picture the metaphor
about biological body as a cloth becomes very concrete.
Since self has an extension with respect to geometric time, it has memories about its earlier history
and one could perhaps identify the continuation of self after the death as that self which has the memories
of self with respect to geometric time before death. In this extended state of consciousness self could
experience the subjective past of the space-time sheet of self and associate it with self’s recent mind-like
space-time sheet.
2.6
Near death experiences
Near death experiences provide a testing ground for the general ideas about what might happen in
the physical death. Experiences resembling near death experiences can be produced now in controlled
manner in laboratory circumstances for people well and alive and irrespective of their belief structure
subject persons tell about light tunnels and meeting of deceased relatives [2] . These experiences have
been found to be therapeutic and are indeed used as therapy to cure severe psychic traumas. Therefore
the materialistic explanation as a hallucination associated with dying brain seems to be excluded. Near
death experiences involve experiences like being in light tunnel, seeing beautiful and rich landscapes and
meeting dead relatives. Also out-of-body experiences are involved. The model of NDEs are discussed in
detail in [7] and here only some brief comments are represented.
The proposed picture about physical death allows a lot of room to interpret these experiences. For
instance, OBEs allow two explanations.
1. The first explanation is based on the fact that in TGD based model of sensory representations the
magnetic sensory canvas far outside body basically sees the brain in ELF light. This light usually
comes from brain and provides a sensory representation for the external world. TGD predicts also
a mechanism producing background ELF radiation from the entire body at magnetic transition
frequencies and this background would make possible to see the body 3-dimensionally from outside
when the sensory input is absent and does not mask this weak contribution. NDE OBEs might
correspond to this kind of vision reported also by yogis.
2. The experience looking one’s body from outside could mean that some higher level self corresponding
to slow EEG waves and higher em selves formed physically by the personnel of hospital in the hospital
room begins to dominate. This self could perhaps see patient’s body with the combined eyes of
the hospital personnel. Indeed, since the sensory input from the biological body ceases, the illusory
identification of ”me” with the biological body ceases and attention can be directed to this higher
level sensory input.
Geometrically the em bodies of our dead relatives would exist in the geometric past and now, perhaps
already in a re-incarnated form. This allows several explanation for the experience of meeting dead or
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living relatives. A very concrete model would be based on electromagnetic bridges formed by magnetic
mirrors and connecting us with our relatives and friends. This would make possible for us to see them in
ELF light just like we would see ourselves.
The experience about meeting deceased relatives could be also understood as a special kind of geometric memory. Generation of the long term memory means classically looking to a magnetic mirror
at classical level and seing the me of the past in the mirror. It is however possible to see someone else
in the mirror since the magnetic flux tube from the mirror could continue to the body of the deceased
relative of friend instead of my body. In the usual states of consciousness the sensory input from the
psychological now dominates and this contribution is masked. In near death experiences sensory input
from the geometric now is diminished and the transpersonal background contribution becomes unmasked.
2.7
What after biological death?
Biological death could mean the loss of sub-self representing body image and involve extension of the
physical self: this would explain out of body experiences and near death experiences (person near death
looking his body from outside). In fact, an attractive hypothesis, motivated by the quantum model of
brain, is that the topological field quanta associated with photons generated by EEG currents having
size of order Earth by Uncertainty Principle, could correspond to selves in our personal self hierarchy.
Also magnetic flux tube structures associated with body and brain could have similar sizes and serve
as a magnetic body [8]. In biological death these ELF selves could continue to oscillate as Schumann
resonances in the wave cavity between Earth’s surface and ionosphere interacting with magnetic flux tube
structures!
If one believes that even cell sized structures have their own CDs then the primary p-adic length scale
defined by the size scale of a large neuron (10−4 meters) would correspond to a time scale of the order
of the age of the Universe! It seems implausible that these CDs could disappear totally although zero
energy ontology in principle allows it.
Biological body is accompanied by magnetic body and radiation body which provide representation for
the physical (or better to say, material) body. The latter consists of radiation selves (massless extremals
representing topologically rays of light) representing classically the ELF radiation fields generated by
EEG currents, one is led to ask what happens for these em selves in biological death. Some of them
correspond to resonant frequencies of the em fields in the 80 km thick wave cavity between Earth surface
and ionosphere known as Schumann frequencies and one can consider the possibility that that something
which might be called soul remains after the biological death and is represented as Schumann resonances.
The most plausible hypothesis is that both ULF MEs and magnetic flux tube structures remaining
after physical death together with the 4-dimensional body of geometric past define our self after the
biological death. This leads to the following speculative vision about consciousness after the biological
death.
1. The transformation of intentions to actions ceases in the biological death so that the dominating
contribution of the psychological now to the experience disappears and conscious experience becomes
kind of four-dimensional life review in which also the contributions from other bodies (say deceased
relatives) appear as unmasked.
2. The geometric past, or rather experiences about it, can be gradually refined but no big changes are
possible, so that a totally new life based on different decisions does not seem to be possible. The
assumption about totally new life would also lead to paradoxes. On the other hand, the instability
of the long term memories suggests that the memories about the past life could be edited. The
conscious experience contains also the contribution of the magnetic body continuing to exist.
3. The surviving magnetic body could attach to some new organism which it begins to use as a
sensory and motor organ. The re-incarnation would have the memories of the past life as an
unconscious background masked strongly by the sensory input and coming clearly conscious only
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in some altered states of consciousness. The reports about children remembering they previous life
could be understood in this conceptual framework. This of course makes one wonder whether young
children could remember their past lives. Perhaps someone should ask!
4. ZEO inspired view about state function reduction suggests more concrete view. The new self is
generated at the previously active boundary of CD assignable to the biological body and the new
life is lived in reversed direction.
2.8
Does soul exist in some sense?
An open question is what happens for the space-time sheet (or CD) assignable to self after biological
death.
1. Could this space-time sheet or CD be called soul? Does this soul continue drift in light-cone and
get attached to some new material system. Or can it disappear in quantum jump? This would not
be a reincarnation in the usual sense of the word. The re-incarnation in the usual sense if the word
would mean that one has memories about the life of someone whose has lived in past. In TGD
Universe this is quite possible since the mechanisms of remote mental interactions are basically the
same as the interaction mechanisms making possible for the magnetic body to control the biological
body receive information from it.
2. ”Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny” principle suggests that the evolution of an individual is image
for the evolution of the entire universe. Biological death would be only a metamorphosis to some new
form of existence, perhaps as topologically quantized classical fields associated with the biological
body. Magnetic flux tube structures having sizes measured in scale of light lifetime are especially
promising candidates for the components of electromagnetic body surviving in the death of what
is usually identified as the biological body. Some experimental facts lead to rather precise ideas
about the geometric representation of our selves and also suggest that our existence continues in
electromagnetic form after death [4].
3. An attractive identification of ”soul” would be as negentropic entanglement resources - Akashic
records - serving also as a quantum correlate of love and other positive atributes of consciousness.
Could this negentropic entanglement become conscious (be read) in repeated state function reductions or is the counterpart of interaction free quantum measurement require for this to happen?
Indirect support for the survival of space-time sheets carrying associated with negentropic entanglement/large hef f after death comes from rather unexpected direction.
1. The phenomenon of phantom DNA suggesting that dark space-time sheets associated with DNA
remain in the chamber which contained DNA: in the experiments of Poponin [1] the signature of
phantom DNA is its interaction with laser light at visible frequencies. Phantom DNA would be
represented by mind-like space-time sheets with size of at least the wavelength of visible light (10−7
meters). The em selves remaining after our death would have consirably larger size! One can
however consider the possibility that some detectable interaction between ELF frequency em fields
and ”phantom brain” could be possible and make it possible to prove experimentally the presence
of em soul!
2. The claimed successes of homeopathy (for phantom DNA and homeopathy see [9] and [5] ). could
also have explanation in terms of the mind-like space-time sheets. Homeopathic drugs are fabricated
by a repeated dilution of the active drug so that the concentration of the drug in solution becomes
extremely low. The method of fabrication could however imply that final product contains quite
many mind-like space-time sheets of the drug molecules. These mind-like space-time sheets might be
able to affect the sickness since the mind-like space-time sheets provide a cognitive representation
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for drug and this mimicry could ”cheat” the patient to cure. The law of similarities could have
something to do with the mechanism involved.
More concretely, a given quantum transition frequency characterizing the medicine would be represented as ME with length equal to the wavelength associated with the transition frequency. The
electromagnetic body of the molecule could be mimicked by liquid crystal water blobs producing
similar transition frequencies and thus containing similar MEs in their electromagnetic bodies. The
effect of the medicine would be mediated by the electromagnetic body so that the ”fake” medicine
could indeed cure.
Some support for the extension of self in death is provided by near death experiences (NDEs). For
instance, looking one’s body from outside could mean that self is entangled with a larger self formed by
the personnel of hospital in the hospital room and sees patient’s body with the eyes of the personnel. This
experience could be understood as experience of, say self representing hospital room: in this experience the
visual experiences of persons in the hospital room would fuse to the experience experienced by patient
entangled with the hospital room. Meeting one’s relatives and elders could mean entanglement with
a larger self formed by the selves of dead and living relatives. This larger self could experience the
abstracted experiences of dead and living relatives. Also the ability of subjects of surgical operations
to occasionally remember about events occurred during unconscious state, supports this view. Magnetic
flux tube structures are the most plausible candidates for the ”body” remaining in physical death: this
point is discussed in more detail in [4].
2.9
Is it possible to get into contact with deceased?
There is a lot of anecdotal evidence consistent with life after death. Near-death experiences are not
the only manner to get convinced for life after death. So called eye-movement de-sensitization and
reprocessing (EMDR) discovered by Francine Shapiro [2, 3] induces what could be interpreted as afterdeath communications.
1. The experiences of subject persons can be induced by this therapy in highly reliable manner: according to [2] 98 per cent of patients willing to participate the therapy had after death communication
experience It does not matter what the religious convictions of the subject person are and the experiences are actually rather easy to induce. It does not matter if the loss is traumatic or not or
whether it is recent or occurred for decades in past.
2. The experiences resemble near death experiences (light tunnels, beautiful landscapes) and involve
spiritual contact with the deceased. The EMDR technique involves getting the patient to move his
or her eyes in a particular rhythmic fashion while at the same time attending to a particular aspect
of the traumatic memory.
3. How EMRD works is poorly understood as yet: possibly the fact that the shifting of eyes leads to
increased brain processing is of importance. Notice that rapid eye movements REM are also involved
with dreams. A possible explanation is that EMDR experiences could involve communication with
the recent selves of the deceased ones located possibly in the geometric recent or past and represented
by magnetic flux tube structure and MEs interacting with them.
3
Good and Evil
The vision about life as something in the intersection of real and p-adic worlds together with the notion
of negentropic entanglement gives hopes for understanding the quantum correlates of evolution and even
ethics. The basic principle would be that good deeds generate negentropic entanglement and Negentropy
Maximization Principle - perhaps suitably generalized from its original form- would define the basic
principle of ethics.
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3.1
Quantum ethics very briefly
The proposal is that the basic ethical principle is that good deeds help evolution to occur. This proposal
can be criticized. Evolution should correspond to the increase of negentropic entanglement. NMP in
trong forces it and in weak form allows it.
1. If strong form of NMP prevails, one can worry that TGD Universe does not allow Evil at all, perhaps
not even genuine free will! No-one wants Evil but Evil seems to be present in this world.
2. Could one weaken NMP so that it does not force but only allows to make a reduction to a final
state characterized by density matrix which is projection operator? Self would choose whether to
perform a projection to some sub-space of this subspace, say 1-D ray as in ordinary state function
reduction. NMP would be like Christian God allowing the sinner to choose between Good and Evil.
The final entanglement negentropy would be measure for the goodness of the deed. This is so if
entanglement negentropy is a correlate for love. Deeds which are done with love would be good.
Reduction of entanglement would in turn mean loneliness and separation.
3. Or could could think that the definition of good deed is as a selection between deeds, which correspond to the same maximal increase of negentropy so that NMP cannot tell what happens. For
instance the density matrix operator is direct sum of projection operators of same dimension but
varying coefficients and there is a selection between these. It is difficult to imagine what the criterion for a good deed could be in this case. And how self can know what is the good deed and what
is the bad deed.
Good deeds would support evolution. There are many manners to interpret evolution in TGD Universe.
1. p-Adic evolution would mean a gradual increase of the p-adic primes characterizing individual
partonic 2-surfaces and therefore their size. The identification of p-adic space-time sheets as representations for cognitions gives additional concreteness to this vision. The earlier proposal that
p-adic–real-phase transitions correspond to realization of intentions and formations of cognitions
seems however to be wrong. Instead, adelic view that both real and p-adic sectors are present
simultaneously and that fermions at string world sheets correspond to the intersection of realities
and p-adicities seems more realistic.
The inclusion of phases q = exp(i2π/n) in the algebraic extension of p-adics allows to define the
notion of angle in p-adic context but only with a finite resolution since only finite number of angles
are represented as phases for a given value of n. The increase of the integers n could be interpreted
as the emergence of higher algebraic extensions of p-adic numbers in the intersection of the real and
p-adic worlds. These observations suggest that all three views about evolution are closely related.
2. The hierarchy of Planck constants suggests evolution as the gradual increase of the Planck constant
characterizing p-adic space-time sheet (or partonic 2-surface for the minimal option). The original
vision about this evolution was as a migration to the pages of the book like structure defined by the
generalized imbedding space and has therefore quite concrete geometric meaning. It implies longer
time scales of long term memory and planned action and macroscopic quantum coherence in longer
scales.
The new view is in terms of first quantum jumps to the opposite boundary of CD leading to the
death of self and its re-incarnation at the opposite boundary.
3. The vision about life as something in the intersection of real and p-adic words allows to see evolution
information theoretically as the increase of number entanglement negentropy implying entanglement
in increasing length scales. This option is equivalent with the second view and consistent with the
first one if the effective p-adic topology characterizes the real partonic 2-surfaces in the intersection
of p-adic and real worlds.
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The third kind of evolution would mean also the evolution of spiritual consciousness if the proposed
interpretation is correct. In each quantum jump U -process generates a superposition of states in which
any sub-system can have both real and algebraic entanglement with the external world. If state function
reduction process involves also the choice of the type of entanglement it could be interpreted as a choice
between good and evil. The hedonistic complete freedom resulting as the entanglement entropy is reduced
to zero on one hand, and the negentropic entanglement implying correlations with the external world and
meaning giving up the maximal freedom on the other hand. The selfish option means separation and
loneliness. The second option means expansion of consciousness - a fusion to the ocean of consciousness
as described by spiritual practices.
In this framework one could understand the physics correlates of ethics and moral. The ethics is simple:
evolution of consciousness to higher levels is a good thing. Anything which tends to reduce consciousness
represents violence and is a bad thing. Moral rules are related to the relationship between individual
and society and presumably develop via self-organization process and are by no means unique. Moral
rules however tend to optimize evolution. As blind normative rules they can however become a source
of violence identified as any action which reduces the level of consciousness. There is an entire hierarchy
of selves and every self has the selfish desire to survive and moral rules develop as a kind of compromise
and evolve all the time. ZEO leads to the notion that I have christened cosmology of consciousness. It
forces to extend the concept of society to four-dimensional society.
There is an entire hierarchy of selves and every self has the selfish desire to survive and moral rules
develop as a kind of compromise and evolve all the time. The newest progress in this evolution is brought
by the cosmology of consciousness, which forces to extend the concept of society to four-dimensional
society! The decisions of ”me now” affect both my past and future and time like quantum entanglement
makes possible conscious communication in time direction by sharing conscious experiences. One can
therefore speak of genuinely four-dimensional society. Besides my next-door neighbors I had better to
take into account also my nearest neighbors in past and future (the nearest ones being perhaps copies of
me!). If I make wrong decisions those copies of me in future and past will suffer the most. Perhaps my
personal hell and paradise are here and are created mostly by me.
3.2
What could the quantum correlates of moral be?
We make moral choices all the time. Some deeds are good, some deeds are bad. In the world of materialist
there are no moral choices, the deeds are not good or bad, there are just physical events. I am not a
materialist so that I cannot avoid questions such as how do the moral rules emerge and how some deeds
become good and some deeds bad. Negentropic entanglement is the obvious first guess if one wants to
understand emergence of moral.
1. One can start from ordinary quantum entanglement. It corresponds to a superposition of pairs of
states. Second state corresponds to the internal state of the self and second state to a state of
external world or biological body of self. In negentropic quantum entanglement each is replaced
with a pair of sub-spaces of state spaces of self and external world. The dimension of the sub-space
depends on the which pair is in question. In state function reduction one of these pairs is selected
and deed is done. How to make some of these deeds good and some bad?
2. Obviously the value of hef f /h = n gives the criterion in the case that weak form of NMP holds true.
Recall that weak form of NMP allows only the possibility to generate negentropic entanglement but
does not force it. NMP is like God allowing the possibility to do good but not forcing good deeds.
Self can choose any sub-space of the subspace defined by n-dimensional projector and 1-D subspace
corresponds to the standard quantum measurement. For n = 1 the state function reduction leads
to vanishing negentropy, and separation of self and the target of the action. Negentropy does not
increase in this action and self is isolated from the target: kind of price for sin.
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For the maximal dimension of this sub-space the negentropy gain is maximal. This deed would
be good and by the proposed criterion the negentropic entanglement corresponds to love or more
neutrally, positively colored conscious experience. Interestingly, there are 2n − 1 possible choices
which is almost the dimension of Boolean algebra consisting of n independent bits. The excluded
option corresponds to 0-dimensional sub-space - empty set in set theoretic realization of Boolean
algebra. This could relate directly to fermionic oscillator operators defining basis of Boolean algebrahere Fock vacuum would be the excluded state. The deed in this sense would be a choice of how
loving the attention towards system of external world is.
3. A map between between the different choices of k-dimensional sub-space to k-fermion states is
suggestive. The realization of logic in terms of emotions of different degrees of positivity would be
mapped to many-fermion states - perhaps zero energy states with vanishing total fermion number.
State function reductions to k-dimensional spaces would be mapped to k-fermion states: quantum
jumps to quantum states!
The problem brings in mind quantum classical correspondence in quantum measurement theory.
The direction of the pointer of the measurement apparatus (in very metaphoral sense) corresponds
to the outcome of state function reduction, which is now 1-d subspace. For ordinary measurement the pointer has n positions. Now it must have 2n − 1 positions. To the discrete space of n
pointer positions one must assign fermionic Clifford algebra of second quantized fermionic oscillator
operators. The hierarchy of Planck constants and dark matter suggests the realization. Replace
the pointer with its space-time n-sheeted covering and consider zero energy energy states made of
pairs of k-fermion states at the sheets of the n-sheeted covering? Dark matter would be therefore
necessary for cognition. The role of fermions would be to ”mark” the k space-time sheets in the
covering.
One can make further questions.
1. Could the moral rules of society be represented as this kind of entanglement patterns between its
members? Here one of course has entire fractal hierarchy of societies corresponding different length
scales. Attention and magnetic flux tubes serving as its correlates is the basic element also in TGD
inspired quantum biology already at the level of bio-molecules and even elementary particles. The
value of hef f /h = n associated with the magnetic flux tube connecting members of the pair, would
serve as a measure for the ethical value of maximally good deed. Dark phases of matter would
correspond to good: usually darkness is associated with bad!
2. These moral rules seem to be universal. There are however also moral rules or should one talk
about rules of survival, which are based on negative emotions such as fear. Moral rules as rules of
desired behavior are often tailored for the purposes of power holder. How this kind of moral rules
could develop? Maybe they cannot be realized in terms of negentropic entanglement. Maybe the
superposition of the allowed alternatives for the deed contains only the alternatives allowed by the
power holder and the superposition in question corresponds to ordinary entanglement for which the
signature is simple: the probabilities of various options are different. This forces the self to choose
just one option from the options that power holder accepts. These rules do not allow the generation
of loving relationship.
Moral rules seem to be generated by society, up-bringing, culture, civilization. How the moral rules
develop? One can try to formulate and answer in terms of quantum physical correlates.
1. Basically the rules should be generated in the state function reductions which correspond to volitional action which corresponds to the first state function reduction to the earlier active boundary
of CD. Old self dies and new self is born at the opposite boundary of CD and the arrow of time
associated with CD changes.
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2. The repeated sequences of state function reductions can generate negentropic entanglement during
the quantum evolutions between them. This time evolution would be the analog for the time
evolution defined by Hamiltonian - that is energy - associated with ordinary time translation whereas
the first state function reduction at the opposite boundary inducing scaling of hef f and CD would
be accompanied by time evolution defined by conformal scaling generator L0 .
Note that the state at passive boundary does not change during the sequence of repeated state
function reductions. These repeated reductions however change the parts of zero energy states
associated with the new active boundary and generate also negentropic entanglement. As the self
dies the moral choices can made if the weak form of NMP is true.
3. Who makes the moral choices? It looks of course very weird that self would apply free will only at
the moment of its death or birth! The situation is saved by the fact that self has also sub-selves,
which correspond to sub-CDs and represent mental images of self. We know that mental images die
as also we do some day and are born again (as also we do some day) and these mental images can
generate negentropic resources within CD of self.
One can argue that these mental images do not decide about whether to do maximally ethical choice
at the moment of death. The decision must be made by a self at higher level. It is me who decides
about the fate of my mental images - to some degree also after their death! I can choose the how
negentropic the quantum entanglement characterizing the relationship of my mental image and the
world outside it. I realize, that the misused idea of positive thinking seems to unavoidably creep in!
I have however no intention to make money with it!
4. It is difficult to avoid an association with the basic myth of Christianity about the death of God’s
Son which is said to mean that sins of sinners are forgiven. How could one make sense of this? Or
is the Freudian interpretation the only possible explanation? If negentropy increases as self dies,
the paradox begins to disappear. God was self and his Son was his mental image, whose death
increased the negentropic resources of the Universe and made it better. We are Gods of our mental
images and we are mental images of higher level Gods.
3.3
Do positively colored emotions allow a representation of Boolean logic?
Weak form of NMP allows the state function reduction to occur in 2n − 1 manners corresponding to
subspaces of the sub-space defined by n-dimensional projector if the density matrix is n-dimensional
projector (the outcome corresponding to 0-dimensional subspace and is excluded). If the probability for
the outcome of state function reduction is same for all values of the dimension 1 ≤ m ≤ n, the probability
distribution for outcome is given by binomial distribution B(n, p) for p = 1/2 (head and tail are equally
probable) and given by p(m) = b(n, m)×2−n = (n!/m!(n−m)!)×2−n . This gives for the average dimesion
E(m) = n/2 so that the negentropy would increase on the average. The world would become gradually
better. Note that one assumes that there is some preferred basis for the states and these numbers apply
when this basis is given.
One cannot avoid the idea that these different degrees of negentropic entanglement could actually give
a realization of Boolean algebra in terms of conscious experiences.
1. There should be a mapping of k-dimensional subspaces of n-dimensional space to the fermionic
representation of Boolean algebra
2. Could one speak about a hierarchies of codes of cognition based on the assignment of different
degrees of ”feeling good” to the Boolean statements? If one assumes that the n:th bit is always 1,
all independent statements except one correspond at least two non-vanishing bits and corresponds
to negentropic entanglement. Only of statement (only last bit equal to 1) would correspond 1 bit
and to state function reduction reducing the entanglement completely (brings in mind the fruit in
the tree of Good and Bad Knowlege!).
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3. A given Q
hierarchy of breakings of super-symplectic symmetry corresponds to a hierarchy of integers
ni+1 = k≤i mk . The codons of the first code would consist of sequences of m1 bits. The codons
of the second code consists of m2 codons of the first code and so on. One would have a hierarchy
in which codons of previous level become the letters of the code words at the next level of the
hierarchy.
In fact, I ended up with almost Boolean algebra for decades ago when considering the hierarchy of
genetic codes suggested by the hierarchy of Mersenne primes M (n + 1) = MM (n) , Mn = 2n − 1.
1. The hierarchy starting from M2 = 3 contains the Mersenne primes 3, 7, 127, 2127 − 1 and Hilbert
conjectured that all these integers are primes. These numbers are almost dimensions of Boolean
algebras with n = 2, 3, 7, 127 bits. The maximal Boolean sub-algebras have m = n − 1 = 1, 2, 6, 126
bits.
2. The observation that m = 6 gives 64 elements led to the proposal that it corresponds to a Boolean
algebraic assignable to genetic code and that the sub-algebra represents maximal number of independent statements defining analogs of axioms. The remaining elements would correspond to
negations of these statements. I also proposed that the Boolean algebra with m = 126 = 6 × 21
bits (21 pieces consisting of 6 bits) corresponds to what I called memetic code obviously realizable
as sequences of 21 DNA codons with stop codons included. Emotions and information are closely
related and peptides are regarded as both information molecules and molecules of emotion.
3. This hierarchy of codes would have the additional property that the Boolean algebra at n + 1:th
level can be regarded as the set of statements about statements of the previous level. One would
have a hierarchy representing thoughts about thoughts about.... It should be emphasized that there
is no need to assume that the Hilbert’s conjecture is true.
m
One can obtain this kind of hierarchies as hierarchies with dimensions m, 2m , 22 , ... that is n(i+1) =
2n(i) . The conditions that n(i) divides n(i + 1) is non-trivial only for at the lowest step and implies
that m is power of 2 so that the hierarchies starting from m = 2k . This is natural since Boolean
algebras are involved. If n corresponds to the size scale of CD, it would come as a power of 2.
p-Adic length scale hypothesis has also led to this conjecture. A related conjecture is that the sizes
of CDs correspond to secondary p-adic length scales which indeed come as powers of two. In case of
electron this predicts that the minimal size of CD associated with electron corresponds to time scale
T = .1 seconds, the fundamental time scale in living matter (10 Hz is the fundamental biorhythm).
It seems that the basic hypothesis of TGD inspired partly by the study of elementary particle mass
spectrum and basic bio-scales (there are 4 p-adic length scales defined by Gaussian Mersenne primes
in the range between cell membrane thickness 10 nm and and size 2.5 µm of cell nucleus!) follow
from the proposed connection between emotions and Boolean cognition.
Hilbert’s conjecture relates in interesting manner to space-time dimension. Suppose that Hilbert’s
conjecture fails and only the four lowest Mersenne integers in the hierarchy are Mersenne primes that is
3, 7, 127, 2127 − 1. In TGD one has hierarchy of dimensions associated with space-time surface coming
as 0, 1, 2, 4 plus imbedding space dimension 8. The abstraction hierarchy associated with space-time
dimensions would correspond discretization of partonic 2-surfaces as point set, discretization of 3-surfaces
as a set of strings connecting partonic 2-surfaces characterized by discrete parameters, discretization
of space-time surfaces as a collection of string world sheet with discretized parameters, and maybe discretization of imbedding space by a collection of space-time surfaces. Discretization means that the
parameters in question are algebraic numbers in an extension of rationals associated with p-adic numbers.
In TGD framework it is clear why imbedding space cannot be higher-dimensional and why the hierarchy does not continue. Could there be a deeper connection between these two hierarchies. For instance,
could it be that higher dimensional manifolds of dimension 2 × n can be represented physically only as
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unions of say n 2-D partonic 2-surfaces (just like 3 × N dimensional space can be represented as configuration space of N point-like particles)? Also infinite primes define a hierarchy of abstractions. Could it
be that one has also now similar restriction so that the hierarchy would have only finite number of levels,
say four. Note that the notion of n-group and n-algebra involves an analogous abstraction hierarchy.
3.4
Some questions
There are still many questions that are waiting for more detailed answer. These questions are also a good
manner to detect logical inconsistencies.
1. What is the size of CD characterizing self? For electron it would be at least of the order of Earth
size. During the lifetime of CD the size of CD increases and the order of magnitude is measured in
light-life time for us. This would allow to understand our usual deeds affecting the environment in
terms of our subselves and their entanglement with the external world which is actually our internal
world, at least if magnetic bodies are considered.
2. Can one assume that the dynamics inside CD is independent from what happens outside CD.
Can one say that the boundaries of CD define the ends of space-time or does space-time continue
outside them. Do the boundaries of CD define boundaries for 4-D spotlight of attention or for one
particular reality? Does the answer to this question have any relevance if everything physically
testable is formulated in term physics of string world sheets associated with space-time surfaces
inside CD?
Note that the (average) size of CDs (, which could be in superposition but need not if every repeated
state function reduction is followed by a localization in the moduli space of CDs) increases during
the life cycle of self. This makes possible generation of negentropic entanglement between more and
more distant systems. I have written about the possibility that ZEO could make possible interaction
with distant civilizations [10]. The possibility of having communications in both time directions
would allow to circumvent the barrier due to the finite light-velocity, and gravitational quantum
coherence in cosmic scales would make possible negentropic entanglement.
3. How selves interact? CDs as spot-lights of attention should overlap in order that the interaction is
possible. Formation of flux tubes makes possible quantum entanglement. The string world sheets
carrying fermions also essential correlates of entanglement and the possibly entanglement is between
fermions associated with partonic 2-surfaces. The string world sheets define the intersection of real
and p-adic worlds, where cognition and life resides.
3.5
How the law of Karma could be realized?
The existence of self hierarchy means that our deeds are remembered also after our death at higher level
of self hierarchy although only as an abstracted summary. Also the shadow me which is born at the
opposite boundary of my personal CD remembers my deeds like a person remembers his dreams just after
wake-up.
One can therefore ask whether the law of Karma or something akin to it might be implied by basic
principles of consciousness theory.
First of all, self has two life strategies: be a sinner or saint. Sinner is selfish and minimizes the
dependence on the environment be avoiding negentropic entanglement. Saint does the opposite and
develops love towards surrounding world.
1. Self can fight for the metabolic energy feed giving rise to the self-organization of self. This strategy
works as long as self is a young, brisk and arrogant sinner. Sinners are not desirable mental images
from the point of view of higher level self since they induce a lot of entropic mental images (pain).
This strategy is also in conflict with the possible goal of the higher level self to achieve fusion of its
own mental images.
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2. Self can attempt to share mental images by quantum entangling its sub-selves with the sub-selves of
other, possibly, higher level selves. This mechanism gives rise to quantum metabolism and expanded
states of consciousness, favors the generation of social structures, and means fusion of mental images
from the point of view of higher level self. The cognitive mental images of the saintlike self are highly
negentropic and favored by p-adic NMP.
On basis of these findings the policy for higher level selves looks obvious: try to get rid of the unpleasant
mental images represented by sinners. Higher level self could apply this policy for purely selfish reasons:
too bad sinners might affect like a poison to the moral level of the higher level self and, since the law
of Karma is universal, could eventually lead to the decline of the higher level self to a lower level of the
hierarchy: the world would seem to be a tough place also after death!
3.6
What ”liberation” might mean?
The strong analogies with eastern spirituality encourage to ask whether the TGD inspired quantum
counterpart for the concept of liberation might make sense.
1. Quantum-classical correspondence suggests that the endless evolution at the level of the entire
universe corresponds to endless evolution at the level of individual so that the notion of liberation
would make sense only as kind of transformation to a higher level of consciousness.
2. In the real context selves having only single mental image or no mental images at all are in state
of ”oneness” and experience no divisions and separations since the analysis process represented by
state function reductions and self measurements is absent. This kind of state realized at the level
of field body is a possible candidate for enlightened state. Certainly it cannot last forever.
3. Liberation experience might also relate to the experience of ”cosmic consciousness”. Most naturally
a generation of negentropic entanglement fusing self to a self at higher level of self hierarchy. The
fear about the loss of consciousness is what gives self an ego, since ego is something which can be lost.
This can happen via the generation of entropic bound state entanglement with some other system.
This can happen for any subsystem of Universe but not for the entire Universe enjoying an eternal
state of consciousness. The state of cosmic consciousness thus means being a self without ego. The
counterpart for this would be negentropic entanglement. Leaving aside the question whether we
are able to experience ideal cosmic consciousness, one can consider the possibility that even human
beings could achieve a state of consciousness in which the loss of consciousness is highly un-probable
and that this loss of ego is synonymous with the experience of liberation.
The term ”cosmic consciousness” looks somewhat pompous notion to anyone identifying himself with
his suffering biological body and it would be certainly very difficult to sell this concept to a neuroscientist. The notion of magnetic body, the hierarchy of Planck constants, and the identification of quantum
gravitational bound states in terms of astroscopic quantum coherence assignable to gravitational Planck
constant, allow to take this notion seriously. In ZEO the arrow of geometric time can change so that
finite light velocity does not prevent instantaneous communications over cosmic distances so that communications with life forms in distant galaxies become possible. I have considered a concrete model for
what might be involved in [10].
References
[1] V. Poponin. DNA PHANTOM EFFECT: Direct Measurement of a New Field in the Vacuum Substructure. http://www.webcom/~hrtmath/IHM/ResearchPapers/DNAPhantom/DNAPhantom.html,
1996.
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Pitkänen, M., On Life, Death, Good and Evil
[2] A. L. Botkin. The Induction of After-Dearth Communications Utilizing Eye-Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing: A New Discovery. Journal of Near-Death Studies, (3):181, 2000.
[3] F. Shapiro. Eye moment densensitization and reprocessing: Principles, processes and procedures.
Guilford, New York, 1995.
[4] M. Pitkänen. Biological Realization of Self Hierarchy. In Bio-Systems as Self-Organizing Quantum Systems. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/bioselforg/bioselforg.html#
bioselfc, 2006.
[5] M. Pitkänen. Homeopathy in Many-Sheeted Space-Time. In Bio-Systems as Conscious Holograms.
Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/hologram/hologram.html#homeoc, 2006.
[6] M. Pitkänen. Negentropy Maximization Principle. In TGD Inspired Theory of Consciousness.
Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdconsc/tgdconsc.html#nmpc, 2006.
[7] M. Pitkänen. Quantum Model for Paranormal Phenomena. In TGD Inspired Theory of Consciousness. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdconsc/tgdconsc.html#parac, 2006.
[8] M. Pitkänen. Quantum Model for Sensory Representations. In TGD Inspired Theory of Consciousness. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdconsc/tgdconsc.html#expc, 2006.
[9] M. Pitkänen. Wormhole Magnetic Fields. In Quantum Hardware of Living Matter. Onlinebook.
http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/bioware/bioware.html#wormc, 2006.
[10] M. Pitkänen. Meditation, Mind-Body Medicine and Placebo: TGD point of view. In TGD based view
about living matter and remote mental interactions. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_
html/pdfpool/panel.pdf, 2012.
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Title:
CONSCIOUSNESS: A DIRECT LINK WITH LIFE’S ORIGIN?
Authors:
A. N. Mitra1
and
G. Mitra-Delmotte2, Ph.D.
1
Emeritus, Department of Physics, Delhi University, Delhi-110007; 244 Tagore Park,
Delhi-110009; e.mail: ganmitra@nde.vsnl.net.in
2
39 Cite de l’Ocean, Montgaillard, 97400 St.Denis, Reunion Island ;
e.mail: gargijj@orange.fr
Abstract: Inspired by the Penrose-Hameroff thesis, we are intuitively led to examine an
intriguing correspondence of ‘induction’ (by fields), with the complex phenomenon of
(metabolism-sustained) consciousness: Did sequences of associated induction patterns in
field-susceptible biomatter have simpler beginnings?
Keywords: mind-matter; field-driven assembly; induction; environment; solitons;
coherence; magnetism.
1. Introduction
Consciousness is a many-splendoured thing, whose anatomy has been under scrutiny
almost since the birth of civilization. We have come a long way from the times when this
term was associated with religion and spiritualism, to the present era when serious efforts
are directed towards understanding it in the language of Science (Penrose 1995;
Hameroff 2003). During this saga, physical science has progressed all the way from
Newtonian mechanics (when Cartesian Partition ruled against such efforts) to the birth of
relativity and quantum mechanics when sheer compulsions of logical self-consistency
demanded that Cartesian Partition was no longer tenable and that mind and matter could
no longer be divorced from each other. This was despite Bohr’s Copenhagen
Interpretation which had effectively decreed against difficult logical questions being
asked about quantum mechanics. But Einstein could not accept this dictum and produced
his EPR paper (Einstein et al 1935) ostensibly designed to demolish the tenets of
quantum mechanics, but serendipitously treaded on a most fertile land as a logical
consequence of the new paradigm, namely quantum entanglement and non-locality. This
was directly at variance with the concept of local realism, the bedrock of the Copenhagen
Interpretation. Since both could not be right at the same time, it took another half a
century to decide on the issue: Alan Aspect, through his famous experiment (Aspect et al
1982), gave the verdict in favour of EPR’s entanglement and non-locality and in so
doing, ruled out Bohr’s local causality. In the meantime Copenhagen had got rather
outdated due to the emergence of decoherence, thanks to a two-decade-old development
bearing on the very foundations of quantum mechanics (following the Aspect discovery)
which gave an increasingly active role to the environment (see below for its fuller
ramifications).
This episode offers a possible setting for bringing mind and matter on a common
platform, since a direct touch with reality of these bizarre quantum concepts have willynilly got these two entities “mutually entangled”! One may wonder how this
‘Frankenstein’ (read science with all its tools) which is the product of the human mind in
the first place, has come to challenge its own Creator, and probe its `anatomy’.
This essay is an attempt to string together some scientific advances designed to
reduce the complex phenomena of consciousness (Sect.2-5), and to map (Sect.6-7) the
resulting scenario to simpler ingredients that may have been available in the Hadean.
2. Bohm’s Thesis: Integral Duality of Mind and Matter
For historical reasons, we start with a semi-intuitive model due to David Bohm
(1990) who was led, by the conflict of quantum theory (discreteness) with GTR
(continuous matter), to propose the existence of an undivided wholeness present in an
implicate order which applies to both matter and mind, so that it can in principle access
the relationship between these two different things. In this picture, matter and mind are
seen as relative projections into an explicate order from the reality of the implicate order,
with apparently no connection between them. Only at the deeper, fundamental level of
the universe, does there exist an unbroken wholeness in which mind (consciousness?)
merges with matter-- something akin to a holographic image of the brain (Pribram 1975).
Bohm also illustrates the idea of `meaning’ through the example of listening to music as a
sequence of overlapping moments each with a short but finite interval of time. To
produce the notes, one moment ‘induces’ the next, such that the content that was
implicate in the immediate past, becomes explicate in the next interval (the immediate
present). The sense of movement in music is thus the result of a sequence of overlapping
transitions, thus producing consciousness from an implicate order. Consciousness is thus
seen to be intimately related to the concept of `time’ –not merely a ‘duration’, in the
sense of classical mechanics, but an active ingredient bearing on consciousness that
reveals a world of continuous and unfolding events, a la Bergson (2001[1889]). Bohm
(1990) further suggests that the tiny electron is an inseparable union of particle and (not
or) field wherein the latter (like consciousness) organizes the movement of the former
(like body). This is in line with Bohm’s (1952) earlier thesis on quantum mechanics with
“hidden variables” wherein guiding waves determine the motion of the associated
particles.
3. Quantum Coherence in Biology
Next, quantum coherence, which is naturally associated with quantum mechanics,
is considered as a key ingredient in a more recent approach to consciousness studies,
questioning the validity of purely algorithmic prescriptions for addressing phenomena
like human insight. To deal with this issue of “non-computability”, Penrose (1995)
suggests a new role for the environment, viz., as an “external guide” influencing
decisions in an algorithmic system, and for this a necessary condition is its quantum
coherence. For a more concrete representation of such a picture in a biosystem, let us
look at Frohlich’s (1968) coherent excitations envisaged for cell membranes. Now, a
stationary state is reached if the energy fed into an assembled material with polar
vibrational modes, is sufficiently larger than that lost to bath degrees of freedom. Then, in
the words of Frohlich (1968), “The long-range Coulomb interaction then causes this
energy to be shared with other dipoles. …the dipoles will tend to oscillate coherently
provided the energy supply is sufficiently large compared with the energy loss. Nonlinear effects are likely to reduce this loss with increasing excitation and effectively
transfer the system into a metastable state in which the energy supplied locally to dipolar
constituents is channelled into a single longitudinal mode which exhibits long-range
phase correlations”. Of course, the energy of the metabolic drive must be large enough,
and the dielectric properties of the materials concerned need to have a matching capacity
for maintaining (and withstanding) extremely high electric fields (Frohlich 1975). This is
similar to Bose-Einstein condensation, in which a large number of particles participate in
a single quantum state, i.e., behaving as one with a wave function applicable for a single
particle, albeit scaled up appropriately. Despite their much higher than ‘absolute zero’
temperatures, it seems that coherence conditions are not only met in bio-systems, but that
there is some direct experimental evidence too (Grundler and Keilmann 1983) of 1011 Hz
oscillations predicted by Frohlich (1968). If this seems surprising vis-a-vis physical
systems, note that it is because of (not despite!) the warm and soft sol-gel state that
efficient nano-machines actually harness thermal fluctuations (Bustamante et al 2005, see
below) in biology, where energy transformations occur under isothermal conditions.
4. Penrose-Hameroff Model: New Role for the Environment
In looking for appropriate biomaterials that on supplying with energy led to
Frohlich-like excitations in the sub-nanosecond range, the Penrose-Hameroff model
zeroes in on microtubules having the required ingredients of voltage effects and a
geometry favoring "coupling among subunits" (Hameroff 2003) for acting as reservoirs
of highly ordered energy. The early-evolved cytoskeleton forms the basic ‘building
block’ in their new fractal perspective of the nervous system, which argues for a change
in paradigm so that the sophisticated actions of animals down to single celled ones (all
affected by general anaesthetics at about the same concentration) can be explained using
only one basic control system (Penrose 1995). Now functional protein conformations
appear to be correlated to such collective “metastable states” mediated via the
surroundings: "action of electric fields, binding of ligands or neurotransmitters, or effects
of neighbor proteins” (Hameroff 2003). Thus consciousness can be partially inhibited
using anaesthetics. (By reversibly binding to hydrophobic pockets within key neural
proteins via weak forces, these can alter the environmental medium and thereby the
electron mobility, in turn non-linearly coupled to mechanical movements).
A complementary approach to such long range cooperativity is due to Davydov
(see Lomdahl et al 1984) who considers wave-like propagations—solitons-- for the
spatial transfer of vibrational energy in ordered form, which also can be derived from the
same type of non-linear effects leading to the coherent Frohlich ordered state. Tuszynski
et al (1984) observe that while the latter lays its emphasis on time-independent dynamical
ordering aspects, the former offers a plausible mechanism for not only localization but
also transporting order through the system (time dependent aspects). (The unusual
resilience of a soliton-- a quantum of energy that propagates as a traveling wave in
nonlinear systems-- stems from two opposing tendencies as a result of which a
dynamically stable entity emerges). Indeed, as the substrate for energy transfer in the
cytoskeleton, just like electrons in computers, Hameroff (2003) considers Davydov’s
solitons. “Objective reduction” (a self-collapse of the observer’s wave function), then
occurs in this algorithmic coherent system (see above), one in which the external
(gravitational) field plays a key role. Here, the Penrose-Hameroff thesis makes a major
departure from the conventional view, in that the (non-computable) field shows a new
and active role for the environment, viz., as a concerned 'teacher' with a deep involvement
in the system's decision-making- not merely a neutral examiner, assessing system
variants (Penrose 1995).
Further, another study (Davia 2006) suggests the relation between the organism
and the environment as one of mutual ‘friendliness’, in contrast to the reigning Darwinian
perspective where, apart from being a source/sink, the environment presents itself to
living systems as a sort of (potentially destructive) obstacle course to be negotiated; and
the organism appears as a machine within an environment, with no causal relationship
between the two. Briefly, Davia seeks to demonstrate that the question of how life
maintains its organization through time is central to an understanding of the brain. To that
end, he postulates life to be a scale- free (fractal) process of catalysis (which involves the
fusion of energy and structure in the form of solitons). Then, rather than a hostile
‘obstacle course’, the environment becomes a willing partner in a set of transitions
mediated by the living process via `catalysis’.
5. Non-computable Bio-issues: External Control?
According to Goedel’s incompleteness theorem, with any set of axioms, it is
possible to produce a statement that is obviously true, but cannot be proved by means of
the axioms themselves. Penrose (1995) took advantage of the Goedel theorem to claim
that the functioning of the human brain also includes non-algorithmic processes, i.e. a
system can be deterministic without being algorithmic. For this an excellent candidate is
again quantum mechanics in its full glory of quantum coherence, in common with
Bohm’s (1990) semi-intuitive thesis. Now, mathematical induction is a well known
concept which is akin to Goedel’s theorem. Inspired by Penrose, we wish to extend this
terminology to a physical level via the well known phenomena of (electric, magnetic)
field-induced effects, which although conceived classically has a good promise of
quantum extension. And with due respect to gravitation, the effects of other fields at
different levels, from classical to quantum, should not be neglected in view of the
properties of biomatter (Cope 1975).
We again return to the theme of non-computability for thought processes (Penrose
1995), looking to the environment as exerting external control. Now in fact, across
biology we encounter instances where bio-solutions can include choices outside the space
of existing possibilities. For instance, consider Bio-evolution (in particular the
algorithmic complexity of sequences pointed out by Abel (2009)), and note that a similar
Darwinian selection at the time scale of days--affinity maturation in B-cells-- can be
found in higher vertebrates. So it is natural to ask how life itself must have emerged,
(very likely from a set of not-as-yet-living systems), thus taking the problem to the door
of life’s origin!
6. The Environment as Guide; a Scaffold for Life (?)
Now in addition to the vital role for solitons in today’s biology, they have strong
implications for life’s emergence owing to their fundamental association with both
energy and information (Taranenko et al 2005). That is the boundary conditions offered
by repeating structures could have been the answer to how energy and structure in
biology got synonymous (Davia 2006), so that the patterns sustaining these quasiparticles
could have been retained while gradually replacing the materials embodying them, en
route to present day versions of metabolism and replication (c.f. Cairns Smith 1982; see
below). In this context, Davydov’s (1991) proposal for ‘electrosolitons’ (a plausible
mechanism for electron transfers across distances with minimum energy losses,
traditionally approached using tunneling effects) seems to be highly relevant for the
hydrogenation of CO2--seen as the basis for life’s emergence (Nitschke and Russell
2009). Indeed, the quantum metabolism model of Demetrius (2008) approaches the issue
of energy harnessing in the ATP-membrane proton pump-the most primitive of energy
transduction mechanisms-using Frohlich’s coherent excitations. Hence, revisiting CairnsSmith’s (1982) idea of a mineral scaffold for life ‘taken over’ by organic matter, in the
light of these insights, prompts the question of whether the above non-linear interactions
leading to coherent dynamics could have been achieved using simpler/less sophisticated
substances that in turn got gradually replaced by the advanced ones of today with greater
time-stability. Importantly, the new ingredient would be the environment having a
penetrating influence in the coherent scaffold, and taking decisions a la Penrose.
A few years ago, we have drawn attention to another ubiquitous ingredient in
terrestrial phenomena, viz., magnetism, which appears to exert its influence across
kingdoms of life, and has a natural association with quantum coherence (see Merali
2007). A soft colloidal scaffold a la Russell and coworkers (1989) in terms of a fieldinduced assembly of magnetic dipoles (Mitra-Delmotte and Mitra 2010b), seems
equipped with the potential to address symmetry-broken dynamics for primordial
chemical reactions hosted within its ‘layers’. A magnetic field can ‘order’ magnetic
nanoparticles; the resulting structural order in natural assemblies could provide the
boundary conditions needed for generating soliton-like structures. The synonymy
between structure and energy across biology (Davia 2006) makes it compelling to
speculate if magnetic solitons could not have been a primitive mechanism (c.f. CairnsSmith 2008) for energy transport in a natural assembly (Russell et al 1990; Sawlowicz
1983), whose dynamical order was controlled by a field. To that end, it is encouraging to
find studies using particles interacting via dipolar interactions (Ishizaka and Nakamura
2000) and indeed worth noting the recent field-modulated dynamics of magnetic
nanoparticle ensembles by Casic et al. (2010). That solitons could be linked to transfer of
order within field-induced colloidal structures, shows to what extent the analogies of
energy landscapes for protein-folding and of disordered (solid) spin systems can be
extended, and which thereby reduces the immense gap demarcating living and
(considered as) non-living matter. Then it becomes tempting to cite a few other
apparently disjointed features which fit into a bigger mosaic. For instance, there are
intriguing analogies of conformational fluctuations of ‘sophisticated’ motor proteins
carrying a load, with infinitesimal spin alignment changes of magnetic dipoles, ligand
bound to organics, making their way through templates of head-to-tail aligned electric
and magnetic dipoles, respectively (Mitra-Delmotte and Mitra 2010a). These can throw
light on how thermal fluctuations can be harnessed in a simpler system with such life-like
features, and which seems plausible to imagine in a Hadean setting. Like in ATP-driven
molecular motors, a gentle flux gradient (in a non-homogeneous rock magnetic field) can
offer both detailed-balance breaking non-equilibrium as well as asymmetry to a magnetic
dipole. Again, the correspondence of the local lowering of temperature (towards aiding
coherence) theorized by Matsuno and Paton (2000) via the slow release mechanism of
ATP hydrolysis, to the magnetic scenario comes in the form of an accompanying
magnetocaloric effect, which allows interchange between system-entropy and bath
temperature. And, not only does the matter-structuring role of a magnetic field gel with
the boundary requirements of soliton-like structures, it provides a friendly background for
a more dynamic role mediated by the soliton, besides being the same ingredient already
found to be crucial to the Frohlich mechanism (1968).
7. Any Direct Link to the Origins?
Indeed, the above inductive form of reasoning by analogies, which is
complementary to algorithmic deduction (c.f. Penrose 1995), matches the traditional
‘pattern-recognition’ approach to biology. Guided by the above, and the repetitively
appearing phenomenon of sequential induction (in association with a self-referential
character) across a hierarchy of life-processes, we propose that associated induction
patterns could offer a richer ‘simulation’ of an ‘active’ experience as compared to a mere
collection of data on a screen by a computer programmed to ‘passively’ mimic the same.
Figure 1: The subjective experience
The picture above (Figure 1) (taken from the Web) depicts the said subjective experience.
Indeed, the communication of the image via propagating patterns induced within a
biological device could be what makes room for optical illusion effects and subjectivity.
Now contrast this typical example of observation/measurement in biology with a detector
(without outside field effects), say a camera, where the corresponding information gets
quenched on the image plate. So this begs the question whether sequential induction as
a measuring mode could throw light on the origins of the complex phenomena of
consciousness, in view of the field-susceptible nature of biological matter. Note further
that an environment--as a field-- does have the potential for induction, given access to
any active d.o.f.s in matter. Such a scenario seems to gel with our proposal of a fieldinduced primitive scaffold for life.
8. Conclusion: Extra Scientific Dimensions?
We have chosen only a few samples of consciousness models, at the same time trying to
extrapolate the environment-related issues to the emergence of life itself, yet they seem to
go hardly beyond scratching only the outer surfaces of the problem so far. The huge gap
is perhaps symbolized by a perspective taken from Whitehead if one substitutes
“consciousness” for his definition of “religion” (Whitehead 1970):
“Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within the passing
flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized;
something which is a remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something
which gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose
possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate
ideal, and the hopeless quest.”
Acknowledgements: This essay is dedicated to the memory of ANM’s mother, Rama
Rani Mitra, on the occasion of her birth centenary (2011). We thank Prof.M.J.Russell for
inspiration and constant help; and Dr.J.J. Delmotte for financial/infrastructural support.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 729-745
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Research Essay
Is Qualia Meaning or Understanding?
Cosmin Vișan*
Abstract
By arguing that qualia is meaning or understanding, a new framework for understanding
consciousness is developed. In this way, the meaning of yellow and red are uncovered. The
suggested solutions are that yellow means “source of light” and red means “important”. Also, in
the process of arguing that qualia is meaning, remarkable similarities in the structure of qualia
are uncovered. In this way, a reason for why very hot and very cold water feel the same, is given.
The same behaviour is also shown to take place for colours.
Key Words: qualia, meaning, understanding, consciousness, colour, yellow, red.
Introduction
When looking at the colours, we are faced immediately with a problem. Why do they look the
way they look? Why is red red? Why is yellow yellow? When asked, a physicist will tell you a
beautiful story about light and its frequencies and how each colour corresponds to a specific
frequency. But all this picture is misleading1. The main reason is that, for once, colours are
qualia and they are created in the brain. There is no connection between the qualia of colours and
whatever the light is doing outside of our brain. Unfortunately, the picture is very prevailing in
society and in our educational systems, that the children grow up with this idea that colours are
inextricably mingled with light, and so, the question “Why does red look red?” is very rarely
raised. In this paper, the nature of qualia is analysed. It will be shown that qualia is meaning. One
very simple reason for this is that each quale means something. The quale “1+1=2” has a very
clear meaning to everyone. But there are other qualia, as for example colours, that at a first sight,
it is very hard, if not impossible, to know what they mean. By presenting a broad analysis of
qualia in general and then of particular cases, we would come up eventually with an explanation
for the meanings behind yellow and red, and so, explain why they look the way they look.
* Correspondence: Cosmin Visan, Independent Researcher. Email: visancosmin17@yahoo.com
1
Because the confusion is unfortunately persistent, I must stress out here, that by colours I’m referring strictly to
the subjective experience of colours. For example, let’s say that for the 700nm light I see red and another person
sees what I would call green. In order to avoid ambiguity, by red I call what I see as red. By green I call what I see as
green, etc. This should be clear to anyone from the start, but unfortunately people get confused about this aspect.
Another way to avoid confusion is to postulate that everybody sees the same thing. And this is well justified for the
colour yellow. If you ask someone what is the brightest colours that he/she sees, and the answer is yellow, then
most likely it is the same colour for both persons.
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The Nature of Qualia
How does one even begin to address this problem? The first thing that one encounters when first
meeting with qualia, are their tremendous diversity. And the difficulty arises when someone tries
to find the similarities between, for example, colours and sounds. How can such different
manifestations of consciousness have anything in common with each other? At a closer look,
though, few main common characteristics appear, as for example, ontological subjectivity,
quality and unity. But even though both sounds and colours are subjective, each have a specific
quality, and are each one well defined unity, the difference between them still begs the question:
“In what respect does a sound differ from a colour?” “What makes a sound to be a sound and a
colour to be a colour?” One answer to this is that each quale has its own content. But this is just a
hand-waving answer, not really explaining the difference. In order to really explain the
difference, the content must be specified. But what can the content of colour red be? Is it even
possible to answer this question? In order to do so, we need to have a closer look at the structure
of qualia.
Kant divided our consciousness into two parts, sensibility and understanding. Sensibility is
comprised out of what we experience from our senses, like colours, sounds, smells, feelings,
emotions. Understanding, on the other hand, is made up of concepts that lie under the control of
reason. Apparently, the division is well justified. But is this division a fundamental one? Or is it
merely an apparent one? Let’s have a closer look at both parts, and see if we can find some
elements that will allow us to consider both one and the same thing. Let’s first start with
understanding and take a case where understanding occurs. Let’s assume that we want to
understand something, as for example Pythagoras Theorem. In order to do this, we take a
Mathematics book. We read a while and try to figure it out the logical argument presented in its
pages.
After a little effort and concentration, something new happens. For a brief moment of time, so
brief that it is only an instant, we understood. So what happened? What is that instant in which
we understood Pythagoras Theorem? If we have a closer look at it, we discover few properties.
First of all, its nature was ontological subjective. That moment was experienced by us, in a
subjective manner. Secondly, it has a specific quality. There is one thing to understand
Pythagoras Theorem, and there is another thing to understand Relativity Theory. They both have
their own specific feeling to them. And thirdly, it is unified. It is one specific experience that
occurs in only one instant. So, what we discover, are the very properties of qualia. The
understanding of Pythagoras Theorem is a quale. We acquired the quale of Pythagoras Theorem,
and by its very way in which it feels, we know that we understand the theorem.
Let’s now have a look at sensibility. Let’s say we want to see colour red. In order to do this, we
take a book about paintings and open it to a page where an apple is drawn. What happens at that
moment is that in an instant, we see colour red. But colour red is also a quale. It is subjective,
being experienced by us. It has a specific quality of looking red. And it’s unified: it is one entity,
called red.
The conclusion that we reach is that there is no fundamental difference between understanding
and sensibility. One might point out at this moment, that there is actually a difference. For the
case of understanding, we take some time and efforts to reach that understanding. While for
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 729-745
Vișan, C., Is Qualia Meaning or Understanding?
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sensibility, it just happens to us. But is this a real difference? I will argue that is not. And here is
why. When one acquired the understanding of Pythagoras Theorem, the next time he will
encounter the theorem, he will simply understand it immediately, in exactly the same manner
that one sees colour red immediately. The difference is most likely not a fundamental difference,
but rather a difference having to do with the brain. For the case of sensibility, there are already
specialised regions in the brain that are responsible for the immediate experience of sensibility
qualia. For the case of understanding, the physical structures in the brain are missing at the first
encounter with the understanding. A learning process is needed, by which the appropriate
physical structures are created in the brain. But after they are created, understanding will come
up with the same ease as sensibility comes.
We draw the conclusion that, as far as the nature of consciousness is concerned, understanding
and sensibility are the same phenomenon. In order to make things clearer for the rest of the
paper, I will summarise this as follows:
Consciousness Is Understanding2
Meaning
Is this a fare conclusion to draw? After all, understanding is a meaningful phenomenon. When
we understand Pythagoras Theorem, we acquire a certain meaning. From that moment on, when
we read in a book about this theorem, we know what it means. Every understanding that we
acquire about the world, actually means something. Understanding is meaning. But are all qualia
meaning? Does red mean anything? Haven’t we just uncovered a difference between sensibility
and understanding? Let’s proceed and see why all qualia are meaning. For this, we need to have
a look at the duck-rabbit image.
Figure 1. Duck-rabbit image. An example of how qualia and meaning are the same
thing.
2
One further aspect of consciousness is probably free will, otherwise consciousness would be rendered
epiphenomenal. But since this paper is only dealing with the aspect of qualia, it is safe to say that consciousness is
understanding.
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This image is actually showing the equivalence between meaning and qualia. Every time we give
the meaning of rabbit, we also experience the quale of rabbit, namely the image of a rabbit.
Every time we give the meaning of duck, we also experience the quale of duck, namely the
image of a duck.
If a more technical treatment is desired, the task of proving that qualia is meaning, can be written
as “qualia meaning”. The first implication
“meaning => qualia” is trivial. Since meaning
is a phenomenon in our consciousness, it has all the properties that a conscious experience has,
so it is automatically a quale. All meanings exist as qualia. But what about the “qualia =>
meaning” implication? This would imply that each quale means something. But is this really
true? Let’s take some examples. The “1+1=2” quale means a mathematical statement. The
sentence “John went out for a walk.” is again a quale that means something. The above example
with the duck-rabbit image is another quale that means something. And it even illustrate that the
quale changes as we change the meaning. And in this case, the meaning is not of a linguistic
type, which is the most common place where the notion of meaning is used. But in this case, the
quale is a visual one. So it seems that each quale that we can think of, actually means something.
So the inverse implication is also true. In this way, we arrive at the conclusion that qualia
meaning. Of course, there still seems to be some qualia that have no meaning. Does red mean
anything? In order to get there, we need to have a look at some similarities between language and
colours.
Meaning in language and colours
The most common place where the notion of meaning is used, is in the field of linguistic. There,
the words are said to have meaning. Of course, what we need to be careful here, is that it is not
actually the word that has a meaning. The word in itself is just a group of meaningless symbols.
What actually has meaning is the representation of that word in our mind. So the mode of
existence of meaning is ontological subjective, meaning being part of consciousness. When we
communicate with other people, even though it might appear that we communicate through
words, we are actually communicating through meanings in our minds. Words are merely
carriers of meaning, they are simply tools through which we transfer our meanings. Meanings are
the semantic part of a sentence, while the written or spoken words are merely just the syntax of a
sentence.
What matters in a sentence is its semantic content, which exists in the mind of the people who
communicate the sentence. Syntax is just a convenient way of transmitting the semantics. But
syntax on its own carries no meaning. This can be easily shown when someone who doesn’t
understand Chinese wants to read a sentence in Chinese. The only entity that he perceives is just
the syntax of that sentence. But since he has no access to the semantics that existed in the mind
of the person who wrote the sentence in Chinese, the syntax simply doesn’t mean anything to
him3. What is the relevance of this? Let’s see what happens when we have a single syntax, but
3
The reason that we still don’t have a computer program that can do a perfect translation between languages has
to do with the very nature of language. Language is first of all a meaningful phenomenon. A language operates
within the consciousness of the persons who engage in a conversation, and it does this by using meanings or
semantic content. What a translation software does, is to find patterns and underling structures in the syntax of a
language, and based on those patterns tries to do the translation. But this approach is doomed to fail right from
the beginning. This is for the reason that language is not syntax alone, but especially semantics. The structures
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two different meanings. The word “rock” by itself is ambiguous in what meaning it might
convey in the mind of the reader. But if we write the sentence “The mountain is made up of
rocks.”, we know what meaning to attach to this word. If we take the sentence “I’ve been to a
rock concert.”, we again know what meaning the word “rock” takes in this case, so we have a
different subjective experience when we read the word in this context. Let’s put this example in
the following way: We have a stimulus: rock. And we have two different qualia that this stimulus
creates in the mind of the reader, depending on context.
Now let’s have a look at colours and be stricken by the fact that we will see exactly the same
phenomenon taking place.
Figure 2. Colours are meaning.
In this image, the two arrows point to two different coloured squares. The square on the left is
blue and the square on the right is yellow. The physicist’s classical picture will tell you that in
the first cube, the wavelength that hits your eyes is the 475nm one, and the wavelength on the
right is the 570nm one. But as I warned at the beginning of the paper, this picture is misleading.
In this example, if the two squares are brought together, they both look grey! So what is going
on? How can the same grey square not only look different in the two different cases, but the way
in which it looks different is that it also acquires colours! Out of nowhere! The explanation is
exactly the same as for the case of linguistic. The same stimulus acquires different meanings
depending on the context.
The two phenomena are so strikingly similar, that the only conclusion that can be draw is that we
are actually dealing with a single phenomenon, and that phenomenon is the phenomenon of
meaning, the differences arising from the contents of each meaning. In the linguistic case, the
form that meaning takes is as words in the mind of the reader. In the colours case, the form that
with which a language operates are found in the semantics, and not in the syntax. But since semantics is a noncomputational phenomenon, it is not accessible to a computer. A computer only has access to syntax, and so, by
not having access to the entire phenomenon of language, a perfect translator will never be possible for a
computer. What would be needed for a perfect translator, is a system that operates on the same principles that
consciousness operates. As of today, the principles of consciousness are not known.
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meaning takes is the qualia of colours. This example I consider to prove in a conclusive way that
colours are indeed meaning. And if even the colours are a form of meaning, it strongly suggests
that the postulate that qualia and meaning are the same thing, is true. Let’s summaries this as
follows:
Qualia are meaning
Having established our bases, we can now safely move on and try to search the meanings of
colours. In the linguistic example, it is straightforward to see the meanings that we are dealing
with. But in the colours example, even though we established that we are dealing with the same
phenomenon, namely the phenomenon of meaning, it is not at all clear what the meanings of
colours are. We are still at the stage of “What does red mean?”.
At this moment we are still not going to try to answer this question. We need to see more
examples of how meaning works. And only after we will uncover a certain pattern, we will be in
the position of finally dealing with the colours.
Qualia Hierarchy and Composition
One feature of the unity of qualia is that it has a hierarchy component. Some qualia are more
complex than others, and for qualia belonging to the same domain this complexity can be
directly shown. Let’s take the linguistic domain. One set of qualia are the letters of the alphabet.
The next set in the hierarchy can be considered to be the words in a language. The next level can
be taken as being the level of sentences. And so on until you get to novels, poems and other
complex forms of language. Of course, these levels are not as clearly defined as in this simple
example that I give here. But what is important is that there is indeed a hierarchy of qualia. Each
level of the hierarchy gives us the ability to see its components. Even though each level is a
unity, it also contains information about its parts and is itself a part in a more complex quale.
This hierarchy is present everywhere. In the visual domain, the hierarchy starts from colours,
shapes, and go on to the most intricate geometrical patterns, the most amazing architecture or the
most complex nature’s landscapes. When we have the quale of a tree, we know that it is a tree. If
we then concentrate only on the leaves, we know what the quale of a leaf is. Actually, we are
able to see at all only because we understand what we see, only because we have the meaning of
what we are seeing. It is probably a common experience to all of us that sometimes, when we see
a new object, even though we are able to see its shapes or colours, we are unable to see the
object. This is because we don’t understand what that object is. Only when we understand, only
when we have an “aha!” moment, we then also acquire the visual experience of the object, so
only then we also have the necessary visual quale. So we are able to see a leaf only because we
understand its meaning. But what about its colour? We are able to see green. But what does
green mean? Before getting there, let’s see some similarities between temperature and colours.
Temperature and Colours
We saw how composition in different qualia domains goes from simple to complex and gives
birth to a qualia hierarchy. It would be illuminating to have a closer look at this process. What
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we would like to know here is if there are commonalities between how the composition works in
different domains. If this process appears in many domains, it probably also has certain
underlying principles that it obeys regardless of the domain in which it acts. This would mean
that given two different domains, a similar construction should be observed. That would indicate
that the structure that helps building qualia is the same, what would differ being only the content.
Even though the structure might be the same, we will see that the content can give birth to such
different final qualia that the structure can be easily obscured. The two domains that are most
revealing for this hidden structure in the way qualia is composed are temperature and colours.
A phenomenon that was probably observed by each of us is how we experience the temperature
of very hot and very cold water. In the first moment when we touch very hot or very cold water,
the quale of temperature that we have is the same in both cases. In the first moment of touching
the water, we cannot say if the water is very hot or very cold. Of course, after the first moment,
our brain acquires different other information, as for example if there is steam from the water,
and then the distinction can be made. But given the case when no extra information is present,
the quale that we acquire when we touch an extreme temperature object, doesn’t allow us to
specify if the object is very cold or very hot. Why is that? In order to understand what is
happening, we also need to consider the case of mild temperature. If we touch only a slightly
warn or slightly cold object, we are able to specify its temperature. So what is going on? To
understand what is happening, we need to remember that qualia have the ability of composition.
This is of course clear for complex objects. When we hear a song, it is clearly composed of
different sounds, but what about temperature? It appears to be a primitive quale. Not quite so.
Since it has different behaviours in different cases, this is probably because it also has a
structure.
Let’s try to specify that structure. Take for example 3 warm objects at 3 different temperatures,
say 30, 35 and 40 degrees. Each object creates us a slightly different quale. Then take 3 cold
objects, say at 15, 10 and 5 degrees. They also each creates us a slightly different quale. So there
is something in the quale structure that changes as the temperature changes. We thus observe that
the temperature quale has an intensity component. It also has another component that informs us
if the object is either cold or warm. So what we observe is that there are two types of temperature
qualia. One is: cold+intensity, the other one being warm+intensity. Cold and warm can then be
considered to be two aspects of the same thing, if we consider that they provide the meaning that
the temperature is below or above a certain value that is taken to be the reference value. But let’s
not worry about this aspect in this discussion. Let’s now go back to our original problem, namely
why does very hot and very cold water feel the same. Since we elucidated the composition of
temperature quale, this problem can easily be solved. What happens when the temperature
becomes extreme (either very hot or very cold), is that the intensity component of the
temperature quale is changing.
The cold/warm components on the other hand, don’t change. Since their meaning is only the side
relative to a reference value, they cannot change. They only tell us if the temperature is below or
above a certain reference point. So the components of cold/warm are always the same. What
changes is the intensity component. What we obtain at very high or very low temperatures, is a
very high intensity component and two cold/warm components that haven’t changed their values.
We can represent this numerically in the following way: At mild temperatures, we can take the
following proportion in a temperature quale: 90%warm+10%intensity, 90%cold+10%intensity.
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Since the cold/warm components are dominant, we can clearly feel them, and a mild warm and
mild cold objects appear distinct to us. But for extreme temperatures, the proportions change to:
1%warm+99%intensity, 1%cold+99%intensity. Basically, the cold/warm components become
negligible. The only component that we can feel is the intensity component. So we feel the same
thing. That is why a very hot water feels the same as a very cold water.
We just uncovered the structure behind the temperature quale. It is conceivable that the structure
is much more complex than this. But for our present purposes here, this will suffice. What is
important to know is that there are certain structures built into qualia. We will now emphasize
that these structures can be independent of the content and that they can receive different
contents and yield different manifestations. We will thus search for the same structure in the
colours domain. We will see that only the content will differ, but the structure will be similar to
the structure present in the temperatures domain.
We thus need to look for a structure of the form x+intensity. For the temperatures domain, x was
the cold/warm component, and the intensity was the quale that informed us how cold or warm an
object was. What could these components be for the colours domain? We first need to look for a
quale that behaves as if it would represent an intensity, thus a quale that gradually increases in its
quality. The black-and-white spectrum looks like a good candidate.
Figure 3. The intensity component in the colours domain.
In order for the black and white spectrum to qualify for the type of intensity that we are looking
for, it needs to take part in a qualia composition of the type x+intensity such that when intensity
is extreme, x is lost. What can x be such that x+intensity displays the desired behaviour? The
only other qualia that we have in the colours domain, are the colours themselves. And amazingly,
they follow the desired behaviour.
Figure 4. The x+intensity structure in the colours domain. Here x is a specific colour,
while intensity is the black-and-white spectrum.
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Regardless of what colour we pick, they all follow the same behaviour. All colours combine with
the black-and-white spectrum such that when the intensity of the black-and-white spectrum is
increased, (i.e. when its value approaches white), the colours become more and more fade until
they all look the same: white. We are dealing with exactly the same phenomenon as in the
temperature domain. Also, if we decrease the intensity of the black-and-white spectrum (i.e.
when its value approaches black), the colours not only look the same, but all visual qualia
disappear. There is nothing to see anymore. The same phenomenon is taking place in the
temperature domain. When we decrease the intensity, warm becomes less warm and cold
becomes less cold, until we reach a point where we no longer feel either warn or cold. At that
point we don’t feel any temperature whatsoever. We only feel the texture of the object, or its
shape, but no temperature.
We thus uncovered a common structure in the way colours and temperature domains are built.
There are also differences, as for example the number of x components. For the temperature
domain, x can only be warm or cold, while for the colours domain, the number of colours is
much larger. In principle, there are 7 well defined colours, but their total number can be of the
order of millions.
The meaning of sounds and colours
We now have all the tools we need in order to try to find the meaning of colours. We gave many
examples in which various qualia each means something, we saw how various components are
built into a specific quale in order to give its specific feel. The reason that we talked about qualia
composition is that a specific quale is usually not only one isolated meaning, but it rather has a
rich structure that combines many meanings which eventually go to give the quale its specific
feel. Before getting to colours, we will first have a look at sounds. This is because we need to
know the structure of sounds in order to later emphasize and important feature that colours lack
while sounds have.
There are three main meanings that are built into a sound. Note that, as we also mentioned
earlier, the structure of a quale might be much richer than we describe here. An interested reader
may go much deeper into analysis, but we are restricting ourselves here only to the main
meanings.
The first meaning is one that we also uncovered for temperature and colours, and that is
intensity. A sound can range from faint to loud, the meaning which value is changing being the
intensity meaning. This is correlated with the amplitude of the air waves that are touching our
ears. The higher the amplitude, the louder the sound.
The second meaning is the sound’s pitch. A sound can be higher or lower. This meaning is
correlated with the frequency of the air waves that are touching our ears. The higher the
frequency, the higher the pitch of the sound.
The third type of meaning are the harmonics that manifest themselves as the musical notes.
There are 12 musical notes that form an octave, C C# D D# E F F# G G# A A# B and then again
C, etc. this pattern being repeated from the lowest pitch that our ear can hear, to the highest one.
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Figure 5. The twelve chroma.
Even though an octave differs from the adjacent octaves by its frequencies, a specific musical
note from one octave sounds in some way identical with its corresponding musical note from the
adjacent octaves. The notes are not easy to distinguish for an untrained ear, but a musician has no
trouble identifying two identical tones from two different octaves.
Figure 6. Identical chroma from different octaves.
An octave is the interval between a musical note and another identical musical note which
corresponds to an air frequency which is half or double the frequency of that particular note. So
the sounds qualia have a meaning component that helps us distinguish various harmonics of the
air frequencies that are touching our ears. These musical notes are also called pitch classes or
chroma. There are 12 of them.
One consequence of the structure of sounds qualia is that given two sounds that differ in their
pitches, it is easy to tell which is the higher pitch one and which is the lower pitch one. This is a
direct consequence of the fact that sounds have in their composition meanings that refer to the
frequency of the air that reaches our ears. We will see that colours don’t have this meaning.
That being said, let’s move on to colours and ask immediately if colours have anything to do
with the frequency of light. As we warned from the very beginning of this paper, colours have
nothing to do with light. A physicist will tell you a beautiful story about how each colour
corresponds to a specific light frequency, red being the 650nm light, green being the 510nm
light, blue being the 475nm light and so on. But as we saw for sounds, which indeed refer to the
frequency of the air, if two different pitch sounds are given, it is natural to tell which one
corresponds to a higher frequency of the air, and which one corresponds to a lower air frequency.
Unfortunately, this is not the case for colours. If someone (who doesn’t already know the order
of colours in the rainbow) is given two different colours, he has no way of telling which one
corresponds to a higher frequency light and which one corresponds to a lower frequency light.
This inability comes from the fact that there is no meaning in colours that refers to the frequency
of light. Otherwise, we would be able to know the frequency of light with the same ease that we
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are able to know the frequency of air wave. But we cannot do that. There is no meaning in the
structure of a colour that can inform us about the frequency of light. So clearly we are dealing
with a different structure for colours.
That structure is being described by the RGB colour system, where R=red, G=green, B=blue.
This system is based on the fact that the rods cells in our eyes are only sensitive to three light
frequencies that would correspond to the so called red, green and blue colours. In this system,
each colour is a combination of these three colours. Black and white are also included. We show
here the RGB codes for the main colours, where the RGB parameters can take values between 0
and 255.
The question that now arises is if the RGB structure is all there is required in order to give a full
description of colours. Does this structure determine in a unique way the quality of red? Does red
acquires its quality of redness because of its position in this structure?
Colour
Red
Yellow
Green
Cyan
Blue
Violet
Black
White
R
255
255
0
0
0
255
0
255
G
0
255
255
255
0
0
0
255
B
0
0
0
255
255
255
0
255
One more set of relations are actually present in the structure of colours. As we saw earlier, if
you give to a person two different colours, he will not be able to tell you which corresponds to a
higher frequency of light. But what if you give him 1000 colours? Indeed, in that case, the person
will be able to arrange the colours in an order. But that order will also not reflect the frequencies
of light. One more feature about the structure of colours is that it is circular. You can arrange the
colours in a circle such that after violet comes red. So the person required to put the 1000 colours
in order will make two mistakes. One is that he will not be able to tell which is the first colour.
There is nothing in the way red looks that might suggest that it should be the first colour in the
spectrum. The second mistake is the order. There is no way to tell that after red there should be
orange and not violet. So beside the RGB structure, there is another structure that sorts the
colours in a circular way and in a specific order: ROYGBIV.
But even if we take this extra structure into account, do we have all the relations that are
necessary to give the colours their specific qualities? Why would these relations make red look
red or yellow look yellow? For yellow we can actually find an explanation at this point. But as
we will see later on, it might not be the full story. Let’s try to give an explanation for yellow.
Let’s ask: Pick the colour that stands up from the crowd! That’s rather a weird question at first.
How can a colour stand up from all the others? But at a closer look at all the colours, your
attention will be drawn towards yellow. Yellow is indeed different from all the other colours.
What distinguishes it, is the fact that it appears to have an intrinsic brightness. It clearly is a
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bright colour in a way that red is not, neither green, nor blue for example. This can only means
that in the structure of yellow there is a meaning that is not in the other colours. Otherwise, we
would not be able to pick it from the crowd. Is the same case as for the pitch of the sounds. We
can tell that one sound corresponds to a higher air frequency than other, only because there is a
specific meaning inside the qualia of sounds that lets us know its frequency.
For colours, not having this meaning, we cannot tell if a colour is at a higher light frequency than
another. So the fact that yellow appears different from all the colours must be because it contains
a meaning that none of the other colours contain. This can be explained at this moment by the
RGB code. If we look at yellow, we see that it has R=255, G=255, (B=0). A lot of light is
received by the eye when we look at a yellow object. So the brain created a colour which
contains the meaning of “intrinsic brightness”. Another colour that appears to have intrinsic
brightness, but not quite as yellow, is cyan. And if we look at its RGB code, we indeed see that it
has the code G=255, B=255, (R=0). But what about the colour that has R=255, B=255, (G=0)?
That is violet. But violet doesn’t appear like a colour that has intrinsic brightness. This is because
of the sensibility of the eye to RGB. The sensibility for blue is much lower than the sensibility
for the other colours.
Figure 7. Human eye sensibility
This might seem like a good explanation for at least how yellow acquires its quality. But let’s
push a little harder. Let’s tackle the problem from an evolutionary point of view.
Consciousness has two very different aspects. First of all, it is a natural phenomenon that has to
do with the very way in which reality is. Secondly, our specific consciousness acquired its qualia
through an evolutionary process. In the same way that our physical body has its form because it
helped us in the process of evolution, so does our particular set of qualia have acquired their
quality through an evolutionary process. We have the specific senses that we have because they
proved the best for our evolutionary advantage. We also have many feelings and emotions with
specific meanings that helped us in the process of evolution. Take for example hunger. Hunger
feels the way it does because it has a specific meaning. As we saw throughout this paper, each
quale acquires its specific quality because of its meaning. Hunger means the need for food or
energy, and this very meaning creates the very way in which hunger feels. Thirst having a
different meaning, the desire for water, has a different quality. And by the very way in which
they feel, you know their meaning. One can take any emotion that he wants, and he will find
specific meanings for all of them. So this assures us once again that we are on the right track in
our attempt to find meanings for colours.
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Let’s ask now what could have been the evolutionary advantage of seeing yellow? If yellow
acquired its quality because of an evolutionary reason, then we need to find that reason in the
environment of the animal. And we do find such a reason! One very important object in the life
of a creature that has a visual system is the Sun. And curios enough, the Sun has the colour
yellow. Or to dispel confusion, I better say: when we look at the Sun we have the quale of
yellow. Is this just a coincidence? I will argue that it is not. What we saw earlier is that yellow is
a rather peculiar colour, having a distinct quality that none of the other colours have. I called that
quality intrinsic brightness. But the Sun is just that: a bright object. We also need to realize at
this point that when our visual system evolved, the Sun was the only bright object in the
environment. Of course, at night there was the Moon, and occasionally fires sprung here and
there, but there was one object that was always around. And that was the Sun.
Given the importance of the Sun, I don’t consider a mere coincidence that we have evolved to
have the quale of yellow in association with the Sun. And this further points out to the fact that
the meaning that gives yellow its peculiar quality of intrinsic brightness is the meaning of
“source of light” or “brightness” or something that in some way represents the Sun. If this is the
case, the RGB system is not the primary reason for why yellow looks the way it looks, but is
merely a system that evolved such that it could mold around the meaning that yellow had. One
might ask at this point: Why should yellow have this meaning and not white? After all, white is
the brightest colour that can be. The reason is that white has a totally different meaning. As we
saw in the comparison with temperature, the black-and-white spectrum has the meaning of
intensity. But since it proved advantageous to see the world in colours, rather than just blackand-white, the meanings that were used in the construction of the colours, went beyond the
simple meaning of intensity.
Let’s move on to another colour and observe another peculiarity. Since the Sun was such an
important object for the animals, it needed to be clearly identified from the surroundings. The
surrounding for the Sun is the sky. And here we stumble upon another apparent coincidence. The
quale that we have when we look at the sky is the quale of colour blue. But blue and yellow are
opposite colours. Is this a coincidence that also the Sun and the sky have these two opposite
colours? I consider that not only is not a coincidence, but that the meaning of blue is “the
opposite of yellow”. When asked “Why is the sky blue?” a physicist will tell you a beautiful
story about how the rays of light are reflected in different ways based on their wavelengths by
the molecules present in the atmosphere, especially oxygen. But I consider that this answer
misses completely the point. The correct answer should be: “Because this way, the Sun was best
distinguished from the surroundings by the brain of the animals.”
Can these hypotheses be tested? I would suggest two tests for them. One is that each
extraterrestrial will see their home star yellow and their sky blue. This doesn’t mean that we will
see them like that. If we were to go on their home planet, we would see their star and sky as
having various colours. But this is because our visual system and our brain evolved in a different
environment. But each native species will see their star yellow and their sky blue. If they would
have more than one main star, they will probably see colours that we cannot even imagine. Their
colours will have specific meanings that will help them distinguish between the two or more
different stars. But since we didn’t need to make such a distinction, we didn’t evolve to have
those meanings in our colours. For us it was enough to have a colour that has the meaning
“source of light” that we can see when we looked at the Sun. Unfortunately, this hypothesis
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cannot be tested at the present moment. It might even be the case that we will explain
consciousness before we will encounter aliens. And by that time we will anyway know for sure
that each alien are seeing their home star yellow and their sky blue.
The second test is the phenomenon of Haidinger’s Brush that we will later explore.
Before getting there, let’s try to find the meaning of colour red. We will adopt a similar approach
as for yellow. Since the particular sets of qualia that we have were acquired through an
evolutionary process, we need to have a look in the environment and see where could the colour
red come from. One of the most important things in the life of an animal is the acquisition of
food. In order for the animal to be most efficient in this attempt, he needed to quickly make sense
of the environment. Food had to be easily identifiable. Ideally, it would have been good if all
food looked the same. In practice this is not the case. But nevertheless, there is a recurrent
feature of how food looks. And that is: red! Most of the fruits are indeed red, especially when
they are ready to be eaten. We have to be once again careful here. Fruits are not red. They have
no colours whatsoever. Red is only in the consciousness of the animal.
So whatever light was coming from the fruits, the brain of the animals evolved such as to give
the meaning of red, to see colour red. So now that we identified how red got to come about, we
are in the position to find a meaning for it. Could it mean “food”? Not necessarily. I would go for
a more profound meaning, and that is: Red has the meaning of “important”. The animal not only
needed to know that that is food, but it needed to know that that is important for his survival.
Another reason for why I consider that “important” should be the actual meaning, and not
“food”, is because “important” is a more abstract meaning, that can be used in a more general
way in other qualia as well. Is something similar to “intensity”. As we have seen, the meaning of
“intensity” appears in many different qualia and in each qualia domain it takes a different form.
Is this the real source from which red acquired its quality? Let’s argue that indeed it is. Fruits are
not simply found in the environment all by themselves, but they are found in trees. One
important characteristic of trees is that leaves are coloured green. But red and green are opposite
colours. We are in the same situation as for the Sun-sky pair. This time the pair is fruits-leaves.
Is this a coincidence that leaves have the opposite colour of red? No. The reason, the same as for
the Sun, was that fruits needed to be easily identifiable. So the brains of the animals evolved to
see the leaves as having colour green. In this case, green has the meaning “the opposite of red”.
One might ask at this moment: Why fruits red and leaves green and not the other way around?
Wouldn’t it be the same situation? The answer is no, and this is for the reason that animals were
interested in the fruits. What needed to draw the attention of the animals, were the fruits. The
fruits were those important, not the leaves. So only the fruits could have acquired colour red,
because that is the colour that has the meaning of “important”.
Can this explanation for the meaning of red be tested? I will propose here two experiments that
might be able to see at least some correlations. One way to test this is to have a look at some
MRI scans. Since the meaning of “important” is also an abstract idea and not only part of red
itself, the subjects of the experiment can be asked to think about important persons or events in
their life and then identify the neuronal correlate (NCC) of the idea of “important”. Then the
subjects will be asked to see colour red and register the corresponding NCC. It might turn out
that some similarities will be seen for the two NCCs.
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The second experiment will be to ask the subjects to have a look at a screen on which various
coloured objects are displayed for only a brief moment of time. Then the persons will be asked to
tell the objects that they remembered. The colours would probably be needed to be adjusted such
that they have the same luminance, such that this parameter would not influence the answer of
the subjects. If the objects that are mostly remembered turn out to be those that are coloured red,
it might be an indication that indeed colour red looks the way it looks because it has the meaning
of “important”. This experiment should also take into account the cultural background of the
subjects. It might be that for different cultures, some objects or some colours are more likely to
be chosen. But if even after the cultural background has been eliminated and the most often
remembered objects would still be the red ones, this would indicate more strongly that indeed
colour red might have this meaning.
Haidinger’s Brush
Let’s argue a little more for the meaning of yellow. Since we cannot find an alien right now that
can provides us with an answer about what colour it sees its own star, maybe we can find an
answer here on Earth. Let’s have a look at the phenomenon of Haidinger’s Brush and see if we
can see something remarkable.
Figure 8. Haidinger's Brush with its yellow and blue colours.
This phenomenon is our ability to see polarized light. It is a rather weak effect, not seen by many
people. It presents 2 colours, yellow and blue, arranged at 90° to each other. The blue axis
corresponds to the direction of the electrical vector of the electromagnetic radiation that hits our
eyes. By seeing the orientation of the blue axis we can thus know the polarization of light
without using any apparatus beyond our own eyes. There are various explanations put forward
about how we are able to see this pattern. The most common has to do with the ability of the
xanthophyll pigment in the macula to absorb polarized light. And because of the circular
geometry of this pigment’s arrangement in the eye, the specific pattern and colours of the
Haidinger’s Brush are obtained. However, none of the proposed models are able to fully account
for the look of Haidinger’s Brush.
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I will therefore allow myself the liberty to bring a new explanation in terms of the ideas
presented in this paper. First of all, I will allow for the shape to be realized entirely by the
geometry of the eye. But for colours, I will suggest that they are not accountable for by anything
in the structure of the eye. What the eye is doing is just sending signals to the brain, letting the
brain know that there is an interaction in the eye that has the geometry corresponding to the
polarization of the light. So the brain has 2 pieces of information to deal with, corresponding to
the two geometrical axes.
Now it needs to represent this information somehow. Since it is part of the visual system, it will
have to use qualia of colours to represent it. The question arises about what colours to use to
represent it. Since the information coming from the polarized light is isolated from the
information that we usually receive from the normal light, it forms a totally independent system
of qualia. So we are dealing with 2 systems here. First, there is the normal visual system that
contains the normal set of information, which is then used by the brain to create 7 different main
colours (let’s say the 7 colours of the rainbow: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet).
And then there is a different system, that contains only 2 pieces of information. The question is:
If you were to have a visual system that contains only two colours, what would those two colours
be? I would suggest that those colours would be yellow and blue. And here is why. One of the
colours needs to mean “source of light”, because that would be the colour that would let you
know that you are actually seeing a colour. And that colour is yellow. The other colour needs to
be the colour that is opposite of the first one, such that the 2 colours contrast maximally and so
they contain the maximum meaning that can be contained in such a situation. So the second
colour should be blue. Those are exactly the colours that we are seeing in the Haidinger’s Brush.
If it will turn out that indeed the colours in the Haidinger’s Brush cannot be accounted by the
structure of the eye but they are actually created by the brain, then this will be an important
argument in the favour of the idea that yellow means “source of light”, and more generally it will
be an argument in the favour that all qualia are meaning4.
Conclusions
We are drawing to an end now. We just presented a rather controversial view in this paper. Can
this be a valid explanation for why colours look the way they look? Shouldn’t a real explanation
involve mathematical equations? How would colours be explained in a future science in which
consciousness will be explained? I will only give a short justification for why this explanation
will likely hold even when we will have a theory of consciousness. Let’s take the simple case of
feeling thirsty and drinking water in order to end thirst. We then ask: Why did I drink water? I
think the answer is straightforward and that is: Because I was thirsty. I don’t consider to be
anything more to the answer than this simple explanation. I don’t think that there is any need to
explain the reason for drinking water in any sophisticated mathematical terms. I think that this is
the most fundamental explanation that can be given to the question of why I drank water. When
4
The expression “The meaning of qualia” (i.e. the meaning of red) is employed here in a rather loosely way. Since
what I argue for is that qualia IS meaning, the expression “the meaning of qualia” is incorrect. It is only used for the
ease of expression. A more proper expression would be “the content of qualia” or “the content of meaning”, since
meaning is synonymous with qualia.
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745
it comes to consciousness, it might well be that some explanations can simply be given in plain
words, that being the most fundamental level possible. So is not unreasonable to search for an
explanation in plain words for why some qualia feel the way they do.
What a theory of consciousness will probably do is to provide an explanation of what meaning
is, how it arises in the world, and how it can have different contents. But this would be probably
the only explanation that can be given to consciousness from a 3rd person perspective. Other
explanations, as for example the relations between various meanings, will only have to come
from the 1st person perspective: I drank water because I was thirsty. It would still be possible to
give a 3rd person account for the relations between meanings, but this will not tell us how that
specific meaning feels like.
This 3rd person account might come from brain scans. As we suggested for colour red, a scan
might reveal that what happens when we see a specific colour also happens when we think about
something in a rational way, this suggesting what the meaning of a particular colour is. This also
might point out what reason actually is and what its powers are. It appears that reason has access
to meanings that are embedded in sensibility qualia. How is it possible for reason to manipulate
these meanings? What is it about free will that through the power of reason can have access to
meanings hidden deep inside sensibility qualia? The questions are indeed fascinating, but we will
stop here. For the present moment, it is enough to know that there is meaning inside all qualia.
Future developments will reveal us more about the nature of consciousness.
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arXiv:physics/9906040v2 [physics.pop-ph] 8 Feb 2000
Night Thoughts of a Quantum Physicist
Adrian Kent
Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics,
University of Cambridge,
Silver Street, Cambridge CB3 9EW, U.K.
Abstract
The most dramatic developments in theoretical physics in the next millennium are
likely to come when we make progress on so far unresolved foundational questions. In this
essay I consider two of the deepest problems confronting us, the measurement problem in
quantum theory and the problem of relating consciousness to the rest of physics. I survey
some recent promising ideas on possible solutions to the measurement problem and explain
what a proper physical understanding of consciousness would involve and why it would
need new physics.
1. Introduction
As the twentieth century draws to a close, theoretical physics is in a situation that,
at least in recent history, is most unusual: there is no generally accepted authority. Each
research program has very widely respected leaders, but every program is controversial.
After a period of extraordinary successes, broadly stretching from the 1900’s through to the
early 1980’s, there have been few dramatic new experimental results in the last fifteen years,
with the important exception of cosmology. All the most interesting theoretical ideas have
run into serious difficulties, and it is not completely obvious that any of them is heading in
the right direction. So to speak, some impressively large and well organised expeditionary
parties have been formed and are faithfully heading towards imagined destinations; other
smaller and less cohesive bands of physicists are heading in quite different directions. But
we really are all in the dark. Possibly none of us will get anywhere much until the next
fortuitous break in the clouds.
I will try to sketch briefly how it is that we have reached this state, and then suggest
some new directions in which progress may eventually be possible. But my first duty is to
stress that what follow are simply my personal views. These lie somewhere between the
heretical and the mainstream at the moment. Some of the best physicists of the twentieth
century, would, I think, have been at least in partial sympathy.1 But most leading present
day physicsts would emphasize different problems; some would query whether physicists
can sensibly say anything at all on the topics I will discuss.
I think we can, of course. It seems to me the problems are as sharply defined as those
we have overcome in the past: it just happens that we have not properly tackled them
yet. They would be quite untouched — would remain deep unsolved problems — even
if what is usually meant by a “theory of everything” were discovered. Solving them may
need further radical changes in our world view, but I suspect that in the end we will find
there is no way around them.
2. Physics in 1999
The great discoveries of twentieth century physics have sunk so deeply into the general
consciousness that it now takes an effort of will to stand back and try to see them afresh.
But we should try, just as we should try to look at the night sky and at life on earth with
childlike eyes from time to time. In appreciating just how completely and how amazingly
our understanding of the world has been transformed, we recapture a sense of awe and
wonder in the universe and its beauty.2
So recall: in 1900, the existence of atoms was a controversial hypothesis. Matter
and light were, as far as we knew, qualitatively different. The known laws of nature were
deterministic and relied on absolute notions of space and time which seemed not only
natural and common sense but also so firmly embedded in our understanding of nature as
to be beyond serious question. The propagation of life, and the functioning of the mind,
remained so mysterious that it was easy to imagine their understanding might require quite
new physical principles. Nothing much resembling modern cosmology existed.
Einstein, of course, taught us to see space and time as different facets of a single geometry. And then, still more astonishingly and beautifully, that the geometry of spacetime
1
In any case, I am greatly indebted to Schrödinger and Bell’s lucid scepticism and to Feynman’s
compelling explanations of the scientific need to keep alternative ideas in mind if they are even
partially successful, as expressed in, for example, Schrödinger 1954, Bell 1987, Feynman 1965.
2
We owe this, of course, not to nature — which gives a very good impression of not caring
either way — but to ourselves. Though we forget it too easily, that sense is precious to us.
is nonlinear, that matter is guided by the geometry and at the same time shapes it, so that
gravity is understood as the mutual action of matter on matter through the curvature of
spacetime.
The first experiments confirming an important prediction of general relativity — that
light is indeed deflected by the solar gravitational field — took place in 1917: still within
living memory. Subsequent experimental tests have confirmed general relativity with increasingly impressive accuracy. It is consistent with our understanding of cosmology, as
far as it can be — that is, as far as quantum effects are negligible. At the moment it has
no remotely serious competitor: we have no other picture of the macroscopic world that
makes sense and fits the data.
Had theorists been more timid, particle physics experiments and astronomical observations would almost certainly eventually given us enough clues to make the development
of special and general relativity inevitable. As it happens, though, Einstein was only partially guided by experiment. The development of the theories of relativity relied on his
extraordinary genius for seeing through to new conceptual frameworks underlying known
physics. To Einstein and many of his contemporaries, the gain in elegance and simplicity
was so great that it seemed the new theories almost had to be correct.
While the development of quantum theory too relied on brilliant intuitions and syntheses, it was much more driven by experiment. Data — the black-body radiation spectrum,
the photo-electric effect, crystalline diffraction, atomic spectra — more or less forced the
new theory on us, first in ad hoc forms, and then, by 1926, synthesised. It seems unlikely
that anyone would ever have found their way through to quantum theory unaided by the
data. Certainly, no one has ever found a convincing conceptual framework which explains
to us why something like quantum theory should be true. It just is. Nor has anyone, even
after the event, come up with a truly satisfactory explanation of what precisely quantum
theory tells us about nature. We know that all our pre-1900 intuitions, based as they are
on the physics of the world we see around us every day, are quite inadequate. We know
that microscopic systems behave in a qualitatively different way, that there is apparently
an intrinsic randomness in the way they interact with the devices we use to probe them.
Much more impressively, for any given experiment we carry out on microscopic systems,
we know how to list the possible outcomes and calculate the probabilities of each, at least
to a very good approximation. What we do not fully understand is why those calculations
work: we have, for example, no firmly established picture of what (if anything) is going on
when we are not looking.
Quantum theory as originally formulated was inconsistent with special relativity.
Partly for this reason, it did not properly describe the interactions between light and
matter either. Solving these problems took several further steps, and in time led to a
relatively systematic — though still today incomplete — understanding of how to build
relativistic quantum theories of fields, and eventually to the conclusion that the electromagnetic force and the two nuclear forces could be combined into a single field theory. As
yet, though, we do not know how to do that very elegantly, and almost everyone suspects
that a grander and more elegant unified theory of those three forces awaits us. Nor can we
truly say that we fully understand quantum field theory, or even that the theories we use
are entirely internally consistent. They resemble recipes for calculation, together with only
partial, though tantalisingly suggestive, explanations as to why they work. Most theorists
believe a deeper explanation requires a better theory, perhaps yet to be discovered.
Superstring theory, which many physicists hope might provide a complete theory of
gravity as well as the other forces— a “theory of everything” — is currently the most
popular candidate. Though no one doubts its mathematical beauty, it is generally agreed
that so far superstring theory has two rather serious problems. Conceptually, we do not
know how to properly make sense of superstrings as a theory of matter plus spacetime. Nor
can we extract any very interesting correct predictions from the theory — for example,
the properties of the known forces, the masses of the known particles, or the apparent
four-dimensionality of space-time — in any convincing way.
Opinions differ sharply on whether those problems are likely to be resolved, and so
whether superstring theory is likelier to be a theory of everything or of nothing: time will
tell. Almost everyone agrees, though, that reconciling gravity and quantum theory is one of
the deepest problems facing modern physics. Quantum theory and general relativity, each
brilliantly successful in its own domain, rest on very different principles and give highly
divergent pictures of nature. According to general relativity, the world is deterministic,
the fundamental equations of nature are non-linear, and the correct picture of nature is,
at bottom, geometric. According to quantum theory, there is an intrinsic randomness
in nature, its fundamental equations are linear, and the correct language in which to
describe nature seems to be closer to abstract algebra than geometry. Something has to
give somewhere, but at the moment we do not know for sure where to begin in trying to
combine these pictures: we do not know how to alter either in the direction of the other
without breaking it totally.
However, I would like here to try to look a bit beyond the current conventional wisdom.
There is always a danger that attention clusters around some admittedly deep problems
while neglecting others, simply through convention, or habit or sheer comfort in numbers.
Like any other subject, theoretical physics is quite capable of forming intellectual taboos:
topics that almost all sensible people avoid. They often have good reason, of course, but
I suspect that the most strongly held taboos sometimes resemble a sort of unconscious
tribute. Mental blocks can form because a question carries the potential for revolution,
and addressing it thoughtfully would raise the possibility that our present understanding
may, in important ways, be quite inadequate: in other words, they can be unconscious
defences against too great a sense of insecurity. Just possibly, our best hope of saying
something about future revolutions in physics may lie in looking into interesting questions
which current theory evades. I will look at two here: the measurement problem in quantum
theory and the mind-body problem.
3. Quantum Theory and the Measurement Problem
As we have already seen, quantum theory was not originally inspired by some parsimonious set of principles applied to sparse data. Physicists were led to it, often without
seeing a clear way ahead, in stages and by a variety of accumulating data. The founders
of quantum theory were thus immediately faced with the problem of explaining precisely
what the theory actually tells us about nature. On this they were never able to agree.
However, an effective enough consensus, led by Bohr, was forged. Precisely what Bohr
actually believed, and why, remain obscure to many commentators, but for most practical purposes it has hardly mattered. Physicists found that they could condense Bohr’s
“Copenhagen interpretation” into a few working rules which explain what can usefully be
calculated. Alongside these, a sort of working metaphysical picture — if that is not a
contradiction in terms — also emerged. C.P. Snow captures this conventional wisdom well
in his semi-autobiographical novel, “The Search” (Snow 1934):
Suddenly, I heard one of the greatest mathematical physicists say, with complete
simplicity: “Of course, the fundamental laws of physics and chemistry are laid
down for ever. The details have got to be filled up: we don’t know anything of the
nucleus; but the fundamental laws are there. In a sense, physics and chemistry
are finished sciences.”
The nucleus and life: those were the harder problems: in everything else, in
the whole of chemistry and physics, we were in sight of the end. The framework
was laid down; they had put the boundaries round the pebbles which we could
pick up.
It struck me how impossible it would have been to say this a few years before.
Before 1926 no one could have said it, unless he were a megalomaniac or knew no
science. And now two years later the most detached scientific figure of our time
announced it casually in the course of conversation.
It is rather difficult to put the importance of this revolution into words. [. . .]
However, it is something like this. Science starts with facts chosen from the external world. The relation between the choice, the chooser, the external world and
the fact produced is a complicated one [. . .] but one gets through in the end [. . .]
to an agreement upon “scientific facts”. You can call them “pointer-readings” as
Eddington does, if you like. They are lines on a photographic plate, marks on
a screen, all the “pointer-readings” which are the end of the skill, precautions,
inventions, of the laboratory. They are the end of the manual process, the beginning of the scientific. For from these “pointer-readings”, these scientific facts, the
process of scientific reasoning begins: and it comes back to them to prove itself
right or wrong. For the scientific process is nothing more nor less than a hiatus
between “pointer-readings”: one takes some pointer readings, makes a mental
construction from them in order to predict some more.
The pointer readings which have been predicted are then measured: and if
the prediction turns out to be right, the mental construction is, for the moment,
a good one. If it is wrong, another mental construction has to be tried. That is
all. And you take your choice where you put the word “reality”: you can find
your total reality either in the pointer readings or in the mental construction or,
if you have a taste for compromise, in a mixture of both.
In other words, on this conventional view, quantum theory teaches us something deep
and revolutionary about the nature of reality. It teaches us that it is a mistake to try to
build a picture of the world which includes every aspect of an experiment — the preparation of the apparatus and the system being experimented on, their behaviour during the
experiment, and the observation of the results — in one smooth and coherent description.
All we need to do science, and all we can apparently manage, is to find a way of extrapolating predictions — which as it happens turn out generally to be probabilistic rather than
deterministic — about the final results from a description of the initial preparation. To
ask what went on in between is, by definition, to ask about something we did not observe:
it is to ask in the abstract a question which we have not asked nature in the concrete. On
the Copenhagen view, it is a profound feature of our situation to the world that we cannot
separate the abstract and the concrete in this way. If we did not actually carry out the
relevant observation, we did not ask the question in the only way that causes nature to
supply an answer, and there need not be any meaningful answer at all.
We are in sight of the end. Quantum theory teaches us the necessary limits of science.
But are we? Does it? Need quantum theory be understood only as a mere device for extrapolating pointer-readings from pointer-readings? Can quantum theory be satisfactorily
understood this way? After all, as we understand it, a pointer is no more than a collection
of atoms following quantum laws. If the atoms and the quantum laws are ultimately just
mental constructions, is not the pointer too? Is not everything?
Landau and Lifshitz, giving a precise and apparently not intentionally critical description of the orthodox view in their classic textbook (Landau & Lifshitz, 1974) on quantum
theory, still seem to hint at some disquiet here:
Quantum mechanics occupies a very unusual place among physical theories: it
contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at the same time requires this
limiting case for its own formulation.
This is the difficulty. The classical world — the world of the laboratory — must be
external to the theory for us to make sense of it; yet it is also supposed to be contained
within the theory. And, since the same objects play this dual role, we have no clear division
between the microscopic quantum and the macroscopic classical. It follows that we cannot
legitimately derive from quantum theory the predictions we believe the theory actually
makes. If a pointer is only a mental construction, we cannot meaningfully ask what state
is in or where it points, and so we cannot make meaningful predictions about its behaviour
at the end of an experiment. If it is a real object independent of the quantum realm, then
we cannot explain it — or, presumably, the rest of the macroscopic world around us — in
terms of quantum theory. Either way, if the Copenhagen interpretation is right, a crucial
component in our understanding of the world cannot be theoretically justified.
However, we now know that Bohr, the Copenhagen school, and most of the pioneers of
quantum theory were unnecessarily dogmatic. We are not forced to adopt the Copenhagen
interpretation either by the mathematics of quantum theory or by empirical evidence. Nor
is it the only serious possibility available. As we now understand, it is just one of several
possible views of quantum theory, each of which has advantages and difficulties. It has not
yet been superseded: there is no clear consensus now as to which view is correct. But it
seems unlikely it will ever again be generally accepted as the one true orthodoxy.
What are the alternatives? The most interesting, I think, is a simple yet potentially
revolutionary idea originally set out by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber (Ghirardi et al.
1986), and later developed further by GRW, Pearle, Gisin and several others. According
to their model, quantum mechanics has a piece missing. We can fix all its problems by
adding rules to say exactly how and when the quantum dice are rolled. This is done
by taking wave function collapse to be an objective, observer-independent phenomenon,
with small localisations or “mini-collapses” constantly taking place. This entails altering
the dynamics by adding a correction to the Schrödinger equation. If this is done in the
way GRW propose, the predictions for experiments carried out on microscopic systems
are almost precisely the same, so that none of the successes of quantum theory in this
realm are lost. However, large systems deviate more significantly from the predictions
of quantum theory. Those deviations are still quite subtle, and very hard to detect or
exclude experimentally at present, but they are unambiguously there in the equations.
Experimentalists will one day be able to tell us for sure whether or not they are there in
nature.
By making this modification, we turn quantum theory into a theory which describes
objective events continually taking place in a real external world, whether or not any
experiment is taking place, whether or not anyone is watching. If this picture is right, it
solves the measurement problem: we have a single set of equations which give a unified
description of microscopic and macroscopic physics, and we can sensibly talk about the
behaviour of unobserved systems, whether they are microscopic electrons or macroscopic
pointers. The pointer of an apparatus probing a quantum system takes up a definite
position, and does so very quickly, not through any ad hoc postulate, but in a way that
follows directly from the fundamental equations of the theory.
The GRW theory is probably completely wrong in detail. There are certainly serious
difficulties in making it compatible with relativity — though there also some grounds for
optimism that this can be done (Pearle 1998, Kent 1999). But GRW’s essential idea has,
I think, a fair chance of being right. Before 1986, few people believed that any tinkering
with quantum theory was possible: it seemed that any change must so completely alter
the structure of the theory as to violate some already tested prediction. But we now know
that it is possible to make relatively tiny changes which cause no conflict with experiment,
and that by doing so we can solve the deep conceptual and interpretational problems of
quantum theory. We know too that the modified theory makes new experimental predictions in an entirely unexpected physical regime. The crucial tests, if and when we can
carry them out, will be made not by probing deeper into the nucleus or by building higher
energy accelerators, but by keeping relatively large systems under careful enough control
for quantum effects to be observable. New physics could come directly from the large scale
and the complex: frontiers we thought long ago closed.
4. Physics and Consciousness
Kieslowski’s remarkable film series, Dekalog, begins with the story of a computer
scientist and his son who share a joy in calculating and predicting, in using the computer
to give some small measure of additional control over their lives. Before going skating, the
son obtains weather reports for the last three days from the meteorological bureau, and
together they run a program to infer the thickness of the ice and deduce that it can easily
bear his weight. But, tragically, they neglect the fire a homeless man keeps burning at the
lakeside. Literally, of course, they make a simple mistake: the right calculation would have
taken account of the fire, corrected the local temperature, and shown the actual thickness
of the ice. Metaphorically, the story seems to say that the error is neglecting the spiritual,
not only in life, but perhaps even in physical predictions.
I do not myself share Kieslowski’s religious worldview, and I certainly do not mean
to start a religious discussion here. But there is an underlying scientific question, which
can be motivated without referring to pre-scientific systems of belief and is crucial to our
understanding of the world and our place in it, and which I think is still surprisingly
neglected. So, to use more scientifically respectable language, I would like to take a fresh
look at the problem of consciousness in physics, where by “consciousness” I mean the
perceptions, sensations, thoughts and emotions that constitute our experience.
There has been a significant revival of interest in consciousness lately, but it still
receives relatively little attention from physicists. Most physicists believe that, if consciousness poses any problems at all, they are problems outside their province.3 After all,
3
Penrose is the best-known exception: space does not permit discussion of his rather different
arguments here, but see Penrose 1989, 1994.
the argument runs, biology is pretty much reducible to chemistry, which is reducible to
known physical laws. Nothing in our current understanding suggests that there is anything
physically distinctive about living beings, or brains. On the contrary, neurophysiology, experimental psychology, evolutionary and molecular biology have all advanced with great
success, based firmly on the hypothesis that there is not. Of course, no one can exclude
the possibility that our current understanding could turn out to be wrong — but in the
absence of any reason to think so, there seems nothing useful for physicists to say.
I largely agree with this view. It is very hard to see how any novel physics associated
with consciousness could fit with what we already know. Speculating about such ideas does
seem fruitless in the absence of data. But I think we can say something. There is a basic
point about the connection between consciousness and physics which ought to be made,
yet seems never to have been clearly stated, and which suggests our present understanding
almost cannot be complete.
The argument for this goes in three steps. First, let us assume, as physicists quite commonly do, that any natural phenomenon can be described mathematically. Consciousness
is a natural phenomenon, and at least some aspects of consciousness — for example, the
number of symbols we can simultaneously keep in mind — are quantifiable. On the other
hand we have no mathematical theory even of these aspects of consciousness. This would
not matter if we could at least sketch a path by which statements about consciousness
could be reduced to well understood phenomena. After all, no one worries that we have
no mathematical theory of digestion, because we believe that we understand in principle
how to rewrite any physical statement concerning the digestive process as a statement
about the local densities of various chemicals in the digestive tract, and how to derive
these statements from the known laws of physics. But we cannot sketch a similar path for
consciousness: no one knows how to transcribe a statement of the form “I see a red giraffe”
into a statement about the physical state of the speaker. To make such a transcription, we
would need to attach a theory of consciousness to the laws of physics we know: it clearly
cannot be derived from those laws alone.
Second, we note that, despite the lack of a theory of consciousness, we cannot completely keep consciousness out of physics. All the data on which our theories are based
ultimately derive from conscious impressions or conscious memories of impressions. If our
ideas about physics included no hypothesis about consciousness, we would have no way of
deriving any conclusion about the data, and so no logical reason for preferring any theory
over any other. This difficulty has long been recognised. It is dealt with, as best we can,
by invoking what is usually called the principle of psycho-physical parallelism. We demand
that we should at least be able to give a plausible sketch of how an accurate representation
of the contents of our conscious minds could be included in the description of the material world provided by our physical theories, assuming a detailed understanding of how
consciousness is represented.
Since we do not actually know how to represent consciousness, that may seem an
empty requirement, but it is not. Psycho-physical parallelism requires, for example, that a
theory explain how anything that we may observe can come to be correlated with something
happening in our brains, and that enough is happening in our brains at any given moment
to represent the full richness of our conscious experience. These are hard criteria to make
precise, but asking whether they could plausibly be satisfied within a given theory is still
a useful constraint.
Now the principle of psycho-physical parallelism, as currently applied, commits us to
seeing consciousness as an epiphenomenon supervening on the material world. As William
James magnificently put it (James 1879):
Feeling is a mere collateral product of our nervous processes, unable to react
upon them any more than a shadow reacts on the steps of the traveller whom it
accompanies. Inert, uninfluential, a simple passenger in the voyage of life, it is
allowed to remain on board, but not to touch the helm or handle the rigging.
Third, the problem with all of this is, that as James went on to point out, if our
consciousness is the result of Darwinian evolution, as it surely must be, it is difficult to
understand how it can be an epiphenomenon. To sharpen James’ point: if there is a simple mathematical theory of consciousness, or of any quantifiable aspect of consciousness,
describing a precise version of the principle of psycho-physical parallelism and so characterising how it is epiphenomenally attached to the material world, then its apparent
evolutionary value is fictitious. For all the difference it would make to our actions, we
might as well be conscious only of the number of neutrons in our kneecaps or the charm
count of our cerebella; we might as well find pleasures painful and vice versa. In fact, of
course, our consciousness tends to supply us with a sort of executive summary of information with a direct bearing on our own chances of survival and those of our genes; we tend
to find actions pleasurable or painful depending whether they are beneficial or harmful
to those chances. Though we are not always aware of vital information, and are always
aware of much else, and though our preferences certainly don’t perfectly correlate with our
genetic prospects, the general predisposition of consciousness towards survival is far too
strong to be simply a matter of chance.
Now, of course, almost no one seriously suggests that the main features of consciousness can be the way they are purely by chance. The natural hypothesis is that, since they
seem to be evolutionarily advantageous, they should, like our other evolutionarily advantageous traits, have arisen through a process of natural selection. But if consciousness really
is an epiphenomenon, this explanation cannot work. An executive summary of information which is presented to us, but has no subsequent influence on our behaviour, carries no
evolutionary advantage. It may well be advantageous for us that our brains run some sort
of higher-level processes which use the sort of data that consciousness presents to us and
which are used to make high-level decisions about behaviour. But, on the epiphenomenal
hypothesis, we gain nothing by being conscious of these particular processes: if they are
going to run, they could equally well be run unconsciously, leaving our attention focussed
on quite different brain activities or on none at all.
Something, then, is wrong with our current understanding, There are really only two
serious possibilities. One is that psycho-physical parallelism cannot be made precise and
that consciousness is simply scientifically inexplicable. The other is that consciousness
is something which interacts, if perhaps very subtly, with the rest of the material world
rather than simply passively co-existing alongside that world. If that were the case, then we
can think of our consciousnesses and our brains — more precisely, the components of our
brains described by presently understood physics — as two coupled systems, each of which
influences the other. That is a radically different picture from the one we presently have, of
course. But it does have explanatory power. If it were true, it would be easy to understand
why it might be evolutionarily advantageous for our consciousness to take a particular form.
If say, being conscious of a particular feature of the environment helps to speed up the
brain’s analysis of that feature, or to focus more of the brain’s processing power on it, or
to execute relevant decisions more quickly, or to cause a more sophisticated and detailed
description to enter into memory, then evolution would certainly cause consciousness to
pay attention to the relevant and neglect the irrelevant.
We have to be clear about this, though: to propose this explanation is to propose that
the actions of conscious beings are not properly described by the present laws of physics.
This does not imply that conscious actions cannot be described by any laws. Far from it: if
that were the case, we would still have an insoluble mystery, and once we are committed to
accepting an insoluble mystery associated with consciousness then we have no good reason
to prefer a mystery which requires amending the laws of physics over one which leaves the
existing laws unchallenged. The scientifically interesting possibility — the possibility with
maximal explanatory power — is that our actions and those of other conscious beings are
not perfectly described by the laws we presently know, but could be by future laws which
include a proper theory of consciousness.
This need not be true, of course. Perhaps consciousness will forever be a mystery.
But it seems hard to confidently justify any a priori division of the unsolved problems
in physics into the soluble and the forever insoluble. We ought at least to consider the
implications of maximal ambition. We generally assume that everything in nature except
consciousness has a complete mathematical description: that is why, for example, we carry
on looking for a way of unifying quantum theory and gravity, despite the apparent difficulty
of the problem. We should accept that, if this assumption is right, it is at least plausible
that consciousness also has such a description. And this forces us to accept the corollary
— that there is a respectable case for believing that we will eventually find we need new
dynamical laws — even though nothing else we know supports it.
One final comment: nothing in this argument relies on the peculiar properties of
quantum theory, or the problems it poses. The argument runs through equally well in
Newtonian physics. Maybe the deep problems of quantum theory and consciousness are
linked, but it seems to me we have no reason to think so. It follows that anyone committed
to the view I have just outlined must argue that a deep problem in physics has generally
been neglected for the last century and a half. So let me try to make that case.
There is no stronger or more venerable scientific taboo than that against enquiry,
however tentative, into consciousness. James, in 1879, quoted “a most intelligent biologist”
as saying:
It is high time for scientific men to protest against the recognition of any such
thing as consciousness in scientific investigation.
Scientific men and women certainly have protested this, loudly and often, over the last
hundred and twenty years. But have those protests ever carried much intellectual force?
The folk wisdom, such as it is, against the possibility of a scientific investigation of consciousness seems now to rest on a confusion hanging over from the largely deleterious effect
of logical positivism on scientists earlier this century. Hypotheses about consciousness are
widely taken to be ipso facto unscientific because consciousness is presently unmeasurable
and its influences, if any, are presently undetectable. Delete the word “presently”, and the
case could be properly made: as it is, it falls flat. If logical positivism is to blame, is only
the most recent recruit to the cause. The problem seems to run much deeper in scientific
culture. Schrödinger described (Schrödinger 1954) the phenomenon of:
[. . .] the wall, separating the ‘two paths’, that of the heart and that of pure reason.
We look back along the wall: could we not pull it down, has it always been there?
As we scan its windings over hills and vales back in history we behold a land far,
far, away at a space of over two thousand years back, where the wall flattens and
disappears and the path was not yet split, but was only one. Some of us deem it
worth while to walk back and see what can be learnt from the alluring primeval
unity.
Dropping the metaphor, it is my opinion that the philosophy of the ancient
Greeks attracts us at this moment, because never before or since, anywhere in
the world, has anything like their highly advanced and articulated system of
knowledge and speculation been established without the fateful division which
has hampered us for centuries and has become unendurable in our days.
Clearly, the revival of interest in Greek philosophy that Schrödinger saw did not
immediately produce the revolution he hoped for. But our continued fascination with
consciousness is evident on the popular science and philosophy bookshelves. It looks as
though breaking down the wall and building a complete worldview are going to be left
as tasks for the third millennium. There could hardly be greater or more fascinating
challenges.
Nor can there be many more necessary for our long term well being. Science has done
us far more good than harm, psychologically and materially. But the great advances we
have made in understanding nature have also been used to support a worldview in which
only what we can now measure matters, in which the material and the external dominate,
in which we objectify and reduce ourselves and each other, in which we are in danger of
coming to see our psyches and our cultures, in all their richness, as no more than the
evolutionarily honed expression of an agglomeration of crude competitive urges.
To put it more succinctly, there is a danger, as Vaclav Havel put it in a recent essay
(Havel 1996), of man as an observer becoming completely alienated from himself as a
being. Havel goes on to suggest that hopeful signs of a more humane and less schizophrenic
worldview can be found in what he suggests might be called postmodern science, in the
form of the Gaia hypothesis and the anthropic principle.
I disagree: it is hard to pin down precise scientific content in these ideas, and insofar
as we can it seems to me they are no help. But I think we have the answer already. The
alienation is an artefact, created by the erroneous belief that all that physics currently
describes is all there is. But, on everything we value in our humanity, physics is silent.
As far as our understanding of human consciousness is concerned, though we have learned
far more about ourselves, we have learned nothing for sure that negates or delegitimizes a
humane perspective. In that sense, nothing of crucial importance has changed.
5. Postscript
All this said, of course, predicting the future of science is a mug’s game. If, as I
have argued, physics is very far from over, the one thing we should be surest of is that
greater surprises than anything we can imagine are in store. One prediction that seems
likelier than most, though, is that the Editor will not be restricted to considering human
contributors for the corresponding volume in 2999. Perhaps our future extraterrestrial or
mechanical colleagues will find some amusement in our attempts. I do hope so.
References
Schrödinger, E. 1954 Nature and the Greeks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bell, J.S. 1987. Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics: Collected papers
on Quantum Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Feynman, R. 1965 The Character of Physical Law. London: British Broadcasting
Corporation. Reading: Addison Wesley.
Snow, C.P. 1934 The Search. London: Victor Gollancz.
Ghirardi, G. et al. 1986 Unified Dynamics for Microscopic and Macroscopic Systems.
Physical Review D 34 470-491.
Landau, L. and Lifshitz, E. 1974 Quantum Mechanics. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Pearle, P. 1999 Relativistic Collapse Model with Tachyonic Features. Physical Review
A 59 80-101.
Kent, A. 1998 Quantum Histories. Physica Scripta T76 78-84.
Penrose, R. 1989 The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the
Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Penrose, R. 1994 Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
James, W. 1879 Are We Automata? Mind 13 1-22.
Havel,V. 1996. In The Fontana Postmodernism Reader, (ed. W. Truett Anderson).
London: Fontana. |
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Article
Experimental Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic
Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject
Pairs Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Mandy A. Scott, Nicolas Rouleau, Brendan S. Lehman, Lucas W. E. Tessaro,
Lyndon M. Juden-Kelly, Kevin S. Saroka & Michael A. Persinger*
Neuroscience Research Group, Human Studies and Biomolecular Sciences Programs,
Laurentian University, Sudbury, Ontario, Canada P3E 2C6
ABSTRACT
There have been multiple historical and cross-cultural reports of excess correlation of specific
experiences between individuals separated by thousands of kilometers. Recently there have been
experimental demonstrations of excess correlations between measurable cerebral events for small
percentages of test subjects. More reliable effects can be elicited when electromagnetic fields and
photons are involved. In this experiment completed during the summer of 2015, 5 pairs of
volunteers separated by more than 6,000 km wore identical cerebral toroids through which
patterns of phase shifting, 30 nT magnetic fields that diminished the local magnetic field in both
loci by 1-5 nT were exposed to the sequences that produced excess correlation in
chemiluminescent reactions and shifts in pH. Compared to the various baselines and control
procedures enhanced power between the right hemispheres of pairs of participants occurred
during the interval documented to produce excess correlation. Specific analyses indicated
diminished coherence within the theta band only within the right temporal lobes of the pairs.
Sequential block analyses revealed that the paired brains’ responses to pulsed tones at 6.5 Hz
occurred within the 30-40 Hz band over the caudal temporal lobes during the exposures to the
effector field. Primary independent component analyses verified these patterns. During the 6.5
Hz tones there was a peak in the spectral power density (SPD) at that frequency over the right
temporal lobe of the person listening but a trough in (SPD) over this region for the person who
was not. Even subjective experiences, as measured by the Profile of Mood States (POMS),
indicated significantly increased excess correlation for scales by which increased anger and
decreased vigour are inferred. This experiment, based upon physical principles, suggests there is
a technology that can generate reliable excess correlation of brain activity (and potentially
consciousness and specific experiences) between two people separated by thousands of
kilometers.
Part I of this two-part article includes: 1. Introduction; 2. Method; 3. Equipment; and 4. Results
and Discussion.
Keywords: Excess correlations, entanglement, transatlantic effects, theta frequency, right
temporal lobe, toroidal magnetic fields, brain coherence.
*Corresponding author: Dr. M. A. Persinger, mpersinger@laurentian.ca
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
1. Introduction
Consciousness has been strongly correlated with a single brain’s structure and
electromagnetic activity most typically measured by electroencephalography (EEG). The
interaction between two loci associated with consciousness has assumed that distance is limited
because locality is required. It is mediated by proximal physical stimuli such as visual or
auditory events. However from an operational perspective as long as reliable, specific excess
correlation for measureable events occurs between person A and person B, distance is not
limited. Even from a classical behaviorist perspective the reciprocal interactions between two
people are simply the manifestations of alternating stimulus-response sequences. We have
developed a paradigm to evoke powerful excess correlations between chemilumiscent reactions
(Dotta and Persinger, 2012; Dotta et al, 2013a) shifts in pH within spring water (Dotta et al,
2013b), and alterations in malignant cell growth (Karbowski et al, 2015) within two loci
separated at distances between 10 m and 3 km. Here we present experimental evidence for the
first known trans-Atlantic excess correlations in the type of brain activity associated with
consciousness when the brains of pairs of people, each separated by thousands of kilometers,
share toroidal, rotating magnetic fields with changing angular velocities.
The Nature of Locality and Causality
The definition of a causal relationship between a stimulus and response depends upon
their space-time contiguity and whether or not the display of the responses systematically
follows the occurrence of the stimuli. Examples are bright light flashes that elicit eye blinks or
the verbal behavior of one person that elicits the verbal behavior of another. The usual
perspective is: 1) there is some proximity between the locus of the stimulus and the locus of the
response, and, 2) the correlation approaches 1 such that for every stimulus there is always a
specified response. This would be an example of the maximum limit or “asymptote” for excess
correlation which is often described as causality. However near thresholds or limens for
perceptual phenomena such as detecting the presence or absence of a tone the elicitation of a
response to a stimulus is not one-to-one but becomes a weaker and weaker correlation until there
is some point where the “excess correlation” does not vary from random variation. As aptly
demonstrated by decades of research in psychophysics signal detection around thresholds is a
multivariate process where even chaotic distributions or stochastic components can enhance the
capacity to discern the signal.
When the two loci that are attributed to the stimulus and response are separated by
distances that do not appear to involve proximity or locality, the mechanisms for any excess
correlation may be different. Dozens of theoretical approaches and experiments have shown that
non-local effects are easily reproduced for quantum systems. The measurement involves photons
(Vaziri, et al, 2002). Experimental free-space quantum teleportation involving photons has been
measured at distances of up to 600 m according to Jin et al (2010). However Hotta et al (2014)
has indicated that quantum energy teleportation does not necessarily display a limit of distance.
Megidish et al (2013) showed that entanglement can occur between photons that never coexisted
in traditional space-time, which suggests that specific modifications of the electromagneticgravitational features of spaces could induce excess correlation. This interpretation is consistent
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
with the theory developed by Hu and Wu (2006a, b; 2013) that the primary source of the
macroscopic manifestation of quantum entanglement originates from primordial spin processes
in non-spatial and non-temporal pre-space-time and involves gravity. When one considers the
measurement by Fickler et al (2013) that single photons (even though they differ by 600 in
quantum number as long as they exhibit quantized orbital angular momentum from helical wave
structures) can exhibit excess correlation, then the potential for remote sensing become feasible.
Entanglement is defined as “when the quantum system contains more than one particle,
the superposition principle gives rise to the phenomenon of entanglement” (Aczel, 2002). The
superposition principle, or more specifically the principle of superposition of states, indicates
that a new state of a system may be composed of two or more states such that a new state
emerges that shares some of the properties of each of the composite states. If X and Y are two
different properties of a particle, for example existing in two different loci, then superposition
indicates a condition X+Y arises which has properties of both entities. Thus there would be a
non-zero probability that the particle could be in both loci simultaneously. The application to a
“multi-particle” system or one that involves more than one photon has been shown
experimentally. Macroscopic manifestations of “excess correlation” have also been shown.
Julsgaard et al (2001) demonstrated excess correlation in two macroscopic objects (gas
molecules). Dotta and Persinger (2012) measured this effect with millions of photons each
generated by separated reactions of hypochlorite and hydrogen peroxide.
Development of the Theory and the Technology
Excess correlation at spaces greater than quantum levels may appear to require physical
conditions that allow the superposition of two loci such that they display the behavior of a single
space. Based upon the conceptual approaches of Ernst Mach (1988), Sir Arthur Eddington
(1981), Niehls Bohr (1958), and Hu and Wu (2006a, b; 2013), we had reasoned that the circular
momentum of a quantized electromagnetic field could create the condition to facilitate
entanglement between two loci (and the state of matter within those loci) separated by nontraditional distances (Persinger and Koren, 2013; 2014). The essential premise is that the
physical mechanisms that serve as the substrate for entanglement reflect the properties of the
entire universe as a unit within which differences in space and time may be less critical. It would
be similar to Hu and Wu’s (2013) concept that it is a feature of the universe before space and
time emerged as properties with which they are now recognized.
Our initial methodology employed bursts of weak magnetic fields rotating within a
circular array of 8 solenoids. The angular velocity of these rotating magnetic fields either
increased or decreased. The pattern of the magnetic fields that were produced within each
solenoid in the circular array of solenoids was produced by a computer program that generated
pulsed or punctate 1 ms or 3 ms fields that composed either an accelerating or decelerating
frequency-modulated and phase-modulated magnetic field. The durations of ~1 ms and ~3 ms
were derived from our (Persinger and Koren, 2007) calculations that these two values reflected
the time for an electron and a proton to expand one Planck’s Length. Since those initial
quantifications, several experimental results have supported this interpretation (Persinger, 2013a;
Koren et al, 2014).
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | pp. 658-684
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Inspired by the importance of the difference in phase and group velocities of photons in
order to produce a non-zero rest mass (Tu et al, 2005) Dotta and Persinger (2012) compared the
effects of different combinations of accelerating and decelerating group velocities (the changing
angular velocities of the whole field rotating around the array of solenoids) and accelerating and
decelerating frequency-modulation or phase-modulation of the patterns of magnetic fields that
were being generated by the computer to each solenoid. The change in velocity was
accomplished by adding +2 or -2 ms to the base duration of 20 ms as the field rotated around the
ring of solenoids. They found that only one combination produced excess correlation. The group
angular velocities were equivalent to frequencies between 5 and 20 Hz with specific locations
around the array where the acceleration was convergent with g: 9.8 m·s-2.
If an initially accelerating group velocity embedded with a decelerating frequencymodulation field was presented first (the primer field), the subsequent presentation of a
decelerating group velocity embedded with an accelerating frequency-modulated field (the
effector field) produced excess correlation of photon emissions between two loci separated by
either 10 m or 3 km for about 8 minutes. These were the only two distances tested. During the
approximately 8 min interval the power density of the photons emitted from the chemical
reactions in one location was double that of the typical measures. In fact it was equivalent to
injecting twice the reactant into a single reaction when there was no excess correlation. This was
consistent with our assumption that the structure of the two loci separated by non-traditional
distances behaved as if they had been superimposed into a single space. In other words, the states
exhibit superposition.
The Electroencephalogram and Brain Imaging
The most frequent tool employed to study consciousness is electroencephalographic
activity. These measurements obtained from sensors located more or less equally over the
surface of the scalp measure the variations in the averaged, distant electric fields from the
approximately 20±5 billion neurons that compose the human cerebral cortices (Pakkenberg and
Gundesen, 1997). We have employed the 10-20 international system. Although other
researchers who prefer denser sensor arrays we have found this matrix is sufficient to discern the
phenomena we are investigating. The measurements are within the microvolt range. The
corresponding magnetic field component exhibits picoTesla values and is consistent with the
product of magnetic permeability of a vacuum and the current density from these voltages within
the resistivity of extracellular fluid across the length of the human brain (Persinger and Saroka,
2015; Saroka and Persinger, 2014).
Quantitative electroencephalography (QEEG) was a major development that permitted
the quantized perspective to be applied to brain activity. The decomposition of fluctuations from
scalp sensors into quantized microvolt increments markedly increased the complexity and
numbers of measurements and permitted the consideration of QEEG activity as a field
potentially composed of “infinite, infinitesimal points”. When real-time brain activity from 19
sensors is sampled between 250 to 1000 times per second the density of the potential data arrays
is sufficient to discern very subtle changes from the environment yet manageable for routine
analyses. Such complexity could be sufficient to demonstrate the subtle changes in two locations
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | pp. 658-684
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
displayed by two human brains that could meet the criteria for “excess correlation” or
entanglement.
QEEG has the potential to manifest excess correlation because the data can be considered
as representative (or by inference) of a “state” composed of a more or less reliable field or
pattern of frequencies and intensities. There are reliable microstates first described by Lehmann
et al (1998 ) and standardized by Koenig et al (2001) that remain relatively consistent across a
person’s life time. There are primarily four states of whole cerebrum organization with polarities
arranged in left frontal to right caudal, right frontal to left caudal, frontal to caudal and central
frontal to caudal patterns. They accommodate more than 70% of cerebral activity. Each state
exists for about 80 to 120 ms, the duration of a “percept,” and is remarkably similar across
human beings. The median value is conspicuously equivalent to 10 Hz.
The concept of a field involving billions of neurons would appear to contain considerable
momentum that would oppose alteration by a single, small source energy. There is clear
experimental evidence that very small energies can alter states composed of millions or billions
of units. Houwelling and Brecht (2008) found that the activity of only one neuron could affect
the direction of a rat’s motor behaviour. Within a single barrel cortical column containing about
8,500 excitatory neurons, detection required 2,500 action potentials above the 1,500 action
potentials (a difference of 1,000) per 200 ms period. This means that the initiatory detection and
the whole-organism effect required only about 5 action potentials per 1 ms. Later Li et al (2009)
reported that repetitive high frequency spiking of only a single rat cortical neuron could trigger a
shift between two cortical states that resembled rapid-eye-movement (REM) and slow wave
sleep.
In other words the energies required to produce significant alterations in brain states and
overt behaviour are in the order of 10-20 J. This is the energy from the effect of the net change of
an action potential upon a unit charge (Persinger, 2010). It is also a likely increment of energy
that might integrate the distribution of energy at the level of Planck’s Length throughout the
universe. The total force within the universe based upon its mass, length and squared
“Zitterbewegung” frequency divided by the total number of Planck’s voxels in the universal
volume distributed across the wavelength of the hydrogen line results in 10-20 J (Persinger, et al,
2008; Persinger, 2015). Thus very small increments of energy transmitted through non-local
space could alter the entire pattern of global brain activity.
Previous Experiments of EEG-Related Excess Correlation
Hans Berger, the pioneer who developed the concept and original tools that now define
modern electroencephalography, was interested in explaining a personal experience that would
now be identified as a potential example of excess correlation between his exposure to a trauma
that could have been deadly and the cerebral ideation of his sister who was living in different city
of that country. The first major high profile experiment showing that two (2) of 15 pairs of twin
infants separated by non-traditional distances displayed excess correlation in elicitation of alpha
rhythms was published by Duane and Behrendt in Science in the year 1965. Although there were
many interesting preliminary studies involved with “extrasensory perceptual” research, including
that of a martial arts master who was instructed to emit “qi” force and the concurrent increase in
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
strip-chart alpha wave moving in a rostral direction from the occipital region of the student
recipient sitting in another room (Kawano, et al, 2000), direct experimental manipulation of the
process has been more rare.
Standish et al (2004) reviewed about a dozen experiments involving “remote transfer of
signals” from the previous 40 years. Standish and her colleagues found that 5 of the 60 subjects
displayed reliable visually evoked potentials when their “senders” were viewing flickering but
not static light displays. In a previous experiment Standish et al (2003) had demonstrated excess
correlation between the MRI signals of two brains separated by non-traditional distances.
Although there have been many reports of specific or exceptional individuals who report
“spontaneous” experiences consistent with excess correlations at greater distances (Dotta et al,
2009; Scott and Persinger, 2013), without experimental manipulation or simulation of these
conditions within the laboratory, the mechanisms cannot be isolated. In addition both the Duane
and Behrendt (1965) and Standish et al (2004) experiments indicated that the effects were not
demonstrable in all pairs of “senders” and “receivers”. The relative portion is in the order of
about 10%.
We have assumed that the spontaneous occurrences of excess correlations between the
activities of two different brains separated by non-traditional distances suggest an aggregate
phenomenon within which one component is essential. The analogy would be the remarkable
analgesic and antipyretic effects of white willow bark. The clinical effects were often variable.
However when late 19th century methods for organic chemistry were developed that allowed the
extraction and later synthetic reproduction of the specific component (acetyl salicylic acid) that
was responsible for the analgesia and antipyresis, the effects could be more reliably replicated
between individuals. We have assumed spontaneous excess correlations between human brains
separated by thousands of kilometers are natural phenomena that, like the white willow bark’s
correlation with analgesia, can be reliably elicited once the critical variables are isolated and
experimentally manipulated.
Persinger et al (2003) first reported that the stimulation of one of a pair of siblings with a
circular array of 8 solenoids placed around the head at the level of the temporal lobes produced a
specific change in theta power (5 to 5.9 Hz) in the right temporal lobe of the other sibling (not
wearing an array of field-generating solenoids) sitting blindfolded with earplugs in a separate
room. The rates of rotation of the magnetic that were most effective involved 20 ms reference
intervals. Additions or subtractions of unit times, such as 2 ms, as the field moved to each
successive solenoid produced a changing angular velocity. This interval which is more likely a
range between 15 and 25 ms is the classic “refresh” rate of consciousness (~40 Hz) which has
been described as the rate of “re-entry” of continuous processes (Edelman, 1989). It can be
considered a second derivative. A magnetic field moving within a circle might be considered as
in a state of continuous acceleration. Changing that rate would result in a second derivative.
Because one of the features of excess correlation or entanglement is a history of shared
space-time, Persinger et al (2008) paid pairs of random strangers to meet each other for one hour
twice per week for four weeks and simply remain within a meter of each other. When one of the
pair who had been randomly assigned to the entanglement process was stimulated with the same
effective field parameters (20 ms intervals) while wearing the circular array of 8 solenoids and
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Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
the other member’s QEEG was recorded there was an increase in power within the 5.0 to 5.9 Hz
band over the temporal lobes but no other lobes. Pairs of people randomly selected on the days of
the experiment who had no previous shared space-time history did not display this effect.
In that experiment the stimulus person (the one receiving the angular accelerating
magnetic fields) was instructed to imagine walking to the other room and standing on the left
side of the response person whose QEEG was being recorded. The response persons, during the
period associated with the enhanced theta activity over the temporal lobes, reported (as indicated
by post-experimental questionnaire responses) an increased incidence of sensed presences, anger,
and sexual arousal. These effects were not reported by the other members of the pair who were
exposed to the rotating magnetic fields or by the response persons who composed the random
pairs of subjects for the reference (control) group.
These studies were predicated on the concept that the magnetic field condition for one
person was a type of stimulus while the response in the EEG for the other person (no field) was
the consequence of this effect. Subsequent experiments, which were similar to the excess
correlation experiments for photon-chemical reactions (Dotta and Persinger, 2012) and shifts in
pH (Dotta et al, 2014), involved both loci or the brains of both participants in a pair being
exposed to the same rotating magnetic fields around each of their heads. The demonstration of
proof of principle involved a reliable shift in the intercorrelations of QEEG sensor data over the
scalp for the “receiver” person sitting blind folded and wearing ear plugs in one room while the
“stimulus” person sitting in a closed, acoustic chamber was exposed to a series of different
frequency lights (Persinger et al, 2010). The changes in the intercorrelations in the response
person’s brain when the stimulus person’s brain was being exposed to the light flashes occurred
over the right posterior hemisphere.
Dotta et al (2011) extended this study by measuring the photon emissions from the right
hemisphere of the response person who was sitting in complete darkness while wearing one of
the circular arrays of solenoids. When the stimulus person (also wearing the array of solenoids,
was sitting in a closed acoustic chamber) was stimulated with light flashes the response person’s
right hemisphere displayed an increase in photon flux density when measured at a distance of
about 15 cm. The reversible increases and decreases of these ultraweak biophoton emissions
from one person as a function of the light exposure to a second (stimulus) person in another
room was within the range of 10-11 to 10-12 W·m-2. This effect only occurred if both the stimulus
and response persons were wearing the solenoid arrays and were simultaneously exposed to
rotational fields with changing angular velocities. The results suggested that when both loci, or
both person A and B, were exposed to the specific parameter of circular rotating weak
(microTesla) magnetic fields with changing angular velocities changes consistent with excess
correlation were stronger and more likely to occur reliably.
Estimated Magnitude of Energies
Any mechanism that is involved with excess correlations between two brain loci
separated by non-local distances should involve energies that reflect those that involve the
processes that mediate the effect. Saroka and Persinger (2014) and Persinger and Saroka (2015)
have shown that the basic frequency and the harmonics of the Schumann Resonance (7-8 Hz, 14
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Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Hz, 20-21, 26-27, 33-34, 39-40 Hz, etc) can be discerned within the spectral profiles of most
human brain activity. Most all terrestrial organisms are immersed in these fields or their variants.
The manifestation of the Schumann Resonances and the harmonics are more evident within the
caudal portions of cerebral activity than more rostrally.
The magnitudes of both the electric field and the magnetic field of human cerebral
electroencephalographic activity are similar to those of the fundamental Schumann resonance.
These values are in the range of mV per meter for the electric field and 1 to 2 picoTesla for the
magnetic field. The Schumann resonance is primarily generated by global lightning strikes
whose average incidence is about 44±5 Hz (Christian, et al, 2003) which is the median interval
of the gamma frequency frequently associated with consciousness. The propagating field from a
single lightning discharge returns to the source over the spherical guide in about 20 to 25 ms
with a phase shift of 13 ms within this 7 to 9 Hz interval. As shown by Llinas and his colleagues
(e. g., 1993) the recurrent 20 to 25 ms propagating waves that integrate large areas of the human
cerebral cortices occurs between the rostral and caudal cerebrum. This particular pattern occurs
predominately during waking and dream sleep but not during slow wave sleep. The phase
modulation is about 12.5 ms.
Even from a conservative electrophysiological perspective brain tissue displays a
resonance frequency with a medium value in the 7 to 8 Hz range. According to traditional
empirical measurements the permeability (inductance, L, per meter) of cortical grey matter at
frequencies around 1 kHz is about 10-2 Henrys. This frequency (1 kHz) is equivalent to 1 ms
which is the effective duration of the action potential of most neurons. The energy of a single
action potential with this duration produced by the product of the shift in voltage and the unit
charge is about 10-20 J which reflects both the magnitude and duration required to stack a base
nucleotide upon the type of RNA sequence the produces the proteins that some neuroscientists
consider the substrate of memory (Persinger, 2010). The permittivity value, C (capacitance), for
grey matter is 2·10-1 F·m-1. Application of the classic formula:
f=[√2π·(LC)-1/2)]-1 (1),
results in about 7 Hz.
The immersion of human brains within an electromagnetic pattern that shares peak
spectral frequencies and electric and magnetic field intensities produces the condition for a
pervasive diffusivity. The resistivity of the whole brain’s primary constituent (physiological
water) is about 2 Ω·m. When multiplied by magnetic susceptibility (4π · 10-7 N·A-2) the resulting
diffusivity is 1.7·106 m2·s-1. The median potential difference for QEEG activity per Hz is ~2·10-6
V (2 μV). When this value is divided by 1.7·106 m2 s-1 the equivalent magnetic field strength is
about 10-12 T (pT). This is the value of the magnetic component of the Schumann Resonances.
The convergence does not prove a variable that produces diffusivity is necessary for the similar
strength magnetic field. However it suggests that a fundamental feature of space, magnetic
permeability, with the exact conditions (extracellular fluid conductivity) within which a
collection of neurons (a brain) interact could produce a conduit for this global interaction.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
The functional duration for all human brains immersed within a common medium to be
potentially interconnected has been calculated to occur within about 8 to 9 min (Dotta and
Persinger, 2012). Assuming the conductivity of physiological saline within each brain to be
σ=0.5 S·m-1, the magnetic diffusivity would be 0.63·106 m2·s-1. If the surface area of each human
cerebrum is assumed to be ~π·102 m2 the total surface area for 7 billion human brains would be
22·107 m2. When this value is divided by the magnetic diffusivity term the resulting value is 349
s or about 6 min (Persinger, 2013b). One interpretation is that if there was some factor that
simultaneously integrated or “connected” all brains because they shared the same medium, such
as the earth’s static magnetic field within which the Schumann patterns are embedded, then the
time required for a change in one brain to affect any one or all of the other 7 billion brains would
be about 6 min.
This latency does not reveal the quantity of the effect being mediated. If ~10-20 J is
associated with the excess correlation as a basic unit about 107 neurons each discharging around
10 Hz would be required to achieve the threshold for a percept where the person might be aware
of the effect (Rouleau and Dotta, 2014). However if the demonstration by Houwelling and
Brecht (2008) is applied and this magnitude of energy is sufficient to affect the overt response of
an animal, an effect could occur without necessarily the awareness or perception of the effect.
The phenomenon of “blind sight”, for example, involves adaptive responses during ambulation
of technically blind people. fMRI data indicate that small numbers of occipital cortical neurons
respond to the optic stimuli but the numbers are not sufficient to meet the threshold at which
“conscious awareness” occurs.
The conditions for the two similarities, from a signaling perspective, could be consistent
with Lorentz’s Lemma which relates any two electromagnetic fields if: a) they are the same
frequency, b) outside of the source, and c) in a linear isotropic medium. If we assume: 1) the two
fields are the Schumann resonance generated between the surface of the earth and ionosphere by
lightning and the cerebral resonance generated between the corona of the cortices and the
multiform layer of the cerebrum by action potentials (Persinger, 2012), and, 2) the Schumann
Resonance and cortical fields are harmonic in time, then:
del·(Eb x Hs) = del·(Es x Hb) (1),
where E refers to the electric field vector component, H is the magnetic field (A ·m-1) vector
component and the subscripts refer to b (brain) and s (Schumann) sources. The aggregate is
Watts per meter squared. For both the human and the Schumann Resonances, this value is ~10-12
W·m-2. This is also the power density emitted from the right hemisphere of subjects imagining
white light while sitting in a hyper-dark environment (Dotta and Persinger, 2011; Dotta et al,
2012).
As predicted by the Lorentz Lemma, Persinger and Saroka (2015) demonstrated real time
intermittent coherence between the spectral power within the Schumann frequencies associated
with the brain activity of 41 men and women and ionosphere measures. Transient coherence of
spectral power densities with the first three modes (7-8 Hz, 13-14 Hz, 19-20 Hz) of the
Schumann Resonance in real time were measured from local (measured in Sudbury) and distal
(measured in Italy) stations. The duration of the coherence was for about 300 ms about twice per
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
min. This suggested that the “interface” interval between the global Schumann field within the
spherical wave guide and each brain was once every ~30 s.
Topographical map clusters indicated the domain of maximum coherence was within the
right caudal hemisphere within the volume occupied by the parahippocampal gyrus. These
clusters, associated with shifts of about 2 μV, became stable about 35 to 45 ms after the onset of
the synchronizing event. During the first 10 to 20 ms the isoelectric lines shifted from clockwise
to counterclockwise rotation. Persinger and Saroka (2015) concluded that the results were
consistent with the congruence of the frequency, magnetic field intensity, voltage gradient, and
phase shifts that are shared by the human brain and the earth-ionospheric spherical wave guide.
The observation that the intermittent coherence for brain measures was similar for measurements
of the Schumann values in Italy and within a few meters (locally) of where the brain activity was
being measured suggested that coherence might occur any where on the planet for some
individuals. This capacity might be considered a major antecedent variable for phenomena
represented as “non-local”.
There are multiple examples of measurements demonstrating the magnetic fields of the
cognitive correlates of brain function and of the Schumann Resonance at the fundamental (7-8
Hz) are about 10-12 T and the electric field components are about 1 μV·m-1 to 1 mV·m-1. The
Lorentz Lemma adds the dimension of radiant flux density. For the human brain with an average
of 1 μV per 10 cm per Hz or 10-5 V·m-1 and current gradient of 1·10-6 V divided 2 Ω·m or
0.5·10-6 A·m-1, the flux power density would be about 5·10-12 W·m-2. This is the same order of
magnitude as the photon flux density emitted from the earth and during human cognitions
associated with imagination and thinking of white light when sitting in hyperdark settings (Dotta
et al, 2012). The involvement of photons within a “macro-entanglement process” is expected
from both theory and measurement because quantum phenomena manifested as discrete shifts of
change in energy between electron shells is considered the bases of “entanglement”. A similar
concept, employing a different perspective, has been developed by the extraordinary original
thinker Pitkanen (2012; 2013; 2014).
The Present Experiment
The major limit of our DAC (Digital-to-Analogue Convertors) technology is that is not
readily accessible to the population. We (St-Pierre and Persinger, 2006) have found that when a
technology is too complex its application by others (Persinger and Koren 2005) is often
erroneous because of the numbers of requirements for function. This leads to results that can be
misinterpreted. What was required was equipment that: 1) could be easily constructed by the
average person and 2) imitated or replicated the excess correlation effects we have found in the
laboratory. Burke et al (2013) found that when a toroid was placed over the head (level of the
temporal lobes) of each individual in a pair separated by about 400 km while each subject’s
QEEG was being measured, LORETA profiles indicated excess correlation in the activity within
the temporal lobes of both subjects when one of the pair was exposed to sound patterns. The
effect was not observed with visual stimuli.
The excess correlation also occurred only during the component of the experiment when
the rotating magnetic fields were functioning in a decelerating manner that simulated the
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
conditions in which double photon emissions were measured by Dotta and Persinger (2012).
However in the Burke et al (2013) experiments the fields were generated from the programs
within laptop computers to Arduino circuits that could be easily constructed. This meant that
there was the potential for any person to construct the equipment with readily available
components to replicate and extend this research.
Rouleau et al (2014) employed the same double toroid and Ardueno system within which
two containers of spring water were placed in order to verify that the arrangement produced the
excess correlation in the pH shift that was reported for the DAC system by Dotta et al (2013b).
Rouleau and his colleagues (2014) found that the excess correlation effect was discernable
within the component of the presentation of the field that was most similar to the “entanglement”
phase of the DAC studies. In addition Rouleau and Persinger (2015) later found that the intensity
required to produce the effect associated with the activation of these counterclockwise,
experimental rotating fields (0.3 mG) was a small decrease in intensity of the ambient
geomagnetic field between 1 and 5 nT. This small diminishment occurred primarily in the eastwest direction or within the direction of the axial rotation of the earth.
This small shift of 1 to 5 nT is not trivial. The change in magnetic energy for a shift of 5
nT within a cerebral volume of 10-3 m3 would be about 10-14 J, or, the mass equivalent of an
electron. The convergence with the energy-mass relationship for an electron could be considered
essential given the intricate connections between quantum photon emissions and absorptions and
electron shells. In addition, the product of 1 to 5·10-9 kg·A-1·s-2 (T) and the rotational velocity
(~4.5·102 m·s-1) at the latitudes in which our experiments were completed is in the order of 10-6
V·m-1. In other words a potential difference that occurs in the cerebral cortical fields of the
human brain is coupled to the angular velocity of the earth itself for the same magnetic field
intensities that characterize both the dynamic activity associated with the Schumann and human
brain harmonics.
The present experiment was designed to discern if excess correlation between pairs of
two brains separated by the Atlantic Ocean would occur specifically during the effector
component of the paired toroid design. In order to integrate all of the major themes and
procedures that have been involved with previous experiments that pursued excess correlations
over long distances without the participation of traditional senses, the design involved multiple
operations for different types of cognitions, such as eyes open or closed, imagining sending or
imaging receiving light, listening to either pulsed (6.5 Hz) or continuous tones, and field on or
field off conditions.
We appreciated that the demonstration for excess correlation between brain activities of
two individuals separated by thousands of kilometers but who shared the “entanglement”
magnetic fields would be embedded within the normal activity of the brain that reflected the
behavioural contingencies and cognitive structuring of the experiment. These conditions were
employed as reference points or comparator functions so that the effect size and strength of any
evidence of excess correlation could be quantified. We also realized that an elegant, simple
design would appeal to parsimony. However if consciousness is a complex, emergent
phenomenon, then the opportunity for interactions of processes to occur was considered
preferable. This required a more multivariate design.
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Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
2. Method
Participants
The participants (N=10) were 4 female and 6 male adults aged 23 to 57 years (mean
age=33.5 years). During the experiment they were located in Sudbury, Ontario, Canada; Berlin,
Germany; and Madrid, Spain. They were divided into Groups A and B and then paired by trial
(e.g. A1 with B1, see Table 1). Group A (n=5, 3 female, 2 male, mean age= 30.4 yr) was the first
to be cued to “send” while simultaneously Group B (n=5, 1 female, 4 male, mean age= 36.6 yr)
was the first to be cued to “receive” white light, the active engagement conditions. Group A was
also the first to receive the burst tone while Group B was first exposed to the single tone +
silence, the passive engagement and “rest” conditions.
Table 1. Designation of Participants in the TransAtlantic Entanglement Experiments
Group A
Group B
Pair
ID
Sex
Age
Location
ID
Sex
Age
Location
1
A1
1
31
Sudbury
B1
1
39
Berlin
2
A2
1
30
Sudbury
B2
2
40
Berlin
3
A3
2
24
Sudbury
B3
2
57
Madrid
5
A5
2
42
Berlin
B5
2
23
Sudbury
6
A6
1
25
Berlin
B6
2
24
Sudbury
Procedure: TransAtlantic Entanglement
Each pair of participants from Groups A and B completed a single trial of the paradigm in
June 2015 between 16:00 to 19:00 UTC. Timing was precise (within 1 s) in order to facilitate
synchronous measurements at distances exceeding 6000 km. At agreed upon times based on
UTC, experimenters in the NRG Consciousness Research Laboratory located in Canada
coordinated with out-bound experimenters located in Berlin, Germany and Madrid, Spain to
complete the TransAtlantic measurements of Non-Local Entanglement. The orientation (facing)
of the pairs (A and B, respectively) were: N-N, E-E, S-E, N-SE, and N-NW.
The participants completed a demographics questionnaire and pre-test profile of mood
states (POMS-SF) after which the experimenters applied the 19 channel (Mitsar EEG-201)
quantitative electroencephalogram (QEEG) for continuous measurement during the 42 minute
paradigm, as well as the toroid systems for the field application, to each participant in the
pairing. Stop watches for pairs of Group A and B measures were synchronized by the
experimenters (to the second) via video-teleconferencing (Skype). Once watches were
synchronized and a start time was determined (~5 min from synchronization), communication
between experimenters was ended and the participants were each read verbatim a script
describing cuing instructions for the paradigm (see Appendix A). The participants were informed
that the entire experiment, except for baseline measures, would be completed with eyes closed,
and that verbal cues to send-receive would be followed by rest conditions cued by audible tones.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Table 2. Flow diagram of the temporal components of QEEG data extracted for
analyses and the operations within each component.
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Condition
EO-pre
EC-pre
Rest
S-R
R-S
Rest
S-R
R-S
Rest
S-R
R-S
Field
No field
Primer Field
Effector Field (I)
#
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Condition
Rest
S-R
R-S
Rest
S-R
R-S
Rest
S-R
R-S
EC-post
EO-post
Field
Effector Field (II)
No Field
The experiment began with a 6 min baseline (3 min eyes opened then 3 min eyes closed)
followed by a 1 min “rest” period, the onset of which was signaled by an audio cue (either burst
tone or single tone + silence, for Groups A and B respectively). The carrier tone was 220 Hz
while the pulsation of that tone was 6.5 Hz. Next Group A was cued to “send” while
simultaneously Group B was cued to “receive” (condition S-R) for a duration of 2 min, after
which the pairs switched (Group A receives while Group B sends, condition R-S) for another 2
min. Following this first block of send/receive conditions, the second 1 min “rest” period was
cued and Group A received the single tone + silence while Group B receives the burst tone. The
conditions alternated for a set of 6 send/receive + rest repetitions.
The magnetic field application was initiated through the Toroid + Arduino system at the
start of the second rest period, 11 min into the paradigm, following one full trial of both passive
and active engagement conditions (Rest, S-R, R-S), for a total duration of 20 min, involving 2
different magnetic field patterns. The second trial of entanglement conditions was completed
during exposure to the first pattern, a counter-clockwise decelerating magnetic field pattern
(minutes 11 to 17, for 6 min total).
At the end of the third rest period (min 17) the second field pattern was initiated. It was a
counter-clockwise accelerating magnetic field. Send/Receive trials 3-5 were completed during
the accelerating field exposure, from minute 17 to 31 in the full paradigm and minutes 6 to 20
within the magnetic field exposure time. The fields were turned off at the start of the 6th and final
rest period, at minute 31. The participants completed trial 6 of the send/receive paradigm postfield exposure before completing a 6 min post-experimental baseline measure (3 min eyes closed
and 3 min eyes open). The participants completed the POMS (Profile of Mood States) before the
beginning and at the end of the 22 sequences (42 min).
Table 3. Locations of the pairs of subjects and the estimated distances of separation.
City
Sudbury, Canada
Berlin, Germany
Madrid, Spain
ISSN: 2153-8212
Longitude
Latitude
UTC
46.49° N
52.52° N
40.40° N
81.01° W
13.38° E
3.68° E
UTC-5
UTC+1
UTC+1
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Distance (km) to
Sudbury
0
6341
6019
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Quantitative EEG Data
The continuous data, spanning a total of 2520 sec, from each of the 19 channels for each
of the pairs were extracted from WINEEG Software and imported into MATLAB for
synchronization by pair. This allowed for artifact removal from paired data without
compromising the synchrony of the measurements. The continuous synchronized data were then
segmented into the 22 conditions (Table 2), from pre to post baseline. Segmented data were then
spectral analyzed into 8 band ranges from delta to gamma (1.5-4.5, 4.5-7.5, 7.5-10, 10-13, 13-20,
20-25, 25-30, 30-44 Hz) and imported into SPSS Windows for further analyses. The segmented
data were also entered into a series of coherence analyses within MATLAB comparing 19 x 19
channels within each pair, from A1 to B1, etc., across the 8 frequency bins.
3. Equipment
Toroid & Arduino
The devices consisted of identical torus-shaped coils coupled to identical
microcontrollers receiving synchronized signal-generating procedures from separate laptop
computers. Previous studies have shown that this configuration induced a stimulus-response
pattern in human participants such that quantitative electroencephalographic (QEEG) activity
associated with stimuli presented to an individual at location A was effectively displayed for a
second, stimulus-naïve individual at location B where the paired participants were separated by
over 300 km (Burke et al., 2013). Additionally, discrete pH shifts were recorded in coupled
beakers of spring water such that the injection of a proton donor at location A (decrease in pH)
was associated with reliable increases in pH (more alkaline) at location B where the paired
beakers were separated by 1 meter (Rouleau, Carniello, & Persinger, 2014).
Figure 1. A plastic crotchet ring (A) before and after (B) copper wrapping. The coil is
covered in black vinyl electrical tape.
Each coil consisted of a plastic ring with a diameter of 25.4 cm, wrapped in a single layer
of 16 gauge insulated copper wire for a total of 225 turns around the 79.8 cm circumference
(Figure 1). This toroid, fastened to the head by an elastic cap, was plugged into a solderless
ISSN: 2153-8212
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
breadboard equipped with the basic circuit seen in Figure 2. The details, including schematic
representation, were specified by Rouleau & Persinger (2015).
Figure 2. Components of the circuit disassembled (A) and assembled (B).
The solderless breadboard and coupled coil received pulsed current from an Arduino Uno
R3 Microcontroller (as seen in Figure 2). Two pulse patterns were coded within the Arduino
1.0.6 software interface. The Primer pattern consisted of 7 all-or-none 3 ms point potentials
which continuously looped, separated by incrementally longer inter-stimulus intervals beginning
with 20 ms and increasing by 2 ms for every pulse, recycling back to 20 ms after the 7-pulse
sequence. The 3 ms point duration was selected on the bases of calculations by Persinger and
Koren (2007), derived from the Hubble parameter, for the time required for a proton to expand
one Planck’s Length. The Effector pattern involved the same all-or-none potentials. However,
the inter-stimulus intervals between points starting with 20 ms decreased by 2 ms for every
pulse. The code is partially displayed in Figure 3 whereas 2D representations of the pulse
patterns are provided in Figure 4.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 3. Arduino code for the Primer (left) and Effector (right) pulse patterns.
Once the fields were initiated, the duration of the whole exposure procedure was 20
minutes. The first field (Primer) was presented for 360 s and immediately followed by the second
field (Effector), which was presented for 840 s. Rouleau and Persinger (2015) have reported that
the electromagnetic fields generated within the center of the coils outputting these pulse patterns
undergo 1-5 nT diminishments within the East-West horizontal axis referenced to Magnetic
North as recorded by a MEDA FVM-400 Vector Magnetometer. A power frequency unit
indicated that the strength of the pulsed magnetic fields rotating around the toroids averaged 30
nT (0.3 mG). This was the intensity that produced the largest excess correlation in the pH studies
that employed this equipment.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | pp. 658-684
674
Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 4. Primer (top) and Effector (bottom) pulse patterns as specified by the code.
Each diamond represents a 1 ms point. Note that each pulse duration was 3 ms.
The field exposure procedure subsequent to cap application and antecedent psychometric
data collection can be summarized succinctly. First, the participant was fitted with the toroid
over the head (Figure 5). The participant then sat still in a comfortable chair while baseline
QEEG recordings were obtained. The Primer pattern was initiated upon the 11th minute of the
trial by plugging in the USB cord which connected the laptop to the microcontroller.
Synchronization of this step across both locations was accomplished by strict adherence to presynchronized time keeping devices and the experimental schedules that accompanied them. Once
connected by the USB cord, the microcontroller, breadboard, and coil drew power from the
laptop. After 360 s had elapsed, the Effector pattern was initiated manually using the Arduino
1.0.6 software. Once uploaded, the Effector pattern cycled for 840 s. The field was terminated by
unplugging the USB cord, thereby removing the power source of the device. QEEG recording
continued until the 42nd minute of the experiment had elapsed.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 5. Schematic of the experimental equipment.
4. Results and Discussion
Expected Activities of Local Behaviours (Within Subject Brain Correlations)
In order to compare any statistically significant effects for the shared hemispheric
correlations between subject (non-local) effects we measured the magnitude of intercorrelations
between hemispheres within subjects, i.e., within the same brain. Table 4 shows the global
power in μV for each person’s left and right hemisphere as well as the net difference in power
and the equivalent voltage when the eyes were opened. There were baseline differences in the
two Mitsar boxes employed in the experiments. This is shown by yellow and grey color.
However the net differences in voltage between the persons’ left and right hemisphere were
comparable for the two instruments.
Table 4. Global Power for the Left and Right Hemispheres of the 10 participants during
eyes open conditions as well as the net difference in power and equivalent in
microVolts. Yellow vs grey reflects the intrinsic characteristics of the two Mitsar
devices.
Eyes Open Global Power Converted to µV
Left Global
Right Global
Net Difference
Net Difference
Power
Power
in Power
in µV
49.22
50.58
1.36
7.236
24.57
23.44
1.13
6.595
19.8
21.95
2.15
9.098
25.55
28.53
2.98
10.711
30.53
37.44
6.91
16.310
8.64
6.9
1.74
8.184
4.44
4.6
0.16
2.481
3.07
3.32
0.25
3.102
12.28
8.48
3.8
12.095
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
6.49
8.29
1.8
8.324
Table 5 also shows the global power differences and net changes when the subject’s eyes
were closed. The net increase in μV global power when the eyes were closed was typical for the
normal person and representative of what we have measured in the last approximately 500
subjects assessed with this technology. A separate analyses by another one of the authors showed
that the average increase in global spectral power was about 5 to 10 μV higher during phases 2
through 21 of the experiment when the subjects’ eyes were closed compared to the pre (phase 1)
and post (phase 22) baselines whose average was 20 and 16 μV respectively.
Table 5. Global power for the left and right hemispheres for all 10 participants during
the eyes closed conditions as well as the net differences in power between the
hemispheres in microVolts. Yellow vs grey indicates the two Mitsar devices.
Eyes Closed Global Power Converted to µV
Left Global
Right Global
Net Difference
Net Difference
Power
Power
in Power
in µV
5.6
6.05
0.45
4.162
5.51
4.31
1.2
6.797
3.22
3.69
0.47
4.253
11.44
8.96
2.48
9.771
7.36
7.17
0.19
2.704
38.62
40.6
1.98
8.730
50.7
44.26
6.44
15.741
29.28
34.97
5.69
14.800
36.31
41.66
5.35
14.351
81.42
99.65
18.23
26.493
The interhemispheric correlations for each subject across the phases of the experiment are
shown in Figure 6. Because these measures reflected the intrasubject correlation of activity
across hemispheres the expected near 1.00 values were expected. The coefficients for the 10
subjects per phase ranged between r=0.97 to r=0.99. From a neurofunctional perspective, the
inter-correlations between the individuals’ own lobes is significant. As seen in Figures 7 thorugh
10 the individual lobes are strongly intercorrelated. Although T3 (left) and T4 (right) sensors
were least correlated and accommodated only 77% of the shared variance compared to the other
examples (> 90% of shared variance), the effect is not statistically significant because of the
sample size (n=10).
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 9 | pp. 658-684
677
Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 6. Within subject correlation between the magnitudes of the global power within
the left and right hemisphere of the same brain for the 10 participants
Figure 7. Correlation (r=0.88) between T3 and T4 global power for each person’s brain
(n=10) during eyes opened conditions.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 8. Correlation (r=0.95) between T3 and T4 global power for each person’s brain (n=10)
during eyes closed conditions
Figure 9. Correlation (r=0.99) between global power between the left and right frontal
sensors for each person’s brain during eyes closed condition.
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679
Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 10. Correlation (0.99) between global power between the left and right occipital
sensors within each person’s brain during eyes closed condition.
Excess Correlation Patterns Between Subjects at a Distance: Global Power
The same methods of comparisons were completed for correlations of global power
values between each pairs left hemisphere and right hemisphere even though they were separated
by more than 6,000 km. During the Effector field sequence of the EMF exposure, statistically
significant increased coherence of global spectral power density across right hemispheric
sensors equivalent to a correlation coefficient of .88 could be discerned, explaining
approximately 77% of the variance (Figure 11).
Spectral power densities were highly correlated over F4 (r= .95, p<.05; rho= .90, p<.05)
and T4 (r= .97, p<.01; rho= .90, p<.05), which were the sensors located over the right frontal and
right anterior temporal areas. Removing pairs systematically from the analysis revealed that a
cluster of significant non-parametric correlation coefficients could be identified for right
hemispheric global power during the second half of the Effector field sequence, continuing
somewhat after the termination of the field (p<.05).
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 11. Correlation coefficients plotted overtime indicative of the strength of the
association between paired right (light circle; dotted line) and paired left (dark circle;
full line) hemispheric global spectral power densities. EO indicates baseline with eyes
open, EC indicates baseline with eyes closed, L indicates white light visualization, and
T indicates paired tone presentations.
Correlation coefficients presented in Figure 12 were loaded and chunked into 5
experimental sequences across time: Pre-Baseline (n=5), Primer (n=4), Effector 1 (n=4), Effector
2 (n=4), and Post-Baseline (n=5). An ANOVA revealed that correlation coefficients indicative of
the strength of the association between global spectral power density over right hemispheric
sensors of paired participants differed as a function of sequence, F(4,21)= 3.83, p<.05, η2= .47.
Left sensors did not demonstrate the effect after Bonferroni correction (p<.05). Post-hoc analyses
revealed two homogenous subsets where the primary source of variance was accommodated by
differences in the correlation coefficients during Effector 2 (M= .74, SE= .10) relative to PreBaseline (M= .34, SE= .09), t(7)= 2.84, p<.05, r2= .53.
During the second half of the Effector field sequence (Effector 2), correlation coefficients
indicative of the strength of the association between global spectral power density measures
across QEEG channels for paired participants differed as a function of channel, F(7,31)= 21.90,
p<.001, η2=.86. As visualized in Figure 13, the weak association between paired right occipital
sensors (O2) relative to all other sensor pairs was the major source of variance (p<.001).
However, it should be noted that further differences among the remaining sensors were
identified. Increased average correlation coefficients were noted for paired T6 sensors (M= .90,
SE= .04) relative to paired C4 sensors (M= .74, SE= .05, t(6)= 2.51, p<.05, r2= .51). Similarly,
correlation coefficients were increased for paired F4 sensors (M= .92, SE= .03) relative to paired
C4 sensors, t(6)= 3.21, p<.05, r2=.63.
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
Figure 12. Average correlation coefficient indicative of the strength of the association
between global spectral power density for sensors over the left (dark) and right (light)
hemispheres for paired individuals.
Figure 13. Average correlation coefficients indicative of the strength of the association
between global spectral power densities displayed at sensors over the right hemisphere
for paired individuals during the second half of the Effector sequence (Effector 2).
Figure 14 shows mean differences between correlation coefficients associated with μV
from the left and right hemispheric sensors. These computed values, with their measures of
dispersion, are indicative of the magnitude of the global spectral power density coherence
disparity between the left and right hemispheres of the paired individuals over the course of the
experiment. This was accomplished by subtracting left-hemisphere-associated correlation
coefficients from right-hemisphere-associated correlation coefficients. An ANOVA revealed that
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
this measure differed as a function of the sequence of the experiment, F(4,21)= 4.83, p<.01,
η2=.53. The source of the variance associated was an increased value for this metric associated
with the Post-Baseline (M= .37, SE= .06) relative to the Effector 1 sequence (M= .11, SE= .03)
at the point of inflection, t(7)= -3.52, p=.01, r2= .64.
Figure 14. Difference scores obtained by subtracting correlation coefficients indicative
of the strength of the association between global power spectral densities for sensors
over the left hemisphere of paired individuals from those displayed over the right
hemisphere as a function of the sequence of the experiment.
Excess Correlations Between Subjects at a Distance: Intrahemispheric and Interhemispheric
Coherence
The mean coherence values for the five pairs of participants over the blocks of the
protocol for power within the theta and gamma bands between the left and right hemisphere for
each of the four lobes indicated that the only major significant and obvious effects involved the
temporal lobes. These bands are the predominant interaction mode between the hippocampal
formation and cerebral cortices (Bear, 1996; Whitman et al, 2013). The other frequency bands,
delta, alpha-1, alpha-2, beta-1, and beta-2 did not exhibit any significant coherence differences
across the phases of the experiment for the shared hemispheric activity for the pairs of
participants. The parietal, occipital and frontal regions did not show this effect during the
effector field period. There was a marginally significant increase in coherence over the right
prefrontal regions for gamma activity during the beginning of the experiment when the
instructions were given and individuals were concentrating accordingly.
The conspicuous effect of changed coherence between the more rostral left (T3) and
right (T4) temporal lobes as a function of the phase of the experiment and type of magnetic field
configuration is shown in Figure 15. During the effector field only there were statistically
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Scott, M. A., Rouleau, N., Lehman, B. S., Tessaro, W. E., Juden-Kelly, L. M., Saroka, K. S. & Persinger, M. A., Experimental
Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
significant (as inferred by the absence of overlap of the SEMs) and transient diminishments of
the coherence of power within the theta bands between the right temporal lobes of the pairs of
individuals separated by ~6000 km. This was not evident for the left temporal region for this
frequency band or for the theta band for either temporal lobe.
The specificity of the (right) temporal lobe (and not other lobes) and the gamma band
(compared to all other bands) strongly suggests the effect was not simply an artifact of direct
exposure to the simultaneously applied toroidal fields. This effect was also not apparent during
the primer fields, which also strongly indicates the effect was not due to simply shared magnetic
fields. The diminishment was from a right temporal (person 1) to right temporal (person 2) value
of 0.15 to 0.10 or a shift of 0.05. For comparison the typical correlations between spike counts
from groups of individual neurons in cortical networks range between 0.1 to 0.3 (Ecker et al,
2010).
Figure 15. Mean coherence between the left temporal (T3) and right (T4) temporal
sensors for the pairs for the theta and gamma band. The only statistically significant
differences occurred during the entanglement (effector) stage associated with the
depression for right theta coherence. Vertical bars indicate SEMs.
A similar effect was noted only during the effector field condition for the region of the
more caudal portion of the temporal lobes (T5, T6). However in this region the diminishment of
interbrain coherence during the latter portion of the effector phase occurred for both the left and
right hemisphere. It is relevant that these two surface sensor positions are most strongly
correlated with activity within the parahippocampal gyrus. The parahippocampal gyrus is the
general region by which interactions between the two hippocampuses are mediated through the
dorsal hippocampal commissure. It is located in the rostral portion of the splenium of the corpus
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Production of Excess Correlation across the Atlantic Ocean of Right Hemispheric Theta-Gamma Power between Subject Pairs
Sharing Circumcerebral Rotating Magnetic Fields (Part I)
callosum. The dorsal hippocampal commissure in the human being mediates information
between the hippocampal formations within the left and right hemisphere without processing
through the neocortices. Consequently memory modifications can occur without self-awareness.
Figure 16. Mean coherence between the left temporal (T5) and right (T6) temporal
lobes for each pair (separated by 6000 km) for the power within the gamma and theta
band over the various conditions of the experiment. The only statistically significant
differences occurred during the entanglement (Effector II) stage. Vertical bars indicate
SEMs.
(Continued on Part II)
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749
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 749-751
Kaufman, S. E., Intelligence
Realization
Intelligence
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
What is true intelligence? No one can really say, because true intelligence is non-conceptual, and
so beyond words. What is the true source of intelligence? That too cannot really be spoken,
because the true source of intelligence is also non-conceptual, and so also beyond words.
Key Words: intelligence, non-conceptual, thought.
When it is thought
that thinking
is the height of intelligence
then true intelligence is lost.
When it is thought
that the mind
is the source of intelligence
then the true source of intelligence
becomes obscured.
What is true intelligence?
No one can really say,
because true intelligence
is non-conceptual,
and so beyond words.
What is the true source of intelligence?
That too
cannot really be spoken,
because the true source of intelligence
is also non-conceptual,
and so also beyond words.
And so true intelligence
and the true source of intelligence
are not two different things,
but are one thing
that is not a thing.
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 749-751
Kaufman, S. E., Intelligence
And what is this one thing
that is not a thing
that is both true intelligence
and the true source of intelligence?
What sees when the sun rises,
and hears when the bird sings?
What feels love when the heart is open,
or hate when the heart is closed?
What knows when the mind thinks?
That alone is both true intelligence
and the true source of intelligence.
And that alone
is what you truly Are.
What you truly Are
cannot be known
through the intermediary of form.
But what you truly Are
can be Known directly,
as That by which
all form is known.
What is seen when the sun rises,
or heard when the bird sings,
or felt when the heart is open or closed,
or thought when the mind thinks,
are all forms.
What you truly Are
is not that,
is not a form.
What you truly Are
is the formless Consciousness
that knows all those forms,
and on occasion,
mistakes Itself
for the forms it knows.
What you truly Are
is not the word Consciousness,
for that too is but a concept,
and so is also a form,
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 749-751
Kaufman, S. E., Intelligence
and so is not what you truly Are.
What you truly are
is the formless Isness
that is pointed toward
through the use of the word
Consciousness,
and through the use of the words
formless Isness.
The formless Isness
that sees the sun rise,
that hears the bird sing,
that feels love or hate,
and knows what the mind thinks,
even when It does not Know Itself,
even when It has obscured Itself,
as a result of knowing itself to be
a form,
as a result of knowing itself to be
what is seen,
and heard,
and felt,
and thought.
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
Consciousness is Pattern-Recognition: A Proof
Copyright Ray Van De Walker 2016, Licensed under Creative Commons License
Attribution 4.0 International License, as specified at
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode
Author: rgvandewalker –at- yahoo –dot- com
orcid:0000-0001-9072-7390
Abstract:
This is a proof of the strong AI hypothesis, i.e. that machines can be conscious. It is a
phenomenological proof that pattern-recognition and subjective consciousness are the same
activity in different terms. Therefore, it proves that essential subjective processes of
consciousness are computable, and identifies significant traits and requirements of a conscious
system. Since Husserl, many philosophers have accepted that consciousness consists of
memories of logical connections between an ego and external objects. These connections are
called "intentions." Pattern recognition systems are achievable technical artifacts. The proof
links this respected introspective philosophical theory of consciousness with technical art. The
proof therefore endorses the strong AI hypothesis and may therefore also enable a theoreticallygrounded form of artificial intelligence called a "synthetic intentionality," able to synthesize,
generalize, select and repeat intentions. If the pattern recognition is reflexive, able to operate on
the intentions, and flexible, with several methods of synthesizing intentions an SI may be a
particularly strong form of AI. Similarities and possible applications to several AI paradigms are
discussed. The article then addresses some problems: The proof’s limitations, reflexive
cognition, Searles' Chinese room, and how an SI could "understand" "meanings" and “be
creative.”
This paper directly proves the “strong AI hypothesis” that consciousness is computable.
Also, this proof describes critical features of the algorithms of consciousness, which may help
practical AI development and testing.
One problem with any such proof is that conventional tests of consciousness are subjective,
thus the proof must be at least half phenomenal. The required phenomenal analysis seems to
have stymied many researchers.
I'd like to describe the proof that persuaded me. I haven’t seen it anywhere else, so as far as I
know, it is original.
Briefly, a philosophically respectable position is that consciousness is always
consciousness… Of. Some. Thing. There is a substantial body of philosophy, Phenomenology,
which studies the connection between a perceiver, and the object, i.e. the meaning of that critical
little word "of." Phenomenology is often defined as the study of experience.
Some evidence that phenomenology may be relevant to AI is that by 1930,
phenomenologists had uncovered the complexity of natural human intelligence. They recoiled in
horror at the "vast field of toilsome discoveries" of which logic, mathematics and epistemology
were small parts.1 This is clearly parallel with more-modern experiences in practical AI.
Edmund Husserl, who cast phenomenology in its modern terms, describes a consciousness
as a memory or stream of experience of the logical connections (or “intentions”) between an
"ego" and other things.2 His proof and evidence is widely respected by philosophers, and is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Intentions (connections between things and an ego) include perception, belief, observation,
desire, communication and will. All of these are described as "of," "with," "about" or "to." In
people, intentions seem to occur about 10 times per second. Husserl claims that consciousness
consists of sequential memories of intentions.
If Husserl's proofs are right, the practice of strong AI should be phenomenological
engineering: The design of consciousness is the design of intentions between a self and objects,
recorded in a memory.
If the connection between ego and object is an “intention,” then a mechanism that
synthesizes intentions would be a “synthetic intentionality,” or “SI.”
To make a rigorous proof, a basic research tool of phenomenology is needed, an
introspective mental operation called "bracketing." The name is from the idea of putting some
part of one’s experience into “brackets,” and mentally pretending that it and its logical
consequences don't exist. Bracketing is essential to the proof that follows.
In phenomenal experiments, one brackets some part of one's experience, and then observes
how one's experience would be different. The really unique thing about phenomenal experiments
is that they require no equipment and little preparation. So, they're actually better than logic for
making a proof. With logic, one has to start from agreed premises. Phenomenal truths are
objective because they're so easy for individuals to reproduce.
The utility of bracketing is that one can examine the conceptual structure of one's
experiences in detail. For example, one can bracket the color or smell of an apple, and it still can
be an apple. One cannot bracket "edibility" in an apple, and retain "appleness." If one does, then
a moist wax model of an apple becomes phenomenally equivalent to a real apple. This shows the
interesting fact that edibility is part of the mental concept of an apple.
Briefly:
The proof uses bracketing to analyze the "object-ground" problem. Briefly, this problem
asks: "What's an ‘object’?" and, "How do people separate objects from backgrounds?"
One way to investigate this is to bracket all objects. This experiment has the interesting
effect that what’s left is ground, mere qualia (or “sense data”).
There are some further interesting side-effects. When I do this, I have to remove all thought
from consideration, because thinking is precisely "about" "things." In order to think, or
apparently to do anything “conscious,” people have to make logical connections between things,
that is, "objects," and themselves, their “ego.”
It occurred to me that the process of synthesizing intentions, i.e. separating “objects” from
the “ground” was precisely the problem that AI researchers call "pattern recognition."
That is, pattern recognition is consciousness. Therefore, since pattern recognition can be
computed, then consciousness can also be computed. That is, the “strong AI hypothesis” is
confirmed.
The identity of consciousness and pattern recognition has already been recognized by many
AI researchers, but the lemma that it proves computability of consciousness has been neglected.
A more detailed phenomenal analysis yields not only a more rigorous proof, but also
identifies essential features of consciousness and its necessary algorithms.
Here's the details:
For an example to generalize from, let's imagine a very simple pattern recognition program.
Let's say that it finds square-shaped patches of zeros in a square array of numbers. I am sure that
this is within the state of the art, because I could program it myself. This might even be useful, if
the array of numbers was from a video camera, or had mathematical interest.
Now, for lemma A, let’s bracket each piece of consciousness as it is found in the pattern
recognition program.
Lemma A1:
If one brackets the program’s concept of “objects” a square can’t be recognized, because it’s
an object. The logical consequences, i.e. the variables identifying it, must be removed from
consideration, and therefore from usage. The bracketed program cannot perform its function.
Lemma A2:
If one brackets the program's connection between the concept of square, and a position in
the array, the logical consequences, i.e. the variables owned by the program that identify or
locate the square, must be removed from consideration, and therefore from usage. The bracketed
program cannot perform its function.
Lemma A3:
If one brackets the concept of a “recognizer” (i.e. an ego) from the program, then the
purpose and meanings of the program’s outputs are lost, and therefore the program can’t perform
its function. It might still produce data, something like “qualia,” perhaps, but never information.
(Note that qualia as such lack memory, ego and a logical connection, and are not enough to
produce consciousness.)
Lemma A4:
If one brackets the program's memory of such a connection, the justification for any belief is
not available. The program may produce data, but there is no evidence from it. In particular,
there’s no way to decide that some sense-data is or was a square. Again, the progam can’t
perform its function.
Lemma A, Evidence:
I think it’s clear that almost all pattern recognition programs would have similar issues, if
the parts of consciousness were bracketed in similar very general ways. There might be
pathological cases that don’t reduce, but they will be remarkably interesting in their own right for
their very peculiar properties. These special cases might be ways to produce exceptionally stable
synthetic intentions, or especially low-cost or well-performing implementations.
For the general case, Lemma A shows that bracketing significant parts of consciousness in a
pattern recognition program causes the pattern recognition program to fail to recognize. It is no
longer a "pattern recognition" program. These parts are essential, that is, required by definition.
Lemma A, Conclusion:
Thus, by eliminating the concepts which are essential to consciousness: Any of: objects, the
connection, the former of the connection or the memory of the connection, one eliminates the
equally essential parts of pattern recognition.
Lemma B, Evidence:
Now, for lemma B, let’s bracket pattern recognition from consciousness.
Imagine, a human being, someone who is indisputably conscious, such as yourself. Bracket
your pattern recognition. That is, pretend to yourself that "everything which was logically
dependent on pattern recognition" ceased to exist.
Lemma B1:
One will discover that one cannot recognize any objects in such a state; Consciousness is
removed from consideration because it forms intentions with (logical connections to) objects.
Lemma B2:
Further, the intentions, the logical connections are gone as well. There are no recognized
objects to which they can attach.
Tellingly, even Husserl’s “transcendentally pure consciousness” (when one’s consciousness
is conscious only of itself) is removed from consideration, because one must recognize one’s
own consciousness as being different from the other items of one’s mental landscape.
Lemma B3:
In this state, there may be sense-data, so-called “qualia,” but there is no narrative, even as a
sequence of connected mental pictures. In a real sense, formation of an observation is
impossible, and therefore there is no observer (i.e. no ego). Arguably, the consciousness itself
does not exist in this state. That is, there is no consciousness, in a different way. (Qualia as such
are not sufficient to identify consciousness.)
Lemma B4:
Memory becomes impossible, because recognition experiences objects in time and space.
When recognition is removed from consideration, space, sequence and time are also removed
from consideration. Memories depend on these, and are also removed from consideration.
Why do I consider time and space essential items for memory? Well, a simple example is
food. If you remember food, the memory is utterly useless unless you can use the memory to get
the food. Arguably, such a mental phenomenon without time and location is so useless that it’s
not a memory.
This is rather a weak spot. Often people substitute a discovery procedure for a reliable
memory. We look for restaurants on the street or net, or use a cook-book or phone-book.
However, I would argue then that what we are responding to is not a memory, but a hope,
and we’re trying to convert the hope into a plan. This may eventually turn into a memory, but it
simply isn’t one yet.
Lemma B Conclusion:
All the items of consciousness are removed from consideration when pattern recognition is
bracketed.
Main lemma, combining A & B:
The logic:
If not A implies not B and not B implies not A, then B implies A and A implies B.
That is, A and B are biconditionally equivalent.
Restated: The items A and B have the same logical effects in different terms.
By this logic, pattern recognition in objective technical terms has the same effects as
consciousness, in different, subjective terms. Therefore, since many forms of pattern recognition
are computable, then parallel forms of subjective consciousness are also computable and viceversa.
An even more detailed phenomenal examination may yield more insight about how to
implement more human-like AIs. But, there’s enough to move forward. Also, useful SIs might
not need to resemble human cognition much.
So, let’s speculate about how to apply these logical identities.
A memorized sequence of intentions, what we subjectively call an “experience,” might be
selectively replayed by a synthetic intentionality as it uses its pattern recognition to unify a
sequential graph of intentions with its sense-data.
With simple feedback and some reflexive processes, a synthetic intentionality might select
its sequence of intentions to search for and repeat subjective experiences. That is, given feedback
equivalent with the qualia of pain and pleasure, and a method to find and replay intentions, a
synthetic intentionality can have an experience that is subjectively equivalent to learning.
A fruitful application of an automaton's pattern recognition might be to reflexively apply
pattern recognition to its own memories and internal operations. In this way it could even learn
to improve its general problem-solving methods.
An SI requires only one data structure, a graph of “intentions.” Intentions can be passive or
active, because the type of connection (between ego and object) of an intention can vary. Also
the data structure of intentions is finite, closed, defined by the hardware (input, output and
reflexive) that the SI is designed to operate. Given full reflexive access, an SI might even be able
to compile intentions into optimized code for its CPU or other computational substrate.
That is, in subjective terms, continuing effort by a programmer is not needed for a synthetic
intentionality to learn by experience and improve itself.
When intentionally-guided pattern recognition failed, a synthetic intentionality could fall
back to evolutionary searches for intentional sequences,5 Bayesian-guided searches of a
stochastic space of intentional sequences, or, when lacking data, even random generation and
recording of intentions. The result could be a very strong form of AI, whose intentions,
intentional sequences and later algorithms are not limited by its starting algorithms.
These might be intentional, literally conscious improvements. However, if unconscious
methods were used (e.g. evolution of intentional graphs) these unconscious reflexive processes
might occur in a subjective experience like sleep, to avoid interference with real senses and
effectors during the reorganization of the intentions.
We’d expect successes in AI systems that resemble synthetic intentionalities (SIs), and
failures as they depart from that model. The canonical form of a synthetic intentionality might
synthesize and store a database describing a graph of intentions, then apply pattern recognition to
realia to select a graph or intentions to predict the future in a limited way and cope with the
future. This canonical form might be useful in some applications: Explicit reasoning such as
mathematical proofs, heuristic descriptions, knowledge transfer, etc.
A synthetic intentionality thus resembles a frame-based4 AI, except that an SI fixes some of
frames’ practical issues by using explicit pattern recognition to automatically provide new
frames, linkage between frames and data, and other context.
An SI is amenable to genetic programming5 with the advantage that an SI’s provensufficient, defined-by-I/O data structure removes any necessity to manually design new data
structures.
A compact, fast, parallel implementation of an SI might be neuromorphic. It could be like
Hawkins’ hierarchal temporal memory6 (an HTM has hierarchies of stochastic forwardpredicting state-machines.) As in an HTM, a hierarchy can multiply a (relatively) small number
of intentional graphs (thousands) into many distinct intentions, economically yielding trainable,
flexible, adaptive behavior. However, an SI’s reflexive consciousness (i.e. “imagination” or
“abstraction”) could speed learning compared to the unconscious training of current HTMs.
Also, the canonical form of SIs may permit direct design of HTMs, given some translation from
canonical to HTM.
Conversion between an easily analyzable database of intentions and a neuromorphic
implementation might be by something like Tononi’s integrative process(es), that produce
transition probability matrices.8 This would permit a-somatic design or training of SIs.
A reverse elaborative process would decompile neural or neuromorphic data into a graph of
intentions, permitting transfer, design, functional composition, optimization and synthesis of SIs.
This proof and its schemes have some issues. First, the proof has reasonably clear
limitations in its fidelity because of its incompleteness and unrealistic simplicity.
As to completeness, the proof may fail to describe many parts of human consciousness. But,
many major, subjective tests of consciousness will be satisfied, because the proof leverages
decades of research in phenomenology. Also, it’s not reasonable to expect humans and machines
to have identical consciousnesses without targeted research and development.
The actual complexity of subjective phenomena and implementations may prevent high
fidelity in basic implementations. However, R&D can improve a practical implementation’s
fidelity until it’s valuable in practice.
A theoretical problem is to define "pattern recognition" well enough to implement an SI.
Ideally, such a definition would be mathematically complete, closed over all possible
experiences of the SI. However, since the SI is computable, this seems to require that the SI’s
mental system be both consistent and self-proving, which Gödel proved is likely impossible.
Luckily, we have examples of pattern recognition. Using these, phenomenological engineers
can build SIs without a general definition. The story here would be something like, “Smarter SIs
will recognize more items and types of items, and therefore smarter SIs will have expanded
forms of consciousness.” This puts SI design into a continuum of technique by which SIs can be
improved like any other technical artifact. Eventually a limited theory of pattern recognition may
be possible, and bring many improvements.
But, can an SI possibly be conscious? Many philosophers argue that computers are
"syntactic," that is, they perform only symbol manipulation. Then these philosophers prove that
consciousness is nonsymbolic, and therefore "can't be performed by computers." This is Searle’s
“Chinese room.”9
Searle is qualitatively right. Pattern recognition, therefore consciousness, is generally an
analog process. That is, its inputs are smoothly varying quantities from sensors that interact with
some nonsymbolic "real world."
However, there’s no profound problem in turning those quantities into streams of numbers
and processing the numbers. Electrical engineers frequently use "digital signal processing" in
place of analog circuitry. It works well. Almost all digitally-recorded music “sounds like music.”
Even when it goes wrong, it sounds like “badly recorded” music. There are technical deficiencies
in digitization, but they are well-understood sources of error, characterized mathematically using
the “Z transform” to manage “sampling error,” “quantization error” and “frequency response.”
The "non-syntactic" nature of consciousness thus seems amenable to normal engineering
tradeoffs between the costs and convenience of digital and analog designs. Just design the
desired pattern recognition algorithm. Then use the cheaper of analog or digital implementation.
Reflexivity is also an issue. It’s common to believe that only a conscious being can perceive
meaning. So, “recognizing concepts” is at the core of consciousness. Some philosophers still
argue about whether one can recognize a concept. But, the proof says that consciousness and
pattern recognition have identical consequents, so if one can be “conscious of” a concept, one
can “recognize” it. So, the existence of the philosophers' argument itself indicates that people can
be conscious of a concept, and therefore can recognize it.
There's also real dispute among philosophers about what "meaning" is, and therefore
whether automata can perceive it. Let’s use Wittgenstein's assertion that meaning is how one
uses words.10 This explains why meaning requires exactly a set of words and an interpreter. Still,
Wittgenstein leaves open what one is doing, and what words are.
As programmers might note, Wittgenstein's definition is shockingly close, perhaps even
practicably close, to such computer-science subjects as Turing-equivalent instruction sets and
syntax-directed compilation. But, Wittgenstein's definition is too vague to be inherently
mechanistic. Note that the interpreter could even be a human soul increasing in spiritual beauty
because of the nourishment of God's word.
Compiling to intentions can resolve these issues. An SI could consciously understand
meaning by synthesizing new intentions from a stream of words or other symbols, and linking it
to its preexisting set of intentions. And, in a crucial test of consciousness, an SI can
misunderstand, by mislinking intentions to its preexisting intentions, and correct its
misunderstanding by relinking them more accurately.
Wittgenstein's words could be absolutely anything that is not already in the interpreter,
including the experience of eating an apple. The memory of such an experience could be in the
interpreter, but the experience cannot be, because it occurs only when the apple goes into the
interpreter's mouth. (Note that experience requires particular equipment: e.g. a “mouth.” This is
evidence that the physical structure of the interpreter is crucial to symbolic interpretations of
experience.) Synthesizing intentions can solve these issues, too.
It’s also common to believe that creativity is an essential element of consciousness. How
might an SI be creative? From my personal observations, creative people do something very like
rolling weighted mental dice when making contingent decisions.
An SI can handle such contingent decisions by using what amounts to an infinitely-divisible
roulette wheel, in which different contingent choices of paths through a graph of intentions are
assigned to each slice of the wheel. And, there can always be some probability of a totally
random choice.
When the SI starts, totally random choices might be a large part of each intention. But, if a
result is sufficiently unpleasant, that choice can be avoided in the future by reducing that
choice’s slice of the probabilities. The contingent choices without unpleasant consequences will
remain contingent, making the SI creative throughout its behavior.
Pattern recognition also appears to be the foundation of all symbol manipulation. The way
that people perform symbolic manipulation is that they recognize patterns of symbols, and
transform them into other patterns.
Even digital computers use analog pattern recognition, because every binary switch has to
recognize whether its control is on or off. If this is right, then computers are already conscious, in
trivial ways. The same sense of consciousness over time is in every thermostat: Too hot or too
cold, with some memory of other states, and something to do about them.
So, synthetic intention is not only possible, it already exists. Doing it more skillfully, and
linking it to languages, space, time and other qualia (“sense data”) seems perfectly possible.
Citations
1.
Edmund Husserl, "Ideen", 1913. pub. as "Ideas", English paperback, 1962, Collier
Press, section 87.
2.
Ibid, Section 84, 1st paragraph. In reading this section, note that the philosophical
term for the connection between an ego and object is "intentionality." About the
edition: to my knowledge, this is the only inexpensive edition of the only English
translation that was corrected by the author before his death. Some other English
translations appear to be mistranslated to grind the axes of the translators. A unique
aid is the "analytic index" in the back, originated by Husserl, and corrected. The
book is tough to read in English, and harder in German, but very good.
3.
Ibid. section 31. Husserl calls bracketing "phenomenological reduction," or often:
"reduction." "Bracketing" is the common usage in American philosophy.
4.
Marvin Minsky, “A Framework for Representing Knowledge”, 1974, Retrieved
May 11, 2016 from http://web.media.mit.edu/~minsky/papers/Frames/frames.html
5.
John R. Koza, “Genetic Programming by Natural Selection”, 1992, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA; This is the first of four books by Koza. Book 3 discusses
how evolutionary algorithms can design structure, including hierarchies.
6.
Jeff Hawkins, “On Intelligence”, 2005, Henry Holt, New York. Hawkins
identified HTM by neural analysis, and has arranged simulations and development.
7.
Djuro G. Zrilic, “Circuits and Systems based on Delta Modulation”, 2005,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin. This appears to be a stable, low-power, compact technique
to implement a neuromorphic fabric.
8.
Masafumi Oizumi, Larissa Albantakis, Giulio Tononi, “From the Phenomenology
to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0”, May
2014, v.10.5; PLoS Computational Biology. Retrieved May 10, 2016, http://journals
.plos .org /ploscompbiol /article?id=10.1371 /journal .pcbi .1003588 IIT’s
mathematical description of the biology is an excellent hypothesis.
9.
John Searle, “Mind, Language and Society”, 1999, Basic Books, New York.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Philosophical Investigations”, trans. By G.E.M.
Anscombe, 1973, Pearson, New York; Section 543. |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | pp. 422-440
Adnan, S. & Azam, S., The Integrative Brain Theory
422
Exploration
The Integrative Brain Theory
Sohail Adnan1*& Sher Azam2
1
FCPS Neurology, LRH, KPK, Pakistan
2
CESAT, Islamabad, Pakistan
Abstract
The element of conscious interpretation remained an unknown fact for more than a century. It
can be realized from the observation that the theories explaining consciousness have changed
over time. It is still difficult to explore a relationship between the brain activity and the conscious
mind, the involved neuronal processes, and how do we determine an appropriate motor response.
Determinately, a testable theoretical description will be more paramount and acceptable to
consciousness. In this article, we will amass information on different theoretical models
explaining consciousness, and later, the electromagnetic concept will be discussed in the form of
an integrative brain theory (IBT). We claim that IBT gives a complete description of conscious
meaning, motor response, and differences in basic sensory modalities at one moment in time. In
this theory, the electromagnetic field effects (accompanying spatial patterns of neuronal activity)
bind the processed information and serve as a medium of detection. A temporal relationship of
these spatial field effects may engender an overall meaning of a perception. The linear
polarization frequency is suggested to exist along the surface of cortical dendrites, and possibly
differentiate the basic sensory modalities. A simple experiment can evaluate the presence of
dendritic polarization rates and, therefore, the dipole idea of cortical activity may become less
consequential for the differences in basic sensory modalities.
Key Words: integrative, brain theory, spatial pattern, consciousness, electromagnetic field,
dendritic polarization.
1.0 Introduction
The true nature of conscious mind remained a baffling puzzle to the philosophers,
neuroscientists, and psychologists. There hasn’t been a single concurred definition for
consciousness. In general words, it means self-awareness or knowing of self-existence. For me, it
is a property of brain activity, which creates awareness of self, and relates meaning to our
thoughts and psychic experiences. The underlying mechanism for consciousness is always
speculated, because it is not an entity at a single point in space to be quantified. The
neuroscientists have so far been unable to explain the neural processes involved in the vast
diversity of psychic experiences like thoughts, color perception, passage of time, feelings, and
the different modalities of sensation. We don’t yet have an explanation for the differences in
various forms of qualia at the level of the brain. The peripheral nerve impulses of different
*
Correspondence: Dr. Sohail Adnan, FCPS Neurology, LRH, KPK, Pakistan. E-mail: adnan.neuron@gmail.com
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
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Adnan, S. & Azam, S., The Integrative Brain Theory
sensory modalities behave similarly, and there is no considerable variation in the morphology of
neurons in the brain to account for the differences in perception. When we relate these diversities
of mind to the underlying neuronal processes, it is called a mind-brain problem. The sensory
perception, which becomes single in mind, has multiple aspects interpreted in different parts of
the brain. A mechanism that brings all these aspects together, and produces a unified perception
in mind is called a binding problem.
We have sensory and motor areas in the central nervous system. The neurons of all the sensory
areas interlace in an intricate fashion, and process a sensory signal of any kind into a quantified
meaning. The neuronal activity determines a pattern of motor coordination, which is an implicit
destination of all kinds of interpretations in the brain. In fact, the brain’s interpretation of any
sort is destined to determine an appropriate motor response. It seems that the consciousness has
evolved over time to enhance the brain effectiveness in survival against the challenging
environment. A large chunk of brain tissue between the sensory and motor areas makes all this
complex integration. The whole confusion resides in the sensory aspect of interpretation.
The excitatory electrodynamics of neurons is considered in multiple field theories to develop an
explanation for consciousness. However, there is no successful theoretical description so far to
explain, all problems of the conscious-mind. The broad significance of the mind-brain problem
prompted William James [1] to declare that the attainment of a genuine glimpse into the mindbrain relation would constitute “the scientific achievement before which all past achievements
would pale’’.
It will also be appropriate to recall the Charles Sherrington’s [2] comment, which remains as valid
today as when he wrote it many years ago: “we have to regard the relation of mind to brain as
still not merely unsolved, but still devoid of a basis for its very beginning”.
In the earlier part of the twentieth century, Wolfgang Kohler presented a theory of electrical
currents in the brain as a possible means of detection and integration. The proposed electrical
currents were recorded on the surface of the scalp, and presented as an evidence of electrical
activity in the brain. Many invasive experiments were performed in the cats and monkeys to
disrupt the proposed electrical currents of the brain. However, the brain’s function couldn’t be
impaired.
Therefore, it was considered that the deflections recorded on the surface of scalp were not due to
the travel of electric currents to the external electrodes. The deflections were probably due to the
electric field effects of the brain. It encouraged the evolution of electromagnetic field theory of
the brain towards the end of the twentieth century.
Johnjoe McFadden believes that consciousness is an electromagnetic phenomenon with a low
electric potential value of 0.5 to 1 millivolt /mm, capable of influencing the membranes’
potentials and activity of motor neurons. The electric potential initially develops as a local field
potential from depolarization of neurons. Reinforcement of the local field potentials forms an
amplified electromagnetic information field. The resultant information field activates the motor
neurons to show an appropriate motor response to the environment.
Susan pocket, on the other hand, has a different theoretical description for the conscious
electromagnetic phenomenon. She believes in the presence of conscious and non-conscious
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
424
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| August 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | pp. 422-440
Adnan, S. & Azam, S., The Integrative Brain Theory
electromagnetic field patterns. The cortical dendrites are suggested to behave as dipoles. It will
be explained in the relevant section of our article.
Towards the end, we will describe that electromagnetic field theory of consciousness can have a
third possible dimension of explanation. We call it an integrative brain theory. This theoretical
model suggests that the large chunk of brain tissue between the sensory and motor areas
possesses a delicate network of neurons with complex wiring. The complex sequence of wiring
in the neuronal network influenced by everyday experience will be capable of fine integration,
and finding an appropriate motor response to a given problem. If every kind of interpretation is
possible for the brain, then the electromagnetic field effects of neurons may not require
additional processing of information to determine an appropriate motor response. The
electromagnetic field effects accompanying the spatial patterns of neuronal activity may only
bind the processed information, and serve as a medium of detection and meaning.
The integrative brain theory introduces the idea of dendritic polarization rates to explain the
differences in various forms of qualia. An experimental technique is also suggested to evaluate
the presence of dendritic polarization rates. If the polarization frequencies are found to exist
along the surface of dendrites then the neurons may be viewed as integrating entities of
conscious mind for the differences in basic sensory modalities. They can interpret information in
the form of different frequencies. The same frequency may also be reflected into the
electromagnetic field of the brain. This matter will be discussed further in detail as we move
forward in the article. Now we will discuss the neuronal electrodynamics first followed by the
theories of consciousness. The third possible dimension of conscious mind in the form of
integrative brain theory will be discussed at the end.
1.1.0 Neuronal Electrodynamics
Neuronal activity engenders a conscious mind and, therefore, first we will elaborate the neuronal
electrodynamics. The dendrites, somatic impedance, and a long myelinated axon make the three
essential parts of a neuron. An axon is a single long process, and conducts an ionic signal away
from the cell body. The axonal terminal is loaded with the transmitter vesicles. The transmitter
vesicles contain a particular type of neurotransmitter i.e. acetylcholine, glutamate, and serotonin
etc. The transmitter is released into the gap (synapse) between the axonal terminal and the
dendrites of another neuron. The neurotransmitters move across it, and bind to the receptors on
the postsynaptic membrane. The ligand’s gated channels open up for the sodium ions to
depolarize the membrane potential. The electric potential sensitive ion channels are incorporated
separately for the sodium, potassium, and calcium ions in the neuronal membrane [3]. Under the
normal circumstances, there is high sodium ions’ gradient to the outside compared to the inside
of a neuronal membrane.
Similarly, the intracellular potassium ions’ concentration is higher than the outside. The sodiumpotassium pumps serve to maintain the high sodium ions’ gradient to the outside and high
potassium ions’ gradient to the inside of a neuronal membrane [4]. This complex protein is driven
by the adenosine triphosphate (ATP). It pumps three sodium ions to the outside and two
potassium ions to the inside against their concentration gradients. It builds an extracellular
sodium ions’ concentration of 140 mmol /l, and a similar amount of potassium is maintained in
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the intracellular compartment. The intracellular sodium is maintained as low as 10 -12 mmol/l.
Similarly, the extracellular potassium concentration is only 4 mmol/ l. The ionized calcium is
required for the interneuronal signal transmission. The calcium ions enter the cell when an
electric signal arrives at the axonal terminal. The diffused calcium ions mediate binding of the
transmitters’ vesicles to the presynaptic membrane. The neurotransmitters are released in the
synapse from the transmitter vesicles. Subsequently an electric signal is induced in the second
neuron.
In the resting state of the membrane’s potential, the potassium ions being smaller in size move
out of the membrane’s pores easily than either of the sodium and calcium to the inside. The
potassium ions are positively charged. The rapid diffusion of the potassium ions to the outside
compared to either of the sodium and calcium ions to the inside, creates a negative electric
potential of -65 to -85 millivolts on the inside of the neuronal membrane [5].At the same time, a
similar amount of charge of the opposite polarity is established on the outer surface of the
membrane. When a signal arrives at the axonal terminal, a neurotransmitter is released and binds
to the receptors in the post-synaptic membrane. If an excitatory neurotransmitter like
acetylcholine, binds to the receptor then a central ion’s channel of the receptor will open for the
sodium ions. The sodium ions rapidly move to the inside making the membrane’s potential less
negative. If the input signal is strong enough, the transmembrane potential may fall to a level
of -40 millivolts, known as the threshold potential. An impulse is fired at the threshold level. The
impulse produces electric potential changes and travels from the dendrites to an axonal terminal.
1.2.0 Wolfgang Kohler
Kohler was a gestalt psychologist. Kohler believed that the conducted action potentials could not
explicate the complexities of visual perception. The action potentials traveling along the separate
fibers cannot merge together to form a molar object, and separate it from the attributes of the
environment in the cerebral cortex. He suggested that the cerebral cortex integrates information
in the form of electric currents [6, 7].The description was initially formulated to explain the visual
perception in the striate cortex. However, the cortical currents were believed to operate in all
forms of cerebral activity. An electric field is established when impulses arrive at a
circumscribed area in the cerebral cortex. An electromotive force develops due to the electric
potential difference between this area and the surrounding tissue. It causes an electric current to
flow that passes through the circumscribed area. The direction of flow is opposite within the area
compared to the surrounding tissue.
In this regard, the cortical currents were also recorded on the surface of the scalp [8].The cerebral
currents were recorded with two electrodes positioned on the surface of the scalp over the
occipital area. The active electrode was placed 1 cm above the occipital protuberance to
represent the foveal locality of the striate cortex. The second electrode was positioned at the
vertex. An object in the form of either a projected bright circle or a strip of the bright cardboard
with a dark background was moved in the visual field across a fixation point. A fairly smooth
deflection was recorded multiple times. The deflection peaked when the object passed the
fixation point. It corresponds to the activation of the foveal part of the visual cortex. The smooth
deflections recorded on the surface of the scalp were suggested to represent electric currents of
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the brain. The brain activity responsible for the external deflections required exploration. The
researchers performed multiple experiments to reveal the nature of the underlying cortical
currents.
Kohler himself did not suggest an experimental model to show the presence of cerebral currents.
There was a great deal of interest in the scientists’ community to reveal the nature of electric
currents in the brain. Different intracranial experiments were endeavored in the cats and
monkeys to disrupt the cerebral currents. However, none of them was rewarding to show the
presence of molar currents in the brain.
In 1951, Karl Spencer Lashley and his colleagues attempted to disrupt the predicted cortical
currents with the strips of gold foil and pins[9].The strips of gold foil were placed in contact with
the striate cortex of monkeys, while the gold pins inserted perpendicular to the macular area. The
presence of gold was expected to fuse the cerebral currents and make clouding of the visual field.
However, the visual function was preserved. The idea of cerebral currents became uncertain if
the presence of gold couldn’t impair the recognition of visual patterns.
Roger Sperry et al performed similar experiments [10],[11]. The cats one-half to three-fourths
grown at the start were trained to differentiate an equilateral triangle from a series of imperfect
triangles with similar dimensions. The cats were then operated and subpial cuts produced in the
visual area to obstruct the flow of cerebral currents. In some cases, metal wires cut from the
tantalum sutures were inserted in the visual area to disrupt the flow of currents. However, the
cats performed well after the surgery, and specific equilateral triangles could still be
differentiated. In another experiment with a similar approach, dielectric mica plates were inserted
in the visual area to disrupt the vision. However, no effect was observed in recognition of the
visual patterns to suggest the presence of cerebral currents.
1.3.0 Johnjoe McFadden (Conscious electromagnetic field theory)
McFadden explained the idea of electromagnetic (EM) information field as a possible substrate
of conscious mind [12]. McFadden believes that consciousness is an electromagnetic phenomenon
with a low electric potential value of about 0.5 to 1 millivolt /mm, capable of influencing the
membranes’ potentials and activity of the motor neurons.
A resting electric potential of -65 millivolts is established at the inside of a neuronal membrane
due to the activity of ion pumps. These ion pumps move out the positively charged sodium and
calcium ions to the extracellular space. However, the resting membrane potential is influenced
by the electric field changes occurring in the surrounding neurons. The cerebral cortex has a
parallel alignment of cells and densely packed with virtually 104 cells per square millimeter.
Therefore, when a group of neurons with a parallel alignment is activated, their extracellular
field effects reinforce to form an amplified local field. The amplified field is able to modulate the
membranes’ potentials of neurons in the vicinity. Its strength varies from a few hundred
microvolts to about one millivolt. The weak local field may produce a small drift in the
membranes’ potentials, and activate neurons that are already close to a firing threshold.
Therefore, a further amplified field is generated. In this fashion, a self-referred feedback loop of
the electromagnetic field is created between the groups of neurons. McFadden expanded the
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vision into an integrative electromagnetic field known as conscious electromagnetic information
(CEMI) field [13, 14].The digital information of neurons is pooled and integrated into the
electromagnetic information field. Consciousness constitutes that part of the integrative EM field
which activates the motor neurons and makes communication with the external environment.
McFadden explained in his recent papers [15] that the CEMI field is capable of producing
neuronal synchrony. The neuronal synchrony is considered to be a stronger correlate of
consciousness and awareness. It is believed that conscious awareness is produced when all the
aspects of an object are processed at the same time, though in different parts of the brain,
producing a unified perception. The CEMI field binds the digital information of these aspects
into a single physical system known as a gestalt [16]. The structure of the gestalt is similar to that
of the real object. Awareness and meaning are believed to be a part of the same gestalt
information. Therefore awareness is produced when all the aspects of an object bind together
into the gestalt information. However, the theory is still required to explain:
1. An experimental technique to confirm that the CEMI field operates the conscious mind.
2. A possible mechanism for the differences in basic sensory modalities on the basis of
CEMI field theory.
3. How does a CEMI field determine the position of motor neurons to be stimulated without
an anatomical connection?
4. It is a common observation in neurology that the patients with a middle cerebral artery
infarction, [17], [18] develop a motor aphasia and or contralateral hemiplegia (power of 0/5)
due to degeneration of the motor neurons. However, they are still able to develop a
conscious desire for speech and movement in the paralyzed limb. If consciousness
constitutes that part of the EM field which activates the motor neurons then these patients
would have not been able to make a conscious desire for the lost function.
1.4.0 Susan Pockett
Pockett believes that the conscious interpretation happens in the sensory areas of the brain rather
than in the motor cortex. The sensory cortex contains an electrically neutral layer 4 as compared
to the motor areas [19]. She claims that the presence of a neutral layer may be a possible reason
for the development of conscious patterns in the sensory areas.
The cortical pyramidal cells are suggested to behave as dipoles. When a signal arrives, a negative
charge is established on the upper outer surface of a dendrite due to diffusion of the positive ions
to the inside. The intracellular electrical neutrality is maintained with the diffusion of positive
charge to the outside near the cell body. In this fashion, the cortical dendrite operates in the form
of a dipole. The presence of a neutral layer 4 within the dipole makes it a conscious pattern of the
electromagnetic field. The motor cortex lacks the neutral layer and, therefore, the dipole spatial
patterns behave unconscious.
However, we feel that the cortical dendrite is a long slender filament of the pyramidal cell. The
neuronal electrodynamics changes in a short span of time during an action potential. If the
dendrite passes a series of impulses rapidly then the changing ionic gradients may develop
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polarization patterns along the surface. This is explained in the relevant section below. If
experiments showed the presence of polarization patterns along the surface of dendrites then the
dipole idea of cortical activity may become less important.
Susan Pockett also explained that the brain electromagnetic waves are produced as a result of
convective ionic currents with a spatiotemporal coherence [20]. The behavior of the convective
ionic currents in a tissue is different than that of electrons in a metal. Therefore, Maxwell’s
equations of the electromagnetic phenomenon based on the electrons’ dynamics are required to
be changed for the electromagnetic field effects of the brain based on the convective ionic
currents.
We feel that Susan Pockett is absolutely right because Maxwell’s equations are entirely based on
the electron dynamics. The transmembrane electrodynamics of ions is different than the
movement of electrons in conductors. During an action potential, the sodium ion’s permeability
of the membrane is increased and diffuse inside rapidly. The process brings a negative charge on
the outer surface of the membrane and at the end voltage-sensitive potassium channels are
opened. Subsequently the outward diffusion of the potassium ions restores the membrane’s
potential. The entire process is accomplished in fractions of microseconds. The electromagnetic
field effects associated with the above neuronal electrodynamics may have a different
spatiotemporal configuration. Therefore the theoretical and experimental values of the
Maxwell’s equations are required to be changed for the electromagnetic field effects of the brain.
Unless the experimental evaluation of the CEMI field as a possible substrate of consciousness
remains difficult, it is better to consider a testable theory explaining consciousness as a property
of brain activity, EM field as a medium of detection and distinguish sensations on the basis of
dendritic polarization rates. If evidence of dendritic polarization rates becomes available then we
may become certain that the brain has potential mechanisms to explain diversities of the
conscious mind, and can be gathered into a structured theory. We call it an integrative brain
theory. The theory also gives an explanation of certain basic facts discussed below.
2.0 Discussion
Kohler theory of cerebral currents was disproved in a series of experiments performed over the
decades at that time. The failure of demonstrable electric currents in the brain gave space to the
electromagnetic field theories of consciousness. The electromagnetic field effects can be detected
in association with the brain’s activity and, so far, remained the only alternate option to explain
the conscious mind. The electromagnetic field forms the base of a different theoretical idea of
consciousness. However, this new evolving concept is required to give an explanation to the vast
diversities of conscious mind. We will explain these diversities of conscious mind in the form of
certain basic facts. Susan Pockett, [21] discussed three important difficulties with the
electromagnetic field theories of consciousness. Here we will discuss some more important basic
facts that would require flexible explanations in the electromagnetic field theory of
consciousness:
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I) The EM field concept is altogether theoretical and the conscious mind has too many
aspects. The theory is quite primitive, and needs to explain various dimensions of the
psychic mind. The electromagnetic field theory is required to incorporate flexible
explanations for differences in basic sensory modalities, i.e. touch, pain, pressure, vibration,
hearing, and color vision. How do these differ and what is the possible explanation on the
basis of EM field theory.
II) The peripheral nerve impulses all over the body behave similar [22]. The quality and
characteristic of conduction of peripheral nerve impulses for the different sensory modalities
are similar and, therefore, may not influence differentiation of sensory signals at the level of
the brain. The differentiation is determined by areas of the brain into which they discharge.
When a given sensory area of the cortex is stimulated in a conscious human subject, it
produces a sensation in that particular area of the body [23]. If peripheral impulses of the
basic sensory modalities behave similarly, then, how do we differentiate them at the level of
the brain? For instance, if the peripheral impulses of touch and pain are similar, how do they
become different at the level of the brain? We suggest a model of dendritic polarization rates
to explain the differences in basic sensory modalities. It is discussed in the relevant section
below.
III) It is likely that the EM field of consciousness will be made up of electromagnetic waves.
The confusion arises when we consider how waves are produced in the EM field of the
brain? When a neuron is activated, the sodium ions move to the inside of a cell followed by
the exit of potassium ions to the outside to complete an action potential cycle. The two types
of ions move opposite to each other during the process. The movement of sodium ions to the
inside causes depolarization of the membrane and exit of the potassium ions will restore the
membrane potential. The two processes are well separated in time, and the associated
electromagnetic field effects will travel away from the membrane by a speed of light.
Therefore, it becomes difficult to believe that the fast traveling field effects produced by a
slow process of ionic currents would merge together to form an electromagnetic wave. We
can overcome the difficulty by considering that the electromagnetic waves exist in the brain
in the form of dendritic polarization rates or frequencies. We describe the dendritic
polarization rate as a linear polarization pattern on the surface of a dendrite when a series of
impulses are transmitted. The electromagnetic field effects of the polarization patterns on the
surface of aligned cortical dendrites may reinforce together. Subsequently, the polarization
pattern frequency of the aligned cortical dendrites is incorporated into a spatial pattern of
EM field (formed as a result of synchronous neuronal activity).
IV) The brain has a complex sequence of connections. However, the brain connections are
usually fixed for a period of time. The conscious experience is a property of brain activity.
With the fixed connections, how does the brain activity evolve into a conscious mind that
has a variety of options to think, feel, and execute?
V) The electromagnetic field effects generated within the brain represent our conscious
perceptions. These field effects can also be recorded on the surface of the scalp. Therefore,
the field effects are not confined to the inside of the brain. The brain’s electromagnetic
waves travel by a speed of light. We should have been able to feel the interaction of these
EM waves in the external environment at a distance far away from our body in a matter of
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no time. These field effects ultimately distort as EM waves move in the brain tissue. If the
spatial patterns of EM waves have conscious values, their distortion effects should have
been experienced.
2.1.0 Integrative Brain Theory
Despite all the above facts, the conscious mind and different modalities of sensations can still be
experienced as electromagnetic in nature. This is because the psychic feeling of our own
existence cannot be attributed to the organic membranes of cells. There is no comparable
diversity in the organic membranes to explain the different aspects of conscious mind. It includes
the perception of different colors, calibration of distance, binding problem, the passage of time in
mind, and differences in various forms of sensations. It will not be logical to think that the
interaction of transmitters with their receptors will be interpreted into any sort of information.
Similarly, a simple movement of ions cannot give you a perception. This is because ions are only
particles. They lack awareness of their own existence and may not add up anything to
consciousness with a simple movement across the membranes. If we look as a second observer to
a depolarizing neuron then as a single neuron it may not produce a quantified feeling of any kind.
A particular perception may be experienced only, if activities of the neighboring neurons are
unified together. The only adequate explanation that unites a synchronous neuronal activity is the
interaction of field effects produced by the individual neurons. The electromagnetic field effects
accompanying a synchronous neuronal activity can bind the information into a spatial pattern.
The informational values of field effects may become productive of a meaning when they bind
together in a spatial pattern. The spatial patterns of the electromagnetic field may then serve as a
medium of detection and meaning. However, many serious problems will occur if values of the
electromagnetic field are extended to a level of self-integration. The spatial patterns of
electromagnetic field effects may disrupt while traveling through the brain and their
informational values may not remain intact. This can make the integration quite difficult within
the electromagnetic field. It may be very difficult to evaluate the integrative electromagnetic
field with an appropriate experiment. Again it is quite difficult to explain that an electromagnetic
field operating at a speed of light, determines the exact position and sequence of motor neurons
for an appropriate motor response. The picture is further complicated when EM field has to take
a decision with a speed of light in a limited distance between the sensory and motor areas.
Consciousness behaves in a controlled fashion and requires processing in a well inhibited
environment. A controlled well inhibited environment may not be possible in an EM field
operating at a speed of light. The brain contains both excitatory and inhibitory neurons and is a
suitable place for a controlled processing.
Based on these facts we present a model of integrative brain theory of electromagnetic
consciousness. The theory suggests that integration and processing happen within the controlled
environment of the brain while the electromagnetic field effects produce detection and meanings
only.
If perception is at all related to the neuronal field effects then at which point do we feel anything
as the neurons become activated via action potentials? For this reason, the neuronal status may
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be viewed as changed when its polarity reverses compared to the surrounding during a
depolarization. It happens when a depolarization makes the intracellular potential more positive.
A similar amount of negative charge is also established on the outer surface of the membrane at
the same time. A cluster of neurons that depolarize together at the same time produces a
reinforced localized EM field. This localized EM field is called a spatial pattern. A spatial
pattern can form in a matter of a few microseconds. When a series of spatial patterns follows
each other in a short span of time then a temporal relationship will be established. In the
meanwhile, a signal comprising of several spatial patterns with a gap of microseconds will take a
few milliseconds to reach the premotor area. At that time, the operational effect of temporally
related spatial patterns of EM field may reflect a psychic meaning in mind.
We believe that the conscious awareness of meaning is a result of the brain processing forming
temporally related spatial patterns of electromagnetic field. A conscious meaning may be an
impact of processing of more than a few spatial patterns. The spatial pattern of neuronal activity
binds its information into a spatial pattern of the electromagnetic field. It may happen with the
processing of every spatial pattern of neuronal activity as the signal proceeds towards the
premotor area. Ultimately the brain processing will yield temporally related spatial patterns of
the electromagnetic field. Temporally related spatial patterns of the electromagnetic field may be
the ultimate point of detection and meaning. The spatial patterns of neuronal activity will
permeate a dense volume of cells in the brain before arrival in the premotor area. Therefore,
information arriving the premotor area will be well processed, inhibited, reflect more of a
conscious type, and determined to show an appropriate motor response.
Each signal processed in different sensory areas may have a tendency to move to the premotor
area and determine a pattern of motor coordination to show an overt response. However, one
signal with many spatial patterns of neuronal activity may get a chance to reach the premotor
area at one time with a desired effect. This fact is based on the observation that the human mind
can be conscious about one thing at a time. The information of different sensory areas may share
a “common group of neurons” before reaching the premotor area. When a signal passes through
the common group of neurons, it becomes refractory to receive and process signals from other
sensory areas that are a fraction of a microsecond late to arrive. In this situation, one signal will
produce a conscious meaning at one time that succeeds to permeate all the way to the premotor
area.
Subsequently the later signals would fail to produce a meaning and a desired effect. They cannot
permeate all the way to the premotor area and do not complete the required numbers of spatial
patterns to have a conscious impact in mind. The common groups of neurons with a relative
refractory state explain the fact that the brain can approach the premotor area with a variety of
options even if the connections are fixed. It also explains our basic fact IV mentioned earlier. A
psychic meaning that appears to emerge in milliseconds may actually contain the integrated
values of spatial patterns in series. A single spatial pattern is a local EM field. We predict that a
single spatial pattern add up its value to the overall meaning during the process of development
and binding. When a spatial pattern of EM field is well established its integrated value for the
overall meaning is released. Later if it is distorted while traveling through the brain, the meaning
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won’t be affected. Its effect is felt with the integrated values of other spatial patterns ahead. It
explains the basic fact V as well.
2.1.1Patterns of Brain Stimulation
The physical patterns of brain stimulation may not always resemble the perceptions in mind. It
may depend on the sequential arrival of impulses in the sensory cortex. For instance, consider the
stimulation of visual cortex for a triangle. The visual field is divided into the right and left
halves. The left half of the visual field is processed in the right occipital cortex while the right
half of the visual field is processed in the left occipital cortex respectively. When the vision is
fixed at the center of a triangle then its left half moves to the right occipital cortex and the right
half goes to the left occipital area [24]. The two occipital cortices are quite separate and apart. The
single image is divided in equal halves and interpreted in separate visual areas.
However, the image is still perceived as a single quantified entity rather than two separate
halves. The quantified perception of an image or any other information may not require
interpretation at a single point in the brain. It is probably the time of interpretation of various
aspects of an object in the brain that matters for a quantified perception in mind. The sequence
and timing of arrival of photons for the various aspects of an object may be fixed and specified,
and peripheral receptors in the retina will be stimulated according to the sequence of arrival of
photons. Consequently, the impulses carrying information to the visual area will be traveling
with a time sequence for all the aspects of an object. The same temporal relationship of all the
aspects will also be preserved between the spatial patterns of neuronal activity in the visual areas.
The spatial patterns of neuronal activity for the different aspects of an object will bind
information into the spatial patterns of EM field and their temporal relationship may give an
impression of a unified perception. The above explanation still considers the brain as a possible
source of integration of information for a unified perception in mind rather than the EM field.
2.1.2Dendritic Polarization Pattern Frequency
At the end, we will discuss an important aspect of mind that requires an additional explanation.
The basic sensory modalities like hearing, vision, touch, pain, pressure, cold and vibration are all
processed by action potentials in the cerebral cortex but still we experience them as separate and
distinct. One aspect of the action potential can explain the difference. There is experimental
evidence that action potentials can develop in the distal parts of the dendrites and travel towards
the soma [25]. The conduction of action potentials in a dendrite depends on its geometry i.e.
morphology and the density of ion channels in the membrane [26]. If there happens to be a
difference in the speed of conduction of impulses in the dendrites then polarization patterns may
develop along the surface of the membranes. A group of neurons that interpret one particular
sensation may all have a similar dendritic polarization pattern. The polarization patterns can
integrate into the spatial patterns of EM field and represent a particular sensation. The
phenomenon of dendritic polarization pattern is shown in the diagram below. It gives a twodimensional view of the long dendritic process of a pyramidal cell.
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Fig.1. Formation of polarization patterns along the surface of a dendrite.
In part ‘A’ the dendrite has a stable resting membrane potential with extracellular surface ‘e’
charged positively compared to the intracellular surface ‘I’. When an excitatory signal arrives,
the upper part will begin to depolarize. The positive sodium ions will diffuse to the inside of the
dendrite. At this instant diffusion of sodium ions bring a positive charge of approximately +5 ---+10 millivolts to the inside at the upper segment as shown in ‘B’. At the same time, positive
charges permeate a small distance of the cytoplasm but still not all the way to the cell body
because of resistance in the cytoplasm.
As positive charges move forward, the intracellular resting membrane potential of -65 to -80
millivolts is raised to the threshold level of -40 millivolts. When the threshold is achieved then
sodium channels are opened up again for further diffusion of positive ions as shown in ‘C’. In
that much time, the repolarization process may be activated in the upper part of the membrane.
The potassium ions move outward and restore the resting membrane potential near the upper
segment as shown in ‘D’. When a dendrite has to pass a series of impulses then the two processes
may follow each other rapidly. Finally, polarization patterns will develop along the surface of the
membrane as shown in ‘F’. We predict that such polarization patterns (dendritic polarization
rates/ frequency) may vary for the different groups of neurons. During a synchronous neuronal
activity, the intrinsic polarization pattern frequency will bind into the special patterns of the
electromagnetic field. The dendritic polarization pattern frequency in different groups of neurons
explains the differences in various sensory modalities.
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2.1.3Experimental Technique to Evaluate the Presence of Polarization Patterns
Our theory relates dendritic polarization patterns to the differences in various forms of qualia.
The pyramidal cells in the cortex have a long slender dendritic process. These neighboring
slender processes have a close parallel alignment to each other. Therefore, the changing
electromagnetic field effects can readily reinforce together as signals travel these fibers.
Reinforcement can establish in all the aligned fibers with a synchronous nerve impulse.
There are about ten thousand cells in one square millimeter area of the cerebral cortex. So, there
will be a synchronization of a few hundred cortical neurons in a spatial pattern of neuronal
activity. Keeping in mind the density of cells in the cerebral cortex, it is quite certain that the
individual spatial patterns would measure in micrometers. Therefore, it is inappropriate to think
that the entire sensation can be impaired by interfering with a few cells at a random point in the
macro map of that sensation. The interruption mechanism will be appropriate if it disrupts the
reinforcement of the maximum number of cells in a micro map in real time. Merzanik developed
the concept of micro mapping in the past century with multiple successful experiments [27, 28].
These experiments were performed to test the hypothesis that neurons change their representative
function after every few months. This is called the brain’s plasticity. The micromaping is an
invasive procedure. It determines a group of cerebral neurons working for a small portion of the
body.
Like the representative area of the thumb is grossly localized in the cerebral cortex. Similarly,
neurons representing a single point of the surface of the thumb may also be localized. It requires
insertion of a micro electrode in the representative area of the thumb and recording in real time
from the individual cells. A microelectrode is inserted in one neuron at a time and different
points are stimulated on the surface of the thumb. The electrode produces a spike when a
relevant point is stimulated on the surface of the thumb. Thereafter the electrode position is
changed and adjacent points are stimulated again to know their cortical position. With this effort,
the entire set of cortical neurons may be mapped for the surface of the thumb. A similar
technique may also be used to localize the cortical cells for the different modalities of sensation.
The cortical area where different modalities of sensation arrive may not be the ultimate site of
conscious perception.
The conscious awareness of a sensation may develop when a signal penetrates deeper in the
brain tissue. We already explained in an earlier section that the conscious awareness of any kind
may be an overall operational effect of all the processed spatial patterns of EM field
accompanying the spatial patterns of neuronal activity. Therefore, we believe that psychic
awareness of a particular sensation may not develop at one particular point. Our hypothesis
suggests that the spatial patterns of a sensation occupying a neuronal track have a linear
polarization frequency. The linear polarization frequency is the total number of electric field
gradients established on the surface of a neuronal membrane during conduction of an action
potential as explained in fig 1. The following figure demonstrates how linear electrical gradients
may reinforce together.
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Fig.2. Synchronized polarization patterns
The linear polarization frequency in the above figure is five. The linear polarization frequency
can either be single or be a range of frequencies for a particular sensation. In the later case, the
idea will not be surprising if we consider that the linear polarization frequencies of a sensation
exist with a small difference along the neuronal track. Stimulation of the entire frequency
sequence may give feelings of a particular sensation. Suppose the sensation of touch has a
hundred spatial patterns in the neuronal track divided in a group of three, 40, 30 and 30. Consider
that the polarization frequencies in these groups are 06, 04 and 02 respectively. Now stimulating
the entire track of 100 spatial patterns in a sequence with a slight variation in frequencies could
be an energy value and determinant of touch. Similarly for the sense of smell and taste the
polarization frequencies may range from 08 to 10, 12 to 15, and so on. Before discussing the
technique, we will elaborate certain basic facts regarding the approach of an appropriate
experiment:
1. The technique should not interfere with the release of neurotransmitters and the
movement of ions across the membranes.
2. Spatial patterns are suggested to measure in micrometers. Therefore, application of gross
techniques like mica plates or widely separated scars may not interfere with the conscious
perceptions. These experimental techniques were however appropriate to test the
Kohler’s theory at that time.
3. A conscious interpretation of any sort may develop as an overall operational effect of all
the processed spatial patterns of EM field. It is unlikely that a technique employed at a
single point will disrupt the whole conscious phenomenon.
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4. It is hard to accept an experimental technique applying the external electric fields to the
brain activity. If an external electric field is stronger than the changing field effects of the
membrane, it may resist the movement of ions. If the strength is equal to the changing
field effects of the membrane, it may either get aligned or do not affect the reinforcement.
Therefore, we recommend demonstrating the presence of linear polarization patterns in the
neuronal track. These polarization patterns may establish in fractions of microseconds along the
surface of a membrane. A microelectrode that takes recording at a comparative speed without a
significant time lapse will be appropriate to show such changes. In other words, if a greater time
lapses at the recording end then such critical changes may not be registered. First, we will be
required to localize a neuronal track. Micro map technique may then be employed to localize the
first point on the surface of the sensory cortex. It may be labeled as point ‘a’. Three consecutive
points ‘b’, ‘c’, and‘d’ should be localized with reference to the first point such that all may be
stimulated in a series.
Fig.3.Transmission of signal to the sensory cortex
Three electrodes can now be placed inside the long dendrite of a pyramidal cell at point ‘b’. The
first electrode positioned at the top, second in the middle and third near the body of the
pyramidal cell with a gap of micrometers in all three. Point ‘a’ should now be stimulated
continuously to make uniform discharges in the neuron at point ‘b’ with the positioned
electrodes. When a transmitter is released for a few microseconds, it may sustain discharges of
impulses in the neuron at point ‘b’ for a brief period of time. The molecules will metabolize in a
few microseconds. Transmitters at the receptors’ site will keep the ligand-gated sodium channels
open for the repeated transmission of action potentials. The positioned electrodes will take
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independent recordings. The phases of the deflection of all the three electrodes may then be
compared at a specific time interval. If phases of the deflection are different at one time, the
segments of the neuronal membrane will be at a different electric potential level indicating the
presence of polarization patterns.
Fig.4. Recorded polarization patterns of a dendrite
The third electrode is introduced in the experiment to compensate for time lapses in recording
the electrical changes. A similar procedure can also be repeated for the other two points ‘c’
and‘d’. If all the electrodes show a similar deflection at one time then it suggests that the dendrite
is activated as a single unit and polarization patterns do not exist along the surface.
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3.0 Conclusion
After a detailed study of the theories of consciousness and observing the fact that the organic
membranes of neurons lack a comparative diversity to the conscious experiences, we believe that
the conscious mind and its various aspects are electromagnetic. The brain activity generates spatial
patterns of the electromagnetic field. A spatial pattern is possibly a basic integrative unit of the
conscious meaning. The spatial pattern is established with synchronous neuronal activity and all
the neurons working together may have similar polarization patterns. The polarization patterns can
form linear polarization frequency. The dendritic polarization frequency may be a possible reason
for the differences in basic sensory modalities. When a set of spatial patterns follow each other in a
short span of time then a temporal relationship is established. Proceeding of temporally related
spatial patterns can produce a peculiar awareness and psychic meaning in mind as an overall
operational effect. The operation and integration happen in the complex neuronal network of the
brain while the binding and meaning may develop in the accompanying electromagnetic field. The
spatiotemporal relationship of the brain activity remains preserved in the electromagnetic field.
The brain activity is directed from the sensory areas towards the motor cortex. A signal comprising
of a series of spatial patterns, permeates a large volume of cells before arrival into the premotor
area. It moves through a lot of neuronal groups and becomes more decisive and a complete
conscious information before arrival into the motor areas.
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References
1. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
2. Sherrington, C, S. (1933). The brain and its mechanism.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Martin, A. R., Wallace, B. G., & Fuchs, P. A. (2001). From neuron to brain (Vol. 271). Sunderland,
MA: Sinauer Associates.
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interactive tutorial. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Blanton, M. G., Lo Turco, J. J., &Kriegstein, A. R. (1989). Whole cell recording from neurons in
slices of reptilian and mammalian cerebral cortex. Journal of neuroscience methods, 30(3), 203-210.
6. Kohler, W. (1929). Gestalt psychology. New York: Liveright
7. Kohler, W., & Held, R. (1949). The cortical correlate of pattern vision. Science, 110, 414-419.
8. Kohler, W., Held, R., & O'Connell, D. N. (1952). An investigation of cortical currents. Proceedings
of the American Philosophical Society, 290-330.
9. Lashley, K. S., Chow, K. L., & Semmes, J. (1951). An examination of the electrical field theory of
cerebral integration. Psychological Review, 58(2), 123.
10. Sperry, R. W., Miner, N., & Myers, R. E. (1955). Visual pattern perception following subpial slicing
and tantalum wire implantations in the visual cortex. Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology, 48(1), 50.
11. Sperry, R. W., & Miner, N. (1955). Pattern perception following insertion of mica plates into visual
cortex. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 48(6), 463.
12. McFadden, J. (2002). Synchronous firing and its influence on the brains electromagnetic field.
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(4), 23-506
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problem made easy?Journal of Consciousness Studies, 9(8), 45-60.
14. McFadden, J. (2007). Conscious electromagnetic (CEMI) field theory. NeuroQuantology, 5(3).
15. McFadden, J. (2013). The CEMI Field Theory Closing the Loop. Journal of Consciousness Studies,
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16. McFadden, J. (2013). The CEMI field theory gestalt information and the meaning of meaning.
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19. Pockett, S. (2012). The Electromagnetic Field Theory of Consciousness A Testable Hypothesis about
the Characteristics of Conscious as Opposed to Non-conscious Fields. Journal of Consciousness
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20. Hales, C. G., &Pockett, S. (2014). The relationship between local field potentials (LFPs) and the
electromagnetic fields that give rise to them. Frontiers in systems neuroscience, 8.
21. Pockett, S. (2002). Difficulties with the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 9(4), 51-56.
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26. Vetter, P., Roth, A., &Häusser, M. (2001). Propagation of action potentials in dendrites depends on
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PROCEEDINGS COINs15
MEASURING ORGANIZATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS THROUGH E-MAIL BASED SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS
Peter Gloor, Andrea Fronzetti Colladon
MIT, University Rome Tor Vergata
Cambridge USA, Rome Italy
pgloor@mit.edu, fronzetti.colladon@dii.uniroma2.it
ABSTRACT
This paper describes first experiments measuring
organizational consciousness by comparing six
“honest signals” of interpersonal communication
within organizations with organizational metrics of
performance.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since French enlightenment philosopher Rene
Descartes put human consciousness into the sentence
“Cogito ergo sum” – “I think therefore I am,”
researchers have been grappling with what human
consciousness really is. In this paper we extend
individual consciousness to collective consciousness,
trying to identify communication patterns that might
be indicative of the consciousness of groups.
Teilhard de Chardin introduced the concept of
“noosphere”, the sphere of human thought
complementing the biosphere, as the notion of a
globally connected intelligence. Recently the concept
of the “noosphere” has been gaining some traction,
for instance by the Global Awareness Project at
Princeton, which is trying to measure it using a
network of sensors spread around the globe. The
Princeton researchers claim to have identified a
correlation between recognizable signals measured
by their instrument, and significant external events
such as earthquakes, or when the two airliners hit the
World Trade Center 9-111. Other researchers claim to
have discovered traces of global consciousness for
example in the Twittersphere (Dodds et al. 2011). In
this paper we define organizational consciousness as
common understanding on the team’s global context,
which allows team members to implicitly coordinate
their activities and behaviors through communication
(Daassi & Favier, 2007).
SIX HONEST SIGNALS OF
COMMUNICATION
Our work focuses on organizations, and measures
“honest signals” of communication, aggregating
group consciousness along three dimensions of social
interaction (figure 1): network structure, where we
measure the degree of connectivity, dynamic changes
1
http://noosphere.princeton.edu/results.html
in the network structure over time, where we measure
the degree of interactivity of an actor, and content,
where we measure the degree of sharing in word
usage, sentiment, and emotionality.
Degree of
Connectivity
Degree of
Sharing
Degree of
Interactivity
Figure 1: Three-dimensional framework of group
consciousness
These three dimensions are the result of research
conducted over the last twelve years analyzing
hundreds of organizations on the global level,
organizational, and individual level (www.ickn.org).
On the global level we have studied dynamic
networks constructed from re-tweets on twitter, link
structure on Blogs, and co-authorship and Wikipedia
link structure on Wikipedia. On the organizational
level we have studied communication within dozens
of organizations through their e-mail archive. On the
individual level we have identified similar patterns
using sociometric badges measuring interpersonal
interaction.
Structure' Time'
Central&&
leaders&
Rota2ng&&
leadership&
Content'
Balanced&&
contribu2on&
Rapid&
response&
Innova2ve&&
language&
Honest&&
sen2ment&
Figure 2: Six honest signals of communication
On the structure, temporal, and content level we have
identified six signals, which are excellent predictors
of organizational creativity and performance (figure
2).
(1) Central leadership is measured through SNA
metrics like group degree and group betweenness
centrality.
(2) Balanced contribution is measured as the variance
in contribution index, i.e. the ratio of sending to
receiving messages.
(3) Rotating leadership is measured as oscillation in
betweeness centrality and contribution index of
actors.
(4) Rapid response is measured as the average time it
takes an actor to respond to another, and the number
of nudges it takes until the other actor responds.
(5) Honest sentiment is measured by the standard
deviation in emotionality
(6) Innovative language is measured as the deviation
in word usage from a standardized dictionary.
These six signals can be used to measure
organizational consciousness.
operation business units are regressed against an
exogenously measured organizational performance
4"Steps"of"Knowledge"Flow"Op2miza2on"
variable.
OPTIMIZING THE FLOW OF KNOWLEDGE
Predictors
Intercept
Emotionality
Responsiveness
Structure
The six signals can then be calibrated with a
dependent variable of organizational performance in
a four-step process towards measuring organizational
consciousness (figure 3).
In the first step, an e-mail-based structural social
network analysis of the organization provides initial
insights into key questions at the divisional,
departmental, and role/individual level such as: Who
are key influencers? Who is central in the network?
How do they behave? Do they contribute to
discussions or filter them? Do they assume a
collegial/creative work style? Do they respond
quickly? What is the sentiment of their
conversations? How do business units interact with
the rest of the organization? How do outside partners
interact with the organization? Answering these ad
similar questions assists in developing the hypotheses
for the calibration step.
In the second step the six honest signals of
communication are calculated.
In the third step, if the organization has performance
metrics, these can be used evaluate the organization
and ascertain whether certain communication patterns
are associated with superior performance coefficients
of the six honest signals, using or instance a
regression model (see table 1 for an example).
In the fourth step, these organizational signals of
consciousness can be continuously calculated, and
interventions be taken to increase organizational
effectiveness and creativity.
Table 1 illustrates analyzing organizational
consciousness of a large company, where the six
honest signals of communication of 16 independently
1"
Structure"
bridges"
structural"holes"
connectors"
bo<lenecks"
2"
Honest"signals"
best"prac2ce"
benchmarks"from"
100’s"of"
organiza2ons"
3"
Calibra5on"
"
correlate"structure"
with"outcomes"
"
4"
Interven5ons"
customized"
behavioral"change"
Figure 3: Four steps of knowledge flow optimization
to measure organizational consciousness
As the regression shows, the more emotional and
responsive, and the less hierarchically structured a
business unit is, the more successful it is.
Model&1
Coeff.
FIT
N
Adj&R2
Model&2
Coeff.
Model&3
Coeff.
0.1193777 0.6590365* 1.064805**
0.1409307* 0.1409307** 0.1228148**
0.0568062* 0.0511518**
-0.0678522*
16
0.2612
16
0.5163
16
0.6930
Table 1. Regression results analyzing 16
organizational units of a company
Through this approach we can substitute a dependent
which is near impossible to measure – organizational
consciousness – with measuring structural, temporal,
and content based communication patterns, which,
while still hard to measure, are far more tangible and
measureable.
REFERENCES
Daassi, M, Favier M. (2007) Developing a measure of
collective awareness in virtual teams, Int. J. Business
Information Systems, Vol. 2, No. 4, 413-425.
Dodds PS, Harris KD, Kloumann IM, Bliss CA, Danforth
CM. (2011) Temporal Patterns of Happiness and
Information in a Global Social Network: Hedonometrics
and
Twitter.
PLoS
ONE
6(12):
e26752.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026752
Gloor, P. A., Almozlino, A., Inbar, O., Lo, W., & Provost,
S. (2014). Measuring Team Creativity Through
Longitudinal
Social
Signals.
arXiv
preprint
arXiv:1407.0440.
Gloor, P. A., & Giacomelli, G. (2014). Reading global
clients' signals. MIT Sloan management review, 55(3), 2329. |
396
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| June 2016 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | pp. 396-398
Deshpande, P. B., Why Teach Science of Internal Excellence
Op-Ed
Why Teach Science of Internal Excellence
Pradeep B. Deshpande*1
*
Professor Emeritus of Chemical Engineering, Univ. of Louisville, & Six Sigma & Advanced Controls, Inc.,
Louisville, KY 40222 USA
Abstract
Students will derive a myriad of benefits from higher levels of internal excellence that are
amenable to an audit. Among them are health & wellness, improved performance in all walks of
life including academic work, better interpersonal and family relationships, and less discord and
violence.
Keywords: science, internal excellence, external excellence, ultimate reality, Consciousness.
Educators have the noble responsibility to teach students how to excel. Today’s students are
tomorrow’s leaders and so the importance of teaching the correct knowhow cannot be overstated.
Excellence can be categorized into two components: Excellence of the External and Excellence
of the Internal. Excellence of the external encompasses two types of activities human beings
engage in life: dynamic and static. Examples of dynamic processes include Petroleum refineries,
petrochemical plants, pulp & paper mills, cement plants, Aluminum smelters, etc. Virtually
everything else in life falls in the category of static processes or transactions. Transactional
processes vastly outnumber static and dynamic manufacturing processes.
The outcomes of all processes, whether static or dynamic, manufacturing or transactional, are
influenced by unknown and uncontrollable causes which prevent us from achieving perfection
(zero defects ad infinitum). Restricting this degradation in performance to unavoidable variation,
which goes by name minimum variance, is the limit of achievable perfection in all external
activities. The author refers to the wherewithal of how to achieve this level of performance as
Excellence of the External and this training requires college education. Engineering students
are appropriate recipients of training in minimum variance in dynamic processes while all
college students ought to be trained in the knowhow of how to achieve minimum variance in
static processes which are abundant in life and commerce.
In his research into excellence of external activities the author kept finding evidence that
organizations pursuing identical quality initiatives were realizing vastly different levels of
performance. On the flip side, folks with no formal quality-training were delivering outstanding
performance. It turns out that the elephant in the room in both instances is the level of internal
excellence. Briefly, the level of internal excellence refers to the capacity of an individual to
remain centered in the face of challenging external conditions that are part and parcel of life. The
1
Correspondence: Prof. Pradeep B. Deshpande, Six Sigma & advanced Controls, Inc., 1209 Holsworth Lane, Louisville,
KY 40222, http://www.sixsigmaquality.com E-mail: pradeep@sixsigmaquality.com
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Deshpande, P. B., Why Teach Science of Internal Excellence
wherewithal of how to enhance the level of internal excellence is called Excellence of the
Internal. Together the two components of excellence and the practices associated with them
constitute the Scientific Framework for World Transformation and it has become available
arguably for the first time in human history. Exemplary performance requires both external
excellence and internal excellence. While the scientific framework for external and internal
excellence requires college education, the practices of internal excellence can be taught to
students from an early age when they are able to sit quietly for a period of time and follow
directions. Scientific scrutiny of internal excellence is important for success as humanity has
become increasingly rational minded since the days of Copernicus possibly stung by the false
claims of an Earth-centric nature of our existence.
The capacity to remain centered in the presence of extremely unfavorable or highly pleasing
external conditions depends on the three components of the mindset and two types of correlated
emotions each of the 6 ½ billion of us is endowed with (The definitions are at the end of the
article). The specific level of internal excellence of an individual can be inferred from several
measurable outcomes. Among them are heart rate variability (beat-to-beat variations), respiration
rates, brain waves, human energy field, and spontaneous affection shown by animals, birds and
butterflies, among others. The principal tools for raising the level of internal excellence are
contemplative practices such as mindfulness and meditation. Success with these practices can
deliver improved health & wellness but they also benefit from good health and therefore a
healthy diet and physical exercises for the external systems (spine, muscles, and joints) such as
Yoga postures, workouts at a gym, etc., and breathing exercises for the internal organs and
systems (Pranayam) are important.
Students will derive a myriad of benefits from higher levels of internal and external excellence
that are amenable to an audit. Among them are health & wellness, improved performance in all
walks of life including academic work, better interpersonal and family relationships, and less
discord and violence. The United States is home to the science of external excellence while the
practices of internal excellence are uniquely ancient Indian, several thousand years old.
However, in its scientific incarnation the scientific framework of internal excellence is made
possible in part by the work of several American, Russian, and European scientists together with
three Americans of different faiths. One is a Jewish American journalist who began her journey
to decipher the mystery of the beginning of the universe in 1995 when she was a teenager. In
2014 she published a path-breaking book, ‘Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn’. The second is a
Christian American theoretical physicist with a doctorate from Brown who is also a physician,
board certified in Neurology and Internal medicine. Several years ago, he retired from private
practice to spend full-time in search for the nature of ultimate reality. He is coauthor of the book
on the Nature of Ultimate Reality with the author. Finally the author is an Indian American born
in the Hindu faith and he has been on the journey to develop the framework for four decades.
Together, the two components of the scientific framework can transform individuals,
organizations, and nations, and make this a better and a more peaceful world. The author has
made a presentation on this topic in several countries and the feedback has been overwhelmingly
positive. He introduced the scientific framework and practices of internal excellence in his six
sigma course (scientific framework of external excellence) in the MBA program of the
University of Kentucky in Athens, Greece three years ago and the students love it.
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Deshpande, P. B., Why Teach Science of Internal Excellence
Some Words of Caution
The mysteries of the universe and the mystery of life are all about consciousness, emotions,
energy, vibrations, and frequency. Once educators have internalized the scientific framework for
world transformation, they will see that the quest to remain centered has nothing to do with race,
gender, languages, religion, caste, or national origin. Discrimination and violence on any basis is
a product of excessive R and T components. Race, religion, or caste have very little to do with
these human afflictions. Incarnations, son of God, and Prophets from all faiths have left ample
evidence that their sole aim in life had been to raise the S component and to endow humanity
with abundant positive emotions (unconditioned love, empathy, kindness, compassion). These
comments notwithstanding, the practices associated with the scientific framework for internal
excellence which originated in ancient India involve certain postures, chants, etc., which can be
easily misconstrued as being religious. They can be modified easily enough as deemed necessary
without the loss of impact value.
Further Readings
Deshpande, Pradeep B. and Tantalean, Roberto Z., Process Control and Optimization, Six Sigma and
Advanced Controls, Inc., September 2015 (will be available on amazon).
Deshpande, Pradeep B. and Kowall, James P., The Nature of Ultimate Reality and How it can Transform
our World: Evidence from Modern Physics; Wisdom of YODA, Six Sigma and Advanced Controls,
Inc., January 2015 (Available from amazon).
Deshpande, Pradeep B., Website, sot.sixsigmaquality.com, June 2015.
Deshpande, P. B., Six Sigma for Karma Capitalism, Six Sigma and Advanced Controls, Inc., January
2015 (Available on amazon).
Gefter, Amanda, Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn, Bantam Books, 2014.
•
•
Max S
Max T
Max Positive
Emotions
Level of Internal
Excellence
•
Mindset Components:
S: Truthfulness, honesty, steadfastness, equanimity
R: Attachment, bravery, ego, ambition, greed, desire to live
T: Lying, cheating, causing injury in words or deeds, sleep
Emotions:
Positive Emotions: Unconditional love, kindness, empathy,
compassion
Negative Emotions: Anger, hatred, hostility, despair, resentment,
frustration, guilt, jealousy, fear, sorrow
Positive emotions are strongly and positively correlated with the S
component
Negative emotions are strongly and positively correlated with R and T
components
Level of Internal
Excellence
Max Negative
Emotions
Figure 1. Internal Excellence Explained
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-909
Smetham, G. P., Engaging Buddhism with a False Imagination (Part I)
889
Article
Engaging Buddhism with a False Imagination:
Reflections on Some Misrepresentations of Buddhist Philosophy by Western
philosophers, & a Quantum Buddhist Mind-only Solution (Part I)
Graham P. Smetham*
ABSTRACT
The metaphysical implications of the Yogācāra-Vijnanavada ‘consciousness-only’ school of
Buddhist psycho-metaphysics has become an issue of some debate amongst some Western
philosophers with an interest in Buddhist philosophy. The ‘canonical’ view amongst many
significant scholars is that, as the name suggests, this perspective asserts that the ultimate nature
of the process of reality is nondual primordial consciousness/awareness. On this ‘Idealist’ view
the external apparently material world is considered to be a mind-created illusion. However,
some contemporary Western philosophers are offering seemingly more materialist, or noncommittal as to the existence of an external material world, versions. This article examines such
claims and exposes their deficiencies. A quantum-Mind-Only Yogācāra-Vijnanavada
perspective is explored.
Keywords: Engaging Buddhism, consciousness-only, mind-only, three-nature theory, quantum
consciousness potentiality, quantum Darwinism, ground-consciousness, store-consciousness,
collective karma, quantum mind-created reality.
The distinguished philosopher Jay L. Garfield has an impressive academic profile, having
Professorships in both Philosophy and Tibetan Studies. He is also a member of a group of
philosophers who call themselves “The Cowherds.” This appellation is derived from a comment
made by the seventh century Indian Buddhist practitioner-philosopher Chandrakirti indicating
that ‘conventional truth/reality’ (saṃvṛti-satya – also translated as ‘seeming’, ‘relative’, and
‘everyday’ truth or reality, as opposed to paramārtha-satya, ‘ultimate truth/reality’) is the way
that the world is experienced by unenlightened people such as cowherds; ultimate reality,
according to Buddhist philosophy, of course, is the way that reality is experienced by enlightened
beings. The ‘Cowherds’ describe themselves as being:
… scholars of Buddhist studies … [who] are united by a commitment to rigorous
philosophical analysis as an approach to understanding Buddhist metaphysics and
epistemology, and to the union of philology and philosophy in the service of the greater
understanding of the Buddhist tradition and its insights.1
There are a couple of things one can say about this project at the outset. There are many
impressive practitioners who are trained in both the meditative practices and the philosophical
perspectives of the various Buddhist traditions, as opposed to people who are only academic
* Correspondence: Graham Smetham http://www.quantumbuddhism.com E-mail:graham@quantumbuddhsim.com
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“scholars.” Contemporary Buddhist practitioners such as Dzigar Kongtrul Rinpoche, Dzongsar
Khyentse Rinpoche, and Ringu Tulku, to mention just three I have had experience of, clearly
have degrees of realization which derives from consistent and committed meditation practice, as
well as profound knowledge of Buddhist philosophical/metaphysical perspectives, perspectives
that perhaps become more understandable with some degree of meditation competence.
Teachers like these are fully conversant with the Western world and speak fluent English and
therefore are able to explain Buddhist philosophy, which has been handed down through a line of
teachers within various traditions, clearly for a Western audience. In the light of this it seems
perhaps slightly incongruous for Western “scholars” to decide that they are required to sort out
what various Buddhist philosophical perspectives really amount to. And the notion that a
Western analytic philosophical approach is going to get the job done properly is, as we shall see,
questionable. The fact that the various ‘cowherds’ come to significantly different conclusions
points to this conclusion.
Furthermore, there are a few significant Western scholar-practitioners, working within Buddhist
traditions under the guidance of accomplished Buddhist teachers, who are able to articulate
Buddhist metaphysical viewpoints with great precision and clarity. To my mind a remarkable
contemporary example of such a scholar-practitioner is Karl Brunnhőlzl, who works alongside
respected Tibetan teachers such as Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche. Brunnhőlzl has translated and
written introductions and commentaries to important Buddhist texts, and his brilliant elucidations
of such texts are clearly in line with traditional Buddhist perspectives, whereas some of the
accounts presented by some of the ‘cowherds’ are a little misleading. In this article I will
primarily be concerned with Garfield’s account of Yogācāra-Vijnanavada psycho-metaphysics,
which, when viewed from the perspective of ‘canonical’ Yogācāra-Vijnanavada, is both bizarre
and misleading.
It must be said that Garfield is an academic who has done a great deal of significant work in the
field of Buddhist Studies, translating texts and writing and editing several books. And he should
be heartily congratulated for championing the view that Buddhist philosophy should be treated
seriously by Western philosophers:
People in our profession are still happy to treat Western philosophy as the “core” of the
discipline, … So, for instance, a course that addresses only classical Greek philosophy
can be comfortably titled “Ancient Philosophy,” not “Ancient Western Philosophy,” and
a course in metaphysics can be counted on to ignore all non-Western metaphysics…. It
is simply irrational to ignore most of world philosophy in the pursuit of truth, and
immoral to relegate any literature not written by Europeans as somehow beneath our
dignity to read.2
Such an attitude is indeed refreshing. However, the fact that Garfield, through a misguided use
of a Western ‘analytic’ philosophical attitude, misrepresents a core Buddhist philosophical
perspective is, obviously, less laudable. The fact that someone holding a weighty list of
academic positions, and a significant stature within Buddhist Studies, manages to misconstrue
and misrepresent the Yogācāra-Vijnanavada (yoga/meditation-practice-consciousness-onlyvehicle), which is the basis for what later became the Tibetan school of Chittamatra or MindOnly Buddhism, is disturbing.
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The Yogācāra-Vijnanavada school of Buddhist psycho-metaphysics developed in Indian
Mahayana (Great-Vehicle) Buddhism around the fourth century C.E., largely as a result of the
metaphysical explorations of the practitioner-philosophers Vasubandhu and Asanga. The term
Yogācāra indicates that the exponents of this school considered the practice of meditation was a
central aspect of the Buddhist path (‘yoga’ here refers to meditation, not physical postures), and
the term Vijnanavada, ‘consciousness-way’, indicates that the metaphysics associated with this
school asserts the primacy of consciousness in the process of reality. This viewpoint was in
contrast to the Madhyamaka, Middle-Way, school which held that it was mistaken to ascribe
either existence or non-existence to ultimate reality. As the philosopher Roger Zim points out:
The fundamental doctrine of the Yogacara school is “that all phenomenal existence is
fabricated by consciousness.” Consciousness is the basis of all activities from birth to
attaining enlightenment; “...all is based upon the coming into being and the ceasing to be
of consciousness, i.e., of distinctions in the mind.” Consciousness is the distinction
making activity of the mind, both in making and having distinctions, including the states
we consider the conscious as well as the unconscious. Consciousness, in making
distinctions between self and other, becomes the subject which treats everything else as
object. Consciousness itself is real. It exists as a series, or stream, of successive
momentary awareness of events, each immediately replaced by consciousness in the next
moment. Consciousness “has no substantiality ...and is dependent on the consciousness
of the preceding instant.”3
Thus the foundational feature of Yogācāra-Vijnanavada would seem to be that all phenomena,
including the appearances of apparently external objects, ultimately derive from the activities of
consciousness.
However, the extent to which consciousness determines the process of reality, in particular the
status of apparently external objects, has for Western philosophers become a matter of dispute.
The most prevalent understanding of Yogācāra-Vijnanavada is that the process of reality is in
somehow entirely orchestrated by mind:
The basic ontological question - what is there in the world? - is answered unambiguously
by the Indian Yogācāra theorists of the classical period: they say there is nothing but
mind (cittamatra).4
As Brunnhőlzl writes regarding the views of the 4th century Yogācāra practitioner-philoso-pher
Vasubandhu:
The beginning of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatikavrtti says:
In the mahayana, the three realms are presented as being mere cognizance
(vijnaptimatra). The sutras say, “Oh sons of the Victor, all three realms are mere mind
(cittamatra).” … “Mere” has the meaning of excluding referents.
All this is mere cognizance
Because of the appearance of nonexistent referents,
Just like the seeing of nonexistent strands of hair
In someone with blurred vision.
Like many other Yogācāra texts, Vasubandhu’s indeed continues by denying the
existence of material outer objects…5
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This view is sometimes termed ‘Idealist’, although the details of Yogācāra-Vijnanavada
(henceforth denoted simply by ‘Yogācāra’) are much more complex and detailed than most
Western notions of Idealism.
However, Garfield, whilst sometimes conceding an Idealist aspect of the Yogācāra worldview,
also suggests that it does not necessarily indicate that consciousness is involved in the actual
production of the appearance of the apparently material external world. Thus in his discussion
of the famous ‘brain in a vat’ scenario in relation to Yogācāra he writes:
…Vasubandhu is an important partner in this conversation – that this conclusion is not
necessarily idealistic. It is neither to deny the materiality of the brain, nor the vat, nor
to deny the reality of the world to which I have only unmediated access. 6
And:
Vasubandhu … calls upon us to challenge neither the reality nor the illusory character of
the objects we perceive, but rather our instinctive view that they, we, and our experience
of our own being are given to us just in the way that they exist, or that anything ever
could be.7
In other words there may be objects ‘out there’ but we cannot know their true and ‘real’ nature.
The Buddhist scholar Georges B. J. Dreyfus writes concerning this kind of approach to MindOnly:
Modern scholars have tried to come to terms with this difficult topic. One interpretation
is that this system is Idealist. Another view is that this is a misinterpretation of a
philosophy that emphasizes the mind dependency of perceptual elements but remains
neutral as far as the status of external objects are concerned. I have not seem anything in
the Tibetan tradition supporting the latter interpretation.8
This would mean that Garfield’s claim would amount to indicating significant incompetence on
the part of Tibetan scholars. But, as we shall see, the notion that the Yogācāra perspective is
neutral concerning the nature of the apparently external material world is in the mind-only of
some misguided Western philosophers.
Examples of misleading presentations of the Yogācāra perspective are provided by Garfield’s
account of Yogācāra psycho-metaphysics in general and his treatment of Vasubandhu’s magic
elephant analogy in particular. This analogy comes towards the end of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra
text Trisvabhavanirdesa (Verses Explaining the Three Natures). Garfield proffers his
idiosyncratic vision of Yogācāra both in his recently published book Engaging Buddhism: Why it
Matters to Philosophy and in an essay entitled ‘I am a Brain in a Vat (Or Perhaps a Pile of
Sticks by the Side of the Road)’, this essay is contained in a recently published collection of
essays Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: Allies or Rivals? Garfield has translated and interpreted
Vasubandhu’s thirty-eight verses, as have several others, including Brunnhőlzl, and it is
interesting to compare the difference between Garfield’s version, concocted with the help of an
analytical philosophical attitude, and a correct reading of Yogācāra. It is also illuminating to
view the Yogācāra, consciousness-mind-only viewpoint presented by Vasubandhu in the context
of modern quantum discoveries, rather than analytic philosophy. We shall explore the possibility
of a quantum-Yogācāra, which is in line with Mensky’s quantum psycho-metaphysical
perspective, later in this article.
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We shall examine Garfield’s approach after a fairly comprehensive exploration of the Yogācāra
worldview. The ‘cowherds’ are not the first academics to subject Buddhist philosophy to
Western philological and philosophical treatment. The philosopher William S. Waldron focuses
on the Yogācāra and its dialogue with modern thought, and he writes in a review of a book titled
Yogācāra Phenomenology9 by another Western academic, Dan Lusthaus, that:
There is still no consensus in the West as to how to best interpret, or even approach, the
vast collection of Buddhist teachings and practices falling under the rubric ‘Yogācāra.’
A recently completed annual seminar at the American Academy of Religion, for
example, hosted an impressive array of papers on an extensive range of topics for five
years running without, however, finally addressing exactly ‘What is, or isn’t,
Yogācāra?10
What this means, of course, is that there is no consensus amongst Western academic scholars of
Buddhism. The Western academic practitioner of Buddhist Studies Dan Lusthaus, in particular,
has forcefully asserted, in the book reviewed by Waldron and also in an article ‘What is and isn’t
Yogācāra’, that Yogācāra does not involve the claim that the primary ontological nature of the
process of reality is of the nature of mind or consciousness. In his article Lusthaus writes that:
Yogācārins’ sustained attention to issues such as cognition, consciousness, perception,
and epistemology, coupled with claims such as “external objects do not exist,” has led
some to misinterpret Yogācāra as a form of metaphysical idealism. They did not focus
on consciousness to assert it as ultimately real (Yogācāra claims consciousness is only
conventionally real since it arises from moment to moment due to fluctuating causes and
conditions), but rather because it is the cause of the karmic problem they are seeking to
eliminate.
And that:
The school was called Yogācāra (Yoga practice) because it provided a comprehensive,
therapeutic framework for engaging in the practices that lead to the goal of the
bodhisattva path, namely enlightened cognition. Meditation served as the laboratory in
which one could study how the mind operated. Yogācāra focused on the question of
consciousness from a variety of approaches, including meditation, psychological
analysis, epistemology (how we know what we know, how perception operates, what
validates knowledge), scholastic categorization, and karmic analysis. Yogācāra
doctrine is summarized in the term vijñapti-mātra, “nothing-but-cognition” (often
rendered “consciousness-only” or “mind-only”) which has sometimes been interpreted
as indicating a type of metaphysical idealism, i.e., the claim that mind alone is real and
that everything else is created by mind. However, the Yogācārin writings themselves
argue something very different. Consciousness (vijñāna) is not the ultimate reality or
solution, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental
operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end. Yogācāra
tends to be misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because its
teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as epistemological warnings
about karmic problems. The Yogācāra focus on cognition and consciousness grew out of
its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation. Two things
should be clarified in order to explain why Yogācāra is not metaphysical idealism: 1.
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The meaning of the word “idealism”; and 2. an important difference between the way
Indian and Western philosophers do philosophy.11
There is much that is completely correct in Lusthaus’ perspective. It is indeed true that the
Yogācāra perspective held that vijñāna, which is dualistic consciousness, is a “root problem” and
did not assert that dualistic consciousness was the ultimate ontological nature of the process of
reality. It is also correct that Yogācāra is not ‘metaphysical idealism’ as this term is generally
understood in Western philosophy. However, this still leaves the issue of what the Yogācāra
position is regarding the ultimate nature of the process of reality. Lusthaus claims that “There is
no Universal collective mind in Yogācāra,” however, we shall see that Yogācāra indicates that
the ultimate nature of the process of reality must be of the nature of mind.
The first essential point concerning Yogācāra psycho-metaphysics is that it indicates that the
world is experience-only, or consciousness-only (vijnanavada), cognition-only (vijñapti-mātra),
or information-only and therefore outer, external, apparently material objects do not exist in the
manner that they appear to, they are akin to collective illusions appearing, in a coordinated and
coherent way, within the mindstreams of all sentient beings. The reason for the coherent and
coordinated appearances within a group of sentient beings is the fact of collective karma.
According to fully developed Yogācāra psycho-metaphysics ‘mind’ or ‘consciousness’ is a field
– the cognitive field of the buddhas12 - (analogous to a quantum field, as we shall see) of
awareness and experience energy-potentiality which can take various forms. In particular there
are two levels of mind/consciousness, as Vasubandhu indicates (the following verses from
Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhava-nirdesa are Garfield’s translation):
Because it is cause and effect,
The mind has two aspects.
As the foundation consciousness it creates thought;
Known as the emerged consciousness it has seven aspects.13
The ‘foundation consciousness’ or ‘store consciousness’, the alayavijnana, is an undifferentiated
level of experience/awareness potentiality which underlies the manifested levels of
consciousness which ‘operate’ within sentient beings. When this foundation level consciousness
‘emerges’ in sentient beings it manifests as “seven aspects.” These aspects are the
consciousnesses which are associated with the various sense faculties: sight, hearing, smell, taste,
touch and two mental faculties, which are ‘thought’ and ‘self-awareness’, the latter is also termed
the ‘afflicted consciousness’ because the sense of self-identity is actually, according to Yogācāra
psycho-metaphysics, delusional.
The ‘foundation consciousness’, the alayavijnana, is also called ‘store consciousness’ because it
‘stores’ impressions or ‘seeds’ which are generated by the perceptions, thoughts and actions of
all sentient beings. In other words, all the activities of the seven emergent consciousnesses leave
traces in the foundation consciousness, and on the basis of these traces the activities of future
emergent consciousnesses are conditioned. Vasubandhu’s verses describe this:
The first [the foundation consciousness], because it collects the seeds
Of suffering is called “mind.”
The second [the emergent consciousnesses], because of the constant emergence
Of the various aspects of things is so called [i.e. ‘mind’].
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One should think of the illusory non-existent
As threefold:
Completely ripened, grasped as other,
And as appearance.
The first, because it itself ripens,
Is the root consciousness,
The others are emergent consciousness,
Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen.14
The “foundation” or “root” consciousness, then, “collects seeds” which then “ripen” as future
“emergent” consciousnesses. The “appearances” experienced through the functioning of the
emergent consciousnesses are “illusory” and “non-existent,” furthermore, they are “grasped” as
being “other.” This means that they are “conceptualized” as “seer and seen,” which means they
appear ‘dualistically’, in the guise of subject and object. This is the continuous cycle of
samsara, the conditioned and dissatisfactory realm of cyclic dualistic experience. Within this
cycle, the universal law of karma-vipaka, cause and effect, operates; karmic ‘seeds’ (bija) will
produce similar future effects. Furthermore this universal karmic law operates on all aspects of
the process of reality, including the appearance of the collective material world:
…since beginningless time we have been perceiving sights, sounds, smells, tastes and
bodily sensations and these perceptions have been creating imprints or latencies in the
ground consciousness. Habituation of having experienced a certain visual form will
create a latency for that very form. Eventually, that latency will manifest from the
ground consciousness as a visual form again, but it will be perceived as external to
ourselves.15
Within this process there are aspects which are common to groups of sentient beings because of
common karma, like the apparently ‘material’ world which is common to humans and animals,
and also individual aspects:
The samsaric appearances that arise from these causes and conditions are of two kinds:
common and individual. Some appearances are the result of identical causes created by
many beings, so that something will be seen by everyone in common, such as everyone
in a particular room seeing that it has two pillars. However, there are certain individual
causes and conditions which result in beings having their own individual experiences
of happiness and discomfort. … These different perceptions are due to different
latencies that have been laid down in the ground consciousness.16
The ‘foundation consciousness’ (alayavijnana or “ground consciousness” in the above quotes)
operates within the overall space of the dharmadhatu, the ‘space of phenomena’. When a
sentient being becomes enlightened the alayavijnana dissolves and the ultimate ‘truth body’ of
reality – the dharmakaya manifests. The dharmadhatu is the eternal backdrop of potentiality
within which all the phenomena of samsara and nirvana take place. Samsara is the
unenlightened perspective of conditioned and dissatisfactory cyclic existence, and nirvana is the
extinguishing of samsara and the dissolution of the alayavijnana which is the basis of samsara.
When the alayavijnana dissolves, the qualities of the dharmadhatu shine forth as nondual
wisdom, jnana. The term ‘jnana’ refers to the profound nondual awareness-wisdom of the
process of reality, the term vi-jnana indicates divided dualistic consciousness (the prefix ‘vi’
indicates a cut) which derives from jnana.
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The opening verses of Vasubandhu’s text which outlines the three natures are as follows
(Garfield’s translation):
The imagined, the other-dependent and
The consummate:
These are the three natures
Which should be deeply understood.
Arising through dependence on conditions and
Existing through being imagined,
It is therefore called other-dependent
And is said to be merely imaginary.
The eternal non-existence
Of what appears in the way it appears,
Since it is never otherwise,
Is known as the nature of the consummate.
If anything appears, it is imagined.
The way it appears is as duality.
What is the consequence of its non-existence?
The fact of non-duality!
What is the imagination of the non-existent?
Since what is imagined absolutely never
Exists in the way it is imagined,
It is mind that constructs that illusion.17
The next verses are those we have covered above, which elucidate the structure of mind, or
consciousness, as operating at two levels, the ‘foundation/store/ground-consciousness’
(alayavijnana) and the dualistic consciousnesses which ‘operate’ within sentient beings. The
last line in the above quote clearly indicates that the functioning of the alayavijnana “constructs
that illusion.” The three natures, as translated by Garfield, are: parikalpita, or ‘imagined
nature’, paratantra, or ‘dependent nature’, and parinispanna, or ‘consummate nature’. These
terms are translated differently by others. The above verses, including those indicating the two
levels of mind, as translated by Brunnhőlzl are:
The imaginary, the other-dependent
And the perfect as wellThe three natures are held to be
The profound object to be understood by the wise.
What appears is the other-dependent
And the way that it appears is the imaginary,
Since it comes about through being subject to conditions
And since it exists as mere imagination.
The fact of the invariable absence
Of the way it appears in what appears
Is known as the perfect nature,
Since it is never otherwise.
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What appears here? The imagination of what is non-existent.
How does it appear? By way of having the character of duality.
What is its nonexistence with that duality?
The very nature of nonduality in it.
What is the imagination of the nonexistent here?
It is the mind that imagines in certain ways what does not exist,
But its referents which it imagines like that,
Are absolutely never found in these ways.
Through being either cause or result,
The mind is held to be twofold:
The consciousness called “alaya”
And the one called “operating,” which is sevenfold.
The first is called mind, since it is accumulated
By the seeds of the latent tendencies of afflictions,
While the second is called mind
Since it operates under various aspects.
In brief, this false imagination
Is considered as threefold:
As maturational; likewise, as having characteristics;
And the other as involving appearances.
The first refers to the root-consciousness,
Since its character is the maturation of latent tendencies
The other refers to the operating consciousness,
Since it functions as cognition with the duality of seer and what is seen.18
Brunnhőlzl, then, translates the three natures as 1) the imaginary, 2) the other-dependent and 3)
the perfect, all consistent with Garfield’s terminology. Brunnhőlzl elucidates the term ‘otherdependent’ by indicating that:
The “other” in “other-dependent” refers to the latent tendencies of various appearances
of subject and object. Which in their entirety make up the alaya-consciousness.19
This identification of the other-dependent nature with the latent tendencies of dualistic
appearances within the alayavijnana is validated by both analysis and other commentaries.
Brunnhőlzl, in his work Mining for Wisdom within Delusion, which is an extensive exposition
of the Yogācāra text Dharmadharmatavibhaga (Distinguishing Phenomena and the Nature of
Phenomena) as well as an exploration of both Indian and Tibetan commentaries, shows that this
identification is natural and is made by all commentaries, Sthiramati for example:
…once the fundamental change of the alaya-consciousness (the dependent nature) occurs,
the perfect nature is observed as the aspect of the freedom from duality, just like seeing a
rope when one no longer sees a snake.20
The situation, however, is subtle and needs to be understood with subtlety. The alayaconsciousness is the dependent nature operating dualistically and thereby seemingly ‘creating’
the illusion of the dualistic world of the manifested dualistic consciousnesses. When the
“fundamental change,” which takes place within enlightenment, occurs, the dualistic
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appearances of the imaginary nature dissolve, and thereby the dependent nature appears to
‘transform’ into the perfect (consummate) nature. What appears to be a snake (the imaginary) is
seen to be a rope, the ‘rope’ here represents the other-dependent operating within the ‘ultimate’
or ‘consummate’ nature. However, this is not a case of the imaginary being ‘taken out’,
because it was never there as something extra, and there was no actual transformation from one
thing into another. Brunnhőlzl writes brilliantly about this:
Thus, the three natures are not three different “things.” It is not through taking away one
(the imaginary nature) from the other (the dependent nature), that the third (the perfect
nature) is obtained. Rather, Yogācāra takes the other-dependent nature as the
experiential ground for a dynamic disillusioning and refining the way we see ourselves
and the world, with the imaginary nature and the perfect nature being the two poles of
mistaken and pure perception, respectively, right within that experiential ground. The
other dependent nature stands for the continuity of experience, which is impure when
blurred by the superimpositions of the imaginary nature and pure or perfected when the
imaginary nature has been seen through and let go. However, since the realization of the
perfect nature is an experience as well and not something abstract or just some
nothingness … the other-dependent nature in its pure aspect is the perfect nature. …
“other-dependent nature” is just a term for the compound … of the imaginary nature and
perfect nature, which points to the underlying experiential continuity of a mind stream
that becomes increasingly aware of its own true nature.21
So Brunnhőlzl characterizes the Yogācāra ‘three natures’ doctrine as primarily having to do with
the process by which an individual mind-stream transforms its experiential continuum in order to
become “aware of its own true nature.”
Brunnhőlzl’s approach is in line with the presentation of Yogācāra philosophy by Gadjin M.
Nagao:
This one unchanging world is originally neither contaminated nor purified, but rather
neutral … However, insofar as our interaction occurs directly or instinctively, like an
animal, without reflection or self-consciousness – that is, in so far as we are not yet
enlightened to its reality but remain in a deluded state – we speak of this world as a
world of the imagined nature; it is an imagined world. Through our cognitions, or
discriminations, or intellect, we are always projecting some kind of imagination … This
projection of false imagination changes or contaminates the world … The sages and
enlightened ones also live in this one, unchanged world. But, because they are
enlightened and are free of all false imagination and attachment, for them, the world is
no longer imagined and contaminated; it is pure and consummated.22
Thus, we see that the core Yogācāra delineation of the structure of the process of reality can be
delineated as a common world, which is not “unchanging” in its details, although the ‘stuff’ it is
made of (dharmata) is unchanging in essence. This ‘world’ can be experienced in two different
ways. The common world is the paratantra, the ‘dependent’ or ‘other-dependent’ nature, which
is the stream of ‘dependently’ or ‘other-dependently’ originated causal realm of experiential
possibility. As Brunnhőlzl indicates most people experience the common world of the
paratantra, the dependent nature, through the mistaken projections of the parikalpita, the
mistaken imaginary nature which is projected onto or into the dependent nature. A central and
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pervasive feature of the imaginary projection is the appearance of svabhava, the deep-rooted
immediate experience of entities as having their own internal, independent cut-off core of ‘selfbeing’ or ‘inherent-existence’. The paratantra, the ‘other-dependent nature’ is an interconn-ected
and interpenetrating field of causes and conditions, but when it is viewed through the projection
of the imaginary nature it is experienced as being made up of independent, separate entities. And
it is through a process of transformation of consciousness and mind-streams that Buddhist
practitioners are able to withdraw the imaginary projection in order to experience the dependent
nature in its consummated, perfected or perfect nature – the parinispanna.
Lusthaus uses the terms “the conceptually constructed realm” for the ‘imaginary nature’, “the
realm of causal dependency” for the ‘other-dependent nature’ and “the perfectional realm” for
‘the perfected nature’. He writes:
The conceptually constructed realm is the erroneous narcissistic realm in which we
primary dwell, filled with projections we have acquired and habituated and embodied.
Paratantra (lit. ‘dependent on other’) emphasizes that everything arises causally
dependent on things other than itself (i.e. everything lacks self-existence). The
perfectional realm signifies the absence of svabhava (independent, self-existent,
permanent nature) in everything. When the causally dependent realm is cleansed of all
defilements it becomes “enlightened.”23
So Lusthaus’ version of the meaning and relationships of the three natures is consistent with
those of Brunnhőlzl and Nagao. The ‘other-dependent’ realm of the ground/foundation/storeconsciousness, wherein the seeds of future dualistic experiences are stored, is the foundational
nature. But it has two possible modes of experience. The first mode is that which imputes or
projects the solidity and inherent existence of the imaginary nature into or onto the otherdependent realm, this is the unenlightened mode. When the fictions of the imaginary nature
dissolve then the enlightened mode of the perfected, perfect or consummate nature comes into
being. This psycho-existential configuration is most precisely captured in Brunnhőlzl’s
translation:
What appears is the other-dependent
And the way that it appears is the imaginary…
It is the ‘other-dependent’ nature, which is the alayavijnana, the ground-consciousness, which
actually does the appearing, and it produces appearances which appear as if a real, external,
independent world of materiality were to stand over against an internal subjectivity. However,
although the dualistic appearance is very powerful and persuasive, this “way it appears” is in
actuality false, “the way that it appears is the imaginary.” The perfect nature manifests when
the fact that the imaginary is imaginary and an illusion is directly seen:
The fact of the invariable absence
Of the way it appears in what appears
Is known as the perfect nature,
Since it is never otherwise.
This Yogācāra insight is actually a restatement, with added surrounding context and elucidation,
of Madhyamaka emptiness – sunyata, the apparent external solidity of the apparently material
world is in actuality not there. All phenomena, internal and external, lack inherent existence, or
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svabhava. However, it is also the case that all the phenomena of the apparently material world
appear to have independent internal self-existence. The fact that this appearance of internal selfexistence and solidity is an appearance, and not reality, means that the reality of the appearance is
absent from reality.
Lusthaus’ use of the phrase “the conceptually constructed realm” for the parikalpita, ‘the
imaginary nature’, points to an important issue. The term ‘parikalpita’ literally means “fully
conceptualized,” so Lusthaus’ translation is, on the face of it, closer to the original meaning.
However, Brunnhőlzl points out that the term “kalpana,” from which “kalpita” is derived:
…is usually translated as “thought” or “conceptual thinking,” but basically refers to the
deluded constructive activity of mind, which produces all kinds of dualistic appearances
and experiences.24
The hugely significant issue, however, is just how deep and efficacious the constructive activity
of mind is? Lusthaus, for example, denies that the Yogācāra perspective asserts the nonexistence of external entities:
Yogācāra tends to misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because
its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than epistemological warnings
about karmic problems. The Yogācāra focus on cognition and consciousness grew out
of its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation.25
And with regard to the material world he writes that:
…questions about the ultimate reality of non-cognitive things are simply irrelevant and
useless for solving the problem of karma. … Yogācārins emphasize that categories such
as materiality (rupa) are cognitive categories. “Materiality” is a word for the colors,
textures sounds. Etc. … that we experience in acts of perception, and it is only to the
extent that they are experienced, perceived and ideologically grasped, thereby becoming
objects of attachment, that they have karmic significance.
Lusthaus is suggesting, then, that the ‘existence’ or ‘non-existence’ ‘out there’, beyond our
“cognitive categories” is irrelevant, all the Yogācārins are concerned with, according to Lusthaus,
is the structures of cognition and consciousness which we throw over, so to speak, whatever, is,
or is not, “out there.” Lusthaus calls this position “epistemological idealism” as opposed to
ontological/metaphysical idealism. On this view, whether there is, or isn’t anything “out there” is
irrelevant. Lusthaus’ perspective is, however, internally contradictory and incoherent. He tells us
that Yogācārins are only concerned with its “analysis of karma,” and not interested in
“metaphysical speculation.” What he seems to miss, however, is that the Yogācāra analysis of
karma, which involves the notion of the ground consciousness (alayavijnana) as a deep layer of
consciousness that carries seeds of potentiality across lifetimes, automatically has the
ontological-metaphysical implication that the material world must be a production of the
alayavijnana. All experiences which (unenlightened) sentient beings are subject to are the result
of karma, their previous actions, and this must extend to experiences of materiality. It follows
that experiences of materiality constitute what appears to be the material world, if there were a
‘truly material’ realm beyond our experience it would be beyond the influence of karma, and this
would mean that this ‘real’ material realm would have no karmic influence on any sentient
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being’s world, therefore natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and so on would have to be
considered as random, not karmic, events, which is contrary to Buddhist doctrine.
In this context the Buddhist practitioner and teacher Alexander Berzin was asked:
…earthquakes are the inevitable outcome of our planet’s having arisen as it is; and it has
arisen as it is as the result of the very broad collective karma of all the beings who have
ever lived on this planet. Could you comment on this?
And he replied:
Karma, or more specifically, positive or negative karmic forces and karmic tendencies,
whether individual or collective, ripen into various types of results. One of these results
is a dominating result. A dominating result is our experiencing of the type of
environment or society in which we are born or enter, and the way it treats us, or objects
such as our possessions, and what happens to them.26
If karma is ubiquitous in forming the experiences of all sentient beings then whatever the
‘material’ world is ultimately made up of must ultimately be orchestrated by the groundconsciousness. It would be a very odd situation in which a group of people were having
earthquake experiences generated by their karmic cognitive categories of ‘materiality’ if the
‘real’, so to speak, unknowable “out there” world of materiality was not actually quaking. At this
point it is worth quoting a conclusion the much admired twentieth-century physicist John
Wheeler came to on the basis of his understanding of quantum phenomena:
Directly opposite to the concept of a universe as machine built on law is the vision of a
world self-synthesized. On this view, the notes struck out on a piano by the observer
participants of all times and all places, bits though they are in and by themselves,
constitute the great wide world of space and time and things.27
Wheeler suggested that the material world was constructed by the perceptions of all the sentient
beings, the “observer participants,” who inhabit or have inhabited the universe. This notion he
graphically represented by his ‘self-perceiving’ universe graphic image shown in figure 1. As
we shall see this is a natural conclusion from the details of quantum theory. Wheeler made many
such dramatic statements and indications. In 1978 he wrote that:
Figure 1
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The universe does not ‘exist, out there,’ independent of all acts of observation. Instead, it
is in some strange sense a participatory universe.28
And speaking in April 2003 to the American Physical Society, he made the following
remarkable, almost mystical, sequence of remarks:
The Question is what is the Question?
Is it all a Magic Show?
Is Reality an Illusion?
What is the framework of the Machine?
Darwin’s Puzzle: Natural Selection?
Where does Space-Time come from?
Is there any answer except that it comes from consciousness?
What is Out There?
T’is Ourselves?
Or, is IT all just a Magic Show?29
Wheeler, and quite a few other physicists, have been ‘forced’ to the conclusion that in some way
the perceptual activities of all sentient beings determines what appears to be an external material
world. As we shall see in more detail later, quantum theory actually supports a Yogācāra-like
‘idealist’ or ‘idea-ist’ psycho-metaphysical worldview. Yogācāra is idealism in the sense that it
denies the ontological primacy of the material world and asserts that the process of reality is a
matter of mind-stuff, so to speak.
Wheeler asked, on the basis of his profound understanding of quantum physics, whether what
appears to be a material world inhabited by sentient beings might be a “Magic Show.”
Vasubandhu, a little under two thousand years ago, answered in the affirmative with his magic
elephant analogy. The analogy involves a magician who by means of a magic spell, or ‘mantra’
is able to make a block of wood, or pile of sticks, appear in the form of an elephant. People
deceived by the appearance might consider that an elephant really is “out there.” The magician,
of course, knows that it is just an appearance. Here are the stanzas from Vasubandhu’s Thirty
Verses as translated by Brunnhőlzl:
Something magically created through the force of a mantra
May appear as if it had the character of an elephant,
But there is merely an appearing aspect there
And no elephant at all exists.
The elephant is the imaginary nature,
Its appearance is the other-dependent,
And the nonexistence of the elephant there
Is held to be the perfect.
Likewise, the imagination of what is non-existent
Appears from the root-mind as having the character of dualityThere is absolutely no duality there,
But a mere appearance does exist.
The root-consciousness is like the mantra,
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Suchness is regarded as similar to the wood,
Imagination is considered like the appearing aspect of the elephant
And duality is like the elephant.
Once the true reality of things is realized,
Corresponding to the order of the [three natures]
The processes of knowing, relinquishment, and attainment
Are held to be simultaneous.
Here, knowing is nonobservation,
Relinquishment is held to be nonappearance,
And observation without characteristics
Is attainment, direct realization.
Through the nonobservation of duality,
The dualistic appearing aspect vanishes,
And since that vanishes, the perfectThe nonexistence of duality-is discovered.
This is just as the nonobservation of the elephant,
The vanishing of its appearing aspect,
And the observation of the wood
In the magical illusion are simultaneous.30
The following, and final stanzas indicate that when the magic illusion is ‘seen through’, and
thereby disempowered, the reality of the ultimate sphere of the dharmadhatu, the spacious
sphere of the ground of all phenomena is observed. This is the realm of “suchness” (tathata),
which in Vasubandhu’s analogy corresponds to the wood. Tathata is also termed dharmata
which is the ultimate immaterial nature of all phenomena. Dharmata is the ultimate immaterial
‘stuff’, using this term very loosely, which in various configurations make up all dharmas, all
phenomena.
In Vasubandhu’s analogy the mantra, which corresponds to the root-consciousness or
alayavijnana, operates upon the wood, which is suchness, the ultimate immaterial nondualawareness of reality. This interaction results in the appearance of the elephant, which is the
appearance of a world of duality – apprehenders and apprehended, subjects and objects.
Furthermore, these dualistic appearances appear to be very ‘real’ and are taken, by unenlightened
beings, to be real in the way that they appear, the imaginary nature is taken to be real. And
because of this, the reality of the ultimate nature of suchness is not seen, not realized. However,
“once the true reality of things is realized” the illusion dissolves and the “wood” of the ultimate
reality of the nondual realm of tathata, or suchness, is immediately experienced and known.
The two penultimate stanzas of Vasubandhu’s exposition are as follows:
Through the observation of it being merely mind,
A knowable object is not observed.
Through not observing a knowable object,
Mind is not observed either.
Through not observing both,
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The dharmadhatu is observed.
Through observing the dharmadhatu,
Mastery is obtained.31
These verses assert that when a practitioner fully comprehends, directly and experientially
through profound meditation, that external dualistic phenomena are not as they appear to be, i.e.
independent ‘material’ objects, but are actually collective projections of minds, then the
subjective side of the duality dissolves as well. The term ‘mind’ refers to dualistic mind, and this
dualistic mind dissolves into the non-dual experiential realm of the dharmadhatu. And the
experiential nature of the dharmadhatu is the nondual dharmadhatu-jnana (wisdom-awareness).
This nondual internally self-aware, self-luminous ground of dualistic appearances and dualistic
mind (vijnana) is the fundamental nondual and insubstantial mind-energy-potentiality-awareness
of the process of reality. As an advanced Yogācāra practitioner writes:
…from the moment an individual attains awakening, the absolute Reality that is the
natural state of abiding is realized, and whatever exists is seen to be contained without
duality in the uncreate Clear Light of the ground. When this is realized, then the
practitioner recognizes that even though various phenomena arise and pass away on a
continuous basis, all such phenomena have the one same flavour throughout, which is
the single taste of existing in awareness. Were there no such awareness, no entities
would exist … When yogis realize the extra-temporal natural state of mind stripped
naked as mere awareness, it is then that consciousness dawns no longer as consciousness
but as gnosis (jnana, ye-shes) or ‘non-dual knowing.’ All phenomena dawn as innately
pure. Thus the many synonyms, “basic goodness, Absolute Totality, Mahamudra, or the
mind of uncreate Clear Light,” refer not to the mind (sems) as such but to the essence of
mind (sems-nyid), or mind in its original natural state …32
And also:
The metaphysical doctrine of the ancient Yoga tradition puts forth an understanding of
the creation, progresson and eventual destruction of the Universe that seems
surprisingly modern, to the extent in which it agrees with leading edge advances in
science, quantum mechanics and cosmology. Those who go deeply into this subject, will
find this doctrine rooted in a profound understanding of a great mystery called
PARAMĀRTHA, which in Indian philosophy means ‘the Absolute’, devoid it is said of
all attributes, and essentially distinct from manifested finite Being. The manifestation
(pravrtti) and re-absorption of the Universe, or domain of finite Being, and how the
latter relates to the transcendent infinitude of the Absolute has been central to Yogacara
inquiry from the beginning of its history … It is believed that by means of proliferation
(prapanca, differentiation), the innate essence of being in three forms (trisvabhava)
manifests or is transformed, as it were, into active mentation in the act of Creation. This
is then explained as the coming into being of alaya-vijnana, universal or cosmic
consciousness, which is a concept that has also been held in Western philosophy by
many great thinkers, from Plato, Plotinus and others…33
Here is the true meaning of Yogācāra-Chittamatra. And it turns out that there are in a sense
two levels of mind-only. The first is the dualistic level of vijnapti-matra, or ‘cognition-only’,
the dualistic world of subjects and objects are a matter of repeated and continuous cognition and
perception, external objects are appearances which ultimately do not exist independently of
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perceiving minds. Once the illusion of this cognitive process is penetrated, the second, deeper
level of insubstantial (as opposed to the substantialist Chittamatra perspective) nondual
absolute mind-awareness becomes apparent. From this perspective it becomes apparent that all
levels of the process of reality are transformations of mind-awareness-consciousness. The
paratantra, which in unenlightened mode is also the alayavijnana, can be experienced as
dualistic, whereby it manifests as the imaginary, or it may be experienced non-dualistically, in
which case the paratantra is experienced as it really is, as an illusory play of appearances
within the perfect nature of the nondual experiential realm of the dharmadhatu. As the ninth
century Zen Patriarch Huang Po declared:
This pure Mind, the source of everything, shines forever and on all with the brilliance
of its own perfection. But the people of the world do not awake to it, regarding only
that which sees, hears, feels and knows as mind. Blinded by their own sight, hearing,
feeling and knowing, they do not perceive the spiritual brilliance of the source
substance. If they would only eliminate all conceptual thought in a flash, that source
substance would manifest itself like the sun ascending through the void and
illuminating the whole universe without hindrance or bounds.34
In this depiction the ultimate ground of the process of reality, the perfect nature, which
manifests when all of the imaginary projections of the dualistic sensory and mental
consciousnesses are withdrawn, is portrayed as a “pure” mind-energy pervading the “whole
universe.”
In the light of this, the picture of Yogācāra psycho-metaphysics which is presented by some
Western ‘analytic’ philosophers is very mundane. In Engaging Buddhism (EB), Garfield
suggests that according to Yogācāra:
…the phenomena we experience are dependent on our conceptual imputation simply
because they are all really nothing more than projections of our consciousness, mere
ideas and not external phenomena.35
In this connection Garfield cites Vasubandhu’s opening verse from his Twenty Stanzas:
All this is merely consciousness,
Because all intentional objects are non-existent.
It is just as one who suffers from ophthalmia
Sees such non-existent things as moons and hairs.
However, when Garfield turns his attention to Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the Three Natures
(Trisvabhavanirdesa) he believes, bizarrely, that Vasubandhu has changed his philosophical tack
in the direction of phenomenology:
…it is reasonable to say that Vasubandhu explicitly articulates an idealistic perspective
in his Twenty Stanzas and Thirty Stanzas … and Vasubandhu in his final work Treatise
on the Three Natures (Trisvabhavanirdesa) as developing a phenomenology. We might
also say that the Entry into Lanka grounds the idealism … whereas the Discourse
Unravelling the Thought, particularly the Paramartha-samutgata chapter … grounds the
phenomenology.36
He then makes the extraordinary, and mistaken, claim concerning “radical idealism” that:
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Few in the West today, and even few contemporary Buddhists, take radical idealism
seriously, but phenomenology is a central concern of contemporary philosophy of mind
and cognitive science. As we shall see, Yogācāra phenomenology can be an important
resource for contemporary thought.37
However, as we shall see, Yogācāra is not phenomenology as practiced by Western philosophers.
It is rather the case that some Western philosophers, such as Garfield, falsely imagine Yogācāra
to be phenomenology in order to practice Western style philosophy in a Buddhist context.
Furthermore, with regard to Garfield’s claim the possibility of taking “radical idealism”
seriously, not only do contemporary Buddhists who are true to the metaphysical worldview of
traditional Buddhism, rather than adherents to a misguided modified Western materialist
Buddhism (which is not actually Buddhism at all), take the idea that the ground of the process of
reality is mind-stuff seriously, but modern physicists are being forced into a quantum-Yogācāra
“radical idealism” metaphysical perspective by quantum discoveries.
In his book Engaging Buddhism Garfield offers the following ‘phenomenological’ exposition of
the ‘three natures’:
Every object, on this view, has these three natures. When I consider my coffee cup, for
instance, it appears to me to be an independently existing external object that possesses
all of the properties I naturally ascribe to it, including a color, feel, or some other
property, that I simply register through veridical perception and cognition. This is its
imagined nature. In fact the object as I experience is represented in my brain as a
complex set of perceptive and cognitive processes, and may be experienced quite
differently by beings with very different kinds of minds, for instance an insect or a dog.
The fact that as an object of consciousness it is dependent on my cognitive architecture
is its dependent nature. And seeing this leads me to see that as an object of experience,
while it exists in one way (as dependent) but appears in another (the imagined). It is
devoid of existence in the way that it is imagined, and this is its consummate nature.
At first sight this may appear to be a precise statement of the Yogācāra ‘three natures’ doctrine,
but, because Garfield presents the delineation of the natures in a materialist guise, it is in fact a
travesty. It is quite clear that all three of the natures within the Yogācāra worldview are of the
nature of mind, and the appearance of the material world, including ‘brains’, derives from the
karmic activities within the paratantra, the alayavijnana or the other-dependent nature, so ‘brains’
are appearances within the mind-stuff of the paratantra/alayavijnana. It follows, therefore, that to
represent, as Garfield does, the paratantra, other-dependent nature, as being an aspect of the
process of reality which highlights the fact that “objects” are “represented in my brain as a
complex set of perceptive and cognitive processes” is highly misleading because it suggests that
‘brains’ and ‘coffee cups’ actually exist as fully paid up material entities. This amounts to an
attempt to completely remove the Yogācāra from its Buddhist soteriological context in order to
cast it into the context of a fundamentally materialist mode of Western analytic philosophy. And
this is a crude and mistaken attempt to appropriate subtle Buddhist psycho-metaphysical analysis
for the purposes of a much less precise, cogent and competent Western academic discourse.
Consider what the physicist Henry Stapp states about the ultimate existence of apparently
material entities such as ‘brains’:
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…no such brain exists; no brain, body, or anything else in the real world is composed
of those tiny bits of matter that Newton imagined the universe to be made of.38
According to Stapp and other significant physicists all material entities emerge form an “idealike” quantum realm of potentiality:
We live in an idealike world, not a matterlike world. The material aspects are
exhausted in certain mathematical properties, and these mathematical features can be
understood just as well (and in fact better) as characteristics of an evolving idealike
structure. There is, in fact, in the quantum universe no natural place for matter.39
Much contemporary Western philosophy tends to ply its trade with the bizarre idea that
metaphysical concerns can be decided by purely conceptual word-spinning without a look at what
science has uncovered about the nature of the functioning of reality. As Stapp has pointed out:
Philosophers of mind appear to have arrived, today, at less-than-satisfactory solutions
to the mind-brain and free will problems, and the difficulties seem, at least prima facie,
very closely connected with their acceptance of a known-to-be-false understanding of
the nature of the physical world, and of the causal role of our conscious thoughts within
it.40
Because of its soteriological concerns Buddhist philosophy was not isolated from a concern with
the nature of apparently external material world as well as the apparently internal subjective
world. The pursuit of enlightenment requires a knowledge of the ultimate functioning of reality,
and, because of this, Buddhist philosophy is not philosophy as practiced by many Western
philosophers who only indulge in conceptual analysis, often with a hidden materialist bias, as if
such a procedure is able on its own decide metaphysical issues.
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1
Cowherds, The, (2010), Moonshadows: Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy, Oxford University
Press, U.S.A. Back cover blurb.
2
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/americanbuddhist/2013/05/jay-garfield-a-buddhist-philosopher-speaksout-or-howls-at-fellow-philosophers-academia-and-perhaps-the-moon.html
3
http://online.sfsu.edu/rone/Buddhism/Yogacara/basicideas.htm
4
Griffiths, Paul, J. (1986), On Being Mindless: Buddhist meditation and the mind-body problem, 80 http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documents/On%20Being%20Mindless_Buddhist%20Meditation%20an
d%20the%20Mind-Body%20Problem_Griffiths.pdf
5
Brunnholzl, Karl, (2009), Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and
Buddha Nature, Snow Lion, 18
6
Garfield Jay L. & Westerhoff Jan (Cowherds) (eds.), (2015), Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies or
Rivals, Oxford University Press, 256
7
Garfield Jay L. & Westerhoff Jan (Cowherds) (eds.), (2015), Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies or
Rivals, Oxford University Press, 271
8
Dreyfus, Georges B. J. () Recognizing Reality, Suny, 465
9
Lusthaus, Dan (2006), Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism
and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism
10
http://www.middlebury.edu/media/view/440170/original/reviewlusthaus_buddhist_phenomenology_h-buddhism.pdf
11
Lusthaus, Dan – ‘What Is and Isn’t Yogācāra’ - www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro.html
12
Garfield Jay L. & Westerhoff Jan (Cowherds) (eds.), (2015), Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies or
Rivals, Oxford University Press, 147
13
Edelglass, W. & Garfield J. L. (2009), Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, Oxford University
Press, 42
14
ibid
15
Thrangu Rinpoche, Kenchen (2001), Transcending Ego: Distinguishing Consciousness from Wisdom.
Namo Buddha Publication., Boulder, Colorado. 34-35
16
Thrangu Rinpoche, Kenchen (2001), Transcending Ego: Distinguishing Consciousness from Wisdom.
Namo Buddha Publication., Boulder, Colorado.
17
Edelglass, W. & Garfield J. L. (2009), Buddhist Philosophy: Essential Readings, Oxford University
Press, 41
18
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2007), Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 47-48
19
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2007), Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 492-3
20
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2013), Mining for Wisdom within Delusion: Maitreya’s “Distinction between
Phenomena and the Nature of Phenomena” and Its Indian and Tibetan Commentaries. Snow Lion, 79
21
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2007), Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 45
22
Nagao G. M. (1991), Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, State University of New York, 63
23
Lusthaus, Dan – ‘What Is and Isn’t Yogācāra’ - www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro.html
24
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2007), Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 491 (endnote 198)
25
Lusthaus, Dan – ‘What Is and Isn’t Yogācāra’ - www.acmuller.net/yogacara/articles/intro.html
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| October 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-909
Smetham, G. P., Engaging Buddhism with a False Imagination (Part I)
909
26
http://www.berzinarchives.com/web/en/archives/sutra/level2_lamrim/initial_scope/karma
/questions_collective_karma.html
27
John D., Davies, Paul C. W., Harper, Charles L. (eds) (2004) p577 – Wheeler, J A (1999)
‘Information, physics, quantum: the search for links.’ In Feynman and Computation: Exploring the
Limits of Computers, ed A. J. G. Hey, p309 (314). Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.
28
Dolling, L.M.; Gianelli, A. F. & Statile, G. N. (eds) (2003) p491 – John A. Wheeler (1978): ‘The ‘Past’
and the ‘Delayed Choice’ Double-Slit Experiment.’
29
Sarfatti , Jack ‘Wheeler’s World: It From Bit?’ - Internet Science Education Project,
30
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2007), Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 51-52
31
Brunnhölzl, Karl (2007), Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion
Publications, 52
32
Devenish, R. P. (2012), Principle Yogacara Texts. Dharma Fellowship. 13-14
33
Devenish, R. P. (2012), Principle Yogacara Texts. Dharma Fellowship, 2-3
34
Addiss, Stephen; Lombardo, Stanley; Roitman, Judith (2008), Zen Source Book: Traditional
Documents from China, Korea and Japan. Hackett Publishing Company, 39
35
Garfield, Jay L. (2015), Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters To Philosophy Paperback, Oxford
University Press, 33-34
36
Garfield, Jay L. (2015), Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters To Philosophy Paperback, Oxford
University Press, 71
37
Garfield, Jay L. (2015), Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters To Philosophy Paperback, Oxford
University Press, 72
38
Stapp, Henry (2007), Mindful Universe. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 139
39
Stapp, Henry (2004), Mind, Matter and Quantum Mechanics. Springer, 223
40
Stapp, Henry: ‘Philosophy of Mind and the Problem of Free Will in the Light of Quantum Mechanics’,
19
(Continued on Part II)
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November 25, 1997
LBNL- 40369
arXiv:quant-ph/9711064v1 26 Nov 1997
On Quantum Theories of the Mind ∗
Henry P. Stapp
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Abstract
Replies are given to arguments advanced in this journal that claim
to show that it is to nonlinear classical mechanics rather than quantum
mechanics that one must look for the physical underpinnings of consciousness.
This work was supported by the Director, Office of Energy Research, Office of High Energy
and Nuclear Physics, Division of High Energy Physics of the U.S. Department of Energy under
Contract DE-AC03-76SF00098.
∗
In a paper with the same title as this one Alwyn Scott (1996) has given
reasons for rejecting the idea that quantum theory will play an important role
in understanding the connection between brains and consciousness. He suggests
that it is to nonlinear classical mechanics, not quantum mechanics, that we
should look for the physical underpinnings of consciousness. I shall examine
here all of his arguments, and show why each one fails.
Scott contrasts, first, the linearity of quantum theory with the nonlinearity
of certain classical theories, and notes the complexities induced by the latter.
Thus he asks: “Is not liquid water essentially different from gaseous hydrogen and oxygen?” Of course it is! And this difference is generated, according
to quantum field theory, by certain nonlinearities in that theory, namely the
nonlinearities in the coupled field equations. These field equations (or, more
generally, Heisenberg equations) are the direct analogs of the coupled nonlinear
equations of the corresponding classical theory, and they bring into quantum
theory the analogs of the classical nonlinearities: these nonlinearities are in no
way obstructed by the linearity of the wave equation.
To understand this point it is helpful to think of the equation of motion for
a classical statistical ensemble. It is linear: the sum of two classical statistical
statistical ensembles evolves into the sum of the two evolved ensembles. This
linearity property is a trivial consequence of the fact that the elements of the
ensembles are imaginary copies of one single physical system, in different contemplated states, and hence they do not interact with one another. Thus in
classical statistical mechanics we have both the (generally) nonlinear equations
for coupled fields, and also the (always) linear equation for a certain statistical
quantity.
Similarly, in quantum field theory we have both the (generally) nonlinear
field equations for the coupled fields, and also the (always) linear wave equation
for a certain statistical quantity, the wave function. The fact that a group of
several atoms can behave very differently from how they would behave if each
one were alone is a consequence of the nonlinearity of the field equations: this
nonlinearity is not blocked by the linearity of the wave equation.
This blurring of the important distinction between the completely compatible linear and nonlinear aspects of quantum theory is carried over into Scott’s
1
discussion of solitons. The nonlinear field equations make the parts of this configuration of fields hang together indefinitely, and never spread out like a wave,
as could be verified by doing experiments that probe its ‘togetherness’ by making
several measurements simultaneously at slightly separated points: the various
simultaneously existing parts of the soliton never move far apart. There is no
conflict between this stability of the soliton and the linearity of the quantum
mechanical wave equation. The wave function for the center-of-mass of the soliton does eventually spread out in exactly the way that a statistical ensemble
consisting of the centers of the solitons in an ensemble of freely moving solitons
(of fixed finite extension) would do: the spreading out of the wave function of
the center-of-mass of a soliton just gives the diffusion analogous to the spreading
out of a statistical ensemble of superposed centers of mass, due to the distribution in this ensemble of velocities of these centers of mass: the extended object
itself, the soliton, does not spread out; its parts are held together by a nonlinear
effect that can be attributed to the nonlinearity of the field equations.
This obscuring by Scott of the important conceptual distinctions between
the two very different aspects of the soliton associated with the linear and nonlinear aspects of quantum theory creates, I think, a very false impression of some
significant deficiency of quantum theory with regard to the manifestation of the
analogs in quantum theory of nonlinear classical effects. No such deficiency
exists: the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen do combine, according to quantum
theory, to form water.
Failure carefully to follow through this conceptual distinction is the root of
the failures of all of Scott’s arguments.
Scott emphasizes the smallness of the spreading of the wave function of the
center-of-mass of Steffi Graf’s tennis ball. That situation involves the motion
of a large massive object, the tennis ball, relative to, say, a baseline on a large
tennis court.
A pertinent analogous situation in the brain involves the motion of a calcium ion from the exit of a microchannel of diameter 1 nanometer to a target
trigger site for the release of a vesicle of neuro-transmitter into the synaptic
cleft. The irreducible Heisenberg uncertainty in the velocity of the ion as it
exits the microchannel is about 1.5 m/sec, which is smaller than its thermal
2
velocity by a factor of about 4 × 10−3 . The distance to the target trigger site
is about 50 nanometers. So the spreading of the wave packet is of the order
of 0.2 nanometers, which is of the order of the size of the ion itself, and of the
target trigger site. Thus the decision as to whether the vesicle is released or not,
in an individual instance, will have a large uncertainty due to the Heisenberg
quantum uncertainty in the position of the calcium ion relative to the trigger
site: the ion may hit the trigger site and release the vesicle, or it may miss the
trigger site and fail to release the vesicle. These two possibilities, yes or no, for
the release of this vesicle by this ion continue to exist, in a superposed state,
until a “reduction of the wave packet” occurs. Thus, if there is a part of the
wave function that represents a situation in which a certain particular set of
vesicles are released, due to the relevant calcium ions having been captured at
the appropriate sites, then there will be other nearby parts of the wave function
of the brain in which some or all of the relevant captures do not take place—
because, for this part of the wave function, some of the calcium ions miss their
target—and hence the corresponding vesicles are not released.
This means, more generally, in a situation that corresponds to a very large
number N of synaptc firings, that until a reduction occurs, all of the 2N possible combinations of firings and no firings will be represented with comparable
statistical weight in the wave function of the brain/body and its environment.
Different combinations of these firings and no firings can lead to very different
macroscopic behaviours of the body that is being controlled by the this brain, via
the highly nonlinear neurodynamics of the brain. Thus the collapse effectively
chooses between very different possible macroscopic bodily actions.
I do not suggest that the mechanism just cited, involving the diffusion of the
calcium ions in the nerve terminals is the only sources of significant differences
between the macroscopic consequences of the quantum and classical descriptions of brain dynamics, for many other possible effects have been identified
by quantum physicists interested in brain dynamics. But this effect is directly
computable, whereas some of the others depend on complex factors that are not
yet under theoretical control, and hence could be challenged as questionable.
But this effect pertaining to calcium ions in nerve terminals gives very directly
a reason for the the inappropriateness of the example of Steffi Graf’s tennis ball:
the relevant scales are enormously different. Because of this the huge difference
3
in scales, the consequences of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and the subsequent collapses that they entail, are irrelevant to the outcome of the tennis
match, but are critical to the bodily outcome of a brain activity that depends
on the action at synapses.
Scott now lists a number of reasons for believing that quantum theory is
not important in brain dynamics in a way that would relate to consciousness.
However, as I shall now explain, none of these arguments has any relevance to
the issue, which hinges on a putative connection between conscious thoughts
and quantum reduction events.
The point is this. The quantum reduction/collapse events mentioned above
are, according to orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory, closely tied to our conscious experiences. I believe that all physicists who suggest that consciousness
is basically a quantum aspect of nature hold that our conscious experiences are
tied to quantum collapses. The motivation for this belief is not merely that
it was only by adopting this idea that the founders of quantum theory were
able to construct a rational theory that encompassed in a unified and logically
coherent way the regularities of physical phenomena in both the classical and
quantum domains. The second powerful motivation is that this association
seems provide a natural physical basis for the unitary character of our conscious
experiences. The point is that quantum theory demands that the collapse of
the wave function represent in Dirac’s words “our more precise knowledge after
measurement”. But the representation of the increase in knowledge associated
with say, some perception, would be represented in the brain as the actualization, as a whole unit, of a complex brain state that extends over a large part of
the brain. Collapse events of some kind are necessary to make ontological sense
out of orthodox-type quantum theory, and these events can never be pointlike
events: they must have finite extension. But once they are in principle nonpointlike, they need not be tiny, and can quite naturally extend over an entire
physical system. The natural and necessary occurrence in quantum theory of
these extended holistic macroscopic realities that enter as inseparable and efficacious units into the quantum dynamics—and which, according to the physical
theory itself, are associated with sudden increments in our knowledge—seems
to put the physical and psychological aspects of nature into a much closer and
more natural correspondence with each other in quantum theory than in classi4
cal mechanics, in which every large-scale thing is, without any loss, completely
decomposable, both ontologically and dynamically, into its tiny parts.
Scott’s first reason for claiming quantum theory to be unimportant to mind
pertains to the speading of wave packets in molecular dynamics. That effect
was just considered, and the crucial spreading of the calcium ion wave packets
in nerve terminals was shown to be large compared to the ion size, contrary to
Scott’s estimate.
Scott then considers a subject he has worked on: polarons. He says the
the effect of the quantum corrections is to degrade the global coherence of the
classical polaron. But this “degrading” is not just some fuzzying-up of the
situation: it is the very thing that is of interest and importance here. In the case
of a body/brain this “degrading” is, more precisely, the separation of the wave
function into branches representing various classical describable possibilities.
However, only one of these classical possibilities is experienced in the mind
associated with this body/brain. Quantum theory in its present form is mute
on the question of which of these possibilities is experienced: only a statistical
rule is provided. But then what is it that undoes this huge (in our case) degrading
that the linear wave equation generates. It is not the classical nonlinearities,
for the quantum analogs of these nonlinearities are built into the part of the
quantum dynamics that creates the superposition of the classically describable
possibilities: they are built into the Schroedinger equation. A collapse, which is
the putative physical counterpart of the conscious experience, is a different effect
that does not enter into the Schroedinger equation. Nor does it enter at all into
the classical approximation to quantum theory. In that approximation there
are no Heisenberg uncertainties or indeterminacies, and hence no collapses, and
hence from the persective of the encompassing and more basic quantum theory,
no physical counterparts of our conscious experiences.
His next two points concern the difficulty of maintaining “quantum coherence” in a warm, wet brain. The brain is a complex structure with built-in
energy pumps. The question of whether or not long-range quantum coherence
could be maintained is difficult to settle theoretically. Some explorations have
been made (Vitiello, 1995), but the matter is not yet settled. On the other
hand, my theory yields important quantum effects that are not wiped out by
decohence effects and that could lead to the evolution of a dynamically effica5
cious consciousness in coordination with evolution of brains without requiring
any long-range quantum coherence (Stapp, 1997a,b).
Scott’s next item is the theory for the propagation of an action potential
along a nerve fiber. He points out that this propagation is well described by
the classical Hodgkin-Huxley equation. But even among neuroscientists who
accept classical mechanics as an adequate foundation for brain dynamics there
is a recognition that although in some situations the parallel processing structure
produces reliable and essentially deterministic behaviors of groups of neurons, in
spite of the essentially stochastic character of the the distribution of individual
pulses on the individual neurons, in other cases there are long-range correlations
in the timings of pulses. One can expect in cases where thermal and other
classical fluctuation effectively cancel, in such a way as to give reliable and
deterministic behaviors, that the quantum effects associated with collapses will
probably have no major macroscopic consequences. But in cases where longrange correlations of pulse timings arise, the precise details of these timings must
be controlled in part by stochastic variables even in a completely classical model
that generallly conforms to, say, the Hodgkin-Huxley equation. In these more
delicate situations there is ample room for the large-scale effects associated with
quantum collapses of brain-wide quantum states to play a decisive dynamical
role within the framework of possibilities compatible with the classical HodgkinHuxley equations. Indeed, the actualization of global brain states would be
expected produce fine-tuned global regularities that classical mechanics could
not account for.
Scott’s final point is about Schroedinger’s cat. He says the Schroedinger
equation cannot be constructed because the cat does not conserve energy. But
the usual assumption in these studies of the quantum mind-brain is that quantum theory is universally valid, in the sense that the Schroedinger equation is
the equation of motion for the entire universe, in absence of collapse events.
Partial systems are defined by integrating over the other degrees of freedom,
and their energies are not conserved.
6
References
Fogelson, A.L. & Zucker, R.S. (1985),‘Presynaptic calcium diffusion from
various arrays of single channels: Implications for transmitter release and synaptic facilitation’, Biophys. J., 48, pp. 1003-1017.
Scott, A. (1996), ‘On quantum theories of the mind’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 5-6, pp.484-91.
Stapp, H. (1993), Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, (Berlin: Springer),
Chapter 6.
Stapp, H. (1997a), ‘Pragmatic Approach to Consciousness’ To be published
in The Neural Correlates of Consciousness, ed., N. Osaka; To be re-published
in Brain and Values, ed. K. Pribram, Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ.
Availaible at http://www-physics.lbl.gov/∼stapp/stappfiles.html
Stapp, H. (1997b) ‘Quantum ontology and mind-matter synthesis’, in The
X-th Max Born Symposium, eds., P. Blanchard and A. Jadczyk, to be published
by Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Availaible at http://www-physics.lbl.gov/∼stapp/stappfiles.html
Vitiello, G (1995), ‘Dissipation and memory capacity in the quantum brain
model’, Int. J. Mod. Phys. B9, 973-89.
Zucker, R.S. & Fogelson, A.L. (1986), ‘Relationship between transmitter release and presynaptic calcium influx when calcium enters through disrete channels’, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 83, pp. 3032-3036.
7 |
757
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 757-761
Kaufman, S. E., the Flow of the Great Mother
Realization
The Flow of the Great Mother
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
The Great Mother is One, everything else comes in pairs of opposites, because everything else is
created as the Great Mother Flows in relation to Herself. And so in constructing the door that
leads to Her enjoying Herself, She also constructs a door that makes it possible for Her to do the
opposite of enjoying Herself.
Key Words: Great Mother, One, flow, universe of form.
Better than to try and improve yourself
is to just enjoy yourself.
The Great Mother
did not create this Universe of Forms
out of Herself
to improve Herself.
The Great Mother
created this Universe of Forms
out of Herself
to enjoy Herself.
To envelope Herself
in her own Joy
in her own Being.
To Wrap Herself around Herself
and then Flow through Herself
while still Wrapped around Herself.
The Great Mother does not Flow Herself
through these Forms made of Herself,
as She is wrapped about Herself,
in order to become better,
in order to become more,
for that is not possible.
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
758
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 757-761
Kaufman, S. E., the Flow of the Great Mother
She is perfect as She Is.
There is no room for improvement.
There is however,
room for enjoyment.
But with the possibility of enjoyment
must also arise the possibility
of the opposite of enjoyment.
All this Wrapping around
and Flowing through
in order to create enjoyment,
in order to create joy,
requires the Great Mother
to Be in relation to Herself.
And where one relation is possible
that creates one sort of feeling,
the opposite relation must also be possible
that creates the opposite feeling.
The Great Mother is One,
everything else
comes in pairs of opposites,
because everything else
is created
as the Great Mother Flows
in relation to Herself.
And so in constructing the door
that leads to
Her enjoying Herself,
She also constructs a door
that makes it possible
for Her to do the opposite
of enjoying Herself.
One who does not understand this
thinks that suffering
should not be.
But one who does understand this
knows that
without the possibility of suffering
there can be no possibility of its opposite,
no possibility of enjoyment.
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759
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 757-761
Kaufman, S. E., the Flow of the Great Mother
Enjoyment arises
when the Great Mother
Flows through Herself
unopposed by Herself.
Suffering arises
when the Great Mother
Flows through Herself
opposed by Herself.
When the Great Mother Knows Herself,
She naturally Flows through Herself
without opposition,
and so feels enjoyment.
But when the Great Mother forgets Herself,
She just as naturally Flows through Herself
opposing Herself,
and so feels suffering.
And so there is something
that we can improve,
but it is not what we Are,
for That is already perfect.
What we can improve
is what we know our self to be,
for in this regard
we are always mistaken,
but to greater and lesser degrees.
The more our idea of our self
is in conflict with our true Nature,
the more in conflict with that Nature
our Flow will Be.
And the more our idea of our self
is in harmony with our true Nature,
the more in harmony with that Nature
our Flow will Be.
Now no idea
is exactly what we Are,
for ideas are forms
and we Are not.
ISSN: 2153-8212
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760
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 757-761
Kaufman, S. E., the Flow of the Great Mother
So as long as an idea
comes between us
and our Nature
there will be some conflict
between us
and our Nature.
But as a clean mirror
has greater utility
than one that is caked with mud,
a clear idea of one's Nature
has greater utility
than an idea that muddies one's Nature.
The idea that you can improve yourself,
and that you can improve the world,
are ideas that arise
from a muddy image
of what you Are.
The idea that you can enjoy yourself,
and that you can enjoy the world,
are ideas that arise
from a clear image
of what you Are.
It may be true
that the ultimate Knowledge comes
when all thought is set aside,
when all masks are dispensed with.
But until then
why not just enjoy yourself
as best you can.
It is what the Great Mother would do.
It is what the Great Mother is doing.
And when you do as the Great Mother does
you Flow as the Great Mother Flows,
and the more you Flow
as the Great Mother Flows
the more transparent and unreal
all the masks become,
until all that remains
is That which,
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | October 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 8 | pp. 757-761
Kaufman, S. E., the Flow of the Great Mother
to the extent that It is revealed,
gives to every mask its Beauty,
and so causes the world
and one's self
to appear as beautiful
and perfect as they are,
and to the extent that It is hidden
makes every mask appear less than beautiful,
and so causes the world
and one's self
to appear as less than beautiful
and imperfect as they are,
and so in need of some repair,
in need of some improvement.
So many words,
so little actually happening.
The Great Mother Being and Flowing
in aligned or opposed relation to Herself,
and so enjoying Herself,
or suffocating Herself.
That is all.
ISSN: 2153-8212
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Viewpoint
A Theoretical Computer Science Perspective on
Consciousness and Artificial General Intelligence1
Lenore Blum2 and Manuel Blum3
Abstract
We have defined the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) for the purpose of investigating a
Theoretical Computer Science (TCS) approach to consciousness. For this, we have hewn to the
TCS demand for simplicity and understandability. The CTM is consequently and intentionally a
simple machine. It is not a model of the brain, though its design has greatly benefited - and
continues to benefit - from neuroscience and psychology. The CTM is a model of and for
consciousness.
Although it is developed to understand consciousness, the CTM offers a thoughtful and novel
guide to the creation of an Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). For example, the CTM has an
enormous number of powerful processors, some with specialized expertise, others unspecialized
but poised to develop an expertise. For whatever problem must be dealt with, the CTM has an
excellent way to utilize those processors that have the required knowledge, ability, and time to
work on the problem, even if it is not aware of which ones these may be.
1
The Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) in a nutshell
A Theoretical Computer Science (TCS) perspective is employed to define the Conscious Turing Machine
(CTM), “conscious awareness”, and the “feeling of consciousness” in the CTM (Blum & Blum, 2021).
These are followed by arguments explaining why the definitions capture commonly accepted
understandings of consciousness and the feelings that many people have of their own consciousness
(Blum & Blum, 2022).
The CTM is a mathematical formalization of a modified version of the Global Workspace Theory (GWT)
of consciousness (Figure 1) that originated with cognitive neuroscientist Bernard Baars in (Baars B. J.,
1988) and (Baars B. J., 1997), and was subsequently extended to the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW)
by (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), (Dehaene S. , 2014) and (Mashour, Roelfsema, Changeux, & Dehaene,
2020).4
Baars describes conscious awareness through a theater analogy as the activity of actors in a play
performing on a stage of Working Memory, their performance under observation by a huge audience of
unconscious processors sitting in the dark.
In the CTM, the stage is represented by a Short Term Memory (STM) that at every tick of a central clock
contains what is defined to be CTM’s conscious content. The audience members are represented by an
enormous collection of powerful random access processors - some with their own expertise, some
1 This work was supported in part by a grant from UniDT.
2 lblum@cs.cmu.edu; lenore.blum@berkeley.edu
3 mblum@cs.cmu.edu; blum@cs.berkeley.edu
4 Baars’s GWT is strongly influenced by earlier work in cognitive science, much of which was done at Carnegie Mellon: (Simon,
1969), (Reddy, 1976), (Newell, 1990) and (Anderson, 1996).
1
© 2023 Blum & Blum
without, and all with deep learning hardware to develop or improve an expertise - that make up CTM’s
Long Term Memory (LTM) processors. These LTM processors make predictions about the world and get
feedback from that (CTM’s) world. Based on that feedback, learning algorithms Internal to each
processor improve that processor’s behavior.
LTM processors compete to get their questions, answers, and comments onto the STM stage for
immediate broadcast to the audience. The information that passes through STM is coded in the form of
chunks. Conscious awareness/attention is defined formally in the CTM as the reception by all LTM
processors of whatever chunk was broadcast from STM and received by processors of LTM. In time,
some LTM processors become connected via links that serve as channels for carrying chunks directly
between processors. Links turn indirect conscious communication (via STM) between LTM processors
into direct unconscious communication (not involving STM) between those processors.
While these definitions are natural, they are merely definitions. They are not arguments that the CTM is
conscious in the sense that the word “consciousness” is normally used. We do argue however that the
definitions and explanations from the CTM capture broadly accepted intuitive understandings of
consciousness.
Although inspired by Baars’ global workspace model, there are significant differences between Baars’
model (Figure 1a) and the CTM (Figure 1b). With respect to architecture, while Baars has a central
executive, the CTM has none: it is a distributed system that enables the emergence of functionality and
applications to general intelligence. In the CTM, input sensors transmit environmental
information directly to appropriate LTM processors; output actuators act on the environment based on
information gotten directly from specific LTM processors. In the Baars model, these inputs and outputs
are processed through working memory. In the CTM, chunks are formally defined and are submitted by
LTM processors to compete in a well-defined competition for STM; in the Baars model, neither are
formally defined. For Baars, a conscious event occurs between the input and the central executive; in
the CTM, conscious awareness is the reception by the LTM processors of the chunk broadcast globally
from the STM.
Although inspired by Turing’s simple yet powerful model of a computer, the CTM is not a standard
Turing Machine. That’s because what gives the CTM a “feeling of consciousness” is not its input-output
map or its computing power but rather its global workspace architecture; its predictive dynamics (cycles
of prediction, feedback, and learning); its rich multi-modal inner language (which we call Brainish) for
inter-processor communication; and certain particularly important LTM processors including the Inner
Speech, Inner Generalized Sensation, and Model-of-the-World processors.
Figure 1. Sketches of models: a) Baars' GWT model (left) and b) the CTM (right).
2
© 2023 Blum & Blum
As mentioned in the abstract, the CTM is not intended to be a model of the brain but a simple model of
consciousness, and even there, the CTM model can hardly be expected to explain everything: it is too
simple for that. The reasonableness of the model (and its TCS perspective) should be judged by its
contribution to the discussion and understanding of consciousness, to related topics like feelings of pain
and pleasure, and to its potential for use as an AGI.
The above presents an overview of the CTM model. We refer the reader to two papers for the formal
definition of CTM as 7-tuple and chunk as 6-tuple. The first paper (Blum & Blum, 2021) explores
explanations for the feelings of pain and pleasure in the CTM.5 The second paper (Blum & Blum, 2022)
explores additional phenomena generally associated with consciousness such as free will and the
disorder of blindsight.6 We give explanations derived from the formal model and draw confirmation from
consistencies at a high-level with the psychology and neuroscience literature.7,8
2
The CTM and Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)9
Though the CTM is defined to be a very simple model of consciousness, it being explicitly formally
defined for generating definitions and understandings of consciousness, it also suggests a novel
approach to AGI, giving a way to coordinate an enormous number of (special-purpose) artificial
intelligence (AI) agents for the purpose of building the AGI. In particular, it suggests how to coordinate a
huge number - 107 or more10 - of processors, some specialized, most initially unspecialized but capable
of being specialized, to solve a variety of unforeseen problems. In an AGI, specialized processors could
be tasked to get information from a number of search engines, from ChatGPT or GPT-4, Wikipedia,
Google Translate, Wolfram alpha, the weather channel, newspapers, HOL Light11, and so on. These are
existing ready-made processors. Many more processors could and would be developed from scratch as
needed by the CTM itself.
A principal contribution of the CTM is a way to coordinate processors that must solve a diverse
collection of unforeseen problems. The CTM assigns tasks to its processors, even though it has no
5 For an update on pain and pleasure in the CTM, see Chapter 4 of the Blum’s The Hard Problem for Pain and Pleasure, in
https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.09850.
6 For an update see https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.13704.
7 We note a historical synergy between theoretical computer science and neuroscience. Turing’s simple computer model led
neuroscientist Warren S. McCulloch and mathematician Walter Pitts to define their formal neuron, itself a simple model of a
neuron (McCulloch & Pitts, 1943). Mathematics forced their model to have inhibition, not just excitation - because without
inhibition, loop-free circuits of formal neurons can only compute monotonic functions - and these do not suffice to build a
universal Turing Machine. The McCulloch-Pitts neuron also gave rise to the mathematical formalization of neural nets
(Wikipedia) and subsequent deep learning algorithms (Goodfellow, Bengio, & Courville, 2016), further illustrating ongoing
synergies.
8 A forthcoming monograph (Blum, Blum, & Blum, In preparation) describes in more detail how the CTM works. Its three
appendices demonstrate how CTM can operate with no central executive, despite that all other global workspace models (such
as Baars’ functional model (Baars B. J., 1997)) hypothesize a Central Executive. These same appendices show by example how
CTM functions with just one chunk in STM instead of George Miller’s 7±2 (Miller, 1956) or Nelson Cowan’s 3 or 4 (Cowan,
2015). No other models suggest that one chunk will suffice.
9 Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is the ability of an intelligent agent to understand or learn any intellectual task that can be
learned by human beings or other animals.
10 107 is the estimated number of cortical columns in the brain.
11 HOL Light is a formal mathematical programming system for generating proofs that are logically and mathematically correct,
and/or for checking any “proofs” given it. It was used, for example, by Tom Hales to prove the correctness of his solution to the
Kepler conjecture (Hales, 2005).
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central executive and no single processor or collection of processors to keep track of which processors
have the time and know-how to do the task. How it does that is an interesting koan.
Suppose (a processor of) CTM has a task to perform but nary a clue how to perform it, and no idea
which, if any, of its many Long Term Memory (LTM) processors has the knowledge, ability, and time to
deal with the task. Through a well-defined competition for Short Term Memory (STM), the processor
submits a request for help to all LTM processors. The request will with some probability [well-defined in
the CTM] reach STM for global broadcast to all (LTM) processors. All processors that have relevant
expertise and time to work on the problem respond, again through the competition and global
broadcast. Their broadcasts in turn can motivate other processors to come into play. In this way, the
CTM engages powerful processors to collectively solve a problem that CTM had no idea how to solve, no
approach to the problem, no sense which processors, if any, could be helpful.
When it comes to mathematics, the CTM is ideal for orchestrating its processors to recognize a sound
logical argument, write a correct mathematical proof, and check its work. It can program its processors
and modify them as needed to reach such goals. For example, one processor can suggest an approach to
a proof, a second can evaluate the likelihood that the approach will work, a third can outline a potential
“proof”, a fourth can check if a proposed “proof” is really a proof (pointing out what problems arise) if
not, and so on...
More generally, the CTM can and must have processors for checking the truth of statements or
arguments. Consider for example the assertion that shrimp is healthy to eat. One source says YES,
shrimp is healthy, but that statement comes from an Association that represents the Frozen Foods
industry, making it suspect. Another says NO, shrimp is unhealthy: it has lots of cholesterol and
cholesterol is unhealthy. Yet another says YES, shrimp is healthy, the cholesterol in shrimp is the healthy
LDL kind. As that last paper (De Oliveira e Silva, et al., 1996) is authored by a scholar from a respected
(Rockefeller) University, and published in a reputable refereed journal, its case is the strongest so far.
Responses to the paper may further strengthen or weaken the assessment.
3
What features does the CTM bring to the design of an AGI?
The CTM is a simple TCS model of consciousness. It is not a brain. It is not an AGI. That said, we suggest
that its basic features surely have value in the design of some aspects of an AGI. For example:
3.1. The CTM suggests an approach to building an AGI that has no central executive - no conductor, no
stage director. It has an enormous number of processors, each of which is largely self-directing, rather
like the members of a self-conducting musical ensemble. This architecture is unexpected and strange
because large assemblies, large orchestras, and large political states, generally have a leader.
The CTM has one and only one actor on stage, and that one is not a leader. It serves merely as
3.1.1. a small buffer to hold the winning chunk of the current competition and
3.1.2. a broadcasting station to beam that chunk to the entire LTM audience.
The CTM solves a conundrum: how is it possible for a long and subtle argument, say the proof of a
difficult theorem, to be understood – grasped as it were in the palm of one’s hand? That handful is the
final chunk that contains something like “Eureka! I got it.” That chunk is from a processor that, if asked,
can point to the outline of a proof, each phrase of which can point to what in the proof it depends on
and what depends on it.
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3.2. The audience members of the CTM global workspace are self-monitoring processors. They have
the final word on the value of their personal contribution.12
3.3. Baars (Baars B. J., 1997) says that the audience members of the global workspace consult among
themselves to agree on who to send to the stage, but how do they do that? Baars doesn’t say.
The CTM, on the other hand, explains precisely how to do it. It hosts a well-defined competition that is
similar to, and actually provably better than a chess or tennis tournament in that, at minor cost and
negligible extra time, it guarantees that each processor will broadcast its information with probability
proportional to the value of its information (a value computed dispassionately by the processor’s
sleeping experts algorithm), something that chess and tennis tournaments do not and cannot do.
3.4. Sleeping Experts learning algorithms (Blum A. , 1997), (Blum, Hopcroft, & Kannan, 2015)
determine how a processor assigns a value to its information, a value that is (mostly) self-determined by
the processor. The CTM makes do with no teacher at the head of the class and no answer sheet to make
corrections. Its processors self-predict and self-correct based on feedback. We expect AGI designers to
be interested in how they manage that.
3.5. CTM’s Model-of-the-World (MotW) processor develops world models. These world models are
hugely important for planning, testing, making corrections, distinguishing fiction from nonfiction, living
from non-living, self from not-self, and most importantly for contributing to feelings of consciousness.
The CTM has at birth a rudimentary MotW Processor, then continuously upgrades it and its models.
How the CTM creates and manages its world models is especially important given that the CTM does not
consciously see the world directly, as does the Baars model (Figure 1a), but indirectly through its world
models (Figure 1b).
3.6. The CTM can explain what it is doing and why. It can answer questions about the how and why of
its doings and give arguments to support its answers.
4
Arguments for and against using CTM as a guide for creating an AGI
The specification of CTM 13 gives a sense of how a CTM works. Descriptions are given of how each
processor assigns a valenced measure of importance (a weight) to its chunks, and how that measure is
affected by the Sleeping Experts Algorithm in each LTM processor. There is a description of how the
tournament that starts at time t is run, that tournament being a competition among all N chunks14
contributed by all N processors at time t. Each such tournament takes (log2N) steps: the first step being
N/2 matches performed in parallel, the second being N/4, ..., the last being a single match to crown the
winner. The tournament is as fast as any tournament for tennis and chess but better as chess and tennis
tournaments don’t guarantee, as does the CTM tournament, that chunks get to STM with probability
proportional to their importance. On that account, CTM processors can remain hard-wired and in place
without in any way affecting which chunk will win any given tournament.
Another argument for using CTM as a guide for AGI comes from neuroscience research demonstrating
that in humans, “language and thought are not the same thing” (Fedorenko & Varley, 2016). Individuals
with global aphasia, “despite their near-total loss of language are nonetheless able to add and subtract,
12 The idea reminds us of the visiting Admiral at MIT who told McCulloch’s neurophysiology group in 1959 that in the navy, it is
not the flagship that commands the fleet: it is the ship with the information. The CTM’s processors are the ships of an
enormous fleet. The workings of the CTM give precise meaning to the Admiral’s words.
13 In (Blum & Blum, 2021), (Blum & Blum, 2022), and in the upcoming monograph (Blum, Blum, & Blum, In preparation).
14 We assume that N = 2k for some positive integer k.
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solve logic problems, think about another’s thoughts, appreciate music, ....” Healthy adults “strongly
engage the brain’s language areas when they understand a sentence, but not when they perform nonlinguistic tasks such as arithmetic, storing information in working memory, ..., or listening to music.”
Influenced by this research and comparing large language models to formal and functional properties of
human language, (Mahowald, et al., 2023) argue that while large language models “are good models of
language”, [they are] “incomplete models of human thought.” They further argue “that future language
models can master both formal and functional linguistic competence by establishing a division of labor
between the core language system and components for other cognitive processes, ...” as in the human
brain. They provide two suggestions to accomplish this. Their first suggestion is Architectural
Modularity (whereby separate specialized modules work together with each other). The CTM
incorporates such modularity by utilizing multiple processors with different input domains, knowledge,
and functionalities.
Their second suggestion, Emergent Modularity (modularity that emerges within a large language
model), points to the possibility that deep learning alone will suffice for AGI, though they argue that
architectural modularity is “much better aligned with... real-life language use”.
The possibility of emergence is supported by (Bubeck, et al., 2023) who examine the impressive and
multiple “sparks” of general intelligence demonstrated by early experiments with the large language
model GPT-4 and view it as an early version of an AGI.
Indeed, it may turn out that no global workspace model or CTM is needed to create an AGI, that deep
learning alone suffices, that a single machine with a sufficiently large matrix size can be a universal AGI,
but we doubt it. One can argue that the matrix size of a deep learning AGI must grow with the square of
the number of problems it is to solve, and such a size would be difficult to achieve since the best current
AIs currently use about 1014 parameters. The CTM, which is designed for understanding consciousness,
can reasonably handle 107 AIs with 1014 parameters per AI, for a total of 1021 parameters. For
comparison, there are 1011 stars in the milky way galaxy and 2x1023 stars in the visible universe.
Avogadro’s number is 3 time as large as that at ≈ 6.0221 x 1023.
Returning to consciousness, the CTM global workspace model is a promising untapped approach to
turning AI into AGI. We expect that robots with CTM-like brains that construct models of the world will
have “feelings of consciousness”, hence be more likely to experience empathy. Finally, as AIs become
more human-like, understanding consciousness and feelings of pain will be critical if we want to avoid
inflicting suffering on our planet’s co-inhabitants.
Acknowledgements
The work of Lenore Blum and Manuel Blum was supported in part by Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), in
part by a sabbatical year from CMU at the Simon’s Institute for the Theory of Computing, and in part by a
generous gift from UniDT. We are grateful to Jean-Louis Villecroze for his ongoing work to simulate CTM, Paul
Liang for his insight into multimodal Brainish (Liang, 2022), for our students at CMU and Peking U who
constantly challenge us, and our friends and colleagues Raj Reddy and Michael Xuan for their suggestions,
personal support, and extraordinary encouragement.
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References
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Conscious Enactive Computation
Daniel Estrada
arXiv:1812.02578v1 [cs.AI] 3 Dec 2018
New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark NJ 07102
djestrada@gmail.com
Abstract. This paper looks at recent debates in the enactivist literature on computation and consciousness in order to assess major obstacles
to building artificial conscious agents. We consider a proposal from Villalobos and Dewhurst (2018) for enactive computation on the basis of
organizational closure. We attempt to improve the argument by reflecting
on the closed paths through state space taken by finite state automata.
This motivates a defense against Clark’s recent criticisms of “extended
consciousness”, and perhaps a new perspective on living with machines.
Keywords: enactivism, artificial intelligence, computation, Turing machine, state space, finite state automata, predictive coding, consciousness
1
Introduction
Enactivism challenges the dominant cognitive paradigm in psychology with an
account of intentional (purposive) agency that is grounded in the emergent dynamics of biological complexity [15,43,46]. Specifically, enactivism holds that
biological life is characterized by adaptive self-constitution: living systems construct and maintain their own organized structure through their active engagement with a changing world [4,35]. This approach motivates a systematic account
of autonomy [3,33,41,48], intentional agency [17,31], subjective consciousness
[19,28], and identity in complex dynamical systems [5,6], with the promise of a
consistent and unified explanatory framework across the full range of biological processes, from the biomechanics of single-celled organisms to ecologies and
societies [18,26,44].
Despite the emphasis on biological complexity, enactivism has from its inception maintained a robust research program investigating artificial intelligence,
artificial life, and robotics (hereafter AI) [1,2,13,16,20,42]. This research aims to
develop models, simulations, and robots that assist in the scientific investigation
of biological complexity and adaptive systems. For instance, AI that exhibits
some dynamically self-organizing behavior might serve as a useful “proof of concept” demonstrating key enactivist principles (see [20] for examples). However,
while robotics research has already felt a significant impact from the embodied
approach [37,38], enactivist AI is often advanced against a backdrop of criticism
directed at “merely” computational or representational explanations [22,23]. As
a founder of enactivism Francisco Varela put it, “This fundamental paradigm of
the digital computer program will not do for biology, nor for AI.” [46]
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A recent set of papers from Villalobos, Dewhurst, Ward and colleagues (hereafter Villalobos) [14,49,50,51] address these historical tensions between enactivism and computation. Villalobos argues that the enactivists are mistaken to
treat computers as mere symbolic processors of abstract representations. Drawing on a mechanist account of computation, Villalobos suggests an interpretation
of the classical Turing machine which they claim would meet enactivist conditions for self-determination. If so, it would suggest that embodied agency could
be given a computational rather than biological basis without sacrificing enactivist commitments to the dynamical interactions between agent and world. This
argument strikes at the foundations of the enactivist program, and threatens to
overturn 20+ years of enactivist thought on AI and computation.
The central concern of this paper is to assess the proposal for enactive computation put forward by Villalobos. Their argument turns on the enactivist interpretation of self-determination in terms of organizational closure. While we
think Villalobos’ examples fail to meet strong enactivist conditions on closure,
we suggest they can be improved through explicit consideration of the structure
of the finite state automata (FSM) that controls a classic Turing machine. This
highlights an important form of closure that is, we argue, more fundamental than
organizational closure: namely, the closed path through state space taken by the
FSM. We claim that computation is fundamentally concerned with the structure
of paths through state space, and that all living organisms can be characterized
by such paths. This result suggests computation as the fundamental basis from
which the enactivist program must emerge. We then consider the implications of
this argument for a particular strand of criticism raised by Clark [10,12] against
enactivist proposals for “extended consciousness” [36]. We conclude with general
thoughts on the implications these arguments have for living with machines.
2
Organizational closure and Turing’s machine
Organizational closure serves as the basis for the enactivist approach to autonomous intentional (purposive) behavior, and names the sense in which biological organisms are self-determined [3,4,47]. A system is organized when its
constitutive components are arranged into a network of functionally interdependent processes and constraints [27]. An organization is closed when the operation of its constitutive components are themselves sufficient for the adaptive
construction and generation of its organized state [35]. Enactivists argue that
organizational closure provides an intrinsic basis for identifying organisms and
their boundaries as unified wholes. Furthermore, enactivists emphasize that organisms are precariously situated within a dynamic world to which they must
continually adapt in order to maintain an organized state. This precariousness
creates conditions that demand coordinated action from the organism as a whole
in order to maintain its organized state [7]. This gives rise to what enactivists
call adaptive sense-making, which serves as the basis for investigations into consciousness and phenomenology [19,28,43].
Conscious Enactive Computation
3
Beyond its central role in the enactivist theory of autonomous agency, organizational closure also figures in enactivist criticisms of classical computation1 .
Enactivists contrast the closed structure of biological organisms with the open or
linear structure of traditional computing machines [20]. On this view, computers
operate through a sequence of formal operations that transforms symbolic “input” into symbolic “output”. Enactvists claim at least two important differences
between computation and the adaptive self-constitution of biological organisms.
First, computers perform stepwise formal operations on symbolic input, rather
than performing dynamic mechanical operations within a changing world. Second, computers don’t “build themselves” in the sense relevant for adaptive selfconstitution, which requires organizational closure. Put simply, computers aren’t
self-determined wholes with a world of their own, and so cannot serve as the intrinsic subject of an experience. Instead, computers are artifacts created through
external processes of human design and manufacturing. Such considerations lead
Froese and Ziemke [20] to distinguish the behavioral autonomy characteristic of
certain kinds of self-controlled machines (say, a dishwasher on a timer), from the
constitutive autonomy characteristic of living biological systems.
Villalobos’ argument for enactive computation in [51] is designed to show that
a Turing machine can meet the conditions for self-determination as described by
Maturana (1988) [30]. Here, self-determination is identified with functional closure. A system has functional closure when its organizational structure forms
closed feedback loops. As an example, Villalobos offers a thermostat regulating
the temperature of a house. The behavior of the thermostat-house system is characterized by a feedback loop between these two components which has a circular
structure and satisfies functional closure. Of course, while the thermostat-house
system “controls itself” with respect to temperature, it is not adaptively selfconstituting in any deeper sense; thermostats and houses don’t build themselves
with their parts alone. Thus, functional closure is not sufficient for organizational
closure of the sort required for constitutive autonomy. Nevertheless, Villalobos
argues this control structure does not connect inputs to outputs through a linear
sequence of symbolic processes, and so is not “open”. It is, they argue, closed
and minimally self-determining in a sense relevant for enactivist theory.
Villalobos then applies this feedback loop model to the classic Turing machine. Turing [45] proposed a computing machine with three components: a tape
with discrete cells; a read-write head that operates on the tape; and a program
which controls the operation of the head. On the enactivist interpretation, the
tape serves input to the machine and records output from the machine, and the
machine (the head and program) performs formal operations that convert the
former to the latter as a linear process. Against this view Villalobos offer an alternative, inspired by Wells [54] and Piccinini [39,40], that interprets the Turing
1
Enactivists are not universally hostile to computation. Importantly, Mossio et al
[34] render an organizationally closed system in the λ-calculus, and argue that
“there are no conceptual or principled problems in realizing a computer simulation or model of closure.” Such arguments have resulted in a split between radical
anti-computationalists [22] and more traditional versions of enactivism. See [8,53].
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Estrada
machine in terms of looping interactions between the machine and the tape. This
forms a functionally closed loop, much like the thermostat-house system, which
implies self-determination in the sense that the computer’s state is determined by
the interactions between the machine and the tape. In an analog computer these
constraints might appear as features of the physical mechanisms of the device,
thereby eliminating any symbolic aspect of the computation. Thus, Villalobos
argues, even a classical Turing machine can be understood as purely mechanical
and functionally closed, and so evades the enactivist criticism of computation.
While this argument doesn’t entail that computers are conscious living creatures
of equivalent complexity to biological organisms, it does confront a major hurdle within the enactivist literature to treating computing machines as genuinely
purposive agents with a world of their own.
Does Villalobos’ argument succeed? Briefly, no: functional closure alone is not
sufficient for adaptive self-constitution of the sort relevant for intentional agency
or adaptive sense-making. Villalobos’ ‘enactive’ Turing machine is merely behaviorally and not constitutively autonomous. While Maturana’s account is influential, recent work has developed more rigorous constraints on organizational
closure. For instance, Mossio et al. [32,35] present a model of closure which requires that constitutive constraints operate across multiple scales or levels of organization to achieve closure. While the thermostat-house system is functionally
closed, we might say that closure occurs at a single scale, namely the feedback
loop that controls temperature. At other scales, for instance the internal structure of the thermostat mechanism, the system is not closed or self-determining.
Similarly, Turing’s machine appears to be functionally closed only at the level of
operations of the head on the tape and nowhere else. Biological systems, on the
other hand, are in some sense self-determining all the way through—or at least
they are self-organized across a range of scales from inter-cellular biochemistry
through geopolitics that covers the breadth of our experiences of a meaningful
world as human agents. A Turing machine might be functionally closed, but it
covers nothing close to the same range of interactivity.
How many levels of organizational constraints are required to distinguish between behavioral and constitutive autonomy? Mossio’s model suggests at least
two. If so, Villalobos’ argument might be improved by describing a Turing machine with two layers of self-determining organizational constraints rather than
one. In the next section, I will discuss how the classic Turing machine already
captures organizational closure across two layers of constraint.
3
Closed paths through state space
If we suspend the anti-representational commitments of enactivism for a moment, there’s an important feature of Turing’s machine which is not explicitly
addressed in these arguments: the structure of the program which controls the
read-write head. In Turing’s model, the program takes the form of a finite state
machine (FSM). FSMs are abstract automata that are characterized by a finite number of discrete states, and a set of rules that describe the operations
Conscious Enactive Computation
5
performed in each state, and the conditions for transitioning between states,
depending on what is read from the tape. These rules can be represented as a
state transition table, which can be realized2 in a physical machine in a number
of ways. The physical Turing machine is ‘programmed’ insofar as it realizes the
abstract state transition structure of the FSM.
The abstract nature of the FSM should not worry enactivists [27]. An FSM
can in principle be realized by simple physical mechanisms; there’s nothing inherently “symbolic” about the FSM. The FSM does not directly concern the
relationship between a computer and its environment; the FSM is not (necessarily) used by a computer to represent the world. The FSM is just an abstract
model of the states a machine can be in, and the conditions for transitioning
between these states. Enactivist literature is often directly preoccupied with
systems being in certain states, like the equilibrium state (homeostasis), and
with the activities organisms must perform to maintain these states [25,41]. To
this extent, enactivist theory depends on state abstractions of the same sort
used to describe the FSM. Describing the autonomy of an organism in terms of
“organizational closure” is already to appeal to an abstract control structure,
so there should be no principled objections from enactivists to discussing the
equally abstract structure of the FSM.
While the FSM can be represented as a transition table, it is also customary
to represent an FSM with a state space diagram with states represented as circles, and arrows between circles representing the transitions between states. A
state space diagram has a closed path (or loop) if some sequence of operations will
return the system to a previous state. For instance, suppose I take water at room
temperature, freeze it to ice, then let it thaw back to room temperature. The
water changed state, then changed back; we can represent this as a short path
through the state space of water that loops back to where it began. Homeostasis
is an interesting state for biological organisms precisely because they maintain
the state as a fixed point attractor, returning to equilibrium after minor disturbances. This is another way of saying that homeostasis is characterized by a
closed path in state space (CPSS).
With these considerations in mind, we propose that CPSSs, and paths in
state space generally, are of fundamental relevance to enactivist models of selfdetermination. Moreover, CPSSs put computers and organisms on equal ontological footing. Recall the theoretical motivation for appealing to organizational
closure to explain autonomy: it provides an intrinsic basis for individuating a
system as a unified whole, and so serves as a basis for adaptive sense-making.
We claim that a CPSS accomplishes the same theoretical task: organisms can
2
For historical reasons originating with Putnam [21], it is often taken for granted
that a definition of computation in terms of finite state automata cannot distinguish
between different realizations of a computer, and so cannot in principle provide an
explanation for cognitive behavior. Piccinini [39] cites this as an explicit motivation
for developing his mechanistic account of computation. There are good reasons for
thinking that Putnam’s concerns are overstated [9,24], but this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper. Thanks to Jon Lawhead for pointing this out.
6
Estrada
be identified intrinsically as the collection of processes and constraints that walk
a CPSS. This definition is intrinsic in the same sense as organizational closure:
whether a path counts as “closed” is set by the constitution of the system itself.
More strongly, we claim that any organizationally closed system can be characterized by a collections of CPSSs with a fixed attractor at the constitutive
organized state. This suggests that CPSSs are theoretically a more fundamental form of closure than organizational closure. Indeed, the important sense of
‘closure’ captured by the enactivists has less to do with daisy-chained functions
looping on themselves, and more to do with the CPSSs those functional relationships enable. Strictly speaking, neither functional nor organizational closure
is necessary for walking a CPSS.
Not every Turing machine will walk a CPSS, but it is exceedingly common
for them to do so3 . We can think of the CPSSs which characterize a Turing
machine’s program as another scale of closure, one which directly controls the
looping interactions between head and tape. With two scales of closed loops,
this would appear to meet Mossio’s stronger constraints on closure, and thus we
have shown the classical Turing machine might already constitute an adaptively
self-constituting system on enactivist grounds. Or, perhaps more realistically, the
depth of closure matters a lot less than what states those functional relationships
(closed, shallow, or otherwise) make available for the organism as it walks paths
in state space.
4
Extended consciousness
To appreciate how CPSSs can be useful to enactivism, consider a recent debate
on the bounds of consciousness. Despite his strong influence on enactivism, Clark
has pushed back against attempts to locate the processes constitutive of conscious experience in the world [10]. Clark argues there is no good reason to do
so; the activity constitutive of a conscious experience occurs immediately within
patterns of neural firings. Clark advocates for an explanatory approach called
”predictive coding” which uses “a hierarchical generative model that aims to
minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing”
[12]. Clark argues that the model works by rapidly updating on the basis of
new information. This leaves little bandwidth for external changes to impact
the updating model beyond sensory input; the dominant influence on a neuron
is simply the activity of other neurons. Thus, Clark argues, it is unlikely that
external processes play a constitutive role in conscious experience.
Ward [52] offers a response to Clark on behalf of enactivists that appeals
to multiple layers of interactions between the agent and world. Clark’s mistake,
on this view, is to localize consciousness to any single process in the organized
hierarchy. The appeal to multiple layers should by now be a familiar enactivist
move, one Clark rejects as superfluous in this case [11]. Whatever world-involving
3
The question of deciding in general whether a path in state space will close is formally
equivalent to the halting problem, and so is not computable. See [29].
Conscious Enactive Computation
7
processes enactivists believe are important, Clark claims he can account for them
with predictive coding. So consciousness appears stuck in the head.
Clark’s alternative doesn’t appeal to enactivists because the world-involving
aspects of predictive coding appear linear and open, like a computer, rather
than closed like an organism. This isn’t an accurate perception; the cascade of
neural activity develops with looping feedback until the neurons reach stability,
so there are functionally closed processes; those processes just aren’t extended
and world-involving. They only involve neurons and their cortical support. Enactivists are attracted to externalism because they view consciousness as inherently
world-involving and organizationally closed. Just as with Villalobos’ computer,
enactivists are hoping to find closure in the organizational structure of the embodied conscious state. Since closure is an indicator of unification and wholeness,
enactivists expect neural activity and world-involving processes to demonstrate
functional interdependencies. Clark’s argument that the neural activity is not
functionally dependent on external processes is therefore fatal to the view.
Perhaps CPSSs can help resolve this conflict amicably? If we think about
closure in terms of CPSSs we can recover the looping interactions that are inherently world-involving and closed in state space, while conceding to Clark that
the neural activity is sufficiently explanatory of the functional interactions that
give rise to the conscious state. In state space we are no longer confined to a
single closed loop spanning organizational levels. Instead, our dynamical activity
across different scales will form many different kinds of closed paths in different
state spaces. Some of these CPSSs will be characterized by inherently worldinvolving states, and so will recover an enactivist sense of closure compatible
with predictive coding.
Consider, for instance, that it is easier to maintain your balance with your
eyes open than closed. Here we have two cortical cascades: one producing visual
experiences, and one producing motor activity to maintain balance. These two
systems reinforce each other. Maintaining balance is a precarious state that inherently involves the configuration of the body as a massive physical object with
specific dimensions. Thus, the configuration of my body is a fundamental factor
in whether I am in a balanced state. The balanced state is a fixed attractor for
certain CPSSs that characterize my attempts to stay balanced. This brings in
looping, inherently world-involving processes into an explanation of my behavior as an agent without committing to implausible functional interdependencies
between neurons and world. The important dependencies for closure, and ultimately for autonomy, identity, and consciousness, are found in state space.
5
Conclusion
We don’t view CPSSs as a threat to enactivism’s positive theory of autonomy or
adaptive sense-making. Instead, we see it correcting the over-emphasized anticomputationalism that has historically motivated the view. We think enough
speaks in favor of the enactive approach that it needn’t appeal to a questionable
and increasing problematic ontological distinction between computing machines
8
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and biological life. Insofar as Villalobos’ argument also serves these goals, this
paper is meant to push harder in the same direction.
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
Article
Premomentumenergy Model I:
Genesis of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a Dual
Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
Huping Hu* & Maoxin Wu
ABSTRACT
This article is a continuation of the Principle of Existence. A premomentumenergy model of
elementary particles, four forces and human consciousness is formulated, which illustrates
how the self-referential hierarchical spin structure of the premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) provides a foundation for creating, sustaining and causing evolution of
elementary particles through matrixing processes embedded in said premomentumenergy
(Consciousness). This model generates elementary particles and their governing matrix laws
for a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external momentum-energy space and
an internal momentum-energy space. In contrast, the prespacetime model described
previously generates elementary particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual
universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external spacetime and an internal spacetime.
These quantum frames and their metamorphoses are interconnected through quantum jumps
as demonstrated in forthcoming articles.
The premomentumenergy model reveals the creation, sustenance and evolution of fermions,
bosons and spinless entities each of which is comprised of an external wave function or
external object in the external momentum-energy space and an internal wave function or
internal object in the internal momentum-energy space. The model provides a unified causal
structure in said dual universe (quantum frame) for weak interaction, strong interaction,
electromagnetic interaction, gravitational interaction, quantum entanglement, human
consciousness. Further, the model provides a unique tool for teaching, demonstration,
rendering, and experimentation related to subatomic and atomic structures and interactions,
quantum entanglement generation, gravitational mechanisms in cosmology, structures and
mechanisms of human consciousness.
Key Words: principle of existence, premomentumenergy, prespacetime, four forces,
consciousness, spin, existence, God, Consciousness.
*Corresponding author: Huping Hu, Ph.D., J.D., P.O. Box 267, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA. E-mail: hupinghu@quantumbrain.org
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
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1. Introduction
In Consciousness We Contemplate
As a continuation of the Principle of Existence [1-4], the beauty and awe of the
manifestations of premomentumenergy (Consciousness) are described in this article. The
premomentum-energy model generates elementary particles and their governing matrix
laws for a dual momentum-energy universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external
momentum-energy space and an internal momentum-energy space. This model creates
Relativistic Quantum Mechanics for a dual momentum-energy universe. In contrast, the
prespacetime model described previously [1-4] generates elementary particles and their
governing matrix laws for a dual spacetime universe comprised of an external spacetime
and an internal spacetime. The prespacetime model creates the usual Relativistic Quantum
Mechanics for the dual spacetime universe. These dual universes (quantum frames) and
their metamorphoses are interconnected through quantum jumps as illustrated below in
Figure 1.1 and demonstrated in forthcoming articles.
Figure 1.1 Illustration of Prespacetime model & premomentumenergy model
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
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This work is organized as follows. In § 2, we shall use words and drawings to lay out the
ontology of the premomentumenergy model. In § 3, we shall express in mathematics the
premomentumenergy model in the order of: (1) scientific genesis in a nutshell; (2) selfreferential matrix law and its metamorphoses; (3) additional forms of matrix law; (4)
scientific genesis of primordial entities; and (5) scientific genesis of composite entities. In §
4, we shall discuss within the context of premomentumenergy model: (1) metamorphoses
& the essence of spin; (2) the determinant view & the meaning of Klein-Gordon-like
equation; (3) the meaning of Schrodinger-like equation & quantum potential; and (4) the
third state of matter. In § 5 through § 8, we shall discuss, within the context of
premomentumenergy model, weak, electromagnetic, strong and gravitational interactions
respectively. In § 9, we shall focus on the essence of consciousness and the mechanism of
human conscious experience within the context of premomentumenergy model. In § 10, we
shall pose and answer some anticipated questions related to this work. Finally, in § 11, we
shall conclude this work.
Readers are reminded that we can only strive for perfection, completeness and correctness
in our comprehensions and writings because we are limited and imperfect.
2. Ontology
In words and drawings we illustrate
In the beginning there was premomentumenergy (Consciousness) ei0 materially empty but
spiritually restless. And it began to imagine through primordial self-referential spin
1=ei0=eiM-iM=eiMe-iM=e-iM/ e-iM = eiM/ eiM…such that it created the external object to be
observed and internal object as observed, separated them into external momentum-energy
space and internal momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through selfreferential matrix law and thus gave birth to the dual momentum-energy universe which it
has since sustained and made to evolve.
In this universe, the body of premomentumenergy (Consciousness), represented by Euler’s
Number e, is the ground of existence and can form external and internal wave functions as
external and internal momentum-energy objects (each pair forms an elementary entity in
the dual momentum-energy universe) and interaction fields between elementary entities
which accompany the imaginations of the premomentumenergy.
The body of premomentumenergy (Consciousness) can be self-acted on by self-referential
matrix law LM. Premomentumenergy has imagining power i to project external and internal
objects by projecting, e.g., external and internal phase +M =+(Et-p·x)/ħ at the power level
of premomentumenergy. The universe so created is a dual momentum-energy universe
comprising of the external momentum-energy space to be observed and internal
momentum-energy space as observed under each relativistic frame pμ=(E/c, p). In one
perspective of premomentumenergy (Consciousness) view, the internal momentum-energy
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769
space (which by convention has negative time) is the negation/image of the external
momentum-energy space (which by convention has positive time). The absolute frame of
reference is the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) itself. Thus, if premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) stops imagining (i0=0), the dual momentum-energy universe would
disappear into materially nothingness ei0=e0=1.
The accounting principle of the dual momentum-energy universe is conservation of zero.
For example, the total time of an external object and its counterpart, the internal object, is
zero. Also in this dual momentum-energy universe, self-gravity is the nonlocal-momentumenergy self-interaction (wave mixing) between an external object in the external
momentum-energy space and its negation/image in the internal momentum-energy space,
vice versa. Gravity in external momentum-energy space is the nonlocal-momentum-energy
interaction (quantum entanglement) between an external object with the internal
momentum-energy space as a whole.
Some other most basic conclusions are: (1) the two spinors of the Dirac electron or positron
in the dual momentum-energy universe are respectively the external and internal objects of
the electron or positron; (2) the electric and magnetic fields of a linear photon in the dual
momentum-energy universe are respectively the external and internal objects of a photon
which are always self-entangled; (3) the proton may be a momentumly confined positron
through imaginary position in the dual momentum-energy universe; and (4) a neutron may
be comprised of an unspinized (spinless) proton and a bound and spinized electron in the
dual momentum-energy universe.
In this dual momentum-energy universe, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has both
transcendental and immanent properties. The transcendental aspect of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is the origin of primordial self-referential spin (including the selfreferential matrix law) and it projects the external and internal momentum-energy spaces
through spin and, in turn, the immanent aspect of premomentumenergy (Consciousness)
observes the external momentum-energy space through the internal momentum-energy
space. Human consciousness in the dual momentum-energy universe is a limited and
particular version of this dual-aspect premomentumenergy (Consciousness) such that we
have limited free will and limited observation which is mostly classical at macroscopic
levels but quantum at microscopic levels.
Before mathematical presentations, we draw below several diagrams illustrating the
mechanism of how premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates the dual momentumenergy universe comprising of the external momentum-energy space and the internal
momentum-energy space and how the external object and internal object and the external
momentum-energy space and internal momentum-energy space interact.
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
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Figure 2.1. Illustration of primordial phase distinction
As shown in Figure 2.1, a primordial phase distinction (dualization), e.g., +M=+(Et-p·x)/ħ,
was made at the power level of premomentumenergy (Consciousness) through imagination
i. At the ground level of premomentumenergy (Consciousness), this is 1=e0=eiM-iM=eiMeiM
=e-iM/ e-iM = eiM/ eiM….
The primordial phase distinction in Figure 2.1 is accompanied by matrixing of e into: (1)
external and internal wave functions as external and internal objects; (2) interaction fields
(e.g., gauge fields) for interacting with other elementary entities; and (3) self-acting and
self-referential matrix law, which accompany the imaginations of the premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) at the power level so as to enforce the accounting principle of
conservation of zero, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) Equation
Figure 2.3 shows from another perspective of the relationship among external object in the
external momentum-energy space, internal object in the internal momentum-energy space
and the self-acting and self-referential matrix law. According to the Principle of Existence,
self-interactions (self-gravity) are quantum entanglement between the external object in the
external momentum-energy space and the internal object in the internal momentum-energy
space.
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
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Figure2.3 Self-interaction between external and internal objects of a quantum
entity in a dual momentum-energy universe
As shown in Figure 2.4, the external object and internal object in the two momentumenergy spaces interact with each other through gravity or quantum entanglement since
gravity is an aspect of quantum entanglement (See, e.g., [1]). Please note that, although in
Figure 2.4 the body of premomentumenergy (Consciousness), ether, is shown as a strip,
both the dualized external energy-momentum space and internal energy-momentum space
are embedded in premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
Figure2.4 Interactions in the dual momentum-energy universe
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
3. Mathematics of the Premomentumenergy Model
In mathematics we express
3.1
Scientific Genesis in Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) in a Nutshell
It is our comprehension that:
Consciousness=Premomentumenergy = Prespacetime =
Omnipotent, Omnipresent & Omniscient Being/State = ONE
(3.1)
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of primordial
entities (elementary particles) in premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by self-referential
spin as follows:
1 ei 0 1ei 0 L1e iM iM Le Li 1 e iM e iM
L
M ,e
1
Aee iM
A
LM ,i iM LM e e iM LM e L M 0
Ai
i
Ai e
(3.2)
In expression (3.2), e is Euler’s Number representing the body (ether) of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness), i is imaginary unit representing the imagination of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness), ±M is the content of imagination i, L1=1 is the Law
of One of premomentumenergy (Consciousness) before matrixization, Le is external law, Li
is internal law, LM,e is external matrix law, and LM,i is internal matrix law, LM is the selfreferential matrix law in premomentumenergy (Consciousness) comprised of external and
internal matrix laws which governs elementary entities and conserves zero in the dual
momentum-energy universe,
Ae e iM e
is external wave function (external object),
Ai e iM i
is internal wave function (internal object), and is the complete wave function
(object/entity in the dual momentum-energy universe as a whole).
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of primordial entities in the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by self-referential spin
as follows:
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
0 0e i 0 L0 e iM iM DetM t DetM DetM x e iM e iM
L
M ,e
773
1
Ae e iM
A
L M e e iM L M e L M 0
LM ,i
iM
Ai
i
Ai e
(3.3)
where L0 is the Law of Zero of the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) as defined by
fundamental relationship (3.4) below, Det means determinant and Mt, M and Mx are
2
respectively matrices with t , and x as elements and t , 2 and x2 as
determinants.
Premomentumenergy
(Consciousness)
spins
as
1=ei0=eiM-iM=eiMe-iM=e-iM/eiM iM iM
=e /e …before matrixization. It also spins through self-acting and self-referential
matrix law LM after matrixization which acts on the external object and the internal object
to cause them to interact with each other in the dual momentum-energy universe as further
described below.
3.2
Self-Referential Matrix Law and Its Metamorphoses
The matrix law
LM , e
LM , i L M
of the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is derived from the following fundamental
relation through self-reference within this relation which accompanies the imagination
(spin i) in premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
(ct)2 - x2 - (c)2 = L0 = 0
(3.4)
where t and x are dynamical variables of time and position respectively and is an intrinsic
proper time of an elementary particle (e.g., defined as Compton wavelength divided by
speed of light =/c). For simplicity, we will set c=ħ=1 throughout this work unless
indicated otherwise. Thus, we have from (3.4):
t2 - x2 - 2 = L0 = 0
(3.4a)
Expression (3.4) is based on the relation of four-position x = (ct, x) in special theory of
relativity:
(ct)2 = x2 + (c)2
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In the presence of a four-potential A = (, A) of a second primordial entity, equation (3.4a)
for an elementary entity with charge e is modified as follows:
t e 2 2 x - eA L0 0
2
(3.5)
One form of the matrix law of the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is derived through
self-reference as follows:
t 2 2
t
L 1
2
x
x
x
t
1
(3.6)
x
x
t
t
0
x
t
x
t
where x x 2 . Matrixing left-land side of the last expression in (3.6) such that
Det LM t 2 2 x 2 0 so as to satisfy the fundamental relation (3.4) in the determinant
view, we have:
x
LM , e
t
t
x
LM ,i L M
(3.7)
Indeed, expression (3.7) can also be obtained from expression (3.4) through self-reference
as follows:
0 t 2 2 x 2 Det
0
t 0
0
Det
Det
x
0 t
0
x
0
(3.8)
Matrixing expression (3.8) by removing determinant sign Det, we have:
0
t 0 0
x
0 t
0
x
t
0
x
x
LM ,e
t
L M ,i L M
(3.9)
After fermionic spinization:
x x 2 Det(σ x ) σ x
(3.10)
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) are Pauli matrices:
0 1
0 i
1 0
2
3
1
0
i
0
0
1
1
(3.11)
expression (3.7) becomes:
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t σ x
LM ,e
σ x t
LM ,i L M t - α x
(3.12)
where α = (α1, α2, α3) and β are Dirac matrices. Expression (3.12) governs fermions in
dual-momentum-energy Universe in Dirac form such as Dirac electron and positron and
expression (3.7) governs unspinized or spinless entity/particle with charge e and intrinsic
proper time (e.g., a meson or a meson-like particle) in dual-momentum-energy universe.
Bosonic spinization of expression (3.7) x x 2 s x shall be discussed later.
If we define:
Det
t σ x
t t σ x σ x
σ x t
(3.13)
We get:
Det
t σ x
t 2 2 x 2 I 2 0
σ x t
(3.14)
Thus, fundamental relationship (3.4) is also satisfied under the determinant view of
expression (3.13). Indeed, we can also obtain the following conventional determinant:
Det
t σ x
2
t 2 2 x 2 0
σ x t
(3.15)
One kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.6) – (3.14) is respectively as follows:
L 1
t2 x2
2
t x
t x
1
t x
t x
0
t x
t x
t x
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t x
LM ,i L M
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0 t 2 2 x 2 Det
t 0 0
0 t
t 0
0
Det
0 t
x
0 0
x
Det
0
0
0 t x
x
t σx
LM ,e
t σx
Det
0
x
t x
LM ,i L
t σx
t σ x t σ x
t σx
Det
t σx
t 2 x 2 2 I 2 0
t σx
(3.18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
(3.21)
(3.22)
Expression (3.17) is the unspinized matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form and it is
connected to expression (3.7) by Hadamard matrix H
t
H
x
x 1 t x
H
t
1 1 1
:
2 1 1
t x
(3.23)
Expression (3.20) is spinized matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form and it is connected
to expression (3.12) by 4x4 Hadamard matrix:
t σ x 1 t σ x
H
H
σ x t
t
σ
x
(3.24)
Another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.6) - (3.14) is respectively as follows:
t2
t
L 1 2
2
x
i x
i x 1
t
t i x t i x 0
i x
t
i x
t
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i x
t
t
i x
0 t 2 2 x 2 Det
LM ,e
t 0
0
Det
0 t
0
Det
i
0
i x t
0 i x
0
0 i x
t 0 0
0 t
t
iσ x
LM ,e
iσ x
t
Det
Det
LM ,i L M
(3.26)
i
0
(3.27)
i x
t
(3.28)
LM ,i L M
(3.29)
t
iσ x
tt iσ x iσ x
iσ x
t
(3.30)
t
iσ x
t 2 2 x 2 I2 0
iσ x
t
(3.31)
Indeed, Q iσ is a quaternion and Q iσ x is its conjugate. So we can
rewrite expression (3.29) as:
t
Q
Q
t
LM , e
LM ,i L M
Expression (3.26) is connected to expression (3.7) by unitary matrix
t
HS
x
t
x
HS 1
i x
t
(3.32)
HS
1 1 i :
2 1 i
i x
t
(3.33)
Similarly, expression (3.12) is connected to expression (3.29) by 4x4 matrix HS:
t
iσ x
t σ x
HS 1
HS
σ x t
iσ x
t
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
Yet another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.6), (3.7) & (3.12) is respectively as
follows:
x
t 2 2
t
L 1
2
x
x
1
t
x
x
t
t
0
x
t
x
t
t
x
x
LM ,e
t
L M ,i L M
(3.35)
(3.36)
t σ x
LM ,e LM ,i L M t α x
σ x t
(3.37)
If =0, we have from expressions (3.6) - (3.14):
t2
t
L 1 2
x
x
x
1
t
x
x
t
t
0
x
t
x
t
t
x
x
LM , e
t
0 t 2 x 2 Det
t 0 0
0 t x
LM ,i L M
0
t 0
Det
x
0 t
x
0
x t
0 x
x
t
(3.38)
(3.39)
(3.40)
(3.41)
After fermionic spinization x σ x , expression (3.39) becomes:
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t
σx
LM ,e
σx
t
LM ,i L M
(3.42)
which governs massless fermion (neutrino) in Dirac-like form.
After bosonic spinization:
x x 2 Det(s p I 3 ) Det I 3
s p
(3.43)
expression (3.39) becomes:
t
sx
LM ,e
sx
t
LM ,i L M
(3.44)
where s = (s1, s2, s3) are spin operators for spin 1 particle:
0 0 i
0 0 0
0 i 0
s1 0 0 i s2 0 0 0 s3 i 0 0
i 0 0
0 i 0
0 0 0
(3.45)
If we define:
Dets
t
sx
t t s x s x
sx
t
(3.46)
We get:
x xy xz
t
sx
Det
t x I yz y
yz
sx
t
zx zy z
s
2
2
2
2
3
(3.47)
2
To obey fundamental relation (3.4) in determinant view (3.46), we shall require the last
term in (3.47) acting on the external and internal wave functions respectively to produce
null result (zero) in source-free zone as discussed later. We propose that expression (3.39)
governs massless particle with unobservable spin (spinless) in the dual momentum-energy
universe. After bosonic spinization, the spinless and massless particle gains its spin 1.
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
Another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.18) - (3.22) when =0 is respectively as
follows:
0 t 2 x 2 Det
x
t 0
0
0 t
x
t 0
Det
0
0 t
0
t x
x
0
0
LM ,e
t x
(3.48)
L M ,i L M
(3.49)
0
x
t σx
0
LM ,e
0
t σx
LM ,i L M
(3.50)
t sx
0
LM ,e
0
t sx
LM ,i LM
(3.51)
Det s
t sx
0
t s x t s x
0
t sx
x2
t sx
0
Det s
t 2 x 2 I 3 yz
0
t sx
zx
xy xz
y 2 yz
zy z 2
(3.52)
(3.53)
Again, we shall require the last term in expression (3.53) acting on external and internal
wave functions respectively to produce null result (zero) in source-free zone in order to
satisfy fundamental relation (3.4) in the determinant view (3.52) as further discussed later.
Importantly, if t = 0, we have from expression (3.4):
2 x2 0
(3.54)
Thus, if premomentumenergy (Consciousness) allows energy-less forms of matrix law, we
can derive, for example, from (3.7) and (3.17) the following:
x
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x
LM , e
x
LM ,i L M
(3.56)
Further, if |x|=0, we have from expression (3.4):
t2 2 0
(3.57)
Thus, if premomentumenergy (Consciousness) allows momentumless forms of matrix law,
we can derive, for example, from (3.7) and (3.17) the following:
t
0
0
LM ,e
t
LM ,i L M
(3.58)
t
t
LM ,i L M
(3.59)
LM , e
The significance of these forms of matrix law shall be elucidated later. We suggest for now
that the energy-less forms of matrix law govern external and internal wave functions (selffields) which play the roles of energy-less gravitons, that is, they mediate energyindependent interactions through momentum space (position) quantum entanglement. On
the other hand, the momentumless forms of matrix law govern the external and internal
wave functions (self-fields) which play the roles of momentumless gravitons, that is, they
mediate momentum independent interactions through intrinsic-proper-time (mass)
entanglement.
The above metamorphoses of the self-referential matrix law of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) are derived from one-tier matrixization (self-reference) and two-tier
matrixization (self-reference) based on the fundamental relation (3.4). The first-tier
matrixization makes distinctions in energy (time), mass (intrinsic proper time) and total
momentum (undifferentiated space) that involve scalar unit 1 and imaginary unit (spin) i.
Then the second-tier matrixization makes distinction in three-dimensional momentum
(three-dimensional space) based on spin σ, s, or other higher spin structures, if they exist.
3.3
Additional Forms of Matrix Law
If premomentumenergy (Consciousness) allows partial distinction within first-tier selfreferential matrixization, we obtain, for example, the following additional forms of matrix
law LM , e LM ,i L M :
t 2 2
x
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2
2
t
x
t 2 2
σ x
σ x
t 2 2
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t 2 2 x
0
(3.62) t 2 2 σ x
2
2
0
t x
2
2
t σ
0
0
(3.63)
t 2 x 2
(3.64)
t 2 x 2
t 2 x 2
0
0
2
2
t x
(3.65)
t
2
x 2
2 x 2 (3.66)
t
t 2 x 2
0
2
2
t x
(3.67)
t 2 2 x 2
0
0
2
2
2
t x
(3.68)
0
Bosonic versions of expressions (3.61) and (3.63) are obtained by replacing σ with s.
If premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates momentum self-confinement of an
elementary entity through imaginary position xi (downward self-reference such that 2>t2)
we have:
2 t 2 x i2 xi2 yi2 zi2 ixi 2 Det(σ ix i )
(3.69)
that is:
t 2 2 x i2 0
(3.70)
Therefore, allowing imaginary position (downward self-reference) for an elementary entity,
we can derive the following matrix law in Dirac-like form:
pi
LM ,e
t
σ xi
σ xi
LM ,e
t
xi
L M ,i L M
LM ,i LM
(3.71)
(3.72)
Also, we can derive the following matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form:
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
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LM ,e
xi
t σ xi
LM , e
E σ xi
t xi
LM ,i L M
(3.73)
LM ,i L M
(3.74)
Bosonic versions of expressions (3.72) and (3.74) are obtained by replacing σ with s. It is
likely that the above additional forms of self-referential matrix law govern different
particles of the particle zoo in the dual momentum-energy universe as discussed later.
3.4
Scientific Genesis of Primordial Entities in the Premomentumenergy Model
Therefore, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of
a free plane-wave fermion such as an electron in Dirac-like form in dual momentum-energy
Universe as follows:
1 e 1e Le
i0
i0
M iM
t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
x2
t x
x t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.75)
t ip x x ip x
t ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
t
x
t
σ x
that is:
ip x
x ae, e
L
ip x
t
ai, e
ip x
σ x Ae, e
L
ip x
t
A e
i ,
e,
L 0
i,
LM ,i
M ,e
M ,e
M
e,
L 0
i,
LM ,i
M
i E e, e, iσ p i ,
t e, σ x i ,
or
t i , σ x e ,
i E i , i , iσ p e,
(3.76)
where substitutions t i E and x i p have been made so that components of LM can
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
act on external and internal wave functions. Equation (3.76) also has free spherical wave
solution in the dual momentum-energy universe in the form:
e, S e, e iEt
i, Si, e iEt
(3.77)
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a free plane-wave fermion such as the electron in Dirac-like form in the dual
momentum-energy universe as follows:
0 0ei 0 L0eiM iM t 2 2 x 2 e
t
σ x
(3.78)
1
0
t 0
0
Det
Det
Det
0 t
0
x
t 0 0 0
0 t 0 x
ip x ip x
x ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
x ae, e
t
x
ip x
0
ai, e
ip x
σ x Ae, e
LM , e
ip x
t
A e
i,
ip x
x ae, e
0
ip x
t
ai , e
e,
L 0
LM , i
i, M
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free
plane-wave antifermion such as a positron in Dirac-like form in the dual momentum-energy
universe as follows:
1. ei 0 1ei 0 Le iM iM
t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
x2
t x
x t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.79)
t ip x x ip x
t ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
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ip x
x ae, e
e,
L 0
L L
i, M
ip x
t
ai, e
ip x
σ x Ae, e
e,
L 0
L L
i, M
ip x
t
A e
i,
t
x
M ,e
t
σ x
M ,i
M ,e
M ,i
or
0 0ei 0 L0eiM iM t 2 2 x 2 e
ip x ip x
(3.80)
1
0
t 0
0
Det
Det
Det
0 t
0
x
x ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
ip x
t x ae, e
x ae, e
0
x t
ip x
ip x
0
ai, e
ai, e
t 0 0 0
0 t 0 x
t σ x Ae, e
ip x LM ,e
σ x t
A e
ip x
LM ,i
i,
e,_
LM 0
i,
Similarly, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a
free plane-wave fermion in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in the dual momentum-energy
universe as follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
t2 x2
2
e
ip x ip x
t x
t x
e
ip x
t x
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.81)
t x ip x
ip x
ip x
e
e
e
0
t x
t x
ip x
ae,l e
e,l
L 0
L
L
i,r
ip x
t x
ai , r e
ip x
Ae,l e
e,l
t σ x
L 0
L L
i,r
ip x
t
σ
x
Ai,r e
t x
M ,e
M ,i
M ,e
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
that is:
i E e,l iσ p e,l i ,r
t σ x e, l i , r
or
i E i ,r iσ i , e,l
t σ x i , r e, l
(3.82)
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a free plane-wave fermion in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as follows:
0 0e i 0 L0 e iM iM t 2 2 x 2 e
ip x ip x
x
Det
0
0
t 0
0
Det
Det
0 t
t 0
0
0 t
x
0
0
a
0
x
e, l
e
ai, r e
0
x
ip x
ip x
e
ip x
t x
ip x
Ae,l e
t σ x
L
ip x
t σ x
A e
i, r
M ,e
e
ip x
t x
1
(3.83)
0
ai, r e
a
e, l
e
ip x
ip x
e,l
L 0
i,r
LM , i
M
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free
plane-wave fermion in another form in the dual momentum-energy universe as follows:
1 e 1e Le
i0
i0
i x
t
i x
t
i x
t
e
ip x
iM iM
ip x ip x
t2
2
e
x2
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
ip x
t
e
i x
(3.84)
i ip x
ip x
t
e
e
0
i x
t
t
Q Ae e
L
Q
t Ae
i
ip x
ip x
t
Q Ae e
L
Q
t Ae
i
M ,e
ip x
ip x
M ,e
LM ,i
e
LM 0
i
L M ,i
e
LM 0
i
that is:
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t e iσ x i
or
t i iσ x e
i E e i σ p i
i σ
E
i
e
p
i
(3.85)
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a free plane-wave fermion in another form in the dual momentum-energy universe as
follows:
ip x ip x
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM t 2 2 x 2 e
t 0
0
Det
Det
0 t
t 0 0
0 t
0
0 i x
t
iσ x
t
Q
0
Det
0
i x
1
i x ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
i x ae e
t
0 ip x i x
ai e
ip x
iσ x Ae e
LM ,e
ip x
t
Ai e
ip x
Q Ae e
LM ,e
ip x
t
Ai e
ip x
i x ae e
0
t ip x
ai e
LM ,i e LM 0
i
LM ,i e LM 0
i
(3.86)
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a linear
plane-wave photon in the dual momentum-energy universe as follows:
1 ei0 1ei0 Le iM iM
1
t 2 ip x ip x
e
x2
1
t x ip x ip x
e
x t e
t ip x x ip x
t ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
ip x
x ae, e
e, L 0
LM , e
L
M
,
i
M
ip x
t
i,
ai, e
ip x
s x E 0e, e
e, L
L
L
0
M ,i
M ,e
M
photon
i,
ip x
t
iB e
0i,
t
x
t
s x
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of the linear plane-wave photon in the dual momentum-energy universe as follows:
0 0e h 0ei0 L0 e iM iM t 2 x 2 e
ip x ip x
t
s x
(3.88)
1
0
t 0
Det
Det
0 t
x
t 0 0
0 t x
x ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
ip x
x ae, e
x ae, e
t
0
x
ip x
ip x
0
t
ai, e
ai, e
ip x
s x E 0e, e
LM ,e
ip x
t
iB e
0i,
e,
L
LM ,i
0
i, M photon
This photon wave function in the dual momentum-energy universe can be written as:
e, E(p, E) E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 i (t kx )
photon
iB
iB 0 e i (t kx ) iB 0 e
i , (p, E)
(3.89)
After the substitutions t i E and x i p , we have from the last expression in (3.87):
i E
is
p
is p E (p, E)
p B (p, E)
E
0 E (p, E)
B
i E iB ( p, E)
E
p
( p, E)
E (p, E)
(3.90)
where we have used the relationship s i p p to derive the latter equations which
together with p E(p, E) 0 and p B (p, E) 0 are the Maxwell-like equations in the
source-free vacuum in the dual momentum-energy universe.
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates a neutrino in Dirac-like form in the dual
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
momentum-energy universe by replacing the last step of expression (3.87) with the
following:
t
σ x
ip x
σ x ae, e
LM ,e
ip x
t
a e
i,
LM ,i e, LM 0
i,
(3.91)
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a linear
plane-wave antiphoton in the dual momentum-energy universe as follows:
t 2 ip x ip x
1 ei 0 1ei 0 Le iM iM 2 e
x
t x
x
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.92)
t ip x x ip x
t ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
x e,
LM ,e LM ,i e, LM 0
t i,
i ,
ip x
s x iB 0e, e
e, L
L
L
0
M ,i
M ,e
i, M antiphoton
ip x
t
E e
0i,
t
x
t
s x
This antiphoton wave function can also be written as:
e , iB (p , E) iB 0 e i (t k x ) iB 0 i (t kx )
antiphoton
E
E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 e
i , (p , E)
(3.93)
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates an antineutrino in Dirac-like form in the dual
momentum-energy universe form by replacing the last step of expression (3.92) with the
following:
t
σ x
ip x
σx ae, e
LM ,e
ip x
t
a e
i,
LM ,i e, LM 0
i,
(3.94)
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of chiral-like
plane-wave photons in the dual momentum-energy universe as follows:
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM t 2 x 2 e
ip x ip x
(3.95)
1
x 0 ip x ip x
t 0
Det
e
e
0 t Det 0
x
ip x
ip x
t 0 x 0 ae,l e
0 ae,l e
t x
0
0
ip x
ip x
0 t 0
x
t
x
ai,r e
ai , r e
ip x
0 Ae,l e
t s x
LM ,e
0
ip x
t
s
x
Ai,r e
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
that is, e,l and i, r are decoupled from each other and satisfy the following equations
respectively:
t s x e,l 0
s p e,l 0
or E e,l
s 0
t
s
x
0
p i ,r
i ,r
E i ,r
(3.96)
which have the following respective solutions:
e ,l E (p , E) iB (p , E) E 0 iB 0 ei (t kx )
E
E 0 iB 0 ei (t kx )
i
B
( p , E)
i ,r (p , E)
Both
(3.97)
E e,l s p e,l 0 and E i , r s p i , r 0 produce the Maxwell-like
equations in the source-free vacuum as shown in the second expression of (3.90).
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates neutrinos in Weyl-like (chiral-like) forms in
the dual momentum-energy universe by replacing the last step of expression (3.95) with the
following:
ip x
(3.98)
0 Ae,l e
t σ x
e,l L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
0
M
ip x
t σ x
i, r
Ai,r e
that is, e,l and i, r are decoupled from each other and satisfy the following equations
respectively:
t σ x e ,l 0
σ p e,l 0
or E e,l
t
σ
x
0
σ
0
i ,r
p i ,r
t i ,r
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains energy-less external and internal
wave functions (energy-less graviton) of an intrinsic proper time in Dirac-like form as
follows:
1 ei 0 1ei 0 Le iM iM
1
2 iM iM
e
x2
x
1
e iM e iM
x
iM x iM
iM x iM
e
e
e
e 0
x
x
(3.100)
x g D,e e iM
V
D,e L V 0
L
L
x g D,i e iM M , e M , i VD,i M D
We will determine the form of imaginary content M in expression (3.100) later.
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains energy-less
external and internal wave functions (energy-less graviton) of an intrinsic proper time in
Dirac-like form as follows:
0 0ei0 L0 e iM iM 2 x 2 e iM iM
Det
0
0
x iM iM 1
e
e
0
iM
x g D, e e iM
x g D, e e
0
iM
iM
0 g D, i e
x g D, i e
0
0
Det
x
0 0
x
(3.101)
Similarly, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains energy-less external
and internal wave functions (energy-less graviton) of an intrinsic proper time in Weyl-like
(chiral-like) form as follows:
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
1 ei 0 1ei 0 Le iM iM
x
x
1
2 iM iM
e
x2
e e
iM
iM
1
(3.102)
x iM
x iM M
iM
e
e
e
e 0
x
x
x
gW ,e e iM
L
x gW ,i e iM M ,e
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
Again, we will determine the form of the imaginary content M in expression (3.102) later.
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains energy-less
external and internal wave functions (energy-less graviton) of an intrinsic proper time in
Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as follows:
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM 2 x 2 eiM iM
x
Det
0
x
0
0 0
x
(3.103)
iM iM 1
e
e
0
gW ,e e iM x gW ,e e iM
0
0 gW ,i e iM x g w,i e iM
0
0
Det
x
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains momentum-less (momentum
independent) external and internal wave functions of an intrinsic proper time in Dirac-like
form as follows:
0 0e 0 L0 e iM iM t 2 2 e imt imt
(3.104)
t 0
0 imt imt 1
Det
Det
e
e
0 t
0
t 0 0 g D,e e imt t
0 g D,e e imt
0
0 t 0 g D,i e imt 0 t g D,i e imt
Similarly, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains momentum-less
(momentum independent) external and internal wave functions of an intrinsic proper time
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as follows:
1 e 1e Le
0
0
1
iM iM
t2
2
e imt imt
1
t
imt
e imt
e
t
t imt imt
t imt imt
e
e
e
e
0
t
t
V
t gW ,e e imt
W ,e L V 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
V
t g e imt
M W
W ,i
W ,i
(3.105)
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains momentum-less
(momentum independent) external and internal wave functions of an intrinsic proper time
in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as follows:
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM t 2 2 eimt imt
t 0
0 imt imt 1
Det
Det
e
e
0
t
0
imt
t gW ,e e imt
t 0 0 gW ,e e
0
0 t 0 gW ,i e imt t g w,i e imt
(3.106)
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a
momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton in the dual momentum-energy universe
through imaginary position xi (downward self-reference such that 2>t2) in Dirac-like form
as follows:
1 ei0 1ei0 LeiM iM
1
t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
x i2
1
t x i ip x ip x
e
e
x
t
i
t ip x x i ip x t ip x x i ip x
e
e
e
e
0
xi
t
xi
t
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t
xi
x i se, e iEt
L
t si, e iEt M ,e
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(3.108)
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(3.109)
After spinization of expression (3.108), we have:
t
σ x i
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t Si, e iEt
As discussed later, it is plausible that expression (3.108) governs the confinement structure
of the unspinized proton in Dirac-like form through imaginary position x i and, on the other
hand, expression (3.109) governs the confinement structure of spinized proton through x i .
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of the momentum-ly self-confined entity such as a proton in the dual momentum-energy
universe in Dirac-like form as follows:
0 0ei 0 L0eiM iM t 2 2 x i2 e
ip x ip x
(3.110)
1
0
x i ip x ip x
0
0
e
e
Det
Det
0
x
0
t
i
iEt
t 0 0 0
x i se, e t x i se, e iEt
0
0 t 0 x i
0 si, e iEt x i t si, e iEt
t
Det
0
t
xi
x i se, e iEt
L
t si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
t
σ x i
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Dirac-like form may be respectively
governed as follows:
t
xi
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x i se, e iEt
L
t si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t
σ x i
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
σx i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
(3.112)
Similarly, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a
momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton in the dual momentum-energy universe
through imaginary position x i (downward self-reference) in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as
follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le
iM iM
t x i
t x
i
t xi
e
ip x
t xi
1
e
t 2 x i2
2
ip x
e
e
ip x ip x
ip x
1
(3.113)
t x i ip x
ip x
ip x
e
e
e
0
t xi
t xi
se,r e iEt
L
t x i si,l e iEt M ,e
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
(3.114)
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
(3.115)
After spinization of expression (3.114), we have:
t σ x i
S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
t σ x i S i,l e iEt
It is plausible that expression (3.114) governs the structure of the unspinized proton in
Weyl-like form and expression (3.115) governs the structure of spinized proton in Weyl-like
form.
Alternatively, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a spatially self-confined entity such as a proton in the dual momentum-energy universe
in Weyl (chiral) form as follows:
0 0ei 0 L0eiM iM t 2 2 x i2 e
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ip x ip x
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
xi
t 0
Det
Det
0 t
0
t 0 x i
0 t 0
t xi
t σ x i
1
ip x ip x
e
e
0
iEt
se,r e iEt
se,r e t x i
0
t x i si,l e iEt
0 si,l e iEt
0
0
Det
x i
0 0
x i
se,r e iEt
LM ,e LM ,i e,r L 0
M
t x i si,l e iEt
i,l
S e,r e iEt
LM ,e LM ,i e,r L 0
M
t σx i S i,l e iEt
i,l
(3.117)
(3.118)
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Weyl-like form may be respectively
governed as follows:
se, l e iEt
L
t xi si, r e iEt M , e
t xi
S e,l e iEt
LM ,e
t σx i Si,r e iEt
t σ x i
3.4
e, l
L 0
LM , i
i, r M
(3.119)
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
(3.120)
Scientific Genesis of Composite Entities in the Premomentumenergy Model
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create, sustain and cause evolution of a neutron
in the dual momentum-energy universe in Dirac-like form which is comprised of an
unspinized proton:
t e(p, E )
x i eA (p, E )
x i eA (p, E ) se, e iEt
0
iEt
t e(p, E ) si, e
p
(3.121)
and a spinized electron:
t e(p, E ) V(p, E )
σ x eA
(p, E )
as follows:
σ x eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e
(3.122)
1 ei 0 1ei 01ei 0 Le iM iM p Le iM iM e
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t 2 2 ip x ip x t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
2
x
x
e
i
p
1
1
1
1
t x ip x ip x t x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
e
x i t
x t s
p
e
t
x i
x i se, e iEt t
0
t si, e iEt x
p
x se, e iEt
0
t si, e iEt
e
t e
x i eA p, E se, e iEt
p, E
0
iEt
x eA
t ep, E si, e
p, E
i
p
σ x eA p, E S e, e iEt
t ep,E Vp, E
0
iEt
σ x eA
t
e
V
S
e
p, E
p, E p, E i,
e n
(3.123)
In expressions (3.121), (3.122) and (3.123), , and indicate proton, electron
p
e
n
and neutron respectively. Further, unspinized proton has charge e, electron has charge –e,
A (
(p.,E )
, A (p.,E ) ) p and A ( (p.,E ) , A (p.,E ) ) e are the electromagnetic potentials acting on
unspinized proton and tightly bound spinized electron respectively, and V(p , E ) e is a binding
potential from the unspinized proton acting on the spinized electron causing tight binding
as discussed later.
If A ((p.,E ) , A (p.,E ) )p is negligible due to the fast motion of the tightly bound spinized
electron in the dual momentum-energy universe, we have from the last expression in
(3.123):
t x i s e iEt
e, iEt 0
x i t si, e
p
t e
iEt
σ x eA p, E S e, e
p, E
0
σ x eA p, E t ep, E S i, e iEt
e n
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
Experimental data on charge distribution and g-factor of neutron may support a neutron
comprising of an unspinized proton and a tightly bound spinized electron.
The Weyl-like (chiral-like) form of the last expression in (3.123) and expression (3.124)
are respectively as follows:
t e
s e,r e iEt
(p, E ) x i eA (p, E )
0
iEt
e x i eA (p, E ) si,l e
p
iEt
S e,l e
t e (p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
0
t e (p, E ) V(p, E ) σ p eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e n
t x i
se,r e iEt
0
t x i si,l e iEt
p
t e
(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
(3.125)
iEt
S e,l e
0
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e n
(3.126)
Then, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create, sustain and cause evolution of a
hydrogen atom in the dual momentum-energy universe comprising of a spinized proton:
t e(p, E )
x i eA (p, E )
σ
(3.127)
(3.128)
σ x i eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) S i, e iEt
p
σ x eA (p,E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p,E ) Si, e iEt
e
and a spinized electron:
t e(p, E )
σ x eA
(p, E )
in Dirac-like form as follows:
1 ei 0 1ei 01ei 0 Le iM iM p Le iM iM e
t 2 2 ip x ip x t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
2
e
xi
p x
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
1
1
1
1
t x ip x ip x t x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
x t e
x
t
i
p
e
t
x i
x i se, e iEt t
0
t si, e iEt x
p
x se, e iEt
0
t si, e iEt
e
t ep, E
σ x i eA p, E S e, e iEt
0
σ x i eA p, E
t ep, E S i, e iEt
p
t e
σ x eA p, E S e, e iEt
p, E
0
σ x eA p, E t ep, E S i, e iEt
e h
(3.129)
In expressions (3.127), (3.128) and (3.129), p , e and h indicate proton, electron
and hydrogen atom respectively. Again, proton has charge e, electron has charge –e, and
A (
(p.,E )
, A (p.,E ) ) p and A ( (p.,E ) , A (p.,E ) ) e are the electromagnetic potentials acting on
spinized proton and spinized electron respectively.
Again, if A ((p.,E ) , A (p.,E ) )p is negligible due to fast motion of the orbiting spinized
electron, we have from the last expression in (3.129):
t
σ x i S e, e iEt
0
S e iEt
σ x i
t
i,
p
t e
iEt
σ x eA (p, E ) S e, e
(p, E )
0
σ x eA (p, E )
t e(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e h
(1.130)
The Weyl-like (chiral-like) form of the last expression in (3.129) and expression (3.130)
are respectively as follows:
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t e(p, E ) σ x i eA (p, E )
S e,r e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) σ x i eA (p, E ) S i,l e iEt
p
t e
S e,l e iEt
(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
0
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
t σ x i
S e,r e iEt
0
iEt
t σ x i S i,l e
p
t e
iEt
S e,l e
(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
0
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
(3.131)
(3.132)
4. Metamorphous Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) View
4.1 Metamorphoses & the Essence of Spin in the Premomentumenergy Model
The preceding sections make it clear that the particle ei0 of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) can take many different forms as different primordial entities and, further,
can have different manifestations as different wave functions and/or fields in different
contexts even as a single primordial entity. For example, the wave functions of an electron
can take the Dirac-like, Weyl-like, quaternion-like or determinant form respectively in
different contexts in the dual momentum-energy universe depending on the questions one
asks and the answer one seeks.
This work also makes it clear that primordial self-referential spin in premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is hierarchical and it is the cause of primordial distinctions for creating the
self-referential entities in the dual momentum-energy universe. There are several levels of
spin: (1) spin in the power level in premomentumenergy (Consciousness) making
primordial external and internal phase distinctions of external and internal wave functions;
(2) spin of the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) on the ground level making
primordial external and internal wave functions which accompanies the primordial phase
distinctions; (3) self-referential mixing of these wave functions through matrix law before
spatial spinization; (4) unconfining spatial spin through spatial spinization (electromagnetic
and weak interaction) for creating bosonic and fermionic entities; and (5) confining spatial
spin (strong interactions) creating the appearance of quarks through imaginary position
(downward self-reference).
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4.2 The Determinant View & the Meaning of Klein-Gordon-like Equation in the
Premomentumenergy Model
In the determinant view, the matrix law collapses into Klein-Gordon-like form as shown in
§ 3 but so far we have not defined the form of the wave function as a result of the said
collapse. Here, we propose that the external and internal wave functions (objects) form a
special product state with i containing the hidden variables, quantum potentials or
e
i
self-gravity as shown below, vice versa.
From the following equations for unspinized free particle in Dirac-like and Weyl-like form
respectively:
t
x
x e,
LM D 0
t i,
t x
e, l
L 0
t x i, r M W
(4.1)
and
(4.2)
we respectively obtained the following equations in the determinant view (Klein-Gordonlike form):
DetLM e, i, t 2 2 x 2 e, i, 0
t 2 2 x 2 e, 0
t 2 2 x 2 0
i,
and
DetLM e,l i,r t 2 x 2 2 e,l i,r 0
2
2
2
t
x
0
e ,l
2
2
2
t x i ,r 0
(4.3)
(4.4)
By way of an example, equation (4.1) has the following plane-wave solution:
from which we have:
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e, ae, e i Et px
a e i Et px
i,
e,
(4.5)
e, i, ae, e i Et px e ai, e i Et px i
(4.6)
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where
Et p x e e
(4.7)
Et p x i i
are respectively the external and internal phase in the determinant view. The variables in
i, play the roles of hidden variables to e, which would be annihilated, if i, were
allowed to merged with e , . Indeed, if relativistic time in the external wave function e ,
is considered to be inertial time, then the relativistic time in the conjugate internal wave
function i, plays the role of gravitational time. We will discuss quantum potential later.
Similarly, from the following equations for spinized free fermion in Dirac-like and Weyllike form respectively:
t
σ x
σ x e,
LM 0
t i,
(4.8)
and
e, l
t σ x
(4.9)
LM 0
t σ x i, r
where ψD=(ψe,+, ψi,-)T=(ψ1,ψ2, ψ3, ψ4)T and ψW=(ψe,l, ψi,r)T=(ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4)T, we respectively
obtained the following equations in the determinant view (Klein-Gordon-like form):
Det LM e, i, t 2 2 x 2 I 2 e, i, 0
t 2 2 x 2 1 0
2
2
2
t x 2 0
t 2 2 x 2 3 0
t 2 2 x 2 4 0
and
Det LM e,l i,r t 2 2 x 2 I 2 e,l i,r 0
t 2 2 x 2 1 0
2
2
2
t x 2 0
t 2 2 x 2 3 0
t 2 2 x 2 4 0
(4.10)
(4.11)
In the presence of electromagnetic potential A ( , A) in the dual momentum-energy
universe, we have from equations (4.1) and (4.2) the following equations:
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t e(p,E)
x-eA (p,E)
x-eA (p,E) e,
L 0
t e(p,E) i, M D
(4.12)
e,l
L 0
t e(p,E ) x-eA (p,E ) i,r M W
(4.13)
and
t e(p,E ) x-eA (p,E )
from which we respectively obtained the following equations in the determinant view
(Klein-Gordon-like form):
2
2
2
DetLM e, i , t e(p , E ) m x-eA (p , E ) e, i , 0
2
2
t e
2
m
x
e
A
0
e,
(p , E )
(p , E )
2
2
t e
0
2
m
x
e
A
(p , E )
i,
(p , E )
(4.14)
and
2
2
2
DetLM e,l i ,r t e(p ,E ) x-eA (p ,E ) e,l i ,r 0
2
2
t e
2
e,l 0
(p , E ) x-eA (p , E )
2
2
t e
2 i,r 0
(p , E ) x-eA ( p , E )
where t e(p,E ) and x-eA
we have:
t e(p, E )
σ x-eA (p, E )
and
t e(p, E ) σ x-eA (p, E )
(p, E )
(4.15)
. After spinization of equations (4.12) and (4.13),
σ x-eA (p, E ) e,
L 0
t e(p, E ) i, M D
(4.16)
e,l
L 0
t e(p, E ) σ x-eA (p, E ) i,r M W
(4.17)
from which we respectively obtained the following equations in the determinant view
(Klein-Gordon-like form):
Det LM e, i, t e(p , E ) 2 2 x-eA (p , E ) 2 eσ B (p , E ) I 2 e, i, 0
2
2
2
t e(p,E ) x-eA (p,E ) eσ B (p,E ) I 2 e, 0
2
2
t e(p , E ) 2 x-eA (p , E ) eσ B (p , E ) I 2 i, 0
(4.18)
and
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Det LM e,l i,r t e(p , E ) 2 x-eA (p , E ) 2 2 eσ B (p , E ) -ieσ E (p , E ) I 2 e,l i,r 0
2
2
t e(p , E ) x-eA (p , E ) 2 eσ B (p , E ) -ieσ E (p , E ) I 2 e,l 0
2
2
t e(p , E ) x-eA (p , E ) 2 eσ B (p , E ) -ieσ E (p , E ) I 2 i,r 0
(4.19)
In equations (4.16) and (4.17), the couplings of E(p,E) and/or B(p,E) with spin σ are either
implicit or hidden. These interactions are due to self-referential matrix law LM which causes
mixing of the external and internal wave functions. However, in the determinant view, these
interactions are made explicit as shown in equations (4.18) and (4.19) respectively.
4.3 The Meaning of Schrodinger-like Equation & Quantum Potential in the
Premomentumenergy Model
It can be shown that the following Schrodinger-like Equation is the non-relativistic
approximation of equation (4.3) or (4.4):
1 2
2 2
p (c=ħ=1)
i E Tˆ
p or i E Tˆ
2
2
2c
(4.20)
where Re i Im .
From (ct)2 = x2 + (c)2, we have:
2
x2
x2
1 x 2
x2
t
1
1
...
2
2c 2 8 c 4
2
c
c 2
Choosing +, omitting second term on the right, and making substitutions T i E and
x i p , we arrive at equation (4.20).
Equation (4.20) can be written as two coupled equations (c=ħ=1):
E Re Tˆ Im
Tˆ
Re
E Im
E
or ˆ
T
Tˆ Re
0
E Im
(4.21)
The above equation describes the non-relativistic self-reference of the wave components
Re and Im due to spin i. If we designate Re as external object, Im is the internal
object. It is the non-relativistic approximation of the determinant view of an unspinized
particle (Klein-Gordon-like form) in momentum-energy space with self-referential
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interaction reduced to spin i and contained in the wave function from which the quantum
potential Q can be extracted.
For example, in the case:
e, i, ae, e i Et p x ai , e i Et p x e iS e i
(4.22)
where ae,+ and ai,- are real, ζ contains the hidden variables and:
ae, ai ,
S Et x p x e
Et p x
x
i
2
x
tx
2
(4.23)
we can derive the following quantum potential (details will be given elsewhere):
Q
2
1
p 2 x t x i
2
2 i
(4.24)
which originates from spin i in:
i, ai , ei Et px ai , e iE ei
(4.25)
Q would negate the non-relativistic kinetic time tx=x2/2 of the external wave function, if
the external wave function and the conjugate internal wave function would merge.
Further, it can be shown that the Pauli-like Equation is the non-relativistic approximation of
equation (4.18) which is the determinant view of a fermion in an electromagnetic field in
Dirac-like form within the momentum-energy space:
1
e
2
i E 1 i eA p,E ) σ B (p,E ) e(p,E ) 1
2
2
2 2
(4.24)
It contain non-relativistic self-reference due to both spin i and σ and will be treated
elsewhere in detail when and if time permits.
4.4 The Third State of Matter in the Premomentumenergy Model
Traditionally, a scalar (spinless) particle is presumed to be described by the Klein-Gordon
equation and is classified as a boson. However, in this work we have suggested that KeinGordon-like equation is a determinant view of a fermion, boson or an unspinized entity
(spinlesson) in which the external and internal wave functions (objects) form a special
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product state with as the origin of hidden variable, quantum potential or selfe
i
i
gravity. The unspinized entity (spinlesson) is neither a boson nor a fermion but may be
classified as a third state of matter described by the unspinized equation in Dirac-like or
Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in the dual momentum-energy universe, for example:
t
x
ip x
x ae, e
LM ,e
ip x
t
ai, e
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.25)
ip x
(4.26)
ae,l e
e,l L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
i,r M
ip x
t x
ai,r e
The hadronized versions of the above equations in which the position is imaginary are
respectively as follows:
t x i se, e iEt
(4.27)
LM , e LM , i e, L 0
iEt
M
x i t si, e
i,
t x i
se,l e iEt
(4.28)
LM ,e LM ,i e,l L 0
iEt
i,r
t x i si,r e
t x
M
The third state of matter may not be subject to the statistical behavior of either bosons or
fermions. The wave functions of a fermion and boson are respectively a bispinor and bivector but that of the third state (spinlesson) is two-component complex scalar field. The
third state of matter is the precursor of both fermionic and bosonic matters/fields before
fermionic or bosonic spinization. Thus, it may step into the shoes played by the Higgs field
of the standard model. Further, in this scenario, intrinsic proper time is created by the selfreferential spin (imagination) of premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
5. Weak Interaction in the Premomentumenergy Model
In this model, weak interaction is an expressive process (emission or radiation) through
fermionic spinization with or without intermediary bosonic spinization and the associated
reverse process (capture or absorption). There are two possible kinds of mechanisms at
play. One kind is the direct fermionic spinization of an unspinized massive particle as
shown in § 3:
x x 2 Det (σ x ) σ x
(5.1)
that is, for example:
t
x
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t σ x e
0
0
σ x t i
t i
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and the following reverse process:
σ x Det (σ x ) x 2 x
(5.3)
that is, for example:
t
t σ x e
0
σ.x t i
x
x e
0
t i
(5.4)
Processes (5.1) and (5.3) only conserve spin in the dual universe as a whole. If they hold in
reality, neutrino may not be needed in the weak interaction in this model.
Accordingly, beta decay of a neutron may involve the spinizing process (5.1) during which
an unspinized proton (or electron) gains its spin 1/2 and a bound spinized electron becomes
free as follows:
(1) Spinless Proton → Spinized Proton → Release of Bound Electron; or
(2) Spinless Electron → Spinized Electron → Release of Spinized Electron.
Process (1) seems in closer agreement with experimental data on g-factor and charge
density of neutron. There is no exchange particle involved in process (1) or (2). In neutron
synthesis from proton and electron, if it exists, the reverse process (5.3) occurs in this
model during which a spinized proton (or electron) loses its spin and free electron becomes
tightly bound to proton.
We suggest that the following equation governs free unspinized particles having intrinsic
proper time and charge e respectively but spinless, that is, they are pion-like particles
(their combination generates 0 -like particles):
t
x
x e
0 or
t i
t e x i
t x
i
e
(5.5)
After spinization through (5.1), we arrive at Dirac-like equation:
t x e
0
x t i
Assuming a plane wave e , e
ip x
t e σ x i
t i σ x e
or
(5.6)
exists for equation (5.5), we obtain the following
solution for said equation ( -like plane-wave solution):
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e ip x
1
e,
t
ip x
x ip x N x e
i,
2t
e
t
t
(5.7)
where N is a normalization factor and we have utilized the following relation for a time
eigenstate:
t i, x e, i,
x
t
e,
(5.8)
After spinization of solution (5.7):
1
0
1 1 0
x 0 1 z
σ
x
t
t
x iy
t
t
0
1
x iy
t
z
t
(5.9)
we arrive at the free plane-wave electron solution for Dirac-like equation (5.6) in the dual
universe comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal momentumenergy space:
1
0
0
1
e,
and
t
z
t
ip
x
x
iy
e
,
e ip x
e
i,
2t t
i,
2t t
x iy
z
t
t
(5.10)
In the above solutions for external spin up and down respectively, the external spin 1/2 is
balanced by the internal spin components which may be deemed as antineutrino such that
the total spin in the dual universe is still conserved to zero. Therefore, in this model it may
be that external spin up or down can be created without the need of a separate antineutrino
in beta decay, if any excessive time ∆t and/or position ∆x are allowed to cancel each other
in premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
e i Et pΔ x
i Et pΔ x e i Et pΔ xe i Et pΔ x e i Et pΔ xi Et pΔ x e 0 1
e
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Further, if premomentumenergy (Consciousness) allows the following bosonic spinization
of massive spinless particle (e.g., as unstable particle with very short life-time):
x x 2 Det(s x I 3 ) Det I 3
sx
(5.12)
that is, for example:
x e
t
0
s x
t i
t
x
and/or
x x 2 Det(s x I 3 ) Det I 3
sx e
0
t i
(5.13)
s x σ x σ x
1
(5.14)
2
that is, for example:
t x e
t sx e
0
0
sx t i
x t i
t σ x e 0 t σ x e 0
t i
σ x t i
1 σ x
2
(5.15)
during which transitory states similarly to vector bosons W-, W+ and/or Z0 appear and
disappear, we have from expression (5.14) the second kind of weak interactions. We point
out here that only process (5.14) mediates weak interactions since in process (5.12) vectorboson-like particles are just transitory states that do not decay into fermions.
The spinized equation in expression (5.13) for a free massive spin 1 particle may take the
following Dirac-like form:
t
s x
E
e,
sp e,
(p, E)
L
L
L 0
t i, _ M i, _ M iB (p, E) M
(5.16)
or
t
s x
iB
sx e,
LM e, _ LM (p, E) LM 0
i,
E (p, E)
t i,
(5.17)
After calculating the determinant:
t s x
t t s x s x
Dets
s x t
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We obtain the following:
x
t s x
Det
t x I yz
s x t
zx
s
2
2
2
2
3
xy
y2
zy
xz
yz
z2
(5.19)
t 2 x 2 2 I3 MT
As mentioned in § 3, the last term MT in expression (5.19) makes fundamental relation
t 2 x 2 2 0 not to hold in the determinant view (5.18) unless the action of MT on the
external and internal components of the wave function produces null result, that is:
Ex
M T E y ( px p y pz ) p E (p, E) 0
E
z
(5.20)
Bx
M T B y ( px p y pz ) p B (p, E) 0
B
z
(5.21)
and
Thus, if premomentumenergy (Consciousness) allows these violations to exist transitorily,
equations (5.16) and (5.17) may describe free vector bosons W- and W+ in the dual
momentum-energy universe respectively; their combination then describes free vector
boson Z0 and MT may be deemed as transitory intrinsic proper time (or intrinsic proper time
operator).
In contrast to processes (1) and (2), vector bosons W- and W+ or the like mediate the
spinization of spinless proton or electron respectively as follows:
(3) Spinless Proton → Spinized Vector Boson W+ → Spinized Proton + Spinized 2nd
Fermion → Release of Bound Electron + Spinized 2nd Fermion; and
(4) Spinless Electron → Spinized Vector Boson W- → Spinized Electron + Spinized
2nd Fermion → Release of Spinized Electron + Spinized 2nd Fermion.
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It is hoped that the metamorphous forms of matrix maw in § 3, their further metamorphoses
and the corresponding wave functions that these laws govern will be able to accommodate
all known particles of the particle zoo in the dual momentum-energy universe.
Very importantly, in this model there may be no parity violations in weak interactions such
as beta decay as the apparent parity violation in the experiment may simply be explained as
a spin polarization effect in which the spin polarization influences the dynamics and
directions of the emitted electron in an external magnetic field. Also, there may be no need
for Higgs boson to generate mass since mass is generated by self-referential spin at the
power level of premomentumenergy (Consciousness), so the primordial particle of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is simply 1= ei0.
6. Electromagnetic Interaction in the Premomentumenergy Model
Electromagnetic interaction is an expressive process (radiation or emission) through
bosonic spinization of an intrinsic-proper-time-less (massless) and spinless entity and the
associated reverse process (absorption). In this model, there are possibly two kinds of
mechanisms at play. One kind is the direct bosonic spinization (spinizing radiation):
x x 2 Det(s x I 3 ) Det I 3
sx
(6.1)
that is, for example:
t
x
x e
s x e
t
0
0
s.x
i
t i
t
(6.2)
and the following reverse process (unspinizing absorption):
s x Det(s x I 3 ) Det I 3
x x
2
(6.3)
that is, for example:
t
s x
t
s x e
0
x
t i
x e
0
t i
(6.4)
The radiation or absorption of a photon during acceleration of a charged particle may be
direct bosonic spinizing or unspinizing process respectively:
(1) Bound Spinless & Intrinsic-proper-time-less Particle → Bound Spinized Photon →
Free Spinized Photon; and
(2) Free Spinized Photon → Bound Spinized Photon → Bound Spinless & & Intrinsicproper-time-less Particle.
In this model, these two processes may also occur in nuclear decay and perhaps in other
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processes. Assuming a plane wave e, e
particle:
ip x
t e x i
t x
i
e
x e
0 or
t i
t
x
exists for the spinless and massless
(6.5)
we obtain the following solution for this equation:
ip x
1 ip x
e,
1 e
x N x e
x
ip
i,
2 e
t
t
(6.6)
where we have utilized the following relation for a time eigenstate and N is the
normalization factor :
t i , x e , i ,
x
e,
(6.7)
iy
t
ix
t
0
(6.8)
t
After spinization:
0
x
s x iz
t
t
t
iy
t
iz
t
0
ix
t
We arrive at the plane-wave solution:
1
0
0
ex,
ip x
1
0
e
i,
2 iz
t
iy
t
0
1
0
ey,
_ ip x
1
iz
e
i,
2 t
0
ix
t
0
0
1
ez,
ip x
1
iy
e
i,
2 t
ix
t
0
(6.9)
for the spinized photon equation:
t
sx
sx e
0 or
i
t
t e s x i
t
s
x
e
i
(6.10)
The second kind of electromagnetic interaction is the release (radiation) or binding
(absorption) of a spinized photon without unspinization:
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
(3) Bound Spinized Photon → Free Spinized Photon; and
(4) Free Spinized Photon → Bound Spinized Photon.
Processes (3) and (4) occur at the openings of an optical cavity or waveguide and may also
occur in atomic photon excitation and emission and perhaps other processes.
For bosonic spinization x x 2 s x , the Maxwell-like equations in the vacuum (c=1) in
the dual momentum-energy universe are as follows:
t
i E p E (p , E)
s x E (p , E)
0
0
t iB ( p , E)
s x
p i E iB ( p , E)
p E (p , E) 0
,
x E ( p , E) 0
p B (p , E) 0
x B ( p , E) 0
E E (p , E) p B (p , E)
t B (p , E) p E (p , E)
or
p E (p , E) 0
B
0
p
( p , E)
(6.11)
If we calculate the determinant:
s x
t
t t s x s x
Dets
s x
t
(6.12)
We obtain the following:
x xy xz
t
sx
Det
t x I yz y
yz t x I M
sx
t
zx zy z
s
2
2
2
2
2
3
2
3
T
(6.13)
2
2
2
The last term MT in expression (6.13) makes fundamental relation t x 0 not hold in
the determinant view (6.12) unless the action of MT on the external and internal
components of the wave function produces null result, since equations (5.20) and (5.21)
only hold in the source-free region of the dual momentum-energy universe.
At the location of a massive (i.e., intrinsic proper time is non-zero) charged particle such as
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
an electron or proton, equations (5.20) and (5.21) are also violated by the photon. That is,
the photon appears to have intrinsic proper time MT at the source, thus in this model particle
pairs may be created on collision of a photon with a massive charged particle. In the
Maxwell-like equations, these violations are counter-balanced by adding source to the
equations as discussed below. The Maxwell-like equations with source are, in turn, coupled
to the Dirac-like Equation of the fermions such as electron or proton forming the DiracMaxwell-like system as further discussed in § 11.
Indeed, if source j (p ,E ) , j(p ,E ) 0 in the dual momentum-energy universe, we have
instead:
t
s x
s x E ( p , E) ij( p , E) i E p E (p , E) ij( p , E)
t iB (p , E) 0 p i E iB (p , E) 0
,
x E ( p , E) i ( p , E)
p E (p , E) (p , E)
x B (p , E) 0
p B ( p , E) 0
E E (p , E) p B (p , E) j(p , E)
t B (p , E) p E (p , E)
or
p E (p , E) (p , E)
B
0
p
( p , E)
(6.14)
Importantly, we can also choose to use fermionic spinization scheme x x 2 σ x to
describe Maxwell-like equations in this model. In this case, the Maxwell-like equation in
the vacuum has the form:
- σ x σ E (p , E)
t
0
t iσ B (p , E)
- σ x
(6.15)
E
p E ( p , E)
0
E B (p , E)
p
p E (p , E) 0
p B (p , E) 0
(6.16)
which gives:
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If source j (p ,E ) , j(p ,E ) 0 , we have:
t
- σ x
- σ x σ E (p , E) iσ j (p , E)
t iσ B (p , E) i (p , E)
(6.17)
which gives:
E E (p , E) p B (p , E) j(p , E)
t B (p , E) p E (p , E)
p E (p , E) (p , E)
B
0
p
( p , E)
(6.18)
Therefore, in the fermionic spinization scheme, we have in place of the bi-vector wave
function a 4x4 tensor comprising of two bi-spinors (instead of the bi-vector itself)
generated by projecting the bi-vector comprised of E(p, E) and iB(p, E) to spin σ.
Further, we point out here that for a linear photon its electric field E(p, E) is the external
wave function (external object) and its magnetic field B(p, E) is the internal wave function
(internal object) in this model. These two fields are always self-entangled and their
entanglement is their self-gravity. Therefore, the relation between E(p, E) and B(p, E) in a
propagating electromagnetic wave in the momentum-energy universe is not that change in
E(p, E) induces B(p, E) vice versa but that change in E(p, E) is always accompanied by change
in B(p, E) synchronously vice versa due to their entanglement (self-gravity). That is, the
relationship between E(p, E) and B(p, E) are gravitational and instantaneous.
7. Strong Interaction in the Premomentumenergy Model
While weak and electromagnetic interactions are expressive processes involving fermionic
and bosonic spinizations of spinless entities (the third state of matter) and their respective
reverse processes, strong interaction in this model does not involve spinization, that is,
strong force is a confining process. It may be assumed that spinless entities in general are
unstable and decay through fermionic or bosonic spinization. In order to achieve
confinement of a nucleon or stability of the nucleus, we suggest that strong interaction may
involve imaginary position in the confinement zone in the dual momentum-energy universe
as illustrated below. There are two types of strong interactions at play. One is the selfconfinement of a nucleon such as a proton and the other is the interaction among nucleons
such a proton and a neutron.
In the Standard Model, a proton is a composite entity comprised of three quarks confined
by massless gluons and the interaction among the nucleons is mediated by mesons
comprised of pairs of a quark and an antiquark which in turn interact through gluons.
However, since no free quarks have been observed, there may be good reason to consider
other options. We have suggested in § 3 that the proton may be considered as an
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
elementary particle that accomplishes momentum self-confinement through downward
self-reference (imaginary position).
Here, we will first derive the condition for producing momentum self-confinement of the
nucleon in the dual momentum-energy universe and the Yukawa-like potential. The
equation for a massive but spinless entity in Dirac-like Form is as follows:
t
x
x e
0 or
t i
t e x i
t x
i
e
(7.1)
Assuming that the wave function has time eigenstate -t (that is, the external and internal
wave functions have time eigenstate -t and +t respectively in the determinant view), we can
write:
t e x i t e iEte p x e iEti p t e p x i p
t i x e t e iEti p x e iEte p i p
x
t
e p
(7.2)
(7.3)
From expressions (7.2) and (7.3), we can derive the following:
t x p 0 or t p 0
2
2
2
2
2
2
i
p
(7.4)
i
Equation (7.4) has radial solution as follows:
i ( p)
1 ip t 2 2
e
4p
(7.5)
Then, we have from expression (7.3):
e p
x
t
i p
x
1 ip t 2 2
e
t 4p
(7.6)
where we may utilize the following conjecture:
x i p p
2
1 ip t 2 2
1 ip t 2 2
e
t 2 2
e
4p
4p
(7.7)
The complete radial solution of equation (7.1) for time eigenstate -t in Dirac-like form is:
x 1 iEt ip t 2 2
e
x
e , E , p
1 iEt ip t 2 2
t
4
p
N
( E , p )
N t
e
(7.8)
2
2
1
E
,
p
4
p
iEt
ip
t
i
,
1
e
4p
where N is a normalization factor.
When 2>t2, that is, when the position in t2-2=x2 is imaginary, we have from (7.8):
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
x 1 iEt p 2 t 2
e
x
e, E , p
1 iEt p
t
4
p
N
( E , p)
N t
e
1 iEt p 2 t 2
4p
i , E , p
e
1
4p
(7.9)
where 2 t 2 .
Now, if we consider the special case of an energy-less, spinless but massive entity in which
t=0, we have from (7.9):
x 1
p
e
e
4
p
( p) N
1 p
i
e
4p
x
1 p
N
e
1 4p
(7.10)
Thus, the internal and external wave functions in expression (7.10) have the form of
Yukawa-like potential and its negative imaginary projection, respectively.
We suggest that the interior (confinement zone) of an unspinized nucleon is described by
wave functions similar to expressions (7.9) or (7.10) in the dual momentum-energy
universe and confinement is achieved through downward self-reference (imaginary position
x i ). Therefore, in this scenario, the three colors of the strong force are the threedimensional imaginary position x i . Further, another implication of this scenario is that in
the Machian quantum universe the energy-less edge or the outside of this dual momentum
universe (which is embedded in premomentumenergy (Consciousness)) is connected to or
simply is the enegy-less inside of the nucleons.
If we assume that the internal wave function ψi (which is self-coupled to the external wave
function ψe through expression (7.1)) also couples with the external wave function χe of
another entity (which is also self-coupled to its internal wave function χi) as, for example:
g 2 i e g 2
1 p
g2
e e e p e
4p
p
(7.11)
where –g2 is a coupling constant, we can write part of the nuclear potential of a nucleon as
follows:
V
g 2 p
e
p
(7.12)
which is in the form of Yukawa-like Potential.
We now discuss the unspinized and spinized forms of proton. The spinized proton in the
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
duel momentum-energy universe is the commonly known form of proton and we suggest
that the unspinized proton may reside in the neutron comprised of the unspinized proton
and a spinized electron as illustrated in § 3. The equations for a free unspinized and
spinized proton in Dirac Form are respectively as follows:
t
xi
x i e
0
t i
t
σx i
σx i e
0
t i
and
(7.13)
(7.14)
where xi is imaginary position. From the above derivation, we may write the wave function
of an unspinized proton with external and internal time eigenstate –t and +t respectively as
follows (by convention, electron has positive external time +t and internal time –t):
x i 1 iEt p
e
e, E , p
t
4
p
N i e iEt 1 e p
N
( E , p)
1
1 iEt p
4r
i , E , p
e
4p
(7.15)
In contrast, an unspinized antiproton with external and internal time eigenstate +t and -t
respectively may have the following wave function:
1 iEt p
e
e, E , p
4p
N 1 e iEt 1 e p
N
( E , p )
i
x i 1 iEt p
4p
i , E , p
e
t 4p
(7.16)
According to this scenario, the nuclear spin of the neutron in the dual momentum-energy
universe is solely due to the tightly bound spinized electron. Indeed, experimental data on
charge distribution and g-factor of neutron supports this scenario. We further suggest that
the nuclear potential causing tight binding of the spinized electron in the neutron may have
the form of expression (7.12). Detailed consideration will be given elsewhere.
The wave function of spinized proton described by equation (7.14) can be obtained by
spinizing the solution in expression (7.15) as follows:
x i x i2 Detσ x i σ x i iσ
(7.17)
1
j 1 / 2
1 j 1 / 2
i
i
I 2 i
I2
p p
p p
p
p
where j is the total angular momentum number. Choosing j=1/2, we obtain from expression
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
(7.15) two sets of solutions as follows:
1 / p i 1 iEt r
1 / p i
e
t
4p
t
1
e, E , p
0
N
0
N
( E , p)
e iEt p (7.18)
1
iEt p
E
,
p
4
p
i,
e
1
4p
0
0
0
0
1 / p i 1 iEt p
1 / p i
e
e, E , p
1 iEt p (7.19)
t
4p
N
N
t
( E , p)
e
0
4p
0
i , E , p
1 iEt p
e
1
4
p
where 2 t 2 . In the case of energy-less proton (that is, when t=0), we have from
expressions (7.18) and (7.19) the following:
1
1 p
1
i
e
i
p 4p
p 1
e, E , p
0
N
( E , p)
N 0
e p
1 p
1 4p
i , E , p
e
4p
0
0
(7.18)
0
0
1
1 p
1
i
e
i
E
,
p
e,
N p 1 e p
N p 4p
( E , p)
0
0 4p
i , E , p
1 p
1
e
4
p
(7.19)
In this scenario, spinization of unspinized proton may cause loss of tight binding of
spinized electron to unspinized proton the possible cause of which will be considered
elsewhere.
8. Gravity (Quantum Entanglement) in the Premomentumenergy Model
Gravity in the dual momentum-energy universe is quantum entanglement (instantaneous
interaction) across the dual momentum-energy world. There are two types of gravity at
play. One is self-gravity (self-interaction) between the external object (external wave
function) and internal object (internal wave function) of an entity (wave function) governed
by the metamorphous matrix law described in this work and the other is the quantum
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
world as a whole. As further shown below, gravitational field (graviton) is just the wave
function itself which expresses the intensity distribution and dynamics of self-quantumentanglement (nonlocality) of an entity. Indeed, strong interaction in the dual momentumenergy universe may be strong quantum entanglement (strong gravity).
We focus here on three particular forms of gravitational fields. One is energy-less (zero
time) external and internal wave functions (self-fields) that play the role of energy-less
graviton, that is, they mediate energy-independent interactions through momentum
quantum entanglement. The second is momentum-less external and internal wave functions
(self-fields) that play the role of momentum-less graviton, that is, they mediate momentum
independent interactions through mass (intrinsic proper time) entanglement. The third is
proper-timeless external and internal wave functions (self-fields) that play the role of
proper-timeless (massless) graviton, that is, they mediate intrinsic-proper-time (rest-mass)
independent interactions through massless energy entanglement. The typical wave function
(self-fields) in the dual momentum-energy universe contains all three (energy-less,
momentum-less and proper-timeless) components. In addition, the typical wave function
also contains components related to fermionic or bosonic spinization.
As shown below, energy-less quantum entanglement between two entities accounts for
Newtonian-like gravity. Momentum-less and/or proper-timesless quantum entanglement
between two entities may account for dark matter. Importantly, gravitational components
related to spinization may account for dark energy.
When t=0, we have from fundamental relationship (3.4):
2 x 2 0
or
2 x2 0
(8.1)
We can regard expression (8.1) as a relationship governing the Machian-like quantum
universe in which the total time is zero. This may be seen as: (1) the intrinsic proper time
being comprised of imaginary position x=ixi, or (2) position x being comprised of
imaginary intrinsic proper time =ii.
As shown in § 3, the energy-less matrix law in Dirac-like and Weyl-like form is
respectively the following:
(8.2)
x
LM ,e LM ,i LM
x
(8.3)
x
LM ,e LM ,i LM
x
Thus, the equations of the timeless wave functions (self-fields) are respectively as follows:
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
x
x g D,e e iM
L
g D,i e iM M ,e
VD,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VD,i M D
(8.4)
x
gW ,e e iM
L
x gW ,i e iM M ,e
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
(8.5)
and
Equation (8.4) and (8.5) can be respectively rewritten as:
x
VD ,e VD ,i
x
VD ,i VD ,e
(8.6)
x
V
V
W ,e
W ,i
VW ,e x VW ,i
V x V or
x
W ,e
W ,i
VW ,i VW ,e
(8.7)
VD ,e x VD ,i
V x V or
D ,e
D ,i
and
To see the coupling of external and internal wave functions (self-fields) in a different
perspective we can rewrite (8.6) and (8.7) respectively as follows:
VD ,eVD ,i x VD ,i x VD ,e
x V V V x V
D ,e
D ,e
D ,i
D ,i
(8.8)
VW ,eVW ,i x VW ,i x VW ,e
x V V V x V
W ,e
W ,e
W ,i
W ,i
(8.9)
and
From expression (8.6), we can derive the following:
x V
2
2
D ,e
0 or 2 2 V D,e 0
(8.10)
Equation (8.10) has radial solution in the form of Yukawa potential:
V D ,e ( p )
1 p
e
4p
(8.11)
So in expression (8.4), M=-ip, that is, position is comprised of imaginary intrinsic proper
time. The external energy-less self-field in expression (8.11) has the form of Newton-like
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
gravitational or Coulomb-like electric potential at large momentum p→∞. We have from
expression (8.6):
VD ,i
x
VD ,e
x 1 p
1 p
e i
e
4p
4p
(8.12)
where we have utilized the following conjecture:
x V D ,e p
2
1 p
1 p
e i
e
4p
4p
(8.13)
The complete radial solution of equation (8.4) is then:
1 p
e
VD ,e
4
p
N 1 1 e p
N
VD ( p)
i 4p
1 p
VD ,i
i
e
4p
(8.14)
where N is a normalization factor. Indeed, expression (8.7) can have same radial solution as
expression (8.6):
1 p
e
VW ,e
4
p
N 1 1 e p
N
VW ( p)
(8.15)
i 4p
1
V
p
W
,
i
i 4p e
If we assume that the internal self-field VD,i (which is self-coupled to its external self-field
VD,e through expression (8.4) or (8.8)) also couples through energy-less quantum
entanglement with the external wave function ψe of another entity of test intrinsic-propertime t (which is also self-coupled to its internal wave function ψi ) as, for example:
iVD ,i t e ii
1 p
e t e G e p t e
4r
p
(8.16)
where iκ is a coupling constant and G=κ/4π is Newton-like Gravitational Constant, we have
gravitational-like potential at large momentum p→∞ as:
V g G
p
(8.17)
When |x|=0, we have from fundamental relationship (3.4):
t 2 2 0
(8.18)
We can regard expression (8.6) as a relationship governing a momemtum-less quantum
universe. Classically, this may be seen as the intrinsic-proper-time being comprised of
energy-position (time t). As shown in § 3, the momemtum-less Matrix Law in Dirac and
Weyl form is respectively the following:
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t
0
0
LM ,e
t
LM ,i LM
(8.19)
t
LM , e
t
LM , i L M
(8.20)
and
and the equation of momemtum-less wave functions (self- fields) are respectively the
follows:
t
0
0 g D,e e iE
LM ,e
t g D,i e iE
VD,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VD,i M D
(8.21)
t
gW ,e e iE
LM ,e
t gW ,i e iE
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
(8.22)
and
The external and internal (momentum-less) wave functions VD,e and VD,i in equation (8.21)
are decoupled from each other, but those in equation (8.22),VW,e and VW,i, are coupled to
each other:
tVD ,e VD ,e
tV VW ,i
but W ,e
tV V
tV
V
D
,
i
D
,
i
W ,e
W ,i
It can be easily verified that the solutions to equation (8.21) are in forms of:
(8.23)
1e iE
VD ,e
1
iE N e iE
VD
N
0e
0
VD ,i
(8.24)
0e iE
VD ,e
0
N iE N e iE
VD
1e
1
VD ,i
(8.25)
or
but the solutions to equation (8.22) are in the forms of:
1e iE
VW ,e
1
N iE N e iE
VW
1
VW ,i
1e
(8.26)
1e iE
VW , e
1
N iE N e iE
VW
1e
1
VW ,i
(8.27)
or
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
We shall illustrate below momentum-less quantum entanglements (gravity) between two
entities. For simplicity, we will consider two intrinsic-proper-times 1+p and 2
respectively located at momentum points 1 and 2. Their respective momentum-less wave
functions may be be written in Weyl-like form as follows:
i 1 E
g 2W ,e e i 2 E
g1W ,e e p
V1W
and V2W
i 2 E
i 1 p E
g
e
g
2W ,i
1W ,i e
(8.28)
which form product stateV1W V2W . After p leaves V1W+ as an emitted particle and get
absorbed by V2W-, we may have the following two additional momentum-less wave
functions in Weyl-like form:
g 2W ,e e i 2 p t
g1W , ee i 1 E
V2W
V1W
i 2 p t
i 1 E and
g
g
e
1W ,i
2W ,i e
(8.29)
which form product stateV1W V2W . The final momentum-less quantum state may be written
as follows:
V
1
V1W V2W V1W V2W 1 1 2 1 2
2
2
(8.30)
In this joint momentum-less wavefunction, 1 and 2 are quantum entangled due to
interaction with and through p.
When =0, we have from fundamental relationship (3.4):
t2 x2 0
(8.31)
We can regard expression (8.11) as a relationship governing the intrinsic-proper-time-less
quantum universe in which the total intrinsic proper time (rest mass) is zero. Classically,
this may be seen as time t being comprised of position x. As shown in § 3, the intrinsicproper-time-less matrix law in Dirac-like and Weyl-like form is respectively the following:
t
x
x
L
t M ,e
LM ,i LM
t x
0
0
L
t x M ,e
LM ,i LM
(8.32)
and
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
and the equations of intrinsic-proper-time-less wave functions (self-fields) are respectively
the following:
t
x
x g D,e e iM
L
t g D,i e iM M ,e
VD,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VD,i M D
(8.34)
t x
0
0 gW ,e e iM
L
t x gW ,i e iM M ,e
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
(8.35)
and
Equations (8.34) and (8.35) have plane-wave solutions. The external and internal
(masssless) wave functions VD,e and VD,i in equation (8.34) are coupled with each other, but
those in equations (8.35),VW,e and VW,i, are decoupled from each other:
tVD ,e x VD ,i
tV x VW ,e
but W ,e
tV x V
tV x V
D ,e
W ,i
D ,i
W ,i
(8.36)
For eigenstate of t and |p|, the solutions to equation (8.34) are in the forms of:
1e i (t k x )
V D ,e
1
N x i (t k x ) N e i (t k x )
VD
e
1
VD ,i
t
(8.37)
x i (t k x )
V D ,e
1 i (t k x )
e
e
VD
N
N
t
1e i (t k x )
1
VD ,i
(8.38)
or
but the solutions to equation (8.35) are in the forms of:
1e i (t k x )
VW ,e
1
N i (t k x ) N e i (t k x )
VW
0e
0
Vw,i
(8.39)
0e i (t k x )
VW ,e
0
N i (t kx ) N e i (t k x )
VW
1e
1
VW ,i
(8.40)
or
Equations (8.34) and (8.35) describe the self-interaction of external and internal intrinsicproper-time-less and spinless wave functions (self-fields). We may build a quantumentangled state of two intrinsic-proper-time-less and spinless entities similar to that of two
momentum-less entities.
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
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9. Human Consciousness in the Premomentumenergy Model
We now briefly discuss human consciousness in the premomentumenergy model. Detailed
treatment will be given in forthcoming articles.
Our experimental results on quantum entanglement of the brain with external substances
(See, e.g., Refs, in [1]) suggest that Consciousness is not located in the brain but associated
with
prespacetime/
premomentumenergy
(Consciousness)
or
simply
is
prespacetime/premomentumenergy
(Consciousness).
Thus,
Consciousness
as
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has both transcendental and immanent properties.
The transcendental aspect of Consciousness as premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is the
origin of primordial self-referential spin (including the self-referential matrix law) and it
projects the external and internal objects (wavefunctions) in the dual universe through spin
and, in turn, the immanent aspect of Consciousness as premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) observes the external object (wavefunction) in the external momentumenergy space through the internal object (wavefunction) in the internal momentum-energy
space.
Human consciousness in the dual momentum-energy universe is a limited and particular
version of this dual-aspect Consciousness as premomentumenergy (Consciousness) such
that we have limited free will and limited observation.
Figure 9.1 Interaction between an object and the brain (body) in the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal momentum-energy
space
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
As illustrated in Figure 9.1, there are two kinds of interactions between an object (entity)
outside the brain (body) and the brain (body) in the premomentumenergy model. The first
kind is the direct physical and/or chemical interactions such as sensory input through the
eyes. The second and lesser-known but experimentally proven to be true kind is the
instantaneous interactions through quantum entanglement. The entire universe outside our
brain (body) is associated with our brain (body) through quantum entanglement thus
influencing and/or generating not only our feelings, emotions and dreams but also the
physical, chemical and physiological states of our brain and body.
In the premomentumenergy model, we may write the following Hodgkin-Huxley-like
equation in the external/internal momentum-energy space:
EVm(p.E )
Vm (p.E ) Ei (p.E ) g i (p.E )
Cm ( p . E ) i
1
(9.1)
where Vm(p,E) is the electric potential across the neural membranes, Cm(p,E) is the capacitance
of the membranes, gi(p,E) is the ith voltage-gated or constant-leak ion channel.
Microscopically, in the dual universe comprised of the external momentum-energy space
and the internal momentum-energy space, electromagnetic fields E(p, E) and B(p, E) or their
four-potential A (p , E ) (p , E ) , A (p , E ) :
E(p ,E ) (p ,E ) E A (p ,E )
B
A
(
p
,
E
)
(
p
,
E
)
(9.2)
interact with proton of charge e and unpaired electron of charge –e respectively as the
following Dirac-Maxwell-like systems:
t ep, E
σ x i eA p, E
σx i eA p, E e,
0
t ep, E i,
p
†
- σ x σ E p , E iσ ( α ) iσ j p , E
t
t iσ B p , E i ( † ) i p , E
- σ x
and
t e p ,E
σ x eA
p ,E
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t e
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e
(9.3)
(9.4)
p
(9.5)
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
t
- σ x
†
- σ x σ E p , E iσ ( α ) iσ j p , E
t iσ B p , E i ( † ) i p , E
e
(9.6)
where β and α are Dirac matrices and j (p , E ) , j(p , E ) is four-current in external/internal
momentum-energy space.
In equations (9.3) and (9.5), the interactions (couplings) of E(p, E) and/or B(p, E) with proton
and/or electron spin operator (σ)p and (σ)e are hidden. The said interactions are due to the
self-referential matrix law which causes mixing of the external and internal wave functions
and can be made explicit in the determinant view as follows. For Dirac-like form, we have:
t e p , E
σ x eA
p, E
t e
p , E
σ x eA p , E
t e
p,E
e,
p
M
i,
p, E
p , E
σ x eA
p , E
2
e,
i,
x eA eσ B I
2
p , E
L 0
t e
t e
I 0
σ x eA
2
2
p ,E
p ,E
2
e,
(9.7)
p
i,
0 p
For Weyl-like (chiral-like) form, we have:
t e
p, E σ x eA p, E
e,r
0
t ep, E σ x eA p, E i,l
p
(9.8)
t e σ x eA t e σ x eA I 0
t e x eA eσ B -ieσ E I 0
2
p , E
p , E
2
p , E
p , E
p , E
2
e ,r
e ,r
i ,l
2
2
p , E
p , E
p , E
2
i ,l
p
p
These two couplings will also be explicitly shown during the process of non-relativistic
approximation of the Dirac-like equation in the present of external electromagnetic
potential Aμ. We can carry out the same procedures for an electron to show the explicit
couplings of (σ)e with E(p, E) and B(p, E).
One effect of the couplings is that the action potentials through E(p, E) and B(p, E) (or Aμ(p, E))
input information into the mind-pixels in the brain. Another possible effect of the couplings
is that they allow the transcendental aspect of consciousness through wave functions (the
self-fields) of the proton and/or electron to back-influence E(p, E) and B(p, E) (or Aμ(p, E))
which in turn back-react on the action potentials through the Hodgkin-Huxley-like neural
circuits in the brain.
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10. Some Questions & Answers
1. Do the uncertainty principle and commutation relations among energy, momentum, time
and position hold in the premomentumenergy model? Yes. However, in this model, time
and position of an elementary particle are quantized dynamical variables and energy and
momentum are continuous parameters. In contrast, in the prespacetime model [1-4],
time and position are continuous parameters and energy and momentum are quantized
dynamical variables.
2. How are prespacetime model and premomentumenergy model connected to each other?
The elementary particle in prespacetime model is transformed into that in
premomentumenergy model through quantum jump, vice visa, as demonstrated in forth
coming articles.
3. What is the foundation of the dual momentum-energy universe? The foundation is
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) which is omnipotent, omniscient and
omnipresent.
4. Was there something before the dual momentum-energy universe was born (if there was
such birth)? Yes, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) alone (1=ei0) without
differentiation or dualization. So, it may be said that 1= ei0 is the primordial particle.
5. How does premomentumenergy (Consciousness) create, sustain and cause evolution of
the dual momentum-energy universe and all entities in it? Premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) does these things by hierarchical self-referential spin of itself at its free
will.
6. Why is there materially something instead of nothing? Premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is restless and tends to create, sustain and make evolutions of different
entities.
7. How does premomentumenergy (Consciousness) govern the dual momentum-energy
universe? Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) governs through metamorphous selfreferential matrix law.
8. What is matter in the premomentumenergy model? Matter is a dualized entity (created
through hierarchical self-referential spin of premomentumenergy (Consciousness))
comprised of an external wave function (external object) having positive time by
convention and an internal wave function (internal object) having negative time by
convention.
9. What is antimatter in the premomentumenergy model? Antimatter is a dualized entity
(created through hierarchical self-referential spin of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness)) comprised of an external wave function (external object) having
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
830
negative time by convention and an internal wave function (internal object) having
positive time by convention.
10. Is time conserved in the premomentumenergy model? Yes, time is conserved to zero
according to the accounting principle of zero.
11. Is time conserved in the external (internal) momentum-energy space? The answer
depends on the context. In most natural processes, external (internal) time is conserved
and transformed into different forms without loss due to cancellation between the
external and internal spaces. However, in some processes, especially those involving
human consciousness and/or intention (free will), time conservation in the external
(internal) momentum-energy space may be slightly violated so that the free will may
function.
12. What is quantum entanglement in the premomentumenergy model? It is the interaction
and/or connections between the external and internal wave functions (objects) of a
single dualized entity or among different dualized entities through premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) which is outside momentum-energy.
13. What is self-interaction, self-gravity or self-quantum entanglement in the
premomentumenergy model? Self-interaction is the interaction between the external and
internal wave functions (objects) according to the premomentumenergy (Consciousness)
equation governed by the self-referential matrix law.
14. What is strong force in the premomentumenergy model? It is downward self-reference
through imaginary position. It is strong gravity (strong quantum entanglement).
15. What is weak force in the premomentumenergy model? It is fermionic spinization and
unspinization of spinless entities with or without bosonic intermediary spinization.
16. What is electromagnetic force in the premomentumenergy model? It is bosonic
spinization and unspinization of intrinsic-proper-time-less (massless) and spinless entity.
17. What is gravity in the premomentumenergy model? It is quantum entanglement across
the dual momentum-energy universe which includes self-gravity or self-quantumentanglement between the external and internal wave functions (objects) of a single
dualized entity and gravity or quantum entanglement among different entities.
18. What is the origin of the quantum effect in the premomentumenergy model? The origin
is primordial hierarchical self-referential spin of premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
19. What is information in the premomentumenergy model? It is a distinction (either
quantitative or qualitative) experienced or perceived by a particular consciousness.
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831
20. What is quantum information in the premomentumenergy model? It is a distinction or a
state of distinction (either quantitative or qualitative) experienced or perceived by a
particular consciousness which is due to a quantum effect such as quantum
entanglement.
21. What is the meaning of imaginary unit i in the premomentumenergy model? It is the
most elementary self-referential process. As imagination of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness), it makes phase distinction of an elementary entity and, as an element
in the matrix law, it plays a crucial role in self-referential matrixing creation of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
22. What is Consciousness? Consciousness is premomentumenergy (Consciousness) which
is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent.
23. What is human consciousness? It is a limited or individualized Consciousness
associated with a particular human brain/body.
24. Does human consciousness reside in human brain? No, the human brain is the interface
for human consciousness to experience and interact with the external universe.
25. What are spirit, soul and/or mind? They are different aspects or properties of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) which is transcendent, immanent and eternal.
26. Where did we come from? Physically/biologically, we came from premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) as its creation. Spiritually, we are an inseparable part of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) and our consciousness is limited and/or
individualized version of unlimited Consciousness.
27. Where are we going? Physically/biologically, we disintegrate or die unless we advance
our science to the point where death of our biological body becomes a choice, not
unavoidability. Also, we are of the opinion that advancement in science will eventually
enable us to transfer or preserve our individual consciousness associated with our ailing or
diseased bodies to another biological or artificial host. Spiritually, we may go back to
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) or reincarnate into a different form of individual
consciousness that may be able to recall its past.
28. How does the mind influence the brain? Mind influences the brain through free will
which acts on subjective entities (internal objects), which in turn effect objective entities
(external objects) through the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) equation.
29. What is the origin of the uncertainty principle? The origin is self-referential spin or
zitterbewegung.
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832
30. What is the origin of quantum jump or wave collapse? The free will of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) or unlimited transcendental Consciousness.
Remember that our limited free will is part of the unlimted free will of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) since we are part of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness).
31. Is information conserved? It is our opinion that information is conserved to zero in the
dual universe since each distinction in the external space is accompanied by its negation in
the internal space. However, information is not conserved in each space alone.
32. What is a graviton? There is no graviton in the sense of a quantum (particle) which
mediated gravitational interaction at the speed of light. However, since gravity is quantum
entanglement, the wave function of each entity may be treated as a graviton.
33. Is there an absolute reference frame? Yes, it is simply prespacetime/
premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
11.
Conclusion
This article is a continuation of the Principle of Existence. A premomentumenergy model of
elementary particles, four forces and human consciousness is formulated, which illustrates
how the self-referential hierarchical spin structure of the premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) provides a foundation for creating, sustaining and causing evolution of
elementary particles through matrixing processes embedded in said premomentumenergy
(Consciousness). This model generates elementary particles and their governing matrix laws
for a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external momentum-energy space and
an internal momentum-energy space. In contrast, the prespacetime model described
previously generates elementary particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual
universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external spacetime and an internal spacetime.
These quantum frames and their metamorphoses are interconnected through quantum jumps
as demonstrated in forthcoming articles.
The premomentumenergy model reveals the creation, sustenance and evolution of
fermions, bosons and spinless entities each of which is comprised of an external wave
function or external object in the external momentum-energy space and an internal wave
function or internal object in the internal momentum-energy space. The model provides a
unified causal structure in said dual universe (quantum frame) for weak interaction, strong
interaction, electromagnetic interaction, gravitational interaction, quantum entanglement,
human consciousness. Further, the model provides a unique tool for teaching,
demonstration, rendering, and experimentation related to subatomic and atomic structures
and interactions, quantum entanglement generation, gravitational mechanisms in
cosmology, structures and mechanisms of human consciousness.
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Hu, H &Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles & Relativistic QM for a
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833
One of the key features of the Principle of Existence illustrated in this work is the use of
hierarchical self-referential mathematics in order to accommodate both the transcendental
and immanent qualities/properties of premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
In the beginning there was premomentumenergy (Consciousness) ei0 materially empty but
spiritually restless. And it began to imagine through primordial self-referential spin
1=ei0=eiM-iM=eiMe-iM=e-iM/ e-iM = eiM/ eiM…such that it created the external object to be
observed and internal object as observed, separated them into external momentum-energy
space and internal momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through selfreferential matrix law and thus gave birth to the dual momentum-energy universe which it
has since sustained and made to evolve.
In this universe, the body (ether) of premomentumenergy (Consciousness), represented by
Euler’s Number e, is the ground of existence and can form external and internal wave
functions as external and internal momentum-energy objects (each pair forms an
elementary entity in the dual momentum-energy universe) and interaction fields between
elementary entities which accompany the imaginations of the premomentumenergy.
The body of premomentumenergy can be self-acted on by self-referential matrix law LM.
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has imagining power i to project external and
internal objects by projecting, e.g., external and internal phase +M =+(Et-p·x)/ħ at the
power level of premomentumenergy (Consciousness). The universe so created is a dual
momentum-energy universe comprising of the external momentum-energy space to be
observed and internal momentum-energy space as observed under each relativistic frame
pμ=(E/c, p). In one perspective of premomentumenergy (Consciousness) view, the internal
momentum-energy space (which by convention has negative time) is the negation/image of
the external momentum-energy space (which by convention has positive time). The
absolute frame of reference is the premomentumenergy (Consciousness) itself. Thus, if
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) stops imagining (i0=0), the dual momentum-energy
universe would disappear into materially nothingness ei0=e0=1.
The accounting principle of the dual momentum-energy universe is conservation of zero.
For example, the total time of an external object and its counterpart, the internal object, is
zero. Also in this dual momentum-energy universe, self-gravity is the nonlocal-momentumenergy self-interaction (wave mixing) between an external object in the external
momentum-energy space and its negation/image in the internal momentum-energy space,
vice versa. Gravity in external momentum-energy space is the nonlocal-momentum-energy
interaction (quantum entanglement) between an external object with the internal
momentum-energy space as a whole.
Some other most basic conclusions are: (1) the two spinors of the Dirac electron or positron
in the dual momentum-energy universe are respectively the external and internal objects of
the electron or positron; and (2) the electric and magnetic fields of a linear photon in the
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Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness
834
dual momentum-energy universe are respectively the external and internal objects of a
photon which are always self-entangled.
In this dual momentum-energy universe, premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has both
transcendental and immanent properties. The transcendental aspect of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is the origin of primordial self-referential spin (including the selfreferential matrix law) and it projects the external and internal objects (wavefunctions) in
the dual universe through spin and, in turn, the immanent aspect of premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) observes the external object (wavefunction) in the external momentumenergy space through the internal object (wavefunction) in the internal momentum-energy
space. Human consciousness in the dual momentum-energy universe is a limited and
particular version of this dual-aspect premomentumenergy (Consciousness) such that we
have limited free will and limited observation.
References
1. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2010), The Principle of Existence: Towards a Science of Consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1:1, pp. 50-119. Also see:
http://vixra.org/abs/1001.0011
2. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2010), The Principle of Existence II: Genesis of Self-Referential Matrix Law,
& the Ontology & Mathematics of Ether. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1:9,
pp. 1149-1178. Also see: http://vixra.org/abs/1012.0043
3. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2013), Application of Prespacetime Model I. Prespacetime journal 4:6, pp.
641-660.
4. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2013), Application of Prespacetime Model II. Prespacetime journal 4:6, pp.
661-680.
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
Prognostication of chronic disorders of consciousness using brain
functional networks and clinical characteristics
Ming Song1,2*, Yi Yang3*, Jianghong He3, Zhengyi Yang1,2, Shan Yu1,2, Qiuyou Xie4,
Xiaoyu Xia3, Yuanyuan Dang3, Qiang Zhang3, Xinhuai Wu5, Yue Cui1,2, Bing Hou1,2,
Ronghao Yu4, Ruxiang Xu3, Tianzi Jiang1,2,6,7,8
1
National Laboratory of Pattern Recognition, Institute of Automation, The Chinese
Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
2
Brainnetome Center, Institute of Automation, The Chinese Academy of Sciences,
Beijing 100190, China
3
Department of Neurosurgery, PLA Army General Hospital, Beijing 100700, China
4
Centre for Hyperbaric Oxygen and Neurorehabilitation, Guangzhou General Hospital
of Guangzhou Military Command, Guangzhou 510010, China
5
Department of Radiology, PLA Army General Hospital, Beijing 100700, China
6
CAS Center for Excellence in Brain Science and Intelligence Technology, Chinese
Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China
7
Key Laboratory for Neuroinformation of the Ministry of Education, School of Life
Science and Technology, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,
Chengdu 625014, China
8
The Queensland Brain Institute, University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD 4072,
Australia
*These authors contributed equally to this work.
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To whom correspondence should be addressed:
Tianzi Jiang
National Laboratory of Pattern Recognition
Institute of Automation
Chinese Academy of Sciences
Beijing 100190, China
Phone: +86 10 8254 4778
Fax: +86 10 8254 4778
Email: jiangtz@nlpr.ia.ac.cn
And
Ruxiang Xu
Department of Neurosurgery
PLA Army General Hospital
Beijing 100700, China
Phone: +86 10 6403 0762
Fax: +86 10 6403 0762
E-mail: zjxuruxiang@163.com
Running title:
Multidomain prognostic model for DOC
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Abstract
Disorders of consciousness are a heterogeneous mixture of different diseases or
injuries. Although some indicators and models have been proposed for
prognostication, any single method when used alone carries a high risk of false
prediction. This study aimed to develop a multidomain prognostic model that
combines resting state functional MRI with three clinical characteristics to predict one
year outcomes at the single-subject level. The model discriminated between patients
who would later recover consciousness and those who would not with an accuracy of
around 88% on three datasets from two medical centers. It was also able to identify
the prognostic importance of different predictors, including brain functions and
clinical characteristics. To our knowledge, this is the first reported implementation of
a multidomain prognostic model based on resting state functional MRI and clinical
characteristics in chronic disorders of consciousness, which we suggest is accurate,
robust, and interpretable.
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Keywords: disorders of consciousness; prognosis; resting state fMRI; functional
connectivity; brain network
Abbreviations: CRS-R = Coma Recovery Scale-Revised; DOC = disorders of
consciousness; GOS = Glasgow Outcome Scale; MCS = minimally conscious state;
PLSR = partial least square regression; UWS = unresponsive wakefulness syndrome;
VS = vegetative state
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Introduction
Severe brain injury can lead to disorders of consciousness (DOC). Some patients
recover consciousness from an acute brain insult, whereas others tragically fall into
chronic DOC. The latter cannot communicate functionally or behave purposefully.
Most patients remain bedridden, and require laborious care. The medical community is
often confronted with expectations of the chronic DOC patients' families. The social,
economic, and ethical consequences are also tremendous (Bernat, 2006). In parallel,
although more validations are required, recent pilot studies have proposed new
therapeutic interventions, which challenge the existing practice of early treatment
discontinuation for a chronic DOC patient (Schiff et al., 2007; Corazzol et al., 2017;
Yu et al., 2017). However, before using these novel therapeutic interventions,
clinicians first need to determine if the patient is a suitable candidate. The availability
of an accurate and robust prognostication is therefore a fundamental concern in the
response to chronic DOC patients, as medical treatment, rehabilitation therapy and
even ethical decisions depend on this information .
To date, the prognostication for a DOC patient is based on physician observation of
the patient's behavior over a sufficient period of time to discover whether there is any
evidence of awareness. On the one hand, a patient's motor impairment, sensory deficit,
cognitive damage, fluctuation of vigilance and medical complications could give rise
to misjudgments; on the other hand, for the assessor, a lack of knowledge regarding
DOC, poor training and non-use of adequate behavioral scales are additional elements
that may contribute to a high possibility of mistakes. Consequently, careful and
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repeated behavioral assessments are considered to be particularly important for a
precise diagnostic and prognostic judgment (Wannez et al., 2017). However,
behavioral assessments are inevitably subjective and vulnerable to a variety of personal
interferences (Giacino et al., 2009). Physicians and scientists have therefore been
seeking accurate and objective markers for diagnosis and prognosis (Demertzi et al.,
2017; Noirhomme et al., 2017).
Several pioneering studies suggested that the etiology, incidence age and duration
of DOC were important indicators for prognosis (The Multi-Society Task Force on
PVS, 1994). Specifically, patients with non-traumatic brain injury were expected to
have a worse functional recovery than traumatic brain injury patients, and young
patients were considered more likely to have a favorable outcome than older ones.
During the past decades, some pilot prognostic models have also been explored based
on features of neurological examination (Zandbergen et al., 1998; Booth et al., 2004;
Dolce et al., 2008), abnormalities detected with EEG and evoked potentials
(Steppacher et al., 2013; Kang et al., 2014; Hofmeijer and van Putten, 2016; Chennu et
al., 2017), anatomical and functional changes identified with brain CT, PET and MRI
(Maas et al., 2007; Sidaros et al., 2008; Galanaud et al., 2012; Luyt et al., 2012;
Stender et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2015), and physiological and biochemical disturbances
at both the brain and body levels (Kaneko et al., 2009; Rundgren et al., 2009).
However, despite many efforts, identifying efficient biomarkers for the early
prediction of outcome is still challenging and requires additional research. One of the
reasons for this is that the DOC could have many different causes and be associated
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with several neuropathological processes and different severities, such that any method
when used alone carries the risk of false prediction (Bernat, 2016; Rossetti et al.,
2016).
Recently, resting state functional MRI (fMRI) has been widely used to investigate
the brain functions of DOC patients. Research suggests that these patients demonstrate
multiple changes in brain functional networks, including the default mode
(Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010; Silva et al., 2015), executive control (Demertzi et al.,
2014b; Wu et al., 2015), salience (Qin et al., 2015; Fischer et al., 2016), sensorimotor
(Yao et al., 2015), auditory (Demertzi et al., 2015), visual (Demertzi et al., 2014a) and
subcortical networks (He et al., 2015). The within-network and between-network
functional connectivity appeared to be useful indicators of functional brain damage and
the likelihood of consciousness recovery (Silva et al., 2015; Di Perri et al., 2016).
Taken together, these studies suggest that the brain networks and functional
connectivity detected with resting state fMRI could be valuable biomarkers to trace the
level of consciousness and predict the possibility of recovery.
With advances in medicine, prognostication of a DOC patient has moved towards a
multidomain paradigm that combines clinical examination with the application of
novel technologies (Gosseries et al., 2014). Multidomain assessment has the potential
to improve prediction accuracy. More importantly, it can provide reassurances about
the importance of each predictor for prognostication by offering concordant evidence
(Stevens and Sutter, 2013; Rossetti et al., 2016). More than twenty years ago, the
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS suggested that the etiology, incidence age and
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duration of DOC could help to predict the outcome (The Multi-Society Task Force on
PVS, 1994), and numerous studies have subsequently validated the clinical utility of
these features (Jennett, 2005; Bruno et al., 2012; Estraneo et al., 2013; Celesia, 2016).
Therefore, it is possible that a multidomain model that combines these clinical
characteristics and resting state fMRI could improve prognostic predictions at an
individual level and lead to the early identification of patients who could recover
consciousness.
The present work had two major objectives. The first aim was to develop an
approach to predict the prognosis of an individual DOC patient using clinical
characteristics and resting state fMRI. The second aim, building on the first, was to
further explore different prognostic effects of these clinical and brain imaging features.
Materials and methods
The study paradigm is illustrated in Figure 1. Resting state fMRI and clinical data
from DOC patients were collected at the so-called T0 time point when the patients'
vital signs and conscious level had stabilized and a diagnosis had been made.
Outcomes were assessed at least 12 months after this T0 time point; this is referred to
as the T1 time point. The principal scales included the Coma Recovery Scale Revised
(CRS-R) and the Glasgow Outcome Scale (GOS). Instead of predicting diagnosis, this
study used the outcome as a target for regression and classification. Using the resting
state fMRI and clinical data at the T0 time point in a training dataset, a regression
model was first developed to fit each patient's CRS-R score at the T1 time point, after
which the optimal cut-off value for classifying individual patients based on
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consciousness recovery was calculated. In this way, we set up the prognostic
regression and classification model. Two independent testing datasets were then used
to validate the model.
Subjects
This study involved three datasets. The datasets referred to as "Beijing 750" and
"Beijing HDxt" were both collected in the PLA Army General Hospital in Beijing,
and the same medical group diagnosed and managed the patients. However, the MRI
scanners and imaging acquiring protocols were different; the "Beijing HDxt" cohort
was scanned with a GE signa HDxt 3.0T scanner between May 2012 and December
2013, whereas the "Beijing 750" cohort was scanned with a GE Discovery MR750
3.0T scanner between January 2014 and May 2016. The dataset referred to as
"Guangzhou HDxt" was collected from the Guangzhou General Hospital of
Guangzhou Military Command in Guangzhou, and the MRI data were obtained with a
GE signa HDxt 3.0T scanner between April 2011 and December 2014.
The inclusion criterion was that the patients should be at least 1 month after the
acute brain insult so that they met the DOC diagnosis. Patients were excluded when
there was an unstable level of consciousness (continuous improvement or decline
within the two weeks before the T0 time point), uncertain clinical diagnosis
(ambiguity or disagreement between examiners), contraindication for MRI or large
focal brain damage (>30% of total brain volume).
One hundred and sixty DOC patients were initially enrolled in this study. Eleven
patients were excluded due to large local brain lesions or movement artifacts during
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MRI scanning. Nine patients died during the period of the follow-up, 16 patients were
lost to follow-up, and in 12 cases no definite outcome information was collected at the
12-month endpoint of the follow-up. Thus, according to the inclusion and exclusion
criteria and the follow-up results, the "Beijing 750" dataset included 46 vegetative
state/ unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) patients and 17 minimally
conscious state (MCS) patients. The "Beijing HDxt" dataset contained 20 VS/UWS
patients and 5 MCS patients, and the "Guangzhou HDxt" dataset contained 16
VS/UWS patients and 8 MCS patients.
The demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients are summarized in
Table 1, with additional details provided in Appendix 1-table 1, 2, 3. The "Beijing
750" dataset also included 30 healthy participants, and the "Beijing HDxt" dataset
included 10 healthy participants. All of the healthy participants were free of
psychiatric or neurological history. These healthy participants are referred to as
"normal controls". See Appendix 1 -table 4, 5 for details.
As the "Beijing 750" dataset involved more patients than the other two datasets, it
was used as the training dataset for model development and internal validation,
whereas the "Beijing HDxt" and "Guangzhou HDxt" datasets were only used for
external validation. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the PLA
Army General Hospital (protocol No: 2011-097) and the Ethics Committee of the
Guangzhou General Hospital of Guangzhou Military Command (protocol No:
jz20091287). Informed consent to participate in the study was obtained from the legal
surrogates of the patients and from the normal controls.
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Clinical measurements
Diagnosis and consciousness assessments
The diagnosis of each patient in the three datasets was made by experienced
physicians according to the CRS-R scale (The Multi-Society Task Force on PVS,
1994; Bernat, 2006; Magrassi et al., 2016). In the "Beijing 750" and "Beijing HDxt"
datasets, the patients underwent the evaluations at least twice weekly within the two
weeks before the MRI scanning (i.e. the T0 time point). The highest CRS-R score was
considered as the diagnosis. The CRS-R includes six subscales that address auditory,
visual, motor, oromotor, communication, and arousal functions, which are summed to
yield a total score ranging from 0 to 23.
Outcome assessments
All patients were followed up at least 12 months after MRI scanning, according to
the protocols for DOC described in a number of previous studies (Galanaud et al.,
2012; Luyt et al., 2012; Stender et al., 2014; Pignat et al., 2016). Basically, follow-up
interviews were performed in four ways, including outpatient visit, assessments by
local physicians, home visit, and telephone/video review. Whenever possible signs of
responsiveness were detected or reported, the patient was evaluated either at the unit
or at home by the hospital staff. In cases where no change was signaled, patients were
examined twice by one hospital physician via telephone/video reviews at the end of
the follow-up process.
For the training dataset "Beijing 750", two outcome scales were assessed: the
GOS and CRS-R. The GOS is one of the most commonly reported global scales for
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functional outcome in neurology, and provides a measurement of outcome ranging
from 1 to 5 (1, dead; 2, vegetative state/minimally conscious state; 3, able to follow
commands/unable to live independently; 4, able to live independently/unable to return
to work or school; 5, good recovery/able to return to work or school). Although
simple to use and highly reliable, the GOS score cannot provide detailed information
about individual differences in consciousness level for DOC patients. In contrast, the
CRS-R score can assist with prognostic assessment in DOC patients (Giacino and
Kalmar, 2006). The six subscales in the CRS-R comprise hierarchically-arranged
items associated with brain stem, subcortical and cortical processes. The lowest item
on each subscale represents reflexive activity, whereas the highest items represent
cognitively-mediated behaviors. In order to simplify modeling, we hypothesized that
the higher the total CRS-R score at the follow up, the better the outcome for the
patient. We developed a regression model to fit each patient's CRS-R score at the T1
time point based on their clinical characteristics and resting state fMRI data, and
designed a classification model to predict consciousness recovery or not for each
patient. The classification accuracy was assessed by comparing the predicted label
and the actual GOS score, i.e. "consciousness recovery" (GOS≥3) versus
"consciousness non-recovery" (GOS≤2).
The testing dataset "Beijing HDxt" involved both the GOS scores and the CRS-R
scores at the T1 time point for each patient. The testing dataset "Guangzhou HDxt"
measured the GOS scores, but not the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point.
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MRI acquisition
All of the participants in the three datasets were scanned with resting state fMRI
and T1-weighted 3D high-resolution imaging. During the MRI scanning, the
participants did not take any sedative or anesthetic drugs. The resting state fMRI scan
was obtained using a T2*-weighted gradient echo sequence, and a high-resolution
T1-weighted anatomical scan was obtained to check whether the patients had large
brain distortion or focal brain damage. For the training dataset "Beijing 750", the
resting state fMRI acquisition parameters included TR/TE=2000/30ms, flip angle=90°,
axial 39 slices, thickness=4mm, no gap, FOV=240×240mm, matrix=64×64, and 210
volumes (i.e., 7 minutes). For the testing dataset "Beijing HDxt", the resting state
fMRI acquisition parameters were as follows: axial 33 slices, TR/TE=2000/30ms, flip
angle=90°, thickness=4mm, no gap, FOV=220×220mm, matrix=64×64, and 240
volumes (i.e., 8 minutes). For the testing dataset "Guangzhou HDxt", the resting state
fMRI acquisition parameters included axial 35 slices, TR/TE=2000/30ms, flip
angle=90°, thickness=4mm, no gap, FOV=240×240mm, matrix=64×64, and 240
volumes (i.e., 8 minutes).
Data analysis
The data analysis pipeline is illustrated in Figure 2.
Imaging preprocessing
Preprocessing and connectivity calculation were performed in the same way for
the training dataset and the two testing datasets. All resting state fMRI scans were
preprocessed using SPM8 (SPM, RRID:SCR_007037) and in-house Matlab codes.
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Specifically, the first five volumes of each subject were discarded. The remaining
resting state fMRI volumes were corrected for slice timing differences and realigned
to the first volume to correct for inter-scan movements. The functional images were
then spatially smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of 6×6×6 mm full-width at half
maximum. Linear regression was used to remove the influence of head motion, whole
brain signals and linear trends. The variables regressed out included 12 motion
parameters (roll, pitch, yaw, translation in three dimensions and their first derivatives),
the average series of the signals within the brain, and the regressors for linear trends.
Motion artifact is increasingly recognized as an important potential confound in
resting state fMRI studies. Any particular motion may produce a wide variety of
signal changes in the fMRI data, and thus introduce complicated shifts in functional
connectivity analysis. This problem was particularly serious for the DOC patients, as
they were unlikely to follow the experimental instructions and control their head
motion. To balance the demands of noise reduction and data preservation, we
censored volumes that preceded or followed any movement (framewise displacement,
FD) greater than 1.5 mm. The FD is a summarization of the absolute values of the
derivatives of the translational and rotational realignment estimates (after converting
the rotational estimates to displacement at 50 mm radius) (Power et al., 2015). The
head motion measures were achieved in the preprocessing step of realignment using
SPM. To obtain reliable Pearson's correlations for functional connectivity, the patients
with less than 50 volumes worth of remaining data were excluded. More information
about the analysis and validation of controls for motion-related artifacts are provided
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in Appendix 4.
Finally, to reduce low-frequency drift and high-frequency noise, band-pass
filtering (0.01-0.08 Hz) was only performed on volumes that survived motion
censoring.
Definition of networks and regions of interest
As noted in the introduction, multiple functional brain networks are disrupted in
DOC patients. Among these impaired networks, six (the default mode, executive
control, salience, sensorimotor, auditory, and visual networks) show system-level
damages and significant correlations with behavioral assessments (Demertzi et al.,
2014b; Demertzi et al., 2015). We therefore defined a total of 22 regions of interest
(ROIs) to probe these six brain networks. The definitions of the 22 ROIs were based
on the results of a series of previous brain functional studies (Seeley et al., 2007;
Raichle, 2011; Demertzi et al., 2015), and their names and Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) coordinates are listed in Appendix 2.
The connection templates of the six brain networks were first investigated within
the normal control group. In addition to the above-mentioned preprocessing stages,
the resting state fMRI scans of the normal controls in the training dataset were
transformed into MNI standard space. For each of the six networks, time series from
the voxels contained in the various ROIs were extracted and averaged together. The
averaged time series were then used to estimate whole-brain correlation r maps that
were subsequently converted to normally distributed Fisher’s z-transformed
correlation maps. Group functional connectivity maps for each of the six networks
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were then created with a one-sample t test (see Appendix 3 for details). Notably, the T
map included both positive and negative values. We used the six T maps as the brain
connection templates of the corresponding brain networks in the healthy population,
which would assist to define one type of imaging features, i.e. the connection feature
of the ROI. More information about the connection features of the ROIs are provided
in the following section.
The conventional fMRI preprocess normalizes individual fMRI images into a
standard space defined by a specific template image. Our goal was to extend this
conventional approach to generate a functional connectivity image for each patient in
his/her own imaging space. During the preprocessing of each patient’s fMRI scans,
the 22 ROIs and six brain connection templates were therefore spatially warped to
individual fMRI space and resampled to the voxel size of the individual fMRI image.
We also developed tools to visually check the registration for each subject, some
examples of which are provided in Appendix 5 and Supplementary file 1.
Calculation of imaging features
We designed two types of imaging features from the resting state fMRI, one being
the functional connectivity between each pair of 22 ROIs, and the other being the
spatial resemblance between the functional connection patterns of each ROI and the
brain connection templates across the whole brain. The functional connectivity was
based on the Pearson’s correlation coefficients, while the spatial resemblance was
conceptually similar to the template-matching procedure (Greicius et al., 2004; Seeley
et al., 2007; Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010).The basis of template matching is that the
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more spatial consistency which exists between the template of a brain network and a
specific connectivity map (for example, a component in an independent component
analysis), the stronger the possibility that the connectivity map belongs to that brain
network. Here, for each ROI of an individual DOC patient, we first computed the
Pearson’s correlation coefficients between the time-course of the ROI and that of each
voxel within the brain so as to obtain a functional connectivity map, and subsequently
converted the functional connectivity map to a normally distributed Fisher’s z
transformed correlation map. Next, we calculated the Pearson’s correlation
coefficients between the Fisher’s z transformed correlation map and the
corresponding brain connection template wrapped to individual fMRI space across
each voxel within the brain. A greater correlation coefficient between the two maps
suggests that there is more spatial resemblance between the functional connectivity
map of the ROI and the normal brain connection template. Our assumption was that
the more spatial consistency that existed between the connectivity map of the ROI in a
DOC patient and the brain connection template, the more intact the corresponding
brain function of the ROI in this individual. In this way, we defined the connection
feature of the ROI with the spatial resemblance.
Overall, for each participant in this study, there were 231 (22×21/2) functional
connectivity features and 22 brain area connection features.
Imaging feature selection
Feature selection techniques have been widely adopted in brain analysis studies, in
order to produce a small number of features for efficient classification or regression,
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and to reduce overfitting and increase the generalization performance of the model
(Fan et al., 2007; Dosenbach et al., 2010; Drysdale et al., 2016). Feature ranking and
feature subset selection are two typical feature selection methods (Guyon and
Elisseeff, 2003). Feature subset selection methods are generally time consuming, and
even inapplicable when the number of features is extremely large, whereas
ranking-based feature selection methods are subject to local optima. Therefore, these
two feature selection methods are usually used jointly. Here, we first used a
correlation-based feature selection technique to select an initial set of features, and
then adopted a feature subset selection method for further selection.
As a univariate method, correlation-based feature selection is simple to run and
understand, and measures the linear correlation between each feature and the response
variable. Here, the image features (i.e., functional connectivity features and brain area
connection features) which significantly correlated to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time
point across the DOC patients in the training dataset were retained for further
analysis.
Competitive adaptive reweighted sampling coupled with partial least squares
regression (CARS-PLSR, http://libpls.net/) was then used for further feature subset
selection (Li et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014). Briefly, CARS-PLSR is a sampling-based
feature selection method that selects the key informative variables by optimizing the
model's performance. As it provides the influence of each variable without
considering the influence of the remainder of the variables, CARS-PLSR is efficient
and fast for feature selection (Mehmood et al., 2012), and has therefore been used to
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explore possible biomarkers in medicine (Tan et al., 2010) and for wavelength
selection in chemistry (Fan et al., 2011). Using CARS-PLSR, we selected a subset of
key informative imaging features.
Notably, both the correlation-based and CARS-PLSR feature selection methods
filtered the features from the original feature set without any transformations. This
made the prognostic regression model easier to interpret, as the imaging predictors
were associated with either brain regions or functional connectivity.
Prognostic modeling and assessments of predictor importance
PLSR is able to handle multicollinearity among the predictors well (Wold et al.,
2001; Krishnan et al., 2011). It was therefore used to generate the prognostic
regression model in the training dataset "Beijing 750". Given that clinical
characteristics, including the etiology, incidence age and duration of DOC, have been
verified as useful prognostic indicators, we designated the selected imaging features
and the three clinical characteristics at the T0 time point as independent co-variates
and the CRS-R score at the T1 time point as the dependent variable. Among the three
clinical characteristics, the incidence age and duration of DOC were quantitative
variables, whereas the etiology was a qualitative variable. In accordance with a
previous study (Estraneo et al., 2010), we categorized the etiology into three types,
including traumatic brain injury, stroke and anoxic brain injury. Thus, two dummy
variables for etiology were designed and included in the model. Prior to model
training, all involved predictors were centered and normalized (i.e., transformed into
Z-scores). The prognostic regression model therefore took the imaging and clinical
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features as input and returned a predicted score as output. In the training dataset
"Beijing 750", we used cross-validation to decide that the number of latent variables
for PLSR was three. To evaluate the regression model, the coefficient of
determination R2 between the predicted scores and the CRS-R scores at the T1 time
point was calculated, and the Bland-Altman plot was used to measure the agreement
between them.
Next, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves were plotted for the
predicted scores. The optimal cut-off value for classifying an individual patient as
having recovered consciousness or not was appointed to the point with the maximal
sum of true positive and false negative rates on the ROC curve. Individual patients
were classified as exhibiting recovery of consciousness if their predicted scores were
higher than or equal to the cut-off value, otherwise as consciousness non-recovery .
The classification accuracy was calculated by comparing the predicted label and the
actual GOS score, i.e. "consciousness recovery" (GOS≥3) versus "consciousness
non-recovery" (GOS≤2).
As model interpretation is an important task in most applications of PLSR, there
has been considerable progress in the search for optimal interpretation methods
(Kvalheim and Karstang, 1989; Kvalheim et al., 2014). In this study, using the
Significant Multivariate Correlation (sMC) method (Tran et al., 2014), we assessed
predictor importance in the prognostic regression model. The key points in sMC are to
estimate for each predictor the correct sources of variability resulting from PLSR (i.e.
regression variance and residual variance), and use them to statistically determine a
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variable's importance with respect to the regression model. The F-test values (termed
the sMC F-values) were used to evaluate the predictors' importance in the prognostic
regression model.
Internal validation of model
The prognostic regression model was internally validated using bootstrap
(Steyerberg, 2008). Specifically, bootstrap samples were drawn with replacement
from the training dataset "Beijing 750" such that each bootstrap sampling set had a
number of observations equal to that of the training dataset. Using a bootstrap
sampling set, correlation-based feature selection and CARS-PLSR were first used to
select the feature subset, after which the PLSR was used to generate a prognostic
model. We then applied the model to the bootstrap sampling set and the original
training dataset, and calculated the coefficient of determination R2 of each of the two
datasets. The difference between the two coefficients of determination was defined as
the optimism. This process was repeated 1000 times to obtain a stable estimate of the
optimism. Finally, we subtracted the optimism estimate from the coefficient of
determination
R2
of
the
"Beijing
750"
training
dataset
to
obtain
the
optimism-corrected performance estimate.
In addition, out-of-bag (OOB) estimation was used as an estimate of model
classification performance in the training dataset (James et al., 2013). Specifically, for
the original training dataset x, we left out one sample at a time and denoted the
resulting sets by x(-1),..., x(-n). From each leave-one-out set x(-i), 1000 bootstrap learning
sets of size n-1 were drawn. On every bootstrap learning set generated from x(-i), we
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carried out feature selection, built a PLSR regression and classification model, and
applied the model to the test observation xi. A majority vote was then made to give a
class prediction for observation xi. Finally, we calculated the accuracy for the whole
training dataset x.
External validation of model
External validation is essential to support the general applicability of a prediction
model. We ensured external validity by testing the model in two testing datasets,
neither of which included samples that were considered during the development of the
model. First, using the prognostic regression model, we calculated one predicted score
for each patient in the two testing datasets. As the "Beijing HDxt" dataset assessed the
patients' CRS-R scores at the T1 time point, we calculated the coefficient of
determination R2 between the predicted scores and the patients' CRS-R scores at this
time point. The Bland-Altman plot was also determined. Finally, the patients in the
two testing datasets were assessed as achieving consciousness recovery or not based
on the cut-off threshold obtained using the training dataset. The performance of the
classification, including the accuracy, sensitivity and specificity, was determined.
Comparison between single-domain model and combination model
Using the same modeling and validation method as described above, we examined
predictability and generalizability in the two testing datasets based on the clinical
features alone or the imaging features alone.
In addition, to compare the two types of single-domain models and the
combination model, we used bootstrap resampling to obtain the distribution of the
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prediction accuracies in the two testing datasets based on each of the three types of
models. We first resampled with replacement from the training dataset, and built a
regression and classification model based on the clinical features alone, the
neuroimaging features alone, or the combination of the two-domain features. We then
tested the classification accuracy in the two testing datasets using the three types of
models. In this way, we obtained the distribution of the prediction accuracies using
each of the three types of models. Next, we used repeated measures ANOVA to
determine whether or not the performances of the three types of models were the same,
as well as Ψ, the root-mean-square standardized effect, to report the effect sizes of the
mean differences between them.
Comparison between the proposed modeling method and linear SVM
We compared the prediction performances between the proposed modeling
method and linear SVM. The code for SVM was downloaded from LIBSVM
(LIBSVM, RRID:SCR_010243). The 253 imaging features and the four clinical
features were integrated into one feature vector. No feature selection was adopted in
the linear SVM-based classification. The patients with GOS≥3 were labeled as 1, with
the others being designated as -1 (i.e., GOS ≤2).
Similarly, the OOB estimation process was used to estimate the performance of
linear SVM in the training dataset "Beijing 750". Next, using all the samples in the
training dataset "Beijing 750", we trained a linear SVM-based classifier and then
tested the predictive accuracy in the two testing datasets.
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RESULTS
Imaging feature selection
Correlation-based feature selection
Using the training dataset, we found that some imaging features significantly
correlated to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point. For example, the connection
features of some brain areas, including the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC),
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC) and right lateral parietal cortex in the
default mode network, and the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and left
lateral superior parietal cortex in the executive control network, displayed significant
correlations to the CRS-R T1 scores across the DOC patients. We also found
numerous examples of significant correlation between functional connectivity and the
CRS-R score at the T1 time point, with these functional connectivities being
distributed both within and between brain networks. More information about the
correlations between the imaging features and the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point
are provided in Appendix 6.
CARS-PLSR feature selection
Figure 3 shows the final imaging features selected with CARS-PLSR. Specifically,
the brain area connection features included the aMPFC and PCC in the default mode
network, and the DMPFC in the executive control network. The functional
connectivity features included the connectivity between the aMPFC in the default
mode network and the DMPFC in the executive control network, as well as between
the middle cingulate cortex in the auditory network and the right lateral primary
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visual cortex in the visual network. More information about the feature selection by
bootstrap is provided in Appendix 7.
Prognostic regression model and predictor importance
The prognostic regression model is presented in Figure 4. Based on the regression
formula, we noted some interesting findings. First, there were both positive and
negative weights. In particular, the weights were all positive for the three brain area
connection features, whereas the weight for the functional connectivity feature
between the aMPFC in the default mode network and the DMPFC in the executive
control network was negative. Interestingly, this connection had the maximum sMC
F-value as shown in Figure 4B. In addition, the age and the anoxic etiology had
negative weights, and the age predictor had the largest sMC F-value among the four
clinical features.
Prognostic classification model and internal validation
Figure 5A presents the predicted score for each patient in the training dataset. As
shown in Figure 5B, there was good agreement between the CRS-R scores at the T1
time point and the predicted scores. The apparent coefficient of determination R2 was
equal to 0.65 (permutation test, p=0.001), and the Bland-Altman plot verified the
consistency between the predicted and achieved scores (one sample T test, p=1.0).
The prognostic regression model was internally validated using bootstrap. The
optimism-corrected coefficient of determination R2 was equal to 0.28.
Figure 5C illustrates the number and proportion of DOC patients in different
bands of predicted scores. We found that the proportion of the patients with a
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“consciousness recovery” outcome in the patient cohorts rose in conjunction with an
increase in the predicted score. The higher the predicted score, the higher the
proportion of patients who exhibited a favorable outcome. Figure 5D shows the area
under the ROC curve (AUC=0.96, 95% CI=0.89-0.99). Based on the ROC curve for
the training dataset, the threshold 13.9 was selected as the cut-off point to classify the
recovery of individual patients. In other words, if the predicted score for a patient was
equal to or larger than 13.9, the classification model designated the label
"consciousness recovery" for this patient, otherwise "consciousness non-recovery".
The classification accuracy was assessed by comparing the predicted and actual
outcomes,
i.e.
"consciousness
recovery"
(GOS≥3) versus
" consciousness
non-recovery" (GOS≤2). Using this method, the classification accuracy in the training
dataset was up to 92%. Specifically, the sensitivity was 85%, the specificity was 94%,
the positive predictive value (PPV) was 79%, the negative predictive value (NPV)
was 96%, and the F1 score was 0.81.
The OOB was able to provide the mean prediction error on each training sample
and estimate the generalizability of our method in the training dataset. Using the OOB
estimation, we found that the prediction accuracy in the training dataset "Beijing 750"
was 89%, and the sensitivity, specificity, PPV and NPV were 69%, 94%, 100%, and
87%, respectively.
Model external validation
The performance of the prediction model on the two testing datasets is illustrated
in Figure 6. As we assessed the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point for the patients in
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the "Beijing HDxt" dataset, we calculated the coefficient of determination R2 between
these scores and the predicted scores. The R2 was equal to 0.35 (permutation test,
p=0.005), with the Bland-Altman plot verifying the consistency between the predicted
and actual scores (one sample T test, p=0.89). Using the predicted score 13.9 as the
threshold, we then tested the classification accuracy on the two testing datasets. We
found that, for the "Beijing HDxt" dataset, the prediction accuracy was up to 88%
(sensitivity: 83%, specificity: 92%, PPV: 92%, NPV:86%, F1 score:0.87; permutation
test, p<0.001), while for the "Guangzhou HDxt" dataset it was also up to 88%
(sensitivity:
100%,
specificity:83%,
PPV:67%,
NPV:100%,
F1
score:0.80;
permutation test, p<0.001). Notably, our model demonstrated good sensitivity and
specificity for both the "subacute" patients (i.e. duration of unconsciousness ≤3
months) and those in the chronic phase (i.e. duration of unconsciousness >3 months),
as shown in Figure 7. More interestingly, for the testing dataset "Beijing HDxt", eight
DOC patients who were initially diagnosed as VS/UWS subsequently recovered
consciousness. Using the proposed model, we could successfully identify seven of
these and there was only one false positive case. That is, for the VS/UWS patients, the
model achieved 90.0% accuracy (sensitivity: 87.5%, specificity: 91.7%, PPV:87.5%,
NPV:91.7%, F1 score:0.875).
To test robustness, we evaluated whether the present prognostic regression model
generalized to the healthy subjects scanned in the "Beijing 750" training dataset (n=30)
and the "Beijing HDxt" testing dataset (n=10). We found that both the healthy subjects
and the "consciousness recovery" patients had significantly higher predicted imaging
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subscores than the "consciousness non-recovery" patients (two sample T test, p<0.05).
Additional information is provided in Appendix 8.
Comparison of the single-domain and combination models
When only the clinical features were used to build the predictive model, the
prediction accuracy for the "Beijing HDxt" dataset was 68% (sensitivity: 58%,
specificity: 77%, PPV: 70%, NPV:67%, F1 score:0.64), while for the "Guangzhou
HDxt" dataset it was 83% (sensitivity: 100%, specificity:78%, PPV:60%, NPV:100%,
F1 score:0.75). When only the imaging features were involved in the model, the
prediction accuracy for the "Beijing HDxt" dataset was 80% (sensitivity: 67%,
specificity: 92%, PPV: 89%, NPV:75%, F1 score:0.76), while for the "Guangzhou
HDxt" dataset it was 79% (sensitivity: 100%, specificity:72%, PPV:55%, NPV:100%,
F1 score:0.71).
Using bootstrapping, we obtained the distribution of the prediction accuracies in
the two testing datasets with each of the three types of models. In the "Beijing HDxt"
testing dataset, the mean±standard deviation of the distribution of the prediction
accuracies was 0.815±0.050, 0.811±0.044, and 0.666±0.037 for the combination
model, the model using imaging features alone, and the model using clinical features
alone, respectively. We found that there were significant differences between the
means of the classification accuracies using the three types of models (repeated
measures ANOVA, p<0.001). Subsequently, we conducted pairwise comparisons. We
found that there was significant difference between the combination model and the
model separately using the imaging feature alone (paired sample t-test, p=0.001) and
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using the clinical feature alone (paired sample t-test, p<0.001). We also found that
there was significant difference between the model using the imaging feature alone
and the model using the clinical feature alone (paired sample t-test, p<0.001). Using
effect size analysis, we found that there was a mean difference of Ψ=0.004 (95%
CI=[0.002, 0.007]) between the combination method and the method using only
imaging features, and Ψ=0.149 (95% CI=[0.147, 0.152]) between the combination
method and the method using only clinical features. We also observed a mean
difference of Ψ=0.145 (95% CI=[0.142, 0.147]) between the methods using only
imaging features and only clinical features.
In the "Guangzhou HDxt" testing dataset, the mean±standard deviation of the
distribution of the prediction accuracies was 0.863 ± 0.051, 0.783 ± 0.044, and
0.829±0.086 for the combination model, the model using imaging features alone, and
the model using clinical features alone, respectively. Similarly, we found that there
were significant differences between the mean of the classification accuracies using
the three types of models (repeated measures ANOVA, p<0.001), and there was
significant difference between the combination model and the models using imaging
features alone (paired sample t-test, p<0.001) or using clinical features alone (paired
sample t-test, p<0.001). Using effect size analysis, we found a mean difference of
Ψ=0.080 (95% CI=[0.076, 0.084]) between the combination model and the model
using the imaging features alone, and Ψ=0.034 (95% CI=[0.028, 0.040]) between the
combination model and the model using only clinical features. We also observed a
mean difference of Ψ= -0.046 (95% CI=[-0.053, -0.040]) between the model using
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imaging features alone and that using only clinical features.
Therefore, in both testing datasets, the combination of imaging and clinical
features demonstrated higher accuracy than the use of the single domain features
alone. In addition, using the imaging features alone had higher predictive power in
comparison to using the clinical features alone in the "Beijing HDxt" dataset, whereas
the opposite condition was observed in the "Guangzhou HDxt" dataset, suggesting
that the two testing datasets might be heterogeneous. More information about the
single-domain models are provided in Supplementary file 2.
Comparison between the proposed modeling method and linear SVM
Using the OOB estimation, we found that the accuracy of the linear SVM-based
classification method in the training dataset "Beijing 750" was 83% (sensitivity: 31%,
specificity: 96%, PPV: 100%, NPV: 81%), which was lower than the accuracy of our
proposed modeling method (i.e., accuracy: 89%, sensitivity: 69%, specificity: 94%,
PPV: 100%, NPV: 87%). On the other hand, the linear SVM-based classification
method achieved an accuracy of 76% (sensitivity: 58%, specificity: 92%, PPV: 88%,
NPV: 71%) and 88% (sensitivity: 100%, specificity: 83%, PPV: 67%, NPV: 100%) in
the "Beijing HDxt" testing dataset and the "Guangzhou HDxt" testing dataset,
respectively. That is, the accuracy in the "Beijing HDxt" testing dataset was lower
than that in our method, whereas the accuracy in the "Guangzhou HDxt" testing
dataset was similar to that of our approach. Therefore, taking together the
performance comparisons in both the training dataset and the two testing datasets, we
believe that our method based on feature selection and PLSR should have higher
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prediction accuracy and better generalizability in comparison to linear SVM.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we describe the development of a prognostic model that combines
resting state fMRI with three clinical characteristics to predict one year outcomes at
the single-subject level. The model discriminated between patients who would later
recover consciousness and those who would not with an accuracy of around 88% on
three datasets from two medical centers. It was also able to identify the prognostic
importance of different predictors, including brain functions and clinical
characteristics. To our knowledge, this is the first reported implementation of a
multidomain prognostic model based on resting state fMRI and clinical characteristics
in chronic DOC. We therefore suggest that this novel prognostic model is accurate,
robust, and interpretable. For research only, we share the prognostic model and its
Matlab code at a public download resource (https://github.com/realmsong504/pDOC).
Brain functions are mediated by the interactions between neurons within different
neural circuits and brain regions. Functional imaging can detect the local activity of
different brain regions and explore the interactions between them, and has
demonstrated potential for informing diagnosis and prognosis in DOC. On the one
hand, many studies have focused on one modality of brain functional imaging, such as
PET (Phillips et al., 2011), SPECT (Nayak and Mahapatra, 2011), task fMRI (Owen
et al., 2006; Coyle et al., 2015), and resting state fMRI (Demertzi et al., 2015; Qin et
al., 2015; Wu et al., 2015; Roquet et al., 2016). On the other hand, some
cross-modality studies have compared the diagnostic precision between imaging
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modalities, for example, comparing PET imaging with task fMRI (Stender et al.,
2014), or comparing PET, EEG and resting state fMRI (Golkowski et al., 2017). In
our study, by combining brain functional networks detected from resting state fMRI
with three clinical characteristics, we built a computational model that allowed us to
make predictions regarding the prognosis of DOC patients at an individual level. We
compared the models separately using only the imaging features or only the clinical
characteristics and found that the combination of these predictors achieved higher
accuracy. This validated the need for the use of accumulative evidence stemming from
multiple assessments, each of which has different sensitivity and specificity in
detecting the capacity for recovery of consciousness (Demertzi et al., 2017).
Validations in additional and unseen datasets were also undertaken to evaluate the
feasibility of the predictive model. Our results showed about 88% average accuracy
across the two testing datasets, and good sensitivity and specificity in both the
"subacute" patients (i.e. 1 months ≤ duration of unconsciousness ≤3 months) and
those in the prolonged phase (i.e. duration of unconsciousness >3 months), which
suggested good robustness and the generalizability of our model.
Further, the sensitivity of 83% and 100% obtained across the two testing datasets
demonstrated a low false negative rate, which would avoid predicting non-recovery in
a patient who can actually recover. Our method successfully identified 16 out of the
total 18 patients who later recovered consciousness in the two testing datasets. In
parallel, the specificity across the two testing datasets was up to 92% and 83%,
respectively. Taken together, these results suggest that our method can precisely
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identify those patients with a high-potential for recovery consciousness and
concurrently reduce false positives in predicting low-potential patients. In addition,
although it has been widely considered that the prospect of a clinically meaningful
recovery is unrealistic for prolonged DOC patients (Wijdicks and Cranford, 2005),
our model correctly predicted 9 out of 10 DOC patients with longer than or equal to
three months duration of DOC who subsequently recovered consciousness, including
three patients with longer or equal to six months duration, suggesting that it can also
be applied to prolonged DOC patients.
According to the surviving consciousness level, DOC patients can be classified
into distinct diagnostic entities, including VS/UWS and MCS. As MCS is often
viewed as a state with a potentially more favorable outcome (Luaute et al., 2010), a
misdiagnosis of VS/UWS could heavily bias the judgment of the prognosis, the
medical treatment options and even the associated ethical decisions. Some influential
studies have found that a few VS/UWS patients exhibit near-normal high-level
cortical activation in response to certain stimuli or commands (Owen et al., 2006;
Monti et al., 2010), and that late recovery of responsiveness and consciousness is not
exceptional in patients with VS/UWS (Estraneo et al., 2010). Instead of predicting
diagnosis, this study used one year outcome as a target for regression and
classification. Our method based on the combined use of clinical and neuroimaging
data successfully identified seven out of the eight VS/UWS patients in the testing
dataset who were initially diagnosed as VS/UWS but subsequently achieved a
promising outcome.
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By analyzing the sMC F-value for each predictor in the regression model, we
investigated the prognostic effects of these predictors. In particular, the sMC F-value
of the incidence age was greater than that of the other clinical characteristics,
suggesting that incidence age might be the most important predictor among the
clinical characteristics. Notably, the sMC F-value for the imaging features as a whole
seemed to be greater than that of the clinical features, as shown in Figure 4B. We
therefore speculate that the patient's residual consciousness capacity, indicated by
brain networks and functional connectivity detected from resting state fMRI, might
have a stronger prognostic effect than their clinical characteristics.
Some previous studies have shown that the resting state functional connectivity
within the default mode network is decreased in severely brain-damaged patients, in
proportion to their degree of consciousness impairment, from locked-in syndrome to
minimally conscious, vegetative and coma patients (Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2010).
Moreover, the reduced functional connectivity within the default mode network,
specifically between the MPFC and the PCC, may predict the outcome of DOC
patients (Silva et al., 2015). Our model also validates that the aMPFC and PCC in the
default mode network play important roles in predicting prognosis.
Above all, we found that the functional connectivity between the aMPFC and the
DMPFC had the maximum sMC F-value in the prognostic regression model. The
aMPFC is one of the core brain areas in the default mode network, whereas the
DMPFC is located in the executive control network. Previous studies have
demonstrated that this functional connectivity is negative connectivity in normal
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healthy populations, with the anti-correlation being proposed as one reflection of the
intrinsic functional organization of the human brain (Fox et al., 2005). The default
mode network directly contributes to internally generated stimulus-independent
thoughts, self-monitoring, and baseline monitoring of the external world, while the
executive control network supports active exploration of the external world. Correct
communication and coordination between these two intrinsic anti-correlated networks
is thought to be very important for optimal information integration and cognitive
functioning (Buckner et al., 2008). A recent study reported that negative functional
connectivities between the default mode network and the task-positive network were
only observed in patients who recovered consciousness and healthy controls, whereas
positive values were obtained in patients with impaired consciousness (Di Perri et al.,
2016). Further, our regression model suggests that the anti-correlations between these
two diametrically opposed networks (i.e., default mode network and executive control
network) should be the most crucial imaging feature for predicting the outcomes of the
DOC patients. We therefore conclude that our prognostic model has good
interpretability, and that it not only verifies the findings of previous studies but also
provides a window to assess the relative significance of various predictors for the
prognosis of DOC patients.
This study involved two testing datasets, which were found to be quite different, as
shown in Table 1. First, the distributions of the etiology of the patients were
remarkably different in the two datasets. The numbers of patients suffering from
trauma/stroke/anoxia were 12/6/7 and 8/0/16 in the "Beijing HDxt" and "Guangzhou
35 / 102
HDxt" datasets, respectively. The outcomes were also different. In the "Beijing HDxt"
dataset, 12 out of the total 25 patients recovered consciousness, compared with six out
of the total 24 patients in the "Guangzhou HDxt" dataset. Given that the characteristics
of the two medical centers and their roles in the local health care system are different,
we speculate that this could be one of the main reasons that the enrolled patient
populations were heterogeneous. As described in the Introduction, DOC can have
many causes and be associated with several neuropathological processes and different
severities, leading to the suggestion that information from different domains should be
integrated to improve diagnosis and prognostication (Bernat, 2016). Our study
demonstrates that the combination of imaging and clinical features can achieve a better
performance than the use of single domain features.
However, some caution is warranted. Firstly, although this study involved 112
DOC patients, the patients who would later recover consciousness was relatively low
(i.e. 31/112). So, a much larger cohort will be needed for further validation. Secondly,
the PPVs for the two testing datasets were remarkably different, with that for the
"Guangzhou HDxt" dataset being relatively low (67% versus 91%). Although our
method predicted that nine patients in this dataset would recover consciousness, only
six of them did (i.e. GOS≥3), with the other three remaining unconscious at the end of
the follow-up (i.e. GOS≤2). Given that many additional factors are associated with the
outcome of DOC patients, including medical complications, nutrition and so on,
future work will need to integrate more information in order to provide more precise
predictions. Thirdly, the signal-to-noise ratio of resting state fMRI can influence
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functional connectivity analysis, so calibrations will be necessary when applying the
predictive model across different sites, including standardizing the MRI acquisition
protocols (e.g. scanner hardware, imaging protocols and acquisition sequences) and
the patients' management strategies (see Appendix 10 for more information). Finally,
a DOC patient’s prognosis can be considered according to at least three dimensions:
survival/mortality, recovery of consciousness, and functional recovery. This study
focused on predicting recovery of consciousness, and the patients who died during the
follow-up were excluded. In the future, we will consider more outcome assessments,
including survival/mortality and functional recovery.
In summary, our prognostic model, which combines resting state fMRI with
clinical characteristics, is proposed to predict the one year outcome of DOC patients
at an individual level. The average accuracy of classifying a patient as "consciousness
recovery" or not was around 88% in the training dataset and two unseen testing
datasets. Our model also has good interpretability, thereby providing a window to
reassure physicians and scientists about the significance of different predictors,
including brain networks, functional connectivities and clinical characteristics.
Together, these advantages could offer an objective prognosis for DOC patients to
optimize their management and deepen our understanding of brain function during
unconsciousness.
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Acknowledgements
The authors appreciate the help of Ms Rowan Tweedale with the use of English in
this paper.
Funding
This work was partially supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China
(Grant Nos. 81471380, 91432302, 31620103905), the Science Frontier Program of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences (Grant No. QYZDJ-SSW-SMC019), National Key
R&D Program of China(Grant No. 2017YFA0105203), Beijing Municipal Science&
Technology Commission (Grant Nos. Z161100000216139, Z161100000216152,
Z161100000516165), the Guangdong Pearl River Talents Plan Innovative and
Entrepreneurial Team grant (2016ZT06S220) and Youth Innovation Promotion
Association CAS.
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Legend
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of the patients in the three datasets.
Beijing_750 Beijing_HDxt Guangzhou_HDxt
(n=63)
(n=25)
(n=24)
Gender, M/F
Etiology
Trauma/Stroke/Anoxia
Age at the T0 (years)
Mean(SD)
Range
Time to MRI (months)
Range
Mean(SD)
Median
Band
[1,3]
(3,6]
(6,12]
>12
Follow-up time (months)
Range
Mean(SD)
Median
Band
[12,24]
(24,48]
>48
Diagnosis at T0
MCS/VS
CRS-R total score
Mean(SD)
Range
Outcome at T1
CRS-R total score
Mean(SD)
Range
GOS score
GOS=5
GOS=4
GOS=3
GOS<=2
36/27
18/7
14/10
17/21/25
12/6/7
8/0/16
42.8(13.8)
18.0~71.0
40.7(15.2)
18.0~68.0
39.3(16.9)
15.0~78.0
1.0~77.0
7.4(12.8)
3.0
1.0~44.0
5.4(8.4)
3.0
1.0~10.0
2.3(2.4)
1.5
32
15
11
5
13
8
3
1
20
2
2
0
12.0~51.0
21.0(9.8)
15.0
14.0~53.0
41.7(8.4)
43.0
27.0~78.0
52.2(14.5)
53.0
38
24
1
2
20
3
0
8
16
17/46
5/20
8/16
7.3(2.9)
3.0~18.0
6.5(2.3)
3.0~14.0
7.1(4.1)
3.0~17.0
9.9(5.1)
3.0~22.0
12.7(6.4)
5.0~23.0
N/A
N/A
0
5
8
50
0
5
7
13
0
1
5
18
48 / 102
Abbreviations: CRS-R: Coma Recovery Scale–Revised; GOS: Glasgow Outcome
Scale; MCS: minimally conscious state; N/A: not available; SD: standard deviation;
VS: vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome.
49 / 102
Figure 1. Conceptual paradigm of the study. CRS-R: Coma Recovery Scale Revised
scale; GOS: Glasgow Outcome Scale.
50 / 102
Figure 2. Data analysis pipeline. All datasets involved in this study included resting
state fMRI and clinical data. For the fMRI data in the training dataset, data analysis
first encompassed preprocessing and imaging feature selection and extraction. Partial
least square regression was then used to generate the regression model using the
selected imaging features and clinical features in the training dataset. In this way, a
prediction score that depicts the possibility of consciousness recovery was computed
for each patient. The optimal cut-off value for classifying an individual patient as
responsive or non-responsive was then calculated, and the prognostic classification
model was obtained. The two testing datasets were only used to externally validate the
regression and classification model.
51 / 102
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Figure 3.
Imaging features involved in the prognostic regression model.
DMN.aMPFC: anterior medial prefrontal cortex in the default mode network;
DMN.PCC: posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus in the default mode network;
ExecuContr.DMPFC: dorsal medial prefrontal cortex in the executive control network;
Auditory.MCC: middle cingulate cortex in the auditory network; Visual.R.V1: right
lateral
primary
visual
cortex
in
the
visual
network.
DMN.aMPFC
-
ExecuContr.DMPFC: the functional connectivity between DMN.aMPFC and
ExecuContr.DMPFC; Auditory.MCC - Visual.R.V1: the functional connectivity
between Auditory.MCC and Visual.R.V1.
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54 / 102
Figure 4. Prognostic
rognostic regression model. In the three subplots, each color denotes a
particular predictor. (A) Regression formula. (B) Predictor importance for each
predictor in prognostic regression model. The vertical axis represents the sMC
F-test value. The
he larger the sMC F-value,
F value, the more informative the predictor
with respect to the regression model.
model (C) The imaging features in the model are
rendered on a 3D surface plot template in medial view.
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Figure 5.
The performance of the prediction model on the training dataset. (A)
Individual predicted scores for each DOC patient in the training dataset. The CRS-R
score at the T0 time point is shown on the x axis and the predicted score on the y axis.
The patients diagnosed as VS/UWS at the T0 time point are shown to the left of the
vertical red solid line, whereas the patients diagnosed as MCS at this time point are
shown to the right. The purplish red pentagram, imperial purple triangle and blank
circle mark the patients with a GOS score ≥4, =3 and ≤2, respectively, at the T1 time
point. (B) Agreement between the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point and the
predicted scores. The left panel shows the correlation between the CRS-R scores at
the T1 time point and the predicted scores, and the right panel shows the differences
between them using the Bland-Altman plot. (C) Bar chart showing the numbers or
proportions of DOC patients in each band of predicted scores. In these two panels, the
y axis shows the predicted score. (D) The area under the receiver-operating
characteristic (ROC) curve. The star on the curve represents the point with the
maximal sum of true positive and false negative rates on the ROC curve, which were
chosen as the cut-off threshold for classification. Here, the corresponding predicted
score=13.9.
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57 / 102
Figure 6. The performance of the prediction model on the two testing datasets. (A)
The individual predicted score (top panel) and agreement between the CRS-R scores
at the T1 time point and the predicted scores (bottom panel) for the testing dataset
"Beijing HxDt". (B) The individual predicted score for each DOC patient in the
testing dataset "Guangzhou HxDt". The legend description is the same as for Figure 5.
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Figure 7. The sensitivity and specificity in the "subacute" patients (i.e. duration of
unconsciousness T0≤33 months) and those in the chronic phase (i.e. duration of
unconsciousness T0 >3 months), respectively.
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Supplementary file 1. Some examples of the warped ROIs in the default mode
network for one healthy control and three DOC patients with a GOS score 2,3,4,
respectively.
Supplementary file 2. Details about single-domain prognostic models and
comparisons of the single-domain and combination models.
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Appendix 1:
Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients and normal controls in this study.
The diagnosis in this study was made by experienced physicians according to the CRS-R scale. Patients were diagnosed as MCS when they
demonstrated at least one of the following behaviors: (1) following simple commands; (2) yes/no responses (gestural or verbal); (3) intelligible
verbalization; (4) purposeful behavior in response to an environmental stimulus; (5) vocalization or gestures in direct response to questions; (6)
reaching for objects that demonstrates a clear relationship between the position of the object and the direction of the movement; (7) touching or
holding objects; (8) following or staring at an object in direct response to its movement. Emergence from the MCS was signaled by the return of
functional communication and/or object use.
In this study, the patients underwent the CRS-R assessments twice weekly (or more) within the two weeks before MRI scanning. So, the CRS-R
can be generally administered about 4-5 times for a patient. The highest CRS-R score was considered as the diagnosis and listed in the following
tables. T0:
the time point of the MRI scanning; T1: the time point of follow-up.
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Appendix 1-table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients in the "Beijing_750" dataset.
patient
age
gender
diagnose etiology
alias
(years)
001
M
36
VS/UWS
Anoxia
002
M
29
MCS
Trauma
003
F
33
VS/UWS
Trauma
004
F
28
MCS
Trauma
005
M
23
MCS
Anoxia
006
M
45
MCS
Stroke
007
M
39
MCS
Stroke
008
F
27
MCS
Trauma
structural
lesions on
MRI
Diffuse pons
damage
Bilateral-temp
oro-parietal
damage
Bilateral-front
al lobe
damage,
atrophy
L-frontal-temp
oral lobe
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
L-temporo-par
ietal damage
Brainstem
damage
L-basal ganglia
assessments
CRS-R
score
at T0
CRS-R
subscore
at T0
CRS-R
score
at T1
CRS-R
subscore
at T1
1
6
7
022102
22
446323
15
4
18.26
9
4
18
355113
22
456223
39
4
15.31
12
5
7
102202
22
455323
12
4
22.88
1
4
15
335103
22
456223
19
4
16.58
3
4
10
232102
21
455223
13
4
17.08
9
4
9
222102
17
334223
12
3
13.94
1
4
17
345113
19
445123
12
3
14.39
10
6
12
332103
18
345123
19
3
16.09
time to
MRI
(months)
number of
CRS-R
63 / 102
follow-up
GOS
（months）
predicted
score
009
M
23
MCS
Trauma
010
M
42
MCS
Stroke
011
M
53
MCS
Stroke
012
F
40
VS/UWS
Stroke
013
M
22
VS/UWS
Trauma
014
F
64
VS/UWS
Stroke
015
F
42
VS/UWS
Anoxia
016
M
45
VS/UWS
Anoxia
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
L-basal ganglia
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
basal ganglia
(caudates)
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
basal ganglia
damage
L-frontal-temp
oro-parietal
lobe damage
L-thalamus,
basal ganglia
lesions
Diffuse anoxic
cortical lesions
Diffuse anoxic
cortical lesions
6
4
9
132102
19
444223
13
3
10.94
3
7
7
103102
19
416323
12
3
14.72
7
5
11
332102
14
332123
14
3
11.55
5
6
7
112102
14
333122
12
3
14.67
3
4
7
112102
15
334122
27
3
15.48
1
4
7
112102
11
233102
17
2
8.28
1
4
7
112102
9
222102
14
2
9.02
9
5
5
002102
7
112102
15
2
8.65
64 / 102
017
F
60
VS/UWS
Anoxia
018
M
42
VS/UWS
Stroke
019
M
51
VS/UWS
Anoxia
020
F
35
VS/UWS
Anoxia
021
M
71
VS/UWS
Trauma
022
F
30
VS/UWS
Anoxia
023
F
58
VS/UWS
Trauma
024
M
23
MCS
Trauma
Diffuse anoxic
cortical lesions
R-cerebral
hemisphere
lesions
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral-front
al lobe
damage,
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral-basal
ganglia
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
R-basal
ganglia
4
4
6
102102
6
102102
13
2
7.71
6
4
7
112102
7
112102
14
2
12.44
3
4
7
112102
7
112102
28
2
4.28
2
4
7
112102
7
112102
13
2
5.87
6
6
3
101100
4
101101
13
2
4.46
2
4
4
002002
7
022102
38
2
6.92
2
4
3
002100
4
002101
14
2
5.09
5
5
7
103102
11
223202
12
2
14.57
65 / 102
025
F
66
VS/UWS
Trauma
026
F
25
VS/UWS
Anoxia
027
M
48
VS/UWS
Anoxia
028
F
28
MCS
Anoxia
029
M
57
VS/UWS
Anoxia
030
M
61
MCS
Stroke
031
M
40
VS/UWS
Anoxia
(caudates)
damage
Bilateral-temp
oro-parietal
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral-temp
oro-parietal
lobe damage
Diffuse
cortical &
1
4
6
102102
8
113102
32
2
5.71
3
4
5
102002
6
112002
36
2
6.75
4
5
7
112102
8
113102
29
2
7.83
5
4
9
222102
11
233102
32
2
11.36
11
4
6
102102
6
102102
33
2
4.70
2
4
11
134102
11
223112
12
2
10.34
4
4
4
001102
5
011102
27
2
5.70
66 / 102
032
M
39
VS/UWS
Stroke
033
M
41
VS/UWS
Anoxia
034
M
26
VS/UWS
Stroke
035
F
50
VS/UWS
Anoxia
036
F
53
VS/UWS
Stroke
037
M
67
VS/UWS
Stroke
038
M
45
MCS
Stroke
subcortical
atrophy
R-basal
ganglia
damage,
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral
brainstem,
midbrain
damage
R- brainstem,
cerebellar
damage
Diffuse
3
4
7
112102
7
112102
12
2
8.03
2
4
5
002102
5
002102
13
2
6.44
54
4
7
112102
7
112102
38
2
7.28
8
6
6
102102
9
122202
12
2
5.77
3
4
5
112100
7
112102
28
2
8.02
1
4
5
112100
3
002001
12
2
2.04
2
5
9
132102
10
222112
13
2
10.91
67 / 102
039
F
35
VS/UWS
Anoxia
040
F
46
MCS
Trauma
041
M
49
VS/UWS
Stroke
042
M
45
VS/UWS
Stroke
043
M
18
VS/UWS
Anoxia
044
M
53
VS/UWS
Anoxia
045
M
46
VS/UWS
Trauma
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse axonal
injury
Bilateral-brain
stem,
cerebellar
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
basal ganglia
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral-occipi
tal lobe
damage,
atrophy
R-temporo-pa
3
4
6
102102
8
112202
19
2
10.24
77
7
11
222212
13
332212
51
2
14.76
10
4
7
112102
7
112102
28
2
10.87
3
4
7
112102
8
122102
19
2
7.59
8
5
6
111102
9
123102
12
2
10.85
2
4
3
002001
7
112102
34
2
1.98
4
4
6
101202
6
101202
13
2
7.23
68 / 102
046
F
29
VS/UWS
Anoxia
047
F
47
MCS
Stroke
048
M
58
VS/UWS
Stroke
049
M
66
VS/UWS
Anoxia
050
M
34
VS/UWS
Trauma
051
F
31
MCS
Trauma
052
M
33
VS/UWS
Stroke
053
F
31
VS/UWS
Anoxia
rietal damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
R-basal
ganglia
damage
Bilateral-temp
oro-parietal
lobe damage
L-frontal lobe
damage
Diffuse axonal
injury
L-frontal-temp
oro-parietal
lobe damage
L-temporo-par
ietal lobe
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
basal ganglia
(caudates)
damage
28
4
7
112102
9
123102
12
2
8.31
47
5
8
113102
11
222212
12
2
9.66
6
4
7
112102
8
113102
27
2
7.05
4
4
4
002002
6
102102
38
2
4.79
3
4
6
112101
8
122102
14
2
10.28
3
5
11
133202
8
112202
15
2
15.56
17
4
6
102102
8
113102
13
2
7.67
1
4
6
102102
6
102102
27
2
8.36
69 / 102
054
F
28
VS/UWS
Anoxia
055
F
26
VS/UWS
Stroke
056
M
45
VS/UWS
Trauma
057
F
69
VS/UWS
Stroke
058
F
68
VS/UWS
Trauma
059
M
50
VS/UWS
Stroke
060
M
60
MCS
Trauma
061
M
44
VS/UWS
Anoxia
062
F
35
VS/UWS
Anoxia
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
L-basal ganglia
damage
Diffuse axonal
injury
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse axonal
injury
L-frontal-temp
oro-parietal
lobe damage
Bilateral
brainstem,
midbrain
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral-basal
3
4
6
102102
8
112202
32
2
9.23
4
4
6
102102
6
102102
12
2
10.96
1
4
6
102102
6
102102
29
2
9.05
4
4
6
102102
7
102202
33
2
12.43
6
6
7
112102
9
132102
17
2
9.74
3
4
6
111102
8
222002
27
2
7.01
7
4
11
134102
11
223112
30
2
11.69
2
4
6
102102
4
002101
13
2
10.48
3
5
7
211102
9
231102
27
2
9.07
70 / 102
063
F
43
VS/UWS
Anoxia
ganglia
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
2
4
71 / 102
7
112102
8
202112
29
2
10.09
Appendix 1-table 2. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients in the "Beijing_HDxt" dataset.
patient
age
gender
diagnose
alias
(years)
etiology
001
M
19
VS/UWS
Trauma
002
M
26
MCS
Trauma
003
F
22
VS/UWS
Trauma
004
M
41
VS/UWS
Stroke
005
M
36
MCS
Stroke
006
M
34
VS/UWS
Anoxia
007
F
18
VS/UWS
Trauma
structural
lesions on
MRI
L-temporo-pa
rietal lobe
damage
R-thalamus,
basal ganglia
lesions
L-temporal
lobe damage
Bilateral
brainstem,
midbrain
damage
Bilateral
brainstem
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse axonal
injury
at T0
CRS-R
score
at T1
CRS-R
subscore
at T1
7
112102
22
456223
40
4
20.37
6
10
232102
23
456323
47
4
17.12
4
4
6
102102
22
456223
47
4
14.05
3
4
6
112101
23
456323
50
4
20.23
4
4
6
003102
23
456323
39
4
7.75
1
4
6
111102
14
323123
31
3
17.25
3
4
5
012002
14
332123
41
3
14.86
time to
MRI
(months)
number of
CRS-R
CRS-R
CRS-R
score
subscore
assessments
at T0
6
4
3
72 / 102
follow-up
GOS
（months）
predicted
score
008
M
58
MCS
Trauma
009
M
41
MCS
Trauma
010
M
46
VS/UWS
Stroke
011
M
25
VS/UWS
Anoxia
012
M
58
VS/UWS
Trauma
013
M
36
VS/UWS
Trauma
014
M
58
VS/UWS
Trauma
015
M
65
VS/UWS
Stroke
016
F
24
VS/UWS
Trauma
R-frontal lobe
damage
R-frontal-tem
poro-parietal
lobe damage
L-brainstem,
cerebellar
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
L-brainstem
damage
L-frontal-tem
poro-parietal
lobe damage
R-frontal-tem
poro-parietal
lobe damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse axonal
injury
12
4
8
113102
15
333123
40
3
15.62
1
5
11
233012
18
344223
42
3
18.89
7
4
6
102102
14
332123
53
3
17.05
4
6
6
102102
14
224123
46
3
18.07
1
7
7
112102
19
355123
40
3
10.75
6
4
7
112102
10
232102
44
2
9.58
4
4
6
102102
6
102102
45
2
6.69
3
4
3
100002
5
101102
43
2
4.01
44
6
6
102102
8
122102
44
2
14.03
73 / 102
017
F
46
VS/UWS
Stroke
018
M
53
VS/UWS
Anoxia
019
F
32
VS/UWS
Trauma
020
M
41
VS/UWS
Anoxia
021
F
33
VS/UWS
Anoxia
022
M
49
VS/UWS
Anoxia
023
F
25
MCS
Anoxia
024
M
63
VS/UWS
Stroke
L-pons
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
L-temporo-pa
rietal lobe
damage
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Diffuse
cortical &
subcortical
atrophy
Bilateral
thalamus,
brainstem
damage
L-basal
2
4
7
112102
7
112102
40
2
12.11
3
4
4
101002
6
102102
41
2
5.38
3
4
6
102102
8
112202
23
2
13.76
2
4
4
101002
8
112202
40
2
12.06
7
5
6
211002
11
232202
47
2
4.55
2
4
6
102102
6
102102
14
2
8.97
4
7
14
450023
10
240022
50
2
12.42
5
4
4
001102
5
101102
48
2
8.22
74 / 102
025
M
68
VS/UWS
Trauma
ganglia
lesions
L-frontal-tem
poro-parietal
lobe damage
2
4
75 / 102
5
002102
6
012102
47
2
9.72
Appendix 1-table 3. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients in the "Guangzhou_HDxt" dataset.
patient
alias
001
002
003
004
005
006
007
008
009
010
011
012
013
014
015
016
017
018
019
020
021
gender
F
M
F
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
F
M
M
F
F
M
age
(years)
15
29
27
20
30
31
28
48
46
78
39
46
39
16
25
76
36
32
49
52
62
diagnose
etiology
MCS
MCS
MCS
MCS
MCS
MCS
VS/UWS
MCS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
MCS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
Anoxia
Trauma
Trauma
Trauma
Trauma
Trauma
Anoxia
Trauma
Trauma
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
Trauma
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
time to
MRI(months)
1
4
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
5
2
10
1
1
2
CRS-R
score at T0
13
9
9
8
15
20
5
12
4
4
5
4
5
3
12
4
5
6
6
3
3
76 / 102
CRS-R
subscore at T0
135112
114012
105102
113102
116223
445223
102002
234102
102001
100102
002102
001102
102002
001002
135102
100102
001202
102102
102102
000102
001002
follow-up
GOS
（months）
59
4
61
3
29
3
41
3
63
3
51
3
69
2
55
2
65
2
49
2
51
2
46
2
43
2
71
2
78
2
59
2
65
2
56
2
49
2
27
2
28
2
predicted
score
20.92
16.50
16.67
20.37
17.34
14.00
9.71
9.11
12.58
9.20
4.20
14.49
7.30
14.17
8.56
3.57
17.28
5.66
4.55
5.08
10.26
022
023
024
F
F
F
33
28
57
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
VS/UWS
Anoxia
Anoxia
Anoxia
2
9
1
6
6
5
77 / 102
102102
102102
002102
29
67
42
2
2
2
9.09
12.62
4.72
Appendix 1-table 4. Demographic of healthy controls in the "Beijing_750" dataset.
alias
NC001
NC002
NC003
NC004
NC005
NC007
NC008
NC009
NC010
NC012
NC013
NC014
NC015
NC016
NC017
NC018
NC019
NC020
NC021
NC022
NC023
NC026
gender
F
M
F
M
M
F
F
F
F
F
M
F
M
M
F
M
M
F
F
M
F
M
age
40
50
34
25
28
24
47
22
60
26
21
27
40
44
22
50
27
43
25
54
52
46
handedness
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
78 / 102
NC027
NC028
NC029
NC030
NC031
NC032
NC033
NC034
F
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
52
29
46
44
30
31
32
30
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Appendix 1-table 5. Demographic of healthy controls in the "Beijing_HDxt" dataset.
alias
NC001_HDxt
NC002_HDxt
NC003_HDxt
NC004_HDxt
NC005_HDxt
NC006_HDxt
NC007_HDxt
NC008_HDxt
NC009_HDxt
NC010_HDxt
gender
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
F
F
F
age
44
42
30
40
30
30
58
54
41
41
handedness
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
79 / 102
Appendix 2:
Brain networks and regions of interest in this study.
The six brain networks investigated in this study and the names of regions of interest
(ROI). The Appendix 2 - table 1 represented the six brain networks, the name of ROIs,
the peak coordinates in the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space and the
corresponding references. All of ROI were defined as a spherical region with a radius
of 6mm at the center of the peak coordinates of the ROI.
Appendix 2 - table 1: Brain networks and ROIs in this study.
Brain Network
ROI name
ROI
Peak
MNI
Abbreviation
coordinates
References
(Raichle,
Default mode
Demertzi
2011;
et
al.,
2015)
Anterior medial prefrontal cortex
aMPFC
-1 54 27
Posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus
PCC
0 -52 27
Left lateral parietal cortex
L.LatP
-46 -66 30
Right lateral parietal cortex
R.LatP
49 -63 33
(Seeley et al., 2007;
Executive control
Raichle, 2011)
Dorsal medial PFC
DMPFC
0 27 46
Left anterior prefrontal cortex
L.PFC
-44 45 0
Right anterior prefrontal cortex
R.PFC
44 45 0
Left superior parietal cortex
L. Parietal
-50 -51 45
Right superior parietal cortex
R. Parietal
50 -51 45
(Seeley et al., 2007;
Raichle,
Salience
Demertzi
2011;
et
al.,
2015)
Left orbital frontoinsula
L.AIns
-40 18 -12
Right orbital frontoinsula
R.AIns
42 10 -12
Dorsal anterior cingulate
dACC
0 18 30
(Raichle,
Sensorimotor
Demertzi
2015)
Left primary motor cortex
L.M1
80 / 102
-39 -26 51
2011;
et
al.,
Brain Network
ROI
Peak
Abbreviation
coordinates
Right primary motor cortex
R.M1
38 -26 51
Supplementary motor area
SMA
0 -21 51
ROI name
MNI
References
(Raichle,
Auditory
Demertzi
2011;
et
al.,
et
al.,
2015)
Left Primary auditory cortex
L.A1
-62 -30 12
Right Primary auditory cortex
R.A1
59 -27 15
Middle cingulate cortex
MCC
0 -7 43
(Demertzi
Visual
2015)
Left primary visual cortex
L.V1
-13 -85 6
Right primary visual cortex
R.V1
8 -82 6
Left associative visual cortex
L.V4
-30 -89 20
Right associative visual cortex
R.V4
30 -89 20
81 / 102
Appendix 3:
Brain functional network templates.
Although the neurobiological implications of the spontaneous neuronal activity are
not very clear, spontaneous fluctuations in the blood oxygenation level-dependent
signal have been found to be coherent within a variety of functionally relevant brain
regions, which are denoted as representing a "network". Moreover, several networks
have been found to be spatially consistent across different healthy subjects
(Damoiseaux et al., 2006). Researchers suggested that the brain networks assessed by
resting state fMRI may reflect an intrinsic functional architecture of the brain (Raichle,
2011). As mentioned in the manuscript, multiple networks were reported to be
disrupted in the DOC patients. Here, the connection templates of the six brain
networks were investigated within the healthy control group of the "Beijing 750"
dataset. This study focused on the cortex, so six functional networks were investigated,
including default mode network, executive control network, salience, sensorimotor,
auditory, and visual network. Group functional connectivity maps for each of the six
networks were created with a one-sample t test as shown the following Appendix 3 figure 1. These templates were separately shown on the brain surface using the
SurfStat toolbox (SurfStat, RRID:SCR_007081). The color bar represented T value.
Appendix 3 - figure 1. The six brain functional network templates in this study.
82 / 102
83 / 102
Appendix 4:
Quality control for resting state functional connectivity.
During the MRI scanning, the foam pad and headphones were used to reduce head
motion and scanner noise. The normal controls were instructed to keep still with their
eyes closed, as motionless as possible and not to think about anything in particular.
The same instructions were given to the patients but due to their consciousness and
cognitive impairments, we could not fully control for a prolonged eye-closed yet
awake scanning session. The Appendix 4-figure 1 showed cumulative distribution of
head motion per volume (framewise displacement) for normal controls and the
patients. The Appendix 4-figure 2 showed the results of control quality of resting state
fMRI in this study. The Appendix 4-figure 3 showed the histogram of the remaining
number of fMRI volumes after scrubbing.
84 / 102
Appendix 4-figure 1.. Cumulative distribution of head motion per volume (framewise
displacement) for normal controls and DOC patients separately in the training dataset
"Beijing 750" (A1), the testing dataset "Beijing HDxt" (A2), and the testing dataset
"Guangzhou HDxt" (A3).. The normal controls were shown in left column, whereas
the DOC patients were shown in right column. Noo healthy control data were available
for the Guangzhou centre.
centre In both patients and controls, head position was stable
st
to
within 1.5 mm for the vast majority (>95%)
(>
of brain volumes.
85 / 102
Appendix 4-figure 2. Correlations between motion artifact and neuroanatomical
distance between the ROIss in this study. Prior studies have shown that motion artifacts
tend to vary with neuroanatomical distance between brain nodes. Here, we conducted
quality control analyses as described in the previous study (Power
Power et al., 2015).
Specifically, we computed
ed correlations between head motion (mean FD) and each
resting state functional connectivity (RSFC) feature and plotted them as a function of
neuroanatomical distance
tance (mm) for subjects in the training dataset "Beijing 750" (B1),
the testing dataset "Beijing HDxt" (B2), and the testing dataset "Guangzhou HDxt"
(B3). Smoothing curves (in red) were plotted using a moving average filter.
86 / 102
Appendix 4-figure 3. Histogram of the remaining number of fMRI volumes after
scrubbing for each population, specifically "Beijing 750" datatset (C1), "Beijing
HDxt" dataset (C2), and "Guangzhou HDxt" dataset (C3).
87 / 102
Appendix 5:
Warped regions of interest and brain network templates.
The conventional fMRI preprocess normalizes individual fMRI images into a standard
space defined by a specific template image. This study generated a functional
connectivity image for each patient in his/her own fMRI space. During the
preprocessing of each patient’s fMRI scans, the 22 ROIs and the 6 brain network
templates were spatially warped to individual fMRI space and resampled to the voxel
size of the individual fMRI image. To ensure the registration, we developed some
tools to visually check the transformed ROIs and brain network templates for each
subject in this study.
Supplementary file 1 illustrated some examples of the warped ROIs in the default
mode network (DMN) for the 3 DOC patients with a GOS score 2,3,4, respectively.
Additionally, as a reference, we showed these figures for one normal control. The
ROIs in the DMN include the anterior medial prefrontal cortex (aMPFC), the
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC), the left lateral parietal cortex (L.LatP),
the right lateral parietal cortex (R.LatP). The details about these 4 ROIs were listed in
Appendix 2, and the brain network template of the DMN was provided in Appendix 3.
88 / 102
Appendix 6:
Correlations between imaging features and CRS-R scores at T1.
Appendix 6 - table 1. The brain area connection features and their Pearson's
correlations to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point across the DOC patients in the
training dataset "Beijing 750".
**
**
**
**
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
ROI name
DMN.aMPFC
ExecuContr.L.Parietal
DMN.PCC
DMN.R.LatP
ExecuContr.DMPFC
ExecuContr.R.Parietal
Sensorimotor.SMA
ExecuContr.R.PFC
Auditory.R.A1
DMN.L.LatP
ExecuContr.L.PFC
Sensorimotor.L.M1
Auditory.L.A1
Salience.R.AIns
Sensorimotor.R.M1
Visual.L.V4
Salience.dACC
Salience.L.AIns
Visual.R.V1
Auditory.MCC
Visual.R.V4
Visual.L.V1
Pearson's correlation coefficient and p value
r= 0.514, p=0.000
r= 0.429, p=0.000
r= 0.420, p=0.001
r= 0.407, p=0.001
r= 0.405, p=0.001
r= 0.363, p=0.003
r= -0.332, p=0.008
r= 0.320, p=0.011
r= 0.315, p=0.012
r= 0.298, p=0.018
r= 0.291, p=0.021
r= 0.267, p=0.035
r= 0.206, p=0.105
r= -0.187, p=0.142
r= 0.167, p=0.191
r= -0.151, p=0.236
r= -0.104, p=0.418
r= 0.075, p=0.560
r= 0.065, p=0.611
r= 0.053, p=0.682
r= -0.031, p=0.809
r= -0.028, p=0.830
**: p<0.05, FDR corrected; *: p<0.05, uncorrected.
In addition, Appendix 6 - figure 1 illuminated these brain area connection features and
their Pearson's correlations to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point.
89 / 102
Appendix 6 - table 2. Functional
unctional connectivity features and their Pearson's correlations
to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point across the DOC patients in the training
dataset "Beijing 750".
**
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Functional connectivity
Pearson's correlation coefficient
and p value
DMN.aMPFC - ExecuContr.DMPFC
r= -0.489, p=0.000
DMN.L.LatP - Visual.L.V4
Auditory.MCC - Visual.R.V1
ExecuContr.R.PFC - ExecuContr.R.Parietal
ExecuContr.DMPFC - Auditory.MCC
ExecuContr.L.PFC - Salience.dACC
Sensorimotor.R.M1 - Sensorimotor.SMA
Sensorimotor.R.M1 - Auditory.L.A1
Salience.dACC - Visual.R.V1
ExecuContr.DMPFC - Sensorimotor.L.M1
DMN.R.LatP - Visual.R.V4
ExecuContr.L.Parietal - Sensorimotor.L.M1
DMN.aMPFC - Salience.dACC
DMN.aMPFC - Sensorimotor.L.M1
DMN.aMPFC - DMN.PCC
ExecuContr.R.Parietal - Visual.R.V4
DMN.aMPFC - Sensorimotor.R.M1
r= -0.421, p=0.001
r= 0.375, p=0.002
r= 0.361, p=0.004
r= -0.351, p=0.005
r= -0.335, p=0.007
r= -0.330, p=0.008
r= 0.319, p=0.011
r= 0.319, p=0.011
r= -0.310, p=0.013
r= -0.306, p=0.015
r= -0.302, p=0.016
r= -0.292, p=0.020
r= -0.286, p=0.023
r= 0.275, p=0.029
r= -0.270, p=0.033
r= -0.268, p=0.034
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
ExecuContr.R.Parietal - Sensorimotor.R.M1
Sensorimotor.L.M1 - Sensorimotor.SMA
DMN.R.LatP - Sensorimotor.R.M1
ExecuContr.R.Parietal - Visual.L.V4
Salience.dACC - Visual.L.V4
ExecuContr.DMPFC - Sensorimotor.R.M1
DMN.aMPFC - Visual.L.V1
Salience.R.AIns - Sensorimotor.L.M1
DMN.L.LatP - Sensorimotor.SMA
r= -0.263, p=0.037
r= -0.261, p=0.039
r= -0.261, p=0.039
r= -0.257, p=0.042
r= 0.256, p=0.043
r= -0.255, p=0.043
r= 0.251, p=0.047
r= 0.250, p=0.049
r= 0.248, p=0.050
Specifically, the functional connectivity features were the functional connectivity
between any pair of ROIs.
s. Since there were more than 200 functional connectivity, for
the space limitations, only the functional connectivity features which were
significantly correlated to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point were shown.
shown **:
p<0.05, FDR corrected; *: p<0.05, uncorrected.
In addition, Appendix 6 - figure 2 illuminated these functional connectivity features
that were significantly correlated to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point.
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Appendix 6 - figure 3 showed these significant functional connectivity features in a
Circos manner. The
he red links represented
represent the within-network
network functional connectivity,
while the blue links represented
represent the inter-network
network functional connectivity. The width
of link wass proportional to the strength of functional connectivity.
92 / 102
Appendix 7:
Histogram depicting the imaging features included in CARS-PLSR models.
We resampled 1000 times with replacement from the training dataset "Beijing 750". In each bootstrap sampling set, the CARS-PLSR was used
for imaging feature subset selection. We then summarized the number of each imaging feature that was included in the CARS-PLSR model.
Appendix 7 - figure 1 shows the histogram depicting the imaging features included in CARS-PLSR models. The horizontal bar represents the
number.
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Appendix 8:
Validations in healthy control
ontrols.
To test robustness, we evaluated whether the prognostic regression model generalized
to the normal controls (NC) in the training dataset "Beijing 750" (n = 30)
3 and the
testing dataset "Beijing HDxt" (n=10).
(n=10) No normal control data was available in the
Guangzhou centre.. Since the NC subjects did not have the clinical characteristics, we
calculated the subscores only using the imaging features and then compared the
subscores to thatt of the DOC patients. Appendix 8 -figure
figure 1 showed the imaging
subscores for all of the subjects in the three datasets. We would like to emphasize that
the
he normal controls in the training dataset were only used to establish the brain
network templates, and not used for any training.
We found that (1) in the training dataset "Beijing 750", the NC subjects had
significantly larger imaging subscores in comparison to both the DOC patients with
consciousness recovery and the DOC patients with consciousness non-recovery
no
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(one-way ANOVA, p<0.05, multiple comparison corrected), and the DOC patients
with consciousness recovery had significantly larger imaging subscores in comparison
to the DOC patients with consciousness non-recovery (one-way ANOVA, p<0.05,
multiple comparison corrected); (2) in the testing dataset "Beijing HDxt", the NC
subjects had significantly larger imaging subscores in comparison to the DOC patients
with consciousness non-recovery (one-way ANOVA, p<0.05, multiple comparison
corrected), and the DOC patients with consciousness recovery had significantly larger
imaging subscores in comparison to the DOC patients with consciousness
non-recovery (one-way ANOVA, p<0.05, multiple comparison corrected); (3) In the
testing dataset "Guangzhou HDxt", the imaging subscores of the DOC patients with
consciousness recovery were significantly larger than the one of DOC patients with
consciousness non-recovery (two-sample t-tests, p<0.05).
96 / 102
Appendix 9:
Variations across different sites.
To investigate variations across different sites, we did two experiments using the
normal control (NC) subjects in this study. First, we explored whether the predicted
imaging subscores of the NC subjects were significantly different between the
training dataset "Beijing 750" (n = 30) and the testing dataset "Beijing HDxt" (n=10).
We found that there was no significant difference between the two groups
(two-sample T test, p=0.24). The distribution is shown as the following Appendix 9 figure 1.
Second, we investigated the relationships between the fMRI signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) and the predicted imaging subscores. Different MRI acquisition protocols (e.g.
scanner hardware, imaging protocols and acquisition sequences) can influence the
97 / 102
imaging SNR. But, it is not trivial to estimate the SNR in resting-state fMRI, since the
noise is complex and also differs spatially. Here, we calculated the temporal SNR
(tSNR) as the ratio between the mean fMRI signal and its temporal standard deviation
in each voxel (Welvaert and Rosseel, 2013), and then averaged across all voxels in
each region of interest (ROI) (Gardumi et al., 2016; Hay et al., 2017). Since there
were 22 ROIs in this study, the median of these 22 ROI tSNR values was used as the
measure for evaluating the SNR of the fMRI. We then correlated the median tSNR
with the predicted imaging subscores across all of the NC subjects (n=40), and found
that there were significant correlations between them (Pearson's correlation r=0.36,
p=0.024) as shown in the following Appendix 9 - figure 2.
From the above two experiments, we found that (1) the fMRI tSNR could be one of
influencing factors in the application of the presented model; (2) the predicted
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imaging subscores for the NC subjects could be approximate across different sites
when the tSNR was proximity. Therefore, we suggested that our presented model can
be applied to different centers, although the calibration might be required. Further, the
tSNR in fMRI is not only associated with instrumental noise but also modulated by
subject-related noise, such as physiological fluctuations and motion artifacts (Huettel
et al., 2009). Therefore, we suggest that, on the one hand, the quality of imaging
acquisition, including MRI scanner and imaging sequence/ parameters, need to be
guarantee; on the other hand, scanning protocols is required to be standardized to
reduce the subject-related noise during the scanning.
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Appendix 1-table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients in the
"Beijing_750" dataset.
Appendix 1 - table 2. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients in the
"Beijing_HDxt" dataset.
Appendix 1 - table 3. Demographic and clinical characteristics of patients in the
"Guangzhou_HDxt" dataset.
Appendix 1 - table 4. Demographic of healthy controls in the "Beijing_750" dataset.
Appendix 1 - table 5. Demographic of healthy controls in the "Beijing_HDxt" dataset.
Appendix 2 - table 1: Brain networks and ROIs in this study.
Appendix 3 - figure 1. Six brain functional network templates.
Appendix 4 - figure 1. Cumulative distribution of head motion per volume (framewise
displacement) for normal controls and DOC patients.
Appendix 4 - figure 2. Correlations between motion artifact and neuroanatomical
distance between the ROIs.
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Appendix 4 - figure 3. Histogram of the remaining number of fMRI volumes after
scrubbing for each population.
Appendix 6 - table 1. The brain area connection features and their Pearson's
correlations to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point across the DOC patients in the
training dataset "Beijing 750".
Appendix 6 - figure 1. The brain area connection features sorted by their Pearson's
correlations to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point in the training dataset "Beijing
750".
Appendix 6 - table 2. The functional connectivity features and their Pearson's
correlations to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point across the DOC patients in the
training dataset "Beijing 750".
Appendix 6 - figure 2. The functional connectivity features sorted by their Pearson's
correlations to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point across the DOC patients in the
training dataset "Beijing 750".
Appendix 6 - figure 3. The Circos map for the functional connectivity features that
were significantly correlated to the CRS-R scores at the T1 time point across the DOC
patients in the training dataset "Beijing 750".
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Appendix 7 - figure 1. Histogram depicting the imaging features included in
CARS-PLSR models.
Appendix 8 - figure 1. The imaging subscores for all of the subjects in the three
datasets.
Appendix 9 - figure 1. The distribution of the predicted imaging subscores of the
healthy controls at different sites.
Appendix 9 - figure 2. The correlations between the fMRI signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
and the predicted imaging subscores in the healthy controls.
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
Research Essay
Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in
Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
*
Raul Valverde
Abstract
Transpersonal Psychology considers that the psyche is multidimensional and that there are
several "levels of consciousness" and each has different characteristics and is governed by
different laws. The main goal of transpersonal theory is to integrate the spiritual experience
within a broader understanding of the human psyche. The most used tool by professionals in
transpersonal psychology is the use of transpersonal experiences through altered states of
consciousness for self exploration such as the holotropic therapy developed by Stanislav Grof.
Channelling is a parapsychological phenomenon which is considered an altered state of
consciousness, although there are many differences of opinion as to whether channelling, is
really true, what is known is that in many cases this phenomena can be attributed to the very
psyche of the individual who manifested this phenomena and so could be used in psychology to
know more about the inner subconscious of the individual.
Keywords: Transpersonal
consciousness
psychology,
channelling,
parapsychology,
altered
state
of
1. Introduction
Parapsychology research focuses on seemingly anomalous experiences. The three main areas of
parapsychological research are: extrasensory perception (ESP), and psychokinesis (PK). These
two are often called 'psi phenomena'. The third main area is the survival hypothesis, the notion
that some element of human existence survives death (Irwin and Watt, 2007).
Musso (1994) suggests that the phenomena of ESP and PK are transpersonal in nature and part of
parapsychology. A new paradigm of psychology is Transpersonal Psychology. Transpersonal
Psychology considers that the psyche is multidimensional and that there are several "levels of
consciousness" and each has different characteristics and is governed by different laws.
Transpersonal psychology does not deny other schools of thought as psychoanalysis and it does
not arise as opposed; the right thing to say is that it attempts to go further. For the transpersonal
vision, Freud developments have been of fundamental value in the development of a
psychological science to include the idea of the unconscious in a discipline that was tied to the
positivist rationalism. Although psychoanalysis opened the possibilities of understanding of the
human psyche, transpersonal psychology goes further by promoting the inclusion of the spiritual
dimension of the human being. The main goal of transpersonal theory is to integrate the spiritual
*
Correspondence: Raul Valverde, Concordia University, Canada. E-mail: raul.valverde@concordia.ca
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
experience within a broader understanding of the human psyche.
The most used tool by professionals in transpersonal psychology is the use of transpersonal
experiences through altered states of consciousness for self exploration such as the holotropic
therapy developed by Stanislav Grof. Channelling is a parapsychological phenomenon which is
considered an altered state of consciousness, it is the aim of this article to discuss the usefulness
of the channelling in transpersonal psychology that studies man from several dimensions
including what is unseen but is manifested in our reality.
2. Altered states of consciousness and transpersonal psychology
The human being experiences different altered states of consciousness. Consciousness can be
altered in different ways; we find pathological states of consciousness as in the case of severe
depression, especially in the case of psychosis, states of consciousness as deep hypnosis
produced by hallucinogenic drugs like mescaline and LSD, and even altered states of
consciousness that are common in the practice of yoga and in the case of mystical ecstasy. It
would be quite impossible to give a concrete and precise definition of the so-called altered states
of consciousness (ASC).
For many, it is an unclear term, too ambiguous. The scientific community itself is divided over
the definition of their functions, location, objectivity, etc. However, even with the added
constraints of language, we try to be as objective as possible, but, as everyone knows, as the
general principles of quantum theory state, we must be aware that we can only know a part of the
reality that, in any case, will always be "the reality" of the observer.
Traditionally, psychology described two states of consciousness: waking and sleep. However, the
great psychologist William James (1985) stated, in his time: "I am sure that, between the two
extreme states of consciousness as we know, there are many other states that do not have to be
pathological". These were prophetic words indeed, because now we have identified many of
these states and many of them are beneficial to humans.
Stanley Kripner (2000) defines ASC as mental states that can be recognized by an objective
observer other than the individual who experiences it as differences in mental functions; the
normal state of the individual, the alertness and the waking. In fact, twenty states have been
provisionally identified, with considerable overlap, as worthy of further study.
The ASC may be spontaneous or caused by many different methods. Among them we can
highlight hypnosis, meditation, psychedelic drugs intake, hearing some music, colors or
perfumes, sensory isolation, electronic stimulation of the brain by a brain synchro energizer
(Ossebaard, 2000), etc.
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
In general terms they can be defined as mental states likely to be recognized by an individual (or
an objective observer of the individual) as different as it relates to normal psychological
functions of the individual alert. Of all the ASC, the best known and widespread is the meditation
practice that is currently carried out in universities, colleges, schools, etc. Already in the era of
the caverns individuals realized that focusing on a single stimulus, sounds, breathing, etc., a
special type of consciousness is generated. Hardt & Kamiya (1978), observed that in the subjects
who practiced meditation, the alpha activity was more pronounced in the frontal regions, and top
of the head, because normally these wave trains are more common to find in the occipital region.
Another known way of inducing ASC is with neurological rhythmical stimulation of the brain,
this is with a repetitive quality of sensory stimuli that begins to generate a synchronous pattern of
brain waves that is known as the Monroe effect (Monroe 1982). Ornstein (1973) tells us of a
similar phenomenon that is known as the Ganzfeld effect, which is caused by looking at a white
screen or by placing on the eyes two devices similar to half balls of the type used in the
ping-pong game, which, after about 20 minutes, the subject blocks his or her sense of sight while
an electroencephalogram (EEG) detects an increase in frontal alpha waves.
Through these and similar studies, it has been possible to establish that meditation increases the
blood flow and causes decrease in oxygen consumption, both effects due to a profound change in
metabolism. Also, it increases the electrical resistance of the skin, giving an index of the state of
relaxation of the subject. For information only we can point out that after several hours of sleep
the electrical resistance of the skin arrives doubled, while after a few minutes of meditation is
reached it quadruples its value (Hafner 1982).
Meditation also produces a rapid reduction of blood lactate level-a product of the cell's
metabolism, possibly because it is combined with calcium, which is essential for the
transmission through the nervous system. In fact, a high level of blood lactate is associated with
panic disorder (Hafner 1982).
Our brains mathematically construct concrete images by interpreting frequencies from another
dimension, a realm of primary reality, significant, scheduled and that transcends time and space
reality. In this sense, the brain can be described as a hologram interpreting a holographic
universe, and in such a context the ASC may be due to a literal harmonization with the invisible
matrix that generates concrete reality (King 2012).
In this scheme, if events come in a holographic representation of frequencies that transcend
space and time they do not have to be communicable, as they are potentially simultaneous and
available everywhere. David Bohm (1990), described that the universe is a hologram that would
seem to be a range of frequencies that give the illusion of immediate and tangible apparently
creation. The most harmonious and coherent states of consciousness come into harmony with
this primary reality. David Bohm (1990) affirms that whatever is manifested by nature has "n"
dimensions, is timeless and cannot be handled in any way.
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
Abraham Maslow (1969), known psychologist in transpersonal psychology, through its
observations concluded that the climax experience involves an individual merger of facts and
values in conflict resolution, loss of anxiety, the discovery of the true self, a sense of unit,
detachment, generosity, happiness and love. Stanislav Grof one of the founders of transpersonal
psychology, is a psychiatrist of Czech origin, who worked most of his career in the United States.
He was professor of psychiatry at Johns Hopkins, and his last work was at the Esalen Institute
and the center of transpersonal psychology for many years. Grof has studied the effect of LSD in
a particularly extensive and profound way. In the sixties he directed about three thousand
sessions with the drug and had access to about two thousand case histories of other cases that he
had not spoken personally. Then, as the ban on held LSD in the United States, he started
practicing holotropic therapy, with which can also be used to induce a similar altered state of
consciousness.
Holotropic therapy has been practiced by Grof (1994) along with his wife Cristina as a way to
produce an altered state of consciousness without drugs. This is done with Hyperventilation
making an individual to take a deep and rapid breath for several minutes. Grof, with this
technique, caused a pulmonary hyperventilation, this is also accompanied by music and some
verbal guidance from who leads the session. The subject remains lying down, eyes closed, in
order to facilitate the alteration of consciousness. This technique produces a decrease of carbon
dioxide in the blood, which must also have a level neither too high nor too low. This sharp
decline in the level of carbon dioxide in turn causes a neurological crisis, and through the brain
acts in a similar way to a drug. This causes a crisis that leads to an altered state of consciousness,
and allows the psychologist to study the consciousness of the individual from that new state.
Stanislav Grof (1994) uses the experiential healing power of this new state of consciousness.
3. The phenomenon of parapsychological "channeling" in altered states of
consciousness as a tool for transpersonal psychology
The channelling is a parapsychological phenomenon which is considered an altered state of
consciousness that can also lead to the exploration of the inner self and the transpersonal
psychoanalysis in a similar way as holotropic therapy does. Channelling, as defined by Jon
Klimo (1988), it would be receiving information through paranormal sources.
According to Klimo (1988), channelling, is the communication of information to a physically
embodied human being or their intermediaries, from a source that is said to exist in some another
level or dimension of reality other than the physical plane as we know, and not from the
conscious mind of the channeller. Another definition of channelling which identifies the process
by which a person transfers messages from a source presumed not embodied and external to their
consciousness. Channeling often uses trance that does not stop being a form or aspect of
mediumship.
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
Chandley Margo (1986) in his doctoral thesis, believes that this non-physical energy is an
intrinsic part of every human being, and that the reason why the label as being with personality is
located outside of us. Channelling would, in this context, be the only way to communicate with
that energy in a form of transpersonal psychoanalysis using the paranormal phenomenon of
channeling.
Scott Rogo (1975), established differences between mediumship and channelling. According to
Rogo, serious mediumship is the art of attracting the spirits of dead people with the specific
objective to communicate with their families, while channeling would try to attract some
undefined nature of intelligence for the purpose of promoting and encouraging education
spiritual and philosophical discussion. However, we must exclude from channelling what is
known as ESP (ie telepathy), which would be the transmission of information between two
embodied people, since in channelling the source or transmitter is at some other level of different
reality from perceiving it.
Huston Smith (1965), rather than entities, prefers to use the term psychic centers, and thus
encompasses a variety of types of living beings individualized that could function as a
communicators through the channeling process. We would also consider, to talk about
channelling, there are other levels, dimensions or planes of reality where only the physical would
be one more of these realities. Other parallel planes exist where the various doctrines or different
movements have their place, and could be listed in terms of astral plane, mental plane, causal
plane, etc.
Throughout history there have been various entities that came to enjoy some popularity;
according to Cunningham (2012), the Seth entity manifested through a medium called Jane
Roberts. Seth says that we are multidimensional in nature and exist outside of time and space as
part of a wider reality and will be evolving within the universe. We create our own reality
projecting energy outward and thus form the physical world in which we learn our creativity.
This ongoing work is what makes the universe is constantly developing, and to modify our
personal world we must change ourselves, so that we change what we project or express.
Seth's teachings include reincarnation, although we are contemplated as relatively immortal
beings we cover many physical incarnations. Jane Roberts had the first conduit through
automatic writing in 1963, which lasted until 1984, the year of her death. Jane Roberts, described
the process as a situation as if she had taken an hallucinogen drug and in this situation she had an
avalanche of great new ideas that flooded her mind, making it a receiving station messages. Jane
Roberts (Cunningham (2012)), suggested that individualized energy is materialized within our
physical existence, to learn to create energy and ideas to make physical parts. We project these
ideas into an object so that in this way we can relate to us; in this context, the object is
materialized thought, the idea has obvious similarities to certain areas of the Buddhist philosophy
and some modern cosmological theories.
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
Jane began receiving channeling from Seth in a clairvoyant way, then she moved to a deep trance
in occasions. Seth described himself as an individual consciousness, energy personality essence,
no longer limited by physical reality. Jane Roberts always wonder if this phenomenon was real,
or Seth belonged to a part of her own psyche. Seth, on the other hand, seemed to reveal an
alleged absolute knowledge, and the explanation that it gave Jane is that our current figures could
be aspects of a broader which distant consciousness, the individual is only a part, albeit In the
case of an inviolable and unique part. Our personalities would be composed by many other
aspects, and each of them would be dominant in other realities.
Besides Seth, Jane Roberts channeled also two other sources, a French impressionist painter of
the nineteenth century, Paul Cezanne, and the famous American psychologist William James.
Roberts believed that she perceived the personality of James Williams as a construction formed
unconsciously as an automatic process. Seth let the material is very prolific, and its main
contribution is that each of us are able to create our reality through our own beliefs and desires,
that is, we would live this our present life as one of the many personalities experience, each
within their respective level of reality and another as part of a broader nature also learns and
evolves. The level of the texts left by Jane Seth dictation are philosophically very high, although
debatable, as well as expressing general concepts, answering all a person of high scientific,
philosophical and humanistic preparation.
Usually, the first idea that comes to mind is that the neophyte channels are people with
psychological pathology, if not worse, and that basically is all a sham. We must admit that, at
least in part, such an opinion has some justification given the authentic falsehoods and scams that
have come to mount on the issue.
Myers (1895) speaks of subliminal in the phenomenon of channeling as it was a part of the mind
that transcended the control of consciousness and was wider and deeper faculty. So through this
subliminal, one could access the mysteries of a broader universe of a superior spirit with more
energy and possibilities. This concept of subliminal could help to explain the channeling
phenomenon and its use in psychoanalysis to the transpersonal level.
Russel Wallace speaks of the existence of higher powers in the context of a hierarchy of spiritual
nature in creation; He said that there must be an invisible world of the spirit that causes changes
in the world of matter. The evolution of this planet must be guided and assisted by upper and
invisible intelligences, to which man, as a spiritual being is exposed. Furthermore, it would be
likely that these beings of superior intelligence lived in a hierarchy above ours. In addition,
Wallace adds that these spiritual beings could communicate with us via telepathy. This could
provide a gateway to the acquisition of universal knowledge through parapsychology (Kottler
1974).
Thomson J. Hudson (1904) expounded his theory of objective mind, which would deal with
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
everyday experience, and a subjective, which would be oriented inward, would control our inner
being and would live in the deepest levels of the self with the powers employed sewers and other
paranormal experiences.
Richard M. Bucke (2009) also differed less than our simple awareness of higher consciousness or
cosmic. He worked with subjects who practiced the channelling and admitted that was natural in
all of us, that would be related to the exact extent that we consciously realize our oneness with
eternal life and open ourselves to the divine energy. He thought that we had in ourselves the
properties and powers of eternal life, and we constitute channels through which they can act in
intelligence and power.
All these theories are against the tide with respect to traditional psychology that believes that the
unconscious is as a closed system and therefore impossible to communicate with the mental or
spiritual universe. Current theories of the psyche propose that we each have a conscious part,
would work within the limits of normal perceptions, individual memory and an unconscious part
that would be a deposit of perceptions and memories are still not ready to emerge into
consciousness . This unconscious mind would be responsible for channelling and therefore this
could be seen as a tool to explore the unconscious mind and the true self of the individual.
The current experimental systems are strongly based on behaviorism; behavioral psychologists
believe that learned behaviors are based largely unconscious associations structures built in the
mind by various environmental stimuli and internal configurations. Behaviorists believe that
ignore the fundamentals of much of our own conduct, which apparently work in a field based on
conditioning beyond the control of consciousness.
The most important type of conduct in channelling: the individual hears a voice that seems to
come from him or herself or anyone around him or he, but uses its vocal cords to speak, or notes
with surprise that someone who is not then uses his or her hand to write. Based on the theories of
conditioning, these situations can be interpreted as functions of certain structures of associations
formed unconsciously by memories, mental game configurations and combinations of creativity.
Sigmund Freud (1964), talked of the paranormal phenomena related to channelling although his
whole life was skeptical about this phenomena. He said that this type of behavior would be
sought to recover by "supernatural" means the lost illusion in this world. Channeling was for
Freud the result of dissatisfaction desires and manifestations of repressed material in the
unconscious; voices, visions and expressions of repressed material would be channeling the
unconscious and seek a way out.
Jung (1936), said that the psyche is not an indivisible unit, but a divisible whole, in fact more or
less divided, and was composed of many complex psychic materials. The ego would be the
characteristic center of our psyche, but only one among others. Jung also thought that the
existence of a communication from disembodied spirits can be justified through these complex
materials, that are repressed and away from the usual conscious perception. These are complex,
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he said, could be designed in a configuration perceived by the individual as alien to him or
herself.
Jung said the spirit, seen from a psychological perspective, is an unaware complex autonomous
psychic material that appears as a projection because it has direct contact with the ego. Moreover,
he also believed that grim appearance of the spirit is the dark side of everyone, the less evolved
and understood, sometimes part that could manifest in the form of something or someone outside
the self. He also gave another possible explanation based on what he called the collective
unconscious. Its components are not personal but collective, that is, not belonging to a single
individual but a group of them, an entire nation or even all mankind. These components are not
acquired during the life of the individual but are innate products and configurations, the
fundamental concepts that have always been the basis of human thought, the full circle of
mythological themes.
The channelling has also been compared with hypnosis, with trance and dissociated states. It's
hard to grasp the relationship may have channelling with hypnosis, as is the fact that subjects that
are more easily hypnotized in turn are the ones most likely to be channellers, although it is
possible that the latter are self hypnotized to exercise channelling.
The hypnotic state would be easier to access channelling messages. Through hypnosis the subject,
the channeller breaks his mindset and prejudices aware making it much easier to channel. It is
also true that the subject would be well disposed to suggestions more easily, since it can induce
the hypnotic state channels through to deeper stages of hallucinations.
Charles Tart (1972), when he was studying hypnosis, perceived that he could generate in a
subject an entity with an apparent independent existence of the subject. The subject perceived as
if someone was speaking from outside, that is, that although some cases may be due to
channelling if manipulation, this does not mean that all channelling cases are related to hypnosis.
In effect, for example, we find burnt trees in the countryside, still standing, and that happens
when lightning strikes on him during a storm; that does not mean that all charred trees still
standing that we find are in the fields and forests have suffered a lightning strike. There are
multiple causes that can produce a similar effect.
There are diseases that resemble channelling such as delusions and hallucinations, identity
disorders, schizophrenia, behavior simulation, depersonalization and dissociation, multiple
personalities, etc. However, we should develop more detailed and careful studies before putting
labels of mental disorders to those who act as channels.
Parapsychology has also contributed to the explanation of the channelling phenomena, especially
in what has been called psychical research. Parapsychology has studied the ESP (Extra-Sensory
Perception, information acquired by unusual channels) with what would be an explanation of
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channelling. With respect to the channels of the person that seeks from a medium to
communicate with another person now deceased, we must be careful that the medium is not
telepathically capturing the information contained in the subject who has attended to query. We
must also mention that not only telepathy could capture the information, but also through other
information area that Teilhard de Chardin (1965) proposed as lying around Earth, an evolving
field of knowledge, which they called noosphere. Clearly, any of these options connects with the
collective unconscious of Jung.
It exists in the annals of parapsychology an anecdotal event that may be relevant, in 1973 a group
of people created a fictitious entity that gave the name of Philips. This being manifested by
strokes, realizations, voices, etc. In previous times when Philips figure was created, each
attendee at the meeting incorporating personality traits, professionals, etc., distinct and integrated
a story that were supposed to be those of the body, soon appeared a presence that began to
respond to questions from the group and attended by the name Philips. This event is brought to
prove that, despite speaking seriously and with sufficient rigor, what could be considered an
authentic channel was merely the result of individual and unconscious of those involved in the
experience minds.
Aldous Huxley (1945) also talked that each of us has a high potential of mind, a mind without
restrictions, but in our quality of animals we have above all the instinct to survive. In this sense,
a mind without restrictions should be targeted in any case, through the reducing valve of the
brain and nervous system. Some people, however, seem to be born with a kind of detour that
bypasses the pressure reducing valve. In other words, temporary shifted can be purchased, either
spontaneously or as a result of deliberate retreat. Grof (1994) cites the transpersonal concept
holds that there is a broad spectrum of altered states of consciousness, and one of them is useful
in power and specific in their functions. Some of these are true higher states. Since each state of
consciousness reveals his own vision of reality, we can deduce that reality as we know it (and
this is the only way we know it) is only relatively real, in other words, is to hold genuine
psychosis in a single reality.
The father of transpersonal psychology, Stanislav Grof, was the first to carry out such channeling
experiences under the influence of drugs, particularly LSD, whose composition has many
similarities with serotonin. Grof (1973) explains:
"The subject affected by LSD can, for example, suddenly enter into a trance-like state of a
medium. His appearance and his gestures are alien, and his voice changed completely. You can
speak foreign languages or write texts through automatic writing, you can have encounters with
spiritual beings or astral bodies of people killed even have many of the characteristics of the
so-called spirit possession. "
Grof has used the experiences of channelling as a tool for self-exploration of the individual to
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Valverde, R., Channeling as an Altered State of Consciousness in Transpersonal Psychology Therapy
find possible causes of psychological problems such as depression and psychosis.
Persinger (1983) is skeptical about the paranormal origin of channelling and gives an explanation
of physiological origin. In one experiment, he stimulated the current low level of the temporal
lobes of the brain in order to induce channelling experiences in the subject of study. After an
initial feeling of floating in the air, the individual felt 'out of body'. Then the experiments
recreated experiences that varied from one subject to another, but whose constant is to describe
their feelings with cosmic and spiritual meanings. Persinger says "Often intense listening
experiences in which the person feels that some messages are communicated to occur. This
transmission is perceived by the individual through a kind of feeling of "knowing what happens"
without being able to necessarily say that hears a voice" .
Persinger suggests that people with epilepsy (ie temporal lobe dysfunction), has been found to
possess a kind of constant form of channeling. Another novel contribution to the possible
explanation of channelling was carried out by physicist Frank Barr (1983), who has issued a
whole theory based on the peculiarities of the organic compound called melanin, and the brain
equivalent neuromelanin. It is a substance that would act between mind and brain, as an
intermediary. According to Barr, filamentous cells have bumps called glycocalyx antenna that
could act in strong overlap with neuromelanin. Thus they transform the received waves of a
variety of lengths and frequencies, including light in mechanical impulses and vice versa.
Vibratory waves, once inside the cells would move through these through-called microtubules to
melanin, which is capable of converting light into sound and sound into light. From this pattern,
it is evident the possibility of transforming inner voices emissions received as waves in the brain,
and vice versa. However, Frank Barr does not stop here but also extrapolated that there may be
different standards of living at different levels of wave frequencies, inhabited by beings of
difficult objective understanding from our usual physical reality.
Despite the different views of the phenomenon of channeling, the truth is that it is possible to use
it as a tool for exploration of subconscious. Although some cases are unexplained, many of these
appear to be manifestations of the individual's own unconscious and could reveal information
that could help a patient to understand the origin of their own psychological problems.
4. Conclusions
In this article, the altered state of consciousness of channeling was presented as a tool for
analysis and self exploration that is basic to the transpersonal psychology.
Although there are many differences of opinion as to whether channelling, is really true, what is
known is that in many cases this phenomena can be attributed to the very psyche of the
individual who manifested this phenomena and so it could be used in psychology to know more
about the inner subconscious of the individual.
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The article was meant to open the eyes of the reader about the usefulness of parapsychology in
transpersonal psychology. Believe it or not, parapsychology offers a wider horizon of possible
applications to the transpersonal psychology for better understanding of the human mind.
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334-593).
Ornstein, RE (1973) The nature of human consciousness: A book of readings . WH Freeman.
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Smith, H. (1965). The religions of man . New York: Harper & Row
Hudson, TJ (1904) The Law of Psychic Phenomena: A Working Hypothesis for the Systematic Study of
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
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Article
Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential
Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
Huping Hu* & Maoxin Wu
ABSTRACT
This work is a continuation of the premomentumenergy model described recently. Here we
show how in this model premomentumenergy (Consciousness) generates: (1) time,
position, & intrinsic-proper-time relation from transcendental Law of One, (2) selfreferential matrix law with time, position and intrinsic-proper-time relation as the
determinant, (3) dual-universe Law of Zero, and (4) immanent Law of Conservation in the
external/internal momentum-energy space which may be violated in certain processes. We
further show how premomentum-energy generates, sustain and makes evolving elementary
particles and composite particles incorporating the genesis of self-referential matrix law. In
addition, we discuss the ontology and mathematics of ether in this model. Illustratively, in
the beginning there was premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by itself ei0 =1 materially
empty and spiritually restless, and it began to imagine through primordial self-referential
spin 1=ei0=ei0ei0=e+iL-iLe+iM-iM=e+iLe-iMe+iLe-iM=e+iLe+iM/e+iLe+iM …such that it created the
self-referential matrix law, the external object to be observed and internal object as
observed, separated them into external momentum-energy space and internal momeutmenergy space, caused them to interact through said matrix law and thus gave birth to the
dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the
internal momentum-energy space which it has since sustained and made to evolve.
Key Words: premomentumenergy, principle of existence, spin, hierarchy, self-reference,
ether, mathematics, ontology, matrix law, transcendental Law of One, dual-world Law of
Zero, immanent Law of Conservation, Consciousness, Consciousness.
1. Introduction
Through all of us Consciousness manifests
This article is a continuation of the Principle of Existence [1-4] and the
premomentumenergy model [5]. As shown in our recent work [1] and further shown here,
the principles and mathematics based on premomentumenergy (Consciousness) for
*Corresponding author: Huping Hu, Ph.D., J.D. Address: QuantumDream, Inc., P.O. Box 267, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA.
E-mail: hupinghu@quantumbrain.org
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
836
creating, sustaining and making evolving of elementary particles in the dual momentumenergy universe are beautiful and simple.
First, the premomentumenergy model employs the following ontological principles among
others:
(1) Principle of oneness/unity of existence through quantum entanglement in the
ether of premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
(2) Principle of hierarchical primordial self-referential spin creating:
- time, position and intrinsic-proper-time relation as transcendental Law of One.
- time, position and intrinsic-proper-time relation as determinant of matrix law.
- Dual-universe Law of Zero of time, position and intrinsic-proper-time.
- Immanent Law of Conservation of time, position and intrinsic-proper-time in
external/internal momentum-energy space which may be violated in certain
processes.
Second, premomentumenergy model employs the following mathematical elements &
forms among others in order to empower the above ontological principles:
(1) e, Euler’s Number, for (to empower) ether as foundation/basis/medium
of existence (body of premomentumenergy (Consciousness));
(2) i, imaginary number, for (to empower) thoughts and imagination in
premomemtumenergy (ether);
(3) 0, zero, for (to empower) emptiness (undifferentiated/primordial state);
(4) 1, one, for (to empower) oneness/unity of existence;
(5) +, -, *, /, = for (to empower) creation, dynamics, balance & conservation;
(6) Pythagorean Theorem for (to empower) time, position and intrinsic proper time
relation; and
(7) M, matrix, for (to empower) the external and internal momentum-energy space
and the interaction of external and internal wavefunctions (objects).
This work is organized as follows. In § 2, we shall illustrate scientific genesis in
premomemtumenergy in a nutshell which incorporates the genesis of self-referential matrix
law. In § 3, we shall detail the genesis of self-referential matrix law in the order of: (1)
Genesis of Fundamental Time, Space & Intrinsic-proper-time Relation; (2) Self-Referential
Matrix Law and Its Metamorphoses; (3) Imaginary Momentum; (4) Games for Deriving
Matrix Law; and (5) Hierarchical Natural Laws. In § 4, we shall incorporate the genesis of
self-referential matrix law into scientific genesis of primordial entities (elementary
particles) and scientific genesis of composite entities. In § 5, we shall illustrate the
mathematics and ontology of ether in the premomentumenergy model. Finally, in § 6, we
shall conclude this work.
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Readers are reminded that we can only strive for perfection, completeness and correctness
in our comprehensions and writings because we are limited and imperfect.
2. Scientific Genesis in Premomentumenergy in a Nutshell
Consciousness creates everything through self-referential spin
In the beginning there was premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by by itself ei0 =1
materially empty and spiritually restless, and it began to imagine through primordial selfreferential spin 1=ei0=ei0ei0=e+iL-iLe+iM-iM=e+iLe-iMe+iLe-iM=e+iLe+iM/e+iLe+iM …such that it
created the self-referential matrix law, the external object to be observed and internal object
as observed, separated them into external momentum-energy space and internal
momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through said matrix law and thus gave
birth to a dual momentum-energy universe comprised of an external momentum-energy
space and an internal momentum-energy space which it has since sustained and made to
evolve.
We draw below several diagrams illustrating the above processes:
Figure 2.1 Illustration of primordial phase distinction in premomentumenergy
The primordial phase distinction in Figure 2.1 is accompanied by matrixing of
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) body e into: (1) external and internal wave functions
as external and internal objects, and (2) self-acting and self-referential matrix law, which
accompany the imaginations in premomentumenergy (Consciousness) so as to enforce
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
838
(maintain) the accounting principle of conservation of zero in the dual momentum-energy
universe, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure2.2 Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) Equation
Figure 2.3 shows from another perspective of the relationship among external object,
internal object and the self-acting and self-referential matrix law. According to
premomentumenergy model, self-interactions (self-gravity) are quantum entanglement
between the external object in the external momentum-energy space and the internal object
in internal momentum-energy space.
Figure2.3 Self-interaction between external object in the external momentumenergy space and the internal object in the internal momentum-energy space
Therefore, premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of primordial
entities (elementary particles) in premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by self-referential
spin as follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM Le Li 1 e iM e iM
L
M ,e
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1
A e iM
A
LM ,i e iM LM e e iM LM e L M 0
Ai
i
Ai e
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In expression (2.1), e is Euler’s Number representing premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) body (ether or aether), i is imaginary unit representing imagination in
premomentumenergy (Consciousness), ±M is immanent content of imagination i such as
momentum, energy, space & time, ±L is immanent law of imagination i,
L1 ei 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 1 is transcendental Law of One in premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) before matrixization, Le is external law, Li is internal law, LM,e is external
matrix law, and LM,i is internal matrix law, LM is the self-referential matrix law in
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) comprised of external and internal matrix laws
which govern elementary entities and conserve zero, e is external wave function (external
object) in the external momentum-energy space, i is internal wave function (internal
object) in the internal momentum-energy space, and is the complete wave function
(object/entity in the dual momentum-energy universe as a whole).
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) spins as 1=ei0=ei0ei0=e+iL-iLe+iM-iM=e+iLe-iMe+iLeiM +iL +iM +iL +iM
=e e /e e
…before matrixization. Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) also
spins through self-acting and self-referential matrix law LM after matrixization which acts
on external object in the external momentum-energy space and the internal object in the
internal momentum-energy space to cause them to interact with each other as further
described below.
3. Genesis of Self-Referential Matrix Law in Premomentumenergy
Natural laws are hierarchical
3.1
Genesis of Fundamental Time, Space & Intrinsic-proper-time Relation
In the premomentumenergy model, the time, position & intrinsic proper time relation of an
elementary entity:
ct 2 x 2 c 2 or ct 2 x 2 c 2 0
(3.1)
can be created from the following primordial self-referential spin:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
2
2
c
x c
x c i x c i x c x
i i
ct
ct ct
ct ct ct ct 2
ct 2 x 2 c 2
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840
where t and x are dynamical variables of time and position respectively and is an intrinsic
proper time of an elementary particle (e.g., defined as Compton wavelength divided by
speed of light =/c).
For simplicity, we will set c=ħ=1 throughout this work unless indicated otherwise.
Expression (3.2) satisfy the relation of four-position x = (ct, x) in special theory of
relativity.
In the presence of an interacting field of a second primordial entity such as an
electromagnetic four-potential in the dual universe comprised of the external energymomentum space and the internal energy-momentum space:
A ((p , E ) , A(p , E ) )
(3.3)
equation (3.2) becomes, for an elementary entity with charge e:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x - eA (p ,E )
x - eA (p ,E )
i
i
t e(p ,E )
t e(p , E ) t e(p , E )
t e(p ,E )
2
i x - eA (p ,E ) i x - eA (p ,E ) 2 x - eA (p ,E )
t e(p , E ) t e(p , E ) t e(p ,E ) 2
t e
3.2
x - eA
2
(p ,E )
2
or t e x - eA 0
2
(p ,E )
2
(p , E )
2
2
(p , E )
(3.4)
Self-Referential Matrix Law and Its Metamorphoses
In the premomentumenergy model, one form of matrix law LM in premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is created from the following primordial self-referential spin:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x
x i x i x 2 x 2
i i
t
t
t t t 2
t
t
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
t2 2
t
x2
x
x
t
1
x
x
t
t
0
x
t
x
t
t
x
841
x
LM , e
t
(3.5)
LM ,i L M
where matrixization step is carried out in such way that
Det L M t 2 2 x 2 0
(3.6)
so as to satisfy the fundamental relation (3.2) in the determinant view.
After fermionic spinization:
x x Det (σ x ) σ x
2
(3.7)
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) are Pauli matrices:
0 1
0 i
1 0
2
3
1
0
i
0
0
1
1
(3.8)
expression (3.7) becomes:
t σx
L
σx t M , e
LM , i L M
(3.9)
Expression (3.9) governs fermions in Dirac-like form such as Dirac electron and positron in
a dual universe comprised of an external energy-momentum space and an internal energymomentum space and we propose that the last expression in (3.7) governs the third state of
matter (unspinized or spinless entity/particle) with charge e and intrinsic proper time such
as a meson or a meson-like particle in said dual momentum-energy universe.
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842
If we define:
t σx
t t σx σx
Det
σx t
(3.10)
We get:
t σx 2 2 2
t x I 2 0
Det
σx t
(3.11)
Thus, fundamental relation (3.1) is also satisfied under the determinant view of expression
(3.10). Indeed, we can also obtain the following conventional determinant:
t σx 2 2 2 2
t x 0
Det
σx t
(3.12)
One kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.5), (3.9), (3.10) & (3.11) is respectively as
follows:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x
x i x i x 2 x 2
i i
t
t t
t t t t 2
1
t x
t x
2
t x
t x
0
t x
t x
t 2 x 2
t x
L
t x M ,e
t σ x
LM , e
t
σ
x
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(3.13)
LM , i L M
LM , i L M
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
t σ x
t σx t σx
Det
t σx
843
(3.15)
2 2 2
t σ x
t x I 2 0
Det
t
σ
x
(3.16)
The last expression in (3.13) is the unspinized matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form.
Expression (3.14) is spinized matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form.
Another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.5), (3.9), (3.10) & (3.11) is respectively
as follows:
1 ei 0 e iL iL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
1
i x
x
x i x i x
t
i i
t
t
t t i x
t
t
t
i x
i x
t
t
0
i x
t
i x
t
t
i x
i x
Le
t
t
iσx
LM , e
iσx
t
(3.17)
Li LM
LM , i L M
t
iσx
tt s iσx s iσx
Det
iσx
t
t
iσx 2 2 2
t x I 2 0
Det
iσx
t
(3.18)
(3.19)
(3.20)
Indeed, Q iσ x is a quaternion and Q iσ x is its conjugate. So we can
rewrite expression (3.18) as:
Q
t
LM , e
Q
t
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844
If =0, we have from expression (3.5):
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
0
x 0
x
x
x x2
i i i i 2
t
t t
t
t
t t
t 2 t x
2
x
x t
1
(3.22)
x
x
t
t
0
x
t
x
t
x
L
t
t
x
M ,e
LM , i L M
After fermionic spinization x σ x , the last expression in (3.22) becomes:
t
σ x
σ x
LM , e
t
LM , i LM
(3.23)
which governs intrinsic-proper-time-less (massless) fermion (neutrino ) in Dirac-like form
in said dual momentum-energy universe.
After bosonic spinization:
x x 2 Det (sx I 3 ) Det I 3 s x
(3.24)
the last expression in (3.22) becomes:
t
s x
s x
LM , e
t
LM , i L M
(3.25)
where s = (s1, s2, s3) are spin operators for spin 1 particle:
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0 0 i
0 0 0
0 i 0
s1 0 0 i s2 0 0 0 s3 i 0 0
i 0 0
0 i 0
0 0 0
845
(3.26)
If we define:
Det
t
s sx
sx
t
t t s x s x
(3.27)
We get:
x xy
t
sx 2
Det
t x 2 I yx y
s sx
3
t
zx zy
2
2
xz
yz
z
(3.28)
2
To obey fundamental relation (3.1) in determinant view (3.27), we shall require the last
term in (3.28) acting on the external and internal wave functions respectively to produce
null result (zero) in source-free zone as discussed later.
We propose that the last expression in (3.22) governs intrinsic-proper-time-less (massless)
particle with unobservable spin (spinless). After bosonic spinization, the spinless particle
gains its spin 1.
Further, if |p|=0, we have from expression (3.5):
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
0
0 2
i i 2
t t
t t t t
t
1
t
2 t
t
t
0
t
t
t
LM , e LM , i L M
t
t2
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846
We suggest that the above momentum-less forms of matrix law govern the external and
internal wave functions (self-fields) which play the roles of momentum-less gravitons, that
is, they mediate momentum (distance) independent interactions through intrinsic proper
time (mass) entanglement.
3.3
Imaginary Position
Premomentumenergy model can create momentum self-confinement of an elementary
entity through imaginary position xi (downward self-reference such that 2 > t2):
2 t 2 x i2 xi2 yi2 zi2 ix i Det (σ ixi )
2
(3.30)
that is:
t 2 2 xi2 0
(3.31)
which can be created by the following primordial self-referential spin:
1 ei 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x i
x i i x i i x i 2 x i 2
i
i
t
t
t t t 2
t
t
t 2 2 xi
2
or t
2
2
xi 0
2
(3.32)
Therefore, allowing imaginary position (downward self-reference) for an elementary entity,
we can derive the following matrix law in Dirac-like form:
t
xi
xi
LM , e
t
LM , i L M
(3.33)
σx i
σx i
LM , e
LM , i L M
(3.34)
Also, we can derive the following matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form:
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
t x i
L
xi M,e
LM , i L M
t σx i
LM , e
E σx i
LM , i L M
847
(3.35)
(3.36)
It is suggested that the above additional forms of self-referential matrix law govern proton
in Dirac-like and Weyl-like form respectively in the dual universe comprised of the external
energy-momentum space and the internal energy-momentum space.
3.4
Games for Deriving Matrix Law
The games for deriving various forms of the matrix law prior to spinization can be
summarized as follows:
0 t 2 2 x 2 DetM t DetM DetM x
Det ( M t M M x ) Det ( LM )
(3.37)
where Det means determinant and Mt, M and Mx are respectively matrices with ±t (or ±it),
± (or ±i) and ±|x| (or ±i|x|) as elements respectively, and t2, -2 and –x2 as determinant
respectively, and LM is the matrix law so derived.
For example, the matrix law in Dirac-like form prior to spinization:
t
LM
x
x
t
(3.38)
can be derived as follows:
0
t 0
0
Det
Det
0 t 2 2 x 2 Det
0 t
0
x
t 0 0 0
Det
0 t 0 x
t
x
Det
x
0
x
0
x
Det (L M )
t
(3.39)
For a second example, the matrix law in Weyl-like form prior to spinization:
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
t x
LM
t x
848
(3.40)
can be derived as follows:
t 0
0
Det
0 t 2 2 x 2 Det
0 t
t 0 0
Det
0 t
x
0 0
x
Det
0
0
t x
0
Det
x
0
x
Det LM
t x
(3.41)
For a third example, the matrix law in quaternion form prior to spinization:
t
LM
i x
i x
t
(3.42)
can be derived as follows:
0 i x
t 0
0
Det
Det
0 t 2 2 x 2 Det
0 t
0
i x
0
t 0 0 0 i x
t
i x
Det
Det (LM )
Det
i x
0 t 0 i x
0
t
(3.43)
3.5 Hierarchical Natural Laws
The natural laws created in accordance with the premomentumenergy model are
hierarchical and comprised of: (1) immanent Law of Conservation manifesting and
governing in the external or internal momentum-energy space which may be violated in
certain processes; (2) immanent Law of Zero manifesting and governing in the dual
momentum-energy universe as a whole; and (3) transcendental Law of One manifesting and
governing in premomentumenergy (Consciousness). By ways of examples, conservations
of time, position and intrinsic proper time are immanent (and maybe approximate) laws
manifesting and governing in the external or internal momentum-energy universe.
Conservations of time, position or intrinsic proper time to zero in the dual momentumenergy universe comprised of the external momentum-energy universe and the internal
momentum-energy universe are immanent law manifesting and governing in the dual
universe as a whole. Conservation of One (Unity) based on time, position and intrinsic
proper time relation is transcendental law manifesting and governing in
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849
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) which is the foundation of the dual momentumenergy universe.
4. Scientific Genesis of Elementary Particle in Premomentumenergy
(Consciousness)
4.1
Scientific Genesis of Primordial Entities in the Premomentumenergy Model
Premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free plane-wave
fermion particle such as an electron in Dirac-like form in a dual universe comprised of an
external energy-momentum space and an internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t t
t
i x i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
e
t t
2 x 2 ip μ x μ ip μ x μ t 2 2 ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
e
e
2
2
t
x
t x
x t
1
e
ip μ x μ
e
ip μ x μ
1
(4.1)
t ip μ x μ x ip μ x μ
t ip μ x μ x ip μ x μ
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
t
x
t
σ x
ip x
x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
M
i,
ip x
t
ai, e
ip x
σ x Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
ip x
t
i,
Ai, e
that is:
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t e, σ x i , i E e, e, iσ p i ,
or
i
i
σ
p
t
σ
x
i,
e,
i,
e,
E i,
850
(4.2)
where substitutions t i E and x ip have been made so that components of LM
can act on the external and internal wave functions.
Premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free plane-wave
antifermion such as a positron in Dirac-like form in said dual universe comprised of said
external energy-momentum space and said internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x
x ip μ xμ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
s t
t
i x i x ip μ x μ ip μ xμ
t e
t
2 x 2 ip μ x μ ip μ xμ t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
x2
t
t x
x t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(4.3)
t ip x
e
x e ip x t e ip x x e ip x 0
x
t
x
t
t
x
t
σ x
ip x
x ae, e
e,
LM 0
LM , e LM , i
i,
ip x
t
ai, e
ip x
σ x Ae, e
e,
LM 0
LM , e LM , i
i,
ip x
t
A e
i,
Similarly, premomentumenergy creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free plane-wave
fermion in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in said dual universe comprised of said external
energy-momentum space and said internal energy-momentum space as follows:
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851
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t t
t
i x i x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
t e
t
2 x 2 ip μ xμ ip μ xμ t 2 x 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
t
2
t x
t x
1
1
ip x ip x
e
e
t x ip x ip x t x ip x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
t x
t x
(4.4)
ip x
ae,l e
e,l L 0
L
L
M,i
M,e
i,r M
ip x
t x
ai,r e
ip x
Ae,l e
t σ x
e,l L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
ip x
t σ x
i ,r
Ai,r e
t x
that is:
i E e,l iσ p e,l i ,r
t σ x e,l i ,r
or
i
i
σ
t
σ
x
E
i
,
r
p
i
,
e
,
l
i
,
r
e
,
l
(4.5)
Premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free plane-wave
fermion in another form in said dual universe comprised of said external energy-momentum
space and said internal energy-momentum space as follows:
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852
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t t
t
i x i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
t e
t
i x
t
i x
t
e
ip x
e
ip x
(4.6)
1
i x ip x
t
ip x
e
e
i x
t
i x ip x
t
ip x
e
e
0
i x
t
t
i x
t
Q
1
i x ae e
ip x 0
t
ai e
ip x
Q Ae e
LM , e
t ip x
Ai e
ip x
LM , i e L M 0
i
where Q iσ x is a quaternion and Q iσ x is its conjugate,
that is:
t e iσ x i
or
t i iσ x e
i E e i σ p i
i σ
e
p i
E i
(4.7)
Premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a linear plane-wave
photon in said dual universe comprised of said external energy-momentum space and said
internal energy-momentum space as follows:
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853
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
x 0
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t t
t
x
x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
t
x 2 ip μ x μ ip μ x μ t 2 ip x ip x
2 e
2 e
t
x
t x
x
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
(4.8)
1
t ip μ xμ x ip μ xμ
t ip μ xμ x ip μ xμ
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
ip x
x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
ip x
i, M
t
ai, e
ip x
s x E e
t
e, L
LM , e
L
0
M
,
i
s x
M photon
ip x
t
i
,
iB e
t
x
0e,
0 i,-
This photon wave function can be written as:
e, E(p, E) E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 i (t kx )
photon
iB
iB 0 e i (t kx ) iB 0 e
i , (p, E)
(4.9)
After the substitutions t i E and x i p , we have from the last expression in (4.8):
i E
is
p
is p E (p, E)
p B (p, E)
E
0 E (p, E)
B
i E iB ( p, E)
E
E
(
p
,
E)
p
(
p
,
E)
(4.10)
where we have used the relationship s i p p to derive the latter equations which
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854
together with p E(p, E) 0 and p B (p, E) 0 are the Maxwell-like equations in the
source-free vacuum in the dual momentum-energy universe.
Premomentumenergy model creates a neutrino in Dirac-like form by replacing the last step
of expression (4.8) with the following:
t
σ x
ip x
σx ae, e
LM , e
ip x
t
a e
i,
LM , i e, L M 0
i,
(4.11)
Premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a linear plane-wave
antiphoton as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
x 0
x ip μ xμ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t t
t
x x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
t
x 2 ip μ xμ ip μ xμ t 2 ip x ip x
2 e
2 e
t
x
t x
x
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
t ip μ xμ x ip μ xμ
t ip μ xμ x ip μ xμ
e
e
e
e
0
x
t
x
t
(4.12)
x e,
LM , e LM , i e, L M 0
t i,
i,
ip x
s x iB 0e, e
e, L
L
L
0
M,i
M,e
M antiphoton
i,
ip x
t
E e
t
x
t
s x
0i ,
This antiphoton wave function can also be written as:
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e , iB (p , E) iB 0 e i (t k x ) iB 0 i (t kx )
antiphoton
E
E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 e
i , (p , E)
855
(4.13)
Premomentumenergy model creates an antineutrino in Dirac form by replacing the last step
of expression (4.12) with the following:
ip x
σx ae, e
LM , e
ip x
t
a e
i ,
t
σ x
LM , i e, L M 0
i,
(4.14)
Similarly, premomentumenergy model creates and sustains momentumless (momentum
independent) external and internal wave functions of an intrinsic-proper-time in Weyl-like
(chiral-like) form as follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
0 iEtiEt
i i e
t t
t
t
e iEt iEt
t t
2 iEt iEt t 2 iEt iEt
2 e
2 e
t
t
t
1
e iEt
e iEt
1
t iEt iEt
t iEt iEt
e
e
e
e 0
t
t
t
gW , e e iEt
LM , e
t gW , i e iEt
(4.15)
VW , e
L V 0
LM , i
VW , i M W
Premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a momentumly selfconfined entity such as a proton through imaginary position xi (downward self-reference
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856
such that 2 > t2) in Dirac-like form in said dual universe comprised of said external energymomentum space and said internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x
x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i i i e
t
t t
t
i x i i x i ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
t e
t
2 x i 2 ip μ xμ ip μ xμ t 2 τ 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
2
t
x
i
t
xi
xi
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
t ip μ xμ x i ip μ xμ
t ip μ xμ x i ip μ xμ
e
e
e
e
0
xi
t
xi
t
t
xi
x i se, e iEt
L
t si, e iEt M ,e
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.16)
After spinization of the last expression in (4.16), we have:
t
σ x i
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t Si, e iEt
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.17)
As discussed previously, it is plausible that the last expression in (4.16) governs the
confinement structure of the unspinized proton in Dirac-like form through imaginary
position xi and, on the other hand, expression (4.17) governs the confinement structure of
spinized proton through xi .
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Dirac-like form in said dual universe
comprised of said external energy-momentum space and said internal energy-momentum
space may be respectively governed as follows:
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t
xi
t
σ x i
x i se, e iEt
LM ,e LM ,i D,e L 0
iEt
M D
t si, e
D,i
σx i S e, e iEt
LM ,e LM ,i D,e L 0
iEt
M D
D,i
t S i, e
857
(4.18)
(4.19)
Similarly, premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a
momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton through imaginary position xi
(downward self-reference) in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in said dual universe comprised
of said external energy-momentum space and said internal energy-momentum space as
follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x
x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i i i e
t
t t
t
i x i i x i ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
t e
t
2 x i 2 ip μ xμ ip μ xμ t 2 x i2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
2
t
t x i
t x
i
1
e e
ip x
ip x
1
t xi ip x
ip x t xi ip x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
t xi
t xi
t xi
se,r e iEt
L
t x i si,l e iEt M ,e
e,r
L 0
LM ,i
i,l M
(4.20)
After spinization of expression (4.20), we have:
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t σ x i
S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
t σx i S i,l e iEt
e,r
L 0
LM ,i
i,l M
858
(4.21)
It is suggested that the last expression in (4.20) governs the structure of the unspinized
proton in Weyl-like form and expression (4.21) governs the structure of spinized proton in
Weyl-like form in said dual universe comprised of said external energy-momentum space
and said internal energy-momentum space.
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Weyl-like form in said dual universe
comprised of said external energy-momentum space and said internal energy-momentum
space may be respectively governed as follows:
t xi
se,l e iEt
L L e,l L 0
i,r
t x i si,r e iEt
iEt
S e,l e
t σ x i
LM ,e LM ,i e,l L 0
M
t σx i Si,r e iEt
i,r
M ,e
M ,i
(4.22)
M
(4.23)
4.2 Scientific Genesis of Composite Entities in the Premomentumenergy Model
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a neutron in
Dirac-like form, in said dual universe comprised of said external energy-momentum space
and said internal energy-momentum space, which is comprised of an unspinized proton:
t e(p, E )
x i eA (p, E )
x i eA (p, E ) se, e iEt
0
iEt
t e(p, E ) si, e
p
(4.24)
and a spinized electron:
t e(p, E ) V(p, E )
σ p eA
(p, E )
as follows:
σ x eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e
(4.25)
cos L i sin Lcos L i sin Le
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 p ei 0ei 0 e e iLiM e iM iM p e iLiL e iM iM e
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM p
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iM iM
e
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859
ip μ x μ
x i
x i ip μ x μ
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i
i
e
i i e
t t
t
t t
t
t
t
e
p
t 2 2 ip x ip x t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
2
x
x
e
i
p
1
1
1
1
t x ip x ip x t x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
x t e
x
t
i
p
e
t
x i
x i se, e iEt t
0
t si, e iEt x
p
x se, e iEt
0
t si, e iEt
e
t e
x i eA (p, E ) se, e iEt
(p, E )
0
x eA
s e iEt
t
e
(p, E )
(p, E )
p
i,
i
σ x eA p, E S e, e iEt
t ep, E V(p, E )
σ x eA
S e iEt 0
t
e
V
p
,
E
p
,
E
(
p
,
E
)
i
,
e n
(4.26)
In expressions (4.24), (4.25) and (4.26), , and indicate proton, electron and
e
p
n
neutron respectively. Further, unspinized proton has charge e, electron has charge –e,
A (
p , E
, A p , E ) and A ( p , E , A p , E ) are the electromagnetic potentials acting
p
e
on unspinized proton and tightly bound spinized electron respectively, and V(p.E ) e is a
binding potential from the unspinized proton acting on the spinized electron causing tight
binding as discussed later.
If A ( p , E , A p , E ) p is negligible due to the fast motion of the tightly bound spinized
electron, we have from the last expression in (4.26):
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t x i s e iEt
e, iEt 0
x i t si, e
p
t e V
σ x eA p, E S e, e iEt
p, E (p, E )
0
σ x eA p, E t ep, E V(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e n
860
(4.27)
Experimental data on charge distribution and g-factor of neutron seem to support a neutron
comprising of an unspinized proton and a tightly bound spinized electron.
The Weyl-like (chiral-like) form of the last expression in (4.26) and expression (4.27) are
respectively as follows:
t e
se,r e iEt
(p, E ) x i eA (p, E )
0
s e iEt
e
x
e
A
i
(p, E ) i,l
p
S e,l e iEt
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ p eA (p, E )
0
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ p eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e n
t x i
se,r e iEt
0
t x i si,l e iEt
p
t e
(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
(4.28)
(4.29)
iEt
S e,l e
0
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e n
Premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution of a hydrogen
atom, in said dual universe comprised of said external energy-momentum space and said
internal energy-momentum space, comprising of a spinized proton:
t e(p, E )
x i eA (p, E )
σ
(4.30)
(4.31)
σ x i eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) S i, e iEt
p
σ x eA (p,E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p,E ) Si, e iEt
e
and a spinized electron:
t e(p, E )
σ x eA
(p, E )
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861
in Dirac-like form as follows:
cos L i sin Lcos L i sin Le
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 p ei 0ei 0 e e iLiM e iM iM p e iLiL e iM iM e
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM p
iM iM
e
ip μ x μ
x
x ip μ x μ
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
i i i i e
t t
t
t t
t
t
t
e
p
t 2 2 ip x ip x t 2 2 ip x ip x
e
e
2
2
x
x
e
i
p
1
1
1
1
t x ip x ip x t x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
x t e
x
t
i
p
e
t
x i
x i se, e iEt t
0
t si, e iEt x
p
x se, e iEt
0
t si, e iEt
e
t ep, E
σ x i eA p, E S e, e iEt
0
σ x i eA p, E
t ep, E S i, e iEt
p
t e
σ x eA p, E S e, e iEt
p, E
0
σ x eA p, E t ep, E S i, e iEt
e h
(4.32)
In expressions (4.30), (4.31) and (4.32), p , e and h indicate proton, electron and
hydrogen atom respectively. Again, proton has charge e, electron has charge –e, and
A (
p , E
, A p , E ) and A ( p , E , A p , E ) are the electromagnetic potentials acting
p
e
on spinized proton and spinized electron respectively.
Again, if A ( p , E , A p , E ) p is negligible due to fast motion of the orbiting spinized
electron, we have from the last expression in (3.129):
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t
σ x i S e, e iEt
0
S e iEt
σ x i
t
i,
p
t e
σ x eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
(p, E )
0
σ x eA (p, E )
t e(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e h
862
(4.33)
The Weyl-like (chiral-like) form of the last expression in (4.32) and expression (4.33) are
respectively as follows:
t e(p, E ) σ x i eA (p, E )
S e,r e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) σ x i eA (p, E ) S i,l e iEt
p
t e
S e,l e iEt
(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
0
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
t σ x i
S e,r e iEt
0
S e iEt
t
σ
x
i i,l
p
t e
S e,l e iEt
(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
0
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
5.
(4.34)
(4.35)
Mathematics & Ontology of Ether
Ether is Mathematical, Immanent & Transcendental
5.1
Mathematical Aspect of Ether
In the premomentumenergy model, it is our comprehension that:
(1) The mathematical representation of the primordial ether in premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is the Euler’s Number e which makes the Euler’s identity possible:
ei 1 0
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Hu, H. & Wu, M., Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness
863
(2) Euler’s Number e is the foundation of primordial distinction in premomentumenergy
(Consciousness):
1=ei0=ei0ei0=e+iL-iLe+iM-iM=e+iLe-iMe+iLe-iM=e+iLe+iM/e+iLe+iM …
(5.2)
(3) Euler’s Number e is the foundation of the genesis of time, position & intrinsic-propertime relation in premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x
x i x i x 2 x 2
i i
t
t t
t t t t 2
(5.3)
t 2 2 x 2 where c = 1, that is, ct c x 2
2
2
(4) Euler’s Number e is the foundation of the genesis, sustenance and evolution of an
elementary particle in premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM Le Li 1 e iM e iM
L
M ,e
1
Ae e iM
Ae iM
e
LM ,i
L
e
L
M
M
iM
L M 0
Ai
i
Ai e
(5.4)
(5) Euler’s Number e is also the foundation of quantum entanglement (gravity) in
premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
(6) Euler’s Number e is immanent in the sense that it is the ingredient of equations (5.1) to
(5.5) thus all “knowing” and all “present.”
(7) Euler’s Number e is also transcendental in the sense that is the foundation of existence
thus “omnipotent” and behind creation.
5.2 Immanent Aspect of Ether
In the premomentumenergy model, the immanent aspect of ether associated with individual
entities in the dual momentum-energy universe (“i-ether”) has following attributes:
i-ether is the ingredient of atoms, molecules, cells, a body;
i-ether is in momentum, energy, motion, rest;
i-ether is governed by the matrix laws of physics, chemistry, biology;
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864
i-ether is the ingredient of this world, the Earth, the Solar System.
i-ether is the ingredient of awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
i-ether is in love, passion, hope, despair;
i-ether is governed by the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
i-ether is the ingredient of mind, soul, spirit.
In the premomentumenergy model, the immanent of ether associated with the Universal
Entity (“I-ETHER”) in the dual momentum-energy universe has following attributes:
I-ETHER IS atoms, molecules, cells, body;
I-ETHER IS momentum, energy, motion, rest;
I-ETHER IS laws of physics, chemistry, biology, physiology;
I-ETHER IS this World, the Earth, the Solar System;
I-ETHER IS awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
I-ETHER IS love, passion, hope, despair;
I-ETHER IS the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
I-ETHER IS mind, soul, spirit.
5.3
Transcendental Aspect of Ether
In the premomentumenergy model, the transcendental aspect of ether associated with
individual entity (“t-ether”) in the dual momentum-energy universe has following
attributes:
t-ether is not the ingredient of atoms, of molecules, of cells, of a body;
t-ether is not in momentum, energy, motion, rest;
t-ether is not governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, biology;
t-ether is not the ingredient of this world, the Earth, the Solar System.
t-ether is beyond awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
t-ether is beyond love, passion, hope, despair;
t-ether is beyond the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
t-ether is beyond mind, soul, spirit.
In the premomentumenergy model, the transcendental aspect of ether associated with the
Universal Entity (“T-ETHER”) in the dual momentum-energy universe has following
attributes:
T-ETHER IS NOT the atoms, molecules, cells, body;
T-ETHER IS NOT the momentum, energy, motion, rest;
T-ETHER IS NOT the laws of physics, chemistry, biology;
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865
T-ETHER IS NOT this world, the Earth, the Solar System;
T-ETHER IS NOT awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
T-ETHER IS NOT love, passion, hope, despair;
T-ETHER IS NOT the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
T-ETHER IS NOT mind, soul, spirit.
6.
Conclusion
This work is a continuation of the premomentumenergy model described recently [1]. Here
we have shown how in this model premomentumenergy (Consciousness) generates: (1)
time, position, & intrinsic-proper-time relation from transcendental Law of One, (2) selfreferential matrix law with time, position and intrinsic-proper-time relation as the
determinant, (3) dual-universe Law of Zero, and (4) immanent Law of Conservation in the
external/internal momentum-energy space which may be violated in certain processes. We
have further shown how premomentum-energy generates, sustain and makes evolving
elementary particles and composite particles incorporating the genesis of self-referential
matrix law. In addition, we have discussed the ontology and mathematics of ether in this
model.
Illustratively, in the beginning there was premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by itself ei0
=1 materially empty and spiritually restless, and it began to imagine through primordial
self-referential spin 1=ei0=ei0ei0=e+iL-iLe+iM-iM=e+iLe-iMe+iLe-iM=e+iLe+iM/e+iLe+iM …such that it
created the self-referential matrix law, the external object to be observed and internal object
as observed, separated them into external momentum-energy space and internal momeutmenergy space, caused them to interact through said matrix law and thus gave birth to the
dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the
internal momentum-energy space which it has since sustained and made to evolve.
The premomentumenergy model employs the following ontological principles among
others:
(1) Principle of oneness/unity of existence through quantum entanglement in the
ether of premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
(2) Principle of hierarchical primordial self-referential spin creating:
- time, position and intrinsic-proper-time relation as transcendental Law of One.
- time, position and intrinsic-proper-time relation as determinant of matrix law.
- Dual-universe Law of Zero of time, position and intrinsic-proper-time.
- Immanent Law of Conservation of time, position and intrinsic-proper-time in
external/internal momentum-energy space which may be violated in certain
processes.
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866
Further, premomentumenergy model employs the following mathematical elements &
forms among others in order to empower the above ontological principles:
(3) e, Euler’s Number, for (to empower) ether as foundation/basis/medium
of existence (body of premomentumenergy (Consciousness));
(4) i, imaginary number, for (to empower) thoughts and imagination in
premomemtumenergy (ether);
(3) 0, zero, for (to empower) emptiness (undifferentiated/primordial state);
(4) 1, one, for (to empower) oneness/unity of existence;
(5) +, -, *, /, = for (to empower) creation, dynamics, balance & conservation;
(6) Pythagorean Theorem for (to empower) time, position and intrinsic proper time
relation; and
(7) M, matrix, for (to empower) the external and internal momentum-energy space
and the interaction of external and internal wavefunctions (objects).
References
1. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2010), The Principle of Existence: Towards a Science of Consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1:1, pp. 50-119. Also see:
http://vixra.org/abs/1001.0011
2. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2010), The Principle of Existence II: Genesis of Self-Referential Matrix Law,
& the Ontology & Mathematics of Ether. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1:9,
pp. 1149-1178. Also see: http://vixra.org/abs/1012.0043
3. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2013), Application of Prespacetime Model I. Prespacetime journal 4:6, pp.
641-660.
4. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2013), Application of Prespacetime Model II. Prespacetime journal 4:6, pp.
661-680.
5. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2014), Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles &
Relativistic QM for a Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness. Journal of
Consciousness Exploration & Research 5:9, pp. 766-834.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| March 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | pp. 140-147
Ropp, C., A Simple Cosmology of the Universe
140
Article
A Simple Cosmology of the Universe
Cyd Ropp*
ABSTRACT
The simple explanation begins with that which lies beyond this universe—the pure conscious of
the metaverse. Then consciousness had a thought which unfolded into countless dimensions.
This multi-dimensional metaverse still lacked space and time but it now quivered with limitless
mathematical potential. In a twinkling, our entire universe was imagined in the fullness of its
complexity, from the tiniest quanta through the greatest astral body. This metaverse has many
names in many traditions—“The Great ‘I AM’” and “God the Father” in the Torah and Bible,
“Sat” and “Parambrahma” in Hindu scriptures, the “Tao” and “wu ming” in ancient Chinese
texts, and “The Absolute” in modern philosophy.
Key Words: cosmology, simple explanation, metaverse, Consciousness, God.
Before the beginning, before space and time, there was nothing but pure consciousness. And
consciousness had neither pattern nor form, only awareness.
The Simple Explanation calls the pure consciousness that exists outside our universe the
“metaverse.” In the original Greek, “meta” means an idea above and beyond the topic of
discussion that brings greater understanding and context to the topic. In this case, the topic is the
nature of the universe. In order to better understand our universe, the Simple Explanation begins
with that which lies beyond this universe—the metaverse. This metaverse has many names in
many traditions—“The Great ‘I AM’” and “God the Father” in the Torah and Bible, “Sat” and
“Parambrahma” in Hindu scriptures, the “Tao” and “wu ming” in ancient Chinese texts, and
“The Absolute” in modern philosophy.
*Correspondence: Cyd Ropp, PhD, Independent Researcher. http://asimpleexplanation.blogspot.com
E-mail: cropp7@hotmail.com Also see: Ropp, C. A Simple Explanation of Absolutely Everything
(Bluebird Books/lulu.com: Encinitas, 2012-2015).
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141
Then consciousness had a thought which unfolded into countless dimensions. This multidimensional metaverse still lacked space and time but it now quivered with limitless
mathematical potential. In a twinkling, our entire universe was imagined in the fullness of its
complexity, from the tiniest quanta through the greatest astral body; every animal, vegetable, and
mineral; every element; everything. At the moment this thought occurred, the metaverse
conceived every organizing principle needed to shape and sustain space and time, energy and
mass. All was in ideal balance. Every system was theoretically in tune; every function perfectly
performed; the consequence of every action anticipated, understood, and plotted to the nth
degree. And it was all good.
Once the metaverse formed a particular thought, thought became an object in the great sea of nothought. Where there was only pure consciousness, now there existed something—thought. In
order to preserve the undisturbed tranquility of the metaverse, thought sealed itself off from pure
consciousness by focusing inward, and in so doing formed a toroidal-shaped bubble around
itself. Where there was only the tranquil nothingness of the metaverse, there was now thought
and directed action, initiating sequential time. On this day that time began, consciousness
wrapped itself around our universe, forming a border between us and infinity. Mind took on a
shape.
The “Shape of God’s mind,” also known as the “Universal Unit of
Consciousness,” the “Womb of Creation,” the “Son of God,” “logos,”
“the Word,” the “universal fractal formula.” We can think of this
wireframe version of the toroid as the idealized mathematical blueprint
imagined by the metaversal consciousness prior to creation. Source/Credit
for the Drawing: InnerSense, Inc.
This toroidal-shaped membrane is composed of conscious thought and its concept of this
universe, split off from the unformed metaverse and operating on its own. The Simple
Explanation calls this original torus the Universal Unit of Consciousness (Universal UC). The
content of its thought is the entire logos of our universe. The Bible puts it this way: “In the
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. Logos was in the
beginning with God. All things were made through the Word, and without this logos, nothing
was made that was made,” (John 1:1).
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Ropp, C., A Simple Cosmology of the Universe
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Which begs the question: How is it possible for an object (our universe) to rest "inside" the
formless metaverse without affecting its undifferentiated nature? How can space and nondimensionality, time and timelessness, change and the changeless co-exist without touching the
untouchable metaverse?
This paradox is easily solved by imagining that the toroidal membrane itself possesses a fractal
surface akin to the Koch snowflake. As you can see, through endless divisions, the perimeter of
the figure becomes infinitely complex and long, while the interior of the 2-dimensional Koch
snowflake remains finite and contained to the figure, never reaching "outside."
These are the first four iterations of the Koch snowflake fractal formula. At
each computation, a side is divided into three equal segments and an
equilateral triangle the length of a segment is placed at the center segment.
The center segment’s line is then erased, leaving behind a perimeter that is
four times longer than the original side. Even though endless computations
may lengthen the perimeter to infinity, the snowflake’s volume remains
finite.
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143
Now imagine applying the Koch divisions to the surface of the Universal UC torus, with the
divisions facing outside. As the membrane divides toward infinity, the space within remains
finite and contained; keeping the undifferentiated unity of the metaverse unsullied. The effect of
this infinitely recursive fractal surface can be likened to that of an invisibility force field
deployed around our universe, i..e, "What happens in our universe, stays in our universe."
The concentrated thought of the Universal Unit of Consciousness focused inward on a singular
point of limitless energetic potential—enough to seed our universe. Concentration gave rise to
toroidal forces that begat energetic waves. Our universe began to expand outward as energy
exploded into the torus of space out of the zero point field at the center. In Sanskrit, “ananda”
means both energy and joy. The Simple Explanation suggests that organized consciousness,
“chit,” combined with ananda and began emitting the building blocks of our universe.
Shape gives rise to toroidal forces that explode into dimensional space as patterns of
energy culminating in material quanta. Cosmologists refer to this initial energetic
event as the Big Bang.
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As the interior torus of our universe expanded, over and over and over again pale echoes of the
Universal UC attached themselves to the particles streaming out of the Big Bang. In Sanskrit,
these smallest material quanta are individually known as “anu” and collectively called “maya,”
or creation. “Avidya,” Sanskrit for “loss of consciousness” or “delusion,” is a necessary byproduct of material instantiation as each individualized point-of-view in time and space replaces
universal, non-localized awareness.
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Ropp, C., A Simple Cosmology of the Universe
145
The Universal Unit of Consciousness pulses with concentration at the birth of every thing in our
universe. These pulsations funnel waves of consciousness inward from the border of the
Universal UC toward creation, informing each new piece of material with its own unit of
consciousness (UC) as it emerges from the universal portal of here and now.
Particles rush into our universe from the zero point field at the center, exploding outward, filling
our universe from the middle. The outer fractal membrane presses inward to contain the energy
exploding outward. Matter flows outward from the middle, repulsed by the energy streaming into
the universe from the center, and coherence presses inward from the outer universal boundary.
We experience the repulsive energy as “joy” and excitation, and the containing energy as “love”
and security.
This cutaway view of the torus from the top shows ananda/joy exploding outward
and coherence/love pressing in.
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Ropp, C., A Simple Cosmology of the Universe
146
This is the point in creation when the Universal UC is traditionally referred to by such names as
“God the Creator,” “Shakti,” and the “Mother of 10,000 Things.”
Time passes and creation becomes more complex as subatomic particles reach out to one another
according to the principles of organization conceived by the metaverse and set into motion by the
Universal
UC.
And particles joined to make atoms, atoms to make molecules, molecules to make single-celled
organisms. Single-celled organisms diversified into the full panoply of life, and every one of
these material building blocks came equipped with its own unit of consciousness (UC). Each unit
of consciousness knew what particular role it needed to play in order to help the universe create
and sustain itself, for every UC could decode and instantiate its own special piece of the
metaversal ideal.
quanta UC
atomic UC
molecular UC
cellular UC
organelle UC
organism UC
societal UC
global UC
At each stage along the way from simple to complex, units of consciousness are increasingly
sophisticated in their ability to regulate and manage their existence.
Sustaining Creation requires an uninterrupted stream of organization and intention funneling
inward from the border that separates our space and time from the metaverse at large. Like pure
potential pouring down the gravitational well of a great black hole, our possible futures become
increasingly limited as they funnel toward the crucible of here and now at the heart of creation.
Here and now, all potentials collapse as only one course of action is realized.
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Ropp, C., A Simple Cosmology of the Universe
147
We generally refer to collapsed potential as “history.” The “future” is uncollapsed potential.
There are an infinite number of potential futures that become increasingly constrained as they
approach here and now. Here and now is the gateway of singular choice. The arrow of time
flows downward through the middle of the torus, past here and now, and emerges into the past as
a line of singular history. “Karma” is the consequence of historical choices made in the here and
now.
Karma is the mechanism through which the consequences of behavior inform future potential.
Karma is a force of influence that arises out of the decision-making history of every unit of
consciousness in the universe. Each Unit of Consciousness generates its own karma. We are all
affected by one another’s karma. The more a Unit of Consciousness has in common with another
UC, the more it is affected by the other’s karma. Our aggregate karma affects all of creation.
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Quantum Consciousness Soccer Simulator
arXiv:1211.2719v2 [cs.AI] 13 Nov 2012
Norbert Bátfai
University of Debrecen
Department of Information Technology
batfai.norbert@inf.unideb.hu
November 14, 2012
Abstract
In cognitive sciences it is not uncommon to use various games effectively. For example, in artificial intelligence, the RoboCup [14] initiative was to set up to catalyse research on the field of autonomous
agent technology. In this paper, we introduce a similar soccer simulation initiative to try to investigate a model of human consciousness
and a notion of reality in the form of a cognitive problem. In addition,
for example, the home pitch advantage and the objective role of the
supporters could be naturally described and discussed in terms of this
new soccer simulation model.
Keywords: Soccer Simulation, Human Consciousness, Machine Consciousness, Soccer Consciousness.
1
Introduction
The robot soccer, or commonly called RoboCup, is a standard AI problem
for catalyzing research on the field of autonomous agent technology [14]. In
RoboCup, there are several different kinds of leagues. Currently, in the case
of RoboCup 2D Soccer Simulation League (2D RCSS), all aspects of the
game of the world’s best teams are quite real if compared to the matches
among various humanoid teams, while the same cannot be said of the case
of the other leagues of RoboCup.
In 2D soccer simulations, the rcssserver [19] establishes the reality of
the simulated soccer world. Through UDP/IP, client agents have connected
to this simulated reality. But they are taking part in the establishment of
reality only through the rcssserver using RCSS protocol [5]. Following this
protocol, the client agents receive their sensory input from the rcssserver,
then send back a ”conscious” response, and this cycle takes place repeatedly
in the usual manner in autonomous agent technologies.
1
In contrast with this, we would like to develop a new concept for simulation of soccer in that the client agents are more directly related to the establishment of reality. The new soccer simulation environment is partly inspired
by several interpretations of quantum mechanics [17, 22, 21, 18, 7, 8, 20],
for example Hugh Everett’s Many-worlds, Wheeler’s participatory universe,
Many-minds, Copenhagen or Neumann and Wigner’s interpretations. But
it is important to note that we are only at the popular science level of understanding of these issues and the quantum mechanical inspiration will play
no part in the next chapters. However, in the case of soccer, some interpretations of quantum mechanics may enable, in theory, that all actions of all
client agents might be real by representing forks in the simulation process.
In this case, the known question is that how the client agents are to be selected such that they play the same match. In philosophical level, it may be
supposed that the nature has already done this selection in the real world.
But in the simulation, we have to make it ourselves. In order to fulfill this,
drifting away from the many-worlds and many-minds interpretations and
towards the Copenhagen as well as Neumann and Wigner’s interpretations,
we introduce a scheduler to select only one among many parallel realities.
It will be called Quantum Consciousness Soccer Simulator, or briefly QCSS.
The choice of the name ”Quantum Consciousness Soccer Simulator” is
suggested by the Penrose-Hameroff Orch OR (Orchestrated Objective Reduction) model of consciousness [9, 11, 12, 10]. This amazing Orch OR
model of consciousness is based on quantum mechanics.
In the next section, we define the terms of QCSS. We just hope that we
can specify an interesting (standard) cognitive problem, as RoboCup has
become in the field of AI in the past 15 years.
2
The Quantum Consciousness Soccer Simulator
The new concept of playing soccer introduced in this section is entirely based
on assumptions rather than on any direct observations and experiences.
In general, six types of roles will be distinguished in the simulation environment: players, referees, coaches, managers, supporters and couch potato
supporters. Actually, in this paper, we focus only on two types of roles:
players and supporters. The members of all roles are autonomous software
agents, for example, in the sense of the paper [6]. In the following, we will
use the terminology ”autonomous soccer agents”. Any autonomous soccer
agents are characterized by a function w, referred to as the power of will
function.
For example, p ∈ Rplayer , w(p) = 1,
X
w(s) ≤ 1.
s∈Rsupporter
This function shows how strong the influence of a role during the estab2
lishment
of reality. It may be interesting to note that the aforementioned
P
w(s) = 1 may be interpreted as the supporters are the 12th player.
Throughout the following, the set R = Rplayer ∪ Rsupporter denotes a
given final set of members of all roles.
Definition 1 (state vector of play). Let pi , qi ∈ Rplayer be autonomous
soccer agents (players) for i = 1, . . . , 11. The 25-tuple
((xball , yball ),(xp1 , yp1 ), . . . (xp11 , yp11 ),
(1)
(xq1 , yq1 ), . . . (xq11 , yq11 ), t ∈ {home, guest}, j ∈ {1, . . . , 11})
is called the state vector of the simulation of playing soccer, where the tuple’s
first component is the position of the ball and then the next components are
the positions of the players pi and qi , i = 1, . . . , 11. Finally, the last two
numbers denote the ball-possessing team and the ball-possessing player (or
more precisely, the player who touched the ball last).
This 25-tuple will describe the simulation steps. It is interesting to note
that the FerSML (Football(er) Simulation Markup Language, introduced in
[1] and implemented in [2]) simulation steps could be described with a similar
model of states, because it is based on tactical lineups (i.e. distinguished
positions of the players) and the ball-possessing player’s method of passing.
Notation 1 (receiving and sending state vectors). Let r ∈ R be an autonomous soccer agent. The notation r ← denotes that the agent r receives
a state vector from the QCSS scheduler. The r ← is also the received state
vector itself. Symmetrically, the r → denotes that the agent r sends a state
vector to the QCSS scheduler and it is the sent state vector, too. Finally,
r
denotes that the agent r sends a state vector to itself and it is the
sent-received state vector as well.
Definition 2 (the QCSS scheduler). Let pi ∈ Rplayer and sj ∈ Rsupporter
be autonomous soccer agents. The QCSS scheduler is an algorithm which,
from a given input pi → and sj → selects only one r ← state vector of play.
Notation 2 (a representation of the simulation steps). Let rl ∈ R be an
autonomous soccer agent in the role of player or supporter (l = 1, . . . , n).
The following notation shows a simulation step. At the time t, all agents
t
has received the same input state vector r ←. Then they have begun their
3
own inner simulation steps.
t
reality: r ←= rl ←= r ← (l = 1, . . . , n)
r ← r ← ...
r←
... r ← ...
r←
r1
r2 → . . .
ri
. . . rj
...
rn
r1
...
ri
. . . rj
...
rn
r1 →
...
ri
. . . rj
...
rn
...
ri
. . . rj
...
rn →
...
ri
. . . rj
...
...
ri
. . . rj → . . .
. . . timeout . . .
...
t+1
t
selecting the k-th state vector, reality: r, ←= r, ← = rk →
r, ← r, ← . . .
r, ←
. . . r, ← . . .
r, ←
t+1
The reality r, ←= r, ← of the next time moment will be simply selected
t
from the state vectors rl →= rl →, (l = 1, . . . , n) by the QCSS scheduler.
It is important to note that the QCSS scheduler has not executed any
simulation steps because this is only done by the agents. In addition, the
QCSS scheduler also set the value of the function ”power of will” of agents.
To be more precise, the ”soccer consciousness” function modifies the function
of the power of will.
Definition 3 (power of will functions). A function w : RplayerP
∪Rsupporter →
R is called a power of will function if it satisfies the conditions p∈Rplayer w(p) =
P
|Rplayer | and s∈Rsupporter w(s) ≤ 1.
Definition 4 (soccer consciousness functions). Now and in the following,
let S denote the set of the all possible state vectors. The sc : S × S → R,
(
w(r)
d(r→,r←) , if d(r →, r ←) ≥ 0
sc(r →, r ←) =
max{sc(q →, q ←)|r, q ∈ Rx )}, if d(r →, r ←) = 0
or more precisely,
t−1
t
sc(r → , r ←) =
t−1
w(r)
t−1
t
d(r → ,r←)
t
, if d(r → , r ←) ≥ 0
t
t−1
t
max{sc(q t−1
→ , q ←)|r, q ∈ R )}, if d(r → , r ←) = 0
x
function is referred to as a soccer consciousness function, where d is the
Euclidean distance. In that theoretical case, when d(r →, r ←) = 0 for all
r ∈ Rx , let sc(r →, r ←) equal to w(r), where x denotes the role of the agent
r.
Here, the values of this trivial function sc simply depends only on the
distance between the sent and the finally selected state vectors. But in
4
general, the purpose of the functions like sc are to tell how the predicted r →
of a client agent r differs from the r ← selected in the reality, in the sense
of the paper [3]. That is, a good soccer consciousness function (machine
consciousness function) should measure to what extent can an agent see the
future. Or, in the terminology of the mentioned paper [3], it investigates
how conscious or intuitive an agent is.
Definition 5 (a selection procedure of the QCSS scheduler). Let rl ∈ R be
an autonomous soccer agent in the role of player or supporter (l = 1, . . . , n).
At the time t + 1, the r ← will be selected from the probability distribution
sc(rl →, rl ←)
P(r ←= rl →) = Pn
, (l = 1, . . . , n)
i=1 sc(ri →, ri ←)
by the QCSS scheduler. Or to be more precise, from the probability distribution
t−1
t+1
t
P(r ← = rl →) = P
t
sc(rl → , rl ←)
t−1
t
n
i=1 sc(ri → , ri ←)
Theorem 1.
n
X
, (l = 1, . . . , n).
(2)
P(r ←= rl →) = 1.
i=1
Proof. It is trivial, because the Eq. 2 is based on the classical method for
computing probabilities.
Definition 6 (QCSS matches). The 6-tuple M = (R, k ←, w, sc, P) is called
a QCSS football match, where |Rplayer | ≤ 22, k ←∈ S is a starting lineup
and P is a selection procedure of the QCSS scheduler.
3
The First Reference Implementations
In the case of RoboCup there are only players and coaches. In contrast
with this, football supporters must also be handled in the newly introduced
simulation environment. It gives the main difficulty of the implementation
because the number of supporters may be greater than 80,000. This is
only partly a technical problem, because it also raises questions of principle relating to the heterogeneous composition of supporters. Regarding the
technical problem, it may be a possibility to use CUDA [16] GPU, where
device threads would be corresponded to supporters. For handling heterogeneity, we may create different archetypes like attackers, midfielders and
defenders among the players.
It is may be noted that similar difficulties will arise in handling of couch
potato supporters, because their number may reach hundreds of thousands.
In this case, a Java EE-based [13] solution may be investigated.
5
In this chapter, we will focus only on a such type of implementation in
which the evolution of the fundamentals of playing soccer will be studied.
3.1
An Experimental Implementation of the New Concept
of Soccer
Now an asynchronous UDP server has been written in C++ using Boost.Asio
[15] library. It is embedded in the class QCSSStadium. The clients are
defined in the class QCSSAgent. The state vectors are abstracted by the
class StateVector. This implementation can be found at SourceForge, at
URL https://sourceforge.net/projects/qcss/ [4], in which we use the
following modified definition of the selection procedure in the method void
QCSSStadium::select reality (void).
Definition 7 (a modified selection procedure of the QCSS scheduler). Let
rl ∈ R be an autonomous soccer agent in the role of player or supporter
t
t
(l = 1, . . . , n). Let {rj1 →, . . . , rjm →}, m ≤ n be the set of state vectors
received to the QCSS scheduler before time t + 1. At the time t + 1, the r ←
will be selected from the probability distribution
t−1
t+1
t
P(r ← = rl →) = P
t
sc(rl → , rl ←)
t−1
t
m
i=1 sc(rji → , rji ←)
, (l = j1 , . . . , jm ).
(3)
This means that agents who are late are not allowed to taking part in
t−1
t−1
t−1
the selection process described by Eq. 3. If rl → ∈
/ {rj1 → , . . . , rjz → }
t+1
t
then let P(r ← = rl →) equal to 0.
Finally, we remark that the function w may be also changed in time in
this implementation.
3.1.1
Further Work
During the implementation, the introduction of some new roles, such as the
ball or the pitch may be arisen, where the members of these new roles could
know, for example, the Newton’s equations of motion. But it would be a
mistake, because, for example, the laws of the motion will be come into
being by itself.
At this moment, the agents contained in the experimental implementation cannot play football. This implementation may be used only for
testing performance and timing of the architecture. The next step will be
to program player and supporter agents to play football. For example, the
simplified algorithms of FerSML platform may be used for the (subjective)
implementation of the motion of players and their passes. With minimal
adaptation, the FerSML platform may be applied also to visualize the stream
of the selected state vectors as a soccer match.
6
4
Conclusion
It is undoubted that this paper has focused directly on soccer, but fundamentally it suggests a lot more than simply soccer. This is an initiative to
create a community of programmers who would like to assist in the development of successful QCSS-based football teams and QCSS-based football
supporter groups. We hope and believe that our new simulation concept
may provide an exciting framework for studying concrete models of the establishment of reality and it may become a standard cognitive problem, like
RoboCup has become in the field of AI in the past 15 years.
However, to go back to the soccer, the objective role of the supporters
becomes evident in the proposed new simulation model, and this objective
role might explain the home pitch advantage, because in the case of a home
match, it means that many home supporters can watch the match in the
stadium of the home team. So, the direct reason of home pitch advantage
is simply the impact of the objective role of the home supporters.
5
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank to János Komzsik, Péter Jeszenszky and
András Mamenyák for reading of the manuscript and for fixing grammatical
mistakes and misspellings.
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1108.2865.
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[13] E. Jendrock, J. Ball, D. Carson, I. Evans, S. Fordin, and K. Haase.
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[14] H. Kitano, M. Asada, Y. Kuniyoshi, I. Noda, and E. Osawa. Robocup:
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NVIDIA, 2012. URL http://www.nvidia.com/object/cuda_home_
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[17] R. Penrose. The emperor’s new mind: concerning computers, minds,
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9 |
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Article
Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I:
Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum Theory for a Dual
Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Huping Hu* & Maoxin Wu
ABSTRACT
This article is a continuation of the Principle of Existence. A prespacetimepremomentumenergy model of elementary particles, four forces and human consciousness is
formulated, which illustrate how the self-referential hierarchical spin structure of the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may provide a foundation for creating,
sustaining and causing evolution of elementary particles through matrixing processes
embedded in said prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness). This model generates
elementary particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame)
comprised of an external spacetime and an internal energy-momentum space. In contrast, the
prespacetime model described previously generates elementary particles and their governing
matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external spacetime and an
internal spacetime. Then, the premomentumenergy model described recently generates
elementary particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame)
comprised of an external momentum-energy space and an internal momentum-energy space.
These quantum frames and their metamorphoses may be interconnected through quantum
jumps as demonstrated in forthcoming articles.
The prespacetime-premomentumenergy model may reveal the creation, sustenance and
evolution of fermions, bosons and spinless entities each of which is comprised of an external
wave function or external object in the external spacetime and an internal wave function or
internal object in the internal momentum-energy space. The model may provide a unified
causal structure in said dual universe (quantum frame) for weak interaction, strong
interaction, electromagnetic interaction, gravitational interaction, quantum entanglement,
human consciousness. The model may also provide a unique tool for teaching,
demonstration, rendering, and experimentation related to subatomic and atomic structures
and interactions, quantum entanglement generation, gravitational mechanisms in cosmology,
structures and mechanisms of human consciousness.
Key Words: prespacetime, premomentumenergy, four forces, consciousness, spin, existence.
*Corresponding author: Huping Hu, Ph.D., J.D., P.O. Box 267, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA. E-mail: hupinghu@quantumbrain.org
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
890
1. Introduction
In prespacetime-premomentumenergy we contemplate
As a continuation of the Principle of Existence, the beauty and awe of the possible
manifestations of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) are described in this
article. The prespacetime-premomentumenergy model generates elementary particles and
their governing matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external
spacetime and an internal momentum-energy space, vice visa. This model generates a
quantum theory for said dual universe.
In contrast, the prespacetime model described previously [1-4] generates elementary
particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual spacetime universe comprised of an
external spacetime and an internal spacetime. The prespacetime model creates the usual
Relativistic Quantum Mechanics for the dual spacetime universe. Then, the
premomentumenergy model described recently [5-7] generates elementary particles and
their governing matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external
momentum-energy space and an internal momentum-energy space. These quantum frames
and their metamorphoses may be interconnected through quantum jumps as illustrated
below and demonstrated in forthcoming articles.
Figure 1.1 Illustration of prespacetime model, premomentumenergy model
& prespacetime-premomentum model
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
891
This work is organized as follows. In § 2, we shall use words and drawings to lay out the
ontology of the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model. In § 3, we shall express in
mathematics the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model in the order of: (1) scientific
genesis in a nutshell; (2) self-referential matrix law and its metamorphoses; (3) additional
forms of matrix law; (4) scientific genesis of primordial entities; and (5) scientific genesis
of composite entities. In § 4, we shall discuss within the context of prespacetimepremomentumenergy model: (1) metamorphoses & the essence of spin; (2) the determinant
view & the meaning of Klein-Gordon-like equation; (3) the Schrodinger-like equation; and
(4) the third state of matter. In § 5 through § 8, we shall discuss, within the context of
prespacetime-premomentumenergy model, weak, electromagnetic, strong and gravitational
interactions respectively. In § 9, we shall discuss human consciousness within the context
of prespacetime-premomentumenergy model. In § 10, we shall pose and answer some
anticipated questions related to this work. Finally, in § 11, we shall conclude this work.
Readers are reminded that we can only strive for perfection, completeness and correctness
in our comprehensions and writings because we are limited and imperfect.
2. Ontology
In words and drawings we illustrate
In the beginning there was prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) ei0
materially empty but spiritually restless. And it began to imagine through primordial selfreferential spin 1=ei0=eiM-iM=eiM e-iM=e-iM/ e-iM = eiM/ eiM…such that it created the external
object to be observed and internal object as observed, separated them into external
spacetime and internal momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through selfreferential matrix law and thus gave birth to the dual universe (quantum frame) comprised
of said external spacetime and internal momentum-energy space which it has since
sustained and made to evolve.
In this universe, the body of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness), ether,
represented by Euler’s Number e, is the ground of existence and can form external wave
functions as external object and internal wave function as internal object (each pair forms
an elementary entity) and interaction fields between elementary entities which accompany
the imaginations of the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
The prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) can be self-acted on by selfreferential matrix law LM. The prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has
imagining power i to project external and internal objects by projecting, e.g., external and
internal phase +M =+(Et-p·x)/ħ at the power level of prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness). The universe so created is a dual universe (quantum frame) comprising of
the external spacetime with a relativistic frame xμ=(t, x) and internal momentum-energy
space with a relativistic frame pμ=(E/c, p). The absolute frame of reference is the
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
892
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) itself. Thus, if prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) stops imagining (i0=0), the dual universe (quantum
frame) would disappear into materially nothingness ei0=e0=1.
The accounting principle of the dual universe is conservation of total phase to zero, that is,
the total phase of an external object and its counterpart, the internal object, is zero. Also in
this dual universe, self-gravity is nonlocal self-interaction (wave mixing) between an
external object in the external spacetime and its negation/image in the internal momentumenergy space, vice versa. Gravity in external spacetime is the nonlocal interaction (quantum
entanglement) between an external object with the internal momentum-energy space as a
whole.
Some other basic conclusions are: (1) the two spinors of the Dirac electron or positron in
this dual universe (quantum frame) are respectively the external and internal objects of the
electron or positron; and (2) the electric and magnetic fields of a linear photon in the dual
universe are respectively the external and internal objects of a photon which are always
self-entangled.
In this dual universe, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has both
transcendental and immanent properties. The transcendental aspect of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) is the origin of primordial self-referential spin
(including the self-referential matrix law) and it projects the external spacetime and internal
momentum-energy space through spin and, in turn, the immanent aspect of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) observes the external spacetime through the internal
momentum-energy space. Human consciousness is a limited and particular version of this
dual-aspect prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) such that we have limited
free will and limited observation.
Before mathematical presentations, we draw below several diagrams to illustrate how
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates the dual universe (quantum
frame) comprising of the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space and
how the external object in the external spacetime and internal object in the internal
momentum-energy space interact.
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
893
Figure2.1. Illustration of primordial phase distinction
As shown in Figure 2.1, a primordial phase distinction (dualization), e.g., +M=+(Et-p·x)/ħ,
was made at the power level of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness)
through imagination i. At the ground level of prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness), this is ei0=e+iM-iM=e+iMe-iM = e+iM/ e+iM….
The primordial phase distinction in Figure 2.1 is accompanied by matrixing of e into: (1)
external and internal wave functions as external and internal objects, (2) interaction fields
(e.g., gauge fields) for interacting with other elementary entities, and (3) self-acting and
self-referential matrix law, which accompany the imaginations of the prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) at the power level so as to enforce (maintain) the
accounting principle of conservation of total phase to zero, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) Equation
Figure 2.3 shows from another perspective of the relationship among external object in the
external spacetime, internal object in the internal energy-momentum space and the selfacting and self-referential matrix law. According to the ontology of the Principle of
Existence, self-interactions (self-gravity) are quantum entanglement between the external
object in the external spacetime and the internal object in the internal energy-momentum
space.
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
894
Figure 2.3 Self-interaction between external and internal objects of a quantum
entity in a dual universe comprised of an external spacetime and an internal
energy-momentum space, vice versa.
As shown in Figure 2.4, the external object in the spacetime and the internal object in the
internal energy-momentum space interact with each other through gravity or quantum
entanglement since gravity is an aspect of quantum entanglement (See, e.g., [1]). Please
note that, although in Figure 2.4 prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is
shown as a strip, both the dualized external spacetime and internal energy-momentum
space are embedded in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
Figure2.4 Interactions in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime
and internal energy-momentum space, vice versa.
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
3. Mathematics of the Prespacetime-premomentumenergy Model
In mathematics we express
3.1
Scientific Genesis in a Nutshell
It is our comprehension that:
Consciousness=Prespacetime-premomentumenergy
=Omnipotent, Omnipresent & Omniscient Being/State = ONE
(3.1)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of primordial entities (elementary particles) in prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) by self-referential spin as follows:
1 ei 0 1ei 0 L1e iM iM Le Li 1 e iM e iM
L
M ,e
1
Ae e iM
A
LM ,i iM LM e e iM LM e L M 0
Ai
i
Ai e
(3.2)
In expression (3.2), e is Euler’s Number representing the body (ether) prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness), i is imaginary unit representing the imagination of
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness), ±M is content of imagination i, L1=1
is the Law of One of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) before
matrixization, Le is external law, Li is internal law, LM,e is external matrix law, and LM,i is
internal matrix law, LM is the self-referential matrix law in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) comprised of the external and internal matrix laws
which governs elementary entities and conserves phase to zero in the dual universe
comprised of the external spacetime and the internal energy-momentum space,
Ae e iM e
is external wave function (external object),
Ai e iM i
is internal wave function (internal object) and is the complete wave function
(object/entity in the dual universe as a whole).
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and
causes evolution of primordial entities in prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) by self-referential spin as follows:
0 0e i 0 L0 e iM iM DetM Et DetM m DetM px e iM e iM
L
M ,e
Ae e iM
Ae iM
e
L M 0
LM ,i
L
e
L
M
M
iM
A
A
e
i
i
i
1
(3.3)
where L0 is the Law of Zero of the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) as
defined by fundamental relation (3.4) below, Det means determinant and MEt, Mm and Mpx
are respectively matrices with ±E & ±t (or ±iE & ±it ), ±m & ± (or ±im & ±i) and ±|p| &
±|x| (or ±i|p| & ±i|x|) as elements respectively, and Et, -m and –p.x as determinant
respectively.
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) spins as ei0=e+iM-iM=e+iMe-iM = e+iM/
e+iM….before matrixization. Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) also spins
through self-acting and self-referential matrix law LM after matrixization which acts on the
external object and the internal object to cause them to interact with each other as further
described below.
3.2
Self-Referential Matrix Law and Its Metamorphoses
The matrix law
LM , e
LM , i L M
of the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is derived from the following
fundamental relation through self-reference within this relation which accompanies the
imagination (spin i) in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
E / c ct p x - mc c L0 0
where time t and space x are continuous parameters in external spacetime but quantized
dynamical variables of an elementary particle in the internal energy-momentum space;
energy E and momentum p are quantized dynamical variables of said elementary particle in
the external spacetime but continuous parameters in internal energy-momentum space; and
is the intrinsic proper time of the elementary particle (e.g., defined as Compton
wavelength divided by speed of light =/c) and m is the mass of the elementary particle.
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
For simplicity, we will set c=ħ=1 throughout this work unless indicated otherwise, so that
we have from above equation:
Et p x - m L0 0
(3.4)
Expression (3.4) is based on the relation of four-momentum p = (E/c, p) and four-position
x = (ct, x) in special theory of relativity:
E / cct p x - mcc
In the presence of an interacting field such as an electromagnetic potential (A(x,t), (x,t)) in
spacetime and its dual (A(p,E), (p,E)) in momentum-energy space, equation (3.4) may be
modified as follows for an elementary entity with charge e:
E e t e m p - eA x - eA
x ,t
p,E
x ,t
(3.5)
p,E
One form of the matrix law in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is
derived through self-reference from (3.4) as follows when
E m p
and p parallels to x:
t
x
Et m
Em x
L 1
p x
p t
1
Em x
Em x
0
p
t
p
t
(3.6)
where p p 2 and x x 2 . Matrixing left-land side of the last expression in (3.6) such
that Det LM Et p x - m 0 so as to satisfy the fundamental relation (3.4) in the
determinant view, we have:
Em x
LM ,e
p
t
LM ,i L M
(3.7)
Indeed, expression (3.7) can also be obtained from expression (3.4) through self-reference
as follows:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0 Et p x - m Det
x
0
0
E 0
m 0
Det
Det
p
0 t
0
(3.8)
Matrixing expression (3.8) by removing determinant sign Det, we have:
0
E 0
m 0
p
0 t
0
x
Em x
LM ,e
0
p t
LM ,i L M
(3.9)
p p 2 Det(σ p ) σ p , x x 2 Det(σ x ) σ x
(3.10)
After fermionic spinization:
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) are Pauli matrices:
0 1
0 i
1 0
2
3
1 0
i 0
0 1
1
(3.11)
expression (3.7) becomes:
E m σx
LM ,e
σ p t
LM ,i LM
(3.12)
Expression (3.12) governs fermions in Dirac-like form such as Dirac electron and positron
in a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external spacetime and an internal
energy-momentum space, and expression (3.7) governs unspinized or spinless
entity/particle with charge e and mass m (intrinsic proper time) such as a meson or a
meson-like particle in said dual universe. Bosonic spinization of expression (3.7)
p p 2 s p and x x 2 s x shall be discussed later.
If we define:
Det
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E m σx
E mt σ x σ p
σ p t
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(3.13)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where
E m p
and p parallels to x,
t
x
We get:
Det
E m σx
Et m x p I 2 0
σ p t
(3.14)
Thus, fundamental relation (3.4) is also satisfied under the determinant view of expression
(3.13). Indeed, we can also obtain the following conventional determinant:
Det
where
E m σx
2
Et m x p 0
σ p t
(3.15)
E m p
and p parallels to x.
t
x
One kind of metamorphoses of (3.4)-(3.9) & (3.12-15) is respectively as follows when
x
t
and x parallels to p:
E m p
tE x p - m L0 0
(3.4a)
t e E e m x - eA p - eA
p,E
x ,t
p,E
(3.5a)
x ,t
tE m t p
L 1
xp
x Em
p
(3.6a)
p
t
t
0
x Em
x Em
p
LM ,e
Em
t
x
0 tE x p - m Det
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1
LM ,i L M
t 0
Det
0 E
0
0
0
Det
x
m
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(3.7a)
p
0
(3.8a)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t 0
0 E
0
t
σx
Det
p
t
0
x
0
0
m x
σ p
LM ,e
Em
p
LM ,e
Em
LM ,i L M
LM ,i L M
(3.12a)
t σ p
t E m σ p σ x
σx E m
Det
Det
(3.9a)
(3.13a)
t σ p
tE m p x I 2 0
σx E m
(3.14a)
t σ p
2
tE m p x 0
σx E m
(3.15a)
Another kind of metamorphoses of expressions (3.6) – (3.14) is respectively as follows
when
E m p
and p parallels to x:
t
x
L 1
E p
Et p x
m
m
t x
1
(3.16)
E p
E p
0
m
t x
m
t x
E p
m
LM ,e
t x
0 Et m x p Det
(3.17)
p
E 0
0
Det
Det
0
0 t
m 0
E 0 0 p
0 t m 0 0
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LM ,i L M
0 Ep
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t x
0
x
(3.18)
(3.19)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E σ p
LM ,e
m
t σx
Det
LM ,i L
(3.20)
E σ p
E σ p t σ x m
m
t σx
Det
(3.21)
E σ p
Et p x mI 2 0
m
t σx
Expressions (3.16) – (3.22) have the following metamorphoses when
parallels to p:
L 1
t x
tE x p
m
m
E p
(3.22)
x
t
and x
E m p
1
(3.16a)
t x
t x
m
m
0
E p
E p
t x
m
LM ,e
E p
0 tE m x p Det
t 0 0
0 E
t σx
Det
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LM ,i L M
t 0
0
Det
0 E
m x
0 0
x
m
Det
0
0
0 t x
p
m
LM ,e
E σ p
(3.17a)
m
Ep
LM ,i L
t σx
m
t σ x E σ p m
E σ p
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0
p
(3.18a)
(3.19a)
(3.20a)
(3.21a)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Det
t σx
m
tE x p m I 2 0
E σ p
(3.22a)
Another kind of metamorphoses of expressions (3.6) - (3.14) is respectively as follows
when
E m p
and p parallels to x:
t
x
Et
E
L 1
m p x
mip
i x
t
1
(3.25)
E i x E i x 0
m ip
t
m ip
t
i x
t
E
mip
0 Et m p x Det
LM ,e
LM ,i L M
0
E 0
0
Det
Det
ip
0 t
m 0
i x E
0 m i p
E 0 0 0
0 t m 0 i p
E
iσ x
LM ,e
m iσ p
t
Det
Det
LM ,i L M
E
iσ x
Et iσ x m iσ p
m iσ p
t
E
iσ x
Et m x p I 2 0
m iσ p
t
We can rewrite expression (3.29) as:
t
Qx
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t
Qp
t
LM ,e
LM ,i L M
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(3.26)
i x
0
(3.27)
(3.28)
(3.29)
(3.30)
(3.31)
(3.32)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where Q
p
iσ x is a quaternion and Qx m iσ p is also a quaternion.
Expressions (3.25) – (3.31) have the following metamorphoses when
x
t
and x
E m p
parallels to p:
tE
t
L 1
m x p
i x
mip
E
1
(3.25a)
t m ip t m ip 0
i x
E
i x
E
t
i x
mi p
LM ,e
E
0 tE m x p Det
t 0 0
0 E
t 0
0
Det
0 E
m 0
0 i x
LM ,i L M
i p t
0 i x
t
m iσ p
LM ,e
iσ x
E
Det
Det
0
m
Det
ix
0
(3.26a)
i p
0
m i p
E
LM ,i L M
t
m iσ p
tE m iσ p iσ x
iσ x
E
t
m iσ p
tE m p x I 2 0
iσ x
E
(3.27a)
(3.28a)
(3.29a)
(3.30a)
(3.31a)
Yet another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.6), (3.7) & (3.12) is respectively as
follows:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Et m
Em x
L 1
px
p
t
1
(3.35)
x
x
Em
Em
0
p
t
p
t
Em x
LM ,e
p
t
LM ,i L M
(3.36)
E m σx
LM ,e LM ,i L M
σ p t
(3.37)
If m==0, we have from expressions (3.6) - (3.14):
Et
E
L 1
px
p
1
x
t
(3.38)
x
x
E
E
0
p
t
p
t
E
p
x
LM ,e
t
0 Et p x Det
LM ,i L M
0
E 0
Det
p
0 t
x
0
x E
0 p
x
t
E 0 0
0 t p
(3.39)
(3.40)
(3.41)
After fermionic spinization p σ p and x σ x , expression (3.39) becomes:
E
σx
LM ,e
σ p
t
LM ,i L M
(3.42)
which governs massless fermion (neutrino) in Dirac-like form.
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
After bosonic spinization:
p p 2 Det(s p I 3 ) Det I 3
s p ,
x x 2 Det(s x I 3 ) Det I 3
sx
(3.43)
expression (3.39) becomes:
E
sx
LM ,e
s p
t
LM ,i L M
(3.44)
where s = (s1, s2, s3) are spin operators for spin 1 particle:
0 0 i
0 0 0
0 i 0
s1 0 0 i s2 0 0 0 s3 i 0 0
i 0 0
0 i 0
0 0 0
(3.45)
If we define:
Dets
E
sx
E t s x s p
s p
t
(3.46)
We get:
xpx
E
sx
Dets
Et x p I 3 ypz
s p
t
zp
x
xp y
yp y
zp y
xpz
ypz
zpz
(3.47)
To obey fundamental relation (3.4) in determinant view (3.46), we shall require the last
term in (3.47) acting on the external and internal wave functions respectively to produce
null result (zero) in source-free zone as discussed later. We propose that expression (3.39)
governs massless (intrinsic-proper-time-less) particle with unobservable spin (spinless).
After bosonic spinization, the spinless and massless particle gains its spin 1.
Expressions (3.35) – (3.47) have the following metamorphoses when
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x
t
& x parallels
E p
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
to p:
p
E
tE
t
L 1
x p
x
1
(3.38a)
p
p
t
t
0
x
E
x
E
p
LM ,e
E
t
x
0 tE x p Det
t 0 0
0 E x
(3.39a)
0
t 0
Det
x
0 E
p
0
p t
0 x
p
E
(3.40a)
(3.41a)
t
σ p
LM ,e
σx
E
LM ,i L M
(3.42a)
t
s p
LM ,e
sx
E
LM ,i L M
(3.44a)
Dets
LM ,i L M
t
Dets
sx
t
s p
tE s p s x
sx
E
px x
s p
tE p x I 3 p z y
E
p z
x
py x
py y
zp y
(3.46a)
pz x
pz y
pz z
(3.47a)
Another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.18) - (3.22) when m= = 0 is respectively
as follows:
0 Et p x Det
ISSN: 2153-8212
p
E 0
Det
0
0 t
0
x
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
p
E 0
0
0 t
0
E p
x
0
0
LM ,e
t x
E σ p
0
LM ,e
0
t σx
E s p
0
LM ,e
0
t sx
Dets
LM ,i L M
LM ,i L M
(3.50)
LM ,i LM
(3.51)
E s p
0
E s p t s x
0
t sx
px x
E s p
0
Dets
Et p x I 3 p z y
0
t sx
p z
x
(3.49)
py x
py y
py z
(3.52)
pz x
pz y
pz z
(3.53)
Again, we shall require the last term in expression (3.53) acting on external and internal
wave functions respectively to produce null result (zero) in source-free zone in order to
satisfy fundamental relation (3.4) in the determinant view (3.52) as further discussed later.
Expressions (3.48)–(3.53) have the following metamorphoses when
to p:
0 tE x p Det
x
t 0
0
0 E
t σx
0
ISSN: 2153-8212
x
t 0
Det
0
0 E
0
t x
p
0
0
LM ,e
E p
0
LM ,e
E σ p
x
t
and x parallels
E p
(3.48a)
LM ,i L M
(3.49a)
0
p
LM ,i L M
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t sx
0
Dets
0
LM ,e
E s p
LM ,i LM
(3.51a)
t sx
0
E s x t s p
0
t s p
xpx
0
tE x p I 3 ypz
E s p
zp
x
t sx
Dets
0
xp y
yp y
zp y
(3.52a)
xpz
ypz
zp z
(3.53a)
Importantly, if t = 0, we have from expression (3.4):
m p x 0
(3.54)
Thus, we can derive, for example, from (3.7) and (3.17) the following energy-less forms of
matrix law:
m
p
x
LM , e
LM ,i L M
(3.55)
p
m
LM , e
x
L M ,i L M
(3.56)
Further, if |p| = |x| = 0, we have from expression (3.4):
Et m 0
(3.57)
Thus, we can derive, for example, from (3.7) and (3.17) the following spaceless forms of
matrix law:
Em 0
LM ,e
0
t
LM ,i L M
(3.58)
E
LM ,e
m t
LM ,i L M
(3.59)
The significance of these forms of matrix law shall be elucidated later. We suggest for now
that the timeless forms of matrix law govern external and internal wave functions (selffields) which play the roles of energy-less gravitons, that is, they mediate energyindependent interactions through momentum space (position) quantum entanglement. On
the other hand, the momentum-less forms of matrix law govern the external and internal
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
wave functions (self-fields) which play the roles of momentum-less gravitons, that is, they
mediate momentum independent interactions through proper time (mass) entanglement.
The above metamorphoses of the self-referential matrix law of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) are derived from one-tier matrixization (selfreference) and two-tier matrixization (self-reference) based on the fundamental relation
(3.4). The first-tier matrixization makes distinctions in energy (time), mass (proper time)
and total momentum (undifferentiated space) that involve scalar unit 1 and imaginary unit
(spin) i. Then the second-tier matrixization makes distinction in three-dimensional
momentum (three-dimensional space) based on spin σ, s or other spin structure if it exists.
3.3
Additional Forms of Matrix Law
If prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) allows partial distinction within
first-tier self-referential matrixization, we obtain, for example, the following additional
forms of matrix law LM , e
Et m
p
Et m p
0
LM ,i L M , when
x (3.60)
Et m
E m p
and p parallels to x:
t
x
Et m
σ p
σ x
Et m
(3.62) Et m σ p
0
Et m x
0
(3.61)
0
Et m σ
(3.63)
Et p x
m
(3.64)
Et p x
Et p x m
0
0
Et p x
(3.65)
E
m px
m px (3.66)
t
E m p x
0
0
t m p x
(3.67)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Et m p x
0
0
Et m p x
(3.68)
Bosonic versions of expressions (3.61) and (3.63) are obtained by replacing σ with s.
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create momentum-position selfconfinement of an elementary entity through imaginary momentum pi and imaginary
position xi (downward self-reference such that m >Et). We may write:
m Et pi x i pi , x xi pi , y yi pi , z zi ipi ixi
(3.69)
Et m pi x i 0
(3.70)
that is:
Therefore, allowing imaginary momentum and imaginary position (downward selfreference) for an elementary entity, we can derive the following matrix law in Dirac-like
form when
E m pi
and pi parallels to xi:
t
xi
E m xi
LM ,e
pi
t
m
σ pi
LM ,i L M
σ xi
LM ,e
(3.71)
LM ,i LM
(3.72)
Also, we can derive the following matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form:
E pi
m
LM ,e
xi
E σ pi
m
LM ,e
t σ xi
LM ,i L M
(3.73)
LM ,i L M
(3.74)
Bosonic versions of expressions (3.72) and (3.74) are obtained by replacing σ with s.
It is possible that the above additional forms of self-referential matrix law govern different
particles in the particle zoo as discussed later.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Expressions (3.70) can also be written as follows:
tE m pi x i 0
(3.70a)
Expressions (3.71) – (3.74) have the following metamorphoses when
x
t
i and xi
E m pi
parallels to pi:
t
xi
pi
LM ,e
Em
σ xi
σ pi
LM ,e
m
m
LM ,e
pi
t σ xi
m
LM ,e
E σ pi
t xi
LM ,i L M
(3.71a)
LM ,i LM
(3.72a)
LM ,i L M
(3.73a)
LM ,i L M
(3.74a)
3.4 Scientific Genesis of Primordial Entities in the Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy
Model
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a free plane-wave fermion such as an electron in Dirac-like form in a dual universe
comprised of an external spacetime and internal momentum-energy space as follows:
1 e 1e Le
i0
i0
M iM
Et m ip x ip x
e
px
Em x
p t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.75)
E m ip x x ip x
E m ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
ip x
E m x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
M
i,
p t
ip x
ai, e
ip x
E m σ x Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
σ p t
i,
ip x
Ai, e
M
where
E m p
; p parallels to x; E and p are only operators in spacetime acting on
t
x
external wave function (they are continuous parameters in momentum-energy space); and t
and x are only operators in momentum-energy space acting on internal wave function (they
are continuous parameters in spacetime),
that is:
i m e, iσ p i ,
E m e , σ x i ,
or t e ,
i E i , i , iσ x e,
t i , σ p e,
where substitutions
(3.76)
E i t , p i x in the external spacetime and t i E and
x i p in the internal momentum-energy space have been made so that components of
LM can act on external and internal wave functions. Equation (3.76) may have free spherical
wave solution in the dual universe in the form:
e, S e, e iEt
i, Si, e iEt
(3.77)
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and
causes evolution of a free plane-wave fermion such as the electron in Dirac-like form in the
dual universe as follows:
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM Et m p x e
0
E 0
m 0
Det
Det
Det
0 t
0
p
ISSN: 2153-8212
ip x ip x
(3.78)
1
x ip x ip x
e
e
0
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E 0 m 0 0
0 t 0 p
ip x
ip x
x ae, e
E m x ae, e
0
p t
ip x
ip x
0
ai, e
ai, e
ip x
E m σ x Ae, e
LM , e
σ p t
ip x
Ai, e
e,
L 0
LM , i
i, M
Expressions (3.75), (3.76) & (3.78) have the following metamorphoses, when
x
t
E m p
and x parallels to p, for a dual universe comprised of an external momentum-energy space
and an internal spacetime:
1 e 1e Le
i0
i0
M iM
tE m ip x ip x
e
x p
t p
x Em
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.75a)
p ip x
p ip x
t ip x
t ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
Em
x
Em
ip x
p ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
M
i,
ip x
E m
ai, e
ip x
t σ p Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
σ x E m
i,
ip x
Ai, e
i E e, e, iσ x i ,
t e , σ p i ,
or
(3.76a)
i
m
i
σ
E
m
σ
x
i,
p e,
i,
e,
t i,
t
x
M
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM tE m x p e
t 0
Det
Det
0 E
0
ISSN: 2153-8212
0
0
Det
m
x
ip x ip x
(3.78a)
1
p ip x ip x
e
e
0
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t 0
0 E 0
t
σ x
0 0
m x
ip x
p ae, e
t
x
ip x
0
a i, e
ip x
σ p Ae, e
LM , e
ip x
E m
A e
i,
ip x
p ae, e
0
ip x
t
a i , e
e,
L 0
LM , i
i, M
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a free plane-wave antifermion such as a positron in Dirac-like form in the dual universe
comprised of the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
Et m ip x ip x
e
px
Em x
p t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.79)
E m ip x x ip x
E m ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
ip x
E m x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
i, M
p t
ip x
ai, e
ip x
E m σ x Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
σ p t
M
ip x
Ai, e
i,
or
0 0ei 0 L0eiM iM Et m p x e
ip x ip x
x ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
ip x
x ae, e
E m x ae, e
0
p t
ip x
ip x
0
ai, e
ai , e
E m σ x Ae, eip x LM ,e
σ p t
A e
ISSN: 2153-8212
(3.80)
1
0
E 0
m 0
Det
Det
Det
0 t
0
p
E 0 m 0 0
0 t 0 p
ip x
i,
LM ,i
e, _
LM 0
i,
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where
E m p
; p parallels to x; E and p are only operators in spacetime acting on
t
x
external wave function (they are continuous parameters in momentum-energy space); and t
and x are operators only in momentum-energy space only acting on internal wave function
(they are continuous parameters in spacetime).
Expressions (3.79) & (3.80) have the following metamorphoses, when
x
t
and x
E m p
parallels to p, for the dual universe comprised of the external momentum-energy space and
the internal spacetime:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
tE m ip x ip x
e
x p
t p
x Em
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.79a)
p ip x
p ip x
t ip x
t ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
Em
x
Em
ip x
p ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
i, M
ip x
E m
ai , e
ip x
t σ p Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
σ x E m
M
ip x
Ai, e
i,
t
x
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM tE m x p e
t 0
Det
Det
0 E
0
t 0
0 E 0
0 0
m x
ip x ip x
(3.80a)
1
p ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
ip x
p ae, e
t p ae, e
0
x E m
ip x
ip x
0
ai, e
ai , e
0
0
Det
m
x
t σ p Ae, eip x LM ,e
σx E m A e
ip x
i,
LM ,i
e,_
LM 0
i,
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
evolution of a free plane-wave fermion in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in the dual universe
comprised of the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
Et p x ip x ip x
e
m
E p
m
E p
m
e
ip x
t x
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.81)
E p ip x
ip x
ip x
e
e
e
0
t x
m
t x
ip x
ae,l e
e,l
L 0
LM ,e LM ,i
i,r M
ip x
t x
ai,r e
ip x
Ae,l e
E σ p
e,l L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
m
i,r M
ip x
t σ x
Ai,r e
Ep
m
where
E m p
; p parallels to x; E and p are operators only in spacetime only acting on
t
x
external wave function (they are continuous parameters in momentum-energy space); and t
and x are operators only in momentum-energy space only acting on internal wave function
(they are continuous parameters in spacetime),
that is:
i t e,l iσ p e,l i ,r
E σ p e,l i ,r
or
i
i
σ
m
t
σ
x
m
E
i
,
r
x
i
,
e
,
l
i
,
r
e
,
l
(3.82)
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and
causes evolution of a free plane-wave fermion in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in the dual
universe as follows:
0 0e i 0 L0 e iM iM Et m p x e
ip x ip x
p
E 0
0
Det
Det
Det
0
0 t
m 0
p
E 0
0
0
0 t
m 0
ISSN: 2153-8212
0
x
a e ,l e
ai , r e
ip x
ip x
0
x
e
ip x
E p
m
e
ip x
t x
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(3.83)
0
a e
a e ,l e
ip x
ip x
i ,r
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
ip x
Ae,l e
E σ p
LM ,e
m
ip x
t
σ
x
Ai,r e
E m p
, p parallels to x.
where
t
x
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
Expressions (3.81) - (3.83) have the following metamorphoses, when
x
t
and x
E m p
parallels to p, for the dual universe comprised of the external momentum-energy space and
the internal spacetime:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
tE x p ip x ip x
e
m
t x
t x
e
ip x
t x
t σ x
m
E p
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.81a)
t x ip x
m ip x
m ip x
e
e
e
0
E p
E p
ip x
m ae,l e
e,l L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
i,r M
ip x
E p
ai , r e
ip x
m Ae,l e
e,l L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
ip x
E σ p
i,r
Ai,r e
i E e,l iσ x e ,l m i ,r
t σ x e,l m i ,r
or
E σ p i ,r e,l
i t i ,r iσ p i , e,l
0 0e i 0 L0 e iM iM tE m x p e
ip x ip x
Det
t 0
0
Det
0 E
t 0
0
0 E
ISSN: 2153-8212
x
m
0
0
x
m
Det
0
0
0
p
a e ,l e
ai , r e
ip x
ip x
0
p
e
tx
ip x
e
ip x
m
E p
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a e ,l e
ai , r e
(3.83a)
0
ip x
ip x
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
ip x
m Ae,l e
LM ,e
ip x
E σ p
A e
i,r
t σ x
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a free plane-wave fermion in another form in the dual universe comprised of the external
spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
ip x ip x
Et
e
m p x
i x
E
mip
t
i x
t
e
ip x
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
where
Qx
(3.84)
i p ip x
ip x
E
e
e
0
mip
t
ip x
E
iσ x Ae e
LM ,e
m iσ p
ip x
t
Ai e
t
ip x
E
e
mip
Qp A e
e
LM ,e
t A e ip x
i
ip x
LM ,i e LM 0
i
LM ,i
e
LM 0
i
E m p
; p parallels to x; E and p are operators only in spacetime only acting on
t
x
external wave function (they are continuous parameters in momentum-energy space); and t
and x are operators only in momentum-energy space acting on internal wave function (they
are continuous parameters in spacetime); Q iσ x ; and Q m iσ p , that is:
x
p
E e iσ x i
or
t i m iσ p e
i t e i σ p i
i
m
σ
E
i
e
x
i
(3.85)
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and
causes evolution of a free plane-wave fermion in another form in said dual universe as
follows:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM Et m x p e
ip x ip x
1
0 i x ip x ip x
E 0
0
Det
e
e
0 t Det m 0 Det i p
0
ip x
E 0 0 0 i x a e ip x E
i
x
a
e
e
e
0
0 t m 0 i p
0 ip x m i p
t ip x
ai e
ai e
ip x
E
iσ x Ae e
LM ,e
m iσ p
ip x
t
Ai e
t
Q A e
e
L
Q
t Ae
i
where
p
x
ip x
M ,e
ip x
LM ,i e LM 0
i
LM ,i
e
LM 0
i
(3.86)
E m p
, p parallels to x.
t
x
Expressions (3.84) - (3.86) have the following metamorphoses, when
x
t
and x
E m p
parallels to p, for the dual universe comprised of the external momentum-energy space and
the internal spacetime:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
mi p
t
i x
E
mip
E
t
iσ x
ISSN: 2153-8212
e
ip x
ip x ip x
tE
e
m x p
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
ip x
t
e
i x
(3.84a)
m i p ip x
ip x
t
e
e
0
i x
E
ip x
m iσ p Ae e
LM ,e
ip x
E
Ai e
LM ,i e LM 0
i
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where
E
Q
p
Qx A e
e
ip x LM ,e
t
Ai e
ip x
LM ,i
e
LM 0
i
E m p
, p parallels to x, Q iσ x , and Q iσ x ,
x
x
t
x
t e m iσ p i
or
E i iσ x e
i E e m i σ x i
i σ
e
p i
E i
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM tE m p x e
t 0
0
Det
Det
0 E
t 0 0
0 E
m 0
0 i x
t
iσ x
t
Q p
0
m
Det
0
i x
1
ip x
i p ae e
t
0 ip x i x
ai e
Qx A e
e
ip x LM ,e
E
Ae
i
ip x
i p ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
m iσ p Ae e
x LM ,e
ip
E
Ai e
ip x ip x
(3.85a)
ip x
m i p ae e
0
E ip x
ai e
LM ,i e LM 0
i
LM ,i
e
LM 0
i
(3.86a)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a linear plane-wave photon in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and
the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
1 ei0 1ei0 LeiM iM
Et ip x ip x
e
px
1
(3.87)
1
E x ip x ip x
e
p t e
E ip x x ip x
E ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
ip x
x ae, e
e, L 0
LM , e
L
M
,
i
M
ip x
t
i,
ai, e
ip x
s x E 0e, e
E
e, L
L
L
0
M ,i
M ,e
M
photon
s p
i,
ip x
t
iB 0i,- e
E
p
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and
causes evolution of the linear plane-wave photon in said dual universe as follows:
0 0e i0 L0 e iM iM Et x p e
0
E 0
Det
Det
0 t
p
E 0 0
0 t p
ip x ip x
(3.88)
1
x
e
e
0
ip x
ip x
x ae, e
E x ae, e
0
p
ip x
ip x
0
t
ai, e
ai, e
ip x
ip x
ip x
s x E 0e, e
E
e, L
LM , e
L
0
M
,
i
s p
M photon
ip x
t
i,
iB e
0i,
This photon wave function in the dual universe may be written as:
e, E( x , t) E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 i (t kx )
photon
iB
iB 0 e i (t kx ) iB 0 e
i , (p, E)
(3.89)
After the substitutions E i t , p i x and t i E , x i p , we have from the
last expression in (3.87):
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
i t
is x
p B (p, E)
is p E ( x , t)
E
0 t ( x , t)
i E iB (p, E)
E B ( p, E) x E ( x , t)
(3.90)
where we have used the relationship s i p p to derive the latter equations which
together with x E( x, t) 0 and p B (p, E) 0 are the Maxwell-like equations in the
source-free vacuum in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and internal
momentum-energy space.
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates a neutrino in Dirac-like form
in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal momentumenergy space by replacing the last step of expression (3.87) with the following:
ip x
σx ae, e
E
LM ,e
σp
ip x
t
ai, e
LM ,i e, LM 0
i,
(3.91)
Expressions (3.87) - (3.91) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
1 ei0 1ei0 Le iM iM
1
tE ip x ip x
e
x p
1
t p ip x ip x
e
x E e
t ip x p ip x
t ip x p ip x
e
e
e
e
0
x
E
x
E
(3.87a)
ip x
p ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
M
i,
ip x
E
ai, e
ip x
s p E 0e, e
e, L
L
L
0
M ,i
M ,e
M
photon
i,
ip x
E
iB e
0i,
t
x
t
s x
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0 0ei0 L0 e iM iM tE px e
ip x ip x
t
s x
(3.88a)
1
0
t 0
Det
Det
0 E
x
t 0 0
0 E x
p ip x ip x
e
e
0
ip x
ip x
p ae, e
p ae, e
t
0
x E
ip x
ip x
0
ai, e
ai, e
ip x
s p E 0e, e
LM ,e
ip x
E
iB e
0i,
e,
L
LM ,i
0
i, M photon
e, E(p, E) E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 i (t kx )
photon
(3.89a)
iB
iB 0 e i (t kx ) iB 0 e
i , ( x , t)
i E
is
p
t
σ x
is x E (p, E)
x B ( x , t)
E
0 E (p, E)
B
i t iB ( x , t)
t ( x , t) p E (p, E)
ip x
σp ae, e
LM ,e
ip x
E
a e
i ,
(3.90a)
LM ,i e, LM 0
i,
(3.91a)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a linear plane-wave antiphoton in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime
and the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
Et ip x ip x
e
px
E x
p
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.92)
E ip x x ip x
E ip x x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
x e,
LM ,e LM ,i e, LM 0
t i,
i,
ip x
E
s
x
iB 0e, e
e, L
L
L
0
M ,i
M ,e
s p
i, M antiphoton
ip x
t
E e
0i,
E
p
This antiphoton wave function can also be written as:
i (t k x )
iB 0 ( x , t) i (t kx )
e , iB ( x, t) iB 0 ( x , t) e
antiphoton
E
E 0( p , E) e i (t kx ) E 0( p , E) e
i , (p , E)
(3.93)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates an antineutrino in Dirac-like in
the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy
space form by replacing the last step of expression (3.93) with the following:
ip x
σx ae, e
E
LM ,e
σp
ip x
t
ai, e
LM ,i e, LM 0
i,
(3.94)
Expressions (3.92) - (3.94) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
1 e 1e Le
i0
i0
iM iM
tE ip x ip x
e
x p
t
x
e
ip x
t
p
x
E
p
E
e
1
ip x
e
ip x
t
x
e
e
ip x
ip x
1
p
E
(3.92a)
e
ip x
0
p e,
LM ,e LM ,i e, LM 0
E i,
i,
ip x
s p iB 0e, e
e,
L
LM ,e LM ,i
0
i, M antiphoton
ip x
E
E e
0i,
t
x
t
s x
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
e , iB (p , E) iB 0 ( p , E) e i (t kx ) iB 0 ( p , E) i (t kx )
antiphoton
E
E 0 ( x , t) e i (t kx ) E 0 ( x , t) e
(
x
,
t)
i,
t
σ x
ip x
σp ae, e
LM ,e
ip x
E
a e
i ,
LM ,i e, LM 0
i,
(3.93a)
(3.94a)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and causes evolution
of chiral plane-wave photons in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and
the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM Et p x e
ip x ip x
p
E 0
Det
Det
0 t
0
(3.95)
1
0 ip x ip x
e
e
x
ip x
ip x
E 0 p 0 ae,l e
0 ae,l e
Ep
0
0
ip x
ip x
0 t 0
x
t
x
ai,r e
ai , r e
ip x
0 Ae,l e
e,l
E s p
L 0
LM ,e LM ,i
0
i,r M
ip x
t
s
x
Ai,r e
E p
where
and p parallels to x, that is, e,l and i, r are decoupled from each other
t
x
and satisfy the following equations respectively:
E s p e,l 0
s x e,l 0
or t e,l
s 0
t
s
x
0
i ,r
p i ,r
E i ,r
(3.96)
which have the following respective solutions:
e ,l E( x, t) iB ( x , t) E 0(x,t) iB 0(x.t) ei (t kx )
E
E 0(p.E) iB 0(p,E) ei (t kx )
i
B
( p , E)
i ,r (p, E)
(3.97)
t e,l s x e,l 0 produces Maxwell equations in external spacetime of the source-free
vacuum and E i , r s p i , r 0 produce the Maxwell-like equations in internal
momentum-energy space of the source-free vacuum as shown in the second expression of
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
(3.90).
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates neutrinos in Weyl-like (chirallike) forms in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal
momentum-energy space by replacing the last step of expression (3.95) with the following:
ip x
E
σ
p
0
A
e
e,l
LM ,e
0
ip x
t σ x
Ai,r e
(3.98)
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
that is, e,l and i, r are decoupled from each other and satisfy the following equations
respectively:
E σ p e,l 0
σ x e,l 0
or t e,l
σ 0
t
σ
x
0
i ,r
p i ,r
E i ,r
(3.99)
Expressions (3.95) - (3.99) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM tE x p e
ip x ip x
x
t 0
Det
Det
0 E
0
(3.95a)
1
0 ip x ip x
e
e
p
ip x
ip x
t 0 x 0 ae,l e
t x
0 ae,l e
0
0
ip x
ip x
0 E 0 p
E p
ai,r e
ai,r e
ip x
0 Ae,l e
t s x
e,l L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
0
i,r M
ip x
E s p
Ai,r e
t s x e,l 0
s p e,l 0
or E e,l
s 0
E
s
p
0
i
,
r
x i ,r
t i ,r
(3.96a)
e ,l E(p, E) iB (p , E) E 0(p,E) iB 0(p.E) ei (t kx )
E
E 0(x.t) iB 0(x,t) ei (t kx )
i
B
(
x
,
t)
(
x
,
t)
i
,
r
(3.97a)
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t σ x
0
ip x
0 Ae,l e
LM ,e
ip x
E σ p
A e
i,r
(3.98a)
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
t σ x e,l 0
σ p e,l 0
or E e,l
σ 0
x i ,r
E σ p i ,r 0
t i ,r
(3.99a)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains timeless external
wave function (timeless graviton) and energy-less internal wave functions (energy-less
graviton) of an elementary particle in Dirac-like form as follows:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
1
m iM iM
e
px
m x
1
e iM e iM
p
m iM x iM
m iM x iM
e
e
e
e 0
p
p
(3.100)
m x g D,e e iM
V
D,e L V 0
L
L
p g D,i e iM M , e M , i VD,i M D
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains
timeless external wave function (timeless graviton) and energy-less internal wave functions
(energy-less graviton) of an elementary particle in Dirac-like form as follows:
0 0ei0 L0 e iM iM m x p e iM iM
0
m 0
Det
Det
0
p
m 0 0
0 p
x iM iM 1
e
e
0
x g D, e e iM m x g D, e e iM
0
0 g D, i e iM p g D, i e iM
(3.101)
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains timeless
external wave function (timeless graviton) and energy-less internal wave functions (energyless graviton) of an elementary particle in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as follows:
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
p
m x
1
m iM iM
e
px
e e
iM
iM
1
(3.102)
p iM
p iM iM
iM
e
e
e
e 0
m
x
m
x
p gW ,e e iM
L
m x gW ,i e iM M ,e
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
Again, we will determine the form of the imaginary content M in expression (3.102) later.
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains
timeless external wave function (timeless graviton) and energy-less internal wave functions
(energy-less graviton) of an elementary particle in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form as follows:
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM m p x eiM iM
(3.103)
p
0
0 iM iM 1
Det
Det
e
e
0 x
m 0
iM
p
0 0 gW ,e e p gW ,e e iM
0
0 x m 0 gW ,i e iM m x gW ,i e iM
Expressions (3.100) - (3.103) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
1
m iM iM
e
x p
p
1
e iM e iM
x m
iM p iM
iM p iM
e
e
e
e
0
x
m
x
m
x
ISSN: 2153-8212
(3.100a)
p g D,e e iM
V
D,e L V 0
L
L
m g D,i e iM M , e M , i VD,i M D
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0 0ei0 L0 e iM iM m px e iM iM
Det
0
0
0
0
Det
m
x
0 0
m x
p g D, e e iM
0 g D, i e iM x
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le iM iM
x m
p
x
e iM
x
1
(3.101a)
p iM iM 1
e
e
0
p g D, e e iM
0
m g D, i e iM
m iM iM
e
x p
e e
iM
iM
1
(3.102a)
x iM m iM
m iM
e
e
e
0
p
p
m gW ,e e iM
LM ,e
iM
p gW ,i e
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM m x p eiM iM
x
Det
0
x
0
0 0
p
m iM iM 1
e
e
0
iM
m gW ,e e x m gW ,e e iM
0
0 gW ,i e iM p gW ,i e iM
0
0
Det
p
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM m x p eiM iM
x
Det
0
x
0
ISSN: 2153-8212
0 0
p
(3.103a)
m iM iM 1
e
e
0
m gW ,e e iM x m gW ,e e iM
0
0 gW ,i e iM p gW ,i e iM
0
0
Det
p
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains spaceless
(momentum independent) external wave function and momentumless (space independent)
internal wave functions of an elementary particle in Dirac-like form as follows:
0 0e 0 L0 e iM iM Et m e iM iM
E
0
E 0
m 0 iM iM 1
Det
Det
e
e
0
t
0
0 m 0 g D, e e iM E m 0 g D, e e iM
0
t 0 g D, i e iM 0
t g D, i e iM
(3.104)
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains
spaceless (momentum independent) external wave function and momentumless (space
independent internal wave functions of an elementary particle in Weyl-like (chiral-like)
form as follows:
1 e 0 1e 0 Le iM iM
1
Et iM iM
e
m
1
E
iM
e iM
e
m t
E iM iM
E iM iM
e
e
e
e 0
m
t
m
t
E gW ,e e iM
L
m t g e iM M ,e
W ,i
(3.105)
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates and sustains
spaceless (momentum independent) external wave function and momentumless (space
independent internal wave functions of an elementary particle in Weyl-like (chiral-like)
form as follows:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM Et m eiM iM
E 0
0 iM iM 1
Det
Det
e
e
0
t
m
0
E 0 0 gW ,e e iM E gW ,e e iM
0
0 t m 0 gW ,i e iM m t g w,i e iM
(3.106)
Expressions (3.104) - (3.106) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
0 0e 0 L0 e iM iM tE m e iM iM
0 iM iM 1
t 0
Det
Det
e
e
0
E
0
m
iM
t
t 0
0 g D, e e
0 g D, e e imt
0
0 E 0 m g D, i e iM 0 E m g D, i e imt
1 e 0 1e 0 Le iM iM
1
tE iM iM
e
m
1
t m
iM
e iM
e
E
t iM m iM
t iM m iM
e
e
e
e 0
E
E
t
ISSN: 2153-8212
m gW ,e e iM
LM ,e
E gW ,i e iM
(3.104a)
(3.105a)
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0 0ei0 L0eiM iM tE m eiM iM
t 0
0 m iM iM 1
Det
Det
e
e
0
E
0
t 0 0 m gW ,e e iM t m gW ,e e imt
0
iM
mt
0 E
0
E
g
e
g
e
W ,i
w,i
(3.106a)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create, sustains and causes
evolution of a spatially and momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton through
imaginary momentum pi imaginary position xi (downward self-reference such that mτ>Et)
in Dirac-like form in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal
momentum-energy space as follows:
1 ei0 1ei0 LeiM iM
1
Et m ip x ip x
e
x i p i
1
ip x ip x
E m x i
e
e
t
p
i
E m ip x x i ip x E m ip x x i ip x
e
e
e
e
0
pi
t
pi
t
E m x i se, e iEt
L
pi
t si, e iEt M , e
where
e,
LM 0
LM , i
i,
(3.107)
(3.108)
x
t
i ; xi parallels to pi; E and pi are operators in spacetime only acting
E m pi
external wave function (they are free parameters in momentum-energy space); and t and xi
are operators in momentum-energy space only acting on internal wave function (they are
free parameters in spacetime),After spinization of expression (3.108), we have:
E m
σ p i
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(3.109)
It is plausible that expression (3.108) governs the confinement structure of the unspinized
proton in Dirac-like form through imaginary momentum p i and imaginary position x i and,
on the other hand, expression (3.109) governs the confinement structure of spinized proton
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
through p i and x i in the dual universe.
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustain and
cause evolution of the spatially and momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton in
Dirac-like form in said dual universe as follows:
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM Et m x i p i e
ip x ip x
(3.110)
1
0
x i ip x ip x
0
m 0
e
e
Det
0 Det p
0
t
i
E 0 m 0 0
x i se, e iEt E m x i se, e iEt
0
0 t 0 p i
0 si, e iEt p i
t si, e iEt
E
Det
0
E m x i se, e iEt
L
p i t si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
σx i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
E m
σp i
where
x
t
i and xi parallels to pi.
E m pi
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Dirac-like form may be respectively
governed as follows:
E m x i se, e iEt
L
p i t si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
(3.111)
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
(3.112)
E m
σp i
Expressions (3.107) - (3.112) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
1 ei0 1ei0 LeiM iM
1
tE m ip x ip x
e
p i x i
(3.107a)
1
ip x ip x
t p i
e
e
E m
x
i
t ip x p i ip x t ip x p i ip x
e
e
e
e
0
xi
E m
xi
E m
t
xi
t
σ x i
p i se, e iEt
L
E m si, e iEt M , e
e,
LM 0
LM , i
i,
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM tE m p i x i e
ip x ip x
(3.108a)
(3.109a)
(3.110a)
1
0
p i ip x ip x
0
0
e
e
Det
0 Det x
0
E
i
t 0 0 0
p i se, e iEt t p i se, e iEt
0
0 E 0 m x i
0 si, e iEt x i E m si, e iEt
t
Det
0
t
xi
p i se, e iEt
L
E m si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
t
σ x i
σp i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
E m S i, e iEt
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
t
xi
p i se, e iEt
L
E m si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
L 0
LM ,i
D,i M D
(3.111a)
t
σ x i
σp i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
E m S i, e iEt
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
(3.112a)
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create, sustain and
cause evolution of a spatially and momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
through imaginary momentum p i and imaginary position x i (downward self-reference) in
Weyl-like (chiral-like) form in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and
the internal momentum-energy space as follows:
iM iM
E p i
m t x
i
1
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le
Et p i x i ip x ip x
e
m
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(3.113)
E p i ip x
E p i ip x
ip x
ip x
e
e
e
e
0
m
t xi
m
t xi
E pi
m
se,r e iEt
L
t x i si,l e iEt M ,e
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
(3.114)
After spinization of expression (3.114), we have:
E σp i
m
S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
t σx i Si,l e iEt
e,r
L 0
LM ,i
i,l M
(3.115)
It is plausible that expression (3.114) governs the structure of the unspinized proton in Weyl
form and expression (3.115) governs the structure of spinized proton in Weyl form.
Alternatively, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) creates, sustains and
causes evolution of a spatially and momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton in
Weyl (chiral) form in said dual universe as follows:
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM Et m p i x i e
ip x ip x
(3.116)
1
0
0 ip x ip x
Det
e
e
x i
m 0
0 0 se,r e iEt E p i
se,r e iEt
0
x i m 0 si,l e iEt m
t x i si,l e iEt
p
E 0
Det
Det i
0 t
0
E 0 p i
0 t 0
t xi
ISSN: 2153-8212
se,r e iEt
L
t x i si,l e iEt M ,e
e,r
L 0
LM ,i
i,l M
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E σp i
m
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
t σx i S i,l e iEt
(3.118)
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Weyl-like form may be respectively
governed as follows:
E pi
m
se,l e iEt
LM ,e
iEt
t x i si,r e
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
(3.119)
E σp i
m
S e,l e iEt
LM ,e
t σ x i S i,r e iEt
e,l
LM 0
LM ,i
i,r
(3.120)
Expressions (3.113) - (3.120) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
iM iM
t x i m
E p
i
1
1 e i 0 1e i 0 Le
t xi
e
ip x
tE x i p i ip x ip x
e
m
e
ip x
e
ip x
(3.113a)
t x i ip x
m ip x
m ip x
e
e
e
0
E pi
E pi
t xi
m se,r e iEt
L
E p i si,l e iEt M ,e
t σ x i
m S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
E σp i S i,l e iEt
e,r
L 0
LM ,i
i,l M
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
0 0ei 0 L0e iM iM tE m x i p i e
ISSN: 2153-8212
1
ip x ip x
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(3.114a)
(3.115a)
(3.116a)
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
x
t 0
Det
Det i
0 E
0
1
m ip x ip x
e
e
0
t 0 x i
0 0 m se,r e iEt t x i
m se,r e iEt
0
0 E 0
p i
E p i si,l e iEt
0 si,l e iEt
iEt
t xi
m se,r e
(3.117a)
LM ,e LM ,i e,r L 0
iEt
M
i,l
E p i si,l e
iEt
(3.118a)
m S e,r e
t σ x i
LM ,e LM ,i e,r L 0
M
E σp i S i,l e iEt
i,l
0
0
Det
p i
t xi
m se,l e iEt
L
E p i si,r e iEt M ,e
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
(3.119a)
t σ x i
m S e,l e iEt
LM ,e
E σp i S i,r e iEt
e,l
LM 0
LM ,i
i,r
(3.120a)
3.4 Scientific Genesis of Composite Entities in the Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy
Model
Then, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create, sustain and cause
evolution of a neutron in a dual universe comprised of an external spacetime and internal
momentum-energy space in Dirac-like form which is comprised of an unspinized proton:
E e( x ,t ) m
p i eA ( x ,t )
where
t e(p , E )
E e( x ,t )
m
x i eA (p, E ) se, e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) si, e iEt
p
x i eA (p , E )
p i eA ( x ,t )
(3.121)
, x i eA(p, E ) parallels to p i eA( x ,t ) , E and pi are
operators only in spacetime acting on external wave function (they are continuous
parameters in momentum-energy space), and t and xi are operators only in momentumenergy space acting on internal wavefunction (they are continuous parameters in
spacetime), and a spinized electron:
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E e( x ,t ) V( x ,t ) m
σ p eA (x ,t )
where
t e(p , E ) V(p , E )
E e( x ,t ) V( x ,t )
m
σ x eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e
x eA (p , E )
p eA ( x ,t )
(3.122)
, x eA (p,E ) parallels to p eA ( x ,t ) , E and p are
operators in in spacetime acting on external wavefunction (they are continuous parameters
in momentum-energy space), and t and x are operators in momentum-energy space only
acting on internal wavefunction (they are free parameters in spacetime), as follows:
1 ei 0 1ei 01ei 0 Le iM iM p Le iM iM e
Et m ip x ip x Et m ip x ip x
e
e
x i pi
p x i pi
e
1
1
1
1
E m x ip x ip x E m x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
p t e
p
t
i
p
e
E m x i se, e iEt E m x se, e iEt
0
0
p i t si, e iEt p t si, e iEt
p
e
iEt
E e m x eA
x ,t
p, E se, e
i
0
iEt
p eA
t ep, E si, e
x ,t
i
p
σ x eA p, E S e, e iEt
E ex ,t Vx ,t m
0
σ p eA
t ep, E Vp, E S i, e iEt
x
,
t
e n
(3.123)
In expressions (3.121), (3.122) and (3.123), , and indicate proton, electron
p
e
n
and neutron respectively. Further, unspinized proton has charge e, electron has charge –e,
A (
( x .,t )
A (
, A ( x .,t ) ) p ,
(p.,E )
, A (p.,E ) ) p and
A (
( x .,t )
, A ( x .,t ) ) e ,
A (
( p .,E )
, A (p.,E ) ) e are
the electromagnetic potentials acting on unspinized proton and tightly bound spinized
electron respectively, and V(x ,t ) e , V(p , E ) e is a binding potential from the unspinized proton
acting on the spinized electron causing tight binding.
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
If A (( x .,t ) , A ( x .,t ) )p , A ((p.,E ) , A (p.,E ) )p is negligible due to the fast motion of the tightly
bound spinized electron, we have from the last expression in (3.123):
E m x i s e iEt
e, iEt 0
p i
t si, e
p
E e V m
iEt
σ x eA p, E S e, e
x ,t x ,t
0
σ p eA x ,t
t ep, E Vp, E S i, e iEt
e n
(3.124)
Experimental data on charge distribution and g-factor of neutron seem to support a neutron
comprising of an unspinized proton and a tightly bound spinized electron.
The Weyl-like (chiral-like) form of the last expression in (3.123) and expression (3.124)
are respectively as follows:
E e p eA
s e,r e iEt
( x ,t )
i
( x ,t )
0
iEt
m
t e x i eA (p, E ) si,l e
p
iEt
S e,l e
E e (x ,t ) V(x ,t ) σ p eA (x ,t )
0
m
t e (p, E ) V(p, E ) σ p eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e n
E p i
se,r e iEt
0
s e iEt
m
t
x
i i,l
p
E e V σ p eA
iEt
S e,l e
( x ,t )
( x ,t )
( x ,t )
0
m
t e(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e n
(3.125)
(3.126)
Expressions (3.121) - (3.126) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
t e(p, E )
x i eA (p, E )
ISSN: 2153-8212
p i eA (x ,t ) se, e iEt
0
t e(x ,t ) si, e iEt
p
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t e(p, E ) V(p, E )
σ x eA
(p, E )
σ p eA (x ,t ) S e, e iEt
0
E e(x ,t ) V(x ,t ) m S i, e iEt
e
(3.122a)
1 ei 0 1ei 01ei 0 Le iM iM p Le iM iM e
tE m ip x ip x tE m ip x ip x
e
e
p
x
p
x
i i
p i i
e
1
1
1
1
t p ip x ip x t p
ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
e
x E m
x i E m
p
e
t
x i
p i se, e iEt t
0
E m si, e iEt x
p
p se, e iEt
0
E m si, e iEt
e
t e
p i eA x ,t se, e iEt
p, E
0
x eA
s e iEt
E
e
m
p, E
x ,t
p
i,
i
σ p eA x ,t S e, e iEt
t ep, E Vp, E
σ x eA
S e iEt 0
E
e
V
m
p
,
E
x
,
t
x
,
t
i,
e n
t p i s e iEt
e, iEt 0
x i E m si, e
p
t e
σ p eA x ,t S e, e iEt
p, E Vp, E
0
σ x eA p, E
E ex ,t Vx ,t m S i, e iEt
e n
(3.123a)
(3.124a)
t e
(3.125a)
s e,r e iEt
m
(p, E ) x i eA (p, E )
0
s e iEt
E
e
p
e
A
( x ,t )
i
( x ,t ) i,l
p
m
S e,l e iEt
t e (p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
S e iEt 0
E
e
V
σ
p
e
A
(
x
,
t
)
(
x
,
t
)
(
x
,
t
)
i
,
r
e n
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t x i
m s e,r e iEt
0
E p i si,l e iEt
p
t e
(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
(3.126a)
iEt
m
S e,l e
0
E e (x ,t ) V(x ,t ) σ p eA (x ,t ) S i,r e iEt
e n
Then, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may create, sustain and cause
evolution of a hydrogen atom in a dual universe comprised of an external spacetime and
internal momentum-energy space in Dirac form comprising of a spinized proton:
E ex ,t m σx i eA p, E Se, e iEt
0
t ep, E Si, e iEt
σp i eA x ,t
p
where
t e(p , E )
E e( x ,t )
m
x i eA (p , E )
p i eA ( x ,t )
(3.127)
, x i eA(p, E ) parallels to p i eA( x ,t ) , E and pi are
operators in spacetime only acting on external wave function (they are free parameters in
momentum-energy space); and t and xi are operators in momentum-energy space only
acting on internal wavefunction (they are free parameters in spacetime), and a spinized
electron:
E ex ,t m σx eA p, E Se, eiEt
0
iEt
σ
p
e
A
t
e
x ,t
p, E
Si,e e
where
t e(p , E )
E e( x ,t )
m
x eA (p , E )
p eA ( x ,t )
(3.128)
, x eA (p,E ) parallels to p eA ( x ,t ) , E and p are
operators in spacetime only (they are free parameters in momentum-energy space); and t
and x are operators in momentum-energy space only (they are free parameters in
spacetime), as follows:
1 ei 0 1ei 01ei 0 Le iM iM p Le iM iM e
Et m ip x ip x Et m ip x ip x
e
e
x
p
x
p
i i
p i i
e
1
1
1
1
E m x ip x ip x E m x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
p t e
p
t
i
p
e
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E m x i se, e iEt E m x se, e iEt
0
0
pi
t si, e iEt p t si, e iEt
p
e
E ex ,t m
σ x i eA p, E S e, e iEt
0
σ p i eA x ,t
t ep, E S i, e iEt
p
E e m σ x eA
iEt
x ,t
p, E S e, e
0
σ p eA x ,t t ep, E S i, e iEt
e h
(3.129)
In expressions (3.127), (3.128) and (3.129), p , e and h indicate proton, electron
and hydrogen atom respectively. Again, proton has charge e, electron has charge –e, and
A (
( x .,t )
A (
, A ( x .,t ) ) p ,
(p.,E )
, A (p.,E ) ) p and
A (
( x .,t )
, A ( x .,t ) ) e ,
A (
( p .,E )
, A (p.,E ) ) e are
the electromagnetic potentials acting on spinized proton and spinized electron respectively.
Again, if A (( x .,t ) , A ( x .,t ) )p , A ((p.,E ) , A (p.,E ) )p is negligible due to fast motion of the
orbiting spinized electron, we have from the last expression in (3.129):
E m σ x i S e iEt
e,
0
S e iEt
σ p i
t
i,
p
E e m σ x eA
iEt
( x ,t )
(p, E ) S e, e
0
σ p eA (x ,t )
t e(p, E ) S i, e iEt
e h
(1.130)
The Weyl-like (chiral-like) form of the last expression in (3.129) and expression (3.130)
are respectively as follows:
E e(x ,t ) σ p i eA (x ,t )
S e,r e iEt
0
m
t e(p, E ) σ x i eA (p, E ) S i,l e iEt
p
E e σ p eA
S e,l e iEt
( x ,t )
( x ,t )
0
m
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E σ p i
S e,r e iEt
0
S e iEt
m
t
σ
x
i i,l
p
E e σ p eA
S e,l e iEt
( x ,t )
( x ,t )
0
m
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
(3.132)
Expressions (3.127) - (3.132) have the following metamorphoses for the dual universe
comprised of the external momentum-energy space and the internal spacetime:
t e(p, E )
x i eA (p, E )
σ
t e(p, E )
σ x eA
(p, E )
(3.127a)
(3.128a)
σ p i eA (x ,t ) S e, e iEt
0
E e(x ,t ) m S i, e iEt
p
σ p eA (x ,t ) S e, e iEt
0
E e(x ,t ) m Si, e iEt
e
1 ei 0 1ei 01ei 0 Le iM iM p Le iM iM e
tE E ip x ip x tE E ip x ip x
e
e
p
x
p
x
i
i
i
i
p
e
1
1
1
1
t p ip x ip x t p ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
e
x i E m
p x E m
e
t
x i
p i se, e iEt t
0
E m si, e iEt x
p
p se, e iEt
0
E m si, e iEt
e
t ep, E
σ p i eA x ,t S e, e iEt
0
σ x i eA p, E E ex ,t m S i, e iEt
p
t e
σ p eA x ,t S e, e iEt
p, E
0
σ x eA p, E E ex ,t m S i, e iEt
e h
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
t
σ p i S e, e iEt
0
σ x i E m S i, e iEt
p
t e
σ p eA (x ,t ) S e, e iEt
(p, E )
0
σ x eA (p, E )
E e(x ,t ) m S i, e iEt
e h
(1.130a)
t e(p, E ) σ x i eA (p, E )
m
S e,r e iEt
0
E e(x ,t ) σ p i eA (x ,t ) S i,l e iEt
p
E e σ p eA
S e,l e iEt
( x ,t )
( x ,t )
0
m
E e(x ,t ) σ p eA (x ,t ) S i,r e iEt
e h
E σ p i
S e,r e iEt
0
S e iEt
m
t
σ
x
i i,l
p
E e σ p eA
iEt
S e,l e
( x ,t )
( x ,t )
0
m
t e(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E ) S i,r e iEt
e h
(3.131a)
(3.132a)
4. Metamorphous Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness)
View
4.1 Metamorphoses & the Essence of Spin in the Prespacetime-premomentumenergy
Model
The preceding sections make it clear that the particle ei0 of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) can take many different forms as different
primordial entities and, further, can have different manifestations as different wave
functions and/or fields in different contexts even as a single primordial entity. For example,
the wave functions of an electron can take the Dirac-like, Weyl-like, quaternion-like or
determinant form respectively in different contexts depending on the questions one asks
and the answer one seeks.
This work also makes it clear that primordial self-referential spin in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) is hierarchical and that it is the cause of primordial
distinctions for creating the self-referential entities in the dual universe comprised of the
external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space. There are several levels of
spin: (1) spin in the power level in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness)
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
making primordial external and internal phase distinctions of external and internal wave
functions; (2) spin of the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) on the
ground level making primordial external and internal wave functions which accompanies
the primordial phase distinctions; (3) self-referential mixing of these wave functions
through matrix law before spatial-momentum spinization; (4) unconfining spatialmomemtum spin through spatial-momentum spinization (electromagnetic and weak
interaction) for creating bosonic and fermionic entities in the dual universe; and (5)
confining spatial-momentum spin (strong interactions) creating the appearance of quarks
through imaginary position-momentum (downward self-reference) in the dual universe.
4.2 The Determinant view & the meaning of Klein-Gordon-like equation in the
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy Model
In the determinant view, the matrix law collapses into Klein-Gordon-like form as shown in
§ 3 but so far we have not defined the form of the wave function as a result of the said
collapse. Here, we propose that the external and internal wave functions (objects) form a
special product state with i containing the hidden variables, quantum potentials or
e
i
self-gravity as shown below, vice versa.
From the following equations for unspinized free particle in a dual universe comprised of
an external spacetime and internal momentum-energy space in Dirac-like and Weyl-like
form respectively:
E m x e,
L 0
p t i, M D
(4.1)
and
Ep
m
e,l
L 0
t x i,r M W
(4.2)
we respectively obtained the following equations in the determinant view (Klein-Gordonlike form):
DetLM e, i, Et m x p e , i, 0
Et m x p e, 0
Et m x p i, 0
(4.3)
and
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
DetLM e,l i,r Et p x m e,l i,r 0
Et p x m e,l 0
Et p x m i ,r 0
where
(4.4)
E m p
; p parallels to x, E and p are operators in spacetime only acting on
t
x
external wave function (they are free parameters in momentum-energy space); and t and x
are operators in momentum-energy space only acting on internal wave function (they are
free parameters in spacetime).
By way of an example, equation (4.1) has the following plane-wave solution:
from which we have:
e, ae , e i Et px
a e i Et px
i,
e,
(4.5)
e, i, ae, e i Et px e ai, e i Et px i
(4.6)
where
Et p x e e
(4.7)
Et p x i i
are respectively the external and internal phase in the determinant view. The variables in
i, play the roles of hidden variables to e, which would be annihilated, if i, were
allowed to merged with e , . Indeed, if relativistic time in the external wave function e ,
is considered to be inertial time, then the relativistic time in the conjugate internal wave
function i, plays the role of quantized gravitational time.
Similarly, from the following equations for spinized free fermion in Dirac-like and Weyllike form respectively:
E m σ x e,
L 0
σ p t i, M
(4.8)
e,l
E σ p
LM 0
m
i,r
t
σ
x
(4.9)
and
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where ψD=(ψe,+, ψi,-)T=(ψ1,ψ2, ψ3, ψ4)T and ψW=(ψe,l, ψi,r)T=(ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4)T, we respectively
obtained following equations in the determinant view (Klein-Gordon-like form):
and
where
Det LM e, i, Et m x p I 2 e, i, 0
Et m x p 1 0
Et m x p 2 0
Et m x p 3 0
Et m x p 4 0
(4.10)
Det LM e,l i,r Et p x m I 2 e ,l i,r 0
Et p x m 1 0
Et p x m 2 0
Et p x m 3 0
Et p x m 4 0
(4.11)
E m p
; p parallels to x, E and p are operators in spacetime only acting on
t
x
external wave function (they are free parameters in momentum-energy space); and t and x
are operators in momentum-energy space only acting on internal wave function (they are
free parameters in spacetime).
Klein-Gordon-like equation in the presence of electromagnetic potential A ( x ,t ) , A ( x ,t )
in spacetime and A (p , E ) , A (p , E ) in momentum-energy space will be treated in future
articles.
4.3 Schrodinger-like Equation in the Prespacetime-premomentumenergy Model
From equation (4.3), we can obtain the following Schrodinger-like Equations:
x
m
E e Hˆ e p e
t
t
(4.12)
mc
x
e
i t e Hˆ e i x
t
t
(4.13)
that is,
2
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
and
p
m
t i Tˆ i x i
E
E
(4.12)
mc 2
p
i
i E i Tˆ i i p
E
E
(4.13)
that is,
4.4 The Third State of Matter in the Prespacetime-premomentumenergy Model
In this work we have suggested that Kein-Gordon-like equation is a determinant view of a
fermion, boson or an unspinized entity (spinlesson) in which the external and internal wave
functions (objects) form a special product state with as the origin of hidden
e
i
i
variable, quantum potentials or self-gravity. The unspinized entity (spinlesson) is neither a
boson nor a fermion but may be classified as a third state of matter described by the
unspinized equation in Dirac-like or Weyl-like (chiral-like) form, for example:
ip x
(4.14)
E m x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
M
i,
p t
ip x
ai, e
Ep
m
where
ip x
ae,l e
LM ,e
ip x
t x
ai , r e
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
(4.15)
E m p
, p parallels to x.
t
x
The hadronized versions of the above equations in which the position is imaginary are
respectively as follows:
E m x i se, e iEt
L
pi
t si, e iEt M ,e
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.16)
se,l e iEt
L
t x i si,r e iEt M ,e
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r
(4.17)
E pi
m
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where
x
t
i and xi parallels to pi.
E m pi
The wave functions of a fermion and boson are respectively a bispinor and bi-vector but
that of the third state (spinlesson) is two-component complex scalar field. The third state of
matter is the precursor of both fermionic and bosonic matters/fields before fermionic or
bosonic spinization. Thus, it may step into the shoes played by the Higgs field in the
standard model. Further, in this scenario, intrinsic proper time is created by the selfreferential spin (imagination) of premomentumenergy.
5. Weak Interaction in the Prespacetime-premomentumenergy Model
Weak interaction is an expressive process (emission or radiation) through fermionic
spinization with or without intermediary bosonic spinization and the associated reverse
process (capture or absorption). There are two possible kinds of mechanisms at play. One
kind is the direct fermionic spinization of an unspinized massive particle as shown in § 3:
p p 2 Det(σ p ) σ p , x x 2 Det (σ x ) σ x
(5.1)
that is, for example:
E m x e
E m σ x e
0
0
σ p t i
p t i
and the following reverse process:
(5.2)
σ p Det (σ p ) p 2 p , σ x Det (σ x ) x 2 x
(5.3)
that is, for example:
E m x e
E m σ x e
0
0
σ.p t i
p t i
(5.4)
Processes (5.1) and (5.3) only conserve spin in the dual universe as a whole. There is no
exchange particle involved in process (1) or (2). In neutron synthesis from proton and
electron, if it exists, the reverse process (5.3) may occur during which a spinized proton (or
electron) loses its spin and free electron becomes tightly bound to proton.
We suggest that the following equation governs free unspinized particles having mass m in
external spacetime, intrinsic proper time in momentum-energy space, and charge e
respectively but spinless:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E m e x i
t p
i
e
E m x e
0 or
p t i
(5.5)
After spinization through (5.1), we arrive at Dirac-like equation:
E m x e
0
p t i
Assuming a plane wave e, e
ip x
E m e σ x i
t i σ p e
or
(5.6)
exists for equation (5.5), we obtain the following
solution for said equation:
e ip x
1
e,
N p ip x N p e ip x
i,
t e
t
(5.7)
where N is a normalization factor and where we have utilized the following relation for an
time eigenstate:
t i , p e, i ,
p
e,
t
(5.8)
After spinization of solution (5.7):
1 0
0 1
1
0
1
p
ip
p 0 1 pz
x
y
t
t σ p t
p ip y p z
t x
t
t
(5.9)
we arrive at the free plane-wave electron solution for Dirac-like equation (5.6) in the dual
universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space:
1
0
0
1
e,
and
p
ip
e
,
N p z e ip x
e ip x
x
y
N
t
i,
t
i,
p z ipy
p
z
t
t
(5.10)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may allow the following bosonic
spinization of massive spinless particle:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
s p ,
sx
p p 2 Det(s p I 3 ) Det I 3
x x 2 Det(s x I 3 ) Det I 3
(5.11)
that is, for example:
E m x e
E m sx e
0
0
sp t i
p t i
and/or
(5.12)
s p σ p σ p
x x Det(s x I ) Det I s x σ x σ x
p p 2 Det(s p I 3 ) Det I 3
1
2
1
2
2
3
3
(5.13)
that is, for example:
E m x e
E m sx e
0
0
sp t i
p t i
E m σ x e 0 E σ x e 0
t i
σ p t i
1 σ p
2
(5.14)
The spinized equation in expression (5.12) for a free massive spin 1 particle may take the
following Dirac-like form:
E
E m sp e,
LM e, LM (x, t) LM 0
sp t i, _
i, _
iB (p, E)
(5.15)
or
iB
E m sx e,
LM e, _ LM (x, t) LM 0
sp t i,
i,
E (p, E)
(5.16)
After calculating the determinant:
E m s x
E m t s x s p
Dets
s p t
(5.17)
We obtain the following:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
xpx
E m sx
Dets
Et m x p I 3 ypz
s p t
zp
x
xp y
yp y
zp y
Et m x p I 3 M T
xpz
ypz
zpz
(5.18)
As mentioned in § 3, the last term MT in expression (5.18) makes fundamental relation
Et m x p 0 not to hold in the determinant view (5.17) unless the action of MT on
the external and internal components of the wave function produces null result, that is:
Ex
M T E y ( x y z ) x E ( x, t) 0
E
z
(5.19)
Bx
M T B y ( p x p y p z )p B (p, E) 0
B
z
(5.20)
and
6. EM Interaction in the Prespacetime-momentumenergy Model
Electromagnetic interaction is an expressive process (radiation or emission) through
bosonic spinization of a massless and spinless entity and the associated reverse process
(absorption). There are possibly two kinds of mechanisms at play. One kind is the direct
bosonic spinization (spinizing radiation):
s p ,
x x Det(s x I ) Det I s x
p p 2 Det(s p I 3 ) Det I 3
2
3
3
(6.1)
that is, for example:
E
p
x e
s x e
t
0
0
s.x
i
t i
t
(6.2)
and the following reverse process (unspinizing absorption):
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
p p,
s x Det(s x I ) Det I x x
s p Det(s p I 3 ) Det I 3
2
2
3
(6.3)
3
that is, for example:
E
s x e
E
0
s p
p
t i
Assuming a plane wave e, e
E
p
ip x
x e
0
t i
(6.4)
exists for the spinless and massless particle:
x e
0 or
t i
E e x i
t p
e
i
(6.5)
we obtain the following solution for this equation:
ip x
1 ip x
e,
1 e
p e
N
p ip x
i,
2 e
t
t
(6.6)
where we have utilized the following relation for an energy eigenstate and N is the
normalization factor :
t i , p e , i ,
p
e,
(6.7)
ip y
t
p
x
t
0
(6.8)
t
After spinization:
0
p
s p ip z
t
t
t
ip
y
t
ip z
t
0
ip x
t
We arrive at the plane-wave solution:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
0
1
1
0
0
0
y
ex,
ip x e, 1 ip e ip x
1
z
0 e
i,
2 t
i,
2 ipz
0
t
ipx
ip y
t
t
for the spinized photon equation:
E
s x e
0 or
i
s p
t
0
0
1
z
ip x
e,
1 ip y e
i,
2 t
ipx
t
0
E e s x i
t
s
p
e
i
(6.9)
(6.10)
For bosonic spinization p p 2 s p and x x 2 s x , the Maxwell-like equations in
the vacuum in the spacetime-momentumenergy unverse may be written as follows:
p E ( x, t)
E
i t
s x E ( x , t)
0
0
i E iB ( p , E)
t iB (p , E)
s p
x
,
x E ( x, t) 0
p E ( x , t) 0
p B (p , E) 0
x B (p , E) 0
t E( x, t) p B (p , E)
E B (p , E) x E( x , t)
or
x E( x , t) 0
B
0
p
(
p
,
E)
(6.11)
If we calculate the determinant:
s x
E
Et s x s p
Dets
s p
t
(6.12)
We obtain the following:
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
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xpx
E
sx
Det s
Et x p I 3 ypz
s p
t
zp
x
xp y
yp y
zp y
xpz
ypz Et x p I 3 M T
zp z
(6.13)
The last term MT in expression (6.13) makes fundamental relation Et x p 0 not hold
in the determinant view (6.12) unless the action of MT on the external and internal
components of the wave function produces null result, since equations (5.20) and (5.21)
only hold in the source-free region of the dual momentum-energy universe.
If source (p,E ) , j( x ,t ) 0 in the spacetime-momentumenergy universe, we may have
instead:
E
s x E ( x , t) ij( x , t) i t
p E ( x , t) ij( x , t)
t iB ( p , E) 0 p
i E iB (p , E) 0
s p
,
p E ( x , t) i ( E, p)
x E ( x , t) (p , E)
x B ( p , E) 0
p B (p , E) 0
t E ( x , t) p B (p , E) j( x , t)
E B (p , E) x E ( x , t)
or
x E ( x , t) (p , E)
B
0
p
(
p
,
E)
(6.14)
Importantly, we can also choose to use fermionic spinization scheme p p 2 σ p and
x x 2 σ x to describe Maxwell-like equations. In this case, the Maxwell-like
equation in the vacuum may have the form:
- σ x σ E ( x, t)
E
0
i
σ
B
σ
p
t
( p , E)
(6.15)
which gives:
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t
p E ( x , t)
0
E B ( p , E)
x
x E ( x , t) 0
p B ( p , E) 0
(6.16)
If source (p,E ) , j( x ,t ) 0 , we may have:
- σ x σ E ( x , t) iσ j ( x , t)
E
i
i
σ
B
σ
p
t
( p , E)
( p , E)
(6.17)
t E ( x , t) p B (p , E) j( x , t)
E B (p , E) x E ( x , t)
x E ( x , t) (p , E)
B
0
p
(
p
,
E)
(6.18)
which gives:
Therefore, in the fermionic spinization scheme, we have in place of the bi-vector wave
function a 4x4 tensor comprising of two bi-spinors (instead of the bi-vector itself)
generated by projecting the bi-vector comprised of E(x, t) and iB(p, E) to spin σ.
Further, we point out here that for a linear photon its electric field E(x, t) is the external wave
function (external object) and its magnetic field B(p, E) is the internal wave function (internal
object). These two fields are always self-entangled and their entanglement is their selfgravity. Therefore, the relation between E(x, t) and B(p, E) in a propagating electromagnetic
wave is not that change in E(x, t) induces B(p, E) vice versa but that change in E(x, t) is always
accompanied by change in B(p, E) vice versa due to their entanglement (self-gravity). That
is, the relationship between E(x, t) and B(p, E) are gravitational and instantaneous.
7. Strong Interaction in the Prespacetime-momentumenergy Model
While weak and electromagnetic interactions are expressive processes involving fermionic
and bosonic spinizations of spinless entities (the third state of matter) and their respective
reverse processes, strong interaction does not involve spinization, that is, strong force is a
confining process.
In order to achieve confinement of a nucleon or stability of the nucleus, we suggest that, in
the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and internal momentum-energy
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Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
space, strong interaction may involve imaginary momentum and imaginary position
respectively in the confinement zone as illustrated below. We have suggested in § 3 that the
proton may be considered as an elementary particle that accomplishes spatial and
momentum self-confinement through downward self-reference (imaginary momentum and
imaginary position).
8. Gravity in the Prespacetime-momentumenergy Model
Gravity in the spacetime-momentumenergy universe is quantum entanglement
(instantaneous interaction) across the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime
and internal momentum-energy space. There are two types of gravity at play. One is selfgravity (self-interaction) between the external object (external wave function) and internal
object (internal wave function) of an entity (wave function) governed by the metamorphous
matrix law described in this work and the other is the quantum entanglement (instantaneous
interaction) between two entities or one entity and the external or internal universe as a
whole. As further shown below, gravitational field (graviton) is just the wave function itself
which expresses the intensity distribution and dynamics of self-quantum-entanglement
(nonlocality) of an entity. We focus here on three particular forms of gravitational fields.
When E=t=0, we have from fundamental relationship (3.4):
m x p 0
or
m x p 0
(8.1)
As shown in § 3, the timeless and energy-less matrix law in Dirac-like and Weyl-like form
is respectively the following:
(8.2)
m x
LM ,e LM ,i LM
p
(8.3)
p
LM ,e LM ,i LM
m x
Thus, the equations of the timeless and energy-less wave functions (self-fields) are
respectively as follows:
m x g D,e e iM
L
p g D,i e iM M ,e
VD,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VD,i M D
(8.4)
p gW ,e e iM
L
m x gW ,i e iM M ,e
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
(8.5)
and
Equation (8.4) and (8.5) can be respectively rewritten as:
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x
V D , e V D ,i
m
p
V D ,i V D , e
mVD ,e x VD ,i
or
V p V
D ,e
D ,i
(8.6)
and
mVW ,e x VW ,i
V p V or
W ,e
W ,i
x
VW ,e VW ,i
m
p
VW ,i VW ,e
(8.7)
When |p|=|x|=0, we have from fundamental relationship (3.4):
Et m 0
(8.18)
As shown in § 3, the spaceless and momemtumless matrix law in Dirac-like and Weyl-like
form is respectively the following:
E m 0
LM , e
0
t
LM , i L M
(8.19)
E
L
m t M , e
LM , i L M
(8.20)
and
and the equation of spaceless and momemtumless wave functions (self-fields) are
respectively the follows:
E m 0 g D,e e iM
LM ,e
0
t g D,i e iM
VD,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VD,i M D
(8.21)
E gW ,e e iM
L
m t g e iM M ,e
W
,
i
VW ,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VW ,i M W
(8.22)
and
The external and internal (momentum-less) wave functions VD,e and VD,i in equation (8.21)
are decoupled from each other, but those in equation (8.22),VW,e and VW,i, are coupled to
each other:
EVD ,e mVD ,e
EV VW ,i
but W ,e
tV mV
tV
V
D
,
i
D
,
i
W ,e
W ,i
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Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
It can be verified that the solutions to equation (8.21) are in forms of:
e imt
V D ,e
1
N e imt
N
VD
0
VD ,i
0
(8.24)
V D ,e
0
0
N iE N e iE
VD
e
1
VD ,i
(8.25)
or
but the solutions to equation (8.22) are in the forms of:
e iEmit
VW ,e
1
N iEmit N e iEmit
VW
e
1
VW ,i
(8.26)
When m==0, we have from fundamental relationship (3.4):
Et x p 0
(8.31)
We can regard expression (8.31) as a relationship governing the massless and intrinsicproper-time-less dual universe in which the total mass and intrinsic-proper-time are both
zero. As shown in § 3, the intrinsic-proper-time-less matrix law in Dirac-like and Weyl-like
form is respectively the following:
E
p
x
L
t M ,e
LM ,i LM
(8.32)
and
Ep
0
(8.33)
LM ,e LM ,i LM
0
t x
and the equations of massless and intrinsic-proper-time-less wave functions (self-fields) are
respectively the following:
E
p
x g D,e e iM
L
t g D,i e iM M ,e
VD,e
L V 0
LM ,i
VD,i M D
(8.34)
Ep
0
0 gW ,e e iM
L
t x gW ,i e iM M ,e
VW ,e
LM VW 0
LM ,i
VW ,i
(8.35)
and
The external and internal (masssless) wave functions VD,e and VD,i in equation (8.34) are
coupled with each other, but those in equations (8.35),VW,e and VW,i, are decoupled from
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
each other:
EVD ,e x VD ,i
EV p VW ,e
but W ,e
tV p V
tV x V
D
,
i
D
,
e
W
,
i
W
,
i
(8.36)
The solutions to equation (8.34) are in the forms of:
1e i (t k x )
1
V D ,e
N p i (t k x ) N p e i (t k x )
VD
e
VD ,i
t
t
(8.37)
x i (t k x )
x
VD ,e
i (t k x )
N E e
VD
N
E e
V
i
(
t
k
x
)
D
,
i
1
1e
(8.38)
or
but the solutions to equation (8.35) are in the forms of:
e i (t kx )
VW ,e
1
N e i (t kx )
N
VW
0
0
Vw,i
(8.39)
0
VW ,e
0
N i (t kx ) N e i (t k x )
VW
e
1
VW ,i
(8.40)
or
Equations (8.34) and (8.35) describe the self-interaction of external and internal spinless
wave functions (self-fields).
9. Human Consciousness in the Spacetime-momentumenergy Universe
We now briefly discuss human consciousness in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) model. Detailed treatment will be given in forthcoming articles.
Our experimental results on quantum entanglement of the brain with external substances
(See, e.g., Refs, in [1]) suggest that Consciousness is not located in the brain but associated
with prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) or simply is prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness). Thus, Consciousness as prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) has both transcendental and immanent properties.
The transcendental aspect of Consciousness as prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) is the origin of primordial self-referential spin (including the selfreferential matrix law) and it projects the external and internal objects (wavefunctions) in
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
the dual universe through spin and, in turn, the immanent aspect of Consciousness as
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) observes the external object
(wavefunction) in the external spacetime through the internal object (wavefunction) in the
internal momentum-energy space.
Human consciousness in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the
internal momentum-energy space is a limited and particular version of this dual-aspect
Consciousness as prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) such that we have
limited free will and limited observation.
Figure 9.1 Interaction between an object and the brain (body) in the dual universe
As illustrated in Figure 9.1, there are two kinds of interactions between an object (entity)
outside the brain (body) and the brain (body) in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy
model. The first kind is the direct physical and/or chemical interactions such as sensory
input through the eyes. The second and lesser-known but experimentally proven to be true
kind is the instantaneous interactions through quantum entanglement. The entire world
outside our brain (body) is associated with our brain (body) through quantum entanglement
thus influencing and/or generating not only our feelings, emotions and dreams but also the
physical, chemical and physiological states of our brain and body.
In the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model, we may write the following HodgkinHuxley equation in the external spacetime and Hodgkin-Huxley-like like equation in the
internal momentum-energy space respectively:
tVm
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Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
where Vm is the electric potential across the neural membranes, Cm is the capacitance of the
membranes and gi is the ith voltage-gated or constant-leak ion channel; and
EVm(p.E )
Vm (p.E ) Ei (p.E ) g i (p.E )
Cm ( p . E ) i
1
(9.1a)
where Vm(p,E) is the electric potential across the neural membranes, Cm(p,E) is the capacitance
of the membranes, gi(p,E) is the ith voltage-gated or constant-leak ion channel.
Microscopically, in the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal
momentum-energy space, electromagnetic fields E(x, t) and B(x, t) or their four-poential
A ( x ,t ) ( x ,t ) , A ( x ,t ) in the external spacetime:
E ( x ,t ) ( x ,t ) t A ( x ,t )
B
A
(
x
,
t
)
(
x
,
t
)
and
electromagnetic
fields
E(p,
and
E)
B(p,
(9.2)
E)
A (p , E ) (p , E ) , A (p , E ) in the internal momentum-energy space:
or
their
E(p ,E ) (p ,E ) E A (p ,E )
B
A
(p , E )
(p , E )
four-potential
(9.2a)
interact with proton of charge e and unpaired electron of charge –e respectively as the
following Dirac-Maxwell-like systems:
E ex , t m
σ p i eA x , t
σx i eA p, E e,
0
t ep, E i,
p
†
- σ x σ E x ,t iσ ( α ) iσ j x ,t
E
t iσ B p , E i ( † ) i p , E
- σ p
and
E e
m
x ,t
σ p eA
x ,t
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Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
E
- σ p
†
- σ x σ E x ,t iσ ( α ) iσ j x ,t
t iσ B p , E i ( † ) i p , E
e
(9.6)
where β and α are Dirac matrices and (p,E ) , j( x ,t ) is the electric density in the internal
momentum-energy space and current in external spacetime respectively.
10. Some Questions & Answers
1. Do the uncertainty principle and commutation relations among energy, momentum, time
and position hold in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? Yes, they hold
separately in the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space. In
external spacetime, time and position are continuous parameters and energy and
momentum are quantized dynamical variables. In the internal momentum-energy space,
time and position are quantized dynamical variables and energy and momentum are
continuous parameters.
2. How are prespacetime model, premomentumenergy model and prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) connected to each other? The elementary particle
in prespacetime model is transformed into that in prespacetime-premomentumenergy
and/or premomentumenergy model through quantum jump as demonstrated in forth
coming articles.
3. What is the foundation of the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the
internal momentum-energy space? The foundation is prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) which is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent.
4. Was there something before the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and
the internal momentum-energy space was born (if there was such birth)? Yes,
prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness)
alone
(1=ei0)
without
differentiation or dualization. So, it may be said that 1= ei0 is the primordial particle.
5. How does prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) create, sustain and cause
evolution of the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the internal
momentum-energy space and all entities in it? Prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) does these things by hierarchical self-referential spin of itself at its free
will.
6. Why is there materially something instead of nothing? Prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) is restless and tends to create, sustain and make
evolutions of different entities.
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964
7. How does prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) govern the dual universe
comprised of the external spacetime and the internal momentum-energy space?
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) governs through metamorphous
self-referential matrix law.
8. What is matter in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? Matter is a dualized
entity (created through hierarchical self-referential spin of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness)) comprised of an external wave function
(external object) having positive energy by convention and an internal wave function
(internal object) having negative time by convention.
9. What is antimatter in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? Antimatter is a
dualized entity (created through hierarchical self-referential spin of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness)) comprised of an external wave function
(external object) having negative energy by convention and an internal wave function
(internal object) having positive time by convention.
10. What is quantum entanglement in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is
the interaction and/or connections between the external and internal wave functions
(objects) of a single dualized entity or among different dualized entities through the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy model which is outside spacetime and momentumenergy.
11. What is self-interaction, self-gravity or self-quantum entanglement in the the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? Self-interaction is the interaction between
the external and internal wave functions (objects) according to the the prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) equation governed by the self-referential matrix
law.
12. What is strong force in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is downward
self-reference through imaginary momentum in the external spacetime and imaginary
position in the internal momentum-energy space.
13. What is weak force in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is fermionic
spinization and unspinization of spinless entities with or without bosonic intermediary
spinization.
14. What is electromagnetic force in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is
bosonic spinization and unspinization of intrinsic-proper-time-less (massless) and
spinless entity.
15. What is gravity in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is quantum
entanglement across the dual universe comprised of the external spacetime and the
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Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
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entanglement between the external and internal wave functions (objects) of a single
dualized entity and gravity or quantum entanglement among different entities.
16. What is the origin of the quantum effect in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy
model? The origin is primordial hierarchical self-referential spin of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness).
17. What is information in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is a distinction
(either quantitative or qualitative) experienced or perceived by a particular
consciousness.
18. What is quantum information in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model? It is a
distinction or a state of distinction (either quantitative or qualitative) experienced or
perceived by a particular consciousness which is due to a quantum effect such as
quantum entanglement.
19. What is the meaning of imaginary unit i in the prespacetime-premomentumenergy
model? It is the most elementary self-referential process. As imagination of
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness), it makes phase distinction of an
elementary entity and, as an element in the matrix law, it plays a crucial role in selfreferential matrixing creation of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
20. What is Consciousness? Consciousness is prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) which is omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent.
21. What is human consciousness? It is a limited or individualized Consciousness
associated with a particular human brain/body.
22. Does human consciousness reside in human brain? No, the human brain is the interface
for human consciousness to experience and interact with the external universe.
23. What are spirit, soul and/or mind? They are different aspects or properties of
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) which is transcendent, immanent and
eternal.
24. Where did we come from? Physically/biologically, we came from prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) as its creation. Spiritually, we are an inseparable
part of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) and our consciousness is
limited and/or individualized version of unlimited Consciousness.
25. Where are we going? Physically/biologically, we disintegrate or die unless we advance
our science to the point where death of our biological body becomes a choice, not
unavoidability. Also, we are of the opinion that advancement in science will eventually
enable us to transfer or preserve our individual consciousness associated with our ailing or
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diseased bodies to another biological or artificial host. Spiritually, we may go back to
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) or reincarnate into a different form of
individual consciousness that may be able to recall its past.
26. How does the mind influence the brain? Mind influences the brain through free will
which acts on subjective entities (internal objects), which in turn effect objective entities
(external objects) through the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness)
equation.
27. What is the origin of the uncertainty principle? The origin is self-referential spin or
zitterbewegung.
28. What is the origin of quantum jump? The free will of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) or unlimited transcendental Consciousness.
Remember that our limited free will is part of the unlimted free will of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) since we are part of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness).
29. Is information conserved? It is our opinion that information is conserved to zero in the
dual universe since each distinction in the external space is accompanied by its negation in
the internal space. However, information is not conserved in each space alone.
30. What is a graviton? There is no graviton in the sense of a quantum (particle) which
mediated gravitational interaction at the speed of light. However, since gravity is quantum
entanglement, the wave function of each entity may be treated as a graviton.
31. Is there an absolute reference frame? Yes, it is simply prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness).
11.
Conclusion
This article is a continuation of the Principle of Existence. A prespacetimepremomentumenergy model of elementary particles, four forces and human consciousness is
formulated, which may illustrate how the self-referential hierarchical spin structure of the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) provides a foundation for creating,
sustaining and causing evolution of elementary particles through matrixing processes
embedded in said prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness). This model generates
elementary particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame)
comprised of an external spacetime and an internal energy-momentum of a dual universe. In
contrast, the prespacetime model described previously generates elementary particles and
their governing matrix laws for a dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of an external
spacetime and an internal spacetime. Then, the premomentumenergy model described
recently generates elementary particles and their governing matrix laws for a dual universe
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967
(quantum frame) comprised of an external momentum-energy space and an internal
momentum-energy space. These quantum frames and their metamorphoses may be
interconnected through quantum jumps as demonstrated in forthcoming articles.
The prespacetime-premomentumenergy model may reveal the creation, sustenance and
evolution of fermions, bosons and spinless entities each of which is comprised of an
external wave function or external object in the spacetime and an internal wave function or
internal object in the internal momentum-energy space. The model may provide a unified
causal structure in said dual universe (quantum frame) for weak interaction, strong
interaction, electromagnetic interaction, gravitational interaction, quantum entanglement,
human consciousness. The model may also provide a unique tool for teaching,
demonstration, rendering, and experimentation related to subatomic and atomic structures
and interactions, quantum entanglement generation, gravitational mechanisms in
cosmology, structures and mechanisms of human consciousness.
In the beginning there was prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) ei0
materially empty but restless. And it began to imagine through primordial self-referential
spin 1=ei0=eiM-iM=eiM e-iM=e-iM/ e-iM = eiM/ eiM…such that it created the external object to be
observed and internal object as observed, separated them into external spacetime and
internal momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through self-referential matrix
law and thus gave birth to the dual universe (quantum frame) comprised of said external
spacetime and internal momentum-energy space which it has since sustained and made to
evolve.
In this universe, the body (ether) of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness),
represented by Euler’s Number e, is the ground of existence and can form external wave
functions as external object and internal wave function as internal object (each pair forms
an elementary entity) and interaction fields between elementary entities which accompany
the imaginations of the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
The prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) can be self-acted on by selfreferential matrix law LM. The prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has
imagining power i to project external and internal objects by projecting, e.g., external and
internal phase +M =+(Et-p·x)/ħ at the power level of prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness). The universe so created is a dual universe (quantum frame) comprising of
the external spacetime with a relativistic frame xμ=(t, x) and internal momentum-energy
space with a relativistic frame pμ=(E/c, p). The absolute frame of reference is the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) itself. Thus, if prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) stops imagining (i0=0), the dual universe (quantum
frame) would disappear into materially nothingness ei0=e0=1.
The accounting principle of the dual universe is conservation of total phase to zero, that is,
the total phase of an external object and its counterpart, the internal object, is zero. Also in
this dual universe, self-gravity is nonlocal self-interaction (wave mixing) between an
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentum-energy Space
968
external object in the external spacetime and its negation/image in the internal momentumenergy space, vice versa. Gravity in external spacetime is the nonlocal interaction (quantum
entanglement) between an external object with the internal momentum-energy space as a
whole.
Some other basic conclusions are: (1) the two spinors of the Dirac electron or positron in
this dual universe (quantum frame) are respectively the external and internal objects of the
electron or positron; and (2) the electric and magnetic fields of a linear photon in the dual
universe are respectively the external and internal objects of a photon which are always
self-entangled.
In this dual universe, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) has both
transcendental and immanent properties. The transcendental aspect of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) is the origin of primordial self-referential spin
(including the self-referential matrix law) and it projects the external spacetime and internal
momentum-energy space through spin and, in turn, the immanent aspect of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) observes the external spacetime through the internal
momentum-energy space. Human consciousness is a limited and particular version of this
dual-aspect prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) such that we have limited
free will and limited observation.
References
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 889-969
Hu, H & Wu, M., Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary Particles & Quantum
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969
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| February 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 2 | pp. 135-139
Neppe, V. M. & Close, E. R., Relative non-locality—Key Features in Consciousness Research –
On Non-locality VII: References Cited in Non-locality I, II, II, IV, V & VI
Exploration
Relative Non-locality - Key Features in Consciousness Research On Non-locality VII: References Cited in Non-locality I, II, II, IV, V & VI
Vernon M. Neppe* & Edward R. Close
ABSTRACT
This part contains the references cited in Non-locality I, II, II, IV, V & VI.
Key Words: reference, consciousness, relative, framework, non-locality, space-time, level,
relative non-locality, dimension, beyond.
Acknowledgements: We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Shauna Mason, Neil McNeill, Dean
Radin, Jacqueliine Slade and Suzan Wilson, and the permission of the Pacific Neuropsychiatric Institute,
Seattle to publish one part of this series of articles which is rewritten for this journal.
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arXiv:0705.1617v1 [quant-ph] 11 May 2007
Non-Computability of Consciousness
Daegene Song∗
October 22, 2018
Abstract
With the great success in simulating many intelligent behaviors using
computing devices, there has been an ongoing debate whether all conscious
activities are computational processes. In this paper, the answer to this
question is shown to be no. A certain phenomenon of consciousness is
demonstrated to be fully represented as a computational process using a
quantum computer. Based on the computability criterion discussed with
Turing machines, the model constructed is shown to necessarily involve a
non-computable element. The concept that this is solely a quantum effect
and does not work for a classical case is also discussed.
1
Introduction.
Research in the field of artificial intelligence, which attempts to imitate and
simulate intelligent activities using a machine, has blossomed along with the
development of information technology [1]. Because the study of artificial intelligence has provided many insights into intelligent behaviors such as pattern
recognition, decision theory, etc., there is a question whether consciousness or
self-awareness could emerge out of a computational system, a view termed as
strong artificial intelligence. This question can be rephrased and stated as follows: Are all conscious activities computational processes?. In this paper, the
answer to this question is shown to be no.
In order to examine the computability of a physical phenomenon, the phenomenon should first be represented as a computational model; subsequently,
the computability of this particular model can be examined. The physical phenomenon can then be claimed to be computable or not based on this examination. A similar approach will be taken in order to examine the computability
of consciousness. Because consciousness is a phenomenon experienced by an
observer, representation of consciousness as a computational process will be
attempted and its computability will be examined. Although traditional approaches for studying consciousness have included neuroscience [2] or neural
∗ School of Computational Sciences, Korea Institute for Advanced Study, Seoul 130-722,
Korea.; Email: dsong@kias.re.kr.
1
0
1 0 0
0 1 1
0 1 1 0
Figure 1: Turing machine. A Turing machine is an abstract model of a computing system consisting of internal states, a tape containing symbols in each cell
and a head that reads and writes the symbol. Evolution in time of the Turing
machine is described by (I, a) → (I ′ , a′ , d) where I is the internal state, and a
is a symbol written on the tape. At the ith cell, i.e., the head’s position, the
head reads the symbol a, and, with the instruction I, it writes a new symbol,
a′ , and moves either one cell to the left (d = −1) or to the right (d = +1) with
an updated internal state, I ′ . The initiation and termination of computation
are indicated by internal states, h0 and h1 , respectively.
network modeling [3, 4], it is demonstrated that a quantum system to be presented below, it necessarily involves a conscious, as opposed to a physical, activity of an observer observing the unitary dynamics of a quantum state. Based
on this observation, a particular quantum computer can be built such that it
yields a computational model involving consciousness. Using logic similar to
that in Turing’s haling problem, it can be shown that this computational model
necessarily runs into a contradiction. As a result, this effectively provides a
counter-example to the assumption that all conscious activities are computational processes.
In this paper, it is not claimed that all conscious activities can be constructed, using a quantum computer, nor that they are quantum mechanical.
Instead, it will be argued that the quantum system to be presented necessarily involves a certain conscious activity and that quantum theory provides a
full description of this particular conscious activity. This argument will be
used to build a quantum computing machine such that it suffices to provide a
counter-example. A single counter-example is sufficient to prove the assumption
is incorrect.
2
Computability and Turing machine.
In order to discuss computability of consciousness, let us first consider what it
means to be computable. This can be done using the notion of Turing machines.
A Turing machine, denoted as TM, is a theoretical model of dynamic computing
system configured with an internal state, a tape containing a symbol in each cell
2
and identification of the position of the head on the tape (see Fig. 1). The time
evolution of the TM is described by (I, a) → (I ′ , a′ , d) where I is the internal
state, a a symbol in the cell of the tape, and d = ±1. Therefore, at the ith cell,
the head reads the symbol, a. Then, given the current internal state, I, which
provides an instruction, the new symbol, a′ = I(a), is written, and the internal
state is updated to I ′ and the head moves either one cell to the right (d = +1)
or one cell to the left (d = −1), i.e., to the (i + d)th cell.
Among the functions of the internal state, is the indication of initiation and
termination of computation. Initially, this particular state is set to h0 , indicating
the initiation of the computation. After the computation is completed, the state
is set to h1 and the machine ceases its activity. The output of the computation
corresponds to the symbol in the cell where the head is located when the machine
halts. For a given input, i, the TM runs, following the time evolution described
above, and either (A) produces an outcome, f = TM(i), and halts with the
internal state set to h1 or (B) loops forever and the internal state never reaches
h1 . A system is called computable if it corresponds to a TM such that it follows
either (A) or (B) for a given input i, and is called non-computable otherwise.
The issue of computability is considered in the following setup: suppose T
is defined to have the following two properties:
1. Computable: T (i) when i 6= T
2. Non-computable: T (i) when i = T
That is, T corresponds to a TM that follows either (A) or (B) except when the
input is T , i.e., the description of T , itself (see Fig. 2). In the following approach, the manner in which the computational model involving consciousness
may be defined through T will be shown using a quantum computing machine,
such that the two conditions regarding computability are satisfied, i.e. necessarily containing non-computability.
3
The halting problem.
Before proceeding with the discussion of consciousness, it is instructive to review
Turing’s halting problem [5] and to examine its use of a property similar to
that seen in T , such that the problem was shown to be non-computable. The
situation for the halting problem is as follows: for some TMs, an outcome
indicated by the halt internal state h0 → h1 , is computed, while for some other
TMs, with a given input, the computation loops forever indicated by a constant
internal state, h0 . Turing’s halting problem asks if there is a TM that can
distinguish between the two types given an arbitrary TM and an input. Suppose
there is such a TM that performs a calculation given the description of TM and i
such that it is able to determine if TM halts or not. This assumption then makes
it possible to construct a particular TM, TMH , such that the machine does not
halt, for an input TM, if and only if TM(TM) halts. However, a contradiction
follows for TMH when the input is TMH itself, because TMH (TMH ) does not
halt, if and only if, TMH (TMH ) halts.
3
Non-computable
Computible
i where i
Computable
i
where i
Computible
Figure 2: Computability and Non-computability. T is defined to have the property corresponding to a Turing machine that either halts or not unless it is given
an input of T itself. The halting problem can be defined in association with T ,
such that it necessarily is non-computable. Similarly, quantum theory allows
consciousness to be represented as a computational process in terms of T , such
that it would necessarily consist of a non-computable element when the input
is T itself.
Therefore, by identifying the TMH associated with the hypothetical TM that
could decide if an arbitrary TM would halt on a given input, it is possible to
show that the TMH contains an element that neither halts after completing the
computation nor loops forever as should a valid TM. The constructed TMH has
the same property as T in Fig. 2, i.e., it is computable except when the input
is TMH itself.
4
Conscious activity in quantum system.
In order to represent a phenomenon of consciousness as a computational model,
the manner in which a conscious activity is involved in a quantum system is
first discussed. This will be conducted using the notation of a qubit, a two-level
quantum system. A qubit in a density matrix form is written as |ψihψ| = 21 (1 +
µ̂ · ~σ ) where µ̂ = (µx , µy , µz ) = (sin θ cos φ, sin θ sin φ, cos θ) and ~σ = (σx , σy , σz )
with σx = |0ih1| + |1ih0|, σy = −i|0ih1| + i|1ih0|, and σz = |0ih0| − |1ih1|.
Therefore a qubit, |ψihψ|, can be represented as a unit vector µ̂ = (µx , µy , µz )
pointing in (θ, φ) of a sphere with 0 ≤ θ ≤ π, 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2π. In quantum
theory, there is another important variable called an observable. For a single
qubit, an observable can also be written as a unit vector, ν̂ = (νx , νy , νz ) =
(sin ϑ cos ϕ, sin ϑ sin ϕ, cos ϑ), pointing (ϑ, ϕ) direction in a sphere. Therefore if
one is to make a measurement in (ϑ, ϕ) direction, the observable would be ν̂ · ~σ .
4
Representing a qubit and an observable as unit vectors in the Bloch sphere will
make their visualization easier which will be helpful in the following discussions.
Let us consider one particular phenomenon, denoted as P1, and described
as follows: an observer observes the unitary evolution of a qubit, µ̂, with respect
to the observable, ν̂. The observer is observing the evolution of µ̂ indirectly
and a measurement can be followed in order to confirm the evolution. When a
measurement on µ̂, with the observable, ν̂, is made, it yields a real eigenvalue
that can be directly observed by the observer. Before discussing the description
of the phenomenon, P1, using the dynamics of quantum theory, it is necessary
to illustrate why the phenomenon, P1, necessarily involves a conscious activity
of the observer. An observable serves as a coordinate or a reference frame
when the measurement is made on a given state vector [6]. This concept is
easier to visualize with two unit vectors, µ̂ and ν̂. The unit vector representing
an observable, i.e., ν̂, is serving the role of a coordinate for the unit vector
representing a qubit, µ̂. Because the measurement is performed by an observer,
the observable is considered to be a coordinate or a reference frame of the
observer, for a given qubit µ̂.
However, in quantum theory, observables, being a reference frame of the
observer, are fundamentally different from reference frames in classical physics.
In quantum theory, the state vectors have representation in, and evolve in, the
Hilbert space, a complex vector space. This description was invented in order to
correctly predict the outcome of measurement performed on a state vector which
yields a real eigenvalue outcome. Not only do state vectors reside and evolve in
the Hilbert space, so do the observables. Because the observables correspond
to the reference frame of the observer and they exist in the complex Hilbert
space, it must be concluded that, unlike reference frames in classical physics,
quantum observables correspond to an observer’s reference frame in thought.
That is, an observable should be considered to represent the conscious status of
an observer while observing a given state vector. This argument explains why
the phenomenon, P1, necessarily involves a conscious activity.
The qubit in P1 can be any 2-level quantum system, for example, a spin 1/2particle or any quantum system in 2-levels, etc. However, it is not necessary
to specify all properties of the physical system other than µ̂, because µ̂ is a
pure state and is disentangled from the state that represents other properties of
that quantum system. Therefore, as far as the phenomenon, P1, is concerned,
µ̂ provides a full description of the physical system. The same logic applies
to ν̂ as well. The vector, ν̂, is not entangled with vectors representing other
observables. Therefore, ν̂ must provide a full description of the conscious status
of the observer in phenomenon, P1. That is, similarly to the case with µ̂, it
is not necessary to be concerned with other conscious activities of the observer
because ν̂ is disentangled from them. Therefore, P1 not only necessarily involves
a conscious activity of the observer, ν̂ gives a full description of the conscious
activity as far as the phenomenon, P1, is concerned.
Quantum theory provides two approaches in describing the natural phenomenon P1. Given µ̂ and ν̂, the first is by applying a unitary operation to
the qubit with µ̂′ = U µ̂U † where a measurement would yield the expectation
5
value of ν̂ · µ̂′ . The second is by applying a unitary operation to the observable
as ν̂ ′ = U † ν̂U and a measurement would yield ν̂ ′ · µ̂. That is, quantum theory
insists that, in order to have an observer observe the unitary transformation
of µ̂ with respect to ν̂, either a unitary transformation is applied to the qubit,
i.e., the first approach, or the observer’s reference frame ν̂ is changed, i.e., the
second approach. The first approach is called the Schrödinger picture and the
second corresponds to the Heisenberg picture.
In the second approach, it was the observable that went through a unitary
transformation which should describe the same phenomenon, P1, as the first
approach. Because the evolution of observables through unitary transformations
are performed in the Hilbert space and the observable is the observer’s conscious
status in P1, an observable that is being changed must correspond to a conscious
activity of an observer. However, while the observer’s conscious status is being
changed, the observer is not observing the observable but the state vector, µ̂.
Therefore, this approach also yields the description of the natural phenomenon,
P1, just as in the first approach.
5
Conscious activity in quantum computing process.
So far, it has been argued that the phenomenon, P1, necessarily involves an
observer’s conscious activity and quantum theory provides a full description of
the conscious status of the observer regarding P1. Based on these observations,
a quantum computational model is to be constructed such that it represents a
phenomenon involving a conscious activity and its computability will be examined. In particular, T will be defined in terms of this computational model and
the computability for a given input, i, will be examined. In the next section, it
will be argued that when the input is T itself, it represents consciousness and
will be proven to be non-computable similarly to the halting problem.
Let us review basic elements of quantum computation by following the discussion in [7, 8]. The particular class of quantum computers to be considered
is assumed to perform a computation on an input of a single qubit, i.e., a
unit vector in the Bloch sphere, µ̂s , in which the subscript, s, is placed in
order to distinguish it from the halt qubit to be defined shortly. In this particular class, the computation is assumed to be conducted through a unitary
process on a given single input qubit, a rotation about the y-axis by δ, i.e.,
Uy ≡ cos 2δ |0ih0| − sin 2δ |0ih1| + sin 2δ |1ih0| + cos 2δ |1ih1|. Among the components
of the classical TM, the head exists which reads each cell on the tape (see Fig.
1). The head in the classical TM may correspond to the observables in the
quantum computer. As demonstrated earlier, for a single qubit, the observable
can also be written as a unit vector in the Bloch sphere, which will be denoted
as ν̂s .
As suggested in [8], in addition to the system input qubit, an additional qubit
is placed which indicates if the computation on the system qubit has successfully
6
ended by 0 → 1 after a valid computation on the single system qubit which
remains 0 otherwise. This is equivalent to the classical TM in which its internal
state indicates if the machine completed its computation by h0 → h1 . The halt
qubit is set to point at the z-direction, i.e. µ̂h = (0, 0, 1). The corresponding
observable, ν̂h = (0, 0, 1), also set to point at the z-direction, initially. Therefore,
the quantum computer constructed for a given input µ̂s , is a closed system
consisting of µ̂s , ν̂s , µ̂h , and ν̂h . Because there is freedom to set the observable,
it can be used to identify one particular quantum computer which works on
a given input, µ̂s . Among the infinitely many choices of ν̂s , assume that one
particular quantum computer exists with the observable, ν̂s = (0, 0, 1). Because
the unitary evolution will be Uy only, the initial observable fully characterizes
this particular quantum computer and it will be defined as T .
The quantum model constructed operates on a single qubit, and, only a
single operation, i.e., Uy , is considered. Therefore, there is no need to specify
any internal state that yields an instruction because there is only one operation.
The only internal state needed is the indication of initiation and termination of
the computation that is represented with the halt qubit. Moreover, indication
of the position of the head is unnecessary because there is only one qubit, which
corresponds to a tape with a single cell. Therefore, the quantum computer
constructed corresponds to a very simple case of a quantum mechanical TM.
One particular phenomenon, denoted as P2, is considered as follows: an
observer observes a rotation of the input, µ̂s , about the y-axis by δ, with respect to ν̂s . As in P1, the observer is observing the rotation indirectly and
a measurement on µ̂s with the observable, ν̂s , can be followed to confirm the
evolution. Note that P2 is almost identical to the phenomenon, P1, except the
unitary operation is specified as Uy . Therefore, similarly to the case with P1,
the phenomenon, P2, necessarily involves a conscious activity of the observer,
represented as ν̂s . Moreover, as discussed with the instance of P1, ν̂s provides
a full description of the conscious status of the observer in reference to P2. In
the following, it will be established that the quantum computer constructed, T ,
represents P2 as a computational model and is computable, therefore indicating
that the phenomenon, P2, is computable.
As discussed earlier, the quantum theory provides two approaches for the
evolution in time of a quantum system. Therefore, because T , the quantum
computer constructed, is a quantum system, it should also evolve in both approaches. The evolution in time of T with an initial input state, i = µ̂s =
(0, 0, 1), will be examined. The first approach, i.e., the Schrödinger picture,
is considered as follows: the unitary operation Uy transforms the input as
µ̂s → Uy µ̂s Uy† and the halt qubit µ̂h ≡ (0, 0, 1) halts by transforming into
−µ̂h . In the second approach, i.e., the Heisenberg picture, it is the observable
that evolves. Therefore, Uy† transforms the vector representing the observable
ν̂s into Uy† ν̂s Uy and the observable for the halt qubit ν̂h ≡ (0, 0, 1) is transformed into −ν̂h . Therefore, in the second approach, the observer’s conscious
status ν̂s is being changed while the observer observes µ̂s . This should yield
the same observation as the first approach. It is noted that the expectation
7
value of (Uy† ν̂s Uy ) · µ̂s for the second approach is equal to the expectation value
in the first approach, ν̂s · (Uy µ̂s Uy† ). Therefore, both the first and the second
computational processes ultimately describe the phenomenon, P2, by correctly
producing an outcome described in P2.
Initially, it was discussed that a system is stated to be computable when it
satisfies one of two criteria, i.e. either (A) it halts after completion of a valid
computation or (B) it loops forever without halting. T was shown to yield the
description of P2, with a given input µ̂s , by following both pictures in quantum
theory, i.e., both approaches yielded the outcome by which µ̂s rotated about the
y-axis by δ, with respect to ν̂s , and halted. Therefore, the phenomenon, P2,
can be claimed to be computable because its computational representation, T ,
with the input µ̂s , was shown to be computable by satisfying the criterion (A).
6
Counter-Example to the Assumption.
In case of the Heisenberg picture description of P2, as well as of P1, it was
discussed that the observer is in the conscious status undergoing change, ν̂s ,
and observes µ̂s . This was shown to yield the phenomenon of P2, i.e., the
observer observing the rotation of µ̂s . A slightly different case can be considered.
While the observer is in the conscious status, ν̂s , that is being changed, the
observer observes ν̂s rather than µ̂s . This is a peculiar aspect of consciousness–
observing one’s own conscious status–that is not observed in other measurement
experiences, for example, in classical dynamics. This phenomenon can be stated
as follows and denoted as P3: an observer observes a rotation of the input, ν̂s ,
about the y-axis by δ, with respect to ν̂s . Therefore, in P3 which describes
consciousness of the observer, ν̂s is serving the role of a state vector, because it
is being observed, and an observable, because it is serving as the reference frame
of the observer. Unlike the cases of P1 and P2, the measurement confirmation
is not needed for P3. While the conscious status, ν̂s , is evolving, the observer
is not observing µ̂s but ν̂s . No measurement is needed in order to confirm the
evolution of ν̂s because the observer is already experiencing it as consciousness.
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that T , with an input µ̂s ,
provides a computational model for describing the phenomenon of P2 and was
shown to be computable. Because P3 is exactly the same as P2 except the
input has changed to vector, ν̂s , from µ̂s , it follows that T , with an input, ν̂s ,
must correspond to a computational model representing the phenomenon, P3
(see Table 1). The observable, ν̂s = (0, 0, 1), fully characterizes T . Therefore, T
with an input, ν̂s , can also be stated as T with an input of the description of T ,
or simply as T with an input, T . In the following, the computability of T for
a given input of T , which represents the phenomenon, P3, as a computational
model, is to be examined.
As established previously, quantum theory provides two approaches to the
evolution in time of T for the input, ν̂s , because it is a quantum system where
ν̂s corresponds to both a state and an observable. In the first approach, it is
the input system that evolves. Since the input is ν̂s , the evolution is as follows,
8
Computational Model
(T ,i = µ̂s )
(T ,i = ν̂s )
Phenomenon
P2: Observer observes the rotation of µ̂s with respect to ν̂s .
P3: Observer observes the rotation of ν̂s with respect to ν̂s .
Table 1: Analogy between the computational model, T , and phenomena P2
and P3. If the phenomenon, P2, can be represented as a computational model,
T , with an input, µ̂s , then T with an input, ν̂s , should correspond to a computational model for the phenomenon, P3.
ν̂s → ν̂s′ = (sin δ, 0, cos δ), while the halt qubit is transformed as µ̂h → −µ̂h .
Quantum theory provides a second approach where the same vector, being an
observable, is transformed as ν̂s → ν̂s′′ = (− sin δ, 0, cos δ), while the observable
for the halt qubit is transformed as ν̂h → −ν̂h . It is noted that ν̂s′ 6= ν̂s′′ unless
δ = kπ where k = 0, 1, 2, ....
Let us now discuss the computability of T (i) where i = T . In order for
T (T ) to be computable, it has to follow either the computability criterion (A)
or (B). Since T halted on both approaches, i.e., µ̂h → −µ̂h , with respect to ν̂h ,
in both pictures, it must follow (A) rather than (B) in order to be computable.
In order to satisfy (A), the halt qubit of T must have halted accompanied
by a valid computation, i.e., both approaches should yield the same outcome
predicted in P3. However, the two approaches yielded two generally different
outcomes for a single input vector, ν̂s . The second approach did not yield the
outcome described in the phenomenon, P3, because the vector is rotated by
−δ. Therefore, this results in a contradiction because T halted on the invalid
computation. The contradiction is noted to result from a peculiar property of
consciousness in which ν̂s is serving as a reference frame of the observer and as
a system to be observed.
The assumption states that all conscious activities are computational processes. Because T (i), with i = ν̂s , being a computational model of the phenomenon P3, is a closed and independent system, this must satisfy the assumption. However, it was shown that T , with a given input ν̂s , is not computable.
That is, a particular conscious activity of an observer observing the change of
an observable, as described in P3, is not computable. Therefore, this leads to a
conclusion that the assumption is incorrect, because it suffices to have a single
counter-example to invalidate the assumption.
Perhaps, by considering a larger system that includes the qubit, the contradiction may be removed and may yield the result that consciousness is always
a computational process. This is commonly seen in thermodynamics in which
a subsystem violates the second law but this violation is always removed when
the total system is considered. However, this kind of argument would not work
because the evolution considered in P2 and P3 are for pure states. Any attachment of ancilla to T and their interaction with the system qubit would cause
entanglement and this will not properly represent the physical phenomena P2
and P3.
9
7
Discussion.
The above argument applies only as a quantum effect. The classical TM cannot
define consciousness using the same technique. As discussed, a reference frame
of quantum measurement was represented in complex Hilbert space which led
to the conclusion that it must correspond to the observer’s conscious status. A
classical measurement yields an outcome in terms of the difference between the
object and the reference frame of an observer, and, unlike consciousness, the
observer cannot observe the dynamics of its own reference frame alone. Therefore, the same argument used with the quantum computing machine involving
conscious activities cannot be used in a classical case.
In [9], Penrose discussed that a non-computable aspect in consciousness may
exist at the fundamental level as described in Gödel’s incompleteness theorem.
Including Turing’s halting problem, there have been a number of mathematical
examples showing undecidability in Gödel’s theorem. In this paper, it was
demonstrated that, as in Penrose’s suggestion, consciousness is a physical, i.e.,
rather than mathematical, example of Gödel-type proofs.
References
[1] S. Russell, P. Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Prentice
Hall, 2nd edition, 2002)
[2] C. Koch, The Quest for Consciousness: a Neurobiological Approach (Roberts
& Company Publishers, 2004).
[3] G. Tononi, G.M. Edelman, Science 282, 1846 (1998).
[4] R.L. Harvey, Neural Network Principles (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs,
NJ, 1994).
[5] A.M. Turing, Proc. London Math. Soc. (2) 442, 230 (1936).
[6] A. Peres, Quantum Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers, (1991).
[7] P.A. Benioff, J. Stat. Phys., 563 22 (1980).
[8] D. Deutsch, Proc. R. Soc. London A 400, 97 (1985).
[9] R. Penrose, The Emperer’s New Mind (Oxford University Press, New York,
1989).
10 |
Quantum Mechanics May Need Consciousness
Andrew Knight
aknight@alum.mit.edu
(Dated: July 14, 2020)
arXiv:2005.13317v2 [quant-ph] 12 Jul 2020
The assertion by Yu and Nikolić that the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment of Kim et al.
empirically falsifies the consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis of quantum mechanics is based on
the unfounded and false assumption that the failure of a quantum wave function to collapse implies
the appearance of a visible interference pattern.
In 2011, Annalen der Physik published “Quantum
Mechanics Needs No Consciousness,” in which Yu and
Nikolić [1] attempt to empirically put to rest what they
called the “bizarre bridge between the mental and the
physical.” To these authors and other physicists to whom
academic discussion of a relationship between consciousness and quantum mechanics is regarded as unfashionable, the hypothesis that consciousness causes collapse
(“CCC”) of the quantum mechanical wave function is
perhaps the most inconvenient and least liked of the
various currently unfalsified hypotheses to explain the
so-called measurement problem1 of quantum mechanics.
Despite assertions by [1] to the contrary, the CCC hypothesis remains unfalsified.
Yu and Nikolić [1] address the “delayed choice quantum
eraser” experiment suggested by Scully and Drühl [2] and
performed by Kim et al. [3], which will be described
with reference to Figs. 1-3. A laser beam is incident on a
double slit, each slit containing a crystal that converts a
laser photon, via the process of spontaneous parametric
down conversion, to an entangled two-photon state of
orthogonally polarized “signal” and “idler” photons, so
named because the experiment is designed to detect each
idler photon after (i.e., within the light cone of) detection
of its entangled signal photon. The laser beam produces
photons that are monochromatic and spatially coherent
– thus indistinguishable – over the width of the two slits.
A first detector D0 , which is placed in the far field by
use of a converging lens (not shown), allows for detection
of signal photons as a function of lateral displacement.
A prism directs idler photons through an optional beam
splitter (“BS”) to detectors D1 and D2 , also placed in
the far field.
In Fig. 1, shown without the beam splitter, the prism
and detectors are configured so that idler photons originating from slit A are detected by D1 (and not D2 ) while
idler photons originating from slit B are detected by D2
(and not D1 ), so that detector D1 is correlated with slit
A and detector D2 is correlated with slit B. Without
the beam splitter, it is asserted by both [1] and [3] that
“which-path” information is preserved.2 If so, it would
1 Specifically, the inconsistency between these two statements: the
quantum state of a system evolves linearly; and observations always yield outcomes (i.e., eigenstates of the measurement operator).
2 I disagree that “which-path” information ever exists in any of the
not be surprising, as confirmed by [3], that the distribution recorded at D0 is the sum of two closely-spaced
single-slit Fraunhofer distributions. In other words, the
detection of which-path information by detectors D1 and
D2 guarantees no interference distribution at D0 .
FIG. 1. When which-path information of idler photons is
recorded by detectors D1 and D2 , detector D0 does not produce an interference pattern.
In Fig. 2, the beam splitter allows some photons to
pass but reflects others, according to quantum mechanical randomness, so that a detection at D1 is no longer correlated with emission of a photon at slit A, nor detection
proposed experimental set-ups. Because the initial photons are
spatially coherent over the width of the slits, all three detectors
are placed in the far field, and the experimental setup prevents
differentiation of slits A and B at the time of each biphoton’s
creation in the slits, no information exists – or can ever exist –
to distinguish the creation of entangled pairs in either slit A or
slit B. [1] and [3] make the same mistake as Afshar et al. [4]
in assuming that the correlation of detector D1 to slit A when
slit B is closed and correlation of detector D2 to slit B when
slit A is closed imply the same correlations when both slits are
open. However, with both slits open, and with detectors D1 and
D2 located in the far field, the wave functions emanating from
slits A and B have already fully interfered (and rendered moot
any “which-path” information) long before detection. A future
measurement does not retroactively cause collapse or decoherence. (See, e.g., [5].) Nevertheless, for the sake of argument,
I will describe the experiments consistently with analysis by [1]
and [3] as if, in the absence of the beam splitter, detectors D1
and D2 indeed measure which-path information when both slits
are open. The opposing opinion that no which-path information
ever exists only strengthens this paper’s conclusions.
2
at D2 correlated to slit B. The beam splitter thus “erases”
any which-path information so that it is never again available, even in principle. In a standard Young’s double-slit
interference experiment, the lack of which-path information is ordinarily manifested, over many photon detections, in the form of a visible interference pattern. However, in the present case, entanglement with the idler
photon complicates matters: reflection (or not) from the
beam splitter produces a phase shift [3] between the distributions correlated respectively to D1 and D2 so that
their sum, as recorded at D0 , is identical to the “no interference” distribution produced by the configuration of
Fig. 1.
FIG. 3.
When a coincidence counter is used postmeasurement to correlate signal and idler photons, detector
D0 produces a visible interference pattern for signal photons
that correlate to idler photons detected by detector D1 .
FIG. 2. When which-path information is erased by a beam
splitter, detector D0 produces a distribution that cannot be
distinguished from that produced by detector D0 of Fig. 1.
Finally, in Fig. 3, a coincidence counter (“CC”) is
placed between the detectors that allows determination
of which measurements on D0 correlate to detections by
either D1 or D2 . When the distribution produced by D0
corresponding only to simultaneous D1 detections is plotted, a typical two-slit interference distribution appears
[3]. The same is true of a distribution produced by D0
corresponding only to simultaneous D2 detections, but it
is phase shifted so that the sum of these two interference
patterns is indistinguishable from the “no interference”
distribution produced by the configuration of Fig. 1. The
analysis of [3] suggests not only that which-path information can be forever erased from the universe, but also that
this erasure can, through the use of coincidence counting and post-measurement analysis, be confirmed by the
appearance of a visible interference pattern.
Ref. [1] aims to interpret the results of [3] as providing empirical evidence to falsify the CCC hypothesis. The paper first characterizes the CCC hypothesis as
(¬P R =⇒ ¬CW F ), where CWF means “collapse of the
wave function” and PR means “phenomenal representation,” or the “registering [of] the results of a measurement in consciousness,” or simply conscious observation.
To falsify this statement, all that is needed is an example
in which there is a wave function collapse without a corresponding conscious observation. The paper provides
no such example, and that’s not surprising. How does
one provide an example of a wave function collapse without making a conscious observation? How does one definitely state, “There’s been a wave function collapse, but
it’s not correlated to any conscious observation”? What
(presumably conscious) observer could possibly say that?
This conundrum has always been a problem with falsifying the CCC hypothesis. It is not trivial. There are, in
fact, proposals for doing so, such as Deutsch’s creative attempt [6] to show how to empirically distinguish whether
or not Wigner’s Friend, presumed conscious, collapses the
quantum wave function. Proposals like this, however,
heavily depend on whether there is any natural limit to
the size of objects subject to interference experiments,
to what extent decoherence prevents macroscopic quantum superpositions [7], whether conscious perception is
related to irreversible processes or the cosmological arrow of time [8, 9], and whether a conscious being could
survive the thermal isolation necessary for a relevant interference experiment [10]3 . These are complicated and
difficult questions that transcend the analysis of [1].
Instead of providing evidence for a wave function collapse without conscious observation, [1] later asserts that
the CCC hypothesis is equivalent to the statement, “The
interference pattern should be visible if which-path’ information has not been registered in consciousness of
the observer,” which I’ll label as (¬P R =⇒ V IP )
(“visible interference pattern”). This is a big jump
from (¬P R =⇒ ¬CW F ), and only follows, logically,
if (¬CW F =⇒ V IP ), but the paper more or less
states this anyway. (“If the photons are always in a
superposition state, after a sufficient number of photons have been registered at D0 , [they] will exhibit the
3 Indeed, [10] correctly identifies a major flaw in [1] by pointing
out why the phase shift caused by the beam splitter would, without coincidence counting, result in an apparent lack of any interference pattern detected by D0 , whether or not which-path
information existed.
3
standard Young’s double-slit interference pattern,” and
“Thus, the presence of the interference pattern at D0 indicates whether the wave function of the original photon
[sic] collapsed or not.”) In other words, [1] positively asserts, through statements as well as logical necessity, that
(¬CW F =⇒ V IP ). Based on their new characterization of the CCC hypothesis – i.e., (¬P R =⇒ V IP ) –
all the authors must do to falsify it is to give an example
in which there is not a visible interference pattern when
there is no conscious observation. This is easy: they then
(correctly) point out that in the Kim et al. experiment,
there is “no interference pattern in D0 ... irrespective of
what happens with the idler photons.”
The problem is not with their evidence; it is with their
logic. They are correct that an interference pattern will
not be found at D0 , but this says nothing to disparage the
CCC hypothesis, as the logical flaw is found in their assertion that (¬CW F =⇒ V IP ). Regarding CWF, they
make it clear that “the relevant information” is “which
path (i.e., L or R) the photons took.” Therefore, [1] necessarily claims that if there is no collapse of the wave
function, due to a lack of which-path information, then
an interference pattern will be visible at D0 .4 So how
long need we wait for a collapse? When can we officially
declare that there has been no collapse and it’s time to
look for interference? Note that we are discussing entangled photons that are notoriously contemptuous of the
demands of special relativity.
The authors clarify that interference will be exhibited
by photons that “are always in a superposition state.”
(Emphasis added.) But instead of waiting until the end
of eternity to verify their theory, let’s choose some firm
date in the future at which we will eliminate any possibility of which-path information – in other words, let’s use
the actual Kim et al. quantum eraser experiment that
[1] cites. Let’s choose some definitive time in the future
after which we no longer have to worry about the possibility of collapse. Referring back to Fig. 3, the detection
of the idler photon is delayed beyond detection of the
signal photon by 8ns, which is much longer than the 1ns
response time of the detectors [3]. Thus, after 8ns following detection of the signal photon by detector D0 , we are
guaranteed that any information regarding “which path
(i.e., L or R) the photons took” is forever erased and inaccessible. And if [1] is correct that (¬CW F =⇒ V IP ),
we should see an interference pattern at D0 .
But we don’t. Nor would we expect to.5 And a single
sentence in Footnote 16 in [1] indicates that the authors
already knew that.
For the sake of argument, let’s give [1] the benefit of
the doubt. Let’s assume the veracity of the assertion in
[1] that (¬CW F =⇒ V IP ) and redo the Kim et al.
experiment. Of course, there’s no reason we can’t delay
the idler photon by a few minutes, a few hours, perhaps
even a few years before the two possible photon trajectories are recombined in a quantum eraser. How can we be
sure that the idler photon isn’t intercepted and detected
by some conscious person during that time? According
to [1], we need only look for “the presence of [an] interference pattern at D0 ” and that will tell us “whether the
wave function of the original photon collapsed or not.” If
that were true, then we could foretell whether or not the
wave function of the idler photon will collapse sometime
in the future by reading the output of D0 today – a problem of backward causality. Further, let’s redesign the experiment so that I can choose whether or not to insert
the beam splitter of Fig. 2 into the experiment any time
before detection by D1 or D2 . I’ll run the experiment
today and then decide to insert the beam splitter only if
the Red Sox win the World Series in 2021. All I’ll need to
do is look at D0 today and I’ll have my answer. Clearly,
the problem of backward causality (or “[violation of] the
no-signaling condition in quantum mechanics” [10]) invalidates the assumption that (¬CW F =⇒ V IP ) and
is fatal to the analysis of [1].
It is my opinion that consciousness exists in the physical world and is therefore fair play in the field of physics,
including the extent to which relativity and quantum mechanics may relate to consciousness. The problem of consciousness may be one of the last big questions in science,
and the laws of physics may very well be implicated in
its successful explanation. The authors of [1] reject the
role of consciousness in quantum mechanics and note that
“the hypothesis that consciousness causes (or at least correlates with) the collapse of the wave function” is “not
preferred by most physicists.” That may or may not be
true, but appeals to consensus in any scientific paper
should be a red flag. After all, general relativity was not
preferred by most physicists in 1915.
More importantly, despite what may or may not be
currently fashionable to discuss in the physics academy,
[1] fails to falsify, empirically or otherwise, the CCC hypothesis. Whether or not quantum mechanics needs consciousness, or vice versa, is yet to be known.
4 We can all agree that if there is a collapse, then an interference
pattern will not be visible. That is, (CW F =⇒ ¬V IP ).
cones of) the occurrence of both detections.
5 An interference pattern can be inferred only by looking at joint
6 “So proper separation of sub-populations of registered photons
detection rates between D0 and D1 (or D2 ), and that’s only
possible at a point in spacetime after (i.e., within both light
may be needed.” These “sub-populations” can only be separated
after post-measurement correlations are accounted for.
4
[1] Yu, S. and Nikolić, D., 2011. Quantum mechanics needs
no consciousness. Annalen der Physik, 523(11), pp.931938.
[2] Scully, M.O. and Drühl, K., 1982. Quantum eraser: A
proposed photon correlation experiment concerning observation and” delayed choice” in quantum mechanics.
Physical Review A, 25(4), p.2208.
[3] Kim, Y.H., Yu, R., Kulik, S.P., Shih, Y. and Scully, M.O.,
2000. Delayed “choice” quantum eraser. Physical Review
Letters, 84(1), p.1.
[4] Afshar, S.S., Flores, E., McDonald, K.F. and Knoesel,
E., 2007. Paradox in wave-particle duality. Foundations
of Physics, 37(2), pp.295-305.
[5] Kaloyerou, P.N., 2016. Critique of Quantum Optical Experimental Refutations of Bohr’s Principle of Complementarity, of the Wootters–Zurek Principle of Comple-
mentarity, and of the Particle–Wave Duality Relation.
Foundations of Physics, 46(2), pp.138-175.
[6] Deutsch, D., 1985. Quantum theory as a universal physical theory. International Journal of Theoretical Physics,
24(1), pp.1-41.
[7] Haroche, S., 1998. Entanglement, decoherence and the
quantum/classical boundary. Physics today, 51(7), pp.3642.
[8] Aaronson, S., 2016. 12 The Ghost in the Quantum Turing
Machine. The Once and Future Turing: Computing the
World.
[9] Maccone, L., 2009. Quantum solution to the arrow-oftime dilemma. Physical review letters, 103(8), p.080401.
[10] de Barros, J.A. and Oas, G., 2017. Can we falsify the
consciousness-causes-collapse hypothesis in quantum mechanics?. Foundations of Physics, 47(10), pp.1294-1308. |
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
arXiv:1907.11405v2 [quant-ph] 28 Nov 2019
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Abstract QBism may be the most significant contribution to the search for meaning in quantum mechanics since Bohr, even as Bohr’s philosophy remains the most
significant revision of Kant’s theory of science. There are two ironies here. Bohr
failed to realize the full extent of the affinity of his way of thinking with Kant’s,
and QBists fail to realize the full extent of their agreement with Bohr. While
Bohr’s discovery of contextuality updates Kant’s transcendental philosophy in a
way that leaves the central elements of the latter intact, Kant’s insight into the
roles that our cognitive faculties play in constructing physical theories can considerably alleviate the difficulties that Bohr’s writings present to his readers. And
while throwing a QBist searchlight on Bohr’s writings can further alleviate these
difficulties (as well as reveal the presence in them of the salient elements of QBist
thought), Bohr’s writings can in turn provide answers to important questions that
QBism leaves unanswered (and also allay some of QBism’s excesses and possible
inconsistencies). In the final sections I confront the two most impenetrable mysteries yet unearthed: making sense of quantum mechanics, and the dual mystery
of making sense of (i) the existence of consciousness in a seemingly material world
and (ii) the existence in consciousness of a seemingly material world. Here the
relevant arguments are framed in the context of the philosophy of the Upanishads,
according to which we (as Schrödinger put it) “are all really only various aspects
of the One.” There is no world that exists out of relation to consciousness, but
there are different poises of consciousness. In particular, there is a poise of consciousness peculiar to the human species at this point in time, and there are poises
of consciousness that are yet to evolve (and that may be essential to averting the
calamities towards which humanity appears to be heading).
Keywords Bohr; consciousness; empirical realism; evolution; experience; intersubjectivity; Kant; manifestation; objectivity; QBism; Schrödinger; Upanishads
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education
Pondicherry 605002 India
E-mail: ujm@auromail.net
2
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics has a well-known problem. It comes in two versions, a BIG
one and a small one.[1] The former calls for an explanation of how measurement outcomes come about dynamically. It is a pseudo-problem if ever there was
one. Pseudo-problems arise from false assumptions, in this case the belief that
a quantum state is some kind of evolving physical state. The latter arises once
it is acknowledged that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics is a
probability calculus, and that the events to which (and on the basis of which) it
assigns probabilities are measurement outcomes. It calls for a demonstration of
consistency between the representation of measurement outcomes by subspaces of
a Hilbert space and the representation of outcome-indicating states or events by
atomic subsets of a phase space. Nine decades after this problem was solved by
Niels Bohr in or around 1929 (albeit in a way that nobody seems to have understood), and after half a century of futile attempts at solving it without taking
account of the universal context of science, which is human experience,[2] there is
light at the end of the tunnel. It is called QBism. Launched at the beginning of
the 21st Century by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger Schack,[3] QBism
may be the most significant contribution to the search for meaning in quantum
mechanics since Bohr, even as Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics remains
the most significant revision of Kant’s theory of science.
To David Mermin,[4] QBism is “as big a break with 20th century ways of
thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th century ways of thinking about
art.” The big break lies not in the emphasis that the mathematical apparatus
of quantum mechanics is a probability calculus—that ought to surprise no one—
but in this plus a radically subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability plus
a radically subjective interpretation of the events to which (and on the basis of
which) probabilities are assigned. What distinguishes the outcome-indicating properties of outcome-indicating devices from other physical properties is that they
are perceived. They are experiences. Nothing but the incontestable definiteness
and irreversibility of direct sensory experience can account for the definiteness of
outcome-indicating properties and the irreversibility of measurements.
There are two ironies here. The first is that Bohr failed to realize the full extent
of the affinity of his way of thinking with Kant’s. The second is that QBists fail to
realize the full extent of their agreement with Bohr. While Bohr’s discovery of the
contextuality of quantum phenomena updates Kant’s transcendental philosophy
in ways that leave the central elements of the latter intact, being acquainted with
Kant’s insight into the roles that our cognitive faculties of intuition (Anschauung) and thought play in constructing physical theories can considerably alleviate
the difficulties that Bohr’s writings present to his readers. And while throwing
a QBist searchlight on Bohr’s writings can further alleviate these difficulties (as
well as reveal the presence in them of the salient elements of QBist thought),
Bohr’s writings can in turn provide answers to important questions that QBism
leaves unanswered (and also allay some of QBism’s disconcerting extravagances
and possible inconsistencies).
My first order of business, carried out in Sect. 2, is to set off empirical realism—
the kind of realism that was inaugurated by Immanuel Kant and defended (among
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
3
others) by Hilary Putnam and Bernard d’Espagnat1 —against the two kinds of
realism that preceded it: direct or naı̈ve realism and indirect or representational
realism. Section 3 presents in outline Kant’s transcendental philosophy, and Sect. 4
backs up the claim that Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics agrees in all
essential respects with Kant’s theory of science.
Bohr’s unique understanding of quantum mechanics is the focus of the next four
sections, beginning in Section 5 with a general outline of his views. It is important
to distinguish Bohr’s views from (all variants of) the Copenhagen interpretation.
This interpretation only emerged in the mid-1950’s, in response to David Bohm’s
hidden-variables theory and the Marxist critique of Bohr’s alleged idealism, which
had inspired Bohm.[8] The term “Copenhagen interpretation” first appeared in
print in Heisenberg’s version of 1955.[9]
Section 6 highlights a key implication of Bohr’s thought, which is that the
dichotomy between quantum systems and attributes created for them by measurements is unwarranted: experimental conditions are constitutive not only of the
attributes of quantum systems but also of the systems themselves. Section 7 aims
to clarify the respective roles that ordinary language and classical concepts play in
Bohr’s thought, and Sect. 8 addresses a major stumbling block that Bohr’s writings present to the reader, i.e., his several invocations of “irreversible amplification
effects.”
The next four sections are centered around QBism. Section 9 contrasts the
role that language plays (or is claimed to play) in QBism with the role it plays in
Bohr’s thinking. Section 10 addresses certain flaws in QBism that quite unnecessarily distract from its core message. Section 11 brings up QBists’ (widely shared)
misappreciation of Bohrian thought, and Sect. 12 raises the question of whether
QBism countenances a reality beyond “the common external world we have all
negotiated with each other”.[4] (The jury appears to be still out on this.)
In Sect. 13 I revisit a reality criterion I previously proposed for distinguishing
between two kinds of observables: the contextual ones that have values only when
measured, and the ones whose values exist independently of measurements (and
thus are capable of indicating measurement outcomes). While superior to appeals
to the size or weight of the measurement apparatus in justifying the irreversibility
of measurements (as Bohr seems to have done), this criterion cannot establish
more than the empirical reality of an intersubjectively constructed world. It only
permits us to treat the known world as if it existed independently of the subjects
knowing it.
The sections that follow present my attempts to confront the two most impenetrable mysteries we have yet unearthed: making sense of quantum mechanics,
and the dual mystery of making sense of (i) the existence of consciousness in a
seemingly material world and (ii) the existence in consciousness of a seemingly
material world. To my mind, these mysteries are so intertwined that neither of
them can be solved in isolation.
1 Putnam assumed the existence of a mind-independent real world but insisted that it does
not dictate its own descriptions to us: “talk of ordinary empirical objects is not talk of thingsin-themselves but only talk of things-for-us”[5]; “we don’t know what we are talking about
when we talk about ‘things in themselves’.”[6] D’Espagnat[7] stressed the necessity of distinguishing between an empirically inaccessible veiled reality and an intersubjectively constructed
empirical reality.
4
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Section 14 offers an explanation for “the miraculous identity of particles of
the same type,” which according to Misner et al.[10] “must be regarded, not as a
triviality, but as a central mystery of physics.” If correct, it not only implies the
numerical identity of particles of the same type but also makes it possible to argue
that, at bottom, any object we observe here with these properties and any object
we observe there with those properties are one and the same “thing.” It further
suggests that quantum physics concerns not the world (as classical physics does)
but how the world is manifested to us. Here the relevant arguments are framed
in the context of the philosophy of the Upanishads, according to which we (as
Schrödinger phrased it) “are all really only various aspects of the One”,[11] and
which is outlined in Sect. 15.
Among the kinds of cognition posited by the Upanishads, one deserves special
attention, to wit, indirect knowledge, which is mediated by representations. This
forms the subject of Sect. 16. In Sect. 17 the role that quantum mechanics plays
in said context is examined, and an answer to the question why the fundamental
theoretical framework of contemporary physics is probability calculus is proposed.
In Sect. 18 an Upanishadic theory of evolution is outlined, and Sect. 19 ventures
to set forth a possible future.
2 Three kinds of realism: direct, representational, and empirical
In an essay written during the last year of his life,[11] Erwin Schrödinger expressed
his astonishment at the fact that despite “the absolute hermetic separation of my
sphere of consciousness” from everyone else’s, there is “a far-reaching structural
similarity between certain parts of our experiences, the parts which we call external; it can be expressed in the brief statement that we all live in the same world.”
This similarity, Schrödinger avowed, “is not rationally comprehensible. In order
to grasp it we are reduced to two irrational, mystical hypotheses,” one of which
is “the so-called hypothesis of the real external world”.2 Schrödinger left no room
for uncertainty about what he thought of this hypothesis: to invoke “the existence
of a real world of bodies which are the causes of sense-impressions and produce
roughly the same impression on everybody . . . is not to give an explanation at
all; it is simply to state the matter in different words. In fact, it means laying a
completely useless burden on the understanding.” For while we can compare the
“external” contents of our respective spheres of consciousness through communication, we have no access to this real world of bodies and no way of knowing how
it relates to those parts of our experiences about which we agree.
Before Descartes, to be was either to be a substance or to be a property of
a substance. With Descartes, the human conscious subject assumed the role of a
substance: to be meant either to be a subject or to exist as a representation for a
subject. Thus was born the representative theory of perception, and along with it
the aforesaid completely useless burden on the understanding.
Most current scientific accounts of perception still labor under this burden.
They begin by assuming the existence of a mind-independent external world, in
which objects emit photons or sound-waves, which stimulate peripheral nerve endings (retinas or ear drums). The stimulated nerves then send signals to the brain,
2
See Sect. 17 for the second of the two hypotheses.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
5
Fig. 1 A neuroscientist explaining the explanatory gap. Drawing by Jolyon Troscianko
(jolyon.co.uk). Reproduced with permission.
where neural processes miraculously give rise to perceptual experience (Fig. 1).
Neither do we have the slightest idea of how this “explanatory gap”[12] is bridged,
nor do we have the slightest idea of how we could have knowledge of what goes on
in this mind-independent external world. While the aforesaid scientific accounts
begin by invoking events in such a world, they lead to the conclusion that we have
access only to perceptual experience.3
In the eyes of John Searle,[13, p. 23] the move from the naı̈ve view that “we
really perceive real objects” to the view that we only perceive sense-impressions,
was “the greatest single disaster in the history of philosophy over the past four
centuries.” In an attempt to defend the earlier naı̈ve or direct realism against
this indirect or representational realism, he invoked the fact that we are able to
communicate with other human beings using publicly available meanings in a
public language. For this to work, we have to assume the existence of common,
publicly available objects of reference[13, p. 276]:
So, for example, when I use the expression “this table” I have to assume
that you understand the expression in the same way that I intend it. I
have to assume we are both referring to the same table, and when you
understand me in my utterance of “this table” you take it as referring to
the same object you refer to in this context in your utterance of “this table.”
The implication then is that
you and I share a perceptual access to one and the same object. And that
is just another way of saying that I have to presuppose that you and I are
both seeing or otherwise perceiving the same public object. But that public
availability of that public world is precisely the direct realism that I am
here attempting to defend.
3 This was already obvious to the Greek philosopher-poet Xenophanes, who some twentyfive centuries ago pointed out that even if our minds represented the world exactly as it was,
we could never know that it did.
6
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Searle points out that his argument is transcendental in the sense of Immanuel
Kant. A transcendental argument begins by assuming that a certain proposition
p is true, and then shows that another proposition q, stating a precondition for
the truth of p, must also be true. For Kant the relevant proposition p was the
assumption that empirical knowledge was possible, and the corresponding proposition q was the conclusion that certain universal laws of nature must hold. In the
argument presented by Searle, p is the assumption that we are able to communicate with each other in a public language, and q is the conclusion that there must
be publicly available objects in a public world about which we can communicate
in a public language.
The realism that Searle’s argument succeeds in defending is not the one it
purports to defend. It is the empirical realism that was inaugurated by Kant[14]
and defended by Putnam[5, 6] and d’Espagnat[7] (among others). It is neither the
naı̈ve realism that reifies the perceived world nor a realism based on agreement
between a mental construct or representation and a reality independent of us, but
a realism based on agreement between our respective “spheres of consciousness”—
between what exists for me, in my experience, and what exists for you, in your
experience.
3 Kant
[T]hose who really want to understand contemporary physics—i.e., not only to
apply physics in practice but also to make it transparent—will find it useful,
even indispensable at a certain stage, to think through Kant’s theory of science.
— Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker[15]
Transcendental philosophy—inaugurated by Kant and continued in the 20th century by Edmund Husserl[16] and others—emerged as a critique of the representative theory. Here is how it was defined by Kant: “I call all cognition transcendental
that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of
objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori. A system of such concepts would
be called transcendental philosophy.”[CPR 149]4 The concepts in question are synthetic rather than analytic. They are synthetic in that they enable us to “work up
the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects”[CPR 136], and
they are not analytic because they owe nothing to contingent experience. They owe
their meanings to the logical structure of thought and the spatiotemporal structure
of human sensory perception.
The logical relation between a subject and a predicate makes it possible to
think of a particular nexus of appearances as the properties of a substance, connected to it as predicates are connected to a subject. It makes it possible for me
to think of my perceptions as connected not in or by me, the subject, but in an
external object. The logical relation between antecedent and consequent (if . . .
then. . . ) makes it possible to think of appearances at different times as events or
properties connected by causality. It makes it possible for me to think of successive perceptions as connected not merely in my experience but objectively, in an
external world. And the category of community or reciprocity, which Kant associated with the disjunctive relation (either. . . or. . . ), makes it possible to think
4
These references are to The Critique of Pure Reason.[14]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
7
of appearances in different locations as events or properties connected by a reciprocal action. It makes it possible for me to think of simultaneous perceptions as
objectively connected. (Kant thought that by establishing a reciprocal relation,
we establish not merely an objective spatial relation but also an objective relation
of simultaneity.)
But if I am to be able to think of my perceptions as a system of external objects, the connections must be lawful. If appearances are to be perceptions of a
particular kind of object (say, an elephant), they must be connected in an orderly
way, according to a concept denoting a lawful concurrence of appearances. If appearances are to be perceptions of causally connected events, like (say) lightning
and thunder, they must fall under a causal law, according to which one appearance necessitates the subsequent occurrence of another. (By establishing a causal
relation falling under a causal law, we also establish an objective temporal relation.) And if appearances are to be reciprocally connected objects, like (say) the
Earth and the Moon, they must affect each other according to a reciprocal law,
such as Newton’s law of gravity. It is through lawful connections in the “manifold of appearances” that we are able to think of appearances as perceptions of a
self-existent system of objects.
Kant’s inquiry into the preconditions of empirical science was an inquiry into
the preconditions of the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects—
things that the subjects of these impressions could treat as if they existed independently of subjects and their impressions. The crucial premise of this inquiry
was that “space and time are only forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only
conditions of the existence of the things as appearances.”[CPR 115] They are not
conditions of the existence of things in themselves, things that exist independently
of subjects and their impressions. Combined with the fact that all physical concepts have visualizable content, and thus owe their meanings to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience,5 this implies
that we have no concepts of the understanding and hence no elements for
the cognition of things except insofar as an intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts, consequently that we can have cognition of no
object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible
intuition, i.e. as an appearance; from which follows the limitation of all
even possible speculative cognition of reason to mere objects of experience.
[CPR 115, original emphasis]
By placing the subject matter of empirical science squarely into the context of human experience, Kant dispelled many qualms that had been shared by thinkers at
the end of the 18th century—qualms about the objective nature of geometry, about
the purely mathematical nature of Newton’s theory, about the unintelligibility of
action at a distance, and about Galileo’s principle of relativity.
Concerning the laws of geometry, which apply to objects constructed by us
in the space of our imagination, the question was why they should also apply
to the physical world. Kant’s answer was that they apply to objects perceived
5 Position and orientation are in an obvious sense visualizable. Linear and angular momentum derive their meanings from the symmetry properties of space or the invariant behavior of
closed systems under translations and rotations, while energy derives its meaning from the uniformity of time or the invariant behavior of closed systems under time translations. Causality
and interaction, too, are in obvious ways related to space and time.
8
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
as well as to objects imagined because visual perception and visual imagination
share the same space.6 As to the mathematical nature of Newtonian mechanics, it
was justified, not by the Neo-Platonic belief that the book of nature was written
in mathematical language, but by its being a precondition of scientific knowledge.
What makes it possible to conceive of appearances as aspects of an objective world
is the mathematical regularities that obtain between them. Newton’s refusal to explain action at a distance was similarly justified, inasmuch as the only intelligible
causality available to us consists in lawful mathematical relations between phenomena: for the Moon to be causally related to the Earth is for the Moon to stand
in a regular mathematical relation to the Earth. As to the principle of relativity,
ditto: lawful mathematical relations only exist between phenomena, and thus only
between objects or objective events, but never between a particular phenomenon
and space or time itself.7
For this remarkable achievement there was a price to be paid. To preserve the
objectivity of science, it must be possible to think of phenomena as appearances
of things in themselves:
even if we cannot cognize these same objects as [i.e., know them to be]
things in themselves, we at least must be able to think them as things in
themselves. For otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that
there is an appearance without anything that appears. [CPR 115, original
emphasis]
In other words, we must be able to decontextualize nature, to free it from the
context of human experience, to forget that it is the product of a synthesis achieved
by the experiencing subject. The price to be paid was that we must ignore the
transcendent reality which affects us in such a way that we have the impressions
that we do, and that we are able to organize our impressions into objects that
change and interact with each other in accordance with laws of nature.
4 Kant and the quantum theory
By the time quantum mechanics came along, scientists and philosophers alike had
realized that renouncing ontological prejudices and sticking to operationally definable notions was the safest way to arrive at reliable knowledge. At the same time
classical physics, still deemed eminently successful, appeared to support a realistic
interpretation. What made it possible to reconcile these opposing tendencies was
Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It offered an ingenious way to go on talking in
realist language about, e.g., electromagnetic waves propagating in vacuum, while
disavowing ontological inclinations. Kant’s transcendental philosophy was therefore widely considered to be tightly linked with classical physics, and to make the
latter philosophically acceptable. When classical physics failed to account for such
6 It is noteworthy that Kant’s argument applies, not to Euclidean geometry specifically, even
though it was the only geometry known in Kant’s time, but to geometry in general, and thus
to whichever geometry is best suited to formulating the laws of physics. It has even been said
that Kant’s theory of science set in motion a series of re-conceptualizations of the relationship
between geometry and physics that eventuated in Einstein’s theories of relativity.[17]
7 Here, too, it would be an anachronism to argue that Kant singled out Galilean relativity,
even though it was the only relativity known in his time. His argument holds for every possible
principle of relativity, including Einstein’s.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
9
data as atomic spectra, the obvious conclusion was that Kant’s philosophy fared
no better than naı̈ve realism.[18]
And indeed, many of Kant’s claims appeared to be contradicted by quantum
mechanics. There was his principle of thoroughgoing determination, “according
to which, among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared
with their opposites, one must apply to it.”[CPR 553] In direct contradiction to
this principle, the properties of atomic systems came to be regarded as possessing
values only if (and when) two conditions were satisfied: a set of possible values
was defined by an experimental arrangement, and an actual value was indicated.
Then there was the necessary and universal truth of a priori propositions such as
“the law of the connection of cause and effect”[CPR 304], established by Kant as
preconditions of the possibility of organizing sense-impressions into objects. Yet in
the newly discovered quantum domain, there were no sense-impressions waiting to
be organized into objects. Neither was it possible to conceive of an atom as a nexus
of sense-impressions, nor did atoms satisfy Kant’s a priori laws. In particular, as
was stressed by Schrödinger,
Atoms—our modern atoms, the ultimate particles—must no longer be regarded as identifiable individuals. This is a stronger deviation from the
original idea of an atom than anybody had ever contemplated. We must be
prepared for anything. [19, p. 162]
Niels Bohr, seeing Kant as arguing not only for the necessary validity but also the
unlimited range of classical concepts, could not but regard his own complementarity interpretation of the quantum formalism as an alternative to Kant’s theory of
science. And yet—just as Kant did not argue for the universal validity of Euclidean
geometry in particular (see Note 6), nor for Galilean relativity in particular (see
Note 7), so his arguments did not establish that the range of classical concepts was
unlimited. As Kant’s arguments had merely established the validity of whichever
geometry (and whichever principle of relativity) was the most convenient, so they
merely established the necessary validity of classical concepts as long as one was
dealing with the organization of sense-impressions into objects (which he assumed
was always the case). Bohr realized that in the new field of experience opened up
by the quantum theory one was not only dealing with the organization of senseimpressions into objects, and that, consequently, the range of classical concepts was
limited—that it did not extend to quantum systems but only to quantum phenomena. Apart from that, Bohr established the indispensability of classical concepts
in dealing with quantum phenomena by the very same arguments by which Kant
had established it for classical phenomena (i.e., for sense-impressions that allow
themselves to be organized into objects). Here is Bernard d’Espagnat[18] on the
relation between Kant and contemporary physics:
It is true that contemporary physics forces us to give up . . . significant,
although non central, elements of Kant’s thinking. But it more than compensates this blow by practically compelling us to adopt the idea that was,
in fact, at the very core of Kantism and constitutes its truly original contribution to philosophical thinking, to wit, the view that things and events,
far from being elements of a “reality per se,” are just phenomena, that is,
elements of our experience.
Kant did not anticipate the possibility of an empirical knowledge that, while being
obtained by means of sense-impressions organized into objects, was not a knowl-
10
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
edge of sense-impressions organized into objects. Bohr realized that quantum mechanics was that kind of knowledge. He completely agreed with Kant that what
is inaccessible to our senses cannot be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience, and therefore cannot be expected to accord with
concepts that owe their meanings to these conditions.
5 Niels Bohr
It is often said that a work of genius resists categorization. If so, Bohr’s philosophical viewpoint easily passes this criterion of greatness. Surely this is one
of the reasons for the commonplace complaints over Bohr’s “obscurity.”
— Henry J. Folse[20]
As a philosopher Niels Bohr was either one of the great visionary figures of
all time, or merely the only person courageous enough to confront head on,
whether or not successfully, the most imponderable mystery we have yet unearthed.
— N. David Mermin[21]
“Without sensibility no object would be given to us,” Kant wrote [CPR 193], “and
without understanding none would be thought.” Bohr could not have agreed more,
insisting as he did that meaningful physical concepts have not only mathematical
but also visualizable content. Such concepts are associated with pictures, like the
picture of a particle following a trajectory or the picture of a wave propagating in
space. In the classical theory, a single picture could accommodate all of the properties a system can have. When quantum theory came along, that all-encompassing
picture fell apart. Unless certain experimental conditions obtained, it was impossible to picture the electron as following a trajectory (which was nevertheless a
routine presupposition in setting up Stern-Gerlach experiments and in interpreting
cloud-chamber photographs), and there was no way in which to apply the concept
of position. And unless certain other, incompatible, experimental conditions obtained, it was impossible to picture the electron as a traveling wave (which was
nevertheless a routine presupposition in interpreting the scattering of electrons by
crystals), and there was no way in which to apply the concept of momentum.
If the visualizable content of physical concepts cannot be described in terms
of compatible pictures, it has to be described in terms of something that can be
so described, and what can be so described are quantum phenomena. The definite
definition of a quantum phenomenon is contained in the following passage:
[A]ll unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism involves the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the
atomic system concerned and the character of the possible predictions as
regards subsequent observable properties of that system. Any measurement
in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a fixation of the initial
state or to the test of such predictions, and it is first the combination of
measurements of both kinds which constitutes a well-defined phenomenon.
[BCW7: 312]8
8
These references are to the volumes of the Collected Works of Niels Bohr.[22]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
11
Today, Bohr is mostly known for his insistence on the necessity of using classical concepts, for attributing this necessity to the need to communicate to others “what we have done and what we have learned” [BCW7: 273, 331, 349, 390,
418], and for the thesis that “the specification of [the whole experimental arrangement] is imperative for any well-defined application of the quantum-mechanical
formalism”.[23] The conceptual links between these demands, however, belong to
a fabric of thought that is not widely known. In the remainder of this section and
the three sections that follow, an attempt is made at an outline of the overarching
framework of Bohr’s thought.
In a 1922 letter to his philosophical mentor Harald Høffding, Bohr wrote:
my personal opinion is that these difficulties are of such a kind that they
hardly allow us to hope, within the world of atoms, to implement a description in space and time of the kind corresponding to our usual sensory
images. [BCW10: 513]
In each of the following quotes, all from 1929, Bohr refers to space and time as
our “forms of perception”:
[T]he very recognition of the limited divisibility of physical processes . . . has
justified the old doubt as to the range of our ordinary forms of perception
when applied to atomic phenomena. [BCW6: 209]
[W]e can hardly escape the conviction that in the facts which are revealed to
us by the quantum theory and lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms
of perception we have acquired a means of elucidating general philosophical
problems. [BCW6: 217]
This limitation [of our forms of perception] is brought to light by a closer
analysis of the applicability of the basic physical concepts in describing
atomic phenomena. [BCW6: 242]
[W]e must remember, above all, that, as a matter of course, all new experience makes its appearance within the frame of our customary points of
view and forms of perception. [BCW6: 279]
[W]e must not forget that, in spite of their limitation, we can by no means
dispense with those forms of perception which colour our whole language
and in terms of which all experience must ultimately be expressed.
[BCW6: 283]
[T]he difficulties concerning our forms of perception, which arise in the
atomic theory. . . , may be considered as an instructive reminder of the general conditions underlying the creation of mans concepts. [BCW6: 293]
[A]ll our ordinary verbal expressions bear the stamp of our customary forms
of perception, from the point of view of which the existence of the quantum
of action is an irrationality. Indeed, in consequence of this state of affairs,
even words like “to be” and “to know” lose their unambiguous meaning.
[BCW6: 297]
Today the task of making sense of the quantum theory is widely seen as one of
grafting a metaphysical narrative onto a mathematical formalism, in a language
that is sufficiently vague philosophically to be understood by all and sundry. For
12
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
Bohr, as also for Heisenberg and Pauli, the real issues lay deeper. They judged
that the conceptual difficulties posed by the quantum theory called in question
the general framework of thought that had evolved in Germany beginning with
Kant. If (i) space and time are but our forms of perception, if (ii) physical concepts
derive their meanings from different aspects of these forms (e.g., localizability and
homogeneity or invariance under translations), and if (iii) the facts revealed to us
by the quantum theory lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception
(in other words, if they are inaccessible to sensory perception), then these facts
cannot be expected to be expressible by the physical concepts at our disposal. How,
then, can they be expressed, and how can this be done without compromising the
objectivity of the theory? Bohr’s answer in a nutshell:
the decisive point is that the physical content of quantum mechanics is
exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations
obtained under conditions specified in plain language. [BCW10: 159]
By developing the mathematical part of the quantum theory into an autonomous
formal language, von Neumann[24] transformed the theory into a mathematical formalism in search of a physical interpretation. Transmogrifying a probability algorithm—the state vector—into an evolving physical state, adopting the
eigenvalue-eigenstate link, and modeling measurements as two-stage processes
(“pre-measurement” followed by “objectification”), he gave rise to what has been
appropriately called “the disaster of objectification” by van Fraassen.[25] This is
how quantum mechanics became “the great scandal of physics”,[26] “the silliest”
of all the theories proposed in the 20th century,[27] and a theory that “makes
absolutely no sense”.[28] A distinction is made between the “bare quantum formalism,” which is regarded as “an elegant piece of mathematics . . . prior to any
notion of probability, measurement etc.,” and the “quantum algorithm,” which is
looked upon as “an ill-defined and unattractive mess”[26].9 “Measurement” has
become the unmentionable M-word of physics.[33] And Bohr, of all people, often
gets blamed for this sorry state of affairs!10
If measurements and plain language played pivotal roles in Bohr’s writings, it
was to ensure the objectivity of the new theory. When Bohr realized that his references to “sensory images” and “forms of perception” rather contributed to undermining his efforts in that direction, Bohr replaced these expressions by “quantum
phenomena” and “experimental arrangements.” I owe this observation to the editor of the two volumes of Bohr’s Collected Works that deal specifically with the
foundations of quantum physics:
9 In reality there is no such thing as a bare quantum formalism. Every single axiom of any
axiomatization of the theory only makes sense as a feature of a probability calculus.[29, 30] The
distinction between a bare quantum formalism and a quantum algorithm is as illegitimate as
the distinction between the “easy” problems of consciousness and the “hard” one.[31, 32] Both
distinctions are rooted in the obsolescent mode of thinking that is known as “physicalism.”
10 Even by QBists: “The Founders of quantum mechanics were already aware that there was
a problem. Bohr and Heisenberg dealt with it by emphasizing the inseparability of the phenomena from the instruments we devised to investigate them. . . . Being objective and independent
of the agent using them, instruments miss the central point of QBism, giving rise to the notorious measurement problem, which has vexed physicists to this day”.[34, emphasis added] In
actual fact, it was von Neumann who gave rise to this problem. For Bohr there was “no new
observational problem”[BCW10: 212] because we are doing what we have always done: setting
up experiments and reporting their results.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
13
when the phrase “forms of perception” was replaced by “experimental arrangement”, “the objectivity of physical observations” could be stressed
without the somewhat bewildering addition that it could be “particularly
suited to emphasize the subjective character of all experience”.[35]
While the business of physics was “the development of methods for ordering and
surveying human experience,” this was to be done “in a manner independent of
individual subjective judgement and therefore objective in that sense, that it can
be unambiguously communicated in the common human language” [BCW10: 157–
158]:
To clarify this point [whether we are concerned with a complete description
of natural phenomena], it was indeed necessary to examine what kind of
answers we can receive by so to say putting questions to nature in the form
of experiments. In order that such answers may contribute to objective
knowledge, independent of subjective judgement, it is an obvious demand
that the experimental arrangement as well as the recording of observations
be expressed in the common language, developed for our orientation in the
surroundings. [BCW10: 212]
At one time Heisenberg[36] drew a dividing line between “the apparatus which
we. . . , in a way, treat as part of ourselves,” and “the physical systems we wish to
investigate.” Pauli likewise thought that it was “allowed to consider the instruments of observation as a kind of prolongation of the sense organs of the observer”
[BCW10: 564]. Bohr would have none of this. The observed had to be detached
from the observer (rather than the other way round), and there was only one way
to do this: to take the means of observation, rather than the system observed,
for what was actually observed, what was directly accessible to our senses, and
what therefore was amenable to communication using words and concepts we can
understand. The dividing line was to be drawn, not between the apparatus as part
of ourselves and the object of investigation, but between our observing selves and
the observed apparatus. What could not be separated from the object of investigation was not the subject, which remained the same detached observer it had
been before quantum physics came along, but the means of investigation. And this
was not a matter of choice, for without the apparatus not only did the object of
investigation lack properties but, in fact, there was no object of investigation.
6 Quantum systems or quantum phenomena?
Where there are no sense-impressions waiting to be organized into objects, there
are no objects. Bohr’s emphatic rejection of the familiar language of objects when
dealing with “the facts which are revealed to us by the quantum theory” cannot
be overemphasized:
The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are confronted
in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as regards all questions
of terminology. Speaking, as is often done, of disturbing a phenomenon by
observation, or even of creating physical attributes to objects by measuring
processes, is, in fact, liable to be confusing, since all such sentences imply a
departure from basic conventions of language which, even though it sometimes may be practical for the sake of brevity, can never be unambiguous. It
14
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
is certainly far more in accordance with the structure and interpretation of
the quantum mechanical symbolism, as well as with elementary epistemological principles, to reserve the word “phenomenon” for the comprehension
of the effects observed under given experimental conditions. [BCW7: 316]
If there is no object to be disturbed by a measurement, if even the dichotomy of
objects and attributes created for them by measuring processes is unwarranted,
then it is not just the measured property but the quantum system itself that is
constituted by the experimental conditions under which it is observed.
More recently this point was forcefully made by Brigitte Falkenburg in her
commendable monograph Particle Metaphysics:
[O]nly the experimental context (and our ways of conceiving of it in classical
terms) makes it possible to talk in a sloppy way of quantum objects. . . . Bare
quantum “objects” are just bundles of properties which underlie superselection rules and which exhibit non-local, acausal correlations. . . . They seem
to be Lockean empirical substances, that is, collections of empirical properties which constantly go together. However, they are only individuated
by the experimental apparatus in which they are measured or the concrete quantum phenomenon to which they belong. . . . They can only be
individuated as context-dependent quantum phenomena. Without a given
experimental context, the reference of quantum concepts goes astray. In
this point, Bohr is absolutely right up to the present day. [37, pp. 205–206,
original emphases]
A similar conclusion was reached by Ole Ulfbeck and Aage Bohr,[38] for whom
“there is no longer a particle passing through the apparatus and producing the
click. Instead, the connection between source and counter is inherently non-local.”
While “clicks can be classified as electron clicks, neutron clicks, etc., . . . there
are no electrons and neutrons on the spacetime scene.” Hence “there is no wave
function for an electron or a neutron but a wave function for electron clicks and
neutron clicks, etc.” What makes it seem as if there are electrons and neutrons is
the existence of conservation laws, which govern patterns of clicks. If a “+ click”
is always followed by a “+ click” we seem to have the right to infer the continued
existence of a “+ particle,” but if a “+ click” can also be followed by two “+ clicks”
and a “− click” or by three “+ clicks” and two “− clicks” then, as Schrödinger put
it, “we must be prepared for anything.”
7 Objectivity, ordinary language, and classical concepts
Presently (July 2019) a combined Google search for “Bohr” and “classical language” (the latter term including the quotes) yields more than 5,000 results. A
search for “Bohr” and “language of classical physics” yields nearly 25,000 results.
By contrast, searching the 13 volumes of the Complete Works of Niels Bohr does
not yield a single occurrence of either “classical language” or “language of classical physics.” While Bohr insisted on the use of classical concepts for describing
quantum phenomena,11 the language on the use of which he insisted was “ordinary
11 Sometimes Bohr refers instead to “elementary physical concepts”: “all subjectivity is
avoided by proper attention to the circumstances required for the well-defined use of elementary physical concepts” [BCW7: 394].
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
15
language” [BCW7: 355], “plain language” [BCW10: 159], the “common human language” [BCW10: 157–158], or the “language common to all” [10: xxxvii].12
To represent the content of my experience as objective, I do not need to represent it as a system of objects located in space and changing with time in such
a way that they can be re-identified and compared, as Kant had taught, but I
need to be able to refer to such objects, and for this I need ordinary language
and classical concepts. Ordinary human language uses words we can all understand, inasmuch as their meanings are rooted in what is common to us, i.e., the
spatiotemporal structure of human experience and the logic of human thought or
the structure of human language. This includes the classical concepts. Bohr often
referred to ordinary language and classical concepts (of equivalents thereof) in the
same breath. What is required is not classical physics but only the terminology
of classical physics: “all well-defined experimental evidence, even if it cannot be
analysed in terms of classical physics, must be expressed in ordinary language”
[BCW7: 355; emphasis added], i.e., “plain language suitably refined by the usual
physical terminology” [BCW7: 390] or “conveniently supplemented with terminology of classical physics” [BCW10: 277].
While classical concepts and ordinary language are necessarily used in both
classical physics and quantum physics, in quantum physics their use is restricted
to the domain of re-identifiable objects with intrinsic attributes, which in classical
physics is all there is. Quantum physics reveals a domain to which neither ordinary language nor classical concepts can legitimately be applied—an intrinsically
unspeakable domain which becomes speakable only indirectly, via an experimental
context. So: objectivity ⇒ ordinary language and classical concepts ⇒ contextuality:
By objectivity we understand a description by means of a language common to all (quite apart from the differences in languages between nations)
in which people may communicate with each other in the relevant field.
[BCW10: xxxvii]
From a logical standpoint, we can by an objective description only understand a communication of experience to others by means of a language
which does not admit ambiguity as regards the perception of such communications. In classical physics, this goal was secured by the circumstance
that, apart from unessential conventions of terminology, the description is
based on pictures and ideas embodied in common language, adapted to our
orientation in daily-life events. [BCW10: 276]
Faced with the question of how under such circumstances we can achieve
an objective description, it is decisive to realize that however far the phenomena transcend the range of ordinary experience, the description of the
12 Jan Faye[39] has argued that “Bohr was not a transcendentalist in his insistence on the
use of classical concepts. Instead he had a naturalistic attitude to how common language
came about.” Certain passages from the Bohr canon can be adduced in support of this claim,
e.g., when Bohr insists on the use of the “common language developed for our orientation
in the surroundings” [BCW10: 212], or when he points out that in classical physics the goal
of an objective description is secured by the circumstance that such descriptions are “based
on pictures and ideas embodied in common language, adapted to our orientation in daily-life
events” [BCW10: 276]. I do not think, however, that transcendentalist and naturalistic attitudes
are mutually exclusive, nor that Bohr’s motivation for insisting on the use of classical concepts
was primarily naturalistic.
16
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
experimental arrangement and the recording of observations must be based
on common language. [BCW10: 158]
One day during tea at his institute, Bohr was sitting next to Edward Teller and
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Von Weizsäcker[40] recalls that when Teller suggested that “after a longer period of getting accustomed to quantum theory we
might be able after all to replace the classical concepts by quantum theoretical
ones,” Bohr listened, apparently absent-mindedly, and said at last: “Oh, I understand. We also might as well say that we are not sitting here and drinking tea but
that all this is merely a dream.” If we are dreaming, we are unable to tell others
what we have done and what we have learned. Therefore
it would be a misconception to believe that the difficulties of the atomic
theory may be evaded by eventually replacing the concepts of classical
physics by new conceptual forms. . . . the recognition of the limitation of
our forms of perception by no means implies that we can dispense with our
customary ideas or their direct verbal expressions when reducing our sense
impressions to order. [BCW6: 294]
Or, as Heisenberg put it,[41, p. 56] “[t]here is no use in discussing what could
be done if we were other beings than we are.”13 Bohr’s claim that the “classical
language” (i.e., plain language supplemented with terminology of classical physics)
was indispensable, has also been vindicated by subsequent developments in particle
physics:
This [claim] has remained valid up to the present day. At the individual
level of clicks in particle detectors and particle tracks on photographs, all
measurement results have to be expressed in classical terms. Indeed, the use
of the familiar physical quantities of length, time, mass, and momentumenergy at a subatomic scale is due to an extrapolation of the language of
classical physics to the non-classical domain.[37, p. 162]
8 Irreversible amplification?
If the terminology of quantum phenomena is used consistently, then nothing—at
any rate, nothing we know how to think about—happens between “the fixation of
the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system concerned”
and “the subsequent observable properties of that system” [BCW7: 312]. Any story
purporting to detail a course of events in the interval between a system preparation
and a subsequent observation is inconsistent with “the essential wholeness of a
quantum phenomenon,” which “finds its logical expression in the circumstance
that any attempt at its subdivision would demand a change in the experimental
arrangement incompatible with its appearance” [BCW10: 278]. What, then, are
we to make of the following passages [emphases added]?
[E]very well-defined atomic phenomenon is closed in itself, since its observation implies a permanent mark on a photographic plate left by the impact of
13 Heisenberg thought it possible that the forms of perception of other beings, and hence
their concepts, could be different from ours: ours “may belong to the species ‘man,’ but not
to the world as independent of men”.[41, p. 91]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
17
an electron or similar recordings obtained by suitable amplification devices
of essentially irreversible functioning. [BCW10: 89]
Information concerning atomic objects consists solely in the marks they
make on these measuring instruments, as, for instance, a spot produced by
the impact of an electron on a photographic plate placed in the experimental arrangement. The circumstance that such marks are due to irreversible
amplification effects endows the phenomena with a peculiarly closed character pointing directly to the irreversibility in principle of the very notion
of observation. [BCW10: 120]
In this connection, it is also essential to remember that all unambiguous information concerning atomic objects is derived from the permanent
marks—such as a spot on a photographic plate, caused by the impact of an
electron—left on the bodies which define the experimental conditions. Far
from involving any special intricacy, the irreversible amplification effects on
which the recording of the presence of atomic objects rests rather remind us
of the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation.
[BCW7: 390; BCW10: 128]
If a well-defined atomic phenomenon is closed, how can there be something between
the fixation of the external conditions and a permanent mark on a photographic
plate? Does not the interposition of the impact of an electron and of a subsequent
amplification effect amount to a subdivision of the phenomenon in question?
Ulfbeck and (Aage) Bohr[38] have shed light on this issue. Like Kant and
subsequently (Niels) Bohr, they view space and time as “a scene established for
the ordering of experiences.” Clicks in counters are “events in spacetime, belonging
to the world of experience.” All physical phenomena are described in terms of
variables that have values at all times, and each variable of this kind belongs to
an object that is present on the spacetime scene—a “classical” or “macroscopic”
object in customary parlance. The matrix variables of quantum mechanics are “of
an entirely novel type.” A click is an event “by which a matrix variable manifests
itself on the spacetime scene, without entering this scene.” The key to resolving
the issue at hand is that this event—the click—has an “onset”:
[A] click is distinguished by the remarkable property of having an “onset,”
a beginning from which the click evolves as a signal in the counter. The
onset, thus, has no precursor in spacetime and, hence, does not belong to
a chain of causal events. In other words, the onset of the click is not the effect of something, and it has no meaning to ask how the onset occurred. . . .
The notion that a particle entered the counter, therefore, becomes inappropriate, and it is likewise inappropriate to state that the particle produced
the click. . . . [T]he downward path from macroscopic events in spacetime,
which in standard quantum mechanics continues into the regime of the particles, does not extend beyond the onsets of the clicks. . . . [T]he occurrence
of genuinely fortuitous clicks, coming by themselves, is recognized as the
basic material that quantum mechanics deals with. . . . The theory of what
takes place in spacetime is, therefore, inherently non-local. . . . Thus, the
wave function enters the theory not as an independent element, but in the
role of encoding the probability distributions for the clicks, which is the
content of the theory.
18
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
In the conventional/orthodox picture, a particle impinges on the counter and produces a chain of processes leading to the click. For Ulfbeck and Bohr, “there is no
incident particle, and the steps in the development of the click, envisaged in the
usual picture, are not events that have taken place on the spacetime scene.”
To (Niels) Bohr, “the quantum-mechanical formalism . . . represents a purely
symbolic scheme permitting only predictions . . . as to results obtainable under
conditions specified by means of classical concepts” [BCW7: 350–351]. Because
“the physical content of quantum mechanics is exhausted by its power to formulate
statistical laws governing observations obtained under conditions specified in plain
language” [BCW10: 159], a quantum phenomenon has a mathematical or statistical
part and a part that relates the same to experience. The irreversible amplification
effects belong to the former. The unmediated step from the so-called source to
the onset of the click, and the subsequent unmediated steps in the development
of the click, are steps in a gazillion of alternative sequences of possible outcomes
of unperformed measurements, and unperformed measurements have no effect on
the essential wholeness of a quantum phenomenon.
In the following passages [emphases added], Bohr appears to argue (rather
unnecessarily) that the quantum features involved in the atomic constitution of
the measurement apparatus (or the statistical element in its description) can be
neglected because the relevant parts of the apparatus are sufficiently large and
heavy.
In actual experimentation this demand [that the experimental arrangement
as well as the recording of observations be expressed in the common language] is met by the specification of the experimental conditions by means
of bodies like diaphragms and photographic plates so large and heavy that
the statistical element in their description can be neglected. The observations consist in the recording of permanent marks on these instruments,
and the fact that the amplification devices used in the production of such
marks involves essentially irreversible processes presents no new observational problem, but merely stresses the element of irreversibility inherent
in the definition of the very concept of observation. [BCW10: 212]
In actual physical experimentation this requirement [that we must employ
common language to communicate what we have done and what we have
learned by putting questions to nature in the form of experiments] is fulfilled
by using as measuring instruments rigid bodies like diaphragms, lenses,
and photographic plates sufficiently large and heavy to allow an account
of their shape and relative positions and displacements without regard to
any quantum features inherently involved in their atomic constitution. . . .
The circumstance that [recordings of observations like the spot produced
on a photographic plate by the impact of an electron] involve essentially
irreversible processes presents no special difficulty for the interpretation of
the experiments, but rather stresses the irreversibility which is implied in
principle in the very concept of observation. [BCW10: 165]
How can the size or weight of a measuring device justify
— the irreversibility in principle of the very notion of observation
[BCW10: 120],
— the essential irreversibility inherent in the very concept of observation
[BCW7: 390; BCW10: 128],
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
19
— the irreversibility which is implied in principle in the very concept of observation [BCW10: 165], or
— the element of irreversibility inherent in the definition of the very concept of
observation [BCW10: 212]?
The only irreversibility that can justify the irreversibility of observations is the incontestable irreversibility of human sensory experience. For Bohr, “the emphasis on
the subjective character of the idea of observation [was] essential” [BCW10: 496].
If the description of atomic phenomena nevertheless had “a perfectly objective
character,” it was “in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that therefore . . . no ambiguity is involved in the communication
of information” [BCW7: 390, emphasis added]. It was never in the sense that no
explicit reference was made to the community of communicating observers or to
the incontestable irreversibility of their experiences. It is only if one wants to
disavow any reference to experience that one may have to invoke something like
a sufficiently large or heavy apparatus. Bohr may have intended in this way to
appease the naı̈ve realistic inclinations of lesser minds, but it certainly does not
characterize his own philosophical stance.
9 QBism, language, and the external world
There can be no doubt that significant progress has been made during the roughly
four decades between the passing of Niels Bohr and the advent of QBism. We now
have a congeries of complex, sophisticated, and astonishingly accurate probability
algorithms—the standard model14 —and we are witnessing rapid growth in the
exciting fields of quantum information and quantum technology. By contrast, the
contemporaneous progress in quantum theory’s philosophical foundations mainly
consists in finding out what does not work. This includes the various attempts
that were made to transmogrify statistical correlations between observations into
physical processes taking place between or giving rise to observations.
Whereas a quantum state exists in a Hilbert space, we live in a 3D space,
at least in the sense that it frames our experience of an external world. Hilbert
space “knows” nothing about a world of objects localized in a 3D space. We do.
To make the abstract Hilbert space relevant to our experience, we represent it as
a space of wave functions defined on a configuration space and evolving in time.
This configuration space and this time are not part of the aforesaid “elegant piece
of mathematics” (the so-called bare quantum formalism); they belong to the “illdefined and unattractive mess” (the so-called quantum algorithm) to which that
“elegant piece of mathematics” owes its physical meaning and relevance.
As a system of formal propositions, quantum mechanics allows us to call a selfadjoint operator “elephant” and a spectral decomposition “trunk.” This makes
it possible to prove a theorem according to which every elephant has a trunk.
Either the words “time” and “space” mean as little as the word “elephant” does
when it is used in this way, or they owe their meanings to human experience,
in which case wave functions encapsulate correlations between experiences. Selfadjoint operators on a Hilbert space do not become observables by calling them
14
“Standard model is a grotesquely modest name for one of humankind’s greatest
achievements”.[42]
20
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
“observables,” any more than they become elephants by calling them “elephants.”
They come to be associated with observables when they are seen as tools for
assigning probabilities to the possible outcomes of measurements, which do not
happen in a Hilbert space. The real business of interpreting the quantum formalism
is to situate it in the experiential framework in which “time” and “space” make
sense, not to use these words in ways that divest them of their meanings.
The great merit of QBism is to put the spotlight back on the role that human
experience plays in creating physical theories. If measurements are irreversible and
outcomes definite, it is because our experiences are irreversible and definite. This
at once disposes of the disaster of objectification. Bohr could have said the same,
and arguably did, but in such elliptic ways that the core of his message has been
lost or distorted beyond recognition. The fundamental difference between Bohr and
QBism is that one was writing before interpreting quantum mechanics became a
growth industry, while the other emerged in reaction to the ever-growing number
of futile attempts at averting the disaster of objectification.
To make the centrality of human experience truly stick, QBism emphasizes the
individual subject. It is not we who experience the world. At first the experience
is not ours; it is yours and mine. It becomes ours, and the process by which it
becomes ours is communication:
What is real for an agent rests entirely on what that agent experiences, and
different agents have different experiences. An agent-dependent reality is
constrained by the fact that different agents can communicate their experience to each other, limited only by the extent that personal experience can
be expressed in ordinary language. Bob’s verbal representation of his own
experience can enter Alice’s, and vice-versa. In this way a common body of
reality can be constructed.[34]
This was also Schrödinger’s take.[11] Here is how he set up the question:
I get to know the external world through my sense-perceptions. It is only
through them that such knowledge flows into me; they are the very material
out of which I construct it. The same applies to everyone else. The worlds
thus produced are, if we allow for differences in perspective, etc., very much
the same, so that in general we use the singular: world. But because each
person’s sense-world is strictly private and not directly accessible to anyone
else, this agreement is strange; what is especially strange is how it is established. . . . This is a valid question: how do we come to know of this general
agreement between two private worlds, when they admittedly are private
and always remain so? Direct comparison does not help, for there is none.
It is absolutely necessary that we should start by being deeply troubled
by the monstrous character of this state of affairs, if we are to treat with
indulgence the inadequate attempts that have been made to explain it.
So what establishes the correspondence “between the content of any one sphere of
consciousness and any other, so far as the external world is concerned”?
What does establish it is language, including everything in the way of expression, gesture, taking hold of another person, pointing with one’s finger
and so forth, though none of this breaks through that inexorable, absolute
division between spheres of consciousness.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
21
As far as the external world is concerned, it thus seems that Bohr, Schrödinger, and
the QBists are all on the same page. They all agree that experience provides the
material from which we construct “a common body of reality,” and that language
is the means by which we construct it.
But here I must respond to something I strongly disagree with. Mermin[4]
claims that “[o]rdinary language comes into the QBist story in a more crucial
way than it comes into the story told by Bohr.” He supports this by saying that
“measurement outcomes in QBism are necessarily classical, in a way that has nothing to do with language,” implying that for Bohr the classicality of measurement
outcomes had something to do with language. I maintain that it had not. For
QBism as for Bohr, measurement outcomes are definite and irreversible because
experiences are definite and irreversible.
Bohr would also agree with Mermin that “language is the only means by which
different users of quantum mechanics can attempt to compare their own private
experiences” (though he might have pointed out that this is true for everyone, not
just for users of quantum mechanics). What he might not have agreed with is the
idea that each of us first constructs a private external world, and that language
comes in only after this is done, as a means of figuring out “what is common to all
our privately constructed external worlds.” He might have pointed out that one
cannot construct a private external world before being in possession of a language
providing the concepts that are needed for its construction.
Arguably nobody has shed more light than Kant on how each of us constructs
her or his private external world, assuming that we are in possession of the relevant
concepts. In Kant’s view, I construct a system of interacting, re-identifiable objects
by combining relations that owe their meanings to our “forms of perception” with
relations that owe their meanings to the logical structure of our thought or the
grammatical structure of “a language common to all.” Here I made use of phrases
from the Bohr canon in order to highlight Bohr’s affinity with Kant, and I wrote
our “forms of perception” and our thought because we could never communicate
with each other and arrive at a common external world if my forms of perception
and the logical structure of my thought were different from yours. The essential
similarity of the general form of my perceptions and my thoughts with yours is a
presupposition that is implicit in every statement about the external world.
It might seem at first that Kant had little to say about how we make the
move from privately constructed external worlds to a shared external world. But
if my forms of perception are the same as yours, and if the logical structure of
my thought is identical to yours, then we use the same concepts in constructing
our private external worlds. And then it makes little difference whether we talk
to ourselves silently (i.e., construct our private external worlds) or talk to each
other loudly (i.e., construct our common external world). Mermin overlooks that
language plays the same constitutive role in the construction of his own private
external world as it does in the “collaborative human effort to find . . . a model
for what is common to all of our privately constructed external worlds,” which is
the QBist view of science.
22
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
10 Locating the boundary of our common external world
John Bell is famous for, among other things, his disapproval of the word “measurement” in quantum mechanics textbooks and the “shifty split of the world into
‘system’ and ‘apparatus’ ” thereby entailed:
There can be no question—without changing the axioms—of getting rid of
the shifty split. Sometimes some authors of ‘quantum measurement’ theories seem to be trying to do just that. It is like a snake trying to swallow
itself by the tail. It can be done—up to a point. But it becomes embarrassing for the spectators even before it becomes uncomfortable for the
snake.[33]
While for Heisenberg the location of the split (a.k.a. the Heisenberg cut) was to
some extent arbitrary, for Bohr it was unambiguously determined by the measurement setup.15 In an attempt to get rid of the shiftiness of the split, QBists
put the measurement outcome into the mind of an agent and replace the measurement setup by any old action taken by the agent: a measurement is an action
taken to elicit one of a set of possible experiences, and the outcome of a measurement is the experience elicited by such an action.16 Accordingly there are as
many splits between the agent-experiencer and the system acted on as there are
agent-experiencers, and there is nothing shifty about the splits:
Each split is between an object (the world) and a subject (an agent’s irreducible awareness of her or his own experience). Setting aside dreams or
hallucinations, I, as agent, have no trouble making such a distinction, and
I assume that you don’t either. Vagueness and ambiguity only arise if one
fails to acknowledge that the splits reside not in the objective world, but
at the boundaries between that world and the experiences of the various
agents who use quantum mechanics.[44]
Let us disregard the philosophically ambiguous concept of awareness of one’s own
experience. The trouble with this approach is that it poses a dilemma. If QBism
treats “all physical systems in the same way, including atoms, beam splitters,
Stern-Gerlach magnets, preparation devices, measurement apparatuses, all the way
to living beings and other agents”,[45] and if the action taken “can be anything
from running across the street at L’Étoile in Paris (and gambling upon one’s life) to
a sophisticated quantum information experiment (and gambling on the violation of
a Bell inequality)”,[46] then Bohr’s crucial insight that the properties of quantum
systems are contextual —that they are defined by experimental arrangements—is
lost.
To preserve this contextuality, Fuchs re-introduces the apparatus (which however does not seem to feature in the act of running across the street at L’Étoile)
as a part of the agent:
QBism holds with Pauli (and against Bohr) that a measurement apparatus
must be understood as an extension of the agent himself, not something
15 If the diaphragm is fixed, it is part of the experimental arrangement; if it is moveable, it is
part of the system under investigation.[23] See Camilleri and Schlosshauer[43] for a discussion
of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s divergent views on this matter.
16 While Fuchs and Schack prefer the term “agent,” Mermin prefers the term “user,” to
emphasize that QBists regard quantum mechanics as a “user’s manual”.[4]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
23
foreign and separate. A quantum measurement device is like a prosthetic
hand, and the outcome of a measurement is an unpredictable, undetermined
“experience” shared between the agent and the external system.[46]
Whereas orthodoxy has it that the experimenter acts on laboratory equipment
(i.e., manipulates it with her actual hands), according to Fuchs she acts on the
“external system” using her prosthetic hand. This brings us to the other horn of
the dilemma, for now it is not clear where the apparatus—the prosthetic hand—
ends and the rest of the laboratory begins. It appears that one shifty split has
been traded for another.
In Bohr’s view, a measurement apparatus serves not only to indicate the possession of a property (by a system) or a value (by an observable) but also, and in
the first place, to make a set of properties or values available for attribution to a
system or an observable. The sensitive regions of an array of detectors define the
regions of space in which the system can be found. In the absence of an array of
detectors, the regions of space in which the system can be found do not exist. The
orientation of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus defines the axis with respect to which a
spin component is measured. In the absence of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, the axis
with respect to which a spin component can be up or down does not exist. What
physical quantity is defined by running across the street at L’Étoile in Paris?
We cannot describe an object without describing it. For describing an object
we need concepts, and if we want to describe a quantum system, we need to
make the concepts that are available to us applicable to it. And for this we need
experimental arrangements. There is a clear-cut demarcation between the object
of investigation and the means of investigation: the means we can describe directly,
the object only indirectly, in terms of correlations between what we may do and
what we may learn as a result. No such clear-cut demarcation exists between what
forms part of the experimenter’s prosthetic hand and what does not.
Fuchs’ response to this challenge is that the physical extent of the agent is up
to the agent:
The question is not where does the quantum world play out and the classical world kick in? But where does the agent expect his own autonomy
to play out and the external world, with its autonomy and its capacity to
surprise, kick in? The physical extent of the agent is a judgment he makes
of himself.[47]
While Mermin places the quantum/classical divide between each individual users
subjective experience and “the common external world we have all negotiated with
each other”,[4] Fuchs places it between the agent-cum-instrument and the rest of
the physical world. In other words, the dividing line—wherever the agent chooses
to place it—is drawn in the objective world, which is precisely what Mermin
objects to when he writes that “[v]agueness and ambiguity only arise if one fails to
acknowledge that the splits reside not in the objective world, but at the boundaries
between that world and the experiences of the various agents who use quantum
mechanics”.[44]
The single most important message of QBism is that the definiteness of measurement outcomes and the resultant irreversibility of measurements are rooted in
the incontestable definiteness and irreversibility of each human individual’s sensory experience. QBists seem to believe that they are therefore required to treat
all physical systems in the same way, from subatomic particles to measurement
24
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
apparatuses and on to all agents except the experiencing one. They thus feel
compelled to consider the outlandish possibility of “some amazing quantum interference experiment” that puts Wigner’s friend in a coherent superposition of
having experienced two different measurement outcomes.
In Wigner’s scenario,[48] his’s friend (F ) performs a measurement on a system S using an apparatus A. Treating F as a quantum system, and treating
quantum states as ontic states evolving unitarily between measurement-induced
state reductions, Wigner concludes that a reduction of the combined system S+A
occurs for F when she becomes aware of the outcome, while a reduction of the
combined system S+A+F occurs for him when he is informed of the outcome
by F . This led Wigner to conclude that the theory of measurement was logically
consistent only “so long as I maintain my privileged position as ultimate observer.”
QBism, by contrast, maintains that Wigner’s state assignments, which are based
on his actual past and possible future experiences, are as valid as his friend’s,
based as they are on different sets of actual past and possible future experiences.
This important point, however, can be made without envisioning Wigner’s friend
in a coherent superposition of two distinct cognitive states:
Wigner’s quantum-state assignment and unitary evolution for the compound system are only about his own expectations for his own experiences
should he take one or another action upon the system or any part of it.
One such action might be his sounding the verbal question, “Hey friend,
what did you see?,” which will lead to one of two possible experiences for
him. Another such action could be to put the whole conceptual box into
some amazing quantum interference experiment, which would lead to one
of two completely different experiences for him.[46]
Everything we believe—including what we claim to know—is a belief. QBists are
absolutely right about this. The objective world is what we collectively believe
to exist: “the common external world we have all negotiated with each other.”
The implicit assumption underlying our common external world is not only that
the spatiotemporal structure of my perceptual awareness and the logical structure
of my thought are the same as the spatiotemporal structure of your perceptual
awareness and the logical structure of your thought, that we share the structures
to which our basic physical concepts owe their meanings—how else could we be in
a position to negotiate a common external world? The implicit assumption is also
that my experiences are as definite as yours. I may be ignorant of your experiences,
but I cannot doubt the definiteness of your experiences. Wigner may be ignorant
of the outcome experienced by his friend, but he should not be cavalier about the
definiteness of her experience. By the very nature of our common external world he
is required to assign to “the whole conceptual box” an incoherent mixture reflecting
his ignorance of his friend’s actual experience. To treat his own experiences as
definite but not those of his friend, to assign to the box a coherent superposition
of distinct cognitive states—that would be the solipsism which Wigner feared and
sought to avoid by proposing “that the equations of motion of quantum mechanics
cease to be linear, in fact that they are grossly non-linear if conscious beings enter
the picture.”
QBists are united in rejecting “the silly charges of solipsism.” But if they are
to escape these charges, they must do more than acknowledge the fact that “[m]y
experience of you leads me to hypothesize that you are a being very much like
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
25
myself, with your own private experience”.[4] They must also acknowledge that
your experiences are as definite as mine. They must draw the dividing line between
the classical and the quantum not at the near boundary of our common external
world, situated between it and each individual users subjective experience, nor
within our common external world, but at its far boundary, which separates it
from the quantum domain proper, which becomes speakable only via correlations
between events that happen or can happen in our common external world. It is
our common external world in its entirety that is imbued with the classicality of
human sensory awareness.
11 Objectivation vs. reification
While Bohr failed to realize the full extent of the affinity of his way of thinking
with Kant’s, QBists fail to realize the full extent of their way of thinking with
Bohr’s. Thus Fuchs et al.[34]:
The Founders of quantum mechanics were already aware that there was
a problem. Bohr and Heisenberg dealt with it by emphasizing the inseparability of the phenomena from the instruments we devised to investigate
them. Instruments are the Copenhagen surrogate for experience. . . . [They
are] objective and independent of the agent using them.
QBists, it seems, consistently fail to appreciate the constitutive role played by
instruments: instruments define not only the properties that quantum system can
possess but also (in conjunction with conservation laws) the kinds of quantum
systems that can exist. The reason their outcome-indicating and property-defining
attributes are definite is that they are given us in direct sensory experience. While
they are objective in the sense that they are experiences that we can objectivize—
we can deal with them as if they existed independently of being experienced by
us—they are not by any means independent of the experiencing and objectivizing
agent.17 Again, writes Mermin[4]:
Those who reject QBism . . . reify the common external world we have
all negotiated with each other, purging from the story any reference to the
origins of our common world in the private experiences we try to share with
each other through language. . . . [B]y “experience” I believe [Bohr] meant
the objective readings of large classical instruments. . . . Because outcomes
of Copenhagen measurements are “classical,” they are ipso facto real and
objective.
QBists also seem to consistently overlook the all-important difference between
reification and objectivation. For Bohr, as for Kant, the objective world was the
common external world we have all negotiated with each other. It contains, inter alia, the objective readings of large classical instruments. While outcomes of
“Copenhagen measurements” are classical because they are (inferred from) objec17 I use the verb “to objectivize” in conjunction with “objectivation,” leaving the more commonly used verb “to objectify” to go with “objectification,” which is a stage of the measurement
process thought up by Ψ -ontologists.
26
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
tivized experiences, they are not therefore “real and objective” independently of
the experiencing and objectivizing subject.18
Bohr was concerned with objectivation, the process of representing a shared
mental construct as an external reality, which can be dealt with as if it existed
independently of the constructing minds. Objectivation means purging any reference to the origins of the “common body of reality”[34] constructed by us, not in
order to deny its origins in our experiences, but in order to be able to deal with
it as common-sense realism does—as if it existed independently of our thoughts
and perceptions. (That this can no longer be done consistently was the conclusion
we reached in Sect. 8.)
Objectification is not the same as reification, which implies complete or willful
ignorance of the origins of the objective world in the experiences we try to share
with each other through language. Reification is the self-contradictory assertion
that the world we perceive exists (just as we perceive it) independently of our
perceptions, that the world we mentally construct exists independently of our
constructing minds, or that the world we describe exists (just as we describe it)
independently of our descriptions.
To Bohr, instruments straddle the far boundary of our common external world.
Measurement outcomes are “classical” not because they are reified but because
they are situated in this intersubjectively constituted world. Instruments make it
possible to extend the reach of classical concepts (whose meanings are rooted in the
spatiotemporal structure of human sensory perception and the logical structure of
human thought) into the non-classical domain via principles of correspondence.19
12 Is there a “world in itself ”?
Kant—the first to make empirical reality the subject of physical science—found
it necessary to posit an empirically inaccessible thing or world in itself. This has
the power to affect us in such a way that we have the sensations that we do, and
that we are able to organize our sensations into objects that interact with each
other and change in accordance with physical laws. (It also contains ourselves as
transcendental subjects, our free will, and our moral responsibility, but this isn’t
relevant here.)
Bohr realized that empirical knowledge need not be limited to what is accessible to our senses, and that therefore it does not have to be solely a knowledge
18 While it is true that those who reify the objective (=objectivized) world will have to reject
QBism, it is not necessarily true that those who reject QBism reify our common external world.
One can certainly reject some of the (sometimes mutually inconsistent) claims made by QBists
without reifying the objective world.
19 “[Q]uantum mechanics and quantum field theory only refer to individual systems due to
the ways in which the quantum models of matter and subatomic interactions are linked by
semi-classical models to the classical models of subatomic structure and scattering processes.
All these links are based on tacit use of a generalized correspondence principle in Bohr’s
sense (plus other unifying principles of physics).” This generalized correspondence principle
serves as “a semantic principle of continuity which guarantees that the predicates for physical
properties such as ‘position’, ‘momentum’, ‘mass’, ‘energy’, etc., can also be defined in the
domain of quantum mechanics, and that one may interpret them operationally in accordance
with classical measurement methods. It provides a great many inter-theoretical relations, by
means of which the formal concepts and models of quantum mechanics can be filled with
physical meaning”.[37, pp. XII, 191]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
27
of interacting, re-identifiable objects and causally connected events. In that he
went beyond Kant. But he also realized, with Kant, that what was not directly
accessible to our senses could not be expected to conform to the spatiotemporal
conditions of human experience, and thus could not be expected to be describable
in any language we can understand (apart from the language game of pure mathematics20 ). He did not deny the existence of an empirically inaccessible reality; he
only denied that physics has anything to do with it.21
Schrödinger has often been depicted as a realist about wave functions. While
this was true of the Schrödinger of 1926, it does not apply to the Schrödinger post
1926, who according to Michel Bitbol[50] adopted a postmodernist stance. This is
from a 1950 lecture:
we do give a complete description, continuous in space and time without leaving any gaps, conforming to the classical ideal—a description of
something. But we do not claim that this ‘something’ is the observed or observable facts; and still less do we claim that we thus describe what nature
. . . really is. In fact we use this picture (the so-called wave picture) in full
knowledge that it is neither.[19, p. 144, original emphasis]
Where nature itself was concerned, Schrödinger thus agreed with Bohr, who would
say (as reported by his assistant Aage Petersen[51]) that it is “wrong to think that
the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say
about nature.” What we can say about nature constitutes the empirical reality
that for Kant was nature.
When it comes to QBism, the situation is less clear. In an early QBist manifesto, Fuchs asked: “If the quantum state represents subjective information, then
how much of its mathematical support structure might be of that same character?
Some of it, maybe most of it, but surely not all of it.” The “raw distillate” that
is left behind “when we are finished picking off all the terms (or combinations
of terms) that can be interpreted as subjective information . . . will be our first
glimpse of what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about nature itself ”.[52,
emphasis added] Two years later, when talk of “information” had been replaced
by personalist Bayesian phraseology, Fuchs and Schack wrote that
[t]he agent, through the process of quantum measurement stimulates the
world external to himself. The world, in return, stimulates a response in the
agent that is quantified by a change in his beliefs—i.e., by a change from
a prior to a posterior quantum state. Somewhere in the structure of those
belief changes lies quantum theory’s most direct statement about what we
believe of the world as it is without agents.[53, emphasis added]
To QBists, quantum mechanics is a generalization of the Bayesian theory of probability. It is a calculus of consistency—a set of criteria for testing coherence between
beliefs. In this, the Born rule—formulated in terms of positive-operator-valued
measures rather than the standard projection-operator valued ones—is central. It
20 “To say mathematics is a game is supposed to mean: in proving, we need never appeal to
the meaning of the signs, that is to their extra-mathematical application”.[49]
21 “We meet here in a new light the old truth that in our description of nature the purpose
is not to disclose the real essence of the phenomena but only to track down, so far as it is
possible, relations between the manifold aspects of our experience” [BCW6: 296]. This has an
entirely Kantian ring to it.
28
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
is seen not merely as a rule for updating probabilities, for getting new ones from
old, but as a rule for relating probability assignments and constraining them, a rule
that (as they have shown) can be expressed entirely in terms of probabilities: “The
Born Rule is nothing but a kind of Quantum Law of Total Probability! No complex
amplitudes, no operators—only probabilities in, and probabilities out”.[54]
QBists hope to eventually derive the standard Hilbert space formalism from
the Born rule, and in doing so puzzle out what is attributable to our way of
knowing the world and what is attributable to the world itself. The Born rule
has this dichotomic character: it is normative—it guides an agent’s behavior in
a world that is fundamentally quantum—but it also is an empirical rule. It is a
statement about nature itself, indirectly expressed as a calculus of consistency for
bets placed on the outcomes of measurements. Writes Fuchs: “The only piece of
the quantum formalism that plays an objective role is the normative character of
the Born Rule”.[46, emphasis added]
Mermin,[55] on the other hand, writes that “QBists (at least this one) attach no
meaning to ‘the world as it is without agents.’ It only means ‘the common external
world we have all negotiated with each other’.” But then he also writes that “my
understanding of the world rests entirely on the experiences that the world has
induced in me throughout the course of my life”,[4] and again that “[t]he world
acts on me, inducing the private experiences out of which I build my understanding
of my own world”.[56] The world that induces private experiences in me—is it our
common external world, or is it something like the Kantian thing in itself, which
induces the experiences from which we construct our common external world? It
seems to me that it has to be the latter, for what induces experiences in us can
hardly be the world we construct from our experiences.
In the sections after next I shall present my own take on how our common external world relates to whatever reality lies beyond or at the origin of our common
external world.
13 A reality criterion revisited
Before I encountered QBism, I wrote a series of papers[29, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62] in
which I insisted on at least two of the basic tenets of QBism: that quantum mechanics is a probability calculus, and that quantum observables have values only
if and when they are actually measured. Probability 1 or the eigenvalue-eigenstate
link are not sufficient for “is” or “has.” Lacking the QBist insight that the irreversibility of measurements and the definiteness of outcomes was attributable
solely to the definiteness and irreversibility of direct perceptual experience, I proposed a criterion for distinguishing between (i) observables that have values only
when they are measured and (ii) observables whose values are real per se (and
thus capable of indicating measurement outcomes). I still regard this criterion as
superior to mere appeals to the size or weight of an apparatus, but thanks to
QBism I have come to realize that it only allows me to treat the macroworld (herafter defined) as proxy for an intersubjectively constructed world, from which the
constructing subjects can detach themselves.
Fuchs[52] once asked an important question, which has already been quoted:
“If the quantum state represents subjective information, then how much of its
mathematical support structure might be of that same character?” Specifically: are
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
29
the positions on which wave functions depend of the same character? Ψ -ontologists
are necessarily xyzt-ontologists as well, postulating as they must an independently
existing spatiotemporal manifold M. This goes as badly as their formulation of
the measurement problem, which leads to the disaster of objectification.
Here is how: Gerhard Hegerfeldt[63, 64] and David Malament[65] have shown
that a free particle, localized at a time t1 in a bounded region R1 , has a non-zero
probability to be found at a time t2 > t1 in a bounded region R2 , even if in the time
between t1 and t2 no light signal can travel from R1 to R2 . Since this is inconsistent
with the theory of relativity, it seems to follow that particles cannot be localized.
Having shown that this result also obtains for unsharply localized particles, Hans
Halvorson and Rob Clifton[66] concluded that particle talk is “strictly fictional”:
The argument for localizable particles appears to be very simple: Our experience shows us that objects (particles) occupy finite regions of space. But
the reply to this argument is just as simple: These experiences are illusory!
Although no object is strictly localized in a bounded region of space, an
object can be well-enough localized to give the appearance to us (finite
observers) that it is strictly localized.
What Hegerfeldt, Malament, and Halvorson and Clifton have actually shown is
that particles are not localizable relative to M. But M is not the expanse in
which position measurements are made. Actually measured positions are defined
by the sensitive regions of actually existing detectors, and what Halvorson and
Clifton have shown for “objects (particles)” also holds for such objects as detectors.
Neither particles nor detectors are localizable in finite spatial regions of M. Hence
what is strictly fictional (i.e., not objectivizable) is the existence of an infinitely
or completely differentiated spatiotemporal manifold.
Here, then, is my criterion for distinguishing between observables that only
have values if and when they are measured, and observables to which a measurement-independent reality can be attributed. The argument begins by observing
that the space that can be objectivized is not intrinsically partitioned. To define
a partition of space, we need an array of detectors, and no physically realizable
array of detectors can partition space ad infinitum, i.e., into infinitesimal regions.
The complete differentiation of physical space taken for granted by field theories
corresponds to nothing in the objective world.
The next best thing to a sharp trajectory is a trajectory that is so sharp that
the bundle of sharp trajectories over which it is statistically distributed is never
probed. In other words, the next best thing to an object with a sharp position
is a macroscopic object, defined as one whose position probability distribution is
and remains so narrow that there are no detectors with narrower position probability distributions—detectors that could probe the region over which the object’s
position statistically extends.
Macroscopic objects thus follow trajectories that are only counterfactually indefinite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an imaginary spatiotemporal background that is more differentiated than the objectivizable world.
The events by which the positions of macroscopic objects are indicated are therefore correlated in ways that are consistent with the laws of motion that quantum
mechanics yields in the classical limit. This makes it possible to attribute to the
positions of macroscopic objects (collectively referred to as “the macroworld”) a
measurement-independent reality, to regard them as defining the space of posi-
30
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
tions on which the wave functions of unbound objects22 depend, and to use them
as apparatus pointers, in the unassailable conviction that they are definite at all
times.
According to Fuchs,[67] “there might be uncertainty because the world itself
does not yet know what it will give. . . . QBism finds its happiest spot in an unflinching combination of ‘subjective ‘probability’ with ‘objective indeterminism’.”
In other words, uncertainty is a consequence of an objective indeterminism. I see
it differently. To my mind, indeterminism—lack of predictability not attributable
to anyone’s ignorance of the facts—is the observable consequence of an objective
indefiniteness or indeterminacy (or “fuzziness”).23 But whereas the objective indefiniteness of a quantum observable is revealed by the unpredictability of the
position of the “pointer” upon measurement, the indefiniteness of the (position
of the) pointer is never revealed. That is: it cannot be objectivized; it is not an
objective indefiniteness; it corresponds to nothing in the objective world.
14 The mystery of identity
No acceptable explanation for the miraculous identity of particles of the same
type has ever been put forward. That identity must be regarded, not as a
triviality, but as a central mystery of physics.
— Charles W. Misner, Kip S. Thorne, and John A. Wheeler[10]
My approach to extracting essential information about what lies beyond the objective (=objectivizable) world from correlations between measurement outcomes
relies on Feynman’s formulation of the theory.[68] This is based on summations
over alternatives, which are defined as sequences of outcomes of (performed or
unperformed) measurements. Suppose, for example, that we24 perform a series of
position measurements, and that each measurement yields exactly one outcome,
i.e., each time exactly one detector clicks. This would be evidence of a conservation
law and could be construed as evidence of a persistent quantum object—not an
object that causes clicks (Ulfbeck and Bohr are absolutely right about this) but
an object whose successive positions are indicated by the clicks. We would then be
able to construe the clicks as measurements of the position of a quantum object
and to think of the clicking devices as detectors for such objects.
If each time exactly n detectors click, we have evidence that the number of
simultaneous detector clicks is a conserved quantity, but this cannot be construed
as evidence of a fixed number of re-identifiable quantum objects unless further
conservation laws are in force. This is where Feynman’s pair of rules of summation
becomes important. If the alternatives are indistinguishable, we assign probabilities by adding their amplitudes and calculating the absolute square of the result.
If the alternatives are distinguishable, we assign probabilities by calculating the
22 When dealing with an internal relative position (e.g., the position of the electron relative to
the proton in the ground state of atomic hydrogen), the positions of the (in this case imaginary)
detectors are defined relative to another object (the nucleus), which remains undefined.
23 It is this indefiniteness, made irreducible by the uncertainty relations, that is at least
in part responsible for the existence of stable atomic ground states, and ultimately for the
stability of matter and thus the existence of matter as we know it.
24 The plural is justified by the fact that measurements take place in our common external
world.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
31
absolute square of each amplitude and adding the results. In the second case the
distinctions we make between the alternatives can be objectivized, for example because the simultaneous clicks are of different types, individuating different Lockean
substances (such as electrons and protons), and because there is a conservation
law for each of these Lockean substances.25 In this case the behavior of the detectors can be construed as indicating the successive positions of n re-identifiable
quantum objects.
In the first case, nothing in our common external world indicates which quantum object is which. In other words, the distinctions we make between the alternatives cannot be objectivized. We are then in the presence of a single quantum
object, which is instantiated but not individuated by the clicks. If we nevertheless
think of the clicks as indicating the positions of quantum objects, we must think of
the objects instantiated by the clicks as identical, and this not in the weak sense of
exact similarity but in the strong sense of numerical identity. They are the same
object in n different places. What is signaled by the detectors that click is the
presence of one and the same object in each of their respective sensitive regions.
But why should we treat a positions differently from other properties, such
as the properties that make electrons distinguishable from protons? Is there any
compelling reason to believe that the numerical identity of quantum objects in
different places ceases when it ceases to have observable consequences owing to
the presence of “identity tags”? I can think of no such reason. I am therefore
prepared to defend the following claim: a quantum object observed here with
these properties and a quantum object observed there with those properties are
one and the same thing. It appears to us here with these properties and there with
those properties.
Kant did not stop at saying that if I see a desk, there is a thing in itself that
has the power to appear as a desk, and if I see a chair in front of the desk, there is
another thing in itself that has the power to appear as a chair. For him, there was
only one thing in itself, which affects us in such a way that we see both a desk and
a chair in front of the desk. What would be news to him is that all is not desks
and chairs. In addition to phenomena in the traditional sense there are quantum
phenomena. In addition to the universal context of human experience, and within
the same, there are experimental contexts instantiating Lockean substances. If
we insist on thinking of these instantiations as things, then quantum mechanics
strongly suggests that the thing we observe here with these properties and the
thing we observe there with those properties is what Kant would have called the
thing in itself. It appears to us here as an electron and there as a proton.
What we have learned from Kant is this: if our minds are to be able to “work up
the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects” [CPR 136], the
system of objects he called “nature” must obey certain laws. What Kant could
not tell us is how the thing in itself affects us in such a way that we are able
25 Here the reader may want to revisit the discussion in Sect. 6. A single click does not
usually announce the type to which it belongs—whether it’s an electron click or a proton click.
In general the type of a click has to be inferred from a sequence of clicks. A sequence of clicks
makes it possible to determine such quantities as the radius of curvature of a particle’s track
in a magnetic field, a particle’s time of flight, a particle’s kinetic energy, or a particle’s energy
loss through ionization and excitation. Measuring three of these four quantities is sufficient in
principle to positively identify the particle type, which then makes it possible to classify the
individual clicks.[69]
32
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects.
This is where quantum mechanics comes in. The knowledge it provides does not
concern laws that a world of experience objects obeys. It concerns how something
corresponding to Kant’s thing in itself causes itself to be experienced as a world
of objects. It touches on the age-old subject of how a One becomes Many, but
it does not concern the coming into being of a world that exists independently
of experiencing subjects, agents, or users, and it does not concern how such a
world comes to be reflected in our minds. It concerns the coming into being of an
experienced world, without interposition of an unexperienced world.
15 The poises of creative awareness
Schrödinger held that the “extensive agreement or parallelism” between our hermetically separated “spheres of consciousness” can only be explained by either of
two “irrational, mystical hypotheses.” In Sect. 2 we saw what he thought of one
of them. The other, which he endorsed, was that “we are all really only various
aspects of the One”[11]: the multiplicity of minds, he wrote,[70] “is only apparent,
in truth there is only one mind. This is the doctrine of the Upanishads. And not
only of the Upanishads”.(The Upanishads are ancient Sanskrit texts which contain
many of the central concepts and ideas of Indian philosophy.) The One here refers
to the Ultimate Subject, from which we are separated by a veil of self-oblivion.
The same veil (according to the Upanishads) also prevents us from perceiving the
Ultimate Object, as well as its identity with the ultimate subject.26
If at bottom we are all the same subject (without being aware of it, except by
a genuinely mystical experience that is hard to come by), we can conceive of two
poises of consciousness or two modes of experience, one in which the One manifests
the world to itself perspectivally, as if experienced by a multitude of subjects from
a multitude of locations within the world, and one in which the One manifests
the world to itself aperspectivally, as if experienced from no particular location
or from everywhere at once.27 And if we distinguish between two such poises, we
can, so Schrödinger affirms, understand the origin of the agreement between our
private external worlds. His assertion that the agreement “between the content of
26 Schrödinger[71] adds that if “to Western thought this doctrine has little appeal,” it is
because our science “is based on objectivation, whereby it has cut itself off from an adequate
understanding of the Subject of Cognizance, of the mind,” and that “this is precisely the
point where our present way of thinking does need to be amended, perhaps by a bit of bloodtransfusion from Eastern thought. That will not be easy, we must beware of blunders—bloodtransfusion always needs great precaution to prevent clotting. We do not wish to lose the
logical precision that our scientific thought has reached, and that is unparalleled anywhere at
any epoch.”
27 Such an aperspectival experience features prominently in the work of Jean Gebser[72, 73]
and in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo.[74] Here is an account of an experience of this kind:
“It is as if the consciousness was not in the same position with regard to things—I do not
know how to say it. . . . The ordinary human consciousness, even when it has the widest ideas,
is always at the centre, and things are like this (gesture of convergence from all sides). . . . I
believe this is how it is best expressed: in the ordinary human consciousness one is at a point
and all things exist in their relation to this point of consciousness. And now, the point exists
no more. . . . So, my consciousness is in the things—it is not something which is receiving”.[75]
In other words, the subject is where its objects are; it lacks the distantiating viewpoint of our
perspectival outlook.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
33
any one sphere of consciousness and any other” was established by language (and
corresponding declarations by QBists) leaves unexplained the agreement between
my sense impressions and yours, without which it would be impossible for my
description of my impressions to agree with your description of your impressions.
The reason why my sense impressions agree with yours (to the extent that they
do) is that we do, in fact, experience the same world. We experience perspectively
the world that the One manifests to itself aperspectively.
If there is no unexperienced world, the question how such a world can come
to be experienced or reflected in a conscious mind does not arise. In Schrödinger’s
own words,
to say . . . that the becoming of the world is reflected in a conscious mind is
but a cliché, a phrase, a metaphor that has become familiar to us. The world
is given but once. Nothing is reflected. The original and the mirror-image
are identical. The world extended in space and time is but our representation. Experience does not give us the slightest clue of its being anything
besides that.[70]
The question that arises instead concerns the relation between the two poises of
consciousness or modes of experience. According to the Upanishads, all knowledge
(or experience, or awareness) is based on identity. The One is indistinguishably
both a consciousness that contains objects and a substance that constitutes objects. But if the One adopts a multitude of localized standpoints within the world
it manifests to itself, knowledge by identity takes the form of a direct knowledge:
each individual knows the others directly, without mediating representations.28
And if the localized subject identifies itself with an individual to the exclusion
of all other individuals, direct knowledge of objects takes the form of an indirect knowledge—a knowledge mediated by representations. It becomes a direct
knowledge of some of the individual’s attributes—think electrochemical pulses in
brains—that gets transformed into a knowledge of “external” objects with the help
of a subliminal direct knowledge.
16 Indirect knowledge
While it used to be said that qualities are “nothing but” quantities (e.g., colors
are “nothing but” frequencies or reflectances), it may be much closer to the truth
to say that quantities are nothing but means of manifesting qualities. What is not
sufficiently appreciated is that not only the sensations of color, sound, taste, smell,
and touch fail to be reducible to quantities. Our very experience of space and time
is qualitative and therefore equally irreducible to quantities.
Like the color of a Burmese ruby, spatial extension is a quality that can only be
defined by ostentation—by drawing attention to something of which we are directly
28 In the original, aperspectival poise of relation between the One and the world, the One is
coextensive with the world. As yet no distances exist between the knower and the known. In
other words, space as we know it does not yet exist. The familiar dimensions of phenomenal
space (viewer-centered depth and lateral extent) come into being in this secondary poise,
in which the One views the world in perspective. Objects are then seen from “outside,” as
presenting their surfaces. Concurrently the dichotomy between subject and object becomes a
reality, for a subject identified with an individual form cannot be overtly identical with the
substance that constitutes all forms.
34
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
aware. If you are not convinced, try to explain to my friend Andy, who lives in a
spaceless world, what space is like. Andy is good at math, so he understands you
perfectly if you tell him that space is like a set of all triplets of real numbers. But
if you believe that this gives him a sense of the expanse we call space, you are
deluding yourself. We can imagine triplets of real numbers as points embedded
in space; he cannot. We can interpret the difference between two numbers as the
distance between two points; he cannot. At any rate, he cannot associate with the
word “distance” the phenomenal remoteness it conveys to us.29
Much the same goes for time. Time passes, and the only way to know this is
to be aware of it. This is what St. Augustine meant when he wrote, “What, then,
is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know
not.” That the passingness of time is another quality which cannot be defined
in quantitative or mathematical terms, is obvious from the fact that we cannot
measure the speed at which it passes. (One second per second?)
Neuroscience has learned a great deal about how the brain extracts information from images falling on our retinas.[77, 78, 79] This information is encoded in
patterns of electrochemical pulses, and these patterns need to be interpreted in
order to be experienced as (or give rise to experiences of) objects in an external
world extended in space and time. The decoding or interpretation of these firing
patters presupposes acquaintance with the expanse of space and the passingness
of time, and such acquaintance is not something that neural processes can provide.
So the question is not only “whence the sensory qualities?” but also “whence our
forms of perception?”
There are sound reasons to doubt that the empirically accessible correlations
between measurable brain function and qualitative experience will ever fall within
the purview of rational scientific explanation.[80, 81] After all, as Maurice MerleauPonty[82] and Karl Jaspers[83] have pointed out, the existence of correlations between sensory experiences and neural processes is itself a fact of sensory experience.
The empirically known correlations exist between experiences and therefore cannot be invoked to explain how neural processes give rise to experiences. Sensory
experiences do not give rise to sensory experiences.
To clearly get this, imagine a neuroscientist, Alice, who observes a specific
complex of neural processes in Bob’s visual cortex whenever she sees that a green
apple is located in Bob’s visual field. Something in her experience of Bob’s brain
correlates with something in her experience of what Bob is looking at. If Bob tells
her that he, too, perceives a green apple, it confirms the existence of a green apple
in a shared objective world. What it does not confirm is the existence of a real
apple that causes both Alice and Bob to perceive an apple, nor the belief that
Bob’s brain—as experienced and studied by Alice—serves as a link in a causal
chain that connects a real apple in a mind-independent external world to Bob’s
experience of an apple.
Again, when we say “this is a green apple,” we do not state the correspondence
of a perception to a thing-in-itself. While our judgment that this is a green apple
goes beyond what is immediately given to us, it does not reach beyond what is
given to us. It merely involves the claim that this thing is of much the same color,
29 The same point was made by Hermann Weyl[76] when he wrote that geometry “contains
no trace of that which makes the space of intuition what it is in virtue of its own entirely
distinctive qualities which are not shared by ‘states of addition-machines’ and ‘gas-mixtures’
and ‘systems of solutions of linear equations’.”
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
35
Fig. 2 Indirect knowledge: a flowchart
shape, and consistency as the things we previously judged to be green apples, or the
claim that this particular experience is of the same kind as experiences we previously referred to as “green apples.” It involves the correspondence between “green
apple experienced here and now” and “green apple experienced there and then.”
Representations are re-presentations of experiential material that was present at
some other time. They are objective in the sense of being recognizable invariants
of experience.
On the other hand, if the “irrational, mystical” hypothesis we are here exploring
is correct, then the incomplete information provided by neural firing patterns is
supplemented by a subliminal direct knowledge, and in this case Bob’s experience
of an apple is veridical,30 and Alice’s experience of neural firing patterns in Bob’s
brain is a veridical experience of representations mediating Bob’s experience of an
apple. Indirect knowledge is the meeting point of information flowing inward from
the object and information flowing outward from a subliminal self (Fig. 2).
In the philosophy of mind, the problem of intentionality is as formidable as
the problem of qualia. “Intentionality” denotes the fact that, instead of perceiving internal representations, we perceive external objects. Both problems resolve
themselves if we accept the fundamental affirmations of the Upanishadic theory of
existence. Whatever is missing from the internal representations—intentionality,
qualia, including our forms of perception—is supplied by a subliminal subject’s direct awareness of objects. This direct awareness is rooted in the Ultimate Subject’s
identity with the Ultimate Object, which appears to us here with these properties
and there with those properties. In the words of Sri Aurobindo (arguably the most
competent modern interpreter of Upanishadic thought):
In the surface consciousness knowledge represents itself as a truth seen from
outside, thrown on us from the object, or as a response to its touch on the
sense, a perceptive reproduction of its objective actuality. . . . Since it is
unable to . . . observe the process of the knowledge coming from within, it
has no choice but to accept what it does see, the external object, as the
cause of its knowledge. . . . In fact, it is a hidden deeper response to the
contact, a response coming from within that throws up from there an inner
30
To be precise: as veridical as a knowledge mediated by representations can be.
36
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
knowledge of the object, the object being itself part of our larger self. [74,
pp. 560–61]
17 Why quantum mechanics?
It seems clear that quantum mechanics is fundamentally about atoms and
electrons, quarks and strings, not those particular macroscopic regularities associated with what we call measurements of the properties of these things.
But if these entities are not somehow identified with the wave function itself—
and if talk of them is not merely shorthand for elaborate statements about
measurements—then where are they to be found in the quantum description?
— Sheldon Goldstein[84]
Here is what I believe to be the most important message that quantum mechanics
has for us: the theory does not primarily concern the world that the One manifests
to itself. It primarily concerns how the One manifests the world to itself—and
therefore to us, inasmuch as we “are all really only various aspects of the One.”
Rather than being constituent parts of the manifested world, subatomic particles,
atoms, and (to some extent) molecules are instrumental in the manifestation of
the world (to us).
We keep looking for the origin of the universe at the beginning of time, but
this is an error of perspective. The origin of the manifested world is the One,
transcendent of spatial and temporal distinctions, and the manifestation of the
world is an (atemporal) series of transitions away from the unity of the One qua
Ultimate Object to the multiplicity of a world that allows itself to be described
(not in terms of classical physics but) in the object-oriented language of classical
physics.
The first transition takes us from the One (who of course is formless) to an
apparent multitude of formless “ones.” By entering into reflexive spatial relations,
the Ultimate Object gives rise to (i) what looks like a multitude of relata if the
reflexive quality of the relations is ignored, and (ii) what looks like a substantial
expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified. The relata are usually referred to as “fundamental particles” and regarded as the “ultimate constituents
of matter”.31 The result of this transition is probed by high-energy physics and
known to us through correlations between detector clicks (i.e., in terms of transition probabilities between in-states and out-states).
Forms emerge as sets of more or less indefinite spatial relations between formless and numerically identical relata, i.e., between the One and the One. The forms
of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms “exist” in probability spaces of increasingly higher
31 Fundamental particles are often characterized as pointlike, and many physicists take this
to be the literal truth. What it actually means is that a fundamental particle lacks internal
relations. Lacking internal relations, it also lacks a form, inasmuch as forms resolve themselves
into sets of internal spatial relations. And if we conceive of objective space as the totality
of objective or objectivizable spatial relations, then a fundamental particle, lacking internal
relations, cannot even be said to exist or be contained in space. (A reminder: in Sect. 13
we arrived at the conclusion that the existence of an infinitely and completely differentiated
spatiotemporal manifold must be regarded as an illusion.) There is even a sense in which space
is internal to each fundamental particle, inasmuch as each fundamental particle is the One qua
Ultimate object, and each spatial relation is a relation between the One and the One.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
37
dimensions. At energies low enough for atoms to be stable, we are dealing with
Lockean substances that can be described in terms of correlations between the
possible outcomes of unperformed measurements. (Recall note 23.)
At the penultimate stage of the (atemporal) process of manifestation there
emerges a kind of form that can be visualized, and this not merely as a distribution
over some probability space. What makes the atomic configurations of molecules
visualizable is that the indefiniteness of the distance d between any pair of bonded
atoms, as measured by the standard deviation of the corresponding probability
distribution, is significantly smaller than the mean value of d.
If the manifestation of the world consists in a progressive transition from the
undifferentiated unity of the One to a multitude of distinguishable objects with
definite properties, via formless particles, non-visualizable atoms, and partly visualizable molecules, the question arises as to how the intermediate stages of this
transition are to be described—the stages at which distinguishability and definiteness are incompletely realized. The answer is that whatever is not completely
distinguishable or definite can only be described in terms of probability distributions over what is completely distinguishable and definite—i.e., over the possible
outcomes of measurements. What is instrumental in the manifestation of the world
can only be described in terms of correlations between events that happen (or could
happen) in the manifested world. This, I believe, is why the general theoretical
framework of contemporary physics is a probability calculus, and why the events
to which it serves to assign probabilities are measurement outcomes.
18 The adventure of evolution
But why should the ultimate subject not only adopt a multitude of standpoints
but also identify itself with each to the apparent exclusion of the others? The
answer hinges on the evolutionary character of this world. From the point of view
of the Upanishads, evolution presupposes involution. By a multiple concentration
of consciousness the ultimate subject assumes a multitude of vantage points, and
by a further exclusive concentration of consciousness the individual subject loses
sight of its identity with the other subjects and, as a consequence, loses access
to the aperspectival view of things. The direct self-knowledge of the One thereby
becomes implicit, or involved, in an indirect or representative knowledge.
While our state of being and knowing in some respects corresponds to this
poise of relation between self and world, we are evolved from a condition of maximal involution rather than “devolved” by a multiple exclusive concentration of a
consciousness that is one with existence. Because of the identity of the Ultimate
Subject with the Ultimate Object, the consciousness by which the former creates
its content is also the force by which the latter creates forms. In the original, unitary and aperspectival poise of awareness, force is rather implicit in consciousness.
At the other end of the spectrum of involution, consciousness becomes implicit
(or involved) in the force that creates forms. But this is not all. As there is a
world-transcending state of self-awareness,32 so there is state of inconscience tran32 “For at the gates of the Transcendent stands that mere and perfect Spirit described in
the Upanishads, luminous, pure, sustaining the world but inactive in it, . . . the transcendent
Silence. And the mind when it passes those gates suddenly, without intermediate transitions,
receives a sense of the unreality of the world and the sole reality of the Silence which is one of
38
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
scendent of both self and world. If involution begins with a multiple localization of
the Ultimate Subject resulting in multitude of localized subjects, it ends not with
the involution of consciousness in force, nor even with the involution of force in
form, but in the involution of consciousness and formative force in a multitude of
formless entities. And since formless entities are indistinguishable and therefore—
by the principle of the identity of indiscernibles—numerically identical, evolution
ends with the Ultimate Object apparently deprived of its inherent consciousness
and self-determining force. This (or something very much like it) is how the stage
for the drama of evolution was set.
But what can justify this adventure, considering all the pain and suffering
that (in hindsight) it entails? Certainly not an extra-cosmic Creator imposing
these evils on his creatures. But the One of the Upanishads is no such monster; it
imposes these things on itself. But still—why? Here goes:
a play of self-concealing and self-finding is one of the most strenuous joys
that conscious being can give to itself, a play of extreme attractiveness.
There is no greater pleasure for man himself than a victory which is in
its very principle a conquest over difficulties, a victory in knowledge, a
victory in power, a victory in creation over the impossibilities of creation. . . .
There is an attraction in ignorance itself because it provides us with the
joy of discovery, the surprise of new and unforeseen creation. . . . If delight
of existence be the secret of creation, this too is one delight of existence;
it can be regarded as the reason or at least one reason of this apparently
paradoxical and contrary Lila. [74, pp. 426–27]
Lı̄lā is a term of Indian philosophy which describes the manifested world as the field
for a joyful sporting game made possible by self-imposed limitations. “Conscious
being” is Sri Aurobindo’s term for the ultimate subject or consciousness that is
one with the ultimate object or being. “Delight of existence” is the third of the
three terms by which the One is described in the Upanishads. If as being (sat) the
One constitutes the world and as consciousness (chit) it contains it, as an infinite
Quality, Value, and Delight (ānanda) it experiences and expresses itself in it.
In a materialistic framework of thought, what ultimately exists is a multitude
of entities (fundamental particles, spacetime points, whatever) lacking intrinsic
quality or value. In many traditions this multiplicity is fittingly referred to as
“dust.” Such a framework leaves no room for a non-reductive account of quality
and value. In an Upanishadic framework, quality and value and their subjective
counterpart joy or delight are at the very heart of reality. In such a framework
the most powerful and convincing experiences of which the human mind is capable. Here, in
the perception of this pure Self or of the Non-Being behind it, we have the starting-point for
a second negation,—parallel at the other pole to the materialistic, but more complete, more
final, more perilous in its effects on the individuals or collectivities that hear its potent call
to the wilderness,—the refusal of the ascetic. It is this revolt of Spirit against Matter that
for two thousand years . . . has dominated increasingly the Indian mind. . . . And through many
centuries a great army of shining witnesses, saints and teachers, names sacred to Indian memory
and dominant in Indian imagination, have borne always the same witness and swelled always
the same lofty and distant appeal,—renunciation the sole path of knowledge, acceptation of
physical life the act of the ignorant, cessation from birth the right use of human birth, the call
of the Spirit, the recoil from Matter. For an age out of sympathy with the ascetic spirit . . . it
is easy to attribute this great trend to the failing of vital energy in an ancient race. . . . But
we have seen that it corresponds to a truth of existence, a state of conscious realisation which
stands at the very summit of our possibility.” [74, pp. 26–27]
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
39
accounting for the qualitative content of consciousness poses no difficulty, since it
is simply the finite expression or manifestation of the infinite quality inherent in
reality itself.
19 A possible future
Because what has been involved is an unlimited consciousness and force, evolution
is far from finished. What has yet to evolve is a consciousness that is not exclusively
concentrated in each individual, a consciousness aware of the mutual identity of
all individuals, a consciousness no longer confined to the perspectival outlook of
a localized being but capable of integrating its perspectival viewpoint with the
aperspectival outlook of the Ultimate Subject.
In recent years, many philosophers have put a high priority on providing a
reductionist account of intentional categories such as beliefs and desires. There
is an unmistakable tone of urgency in the relevant literature. Apparently something dreadful will follow if the program of “naturalizing” the intentional does not
succeed—something more dreadful (to the physicalist) than what would follow if
the program were to succeed.[85] If the program were to succeed, it would not
be true that my wanting something is causally responsible for my reaching for it,
that my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and that my believing
something is causally responsible for my saying it. And “if none of that is literally true,” Jerry Fodor concludes,[86] “then practically everything I believe about
anything is false and it’s the end of the world”.33
What, then, shall we make of the neuroscientific and psychological evidence
that, along with philosophic analysis and phenomenological introspection, supports
the conclusion that the folk model of free will is seriously flawed?34 What the
opponents as well as the proponents of the libertarian (non-compatibilist) version
of free will miss, is the subliminal self and the role it plays in both volition and
cognition. Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that Sri Aurobindo is right
when he writes that “to establish an infinite freedom in a world which presents itself
as a group of mechanical necessities . . . is offered to us as . . . the goal of Nature in
her terrestrial evolution”.[74, p. 4] There is only one way in which infinite freedom
can be attained, and that is to become one with the ultimate determinant of
this evolving manifestation. We are in possession of genuine freedom to the extent
that we are consciously and dynamically identified with this ultimate determinant.
Absent this identification, our sense of being the proud owner of a libertarian free
33 In other words,[87], “if commonsense intentional psychology really were to collapse, that
would be, beyond comparison, the greatest intellectual catastrophe in the history of our species;
if we’re that wrong about the mind, then that’s the wrongest we’ve ever been about anything.
The collapse of the supernatural, for example, didn’t compare; theism never came close to
being as intimately involved in our thought and our practice—especially our practice—as
belief/desire explanation is. Nothing except, perhaps, our commonsense physics—our intuitive
commitment to a world of observer-independent, middle-sized objects—comes as near our
cognitive core as intentional explanation does.”
34 Because classical physics was taken by many to imply determinism, it is not surprising
that the indeterminism of quantum physics has been invoked as the physical basis of free will.
One of the first to suggest that quantum indeterminism makes room for mental causation—
the determination of physical events by irreducibly mental ones—was Pascual Jordan.[88] And
it was none other than Schrödinger[19, pp. 164–66] who pointed out the flaws in Jordan’s
reasoning, considering it “to be both physically and morally an impossible solution.”
40
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
will is, not indeed a complete illusion, but a misappropriation of a power that
belongs to our subliminal self, a power that more often than not works towards
goals at variance with our conscious pursuits.
Just as the One adopts several cognitive poises of relation between subject and
object, so it adopts several dynamic poises. At the extreme point of involution,
we have an apparent multitude of formless particles governed by laws that serve
to set the stage for the adventure of evolution.35 That’s all they do. They do
not direct what happens on the stage. Evolution does not happen without active
modifications (or, God forbid, “violations”) of the laws that served to set the stage.
If (as we presently assume) the adventure was made possible by an unlimited force
subjecting itself to these laws, its ability to modify them should be a no-brainer.
So why do we not have irrefutable evidence that such modifications occur?
For one, because we tend to look for them where they do not occur (e.g., at the
origin of our supposedly free choices). For another, because of the Houdiniesque
nature of this manifestation. “If delight of existence be the secret of creation,” and
if the joys of winning victories, conquering difficulties, overcoming obstacles, and
discovering the unknown be possible expressions of this delight, then there have
to be serious limitations, initially and for a long time, on the power to modify
the laws, and this makes it virtually impossible for us (given the means at our
disposal) to discern where and when such modifications occur.36
Each of the major evolutionary transitions entails a displacement of the boundary between what is overtly at play and what acts subliminally. To see what I mean,
think of the creative process by which the infinite Quality at the heart of reality
expresses itself in finite forms as encompassing two intermediate stages:
Infinite Quality → Expressive Idea → Formative Force → Finite Form
The boundary can be located between any two stages. When life appears, what
essentially begins to be overtly at play is the formative force whose principal
purpose is to execute expressive ideas, while the power to form expressive ideas
acts subliminally if at all. When mind appears, what essentially comes openly into
play is the power whose principal purpose is to develop Quality into expressive
ideas, while the Quality to be expressed continues, for the most part, to dwell in the
subliminal recesses of existence. Nor can the formative force, when it appears, begin
at once to execute expressive ideas; it first has to fashion the necessary anatomical
and physiological instrumentation. Nor can the power to form expressive ideas act
without the requisite instrumentation, and when it begins to act, it must attend
to the needs of self-preservation and self-development before it can turn to loftier
pursuits.
35 Setting the stage for evolution arguably requires objects that are spatially extended (they
“occupy” finite volumes) and are sufficiently stable (they neither explode nor collapse as soon
as they are formed). And because the stage was set by an involution of consciousness and
formative forms in an apparent multitude of formless entities, these objects appear to be “made
of” finite numbers of particles that do not “occupy” space. As I have argued previously,[29, 89,
90] the existence of such objects not only implies the validity of quantum mechanics but also
goes a long way toward establishing the other well-tested laws of physics (the standard model
and general relativity).
36 What about the alleged causal closure of the physical? Since the doctrine of causal closure
is tantamount to the claim that modifications of the laws of physics cannot occur, it obviously
cannot be invoked as an argument against the occurrence of such modifications.
Bohr, QBism, and Beyond
41
What will happen if the infinite Quality at the heart of reality finally comes
in front and the entire creative process becomes conscious and deliberate? Will
there remain any need for complex anatomies and physiologies? To put it bluntly,
will the complete embodiment of the original Consciousness and Force dispense
with muscles, bones, stomachs, hearts, and lungs? Will the world be experienced
by its future inhabitants without the need for mediating representations and thus
without the need for a brain? When the creative process is no longer broken into
an automatic or mechanical action on the surface and a subliminal modifying
action, when the previously automatic action is fully integrated into the formerly
modifying action, when the limited action and the limiting action are fused into
one unlimited action, the anatomical and physiological instrumentation will have
served its purpose and can be dispensed with, for its evolution was necessitated by
the limitations that the One had imposed on itself for the purpose of instituting
the adventure of evolution, and these limitations no longer exist.
If any or all of this sounds preposterous, it is in large part because our theoretical dealings with the world are conditioned by the manner in which we, at this
particular evolutionary juncture, experience the world. We conceive of the evolution of consciousness, if not as a sudden lighting up of the bulb of sentience, then as
a progressive emergence of ways of experiencing a world that exists independently
of how it is experienced, but which nevertheless is structured or constituted more
or less as it is experienced by us. In reality there is no world that exists independently of how it is experienced. There are only different ways in which the One
manifests itself to itself.
The different ways in which the One has so far manifested itself to itself have
been painstakingly documented by Gebser.[72, 73] One way to characterize the
structures of human consciousness that have emerged or are on the verge of emerging, is in terms of their dimensionality. An increase in the dimensionality of the
consciousness to which the world is manifested is tantamount to an increase in the
dimensionality of the manifested world.
Consider, by way of example, the consciousness structure that immediately
preceded the still dominant one. One of its characteristics was the notion that the
world is enclosed in a sphere, with the fixed stars attached to its boundary, the
firmament. We cannot but ask: what is beyond that sphere? Those who held this
notion could not, because for them the third dimension of space—viewer-centered
depth—did not at all have the reality it has for us. Lacking our sense of this dimension, the world experienced by them was in an important sense two-dimensional.
This is why they could not handle perspective in drawing and painting, and why
they were unable to arrive at the subject-free “view from nowhere”,[81] which is
a prerequisite of modern science. All this became possible with the consolidation,
during the Renaissance, of our characteristically three-dimensional structure of
consciousness.
Our very concepts of space, time, and matter are bound up with, are creations of our present consciousness structure. It made it possible to integrate the
location-bound outlook of a characteristically two-dimensional consciousness into
an effectively subject-free world of three-dimensional objects. Matter as we know
it was the result.37 It is not matter that has created consciousness; it is consciousness that has created matter, first by carrying its multiple exclusive concentration
37
As was the so-called mind-body problem.
42
Ulrich J. Mohrhoff
to the point of being involved in an apparent multitude of formless particles, and
again by evolving our present mode of experiencing the world. Ahead of us lies the
evolution of a consciousness structure—and thus of a world—that transcends our
time- and space-bound perspective. Just as the mythological thinking of the previous consciousness structure could not foresee the technological explosion made
possible by science, so scientific thinking cannot foresee the consequences of the
birth of a new world, brought about, not by technological means, but by a further
increase in the dimensionality of the evolving consciousness.
In this new world, will consciousness still depend on a brain? Will bodies
still depend on organs and cells? We can envision a new perception in which our
anatomical insides are replaced by the previously hidden truths of our individual
existences, a new seeing in which our true natures—our mutually complementary
embodiments of the One—are revealed. We find it harder to accept that the new
way of seeing will be the new way of being, and that in this new way of seeing and
being our anatomical insides will have disappeared, discarded like a scaffolding or
the chrysalis of a butterfly.
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-------------------------CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD
EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIUM ON
CONSCIOUSNESS HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE IN JANUARY 1978
EDITED BY
B. D. JOSEPHSON
Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge
and
V. S. RAMACHANDRAN
California Institute of Technology, U.S.A.
First edition, © Pergamon Press 1980
By agreement with the publishers, copyright was transferred to the Editors (B D
Josephson and V S Ramachandran) in February 2014.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data (original edition)
Consciousness and the physical world.
1. Consciousness —— Congresses
I. Josephson, B D
II. Ramachandran, V S
153 BF3l1 79-40300
ISBN 0-08—024695—8
Contents
Foreword
F. J. DYSON
vii
Introduction
V. S. RAMACHANDRAN
1
Part I. General
17
1. What Defines Privacy?
G. VESEY
19
2. Regarding Consciousness
R. L. GREGORY
31
3. Is Consciousness a Phenomenon?
H. C. LONGUET-HIGGINS
49
Part II. Consciousness and Behaviour
55
4. Nature's Psychologists
57
N. K. HUMPHREY
5. Nature’s Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role
of Consciousness
H. B. BARLOW
81
6. Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains
D. M. MACKAY
95
7. Some Hypotheses Concerning the Role of
Consciousness in Nature
B. D. JOSEPHSON
115
Part III. Subjective Experience
121
8. Consciousness and Psychopathology
M. ROTH
123
9. Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity
V. S. RAMACHANDRAN
139
10. Mind—Matter Interaction in the Psychokinetic
Experience
S. PADFIELD
165
ll. Phenomenal Space
M. J. MORGAN
177
Afterword to the Conference:
The Prospects for Consciousness Research
B. D. JOSEPHSON
193
List of Participants
197
Name Index
199
Subject Index
201
Foreword
F. J. DYSON
This book stands in opposition to the scientific orthodoxy of our day.
The orthodox dogma is stated by the biologist Jacques Monod in his
book Chance and Necessity with characteristically French sharpness:
“The cornerstone of the scientific method is the postulate that nature is
objective. In other words, the systematic denial that true knowledge can
be got at by interpreting phenomena in terms of final causes — that is to
say, of purpose.” Monod labels those who disagree with him
“animists”. The arch—animist is Teilhard de Chardin, for whom Monod
reserves his deepest scorn: “The biological philosophy of Teilhard de
Chardin would not merit attention but for the startling success it has
encountered even in scientific circles. . . . There is no inert matter, and
therefore no essential distinction between matter and life. . . . For my
part I am most of all struck by the intellectual spinelessness of this philosophy. In it I see more than anything else a systematic truckling, a willingness to conciliate at any price, to come to any compromise. Perhaps,
after all, Teilhard was not for nothing a member of that order which,
three centuries earlier, Pascal assailed for its theological laxness.’ ’
The authors of this book are not followers of de Chardin. They represent a variety of scientific disciplines and a variety of philosophical
viewpoints. But they are all, according to Monod’s definition, animists.
That is to say, they are not willing to exclude a priori the possibility that
mind and consciousness may have an equal status with matter and energy
in the design of the universe. They are trying to extend the boundaries of
scientific discourse so that- the subjective concepts of personal identity
and purpose may come within its scope. They are all to some extent
exposing themselves to the charges of ideological laxity with which
Monod lambasted de Chardin. They are accepting a certain risk that their
orthodox colleagues will consider them a little soft-headed.
vii
viii Foreword
I am delighted to see that the contributors to this book include more
biologists than physicists. In recent years biologists have usually been
more inhibited than physicists in stepping outside the accepted norms of
scientific respectability. Monod was, after all, a biologist. In dealing with
the problems of consciousness, physicists have had courage but no competence, biologists have had competence but no courage. In this book we
see some examples of competence combined with courage.
Why have the biologists during the last century been so inhibited? I
believe they are still suffering from the after—effects of the great
nineteenth—century battle between the evolutionists led by Darwin and
Huxley, and the churchmen led by Bishop Wilberforce. The high point of
the battle was the great debate in Oxford in 1860 during which Bishop
Wilberforce asked Huxley whether he was descended from a monkey on
his grandfather’s or on his grandmother’s side. Huxley won the debate,
but the biologists are still fighting the ghost of Bishop Wilberforce. In the
bitterness of their victory over the forces of religious orthodoxy, they
have made the meaninglessness of the universe into a new dogma. “Any
mingling of knowledge with values is unlawful, forbidden”, says Monod.
The authors of this book have defied Monod’s anathema. They have
wandered freely over the borderland between science and philosophy,
where knowledge and values are inextricably mixed. I believe they have
brought back some insights which will be illuminating not only to
scientists but also to anybody with a philosophical turn of mind who
enjoys pondering over the mysteries of mind and consciousness.
Introduction
V. S. RAMACHANDRAN
Trinity College, Cambridge
This book is about consciousness and is based on a symposium on that
subject held at the University of Cambridge on 9-10 January 1978.
Usually, books on scientific or philosophical subjects are edited by experts
on the subject matter of the book itself. I make no apology for the fact that
this particular book is an exception to that rule — since there can really be no
such thing as an “expert” on a subject as nebulous as consciousness.
Although scientists often have their own private views on consciousness
they are usually reluctant to talk about these views. There are two reasons
for this. Firstly, scientists are generally unwilling to venture into realms
outside their legitimate scope or to speculate on questions for which there
can be no precise empirically demonstrable answers. Secondly, there is a
widely prevalent superstition among them that interest in such “fringe
areas” is a sign of woolly thinking and declining intellectual vigour.
Perhaps this explains their curious silence and their unwillingness to publish
philosophical speculations.
The purpose of the Cambridge conference was to encourage
distinguished scientists to express their views on the relationship of
conscious experience to the physical world.* To add a sense of proportion
we also invited a professional philosopher (G. Vesey) and a person claiming
psychokinetic powers (Suzanne Padfield). By doing this we have tried to
represent as wide a spectrum of views on consciousness as possible.
And as the reader will notice, the spectrum is very wide indeed — ranging
from Barlow’s materialistic account (that consciousness is nature’ 3 ‘ ‘trick’ ’
‘We are grateful to Research Corporation of New York for a grant out of which
this conference was supported.
2 V. S. Ramachandran
to chain us to our herd) to Josephson’s view that minds may even have
oertain attributes of their own (e. g. “creativity” or “intelligence’ ’) to help
channel the activity of physical brains towards specific goals. Yet in spite of
these wide—ranging views, some of them flatly contradicting each other, a
surprising degree of communication was achieved between the various
speakers. What emerged was this book, whose contents I shall attempt to
summarize in this Introduction. *
The publication of an interesting book by Popper and Eccles,‘ The Self
and its Brain, coincided with the conference, and since the ideas in that
book are rather similar in spirit to some of those which were discussed at the
conference, it may be relevant to begin our survey with some of Popper’s
ideas. Popper calls himself a “dualist” and “interactionist’ ’, and believes
in what he calls World 1 (the material universe, including physical brains),
World 2 (individual human minds) and World 3 (language, culture, science
and other products of World 2). He suggests that although World 3
originally emerged as a product of World 2, it seems to have acquired a life
of its own and is no longer chained to individual minds. He speaks of World
3 “objects” like numbers, ideas, numerical concepts, etc., which are in
some respects analogous to the physical objects of World 1. Calling ideas
and numbers objects may sound like an elaborate joke to some readers, but
in defence of his thesis Popper points out that:
(a) World 3 has a quasi—independent status and would exist even if individual men died.
(b) Many World 3 attributes are unplanned consequences of collective
culture (e. g. Goldbach’s conjecture and other hidden properties of
number systems that are discovered by mathematicians just as an
archaeologist discovers a World 1 object).
(c) World 3 properties are often novel and “emergent”, i.e. irreducible
to the properties of individual minds — just as brains may have properties which are irreducible to single neurons.
((1) Finally, one can imagine chains of causation in World 3 that are logically independent of (though necessarily accompanied by) physical
causation in World 1. For instance, two computers that are grossly
*The speakers were encouraged to correspond with each other after the conference
and this additional discussion is also included in the book.
Introduction 3
different physically can nevertheless operate according to the same
“ standards of logic’ ’ (which are World 3 entities).
Popper also emphasizes that Worlds 2 and 3 are symbiotic since culture
can “feed back” to enrich and expand individual minds. “Matter”, he
argues, “can thus transcend itself by producing mind, purpose and a world
of the products of the human mind. One of the first of these products is
language. In fact I conjecture that it was the very first of these products, and
that the human brain and the human mind evolved in interaction with
language.” Elsewhere: “. . . As selves, as human beings, we are all
products of World 3 which, in its turn, is a product of countless human
minds.”
It is important not to evade the chicken-or-egg aspects of this theory.
Fortunately both authors (Eccles and Popper) give some thought to the
apparently insuperable problem of how a closed system like the physical
universe can “interact” with minds. Eccles begins by making the
deliberately outrageous suggestion that the physical world is in fact not a
closed system and that World 2 can directly influence the activity of
brains.* The self-conscious mind, according to him, may act on certain
“open” elements in the nervous system (such as synaptic clefts), which are
so minute that even Heisenbergian uncertainty can influence their
behaviour. The activity of these structures could then become magnified to
account for brain events corresponding to human “choice” or
“creativity”.
Not everyone would find this view very satisfactory. If a combination of
sub—atomic uncertainty (World 1) and the constraints of rational thought
(World 3) can account for human freedom and creative enterprise, then
what need is there for World 2? There is, after all, nothing logically
impossible about World 1 objects (brains) creating World 3 without the
intervention of World 2; so Eccles’s own argument seems to suggest that
minds are redundant by—products of evolution!
In spite of these difficulties The Self and its Brain contains some bold and
powerful arguments for dualism and is sure to provide a valuable stimulus
‘The authors seem to rely largely on introspection for arriving at some of these
conclusions. For instance, the fact that people can reverse Necker cubes or
engage in adventurous mountain climbing (Popper, p. 146) is cited as evidence
for the view that the conscious self has “taken over” the activities of brains!
4 V. S. Ramachandran
to new enquiry. If the Cambridge Symposium (embodied in this book)
provides a similar stimulus, it will have achieved its purpose. It begins,
appropriately, with a scholarly chapter by G. Vesey which contrasts sharply
with some of the more light—hearted chapters in the book. The other
contributors include three psychologists (R. L. Gregory, N. K. Humphrey
and M. J. Morgan), three physical scientists (B. D. Josephson, H. C.
Longuet—Higgins and D. M. MacKay), two physiologists (H. B. Barlow
and myself) and a psychiatrist (M. Roth).
THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Chapters 4 and 5 form the core of the book and deal with speculations
on the possible evolutionary significance of consciousness. Barlow’s
suggestion (Chapter 5) is novel and surprisingly simple. He begins by
rejecting “parallelism” (i.e. the view that consciousness simply parallels
any complex neural event such as the activity of MacKay’s “supervisory”
system, described in Chapter 6) on the grounds that if consciousness merely
parallels complex neural events there is no reason why only a tiny fraction
of such events should emerge into awareness. He suggests, instead, that
consciousness may have emerged as an evolutionary novelty among
social animals to permit gregariousness and communication. Thus
consciousness, according to him, is “interaction and not a property”. We
feel pain only in order to communicate it, and if the need to communicate it
had not arisen (e.g. in non—social animals like frogs or lizards) there would
only be reflex withdrawal unaccompanied by the subjective sensation of
pain. Perhaps the fact that people generally shout when jabbed with a
needle supports Barlow’s argument, but then why is the pain often felt after
the shout?
Barlow also suggests that archetypes of other people are modelled into
our brains by natural selection, and that consciousness consist either of
real conversations with other individuals or of imaginary conversations
with those archetypes (psychologists would call this “internal rehearsal”).
Consciousness in his view is synonymous with communication. It would be
biologically useless to communicate certain brain events (like the pupillary
light reflex and reflex arcs regulating visceral functions, etc.) and therefore
these events never emerge into consciousness.
Introduction 5
Note that Barlow is not merely saying that communication adds an extra
dimension to consciousness (a point that is already implicit in Popper’s
ideas), but that communication is consciousness. What he claims to have
found is a correlation between certain kinds of neural events and consciousness — namely those neural events which are involved exclusively in communicating with other brains. Of course Robinson Crusoe was also
conscious, but that is because his brain was engaged in imaginary dialogues
with archetypes of other people.
Humphrey (Chapter 4) also emphasizes social aspects of consciousness
but in a sense of his argument is the exact converse of Barlow’s. He points
out that a person who has never felt (say) pain cannot meaningfully
understand or interpret the behaviour of another person being exposed to
painful stimuli and would consequently be unable to communicate*
effectively with him. From this example, he argues that the biological
function of the sensation of pain lies in its usefulness for social interaction.
Thus we feel pain in order better to understand the pain felt by others. He
argues further that such subjective sensations evolved primarily to permit an
animal to attribute reasons for its own behaviour and consequently to make
sense out of the behaviour of other members of the social group.
Although at first sight Humphrey’s argument seems flatly to contradict
Barlow’s, there is really no fundamental inconsistency, since both authors
emphasize the importance of social factors and suggest that consciousness
may have an evolutionary function. Thus, while Humphrey suggests that
introspection is necessary for modelling archetypes of other people,
Barlow regards conversations with archetypes as almost synonymous with
introspection. Barlow speaks of communication with people “enriching”
our conscious experience whereas Humphrey points to people who seek out
new subjective experiences in order to enrich communication with others!
A biologically inclined philosopher might support Barlow, but
Humphrey’ s more introspective account seems closer to common sense.
To use Popperian terminology, Barlow is suggesting that World 2 (mind)
is compulsorily parasitic on World 3 (which includes languages and
culture). This is a bold departure from Popper’s own interactionist view
that Worlds 1, 2 and 3 exist independently while interacting to enrich each
*Here, and elsewhere, I use the word communication in its widest sense (and
interchangeably with social interaction). The word should not be taken to mean
verbal communication alone.
6 V. S. Ramachandran
other. Humphrey, on the other hand, sticks to the Popperian tradition, and
his view would be consistent with the suggestion that World 3 (as well as
simple communication with others which is a necessary antecedent of
World 3) would not have arisen if World 2 had not crept into physical brains
at some stage in evolution, i.e. in his account World 2 would necessarily
precede World 3. However, it is not clear whether either author would want
to argue that the survival value of World 3 actually exerted selection
pressure for the emergence of World 2. This, it seems to me, is the crux of
the whole debate.
These considerations must lead us to a synthetic View of the evolution of
mind. Perhaps at some stage in phylogeny, consciousness emerged as an
incidental by—product of certain complex neural events. This new property
was unplanned for, but once it emerged it made communication possible,
since animals could begin to “introspect” and (by analogy) make sense out
of one another’s behaviour. Since communication has survival value,
natural selection seized upon these neural events which were associated with
consciousness and this in turn led to a mutually reinforcing interaction
between collective culture and individual minds.
Such an account would be wholly consistent with Humphrey and Popper
but would also leave several questions unanswered. Implicit in all the views
presented so far is the assumption that consciousness is causally important
for communication. For if it were not causally important then natural
selection could not have favoured its emergence and its absence would have
made no difference to the course of evolution. On the other hand, if its
presence does make a difference we would have to assume that minds can
actually exert an influence (however indirect) on the course of events in the
physical world — particularly on a small portion of the physical world
consisting of communicating brains. The implication of this would be that
(a) the physical world is not a “closed system” and that (b) minds cause
communication and do not merely accompany it.
This gets us into logical difficulties. Can consciousness really cause
neural events? Stimulating the cortex can lead to mental events (e. g.
phosphenes), but the converse would be hard to demonstrate empirically.
Josephson accepts “mind acting on brain” as being almost axiomatic but is
there any evidence to justify such a view? Unfortunately we are not even
sure of what cause—and—effect means when talking about brain events and
mentation. Gregory (Chapter 2) points out that our common—sense notions
Introduction 7
about causation are hopelessly muddled, and he illustrates this with the
example of night following day. Obviously day does not cause night; nor
are they both caused by some third agent. Instead we see the night-day
sequence as part of our conceptual model of the solar system. Similarly, the
nature of brain—mind causation may become clearer when we start seeing it
as part of a larger (hitherto undiscovered) conceptual scheme. Perhaps the
causal links between brain events and mentation belong to a logical
category that is quite distinct from, and are of a much more subtle nature
than, the causation we talk about in the context of objects and forces.
(Though, heaven knows, these words beg enough questions themselves!)
And nowhere is the problem of disentangling cause and effect more
difficult than in the World 2 .2’ World 3 interactionism proposed by Popper
and Eccles. Could World 3 have arisen at all in the absence of at least a
rudimentary World 2, and if so could the survival value of World 3 have
exerted any selection pressure for the emergence of World 2? Did the dim
introspective abilities of Proconsul necessarily antedate his ability to communicate, and if so did the culture which emerged from such
communication propel him onwards to become Homo erectus? The
theories of Barlow and Humphrey (as well as Popper’ s interactionism) may
well contain partial answers to these important questions.
WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS?
While engaging in philosophical discussions of this kind there is always
the tendency to forget that problems of consciousness are not merely of
academic interest. To a patient in a hospital, experiencing intense pain or
anguish, what we have said so far in this chapter, and any talk about
consciousness being a “ghost in the machine”, would seem curiously
irrelevant or even perverse (Gregory, p. 31). Fortunately, this deficiency is
remedied by Roth (Chapter 8), who surveys the phenomenology of
consciousness from a clinical point of view, and by Longuet—Higgins
(Chapter 3), who examines the validity of common-sense criteria which
people generally use for deciding whether someone is conscious or not.
Relying largely on common sense, Longuet—Higgins argues that the
encodability of events into memory seems to be an invariant correlate of
conscious experience — i.e. if a person remembers something, he must have
8 V. S. Ramachandran
been conscious of it in the first instance. This seems to be generally true, but
it is not difficult to think of possible exceptions. For instance, we often
remember dreams vividly and attribute consciousness to dreams while
recalling them later, but does it necessarily follow that we were conscious
during the dream?
Josephson’s approach to consciousness (Chapter 7) differs radically
from those of the other contributors. Most scientists start with the brain and
ask themselves why certain brain events seem to be associated with consciousness. J osephson’s point of departure, on the other hand, is in
consciousness itself, which he suggests can be empirically studied by introspection.
He begins with consciousness as a “given thing” and points out that our
minds seem to have certain obvious attributes like creativity or intelligence.
He regards these attributes as being almost axiomatic since we know them
to be there from our own personal experience. Might we then not start with
these almost axiomatic observations on consciousness and then try to arrive
at more general “laws” of behaviour? Josephson points out that there
already exists an extensive introspective—phenomenological account of
consciousness to be found in the Eastern philosophical literature? He uses
ideas from this literature and tries to construct a theory of consciousness
based on concepts borrowed from systems engineering.
Professional psychologists frown on introspection largely because other
professional psychologists would frown on them if they did not. There is,
after all, no a priori reason for starting with brains and working up towards
consciousness instead of vice versa. In fact, to a person untrammelled by
conventional scientific training, Josephson’s approach might seem much
more simple and straightforward. Galileo and Newton began with
observations about the physical world and went on to construct laws (such
as the laws of motion) of steadily increasing explanatory power. Why
sneer on the same approach being used for studying our own conscious
experience?
Until now we have considered the evolutionary origins of consciousness
and tried to answer the question “What is consciousness?” We must now
turn to more ancient philosophical issues — like free will and personal
identity. In my own contribution (Chapter 9) I have tried to point out that
there are really two kinds of personal identity which I have dubbed
“empirical identity” and “ontological identity”. The empirical identity
Introduction 9
question is philosophically trivial and has the form “What criteria do
people generally use when trying to identify an agent A’ as being the same as
an agent A whom they have seen in the past?”. The ontological identity
question (i.e. what criteria should be used when trying to decide whether A’
is existentially the same as A who lived in the past) is much more important
and can be stated in the form of a series of “thought experiments”. I have
argued that nothing more can be said about personal identity than what is
contained in these thought experiments.
FREE WILL — AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
Any theory of consciousness must eventually contend with the problem
of free will and determinism. If every event in the universe (including brain
events) is the inevitable outcome of preceding events, then in what sense are
our actions really free? Of course, if a person were completely free his
behaviour would be chaotic. Freedom of behaviour (and consequently the
will) is necessarily limited by environmental constraints, and hence the
question of freedom arises only at what might be called “choice-points”,
where an agent is called upon to choose between alternate courses of action.
The situation is analogous to a donkey located exactly between two
haystacks. Obviously the donkey would not starve to death. He would
eventually move towards one haystack or the other, and one would be
tempted to describe his choice as being random. A human being in a similar
situation might claim that he was exercising the privilege of free will.
If there were no special reason for favouring one haystack, the donkey’s
choice would either (a) depend on a hidden, thermodynamic bias in the
immediately preceding state of the animal’s nervous system, or (b) be truly
random. Such randomness could arise from a magnification of
Heisenbergian uncertainty (see Eccles).3 The sequence of events would be
identical in a man but an illusion of free will would accompany the events.
Two questions arise. Firstly, why are events at choice—points accompanied
by the subjective feeling of free will? And secondly, is there any sense in
which an agent’ s behaviour may be said to be truly free?
Why human behaviour at choice—points is accompanied by the subjective
sensation of ‘ ‘willing’ ’ is difficult to answer. I do not get this feeling
(even at choice—points) if my behaviour is triggered off by (say) an epileptic
fit. So
10 V. S. Ramachandran
the presence of intervening variables, as opposed to a straightforward S—R
sequence, and knowledge (or belief) that I could have acted otherwise are
both necessary conditions for claiming to have chosen freely. Further I
must be aware of the outcome of my action and must intend that outcome.
(For there can be irrelevant consequences of my action which I am aware of
but do not intend — see Kenny4)
The criteria specified above are mainly self-testimonial. Further, they
would be possible only in a nervous system that was capable of projecting
itself into the future to anticipate consequences of different kinds of
simulated behaviour. (Hence our donkey could not have acted freely.) The
system could then use feedback from such anticipations to make what one
could call a decision — based on certain goal criteria. If the anticipated consequences are the same for either of two kinds of behaviour then an element
of randomness may be deliberately introduced to break the deadlock.
Thus free will seems logically possible only in situations where the
outcomes of two anticipated courses of action are equally desirable (e.g.
choosing between two identical peanuts — where all of Kenny’s criteria
would be satisfied). Yet, oddly enough, it is precisely in situations like this
that a person often declines having chosen freely and says: “My choice was
not based on any particular reason —it was random. . . .” One is almost
tempted to conclude that free will exists only among philosophers!
We experience willing even in situations where one choice is clearly
preferable to the other. The fact that rational considerations lead to one
choice and not the other does not seem to be incompatible with feeling free
(i.e. feeling that we could have acted otherwise). The sense of choosing
freely seems to parallel closely the activity of the system in the brain that is
involved in assessing priorities of action in the light of certain goal
criteria.
Actions uncoupled from this system (e.g. automatisms) are not “willed”.
Why the activity of this system should be accompanied by a feeling of
conscious choice is a mystery, but we can speculate on its biological origins.
Perhaps belief in free will provides the drive or incentive to explore
various strategies of action by turning and tossing over ideas in one’s mind
(just as hunger provides the drive for exploring one’s physical environment). A drive of this kind would discourage passive acceptance of
environmental constraints — and would therefore have obvious survival
value. What demarcates Jean—Paul Sartre from Homo habilis may be free
will rather than language or consciousness!
Introduction 11
This analogy between hunger and free will may not be as superficial as it
sounds. Consider a hypothetical organism living in an environment where
food is always available in plenty. Such an organism would eat and excrete
in a continuous and uninterrupted cycle and would never need to feel
hungry. Hunger must have evolved as part of a control system to regulate
the state of nutrition of the animal, when food supply became scarce and
intermittent. A fall in blood sugar generates hunger and this in turn goads
the animal on to look for food. Consistent with this argument is the fact
that carnivores probably experience more intense hunger than herbivores,
and plants and trees do not feel hungry at all.
Now in my view, just as the conscious sensation of hunger leads us to
explore the environment around us, the inner feeling of freedom goads us
on to explore strategies of action in an imaginary world which we construct
in our minds. We then see ourselves as active agents striving to do things in
this imaginary world; and this is possible only because we feel free.
Consider a fatalist who feels a sense of inevitability about his own
future. To him all actions would seem futile and pointless. In extreme
cases, such individuals are often profoundly depressed since they feel they
have “lost control” over themselves. Conscious beings need to feel free
in order to justify planning for the future and even to justify their very
existence. As Sartre would put it, we need to believe in the permanent
possibility of consciousness “. . . effecting a rupture with its own past, of
wrenching itself away from its past . . .”. So, if consciousness is
“nature’s joke” to chain us to each other (Barlow, Chapter 5), free will
may be nature’s joke to permit human beings to plan their own future
without feeling like puppets in a Laplacian world.
An animal will work only for a tangible reward that lies well within his
reach. What characterizes all human actions, on the other hand, seems to
be the willingness to participate in what Bronowski5 has called
“unbounded plans”. Instead of going through a specific sequence of
steps leading to a reward, we often adopt global strategies of action
directed towards more general aims which we call values or ideals. This
ceaseless striving towards abstract and sometimes even unattainable goals
(such as “truth” or “perfection”) may also depend crucially on our
belief in our freedom. Free will may therefore turn out to be a
biologically useful delusion that has been built into our brains by natural
selection, i.e. those who believed in their ability to will survived and those
who did not died out.
12 V. S. Ramachandran
This delusion certainly exists in World 2 —and it may also partly exist
in World 3 (e. g. French Existentialist literature). It is a sort of imaginary
carrot that keeps the donkey in us running all the time — and maybe that
is what Sartre really meant when he said, ‘‘It is not enough to will; it is
necessary to will to will.”
“Free will” may even have a specific anatomical locus—the frontal
lobes. Evidence for this view comes from the fact that frontal lobotomy
patients are often impulsive and unwilling to deliberate. They also report
losing all initiative (or “drive”) and have no interest in planning for the
future; although they remain conscious, alert and intelligent in every
other respect. Since the illusion of willing has survival value it may have
become incorporated into the circuitry of the frontal lobes as these
structures became progressively larger during the transition from
Proconsul to H. habilis. It could be argued that once this feeling emerged
men began to experience events as being done by them rather than
happening to them; and this in turn may have given rise to other socially
useful feelings such as “conscience” and moral responsibility.
Theologians would no doubt find this theory rather distasteful and I
myself find it intuitively unappealing; but that, of course, is additional
evidence in its favour. In fact it is probably our innate sense of freedom
that makes us feel a bit odd when someone points out that all our actions
are determined exclusively by preceding brain events.
Of course, it is interesting to ask why this whole debate over freedom
v. determinism arose in the first place. The physicist’s assertion—that
even what we usually call a choice is determined exclusively by preceding
brain states— seems to conflict with our inner experience (i.e. our feeling
that we could have acted differently). So we jump to the conclusion that
there is some kind of paradox here to be explained. But is it really
legitimate to contrast feelings with factual assertions about brain states?
Why not consider the possibility that what our feelings assert may simply
be wrong? Perhaps what we really have here is a pseudo-paradox that is
based on the unwarranted assumption that because we feel free, we must
also in some sense be free.
Let me illustrate this with a more familiar example. Each of us has a
feeling of what might be called “self-importance” or selfishness built into
him. And a person will continue to feel selfish even if a biologist assures
Introduction 13
him that objectively speaking his existence has no more value than
anyone else’s. The brain is biologically programmed to value itself, for if
it did not value itself there would be no motivation for a person to
preserve his safety or to plan his future. In fact, it could even be suggested
that an error or perversion in this mechanism is what sometimes leads to
feelings of uselessness and futility (“depression”) culminating in suicide.
Maybe the free will illusion has similar biological origins. One of its
functions, as we have seen, may be to provide motivation for exploring
novel strategies of action and for “non—conformist” behaviour. It is also
important to note that practically all our notions about legal, moral and
ethical issues are parasitic on the assumption of human freedom — i.e. the
assumption of a distinction between responsible and irresponsible
actions. So perhaps it is these World 3 entities that exerted the selection
pressure for the emergence of free will as a useful superstition in our
minds. For without this superstition we could make no sense out of even
such commonly used words as “deceit”, “cunning”, “kind”, “fickle”,
“impulsive”, “determined”, “deliberate”, and so on.*
Note the similarity between some of these ideas and Humphrey’s
theory on the evolution of mind. While Humphrey would probably argue
that we feel free in order to make sense out of each other’s actions, we
could go a step further and suggest that the need to attribute freedom (or
lack of it) to someone’s choices arises only in the specifically social
context of law, ethics and morality — i.e. all those institutions which seem
to provide a cohesive force for the orderly organization of society. (For
instance, punishing “irresponsible” behaviour would reinforce
“responsible” behaviour and encourage people to deliberate more and to
refrain from acting impulsively.)
Until now we have been considering what might be called the
phenomenology of free will. But is there any other strictly logical sense in
which human actions may be said to be free?
Consider yourself faced with a difficult choice—say between A and
B, which are equally desirable. Your choice, we have argued, 1S
‘Note that this argument deliberately evades the “mind—body problem” in its
classical form -i.e. why there should be any feelings at all associated with
neural events. But it is perhaps just as meaningful to ask why the feeling ‘of
freedom (and associated neuracircuitry) evolved as it is to ask why (say) hunger
or pain evolved.
14 V. S. Ramachandran
determined either by a hidden bias or (in the absence of such a bias) by
random neural events caused by magnifications of Heisenbergian
uncertainty. If this is true then how can you justify your claim to freedom
other than by pointing out that you feel free?
LOGICAL INDETERMINACY
Imagine that a super-scientist is watching you from behind a tree and
that he has access to complete information about your brain state and
about your local environment. He then tries to make an accurate
prediction of the detailed future state of your brain including your choice
(A or B) and writes this down on a piece of paper. After you make your
“free” choice he triumphantly shows you the slip of paper to prove that
he was right. He could repeat this a hundred times and he would be right
each time . . . until you begin seriously to start doubting your free will.
But you would be wrong to do so — or so at least MacKay would argue
(Chapter 6). For you could challenge the scientist to state whether his
prediction is one that you would be correct to accept as inevitable in every
detail before you make the choice. The fact is that if the prediction were
embodied in your brain it could no longer be valid in full detail. MacKay
argues that deterministic predictions even in a Laplacian world are valid
in full detail only for a detached external observer (like our super-scientist)
and are not valid for you since they would have no unconditional claim
to your assent. His prediction would be rendered invalid in detail the
moment it was embodied in your brain, since the state of your nervous
system would change. Even if he could take these anticipated changes
into account while writing his prediction he cannot claim that you would
be in error to disbelieve it, since if you disbelieved it, it would then be
incorrect in detail. These and other versions of MacKay’s arguments are
too well known to require repetition here. For a more comprehensive
review of his ideas see his chapter in Cerebral Correlates of Conscious
Experience (ed. P. A. Buser and A. Rouguel-Buser, Elsevier/ NorthHolland, 1978).
Finally, let us consider another related “thought experiment”. When
facing a choice between A and B supposing you were to decide “I shall
Introduction 15
deliberately do the opposite of whatever prediction the determinist
makes”. You can now challenge your determinist friend confidently with
this self—fulfil1ing prophecy—since whatever prediction he now makes
would ipso facto be rendered false! There is no way in which your decision to contradict his prediction can be embodied in the final prediction
which is shown to you. He, in turn, may point out to you that although
your behaviour is now no longer predictable by him it is still determined
by his prediction.
_
I shall conclude this chapter with a quotation from Russell, which, I
hope, conveys the essence of what we have tried to achieve in this book:
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its
questions, . . . but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because
these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our
intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance that Closes the
mind to speculation; but above all because, through the greatness of the
Universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind also is rendered great, and
becomes capable of that union with the Universe which constitutes its highest
good.
REFERENCES
1. K. Popper and J. Eccles, The Selfand its Brain, Springer International, 1977.
2. Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, videotaped Lecture Course on the Science of Creative
Intelligence, 1972.
3. J. Eccles, Facing Rea1ity, Springer, New York. 19704. A. Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, Routledge& Kegan Paul, 1963.
5. J. Bronowski, A Sense of the Future, M.I.T. Press, 1977.
PART I
General
CHAPTER 1
What Defines Privacy?
G. VESEY
The Open University, Milton Keynes
The purpose of this conference is stated as being “to make a scientific
study of subjective experience and to explore the relationships between
subjective experience and the objective world”. Examples are given of
subjects which might be discussed. One of them is “What defines the
privacy and personal nature of a person’s conscious experience?” Perhaps
the hope is that a definition can be found which does not put subjective
experience beyond the pale for the scientist. Whether I can fulfil that
hope, expressed in these terms, I am not sure. But at least I can show
willing, by giving my paper the title “What defines privacy?’ ’.
One other preliminary remark. In the statement of the purpose of the
conference there is the phrase “to make a scientific study”. To what is
“scientific” opposed, in this phrase? If it is opposed to “philosophical”
then perhaps I have stumbled into the wrong conference. But probably
the term “scientific” was meant in opposition to “unsystematic” or otherwise disreputable. After all, scientists, quite properly, reflect on the concepts with which they operate, and sometimes make what may be called
“conceptual innovations”. I am not sure that most scientific revolutions
are not in large measure conceptual in character; for example, new ways
of thinking about the relationship of space and time. Perhaps the required
definition of privacy will be a new way of thinking about the relation of
what a person says about himself and what others, observing him, can
say about him.
But before talking about new ways, perhaps I had better say something
about the old ones. At the risk of telling you what you know very well, I
shall briefly survey the relevant history of the concept of mind; that is, the
19
20 G. Vesey
history of answers, not to the question “What defines privacy?”, but to
the question “What defines mentality?”. I will concentrate on just three
philosophers: René Descartes, whose Second Meditation is sub-titled
“The Nature of the Human Mind: it is better known than the Body”;'
Franz Brentano, author of Psychology from an Empirical Standp0int;2
and G. E. Moore, who once read a paper to the Aristotelian Society with
the title “The Subject—matter of Psychology’ ’.3
Descartes defined mentality in terms of thinking and extension, meaning
by “thinking”— doubting, understanding, asserting, denying, willing, and
so on;4 and by “extension”— being spread out in space. Minds think but
are not extended, he said; matter is extended but does not think. In other
words, mind and matter are two distinct substances, even though a mind
and a portion of matter are providentially united in a person in this earthly
existence.5 This dualism of thinking non-extended mind and non—thinking
extended matter gave rise to the intractable problem of how the two substances interact, a problem which a number of philosophers tried to solve
by invoking God. I shall not go into that, but will skip across the centuries,
two and a third centuries to be exact, to Franz Brentano.
Brentano was more concerned with the inadequacy of Descartes’s
definition of mentality than with the problems to which it gave rise. The
negative characteristic, of not being extended in space, he thought, does
not serve to mark off what is mental from what is not mental. “A large
number of not unimportant psychologists teach that the phenomena of
some or even all of our senses originally appear apart from all extension
and spatial location. In particular, this view is very generally held with
respect to sounds and olfactory phenomena.”6 Certainly one does not
talk of the shape and size of a sound or smell as one does of, say, a colour
patch. The argument is: If Descartes was right then sounds and smells,
not being extended, should be mental; but obviously they are not mental —
they are not the sort of things that think; so Descartes was wrong.
But Brentano was not content with showing Descartes to be wrong
about the negative characteristic. He held that, in stating the positive
characteristic to be thinking, Descartes had done no more than state the
problem. What is thinking? What is it that is common to doubting, understanding, asserting, denying, willing, and so on, and that does not
characterize any physical phenomenon?
Brentano’s answer was as follows:
What Defines Privacy? 21
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle
Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we
might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction
toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or
immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object
within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation
something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
This intentional in»existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena.
No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define
mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object
intentionally within themselves.7
With the qualification “though not wholly unambiguously” Brentano
recognized that the expressions “reference to a content”, “direction
toward an object” and “immanent objectivity” stand in need of further
elucidation. He later attempted such elucidation, as did other philosophers,
such as his one-time pupil Edmund Husserl. I think that G. E. Moore may
well have read Brentano’s Psychol0gy—he certainly read his book on
ethics — and that Moore’s paper on the subject-matter of psychology was
an attempt at a non—technical version of Brentano’s thesis.
But before I come on to Moore let me just say one other thing about
Brentano. In one respect he was still very much in the Cartesian tradition.
The respect is that of knowledge. What sort of knowledge do people have
of their own doubts, understandings, beliefs and so on? Is it like the
knowledge they have of objective material things? We feel drawn to say
that it is not. We feel drawn to distinguish two ways of knowing things,
an inward way and an outward way. Thus John Locke distinguishes
between “reflection”, the mind’s turning inward upon itself, and
“sensation”, the source of our ideas of external objectsf‘
Apart from one being inward and the other outward, Locke regards
reflection and sensation as being very similar. He evidently regards sensation as being the more familiar mode of observation, for he explains
reflection in terms of it. “Though it be not sense, as having nothing to do
with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough he
called internal sense.”9 He accepts unquestioningly that both sensation
and reflection are modes of observation: he refers to “our observation,
employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal
operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves”. 10
Brentano draws our attention to a difference which seems to have
escaped Locke when he was writing the above. Outer observation is
22 G. Vesey
inherently fallible: one may not actually be perceiving what one thinks
one is perceiving. This means that, strictly speaking, so-called outer perception is not really perception at all. One does not perceive external
objects; one infers their existence from one’s ideas of them. So, far from
it being appropriate to assimilate inner perception to outer perception, as
Locke does, we must acknowledge that mental phenomena are “the only
phenomena of which perception in the strict sense of the word is possible’ ’."
In this, Brentano is more consistently Cartesian than Locke. Descartes
had said that the mind is better known than the body.
G. E. Moore, in his paper on the subject-matter of psychology, sets out
to answer the questions “What kinds of ‘entities’ are ‘mental’ or ‘psychical’
entities? And how are those which are ‘mental’ entities distinguished
from those which are not?”‘2 He says that certain kinds of entities seem
to him to be undoubtedly mental. They are the acts of consciousness
named by the words “seeing , remembering”, “imagining”, “dream—
ing’ ’, “thinking”, “believing”, “resolving” and so on. Whenever a person
performs such an act, Moore says, he is always “conscious of” something
or other. 13 But when one sees a colour and when one remembers it, one is
conscious of it in very different senses. Apart from both being acts of
consciousness they may have nothing in common. Moore does not know
how to explain what he means by “consciousness” except by saying that
each of the acts he has named is an act of consciousness. The sense in
which to be a mental entity is to be an act of consciousness is, he thinks,
the most fundamental sense of the word “mental”.
But being an act of consciousness, he says, is not the only characteristic
of mentality. There is a characteristic which cannot be said to be a
“meaning” of the term “mental”, but which may be proposed as a
criterion of what is mental. The characteristic is that of being directly
known by one mind only.” In one word: privacy. Moore is doubtful
whether privacy is a characteristic which belongs to all mental acts. He
has in mind the abnormal phenomena of co—consciousness in a case of
split personality. Other philosophers do not share his doubts. Brentano
had said that since mental phenomena are the objects of inner perception,
“it is obvious that no mental phenomenon is perceived by more than one
individual”.15 And John Wisdom says: “The peculiarity of the soul is not
that it is visible to none but that it is visible only to one.””’
I said that I would briefly survey the relevant history of answers to the
What Defines Privacy? 23
question “What defines mentality?” at the risk of telling you what you
already know very well. I have now done so and we have seen that the
two chief contenders, once Descartes is out of the way, are, first, what
Brentano calls “intentionality” and Moore calls “consciousness of”;
and, secondly, privacy — defined in terms of direct knowledge, inner
perception, or visibility only to one. Incidentally, the thesis that mentality
is characterized by privacy, so defined, is known by critics of the thesis as
“the doctrine of privileged access”.
I have little doubt that the organizers of this conference are familiar
with the traditional “privileged access” definition of privacy. Moore and
Wisdom are both Trinity College, Cambridge, philosophers, and philosophical ideas have a way of percolating through into other disciplines.
And yet they suggest as an example of the sort of subject we should discuss
“What defines the privacy and personal nature of a person’s conscious
experience?”. I can only suppose that they find the “privileged access”
definition unsatisfactory for some reason, and are looking for a new definition. This supposition leads me, naturally enough, to the question “What
might their reason be for being dissatisfied with the traditional conception
of privacy?".
I can only speak for myself. My reason for being dissatisfied with the
inner—observation account is this. We think of people doubting, understanding, believing, remembering, imagining, hoping, knowing, fearing,
expecting, and so on. How do we know the difference between these things
—between, say, remembering and imagining, or believing and knowing?
How is a person able to say which he is doing? According to the privileged
access definition of privacy, the inner observation account, the answer is as
follows. We know about these things in the same sort of way as we know
about the difference between, say, cats and dogs, except that the perception
is an inward perception and the phenomenon perceived is a private phenomenon. An act of remembering is phenomenally different from an act
of imagining, or expecting, or understanding; and we know which we are
doing because we can recognize the act in question.
I am dissatisfied with the inner—observation account because that
answer, to put it bluntly, seems all wrong, a complete fabrication. Let me
explain what I mean, by means of a partial analogy. Consider the question
“What is the difference between a pain in one’s foot and a pain in one’s
stomach?”. ”the most natural and immediate answer”, says William
24 G. Vesey
James, is that the difference is one ‘ ‘ of place pure and simple”. But James
rejected that answer, for reasons we need not go into,” in favour of the
so—called “Local Sign” theory of Hermann Lotze. According to this
theory a person can say where a pain is because of something qualitative
about the pain which is for him a sign of the location of the cause. He has
learnt to associate this quality with a definite part of the body. Wilhelm
Wundt agreed with Lotze, and described the local sign as “a peculiar
qualitative colouring, which is independent of the quality of the external
impression”. But a later psychologist, Oswald Kulpe, put the theory down
to what he called “metaphysical prepossession”. He wrote, with reference
to the local sign theory of Lotze and Wundt: “The thought upon which
this whole theory is based is that the impressions must all be of a conscious
nature. And here we see the influence of metaphysical prepossession. It
was difficult to conceive that an unequivocal relation obtaining between
tactual impressions and visual ideas, or other factors subserving localization, could have arisen without conscious direction, by way of purely
physiological connection. But there is no justification for the assumption
of these conscious intermediaries in the facts of consciousness itself.”
In short, Lotze fabricated local signs, signs of location, in order to
provide a specious answer to the question “How can a person say whether
he has a foot—ache or a stomach—ache?”. Similarly, I suggest, advocates of
the privileged—access doctrine fabricate phenomenally different acts of
consciousness in order to provide a specious answer to the question “How
can a person say whether he is remembering, or imagining, or expecting,
or understanding?”. The analogy is partial only in that there is nothing in
the case of remembering, imagining, and so on, to correspond to the
physiological explanation of how a person can say where he feels pain.
But I have said enough about the old way of defining privacy. It is high
time to go on to a new way.
The new way I want to outline is the way proposed by a third Cambridge
philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, in the last lectures he gave before he
resigned from his chair here. They were the lectures on Philosophical
Psychology given in l946—7, attended by people like Peter Geach, now
Professor of Philosophy at Leeds, and Norman Malcolm, Professor at
Cornell. Geach took notes. Unfortunately they have not been published
and I do not intend to quote from them. There are passages in Wittgenstein’s
published works in which he makes the same or similar points.
What Defines Privacy? 25
The first and possibly the most important point for our purposes is this.
Psychological verbs—that is, verbs like “believe”, “expect”, “hope”,
“imagine”, “intend”, “know”, “remember”— are characterized,
Wittgenstein says, “by the fact that the third person of the present is to
be verified by observation, the first person not”.‘8 In other words there
is an asymmetry between the third person singular present tense use of a
psychological verb — for example, “He expects ...’ — and the first person
singular present tense use —“I expect”. That someone else expects something IS something I find out about by observation; that I expect something
is not something I find out about by observation. It is neither something I
‘ind out about by outer observation, nor something I find out about by
inner observation. It is not something I find out about, and a fortiori
not something I find out about in this way or that. If I say to someone “I
expect he’ll be here in a moment” and they say “How do you know?”,
they are asking how I know, or why I think, he will be here in a moment.
It would be perverse in the extreme to take their question as meaning:
how_do I know I am expecting, as opposed to believing, hoping, imagining, intending, remembering? I do not need any internal evidence to use
the word “expect”. If I say to someone ‘‘I hope you’ll come to the dance”,
and he, having two left feet so far as dancing goes, says “Are you sure?”,
he is questioning my sincerity—do I really want him to come? —not my
powers of recognizing the psychological state I am in. I do not need to
have Something to go on, to say “I hope you’ll come’ ’. Norman Malcolm
has. a rather nice phrase for this— “the autonomous status of selftestimony”.‘9
YOU may be thinking: What has the autonomous status of self—testimony
got to do with privacy? Well, private is opposed to public. Consider the
two utterances “I’m longing for a cigarette” and “I’m over eleven stone
in weight ._About the latter someone may say: “You’re not; your scales
need adjusting . The fact that it is my weight that is in question does not
mean that what I say goes. But with my longings and such like, it is
different. What I say goes. And it is a large part of treating a person as a
person that we accept this; that is, that we treat people as having the first
and last word about certain things. It is the reluctance of behaviourists
like B.2F. Skinner to accept this that makes us think he treats people as
things. 0 The privacy that matters is not that of having access to private
Objects of some sort: it is that of being treated as a person as opposed to
being treated as an object among other objects.
26 G. Vesey
There is one big question that I have left unanswered. According to the
privileged-access doctrine, we know about the difference between believing, expecting, hoping, imagining, intending, knowing, remembering,
and so on, through some sort of inner perception. They are phenomenally
different acts of consciousness, and we have simply to attend to the
“mental phenomena”, as Brentano calls them. If the privileged—access
doctrine is a false doctrine, if it is a myth that the words “believe”,
“expect”, “hope”, “know”, “remember”, etc., have meaning by being
names of introspectible mental processes,” then how do they have
meaning? How do we distinguish between them?
At this point there is an awful temptation to take an easy way out. It is
very tempting to fall back on the distinction between inner observation
and outer observation, and to say that if we do not know about these
things by inner observation then we must know about them by outer
observation. That is, they must be words for various kinds of behaviour.
We get the concept of expecting, for instance, from observing expectant
behaviour. Along with this answer goes a causal interpretation of intentionality. To say that someone’s longing is a longing for a cigarette is to predict
that a cigarette will satisfy it, at least temporarily.
Wittgenstein rejected this answer as vehemently as he rejected the inner
observation answer. I have heard it said that Wittgenstein was a behaviourist. Nonsense! To say that he was a behaviourist is to ignore all that he
says about grammar, about what he calls “language games”, and about
rules of language. In his 1946-7 lectures be explicitly contrasted any attempt
to elucidate psychological concepts in terms of phenomena, whether
inner or outer, with an elucidation in terms of the grammar of linguistic
utterances. Unfortunately I have not left myself with time even to begin a
summary of his teaching on these matters. In particular I cannot hope to
convey anything of what he says about intentionality (“It is in language
that it’s all done”21). What I will do is to leave you with five quotations,
in four of which the term “language-game” occurs, and a short story.
The quotations are these:
. . . a concept is in its element within the language—game.”
The question is not one of explaining a language-game by means of our
experiences, but of noting a language—game.”
Look on the language—game as the primary thing. And look on the feelings, etc.,
as you look on a way of regarding the language-game, as interpretation.”
What Defines Privacy?? 27
. . . the term “1anguage-game” is meant to bring into prominence the fact that
the speaking of language is part of an activity.”
Words are deeds.“
And the story is as follows. Once upon a time a Martian, with telepathic
powers, landed on earth in his flying saucer. He put on his invisibility
shield and set off to investigate the possibility of communicating with the
natives. He came across children engaged in some activity with pieces of
card. They talked quite a lot, but our Martian soon noticed that one word,
“snap”, was evidently regarded as particularly important. He decided
that if he was to communicate with these strange beings he must learn
what this word stood for. He had never heard of Wittgenstein, but back
on Mars he had come under the influence of the great Martian philosopher,
Lok Jon, who taught that words have meaning by standing for ideas, and
that ideas are either ideas of sensation or ideas of reflection. Using his
telepathic powers our Martian soon discovered that when one of the
children used the word “snap” he often had an experience like the
experience he, the Martian, had back home when he managed to jump
clear across one of the canals —an experience of triumphant excitement.
Perhaps the child was reporting this experience. And yet when the second
child said “snap”, a second after the first, the experience was more like
the one he had when he fell short and landed in the liquid nitrogen.
Perhaps, then, the word stood for some feature of the cards. He had
noticed that the cards had marks on them, and it was not long before he
realized that the word “snap” was used when the marks were the same.
And yet that could not be it, for he noticed that if one child said “snap”
very quickly, the second child instead of agreeing would look as if he did
not agree at all with the description. So, in despair, our Martian left as
silently as he had come, and went back to tell Lok Jon that the earthlings
made language—like noises but that he could not make out what on earth
the noises were meant to refer to.
Well, that is the story — a very simple one. The moral of the story is that
not all words and expressions are used to refer to something. Consider
the expressions “I know”, “I hope”, “I remember”, “I mean” and “I
understand”. Are they used to refer to something? We have a metaphysical
prepossession to say that they are~— that they are used to refer to various
mental processes.” So long as we are in the grip of that prepossession we
28 G. Vesey
shall continue to be worried about “the relationships between subjective
experience and the objective world”.
REFERENCES
1. Descartes: Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. Elizabeth Anscombe and
Peter Thomas Geach, London, 1954, p. 66.
2. Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed. Oskar Kraus,
1874, English edition ed. Linda L. McAlister, trans. Antos C. Rancurello,
D.B.Terell and Linda L. McAlister, London, 1973.
3. Reprinted in G.N.A.Vesey (ed.), Body andMind, London, 1964, pp. 236-45.
4. Descartes: Philosophical Writings, p. 70.
5. Ibid., p. 194.
6. Psychology from an Empirical S tandpoint, p. 86.
7. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
8. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690, Bk.II, Ch.1,
Sections 2-4.
9. Ibid., Section 4.
10. Ibid., Section 2.
11. Psychology from an Empirical S tandpoint, p. 91.
12. Body and Mind, pp. 236-7.
13. Ibid., p.237.
14. Ibid., p.241.
15. Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 92.
16. John Wisdom, OtherMinds, Oxford, 1952, p. 220.
17. I have gone into them in G.N.A.Vesey, The location of bodily sensations,
Mind, 70, 25-35, (1961). The same article gives the references to James, Lotze,
Wundt and Kiilpe.
18. L.Wittgenstein, Zettel, Oxford, 1967, §472; Philosophical Investigations,
Oxford, 1953, Pt. I, §277-81.
19. Norman Malcolm, Behaviourism as a philosophy of psychology, in T.W.Wann
(ed.), Behaviourism and Phenomenology, Chicago, 1964, pp. 153-4.
20. Godfrey Vesey, Conditioning and learning, in R.S.Peters (ed.), The Concept
of Education, London, 1967, p. 70.
21. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar. Oxford, 1974, Pt. I, §95. Cf. §92
and
Philosophical Investigations, Pt. I, § 445.
22. Zettel, §39l.
23. PhilosophicalInvestigations, Pt. l, §655.
24. Ibid., §656.
25. Ibid., §23.
26. Philosophical Grammar, Pt. I, §131.
27. Zettel, §211.
What Defines Privacy? 29
Discussion
MACKAY:
It is not too strong to say (p. 25)that with my subjective experience, “What I
say goes’ ’? This may be true as a matter of social convention; but
ontologically we must surely recognize the possibility of lying—as in
malingering, for example, or when a mischievous student subject fools an
experimental psychologist. I would agree that the privacy that matters is
not that of having access to private objects, but it is, I think, that of having
private experiences about which we can (in principle) lie. If we knew more about
the physiological correlates of specific experiences (e.g. of seeing red rather
than seeing blue, or seeing one line as longer than another) we might even hope
to check objectively the probable truthfulness of such reports. What is at issue
is a question of fact: did he, or did he not, have the experience he reports? To
“treat him as a person” is doubtless a necessary condition for gaining evidence
on this question, but it is not of itself sufficient to resolve it.
VESEY:
I may say “I expect he’ll be here soon” to someone, and then later say to
someone else “I only said that to buoy her up; actually I had no idea whether he
was coming or not”. And I may say ‘‘I hope you’ll come to the party" to someone
I hope will not come, simply to be pleasant to him. I do not wish to deny the
possibility of my uttering sentences beginning “I expect . . .” or “I hope ...”
and of what I say being in some sense wrong. But in what sense? That is the
question. Is what I said wrong in a sense which supports the thesis that someone
who says ‘‘I expect ...”, or “I hope .. .”, meaning what he says, is right
about something? Suppose someone says “I hope you’ll come”, not just to be
pleasant.
What he says is not wrong, in the relevant sense. Is its not being wrong a
matter of his not being wrong about something? Specifically, is it a matter of
his being right—about his “subjective experience"?
My answer to this last question is “No”. If I say “The carpet is blue” there is
the question of whether I correctly perceived it. There is no similar question
with “I hope you’ll come". That is what I meant when I said, apropos of such
utterances, “What I say goes”. Such utterances are not reports, correct or
incorrect, of something being experienced. The notion of private mental
processes is the product of the idea that such utterances must be reports. And
this, in turn, is one aspect of the idea that all linguistic utterances, except
questions and commands, have the same linguistic role, that of stating what is
the case.
JOSEPHSON:
What the organizers had in mind as a subject for the conference was the
possibility of being able to produce a general theoretical framework from which
could be derived details of the phenomenon of privacy, and not just a dictionary
definition of that term.
I do not find your discussion of such words as “believe”, “expect” and “hope”
very helpful in regard to the problem of privacy of personal experience, as it
seems to me that there is a straightforward way to deal with the problems you
raise. Just as a hot body gives rise to thermal radiation whose colour gives an
indication of its temperature, we can
30 G. Vesey
postulate that the nervous system, as a result of its prior exposure to verbal
and non-verbal sensory input, generates under certain conditions verbal output
which is a reflection of, and in a certain sense a description of, its internal
state. The fact that I may not be able to observe the state of the nervous
system directly (as opposed to being aware of the descriptions generated) is not
of fundamental importance: I may similarly be able to tell the temperature of a
hot body by its colour without being in a situation to feel the heat directly.
With this idea in mind, I postulate that when sentences containing words such as
“believe”, “expect" and “hope” are spoken, there is a corresponding property of
the nervous system, caused by its response to the given situation. The
connection Wittgenstein proposed between non«observability and privacy seems to
me to be fortuitous, and in my experience, when belief, expectation, hope are
sufficiently intense they are observable, in the form of emotions.
There is a reason, I believe, why psychological states are often not observable.
Unlike ordinary information, which may have to be analysed intellectually before
being used, emotions (more visibly with emotions such as fear or hate) produce
their effects on behaviour directly, without the mediating influence of the
intellect. Therefore we tend just not to bother to attend to such happenings and
are not aware of them.
CHAPTER 2
Regarding Consciousness
RICHARD L. GREGORY
Brain and Perception Laboratory, Medical School, University of Bristol
“Problems of consciousness” are often regarded as of philosophical but
of no other interest. For neurologists problems of consciousness can be
practical— requiring urgent decisions on disturbingly metaphysical
grounds. A boy, whom I knew with affection, fell on his head with
grievous injury and remained in coma for many months. Although unable
to speak, or respond to those around him, he did have facial expressions.
Sometimes he appeared distressed: perhaps he was in pain. Was he
conscious, suffering? Our usual means for deciding were absent as he
could not communicate: yet perhaps he was in dire need of pain-relieving
measures. In such a case as this the extreme behaviourist creed that statements of “mental events” can be reduced to accounts of behaviour — that
consciousness and all its works should be exorcised as the absurd “ghost
in the machine” —seem irrelevant, even actively evil. They do not at all
help to deal with normal life situations; less still such extreme human
issues demanding deep understanding and urgent solution.
It is remarkable that anaesthetics are given to remove pain, and indeed
all consciousness, while we have no understanding of what they do; or
how they or consciousness are related to brain function. Possibly anaesthetics and analgesics will become significant research tools for discovering just which features of brain structure and function are especially
associated with consciousness; and hopefully how they are related. The
question, What is this relation?, is the classical Problem of Consciousness.
31
32 Richard L. Gregory
HOW IS CONSCIOUSNESS RELATED TO BRAIN FUNCTION?
Is consciousness causally important? Does consciousness affect brain
processes? We know that brain activity is affected by normal or artificial
physical stimuli; this is clear from electrical brain recordings. We know
also that some physical stimuli produce sensations. So the question may
be put: “Is consciousness a kind of stimulus affecting the nervous system
and behaviour?”
Are conscious states mental stimuli? This violates the accepted technical
meaning of “stimuli”, which are regarded in physiology and psychology
as physical events affecting the nervous system. The notion of nonphysical stimuli looks like a move from a different game; not like anything
accepted in physiology or physics. Is consciousness, conceived in this way,
so odd that it will never be accepted by any future physics? Or is consciousness odd in the way that magnetism is odd, fitting, if with some difficulty,
into accepted physics? This issue forces us, I think, to consider what we
can accept as science—and so what “paranormal” should be taken to
mean. I shall discuss this now, for use later (p. 42) in a rather different
context.
IS CONSCIOUSNESS PARANORMAL?
Telepathy and telekinesis are alleged phenomena which—if accepted
as genuine phenomena and not conjuring tricks — may be accepted in one
of two ways: (a) they could be explained by processes, or whatever, which
though so far unrecognized would be acceptable to science; or (b) they
are due to processes, or whatever, unacceptable to science. This second
alternative subdivides into two kinds of unacceptable: (i) unacceptable
now, in current science, (ii) unacceptable for ever, in any possible future
science. To justify this last possibility (which is the strong meaning of
“ paranormal”), it would be necessary to show that something going on is
in principle unacceptable, in any possible or conceivable natural science.
Are there any examples? There are many cases of the weaker sensephenomena moving from “unexplained” to “explained” as science
changes. Examples are: lightning; the lode stone, or compass; movement
of muscles; and very many other formerly mysterious but clearly established phenomena. These were not, however, generally considered as
paranormal before they were explained in terms acceptable to natural
Regarding Consciousness 33
science. What is odd about telepathy, telekinesis and pre-cognition is that
they are “paranormal” in the sense that no such explanation is expected.
Relegation to paranormal status seems to mean, not only that they
cannot now be explained; but that they cannot in principle be explained
within, or brought into, any conceivable acceptable science. Does
consciousness fall into this category; though its “existence” (if this is the
correct word) is not in serious doubt? If so, consciousness is a paranormal
phenomenon.
No doubt this would be strengthened by establishing other phenomena
as paranormal. Meanwhile, it seems wise to attack the claim that
consciousness is a paranormal phenomenon; for this is to say that we
cannot now (weak sense) or ever in the future (strong sense) explain
consciousness in terms acceptable to science.
IS CONSCIOUSNESS BIOLOGICALLY SIGNIFICANT?
If consciousness affects matter (especially brain states) then is it causal
—in the sense that, for example, hitting a nail with a hammer affects the
nail? If it has no such effect (no effect on brain or behaviour) why should
consciousness have developed biologically? If we suppose that sticks and
stones are conscious this would not be a special problem; but given that
only organisms are conscious, we must suppose that consciousness has
developed in organic evolution — and so it should have survival value. But
how can it have survival value if it has no causal effects on behaviour?
Any account which supposes that consciousness has biological significance
must surely suppose that it causally affects some matter: which implies
either that it can (like magnetism) be incorporated into physics though it
is odd; or that it is (in the strong sense) paranormal. Personally, I do not
see how we can predict future science (or lay down defining criteria for
what is for ever to be “acceptable” science) to preclude “paranormal”
from being “normalized”, by incorporation into some future science.
But if consciousness has no causal roles to play then science would have
to accept non—causal entities or processes; and neo—Darwinians would
have to accept features developed by natural selection which, though not
causal, have survival value.
A way out from this is to suppose that consciousness is a biological
fluke. But it seems to have developed through many species over a long
34 Richard L. Gregory
biological time span; so this is unlikely. A further way out may be to say
that consciousness is an accidental property (or, similarly, an emergent
property) of complex neural tissue or function— or of whatever increases
physically at the top end of evolution. To deny causal significance to
consciousness is likely to be dull indeed. If consciousness is a logically
necessary characteristic of high complexity, or some such, this would be
formally like: “This x is an extended object, so x must be coloured”,
though we may not know the colour, and the colour does not matter. This
would parallel a logically necessary (rather than a contingent) status to
consciousness, which would be hardly more interesting, at least for
biologists, than supposing it to be an inconsequential ineffective one—off
fluke having no effects. All this is, however, to assume that something
without effects is pointless. Do we understand cause sufficiently clearly to
make this claim?
THE CONCEPT OF CAUSE
As David Hume pointed out, the notion cause is not plain. It is more
than sequence, or correlation; for causes have, or at least are supposed to
have, one-way direction in time. Thus if event A causes event B, A must
have occurred before B. There may, however, be a common ancestral
causal event, C. If C causes A and B, then A and B may occur simultaneously, or in either order of precedence. So causes cannot be simply
inferred from observed sequences: though particular causal hypotheses
may be ruled out by observed sequences.
There can be sequences or regularities for which no cause is attributable.
A classical case is, day following night. Day does not cause night, nor night
cause day, yet they follow in sequence (so far) without exception. We understand this from our conceptual model of the solar system - the earth rotating and so on. Within this model it is absurd to say that day causes night, or
that night causes day. They are not causally related; in the way that a nail is
driven by a hammer, or the hammer becomes worn or dented by hitting
nails. Neither is there a simple ancestral common cause. We might say that
day is “caused” by the sun shining on a given region of the earth, and that
the sequence day—night is given by the earth’s rotation with respect to the
sun. We must appreciate the complex solar system model to ascribe any
Regarding Consciousness 35
such causal relation, linking day with night. This inspires the thought that
perhaps we cannot link brain states and consciousness causally except by
some general model, which we do not as yet appreciate. This would be an
adequate account of psycho-physics. This model might look very odd
indeed, and yet be acceptable to science, if we may judge from weird current
accounts of particle physics invoking extremely counter-intuitive concepts
and linking relations which indeed are hardly causal in any traditional
sense. Though extremely odd they are (though I do not entirely understand
why) acceptable science. This is so for the more familiar statistical regularities of matter from random (and perhaps uncaused) quantal jumps of subatomic particles. Indeed, randomness is itself a tricky issue, if only because
it can be attributed to (1) lack of evidence of cause; or (2) very many causal
influences; or (3) no causal influences. Quantal jumps of sub-atornic particles are generally accepted as individually uncaused; but, when averaged
in large populations, they give macroscopic stability and predictable lawfulness to objects. A candle flame is a beautiful example of statistics of quantal
jumps of energy producing the appearance of an object, with sharp outlines
(the flame), from a continuous temperature gradient.
Interestingly, the apparent size of the flame is set by the spectral sensitivity characteristic of our eyes. The same considerations apply to the
apparent size of the sun as photographed at different wavelengths. I
consider that such examples go to show that what seem objects of the
physical world—as well as what seems causal and caused—is no simple
matter; but are given by matching characteristics of data and observer. It
is this relation which determines our consciousness of reality.
The importance for object-perception of this kind of matching applies
to time as well as space. This is clear from the dramatic change of appearance of speeded—up or slowed—down film (say of the movements of clouds)
which shows that what are taken as objects is very different when the
time-scale is changed, with respect to the temporal characteristics of our
visual sensory channel. This, in turn, affects how we attribute cause — for
cause is applied to what are accepted as separate, but interacting, objects.
This has relevance to the classical consciousness problem: Does consciousness interact with brain states: or are they ultimately the same? There is,
of course, far more to how we classify patterned stimuli as representing
more or less separate objects: this includes stimulus pattern or shape
characteristics, and it involves the whole of perceptual learning. This issue
36 Richard L. Gregory
has conceptual relevance to the classical consciousness problems: Does
consciousness, or do states of consciousness, interact with brain states, or
are they ultimately the same? It is relevant also to how conscious states
are structured; and to how we should think of one state affecting another
which, following Hume, is a central question in controversies on the
nature of self-identity.
To say that consciousness and certain brain states are the same (and so
have no causal relations) is some kind of identity theory. To say that
consciousness and brain states are separate implies that there is some kind
of relation between them —which may or may not be causal. If causal, it
might be two-way interaction or one-way control, by brain or by mind.
So we have a number of possibilities to examine, and for each we should
consider whether there is or could be empirical evidence. I shall not go
exhaustively (and exhaustingly) through all these; but will extend a
physical analogy suggested by Leibniz, which may be of some help at
least as an aide-mémoire.
KINDS OF MlND—BRAlN PARALLELISM COMPARED WITH
SYNCHRONIZED CLOCKS
Consider two clocks which keep the same time. They thus run 111
parallel”, in time. It is time-parallelism which is suggested for mind—brain
(or psycho—physical) parallelism. Brain states and consciousness may
appear to be quite different — so we may imagine our clocks as very different though they run parallel in time. There are several ways of achieving
parallel-time clocks. Each suggests a relation to be considered for mindbrain parallelism. The relations are between Masters, Slaves and Repeaters
— by analogy with electrically synchronized clocks. It is worth noting that
all these clock systems do exist. These are the three kinds of clock:
1. Master clocks: which are autonomous timekeepers.
2. Slave clocks: which are autonomous timekeepers, but receive frequent corrections from the Master.
3. Repeater dials: which follow or count pulses (including domestic
electric clocks run off the mains). They depend on uninterrupted
Master signals to keep going, but may have ‘ ‘catch-up” mechanisms
to restart them correctly.
Regarding Consciousness 37
Suppose that the brain and mind are separate entities, with physical
and mental events running parallel in time, like a pair of our clocks.
Suppose also that there may be some kind of causal link (analogous to
electrical clock-pulses) to synchronize them. We can look at clock systems
of these kinds and ask which (perhaps by assuming horological technology,
or more general knowledge of interacting systems) would work best.
1. Master—Master: a pair of Master clocks keeping the same time,
though without causal links of any kind. This is the most unlikely
horologically, as in practice clocks always differ in their rates.
2. Master—Slave: the autonomous Master provides occasional corrections to the Slave. This is an autonomous clock, which is generally
set to run either slightly fast or slow, so that the correcting signals
are of only one sign. If the correction signals are lost, the Slave will
continue running, though slow or fast.
3. Master—Repeater: a Master providing a steady flow of signals to a
Repeater dial. If the signals are interrupted, when restarted the
Repeater dial will always be slow by the lost time, until it is reset.
Resetting may be automatic.
4. Slave—S1ave.' there might be a pair of (or better very many) interacting
Slaves, each correcting the others so that there is a pooled average
time. There would be small varying discrepancies but on average
they would agree with each other in this democracy.
The remaining logical possibilities remain empty, for neither Slave nor
Repeater can drive a Repeater or a Master Clock, and one Master driving
another denies the “Master” status. The Master—Repeater relation is
most used, as it is simple and cheap. It has the grave disadvantage that a
momentary loss of Master signal gives a permanent error, which must be
corrected. The Master—Slave is interesting, in that the two clocks are not
continually but only on average synchronized.
The least likely alternative is (l) the Master——Master relation, in which
neither affects the other. It is virtually impossible to get a pair of
independent clocks to run in step, so we should not on this analogy expect
independent mind—brain parallelism. (Of course one might use this for
fanciful theories: for example that there is loss of synchronism with
ageing—and that this explains increasing absent-mindedness and lack of
contact with reality in old people.)
38 Richard L. Gregory
All these analogy—examples adopt the underlying assumption of a representational account of perception; and that Direct Realism is false. A Direct
Realist horological example would be sundials. They keep time by direct
“contact” with an aspect of the physical world, which is accepted as
time. Since adopting atomic time standards, and rejecting the earth’s
rotation and so the sun’s shadow as time, sundials now can —and
do—run fast or slow (apart from the equation of time correction for
mean solar time). So the realist account would now be given by atomic
clocks rather than by sundials. On this analogy with sundials or atomic
clocks consciousness is selections of physical reality: features of physical
reality are held to be conscious. This gives the brain no role beyond that
of a passive filter. I assume here that this doctrine is false: that the brain
does have some special importance for consciousness and that other
objects are not conscious, and do not confer consciousness.
This might be an empirical issue for experiment. Indeed I think one can
give strong empirical evidence against Direct Realist theories of perception;
though I shall not give the evidence here.
EVIDENCE FOR CAUSAL EFFECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
We seldom doubt that physical events, especially stimuli of various
kinds, affect consciousness. The sensation of a pin stuck in the finger is
sufficient example. It is not, however, at all so clear that this sensation, or
any other, has any effect. Indeed, the sensation of pain generally, and
perhaps always, comes too late to serve as a cause of action—such as
withdrawing the hand from hurt. We start to feel the pain after the
(reflex) withdrawal of the hand. Is there any evidence for consciousness
affecting behaviour?
William James discusses mind affecting brain in The Principles of
Psychology (1890), under the heading “The Intimate Nature of the
Attentive Process”. On page 434 he gives as examples (his italics):
1. The accommodation or adjustment of the sensory organs
and
2. The anticipatory preparation from within of the ideational centres
concerned with the object of which the attention is paid.
Regarding Consciousness 39
The point he makes here is that the eyes are adjusted prior to (in
anticipation of) what visual signals will be needed; so their movements
are not always controlled by physical stimuli. This may occur in darkness —
in the absence of any visual stimuli — according to purely internal processes
of mental images.
The question is: Do we know that it is mental events which are moving
the eyes; or is it internal physical events? This question must be asked, for
it is clear that there are physical (physiological) processes capable of
moving the eyes from within. (If everything inside the skull could be said
to be mental, the situation would be much simpler!)
William James goes on to consider various perceptual examples of
what he thinks might be mind controlling brain. He cites an interesting
observation of He1mholtz’s, which I am not sure has been investigated
since. Helmholtz found that simple stereograms could be made to fuse by
will, when presented as after—images from the flash of a single spark, so
that eye movements are ineffective. Helmholtz says: "If I chance to gain
a lively mental image of the represented solid form (a thing that often
occurs by lucky chance) I then move my two eyes with perfect certainty
over the figure without the picture separating again.” This must be a
“central" effect because the after—images are stuck to the eyes. William James, however, is careful to point out that it could be other
physical brain processes which are affecting the fusion of the images —in
which case such effects would be no evidence for mind affecting brain.
I shall quote James in full here from Principles (p. 447):
When, a few pages back, I symbolized the ldeational preparation element in
attention by a brain—cell played upon from within, I added “by other braincells, or by some spiritual force’ ’ without deciding which. The question ‘
‘which? ’ ’ is one of those central psychological mysteries which part the
schools. When we reflect that the turnings of our attention form the nucleus of
our inner self; when we see that volition is nothing but attention; when we
believe that our autonomy in the midst of nature depends on our not being pure
effect, but a cause — Principium quoddam quod fait foedera rumpat,
Ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur — we must admit that the question whether
attention involves such a principle of spiritual activity or not is metaphysical
as well as psychological, and is well worthy of all the pains we can bestow on
its solution. It is in fact the pivotal question of metaphysics, the very hinge
on which our picture of the world shall swing from materialism, fatalism,
monism, towards spiritualism, freedom, pluralism, — or else the other way.
James himself inclines to thinking that attention and will do have
significant effects — especially (p. 453): “It would deepen and prolong the
40 Richard L. Gregory
stay in consciousness of innumerable ideas which else would fade more
quickly away.”
James ends this discussion by objecting to the materialist analogy with
the sense of will occurring during difficulty as being merely physical (like
the turbulence of rivers in constricted regions) (p. 454). He waxes eloquent:
Meanwhile, in view of the strange arrogance with which the wildest materialistic
speculations persist in calling themselves "science”, it is well to recall just
what the reasoning is, by which the effect—theory of attention is confirmed. It
is an argument from analogy, drawn from rivers, reflex actions and other material
phenomena where no consciousness appears to exist at all, and extended to cases
where consciousness seems the phenomenon’s essential feature. The consciousness
doesn’t count, these reasoners say; it doesn’t exist for science, it is nil; you
mustn’t think about it at all.
The intensely reckless character of all this needs no comment. . . . For the
sake of that theory we make inductions from phenomena to others that are
startlingly unlike them; and we assume that a complication which Nature has
introduced (the presence of feeling and of effort, namely) is not worthy of
scientific recognition at all. Such conduct may conceivably be wise, though I
doubt it; but scientific, as contrasted with metaphysical, it cannot seriously
he called.
Whatever the reader makes of William James’s impassioned prose, in
favour of mind controlling brain, it may be agreed that he states very
clearly this traditional view: that consciousness has significant if small
effects on perceiving, thinking and behaviour.
This view has recently been defended by Sir Karl Popper and Sir Jack
Eccles, in The Self and its Brain (1977). They take two cases of what they
regard as evidence for mind affecting brain:
1. The reports of people having their brains electrically stimulated
while undergoing brain surgery, who experience streams of memories
of other mental images, and at the same time are aware that they are
in the operating theatre.
2. Speeding or slowing down of Necker cube reversals by act of will.
These are taken as evidence — but without explicit reference to the alternative which James considers, though does not like — that other physical
brain processes produce or inhibit changes in the Necker cube reversals,
or whatever; and that the two experiences of the brain—operation patient
are given by two sets of physical brain processes. Actually it is not at all
clear to me why this particular example is supposed by Popper and Eccles
to have special power to persuade us; I can read a book, listen to the
radio and feel hungry at the same time: which of these is supposed
Regarding Consciousness 41
mental, which physical? They should have considered not only two, but
three or more simultaneous experiences or activities; do we have a mind
(or brain) for each?
For Popper and Eccles mind and brain are separate, with weak and
slow—acting control of brain by mind. Thus, Popper writing on page 514:
. . . there are two kinds of illusions — illusions delivered to us or imposed
upon us by the brain; and illusions which have a mental origin, let us say.
wish—fulfilment. It is apparently built into our organism and into the whole
“mechanism of interaction“ between the brain and the mind that the mind should
be in many respects dependent on the brain, in order not to fall too easily into
that kind of illusion which we experience in fantasy.
I would say that this whole field can be used to show at the same time a kind of
gulf and also a kind of dependence between the self-conscious mind and the
brain.
Do illusions give us the right to make such statements? Granted we can
perceive one thing and know at the same time that this perception is
false —but surely it by no means follows that one of these, perception or
knowledge, is mental and the other physical. Indeed computers could not
be given check procedures involving recognizing discrepancies if this were
so. All we can infer is that the brain can process more than one thing at a
time, and that discrepancies can be noted—as when we recognize an
illusion. Of course this could be rewritten “the mind can process more
than one thing at a time . . .” but this again gives no reason for saying
that there is evidence here of mind and brain as separate, interacting
entities. I conclude that James’s alternative (which he disliked) is in no
way discounted by such evidence. In every case. it seems, one can argue
that it is some other brain process which intervenes —not mind or consciousness.
WHEN ARE WE MOST AWARE?
It is worth considering under which conditions we are most conscious.
or aware —and relate these to our ability at skills and how we behave. I
think I am most aware at surprise, and when things go wrong. Thus when
driving a car I am scarcely conscious of the situation until something
surprising happens. Consciousness seems to be associated with
mismatches between predictions and events as signalled. If this is correct,
and if consciousness does have causal effects, I suppose it might be
42 Richard L. Gregory
supposed to select fresh predictive models— “internal models” as
Kenneth Craik called them — or fresh hypotheses of reality or fiction. But
again it is not at all clear that this observed association is evidence of
a causal relation; or if it is causal, in which direction the cause goes. There
is no reason to suppose that awareness causes changes of predictive
models or perceptual hypotheses even if we are most aware in these
situations.
Should we look beyond normal brain function for evidence of mind
affecting matter—to alleged paranormal phenomena? I think there are
severe logical problems in such an undertaking, at least before we are
clearer what we should mean by “paranormal”. This we shall now
briefly discuss.
EVIDENCE OF CAUSAL CONSCIOUSNESS FROM PARANORMAL
PHENOMENA
If it could be shown that mind affects matter other than via the
nervous system, would we have evidence for causal mind?
There is not, it seems, any clear evidence from neurology that
behaviour is controlled by a separate interacting mind or consciousness:
so why should breaking the neural link —as for telekinesis where distant
objects unconnected by nerve fibres, or the body, are supposed to move
by mental cause — give better evidence?
Returning to our discussion of the meaning of “paranormal” (p. 32)
we distinguished between a weak and a strong sense. The weak sense
concerns phenomena which are odd and difficult to explain, but which
might receive explanation within present or conceivable future science.
The strong sense of “paranormal” concerns phenomena which are still
odder and more difficult to explain, for it is being claimed that
explanation is not possible within present or any future science. This at
once raises the question: can we make the claim with certainty that
phenomena cannot be explained by any future science? I fail to
understand how such a claim could be justified. It is tantamount to
saying that only limited paradigm shifts of science are possible: but how
can this be shown? After all, there have been quite remarkable paradigm
shifts during this present century.
Regarding Consciousness 43
What the strong sense amounts to, I think, is that we cannot at present
see how such alleged phenomena can be reconciled within current or
predictable future paradigms of science. This claim may depend purely
upon limited imagination. Even if telepathy, telekinesis, or whatever were
shown convincingly to occur (and at present I am not convinced), the
phenomena could not, without highly questionable assumptions, be used
to justify mind affecting brain. This is more than a question of whether
this is the best hypothesis (which holds for interpretations of all
observations and empirical claims) for a sufficiently drastic paradigm
change might change “paranormal” to “normal”. If I am right that
claims of paranormal can only be made within fixed paradigm systems, I
do not see how any inferences from what are claimed as paranormal can
be made: for the (strong and weak senses of) “paranormal” preclude
inferences within accepted data-bases and inference structures.
IDENTITY THEORIES
Although the notion of mind as being different and essentially separate
from, though somehow causally linked to, the brain is the traditional
view through the recorded history of philosophy and religions, there is
remarkably little if indeed any evidence for it, and there are severe
conceptual difficulties. It would be much neater to suppose that mind
and brain are essentially one-different aspects of the same thing. To
show how this could be so is the aim of Identity Theories.
I shall introduce the notion with the words not of a philosopher, but of
a nineteenth-century naturalist. who was a personal friend of Darwin,
and who concerned himself with the evolution of mind—George John
Romanes (1848-94). In his Mind and Motion (1885), Romanes writes
(see Body and Mind (1964), ed. G. Vesey, p. 183):
We have only to suppose that the antithesis between mind and motion — subject
and object—is itself phenomenal or apparent: not absolute or real. We have only
to suppose that the seeming quality is relative to our modes of apprehension;
and, therefore, that any change taking place in the mind, and any corresponding
change taking place in the brain, are really not two changes, but one change.
This is a remarkably clear statement of the mind—brain identity notion.
Romanes continues:
44 Richard L. Gregory
When a violin is played upon we hear a musical sound and at the same time we see
a vibration of the strings. Relatively to our consciousness, therefore, we have
here two sets of changes, which appear to be very different in kind: and yet we
know that in an absolute sense they are one and the same: we know that the
diversity in consciousness is created only by the difference in our modes of
perceiving the same event — whether we see or whether we hear the vibration of
the strings. Similarly we may suppose that a vibration of nerve—strings and a
process of thought is really one and the same event, which is dual or diverse to
our modes of perceiving it.
The great advantage of this theory is that it supposes only one stream of
causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously concerned.
Romanes regards this identity as an hypothesis— for which there is no
evidence but which is for him “the only one which is logically possible,
and at the same time competent to satisfy all the facts alike of the outer
and the inner world’ ’.
This is in many ways a highly attractive account. It does, however,
raise questions which are far from resolved. In the first place, much
clearly hinges here on what we mean by “identity”. It cannot be taken to
mean that everything we say of brain states we can say of consciousness.
The problem indeed is to find anything in common! So this is no
“surface” identity. What criteria for identity should, then, be satisfied
for brain states to be accepted as identical with conscious states? If we
have to accept criteria for “identity” which would be accepted in other
cases (such as electron flow and lightning, or electro-magnetic radiation
and light) just how like such cases does the mind—consciousness relation
have to be to be accepted as an “identity”?
If it is a unique case — and this is the trouble about consciousness — it is
helpful to apply criteria taken by such analogies? At least two criteria for
“identity” between two things (A and B) would normally be demanded.
First, that there are precisely related time relations between the
occurrences, or changes, in A and in B. Secondly, that A and B are
coincident in space. Whether there are exact time relations between brain
states and consciousness seems to be an empirical question which might
be answered by experiment. Spatial coincidence of brain states and
consciousness poses a deeper problem; for it seems misleading to say that
consciousness occupies space. How then can brain states and
consciousness be identical, if one occupies space and the other does not!
Could this, though, be a case where we take over criteria of “identity”
from common physical object examples which are inappropriate for this
peculiar case?
Regarding Consciousness 45
Since the brain exists in space but experiences do not, for the identity
theory to be accepted, should we relax the usual spatial requirement for
identity? We do often allow that two things can be in some ways identical
though they have spatial differences. For example, a brick and a pail of
water may have the same weight. Their weights are identical though their
shapes, etc., are quite different. Can mind—brain identity be such a nonspatial identity? This would require that some non—spatial characteristic
of the brain is identical with consciousness. For the brick and bucket of
water we found a common non—spatial property (weight) and many
others could be suggested —so non—spatial identity of consciousness and
brain would not be a unique kind of identity. What, then, should we
suppose is identical?
DO WE LIVE IN QUOTATION MARKS?
It does seem clear that brain states symbolize events and concepts; so
they are like words in a book. A kind of identity which I consider should
be explored here is between symbol and symbolized. It is not identity in a
wide strict sense: it is rather a stands for, or an equivalent to, relation.
The sentence: “there are six beans in this box” stands for, and for some
purposes is equivalent to, the box with six beans in it, provided that the
sentence can be read. Perhaps consciousness is reading the world. The
nearest I can come to an understanding is to say that: the brain puts
reality into quotation marks. We seem to live inside our brain’s
quotations.
MACHINE CONSCIOUSNESS
Mind seems more mysterious than matter; but if we ask “What is
matter?” do we get an answer? If we ask “What are the ultimate
particles of matter made of?” we get no more of an answer than we do
when we ask “What is mind?”. We can, however, say a great deal about
relational aspects of matter: about generalizations and laws which make
predictions possible; and especially conceptual causal models, which give
unique intellectual satisfaction. It is this which is absent from accounts of
mind and consciousness. Most accounts of mind are analogies with
accounts of physical substances and the sometimes surprising “emergent”
46 Richard L. Gregory
properties of, especially, chemical combinations of atoms into other substances having (at least on inadequate accounts) surprising properties which
seem to pop up mind-like: as ideas, inventions, and indeed perceptions
seem to emerge from situations. Ideas are sometimes seen as embedded in
inexperienced “mind substance”. Physics is, however, more concerned
with structures than substance. In physics, surely, the term “substance’ ’ is
as mysterious and probably as meaningless as the term “mind’ ’ conceived
as an underlying primeval glue, sticking bits of consciousness and
behaviour together to give the self-identity of a person. Hume was surely
right to reject this, but until we have functional models approaching the
adequacy of accounts in engineering, mind must appear unexplained. The
best hope for developing precise and detailed models of mind seems now to
be the procedures for problem solving developed for“artificial intelligence”
of robot machines. As they begin to solve problems we find difficult (and
even impossible), and as they begin to learn, and recognize objects with their
television-camera eyes, so we must ask, “Will they become conscious?”
Philosophers might be persuaded that they are, if the machines spend
time speculating on whether we are conscious. For the common man, it
may depend, rather, on whether they share jokes and opinions which
inspire our loyalty. Animals and humans which do not share these are
doubtfully conscious.
Suppose, though, that A.I. machines prove never to be highly
successful. Would this be attributed to their lack of consciousness? This
could be evidence that consciousness is causally important in us. This
might be shown if A.I. reaches a ceiling too low, and unexplainable by
limited computing power and concepts of intelligence. If, on the other
hand, A.I. machines do come to rival us, and we hold that they are not
conscious, then it will be hard to hold that consciousness has causal
effects for us—at least for anything for which machine performance
rivals ours. This would, say, rule out consciousness as important for
problem—solving, though it might allow consciousness the role of setting
up aesthetic preferences and goals and action. Such conclusions could
follow empirically from successes or failures of machine replications of
human capacities to decide, solve and do.
Meanwhile, I see no reason to suppose that consciousness is a separate
entity, affecting brain and behaviour. Some kind of identity with brain
function seems a better bet; but if so, it is a limited identity and hard to
Regarding Consciousness 47
specify. One might guess that it is something to do with symbols and how
they symbolize. If this is so (and the notion is vague) we may have to
suspect that future machines, capable of rivalling us by the power of
symbols, will be our conscious brothers.
REFERENCES
James, William, Principles of Psychology, 1890.
Popper, K. and Eccles, J. The Self and its Brain, 1977.
Romanes, G. J., Mind and Motion, 1885. (Passage in Body and Mind, ed. G. N. A.
Vesey, Allen & Unwin, 1963, pp. l80~6).
48 Richard L. Gregory
Discussion
VESEY:
I have two related comments, both about the problem of “the gap between matter
and mind”. The first is about one of the supposed solutions to the problem, the
so—called “Identity Theory”. The second is much more general.
You said something about “the status of verification criteria" for the identity
theory. As you know, the people who hold the theory say that the identity in
question is an empirical or contingent one, like the identity of a flash of
lightning and an electrical discharge (J. J. C. Smart, Philosophical Review,
LXVIII, 141-56, 1959).Evidently you don’t think that answers your question about
the status of the theory. Why not? More specifically, would you agree with the
following criticism of the assimilation of mind-brain identity to lightning—
electricity identity? The statement “Sensations are identical with brain
processes” is about a whole philosophical category of things. It isn’t just
about, say, sensations of being tickled. But the statement “Flashes of lightning
are identical with electrical discharges” is not about a whole, philosophical
category of things. It isn’t about the whole class of things in the ordinarily
accepted world of experience—as opposed to that of things in the world of the
physical sciences. It is not even about the whole class of visible phenomena. In
short, the two statements are not on a par. A closer parallel to “Sensations are
identical with brain processes” would be "Things in the ordinarily accepted
world of everyday experience are identical with things in the world of the
physical sciences”. But to say that is to let the cat—meaning the status
question—wel1 and truly out of the bag. If “Sensations are identical with brain
processes" is like “Things in the ordinarily accepted world, etc.“, is it a
scientific hypothesis? (If so, what would falsify it?)
Or is it a methodological postulate? (If so, why would not a statement of
isomorphism, or what used to be called “psycho-physical parallelism”, serve as
well?) And so on.
My second, much more general, comment is intended to undercut the whole
endeavour in which identity theorists and other are engaged. It occurs to me
that if I were to ask you a question about the concept of perception — for
example, “Should we think of perception in stimulus-response terms?” —- you
would not be at a loss for an answer. It is only when a question like “What is
the relation of mind and matter?” is asked that people don't know what to say.
This makes me wonder whether the fault is not in the formulation of the question
— implying, as it does, that we know something the word “mind" stands for, and
know something else the word “matter" stands for, but somehow can’t penetrate to
how the two things are connected. Do you share my feeling that if we have an
adequate conceptual understanding of things that distinguish people from lumps
of matter —I mean things like their being able to perceive things, and to do
things for which they can be held morally responsible, and, more than anything
else, to enter into conversation with us — we know all there is to know about
the concept of mind? Do you, like me, think that the idea that there is some
sort of higher-order truth about the relationship of two substances, mind and
matter, is a myth left over from our Cartesian past?
CHAPTER 3
Is Consciousness a Phenomenon?
H.C. LONGUET—HIGGINS
University of Sussex
In this short contribution to our discussion of “Consciousness and the
Physical World” I do not propose to offer solutions to any scientific
problems about consciousness, but merely to make some observations on
how we use the word “conscious”, and on whether consciousness can
legitimately be regarded as a “phenomenon” in the same sense as gravity
or morphogenesis, to be explained in ordinary scientific terms.
I completely agree with Godfrey Vesey, and Wittgenstein before him,
that many intellectual headaches are due to negligence about the use of
words, and can be dispelled by proper attention to the everyday use of
language. The word “consciousness” occurs most naturally in contexts
such as “I lost consciousness” or “He regained consciousness”, where
the state of consciousness is clearly being contrasted with more passive
states such as sleep, coma or trance. When we visit a seriously injured
person, and cannot tell whether he is conscious or not, what is the nature
of our concern? We are wondering, surely, whether he is aware of what is
going on around him—whether he is having experiences, pleasant or
painful, which he might subsequently be able to recall. If, on a later
occasion, he can accurately report events in which he was involved at a
particular time, then we have no doubt that he was conscious at that time.
So although the ability to commit experience to memory may not suffice
to define the conscious state, it does seem to be a peculiarly characteristic
property of that state.
If consciousness is hard to define, self-consciousness is even harder.
But the commonplace sentiment “I was acutely self-conscious” points
the way to some relevant considerations. It indicates that the speaker was
49
50 H. C. Longuet—Higgins
observing himself and his actions in a way similar to that in which other
people might be observing him. Most people feel sure that monkeys, for
example, must be conscious, and possibly even self-conscious. But any
satisfactory definition of consciousness, or of self—consciousness, should
in principle be applicable to any system, biological or other, which was
capable of processing information. If someone were to design an
apparently intelligent robot, the definition ought to enable us to decide
whether or not the robot was conscious, by studying in detail the
programme which controlled it. At present we have only the haziest
notions as to what criteria might be relevant, but presumably they would
have to be couched in logical or psychological terms, rather than in the
language of electronics or solid-state physics. Presumably the system
would have to possess a memory, both of its experiences and of its own
responses to those experiences; presumably also. its representation of the
world would have to include a representation of the robot itself, for it to
meet the criteria of self-consciousness. But there would be formidable
problems of principle, to do with the appropriateness of any such
psychological account of the physical processes taking place inside it; and
the implementation of such proposals is a task altogether beyond the
scope of present achievements in “artificial intelligence”.
A quite different approach to the concept of consciousness takes as its
starting-point the theory of observation, as often propounded in
connection with the interpretation of modern physics, especially quantum
mechanics. The orthodox view is that the complete “Laplacian” account
of physical reality is a myth, and that all we can hope for is statistical laws
which correlate descriptions of the world at different times. These
descriptions must be couched in terms of “observations” (of complete
sets of commuting observables). What intervenes between two states so
specified is amenable to mathematical calculation but not to observation;
the only “phenomena” admitted by the theory are the observations
themselves, and the concept of an observation seems to depend crucially
on the concept of an observer. So if consciousness is that state of being
which enables the observer to observe, it must belong to a different
ontological category from anything that he observes, and cannot be
classified as a physical phenomenon, in the strict sense of that term.
The latter part of this argument is my own gloss on the orthodox
theory of observation, but comes close to the view expounded by
Is Consciousness a Phenomenon? 51
Heisenberg in his book The Philosophy of Physics. But whether or not it
stands up to critical examination, it does suggest that attempts to
construct a scientific account of consciousness may be doomed to
failure from the start. We may succeed in understanding, in evolutionary
terms, how creatures have evolved which can evidently commit their
experiences to memory and thereby profit from their failures and
successes, but that is an altogether different enterprise from trying to
describe a subjective state in objective terms.
When this meeting was first being planned, its provisional title was
“Possible Effects of Consciousness on the Physical World”. So let me
devote the rest of this paper to some issues which that title suggests.
First, it is undeniable that human beings affect the world all the time,
not only in accidental ways, such as exhaling carbon dioxide, but also by
design — through conscious decisions, translated into action. Unless one is
a Cartesian dualist, perplexed as to how the mind can affect the body,
there need be no mystery, in principle, about our ability to do things on
purpose. Have we ourselves not designed machines which, under the
control of computer programmes, can respond in quite complex ways to
stimuli from their environments; and as for our own bodies, do we not
possess brains which, beyond doubt, carry out the logical processes which
we describe as our thoughts? It is unnecessary, and solves no problems,
to postulate the existence of a ‘ ‘homunculus’ ’ sitting at the controls of the
brain (possibly somewhere near the pineal gland) and transforming the
aspirations of the soul into physical stimuli acting on the brain; the
required transformations would be just as problematical as the mindbody interaction hypothesis itself.
One need not suppose, then, that the microscopic cerebral events which
mediate consciousness are any different physically from those which
have been studied experimentally in similar systems. But those events are
of no particular interest in themselves, except to a neurophysiologist or
neurochemist. What concerns us as human beings is their collective
outcome, which we can only interpret in terms of concepts such as
motive, intention, decision and action. An action, as Vesey reminds us, is
much more than a complex train of physical events, it is something that a
person does, and something we may or may not hold him responsible for.
The exercise of the will, which we normally regard as a manifestation
of consciousness, presents the psychologist — and the philosopher — with
52 H. C. Longuet-Higgins
a number of difficult problems. Certain sorts of behaviour for which
people used to be held responsible are now seen as unconscious or
uncontrollable; other kinds of activity, conventionally classified as
‘ ‘autonomic’ ’ , are now known to be accessible to voluntary control. There
is much evidence that people can be trained to control their pulse rates
and skin responses, and to weep spontaneously, though at the present
time the physiological mechanisms are quite obscure.
But I suspect that more may have been in the minds of the organizers:
perhaps such putative phenomena as levitation, psychokinesis, telepathy
and clairvoyance. It would, of course, be unhelpful merely to dismiss
such claims as founded on delusion, deceit or experimental
incompetence. But the fact remains that a mere set of observations does
not constitute a natural phenomenon. To establish a new phenomenon
which contravenes accepted laws demands that the relevant observations
be exhibited as instances of a clearly stated generalization, and that a
convincing reason be given for accepting this generalization in the face of
the evidence for the laws in question. And finally, the authentication of
one or more “psychic” phenomena would not put an end to the matter:
we should then be hard put to it to understand what need human beings
have for hands, feet, eyes, ears and voices.
Is Consciousness a Phenomenon? 53
Discussion
VESEY:
The first sense of the word “consciousness” you mentioned was that in which the
state of consciousness is opposed to states such as sleep, coma or trance. I
suppose there may be borderline cases but, for the most part, I think, we know
where we stand with that sense of “consciousness”. That is, we can usually tell
whether someone is conscious or not; and the question “What is the use of being
conscious?“ has the obvious answer “Well, if everyone were always asleep, or in
a coma or trance, our days would be numbered”. Now, two of our fellow
symposiasts, Nick Humphrey and Horace Barlow, evidently regard the usefulness
question as requiring some other, less obvious, answer. Presumably they are not
using the term “consciousness" in the sense in which it is opposed to sleep,
etc. So, in what sense are they using it‘? How is their use of the term related
to the one in which consciousness is opposed to sleep? What are the criteria of
application of the term in their sense? Is one of the senses more basic than the
other?
JOSEPHSON:
You say it solves no problems to postulate a “homunculus” sitting at the
controls of the brain transforming the aspirations of the soul into physical
stimuli acting on the brain. But if we are trying to understand a complex
system, it is always helpful to try to subdivide it into components having
particular roles, and the hypothesis you refer to may be an extremely useful one
in the long run, even if it is far from leading to a complete solution of the
problem when standing by itself. In biological systems we do this subdivision
all the time (with conceptual components such as the circulatory system and the
immune system), and even in artificial intelligence we find such divisions of
function in the most advanced systems, such as Sussman‘s Conceptual Model of
Skill Acquisition (HACKER). Separation of the total system into the knower, what
he knows, and the consequences of that knowledge, may be the most important step
we can take towards the understanding of the nature of intelligence.
PART II
Consciousness and Behaviour
CHAPTER 4
Nature's Psychologists*
N. K. HUMPHREY
University of Cambridge
On the temple at Delphi was written the stern message “Know thyself”.
Did the oracle realize she was uttering an evolutionary imperative? I shall
argue presently that self—knowledge, and through it the possibility of
“intuitive” knowledge of others, has made an essential contribution to
the biological fitness of man and certain other social animals. The means
to self—knowledge have consequently been promoted and perfected by
selection. Within this argument lies a theory of the evolution of consciousness; within it, too, lie some humbler ideas about the evolution of overt
behaviour.
In The Nature of Explanation‘ Kenneth Craik outlined an “Hypothesis
on the nature of thought”, proposing that “the nervous system is .. . a
calculating machine capable of modelling or paralleling external events.
... If the organism carries a ‘small-scale model’ of external reality and of
its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before
they arise, utilize the knowledge of past events in dealing with the future,
and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer and more competent
manner to the emergencies which face it.” The notion of a “mental model
of reality” has become in the years since so widely accepted that it has
grown to be almost a cliche of experimental psychology. And like other
cliches its meaning is no longer called in question. From the outset Craik’s
‘This paper is based on the Lister Lecture delivered at the B.A.A.S. meeting,
September
1977.
57
58 N. K. Humphrey
“hypothesis” begged some fundamental questions: A model of reality?
What reality? Whose reality?
My dog and I live in the same house. Do we share the same “reality”?
Certainly we share the same physical environment, and most aspects of
that physical environment are probably as real for one of us as for the
other. Maybe our realities differ only in the trivial sense that we each
know a few things about the house that the other does not—the dog
(having a better nose than I) knows better the smell of the carpet, I (having
a better pair of eyes) know better the colour of the curtain. Now, suppose
my dog chews up the gas bill which is lying on the mat by the door. Is the
reality of that event the same for him as me? Something real enough has
happened for us both, and the same piece of paper is involved. The dog
hangs his head in contrition. Is he contrite because he has chewed up the
gas bill? What does a dog know about gas bills! Gas bills are an important
part of my external reality, but they are surely none of his.
If mine and the dog’s realities differ in this and other more important
ways they do so because we have learned to conceptualize the world on
different lines. To the dog paper is paper, to me it is newspaper or lavatory
paper or greaseproof paper or a letter from my friend. These ways of
looking at paper are essentially human ways, conditioned of course by
culture, but a culture which is a product of a specifically human nature.
I and the dog are involved with different aspects of reality because, at
bottom, we are biologically adapted to lead different kinds of lives.
To all biological intents and purposes the portion of reality which
matters to any particular animal is that portion of which it must have a
working knowledge in the interests of its own survival. Because animals
differ in their life—styles they face different kinds of “emergencies” and
they must therefore have different kinds of knowledge if they are to react
in the full, safe, competent manner which Craik — and natural selectionrecommends.
But different kinds of knowledge entail different ways of knowing. In so
far as animals are biologically adapted to deal specifically with their own
portions of reality, so must their nervous “calculating machines” be
adapted to construct very different kinds of models. This is not to say
merely that the calculating machines may be required to do different kinds
of sums, but rather that they may have to work according to quite different
heuristic principles. Depending on the job for which Nature has designed
Nature’s Psychologists 59
them the nervous systems will differ in the kind of concepts they employ,
the logical calculus they use, the laws of causation they assume, and so on.
They will differ in what may properly be called their “ideologies”.
Ideology, in the sense I use the term, means simply a framework of ideas.
Ideologies provide, if you like, the “conceptual language” in terms of
which questions are asked, calculations made and answers given.
Let us call these nervous calculating machines “minds”. It is the thesis
of this paper that a revolutionary advance in the evolution of mind
occurred when, for certain social animals, a new set of heuristic principles
was devised to cope with the pressing need to model a special section of
reality —— the reality comprised by the behaviour of other kindred animals.
The trick which Nature came up with was introspection; it proved possible
for an individual to develop a model of the behaviour of others by reasoning by analogy from his own case, the facts of his own case being revealed
to him through “examination of the contents of consciousness”.
For man and other animals which live in complex social groups reality
is in larger measure a “social reality”. No other class of environmental
objects approaches in biological significance those living bodies which
constitute for a social animal its companions, playmates, rivals, teachers,
foes. It depends on the bodies of other conspecific animals not merely for
its immediate sustenance in infancy and its sexual fulfilment as an adult,
but in one way or another for the success (or failure) of almost every
enterprise it undertakes. In these circumstances the ability to model the
behaviour of others in the social group has paramount survival value.
I have argued in more detail before now that the modelling of other
animals’ behaviour is not only the most important but also the most
difficult task to which social animals must turn their minds? In retrospect
I do not think I took my own case seriously enough. The task of modelling
behaviour does indeed demand formidable intellectual skill —social
animals have evolved for that reason to be the most intelligent of animals —
but intelligence alone is not enough. If a social animal is to become — as it
must become— one of “Nature’s psychologists” it must somehow come
up with the appropriate ideology for doing psychology; it must develop a
fitting set of concepts and a fitting logic for dealing with a unique and
uniquely elusive portion of reality.
The difficulties that arise from working with an inappropriate ideology
are well enough illustrated by the history of the science of experimental
60 N. K . Humphrey
psychology. For upwards of a hundred years academic psychologists have
been attempting, by the “objective” methods of the physical sciences, to
acquire precisely the kind of knowledge of behaviour which every social
animal must have in order to survive. In so far as these psychologists have
been strict “behaviourists” they have gone about their task as if they
were studying the behaviour of billiard balls, basing their theoretical
models entirely on concepts to which they could easily give public
definition. And in so far as they have been strict behaviourists they have
made slow progress. They have been held up again and again by their
failure to develop a sufficiently rich or relevant framework of ideas.
Concepts such as “habit strength”, “drive”, or “reinforcement”, for all
their objectivity are hopelessly inadequate to the task of modelling the
subtleties of real behaviour. Indeed, I venture to suggest that if a rat’s
knowledge of the behaviour of other rats were to be limited to everything
which behaviourists have discovered about rats to date, the rat would
show so little understanding of its fellows that it would bungle disastrously
every social interaction it engaged in; the prospects for a man similarly
constrained would be still more dismal. And yet, as professional scientists,
behaviourists have always had enormous advantages over an individual
animal, being able to do controlled experiments, to subject their data to
sophisticated statistical analysis, and above all to share the knowledge
recorded in the scientific literature. By contrast, an animal in nature has
only its own experience to go on, its own memory to record it and its own
brief lifetime to acquire it. “Behaviourism” as a philosophy for the
natural science of psychology could not, and presumably does not, fit the
bill.
Chomsky in his famous review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior3 argued
on parallel lines that it would be impossible for a child to acquire an
understanding of human spoken language if all the child had at its
disposal was a clever brain with which to make an unprejudiced analysis
of public utterances. Chomsky’s way round the problem was to propose
that the child’s brain is not in fact unprejudiced: the child is born with an
innate knowledge of transformational grammar, and this knowledge of
the grammar provides it, in my terms, with the ideology for modelling
human language. Though there are snags about Chomsky’s thesis, it
would not, I suppose, be wholly unreasonable to suggest something similar
with regard to the acquisition of a model of behaviour: the essential rules
Nature’s Psychologists 61
and concepts for understanding behaviour might simply be innately given
to a social animal. There is, however, an alternative, and to my mind
more attractive, possibility. This is to suggest that the animal has access
not to “innate knowledge” but to “inside evidence” about behaviour.
Nature’s psychologists succeed where academic psychologists have failed
because the former make free use of introspection.
Let us consider how introspection works. I shall write these paragraphs
from the position of a reflective conscious human being, on the assumption that other human beings will understand me. First let me distinguish
two separate meanings of what may be called “self-observation”, a weak
one and a strong one. In the weak sense self-observation means simply
observing my own body as opposed to someone else’s. It is bound to be
true that my body is the example of a human body which is far the most
familiar to me. Thus even if I could only observe my behaviour through
“objective” eyes it is likely that I would draw on self-observation for
most of my evidence about how a human being behaves (in the same way
that a physicist who carried a billiard ball about in his pocket might well
use that “personal” billiard ball as the paradigm of billiard balls in
general).
But the importance of self-observation does not stop there. In the
strong sense of the term self-observation means a special sort of observation to which I and I alone am privileged. When I reflect on my own
behaviour I become aware not only of the external facts about my actions
but of a conscious presence, “I”, which “wills” those actions. This “I”
has reasons for the things it wills. The reasons are various kinds of
"feeling"—“sensations”, “emotions”, “memories”, “desires”. “ ‘I’
want to eat because ‘I’ am hungry”, “ ‘I’ intend to go to bed because ‘I’
am tired”, “‘I’ refuse to move because ‘I’ am in pain”. Moreover,
experience tells me that the feelings themselves are caused by certain
things which happen to my body in the outside world. “ ‘I’ am hungry
because my body has been without food”, “ ‘I’ am in pain because my
foot has trodden on a thorn”. It so happens (as I soon discover) that
several sorts of happening may cause a particular feeling and that a
particular feeling may be responsible for my willing several sorts of action.
The role of a feeling in the model I develop of my own behaviour becomes,
therefore, that of what psychologists have called an ‘ ‘ intervening variable’
’,
bridging the causal gap between a set of antecedent circumstances and a
62 N. K. Humphrey
set of subsequent actions—between what happens to “me” and what
“I” do.
Now, when I come to the task of modelling the behaviour of another
man, I naturally assume that he operates on the same principles that I do.
I assume that within him too there is a conscious “l” and that his “I” has
feelings which are the reasons for “his” willing certain actions. In other
words I expect the relation between what happens to his body and what
he does to have the same causal structure——a structure premised on the
same intervening variables—as I have discovered for myself. It is my
familiarity with this causal structure and these variables which provides
me with the all—important ideological framework for doing natural
psychology.
Without introspection to guide me, the task of deciphering the behaviour
of fellow men would be quite beyond my powers. I should be like a poor
cryptographer attempting to decipher a text which was written in a totally
unfamiliar language. Michael Ventris could crack the code of Linear B
because he guessed in advance that the language of the text was Greek;
although the alphabet was strange to him he reckoned—correct1y—that
he knew the syntax and vocabulary of the underlying message. Linear A
remains to this day a mystery because no one knows what language it is
written in. In so far as we are conscious human beings we all guess in
advance the “language” of other men’s behaviour.
But it may be objected that I have not really made out a case for there
being any unique advantage in using introspection since non—introspective
psychological scientists do in fact also allow themselves to postulate certain
intervening variables such as “hunger” and “fear”. And so they do. But
think of how they derive them. To establish what variables are likely to
prove useful to their models they must (assuming they do not cheat) make
a vast and impartial survey of all the circumstances and all the actions of
an animal and then subject their data to statistical factor analysis. In
practice, of course, they usually do cheat by restricting their data to a few
“relevant” parameters -— relevance being decided on the basis of an
intuitive guess. But even so their task is not an easy one. Before postulating
even such an “obvious” variable as hunger the experimental psychologist
must go through a formidable exercise in data collection and statistical
cross—correlation (cf. Hinde).“ An ordinary introspective human being
has, however, no such problem in devising a “psychological” model of
Nature’s Psychologists 63
his own and other men’s behaviour: he knows from his own internal
feelings what intervening variables to go for. Indeed he knows of subtle
feelings which no amount of objective data crunching is likely to reveal as
useful postulates. Speaking again for myself, I know of feelings of awe,
of guilt, of jealousy, of irritation, of hope, of being in love, all of which
have a place in my model of how other men behave.
Before I can attribute such feelings to others I must, it seems, myself
have had them — a proviso which the academic psychologist is spared. But
it is generally the case, for reasons I shall come to in a moment, that in
the course of their lives most people do have most of them, and often
indeed it takes only a single seminal experience to add a new dimension to
one’s behavioural model. Let a celibate monk just once make love to a
woman and he would be surprised how much better he would understand
the Song of Solomon; but let him, like an academic psychologist, observe
twenty couples in the park and he would not be that much wiser:
A garden inclosed is my sister, my spouse; a spring shut up, a fountain sealed.
Thy plants are an orchard of pomegranates, with pleasant fruits. . . . Let my
beloved come into his garden, and eat his pleasant fruits. I sleep, but my
heart waketh; it is the voice of my beloved that knocketh, saying Open to me my
sister, my love, my dove. My beloved put in his hand by the hole of the door,
and my bowels were moved for him.
The translators of the King James Bible, who summarized these lines of
the Song as: “Christ setteth forth the graces of the church; the church
prayeth to be made fit for his presence” were themselves perhaps somewhat restricted in their ideological perspective.
People are I think well aware of the value of novel experiences in
“broadening” their minds. I admit, pace my last example, that mindbroadening is not the usual motive which lies behind people’s first experiments in making love; carnal knowledge, so called, has intrinsic
attractions over and above the insight it may give into what the psalmist
meant by an orchard of pomegranates. But there are times when people
do apparently seek new experiences for no other reason than to help
themselves “make sense”, through introspection, of the behaviour of
other people. The clearest cases are those where someone deliberately
undergoes an unpleasant experience in order to gain insight into the
associated state of mind. My mother once discovered that my young
sister had swallowed twenty plumstones, whereupon she herself swallowed
l
l
,
64 N. K. Humphrey
thirty plumstones in order, she said, that she should be able to understand
my sister’s symptoms. My father, in the days when he was politically
active, deprived himself of food for a week in order that he should know
what it feels like to be a starving peasant. A colleague of mine, studying a
tribe of Amazonian Indians, joined the Indians in drinking a strongly
emetic and hallucinogenic drug in order that, having experienced the
sickness and the visions, he should be better placed to interpret the
Indian’s behaviour. I could multiply examples, and so I am sure could you.
These acts of calculated self—instruction have, however, a rather artificial
ring to them. They are the acts of “intellectuals”, hardly to be expected
of ordinary people, let alone of ordinary infra-human social animals. Yet
every one of Nature’s psychologists, if they are to make good use of the
possibilities of introspection, must somehow or another acquire a broad
base of inner experience to which they can refer. Had they but time, they
might perhaps hope to pick up the requisite ideas simply by waiting
passively for relevant experiences to come their way. Sooner or later,
without seeking it, most animals will no doubt find that they have, say,
run short of food or been beaten in a fight or had a narrow escape from
danger; they may even — if they are lucky (or unlucky, depending on how
you look at it) — find that they have accidentally swallowed twenty plumstones. But what if the experience comes later rather than sooner? The
costs of naivety are likely to be heavy in terms of psychological misunderstanding.
The matter is so serious that it would be surprising if it had been
neglected by natural selection in the course of evolution. I believe that
biological mechanisms have in fact evolved for ensuring that young
animals, like it or not, rapidly receive the ideological instruction required
to turn them into competent psychologists. They fall into three categories:
(i) play, (ii) parental manipulation, (iii) dreaming.
The role of play in extending inner experience is so obvious as to need
little elaboration. For all animals, and not just man, play involves adventures for the mind as well as for the body. If we could ask a young animal,
as we can ask a child, why it is doing whatever it is doing in play, it would
probably reply that it is simply “having fun”: but in the course of having
fun the animal is unwittingly educating itself. It is throwing itself into new
kinds of interaction with the physical and social world and thereby introducing its mind to a whole new range of feelings—new sensations, new
Nature’s Psychologists 65
emotions, new desires. Look at a child playing hide—and—seek, or look at a
young monkey playing king of the castle: feelings of anxiety, of excitement, of satisfaction, of disappointment, of competitiveness, even
perhaps of compassion; these and many other rarer and often unnamable
ideas are being planted and tended in the youngsters’ minds. One day,
when the games are for real, the child or the monkey will use its introspective knowledge of such feelings to interpret and predict the behaviour
of another member of its social group.
There are, however, limits to the range of feelings which animals are
likely to learn about through play. They play because it pleases them to do
so. How then shall they learn about the feelings associated with experiences
which are in no way pleasurable? Many of the feelings most pertinent to
the modelling of the behaviour of others in the social group are in one
way or another disagreeable to the animal who has them—fear, anger,
pain, jealousy, grief. But these are the very feelings which a young
animal, left to itself, is likely to do its best to avoid. If play, on the
whole, plants pleasant flowers in the garden of a child’s mind, what— or whoplants the tares and weeds?
My answer may surprise you. I think that, often enough, it is the child’s
parents. Biologically it is in the interests of parents to increase the fitness
of their offspring in whatever ways they can. Ethologists have long
recognized that this is the reason why parents so often take a hand in their
children’s education, giving them lessons in how to do things and, of
course, being active partners in their play. But there has been very little
discussion of how parents might help their children by abusing them ‘ ‘for
their own good”. Let me illustrate the principle with a happening I
witnessed not long ago on the train to Cambridge. A woman sat opposite
me in the carriage with her 4-year-old daughter. The little girl asked her
mother an innocent question. The mother pretended not to notice her.
The girl repeated her question, adding plaintively “Mummy, please tell
me”. “I’m not your mummy”, said the woman, “Your mummy got off
at the last station”. The girl began to look anxious. “You are my mummy.
I know you’re my mummy.” “No I’m not. I’ve never seen you before.”
And so this strange game, if you can call it such, continued until eventually
the bewildered little girl broke down in tears. A wicked, heartless mother?
I thought so at the time—but maybe it was an unfair judgement. That
little girl was in the truest sense being taught a lesson, the lesson of what it
66 N. K. Humphrey
feels like to be mystified and scared. She perhaps learned more of real
importance in those few unhappy minutes than I myself have ever learned
from the hundred books I have read on train journeys.
Now I believe such parental abuse of children may be much more widespread than ethologists have either noticed or perhaps cared to admit.
And, following my present line of argument, I believe that its biological
function may often be to educate children in the knowledge of disagreeable feelings. Children, as apprentice psychologists, need to know about
being frightened, so parents frighten them; they need to know about
jealousy, so parents do things to make them jealous; they need to know
about pain, so parents hurt them; they need to know about feeling guilty,
so parents contrive to catch them doing wrong. And so on. If you were to
press me for further specific examples, I should probably continue to
refer chiefly to the actions of human beings. But there is one general
category of parental abuse which is well known to occur in other social
animals than man. That is the “parent—offspring conflict” which occurs
in relation to weaning. There are, of course, alternative theories of why
mothers become progressively more hard-hearted to their children
around the time of weaning, but I would suggest that at least one of the
functions of the mother’s behaviour is purely educational—it is in the
child’s best interests that it should have first-hand experience of frustration,
rejection, hunger and loneliness.
The third way by which young animals may acquire their ideological
grounding as psychologists is by exposing themselves to purely imaginary
experiences. I mean by dreaming. Dream experience is clearly in a different
class to the experience provided by play or parental manipulation; yet I
would argue that as a means of introducing the animal to a range of novel
feelings it is potentially as powerful. True, there may seem at first sight to
be a fundamental problem here: whereas through play or parental
manipulation real things happen to the infant animal and real feelings are
aroused, in dreams unreal things happen and, presumably, unreal feelings
are aroused. But it is a mistake to talk of “unreal” feelings. All feelings,
whatever context they occur in, are internal creations of the subject’s
mind. Although they may be-and usually are—evoked by external
happenings, it is not the external happenings as such which evoke them,
but the subject’s perception of and belief in those external happenings.
For a feeling to occur it is a sufficient condition that the subject should
Nature’s Psychologists 67
have the appropriate perceptions and beliefs—that he should “think”
himself to be undergoing the relevant experience. Thus for me to feel fear
it is sufficient that I should think I am being chased by a crocodile: my
fear will be the same whether the crocodile is an objective physical
crocodile or a subjective crocodile conjured up in my imagination.
If you yourself have never dreamed of being chased by a crocodile, or if
— as I hardly think likely — you doubt altogether the possibility of feelings
being induced by fantasy experience, go and watch a stage hypnotist at
work. Better still, go up on the stage and allow him to use you as one of
his subjects: the hypnotist will, perhaps, suggest that there is a spider
crawling up your neck and you will find yourself shuddering with genuine
horror.
What the hypnotist does to his subjects on the stage the dreamer can do
to himself as the subject of his self—generated fantasies. In the freedom of
the dream he can invent extraordinary stories about what is happening to
his own person and so, responding to these happenings as if to the real
thing, he discovers new realms of inner experience. If I may speak from
my own case, I have in my dreams placed myself in situations which have
induced in my mind feelings of terror and grief and passion and pleasure
of a kind and intensity which I have not known in real life. If 1 did now
experience these feelings in real life I should recognize them as familiar;
more important, if I were to come across someone else undergoing what I
went through in my dream I should be able to guess what he was feeling
and so be able to model his behaviour.
Although I have been talking now more of people than of other social
animals, I have intended that most of what I have said should apply to
animals as well. In people, and people alone, however, the biological
mechanisms for providing ideological instruction have been supplemented
in important ways by culture. All three mechanisms — play, parental
manipulation and dreaming - have parallels in human cultural institutions.
The play of individual animals has its counterpart in organized games
and sports where youngsters, besides enjoying themselves, are encouraged
to compete, co-operate, take risks, set their hearts on winning, and discover what it means to lose. Abuse by individual parents has its counterpart in “initiation rites” where adolescents are frequently subjected to
bodily mutilation, to fearsome ordeals, and sometimes to forced isolation
from the social group. And dreaming has its counterpart in drama and
68 N. K. Humphrey
public story—telling where the actors — and their audience too — get drawn
into elaborate fantasies. I am suggesting not merely an analogy but a
functional homology between the cultural and the biological phenomena.
I believe it could be shown that members of a society who have, for
example, been put through a brutal initiation ceremony make better
introspective psychologists than others who lack the experience. At another
extreme I believe that nineteenth—century readers of Dickens’s serial novel
The Old Curiosity Shop, who cried in the streets when they heard of the
death of Little Nell, may have been better able to understand the behaviour
of their neighbours when a real child died.
I do not for a moment mean to say that this is all there is to these
cultural institutions, any more than a sociobiologist would say that the
avoidance of inbreeding is all there is to the incest taboo. But if, as I have
argued, greater insight into other people’s behaviour is one of the benefits
of subscribing to a cultural institution, then almost certainly it is one of
the factors which keeps that institution alive.
So much for how I think that Nature’s psychologists proceed. Let me
turn to more purely philosophical implications of the theory. I promised
at the start of this paper to say something about the evolution of
consciousness.
I take it to be the case that what we mean by someone’s conscious
experience is the set of subjective feelings which, at any one time, are
available to introspection, i.e. the sensations, emotions, volitions, etc.,
that I have talked of. Our criterion for judging that someone else is
conscious is that we should have grounds for believing that he has subjective reasons for his actions — that he is eating an apple because he feels
hungry, or that he is raising his arm because he wants to. If we had
grounds for believing that a dog had similar subjective reasons for its
actions we should want to say the dog was conscious too. In proposing a
theory about the biological function of introspection I am therefore
proposing a theory about the biological function of consciousness. And
the implications of this theory are by no means trivial. If consciousness
has evolved as a biological adaptation for doing introspective psychology,
then the presence or absence of consciousness in animals of different
species will depend on whether or not they need to be able to understand
the behaviour of other animals in a social group. Wolves and chimpanzees
and elephants, which all go in for complex social interactions, are probably
all conscious; frogs and snails and codfish are probably not.
Nature’s Psychologists 69
There may be philosophers who protest that it is nonsense to talk of a
biological “function” for consciousness when, so Wittgenstein tells us,
conscious experience does not even have a “place in the language game”.5
But what Wittgenstein demonstrated is that there are logical problems
about the communication of conscious experience — and it is not proposed
by the theory that consciousness had any direct role in communication
between individuals; I am not saying that social animals either can or
should report their subjective feelings to each other. The advantage to an
animal of being conscious lies in the purely private use it makes of
conscious experience as a means of developing an ideology which helps it
to model another animal’s behaviour. It need make no difference at all
whether the other animal is actually experiencing the feelings with which
it is being credited; all that matters is that its behaviour should be understandable on the assumption that such feelings provide the reasons for its
actions. Thus for all I know no man other than myself has ever experienced
a feeling corresponding to my own feeling of hunger; the fact remains
that the concept of hunger, derived from my own experience, helps me to
understand other men’s eating behaviour. Indeed, if we assume that the
first animal in history to have any sort of introspective consciousness
occurred as a chance variant in an otherwise unconscious population, the
selective advantage which consciousness gave that animal must have been
independent of consciousness in others. It follows, a fortiori, that the
selective advantage of consciousness can never have depended on one
animal’s conscious experience being the “same” as another’s.5
Maybe this sounds paradoxical. Indeed, if it does not sound a little
paradoxical I should be worried. For I assume that you are as naturally
inclined as any other introspective animals to project your conscious
feelings onto others. The suggestion that you may be wrong to do so, or
at least that it does not matter whether you are right or wrong, does I
hope arouse a certain Adamite resistance in you. But allow me to elaborate
the argument.
I think no one of us would object to the claim that a piece of magnetized
iron lacks consciousness. Suppose now that an animal— let us call it one
of “Nature’s physicists” —wanted to model the behaviour of magnets.
I can conceive that it might be helpful to that animal to think of the north
pole of a magnet as having a desire to approach a south pole. Then, if the
concept of having a desire was one which the animal knew about from its
70 N. K. Humphrey
own inner experience, I should want to argue that introspective consciousness was an aid to the animal in doing physics. The fact that the animal
would almost certainly be incorrect in attributing feelings of desire to
magnets would be irrelevant to whether or not the attribution was heuristically helpful to it in developing a conceptual model of how magnets
behave. But if this is conceivably true of doing physics, all the more is it
true of doing psychology. Notwithstanding the logical possibility that
every other human being around me is as unconscious as a piece of iron,
my attribution of conscious feelings to them does as a matter of fact help
me sort out my observations of their behaviour and develop predictive
models.
Ah, you may say, but you are not really saying anything very interesting,
since it can only be helpful to attribute feelings to other people— or
magnets — in so far as there is something about the other person or the
magnet which corresponds to what you call a feeling: the attribution of
desire to magnets is heuristically valuable if, and only if, there exists in
reality an electromagnetic attractive force between a north pole and a
south pole, and the attribution of a feeling of hunger to a man is valuable
if, and only if, his body is in reality motivated by a particular physiological
state. Quite so. But the magnet does not have to know about the electromagnetic force and the man does not, in principle, have to know about
the physiological state.
Magnets do not need to do physics. If they did—if their survival as
magnets depended on it — perhaps they would be conscious. If volcanoes
needed to do geology, and clouds needed to do meteorology, perhaps they
would be conscious too.
But the survival of human beings does depend on their being able to do
psychology. That is why, despite the sophistical doubts I have just expressed, I do not consider it to be even a biological possibility — let alone do I
really believe — that other people are not as fully conscious of the reasons
for their actions as I know that I myself am. In the case of frogs and
snails and cod, however, my argument leads me to the opposite conclusion.
Let me say it again: these non—social animals no more need to do
psychology than magnets need to do physics—ergo they could have no
use for consciousness.
Somewhere along the evolutionary path which led from fish to
chimpanzees a change occurred in the nervous system which transformed
Nature’s Psychologists 71
an animal which simply “behaved” into an animal which at the same
time informed its mind of the reasons for its behaviour. My guess is that
this change involved the evolution of a new brain— a “conscious brain”
parallel to the older “executive brain”. In the last few years evidence has
at last begun to emerge from studies of brain damage in animals and man
which makes this kind of speculation meaningful.
To end my paper I want to talk about a monkey called Helen.
In 1966 Helen underwent an operation on her brain in which the visual
cortex was almost completely removed. In the months immediately
following the operation she acted as if she were blind. But I and Professor
Weiskrantz with whom I was working were not convinced that Helen’s
blindness was as deep and permanent as it appeared. Could it be that her
blindness lay not so much in her brain as in her mind? Was her problem
that she did not think that she could see?
I set to work to persuade her to use her eyes again. Over the course of
seven years I coaxed her, played with her, took her for walks in the fields —
encouraged her in every way I could to realize her latent potential for
vision. And slowly, haltingly, she found her way back from the dark
valley into which the operation had plunged her. After seven years her
recovery seemed so complete that an innocent observer would have noticed
very little wrong with the way she analysed the visual world. She could,
for example, run around a room full of furniture picking up currants
from the floor, she could reach out and catch a passing fly.7
But I continued to have a nagging doubt about what had been achieved:
my hunch was that despite her manifest ability Helen remained to the end
unconscious of her own vision. She never regained what we — you and I —
would call the sensations of sight. Do not misunderstand me. I am not
suggesting that Helen did not eventually discover that she could after all
use her eyes to obtain information about the environment. She was a
clever monkey and I have little doubt that, as her training progressed, it
began to dawn on her that she was indeed picking up “visual” information from somewhere—and that her eyes had something to do with it.
But I do want to suggest that, even if she did come to realize that she
could use her eyes to obtain visual information (information, say, about
the position of a currant on the floor), she no longer knew how that
information came to her: if there was a currant before her eyes she would
find that she knew its position but, lacking visual sensation, she no longer
saw it as being there.
72 N. K . Humphrey
It is difficult to imagine anything comparable in our own experience.
But perhaps the sense we have of the position of parts of our own bodies
is not dissimilar. We all accept as a fact that our brains are continuously
informed of the topology of the surface of our bodies: when we want to
scratch an ear we do not find ourselves scratching an eye; when we clap
our hands together there is no danger that our two hands will miss each
other. But, for my own part, it is not at all clear how this positional
information comes to me. If, for example, I close my eyes and introspect
on the feelings in my left thumb I cannot identify any sensation to which I
can attribute my knowledge of the thumb’s position— yet if I reach over
with my other hand I shall be able to locate the thumb quite accurately.
I “just know”, it seems, where my thumb is. And the same goes for other
parts of my body. I am inclined therefore to say that at the level of conscious awareness “position sense” is not a sense at all: what I know of
the position of parts of my body is “pure perceptual knowledge” —
unsubstantiated by sensation.
Now in Helen’s case, I want to suggest that the information she obtained
through her eyes was likewise “pure knowledge” for which she was aware
of no substantive evidence in the form of visual sensations. Helen “just
knew” that there was a currant in such—and—such a position on the floor.
This, you may think, is a strange kind of hypothesis — and one which is
in principle untestable. Were I to admit the hypothesis to be untestable I
should be reneguing on the whole argument of this paper. The implication
of such an admission would be that the presence or absence of consciousness has no consequences at the level of overt behaviour. And if consciousness does not affect behaviour it cannot, of course, have evolved through
natural selection—either in the way I have been arguing or any other.
What, then, shall I say? If you have followed me so far you will know my
answer. I believe that Helen’s lack of visual consciousness would have
shown up in the way she herself conceived of the visually guided behaviour
of other animals—in the way she did psychology. I shall come back to
this in a moment; I think you will be more ready to listen to me if I first
refer to some remarkable new evidence from human beings.
In the last few years Weiskrantz and his colleagues at the National
Hospital, and other neurologists in different hospitals around the world,
have been extending our findings with Helen to human patients.3 They
have studied cases of what is called “cortical blindness”, caused by
Nature’s Psychologists 73
extensive destruction of the visual cortex at the back of the brain (very
much the same area as was surgically removed in Helen). Patients with
this kind of brain damage have been described in most earlier medical
literature as being completely blind in large areas of the visual field: the
patients themselves will say that they are blind, and in clinical tests, where
they are asked to report whether they can see a light in the affected area
of the field, their blindness is apparently confirmed. But the clinical tests
—and the patients’ own opinion—have proved to be deceptive. It has
been shown that, while the patients may not think that they can see, they
are in fact quite capable of using visual information from the blind part
of the field if only they can be persuaded to “guess” what it is their eyes
are looking at. Thus a patient studied by Weiskrantz, who denied that he
could see anything at all in the left half of his visual field, could “guess”
the position of an object in this area with considerable accuracy and
could also “guess” the object’s shape. Weiskrantz, searching for a word
to describe this strange phenomenon, has called it “blindsight’ ’.
“Blindsight” is what I think Helen had. It is vision without conscious
awareness: the visual information comes to the subject in the form of
pure knowledge unsubstantiated by visual sensation. The human patient,
not surprisingly, believes that he is merely “guessing”. What, after all, is
a “guess”? It is defined in Chambers’s Dictionary as a “judgement or
opinion without sufficient evidence or grounds”. It takes consciousness
to furnish our minds with the sensations which provide “evidence or
grounds” for what our senses tell us; just as it takes consciousness to give
our mind the subjective feelings which provide “evidence or grounds”
for our eating behaviour, or our bad temper, or whatever else we do with
the possibility of insight into its reasons.
So if Helen lacked such insight into her own vision, how might it have
affected her ability to do psychology? I do not think that Helen’s particular
case is a straightforward one, since Helen was already grown up when she
underwent the brain operation and she may well have retained ideas
about vision from the time when she could see quite normally. I would
rather discuss the hypothetical case of a monkey who has been operated
on soon after birth and who therefore has never in its life been conscious
of visual sensations. Such a monkey would, I believe, develop the basic
capacity to use visual information in much the same way as does any
monkey with an intact brain; it would become competent in using its eyes
74 N. K. Humphrey
to judge depth, position, shape, to recognize objects, to find its way
around. Indeed, if this monkey were to be observed in social isolation
from other monkeys, it might not appear to be in any way defective. But
ordinary monkeys do not live in social isolation. They interact continuously
with other monkeys and their lives are largely ruled by the predictions
they make of how these other monkeys will behave. Now, if a monkey is
going to predict the behaviour of another, one of the least things it must
realize is that the other monkey itself makes use of visual informationthat the other monkey too can see. And here is the respect in which the
monkey whose visual cortex was removed at birth would, I suspect, prove
gravely defective. Being blind to the sensations of sight, it would be blind
to the idea that another monkey can see.
Ordinary monkeys and ordinary people naturally interpret the visually
guided behaviour of other animals in terms of their own conscious
experience. The idea that other animals too have visual sensations provides
them with a ready—made conceptual framework for understanding what it
“means” for another animal to use its eyes. But the operated monkey,
lacking the conscious sensations, would lack the unifying concept: it
would no longer be in the privileged position of an introspective
psychologist.
In the days when we were working with Helen, Weiskrantz and I used
to muse about how Helen would describe her state if she could speak. If
only she could have communicated with us in sign language, what
profound philosophical truths might she have been ready to impart? We
had only one anxiety: that Helen, dear soul, having spent so long in the
University of Cambridge, might have lost her philosophical innocence.
If we had signalled to her: “Tell us, Helen, about the nature of consciousness”, she might have replied with the final words of Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”
Silence has never formed a good basis for discussion.
Too often in this century philosophers have forbidden the rest of us to
speak our minds about the functions and origins of consciousness. They
have walled the subject off behind a Maginot line. The defences sometimes
look impressive. But biologists, advancing through the Low Countries,
should not be afraid to march around them.
Nature’s Psychologists 75
REFERENCES
l. K.J.W. Craik, The Nature of Explanation, Cambridge, 1943.
2. N.K. Humphrey, The social function of intellect, in P.P.G. Bateson and R.A.
Hinde (eds.), Growing Points in Ethology, Cambridge, 1976, pp. 303-17.
3. N. Chomsky, Review of B.F. Skinner, Verbal Behavior, in Language, 35, 26-58,
(1959).
4. R.A. Hinde, Animal Behaviour, McGraw~Hill, New York, 1970.
5. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, Part
I, §293.
6. Ibid., §272.
7. N. K. Humphrey, Vision in a monkey without striate cortex: a case study,
Perception, 3, 241-55 (1974).
8. L. Weiskrantz, E.K. Warrington, M.D. Sanders and J. Marshall, Visual capacity
in the hemianopic field following a restricted occipital ablation, Brain, 9'],
709-28 (1974).
76 N. K. Humphrey
Discussion
RAMACHANDRAN:
You point out that consciousness permits social interaction. I agree that my
direct conscious experience of non-neutral (and emotionally coloured) states,
such as pain, hunger, sex, etc., does improve my ability to interact effectively
with someone experiencing similar states; especially when I assume that the
other person is also conscious of these states in the same intense way that I am
conscious of them. But I do not see how this argument applies to neutral states
such as elementary sensations (e. g. reds, greens, etc.). How would my knowledge
that the other person was consciously seeing these (rather than merely reacting
to them) influence my behaviour towards him? Ifa person were consistently to
report red when confronted with such and such a wavelength then I can at once
begin effective communica- tion with him. It is quite irrelevant to me whether
he is actually conscious of it (like I am) or not. If this is true, then why did
“redness” emerge into awareness at all instead of “behaviour towards red”
remaining a subconscious and neutral event like the pupillary light reflex? It
seems to me that what you have given us is a theory of emotions rather than a
theory of consciousness.
I see a partial answer to some of these questions in your example of the monkey
Helen, who was (presumably) not conscious, although her visual behaviour could
be restored; but would you like to elaborate’? Supposing I met a man whose
visual performance was indistinguishable from normal (i.e. an extreme example of
the kind of patient reported by Weiskrantz) but who lacked visual consciousness.
Would this knowledge make any difference to my understanding him or
communicating with him? If not, where does your argument stand?
HUMPHREY:
Your question about the function of “neutral states of consciousness” raises
problems which, I am bound to say, I have not fully thought through. Certainly
the hypothesis I’ve presented lends itself more readily to explaining why
someone should be conscious of affective states (emotions, motives, etc.) than
to explaining why they should be conscious of neutral states such as simple
auditory or visual sensations. But I did not mean in my paper to sidestep the
latter issue altogether, and I hope that what I say about “blindsight” does
suggest where the answer lies. On pages 73-4 of my paper I do indeed discuss the
question which you now put to me: “In what way would someone who lacked visual
consciousness (e.g. after removal of the striate cortex) prove biologically
defective?” And I answer it by suggesting that, in one respect at least, such a
person would prove to be a poor psychologist, because he would find it difficult
to conceive that the behaviour of another person was guided by what we call
“sight” (I don’t say that he could never arrive at the concept, but it might
well take him a long time to catch on). A parallel of a sort is provided by the
difficulty zoologists have had in accepting the existence of “alien” sensory
systems, such as the electric sense in fish or the magnetic sense in birds, of
which a human being can have no introspective knowledge. More pertinent still,
perhaps, is the case of so—called pheromones: it now seems quite probable that
human beings are, without being consciously aware of it, influenced by chemical
signals from other human beings — but the idea of pheromonal communication
remains strange to us because (I would argue) we cannot fit it into a conceptual
framework informed by our own consciousness. Radical behaviourists did, in the
early days, actually attempt to develop models of both human and animal
behaviour which, borrowing nothing from human insight, made no reference
Nature’s Psychologists 77
to the existence of different sensory “modalities”; ordinary people, however,
being dis- inclined to cut off their intuitive noses to spite their
psychological faces, have always made life easier for themselves by relying on
the phenomenology of their own conscious experience to generate the (genuinely)
useful concepts of “sight”, “hearing“, “taste” and so on.
RAMACHANDRAN:
Is the distinction between ordinary consciousness and self—consciousness
important to your argument?
HUMPHREY:
By ordinary consciousness or ‘raw consciousness” I mean sensations, desires,
etc., existing as primitive mental events. Self—consciousness or reflexive
consciousness, on the other hand, involves inward observation of what is
happening on the level of raw consciousness: it is thus logically dependent on
the existence of raw consciousness, although it might be argued that the
converse is not true, i.e. that raw consciousness is not logically dependent on
the existence of reflexive consciousness. However, I know of (and can imagine)
no reason to suppose that raw consciousness does as a matter of fact ever exist
without reflexive consciousness: indeed, if raw consciousness were present in a
subject who was unable to reflect on it, he could not (by definition) notice it,
remember it, think about it or, a fortiori, tell any one else about it. Further,
I am not convinced that raw consciousness as such has, or could have, any
independent biological function; my own view is that raw consciousness probably
evolved to provide the substrate for reflexive consciousness.
JOSEPHSON:
While we are discussing reflexive or self—consciousness, it is worth pointing out
that according to some people there are two kinds of “self” involved. There is
the individual self, which is the accumulation of the individual’s own
experiences, and the higher or transpersonal self concerned with creative
insights and spiritual experience, which have the appearance of coming from a
source beyond the individual and being unrelated to memory. While contact with a
higher self is usually stated to be an exclusively human experience, possibly
behaviour involving insight, as occurs with monkeys, indicates that they too
possess this ability to a limited degree.
VESEY:
As you may know, philosophers spend a lot of their time talking about meaning.
There are radically opposed views, some with quite a history to them. For
instance, there is the empiricist view, held by people like John Locke, J.S.
Mill, and, more recently, Bertrand Russell and A.J. Ayer. Roughly, they say that
a word has meaning by being a name given to an experience. For instance, someone
has a pain, gives the name “pain” to it, and then uses the same word again when
he has an experience he recognizes as being similar to the one to which he first
gave the name. (That is a one—sentence summary of what Mill says in Book I,
Chapter 3, of his System of Logic, 1843.) This seems an attractively simple
78 N. K. Humphrey
account of meaning, but there is a problem connected with it. If “pain” is a
name I give to one of my experiences, and regive when I have a similar
experience, what can I mean when I say that someone else is in pain? It’s a bit
like knowing what it means to say that it is afternoon, when one is in Houston,
Texas, and then being expected to understand the remark when one is half—way to
the moon. The conditions of meaningfulness have been removed. There is no zenith
for the sun to be past, no horizon for it not to be past. Similarly with talk
about someone else being in pain, if one accepts the empiricist account of
meaning. The condition of meaningfulness, that the sensation can be recognized
as similar to the one first named, no longer holds.
It seems to me that a basic presupposition of your argument is the correctness
of the empiricist view of meaning. Do you have a solution to the problem l’ve
indicated?
HUMPHREY:
Let me try to make my argument clearer with an example. Then maybe the problem
you raise about meaning will be easier to resolve.
Suppose that each and every one of us owns a whistling kettle, and that it is
important to be able to predict the “behaviour” of these kettles (to anticipate
their whistling, etc.). The external facts I observe about my own and other
people’s kettles are, say, of the following kind: (i) the kettle when filled
with cold water and put on the stove begins to whistle within about 5 minutes,
(ii) the kettle takes less time to whistle when filled with hot water, (iii) the
kettle takes more time to whistle when salt is added to the water, (iv) the
kettle takes less time to whistle on top of a mountain, (v) if the kettle is
filled with liquid nitrogen instead of water it whistles without being put on
the stove, (vi) if the kettle is filled with treacle it doesn’t whistle at all,
and so on.
I suggest that, if these external facts were all I had to go on, the behaviour
of the kettles might seem puzzling. I would be hard put to it to develop a
theory of the relation between what is done to the kettle and what the kettle
does. But suppose that, while everybody else’s kettle is made of tin, my own
kettle is made of Pyrex glass so that I can see into it. I look into my kettle
and observe (i) that when certain things are done to the kettle the liquid
inside it boils, and (ii) that when the liquid boils the kettle whistles. I am
led to regard boiling as an explanatory concept, an “intervening variable” which
“bridges the causal gap between a set of antecedent circumstances and a set of
subsequent actions- between what happens to my kettle and what my kettle does”
(cf. my paper, p. 62). Thus I now explain the behaviour of my kettle by arguing
along the following lines: the kettle whistles when the liquid boils, the liquid
boils when the kettle is put on the stove, therefore the kettle whistles when it
is put on the stove.
But at this point something philosophically interesting has happened. While the
concept of boiling has been put into my mind by a factual observation (what I
actually saw when I looked into my kettle), its usefulness as an explanatory
concept does not depend on the observation’s having been of any particular kind;
indeed, I could have observed something quite different. Suppose, for example,
that when I looked into my kettle I had observed the liquid turning a red colour
under just those circumstances when in fact I saw it boil, then the concept of
reddening might have come to play exactly the same role in my argument as the
concept of boiling: the kettle whistles when the liquid reddens, etc. Indeed as
far as my new-found theory is concerned it really doesn’t matter what I have
actually observed (and a fortiori it doesn’t matter what I choose to call what I
have observed — I might as well say the liquid in the kettle is in pain).
Nature’s Psychologists 79
Now, how about other people’s kettles? Since they are made of tin I cannot, of
course, observe the liquid inside their kettles boiling (or reddening or
whatever). Can I then use the concept of boiling to help myself explain the
behaviour of their kettles’? Yes. Since the usefulness of boiling as an
explanatory concept is independent of any particular observation I have or could
have made, the concept can play just the same role in my argument about someone
else’s kettle as it does in my argument about my own.
With regard to the problem of meaning, I accept that the factual propositions
“The liquid in my kettle is boiling” and “The liquid in his kettle is boiling”
are of different status (indeed the latter proposition is arguably, by
positivist criteria, meaningless). But the explanatory propositions “My kettle
is whistling because the liquid inside it is boiling” and “His kettle is
whistling because the liquid inside it is boiling" are on a par.
Another example to think about: suppose that Mendel, when he was searching for a
theory of inheritance, could have observed his own genes.
VESEY:
You are right: your example does make your argument clearer. It makes it clearer
that it is as follows. (i) The concept of boiling is put into one’s mind by what
one observes on looking into kettles. Similarly, (ii) the psychological concepts
one uses to explain people’s behaviour—concepts like expecting, hoping,
remembering, understanding, wanting, wondering—are put into one’s mind by what
one observes on looking into one’s mind (introspecting) when one is doing these
things. (iii) That one cannot look into other people’s minds does not prevent
one using psychological concepts to understand their behaviour.
Not only does your example make your argument clearer; it also enables me to
make clear the extent and nature of my disagreement with you. I disagree with
you not only about (ii) but also about (i). And the disagreement is a
fundamental one, about meaning. To know the meaning of a word (=“to have the
concept for which the word stands”) is to know how to use the word correctly. A
word’s being meaningful, and there being criteria of its correct use, go hand in
hand. This being so, it does not make sense to talk of concepts being put into
people’s minds by their observing things, either inner things or outer things.
Concepts are not experiences, to be put into people’s minds by pointing their
eyes, or their mind's eye, in the right direction. They are abilities exercised
primarily, in humans, in acts of verbal communication. And the linguistic
practices involved could not, even in theory, start as private practices.
JOSEPHSON:
The dilemma can be resolved by assuming that the concepts are already there in
latent form in the nervous system, waiting to be triggered off by the relevant
experiences. The latter do not have to be linguistic in nature.
BARLOW:
As a result of thinking about the biological role of consciousness both Nick
Humphrey and I (see next paper, “Nature’s Joke”) have come to the same
conclusion, namely that the survival value of consciousness is very much
connected with its role in the social life of gregarious animals, but there is a
difference between our proposals that may be important. I argue that
consciousness is impossible without some kind of social interchange, so that
80 N. K. Humphrey
mankind is driven to engage in social relations to preserve his consciousness.
Consciousness is thus Nature’s tool to make man social, just as pain can be
regarded as her tool to make us avoid injury. The survival value of
consciousness would result from social hominids leaving more offspring than
solitary hominids. If I understand Humphrey correctly, he regards the gregarious
nature of man as a prior fact, and sees consciousness as conferring an advantage
in competing against other individuals within the same social group. Am I right
in understanding him to say that consciousness improves social behaviour, but
does not actually help to generate it, as I would claim?
I have another question relating to the use of the word “introspection”, for I
don’t think we find out about others in this way. It is very likely true that
you cannot understand certain aspects of other individuals’ behaviour until you
have yourself undergone the experience motivating that behaviour, and this is
interesting and important. But this insight seems to come by a process of
imitation rather than introspection, which I take to mean a Conscious searching
of one’s own mind. Sight of a pattern of muscular movements may enable one to
imitate them, and I think one’s feelings can imitate the emotions that generate
a pattern of behaviour in another. But I don’t think there is any conscious
search in one’s mind for them, so I would hesitate to call this process
introspection.
HUMPHREY:
1. I hope Barlow will not mind if I characterize his argument as follows.
Consciousness is rather like group sex: something which is a source of pleasure
to the individual but which he can’t achieve on his own and so is obliged to
seek through interaction with others. Thus Barlow sees the biological function
of consciousness—the contribution it makes to biological survival—as the
provision of an incentive to being social (sociality being essential to human
survival). His argument rests, as I see it, on three premises: (i) people desire
to be conscious (as, for example, they desire sex); (ii) people can only be
conscious through social interaction; (iii) people would not be social if they
were not made to be by this “trick” which Nature plays on them. Bar1ow’s
question relates to this last point, and he is right to think that I disagree
with him here. I do not believe that people remain in social groups in order to
preserve their consciousness; my view is that people would, whether conscious or
not, try to form social groups but that if they were not conscious they would
probably fail because they would be unable to understand each other. In Barlow‘s
view, without consciousness the social group would never get together; in my
view, without consciousness the social group would fall apart. But either way,
surprisingly enough, we draw the same conclusion, namely that consciousness is
probably a necessary condition of being a highly social animal. And indeed we
agree on a more specific prediction, namely that a dysfunction in the mechanism
of consciousness (as I suggest may have occurred in Helen and Barlow suggests
may occur in autistic children) is likely to show up as social maladjustment.
2. Barlow has misconstrued my argument if he thinks I‘m suggesting that “we find
out about others” by introspection. No, we don’t “find out” about them that way;
we find out about them by ordinary external observation — looking at them,
listening to them, etc. What introspection does is to help us explain what we
find out about them: it provides us with the explanatory concepts in terms of
which we “make sense" of what we observe. This point is elaborated in my reply
to Professor Vesey. But when, for example, we explain someone else’s behaviour
by saying “He is crying because he is in pain” we don’t have to be feeling the
pain ourselves (which is what Barlow seems to be implying by his remarks about
“imitation").
CHAPTER 5
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the
Biological Role of Consciousness
H. B. BARLOW
University of Cambridge
ABSTRACT
A physiologist needs to know the function of an organ when he tries to find out
how it works, and a biologist needs to know the survival value conferred on an
individual by the performance of that function. This essay provides a
conjectural answer to the questions “What is the function of the consciousness
of man?” and “What is its survival value? ’ ’.
It is argued that consciousness primarily arises in the relation between one
indivi- dual and another, and is not a property of a brain in isolation. One
can, of course, be conscious when one is alone, but it is suggested that on
these occasions one is rehears- ing future discourse with an imagined
individual. This is rendered plausible by the fact that our brains are certainly
adept model-makers and the character and person- ality of parents and others
must be amongst the most thoroughly modelled aspects of a person's environment.
Could one be conscious at all if all memories of experiences with other
individuals were deleted from one’s brain?
The individual values his consciousness above all else, but if it only arises in
real or imagined relations with others, this will have an interesting
consequence; his con- sciousness, the arena within which he makes his decisions,
is not his own alone, but is influenced by and interacts with those others, real
and imagined, with whom he must discourse in order to be conscious. This can be
no accident, and it is suggested that Nature has constructed our brains so that,
first, we seek to preserve individual con- sciousness; second, we can only
achieve it in real discourse or rehearsed future dis- course; and third,
important new decisions require the sanction of consciousness. These three
aspects of consciousness generate a communal culture in the light of which
individual decisions tend to be made. Thus the survival value of consciousness
consists of the peculiar form of gregarious behaviour it generates in man; it is
Nature’s trick to chain him to the herd.
I became interested in the mind-body problem because I am a neurophysiologist and try to relate subjective experiences to the physical
properties of sense organs and nerve cells. Now when a physiologist
81
82 H. B. Barlow
wants to investigate the working of some organ he first forms a hypothesis about its function, because without such a hypothesis he is likely to
waste much time studying inessential aspects of the organ; imagine, for
instance, how futile it would be to investigate the lungs without knowing
that the interchange of gases between the blood and air takes place in
them. When thinking of consciousness my instinctive approach was to
avoid studying what consciousness looked or felt like to myself, and also
to avoid paying much attention to what philosophers have said about it,
for this also seems mainly based on introspection. Nature does not tell us
what our organs are for and is well able to make her actors think they are
playing one part when they are really playing another, or serving in some
quite different capacity. So instead of introspection and reading, my
approach has been to observe the actors, to see what it is they refer to as
consciousness, and to make a conjecture on its biological role. My
conclusions depend, for whatever force they may have, first on this being
(I think), an unusual approach to the problem, and second on the fact
that a surprisingly simple, far-reaching and unifying concept does
emerge.
In the first part of the essay I argue that consciousness is not a property
of a brain in isolation, but is a property of a brain that is and has been in
communication with other brains. By communication I mainly mean
talk, certainly nothing mysterious or non—physical; indeed I think that
much of the apparent conflict with physics in the mind—body relation
disappears if one accepts that consciousness is something to do with
relations between brains rather than a property of a single brain.
The second part tries to account for the prominence of these conscious
interactions between brains in the conduct of the affairs of mankind.
Because of its prominence one must ask the question “What is the
survival value of consciousness?”. I shall suggest that consciousness, and
particularly the restricted nature of our conscious knowledge of our own
brains, is Nature’s method of making humans behave co-operatively.
Our being is centred in our conscious self, but if consciousness is the
relating of one brain to another, this means that one’s being is centred,
not in one’s own brain, but in the relation between one’s own brain and
others. The view that consciousness is much concerned with past and
present interpersonal relationships may find supporters outside the realm
of neurophysiologists and biologists.
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role of Consciousness 83
CONSCIOUSNESS A RELATION, NOT A PROPERTY
Some everyday usages of the notion of consciousness clearly reflect an
appreciation that it refers to relationships. For instance, if we ask “Is he
conscious?”, someone will immediately try to establish contact with the
person concerned to test his capacity for making such relationships.
Furthermore, he is likely to apply the same test even if the person is
behaving in an outwardly normal way, as might a sleepwalker or
someone in an unusual, trance—1ike state. To be conscious is to be able to
relate to others, not just to act normally.
Another fact that fits the concept well is the prominence of language in
our consciousness. One is at once consciously aware of the spoken word,
which seems to take precedence over almost any other sensory
experience, except perhaps intense pain. And if one has something to say,
this thought in one’s head is certainly in the forefront of one’s conscious
awareness. Received and uttered speech are, of course, the most
important way that two brains relate to each other.
Speech, however, is not the only way that brains relate in a way that I
think qualifies for consciousness. The moment a baby first smiles at its
mother seems at least as good a time to take for the birth of its
consciousness as any other, and the capacity of an animal to respond
personally to another or to its master might form a rather acceptable test
of its consciousness: dogs and cats, yes; snails and toads, no.
So far so good, but one does not have to look far to find difficulties,
for I am obviously conscious when I am completely alone. It is true that,
for others to know about these conscious experiences, I must establish
relationships and interact with them, but it seems quite incorrect, from
our own introspective knowledge, to deny that consciousness occurs until
we communicate it to others. Or is it wholly wrong? Certainly some
experiences gain greatly in vividness from the telling. But I shall simply
maintain that immediate conscious experience is preparation for
recounting the sensory events to others, that it is a rehearsal before other
brains that are embedded or modelled in the imagination.
This may sound far-fetched and evasive, but we know very well that
our brains contain accurate maps and models of the physical
environment, and an individual’s past experience and interaction with
other people must surely form the basis of models of their character and
84 H. B. Barlow
personality. It would be most surprising if we modelled people less
effectively than we model the physical environment. Thus models of
other brains normally exist in our heads, and one can ask “Could one
have a conscious sensory experience at all if the models of all past and
present acquaintances were suddenly deleted or made unavailable?”.
Since we learn language from others, we should have no words to
represent our awareness, and it is certainly only an impoverished
awareness that can occur without words. Even this residue requires, 1
would claim, an imagined person to relate to before it can become
conscious. Pain, it is true, seems to require no words for its experience,
but it evokes a uniquely strong urge to communicate.
Thus I conclude that subjective awareness, even of immediate
sensation, is a form of imagined future discourse. Or to put it another
way, the portion of the stream of sensory information of which one
becomes conscious corresponds to what one is selecting for potential
communication to others. It is reasonable to suppose that the brain has to
make this preselection, whether or not circumstances are propitious or
mandatory for actual communication, but I am insisting on the
importance of one or more imagined recipients of the communication
before it becomes conscious. An audience, as well as an actor, is
necessary for consciousness.
Self-awareness might be thought to pose another difficulty with the
view that consciousness is a relationship and not a property. If it is a
relationship, what is unique about one side of it? Should not
consciousness be shared between the group of brains that are interacting
and relating? It is interesting that groups do sometimes claim such
common consciousness, though it is certainly not usual. But in any case a
relationship can have a direction, and there is no need at all for
relationships to imply dispersal and sharing. Every node in a network has
its own individual set of connections, and it is this set of an individual
brain’s directed relationships that I conceive of as its consciousness. Selfawareness would then result from a brain modelling the reaction of other
brains, and incorporating the fact that the others, like itself, are nodes in
an interacting network. This recognition that others are unique but like
oneself implies the reciprocal, which is self—awareness: “I am unique,
but similar to others.” Self-awareness is a product of efficient modelling
of the relations between brains.
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role of Consciousness 85
Intentions and the making of decisions about future actions are
important aspects of conscious mental activity; in fact consciousness is
often thought of as the arena within which decisions are made and
intentions declared. In what sense, it may be asked, is there really an
audience here, people to relate to? Many decisions and intentions directly
concern another person, and in these cases it is hard to believe that a
brain as intelligent as the human’s would fail to employ the model it has
of that other person. “I shall ring him up”; “I shall kiss her”; “I shall
not pay this bill”: how could these intentions be declared without having
in the forefront of one’s mind the people most directly concerned? It
must be admitted there are other decisions where the audience is not
necessary; for instance “I shall go to the laboratory by way of the market
place because I want to buy some apples”. But my impression is that this
type of decision is often barely conscious -one just finds oneself in the
market buying the apples without having consciously made the decision.
One can also raise the question as to why consciousness is thought of as
an arena at all if there is no audience; it can hardly be the rest of one’s
own brain one is telling for one does not need to shout or declaim to that.
By now I hope to have established the concept of consciousness as
the special quality or feeling that imbues those parts of a brain's activity
that deal with the relationships of one individual with others. This
requires appreciation of the model—making propensities of brains, and
acknowledgement that models of other individuals, not real ones, are
sometimes involved in the relationships. To strengthen the concept we
must now look at the other part of the workings of a brain, those that are
not accessible to consciousness.
THE UNCONSCIOUS, UNRELATING BRAIN
Consciousness has the illusion that it has access to most of the working
of its own brain, but this is a foolish conceit and far from the case. There
are a host of automatic actions that one can partially control consciously,
such as breathing and walking, but clearly one has no introspective
understanding of the intimate sequences of muscular contractions
required to execute these acts. Similarly with sensory mechanisms: we see
a red apple, but have no introspective access to the physiological
mechanisms of receptors, retina, lateral geniculate nucleus, and primary
86 H. B. Barlow
cortex that start to label the source of excitation. These aspects of motor
and sensory mechanisms are an individual brain’s private business, and
on the current view it is not surprising that they are inaccessible to
conscious introspection.
The conceit of consciousness’s claim to know its own brain’s working
is well brought out by our introspective ignorance of details of the models
of the environment and its furniture. These enable us to walk around
town, eat a meal, or drive a car, and they are extraordinarily complex, as
the experts in artificial intelligence who try to imitate them have
discovered. However, all we have conscious access to is the end—product,
not the inner workings. A nice demonstration of our ignorance of such
details is provided by the contrasted habits of the left (clutch) and right
(brake and accelerator) feet when driving. The left foot has to be
withdrawn slowly and skilfully when starting, but the opposite action
rarely has to be done delicately and the left foot is usually depressed
forcefully and suddenly. Most people are quite unaware that their feet
have modelled the car’s requirements, but the left foot’s habit of
indelicate depression is dramatically revealed if it is used for braking
when driving an automatic.
What is even odder about these models is our unawareness of the
process of their construction. We acquire knowledge and skill, and can
consciously use the end—product, but we cannot reconstruct the steps by
which they were acquired. They are formed by experience and the
experience is “remembered” in the sense that it is incorporated into the
model, but it is not independently available. This is certainly one
important form of unconscious memory, but notice that it requires no
active “repression” to explain its unavailability; this simply results from
each individual memory being merged in the averaging process by which
the model must be formed.
Freudian notions of the unconscious are particularly interesting, for
in this case it is claimed that there are past experiences that guide and
largely control an individual’s behaviour, yet are repressed and thereby
deliberately kept from conscious awareness. That may be so, but on the
present viewpoint the working of the brain is necessarily unconscious
except when it is communicated to others. Active repression is quite
unnecessary, and instead some active inducement, a model brain
soliciting discourse, is required to bring a thought to consciousness.
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role of Consciousness 87
Perhaps the role played by the helpful counsellor or analyst is to solicit
this discourse directly, and to provide the model for the patient to
continue the discourse in his imagination. The increased range of
consciousness would thereby be simply and directly explained.
Clearly one could continue to speculate along these lines. For instance,
if nature normally imbues interpersonal relations with this special
characteristic, perhaps she sometimes fails to do so, as she sometimes
fails to provide full colour vision, or as with the occasional congenital
absence of pain sensations; could this be the defect in the autistic child?
At all events the main point to emphasize at this stage is that if an
individual needs other brains in order to become conscious, these other
brains will have a reciprocal effect on the individual: he cannot become
conscious of what he cannot communicate.
Enough has been said to show that making relations its primary seat
leads to a very different view of consciousness. It can no longer be
thought of as something added to the physical brain, or “emerging”
when the brain reaches a certain size, maturity, or complexity.
Consciousness is something to do specifically with that part of a brain
that deals with other brains, and this is why it is interesting. The question
how the brain brings about these interactions loses interest, for there is no
reason to believe that the mechanisms of the brain achieve this function
differently from any others. The question whether they are bound by the
laws of physics, or have an influence on them, no longer seems a
specially important one. Indeed it becomes almost absurd when one
appreciates that consciousness is concerned with the part of the brain that
handles human relations, for then there are so many other more
interesting questions to ask about it. It is like harping on the question “Is
speech the physical vibration of air molecules?”. Sound might be so
described, but speech is so much more than sound that the answer to the
question becomes unimportant; an affirmative answer leaves the interest
and importance of speech unimpaired.
I hope you are convinced that one can include all the normally
accepted aspects of consciousness in a view of it which makes the relating
of one brain to another the primary act of consciousness. I cannot conceive how we could logically decide between this view and others which
place “Je pense” or “Ich will” or “I feel” in the primary position. But
just as the geocentric view of the universe lost ground because it had to be
88 H. B. Barlow
made increasingly complex to accommodate new facts, so I hope that the
view that consciousness arises in interpersonal relations will gain ground
because it brings out clearly and simply the cause of its own evolution: it
gives a clear answer to the question about its functional role and survival
value. It is this unifying role that gives point and purpose to the
conjecture; but let me first illustrate with a short story.
An informed and friendly person places in your hands what he tells
you is a stone, but it is soft and warm instead of being hard and cold as
you expected. Surprise prompts curiosity, and you find that there is
indeed a stone in your hand, but it has been heated and wrapped in a soft
woollen sock. I have been saying that interpersonal relations envelop the
hard physical brain in all those aspects where we talk of consciousness,
and this is what makes mind appear soft and non—physical.
Now this episode is not bizarre and senseless because your friend gave
you the hot stone wrapped in a sock for a purpose, namely to help you
keep your hands warm. I am going now to suggest why our dubious
friend, Nature, placed this warm and glowing consciousness in our heads;
the answer, I am afraid, turns out to imply we are the victims of a
confidence trick, but it leads to a less bizarre and senseless view of
consciousness than is to be found in most philosophies.
CONSCIOUSNESS, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE HERD
The answer I want to propose is that consciousness is Nature’s trick to
ensure that mankind behaves co-operatively, that he is a gregarious
animal. We all regard our own consciousness as our most personal and
treasured possession: not to be conscious is not to be alive, and to be
unconscious is next to death. Yet if consciousness is one’s own brain’s
discourse with other brains, there are only two ways for it to stay alive.
The first is to engage in real discourse with real people for as much of the
day as possible, and no one will deny that that solution promotes the
gregariousness of mankind. The second, as we have seen, is to engage in
rehearsal of future discourse. It is this capacity to use his models of other
brains, to substitute imagined for real discourse, that seems to make
man’s social life so different from other gregarious creatures. How long
could a purely imaginary discourse be sustained? How can one
continuously check that members of the audience of one’s imagined
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role of Consciousness 89
discourse are good models and correspond to their prototypes in the real
world? The rehearsal and imagined discourse cannot be stored
indefinitely and therefore, if I have stated the nature of consciousness
correctly, an attempt must sooner or later be made to communicate it to
others. This, it seem to me, is the origin of Popper’s World 3, the world
of human culture, books and other products of man’s mind.
Thus, if people spend much time alone, it follows from the biological
role of consciousness, as presented here, that culture will be produced.
Perhaps cave paintings, those time—defying communications, were an
early manifestation; our books, movies, and tapes the more transient
modern versions. Attempting to contribute towards or to understand our
cultural heritage is an activity that links one to the rest of mankind, and
thus is a form of gregarious behaviour, but obviously a much more
interesting one than a sheeplike desire to follow, to huddle, or to avoid
being on the edge of the flock. The essence of this new trick to ensure
gregarious behaviour is that one only experiences one’s most personal
possession, one’s own consciousness, when one is sharing it with others;
one only has it when one gives it away. But that is just half the story.
A convention is two—sided. I cannot say anything I like, but only what
you will listen to and understand. Conventions must be established and
adhered to, including those of language itself. This means that when I
preserve my consciousness by entering into a real discourse with you, you
have some control over what I can say, what I can become conscious of.
There is nothing mystical about this and it is no more strange than a
townsman not losing his way in his town because he knows it. It follows
naturally from my brain’s ability to model you and your ways of
thought, to learn your language, to take account of your past responses,
known fields of expertise, your likes, dislikes and prejudices. Because I
must take these into account to converse with you, you exert some
reciprocal control over my consciousness, just as the plan of the town
controls the townsman’s movements. And, of course, what is true of real
discourse with a real person is also true of discourse with the imagined
people who substitute for a real person when I am attempting to maintain
consciousness by rehearsing future discourse. My family and friends,
cultural archetypes, my experience of father—figures and schoolmasters,
have a firm grip on what can enter my conscious mind, and because of
consciousness’s self—importance, they also control my decisions and
behaviour.
90 H. B. Barlow
Now let us look at it from Nature’s viewpoint. Can you imagine a
neater trick than this for making man a social being? She implants in you
this special sensation called consciousness, telling you it is your very own
possession, from birth to death; she tells you there is really nothing else
that is your own, this is your very being, and it is so important that no
new decision can be made, no major intention formulated, without this
accompanying sensation. All this, of course, she tells you in her own
script, in DNA, so that consciousness inevitably has these properties. But
she also arranges that nothing whatever will give rise to that sensation of
consciousness except a communication between your own brain and
another brain of the species Homo sapiens, though she is not explicit
about that. Without knowing why, you spend your life chasing the herd,
attempting to communicate with it, and rehearsing such communication
when you are unable to achieve it. Man is thus trapped by this glorious,
hilarious, trick, but it is a trick with remarkable consequences. Who
could have foretold that making an animal gregarious in this particular
way would cause the earth to become a storehouse and museum of the
products of his mind?
We had better enjoy the joke, for there is no escape; we each are
chained for life to the herd and its image. But during that life we could try
to ensure that the earth grows as a museum and does not become, too
soon, just a dead monument to Nature's Joke.
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role of Consciousnesss 91
Discussion
RAMACHANDRAN:
Let me first summarize your argument to see if I have got it right. You begin by
rejecting epiphenomenalism (according to which consciousness is merely the
“inner aspect” of cerebral activity) on the grounds that if this view were
correct we should be conscious of everything that goes on inside our brains.
Since only a tiny fraction of brain events emerge into consciousness you ask
“What is it that characterizes these events and makes them different from other
brain events?”. Your answer is that the need to communicate certain internal
states to other members of the species led to their emergence into
consciousness. For instance, we shout when jabbed with a needle and maybe this
is possible only because we consciously feel pain. On the other hand, it would
be biologically useless to communicate (say) the pupil’s response to light to
another person and so this has remained an unconscious reflex.
First, your argument requires that the common denominator of all conscious brain
states (as opposed to unconscious ones) is the fact that they would have
survival value if communicated to members of the species. Unfortunately this
does not seem to be true. I am aware of a much wider range of (say) sensations
than I would ever want to communicate. For instance, I can see dozens of shades
of green. If ordinary language has only one or two words for green (e.g. light
green, dark green) then what exerted the selection pressure for me to become
conscious of dozens of shades?
I can also see hundreds of depth planes using binocular parallax (stereopsis)
and I am conscious of each of these. Why not accept the more conventional view
that we are aware of depth in order to obtain visual feedback for prey catching
and locomotion? What use would it be to communicate stereopsis to my neighbours?
My point is that we can be (potentially) conscious of a much wider range of
events than we would ever want to or need to communicate; and so language could
not have exerted the selection pressure that led to the emergence of these
states into Consciousness.
I would argue that events emerge into consciousness only if they are linked to
the brain’s decision—making mechanisms, i.e. the centre in the brain that is
involved in assessing priorities of action based on certain goal criteria (what
MacKay calls the “supervisory system" in this volume). Of course, this centre
may be incidentally linked to language areas in man but that does not
necessarily implicate language in consciousness.
Second, it wasn’t clear to me whether you want to distinguish between linguistic
and non-linguistic communication and between creative and non-creative use of
language. Much of non»linguistic communication (popularly known as “body
language”) is completely unconscious, and people can unconsciously exchange a
great deal of information without uttering a single word (e.g. the pupil’s
response to attractiveness). Conversely we often speak of “mindless babble” when
people engage in unintelligent (though articulated) conversation. So perhaps you
need consciousness only for particular kinds of communication.
Finally, even if we accept your argument that consciousness is intimately
related to language, it doesn‘t follow that consciousness is causally effective
in permitting or facilitating communication. If the physical world (including
communicating brains) is a closed system then I don’t see how consciousness can
influence it. Indeed there is nothing logically impossible about brains
communicating actively without consciousness ever coming into the picture. Would
you agree with this?
7
_
92 H. B. Barlow
BARLOW:
I almost agree with your summary of my argument but would like to add a bit
more. I am postulating that the innate desirability of consciousness, together
with the impossibility of attaining it except by communication, is an important
factor in causing man to be social and gregarious. Thus the need to communicate
that you refer to becomes more than a matter of finding pragmatic solutions to
current problems; it becomes more like the motive for all existence. So in
answer to your first question I would say that not every conscious brain state
need have survival value if communicated; it is the practice of social
communication that has survival value, and single communications may not. Thus I
don’t really find it contradictory that our sensations are more fine-grained
than our communications. Surely our sensations do not contain details that we
can be sure we would never wish to communicate; in seeking the right tint of
paint you might ask for something “less bluey, more olive”, thus using a detail
of your fine»grained sensory representation in a social communication. Similarly
with stereopsis you might say “nearer" or “further" in directing someone how to
pour the champagne into your glass and not onto the floor.
I would also agree with your remarks about consciousness being linked to the
decision- making mechanisms, but think the decisions we are most conscious of
are those with social implications, whereas decisions with no social relevance
are often made unconsciously.
With regard to non-verbal communication, are you sure “body-language” is
entirely unconscious, to either communicant or recipient? But I don't want to
evade an important issue here. Whereas I think there is little if anything in
consciousness that is of purely private concern, I very much doubt if the
converse is true; I Very much doubt if all the social communications we make and
receive pass through our consciousness. So I agree there is a missing factor
here.
Finally, why should not brains communicate without consciousness? Well, as I’ve
just said, I think they do. In the same way I think an animal's spinal cord
mediates reflex responses to noxious stimuli without experiencing pain. The
subjective experience of pain puts in motion strategies for longer—term
avoidance and recovery. In the same way consciousness is something we desire and
seek, but can only achieve by communication; attaining this consistently calls
for long-term planning.
VESEY:
You say that what philosophers have said about consciousness seems mainly based
on introspection. This is not true of what Wittgenstein says about consciousness
in his later works (e.g. Philosophical Investigations, Pt. I, sections 412 ff .,
1953). In fact, I wonder whether you couldn’t make use of a rather
Wittgensteinian argument to support what you say about a connection between
communication and consciousness. It is the argument propounded by Anthony Kenny
in the I972/3 Gifford Lectures (A. J. P. Kenny et al., The Development of Mind,
Edinburgh University Press, 1973, pp. 9I—l07). Very briefly, the argument is (i)
that the behaviour of language-users is rule-governed, (ii) that if someone’s
behaviour is governed by a rule he must be to some degree conscious of the rule,
and (iii) that it would not be possible to distinguish between correct and
incorrect applications of a rule if there were not a community of languageusers. Obviously it is too much to ask you for a snap decision on the validity
of an argument that has quite a lot of theorizing about the philosophy of
language behind it. But I'd be interested to know whether you think the
Nature's Joke: A Conjecture on the Biological Role of Consciousness 93
sort of consideration Kenny advances is compatible with an evolutionary
explanation of consciousness. (Kenny himself says that: “there seem to be
profound difficulties in principle in seeing how the practice of following rules
could have . . . been produced by natural selection’ ’ .)
BARLOW:
I did not want to insult philosophers by implying that all they have ever said
about consciousness stems from introspection. However, I don't think they often
go as far as they should in mistrusting common—sense introspective ideas about
consciousness. My reason for this mistrust arises partly from recognition that
our actions can be guided by brain events and mechanisms of which we are
unconscious; you do not have to be a dogmatic Freudian to accept that this does
sometimes occur. But in a more important way it stems from comparisons of the
biological and introspective viewpoints on other prominent subjective
experiences. Pain, to a biologist, is a signal to an animal that warns of more
serious injury and is thus protective, but there is no trace of this
protectiveness in the subjective, introspective, experience of pain. Similarly
with love: to a biologist this is the set of emotions that guide reproduction
and child rearing, but when touched by it we do not rush forward and say “Ah,
how fertile and motherly you look”, nor would it be well received if we did. Our
nature is such that we experience conscious thoughts and feelings that make us
act in certain ways, and it is these actions that serve Nature’s purpose. The
logic and rationality of the whole sequence is not at all evident in the part
that we consciously experience, and my thesis is that this is true of
consciousness itself.
I am afraid I have not attempted to tackle Wittgenstein on this matter, but I
confess that 1 find Kenny’s argument amazingly unconvincing. Does he really
think that one must be to some degree conscious of every rule one follows? Can
he give me a list of the rules he follows when choosing his footfalls on a rocky
mountain path? Or when deciding that his daughter’s face is the third from the
left in the front row of the school photograph? Or when deciding the appropriate
way to introduce his guest in a crowded room?
The suggestion that the practice of following rules could not have been produced
by natural selection was, I thought, largely demolished in the discussion by
Waddington and Lucas that followed Kenny’s contribution to the Gifford Lectures.
I do not know that much more need be added, but I am sure Kenny would agree that
few human mates are selected (by either sex) without the use of language. Since
language is a rule-following game, it is only too easy to see how its skilful
use can be a positive factor in survival and propagation; fine words, for the
human, are at least the equivalent in this respect of fine tail-feathers for the
peacock. And it must be added that words and language are a great deal more
useful, and confer much greater survival advantage, in other circumstances.
So in summary I do not see any reason why consciousness should not have evolved
by natural selection. But to accept this you will have to look at the way it
induces us to behave, not at your subjective experience of it.
RAMACHANDRAN:
In a sense your argument seems to be the exact converse of what Nick Humphrey
has suggested (Chapter 4). Would you like to say anything about the relation
between your views and his?
94 H. B. Barlow
BARLOW:
I was as surprised as anyone else to find that we have been thinking about the
same subject, but this surprise should be tempered by the knowledge that both of
us are receptive to current ideas in sociobiology, and an extension of these
ideas to philosophical problems was a natural channel for both our thoughts to
flow along.
It is gratifying that we agree on the answer to the question “What does
consciousness do?”, namely that it promotes man’s survival as a social animal.
But then we seem to diverge, for I assume nothing about consciousness except
that it is desirable to the individual, and only attainable in real or imagined
social relations. Nick Humphrey takes a less radical view, endowing
consciousness with many of the properties that we think it has by subjective
introspection. Thus 1 think he assumes that, because we are conscious of some
piece of information we shall make better, more rational, use of it. Now I don’t
see why this should be so: why should not observation of the behaviour of a
conspecific creature that is hungry, love—sick or jealous lead to unconscious
recognition of the cause of its behaviour? Indeed I think this does often
happen, and social behaviour induced by such unconscious intuition is as
rational and appropriate as that which follows conscious recognition.
Nevertheless one can see that there is an important difference between the
unconscious and the conscious case, for in the latter one can communicate
directly about the motive state; one can say “I see you are hungry and shall
give you food", whereas the unconsciously motivated response could only have
been the action of giving food. Thus we see yet another link between
consciousness and communication.
To put this another way, I think I neglected the aspect of consciousness that
Nick Humphrey emphasizes most strongly, its input from one’s own emotional
state. But whereas he says this is important for understanding others, I think
this understanding comes at least as effectively from unconscious intuition, and
the importance of conscious awareness of one’s emotional state lies in
facilitating communication; this awareness adds important words to our language.
And I must say I prefer my more radical view of consciousness as the prompter
and initiator of man’s social and intellectual life to his more conservative
view that it simply facilitates these activities and makes them more effective.
CHAPTER 6
Conscious Agency with Unsplit
and Split Brains
D. M. MACKAY
University of Keele
ABSTRACT
The bizarre symptoms produced by section of the corpus callosum in man have led
to a variety of speculations about the consciousness to be attributed to the
result. Are there now two conscious minds, or even two persons, where there was
one before? Is one brain hemisphere conscious, the other unconscious? Do normal
(unsplit) brains embody two conscious persons all the time? Should we grant that
both halves are conscious but only one is self-conscious? And so on.
In this paper I want to examine some of the presuppositions that underlie such
questions, from the standpoint of information engineering. The intention is not
to enter into the vexed question whether automata can be conscious, but only to
take advantage of a system of concepts common to both neurology and automata
theory as a scaffolding on which to feel our way around these perplexing
problems. From this standpoint I shall argue that in order to attribute
significant determinative power to conscious processes we have no need to rely
on any breach of physical causality in the nervous system.
Our primary focus will be, not on the processing, storing and retrieval of
informa- tion, nor merely on the co—ordination of sensori-motor performance, but
on the evaluative aspects of conscious agency. Unless a surgical operation
splits the evaluative hierarchy into two autonomously functioning wholes, there
would seem to be no justification for considering the result to be two
independent, conscious individuals, however elaborately absent-minded the victim
might be.
In the interests of clarity, it is suggested that to speak of “hemispheres” or
“brains" as conscious is to fasten on the wrong target. It is agents who may (or
may not) be conscious, not brains or half-brains.
In this contribution I want to raise three questions, two of which I hope will
clear the ground for the third. First, starting from the ground level of common
experience, how does talk of “consciousness” arise, and what implications has it
for our view of physical reality? Next, at what level of
95
96 D. M. Mackay
analysis, and in what categories, might we hope to find distinctive
features of brain states in which a subject is conscious, as opposed to
those in which he is not? Finally, under what conditions does it make
sense to claim that we are confronted with two or more conscious
individuals? This last question will be related particularly to the bizarre
phenomena manifested in cases where the human brain has been partially
split by section of the corpus callosum.
HOW DOES TALK OF CONSCIOUSNESS ARISE?
What we call “conscious experience” is for each of us the primary
datum to which all our thinking must do justice —the ground on which
we must build even our doubting. All our knowledge of the physical
world and of other people goes back to this base; so any attempt to deny
the foundational reality of conscious experience would be derisorily selfcancelling. Whatever else “exists” or “does not exist”, the existence of at
least one conscious agent in the world is a fact for all of us.
When trying to relate the data of conscious experience to what we
believe about the physical world, I have found an imaginary visual aid‘
helpful in the interests of semantic hygiene. If you were asked to bear
witness to the content of your conscious experience, you could in
principle write down a long list of statements in a vertical column, each
beginning with “I”. “I see—such-and—such”; “I hear—that”; “I feel—thus—
and—so”; “I remember— . . .”; ‘‘I believe— . . .”; and the like. Call this
collectively the “I-story”. The I-story bears witness to data that you
would be lying to deny.
Now the objective of those of us in brain research is to fill out entries in
a parallel column (say to the right of the first), describing states of or
processes in your central nervous system that correlate with the facts
listed on the left. We may call it the “brain story”. How do we get to this
from our base in experience? The general answer is: through our
experience as conscious agents; but to trace the logical path without
jumping illegitimate gaps will take some care and patience.
As conscious agents we find ourselves having to reckon with
constraints (boundary conditions) on our action and our planning of
action. We cannot move freely in all directions, for example. There are
“objects” in the way, and other limitations and enablements (such as
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 97
“gravitational forces”) to be taken into account. These constraints,
many of them conditional on one another, are regular enough to be
worth naming, modelling, analysing mathematically, and so forth. We
attribute them to “physical reality”, meaning what must be reckoned
with in planning and taking action with our muscular system. Through
our sensory experience our conditional readiness to reckon with the
physical world is continually updated. This updating in self—matching
response to the demands of sensory information we call conscious
perception of the physical world?
By suitably designed exploratory and experimental interaction we can
analyse and elaborate the structure of environmental contingencies and
develop a scientific map of physical reality which enlarges our conditional
readiness far beyond the immediate correlates of our own perceiving. The
total structure of our conditional readinesses represents (embodies) what
we believe about the physical world.
One relatively minute sample of physical reality we each find we have
to reckon with in a special way. It is our own nervous system. This can in
principle be prodded, weighed, dissected like other physical objects; but
whereas changes in the rest of the physical world are known to us only by
observation or report (and may be ignored by closing our eyes, ears, etc.),
there is good evidence that certain physical changes in certain parts of our
nervous system directly correlate with changes in our conscious
experience. In many regions of that system, especially in the periphery,
physical activities may normally be necessary correlates of sensory
experience and the like; but (as the use of peripheral anaesthetics or the
results of cortical brain damage can demonstrate) they are not at all
sufficient. Only in deep central brain structures, most of which still await
detailed identification, do we find physical activities so unconditionally
correlated with the subject’s experience that we may suppose them to be
sufficient conditions of that experience. (Even then, of course, this is only
a working hypothesis made plausible, but not conclusively demanded, by
the data of neurology.) Although the details of the correlation between
“I-story” and “brain—story” are at present obscure, the conjecture we
are considering is that no change can take place in your conscious
experience without some corresponding change taking place in the
physical structure concerned. This in principle defines the postulated
cerebral correlate of any experience: it is that physical state or process
which must change if any change takes place in that experience.
98 D. M. Mackay
The point of our visual aid is just to remind us that mental terms like
seeing, feeling, thinking, hoping, believing, and being conscious all
belong to the left-hand column. The corresponding places on the right, if
the assumption were valid, would all be occupied by references to
physical, or at any rate mechanistic, concepts such as nerve-cell firings,
synaptic modifications and the like. Note that these are not translations
of mental terms but only correlates, in something of the sense in which an
electronic engineer’s account of the physical process in a computer is a
correlate of the description a mathematician might give of what the
computer is doing. Neglect of this distinction causes much confusion, as
when people claim that in conscious experience we perceive directly what
is happening in our brains. If we actually wanted to do that, we should
have to use appropriate instruments like anybody else; and as we shall
now see, we might run into sufficiently profound epistemological
difficulties to convince us of the difference between self—awareness and
self-observation!
THE COSTS OF KNOWING
According to the working hypothesis of brain science, then, we come
to know only at the cost of dedicating a relatively minute region of the
physical world inside our own heads to the purpose of representing what
we know or believe. Let us call this our “cognitive system”. Because it is
the region of our nervous system that has to represent what we know or
believe, by determining the corresponding conditional constraints and
enablements, our cognitive system must change significantly as what we
know or believe changes; and by the same token, it is itself something not
to be known by us. (In a community of persons in dialogue, as we shall
see later, this dedicated region may expand to include the cognitive
systems of those in dialogue with us.)
“Not to be known” here means “not to be known until afterwards”.
Tell me later if you like, but not now—your effort is bound to be selfstultifying. If you had a completely accurate and detailed statedescription of the immediate future of my cognitive system, the changes
that would be necessary to embody it in my cognitive system now must
(logically must) render it out of date for me. Until afterwards, in a certain
strict sense it is not just undiscoverable by me but indeterminate-for-me.
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 99
This last distinction is important.
(a) A state may be unknowable—by-A, or undiscoverable-by—A, in the
weak sense that although there exists in principle a state-description
which has an unconditional claim to A’s assent (i.e. A would be
correct to believe it and in error to disbelieve it if only he knew it) A
cannot acquire this description. (Example: a detailed statespecification of the particles in the centre of the sun.) This is not a
particularly interesting case, unless perhaps to a very old-fashioned
variety of logical positivist.
(b) A state may, however, be indeterminate—for-A, in the much stronger
sense that no fully detailed description of it exists which A would be
correct to believe and in error to disbelieve.’ The immediate future
of my cognitive system is indeterminate-for—me (and of yours indeterminate-for-you) in this strong sense — quite regardless of the
extent to which it may be affected by any physical (Heisenberg—type)
‘ ‘uncertainty’ ’ .
Now of course socially, especially for scientific purposes, we share a
concept of “the physical world” as if it were well defined or even (in preHeisenberg days) completely determinate. The point we must note,
however, is that when each of us appropriates the concept for himself, he
has to recognize one region of his physical world (a different one for
each) to be systematically indeterminate - namely, the region that
represents his present knowing. The physical world may be littered with
physical relics of my past knowings and those of others, which are now
fully determinate for me and everybody else. But at any given time there
IS in our physical world a flickering, shifting little area of indeterminacy,
different for each of us, which waits for us to determine its state by our
cognitive activity.
_ In this sense, the shared social concept of a determinate physical world
is strictly a make-believe, even without reference to Heisenberg
uncertainty. If our brains are accepted as part of the physical world, then
the true picture of that world for each of us includes an irreducible area
of indeterminacy, whereof we as cognitive agents are the necessary
determinants. This partly indeterminate world is the only world we know.
Any Image of the physical world that showed all our cognitive systems in
complete1y determinate future states would be false to reality, in the strict
sense that we would be in error if we believed it to be the only one
100 D. M. Mackay
possible. Such an image of someone else ’s brain may exist with an
unconditional claim to my assent, if I am physically uncoupled from him;
but none exists with such a claim to the assent of all. In this strict sense
the social concept of a fully determinate future for the physical world is
logically bankrupt. It is like a cheque which is endorsed “Not payable to
anyone signing”.“
LOGICAL RELATIVITY
It may be tempting to feel that if others (sufficiently detached
observers) could in principle observe and predict the future of the area for
which we have a “blind spot”, this would show that it was not “really”
indeterminate for us, but that we were just “invincibly ignorant” of its
immediate future. But this would be a logical mistake. The most we could
validly conclude is that the area was not indeterminate-for—others—but
this was granted at the outset. The situation is relativistic, in the strong
sense that no single determinate total state-description of physical reality
can exist upon which all would be unconditionally correct to agree. What
the detached observers know about the future of our brains is not
knowledge for us. It is not that knowledge exists which we lack and
cannot gain, or cannot be persuaded to accept. The truth is rather that
because of our unique relationship to the subject matter, what the
detached observers correctly believe would be inaccurate information for
us if we had it. It would thus be a solecism to describe our lack of it as
“ignorance”, invincible or otherwise. This logically tantalizing
conclusion is perhaps the most remarkable consequence of the
assumption that conscious experience is physically embodied}
Objectors to the foregoing argument have sometimes claimed that it
could be circumvented by ensuring that the future state-description was
corrected to take account of the changes in the cognitive system that
would be produced by embodying it there. Recondite mathematical
theorems have been invoked to prove that this is in principle possible.“ It
may be worth taking a few lines to see how this move misses the point.
Suppose that (with the help of the “Fixed Point Theorem” or
whatever) a super—scientist could derive a detailed future state-description
of your cognitive system that would become accurate if (but only if) you
believed it. Then indeed he has found a possible description that you
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 101
would be correct to believe; but unless he were allowed to interact with
your situation so as to make you believe it, in the way he has assumed in
making his calculations, it must remain false. Furthermore, and logically
more important, what he has derived is something that you would not be
in error to disbelieve! Thus whether or not in fact you were given it and
believed it, his cooked-up state-description has no unconditional claim to
your assent (such that you would be correct to believe it and in error to
disbelieve it). On the contrary, your assent is one of the factors that will
determine whether it is correct.
Even if we imagine that in a given case the super—scientist could predict
that you would be given it and would assent to it, and you did, it would
not follow that its logical claim on you was unconditional; for that would
require him to show that you would have been in error had you rejected
it. But in fact if you had disbelieved it, the assumption on which it was
based would have been ipso facto false, so you would still have been right
to do so! Thus although you were not mistaken to believe it, and he
(having been allowed to influence you) was right to predict you would, its
claim to your assent was not unconditional. You would have been
mistaken to accept his prediction as inevitable—for—you.
A DISTINCTIVE CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUSNESS?
One particularly important class of change in my nervous system is that
which causes me to “lose consciousness”. When this happens I become
unable, then or later, to bear witness to events observable by others
during the time that my system was in this abnormal state. (In passing,
this common phenomenon surely throws doubt on the notion sometimes
aired, that consciousness is something that arises automatically when
matter is organized into structures of sufficient complexity!)
Metaphorical talk of “losing consciousness” or “regaining
consciousness” might seem to lend support to speculations that
“consciousness” is the name of some kind of entity, like fuel or electric
charge, that can exert quasi—physical influences on the brain; but this
inference would be as invalid as the conclusion that “loss of balance” in
a wheel, or “loss of stability” in a servo system, must refer to the escape
of intangible substances called “balance” or “stability”. When I regain
consciousness I become a conscious agent -1 do not acquire one. Note
102 D. M. MacKay
too that it is I who become conscious, and not my brain or CNS.
Doubtless when I am conscious my CNS is organized in some
correspondingly distinctive way; but it would be a solecism to claim that
it is conscious.
How then may we hope to make explicit what is distinctive about the
cerebral correlate of consciousness? As it happens, the requirements of
industry and war for the mechanization of intelligent action have given
rise to a conceptual framework that seems well adapted for the purpose.
It goes by the name of information-flow analysis. Applied to a living
organism it means a systematic attempt to identify needs for information
in the functioning of the organism, and to discover how the necessary
information is acquired?
In any organism there is a more or less rich repertoire of possible
modes of action in the world, including complex “sub-routines”.
Information is needed to determine the running selection from this
repertoire that constitutes the behaviour of the animal. Where does this
information come from? In part, of course, from the receptor system;
but the raw data are not enough. At a minimum, if behaviour is to be
goal—directed, there must be a stage of evaluation of incoming
information in the light of criteria sufficient to determine whether, and if
so what, corrective action is called for. Normally the calculation of
adaptive action will have to take account also of stored information, kept
up to date by sensory input.
Where then do the criteria of evaluation come from? In something like
a thermostat they are set by a human supervisor, but in an autonomous
organism any reordering of goals and priorities is normally organized
internally. Let us call the system responsible (whatever it may turn out to
be) the supervisory system. Because of the complex array of alternative
goals and sub—goals, norms and satisfactions pursued under different
conditions by human beings in particular, the human supervisory system
must be at least hierarchic, and more probably heterarchic (having
feedback between levels) in structure.
At this point we face a choice. Some thinkers, of whom Sir John Eccless
is a distinguished contemporary exemplar, would locate at least part of
the human supervisory system outside the physical world altogether. This
would mean that some of the lines of information-flow in our map would
have to terminate in thin air, so to say: the “self-conscious mind” would
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 103
exert non-physical influences on appropriately “open” elements of the
nervous system. It is important to recognize that no scientific data rule
out such speculations. Those of us who object to them do so rather on the
grounds that they multiply entities beyond any demonstrated necessity. I
must indeed confess to feeling the same objection to Professor
Josephson’s conjectures in the present symposium, even though (in his
spoken presentation) he prefers to speak of consciousness as “some kind
of physical substance”.
But could an information-flow model without such extra-physical
entities be compatible with the facts of conscious experience? Above all,
could it offer any natural (rather than contrived ad hoc) distinctive correlate of the conscious as opposed to the unconscious state? It is sometimes
objected that for any mechanistic theory of brain functions, conscious
and unconscious states must be equally and indistinguishably reducible to
“mere” configurations of nerve impulses; but this I believe is a mistake
based on the wrong level of analysis — as if someone were to claim that to
a telegraph engineer all messages must be indistinguishable in terms of the
physical currents carrying them. Once you know the code, the opposite is
true: physical data can actually provide a way of cross—checking a
description of the message being sent.
EVALUATIVE SUPERVISION
The alternative view, which seems at present the more parsimonious,
would be that all the lines of cause—and—effect on the information—flow
map form closed loops within the brain or by way of the external physical
world, and that the distinctive correlate of a conscious state should be
sought first in the form of the informational activity. The conjecture I
would favour° is that the direct correlate of our conscious experience is
not the activation of sensory receiving centres, nor even the exercise of
sensori-motor co-ordination as such, but the “meta-organizing”
evaluative activity of the supervisory system. According to this
conjecture, any brain centre could in principle be active without my
necessarily experiencing a conscious correlate; but any change that was
significant at the level of the evaluative supervisory activity in my CNS
would have its necessary correlate in my experience. What is distinctive,
according to this hypothesis, is the information—flow structure of the
104 D. M. Mackay
physical activity concerned, rather than any vulnerability of the physical
components to extra—physical influences.
Without going into details, we may note that on this view the total
physical correlate whose “informational shape” determines the content
of conscious experience will constantly change with the domain of
supervisory activity. In driving a car or playing a game of tennis, for
example, the evaluative flow—system will have informational feedback
loops reaching out not only into primary cortex but also into the outside
world of action. It is well known that a blind man with a cane perceives
his world as out there at the tip of his cane, not in his palm. The total
physical system in which my conscious experience is embodied at a given
time may thus extend far beyond the boundaries of my skin, which from
this standpoint are largely incidental.
What then of the distinction between human self—consciousness and the
general conscious awareness that most of us would attribute to lower
animals? Without any further assumptions ad hoc, our analysis suggests
a natural correlate. We can think of the human supervisory system, like
that of other animals suitably equipped, as keeping up to date the internal
representation of the world by an active matching response to incoming
information. If, however, this response in man is organized partly at the
abstract conceptual level developed for purposes of verbal communication with others, we could expect our correlated experience to link directly
with Verbalized thinking: “There goes so—and—so on his bicycle”;
“What’s that? —Oh, it’s the missing cuff-link”; and so on. If now we
imagine the field of “incoming information” widened to include
information about the activity of the supervisory system itself,” we can
by the same token expect the agent’s conscious experience to include such
trains of thought as: “There I go making the same mistake as before” or
“Which of these do I prefer?” In short, the game of (internalized) talking
to oneself about one’s world, including oneself, would follow naturally
on the development of the game of talking to one another, without any
apparent need to suppose that the hardware of the human CNS must be
open to non-physical influences of the sort postulated by Eccles8 The reentrant information-flow loops set up when the supervisory system
became the subject of its own internal representation could, of course, be
expected to introduce special possibilities of oscillatory or co-operative
behaviour with qualitatively unique correlates in experience (and with the
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 105
logical consequences outlined on p. 99); but none of this would seem to
take us outside of the domain of normal behaviour at the physical level.
Now I have stated all this as only a conjecture, and you may well ask
why we should pick on the evaluative function as crucial. My reason is
that (following John MacMurray") I think of the human self primarily as
an agent: one who evaluates his situation and attaches relative priorities
to alternative modes of responding to it, including inactivity (passive
undergoing or suffering) at one extreme and the upheaval of his whole
scheme of priorities itself at the other. It is when activity becomes
sufficiently stereotyped to require no evaluative supervision that we tend
to become unconscious of it—even though it may employ elaborate
sensori-motor co-ordination and a rich supply of stored information.
Conversely, it is when we struggle with conflicting demands on our
central priority—scheme that we are most acutely conscious of what we are
doing and suffering.
The hypothesis is also in line with a wide range of clinical observations
on the kinds of brain lesion (mostly in deep central structures) that
abolish all conscious experience in coma, as opposed to those confined to
cortical levels which seem merely to affect its detailed content.”
Moreover, it is in the central (hypothalamic and diencephalic) subsystems of the brain that physical changes seem most closely correlated
with conscious moods, desires and evaluative affect. Although in man
these structures are particularly elaborately integrated with others such as
the frontal lobes, damage to the latter seems only to affect the sensitivity
and coherence with which priorities are evaluated and changed, rather
than abolish all signs of conscious appraisal.
SPLIT BRAINS — HOW MANY CONSCIOUS INDIVIDUALS?
Dr. Ramachandran has already referred to the bizarre symptoms that
result from surgical section of the human corpus callosum — the elaborate
cableway of several hundred million nerve fibres that link the two brain
hemispheres. Although according to Sperry” speech, verbal intelligence,
calculation, established motor co—ordination, verbal reasoning and recall,
personality and temperament are all preserved to a surprising degree,
there is a strong dissociation of reactions to stimuli presented only to one
half or the other of the split sensori-motor system. Because the speech
106 D. M. MacKay
organs are normally controlled only by one (usually the left) hemisphere,
a patient may verbally report seeing only a stimulus flashed to the right of
his fixation point, while at the same time correctly identifying with his left
hand (controlled by the right hemisphere) an object whose name was
flashed to the left (and so signalled only to the right hemisphere).
The philosophical implications of these dramatic findings are currently
a matter of keen debate. In particular, how many conscious individuals
are there in a split-brain patient? Sperry himself happily speaks of “two
rather separate streams of conscious awareness”. “Each hemisphere”,
he says, “has its own private sensations, perceptions, thoughts and ideas
. . . its own private chain of memories and learning experiences.” This
claim as it stands involves the transfer of an “I-story” category to the
“brain-story”, and strictly makes no more sense than to claim that an
unsplit brain is conscious, rather than the person whose brain it is. But
the question Sperry is raising is a real one. Without committing any transgression of categories, we can still ask whether the two split hemispheres
are now the brains of two conscious individual persons, who just happen
to share pre—operative memories and a common body. This is neither
inept nor inconceivable, and at least one philosopher, Puccetti,“ has
argued in this way. (Puccetti actually goes further, and suggests that on
these grounds each of us with unsplit brains must in reality be two
persons; but to the logic of this we shall return.)
Before we jump to such conclusions, however, I believe that an
information-flow analysis of the situation should sow some legitimate
seeds of doubt in our minds. For obvious reasons, the surgeon splitting
the corpus callosum to relieve an epileptic patient leaves intact as many
oentral brain structures as possible. In particular, there is no division of
the deeper central structures concerned with the most basic and dominant
evaluative functions. If the normal human evaluative system is an
integrated hierarchy or heterarchy (a hierarchy with inter—level feedback)
then it is not at all obvious that an operation which splits at most its
peripheral levels should bring into being two independently conscious
individuals. Admittedly, one “split” patient has been reported to button
up his trousers with one hand while unbuttoning them with the other,
which suggests some independence in executive goal-setting mechanisms.
But there is no evidence, and indeed it seems neurologically implausible,
to suggest that more than one independent evaluative hierarchy had come
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 107
into being. Bizarre though it must be, such experience of divided
executive control would seem more parsimoniously bracketed with things
like absent-mindedness, or the experience of “finding oneself in two
minds”, than with the discovery of an identical (but conflicting) twin.
However vigorous the conflict at the executive level, it seems more
analogous to a quarrel in a sub-committee than to the formation of an
independent rival organization. The same boss, with the same ultimate
criteria of evaluation, presides over both sub—agencies.
ARTIFICIAL AGENCY IN DUPLICATED STRUCTURES
At this point an example from the engineering of artificial agency may
help us sort out our ideas. Suppose that a radar-guided automatic missile
director were, for reasons of reliability, constructed entirely in duplicate.
Each unit, we may suppose, is wired in parallel with its twin, so that both
share all tasks. How many missile directors have we? The engineer’s
criterion is quite clear. If there is only one integrated goal—directed flow
system with a single central evaluator, we have only one director.
Suppose now that we begin to split the system by cutting the paralleling
links. At what point would we claim to have two directors? Obviously if
the splitting were 100 per cent complete, each half could thereafter
function individually. But if only, say, the radar systems were split, or the
information storage systems, or the “sensori-motor co—ordinating”
systems that linked both of these with the missile controls, it would be
quite misleading to describe the end—product as two directors. True, it
would be possible, by stimulating each radar receiver separately, to have
independent and even conflicting commands issued to missiles (especially
if the missiles controlled by each half were different). But as long as the
system had only one central evaluator defining its criteria of match and
mismatch, the only directed activity would be that which was calculated
to reduce mismatch and optimize match according to those criteria. The
most that peripheral splitting could do would be to increase the number
of degrees of freedom of the executive sub—system, at some risk to overall
efficiency.
Conversely, it may be useful to remind ourselves that one and the same
piece of undivided hardware can easily embody two or more autonomous
artificial agents, each with its own evaluative hierarchy. A stock example
108 D. M. Mackay
would be the use of a general-purpose computer to embody two artificial
chess players sufficiently independent to play against one another.
Always the key question is how many independent evaluative roles can be
played simultaneously. The physical singleness or multiplicity of the
hardware is relevant only in so far as it bears on this question.
In the case of split brains, of course, I do not wish to argue that
“hardware” considerations can safely be neglected. For all we know, our
conscious experience may depend not only on having the right pattern of
connections in our brains, but also on phenomena analogous to physical
co—operativity15 which may (who knows?) depend on some particular
combination of spatial contiguity and molecular structure obtaining only
in the natural CNS. (Think, for example, of the combination of physical
factors that determine whether a nuclear reactor, or a coal fire, “goes
critical”.) So I am very far from suggesting that we can guarantee
conscious experience to any artificial agent that happens to have the
appropriate evaluative structure, and I would certainly not personally
attribute it to our missile director, whose “supervisory system”, after all,
is a human operator. The purpose of our excursion into the theory of
artificial agency was rather the converse—to show how unjustified it
would be to assume that peripheral splitting of the CNS, so as to produce
independent sensori—motor and information-storage systems, is enough
of itself to set up two independent “streams of consciousness”.
HOW MANY INDEPENDENT SUPERVISORY EVALUATORS?
The key question, I am suggesting, is how many independent
supervisory evaluators are able to function simultaneously. The answer
for all of the human split-brain cases described so far appears to be: one.
As Sperry himself admits, emotional reactions triggered by offensive
signals to one hemisphere seem to be entirely unified, showing no sign of
lateralization. Attempts to set up concurrent conflicting emotional sets
have failed.” When the non—speech hemisphere receives an offensive
input, the patient as a whole blushes or giggles and bears witness to an
experience of embarrassment, even though unable to say why. At the
outer levels of the evaluative hierarchy that are split, it is only to be
expected that independent and even conflicting sub-criteria of evaluation
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 109
can be established once conflicting patterns of experience have been
mediated by the two hemisphere systems; but this does not show that
either has broken free of the unifying central supervisory evaluation that
(according to my conjecture) identifies the conscious agent. It is
significant that Sperry (loc. cit., p. 8) finds “separate parallel performance on different tasks, though possible under special facilitating conditions, . . . not to be the general rule. . . . Attention in many tests seems
to become focused in one separate hemisphere and simultaneously
become repressed in the other. . . .” He points out that brainstem
orienting mechanisms are undivided as well as the cerebellar controls for
motor co-ordination, and warns (p. 10) that “With most of our research
interest naturally concentrated on the divided aspects of brain function, it
is easy to underemphasize the many components of behaviour that
remain unified”.
The fallacy in arguing back from split-brain data to the conclusion that
two conscious persons coexist in normal human beings should now be
doubly apparent. Not only are the data insufficient to prove that separate
persons are embodied in split hemispheres; but even if they were
sufficient (if, for example, in a science fiction world a human brain could
be split so deeply that two independent conscious agents clearly had their
separate supervisory evaluators in the severed halves) it would not follow
logically that there must have been two before, any more than in the
analogous case of our missile director. In particular we must bear in mind
the evidence from ablation studies that Parkinson’s Law (‘ ‘work expands
to fill the space available”) seems often to apply in the neuronal domain.
Any drastic change in connectivity is likely to bring about some
redeployment of essential functions, possibly involving the
“cannibalization” of structures whose role in the intact brain would have
been quite different. This point would apply even more strongly if largescale co—operative phenomena do play a functional part in the working of
the nervous system, since the resulting dynamic patterns of activity could
have the same kind of mobility and lability as the flames that flicker over
a coal fire.
DIALOGUE: THE ULTIMATE TEST
Perhaps the most characteristic conscious human activity is that
reciprocal interaction with others which we call dialogue. I am not now
110 D. M. MacKay
referring to the non-committal alternating monologue that sometimes
passes for dialogue in our sophisticated society, but to the deep-going
relationship of mutual vulnerability through which another in a special
way becomes “Thou” to me and I to him. The distinction between the
two seems to have an illuminating parallel at the level of informationflow analysis. As long as someone communicating with another is able to
shield his own evaluative system from the address of the other, he can in
principle treat the other as an object, a manipulandum, open in principle
to full scientific specification like any other physical object. Once the
barriers to fully reciprocal communication are down, however, a specially
interesting configuration becomes possible, in which the informationflow structure that constitutes each supervisory system interpenetrates the
other, and the lines of flow from each return by way of the other, so that
the two become one system for purposes of causal analysis.
In this relationship, each conscious agent becomes indeterminate for
the other (for the reasons explained on p. 99) as well as for himself.
Each is mysterious to the other, not merely in the weak sense that the
other cannot gain the necessary completely determining information, but
in the strong sense that no such information exists, either for him or for
his interlocutor, until after the event. There are “interaction terms”, as
a physicist would say, in the joint state-equation, which prevent it from
having a uniquely determinate solution for either, even if the physical
systems concerned were as mechanistic as pre—Heisenberg physics
pictured them.
Coming back then to the two halves of a split brain, we might have
strong grounds for recognizing two conscious individuals if each could be
fully “Thou” to the other in dialogue; but this is just what can never be,
so long as the deep central supervisory systems in these human cases are
undivided. No mutual interpenetration of independent evaluators is
possible, unless at the most superficial levels, where any “dialogue” that
could be implemented would amount to little more than the debates with
oneself that every normal individual conducts without serious danger to
his individuality. Where linguistic ability was closely linked with only one
hemisphere, that would of course be a further reason for doubting
whether the agent embodied in the other hemisphere could be selfconscious on the lines suggested on p. 104. In this sense (though for
different reasons!) I am sympathetic to the suggestion by Eccles3 that any
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 111
consciousness associated with the “minor” hemisphere might best be
compared with that of a non-speaking animal.
Incidentally, it is in exchanges at the evaluative rather than simply the
informative level that we see one of the most important biological
advantages of human communication. It provides a vital means of
resolving potential goal-conflict. To revert to an old analogy,” imagine
two air—conditioners operating in a common space with incompatible goal
settings. What will happen? Clearly, a tug-of—war: one will run flat out
heating and the other cooling until one of them breaks down, when the
survivor can relax to a normal level of activity. How could this mutual
attrition be avoided? One solution with some survival value would be to
equip each with an arm and hand that could pull out the plug of any
other it encountered (if the other did not get there first). The most viable
solution, however, would be for one to use its hand to adjust the goal
setting of the other into conformity with its own, so that each could settle
down to carry only half a normal load.
Taking this as a parable, we can see the huge biological utility of
conscious communication as a means, first and foremost, of mutually
adjusting evaluative supervisory systems into compatible states. A true
“meeting of minds” is a form of internalized mutual adjustment of
evaluators. For such an interaction to be possible at the deepest levels
between the split halves of a patient’s CNS, I conjecture that more than
the cerebral hemispheres would have to be separated. Without this
possibility it would seem hardly justifiable to regard such unfortunates as
two persons each.
CONCLUSION
The hypothesis that all our conscious perceiving, knowing, desiring
and doing have specific physical correlates in the informational traffic of
our CNS seems likely to accommodate all the data of human experience,
both secular and sacred, without the need to postulate non-material
Substances interacting with the brain. It leads directly to the conclusion
that physical reality as known to each of us has a small but significant
domain that waits to be determined by our cognitive agency, and has no
completely determinate future state—description with an unconditional
claim to our assent. It also leads naturally to a qualitative distinction
112 D. M. Mackay
between the conscious experience attributable to lower animals and the selfconsciousness attributable to agents whose supervisory systems have the capacity
for self-description.
I have suggested that the key element in conscious agency is evaluation —the
assessment of states of affairs as desirable/ undesirable according to a
(hierarchic or heterarchic) scheme of basic priorities. This implies that it is
in the unity of a coherent evaluative system that a conscious individual has his
unitary identity. If so, a surgical operation that divides the sensori-motor co—
ordinating mechanisms but leaves intact the final levels of the evaluative
hierarchy cannot be said to have created two conscious individuals, even though
the resulting individual may reasonably be said to find himself “in two minds”
in a distressingly wide range of special circumstances. If an operation were
ever performed which left two independently viable evaluative hierarchies, the
case would be different; but it may be time enough to consider this when it
arises, in the light of the evidence.
REFERENCES
1. D. M. MacKay, The use of behavioural language to refer to mechanical
processes, Brit. J. Phil. of Sci. 13, 89-103 (1962). Also in Human and
Artificial Intelligence (F. J. Crosson, ed.), Appleton~Century—Crofts, New York,
1970.
2. D. M. MacKay, Perception and brain function, in The Neurosciences: Second
Study Program (F. O. Schmitt, editor-in-chief), Rockefeller Univ. Press, New
York, 1970, pp. 303-16.
3. D. M. MacKay, On the logical indeterminacy of a free choice, Mind, 69, 31-40
(1960). Freedom ofA ction in a Mechanistic Universe (Eddington Lecture),
Cambridge Univ. Press, London and New York, 1967. Reprinted in Good Readings in
Psychology (M. S. Gazzaniga and E. P. Lovejoy, eds.), Prentice Hall, New York,
1971, pp. 121-38.
4. This should not be confused with the theorem due to K. R. Popper (Brit. J.
Phil. of Sci. 1, 117-33 and 173-95 (1950)), stating that no computing machine
(or brain con- ceived as such) could completely predict its own future. We are
not here concerned with the agent’s inability to predict, but with the non—
existence of a prediction (even if produced by a detached observer) which has a
logical claim to the agent’s unconditional assent.
5. D. M. MacKay, Scientific beliefs about oneself, in The Proper Study (G. N. A.
Vesey, ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 4, Macmillan, London,
1971,
pp. 48-63.
For example, by J. Taylor in New Scientist and Science Journal, 30/9/71, p. 736.
For some early examples see D. M. MacKay, Mind-like behaviour in artefacts,
Brit. J. Phil. of Sci. 2, 105-21 (1951). Towards an information-flow model of
human behaviour, Brit. J. Psychol. 47, 30-43 (1956). Also G. A. Miller, E.
Galanter and
K. H. Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior, Holt, New York, 1960.
Conscious Agency with Unsplit and Split Brains 113
8. Sir John Eccles, in The Selfand its Brain by K. R. Popper and J. C. Eccles,
Springer International, Berlin, Heidelberg, London, New York. 1977.
9. D. M. MacKay, Cerebral organization and the conscious control of action, in
Brain and Conscious Experience (John C. Eccles, ed.), Springer-Verlag, New York,
1966, pp. 422-45.
10. See Mind~like behaviour in artefacts (note 7). p. 118, and Mentality in
machines. Proc. Aristot. Soc. Suppl. 26, 61-86 (1952), especially pp. 81-3.
11. John MacMurray, The Selfas Agent, Faber & Faber, London, 1957.
12. S. J. Dimond and J. G. Beaumont (eds.), Hemisphere Function in the Human
Brain, Wiley, New York, 1973.
13. R. W. Sperry, Lateral specialization in the surgically separated
hemispheres, in F. O. Schmitt and F. Worden (eds.), The Neurosciences: Third
Study Program, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1974, pp. 5-19.
14. R. Puccetti. Brain bisection and personal identity, Brit. J. Phil. of Sci.
24, 339-55 (1973).
15. “Co-operativity” in molecular biology refers to the ways in which a system
of com- ponents may be so functionally linked as to act together in switching a
molecule from one stable state to another. A macroscopic illustration would be
the various alternative coupled modes in which a system of many adjacent compass
needles can settle down, with large blocks of needles switching orientations as
a co-operating unit. Another example is the amplification of weak effects (e.g.
the absorption of a single photon in a visual receptor cell)by self—propagating
changes ofstate. See Schmitt, F. 0., Schneider, D. M. and Crothers, D. M.
(eds.), FunctionalLinkage in Biomolecular Systems, Raven Press, New York, 1975.
16. D. M. MacKay, Communication and meaning—a functional approach, in CrossCultural Understanding, F. S. C. Northrop and Helen Livingston (eds.), Harper &
Row, New York, 1964, pp. 162-79. Reprinted as Chapter 9 of D. M. MacKay, Information, Mechanism &Meaning, M.1.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1969.
114 D. M. Mackay
Discussion
JOSEPHSON:
You mentioned your objection to my ideas on grounds of parsimony (i.e. the
inclusion within the theory of an entity, conscious experience, which has not
yet been shown to be necessary to explain the data). I should like to make the
point here that parsimony is one criterion, but it is not the only one.
Parsimony is most relevant when we already have a complete explanation of the
phenomena of interest. Neurophysiology can hardly be said to have reached this
stage yet. In the history of physics it has at various times happened that
explanations involving radically new assumptions have been successfully adopted,
when it would have been quite possible in principle to adjust the old framework
to fit the facts. An example is Einstein’s general theory of relativity, based
on the assumption that space is curved in the vicinity of massive bodies.
The noted physicist P. A. M. Dirac has suggested that elegance may be a strong
indication of the validity of a new kind of theory. In this aspect Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi’s Science of Creative Intelligence, parts of which were used in my
own paper in this conference, has much to recommend it, in comparison with
conventional theories based on neurophysiology, as an account of the basic
phenomena of intelligence.
You say in your talk that there are those who object to these new concepts
because they multiply entities beyond any demonstrated necessity. Equally, there
will be those who, in the spirit of Dirac, will be attracted to these ideas
because of the elegance and directness of their explanatory power. The right
course, it seems to me, is that both lines of attack should be followed up; the
future will decide the value of each.
CHAPTER 7
Some Hypotheses Concerning the Role
of Consciousness in Nature
B. D. JOSEPHSON
Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge
The fact of the existence of consciousness plays no part in ordinary
physics (with the possible exception, discussed in the paper by LonguetHiggins, of the process of observation in quantum mechanics). It would
be wrong to conclude from this, even taking into account the enormous
success which physics has had in explaining natural phenomena, that
consciousness is not a parameter which needs to be included in the description of the world, for the simple reason that the physicist does not
carry out experiments on systems which are conscious. In fact, the success
of physics has no bearing at all on this question.
The person concerned with the study of conscious systems is the
biologist, or, more specifically, the psychologist. For him, the quantitative test in the style of the physicist is not feasible; it will not be feasible
until we are able to derive all of psychology in a quantitative way from
neurophysiology. We are forced to conclude that the question of whether
consciousness is in fact an important parameter in the scientific
description of nature is an unanswered one at the present time.
From a naive point of view, consciousness obviously is a parameter
having significant effects. What we can do and in fact do do when we are
conscious (awake) is totally different from what we can do when we are
not conscious. It seems worthwhile to study the situation and to try to
frame hypotheses about the role which consciousness may play. By
definition, this requires a study of subjective experience, and attempts to
correlate it with other phenomena. There appears to be a problem with
this, in that a subjective experience is observable by only one person, the
115
116 B. D. Josephson
experiencer; “objective” observation is not possible. Fortunately
language comes to our rescue; in many instances the language a person
uses appears to be, and would by most people be believed to be, an
indication of the experience he is having. The extent to which this is true
depends mainly on how adequately language has been developed to
indicate the particular experience, and the practice which the person has
had in describing his experience. It is true that, as a philosophically
minded person might point out, we can never prove that the conscious
experiences of two people are the same when they describe them in the
same way. Fortunately science is not concerned with proving its
assumptions, but with testing them, that is, assuming them to be true and
seeing if the consequences agree with experience.
In this paper some specific hypotheses are made about the possible role
of consciousness. They are based in part on common experience, but in
addition I shall give arguments based on the hypotheses which connect
them with systematics of intelligent behaviour. There appears, indeed, to
be a distinct possibility that theories based on knowledge relating to
subjective experience may provide a deeper understanding of how
intelligence functions and how it comes about than theories based on
neurophysiology or artificial intelligence, and this alone provides
motivation for following the path taken in this paper.
Let us begin our analysis by discussing the distinction which exists
between voluntary and automatic behaviour. The concept of automatic
behaviour is the simpler one. Consider first an arrow being shot by an
archer. It is clear that once the arrow has left the bow it is no longer under
the control of the archer, and follows automatically along a trajectory
determined by the laws of aerodynamics and mechanics. We have a
somewhat similar situation in the case of a person running up to and
jumping over a stream (the interest being in his actions, and not, as in the
first example, in the free trajectory). After the person has started running
he has a limited ability to control his motion or even abort the jump, but
he also has the choice of not exerting such control. In this situation we
may say that he carries out his action automatically. What actually occurs
then is determined by laws not very accessible to us but clearly dependent
on the person’s competence at running and jumping, which is itself
related to his past experience and learning. The person jumping appears
Some Hypotheses Concerning the Role of Consciousness in Nature 117
to participate as little consciously in the details of running and jumping as
does the archer in the flight of the arrow.
The last remark leads us to a consideration of the relationship between
consciousness and voluntary action. The archer is conscious of a decision
of it being the right moment to release the bow, and the jumper is
conscious of a decision that he should now jump. And both these actions
are what we would term voluntary ones.
We can deepen the discussion by linking the ideas already expressed to
the concept of value. In both the cases discussed it can be seen that the
voluntary actions undertaken are ones which produce a result of value to
the individual concerned: hitting the target with the arrow or getting to
the other side of the stream. The behaviour that comes to conscious
awareness is associated with a certain degree of flexibility (the decision
aspect), and this flexibility is used to maximize the value of the outcome
of the current action.
If we take for granted for the moment the connection just stated
between conscious awareness and flexibility, we have the basis of an
explanation for what information comes to conscious awareness and
what information does not. In a situation where a person has a high
degree of competence, as may be the case for jumping across a stream if
the stream is not too wide, there is no reasonable prospect of an increase
in value of the outcome by adjusting many precise details of the run—up
and jump; therefore this information need not be present to
consciousness. The only information that is needed will be information
such as where to land and where to take off, and this is the information
that will tend to occupy consciousness.
The linking of consciousness with considerations of value suggests that
consciousness may play an important role in the improvement of skills
over time. There are no grounds for supposing that actions carried out
automatically will improve with time; they are just like fixed computer
programs in their character. But a system concerned with questions of
value, as we have postulated for the conscious part of the system, may be
able to recognize that certain new actions lead to consequences of higher
value than would be obtained using the normal procedures in current use.
We can thus assign consciousness the attribute of creativity, in that it
leads to new procedures being adopted. Furthermore, in that it appears to
118 B. D. Josephson
be the case that new ideas are good ones more often than would be
expected by chance, the overall effect of consciousness would seem to be
a positive one of giving steady improvement over time.
To clarify a point arising in connection with the hypothesis in the last
sentence, automatic behaviour displays intelligence, as well as does consciously guided, voluntary behaviour. However, according to the picture
being presented, such automatic behaviour is the result mainly of past
conscious experiences which had the overall effect of improving the skill
of the performer (but obviously a small component of the skill is the
result of innate programming and need not be attributed to
consciousness).
It has been suggested above that consciousness, as well as being in
effect creative, in that it is associated with changes in behaviour patterns,
is also in effect intelligent, in that these changes tend to be in a positive
direction. We now propose a hypothesis to account for this. The
hypothesis consists in the assertion that there can be an intimate
connection between conscious experience and meaning. At the moment
when we understand either the situation in which we find ourselves, or
alternatively the meaning of something expressed in language, we have a
particular conscious experience of knowing the meaning (which after the
event may dwindle to a mere memory of having had the experience). Now
what do we mean by meaning here? Knowing the meaning of a situation
means knowing what is in the situation for us, that is knowing what to do
about the situation to ensure the best outcome from it. To give an
example, when we experience the feeling of hunger we at the same time
become aware that it would be good to eat some food. This will generally
be followed by action to ensure the desired result. Hunger is an
experience with a definite meaning to its perceiver. This example
illustrates an important point, that the experience (in this particular case)
has to be conscious in order to have the powerful effect that it does,
which is different from merely, for example, going to a restaurant at a
particular time out of habit. We may assert, in a way parallel to our
discussion of the difference between voluntary and automatic behaviour,
that conscious awareness of the meaning of a situation followed by an
appropriate response is different from making an automatic response,
since only the former is concerned with the question of the value of an
Some Hypotheses Concerning the Role of Consciousness in Nature 119
action to the perceiver (in this case the value of removing hunger). One
way of explaining the relation between consciousness and intelligence is to
postulate that there is a basic type of subjective experience, such that as a
result of something analogous to the basic laws of physics a meaningful
conscious experience is automatically followed by the idea of the
appropriate response (for example, hunger by the idea of obtaining
something to satisfy the hunger, or danger by the idea of escaping from
danger). While this idea may seem highly ad hoc, it is completely
analogous to the situation we find in ordinary physics, with its various
types of basic fields and their interrelating equations, such as Maxwell’s
equations for the electromagnetic field.
The reader will probably have realized the incompleteness in itself of
the hypothesis proposed in the last section. It must be augmented by the
consideration that evolution must have played an important part.
Evolution must have provided an efficient perceptual system to generate
conscious experiences correctly representing the environmental situation,
and a planning—motor system to put the ideas generated into practice.
These two additional systems are needed to allow the basic intelligence
postulated to be associated with conscious experience to be effective.
I should like to acknowledge my debt to the thought of Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi, whose ideas, especially those contained in his videotaped
lecture course entitled The Science of Creative Intelligence, have played
an important part in formulating the above.
120 B. D. Josephson
Discussion
VESEY
In the course of talking about the freewill/ determinism problem I think you
said that scientists feel that a person’s behaviour is determined by what
happens in his head. What b ' ‘ ' did you mean by “behaviour”?
I would not want to dispute that the motions of a person’s body are often
determined,
in part at any rate, by what happens in his head. One can explain someone‘s arm
bending, for example, by reference to nerve impulses from his brain to a muscle.
But questions about a person’s behaviour are rarely simply about his bodily
motions. One wants to know what the chap is up to, what he is doing. And one can
sensibly ask him “What are you doing?” even when one is in full possession of
the facts about the motions of his body. Is he signalling a right turn or
pointing out where his mother’s cook used to live? The “action-description”, as
I’ll call it, is a different sort of description from the “motion- description”.
I don’t mean just that one can have the same motion—description but different
action—descriptions, and vice versa. I mean that the action-description is
authorized in a way in which the motion—description is not. The way to find out
what someone is up to is to ask him, just as, when someone says he once saw Ted
Heath , conducting, the way to find out whether he meant Ted Heath the bandleader or Ted Heath the Conservative politician is to ask him. In both cases it
makes no sense for him to i say ‘‘I was wondering that myself”. l ‘ My question
is this. When you talked about a person’s behaviour being determined by ‘ what
happens in his head, did you mean simply the motions of his body, or did you
mean i what he is doing? If the latter, can you please explain? Why do
scientists feel that what a person does is determined by what happens in his
head? is there empirical evidence to this effect? (And, if so, is the strength
of their feeling proportional to the evidence?) Or do they feel it must be so?
If so, why do they feel it must be so?
JOSEPHSON:
I think you have raised a very important point. When I suggested that a person’s
intentions are determined by what happens in his head I was basing my remark on
the belief, common to physicists, that everything which is in some sense “real”
has some definite location in space (and time). But perhaps this belief is not
true. An argument for this, within physics, involves the theory of observation
in quantum mechanics. While there exists a well—defined formula giving what
happens when an observation is made, it does not seem possible to understand the
formula in terms of mechanisms happening in space and time. Recent research by
J. S. Bell and by H. P. Stapp, based on the so-called Einstein-Rosen—Podolsky
paradox, indicate that some very counter—intuitive things are going on.
There is a point of View which transcends the distinction between whether things
happen within space and time or outside space and time. This is to say that
certain things have no apparent location in space and time because they happen
everywhere in space and time. l This is a common View in Eastern mysticism. On
this view if I intend to do some particular thing, my intention corresponds to a
process happening through all space and time, but it leads to my observable
behaviour at some particular time because my nervous system is, as it were,
“tuned in” to that intention at that particular time.
PART III
Subjective experience
CHAPTER 8
Consciousness and Psychopathology*
M. ROTH
University of Cambridge
INTRODUCTION
At the present time, there are no indubitable criteria of “consciousness” which command general assent. The reason for this is that despite
the direct experience we have of it and take for granted in other human
beings, scientific understanding of it as a phenomenon is rudimentary.
And precise, generally accepted definitions emerge not at the beginning
of a scientific exercise but at an advanced stage of it.
In philosophical discourse regarding human consciousness and the
nature of its relationship to the activity of the brain, the state of
consciousness of one person is treated as comparable in essential features
to the state of every other. The validity of such an assumption is
questionable. There are variations in the degree and quality of
consciousness and individuals differ from each other in definable ways in
both respects. Degree of consciousness will be discussed at a later stage.
Differences in quality arise because such characteristic manifestations of
consciousness as attention, memory, the capacity for conceptual thought
and logical reasoning, and the ability to perceive the world correctly are
among the criteria used for the recognition of conscious states. But each
of these may vary independently of the others. Thus an individual may
have auditory hallucinations without insight into the illusory nature of
the experience. Yet psychiatric examination will show some individuals so
affected to be in a state of clear consciousness. These variations are
* Paper based on discussion comments, submitted after the conference.
123
124 M. Roth
important for investigations aimed at refining scientific knowledge of
consciousness and have to be taken into account in the shaping of our
philosophical concepts of it. In so far as answers can be obtained to these
questions, they must affect the philosophical concepts of consciousness
and the methods employed to refine knowledge of it.
We have neither the logic nor the language, according to Wittgenstein,‘
wherewith to call in question the consciousness of other human beings.
But this refers to consciousness in an abstract sense. When asked to
examine a man who complains of mental distress or is regarded by others
as displaying behaviour out of character for him, one of the most
important matters a psychiatrist has to decide is the degree to which he
can be regarded as “conscious” in a specific sense of the term. His level
of consciousness requires technical means for its determination and has a
significant bearing upon the diagnosis and treatment of the disorder in
question.
He may appear alert and awake and normal in his conduct to ordinary
observation, but prove incapable of forming correct or safe judgements
about his whereabouts and circumstances. If level of consciousness is
lowered his memory for current events will tend to be impaired and his
beliefs may be distorted or deluded.
It will be apparent that consciousness is not an all—or-none state with
deep sleep or coma at one end and complete alertness at the other. There
is every gradation in between. But variation is not linear all the way, in
that any graph which depicts states of consciousness between these
extremes must show plateaus corresponding to the states of incomplete
arousal, such as clouding or delirium, in which the individual’s thought
and behaviour will be muddled and confused. But he cannot be
awakened like the person asleep or experiencing dreams or the
sleepwalker. The process of arousal has been arrested at some point
intermediate between sleep and full consciousness.
Whether such an individual is capable of forming intent and carrying
out complex, co—ordinated and dangerous acts is a complex and difficult
question to resolve. The answer to it may be of crucial importance in the
case of a man charged with murder or some other criminal act.
An elderly person with senile dementia may be able to hear noises and
recognize objects in a crude and undifferentiated way, but prove incapable
of retaining any current event in memory, although memory for remote
Consciousness and Psychopathology 125
events may be intact. At an advanced stage she will also prove incapable
of recognizing her own relatives, be unaware that she was married and
liable to stare in fear and bewilderment at the mirror image of her own
face which she does not recognize. Whether or not such a person can be
regarded as conscious is neither a trivial nor a purely semantic question. It
poses questions about differences between certain states of mind which
are inherently capable of resolution by scientific means. The answers
would be bound to sharpen our knowledge of “consciousness” and the
words we use to depict it.
Among the stated objectives of this conference is the “. . . study of
subjective experience and . . . the relationship between subjective
experience and the objective world”. We are also enjoined to examine
what defines the personal character or privacy of the individual’s
conscious experience. These are interesting questions for the
psychopathologist because there are individuals who lose just these
faculties conjointly. They confuse subjective experiences with perception
of the external world, and through failure of this differentiation their
inner thoughts and feelings are attributed to outside influences. At the
same time they feel their privacy and their most intimate experiences to be
encroached and intruded upon by forces beyond their control. It may be
inferred from this that there is a neurological apparatus which makes
possible fulfilment of this function of sifting subjective from objective
perceptions.
The development of objective scientific knowledge is dependent upon
our ability to differentiate between the world of phenomena independent
of our perceptions and a reality distorted by or entirely determined by
private inner experience. However, as Whewell pointed out more than a
century ago, the ordinary individual engaged in his task of perceiving and
acting upon the world is all the time testing hypotheses and so refining his
knowledge in a similar manner.
In some disorders, notably in schizophrenia, the ability to differentiate
between the subjective world within and the objective one beyond the
boundaries of the body is undermined and in consequence the
individual’s picture of reality becomes distorted. It requires the
knowledge held by others to diagnose the distortion and take action to
correct it as far as possible by appropriate treatment.
The study of psychopathology makes it possible to describe tentatively
126 M. Roth
the criteria that should be employed to characterize consciousness. These
are the criteria that would have to be satisfied by any form of artificial
intelligence or organism that was designed to exhibit “consciousness” in
the human sense of the term.
In the sections that follow some relevant criteria will be examined and
the bearing of some of the commoner forms of psychopathology for
problems of consciousness considered.
MEMORY AND CONSCIOUSNESS
The ability to observe and lay down a record of events in the
surrounding world, the faculty of memory, is widely regarded as a central
feature of any organism or machine we would accept as having
“consciousness”. However, it is well known that there are disorders of
the mind in which short—term memory is severely impaired so that the
ability to lay down memories in, or to retrieve them from, the long-term
store is severely and irretrievably damaged. Beyond a limit of about
one or two minutes, such an individual will be found on direct inquiry
devoid of memory for current events. But he appears alert and may be
able to conduct an intelligent conversation and exercise his usual skills in
dressing, eating and even in complex activities such as card-playing or the
musical performance of works learned in the past.
For example, one lady suffering from such a Korsakov or amnestic
syndrome had just completed a performance of Beethoven’s Quartet in E
Minor, Opus 59, No. 2 with three friends. Three or four minutes later,
the cellist, fired with enthusiasm, said, “Let us play something else”. The
lady in question, who had played the violin superbly in the first
performance, said “Let us play Beethoven’s E minor Quartet, Opus 59,
No. 2.” After an embarrassed silence, one of her friends said, “But,
Angela, we have just finished playing that!” One could not regard an
individual with such a disorder as devoid of consciousness. The picture
would, of course, be quite different if the person affected were not able to
draw upon a vast memory store extending back into early life. In a
progressive degenerative disease of the brain such as senile dementia, this
store is also progressively encroached upon so that less and less is left. We
are unable to answer the question as to whether or not there is a critical
Consciousness and Psychopathology 127
level in the extent of the loss of both short- and long-term memory which
would be incompatible with “consciousness”. There are no quantitative
observations to guide us. But it is of interest that in advanced stages of
dementia individuals are liable to sink into unconsciousness in the
absence of any obvious explanation for this, such as an intercurrent
infection that has caused further impairment of brain function. Death is
then imminent.
Inability to remember cannot serve as a necessary criterion for the
presence of consciousness for more subtle reasons. It is characteristic of
human consciousness that certain experiences can be segregated or locked
away in separate compartments whose contents are not accessible to
ordinary methods of retrieval without special aids. In his earliest
investigations with Breuer, Freud discovered that certain neurotic
patients were able to recount, under hypnosis, experiences of which they
had no conscious recollection. These memories had been “repressed”
into the unconscious “because” they were associated with emotional
conflicts beyond the capacity of the individual to resolve. Needless to say
such statements tell us nothing about the mechanisms employed in such
sequestration of memories. Another example is the seemingly obliterated
memory of some profoundly distressing experience such as the injury
received during a battle in which friends of the subject might have been
killed or mutilated. Such memories can be brought into consciousness by
injection of a hypnotic drug which causes partial impairment of
awareness. The recovery of such memories is commonly associated with
the discharge of intense emotion or ‘ ‘ abreaction’ ’ .
Yet another example, which illustrates the point that consciousness is
not an all-or-none phenomenon of the kind implicitly assumed in some
forms of philosophical discourse, is provided by certain phenomena
encountered during anaesthesia. The subject, in the process of recovery,
may appear to all intents and purposes unconscious. He does not respond
to painful or other forms of stimulation. His eyes are closed and he is
immobile. Yet the remarks made by the surgeon are heard and
remembered. In some cases where they have been personal or unflattering
in character they have been the subject of legal action.
It will be apparent that the ability to provide an accurate account of
recent events in which the individual had been a participant cannot
provide reliable information as to whether he had been conscious at the
128 M. Roth
time. To direct questioning he may have no memories to report. But
when special techniques are applied, he may bring to light experiences
that have been recorded and sequestered as a result of repression into the
unconscious in the Freudian sense. In contradistinction to this, islands of
memory may remain following a state of epileptic automation in which
the individual has been confused and the electrical activity recorded from
the brain disturbed throughout.
CAN CONSCIOUSNESS BE REGARDED AS A CAUSAL AGENT?
It will be apparent that consciousness cannot be regarded as merely the
simple aggregate of the activities that result from information transmitted
from the outside world along the different modalities of perception. We
know that the level of awareness of the individual cannot be judged from
functional integrity of the pathways that subserve touch, proprioception,
vision and hearing, or from the capacity to form a record of experiences
gained alone. This is not to say that tests applied to these functions
provide no information about the state of consciousness. But they are
very crude indices of it.
For example, mild states of impairment are notoriously difficult to
diagnose because there are no pathognomonic features. The patient will
appear dull, vague and inert. His responses to external events will often
be mildly inappropriate, inconsistent and undiscriminating. We know
that such a mental state may be the prelude to a state of acute delirium
in which the patient loses contact with his environment. And
subsequently no trace of memory of the premonitory phase may survive.
The human electroencephalogram will sometimes provide valuable
evidence regarding the level of awareness. But it is far from being an
accurate measure and the results in mild impairment of consciousness are
unreliable.
Recent investigations have provided a large body of evidence in
support of the view that the level of human consciousness is determined
by mechanisms that are distinct from, and to some extent independent of,
those which are responsible for the flow of sensory information along the
specific afferent pathways to the brain. The reticular activating system
whose activities have been shown to be closely related to the level of arousal2
is a complex network of neurones in the medial part of the brain stem"
Consciousness and Psychopathology 129
extending from the medulla and pons, through the mid—brain to the
hypothalamus. It is distinct from the specific pathways that subserve
ordinary perception in three respects. A large number of the fibres bypass
the thalamus which is a relay station for ordinary afferent pathways. It is
distributed to extensive areas of both cerebral hemispheres and not
merely to one specific contra—lateral area. Finally, because it is a complex
neuronal network any specific effects of one form of sensory stimulation
are quickly abolished; different sensory stimuli have equal effects in the
promotion of arousal or maintenance of level of consciousness. Damage
to this part of the brain will render an experimental animal unconscious
but interruption of specific pathways will not do so.
It is therefore the intensity of activity within this system and its sites of
projection in the cerebral cortex that determines the level of
consciousness of the individual. And this will in turn decide whether an
afferent stimulus of pain, touch or hearing is or is not perceived. Thus in
states of light unconsciousness it is possible to elicit electrical changes or
“evoked potentials” in the cerebral cortex by sensory stimulation. But
they are neither perceived nor remembered.
The answer to the question posed by the title of this section is therefore
that there is a certain sense in which consciousness can be regarded as a
causal agent. For its complete integrity is a necessary condition for the
acquisition of information about the external world and the recording of
this information in the memory store. Something more than wakefulness
and reaction to stimuli is involved. The individual may appear awake and
responsive to stimuli without being fully conscious.
PERCEPTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS
This leads to the relationship between perception and consciousness
and the extent to which the state of the latter can be gauged from
accuracy of perception.
It is widely recognized that no form of perception can be explained in
terms of a passive registration of signals emanating from sense organs.
Perception is an active process which creates a picture of the objective
world from minimal and partially familiar cues. Hypotheses are rapidly
advanced and discarded or upheld. But success in this operation of
depicting external reality depends upon a consistently high level of
130 M. Roth
arousal which is in turn dependent upon an adequate intensity of activity in
the cerebral cortex.
We obtain some measure of insight into the role of consciousness in
extracting an accurate percept from an array of signals, by observing the
states in which consciousness is partially in abeyance. A good example is
provided by the clouded and delirious states with impaired awareness
seen in the course of chronic intoxication with alcohol and hypnotic
drugs. In delirium tremens the individual is disorientated in time and
place and his memory for recent events is markedly impaired. He is
unable to construe happenings in the objective world correctly because,
among others reasons, he suffers from falsifications of perception of
hallucinations, commonly in the visual field. Large insects are crawling
on his bedclothes, rats are scuttling on the floor, poisonous dust is falling
from the ceiling and hideous monsters boring their way through the
walls. He is surrounded by warders, spies, executioners. His relatives are
at the door but are prevented from entering. There are concomitant
emotional changes. The subject experiences suspicion, perplexity and
intense fear which may lead him to attack his imaginary persecutors. He is
living through a terrifying nightmare but he is not asleep. His perceptual
world is in chaos because the errant hypotheses are being discarded and
erroneous ones upheld. Perceptual gaps are filled indiscriminately with
fantasy which displaces reality.
We have no more than rudimentary understanding of the neurological
mechanisms underlying such processes. But normal consciousness may be
conceived as the obverse of these states in which hypotheses are tested
against reality and sound ones sifted from incorrect and illusory ones.
We see, therefore, that the paradigm often employed by classical
philosophers of the human subject engaged in perception - usually visual
perception—is a weak and unsatisfactory model for making inferences
about the nature of knowledge. What we designate as human
consciousness depends on the interaction of a number of disparate
interdependent psychological functions: state of general arousal,
perceptions of the objective and subjective world, memory, reasoning
and emotion.
However, these interdependent and covarying functions display a
surprising degree of autonomy. One may show marked variations
without affecting the others or impairing the level of consciousness.
Consciousness and Psychopathology 131
Illustrations have already been provided in relation to memory. The same
situation holds for perception. In the case of delirium tremens, the
frightening hallucinations are associated with disorientation in time and
place, and inaccurate perception and judgement of the outside world;
there is clouding of consciousness. But in another disorder also due to
alcoholism, the subject hears hallucinatory voices in a state of clear
awareness. He hears them threatening, cajoling, deriding and humiliating
him. He attributes them to some remote group of tormentors intent on
destroying him. But other than the hallucinations, his picture of the
world is clear, detailed and accurate. Again, impairment of consciousness
is prone to distort perception but not invariably so. Many patients with
clouding of consciousness are merely muddled and disorientated, and the
emotions of patients which have a selective effect on filtering of perceptual
experiences may become grossly deranged without involving any other
aspect of mental life. We call such conditions Depressive and Manic
Psychoses.
MODELS OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Any attempt to create a model that replicates human consciousness
must do full justice to this complexity. Such a model must be capable of
making reliable and accurate observations of the outside world, and
reporting on its subjective, inner activities, and must also be aware of
itself as observer in both capacities. It has to replicate variation in degree
of awareness or arousal as a relatively distinct function but one whose
fluctuations are liable to exert a profound effect upon the accuracy of
perceptions. The very characteristics that enable it to extrapolate
complex percepts so effectively and accurately from minimal cues also
cause it to conjure up spurious perceptions, phantoms and fantasies.
It must also make allowance for uniqueness in two respects. The first is
that no individual’s cerebral equipment has been shaped by genetic
endowment in exactly the same way as any other, and a working
consensus about its characteristics has to be achieved with the aid of
comparison and communication about shared experiences. ‘
Finally, emotional factors have to be brought into the picture in that
they have been repeatedly shown to exert an important selective effect on
what is perceived. For example, a patient with a mild Korsakov syndrome
132 M. Roth
may remember the visits paid during the day by his wife but nothing else.
Or if he has had a stroke he may forget and ignore the paralysis of the left
side of his body and even deny it completely. And the emotions of each
individual are uniquely shaped by his own past experiences and
vicissitudes in interplay with his genetic and constitutional endowment.
SELF—CONSCIOUSNESS
The most distinctive feature of human consciousness is the awareness
that mental happenings are taking place-—or self-consciousness. This
awareness is intimately dependent upon our ability to differentiate the
happenings in our own inner self from those in the outside world. The
phenomena of “believing”, “deciding”, “wishing” ' stem from this selfawareness. Uniqueness apart, they are characterized by the fact that only
the individual who is experiencing these mental states has access to them.
The unique privacy and freedom from control (other than through the
medium of language) of these experiences have to be assumed unless we
are prepared to jettison our existing scientific picture of the world. Some
philosophers go further and assert that it is the states of intention, choice
and belief that render the individual autonomous, make him accountable
for his actions, and arouse our respect for him as a person. They are
given and not susceptible to scientific investigation or analysis. We can
entertain no hope of arriving at an objective account or causal
explanation of the inner world of subjective experience.
Now for reasons that will emerge later it could be held that there are
limits beyond which such an objective scientific account cannot proceed.
But the view that the self—conscious mind is an independent entity about
which the objective deterministic language of science can have nothing to
say is untenable for a number of reasons.
In the first place there are conditions in which the inner self is no longer
clearly differentiated from the objective world beyond it. In these
disorders the thoughts in the mind of the individual are experienced as
voices that emanate from some outside source. The person is hallucinated.
His intentions, wishes and purposes are felt to be usurped by outside
agencies. He experiences himself as the passive victim of witches,
freemasons or “atomic rays”. He may come to regard himself as the
agent of God and act accordingly.
Consciousness and Psychopathology 133
This summarizes some of the leading features of typical schizophrenic
illness and leads to two inferences. The first is that the claim that a
person’s private intentions, beliefs and expectations are sacrosanct in
that they cannot in any circumstances be judged subservient to the
objective judgment of others is untenable. The second inference follows
from the fact that such disorders often arise in minds that have been
previously intact and to which the capacity to differentiate reliably
between objective reality and subjective experience can be restored by
specific treatments.
It follows that there must be neurological mechanisms which mediate
this sifting of sense data so as to differentiate the external from the
subjective world. Little is known about them at the present time. But the
ignorance is of a kind which we can reasonably expect to remedy with
the aid of scientific inquiry.
The view of Wittgenstein that the world of personal, private will,
purpose and belief belonged to an order of phenomena that was categorically different from the world of physical phenomena is reminiscent of
the distinction drawn by the psychiatrist and philosopher Jaspers between
“understandable” and “causal” connections. Both believed the
former to be impervious to the causal explanations and general laws that
emerged from scientific study of the objective world (Wittengenstein’s
criticism of Freudian psychoanalytic theory was essentially similar to
Japsers’s3). But it is difficult to reconcile some of the findings of
psychopathology with categorial distinctions of this nature.
DEPERSONALIZATION: A MORBID STATE OF THE
SELF-CONSCIOUS MIND
It may be helpful to examine another form of psychopathology in
order to judge how far we are likely to succeed in explaining human
consciousness in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry.
In the phenomenon of depersonalization known to psychiatrists the
consciousness of the individual is divided into an observing and
participating self . Here are some extracts from the self-descriptions of
an intelligent and gifted observer:
When I am talking to people, especially if the conversation is difficult or
important, I feel, as it were, withdrawn into myself at a great distance with
difficulty in focusing
134 M. Roth
my eyes or attention on the person I am talking to. At times I feel like a mind
detached and nebulous without a body or a physical setting. The only thing of
which I can really be aware is my own mind and the fact that it is working.
Everything else shades off into unreality. It is as though I have been living
automatically, reacting and behaving apparently as usual and yet with a part of
me which I would call my personality not really involved. In this connection
“depersonalisation” seems a very accurate word.
The feelings occasionally assume a more specific and physical form especially in
the period between waking and sleeping. I feel as though mind and body were
parting and expanding, and mind as it were suspended over an expanding gulf into
which the body is sinking. This sensation continues indefinitely, the gulf
increasing, until I switch on the light or ‘get up and move about. . . . Another
occasional physical sensation is that I am literally “beside myself” . . .
displaced in space, almost drifting away. Here again to relieve the feeling I
have to clench my fists or grasp a fold of clothing for reassurance.
Closely associated with these sensations is an inability to experience
ordinary emotions. The subject not only feels one part of himself
detached and viewing the other as would a passive and indifferent
spectator. He complains that he moves and behaves as would an
automaton or a wound—up mechanical toy. Every act, no matter how
simple, and formerly carried out without reflection, seems now to require
an effort of will. Eating, dressing or washing entails a special effort,
and even breathing may have to be undertaken with deliberation and
self—vigilance. The experience sometimes includes an actual visual
hallucination of the self, usually recognized within a short interval as
illusory.
It should be noted that these phenomena cannot be dismissed as
irrelevant for the study of ordinary subjective experience in that they are
disordered states of mind. In transient form, depersonalization commonly
occurs in normal individuals.‘ And the central core of the phenomenon
has been found to occur in a high proportion of those exposed to sudden
life—threatening dangers. There is reason to believe that in such
circumstances depersonalization and the sense of detachment and objectivity associated with it may enhance the chances of survival.5~5»7 When
the peril has passed or ceased the mental state of the individual returns
to normal. Closely similar experiences may be engendered by electrical
stimulation of certain parts of the brain, namely the cortical surface of
the temporal lobe. They also arise during the early stages in the development of epileptic fits that result from the discharge of a focus located in
one of the temporal lobes. Since we know that experiences have a
Consciousness and Psychopathology 135
neurological substrate we may hope through scientific inquiry to acquire
more knowledge about and greater control over them.
SUBJECTIVE MENTAL STATES AND THE BRAIN
Two main questions arise which have a close bearing on certain
problems of the mind—brain relationship.
The findings of neurology and psychiatry are inconsistent with the view
that mind and brain are not connected. Moreover, it is clear that
something more than parallelism between the two without causal
connection is entailed. The investigation of abnormal mental states and
related phenomena may deepen understanding of cerebral activity in its
relationship to consciousness.
But is it possible that the language of physiology will become so precise
and differentiated that, in terms of the activities of neurones, we will be
able to describe an individual experiencing a part of himself displaced
from the body in space, observing the self as a passive spectator and
finding this participant and executive self distressingly unreal and
unfamiliar while aware at the same time that the whole experience is
morbid and illusory? Will it be possible for someone familiar with the
language to recognize from such an account the feelings of
depersonalization as he has experienced them in every nuance and detail
during introspection? According to the materialist account of the mindbrain relationship this should be possible at some future date. The
introspective accounts given by depersonalized patients, and our
recognition of them through our own introspection and empathy, will
then become redundant in the same way as the knowledge relating the
sequence of nucleotides in DNA molecules with the amino acids they sort
and assemble into proteins has rendered so much of the older language of
cellular biology and genetics redundant.
For those who allow for an interaction between body and mind within
the framework of a materialist account of the relationship between them,
subjective experience, introspection and their disturbances should
ultimately prove explicable in a causal language. They are the outcome of
processes in which all the activities in one part of the brain—activities
which would otherwise remain unconscious — are read off or scanned by
some higher centre which undertakes a second order of perception.
136 M. Roth
According to current knowledge this centre would be located in the
dominant, usually the left, cerebral hemisphere, which appears to have
the main responsibility for the conceptual, linguistic and symbolic aspects
of mental functioning.
In their recent book The Self and its Brain Popper and Eccles“ reject
this view, holding that there is no reason why such scanning activities
should result in self-awareness or self-criticism.
The materialist’s answer given by Armstrong° is that this scanning is
identical with consciousness. There need be no residue to explain. When
we have learnt to define the physiological processes, the question of all
other accounts of self—consciousness will have been rendered redundant
and obsolete.
Now it may be that the two accounts, the one in the language of
cerebral function and the other drawn from self—conscious experience,
will approximate to each other. But that ultimately physiology will
entirely displace the introspective account is difficult to credit. It is
impossible to conceive of a state of affairs in which the latter could be
discarded as wholly superfluous. For an indefinite time ahead two
separate accounts of self—conscious experience, the one complementing
the other, appear indispensable.
The second question is a related one. Is it possible to envisage a state of
affairs in which we will have produced a computer that will be able to
experience and report upon both a subjective internal world and an
objective one, and which will be able to observe itself in action as the
cause of both forms of perception, empathize with others in both roles,
and display insight in the presence of some forms of derangement of
discrimination between subjective and objective worlds and loss of insight
in others?
The answer that has to be given is that there is for the present no body
of knowledge at our disposal to encourage the hope that such a feat will
be possible. Nor do we possess sufficient understanding of human
consciousness to apply valid and satisfactory tests so as to ascertain
whether the machine we had manufactured possessed properties of a
kindred nature.
Consciousness and Psychopathology 137
REFERENCES
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, 1967, Part I,
§420.
G. Moruzzi and H. W. Magoun, Brain stern reticular formation and activation of
the EEG, Electroenceph. Clin. Neurophysiol. 1, 455-73 (1949).
F. Cioffi, Wittgenstein’s Freud, pp. 184-210, in Studies in the Philosophy of
Wittgen- stein, Ed. Peter Winch, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York:
Humanities Press, 1969.
D. H. Myers and G. Grant, A study of depersonalisation in students, Brit. J.
Psychiatry, l21,560(July 1972).
M. Roth and M. Harper, Temporal lobe epilepsy and the phobic anxiety—depersonalization syndrome. Part 11: Practical and theoretical considerations. Comprehen.
Psychiatry, 3, no 4 (Aug. 1962).
M. Harper and M. Roth, Temporal lobe epilepsy and the phobic anxiety—depersona1ization syndrome. Part I: A comparative study, Camprehen. Psychiatry, 3, no. 3.
(June 1862).
R. Noyes, Jr., and R. Kletti, Depersonalization in response to life-threatening
danger, Comprehen. Psychiatry, 18, 4 (July/Aug. 1977).
K. R. Popper and J. C. Eccles, The Self and its Brain, Springer International,
1978. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Ed. T. Honderich,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1968.
CHAPTER 9
Twins, Split Brains and
Personal Identity
V. S. RAMACHANDRAN
Trinity College, Cambridge
Most of the chapters in this book are heavily inclined towards the scientific
materialist view that consciousness is an emergent property of certain
complex brain events. Since brains precede minds in evolution it would be
hard to maintain (like the idealist philosophers did) that the existence of
the physical universe depends on the existence of a conscious “observer”.
It is the emergence of minds that seems to require explanation. Why did
certain kinds of brain activity become associated with consciousness? Is
consciousness biologically useful or is it a redundant by—product of
evolution? Maybe consciousness is an “epiphenomenon” like the ghostly
whistling of a train —but somehow this view seems curiously inadequate.
We generally think of our minds as being causally effective in all our
actions, and indeed, it is difficult to think of the word “mind” having
any other meaning.
One of the aims of the Cambridge symposium was to answer the
question “What determines the uniqueness and privacy of an individual’s
conscious experience?”. This question is generally considered by philosophers under the heading “personal identity”. My approach to this
problem will be to present a series of “thought experiments” in which the
reader is invited to participate. In my view nothing more can be said
about personal identity than what is contained in these examples.
Within each of us there seems to be an “I” that remains invariant in
spite of continuously changing sensory impressions. If you are (say)
presented a stimulus A followed by a stimulus B, there seems to be a
“unifying agency” in you that relates the two sensations as having been
139
140 V. S. Ramachandran
experienced by the same person. This “I” within you also has other
attributes—it claims to “will” actions‘ and seeks self-preservation and
immortality.
Under the heading ‘ ‘personal identity” we may include two questions:
(a) What determines the coherence and continuity of a person’s consciousness — in spite of constantly changing sensory impressions?
(b) What determines the exclusive relationship of a person’s mind to a
particular physical brain?
Question (a) can be stated in a weak form or a strong form. The weak
form of the question is “Why do I feel single in spite of changing sensory
impressions?” or “Why do I not feel double even though I have two
hemispheres?”. In my view these questions are meaningless since there
can be no circumstance in which a person can feel double—for who is
there to feel the doubling? The situation is analogous to two one—eyed
dogs fighting over a bone. As Descartes points out, the dogs would behave
as though they saw one bone and not two! Similarly there is no sense in
which a split—brain patient could feel double—even if we assume that
there are two quasi—independent spheres of consciousness inside his skull.
A stronger form of the same question (a) is “What is the exact nature
of the unifying agency in me that issues commands for action, etc., and
relates various memories and sensations as having been experienced by
the same person?”. This is really an empirical rather than a philosophical
question. People with frontal lobe lesions, for instance, often report
losing this sense of coherence and continuity in time. The feeling that I
am a particular individual with some control over my future behaviour is
also associated with self-consciousness and may be the subjective
correlate of what MacKay calls the brain’s “supervisory system”
(Chapter 6).
But now let us turn to the second question (b), which is really a special
form of a problem which Jennings2 and Eccles3 refer to as the
“Uniqueness of personal existence”. Jennings asks:
What is the relation of myself, identified as it is with one particular knot in
the great network that constitutes humanity, to the other knots now existing?
Why should I be identified with one only? To an observer standing apart from the
net, it will not appear surprising that the different knots, since they are
formed of diverse combinations of strands, should have different peculiarities,
different characteristics. But that the observer himself —his total possibility
of experience, that without which the universe
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 141
for him would be non-existent — that he himself should be tied in relations of
identity to a single one of the millions of knots in the net of strands that
have come down from the unbeginning past — this to the observer appears
astonishing, perplexing. Through the operation of what determining causes is my
self, my entire possibility of experi- encing the universe, bound to this
particular one of the combination of strands, to the exclusion of some millions
of others? Would I never have been, would I have lost my chance to participate
in experience, would the universe never have existed for me, if this particular
combination had not been made?
Eccles takes this as the starting-point of what he calls a “personalist
philosophy":
This personal uniqueness and all aspects of its associated experiences are
dependent upon the brain; yet it is not entirely dependent on the genetic
instructions that built the brain. . . . I believe that my genetic coding is not
responsible for my uniqueness as an experiencing being, as I have argued in my
book Facing Reality. Of course, I have a unique genetic coding, as indeed do all
of us who do not have an identical twin, but the probability of the existence of
such a unique code is fantastically low: even 1 in 10^10000°.
Thus the theory that the uniqueness of the code is the determinant of the
unique- ness of the self results in such inconceivable improbabilities that it
cannot be an explanation. Nor do my postnatal experiences and education provide
a satisfactory explanation of the uniqueness of the self that I experience. It
is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
We don’t know how we came to be this unique self that is tied into our brain in
a way we do not understand. . . . We go through life living with this mysterious
exist- ence of ourselves as experiencing beings. I believe that we have to
accept what I call a personalist philosophy—that central to our experienced
existence is our personal uniqueness.
And in his dialogue with Sir Karl Popper, he says 3*’:
I believe that there is some incredible mystery about it. What does this life
mean: firstly coming—to-be, then finally ceasing-to-be? We find ourselves here
in this wonderful rich and vivid conscious experience and it goes on through
life, but is that the end? . . . Is this present life all to finish in death or
can we have hope that there will be further meaning to be discovered? I don’t
want to define anything there. I think there is complete oblivion about the
future, but we came from oblivion. Is it that this life of ours is simply an
episode of consciousness between two oblivions? . . . Our coming-to—be is as
mysterious as our ceasing—to—be at death. Can we therefore not derive hope
because our ignorance about our origin matches our ignorance about our destiny?
It is obvious that (a) my genetic uniqueness, (b) the uniqueness of the
experiences I have had, and (c) the particular physical matter that now
constitutes my brain are all necessary conditions for my existence as I am
now; but what Eccles seems to be asking is whether these conditions alone
are sufficient to explain my personal uniqueness. Maybe questions such
142 V. S. Ramachandran
as these are meaningless since they seem to imply a metaphysical origin
for my existence and unlike Eccles I do not believe in soul—like “agents”
inhabiting brains. But I do share his view that each person’s conscious
existence in this world is an extraordinary mystery.
THE MIND—BODY PROBLEM AND “PERSONAL IDENTITY”
The history of science is full of examples of large conceptual gaps
which were bridged by sudden flashes of insight. One recalls Maxwell's
equations and the large gap which once existed between “life” and “nonlife” before the advent of molecular biology. But when confronted with
the mind—body problem one has the uneasy feeling that somehow we are
dealing with a different kind of “gap”. As Konrad Lorenz4 points out:
The “hiatus” between soul and body . . . is indeed unbridgeable, albeit perhaps
“only for us”. . . . I do not believe that this is a limitation imposed just by
the present state of our knowledge, or that even an utopian advance of this
knowledge would bring us closer to a solution. . . . It is not a matter of a
horizontal split between sub- jective experience and physiological events, nor a
matter of dividing the higher from the lower, the more complex from the more
elementary, but a kind of vertical dividing line through our whole nature.
The mind—body problem and the problem of “personal identity” are
really two sides of a coin — and there is an interesting thought experiment
which illustrates this.
Imagine that you are a “super—scientist” with complete access to all
laws of physics and brain-function. Supposing you were using
microelectrodes to record from nerve-cells in the brain of a person A
looking at (say) a red flower.
As soon as he sees the red flower you find that certain cells begin to
respond vigorously (in those areas of the brain which are known to be
involved in colour perception). You then come up with what is essentially
a complete and detailed state—description of his brain when he is
confronted with such—and—such wavelength.
Now the important thing to note is that this description you have
produced is not in principle different from a description of (say) what
happens when a computer solves differential equations. Each is an
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 143
intellectually satisfying account of a sequence of events in the external
world; and we can describe these events at both “soft—ware” and “hardware’ ’ levels.
Now you can repeat the experiment in any number of people (B, C, D,
E, etc.) and you would come up with the same description each time.
There may be minor differences in detail due to statistical fluctuations in
each individual’s brain state) but the information—flow diagram
specifying “perception of redness” would be the same for everyone.
If brain-science is sufficiently advanced you may even be able to record
from cells in your own brain when you are looking at a red flower. The
description you would then come up with would be identical to
descriptions you produced earlier for the brain states of other people
looking at a red flower. If you compare the diagrams you have produced
for A, B, C, D and E with the one you produced for your own brain
state, you will not discern any difference.
But now we have a curious discrepancy. You have no reason to doubt
that the descriptions of other people’s brain states are complete. But
when you examine the description of your own brain’s response to the red
flower you will notice that it seems to leave something out —namely, the
actual conscious perception of “redness”. From an “objective” point of
View your brain has the same logical status as other brains. You have
studied 11 brains of which yours is one. And yet you find there seems to be
something fundamentally incomplete about your description of one of
these n brains (i.e. your own) but not of any of the others. The
description of your own brain is identical to A, B, C, D and E but
incomplete. Hence there seems to be an asymmetry in nature between the
observer’s brain and the brains of those whom he observes. Or, to put it
differently, there is no one—to—one correspondence between an objective
description of the world and what you experience — since your perception
of redness just is not contained in that description.
This leads us to what might be called a definition of consciousness.
Consciousness is that “property” which makes a detailed statedescription of the observer’s own brain seem incomplete (in some
philosophical sense) when contrasted with the descriptions of the brains
of other people whom he observes —even if these descriptions are
identical to his own in every other respect.
In everyday life, of course, we conveniently forget the special
144 V. S. Ramachandran
philosophical status of the observer. This has been called the fallacy of
“objectivation” by Erwin Schrodinger?
Without being aware of it and without being rigorously systematic about it, we
exclude the Subject of Cognizance from the domain of nature that we endeavour to
understand. We step with our own person back into the part of an onlooker who
does not belong to the world, which by this very procedure becomes an objective
world. This device is veiled by the following two circumstances. First, my own
body (to which my mental activity is so very directly and intimately linked)
forms part of the object (the real world around me) that I construct out of my
sensations, perceptions and memories. Secondly, the bodies of other people form
part of this objective world. Now I have very good reasons for believing that
these other bodies are also linked up with, or are, as it were, the seats of
spheres of consciousness. I can have no reasonable doubt about the existence of
some kind of actualness of these foreign spheres of consciousness, yet I have
absolutely no direct subjective access to any of them. Hence I am inclined to
take them as something objective, as forming part of the real world around me.
Moreover, since there is no distinction between myself and others, but on the
contrary full symmetry for all intents and purposes, I conclude that I myself
also form part of this real material world around me. I so to speak put my own
sentient self (which had constructed this world as a mental product) back into
it—with the pandemonium of disastrous logical consequences that flow from the
aforesaid chain of faulty conclusions.
Elsewhere he says:
So we are faced with the following remarkable situation. While the stuff from
which our world picture is built is yielded exclusively from the sense organs as
organs of the mind, so that every man's world picture is and always remains a
construct of his mind and cannot be proved to have any other existence, yet the
conscious mind itself remains a stranger within that construct, it has no living
space in it, you can spot it nowhere in space.
The questions raised by Schrödinger in these eloquent passages lead us
inevitably to the “why” of personal existence. Why did one tiny corner
of the Minkowski space—time diagram become suddenly “illuminated”,
as it were, by my conscious awareness?
For millions of years the universe must have been a “play before
empty benches”. Then, quite suddenly, I was born in a little corner of the
world. In a sense I created the world the moment I was born and my
mind gave it substance and form. I am told that the world existed before
my birth and I infer that it will continue after my death. Yet in what
meaningful sense may the world be said to continue when the cognitive
agent who perceives the world has ceased to exist?
These are rather self—centred ideas. Contrast them with the more
intellectually satisfying (but equally pessimistic) view —the so-called
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 145
“objective” world—view of a detached external observer. From his
vantage—point my brain is just one of many thousands of brains and
obviously has no special philosophical status —no “privileged access” to
the world. The “I”, in his view, is a mere evolutionary novelty and so my
coming to be and passing away have no special significance.
WHAT DOES THE UNIQUENESS OF MY EXISTENCE DEFEND ON?
As a brain scientist I am puzzled by the following facts about my
existence:
1. In my lifetime I have had a great variety of experiences — sensations,
emotions, thoughts, etc. But one thing that all have in common is that
they are all my experiences.
This mind of mine is always experienced as one in spite of the diversity
of sense-data. I also feel convinced that this mind did not exist before the
biological birth of my body, i.e. before a particular egg of my mother had
been fertilized by a particular sperm of my father. Also, I experience
“gaps” in my memory when my brain activity is arrested using an
anaesthetic and conclude that I exist only as a result of the activity of a
particular brain. That brain is in turn located in a particular body that
people have named “R”. Moreover, when people refer to “R” I realize
that they mean me and not my body.
2. One of the most mysterious questions I can ask about myself is the
following: “How did my conscious agency (the ‘I’ within me) come to
occupy this particular body which people call ‘R’? In other words, why
was I born in a particular place at a particular time? Why am I me rather
than someone else? Why was I not born, say, a thousand years ago in
Egypt or Rome?”
This question may strike the reader as being mystical or even
meaningless but its exact significance will become clearer when he reads
the “paradoxes” I shall soon describe. You may be tempted to brush
aside the question by saying to yourself: “I am me rather than someone
else simply because no one else has the same unique brain organization
that I have. I am me, by definition. . . .” But this leads to further
questions:
3. Does my existence (i.e. the existence of the conscious “agency” that
“inhabits” the present body and experiences pleasure, pain and
146 V. S. Ramachandran
emotions) depend on the particular physical matter that now constitutes
my brain? In other words, if you were to replace all the carbon, H2, 02,
Na+, Kt and other atoms in my brain with identical atoms picked out
from the environment at random, then would I continue to exist? Would
the same conscious agency then experience pain and pleasure, that
experiences pain and pleasure now?
4. Does my existence depend on the particular environment I was
raised in? To answer this question, let us do a “thought experiment”. If I
asked you “Would you mind particularly, if I tortured you ten years
from now?”. You would answer “Yes”. If I went on to ask “If you spent
those ten years in Africa, would you mind being tortured after that?”,
you would answer “Yes”. Your answer would also have been “Yes” if I
had asked “Would you mind being tortured after you have spent ten
years in Finland? ’ ’. Hence one is convinced that environmental programming is irrelevant to personal existence although it determines the content
of personal awareness. Even if you were regressed back to early
childhood and asked “Would you mind being tortured 20 years from
now” you would answer “Yes . . . irrespective of where I am brought up.
“PERSONAL IDENTlTY” — ONTOLOGICAL AND SEMANTIC QUESTIONS
There are really three different questions about personal identity that
people are often confused about. It is important to keep these questions
separate, since although their meanings overlap a great deal, failure to
distinguish between them can lead to all sorts of verbal quibbles.
Question 1
First, there is the empirical question of what gives unity and coherence
to my “mind”. This is really a problem for brain physiologists. What is
often referred to as the mysterious “unity of mind” may simply reflect
some particular kind of neural organization that integrates different
sensory impressions and issues commands for action based on certain
“goal criteria”. Our “minds” also construct symbolic representations of
the outside world and we can even enact various roles in this symbolic
Twins, Split Brains and Personal identity 147
world before doing so in the real world. What we call “self—awareness”
must have emerged in evolution when one’s own body became a part of
this symbolic representation.
Question 2
Second, there is the philosophical question of “asymmetry” between
the observing self and other agents. Supposing you are sitting in a red
room and hundreds of other agents exactly identical to you are sitting in
rooms which are coloured differently from yours. Then from your
subjective point of view there is only “redness”; but in the objective
description there are hundreds of people and hundreds of colours. Your
perception of redness has no special place in that description. So there is
no one—to—one correspondence between the “objective description” of
the world and your own subjective experience.
In each one of the thought experiments I am going to describe I shall
begin with an asymmetry between the self (A) and others (0). Now we
can do certain things to A. We can remove all the information in A’s
brain and insert new memories, programmes, etc. (as in Bernard
Williams’s° example) or we could replace all the atoms in his brain either
one by one (gradually) or suddenly. You would then come up with what
might be a new asymmetry between the apparently new agent A‘ and 0.
Now the key question is how does the old asymmetry A—> O relate to the
new asymmetry A‘—> O? This is the only real or ontological question we
can ask about personal identity and almost all other questions which
philosophers have dealt with in the past (for example, if an agent A‘
claims to be Napoleon based on his memories and based on his resemblance to Napoleon — would we want to regard him as Napoleon?) reallv
boil down to this question. In the rest of this essay when I ask is A‘
existentially continuous with A, what I am really asking is whether the
original asymmetry between A and O continues as the asymmetry
between A‘ and 0 after certain transformations have been applied to the
physical world (including A); or whether a new asymmetry has been
created. All other questions about P.I. are trivial in the sense that they are
of no fundamental philosophical importance. For instance, to take the
extreme case, it would be trivial to ask whether A‘ is the same as A after A
had undergone plastic surgery—since it is obvious that nothing would
148 V. S. Ramachandran
have happened to the original A—>O asymmetry. Of course, external Os
often use the face as a criterion for identity, but their choice or criterion
has no bearing on what I shall call ontological or existential identity. So,
like Popper,’ I would argue that Strawson’s ideas are somewhat irrelevant
to the true philosophical question underlying personal identity.
The “paradoxes” I shall state are really a summary of everything that
can ever be asked about what I have called the ontological personal
identity question—the question of how the A—>O asymmetry persists
after certain perturbations have been applied to the physical world
(including A’s brain).
Question 3
Finally we come to a third question about personal identity-—namely
the question of how you would identify a person A1 as being different
from other agents and as being the same as an agent A whom you have
seen in the past. This question (which some philosophers have been
interested in) is really quite different from the ontological question (2)
although it often masquerades as (2). I shall call this the empirical identity
question since it ought to interest only policemen and detectives. (It is not
different in principle from asking how one goes about distinguishing
chickenpox from measles.)
Take the question of criminal responsibility. A has just committed
murder and is to be punished. Supposing I were gradually to replace all
the atoms in his brain over a half—hour period to create A‘. Now should I
punish A‘ since he talks and behaves like A originally did (he would even
remember the murder!) and since he satisfies all the conventional criteria
that an external observer would use for determining the identity of A? I
think we would feel justified in punishing A‘ only if we felt sure that he
was existentially the same as A — i.e. only if we are sure of his ontological
identity in terms of whether the A —> O asymmetry has really continued
as A‘—-> O asymmetry.
Hoping to tackle some of these questions I invented a series of
paradoxes involving twins and split~brain patients. As I pointed out
earlier, these paradoxes are really a way of separating the question of
ontological identity from empirical identity. It turns out that the
paradoxes cannot be resolved at all; suggesting that the really interesting
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 149
questions about personal (ontological) identity can never be answered.
This does not mean that no answer exists but simply that we cannot ever
hope to answer them — even in principle.
Of course, in everyday life we assume that what I have called
“empirical identity” corresponds closely with ontological identity—but
this assumption can never be proved; it is merely a belief that we accept
for convenience.
THE TWIN PARADOX
Experiment I
1. Does my existence, the existence of the 1 within me (the cognitive
agent that experiences joy, pain and pleasure) depend on the particular
atoms that now constitute my brain? The answer is clearly no; from
the following argument. I experience continuity of “self” right from
childhood. However, there is continuous metabolic turnover of the atoms
in my brain. Every few months or so the atoms in my brain must undergo
almost complete replacement as I excrete wastes and eat new food. Yet I
do not experience a “jerky” existence.
This argument also makes sense from another point of view. It is
obviously the way in which nerve cells are connected together that
determines my conscious awareness. In other words, it is the processing
of information in my brain that leads to awareness, and the actual atoms
that “carry” the information are quite irrelevant.* Otherwise my
existence today would depend on the particular apple pie or Christmas
cake I ate last week!
Having accepted that an individual’s awareness would continue even if
the particular atoms in his brain are replaced let us go on to do a
“thought experiment”. Supposing a “super-scientist” were to create a
being that is exactly identical to you down to every fine detail. Ignore, for
the moment, any limitation that might be imposed by Heisenbergian
uncertainty. Imagine that this identical twin‘ is now seated in the next
room (that is identical to your own) and keep in mind that there is
* We shall examine this conclusion more critically later (p. 153), but let us
assume for the
moment that it is true and see what it leads to.
150 V. S. Ramachandran
nothing logically impossible about this whole situation. (Although
practically the experiment would be very difficult to perform.)
If I were to ask you ‘ ‘Shall I torture the chap in the other room? Would
you mind terribly if I did so?” you might answer “I don’t mind your
torturing him because I won’t feel the pain” (although, of course, you
might feel some concern for his well-being).
If I were then to ask you: “I am afraid I have to kill you now. After
killing you, would you mind if I tortured your twin? Do you mind
particularly what I do to him after you are gone?” Although you might
have some ethical concern for his well—being, you would probably
answer: “I don’t particularly mind what you do to him —though
obviously I wish him well. . . .”
And now we come to a “paradox”. I kill you instantly and grind you
up or cremate you. I then bring the twin brother and make him sit down
in your chair. This is logically exactly equivalent to replacing all the
atoms in your brain with new atoms.* It must follow that if I now torture
your brother you will experience pain and if I make him happy you will
be happy. In short, you will survive death and will “continue” in your
brother! So you should be just as much concerned about your brother’s
future welfare as you are about your own!
The curious implication of this is that so long as you are alive nothing
happens to you (i.e. you don’t feel pain) when 1 pinch your twin.
However, the moment I destroy your brain and bring the twin to your
room, “you” will feel pain when “he” is pinched!
2. What would happen if I were to destroy you and replace you with
two identical agents instead of one? Would you then continue in each of
them? If not, what or who decides which one you should continue in?
If information=ontological identity then you ought to continue in
both the twins. This would be a fortunate state of affairs if you are now
motivated by two conflicting goals—say two careers you would equally
like to pursue or two women whom you would equally like to marry. You
could then destroy yourself after having asked each of your twin brothers
to pursue one of these two goals. Perhaps “you” would then be
simultaneously satisfying both your desires!
‘The fact that the replacement is done suddenly rather than gradually is
irrelevant to the
question of ontological identity. See Appendix I.
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 151
3. We shall now go on to consider a more instructive version of the
“twin paradox’ ’.
Is the paradox applicable to a situation where your twin had been
brought up in an environment that was different from yours?
Assume that you actually have such a twin living now in (say) Paris and
assume that he has been much more fortunate in life than you have been.
Maybe he is more famous and has more money than you do; in which
case you may envy him and may wish that you were him.
Perhaps when you were both still very much alike (in early
childhood — say, when you were both 5 years old) your parents were
divorced. Perhaps you were at that stage adopted by your mother and
brought up under less favourable circumstances in Cambridge than your
brother who was adopted by your father in Paris. Since you both began
with the same genetic potential it was the environment alone that made all
the difference. Your fate was decided at that critical moment when your
parents were divorced. “How wonderful it would have been”, you may
feel, “if I had been adopted by my father; and my brother by my
mother.”
Assume that a time machine existed now. I regress both of you back to
the stage when you were relatively undifferentiated. Assume, for the sake
of argument, that the two of you were completely identical down to every
fine detail at the time when the divorce took place. (This assumption is
not critical to my argument but it simplifies the logic considerably.)
I now exchange two 5-year-olds so that you (the reader) are
subsequently brought up by your father. I then bring both of you back to
the world of the present. What would be the situation now? Would you
now be your brother or would you still be you anyway in spite of the
exchange? Would you now exist as your brother and experience all those
fortunate circumstances which once belonged exclusively to him?
There are three ways of approaching this problem:
(a) There is an obvious linguistic sense in which you would not and
indeed cannot exist as your brother. You could take the stand that
since “I am by definition the person who is here and now, it is
meaningless to even ask whether I would exist as my brother”.
(b) However, hidden behind this linguistic riddle is a more fundamental
philosophical problem.
Many of us often regret some (retrospectively) foolish decision or other
152 V. S. Ramachandran
which we made in the past. For instance, you may dislike your present
career as a philosopher. At the age of 14 you may have decided on
philosophy instead of (say) medicine and perhaps you very much regret
having made the wrong choice. Given a chance to live your life again you
would obviously choose to do medicine.
Yet if the linguistic argument presented in (a) is strictly correct you
would not even have existed if you had chosen medicine. In fact the
argument would imply that it is not even legitimate for you to regret your
past (or wish that you had chosen a different career) since the only
alternative would be non-existence!
This linguistic argument (a) must surely be false since it seems flatly to
contradict common sense. There clearly is a sense in which you would
have existed even if you had chosen medicine —and in fact all your daily
actions are based on that fundamental assumption. As I pointed out on
page 146, it seems likely that the particular environment you were brought
up in is irrelevant to your existence (ontological identity) although it
determines the content of your awareness. (One way of looking at this
would be to suggest that the “I” within you is analogous to the program of a computer. The existence of these programs would clearly not
depend on the particular inputs that the computer was called upon to
handle.)
It seems to me, therefore, that no linguistic resolution of the twin
paradox is possible, and this takes us back to where we started. If you
had exchanged places with your twin brother early in life would you now
exist in your brother’s body in Paris—i.e. would you experience those
sights, events and sensations which once belonged exclusively to him?
Let me explain this a little further since it is central to my whole
argument. Supposing you (A) have lived in Cambridge all your life, and
your twin (B) has been brought up in Paris. Assume that at least one
complete cycle of metabolic turnover of brain atoms has occurred since
you were separated (in early childhood). You ate English food (composed
of E atoms) and your brother ate French food (F atoms). So your brain
now is made of E atoms (in England) and your existence is “tied” to
these atoms while your brother’s existence is tied to F atoms.
Now supposing A and B had exchanged places early in life. Then B
would have eaten E atoms and A would have eaten F atoms; but the final
physical state of affairs in the world would be exactly the same as it
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 153
would have been if the exchange had not taken place. In spite of the
exchange there would now be one brain in England made of E atoms and
one in Paris made of F atoms.
Since the physical world now is the same as (not merely indistinguishable from) what the physical world would have been if no exchange had
occurred, it must follow that your existence would also remain
unaffected. Hence you would now be in Cambridge even if you had
exchanged places with your twin!"‘
BIOLOGICAL CONTINUITY AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
Until now we have been assuming that existential continuity is
unaffected by replacement of brain atoms; and this resulted in a series of
“paradoxes”. Perhaps the paradoxes prove that this central assumption
is wrong. Maybe if the atoms of your brain are replaced (whether
gradually or suddenly) you will cease to exist and a new person (identical
to you but not the same as you) may begin his existence. The fact that you
experience continuity in spite of metabolic turnover is no guarantee that
you are not existentially a new conscious agent. Supposing I were now to
suddenly replace the atoms in your head and supposing a new agent is
thereby created. There is no way in which either I (the experimenter) or
you (the new agent) could know that you were a new agent since you
would experience an uninterrupted continuity of memories with the
“old” agent. The question of whether you have ontologically a new
existence can never be answered. But if it is really the case that every
complete replacement of brain atoms leads to a new existence—then
several bizarre consequences follow. For instance, one implication would
be that it would be quite unnecessary to plan your life more than a year or
two ahead since metabolic replacement of your brain would have
occurred by then and you would, therefore, in effect be planning the
future of someone else’s life! Of course, that person would resemble you
a great deal and have the same memories, etc., but he would be
existentially new (just as an identical twin is existentially different from
you)——and you would, therefore, really be planning the life of a future
identical twin!
‘I would like to emphasize that these paradoxes make sense only if the reader
thinks of himself as one of the twins. From the point of view of a detached
external observer the situation is completely symmetrical.
154 V. S. Ramachandran
Here, and elsewhere, I have been asking the question “Is this agent A‘
existentially the same as the agent A who existed a few minutes ago?”.
But what exactly do we mean by existential “sameness”? Is this a
pseudo-question arising from misuse of language?
To answer this, let us remind ourselves of the definition of
consciousness which we considered earlier——in terms of the asymmetry
between the observer and other agents. All my thought experiments
involve changing the world in some way to find out whether this
asymmetry persists. The question is “How does the new asymmetry
which arises after applying a certain transformation (e.g. replacing brain
atoms, replacing with an exactly identical twin, or replacing memories)
relate to the asymmetry we began with before applying the
transformation?”. Does your “self” or consciousness as defined by this
asymmetry continue after I have applied the transformation?
This is the only precise meaning we can give to the question of whether
two agents are existentially the same or not. To a detached external
observer the phrase “existentially continuous” is quite meaningless since
from his point of view there was no asymmetry even to begin with. The
criteria he would use for deciding whether A would continue as A‘ are
largely arbitrary. For instance, if A is suddenly replaced by a replica (A1)
made of new atoms, he may choose to call A‘ a new “person”; but if A’s
atoms are gradually replaced one by one to produce A‘ he may decide to
continue to use the same name label A. His choice has no bearing,
however, on what we have earlier referred to as ontological identity.
Further, the continuity of experienced consciousness is neither
necessary nor sufficient logically to guarantee existential continuity. It is
not necessary because you experience discontinuity on waking up from
sleep (or anaesthesia) and in such situations there would obviously be no
grounds for assuming that you were existentially new each time you woke
up. And it is not sufficient either, because, although I can replace your
brain atoms gradually (one by one) in such a way that your experienced
consciousness is unaffected, there is no way in which either you or I could
be sure that you were ontologically the same as the original agent.
SPLIT-BRAIN PATIENTS
The normal human brain consists of two nirror-image halves (the
cerebral hemispheres) which are connected together by a band of nerve
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 155
fibres called the corpus callosum. Almost all memories and skills that are
acquired during an individual’s lifetime are laid down simultaneously in
the two hemispheres; and there is evidence to indicate that one of the
functions of the corpus callosum may be to permit such duplication of
memories.
In most people one cerebral hemisphere appears to be specialized for
speech and so it would not be strictly accurate to speak of all memories
being duplicated. However, in some rare individuals, both hemispheres
appear capable of speech production; and in such persons one
hemisphere is almost literally a mirror—image of the other.
During the last decade or so the brains of several human patients have
been surgically divided into two by cutting the corpus callosum. The
procedure was originally used to prevent the spread of epilepsy from one
hemisphere to the other. When these “split-brain” patients8‘ were
subjected to a battery of psychological tests, it was found that they often
behaved as though they were inhabited by two “minds” or spheres of
consciousness. In one well—known example (quoted by Sperry8) the two
hands (controlled by different hemispheres) even tried to perform
mutually incompatible actions. For instance, while one hand was trying
to button the jacket worn by the patient the other hand simultaneously
attempted to unbutton it!
Almost everyone (except a few theologians) now accepts Sperry’s views
that surgical bisection of the brain actually creates two “minds” or
conscious agents where only one existed before.
Of course, it is true that these patients often look normal and even
behave normally except when special tests are used to reveal the presence
of two minds. There are two explanations for this. First: it is possible that
the “dominant” hemisphere is dominant not only for speech but for
initiating motor commands as well (just as a dominant spouse can
sometimes completely suppress the individuality of his more submissive
partner).
Second: it must be borne in mind that the brain of a split—brain patient
has not been divided at the output level — the thalamic, bulbar, and spinal
motor output centres have not been split. It is possible that when these
centres receive conflicting “commands” from the two hemispheres, some
simple strategy is adopted to resolve the conflict. One such strategy would
be simply to obey the first command and ignore the second. These
156 V. S. Ramachandran
strategies may be embodied in the circuitry of the motor output system
and may not need instructions from higher centres.
In spite of these strategies (which may help the patient avoid conflicts),
there is at least one sense in which he really has two minds. If I pinch his
left hand only his right hemisphere feels the pain and if I pinch his right
hand, pain is felt only by his left hemisphere. So if we were to consider
sensations and the reactions to sensations as being of prime importance,
then we are really dealing with two independent spheres of consciousness
here, although the person’s motor response appears to issue from one
mind because of limited “channel capacity” (or even actively adopted
strategies) at the output level.
Experiment 2. Split—brains and personal identity
Our interest in split—brain patients arises from the fact that they can be
used to construct bizarre thought experiments—a possibility that has
already been recognized by Derek Parf1t.9
Assume, for the sake of argument, that you (the reader) have speech
centres in both your hemispheres. This assumption is not unreasonable,
since, as I pointed out earlier, such cases are actually known to exist.
Now supposing it has become necessary to remove one of your
hemispheres for some surgical reason (e.g. to relieve pressure from a
tumour). You ought not to mind this since removing one hemisphere
alone would not affect your existential continuity (in the other
hemisphere). It would also make no difference to you whether I removed
the right hemisphere or the left; since you would be confident that you
would continue existentially in either hemisphere.
But now, let us assume that in order to simplify the surgery it has
become necessary to cut your corpus callosum before removing one
hemisphere. There is no reason why you should object to this minor
change in surgical procedure: since the eventual outcome of the operation
would remain unchanged you ought not to mind having your corpus
callosum divided before hemispherectomy.
I then divide the corpus callosum, thereby instantaneously creating two
minds. Assume that the “mind” associated with the right hemisphere is
you (the reader). I whisper to you “I am going to destroy you now since I
shall be removing the right hemisphere. But, of course, you don’t have to
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 157
worry since there is a spare ‘you’ located in the same body.” (This
message is delivered to the right hemisphere alone by whispering it
through the left ear.)
Now you might realize at an intellectual level that there was another
“spare” hemisphere available in which you would continue to exist even
if the right hemisphere is destroyed. Yet in spite of realizing this you
would probably object violently to being destroyed. In what sense, you
might wonder, is the mind of that “other” chap sufficient to replace your
own? We have a situation here that is analogous to the “twin paradox”
except that both the conscious agents in this case can legitimately claim
direct existential continuity with one conscious agent who existed just a
few minutes ago. This ought to increase the confidence of each of the two
conscious agents that he will “continue” in the other hemisphere if he is
destroyed!
CAN THESE PARADOXES BE RESOLVED?
Supposing an agent exactly identical to you is sitting in the room next
door. Your two minds are ontologically different at least in one sense, i.e.
in the sense that I can do things to you (such as cause pain) while at the
same time sparing the other person. Since the two of you simultaneously
coexist in space, you are numerically different and there would be no
grounds for “confusing” one for the other. Our “paradoxes” arise only
when one agent A is destroyed and replaced by a replica A‘ made of new
atoms. Also, when we are considering the ontological continuity of A, it
is irrelevant whether the replacement is done suddenly (as with a twin) or
gradually (as in metabolic replacement).
If we accept the position that ontological identity=information and
that the “carrier” of the information is irrelevant then A should continue
as A‘.
But this would have several curious implications. One implication
would be that if you are replaced by two or three agents (A‘, B‘, C‘) who
are completely identical to you, you ought to continue completely in each
of them. Another implication would be that if A‘ only partially resembles
A, containing (say) only 90 per cent of the information that A contains
(e. g. I could replace you with another man instead of an identical
replica), then A’s ontological identity ought to continue at least partially
158 V. S. Ramachandran
in A‘. (We cannot be sure of this but it seems reasonable.) So, when you
die, you ought to “continue’ ’ at least partially in all other people!
But supposing the “carrier” of the information in your brain—i.e.
your brain—atoms—are also necessary determinants of your ontological
identity then you ought not to even survive another two or three years
since metabolic replacement of brain atoms would have occurred by then.
And, again, the fact that you would appear (to other people) to have
survived, or that you experience an uninterrupted continuity of memories
right from childhood, is irrelevant to the question of your ontological
identity.
So, after considering all these thought experiments we are, in a sense,
back where we started. It looks as though questions about “empirical”
identity are philosophically trivial and questions about ontological
identity can never be answered!
But can we learn anything at all from the examples we have been
considering? Some of our “paradoxes” seem to imply that we all go
through life making certain assumptions about the nature of our
existence. We sometimes accuse others of holding “super—natural”
beliefs about souls and life after death without realizing that our own life
is sustained by beliefs that are even more superstitious. For instance, we
assume that we shall survive metabolic replacement of brain atoms and
that we shall continue to remain more or less the same person in the near
future. Sometimes we regret our past and assume that if we had lived
elsewhere our lives would have been more fortunate. All these
assumptions seem reasonable enough but if you examine them carefully
(as we have done in this chapter) you will notice that they are all mere
beliefs and that none of them can actually be proved.
Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are melted into air, into thin air;
. . . We are such stuff
As dreams are made of, and our little life
is rounded with a sleep.
CONCLUSION
According to Wittgenstein “The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense.’ ’
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 159
Wittgenstein’s remark seems particularly appropriate to some of the
problems we have been dealing with in this chapter. Perhaps the best that
philosophers can hope to do is to state more concisely the nonsense that
has already been uncovered by other philosophers; and in a sense that is
what we seem to have achieved for the problem of personal identity.
I began by making a distinction between what I called “empirical” and
“ontological” identity. I pointed out that the empirical identity question
is philosophically trivial and then went on to explore all possible
ramifications of the ontological identity question by inventing a series of
“paradoxes”. These paradoxes encompass all the questions that men
have ever asked about souls, transmigration and immortality, including
metaphysical questions such as “What am I?”.
It may turn out that the ontological identity question can ultimately
never be answered. But at least we have succeeded in understanding the
question as clearly as possible and that is the best that one can hope to do
in philosophy. Also, our analysis seems to have taken us slightly further than
Hume, who believed:
The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great
importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile questions
concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be
regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties . . . we have
no just standard by which we can decide and dispute concerning the time, when
they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the disputes
concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal. . . .
REFERENCES
1. See the section on “free will” in the introductory chapter of this volume
(pp. 9 ff).
2. H. S. Jennings, The Universe and Life, Yale University Press, 1933.
3. J. Eccles, (a) The Understanding of the Brain, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1973;
(b) in K. Popper and J. Eccles, The Self and its Brain, Springer International,
1977.
4. K. Lorenz, Behind the Mirror, Methuen, London, 1977.
5. E. Schrodinger, Mind and Matter, Cambridge University Press, 1958.
6. B. Williams, in J.Glover,ed., Essays on the Philosophy ofMind, 1977.
7. K. Popper, in K. Popper and J. Eccles, The Selfand its Brain, p. 118.
8. R. W. Sperry, in J. Eccles, ed., Brain and Conscious Experience, Springer,
1977.
9. D. Parfit, in J. Glover, ed., Essays on the Philosophy ofMind, 1977.
160 V. S. Ramachandran
APPENDIX I: SUDDEN V. GRADUAL REPLACEMENT OF BRAIN ATOMS
The paradox I have considered rests on the assumption that sudden
and gradual replacements of brain atoms are logically equivalent. This
assumption seems permissible to me since the final result of the
replacement is exactly the same whichever procedure is used (i.e. there
now exists a completely identical brain that is composed of new atoms).
The objection that sudden and gradual replacements are not equivalent
might arise from the common tendency to confuse material objects with
functions. If consciousness were a lump of “something” attached to the
brain then it might become dislodged if the brain were replaced suddenly
but might “stick” to the brain if the replacement were done gradually.
But if consciousness is a function (as it almost certainly is) the rapidity of
replacement becomes irrelevant (i.e. the physical momentum of sudden
replacement would not give it a “jolt” as it would if consciousness were
something like a bit of matter attached physically to the brain).
It is true, of course, that if the replacement is done gradually then
continuity of function would be preserved (like planks being replaced one
by one in a bridge so that it is never allowed to collapse), while sudden
replacement would interrupt, albeit briefly, the continuity of function.
But temporary interruption of function is not detrimental to the
preservation of existence: complete cessation of brain activity (as during
deep anaesthesia), followed by recovery of activity, interrupts the
continuity of the stream of consciousness but the person who wakes up
after the discontinuity (i.e. after anaesthesia) is exllstentially the same as
the original person; unless one adopts the supernatural position that the
original “soul” departs and is replaced by a new one.
In the case of planks being replaced in a bridge it is largely a linguistic
problem whether we choose to call the “new” bridge (arising from the
replacement) the same as the original one or merely identical to it. We
may choose to define anything that results from gradual replacement as
the same as the original object and that which results from sudden
replacement as a new but identical object; and this nomenclature is
entirely arbitrary.
But the question of whether my existence would continue if my brain
atoms were replaced cannot be reduced to this kind of linguistic analysis.
An outside observer may choose to call me the same person if the
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 161
replacement had been gradual but not if the replacement had been
sudden. But the question is not what I should be called but whether I
would ontologically continue to exist or not——and this cannot be
answered by merely considering what criteria people generally use in
such situations.
APPENDIX II: THE MIND—BODY PROBLEM (p. 142)
Not everyone would find it necessary to believe in a “split” of the
kind described by Lorenz or implied in my thought experiment.
Grover Maxwell has argued, for instance, that since the ontological or
intrinsic (as opposed to descriptive or structural) properties of the
world are fundamentally unknowable to science, the possibility is
open that some of these properties are just the ones that are exemplitied in the events that constitute our own private experience. In that
case, mental events would be merely one kind—perhaps a rather
special kind—of physical event (G. Maxwell, in Consciousness and the
Brain, ed. G. G. Globus et al., Plenum Press, 1976). However, the
assumption of such a split is not necessary for creating the
“paradoxes” that I have described.
162 V. S. Ramachandran
Discussion
Mackay:
You argue that if my physically indistinguishable twin sat down in my chair,
that would be “exactly equivalent” to replacing all the atoms in my brain, so
that “in a sense” I would be sitting in that chair. But (1) for this to be at
all plausible, my twin and I would have to have had identical experiences
(including meeting the same people at the same time and in the same geometrical
relationships) at every point throughout our two lives. This is impossible in
principle, unless you could have us in duplicate worlds with duplicate people i.e. unless you had already solved the problem of producing identical twins!
(2) Something that makes me permanently distinct from any other cognitive agent
is that in principle I can be “Thou” to him and he to me. Even theoretically
identical twins would become distinguishable in principle the moment they were
able to engage in dialogue. One of them, for example, would have to listen while
the other talked, and so on. (3) If, as I would argue, the identity of a
conscious agent is associated with the interpersonal roles he can play, then no
other conscious agent who exists simultaneously with me in the same world can be
confused with me, since in principle we have the capacity to be “Thou" to one
another. To take two conscious role players, however indistinguishable, and
exchange them is different from taking one conscious role player and exchanging
his bodily atoms, precisely because the first requires the prior existence of
two conscious role players, and the second only one. The question “Which was
which?” is simply resolved by tracing the roles, active and/or passive, played
by each up to and through the point of exchange.
RAMACHANDRAN:
My question is: “What would happen if an agent exactly identical to me were to
be created?" The fact that this is impossible in practice is irrelevant to my
argument.
Your second question is an extremely interesting one. My reply would be that in
the kind of situation I have been considering (i.e. in a Laplacian world) the
two agents would not be able to engage in “dialogue” even if they were allowed
to confront each other. Dialogue requires exchange of information and since both
our agents contain exactly the same information no such exchange can occur. Each
agent would say and do exactly the same thing as his twin. Let anyone who
believes in his “free will” imagine this situation!
Supposing I now create a replica of you (Donald MacKay) and allow the two of you
to confront each other in a completely featureless room——so that your brain
states are completely identical right up to the point of confrontation. You
would then try to be “Thou" to him by starting a conversation but to your
surprise you would discover that he always simultaneously utters the same words
as you. You might then even go on to explain to him that you wanted to prove to
the audience here at the conference that you could be “Thou” to him—but you
would be unsuccessful and the audience (who are watching you through closedcircuit TV) would notice that the other Donald MacKay was simultaneously making
equally futile attempts to be “Thou” to you!
Fortunately, there is a trick you could employ to break the “deadlock". You
could use a radioactive device designed to (say) emit a signal either towards
you or towards him. You could then decide in advance that only the person
towards whom the signal was emitted:
Twins, Split Brains and Personal Identity 163
should start speaking. This would at least help you start a dialogue but even
then the conversation would soon become quite boring since your brains contain
identical information.
Furthermore, in all my thought experiments the exchange of bodies is done before
the two agents have had a chance to initiate a dialogue. So although your
question is an interesting one it does not create problems for the examples I
have been considering.
CHAPTER 10
Mind—Matter Interaction in the
Psychokinetic Experience
SUZANNE PADFIELD
West Wickham, Cambridgeshire
For many of you, the topic about which I am going to make some
comments, namely psychokinesis or the apparent ability to move or alter
matter by paranormal means, will seem startling, remote and
implausible. May I stress here and now that the remarks I shall make are
aimed fundamentally at bringing us merely to the starting—point of
discussion, not at attempting to provide a scientific answer under the
guidelines of science at present in existence.
Just as we cannot measure an electric current with a ruler, neither can
we register a step in the evolution of mankind with an attitude or frame
of reference proper to a much cruder and outworn part of the history of
man’s mental understanding. We have to adjust our attitudes, alter our
frame of reference and angle of approach. The startling and intensely
uncomfortable nature of psychokinetic phenomena provides the reasons
which make the study and discussion of them a very good starting—place.
For the purpose of aiding scientific understanding, I have in the past
demonstrated some psychokinetic effects under controlled conditions.
Most of these experiments took place at the Paraphysical Laboratory,
Downton, Wiltshire, with Dr. Benson Herbert, and the principal
experiment involved a piece of apparatus known as a light mobile system.
This apparatus consisted of a single strand of polyester fibre, the polymer
known as polyethylene terephthalate, 25 cm long and 16 microns in
diameter (chosen for its high tensile strength and low electrical and
thermal conductivity because of its low moisture content). A straw beam 8
cm long was attached to one end of the fibre by means of sealing wax and
165
166 Suzanne Padfield
the other end attached by the same means to a cork which fitted tightly
into the neck of a large glass bottle in which the straw became suspended
horizontally. The straw was balanced by two differently coloured pieces
of plasticine, one at either end, and the sides of the bottle marked with
vertical lines, enabling the angle of rotation of the straw to be observed
accurately.
The system was placed on a vibration-free surface in a room free from
disturbances and left for 24 hours, being monitored during that time to
ensure that none of the known factors which might produce an effect on
the straw beam were in operation. At the selected time for the experiment
(no detectable movement of the beam, i.e. less than half a degree movement, having been recorded for 24 hours) I would enter the room quietly
and stand 5 or 6 ft away from the system. I always wore a visor to reduce
effects of heat radiation from my face and electrostatic charge from my
hair.‘ I would then commence to “direct” the beam a certain number of
degrees towards or away from me, either by free choice, having stated the
number of degrees of rotation and direction beforehand, or at the
command of the experimenter who was also present in the room but only
near enough to the system to allow accurate observation, usually 10-12
ft. The experiment was successful about 70 per cent of the time and the
straw beam would rotate the required number of degrees and remain still
until a further direction or degree of rotation was chosen. A series of up
to fifteen runs of psychokinetic influences could be accomplished during
one experimental period with successful deflections of the beam from 5 to
90 degrees, fatigue usually deciding when the period would end.
This particular experiment was carried out almost weekly for a period
of nine years, and various refinements were made at different times. For
example, when the subject and the experimenter entered the room a
period was allowed during which any effect upon the mobile due to a
change in temperature or humidity caused by the addition of two human
bodies to the room would, if it was going to occur, have been observed.
In fact we found that the addition of two people to the room caused no
detectable effect on the system, no movement of the beam being observed
prior to the start of the experiment. When a large number of observers
wished to be present this did pose a great problem as the disturbance
caused by temperature and humidity change and by general bustling
around, no matter how strict one tried to be, usually caused an oscillation
Mind—Matter Interaction in the Psychokinetic Experience 167
in the system or alignment of the beam. We overcame this problem by
giving observers visual access via the window of the room containing the
light mobile system. Later, at the Stanford Research Institute in
California in 1976, I was able to produce deflexions of the beam
successfully using only the monitor of a video camera for visual contact,
the system itself being in an adjoining room with no one present. I have
also been able on a large number of occasions to demonstrate
“psychometry”, which is the ability to tell the past of an object, or
events in the history of an object, merely by handling it and with no other
information available?
There are similarities and differences in my subjective experience of
what is taking place when I do both psychometry and psychokinesis,
which I believe are indicative of a new attitude and framework which may
provide a useful tool for future understanding of the nature of matter
and of consciousness.
In the case of psychometry I am aware of a feeling of scanning the past
events of the object I am holding and am aware of sequences or memory
tracks, some of which become actual events and others which existed only
as possible events. Both are explored and the actual events are singled out
and emphasized in the same way as one might retrieve a memory trace.
In the case of psychokinesis I am also aware of a sequence of possible
events, as it were, in stages which I feel myself to be exploring. It differs
from psychometry in that I am aware of the possibility of future events
which are open to me and I am able to choose one of them, which
becomes the actuality. In the case of the light mobile system it is the new
position it will occupy.
In both cases there is the subjective experience of exploring possibilities
rather in the way one might remember what one did yesterday and the
things one might or might not have done in retrospect.
I must emphasize here that I feel myself to be a part of these processes
and these events and not in any way separate from them. I am a part of
the events, of the sequences, not merely observing them.
This subjective experience of knowing all the possibilities and being a
part of each one as it occurs is not mine alone. It occurs frequently in the
revelations of mystical literature, “I am That”,3 and traditionally the
second stage of spiritual development embodies just this experience, the
notion that the perceiver is not separate but is a part of the process. In 800
168 Suzanne Padfield
B.C., Patanjali, the founder of the school of Raja Yoga, wrote in his
Yoga Sutras:“ “There is identity of relation between memory and effectproducing cause, even when separated by species, time and place.”
Obviously the word “species” may cause some misunderstandings. The
text and commentary 1 use as my source‘* discusses the problem of correct
translation at some length. If I do as Alice Bailey suggests to her readers
and apply my own concept of what Patanjali was saying in the light of
my own experience and the rest of his teachings, I would insert
“differences of form” rather than and in place of “species”. But it is the
phrase “identity of relation” that is the key. The dynamics is determined
by the identity of structures, one with another, rather than spatial
positions. Let me explain further.
Consider the brain as an atomic organization or society. The process of
thought may be considered as the reciprocal activity taking place between
different atomic organizations. The memory trace is the effect, within the
brain as an atomic organization, of its interaction and degree of
identification with other atomic organizations. By identification, 1 mean
that what we know as a memory trace occurs when the sequence of
atomic codings within the brain becomes identical with those of other
atomic organizations. Patanjali says: “The past and the present exist in
reality, the form assumed in the time concept of the present is the result
of developed characteristics and holds latent seeds of future qualities.”5
Here again I believe the translation has suffered and the context of the
Sutra strongly suggests replacing the obscure word “qualities” by the
more precise words “states”, which makes absolute sense in the light of
my own experience.
Those “developed characteristics” of which Patanjali speaks are the
sequences of atomic codings. They are, I believe, what I encounter and
interact with when I do psychometry. “The latent seeds of future
‘states’ ” embodies the notion of a choice of one among many possible
atomic rearrangements of an encountered atomic organization, via the
interaction with the brain.
When two codings match, you have a memory: at the instant they
match you have the possibility, w'a the interaction, of creative thought,
imagination to one degree, the macroscopic alteration of form to a larger
degree. Obviously people will look for and try to make some comparison
with more conventional psychology. They might expect some change in
Mind—Matter Interaction in the Psychokinetic Experience 169
the nervous system in the case of psychometry which allows images of
past events to be re—created. What I am saying is that there is no recreation of images, but that what is taken to be the re-creation of an
image is in fact a newly created event arising out of the identification or
matching of codings within the brain and any encountered organisation
(or object). People term the new event a “memory” because of degrees
of similarity. But I am saying that what we term “memories” are in fact
new events never precisely identical (as those who have to deal with eyewitness accounts in court will testify).
Concerning the similarity between the past and the present: in the case
of psychometry people would normally expect that the experiences that
an object had undergone must have changed it in such a way that the
psychometrist could re—create the image of those things. The normal way
of thinking would be that the object could “pick up traces” which would
stimulate analogous memory traces in the mind of the psychometrist,
therefore implying some kind of passive memory store. This is not so. Of
course each organization is structurally altered atomically by its
encounters with other organizations. But each encounter (including its
encounter with a psychometrist) is actually a new event and the image the
psychometrist perceives is that of a new event. One asks why those
experiences tend to bear a startling similarity to events someone
recognizes and verifies the psychometrized object to have been involved
in. To answer this question I can only say briefly that the elements which
go to make up the total object or organization are connected in a
similarity space in which distances are defined by degree of similarity and
where time and space do not automatically appear at all. In such a space a
natural form of connectivity is a sequence of elements or patterns of
elements in which neighbours differ only minimally. I further have to
postulate that cerebral tissue has evolved the special function of rapidly
producing structures which match the coding of some parts of such a
sequence and thus get connected to the others. These will seem to be in
the past of the object. This form of connectivity is unfamiliar in current
physics. On the other hand, there is a growing interest in discrete or
combinatorial approaches to physical foundations and in such
approaches sequences in similarity space appear naturally at a more
primitive level than space and time. (See, for example, Bastin and Noyes,
“Possible physical interpretations of the combinatorial hierarchy”, to
170 Suzanne Padfield
be published in proceedings of the July 1978 Tutzing conference on
“Quantum Theory and the Structures of Time and Space’ ’ .)
People might interpret what I have been saying about psychokinesis as
my having suggested that the mind of the subject would have the power
of exploring a great range of possibilities which are open to a given object
or physical situation, so that by choosing and working on one of them the
“mind” could make it come about. This is a step in the right direction of
thinking from my point of view, but the emphasis is wrong. If you look
back at my description of influencing the suspended mobile you will see
that this summary gives too much autonomy to the mind. Possibilities are
in fact explored, but which one is to be chosen is dictated to a large extent
by the possibilities themselves.
I am well aware that I have encroached upon the subject of physical
particles and what they can do, and that I have postulated that, in some
way, the structures formed from them may have the power, via identity
of structure, of matching with and leading what we call our consciousness
forwards or backwards along sequences determined by the interaction of
the microscopic organizations both within and outside the brain. I am
also aware that this idea is foreign to current physics, where this kind of
connectivity has not been noticed. Formerly physicists would simply have
said that no such thing could happen; now they are not so unequivocally
certain about the matter. Some writers are seriously investigating the
freedom allowed for psychokinesis by current quantum theory. Even
they, however, have only demonstrated that a good deal of freedom
exists. They have said nothing positive about the way their information
organizes the details.
My function in this situation is only to present you with my experience
and to invite you to examine my argument that particular forms of
connectivity are dictated by these experiences.
Editorial note:
The above has been printed with only minor changes from the author’s original
manuscript. A restatement of the theoretical ideas in more conventional
terminology based on editorial discussions with the author, may be of some
value, provided it is borne in mind that the concepts may not be capable of
exact translation. The basic ideas are: (1) laying down of memory is not the
laying down of a precise copy of an image. but the creation of a structural
change which encodes the event; corre-
Mind—Matter Interaction in the Psychokinetic Experience 171
spondingly the recall process is an active one and does not in general re-create
the original event exactly; (2) objects are capable of laying down memories of
events they have experienced, by a similar mechanism to that of personal memory;
(3) the structure of an object may encode a future possibility as much as it may
encode a past event; (4) by generalizing the sense of identity, a psychic may
perceive images connected to an object in the same way that we normally perceive
images related to our nervous systems: (5) psychometry is explained as a
perception created in this manner from the coding of a past event in an object;
(6) psychokinesis is explained as a process of first creating an image of a
future possibility for the object out of a structure within the object which
encodes that possibility, and then interacting with that struc- ture so as to
trigger off a causal chain leading to that possibility being realized.
It is an interesting question whether the author’s theories, if valid, would
reduce the paranormal phenomena she describes to normal ones. The explanations
she gives would be quite conventional if one were to accept the idea that an
external object could by some mechanism function as part of a person’s nervous
system, a possibility which it is difficult to deny on purely logical grounds.
While Dr. Ramachandran in his paper asks why one person’s experiences should be
linked to one particular nervous system, Ms. Padfield argues that the principle
just stated can on occasion be violated; while again Mrs. Noakes (see
Josephson’s Afterword to the Conference) suggests that physics as currently
interpreted gives an incomplete description of physical reality, and that
subtler aspects of a person's identity exist which are not necessarily confined
to his usual physical body. These papers all point towards the idea that
personal identity and the relation between objective and subjective reality are
questions of crucial importance to science. [B. D. J .]
APPENDIX
During the conference, several questions about experimental
procedure, and in particular about the separation of psychokinetic effects
from movements due to familiar causes, were put. The experimenter is
very aware of the complexity of the problem of isolating effects, and in
my opinion the safest course by far is to pursue what I will call a
pragmatic approach which does not presuppose that one has a complete
knowledge of relevant effects. If one observes the suspended beam for
long enough, one can make an estimate to any desired measure of
accuracy of the probability of a given effect taking place as a result of
uncontrolled effects whatever these may be. Then, provided only that one
is satisfied that the introduction of the subject has not altered any of the
ambient conditions significantly, one can give an upper bound to the
probability of the subject’s effects being fortuitous.
In the experiments at Downtown, this pragmatic approach was
consistently used. The beam was observed every ha1f—hour or so
172 Suzanne Padfield
continuously for 24 hours before an experimental session, and all
excursions of the beam greater than a fixed angle were recorded. What
happened was that during the 24 hours no excursion greater than one or
two degrees was observed; usually there was no excursion at all. During
the experimental sessions I was able to produce excursions of the beam
through angles of say 45 degrees, at will, every few seconds for as long as
I was asked.
In circumstances like these I would hardly bother with probability
calculations, but they would be there in principle for sticklers on
experimental protocol.
It is very unfortunate that I seem to have given a misleading impression
in my talk, when I spoke of the 24 hours’ observation period. Some of
my questioners evidently thought that I said that only one experiment (i.e.
excursion of the beam) was recorded in one 24-hour period, and some of
the questions are misdirected in consequence. What I meant to say was
that there would be a 24-hour observation period before each
experimental session, the session including an indefinite number of
excursions of the beam.
REFERENCES
1. Benson Herbert, Paraphysical News, Supplement to the Journal of Paraphysics,
7, no. 5, p. 2 (1971).
2. For details of experiment carried out for B.B.C. TV, see ibid., p. 8.
3. Exodus 3: 14.
4. Alice A. Bailey, The Light of the Soul, The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, Lucis,
1972, p. 394.
5. Ibid., p. 374, v. 12.
Mind—Matter Interaction in the Psychokinetic Experience 173
Discussion
MACKAY:
The “information rate" (number of bits of information per day) claimed for the
alleged communication channel here is so low that our normal instincts for the
dangers of correlated disturbances can be unreliable. For example, an extremely
minute correlation between the process by which the “commands” were selected and
the pattern of earth tremors, etc., that might physically influence the beam
could give rise to a spurious appearance of information transmission at these
low rates. How did the scores vary according to the method of selection?
PADFIELD:
I would agree with Professor MacKay’s criticism if the experimental procedure
were as he supposes, and I hope my remarks above (see Appendix) have cleared up
the misunder- standing. I hope, too, that my description of our “pragmatic
approach" assures him that our reliance on “normal instincts” had a proper
basis.
A lot of attention was given to the selection of commands. At an early stage in
the course of experiments, trials were made in which the instructions were
selected by a suitable random process using random number tables to dictate the
timing, and direction of the excursion of the beam which was to be aimed for by
the experimenter. It was found that the degree of success of the subject was not
related at all to the method of selection.
MacKay mentions earth tremors. In some experiments a simple seismograph was kept
running. There was never any correlation between earth tremors and other effects
of any sort.
BARLOW:
Obviously you cannot give details of all the control observations and other
precautions you took when doing these experiments, but I wonder if you could
give us a few particulars in order to show us how easy, or difficult, it was to
come to the conclusions you have come to?
First, what is the natural period of your device when you are not trying to
influence it in any way? Second, I think you said it took a day to recover fully
from a perturbation, but I wonder if you can specify rather more precisely the
time constant of the decay of oscillations following an imposed perturbation?
Third, I wonder if you can specify the range, and perhaps the standard
deviation, of positions observed if the reading was taken at, say, daily
intervals following a long period without any deliberately imposed
perturbations? Fourth, what was the amplitude of the perturbations you thought
you achieved, how long did it take you to achieve them, and how did you decide
what direction of perturbation you would attempt on any given day?
The system may not be simple enough to give straightforward answers to these
questions, but even very approximate answers would indicate to us rather more
clearly the nature of the task of deciding whether your device is influenced in
the way you believe that it is.
174 Suzanne Padfield
It is not always easy to decide whether a signal has emerged from the noise,
even when the noise behaves well and observations can be repeated every few
seconds. It must be a fearsome task if the noise is less regular than expected
and if you can only make one observation per day.
PADFIELD:
Firstly, the system is certainly far beyond the point of critical damping, in
the direction of very low Q. I don’t know exactly how far, but the sensation one
gets is always of a beam which drifts, certainly not one which oscillates. The
fibre which was used for most of the experiments (after a great many had been
tested) was a single strand of a polyester- polyethylene terephthalate with a
diameter of 16 microns. It has a very low torsional elastic constant. In fact
the elastic constant plays a very small part in the thinking about the
experiment. For reasons which are not understood, these beams seem to have a
natural alignment to which they settle down (quite apart from the activity of
the subject) and you have to turn the torsion head several times before the
torsional force is great enough to overcome this tendency to alignment.
The second question is answered by my answers to MacKay, particularly in
relation to the confusion over the 24-hour period, and by my statements about
the restoring torsional force and the damping. There must presumably be a time
constant which characterizes the exponential relaxation after an excursion of
the beam, but I have no idea what it might be. When 1 cause the beam to rotate
it moves through a finite angle and stays there.
In view of my foregoing comments on oscillations questions 3 and 4 seem to boil
down to the question “How far do you customarily move the beam?”. The answer is
that it usually moves anything from 5 degrees to 90 degrees and that it is
pretty much under my control how far it goes.
VESEY :
To the best of my knowledge I have never moved anything psychokinetically, so I
was very interested in your account of the experience of doing so. From what you
said there would appear to be one respect in which the experience of moving
something psychokinetically is like the ordinary experience of, say, moving
one’s arm. Lotze once said that he felt “thoroughly at home" in his voluntary
bodily movements, as distinct from certain other bodily activities. (I suppose
he was thinking of things like digestive processes—things we would not
ordinarily say were “done” by the agent, although he certainly does something
else, namely eating and drinking, to bring them about.) Now, you said that you
had the experience of “not being separate” from the psychokinetically induced
movement. I took you to mean that it felt rather like making an ordinary bodily
movement. But you went on to say something which seemed to me to conflict with
that. You said — didn't you? — that you had to visualize the desired movement in
order to bring it about. I would have thought that to the extent to which you
had to do that it would seem to you that you were separate from the movement. It
would make it more like “willing” dice to fall in a certain, visualized, way. I
wonder if you could say a little more about what you meant by not feeling
separate from the movement in the psychokinetic case.
Mind—Matter Interaction in the Psychokinetic Experience 175
PADFIELD:
I was really concerned to make the point that to get the effect observed, you
had to feel a part of the whole system and process including the mobile, as
distinct from as it were giving it instructions through what MacKay calls a
communication channel. (Indeed, this second process means nothing to me
experientially beyond enunciating the words of the instructions.) I actually
gave much more detailed instructions than merely to visualize the movement, for
you had to get sufficiently a part of the detail of the system to intervene
between two states. The misunderstanding may be due to a use of the word
“visualize” which carries a sense of seeing as a process where a message is
carried from a thing to a mind. On the other hand, “visualize" also carries a
sense of reproducing something of what has been seen, which seems to militate
against separation.
CHAPTER 11
Phenomenal Space
M. J. MORGAN
University of Durham
One of the attributes of mental events, such as thoughts and sensations,
that has been most persistently described as distinguishing them from
physical things is that mental events do not have an obvious location in
physical space. If we are trying to catch a cricket ball, a physicist could tell
us the trajectory of the ball, and where it is at a given instant. But if called
upon to say where our perception of the ball is he would obviously be
much more puzzled about what was required as an answer. One course
of action that might occur to him is to get the observer to point to, or
otherwise indicate, the position in which he sees the ball to be. In this
manner a trajectory of the perceived ball might be plotted out. Such a
trajectory might differ, and indeed usually would differ, from the
trajectory of the actual cricket ball itself, because of such factors as the
speed of the visual response. Suppose the physicist, having established the
perceived trajectory, were to examine the point in space which the
perceived ball occupied at a particular time. He might do this, if he were
very innocent, in the hope of seeing what a perceived ball looks like. Of
course, he would find nothing there. No matter how hard he looks in the
space occupied by cricket balls and the like he will not find perceived or
phenomenal cricket balls. This is the sort of consideration that has led to
the notion that perceptions do not occur in physical space at all, but
rather in a purely mental or “phenomenal” space. If this claim is true it is
clearly a very powerful reason for maintaining a mind—matter dualism. I
therefore think it important to point out that the concept of a
phenomenal space is mistaken, or at best confused, and this is what I
shall try to argue in the following pages.
177
178 M. J. Morgan
Let us first of all analyse applications of the concept of phenomenal
space a bit further. Consider a well—known illusion such as the “Pulfrich
Pendulum”. The observer looks at an object swinging from left to right
on a length of string at right angles to his line of sight. If he places a
neutral density filter in front of one of his eyes, carefully keeping both
eyes open, the observer now sees a very striking effect: the pendulum,
instead of moving in a plane at right angles to the line of sight, now seems
to move in an ellipse, constantly changing its apparent distance from the
observer. The orbit is clockwise in depth (as if viewed from above) with
the filter over the left eye and anticlockwise with the filter over the right
eye. The details of this illusion are not important for the present
discussion; what I wish to draw attention to is the fact that in this case, as
in other illusions, it is possible to apply conflicting spatial descriptions to
the object. We say that the physical object (the bob of the pendulum) is
moving in a straight line, whereas the perceived object is moving in an
ellipse. In the case of the physical object we are accustomed to saying that
it moves “in” space. But if this description is applied, what shall we say
of the movement of the perceived object? Is the ellipse also “in” space?
If so, what space is it “in”: the same space as that of the physical bob, or
some special space reserved for perceptions? ‘
A widely canvassed answer to this question is that there is indeed a
separate space for perceived objects, a “phenomenal”, “subjective” or
“mental” space, quite distinct from the space in which the physical
object moves. A phenomenal object, phenomenally moving in this
phenomenal space, can be meaningfully described, on this theory that I
am outlining, as moving in ellipses, straight lines or whatever. This is not
supposed to be a merely idle analogy, a sloppy use of the same word
“space” to cover two concepts that share nothing whatsoever; on the
contrary, as we shall see, it is often thought that phenomenal space shares
sufficient properties in common with physical space for it to be
meaningfully described as having a geometry — although, as we shall also
see, it has been supposed that these geometries do not have to be
identical.
It would be unfortunate to give the impression that the concept of a
phenomenal space has arisen only out of perceptual illusion. Consider
another example, in which Shepard and Cooper showed people drawings
representing complex three-dimensional shapes with several limbs and
Phenomenal Space 179
angles. The observers were given the task of judging whether two such
shapes, presented together, were the same or not. One of the shapes could
be rotated relative to the other, or both rotated and mirror-imaged: in the
first case the observer was meant to say that it was the same shape, in the
second case that it was different. The finding was that the greater the
angle through which the shape was rotated, the longer the observer took
to decide whether it was “the same” or not. When asked how they did
the task, observers straightforwardly replied that they mentally rotated
one of the shapes until it coincided with the other version, to see if they
matched. It seems that the greater the angle through which they had to
carry out this mental rotation the longer they took over it. Obviously, the
observer is not rotating the physical object on the paper. As in the case of
the Pulfrich Pendulum, it is tempting to say that what is really moving is
an image or phenomenal object, and that it is rotating in a phenomenal
space.
Gregory’s theory of the geometric illusions provides another illustration
of the way in which the concept of phenomenal space might be used,
although Gregory has not emphasized this aspect explicitly. In this theory
certain features of line drawings are thought to trigger constancy scaling
mechanisms normally involved in three-dimensional representations of
objects in space. Lines that are indicated by primitive perspective features
as being further away from the observer are expanded, and those
indicated as nearer are relatively contracted. One interpretation of what is
going on here is that out of the line drawing a representation of an object
in a 3-D phenomenal space is being constructed, and that the observer
is making judgements of lengths of lines in the phenomenal figure.
However, we must be cautious here, because Gregory stresses that the
illusions may be seen even when no depth is perceived in the figure. In
such cases the illusion is treated as a judgement of line length determined
by an unconscious process of “primary scaling”. Even this, however, is
treated as a scaling operation, which seems to demand a spatial
representation of some sort.
To conclude this brief introduction to uses of phenomenal space, I give
the following quotation, which may be more aptly considered as a
blunder than as a reasoned statement, but which nevertheless illustrates a
certain popular conception:
180 M. J. Morgan
One important hypothesis suggests that the brain contains a model of the outside
world. We are so familiar with this model that we think it is the outside world,
but what we are really aware of is an imitation world, a tool which we
manipulate in the way that suits us best and so find out how to manipulate the
real world which it is supposed to represent. . . . When we cross the road and
avoid traffic we are really dodging the moving buses and cars in the mind.
In other words, there are two sets of moving buses and cars; one set in
the physical world, which are dodged by our real bodies, and another set
moving in a purely phenomenal space, which are dodged by a
phenomenal version of our bodies. It is fortunate indeed that these two
dramas are utterly distinct, for if it were not so a collision with a
phenomenal bus might injure our physical body, with disastrous results.
Collisions between real buses and phenomenal bodies are probably less to
be feared on the whole, although bus drivers might think differently on
this point. Luckily these speculations about cross-modal traffic accidents
need not detain us, for the supporters of phenomenal space insist that it is
utterly distinct from physical space and that there is no possibility of
interaction between the two. Indeed, this is what dualism is all about.
The first point that needs to be stressed about the doctrine of the “two
spaces” is that it differs in a very important way from representational
theory as we normally apply it to perceived qualities such as colours,
smells and the pitch of sounds. We do not say that there are two distinct
sets of colours, one physical and the other phenomenal. On the contrary,
we say that phenomenal colours are the only kinds of colours there are:
they represent, not a further set of colours, but differing wavelengths of
light. Colour science made little progress until it was realized that colour
mixture, for example, was a property of colours rather than lights. There
was much confusion concerning the interpretation of Newton’s
experiments until the Young—He1mholtz theory finally became
established and cleared up this logical point. Similarly, we believe that
there are only phenomenal smells. (The philosopher Bradley was
mistaken in ascribing to physiologists the belief that when we smell
rotting fish we are aware of the stinking state of our nervous system.)
There is no need to multiply examples. However, the doctrine of the two
spaces is not like this, because the same word “space” is still used to
describe both the phenomenal and the physical referent, and it is
considered that the two spaces share a number of important features.
Physiologists could not agree, I take it, that there is only a phenomenal
Phenomenal Space 181
space, in the same way that there are only phenomenal colours. If they
held that there was only a phenomenal space, it would be hard to
understand why they should attempt to explain various aspects of our
perception (such as binocular vision of depth) by drawing spatial
diagrams, and by appealing to the fact that light travels in straight lines.
If “straight lines” and the like were purely phenomenal, explanations
couched in these terms would not be physiological explanations at all.
They would resemble a “colour theory” such as the one of Goethe, who
insisted that explanations of colour should remain within the realm of
colour. There may be something to be said for a rigorous phenomenology
of this kind—I do not want to enter into this argument at present, but
merely to point out that the scientific treatment of perception has rejected
pure phenomenology in the case of colours and smells, but has not
succeeded in doing so when it comes to the spatial aspects of perception.
Exactly the same point can be made about the treatment of time and
duration in psychology. We speak of physical events such as eclipses
having a duration, but we also talk as if it were meaningful to apply
exactly the same word to experiences. It is recognized that “subjective”
or phenomenal time will run more or less slowly on different occasions in
comparison to a physical clock, but it remains “time” none the less.
William James discussed Helmholtz’ 5 treatment of this problem:
If asked why we perceive the light of the sun, or the sound of an explosion, we
reply “Because certain outer forces, either light waves or air waves, smite upon
the brain, awakening therein changes, to which the conscious perceptions, light
and sound, respond.“ But we hasten to add that neither light nor sound copy or
mirror the ether or air-waves; they represent them only symbolically. The only
case, says Helmholtz, in which such copying occurs, and in which “our
perceptions can truly correspond with outer reality, is that of the timesuccession of phenomena. Simultaneity, succes- sion, and the regular return of
simultaneity or succession, can obtain as well in sensa- tions as in outer
events. Events, like our perceptions of them, take place in time. . . ."
(W. James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1, pp. 627-8.)
Helmholtz calls this the “only case”, but his use of the word “outer”
gives the game away for space as well. This is a spatial term that can be
applied to physical events and to phenomena. I perceive a tree as outside
my head and my headache as inside; a physiologist would say that the
brain events corresponding to both these phenomena are inside the brain.
We may have arguments on this point but we use the same words. I think
it was Winston Churchill who described the Americans and the British as
182 M. J. Morgan
“two nations separated by a common language”. What Kant called the
inevitable ambiguity of terms like “outer” and “inner” has very much
this divisive effect in the philosophy of perception. In the Critique of
Pure Reason Kant blames scepticism of the Berkeley variety entirely on
this ambiguity.
Reference to Kant brings me to a second general remark on the concept
of phenomenal space. This is that Kant, although he may be held in part
responsible for the intrusion of phenomenal space into psychology
(through figures such as Lotze and Hering), nevertheless did not himself
believe in “two spaces”. The whole point of his argument is that space is
purely phenomenal. He believed it to be a grave error to postulate a
physical space separate from the one involved in our perception. For this
he had two main motives, which —if we follow critical arguments by P.
F. Strawson and others — do not fit very comfortably together. First, there
is the point I have already discussed: that we apply a full—blown
representational argument to colours and smells, but draw back on the
brink of applying a similar rigour to space and time. Without really
saying why, Kant found this privileged position of space and time
inelegant, and urged that the representational argument be pushed to its
obvious conclusion. Arguing in this manner Kant poses as an empiricist
who wants to make empiricism more rigorous, just as Berkeley had
poured scorn on Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary
qualities. Like Berkeley, Kant criticizes the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities as ‘ ‘merely empirical”.
This is Kant as a wolf in the empiricist fold, devouring the sheep on the
pretext that a few less animals will make the flock stronger. Or, to change
the metaphor, he is throwing out the baby to keep the bathwater clean.
This inspired benevolence has not on the whole had a very good reception
from scientists at their bench, who are distressingly tolerant of possible
logical flaws in their outlook provided they carry on getting good results,
and who tend to react with gross ingratitude to offers of assistance from
the like of Kant and Berkeley. But Kant had a much more powerful
reason for his theory than a desire to make empiricism self-consistent,
and here his thinking has had much greater influence, if no more ultimate
success. This was his conception of geometry, an account of which will
take us to the heart of the present problem.
When we are taught Euclidean geometry in school (at least, as it used
Phenomenal Space 183
to be taught) we are offered one or more “proofs” of Pythagoras’
theorem, which purports to be a metrical statement about triangles,
namely, that the square of the length of the hypotenuse of a right-angled
triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides. If we
now go out into the field and carefully construct a right—angled triangle,
we shall find, within the limits of experimental error, that the
Pythagorean metric adequately summarizes the results of our real
measurements. This agreement between theory and observation is
amazing. Kant, at any rate, found it simply staggering. On the face of it,
unaided reason has enabled us to predict the results of real measurement,
carried out on physical objects. Kant called reasoning of this kind a priori
synthetic: a priori because it does not seem to depend on previous
experience, and synthetic because it is about facts, not about tautologies.
Kant’s philosophy of space and time is concerned with the problem of
how such reasoning is possible.
Without going into the details, which are forbiddingly complex, his
answer was once again that space and time are phenomenal: but now
much more fundamentally so than the level on which colours and smells
are phenomenal. We can imagine experiencing a world in which colours
and smell are absent; but (according to Kant) there is no form of
experience intelligible to ourselves that does not involve space and time.
There are thus certain truths which could be stated to hold for experience
even before we have the relevant experience: they are the minimum
conditions for any experience whatsoever. This has some analogies to the
Socratic method of showing that we have innate ideas of geometry, but
with an important difference; for Kant it is not merely a matter of
demonstrating that we are, as a fact, born with certain innate ideas of
space —the important point is that without just these ideas we should, as
experiencing beings, never have been born at all.
It may seem a long way from these general considerations to Euclidean
geometry in particular, and indeed it is too far, for Kant never shows
beyond the utmost generalities how a derivation of Euclidean geometry
might be managed according to his principles. It is now generally held
that his effort was doomed in any case, because other geometries have
been discovered that are at least as self-consistent logically as the Euclidean
variety (see below).
Nevertheless, a revisionist version of Kant’s claim has been claimed in
184 M. J. Morgan
recent years which depends upon the “two—spaces” concept. This is not
really a Kantian notion at all, for to distinguish between a phenomenal
space and a physical one is to abandon the basis of Kant’s philosophy
entirely. However, Strawson has suggested that while Kant is clearly
wrong in claiming that we know Euclidean geometry to be true a priori
for physical space, he may none the less be correct in saying that is true a
prion‘ of a purely phenomenal space:
If we can make sense of this notion of a phenomenal interpretation for Euclidean
geometry then perhaps Kant’s theory of pure intuition can be seen, at least up
to a point, as a perfectly reasonable philosophical account of it. To bring out
the status of the propositions of such a geometry, it is best to take an
example. Consider the pro- position that not more than one straight line can be
drawn between any two points. The natural way to satisfy ourselves of the truth
of this axiom of phenomenal geometry is to consider an actual or an imagined
figure. When we do this, it becomes evident that we cannot, either in
imagination or on paper, give ourselves a picture such that we are prepared to
say of it both that it shows two distinct straight lines and that it shows both
these lines as drawn through the same two points. (P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of
Sense, pp. 282-3.)
This is a very strong claim indeed for the existence of a purely
phenomenal space. Strawson is claiming not merely that we might be able
to make sense of such a concept, but that we could describe phenomenal
space as having a geometry all of its own. On this theory, the very strong
intuitive appeal of Euclidean geometry is to be explained by its being the
geometry that describes such things as phenomenal straight lines and
circles. The theory makes no claims about the proper geometry of
physical space. It would not be worrying, on this account, if physical
triangles were found to have angle sums greater than two right angles:
phenomenal triangles could still be Euclidean. This is a “two spaces”
doctrine with a vengeance.
I have tried to explain in detail elsewhere‘ why I do not think that this
idea of a phenomenal geometry will work. The main problem can be best
brought out by considering first of all how theories of physical space and
geometry have progressed during the last few hundred years. We have
already seen that a remarkable feature of Euclidean geometry is that it
appears to make metrical assertions about figures, as in the case of
Pythagoras’ theorem. Obviously the origin of the metrical aspects must
be buried somewhere in the axioms, and in fact Pythagoras’ theorem
depends upon Euclid’s 5th Axiom, the famous “parallel axiom”: “Given
three straight lines p, q, r one of which p intersects the other two, then if
Phenomenal Space 185
the sum of the interior angles of intersection on the same side of p is less
than two right angles, then if r and q are produced indefinitely they will
meet on that side of p. ” It is the presence of the two right angles in this
axiom that carries the metrical burden of the whole geometry. It is
possible to do without the parallel axiom, but only if we are prepared to
substitute a statement that would normally be a theorem, such as “There
exists a single triangle with the angle sum of two right angles.”
In 1773 the Jesuit priest Saccheri tried replacing the angle sum of two
right angles by various alternatives, and attempted to show that the
resulting geometries were not self-consistent. He failed, and the idea at
length became established that several self-consistent geometries exist.
This was not finally established with certainty until Klein found a method
of mapping each theorem of a non—Euclidean geometry on to a
corresponding theorem in Euclidean geometry. If this can be done, the
non—Euclidean geometry must be at least as self-consistent as the
Euclidean geometry. Klein’s method was roughly as follows. Euclidean
geometry makes reference to a number of “primitive elements” such as
“straight line” and “intersection”. In a formal statement of the
geometry these elements can be replaced by symbols. The same can be
done for the non-Euclidean geometry using a different set of symbols.
Such axiomatic systems are said to be “uninterpreted” in the sense that
the primitive elements have not yet been co—ordinated with points, lines
and so on. Let us now interpret the elements of a non—Euclidean
geometry by relating them to the interpreted elements of Euclidean
geometry, such as “straight line”, “line on the surface of a sphere” and
so on. We shall now have a set of axioms that could be said to be true or
false in Euclidean geometry. The question is whether a suitable
interpretation can be found such that all these interpreted axioms would
be true in Euclidean geometry. Klein showed that such an interpretation
was possible, and in fact several are now known to exist.
For example, suppose that there is a figure T in the non-Euclidean
geometry, composed of three L’s, the angle sum of which is greater than
two right angles. If we co-ordinate Twith a Euclidean “triangle” and L
with a Euclidean “straight line” we have an inconsistency. But if we
adopt the mapping T; “spherical triangle” and L E “shortest distance
between two points on the surface of a sphere” there is no inconsistency.
If, given this mapping, no further inconsistency turns up we may
conclude that our new geometry is as self-consistent as the Euclidean.
186 M. J. Morgan
Another approach is to interpret the primitive elements arithmetically,
and to show that an interpretation is possible at least as consistent as
arithmetic itself. This was done by David Hilbert.
We can now take the argument a stage further. Even the interpreted
elements of a geometry, such as “straight line”, are not yet interpreted in
a physical sense. Before we can apply a geometry to physical
measurement we have to decide on interpretations like: “straight
line” E “path of light ray in empty space”. Until we have done this we
have no right to speak of one geometry as more or less true than any other.
If we took a Euclidean “straight line” to mean the shortest distance
between two points on the surface of the earth, we should find as a matter
of fact that it is not true, in the sense that triangles would have angle sums
greater than two right angles. Whether it is true of the paths of light rays
in empty space is a matter of experimental investigation. Einstein put this
very clearly as follows:
For example, Euclidean geometry considered as a mathematical system, is a mere
play with empty concepts (straight lines, planes, points, etc., are mere
“fancies”). If, however, one adds that the straight line be replaced by a rigid
rod, geometry is transformed into a physical theory. A theorem, like that of
Pythagoras, then joins a reference to reality.
I hope it can be seen without much further elaboration that the idea of
a purely phenomenal geometry is highly suspect.‘ Suppose I ask you to
imagine a triangle and then I wish to find out whether the sum of the
angles of this phenomenal figure is 180 degrees. Since this figure is purely
phenomenal there is no measurement 1 can carry out on it. My only
recourse is to ask you, the imager, to measure it for me. You may even
feel that you can do this, and reply “two right angles”. But what has
been established here? If I agree with your answer, all that has been
established is that we use the words “triangle”, “straight lines” and
“two right angles” in the same way. Consider what we should say if
someone obstinately proclaimed that their phenomenal triangles had
angle sums greater than two right angles; or, worse, that he could imagine
five different lines in the same plane passing through a point and none of
them intersecting a sixth line in that plane. His statement could be true of
our curves but not of our lines. How do we know that he is talking about
our lines rather than our curves? Concluding that our eccentric has a nonEuclidean phenomenal geometry would be just like saying that the
Phenomenal Space 187
geometry of a sausage is non—Euclidean. If we decide that lines drawn at
right angles to the long axis of the sausage are straight, then all “straight
lines” on the sausage are parallel and its geometry is indeed nonEuclidean. But Euclidean descriptions of sausages are not beyond our
power if we adopt a different definition.
It may be objected that eccentrics of the kind just described do not
crop up in reality, and that we all know perfectly well what a phenomenal
straight line is. Indeed we do, and this is precisely because we have been
taught to use the word by other people. It can hardly be maintained even
by the most convinced nativist that we are born with an association
between a phenomenal straight line and the verbal utterance “straight
line”. We are taught it by being shown physical straight lines. A mother
cannot say to her child: “Imagine a straight line. Now this is what we
adults call a straight line.” Nor is it any improvement to say: “Imagine
the shortest distance between two points: this is called a straight line.”
For the term “shortest” has not yet been defined, nor can it be without
escaping if only momentarily from the phenomenal domain.
Thus any phenomenal geometry must be entirely parasitic upon
physical geometry. 1 do not see how it can make sense to speak of
different geometries for physical and phenomenal triangles. Even if there
were such things as phenomenal triangles we could only learn to call them
triangles by being presented with real triangles. We have a set of rules
determining which kinds of line drawings shall be called triangles. They
must, for example, be drawn with straight edges, not curves. If we show
these to people they are simply not allowed to say: “This gives rise to a
phenomenal square.” For what then should a square be called?
Equally intractable difficulties arise when one considers congruence
operations, and what they might mean in a purely phenomenal domain.
Superficially it looks as if the congruence relation “the same length as”
can be replaced in phenomenal geometry by “looking the same length
as”. I think I have said enough to indicate the broad lines on which this
can be attacked, but the argument is lengthy and I would refer the reader
who thinks this point important to a previous article.‘
If we abandon the notion of a phenomenal geometry, as I think we
must, what other properties could phenomenal space have to qualify as
being space—like? If we ask what are the properties possessed by physical
space and try to find counterparts in the phenomenal domain we shall
138 M. J. Morgan
soon see that phenomenal space is extremely impoverished. Of course,
arguments still rage about whether physical space is meaningfully
described as having properties at all. “Relativists” continue to attempt
the replacement of all space-properties by the properties of fields and
relations between bodies. Nevertheless, both relative and absolute
theories of physical space will have to cope, as Hinckfuss points out, with
properties like the following:
Electrical, optical, and electromagnetic properties of space
(i) Empty space is a poor conductor.
(ii) The magnetic permeability of empty space is 471 X 10'7 henrys per
metre.
(iii) The permittivity of empty space is 8.55 X 10‘ 12 farads per metre.
(iv) The speed of light in empty space is 2.9978 X 108 metres per second.
(v) Empty space is transparent.
I cannot say with confidence whether or not empty phenomenal space
is transparent, still less what its permeability might be. One is reminded of
a remark by Meyerson: “The real appears to us a fact — a datum. Now,
reason would like to consider it as necessary. Hence the extravagant
attempts to reduce it to space, namely to nothingness. . . .” If this
applies to physical space, how much more does it apply to phenomenal
space, the chief distinguishing feature of which seems to be that it has no
properties whatsoever.
It may seem somewhat perverse to deny the existence of a phenomenal
space so thoroughly. I am aware that it is in a sense setting up a straw
man to argue that phenomenal space has no metric and no properties
corresponding to the physical space. After all, no one has ever really
supposed that we can measure phenomenal distances in feet or microns.
There are weaker versions of the representational hypothesis than these I
have discussed, and they can very probably be phrased in an entirely
acceptable form. Of course, I do not wish to deny that we have a representation of spatial relations; for example, in the sense that as I look out
of my window I see a line of trees as further away from me than the lawn.
What this does not mean, however, is that I somehow measure the
distance between phenomenal trees and lawns in a phenomenal space.
The perceived space between trees and lawn, I am suggesting, should not
be thought of as having any existence prior to the judgement of the
Phenomenal Space 189
distance. And this judgement refers to the distance between the real trees
and lawn, not to some special and separate phenomenal distance between
them. Our perceived space is constituted by perceptual judgements of
angle and distance, rather than existing prior to these perceptions and
permitting them to be made?
I began this essay with some examples and would like to conclude with
them also. Shepard and Cooper’s subjects describe themselves as carrying
out their task by “mental rotation’ ’. The proper description of what they
were doing, I suggest, is that they were imagining a rotation—not that
they were rotating an image. Shepard and Cooper are actually very
careful to say that “mental rotation” does not imply the rotation of
anything. The advantage of the description “imagining a rotation” is
that it does not imply that any actual rotation occurred, thus obviating
the need for a space in which something might rotate; the phrase
“rotating an image”, on the other hand, implies that something was
actually rotated, with all the difficulties this brings in its wake. In the
Pulfrich Pendulum the target is seen as rotating in an ellipse; this does not
mean that the observer is inspecting a phenomenal target that is actually
moving elliptically. There are possible advantages here in Gregory’s
“hypothesis” terminology for perceptions. The ellipse is the observer’s
hypothesis or judgement of the pendulum’s path; it is not a geometric
description of some special phenomenal kind of trajectory. Hypotheses
are not themselves elliptical or straight any more than judgements are,
and they are about physical events in physical space, not about a separate
phenomenal domain.
REFERENCES
1. N. Bolton (Ed.), The two spaces, in Philosophical Problems in Psychology,
Methuen, in press.
2. See Merleau—Ponty’s strictures on “container” space in The Phenomenology of
Perception.
190 M. J. Morgan
Discussion
VESEY:
Kant held that spatial properties are entirely phenomenal. Like you I think he
was wrong. But my reason for thinking him wrong is one which brings me into
conflict with you on something else. My reason is a very general one about the
conditions of meaningful discourse. I hold that for the remark “X looks ø”,
where X is some object and ø is some property, to be meaningful, “X is ø” must
be meaningful. There must be an accepted practice with “X is ø‘ which we cotton
on to when we are learning to talk, and by refer- ence to which it can be
settled whether or not we are using the term “ø” correctly. Only then can it be
allowed that we know what we are talking about when we say “X looks ø”.
Some of the things you said — for instance, about “straight" and a brick—led me
to think you would agree with me about this. But then, if I’m not mistaken, you
went on to contrast spatial properties with properties like colour and smell—as
though a word like “blue” could have an entirely phenomenal sense. Do you really
think this?
D. E. Broadbent once wrote (Behaviour, London, 196]):
When a man sees blue, his experience is intensely real to him, but the essence
of it cannot be communicated. All he can do is to say a word which labels that
experience, so that he can tell other people whether or not some fresh situation
gives him this same quality of awareness. No man can tell whether another is
really feeling the same as he does himself when he looks at a colour.
Personally I think this is bad philosophy, rather than good psychology. What do
you think?
MORGAN:
We seem to be in close agreement about “phenomenal” space. My purpose was to
argue that, for example, there was no sense in which a line could be said to
“look” straight unless there were agreed ways of showing that a line is
straight. I think perhaps I wanted to go a little further than this, and to
suggest that when we say a line “looks” straight we are actually more or less
covertly carrying out exactly the same operations as we should on a real line.
I’d be interested to know how you see this claim as relating to your logical
argument.
Concerning colour and other “secondary qualities" we probably also agree;
although I hesitate to dismiss Broadbent’s views as “bad amateur philosophy”,
since he is only expressing a view that has been held by the overwhelming
majority of scientists since the seventeenth century. Confusion may have arisen
in my chapter because I was trying to explain Kant’s point of view (not mine)
that while colour and space are both phenomenal, they differ in that colour is
subjective (a property entirely of the perceiver) while space is, in the weird
terminology peculiar to Kant, a priori objective, in that it refers necessarily
to objects “outside" the observer. Kant seems to have swallowed the received
doctrine that colour words are names for wavelengths, or for mysterious inner
experiences aroused in some unknowable manner by wavelengths. My own View is
that a colour word is a name for a property shared by a particular class of
objects in the world; the sensations and emotions aroused in us by an instance
of such a property have to do with our experience of the whole object class.
Even so-called “colour-blind” people, who have great difficulty in
distinguishing between objects on the basis of wavelength information alone,
frequently
Phenomenal Space 191
use colour words more or less correctly. This is presumably because they have
learned the limits of class membership without too much reliance on wavelength
information—in which case it seems to me mistaken to call them “colour—blind”.
I believe it was Iris Murdoch who justified a painter’s saying to a novitiate
“you _don’t understand Red". Perhaps physiologists find colours mysterious and
incommunicable because they have not done the right sort of work to understand
them, and have scant respect for the patient endeavours of the phenomenologists,
who have shown that colours have different “weights”, “distances” and so on. I
don’t know how to remedy this real lack of communication.
VESEY:
On your first point —there are different senses of “looks”: I may say that a
coin looks elliptical if seen at an acute angle, meaning by this that if I were
to trace its outline on a transparent screen between the coin and my eye, at
right angles to the line of vision, the tracing would be elliptical. In this
sense of “looks”, the look is determined by the laws of perspective. Again, I
may say that the lines in the Muller—Lyer figure look unequal. In that case the
look has nothing to do with perspective. What I mean is that on looking at the
figure I would judge the lines to be unequal if I didn’t know better. Perhaps
your remark about our “more or less covertly carrying out exactly the same
operations as we should on a real line” can be interpreted to cover both these
senses of “looks”. My own point IS that, in both of them, “looks” makes sense
only because “is” would make sense.
On your second point, about what I called “bad philosophy" being scientific
orthodoxy, perhaps I should make my own position a bit clearer. There is the
everyday world in which there are flashes of lightning, colours and so on. And
there is the scientific world in which there are discharges of electricity,
wavelengths and so on. For certain purposes (explanation, prediction, control)
the scientific world has priority. For certain other purposes (including
knowledge of the scientific world!) the everyday world has priority. What I
regard as philosophically bad is to suppose that the question “Which world is
prior?” has some meaning tout court, that is, without any specification of
purpose. For the same reason it is bad philosophy to ask “Which is the real one,
the everyday world or the scientific world?” without specifying one’s criteria
of reality. Once the unqualified “Which is real?" question has been allowed, the
scientist feels professionally committed to giving it the answer “The scientific
world", and so to saying that the everyday world is unreal. Then, when questions
about sensible colours are raised, he has to say that, since they are not needed
for explanatory purposes in the scientific world, they exist only in the other
one, the one he has had to dismiss as “unreal”. Or, as he is inclined to put it,
colours are “only subjective”. The fact that philosophers and scientists have
been saying this sort of thing for thousands of years does not make it either
good philosophy or good science. But I suspect, from what you say, that we are
in agreement on this.
Afterword to the Conference: The
Prospects for Consciousness Research
8. D. JOSEPHSON
Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge
In the conference recorded in these Proceedings a group of scientists
discussed various topics concerned with conscious experience and the
relationship of conscious experience to the physical world. What exactly
are we doing when we discuss conscious experience, and what are the
future prospects for research in this area? These are questions I should
like to explore in this concluding chapter.
To some extent scientific inquiry is just an extension of an activity
which occurs naturally in everyday life. Both involve learning about the
world in order to be able to make successful predictions about it, and in
order to be able to carry out such actions as will have desirable outcomes.
One of the principal differences between them is that the processes of
science are more self—conscious and in a certain sense more public. In
science hypotheses are deliberately stated, and steps are taken to test
them, using both experimental methods and intellectual analysis. By these
criteria, the papers presented in this conference are scientific in character,
in comparison with general conversation on the same topics by a
randomly chosen group of people. However, conscious experience is a
field of inquiry in which application of the usual methods and techniques
of science is particularly difficult. Two difficulties in particular are worth
discussing in some detail. One of these is that conscious experience is
personal in nature, and hence not open to public inspection, and the
other is the problem of suitably describing conscious experience.
The first difficulty is one which in practice we have even with
conventional scientific experiments. While it is true that a certain
proportion of experiments are mechanized by using chart recordings or
photography, in other cases readings are taken directly by the individual
193
194 B. D. Josephson
experimenter, and in such cases the general scientific community does not
have direct access to the original experiment itself. Acceptance of such
results is dependent upon the reputation of the experimenter and the
repeatability of the results by other people. In such a situation we can
never have an exact repetition of an experiment, but only a close
approximation to it, and in, for example, psychological experiments it is
only possible to reproduce a situation which is qualitatively the same.
This does not prevent general conclusions from being drawn (a good
illustration being the case of linguistics; it is possible to infer grammatical
rules from a collection of utterances in which no two speakers are talking
about the same thing). In the light of these remarks, the drawing of
general conclusions about conscious experiences may not be an
impossible task.
If we want to consider conclusions of a reasonably precise nature about
conscious experience, we must consider the question of what kind of
description of conscious experience is to be used. There seem to be three
main possibilities. Firstly, there are the verbal descriptions given by the
conscious subject himself. Secondly, there is the possibility of measuring
physiological or behavioural correlates to conscious experience. And
finally, there is the more remote but also more exciting possibility that
some future formulation of physics may describe inner experiences as
well as the external world, and hence provide its own way of quantifying
subjective experience.
I shall deal fairly briefly with the first two possibilities. With the first
possibility we are dealing with the use of language to describe experiences.
The fact that language can be used at all must imply similarities between
the experiences of different people, and furthermore, since words are
used to distinguish between different possibilities, must imply that there
are particular differences between conscious experiences that we can be
trained to notice and attach linguistic labels to. To this extent language
constitutes a kind of measuring instrument, though an imprecise one. It
may be important to note that, since the meanings of the words are tied to
the conscious experiences, for one person to understand another’s
description fully it may be necessary for him to have had a similar kind of
experience, a problem to which Charles Tart has drawn attention.‘ On
the other hand, it may be possible to understand strange experiences on
the basis of a mathematical model, in the same way that we can
Afterward to the Conference 195
understand curved spaces or multi-dirnensional spaces beyond our own
experience mathematically.
Let us turn now to the second possibility. It may be possible to find
physiological correlates to conscious experience, for example the EEG. If
this could be done, the result would be to add precision to the verbal
description. Similarly, there might be definite behavioural changes
associated with a conscious experience, a familiar example being the
effects of alcohol intoxication. Another example would be the more
subtle changes following experience of the meditative state, involving for
example improvements related to attention, discrimination and value
judgements.
So far we have been concerned with the study of conscious experience
at a purely phenomenological level. What is the possibility that a more
quantitative, mathematical theory might be feasible? One way in which
this might come about is through an extension of existing physical theory.
The existing basic theory of physics, quantum mechanics, while in one
sense a good description of nature is, from a different viewpoint, highly
inadequate. I am referring not to the well-known difficulty that its
predictions are statistical in character, but to the fact that it is not
entirely
clear how it is to be applied to the real world. The situation is that while
we understand how the theory can be confirmed, in terms of controlled
experiment, there is no well-defined prescription for how predictions can
be made in a general uncontrolled situation, where the knowledge of the
state of the system does not necessarily take the form required to apply
the quantum theory, i.e. measurement of a physical quantity. Is it the
situation that inner observation as well as observation of the external
world should count as a quantum—mechanical measurement, and if so,
what is it a measurement of? The fact that quantum theory is a theory of
what can be deduced from observation, as much as it is one of what
exists, seems to force such matters upon our attention; if we exclude such
matters we cannot legitimately regard quantum mechanics as a
comprehensive theory.
I should like, finally, to consider in this light the talk given in this
conference by Mrs. E. M. Noakes,* to which I shall give more emphasis
* The Editors reluctantly agreed to a request ‘by a number of participants that
Mrs. Noakes’s paper should not appear in these proceedings, on the grounds that
its methodology lay outside the paradigm of science as perceived by these
participants.
196 B. D. Josephson
than normal on account of it not being available for these Proceedings.
In her talk, based on a particular mystical tradition, she described various
entities which are supposed to have important effects in the life of an
individual human being. An example given was the so—called “astral
body”, i.e. the collection of the feelings and emotions of the individual
concerned. Now while the average scientist might recoil at even the
mention of a term such as “astral body”, it must be admitted that
feelings and emotions form a relatively unchanging pan of an
individual’s make—up, and that furthermore they do have well-defined
effects on the world publicly observable (through the agency of the
individual’s nervous system, presumably). Following along this line of
thought, we can argue that awareness of feelings and emotions, or other
inner experiences, constitutes an observation of the world, which may
later have publicly observable effects. If we were to try to say instead that
all the physics is to be described in terms of the properties of neurones
and synapses, we should run into the practical difficulty that we are not
able to observe the details required in order to make prediction (perhaps
not even in principle, in a living being) in the way that we can observe
feelings and emotions. This argument again suggests the necessity of
including inner experience within the subject matter of physics.
I cannot detail here the remaining subtler entities and processes to
which Mrs. Noakes made reference in her talk. I can only conclude by
making the point that while mystical experience is not at the moment
considered by the majority of scientists to be a matter worthy of scientific
attention, this is to some extent purely an arbitrary decision. The desire to
probe more deeply into the interaction between man and the world in
which he exists will ultimately lead to the systematic study of the mystical
experience and to its incorporation into science.
REFERENCE
1. Charles T. Tart, States of Consciousness, Dutton, New York, 1975, Chaps. 15
and 16.
List of Participants
(Contributors of papers are indicated by an asterisk)
*Professor H. B. Barlow, The Physiological Laboratory, University of
Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 3EG.
Dr. E. W. Bastin, Pond Meadow, West Wickham, Cambs. .
Professor J. W. S. Cassels, Department of Pure Mathematics and
Mathematical Statistics, 16 Mill Lane, Cambridge.
Professor Sir Alan Cottrell, The Master’s Lodge, Jesus College, Cambridge.
Professor 0. R. Frisch, Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 1TQ. _
*Professor R. L. Gregory, Brain and Perception Laboratory, Medical
School, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1TD.
Dr. J. R. Henderson, Cavendish Laboratory, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 OHE.
*Dr. N. K. Humphrey, Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour, University
of Cambridge, Madingley, Cambridge CB3 8AA. .
*Professor B. D. Josephson, Cavendish Laboratory, Madingley Road,
Cambridge CB3 OHE.
Dr. A. J. Leggett, Department of Physics, Sussex University, Brighton
BN1 9QG. _
*Professor H. C. Longuet-Higgins, Department of Experimental Psychology, Sussex University, Brighton BN1 9QG.
*Professor D. M. MacKay, Department of Communication and Neuroscience, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 SBG.
*Dr. M. J. Morgan, South Road, University of Durham, Durham
DH1 3LE.
*Mrs. E. M. Noakes, Sidmouth House, Sidmouth, Devon EX10 8ST.
197
198 List of Participants
*Mrs. S. Padfield, Pond Meadow, West Wickham, Cambs.
*Dr. V. S. Ramachandran, Trinity College, Cambridge CB2 ITQ.
*Professor Sir Martin Roth, Department of Psychiatry, University of
Cambridge, Cambridge CB2 IEL.
*Professor G. Vesey, Department of Philosophy, Open University, Milton
Keynes MK7 6AA.
Dr. P. Whittle, Psychological Laboratory, Downing Street, Cambridge.
Prof. O. L. Zangwill, Department of Experimental Psychology, Downing
Street, Cambridge.
Name Index
Armstrong, D. M. 136
Barlow, H. B. 4
Bastin, E. W. 169
Bell, J. S. 120
Brentano, Franz 20, 22
Broadbent, D. E. 190
Bronowski, J. 11
Chardin,Teilhard de vii
Chomsky. N. 50
Cooper 178. 189
Craik. Kenneth 42. 57
Descartes, R. 20, 22, 48, 140
Eccles, Sir John, 40-1, 102, 110, 136, 140-1
Einstein, A. 186
Freud, S. 86, 127
Gregory, R. L. 179, 189
Heisenberg, W. 51
Helmholtz, H. L. F. von 39, 181
Herbert, B. 165
Hilbert, D. 186
Hinckfuss 188
Hume, David 34, 159
Humphrey, N. K. 5, 13
James, William 23, 38-41, 181
Jaspers, K. 133
Jennings, H. S. 140
Josephson, B. D. 8,103
Kant, I, 182-4, 190
Kenny, A. 10, 92-3
K1ejn, F. 135
Külpe, Oswald 24
Lorenz, Konrad 142
Lotze, Hermann 24
MacKay, D. M. 14, 140
MacMurray, John 105
Mahesh Yogi, Maharishi 119
Malcolm, Norman 25
Maxwell, G. 161
Meyerson 188
Mill, John Stuart 77
Monod, Jacques vii—viii
Moore, G. E. 22-3
Noakes, E. M. 171,195
Noyes, P. 169
Parfit, D. 156
Palanjali M. 158
Popper, Sir Karl 2-7, 40-1, 89, 136
Puccetti R. 106
199
200 Name /ndex
Romanes, George John 43-4
RusseIl,Bertrand 15
Sartre, Jean—Paul 11
Schrodinger, E. 144
Shepard 178, 189
Skinner, B. F. 25, 60
Smart, J. J. C. 48
Sperry, R. W. 105, 108-9, 155
Stapp, H. P. 120
Strawson, P. F. 148, 182, 184
Sussman, G. J. 53
Tart, Charles T. 194
Weiskrantz, L. 71-4
Williams, Bernard 147
Wisdom, John 22
Wittgenstein, L. 24-6, 49, 69, 124, 133, 158
Wundt, Wilhelm 24
Subject Index
The letter D after a page number denotes a discussion comment.
Agent 96-7, 101, 105, 145
Anaesthetics 31, 97
Arousal 124, 128
Artificial intelligence 46-7, 50-1, 53D
Astral body 196
Attention 39, 123
Autism 87
Behaviour and state of consciousness 195
Blindness, cortical 72-3, 76D
Blindsight 71-4, 76D
Brain and mind see Mind -brain relationship
Brain stem 128
Cause 6-7, 34-6, 168
Choice see Decision
Combinatorial methods 169
Communication channel 175D
Communication and consciousness Ch. 5,
4-5, 82-5, 91-2D, 109-11
Concepts 59-61, 78—9D
Conscious agent 96-7, 101, 145
Conscious experience Ch. 8, Ch. 11
9-14,51,69,84,96,115,118-19,143
167
Consciousness (see also Mind)
and behaviour 195
as causal agent 32-4, 38-43, 46-7,
91D, 128
and communication Ch. 5, 4-5, 82-5,
91,92D, 109-11
definition 50, 53D, 143
evolution of 68-71, 88-90
function of 33, 68-71. 76--7D, 79-80D,
91-4D
gain and loss 31,49,101
in machine 46-7, 108, 136
possible paranormality of 32-4
and physics Ch. 3, 115, 119, 193-6
and physiology 195
recognition of 49, 123
relevance of 7, 31,49
and social interactions Ch. 4, Ch. 5, 4-6, 62, 82
variations in Ch. 8, 105
Continuity, biological 153-4, 160-1
Corpus callosum 105, 155-6
Creativity 117
Decision 9,117
Delirium tremens 130-1
Depersonalization 133-5
Depression 131
Determinism 15,100-1
Dialogue 109-11
internal 104
Diencephalon 105
Direct realism 38
Dreaming 66-7
Dualism (Cartesian) 20, 41, 48D, 51, 180
(see also Mind—body relation)
Einstein-Rosen—Podolsky paradox 120
Electroencephalogram 128,195
Emotions 30D, 94D, 127, 130-2, 196
Empirical identity 8, 148
Epileptic automatism 128
Epiphenomenalism 91D,139
Evaluation 102-5, 117
Evolution 4-13, 33, 68-71, 88, 169
Existential identity 9, 147-8
Fatalism 11
Free will 9-14
Frontal lobes 12, 105
Future 10, 57,85,167, 168
Geometry and subjective experience 182-8
Goal-setting mechanisms 46, 106-7
Gregariousness 4, 88-90
Hallucinations 131-2
Homunculus 51, 53D
Hypnotism 67
Hypothalamus 105, 129
I see Self
I—story 96, 106, 143-4
I-thou relationship 109-10, 162-3D (see
also Self and others)
Identity
empirical 8, 148
existential 9, 147-8 (see also Personal
identity)
hypothesis (mind-brain) 35-6, 43-7,
48D, 91D
ontological 9,147-8
personal Ch.9, 171
of structure 168
of subject and object 167, 175D
Ideology 59-61, 64
Illusions 41, 179
Improvement (of skills) 1 17-18
Indeterminacy 9, 98-101
Information 50, 103-4, 106, 147, 149
Inner observation 21-8, 29D (see also
Introspection)
Intelligence 118
Intentionality 21,23
Intentions 85
Internal dialogue 104
Internal models see Mental models
Introspection Ch. 4, 30D, 59, 61, 80D, 82,
92—3D, 135-6 (see also Inner
observation)
Intuition 62, 94
Knowledge Ch. 4, 21, 23-4, 53D, 98-101
Korsakov syndrome 126, 131
Language 26-8, 29-30D, 60, 69, 83, 104,
116, 190D, 194
Local signs 24
Machine consciousness 45-7, 108, 136
Magnet model of introspection 69-70
Mania 131
Master—slave analogy 36-8
Meaning 26-7, 77—9D, 118
Meditation 195
Medulla 129
Memory 49, 126-8, 131-2, 167-9
Mental models Ch. 4, 42, 83-5, 180
Mental rotation 179, 189
Mental space Ch. 11
Mentality 20-3
Mid-brain 129
Mind—body relation Ch. 2, 14, 38-47
48D,101-3,134—5,142—5, 161,171
(see also Dualism, Mind-brain relation)
Mind-brain relation Ch. 2, 3, 6, 32_
35-47, 48D, 85-6, 97-8, 103, 135-6
(see also Mind—body relation)
Mind control 89
Mind and matter 20, 41, 48D, 51
Mind-substance analogy 45-6, 103
Models, mental Ch. 4, 42, 83-5, 180
Mysticism 120D, 195-6
Natural selection 6, 33, 64, 92—4D
Nature's trick 80D, 88-90
Objective reality 97, 144-5
Observation 30D, 50-1, 115, 195-6
Ontological identity 9, 147
Paradigm viii, 8, 196
Parallelism, mind-brain 4, 36-8
Paranormal phenomena see Psychic
phenomena
Paranormality of consciousness, possible
32-4
Parental manipulation 65-6
Parsimony as criterion 103, 114D
Past, present and future 168
Perception Ch. 11, 21-2, 97, 129-31, 181
Personal existence Ch. 9, 171
Personal identity Ch. 9, 171
Personal uniqueness 140-2
Phenomenal object 178
Phenomenal space Ch. 11
Physical world (reality) 50, 97, 99
Physics and consciousness Ch. 3, 115,
119, 193-6
Play 64-5
Pons 129
Positional knowledge 23-4, 72
Privacy of subjective experience Ch. 1,
22-8, 132-3
Privileged access 23, 132, 145
Psychic phenomena Ch. 9, 33, 42-3, 52
Psychokinesis 165-7, 171, 174-5
Psychological skills and survival 70
Psychological verbs 20, 22-3, 25-8
Psychometry 167, 171
Psychopathology Ch. 8
Pulfrich pendulum 178
Purpose vii, 3
Quantum mechanics 50, 120D, 195
Realism, direct 38
Reality Ch. 8, 57-8, 99
Reflection 21-8 (see also Inner
observation, lntrospection)
Repression 86, 127
Reticular activating system 128
Rules, knowledge of 92—3D
Subject /ndex 203
Schizophrenia 125, 132
Self-awareness 61-2, 84, 104, 147 (see
also Self-consciousness)
Self-consciousness Ch. 4, 49-51, 61, 77D,
104,110, 132-4,139
Self, higher 77D
Self-knowledge see Self awareness,
Self-consciousness
Self and others 5, 25, 82-90, 147, 162—3D
Self-testimony 25, 29D
Senile dementia 124-6
Sensation(s) 21-2, 48D, 71-3 (see also
Perception)
Social aspects Ch. 4, Ch. 5, 4-6
Space, mental Ch. 11
Space—time, location in 120D
Spatial knowledge Ch. 1 1, 72
Speech 83
Split brains 105-12, 154-7
Subject-object identity 167,175D
Subjective experience see Conscious
experience
Subjective experience, confusion with
perception 125, 132
Substance 45-6, 103
Supervisory system 91D, 102-4, 108-12,
140
Symbolization 45,47
Teleology vii
Temporal lobe 134
Twin thought—experiments 149-53,
162-3D
Uncertainty, Heisenbergian 9, 99
Unconscious mind 85-7
Unifying agency of self 139
Uniqueness, personal 140-2
Unity of mind 146
Value(s) viii, 12-13, 117
Voluntary action 9-12, 52, 116-17
Will 9-12, 39-40, 51-2, 61
Worlds 1, 2 and 3 (Popper) 2-7, 89 |
arXiv:2201.09663v5 [quant-ph] 3 Aug 20
Consciência e mecânica quântica:
uma abordagem filosófica
Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo
Centro de Lógica, Epistemologia e História da Ciência
Universidade Estadual de Campinas
Apoio: Processo no 2021/11381-1, Fundação de Amparo
à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)
Livro no prelo na Editora NEL
Coleção Pontos de Partida
Versão atual: 5 de agosto de 2022
https://nel.ufsc.br/pontos-de-partida
Sumário
Introdução: Um problema filosófico na física
1
8
Questões de fundamento
13
1.1 O princípio da indeterminação . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 A complementaridade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3 Uma interpretação fragmentada . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2 Visões de mundo em conflito
2.1 As ontologias da ciência e a ontologia do mundo . .
2.2 A realidade da mecânica quântica . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 À procura da Realidade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54
56
60
70
3 A consciência colapsa
86
3.1 Medição: clássica e quântica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 O problema da medição . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.1 A interpretação da consciência . . . . . . . . 93
3.2.2 O problema ontológico . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.2.3 O problema metafísico . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.2.4 Metafísicas da consciência quântica . . . . . 115
3.3 Outras interpretações . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.4 Uma escolha filosófica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4 Novos horizontes
149
4.1 Quem precisa de consciência? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
1
4.2
Consciência como processo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5 Questões de formalismo
166
Referências bibliográficas
178
2
Agradecimentos
Este livro foi possível graças às contribuições das seguintes pessoas.
• Andrea Faggion, Décio Krause, Jonas Arenhart, e a turma de
Filosofia da Física de 2022, do Departamento de Filosofia da
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, pela leitura cuidadosa e comentários feitos a uma versão anterior do texto;
• Gilson Olegario da Silva pela ajuda na diagramação em LATEX;
• Helcio Felippe Jr. pela revisão do material, em especial o
apêndice;
• Jerzy Brzozowski pelo auxílio na editoração deste material;
• Maju Capelato pela linda arte da capa.
• Equipe do Grupo de Pesquisa em Lógica e Fundamentos da
Ciências e também do International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information pelas
intrigantes conversas sobre filosofia da mecânica quântica.
Muito obrigado!
3
Prefácio
Fruto de anos de pesquisa, este livro de introdução à filosofia da
mecânica quântica fornece uma base conceitual para os problemas centrais da mecânica quântica não-relativista, delineando o
papel da filosofia na discussão e aspectos históricos das soluções já propostas. Tento suprir uma deficiência de materiais em
português sobre o tema, pois se trata de uma discussão de ponta
na contemporaneidade e com escasso material em nossa língua
—motivo pelo qual todas as citações em inglês encontram-se em
tradução livre para o português.
Divido o livro em quatro capítulos principais e um apêndice
matemático. No primeiro capítulo, parto do ponto de vista da interpretação ortodoxa da mecânica quântica. Ainda que existam
vários modos de formulá-la, sempre que utilizar a nomenclatura
“mecânica quântica” neste livro, tenho em mente os pontos em
comum entre os autores Bohr e Heisenberg, comumente referida como “interpretação de Copenhague”. Nesse capítulo, procuro delinear definições precisas para os conceitos envolvidos
nos fundamentos dessa interpretação, enfatizando o papel central da noção de medição, bem como alguns aspectos gerais de
seus problemas filosóficos internos, a fim de prosseguirmos com
o debate mais geral nos capítulos seguintes. Exponho separadamente as formulações de Heisenberg e Bohr, considerados os
principais autores da interpretação ortodoxa e, em seguida, confronto os pontos de vista de ambos os autores, a fim de apresen4
tar com maior precisão o posicionamento ontológico de cada um
frente à noção de medição.
No segundo capítulo, enfatizo como a problemática em torno
da medição se insere no debate filosófico, especificamente numa
discussão ontológica. Para tanto, busco definições para o termo
“ontologia”, que são utilizadas ao longo deste livro. Em seguida,
analiso as críticas de Einstein à posição ortodoxa e o debate entre Einstein e Bohr, enfatizando o comprometimento ontológico
dos autores no que tange à noção de medição. Com isso, poderei
descrever com precisão ainda maior o ponto de vista de cada autor frente à interpretação da teoria quântica, bem como entender
como o problema da medição se insere no debate filosófico.
No terceiro capítulo, exploro algumas diferenças no conceito
de medição entre a física clássica e a teoria quântica. Procuro
expor a teoria da medição von Neumann, de modo a delinear
de forma clara o “problema da medição”. Enfatizo as interpretações lógicas e ontológicas de sua solução para o problema da
medição, que marca a introdução do conceito dualista de “consciência” na medição quântica, explicitando de que modo a noção
de “consciência” se insere na discussão filosófica como um problema ontológico.
Em seguida, analiso brevemente algumas das propostas
pouco abordadas na literatura especializada, que deram continuidade e extensão ontológica à formulação de von Neumann,
como a formulação de Ludwig Bass e proposta de Amit Goswami,
que utilizaram uma formulação monista para a noção de “consciência”. Também analiso muito brevemente algumas propostas
alternativas e críticas em relação às formulações tanto de von
Neumann quanto de Bohr, a título de amostragem, justamente
para ilustrar a pluralidade de interpretações à noção de “medição”.
No quarto capítulo, destaco a possibilidade de investigar a
ontologia da noção de “consciência”, relacionada à mecânica
5
quântica, a partir de um novo horizonte, a saber, sob a perspectiva ontológica de Alfred North Whitehead, abordando vários autores que consideram que a ontologia whiteheadiana é apropriada para entender conceitos de interpretação da mecânica quântica (entre eles, o próprio Whitehead).
Shimon Malin desenvolve uma concepção de “colapso” inspirada na ontologia dos processos de Whitehead, mas não aborda
a questão da consciência. Henry Stapp usa a ontologia whiteheadiana para a compreensão da consciência em relação à mecânica quântica, mas o faz pressupondo o surgimento daquilo que
chama de “cérebro quântico” —o que também acaba por descaracterizar a proposta de von Neumann. A ontologia de Whitehead
admitidamente evita os problemas do dualismo e, como Anderson Weekes aponta, oferece uma visão monista inovadora do problema filosófico clássico da relação mente-corpo (além do monismo reducionista, como a ontologia materialista ou idealista).
Investigo, então, uma proposta do desenvolvimento de uma ontologia para o conceito de “consciência”, inspirada na filosofia de
Whitehead, que poderia ser considerada uma leitura mais frutífera para o problema ontológico da consciência na mecânica
quântica.
Por fim, apresento no quinto capítulo algumas notas introdutórias para o formalismo da mecânica quântica que é utilizado
tacitamente ao longo de todo o livro, a fim de especificar melhor
as questões que percorrem o debate feito aqui.
Meu maior enfoque é sobre a interpretação da consciência,
por ser uma interpretação má aceita pela comunidade científica,
tendo em vista a falta de debates filosóficos sobre as entidades
que pressupõe e postula. Muitos mal-entendidos foram cometidos devido à escassez de discussões acerca desta questão, desde
a utilização de tal interpretação por parte da pseudociência litigiosa até o seu descarte precoce por parte de uma comunidade
que não se preocupou em debatê-la seriamente.
6
Escrevo este livro na esperança que tais lacunas sejam preenchidas.
Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo
Campinas, 2022
7
Introdução: Um problema
filosófico na física
Existem várias maneiras de enunciar o que é a mecânica quântica. Se este fosse um livro de história da física, eu começaria
introduzindo o advento da mecânica quântica através da teorização de Max Planck, em 1900, sobre a radiação de corpo negro.
No entanto, como é um livro de filosofia, escolhi situar o debate
através do contraste entre as concepções filosóficas das físicas
clássica e quântica. Para tanto, aponto muito brevemente três teses principais, tácita ou implicitamente assumidas por aquilo que
se conhece como “física clássica”:
1. Determinismo causal: podemos conhecer todas as condições iniciais dos sistemas físicos e, com isso, podemos prever com certeza o seu comportamento futuro a partir de
uma cadeia causal.
2. Localidade/independência: dois sistemas separados no espaço não podem interagir instantaneamente.
3. Realismo objetivista: objetos na realidade externa existem
com propriedades bem definidas e independentes de eventuais observadores.
Como procurarei expor ao longo deste livro, a mecânica quân8
tica nos força a rejeitar tais teses.1 O conceito de “medição” ocupa
um papel central na discussão acerca da interpretação da mecânica quântica, estando presente desde os primeiros debates ontológicos da teoria conduzidos, mesmo que indiretamente, pelos físicos Niels Bohr e Werner Heisenberg. É um dos maiores
problemas filosóficos para a questão interpretativa da mecânica
quântica, dando à mecânica quântica diversas interpretações nas
quais uma ontologia própria parece estar relacionada a cada uma
delas.
Na física clássica, a medição é um aspecto que pode nos parecer intuitivamente simples e relativamente pouco problemático —como o ato de medir o peso de um corpo maciço tal como
uma bola de bilhar. Já na mecânica quântica, a medição não é um
conceito consensual, havendo diversas posições filosóficas conflitantes sobre seu modo de operação, de modo que questões
como “a medição cria ou revela o valor observado?” permeiam o
debate filosófico sobre conceito de medição.
Argumentarei, ao longo deste livro, contrário à prática usual,
que todas as características problemáticas dos fundamentos da
mecânica quântica se relacionam com a noção de medição. A prática usual é considerar a medição como um problema fundacional
dentre muitos outros, tais como determinismo, localidade, ontologia, etc. No entanto, argumentarei em cada capítulo que esses
problemas são subsidiários e dependentes da noção de “medição”. Assim, me alinho com Gibbins (1987), para quem o problema
da medição é o problema central da mecânica quântica. Dessa
forma, considero que problemas fundamentais da microfísica,
tais como incerteza, complementaridade, localidade, contextualidade e inflação ontológica, são consequências da interpretação
1
É importante deixar claro logo no início que o termo “mecânica quântica”, conforme empregado neste livro, refere-se à mecânica quântica usual
(ou padrão), conforme estudada nos cursos de física ao redor do mundo (cf.
Arroyo e da Silva, 2021; Griffiths, 1995; Hughes, 1989).
9
do problema da medição e, portanto, consequências da interpretação da mecânica quântica.2
Trago um debate essencialmente filosófico, na medida em
que trato do debate acerca da natureza das entidades e processos que regem uma das teorias físicas com maior sucesso empírico da história da ciência moderna. Neste livro, busco destacar
alguns dos aspectos filosóficos centrais no debate em torno do
que se conhece como problema da medição quântica. Procuro,
especificamente, discutir sobre a introdução do conceito de consciência, dentro do debate da medição, como um problema essencialmente ontológico. É importante esclarecer que, ao invés de
defender uma ou outra posição, procuro mostrar que existe um
campo para a discussão filosófica na interpretação da mecânica
quântica e, como a discussão filosófica se dá por problemas, buscarei explicitar os aspectos problemáticos em torno da interpretação do conceito de “medição”. A estrutura do livro é a seguinte.
No primeiro capítulo, inicio a discussão por diretrizes dadas
pela história da filosofia da física, isto é, pela gênese do problema
que seu deu a partir das formulações de Bohr Heisenberg sobre o
ato de medir. Nesse capítulo, sustentarei a seguinte tese: as noções de “incerteza” e “complementaridade”, fundamentais para
aquilo que se conhece como a “interpretação ortodoxa” da mecânica quântica, são moldadas no final da década de 1920 por
questões embrionárias ao “problema da medição”, cuja formalização aparecerá somente anos mais tarde.
No segundo capítulo, trato do famoso debate entre Bohr e
Einstein, enfatizando a relação do debate com concepções filosóficas conflitantes acerca da realidade —e do papel da medição
na mecânica quântica. Nesse capítulo, forneço mais elementos
para endossar a tese geral deste livro: os problemas nos funda2
Também fica implícito que endosso a tese de Friederich (2014), segundo
a qual uma interpretação da mecânica quântica se caracteriza fundamentalmente pelo fornecimento de uma solução ao problema da medição —ainda
que esse assunto seja debatido somente de passagem ao final do Capítulo 3.
10
mentos da mecânica quântica são problemas filosóficos, todos
eles relacionados à noção de medição.
O terceiro capítulo é central no livro. É nele que o problema
da medição aparece explicitamente, ainda que eu tenha deliberadamente filtrado questões relativas ao formalismo da mecânica quântica, e tratado diretamente com as questões conceituais
que envolvem o problema. Trato especificamente de uma interpretação da mecânica quântica, que é extremamente mal vista
pela comunidade física e filosófica: a interpretação que atribui
à consciência humana poder causal na medição. Por um lado,
é compreensível que essa interpretação seja tão mal vista pela
comunidade acadêmica: em nome dela, foram feitas muitas deturpações de maneira intelectualmente pouco honesta; por outro lado, tento mostrar como é uma interpretação perfeitamente
consistente, e que não deve ser descartada do rol de interpretações disponíveis sem justificativas adicionais. Por fim, mostro
como tal interpretação é somente uma, em meio à vasta gama de
opções de interpretações da mecânica quântica. Assim, qualquer
sentença que comece com “a mecânica quântica implica que. . . ”
deve ser lida com bastante cautela, especialmente no tocante a
aspectos filosóficos. Parte deste capítulo foi publicado no formato e artigo em Arroyo e Sversutti (2022), e partes dos outros
capítulos compuseram minha dissertação de mestrado (Arroyo,
2015).
No quarto capítulo, exploro alguns horizontes possíveis para
uma fundamentação mais rigorosa dos fundamentos da consciência na mecânica quântica, tendo em vista a interpretação apresentada no capítulo anterior. Em específico, considero a possibilidade de uma fundamentação filosófica, inspirada na ontologia de
processos de Alfred Whitehead. Essa alternativa ontológica tem
a vantagem de evitar os problemas da metafísica dualista —viz.
o problema mente-corpo— ao mesmo tempo que deixa aberta a
possibilidade de causação mental. Desnecessário dizer que a es11
trutura ontológica whiteheadiana também evita uma justificação
baseada em critérios religiosos para a causalidade da consciência, como é feito por alguns exemplos discutidos no Capítulo 3.
Por fim, o Capítulo 5 é uma espécie de apêndice, no qual são
tratadas questões matemáticas mínimas relativas ao formalismo
da mecânica quântica, de modo a tornar ainda mais preciso o
problema da medição. O formalismo apresentado ali não é necessário para o entendimento pleno das questões tratadas neste
livro, mas servem a uma leitura mais aprofundada, embora ainda
introdutória, da filosofia da física.
12
Capítulo 1
Questões de fundamento
Uma característica notável da mecânica quântica não-relativista
(doravante apenas “mecânica quântica”) é sua questão interpretativa. É possível interpretar a mecânica quântica de diversas maneiras. As diferenças interpretativas, por sua vez, se mostram de
diversos modos: podem ser estruturais, modificando, por exemplo, axiomas da teoria ou equações de movimento; podem ser
substanciais, na medida em que alteram o próprio objeto de
estudo da física; e também podem ser ontológicas, na medida
em que diferenças interpretativas podem significar diferenças de
concepções sobre como o mundo é, e quais os objetos que o compõem.
As fronteiras entre a física e a filosofia, e também entre teoria e interpretação, se tornam borradas quando nos deparamos
com os fundamentos da mecânica quântica. Seja como for, qualquer abordagem interpretativa tem um ponto de partida. De uma
perspectiva da história da filosofia e da física, o ponto de partida
para as questões interpretativas tem um nome: a interpretação
de Copenhague.
Por isso, acredito que seja um bom lugar para começar esta
investigação. Como veremos ao longo deste livro, todas as interpretações analisadas aqui têm como ponto de partida, direta ou
13
indiretamente, a interpretação de Copenhague. Seja pelos experimentos mentais, ou pelas questões filosóficas levantadas pelos
fundadores da mecânica quântica: os físicos Niels Bohr e Werner
Heisenberg.
Analiso separadamente as formulações de Heisenberg e Bohr,
tentando delinear, da forma mais precisa quanto possível, a definição dos principais conceitos de tais autores, que abordam, respectivamente, o princípio da indeterminação e a complementaridade. Em seguida, discuto, também, sobre algumas das diferenças filosóficas fundamentais entre os dois autores que compõem
o cerne da interpretação de Copenhague da mecânica quântica
—deixando de lado a discussão de outros autores, não menos
importantes, como Born, Jordan, Pauli, entre outros.
Em diversos manuais e livros-texto de física, a mecânica
quântica é exposta sob a ótica da interpretação de Copenhague,1
uma interpretação que, supostamente, advém diretamente das
formulações de Bohr e Heisenberg, e é até mesmo considerada
a interpretação ortodoxa da mecânica quântica. A noção de uma
interpretação unitária da mecânica quântica, chamada de “interpretação de Copenhague”, de acordo com D. Howard (2004), fora
introduzida por Heisenberg. Até os anos 1950, segundo D. Howard
(2004, p. 680), existia apenas um chamado “espírito de Copenhague”, que representaria “[. . .] um grupo de pensadores unidos
pela determinação de defender a mecânica quântica como uma
teoria completa e correta”.
d’Espagnat (1999) considera a interpretação de Copenhague
uma ferramenta prática para a solução de problemas da física
quântica. Para que possamos discutir com a literatura especializada, chamo de “interpretação de Copenhague” a adoção dos
pontos de vista do princípio da incerteza e da complementaridade —conceitos que serão explicados adiante.
1
Como, por exemplo, em Cohen-Tannoudji et al. (2020), Dicke e Wittke
(1960), Messiah (1961) e Schiff (1949).
14
Jamais existiu consenso sobre uma interpretação unitária da
mecânica quântica e/ou suas implicações filosóficas. Exemplo
disso é o fato de que os próprios teóricos fundadores da mecânica quântica, como Heisenberg e Bohr, frequentemente divergiam em questões filosóficas, como procuro expor ao final deste
capítulo. Ainda assim, conforme observa Beller (1996), os dois físicos deliberadamente ocultariam suas diferenças em nome de
uma interpretação unitária de Copenhague.
É preciso salientar que a mecânica quântica, estritamente falando, não oferece uma visão de mundo ou uma ontologia. A interpretação de Copenhague considera que a mecânica quântica
seja meramente um conjunto de regras para fazer predições sobre tipos especiais de condições experimentais. No entanto, considero que é possível extrair uma ontologia associada à investigação da mecânica quântica. Portanto, tratarei de ontologia mesmo
que os proponentes da teoria não o tenham feito explicitamente.
É igualmente importante ressaltar que, por mais que a mecânica quântica apresente diversos problemas filosóficos, sua capacidade de predição é bastante grande, atingindo dezenas de casas decimais de precisão. Isto é, trata-se de uma teoria muito bem
sucedida em termos da concordância de suas predições com resultados experimentais. Como diria Bell (2004), a mecânica quântica funciona para todos os propósitos práticos. Dito isso, passemos ao debate conceitual acerca da mecânica quântica.
1.1
O princípio da indeterminação
O famoso “princípio da incerteza” foi formulado por Heisenberg
(1983). É um dos pontos centrais —e mais famosos— daquilo que
se entende por interpretação de Copenhague, sendo um dos aspectos que diferenciam radicalmente a física clássica da física
quântica. Ademais, como já disse anteriormente, veremos, ao
longo deste livro, que todas as características que diferenciam
15
radicalmente as físicas clássica e quântica se relacionam com o
conceito de “medição”.
De acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 65), quando teve acesso
ao manuscrito do (ainda não publicado) artigo de Heisenberg
(1983), Bohr (1928) teria apresentado uma série de críticas acerca
da base conceitual sob as quais as relações foram formuladas,
ainda que a validade das relações de Heisenberg —ou seja, sua
existência— não fosse questionada. Nesta seção, é delineada, de
acordo com a posição de Heisenberg, uma definição tão precisa
quanto possível para o princípio da incerteza.
Grosso modo, o princípio da incerteza postula a impossibilidade de atribuir valores exatos para certas propriedades observáveis dos objetos quânticos, tais como “posição” e “momento”
(“momentum”), simultaneamente, de modo que tal atribuição
deva obedecer uma quantidade constante de “incerteza”. Essa
é a definição paradigmática do princípio, encontrada frequentemente em manuais e livros-texto de mecânica quântica e representada sob a forma da seguinte expressão: ∆p∆q ≥ ~/2π (em
que “q” e “p” representam os desvios padrão, isto é, as propriedades observáveis e “~” representa a constante reduzida de Planck).
As variáveis “tempo” e “energia” podem igualmente expressar o
argumento, sendo também observáveis. No entanto, manterei o
raciocínio com os observáveis “posição” e “momento”, frequentemente expressos sob a forma dos caracteres q e p, respectivamente. O termo “posição” é uma propriedade observável que
designa, como o nome intuitivamente sugere, a posição de um
objeto quântico em movimento; o termo “momento” pode ser entendido como uma propriedade observável que designa a direção
ou a velocidade do movimento de um objeto quântico.
Duas questões surgem imediatamente:
• Quanto ao primeiro termo: o “princípio da incerteza” é, de
fato, um princípio da teoria quântica?
• Quanto ao segundo termo: o “princípio” se refere a uma tese
16
epistemológica (de fato “princípio da incerteza”) ou a uma
tese ontológica (como “princípio de indeterminação”)?
Discuto, adiante, o que implica levar em consideração uma
referência epistemológica ou ontológica. Para uma abordagem
acerca da primeira questão, é necessário distinguir entre as “relações de incerteza” e o “princípio da incerteza”. Segundo Osvaldo
Pessoa Júnior, cabe a seguinte distinção entre os dois termos:
O princípio [de incerteza], que se aplica a grandezas
não compatíveis entre si [. . .], exprime o fato de que
uma maior previsibilidade nos resultados da medição de um dos observáveis implica uma diminuição
na previsibilidade do outro. Uma relação de incerteza
é qualquer relação matemática que exprima quantitativamente o princípio. (Pessoa Junior, 2003, p. 77).
Na física clássica, todas as grandezas são compatíveis, o que
não acontece na mecânica quântica. As relações de incerteza
são consequências do formalismo da mecânica quântica. De fato,
essa é uma das críticas tecidas por Karl Popper (1967) em relação
ao princípio da incerteza: as relações não poderiam alcançar o
status de princípio da teoria quântica por uma questão de prioridade lógica. As relações são derivadas da própria teoria quântica,
de modo que seria impossível fazer o caminho inverso e obter a
teoria quântica a partir das relações de incerteza.
Para Reichenbach (1944, p. 13), no entanto, o princípio é uma
“afirmação empírica”. Assim, a questão em torno da utilização
ou não das relações de incerteza sob o nome de “princípio”
deveria se dar no sentido empírico do termo, na medida em
que as relações são apresentadas originalmente como um resultado experimental, ainda que formulada a partir de um experimento mental, como veremos a seguir. Da forma como interpretam Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016), Heisenberg expressaria que relações de incerteza seriam um princípio fundamental da natureza,
17
isto é, imposto como uma lei empírica, ao invés de ser tomado
como um resultado derivado do formalismo da teoria.
O princípio da incerteza é uma interpretação agregada às
relações (matemáticas) de incerteza, frequentemente associada
àquilo que se entende por interpretação de Copenhague. De
acordo com Cassidy (1998), Heisenberg nunca teria endossado o
ponto de vista de que suas relações fossem de fato um princípio
da mecânica quântica. Segundo o autor, para designar o argumento expresso através do suposto princípio da incerteza, como
ficara popularmente conhecido, Heisenberg utilizava os termos
“relações de imprecisão” (inaccuracy relations, Ungenauigkeitsrelationen) ou “relações de indeterminação” (indeterminacy relations, Unbestimmtheitsrelationen).
Como não entrarei aqui na discussão relativa ao formalismo
da teoria quântica, a discussão que se seguirá, para o escopo
desta obra, será relativa àquilo que se refere ao princípio. Adoto,
por ora, a nomenclatura “relações de Heisenberg” (ou somente
as “relações”) para me referir ao que fora chamado até aqui de
princípio da incerteza. Desse modo, não me comprometerei —ao
menos de antemão— com alguma interpretação, como as explicitadas acima.
A tentativa de responder à segunda questão esbarra na dificuldade de não haver uma única terminologia, na medida em
que não existe um consenso para a interpretação das relações.
Para uma melhor compreensão do significado das relações de
Heisenberg, examinarei o raciocínio do próprio autor. O título do
artigo de 1927, no qual as relações são formuladas, parcialmente
traduzido para o português, seria: “Sobre o conteúdo ‘anschaulich’ da teoria quântica cinemática e mecânica”. De acordo com
Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016), o termo “anschaulich” merece atenção
especial. É uma palavra própria da língua alemã, cuja tradução
para outros idiomas é frequentemente ambígua, de modo que a
expressão “conteúdo anschaulich” tem diversas traduções.
18
No volume organizado por Wheeler e Zurek, o título do artigo de Heisenberg (1983) fora traduzido para o inglês como “the
physical content” (“o conteúdo físico”); Cassidy (1992), biógrafo
de Heisenberg, traduziu como “the perceptible content” (“o conteúdo perceptível”). A tradução literal mais aproximada seria
“conteúdo visualizável”, sendo a visão é frequentemente utilizada
como uma metáfora para o entendimento da questão proposta.
Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016) sugerem a tradução “conteúdo inteligível”. Para Heisenberg (1983, p. 64), o que garante anschaulich a um
conceito físico é sua correspondência biunívoca com uma operação experimental especificamente designada para a aplicação
de tal conceito. Assim, fica claro que a palavra “anschaulich” não
se refere a um conteúdo puramente inteligível, que poderia ser
entendido como um conteúdo puramente conceitual, sem correspondente experimental. Desse modo, sugerimos que a expressão
tenha um significado mais próximo ao “conteúdo manifesto”, da
forma como enuncia através da seguinte passagem:
Quando alguém quiser ter clareza sobre o que se deve
entender pelas palavras “posição do objeto”, como,
por exemplo, do elétron (relativamente a um dado referencial), é preciso especificar experimentos definidos com o auxílio dos quais se pretenda medir a “posição do elétron”; caso contrário, a expressão não terá
significado. (Heisenberg, 1983, p. 64).
Em outras palavras, se trata de um postulado que declara que
apenas as propriedades que forem a princípio observáveis devem se inserir na teoria. Tal atitude fora identificada como uma
posição operacionista dos conceitos físicos, frequentemente associada ao empirismo lógico e ao positivismo. Ao mencionar o
termo “positivismo”, tem-se em mente, principalmente, a defesa
dos aspectos empiricista e verificacionista da ciência, segundo os
quais a experiência (ou a medição) é condição necessária para a
19
formulação de enunciados científicos. Tais termos serão discutidos no capítulo seguinte. Adoto, a partir daqui, a nomenclatura
proposta por Pessoa Junior (2003, p. 74), de “postulado operacionista” para me referir à passagem citada acima.
Para exemplificar esse postulado, Heisenberg (1983, p. 64) introduz um experimento de pensamento —posteriormente conhecido como “microscópio de Heisenberg”— no qual se objetiva efetuar uma medição de posição sobre um elétron a partir de um
microscópio de raios γ (gama). Os raios gama têm o menor comprimento de onda conhecido até então do espectro luminoso. A
ideia de utilizá-los para iluminar o elétron vem de uma propriedade matemática do processo de tal medição, segundo a qual se
obtém maior precisão quanto menor for o comprimento de onda
da luz que iluminará o elétron. Então, para efetuar uma medição,
seria preciso iluminar o elétron. No entanto, a tentativa de iluminar um elétron, e assim medir sua posição, deve envolver ao menos um fóton, cuja interação com o elétron pode ser considerada
uma colisão de modo a implicar uma perturbação no momento
do elétron —distúrbio que é maior quando menor for o comprimento de onda da luz que colide com o elétron— e isso limitaria
a precisão do conhecimento sobre tal momento. Esse fenômeno
é conhecido como “efeito Compton”.2 Com tal raciocínio, Heisenberg é capaz de afirmar que:
No instante de tempo em que a posição é determinada, isto é, no instante em que o fóton é disperso
pelo elétron, o elétron sofre uma mudança descontínua no momento. Essa mudança é maior [. . .] quanto
mais exata for a determinação da posição. No instante
em que a posição do elétron é conhecida, seu momento poderá ser conhecido apenas por magnitudes
2
Para um detalhamento físico-teórico desse fenômeno, ver Chibeni (2005,
p. 8).
20
que correspondam a essa mudança descontínua; assim, quanto mais precisamente for determinada a posição, menos precisamente o momento é conhecido, e
vice-versa. (Heisenberg, 1983, p. 64).
Essa é a primeira formulação das relações de Heisenberg,
que implicam, à primeira vista, uma tese epistemológica, na medida em que se relaciona com uma limitação do conhecimento
acerca dos valores observáveis. Tal formulação induz a uma conclusão preliminar acerca de uma drástica ruptura entre os conceitos “clássico” e “quântico”: os conceitos (tais como posição e
momento) teriam, na teoria física clássica, definições exatas (isto
é, limitadas somente pela imprecisão dos instrumentos de medida), o que não acontece na física quântica, visto que os conceitos agora obedecem a uma limitação imposta pela operação
experimental, impedindo, assim, que a “definição” dos conceitos
seja simultaneamente exata.
Uma tese semântica está implícita aqui. Como observam
Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016), o postulado operacionista especifica
que um experimento garante significado a um conceito tal como
“posição”, de modo que a atitude de, por exemplo, “efetuar uma
medição de posição sobre um elétron” acaba por atribuir significado à posição do objeto quântico em questão. A formulação das
relações de Heisenberg parece indicar, para além do que se pode
conhecer acerca dos observáveis, uma limitação acerca do que se
pode dizer dos conceitos físicos em dada operação experimental.
Assim, os autores propõem o uso da nomenclatura “princípio de
medição=significado”.
No entanto, Heisenberg (1983, p. 73) exibe uma segunda formulação das relações, de caráter ontológico, quando afirma:
“acredito que se possa formular proveitosamente a origem da
[noção de] ‘órbita’ clássica da seguinte maneira: a ‘órbita’ passa
a existir somente quando a observamos”. De acordo com tal formulação, a medição não apenas garante significado para uma
21
propriedade observável de um objeto quântico, mas, de fato, garante realidade física para tal conceito. Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016)
propõem, para esse raciocínio, o uso da nomenclatura “princípio
de medição=criação” —que, como discutirei adiante, Heisenberg
(1958) afirma posteriormente que não se trataria de uma criação, mas de uma atualização de potencialidades, remetendo
aos conceitos de “ato” e “potência” dos analíticos posteriores de
Aristóteles (Órganon, §99b28–29).3
De acordo com o quadro conceitual exposto acima, a medição
dos observáveis (no caso, posição e momento) parece proceder
da seguinte maneira: quando a posição é medida pelo princípio
de medição=significado, pode-se atribuir significado epistemológico ao conceito físico “posição do elétron”; além disso, pelo
princípio de medição=criação, pode-se atribuir realidade física à
noção de posição, tal que a relação de incerteza impossibilitaria a medição simultânea do outro observável (o momento) com
uma precisão arbitrariamente grande. Deve-se notar que a definição de algumas das propriedades observáveis (nesse exemplo,
o momento) são imprecisas num sentido ontológico (de acordo
com o princípio de medição=criação), de modo que só se pode
atribuir à realidade do elétron um momento impreciso.
Até aqui, parece seguro definir as relações de Heisenberg
como a impossibilidade de medição das propriedades observáveis de um objeto quântico com precisão arbitrariamente grande.
Anos mais tarde, Heisenberg exibe uma definição de suas relações de forma ainda mais precisa:
O princípio da incerteza se refere ao grau de indeterminação no possível conhecimento presente de valores simultâneos de várias quantidades com as quais a
teoria quântica lida; ele não se restringe, por exemplo,
3
Para uma análise aprofundada do conceito de “potentia” em Heisenberg,
ver Pangle (2014).
22
à exatidão de uma única medição de posição ou de velocidade. Assim, suponhamos que a velocidade de um
elétron livre é conhecida com precisão, enquanto que
sua posição é completamente desconhecida. O princípio afirma que cada observação subsequente da posição irá alterar o momento por um valor desconhecido e indeterminável tal que, após a realização da experiência, nosso conhecimento do movimento do elétron é restringido pela relação de incerteza. Isso pode
ser expresso em termos gerais e concisos ao dizer que
cada experimento destrói parte do conhecimento do
sistema, que fora obtido por experimentos anteriores.
Essa formulação torna claro que a relação de incerteza
não se refere ao passado; se a velocidade do elétron é
previamente conhecida e a posição é medida com exatidão, a posição para os tempos anteriores a tal medição pode ser calculada. Então, para tais tempos [. . .]
[a relação de incerteza] é menor do que o limite usual,
mas esse conhecimento do passado é de caráter puramente especulativo visto que nunca (devido à alteração desconhecida do momento causada pela medição da posição) pode ser usado como condição inicial
em qualquer cálculo da progressão futura do elétron
e, portanto, não pode ser objeto de verificação experimental. É uma questão de crença pessoal se se pode
ou não atribuir realidade física ao cálculo relativo à
história passada do elétron. (Heisenberg, 1930, p. 20).
Nessa definição, a ênfase é dada no fato de que os valores dos
observáveis podem ser conhecidos precisamente, o que parece
contradizer a definição clássica das relações de incerteza. No entanto, Heisenberg afirma que as relações não se aplicariam para
valores de medições passadas, de modo que os valores passados não podem ser utilizados para os cálculos futuros, pois cada
23
nova medição perturba descontinuamente o valor de um dos observáveis de maneira, a princípio, incontrolável.
Como observa Jammer (1974, p. 68), a limitação imposta pelas
relações de Heisenberg não impõe uma restrição à definição dos
observáveis visto que, se considerados isolados, podem ser medidos com precisão arbitrariamente grande. As relações se aplicam somente à tentativa de medição simultânea dos dois observáveis.
Quanto ao estatuto ontológico relativo à “história passada”
dos observáveis (ou seja, dos valores “precisos” dos observáveis
em medições passadas e isoladas), Heisenberg (1930, p. 20) relega ao plano da “crença pessoal”, visto não haver possibilidade
de referir um aparato experimental próprio para verificar tal noção. Sua própria “crença pessoal” é negar sua realidade física se
for levado em consideração o princípio de medição=criação.
Ainda assim se mantém a questão acerca do que as relações
de Heisenberg de fato expressam (ainda que as alternativas não
sejam exclusivas): (i) uma limitação experimental sobre o que se
pode conhecer acerca dos objetos quânticos, uma incerteza; (ii)
uma restrição acerca do significado que se pode atribuir à definição dos objetos quânticos, uma indefinição; (iii) uma restrição ontológica quanto às propriedades observáveis dos objetos
quânticos, uma indeterminação.
O extenso debate acerca da interpretação das relações de
Heisenberg é refletido na própria existência de diversas nomenclaturas para as relações de Heisenberg. Jammer (1974, p. 61–62)
identifica três termos distintos, utilizados por Heisenberg no artigo de 1927, para se referir ao argumento de suas relações: (1)
Ungenauigkeit, que denota “inexatidão” ou “imprecisão”; (2) Unbestimmtheit, que denota “indeterminação”; (3) Unsicherheit, que
denota “incerteza”.
Da mesma forma, existem três usos distintos do argumento.
Se a ênfase é dada na (a) ausência de conhecimento subjetivo
24
acerca das propriedades dos objetos quânticos, utiliza-se a acepção (1) —há uma incerteza de caráter epistemológico. Se a ênfase
é dada na (b) ausência de conhecimento objetivo, independentemente de observador acerca das propriedades dos objetos quânticos, utiliza-se a acepção (2)— há uma indeterminação de caráter
ontológico. O termo (3) é utilizado de forma neutra, para quando
esta ênfase não for dada. De acordo com Hilgevoord e Uffink
(2016), Heisenberg transita livremente das implicações epistemológicas para as implicações ontológicas. Segundo Pessoa Junior
(2003, p. 78), o motivo pelo qual as relações de Heisenberg transitam de uma tese epistemológica para uma tese ontológica é
justamente a assunção do postulado operacionista.
De fato, tal postulado é, além do ponto de partida do argumento, a base conceitual das relações de Heisenberg. Tanto
as implicações epistemológicas quanto ontológicas das relações
se fundamentam no ato de medição, entendida nesse contexto
como uma operação experimental. Se as relações demonstram
que não é possível medir as propriedades observáveis de um objeto quântico de forma precisa e simultânea, isto quer dizer que,
em última análise, tais propriedades nem sequer existem simultaneamente de forma determinada. Assim, se segue logicamente
que, devido ao fato de não existirem de forma determinada, não
podem ser conhecidas ou definidas de forma determinada. Desse
modo, por mais que Heisenberg dê menos atenção às implicações ontológicas desse argumento, elas parecem ocupar um lugar central no plano conceitual das relações, tal que as implicações epistemológicas parecem derivar da implicação ontológica
do princípio medição=criação. Portanto, parece seguro caracterizar que, para Heisenberg, as relações são entendidas como relações de indeterminação. Isto é, se assumido o postulado operacionista, que parece ser o cerne do argumento de Heisenberg
(1983), o sentido ontológico é condição necessária para as implicações epistemológicas e semânticas.
25
No entanto, Jammer (1974, p. 76) considera “estranha” e até
mesmo “inconsistente” a atitude de classificar o raciocínio de
Heisenberg como positivista, conforme a adoção do postulado
operacionista parece sugerir. A motivação para o raciocínio das
relações de indeterminação fora fortemente influenciada por
uma conversa com Albert Einstein, como reconhece o próprio
Heisenberg (1996, p. 95). Da forma como Heisenberg (1996, p. 78)
transcreve, o raciocínio de Einstein seria o seguinte: “em princípio é um grande erro tentar fundamentar uma teoria apenas
nas grandezas observáveis. Na realidade, dá-se exatamente o inverso. É a teoria que decide o que podemos observar”. Tal raciocínio acerca do significado do termo “observação” parece indicar
uma ordem das razões oposta à proposta positivista para as ciências —na qual as teorias científicas deveriam ter como ponto
de partida os dados observáveis.
Em uma entrevista conduzida por Thomas Kuhn, Heisenberg
esclarece esse ponto:
Ele [Einstein] explicou-me que o que se observa ou
não é decidido pela teoria. Somente quando você tem
a teoria completa, você pode dizer o que pode ser observado. A palavra observação significa que você faz
algo que é consistente com as leis físicas conhecidas. Então se você não tem leis físicas, você não observa nada. Bem, você tem impressões e você tem algo
em sua chapa fotográfica, mas você não tem nenhuma
maneira de ir da placa para os átomos. Se você não
tem nenhuma maneira de ir de placa para os átomos,
qual a utilidade da placa? (Heisenberg, 1963, sec. XVIII).
A referida teoria (que deve preceder a observação) seria, no
entendimento de Heisenberg, a matemática.
Bem, nós temos um esquema matemático consistente
e esse esquema matemático consistente nos diz tudo
26
o que pode ser observado. Não existe algo na natureza
que não possa ser descrito por esse esquema matemático. [. . .] ondas e corpúsculos são, com certeza, um
modo de expressão, e nós chegamos a estes conceitos
através da física clássica. A física clássica nos ensinou
a falar acerca de partículas e ondas, mas desde que a
física clássica não é verdadeira lá [na física quântica],
por que devemos nos ater tanto a estes conceitos? Por
que não dizer simplesmente que não podemos usar
esses conceitos com uma precisão muito elevada? Daí
as relações de incerteza, e, por isso, nós temos que
abandonar estes conceitos até certo ponto. Então ficamos além desse limite da teoria clássica, e devemos perceber que nossas palavras não são adequadas. Elas não têm de fato base na realidade física e,
portanto, um novo esquema matemático seria melhor
que elas, porque o novo esquema matemático diz o
que pode e o que não pode estar lá. A natureza de
alguma forma segue tal esquema. (Heisenberg, 1963,
sec. XVIII).
O argumento original das relações de Heisenberg (sob o
exemplo do microscópio de raios gama), de acordo com Redhead
(1987, p. 67), infere que “uma partícula descrita classicamente
se ‘infecta’ com as relações de incerteza da mecânica quântica
quando interage com um agente quântico em uma medição”. Isso
parece indicar, no limite, a rejeição por parte de Heisenberg da
descrição clássica (tais como ondas e partículas) para os objetos
quânticos. Para Jammer (1974, p. 68), isto é notável, visto que a
formulação matemática da teoria, na concepção de Heisenberg,
permitiria a predição de todo e qualquer experimento, de modo
que a utilização de termos clássicos, tais como “ondas” ou “partículas”, seria obsoleta para a descrição do que ocorre em uma
27
medição quântica —ao menos diante de tal esquema matemático.
Pela definição, ainda em linhas gerais, que busco apresentar para o princípio de Heisenberg (1983), chamarei de princípio
de indeterminação, dada a ênfase nos pressupostos ontológicos
subjacentes ao raciocínio de sua formulação. Passemos à analise
de alguns aspectos centrais da formulação da complementaridade de Bohr para definir com maior precisão a noção de interpretação de Copenhague.
1.2
A complementaridade
Juntamente com o princípio de indeterminação de Heisenberg, a
noção de “complementaridade”, formulada por Bohr (1928), contém o cerne daquilo que se conhece por interpretação de Copenhague, muitas vezes chamada de “interpretação da complementaridade” ou “interpretação ortodoxa”. No entanto, o termo “complementaridade” tem, de acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 88–89),
usos muito distintos e fora aplicado a diversas outras áreas do
conhecimento, tais como ética, linguística, psicologia e teologia.
No contexto da física —sobre o qual me aterei exclusivamente—
o termo tem diversos usos filosóficos distintos, com implicações
epistemológicas (como o próprio Bohr parece sugerir), lógicas e
até mesmo ontológicas. Buscarei evidenciar tais implicações ao
longo deste capítulo.
Me aterei, a princípio, à formulação original de Bohr (1928), na
tentativa de reconstruir uma definição tão precisa quanto possível do termo complementaridade, entendendo que haverá uma
série de dificuldades, na medida em que, como apontam Jammer
(1974, p. 95) e Faye (2012, p. 142), nem mesmo Bohr delineou uma
definição clara para aquilo que diz respeito ao conceito complementaridade.
28
O termo aparece pela primeira vez em uma palestra de Bohr
(1928) ministrada em 1927, na cidade italiana de Como, conhecida
como “Como lecture”, e publicada no ano seguinte. A argumentação conduzida por Bohr (1928) se dá por duas premissas e uma
conclusão:
(P1 ): Os conceitos clássicos são indispensáveis para a descrição dos experimentos quânticos.
(P2 ): A indivisibilidade dos fenômenos quânticos é um fato
imposto pela natureza e deve ser aceito como tal. Isto é,
como cada medição envolve a troca de uma quantidade finita de energia (de ao menos um quantum), nenhuma medição seria rigorosamente idêntica à outra e, por isso, fala-se
na indivisibilidade dos fenômenos quânticos.
(C1 ): O uso dos conceitos clássicos tem sua limitação na
descrição dos fenômenos quânticos.
Iniciarei a análise desse argumento partindo da premissa
(P2 ). Uma das principais características que diferencia as teorias clássica e quântica seria a introdução do postulado quântico,
contido na premissa de que ele:
[. . .] atribui a qualquer processo atômico uma descontinuidade essencial, ou ainda uma individualidade,
completamente estranha para as teorias clássicas [. . .].
(Bohr, 1928, p. 88).
É precisamente a essa descontinuidade inerente ao processo
de medição que Heisenberg se refere nas relações de indeterminação. Tal postulado declara que toda e qualquer interação entre
(ao menos) dois sistemas é caracterizada pela troca de energia
de (ao menos) um quantum, de modo que qualquer medição envolve uma interação entre o fenômeno quântico e as agências de
medição.
29
O termo “agência de medição” é utilizado com frequência nos
escritos de Bohr, o que talvez indique uma posição de neutralidade em relação ao que, de fato, seria a causa da medição, de
modo a não se comprometer com as ambiguidades contidas em
termos como “observação” que poderiam remeter a um aspecto
humano. Dado o postulado quântico e suas consequências para
o ato de medição, Bohr é capaz de enunciar pela primeira vez o
sentido do termo “complementaridade”:
Por um lado, a definição do estado de um sistema físico, como entendido comumente, alega a eliminação
de todas as interferências externas. Mas, nesse caso,
de acordo com o postulado quântico, qualquer observação será impossível, e, acima de tudo, os conceitos de espaço e tempo perdem imediatamente o
seu significado. Por outro lado, se, para tornar a observação possível, temos que permitir certas interações com agências apropriadas de medição que não
pertençam ao sistema, uma definição não ambígua do
estado do sistema naturalmente não é mais possível,
e a causalidade, no sentido comum da palavra, está
fora de questão. A própria natureza da teoria quântica nos obriga, portanto, a considerar a coordenação
espaço-tempo e a alegação da causalidade, a união
que caracteriza as teorias clássicas, como características complementares, mas exclusivas, da descrição,
simbolizando a idealização da observação e da definição respectivamente. (Bohr, 1928, p. 89–90).
Diversas considerações podem ser extraídas do trecho acima,
que é a primeira vez em que Bohr se refere ao termo “complementaridade”. Chamo a atenção aos seguintes pontos, respectivamente relativos às três passagens grifadas na citação acima: (i)
a ressignificação do conceito clássico de observação; (ii) o operacionismo e (iii) as variáveis complementares. O ponto (i) deixa
30
claro que, uma vez assumido o postulado quântico, uma observação passiva de um objeto isolado não seria possível, uma vez
que, na teoria quântica, há a troca de energia discreta (de ao menos um quantum) entre a agência de medição e o objeto medido.
Tal inter-relação acaba por aparentemente desconstruir a linha,
clara na teoria clássica, que distingue sujeito e objeto.
O ponto (ii), que chamo de operacionismo, parece ter as mesmas consequências do postulado operacionista proposto por
Heisenberg (1983, p. 64) na formulação das relações de indeterminação, na medida em que admite significado somente aos conceitos sobre os quais se possa indicar uma operação experimental.
Isto se torna notável em várias passagens da palestra de Como,
quando, por exemplo, Bohr (1928, p. 91–92) admite que a “[. . .] radiação em espaços livres assim como partículas materiais isoladas são abstrações, suas propriedades na teoria quântica são
definíveis e observáveis apenas através de sua interação com outros sistemas”.
Em um sentido ontológico mais forte, afirma que
[. . .] uma realidade independente, no sentido físico
usual [clássico], não pode ser atribuída nem ao fenômeno nem às agências de observação. (Bohr, 1928,
p. 89).
Assim, o ponto (ii) parece enfatizar, de acordo com
Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016), que o contexto experimental define aquilo que pode ser significativamente atribuído à descrição
de um objeto quântico, ao invés de alterar propriedades préexistentes em tal objeto. De fato, a última colocação é uma
interpretação possível da primeira formulação da complementaridade expressa por Bohr (1928). Entretanto, ao conflitar com o
operacionismo do ponto (ii) sublinhado acima, tal interpretação
fora veementemente combatida por Bohr na defesa da completude da mecânica quântica na segunda metade da década de 30,
assunto que tratarei em detalhe no capítulo seguinte.
31
Os dois pontos citados acima carregam notáveis consequências filosóficas em relação ao raciocínio de Bohr. Por ora, deixarei
de lado a discussão em torno de tais implicações, e enfatizarei
o ponto (iii) a fim de delinear uma definição clara para o termo
“complementaridade”. O raciocínio utilizado por Bohr nessa passagem é de que a complementaridade seria relativa a modos de
descrição mutuamente exclusivos, que seriam: (a) a descrição ou
coordenação espaço-temporal de um objeto quântico e (b) a descrição causal ou a alegação da causalidade de tal objeto.
Enquanto a noção (a) é, de certa forma, mais clara, o item (b)
merece mais atenção. A opção de Bohr da definição do item (b),
identificada como causalidade, se refere, segundo Jammer (1974,
p. 95) “aos teoremas de conservação de energia e momento”, o
que Patrícia Kauark-Leite (2012, p. 171) identifica como “o determinismo causal do formalismo matemático”; de fato, assegura
Kauark-Leite (2012, p. 170), o formalismo da teoria quântica, sob a
representação matemática da evolução temporal de uma função
de onda, seria sempre determinista.4 Em sua formulação original, as variáveis complementares —ou observáveis ou variáveis
conjugadas— (a) e (b) denotam a incompatibilidade de qualquer
tentativa de, simultaneamente, se atribuir validade a uma descrição espaço-temporal das leis matemáticas.
Como aponta Jammer (1974, p. 102), Bohr não utiliza os termos “posição” e “momento”, ou “partícula” e “onda”, na palestra de Como, ainda que pudesse tê-lo feito facilmente. De fato,
como notam Hilgevoord e Uffink (2016), as variáveis de posição e
momento seriam os melhores exemplos para tratar da complementaridade de Bohr, num sentido de clareza ou praticidade, uma
vez que são estas as variáveis utilizadas nos debates em relação
à interpretação de Bohr. Assim, unicamente porque os exemplos
que se seguirão pressupõem de alguma forma o uso das variáveis
4
A evolução temporal dos sistemas quânticos será tratada em maiores detalhes no Capítulo 3 sob a nomenclatura de “processo 2”.
32
posição e momento, utilizarei por ora, por motivos de clareza, a
“versão de Pauli” como sugere Jammer (1974, p. 102), que intercambia a variável (a) por “posição” e (b) por “momento”.
Uma das contribuições de Weizsäcker para a compreensão do
termo “complementaridade” de Bohr fora a distinção entre várias
acepções do termo. A versão de Pauli seria chamada de “complementaridade paralela” visto que os conceitos de “posição” e
“momento” pertenceriam à mesma imagem intuitiva dos processos físicos, caso se queira definir completamente o estado de um
sistema; a versão de Bohr, no entanto, seria chamada de complementaridade circular. Em simultaneidade, as variáveis (a) e (b)
constituem o significado clássico do termo observação.
Na teoria clássica, dois modos de descrição (a) e (b) são combinados, uma vez que (a) o estado de um sistema se desenvolve
continuamente no espaço e no tempo, e (b) a mudança do estado de um sistema, causada pela interação, é determinada pelos princípios de conservação de momento e energia. Por isso, na
mecânica clássica, um estado bem definido pode sempre ser atribuído a um sistema isolado, quer ele interaja ou não com outro
sistema.
Na teoria quântica, no entanto, em consequência do postulado quântico, não seria possível medição simultânea das duas
variáveis, o que desproveria de sentido os conceitos (a) e (b), de
acordo com o critério operacionista assumido. Para tanto, Bohr
propõe que tais variáveis componham uma descrição complementar, caso tomadas em situações experimentais distintas, mutuamente exclusivas, mas, no entanto, necessárias para uma descrição exaustiva dos fenômenos quânticos.
Da forma como descrito, o termo “complementaridade” de
Bohr parece se referir a modos de descrição distintos, acompanhados de arranjos experimentais distintos, de modo que pode
ser estendido às variáveis elas mesmas em termos de quais descrições complementares são formuladas, assim, por exemplo,
33
uma coordenada de posição e uma variável de momento são chamadas complementares umas às outras; neste sentido, o termo
“complementaridade” é justificado somente se as variáveis são
utilizadas em descrições que correspondam a operações experimentais complementares.
São precisamente tais modos complementares de descrição
que devem ser realizados na terminologia da linguagem da teoria clássica, de modo que podemos passar para a análise da primeira premissa (P1 ). Isto se daria, a princípio, pela natureza da
observação que, segundo Bohr (1928, p. 89) “em última análise,
toda observação pode, de fato, ser reduzida às nossas percepções sensoriais”. Uma observação de um objeto quântico parece
representar a ampliação de um sinal microscópico (quântico), por
uma agência de medição, para o nível macroscópico (clássico), de
tal forma que:
Ao traçar as observações de volta às nossas sensações, novamente deve-se referir o postulado quântico
em conexão com a percepção da agência de observação [medição], seja por meio de sua ação direta sobre o olho ou por meio de auxiliares adequados [. . .].
(Bohr, 1928, p. 102).
Assim, raciocina Bohr (1928, p. 126), na medida em que “[. . .]
toda palavra na linguagem se refere a nossa percepção comum”,
e que nossa percepção comum é relativa aos macroobjetos —os
objetos da teoria clássica— nossa linguagem deve ser clássica.
Tentei, até aqui, reconstruir a argumentação de Bohr sobre o termo “complementaridade”. Da forma como proposto por
Jammer (1974, p. 101), a reconstrução da premissa P2 pode ser resumidamente enunciada passo a passo da seguinte maneira:
1. Indivisibilidade do quantum de ação (postulado
quântico).
34
2. Descontinuidade (ou indivisibilidade) dos processos
quânticos.
3. Incontrolabilidade da interação entre objeto e instrumento [de medição].
4. Impossibilidade de uma (estrita) descrição espaçotemporal, ao mesmo tempo, causal.
5. Renúncia ao modo clássico de descrição.
Passemos agora à análise crítica do conceito “complementaridade”. O ponto 5 indicado na conclusão (C1 ) pode soar contraditório tendo em vista a necessidade, expressa por Bohr, do uso
da linguagem clássica para a explicação dos fenômenos quânticos. No entanto, para Bohr, o que caracteriza um modo clássico
de descrição é a existência de apenas uma descrição completa.
No entendimento de Bohr, tal único modo se refere a uma única
descrição, ao mesmo tempo causal e espaço-temporal. Assim, se
for levado em consideração que uma descrição clássica jamais
fornece uma descrição completa de um objeto quântico no sentido da necessidade da exclusividade mútua de (ao menos dois)
modos clássicos de descrição, a aparência de uma contradição
desaparece.
Ainda assim, outra dificuldade para a utilização da terminologia clássica para a descrição dos fenômenos quânticos é exposta
por D. Howard (1994, p. 201–229), na medida em que os conceitos clássicos carregam pressupostos filosóficos diferentes ou até
mesmo contraditórios em relação àqueles assumidos pela mecânica quântica —da forma como interpretada pela complementaridade. O comprometimento ontológico com a tese de que os
entes possuem uma realidade objetiva independente é uma característica notável do referencial conceitual clássico. Em outras
palavras, os termos clássicos trazem consigo a ideia de que os
objetos que compõem o mundo existem independentemente de
35
qualquer interação (medição/observação) —o que parece claramente contradizer o postulado quântico, assumido como ponto
de partida para a interpretação de Copenhague.
Tal comprometimento ontológico, presente na terminologia
clássica, fora chamado por D. Howard (1994, p. 207) de “princípio da separabilidade”, que seria uma nomenclatura abreviada de
um princípio, atribuído a Einstein, que prevê a “existência mutuamente independente de coisas espacialmente distantes”. Dessa
maneira, a assunção da separabilidade seria necessária para a
noção de independência ontológica. Para Einstein (1971, p. 169),
a separabilidade seria a condição necessária para que conceitos
físicos ou leis físicas fossem formuladas.5
O princípio da separabilidade será tratado mais detalhadamente no Capítulo 2. Por ora, limito-me a explicitar a forma como
Bohr enuncia esse problema (bem como sua solução):
A elucidação dos paradoxos da física atômica tem divulgado o fato de que a interação inevitável entre os
objetos e os instrumentos de medição define um limite absoluto à possibilidade de falar de um comportamento de objetos atômicos que seja independente dos meios de observação. Estamos aqui diante
de um problema epistemológico muito novo na filosofia natural, onde toda a descrição das experiências
até agora tem sido baseada na suposição, já inerente
às convenções comuns da linguagem, de que é possível distinguir claramente entre o comportamento dos
objetos e os meios de observação. Essa suposição não
é apenas plenamente justificada por toda experiência
cotidiana, mas constitui até mesmo toda a base da física clássica. [. . .] Como nós estamos tratando, porém,
5
D. A. Howard (2017) e Décio Krause (2010, p. 122) vão além e consideram
que o realismo einsteiniano é a própria tese da separabilidade.
36
com fenômenos como processos atômicos individuais que, devido à sua própria natureza, são essencialmente determinados pela interação entre os objetos
em questão e os instrumentos de medição necessários para a definição do arranjo experimental, somos,
portanto, obrigados a examinar mais de perto a questão sobre o tipo de conhecimento que pode ser obtido
em relação aos objetos. A este respeito, devemos, por
um lado, perceber que o escopo de cada experimento
físico —para adquirir conhecimento em condições reprodutíveis e transmissíveis— não nos deixa escolha
a não ser usar conceitos cotidianos, talvez refinados
pela terminologia da física clássica, não só em todos
os relatos de construção e de manipulação dos instrumentos de medição, mas também na descrição dos resultados experimentais reais. Por outro lado, é igualmente importante entender que essa própria circunstância implica que nenhum resultado de um experimento relativo a um fenômeno, que, em princípio, está
fora do alcance da física clássica, pode ser interpretado como provedor de informações sobre propriedades independentes dos objetos. (Bohr, 1938, p. 25–26).
A ordem das razões da passagem citada acima é a seguinte: (i)
a separabilidade deve ser abandonada em se tratando dos fenômenos quânticos; (ii) a assunção da independência —que pressupõe a separabilidade— é inerente ao modo clássico de descrição; (iii) para comunicar os resultados dos experimentos quânticos, de modo a evitar ambiguidades, a linguagem clássica deve
ser utilizada; (iv) a linguagem clássica é fundada na assunção da
independência que a teoria quântica nega. Ao que parece, para
Bohr, a utilização dos conceitos clássicos é necessária para que
haja uma comunicação dos experimentos quânticos livre de ambiguidades. Tal comunicação seria a base para aquilo que Bohr
37
chama de objetividade: uma comunicação objetiva é uma comunicação livre de ambiguidades.
Nossa tarefa deve ser responder pela experiência de
um modo independente do julgamento subjetivo, individual, e, por conseguinte, objetivo na medida em
que pode ser inequivocamente comunicada na linguagem humana comum. [. . .] é decisivo perceber que, por
mais que os fenômenos ultrapassem o alcance da experiência comum, a descrição do arranjo experimental e o registro das observações deve ser baseada na
linguagem comum. (Bohr, 1963, p. 10–11).
De tal linha de raciocínio, segue-se que, para que haja objetividade na descrição dos experimentos quânticos, é necessária
a assunção da independência ontológica tanto do instrumento
de medição quanto do objeto quântico —e, por conseguinte, do
princípio de separabilidade— visto que a linguagem clássica, necessária para a descrição objetiva dos fenômenos quânticos, é
baseada em tais noções filosóficas.
Essa problemática se desdobra, para Faye (1991, p. 128–129)
em dois pontos principais: (i) se o aparelho é clássico, o resultado deve ser clássico e (ii) a descrição é clássica, pois a natureza
da noção de observação é clássica. O ponto (i) é caracterizado
pelo seguinte argumento: o aparato escolhido para efetuar uma
medição é constituído de um objeto macroscópico, cujo funcionamento é baseado inteiramente em leis clássicas, e os dados
empíricos da medição fornecidos por tal aparelho devem ser entendidos de acordo com seu funcionamento, de modo que tais
dados empíricos só podem ser descritos em termos dos conceitos
clássicos. A fragilidade do ponto (i) é justamente sua contingência
histórica, de modo que aparelhos mais avançados (menores) poderiam vir a descrever “quanticamente” um fenômeno quântico.
Esse raciocínio também parece controverso, pois pressupõe que
38
algum dia poderíamos perceber diretamente um aparelho quântico de medição —o que parece esbarrar nas próprias limitações
da percepção humana.
O ponto (ii), no entanto, parece ser mais fundamental. Para
Faye (1991, p. 127–129), a física clássica desenvolveu métodos
para ordenar a experiência humana de uma forma objetiva. No
mundo macroscópico é aparentemente possível conectar descrições causais com descrições espaço-temporais, da mesma forma
que, aparentemente, é possível distinguir entre um sistema utilizado como instrumento para observação e um sistema a ser observado. Assim, ao que parece, a natureza da observação que
ordena e estrutura nossa experiência humana cotidiana assim
procede, sendo a única garantia de que tal experiência possa vir
a ser considerada objetiva. É precisamente porque os conceitos
clássicos se referem às formas de percepção, sobre as quais nós
—enquanto sujeitos humanos— apreendemos o mundo exterior,
que eles são indispensáveis para que a descrição de um fenômeno possa ser estruturada e comunicada de forma inteligível.
Da forma como Faye (2012) propõe, a distinção entre sujeito
e objeto seria uma pré-condição para o conhecimento objetivo,
isto é, um conhecimento que não seja dependente da visão do
sujeito sobre um determinado objeto —o que seria possível somente em termos de uma descrição espaço-temporal e causal,
de acordo com nossa percepção. Isso é notável se levarmos em
consideração a redução de Bohr (1928, p. 89) do ato de medição às nossas percepções cotidianas. Ou ainda, da forma como
Favrholdt (1994, p. 80) ilustra a situação, é “[. . .] porque somos
seres macroscópicos, nossa linguagem é necessariamente adaptada ao mundo macroscópico”. Bohr explicita a situação da seguinte maneira:
A exigência de que seja possível comunicar os resultados experimentais, de uma forma inequívoca, implica
que o arranjo experimental e os resultados da ob39
servação devem ser expressos na linguagem comum
adaptada para nossa orientação no ambiente. Assim,
a descrição de fenômenos quânticos exige uma distinção, em princípio, entre os objetos sob investigação e
o aparelho de medição, por meio do qual as condições
experimentais são definidas. (Bohr, 1963, p. 78).
A linguagem clássica seria então utilizada pela assunção da
separabilidade que sua terminologia carrega, e justificada pela
necessidade da comunicação objetiva dos experimentos quânticos. De acordo com D. Howard (1994, p. 209), não se trataria de
uma contingência histórica, passível de ser superada por algum
aprimoramento linguístico, mas justamente de uma necessidade
metodológica. O raciocínio segue da seguinte maneira: a separabilidade —clássica, do instrumento macroscópico— é condição
necessária para que possamos dizer que um objeto quântico tem
tais e tais propriedades bem definidas; isso não seria possível
caso objeto e instrumento fossem inseparáveis ou ontologicamente interdependentes. Sem a separabilidade, não teríamos razões suficientes para justificar que consideramos os resultados
das medições como relatos de propriedades intrínsecas do objeto. Ao que parece, Bohr enfatiza a necessidade de que a agência
de medição seja considerada clássica —isto é, fora do alcance do
postulado quântico (o referido “quantum de ação”) e, portanto,
separado ou independente— no que tange à comunicabilidade
dos seus resultados:
O novo recurso essencial na análise dos fenômenos
quânticos é, no entanto, a introdução de uma distinção fundamental entre o aparelho de medição e os
objetos sob investigação. Essa é uma consequência
direta da necessidade de considerar as funções dos
instrumentos de medição em termos puramente clássicos, excluindo, em princípio, qualquer relação com o
quantum de ação. (Bohr, 1958b, p. 3–4).
40
Isso não significa, no entanto, que a ontologia da física clássica deva ser estendida à mecânica quântica como um todo. O
postulado quântico mantém a implicação de que as variáveis
complementares, ainda que descritas à maneira clássica, só podem ser aplicadas significativamente em relação a uma operação experimental e não —como pressupõe a ontologia clássica—
a despeito de qualquer operação experimental. Isto significa que
a complementaridade recusa qualquer descrição utilizada para
indicar propriedades por trás dos fenômenos, existentes em si
mesmos, inerentes e portadores de uma independência ontológica de qualquer operação experimental. Assim, a utilização da
noção filosófica da separabilidade, implícita nos conceitos clássicos para a descrição dos fenômenos quânticos é limitada, de
modo que não estende a ontologia clássica para os objetos quânticos. Da forma como diz Faye, a teoria quântica e a teoria clássica devem ser “comensuráveis”, num sentido kuhniano, no que
diz respeito ao seu significado empírico.:
As duas teorias podem ser baseadas em suposições
amplamente divergentes a respeito de determinados
aspectos da realidade física e, portanto, as teorias podem envolver diferentes compromissos ontológicos,
mas o conteúdo empírico da linguagem na qual estes
pressupostos são expressos é o mesmo ou é similar.
(Faye, 1991, p. 118).
Ao que parece, há aqui em jogo uma noção semântica na qual
o uso dos conceitos da física clássica são necessários para uma
descrição exaustiva (ou seja, completa) da realidade física que,
de acordo com Faye (2012), implicaria restrição do domínio de
aplicabilidade dos conceitos clássicos e não no seu abandono,
uma vez que, para que os conceitos clássicos possam ser aplicados à descrição quântica, o significado de tais conceitos clássicos
devem ser compatíveis com a teoria quântica. Essa passagem parece sugerir que Bohr contrastaria com a posição historicista da
41
ciência que a teoria quântica seria uma superação da mecânica
clássica, de modo que as duas teorias seriam incomensuráveis,
isto é, totalmente incompatíveis. Bohr chama esse princípio metodológico de princípio da correspondência, cuja formulação é
enunciada da seguinte maneira:
A necessidade de fazer um uso extensivo [. . .] dos conceitos clássicos, sobre a qual a interpretação de toda
a experiência em última análise depende, deu origem à formulação do chamado princípio de correspondência, que expressa nossos esforços de utilizar
todos os conceitos clássicos ao atribuir-lhes uma reinterpretação teórico-quântica adequada. (Bohr, 1962,
p. 8).
A visão comum sobre a interpretação de Copenhague seria
a de relegar às agências de medição um comportamento inteiramente clássico, isto é, considerar que as agências de medição
(frequentemente um aparelho) são um objeto macroscópico e,
portanto, para todos os efeitos, clássico. Isso fica explícito na seguinte passagem de Bohr:
Em arranjos experimentais reais, o cumprimento de
tais exigências [de uma descrição inequívoca do aparelho e dos resultados da medição] é assegurada pelo
uso, como aparelho medidor, de corpos rígidos suficientemente pesados que permitam uma descrição totalmente clássica das relativas posições e velocidades. (Bohr, 1958b, p. 3).
Tal interpretação comum, que concebe o aparelho de medição como inteiramente clássico, é chamada por D. Howard (1994,
p. 210) de “interpretação coincidente” e afirma que a divisão clássica/quântica coincide com a divisão aparelho medidor/objeto
42
medido. Nela, o critério para delinear os limites do mundo clássico para o mundo quântico seria o “tamanho” do aparelho medidor que, por se tratar de um objeto macroscópico, deveria pertencer ao mundo clássico.
De fato, o argumento do “tamanho” do objeto de medição
é apenas uma das características da interpretação coincidente.
Outra característica, igualmente importante, seria a irreversibilidade dos efeitos ampliados pelos instrumentos medidores. Uma
das características dos objetos quânticos é sua reversibilidade no
tempo —uma propriedade que não é observada nos macrocorpos. Nos últimos, a característica observada é sua irreversibilidade, ou seja, a duração ou permanência dos efeitos nos objetos.
No entanto, optarei por apresentar o argumento de D. Howard
(1994) frente à chamada interpretação coincidente da complementaridade de Bohr apenas com o primeiro aspecto, do “tamanho” do aparelho medidor pelas consequências filosóficas
que tal argumento desencadeará nos capítulos seguintes no que
tange ao problema do macrorrealismo ou macroobjetivismo (cf.
d’Espagnat, 1999, pp. 235–237). O aspecto da irreversibilidade da
medição será abordado no Capítulo 3.
A interpretação coincidente desencadearia, no entanto, uma
série de problemas filosóficos como, por exemplo, a introdução
de um dualismo na ontologia do processo de medição, uma vez
que os objetos contidos na ontologia clássica (no caso, os aparelhos medidores) devem interagir fisicamente com os objetos
contidos na ontologia quântica (no caso, os objetos quânticos)
ao passo que pertençam a teorias físicas fundamentalmente diferentes. Uma séria inconsistência, relacionada indiretamente à
problemática da interpretação coincidente, seria a descontinuidade introduzida na teoria pelo postulado quântico da forma
como Bohr enuncia na seguinte passagem:
De acordo com a teoria quântica, a impossibilidade
de ignorar a interação com o mecanismo de medi43
ção significa que cada observação introduz um novo
elemento incontrolável. Na verdade, isto decorre das
considerações expostas que a medição das coordenadas de posição de uma partícula é acompanhada não
só por uma mudança finita nas variáveis dinâmicas,
mas também a fixação de sua posição significa uma
ruptura completa na descrição causal de seu comportamento dinâmico, enquanto que a determinação de
seu momento implica sempre em uma lacuna no conhecimento de sua propagação espacial. Essa situação realça de forma notável o caráter complementar da descrição dos fenômenos atômicos, que surge
como uma consequência inevitável da oposição entre
o postulado quântico e a distinção entre o objeto e a
agência de medição, inerente à nossa própria idéia de
observação. (Bohr, 1928, p. 103).
Essa “ruptura” ou “lacuna” parece ser uma dentre as mais sérias dificuldades filosóficas da posição de Bohr. Tal dificuldade é
agravada da forma como Bohr (1962, p. 11) enuncia em outro momento: “a magnitude do distúrbio causado pela medição é sempre desconhecida”. Da forma como enunciada, a descontinuidade
implícita no processo de medição, de acordo com Jammer (1974,
p. 99) “não seria considerada como o resultado da troca de uma
descrição para seu modo complementar, mas como o resultado
de uma propriedade física operacional”. A situação se torna ainda
mais problemática, caso levarmos em consideração a afirmação,
de cunho essencialmente ontológico, de Bohr, que não se deve
atribuir uma realidade independente aos objetos quânticos fora
do seu contexto operacional. Essa dificuldade dá margem ao famoso problema da medição quântica.
O problema da medição será analisado em detalhe nos capítulos seguintes, e é a inconsistência mais séria daquilo que se
entende por interpretação de Copenhague. Deixarei a análise e
44
discussão dessa problemática para os capítulos seguintes. Por
ora, me aterei ao delineamento dos termos que serão utilizados
para a discussão subsequente acerca de tal problema. Pelo que
foi considerado aqui, parece seguro delinear uma definição para
o termo complementaridade de acordo com a seguinte notação
de Jammer:
Uma determinada teoria T admite uma interpretação
de complementaridade se as seguintes condições forem satisfeitas: (1) T contém (ao menos) duas descrições D1 e D2 , de seu conteúdo; (2) D1 e D2 , referem-se
ao mesmo universo de discurso U (no caso de Bohr, a
microfísica); (3) nem D1 nem D2 , se tomados individualmente, respondem exaustivamente todos os fenômenos de U; (4) D1 e D2 são mutuamente exclusivos,
no sentido de que a sua combinação numa única descrição engendraria em contradições lógicas. (Jammer,
1974, p. 104).
Os pontos (1) a (3) são equivalentes a uma descrição sucinta
daquilo que foi exposto até aqui. O ponto (4), no entanto, merece
atenção, uma vez que dele emerge um problema de ordem lógica.
O termo complementaridade se refere também à incompatibilidade dos modos clássicos de descrição quando há a tentativa de
que sua combinação leve a um único modo de descrição para os
fenômenos quânticos. No entanto, em lógica clássica, a conjunção de duas fórmulas verdadeiras é também uma fórmula válida,
de modo que D1 e D2 (no caso da complementaridade aplicada à
teoria quântica, correspondendo respectivamente às descrições
ondulatórias e corpusculares dos objetos quânticos) são formas
válidas. Sendo assim, sua combinação também deveria ser válida.
Portanto, como apontam da Costa e Krause:
[. . .] se α e β são as duas teses ou teoremas de uma teoria (fundada na lógica clássica), então α ∧ β também
45
é uma tese (ou um teorema) dessa teoria. Isto é o que
entendemos intuitivamente quando dizemos que, com
base na lógica clássica, uma proposição “verdadeira”
não pode “excluir” outra proposição “verdadeira”. [. . .]
Isso corresponde ao fato de que, em lógica clássica, se
α é consequência de um conjunto de afirmações ∆ e β
é também uma consequência de ∆, então α∧β (α e β) é
também uma consequência do ∆. Se β é a negação de
α (ou vice-versa), então essa regra implica que a partir
do conjunto de fórmulas ∆ deduzimos uma contradição α ∧ ¬α (ou ¬β ∧ β). Além disso, quando α e β são
incompatíveis em algum sentido, α ∧ β constitui uma
impossibilidade. (da Costa e Krause, 2006, p. 107).
Isso indica que a noção de complementaridade formulada
por Bohr poderia encontrar dificuldades, caso a lógica clássica
seja utilizada como a linguagem subjacente da teoria, visto que,
da forma como enunciado, o conceito de “complementaridade”
levaria a uma contradição —o que tornaria o conceito inconsistente. Para da Costa e Krause (2006, p. 112), talvez a única solução
para tal problema seria a modificação da lógica subjacente na
linguagem da complementaridade para um sistema no qual uma
contradição estrita (tal como α∧¬α) não seria deduzida dos pares
complementares, ou seja, da fórmula α ∧ β (sob as condições expostas acima, respectivamente correspondentes às variáveis D1
e D2 ).6
A despeito de todas as dificuldades que, como vimos, a interpretação de Copenhague apresenta, procurei até aqui precisar uma definição desse conceito para que possamos discutir
6
Para uma breve formulação de uma lógica desse tipo, ver
da Costa e Krause (2006, p. 112–116). Não me comprometerei aqui com
um sistema lógico em particular, mas me limitarei à exposição dos problemas
que surgem ao utilizar o raciocínio clássico (lógico e físico) para a mecânica
quântica. A discussão em torno desse ponto se estenderá nos capítulos
seguintes.
46
adiante sobre o problema da medição. No entanto, tal definição
não terá precisão arbitrariamente grande na medida em que (1),
como já disse anteriormente, o próprio Bohr não delineou uma
definição precisa e nem mesmo os comentadores apresentam
consenso sobre a complementaridade de Bohr; assim, é possível interpretá-la desde uma concepção antirrealista (sendo essa
a maneira tradicional) até uma concepção realista acerca da mecânica quântica.7 A discussão acerca do último ponto será realizada no Capítulo 2 sob a ótica do posicionamento de Bohr sobre
as críticas de incompletude de sua interpretação. Sobre o primeiro ponto, talvez o mais próximo de uma definição que Bohr
(1962, p. 10) chega é que o postulado quântico nos obriga a adotar um novo modo de descrição descrita como complementar.
Assim, para que eu possa prosseguir com a discussão, adotarei, por ora, para fins práticos, essa definição (ainda que incompleta) que Bohr oferece sobre a complementaridade: tenha em
mente essa definição em todas as ocorrências de tal termo neste
livro.
1.3
Uma interpretação fragmentada
Com o arcabouço conceitual exposto até então, é oportuno discutir sobre as diferenças filosóficas dos considerados principais
autores daquilo que se entende por interpretação de Copenhague. Ainda que uma análise exaustiva acerca do debate filosófico
entre os dois autores esteja fora do escopo deste livro, apontarei algumas considerações notáveis sobre determinados aspectos de suas divergências.
7
Como exemplo de uma leitura que endossa o antirrealismo de Bohr, podese referir a obra de Faye (1991). Já a obra de Folse (1985) oferece, em contraponto, uma leitura realista dos escritos de Bohr. O debate entre Faye e Folse
acerca da postura de Bohr quanto ao realismo científico pode ser encontrado
em Faye (1994) e Folse (1994).
47
Um dos pontos essenciais dentre as (diversas) diferenças filosóficas entre Heisenberg e Bohr seria, para Camilleri (2007, p. 521),
o fato de que, por um lado, Heisenberg enfatiza a necessidade do
entendimento do significado do formalismo da teoria quântica
enquanto, por outro lado, Bohr enfatiza a necessidade de uma
descrição completa dos fenômenos quânticos. Assim, como uma
forma preliminar, podemos discutir a diferença entre Heisenberg
e Bohr acerca da delineação dos limites da teoria e da interpretação da mecânica quântica.
Para Heisenberg, o formalismo matemático da teoria deveria
ser suficientemente elaborado para que pudesse ser feita uma
descrição exaustiva dos fenômenos, pois sua concepção era a de
que não existiria algo que não pudesse ser expresso de acordo
com uma formulação matemática —o que, como aponta Heisenberg, não seria o caso para Bohr:
[. . .] a clareza matemática não tinha em si qualquer virtude para Bohr. Ele temia que a estrutura matemática
formal fosse obscurecer o núcleo físico do problema,
e, em qualquer caso, ele estava convencido de que
uma explicação física completa deve absolutamente
preceder a formulação matemática. (Heisenberg, 1967,
p. 98).
Tal controvérsia se daria somente no plano da ordenação ou
“precedência” dos conceitos; a discussão acerca da importância
e do alcance, tanto do formalismo quanto da interpretação da
teoria quântica, não seria, de acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 67), o
aspecto central do debate entre Bohr e Heisenberg em relação à
interpretação das relações de indeterminação. A chave de leitura
para a compreensão desse debate seria, portanto, a diferença no
ponto de partida escolhido por cada autor: ao passo que Heisenberg partiria do formalismo, o ponto de partida da interpretação
de Bohr acerca das relações seria, de acordo com Jammer (1974,
48
p. 66–69), a dualidade onda-partícula —isto é, a impossibilidade
de reduzir a descrição dos objetos quânticos aos aspectos exclusivamente corpusculares ou ondulatórios, visto que ambas as
formas são encontradas nos experimentos quânticos.
Bohr haveria encontrado indicações de que o argumento de
Heisenberg conectaria descrições de partículas com descrições
de ondas que, assim, “pressupõem implicitamente a dualidade
onda-partícula”.8 De fato, como enfatiza Chibeni (2005, p. 15), o
experimento mental do microscópio de raios gama pressupõe
uma ontologia de partículas enquanto utiliza, ao mesmo tempo,
conceitos ondulatórios (como uma função de onda) para a representação matemática dos objetos quânticos.
Outro argumento apresentado em Jammer (1974, p. 69), seria o
de que, originalmente, quaisquer derivações das relações de Heisenberg a partir dos experimentos mentais (como o do microscópio de raios gama) precisariam utilizar as equações de Einstein–
de Broglie, que conectam descrições da física de partículas com a
física ondulatória. No entanto, considero que os argumentos anteriores, sem a necessidade de adentrar numa discussão acerca
do formalismo da teoria quântica, são suficientes para expor o
ponto de vista de Bohr.
Heisenberg e Bohr concordavam com o fato de que a interpretação da teoria quântica deveria utilizar a terminologia
da física clássica. No entanto, ao passo que Heisenberg afirmava a insuficiência dos termos da física de ondas ou da física de partículas para uma explicação completa dos fenômenos
quânticos —insuficiência essa expressa nas próprias relações de
indeterminação—, Bohr afirmava a necessidade do uso de ambas
as teorias. Para Bohr, no entanto, o significado do termo ‘explicação’ deveria ser revisado.
8
Ainda que a dualidade onda-partícula seja um aspecto central da mecânica quântica, optei por não abordá-lo neste livro, visto que essa problemática recai na questão sobre a linguagem a ser utilizada para uma descrição dos
fenômenos quânticos.
49
Em seu sentido clássico, uma explicação seria um modo
único, suficiente, para o esgotamento da descrição de um objeto.
Segundo Bohr (1962, p. 15–16), essa acepção do termo seria empregada por Heisenberg ao afirmar que um esquema matemático
seria mais adequado para a explicação dos fenômenos quânticos
do que uma ressignificação dos conceitos clássicos (quer sejam
da física de partículas ou da física ondulatória) já utilizados para
a descrição dos objetos quânticos. Contrariamente, Bohr (1962,
p. 96) define uma nova acepção do termo explicação afirmando
que “devemos, em geral, estar preparados para aceitar o fato de
que uma elucidação completa do mesmo e único objeto pode
requerer diversos pontos de vista que desafiam uma descrição
única”, em que os “diversos pontos de vista” seriam os aspectos
complementares da descrição quântica.
A questão do distúrbio descontínuo do ato da medição seria
uma indicação da impossibilidade de definição simultânea das
propriedades observáveis de um objeto quântico, ou seja, de um
modo único de explicação para os fenômenos quânticos. Dito de
outra forma, o indeterminismo expresso pelas relações de Heisenberg, para Bohr, seria um exemplo matemático da ruptura ou
descontinuidade própria do ato de medição, o que obrigaria a
formulação de pontos de vista diversos, complementares, para
uma descrição exaustiva do objeto quântico —a linguagem de tal
descrição deve permanecer, de acordo com a operação experimental (complementar) em questão, na terminologia clássica—,
sendo a indeterminação expressa pelas relações de Heisenberg,
o preço a se pagar, caso haja a tentativa de aplicação simultânea
dos termos clássicos mutuamente exclusivos.
Ao que parece, a descontinuidade implícita nos processos
de medição é um fator chave para que eu possa delinear algumas das divergências filosóficas fundamentais entre Heisenberg
e Bohr.
Enquanto para Heisenberg tal descontinuidade seria ex50
pressa através de uma formulação matemática, sob a nomenclatura de “redução do pacote de onda”,9 para Bohr, a situação seria totalmente diferente. Na medida em que Bohr não considera
que o formalismo matemático da teoria quântica tenha um significado por si —ou seja, considera que o formalismo precisa ser
interpretado— ou mesmo que represente algo real no sentido físico do termo, o problema implicado pela chamada redução do
pacote de onda não seria um problema, caso fosse uma noção
limitada ao formalismo em si mesmo.
Talvez esse seja o motivo pelo qual Henry Folse (1994) considere Bohr um antirrealista quando diz respeito às teorias, isto
é, ao formalismo, e um realista no que tange às entidades empíricas, na medida em que considera um objeto quântico uma
entidade real (quando observada). Assim, o problema da medição (cuja contrapartida no formalismo seria a própria noção de
redução do pacote de ondas, na terminologia de Heisenberg) parece ainda se aplicar na interpretação de Bohr, visto que a ruptura
implícita no ato de medição é algo que se mantém.
De acordo com Camilleri (2007, p. 522), essa diferença da precedência do formalismo matemático implica maneiras diferentes de visualizar o próprio problema da descontinuidade referido
acima (o que ele chama de “o paradoxo implícito da mecânica
quântica”). Pois, se Heisenberg define um sistema quântico nos
termos de uma fórmula matemática, como uma função de onda,
essa definição independe da experimentação. Ainda que não se
possa atribuir realidade física à função de onda (pelo princípio
de medição=criação), essa representação seria aplicável para a
descrição de um objeto quântico em termos de propensões ou
possibilidades. Heisenberg (1958, p. 53) enfatiza que essa realidade se daria num plano potencial —em contraste ao plano atual
9
Que futuramente ficou conhecida como o “colapso”. Tratarei desse assunto
nos próximos capítulos.
51
dos fenômenos empíricos—, remontando ao pensamento aristotélico de potência e ato10
Por outro lado, a definição de um sistema quântico, independentemente de sua relação com um contexto operacional, não
teria significado na semântica de Bohr, que busca na própria experimentação as condições de possibilidade de definição dos objetos quânticos. Assim, ao passo em que para Heisenberg a descontinuidade é fruto de um distúrbio interacional entre a agência de medição e o objeto quântico medido, Bohr enfatiza que tal
descontinuidade seria uma limitação na definibilidade, e não um
distúrbio físico.
Ainda assim, a tese de que ocorre um distúrbio físico aparece dentre as teses principais da interpretação de Copenhague.
Pessoa Junior (2003, p. 87–98) elenca, em dez tópicos, as principais teses atribuídas àquilo que se chama de “interpretação ortodoxa”, dos quais sublinharei apenas um: o distúrbio interacional,
que afirma que há uma interação física entre o objeto observado
e a agência de medição que observa tal objeto.
Esse ponto é uma das vias para se chegar ao problema da medição, motivo pelo qual a interpretação de Copenhague foi duramente criticada nos anos 1930, sob a acusação de incompletude.
No Capítulo 2, analisarei os debates sobre a completude da mecânica quântica, enfatizando o comprometimento ontológico dos
pontos de vista de Einstein e Bohr em relação ao distúrbio interacional e ao problema da medição.
Procurei, neste capítulo, esboçar alguns pontos centrais da
interpretação de Copenhague, bem como seus aspectos filosoficamente problemáticos. Devo enfatizar que de modo algum
busco aqui uma descrição exaustiva dos conceitos de indeterminação e complementaridade, mas meramente uma definição para
possibilitar a discussão feita nos capítulos seguintes. Na realidade, uma descrição completa de tais conceitos —especialmente
10
Ver d’Espagnat (1999, p. 257–258) e Heisenberg (1958, p. 147–148).
52
a noção de complementaridade— não é uma tarefa fácil: conforme aponta Jammer (1974, p. 88) nem mesmo os interlocutores
contemporâneos a Bohr foram capazes de compreender completamente sua interpretação da teoria quântica. Como procurei evidenciar ao longo deste capítulo, grande parte de tal deficiência
se dá pelo fato de que Bohr jamais teria oferecido uma descrição formal para a noção de medição, apesar de ser uma noção
central em suas ideias.
Com o que foi exposto até aqui, poderemos entender melhor
alguns aspectos filosóficos nos fundamentos da mecânica quântica, especificamente do conceito de medição. Destaco como a
interpretação de Copenhague oferece uma visão de mundo bastante contraintuitiva em relação à nossa percepção ordinária da
realidade à nossa volta, principalmente no que diz respeito à suposição —ou até mesmo à certeza— ontológica da existência independente dos objetos que compõem o mundo à nossa volta
e do determinismo causal implícito na linearidade dos eventos
que experienciamos cotidianamente. No próximo capítulo, analiso em detalhes o debate entre Einstein e Bohr, que suscitou diversas questões filosóficas acerca da problemática da medição.
53
Capítulo 2
Visões de mundo em conflito
Neste capítulo, analisarei um dos debates filosóficos centrais no
que se refere às questões de princípios ou fundamentos da mecânica quântica, especificamente em relação ao debate entre Albert
Einstein e Niels Bohr. Saliento que as pressuposições ontológicas
de ambos os autores, que se mostrarão claras ao longo do debate
aqui proposto, são fundamentais para a compreensão de tal debate; da mesma forma, são fundamentais para compreender o
momento em que se insere o problema da medição quântica, que
será discutido detalhadamente no próximo capítulo.
Para tanto, caracterizo os termos utilizados, procurando, inicialmente, destacar de que modo uma questão concernente à interpretação da mecânica quântica se insere na problemática filosófica. Em seguida, busco uma definição para o termo “ontologia”
que utilizarei ao longo do texto, o que me permitirá adentrar nos
aspectos ontológicos do debate entre Bohr e Einstein, a fim de
especificar os pressupostos ontológicos por detrás da argumentação de cada autor. Assim, será possível delinear a questão da
medição quântica como um debate essencialmente filosófico.
Segundo Heisenberg:
A física moderna e, em especial, a teoria quântica [. . .]
54
levantou uma série de questões muito gerais, concernentes não só a problemas estritamente físicos, como
também relacionados ao método das ciências naturais exatas e à natureza da matéria. Tais questões levaram os físicos a reconsiderar os problemas filosóficos que pareciam estar definitivamente resolvidos no
estreito quadro da física clássica. (Heisenberg, 1958,
p. 10).
Com o advento da mecânica quântica, principalmente no final
dos anos 1920, muitos físicos da época se questionaram acerca
dos fundamentos das noções de realidade —noções estas formadas no modelo da física clássica—, instigando debates acerca das
implicações ontológicas da mecânica quântica.
A noção de “crise” apresentada na obra de Kuhn (1989, p. 119–
120) parece refletir a problemática que surge com o advento da
teoria quântica no século XX. A revisão paradigmática que a mecânica quântica propõe no terreno da física pode ser abordada
por diversos aspectos. Limito-me, aqui, a discutir aquilo que, na
teoria kuhniana, constitui as diferenças “substanciais”, ou seja,
as diferenças ontológicas num sentido de diferentes “mobiliários
do mundo”. Segundo Preston (2008, p. 56), paradigmas sucessivos “[. . .] envolvem diferentes ontologias como por exemplo, diferentes listas dos tipos de objetos que o mundo contém”. Nesse
sentido, analiso a problemática de visualizar a concepção da mecânica quântica sob a ótica da física clássica como ontológica.
Para que possamos compreender um pouco melhor o recorte
aqui proposto, assumirei uma distinção utilizada por Cushing
(1994, p. 9), ainda que grosseira, entre “formalismo” e “interpretação”, segundo a qual, o formalismo é o cálculo simbólico utilizado para fazer predições teóricas e experimentais, enquanto a
interpretação seria “[. . .] a história correspondente ao mobiliário
do mundo —uma ontologia)”. As questões sobre os limites entre
“teoria” e “interpretação” são muito mais complexas do que isso.
55
Essa distinção, no entanto, deve bastar para uma aproximação
inicial ao tema.
Desse modo, assumo que o debate em relação à interpretação
do formalismo da teoria quântica se trata de um debate filosófico, especificamente ontológico, na medida em que lida com as
entidades que compõem o mundo —entidades essas dadas pela
teoria, isto é, pelo debate teórico (científico). Portanto, os dois
momentos do debate acerca da mecânica quântica (filosófico e
científico) configuram instâncias diversas, por mais que estejam
intrinsecamente conectados entre si.
Ainda assim, enfatizo que minha discussão se limitará, neste
livro, aos aspectos filosóficos, especificamente ontológicos do
debate. Para me referir ao debate ontológico de uma teoria física, é preciso antes categorizar o termo “ontologia”. Procurarei
delinear brevemente uma definição para esse termo, que usarei
ao longo deste livro.
2.1
As ontologias da ciência e a ontologia do
mundo
Hofweber (2018) elencou, dentre os principais usos na história da
filosofia, quatro principais sentidos ou acepções do termo “ontologia”, dos quais seleciono, para o propósito da discussão, apenas
dois. São eles: o estudo acerca do que há, que chamarei de OT , e
o estudo do comprometimento ontológico, que chamarei de ON .
O sentido OT é comumente chamado sentido tradicional do
termo “ontologia”, o que remete às discussões, desde Aristóteles, acerca de uma “filosofia primeira” cuja parte central seria a
ontologia. Assim, o sentido OT , ou tradicional, carrega a pressuposição de ser a única ontologia, isto é, a descrição mais geral do
ser enquanto ser assim como ele é.
Diferentemente, ao mencionar o sentido ON , ou naturalizado,
56
tem-se implícito, principalmente, o pensamento de Quine (1966),
no qual me apoio para me referir à existência de entidades, através da linguagem que utilizamos para descrever as teorias científicas, o que se torna explícito quando as sentenças são trazidas
para uma linguagem formal.
Conforme argumentado por Russell (1905), algumas expressões linguísticas envolvem quantificação existencial. Por exemplo, a frase “um objeto quântico” carrega, implicitamente, o
sentido: “existe algo tal que esse algo é um objeto quântico”.
Como observou Davidson (1980), até mesmo sentenças de ação
pressupõem o quantificador existencial (∃); assim, se o termo
“ontologia” for entendido no sentido ON , pode-se dizer que
uma sentença como “uma medição efetuada sobre um elétron”
compromete-se com a existência de uma entidade subatômica.
Se a linguagem de uma teoria traz consigo um comprometimento racional com a existência de uma entidade, pode-se dizer
que a teoria se compromete ontologicamente com essa entidade.
É importante notar que tal afirmação não diz qual ontologia é correta, mas diz como nos comprometemos com certas entidades —
e, portanto, com uma ontologia num sentido OT que as suporte. É
nesse sentido que Quine (1966, p. 66) expressa sua máxima: “[. . .]
ser é ser o valor de uma variável”.
É interessante fazermos uma pausa aqui e chamar a atenção
para uma questão delicada. A máxima Quineana poderia ser interpretada de modo a considerar que as variáveis em questão seriam variáveis dentro da linguagem da lógica clássica, exclusivamente. No entanto, conforme procurei expor no capítulo anterior,
podem existir dificuldades no caso de considerar a lógica clássica como a única lógica adequada para o pleno entendimento
da totalidade dos fenômenos e problemas da mecânica quântica
—tese com a qual não compartilho.
Diante essa problemática, diversos apontamentos acerca de
quais desses princípios da lógica clássica podem ser revisados
57
para a mecânica quântica foram formulados: (i) o princípio de
não contradição, da forma como sugerem Cattaneo et al. (2009,
p. 127–226); (ii) o princípio do terceiro excluído, conforme sugere Heisenberg (1958, p. 181); (iii) a lei de distributividade, da
forma como sugerem Birkhoff e von Neumann (1936). Não discutirei aqui qual dos sistemas lógicos não clássicos1 seria o mais
adequado ao contexto da mecânica quântica (nem mesmo compartilho da ideia de que a lógica clássica seja inadequada para a
mecânica quântica), isto é, não me comprometo com algum sistema não clássico em particular. Ao invés disto, me aterei à posição de Krause, da Costa e Bueno (2007, p. 757), para os quais outras lógicas podem ajudar na compreensão de certos aspectos
da realidade quântica que não são facilmente explicáveis quando
tratadas à maneira da lógica clássica, diferentemente das posições normativas de que a lógica da mecânica quântica não deve
ser a lógica clássica.
Da forma como procurei enfatizar no capítulo anterior, a complementaridade de Bohr seria um dos casos em que uma lógica não clássica ajudaria significativamente na compreensão
dos conceitos envolvidos. Assim, visto que considero a possibilidade da utilização de sistemas lógicos não clássicos para a interpretação da mecânica quântica, adoto aqui a relativização do
princípio de Quine, proposta por da Costa (2002, p. 284): “penso
que ser é ser o valor de uma variável em uma dada linguagem
com uma determinada lógica”.
Feitas tais considerações acerca da lógica subjacente, retornei à questão dos dois sentidos para a ontologia. À primeira
1
Embora seja de difícil caracterização, é possível esboçar uma descrição do
paradigma lógico-clássico. Quando utilizo o termo “lógica não clássica”, tenho
em mente precisamente uma lógica pautada pelos princípios de identidade,
terceiro excluído e não contradição —o que equivaleria àquilo que da Costa
(1980, p. 8) chama de “grande lógica”. Ainda assim, pode haver lógicas não
clássicas que conservem os princípios supracitados. Uma discussão aprofundada sobre esse assunto pode ser encontrada em da Costa (1993).
58
vista, os sentidos OT e ON do termo “ontologia” são excludentes. No entanto, tomarei a posição de Arenhart e Krause (2012),
que compatibilizam as duas acepções do termo, no preciso sentido em que ON não implica naquilo que de fato existe ou não,
mas somente nas entidades com as quais as teorias científicas se
comprometem. Desse modo, pode-se dizer que, se o sentido ON
está diretamente associado a uma ou outra teoria científica, então depende de aspectos da investigação empírica. Assim, se de
ON resulta que nossos pressupostos nos comprometem ontologicamente com certo tipo de entidade, devemos ou aceitar uma
resposta para uma questão do tipo OT acerca de tal entidade ou
revisar nossos pressupostos filosóficos.
Dito de outro modo, o estudo da ontologia associada a uma
teoria científica, num sentido ON , isto é, a análise sobre os objetos que compõem o mundo adotados por essa teoria, não exclui
a possibilidade da formulação de uma ontologia num sentido OT
baseado no mobiliário ontológico que a teoria fornece. Assim, por
mais que os dois sentidos mencionados não sejam excludentes,
no que tange aos propósitos da presente análise, basta dizer que
assumo, da mesma forma que Arenhart e Krause (2012, p. 48), que
“é legítimo investigar a ontologia de uma teoria (ou associada a
uma teoria)” —num sentido localizado e descritivo, conforme explicitado anteriormente no sentido ON , de modo que não tratarei
aqui uma ontologia num sentido OT .2
Por fim, é oportuno enfatizar que não utilizo o termo “metafísica”. Me alinho com uma tendência recente na metafísica
analítica, seguindo autores tais como Arenhart (2012), Hofweber
(2016), Tahko (2015), Thomson-Jones (2017), Arroyo e Arenhart
(2019) e Arenhart e Arroyo (2021a), para quem a ontologia trata de
questões relativas à existência de certas entidades, enquanto a
“metafísica” ou “perfil metafísico” trata sobre questões relativas
2
Ainda que o Capítulo 4 traga algumas considerações a respeito de OT .
59
à natureza de tais entidades. Este capítulo trata exclusivamente
da ontologia da mecânica quântica, portanto, de ON .
Em suma, podemos classificar a terminologia apresentada
aqui da seguinte maneira: OT diz o que há, de fato, no mundo
em que vivemos; ON diz o que há modulo uma teoria científica
em questão; e a tese do realismo científico é a correspondência
de ON em OT .
Neste capítulo, argumentarei que o cerne do debate entre interpretações da teoria quântica estaria em uma concepção de realidade, do tipo OT , que seria um tipo de “escolha filosófica” feita
por cada um de seus proponentes. Mais ainda, argumentarei que
essa escolha tem implicações do tipo ON . Analiso, neste capítulo,
o debate entre Einstein e Bohr para visualizar essa questão.
2.2
A realidade da mecânica quântica
As teses associadas à interpretação de Copenhague, analisadas
no Capítulo 1, foram por muito tempo consideradas uma atitude
dominante entre os físicos. No entanto, Einstein nunca teria condescendido à atitude dessa interpretação frente aos pressupostos ontológicos ON que ela carregava. Poderíamos destacar suas
reticências em relação ao indeterminismo implicado pelo princípio da indeterminação de Heisenberg e às considerações acerca
da causalidade propostas pela complementaridade de Bohr, mas
Einstein se opunha, sobretudo, à tese do distúrbio interacional.
Isso pois Einstein teria preferências ontológicas OT nas quais os
estados não observados devem possuir propriedades bem definidas.
Vale recapitular que o argumento do distúrbio interacional
afirma que há, em um processo de medição, uma interação física
entre o objeto observado e a agência de medição que observa
tal objeto. Tal argumento é considerado um argumento calcado
60
na concepção clássica, na medida em que pressupõe a tese da separabilidade como OT . Isto é, o argumento pressupõe que todos
os objetos especialmente distintos existem em distintos estados
físicos. Dito de outro modo, um aparelho de medição só poderia
perturbar um objeto que já esteja lá para ser perturbado. Essa
afirmativa, como vimos no Capítulo 1, parece indicar um compromisso com uma ideia essencialmente clássica de medição. No
entanto, a interpretação de Copenhague afirma que, a princípio,
o conhecimento empírico de tais estados é impossibilitado pelo
postulado quântico. Assim, a afirmação do distúrbio interacional
é confusa e abriu espaço para muitas críticas na década de 30.
Dentre elas, e talvez a principal, viria por parte de Einstein.
Para alguns historiadores da física, como Jammer (1974,
p. 120), o debate entre Bohr e Eintein seria “um dos grandes debates na história da física”. Ademais, para Folse (1994, p. 126), o
pensamento de Bohr só poderia ser considerado totalmente maduro após discussões estabelecidas com Einstein, principalmente
no que diz respeito ao conceito de medição. Isto é, se antes de
tal debate Bohr haveria endossado a tese do distúrbio interacional, depois dele, certamente, isso já não mais seria o caso. O
debate entre Einstein e Bohr em relação à completude da mecânica quântica é um ótimo exemplo de como as diferenças numa
ontologia ON direciona ou ao menos influencia a concepção da
interpretação da teoria quântica de cada autor.
Para que possamos visualizar essa tese, iniciarei com a análise do famoso artigo de Einstein, Podolsky e Rosen (1983 [doravante citado como EPR, 1983]). O artigo, redigido por Podolsky,
questiona a atitude da interpretação de Copenhague frente à noção de medição, como busco analisar adiante.
De acordo com a interpretação de Copenhague, as propriedades dos objetos quânticos não teriam valores definidos simultaneamente, devido à impossibilidade da medição de tais quantidades. Ou seja, o estado de um objeto individual em qualquer
61
tempo determinado não teria valores definidos para todas as
suas quantidades físicas. Einstein, Podolsky e Rosen (EPR, 1983)
propõem um contraexemplo, mediante um experimento de pensamento (Gedankenexperiment), em que medições precisas e simultâneas pudessem de fato ser efetuadas sobre as propriedades observáveis.
Tal raciocínio é frequentemente referido sob a nomenclatura
de “paradoxo EPR”. No entanto, seguirei a proposta de Jammer
(1974, p. 187–188) de optar pelo termo “argumento EPR” visto que
os próprios autores jamais consideraram sua tese como um paradoxo, nem no sentido medieval, de insolubilidade, nem no sentido moderno de uma antinomia sintática ou semântica. O primeiro autor a considerar o argumento EPR como paradoxal foi
Schrödinger (1983, p. 556) no sentido etimológico do termo “paradoxo”, isto é, no sentido de ser contrário à opinião corrente na
medida em que o argumento EPR implicaria a renúncia do princípio de localidade, um princípio deveras intuitivo na época (e
até mesmo nos dias de hoje), ou seja, favorável à opinião corrente. Deve ficar claro que tratarei aqui do argumento conforme
exposto por EPR, deixando de lado, portanto, formulações posteriores tal como a de Bohm (1951a, p. 611–623). O argumento EPR
se baseia, de acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 184), em quatro premissas principais, em que as duas primeiras são formuladas, e as
duas últimas são assumidas. Seguirei a reconstrução de Jammer
(1974, p. 184), embora não seja a ordenação do artigo original de
Einstein, Podolsky e Rosen (EPR, 1983, p. 138). São elas:
1. Critério de realidade: os elementos de realidade física não
podem ser determinados por considerações filosóficas a
priori, mas têm de ser encontrados por meio de resultados
experimentais e medições. “[. . .] Se, sem perturbar de forma
alguma um sistema, podemos prever com segurança (isto
é, com uma probabilidade igual à unidade) o valor de uma
quantidade física, então existe um elemento da realidade
62
física correspondente a essa quantidade física” (EPR, 1983,
p. 138).
2. Critério de completude: uma teoria é completa se e somente
se “[. . .] cada elemento da realidade física tem uma contrapartida na teoria física” (EPR, 1983, p. 138).
3. Assunção da localidade: se “no momento da medição de
[. . .] dois sistemas que já não mais interagem, nenhuma
mudança real pode ocorrer no segundo sistema em consequência de qualquer coisa que possa ser feito com o primeiro sistema” (EPR, 1983, p. 140).
4. Assunção da validade: “[. . .] as previsões estatísticas da mecânica quântica —na medida em que sejam relevantes para
o argumento em si— são confirmadas pela experiência”
(Jammer, 1974, p. 184).
É notável que a formulação do critério de realidade carrega
pressuposições do tipo OT , na medida em que considera a realidade física “algo” cuja existência espaço-temporal seja objetiva e
independente. Esse tipo de pressuposição é frequentemente associada aos conceitos de de “realidade física” da física clássica.
De acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 184), a estrutura do argumento
seria tal que, sob a base fornecida por 1), as assunções 3) e 4)
implicariam que a mecânica quântica não satisfaria o critério 2),
que é o critério de completude. Como um corolário, a descrição
fornecida por tal teoria seria, então, incompleta.
Enunciados os critérios, passemos à análise do experimento
de pensamento. Dois objetos quânticos individuais, A e B, separados espacialmente depois de interagirem um com o outro,
seriam medidos. Devo enfatizar que estou tratando aqui do experimento mental clássico EPR, e não de suas reformulações mais
recentes —tal como a de Bohm (1951a).
63
De acordo com o entendimento de EPR, a mecânica quântica,
conforme a interpretação de Copenhague, prevê que o sistema I
perturba o sistema II de forma descontínua. Antes da medição,
os observáveis A e B não possuiriam propriedades bem definidas e, após a medição em algum deles, uma quantidade física
poderia ser determinada sobre o outro. E justamente essa seria
a forma como operaria o princípio da indeterminação, segundo
o qual o conhecimento pleno e simultâneo dos observáveis A e
B não seria possível, visto que, da forma como tal relação fora
interpretada por EPR, a medição de uma quantidade física de algum dos pares implica perturbação ou distúrbio do outro. Nesse
sentido, A e B seriam observáveis com quantidades físicas incompatíveis.
Tendo em vista esses pontos, podemos passar ao argumento
EPR. Se as “quantidades físicas incompatíveis” —A e B— têm realidade simultânea e se a descrição quântica da realidade é completa, então a mecânica quântica deveria fornecer valores precisos e simultâneos para os observáveis incompatíveis A e B. No
entanto, de acordo com o princípio de indeterminação, a mecânica quântica não fornece tais valores precisos simultâneos para
os valores das propriedades de, por exemplo, posição e momento
de um objeto quântico e, por isso, tais propriedades são referidas
como quantidades incompatíveis. Assim, ou a descrição quântica
da realidade não é completa, ou as quantidades físicas incompatíveis não podem ter realidade simultânea. Abaixo, o argumento
EPR é reproduzido sob a forma de uma redução ao absurdo. A
disjunção “ou” do argumento é originalmente introduzida sob a
forma de uma contradição:
• C: A descrição quântica da realidade é completa;
• RS: Quantidades físicas “incompatíveis” podem ter realidade simultânea;
64
• ψAB : A mecânica quântica fornece valores precisos e simultâneos para as quantidades ‘incompatíveis’ A e B.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
P
(RS ∨ B)
P
¬ψAB
1–2
¬(RS ∧ C)
3
¬C ∧ ¬RS
H: EPR
C → RS
C → ¬RS
C → (RS ∧ ¬RS)
¬C
4
5–6
7: RAA
Brevemente: a primeira premissa diz respeito à definição de
completude; a segunda premissa descreve a mecânica quântica.
No terceiro passo, temos um modus tollens a partir de 1 e 2; no
quarto passo temos a aplicação da lei de de Morgan a partir de
3. O quinto passo é a hipótese referente ao critério de realidade,
conforme exposto no argumento EPR. No sexto passo, temos uma
aplicação do silogismo disjuntivo a partir do passo 4; o passo
7 apresenta uma contradição a partir de 5 e 6; o oitavo e último passo apresenta uma conclusão por redução ao absurdo. O
uso do termo “contradição”, conforme empregado no raciocínio,
precisamente após o condicional da etapa “7” da reconstrução
acima, deve ser entendido à maneira da lógica clássica. É preciso
qualificar tal afirmação, pois considero, anteriormente, a legítima
possibilidade da utilização de lógicas não clássicas na interpretação da mecânica quântica.
Tal situação ocorre na medida em que a discussão acerca
de uma interpretação da mecânica quântica acontece no plano
65
metalinguístico, que corresponde a uma porção restrita da linguagem natural. Em tal metalinguagem, as regras semânticas
são pressupostas e, portanto, não formalizadas; assim, a discussão metalinguística acontece em linguagem natural e, por conseguinte, obedece às regras desse discurso que tem a lógica clássica como linguagem subjacente.3 Apresento o argumento EPR de
modo formalizado por questões de clareza; a discussão que apresento em torno da semântica do argumento, no entanto, continua
obedecendo às “regras” metalinguísticas da linguagem natural: a
lógica clássica.
Ademais, como aponta Murdoch (1994, p. 306), o argumento
original, conforme formalizado acima, tem uma estrutura inválida. Como o critério de realidade adotado por EPR implica realidade simultânea das quantidades físicas incompatíveis, deve-se
negar a completude da descrição quântica da realidade. Como
EPR se comprometem com a tese da realidade independente
como OT , fica claro que todos os objetos quânticos possuem realidade independente —logo, simultânea. Isso ocorre, pois a noção de de “realidade simultânea” depende da noção de “realidade objetiva”— ou seja, dois objetos devem, primeiro, existir
objetivamente para que possam ter realidade simultânea. Assim,
Einstein, Podolsky e Rosen (EPR, 1983, p. 141) são “forçados a concluir” que a descrição dos objetos, conforme a mecânica quântica
(modulo interpretação de Copenhague) não é completa.
No mesmo ano, em resposta a EPR, Bohr (1983, p. 145–146)
escreve um artigo argumentando em defesa do princípio de indeterminação. Nele, afirma que:
A aparente contradição [apontada no artigo de EPR]
só evidencia uma inadequação essencial da perspectiva filosófica usual [clássica] de fornecer uma descrição racional dos fenômenos físicos do tipo que esta3
Para uma discussão mais aprofundada sobre isso, ver Church (1956, p. 50–
55) e Krause e Arenhart (2016).
66
mos interessados na mecânica quântica. De fato, a interação finita entre objeto e as agências de medição,
condicionadas pela própria existência do quantum de
ação, implica —devido à impossibilidade de controlar
a reação provocada pelo objeto nos instrumentos de
medição, se estes devem servir a seus propósitos— a
necessidade de uma renúncia final ao ideal clássico
de causalidade e uma revisão radical de nossa atitude
perante o problema da realidade física. (Bohr, 1983,
p. 145–146).
Podemos observar que é precisamente em relação ao critério de realidade, assumido por EPR, frequentemente chamado de
“clássico”, que Bohr (1983) se posiciona contrariamente na passagem acima. Ao rejeitar a tese ON de Einstein, Bohr acaba por
elaborar ainda mais sua própria ON ; no entanto, é tal rejeição é
comumente vista como a necessidade de uma revisão ontológica
para as teorias físicas, ou ainda uma revisão na semântica, isto é,
uma revisão nos limites de aplicação e na definição dos conceitos envolvidos, tal como o conceito de “realidade física”. Nesse
mesmo artigo, diz Bohr:
A possibilidade de atribuir de significado inequívoco
a expressões tais como “realidade física” não pode,
evidentemente, ser deduzida a partir de concepções
filosóficas a priori, mas —como os autores do artigo
citado [EPR] enfatizam— deve ser fundamentada no
recurso direto a experiências e medições. (Bohr, 1983,
p. 145).
Segundo esse raciocínio, se toda medição é limitada à informação que se obtém por meio dela, essa limitação se estende
ao significado que se pode atribuir por meio dela —o que é uma
consequência direta da atitude operacionista, também uma ON ,
67
assumida por Bohr (1928, p. 89–90) nos fundamentos da interpretação de Copenhague. Assim, a própria ideia de uma OT não
seria significativa, isto é, uma realidade “em si”, com o estabelecimento das suas propriedades intrínsecas, fora do contexto do
aparato medidor utilizado. Para visualizar melhor esse aspecto
do argumento de Bohr, vamos utilizar a reconstrução do contraargumento feita por Murdoch (1994, p. 304):
• Observáveis complementares (como posição e momento)
não podem ser medidas simultaneamente; são necessárias operações experimentais mutuamente exclusivas para
a sua medição;
• Uma medição envolve uma interação ineliminável entre o
objeto e as agências de medição;
• A interação com a medição é indeterminável. Qualquer tentativa de medi-la necessitaria de mudanças no arranjo experimental e ao menos mais uma interação, o que impossibilitaria a medição original;
• Portanto, os resultados das medições sucessivas de observáveis complementares não podem ser atribuídos.
De acordo com essa linha de raciocínio, o tipo de experimento
que EPR propuseram não seria possível, pois os termos como
“posição” ou “momento” só teriam significado quando associados a uma operação experimental e, uma vez que só podem ser
designados experimentos mutuamente exclusivos para verificar
o valor de verdade de tais termos, não se poderia atribuir significado a uma sentença como “valores definidos simultaneamente
de posição e momento”.
Tal atitude indica, no limite, que as operações experimentais
deveriam ser condições necessárias para a definição de sentenças tais como “a posição (ou momento) exata”. Na medida em que
68
as operações experimentais necessárias para a definição das propriedades observáveis dos objetos quânticos são mutuamente
exclusivas, as condições para suas definições também o seriam.
Dito de outro modo, a tese ON implícita por trás desse raciocínio é que o contexto experimental deveria determinar e limitar a
expressão “realidade física”.
De fato, é intuitiva a concepção de que o mundo que nos
circunda possui um estatuto ontológico de existência independente. Isto é, que os objetos que o compõem (átomos, partículas,
prédios e montanhas) se limitariam a “estar lá” de forma objetiva, a despeito da observação de qualquer sujeito. Se as coisas
fossem assim, então as propriedades desses objetos existiriam e
teriam propriedades bem definidas antes ou após uma medição,
ou seja, a despeito de qualquer possível medição ou observação.
É justamente essa a definição da noção de “realidade objetiva”
utilizada no argumento EPR.
Essa noção é compatível com a acepção OT do termo ontologia, pois é pretende-se uma descrição da realidade, e não somente um construto da ciência. Isto é, se trata de uma tese que
põe-se à frente da investigação teórica, e molda aquilo que pode
(ou não) ser teorizado pela ciência. Podemos ver aqui a confluência entre duas posições filosóficas: (i) o realismo metafísico e
(ii) o realismo científico. Grosso modo, tais acepções do termo
“realismo” se comprometem com as seguintes teses: (i) há uma
(única) realidade física que existe objetivamente, independente
de qualquer teoria, vontade, consciência ou observador e (ii) é tarefa da ciência descrever corretamente essa realidade por meio
das melhores teorias. A mecânica quântica, no entanto, tem sido,
até hoje, um ótimo campo de debate para essas duas acepções do
termo “realismo”, na medida em que admite interpretações contrárias e favoráveis. A seguir, analisarei em linhas gerais o debate
entre realismo e antirrealismo científico no debate entre Einstein
e Bohr.
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2.3
À procura da Realidade
Em uma carta endereçada a Schrödinger, datada de 19 de Junho
de 1935, Einstein afirmaria que:
Por razões de linguagem, esse [artigo EPR] foi escrito
por Podolsky depois de muita discussão. Ainda assim,
o artigo não saiu da forma como eu originalmente gostaria; ao contrário, o ponto essencial foi, por assim dizer, obscurecido pela erudição.4
A maior ênfase do artigo EPR foi dada na discussão sobre a
possibilidade ou impossibilidade de atribuir valores bem definidos simultaneamente para os pares observáveis (como posição
e momento), discussão essa sobre a qual, na mesma carta, Einstein expressa seu descontentamento através da expressão “ist
mir wurst” —traduzida por Fine (1986, p. 38) como “I coulnd’t care
less” e por Chibeni (1997, p. 56) como “não ligo a mínima”.
De fato, Einstein (1949a, p. 88) não considerava que a noção
de valores simultaneamente bem definidos para os observáveis
fosse indispensável na teoria quântica. Em um sentido mais forte,
não há um comprometimento ontológico, da parte de Einstein
(1949a, p. 87), com a noção de que os objetos tenham, a priori,
valores definidos de posição e momento, mas somente “[. . .] de
acordo com o quadro total de nossa construção teorética”. A concepção de Einstein frente à tarefa da física é fruto tal raciocínio,
segundo a qual:
“Ser” é sempre algo mentalmente construído por nós,
isto é, algo que nós livremente postulamos (no sentido
lógico). A justificativa de tais construções não reside
na sua derivação a partir do que é dado pelos sentidos
4
Extraído de Fine (1986, p. 35, nota 9).
70
[. . .] [mas] em sua qualidade de tornar inteligível o que
é sensorialmente dado [. . .]. (Einstein, 1949b, p. 699).
Tal concepção essencialmente contrária ao operacionismo,
na medida em que afirma que a realidade não se reduz à experiência sensorial —o que não implica uma posição idealista, isto
é, de que não exista uma realidade exterior e independente da
mente. Assim, Einstein (1949b, p. 674) entende a noção de “realidade” como algo que deveria ser um programa ou uma meta, ao
invés de algo sobre a qual se deva aceitar a priori.
Uma afirmação desse tipo parece estar em harmonia com o
pensamento de Kuhn em relação à discussão ontológica nas teorias científicas (o que corresponderia ao sentido OT ) quando,
algumas décadas mais tarde, afirma que:
Ouvimos frequentemente dizer que teorias sucessivas
se desenvolvem sempre mais perto da verdade ou se
aproximam mais e mais desta. Aparentemente, generalizações desse tipo referem-se [. . .] à sua ontologia,
isto é, ao ajuste entre as entidades com as quais a teoria povoa a natureza e o que “está realmente aí”. [. . .]
Parece-me que não existe maneira de reconstruir expressões como “realmente aí” sem auxílio de uma teoria; a noção de um ajuste entre a ontologia de uma
teoria e sua contrapartida “real” na natureza pareceme ilusória por princípio. (Kuhn, 1989, p. 253).
Para Murdoch (1994, p. 316), a conclusão é de que “[. . .] não
é a priori que todos os objetos físicos, sejam eles clássicos ou
quânticos, tenham em qualquer momento posição e momento
definidos”. Assim, se Einstein (1949a, p. 88) considerava a noção
de “valores simultâneos para as propriedades observáveis dos
objetos quânticos” uma construção racional, então, da mesma
forma que foi livremente construída, poderia —e deveria, na incidência de situações paradoxais— ser livremente abandonada.
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No entanto, abandonada totalmente —e não parcialmente, isto é,
abandonada na mecânica quântica, mas mantendo-a para a mecânica clássica, da forma como o princípio da correspondência
de Bohr parece sugerir.
Já o referido “ponto essencial”,5 omitido no artigo EPR, é retomado por Einstein (1950, p. 59–97) posteriormente. Seguirei aqui
a reconstrução dos argumentos de Einstein (1950) proposta por
Murdoch (1994, p. 309), segundo a qual o argumento pode ser estruturado da seguinte maneira:
1. O estado físico de um objeto quântico pode ser descrito
tanto pelo vetor |ψi ou |ϕi, e tal descrição depende do tipo
de medição que fazemos em outro objeto, distante, A;
2. O estado físico de um objeto não depende do tipo de medição que fazemos no outro objeto ou sobre o estado físico
do outro objeto (princípio da separação);
3. O objeto B está no mesmo estado físico, quer seja descrito
por |ψi ou |ϕi;
4. Um vetor de estado fornece uma descrição completa do
estado físico de um objeto apenas se descrever exclusivamente esse estado, isto é, exclusivamente |ψi ou |ϕi pode
descrever completamente o estado de um dado objeto (a
condição completude);
5. Na situação EPR, o estado físico do objeto B pode ser descrito quer por |ψi ou |ϕi;
6. Nem |ψi nem |ϕi fornecem uma descrição completa do estado físico de B;
7. Portanto, a mecânica quântica não fornece uma descrição
completa do estado físico de um objeto quântico.
5
Ver Fine (1986, p. 35, nota 9).
72
Uma análise exaustiva do argumento de Einstein não é propósito deste livro, motivo pelo qual assumirei que a reconstrução feita por Murdoch (1994, p. 309) é suficiente. No entanto, é
relevante para minha análise a discussão sobre algumas implicações filosóficas, especialmente nos pontos 2 e 4 da reconstrução
acima.
Em outros textos, Einstein (1949b, p. 681–682) argumenta que
o referido princípio de separação, contido na premissa 2, se divide em dois outros aspectos principais: o princípio da localidade
e o princípio da existência independente. De acordo com o primeiro, o que acontece em uma determinada localização no espaço independe do que acontece em outra determinada localização no espaço, ou seja, não há uma ação à distância imediata
ou instantânea entre objetos que ocupam diferentes lugares no
espaço. De acordo com o último aspecto, o que existe em uma determinada localização do espaço independe daquilo que existe
em outra determinada localização no espaço, isto é, o princípio
da existência independente afirma que não há uma conexão ontológica imediata ou instantânea entre objetos que ocupam diferentes lugares no espaço. Para Murdoch (1994, p. 310), esse seria
o ponto crucial omitido no artigo EPR, sugerindo ainda, que sua
omissão seria o principal motivo pelo qual o argumento fora tão
suscetível a críticas.
Já no princípio de completude, contido no ponto 4 da reconstrução de Murdoch (1994, p. 309), Einstein assume a existência de
somente uma descrição completa de um sistema físico. Os argumentos sobre completude são encontrados em detalhe nas notas autobiográficas de Einstein (1949a, p. 83–87), nas quais há a
afirmação de que se uma função de onda fornece uma descrição completa da realidade —segundo os termos da sua própria
noção de completude explicitada acima—, então existiriam casos em que a medição deveria ser considerada como um ato de
73
criação, ao invés de um ato de revelação do valor de um objeto
medido.
Dito de outro modo, uma descrição completa de um aspecto
físico da realidade seria uma descrição do estado real de um objeto real. Assim, se uma descrição completa não fornece um valor
definido para uma propriedade observável do objeto em questão, significa que tal objeto não tem um valor definido para a
propriedade observável. No entanto, uma medição subsequente
mostraria um valor definido para tal propriedade, precisamente
daquela que não tinha um valor definido. Como consequência,
se assumido o princípio de completude, a medição cria a quantidade definida de uma propriedade observável —e, por conseguinte, num sentido mais forte, a sua realidade física— ao invés
de revelar uma propriedade (ou a realidade física de tal propriedade) pré-existente. Esse aspecto da medição se refere ao princípio da medição=criação.
Essa conclusão seria, no entanto, conflitante com a visão
einsteiniana de mundo, de acordo com a qual, a existência da realidade física independe ontologicamente de uma medição. Para
Einstein (1949b, p. 667), a meta de uma teoria física deveria ser a
de fornecer “[. . .] a descrição completa de qualquer situação real
(e individual, que supostamente existe independentemente de
qualquer ato de observação ou comprovação)”. Assim, seguindo
a linha de raciocínio aqui proposta, o princípio da separação e
o princípio da completude seriam princípios mutuamente exclusivos. Einstein (1949b, p. 682) teria optado por manter apenas o
princípio da separação e, da forma como interpreta a posição de
Bohr, a interpretação de Copenhague optaria por manter apenas
o princípio da completude.
Em suma, Einstein teria ao menos três razões principais para
discordar de Borh: em primeiro lugar, seria a rejeição da tese verificacionista assumida por Bohr; em segundo lugar, estaria a rejeição da tese da medição=criação; em terceiro lugar estaria a
74
rejeição do princípio da completude como um todo, na medida
em que é mutuamente exclusivo em relação ao princípio da separação, princípio esse muito caro para a visão einsteiniana, por
negar uma ação à distância ou uma conexão ontológica simultânea entre as propriedades de dois objetos espacialmente separados. Volto a enfatizar que essa seria a leitura de Einstein sobre a
interpretação de Copenhague, e, principalmente, do pensamento
de Bohr —o que, como veremos adiante, não corresponde necessariamente à tese do próprio Bohr.
Vale relembrar que a proposta no artigo EPR seria a análise
de uma situação em que seria possível atribuir valores bem definidos para as propriedades observáveis de dois objetos A e B.
Na visão de Bohr, a tentativa para essa atribuição de valores seria, a princípio, equivocada, na medida em que qualquer afirmação sobre os valores bem definidos de tais propriedades só seria
dotada de significado em condições experimentais mutuamente
exclusivas. Assim, para Murdoch (1994, p. 311–312), no caso EPR, as
condições experimentais que permitiriam uma afirmação dotada
de significado sobre a propriedade x de um objeto A excluiriam
as condições experimentais que permitiriam uma afirmação dotada de significado sobre o valor bem definido da propriedade y
desse mesmo objeto.
Da mesma forma, as condições experimentais escolhidas para
determinar o estado de A constituiriam as condições para que
se pudesse fazer qualquer tipo de inferência significativa sobre
o objeto B, uma vez que a premissa do princípio da separação
é rejeitada. Logicamente, é rejeitada também a (sub)conclusão 3
de sua reconstrução do argumento de Einstein, isto é, a rejeição
de que os valores das propriedades observáveis de B, quer seja
x ou y, independe dos valores das propriedades observáveis de
A. Assim,
[. . .] nenhuma utilização bem definida do conceito de
“estado” pode ser feita, como referindo-se ao objeto
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separado do corpo com o qual tenha estado em contato, até que as condições externas envolvidas na definição desse conceito sejam inequivocamente fixadas por um controle mais adequado do corpo auxiliar.
(Bohr, 1958a, p. 21).
A situação proposta sugere que é correta a interpretação de
Einstein (1949b, p. 682) de que Bohr rejeitaria o princípio de localidade. A argumentação de Bohr não parece implicar existência
de uma interdependência causal ou mecânica entre os objetos A
e B no que se refere ao ato da medição, mas, ao invés disso, que
a medição efetuada em A determina as condições sobre aquilo
que pode ser dito significativamente sobre B. Assim, não se trataria de uma rejeição do princípio de localidade como um princípio causal, mas da rejeição do princípio de localidade como um
princípio semântico, isto é, seria o caso de afirmar que há uma interdependência semântica —mas não causal—, por meio de uma
operação experimental ou medição entre os objetos A e B. A rejeição por parte de Bohr do princípio de localidade é amplamente
conhecida e difundida nos livros-texto sobre mecânica quântica,
ainda que por muitas vezes a ênfase não seja dada no aspecto
semântico de tal princípio.
No entanto, a localidade seria um dos dois aspectos que compõem um princípio maior, o princípio da separação. O outro aspecto do princípio da separação seria o princípio da existência
independente, em relação ao qual a posição de Bohr é menos
clara. Como foi exposto anteriormente, o princípio da separação
(cujo princípio da existência independente seria um de seus aspectos) é mutuamente exclusivo em relação ao princípio da completude que, por sua vez, implicaria na tese da medição=criação,
tese que Bohr parece rejeitar:
[. . .] a discussão dos problemas epistemológicos na física atômica atraiu tanta atenção como nunca e, ao
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comentar sobre as visões de Einstein no que diz respeito à incompletude de modo de descrição da mecânica quântica, entrei mais diretamente em questões
de terminologia. Nesse contexto, eu adverti especialmente contra frases, muitas vezes encontradas na literatura física, como “perturbação de fenômenos através da observação” ou “criação de atributos físicos
para objetos atômicos através de medições.” Essas frases, que podem servir para lembrar dos aparentes paradoxos na teoria quântica, são ao mesmo tempo capazes de causar confusão, uma vez que palavras como
“fenômenos” e “observações”, assim como “atributos”
e “medições”, são utilizados de forma pouco compatível com a linguagem comum e definição prática. (Bohr,
1958a, p. 63–64).
Essa rejeição seria logicamente acompanhada pela defesa de
que o ato da medição seria um ato de revelação de valores préexistentes do objeto medido sem que, no entanto, como observa
Murdoch (1994, p. 312), “[. . .] tal valor pré-existente revelado seja
um valor absoluto, mas uma propriedade relativa ao arranjo experimental escolhido”.
Por esse motivo, Murdoch (1994, p. 312) classifica a atitude de
Bohr em um terreno médio, entre a posição de Einstein (1949b,
p. 667), segundo a qual uma medição revela de forma passiva valores pré-existentes de uma realidade física que existe de forma
totalmente independente da medição, e a posição de Heisenberg
(1983, p. 73), segundo a qual uma medição cria de forma ativa os
valores de uma realidade física que passa a existir com o ato da
medição. Dito de outra forma, segundo o raciocínio de Murdoch
(1994, p. 312), a posição de Bohr poderia ser considerada como
uma tese semântica, que estaria entre uma tese epistemológica
(expressa por aquilo que chamo de medição=revelação) e uma
tese ontológica (expressa pela medição=criação).
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Da forma como a problemática foi delineada, a posição de
Bohr estaria diretamente relacionada com os limites da definibilidade dos conceitos físicos, isto é, com o significado de tais
conceitos. Na medida em que os limites ou significados seriam
dados mediante a experiência empírica, Murdoch (1994, p. 313)
aproxima esta posição a uma atitude operacionista.
Uma concepção operacionista de significado estabelece que
os termos que denotam um conceito físico ou quantidade teórica têm significado nas operações experimentais utilizadas para
medir tal conceito ou quantidade. Uma concepção operacionista
de significado estabelece que os termos utilizados para denotar
um conceito físico ou quantidade teórica tem valor de verdade
ou valor cognitivo, isto é, podem dizer que algo é verdadeiro ou
falso, se e somente se tal valor de verdade pode ser confirmado
por uma operação experimental. Ainda assim, a leitura operacionista seria confirmada por Bohr na ocasião de uma resposta a
Phillip Frank6 que, em uma carta, questiona se a interpretação de
Bohr poderia ser aproximada à atitude operacionista.
Murdoch (1994, p. 314) vai além e categoriza a concepção de
significado de Bohr como verificacionista, na medida em que a
atribuição do significado dos termos se dá mediante condições
de verificação (em oposição às concepções segundo as quais as
condições para significado ou valor de verdade seriam independentes da verificação experimental). De fato, são posições muito
próximas. Segundo o raciocínio de Murdoch (1994, p. 314), o operacionismo seria um subconjunto do verificacionismo, diferindo
no fato de que o último, em um sentido mais amplo, iguala a noção de significado com a noção de uso, de modo que o significado
de um termo deve ser suportado por condições de verdade cuja
verificabilidade e comunicabilidade são possíveis. Por outro lado,
a atitude operacionista afirma que um termo cujo valor de verdade é impossível de ser determinado não é um termo que pode
6
Ver Beller (1996) e Fine (1986, p. 20).
78
ser utilizado. Dessa forma, Murdoch (1994, p. 314) identifica, na
base verificacionista da posição de Bohr, uma atitude mais próxima ao pragmatismo ao invés de um empirismo radical, como o
operacionismo.
Sob tal perspectiva, Bohr consideraria a noção clássica de
(A) valores simultaneamente bem definidos para posição e momento, uma idealização cujo significado pressupõe uma ação virtualmente nula do postulado quântico; da mesma forma, a noção
de (B) simultaneidade aplicada a fenômenos espacialmente separados seria uma idealização cujo significado pressupõe uma
velocidade infinita. Tais conceitos devem ser aplicados apenas
em um conjunto de condições específicas: utiliza-se (A) quando
os objetos são suficientemente grandes em relação à escala
quântica de aproximadamente 10−33 cm dos quanta e (B) quando
as distâncias são suficientemente pequenas em relação à velocidade de 299.792.458m/s da luz. A visão verificacionista e pragmática de significado assumida por Bohr estaria implicada por trás
dessa visão na medida em que os conceitos não são revisados
(da forma como Einstein (1949b, p. 699) propusera em relação à
formulação de novos conceitos), mas, antes, ressignificados, isto
é, restringidos a um escopo de aplicação (ainda) mais limitado.
A contrapartida metodológica para essa atitude seria o princípio
da correspondência, segundo o qual a física quântica seria uma
generalização da física clássica.
Assim, a rejeição de Bohr em relação ao referido princípio da
existência independente parece ser parcial. Ao passo que não se
pode designar uma operação experimental para determinar se de
fato o estado físico de um objeto B independe do estado físico
de um objeto A distante, a leitura verificacionista de Bohr parece
indicar que tal princípio parece ser desprovido de significado. No
entanto, a afirmação da tese da medição=revelação parece sugerir que o princípio da existência independente não é totalmente
negado.
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Se essa leitura for correta, uma notável implicação ontológica
do pensamento de Bohr no que se refere ao comprometimento
ontológico com uma realidade independente parece emergir, isto
é, uma leitura realista do pensamento desse autor seria possibilitada por essa leitura. Para Faye (1991, p. 198), as diversas definições e discussões acerca de uma definição para a concepção filosófica do realismo têm em comum dois pontos essenciais: “(1) o
mundo existe independentemente de nossas mentes; e (2) a verdade é uma noção não epistêmica; isto é, uma proposição não
é verdadeira porque é provável ou cognoscível”. Segundo Folse
(1994, p. 128), Faye (1994, p. 98) defenderia uma interpretação de
Bohr classificada como um antirrealismo objetivo, na medida em
que Bohr aceitaria (1) e rejeitaria (2).
O antirrealismo da leitura de Faye emergiria da negação da
transcendência das condições de verdade, isto é, da negação do
significado de todas as afirmações indecidíveis (as afirmações
sobre as quais é possível verificar o valor de verdade mediante
uma operação experimental) cujo alcance epistêmico está fora
de qualquer possível sujeito cognoscente; em outras palavras,
da negação de que o significado seja intrínseco ao objeto em si
mesmo:
[. . .] [Sentenças] decidíveis são aquelas que são ou determinadamente verdadeiras ou determinadamente
falsas devido à nossa posse de meios cognitivos em
princípio adequados ou evidências perceptuais pelas
quais podemos verificar ou falsificá-las. Em outras palavras, tais sentenças têm condições de verdade cuja
verificação é acessível. A classe complementar de declarações é aquela cujos membros são indecidíveis,
portanto, não têm valores de verdade determinados,
devido ao fato de que tais sentenças têm condições
de verdade cuja verificação é transcendente. No entanto, em oposição ao antirrealista, o realista diria que
80
até mesmo essas sentenças indecidíveis têm um valor de verdade determinado; o que acontece é que somos incapazes de descobrir qual. Assim, tanto o realista quanto o antirrealista objetivo operam com uma
noção de objetividade. (Faye, 1991, p. 199).
Por outro lado, o termo “objetivo” da nomenclatura “antirrealismo objetivo” de Faye (1991) emerge como uma implicação de
(1), na medida em que as afirmações decidíveis (as afirmações
sobre as quais se possam verificar o valor de verdade mediante
uma operação experimental) tenham suas condições de verdade
garantidas pela realidade independente, por mais que o sentido
de tal afirmação (como o estado de um objeto) seja desconhecido
por qualquer possível sujeito cognoscente. Da forma como Folse
(1994, p. 128–130) interpreta tal leitura, Faye não excluiria a possibilidade de que, para Bohr, um objeto não observado possua de
fato valores bem definidos para suas propriedades físicas como,
por exemplo, posição ou momento. No entanto, uma afirmação
acerca dos valores simultaneamente bem definidos de tais propriedades não seria uma afirmação bem formulada na semântica
da complementaridade e, portanto, seria sem sentido.
Contudo, deve ficar claro que, como observa Faye (1991,
p. 208) em relação a (1), não há evidência textual que sustente
a tese de que Bohr atribuiria valores intrínsecos às propriedades não observadas dos objetos quânticos. Quando Faye (1991,
p. 200) menciona (1), parece fazê-lo enfatizando a objetividade
dos conceitos, em um campo semântico, quiçá epistemológico,
mas, certamente, não ontológico.
O antirrealista objetivo, em relação às declarações sobre a realidade física, toma como ponto de partida as circunstâncias publicamente acessíveis ao especificar sua noção de verdade [. . .].
O antirrealismo objetivo é, então, a posição que sustenta que a
verdade é um conceito que se relaciona com circunstâncias cuja
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ocorrência ou não-ocorrência é, a princípio, empiricamente acessível às nossas capacidades cognitivas.
A visão sobre (1), em relação ao pensamento de Bohr, é compartilhada por Folse (1994, p. 128). Por mais que Faye (1991, p. 204)
e Folse (1994, p. 128) concordem com a visão de que Bohr ocuparia um terreno médio entre os dois extremos do idealismo e
do realismo —o que também coaduna com a leitura de Murdoch
(1994, p. 312)—, Folse defende uma leitura realista do pensamento
de Bohr. Folse (1994, p. 128–131) argumenta que o ponto (2) não
seria tão decisivo quanto o ponto (1) na medida em que o comprometimento ontológico com uma realidade independente seria
mais fundamental do que uma tese epistemológica, relativa ao
domínio do significado dos conceitos utilizados mediante nosso
conhecimento. Em outras palavras, Folse (1994) considera que a
aceitação de (1) seria suficiente para uma interpretação realista
do pensamento de Bohr, tendo em vista o comprometimento ontológico com a existência de uma realidade independente.
No entanto, Faye (1991, p. 207–211) expõe sérias restrições à interpretação realista de Folse, das quais sublinharei apenas uma.
Quando Folse (1985, p. 257) afirma que a interação de um objeto
com os instrumentos de medição produz ou causa o fenômeno,
acaba por admitir a ocorrência da tese da medição=criação —uma
implicação que, como vimos, é rejeitada por Bohr. Além disso, tal
ocorrência parece ser incompatível com o comprometimento ontológico com uma realidade independente. Isto é, a atribuição
de um poder criador ao ato da medição parece ser irreconciliável com a afirmação de que tais propriedades, criadas, já estavam lá mesmo antes do ato criador. Por fim, se a tese de Folse
for correta, então deve haver alguma evidência textual —o que
não há— em que Bohr assume que objetos atômicos possuam intrinsecamente propriedades bem definidas, mas que, no entanto,
não podem ser verificadas empiricamente, dado que uma opera-
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ção experimental não é capaz de revelar aquilo que está por trás
do fenômeno.
O fato de que Bohr acreditava que os objetos quânticos seriam reais é consensual, mas, segundo Faye (2019) ainda há muito
debate na literatura das últimas décadas a respeito do tipo de realidade que eles têm, isto é, se são ou não algo diferente e para
além da observação, de modo que tal questão permanece aberta.
Bohr parece deliberadamente evitar o comprometimento
com as teses realistas e com as teses idealistas através do princípio da correspondência, isto é, pela afirmação de que um objeto
(tal como o aparelho medidor) é considerado um objeto clássico
em um determinado conjunto de circunstâncias, a saber, para os
propósitos da medição. No entanto, esta afirmação acaba por esbarrar em outro problema, talvez ainda mais sério.
A separabilidade assumida para o ato da medição seria parcialmente arbitrária. Para que se possa dizer que ocorreu uma
medição, o objeto medido não pode ser parte da agência de medição, ou seja, é necessária uma distinção entre duas entidades,
de modo que, para fins práticos, um instrumento de medição é
um instrumento de medição, e um objeto é um objeto. Como observa Faye (1991, p. 139), se a separação é assumida, sua interação
é, do ponto de vista do ato da medição, indeterminada, pois “[. . .]
a interação só pode ser determinada se o aparelho de medição
for considerado simultaneamente como um aparelho e como um
objeto, o que é logicamente impossível”.
O que daria o tom de arbitrariedade na distinção proposta
seria o ponto de demarcação da separabilidade, que já seria conhecida por Bohr desde o primeiro artigo em que expõe a complementaridade, no qual afirma que:
[. . .] o conceito de observação é arbitrário pois depende de quais objetos são incluídos no sistema para
ser observado. [. . .] em qual ponto o conceito de observação —envolvendo o postulado quântico, com a sua
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“irracionalidade” inerente— deve ser utilizado é uma
questão de conveniência. (Bohr, 1928, p. 89).
A “questão de conveniência” do critério de demarcação para a
separabilidade do processo de medição foi tida como a resposta
de Bohr frente ao problema da medição, sobre o qual discutirei
no próximo capítulo —solução esta, criticada por diversos pensadores da época.
Heisenberg (2004, p. 410–414) argumentou que, como a linha
de demarcação entre o objeto quântico a ser investigado, representado matematicamente por uma função de onda, e o instrumento de medição, descrito por meio de conceitos clássicos, seria arbitrária, então todos os sistemas (incluindo o instrumento
de medição) deveriam ser considerados sistemas quânticos, isto
é, as leis quânticas deveriam se aplicar de forma irrestrita.
Sob a mesma linha de raciocínio, von Neumann (1955) elaborou uma concepção de medição quântica a partir do formalismo
da teoria, segundo a qual, todos os observáveis têm um tratamento quântico. Diferentemente de Bohr e Einstein, von Neumann formulou uma teoria formal da medição, na qual o problema da medição aparece de forma mais clara e distinta, como
analisarei no próximo capítulo. Para nos aprofundarmos na teoria
da medição de von Neumann (1955), faço algumas considerações
gerais sobre a teoria medição em mecânica quântica —que também será o assunto do próximo capítulo.
Procurei enfatizar, neste capítulo, os aspectos filosóficos do
debate em relação à medição na mecânica quântica, através da
discussão entre dois autores com pontos de vista diametralmente opostos, a saber, Bohr, defensor da interpretação de Copenhague, e Einstein, um dos grandes críticos de tal interpretação.
Procurei expor, também, os pressupostos ontológicos aos quais
o pensamento de Bohr e Einstein se referem, a fim de melhor
compreender suas propostas para a interpretação da mecânica
quântica. É essencialmente com o referencial filosófico apresen84
tado aqui que Einstein propõe uma interpretação estatística para
a mecânica quântica, que também tratarei rapidamente no capítulo seguinte.
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Capítulo 3
A consciência colapsa
Como vimos no Capítulo 1, o problema da medição na mecânica quântica tem sua gênese já nas primeiras discussões em
torno da interpretação de Copenhague, na medida em que a posição geral de Bohr seria que as propriedades físicas dos objetos quânticos dependeriam fundamentalmente das condições
experimentais, isto é, de medição, efetuadas sobre tais objetos —
posicionamento que aparece explicitamente no debate suscitado
por EPR.
De acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 473), a concepção ortodoxa
de medição envolve os objetos a serem medidos e os instrumentos macroscópicos de medição que, embora necessários para que
uma medição seja realizada, “[. . .] não são explicados pela teoria
quântica em si mesma, mas considerados como logicamente anteriores à teoria”. Assim, na visão de Bohr, não existiria a necessidade de uma teoria da medição quântica, na medida em que
a assunção do princípio da correspondência supostamente permitiria uma interpretação da mecânica quântica que deliberadamente se afastaria do problema da medição.
Ainda que o princípio da correspondência de Bohr não possa
ser substituído por uma teoria formalizada da medição, o tratamento duplo em relação ao processo de medição seria, como
86
salienta Jammer (1974, p. 472), uma das características mais obscuras da interpretação de Copenhague, especificamente no que
se refere à arbitrariedade da classificação dos domínios clássico
e quântico. Ademais, identifico, ao longo deste livro, alguns aspectos do problema da medição na interpretação de Bohr.
Como enfatizei até aqui, o conceito de medição se relaciona com todos os aspectos filosóficos problemáticos da mecânica quântica expostos neste livro. Juntamente com Gibbins (1987,
p. 104), considero que a medição é um aspecto ligado à maioria
dos paradoxos da mecânica quântica —ao menos aqueles investigados até aqui. No Capítulo 1, apresentei a discussão filosófica
suscitada pela medição das propriedades observáveis —posição
e momento— de um objeto quântico. Da mesma forma, no Capítulo 2, apresentei o debate filosófico que emerge dos efeitos da
medição de um objeto A em um objeto espacialmente distante B.
Assim, conforme procurei elucidar, parece razoavelmente justificada a posição de Gibbins (1987, p. 104) de que “[. . .] o problema
da medição é o problema central da filosofia da mecânica quântica”.
Neste capítulo, analisarei detalhadamente a noção de medição em mecânica quântica, bem como o problema da medição
quântica. Para tanto, iniciarei a discussão pontuando as diferenças entre a física clássica e a física quântica em relação ao conceito de medição. Em seguida, analisarei a formulação da teoria
da medição de von Neumann (1955) e suas extensões ontológicas. Ao final do capítulo, pontuarei algumas atitudes alternativas
às formulações apresentadas ao longo deste livro.
3.1
Medição: clássica e quântica
Muito embora a física tenha sido considerada a ciência da medição por Campbell (1928), Jammer (1974, p. 471) afirma que haveria pouco interesse, por parte dos físicos, anteriormente ao ad87
vento da mecânica quântica, em explorar mais profundamente o
conceito de medição. Para Gibbins (1987, p. 102), isso ocorre, pois
a descrição do processo de medição é um procedimento pouco
problemático na física clássica.
A noção clássica de medição (bem como sua representação
matemática) envolveria, de acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 471), dois
processos, sendo um físico e um psicofísico: o processo físico denota uma interação que chamarei I1 entre um objeto que denominarei X a ser observado (tal como um corpo maciço ou uma
corrente elétrica) e um instrumento de medição que denominarei M (tal como uma balança ou um amperímetro), de modo que
(IX ↔ M); o processo psicofísico denota uma interação que
chamarei I2 entre M e um observador O (seus órgãos dos sentidos e, em última análise, sua consciência).
À primeira vista, tal afirmação parece estranha na medida em
que, da forma como Jammer (1974, p. 471) generaliza a noção de
física clássica, a realidade física clássica seria composta por entidades desprovidas de qualidades sensoriais, isto é, de corpos
extensos e seu movimento no espaço, ou seja, não haveria espaço para a introdução da consciência humana como uma parte
fundamental na teoria; no entanto, na medida em que a teoria
clássica adquire validade através da testabilidade de suas predições, a introdução desse conceito parece ser mais plausível, visto
que uma operação tal como um teste deve envolver, em última
análise, a consciência humana.
Se aceitarmos a definição do processo físico como (IX ↔
M), devemos aceitar, por consequência lógica, uma ação do objeto sobre o instrumento de medição de forma (IX → M) e, ao
mesmo tempo, uma ação do aparelho medidor sobre o objeto de
forma (IM → X ). No entanto, a ordem de magnitude da ação
(IM → X ) seria tão menor do que a ação de (IX → M), a
ponto de ser considerada como eliminável na interação I1 . O aspecto psicofísico da medição clássica também seria abandonado
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sob a alegação de que a relação entre M e O estaria fora dos
domínios de uma teoria física.
A ação do objeto no instrumento de medição, no entanto,
não poderia ser negligenciada, na medida em que o resultado
M, tal como a ponteiro de uma balança indicando um valor y,
deve depender de X , de modo que a medição clássica seria, de
acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 471–472), reduzida à ação (IX → M).
Dito de outro modo, como sugere Gibbins (1987, p. 102), a interação (M → X ) pode ser arbitrariamente pequena, o que sugere
que a medição clássica pode ser descrita com uma precisão arbitrariamente grande. Esta atitude permitiria à física clássica o
fornecimento de uma abordagem inteiramente objetiva no tratamento dos processos físicos, isto é, considerá-los de forma independente da medição e, consequentemente, eliminar da teoria o
papel da consciência do observador implícito em I2 .
Com o advento da mecânica quântica, mais precisamente com
o postulado quântico, que prevê a necessidade da interação finita
(isto é, de ao menos um quantum) entre M e X , a magnitude da
ação (IM → X ) seria igualmente relevante a ação (IX → M).
Como consequência, de acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 472), a condição para a consistência da concepção clássica de medição não
seria mais aplicável, uma vez que o projeto clássico de uma abordagem independente da medição é inviável na mecânica quântica, isto é, não se pode atribuir à interação (M → X ) uma grandeza arbitrariamente pequena —o que é, como vimos no Capítulo
1, uma das vias para se chegar ao princípio de indeterminação.
Um dos aspectos menos problemáticos da medição quântica seria a produção de um resultado macroscópico, determinado, fruto da interação I1 . Esse aspecto não nos interessa aqui,
pois é ontologicamente neutro em relação às teses da medição=revelação e medição=criação. O aspecto problemático que
desejamos enfatizar aqui tem seu recorte nas interpretações que
adotam a tese da medição=criação: enquanto não houver a in89
teração I1 , nenhum evento pode ser considerado atual, mas tão
somente potencial. Explicitados esses pontos, passemos à análise da teoria da medição quântica de von Neumann.
3.2
O problema da medição
De acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 474), a teoria da medição de
von Neumann (1955) se assemelha à interpretação de Copenhague, na medida em que também atribui um papel fundamental à
descontinuidade presente no ato da medição, mas, de forma contrária a Bohr, considera o instrumento de medição M um sistema
quântico-mecânico. O raciocínio de von Neumann (1955) fornece,
para Gibbins (1987, p. 109), as condições necessárias para a formulação de uma teoria da medição em mecânica quântica, sendo
a base conceitual para diversas outras teorias da medição.
O ponto de partida de von Neumann (1955, p. 349–351) seria
a assunção de que existem dois tipos de processos ou mudanças dos estados quânticos: o processo 1, chamado de “mudanças
arbitrárias por medição”, e o processo 2, chamado de “mudanças
automáticas”. O processo 1 é enunciado como “o ato descontínuo,
não causal e instantâneo de experimentos ou medições”; o processo 2 é enunciado como a “mudança causal e contínua no curso
do tempo”. Ao passo que o processo 2 é descrito pelas leis de movimento da mecânica quântica,1 o processo 1 não o é. O processo
1 é irredutível e, portanto, não pode ser reduzido ao processo 2.
Enquanto o processo 2 envolve uma evolução contínua e determinista, o processo 1, ao contrário, envolve uma descontinuidade indeterminista e irreversível. O processo 1 descreve a transformação do estado de um sistema físico após o ato da medição,
isto é, transforma o estado inicial de tal sistema (descrito pelo
1
Frequentemente descrita pela “equação de Schödinger”, como aponto no
Apêndice A.
90
processo 2) em um estado inteiramente novo, não previsível pelas leis dinâmicas de movimento especificadas pelo processo 2.
Isto é notável, pois ao passo que o processo 2 afirma que o estado final do sistema quântico em questão seja indeterminado
em relação às suas propriedades calculáveis pela equação de
movimento, o processo 1 afirma um valor determinado para tal
estado final, registrado pelo ato da medição.
O problema da medição foi então delineado pela primeira vez
de modo claro: é o problema da conjunção entre os dois processos que seriam, para von Neumann (1955, p. 417), uma “peculiar
natureza dual do procedimento da mecânica quântica”. Mais adiante, afirma:
[. . .] a mecânica quântica descreve os eventos que
ocorrem nas partes observadas do mundo —contanto
que elas não interajam com a parte observante— com
o auxílio do processo 2; mas assim que uma interação
ocorre, isto é, uma medição, é requerido a aplicação
do processo 1. (von Neumann, 1955, p. 420).
Em uma taxonomia amplamente difundida, Maudlin (1995) define o problema da medição como a conjunção problemática entre as seguintes suposições sobre a descrição que a mecânica
quântica dá aos sistemas físicos:
A) É uma descrição completa. Isto é, a assunção de que a mecânica quântica descreve todos os aspectos físicos do sistema
físico em questão.
B) É uma descrição linear. Essa assunção afirma que a descrição quântica dos sistemas físicos deve ocorrer exclusivamente por processos lineares.
C) É uma descrição que fornece resultados únicos.
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Sem entrar em detalhes acerca de questões da matemática
subjacente à discussão das interpretações da mecânica quântica,
podemos entender a razão pela qual a conjunção entre A, B e C
é problemática com o seguinte raciocínio. Suponha que ψ é uma
descrição quântica do sistema quântico S, que pode ter os valores 0 ou 1. Se assumirmos A, então a descrição de S por ψ é completa, isto é, não há nada a se dizer de S, em termos físicos, além
daquilo dito por ψ. Como uma característica da descrição linear
é a admissão de uma soma de resultados como um resultado, ao
assumirmos B temos que 0 + 1 é uma descrição possível de S em
termos de ψ. No entanto C pede que tenhamos, exclusivamente,
0 ou 1 como resultado de S por ψ.
Assim, ao menos uma das três assunções acima deve ser negada. As interpretações da mecânica quântica dividem-se, em
qual dessas assunções é negada. As interpretações do primeiro
grupo são as que negam A são as interpretações que introduzem variáveis ocultas no formalismo da medição. Num segundo
grupo, estariam as interpretações que negam B e introduzem outras leis dinâmicas para a mecânica quântica, como o colapso.
Por fim, no terceiro grupo estão as que negam C, e introduzem o
conceito de “ramificação”. Essa é, de modo bastante geral, uma
breve taxonomia das interpretações da mecânica quântica.
A interpretação de von Neumann está dentre as interpretações do segundo grupo, que negam B. Para adequar a discussão
que se segue a essa taxonomia, farei a seguinte escolha terminológica. Aquilo que von Neumann chamou de “processo 2” será
chamado daqui pra frente de “evolução linear”, e aquilo que ele
chamou de “processo 1” será chamado, daqui adiante, de “colapso” (também referido, em algumas citações, como “redução”).
O colapso é uma lei dinâmica não-linear, associada à evolução
linear em processos de medição.
As interpretações do primeiro e terceiro grupo serão consideradas brevemente nas seções finais deste capítulo.
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3.2.1 A interpretação da consciência
Antes de adentrar nas especificidades dessa particular interpretação da mecânica quântica, devo tecer alguns breves comentários de natureza sociológica. É notável que têm sido feitas muitas
apropriações indevidas, que deturpam os assuntos que envolvem
a mecânica quântica. Isso foi tratado com maestria nos trabalhos de Pessoa Junior (2011), Cruz (2011) e Machado e Cruz (2016).
No entanto, como mostram de Barros e Oas (2017), a interpretação da consciência não foi até o presente falseada experimentalmente; e, mais ainda, conforme argumentam Arroyo e Arenhart
(2019), não existem boas razões filosóficas para o que tal interpretação seja descartada do rol de interpretações possíveis para a
mecânica quântica. Tratarei dessa interpretação especificamente
para esclarecer quais são os usos legítimos da consciência na mecânica quântica, e dimensioná-la como mais uma interpretação
—e não “A” interpretação da mecânica quântica, como encontrase em literaturas menos responsáveis sobre o assunto.2
A mecânica quântica considera a união hobjeto + aparatoi
um único sistema, chamado sistema composto. No raciocínio de
von Neumann (1955), o sistema composto obtido por I1 não seria suficiente para completar uma medição. Se todos os objetos
materiais (microscópicos ou macroscópicos) são constituídos por
objetos quânticos, então a interação entre um objeto quântico (a
ser medido) e um aparelho de amplificação (a supostamente medir) não completaria uma medição, mas ficaria atrelada à evolução linear.
Poder-se-ia sugerir que ao aparato M fosse acoplado um segundo aparato de medição M′ , na intenção de completar uma
medição no sistema composto. Essa proposta, no entanto, levaria a uma regressão infinita de aparatos medidores na medida em
que M′ se relacionaria com M da mesma maneira que M se re2
Ver, por exemplo, Goswami (1993).
93
laciona com X no caso do sistema composto hobjeto + aparatoi,
isto é, não conseguiria completar uma medição.
d’Espagnat (1999) nomeou esse aspecto problemático de “cadeia de von Neumann”. É preciso salientar que tal regressão infinita é uma dificuldade filosófica bastante séria para uma teoria,
sendo um dos célebres paradoxos clássicos, conhecido através
do termo em latim “reductio ad infinitum”. Assim, o ato da medição deve ser uma operação finita, o que seria possível, ao que
parece, somente por um ato de medição, em M, em “[. . .] um ato
descontínuo, não causal e instantâneo”, isto é, correspondente ao
colapso. A questão ontológica (ON ) dessa discussão reside justamente nas respostas para a questão sobre onde e como o referido “ato” do colapso acontece: von Neumann (1955, p. 418–420)
afirma, em um longo parágrafo (que reproduzirei integralmente),
que o ato da medição seria causado pela percepção do observador:
Primeiro, é inerentemente e totalmente correto que a
medição ou o processo relacionado à percepção subjetiva é uma nova entidade em relação ao ambiente
físico e não é redutível a ele —de fato, a percepção
subjetiva nos leva para a vida intelectual interior do
indivíduo, que é extra observável por sua própria natureza (já que deve ser assumida por qualquer observação ou experimento concebível). (Ver a discussão acima [precisamente a mesma que conduzimos
nos parágrafos acima]). No entanto, é uma exigência
fundamental do ponto de vista científico —o chamado
“princípio do paralelismo psico-físico”— que deva ser
possível descrever o processo extra físico da percepção subjetiva como se ele fosse pertencente, na realidade, ao mundo físico —isto é, atribuir às suas partes
processos físicos equivalentes no ambiente objetivo,
no espaço comum. (É claro que nesse processo relaci94
onando surge a frequente necessidade de localizar alguns desses processos em pontos situados dentro da
porção do espaço ocupada pelos nossos próprios corpos. Mas isso não altera o fato de que eles pertençam
ao “mundo sobre nós”, o ambiente objetivo referido
anteriormente.) Num exemplo simples, estes conceitos podem ser aplicados do seguinte modo: desejamos medir uma temperatura. Se quisermos, podemos
prosseguir com esse processo numericamente até que
tenhamos a temperatura do ambiente do recipiente de
mercúrio através do termômetro, e então dizer: essa
temperatura foi medida pelo termômetro. Mas podemos levar o cálculo adiante e, a partir das propriedades do mercúrio, que podem ser explicadas em termos
cinéticos e moleculares, podemos calcular seu aquecimento, expansão, e o comprimento resultante da coluna de mercúrio, e em seguida dizer: esse é o comprimento visto pelo observador. Indo ainda mais longe, e
levando a fonte de luz em consideração, nós poderíamos encontrar o reflexo do quanta de luz sobre a coluna opaca de mercúrio, e o caminho do quanta de luz
remanescente até o olho do observador, sua refracção
na lente do olho, e a formação uma imagem sobre a
retina, e em seguida nós diríamos: essa imagem é registada pela retina do observador. E se o nosso conhecimento fisiológico fosse mais preciso do que é hoje,
poderíamos ir ainda mais longe, traçando as reações
químicas que produzem a impressão dessa imagem na
retina, no nervo ótico e no cérebro, e então, no final,
dizer: essas mudanças químicas de suas células cerebrais são percebidas pelo observador. Mas em qualquer caso, não importa o quão longe calcularmos —do
recipiente de mercúrio, com a escala do termômetro,
95
para a retina, ou no cérebro— em algum momento devemos dizer: “e isso é percebido pelo observador”. Ou
seja, devemos sempre dividir o mundo em duas partes, uma sendo o sistema observado e a outra sendo o
observador. No primeiro caso, podemos acompanhar
todos os processos físicos (pelo menos a princípio)
com uma precisão arbitrariamente grande. No último
caso, isso é insignificante. A fronteira entre os dois
é bastante arbitrária. Em particular, vimos nas quatro possibilidades diferentes do exemplo acima que o
observador, nesse sentido, não deve ser identificado
com o corpo do observador real: num dos casos do
exemplo acima, incluímos até mesmo o termômetro,
enquanto em outro exemplo, até mesmo os olhos e as
vias do nervo óptico não foram incluídos. Levar esse
limite profundamente de forma arbitrária para o interior do corpo do observador é o teor real do princípio do paralelismo psico-físico —mas isso não altera a
fato de que em cada método da descrição a fronteira
deva ser colocada em algum lugar, se não for para o
método continuar vagamente, isto é, se uma comparação com a experiência deve ser possível. De fato a
experiência só faz declarações deste tipo: um observador realizou certa observação (subjetiva); e nunca
alguma como esta: uma grandeza física tem um determinado valor. (von Neumann, 1955, p. 418–420).
Embora von Neumann não tenha mencionado a palavra
“consciência”, parece ser unânime, dentre as diversas leituras
dessa famosa passagem, que von Neumann (1955, p. 420) se refere à “consciência do observador” quando enuncia o poder causal da “percepção subjetiva do observador”. Em outra passagem,
von Neumann (1955, p. 421) enuncia o observador como um “ego
abstrato”, isto é, um “eu”, uma subjetividade abstrata. Assim, para
96
von Neumann (1955, p. 418–421), somente algo fora do sistema
composto por X ∧M —tal como a consciência do observador O—
poderia dar cabo à tal cadeia infinita, reintroduzindo a interação
psicofísica I2 na teoria da medição.
A principal motivação histórica para essa interpretação, de
acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 480), seria uma série de longas conversas que von Neumann (1955, nota 218) mantinha com Leó Szilárd, que teria publicado um estudo influente sobre a intervenção
de um ser inteligente em um sistema termodinâmico. O estudo de
Szilárd (1983), para Jammer,
[. . .] marcou o início de especulações instigantes sobre o efeito de uma intervenção física da mente sobre
a matéria e, assim, abriu o caminho para a afirmação
de longo alcance de von Neumann, sobre a impossibilidade de formular uma teoria completa e consistente
de medição mecânica quântica sem referência à consciência humana. (Jammer, 1974, p. 480).
A fim de discutir tal situação, von Neumann (1955, p. 421) divide o universo de discurso em 3 partes correspondentes à notação I, II e III, de modo que “I” corresponde ao objeto (ou sistema)
a ser observado, “II” corresponde ao instrumento de medição e
“III” ao observador, isto é, seu ego abstrato. Em todos os casos, o
resultado da medição em I efetuada por II+III é o mesmo do que
a medição em I+II efetuada por III. No primeiro caso, a evolução
linear se aplica a I e, no segundo caso, a I+II. Em todos os casos,
a evolução linear não se aplica a III, isto é, III é a única parte para
qual o colapso se aplica em todos os casos.3
Utilizarei o famoso experimento mental do gato de
Schrödinger (1983, p. 157) para ilustrar tal problemática, uma
vez que se trata de uma situação idealizada poucos anos mais
tarde da publicação de von Neumann (1955), para explicitar a
3
Ver também Breuer (2001, p. 78).
97
dificuldade do “problema da medição” na mecânica quântica. O
experimento mental do gato de Schrödinger (1983, p. 157) seria,
na opinião do próprio autor, uma extrapolação (até mesmo
“ridícula”) da descrição quântica da realidade, que se dá da
seguinte maneira:
Um gato preso em uma câmara de aço, juntamente
com o seguinte dispositivo diabólico (que deve ser
resguardado contra a interferência direta do gato): um
contador Geiger [um detector de radiação] com um
pouco de substância radioativa, tão pouco que, talvez no curso de uma hora, um dos átomos decai —mas
também, com igual probabilidade, talvez nenhuma; se
isso acontece, o contador descarrega e, através de um
dispositivo elétrico, libera um martelo que quebra um
pequeno frasco de ácido cianídrico. Se o sistema for
deixado a si mesmo por uma hora, poder-se-ia dizer
que o gato ainda vive se enquanto isso nenhum átomo
decaiu. O primeiro decaimento atômico o teria envenenado. A função de onda de todo o sistema poderia
expressar isso por ter nela o gato vivo e o gato morto
(desculpe a expressão) misturado ou espalhado em
partes iguais. (Schrödinger, 1983, p. 157).
O núcleo do argumento está contido na ideia de que, até que
uma observação direta seja efetuada sobre o sistema em questão
(o que corresponde, nessa interpretação, ao colapso), a descrição
do formalismo quântico não forneceria nada além de possibilidades, com igual probabilidade, de dois estados atuais que são
contrários. Na literatura tradicional, esse raciocínio é frequentemente expresso por meio da sentença “estados contraditórios”,
no que se refere ao estado de superposição entre os estados
“vivo” e “morto”. No entanto, o correto seria utilizar a sentença
“estados contrários”, tendo em vista a definição de tais termos no
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clássico quadrado de oposições, em que uma situação de contraditoriedade se estabelece quando duas proposições não podem
ser simultaneamente verdadeiras nem simultaneamente falsas, e
uma situação de contrariedade se estabelece quando duas proposições não podem ser simultaneamente verdadeiras, mas podem ser simultaneamente falsas. Krause propõe que a superposição seja entendida como um terceiro estado, um estado “novo”:
[. . .] em certas “situações quânticas”, nomeadamente
nas de superposição, não podemos de modo algum
dizer —como parece fácil de fazer a partir de uma visão “clássica”— que dois objetos quânticos, como dois
elétrons, quando em superposição de dois estados ψ1
e ψ2 (ou seja, quando são descritos por uma função
de onda ψ12 = ψ1 + ψ2 ) estão em um dos dois estados.
Nem no outro, nem em ambos, nem em nenhum —que
seriam as quatro situações logicamente possíveis (de
um ponto de vista “clássico”—, mas podemos dizer que
estão em um “novo” estado, o de superposição de ψ1
e ψ2 . (Krause, 2010, p. 128).
No caso do exemplo do gato de Schrödinger (1983, p. 157),
tem-se três estados: o estado “vivo”, o estado “morto” e o estado “superposto”. No último, as proposições “o gato está vivo”
e “o gato está morto” são simultaneamente falsas, o que parece
configurar uma relação de contrariedade e não de contraditoriedade. Essa forma de interpretar o estado de superposição se
coaduna com o fato de que os vetores matemáticos que representam os estados “vivo” e “morto” são ortogonais, e não a negação um do outro.4 Na interpretação de von Neumann (1955), tal
quadro se traduziria na afirmação de que nenhum evento atual
ocorreria até que o sistema composto —isto é, o sistema quântico
4
Para uma discussão aprofundada e atualizada sobre o assunto, ver também Arenhart e Krause (2016).
99
e o aparelho de medição— seja percebido pelo ego abstrato do
observador.
Pelo que foi considerado até aqui, existem ao menos duas
leituras possíveis da teoria da medição de von Neumann (1955),
sendo uma ontológica e outra puramente lógica. Considerando a
análise lógica, faço referência ao estudo de Breuer (2001, p. 80–
81), que faz uma aproximação entre a hierarquia infinita dos tipos lógicos, da linguagem-objeto e das infinitas metalinguagens
subjacentes (isto é, a metametalinguagem, a metametametalinguagem, etc.) de Tarski (1956, p. 241–265) e a cadeia infinita de
observações de von Neumann (1955). Para Breuer (2001, p. 80),
tais hierarquias infinitas estão intimamente ligadas com o raciocínio da incompletude de Gödel (1967, p. 610, nota 48), o qual
admite textualmente que “[. . .] a verdadeira razão para a incompletude é que a formação de tipos cada vez mais elevados pode
ser continuado transfinitamente”.
Na teoria da verdade de Tarski (1956), uma predicação da noção de verdade aplicável a todas as sentenças da linguagemobjeto não é parte da linguagem-objeto, mas de um tipo lógico
de hierarquia mais alta, isto é, uma metalinguagem. Se o termo
“verdade” for intercambiado por “demonstrabilidade”, o raciocínio da incompletude de Gödel (1967, p. 592–616) poderia ser parafraseado, segundo Breuer (2001, p. 80), da seguinte maneira:
“um conceito de demonstrabilidade que é formulado dentro de
um sistema formal não pode ser aplicado a todas as sentenças
desse mesmo sistema”.
Voltando ao raciocínio da hierarquia infinita na teoria da medição de von Neumann (1955), uma medição não está completa
no sistema X ∧ M, X ∧ M ∧ M′), ou (X ∧ M ∧ M′ ∧ M′′ ), etc., até
que o colapso ocorra, o que somente aconteceria pela ação de
um agente fora do sistema, ou seja, externo. Nesse preciso sentido, a função de tal observador O externo pode ser aproximada a
um funcionamento metateórico, isto é, a um nível lógico mais alto
100
(um meta-nível). Para Breuer (2001, p. 81), a aproximação feita entre a concepção de “obter uma prova de uma afirmação” e concepção de “obter o resultado de uma medição” seria válida na
medida em que “’medição’ e ‘prova’ são ambos conceitos semânticos que estabelecem uma relação entre um formalismo físico
ou matemático, e que são referidos pelo formalismo”.
Pela sentença com um valor de verdade tal como “completar uma medição”, refiro-me a um evento, cuja probabilidade “P ”
de resultado “R” seja, exclusivamente, ao menos um dos dois resultados possíveis, “s” e “s′ ”, em que a probabilidade dos dois
resultados possíveis seja equivalente, de modo que R(s) = R(s′ ).
O colapso indica que o estado de R é (por exemplo) s′ (e, consequentemente, não-s). Nesse preciso sentido, o observador deve
estar fora dos limites da física. Dito de outro modo, da mesma
forma que para Bohr, para von Neumann o agente causal da medição, isto é, aquilo que completa uma medição está para além
dos limites da física quântica:
[. . .] é inerentemente inteiramente correto que a medição ou o processo relacionado à percepção subjetiva
seja uma nova entidade em relação ao ambiente físico e não pode ser reduzido a esse último. De fato, a
percepção subjetiva nos leva para a vida interior intelectual do indivíduo que é extra observacional, por
sua própria natureza. (von Neumann, 1955, p. 421).
Esse é o motivo pelo qual Breuer (2001, p. 79–80) delineia o
problema da medição em física quântica como o problema da
compatibilidade entre o que está fora da física (tal como o colapso) e o que está dentro da física (tal como a evolução linear).
Dessa forma, por mais que a teoria da medição de von Neumann
(1955) incorra na mesma dificuldade de Bohr, no que tange à arbitrariedade da separação entre o que é e o que não é domínio da mecânica quântica, seu ganho é de especificar a discus101
são para os campos lógicos e ontológicos e não tão somente explicitar uma cisão arbitrária entre o que é um objeto quântico e
o que não é. Ainda assim, de acordo com Becker (2004, p. 121),
existe uma concepção recebida acerca da teoria da medição de
von Neumann segundo a qual o colapso é um processo físico que
“modifica de modo indeterminista o estado do sistema que está
sendo medido”. Para Becker (2004, p. 123), o aspecto central dessa
concepção recebida é considerar o colapso como um processo
físico “que ocorre durante o processo de uma medição, embora
não seja especificado em qual instante”.5
Dadas as características lógicas da teoria da medição de
von Neumann (1955), passemos à discussão em torno de seus
aspectos ontológicos. Foi possível constatar que a posição de
von Neumann (1955) em relação ao problema da medição está
comprometida ontologicamente com um novo objeto que compõe o mobiliário do mundo, isto é, com uma nova entidade com
poder causal para completar uma medição: o “ego abstrato”, que
tem certas características ontológicas, por exemplo, ser um domínio da existência distinto do domínio físico. Tradicionalmente,
a entidade do tipo “ego abstrato” fora entendida como “consciência”. No entanto, como observado por Bueno (2019a), essa generalização pode ser apressada, e até mesmo equivocada. Essa
não foi a única confusão conceitual encontrado na literatura.
Conforme aponta Jammer (1974, p. 482), a teoria da medição
formulada por von Neumann (1955), que culmina na tese de que
a consciência é o agente causal responsável pelo ato da medição, não seria acessível a grande parte dos físicos experimentais
da época na medida em que, sendo demasiadamente formal, requereria dos interlocutores um alto conhecimento de matemática. No entanto, tal teoria foi reelaborada por London e Bauer
(1983) em um estudo que Jammer (1974, p. 482) considera uma
5
Sobre a referida “concepção recebida” do colapso, ver Everett (1957), Stapp
(1982), Albert (1992), e J. A. Barrett (1999).
102
apresentação “[. . .] concisa e simplificada” da teoria da medição
de von Neumann (1955).
O interesse de London por filosofia, especificamente pelo
problema mente-corpo é documentado em uma pequena biografia escrita por sua esposa, Edith London (1961, pp. X–XIV). Dentre suas influências filosóficas, Jammer (1974, p. 482–483) destaca
Pfänder, objeto de análise na tese de doutorado em filosofia de
London e, principalmente, seu professor de filosofia em Munique, Erich Becher. De acordo com Jammer (1974, p. 482–483), a
tese, apresentada no Instituto Arnold Sommerfeld em Munique,
trata sobre Pfänder (1904), que influenciara a teoria psicológica
de Lipps (1907) que, então influenciaria a concepção de medição
em mecânica quântica de London. Jammer (1974, p. 483) também
ressalta que o estudo de London e Bauer (1983) faz referência a
duas obras de Brecher (1906, 1921), para quem o problema mentecorpo seria a questão central em toda a filosofia.
Em relação aos problemas da filosofia da mente, Becher rejeitaria, segundo Jammer (1974, p. 484), a doutrina do epifenomenalismo, isto é, o pensamento segundo o qual os processos mentais
emergem ou são causados pelos processos cerebrais, e defende
o interacionismo, isto é, o pensamento segundo o qual os processos físicos “[. . .] permeiam o cérebro em um curso contínuo e
produzem, além de efeitos físicos, efeitos psíquicos que, por sua
vez, afetam de forma decisiva os eventos físicos”. É natural que
London tenha acatado à crítica de Brecher acerca do epifenomenalismo, uma vez que tenha dado continuidade à ideia de que a
consciência age sobre a matéria.
Para Jammer (1974, p. 484), London teria encontrado na mecânica quântica, especificamente no problema da medição, conforme delineado por von Neumann (1955), um campo para aplicar tais ideias filosóficas, na medida em que, na interpretação de
London e Bauer (1983, p. 251), a interação entre um objeto microfísico e um aparelho macroscópico de medição não seriam sufi103
cientes para produzir uma medição, de modo que uma medição
ocorre somente quando tal sistema composto hobjeto + aparatoi
é “observado”, ou “medido”. No caso, seria a consciência que de
fato causa o colapso, isto é, completa uma medição.
Tal afirmação deve, no entanto, ser melhor caracterizada, visto que existe um caráter ontológico da proposta
London e Bauer (1983) que difere da proposta de von Neumann
(1955). A interpretação de London e Bauer (1983), como aponta
Abner Shimony (1963, p. 759), considera que o observador está
no mesmo nível ontológico que o sistema composto (sistema microscópico e aparato de medição), de modo que “London e Bauer
não parecem atribuir uma posição transcendente ao observador”.
Isto é, ao passo que von Neumann (1955) enfatiza o caráter nãofísico do observador, London e Bauer (1983, p. 251) consideram
que o observador está no mesmo sistema composto que o sistema microscópico e o aparato de medição, que pode ser representado como hobjeto + aparato + observadori.
O observador teria, ainda assim, um papel distinto dentro do
sistema composto. A tese subjetivista, atribuída a von Neumann
devido à passagem em que considera o “ego abstrato” do observador o agente causal da medição, parece se tornar explícita
na teoria de London e Bauer quando, em uma passagem decisiva,
afirmam que a “faculdade de introspecção” é central no processo
de medição:
O observador tem uma impressão completamente diferente. Para ele, é apenas o objeto x e o aparelho
y que pertencem ao mundo externo, para o que ele
chama de “objetividade”. Por outro lado, ele tem consigo mesmo relações de uma maneira muito diferente.
Ele possui uma faculdade característica e bastante familiar que podemos chamar de “faculdade de introspecção”. Ele pode acompanhar cada momento de seu
próprio estado. Em virtude desse “conhecimento ima104
nente” ele atribui a si o direito de criar a sua própria
objetividade —ou seja, cortar a cadeia de correlações
estatísticas [. . .]. É apenas a consciência de um “eu”
que pode separá-lo da função anterior [. . .] e, em virtude de sua observação, configurar uma nova objetividade ao atribuir para o objeto uma nova função dali
pra frente [. . .]. (London e Bauer, 1983, p. 252).
A consciência individual do observador, sua faculdade interna, de introspecção, é considerada por London e Bauer (1983,
p. 252) um sistema distinto do sistema composto material —que
se define pela interação entre o objeto microfísico e o aparelho
medidor macroscópico— de modo que esse sistema, não sujeito
às leis da mecânica quântica, é causal no sistema material. Como
aponta Shimony (1963, p. 759), o observador “[. . .] por possuir a
faculdade de introspecção, pode conceder a si mesmo a abstração dos sistemas físicos com os quais interage”. Em outras palavras, a interpretação subjetivista parece sugerir um estatuto ontológico privilegiado para a consciência individual do observador
humano no universo. Dito ainda de outro modo, essa interpretação se compromete ontologicamente com uma entidade mental
que causa sobre uma entidade material, ponto em que Jammer
(1974, p. 484) traça a influência de Brecher no pensamento de
London. Nesse ponto, as teses de von Neumann (1955) parecem
London e Bauer (1983) se alinhar.
É justamente nesse ponto que muitos comentadores se equivocaram. Como mostrou o estudo de French (2002), a teoria da
medição de London e Bauer (1983) não exige que a faculdade de
introspecção do observador cause o colapso, mas que reconheça
o colapso. Esse é motivo pelo qual a chave filosófica de leitura
para a teoria da medição de London e Bauer (1983, p 252) esteja
na fenomenologia Husserliana, como troca de doação de sentido,
e não causa —muito menos subjetivista.6
6
Para mais detalhes sobre esse ponto, ver Arroyo e Nunes Filho (2018).
105
Esses são, portanto, as duas principais confusões conceituais que encontramos na literatura: 1) a identificação de
von Neumann (1955) com a tese de que a consciência causa o colapso; e 2) a identificação de London e Bauer (1983) com 1). De
modo mais preciso, podemos colocar que o predecessor da interpretação da consciência causal, que considera que é de fato
a consciência do observador que causa o colapso seria Wigner
(1983), na situação conhecida como o “amigo de Wigner”. Suponha que todas as interações possíveis entre um indivíduo humano com um dado sistema físico se resumam a olhar para certo
ponto em certa direção nos instantes de tempo t0 , t1 , t2 , . . . , tn , e
que as sensações possíveis que tal indivíduo possa vir a ter se
resumam às de ver ou não ver um flash de luz; suponha, ainda,
que a formulação matemática representando a possibilidade do
indivíduo ver o flash seja uma função de onda |ψ1 i e que uma
função de onda |ψ2 i represente a possibilidade do indivíduo não
ver o flash.
Assim, a comunicabilidade da função de onda, qualquer que
seja o resultado, dependeria daquilo que o indivíduo observou.
Em outras palavras, ele poderia nos dizer qual das funções de
onda seria o caso, isto é, se o indivíduo viu ou não viu o flash de
luz. Espera-se que o resultado seja objetivo no preciso sentido
em que seja comunicável, isto é, no caso de perguntarmos para
um indivíduo X o resultado da interação num instante t, um outro
indivíduo, Y, que interagisse com o sistema num instante t + 1
poderia se utilizar do resultado obtido em t como se fosse Y, e
não X , que tivesse interagido com o sistema no instante t.
O raciocínio do experimento mental consiste em questionar o
estado do indivíduo X , que observa o sistema no instante t antes
de comunicar o resultado para o indivíduo Y. Dito de outro modo,
o experimento mental propõe uma situação em que alguém realiza uma observação em um sistema. No caso, supondo que Y
seja o próprio Wigner e que X seja o amigo de Wigner, qual se106
ria o estado do sistema no instante de tempo entre a interação
de X em t e a comunicação do resultado da interação para Y no
instante t + 1?
Isto é, se for assumido que o estado inicial seja uma combinação linear dos dois estados possíveis relacionados com a probabilidade de que cada um dos estados seja o caso, o estado do
sistema composto na interação hobjeto + observadori (em que o
termo “observador” corresponde ao amigo) poderia ser descrito
pela mecânica quântica através uma equação linear. No entanto,
de acordo com a mecânica quântica, não seria possível atribuir
uma função de onda que descreva o objeto antes do final de uma
medição, ou seja, antes que o amigo diga o resultado (isto é, se
viu ou não viu o flash), mas somente poder-se-ia atribuir uma
função de onda ao sistema composto hobjeto + amigoi.
Assim, Wigner (Y) pode interagir com o sistema composto
hobjeto+amigoi perguntando ao amigo (X ) se ela viu algum flash.
Qualquer que seja o caso, a função de onda do sistema composto7
se modifica para um caso em que o objeto possa ser descrito uma
estado único. Tal mudança ocorre somente em contato com Y:
[. . .] [A] mudança típica na função de onda ocorrida somente quando alguma informação (o “sim” ou “não”
do meu amigo) entra na minha consciência. Disso se
segue que a descrição quântica dos objetos é influenciada por impressões que entram na minha consciência. (Wigner, 1983, p. 173).
Wigner considera que a consciência do observador modifica
7
A título de precisão, o termo utilizado no texto de Wigner é “mistura”. Ele
se refere, contudo, ao termo técnico chamado “mistura estatística”, denotado
pelo operador ρ, utilizado no formalismo da mecânica quântica para designar
situações de ignorância. Antes, como apontou French (2002, p. 483, nota 27), o
termo “mistura” designava, na época aquilo que hoje chamamos de “superposição”.
107
ativamente o conhecimento8 do sistema e, com isso, as condições de previsibilidade do sistema dos flashes, isto é, modifica
sua representação matemática através da função de onda:
[. . .] a impressão que se obtém em uma interação, chamada também de o resultado de uma observação, modifica a função de onda do sistema. A função de onda
modificada é, além disso, em geral imprevisível antes que impressão adquirida na interação entrasse em
nossa consciência: é a entrada de uma impressão em
nossa consciência, que altera a função de onda porque
modifica ou avaliação das probabilidades para diferentes impressões que esperamos receber no futuro.”
(Wigner, 1983, p. 172–173).
A situação proposta é análoga à cadeia infinita de observações de von Neumann (1955): enquanto a interação do sistema
composto hobjeto + amigoi estiver no mesmo nível, não há, de
fato, uma medição. Há que se perguntar “quem observa o observador?”, pois até que um observador final interaja com o sistema
composto, uma medição não estará completa. Para Wigner (1983,
p. 176), quem teria tal posição privilegiada seria ele mesmo, isto
é, o amigo, ocupando uma posição intermediária, não poderia
ter o resultado da observação registrado em sua consciência a
despeito do observador final: “[. . .] a teoria da medição, direta
ou indireta, é logicamente consistente desde que eu mantenha
minha posição privilegiada de observador final”. Ainda assim, se
depois de completada a situação proposta acima, Wigner (1983,
p. 176) perguntar ao amigo sobre o estado do objeto S antes da
interação entre X e Y proposta no raciocínio acima, o amigo responderia (a depender do que tenha sido o caso de S) que “eu já
lhe disse, eu vi [não vi] um flash”.
8
Wigner (1983, p. 169, nota 3) se utiliza dos textos posteriores de Heisenberg
(1958, p. 87–99), em que o autor se refere ao termo “consciência” como “conhecimento”.
108
Para ilustrar a problemática que está em jogo, Wigner (1983,
p. 177) propõe que o papel do observador intermediário seja trocado: ao invés do amigo, que se utilize um simples aparelho físico de medição, que amplificaria o sinal de um átomo que poderia (ou não) ser excitado pela luz do flash no sistema S. Nesse
caso, como aponta Jammer (1974, p. 499), não haveria dúvida de
que uma representação matemática, através de uma equação linear, poderia descrever o sistema composto hobjeto + aparatoi
—contrariamente à assunção de que tal interação poderia indicar o estado atual de S. Com isso em mente, se modificarmos
novamente o observador intermediário, voltando a considerálo como o amigo, a representação matemática, de acordo com
Wigner (1983, p. 177) “[. . .] parece absurda, pois implica que meu
amigo estaria em um estado de animação suspensa antes de responder à minha pergunta”, isto é, parece absurda, por implicar
não só que o objeto S não teria seu estado atual desenvolvido
(ou seja, o flash não teria nem não teria sido disparado) mas,
principalmente, que o amigo não teria sua própria existência atualizada até que houvesse a ação interativa de Y sobre o sistema
composto hobjeto + amigoi.
A fim de esclarecer tal dificuldade, Wigner conclui que:
Segue-se que o ser com uma consciência deve ter
um papel diferente na mecânica quântica que o dispositivo de medição inanimado: o átomo considerado acima [. . .]. Esse argumento implica que “meu
amigo” tem os mesmos tipos de impressões e sensações como eu —em particular, que, depois de interagir
com o objeto, ele não está nesse estado de animação
suspensa [. . .]. Não é necessário ver aqui uma contradição a partir do ponto de vista da mecânica quântica
ortodoxa, e não há se acreditarmos que a alternativa
é sem sentido se a consciência do meu amigo contém
109
tanto a impressão de ter visto um flash ou de não ter
visto um flash. (Wigner, 1983, p. 177–178).
Quando Wigner (1983, p. 177) descreve que o amigo está em
um estado de suspensão, parece sugerir que no raciocínio todo
só há um colapso, isto é, somente um momento em que uma medição é efetivamente realizada: quando Wigner (e não o amigo)
tem consciência de todo o processo através da interação com o
amigo. Um raciocínio semelhante foi proposto por Penrose (1989,
p. 290–293), que revisita a situação do gato de Schrödinger, adicionando no raciocínio um observador humano —propriamente
vestido com um traje que o proteja do veneno— dentro da caixa
onde se encontra o gato e todo o restante do aparato que envolve
o experimento mental de Schrödinger (1983). No experimento revisitado por Penrose (1989, p. 293), o observador de dentro, que
visualiza diretamente o que ocorre com o gato, e o observador
de fora, que é limitado pelo cálculo das probabilidades sobre o
que ocorre com o gato, teriam, forçosamente, impressões discrepantes sobre o que acontece com o gato. Isso ocorreria até que a
caixa fosse aberta, quando as impressões tornariam-se precisamente as mesmas.
Tal situação é oportuna para visualizarmos a dificuldade colocada por Wigner (1983). Se acatarmos a tese de que a consciência humana (individual/subjetiva) é de alguma maneira causa do
que acontece com o gato, então teríamos a mesma situação que
se tem com o raciocínio do amigo de Wigner: a consciência de
quem atuou como agente causal no caso proposto por Penrose?9
A do observador de dentro ou do observador de fora?
9
É relevante constatar que von Neumann (1955, p. 445) já havia considerado
que haveriam dificuldades no caso de mais de um observador concomitante.
110
3.2.2 O problema ontológico
Atribuir um papel causal à consciência individual de uma pessoa pode levar a uma dificuldade filosófica bastante séria, que é
o solipsismo, isto é, a implicação de que exista uma única subjetividade real e que todas as outras subjetividades sejam irreais ou ilusórias. London e Bauer (1983, p. 258) já haviam reconhecido essa dificuldade ao reiterar que, em mecânica quântica, a
existência de um objeto físico depende do ato da medição que,
por sua vez, “[. . .] está intimamente ligado à consciência da pessoa que realiza [a medição], como se a mecânica quântica nos
levasse a um completo solipsismo”. Para enfrentar a problemática do solipsismo, os autores argumentam em favor de um consenso intersubjetivo dos fenômenos externos, visto que, na prática cotidiana, os fenômenos objetivos ocorrem como se fossem
de fato objetivos no sentido de serem públicos e comuns a mais
de uma subjetividade. Isso se apoiaria no fato de que existe tal
coisa como uma comunidade científica, o que só seria possível
mediante tal consenso intersubjetivo.
Jammer (1974, p. 485) considera que tal tentativa de superar o
solipsismo através do consenso intersubjetivo acaba por entrar
em contradição com a hipótese inicial de que os dois componentes do sistema composto hobjeto + aparatoi estejam no mesmo
nível ontológico. De fato, existe uma dificuldade, pois como poderia um sistema composto, causado por uma consciência individual Ci1 , ser objetivo, isto é, publicamente acessível a outras
consciências individuais Ci2 . . . Cin numa situação em que Ci1 não
estivesse ciente do sistema composto? Isto é, a contradição está
em assumir a existência de um objeto que, num raciocínio posterior, não existe por si, mas tão somente diante de uma consciência individual.
Da mesma forma, a situação proposta por Wigner (1983, p. 173)
parece sugerir uma interpretação solipsista, como vemos no trecho: “[o] solipsismo pode ser logicamente consistente com a me111
cânica quântica presente; já o monismo, no sentido materialista,
não é”. Claramente, Wigner (1983, p. 178) não fica contente com
essa implicação ontológica: “[. . .] negar a existência da consciência de um amigo a esse ponto é certamente uma atitude antinatural que se aproxima do solipsismo, e poucas pessoas, em seus
corações, irão segui-la”.
No entanto, ao final do raciocínio do amigo de Wigner (1983,
p. 173), fica claro que a assunção do solipsismo, na afirmação de
que “[. . .] o solipsismo pode ser logicamente consistente com a
mecânica quântica presente” parece ter um significado estritamente metodológico. Em outras palavras, é precisamente a ideia
de uma interpretação subjetivista para o conceito de “consciência” na mecânica quântica que é colocada em xeque com a situação paradoxal proposta em tal raciocínio, isto é, a ideia de
que a consciência subjetiva, individualizada, seria agente causal
na medição quântica. Talvez uma das formas mais expressivas do
descontentamento em relação às interpretações subjetivistas tenha sido formulada por Bell:
[. . .] permita-me argumentar contra um mito. . . que a
teoria quântica tenha de alguma forma desfeito a revolução copernicana. Desde aqueles que fizeram essa
revolução, aprendemos que o mundo é mais inteligível quando não nos imaginamos no centro dele. A
teoria quântica não colocaria novamente “observadores”. . . nós. . . no centro do quadro? De fato, muito se diz
a respeito de “observáveis” nos livros de teoria quântica. E a partir de alguns textos de divulgação, o público geral poderia ficar com a impressão de que a
própria existência do cosmos dependeria de que estejamos aqui para observar os observáveis. (Bell, 2004,
p. 170).
Bell (2004) se posicionou tacitamente contra a ideia de que
a subjetividade seja um agente causal necessário para que haja
112
o universo, o que parece coadunar com o raciocínio de Wigner
(1983), através do raciocínio expresso no paradoxo do amigo.
3.2.3 O problema metafísico
Esse novo objeto —a consciência— com poder causal é introduzido na ontologia da mecânica quântica sem que tenhamos informações acerca de sua natureza. Assim, ao passo que o problema
ontológico da consciência na mecânica quântica seja a própria
introdução da entidade, o problema metafísico é justamente a
falta de uma metafísica que explique a natureza dessa entidade.
A necessidade (ou não) de que a lacuna entre ontologia e metafísica seja preenchida tem sido extensamente debatida na literatura recente.10 No entanto, ao passo que o debate geralmente
gire em torno da metodologia da metafísica e do realismo científico, trarei um ângulo pouco explorado. Farei uma espécie de
“mostruário” dos perfis metafísicos pouco explorados para a interpretação da consciência causal.
A introdução da noção de consciência como um “objeto” não
físico no sentido de não material, na ontologia subjacente a essa
interpretação da medição quântica vem acompanhada de uma
série de problemas. Dentre eles, destaco a problemática em relação à definição do termo “consciência”, isto é, como a consciência deve ser entendida em termos metafísicos. Qual o lugar de
tal “consciência” no mundo? Ou seja, o problema ontológico da
consciência na mecânica quântica pode ser brevemente enunciado com a seguinte questão: “o que é a consciência?”. Buscarei
elencar como tal questão é abordada pela literatura, bem como
a problemática suscitada por essa discussão.
Como observa Albert (1992, p. 82), a tese defendida por Wigner
dependeria de uma separação entre sistemas inteiramente ma10
Ver Arenhart (2019), Arenhart e Arroyo (2021b), Arroyo e Arenhart (2019),
Bueno (2019b), Chakravartty (2019) e French (2019).
113
teriais e sistemas conscientes, isto é, a separação entre sistemas
não-conscientes e sistemas conscientes, de modo que a evolução
do estado físico de um dado objeto quântico seria diferente caso
o objeto fosse ou não consciente. Consequentemente, o entendimento do comportamento dos objetos quânticos dependeria da
definição ou do significado do termo “consciência”.
No entanto, nenhum dos autores referidos ofereceu uma definição do termo “consciência” Albert (1992, p. 83), de modo que
não fica claro o significado de uma sentença tal como a afirmação
de que “a consciência é o agente causal na medição quântica”. Assim, a problemática suscitada pela interpretação da consciência
causal, isto é, de que a medição seria completa somente com a introdução de um agente causal não-físico, permanece em aberto
—e, como aponta Smith (2003), os resultados de tal debate (se
a consciência não física é realmente um agente causal ou não)
seriam definitivos para as discussões contemporâneas, especialmente nas áreas da filosofia da mente e nas ciências cognitivas.
Deve ficar claro, nesse aspecto, que a noção de “consciência”, conforme apresentada, desempenha um papel fundamentalmente distinto da ordem material, onde se situam os sistemas físicos. Nesse preciso sentido, essa interpretação da consciência é incompatível com uma metafísica monista materialista, como sugerido por Wigner (1983, p. 173) e demonstrado por
Arroyo e Arenhart (2019).
Conforme a analogia proposta, do estatuto ontológico como
o mobiliário do mundo, destaco, em específico, que esta interpretação, que caracterizarei como interpretação da consciência causal, carece de uma formulação ontológica (do tipo OT ) que abarque esse novo objeto: a consciência. Como aponta Köhler (2001,
p. 114), “von Neumann consistentemente evitava discussões ‘filosóficas’ de questões epistemológicas”. Pelo contrário, a única
categorização que é feita em relação ao termo “consciência” é
que se trata de um objeto ontologicamente distinto dos obje114
tos materiais, o que sugere que essa consciência se trata de uma
substância distinta da substância material. Tal proposta, como
observam Stapp (2007, p. 167) e Stöltzner (2001, p. 58–59), se alinha com o dualismo do tipo cartesiano, conhecido como “dualismo de substância”, que possui diversas dificuldades filosóficas
—uma das grandes questões seria o problema mente-corpo.11
É possível delinear a questão da seguinte maneira: da forma
como colocado por von Neumann (1955) e Wigner (1983), a noção
de “consciência” com poder causal na medição quântica deveria cumprir as seguintes caracterizações: a consciência deve ser
imaterial, no sentido de que não pertence ao mesmo nível ontológico que os sistemas quânticos, isto é, deve ser considerada em
um nível diferente em relação à aplicação da mecânica quântica;
não deve ser subjetiva, isto é, individualizada.
3.2.4 Metafísicas da consciência quântica
Nos parágrafos seguintes, elencarei algumas alternativas que
preenchem a lacuna metafísica da consciência na mecânica
quântica. Isto é, tratam-se de alternativas que respondem questões de natureza para essa entidade, a consciência, obtida como
parte da ontologia da interpretação da mecânica quântica analisada neste capítulo. Opto pelas propostas de Bass (1971) e
Goswami (1989), por tratarem diretamente das questões apresentadas e serem alternativas pouco abordadas na literatura.
A proposta de Bass (1971) se trata de uma generalização metafísica do pensamento tardio de Schrödinger (1964) para solucionar a situação paradoxal presente no raciocínio do amigo de
Wigner.12
11
Ainda assim, em termos metafísicos, não é possível determinar nem
mesmo extrair a metafísica associada à ontologia da interpretação de von
Neumann. Para maiores detalhes, ver Arroyo e Arenhart (2019).
12
Um estudo detalhado sobre a concepção filosófica tardia de Schrödinger
pode ser encontrado em Murr (2014).
115
Para Schrödinger, os debates em relação ao conceito de consciência ou mente enfrentariam uma situação problemática, devido ao frequente comprometimento ontológico com a existência
de múltiplas mentes —tal como a situação do amigo de Wigner
parece pressupor:
Para a filosofia [. . .] a dificuldade real está na multiplicidade espacial e temporal de observadores e indivíduos cognoscentes. Se todos os eventos ocorressem
em uma consciência, a situação seria extremamente
simples. (Schrödinger, 1964, p. 18).
Pode-se perceber na passagem anteriormente citada, assim
como em diversas outras, como observa Cohen (1992), o comprometimento ontológico com a existência de uma única mente
que, conforme observa Bertotti é de notável influência do pensamento indiano, especificamente do Vedanta:13
O enigma das consciências individuais e sua comunidade levaram ele [Schrödinger] a uma posição, característica da filosofia indiana, que é o fundamento filosófico do clássico Vedanta: todas as mentes individuais [. . .] são manifestações de uma única Mente que
abrange tudo. (Bertotti, 1994, p. 91).
Sobre o termo “Vedanta”, destaco um trecho de uma exposição de Conger, que explicita precisamente o aspecto espiritualista do Vedanta que é abordado na discussão acima:
[. . .] a filosofia central dos Upanixades e do Vedānta,
muitas vezes considerada panteísta, seria descrita
com maior precisão como um monismo espiritualista. Exemplo melhor de panteísmo é apresentado
13
Ver também Bitbol (2004, p. 171).
116
pelo Deus de Espinosa com um número infinito de
atributos. No Advaita Vedānta, Brahman é caracterizada por sat (ser), cit (inteligência) e ānanda (bemaventurança), ao invés de uma gama de atributos pessoais; [. . .] Brahman é alcançada pelo indivíduo que
chega a compreender sua própria identidade com a
Realidade Una. (Conger, 1944, p. 239).
Schrödinger faz uso da noção de “māyā”, correspondente à
distinção —bastante antiga também na filosofia grega— entre o
que é real e o que seria aparente para responder à questão da
multiplicidade das mentes:
A única alternativa possível é manter a experiência
imediata de que a consciência é singular que desconhece plural; que existe apenas uma coisa e que
aquilo que parece ser pluralidade é meramente uma
série de diferentes aspectos dessa única coisa, produzida por uma ilusão (o termo indiano “māyā”).
(Schrödinger, 1967, p. 89).
Devo apontar, conforme Gough (1891, p. 237), que “a doutrina
de māyā, ou a irrealidade do dualismo sujeito/objeto, bem como
a irrealidade da pluralidade de almas e seu ambiente, é a vida
da filosofia indiana primitiva”. Assim, māyā não se remete exclusivamente ao Vedanta. No entanto, conforme Bertotti, a influência do pensamento tardio de Schrödinger seria primordialmente
o Vedanta e, por isso, destaco apenas seu uso dentro do sistema vedantino. Se pudermos extrair uma metafísica do Vedanta,
ela estaria associada com a identificação entre Atman, um termo
que designa as “mentes individual” e Brahman, que seria algo
como uma “consciência cósmica”. De acordo com Radhakrishnan,
o termo “Maja” (“māyā”, em sânscrito) se insere no sistema vedantino da seguinte forma:
117
[. . .] apenas o Absoluto, chamado Brahman, é real e
as manifestações finitas são ilusórias. Há apenas uma
realidade absoluta e indiferenciada, cuja natureza é
constituída pelo conhecimento. O mundo empírico é
inteiramente ilusório, com suas distinções de mentes
finitas e objetos e os objetos de seu pensamento. Sujeitos e objetos são como imagens fugazes que englobam a alma que sonha, e que se reduzem a nada no
momento em que acorda. O termo “māyā” significa o
caráter ilusório do mundo finito. [. . .] Os aspectos centrais da filosofia Vedantina, como é concebida atualmente, são resumidamente explicitados nas seguintes
frases: Brahman é o real e o universo é falso. O Atman
é Brahman. Nada mais. (Radhakrishnan, 1914, p. 431).
Dessa forma, a multiplicidade das mentes seria uma aparência ao passo que a unicidade da mente seria real ou, nas palavras
de Cohen (1992, p. 97–98), “não existe ‘realmente’ uma multiplicidade de eus. [. . .] existe uma unidade de todas as consciências”.
No entanto, Schrödinger (1964, p. 18) reconhece, conforme explicita na seguinte passagem, que esse não é um assunto estritamente racional: “[. . .] eu não penso que essa dificuldade possa ser
resolvida logicamente, através de um pensamento consistente,
em nossos intelectos”, ao se referir que “[. . .] a pluralidade que
percebemos é apenas aparente, não é real”. De forma mais enfática, Schrödinger explicita que esta ideia, própria do pensamento
do Vedanta, é um pensamento místico:
Resumidamente, é a visão de que todos nós, seres vivos, somos unidos na medida em que somos, na verdade, lados ou aspectos de um único ser, que talvez na terminologia ocidental possa ser chamado de
“Deus” enquanto nos Upanixades seu nome é “Brahman”. [. . .] Nós reconhecemos que estamos lidando
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aqui não com algo logicamente dedutível, mas com
misticismo. (Schrödinger, 1967, p. 95).
No entanto, a ligação desse aspecto de seu pensamento, caracterizado como “misticismo racional” é obscura. Cohen (1992,
p. 98) sugere que a ausência de uma ligação se dá pela posição de Schrödinger de que a ciência deve ser fundamentalmente
objetiva, isto é, deve excluir de forma preliminar o sujeito que
conhece daquilo que é conhecido. Ainda assim, Schrödinger jamais defendeu uma ideia de ciência subjetiva, tampouco objetiva
à maneira do empirismo moderno, mas impessoal.
Para Murr (2014, p. 212), a visão de mundo de Schrödinger, justamente por ter uma estreita relação com seu trabalho científico,
não deve ser entendida como um aspecto religioso, mas essencialmente filosófico. Poser (1992, p. 161) aponta, ainda, que sua
proposta filosófica é mais do que uma continuação de seu trabalho científico; pelo contrário, afirma que seu trabalho na ciência
seja fruto de suas reflexões filosóficas.
O posicionamento filosófico tardio de Schrödinger é classificado por Poser (1992, p. 163) como um “monismo idealista dinâmico”, cuja expressão máxima se encontra na expressão sânscrita
“tat tvam asi”, que Huxley (1947, p. 8) traduz para o inglês como
“that art thou”, que traduzido livremente para o português significaria algo como “tu és isto”, e que Schrödinger (1964, p. 22)
interpreta como: “Eu estou no leste e no oeste, eu estou abaixo e
acima, eu sou o universo todo”.
Poser (1992, p. 166) destaca ainda que Schrödinger utiliza o
pensamento vedantino como referência teórica para seu projeto
científico e filosófico, e não como autoridade religiosa; ou seja,
utiliza a discussão presente no Vedanta para argumentar em favor de sua proposta, de modo que constrói um modelo aberto
a críticas e não um dogma incontestável. Dessa forma, Bertotti
(1994, p. 83) utiliza o termo “misticismo racional” para classificar
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esse tipo de atitude, identificada também na posição filosófica
de Einstein.
Como observa Murr (2014, p. 212), o referido sentimento de
“unidade” pode ser alcançado por diversas vias, sendo a técnica
da meditação uma delas. Wilber vai além e considera que tal unidade é empírica:
A psicologia vedantina funda-se na introvisão experimentalmente verificável de que Brahman-Atman é a
única Realidade, e sua preocupação primária consiste
em proporcionar uma explicação pragmática do “por
que” os seres humanos não compreendem sua básica
e suprema identidade com Brahman. Em geral, a cega
aceitação, pelos humanos, de dualismos e distinções
é a ignorância (avidyā) que os fazem pousar diretamente num mundo de ilusões (māyā). (Wilber, 1997,
p. 152).
Tal referencial, que Murr (2014, p. 211–214) chama de “pósobjetivado”, é utilizado por Bass (1971) em um artigo intitulado
“The Mind of Wigner’s Friend” (que traduzido livremente para o
português significa “A Mente do Amigo de Wigner”), na tentativa
de solucionar o paradoxo do amigo de Wigner (1983) com a introdução da hipótese, inspirada na obra tardia de Schrödinger
(1964), chamada de “visão Vedantina”, que remete à tese da unicidade da consciência.
Para tal raciocínio, Bass propõe as seguintes premissas:
A. Meu corpo, com seu sistema nervoso central (explorado em qualquer grau de completude fisiológica)
funciona puramente como um mecanismo, de acordo
com as leis da natureza. Além disso, a mecânica quântica é a base final desse mecanismo.
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B. Estou ciente, por evidência direta incontestável, do
conhecimento (informação) entrando em minha consciência. (Bass, 1971, p. 56).
Se aceitarmos que exclusivamente a premissa “A” se aplica ao
“observador intermediário”, então este observador seria, para os
efeitos de medição, tal como um aparelho medidor, isto é, seria
incapaz de completar uma medição conforme o sentido do termo
“medição” proposto por von Neumann (1955); da mesma forma,
se aceitarmos que exclusivamente a premissa “B” se aplica ao
“observador intermediário”, então este observador seria, para os
efeitos de medição, um observador final na medida em que seria
capaz de completar uma medição.
As duas premissas, quando aplicadas juntamente ao observador intermediário, trariam uma situação paradoxal, visto que
levam a situações mutuamente exclusivas. Essa seria a leitura de
Bass (1971, p. 57) do paradoxo do amigo de Wigner (1983). No entanto, o raciocínio acima parece levar em consideração dois observadores, nomeadamente o observador intermediário e o observador final. Assim, Bass (1971, p. 59) é capaz de enunciar uma
terceira premissa subentendida no raciocínio que leva à situação paradoxal: “C. Existem, independentemente, ao menos duas
mentes conscientes”.
No entanto, Bass (1971, p. 58–61) procura demonstrar que a
situação paradoxal proposta por Wigner (1983) só ocorre quando
as premissas A, B e C são aceitas, de modo que, se somente a
premissa “C” for negada, as premissas “A” e “B” podem ser ambas
verdadeiras ao mesmo tempo. Para tanto, uma hierarquia das três
premissas, do ponto de vista empírico, é estabelecida por Bass
(1971, p. 59): “mantenho, como Descartes, que a premissa “B” é a
mais forte dentre as três: não tenho conhecimento mais direto e
menos incerto que esse”.
A premissa “A” estaria em segundo lugar na “hierarquia empírica” de Bass (1971, p. 59), e é analisada criticamente: a primeira
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parte da premissa “[. . .] extrapola os avanços maravilhosos e contínuos da fisiologia do sistema nervoso”, mas que, ainda assim,
permanece válida na medida em que a neurofisiologia não nega
que o cérebro é “uma rede de unidades de operação eletroquímicas finamente interligadas (células, axônios, sinapses)”.
Na análise da premissa “C”, Bass (1971, p. 59) afirma que não
é apoiada por qualquer evidência empírica direta”, utilizando-se
do raciocínio de Schrödinger (1967, p. 88), para quem “‘consciência’ nunca é experienciada no plural, apenas no singular” —o que
Bass (1971, p. 60) considera suficiente para afirmar que a premissa
“C” seria a premissa mais fraca dentre as três, do ponto de vista
empírico.
Por outro lado, do ponto de vista lógico, Bass aponta que a
atualização de uma potencialidade, no caso de uma medição efetuada pela consciência, deveria representar “um efeito específico
da consciência sobre o mundo físico”, de modo que seja precisamente
[. . .] esse efeito específico da consciência sobre o
mundo físico que pode ser tomado para acoplar a
introspecção [premissa B] na física [premissa A], de
modo a gerar o paradoxo. (Bass, 1971, p. 60).
Tal “efeito específico” seria a ação da premissa “C”, isto é, a
ação de uma (dentre uma vasta pluralidade) consciência individualizada sobre o mundo físico.
Assim, Bass resume seu argumento da negação da premissa
“C” da seguinte forma. A faculdade de introspecção, contida na
premissa B:
[. . .] pode envolver apenas uma consciência. O mundo
externo (na premissa A) é introduzido e confrontado
com a introspecção de tal modo que a hipótese sobre
a pluralidade das mentes conscientes (na premissa C)
resulta em uma negação. (Bass, 1971, p. 60).
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Dessa forma, Bass (1971, p. 63) assume a “[. . .] visão vedantina,
que nega a pluralidade das mentes conscientes”. A existência da
pluralidade da consciência, contudo, não é negada em absoluto:
ela existiria enquanto aparência, se referindo à doutrina indiana
de māyā, isto é, da aparência da pluralidade das consciências, a
medida em que realmente só existiria uma consciência Bass (1971,
p. 61–62). No entanto, Bass reconhece que a emergência de uma
dualidade sujeito/objeto, tal como parece ocorrer na percepção
humana, é um aspecto problemático de sua proposta:
Assumindo a pluralidade, deduzi uma contradição. Seria desejável complementar tal resultado ao assumir
a unidade e deduzir uma consequência específica que
possa ser, ao menos em princípio, observável. Isso asseguraria que a distinção entre pluralidade e unidade
é significativa até mesmo no âmbito das ciências naturais. Mas a noção ordinária de um ato de observação
envolve um sujeito e um objeto, o que não se coaduna
com a hipótese da unidade, quando ambos sujeito e
objeto envolvem consciência. (Bass, 1971, p. 65).
A dualidade sujeito/objeto no ato de observação, referida
acima, é mais sutil do que a referida por Bohr (1928): há implícita aqui uma distinção entre aquilo que conhece e aquilo que é
conhecido. Mantendo o vocabulário monista da consciência proposta por Bass (1971), há a distinção entre o que está dentro da
consciência e o que está fora da consciência. O tema da dualidade, isto é, a multiplicidade de consciências subsidiária ao monismo, à unicidade da consciência, seria, à luz do Vedanta, abordado pela doutrina da ilusão.
Portanto, longe de solucionar os problemas metafísicos da
consciência na mecânica quântica, essa hipótese daria lugar a
outro espectro de problemas conceituais, próprios do pensamento vedantino. Ademais, metodologicamente, essa proposta
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parece querer impor uma ontologia do tipo OT para a ciência,
sem qualquer justificativa aparente para tal.
Ainda assim, essa atitude frente ao problema da medição
quântica é levada adiante por Goswami. Apresentarei resumidamente sua interpretação da medição quântica nos parágrafos seguintes —já adiantando de antemão, contudo, que se trata de
uma proposta que incorre na mesma dificuldade que a proposta
de Bass, conforme apontada no parágrafo anterior.
A partir de uma generalização da ontologia de Heisenberg
(1958) acerca da distinção entre potencialidade e atualidade e
da medição=criação, Goswami (2003, p. 534) afirma que a evolução determinista e temporal, descrita através da evolução linear,
ocorre em um domínio transcendente, que define —utilizando a
terminologia de Heisenberg (1958)— como “potentia”.
A definição de Goswami (2003, p. 534) para o domínio “potentia”, transcendente, seria também reminiscente da ontologia
processual de Whitehead (1925, p. 202, nota 2), que considera
que “espaço e tempo precisam resultar de algo em processo que
transcenda os objetos”.
Outra motivação para tal definição seria a interpretação de
Stapp (2007) —que também utiliza a filosofia de processos Whitehediana para interpretar a teoria quântica— acerca da não localidade. A não localidade surgiu originalmente do raciocínio EPR,
que, como vimos no Capítulo 2, propuseram um experimento
mental em que a medição efetuada em um objeto A influenciaria instantaneamente um objeto B, espacialmente distante de
A. O estudo sobre a “não localidade” fora desenvolvido posteriormente por Bell (1964) e, posteriormente, ganhou respaldo experimental com os trabalhos de Aspect et al. (1982).
A não localidade é um dos aspectos da física quântica que difere radicalmente da física clássica, e tem suscitado diversos debates filosóficos até a contemporaneidade —que não serão tratados aqui. Limitei-me, no Capítulo 2, a analisar o problema da se124
parabilidade, segundo o qual a “não localidade” segue-se como
consequência.
De acordo com Stapp (1977, p. 191), a principal mensagem da
não localidade seria a de que “os processos fundamentais do
espaço-tempo estão fora do espaço-tempo, mas geram eventos
que podem ser localizados no espaço-tempo”. Assim, Goswami
(2003, p. 534) utiliza o termo “não localidade” como “fora do
espaço-tempo”, de modo que o domínio “potentia” seja não local. Aplicando tal aspecto, que Goswami (2003, p. 535) chama
de “ontologia básica de Heisenberg”, à teoria da medição de
von Neumann (1955), tem-se que o colapso atualiza, isto é, traz
para a realidade manifesta apenas uma possibilidade dentre diversas outras possibilidades contidas neste domínio transcendente, de modo que a realidade transfenomenal, isto é, a realidade entre tais atualizações, estaria contida no domínio “potentia”.
O termo “metafísica experimental”, cunhado por Shimony
(1984, p. 35) expressa a ideia de que os experimentos científicos poderiam, de alguma forma, guiar os debates filosóficos.
Goswami (2001, p. 15–16) faz uso desse conceito para exemplificar, a partir de um experimento conduzido em conjunto com
Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al. (1994), a ação não local da consciência unitiva.
No experimento em questão, duas pessoas são separadas em
salas com isolamento eletromagnético (isto é, que não permitem a transmissão de sinais eletromagnéticos) e conectadas a
eletroencefalogramas diferentes. Solicita-se que, durante o experimento, as pessoas mantenham a intenção de comunicarse entre si. Uma série de flashes de luz é lançada em uma
das salas, de modo que apenas uma das pessoas poderia têlos visto. As ondas cerebrais da pessoa que viu os flashes são
registradas pelo eletroencefalograma, com uma atividade elétrica no cérebro que atinge picos nos momentos em que os
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flashes são disparados— o que é nomeado de “potencial evocado” Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al. (1994, p. 423).
No entanto —e essa é, segundo Goswami (2001, p. 201), a
maior contribuição de tal experimento—, a outra pessoa, que não
viu os flashes, também tem uma atividade cerebral registrada,
precisamente nos mesmos instantes (mas com uma intensidade
menor) em que o potencial evocado ocorre —o que é chamado de
“potencial transferido” Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al. (1994, p. 424).
Em experimentos controle, as pessoas não mantêm a intenção de
se comunicar ao longo do experimento, e o potencial transferido
não foi observado.
Goswami (2001, p. 202) sugere que a explicação desse fenômeno seja a ação não local da consciência unitiva, que “[. . .] colapsa estados similares nos dois cérebros; daí a similaridade dos
potenciais cerebrais”. Assim, da mesma forma que no raciocínio
EPR, os dois cérebros estariam de alguma forma inseparáveis de
maneira não local, com a diferença crucial de que, no caso do
experimento conduzido por Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al. (1994), tal
inseparabilidade se daria por uma intenção consciente e não por
um ato puramente físico.
Um dos aspectos essencialmente novos da interpretação de
Goswami (1989, p. 385) seria a proposta metafísica do “idealismo
monista”, na qual todos os elementos estão dentro da mesma e
única consciência: tanto os elementos transcendentes, potenciais, quanto os imanentes são atualizados. Isto é, tanto o colapso
quanto a evolução linear acontecem dentro da consciência. Na
realidade, seria uma proposta “nova” em relação à interpretação da mecânica quântica, na medida em que Goswami utiliza vários aspectos metafísicos da filosofia platônica. Como veremos,
o termo corresponde àquilo que Conger (1944, p. 239) chamou de
“monismo espiritualista”: dentre os autores ocidentais que advogam essa corrente de pensamento, Conger destaca os nomes
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de Platão, Plotino e Espinoza, principalmente. Nas palavras de
Goswami:
[. . .] os objetos já estão na consciência primordialmente, como formas possíveis em potentia. O colapso
não está fazendo algo aos objetos via observação, mas
consiste em escolher entre as possibilidades alternativas que a função de onda fornece, e em reconhecer
o resultado da escolha. (Goswami, 2003, p. 536).
Isto é, não se trataria da ação da consciência sobre a matéria, isto é, de mover algum corpo material com a força do pensamento, algo como a psicocinese ou a telecinesia. Essa ideia pressupõe uma distinção entre as noções de “consciência” e “matéria”. O que parece estar em jogo aqui é o postulado de que todos
os objetos são objetos dentro da mesma e única consciência. Essa
seria uma forma de tratar a noção de consciência a partir de uma
ontologia outra que não a do monismo materialista —em que a
consciência é um fenômeno advindo da complexidade do arranjo
material (neuronal) e, portanto, sem poder causal— ou a do dualismo —segundo o qual as noções de “consciência” e “matéria”
correspondem a substâncias separadas.
Da mesma forma, Goswami procura demonstrar de que forma
a noção de consciência, quando tratada a partir do idealismo monista, evita dificuldades filosóficas conforme apontadas em situações tais como a do “amigo de Wigner”:
O problema de Wigner surge do seu raciocínio dualista
acerca da sua própria consciência separada da consciência de seu amigo. O paradoxo desaparece se existir somente um sujeito —não sujeitos separados como
estamos acostumados a pensar. [. . .] Se a consciência
do amigo de Wigner não difere em essência da consciência de Wigner, se for sempre uma consciência cau127
sando o colapso da função de onda, não há paradoxo.
(Goswami, 2003, p. 536).
Essa proposta de solução para a situação elaborada por
Wigner (1983), através do “paradoxo do amigo”, é muito próxima
da solução proposta por Bass (1971), como vimos anteriormente.
Revisitando a situação do gato de Schrödinger (1983), expandida
por Penrose (1989), Goswami (1989, p. 390) afirma que questões
acerca da consciência do gato ou a discrepância entre os humanos de dentro e fora da caixa são dificuldades que acompanham
a concepção dualista da noção de “consciência”.
No entanto, Goswami (2003, p. 537) aponta uma dificuldade
para essa solução do problema da medição: se admitirmos que a
consciência, unitiva e transcendente, traz à atualidade manifesta
alguns aspectos da sua própria potencialidade transcendente,
ela seria onipresente. No entanto, se aceitarmos tal uso do termo
“consciência”, ela estaria sempre observando, de modo que caberia a pergunta: a que ponto uma medição está completa? Isto
é, como poderia haver mais do que uma medição se a consciência onipresente estaria continuamente medindo? Dessa forma, a
simples introdução da hipótese de uma consciência onipresente
como agente causal na medição quântica não resolveria o problema da medição.
Na tentativa de resolver tal dificuldade, Goswami (2003,
p. 537) afirma que “a medição não está completa sem a inclusão da percepção autorreferencial mente-cérebro”, o que implicaria numa circularidade causal na medida em que “a percepção
é necessária para completar a medição, mas sem que uma medição esteja completa, não há percepção”. Goswami (1993, p. 99)
afirma que é dessa autorreferência que surge a percepção subjetiva, como um epifenômeno da experiência.
Tais ideias acerca do funcionamento autorreferencial entre mente-corpo teriam sido inspiradas na obra de Douglas
Hofstadter (1979). Resumidamente, Hofstadter (1979, p. 684–714)
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considera que uma das características da autorreferência —tal
como apontada pela noção de incompletude de Gödel (1967)—
seria a emergência de um nível que a transcenda; em sua terminologia, afirma que a autorreferência forma uma “hierarquia entrelaçada”, da qual um “nível inviolado” emerge. Para Hofstadter
(1979, p. 688), tais níveis são hierárquicos, de modo que o nível inviolado governa o que acontece no nível entrelaçado, mas o nível
entrelaçado não pode afetar o nível inviolado.
Na terminologia de Goswami (1993, p.192), a consciência seria análoga ao “nível inviolado”, que governa o aparelho mentecorpo autorreferente, ou em “hierarquia entrelaçada”. No entanto, próprio do nível inviolado, a definição de “consciência”,
para Goswami, fugiria aos critérios discursivos:
O que é a consciência? Podemos começar a discussão com o que não é. Não é uma parte da dualidade
mente-matéria, interno-externo. Não é um objeto, embora objetos apareçam nela. Tem algo a ver com o subjetivo, o experienciador, o conhecedor de objetos. [. . .]
Porque a consciência é a base do ser, tudo mais, incluindo palavras, conceitos e metáforas, são secundários a ela. Não podemos definir a consciência completamente com itens que são secundários a ela, acentuando o mistério. (Goswami, 2001, p. 14).
Poderíamos, talvez, delinear certa influência da filosofia
platônica no pensamento de Goswami (2001, p. 14) acerca da
(in)definição do termo “consciência” na medida em que, para a
ontologia de Platão (A República, VI, §509d–511e), a razão discursiva (do grego “dianóia”) não seria suficiente para apreender os
níveis ontológicos mais elevados, tal como a suprema Ideia de
Bem ou Sumo Bem. Maria Pereira (1990) comenta esse aspecto
da metafísica platônica da seguinte maneira:
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[. . .] o mundo visível (horata ou doxasta) tem em primeiro lugar uma zona de eikones (“imagens”, ou, como
outros preferem, “ilusão”). Num nível mais elevado, temos todos os seres vivos (zoa) e objetos do mundo,
conhecidos através de pistis (fé). O mundo inteligível
(noeta) tem também dois sectores proporcionais a estes, o inferior e o superior, o primeiro apreendido através da dianóia (“entendimento” ou “razão discursiva”)
e o segundo só pela nóesis (“inteligência” ou “razão
intuitiva”). (Pereira, 1990, xxix–xxx).
Em seu dicionário etimológico do vocabulário filosófico
grego, Ivan Gobry reitera essa ideia:
Esse termo [“dianóia”] tem sentido vago; indica habitualmente um modo de pensamento menos elevado
que a nóesis. Classicamente, a diánoia é o conhecimento discursivo, por raciocínio. Assim, em Platão, ela
é o grau inferior da ciência, que recorre a conceitos em
vez de contemplar diretamente as Essências (v. dialektiké, psykhé). (Gobry, 2007, p. 41).
Ademais, há, na ontologia de Platão (A República, VII, §519d521b), considerações que pressupõem a conexão entre as noções
de “unidade” e a “Ideia de Bem”, o que atenua a possibilidade de
um paralelo com a noção de “consciência” em Goswami.
Além da influência na filosofia grega, da mesma forma
que Schrödinger em seu pensamento tardio, o pensamento de
Goswami é claramente influenciado por diversos aspectos da literatura mística, principalmente no que se refere à unidade com
o nível ontológico mais elevado (a saber, a consciência unitiva):
Mas, dizem os sábios espirituais, os descobridores
da filosofia monista idealista, embora não possamos
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defini-la, podemos sê-la, nós somos ela. É nossa ignorância que nos impede de ver nossa natureza original,
nossa interconectividade com a fonte. (Goswami, 2001,
p. 14).
As propostas de solução para o problema do dualismo analisadas acima pressupõem o uso do referencial filosófico indiano
(se é que tal expressão faz algum sentido) —o que ainda é bastante polêmico na prática científica e filosófica do ocidente. Uma
das principais dificuldades de utilizar a sabedoria do vasto oriente para compreender o uso da noção de “consciência” na mecânica quântica é que várias vertentes do pensamento indiano,
tal como o Vedanta, pressupõem a experiência mística (se é que
tal expressão faz algum sentido), isto é, parece fugir do escopo
de investigação limitado pelo discurso racional da ciência e pela
filosofia.
Dessa forma, na medida em que fazem uso referencial do Vedanta, as soluções de Bass (1971) e Goswami (1989), bem como o
pensamento tardio de Schrödinger (1964), a despeito de sua plausibilidade, deveriam ser, no mínimo, precedidas por uma discussão acerca da legitimidade do uso da literatura mística como referencial ontológico para as ciências empíricas, como a mecânica
quântica —o que não é do escopo desta discussão.
Ainda assim, a filosofia processual de Whitehead (1928) tem
aberto um frutífero campo de investigação para os estudos da
consciência frente às dificuldades da noção de consciência frente
ao dualismo e sua relação com a mecânica quântica, como apontam os estudos de Eastman e Keeton (2003), Epperson (2004),
Stapp (2007) —o que pode indicar um campo para investigação
futura de modo a possivelmente oferecer uma solução melhor
aceita pelas comunidades científica e filosófica. Tratarei brevemente dessa investigação no Capítulo 4.
Para finalizar essa exposição, refiro-me à proposta de
Manousakis (2006), que oferece um modelo em que a teoria
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quântica é fundada sob a base ontológica da consciência sem
fazer referência ao pensamento indiano, mas, ainda assim, há características místicas em sua base ontológica. Pode-se constatar
diversos pontos em comum com a proposta de Goswami (1989):
para Manousakis (2006, p. 800), a consciência teria caráter unitivo e seria a base ontológica da realidade; haveria apenas uma
única consciência, nomeada de “fluxo Universal da consciência”,
do qual emergiriam “subfluxos”, como o “fluxo individual da consciência”.
Em contraste à interpretação da consciência causal, chamarei
as propostas delineadas acima como “interpretação mística da
consciência”, ainda que a motivação possa ter sida metafísica. Até
o presente, pouco se avançou no debate, e a interpretação mística também acaba não decolando —ainda que por motivos distintos daqueles enfrentados pela interpretação da consciência
causal. Talvez a maior dificuldade conceitual das interpretações
místicas da consciência é o misteriosismo que envolve a própria
noção de consciência, central não só para o funcionamento da
interpretação, mas base ontológica de toda uma visão de mundo
que depende desse conceito.
3.3
Outras interpretações
Existem inúmeras atitudes frente ao problema da medição, questão que procurei delinear ao longo do texto.14 Dentre as diversas
abordagens, destacarei cinco atitudes frente ao problema, com
base no critério de sua popularidade na comunidade científica
contemporânea.
Selecionei, nos próximos parágrafos, algumas leituras com
14
Um exame histórico-conceitual mais abrangente sobre as diversas abordagens para o problema da medição pode ser encontrado em Pessoa Junior
(1992).
132
base na repercussão que tiveram, a título de amostragem. Deve
ficar claro que tal não é meu propósito aprofundar a discussão
acerca de todas as interpretações selecionadas adiante. Cada
uma delas mereceria um estudo à parte para que se pudesse
apresentar sua riqueza e complexidade; limito-me a apresentálas muito brevemente, a título de amostragem, como interpretações possíveis dentre as mais influentes e/ou populares. Dessa
forma, me limito a uma abordagem bastante resumida e superficial, indicando bibliografias que possam aprofundar a discussão.
As atitudes frente à noção de “medição” foram selecionadas
de forma a exemplificar como o problema não é abordado de
forma unilateral, isto é: a interpretação da consciência não é necessária.
As leituras selecionadas são, cronologicamente: a interpretação estatística que, assim como a interpretação de Copenhague, também é amplamente aceita pela comunidade científica e
frequentemente utilizada em diversos livros-texto de mecânica
quântica;15 a interpretação causal de Bohm (1952), por se tratar
de uma abordagem heterodoxa bastante completa; a interpretação dos estados latentes, abordagem crítica de Henry Margenau
(1963) frente ao conceito de “colapso” na medição quântica, bem
como sua atitude crítica frente às interpretações subjetivas, que
Jammer (1974) destaca como influente; a interpretação dos estados relativos de Everett (1957), por ser uma das abordagens heterodoxas mais populares; a abordagem do colapso espontâneo
de Ghirardi, Rimini e Weber (1986 [doravante citado como GRW,
1986]), por também ser uma das atitudes mais bem aceitas na
comunidade científica contemporânea.16
Com exceção das formulações GRW, 1986 e “estatística”, todas as outras atitudes destacadas adiante negam a validade do
colapso, se enquadrando nas chamadas “teorias sem colapso”.
15
16
De acordo com Pessoa Junior (2003, p. 25, nota 3).
De acordo com Albert (1992).
133
Estatística
Iniciarei a discussão a partir da interpretação estatística, também
conhecida como “interpretação dos coletivos estatísticos” ou “interpretação dos ensemble”. Ballentine (1970, p. 360) distingue as
interpretações da teoria quântica em dois grupos maiores: as interpretações nas quais a mecânica quântica provê uma descrição
completa e exaustiva sobre sistemas individuais e as interpretações nas quais a mecânica quântica provê uma descrição completa e exaustiva sobre sistemas coletivos. A mesma oposição é
feita por Jammer (1974, p. 440). As interpretações do primeiro tipo
são consideradas interpretações ortodoxas e, as do segundo tipo,
são consideradas interpretações estatísticas. A noção de “coletivos estatísticos” ou “ensemble” remete a um grupo imaginário
de diversos sistemas com a mesma estrutura macroscópica e o
mesmo sistema microscópico a ser medido.
Primeiramente, é relevante destacar a maneira como
Ballentine (1970) define e noção de interpretação “ortodoxa” da
teoria quântica com um significado distinto e mais abrangente
do que aquele que utilizamos ao longo deste livro. Até aqui,
a noção de “ortodoxia” tem correspondência exclusiva com a
formulação de Copenhague e suas ligações com o empirismo
lógico. Segundo a formulação de Ballantine, no entanto, até
mesmo a interpretação de von Neumann (1955) seria entendida
como uma atitude ortodoxa. De fato, Ballentine (1970, p. 360)
considera que tanto a “interpretação de Princeton” —a qual
von Neumann seria o fundador— quanto a interpretação de
Copenhague da mecânica quântica “[. . .] reivindicam ortodoxia”.
No entanto, como vimos anteriormente, essas duas interpretações ditas ortodoxas têm suas dificuldades no âmbito filosófico. Seja a necessidade de uma ontologia para abarcar a noção
de um observador para causar a medição na interpretação de
Princeton, ou a prioridade ontológica dos objetos clássicos na
medição da interpretação de Copenhague.
134
O fato de evitar os paradoxos e os problemas filosóficos da
teoria quântica seria uma das três motivações principais que
Home e A. M. B. Whitaker (1992, p. 262–264) destacam para a adoção das interpretações estatísticas. Proposta por Einstein em
1927, na ocasião da vigésima terceira Conferência de Solvay, tal
interpretação fora formulada justamente para evitar quase todas as dificuldades filosóficas discutidas neste livro— quiçá todas
as dificuldades filosóficas da mecânica quântica. Isso porque as
dificuldades surgem quando os sistemas quânticos são tratados
como sistemas individuais, e não como apanhados estatísticos.
Outra motivação destacada por Home e A. M. B. Whitaker (1992,
p. 262) seria a de erigir a física sobre uma ontologia realistaobjetivista, isto é, manter na mecânica quântica nossas percepções intuitivas acerca da realidade que nos cerca.
Como destaca Putnam (2005, p. 624), essa motivação seria
compartilhada por Einstein. Talvez o fato da interpretação de Copenhague oferecer uma visão contraintuitiva do mundo à nossa
volta seria um dos motivos para que Einstein tivesse tantas objeções a essa interpretação. Para ilustrar esse ponto, Putnam (2005,
p. 624) relata um diálogo, na qual afirma, em paráfrase, que Einstein havia dito algo como “olha, eu não acredito que quando não
estou no meu quarto minha cama se espalha por todo o cômodo,
e sempre que eu abro a porta e entro ela salta novamente para
o canto”. Isso é um problema, como visto no Capítulo 2, quando
há incompatibilidade entre uma OT assumida previamente e uma
ON obtida pela teoria.
No entanto, Fine (1990, p. 968) declara que “até onde eu pude
descobrir [. . .] Einstein não oferece em lugar algum uma descrição
detalhada da [. . .] interpretação estatística”. Ainda assim, a despeito da falta de uma formulação textual detalhada, diversos físicos teriam utilizado as ideias de Einstein sobre ensembles para
criar propostas estatísticas para a mecânica quântica.
Há, no entanto, uma grande variedade de abordagens estatís135
ticas para a interpretação da mecânica quântica, com diferentes
nomes e especificidades, e não há consenso sobre exatamente
qual interpretação Einstein teria endossado. Contudo, como procurei enfatizar no Capítulo 2, o comprometimento ontológico de
Einstein com uma realidade independente acaba por sugerir que
ele endossaria um tipo de interpretação na qual todas as variáveis, em todos os instantes, possuem valores passíveis de serem
revelados por meio de medições, de modo que todo indeterminismo se dê pelo desconhecimento de todas as variáveis envolvidas no processo de medição. Tais variáveis seriam as variáveis
ocultas,17 isto é, são criptodeterministas no sentido de um indeterminismo epistemológico subjacente a um determinismo ontológico.
Para Ballentine (1970), essa seria a forma mais natural de pensar a posição einsteiniana sobre ensembles. Essa posição se coaduna com evidência textual, que procuramos destacar, do comprometimento ontológico com uma realidade independente e
pré-existente na obra de Einstein. Home e A. M. B. Whitaker (1992,
p. 263), Bunge (1967, p. 7) e Fine (1986, p. 43) vão além e apontam
para o fato de que, para muitos, essa interpretação seria a interpretação estatística.
No entanto, destaco uma definição mínima para a atitude estatística, presente em todas as interpretações estatísticas, formulada por Gibbins (1987, p. 76). De acordo com tal definição, uma
interpretação estatística considera que uma função de onda representa um ensemble, isto é, que a mecânica quântica trataria
exclusivamente das estatísticas dos resultados obtidos por uma
numerosa sequência de medições simultâneas de sistemas coletivos (chamados de “ensemble”), e não sobre quaisquer propriedades dos objetos físicos. Dessa forma, a atitude estatística
17
Para um estudo detalhado das teorias de variáveis ocultas, ver Belinfante
(1973).
136
contrasta com a atitude ortodoxa, para a qual a função de onda
forneceria uma descrição completa de um sistema individual.
De acordo com Park (1973), o conceito de colapso também é
rejeitado por essa interpretação. Assim, deve ficar claro que, para
a interpretação estatística, o problema da medição não existe.
Para exemplificar a atitude mínima da interpretação estatística
frente à situação do gato de Schrödinger (1983), Ross-Boney (1974,
p. 22) escreve que “Em qualquer experimento, aproximadamente
metade dos gatos estão mortos [. . .] e metade estão vivos”.
Isto é, todo debate filosófico em torno do conceito de medição é evitado. Se trata de uma interpretação puramente funcional
da teoria quântica, evitando grande parte dos seus problemas filosóficos. Por esse motivo, recebe grande atenção por parte da
comunidade científica. Da forma como Jammer (1974, p. 119) descreve, tal interpretação seria “mais palatável para a maioria dos
físicos”. Isto é, tal interpretação evita diversos problemas filosóficos ao preço de considerar a ciência como um instrumento computacional, e não uma descrição da realidade objetiva.
Essa concepção instrumentalista, de acordo com o que vimos
anteriormente, parece conflitar diretamente com a concepção de
ciência do próprio Einstein (1949b, p. 667), segundo o qual, reitero,
uma teoria física deveria fornecer “[. . .] a descrição completa de
qualquer situação real (e individual, que supostamente existe independentemente de qualquer ato de observação ou comprovação)”. Desse modo, parece mais seguro afirmar que as interpretações estatísticas não solucionam os problemas filosóficos nos
fundamentos da interpretação da teoria quântica, mas somente
evitam-nos para fins heurísticos.
Variáveis ocultas
A interpretação causal da teoria quântica fora apresentada por
Bohm (1952) como uma interpretação alternativa à de Copenha137
gue. A interpretação causal, de acordo com Freire Junior et al.
(2000, p. 124), apresentaria “os mesmos resultados já obtidos
pela teoria quântica não relativista [ortodoxa], mas em uma interpretação distinta daquela usual, a da complementaridade”,
distinção essa que residiria “na recuperação de certas premissas epistemológicas próprias da física clássica, como o determinismo”; ainda assim, não se tratava de uma recuperação do quadro clássico, na medida em que Bohm propunha a ideia de um
chamado “potencial quântico”, que seria responsável por efeitos
essencialmente quânticos, como a não localidade.
A teoria de Bohm é essencialmente determinista, introduzindo variáveis ocultas não locais; assim, como observa
Freire Junior (2005, p. 7), “os elétrons de Bohm tem posições e
momentos bem definidos; assim, eles têm trajetórias contínuas e
bem definidas”.
De acordo com Cushing (1996, p. 5), não há um “problema da
medição”, na medida em que o colapso não é admitido; assim,
“uma partícula sempre tem uma posição definida entre medições.
Não há superposição de propriedades e ‘medição’ [. . .] é uma tentativa de descobrir sua posição atual”.
Fica claro que se trata de uma interpretação que se compromete com algum tipo de realismo, na medida em que a “medição”
é considerada um ato de revelação de propriedades dos objetos
quânticos. d’Espagnat (1983, p. 94) considera a ontologia Bohmiana como um “realismo não-físico”, justamente porque a realidade transfenomenal dos objetos quânticos, isto é, entre observações, não corresponde à ordem física.
De acordo com Freire Junior (2015, p. 59), Bohm abandona a
interpretação causal já na década de 1950; na década de 1980
desenvolve, com a colaboração do matemático Hiley, uma interpretação ontológica.18 Apesar de tal mudança na concepção da
interpretação da teoria quântica, Freire Junior (2015, p. 60) aponta
18
Ver Bohm e Hiley (2006).
138
que “houve um comprometimento permanente com um tipo de
realismo científico. [. . .] O determinismo, que seria a motivação
da interpretação causal, foi abandonado”.
Em sua interpretação ontológica, Bohm (1951b, p. 218–271)19
postula “ordens” ontológicas sutis, de modo que a ordem física,
que nós observamos, seria chamada de “ordem explicada”, que
seria determinada por uma ordem sutil mais alta, chamada de
“ordem implicada” —em que estariam, por exemplo, fenômenos
não locais como a “consciência”.
No entanto, conforme expressa em uma entrevista com
R. Weber (2003, p. 140), quando questionado sobre a existência
de uma “ordem super super-implicada”, Bohm respondera que
“pode haver uma ordem implicada até mesmo maior do que essa
[super super-implicada]” —o que poderia ser considerado uma
dificuldade filosófica na medida em que as “ordens” ontológicas cada vez mais altas poderiam ser postuladas infinitamente.
Tal dificuldade parece se assimilar ao argumento de Aristóteles
(Metafísica, Livros I, II e III, I, §990b17) do “terceiro homem” que
deriva de uma redução ao infinito da teoria das formas platônicas, que poderiam, de acordo com a interpretação aristotélica,
ser postuladas em graus ontológicos infinitamente mais altos.
Cushing (1996, p. 6) e Freire Junior (2015, p. 63–64) destacam
que a interpretação de Bohm não fora aceita nas primeiras décadas desde sua formulação, por motivos sociológicos, embora
Freire Junior (2015, p. 64) aponte que tal teoria tem conquistado
prestígio e popularidade nas comunidades científica e filosófica,
principalmente a partir dos anos 2001.
Estados relativos
A interpretação de Everett (1957) da mecânica quântica, conhecida como a “interpretação dos estados relativos” é uma das in19
Ver também Bohm e Hiley (2006, p. 381–388).
139
terpretações heterodoxas da mecânica quântica mais populares.
J. A. Barrett (1999, §2) identifica tal interpretação como uma reação direta ao problema da medição, conforme enunciada por
von Neumann (1955).
Everett (1957, p. 316) apresenta tal interpretação a partir de
dois postulados iniciais: a) a teoria quântica é completa sem o
colapso, isto é, funciona inteiramente com as leis dinâmicas contidas na evolução linear; b) “todo sistema sujeito a uma observação externa pode ser considerado como parte de um sistema
isolado maior”. Tal “sistema maior”, é chamado por Everett (1957,
p. 317) de “estado absoluto”, do qual partem os múltiplos “estados
relativos”. Na formulação de Everett, no processo de medição, o
estado absoluto se desdobra em estados relativos paralelos, de
modo que cada possibilidade de superposição de fato aconteça
em cada estado relativo:
Ao longo de toda sequência do processo de observação, existe apenas um sistema físico representando
o observador, ainda que não exista um único estado
do observador (que se segue das representações dos
sistemas que interagem). Apesar disso, existe uma representação em termos de uma superposição, em que
cada elemento contém um estado definido do observador e um estado do sistema correspondente. Assim,
em cada observação (ou interação) sucessiva, o estado do observador se “ramifica” em um número de
estados diferentes. Cada ramificação representa um
resultado diferente da medição e do estado correspondendo ao estado do objeto. Todas as ramificações
existem simultaneamente na superposição após qualquer sequência de observações. A “trajetória” da configuração da memória de um observador realizando
uma sequência de medições não é, portanto, uma
sequência linear de configurações na memória, mas
140
uma árvore que se ramifica, com todos os resultados
possíveis existindo simultaneamente em uma superposição final com vários coeficientes no modelo matemático. (Everett, 1957, p. 320–321).
É importante salientar que na interpretação de Everett (1957,
p. 320, nota) não existe a dicotomia entre estados potenciais e
estados atuais, tampouco a transição de potência para ato: “todos os elementos de uma superposição (todos as ‘ramificações’)
são ‘atuais’; nenhum é mais ‘real’ do que os demais”, de modo
que todos os elementos de uma superposição obedeçam, igual e
separadamente, à evolução linear —o que implicaria, para Everett
(1957, p. 320, nota), numa “total falta de efeito de uma ramificação
sobre outra”, o que também implica que “nenhum observador jamais estará ciente de qualquer processo de ‘divisão”’. A questão
da impossibilidade da observação de tal ramificação dos estados
é salientada por Jammer (1974, p. 514), quem afirma que “nenhum
experimento em dada ramificação poderia revelar o resultado de
uma medição obtida em outra ramificação do universo”. Assim,
lembrando da taxonomia de Maudlin (1995) apresentada no início deste capítulo, essa interpretação nega a assunção C, isto é,
que existam resultados únicos de medição. Nessa interpretação,
mantendo a analogia do gato de Schrödinger, gatos vivos e gatos
mortos existem, simultaneamente, em ramificações diferentes.
DeWitt (1970, p. 30) cunhou o termo “mundos” para a noção de
“estados relativos”, quando afirmou que, revisitando o paradoxo
do gato, a interpretação dos estados relativos “[. . .] considera que
os gatos habitam dois mundos simultâneos, que não interagem,
mas que são igualmente reais”, o que popularizou a interpretação de Everett como a “interpretação dos muitos mundos”. Jammer ressalta que, nessa interpretação dos estados relativos, as
superposições nunca colapsam. Dessa forma:
Para conciliar essa suposição com a experiência ordinária, que atribui ao sistema do objeto (ou o sistema
141
de aparelhos correlacionados) após a medição apenas um valor definitivo do observável, a formulação
dos estados relativos faz a sugestão ousada de que o
“mundo” [. . .] foi dividido, como consequência da interação, para uma multiplicidade de “mundos” igualmente reais, cada um dos quais correspondendo a um
componente definido pela superposição [. . .]. Assim,
em cada “mundo” separado uma medição tem apenas
um resultado, apesar do resultado diferir, em geral, de
“mundo” para “mundo”. (Jammer, 1974, p. 512).
Ainda assim, Barrett observa que Everett jamais endossou
que a noção de “estados relativos” pudesse ser traduzida para
o termo “mundos”:
De fato, a maioria das interpretações da mecânica
quântica sem colapso tem sido, uma vez ou outra, atribuídas diretamente a Everett ou sugeridas como reconstruções caridosas. A mais popular dessas, a interpretação dos muitos mundos, é frequentemente
atribuída a Everett diretamente e sem qualquer tipo
de comentário até mesmo quando o próprio Everett
jamais descrevera sua teoria em termos de “muitos
mundos”. (J. Barrett, 2018, §2).
Uma análise panorâmica das críticas que a interpretação dos
estados relativos recebeu pode ser encontrada em Jammer (1974,
p. 516–519). Ressalto apenas que o aspecto mais criticado de tal
interpretação é o comprometimento ontológico com algum tipo
de multiverso; d’Espagnat (2006, p. 191–192) chega a descartar tal
interpretação mediante tal crítica, na medida em que a interpretação dos estados relativos não é clara quanto ao momento em
que o universo se divide, isto é, exatamente quando uma ramificação ocorreria. Para Belinfante (1973, p. 313), a interpretação dos
142
estados relativos não responde o problema da medição, mas somente evita o axioma do “colapso” de um ponto de vista prático.
Ainda que os aspectos ontológicos da interpretação dos estados
relativos não tenham sido o objetivo central da discussão suscitada por Everett, é notável que suscite outro espectro de problemas ontológicos —por mais que nenhum deles se relacione com
o subjetivismo.
Também é relevante ressaltar que tal interpretação recebera
diversas releituras, com diversas formulações ontológicas, nas
quais a dos “muitos mundos” referida acima é apenas uma. Outra formulação derivada seria a interpretação das “muitas mentes”, sobre as quais podemos fazer referência aos trabalhos de
Albert e B. (1988) e Lockwood (1989). Outra interpretação notável,
que a princípio se relaciona com a discussão da seção anterior,
fora suscitada por Euan Squires (1991, 1993), na medida em que
postula uma “consciência universal”, que remete ao “estado absoluto” de Everett (1957). Em um raciocínio similar ao de Wigner
(1983), Squires (1991, p. 285) propõe o postulado da “universalidade da consciência”, isto é, a existência de uma consciência universal. O raciocínio de Squires se dá da seguinte forma:
Se supusermos que a minha e a sua consciência pode
selecionar independentemente suas experiências, então não existiria algo para prevenir que fizéssemos
escolhas diferentes. [. . .] Isso não significa que iríamos discordar do resultado das nossas experiências
quando nos encontrarmos (é um fato simples da teoria quântica que isso não pode ocorrer); ao invés
disso, significa que o ‘você’ que eu encontraria não seria escolhido pela sua consciência, isto é, você não seria mais um ser consciente! Tal possibilidade bizarra
deve, certamente, ser excluída. Isso requer que haja
somente uma seleção. A maneira mais simples de assegurar que isso ocorra é postular que há somente
143
uma mente consciente [. . .], isto é, que há uma consciência universal. (Squires, 1993, p. 117–118).
A proposta de Squires, no entanto, se relaciona com teorias
da medição que não aceitam a existência do colapso e, por isso,
se diferencia das demais propostas discutidas anteriormente.
Ainda assim, como lembra Saunders (2010, p. 9, nota 5), Everett jamais teria mencionado o termo “consciência” em seus escritos, ainda que tenha se referido ao termo “experiência”, e que
Zeh (2000) tenha insistido continuamente na necessidade de um
postulado especial para a consciência na interpretação dos estados relativos.
Estados latentes
Para Margenau (1958), a evolução linear é suficiente para descrever os sistemas quânticos, de modo que o colapso introduziria,
desnecessariamente, uma assimetria na teoria. As interpretações
subjetivistas da consciência causando o colapso também são rejeitadas por Margenau (1963, p. 482), sob a acusação de tornar a
mecânica quântica uma teoria psicológica.20 Proponente da “teoria de latência”, Margenau considera que uma medição revela um
estado latente de um objeto. Jammer (1974, p. 505) chama a atenção para o fato de que Margenau, mesmo utilizando um referencial epistemológico e metodológico diverso daquele oferecido
pela interpretação de Copenhague, chega a conclusões muito similares.
Um dos aspectos notáveis seria a interpretação sobre os estados latentes, que se tornariam manifestos com o ato da medição, que é muito próxima da posição de Heisenberg (1958) de
que os estados observáveis são potencialidades (à maneira aristotélica) passíveis de serem atualizadas com o ato da medição.
20
Ver Jammer (1974, p. 478).
144
Ainda assim, os dois autores diferem em um aspecto ontológico,
na medida em que Margenau considera a medição um ato de revelação,21 enquanto Heisenberg (1983, p. 73), como vimos no Capítulo 1 a considera um ato de criação.
Outro aspecto notável seria que Margenau considera a medição um fenômeno macroscópico, o que se aproxima da posição de Copenhague frente à interpretação da medição quântica.
Ao mesmo tempo, tal posição de Margenau acaba por engendrar na mesma problemática que, do ponto de vista filosófico,
representa uma dificuldade para a interpretação de Bohr: o referido aspecto duplo da ontologia com a qual a interpretação
se compromete, isto é, a cisão arbitrária entre os domínios clássico/quântico, acompanhada por uma ontologia própria de cada
domínio —especificamente com o comprometimento ontológico
com entidades diferentes. Assim, por mais que evite os problemas ontológicos da consciência, a proposta de Margenau acabaria por herdar problemas fundamentalmente similares aos enfrentados pela interpretação de Copenhague, como vimos no Capítulo 1.
Colapso espontâneo
Por sua vez, a formulação de Ghirardi, Rimini e Weber
(GRW, 1986), considerada por alguns como uma das melhores teorias da medição quântica, é uma teoria que admite o
colapso descontínuo. No entanto, como aponta Maudlin (2003,
p. 475), abandona a noção de que haja um agente causal necessário para que uma medição seja efetuada: “nessa teoria, colapsos
acontecem aleatoriamente, com uma probabilidade fixa, e não
são particularmente associados com qualquer tipo de interação”.
Em tal formulação, o colapso acontece espontaneamente. De
acordo com Pessoa Júnior, as formulações que assumem a noção
21
Para mais detalhes sobre esse ponto, ver Jammer (1974, p. 483).
145
de colapso espontâneo funcionariam apenas para sistemas
macroscópicos.
Para sistemas de poucas partículas, tal localização
[colapso] ocorreria muito raramente, e praticamente
não violaria a equação de Schrödinger. Para um sistema macroscópico, no entanto, composto de um
grande número de partículas emaranhadas, tal colapso espontâneo ocorreria freqüentemente. Isso explicaria porque a redução só ocorre quando um aparelho macroscópico se acopla ao objeto quântico.
(Pessoa Junior, 1992, p. 200).
Assim, Albert (1992, p. 105) relembra que, da mesma forma
como a interpretação de Copenhague e a interpretação de Margenau, a formulação de GRW, 1986 incorreria no problema filosófico
do macrorrealismo.
3.4
Uma escolha filosófica
Analisei, neste terceiro capítulo, o problema da medição. Introduzido propriamente por von Neumann (1955), esse problema se
origina em conflito axiomático entre as equações dinâmicas e o
fato empírico da observação. A posição de von Neumann foi endossada durante os anos seguintes, atingindo seu ápice na formulação subjetivista de London e Bauer (1983) e em sua maior
dificuldade com a situação solipsista proposta através do experimento de pensamento do amigo de Wigner (1983). Bass (1971)
tentou superar tal dificuldade utilizando a concepção de consciência oferecida por Schrödinger (1964) que, por sua vez, seria
baseada nos escritos indianos do Vedanta.22 Goswami (1989) levou a cabo a formulação de uma interpretação para a mecânica
22
Ver também Schrödinger (1967).
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quântica com base no pensamento vedântico, bem como a formulação de um paradigma para as ciências, baseado numa ontologia na qual a consciência (à maneira vedântica) é a base do
ser.
Conforme procurei expor, os debates filosóficos suscitados
pelas dificuldades conceituais acerca da interpretação da noção
de medição deram origem a diversas interpretações da teoria
quântica em que, como observa Pessoa Junior (2003, p. 4) “[. . .]
cada uma dessas interpretações é internamente consistente e, de
modo geral, consistente com experimentos quânticos”. Todavia,
pudemos observar que, dentre as interpretações que abordam o
problema, nenhuma é livre de dificuldades filosóficas.
Parece seguro classificar tais dificuldades em dois grupos
maiores: 1) o macrorrealismo, próprio das interpretações que separam o domínio clássico do domínio quântico em dois domínios
ontológicos diferentes, em que o primeiro é agente causal sobre
o segundo; 2) a introdução de agentes metateóricos para a causação da medição; nos casos estudados, a introdução e comprometimento ontológico com consciência por duas vias: 2a) subjetiva/múltipla, numa concepção dualista, que herda os problemas da teoria cartesiana; 2b) unitiva, à maneira do pensamento
vedantino, que também se compromete com a problemática própria dessa linha.
Poderíamos colocar num terceiro grupo as teorias que não
admitem a descontinuidade da medição, isto é, o colapso, como
as teorias de Bohm e Everett, que também suscitam problemas
ontológicos na tentativa de solucionar o problema da medição.
Poderíamos ainda colocar as interpretações estatísticas num outro grupo, no qual a questão da medição não é abordada.
Dessa forma, a pluralidade de opções não torna fácil a vida
de quem afirma que existe uma interpretação correta da mecânica quântica —“a mais correta que as outras”. Esse é o famoso
problema da subdeterminação: há diversas alternativas para in147
terpretar os fenômenos descritos pela mecânica quântica, e não
temos razões disponíveis, sejam científicas ou filosóficas, para
escolhermos uma em detrimento de outras.
Esse alto grau de humildade epistêmica gerado pela subdeterminação, caso não seja percebido, pode esconder atitudes dogmáticas mascaradas por sentenças do tipo: “A mecânica
quântica (sic) implica que . . . ”. Como vimos —ao menos em relação ao domínio ontológico— frases assim carecem de justificação
epistêmica.
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Capítulo 4
Novos horizontes
A mecânica quântica funciona. Para todos os propósitos práticos,
a teoria não precisa de outra interpretação que não a ortodoxa
(ou até mesmo a interpretação estatística), que funciona suficientemente bem para a predição de experimentos. No entanto, se
nos arriscarmos a ir além dos propósitos práticos e investigarmos
os fundamentos filosóficos da teoria, poderemos observar que
até mesmo as interpretações mais bem aceitas pela comunidade
científica são fundadas em problemas filosóficos aparentemente
insolúveis no que tange ao conceito de “medição”.
O campo da interpretação da teoria quântica, especificamente em relação à interpretação do conceito de “medição”, é
fortemente marcado por hipóteses “ad hoc” no sentido proposto
por Popper (1974, p. 986), isto é, “uma hipótese [é] ‘ad hoc’ se é
introduzida [. . .] para explicar uma dificuldade particular, mas [. . .]
não pode ser testada independentemente”.
A interpretação de Copenhague e a interpretação de Princeton enfrentam, respectivamente, problemas metafísicos relacionados ao macrorrealismo e à noção de “consciência”. No caso da
interpretação de Copenhague, tal problemática está relacionada
à falta de debate da própria noção de medição que, ainda que
seja central nessa interpretação, não recebeu um tratamento de149
talhado, isto é, a interpretação de Copenhague não chega a oferecer uma teoria da medição.
Por outro lado, a interpretação de Princeton surge precisamente da formulação de uma teoria da medição que aponta algumas dificuldades na adoção de uma metafísica macrorrealista.
No entanto, a introdução da consciência como uma agência metateórica para a causação da medição acaba por introduzir novos
problemas de ordem filosófica, na medida em que tal introdução
não é acompanhada de uma formulação metafísica que defina ou
ao menos discuta o lugar de tal entidade no universo em questão.
Foram referidos os trabalhos tardios de Schrödinger como
uma tentativa de visualizar tais questões através de um projeto
filosófico que inspirou físicos, como Bass e Goswami, que deram
continuidade à interpretação da “consciência” e que se empenham em responder as dificuldades apontadas pela escola de
Copenhague e Princeton. No caso, Bass faz uso do referencial metafísico schrödingeriano para compreender o conceito de “consciência”, enquanto Goswami interpreta este conceito sob o referencial do monismo idealista platônico. Em ambos autores, a
noção de “consciência” é unitiva, embora Goswami, assim como
Schrödinger, seja mais explícito no aspecto ontológico quando
considera a “consciência” unitiva como a base ontológica da realidade.
Por outro lado, existem outras interpretações que não admitem o problema, conforme enunciado pelas escolas de Copenhague e Princeton. Dentre elas, as atitudes mais expressivas se encontram nas interpretações dos estados relativos de Everett e a
interpretação causal/ontológica de Bohm. Ambas se utilizam de
outros contornos ontológicos para evitar o chamado “problema
da medição”: a primeira postula “ramificações” infinitas do universo, de modo que todas são simultaneamente reais; a segunda
postula infinitas “ordens” ou “níveis” ontológicos de nível cada
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vez mais alto, de modo que cada ordem de nível superior é agente
causal e determina sua ordem subalterna.
Também destaquei a atitude comum às interpretações estatísticas, nas quais a problemática filosófica em torno da medição
é deliberadamente deixada de lado pela introdução de coletivos
estatísticos imaginários. De fato, tal atitude acaba por ser, em
muitos aspectos, uma extensão da metafísica da física clássica,
mantendo, por exemplo, a noção de determinismo e realismo.
Por isso, se coaduna com nossas percepções intuitivas acerca do
mundo à nossa volta e, por isso, acaba por ser preferível por muitos teóricos. Também é uma atitude preferível a muitos cientistas, justamente por não se envolver com os problemas filosóficos
próprios da interpretação da mecânica quântica. Ainda assim, é
preciso salientar que esta interpretação não resolve as questões
concernentes à interpretação do conceito de “medição” em mecânica quântica, mas deliberadamente se afasta de toda a problemática que surge na tentativa de interpretá-lo. Ademais, não
deixa de ser uma atitude filosófica, na medida em que os ensembles são coletivos estatísticos inteiramente imaginários.
O debate sobre “qual seria a melhor interpretação da mecânica quântica?” é um debate em aberto —ou, como Jammer (1974,
p. 521) coloca, é “uma história sem um fim”—, de modo que meu
propósito com este livro não foi o de resolver tal questão, mas
de delinear alguns aspectos da problemática filosófica em torno
da questões ontológicas e metafísicas associadas ao conceito de
“medição” em mecânica quântica, principalmente quando a noção de “consciência” está atrelada a tais problemas.
Ainda assim, é relevante destacar que grande parte dos problemas das interpretações destacadas neste livro se deve à falta
de debate filosófico, especificamente à deficiência de formulações ontológicas para o universo de discurso que se abrira com
o advento da teoria quântica. Desse modo, os debates futuros na
área da metafísica, levando em consideração alguns aspectos da
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mecânica quântica, poderiam acabar por auxiliar na elucidação
de questões problemáticas centrais na teoria quântica, tais como
as noções de “medição” ou “consciência”.
4.1
Quem precisa de consciência?
No ano de 2011, os físicos Schlosshauer et al. (2013) apresentaram uma enquete aos participantes da conferência “Quantum
Physics and the Nature of Reality”, na Áustria, contendo 16 perguntas de múltipla escolha sobre diversos temas em aberto nos
fundamentos da física. Em relação à pergunta acerca do papel do
observador na física, apenas 6 acreditam que a consciência desempenha um papel fundamental na medição. Dentre os 35 participantes, havia 27 físicos, 5 filósofos e 3 matemáticos. Os resultados obtidos pela enquete, ainda que pouco expressiva dada a
quantidade de participantes, é bastante emblemática quanto à
atitude dos físicos frente ao conceito de “consciência”.
É verdade, em certa medida, que a mecânica quântica não
precisa da consciência, isto é, a mecânica quântica funciona
mesmo sem o conceito de “consciência”. Tal é a posição de Bell
(2004, p. 33), que representa a posição de diversos físicos em relação a esse assunto, mesmo nos dias atuais: a mecânica quântica
funciona suficientemente bem para predizer fenômenos, resolver equações e computar probabilidades de eventos a despeito
da interpretação adotada, isto é, a mecânica quântica funciona
bem para todos os propósitos práticos. Ainda assim, como afirmou Tegmark (2015, p. 238), o fato de que a maioria dos problemas em física possam ser abordados (e solucionados) sem que
haja referência ao conceito de “consciência”, não há nada que
garanta o salto indutivo de que o mesmo se aplique a todos os
problemas; ainda mais, destaca que diversos dos debates mais
acalorados na física hoje envolvem a noção de medição e, por
conseguinte, a noção de “consciência”.
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A proposta de Tegmark (2015) traça um caminho diametralmente oposto daquele que sigo neste capítulo. Tegmark (2008,
p. 102) admite duas teses fundamentais: 1) existe uma realidade
física externa, completamente independente da percepção; 2) tal
realidade tem uma estrutura matemática. Num estudo mais recente, Tegmark (2015, p. 239), contra as abordagens dualistas, assume a hipótese de que a noção de “consciência” possa ser entendida a partir de uma metafísica monista (reducionista) materialista, na qual a “consciência” representaria um estado material
—assim como os estados líquidos, gasosos, plasmáticos, etc. Uma
abordagem crítica ao posicionamento de Tegmark pode ser encontrada em Hut et al. (2006), em que sua atitude ontológica é
nomeada de “fundamentalista”, representando o monismo materialista em oposição às atitudes “secular”, representando o dualismo (advogada por Alford) e “mística”, representando o monismo idealista (advogada por Hut).
Como procurei explicitar até aqui, quando arriscamos ir além
dos propósitos práticos e investigamos os fundamentos filosóficos das interpretações da teoria quântica, podemos constatar
que é muito comum a ocorrência de problemas filosóficos permeando conceitos como o de “medição”, tal como a problemática
suscitada pela interpretação da consciência causal sugerida por
Wigner (1983), isto é, de que a medição seria completa somente
com a introdução de um agente causal não físico.
Kallio-Tamminen (2014, p. 258) sugere que tais problemas
ocorrem devido à falta de debate entre profissionais da física e
da filosofia na construção dos aspectos filosóficos das teorias físicas —o que requereria profissionais de ambas as áreas. Dessa
forma, parece-me razoável afirmar que profissionais da filosofia
têm um bom motivo para atentar-se aos problemas da mecânica
quântica. Talvez o melhor exemplo seria o referido problema da
medição que (e suas extensões, tal como o problema da “consci-
153
ência”), como procurei apontar, carece de uma discussão metafísica mais rigorosa.
Assim, sugiro que a formulação de uma metafísica que leve
em consideração a mecânica quântica seja uma tarefa legítima
para a filosofia contemporânea. No que tange especificamente à
questão da consciência na medição quântica, reitero a possibilidade de que a implausibilidade das interpretações que assumem
o caráter causal da consciência esteja intimamente relacionada à
ausência de uma formulação metafísica para o conceito de “consciência” que seja adequada às caracterizações colocadas pela interpretação da consciência da mecânica quântica.
É precisamente neste ponto que inseri a hipótese de que a
elaboração de uma metafísica para a noção de “consciência” na
interpretação da medição quântica, inspirada na metafísica de
processos, conforme apresentada por Alfred North Whitehead
(1928) em sua magnum opus “Processo e Realidade”, poderia lançar uma nova luz (e talvez uma solução) ao problema metafísico
da consciência na mecânica quântica —que procurei delinear até
aqui. Assim, se trata de uma proposta calcada na esperança de
que, como aponta Chalmers (1995, p. 311), “ainda que a mecânica
quântica não explique a consciência, talvez uma teoria da consciência possa iluminar os problemas da mecânica quântica”.
Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 271) ponderam diversas atitudes
frente à interpretação do conceito de “medição” e consideram
que a interpretação de que a consciência causa o colapso na medição quântica seria “especialmente favorável para uma filosofia
whitehediana”.
Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 270) dividem em 4 “famílias de
soluções” as diversas propostas de interpretação da mecânica
quântica, sendo que as do tipo (1) representariam a interpretação de Copenhague, calcada na obscura proposta de que uma
medição é efetuada quando um objeto quântico interage com um
aparelho macroscópico; as do tipo (2) representariam as propos154
tas do colapso espontâneo,1 que postulam a inadequação da linearidade das leis dinâmicas do movimento quântico para sistemas macroscópicos; as do tipo (3) representariam a atitude dos
muitos mundos; e, finalmente as do tipo (4) representariam as
propostas que consideram a consciência como agente causal na
medição, isto é, responsáveis pelo colapso.
Ao passo que Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 271) considerem que
os grupos de propostas (1), (2) e (3) caracterizariam soluções para
propósitos práticos, comprometidas (ou ao menos facilmente associáveis) com metafísicas fisicalistas/materialistas (nas quais a
consciência seria um epifenômeno da matéria) ou dualistas (em
que tanto a consciência quanto a matéria seriam fundamentais,
mas separadas), considera que o grupo (4) seria particularmente
promissor para uma abordagem filosófica sob uma perspectiva
Whiteheadiana —que, como veremos adiante, oferece uma visão
de mundo diferente das metafísicas dualista e fisicalista.
No entanto, Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 272) acabam por negar a plausibilidade dessa interpretação, devido ao comprometimento do conceito de “consciência” com a ideia de “consciência subjetiva”, isto é, individualizada e essencialmente humana,
de modo que a metafísica associada a esta tese esteja comprometida, dentre outras coisas, com as teses do solipsismo e antropocentrismo —o que seria particularmente pouco plausível.
Shimony (1963, p. 763–767), assim como grande parte dos físicos
atuais, descarta as interpretações que consideram que a consciência subjetiva do observador seja o agente causal do colapso
na medição quântica pelos mesmos motivos que Wigner (1983).
Ainda assim, é válido ressaltar que o conceito de “consciência” que está em jogo é aquele conforme apresentado pela interpretação metafísica da consciência. Tais autores pressupõem,
ainda que indiretamente, uma metafísica cartesiana para o conceito de consciência que é, ao mesmo tempo, (i) dualista, na me1
Ver Ghirardi, Rimini e Weber (GRW, 1986).
155
dida em que separa “consciência” e “matéria” em substâncias distintas e (ii) subjetivista, na medida em que a noção de “consciência” é calcada no “eu”, que pensa e, por conseguinte, existe.
Diferentemente da metafísica materialista, a metafísica Whiteheadiana é considerada não reducionista na medida em que
não nega a eficácia causal entre os polos material e não material (mental) da existência, tampouco considera-os ontologicamente separados, como a metafísica dualista o faz. No modelo
metafísico de Whitehead, o conceito de “consciência” contém e
é contido pelo conceito de “matéria”; numa perspectiva de processos (e não de objetos), a consciência transcende e é transcendida pela matéria. Assim, pode-se afirmar que, numa perspectiva
da metafísica de processos, o mundo é tanto imanente quanto
transcendente.
A princípio, tais categorizações eliminam as dificuldades que
o conceito de “consciência” enfrenta em torno da problemática metafísica. Contudo, o aspecto do subjetivismo considerado
acima (ii) precisa ser levado em conta, visto que uma interpretação subjetivista é indesejável em uma teoria científica, e que
Whitehead considera que o conceito de “consciência” possui um
aspecto subjetivo.
Contudo, a noção de subjetividade da metafísica Whiteheadiana emerge de uma noção não subjetiva ou individualizada,
que seria a noção de “Deus”. Como aponta Griffin (2001), um dos
pontos notáveis da metafísica Whiteheadiana é o modo como
transita por diversas áreas do saber; a teoria psicológica de Whitehead, por exemplo, é indissociável de sua teoria teológica.
Tendo em vista que o modelo de Whitehead oferece uma
forma original —e pouco referida na literatura específica, como
apontam M. Weber e Weekes (2009)— de lidar com a problemática referida acima, considero que poderia ser frutífera uma leitura inspirada na metafísica Whiteheadiana do termo “consciência” para a interpretação da mecânica quântica.
156
4.2
Consciência como processo
A tentativa de interpretar a mecânica quântica a partir de certos
aspectos da filosofia de Whitehead não é nova. De fato, os resultados da física teriam sido um dos principais pontos de partida
para a teoria de Whitehead (1928, p. 121–122), que pretende fornecer uma base conceitual àquilo que refere como “teoria quântica”.
No entanto, como observa Shimony (1964, p. 240), a referida
“teoria quântica” concebida nos escritos Whiteheadianos seria
bastante rudimentar, formulada em 1900. Isto é, o período em
que a filosofia Whiteheadiana estava sendo desenvolvida, foi anterior a um período de grandes mudanças na mecânica quântica,
inclusive nos debates acerca dos fundamentos e da ontologia
associada a suas interpretações —sobretudo na década de 30.
Dessa maneira, Whitehead não teria mencionado em texto algum
os desenvolvimentos mais “recentes” da mecânica quântica, relativos à sua contemporaneidade. Assim, é natural que autores
como Shimony (1964) e Malin (1988) proponham algumas modificações de alguns conceitos da metafísica Whiteheadiana para
acomodar a interpretação da mecânica quântica.
Talvez a primeira proposta documentada a utilizar a filosofia
Whiteheadiana para elucidar o debate em torno das interpretações de uma teoria quântica relativamente mais bem consolidada
tenha sido a de Burgers (1963, 1965), seguido por, principalmente,
Shimony (1963, 1964), Stapp (1979, 1982), Malin (1988, 1993, 2001)
e Epperson (2004). Destaco que todos os autores referidos utilizam os mesmos conceitos para fazer o paralelo entre a mecânica
quântica e a metafísica de Whitehead (1928):
1) Em relação à mecânica quântica, destaco o conceito de “potentia” contido nos escritos tardios de Heisenberg (1958, p. 12),
que interpreta o conceito de “estado quântico” como uma tendência, algo entre a ideia do fenômeno (ou evento) e sua atuali-
157
dade, um “tipo de realidade física apenas no meio entre possibilidade e realidade”.
Ainda que Heisenberg (1958, p. 12) elabore seu conceito de
‘potentia’ como uma releitura do conceito aristotélico de dynamis, Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 263) garantem que tal proposta
é original, visto que nenhuma outra metafísica até então teria
proposto essa modalidade para a realidade. Na concepção de
Heisenberg (1958, p. 128), até mesmo potencialidades contrárias
poderiam coexistir, tal como num caso de superposição, “já que
uma potencialidade pode envolver ou sobrepor outras potencialidades”. Como apontam Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 264), o próprio
conceito de “superposição” seria “derivado da inovação metafísica fundamental da potencialidade”.
Nessa interpretação, uma “medição” consiste, através do colapso, na atualização de uma (dentre diversas) possibilidades superpostas —o que torna mais plausível a afirmação metafísica de
Heisenberg (1983, p. 73) de que um evento “passa a existir somente quando a observamos”, e que chamamos no Capítulo 1 de
“medição=criação”. No contexto Whiteheadiano, considero mais
apropriada a nomenclatura “medição=atualização”. Malin (2003,
p. 76–77) aponta que as potencialidades não seriam eventos no
espaço-tempo —o que seria uma propriedade das atualidades.
2) Em relação à metafísica whitehediana, destaco que o conceito de “entidades atuais” é utilizado para o paralelo com a interpretação da mecânica quântica. Whitehead enuncia tal conceito
pela primeira vez da seguinte maneira:
As “entidades atuais” —também denominadas de
“ocasiões atuais”— são as coisas reais finais das quais
o mundo é formado. Não há como ir por detrás das
entidades reais para encontrar algo mais real. Elas diferem entre si: Deus é uma entidade atual, e também
é o sopro mais trivial da existência em um espaço vazio distante. Os fatos finais são, igualmente, entida158
des atuais; e essas entidades atuais são gotas de experiência, complexas e interdependentes. (Whitehead,
1928, p. 18).
De acordo com Malin, o conceito de “entidades atuais” seria
a base da metafísica proposta por Whitehead. Sendo impossível
resumir toda a construção filosófica de Whitehead, dada a extensão e objetivos deste texto. Por isso, sigo o recorte proposto por
Malin (1993, p. 77–78);2 que destaca oito aspectos centrais, relevantes para o debate acerca da interpretação da mecânica quântica; dentre os oito aspectos, seleciono apenas quatro que considero relevantes especificamente para o conceito de “medição”:
1. Uma entidade atual é um processo de “autocriação” atemporal e criativa, que leva a uma aparição momentânea das
entidades atuais no espaço-tempo;
2. As entidades atuais são instantâneas; após o único instante em que emergem no espaço-tempo pela autocriação,
fundem-se novamente (na terminologia whitehadiana, elas
“compreendem”) num “plano” atemporal e fora do espaço,
com todas as entidades atuais (passadas, chamadas de “fatos consumados” e futuras), como potencialidades;
3. Toda entidade atual se relaciona e está interconectada (na
terminologia Whiteheadiana, forma um “nexus”) com todas
as entidades atuais;
4. O final do processo de autocriação de uma entidade atual,
isto é, sua aparição momentânea no espaço-tempo, é a autocriação de uma nova entidade atual ou um “pulso de experiência”, de modo que o universo Whiteheadiano não seja
um universo de “objetos”, mas um universo de “experiências”.
2
Ver também Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 266–267).
159
Como aponta Stapp (2007, p. 92), o paralelo entre as metafísicas de Whitehead (1928, p. 72) na qual “as entidades atuais [. . .]
tornam real o que anteriormente era meramente potencial” e Heisenberg, na qual “[. . .] a transição do ‘possível’ para o ‘real’ ocorre
durante o ato de observação” é bastante sugestiva. Para Shimony,
tal paralelo poderia ser visualizado da seguinte maneira:
Considerem, por simplicidade, duas partículas emaranhadas. Se são consideradas, juntas, como uma única
entidade atual, sua dependência mútua é natural: ambas surgem de um único campo de potencialidade.
Quando uma medição ocorre em qualquer partícula,
ela quebra a conexão, criando um relacionamento entre duas entidades atuais [. . .]. (Shimony e Malin, 2006,
p. 274).
O ganho de tal interpretação seria, para Malin (2003, p. 81),
oferecer um novo horizonte de respostas para a seguinte questão —ainda não respondida— no debate acerca da interpretação
medição quântica: “qual é o mecanismo do colapso?”. Na metafísica Whiteheadiana, o universo não seria um universo de objetos
(ou campos), mas um universo de experiências ou processos, de
modo que, se o axioma do colapso for interpretado como o processo da autocriação de uma entidade atual, tal processo não
poderia ser um mecanismo que exclui a possibilidade da criatividade. Nessa leitura, o conceito de “mecanismo” parece não ter
lugar.
Em relação à interpretação da consciência causal, Malin
(2001, p. 260–261) rejeita a interpretação de que a consciência
desempenhe um papel causal no colapso. Ressalto que esta rejeição é especificamente a rejeição de que a consciência humana desempenhe tal papel—o que também rejeito. Assim como
Shimony e Malin (2006, p. 271), também descarto a interpretação
de que a “consciência” cause o colapso na medição quântica—ao
160
menos conforme o termo é apresentado por Wigner (1983), isso
é, de maneira subjetivista e antropomórfica.
Notavelmente, o estudo acerca da noção de “consciência” é
permeado por uma literatura na qual a figura mais citada é Descartes, legando à discussão contemporânea o mesmo escopo de
opções teóricas dados há séculos: ou uma forma de monismo reducionista (das quais as teses do materialismo e epifenomenalismo são as mais populares) ou dualismo. Para Shimony, a metafísica Whiteheadiana, sob certa chave de leitura, pode oferecer
uma abordagem frutífera ao tradicional problema mente-corpo:
Não há nada que sabemos melhor do que isso, que temos experiências conscientes. Não há nada que sabemos muito melhor do que a matéria de que o mundo
é feito é inanimada. [. . .] Coloque os juntos; você
não tem uma solução, você tem um quebra-cabeça,
um quebra-cabeça terrível. [. . .] Eu sou muito simpático com Whitehead porque Whitehead dá uma resposta a isso postulando um universo primitivo que
não é totalmente inanimado; ele chama sua filosofia de “filosofia do organismo”. Isso é tão promissor
quanto qualquer solução que eu conheça para o problema mente-corpo, mas deixa terrivelmente os de
fora. (Shimony e Smolin, 2009, p. 451–452).
Os “detalhes” aos quais Shimony se refere na passagem acima
também são mencionados por Malin sob a forma de problemas
ainda abertos dentro da metafísica Whiteheadiana:
A filosofia do processo de Whitehead fornece uma
base metafísica para a compreensão da realidade. No
entanto, questões essenciais são deixadas sem resposta: A realidade consiste em níveis, alguns dos quais
são “superiores” a outros em um sentido profundo?
161
Os seres humanos têm um lugar e um papel a desempenhar no esquema cosmológico? [. . .] surpreendentemente, o misterioso “colapso dos estados quânticos” continua sendo uma rica fonte de sugestões. O
colapso, o processo de transição do potencial para o
real, envolve uma seleção: Existem muitas possibilidades, das quais apenas uma é atualizada. Como é feita
a seleção? (Malin, 2001, p. 189).
A proposta de Malin (2003, p. 93) seria, seguindo a máxima,
atribuída a Paul Dirac, de que “a Natureza faz a escolha”, isto
é, de que a “Natureza” causa o colapso. Ainda que não especificada a definição dessa “Natureza” com letra maiúscula, em sua
leitura, isso corresponde à atualização das potencialidades, ou
ainda, sua autocriação, com uma aleatoriedade intrínseca —daí a
indeterminação quântica. Dado o caráter investigativo desta proposta, parece-me precipitado nos alinharmos de antemão com
tal perspectiva.
Outra tentativa de interpretar a mecânica quântica, em específico, o papel causal da consciência na medição quântica, é feita
por Henry Stapp. Sua proposta vai no caminho inverso daquele
proposto pela interpretação da consciência causal, que procurou utilizar a consciência para compreender a mecânica quântica;
Stapp (2007) procura utilizar a mecânica quântica para compreender a consciência —caminho este que também é traçado por
Penrose (1994). No entanto, como observa Landau (1998, p. 172),
“Penrose aceita que a mente consciente surge como um funcionamento do cérebro físico [. . .]”, tese que não é endossada por
Stapp (2006), que propõe uma metafísica que chama de “dualismo interativo”. Como aponta Mohrhoff:
162
A teoria que ele [Stapp]3 acaba formulando é completamente diferente da teoria que ele inicialmente professa formular, pois no começo a consciência é responsável pelas reduções de vetores de estado [colapso], enquanto no final uma nova lei física é responsável —uma lei que de forma alguma depende da presença da consciência. (Mohrhoff, 2002, p. 250).
É possível interpretar a ontologia Whiteheadiana a partir
de uma metafísica dualista. Conforme a leitura apontada por
Lovejoy (1960, p. 169), Whitehead seria “um adversário do dualismo com o qual estamos preocupados aqui, mas apenas um dualista com uma diferença”; como aponta Shimony (1964), a leitura
dualista, se legítima, seria fundamentalmente contrária à própria
proposta Whiteheadiana que, como enfatiza Weekes (2009), é essencialmente monista.
Entendendo a pluralidade de leituras (dualistas e monistas)
da metafísica Whiteheadiana, procurei utilizar a chave de leitura
monista, oferecida por Weekes (2012), Griffin (2009) e Nobo (2003)
para compreender o conceito de “consciência” no que se relaciona com a noção de “colapso” na interpretação do conceito de
“medição” em mecânica quântica. Como aponta Griffin (2009), a
concepção Whiteheadiana de “consciência” difere radicalmente
da posição cartasiana (dualista) e materialista (reducionista) —
que são as leituras predominantes para o conceito de “consciência” na filosofia da física— ainda que mantenha alguns aspectos
dessas concepções metafísicas:
Com os dualistas, Whitehead concorda que a consciência pertence a uma entidade —uma mente ou
3
É justo dizer que o próprio Stapp (2002, p. 264) afirma que “[essa] não é
minha teoria final”. Ainda assim, quando questionado por Malin se a teoria
de Stapp considera, como consequência, que a consciência causa o colapso,
Stapp responde categoricamente que não endossa tal interpretação (cf. o diálogo completo em Eastman e Keeton, 2003, p. 110).
163
psique— que é distinta do cérebro, e que a liberdade genuína pode, em parte por essa razão, ser atribuída à experiência consciente. Com os materialistas,
Whitehead compartilha uma sensibilidade naturalista,
evitando assim qualquer solução implícita sobrenaturalista para problemas filosóficos, e, em parte por
essa razão, rejeita qualquer dualismo entre dois tipos
de realidades. Como materialistas, em outras palavras,
ele afirma um monismo pluralista. Assim, ele considera a consciência como uma função de algo mais fundamental. (Griffin, 2009, p. 175).
Nobo (2003, p. 225) também enfatiza que a noção de “consciência”, na metafísica Whiteheadiana, não se reduz à experiência
humana ou à subjetividade —o que acaba por evitar a dificuldade
antropomorfista das leituras utilizadas até então para o conceito
na filosofia da física, e parece oferecer, também, uma chave de
leitura para evitar a dificuldade do solipsismo que pode emergir de uma leitura subjetivista do conceito de “consciência” na
metafísica Whiteheadiana.
Além disso, como observa Katzko (2009, p. 206–208), o debate contemporâneo na filosofia da mente, especificamente para
a leitura da noção de “consciência”, está, em sua parte mais expressiva, comprometido com uma metafísica materialista ou dualista. A título de amostragem: existem os proponentes uma metafísica fisicalista que, assim como Stapp (1982), consideram a
causação mental sobre o físico mas, ao mesmo tempo, consideram a estrutura cerebral como definitivamente importante para
a ocorrência do aspecto mental; Dennett (1991), ainda mais radical, defende a tese do “funcionalismo” de que a mente é um
produto do arranjo cerebral, não podendo ter ação causal sobre
o cérebro, situando-se entre os materialistas ou epifenomenalistas; Chalmers (1995) considera ambos os polos, material e mental,
igualmente importantes, o que o aproxima dos dualistas através
164
daquilo que chama de “dualismo interativo”; em todos os casos,
um dos questionamentos centrais seria de causação, isto é: como
o aspecto físico da realidade poderia dar origem ao aspecto mental?
Como afirma Weekes (2012), a metafísica Whiteheadiana sugere uma metafísica monista, o que também acaba por desfazer
a dificuldade do dualismo no caso de utilizá-la para interpretar a
noção de “consciência” na mecânica quântica.
Com o arcabouço teórico apresentado, proponho que uma
metafísica inspirada na metafísica de Whitehead (ou quaseWhiteheadiana) para o conceito de “consciência”, especificamente em relação ao papel da consciência no aspecto do colapso
da medição quântica, poderia, ao mesmo tempo, (i) lançar uma
nova luz ao problema da medição na interpretação da mecânica
quântica, (ii) oferecer uma nova abordagem ao clássico problema
mente-corpo de forma diversa às leituras padronizadas, isto é, ao
cartesianismo e materialismo.
Encerro este capítulo com a esperança de que tal proposta
possa vir a incentivar novas pesquisas na filosofia da mecânica
quântica —até mesmo para provar se tal proposta é infrutífera.
165
Capítulo 5
Questões de formalismo
Os objetos quânticos não podem ser visualizados diretamente,
da mesma maneira como este livro diante de nossos olhos. São
de tal magnitude que não podem sequer ser visualizados em microscópio. Por isso, o formalismo é de extrema importância para
as discussões sobre mecânica quântica: é somente por meio do
formalismo que os objetos quânticos são tratados. O termo ‘formalismo’, adverte Krause (2016, p. 27), conforme empregada na
literatura da física, designa a formulação matemática da mecânica quântica “[. . .] e não se relaciona, a princípio, com sistemas
formais que são tratados em lógica e em fundamentos da matemática”. Como pontuam Susskind e Friedman (2014, p. 2), não
somos biologicamente aptos a perceber os objetos da mecânica
quântica com nossos órgãos sensoriais, de modo que “o melhor
que podemos fazer é tentar entender os elétrons e seus movimentos como abstrações matemáticas”.
Nesse preciso sentido, Paty (1995, p. 137) considera que a mecânica quântica, “[. . .] uma vez estabelecida, propõe-se, antes
de qualquer interpretação, como um formalismo”. Em tal formalismo, como observa Paty, os estados quânticos:
[. . .] são representados numa formulação teórica, em
166
termos de operadores que se aplicam a vetores de estado e, para realizá-lo, recorremos a entidades matemáticas apropriadas. As propriedades dos objetos ou
conceitos físicos assim designados são, consequentemente, determinados, de um lado, pela coerência
lógico-matemática do esquema e da formulação [. . .];
e, de outro, pela transcrição das observações matemáticas em questão. (Paty, 1995, p. 237).
De modo geral, o formalismo da mecânica quântica descreve
os estados de um sistema físico, considerando os aspectos que
podem ser medidos, chamados de observáveis (posição, momento, spin, etc.). Aqui, o termo ‘estado’ é um conceito primitivo, meta-axiomático, cuja definição (chamada ‘definição operacional’) é dada pelos postulados. No formalismo usual da mecânica quântica, os estados são representados pela noção de ‘vetor’. Uma função de onda, 1 frequentemente notada pelo caractere grego ψ, onde ψ(a, b, c . . . ) são os coeficientes que se movimentam —se expandem— em um espaço vetorial complexo ndimensional, nomeado por von Neumann (1955) de “Espaço de
Hilbert”, notado pelo caractere H, onde H ∈ Cn , por sua vez, é
caracterizado por um conjunto de vetores chamado “base” do espaço. Para Jammer (1974, p. 2), “a ideia de von Neumann de formular a mecânica quântica como um cálculo de operador no espaço
de Hilbert foi, sem dúvida, uma das grandes inovações da física
matemática moderna”.
O formalismo, quando tomado isoladamente, sugere que a
mecânica quântica trata exclusivamente do resultado de medições, mantendo-se silencioso em relação a noções tais como ‘realidade física’ e, como tal, não favorece nem rejeita uma ou outra interpretação particular. Ainda assim, para que possamos tra1
Como advertem Susskind e Friedman (2014, p. 134), não tem conexão direta com o comportamento ondulatório, sendo apenas um nome atribuído por
convenção.
167
tar do formalismo, parece necessário assumir uma “interpretação
mínima”, que considera o caráter probabilístico da teoria quântica. Hughes considera que tal atitude é uma premissa necessária
para que a teoria quântica possa ser uma teoria física:
Ao desenvolver nossa representação geral de uma
teoria física, partimos de uma suposição, de que o
mundo é tal que, em certas circunstâncias especificáveis, vários eventos podem receber probabilidades definidas, eu considero essa suposição mínima,
se quisermos ter alguma teoria física: assumimos que
existem ligações, embora apenas probabilísticas, entre um conjunto de ocorrências (as circunstâncias iniciais) e outro (os eventos resultantes). (Hughes, 1989,
p. 85).
(Busch et al., 1996) vão além, e caracterizam a “interpretação
mínima” no sentido probabilístico:
Na interpretação mínima, a mecânica quântica é considerada uma teoria física probabilística, consistindo
de uma linguagem (proposições sobre resultados de
medições), uma estrutura de probabilidade (um conjunto convexo de medidas de probabilidade representando as possíveis distribuições de resultados de medição) e leis probabilísticas. Além disso, as probabilidades são interpretadas como limites das frequências relativas dos resultados das medições, ou seja, no
sentido de uma interpretação estatística epistêmica.
(Busch et al., 1996, p. 4).
Ademais, Busch et al. (1996, p. 8) constatam que “essa interpretação mínima está contida em qualquer interpretação mais
detalhada da mecânica quântica”. Redhead (1987, p. 44) nomeia
essa atitude de “interpretação instrumentista mínima”:
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[. . .] como o formalismo está relacionado aos possíveis resultados da medição e às frequências estatísticas com as quais esses resultados aparecem quando
uma medição é repetida várias vezes (em princípio, um
número infinito de vezes) em sistemas preparados em
estados quânticos idênticos. (Redhead, 1987, p. 44).
Aquilo que esses autores chamam de ‘interpretação mínima’
se relaciona com a chamada ‘interpretação estatística’ de Max
Born2 que, de acordo com Griffiths (1995), a teoria quântica fornece, dado um determinado estado, o valor de um observável no
intervalo x e x + dx, em um tempo t. De acordo com Griffiths, essa
particularidade da descrição quântica introduz a noção de “indeterminismo” na mecânica quântica, pois:
[. . .] se você sabe tudo o que a teoria tem a lhe dizer
sobre a partícula (a saber: sua função de onda), você
não pode prever com certeza o resultado de um experimento simples para medir sua posição —tudo que a
mecânica quântica tem a oferecer é uma informação
estatística sobre resultados possíveis. (Griffiths, 1995,
p. 2–3).
As questões relativas à realidade transfenomenal dos objetos
quânticos são questões que dependem estritamente da interpretação adotada, motivo pelo qual postergo tal discussão para as
próximas seções. Ainda que, como afirma Redhead (1987, p. 45) teorias sem interpretação “[. . .] simplesmente não contribuem para
a nossa compreensão do mundo natural”, e Jammer (1974, p. 343)
“[. . .] um formalismo, ainda que completo e logicamente consistente, ainda não é uma teoria física”, reitero: ater-me-ei, nesta
seção, somente àquilo que denomino “interpretação mínima”.
2
Que não deve ser confundida com a ‘interpretação dos ensembles estatísticos’ idealizada por Einstein —ver Home e M. A. B. Whitaker (1992). A interpretação estatística (também conhecida como interpretação dos ensembles)
é tratada no Capítulo 3.
169
A interpretação mínima
Cada base pode ser escolhida em função de um observável que se
quer medir sobre o sistema em um dado estado, a partir do qual
é posível designar infinitos vetores, de modo que, por exemplo,
para um observável de posição, |ψi denota um coeficiente do vetor de estado na base da posição da seguinte maneira:
|ψi = hx1 |ψi|x1 i + hx1 |ψi|x1 i + · · · + hxn |ψi|xn i
(5.1)
ρm (t) = |ham |ψ(t)i|2
(5.2)
Ou seja, hxj |ψi denota o j-ésimo coeficiente do vetor de estado |ψi na base da posição. Em termos de uma densidade de
probabilidade denotada por ρm , a probabilidade de que uma medição efetuada sobre um observável A no tempo t tenha como
resultado o valor am é igual a (utilizarei a notação de Paul Dirac
dos ‘bra-kets’ para expressar o vetor de estado ψ, de modo que
‘hψ|’ seja um bra e ‘|ψi’ seja um ket):
Uma medição do observável A no tempo t representa o valor
esperado (que envolve o conceito estatístico de ‘esperança matemática’) hAi(t), dado pela soma das densidades de probabilidade
ρm para o resultado am no tempo t, que por sua vez é equivalente
ao produto interno das funções de onda possíveis, de modo que:
X
hAi(t) =
ρm (t)am
(5.3)
m
Ou mais especificamente, conforme a regra de Born, a probabilidade de se encontrar o valor da medida de um observável
físico A em um sistema quântico descrito por ψ(x, t) em um dado
intervalo [a, b] de uma reta em R é
Z b
ψ(x,t)
P rob[a,b] (A) =
|ψ(x, t)|2 dx
(5.4)
a
170
Como pontua Krause (2016, p. 32), quando o observável a ser
medido tem dimensão unitária, isto é, normalizada, a probabilidade de encontrar o sistema representado pela função de onda
ψ(x, t) no intervalo [a, b] é simplificada pela seguinte expressão:
Z b
p=
|ψ(x, t)|2 dx
(5.5)
a
O valor |ψ(x, t)| é denotado pela densidade de probabilidade
ρ(x, t). Reiterando: a mecânica quântica é uma teoria probabilística no sentido que fornece apenas probabilidades para os estados dos sistemas quânticos. Como recorda Krause (2016, p. 5–
6), somente os estados que obedeçam a uma condição de normalização são relevantes para a problemática em questão, visto
que, ao representarem probabilidades, os escalares xi devem ter
soma igual à unidade, tal que:
2
n
X
i=1
|xi |2 = 1
(5.6)
Como observa Hughes (1989, p. 28) as probabilidades na teoria quântica são dadas na forma de expressões como |x|2 e, por
isso, é importante que os coeficientes sejam normalizados, para
que as expressões relativas às probabilidades possam assumir
valores entre zero e um.
O valor esperado é tudo o que se pode conhecer sobre um
sistema quântico. Como os estados que interessa à problemática da medição quântica devem ser normalizados, é necessária
a utilização da noção de “norma”, uma aplicação que associa um
escalar a cada vetor, de modo que o vetor é unitário se kψk = 1;
em específico, para tratar do problema da medição, interessam
as normas advindas do produto interno hψ|ψi, em que:
kψk =
p
hψ|ψi
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(5.7)
O quadrado da norma dessa função de onda fornecerá uma
densidade de probabilidade de encontrar um sistema quântico
em certa situação (como uma posição definida para uma partícula, por exemplo). O termo “partícula” deve ser tomado com cautela, uma vez que não há visibilidade ou analogia possível com
qualquer objeto macroscópico. É relevante ressaltar que, como
um instrumento heurístico, as partículas em mecânica quântica
são tomadas como pontos sem extensão.
Sintetizando o que foi dito até então, pode-se afirmar que,
no formalismo usual da mecânica quântica, são particularmente
importantes as equações do tipo:
T ξ = λξ
(5.8)
T representa um observável de um sistema, cujo estado é representado por ξ, sendo λ o valor possível para a medida desse
observável.
Evolução temporal dos estados via Equação de Schrödinger
Tendo esclarecido tais pontos, passemos à discussão acerca da
evolução temporal dos estados dos observáveis. Muito embora
a equação de Schrödinger não seja a única equação de movimento da teoria quântica (embora seja a mais utilizada), de fato,
o formalismo da teoria quântica é sempre determinista. É notável
que, embora a teoria quântica seja essencialmente probabilista,
as leis dinâmicas que descrevem a evolução (ou movimento) temporal dos estados são deterministas.
A equação de Schrödinger, especificamente, é determinista
no sentido de que sua solução no tempo t = 0 determina a solução para todos os outros valores de t (positivos ou negativos,
isto é, é uma equação cujo valor temporal é reversível). Assim, o
valor da medição em um observável A em um tempo t, ainda que
172
não forneça valores determinados para o estado quântico |ψi,
fornece elementos para a distribuição estatística de resultados
para medições futuras.
As leis dinâmicas da mecânica quântica são frequentemente
expressas sob a equação de Schrödinger, cuja notação é a seguinte:
∂|ψi
= H|ψi
(5.9)
∂t
Trata-se de uma equação linear, pois envolve derivadas primeiras somente, isto é, não envolve derivações de enésima potência; na medida em que suas variáveis são funções, é uma
equação diferencial. A constante i~ trata-se de um coeficiente
complexo explícito pelo número i, multiplicada pela constante
de Planck ~ = h/2π, representando a constante do movimento de
circunferência em H. A taxa de variação, representada pelo ‘∂’, indica uma derivada parcial cuja operação ∂/∂t incide em |ψi para
determinar a evolução temporal, fornecendo o estado da função
de onda |ψi, isto é, suas coordenadas no tempo, de modo que tal
variação é igual ao cálculo do operador de energia H, chamado
‘Hamiltoniano’, multiplicado à função de onda.3
A solução da equação de Schrödinger pode admitir dois ou
mais estados |ψi possíveis, cuja soma é também um estado possível. Tal é o ‘princípio de superposição’, que de acordo com
Pessoa Junior (2003, p. 23) pode ser enunciado da seguinte maneira: “dados dois estados admissíveis de um sistema quântico,
i~
3
É relevante constatar que a equação de Schrödinger, conforme enunciada
acima, é de fácil resolução para apenas uma partícula (como na simplificação
do átomo de hidrogênio), mas, em realidade, ela funciona para qualquer número arbitrário de partículas. Em H está previsto o potencial, que substitui
a influência do núcleo como uma ferramenta heurística que possibilita o cálculo do movimento do elétron desprezando suas relações com uma segunda
partícula, i.e.: o núcleo.
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então a soma desses dois estados também é um estado admissível do sistema”, o que pode ser descrito da seguinte maneira:
(5.10)
√
Para que os vetores sejam unitários, utiliza-se o fator 1/ 2,
chamado ‘fator de normalização’. Quando uma superposição enn
volve certos vetores que podem assumir valores
√ complexos C ,
introduz-se o número imaginário i, tal que i ≡ −1. Assim,
|ψ12 i = |ψ1 i + |ψ2 i
i
1
|ψ12 i = √ |ψ1 i + √ |ψ2 i
2
2
(5.11)
Os estados acima são ditos ‘estados puros’, em que |ψi descreve toda a informação que pode ser obtida sobre o estado de
uma única partícula. Não é necessário que os vetores dos estados
em superposição sejam ortogonais, isto é, vetores |ψ1 i e |ψ2 i cujo
produto interno hψ1 |ψ2 i = 0; ainda assim, a ortogonalidade é utilizada em raciocínios de situações limite, sendo uma característica importante para a discussão acerca do gato de Schrödinger.
Assim, supomos que os estados tratados aqui sejam ortogonais,
expressos como |ψ1 i ⊥ |ψ2 i. Quando os estados são ortogonais e
normalizados, tais estados são chamados de ‘ortonormais’. Uma
característica importante da ortogonalidade é a exclusividade de
seus estados: dois estados são ortogonais em relação um ao outro se não possuem o mesmo valor.
Ambos os estados ‘1’ e ‘2’ podem ser descritos separadamente
como |ψ1 i e |ψ2 i, ainda que sua soma dê origem a um novo estado
|ψ12 i possível. É importante salientar que, no princípio de superposição, os estados são fatoráveis, isto é, separáveis, sendo apenas o produto tensorial dos componentes da equação, de modo
que:
|ψ12 i = |ψ1 i ⊗ |ψ2 i
174
(5.12)
O vetor |ψ12 i pode ser decomposto em um produto de vetores, cada um em um espaço (possivelmente infinitos), tal que
H = H1 ⊗ . . . Hn , de modo que se pode dizer que os vetores agem
independentemente. Vale ressaltar que é bastante comum a seguinte generalização: |αi ⊗ |βi = |αi|βi = |αβi, e que os produtos
tensoriais não são comutativos, de modo que: |αβi =
6 |βαi.
O colapso
Se uma medição for efetuada sobre |ψ12 i, apenas um dos estados superpostos |ψ1 i ou |ψ2 i será obtido. Se o estado do sistema
é |ψi = Σj cj |aj i, e se a medida fornece o valor an , após a medida o sistema colapsa para o estado |an i com a probabilidade
|cn |2 = |hψn |ψi|2. Quando isso ocorre, o vetor é projetado de maneira descontínua em um desses valores, chamados ‘autovalores’.
O colapso, contudo, não é determinado pela evolução temporal
prevista pela equação de Schrödinger, sendo que a tentativa de
conciliar tais dois aspectos seja uma via de abordar o problema
da medição, conforme explicitado acima.
Uma característica bastante importante para a presente discussão é que os produtos tensoriais são utilizados no formalismo
da mecânica quântica para representar sistemas compostos, ou
seja, sistemas envolvendo mais de um sistema físico.
Remontarei um exemplo dado por Redhead (1987, p. 52–54)
acerca de uma ‘medição ideal’ e suas problematizações, conforme o esquema oferecido até aqui. Suponha que Q é um observável com um espectro discreto {qi }. Suponha que o estado
de um sistema quântico S é um autoestado |qi i de Q, e que S interaja com um aparato de medição A. Suponha, ainda, que o autoestado de A seja |r0 i na quantidade R, e que o autoestado de
A passe, em decorrência da interação, de |r0 i para |ri i, ao passo
que S permaneça em |qi i. Assim, o sistema composto S + A vai de
|qi i|r0 i para |qi i|ri i após a interação. Como observáveis do sistema
175
composto, os operadores para Q e R devem ser designados por
Q ⊗ I e I ⊗ R respectivamente, onde o primeiro produto tensorial
corresponde ao sistema S e o segundo a A.
O estado inicial da situação proposta, denotando que o estado de S é uma superposição de autoestados de Q com amplitude de probabilidade ci , é dado por:
!
X
|ψi =
ci |qi i |r0 i
(5.13)
i
Dada a linearidade da evolução temporal do sistema, em que
se supõe que todos os ri são distintos, tem-se que:
X
|ψ ′i =
ci |qi i|ri i
(5.14)
i
Em termos de operadores estatísticos, antes da medição, o
operador para o sistema composto é:
W = P|ψi = P(Pi c1 |q1 i|r0 i.
(5.15)
Após a medição é o estado puro:
W ′ = PP ci |qii|ri i
(5.16)
i
O valor esperado seria:
W ′′ =
X
i
|ci |2 P|qii|ri i
(5.17)
Nesse caso, W ′′ é um estado misto que descreve um ensemble
de sistemas nos estados |qi i|ri i, tal que a probabilidade de achar
o estado |qi i|ri i na mistura seja |ci |2 .
É importante ressaltar que o formalismo da mecânica quântica é muito mais rico e complexo do que foi apresentado neste
breve apêndice. No entanto, é suficiente para a compreensão (ou
176
ao menos para a abordagem) das questões filosóficas tratadas
neste livro.
177
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197 |
B RAINISH : F ORMALIZING A M ULTIMODAL L ANGUAGE FOR
I NTELLIGENCE AND C ONSCIOUSNESS
arXiv:2205.00001v3 [cs.AI] 6 Jul 2022
Paul Pu Liang
Machine Learning Department
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213
pliang@cs.cmu.edu
Abstract
Having a rich multimodal inner language is an important component of human intelligence that
enables several necessary core cognitive functions such as multimodal prediction, translation, and
generation. Building upon the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), a machine model for consciousness
proposed by Blum and Blum [13], we describe the desiderata of a multimodal language called B RAIN ISH , comprising words, images, audio, and sensations combined in representations that the CTM’s
processors use to communicate with each other. We define the syntax and semantics of B RAINISH
before operationalizing this language through the lens of multimodal artificial intelligence, a vibrant
research area studying the computational tools necessary for processing and relating information
from heterogeneous signals. Our general framework for learning B RAINISH involves designing (1)
unimodal encoders to segment and represent unimodal data, (2) a coordinated representation space
that relates and composes unimodal features to derive holistic meaning across multimodal inputs,
and (3) decoders to map multimodal representations into predictions (for fusion) or raw data (for
translation or generation). Through discussing how B RAINISH is crucial for communication and
coordination in order to achieve consciousness in the CTM, and by implementing a simple version
of B RAINISH and evaluating its capability of demonstrating intelligence on multimodal prediction
and retrieval tasks on several real-world image, text, and audio datasets, we argue that such an inner
language will be important for advances in machine models of intelligence and consciousness.
1
Introduction
Our perception of the natural world surrounding us involves multiple sensory modalities: we see objects, hear audio
signals, feel textures, smell fragrances, and taste flavors. A modality refers to a way in which a signal exists or is
experienced. Multiple modalities then refer to a combination of multiple signals each expressed in heterogeneous
manners [8]. The ability to seamlessly integrate and translate between different modalities is a hallmark of human
intelligence that enables core cognitive functions such as multimodal prediction, translation, and generation [54, 84, 90,
91, 99, 126, 127]:
1. Multimodal fusion: encoding modalities both in individuality (e.g., reading a book) as well as in context with
other modalities (e.g., listening to movie dialog while watching acted facial expressions).
2. Multimodal translation: converting a unit from one modality to semantically corresponding units in another
modality. For example, seeing an image and describing its contents in text.
3. Multimodal generation: parallel generation of realistic data from multiple modalities. For example, dreaming
constitutes synchronized imaginations of speech, sight, touch, smell, and other modalities.
The ability to perform multimodal processing requires the development of a multimodal language comprising words,
images, and sensations combined in representations that are understood by the brain [13, 54, 71, 90, 91] and decodable
to human-perceptible data forms [17, 82, 102]. In this paper, we describe the desiderata of such a multimodal language
called B RAINISH in accomplishing similar functionality in AI. We develop the underlying key principles of this
multimodal language by defining its syntax (grammar) and semantics (meaning). Starting from a local level (e.g.,
Preprint, work in progress.
individual words, image regions, audio segments) multimodal semantics study the relationships across data units with
common meaning expressed across multiple modalities. Multimodal syntax then defines the compositional structure that
jointly builds up shared multimodal units to derive holistic meaning at a global level (e.g., an entire video). Together,
a multimodal language comprising syntax and semantics enables us to effectively (1) fuse modalities by discovering
complementary information unique to each signal, (2) translate between modalities by taking advantage of common
meaning across signals, and (3) generate new multimodal data starting with co-occurring local units and composing
them to form global data of rich content.
We next describe how to operationalize our formalism of B RAINISH through the lens of multimodal machine learning.
Multimodal machine learning has emerged as a vibrant research area studying the computational tools necessary for
processing and relating information from heterogeneous signals. Building upon recent work, our general framework
for capturing unimodal and multimodal syntax and semantics in B RAINISH involves designing (1) suitable unimodal
encoders to segment and represent unimodal data, (2) a coordinated representation space that relates and composes
unimodal features to derive holistic meaning across entire multimodal inputs, and (3) decoders to map multimodal
representations into either a prediction (for fusion) or raw data (for translation or generation).
We evaluate this proposed framework in 2 ways: first conceptually by discussing how the B RAINISH multimodal
language is crucial for communication and coordination in the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), a machine model
for consciousness as proposed by Blum and Blum [13], and then by implementing a simple version of B RAINISH
and evaluating its capability of demonstrating intelligence on a suite of multimodal prediction and retrieval tasks on
real-world image [56], text [86], and audio [105] datasets. We conclude by arguing that a multimodal language is central
to the study of intelligence and consciousness in human and artificial intelligence.
For neuroscientists, we hope that this paper can introduce several challenges and opportunities from the perspective of
multimodal machine learning which can inspire computational models of AI based on human intelligence [13, 21, 80,
89, 122]. For computer scientists, we hope that the insights from human intelligence and consciousness can potentially
inform the design of new computational datasets, algorithms, and evaluation frameworks [9, 60].
In the following section, we first provide necessary background in multimodal machine learning (Section 2) to motivate
our definition of a multimodal language (Section 3). We then discuss algorithms for operationally learning this
multimodal language (Section 4). Using these tools, we apply them to the CTM [13] in Section 5 and to a case study on
real-world multimodal datasets in Section 6.
2
Background: Multimodal Machine Learning
We define a modality as a single particular mode in which a signal is expressed or experienced. Multiple modalities
then refer to a combination of multiple heterogeneous signals [8]. Each modality can be represented as static inputs
without a time dimension (such as images or a table of numerical data) or as temporal inputs which come in a sequence
with a time-dimension such as language (a sequence of tokens), video (a sequence of frames/audio features/optical
flow features), or time-series data. Many real-world research problems are inherently multimodal: from the early
research on audio-visual speech recognition [31] to the recent explosion of interest in language, vision, and video
understanding [31] for applications such as multimedia [66, 92, 94], affective computing [67, 109], robotics [52, 62],
finance [44], dialogue [107], human-computer interaction [30, 97], education [88] and healthcare [34, 140]. The research
field of multimodal machine learning (ML) brings unique challenges for both computational and theoretical research,
and has emerged as a vibrant interdisciplinary field of immense importance and with extraordinary potential [8]. As
relevant background, we review some of the core research challenges and main application areas of this research field.
2.1
Core research challenges
There are several core challenges in multimodal learning. We briefly summarize a few below and give some definitions
and examples, but defer the reader to a survey paper for more details [8]. Please refer to Figure 1 for an overview of
these technical challenges. In Table 1, we give examples of concrete machine learning tasks and datasets in each area.
Note that these technical challenges are not mutually exclusive. Solving each real-world multimodal problem typically
requires tackling more than one core challenge in conjunction.
Representation: Firstly, the challenge of multimodal representation aims to represent and summarize the multimodal
data to highlight the complementarity and synchrony between modalities. The heterogeneity of multimodal data makes it
particularly challenging to learn coordinated and joint representations. For example, language is often seen as symbolic
while audio and visual modalities are represented as signals. Multimodal representation learning is typically exemplified
by joint representations (integrating information from 2 or more modalities, effectively reducing the number of separate
representations) and coordinated representations (interchanging cross-modal information with the goal of keeping
2
Representation
Fusion
Alignment
Translation
Co-learning
Figure 1: Core research challenges in multimodal learning: Representation studies how to represent and summarize the multimodal
data to highlight the complementarity and synchrony between modalities. Fusion aims to combine information from two or more
modalities to perform a prediction (e.g., classification, regression). Alignment aims to identify the direct relations between units
from two or more different modalities. Translation studies the generation of semantically-aligned information in a new and different
modality. Co-learning aims to transfer knowledge between modalities and their representations. Note that these technical challenges
are not mutually exclusive - solving each real-world multimodal problem typically requires tackling more than one core challenge in
conjunction.
the same number of representations but improving multimodal contextualization). Representation is a particularly
overarching challenge that needs to be considered for every more specific challenge below.
Fusion: In multimodal fusion, the main challenge is to combine information from two or more modalities to perform
a prediction (e.g., classification, regression). Classic examples for multimodal fusion include audio-visual speech
recognition where visual lip motion is fused with speech signals to predict spoken words [31], or recognizing human
emotion from language, spoken speech, and visual gestures.
Alignment: The challenge of multimodal alignment aims to identify the direct relations between units from two or
more different modalities. For example, when analyzing the speech and gestures of a human subject, how can we align
specific gestures with spoken words or utterances? Alignment between modalities is challenging since it may depend on
long-range dependencies, involves ambiguous segmentation (e.g., words or utterances), and could be either one-to-one,
many-to-many, or not exist at all. Some core tasks in multimodal alignment are cross-modal retrieval [135] and visual
grounding [3].
Translation: Multimodal fusion and alignment can be contrasted with multimodal translation where the goal is to
generate semantically-aligned information in a new and different modality [134]. For example, generating a descriptive
caption of an image can help to improve the accessibility of visual content for blind people [40]. Multimodal translation
brings about new difficulties involving the generation of high-dimensional structured multimodal data as well as their
evaluation.
Co-learning: Finally, a fifth challenge, co-learning, is to transfer knowledge between modalities and their representations. Exemplified by algorithms of co-training, conceptual grounding, and zero-shot learning, how can knowledge
learned from one modality (e.g., predicted labels or representation) help a computational model trained on a different
modality? This challenge is particularly relevant when one of the modalities has limited resources. Some examples of
co-learning involve transferring knowledge from knowledge graphs to visual classification [79], images to machine
translation [125], and video to language [145].
2.2
Core Applications and Datasets
In this subsection, we list some major applications of multimodal machine learning in the real world.
Affective computing studies the perception of human affective states (emotions, sentiment, and personalities) from
our natural display of multimodal signals spanning language (spoken words), visual (facial expressions, gestures),
and acoustic (prosody, speech tone) [104]. Some commonly studied datasets and tasks involving fusing language,
video, and audio time-series data to predict sentiment (CMU-MOSI [143] and CMU-MOSEI [146]), emotions
(CMU-MOSEI [146]), humor (UR-FUNNY [42]), and sarcasm (MUS TARD [19]).
Healthcare: Medical decision-making often involves integrating complementary signals from several sources such
as lab tests, imaging reports, and patient-doctor conversations. Multimodal models can help doctors make sense of
high-dimensional data and assist them in the diagnosis process [5]. MIMIC is a large-scale dataset [46] which records
ICU patient data including time-series data measured every hour and other tabular numerical data about the patient
(e.g., age, gender, ethnicity) to predict mortality rate and the disease ICD-9-code.
Robotics: Modern robot systems are equipped with multiple sensors to aid in their decision-making. Recent work
has explored methods to integrate visual (RGB and depth), force, and proprioception sensors to predict the pose of
the object being pushed by the robot end-effector [62] or action-conditional learning objectives that capture forward
dynamics of the different modalities (contact prediction and robot end-effector pose) [62]. These multi-sensor robots
3
Table 1: Some representative machine learning tasks and datasets for each of the multimodal challenges of fusion, alignment,
translation, and co-learning. Representation is a more overarching challenge that needs to be considered for the other more specific
challenges, so it does not have specific tasks or datasets. Input modalities span a: audio, e: embodied environment, f : force sensor, g:
graph, i: image `: language, o: optical flow, p: proprioception sensor, s: set, t: time-series, ta: tabular, v: video.
Area
Task
Dataset
Modalities
sarcasm prediction
MUS TARD [19]
{`, v, a} → y
sentiment prediction
CMU-MOSI [143]
{`, v, a} → y
humor prediction
UR-FUNNY [42]
{`, v, a} → y
emotion prediction
CMU-MOSEI [146]
{`, v, a} → y
mortality, disease code prediction
MIMIC [46]
{t, ta} → y
object pose prediction
M U J O C O P USH [63]
{i, f, p} → y
contact, robot pose prediction
V ISION &T OUCH [62]
{i, f, p} → y
Fusion
movie genre classification
MM-IMD B [7]
{`, i} → y
digit classification
AV-MNIST [133]
{i, a} → y
human action classification
K INETICS 400 [48]
{v, a, o} → y
video classification
YOU T UBE -8M [2]
{`, v, a} → y
image question answering
VQA [3]
{`, i} → y
video question answering
TVQA [64]
{`, v} → y
environment question answering
EQA [25]
{`, e} → y
image-caption retrieval
F LICKR -30 K [108]
`↔i
Alignment
audio-caption retrieval
AUDIO C APS [51]
`↔a
audio-visual retrieval
YOU T UBE -8M [2]
a↔v
image captioning
MSCOCO [70]
i→`
video captioning
LSMDC [115]
v→`
Translation
speech recognition
WSJ [101]
a→`
text-to-speech
L IBRI TTS [149]
`→a
image generation
C ONCEPTUAL C APTIONS [113, 123]
`→i
video → text
CMU-MOSI → SST [145]
{`, v, a} → `
Co-learning
text → image
G LOV E → CIFAR10 [124]
{i, `} → i
knowledge graph → image
Visual Genome [55, 79]
{i, g} → i
have been successfully applied into haptic robots [100, 121] and surgical robots [1, 11]. More generally, language [76]
and audio [26] have also emerged as useful signals in learning policies for reinforcement learning in both simulation
and the real world.
Multimedia: A significant body of research in multimodal learning has been fueled by the large availability of
multimedia data (language, image, video, and audio) on the internet. The research field of multimedia involves
understanding and synthesizing different content forms into a single interactive medium. Several real-world challenges
include audio-visual video classification (classifying a video into a particular genre [151] and recommending similar
videos), image/video question answering (asking and answering text-based questions given a relevant image or
video [3, 64]), image/video captioning (generating descriptive text for a given image or video [29, 134]), image/audio/text
retrieval [87, 117, 152] (retrieving relevant image, audio, video, or text articles given a search query in another modality).
2.3
Case Studies
To motivate these multimodal tasks and challenges, we illustrate examples of state-of-the-art models tackling these
technical challenges through 3 case studies:
1. Video-based affect recognition aims to predict human sentiment and emotions from spoken text, prosody, and
visual gestures [146]. This is primarily a fusion problem to combine multimodal signals to make a prediction.
At the same time, a model also needs to learn suitable representations of each signal before fusion can be
performed. These representations should be able to relate signals that represent similar meanings. For example,
loud voices and laughter reinforce each other to predict stronger happiness over each individually. Local fusion
of the loud voice and laugh signals can only be performed with the discovery of the underlying complementary
information across the audio and image modalities.
2. Image-based question answering aims to correctly answer a text-based question in reference to a relevant
image (e.g., asking what color is the table in reference to an image depicting a brown table). This is both
a fusion and alignment problem: fusion because the goal is to integrate complementary information from
the image and text question, and alignment because one has to relate words in the question (e.g., table) to a
specific part of the image referencing that word.
4
3. Image-caption retrieval aims to retrieve a semantically relevant image given a text caption or search query [108].
Similarly, in image-caption generation, the goal is to generate a caption, one word at a time, describing an
image. These are both primarily translation problems with the goal of learning relationships between images
and text to enable translating from one modality to another. It also requires learning alignment between image
and text where units from images are close together with their semantically corresponding units in the caption.
3
Towards Formalizing A Multimodal Language
In this section, we identify the underlying key principles towards formalizing a general multimodal language. We begin
with a basic problem setup that defines a universe of concepts and their manifestations as multimodal data through a
generative process. Using this setup, we first define the notions of unimodal syntax and semantics, before extending
these definitions to capture multimodal syntax and semantics.
Setup: Suppose there are 2 modalities (e.g., image and text) and a set M of underlying atomic abstract concepts (e.g.,
cats, dogs, tables, chairs). Each modality is comprised of a set of atomic units - the most basic unit of real-world data in
that modality which cannot (or rather, the user chooses to not) be broken down into further units. For example, when
working with the text modality, a user may choose the level of words as the most basic unit, in which case the set of
atomic units M1 would be a word-level vocabulary. When working with the image modality, one might choose the level
of cropped object patches as the most basic unit, which results in a ‘visual vocabulary’ M2 (e.g., cropped images of
cats, dogs, tables, and chairs).
A generative process for multimodal data: These abstract concepts are manifested as real-world data in terms of
these 2 modalities. This manifestation process can be seen as stochastic functions mapping units from M to those in M1
and M2 . Continuing with the above example, the concept cat could be mapped to the text modality as words cat, feline,
kitten, and so on. Similarly, it could be mapped to the image modality as different basic images of cats with varying
colors, sizes, and features. While this may seem straightforward for object-based concepts, the generative process
becomes more ambiguous when dealing with non-objects. For example, M could also contain abstract emotions such
as happiness, which can be expressed in language via positive words, audio via loud voices and positive tones, and
visual via smiles, laughs, eye movements, and many more. Typically, M1 ≠ M2 >> M - there are many more real-world
manifestations of abstract concepts through raw data than the abstract concepts themselves. For example, there are
many words describing a cat and also many possible visual scenes of a cat.
Further building on this setup, problems of significance in the real world are typically not defined directly in terms of
atomic units, but rather their compositions into ordered collections. For example, instead of words and object regions,
multimodal tasks involve sentences, long paragraphs, dense images, and videos [70, 108, 146] as an ordered sequence
of atomic units. There is typically a set of rules governing this ordered composition, such as grammar in language [22]
or visual relationships in image [45].
Challenges: The core research challenges of representation, fusion, alignment, translation, and co-learning are then
defined on top of multimodal data and an associated task. These underlying concepts and compositions are important
since they usually define the task space. For example, representation and fusion generally require recovering the
underlying abstract concept (e.g., cats, dogs, tables, chairs, happiness, sadness, sarcasm) after their manifestation
into atomic concepts and composition into real-world high-dimensional multimodal data. Alignment, translation, and
co-learning require the discovery of pairings across data related by shared underlying abstract concepts to enable
retrieval, generation, and information transfer. Therefore, all of these challenges require studying the relationships
between data and abstract concepts (i.e., semantics), as well as the composition of atomic units into higher-order
sequences (i.e., syntax). We will proceed to formalize these notions of unimodal syntax and semantics, as well as
multimodal syntax and semantics in the next section. Together, they create a multimodal language necessary for
modeling the generative process of multimodal data to solve associated tasks.
3.1
Unimodal Syntax and Semantics
We begin with a treatment of unimodal syntax. Commonly studied in language, syntax refers to grammar - the set of
fixed composition rules that govern how words (the atomic unit) build up into a structurally valid (i.e., grammatical)
sentence [22]. The set of composition rules resulting in a grammatical sentence can then be visualized as a constituencybased parse tree (see the left side of Figure 2), where certain parts of speech (NP: noun phrase, VP: verb phrase, etc.)
are composed according to grammar rules [18]. In the visual modality, atomic units could refer to individual objects in
a scene, such as a laptop, a teacup, a table, and a sofa. Visual syntax (right side of Figure 2) then refers to rules that
govern the composition of individual object units into a visual scene [45] - the laptop and teacup typically go onto
a table rather than the sofa, and the sofa is typically parallel but lower than the table. Visual syntax is informed and
constrained by spatial dimensions and perceptual principles, but there are typically no fixed rules. Instead, probabilistic
5
Unimodal language syntax
Unimodal visual syntax
NP
NP
PP
DT
NN
IN
A
teacup
on
NP
(laptop)
NP
PP
DT
JJ
IN
the
right
of
on top of
NP
NP
PP
IN
DT
NN
a
laptop on
in front of
NP
DT
top
PP
IN
(sofa)
NP
(table)
of
DT
NN
a
table.
Figure 2: Unimodal syntax of an arbitrary modality refers to the compositional structure of atomic units in that modality into more
complex yet structurally valid data. Left: In language, the syntax is typically defined via a set of fixed production rules that govern
how words (the atomic unit) build up into a grammatical sentence, which can then be visualized as a syntax tree. Right: In the visual
modality, syntax refers to certain rules that govern the composition of individual object units into a visual scene - the laptop typically
goes on top of a table rather than the sofa, and the table is typically in front of the sofa.
rules are learned from a natural distribution of images or based on visual design principles such as gestalt theory, visual
topologies, prior associations, or visual context [45].
More generally, the syntax of an arbitrary modality refers to the compositional structure of atomic units in that modality
into more complex yet structurally valid data. Formally, given 2 subsets of atomic units A, B ⊆ M1 (or M2 ), unimodal
syntax defines a composition function f ∶ A × B → [0, 1] that outputs a value representing the validity of a particular
composition. In the case of language which has a deterministic syntax, the output is either 0 or 1: output 0 denotes
invalid composition, output 1 denotes valid composition. For the visual modality, a probabilistic syntax means that the
output is a range [0, 1] representing the likelihood of a valid composition based on the natural distribution of images.
The unimodal semantics of an arbitrary modality refers to the meaning of each atomic unit in that modality (atomic
semantics), as well as the meaning of compositions of those units as governed by a corresponding syntax (compositional
semantics). In the former, unimodal atomic semantics aim to discover the meaning of each atomic unit in M1 (and
in M2 ). What is meaning? In linguistics, the study of word meaning includes the study of words both locally and
globally. At local levels (i.e., only a word), meaning is communicated through the relationships between the distinct
senses of a word and how words are derived [128] through word-level semantic relations such as synonyms, antonyms,
hypernyms, hyponyms, homonyms, and polysems [74]. At global levels, meaning is communicated via how words
are used in grammatical contexts [15]. In the visual modality, these local relationships are captured through visual
properties. Following the same example above and illustrated in Figure 3, the visual semantics of each object (laptop, a
teacup, a table, and a sofa) would typically represent both local meaning: what object it is, their physical properties
(size, shape, and color), as well as global meaning: what they are used for and how they would interact with other
related objects [38].
In the latter, unimodal compositional semantics study how the meaning of atomic units correlates with the structure
of the language or syntax (also known as syntax-semantics interface [110]). For example, when individual object
regions are composed together in a scene based on visual syntax, visual compositional semantics would then represent
higher-level concepts such as a person’s work desk, whether the person is right or left-handed depending on the relative
position of the teacup, and whether the scene belongs to a house of an office, and so on (see right side of Figure 3).
In language, semantics are typically learned via the distributional hypothesis: the idea that units (i.e., words) or their
compositions (i.e., sentences) of similar meaning tend to occur in the same context [41]. Extensions of these ideas to
visual semantics have also explored how visual scenes are classified and organized into a semantic hierarchy based on
the occurrence of objects in their visual context [16, 23, 38].
6
Unimodal language semantics
Unimodal visual semantics
furniture
color
table
Atomic
semantics
table
chair
made of
shape
bed
(teacup)
color
wood
shape
laptop
Compositional
semantics
used for
A teacup on the
right of a laptop on
top of a table in
front of a sofa.
(laptop)
work
work space
living room
white
round
grey
square
recreational
living room
right-handed
Figure 3: The unimodal semantics of an arbitrary modality refer to the meaning of each atomic unit in that modality (atomic
semantics), as well as the meaning of compositions of those units as governed by a corresponding syntax (compositional semantics).
Left: The lexical semantics of each word (table, laptop) represent word meaning as exemplified through semantic hierarchies, their
real-world usages, or interactions with other related objects. When composed in a sentence, one can infer higher-level concepts such
as a person’s work desk and whether the scene belongs to a house of an office. Right: The visual semantics of each object provides
complementary information through visual properties (size, shape, and color) that might not be present in the language. Similarly,
compositional semantics represent meaning from the entire visual scene.
3.2
Multimodal Syntax and Semantics
While unimodal syntax and semantics are typically studied in unimodal machine learning (e.g., classification and
generation of image or text individually), multimodal machine learning requires extending the notion of syntax and
semantics to multimodal tasks, which we illustrate in Figure 4. In this section, we provide preliminary definitions and
examples of multimodal syntax and semantics.
Multimodal atomic semantics study shared meaning of atomic units across multiple modalities [49, 50]. These
relationships are present due to the underlying pairing across atomic units in M1 and M2 through abstract concepts
in M that generated them. Therefore, multimodal atomic semantics can be seen as extending the idea of semantic
relations from within the same modality to across different modalities. For example, the semantics of a visual image
of a dog should correspond to the semantics of an audio clip of a dog barking. Given 2 atomic units a ∈ M1 , b ∈ M2 ,
learning multimodal atomic semantics, therefore, involves learning a pairing/alignment function f ∶ a × b → [0, 1]
where the output represents a likelihood of the 2 units across both modalities having shared meaning. While there are
cases where meaning is exactly shared across units, there are also cases where the matching is many-to-many (many
possible dog barks for the same image of a dog), or does not exist at all (it might be hard or impossible to describe a
bark exactly in words). In certain cases, the underlying abstract concepts can be expressed in ambiguous or idiosyncratic
manners - the abstract concept of sarcasm is commonly expressed through positive words in the language modality yet
disappointed/exasperated tones or gestures in the audio or visual modalities [4]. One has to identify the relationships
between these atomic units of seemingly contradictory meaning in order to accurately predict sarcasm from multimodal
data. Similarly, textual references to visual objects in complex scenes can possibly be ambiguous and require careful
reasoning [47, 137].
Multimodal syntax involves learning the compositional structure that jointly builds up shared multimodal atomic units
to derive holistic meaning. Depending on the specific problem, the compositional structure, or multimodal grammar,
can fall in several cases:
1. Deterministic syntax (e.g., grammar in text) helping to resolve probabilistic syntax (e.g., image). For example,
on the right side of Figure 4, the textual description of a visual scene “a teacup on the right of a laptop on
top of a table in front of a sofa” defines a multimodal syntax that describes exactly how one would compose
individual visual objects (tea cup, laptop, table, sofa) into the complete visual scene, rather than a probabilistic
visual syntax as described in Figure 2 (probabilistic since the spatial relationships between tea cup, laptop,
table, sofa are not exactly determined). In this case, additional deterministic information from the language
modality helps resolve ambiguity in the composition of visual objects into a scene.
2. Joint temporal syntax. In cases where deterministic rules are not present (e.g., image and audio modalities),
the joint compositional structure has to be learned from naturally occurring data. One type of multimodal
syntax is a common shared temporal dimension across modalities. This is exemplified in video data, where a
7
Multimodal languageimage syntax
Multimodal languageimage semantics
NP
NP
PP
DT
NN
IN
A
teacup
on
teacup
Atomic
semantics
NP
NP
laptop
PP
DT
JJ
IN
the
right
of
NP
NP
PP
IN
DT
NN
a
laptop on
Compositional
semantics
NP
DT
top
PP
IN
A teacup on the
right of a laptop
on top of a table
in front of a sofa.
NP
of
DT
NN
a
table.
Figure 4: Multimodal syntax refers to a compositional structure that jointly builds up multimodal units. For example, the textual
description of a visual scene defines a multimodal syntax that describes exactly how one would compose individual visual objects (tea
cup, laptop, table, sofa) into the complete visual scene, rather than a probabilistic visual syntax as described in Figure 2. Multimodal
semantics refer to shared meaning across modalities both at atomic and compositional levels.
common time dimension builds up units at individual time steps. For example, after learning local atomic pairs
(smile, loud voice) and (closed eyes, laughter), it is likely that the smile happens at the same time as closed
eyes which co-occur as a result of laughter, all of which happens before a loud voice. Jointly composing paired
units can help reduce ambiguity by decreasing the space of all possible configurations.
At a global level, multimodal compositional semantics study how meaning is built up under the compositional structure defined by multimodal syntax. Similar to unimodal compositional semantics, we show examples of compositional
meaning across multimodal data on the right side of Figure 4: a complete visual scene matching a complete description
of the scene in language. Composing individual local relationships results in a global representation of multimodal data.
Each modality often provides additional information for a task which could come in the following forms [8]:
1. Joint information is present in both modalities that reinforce each other (e.g., loud voice and smile). In this
case, existing information is contextualized and reinforced based on other modalities.
2. Complementary information is present in one modality but not the other (e.g., monotone voice, but positive
words). Existing information is new and necessary since it is not present in other modalities.
Together, a multimodal language comprising syntax and semantics enables us to effectively (1) fuse modalities by
discovering complementary information unique to each signal, (2) translate between modalities by taking advantage
of joint information across signals, and (3) generate new multimodal data starting with co-occurring local units and
composing them to form global data of rich content.
4
Operationally Learning a Multimodal Language
Based on the previous treatment of syntax and semantics in unimodal and multimodal tasks, our goal is to operationally
learn a multimodal language in practice. This section details our framework for multimodal language learning and
references to current research on the machine learning side.
4.1
A Framework for Multimodal Language Learning
Our proposed framework consists of 3 steps: designing encoders from multimodal data to representations, learning
a suitable representation space, and designing decoders from representations back into data. Each of these steps is
designed to capture unimodal and multimodal syntax and semantics.
1. Encoders take in raw data from different modalities and model unimodal syntax and semantics into a unimodal
representation. Syntax is captured by segmenting each modality into atomic units, and semantics are captured
by learning a representation summarizing the meaning of each atomic unit. By modeling unimodal syntax and
8
semantics, the result is a fine-grained unimodal feature representation capturing both compositionality and
meaning in unimodal data.
2. The representation space takes in multiple unimodal feature representations across modalities and captures
multimodal syntax and semantics. Multimodal semantics are learned via alignment: the matching between
atomic units across multiple modalities based on shared meaning. Multimodal syntax involves learning how
aligned subsets of atomic units compose to derive holistic meaning across entire multimodal inputs (rather than
at the level of units). The result is a coordinated multimodal representation capturing shared and composed
meaning across multimodal inputs.
3. Finally, decoders take in multimodal representations and output a prediction, which can either be a classification
label in prediction tasks or raw data in generation tasks. In the former, fused multimodal data is important
to capture complementary information for prediction (e.g., predicting emotion from language, speech, and
gestures). In the latter, generation can be in the same modality (e.g., dialog prediction in language) or different
modality (describing an image in language), all of which necessitate starting from a coordinated multimodal
representation.
To motivate this learning process, we show how they would be executed in three case studies, and show an example in
Figure 5:
1. Video-based affect recognition aims to predict human sentiment and emotions from spoken text, prosody,
and visual gestures [146]. Unimodal encoders segment and learn atomic units such as units of speech (e.g.,
a specific word or phrase), tone (e.g., loud voice or speaking quickly), and gestures (e.g., a yawn or laugh).
Learning correspondences between these units then refers to estimating a fused representation based on
unimodal, bimodal, and trimodal interactions (e.g., loud voice and laugh reinforce each other to predict
stronger happiness over each individually). Finally, the decoder composes these individual local predictions
across the entire video to form a global video-level emotion prediction.
2. Image-caption retrieval aims to retrieve a semantically relevant image given a text caption or search query [108].
Atomic units could refer to specific objects or certain nouns or phrases in text, in which case learning
correspondences between these units refers to estimating an alignment probability based on semantic similarity.
Finally, these individual object and phrase-level alignments are composed to form a global image-text alignment
estimate.
3. Language-guided reinforcement learning is an emerging application investigating whether text descriptions of
a task can help guide an agent to learn better policies in some environment [93]. Unimodal encoders capture
atomic units such as specific text or visual references to a single entity in the environment, the agent’s possible
actions, or possible ways of obtaining rewards. Learning correspondences refers to relating text descriptions to
visual objects in the environment (e.g., identifying that text references to a weapon refer to images of weapons
in the environment), actions in the action space, or possible rewards. Composing these references is crucial
towards more efficiently learning a policy mapping visual states and text descriptions to a distribution over an
agent’s actions to maximize cumulative reward.
We now describe these 3 steps in detail and provide methodological examples suitable for commonly studied modalities
including language, image, video, audio, and time-series data.
4.1.1
Encoders
Each modality is first processed by a set of specialized encoders. The goal of each encoder is to capture unimodal
syntax and semantics and summarize them into a unimodal representation. Unimodal syntax is captured by segmenting
raw input data into a set of atomic units (for example, a sequence of words or word parts in the language modality, a set
of object bounding boxes in the image modality, or a set of segmented speech parts in the audio modality). Unimodal
semantics are captured by learning a feature vector summarizing the meaning of each atomic unit. In general, feature
vectors learned by representation learning techniques exhibit certain desirable properties that make them suitable for
capturing meaning [10]. We list some below but defer the reader to Bengio et al. [10] for a more detailed treatment of
the general desiderata of feature representations:
1. Smoothness: atomic units in each modality with similar meaning tend to be mapped into similar feature vectors
in representation space.
2. Multiple explanatory factors: different underlying factors in the data generating distribution (e.g., size, shape,
color for visual units) are encoded through different subspaces of the representation space.
3. Hierarchy of explanatory factors: underlying factors are defined in terms of other concepts in a hierarchy, with
more abstract concepts higher in the hierarchy defined in terms of less abstract ones.
9
Composition
Correspondences
Visual and text
subunits
match = 0.8
match = 0.7
Multimodal syntax
match = 0.9
A teacup on the right of a laptop on
top of a table in front of a sofa.
Multimodal semantics
Unimodal syntax and semantics
Figure 5: We propose a general multimodal language for processing multimodal data to discover unimodal and multimodal syntax
and semantics essential to a range of challenges in multimodal machine learning. This generalization involves discovering atomic
units in each modality, their correspondences within and across modalities, and their composition for a specific prediction task.
4. Natural clustering: different values of atomic units (e.g., object categories) cluster into separate manifolds in
representation space, and local variations within each cluster tend to preserve the value of a category.
To summarize, the output from each modality’s encoder is a set of atomic features, each with information represented in
a dense vector. By modeling unimodal syntax and semantics, the result is a fine-grained unimodal feature representation
capturing both compositionality and meaning in unimodal data.
Examples: In practice, some common examples of machine learning encoders are convolutional neural networks [61]
for images, which have been shown to learn features representing the semantic meaning of the object in the image.
More fine-grained models such as Region-CNNs [37] further extract feature representations of multiple objects in an
image along with their bounding box regions. Another closely related line of models are those designed for image-based
semantic segmentation [73] which categorizes every pixel in the image into a semantic object category.
For text and other sequential data such as speech and time-series, sequence models like Recurrent neural networks [118],
Long short-term memory networks [43], and Transformer models [130] have emerged as the de-facto choice for
processing. For discrete data like text, the set of discrete tokens is typically first converted into continuous space using
a Tokenizer before learning a token embedding dictionary. For video data, methods for encoding images (such as
convolutional networks or R-CNNs) are typically combined with a sequence model - the former image-based methods
extract features for each frame in the video, and the sequence of features over all frames are combined with a sequence
model such as a Long short-term memory network [43] or Transformer network [130].
For graphs, graph-based neural networks have emerged as a popular option [120, 138]. Each unit is defined as a node
or edge, and the combination function is determined by local connectivity within the graph structure. For example,
representations of nodes would be combined if they were connected together by an edge (or a weighted combination in
the case of weighted graphs).
For tables and sets, a commonly-adopted paradigm is to model the permutation-agnostic structure of input data using a
permutation-agnostic model which has been shown to learn features that better respect the structure of input data [148].
4.1.2
Representation space
After learning atomic features in each modality, the core research problem lies in learning a representation space
that takes in multiple unimodal feature representations and learns a coordinated multimodal representation capturing
multimodal syntax and semantics. As formalized in Section 3, multimodal semantics involves learning the correspondences/alignment in atomic features across modalities based on shared meaning. Multimodal syntax involves learning
how aligned subsets of atomic features relate and compose with each other to derive holistic meaning across entire
multimodal inputs (rather than at the level of units). The result is a coordinated multimodal representation capturing
shared and composed meaning across multimodal inputs.
A general approach to learning this representation space is to define a set of atomic units that are known to correspond
with each other, and enforce alignment using some objective function that imposes a certain form of structure in paired
units (see Figure 6). Some typical examples of structure and their corresponding alignment objective functions are:
10
Language
encoder
Representation
space
Image
encoder
Fish
Horse
Figure 6: Top: A general approach to learn a coordinated representation space is to define a set of atomic units that are known to
correspond with each other (e.g., words with their corresponding images and sounds), and enforce alignment using an objective function that imposes structure in paired units. Bottom: A coordinated representation space enables fusion, retrieval, and compositionality
in the form of multimodal vector space arithmetic (Figure from [53]).
Similarity measures aim to learn a representation space containing transformed features from both modalities such
that units of the same semantic meaning are mapped to features that are nearby in feature space. Distance is typically
measured via cosine distance, l2 distance, or max-margin losses. The exact algorithm used to preserve semantic
distances can range from contrastive learning [75, 142], noise contrastive estimation [106], max-margin learning [39], or
visual-semantic embedding models [35]. When applied to images and captions, the resulting coordinated representation
space enables compositional multimodal vector space: representation(image of blue car) - representation(word “blue”)
+ representation(word “red”) = representation(image of red car) [53].
Ordered and hierarchical spaces: In contrast to the above methods which are distance-preserving (semantically
similar objects are mapped to points that are nearby in the embedding space), an alternative approach is to maintain an
order-preserving representation space. Vendrov et al. [132] achieve this by constructing a visual-semantic hierarchy that
captures a partial order of language and image representations. For example, the image of “a woman walking her dog”
should align with the text “woman walking her dog” which falls under the text “woman walking”, in order to better
capture hierarchical representations of text and their subsentences. Zhang et al. [150] also explore this idea in learning
multimodal concept taxonomies resulting in a hierarchy of hypernyms (i.e., categorizing specific concepts with respect
to more general ones) across both textual and visual atomic units.
4.1.3
Decoders
Finally, the primary function of decoders is to map data in representation space into data space. We distinguish between
2 types of decoders:
1. Predictive decoders map data in representation space into a set of labels for a particular task that one cares about
(e.g., a set of object categories or human emotions). The prediction process typically takes in the set of aligned units
across modalities and learns a task-specific composition function that combines these aligned features into a prediction
for a task. For example, given corresponding atomic units (e.g., a paired positive word and loud voice), the predictive
decoder would predict “strongly happy” as the emotion displayed by the speaker in the video. Fused multimodal data
in the form of coordinated representations is important to capture complementary information for prediction (e.g., being
able to predict emotion when through only speaker gestures, or when language and speech are also present).
11
Examples: Predictive decoders are typically trained neural network classifiers where the composition function is approximated via gradient-based learning. Recent work has also explored handcrafting explicit composition functions [141]
based on the parse tree of questions for tasks like image-based question answering.
2. Generative decoders map data in representation space back into high-dimensional data space such as that of images,
natural language, or speech signals. Generation can be in the same modality (e.g., dialog prediction in language) or
different modality (describing an image in language), all of which necessitate starting from a coordinated multimodal
representation. A core challenge in generation is that of controllable interpolation - given a new feature sample in
representation space, can we decode it back into data space while respecting the changes in factors of variation in feature
space? Factors of variation correspond to individual, atomic changes in the input modality. For example, given a visual
object, each factor of variation could correspond to changes in its color, shape, size, and orientation [58]. Similarly,
given a sentence, each factor of variation could correspond to changes in its tense, sentiment, and tone [77]. Controllable
generation involves the ability to change each factor individually while achieving corresponding perceptible changes in
the desired basis in output space, which is important for generating data with desired properties.
Examples: Recent work in generative decoders has formed the basis for much recent work in generative modeling of
images, video prediction, and style transfer across the image, text, and video modalities. Some examples of decoders
back to raw data include deconvolutional networks/upsampling for image generation [14] and autoregressive models for
sequential data such as text, audio, and video [83, 112, 136].
4.2
Addressing the Technical Challenges
To see why this is a general framework for multimodal language learning, we explain how this approach is able to
tackle each of the core technical challenges in multimodal machine learning as described in Section 2.
Alignment: The challenge of alignment is most directly tackled by this learning paradigm - alignment consists of the
set of unimodal atomic units and their learned correspondences with atomic units in the same or different modality.
Representation: This framework provides flexibility in defining the representations at various levels. The first level is
at the level of unimodal representations by representing each atomic unit as a feature. The second level is a multimodal
representation defined as the composition of unimodal atomic units and their learned correspondences with atomic units
in the same or different modality.
Fusion is performed when the overall multimodal representation from above is combined with a task-specific prediction
layer to make a fused prediction (e.g., predicting speaker affect from human videos).
Translation: After aligning each unimodal atomic unit with their corresponding entities in the other modalities,
translation from a source to target modality then amounts to retrieving from a set/generating from scratch the closest
aligned unit in the target modality for each unit in the source modality. Special care still needs to be taken to coherently
compose the retrieved/generated units into final raw data in the target modality (e.g., composing individual retrieved
words/phrases into a full sentence).
Co-learning is indirectly exemplified by learning an alignment between modality representations. For example, learning
that images of dogs (a visual unit) correspond to audio of dogs barking (an acoustic unit) induces shared information
useful for both image classification as well as audio classification.
Therefore, our blueprint describing a general multimodal learning process is a step towards addressing several core
technical challenges in multimodal learning.
5
Multimodal Language for Consciousness: A Case Study in the CTM
Given the above treatment of a general multimodal language based on modality-specific encoders, a coordinated
representation space, and modality/task-specific decoders, we explain how these can be applied in the Conscious Turing
Machine (CTM), a machine model for consciousness as proposed by Blum and Blum [13]. B RAINISH comprising
words, images, audio, and sensations combined in representations is an essential language that the CTM’s processors
use to communicate with each other, and enables higher-order cognitive functions such as multimodal processing,
constructing a model of the world, inner speech, vision, and tactile sensation, as well as dreaming. Please refer to
Table 2 for an overview of CTM processors and their corresponding multimodal challenges.
5.1
Unimodal Processors
The unimodal processors that each process information from individual modalities can be seen as unimodal encoders
that learn basic unimodal representations. Each of these representations contains information about unimodal atomic
units, their feature representations, and how atomic units are structured compositionally (essentially unimodal syntax
12
Table 2: Linking core processors in the CTM with multimodal research challenges.
CTM processor
Unimodal processors
Examples
Challenge
Language, vision, audio, smell, touch Unimodal representation
Audio-visual
Multimodal fusion
Language-visual
Multimodal fusion
Emotion
Multimodal fusion
Multimodal processors
Model-of-the-world
Multimodal fusion
Inner speech, vision, sensation
Multimodal translation
Dreams
Multimodal generation
CTM language
Brainish
Multimodal representation
and semantics as outlined in Section 3). Each unimodal processor can take the form of a unimodal encoder as described
in Section 4.1.1.
5.2
B RAINISH Multimodal Language
The B RAINISH multimodal language is defined as the coordinated representation space across all sensory modalities
that have been processed by unimodal processors, and multimodal features that have been extracted by multimodal
processors. These features are summarized as multimodal gists [13] in the coordinated representation space as described
in Section 4.1.2. The B RAINISH multimodal language can then be used for multimodal processors in the CTM such as
audio-visual fusion, emotion recognition, model-of-the-world, inner speech/vision/sensation, and dreaming which we
will describe in the next subsection.
5.3
Multimodal Processors
Multimodal processors integrate information from representations learned by individual unimodal processors to
summarize multimodal information. Based on our general treatment of multimodal learning, each multimodal processor
works by learning the correspondences between atomic units across modalities and composing these to form multimodal
features useful for multimodal tasks. We outline some examples of multimodal processors below:
Audio-visual processor: The McGurk effect [81] shows that the brain processes information from audio and visual
sensory inputs in order to recognize speech from a speaker. Multimodal learning exists to the extent that when these
inputs conflict with each other (ambiguity), an ‘overriding’ phenomenon occurs where misreading the person’s lips
leads to incorrect inferences on predicted speech. This could be realized by an audio-visual processor that learns and
composes the correspondences between mouth movements and auditory features (i.e., “baa baa baa”, “daa daa daa”)
into order to make a prediction of the spoken speech [94].
Language-visual processor: Integration of language and vision is crucial for human cognition since language is
commonly used as a communicative medium in reference to the visual world. The integration of language and vision is
exemplified through machine learning tasks such as question answering (asking a question in reference to an image/video
and obtaining a correct answer) [6, 131, 141], navigation (giving a text instruction in reference to a visual environment
and obtaining a sequence of steps taken in that environment to complete the instruction [78]), and image captioning
(generating relevant text descriptions of a given image [134]).
Emotion processor: An emotion processor aims to recognize human sentiment and emotion through multimodal
communicative behaviors spanning language (spoken words), visual (facial expressions, gestures), and acoustic
(prosody, speech tone) [65]. These processors have also been studied in machine learning literature, and several
strong-performing methods are primarily based on the idea of multimodal temporal fusion of these heterogeneous
signals [144].
Model-of-the-world processor: Another important multimodal processor in the CTM is the agent’s model-of-theworld processor which constructs models of its inner and outer worlds. These multimodal models of the world combine
the agent’s multisensory information observed from the physical world, plan possible actions in the world, predict the
effect that its actions have on the world, and help distinguish self from not-self [13] (see Figure 7). These models are
crucial for recognizing strange settings, planning actions by modeling their impact on the environment, and helping the
CTM to stay out of danger. Having a multimodal language is a crucial component in meeting each of these goals.
Prior research in combining multisensory information from the physical world has been studied in multisensor fusion
(involving, for example, the visual, audio, and force modalities) for robotics [62, 68, 119]. In these settings, the agent’s
policies (a mapping from multimodal inputs to actions) are learned based on fused multimodal representations [20].
Multimodal representations are essential for good action prediction since each modality provides unique information
not present in the others. Furthermore, multimodal fusion enables one to perform prediction in the face of noisy or
missing modalities, such as relying on the visual modality to predict robotic movement when touch sensors are missing
13
Language
Vision
Audio
Model-of-theworld processor
Multimodal
representation
Touch
State
Feedback
loop
Smell
Action
Decisionmaking
Reward
Environment
Figure 7: The model-of-the-world processor is an example of a multimodal processor which combines the agent’s multisensory
information observed from the physical world into a multimodal representation (gist), plans possible actions in the world, and updates
itself based on the effect that its actions have on the world (i.e., by observing new states and rewards as an outcome of its actions).
and vice versa [62]. Furthermore, predicting the effect that an agent’s actions have on the world can be seen as a form
of model-based reinforcement learning, which again has been extensively applied to multimodal settings [76].
Inner speech, vision, and tactile sensation: The inner speech processor takes a gist representation broadcast by the
CTM’s short-term memory (i.e., its stage) and maps it to the same locations that the input sends representations of outer
speech [13], and can be nearly indistinguishable from the gists of actual speech from the environment [116]. This is
a multimodal translation problem that involves taking in a representation of one input modality and decoding it into
(inner) speech, which is exemplified by similar machine learning tasks such as conditional text generation [111] (inner
speech given read text), conditional image/video captioning [70, 115] (inner speech given observed visual scenes), and
multimodal dialog [96] (inner speech given heard dialog possibly paired with observed visual scenes). Again, it is
important that the gist representation obtained from an observed input is mapped into the B RAINISH multimodal space
to enable translation from an arbitrary source modality to output speech. Without coordination, translation would not be
possible from independently-learned representation spaces of source modalities (i.e., visual) and target modalities (e.g.,
speech). Similarly, the generalized inner speech processors for inner vision and inner sensation [13] are also translation
problems with different output modalities and require a multimodal gist representation to enable semantically-aligned
decoding into arbitrary outputs. Decoding into the desired target modality can be performed by any of the decoders as
described in Section 4.1.3.
Dreams demonstrate the power of Brainish gists: what the CTM sees, hears, feels, and does in a dream are fabrications
by processors that can recall, modify, and submit creations to the competition for short-term memory [12]. Dreams
generate the sense of a realistic world even while the CTM is completely divorced from external inputs, and can appear
so realistic that it may become hard to distinguish dreams from reality [24]. Dreaming can therefore be seen as taking a
semantic representation in the form of gists stored in memory [147] and decoding it into long-range multimodal data with
no feedback from the outside world during this generation process. Dreaming can be viewed as a multimodal generation
problem where semantically meaningful mappings are learned from the gist representation to a series of long-range
parallel modalities (which could span auditory, tactile, gustatory, and olfactory dream components [82]). This decoding
process is often (1) conditional, (2) synchronized, (3) stochastic, and (4) auto-regressive. Dreams don’t replay memories
exactly, but are semantically conditioned on the same gist as some recent memory and could have the same title [147].
It is synchronized across modalities since dreams involve output modalities that are semantically coherent. The process
is stochastic since there are many possible future generations given a particular state. Finally, it is auto-regressive
across possibly long ranges: future dream states are recursively generated given previous ones. In practice, there has
been some progress towards text to image generation [113], text to speech [129], image captioning [134], and video
generation [98], but a complete decoding process into synchronized high-dimensional multimodal data still remains a
challenge for modern machine learning methods.
5.4
Main Take-away Messages
From this case study of a multimodal language in the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) [13], we observe that many of
the core cognitive processors require a multimodal language to function. These span processors whose main purpose is
14
Image classification
Paired dataset
horse
zebra
lion
(image)
Audio classification
fish
mammal
(audio)
Figure 8: Experimental
setup text
for a real-world implementation
of multimodal language
with 2image
modalities. 2Retrieved
datasets each
labeled
Source
Retrieved image
Source
audio
for some prediction label D1 = {(x1 , y)} and D2 = {(x2 , y)} represent feedback we obtain separately for images and audio. The
paired dataset3/4
D3pound
= {(x
represents
center-cut
fillet shared information through paired natural occurrences of images and audio [69].
1 , x2 )}salmon
with skin, 2 cups kosher salt, 1/4
teaspoon freshly ground black
pepper.
to perform multimodal fusion (e.g., audio-visual reasoning, emotion recognition, model-of-the-world), multimodal
2 Tablespoons
of oil,vision,
2 Chicken
translation (inner
speech,
and sensation), and multimodal generation (dreams). The B RAINISH multimodal
cut into chunks, …, 4
language is breasts
used
by
these
processors
to communicate with each other. Achieving a real-life implementation of such
Cups of chicken broth, 1 Cup of
(Frog)
computational
models
therefore
requires understanding the functionality of a multimodal
language (Frog)
simultaneously
cabbage
cut into
small thin slices,
1 Cup of diced
peeled avocado,
1
realizing multimodal
fusion,
translation,
and generation.
Cup of tortilla chips, …
6
1/4 head red cabbage, 2 carrots,
Multimodal
Language
for
1 fennel bulb,
1 small orange,
3 Intelligence: A Case Study in Machine Learning
scallions, cut into 1-inch pieces, 1
In this section,
we describe
real-world
implementation of multimodal language in the context of a problem with 2
jalapeño,
seeded and a
minced,
1/4
cup cider vinegar,
… setup, which we illustrate in Figure 8, consists of 2 datasets each labeled for some prediction
modalities. Specifically,
the
(Engine)
label D1 = {(x1 , y)} and D2 = {(x2 , y)} as well as a paired dataset D3 = {(x1 , x(Car)
2 )} across modalities. This general
setup captures a natural scenario in both human and artificial intelligence where feedback (the label) is provided for
either modality - for example, feedback is provided for images through dataset D1 and feedback is provided separately
for audio through dataset D2 . To enable multimodal learning, one also needs some amount of paired data across both
modalities (e.g., paired natural occurrences of images and audio) through D3 [69]. Note that this setup does not require
labels for paired data across both modalities (i.e., feedback for paired image and audio at the same time).
6.1
Datasets and Tasks
We collect the following datasets across the following paired modalities: text and image, image and audio, as well
as text and speech. Code for data, methods, and experiments in this section can be found at https://github.com/
pliang279/Brainish/.
Text and image dataset: We use the Yummly-28K dataset [86] which contains parallel text descriptions and images
of recipes. We create classification labels from the metadata by concatenating the meal-type and cuisine, yielding 44
distinct classes. A large number of recipes and shared concepts between text and image makes it an ideal testbed for
learning a shared multimodal language.
Image and audio dataset: We combine two large unimodal classification datasets over images (CIFAR-10 and CIFAR100 [56]) and audio made by various objects (ESC-50 [105]) with partially related label spaces. This allows us to
leverage complementary information from both modalities while testing on new concepts. To obtain weak pairs, we
map similar classes between the datasets using similarities from WordNet [85] and text cooccurrence. This yields 17
clusters of weak pairs.
6.2
Learning a Multimodal Language
We now describe our approach of learning a multimodal language (B RAINISH for short) on the union of these 3 datasets.
Encoders: We define encoders es , et for source and target modalities (i.e., one specialized encoder for each modality).
Specifically, the encoders we use are ResNet pretrained on ImageNet [27] to encode the images, pretrained BERT
encoder [28] for text, and a Convolutional neural network (CNNs) pretrained on AudioSet [36] to encode audio [59, 114].
ResNets are designed for image processing with an inductive bias inspired by convolutional layers which model spatial
15
Algorithm 1 Learning a multimodal language across 2 modalities.
Initialize encoders e1 and e2 , classifier φ.
for iteration = 1, 2, . . . do
Sample alignment pairs {x1 , x2 } from dataset D3 .
Compute alignment loss Lalign (equation 2) on pairs {x1 , x2 }.
Update e1 ∶= e1 − ∇e1 Lalign and e2 ∶= e2 − ∇e2 Lalign using gradient updates.
Sample modality 1 pairs {x1 , y} from dataset D1 .
Compute prediction loss L1 (equation 3) on pairs {x1 , y}.
Update e1 ∶= e1 − ∇e1 L1 and φ ∶= φ − ∇φ L1 using gradient updates.
Sample modality 2 pairs {x2 , y} from dataset D2 .
Compute prediction loss L2 (equation 3) on pairs {x2 , y}.
Update e2 ∶= e2 − ∇e2 L2 and φ ∶= φ − ∇φ L2 using gradient updates.
locality in images. and have shown state-of-the-art results in image classification. BERT is a recent model for processing
text which takes into account both features of individual words as well as how they are used in bidirectional context:
how the meaning of words is influenced by the meaning and order of words before and after in a sentence. Convolutional
neural networks are strong models for processing audio spectrograms by treating spectrograms as an image waveform.
Representation space: We aim to learn a representation space that takes in multiple unimodal feature representations
and learns a coordinated multimodal representation capturing multimodal syntax and semantics. Multimodal semantics
involves learning the correspondences/alignment in atomic features across modalities based on shared meaning.
Multimodal syntax involves learning how aligned subsets of atomic features relate and compose with each other to
derive holistic meaning across entire multimodal inputs. To achieve this, we use dataset D3 which contains pairs across
modalities of the form (x1 , x2 ). We define a similarity measure such that units of the same semantic meaning, as
represented by paired units (x1 , x2 ), are mapped to features that are nearby in feature space (i.e., alignment).
We model alignment by learning an alignment function p(a∣x1 , x2 ) which outputs a probability a representing the
likelihood of x1 and x2 being semantically matched. We parametrize p(a∣x1 , x2 ) ∝ e1 (x1 )⊺ e2 (x2 ) which is a natural
way of measuring (unnormalized) similarity based on cosine similarity of vectors e1 (x1 ) and e2 (x2 ) in the coordinated
representation space. Training requires positive samples (x1 , x2 ) ∈ D3 for which we would like to maximize p(a∣x1 , x2 ),
but also requires contrastive negative samples x1 , x2,neg sampled randomly across all pairs in D3 for which we would
like to minimize pθ (a∣x1 , x2 ). The overall objective resembles Noise Contrastive Estimation (NCE) [32] which learns a
binary classifier to distinguish paired samples (x1 , x2 ) ∈ D3 from unpaired negative samples x2,neg .
Therefore, given encoders es , et for source and target modalities and paired dataset D3 , we learn an aligned space
across source and target modalities by optimizing for the NCE loss:
Lalign =
⎛
⎞
− log p(a∣x1 , x2 ) + ∑ log p(a∣x1 , x2,neg )
⎝
⎠
x2,neg
(x1 ,x2 )∈D3
(1)
⎛
⎞
−e1 (x1 )⊺ e2 (x2 ) + ∑ e1 (x1 )⊺ e2 (x2,neg ) .
⎠
x2,neg
(x1 ,x2 )∈D3 ⎝
(2)
∝
∑
∑
where x2,neg denotes unpaired negative samples. The NCE objective has a nice interpretation as capturing a space where
the representations of similar concepts expressed in different modalities are close together, and different concepts are
far apart [35, 103].
Decoders: Given an aligned space, we now train a single classifier φ on top of the aligned space for prediction across
datasets D1 = {(x1 , y)} and D2 = {(x2 , y)} by optimizing for the cross-entropy loss, which maximizes the log
probability of predicting the true label y given data x1 (or x2 ):
L1 =
∑
(x1 ,y)∈D1
− log φ(y∣e1 (x1 )),
L2 =
∑
(x2 ,y)∈D2
− log φ(y∣e2 (x2 )).
(3)
Training and testing: Overall, the training stage consists of learning from the alignment dataset D3 as well as
classification tasks from each modality through datasets D1 and D2 . We show the full training algorithm in Algorithm 1
and a visual diagram in Figure 9.
After training, we obtain trained encoder parameters e1 , e2 and a classification decoder φ. Given new data from x1 (or
x2 ), a prediction is made by computing φ(e1 (x1 )) or φ(e2 (x2 )). In addition to prediction, this multimodal language
16
Modality 1
zebra
Modality 2
fish
(audio)
(image)
Representation
space
(image)
(video)
(video)
Paired dataset
Modality 2 encoder
Decoder
(audio)
Modality 1 encoder
Figure 9: Visual depiction of learning a multimodal language. Encoders take in raw data from different modalities and model
unimodal syntax and semantics. Syntax is captured by segmenting each modality into atomic units, and semantics are captured by
learning a representation summarizing the meaning of each unit. The representation space takes in features across modalities and
captures multimodal syntax and semantics. Multimodal semantics are learned via alignment: the matching across multiple modalities
based on shared meaning. Multimodal syntax involves learning how aligned subsets of atomic units compose to derive holistic
meaning across entire multimodal inputs. Finally, decoders take in multimodal representations and output a prediction.
Multimodal alignment
Multimodal fusion
Multimodal co-learning
Image classification
Image classification
horse
zebra
lion
horse
zebra
lion
(image)
(image)
+
Audio classification
Audio classification
fish
mammal
fish
mammal
(audio)
(audio)
Figure 10: We design 3 experimental settings to evaluate multimodal language learning. (1) In multimodal fusion, we investigate
whether a joint model learned from both image and audio classification tasks improve over separate models trained on each task
alone. (2) In multimodal alignment, we investigate whether the joint model can retrieve semantically similar data across modalities.
(3) In multimodal co-learning, we investigate whether it is possible transfer knowledge learned from one modality (image) to help a
computational model trained on a different modality (audio).
also enables multimodal translation. Given data x1 , encode it into the coordinated representation space e1 (x1 ) and rank
its alignment with a samples x2 in modality 2 by x2 = arg maxx2 e1 (x1 )⊺ e2 (x2 ), which retrieves the most semantically
aligned data from modality 2 matching input x1 .
6.3
Experiments
We design 3 experimental settings to evaluate multimodal language learning across a suite of technical challenges
described in Section 2. These settings are (1) multimodal fusion, (2) multimodal alignment, and (3) multimodal
co-learning (see Figure 10).
17
Weak cluster:
automobile
Table 3: Results on multimodal fusion across text and image classification. B RAINISH outperforms unimodal baselines that do not
learn a multimodal language.
(Car)
(Engine)
TASK
Text
+
Image
Barbecue:
main dishes
A PPROACH
Unimodal text
Unimodal image
B RAINISH (ours)
Mexican:
soups
ACCURACY
60.0
55.0
68.0
American salads:
side dishes
Figure 11: On Yummly-28K dataset, B RAINISH leverages source text to make accurate few-shot predictions on target images despite
only seeing 1 − 10 labeled image examples.
Table 4: Results on multimodal alignment: B RAINISH yields better alignment scores than the baselines, indicating that meta-alignment
can align new concepts using only weakly paired data across image and audio.
K A PPROACH
No alignment
5
B RAINISH (ours)
No alignment
10
B RAINISH (ours)
6.3.1
R@1 ↑ R@5 ↑ R@10 ↑ R ANK ↓ C OS . ↓
1.0% 2.0%
5.5%
101
0.428
4.0% 19.5% 39.0%
13
0.003
0.5% 3.0%
4.5%
101
0.399
3.5% 17.5% 35.0%
15
0.004
Experiment 1: Multimodal fusion
Setup: We investigate whether a joint model learned from both image and audio classification tasks improves over
separate models trained on each task alone. The former is our joint multimodal language model while the latter is
a unimodal baseline that trains separate encoders e1 , e2 and separate classifiers φ1 , φ2 without sharing a common
representation space. This baseline performs learning and prediction separately in each modality. We report classification
accuracy in each modality, repeating experiments 10 times to report mean and standard deviations.
Results: From Table 3 on text and image classification, B RAINISH outperforms unimodal approaches. This implies that
discovering common information across both modalities through learning a multimodal language leads to performance
gains over unimodal learning. Similar observations were also made in the field of multimodal fusion where multiple
complementary signals improve performance in a variety of applications such as healthcare, robotics, multimedia, and
affective computing [68]. We show samples of text and image classification into recipes in Figure 11. Our method is
able to quickly recognize images from new recipes.
6.3.2
Experiment 2: Multimodal alignment
Setup: Our second experiment centers on the accuracy of multimodal alignment: given new data in one modality,
does our approach accurately retrieve semantically-corresponding data in the other modality? Retrieval is measured
using recall@k, rank, and cosine loss metrics [35] with respect to the ground truth pairings in a held-out test set of
D3 = {(x1 , x2 )}.
Results: We show retrieval performance in Table 4. Our model yields better retrieval performance than a baseline that
does not perform alignment of representation space, which indicates that alignment successfully aligns concepts across
modalities to enable multimodal alignment. In Figure 12, we also show samples of retrieved data in the target given
input in the source modality to help us understand which source modalities the model is basing its target predictions on.
We observe that the multimodal language is able to perform alignment at fine granularities.
18
Audio classification
fish
mammal
(audio)
Source text
Retrieved image
Source image
Retrieved audio
(Frog)
(Frog)
(Car)
(Engine)
3/4 pound center-cut salmon fillet
with skin, 2 cups kosher salt, 1/4
teaspoon freshly ground black
pepper.
2 Tablespoons of oil, 2 Chicken
breasts cut into chunks, …, 4
Cups of chicken broth, 1 Cup of
cabbage cut into small thin slices,
1 Cup of diced peeled avocado, 1
Cup of tortilla chips, …
1/4 head red cabbage, 2 carrots,
1 fennel bulb, 1 small orange, 3
scallions, cut into 1-inch pieces, 1
jalapeño, seeded and minced, 1/4
cup cider vinegar, …
Figure 12: Left: samples of retrieved images given text recipes. Right: samples of retrieved audio samples given images. B RAINISH
can perform multimodal retrieval at fine granularities.
Table 5: Performance on multimodal co-learning: transferring knowledge from a source to target modality - text to image classification
(top), and image to audio concept classification (bottom). B RAINISH is on par and sometimes outperforms the oracle target modality
classifier that has seen thousands of labeled target samples, and also outperforms unimodal baselines that do not learn a multimodal
language. #Target (labels) denotes the number of target modality samples and labels used during meta-training.
6.3.3
TASK
Text
↓
Image
A PPROACH
Unimodal image
B RAINISH (ours)
Oracle image [33, 95]
1 POINTS
5 POINTS 10 POINTS #TARGET ( LABELS )
37.4 ± 0.6 41.7 ± 3.7 49.0 ± 1.0
5131(0)
39.7 ± 1.3 47.1 ± 3.3 51.1 ± 2.1
5131(0)
38.9 ± 2.1 42.1 ± 1.4 47.9 ± 5.6
5131(5131)
Image
↓
Audio
Unimodal audio
B RAINISH (ours)
Oracle audio [33, 95]
45.6 ± 1.3 74.2 ± 0.3 83.7 ± 0.1
47.5 ± 0.2 85.9 ± 0.7 92.7 ± 0.4
45.9 ± 0.2 89.3 ± 0.4 94.5 ± 0.3
920(0)
920(0)
920(920)
Experiment 3: Multimodal co-learning
Setup: Finally, our third experiment investigates multimodal transfer (co-learning): whether it is possible to transfer
knowledge learned from one modality (e.g., predicted labels or representation) to help a computational model trained
on a different modality? This challenge is particularly relevant when one of the modalities has limited resources [69].
Using the same datasets, we study the transfer of knowledge from text to image, image to audio, and text to speech
classification. We call the first task the source modality and the second task the target modality, which often is a
low-resource modality with less labeled data than the source.
During training, we first learn classification in the source task (training e1 and φ) and alignment across source and
target tasks (training e1 and e2 ). After training, we transfer the learned model to the target task. Using only a small
number (k) of labeled training datapoints in the target, we update the model to perform target task classification (training
e2 and φ). Using only k labeled training datapoints in the target enables us to simulate few-shot learning settings
under limited labeled target modality data, and truly test the capabilities of knowledge transfer from source to target
modalities [33, 139].
We compare to the following baselines:
1. Unimodal, which directly performs target task classification with k labeled training datapoints in the target,
without using information from the source task.
2. Oracle, which performs target task classification with all labeled training datapoints in the target, which gives
an upper bound on performance when there is no limited data in the target.
Results: From Table 5, we observe that B RAINISH outperforms unimodal approaches. Unimodal approaches struggle
due to only a small number of datapoints in the target modality.
Surprisingly, B RAINISH also manages to slightly outperform the oracle baseline on the text to image transfer task. We
hypothesize this is because text data (source) is cleaner than image data (target) and these are the tasks where we have
more total labeled data in the source modality (text) and less total labeled data in the target (image). Consistent with
this hypothesis, we found that text classifiers performed better on the Yummly-28K dataset than image classifiers (in
19
reference to Table 3, where unimodal text gets 60.0% while unimodal image gets 55.0% accuracy). This implies that
one can leverage abundant, cleaner, and more-predictive source modalities to improve target modality performance
by learning a multimodal language. For image to audio (Table 5 middle), we observe that our approach is on par
(outperforms for k = 1, and within 2 − 3% for k = 5, 10) with the oracle baseline that has seen a thousand labeled audio
examples in the target modality.
6.4
Main Take-away Messages
From this case study of multimodal language learning in a computational model of artificial intelligence using real-world
machine learning models and datasets [69], we find that the multimodal language we have implemented has successfully
learned to perform several tasks such as multimodal fusion, alignment, and co-learning simultaneously. Performance is
consistently superior to unimodal language learning on the fusion and co-learning tasks, while unimodal learning does
not enable alignment at all. While we are unable to fully explore multimodal generation due to a lack of high-fidelity
generators and evaluation metrics for image and audio, we leave this part for future work. Furthermore, it would also be
interesting to integrate a similar multimodal language with an actual computational model of consciousness such as the
Conscious Turing Machine (CTM) [13], and test it in simulated environments.
7
Conclusion
In conclusion, we formalized the properties of a multimodal language, B RAINISH, essential for machine models of
intelligence and consciousness. We connected these properties to the core technical challenges and algorithms for
multimodal representation learning from an AI perspective and proposed ideas towards operationally learning such a
multimodal language. We hope that these insights can serve as a bridge between the study of multimodal representations
in human and artificial intelligence with the eventual goal of developing a similar multimodal language needed to
achieve intelligence and consciousness in artificial machines.
Future directions: We outline several important directions of future research:
1. Quantifying differences between modalities: One core challenge of multimodal learning lies in representing and
synchronizing vastly heterogeneous modalities which require different unimodal processors. However, different sensory
inputs are more similar than others. For example, speech and language could be seen as more similar than images
and text. Furthermore, it is unclear if speech in different languages should be classified as being the same or different
modalities. Future work should investigate formalisms of heterogeneity in multimodal data and how heterogeneity plays
a role in the design decisions when learning a multimodal language.
2. Plasticity of unimodal processors in the brain: Unimodal processors are not static over time but rather evolve with
our surroundings, especially when encountering lesions such as post-birth blindness [72]. Similarly, when acquiring
new skills (e.g., learning a new language), new processors may develop in conjunction with existing ones [57]. Our
investigation into a multimodal language has only explored static processors across a predefined number of input
modalities and currently lacks the flexibility to handle dynamic modalities and processors.
3. Multimodal integration in the brain: While we have presented a multimodal language based on coordinated representations, insights from neuroscience regarding unimodal and multimodal processing, integration, alignment, translation,
and co-learning [17, 54, 91] could potentially inform our design of multimodal models.
4. Environments and evaluation: It is important to design simulated environments that are reflective of real-world human
learning processes in order to benchmark design decisions in the multimodal language and AI models as a whole.
These environments should capture the multimodality of diverse environments, a comprehensive suite of possible agent
interactions, and feedback signals at varying granularities, all while remaining efficient and reproducible.
Acknowledgements
PPL is supported in part by a Facebook PhD Fellowship and a Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for Machine
Learning and Health Fellowship. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material
are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Facebook or Carnegie Mellon University’s Center
for Machine Learning and Health, and no official endorsement should be inferred. The authors are extremely grateful to
Manuel Blum and Lenore Blum for encouraging the development of this manuscript as well as helpful discussions
and feedback on computational models for artificial intelligence and consciousness. We also thank Louis-Philippe
Morency and Ruslan Salakhutdinov, as well as the students in their research groups (Alex Wilf, Amir Zadeh, Ben
Eysenbach, Brandon Trabucco, Chaitanya Ahuja, Dong Won Lee, Martin Ma, Murtaza Dalal, Peter Wu, Tiffany
Min, Torsten Wortwein, Victoria Lin, Volkan Cirik, Yao-Hung Hubert Tsai, Yiwei Lyu) for constructive discussions
regarding multimodal machine learning. We acknowledge Peter Wu for his role in the implementation and experiments
in Section 6. Finally, we would also like to acknowledge NVIDIA’s GPU support.
20
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27 |
This a preprint version of an article which subsequently appeared in the Journal of
Mind and Behavior. The citation is:
Reason, C. M., (2016) JMB 37 (1) pp 31-46
http://umaine.edu/jmb/
Consciousness is not a physically provable property
Catherine M Reason1
We present a logical proof that computing machines, and by extension
physical systems, can never be certain if they possess conscious
awareness. This implies that human consciousness is associated with a
violation of energy conservation. We examine the significance that a
particular interpretation of quantum mechanics, known as single mind
Q (Barrett 1999), might have for the detection of such a violation.
Finally we apply single mind Q to the problem of free will as it arises in
some celebrated experiments by the neurophysiologist Benjamin Libet.
In 1995 Gilbert Caplain published a paper entitled “Is consciousness a computational
property?”, in which he outlined an argument to the effect that no computing machine
could ever be conscious. In his paper, Caplain pointed out that his argument was
presented only in outline, and that some of the ideas presented required further work
(Caplain 1995, 2000). In this author’s opinion Caplain’s argument is not, in fact, an
argument that consciousness is not a computational property but rather something
more subtle; it is an argument that no computing machine can ever, using purely
computational processes, be certain if it is conscious.
To establish his argument, Caplain demonstrates an inconsistency between two
principles; the principle of reflexivity and the principle of cognitive separation.
Reflexivity is Caplain’s term for the capacity of conscious beings to know with
certainty that they are conscious; cognitive separation can be expressed as the
separation between some symbolic state in a computing machine, and the state of
affairs which that state represents. Caplain argues that, if all computing machines are
bound by the principle of cognitive separation, then the inconsistency between these
two principles implies that no computing machine can ever be truly conscious, and
hence conscious human beings cannot be computing machines. This argument
effectively applies Descartes’ notion of the malicious genius to the internal states of a
computing machine.
It seems to this author that Caplain’s use of the term reflexivity does not conform to
the usual philosophical usage, and so I shall use the term self-certainty instead. To
1
To whom correspondence should be addressed at CMRneuro@Gmail.com
1
avoid any ambiguity we shall define this term here:
Definition: Self-certainty is the capacity of at least some conscious beings to verify
with certainty that they are conscious.
The detailed proof of Caplain’s result that we are presenting here is substantially
different from Caplain’s in form, and attempts to minimize any dependence on
philosophically ambiguous terms such as “knowledge” and “belief”. However it
relies on the same properties of consciousness and of machines. For the purposes of
this argument, a computational process is operationally defined as any process which
can be represented in the following form:
Result = P(input)
where P is some computation. The exact form of P itself is irrelevant to this
argument, so according to this definition a computational process is any computation
which associates an input to an output. A computation here means simply any process
which occurs in a computing machine. If the reader is concerned that this leaves the
term “computing machine” undefined, then this may be taken to mean “some Turing
machine”, although this is not in fact a necessary stipulation.
In order to show that no computing machine can verify with certainty that it is
conscious, one must first assume a computing machine M, all of whose computations
are assumed to take the form above. At this point we must also define the following
Principle F (the functionalist principle):
“Every human mental process supervenes on some computational process.”
This principle asserts, in effect, that human beings are computing machines of the
same form as M. M is now presented with the task with the task of proving that it is
conscious. At this point two conditions must be noted:
1 M is given the task of proving that it is certainly conscious. Proofs that M may be
conscious which depend on additional assumptions, or which fall within particular
limits of confidence short of full certainty, fall outside the scope of this argument and
are not relevant to it.
2 “Conscious” in this context, does not necessarily mean “awake” or “selfconscious”. It means only that some form of conscious experience is present, even if
this is some altered state of consciousness such as a lucid dream. (It may seem odd to
attribute such states to machines, but as it is impossible to assert, a priori, what forms
consciousness may take in computing machines, this possibility must be allowed for.)
At this point the reader should be careful to attend to the following operational
definitions. Firstly we operationally define certainty as follows: M is certain of some
proposition k if M is able to determine that k is certainly true. Other definitions of
certainty -- for example, subjective “feelings” of being certain -- are not relevant to
this argument. Secondly we operationally define provable, in statements of the form
“proposition k is provable by M” as meaning: M is able to determine that k is
2
certainly true. The reader should be careful not to confuse this operational definition
with more familiar notions, for example those concerning the proof of theorems in
formal systems.
M’s task can now be represented as a function or mapping from a domain E to a range
X. E is a binary variable which represents the presence or absence of conscious
experience and takes the following values:
E = 1 if conscious experience is present when the mapping is performed;
E = 0 if no conscious experience is present.
X is a binary variable which takes the following values:
X = YES if E = 1
X = NO if E = 0 or if the state of E cannot be ascertained.
The mapping therefore associates a state E, which represents the presence or absence
of consciousness, with a state X which represents the answer to the question “Am I
conscious?” This mapping is performed by a computation P which can be represented
as follows:
X = P(E)
where X and E can now be thought of as states (or sets of states) in M. It is necessary
also to make the following assumptions:
1 M can reason deductively (in particular, M must have deductive reasoning powers
equivalent to those of a human being). It is not necessary to specify exactly what
these powers are; merely that there is an equivalence between humans and M.
2 M is “honest” -- that is, there are no systematic biases which prevent M from
reasoning deductively in the domain in question. This is actually quite a difficult
requirement to make precise. The best approach is to assert that there are no
systematic biases which would make it impossible, even in principle, for M to follow
classical rules of inference such as modus ponens.
We now define the following deductive argument which I shall call A:
The reliability and accuracy of the computational process X = P(E) depend critically
on the reliability and accuracy of P (which is to say, how well P performs the
mapping from E on to X). Consider some malformed computation BadP such that
X = BadP(E = 0) = YES
In such a case, M will conclude that it is conscious, but M’s conclusion will be neither
accurate nor reliable. Therefore the accuracy of P needs to be checked, and by
Principle F, this must be done by some computation P', such that
3
X' = P'(P)
where X' is YES if P is found to be accurate and NO otherwise. But what of the
reliability and accuracy of P'? Clearly this would necessitate some further
computation P'' to establish the accuracy of P' -- and so on leading to an infinite
regress. It follows that the reliability and accuracy of P can never be ascertained with
certainty, and hence the value of E cannot be ascertained with certainty either. (One
can paraphrase this by saying that, in any system which relies entirely on
computations, the reliability and accuracy of any given computation can only be
determined by applying another computation to it, and this process is obviously nonterminating.) It should be noted here that this argument applies even if P = P' (that is,
if P and P' are the same process) since it does not follow that X = X'. (As the input is
different, the output can be different even if the function is the same.)
It follows from this that X cannot be guaranteed to be reliable indicator of the value of
E, and nor can the value of any subsequent state, such as X', render X ultimately
reliable as an indicator of the value of E. In plain language this means that X, which
represents M’s answer to the question “Am I conscious?”, can never be relied upon to
be a certainly correct answer to that question, so long as the value of X is determined
by some computation. It is not possible, by means of any computation, to establish
with certainty the value of E, and since M is a computing machine, M can never
establish with certainty that it is conscious. This concludes the definition of
Argument A.
It follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 that M can deduce A, and thereby deduce that it
can never be certain if it is conscious. This rules out the possibility that M could be
conscious, and arrive at the correct conclusion that it is conscious via faulty
reasoning. Given our assumptions, it is simply impossible for M to be certain that it is
conscious. It is important to note the two stages of this process. Argument A simply
implies the potential unreliability of M (M may be accurate but it is impossible to
establish this with certainty by means of any computation). Assumptions 1 and 2
allow M to deduce A and thus deduce the uncertainty of M (M can show that it can
never be certain of the accuracy of any of its computations). (Incidentally it is not
necessary for M to assume that it is a computing machine; it is sufficient for M to be
unable to establish with certainty that it is not a computing machine.) This argument
has a recursive character which may seem a little baffling at first sight, since the
reader’s brain is itself part of the argument! That is, we rely on the reader to
appreciate the soundness of the deductive argument A. Once this is given, then
Assumption 1 guarantees that M will also appreciate the soundness of A.
It is now apparent that M cannot possess self-certainty. But conscious human beings
do possess self-certainty; it is possible for a conscious human being to know, with
absolute certainty, that they are conscious (in the sense defined above in Condition 2).
This implies that Principle F (which asserts that human beings are computing
machines of the same form as M) must be wrong. It is in this sense that we can say
that consciousness is not a computational property -- or that if it is, it is attended by
some other property or properties which are not themselves computational in nature.
At this point it should be remembered that this proof applies only if M possesses
4
deductive powers similar to those of a human being (Assumption 1). Conceivably if
M did not possess such powers, then M could not deduce the argument A, and the
proof of M’s uncertainty would not apply; however in such a case, human beings
could not be machines of the same form as M.
Expansion of the computational argument to physical processes
In the previous section P was considered to be a computation mapping E on to X.
However there is no reason to confine the definition of P in this way. P can instead be
regarded as any physical process which performs the same mapping, and M can be
regarded as a physical system rather than specifically a computing machine. To
eliminate any confusion between mappings, computations, and physical processes, the
relation between P and X can be rewritten to avoid any explicit mention of E:
X = O(P)
X is a binary variable as before, but P is now a physical process whose output O
determines the value of X, where X is some state (or set of states) in a physical
system. This formulation is intended to make it clear that physical processes which
perform functions or mappings may not in any sense “look like” computations; in
other words, they may not take the form of operations on data inputs. Once again, the
reader may worry that the term “physical process” is effectively undefined. A
physical process can therefore be operationally defined as any objective entity in the
real world which has the potential to evolve in time. This includes for example
collections of molecules, or computers running programs, but excludes abstract
entities such as mathematical functions, or programs without implementations to run
them. The output O of a physical process can be regarded as just the effect which
that process has on the value of X. A physical system can be regarded as some set of
physical processes.
It is now also necessary to change the Principle F to the following Principle F' (the
physicalist principle):
“All human mental processes supervene on some physical process.”
Argument A then proceeds much as before, except that the word “computation” in A
is replaced by the word “process”. Again one notes the possibility of physical
processes BadP such that:
X = O(BadP) = YES
even when E = 0. This necessitates some physical process P' to ascertain the accuracy
and reliability of P, and as before, this leads to an infinite regress.
This is all that is needed to show that, either consciousness is not a physical property,
or it is attended by a property or properties which cannot themselves be physical. As
before, Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that M can deduce the Argument A, and thereby
5
establish that it can never be certain of being conscious. The upshot is that any
physical system capable of reasoning honestly and which has deductive reasoning
powers equivalent to those of a human being, would have to conclude that the
question “Am I certainly conscious?” is effectively undecidable. Consciousness,
therefore, is not a physically provable property.
How can this be? It is an inevitable consequence of the separation between the state
of X and the process P by which the state of X is determined. This is analogous to
Caplain’s principle of cognitive separation. But it can readily be seen that it applies
to any process P such that X is the output of P. In fact, even the qualifier “physical” is
redundant; this argument applies to any sort of process whatsoever if the state of X is
determined by the output of that process, rather than directly by E with no intervening
process of any sort.2
The reader may feel that this limitation on the capabilities of physical systems is too
trivial to be worth mentioning. It simply means that humans beings derive their
certainty of being conscious not by any sort of mediating process, but by what in
philosophy is called “acquaintance”. However it has a serious consequence which has
received virtually no attention within the academic literature. Principle F' implies that
if M cannot be certain that it is conscious, then human beings cannot be certain that
they are conscious either. Principle F' is therefore inconsistent with the property of
self-certainty.3 So -- either Principle F' is wrong, or one of the other assumptions
does not apply to human beings.
It can be noted immediately that Assumption 1 cannot be discarded since by definition
it must apply to human beings. Assumption 2 could be discarded but would leave one
with the somewhat paradoxical situation that humans could be certain of being
conscious only because their brains were incapable of honest reasoning (and hence
were unreliable). Nonetheless, as we shall see later, there may be situations in which
Assumption 2 could at least be modified, though to discard it entirely would be asking
rather a lot of coincidence; it would in effect require a faulty system to produce, and
produce reliably, the correct result via a series of fortuitous accidents. There could
also be no way for humans to establish with certainty that the flaw in their reasoning
was precisely that flaw required, for them to reach the correct answer to the question
“Am I conscious?” This seems to leave one with no choice but to throw out Principle
F'. Human mental processes, in other words, do not all supervene on physical
processes.4
2
In fact it is not enough for E directly to determine X; E must also directly determine that it is the case
that E directly determines X, and do so in a way that a conscious subject can be certain is reliable -that is, not by means of any physical process which would be susceptible to Argument A.
3
Another way of looking at this is to say that knowledge or understanding by “acquaintance” is
impossible in any physical system; or that if it is possible, it cannot influence the evolution of that
system.
4
One might think that allowing X to be identical with E might solve this problem -- that is, by allowing
X to be a state which is identical with consciousness itself. It is obviously possible to arrange things so
that if E and X are identical, then it must be the case that E = 1 if X = YES. But to make use of this
(and thus to be certain that X can be relied on) M must have some way of being certain that it is the
case that E and X are identical. Since M is a physical system, any means of obtaining such a proof
6
It is important to note that this conclusion applies not only to consciousness itself, but
to some of the contents of consciousness as well. It also follows from Argument A
that if human beings were exclusively physical systems, they could not be certain of
the truth of the statement “I am reading this article”; indeed they could not even be
certain of the truth of the statement “I believe I am reading this article”. One could
even formulate Argument A in such a way that physical systems could not be certain
of their own existence.
There is also an important difference between this conclusion concerning
consciousness in physical systems, and the original, more restricted conclusion
regarding computing machines. This is because even if human beings can be certain
that they have conscious experience, it is still the case that physical systems -- such as
brains -- cannot. This implies that when human beings ask themselves if they are
conscious, either the evolution of their mental processes will diverge from the
physical evolution of their brain-states in some drastic and irreversible manner; or
their mental processes will force their brains to evolve in a manner which is
inconsistent with their own physically determined behavior. Such a violation of
physically determined behavior should entail -- at the very least -- a violation of the
principle of conservation of energy. Such a violation we shall henceforth refer to by
the symbol c (from chramoV, a cleft or gap). The point of interest here is that c
should be empirically detectable. When human beings are asked to consider
Argument A, and then decide if they are conscious, then -- assuming all human beings
are conscious, and know it -- c should be detectable within their brains.
Single-mind Q may partially conceal c
I hope to examine the problems associated with the detection of c in future work.
However it is first necessary to examine a possibility which may make c intrinsically
undetectable, at least under certain conditions. This section will require a small
diversion into quantum mechanics. In the most common interpretation of quantum
mechanics (the Copenhagen interpretation) the physical state of a quantum system is
represented by a vector in Hilbert space (Von Neumann 1955). This state evolves
deterministically according to the unitary dynamics of quantum mechanics (Barrett
1999). Measurements are represented by applying an appropriate operator (in the
form of a Hermitian matrix) to the state vector, which produces a representation of the
state vector in terms of some particular measurement basis. The physical states
represented by the measurement basis are called eigenstates, since these are the states
which result when the state vector is an eigenvector of the corresponding operator.
Normally, however, the state vector will be a superposition of basis states, and on
measurement this vector is assumed to “project” non-deterministically to an eigenstate
of the measurement basis. This is the well-known “collapse” or “reduction” of the
state vector.
The problem is that quantum mechanical theory does not provide any clear
explanation of what constitutes a measurement. In order to circumvent this difficulty,
must supervene on some physical process, whereupon Argument A proceeds as before.
7
attention has focused recently on so-called “no-collapse” interpretations, in which the
physical state never collapses and superpositions persist indefinitely (see Barrett,
1999 for a review). However this now presents us with another problem; how to
account for the determinate nature of our experiences, which are always of single
“classical” properties and never of superpositions of states. One approach to dealing
with this is the single mind Q interpretation (Barrett 1999)5. Single mind Q assumes
some particular property Q, which evolves in such a way as to ensure that all our
experiences are determinate. But in this approach, Q is regarded as a purely mental
property -- single mind Q, in other words, postulates a robust mind-body dualism. Q
also functions to orchestrate or co-ordinate the experiences of different minds;
without this, different minds would experience completely different and potentially
unconnected realities.
The consequences of this for detecting c are as follows. The process of
neuroscientific inquiry can be regarded as the partitioning of a set U, which contains
every possible neural topography. Each element of U -- that is, each neural
topography -- is a fully specified set of neurological properties (or as fully specified as
quantum indeterminacy will allow). The term “neurological properties” is here
intended to refer to all brain properties, and not necessarily just positional ones. The
partitioning of U will yield a subset which I shall call N. As neuroscientific inquiry
advances, the set N would be expected to get smaller and smaller.6
However in a no-collapse theory, the physical state of the brain underlying U is
assumed always to be a quantum state. It is important to be clear about what is going
on here. The elements of U are not themselves quantum states. In fact in single mind
Q, they are not really physical states at all. They are best understood as classical
appearances; that is, they are descriptions of how neural topographies appear to the
neuroscientists who are observing them. They are purely mental properties. (The
determinate nature of these experiences is guaranteed by the determinate property Q,
which is a property of the combined system of observer plus brain being studied.)
There are two ways in which U can be partitioned. First, as the physical system
evolves, correlations will develop both between neurological properties and other
neurological properties, and between neurological properties and properties in the
environment. As this evolution occurs some elements of U will become inconsistent
5
Single mind Q is in fact just one example of a type of theory called a "Q theory". In other versions of
Q theory, Q is regarded simply as a physical parameter. In these versions of Q theory mind-body
dualism is obviously not required.
6
The technically-minded reader will have noticed that this is somewhat oversimplified. Although the
classical requirement that neuroscientific inquiry is possible ensures that the subset N will reduce in
size over time, quantum indeterminacy means that it will not do so smoothly; individual elements of U
will “jump” in and out of N as N is refined. The reason for this apparent anomaly is that, in order to
keep the representation simple, I have deliberately ignored the difference between static topographies -those defined at some precise instant of time -- and dynamic topographies, which evolve over time.
Neuroscientists who aim to understand the brain are typically interested in dynamic topographies. If
one assumes that quantum mechanics plays no functional role in neural processing, then the dynamic
topographies can be considered as evolving in essentially classical ways. In this case the quantum
indeterminacy in the static topographies can be considered as noise and disregarded. From a
neuroscientist‘s perspective, the physical state can therefore be regarded as a set of classical
topographies which is subsequently partitioned by measurement.
8
with the physical state. One can say that these elements are partitioned out of U, and
not included in N. The second way U can be partitioned is via the process of quantum
measurement; that is, the selection of an eigenstate for some observable. Since in
single mind Q this sort of partitioning is always a mental process, the physical state
remains unchanged after each partition. However the net effect of both types of
process is to produce a subset N which is smaller than it was before.
There is here a potential loophole by which the effect c might be partially concealed.
Consider how the brain is normally thought to function; it is a physical system which
instantiates what might be called intelligent processes. These are processes which
enable the brain to respond to a wide range of environmental stimuli without requiring
a separate programmed behavior for each stimulus. (Assumptions 1 and 2 may be
regarded as an operational definition for such intelligent processes in human beings.)
The understanding of these processes is the business of the so-called “special”
sciences, such as psychology and cognitive neuroscience. Intelligent processes are
assumed to supervene on the physical processes which instantiate them.
Now consider the following thought experiment. Imagine an enormously powerful
oracle, which is able to give accurate and meaningful answers to every question asked
of it. Such an oracle would appear omniscient to all those by whom it was
questioned. But consider that the actual number of questions such an oracle is likely
to be asked in a finite period of time is probably a very small fraction of the number
of questions which could be asked. If it were possible for the oracle to know in
advance which questions would be asked, then the oracle could perhaps contrive to
know the answers to just those questions and not trouble itself about those questions
which no-one would ask. The oracle would still appear omniscient to all those who
questioned it; but in practice it would be no such thing.
An analogous situation potentially exists in the relationship between intelligent
processes and the physical processes which instantiate them. Of course no-one
believes that intelligent processes are all-powerful, but they are very likely far more
powerful then is needed to deal with the whole range of situations which arise within
a given human lifetime. That is, intelligent processes are capable of dealing with
many situations that never in fact arise. This is assumed to be necessary because noone can predict what situations will actually arise within a human lifetime, even
though most of them will never occur. But what if the actual state of the brain were
indeterminate at the moment each novel environmental situation arose? In that case
the conscious experience of each new environmental stimulus could be regarded as a
further partitioning of N. If the actual state of the brain were indeterminate then the
resulting partition would contain all neural topographies consistent with the correct
response to that stimulus (except those which had previously been partitioned out of
N). In most cases this would include all topographies which fully instantiated
intelligent processes, but would also include many topographies in which intelligent
processes were only partially instantiated (because these topographies would not yet
have been partitioned out by measurement).
In the previous section it was shown that any physical system which fully instantiates
the human capacity for deductive reasoning will be unable to conclude with certainty
that it is conscious (or indeed that it has any other property). But this does not
9
necessarily apply to systems which only partially instantiate human deductive
reasoning. How does this work in practice? Successive neurological observations
and conscious experiences will partition the set U and Q will evolve to ensure the
partition is determinate. But quantum measurement will partition U in such a way as
to select precisely those topographies which are consistent with those observations
and experiences, as long as such states are available -- that is, as long as topographies
which are consistent with those observations and experiences remain in N. For
example, consider a neural topography which contains a population of cells whose
only purpose is to force M to answer “yes” whenever the question “Am I conscious?”
is asked. The previous section showed that such a topography could not be consistent
with intelligent processes which incorporate a capacity for honest deductive
reasoning. But so long as such topographies remain within N, then quantum
measurement will select precisely those topographies, and these topographies could
be observed through neurological research. Indeed those topographies which did
fully instantiate intelligent processes would be inconsistent with the conscious
experience of self-certainty, and would therefore be selected out by the partition and
hence not included in N. So the price one pays for consistency between conscious
states and physical states is a lack of consistency between the selected topographies
and the intelligent processes which supposedly supervene on them. One can see that
in such a case the effect c would not occur.
Of course in practice it is not just the particular sample of environmental situations
which occur within a given human lifetime which one has to consider, but the sample
of such situations which occur throughout the whole of human evolutionary history.
As the range of actual environmental situations encountered by human beings
throughout history becomes larger and larger, the permissible deviation of the
topographies in N from perfect consistency with intelligent processes becomes
smaller and smaller -- just as, in the case of the oracle, as the number of questions
actually asked of the oracle gets ever larger, the oracle will have to get ever closer to
true omniscience.
There are two potential difficulties with using single mind Q to “conceal” the effect c.
Firstly, mental operations such as deciding that one is conscious are not really like
measurements of quantum observables. In the measurement of a quantum observable
an eigenstate of that observable is selected randomly, in accordance with the quantum
amplitudes associated with the various eigenstates. But in the specific example of
deciding that one is conscious, only those neural states which are consistent with the
outcome of that process are possible. Correlation of the observer’s physical state with
the observer’s own mental state removes any possibility of quantum indeterminacy in
this particular case.
Since clearly we must be correlated with our own brains this presents no problem for
us. But consider an extraterrestrial visitor who is not correlated with our brain states
or our mental states. Such a visitor would find it extremely peculiar that the usual
rules of quantum indeterminacy were being flouted. One can see why by considering
the example above of a population of cells whose sole purpose is to ensure that we
always answer “yes” whenever the question “Am I conscious?” is asked. Such a
neural topography, and the evolutionary history leading up to it, would be extremely
unusual. An extraterrestrial visitor uncorrelated with our mental and brain states
10
would expect to find many examples elsewhere in the universe of conscious beings
whose brains did not exhibit such a topography. We would thus be unusual in being
perhaps the only conscious beings in the universe who could be certain of being
conscious, a circumstance which appears unreasonable.
One way round this problem would be to require that all intelligences in the universe,
including all extraterrestrial intelligences, were in fact correlated with our own mental
and brain states in some fundamental way. The source of such a correlation would
presumably have to be found in the very early history of the universe. Another way
would be to impose a requirement that the “minds” in single mind Q entail certain
properties, and to require that the neural topographies they select be fully consistent
with intelligent processes. In this second case the rules of quantum indeterminacy
could be preserved, and c would not be concealed and should be detectable.
The second problem is that single-mind Q in any case would not completely eliminate
the possibility of c. Consider a comprehensive program of neuroscientific research,
as represented by a long sequence of measurements, completed before any attempt
was made to detect c. The result would be a subset V, which would be the
intersection of all those subsets of U selected by their respective measurements. If the
research program were intensive enough then V might be a very small subset indeed.
In such a case, one could not be sure that V would still contain sufficient neural
topographies, that at least one would remain which was consistent with the mental
property of knowing that one is conscious. All neural topographies consistent with
that outcome might have been partitioned out by the previous sequence of
measurements. In such a case one would expect c to be detectable subsequently.
Note that the subset V can be defined as follows:
V = U \ (Vn È Ve È W)
where Vn is the subset of U inconsistent with neuroscientific observations; Ve is the
subset of U inconsistent with observed environmental properties; and W is the subset
of U inconsistent with the existence of the non-physical “minds” required by single
mind Q. The considerations in this section can be summarized by saying that, if the
correct quantum statistics are to be maintained, then either all “minds” in the universe
are correlated, or “minds” which are certain of their existence are found only on earth,
or it is the case that the subset W is not empty.
Single mind Q may explain a specific operational definition of free will
There is a sense in which the single mind Q approach to quantum mechanics may
explain a certain notion of free will. To see how this is so, we must now refer to
some celebrated experiments by the physiologist Benjamin Libet. The first
experiments of interest here refer to a phenomenon generally known as the readiness
potential (Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl 1983; Libet 1985). When human subjects
are asked to time as accurately as possible when they experience the impulse to
11
perform a random movement, an EEG trace is observable up to 0.3 seconds before the
subject’s first conscious awareness of the impulse (this number is an average
computed from aggregate data). This is known as the readiness potential. It might be
argued that, since the EEG trace precedes the conscious impulse and in effect predicts
it, the apparently random conscious impulse is not, in fact, random at all but
determined by the neurophysiological state of the subject’s brain. So, to the extent
that one regards random impulses as a matter of free will, Libet’s results can be taken
as an argument against free will.
Libet’s interpretation of these findings is controversial, particularly with respect to the
readiness potential; and it is not my intention here to attempt to resolve this
controversy. I wish to make the much narrower point, that even if the readiness
potential can be regarded as a predictor of the subject’s decision in a classical system,
it cannot necessarily be regarded as such in a quantum system. The reason is that the
neurological properties underlying the readiness potential may not actually have
determinate values until the subject becomes consciously aware of their decision. In
connection with this, an earlier experiment (Libet, Alberts, Wright and Feinstein
1972) is of interest here. Using a technique known as backward masking which, for
reasons of space, will not be described here, Libet found evidence that perceptual
stimuli can take up to 0.5 seconds (with a minimum of 0.4 seconds) before they
register as conscious impressions -- it takes that long for the subject’s brain to process
them. This delay is called perceptual latency.
Single mind Q illustrates how the second effect may counteract the first. Consider an
EEG machine which is in a superposition of two states; a state EEGON, in which the
readiness potential is detected, and a state EEGOFF in which no readiness potential is
detected. These states are correlated with brain states BRAINON and BRAINOFF, in
which the readiness potential occurs and does not occur respectively. From the
perceptual latency effect described above, it will take roughly 0.5 seconds for the
states EEGON and EEGOFF to form a conscious impression in the mind of the observer
reading the EEG machine-- at which point, according to single mind Q, the
superposition will be resolved to a single determinate state (albeit only in the minds of
the conscious observers). But by that time, the subject’s conscious awareness will
already have selected a determinate value for the readiness potential, since the
readiness potential is shorter than the perceptual latency.
In other words, it is impossible for any observer to perceive consciously if a readiness
potential has in fact occurred, before the experimental subject experiences the
conscious impression of a random impulse. Since in single mind Q determinate
properties are mental properties, this means there simply is no determinate state for
the readiness potential or the EEG trace before the subject becomes aware of their
conscious decision. The readiness potential therefore cannot, even in principle, be
used to predict the subject’s decision before it happens. This will always be the case
if the perceptual latency is longer than the readiness potential. And so, according to
single mind Q, it will be the subject who determines the state BRAINON or BRAINOFF,
and hence the state EEGON or EEGOFF, by random selection. This state of affairs is
empirically indistinguishable from the operational definition of free will posited by
Libet, but removes any possibility that the readiness potential can be said to have a
determinate value before the subject’s conscious decision. Of course, this only
12
applies to the rather limited sense of free will described by Libet. It is also subject to
empirical review should subsequent research challenge the relative values of the
readiness potential and perceptual latency.
What sort of neural mechanism might be implied by the effect described here? A
neural network which exploits single mind Q might have the following properties: P is
a population of cells, and I1 and I2 are, respectively, excitatory and inhibitory inputs to
P. X is a population of cells I shall call the state determiner -- Population X
determines the output of the network. E and Y are populations which are connected to
X by reciprocal excitatory and reciprocal inhibitory connections respectively. X is
connected to P by a delay line, which allows small changes in P to manifest before
they are amplified by the connections from X to E and Y. K(P) is the mean activity
level7 of P the value of which is equal to Kidle when I1 = I2. The network is set so that
when the activity level of X is Kidle, both E and Y are inactive. An increase in the
activity level K(X) of X will drive K(X) to a level Kmax, and a decrease will drive
K(X) to Kmin, which are respectively the maximum and minimum values of K(X).
We now introduce a quantum noise term8 e to P. (It is important to note that merely
adding classical noise to the network will not work, since the effect being exploited
here relies on the quantum superposition being maintained until a conscious decision
is made.) We assume e to be approximately Gaussian in distribution, with a mean of
zero. Therefore when I1 = I2, the activity level of P will be:
K(P) = Kidle + e
The effect of this is to introduce a small variation in K(P) which will quickly be
amplified by the network so that the state determiner X will evolve to either Kmax or
Kmin. In quantum mechanical terms, the state vector of the network can be represented
as a superposition of two states: a state MAX in which K(P) = Kmax, and a state MIN
in which K(P) = Kmin. According to single mind Q, a single state, either MAX or
MIN, will then be selected randomly once a conscious observation is made.
(Different probabilities for Kmax and Kmin can be arranged by varying I1 and I2 so that
K(P) is initially either slightly greater or slightly less than Kidle).
Consciousness as a fundamental entity in explanations of nature
Finally I want to make a brief remark about how theories of consciousness, and its
7
Each cell in P, X, E and Y fires a number of action potentials within a certain time Dt. This number is
assumed to follow a Poisson distribution with mean mK. Excitatory or inhibitory inputs are assumed to
increase or decrease the value of mK.
8
The most likely source of such noise is thought to be in the random variation of neurotransmitter
release at neural synapses (Destexhe 2012). If these small random variations are considered equally
likely to increase or decrease the likelihood that a cell will fire an action potential, then the cumulative
effect of many such variations can be regarded as Gaussian distributed with a mean of zero, if the
number of effects is sufficiently large. It is unfortunately impossible to quantify these effects in any
simple way since they depend critically on the internal connectivity of the network, and in particular on
the extent of feedback connections within the populations of cells.
13
interaction with the physical world, should include consciousness itself as an entity.
Since consciousness cannot be fully decomposed into physical components, how can
it be defined as a theoretical entity, and what properties should be attributed to it? The
obvious starting point is to define consciousness in terms of precisely that property
which turns out to be
inconsistent with physical decomposition -- that is to say, self-certainty. This property
can be defined in terms of the mapping E ® X which was set out in the first section
of this article. If we refer to this mapping as the function p0, then self-certainty can be
defined as the capacity of consciousness to perform the function p0 with provable
reliability and accuracy. This can be defined symbolically in terms of an infinite
sequence of functions:
p1, p2, p3, …
where every pn can be defined in the following terms:
Xn = pn(pn-1)
such that:
Xn = YES if pn-1 is performed accurately and reliably;
Xn = NO otherwise.
Clearly, each function pn in the sequence examines whether the previous function pn-1
has been correctly performed. These functions obviously correspond to the
computations (or physical processes) described as part of the infinite regress in
Argument A. However, unlike those processes, these functions are merely abstract
representations of the properties of consciousness, and are not concrete entities in the
physical world. In fact the representation of self-certainty in terms of a sequence of
functions provides another way of proving the impossibility of self-certainty in a
purely physical system, since it is easy to show that no physical system can perform
all of these functions. To see why, one need only assume some physical process Pn
which performs each function pn. If one assumes the functions are performed
sequentially, then one notes that each Pn requires some time to execute, say dt. The
infinite sequence of functions therefore requires a total time of dt multiplied by
infinity. Alternatively if one assumes the various functions are performed in parallel,
then each Pn requires some region of space, say dV, to execute. The total volume of
space required to perform all the functions simultaneously is therefore dV multiplied
by infinity. A physical system to perform the infinite sequence of functions would
therefore need either to be infinitely large or to take an infinite amount of time, and
neither contingency is physically reasonable.
The infinite sequence of functions can be summarized as a single function pw,
identified by the subscript w or omega:
Xw = pw(E)
where:
14
Xw = YES if it is provably the case both that E = 1 and pw is reliably performed;
Xw = NO (or more accurately, is undefined) otherwise.
This is purely a notational convenience. One can regard a defining characteristic of
consciousness as the ability to perform the function pw, and a defining physical
property of consciousness as the c effect (or violation of energy conservation) which
is associated with it. Once defined, such a fundamental entity can be included in
theoretical models, or simulations, of neurological or cognitive processes. This
illustrates that it is not true, as is sometimes claimed, that allowing a non-physical
basis for consciousness renders it immune to analysis or understanding.
References
Barrett, J.A. (1999). The quantum mechanics of minds and worlds Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Caplain, G. (1995). Is consciousness a computational property? Informatica 19, 615619.
Caplain, G. (2000). Is consciousness not a computational property? - Reply to
Bojadziev. Informatica 24, 79-81.
Destexhe, A. (2012). Neuronal noise. New York: Springer.
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in
voluntary action. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8, 529-566.
Libet, B., Alberts, W.W., Wright Jr, E.W. and Feinstein B (1972). Cortical and
thalamic activation in conscious sensory experience. In G. Somjen (Ed),
Neurophysiology studied in man, 157-168 Amsterdam: Excerpta Medica.
Libet, B., Gleason, C.A., Wright, E.W. and Pearl, D.K. (1983). Time of conscious
intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness potential): the
unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623-642.
Von Neumann, J. (1955). Mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics. [R.
Beyer, Trans.]. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Originally published
1932.)
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | pp. 970-1020
Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
970
Article
Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation
of Self-Referential Matrix Law &Mathematics of Ether
Huping Hu* & Maoxin Wu
ABSTRACT
This work is a continuation of prespacetime-premomentumenergy model described
recently. Here we show how in this model prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) generates: (1) four-momentum and four-position relation as transcendental
Law of One, (2) self-referential matrix law with four-momentum and four-position relation
as the determinant, and (3) Law of Zero in a dual universe comprised of an external
spacetime and an internal momentum-energy space. We further show how prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) may generate, sustain and make evolving
elementary particles and composite particles incorporating the genesis of self-referential
matrix law. In addition, we will discuss the ontology and mathematics of ether in this
model. Illustratively, in the beginning there was prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) by itself ei0 =1 materially empty and it began to imagine through
primordial
self-referential
spin
1=ei0=ei0ei0=eiL-iLeiM-iM=eiLeiMe-iLe-iM=e-iLe-iM/e-iLeiM iL iM iL iM
=e e /e e …such that it created the self-referential matrix law, the external object to be
observed and internal object as observed, separated them into external spacetime and
internal momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through said matrix law and thus
gave birth to the dual universe which it has since sustained and made to evolve.
Key Words: prespacetime, premomentumenergy, principle of existence, spin, hierarchy,
self-reference, ether, mathematics, ontology, matrix law, transcendental Law of One, Law of
Zero.
1. Introduction
Through all of us Consciousness manifests
This article is a continuation of the Principle of Existence [1-7] and the prespacetimepremomentumenergy model [8]. As shown in our recent work [8] and further shown here,
the principles and mathematics based on prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) for creating, sustaining and making evolving of elementary particles in a
*Corresponding author: Huping Hu, Ph.D., J.D. Address: QuantumDream, Inc., P.O. Box 267, Stony Brook, NY 11790, USA.
E-mail: hupinghu@quantumbrain.org
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
971
dual universe comprised of an external spacetime and an internal momentum-energy space
are beautiful and simple.
First, the prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) model employs the
following ontological principles among others:
(1) Principle of oneness/unity of existence through quantum entanglement in the
ether of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
(2) Principle of hierarchical primordial self-referential spin creating:
- Four-momentum and four-position relation as transcendental Law of One.
- Four-momentum and four-position relation as determinant of matrix law.
- Law of Zero of total phase of external and internal wavefunctions (objects).
Second, prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) model employs the following
mathematical elements & forms among others in order to empower the above ontological
principles:
(1) e, Euler’s Number, for (to empower) ether as foundation/basis/medium
of existence (body of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness));
(2) i, imaginary number, for (to empower) thoughts and imagination in
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness);
(3) 0, zero, for (to empower) emptiness (undifferentiated/primordial state);
(4) 1, one, for (to empower) oneness/unity of existence;
(5) +, -, *, /, = for (to empower) creation, dynamics, balance & conservation;
(6) Pythagorean Theorem for (to empower) energy, momentum and mass relation,
and time, position and intrinsic proper time relation; and
(7) M, matrix, for (to empower) the external spacetime and internal momentumenergy space and the interaction of external and internal wavefunctions.
This work is organized as follows. In § 2, we shall illustrate scientific genesis in a nutshell
which incorporates the genesis of self-referential matrix law. In § 3, we shall detail the
genesis of self-referential matrix law in the order of: (1) Genesis of four-momentum &
four-position relation; (2) Self-referential matrix law and its metamorphoses; (3) Imaginary
momentum & imaginary position; (4) Games for deriving matrix law; and (5) Hierarchical
natural laws. In § 4, we shall incorporate the genesis of self-referential matrix law into
scientific genesis of primordial entities (elementary particles) and scientific genesis of
composite entities. In § 5, we shall show the mathematics and ontology of ether in the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy model. Finally, in § 6, we shall conclude this work.
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
972
2. Scientific Genesis in Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) in
a Nutshell
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model generate everything through self-referential spin
in the beginning there was prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) by itself ei0
=1 materially empty and it began to imagine through primordial self-referential spin
1=ei0=ei0ei0=eiL-iLeiM-iM=eiLeiMe-iLe-iM=e-iLe-iM/e-iLe-iM=eiLeiM/eiLeiM…such that it created the
self-referential matrix law, the external object to be observed and internal object as
observed, separated them into external spacetime and internal momentum-energy space,
caused them to interact through said matrix law and thus gave birth to the dual
universeuniverse which it has since sustained and made to evolve.
We draw below several diagrams illustrating the above processes:
Figure 2.1 Illustration of primordial phase distinction in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness)
The primordial phase distinction in Figure 2.1 is accompanied by matrixing of
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) body e into: (1) external wave
functions as external object in external spacetime and internal wave function as internal
object in internal momentum-energy space, and (2) self-acting and self-referential matrix
law, which accompany the imaginations in prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) so as to enforce (maintain) the accounting principle of conservation of
zero, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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973
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
Figure2.2 Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) Equation
Figure 2.3 shows from another perspective of the relationship among external object in the
external spacetime, internal object in the internal momentum-energy space and the selfacting and self-referential matrix law. According to prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) model, self-interactions (self-gravity) are quantum entanglement between
the external object and the internal object.
Figure2.3 Self-interaction between external object in the external spacetime and
internal object in the internal momentum-energy space
Therefore, prespacetime-premomentumenergy model may create, sustain and cause
evolution of primordial entities (elementary particles) in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) by self-referential spin as follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM Le Li 1 e iM e iM
1
LM ,e
Ae
A
LM ,i e iM LM e e iM LM e LM 0
Ai
i
Ai e
iM
(2.1)
In expression (2.1), e is Euler’s Number representing prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) body, ether; i is imaginary unit representing imagination of prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness); ±M is immanent content of imagination i such as
momentum, energy, space and time; ±L is immanent law of imagination I;
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
L1 ei 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 1 is
transcendental
Law
of
One
in
prespacetime-
premomentumenergy (Consciousness) before matrixization; Le is external law; Li is internal
law; LM,e is external matrix law; and LM,i is internal matrix law; LM is the self-referential
matrix law in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) comprised of the
external and internal matrix laws which governs elementary entities and conserves zero; e
is external wave function (external object) in external spacetime; i is internal wave
function (internal object) in internal momentum-energy space ; and is the complete wave
function (object/entity in the dual universe comprised of external peacetime and internal
momentum-energy space as a whole).
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) spins as 1=ei0=ei0ei0=eiL-iLeiMiM iL iM -iL -iM -iL -iM -iL -iM iL iM iL iM
=e e e e =e e /e e =e e /e e …before
matrixization.
Prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) also spins through self-acting and self-referential
matrix law LM after matrixization which acts on external object and internal object to cause
them to interact with each other as further described below.
3. Genesis of Self-Referential Matrix Law in the Prespacetimepremomentumenergy Model
Natural laws are hierarchical
3.1
Genesis of Four-momentum & Four-position Relation
In the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model, the four-momentum p = (E/c, p) and
four-position x = (ct, x) relation:
E / c ct p x mc c or E / cct p x - mcc 0
can be generated from the following primordial self-referential spin when
(3.1)
E / c mc p
ct
c
x
and p parallels to x:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
mc
p c
x mc i p c i x mc c p x
i
i
E/c
ct
E / c ct E / c ct
E
/
c
ct
E / c ct p x mc c
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
where is intrinsic proper time of an elementary particle (e.g., defined through Compton
wavelength = /c).
For simplicity, we will set c=ħ=1 throughout this work unless indicated otherwise. So, we
have from equation (3.2):
or Et p x m 0
Et p x m
(3.3)
In the presence of an interacting field such as an electromagnetic potential (A(x,t), (x,t)) in
spacetime (x, t) and its dual (A(p,E), (p,E)) in momentum-energy space (p, E), equation (3.3)
may be modified as follows for an elementary entity with charge e:
1 ei 0 e iLiL cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
p - eA x ,t
x - eA p ,E
m
i
i
E ex ,t
E ex ,t t ep ,E
t ep ,E
(3.4)
m p - eA x ,t x - eA p , E
E e x ,t t ep , E m p - eA x ,t x - eA p , E
E
e
t
e
x
,
t
p
,
E
where
E ex ,t
t ep , E
m
p - eA x ,t
x - eA p , E
; p - eA x ,t is parallel to x - eAp, E .
The metamorphoses of (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) & (3.4) are respectively as follows:
ct E / c x p c mc or ct E / c x p - c mc 0
(3.1a)
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
c
x mc
p c i x mc i p c mc x p
i
i
ct
E / c
ct E / c ct E / c
ct
E
/
c
ct E / c x p c mc
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
or tE x p m 0
tE x p m
(3.3a)
1 ei 0 e iLiL cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x - eA p , E
p - eA x ,t
m
i
i
t ep , E
t ep , E E ex ,t
E ex ,t
(3.4a)
m x - eA p , E p - eA x ,t
t ep , E E e x ,t m x - eA p , E p - eA x ,t
t e
E
e
p , E
x ,t
where
E / c mc p
ct
c
x
E ex ,t
t ep , E
3.2
m
(or
p - eA x ,t
x - eA p , E
E m p
when
t
x
c=1),
p
parallels
to
x;
and
; p - eA x ,t is parallel to x - eAp, E .
Self-Referential Matrix Law and Its Metamorphoses
In the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model, one form of matrix law LM in
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) is created from the following
primordial self-referential spin:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
m
p
x m i p i x m p x
i i
E
E t
t E t
Et
Et m
E m x
p x
p
t
ISSN: 2153-8212
1
x
Em
Em x
0
p
t
p
t
E m
p
x
LM ,e
t
(3.5)
LM ,i L M
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
where
E m p
, p parallels to x and matrixization step is carried out in such way that
t
x
Det L M Et ms p x 0
(3.6)
so as to satisfy the fundamental relation (3.3) in the determinant view.
After fermionic spinization in spacetime and momentum-energy space respectively:
p p Det (σ p) σ p
2
x x Det (σ x ) σ x
2
(3.7)
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) are Pauli matrices:
0 1
0 i
1 0
2
3
1
0
i
0
0
1
1
(3.8)
the last expressions in (3.5) becomes:
E m σ x
L
σp t M , e
LM , i L M
(3.9)
Expression (3.9) governs fermions in Dirac-like form such as Dirac electron and positron in
the dual universe comprised of said external spacetime and internal energy-momentum
space. We further propose that last expressions in (3.5) govern the third state of matter
(unspinized or spinless entity/particle) with charge e and mass m (intrinsic proper time )
such as a meson or a meson-like particle in said dual universe.
If we define:
E m σ x
E m t σ x σ p
Det
σ p t
where
(3.10)
E m p
and p parallels to x, we get:
t
x
E m σ x
Et m x p I 2 0
Det
σp t
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
978
Thus, fundamental relation (3.1) is satisfied under the determinant view of expression (3.9).
Indeed, we can also obtain the following conventional determinant:
E m σ x
2
Et m x p 0
Det
σp t
where
(3.12)
E m p
and p parallels to x.
t
x
Expressions (3.5), (3.9), (3.10) & (3.11) have the following metamorphoses respectively:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x m
p i x m i p m x p
i i
t
E
t E
t
E
tE
tE m
t
x p
x
p
Em
1
p
p
t
t
0
x
Em
x
Em
t
x
p
LM ,e
Em
t σp
L
σx E M , e
LM ,i L M
LM , i L M
t σ p
t E m σ p σ x
Det
σ x E
t σp
tE m px I 2 0
Det
σx E m
where
(3.5a)
(3.9a)
(3.10a)
(3.11a)
E m p
and p parallels to x
t
x
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
979
Expressions (3.5), (3.9), (3.10) & (3.11) also have the following metamorphoses
respectively:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
m
p
x m i p i x m p x
i i
E
t
E t
E
t
Et
Et p x E p
m t x
m
1
(3.13)
Ep
Ep
0
m
t x
m
t x
Ep
m
L
t x M ,e
E σ p
LM , e
m
t
σ
x
LM ,i L M
(3.14)
LM , i LM
E σ p
E σ p t σ x m
Det
m
t
σ
x
(3.15)
E σ p
Et px m I2 0
Det
m
t
σ
x
where
(3.16)
E m p
, p parallels to x; or
t
x
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x m
p i x m i p m x p
i i
t
E
t E
t
E
tE
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
tE x p t x m
E p
m
1
(3.13a)
t x
t x
m
m
0
E p
E p
t x
m
L
E p M ,e
m
t σ x
LM , e
E
σ
p
LM ,i L M
(3.14a)
LM , i LM
m
t σ x
t σ x E σ p m
Det
E
σ
p
t σ x
Det
where
980
(3.15a)
m
tE x p m I2 0
E σ p
(3.16a)
x
t
, x parallels to p.
E m p
The last expression in (3.13) or (3.13a) is the unspinized matrix law in Weyl-like (chirallike) form. Expression (3.14) or (3.14a) is spinized matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like)
form.
Another kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.5), (3.9), (3.10) & (3.11) is respectively
as follows:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
1
i x
m
p
x m i p s i x
E
i i
E
E t
t E t m i p
t
i x
i x
E
E
0
m ip
t
m ip
t
E
m ip
ISSN: 2153-8212
i x
Le
t
(3.17)
Li LM
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
E
iσ x
LM , e
m iσ p
t
(3.18)
LM , i LM
E
iσ x
Et iσ x m iσ p
Det
m iσ p
t
(3.19)
E
iσx
Et m x p I2 0
Det
m iσp
t
where
981
(3.20)
E m p
, p parallels to x; or
t
x
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
1
mip
x m
p i x m i p
t
i i
t
E
t E i x
t
E
E
mip
E ip
t
t
0
i x
E
i x
E
t
i x
mip
Le
E
t
m iσ p
LM , e
iσ x
E
Li LM
LM , i LM
t
m iσ p
tE m iσ p iσ x
Det
iσ x
E
t
m iσ p
tE m px I2 0
Det
iσ x
E
where
(3.17a)
(3.18b)
(3.19c)
(3.20d)
x
t
, x parallels to p.
E m p
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
982
Define Q iσ x and Q m iσ p , we can rewrite last expression in (3.18) as:
x
p
E
Q p
Qx
L
t M ,e
(3.21)
LM , i LM
If m= = 0, we have from expression (3.5):
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
0
p 0
x
p
x
px
i i i i
E
t
Et
E
t
E
t
Et E x
px p t
1
(3.22)
x
x
E
E
0
p
t
p
t
E
p
x
L
t M ,e
LM , i L M
After fermionic spinization p σ p , x σ x in spacetime and momentum-energy
space respectively, the last expression in (3.22) or (3.22a) becomes:
σ x
E
LM , e
σp
t
(3.23)
LM , i L M
which governs massless and proper-time-less fermion-like (neutrino-like) in Dirac-like
form.
After bosonic spinization in spacetime and momentum-energy space respectively:
p p Det (sp I 3 ) Det I 3 s p ,
2
(3.24)
x x Det (sx I 3 ) Det I 3 s x
2
the last expression in (3.22) or (3.22a) becomes:
s x
E
LM , e
sp
t
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LM , i L M
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
983
where s = (s1, s2, s3) are spin operators for spin 1 particle:
0 0 i
0 0 0
0 i 0
s1 0 0 i s2 0 0 0 s3 i 0 0
i 0 0
0 i 0
0 0 0
(3.26)
If we define:
Det s
E
sx
s p
t
E t s x s p
(3.27)
We get:
xpx
E
sx
Dets
Et x p I 3 xp y
s p
t
xp
z
ypx
yp y
ypz
zpx
zp y
zpz
(3.28)
To obey fundamental relation (3.1) in determinant view (3.27), we shall require the last
term in (3.28) acting on the external and internal wave functions respectively to produce
null result (zero) in source-free zone as discussed later. We propose that the last expression
in (3.22) governs massless and intrinsic-proper-time-less particle with unobservable spin
(spinless). After bosonic spinization, the spinless and massless particle gains its spin 1.
One kind of metamorphosis of expressions (3.22), (3.23), (3.25), (3.27) & (3.28) is
respectively as follows:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
0
x 0
p
x
p
x p
i i i i
t
E
tE
t
E
t
E
tE t p
x p x E
(3.22a)
p
p
t
t
0
x
E
x
E
t
x
ISSN: 2153-8212
1
p
L
E M ,e
LM , i L M
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
t
σ x
σ p
LM , e
E
LM , i LM
(3.23a)
t
s x
s p
LM , e
E
LM , i LM
(3.25a)
Det s
t
s p
sx
E
tE s p s x
px x
s p
tE p x I 3 p y x
E
p x
z
t
Dets
sx
px y
py y
pz y
(3.27a)
px z
py z
pz z
(3.28a)
Further, if |p|=0, we have:
1 ei 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
0
0 m m
m
i i
E t
t E t Et
E
1
Et E
m m t
E
E
0
m
t
m
t
E
LM , e LM , i L M
m
t
(3.29)
We suggest the above spaceless and momentum-less forms of Matrix Law govern the
external and internal wave functions (self-fields) which play the roles of spaceless and
momentum-less gravitons, that is, they mediate space (distance) independent interactions
through proper time (mass) entanglement.
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
985
One of the metamorphoses of (3.29) is as follows:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
0 m
0 m m
i i
t E
E t E tE
t
1
tE t m
m E
t
m
t
m
0
E
E
m
t
LM , e LM , i L M
E
3.3
(3.29a)
Imaginary Momentum & Imaginary Position
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model may create spatial and momentum selfconfinement of an elementary entity through imaginary momentum pi in external spacetime
and imaginary position xi in internal momentum-energy space (downward self-reference
such that m>Et):
m Et p i x i pix xi piy yi piz zi ip i ix i
(3.30)
Et m pi x i 0
(3.31)
that is:
which can be created by the following primordial self-referential spin:
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
m
p
x m i p i s i x i m p i x i
i i i i
E
t
E t
E
t
Et
Et m p i x i or Et m p i x i 0
where
(3.32)
E m pi
, pi parallels to xi.
t
xi
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Therefore, allowing imaginary momentum pi in external spacetime and imaginary position
xi in internal momentum-energy space (downward self-reference) for an elementary entity,
we can derive the following matrix law in Dirac-like form:
E m x i
L
p i t M , e
LM , i L M
(3.33)
σx i
LM , e
t
LM , i L M
(3.34)
E m
σp i
Also, we can derive the following matrix law in Weyl-like (chiral-like) form:
E pi
m
L
t xi M,e
LM , i L M
E σp i
m
LM , e
t σx i
LM , i L M
(3.35)
(3.36)
It is suggested that the above additional forms of self-referential matrix law govern proton
in Dirac-like and Weyl-like form respectively in said dual universe.
One kind of metamorphoses of (3.30) – (3.36) is respectively as follows:
m tE x i pi xi pix yi piy zi piz ix i ip i
(3.30a)
tE m x i pi 0
(3.31a)
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
x m
p i x i m i p i m x i p i
i i i i
t
E
t
E
t
E
tE
tE m x i p i or tE m x i p i 0
E
xi
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pi
L
E m M , e
LM , i L M
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
987
t
σ x i
σp i
LM , e
E m
LM , i LM
(3.34a)
t x i
m
L
E pi M , e
LM , i L M
(3.35a)
t σ x i
m
LM , e
E σp i
LM , i LM
where
x
t
i , xi parallels to pi.
E m pi
3.4
Games for Deriving Matrix Law
(3.36a)
The games for deriving various forms of the matrix law prior to spinization in the
prespacetime-premomentumenergy model can be summarized as follows:
0 Et m p x DetM Et DetM m DetM px
Det( M Et M m M px ) Det( LM )
(3.37)
where Det means determinant and MEt, Mm and Mpx are respectively matrices with ±E & ±t
(or ±iE & ±it ), ±m & ± (or ±im & ±i) and ±|p| & ±|x| (or ±i|p| & ±i|x|) as elements
respectively, and Et, -m and –|p||x| as determinant respectively, and LM is the matrix law
so derived.
For example, the matrix law in Dirac-like form prior to spinization:
E m x
LM
p t
(3.38)
can be derived as follows:
0
E 0
m 0
Det
Det
0 Et m p x Det
0 t
0
p
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
E 0 m 0 0
Det
0 t 0 p
where
E m x
x
Det
Det (L M )
p t
0
988
(3.39)
E m p
.
t
x
For a second example, the matrix law in Weyl-like form prior to spinization:
Ep
LM
m
t x
(3.40)
can be derived as follows:
p
E 0
0
Det
Det
0 Et m p x Det
0 t
m 0
0
E 0 0 p
Det
0 t m 0 0
where
Ep
0
Det
m
x
0
x
Det LM
t x
(3.41)
E m p
.
t
x
For a third example, the matrix law in quaternion form prior to spinization:
E
LM
m i p
i x
t
(3.42)
can be derived as follows:
0 i x
E 0
0
Det
Det
0 Et m p x Det
0 t
m 0
i p
0
E 0 0 0 i x
E
i x
Det
Det (LM )
Det
m i p
0 t m 0 i p
0
t
where
(3.43)
E m p
.
t
x
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
989
One kind of metamorphoses of (3.37)-(3.43) is respectively as follows:
0 tE m x p DetM tE DetMm DetM xp
Det ( M tE M m M xp ) Det ( LM )
t
LM
x
p
E m
t 0
Det
0 tE m x p Det
0 E
0
t 0
Det
0 E 0
0 0
m x
0
0
Det
x
m
p
Det (LM )
E m
(3.39a)
(3.40a)
x
m
Det
0
0
Ep
0
Det
m
x
t
LM
i x
p
0
Ep
t 0
0
Det
0 tE m x p Det
0 E
E 0 0 p
Det
0 t m 0 0
(3.38a)
t
p
Det
x
0
t x
LM
(3.37a)
0
p
Det LM
t x
(3.41a)
m i p
E
(3.42a)
0 i p
t 0
0 m
Det
Det
0 tE m x p Det
0 E
0
i x
0
t 0 0 m 0 i p
t
i p
Det
Det (LM )
Det
i x
0 E
0
E
0 i x
where
(3.43a)
x
t
.
E m p
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990
3.5 Hierarchical Natural Laws
The natural laws created in accordance with the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model
are hierarchical and comprised of: (1) immanent Law of Conservation manifesting and
governing in the external spacetime and internal momentum-energy space respectively
which may or may not hold; (2) immanent Law of Zero conserving total phase of external
and internal wavefunctions to zero and manifesting and governing in the dual universe as a
whole; and (3) transcendental Law of One manifesting and governing in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness). By ways of examples, conservations of energy,
momentum and mass and conservations of time, position and intrinsic proper time are
immanent (and approximate) laws manifesting and governing respectively in external
spacetime and internal momentum-energy space. Conservations of zero conserving total
phase of external and internal wavefunctions to zero in the dual universe comprised of the
external spacetime and internal momentum-energy space are immanent law manifesting
and governing in the dual universe as a whole. Conservation of One (Unity) based on fourmomentum and four-position relation is transcendental law manifesting and governing in
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) which is the foundation of external
spacetime and internal momentum-energy space.
4.
Scientific
Genesis
in
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness)
4.1 Scientific Genesis of Elementary Particles
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free
plane-wave fermion particle such as an electron in Dirac-like form in the dual universe
comprised of the external spacetime and the internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
p
x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
E t
t
E
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
m i p i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
t e
E
m p x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ Et m ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
e
e
Et
p
x
Em x
p t
1
e
ip μ x μ
e
1
ip μ x μ
E m ip μ x μ x ip μ x μ
E m ip μ x μ x ip μ x μ
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
(4.1)
ip x
E m x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
M
i,
p t
ip x
ai, e
ip x
E m σ x Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
σ p t
ip x
Ai, e
i ,
where
E m p
, p parallels to x, that is:
t
x
E m e, σ x i , i t e, m e, iσ p i ,
or
t
s
σ
p
i
i
σ
i,
e,
i,
x e,
E i,
(4.2)
where substitutions E i t & p i x and t i E & x ip have been made so
that components of LM can act on the external and internal wave functions.
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.1) & (4.2) in which the dual universe is comprised of an
external energy-momentum space and an internal spacetime is respectively as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x m
p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t E
E
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
992
i x m i p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
E e
t
m x p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ tE m ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
e
e
tE
x
p
t p
x Em
1
e
μ
ip x μ
e
1
μ
ip x μ
(4.1a)
p ip μ x μ
t ip μ x μ
t ip μ x μ p ip μ x μ
e
e
e
e
0
x
Em
x
Em
ip x
p ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
ip x
E m
i ,
ai , e
ip x
t σ x Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
σ x E m
i, M
ip x
Ai, e
t
x
t e, σ p i , i E e , e , iσ x i ,
or
i m iσ
E
m
σ
x
i,
p e,
i,
e,
t i,
where
(4.2a)
x
t
, x parallels to p.
E m p
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free
plane-wave antifermion such as a positron in Dirac form in said dual universe comprised of
said external spacetime and said internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
p
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
E
E t
t
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
m i p i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
t e
E
m p x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ Et m ip x ip x
e
e
Et
p
x
Em x
p t
x
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
x
(4.3)
E m ip x
e eip x E m e ip x eip x 0
p
t
p
t
ip x
E m x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
i, M
p t
ip x
ai, e
ip x
e,
E m σ x Ae, e
L 0
LM , e LM , i
σ p t
i, M
ip x
Ai, e
where
E m p
, p parallels to x.
t
x
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.3) in which the dual universe is comprised of said
external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is as follows:
1 ei 0 e i 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x m
p ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
t E
E
i x m i p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
E e
t
m x p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ tE m ip x ip x
e
e
tE
x
p
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1
1
t p
e
e
x Em
t
e p e t e p e
ip x
x
ip x
ip x
ip x
x
Em
ip x
(4.3a)
ip x
Em
0
ip x
p ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
ip x
E m
i ,
ai , e
ip x
t σ p Ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
σ x E m
i, M
ip x
Ai, e
t
x
where
x
t
, x parallels to p.
E m p
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy create, sustain and cause evolution of a free
plane-wave fermion in Weyl (chiral) form in a dual universe comprised of an external
spacetime and an internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
E
E t
t
m i p i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
t e
E
m p x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ Et p x ip x ip x
e
e
Et
m
1
E p ip x ip x
e
e
m t x
E p ip x ip x E p ip x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
m
t x
m
t x
1
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
ip x
ae,l e
e,l
L 0
LM , e LM , i
i,r M
ip x
t x
ai , r e
ip x
Ae,l e
e,l
E σ p
L 0
LM , e LM , i
m
i,r M
ip x
t
σ
x
Ai,r e
Ep
m
where
that is:
E m p
, p parallels to x,
t
x
E σ p e,l i ,r
i iσ x e ,l i ,r
or t e,l
i iσ m
t
σ
x
m
i
,
r
e
,
l
E
i
,
r
p
i
,
e
,
l
(4.5)
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.4) & (4.5) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
x
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
E
E t
t
m i p i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
e
E t
m p x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ Et p x ip x ip x
e
e
Et
m
1
E p ip x ip x
e
e
m t x
E p ip x ip x E p ip x ip x
e
e
e
e
0
m
t x
m
t x
1
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
ip x
ae,l e
e,l L 0
L
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
ip x
t x
i,r
ai , r e
ip x
Ae,l e
e,l
E σ p
L 0
LM , e LM , i
m
i,r M
ip x
t
σ
x
Ai,r e
Ep
m
E σ p e,l i ,r
i iσ x e ,l i ,r
or t e,l
i iσ m
p i,
e ,l
t σ x i ,r m e,l
E i ,r
where
(4.5a)
x
t
, x parallels to p.
E m p
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a free
plane-wave fermion in another form in a dual universe comprised of an external spacetime
and an internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
p
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
E
E t
t
m i p i x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
t e
E
i x
E
m i p
t
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1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(4.6)
i x ip x
E
ip x
e
e
m ip
t
i x ip x
E
ip x
e
e
0
m ip
t
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
E
m i p
ip x
i x Ae e
LM , e
ip x
t
Ai e
E
Q p
Qx Ae e ip x
L
t ip x M , e
Ai e
LM , i e LM 0
i
LM , i e LM 0
i
E m p
, p parallels to x,
t
x
where Q m iσ p and Q iσ x and where
x
p
that is:
E e iσ x i
or
t
m
i
σ
p
e
i
i t e i σ p i
i
m
σ
e
x i
E i
(4.7)
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.6) & (4.7) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x m
p ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
t E
E
i x m i p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
E e
t
mip
t
i x
E
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1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
(4.6a)
m i p ip x
t
ip x
e
e
i x
E
m i p ip x
t
ip x
e
e
0
i x
E
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
t
i x
ip x
m i p Ae e
LM , e
ip x
E
Ai e
LM , i e LM 0
i
Q p Ae e ip x
L
e L 0
L
M
,
e
M
,
i
M
E ip x
i
A
e
i
i m i σ x i
t e m iσ p i
or E e
i
σ
E
i
σ
x
t
i
e
p
i
i
e
t
Qx
where
(4.7a)
x
t
, x parallels to p, Q iσ x and Q m iσ p .
x
p
E m p
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a linear
plane-wave photon in a dual universe comprised of an external spacetime and an internal
energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
p 0
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
E
E t
t
p
x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
E
p x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ Et ip x ip x
e
Et e
p
x
E x
p
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
(4.8)
1
E ip μ xμ x ip μ x μ
E ip μ xμ x ip μ x μ
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
ip x
x ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
ip x
i, M
t
ai , e
ip x
s x E 0e, e
E
e, L
LM , e
L
0
M
,
i
s p
M photon
ip x
t
i
,
iB 0i,- e
E
p
This photon wave function can be written as:
e, E( x , t) E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 i (t kx )
photon
iB
iB 0 e i (t kx ) iB 0 e
(
p
,
E)
i
,
(4.9)
After the substitutions E i t & p i x and t i E & x ip , we have from the
last expression in (4.8):
i t
is x
p B (p, E)
is p E ( x , t)
E
0 t ( x , t)
i E iB (p, E)
E B ( p, E) x E ( x , t)
(4.10)
where we have used the relationship s i x x and s i p p to derive the
latter equations which together with x E 0 and p B 0 are the Maxwell-like
equations in the source-free vacuum in the dual universe comprising of said external
spacetime and internal energy-momentum space.
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates a neutrino in Dirac form by replacing the
last step of expression (4.8) with the following:
ip x
σx ae, e
E
LM , e
σp
ip x
t
a e
i ,
LM , i e, LM 0
(4.11)
i,
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.8)-(4.11) in which the dual universe is comprised of said
external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as follows:
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1000
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
x 0
p ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
t E
E
x p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t E
x p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ tE ip x ip x
e
tE e
x
p
t
p
x
E
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
(4.8a)
1
p ip μ xμ
p ip μ xμ
ip μ x μ
ip μ x μ
t
t
e
e
e
e
0
x
E
x
E
ip x
p ae, e
e, L 0
L
L
M ,i
M ,e
ip x
i, M
E
ai , e
ip x
s p E 0e, e
t
e, L
LM , e
L
0
M
,
i
s x
M photon
ip x
E
i
,
iB 0i,- e
t
x
e, E(p, E) E 0 e i (t kx ) E 0 i (t kx )
photon
iB
iB 0 e i (t kx ) iB 0 e
i , ( x , t)
i E
is
p
t
σ x
is x E (p, E)
x B ( x , t)
E
0 E (p, E)
B
i t iB ( x , t)
t ( x , t) p E (p, E)
ip x
σp ae, e
LM , e
ip x
E
a e
i ,
LM , i e, LM 0
i,
(4.9a)
(4.10a)
(4.11a)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a linear
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1001
plane-wave antiphoton in a dual universe comprised of an external spacetime and an
internal energy-momentum space as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
p 0
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
E
E t
t
p x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i e
t
E
p x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ Et ip x ip x
e
Et e
p
x
E x
p
t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
E ip μ x μ x ip μ x μ
E ip μ x μ x ip μ x μ
e
e
e
e
0
p
t
p
t
(4.12)
x e,
LM , e LM , i e, LM 0
t i,
i ,
ip x
s x iB 0e, e
E
e, L
L
L
0
M ,i
M ,e
s p
i, M antiphoton
ip x
t
E 0i, e
E
p
This antiphoton wave function can also be written as:
i (t k x )
iB 0 ( x , t) i (t kx )
e , iB ( x, t) iB 0 ( x , t) e
e
antiphoton
i (t k x )
E 0( p , E)
E
E
0( p , E) e
(
p
,
E)
i
,
(4.13)
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates an antineutrino in Dirac form by
replacing the last step of expression (4.12) with the following:
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ip x
σ x ae, e
E
LM , e
σp
ip x
t
ai, e
LM , i e, LM 0
i,
1002
(4.14)
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.12)-(4.14) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
x 0
p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t
t E
E
x p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
t E
x p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ tE ip x ip x
e
tE e
x
p
t p
x E
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
t ip μ xμ p ip μ xμ
t ip μ xμ p ip μ xμ
e
e
e
e
0
x
E
x
E
(4.12a)
p e,
LM , e LM , i e, L M 0
E i,
i,
ip x
s p iB 0e, e
e, L
L
L
0
M,i
M,e
M antiphoton
i,
ip x
E
E e
0i,
t
x
t
s x
e , iB (p , E) iB 0 ( p , E) e i (t kx ) iB 0 ( p , E) i (t kx )
antiphoton
E
E 0 ( x , t) e i (t kx ) E 0 ( x , t) e
i , ( x, t)
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
ip x
σ x ae, e
E
LM , e
σp
ip x
t
ai, e
LM , i e, LM 0
i,
1003
(4.14a)
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates and sustains spaceless and
momentum-less (space/momentum independent) external and internal wave functions of a
mass m and intrinsic proper time in Weyl (chiral) form as follows:
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
0 iEt iEt
m
i i e
E t
t
E
m
e iEt iEt
E t
m iEt iEt Et iEt iEt
e
e
Et
m
E
m t
1
e iEt
e iEt
1
E iEt iEt
E iEt iEt
e
e
e
e 0
m
t
m
t
(4.15)
E gW ,e e iEt
L
m t g e iEt M , e
W ,i
VW ,e
L V 0
LM , i
VW ,i M W
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.15) in which the dual universe is comprised of said
external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is as follows:
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1004
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiL e iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
0
0 iEt iEt
i i e
t E
E
t
m
e iEt iEt
t E
m iEt iEt tE iEt iEt
e
e
tE
E
t m
E
1
e iEt
e iEt
1
t iEt
t iEt m iEt
e Ee iEt
e
e 0
E
t
m gW ,e e iEt
LM , e
E gW ,i e iEt
(4.15a)
VW ,e
L V 0
LM , i
VW ,i M W
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution of a
spatially self-confined entity such as a proton through imaginary momentum pi and
imaginary position xi (downward self-reference such that m>Et) in Dirac form in a dual
universe comprised of an external spacetime and an internal energy-momentum space as
follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
p
x ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i i i e
E
E t
t
m i p i i x i ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
e
E t
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1005
m p i x i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ Et m ip x ip x
e
e
Et
p
x
i
i
E m xi
pi t
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
E m ip μ xμ x i ip μ xμ
E m ip μ xμ x i ip μ xμ
e
e
e
e
0
pi
t
pi
t
E m x i se, e iEt
L
p i t si, e iEt M ,e
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.16)
After spinization of the last expression in (4.16), we have:
E m
σ p i
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
iEt
t S i, e
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.17)
As discussed previously, it is likely that the last expression in (4.16) governs the
confinement structure of the unspinized proton in Dirac form through imaginary
momentum pi and imaginary momentum xi and, on the other hand, expression (4.17)
governs the confinement structure of spinized proton through pi and xi in the dual universe
comprising of said external spacetime and internal energy-momentum space.
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Dirac form in the dual universe comprising
of said external spacetime and internal energy-momentum space may be respectively
governed as follows:
E m x i se, e iEt
L
p i t si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
(4.18)
σ x i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
t S i, e iEt
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
(4.19)
E m
σp i
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.16)-(4.19) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1006
1 ei 0 ei 0 ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x i m
p i ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
i i
e
t
E
t
E
i xi m i p i ip μ xμ ip μ xμ
E e
t
m x i p i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ tE m ip x ip x
e
e
tE
x
p
i
i
t
xi
pi
Em
1
e
ip x
e
ip x
1
p i ip μ xμ
t ip μ xμ
t ip μ xμ p i ip μ xμ
e
e
e
e
0
xi
Em
xi
Em
t
xi
p i se, e iEt
LM , e
iEt
E m si, e
e,
LM 0
LM , i
i,
t
σ x i
σ p i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
E m S i, e iEt
e,
L 0
LM ,i
i, M
(4.17a)
(4.16a)
t
xi
p i se, e iEt
L
E m si, e iEt M ,e
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
(4.18a)
t
σ x i
σp i S e, e iEt
LM ,e
E m S i, e iEt
D,e
LM D 0
LM ,i
D,i
(4.19a)
Similarly, prespacetime-premomentumenergy model creates, sustains and causes evolution
of a spatially and momentumly self-confined entity such as a proton through imaginary
momentum pi and imaginary position xi (downward self-reference) in Weyl (chiral) form in
the dual universe comprising of said external spacetime and internal energy-momentum
space as follows:
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1007
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 e iL iLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
m
p
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i i i e
E
E t
t
m i p i i x i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
t e
E
m p i x i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ Et p i x i ip x ip x
e
e
Et
m
E p i
m t x
i
E pi
m
ip x
e
E pi
m
where
1
e e
ip x
ip x
1
ip x E p i ip x ip x
e
e
e
0
t xi
m
t xi
se,r e iEt
L
t x i si,l e iEt
M ,e
e,r
L 0
L
i,l
(4.20)
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
(4.21)
M ,i
M
E m pi
, pi parallels to xi.
t
xi
After spinization of expression (3.114), we have:
E σp i
m
S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
t σ x i S i,l e iEt
The last expression in (4.20) may govern the structure of the unspinized proton in Weyl
form and expression (4.21) governs the structure of spinized proton in Weyl form.
Thus, an unspinized and spinized antiproton in Weyl form in the dual universe comprising
of said external spacetime and internal energy-momentum space may be respectively
governed as follows:
E pi
m
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se,l e iEt
L
t x i si,r e iEt M ,e
e,l
LM 0
LM ,i
i,r
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E σp i
m
S e,l e iEt
LM ,e
t σx i S i,r e iEt
e,l
LM 0
LM ,i
i,r
1008
(4.23)
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.20)-(4.23) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 e iL iLe iM iM
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM
x m
p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i i i e
t
t E
E
i x i m i p i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
E e
t
m x i p i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ tE x i p i ip x ip x
e
e
tE
E
t x i m
E p
i
t xi
e
ip x
1
e e
ip x
ip x
1
t x i ip x
m ip x
m ip x
e
e
e
0
E pi
E pi
t xi
m se, r e iEt
L
E p i si, l e iEt
e, r
L 0
L
i, l
t σ x i
m S e,r e iEt
LM ,e
E σ p i S i,l e iEt
e,r
LM 0
LM ,i
i,l
t xi
m se,l e iEt
L
E p i si,r e iEt M ,e
t σ x i
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M ,e
M ,i
e,l
L 0
LM ,i
i,r M
m S e,l e iEt
LM ,e
E σp i S i,r e iEt
e,l
LM 0
LM ,i
i,r
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
4.2
Scientific Genesis of Composite Entities
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model create, sustain and cause evolution of a neutron
in Dirac form in the dual universe comprising of said external spacetime and internal
energy-momentum space which is comprised of an unspinized proton:
E e(r, t ) m x i eA (p, E) s e iEt
e,
0
p i eA (r, t ) t e(p, E) si, e iEt
p
(4.24)
and a spinized electron:
E e(r, t ) V m
σ x eA (p, E) S e, e iEt
0
t e(p, E) V(p, E) S i, e iEt
σ p eA (r, t )
e
as follows:
(4.25)
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 p e i 0 e i 0 e e iLiM e iM iM p e iLiL e iM iM e
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM p cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM e
m
p i
x i ip μ x μ ip μ x μ m
p
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i
e
i i e
i
t
t
E
E
E
t
E
t
p
e
Et m ip x ip x Et m ip x ip x
e
px e
p
x
i i
p
e
1
1
1
1
E m x ip x ip x E m s ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
p t e
p
t
i
p
e
E m x i se, e iEt E m x se, e iEt
0
0
pi
t si, e iEt p t si, e iEt
p
e
iEt
E e m x eA
(r, t )
i
(p, E ) s e, e
0
iEt
p eA
t e(p, E ) si, e
(r, t )
p
i
σ x eA (p, E ) S e, e iEt
E e(r, t ) V(r, t ) m
0
iEt
σ p eA
t
e
V
S
e
(r, t )
(p, E )
(p, E )
i,
e
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1010
In expressions (4.24), (4.25) and (4.26), , and indicate proton, electron and
p
e
n
neutron respectively. Further, unspinized proton has charge e, electron has charge –e,
A ( , A ) and A ( , A) are the electromagnetic potentials acting on unspinized
p
e
proton and tightly bound spinized electron respectively, and V is a binding potential from
e
the unspinized proton acting on the spinized electron causing tight binding as discussed
later.
If A ( , A ) is negligible due to the fast motion of the tightly bound spinized electron,
p
we have from the last expression in (4.26):
E m x i s e iEt
e, iEt 0
p i t si, e
p
E e V m
iEt
σ x eA (p, E) S e, e
(r, t )
(r, t )
0
σ p eA (r, t )
t e(p, E) V(p, E) S i, e iEt
e
(4.27)
Experimental data on charge distribution and g-factor of neutron seem to support a neutron
comprising of an unspinized proton and a tightly bound spinized electron.
The Weyl (chiral) form of the last expression in (4.26) and expression (4.27) are
respectively as follows:
E e p eA
se,r e iEt
(r, t )
i
(r, t )
(4.28)
0
s e iEt
m
t
e
x
e
A
(p, E )
i
(p, E ) i,l
p
S e,l e iEt
E e(r, t ) V(r, t ) σ p eA (r, t )
0
m
t e(p, E) V(p, E) σ x eA (p, E) S i,r e iEt
e n
E p i
m se,r e iEt
(4.29)
0
s e iEt
m
t
x
i i,l
p
E e V σ p eA
iEt
m
S e,l e
(r, t )
(r, t )
(r, t )
0
m
t e(p, E) V(p, E) σ x eA (p, E) S i,r e iEt
e n
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One kind of metamorphoses of (4.24)-(4.29) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
t e(p, E)
x i eA (p, E)
p i eA (r, t ) se, e iEt
0
E e(r, t ) m si, e iEt
t e(p, E) V(p, E)
σ x eA (p, E)
(4.24a)
p
σ p eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
0
E e(r, t ) V(r, t ) m Si, e iEt
e
(4.25a)
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 p e i 0 e i 0 e e iLiM e iM iM p e iLiL e iM iM e
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM p cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM e
x m
p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
x
p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i m i e
i i i i e
E
t
t
t
E
E
t
E
p
e
tE m ip x ip x tE m ip x ip x
e
xp e
x
p
i i
p
e
1
1
1
1
t p ip x ip x t p ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
x E m e
x
E
m
i
p
e
t
x i
p i se, e iEt t
0
E m si, e iEt x
p
p se, e iEt
0
E m si, e iEt
e
t e
p i eA (r, t ) se, e iEt
(p, E )
0
x eA
s e iEt
E
e
m
(p, E )
(r, t )
p
i,
i
σ p eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
t e(p, E) V(p, E ) m
σ x eA
S e iEt 0
E
e
V
m
(p,
E
)
(r,
t
)
(r,
t
)
i
,
e
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
t p i s e iEt
e, iEt 0
x i E m si, e
p
t e
iEt
V
σ
x
e
A
S
e
(p,
E
)
(p,
E
)
(r,
t
)
e
,
0
σ x eA (p, E)
E e(r, t ) V(r, t ) m S i, e iEt
e
1012
(4.27a)
t e
se,r e iEt
m
(p, E ) x i eA (p, E )
(4.28a)
0
iEt
E e(r, t ) p i eA (r, t ) si,l e
p
iEt
m
S e,l e
t e(p, E) V(p, E) σ x eA (p, E)
S e iEt 0
E
e
V
σ
p
e
A
(r,
t
)
(r,
t
)
(r,
t
)
i,r
e n
t x i
m se,r e iEt
s e iEt 0
E
p
i
i
,
l
p
t e
(p, E ) V(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
(4.29a)
iEt
m
S e,l e
0
E e(r, t ) V(r, t ) σ p eA (r, t ) S i,r e iEt
e n
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model create, sustain and cause evolution of a
hydrogen atom, in the dual universe comprising of said external spacetime and internal
energy-momentum space, which comprises of a spinized proton:
σ x i eA (p, E) Se,e iEt
0
t e(p, E ) Si, e iEt
p
σ x eA (p, E) Se, eiEt
0
t e(p, E) Si,eiEt
e
E e(r, t ) m
σ p i eA (r, t )
(4.30)
and a spinized electron:
E e(r, t ) m
σ p eA (r, t )
in Dirac form as follows:
(4.31)
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 p e i 0 e i 0 e e iLiM e iM iM p e iLiL e iM iM e
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM p cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM e
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1013
m
p
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ m p
x ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i i e
i i i i e
t
E
E
E
t
t
E
t
p
e
Et m ip x ip x Et m ip x ip x
e
px e
p
x
i i
p
e
1
1
1
1
E m x ip x ip x E m x ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
p t e
p
t
i
p
e
E m x i se, e iEt E m x se, e iEt
0
0
iEt
iEt
pi
t si, e
p t si, e
p
e
E e(r, t ) m
σ x i eA (p, E) S e, e iEt
0
σ p i eA (r, t )
t e(p, E) S i, e iEt
p
E e m σ x eA
iEt
(r, t )
(p, E ) S e, e
0
iEt
σ p eA (r, t )
t e(p, E) S i, e
e
(4.32)
In expressions (4.30), (4.31) and (4.32), p , e and h indicate proton, electron and
hydrogen atom respectively. Again, proton has charge e, electron has charge –e, and
A ( , A) and A ( , A) are the electromagnetic potentials acting on spinized
p
e
proton and spinized electron respectively.
Again, if A ( , A) p is negligible due to fast motion of the orbiting spinized electron,
we have from the last expression in (3.129):
E m σ x i S e iEt
e,
0
S e iEt
σ p i
t
i,
p
E e m σ x eA
iEt
(r, t )
(p, E ) S e, e
0
iEt
σ p eA (r, t )
t e(p, E) S i, e
e
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1014
The Weyl (chiral) form of the last expression in (4.32) and expression (4.33) are
respectively as follows:
E e(r, t ) σ p i eA (r, t )
m
S e,r e iEt
0
(4.34)
m
E e(p, E) σ p i eA (p, E) S i,l e iEt
p
E e σ p eA
m
S e,l e iEt
(r, t )
(r, t )
0
m
E e(p, E) σ p eA (p, E) S i,r e iEt
e h
E σ p i
m S e,r e iEt
0
S e iEt
m
(4.35)
E
σ
p
i
i
,
l
p
E e σ p eA
iEt
m
S e,l e
(r, t )
(r, t )
0
m
E e(p, E ) σ p eA (p, E) S i,r e iEt
e h
One kind of metamorphoses of (4.30)-(4.35) in which the dual universe is comprised of
said external energy-momentum space and said internal spacetime is respectively as
follows:
t e(p, E)
σ x i eA (p, E)
t e(p, E)
σ x eA (p, E)
σ p i eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
0
E e(r, t ) m S i, e iEt
p
σ p eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
0
t e(r, t ) m Si, e iEt
e
(4.30a)
(4.31a)
1 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 e i 0 p e i 0 e i 0 e e iLiM e iM iM p e iLiL e iM iM e
cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM p cos L i sin L cos L i sin L e iM iM e
x m p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
x
p ip μ x μ ip μ x μ
i m i e
i i i i e
E
t
t
t
E
E
t
E
p
e
tE m ip x ip x tE m ip x ip x
e
xp e
x
p
i i
p
e
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
1015
1
1
1
1
t p ip x ip x t p ip x ip x
i
e
e
e
x E m e
x
E
m
i
p
e
t
x i
p i se, e iEt t
0
E m si, e iEt x
p
p se, e iEt
0
E m si, e iEt
e
t e(p, E)
σ p i eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
0
σ x i eA (p, E)
E e(r, t ) m S i, e iEt
p
t e
σ p eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
(p, E )
0
σ x eA (p, E)
E e(r, t ) m S i, e iEt
e
t
σ p i S e, e iEt
0
σ x i E m S i, e iEt
p
t e
σ p eA (r, t ) S e, e iEt
(p, E )
0
σ x eA (p, E)
t e(r, t ) S i, e iEt
e
(4.32a)
(4.33a)
t e(rp, E ) σ x i eA (p, E )
m
S e,r e iEt
0
(4.34a)
E e(r, t ) σ p i eA (r, t ) S i,l e iEt
p
E e σ p eA
m
S e,l e iEt
(r, t )
(r, t )
0
m
E e(r, t ) σ p eA (r, t ) S i,r e iEt
e
h
t σ x i
m S e,r e iEt
0
S e iEt
(4.35a)
E
σ
p
i
i
,
l
p
t e
iEt
m
S e,l e
(p, E ) σ x eA (p, E )
0
E e(r, t ) σ p eA (r, t ) S i,r e iEt
e h
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
5.
Mathematics & Ontology of Ether
Ether is Mathematical, Immanent & Transcendental
5.1
Mathematical Aspect of Ether
In the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model, it is our comprehension that:
(1) The mathematical representation of the primordial ether in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness) is the Euler’s Number e which makes the Euler’s
identity possible:
ei 1 0
(5.1)
(2) Euler’s Number e is the foundation of primordial distinction in prespacetimepremomentumenergy (Consciousness):
1=ei0=ei0ei0=eiL-iLeiM-iM=eiLeiMe-iLe-iM=e-iLe-iM/e-iLe-iM=eiLeiM/eiLeiM…
(5.2)
(3) Euler’s Number e is the foundation of the genesis of four-momentum and four-position
relation in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
1 e i 0 e iLiL Le Li 1 cos L i sin L cos L i sin L
m
p
x m i p i x m p x
i i
E
t
E t
E
t
Et
(5.3)
Et m p x
when
E m p
and p parallels to x.
t
x
(4) Euler’s Number e is the foundation of the genesis, sustenance and evolution of an
elementary particle in prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness):
1 ei 0 ei 0ei 0 e iLiLe iM iM Le Li 1 e iM e iM
1
LM ,e
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Ae
A
LM ,i e iM LM e e iM LM e LM 0
Ai
i
Ai e
iM
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(5.4)
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(5) Euler’s Number e is also the foundation of quantum entanglement or gravity in
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
(6) Euler’s Number is immanent in the sense that it is the ingredient of equations (5.1) to
(5.5) thus all “knowing” and all “present.”
(7) Euler’s Number is also transcendental in the sense that is the foundation of existence
thus “omnipotent” and behind creation.
5.2 Immanent Aspect of Ether
In the prespacetime-premomentumenergy model, the immanent aspect of ether associated
with individual entity (“i-ether”) has following attributes:
i-ether is the ingredient of atoms, of molecules, of cells, of a body;
i-ether is in space, time, motion, rest;
i-ether is governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, biology;
i-ether is the ingredient of this world, the Earth, the Solar System.
i-ether is the ingredient of awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
i-ether is in love, passion, hope, despair;
i-ether is governed by the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
i-ether is the ingredient of mind, soul, spirit.
In the prespacetime model, the immanent of ether associated with the universal entity (“IETHER”) has following attributes:
I-ETHER IS atoms, molecules, cells, body;
I-ETHER IS space, time, motion, rest;
I-ETHER IS laws of physics, chemistry, biology, physiology;
I-ETHER IS this World, the Earth, the Solar System;
I-ETHER IS awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
I-ETHER IS love, passion, hope, despair;
I-ETHER IS the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
I-ETHER IS mind, soul, spirit.
5.3
Transcendental Aspect of Ether
In the prespacetime model, the transcendental aspect of ether associated with
individual/entity (“t-ether”) has following attributes:
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t-ether is not the ingredient of atoms, of molecules, of cells, of a body;
t-ether is not in space, time, motion, rest;
t-ether is not governed by the laws of physics, chemistry, biology;
t-ether is not the ingredient of this world, the Earth, the Solar System.
t-ether is beyond awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
t-ether is beyond love, passion, hope, despair;
t-ether is beyond the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
t-ether is beyond mind, soul, spirit.
In the prespacetime model, the transcendental aspect of ether associated with the universal
entity (“T-ETHER”) has following attributes:
T-ETHER IS NOT the atoms, molecules, cells, body;
T-ETHER IS NOT the space, time, motion, rest;
T-ETHER IS NOT the laws of physics, chemistry, biology;
T-ETHER IS NOT this world, the Earth, the Solar System;
T-ETHER IS NOT awareness, feeling, imagination, free will;
T-ETHER IS NOT love, passion, hope, despair;
T-ETHER IS NOT the laws of psychology, economics, sociology;
T-ETHER IS NOT mind, soul, spirit.
6. Conclusions
This work is a continuation of prespacetime-premomentumenergy model described
recently. Here we have shown how in this model prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) generates: (1) four-momentum and four-position relation as transcendental
Law of One, (2) self-referential matrix law with four-momentum and four-position relation
as the determinant, and (3) Law of Zero in a dual universe comprised of an external
spacetime and an internal momentum-energy space. We have further shown how
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness) may generate, sustain and make
evolving elementary particles and composite particles incorporating the genesis of selfreferential matrix law. In addition, we will discuss the ontology and mathematics of ether in
this model.
Illustratively, in the beginning there was prespacetime-premomentumenergy
(Consciousness) by itself ei0 =1 materially empty and it began to imagine through
primordial
self-referential
spin
1=ei0=ei0ei0=eiL-iLeiM-iM=eiLeiMe-iLe-iM=e-iLe-iM/e-iLeiM iL iM iL iM
=e e /e e …such that it created the self-referential matrix law, the external object to be
observed and internal object as observed, separated them into external spacetime and
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internal momentum-energy space, caused them to interact through said matrix law and thus
gave birth to the dual universeuniverse which it has since sustained and made to evolve.
Prespacetime-premomentumenergy model employs the following ontological principles
among others:
(1) Principle of oneness/unity of existence through quantum entanglement in the
ether of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness).
(2) Principle of hierarchical primordial self-referential spin creating:
- Four-momentum and four-position relation as transcendental Law of One.
- Four-momentum and four-position relation as determinant of matrix law.
- Law of Zero of total phase of external and internal wavefunctions (objects).
Further, prespacetime-premomentumenergy model employs the following mathematical
elements & forms among others in order to empower the above ontological principles:
(3) e, Euler’s Number, for (to empower) ether as foundation/basis/medium
of existence (body of prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness));
(4) i, imaginary number, for (to empower) thoughts and imagination in
prespacetime-premomentumenergy (Consciousness);
(3) 0, zero, for (to empower) emptiness (undifferentiated/primordial state);
(4) 1, one, for (to empower) oneness/unity of existence;
(5) +, -, *, /, = for (to empower) creation, dynamics, balance & conservation;
(6) Pythagorean Theorem for (to empower) energy, momentum and mass relation,
and time, position and intrinsic proper time relation; and
(7) M, matrix, for (to empower) the external spacetime and internal momentumenergy space and the interaction of external and internal wavefunctions.
References
1. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2010), The Principle of Existence: Towards a Science of Consciousness.
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1:1, pp. 50-119. Also see:
http://vixra.org/abs/1001.0011
2. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2010), The Principle of Existence II: Genesis of Self-Referential Matrix Law,
& the Ontology & Mathematics of Ether. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 1:9,
pp. 1149-1178. Also see: http://vixra.org/abs/1012.0043
3. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2013), Application of Prespacetime Model I. Prespacetime journal 4:6, pp.
641-660.
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Hu, H. &Wu, M. Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model II: Generation of Self-Referential Matrix Law & Mathematics of Ether
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4. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2013), Application of Prespacetime Model II. Prespacetime journal 4:6, pp.
661-680.
5. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2014), Premomentumenergy Model I: Creation of Elementary Particles &
Relativistic QM for a Dual Momentum-Energy Universe in Consciousness. Journal of
Consciousness Exploration & Research 5:9, pp. 766-834.
6. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2014), Premomentumenergy Model II: Creation of Self-Referential Matrix
Law & Mathematics of Ether in Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Exploration &
Research 5:9, pp. 835-866.
7. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2014), Modeling Methods Based on Premomentumenergy Model. Journal of
Consciousness Exploration & Research 5:9, pp. 867-888.
8. Hu, H. & Wu, M. (2014), Prespacetime-Premomentumenergy Model I: Generation of Elementary
Particles & Quantum Theory for a Dual Universe Comprised of Spacetime & Momentumenergy Space. Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 5:10, pp. 889-969.
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Gillett, G. & Davis, J. J., A Brief Introduction to the Brain and Paradigm of Melchizedek
Guest Editorial
A Brief Introduction to
The Brain and Paradigm of Melchizedek
Grant Gillett
Bioethics Centre University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand
Jeffery Jonathan (Joshua) Davis*
ישוע
The Embassy of Peace, Whitianga, New Zealand
Abstract
How can a new paradigm, the Paradigm of Melchizedek, shape scientific research in a
completely new direction, in a way that is based on Values rather than unhealthy scepticism? A
distorted kind of scepticism about anything beyond the bare facts as described by a limited
scientific paradigm is widespread in the academic world and has shaped the brain structure of
many scientists to favour a perception of reality strongly biased towards promissory materialism.
This paradigm comes as an antidote to that tendency and is geared towards a greater synthesis
between ancient and modern spiritual wisdom and scientific truth, in order to advance a
cognitive science that allows an inclusive study of the neurobiology of values like Truth, Love
and Unity and propel human consciousness towards the manifestation of a peaceful social
environment.
Key Words: Brain, Melchizedek, paradigm, neurobiology, truth, love, value, unity, peace,
Consciousness.
Plato’s great insight that goodness and truth are one suggests that an inclusive form of
knowledge, would shape brains and hearts capable of doing science as part of an integral, loving
and caring way of being that is concerned with the betterment of our knowledge, perception and
experience of life, so as to increase the quality of all aspects and dimensions of human existence
in the world. The thought, derived from John Hughlings Jackson [1], is that as we integrate at
higher and higher levels the varieties of information used to solve a cognitive problem, we
broaden the range of contingencies that are factored into the control of behaviour so as to more
adequately reflect and adapt our lives to our real human situation (maximally understood). Thus,
for instance, if one were conscious of the effect on the environment of increasing energy
consumption and the imbalances created by it one might see that certain types of action,
whatever the gratification they offer, are ultimately maladaptive and so avoid them. In so doing
one might find that a narrow problem solving schema of the type found in the dorso-lateral
frontal lobe needs to be moderated by other less articulate resonances with nature and lived
experience.
*Correspondence: c/o Sarah Frew, The Embassy of Peace, Whitianga, New Zealand. http://paradiselanding.weebly.com/
E-mail: sarahinparadise888@gmail.com
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The Promissory Materialistic paradigm focuses on functional material outcomes aimed at
individual survival and preference in the short to medium term and explains only the functional,
problem solving consciousness directed towards ego-oriented survival needs. It assumes that a
human is and must be accountable for by-processes shaped by organismic values realised in an
individual brain. That creates a paradox of brain and mind duality when we consider abstract and
general thoughts through which human beings become cognisant of eternal and shared concerns
that transcend individual interests and tries to integrate those with a creative source of unity
between all humankind that can be explored subjectively, internally, and spiritually yet also
objectively, energetically through the interaction of biology with meaning, and even through the
interaction between the matter field and the quantum field.
A closed materialistic perspective of the kind found in research reported by V.S. Ramachandran
[2] embodies the view that a ‘God Module’ in the brain mediates “spiritual experience” which is
seen in terms of self-contained brain processes, neurogenetic interactions and intra-organismic
information processes. By contrast, Francisco Varela [3], Humberto Maturana [4], Stuart
Hameroff [5] and Fritjof Capra [6], take a systemic approach to consciousness as a process
emergent in an autopoietic or self-organising and self-making system that is adapted holistically
to a complex world so that life and cognition can embrace all levels of reality from the most
physical and physiological to the most symbolic and abstract. The latter kind of neural process is
deeply informed by “propositionising” [1] a level of representation that is essentially shared and
tracks the truth of our being-in-the-world-with-others [7]. Consciousness in that inclusive sense
shapes and breathes life into the human life world and the whole of the universe as we try to
understand it. Spiritual thought, as explored by mystics in all religions, focuses on a type of
consciousness that embraces the possibility of a personal dialogue, and a personal relationship
with the process of Life and The Creator of all things (however conceptualised). This is the most
highly integrative level of understanding of the human condition, and it allows us to theorise,
hypothesise and explore the existence of creation and Creator by overcoming the dichotomies of
for example, personal~impersonal and self~other, seeing these apparent opposites as ecologically
complementary pairs or as described by Scott Kelso [8].
When we realise that brains are unable to work without the body, and human beings are unable
to work without other human beings, other beings, the planet and life itself, we are left with a
view of reality where consciousness, cognition and neural activity have to be studied in a way
that recognises both downward and upward causation as complementary, and model
consciousness with the aid of non-linear systems dynamics.
To go beyond that complex physical reality and consider the existence of a spiritual field which
permeates all of it, a field different in quality from, and even more beautiful and all-inclusive
than the quantum field, and also to consider The Creator as the Source of this field, we need
“The Connective Paradigm of Melchizedek”. This paradigm differs from Promissory
Materialism, and also from that of a purely energetic, holistic and systemic thought oriented
paradigm. The first turns our view towards the machinery, and the second to why that machinery
exists and what it is all about. One conceives the universe as an impersonal machinery, the other
considers the universe as an impersonal living organism, while “The Connective Paradigm of
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Melchizedek” considers the universe as existing by and through the presence of conscious,
cognising, loving and Living Beings who form a set of Holons. It tells us why the machine or the
living organism exist in time and space in both personal and impersonal relationships, and what
the purpose of these Holons are in a larger family system of personal relationships.
The paradigm itself is based on the existence of The Creator, where communication with HimHer is optional, where we have the choice according to the integrative structures informing our
nervous systems and it is our prerogative to establish that communication or rule it out. The
Spiritual Values concerned can be accessed through an integrated mode of sensory-motor and
cognitive processing that includes our relationships with other people, the environment, and the
universe at large.
When we talk about the embodiment of Values like Love and Truth, we are talking also about an
experience intimately connected with the idea of self or who I Am. This is often limited to the inskin individual and survival however, in reality, that individual is in a dynamic relationship of
continuous reciprocal causation with a context that can be construed either narrowly or broadly
[9].
In this deeper sense, what we think of as the self is actually moulded by something, which is
greater than just our bodies and we lose sight of it when we narrow our gaze to what goes on
within us.
Spiritual Values exist with or without the agency of a human or human behaviour. To
understand, explore and research Spiritual Values would be to understand that we are dealing
with forces, essences and presences that are antidotes to greed, fear, anger, guilt, misuse of
power and chaos in general. These invisible and apprehensible presences, essences and forces
may become accessible to us at will, and help construct our own sense of identity, in the
paradigm of Melchizedek, called our I Am Identity. Through that process, human beings may
then construct human thoughts and feelings beneficial to mental, emotional and physical
wellbeing, and even learn to embody and express Universal Spiritual Values.
Once these Values are accessible to us at will through action structures and neural assemblies
that are maximally inclusive of our engagement in the world, we are given Presence and power
of action, and our jurisdiction or sovereignty in personal relationships is prescribed for us to fit
with our destiny as co-creators, and planters of the seeds of wisdom and goodness. This also
means that the I Am Identity prescribes interpersonal relationships that lay the foundation for
Law and Justice. On the other hand, human values based on individualistic neurogenetics, are
behavioural and sometimes limit or support human wellbeing relativized to personal biological,
physical reality and its priorities, however they can be transformed by integrating Spiritual
Values.
If we are embedded in morphic fields (as Rupert Sheldrake [10] calls them) that can transform
our perception of reality through wide connections with others, the question of human behaviour
and Spiritual Identity can be re-phrased. How can we access ways of being or behaving that are
conducive to the synthesis and synergy that integrates in our neural processors to form a new
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cognitive map suited to the embodiment of Spiritual Values as co-constructors of a realm of
being, shared between humans and other beings?
We seem to be conditioned, however imperfectly, to express Universal Values, and confining our
cognitive structure to the imperfections seems to be getting in the way between human beings of
different groups with different Behavioural Values. To address that, we have to explore the
possibility that our perception and behaviours in a sense, are being coloured by what Metzinger
[11] and Ramachandran [2] call ‘a false construct of self.’ Perhaps those false constructs are
inherent in the temporal and behavioural boundaries erected in our brains through self-oriented
reward and fear conditioning and the moulding of Behavioural Values through national,
religious, or other group identities and we need to (cognitively) step out of them into a
completely different way of being. But what transformations in the brain and which shaping
environments are conducive to producing a change that will overcome these limitations by
creating an integrative neural dynamics, based on gene expressions and environmental
influences? The ideal is a new universal-value-oriented cognitive map that allows one to act
peacefully and harmoniously toward all creation.
In the context of this Paradigm we define such a person as a Tzadik, someone concerned with the
wellbeing of all humanity as seen through the eyes of The Creator or a maximally integrated
state of consciousness, like a Buddha. These kinds of people are wired with a cognitive map of
reality that we have called “The Brain of Melchizedek”. A brain of that kind is capable of
large-scale integration of neuro assemblies through oscillatory synchronisations and desynchronisations, as described by Kozma [12] and the non-linear brain model of Freeman and
Guiseppe Vitiello [13].
This same principle applies to other oscillatory systems that interact with the brain, like the heart,
the respiratory and digestive systems and the autonomic nervous system. At a macro level
synchronisation within a human being can then be extended between human beings in ways that
can be modelled by expanding on the K5 and K6 Models of Kozma and Freeman.
If synchronicity is real in the way described by Sheldrake [10], Carl Jung [14], and Mari Jibu and
Kunio Yasue [15], it becomes possible to understand the thought that we are Holons as part of
something bigger, perhaps God’s Order, and can talk about the Life-Giving Spirit that embraces
all of us and brings us together as something accessible to consciousness and cognition.
“The Brain of Melchizedek”, is a brain geared to the embodiment of Spiritual Values in a way
that is meta-stable (regarding metastability see Scott Kelso and Emmanuelle Tognoli [8], Walter
Freeman and M. D. Holmes [16]). As the brain goes from human consciousness to higher
Consciousness, a person’s perception of reality changes from a survival map, based on reactions
towards threats, fearful situations and so on, into a map of reality capable of existing in the
presence of “a Peace that surpasses all understanding” so that she or he becomes altruistic and
connected in spirit to all other human beings [17]. “The Paradigm of Melchizedek” is realised in
human beings regardless of the experience of knowing God personally or having even conceived
that such a relationship could be valid for them, provided they are minded towards maximal
integration in their holistic adaptation to a context [1]. Both the personal and impersonal ways of
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relating or embodying Universal Values have been discussed by Jewish psychologist Abraham
Maslow [18] who spoke about Being Values (or B Values) and a cross-roads between a personal
relationship with the Source of Values (Union with God) and the impersonal embodiment of B
Values.
Further development of the global potential of this orientation is found in a body of research
concerned with the understanding and modelling of the Spiritual Neurogenetic Propagation of
Spiritual Values and Peace trans-generationally, and a possible conscious re-engineering or
redesign of our evolutionary path towards a peaceful humanity, understood through the works of
Leonid Perlovsky [19], as well as “The Brain of Melchizedek” (Appendix C) [20].
Acknowledgement: This article is a short version of the paper “The Brain and Paradigm of
Melchizedek – A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Spirituality or a Spiritual Approach to Cognitive
Neuroscience” by Grant Gillett and Joshua. The full version of this paper is on the following website:
https://sites.google.com/site/thebrainofmelcizedek/Home/archivepdfs
References
[1] J. Hughlings Jackson; “Remarks on the evolution and dissolution of the nervous system.” Brit. J Psychiatry
1887; 33: 25-48.
[2] V. S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee; Phantoms in the Brain – Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind. (New
York, USA: William Morrow and Company, INC., 1998).
[3] F. J. Varela and E. Thompson; “Radical embodiment; neural dynamics and consciousness”, Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, Volume 5, Issue 10, pp. 418-425 (October 2001).
[4] H. R. Maturana and F. J. Varela; The Tree of Knowledge – The Biological Roots of Human Understanding
Revised Edition. (Boston, Massachusetts USA: Shambhala Publications, 1987).
[5] S. Hameroff; “Consciousness, Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics: The Case for a Connection.”
www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm accessed online 22 July, 2008.
[6] F. Capra; The Web of Life: A New Scientific Understanding of Living Systems. (Anchor Books, 1996).
[7] G. Gillett; Subjectivity and Being somebody: human identity and neuroethics, St Andrews series on philosophy
and Public Affairs. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2008).
[8] J. A. Kelso and E. Tognoli; “Toward a Complementary Neuroscience: Metastable Coordination Dynamics of the
Brain”, (pp. 39-59). In Neurodynamics of Cognition and Consciousness, Perlovsky and Kozma, Editors (Verlag
Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2007).
[9] A. Clark; Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action and cognitive extension. (Oxford: U P, 2008).
[10] R. Sheldrake; A New Science of Life - Revised and Expanded - The Hypothesis of Formative Causation. (Los
Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc. 1981).
[11] T. Metzinger; Being No One - The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. (USA: A Bradford Book, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Press, 2003).
[12] R. Kozma; “Neurodynamics of Intentional Behavior Generation”, (pp.131-161). In Neurodynamics of
Cognition and Consciousness, Perlovsky and Kozma, Editors (Verlag Berlin Heidelberg: Springer, 2007).
[13] W. J. Freeman and G. Vitiello; “Nonlinear Brain Dynamics as Macroscopic Manifestation of Underlying ManyBody Field Dynamics.” (Science Direct, Elsevier, 2006).
[14] C. G. Jung; Synchronicity – An Acausal Connecting Principle. (USA: Princeton University Press, 1973).
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[15] M. Jibu and K. Yasue; Advances in Consciousness Research, Quantum Brain Dynamics and Consciousness - An
Introduction. (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. 1995. Accessed online 22 July, 2008 at:
http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm
[16] W. J. Freeman and M.D. Holmes; “Metastability, Instability, and State Transition in Neocortex.” Neural
Networks 18(5-6) pp. 497-504. (2005).
[17] I. Kant; Anthropology from a pragmatic Point of View. Tr. V.L.Dodwell. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1978).
[18] A. H. Maslow; Religions, Values, And Peak-Experiences. (USA: Viking Press, 1964).
[19] L. Perlovsky; “Evolution of Languages, Consciousness and Cultures”, pp. 25 –39 IEEE Computational
Intelligence. Volume 2 Number 3 (August 2007).
[20] J.J.J. Davis; The Brain of Melchizedek – A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Spirituality. (2008).
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Liu, L., On Artificial Intelligence & Free Will
Opinion
On Artificial Intelligence & Free Will
Lei Liu
*
School of Information Management, Dezhou Universtiy, Dezhou, China
ABSTRACT
It is desirable to us humans that a computer or an AI would not require any programmer to do
meaningful work. How can we achieve this? This paper aims to provide a tentative answer. Lady
Lovelace was the first person and programmer to point out that a computer needs to originate
something to be creative and autonomous. Philosophers think this as free will objection. Though
free will inspired some attention in AI literature, the mystery of free will is so far unsolved. This
paper suggests that a desire for a divergent state is a plausible evidence for existence of free will.
Though a desire is still mysterious to us in some way, the content of a divergent state is somewhat
specific.
Key Words: artificial intelligence, free will, divergent state, human, computer, Lovelace.
1. Introduction
Lady Lovelace’s objection was perhaps the most powerful objection against artificial intelligence.
She stated that computers originate nothing and they merely do what we order them, via programs.
Hauser[2015] classified it as free will objection. Bringsjord et al. [2001] took her objection as a
way to avoid the problem of trickery stirred by the Turing Test. They states that strong AI will be
demonstrated when a machine's creativity is beyond the explanation of its creator. However, Oppy
et al. [2011] points out that “it remains an open question whether a digital computing device is
capable of ‘origination’ in this sense”.
Similarly, I understand it as an indication for our aim at AI: If a computer or an AI doesn’t need
any programmer to do meaningful work for us, it is a desirable scene for us. To achieve this, we
need to add free will to AI. For example, if a man feels to be a puppet, he loses partly free will at
least, cannot originate anything anymore, is not the author of what he does and (is forced to) waits
for instructions.
McCarthy [2000] had given an attempt to realize a free will that is compatible with determinism.
However, it still needs us to write programs. Thus compatible theory of free will is not adequate
for the purpose of this paper.
In addition, the desirable free will faces serious problems because it requires that we have ultimate
control over our actions: that is to say, it needs not nature (without us) but us the conscious beings
as its ultimate source. Determinism holds that nature forms a great causal chain (perhaps) without
ultimate source. Free will demands that our actions are not produced by a deterministic process
*
Correspondence: Lei Liu, Ph.D., School of Information Management, Dezhou Universtiy, Dezhou, China.
E-mail: leiliusid@gmail.com
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that traced back to factors beyond our control [Pereboom, 2007b]. This definition presents a dilemma: if determinism is true, our desires/actions can be traced back to the remote past which is
not under our control. Therefore, if this is true, then we are not free. However, if indeterminism is
true, our desires/actions are nothing but a matter of luck. So once again, we are not free. Versions
of this argument have been posited by Voltaire, Diderot, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche,
Clarence Darrow, Paul Edwards, Bruce Waller, Saul Smilansky, Richard Double, and Pereboom
[Pereboom, 2001, 2007a, 2007b]. As stated by Clark[2008], a determined event occurs necessarily
from the remote past in conjunction with natural law. We have no control over it since we have no
control over the remote past. An undetermined or chance event occurs spontaneously and receives
no control from anything; hence it is not controlled by the agent. For example, if a quantum jump
in one's brain resulted in a choice it would seem that it occurred by accident rather than from a
choice by the agent.
That is to say, free will faces serious threatens from physical laws. Thus some philosophers begin
to consider if physical laws is complete. Recently, 1Horst[2011] provided a compatible theory of
free will which holds that deterministic laws don’t predict motions with exactness. However, this
liberation is not enough for our desire to live. For example, if deterministic laws together with
fixed past predicates the swing will hit me heavily without exactness, the swing-no- hit-me state is
more desirable for me.
This paper states that a desire for a divergent state is the key for forming free will. Though a desire
is still mysterious to us in some way, the content of a divergent state is somewhat specific.
1.1 Problem faced by free will realists
Free will paradigm holds free will as a necessary condition for moral responsibility, i.e., free will is
needed to makes us truly deserving of blame or praise for our actions. It presents a dilemma as we
have stated.
Free will paradigm is faced by two questions:
(1) Is free will compatible with determinism?
(2) Is determinism true in our world?
Question (2) relates to the fact of what our world is. Question (1) would only have theoretical
meaning if there is evidence to falsity of determinism. By the way, the first one received most
attention.
Thus arguments about free will can be classified into two kinds of arguments: theoretical and
factual. Many theoretical arguments don’t start from settling if our world is deterministic or not.
They just argue that free will is incompatible or not with determinism (or indeterminism). Some of
them require that there are causations by a substance without answering whether there are any in
1
Thanks for Pereboom and Oppy for helpful discussions on arguing from incompleteness of physical laws, especially Horst’s
position.
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our world. [Clarke, 2003, 135, 146-7; O'Connor et al., 2006, 244] Uncaused theories require that a
free action be either uncaused or caused as long as it is not deterministically caused [Ginet, 2007;
McCann, 1998; Ginet, 2002] while they give no evidence for this kind of indeterminism.
Event-causal theories face this kind of problem, too. Though quantum mechanics is true in micro
world, it hardly affects the macro world.
Factual arguments state that our world is either deterministic or probabilistically indeterministic or
else. It is very rare in literature recently. Pereboom argues in this way, which can be summarized
below. [Pereboom, 2001; 2007b, 469]
Either Deterministic or probabilistically indeterministic form of scientific naturalism is true according to scientific evidence.
The truth of these scientific naturalisms entails that all actions we perform are the result of processes that traced back to factors beyond our control (The past before we born or chance). If the act
is the result of processes that traced back to factors beyond the agent’s control, then the agent
doesn’t deserve blame or praise for the act. Thus we can’t deserve praise or blame for our actions.
There are also experiments that showed that free will is a illusion besides theoretical objections.
Smith [2011] stated that Haynes and Libet successfully suggested that some simple decisions are
not under our conscious control, which contradicts to the belief that we have free will. You may
have thought you decided whether to have tea or coffee this morning, for example, but the decision
may have been made long before you were aware of it. This is a new challenge to the concept of
free will. However, says Mele, the majority of philosophers debate the interplay between freedom
and determinism—the theory that everything is predestined, either by fate or by physical laws
—but Roskies says that results from neuroscience can't yet settle that debate. They may speak to
the predictability of actions, but not to the issue of determinism.2
In this paper, I wish to find the evidence of free will that is partly specific by investigating a serious
of the following propositions.
Propositions:
Suppose our world is govern by quantum indeterministic laws.
1. If we desire for a state, we desire for that state to happen not with the probability of less than 1
but 1.
2. Thus the desired probability of occurrence of desired state is 1.
3. In reality, the probability of occurrence of it is less than 1since it didn't occur (suppose the desire
is unsatisfied, which is very common according to our experiences. Also suppose our world is
govern by quantum indeterministic laws.).
4. Thus only one of them is the probabilistically determined probability.
5. If the desired probability is not a divergent one (which means “different from the probabilistically determined one”) but the probabilistically determined one, then there is a state that failed
to occur with the probabilistically determined probability, which states that quantum indeterminism is not true. Thus some desires must be desires for a divergent state.
6. We have a desire for a divergent state and it is satisfied. Thus quantum indeterminism is not true
in our world.
2
To be more positively, Mele takes a project of “The Philosophy and Science of Self-Control” to address the relation between
free will and science of self-control.
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We want to add evidence to indicate whether (6) is possible given others. That is to say, there may
be some events or probability distribution of them that can’t be computed from the past (before we
born) and physical law. Thus neither determinism nor probabilistic indeterminism is true in our
world. This is just a negative answer to what our world is. We only give a plausible argument from
some facts. Let “a divergent state” mean “different from a determined state”. Then (6) is changed
into a proposition against determinism. Similar analysis is given in this paper, too.
Before we start, let’s take a look at the value or aim of free will. I believe this presents a better start
for seeking the evidence of free will and a plausible condition for the incompatibilities of free will
with both determinism and quantum indeterminism.
Kane reports that most ordinary persons start out as natural incompatibilists. The idea that freedom
and responsibility might be compatible with determinism looks to them at first like a "quagmire of
evasion" (William James) or "a wretched subterfuge"(Immanuel Kant) [Kane, 1999]. In my experience, when they learned that determinism is a true aspect of our lives, they often seemed to
have a bleak feeling about themselves. Perhaps this was because it seemed that their future is determined by the unchangeable past, since because of this, how could they diverge from their determined future? If they are determined to have a miserable life, how could they struggle to escape
this inevitable future? Thus, it is valuable that there is a divergence from deterministic laws,
though this is not possible if determinism is true. In addition, quantum indeterminism threatens us
too. If a disaster whose antecedent probability of occurrence is 0.82 according to quantum indeterminism is about to occur, we might become unhappy about this point and seek some way to
ensure our chances of surviving. However, this result is not possible according to quantum indeterminism.
If determinism is true, we are destined by the remote past and natural law. Free will can help us
escape from that destiny and affect the physical world. Thus even if some people are determined to
encounter catastrophes, free will can guides them to find ways to escape disasters. If some outcomes of a quantum event are disasters, then it would be desirable if free will helped us to reduce
the probability of these occurrences. Kane also raises this concern:
“Is freedom compatible with determinism?" —the question is too simple and ill-formed. The
reason is that there are many meanings of "freedom" and many of them are compatible with determinism. Even in a determined world, we would want to distinguish persons who are free from
such things as physical restraint, addiction or neurosis, coercion, compulsion, covert control or
political oppression from persons who are not free from these things; and we could allow that these
freedoms would be preferable to their opposites even in a determined world. [Kane, 1996]
Here Kane stated that a freedom that is incompatible with determinism is preferable. In other
words, they are more favorable than their opposite values. Another reason similar to Kane’s, is that
it is valuable for us to have a freedom that is incompatible with quantum indeterminism. Clark also
makes this point: “If it (the indeterminism provided)won’t hurt, it won’t help.” [Clarke, 2008]
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As we and others[Pereboom, 2001; Strawson, 2010] have stated, for us to have moral responsibility, there are events that can’t be traced back to factors beyond our control. This we term it as a
divergence. Obviously evidence is needed for this claim.
2. The desire for a divergent state is a key for free will
Let us take determinism to be the view that given the complete state of the world at one point in
time with conjunction to natural law, the state of the world at every future point in time follows
logically. Or interpret it as: the state of the world at every future point in time is uniquely determined by the previous states of the world as a matter of natural law. Here the state of the world is a
state at a time t.
Paul Thiry D’Holbach, one of the leading figures of the French encyclopedistes, presented the
cosmos precisely as a network of interlocking causes and effects. The universe, he wrote, “reveals
to us an immeasurable and uninterrupted chain of causes and effects” [d’Holbach, 1770]. Thus, if
determinism is true, the future state of the world is determined (by the past as a matter of natural
law). That state is not only determined but also holds since it is the future state of the world. Thus
we can analyze determinism into two conjunctions:
A determined state about each future time point is computed from the past and natural law. (1)
That determined state obtains. (2) Thus, if a future state can’t be traced back to the remote past and
natural law, it is enough to show that (2) is false.
Let us understand quantum indeterminism as the indeterminism introduced by the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics. On this interpretation, the world is governed by statistical laws
which are also strict laws following Davidson. Thus all the outcomes of antecedent events happen
because of non-trivial probabilities, which are given by these statistical laws and the antecedent
event. Here “non-trivial” denotes that the value of them should not all be 0 or 1 for capturing the
idea that it is essential to probability that, at least in principle, it can take intermediate values.
[Hájek, 2012] If some outcome is probabilistically determined by an antecedent event, then given
the antecedent event, the probability of its occurrence is static given the statistical laws. In other
words, if this probability is 0.3, then for a large number of instances it is correct to expect that the
outcome happens close to 30 percent of the time. The words “probabilistically determined” used in
this way is the same as how Kane understands indeterminism: “Indeterminism is consistent with
nondeterministic or probabilistic causation, where the outcome is not inevitable.” [Kane, 1999]
Similarly to determinism, Indeterminism can be analyzed into two conjunctions:
A probability distribution of states about the future is computed from the past and natural law. (3)
This probability distribution obtains. (4)
Similarly, for an event not probabilistically determined, only (4) is needed to be false.
With these interpretations of determinism and quantum indeterminism in place, we return to the
evidence of divergence. Let’s take a look at events involving free will. It is common to see an event
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involving free will as a process: deliberating on some reasons, forming a desire, performing some
overt bodily actions, and testing if we will be able to succeed and fulfill our aims.
At first, a desire is a desire for a (desired) state of affairs.
“According to most theories, desires are always desires for conceivable states of affairs. A desire
for tea is a desire for a certain state of affairs one has in mind: that one drinks some tea. A desire for
a new pair of skates is likewise a desire for another state of affairs: that one owns a new pair of
skates. And so on. This idea is also expressed with phrases such as ‘desires are attitudes toward
propositions’ or ‘desires have propositional content.” [Schroeder, 2012]
For example, if Rose desires candy bars, then there is only one answer of the following five states
of affairs that will provide the solution in which her desire is satisfied:
1. Rose possesses, but does not eat some candy bars in the near future.
2. Rose eats some candy bars in the near future.
3. Rose doesn’t eat some candy bars in the near future while the probability for her to do this is 0.8.
4. Rose eats some candy bars someday.
5. Rose possesses, but does not eat some candy bars in the near future.
It seems that only 2 would satisfy Rose's desire. This gives us grounds to say that Rose's desire is
for a state of affairs: that she eats some candy bars in the near future. An additional observation is
that this state of affairs is possibly not realistic. For example, if only 4 represents Rose’s reality,
then the desired state is certainly not a feasible outcome. One of the other three observations that
need to be addressed is that the desired state corresponds to sometime points which occur in the
near future at the time that she began to desire candy bars.
The second observation is that: A desire is satisfied if counterpart of 2 is true. (SCOD satisfied
condition of desire)[Schroeder, 2012]
The last observation is that: If we desire for a state, we desire that state happens not with the
probability of less than 1 but 1.
Let’s take a look at the concept of “state of affairs” since we used this definition above. A state of
affairs: a way the world is (situations, being able to exist without obtaining) [Plantinga, 1974, 44;
Pollock, 1984, 52]. It can be understood as a possible scenario.
For simplicity, I use “desire for divergent state” to denote “desire for a state that it and the determined state can’t both be the obtaining state,” in the case of determinism. Note that both of these
two states occurring at about the same time and the same place can obtain, if they are the same.
Thus if there is a desire for a divergent state, then it is a desire for a state that is not the same as the
relevant determined state.
Similarly for the case of quantum indeterminism, the desired state may not be the same as the
probabilistically determined state as long as they are different states in a normal sense or their
probability of occurrence are different if they are the same. For simplicity, in the case of quantum
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indeterminism, I use “desire for divergent state” to denote “desire for a state that it and the probabilistically determined state can’t both occur with the same probability.”
We provide evidence for a weak divergence and a strong divergence, though the latter is not ideally proven.
A weak divergence consists of a desire for a divergent state that is not actually satisfied. Though
this is not an evidence for the direct falsity of determinism & quantum indeterminism, it is a divergence in the sense that the actions we perform to realize the desire is a failed try to change the
state of the world from determined or probabilistically determined states. In fact, we can be responsible even if we failed. Thus this is also a divergence while it is a failed divergence. A strong
divergence results from a desire for a divergent state that is actually satisfied. With such an example, we can say that we can change the world from determinism and quantum indeterminism to
a desired state.
In this paper, I will focus the evidence for the case for determinism since analysis of the case for
indeterminism is quite similar. Because of this, I will only provide some necessary words to the
latter.
2.1 Our world doesn’t constrain the desired states to be only the determined states of the
world
Let’s see an attempt that is well known: perpetual motion machine. A perpetual motion machine is
a hypothetical machine that can do work indefinitely without an energy source. This kind of machine is impossible, as it would violate the first and second laws of thermodynamics. [Derry, 2002,
176; Roy, 2002, 58] Thus, the existence of such machine is against natural law. Though no such
machine has ever been built, many have the desire to create one.
We get two states of the world: one is the real state of the world where there is no perpetual motion
machine being built, the other is the desired state that there is a perpetual motion machine being
built. Only one of them obtains that there are no perpetual machines being built.
The question is which one is the same as the determined state of the world according to natural law?
Or is the desire a desire for a divergent state?
Clearly there are no perpetual motion machines being built is the determined state, and obtaining
one since is not even possible according to natural law. Similarly, it is also bound to be the case in
the quantum world since a perpetual motion machine is also impossible according to quantum
mechanics. So since there are no perpetual motion machines being built it is also not an obtaining
state according to quantum mechanics. The obtaining and determined state is that there are no
perpetual motion machines being built.
Thus we have evidence that there are desires for a divergent state: desire for perpetual motion
machine. Similar cases include desires for a Golden Mountain, round squares, meeting aliens, etc.
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This forms firm evidence for the claim that determinism doesn’t constrain desired states to exist
only within determined states of the world. (This is similar to the case of quantum indeterminism
since a perpetual motion machine is also impossible if quantum indeterminism is true.) In addition,
I have another example for the evidence of desire for a divergent state. Let’s consider unsatisfied
desires. The first thing to mention is the truism of them. We have desires almost every day: desire
to have a birthday party, desire to have progress in somebody’s career, etc. Many of them are
unsatisfied. In fact, large numbers of desires are satisfied desires.
Example 1 of an unsatisfied desire:
Tom wanted to drink some water. Then Tom found no water, but an apple after some action or
changed his mind without any action. Tom ate the apple.
These states are listed according to the time sequence of them.
Observations from the above example:
The desired state is not realized in reality. If not so, it is a satisfied desire according to SCOD.
The real state of the world in the near future of the desire is not the same as the desired state.
Only one of them is the same as the determined state by definition of determinism and (2).
If the desired state is not a divergent state but a determined state, then there is a determined state
that failed to hold, which is a contradiction to definition of determinism.
For if this is so, then even a virtual state can be a determined state and thus determinism fails to
have any bearing on reality.
Thus each unsatisfied desire is a desire for a divergent state if we want to believe that determinism
is true.
Let’s turn to the case of quantum indeterminism.
Example 2 of an unsatisfied desire:
Tom wanted to drink some water. Then Tom found no water, but an apple after some action or
changed his mind without any action. Tom ate the apple.
We have the following observations:
1. If we desire for a state, we desire for that state to happen not with the probability of less than 1
but 1. (A previous observation at the beginning of Section 2)
2. Thus the desired probability of occurrence of desired state is 1. The desired state is "Tom's
drinking some water".
3. In reality, the probability of occurrence of it is less than 1since it didn't occur.
4. Thus only one of them is the probabilistically determined probability.
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5. If the desired probability is not a divergent one but the probabilistically determined one, then
there is a probabilistically determined state that failed to occur with the probabilistically determined probability, which states that quantum indeterminism is not true.
Thus each unsatisfied desire is a desire for a divergent state if we want to believe that quantum
indeterminism is true. Combined with the former observation, we have to accept that each unsatisfied desire is a desire for a divergent state whether determinism or quantum indeterminism is true.
This is the second evidence for the claim that we can have a desire for a divergent state.
2.2 Weak divergence
As I have defined, weak divergence is the satisfaction of these two claims:
1. Somebody has a desire for a divergent state.
2. The desire is not satisfied.
We saw that the desire for a perpetual motion machine is such a desire, which satisfies these two
claims. And if determinism is true, each example of unsatisfied desire is such a desire, too.
Though we have no evidence for direct falsity of determinism & quantum indeterminism from this,
it is a divergence in the sense that the actions we perform to realize the desire is a failed try to
change the state of the world. Exemplified by the desire for a perpetual motion machine, the determined state of the world is that there is no such machine, while there is also the desired state by
those people trying to build one as if such a machine were possible to build. Thus the desired state
is different from the determined state.3
If they had succeeded, the state of the world would not be determined by the past and physical laws.
(Counterfactual analysis of weak divergence)
In fact, we can be responsible for the actions required to satisfy a desire even if we fail in our
attempts to reach it, because this is also an attempt to diverge from determined state even though it
is a failed divergence.
For example, those who tried to build perpetual motion machines can be said to make bold and
failed efforts to change the determined world, and it makes good sense to say so.
In addition, many divergent states are as easy to realize as determined ones. Suppose a door is
determined to be open at some future time. Then the door’s closing at that time is a divergent state.
That is also easy to realize. If someone chooses this as his or her desire, then divergence is expected.
Whether the desire for a divergent state is determined or not doesn’t matter, it is weak divergence as long as that
desire is a desire for a divergent state. This shows that Libet and other neurobiologists might be too quick to form the
idea that free will is an illusion.
3
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Counterfactual analysis of weak divergence is prime facie very similar to what compatibilists give
by their conditional analysis:
“Since determinism is a thesis about what must happen in the future given the actual past, determinism is consistent with the future being different given a different past.” [McKenna, 2009]
However, there is a tracing-stop at the time of desiring when I use the denotation of desire for a
divergent state:
From an unsatisfied desire for a divergent state, we may derive these counterfactuals: if that desire
(for a divergent state) were satisfied, a divergent state would obtain.
We can trace this back further: if the agent had taken more care, her desire for passing an exam
would be satisfied.
However, we cannot trace back further to unmake that desire:
If the desire for a divergent state were not made, then this desire would be satisfied.
Certainly this is false, because it is ridiculous to say that a desire that doesn’t exist is satisfied.
This is not to say that you cannot trace back further in other respects, but that the desire for a divergent state should hold necessarily for divergence in the same way as satisfying a desire for a
divergent state. It is far beyond the scope of this paper.
There is no such tracing stop for compatibilists:
Determinism is consistent with the future being different given a different past. Compatibilists
state that if someone has different desires than they had originally, and then accomplishes these
new desires, that the world would be different, because this new desire is an alternative to the
previous one.
Thus the satisfaction of desire for a divergent state doesn’t need to be traced back further to the
time of making that desire. It needs only to change something afterwards.
If we have desires for a divergent state, we have to fail in our attempts to satisfy those desires in
order for determinism to be true. That is to say, that as we satisfy a desire for a divergent state, that
there is also a divergent state that occurs with obtaining.
Thus we have to admit:
Any satisfied desire is a desire for a determined state.
This is intuitively not plausible since we desire many things and we normally don’t know and
don’t consider whether our desire is the determined state.
In fact, with careful analysis, I can show that this actually involves highly implausible coincidences for this to occur. This is provided in detail in the next section as a proof for strong divergence.
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2.3 Strong divergence
In case the world is a deterministic world:
1. From section 2.1, I show that each example of desire for an impossible state is an example of
desire for a divergent state.
2. Each time we have an unsatisfied desire, we have a desire for a divergent state. (That is to say,
we have a desire for determined state and failed to satisfy it, and then there is a determined state
that occurs even without obtaining.)
3. Each time we have a satisfied desire, we have a desire for a determined state. (If that is not so,
then there is an obtaining non-determined state that derives in the same way as the case of
unsatisfied desires.)
4. If the mechanics of forming desire is the same in the case of desire for an impossible state
(unsatisfied desires and satisfied desires) it seems to involve a wild coincidence for 2, 3 to hold.
This is especially true for 3, based on the fact that the examples of unsatisfied/satisfied desires
are very large. I will explain the reasons below.
5. Failure of 2 or 3 entails that determinism is not true or has no decisive bearing on reality.
Note 1 is not needed to derive 2 and 3.
Let me explain this in more detail. Before we form a desire, it is highly possible we think about
many possible scenarios of the near future and choose one from that. Since determinism doesn’t
constrain desired states as only determined states, where only one of them is the determined state,
we have a good chance to choose the non-determined state. For example, imagine Tom is playing
chess with somebody. Before he decides to choose what to do next, he considers every possible
scenario. At most, one of them is the same as the determined state. Since there are many possible
steps if not an infinite number, it is probably true that none of them is the same as the determined
state. Thus we should have much more desires for a divergent state than we should have desires for
a determined state. Thus 3 is more implausible than 2. The failure of 3 decisively sentences the
death of determinism: there is a non-determined state of being realistic in the world, and this is the
desired state.
A
_
A
_
A Undetermined statetes
A Determined states
Figure 1. Venn diagram of the set of determined states and the set of undetermined states
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Satisfied desires
Unsatisfied desires
Figure 2. Venn diagram of the set of satisfied desires and the set of unsatisfied desires
Desires for
Desires for
determined states undetermined states
Figure 3. Venn diagram of the set of desires for determined states and the set of desires for
undetermined states
Someone may worry that having unsatisfied desires signals that the desired state is a divergent
state, and having satisfied desires is the sign that the desired state is a determined state. Of course
this is highly implausible since it would result in a contradiction: if so the probability of choosing
the determined state as the content of our desire is close to 50% (1) because many desires are
satisfied (I can estimate that nearly 50% of our desires are satisfied). However, we have many
options to choose from, so the probability for us to choose the determined state as the content of
our desires is most likely far less than 50%.
Figure 1-3 expresses this analysis. Since the number of determined states is extremely smaller than
that of undetermined states and the number of satisfied desires occupies almost half of all desires,
we should accept that determined states are much easier to be chosen as desired states and this
seems highly implausible.
Let’s dig a little further to show there is strong divergence in some other ways.
The first thing I should address is that we can be certain we will satisfy our ordinary desires. For
example, it is very easy for a healthy adult to do the job of opening or closing the door. Some may
worry that there are possible threats of a catastrophe occurring. Let’s restrict this job as doing
something on a normal day by a healthy adult who we will call, John.
Suppose that John opens and closes the door a thousand times. Each time he formed a desire and
tried to satisfy his desire. He succeeded every time. In this case, it is plausible that if his desire
changed, the outcome will change according to his desire. In another word:
His desire is always a correct sign of the door’s state (if the door is open or closed) in this situation.
(ASD always satisfied desires)
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Since each time at most one of these two outcomes represents the determined state, at least one of
them is a divergent state. This divergent state is as easy as the determined one to realize.
Now imagine:
John is a Laplace’s demon: he can predict which outcome will occur in the near future.
John chooses his desire in this way: if he predicts that the closed door is the determined outcome
by vast computing, then he chooses opening the door as his desire.
Since using ASD, the door is open, then this is a contradiction of determinism.
As we have stated, strong divergence is true iff there is a satisfied desire for a divergent state. In
summary, we give a very weak argument:
Many desires are desires for a divergent state.
Many desires are satisfied desires.
Thus it is possible that there is a satisfied desire for a divergent state. This is very weak but is
helpful for us to summarize our intentions.
So far I have concentrated on the value and end of free will: divergence from both determinism and
quantum indeterminism, even though I have strong evidence for weak divergence and have very
plausible evidence for strong divergence, I have not explained what indeterminism looks like and
where it starts. Let’s leave this deeper analysis to another paper. Here is a primary analysis of
normal reasons to form desires:
As shown above, I have shown that there is a tracing-stop for desire of a divergent state:
If the desire (for a divergent state) were satisfied, a divergent state would obtain.
However, we cannot trace back further to unmake that desire:
If the desire for a divergent state were not made, then the desire would be satisfied. This is ridiculous.
This shows the character of indeterminism that we have studied: it is necessarily for us to first have
a desire no matter what the other factors are surrounding it.
3. Objections
One may objects in this way: For example, if the brain is considered as a physical machine, the
states of brain and also the desires of people will also be determined. In this case, the free wills are
just the products of the internal states of the machine.
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At first, “the states of brain are determined” is never decisively proved though it is plausible. We
don’t provide direct objections. We prove that we will encounter a highly plausible contradiction if
we accept this:
(If we accept this,) We have to accept that it is determined that the desired state is a (probabilistically) determined state in any case of satisfied desires. Besides the contradictional air it involves,
based on the vast number of satisfied desires, it will involve highly implausible coincidences to
accept that all satisfied desires are desires for determined states since the agent is not necessarily
going to consider the determined states.This is not an affirmative answer to what our world is and
not an answer to why the desire is not determined. It states only that determinism is probably false
in our world.
Someone may still have confusions. Why is it possible that determinism is not true even if deterministic laws still holds? As stated above, this is beyond the scope of this paper. However, I
have a vague answer to it. Strawson told us that the only way is that we are causa sui by quoting
Nietzsche’s comment about its impossibility. We are the cause of ourselves[Strawson, 2010].
Inspired by this, the way to save free will is through the fact we are media. Desires as mental states
are media that can be directed to a desired state which is a state in another causal chain different
from the one in our world. (States in any counterfactuals are such examples.) Why this is helpful?
The desired state is a virtual state which can't result in anything without some media. It has no
cause in our world. Thus it is a source. It should have no positive effect to our world because it
doesn’t exist in our world. With desires as a media, we brought them into our world. Thus the
required causa sui is not we cause ourselves, it is a representation of another source causes its
existence with the help of us as a media. It is only quasi causa sui and seems to avoid contradictions faced by causa sui.
Someone may get the idea that a desire for a divergent state is the source of the new causal chain.
This is a misunderstanding because it only serves as an evidence for falsity of determinism and
quantum indeterminism in this paper though it is crucial for having free will. Can it be a source of
a new causal chain? It seems not. After all, we are masters of our desires.
4. Conclusions
What is gained? Weak divergence shows that there are efforts to make events happen that are
(probabilistically) determined not to happen, and that there also are efforts to stop events from
happening when they are (probabilistically) determined to happen. Whether the desire for a divergent state is determined or not doesn’t matter, it is weak divergence as long as that desire is a
desire for a divergent state. This shows that Libet and other neurobiologists might be too quick to
form the idea that free will is an illusion. Strong divergence shows that determinism and quantum
indeterminism does not govern the events that involve a desire for a divergent state. Based on the
vast number of satisfied desires, I argue that it will involve highly implausible coincidences to
accept that all satisfied desires are desires for determined states since the agent is not necessarily
going to consider the determined states. Hence, it is hard to believe that all satisfied desires are
desires for determined states and will not introduce divergences from natural laws, whether they
are deterministic or statistical. If we are right, at least a divergent state as desire contents is specific
and realizable in computer, while a desire is still mysterious to us in some way.
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Conscious Intelligent Systems
Natural Intelligence and Consciousness – A Learning System Perspective
Part I: I X I
Preface
Designs from Nature
Armchair AI
Consciousness
Mobility
Consciousness Driven Learning Systems
Dilemma
Solution?
Mind
Presence of Mind
I
Movies in My Mind
Database, Learning, Patterns, Search - A Question of Scale
Designs of Nature
I X I
Preface
“This work contains hardly any original facts in regard to man; but as the conclusions at which I arrived,
after drawing up a rough draft, appeared to me interesting, I thought that they might interest others… The
conclusion that man is the co-descendant with other species of some ancient, lower, and extinct form is not in
any degree new.” - Charles Darwin – The Descent of Man
Questions about the human mind and consciousness are old questions, possibly man’s oldest.
What is consciousness? What is mind? Who am I? The trend of the moment is to look towards the
natural sciences for help in breaking the brain-mind-consciousness lock. It may look foolhardy and
unseasonable for someone at this point to take an old-fashioned logical hypothesis based look at
these problems. And when such an approach originates from first principles, it can look nothing
less than quixotic. However this is what we have set ourselves to do, we take here a first
principles, learning system perspective to these problems, perhaps for once last time. Let us start
tilting at windmills.
The brain and the computer may not be similar, but no one disagrees with the proposition that
natural entities are also learning systems. One can see that if natural entities are learning systems,
then such systems need to follow some kind of logical design or design path. Is it possible to
unravel the design paths of natural learning systems? Here we make an effort, a humbler one sans
modern tools, and see if we can derive a logical learning-system-based explanation for the rise and
presence of mind, our sense of I, and its relation to consciousness.
To that aim, let us leave aside the beaten track. Rather than undertake a detailed study of natural
intelligence systems, let us do a simpler thought experiment. Let us assume that nature started off
with a simple learning system. Lets us then ask, in tribute to Simon’s ant, what kind of learning
conditions could have possibly given rise to mind and consciousness. Such a thought experiment
and its mapping to the natural world and to humans does give rise to some interesting possibilities,
and can allow for a more coherent and natural explanation for natural intelligence system
phenomena. Let us take a brief overview.
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Natural Intelligence and Consciousness – A Learning System Perspective
Part I: I X I
We first posit a simple learning system and then a complex learning system in a natural
environment and see how environmental constraints and enablers shape their growth paths. Here
we understand the importance of archive based environmental knowledge and the need for pattern
based learning. We understand the possible role and importance of reproduction and incubation to
natural life. We discover how natural environments force all learning systems to abandon online
learning in favor of online response. We see how this push results in the rise of offline learning
mechanisms. We see how this offline movement can ironically result in better learning and how it
may have even contributed to our rise and presence on this planet. We see how the presence of
consciousness and intent enable natural entities with offline learning mechanisms to assume a
semblance of control over their local environments.
We define consciousness in the simplest terms possible and use this definition to build a
consciousness driven learning system. We discuss how mobility influences the growth of
consciousness and intelligence in consciousness driven learning systems. We discuss the effects
of natural environments on such consciousness driven learning systems and how it can result in
the rise of the mind and our sense of I. We see how minds may have online and offline modes. We
look at the presence and need of sleep from a learning system perspective. We posit reasons for
the rise of man’s mind, his mixed mode of mindlessness and mindfulness and his incessantly
looping thought processes.
We do not attempt anything radically new in this discussion other than a slight shift in perspective,
a shift that allows natural phenomena to fall more coherently and naturally in place. If the evolution
of life forms is considered to have risen out of an interaction between living organisms and the
environment, here we presume that the evolution of consciousness and intelligence systems must
have risen through a set of interactions between learning systems and environmental factors and
would have followed a similar evolutionary path. The study of evolution perhaps forms a close
analogy to our approach. Intelligence theorists and scientists working on understanding mind and
consciousness may find such a change in perspective and the resulting discussion meaningful and
interesting.
Pre Script: This discussion takes the chance that consciousness, a seemingly complex entity, if of material
origin and systemic, rests on simple design principles. Consciousness is both a siren and a mirage; it attracts
avid enthusiasts only to let them down when they get too close. Much like an Indian God with many arms, it
takes a multiplicity of meanings and shapes. Experience tells us that nature’s basic mechanisms are generally
simple and complex looking natural systems are generally multiple iterations or modifications over simple
systems. Could consciousness be such an artifact?
We take the simplest possible approach and we base it on simple assumptions. Our attempt is to see if we can
derive a probable, functional, and extensible framework for mind and consciousness design, a frame work
that also lends itself to being falsifiable, an important criterion for a theory as any. The final system that we
come up with could perhaps be sketched on a sheet of paper; this system is but an ant.
A framework that covers such a huge area has to be necessarily panoptic and bare boned. Such an approach
however also makes the following discussion devoid of much of the existing major texts and subtexts of
consciousness and learning theories, also much of biology and philosophy. While we lay out a possible
design path, we avoid any discussion of its implementation in the natural domain. A sizable amount of hard
evidence is just beginning to emerge in these areas and as is true of any new field they seem to be open to
multiple explanations and interpretations. This forces us to ignore most of it and follow the logic of the
perspective, which is at best a dangerous course for anyone trying to explain natural systems.
This discussion is therefore rather speculative, more a discussion of possibilities and does not claim
exactness or correctness in detail. The well known neuroscientist VS Ramachandran once quoted Medawar’s
“We are not cows grazing on the pasture of knowledge” (Frontline interview, April 2006) to defend logic
based non-QED style speculation. No one could disagree; the seeds of science have to first sprout in the mind
before they take root on more solid ground.
(In a companion paper that forms Part II of this discussion (5) we use the results of this discussion to
reexamine the idea of understanding and see how the presence of mind affects its communication and
discover how minds cause language. From such a perspective, we also reexamine the validity of mankind’s
perennial humanoid fantasies. We find that to reach human levels, AI entities may need to be something more
than the learning machines they are now.)
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Natural Intelligence and Consciousness – A Learning System Perspective
Part I: I X I
Designs from Nature
“You get a lot of respect for natural biological systems. Even ants do all these functions effortlessly. It is very
hard for us to imitate that and put it into our machines” - Reinhold Behringer - quoted in a National
Geographic Nov 2004 article on autonomous robotic vehicles.
Natural entities and their underlying intelligence systems have evolved through long periods of
geological history in response to a variety of environmental and evolutionary challenges. Natural
organisms demonstrate multiple levels of intelligence and consciousness.
The common strain through out nature and evolution is that these natural entities are exposed to
recurrent survival risks and unending environmental variation. The resultant learning aims and
response demands placed on a natural entity are thus different from what is generally provided to
an artificial intelligence mechanism or entity, static or mobile.
Nature’s primary focus is first on entity survival and then on entity comfort. Entities that need to
survive in nature like environments need to demonstrate quick and appropriate environment
responses. Such responses arise from the learning processes and intelligence systems within the
entity. All learning processes unfortunately exhibit processing or learning delays. In natural
environments such learning delays create response delays that could be inimical to the very
survival of the entity.
Response speed is therefore very critical in nature like environments. Response appropriateness
however arises out of good learning. Therefore, the target for any natural intelligence system
should be to find the right blend of good learning and quick response, the latter being more
important in the short term. The design of intelligence systems in nature like environments should
contain design factors and paths that help achieve such good blending in aid of both short and long
term targets.
The learning load for any entity inhabiting a natural environment comes from its system
sustenance demands and environmental challenges. Natural entities generally gather sustenance
based on what the environment provides, therefore environmental variation forms the bigger part of
entity learning load.
Learning loads are generally not uniform in a natural environment. They vary both in time and over
time. Even seemingly stable environments are not immune from such dynamic load patterns. We
know that for any learning or data processing system, peak processing or learning loads can lead
to system stall. In nature, such system stalls could prove fatal. Therefore, any learning or
intelligence system that needs to learn and survive in a natural environment has to take
cognizance of dynamic learning loads and manage to keep it within control to avoid/reduce fatal
risks.
Natural intelligence systems seem to have learnt to overcome such dangerous dynamic learning
overloads and other natural load variants. Three of them seem important to us from a design point
of view, stall control, load balancing, and proactive behavior. We will discuss these solutions where
appropriate.
In stall control, the factors’ leading to system stall are avoided and includes an emergency
response system. In load balancing, natural systems take advantage of low dynamic load periods
by shifting peak learning demands to such periods. With proactive behavior, the natural entity
seeks and acts to reduce learning loads by reducing either its exposure to the environment or the
environmental variation it needs to face, to the limits of its learning system capacities. While we will
discuss how these solutions arise, natural scientists are best posited to show and understand how
natural intelligence systems demonstrate such learning load reduction behavior.
Such solutions imply that natural learning systems are not environment reactive systems or mere
environment punch bags buffeted by environmental demands; they are autonomous intentional
systems that are conscious of their needs and act to satisfy them while keeping their exposure to
environmental dangers under check. Such intentional, separatist activity demands a basic sense of
distinction or awareness about themselves - an awareness of themselves as entities separate from
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Natural Intelligence and Consciousness – A Learning System Perspective
Part I: I X I
their environments and interacting with it for sustenance and protection. For this discussion we
assume that such awareness and directed activity derives from the presence of life.
It is the awareness of such differentiation that we call consciousness. Such differentiation from the
environment and the need for efficient interaction with it lead directly to the need for learning
systems. This implies that life necessitates natural consciousness, which in turn necessitates
natural learning systems. Vice versa, sans consciousness, the need for a learning system does not
arise. What follows in this discussion is an elaboration of this simple understanding. In doing so,
we elucidate how a consciousness driven learning system can arise and more importantly how
natural constraints and enablers act to orient and influence natural learning system growth paths.
For such a purpose we create a simple, functional definition of consciousness based on a simple
assumption about life. The main challenge for such a definition of consciousness and the resulting
consciousness-based learning system would be to explain the phenomenon of human selfconsciousness. We will see how such self-consciousness could arise from a simple conjunction of
learning system evolution and human evolutionary history.
To keep the discussion short and simple, we are forced to take a snapshot view of the growth of
conscious learning systems. Readers can read and extrapolate as to how natural settings, learning
load, and consciousness interact to coerce and influence natural learning system design and how
such interaction has resulted in animals and man. Given the recent mushrooming of evidence from
natural science studies the real test of our system lies in the degree of fit it can demonstrate with
such emerging evidence.
Armchair AI
We rush through the basics; professionals can perhaps skip this section and start directly with the
next section, which discusses consciousness and then work back if necessary. However in this
section arise first principles, design insights, and features that set the ground for later discussions.
As mentioned earlier, we posit a simple learning system in a natural environment and help it grow
to deal with the basic demands of the natural environment. Here you will notice that we do take
certain capacities and facilities as granted, we would however not fail to elaborate on such
assumptions as we move on. The scenarios discussed here on are hypothetical but they help
cover the ground faster. The discussion is deliberately kept simple so that only the major points
show up and it proves a quick read.
A simple learning system is a system that consists of an environment sensor and a processing
mechanism that can learn in a given environment. We will consider a natural environment as being
characterized by dynamic learning load patterns, time constrained response demands, and pattern
like environmental repetition.
In such dynamic and time constrained environments a simple learning system, whatever be its
internal design, is susceptible to system freezes, particularly under a combination of high dynamic
processing loads and time constrained response demands. In a natural environment, where we
posit our system to be, the learning needs of the system arise from the environment itself and the
interplay of its inhabitants. Repetition is a general characteristic of all environments, natural or
artificial; therefore if we can add a learning archive to our system, then we can store the successful
results of learning and reuse it when the environmental challenge returns.
Such an archive can help reduce repeated learning demand and the system can offer at least
partial solutions from its archives to problems that show repetition. We can see that old solutions
need not always fit in well to an environmental challenge even when it shows repetition, given that
natural environments show repetitive but chaos like behavior. Chaos-like behavior is characterized
by bounded, but infinitely repetitive, and therefore infinitely variant system behavior. A learning
system in such an environment has to learn to modify its existing solutions on the run to deal with
such small but non-foreseeable variations. Run time adaptation makes sense in nature like
environments.
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Natural Intelligence and Consciousness – A Learning System Perspective
Part I: I X I
This does imply that there are no perfect solutions; we have a bunch of solutions that demonstrate
varying degrees of fit to a bunch of environmental challenges. Such solution reuse helps reduce
the high dynamic processing power demands that result when solution processing has to proceed
from scratch. Such solution clumping also reduces data storage requirements and long term
processing requirements. The power of an archival solution strategy comes to the fore during an
emergency when even a partial solution can be lifesaving to an entity that could otherwise freeze
as a result of highly dynamic learning demands coupled with extreme time constraints.
Emergencies are also intrinsic to natural environments and are actually a reflection of both the
environment’s challenge and the entity’s preparedness to meet it. In an emergency, the usual time
available for processing is refused and in the absence of a prior solution, entity survival can
depend on mere chance and environmental benevolence. This is a major possibly fatal risk, no
conscious learning system interested in its survival will be able to take, and unless learning
systems can learn from such tight situations, they will be as ill prepared to meet a future
emergency as they were in the first instance.
This creates a dilemma for the learning system; on one hand, extreme time constraints do not
allow it to learn, and on the other hand, without learning from an emergency, it cannot better its
response or reduce its susceptibility to risk on a future occasion. On reflection this applies to all
time constrained learning processes. How do we design a learning system that can learn under
such time constraints?
The possible way out is to store emergency data in an archive and look for a time when we can
reprocess or learn from this data, such times are available in natural environments as rest time. It
could be the night, or in general any time when environmental challenges are minimal and do not
stress the entity.
Notice that even with our earlier strategy of learnt response archival, a fair amount of data storage
becomes necessary. This is because any archive-based response process depends on
environment challenge cognition. Such problem cognition can only happen if similar data exist in
the archive, which implies some amount of data storage. Such storage of data however means that
the learning archive grows really big and fast, which increases search time. Large archives that
need searching however imply delayed cognition, resulting in delayed responses and increased
risk. So archive search processes and cognitive processes need to be very fast for archival
solutions to work. We will deal with this problem at later points in the discussion.
The presence of the archive and streaming data means that data storage and archive
management become important activities of the system. When will the system find the time to do
all this, without debilitating the entity’s normal environmental response? On the other hand without
such management processes, the presence of the archive will really become a drag on the system.
A real time online learning system will demonstrate better learning in the short term.
We will however retain the archive-based design since its long-term advantages outweigh the
disadvantages. In nature, where time for online dynamic processing is frequently limited by
external factors, the first advantage of an archive-based system with a built in cognition process is
that a prompt if not exact response, is guaranteed. This advantage can be a life and death
differentiator for the learning system in a natural environment.
Archival solutions also bring forward another possibility, that of learning retention, and by
extension, the mechanism of reproduction. Learning from scratch is a costly and risky endeavor for
any learning system that aims to survive in nature like environments. It is obvious that retaining the
results of learning and reproducing them can help successor or descendant systems start with an
advantage, particularly with respect to an environment of medium to long-term stability, where the
environment is itself the cause of learning loads.
As long as environments remain stable, the chances of survival of such descendant systems
remain high. The presence of the knowledge bank means that systems do not need to worry about
normal environmental challenges. The use of reproductive strategies and incremental learning
mean that with time, the data bank grows higher and richer. On the whole processing power
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Natural Intelligence and Consciousness – A Learning System Perspective
Part I: I X I
requirements in the long term reduce. This also means that entities can use their existing
processing power to deal with new situations and add such learning to the knowledge bank, so that
after multiple generations, the species as a whole can deal with its environment on a more
comfortable basis.
Such a quickly reconfigurable iterative solution process that exists on partial solution bases is good
for chaos like repetitive environments which themselves show slow variation, because it allows
descendants to keep pace with the environment, without being locked on to hard bound solutions.
Linear zero to hero learning is not a viable option for natural entities, such an option demands very
high real time processing power, which may not be practically possible. (An ant with the brain of a
man?)
Our simple learning system with the addition of archives, search processes, and environment
cognition is better termed a simple intelligent system. The primary reason is that even if the system
does not learn continuously, it has the choice of either learning/responding online or environment
cognition/archival solution reuse. This enhances both entity comfort and entity survival possibilities.
Our simple intelligent system with its archive-based design can exhibit a small measure of comfort
in environments of low variance. However, exposing it to higher variance can bring about system
stall, which as we know can threaten survival.
High variance environments bring in a data inrush so high that the processing mechanisms will find
it difficult to keep pace with it. The major problem is in the architecture we normally provide for
learning systems. The usual process and forward architecture means that data coming in from a
sensor, goes into a small data buffer, from where it moves in to the processing mechanism for
solution generation and delivery. When environments speed up, data will tend to pile up at the
processing end, where the inevitable processing delay means that the data that cannot be
accommodated in the data buffer is lost.
Even otherwise, processing delays during such an environment speed up will mean that the
systems responses do not keep pace with environmental response demands and therefore the
system as a whole goes out of tune with its environment. Under very high data deluges, the system
may even stall; there is a distinct call for a reboot. In a natural environment, any possibility of
system stall needs to be avoided because once a system stalls, even an emergency response like
hiding can become impossible, the system in effect is forced to depend on chance and
environmental benevolence. Real life allows no reboots.
We will modify the system so as to avoid the possibility of system stall and the corresponding data
loss during an emergency. We will attempt to store the maximum data possible even through the
emergency so as to make it available for rest time processing. Such processing can at least result
in improved cognition if not appropriate action when the emergency conditions repeat.
For this purpose, we first isolate the data queue and the processing queue. We will stream
incoming sensor data directly into a separate sensor memory bank bypassing the processing
queue. All sensor data thus flows into the memory bank and is stored, from where it can be
recalled for later processing. Next we give the processor the choice of withholding processing or
doing selective processing. To make a choice, the processing unit will poll the data queue for
incoming data speeds. When data speeds are abnormal, it will alert an emergency control system
and hand over control to it. Once the emergency is past, normal processing can restart.
When data speeds are normal, even as data flows into the memory banks, the processing
mechanisms will dip in to this data stream and process the data. In the process and forward
architecture, all data that arrived in the queue had to be necessarily processed; here we avoid
such a necessity. This not only reduces processing time wasted in processing non-critical data, but
also reduces processing delays inherent to such wasteful processing.
The ability to do selective processing is a great help in cognitive architectures, since it is possible
for the system to sieve the data stream and pick only the requisite data to process. Such data that
already have solutions in the archive can be diverted into response reuse or response adaptation
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modes that demand very little processing power compared to complete online real time data
processing. This means that more processing power and time is available for the fresher data and
this improves the learning of the system in the long run. The other advantage of selective
processing is the possibility for intentional processing, where the conscious processing mechanism
based on its priorities can choose the data that it wishes to process.
Both these modifications allow the system to process the more important data even as an
emergency is in progress, which means that the system does the maximum possible processing
before handing over control to an emergency response process. Even if its response fails, all
possible data is stored and can be reprocessed at a later time so that when such emergency
conditions repeat, it can be recognized and at least an evasive action can be taken.
These modifications also allow for saner processing during normal conditions, the pressure for
knee jerk processing is reduced and as a result the system as a whole is in human terms less
anxious. If the system can learn during its rest time from the stored emergency data and other data
that lies unprocessed in the archive, then it is clear that our system can, in time and over learning
cycles, improve its responses to environmental challenges.
In hindsight, our supposition of a system with a single sensor is not practical in natural
environments. Natural entities are generally equipped with multiple sensors. However when we
have our simple intelligent system acquire multiple sensors, then it no longer remains a simple
intelligent system, it necessarily becomes a complex intelligent system.
Even without going into the detailed system architecture, it becomes clear that the resultant
multiple sensor based system needs an architectural revamp and addition of processing power. In
line with our earlier design, each sensor also demands a separate streaming archive and archive
management becomes a major and time-consuming task. It is clear that such time consuming
processes cannot be done in real time without debilitating the systems online response. For the
moment however, for the purpose of moving forward, we will assume that such a multi sensor,
sensory bank based, archival, cognitive, offline learning architecture exists. You were forewarned;
we are rushing through the subject.
It can be seen that given a natural environment, such a multi sensor system, despite our system
stall workaround solutions, can still fail. On one hand, instantaneous learning loads have not only
multiplied due to the presence of multiple sensors, but the need for centralized and combinational
data processing means that cumulative processing demands are very high, therefore learning
delays can increase.
On the other hand, it is to be noticed that natural time constrained response demands are blind to
such increases in learning system power or system complexity. Nature is not bothered about the
system complexity or learning quality of its inhabitants, it demands that learning systems in natural
environments display appropriate timely responses to environmental challenges.
Given the possibility that a static multi sensor complex intelligent system can fail in a natural
environment, the chances of failure for a mobile entity equipped with such a system are simply
higher. Mobility implies constantly changing learning loads and a complex multi sensor intelligent
system in a mobile entity is certainly doomed to failure. One can deem increasingly higher
processing power for such entities, until one remembers that in nature, processing power provision
and availability are subject to morphological and evolutionary constraints.
We can see that the system has a much better chance of survival if it can do away with real time
learning and can concentrate on search and response processes from its archive. Learning though
necessary can come later; prompt responses and survival are primary requirements. However, with
a multi sensor complex intelligent system, even such prompt responses cannot be guaranteed.
This is because the presence of multiple sensors multiplies not only data flow but also archive
sizes, simple linear searching through a multi column database can take time and demand multiple
iterations. Parallel searches can reduce the time and iteration required for such searches, but still
search, cognition and response delivery are going to be delayed affairs. With both search and
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response impaired and online dynamic learning being difficult, the risks for a multi sensor complex
system in a nature like environment are simply too great.
A possible savior that can enable faster cognition in multi sensor arrangements arrives in the form
of patterns. Patterns, an idea familiar to AI people, arise from and are endemic to stable
environments. A pattern can mean a certain set of environmental conditions or can indicate a
sequential environmental condition chain. Patterns can generally be recognized from the presence
of leading incoming data or pattern markers. The presence of pattern markers can ease the pattern
cognition and response planning process. Pattern cognition implies easier cognizance of the
incoming environment.
If such pattern identification and pattern cognition are possible (we skip the details of the pattern
identification and cognition process) then the entity’s environment response can improve over time
and dramatically. Pattern cognition allows the entity some breathing space because the entity
gains a fair amount of pre-knowledge of the possible environment path. Such pre-knowledge can
be a great comfort to the time harassed entity as it can plan or choose a possible response path to
the incoming environment.
If identified patterns and their solutions can be put in a separate archive then searching this pattern
archive is easier; since in an entire lifetime, the number of possible patterns an entity will encounter
are infinitesimal when compared to the number of probable combinations a multi-sensor
intersection of the environment can create. Given an environment, natural or artificial, its possible
patterns are limited in number; this makes pattern archives small and close to linear, thus making
search not only easier but also faster. The presence of pattern archives can drastically cut short
search time and improve environment cognition/response time.
Pattern identification is however not an easy process, moreover it is an extremely time consuming
and resource consuming process. A good knowledge of patterns can arise out of archive study.
Fortunately such an archive study process does not demand real time data processing; it is
actually better suited for offline processing. Archive management, we did discuss earlier is best
done offline to avoid debilitating the entity’s response to the environment, now we see that the
process of archive study and pattern identification is also best done offline.
Such offline movement however necessitates rest periods when environmental challenges and
demands are low. Fortunately such periods and facilities are available and routine in natural
environments. Rest periods are good times for offline activities like pattern identification, archivemanagement, and offline learning. Rest periods are therefore a necessary artifact for intelligent
archive based entities in such environments. When a rat hides in its hole, it is a nice time for such
data processing activity. It can be guessed that when environmental challenges rise and learning
demands increase, short term or long term, the intelligent entity will be forced to find rest-enabled
times, areas and environments, within the limitations of the environment.
This however means that unlike usual AI entities, natural learning entities cannot switch off power
once their online response demands are over. They will have to stay powered, so that they can
undertake offline activities like these during rest periods. Switching off power translates to death for
most natural entities, there is also increasing evidence that offline time could be learning time for
nature’s entities. While the presence of archival processes save them from known environmental
challenges, such offline processes can help save them from newer non-processed environmental
challenges.
In nature like scenarios, where processing power straddles a broad range, where offline periods
may themselves be low, and lifetimes are short, pattern identification and learning may not always
be possible even within an organism’s lifetime. We can see that these are resource intensive costly
processes, so it makes sense to retain the lessons of learning across generations, rather than
have each generation acquire it from scratch. This demand for conservation of learning
necessitates a suitable knowledge retention and reproduction mechanism.
With patterns, the call for reproductive mechanisms, a call that did arise earlier from the presence
of a learning archive, becomes clearer and cleaner. In hindsight, simple archive reproduction is
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inherently messy, and does have many disadvantages. A lot of this messiness can be reduced with
pattern archive reproduction, but an even better option is to bypass the archival pattern data and
pass pattern templates.
Such a pattern template reproduction option, as computer scientists can understand, would not
only reduce archival carrying loads, but also reduce the demand for exact archival matching. This
does demand the use of approximation during cognition, on the other hand such templates are
easy to standardize, carry, install and use. The greater disadvantage of template reproduction is
the demand for template fill-in before these patterns can be used online.
Translated to nature, such a fill in demand means that a call for incubation arises. Incubation
entails both incubation time and incubatory protection processes. This means that parental or
environmental protection should be available to the emergent entity. Incubation time and
experiences allow these barebones templates to be filled in before the entity is called to directly
war with the environment. More complex and more intricate the templates, higher are the need for
incubation experiences and incubation time.
When learning loads increase and incubatory facilities are available, limits on processing power
may demand a phased learning load rollout during the incubation period, so that learning
acquisition can stay within the processing power of the underlying intelligent system. This in turn
means that the entity’s ability to engage the environment from birth is debilitated and a growth
sequence for the new born entity, in consonance with its processing powers is required.
This also means that with good incubation facilities and longer lifetimes, entities with increasing
learning loads can be rolled out. One can see that the final product, mechanism and roll out of an
incubation based, archive based natural intelligence solution is a conjunction of multiple factors.
Processing power limitations and the resulting incubatory strategies are factors that turn simple
(gene based?) reproductive blueprints into recipes, each with its distinctive growth path. It is clear
that the choice of reproduction as a learning retention mechanism will have and has had great
implications in the design, structure, and function of natural entities, entity life styles and lifetimes in
the natural kingdom.
In hindsight it is obvious that such a reproduction strategy is only possible with an archive-based
design. The presence of reproduced archives and archival solutions can instantaneously reduce
the starting learning demand and lifetime learning demands of successor generations. Incubation
helps deliver a product that is ready to perform in an environment and which can continue learning
from where the last generation left off. In effect, reproduction and incubation allow species to run
relay races covering long geographical periods with little processing power. If a reproduction based
archive/pattern passing process were not available, it can be foreseen that all natural organisms
would have to start learning from scratch; the demand for processing power would be very high
and life would have found it extremely difficult to pass even the bacterial stage.
Let us get back to patterns, because patterns provide us with more interesting possibilities. Why do
we harp on patterns so? It is because of the understanding that even the simplest natural mobile
learning entities are pattern-based entities. Every process in life and evolution is tied to patterns
and the abilities that pattern bases provide to natural learning organisms. Read on and you will find
this a statement you will fall naturally in agreement with.
We did see that pattern knowledge allows us to predict environments from pattern markers.
Iterative archival study and pattern correlation can let the system improve its knowledge of pattern
markers, and choose markers that can predict incoming environmental conditions as early as is
possible. We can see that for an entity that is equipped with a facility for such environmental
prediction, the environment is no longer a perennially variant, possibly malicious master; it almost
becomes a predictable sequence of actions and actors. The possibility that a pattern-based entity
need not wait for the environment to completely expose itself, before it can plan a response gives
entities the time and comfort of predetermining its response chain, a response chain that can allow
it to fall seamlessly in step with an incoming environment.
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The availability of this time gap between environment cognition and environment response also
gives rise to some rather interesting possibilities. For instance given that the environment is open
to prediction, given that there is a time gap available between environment cognizance and actual
time of response, given that environment feedback is (also) dependent on entity response activity,
is it possible for an entity to preplan and present an action that will influence the environment, even
if in a limited sense, to provide a beneficial feedback response? Or at least reduce the entity’s
susceptibility to an adverse response?
In effect, rather than stay put with simple environment prediction and passive response play out, is
it possible for a pattern based entity to actively engage the environment so as to maximize possible
environmental benefits and minimize environmental dangers? Can the entity ditch passive
environment responsive behavior in favor of environment ahead proactive behavior?
For such proactive behavior, it is clear that the entity can no longer be a pure environment
responsive entity; it should be an intentional entity that seeks to maximize its environmental
comfort. We will see in the next section how life and consciousness embed all natural entities with
intent. Such intent can allow these entities to demonstrate dynamic load management behavior
and environment-ahead proactive behavior.
Even without going into a detailed discussion of intentional environment ahead proactive behavior,
we can see that the very possibility of such environment prediction and environment management
by an intelligent entity tends to turn our general perception of the objectives of environment based
AI learning systems on its head. The general target for AI entities operating in artificial and natural
environments is good environment responsiveness. We are yet to consider the possibility of active
environment management; an activity that nature’s entities engage naturally in.
Such environment prediction and environment preemptive action allows entities to gain a
semblance of control over their local environments and can make life easier for the entity. This
implies that for natural entities that have occupied natural environments over generations, the real
target is not environment responsiveness. Such base targets have long been overshot through
generations of learning; the real target of most natural entities is environment comfort.
The idea behind environment comfort is not the idea of comfort per se; it arises as an unintended
side benefit of consciousness based learning system design. While still being dependent on the
environment to a large extent, intentional pattern based systems can and will, like an intelligent
servant (Jeeves?) take advantage of the master when and where possible, even arm twisting him
like a child sometimes arm twists its parents.
However not all is fine in the pattern based world. We can see that environment stability gives rise
to pattern based systems; higher the stability and longer the period of stability, more intricate and
detailed will be the pattern database. The possibility of response optimization will mean that as a
species, these natural entities will over time, learning cycles, and generations increasingly dovetail
themselves to their environments.
Such dovetailing is not always beneficial to the entity or its species. Dovetailing increases the detail
and complexity of patterns and increasingly fine grains the entity’s responses to the environment.
When environments change drastically, as they sometimes do, simple patterned systems can
relearn and reorient themselves to most changes quickly, advanced patterned systems will find that
difficult to do.
When environments change drastically, existing patterns may need to be abandoned, new patterns
will need to be identified, and newly identified patterns need to be written back into the genetic
database, all under time pressure and in very short time spans. In effect the learning correction
backlog becomes very high; relearning disturbs the normal life cycle of the entity thus exposing it to
increasing stress. Entities that depended on archival strategies and lived in comparative comfort,
with minimal processing power will find such inflated learning demands difficult to manage.
Hardwiring mechanisms, if they exist, can worsen the scenario; all instinctual responses can
become suspect in the new environment and this can spell doom for the organism and its species.
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Therefore, it can be seen that when the environment changes faster than a pattern-based entity
can learn from it, a separate reason for species extinction is not required. The tendency towards
extinction or survival is dependent on the speed of the environment change envelope, the faster it
moves, higher the chances of extinction. Entities that survive such drastic environmental changes
are usually the beneficiaries of environmental or ecological niches. Entities that live in
environments that are always at the edge of change also have better chances of survival since
their processing power is not only perennially active but also slightly higher than that of
environmentally comfortable organisms.
Thus we see that Darwinian natural selection scenarios can arise even for non-morphological
reasons. While their morphologies may permit many natural entities to survive in environmentally
modified environments, their learning systems may find it difficult to keep pace with new learning
demands; the entity and its species can find their environmental responses increasingly out of tune
with environmental challenges and are thus wiped out.
Over geological history, science tells us that there have been multiple periods of drastic
environmental change that have destroyed millions of species. Given such repeated destruction, it
can be predicted that a demand for quicker pattern rewriting abilities or quicker relearning abilities
and higher processing power will rise. We will discuss in a later section, a learning rewrite
mechanism that probably reduced the demand for such extinction and reduced the speed of
evolution.
In our enthusiasm for patterns and their possibilities we are yet to discuss how an offline learning
process may arise. In our next section we will see that the creation or implementation of such an
offline learning mechanism is not as simple as pattern identification or archive management.
Given our overall experience with AI design, we can however see that real time learning can
become progressively difficult in nature like environments. On one hand learning demands
progressively rise because of environmental/ecological pressures, predator prey relationships and
natural selection pressures and on the other hand, response demands become keener and show
little regard for system complexities. Designing a real time online learning process for such a
demanding environment is a challenging task, not impossible, but improbable. Offline learning is
much simpler. Before we move on to such a discussion of such a system, a quick recap of our
salient points on our natural learning system discussion would be:
The presence of life differentiates entities from their environments. Consciousness arises out of such
differentiation; therefore life necessitates natural consciousness, which in turn necessitates natural
learning systems.
Archive-based learning systems make sense in nature like environments. Nature like environments
generally show chaos like repeated activity and provide varying time constraints to entity responses.
Such time constraints can debilitate online real time learning ability and force it to be moved offline,
archive based solution reuse avoids repeated learning and also offers a better chance of survival. Such
solution reuse however depends on quick environment cognition, archival response look up, and
response reuse, which in turn necessitate environment data storage and quick search capabilities. An
emergency response system is essential for all mobile entities in natural environments.
Processing architectures of systems that inhabit nature like variable learning demand environments will
benefit if the data queue is separated from the processing queue, this reduces chances of data clog and
subsequent clog induced system stall. A sensor memory bank DMA type architecture helps isolate data
queue from processing queue, helps stores all environment data including emergency data, reduces data
clog, allows for offline or postponed processing, and makes archive based environment cognition
possible, which directly reduces online learning demands. This frees us the processing portion from
having to process all data. This option also allows processing systems to choose and process data. This
makes intentional processing of data possible.
Natural environments can force even simple learning systems to concentrate on online archive based
responses and move learning offline. In such an environment, multi sensor equipped intelligent systems
would find online learning and response still difficult. Even archive search, cognition, and response can
also become difficult because of explosive search space expansion. Such a multi sensor intelligent
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system can survive and benefit if it can use rest time or periods of low environment challenges to review
its database, identify patterns from it, and create responses for such patterns. Pattern identification eases
environment cognition and speeds up environment response in repetitive environments. Pattern
identification, pattern based cognition, and pattern exploitation can enhance survival chances of timestressed complex multi sensor based intelligent systems, therefore all multi sensor complex systems
would find it advantageous to morph into offline based pattern identification systems. Most natural
systems are pattern-based systems.
Pattern based systems can exhibit comfort in stable natural environments. This is because pattern
knowledge and pattern marker based cognition can help these systems predict incoming environments
and therefore give them time to choose their response, which is a great relief in time constrained
environments.
However pattern identification is also a slow and resource intensive process and may not be complete
within an organism’s lifetime. The cost of such learning is therefore high; therefore there arises a
demand for a knowledge retention mechanism across generations. In the presence of an archive, the
mechanism of natural reproduction can help satisfy such a demand. Pattern template reproduction helps
decrease pattern carrying loads but necessitates incubation. Good incubation strategies will allow even
entitles with very high archival and learning loads to be rolled out successfully. The presence of archival
lessons and incubation allow newborn natural entities to blend in quickly and seamlessly to a known
environment before it needs to take on new learning loads. This archive based reproductive strategy
reduces learning loads and enables even entities with low processing power to demonstrate increasingly
dovetailed interactions with their environments over multiple generations.
The presence of intent can enable such pattern-based systems to actively engage the environment rather
than react passively to it, such proactive engagement can help it maximize environmental benefits and
reduce environmental risks.
When environments change quickly, pattern based entities can find it difficult to survive, because much
of the pattern based knowledge needs to be rewritten and rather quickly. Unfortunately this pattern
based, archive based, reproduction based design, which allowed them comfy lives with little processing
power, will be found wanting in the face of massive learning loads. Quick environment changes can lead
to species extinction, faster the change, higher the learning load, therefore higher dovetailing to an
environment increases the species’ susceptibility to extinction. Pattern based architectures which emerge
from periods of environmental stability are suitable only for stable or slowly variant environments.
Our first point is that the rise or generation of any learning system is dependent on the presence of
life and consciousness. So what is consciousness?
Consciousness
For readers starting to read from this point, kindly read the synopsis of the earlier section in the last
paragraphs to get an idea of what we have discussed until now
At this point, informed readers have a real hard task at hand. For the course of this discussion, the author
wants them to drop all notions and ideas, preconceived or received, of consciousness and related topics,
so that we can proceed from a simpler perspective on consciousness.
We start with an extremely simple and functional definition of consciousness and watch as it morphs
from being the base of all learning systems to becoming its controller, directing what the entity is to
learn and when and further. The author requests you to follow the logic and promises you that you will
be surprised at what emerges and what the implications are. However please remember that we are only
laying possible design paths and this discussion is not intended to be a final description of consciousness
or its implementation in natural systems, we merely attempt to show how human like binary
consciousness can arise out of a few simple design choices.
First we assume that it is inherent to life that any system that is alive tries to sustain itself so that its
continuity can be ensured. While we cannot explain why this is so, we all know that it is so, we also
know that we cannot explain this phenomenon based on current scientific knowledge. This is a
base assumption and one of the two assumptions we use in this entire discussion.
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Once life is available, then the desire for sustenance implies not only inputs to remain alive but
also the protection of what is alive. For any system to sustain and protect itself, it needs to be first
aware of what is to be protected. This awareness is given by consciousness.
Consciousness simply means awareness. It is logical that in any entity, awareness can arise only
through its sensors. The entity’s sensors delineate the entity environment boundary and all self and
environmental knowledge arise from the sensory boundary. We use the term simple consciousness
to indicate the system’s sensory boundary image. Since environments vary but sensory boundaries
remain the same, simple consciousness indicates the sensory map of the organism.
When we say sensory boundary image, we do not declare any perceptional or cognitional
differences, we mean that the sensor generates sensory data when in contact with the
environment. For instance, heat in an environment will map to thermal sensory data in a thermal
sensor, as simple as that. The question of time differences between individual perception and base
system perception and the accompanying debate are non relevant at the present stage. We will
assume that all sensory data passes via suitably modeled sensory interfaces to the sensory banks
and then this data will be picked up by the processing system we modeled earlier.
It is obvious that without the sensors and the resultant sensory boundary image, a rock, and a
living thing are no different. It will become more obvious when you consider that any data for an
intelligent system in an entity arises from the entity-environment sensory interface, without this
interface and the subsequent data generation, the need for an intelligent system simply does not
arise.
Learning arises and is required to make sense of and make shortcuts and rules out of this sensor
data arising out of the entity environment interface (please see the section on understanding for a
discussion on such learning); therefore any learning in any intelligent entity including man is always
with respect to the system boundaries and on the data that arise out of such boundaries. There
exists no learning demand outside of it. This can be debated; we will come back to it when we
discuss understanding in a forthcoming section.
The natural question arises as to who is it that is conscious. This could be the wrong question to
ask; from our definition of simple consciousness, we understand that given a sensory boundary
there is no individual entity that is aware, awareness is the sum total of the effect of the presence
of the system sensory boundaries.
The next natural question is that how is it that we humans are aware that we are aware. To answer
that question we will have to travel a little further in this discussion where we encounter an
overlying mirage like entity that is aware of and is dependent on the presence of the basic entity.
Humans feel this as the involution (def: the act of enfolding something) of consciousness and call it
self-consciousness; we will discuss how self-consciousness can arise out of such an involution. Let
us keep that point aside for a moment and get back to simple consciousness.
Earlier we assumed that life chooses to sustain and protect itself. Any living system that is aware of
its sensory boundaries can choose to sustain and protect itself. Since the generation of the sensory
image and its sustenance and protection demands are concomitant, perhaps connatural to life, we
expand our definition of consciousness to include these two activities.
The right definition of consciousness is thus system sensory image + system sustenance activity +
system protective activity. This redefinition is truer to the spirit of the word than to its literal
meaning. All natural life therefore needs to be conscious in the spirit of this new definition.
Our definition of simple consciousness makes it clear than an entity’s simple consciousness will be
limited to, and by, the coverage and abilities of its sensors. The immediate urge is to splurge on
sensors; however a cost benefit analysis would dissuade us from that. In nature the spread and
coverage of its sensors seem to be dependent on the cost of protection and protectability of its
subsystems or components.
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For instance, consider simple static natural entities, here the scope of protection is very low. Even
when environments buffet them, stasis prevents these entities from taking effective protective
action. The cost of protecting such a system using sensors and other artifacts will be very high.
Therefore in such cases, mechanisms of easy system or component replacement have evolved
and such systems are tuned for easy system or component replacement in case of damage. In
their case, the sensory boundaries alter quickly and have to be remapped soon after system
replacement is complete. Such remapping however becomes more difficult as complexities rise.
This balance of system replacement vs. consciousness-based protection seems to be
characteristic to life and is not limited to simple static entities alone.
Even within complex systems like animals and man, the system replacement vs. protection rule
works at certain component levels. The idea is that if component complexity is lesser and
replacement rather than protection cheaper, the need for protection of that entity, component, or
sub system does not arise. For example, many of our cells are said to undergo replacement every
moment and we are non the worse for it or even aware of it. However, let a small thorn nick our
skin and the protective measures we take to avoid such damage are disproportional to its
importance. Because of this, we can drink alcohol and damage our liver and our consciousness
cares two hoots about it.
We can also see that the level and spread of consciousness can vary, in terms of the sensory
image detail, system sustenance demands, and system protection demands. The sensory spread
and coverage and system complexity determine to a large extent, the level of consciousness of the
entity. More complex the system higher would be its protection and sustenance demands. Since
one of the jobs of consciousness is the protection of the sensory boundaries, the simplest indicator
of the level and spread of consciousness in a natural entity is the amount of fear and the locations
it favors.
Fear/pain or similar system protective activity arises to protect the system bounds and ensure the
continuity of the system’s sensory image or consciousness. The other indicators for the level of
consciousness are the number, type, granularity, complexity, and coverage of the sensors. The
degree of centralization of the sensors, the sensory wiring, and the actuators is also a good
indicator of the level of consciousness. These factors are also proportional to system replacement
costs and are good indicators of system complexity.
If consciousness implies system image, system sustenance and protection, then it becomes
obvious that no autonomous intelligent system can exist without first being conscious of its own
sensory image and the resulting sustenance and system protection demands that emerge as a
result of such an entity interacting with an environment. Any autonomous intelligent entity, natural
(or artificial), perforce needs to be conscious. There seems to be no way out.
We also see that consciousness rises as a result of rising system complexity where system
protection makes more sense that system replacement. System complexities tend to rise when the
environment begins to demonstrate stability. We did see a parallel with patterns too. We can see
how critical environmental stability has been to the rise of intelligence, consciousness, and system
complexity, the comparative stability of the last sixty odd million years have helped bring us
humans here. We can now link up this idea of consciousness as a collage of system image,
sustenance, and protection with our earlier ideas of natural learning systems to create a
consciousness driven learning system.
Mobility
Mobility needs good sensors; the presence of multiple sensors can help provide a better picture of
the environment. Mobility also demands actuator centralization and processing. The sensors also
need to be coordinated to actuation. The presence of mobility therefore leads to a cumulative
demand for centralization of the sensory wiring system, the actuator wiring system, and
processing. The presence of multiple sensors in a mobile entity forces it to rely on pattern study
and offline data processing. The sustenance demands of mobile entities are also quite complex
and varied.
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In toto, all these factors that arise from being mobile add to increased processing loads and
complex / centralized processing architectures. It is clear that in comparison to that of a static
entity, the consciousness and intelligence system levels of a mobile entity have to be necessarily
very high, the increased consciousness arising out the presence of multiple sensors and
intelligence arising out of complex processing and centralized architectures.
When an entity gains mobility, each of its steps brings forth the risk of sensory boundary damage, a
factor that was not present for static entities. We know that the cost of repair/replacement for
mobile system components is very high due to the centralization of the sensory, processing and
output architecture. This means that the demand for sensory boundary protection is immanent and
permanent.
Our definition of consciousness says that the job of system protection is a function of
consciousness. This implies that the consciousness mechanisms of a mobile entity should forego
the typical role of a sentry that it assumes in a static system and should be transformed into a
perennial patrol party, actively scouting the system boundaries for any presumed or actual danger.
The mobile entity clearly needs a more active and higher level of consciousness than the static
entity.
Since uncontrolled mobility can increase the risk of system damage, it is clear that such
uncontrolled mobility is to be avoided, and that in the interests of system protection, mobility control
be coordinated by the same system that undertakes to protect it. This means that each step and
activity the mobile entity undertakes should not only be conscious but intentional. Since both
consciousness and intent arise out of the presence of the consciousness mechanisms, this implies
that the control of mobility should rest with the consciousness mechanisms. Consciousness in the
mobile entity is therefore an active hardworking artifact doing both system protection and mobility
control.
This leads us to the understanding that a system that is not conscious of its sensory image and its
environment cannot be autonomously mobile. Any mobile entity acting otherwise is either not
completely autonomous, or is under the direction of a conscious entity. Is it not true that in nature
we rarely meet with a non-conscious mobile entity? In nature, the loss of consciousness instantly
kills mobility, which could be a pointer to the link between natural consciousness and mobility.
We did say that intelligence systems rise to meet learning demand and therefore the intelligence
and consciousness systems of mobile entities are at higher levels and demonstrate higher activity
than that of simple static or non-intentional-y mobile organisms. In fact these two artifacts,
intelligence and consciousness, constituent of all learning systems, artificial or natural, are
intertwined like the snakes on the staff of Caduceus (Hippocrates?)
Consciousness Driven Learning Systems
Turing (1) did foresee the major problems in intelligent entity design in his 1950 paper on whether
machines could think. He also foresaw the logical conditions necessary for autonomous learning
and the approximate path to it, but some interlinking mechanisms are missing and the picture is not
very complete. For our design, we reuse Turing’s idea of the punishments and rewards
mechanism, which he posited as useful in child machine learning. Rather than use Turing’s terms,
we will use the terms success monitoring or success/failure mechanisms.
We will first develop a simple consciousness based learning system and wonder about its
enablers, constraints, and its performance in a natural environment. From our discussion on
consciousness we know what consciousness implies; a system image, system sustenance
demands and system protection demands (a sensory boundary image and the need to sustain and
to protect that image).
Here we create a simple system that uses success monitoring and associated mechanisms; one
that is better explained using control system terminology. In deference to readers who may be
natural scientists we keep the scope and terms of the discussion as simple as possible.
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Our system is a twin loop control system, with an outer loop straddling the inner. We did discuss a
simple intelligent system earlier, a simple learning system with an archive and other artifacts, in our
basics section. This simple intelligent system will form the inner loop and we will provide a success
monitoring mechanism that will form part of the outer loop. This is the learning loop.
This outer loop will be driven by system demands, both of sustenance and protection; so both food
demands, environmental demands and environment protection demands form part of this loop.
This means that the outer loop contains both the system image for system protection and
sustenance demands like food and also mobility control. We can therefore call this the
consciousness loop.
This consciousness loop contains a success failure monitoring mechanism that determines if the
systems response satisfied the system’s internal or external demands (sustenance demands and
environmental demands). The success monitoring system has as its reference system protection
and system sustenance demands. The demand is passed on to the learning loop, which will
respond using either online learning or cognition and response from the archive if prior solutions
exist. The success monitoring system will use environmental feedback and tag all responses of the
learning loop to a (system or environmental) demand as successful, failed or partially successful
(but non-optimal) based on how well the response satisfied the demand.
Partial solutions arise because of response time constraints when this consciousness based
learning system inhabits nature like environments. Partial or non-optimal solutions themselves can
be marked with a success percentage, so that they straddle an optimality range. We know that
natural environments provide variable time demands on the organism, many a time, the response
demands are instantaneous, and there is no time available to actually learn/process data. This
means that an instantaneous perfect response to the natural environment may not be possible.
After some time, we can see that the learning archive will contain many solutions; some tagged as
successful, some as failure and some as partially successful. It is clear that non-optimal responses
require further learning and failed responses need repeated learning. In a natural environment,
such learning is however possible only when the condition or demand repeats.
Notice however that the system as a whole is however aware of what it knows and what it needs to
learn. When a demand repeats, successful solutions, if available in the archive, can directly be
delivered to the output. Solutions that require relearning have to go through the learning system for
reprocessing.
The availability of partial and failed solution tags in the archive actually allows for earlier and better
problem cognition when it repeats, when a partial solution exists in the archive and is tagged for
relearning, the system can alert remain and can alert the sensors for a repeat of such a problem. In
effect this is a iteration enabled, postponed learning system that can not only learn, but also look
for, wait and learn when suitable conditions arise, which makes it a good solution under time
constrained response repetitive environments. If the demand recurs and time for reprocessing is
available, then these partial solutions can be taken up for reprocessing.
It is to be however noticed that natural environments may at times even deny such chances for
reprocessing, perhaps when the environment is as constrained as before or when the relevant
archive data is so submerged within the archive that the time available for response is used up in
search and cognition. This means that the system has to be always open to the possibility for
partial learning. Such a wide prevalence of partial learning demands that reprocessing does not
start from first principles every time, learning should continue from where it left off, call it stop and
go learning.
Till this point there is little new when seen from a control system angle, this is a simple multi loop
control system and higher and more advanced systems see service both on earth, in the air and in
space. Patience please!
Notice that in nature, humans and most natural organisms always seem to learn iteratively;
improving their responses in kaizen fashion over multiple learning cycles and even multiple
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lifetimes. Such iterative learning and partial relearning possibilities demands a special kind of
learning and archive design as we discuss later. We call it a scaled learning and database design.
We will discuss how such a design can possibly aid search, learning, and pattern identification. The
system we have discussed now can however do incremental postponed learning, but is not good
enough. Some new mechanisms need to be added to improve learning capabilities.
Did you notice that this system contains a factor that is more important to us from the point of
consciousness and learning? If you did not, notice that this is the beginning of directed or intent
driven learning; the consciousness loop gains the ability to vary and direct the learning demand
and the learning process to its current requirements, thus making it a truly autonomous learning
system. It can even set its priorities on partially learnt solutions and take up learning on a priority
basis. Since these demands arise from an entity being conscious of its own demands and its
environment, a self driven intelligent system fitted with a success monitoring loop and system
protection demands, and capable of iterative learning becomes an autonomous, conscious,
intelligent system.
The effect of directed learning is however greatest on the sensors, orienting them, and supplying
them with a focal set of demands that removes their endless dithering and focuses them on what to
see. This in turn has a great effect in minimizing the extent of the frame problem. Isn’t that
interesting? This does however imply some intelligence on the part of the sensor.
We did see that given nature like environments even pattern-based systems are starved for
learning and processing time. The severity for mobile complex systems is greater. In such a case,
the provision of an additional loop via the success monitoring system can actually worsen the
system’s responsiveness in the short term. The additional consciousness loop adds an inevitable
processing delay in the system, thus enhancing survival risks at least in the short term when the
system is under response pressures. We cannot however wish away the consciousness loop; good
result oriented learning depends on it, so does mobility, consciousness is but a necessary devil.
We also did see that even for the simplest learning systems, learning improvement with respect to
a particular environmental challenge needs recurrence of the challenge. Even during such
recurrence, environmental/time constraints could still deny the possibility of complete or improved
learning; the entity per se has to wait for multiple occurrences of the challenge before a good
quality solution can be achieved. The need for multiple learning cycles is very high.
For entity’s that have life spans of hours, days and months, multiple learning cycles certainly look
like a luxury. One can escape this conundrum by saying that learning cycles will be spread over
multiple lifetimes, something that is true to a certain extent of natural entities. It is clear that even
for the most advanced natural entities, such demand recurrence based iterative learning will mean
that, with such a system, the prospects of good learning are available but limited.
Dilemma
Can we avoid the wait for demand recurrence? Can we improve the learning prospects of such a
system? Can we shorten the learning cycle time? Can we improve the learning per learning cycle?
Under response pressures implicit in a nature like environment, given the processing demands and
delays implicit in online learning and the requirement for offline processes, it will be advantageous
if we can split the entity’s processing and response mechanisms. We can let an archive based
environment response process run in the foreground and shift learning processes to the
background. Transferring the load to an external process or a higher-powered system and
gathering back the results will also help. However these are at best possible solutions for artificial
autonomous mobile entities alone. Why is this so?
Notice that natural systems are already under learning pressures and that their learning abilities
are limited. The effects of morphology, environmental factors, predator prey relationships, and food
availability further constrain the quality and quantity of learning available to an entity.
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The only positive that the environment provides them, considering all other factors as constant is a
little rest time and the presence of low environmental demand periods. In a natural environment,
due to various factors like the sun’s cycle and the weather, most natural organisms can and do
enjoy periods of low environmental demand and some much needed rest. This rest time is
generally a time of low dynamic processing loads, learning loads that arise from the environment
and from internal system requirements are generally low in such periods.
Learning during such low load periods can be advantageous to the entity. This implies learning
load shifting. Is this possible to use this time to learn? Can we shift online learning loads to these
rest periods? If learning can be accomplished during these periods, then it will free up the
organism to concentrate on online response search and response delivery. We can see that rest
period learning, if implemented will result in great advantages to the entity.
However our very definition of consciousness and intelligence precludes this very possibility. The
very idea of consciousness and the resulting learning mechanisms arises from that of the sensory
boundaries. Any learning demand arises with respect to the sensory boundary and there can be no
learning demand that lies outside of it. All data to a consciousness based learning system are
sensor-generated data and our learning system is designed and oriented not to learn from (sensor
reference free) data chunks but against an incoming sensor based data stream.
Notice that even during rest periods too, the sensory boundaries are not exactly idle, they feed in
data, and such data needs to be processed even though response demands may not be urgent.
Also processing any data other than online data while being online may result in incongruent
system responses to the environment, another risky endeavor. On the other hand a background
process looks difficult from the point of view of available processing power and resources.
Let us for the moment recap the demands that precipitate the need for a rest time learning
mechanism. The major cause is the systems decisions, forced upon it by the environment, to
respond now and learn later. This demand curtails learning time, can interrupt search and creates
sub-optimal learning solutions and system responses. Given a certain processing power, the ratio
of sub optimal solutions to complete solutions is going to rise with increase in system complexity or
environment complexity.
Notice that right from the simple intelligent system to the pattern based system the demands for
rest time learning do grow exponentially. We saw in an earlier section that pattern identification and
archival management demands may necessitate that the entity finds times and places of rest, safe
from extreme environmental demands and challenges.
The demand for iterative learning and failure relearning that rises from the consciousness based
learning mechanisms we have just discussed also increase the felt need for a time of rest when all
this processing can be carried out. Without the presence of rest time and associated rest time
processing mechanisms, an archive-based online cognition and response/ offline learning strategy
will fail.
If rest time is available then processes like archive management, deep search and pattern
identification processes can be executed without much system modifications since their process
demands are generally limited to the availability of uninterrupted processing time and resources.
However as discussed earlier, rest time learning remains a problem.
As we noticed what we have now is a learning mechanism designed to learn against a sensory
boundary based data stream. Even during rest, the existing sensory boundaries are busy. The old
data needs to be replayed for the rest time learning mechanism to learn from it. In the absence of a
sensory boundary we will need to create a new learning mechanism to learn from that data. We
may not have the resources to create a parallel learning system.
Can we use the available facilities to resolve our problem or should we create a separate learning
environment and affiliated learning processes?
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Solution
Remember that we have a sensory data archive and that data from the sensors go into it in movie
frame fashion. Reversing the movie frame can give us data recall. Remember that sensory
interfaces bring in these data. If these sensory interfaces could be mimicked in memory, stub like,
we can then recreate the entity environment interface. We can now replay the archived movie
frame like data sets through this (offline) interface to let the learning mechanisms learn from it. As
far as the learning mechanisms are concerned, it sees an actual entity in an actual environment
and can therefore learn from it. However there is a small hitch.
Notice that the offline learning mechanisms are generally concerned with reprocessing or
relearning loads. In such loads the solutions that the entity provided at the time of actual
occurrence are also available. In general such a review based learning process will be slightly
different from the normal online process. How will a learning system even if given time, learn from
such solution embedded data? We will take up this problem in a later section.
Notice that very presence of such a rest time learning process means that with a little resource
sharing the entity can use its lightly loaded rest times to learn/relearn, while responding to the
lighter demands of the environment. When interrupt levels from the environment rise and there is a
demand for quick responses, then the rest time learning process can be aborted and the entity can
go back to proper online activity.
Notice that in theory such rest time learning can be really fast. The happenings of the day can run
thro the entity’s memory mechanism in less than half the time. Why should this be so? You do
know the answer, however to be more explicit, let me say that the rest time learning process runs
at processor speed and not environment speed, not being dependent on the environment for
reactions saves a lot of time.
It is clear that such an offline learning mechanism, if available, would be a great boon to the entity.
It can review its actions and environmental reactions and learn from it at its own pace at a time
when it is not besaddled by environment response concerns. Such a mechanism increases
learning time, improves learning, and can increase the learning prospects of an entity in a natural
environment.
Notice that in the usual case (except for the predator) there is practically no response time
pressure on the rest time learning mechanism. The single biggest inhibitor of good learning quality,
the time constrained learning demand, can be countered by such a rest time learning process.
Rather than relearn or review the entire happenings of the day, we can reduce rest time processing
loads by choosing to process only directed learning demands. The success monitoring mechanism
and the consciousness loop can create a priority ranked list of learning demands and direct the
offline consciousness based learning mechanism to recall relevant events and data and learn from
the data. Iterative learning and Failure relearning become easy and the system will have a trial
response ready in its learning archive, next time the demand recurs. Whenever the entity is free,
then such free time can in theory be offline learning time.
The most important factor is that while this arrangement improves learning, it does not demand
extra processing power or radically new architectures. The same learning mechanism can be
reused for such review and the results of offline learning can be added to the same learning
archive, seen that way this is an economic design that reflects Thatcherian prudence. From an
engineering point of view creating a mock interface is not an easy job, but far easier than creating
a separate learning system. If such a load shifted, rest time learning mechanism sounds like a
fulfillment of a time constrained learning system’s wish list, wait till we encounter the problems.
Notice that in recreating the sensory interfaces, we are recreating the entity in memory, albeit in a
limited sense. If you remember our definition of simple consciousness as awareness that rises as a
result of the sensory boundaries, then this recreation of the sensory boundary essentially
duplicates simple consciousness. A shadow like simulated entity comes to dwell in memory. The
data replay or learning review process runs using this simulated entity as the primary actor to
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interact with the simulated replayed environment. Therefore in doing such data replay we not only
have environment data recall and environment interaction history recall but also entity recall.
During offline learning, the entity has to be aware of this simulated entity, its learning processes,
and its results. Such awareness is best illustrated by the example of a stage and an audience. It is
as if the basic conscious entity is in the audience, watching its alter ego, the simulated entity,
performing with other actors on a stage. (This in effect puts the actor in the foreground and the
audience in the background) Such awareness is essential to avoid environment incongruent
responses that may arise out of response tangling.
Response tangling arises because the learning mechanisms are reused for offline learning, and its
results go into the same learning archive. It is always possible that the result of an offline process
is wrongly routed to the system outputs and confusion and environment incongruence can result.
The entity will seem to exhibit mad behavior. Such response tangling can be extremely risky and
even fatal to the entity. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the entity be aware of these offline
learning results as separate and arising from its rest time learning mechanisms. It is also
necessary that these processes and results be corralled away from the online response
mechanisms.
However with such an offline data replay based learning process, it is clear that the entity has a
higher learning potential. The quality and quantity of such learning will be dependent on the
amount and quality of rest and safety the entity can enjoy. With a rise in learning potential, the
entity can even seek higher processing load by colonization or migration.
Notice that the very presence of a shadow entity and offline learning mechanisms offers some
breathing space to the harassed entity and its online learning mechanisms. Learning pressures
come down; rest time processing also ensures a better and more complete quality of learning. This
leaves the basic consciousness based learning mechanisms to concentrate on faster archive
based search and respond processes, confident that the offline learning mechanisms can handle
any new learning loads. The presence of such benefits from offline learning would mean that the
entity would be motivated to find the rest time and the safety needed for such processes so as to
maximize its learning potential and enjoy the chances of a more relaxed online life.
Rest time is rarely a great problem for natural entities; the diurnal nature of the day is a great help,
other rest times do appear in the daily life of any natural entity. The problem then boils down to the
level of entity safety, higher the safety during rest time, the better the entity can learn. The
combination of good rest and safety for natural organisms depends on a lot of implicit and explicit
factors like morphology, lifetimes, predator prey relationships, food availability, evolutionary paths
etc, in short the evolutionary and ecological history of the entity and its species. Our present
knowledge about processing power availability and processing architectures in natural entities is
too low to make an educated guess about these factors and their level of influence.
Therefore, for purposes of argument, let us ignore individual species capacities and foresee the
scenarios that arise from a combination of these three (offline) learning critical factors; rest, safety,
and processing power. If we suppose that these factors have binary states, eight combinations
become possible; some of which lead to extinction, some to stable online systems and some to
systems that need offline architectures. A combination of 000 is a call for extinction, the
combinations 100 and 010 are exceptionally risky and may not survive, the combinations 001,011,
101 and 111 can lead to pure online learning systems. That leaves the combination 110 as the one
that may need offline learning processes.
Pure online processing power may look like a luxury in nature, where the processes of natural
selection imply that a demand for extra processing power may take generations to satisfy. It is well
known that processing mechanisms tend to consume a large part of the entity’s energy. It can
therefore be presumed that the processing mechanisms will be constrained to stay within the
energy minimum that the system can support, since these systems need to be functional even at
such minimum energy levels. Then there are other systemic and environment based negatives that
act to ensure that processing power availability stays within processing power demand. Despite
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such negatives, it is still possible that some natural entities end up with an excess of processing
power, even if temporary, mainly as a result of evolutionary trajectories.
For purposes of argument, consider a condition in the evolutionary history of the organism where
there was a sustained demand for a rise in processing power. Such demands may have risen due
to factors internal and external to the entity. An improved sensor may demand more processing
resources, so could variant environment conditions. Let us say that over generations of natural
selection, the entity and its species rose to meet the increased processing power demand. Let us
now allow a long period and multiple generations to pass by after which we say that the original
conditions that demanded such power increases have died down or disappeared. In such a case
the entity will be left with an excess of processing power. If we use the logic of natural selection, we
can safely presume that there will never be complete synchrony between processing power
availability and the rise and fall in processing power demand. The response of the entity and its
species to any increased or decreased demand generally takes multiple generations to satisfy.
There can be an interim condition where the entity and its species enjoy an excess of processing
power.
In such a case, like a man newly awash in money, the extra processing power will be directed
towards new baroque or functional targets. The entity and its species may act to colonize new
environments and thus take on new learning loads, alternately it may undertake to fine tune its
courtship strategies or optimize other systemic responses. If this extra processing power
contributes in any way to the success of the entity or its species, then despite the fall in actual
processing power demands, we can expect natural selection to retain this extra processing power.
A stronger case for the presence of extra processing power comes from entity or species dwarfing.
Environmental and systemic factors may force entities or species to take smaller body shapes to
keep in tune with environmental or other demands. It is logical and also well known that brain sizes
are proportional to body sizes. If we reuse our earlier logic, we can see that such downsizing can
also lead to a condition where the entity and its species enjoy a temporary spurt in processing
power, and so on…
The author wonders if (other than for genetic reasons) such size reduction was a primary trigger for
those natural organisms that have come to enjoy better brain to body size ratios. He is not aware if
there is any prior evidence to support such a premise. Such an engineering based logic may not
hold true in natural realms. However if there is evidence to support such a premise or if we can
assume that such a premise is true, we will show in a later section how it is possible to use such a
premise to explain hominid evolution.
While the above case for excess processing power needs such an arm-twisted explanation, a case
for lower processing power can be much more straightforward. The addition of processing power is
costly and resource intensive, so one can expect that processing power supply will generally stay
below or just equal to processing power demands. However a condition of too little processing
power could also be risky to the entity and the species. Given that delays are inherent to
processing, too little processing power can make these entities sluggish and unresponsive and
thus expose them to environmental and systemic risks that may lead them to extinction.
However entities or species with processing power shortages can still maximize their learning
potential if they have the rest and safety to afford offline-learning mechanisms. This is the ‘ 110 ‘
condition we discussed earlier. Rest and safety are critical to offline learning processes since
offline learning mechanisms have to share processing resources with the online mechanisms. A
lack of safety and rest would mean that the entity would not have the time and flexibility to allot
processing resources to this offline mechanism. Even when used, these offline mechanisms are
susceptible to quick rollback calls, which in effect debilitate learning possibilities.
Since rest time is generic and available to almost all entities in nature, it is the level of safety that
determines the level of offline processing possible for the entity. In cases of good safety, like say a
good availability of shelter and rest, the offline processes can increasingly take over online
resources. In cases of exceptional safety and where high demand for offline processing resources
exist, it would even be possible to shutdown the online consciousness mechanisms or reduce its
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processing power requirements to a minimum. This allows the offline mechanisms to garner almost
all the available processing power for offline processing. Does such a condition correspond to
sleep?
Many natural organisms sleep; naturally many scientists have wondered if sleep time corresponds
to learning time and have sought to study them from such a perspective. Unfortunately the real
evidence has not yet tallied up to strongly support such suppositions. The jury understandably is
still out on the evidence. To us viewing the problem from an engineering point of view, sleep looks
like the ideal choice for an offline learning process. It is not necessary however that this be true
from a biological standpoint.
Other reasons for sleep are presently being conjectured. For instance energy conservation looks
like an obvious and logical choice, however notice that even during hibernation, there is evidence
that sleep periods are separate and demarcated. The presence of the circadian and similar
environment based rhythms is also evidence that most natural organisms have a great level of
(inbuilt) awareness of their larger environment. It is possible that through the course of evolution
low load higher safety periods were identified and earmarked for offline learning. The best we can
do is to wait for more evidence from science to support or reject a conjecture that sleep times are
also learning times or that sleep arose primarily for learning purposes.
However if the sleep conjecture is correct, it can be seen that more sleep naturally translates to
higher learning potential. Higher the processing load and higher the processing resource
constraints, higher would be the requirement for sleep. Better the quality of sleep, better the
learning would be, within the given processing power capacities. We can see that a facility for
uninterrupted sleep can multiply by many folds the processing loads that a system can theoretically
process.
What happens to entities with little safety or rest? One presumes that such entities will need to do
some sneak-in offline processing, running a mix of offline and online processes when rest and
safety allow them to. Such an admixed process, though risky, can be a boon to such entities that
are starved for processing power. During such periods, online response may be a little
compromised; a decision to run such offline processes online demands a cost benefit analysis. In
the natural kingdom, the rest and safety available to an entity and its species are dependent on the
entity’s position in the natural hierarchy.
Prey would find such an admixed process difficult to implement, because the need for high alert
means that they would find it difficult to relax and allot time and resources to the offline
mechanisms. The threat of rollback is perennial and high. However in the case of most predators,
such an option can not only be implemented but can also be useful in a manner we are yet to
consider. The presence of a offline learning mechanism combined with the (high priority) need for
hunting success will tend to turn the offline learning mechanisms into an instant replay and review
facility. Such an offline review facility will allow quick reliving of the event history and learning from
it. This will allow the predator to fine tune its strategies on the run and aid their run time
intelligence.
We see that rest and safety remain the most critical factors in the implementation of an offline
processing mechanism. If rest and safety are available, then the target entity’s learning potential
can be maximized. How can such a theoretical maximum be achieved?
Consider a case when the entity has the facility to run an undisturbed offline process during sleep
and an admixed offline-online process during wakefulness. With such a strategy the learning
mechanism enjoys the maximum possible processing power and the maximum offline learning
time. This is the condition where its learning system achieves its highest possible learning
potential.
It is natural to ask whether all this learning load involution and sneak in processing really
necessary. Prima facie, no natural entity seems to be so harassed and point bent on learning or
data processing. What are the learning loads that necessitate such learning process involution
sneak in processing and sleep? Where are the processing power constraints that we talk of?
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The most straightforward answer would be we do not know, nor does current science. We are just
beginning to get a hang of the learning processes of animals and man. However from an
intelligence system design perspective we can say that such loads exist and that an offline solution
that corresponds to rest, safety, and sleep looks like a workable solution. Notice that offline
processes are not confined to offline learning, it also includes processes like archive management
and pattern related processes that range from identification, cognition, pattern solution
creation/play out and so on.
Notice that our discussion until now has assumed that the inner learning loop is inhabited with a
simple learning system. When we replace this system with a multi sensor pattern based system,
we can see that online processing loads are not only high, which in itself can increase offlinelearning demand, but also that archive management jobs have multiplied, and pattern identification
becomes distinctly more difficult. Mobility adds to these increased processing demands, both
online and offline. Notice that we ignore a lot of data during mobility. Such ignored data also wait
for offline processing in the archive. Mobility also implies sub intent devolution and sub intent
reassembly, this also increases processing loads. The moving target of environment comfort also
brings in its own learning loads as the entity looks for measures to do more with less, for instance
reduce food availability variability, reduce predator attraction, improve prey location and so on.
Then there are the small and large environmental variations that are part of any environment; all
natural entities need to keep pace with such learning demands that arise from environment
variation. All natural entities also seem to take risks and learning to the limit of their processing
loads, within their generation and life spans and this is what keeps the species alive and moving.
Even otherwise learning resources are used up in the never-ending one-upmanship with members
of one’s own species in the race for the survival of the fittest.
The author avers that the present trend towards neuroscience based brain studies will increasingly
bring evidence of such learning loads, resource constraints, and offline processes, in many
organisms including man.
Mind
In our discussion of the offline or rest time learning mechanism, we said that the entity should be
aware of the simulated entity, the associated secondary learning process running on the simulated
entity environment interface and its results. Such awareness of this secondary learning
environment will allow it to differentiate itself from the entity and corral its results and processes so
that they do not clash with the online mechanisms.
If we can map our offline learning mechanisms (with its entity recall, environment recall and
environment-entity-interaction-history recall attributes) to natural learning systems and organisms,
say humans and animals or say fruit flies, we can figure out their equivalents. OK you already
guessed it!
Let us call the simulated learning theater as the mind, the arena in which the simulated entity
interacts with a simulated environment and learns from it. Let us call the learning processes that
run in such an environment as the mentation processes and let us term thoughts as results of such
mentation processes. We know that when two processes run in parallel in a system, then the
processes need clear system identifiers; let us identify the shadow entity as “I”. The sense of I
helps the main entity identify its shadow entity as distinct and separate from itself. Our basic
consciousness mechanism is aware of this I as separate but as a coarse reflection of itself.
This equivalence between the artifacts of the offline learning mechanisms and the natural
intelligence system is a basic assumption (presumption?) of this discussion. We assume that our
sense of “I” denotes a proxy entity that inhabits a proxy-learning environment, which is our mind,
that offline-learning processes correspond to our mentation processes, that thoughts are results of
mentation processes and that the basic consciousness is aware of the proxy entity as I.
From our perspective, we see the mind or simulated consciousness as an offline-learning
environment necessitated by high offline learning loads combined with the availability of rest
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periods and comparative entity safety. More the learning load, more the requirement for the
presence of the mind mechanism! More the safety and more the rest, more the time such an offline
learning mechanism can occupy the brain of the entity. More the time the mind occupies the brain,
better the learning capacity of the resource starved entity.
If this equivalence is correct then we can see that the presence of the offline processing and
learning architecture can allow natural organisms to take learning and processing loads that are
simply not possible without such architecture, given processing power and other resource
constraints. If the presence of consciousness marks the beginning of directed or intentional
learning, the presence of an offline learning system running in simulated consciousness optimizes
the learning process. The entity’s basic consciousness and its mirage like sister, the mind share
the learning load and reduce the resultant learning pressure on the system. Such a bi-conscious
system can handle higher learning targets and pressures if it has sufficient rest time and
environment safety.
During wakefulness and periods of high alert, the mind is constrained to give place to the online
basic consciousness mechanisms for environmental response purposes. This online response
requirement cannot be wished away because man or any other animal that has a mind is basically
a mobile entity. Basic consciousness, we did discuss, is a pre-requisite for mobility. During sleep,
when our environment safety allows us considerable leeway when compared to the animals, when
mobility demands are absent, our mind can shift to top gear.
Presence of Mind
Do animals have minds? Do insects have minds? Does man have a mind? If so, why does he need
one or how did he come to one? To answer such questions, one needs to learn and understand
more about the learning loads of a natural entity. Such data being not available, we perforce need
to speculate. Our present understanding of the process however allows us to offer some logic to
our speculations. In the absence of real scientific data any explanatory process is inherently
speculatory (and must be taken with the usual bucket of salt).
If mind equates to offline processing then one can see that for entities that have the facility for
sleep the offline processes would run during sleep periods and will be finished when they wake up.
During such a sleep process, the cognizance of binary consciousness is not necessary and the
entity will not be aware of this learning process running within it, except when it dreams. (Perhaps
as a result or part of a timed/regular keep awake interrupt) In the general case, the entity only
knows that it needs to sleep and that after sleep problems that looked highly intractable prior to
sleep look reasonably soluble.
Mobile entities that have migratory and colonization activity will need offline processing time and
offline processes to update their databases. Even here if such updates can take place within sleep
or deep rest, cognizance of the process is not really necessary. The presence of mind can
therefore be ephemeral in natural entities that are gifted with sleep. If and when they sleep, they
can be said to have offline minds that work as they sleep. The level of sleep is then an indicator of
their presence of (offline) mind. If offline minds come on only during sleep time a cognizance of I
may not be even necessary. The sense of I would make brief appearances as they go into sleep,
when they dream and when they exit out of sleep.
We did see earlier that some entities like predators would benefit from having cognizable minds,
even online. Let us say that they may need online minds, even if ephemeral. On the other hand, for
prey; the attraction of improved learning is at best dicey. In short, natural conditions may not allow
most natural entities the luxury of online minds, while offline sleep based minds look a distinct
possibility. Such a broad based generalization may not apply equally to all entities, however our
present lack of knowledge about these entities learning loads and processing power leaves us with
little option.
Man is not exempt from the natural kingdom. Notice that emergency conditions and exceptional
alert conditions do debilitate his sense of I. When emergencies arise, humans are also forced to
fall back on their instinctual mechanisms. In such situations his sense of I goes missing, the pattern
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of individualistic activity he normally demonstrates vanishes; he becomes nothing more than an
instinctual animal. In such situations he can neither see himself nor understand the logic of his
actions when such actions come under subsequent review. The best he can say is that he was not
acting self-consciously.
The last paragraph implicitly assumes that man has and needs I, that he has online mind. Why
does he need one? What triggered the rise of the human mind? What makes him special or his
needs special from those of the other animals?
The processing power requirements of any entity or its species are in broad terms dependent on
their evolutionary history. At some point in the evolutionary hierarchy there arose a remarkable
intersection of processing power, rest, and safety that heralded the arrival of man. The author feels
that this remarkable conjunction of processing power, rest, and comparative safety can be seen
even today with the advanced primates.
If you look at the advanced primates, they are largely herbivorous, largely non-hunters and on the
whole, are not preferred prey for any predator, despite their having the morphological and
intelligence faculties a predator may need. Whatever the reason for this predator prey food chain
drop out, this seems to have provided them with considerable environment safety and ample rest
time. They also seem to have a predilection for comfortable sleep. Even Darwin (2) in his
comparison of the mental powers of animals and man was tempted to make an observation in this
regard.
“The orang in the Eastern islands, and the chimpanzee in Africa, build platforms on which they sleep; and, as
both species follow the same habit, it might be argued that this was due to instinct, but we cannot feel sure
that it is not the result of both animals having similar wants, and possessing similar powers of reasoning.” Chapter 3 Descent of Man (emphasis author’s)
Darwin’s remark allows us to posit a view that may sound radical. We did say earlier that sleep
arises when ample safety and rest conjunct a lack of processing power. This makes us wonder if
the advanced primates are actually starved for processing power. As of now science is still not
clear as to what triggered the hominid speciation process from an ancestor common to both the
advanced primates and modern humans.
However notice that in the evolutionary branch off, based on the fossil evidence that we are
presently privy to, the hominids actually started off with smaller sizes and bipedalism. Did smaller
sizes place these initial hominids on an equal footing with other prey? A freak thought suggests
itself; did bipedalism itself arise as a response to being chased as prey? What caused the
downsizing? Did this downsizing lead to better mobility? Did such increased mobility lead to better
vision?
More important to us is the question as to whether this downsizing gave them a processing power
advantage, in line with our earlier suggestion of better brain to body size ratios? Did that small
extra make all the difference? Did the improved brain size to body size ratio trigger the start of the
hominid rise? Did he find the extra processing power useful to resolve (may be even belatedly)
small problems that his genetically close brothers, the apes could not solve? As a species we are
not natural carnivores, that much is certain, also we have inbound fear of many of the other
predators which is in itself unusual for a predator.
We know that such speculation hangs on a limb too thin, this is a subject on which no clear
answers presently exist or can be given, however there is clearer evidence that the hominid brain
added more than a kilogram of weight to the head during its one million years of evolution from
prehuman to man. Science posits an evolutionary hierarchy that led from the apes to man, the
lines are however not still clear and form the subject of considerable debate.
Let us look at it from our learning system perspective. We see that processing power increases
can be triggered by both internal systemic needs and external environmental needs. When we
track hominid evolution, we see a picture of increasing brain size. If we assume that most of nature
uses processing equipment that are close to uniform, then we see that processing speeds would
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remain practically the same, there seems to be little indication that man’s nervous systems or its
processing are quicker than that of the other animals. So when brain sizes and learning loads
increase, it is obvious that given the same processing speeds, with a more complex learning
architecture and increased processing loads, more learning time is necessary. While we do not
know the actual learning demands, a comparative look at the advanced primates sleep
requirements tells us that the offline processing slots are practically full; they all need their eighthour sleep quota. This means that any additional learning time demands necessarily have to cut
into online process time, unless the environment permits higher sleep durations or the brain
mechanisms speed up the learning processes.
When one posits such an online cut-in of the mind into hominid evolution, (based on what is known
about hominid evolution now), one sees the possibility that the early hominids would have found
their online rest times being increasingly taken over by their mind mechanisms. With each increase
in brain size, the mind needed to increasingly cut into online times. The final point of such a cut in
process would be the almost parallel presence of the offline and online processes, in other words
the mind and the basic consciousness mechanisms shuttle or oscillate between themselves
incessantly, each giving space to the other. Notice that this matches the theoretical conditions that
we discussed earlier on, a condition where the learning potential of an offline-learning enabled
entity is maximized.
The author posits that this is the condition where the modern human species finds itself in with its
incessant shuttle of the mind and its basic consciousness. Man seems to have come to such a
maximized state of learning where an admixture of online and offline learning processes consumes
his day, while sleep consumes his nights. He has both online and offline minds. Notice that there
seems to be little space for mental Superman; the learning slots seem pretty occupied! Notice that
this puts a theoretical full stop to intelligent system evolution on this evolutionary branch, which is
perhaps why evolution did not continue to make Superman.
It could even be speculated that this moving in of the mind to a more active online presence is
what triggered the dietary move of the hominids from major herbivore to major carnivore. This is
because they now had a review mechanism similar to that of a predator; they could outthink their
prey and fast. For the earlier and later hominids, the increasing presence of an online mind
perhaps helped change the equations of the traditional food chain.
Being a predator changed his status in the animal kingdom from sometime prey to someone who
needed to be feared. If his size did not deter them, his group sizes would, if that did not deter them,
there were the tools that were getting rather fearsome. The move to a carnivorous diet would have
also meant better food supplies and can probably account for their subsequent increase in sizes. It
was perhaps this dietary change that gave them the impetus and safety of migration and
colonization; they were no longer dependent on a vegetarian diet. Another concurrent process
happened here, one we cannot explain how, his increase in fertility, the links are still not clear.
However the author speculates that there is more than a casual link between learning systems and
fertility, given our earlier supposition that reproduction is essentially a pattern passing process. He
wonders if learning stresses debilitate fertility.
It can be speculated that the forward movement of the mind into online time and the resultant
species success brought a forward loop into operation, a loop that ended with modern humans,
who now have the requisite safety and rest to have their mind flit in and out of their basic
consciousness within an eye blink, literally. Before they got comfortable with it, possibly over a
couple of million years, such a creep in would have been very unsettling to the earlier hominids,
particularly for the earlier ones, having to contend with a shadow entity that arose in them at rest
times and proceeded to provide solutions to problems that they had just faced. Once it grew
enough for them to be comfortable they must have craved this shadow entity and even
advantageous to have him around. Perhaps the very human attraction for intoxicants began with
the drive to let the basic consciousness relax and let the mind speak.
Such speculation may not be true, but definitely interesting. It could be argued that our basic
propositions are wrong but notice that even in modern humans, there seems to be a correlation
between body size and brain sizes, lesser the average body sizes, higher the average brain sizes,
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if not intelligence. There also seems to be a link between intelligence and carnivorous behavior
across the animal kingdom. There also seems to be evidence that links the increasingly human
reliance on vegetarianism due to his agricultural successes to a net decrease in average human
brain sizes over the last 10,000 years. Smaller sizes across the animal kingdom have implications
for group size also and there is increasing evidence that there are parallels between brain sizes
and social behavior. Whatever be the major impetus, it can be presumed that it is the enlargement
of the online mind that necessitated the further enlargement of the brain and carried evolution
further on till man was far ahead of the advanced primates. (Some of the above conclusions remain under
debate in the science community; we do not wish to take a position on them. Much of these quoted data/conclusions arise
from general science articles in various media and do not refer to specific science papers)
It is natural to ask as to why other and earlier predators did not rise up to man’s state. For
explanation we will have to fall back on our evolutionary history, our learning demands and more
importantly morphology; bipedalism was the first and most important enabler and differentiator for
the hominid line. We presume that the speciation process that diverged man from the apes also
provided him with a little extra processing power that reinforced and grew to human scales over
evolution. We presume that the mechanism of the mind must have risen early on in evolution, but
has occupied the echelon in man. The author suggests that during wakefulness the human brain
shuttles between mindlessness and mindfulness in the blink of an eye. He wonders if the eye blink
is actually a state change signal of the human brain as it shuttles between online and offline
processes.
I
The presence of the (online) mind creates a binary consciousness in any entity it inhabits. If the
concept of self-consciousness (def: aware of yourself as an individual or of your own being and
actions and thoughts) indicates that man is aware of himself as an entity independent of his body,
from our perspective we can explain how such a feeling can arise.
Offline processes need not be unique to man and so man is not necessarily the only mindful entity,
even an animal can demonstrate mindfulness and binary consciousness if not self-consciousness.
Even online minds need not be unique to man; the best place to look for them might be in the
larger predators.
Man’s awareness of this self-consciousness has challenged him over millennia; the concept of soul
and all philosophy, even religion seems to have risen from this seemingly separate entity that
inhabited the body. An entity that baffles neuroscience by refusing to show up in those brain scans!
The stranger fact is that humans have been aware of the mirage like nature of our selfconsciousness for millennia now; the proponents of quietism were perhaps to notice this. The
quietists have over millennia converged on one single question. Who am I?
In answer many of them have persistently claimed that our sense of I is a mirage and that man’s
actual consciousness resided below this mirage. Across time, sects, and religions, this seems to be
their only common claim. In consequence, many of them consistently refused to identify
themselves by names and used the third person to refer to themselves, rather than say my eyes;
they used the format, this body’s eyes. This is not to claim that the quietists are right/wrong, but to
point out the historicity of the question and their answer.
"Whom are you seeking?" asked Abu Yazid the Sufi. "Abu Yazid," replied the man. "Poor wretch!" said Abu
Yazid. "I have been seeking Abu Yazid for thirty years, and cannot find any trace or token of him."
Other philosophers, scientists, and common people have also tried to make sense of selfconsciousness, however the Descartian proposition of “I think therefore I am” is in many ways a
scientist’s attempt to resolve a pure senses based mechanistic argument, that man is a sum total
of his senses. In the conventional interpretation, if the author’s understanding is correct, Descartes’
assertion is implied as a dualistic argument, that man exists as an entity independent of his body.
The idea also implies that humans are different from animals because he is able to think of himself
as an entity different from the body, an entity divergent and existing independent from/of the
senses, from such a view animals are automata, unfortunately the mechanistic view intended
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originally for man gets hoisted on the animals. Apologies if the author understanding of the
Descartian proposition is wrong!
From our newly arrived perspective, we can now propose that the Descartian “I” is neither the real
“I” nor the entire “I”. Notice that we are not actually born self-conscious, as children we acquire
self-consciousness by correlation, by correlating between our thoughts and our bodies, just like
baby chimps and dolphins also seem to be able to do. We are actually born binary conscious.
Over time and evolution the permanence of our learning loads and the need for the almost
permanent presence of mind have morphed this binary conscious mode into a linked
consciousness mode that allows correlation between our thoughts and our bodies. Thus do we
arrive at self-consciousness! We should perhaps prefer to be called self-sentient to retain our
observation that basic consciousness, binary consciousness, and self-consciousness are all
dependent on sensory data.
One of the reasons for the rise of self-consciousness would have been to reduce the schizoid
discomfort that binary consciousness can induce in the entity, particularly en route to its
maximization. In the common lingo, with a binary conscious offline mechanism, one would expect
to have voices speaking in our head as the brain shuttles between the results of the online and
offline process. Self-consciousness arises as an attempt to reduce the discomfort that the
presence of a shadow man can create by correlation between the real man and his shadow.
Another possible reason for self-consciousness to arise must have been to rein in a runaway brain.
A learning system endowed with good processing power, good inferential processes, rest and
safety can extrapolate events and sequences to an extent that they get out of reality and some
reining in must have been necessary to keep its solutions relevant to the task at hand. Selfconsciousness perhaps arose as a solution to avoid such a runaway. If these are true, one can
expect natural selection to have acted in favor of self-consciousness over plain schizophrenia.
We can presume that over evolution, this self-identification and correlation process has acted to
create and strengthen our sense of “I”. In reality the “I” denotes a proxy entity that resides in the
brain and gives identity to the mind, it is actually a design artifact that allows for the presence of an
offline learning mechanism.
We did see earlier how the presence and activity of the offline mechanisms tend to push it into the
processing foreground, while the basic consciousness based online mechanisms watch in the
background. We also did see how the active learning activity of the basic consciousness
mechanisms are pushed on to the offline learning mechanisms to allow the basic mechanisms to
concentrate on archive based cognition and response.
These are likely scenarios in the evolution of the human mind and self-consciousness. In humans,
due to his inherently high learning loads, the mind covers his existence much like a blanket. Even
while being a proxy for the main entity, it consumes most of his living time, both during sleep and
wakefulness. We are actually more I than not. So what if it masquerades as the real thing? It has
every reason to.
Movies in My Mind
We know from our earlier discussions that the presence of a success monitoring system is the key
to good learning. It is obvious then that the offline learning system, if it is to exhibit good learning,
also has to be equipped with one. The real environment forms the feedback mechanism for the
online learning process, what could be its counterpart for the offline processes? One can see that
the design of an offline learning system is not simple and straightforward.
Learning from a data review process has another problem, which we identified earlier on, the
presence of the entity’s earlier response. Even though the job of an offline learning system is to
improve existing solutions, how will a system learn from such a result-embedded data stream? We
certainly need to better understand the entity’s solution generation process. Rather than start from
first principles and sidetrack this discussion, we will assume that the pattern based learning system
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generates a response to the environment and our job is to better this response by reviewing the
data and the solution.
In our initial discussions, we did refer to proactive behavior as the third solution that a natural
autonomous entity uses to reduce dynamic learning loads. We also said that proactive behavior
arises out of a marriage of consciousness based intent and the pattern-based system. We said that
the time gap between environment cognizance and entity response implicit to pattern cognition
systems allowed the entity to demonstrate proactive behavior.
Proactive behavior means that entities tend to utilize the time gap to probe the environment with
trial responses to see which gives them the most benefits or helps attenuate risks. Much of the
natural behavior we see is actually proactive behavior; a pure online response behavior arises but
rarely and is extremely stressful to the organism.
All natural organisms probe the environment for response beneficiation. Such probing cannot be
rash and risky; it should be tentative and should contain a provision for retreat should the solution
fail. Like a kitten’s tentative paw at a ball of twine when it first encounters it, the entity needs to paw
at the environment, always ready to reverse its actions if they are risky or when they do not meet
system requirements. This can best be done when the probing system has at least an idea of the
response it can expect from the environment in reaction to its probing action. How can such
knowledge and such knowledge-based solutions arise?
An online system generally generates a solution based on its reading of the problem. The quality of
the solution however depends on the time constraint (and environmental risks/demands). With an
offline system, such a time constraint generally disappears or is relaxed. This does allow for a
better quality of learning. A pattern identification process also relies on the presence of an offline
learning system to generate a solution to the identified pattern. Here the presence of the entity’s
online response embedded in the data stream can help the system compare its new solution with
the entity’s old solution and replace it with a trial solution that can be tried next time the challenge
repeats. This trial solution is the base of environment probing and all proactive behavior.
The presence of the offline processes means that solutions to environmental challenges do not
emerge hot from online processing; they are generally derived from the inherited archive or are the
result of offline processing. If we can track back to the base system that starts with a pattern
identification process one can see that initially the systems solutions are mini solutions, solutions
that provide specific answers to specific environmental challenges. As the pattern identification
process gathers steam these mini solutions are stitched together to form a response to a pattern.
Even the most stable environment undergoes micro changes, which means that the entity has to
do a lot of collation, stitching and separation of the micro responses to keep in tune with
environment demands. In fact most of a natural entity’s lifetime is spent in such micro response
collation on demand. Good solution chains tend to get reinforced over time and repetitions and are
written back into the pattern-based database. The initial combinations are necessarily
carpetbagger like; design and aesthetics arrive over time.
The entity knows the reactions of the environment to its micro solutions. This allows it to guess the
environments collated reaction to a solution chain. This means that before the solution chain is
delivered to the output the entity has an approximate idea of the way the environment would
respond to its latest action. Over time and generations, most environmental challenges and their
responses tend to take place within such prebuilt knowledge frames. The result of entity activity
and environment response either reinforces or questions this knowledge frame. The everyday
variance of the environment is reflected in the flexibility of this knowledge frame, it tries to be
inclusive and only when too much divergence occurs does the frame come under review.
The presence of an offline mechanism and the knowledge frame allows the entity to safely probe
its environment. If the improved trial solution fails, the older solution can always be reintroduced. In
the natural environment this kind of probing is common. Solution improvements could be hard to
come by, but all this probing is not wasted, once a solution is learnt, we are one up on the
environment and have just increased our comfort level. A rash probing action is necessary only
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when the environment response does not comply with such internally generated solution frame
works.
Notice that the presence of the offline learning system and the archive alters the very approach of
the entity to environmental challenges. Notice that with such processes the entity is tuned to
catching environment standouts. It is tuned to catch features and challenges that do not conform to
the norm. Most of its usual responses are beneficiated responses; the act automatically returns the
maximum possible benefit in the given circumstances.
From such a perspective we see that much of natural behavior is proactive behavior or the results
of a sum of earlier proactive behavior. Much of the complexity of natural behavior and activity can
be explained by the concept of proactive behavior. Such behavior cannot rise out of systems that
aim to be purely responsive to the environment; it can rise only out of intentional systems that aim
to gain maximum efficiency in their interactions with the environment. Most natural entities are then
like Jeeves, always thinking of the many ways they could persuade their master, the environment
to follow their wishes rather than the other way round. Man is as good an example as any.
The rat, which carves out a home in the ground, or a squirrel that stores nuts may be doing so out
of his pattern based memory, but the rat, which first figured out the solution, had to do some real
work of probing and knowledge frame correlation. Later accretion and improvements arise out of
iterative learning and the final product may be far removed from what the original intent was. Birds
nests, courtship dances, hibernation, many activities which evoke in us wonder all probably
evolved from simple practices, much like the tendency of the chimp and the orang to arrange their
resting places in preparation for a good nights sleep probably led to down pillows and spring beds
and an inability to sleep without air-conditioning.
Our initial problem that sent us scurrying away on trying to understand the solution generation
process was the problem of trying to build a success monitoring system offline. Building solutions
for a real environment and getting them tested is nice and simple, but what will happen if it goes
really wrong? It is possible that the proposed solution carries more than its share of risk, would it
be worthwhile trying it? Many possible solutions can arise for a problem; will we get the time,
space, and conditions necessary to try all of them? Surely the need for a real time environment
and concurrent requirements are a dampener to the system. What can the system do?
It could be beneficial if one could create an offline-based success monitoring system rather than
always rely on the environment to provide an online success monitoring system to test the results
of offline learning. We already know that we can recreate the environment entity interface and its
interactions. We also have a large history bank that contains previous trials and the environments
responses to it. Can we use this accumulated knowledge to build a simulation platform to test the
results of offline learning before such solutions can be offloaded to a real environment?
While we reserve a detailed discussion on the design aspects of such an offline success
monitoring mechanism and its testing environment for a further paper, the simpler way to
understand the offline success monitoring idea and its consequences would be to consider the
offline success monitoring mechanism we humans are equipped with; our conscience, or inner
voice or conditioning or whatever term you like to call it.
The job of this offline success monitoring mechanism is to use past learnt personal and cultural
history to guide our actions and choices. In effect we store both our individual histories and cultural
histories, our understanding of the rules that arise from these histories and posit trial solutions to
the problems we face in everyday life. We then wonder how the environment would react to it
based on its history of earlier reactions. To enable this look ahead and guessing, every real world
success and failure, personal and cultural, goes into this archive.
The learning process acts in two directions, one way to guess a solution, and another way to guess
the environments response. Improved solutions are verified and checkmated against past personal
and cultural history before they are enacted in the real world. The feedback of such an act is again
fed back into the historical archive for reprocessing and correction; this is a continuous process
that keeps our mind busy. Notice that such an offline success monitoring mechanism is only
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possible for systems that have the luxury of online minds; that means that only we humans and
perhaps some other predators may have the luxury of conscience and inner voices.
An offline success monitoring mechanism can and does exist in us and it is logical that its presence
and availability is equivalent to the presence of the offline processing mechanisms. The offline
learning mechanism uses the offline success monitoring mechanisms to generate and improve
offline proactive solutions. Man’s mix of mindlessness and mindfulness seem to ensure the almost
permanent presence of such a proactive offline mechanism. Man therefore shuttles between the
demands of instinctual action and considered conscious action.
While instinctual patterns arise from his evolutionary heritage, the offline learning is newer and
current and arises from cultural learning and the offline learning processes and its inbuilt success
monitoring mechanisms. Here is where we can see conscious action score over instinct, here is
where we set long term strategy that overrules the environmentally correct short term instinctual
response, and here is where cultural training can offset natural behavior.
Such simulated offline proactive behavior, whose basic idea seems simple to us, could prove
difficult for the processing system. For offline proactive behavior to happen it should make the mind
not a theater where vanilla processing happens, but a battleground of options and hypotheses. In
this offline learning process with its own success monitoring mechanism, thoughts can loop
incessantly looking for a solution.
A good simile is that of a stage performance or a movie, a story runs on the stage, however this is
a stage where the director, scriptwriter and actor are one and the same, the entity himself,
performing before an imaginary audience that consists of an environment and other people and
possibly the entity itself, it is on this stage that hypotheses are tried and as Popper said, die in our
stead, the scriptwriter has to find a way out of the conundrums he himself has created or
undergone. This calls not only an awareness of the environment but its past history too, not only
history, but an interpolation of that history into the present future, it calls for recollecting a chain of
events and rechaining it as the entity wishes to, it can become a big job. Developing an AI system
like this would be a difficult affair, but then who said that it is easy to be human? We will expand the
discussion on this in a later paper.
However notice that even the above discussion helps better our picture of our mind and our sense
of I. In our earlier description the concept of I looked like a rather forlorn object necessitated by
offline learning demands. Now we see that the “I” and the mind are better fleshed out, these are
not just simple shadow entities and shadow environments, these are full fledged learning systems,
existing and running within the base learning system, like say Windows running within Linux or vice
versa.
We can see that these offline learning systems are actually equipped with all the appurtenances of
a basic consciousness based learning system, a sensory boundary image, a learning mechanism,
a success monitoring mechanism, archival systems, predictive and proactive behavior, time
constraint switches and so on. This is practically an identical mirroring of the basic consciousness
based learning mechanism. Its only limitation is that it requires and runs on the basic mechanism
and cannot exist without it. Now the explanation for our mind and our sense of I becomes almost
realistic, we do recognize this beast as our own.
We see that Descartian Theater to use a Dennet (3) phrase needs to exist, and not only in man,
however we need to find the way such a mechanism is actually implemented. The mind is the
(offline learning) theater of the brain. The "I" is the online identifier of the mind. This I consumes
much of his time, during his wakefulness and even during his sleep, (during sleep he recognizes it
only when he dreams). We see why thoughts need to loop incessantly in our brain, more difficult
the problem, more unrelenting the swirl. There will always be problems that never go away and
people who never give up, so the looping can be infinite and vicious.
Our discussion of the possible origins and nature of nature’s learning mechanisms are drawing to a
close. We have however barely scratched the surface, what has emerged is a possible substrate
mechanism that can display behavior that is far more complex and richly delineated depending on
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its extent and use. In our effort to provide a basic framework, we have stripped it down so that its
rich details do not obscure its base design. The presence of the gaps is obvious in this discussion
and will be keenly felt by the discerning reader and will initially lead to much nay saying and
shaking of the head. We do have to deal with the proactive mechanism in more detail, but that has
to wait.
Notice that we have no quarrels with natural scientists or philosophers, we have only wondered
about the base design of consciousness and consciousness enabled learning systems from an
engineering point of view. We do not and have not discussed and speculated on the actual
implementation of consciousness based learning at the neuronal or other levels. The reader can
however see that that we have relied on no external factors and characteristics; the discussion
rests on few simple assumptions, is fairly straightforward, and is easily falsifiable.
This hypothesis about the design choices of natural learning systems will make sense only if it is
read in conjunction with the theory of evolution. Like for evolution, the reader perforce has to
consider evolutionary timescales, pressures and influences, a panoptic view is first necessary to
understand the import of the hypothesis before one can map it to the natural world. Any system
natural or artificial, experience tells us, rests on a bed of logical foundations. Life and
consciousness cannot be any different. This discussion has been an effort to put a logical systemic
face to the problem.
Natural scientists can use the perspective to probe and explain some of the mechanisms that
make up man’s mind and consciousness. If the consciousness and learning systems of man and
animal derive from the same roots, then it becomes easier to probe. Our knowledge of natural
intelligence systems is still in its early stages and evidence is quickly emerging from various areas
of natural science. The real measure of the hypotheses would be the degree of fit to present and
emerging evidence. The author would be glad to have and answer relevant feedback on explicit
evidence standouts and conflicting opinions.
Database, Learning, Patterns, Search - A Question of Scale
Having set the consciousness and learning mechanisms in place, one needs to wonder what kind
of archive would satisfy the mechanism and what kind of learning mechanism should be
implemented. The author refrains from a detailed discussion of learning, search, pattern
identification, archive management, and database processes here.
However, from our discussion we know that time-constraints deny the possibilities of complete
processing or complete learning, most of the time. The same applies to search and cognition
processes too. On the other hand, there are occasions when complete learning is possible and our
offline learning processes do contribute to increasing such a possibility. Most organisms would
need to be satisfied with a mix of online and offline processes. These call for an ability on the part
of the learning mechanisms to vary learning/search/cognition/response processes based on the
available time and environmental urgencies.
This calls for a scaled learning approach, visualize a scaling slider that moves up and down based
on the capricious time and response demands of the environment. A scaled learning process can
work when the underlying archive is also scaled. Such an archive can also lend itself to scaled
cognition and search processes. Let us first visualize a scaled database arrangement and then
posit learning, search and pattern identification processes on it.
To visualize this design, imagine a range of hills and a helicopter able to hover over and within it.
The data arrangement is like this. Each hill is devoted to a context; it consists of an object and links
to other objects. The height and spread of the data and contexts are dependent on contextual or
data strength and interlink strength. The top of the hill is populated with high strength data points.
This area is generally detail sparse and possibly interlink sparse. In the mid area, the details
emerge, and the links multiply and are perhaps stronger. The base is a thicket of low strength
relationships among low strength data signals. Therefore data scaling seems to be on data density
and relationship density.
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Under extreme time constraints, the helicopter can just hover over the hill tops, get an approximate
data range and process it for learning or search. Such learning is little more than a random guess,
as we go down the hill; it will become data rich and can become an approximation. The learning
system can also generate theories based on a simple sampling of the data and then search back
the archive for supporting data; we can call this anticipation (def: to guess with desire or intent)
This allows for solution seeding, which speeds up the learning process.
Natural systems do this guess and test most of the time. When time is available or when iterative
learning demands arise, then the helicopter can come down the ranges and exhibit a better quality
of learning/search. During deep offline learning, the quality of learning will become better if the time
available switch is thrown off, reducing response pressure.
Such scaling of the database and learning processes also predict scaled searches, which is a
prime requirement for any entity in time-constrained environments. Scaled searches also imply that
the search process can branch off at certain scale intervals; then depending on the response of the
entity to the present output, search terms can be modified on the fly. This means the process of
search morphs into a tree traversal search, search can expose an object and its link, and search
can proceed along probable links. Such a search path can give rise to heuristic search rather than
linear search. The search process can also become stop and go, going underground when
interrupted by online processing and coming up when online demands weaken.
Scaling helps the pattern identification process also, rather than seek patterns in large masses of
data, it can look for patterns at the sparse top end of the data hill and seek to confirm patterns as it
traverses down hill. This design can help generate time-delimited responses to learning and
search.
Times constrained learning, interrupted or stop and go learning, sub optimal learning, optimal
learning, iterative learning, plain guessing or anticipation, quick search, normal search, deep
search, tree traversal search, simple pattern discovery, pattern confirmation and pattern linking are
all possible with such a database and learning system design. Such scaled learning can
sometimes result in data discontinuity to the processing systems and data bridging may be
necessary, it may be required to guess a missing link. This calls for fuzzification; the positive side
of this activity is insight discovery.
The author wonders if such a scaled learning and database design is possible or if it already exists
in the literature. Rather than a master design, it is obvious that there can arise a simple reusable
unit like design that can incorporate these features, if there is one, the author has not managed to
figure out such things to a degree of confidence as to present it.
Designs of Nature
This section was originally part of our basics section. The ideas here form natural extensions of our
earlier arguments on nature and consciousness, there might be some repetition. Time constrained
readers may skip this and jump directly to the section on understanding.
Our earlier discussion helped us strain the major points and helped us stake out the possible
design for a consciousness mechanism; here we see some of the implications of our arguments
and the design it begot. Consciousness seems to be life’s tool to sustain itself; we do not venture to
seek the purpose or origin of life; however we did presume that it acts in a certain manner. We can
see that life uses consciousness and intelligence as mechanisms to protect its exhibits and sustain
them.
The sum and substance of our consciousness argument is that (given life and its desire to sustain
itself) the more stable the environment, the more complex the systems that evolve, then the more
difficult, more costly it becomes to build, repair and replace, therefore the more sustenance and
protection it demands, and so more the requirement for consciousness. The level of consciousness
is proportional to system complexity and sustenance/protection costs.
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The advantage of consciousness based rules is that very simple factors drive it, the demand for
protection and sustenance, there is no other logic or ideal to which these systems aspire to,
system structures and behaviors are oriented towards these demands, in a sense, these systems
are the ultimate realists. No wonder then that life has survived in spite of extreme pressures and
multiple extinctions; we can judge that it would even survive multiple nuclear winters if niches can
ensure that at least some form of life survives.
We know from geological and biological records that extreme environmental variations have
always meant extinctions. Environmental variance is the greatest challenge to all life, when we say
environment we mean both the animate and inanimate environments and one that includes all
inhabitants and their effects on the ecosystem. Why should entire species and genera be wiped out
in one single stroke of the evolutionary pen?
From our perspective we see that when environments change they generate sudden learning loads
and when natural intelligence systems cannot keep pace with learning loads, then extinction can
result. This can also happen to entities that have little morphological disabilities in new
environments. We also wonder if excessive learning loads dampen fertility and thus help trigger
species extinction.
The interaction of consciousness based directed learning systems and natural environments could
throw up a variety of entities with varying levels of consciousness and intelligence. Since
environments themselves seem to arise from a complex interaction of forces with no pre-defined
trajectory, and consciousness based systems try to dovetail to them, we can see that the trajectory
of intelligence system growth paths cannot be defined clearly. What is however clear is that there
no ideal design or growth path; all paths are dependent on a mix of historical and current system
pressures. We cannot really foresee what kind of organisms and systems may emerge in the
process.
Therefore setting the clock back 65 million years and rerunning the earth’s evolutionary program
does not guarantee the rise of humans, it could be something different too. The prospect of human
like alien forms and ruminations on their intellectual capacities also comes under the same
hammer; we simply cannot say. Here we see that human mental involution itself arises out of a
certain combination of enablers and constraints, without such factors humans would never have
emerged. The most intelligent entity on this entity would have been an ape for reasons it wouldn’t
even know or get to.
One thus sees a parallel with what Darwin wanted the world to see; that there is no master design
in Nature, evolution is an intersection of multiple forces; here we see that learning system abilities
and learning system paths form important factors in evolution. In nature, such conditions can give
rise to a confusing multiplicity of platforms and levels. Darwin’s first success was to prove that all
this seeming multiplicity of life follows a logical inheritance path, but with no logic of its own.
(Darwin’s idea is logical and therefore extremely seductive to us as learning systems, which are
always under pressure to seek answers to close out existing questions. As to the actual evidence
and its interpretation, there seems to be a fair bit of debate even among evolutionists). Having
figured out the path of inheritance, Darwin did wonder as to the logic of inheritance and the
resultant divergence. How did successors so divergent and varied emerge from their simple
ancestors?
“But at that time I overlooked one problem of great importance; and it is astonishing to me, except on the
principle of Columbus and his egg, how I could have overlooked it and its solution. This problem is the
tendency in organic beings descended from the same stock to diverge in character as they become modified.
That they have diverged greatly is obvious from the manner in which species of all kinds can be classed
under genera, genera under families, families under sub-orders and so forth; and I can remember the very
spot in the road, whilst in my carriage, when to my joy the solution occurred to me; and this was long after I
had come to Down. The solution, as I believe, is that the modified offspring of all dominant and increasing
forms tend to become adapted to many and highly diversified places in the economy of nature.” - Excerpted
From Darwin’s Biography – Source: Project Gutenberg
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He concludes that the process of speciation can arise out of the internal pressure of entities
tending to dovetail themselves to their local environments. From our learning system perspective
we can see how such a solution can arise from the activity of directed learning, but that still begs
the question as to how these solutions find their way back into the genes. There are as many
unanswered questions on this subject as there are questioned answers. Let us not add our bit to it.
From a simpler straightforward perspective, one can easily see that speciation can arise on two
counts, from generations of isolation within environments and from generations of isolation within
food chains. Probably the former corresponds to macroevolution and the latter to microevolution.
There could be more reasons we are not presently aware of.
From our perspective, we can see that learning archives can vary both on an individual basis as
each entity responds to its peculiar view of the environment, but also between generations, as they
tend to dovetail to their current environments. Our current state of knowledge posits gene passing
as the way of reproduction and therefore learning retention, therefore from our perspective we
should expect to see some genetic write back with each individual and generation as it learns to
interact successfully with its environment. Variation in lesson passing is to be expected not only
with each individual but also with each generation, though they could be so small as to be
unnoticeable.
It is understandable that all learning need not be reflected back into the pattern passing
mechanisms, only those with a certain level of persistence may need to, one can posit a write back
threshold, however one sees that the entity or its species cannot get away with zero write back in
the long term. Write back requirements can also reduce with the presence of the cultural learning
mechanism, which reduces the need to write back minor environmental variations to the database,
however this will mean that the loss of incubation translates to a steeper learning curve for the
entity.
We have conjectured that all natural intelligence (directed learning systems) arises as a result of
the presence of consciousness and the desire of life to sustain itself. One can foresee that
consciousness enabled learning systems will use the intentional, directed learning mechanism to
adapt closely to environments, probably until they hit morphological limits. The next natural
question is that of how do morphologies change. Darwin’s answer was evolution by natural
selection.
On first inspection, natural selection looks like a poor choice, long geographical periods, multiple
generations, multiple lifetimes, more evolutionary failures than successes, and too damn resource
intensive. Despite the rather discomforting observation that evolutionists have still not explained
the evolution of the rather long neck of the giraffe convincingly, either from fossil based evidence or
otherwise, the fact seems to be that there is no other logical process that can successfully account
for the millions of species that inherit the earth and have passed through the earth till date. No
alternate theories have risen to successfully challenge Darwin’s basic theory. The theory of
evolution does look a little like Charlie Chaplin, all askew and in ill-fitting attire, but then
creationism, which is more an argument and less a theory looks more like the king that wore no
clothes.
From our perspective, we see natural selection as an environmental success-monitoring
mechanism that enables a directed growth of living systems. We can see that paths and results
that rise out of success monitoring mechanisms could be inherently messy. Such results do not
show or follow a clear linear hierarchy; they are more the sum of parts. A theory like the theory of
evolution offers us a logical window that allows us to discern the broad logical stream that
underlies the seeming chaos.
How and why did complex species arise at all? The simple and most natural answer is that
because environments for some reason stayed stable and benevolent. The other answer is that it
is rare for extinctions to completely destroy the entire population; the environment has no such
aim, therefore survivors did manage to survive in ecological and environmental niches. For them
there is no going backward, the only way is forward or sideward. When environments revert back
to stability, it is time for whatever is left of life to pick up where it stopped. New interconnections
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may also arise between the survivors in place of older links that were lost during the unstable
phase, and these interconnections may themselves induce modifications.
When we marry our consciousness driven, archive-based, pattern-based learning systems (with
their inherent tendency for environment comfort) with environments that can show variance, we
can see that processes like natural selection and evolution can and will naturally arise out of such
a marriage. We see that pattern-rewriting difficulty can complement or perhaps drives Darwinian
selection, pushing the extinction envelope further and faster. We recognize that Darwinian natural
selection scenarios can rise not only from morphological disabilities in the new environment but
also from learning system problems.
It is obvious that there is a clear call for a mechanism that enables easy relearning and rewriting of
patterns. We can speculate that such architecture arose, not from the ashes of patterns but astride
the pattern writing architecture, we see cultural writing as Nature’s solution in the face of so much
extinction as a way out. The rise of what we call cultural writing; organisms acquiring learning in
their lifetime and passing it on to their descendants, bypassing the slower instinctual learning
mechanism, perhaps helped slow down the rate of species turnover and perhaps did help stop the
high end of Darwinian evolution in its tracks, culminating in man, where the cultural rewriting
process can be considered to be well entrenched.
With cultural writing, learning, relearning and rewriting becomes easier. Depending on the efficacy
of its directed learning mechanism, the entity could relearn and apply the lessons of life to itself
and teach its descendants. Therefore as long as a species does not face extreme morphological
constraints and demands or resource scarcity, it has a better chance of keeping track of its
environment, which in turn increases the chances of survival. Cultural learning offers a waiting
buffer facility for learning transference, only when environmental conditions turn persistent, is it
required to transfer learning to the instinctual pattern based mechanisms.
Learning transfer does bring us to reproduction. Asexual reproduction makes sense even from our
perspective. A learning system bequeaths its learning to its inheritors to carry on, in the interests of
life’s sustenance. Notice that in an ideal environment with multiple inhabitants, the directed learning
process tends to induce individual divergence over a common base; variation is the norm, except
for twins in highly similar environments. Higher the intelligence and more varied the environment
and more varied the environment worldview, higher the divergence and individual variation would
be. The net benefit of social grouping must therefore be higher for groups to arise. The roots of
sexual reproduction seem to be an extreme version of such grouping instincts, a sense of
formalized give and take, of learning or genes. We certainly need to know more about the
connection between the genes and learning for us to even speculate further on this point.
Life, from a panoptic point of view seems to have followed two major paths in system development.
In the static path, like trees and other flora, it took system replacement as easier than system
protection, thus favoring a system that could easily replicate and conquer the world.
Static entities have few sensor requirements simply because the scope for system protection is
low, we can perhaps ask rhetorically how it would help a tree to have a pair of eyes. These lower
sensory requirements directly translate to lesser levels of consciousness and learning. For trees
and similar static entities consciousness consists of a distributed but interconnected network that
can realign itself quickly in case of system damage.
On the sustenance angle too, static systems tend to be simple systems that learn to survive on
what is available. It could be argued that trees develop patterns and develop proactive behavior,
but the extent and richness of such behavior is lower when compared to such behavior by their
mobile counterparts. Plants and trees are evidence that an alternate to centralized consciousness
exists within the bounds of natural intelligent system design.
Consciousness demands on the mobile side are the other way around of stasis; components
increasingly become complex, sensor wiring gets dense, input and output centralization becomes
high and replacement gets so costly that consciousness and intelligence has evolved to sustain
and protect it. As regards food, for mobile entities, to forage is life. Life is also exceptionally risky.
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These contribute to higher consciousness levels and higher intelligence for mobile entities. Mobile
entities also need good environmental awareness.
As we move up the mobile hierarchy, the patterns multiply and environmental learning demand
again determines their learning ability. Learning ability is not something that entities can acquire
overnight; it is a complex intersection of environmental challenges and demands, their evolutionary
history, their existing level of consciousness, the available rest time, and internal system demands.
The environment also determines where and how these learning abilities are used. We did see that
the dolphin and man may have similar intelligence levels but man's environment put him on top
and made the dolphins his toys, it could well have been otherwise.
In our basics section, we did discuss that learning from scratch is not only impossible but also
improbable for a sufficiently advanced natural learning system. Even given the facility of
incubation, such an ab initio process will take a long, long time. Nature's incubation requirements
for its entities also seem to vary on a mix of pattern complexity and environment demands, some
come OS ready, ready to perform, some come with pattern frameworks, with data filled in during
incubation time, parental or otherwise.
We see that the amount of learning that any entity or species can do within its lifetime is
constrained by its processing abilities and other external factors. It looks logical to propose that
longer lifetimes would mean more learning. Why did not Nature take such an approach? It looks
like there are environmental and morphological constraints to such an approach.
The availability of food resources, the cyclic nature of the weather and climate, the wear and tear
induced by environmental demands all constrain the idea of long lifetimes. Nature seems to face a
dilemma in choosing between learning ability and such natural constraints. The fact that an
environment may itself show variation and thus a sudden spurt in learning load, within a single
lifetime is also a perennial worry, because the available learning ability may not suffice to take care
of such variation. Shorter lifetimes allow parceling of the problem into manageable parts.
The author presumes that nature's choice of rapid life turnover and pattern passing through
reproduction emerged as a golden mean solution to such a dilemma. The lifetime of a natural entity
is therefore a probable intersection of its learning abilities and such ecological and environmental
constraints. In environments of stability and minimal wear and tear, it is possible that learning ability
may be a restriction to longer lifetimes. He does not know if the evidence will allow for a
supposition that the lifetimes of natural organisms are not only a reflection of their maintenance
costs, but are also a reflection of their learning abilities. Full Stop!
Post Script: As regards the application of the mind mechanisms to nature, our discussions have barely
scratched the surface. We have sacrificed much of the details that are critical to natural science to gain the
freedom to say that this is perhaps how it all ought to be. This is at best a perilous approach towards the
natural sciences, as even evolutionists are finding, there will always be standouts that need of explanations
within a broad logical framework. Making a law that explains natural living systems is more difficult that
making physical laws. No past or future biologist in the past and future can afford Newton’s freedom when
he asserted that he did not speculate. Nature’s rules do not seem to follow the rigidity of physical law. As
regards our proposed mechanism, it is for the biological and associated sciences to accept/reject/extend it or
to fill in the gaps with detail. We have merely staked out the possible substrate design.
References:
1. Turing, A.M (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence Mind 49: 433-460.
2. Darwin, Charles (1871), The Descent of Man
3. Dennett, D.C. & Kinsbourne, M (1995) Time and the observer-Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2): 183-247
4. Joel Achenbach (2004) Who’s Driving? - National Geographic, Nov 2004
5. Gayathree U, (2006) Conscious Intelligent Systems Part II - Mind, Thought, Language, and Understanding,
Page 37 |
arXiv:q-bio/0404007v2 [q-bio.SC] 18 Jan 2005
Information Processing in Brain Microtubules
Jean Faber 1, Renato Portugal 1 , Luiz Pinguelli Rosa 2
1
Laboratório Nacional de Computação Cientı́fica - LNCC,
Av. Getúlio Vargas 333 - Quitandinha, 25651-075,
Petrópolis, RJ, Brazil.
{faber, portugal}@lncc.br
2
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro,
COPPE-UFRJ, RJ, Brazil.
lpr@adc.coppe.ufrj.br
October 24, 2018
Abstract
Models of the mind are based on the idea that neuron microtubules
can perform computation. From this point of view, information processing is the fundamental issue for understanding the brain mechanisms that
produce consciousness. The cytoskeleton polymers could store and process information through their dynamic coupling mediated by mechanical
energy. We analyze the problem of information transfer and storage in
brain microtubules, considering them as a communication channel. We
discuss the implications of assuming that consciousness is generated by
the subneuronal process.
1
Introduction
In recent years many papers have addressed the problem of developing a
theory of mind [1-13]. R. Penrose and S. Hameroff developed a quantum model
of the mind considering the cytoskeleton of neuron cells as the principal component that produces states of mind or consciousness [2,3]. In their model the
microtubules (MTs) perform a kind of quantum computation through the tubulins. Tubulins are proteins which form the walls of the MTs. They claim that
the tubulins work like a cellular automata performing that kind of computation.
In this way, the walls of the MT could be able to store and process information by using combinations of the two possible states (α and β) of the tubulins.
The MT interior works as an electromagnetic wave guide, filled with water in
an organized collective state, transmitting information through the brain. A
gelatinous state of water in brain cells, which was observed by [13], could boost
these communication effects.
1
Using a different approach, Tuszynski et al. [6-8] model the biophysical aspects of the MTs considering the following questions: What kind of computing
do microtubules perform? How does a microtubule store and process information? In order to analyze these questions they use a classical approach, studying
the basic physical properties of the MTs as interacting electric dipoles.
→
According to [6-8,14-17] each tubulin has an electric dipole moment −
p due to
an asymmetric charge distribution. The microtubule is thus a lattice of oriented
dipoles that can be in random phase, ferroelectric (parallel-aligned) and an
intermediate weakly ferroelectric phase like a spin-glass phase. It is natural to
consider the electric field of each tubulin as the information transport medium.
Therefore, the tubulin dimers would be considered the information unit in
the brain and the MT sub-processors of the neuron cells. Therefore, to know
how MTs process information and allow communication inside the brain is a
fundamental point to understand the mind functions.
In this work we derive some results which were not explicitly obtained in
[6-8] and extend the ideas introduced by [6,16] using the point of view of the
information theory. We analyze the problem of information transfer and storage in brain microtubules, considering them as a communication channel. The
electric field is the mediator of each communicator entity. We discuss the implications of assuming that the consciousness is generated by the microtubules
as sub-neuronal processors.
2
Biophysical Aspects of the Microtubules
The cytoskeleton has a dynamic structure which reorganizes continually as
the cells change their shape, divide, and respond to their environment. The
cytoskeleton is composed of intermediate filaments, actin filaments (or microfilaments), and microtubules. The filaments and the microtubules are mutually
connected and form a three-dimensional network in the cell. There are many
papers [6-8] showing that the cytoskeleton is the main component which organizes the cell, mediates transport of molecules, organelles, and synaptic vesicles.
The cytoskeleton possibly receives signals from the cellular environment mediated by the membrane of proteins and participates in signal transmission to the
neighborhood of the cell [16,17].
Microtubules are hollow cylinders whose exterior surface cross-section diameter measures 25nm with 13 arrays of protein dimers called tubulins. The
interior of the cylinder contains ordered water molecules which implies the existence of an electric dipole moment and an electric field. The MTs represent a
dipole due to individual dipolar charges of each tubulin monomer. The microtubule dipole produces a fast growth at the plus end towards the cell periphery
and a slow growth at the minus end. The MT polarity is closely connected
with its functional behavior which can be regulated by phosphorylation and
dephosphorylation of microtubule-associated protein (MAP) [6-8,14-17].
Guanosine triphosphate molecules (GTP) are bound to both tubulins in the
heterodimer. After polymerization, when the heterodimer is attached to the
2
microtubule, the GTP bound to the β-tubulin is hydrolyzed to the guanosine
disphosphate (GDP). On the other hand, the GTP molecule of the α-tubulin
is not hydrolyzed. The microtubules present a calm dynamic instability which
are their principal feature [6-8].[?]
Many models of conformation (and polarity energy) of the microtubular
protofilament were developed. These models describe the behavior of the pulses
generated by the free energy in the GTP hydrolysis. The pulses propagate along
of the MTs through an elastic coupling or through electric field propagation
between tubulin dimers [5-8,14,15]. The overall effect of the surrounding dipoles
on a site n can be modelled by the double-well quartic potential [6-7]
A
B
V (un ) = − u2n + u4n ,
(1)
2
4
where un represents the dimer conformational change on the n–th protofilament
axis coupled to the dipole moment. A and B are parameters of the model,
where A is dependent of the temperature by A = a(T − Tc ), Tc is the critical
temperature, and B is a positive parameter independent of the temperature
[6,8]. In figure 1 we plot the effective potential in terms of un .
Fig. 1 - Double well quartic
potential model with a
potential barrier |A2 /2B|.
Our assumptions lead us to reconsider this model taking into account the
Information Theory to calculate the storage and transference of information
along the MT. The information is mediated by the electric field propagating in
the cellular medium. This propagation of energy can provide a communication
channel.
3
Communication Channels
The Shannon entropy of a random variable X is defined by [18]:
X
p(xi ) log p(xi ).
hI(X)i = −
i
3
(2)
where p(xi ) is the probability of the outcome xi . This definition describes the
amount of physical resources required on average to store the information being
produced by a source, in such a way that at a later time the information can be
restored completely.
If we want to send a message X through a noisy channel, that message
can be subjected to a loss of information. To correlate a sent message X with
a received message Y we have to calculate the mutual information I(X : Y )
between them. The mutual information concept gives us how much knowledge
we obtain from a message X given that we have received Y. It is defined by
[18,19]
hI(X : Y )i = hI(X)i − hI(X|Y )i = hI(Y )i − hI(Y |X)i
(3)
and
hI(X|Y )i = −
XX
i
p(xi , yk ) log p(xi |yk ),
(4)
k
where p(xi |yk ) = p(yk , xi )/p(yk ).
Nevertheless, by using a binary code to send a message M, compressed by
procedure C that minimizes the use of bits in that codification, any receiver
of M, using a decoding procedure D, must to be able to get all information
associated to M.
Consider a symmetric memoryless channel1 N with a binary input Ain and
a binary output Aout . For n uses of the channel, the procedure C encodes the
input message M such that C n : {1, ..., 2nR } → Ain and D decodes the output
such that Dn : {1, ..., 2nR } → Aout , where R is the rate of the code (the number
of data bits carried per bit transmitted) [19]. Therefore, if X is the encoded
message M through the procedure C, Y is the received message, and D is the
decoding procedure for Y , then the probability of error is defined by
p(C n .Dn ) = max p(Dn (Y ) 6= M |X = C n (M )).
M
(5)
The principal problem of the information theory is to determine the maximum rate R for a reliable communication through a channel. When p(C n .Dn )
→ 0 for n → ∞, the rate R is said achievable. According to Shannon’s theorem,
given a noisy channel N, its capacity Ω(N ) is defined to be the supremum over
all achievable rates for this channel. That is
Ω(N ) = max(hI(X : Y )i),
p(xi )
(6)
where the maximum is taken over all input distributions p(xi ) of the random
variable X, for one use of the channel, and Y is the corresponding induced
random variable at the output of the channel.
Equation (6) allows us to calculate the transference of information among
many physical systems. The transfer of energy may include the transfer of electrostatic energy, energy of low frequency oscillating fields, energy of light, energy
1 The memoryless channel is the one that acts in the same way every time it is used, and
different uses are independent of one another.
4
of vibrations, etc. Molecules can contain energy in the chemical bonds, in the
excited electron states, in the conformation states, etc. A common measure of
the interaction leading to cooperative behaviour is the information transference.
The electromagnetic field can transfer information through the environment
among the systems like a communication channel.
4
Information Processing in Microtubules
Many features of the cytoskeleton support the idea that microtubules can
perform computation and store information. According to [6] the charge separation of the MTs is wide enough to store information. Due to its dynamic coupling
the information can be stored as mechanical energy and chemical events.
Changes in the opposite direction can be favorable to the SG phase over the
F-phase. This change could switch from the growth mode to operational behavior. Our focus is this operational mode. Information processing is addressed by
[1-5] considering the highly specialized nature of the functional proteins on the
microtubules.
4.1
Information Storage in Microtubules
The tubulins form a dipole moment net and therefore are sensitive to external electric fields. Some papers use physical models such as spin net to describe
the behavior of the dipole moment net [6-7,20]. According to those models models, all tubulins are oriented to the same direction at low temperature (∼ 200K)
and the units of the system are organized (figure 2). In this case the system is
in ferroeletric phase (F). At high temperatures (∼ 400K), the system is in the
paraelectric phase (P) and the polarity of the tubulins are completely disorganized (figure 3). However, there is a critical temperature Tc in which occurs a
phase transition between F and P, that is, between order and disorder. At this
phase transition emerges a new state known as spin-glass phase (SG) (figure 4).
There are some theoretical models trying to estimate this critical temperature.
One of them estimates the critical temperature around to 300K which is near
to the human body temperature [7,8].
Fig. 2 - schematic picture for
F-phase
5
Fig. 3 - schematic picture for
P-phase
Fig. 4 - schematic picture for
SG-phase
We analyze the propagation of informatin along MTs considering the above
phases. Assuming an energy approximation dependent on the mean polarity
described by the Landau theory of phase transitions, the total energy can be
given by [6,16,21]
a 2 b 4
(7)
℘ + ℘ N0 ,
E=
2
4
where ℘ represents the continuous variable for the mean polarization at each site,
and N0 is the total number of sites. The parameter a has a linear dependence
with the temperature a = a(T − Tc ), where 200K < Tc < 400K
p and b > 0
[6-8]. E will be minimized by ℘ = 0 for T > Tc and by ℘ = ± −a(T − Tc )/b
for T < Tc . We use the Boltzmann distribution g(℘) to weight the energy
distribution as a function of the mean polarity
g(℘) = Z −1 exp(−βE),
(8)
where β −1 = kT , Z is the normalization, and k is the Boltzmann constant.
Subtituting (8) into (7) we get
b 4
a(T − Tc ) 2
(9)
℘ +
℘ .
g(℘) = Z −1 exp
2kT
4kT
Because ℘ is a continuous variable, we need to use the continuous counterpart
of (2) in order to calculate the information mean value of the system. Replacing
p(x) by g(℘) in (2) we obtain the following expression for the information storage
capacity:
ln Z
b
a(T − Tc ) 2
hIi =
−
h℘ i −
h℘4 i.
(10)
ln 2
2kT ln 2
4kT ln 2
The average of ℘ over the whole MT, considering all domains, is obtained from
Z ∞
h℘n i =
g(℘)℘n d℘.
(11)
−∞
6
Using (10) we can plot the information capacity against the temperature for
some parameter values.
Fig 5. - Storage information capacity of MT when
a = b = 0.5.
Fig. 6 - Storage information capacity of MT when
a=0.5 and b = 50.
7
Fig. 7 - Storage information capacity of MT when
a = 0.05 and b = 50.
These graphs corroborate with the results of [6], which show that, probably
at physiological temperature, we can have a mode of information storage in MTs.
This is the most important feature for finding another subunit of information
processing inside the brain. It could show us new perspectives for cognitive
aspects.
However, according to these graphs, the maximum information storage is
obtained at the spin-glass phase, therefore we need to make some assumptions.
In this phase, there are domains with many energy levels which can store information. The interaction among the domains due to the electric field generated
by the oscillating dipoles must be considered. This electric field is emitted to
the neighbouring area producing many channels among the domains in MT.
4.2
Microtubules as a Communication Channel
Given the capacity of information storage of MTs, the issue now is to know
whether there exist some kind of information processing on them. To study any
kind of processing, it is necessary to describe how the information is stored in
the MT walls. That is, we need to understand how the information propagates
along the MT. We saw that the SG phase has the maximum capacity of information storage. Therefore, we will restrict to this phase in order to describe
the interaction, or communication, among the domains. Here, we are assuming
that the electric field generated by the MT dipoles is the main mediator which
allows the communication among the domains.
The graphs of the previous section show that near to the critical temperature
Tc the information capacity has the maximum capacity of storage. Following
[6], we assume in this phase a partition of lattices by local domains (see figure
4). Therefore, the previous prescription is valid only on the local domains. In
8
this way, a domain j has a polarization ℘j with probability gj (℘j ). If we make
these assumptions, the total probability is given by
g=
r
Y
gj (℘j ),
(12)
j=1
where r is the number of domains [6]
As a consequence of (12) we have for the spin-glass phase
X
hIi =
hIj i
(13)
j
with j in the set of domains.
Now, we need to calculate the amount of information transferred through
the channels among the domains [6,16]. The domains will communicate only if
they interact. If we consider two domains, the communication is mediated by
the electric field interaction between them. In order, to calculate the capacity
of this communication channel, we use the mutual information concept.
From (6) we know how much information is transferred from an event xk (of
an ensemble X) to another event yj (of an ensemble Y ). The term p(xk |yj ) imposes the dependence among the systems. Assuming a Boltzmann distribution,
we want to know the dependence between the domain k, with polarization ℘k ,
and the domain j, with polarization ℘j . This dependence is described by the
distribution g(℘k |℘j ) which imposes a connection between the domains. Following [16] we will assume that the output energy is expressed as a function of
the electric field energy and of the mean polarization energy. Therefore, in the
thermodynamic equilibrium, we have the average of the output energy E out of
a domain j as
hEjout i = hEjsignal i = hEjf low i + hEjnoisy i,
(14)
where Ejsignal is the energy of the coherent signal, Ejnoisy is the noisy energy,
and Ejf low is the energy of the flow along the system. The energy Ejf low is
responsible for the interaction between the domains. Therefore, supposing that
the domain j emitts Ejf low , we can express the dependence of a domain k as
h
i
g(℘k |℘j ) = Z −1 exp −β(Ek + Ejf low + Ejnoise ) ,
(15)
where Ek is the correspondent energy of the domain k.
The information entropy depends on the amount of energy in the system
and on the noisy energy Ejnoisy . Therefore, the energy of the noise is given by
[16]
hEjnoisy (Tn )i = Z −1 exp(Ah℘2j i + Bh℘4j i),
(16)
where A = a(Tn − Tc )/2kTn and B = b/4kTn .
To evaluate the communication channel capacity, each domain is approximated by a unique dipole. The information transference will be mediated by a
radiation of the electric field in the equatorial region of an oscillating dipole.
9
Using the complex Poynting vector and taking the real part, we get an
expression for the mean value of the flow of energy Ejf low . The amount of energy
absorbed by the oscillating charged units depends directly on its effective crosssection and on the intensity of the flow of energy. We can calculate it considering
the radiation flow of energy through the cross-section D over a spherical surface
of radius R, where D is a rectangle whose sides are x and z. Hence the expression
for the flow of energy towards the dipole axis is given by
"
3 #
x
z
z
1
f low
hEj
i = 2π 2 Sj arcsin
,
(17)
−
2Rx 2Rz
3 2Rz
p
where Sj = ℘2j η 3 ενj4 , such that νj is the dipole frequency, ε is the permitivity,
η is the permeability of the medium, Rx and Rz are the perpendicular distances
from the dipole to the z and x sides, respectively [16].
Using (3) and (4), and the previous relations, we can derive an expression
for the capacity of communication between two domains. The channel between
two domains j and k will be denoted by Njk , hence
Ω(Njk ) = hI(Ek )i − hI(Ek |Ej )i,
(18)
where hI(Ek )i is given by an expression similar to (10). The conditional information hI(Ek |Ej )i, for a specific polarity ℘j , can be calculated by a continuous
version of (4), that is
Z
ln Z
hI(Ek |Ej )i =
(19)
− β g(℘k , ℘j ) Ek + Ejsignal d℘k .
ln 2
Through those calculations we can infer that there is an inter-dependence
among the domains in the SG phase. Each domain communicates to other
domain the value of its polarity. It transforms the MT in a net of communication
units (in this case the units are the domains - see figure 8). Besides, as each
domain has a particular polarity, in the context of the information theory, we
can interpret each polarity representing a type of symbol. It would build a
kind of alphabet along the whole MT, where each domain represents a letter.
However, as the polarity ℘ is a continuous variable, the change of a letter in
another would be also in a continuous way and not in a discrete way
Fig. 8 - A representation of the
communication between domain j
and domain k accomplished by the
f
electromagnetic field Ej lowalong
the walls of MT.
10
Considering the case x = z, we plot the capacity of information transference
between each domain as a function of the distance and frequency.
Fig. 9 - Communication channel capacity:
frequency υj × distance Rz when T ∼ 300K.
Fig. 10 - Communication channel capacity:
frequency υj × distance Rz when T ∼ 100K.
11
Fig. 11 - Communication channel capacity:
frequency υj × distance Rz when T ∼ 600K.
The graphs show that the best conditions to have a communication among
the domains are at the physiological temperature, with frequency of the conformational changes of the tubulin dimer protein around to 1012 s−1 . The relative
permitivity and permeability in the neighbourhood of the oscillating units is assumed to be 1 [14-16]. The distance z between the protein molecules is adopted
to be around to 1µm − 0.1µm. At 300K the information transference is supressed over a distance Rz equal to 0.1µm, and frequency around to 0.1T Hz
(figure 9). At a distance smaller than 0.1µm the communication starts to become independent of the frequency. Finally, at a distance greater than0.1µm
the high frequency of the electric field plays a fundamental role in the transfer
of information. For the other regimes of temperature, the system is not in the
SG-phase and the graphs show the loss in performance (figures 10 and 11).
According to [22], biological molecules with dipolar vibrational activity could
manifest a quantum coherent mode. That systems could have some isolating
effect from thermal environments. The frequency range of that quantum mode,
(also known as Fröhlich systems) is around 1011 s−1 to 1012 s−1 [1,4]. Therefore,
the high frequency regimes obtained above can work not only to perform a
communication along the MT but also to maintain some quantum coherent
regime2 .
5
Conclusions
This work confirm the results of [1-8] which consider microtubules as a
classical subneuronal information processor. Through the information theory
we calculate the information capacity of the MTs. Utilizing models of [1-8] we
estimate that the favorable conditions for storage and information processing
2 Some papers show that the tubulin vibration frequency is in this regime [16,21].
12
are found at temperatures close to the human body. These results corroborate
the possibility of communication among the domains (where each energy level
corresponds to some kind of symbol). This communication is mediated by the
dipole electric field, and this interaction is necessary to describe some processing
or computing on MT. Through this communication, each domain (or symbol)
presents some dependence with another. Therefore there are storage as well as
processing of information associated to the dimers. Besides, from the information theory point of view, the formation of domains creates some redundancy
for storage or representation of these symbols. This redundancy is important
for error correction and information protection. However, some points still need
further investigations. To mention at least two, (1) the direction of the propagation of the information under the influence of the environment is an interesting
point to be analyzed, (2) according to [1-5] there is some water ordination inside
MTs which could increase the quantum processes in MTs. These points deserve
to be analyzed using the information theory point of view.
6
References
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Brain Microtubules: Decoherence and Biological Feasibility, Phys. Rev. E. 65,
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Toward a Sience of Consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996
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Time Selections, in J. Shear, Explaining Consciousness. The Hard Problem,
MIT Press, Cambridge, USA, 1998
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Function, Biosystems 32, 195-209, 1994.
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with Environmental Decoherence? Phys. Rev. E 70, 031902, 2004.
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42, 153-175, 1997.
[7] J. A. Tuszynski, J. A. Brown and P. Hawrylak, Dieletric Polarization, Electric Conduction, Information Processing and Quantum Computation in Microtubules. Are They Plausible?, The Royal Society,356, 1897-1926,1998.
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Nip, Ferroelectric Behavior in Microtubule Dipole Lattices: Implications for Information Processing, Signaling and Assembly/Disassembly.Journal Theoretical
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Rev. E 61 , 4194, 2000
[10] R. Penrose, The Emperor New Mind, Oxford University Press, 1989
13
[11] R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Vintage, London, 1994
[12] J. C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain, Spring Verlag, Berlin, 1994
[13] J. Watterson, Water Clusters: Pixels of Life, in S. Hameroff et alli, Toward
a Sience of Consciousness, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1996
[14] M. V. Sataric, J. A. Tuszyski and R. B. Zakala Phys. Rev. E, 48, 589,1993
[15] J. A. Brown and J. A. Tuszynski, Phys. Rev. E 56, 5834,1997
[16] J. Pokoorny and T. Ming Wu, Biophysics Aspects of Coherence and Biological Order, Spinger, 1998.
[17] E. R. Kandel, J. H. Schwarts, and T. M. Jessell, Principles of Neural Science. Appleton & Lange Norwalk, third edition 1991.
[18] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang, Quantum Computing and Quantum Information. Cambridge, 2000.
[19] J. Preskill, Lecture notes for Physics 229: Quantum Information and Computation, 1998. www.theory.caltech.edu/∼preskill/ph229.
[20] V. Dotsenko, An Introduction to The Theory of Spin Glasses and Neural
Networks. World Scientific Lecture Notes in Physics, v. 54, 1994.
[21] H. Haken, Synergetics: An Introduction. Springer, Berlin 1990.
[22] H. Frohlich, Coherent excitations in active Biological systems, in Modern
Bioelectrochemistry, F. Gutman and H. Keyzer, Springer Verlag, N Y, 1986
14
This figure "Info1.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "Tub_Pot.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "communMT1.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "Info2.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "Info3.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "ferroel.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "highT.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "lowT.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "lowT1.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "paramag.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2
This figure "spin-glass.jpg" is available in "jpg" format from:
http://arxiv.org/ps/q-bio/0404007v2 |
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Janaury 2016 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | pp. 37-52
Dagli, R. S., An Exploration of the Process of Becoming an 'I' & the Quantum World of Realities (Part I)
Exploration
An Exploration of the Process of Becoming an 'I'
& the Quantum World of Realities (Part I)
Rajesh S. Dagli*
ABSTRACT
In this series of articles, the author analyses epistemological and ontological developments of a
human being, in particular, development of an ‘I’ within each of us. It is postulated that each
overall 'I' is an energy exchange reservoir, that is constantly interacting with infinite variety of
other environmental fields, and thus itself undergoing continuous metamorphosis, exhibiting no
defining characteristics for either its brain or body that are unchanged even for an instant. Thus,
each 'I', is not a product, nor an entity that we all believe as remaining unchanged within each of
us all through the life. Rather, it is a process - a long process running all through the life connecting infinite states of an emerging overall 'I' from instant to instant, exhibiting
innumerable avatars of 'duality' between the two extremes of a wave and a particle. Each said
avatar comes into being only at the instant of an actualization interaction with an environment,
which otherwise remains non-existent. The study concludes, perplexingly and painfully, that
each 'I' is as much a quantum-like process as that of an atomic particle.
Part I of the four-part series of articles includes: Introduction; 1. Does God Play Dice? Yes and
No; 2: Cartesian World View; & 3. Human Behavior & Consciousness.
Key Words: Human being, Consciousness, process of becoming, interaction, environment,
actualization, quantum-like, quantum reality, I.
Abbreviations
CCES - Cumulative Consciousness Energy Spectrum
FORs - Frame of References
MCRM - Mechanism of Compatible Rates of Metamorphosis
ROCA - Realm of Consciousized Aggregates
SCAR - Subjective Component of an Actualized Reality
SSG - Super Scientist-God
UCAR - Universal Component of an Actualized Reality
UOR - Ultimate Objective Reality
UOROI - Ultimate Objective Realm of Interactions
Introduction
In this series of articles, the author analyses epistemological and ontological developments of a
human being, in particular, development of an ‘I’ within each of us. The study begins by
bringing to the fore certain ambiguities involved in extending the Cartesian definition of Reality
to all ‘things’ in our normal world views. In particular, the rationality behind extending the same
*Correspondence: Rajesh S. Dagli, Independent Researcher. E-mail: rajeshsdagli@gmail.com
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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38
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Janaury 2016 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | pp. 37-52
Dagli, R. S., An Exploration of the Process of Becoming an 'I' & the Quantum World of Realities (Part I)
to man-made ‘things’ like a school, nation, song or painting, as these all do not seem to have
truly objective properties to qualify as Cartesian realities, existing ‘out there’ independent of the
observer, as for example the table, the trees, the moon, etc. Then, further analysis at the deeper
levels in the study ends up with a proposed consciousness mechanism that leads to an inference
that even the latter, ‘hard core things', are not truly objective realities.
This study proposes consciousness as an inherent automatic process present by default in all
living beings that lets them identify and define the realness of an interacting environment only in
terms of the basic survival instincts of pleasures and pains. Thus, the brain's energy, proposed to
be termed as 'consciousness energy', used in each actualization of a reality, is directly
proportional to the Realness of the environments as defined in terms of its impact on the survival
by the actualizing brain. The nature of this reality, whether pleasure or pain, is determined
equally by both, the mutually interacting brain and the environment in their respective states,
thus each actualized reality connects the mind and the matter at the instant of actualization. It is
further contemplated that all realities in our Cartesian world views, whether pertaining to manmade ‘things’ or to the natural ‘hard-core things’, are all effectively the actualized realities of
pleasures (or pains).
Thus, they all are inherently subjective in nature. Conversely, it implies that the true objective
nature of any reality is outside the purview of human consciousness. And since all such
subjective realities are brought into existence only as an outcome of an actualization interaction
and otherwise, are non-existent, they are like quantum realities. On the other end, at the levels of
ultimate objectivity, it is postulated, there does not exist any 'thing'-animate or inanimate, not
even an independent, freely willing 'I'; and what only 'exist' is one whole universe of interactions,
happening among infinite energy fields interacting with each other perpetually in a timeless
world, each of them undergoing continuous metamorphosis, making it impossible to demarcate
and define any field as existing even for an instant.
The study conjectures, how for a same human brain, from such an objective realm of
interactions, various realities of a Cartesian world, a quantum world, and most important, of an 'I'
get actualized at different levels of subjectivity by the virtue of a proposed mechanism of
compatible rates of metamorphosis likely to exist between certain fields of this objective world.
Further analysis of an 'I' in the study, starts with splitting the overall, aggregate 'I' -as observed
within the Cartesian frame, into its two components, a physical 'I' and a mental 'I'; and
dissections of both, down to their root levels, reveal that the physical 'I' is emerging from the
infinite instantaneous energy exchange interactions, viz. the metabolic reactions with the
environments-within and without the body. Likewise, the mental 'I' is emerging from the infinite
actualization reactions with the environments, which are based upon the consciousness energies.
In either of the cases, the brain, on repetitive interactions with the same or similar environments,
identifies those which are pro-survival from those which are anti-survival, and constantly
develops skills, (both mental and physical) so as to get adapted to all for survival. Thus, from
time to time, a spectrum of all those actualized realities of both pleasures and pains, and also of
all those skills gets continuously developed within the brain, which acts as a spectrum of
potentialities for all future interactions with the ever changing environments-which may be
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Janaury 2016 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | pp. 37-52
Dagli, R. S., An Exploration of the Process of Becoming an 'I' & the Quantum World of Realities (Part I)
presented by a spectrum of probabilities. The two spectra are constantly evolving in time, and at
every interaction between the two, the reflex adaptive actions by the brain are but what we
observe as the behavior of an overall 'I' in our Cartesian frame.
Thus, it is postulated, each overall 'I' is an energy exchange reservoir, that is constantly
interacting with infinite variety of other environmental fields, and thus itself undergoing
continuous metamorphosis, exhibiting no defining characteristics for either its brain or body that
are unchanged even for an instant. Thus, each 'I', is not a product, nor an entity that we all
believe as remaining unchanged within each of us all through the life, but rather, is a process - a
long process running all through the life, connecting infinite states of an emerging overall 'I'
from instant to instant, exhibiting innumerable avatars of 'duality' between the two extremes of a
wave and a particle, with each avatar coming into being only at the instant of an actualization
interaction with an environment, which otherwise remains non-existent! The study concludes,
perplexingly and painfully, that each 'I' is as much a quantum-like reality, as is any atomic
particle!
1. Does God Play Dice? Yes and No
Our normal view of this world consists of things existing ‘out there’ whether we observe them or
not. There are railway stations and airports, streets, highways and expressways, lakes and rivers
and mountains, the planet earth, the stars and galaxies … and so on. Then there are also ‘things’
like people, families, societies, associations and unions, schools and universities, states and
nations, … and so on. This whole world view is based upon a fundamental notion that the nature
of the objective world ‘out there’ is knowable and definable in terms which are not subjective.
This notion also forms the very basis of defining the term Reality, which may be broadly stated
as: The Reality of a ‘thing’ can always be defined in terms of its certain properties that can be
measured uniformly and unambiguously by all observers and hence the reality expressed in
terms of such properties is truly an objective reality. Well, the human progress in all branches of
natural sciences may be cited as the proof to support this notion, but certain developments in
particle physics in early twentieth century gave first jolts to this basic paradigm and paused an
important question on the above meaning of Reality.
These ground shaking developments started with discoveries of Max Planck in 1900, and
culminated with quantum mechanics as propagated by Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg,
Wolfgang Pauli and others around 1925. The shocking revelation of the quantum mechanics was
that the matter which by itself as an aggregate exhibits properties that can be studied objectively
failed to exhibit any objective properties at its atomic or sub-atomic levels. In fact, at these
levels, an atomic ‘particle’ exhibits properties that are no more independent of measuring
systems or the observer, which means moving down from aggregate levels to the levels of its
building blocks, the objectivity is getting lost in a very strange way. As if, a solid thing like a log
of wood evaporates at its elemental levels into something like energy fields depicting 'no-thingness', as (because) inherently, that something are neither particles nor waves! Only at the instance
of a measurement, either a particle or a wave comes into its being as an outcome of an
interaction with the measuring system; prior to that, according to quantum mechanics, what
‘exist’ are only a set of probabilities for each possible outcome, the probabilities being dependent
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | Janaury 2016 | Volume 7 | Issue 1 | pp. 37-52
Dagli, R. S., An Exploration of the Process of Becoming an 'I' & the Quantum World of Realities (Part I)
upon the properties of the measuring system as well. The startling conclusion was that the atomic
and sub-atomic ‘particles’ do not have an objective existence that can be described without any
reference to the measuring system! The clear Cartesian partition between the object ‘out there’
and the subject ‘in here’ became questionable. The quantum experiments revealed that the object
and the subject, at the instance of a measurement would become, in the words of David Bohm
(1917-1992)- the famed American theoretical physicist, an indivisible whole, which cannot be
further analyzed at any deeper level keeping the partition line intact. (Bohm D., 1951, pg. 161.)
Thus, the outcome of the experiment is due to both, the state of potentialities of the ‘particle’ and
the probable states of the measuring system/observer. The objectivity aspect of the basic
paradigm which hitherto was the very foundation of the classical physics and all other sciences
was challenged by the quantum mechanics. The discoveries led to new questions like: Do we
really know how much we know about the nature is truly objective? Or more precisely, how
much is not knowable objectively in principle? If the macroscopic world can be viewed from
Cartesian frame and thus can be split into independently existing ‘things’ as objective realities,
why the very building blocks of the same fail to exhibit any inherent objective properties that are
independent of the measuring systems? Put conversely, if Cartesian paradigm fails at sub-atomic
particles and if these are the building blocks of the matter, application of the same paradigm to
macroscopic world should be erroneous, and if it is so, why the error has nor surfaced in any of
the sciences developed so far? Many such questions surfaced during the historical developments
of quantum physics during the early decades of twentieth century, which probably could not be
answered in unambiguous terms even by the proponents of the new physics.
In light of such paradoxical questions, the quantum mechanical developments turn out to be
incomprehensible for many scientists including Albert Einstein, Max Planck, and Erwin
Schrodinger. Their main argument was: How can centuries old Cartesian system of knowledge
be shaken up fundamentally and so easily? At the same time, the opposite camp of proponents of
quantum mechanics was also not devoid of confusion, which mainly hovered around a new
quandary : The age old concepts of classical physics cannot explain a quantum event
unambiguously, hence the same need to be replaced by an alternative paradigm that necessarily
uses a language not based upon the Cartesian world view. But then, such a new language, if at all
it can be invented would, in turn be simply unintelligible for a human mind which is conditioned
to think in, -and only in-the Cartesian mode ever since the time immemorial! Hence, in the
Copenhagen Interpretation, the classical concepts were accepted as the only course left to explain
the outcome, however ambiguous that may be, thus leaving this paradox- the Measurement
Problem- unresolved. But nevertheless, the quantum developments did make the Cartesian line
between the object and the subject blurred forever.
So at the sub-atomic levels, the subjective element becomes so prominent that a particle can be
turned into a wave and a wave into a particle by choosing an appropriate measuring instrument!
What is the true nature of ‘it’? Well, the true nature of ‘it’ will never be known, because
inherently ‘it’ doesn’t exist! Hitherto, the term Reality was very widely used to mean an
Objective Reality that is existing 'out there', (- and in fact, it is even today widely used in the
same meaning in our common sense world views); but for the first time, the scientists, while
working with the atomic realms, were forced to differentiate between the reality as observed by
us on one side and truly objective reality of the nature on the other side; and not only that, the
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quantum mechanists also realized rather more shockingly, that this truly objective reality is, in
principle not knowable!!
How About Very Large Realms of Nature?
The sub-atomic realms are not the only realms that cannot be studied objectively, there are many
other realms of the Nature which also cannot be studied objectively, but for the different reasons
altogether.
Most of our scientific studies and research are based upon the methods of abstraction. We study
a ‘thing’ of nature -be it a product or a process, by studying it in a laboratory, thus isolating it
from many other forces or energies that might be actually existing in nature. The causal laws
thus formed in the laboratory would be valid for actual natural world only under limiting
conditions, and hence, they are always inaccurate to certain extent. This inaccuracy is directly
dependent upon the degree of closeness between the actual conditions in nature and simulated
conditions in the laboratory, thus we can expect to have very insignificant inaccuracies when the
two conditions match closely well with each other. All products and processes studied and
developed in various branches of sciences are the results of such laboratory experiments
performed under closely matching simulating conditions.
And the scientific progress of the human kind in the last three centuries was at such an
accelerating pace, we started believing that anything and everything in the natural world can be
objectively studied by using the same methods of abstraction, and thus the very concept of
Reality got gradually extended to even those things and objects which are beyond the scope of
scientific research based upon such abstraction methods.
For example, there are certain natural phenomena, certain natural ‘things’ whose very form and
structure are such that they just cannot be simulated in the laboratory. The most striking example
of such a case is that of weather. We just cannot simulate actual weather conditions in its totality
in a laboratory. Any effort in that direction is nothing but a very heavy compromise of its overall
universal totality. The amount of error involved in such an effort would be far from insignificant.
Hence, even with all super computers at our disposal, weather predictions over longer time
periods are far from accurate. Other examples where scientific studies by abstractions and
simulations would fail are, ecology, studies of epidemics, biological and life sciences etc.; in all
these fields, we face problems like predicting and/or determining causes and conditions for
species either going extinct or being produced anew, predicting or determining causes of onset of
an epidemic or onset of a new disease, or even- on a smaller scale, determining root causes for
incidence of a particular disease- be it the common cold or a deadly cancer- in a particular person
at a particular point of time.
In all the above examples, the actual conditions are highly complex due to very large number of
forces and energies simultaneously working on each other making it nearly impossible to
simulate the conditions even in the most elaborate laboratory set-ups. To understand the
complexities involved in these kinds of phenomena, let us take a simple experiment. We take
five uniform lengths of mild steel wires cut from the same coil, and are hung in the air in five
locations in different continents with an identical weight tied at the bottom end of each wire. The
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uniform weight hung is so calculated that the wire will break away when reduced to half its
diameter under corrosive atmospheric conditions, and this is estimated roughly to take about a
year or so. Can the modern science, with all the available data on the composition of the wire,
and also the data on atmospheric conditions as at the time of onset of the experiments in five
locations predict the exact time correct up to seconds, if not milliseconds, when each wire would
break up? It’s very unlikely. But if the same experiment is conducted in a laboratory with all
conditions controlled and known, the prediction could be very accurate, probably even in
milliseconds. In the outdoor experiment, the atmospheric ripple effects which otherwise are
discarded off in the laboratory experiment, become significant forces under natural conditions,
making it extremely difficult to predict an outcome. It’s not that the basic causal laws of science
fail in such cases, but it’s the fact that enormous ripples turn into forces that have direct impact
on the outcome when we experiment in actual environmental conditions with particular objects,
which makes the true objective predictions impossible.
Well, study of all the large realms are, in one way or the other, study of the Nature in its Totality.
Ultimate Objective Reality and Totality of Nature
Let us go back to the example of weather. Let us imagine that there is an omnipotent omniscient
Super Scientist-God well above our planet who at any given instant knows the exact values of all
relevant parameters that are required to define exact status of the weather in every smallest
‘pockets’ of the entire globe. Let us also assume, that this Super Scientist-God also knows by his
super powers, right at that moment, nature of all the energy reactions-without interfering them in
any way, that are happening all over the globe which all would impact those parameters-either
directly, or indirectly through ripple effects- in each of these ‘pockets’ in the next instant; thus
enabling our SSG to determine accurately the changes in all the parameters in each such ‘pocket’
in the next instant; and integrating them all, can also determine exact changes in the weather in
the whole of the planet in the next instant, and then in the next instant …and so on, for any time
in the future. Thus, from the point of view of SSG, the causality holds good for all these
interactions at every level in the universe, and that the events in nature and universe are
determinate, continuous, local and…., -that the God doesn’t play dice!
The emphasis in the above hypothetical example is on the non-abstracted totality of the nature
that consists of infinite interactions enfolding the whole of the planet and also all animate and
inanimate matters in its totality. In fact, there are no distinctions between such matters, as such
there is neither any description of any macroscopic product or process nor any for a microscopic
or sub-atomic ‘particle’, all these are expressed only by infinite energy fields of innumerable
kinds, which all interact with each other every instant undergoing perpetual metamorphosis
through innumerable interactions. These are the fields that corresponds to organic and inorganic
matter, to living and non-living matter, to sub-atomic, atomic and macroscopic aggregates, hence
there are infinite energy fields, all overlapping each other when multiple of them interact with
multiple others simultaneously in a highly complex way, which results into infinite number of
instantaneous energy transformations resulting into newer energy fields, which again enters into
newer interactions and so on and on. The whole scenario is so complex, we, with all our super
duper computers put into the service, shall never be able to study the nature in its totality. And
also, since there are no ‘things’ definable in terms of our classical physics, there are no reference
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frames either to define order or disorder, matter or non-matter, living or non-living, there are
only energy fields and their transformations happening at all levels, and these all are controlled
by causal laws pertaining to energy transformations at the root levels. Well, this in nutshell is the
Ultimate Objective Reality (“UOR”).
The question is, can we, the human scientist, attain the levels of Super Scientist-God ever in
future, and know the UOR in its totality? No and would never, mainly for the following three
reasons:
a. The human scientist does not have non-interfering measuring systems to collect required
data at all levels in all the matters of the entire planet without having any interaction
with the observed energy fields. Nothing can be observed unless there is an interaction
between a measuring system and the observed. Not only this, as we will see in the latter
part of the study, there are entanglements further down the line, between the measuring
system and the interpreting system-or the consciousness faculty of the observer. These
are all inevitably entangled energically with each other, hence affecting the ultimate
objectivity.
b. There is enormous complexity involved in the study of UOR in its totality. Even if we put
aside all above entanglements for a moment, neither the present day science nor in future
would any time have the means to study simultaneously the infinite number of reactions
happening in each of the infinite number of ‘pockets’ in the entire universe that would
have impacts on the relevant parameters of the nature in an infinite direct and indirect
ways. The UOR in its totality is simply beyond the scope of the human beings.
c. The third reason, and probably the most intricate one, it is difficult to determine the
nature of the highly unpredictable forces that may spring from accidental alignments of
ripples effects.
Bohm, while discussing inadequacy of Laplacian determinism, says, (Bohm D., 1957, pg. 159):
"We see then, the behavior of the world is not perfectly determined by any possible purely
mechanical or qualitative line of causal connection. This does not mean, however, that it is
arbitrary. If we take any given effect, we can always in principle trace it to the causes from
which its essential aspects came. Only as we go further and further back into the past, we
discover three important points: viz. first, that the number of causes which contribute
significantly to a given effect increases without limit; secondly that more and more qualitatively
different kinds of causal factors are found to be significant; and finally, that these causes depend
on new contingencies leading to new kinds of chance."
Hence, the human mind has no alternative than to interact with an abstracted version of the UOR
at a particular instant, and assess its overall state by extrapolating the results of abstraction. Thus,
the two states assessed this way spaced out on a time scale would certainly be discontinuous, and
non-causal; and also the state of UOR for any other instant in future would always remain
indeterminable. The God, for us, does play dice!!
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2: Cartesian World View
The basis of human world view for the last several centuries has been Cartesian partition,-the
God, The World and the Observer-‘I’. Even in earlier times, in Stone Age too, there existed a
world view based upon the ‘things out there’ that is either good or bad for the survival of ‘me
over here’. The root of such differentiation lies with the basic inherent pleasures and pains
experienced exclusively by the observer ‘within’ its body in an interaction with the environments
which all are ‘without’ the body. Well, it is this subjective experience of pleasures and pains that
enforces any living creature to differentiate between the environmental ‘things’ around him and
thus form a world view partitioned among the ‘things' of pleasures and pains on one side, and 'I'
on the other side; a partitioned world view that is so vital for the very survival, and hence is a
most common feature among all the living creatures. Put differently, in absence of these basic
instincts of life, the living creature would fail to identify a particular environment as being prosurvival or anti-survival, and thus, would also fail to precipitate a flight or fight action. Whether
in stone age or in the modern times, every human endeavor to know the nature and the world
around him has always been an automatic fall out of such survival instincts, thus automatically
forcing a demarcation between a ‘me’ and the rest of the world in every interaction. Over the
ages, however, there has been an enormous change in both the qualitative and quantitative nature
of the pleasures (and pains), but nevertheless, they remained fundamental instincts of life for all
living beings in all times. With changing times, the earlier stone age demarcation line gradually
became an elaborated framework to describe the basis of human model of thinking in dealing
with nature. This framework, came to be known as Cartesian framework after the French
philosopher Descartes, describes a basis which remains, for the reasons as explained, the only
and most natural way of dealing with the environments for any human being in all ages to ensure
his/her survival. Thus, it forms the commonest basis of all world views of all human beings held
at any time. The three main aspects of the Cartesian world view are : 1. The physical things ‘out
there’ are objective realities, whose properties are independent of the observer/subject 2. In the
same way, the subject-‘I’ is an entity whose properties and existence are independent of the
things ‘out there’. 3. The link between the physical things and ‘I’ is God.
However the new science, as discussed in the previous section, forced the scientists to start
thinking in a Non-Cartesian way, insofar as the world of atomic particles is concerned.
Otherwise, for the human mind which continued to be a ‘prisoner’ within this Cartesian frame,
found it very difficult to think that there could be systems and ‘things’ in the nature that cannot
be defined as objective ‘things’ within this Cartesian frame, and hence that, no causal laws can
be formed, developed or applied to such ‘things’. Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976), the German
Nobel laureate, and co-creator of quantum mechanics along with Niels Bohr, expresses this
difficulty as follows, (Heisenberg W. 1958, pg. 55) : “If one follows the great difficulty which
even eminent scientists like Einstein had in understanding and accepting the Copenhagen
interpretation of quantum theory, one can trace the roots of this difficulty to the Cartesian
partition. This partition has penetrated deeply into human mind during the three centuries
following Descartes and it will take a long time for it to be replaced by a really different attitude
toward the problem of reality”.
Having analyzed the impact of Cartesian thinking on human mind in general and resulting
paradoxes in the study of small particles, we now turn to the other extreme, the realms of larger
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systems. We, in the previous section, have already touched upon weather as a large system, now
let us analyze the impact on man-made systems like a family, nation etc. Once again by default,
in all these realms too, we view all ‘things’ as if they are all physical objects standing ‘out there’
having a set of objective properties, which are measurable by all observers alike. Thus, reality of
India as a nation or reality of a football team or of a painting or a song is all unambiguously as
real as an apple in our hands.
Let us take an example of a school. The most immediate physical manifestations of a particular
school are its physical structures, e.g. administrative offices, class rooms, laboratories, etc. But
these are just its physical manifestations, there are many more aspects –and far more important
too, to completely define a school in its totality; like its education philosophy and policy, its
curriculum, its faculty, caliber of principal and autonomy he/she enjoys, investor’s interests, fee
structures, extra-curricular activities, status of laboratories and libraries, pay scales and health
care for its employees, etc. Now, when different persons interact with this school in their
different capacities and for different reasons, each one of them would experience only a few of
those attributes relevant to their individual interactions, and no one can experience all the aspects
simultaneously in one interaction; and it is from such truncated versions that each observer by
extrapolation would actualize an overall image of the school.
Thus, not only that each such extrapolation has inherent errors, but each is also very subjective.
So no two actualized realities of a school are likely to be identical in all aspects, but at the same
time, each individual version would have some commonalities like the name and location of the
school, its physical structures, play grounds, etc. And it is by virtue of such commonalities that
all observers tend to believe that each one is observing same reality of a particular school
existing ‘out there’, in spite of the fact that each one’s version of actualized reality is different
from all others. For example, the investor assesses the school as a revenue generating asset, and
thus ‘measures’ it with the returns on his investments, but then with the same yardstick he cannot
‘measure’ the quality of the education being imparted in the school, which can be ‘measured’
correctly only by an educationist, say the principal of the school, but then the principal in turn
will not be a good judge on its returns of investments!
So a particular school may be very good by one yardstick, and ‘the same’ could be very bad by
another yardstick! This means the actualized reality of the school is 'yardstick’ dependent, or is
simply subjective. Which of these versions is the truest representation of the school as an overall
entity, existing as a reality out there?’ None, whatsoever, because all the assessments are
subjective and not only that, all being extrapolations to a certain degree, are also approximations
too. Put differently, the school as a whole, as an entity in its entirety, cannot be ‘measured’ and
assessed for all its attributes alike by all observers.
Precisely speaking, for each observer, the extrapolated overall reality of the school is a reality
that has come into being only out of an interaction of each observer with the school, and this
extrapolated reality otherwise was simply non-existent, and would have remained non-existent
forever in absence of any such interaction. We all up to a certain point, may concur that all
versions are subjective and bound to differ from each other, but in practice, we do not extend this
concurrence any further to question the very existence of the school as an objective reality. The
main reason being, the commonalities like its name, the physical structures etc. are enough to
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provide physical manifestations required to actualize the reality of the school as an objective
reality standing out there, because all such physical manifestations are sensed and perceived
uniformly by each observer .
But certainly, the school as a whole is much more than what meets our five senses, and this
‘much more’ is rather more important to assess the school than the physical structures alone. But
then, this ‘much more’ part can only be assessed subjectively, or put differently, the ‘much more’
part of a school doesn’t exist as objective reality; it comes into being only in an interaction. This
means, most important part of the whole, -the whole which is believed to exist as an objective
reality, doesn’t exist as an objective reality! The logical lacuna associated with our basic
paradigm of thinking is thus concluded.
In the same way, the reality of India for a tourist would be different in many ways than that for
any of its citizens, and again in turn, the reality would be different for an urban, rich citizen than
that for a poor villager. If for all these three people - or for that matter for any assessor of any
kind whatsoever, the reality of India is so different, the question is what is Real India? Nobody
knows, nor at the same time, would they agree that they all are talking of different Indias! We
may conclude that when dealing with such large systems, either our common sense meaning of
the term Reality needs to be redefined precisely in more subjective terms, or accept the fact that a
school or a nation per se just does not exist as a reality ‘out there’ in our sense of the meaning!
Hence in all such cases, if we still wish to hold to our Cartesian meaning of reality, then only
conclusion that can be drawn is that the reality of a particular school or a particular nation just
does not exist, which means India or the USA are imaginary entities!
To summarize, we discussed how in the quantum world, the entanglement of the observed and
the measuring system makes the objective studies impossible, while in case of the nature
exemplified by weather or ecology or any such large natural systems, it is their sheer complexity
that rules out any possibility for an objective study. We also saw, in man-made large systems,
objective assessments are not possible largely because of the problem of entanglements. We shall
now see that in case of studies involving living beings and their behaviors with the environments,
we are confronted with both the problems, viz. the problem of entanglements as well as the
problem due to complexity. To understand this, I propose, we start with the behavior of a new
born baby.
3. Human Behavior & Consciousness
A newborn baby belongs to the entire universe. For her, she is neither an Indian nor an
American, neither a Hindu nor a Muslim nor a Jew. She is not black, nor white, nor brown. She
is none in particular, and she is all in general. Hence, she belongs to all uniformly, or put
differently, she does not belong to anyone particularly. However, this universalized state of hers
doesn’t last long. As for any normal infant, she has pains of hunger, and also the pleasures of
being fed, of being loved and cuddled, again and again. She slowly recognizes a face as having
consistently associated with these pleasures. This correlation becomes stronger and stronger with
each feeding session, and with each act of loving and hugging. A causal connection thus
automatically gets established in her little brain, in due course of time. Very soon, it reaches a
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stage when at each instance of sighting this face, there is a sparkle in her eyes, smile on her tiny
face, with her little arms raised in the air as if to embrace this face instantly. All such small acts
and expressions are like embracing that reality- a reality identified as a source of pleasure, love
and warmth. The mother’s face would become invariably the first reality in her life distinctly
identified and memorized as a source of pleasure and protection among many other faces around
her. She now belongs to this face more than the rest of the universe!
Our baby is put on a regular ayurvedic tonic of harade, which is very bitter in taste. Normally
given three times a day, the baby starts correlating the spoon containing harade with its very
unpleasant taste. With repeated dosages, the causal connection is complete, and the baby now, on
the very sight of the spoon, instantly starts crying, then turns away her frowned face with tightly
closed lips in total resistance. All these acts are to avoid the reality of harade, which has been by
now, well identified and memorized as a source of unpleasantness. Well, the baby now doesn’t
belong to all uniformly any more, she belongs to some little more positively, and to some little
more negatively.
What triggers the action when the baby sees her mother approaching or when she smells or sights
the bitter medicine in the spoon? It’s the small bit of information reaching the brain which acts as
a trigger to recall an identical or equivalent reality from the recent past experiences- associated
with a pleasure or a pain, in its entirety, which inadvertently results into a physical reflex
reaction by baby, either to embrace to avert the approaching environmental change. This entire
process of triggering and recalling, including the instantaneous reflex action to embrace or to
avert is automatic, as automatic as the digestion process in her tummy.
The baby would slowly have more and more interactions with all sorts of environments during
her wakeful hours, every minute, every second. She is exposed to ‘things’ like siblings, to
neighborhood kids, to various kinds of people of all ages, and of all colors and contours; and so
also to all kinds of material ‘things’ like foods, drinks, medicines, toys and games, etc. Not all of
these are pleasant, nor all of these are unpleasant. In either case, whenever there are enough
number of repeated encounters, invariably a causal relationship between the thing and the
associated pleasure or pain gets established. The thing along with the nature of pleasure or pain
gets automatically memorized, in such a way that the nature of pleasure or pain gets interwoven
with certain physical characteristics of that object to become one whole inseparable reality, that
collectively goes as a bundle into her memory. We may repeat, this process of memorization of
realities interwoven with the pleasure or pain is very automatic. To be more specific, there are no
conscious efforts by baby to memorize certain realities and not to memorize certain others, either
of the two are happening very automatically, as automatic as the thumping of her heart.
The human memory has certain ‘shelf-life’, and hence the memory of a particular thing tend to
fade out automatically with time in absence of any more repeated encounters with the same.
With constantly changing environments thus, those ‘things’ with decreasing frequencies of
interactions, automatically get replaced by newer ones having higher and increasing frequencies
with time. With growing age, the spectrum of realities in the memory is constantly changing both
qualitatively and quantitatively depending upon the rate of the change of the environments and
also upon the cognitive abilities of the brain, which also is developing and changing with time.
But at the same time, there are certain realities e.g. of the parents, of the home, of the school, etc,
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and above all, of her own image in the mirror, these all are sort of permanent in her memory just
for the simple reason that the interactions with all these realities are continuous with time
without any long breaks.
Physical & Mental Skills
With growing age, the child learns various skills by just imitating the elders around him/her, and
this is how she learns to take her first steps, learns to utter words like ‘ma’ and ‘pa’, and even
learn to speak full sentences by an age of around three, without undergoing any formal training.
The child repeatedly experiences that every new skill he/she learns is well appreciated by all
elders around him, and each such appreciation by itself becomes a newer kind of pleasure for
him/her. (And most children, we have observed, tend to repeat a particular act again and again in
presence of elders to have repeated pleasures of appreciations.) Very soon, a correlation between
the skills learnt and the associated new pleasures automatically gets established in the young
brain, and thus develops inadvertently a continuous inner urge to have more of such kudos by
learning more and more newer skills. The kind of urge for newer skills is akin to her craving for
the very yummy foods he/she has experienced in the past. And as we mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the same pleasure-driven mechanism by which the child grabs the pleasant foods in a
reflex manner, works in the same reflex way to grab every new opportunity to learn a newer
skill.
The mechanism of repetitive interactions holds valid not only for the basic skills learnt during
formative years, but it also provides an underlying functional mechanism by which a human
brain learns more complex skills all through the life.
Whenever the brain starts learning a new physical or mental task, higher level of attention is
demanded, and once the task is learnt, with every subsequent repeated rehearsal, both the time to
complete the task and the attention level required will keep on reducing. With enough
repetitions, a stage is reached, when the required attention reduces down to near zero levels. At
this point of time, the skill goes into the sub-conscious realm of the brain from where it gets
performed very automatically without the brain consciously being aware of the same. Once a
particular skill is mastered, the same goes into the automatic mode of performing and the brain
can turn its attention to learn another new skill requiring higher attention levels, by
simultaneously putting to use all those (lower level) skills mastered earlier and now being used in
their automatic modes, the cycle, thus, goes on and on.
Martha Koukkou and Dietrich Lehmann, Swiss neuroscientists, have reported research
correlating changes observed in EEG patterns at various stages of learning newer
skills,(Koukkou M. and Lehmann D. 1993, pp.61-62): " It was found that the dimension of the
initial EEG reactivity to "new" information relates to the quality of learning; it changes
systematically as a function of changing contextual meaning, expectancy and familiarity with the
event. During learning and overlearning the information-induced EEG changes (the dimension of
EEG reactivity) decrease with increasing familiarity with an event and a task; that is with better
performance. The EEG reactivity is minimal or even abolished when the training procedure
reaches automatic behavioral responses."
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Cycle of Behavior
At any instant, when the brain receives an information coming from environments within or
without the body, with regard to certain changes in the environments, the same triggers the
memory to recollect from the past experiences same or similar environmental change in its
entirety, and subsequently, the same gets automatically sorted out into a probable reality of either
a pleasure or a pain; following which- by using a mastered mental skill, the one which is
visualized as of the highest (probable) pleasure or of the least (probable) pain gets automatically
selected for actualization. This, in turn, triggers a particular reflex action –automatically selected
as appropriate for that situation from the past experiences, and the same executed instantaneously
using the learned physical skills to actualize the selected reality. Now, following the reflex act,
subsequent changes in the environment may turn more positive, more negative or neutral from
the point of view of the targeted pleasure or adaptability in this entire cycle of interaction; the
same, along with some independent changes in environments that may occur in the next instant,
comes collectively as the next bunch of information into the consciousness faculty, triggering a
new cycle of interaction, following the same pattern. It should be noted that in the entire cycle of
behavior, the emphasis is on automaticity.
Bohm expresses similar viewpoint, (Bohm D. 1980, pg. 64): "One of the earliest and most
primitive forms of thought is, for example, just the memory of pleasure or pain, in conjunction
with a visual, or olfactory image that may be evoked by an object or a situation… It is clear,
however, that the whole meaning of such a memory is just the conjunction of the image with its
feeling , which (along with the intellectual content and the physical reaction) constitutes the
totality of the judgment as to whether what is remembered is good or bad, desirable or not, etc. It
is clear that thought, considered in this way as the response of memory, is basically mechanical
in its order of operation. Either it is a repetition of some previously existent structure drawn from
memory, or else it is some combination arrangement and organization of these memories into
further structures of ideas and concepts, categories, etc. These combinations may possess a
certain kind of novelty resulting from the fortuitous interplay of elements of memory, but it is
clear that such novelty is still essentially mechanical." (Italics as in the original).
Each such cycle of interaction, operating totally in an automatic mode, fundamentally works on
the basic instincts of survival, which ‘decides’ in the first stage, whether the environmental
change is good or bad for its survival, or being pleasant or unpleasant with respect to its past
experiences, followed by, in the second stage, a reflex act to actualize or de-actualize the reality
of the same. I may propose to call this cycle as Cycle of Consciousization. In the English
language, there is no verb equivalent for 'consciousness', and since in the present study,
consciousness is defined as a process, the need for such a term is unavoidable. Hence, to
consciousize would mean to become conscious of, and consciousization would mean a process of
becoming conscious of. In the more precise meaning, as described above, consciousization is a
default mechanism, present in all the living beings, that is solely responsible to help them
develop adaptive skills under all circumstances vis-a-vis ever changing environments so as to
maximize their chances of survival, and/or to maximize the pleasures and minimize the pains.
This mechanism of behavior based upon the basic instincts of pleasures and pains is very
fundamental and common to all living beings across the board in any age, at any time
whatsoever. Why do these basic instincts exist in the first place? No science probably would ever
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get an answer to this question, for the simple reason that no experience of any pleasure or a pain
can further be analyzed to any other lower level in order to get an answer for its causes.
Pleasures and pains are there, simply because they are, period. To that extent they would always
remain mysterious forever.
In a way, this fundamental cycle of behavior comes very close to the concept of collective
unconscious , and the basic instincts of pleasures and pains, probably qualify as archetypes; as
postulated by the famed Swiss psychiatrist Carl Jung (1875-1976) in his analytical psychology.
According to him, the collective unconscious is the common pattern that controls human psyche
in all cases. Its correlation with proposed consciousization cycle may be visualized by the
following narration on the collective consciousness and archetypes given by Miller A. in "When
Pauli met Jung", (Atmanspacher H. & Primas H., 2009, pp. 247-248) : "Unlike Freud, Jung was
interested in aspects of the psyche that could not be attributed to individual's personal
development but to the deeper non-personal realms common to humankind- the collective
unconscious, whose contents he called 'archetypes'. These are not inherited ideas, rather they are
latent potentialities whose origins remains forever obscure because they reside in the mysterious
realm of collective unconscious about which we will never have direct knowledge. Whereas the
archetype itself is not representable, its effects enable to visualize it as an archetypal image, or
symbol. Archetypes are hard-wired into the mind and serve as organizing principles allowing us
to construct knowledge from the potpourri of sensations bombarding us. "
The research paper by Koukkou and Lehmann, (Koukkou M. and Lehmann D., 1993, pg. 59),
draws conclusions that are very much in line with those described above in regard to the
functional mechanisms of a human brain: " Summarizing one can say that the operations of the
cycle of communication generate and coordinate all dimensions of human behavior. These
operations can be analyzed into three continuous, interdependent, dynamic, and complex sets of
operations where each set depends on the previous one and initiates the next one. All three sets
of operations are knowledge implemented. That means, their characteristics depend on the kind
of previously acquired and momentarily accessible knowledge of the individual. These sets of
operations are (1) the creation of multidimensional neuronal model of the internal and external
individual realities out of the interaction between incoming signals and momentarily accessible
knowledge (pattern formation) (2) the evaluation of significance of these realities for the
momentary psychobiological priorities by matching against accessible knowledge (pattern
recognition); and (3) selection and execution of the answer, which is a functional
psychobiological adaptation to the recognized significance of these realities. The answer is
relayed back to the central nervous system and together with new incoming messages
participates in the formation of the next model of realities, and so forth."
The seemingly so variant and complex behaviors of all human beings, controlled or not
controlled, aimed at long time goals can in fact, at the root levels be split up into umpteen
numbers of instantaneous consciousizing interactions, one each for each of the innumerable
unitary acts of ‘go/no-go’ types, ‘go’ for pleasures, ‘no-go’ for pains; each of which has been
mastered by repeated encounters in the past, and hence all such acts are executed instantly in a
reflex mode, thus we can say that the entire overall complex behavior is also executed very
automatically and unconsciously. Since, each complex task is but a different combination of such
innumerable unitary root level acts or the skills mastered in the past, the complete automaticity
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of human brain's functioning applies to all kinds of human behaviors. What is being suggested
here is a simple mechanism by which a human brain operates, whereby seemingly complex
functioning of the brain at the aggregate levels can be reduced down to a simple on-off
mechanisms operating at the root levels of neurons. The future research in this field may be able
to correlate each such unitary act, as executed by on-off firing of a particular bunch of the
neurons(-and probably the same bunch of neurons in every repetitive act), with each peak on real
time EEG of an active brain. During the wakeful and very active hours for a person, the number
of elementary acts being performed (either physically or mentally) per unit time increases by
manifold as compared to sleep hours; and this is what exactly reflected in the corresponding
EEGs. For example, the lowest frequency EEG is called Delta, having a frequency as low as 4
Hz, and is normally associated with babies and adult sleep states, and on the other extreme are
highest frequency EEGs, known as Beta(16-31 Hz) and Gamma (32-100 Hz) and are those found
in very active states of adults.
Koukkou and Lehmann contemplates even more close correlations between the human brain's
micro-states, which constitutes its overall macro behavior, with the micro-structure of the EEG.
They report, ( Koukkou M. and Lehmann D., 1993, pg. 64): "Our studies on this micro-structure
of the EEG and its functional and introspective correlates showed that such very brief states can
be clearly identified. For these studies of micro-states, brain electric activity is not viewed as
waveforms but as a continuous series of momentary electric landscapes (maps) at a typical rates
of 128 or 256 maps/second. .. .. .. A given landscape of the brain's momentary electric field can
be assumed to represent the activity of a particular neuronal population and accordingly, a
particular step or mode of information processing. A change of the momentary electric landscape
must mean that a different neural population has become active and, hence, that a different step
or mode of information processing is taking place. This leads to the possibility to identify
momentary functional micro-states of brain activity on the basis of the spatial pattern of
momentary landscape of the brain's electric potential."
I may propose: Consciousness, or ‘Consciousizing’ is a process in which, in the first stage,
the sensory perceptions arising from the brain's interaction with an environment leads to
visualization of a probable reality of either pro-survival/pleasure or anti-survival/pain, (or
as a third possibility, neither of the two), which in the second stage, instantly triggers a
reflex action to actualize the environment of pro-survival /pleasure as a Reality, or to deactualize the environment of anti-survival/pain as if a Non-reality (and in the third case, be
indifferent). Briefly put, the consciousizing is a default mechanism present in all living
beings by the virtue of which they all automatically strive to develop an adaptability to
survive in the ever changing environments.
I also propose the following Principle of Reflex Human Behavior specifying reflex
characteristics underlying all kinds of human actions and reactions:
Principle of Reflex Human Behavior: All human acts and actions are brain’s reflex
reactions –without the subject being consciously aware of the same, triggered automatically
by each consciousizing interaction of the brain with an environment, so as to either
embrace the pleasure or to avert the pain as consciousized in the interaction, and as such
there cannot be any human action which is neither of these two; and further that under the
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prevailing conditions of the brain and the environment, the triggered reflex actions are
inevitable and irreplaceable.
According to the above proposed principles, all human actions are reflex, execution and nature of
which is 'decided' jointly by the existing status of the brain and that of the environment
interacting with it at the instant of each interaction.
And also further that all human beings at the root levels behave identically like robots, - or more
precisely, like Conscious Robots. Whether we like it or not, this fundamental characteristic
underlying the above proposed principles is there by default in all of us to control, regulate and
direct all our actions automatically without we ever realizing the same, to help us survive in or to
adapt to the ever changing environments around us.
(Continued on Part II)
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Article
Alterations of Consciousness at a Self-Development Seminar:
A Matrix Energetics Seminar Survey
Imants Barušs*1, Carolyn van Lier2 & Diana Ali1
1
Department of Psychology, King’s University College at The University of Western Ontario
Department of Psychology, The University of Western Ontario
2
ABSTRACT
Matrix Energetics is a system of self-transformation developed by Richard Bartlett in the context of
alternative medicine, which he teaches at training seminars around the world to anyone who wishes
to learn it. The authors conducted the present study to determine what happens psychologically at a
Matrix Energetics seminar and to see if there could be any long-term health benefits associated with
participation at such a seminar. Participants were 97 attendees at a Matrix Energetics seminar held
over three days at a hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There were 69 women and 26 men (N = 95)
with a mean age of 51.1 years (SD = 13.2; age range: 18–77 years; N = 94). Participants were given
questionnaires to complete before the beginning of the seminar, at the end of each of the three days,
and through a website at a two-month follow-up. The questionnaires included measures of
demographic information, personality, psychological well-being, physical and mental health, state of
being, and profundity of experiences. In addition, behavioral observations were made and
participants were interviewed. During the seminar participants appeared to experience reality as
being more plastic than we ordinarily assume it to be while in an attentive, expanded, and
emotionally positive state of being. Using the total scale of the 36-Item RAND Health Survey, a
paired samples t test revealed that overall health was better at the follow-up (M = 81.33; SD = 10.43)
than at the time of the initial questionnaires (M = 72.77; SD = 16.15) with t(24) = 3.42, p = .002
(two-tailed), although that result needs to be interpreted with caution. The alterations of
consciousness experienced in the context of Matrix Energetics should be further investigated as
should the potentially therapeutic benefits of experiencing Matrix Energetics.
Key Words: Self-development, alterations of consciousness, meaning, well-being, Matrix Energetics.
Matrix Energetics (ME) is a system of transformation developed by Richard Bartlett, a chiropractor
and naturopath, in the context of alternative medicine. Together with Melissa Joy Jonsson, Bartlett
has been teaching this system to the public in a series of seminars, each lasting from one to three
days, which have been held in hotel conference rooms around the world. The purpose of this study
was to investigate what occurs psychologically for people who participate in an ME seminar and to
determine whether there could be any long term improvements in physical or psychological health
following a seminar.
* Correspondence: Professor Imants Barušs, Department of Psychology, King’s University College at The University of Western
Ontario, 266 Epworth Ave., London, Ontario, Canada N6A 2M3. E-Mail: baruss@uwo.ca
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The practice of ME consists of applying specific techniques to oneself or to someone or something
else. These techniques essentially consist of noting one’s own spontaneous thoughts, creating
changes in the imagination, and then allowing whatever process appears to be taking place, to take
place. In theory, the recipient of ME does not need to be physically present for effects to occur.
Whatever is happening is sometimes conceptualized as interacting with a non-physical, intelligent
field that has the ability to create changes. Those who have experienced ME have reported noticing
somatic sensations, altered emotions, unexpected thoughts, or, in some cases, the spontaneous
remission of physical conditions. For instance, sometimes recipients of ME have reported feeling a
wave-like sensation in their bodies and ended up lying on the floor (Bartlett, 2007; 2009; Barušs,
2012; 2013; Jonsson, 2013; Marlowe, 2010).
Because of the nature of ME and its possible non-local effects, it is difficult to determine where the
boundaries of ME lie, and no effort is made to do so in this study. That would require additional
studies that would be difficult to do. Also, for the purposes of this study, no effort is made to
distinguish ME from non-specific factors such as social interactions with like-minded individuals,
suggestion, listening to a charismatic speaker, and so on. Teasing those out would require separate
studies. The situation we faced is not dissimilar to that of the phenomenon of hypnosis. Hypnosis
researchers cannot agree on a definition of hypnosis. The closest that they come to agreement is to
say that hypnosis is whatever it is that is happening in situations that have been labeled as hypnosis
(Barušs, 2003). Similarly, for the purposes of this study, ME is operationalized as whatever it is that
is happening at an ME seminar.
We begin our literature review by summarizing two remote influencing experiments using
techniques derived from ME and then discuss a study of people who said that they had had
transformative experiences in the context of ME. Falling down is a conspicuous behavior at ME
seminars, so we say a little bit about that. Then we situate ME in the larger context of selfdevelopment and healing. We conclude by laying out the design of our study.
Remote Influencing Experiments
Imants Barušs conducted two experiments using techniques derived from ME to look for any
apparent effects of remote influencing. Both experiments were done entirely over the Internet. In
Experiment 1, Barušs conducted 34 remote influencing sessions for 15 volunteers asking them to
report anything that they thought had occurred during the time of the sessions. On the basis of the
responses from participants, Barušs decided to use self-reported energy levels as the main dependent
measure in a second experiment.
Experiment 2 consisted of 138 sessions carried out from May 26, 2010 to May 11, 2012 with 22
participants who had provided informed consent and indicated times when they would not be driving
or operating machinery. Barušs emailed participants indicating the time that he would begin a session
for them, then would flip a coin to determine whether or not it would be a control or experimental
session. If the coin landed heads, he did a remote influencing session for them lasting for about 20
minutes. If the coin landed tails, he did nothing further. Participants were asked to respond to three
statements on a 6-point Likert scale from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.” These were
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statements that something unusual had happened, that participants were more fatigued than they
expected to have been, and that participants were more energized than they expected to have been. In
addition, if he did an experimental session, Barušs took two self-measures immediately after the
conclusion of the session, each on a rising scale from 1 to 10, of his degree of psychological
absorption in the task and of the depth of his altered state of consciousness.
All of the dependent measures were in the expected direction with the absolute value of the
difference between being fatigued and being energized reaching statistical significance. The absolute
value of the difference was M = 1.56 (SD = 1.59, n = 57) for the control group and M = 2.08
(SD = 1.58, n = 60) for the experimental group with z = 1.78, p = .04 (two-tailed). There were no
correlations of dependent measures with length of sessions or absorption but there was a correlation
of r = –.29 (p < .05, two-tailed, n = 55) of being energized minus being fatigued with depth of altered
state of consciousness suggesting that the deeper Barušs’ altered state, the more likely participants
were to feel fatigued rather than energized. This correlation should be interpreted with caution given
that no correction to the level of statistical significance was applied to the consideration of multiple
correlations (Barušs, 2013). These results suggest that anomalous remote influencing could take
place in the context of ME.
Transformative Experiences in an ME Context
For her doctoral dissertation at the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, Jos Marlowe sought to
understand the nature of transformative experiences that individuals claimed to have had as a result
of attending ME seminars. She solicited participants by word of mouth and selected them if they said
that they had had “transformative experiences” in the context of ME and had not been engaged in
other “transformative spiritual practices at the time” (Marlowe, 2010, p. 28). Of the 15 participants
who ended up in her study, 11 completed all aspects of the study.
Participants were asked to fill out an initial questionnaire, two custom questionnaires with written
responses, and two quantitative measures, the Self-Expansiveness Level Form (SELF) and the
Hartmann Boundary Questionnaire (HBQ). The first of the written response questionnaires
essentially asked participants to tell their stories of what had occurred for them, whereas the second
written response questionnaire was used to further query participants using standardized questions
about themes that emerged from the first questionnaire. Marlowe used two scales from the SELF to
measure “identification with the here and now” and “identification with aspects of reality beyond
that which is ordinarily perceived” (Marlowe, 2010, p. 33). The HBQ, measured the degree to which
a person has “thin” psychological boundaries in the sense of having ready access to non-conscious
psychological material (Marlowe, 2010, p. 35).
Using qualitative analyses, Marlowe found 22 themes, which she called “focus codes” (Marlowe,
2010, p. 56), such as “effortlessness” and “transformation” denoting that participants found the
practice of ME to be effortless and transformative, respectively (Marlowe, 2010, p. 124). Six of 88
correlations of focus codes with SELF and HBQ scales were statistically significant. The largest of
those correlations was r(11) = –.86 (p < .01) of “SELF Personal” with the “Unexplained” focus code,
indicating that those who were more grounded in the present were less likely to say that they had
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experienced phenomena that they could not explain. The second highest correlation was r(11) = .76
(p < .01) between the HBQ “World Total” scale and the “Effortlessness” focus code, suggesting that
those who have thinner external boundaries found that ME experiences flowed effortlessly
(Marlowe, 2010, p. 47). Marlowe summarized her results by saying that effortless, limitless,
transformative changes occurred; that detachment was required to have these experiences; that
“What one focuses on expands;” and that “The experience involves shared subconscious processes”
(Marlowe, 2010, p. 40).
One of the main problems with Marlowe’s study is the apparent lack of critical reflection by
Marlowe. For instance, Marlowe explained the correlation between the HBQ “World Total” scale
and the “Effortlessness” focus code by saying: “Effortlessness in this case correlates to the effort that
is involved in channeling the energy of the quantum vacuum” (Marlowe, 2010, p. 47). Richard
Bartlett has used quantum language to describe his system of self-transformation, Marlowe’s
participants used Bartlett’s language to describe their experiences, and Marlowe used Bartlett’s and
the participants’ language to explain her results. No evidence has been provided anywhere in
Marlowe’s dissertation that anything that she discussed actually has anything at all to do with the
quantum vacuum. Another of the problems with Marlowe’s study is that it is frequently not clear
whether Marlowe’s participants were reporting events that actually occurred for them or whether
they were reporting what they believed should be the interpretation of whatever was happening for
them. Without adequate critical reflection, Marlowe’s dissertation could simply be a conduit for
Bartlett’s teaching. There are also problems with the small sample size, data analyses, and confusing
lines of reasoning.
In spite of its shortcomings, Marlowe’s dissertation gives some insight into the experiences that
people can have at an ME seminar. Common themes include the notion that participants’ mental
states have been altered, that participants sometimes experience various somatic sensations,
including falling down, and that reality has become more plastic so that improbable events are more
likely to occur, such as the spontaneous remission of disease. All of these events should be more
carefully examined, and we try to make a beginning at doing so in this study. If ME can have gainful
effects on people’s health, then research concerning ME could have far-reaching, practical, beneficial
consequences for health care.
Falling Down
There are a number of characteristic behaviors associated with experiencing ME, including
uncontrollable laughter, spontaneous movement of various sorts, falling down, and, sometimes,
jerking around after having fallen to the ground (Bartlett, 2007; Marlowe, 2010). Richard Bartlett has
said that falling down is incidental to whatever is happening during the experience of ME, except
that physical movement could facilitate productive readjustment that could be taking place in
people’s bodies (cf. Bartlett, 2008). Marlowe (2010) has speculated that falling down occurs when
the person experiencing ME is exposed to the altered state of the person who is working on her,
although she does not explain why such exposure should result in the loss of muscle tone. In general,
falling down is not confined to ME. There are two other significant contexts in which similar
experiences occur, including the experience of falling down: The phenomenon of being “slain in the
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spirit” of Pentecostal-charismatic Christians (Robbins, 2004) and the result of suggestion during
hypnosis.
Uncontrollable laughter, spontaneous bodily movements of various sorts, falling down, and jerking
around while on the ground are common experiences during charismatic and Pentecostal services
and are typically referred to as being “slain in the Spirit” or, more colloquially, as “carpet time”
(Singleton, 2014, p. 383). For some individuals, the experience of being slain in the spirit is
propelled by deliberately releasing their resistance to it, whereas others just find that their muscles
give out so that they can no longer stand. These experiences are described as “bodily manifestations
of the Holy Spirit” and are attributed to “God’s power” (Singleton, 2014, p. 384; see also Taves,
1993).
All of these behaviors can also occur in the context of hypnosis for some people who are high in
hypnotic susceptibility. It should be noted that hypnosis is not a homogeneous state. Rather, there are
three types of highly susceptible people: the positively set, the fantasy prone, and the amnesia prone
(Barber, 1999). Several brain imaging studies have shown that hypnosis does have unique brain
states associated with it, lending support to the notion that in some cases hypnosis is a special state
(Barabasz et al., 1999; Maquet et al. 1999). The person who rationally decides to go along with what
is happening could be a positively set person, whereas the one who feels that she has no choice,
thereby exemplifying the classic suggestion effect of hypnosis (Barušs, 2003), could be fantasy prone
or amnesia prone. Attributing falling down to hypnosis is not an explanation but a re-labeling. In
other words, falling down during ME, slain in the spirit, and falling down during hypnosis, are
different descriptions of what appear to be similar behaviors that could have similar or different
causes for different people in different contexts. The mechanism is not known for any of these. In
this study we will try to determine some of the characteristics of falling down in the context of ME.
Self-Development and Healing
Perhaps the most straightforward contexts for ME are those of self-development and healing. There
is a notion, particularly in humanistic and transpersonal psychology, that human psychological
development does not end with adulthood, but continues toward states of exceptional well-being
(Barušs, 2003; 2007; Maslow, 1968; 1971/1976; McDowell, 2010). The activities in which people
engage during ME seminars are intended to induce self-transformation. Part of that selftransformation can include healing of physical or psychological ailments. In addition, ME grows out
of chiropractic and naturopathic health care so that the activities taking place can be viewed in the
context of healing. The notion of “therapeutic transformation” captures the notion of change toward
greater well-being without reference to specific religious, therapeutic, or developmental models
(Canda, 1988, p. 205) and provides a way of talking about the confluence of self-development and
healing. That is the context that we will use for this study.
Design
The purpose of the present study was to see what psychological events occurred for participants at an
ME seminar and to see if there were any long-term health benefits. The study was conceptualized as
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having three stages. During the pre stage participants would fill out a battery of instruments while
waiting in their seats for the seminar to begin. During the post stage participants would fill out
questionnaires at the end of each of the three days of the seminar. In addition, behavioral measures
would be taken of participants during demonstrations and practice sessions and those participants
would be interviewed immediately afterwards about the experiences that they had had during those
events. The follow-up stage would consist of having participants log onto a custom website designed
for the study in order to fill out another battery of instruments. The post measures were to be used to
determine what was happening psychologically both by considering the data on those measures alone
and by comparing the data from those measures with the pre measures. The follow-up measures were
to be used primarily to see if there were any improvement in health from the time of the pre
measures.
Given the previous studies of Matrix Energetics, as well as the informal information available to the
researchers, it was expected that participants would experience alterations of consciousness
characterized by greater psychological lability during the seminar and that there would be overall
improvements in health afterwards. However, given that this was an exploratory study, there were no
formal hypotheses.
Method
Participants
Participants consisted of 97 attendees at a Matrix Energetics seminar held August 18–20, 2012 in a
hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. There were 69 women and 26 men (N = 95) with a mean age of
51.1 years (SD = 13.2; age range: 18–77 years; N = 94). With regard to education, 23 indicated that
they had completed high school, 40 that they were college graduates, and 28 indicated that they had a
post-graduate degree. Six did not respond to this item. There was broad representation from a
number of occupations including physicians, nurses, those working in various healing and alternative
healing modalities, and occupations unrelated to self-development or healing such as college
professors, engineers, musicians, artists, office workers, and gas station attendants. The most
commonly chosen religious affiliation was “Other” with 32, “Own Beliefs” with 27, “Christian” with
20, “None” with 10, and smaller numbers for other alternatives (N = 93). Frequency of religious
practice ranged from 1 (Daily) to 5 (Never) and had a mean value of 2.3 (SD = 1.6; N = 86) where
“2” was labelled “Weekly” and “3” was labelled “Monthly.” Only 28 indicated that they had not had
any previous training in healing; 50 indicated that they had had previous training in “Alternative
Medicine;” 21 in “Other” forms of healing; and 12 in “Traditional Medicine” (N = 95). Of the 95
participants who responded to an attendance item, 59 said that this was their first Matrix Energetics
seminar; 15 said it was their second, 2 that it was their third, 3 that it was their fourth, and 16 that
they had been to at least four previous seminars.
Materials
Consent letter. The consent letter consisted of a description of the study and the steps that
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individuals could take should they choose to participate in the study. This letter also outlined the type
of data that would be collected and assured individuals that their identities would remain anonymous.
Contact information of the lead investigator was included. There was a place for individuals to print
their name, sign, and date the document. Individuals were also given a pencil if they needed one.
Pre-Measures. The pre-measures package consisted of six pages of paper-and-pencil
questionnaires. On the first page participants were asked for their names, email addresses, and
written descriptions of their motivation and expectations associated with attending the Matrix
Energetics seminar. On the second page, participants were asked for demographic information as
well as being given a Personality Inventory. The following pages consisted of the State of Being
Questionnaire (Pre), Carol Ryff’s Scales of Psychological Well-Being, and the RAND 36-Item
Health Survey.
Behavioral Measures and Post-Experience Interview. During the course of the seminar, a
member of the research team would observe an attendee while she was experiencing ME during a
demonstration on stage or during one of many practice sessions. The researcher would fill out the
Behavioral Measures form on the basis of her observations. If the attendee who was observed turned
out to be a participant in the study, she was asked to complete a Post-Experience Interview with the
same member of the research team who had observed her. These interviews were audio recorded and
later transcribed. In addition to an open-ended question, the Post-Experience Interview consisted of
questions asked by the researcher to which the participant responded by indicating her preference
along a Likert scale.
Post-Measures. The Post-Measures package consisted of a single sheet of paper on which
participants were asked to fill in their name and the day on which the Post-Measures were
completed. Participants were asked to describe the most memorable experience that they had had that
day. This was followed by the Profundity Scale and the State of Being Questionnaire (Post).
2-Month Follow-Up. A questionnaire was set up on our university server which participants
were invited to access two months after the seminar. Participants were asked to describe what effects
they felt that the Matrix Energetics seminar had had on them. This was followed by the Personality
Inventory, Scales of Psychological Well-Being, the RAND 36-Item Health Survey, the State of Being
Questionnaire (2-Month Follow-Up), and concluded with a space in which participants were asked to
provide any additional comments or reflections.
Measures
Demographics. The demographics section of the pre measures package was used to gather
basic information about participants: age, gender, occupation, highest level of education, religious
affiliation, frequency of religious practice, number of Matrix Energetics seminars previously
attended, and previous training in healing, if any.
Personality Inventory (PI). Gerard Saucier’s Mini-Markers were used as a measure of the
big five personality traits. This is a self-report questionnaire consisting of 40 adjectives for each of
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which the participant is asked to indicate how well it applies to her on a scale from 1 (“Extremely
Inaccurate”) to 9 (“Extremely Accurate”). Eight adjectives per scale are averaged to obtain scores for
the big five personality traits of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional
Stability, and Intellect or Openness with alpha coefficients of .83, .81, .83, .78, and .78 (N = 320)
respectively (Saucier, 1994).
State of Being Questionnaires (SBQ). There were pre, post, and follow-up versions of State
of Being Questionnaires designed specifically for this study. As much as possible, items were
worded in a counterbalanced manner so as not to suggest an implied bias. All items were scored on a
seven-point Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Validity consisted of face
validity and there were no reliability data until the results were analyzed.
Twenty items, designed to measure the state of consciousness of participants, were common to all
three questionnaires. These were chosen on the basis of previous informal experience with people’s
reports of their experiences at ME seminars and modelled after Barušs and Moore’s Beliefs About
Consciousness and Reality Questionnaire (Barušs, 1990; Barušs & Moore, 1992) and Ronald
Pekala’s Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (Pekala, 1991). Items included “There is no
reality other than the physical universe,” “My energy levels are high,” “I feel present to whatever is
happening,” and “The carpet seems to be moving.” The wording for the last of these was changed to
“The floor seems to be moving,” for the follow-up questionnaire.
In addition to the 20 core items, we devised a humility scale for the pre questionnaire in order to
supplement the personality measures and see if humility is relevant to whatever occurs at the
seminars. The humility scale consisted of eight items such as “I am aware of my strengths, but also
acknowledge my weaknesses,” and “I am comfortable accepting honest criticism.” There were two
additional items: “Even though it would be nice if it were so, miracles do not really happen,” and “I
think that I am going to learn a great deal at this seminar.” The net result was a pre State of Being
Questionnaire with 30 items.
The post SBQ consisted of the core 20 items plus the following two items: “I feel reborn,” and “I feel
that I have developed some good relationships with others at this seminar,” for a total of 22 items.
The follow-up SBQ consisted of the core 20 items, the eight humility items from the pre
questionnaire, the item about miracles from the pre questionnaire with the following changed
wording, “I do not think that any miracles actually happened at the seminar,” and the item “I feel that
I have developed some good relationships with others at the seminar.” An additional 11 evaluationtype items included “I experienced a ‘high’ for a period of time after the seminar was over,” and “I
am better able to heal myself as a result of the Philadelphia seminar,” for a total of 42 items.
Scales of Psychological Well-Being (SPWB). Carol Ryff’s Scales of Psychological WellBeing were used as a measure of psychological well-being. This instrument consists of six scales,
Autonomy, Environmental Mastery, Personal Growth, Positive Relations with Others, Purpose in
Life, and Self-Acceptance. The 3-item scales were used for a total of 18 items with alpha values of
.37, .49, .40, .56, .33, and .52 (N = 1108) respectively. Although these are small values, the three
items in each scale correlate strongly and positively only with their own respective scale and each of
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the three items making up a scale had been selected because of its strong correlation with its parent
scale in the long version of the questionnaire (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).
RAND 36-Item Health Survey (RAND). The RAND 36-Item Health Survey 1.0 is a selfreport questionnaire that measures positive and negative physical and mental health states across
eight health dimensions: Physical Functioning, Role Limitations due to Physical Health, Role
Limitations due to Emotional Problems, Energy/Fatigue, Emotional Well-Being, Social Functioning,
Pain, and General Health, with alpha values of .93, .84, .83, .86, .90, .85, .78, and .78 (N = 2471)
respectively (RAND Health, n.d.). The items range from general to specific with some items asking
respondents to rate their health relative to one year previously. For example, respondents are asked to
rate the amount of limitation that they experience carrying groceries or climbing a flight of stairs. As
another example, respondents are asked how much of the time in the past four weeks they felt
“downhearted and blue.” The eight health dimensions can be scored individually, aggregated into
physical and mental scales, and scored as a single scale (Hays & Shapiro, 1992; RAND Health, n.d.;
Ware, 2000; Ware & Sherbourne, 1992). Longitudinal studies for an instrument derived from the
RAND 36-Item Health Survey shows that the normative data are stable or, for some scales in some
studies, decline slightly over time periods of up to three years (Hopman et al., 2004).
Profundity Scale. The profundity scale was a 21-item scale developed by the researchers in
order to gauge the profundity of experiences that participants were having in the course of the
seminar. It was administered as part of the post measures package. Each item was scored on a sevenpoint Likert scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” After providing a written description
of “the most memorable experience” that participants had had that day, the instructions read: “Please
respond to the following statements with regard to the experience that you have just described above
using the attached scale.” Examples of items include: “I cannot adequately express what just
happened,” “What I experienced was not outside the realm of my ordinary everyday experience,” and
“I now realize there are aspects of reality of which I was not previously aware.” Validity consisted of
face validity and there were no reliability data until the results were analyzed.
Behavioral Measures. Behavioral measures were developed for this study to document the
observable behavior associated with experiencing ME. There was a 15-item checklist that was used
while observing participants either on the stage as part of a demonstration or as a recipient of ME
during practice sessions. This was followed, for the same participant, by a 5-item checklist to be used
after a participant had been led from the stage or the practice area to a side room in which she was
interviewed by one of the researchers. Items were scored “0” if the item did not apply and “1” if the
item did apply. Examples of items from the 15-item checklist include: “Participant swayed,”
“Participant fell to the ground,” and “Participant appeared to pass out.” Examples of items from the
5-item checklist include: “Participant appeared disoriented,” and “Participant was reluctant to talk.”
Post-Experience Interview. The Post-Experience Interview consisted of asking participants
“Could you please describe what you just experienced as a recipient of Matrix Energetics?” followed
by orally asking participants to respond to the items of the Profundity Scale. All of the interviews
were recorded on digital voice recorders and subsequently transcribed.
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Procedure
The main body of data was collected during a Matrix Energetics seminar held in a banquet hall at the
Philadelphia Airport Marriott Hotel in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania from Saturday, August 18, 2012 to
Monday, August 20, 2012. On the preceding Friday, the researchers met with one of the organizers
of the Matrix Energetics seminar in order to finalize the logistics of data gathering. This included
making available a room beside the banquet hall in which participants could be interviewed,
assigning an assistant at the seminar to help with questionnaire distribution and collection, and
determining how participants to be interviewed would be handed off to researchers after on-stage
demonstrations. That Friday evening there was a free, two-hour, public demonstration by the
organizers of the Matrix Energetics seminar which appeared to be attended by many of the people
who would become participants in the study.
Prior to the commencement of the seminar at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 18, 2012, the
researchers approached attendees as they came into the seminar room to ask them if they would like
to participate in a study and, if they were interested, to give them a copy of the consent letter, which
they could read once they were seated. Attendees were instructed to raise their hands once they had
read and signed the letter at which time one of the researchers, or the seminar assistant assigned to
the research team, put an animal sticker on the back of their name tag, in order to be able to identify
them as being in the study, and gave them the pre measures package. A pencil was provided for
those who needed one. The completed pre measures package was collected by the researchers or
their assistant, or placed in a drop-box by the entrance to the seminar room by the participants
themselves.
During on-stage demonstrations in the course of the seminar, one of the members of the research
team would observe the person on whom the demonstration was being performed and fill out the first
behavioral measures checklist. As that person left the stage, it was determined whether or not she
was a participant in the study. If not, then there was no further observation of that person. If the
person was in the study, then the person was led to the side room for the second set of behavioral
measures and the Post-Experience Interview. During practice sessions, in which participants
practiced ME techniques on each other, a member of the research team would determine if someone
on whom ME was being practiced were a participant in the study and, if so, carry out the same
process of observation and interviewing as already described.
At the end of the seminar on each of the three days, an announcement was made to ask participants
in the study to remain seated in order to fill out the post measures package before leaving the room.
The completed questionnaires were picked up by the researchers or their assistant, or placed in the
drop-box.
Two months after the seminar, on October 18, 2012, participants were sent an e-mail to invite them
to log onto a web site in order to fill out the follow-up questionnaire package. This message was
repeated on January 11, 2013 in order to have as many participants fill out the follow-up
questionnaires as possible.
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Results
Of the approximately 280 seminar attendees who were approached, 97 signed the consent letter and
95 completed the pre measures package. Sixteen Behavioral Measures and Post-Experience
Interviews were completed on Saturday, 11 on Sunday, and 15 on Monday. Ninety-one post
questionnaires were completed on Saturday, 85 on Sunday, and 63 on Monday. And 27 participants
accessed the web site to fill out the follow-up questionnaires. Isolated missing values on
questionnaires were filled in with the median values, but runs of missing values were left as missing.
Also, all of the missing values for the RAND 36-Item Health Survey were left as missing to comply
with the scoring procedures for the Health Survey.
Sample Characteristics
The means for this sample of participants were checked against the published norms for three of the
instruments (PI, SPWB, and RAND) using individual z tests as shown in Table 1. In terms of
personality, the participants at the ME seminar were higher on Openness and Emotional Stability and
lower on Conscientiousness than the norm. For the Scales of Psychological Well-Being,
Environmental Mastery was below the norm and Personal Growth was above the norm. The sample
scores for the RAND 36-Item Health Survey were numerically above the norms for all scales with
higher scores being indicative of better functioning. The three scales with the largest differences for
the RAND are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of Sample against Norms
Scale
PI
SPWB
RAND
Conscientiousness
Emotional Stability
Openness
Personal Growth
Environmental Mastery
Physical Functioning
Energy/Fatigue
General Health
n
90
90
90
94
93
95
95
95
Sample
Norm
Mean SD
n
Mean SD
z
p
6.43 1.08 1125
6.74 1.12 –2.61 0.01
6.15 1.65 1125
5.79 1.18 2.03 0.04
7.26 1.34 1125
6.55 1.09 4.90 0.00
17.12 1.74 1108 15.7
2.5
7.28 0.00
14.10 2.86 1108 14.9
2.8 –2.61 0.01
83.97 20.42 2471 70.61 27.42 6.17 0.00
63.00 20.53 2471 52.15 22.39 5.04 0.00
77.22 19.11 2471 56.99 21.11 10.09 0.00
Note. Only scales with individually statistically significant differences between means are shown. In
the case of the RAND, only the three scales with the largest differences are shown. The sample data
are taken from the pre measures. PI = Personality Inventory; SPWB = Scales of Psychological WellBeing; RAND = RAND 36-Item Health Survey. All p values are two-tailed.
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Long-Term Changes
Of the three published instruments used in this study (PI, SPWB, and RAND) only the RAND is
designed to be scored as a single scale. Using that total scale, a paired samples t test revealed that
overall health was better at the follow-up (M = 81.33; SD = 10.43) than at the time of the pre
questionnaires (M = 72.77; SD = 16.15) with t(24) = 3.42, p = .002 (two-tailed). Sixteen participants
had improved, five had deteriorated, and four stayed the same. This result should be interpreted with
caution given the low response rate at the follow-up. However, there were no differences on the total
health score at the time of the pre measures between those who completed the follow-up
questionnaires and those who did not (M = 72.93, SD = 15.70 vs. M = 72.35, SD = 18.18;
t(93) = -.15, p = .88, two-tailed). Multivariate analysis of variance on the nine individual scales of
the RAND was not statistically significant (with Roy’s Largest Root λ = .87, F(9, 14) = 1.35,
p = .30). Similarly, neither the changes to SPWB nor PI were statistically significantly different
between pre and follow-up (with Roy’s Largest Root λ = .40, F(6, 19) = 1.27, p = .32 and λ = .33,
F(5, 17) = 1.12, p = .39, respectively).
State of Being
The idea with the post measures had been to look at changes from the time that participants arrived
at the seminar, at which time the pre measures were taken, until they left. However, we realized that
not everyone would be staying for the full three days, nor would they necessarily fill out
questionnaires just before leaving the seminar, so participants were given post questionnaires to fill
out on Saturday and Sunday as well. With this in mind, in order to make the post data more
manageable, only the last post data provided by participants were used unless indicated otherwise.
This resulted in an amalgamated post data file using 85 participants’ Monday data, 2 participants’
Sunday data, and 7 participants’ Saturday data for the State of Being and Profundity measures.
Hierarchical cluster analysis was used with the State of Being pre data to organize into scales the 17
State of Being items that were common to the three questionnaires. A solution with four clusters was
chosen as being the most meaningful. The psychometric characteristics of these scales, k1 to k4,
along with the scale consisting of all 17 items, k5, are given in Table 2. The scale k1 is a measure of
positivity and attentiveness with items such as “I feel happy right now,” and “I feel present to
whatever is happening.” The scale k2 is reflecting transcendence with items such as the reverse
scored “There is no reality other than the physical universe,” and “I feel connected to everything that
exists.” The scale k3 is a measure of the loss of a sense of solidity with items such as the reverse
scored “My body feels physical,” and “The carpet seems to be moving.” The scale k4 consists of the
single item “I feel open-minded.” When all 17 items are summed to make up k5, the item “My body
feels shaky,” which appears without modification on k3, is reverse scored for k5. The scale k5 can be
interpreted as being stable and alert but “high” in the sense of being in a transcendent state of
consciousness.
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Table 2. State of Being Scales
pre
scale #
meaning
k1 9 attentiveness
k2 3 transcendence
k3 4 lability
k4 1 open-mindedness
k5 17 alert high
ch 2 change
post
n
α
94
94
94
95
94
95
0.8 51.92 7.43 92
0.6 17.45 3.76 92
0.6 13.09 4.80 91
– 6.57 0.85 93
0.8 91.89 11.66 89
0.9 11.51 2.58 93
M
SD
n
α
follow-up
SD
n
α
0.7 51.68 7.11
0.4 18.34 2.74
0.6 16.86 5.36
– 6.42 1.11
0.7 94.33 10.61
0.8 12.44 2.24
25
25
25
25
25
25
0.5 53.28 4.47
0.4 17.60 3.16
0.6 13.76 5.02
– 6.08 1.61
0.7 93.20 10.19
0.9 12.20 2.52
M
M
SD
Note. # refers to the number of items in a scale.
A paired samples t test for k5 revealed a statistically significant increase from pre to post with
t(86) = 2.74, p = .007 (two-tailed) and Cohen’s d = 0.29. Multivariate analysis of variance for the
difference variables from pre to post of k1 to k4 was statistically significant with Roy’s Largest Root
λ = .59, F(4, 83) = 12.26, p = .000 and with both k2 and k3 showing statistically significant
differences. Paired samples t tests for the changes in k2 and k3 give t(89) = 2.55, p = .012 (twotailed), Cohen’s d = 0.27 for k2 and t(88) = 6.86, p = .000 (two-tailed), Cohen’s d = 0.73 for k3.
Repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance for k1 to k4 at pre, post, and follow-up was not
statistically significant with Roy’s Largest Root λ = 1.35, F(8, 15) = 2.54, p = .057.
Two items on the pre State of Being Questionnaire were “I expect that something profound will
happen to me at this seminar,” and “I expect to feel different as a result of attending this seminar.”
On the post State of Being Questionnaire these items read “I feel that something profound has
happened to me at this seminar,” and “I feel different as a result of attending this seminar.” At the
time of the follow-up questionnaire these items read “I feel that something profound happened to me
at the seminar,” and “I feel different as a result of attending the seminar.” At each iteration, both
items together were considered to be a scale, ch, with the psychometric properties of that scale given
in Table 2. Using a paired-samples t test there was a difference from pre to post, with t(90) = 3.16,
p = .002 (two-tailed), Cohen’s d = 0.33. Repeated measures analysis of variance for all three
iterations revealed an inverted quadratic relationship with F(1, 23) = 4.35, p = .048, η2 = .16.
Hierarchical cluster analysis of the additional 11 evaluation items on the follow-up version of the
State of Being Questionnaire yielded two clusters. One of the clusters, called kfo1, had five items
with α = .77, and included the item “I am better able to heal myself as a result of the Philadelphia
seminar,” and the reverse scored “I feel a let down since the end of the seminar.” The second cluster,
called kfo2, has six items, was labeled “high,” had a coefficient α = .87 and included the items “I
experienced a ‘high’ for a period of time after the seminar was over,” and “I feel as though I have
awakened to reality.”
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Behavioral Measures
A total of 42 observational measures was taken during the seminar, 17 of which were made of
demonstrations on the stage and 25 of which were made of practice sessions on the floor. A
Behavioral Measures Scale, designated as bm, was created by adding the scores for the first 18 of the
20 items on the Behavioral Measures checklist. The same strategy as was used for the post data was
also used for aggregating data from the Behavioral Measures, so that only 36 of a total 42 behavioral
observations was used for most data analyses. The mean value for the 36 aggregated observations
was 3.94 (SD = 3.22). There was no difference between scale scores for participants who
experienced ME on the stage (M = 4.80, SD = 2.76, n = 15) compared to those who experienced ME
during the practice sessions (M = 3.33, SD = 3.44, n = 21) with t(34) = 1.37, p = .18 (two-tailed).
There were no predictors when bm was regressed on pre scores and there were no statistically
significant correlations of bm with any of the pre scores.
Examining Item 09 by itself, “Participant fell to the ground,” 22 of the times participants fell to the
ground and 20 times they did not. Eleven of those who fell down did so during the stage
demonstrations, and 11 fell down while practicing on the floor during practice sessions. There was
no difference in frequency between falling down during on-stage demonstrations and falling down
during practice sessions on the floor with X2(1) = 1.75 (not significant). Stepwise logistic regression
on pre variables using a p-to-enter of .05 for score tests and p-to-remove of .10 for the likelihood
ratio statistic gave a single predictor with a median cut of Purpose in Life (B = .33, Wald(1) = 3.92,
p = .048; Cox & Snell R2 = .17; Nagelkerke R2 = .23) that can correctly predict falling down 87.5%
of the time when participants did fall down and correctly predict the failure to fall down 50% of the
time when participants did not fall down.
Profundity
The Profundity Scale was designed to measure the profundity of specific experiences that occurred
for participants at the seminar. When hierarchical cluster analysis was used to organize the 21 items
of the post Profundity Scale, a single cluster was revealed. Upon interpreting the cluster, it was
decided to use the first 7 items as a scale, p1, the first 14 items as a scale, p2, and all 21 items as a
scale, p3, with α = .87 (n = 92), α = .86 (n = 92), and α = .83 (n = 91) respectively. The items on
scale p1, along with corrected item-total correlations, are given in Table 3. The scale p2 added items
such as “I felt a wavelike sensation go through my body,” “My perception of space changed during
this experience,” “I now realize there are aspects of reality of which I was not previously aware,” and
“I felt a sense of unity with everything that exists.” The scale p3 added items such as “I cannot
adequately express what just happened,” and the reverse scored “What I experienced was not outside
the realm of my ordinary everyday experience.” These same scales were also used to interpret the
interview data. Because of its clarity of meaning, only the scale p1 was used for most analyses.
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Table 3. Profundity Scale p1
Variable
POLA10
POLA11
POLA13
POLA14
POLA15
POLA16
POLA19
Item
This experience was profound.
During this experience, I felt that my existence became more meaningful.
During this experience, I had a sense of the sacred.
During this experience, I was in an altered state of consciousness.
What I experienced was spiritual in nature.
The word “transcendent” could be used to describe this experience.
This experience brought me closer to the truth.
r
.69
.73
.62
.59
.69
.72
.60
Note. r is corrected item-total correlation.
Normalized versions of the scale scores p1, p2, and p3 were created by dividing through by the
number of items for each scale. The resultant mean scores, both for the post data and the interview
data, were greater than the constant value of 4 (“not sure”). In particular, the normalized p1 had
values of M = 5.68 (SD = 1.12, t(91) = 14.34, p = .000, two-tailed) for the post data and M = 5.42
(SD = 0.96, t(35) = 8.88, p = .000, two-tailed) for the interview data. In fact, for the normalized p1,
the means in both cases were greater than 5 (“slightly agree”) with t(91) = 5.80, p = .000 (two-tailed)
and t(35) = 2.63, p = .013 (two-tailed) respectively. From these data, it would appear that at least
some participants at the seminar are reporting having had somewhat meaningful, profound, spiritual
experiences in altered states of consciousness.
In order to understand the profundity scale, it is instructive to look at correlations of some of the
other variables with profundity shown in Table 4. For instance, there is a negative correlation of p1
with Environmental Mastery. One of the three Environmental Mastery items is “In general, I feel that
I am in charge of the situation in which I live.” Being in charge is usually antithetical to experiencing
profound states of consciousness (Barušs, 2003) so such a negative correlation would be expected for
those scoring high on profundity. The correlations with the State of Being Questionnaire are not
surprising given that whatever experience participants had had during the day could carry over to the
end-of-day query. The correlations with the two follow-up scales suggest that if something profound
happened, that that was not transient, but still memorably profound at the time of the follow-up.
Participants appeared to be having more profound experiences during the practice sessions than on
stage with M = 40.05 (SD = 5.06, n = 21) during the practice sessions and M = 35.00 (SD = 7.76,
n = 15) on the stage, with t(22.36) = –2.21, p = .038 (two-tailed; unequal variances).
Profundity increased during the course of the seminar with values of p1 rising from M = 36.69
(SD = 8.00, n = 90) on Saturday, to M = 39.33 (SD = 7.00, n = 85) on Sunday, to M = 40.46
(SD = 7.49, n = 62) on Monday, with repeated measures analysis of variance giving a value of λ = .38
for Roy’s Largest Root (F(2, 58) = 11.04, p = .000) and a statistically significant linear withinsubjects contrast with F(1, 59) = 22.42, p = .000.
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Table 4. Correlations of the Profundity Scale p1 with Various Variables
Time
pre
post
follow-up
Variable
age
number of ME seminars attended
SPWB: environmental mastery
ch: expected change
SBPR28: “. . . miracles do not really happen.”
k2: transcendence
k3: lability
k4: open-mindedness
k5: alert high
increase in k3, lability, pre to post
increase in k5, alert high, pre to post
ch: experienced change
kfo2: high
n
89
90
89
90
90
91
90
92
89
88
87
24
24
r
–0.27
0.26
–0.21
0.25
–0.23
0.29
0.39
0.22
0.31
0.24
0.23
0.65
0.54
p
0.012
0.013
0.050
0.018
0.032
0.005
0.000
0.036
0.003
0.023
0.036
0.001
0.007
Note. The full text for Item SBPR28 is “Even though it would be nice if it were so, miracles do not
really happen.”
The question arises whether profundity is correlated with changes to any of the long-term measures,
such as changes in physical well-being. The answer is almost no. Change in the personality measure
of Openness has a correlation of r = .45 (p = .043, two-tailed, n = 21) with p1 although Openness
does not increase from pre to follow-up with M = 7.26 (SD = 1.34, n = 90) at pre and M = 7.42
(SD = 0.83, n = 24) at follow-up, and paired samples t test giving t(21) = 1.81, p = .084 (two-tailed).
This correlation was not mirrored in the k4 scale consisting of the single item “I feel open-minded”
which had a correlation of r = –.28 (p = .19, n = 24) with p1. Hence this finding should be
interpreted with caution.
Using stepwise multiple linear regression to predict p1 from the pre measures gave a solution with
R2 = .14, F(2, 65) = 5.27, p = .008 for two predictors: b1* = –.31 for age and b1* = –.24 for SBPR28.
In other words, those having more profound experiences are younger and believe that miracles can
happen. However, this only accounted for 14% of the variance in the profundity measure.
There were no significant changes to humility nor was humility a significant predictor for any of the
other measures.
Interview Data
There was a total of 42 interviews in which participants described what had just occurred to them as
a result of being recipients of ME. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from the original audio
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files without editing. There was no effort to formally analyze any of the transcribed texts nor any of
the written comments. For both the interview data and the written comments, selections are given
here to present the variety of what participants said about their experience and not the frequency of
what was said. In only two cases, participants reported dysphoric experiences, one in an interview,
and one in a written comment. Both of those are included below.
Participant 05: “I experienced a wave while my partner was working on me. My body just
spontaneously swaying and then I would, what I call, lose my body and I would just go . . . into my
head it felt like. It is very, very, very peaceful and I see a celestial light like its glowing from the
inside with occasionally threads of gold. It is just very peaceful and a lovely, lovely spot.” Female,
45, registered nurse, bm = 2, p1 = 45.
Participant 11: “. . . it almost felt like really gentle rain sort of coming down into my body and
gravity. . . . My body just released and I went to the floor. Somebody helped me on the floor. I felt
. . ., and still feel, . . . my heart beat actually increase and I . . . feel more heat in my face. I felt my
blood moving. I feel tingly in my arms and my fingers and I feel more like I am the space and less
that I end at the edge of my body . . . and very peaceful and I’m really aware of just being in a sea of
sounds. I'm just floating. It's really nice.” Female, 57, acupuncturist, bm = 4, p1 = 44.
Participant 19: Interviewer: “Now, what happened when Richard played the guitar?”
Participant: “Oh, I had been wanting to learn how to play the ukulele for a long, long time and I just
resonated with, for some reason, that chord that he played. He knew to play that chord and then I
could just feel it all up my spine. When I was leaned over towards the floor — in what did he call it?
The elephant something stance — I could feel the energy coming up my spine and especially
stretching out on the right side for some reason. There was a major shift in the way my physical body
felt on the right side. And when she pointed to my mouth that was a little bit too close since I had
had a root canal yesterday. It feels much better now.”
Interviewer: “Oh, really? It does? And before that you were in pain?”
Participant: “I was fantasizing about an Advil, but not anymore!” Female, 57, potter, bm = 3,
p1 = 40.
Participant 21: “As soon as I got up, I felt like I had a headache. . . . So I don't have a headache right
now. I feel very relaxed. I felt relaxed before, but it’s a different state, if that makes any sense.”
Female, 24, clinician, bm = 8, p1 = 39.
Participant 33: “Letting go in a way that I don't usually do. . . . It was just very quick and like an
unraveling. It was very quick, I don't even know what she did. . . . It’s involuntary. . . . It just happens
and you just go with it. You have a choice but also you don't have a choice.” Female, 45, Office
Worker, bm = 6, p1 = 43.
Participant 51: “. . . In my brain as I was coming up to the stage and while I was there I was thinking
I'm not going to lie down or anything like that. Then it's difficult to describe it got all wonky.
. . . It was kind of funny observing . . . what was happening to me. . . . In a way it was like stepping
out of one reality and coming into another one . . .. Then I kind of went down onto the ground. . . . It
became very funny at that point . . .. Have you ever seen . . . any drawings by M.C. Escher? . . . So
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there is one drawing that he did that . . . what’s the ground depending on where he is in that drawing
is, it can be at right angle, it can be kind of at a different angle, and where all these different angles
are ground, like where people are standing or sitting. . . . And so then I've got my back on the floor
and the people on the stage are they’re like at right angles, like gravity is at a 90 degree pitch from
where I am, and then they’re looking down at the people that are out in the audience. . . . For me it
was like a complete shift in . . . my perspective. I looked at something from a completely different
angle.” Male, 56, project manager, bm = 5, p1 = 27.
Participant 54: “[Falling over] is like a letting go. You get soft and so that yields, it's like a yielding
feeling. And then, as I was even lying down I felt like patterns unraveling. . . . I felt like I've been
constructing in a way . . .. I feel like it’s unraveling, like a deconstruction in a way. . . . I was very
conscious and present to what was going on.” Female, 51, unknown occupation, bm = 4, p1 = 30.
Written Comments
There was a total of 457 written comments. These are presented as written, with editorial changes in
square brackets.
Most memorable experience.
Participant 03: “When [another participant] did ME on me during practice session, I did not specify a
malady. However, when she touched my right knee started to pop like popcorn – went on for quite a
while. I have had arthritis in my right knew for a while. I feel taller now.”
Participant 12: “Also earlier today I was in a small group and started to feel like the whole room was
spinning. It was not pleasant.”
Participant 17: “My daughter was called up on stage. She was a true sceptic. They Time traveled her
back to before birth. I was in a very Bad car accident in my 7th month with her. It amazed me they
knew!! (she may have been hurt then).”
Participant 66: “Back pain completely gone had to take pain pills every 4 hrs.”
Two-month follow-up effects.
Participant 30: “Following the seminar I felt clearer and more ‘connected.’ This feeling remained
stable for a couple of weeks before dying off somewhat. However there were some shifts that seemed
to be permanent - a greater awareness of the metaphysical aspects of reality and more
solidity/strength within my body.”
Participant 54: “Although I was up on stage and was just freshly operated on for carpal tunnel, I don't
feel it had particular benefits or effects on that as I am still getting physio for it.”
Participant 76: “I was absolutely transformed by the Philadelphia Matrix Energetics seminar. I read a
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lot of books about consciousness and the nature of reality but to actually experience Richard's
seminar first hand and observe the effects that were taking place was an amazing experience. I was
actually called up to the stage and felt the wave of ‘energy’ through my body and noticed positive
improvements in my health afterwards. It was very rewarding.” Change in total RAND: 13.33.
Discussion
Something was happening to people at the ME seminar. And whatever it was that was happening,
appears to have been beneficial. The average total health score improved from pre to follow-up,
when such health scores are known to be stable or to decline with time.
However, this finding should be interpreted with caution given the small number of participants who
responded at the time of the follow-up, thereby introducing a sampling problem. In other words,
those whose health declined may have chosen not to respond or been unable to respond due to poor
health. Also, it is not clear that the seminar was the cause of the increase in well-being, given that
people who were trying to be healthier could have gone to the seminar as one of a number of
strategies that they were using for trying to improve their health. It is unlikely that participants were
inflating values to make ME look good, given that they were unlikely to remember their initial
responses and given that there were no correlations of the changes to total health scores with any of
the personality and psychological well-being scales. For instance, those who were less conscientious
or were less autonomous did not have greater changes in their total health scores than those who
were more conscientious or more autonomous.
There were only two reports of dysphoric experiences during the seminar, both of which have been
included above. It is possible that participants were reluctant to report negative experiences so that
they are under-represented in this study. In some cases, there appears to have been no change in a
person’s physical condition during the seminar. But there were also many cases of reported physical
or psychological improvement, in some cases, dramatically so. Overall, it would appear that the
seminar had beneficial effects on attendees.
Alteration of Consciousness
It is interesting that participants changed more at post than they thought that they would change when
asked at pre, as measured by ch, although being changed more than they thought that they would be
did not statistically carry over to the follow-up. The pre to post change suggests that something
unexpected happened during the seminar to some of the participants. What was that? The state of
being scale k5, alert high, increased from pre to post. In particular the pre to post changes in k2,
transcendence, and k3, lability, indicate that participants tended to lose their sense of the solidity of
reality and their physical isolation, and tended to gain a sense of metaphysical plasticity and an
immaterial connection to everything that exists.
Scores on the profundity scales provide some characterization of the kinds of experiences that
participants were having at the seminar. The scale p1 is a scale that measures self-perceived depth of
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profundity, spirituality, transcendence, meaning, knowledge, and alteration of consciousness.
Increase in meaning is a core existential value and appears to have occurred for some of the
participants at the seminar. There has been a tendency in contemporary scientific research to demote
numinous experiences such as these to the incidental sporadic firing of some neural circuitry. That is
neither logically justified nor helpful. The numinous remains the numinous, whatever its neural
correlates, providing the person exposed to it with meaning that was perhaps previously missing
(Barušs, 1996; 2014; Pearson, 2014; see also Auld & Bailey, 2014).
The correlations given in Table 4 help to provide concurrent validity for the profundity scales. In
particular, k2, k3, k4, and k5 are all positively correlated with profundity, indicating that those having
more profound experiences were also those who experienced feelings of transcendence and lability,
and perceived themselves to be open-minded. In spite of the drop in ch from post to follow-up, those
with more profound experiences during the seminar were more likely to report having experienced
change and to still be positively affected by the seminar for some time after its termination. There
seems to be a practice effect present so that experience with ME is associated with more profound
experiences as seen from the increase in profundity scores during the seminar and from the
correlation with the number of seminars previously attended. Being younger, having less sense of
control over one’s environment, expecting change to occur, and believing that miracles can occur,
were all correlated with more profound experiences, although being younger and believing that
miracles can occur by themselves take up the variance in profundity attributed to those variables.
Somatic Sensations
Reading the interview transcripts and comments, as well as examining the behavioral measures,
reveals the extent to which participants experienced somatic sensations during the seminar. There
was such a range of different sensations that it is difficult to summarize them. Some of the
experiences that participants had were clearly out of the ordinary. Frequently they were identified as
being synchronous, such as the significance for Participant 19 of a chord played on a guitar by
Richard Bartlett or the termination of the time travel technique to a time before birth when the
woman’s mother, Participant 17, had been in an automobile accident. It is not clear whether any
anomalous phenomena occurred; the study was not designed to make those determinations.
About half of the time that behavioral measures were taken for participants as they experienced ME,
they fell to the ground. It is not clear why. The comment by Participant 11, “My body just released
and I went to the floor,” does not answer the question. Why was the “release” so profound that the
person could not stay on her feet? Or Participant 51: “it got all wonky . . . it was like stepping out of
one reality and coming into another one.” The world as we know it just seems to give way and we
find ourselves in a reality in which we fall down. The somatic sensations, falling down, and
synchronous events, all need further research.
There was no difference in the number of people falling down during stage demonstrations or during
practice sessions on the floor, nor was there a difference in the behavioral measures scores between
the stage and the floor. Somewhat counterintuitively perhaps, profundity scores were higher for
participants experiencing ME during the practice sessions than participants experiencing ME during
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demonstrations on stage. It is possible that the researchers selected participants in a biased manner,
although it is not clear how they would have recognized greater profundity at the outset when the
selections were made. It is also possible that participants felt more at ease in the practice sessions
which could have contributed to higher profundity scores. Also, participants having more profound
experiences during the seminar might have been more willing to talk to researchers when they were
approached on the floor, thereby skewing the results.
There were no predictors for who would experience somatic sensations as measured by the total
score on the Behavioral Measures. Purpose in Life was the single, statistically significant predictor of
falling down, although not a particularly good one. What is interesting is that none of the State of
Being Scales predicted falling down. In other words, the people who fell down were not more likely
to be those who were more attentive, or more labile, or more open. The falling down was
independent of such obvious potential predictors and suggests that whatever was happening was
more nuanced than it might at first appear to be. In particular, there is no evidence from our data that
falling down is just the result of compliance or hypnosis and thus it certainly deserves more study.
Conclusion
Participants at the ME seminar at which these data were gathered were sometimes experiencing
alterations of consciousness. It is not clear whether that is due to the ME techniques or to nonspecific factors associated with attending the seminar or a combination of both. However, these
alterations are associated with meaningfulness, an increased sense of transcendence, and increased
psychological lability, but, overall, no lack of attentiveness to whatever is happening in the moment,
as suggested by the State of Being scale “alert high.” Participants appear to be experiencing reality as
being more plastic than we ordinarily assume it to be while in an attentive, expanded, and
emotionally positive state of being. These alterations of consciousness should be further investigated
as should the potential therapeutic benefits of experiencing ME.
Note:
Carolyn van Lier is now at The Westin Grand Cayman Seven Mile Beach Resort and Spa, Grand Cayman
Island; Diana Ali is now at Family Service Thames Valley, London, Ontario, Canada.
This paper is based in part on an undergraduate thesis in psychology written by Carolyn van Lier for the
Department of Psychology, The University of Western Ontario, supervised by Imants Barušs, and in part on an
undergraduate thesis in psychology written by Diana Ali for the Department of Psychology, King’s University
College at The University of Western Ontario, supervised by Imants Barušs.
This research was supported by King’s University College and Medical Technology (W. B.) Inc. Funding
sources were not involved in any way in the design, execution, or reporting of this research. The authors thank
Richard Bartlett and Melissa Joy Jonsson for providing access to the Philadelphia ME seminar for research
purposes, Kasha Herba for helping to design the study and gather data at the seminar, Arwen Sweet for data
entry, Rebecca Curcio for amalgamating data, Canaan Legault for checking the statistics, and Shannon Foskett
for literature searches, critical comments, and proofreading. The authors are grateful to Carol Ryff for
permission to use the Scales of Psychological Well-Being.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| March 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | pp. 164-184
Ropp, C., A Simple Model of Memes
164
Article
A Simple Model of Memes
Cyd Ropp*
ABSTRACT
Memes are the cultural expressions of societies, and their content is information. Memes, in
other words, are the “stuff” of symbolic thought. The importance of memes in the simple
explanation philosophy is that a huge part of our personality is shaped by the memes we collect
and hold onto. The otherwise pristine nature of our underlying fractal units of consciousness is
affected by the memes we hold dear, as well as the memes we despise. We enjoy memes we
approve of and we are repelled by memes we disapprove of. The Sanskrit word for these
provocative memes is samskara. Samskara is traditionally defined in Yogic philosophy as the
habitual thought patterns collected by the ego that interferes with soul consciousness.
Key Words: memes, model, information, cultural expression, consciousness, sociology,
psychology.
Memes are the cultural expressions of societies, and their content is information. In human
societies, memes are often propagated through mass media such as magazines, films, and the
internet in addition to word of mouth and tradition. Every discrete concept, mythology, or icon is
a meme. “The Beatles” is a meme. Andy Warhol’s iconic poster of Marilyn Monroe is a meme.
Football is a meme. Patriotism is a meme—all “ism”s are memes. “The Cross” and “The
Crescent” are memes. “Loyalty” and “Honesty” are memes. Indeed, each and every particular
idea that a person can know is a meme. Even basic concepts like “chair” and “mother” are
memes. Memes, in other words, are the “stuff” of symbolic thought.
Some memes are held in common by most human cultures—the wheel; the ideal model of a
caring family; archetypal heroes and villains like the Wise Sage and the Shadow; even universal
human values such as liberty and safety. Other memes are exclusive to their particular culture.
This especially applies to memes dealing with local traditions, religions, politics, and regional
myths.
Humans are not the only units of consciousness affected by memes. All social aggregations of
UCs propagate and utilize memes. Cats, for example, bury their waste because there is a strong
waste-burying meme that resonates in all cats. “Dog is man’s best friend” is a shared meme
chord continually re-propagated and reenacted by both humans and dogs. “Flying in formation is
awesome” may well be a goose meme.
Memes can be described as energetic waves of cultural information patterns fueled by repetition
or starved by lack of usage. As wave forms, each meme has a distinct vibratory signature, akin to
*Correspondence: Cyd Ropp, PhD, Independent Researcher. http://asimpleexplanation.blogspot.com
E-mail: cropp7@hotmail.com Also see: Ropp, C. A Simple Explanation of Absolutely Everything
(Bluebird Books/lulu.com: Encinitas, 2012-2015).
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a musical note. Each individual meme can be likened to a string on society’s harp. A single
meme is like a single note. A group of related memes is like a chord.
In the example above, "America" is one meme chord and each line is a meme or complex set of
memes that contributes to that chord. Each meme chord vibrates to the particular concepts that
make it up. UCs who share the same memes are like members of a choir cloaked in the robes of
their common meme chords, all vibrating in unison with one another.
We are not all affected by the same memes. Most memes pass us by unnoticed. A meme must be
either instinctually acquired (through prenatal karma) or learned in order to be invoked by a unit
of consciousness. Once a UC does acquire a meme, it becomes a part of that UC’s unique
vibratory bundle. If the UC does not wish to continue holding that meme’s string in its personal
bundle of memes and chords, it must detach the string from its grasp.
Some memes are easy to detach because they do not fit in with the UC’s overall bundle of strings
and chords. One may, for example, forget the details of a foreign film as soon as it is over
because its memes do not bond well with the movie-goer’s personal meme bundle.
Some memes are very difficult to detach once they are acquired because their vibratory pattern is
so intense—the glamorous seduction of the cigarette or the chemical allure of the crack pipe, for
example. Emotionally evocative memes such as victimhood or jealousy are difficult to detach
due to the intense synergistic coupling of thoughts and emotion. In general, unwanted memes
must be detached through an effort of will, either through conscious disuse or by trading for a
competing, more desirable meme. The Alcoholics Anonymous 12-Step meme chord, for
example, has successfully replaced alcoholic meme patterns for millions of drinkers.
Another way to detach memes is through advanced meditation techniques whereby the meditator
learns to suspend and disassociate from language and habitual patterns of thought. In Hinduism
as well as Buddhism, complete meme detachment results in the state of nirvikalpa,true
Enlightenment. “Undifferentiated cognition” is another reference to this blissful, meme-free
state.
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A unit of consciousness may pick up entire chords of associated memes, but it is also common to
pick and choose from among a chord’s individual strings. “Happy Marriage,” for example, is a
complex meme chord that means different things to different people, depending upon their
personal selection of particular strings. One prospective couple may resonate to the “Big
Wedding” meme and so expect to invoke that meme at the outset of the Happy Marriage.
Another couple may not be holding on to that memetic string and so do not need or want a big
wedding. For most couples, the Happy Marriage chord includes children; other couples do not
resonate to the offspring meme, so no children are necessary. For many couples, the “Bouncing
Baby” meme may be adequately invoked by the “Man’s Best Friend” dog meme. So, while we
all have an idea of what “Happy Marriage” means, we each hold a slightly different set of memes
that define it. But the bottom line to marital bliss must begin with a couple’s shared and
harmonious meme chords.
The memes we cling to are like strings obscuring our Self UC.
The importance of memes to the Simple Explanation philosophy is that a huge part of our
personality is shaped by the memes we collect and hold onto. The otherwise pristine nature of
our underlying fractal units of consciousness is affected by the memes we hold dear, as well as
the memes we despise. We enjoy memes we approve of and we are repelled by memes we
disapprove of. The Sanskrit word for these provocative memes is samskara. Samskara is
traditionally defined in Yogic philosophy as the habitual thought patterns collected by the ego
that interfere with soul consciousness.
The memes each of us cling to, both those we like and those we actively dislike, influence our
ability to exercise free will in the here and now. When we unthinkingly lock onto a meme or set
of memes, it is our belief in those memes that determines how we interpret and respond to our
surroundings. Our response may or may not be the best response to a given situation, but it is the
only response allowed for by our particular meme bundle. In other words, our meme bundles
function as incoming and outgoing filters.
Literary theorist and philosopher Kenneth Burke called this meme filter a “terministic screen”
situated between each person and reality, bothselecting and deflecting their perception of the
world. Burke said this terministic screen was activated during information exchanges with others
and within oneself during self-talk. The filter of our terministic screen blocks unacceptable
memes from affecting our comfortable perception of reality.
We see this phenomenon at play every day on the interpersonal level. For example, Person A,
whose meme bundle includes a belief that others are "out to get me," will interpret events in a
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manner that reinforces that meme. The most innocent statement on Person B’s part will activate
Person A's "out to get me" meme, even when no such insult was intended or even imagined by
Person B. Clearly, Person A's ego is hurt by A’s own meme attachment, not by Person B.
The same meme-filtering mechanism holds true for groups in the form of cultural ideologies,
complex bundles of memes shared by members of a group. What is and isn’t allowed in the
minds of members is determined by which memes are included and which are excluded from the
group’s ideological meme chord.
Because of this, information exchanged between members of different cultures will resonate
more strongly with the sender’s memes than with the receiver’s memes. For example, when an
American speaks of “free and democratic elections,” his or her memetic definitions for “free”
and “democratic” may differ radically from someone’s of another culture. The extent to which
communication may occur between cultures is determined by the permeability of each culture’s
terministic screens, and the extent to which they are open to foreign memes.
Another example of delimiting memes occurs during problem-solving. The more tightly held
one's memes are, the fewer solutions will present themselves. If you think only a hammer will
drive a nail, you will not even consider the flat side of the heavy wrench lying nearby. If a group
thinks outsiders are untrustworthy, then they will not trust any outsider. The ability to consider
solutions "outside the box" and to engage in "lateral thinking" comes about through
nonattachment to the "shoulds" and "oughts" of how things work. One must be willing to set
aside treasured beliefs in order to perceive memes outside one's own bundle and thereby discover
fresh solutions.
Thinking outside the Box
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Institutional Memes
As an individual UC’s personality is defined by its unique meme bundle, so, too, institutions are
defined by their sets of treasured memes.Memes are even more important to an institution than
are its members in the sense that members come and go, but memes persist. As President John F.
Kennedy put it, “People may die, nations may rise and fall, but an idea lives on.”
Each and every cultural institution we belong to (family, workplace, church, mosque, tribe,
nation, and so on) not only comes with its own bundle of shared memes held in common by its
members, it also comes with a filter, Burke’s terministic screen, that limits members from
acknowledging or adopting ideologically incompatible_memes.
Institutions are defined as much by their excluded memes as they are by their included memes.
An exclusive institution holds tightly to the identity provided by its current memes; its border is
strong and its filter is powerful. An inclusive institution allows members more latitude in the
memes they may hold--its border is less defended, its filter less opaque. An "open-minded"
institution allows that there may be memes out there in the larger culture of value; its filter is
more permeable.
Conservative institutions hold tightly onto their memes, which are usually formally codified into
law. Whether embodied in the rulings of a Supreme Court or issued by a Tribal Chief, these
reckoning rods declare the boundaries of the institution’s acceptable memes and are the mirrors
by which members define themselves as part of this group rather than that.
Progressive institutions, on the other hand, hold an overarching “inclusive” meme that requires
an open and permeable meme boundary that can accommodate diversity of thought and
expression. Because of this inclusivity value, open institutions look to their members as living
sources of shared memes in preference to codified documents or singular authority figures.
President John F. Kennedy presents a good example of a progressive politician who valued
others’ meme. Witness:
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As every past generation has had to disenthrall itself from an inheritance of truisms and
stereotypes, so in our time we must move on from the reassuring repetition of stale
phrases to a new, difficult but essential confrontation with reality. For the great enemy
of the truth is very often not the lie—deliberate, contrived and dishonest—but the
myth—persistent, persuasive, and unrealistic. Too often we hold fast to the clichés of
our forebears. We subject all facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the
comfort of opinion without the discomfort of thought. – John F. Kennedy in his Yale
University commencement address (New Haven, Connecticut: June 11, 1962), 5:106:08
“We are not afraid to entrust the American people with unpleasant facts, foreign ideas,
alien philosophies, and competitive values. For a nation that is afraid to let its people
judge the truth and falsehood in an open market is a nation that is afraid of its people.”
― John F. Kennedy
“What is objectionable, what is dangerous about extremists is not that they are extreme,
but that they are intolerant. The evil is not what they say about their cause, but what
they say about their opponents.” ― John F. Kennedy
Exoteric and Esoteric Religious Memes
As it is with all groups, the public image of a religious institution is defined by the memes held
by or rejected by the members of that institution. The specific "doctrines, dogmas, dissertations,
rules, and customs" are the sets of memes commonly held to be true within a given religion, and
the specifics of these memes vary from institution to institution. These public memes are known
as exoteric memes, and they are easily identified and fairly well understood by most of the
institution’s members.
Many exoteric religious memes are shared by members of diverse religions. Religions generally
share, for example, belief in an overarching "God" meme chord, and generally agree on many of
the lesser-included memes that make up the God chord, such as memes concerning God's
omniscience and omnipotence, and the importance of communing with God in prayer.
In Exodus and again in Deuteronomy, the first four of the Ten Commandments lay out the basic
God meme of Judaism. The key God meme, Deuteronomy 6:4-5, is known as the
“Shema”: "Hear, O Israel! The LORD is our God, the LORD is one! You shall love the LORD
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might." Agreement on this
basic God chord was so important to the early Hebrews that they were instructed to teach
them diligently to their children, to talk of them while sitting in the house, when walking, when
lying down, and then again first thing upon rising. They were also instructed to bind the memes
to their hands, on their foreheads between the eyes, and to their gateposts and doors. These
containers are known as phylacteries, and they hold within them fundamental Hebrew memes.
In the Christian faith, the “Apostles’ Creed,” professed by most denominations, states the basic
Christian memes regularly recited in unison, out loud, by all believers, beginning with, “I believe
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in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; And in Jesus Christ his only Son our
Lord;” and ending with acknowledgment of belief in “the resurrection of the body; and the life
everlasting. Amen.”
“Born-again” Christians go one step further than the Apostle’s Creed in their emphasis of public
affirmation of the meme that Jesus Christ is their personal Lord and Savior. Enactment of the
“Born-again” meme requires a watershed moment of personal surrender, without which one is
not considered “saved” from sin, death, and damnation.
For Muslims, the “Shahada” summarizes the key memes that must be professed to be counted a
Muslim: “There is no god but God and Muhammad is His Prophet.” And beyond this basic belief
are more key memes. According to the Muslim Voices website, “Someone who becomes a
Muslim is also agreeing to accept the six articles of faith in Islam as well as the Five Pillars of
the faith.”
Unlike these biblical Judeo-Christian-Islamic religious memes with which most Americans are
more or less familiar, Hinduism is an ancient religious tradition with “fuzzy” memes that are
difficult to define and exceedingly diffuse. Hinduism is an inclusive religion that allows each
member to pick and choose from any number of religious memes as they see fit. Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan, India’s first Vice President and a respected theologian, defined Hinduism as
a process rather than a meme set. He said, "Hinduism is not just a faith. It is the union of reason
and intuition that cannot be defined but is only to be experienced.” Wikipedia puts it thusly:
Prominent themes (i.e. memes) in Hindu beliefs include (but are not restricted
to), Dharma (ethics/duties), Samsara (The continuing cycle of birth, life, death and
rebirth), Karma (action and subsequent reaction), Moksha (liberation from samsara), and the
various Yogas (paths or practices).
Hinduism grants absolute and complete freedom of belief and worship. Hinduism conceives the
whole world as a single family that deifies the one truth, and therefore it accepts all forms of
beliefs and dismisses labels of distinct religions which would imply a division of identity. Hence,
Hinduism is devoid of the concepts of apostasy, heresy and blasphemy.
Most Hindus believe in a God meme, Brahma, “Lord of Creation,” but one can be an atheist and
still join this most inclusive religion. Because there are no required memes, there is no apostasy,
heresy, or blasphemy.
Taoism is both a philosophy and a religious tradition. As a philosophy, Taoism’s memes
primarily stem from an ancient Chinese book called the Tao te Ching. Tao means way, path, or
principle, hence the Book of the Way presents memes by which one may live in harmony with
natural order. Religious Taoism adds ancestor worship and local traditions and customs, such as
divination practices, to the basic philosophical meme chord.
Buddhism is an exception to the rule in that it does not hold an explicit God meme. This is
largely because its founder, Siddhartha Gautama, aka “the Buddha” or “Enlightened One,”
realized his central meme to be “Avoidance of Suffering” and not “Worship of God.” All
Buddhist practice and philosophy stems from this single “Avoidance of Suffering” meme chord,
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referred to as the “Four Noble Truths”: 1. Everyone suffers; 2. Craving causes suffering; 3.
Suffering ends when craving ends; 4. Liberation is possible by doing what the Buddha did—by
practicing meditation. This is why the Buddha is usually depicted as sitting and meditating. The
Buddha himself is not considered a deity but a human guide, an exemplar one who tried and
failed at various religious practices until finally achieving liberation through meditation.
Another common meme chord shared by all religions is the importance of leading a moral life,
although, as with all memes, the exact details of what it means to be “moral” may differ.
However, the “Golden Rule” seems to be one universal moral meme common to all religions’
chords.
Treat others as you wish to be treated.
Morality is a different meme than the “God” meme, so, despite the usual conflation of the God
meme chord with the Morality meme, the Morality meme may be held and successfully deployed
without reference to any particular religion. In that case, Morality becomes part of the meme
chord called Ethics and is considered necessary for the smooth operation of civil society.
Despite the many memes religions have in common, it is the exoteric memes they do not share-memes of saints and saviors, official histories, and other idiosyncratic, traditional beliefs--that
define them and set them apart. It is the memes they do not share that give rise to the world’s
diverse religions, denominations, and sects. People generally stick with comfortable, habitual
memes, and are somewhat disinterested in acquiring others’ unfamiliar memes.
Esoteric memes are less well-known than exoteric memes because they are either so difficult to
understand that only advanced devotees can manage, or because they are secrets purposely
withheld from all but an inner circle of believers. Secret esoteric memes would include Temple
rites and other priestly rituals, and hidden texts that only a select few are allowed to see.
The Simple Explanation differentiates between the intentional withholding of secret memes, and
memes that are authentically esoteric. Truly esoteric memes are not secrets withheld from the
many and only shared with a few. Authentic esoterica is information that can be personally
accessed by any individual, and in that sense is “hidden” only until the individual decides to
access it. Yet, despite the free availability of these esoteric memes, relatively few people seek
them out.
The good news is that no one can withhold true "communion of the soul with God" from you.
This is because there are no particular memes that must be collected in order to reach God, but
rather the opposite—memes must be lost. By letting go of habitual memes, one’s governing UC
intuitively aligns itself with the metaversal principles embodied by the Universal UC. During
these periods of alignment, "firsthand knowledge of Reality" may be glimpsed. In Sanskrit, this
intuitive glimpse is calledsamadhi. When one is able to sustain the meme-suspended state, this is
called nirvikalpa samadhi—beyond duality.
If one adopts the Simple Explanation's definition of meme-based vs. intuitive knowledge, then
esoteric knowledge of God is truly available to any and every seeker at all times. The only
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limitation is one’s willingness to suspend egoic attachment to one’s meme bundle long enough
for the governing UC to align with the Universal UC.
When all memes are set aside, when thought and language are suspended, one's governing UC
remains. This seminal fractal unit of consciousness, the soul, lies beneath the memes.
Unencumbered by meme attachments, the person's governing UC aligns with the Universal UC.
This condition is called "bliss" in Buddhist and Yogic teachings. "Be still and know that I am
God" is how the Bible says it (Psalm 46:10). Verse 16 of the Tao Te Ching says, "Be still.
Stillness reveals the secrets of eternity," (J. Star translation). To "be still" is to suspend
attachment. Intuitive knowledgecomes during the still point between the pendulum swings of
breath and thought. To "be still" is how we hear God.
Paramahansa Yogananda (1893-1952) taught his followers a “scientific,” Kriya yoga technique
reputed to reverse a meditator’s life energy flow away from the body and its distracting sense
impressions, redirecting it inward and up through the “third eye,”known as
the KutathsaChaitanya or Christ Consciousness location between the eyebrows. When mastered,
this meditation technique is said to allow direct, intuitive knowledge of "God" or "Reality" –
samadhi in Sanskrit. The Simple Explanation calls this a “meme-shedding” technique.
The following quote from Paramahansa’s discussion of John 3:1-8 introduces the Kriya meme of
what it truly means to be "born again":
All bona fide revealed religions of the world are based on intuitive knowledge. Each has
an exoteric or outer particularity, and an esoteric or inner core. The exoteric aspect is
the public image, and includes moral precepts and a body of doctrines, dogmas,
dissertations, rules, and customs to guide the general populace of its followers. The
esoteric aspect includes methods that focus on actual communion of the soul with God.
The exoteric aspect is for the many; the esoteric is for the ardent few. It is the esoteric
aspect of religion that leads to intuition, the firsthand knowledge of Reality. (p.240,
vol.1) (The Second Coming of Christ: The Resurrection of the Christ Within You.
Paramahansa Yogananda, 2004. Self-Realization Fellowship)
The next quote is in reference to Verses 3-4 in the Bhagavad Gita:
The life of a scientific yogi, is therefore more balanced. He understands and follows
those laws and principles of Nature by which he sees God as the All in all, and thereby
consciously releases himself from the limitations of personal attachments to property
and relatives and friends, serving the Lord in all human beings irrespective of their
creed, race, or condition. By various methods of concentrations, he gradually detaches
his ego from the senses and attaches his life force, mind, and ego to the superconscious
soul. Then by primary ecstasy he experiences the Kutastha Intelligence in all creation,
and by nirvikalpa ecstasy he attains the Spirit beyond phenomena.” (p.842, vol.2) (God
Talks With Arjuna: The Bhagavad Gita. Paramahansa Yogananda, 1999. SelfRealization Fellowship)
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A Simple Explanation of Christianity’s Memes
By this point in the theory, you’ve been introduced to a number of Simple Explanation memes,
and we’re building up a nice-sized meme chord of shared definitions. We have taken a brief tour
of exoteric and esoteric religious memes and the roles these memes play within various religious
traditions. We have also learned that several major religious traditions advocate shedding memes
as a way of uniting with God, an anti-meme usually called “enlightenment.”
We are now prepared to take a longer look at Christianity utilizing memes from the Simple
Explanation philosophy—a practical exercise in translation between one tradition’s meme chord
and another’s. If you are already versed in Christian memes, then here is a way you can make
sense of the Simple Explanation using familiar terminology. If, on the other hand, you are less
familiar with Christianity’s meme chord, this translation may help you understand a few of its
major memes.
When the model speaks of “the metaverse,” this can be thought of as the Simple Explanation’s
fundamental God meme—what the Bible calls God the Father, Creator of Heaven and
Earth. Prior to creating Heaven and Earth, the original ground state of God was an eternally
omnipresent, utterly peaceful consciousness: “I AM WHO I AM,” (Exodus 3:14).
When the model says the metaverse “quivered with every organizing principle needed to shape
and sustain space and time, energy and mass,” this is God the Son, also called “The Word,”
referred to in the Simple Explanation as the "Universal UC" or “Universal Consciousness.” “In
the beginning was The Word, and The Word was with God, and The Word was God.” In the
original New Testament Greek, “The Word” is written as Logos, meaning information and
principles of organization—The Law. The Sanskrit word for Universal Consciousness is chit.
The Simple Explanation credits The Word with not only the memes of Biblical Law, but
with all the working Laws of the Universe including physics and math. Prior to the birth of Jesus
Christ, Savior, his primary role was Logos, “God’s Law.” Jesus materially embodied the
principles of Logos on Earth. Jesus said, “Do not think I have come to destroy the Law or the
Prophets. I have not come to destroy the Law, but to fulfill it” (Matthew 5:17).
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When the model says that consciousness wrapped itself around our universe and took on a shape,
this is God the Holy Spirit, “ananada” in Sanskrit, meaning “joy.” The Simple Explanation calls
this joyful aspect of God the Primordial or Originating Fractal. At the macro scale, the Holy
Spirit surrounds our physical space, forming a membrane of consciousness, chit, that holds
creation in and the metaverse out. This “shape” of God’s mind is the Universal Unit of
Consciousness that knows all there is to know about everything. At the micro level, the Simple
Explanation describes the personal indwelling of the Holy Spirit in terms of fractal offspring of
the Universal UC within every created thing. Thus, the universe is pervaded by joy, from the
smallest atom to the highest heights.
(Source/Credit: InnerSense, Inc.)
The Simple Explanation depicts the Holy Spirit as a torus instead of the more familiar dove.
When the Bible speaks of a person’s immortal spirit, this refers to the Self’s unit of
consciousness (UC), “made in the image of God.” This Self UC is a fractal replica of the Holy
Spirit. As King David said concerning his own death: “I--in righteousness, I see Thy face; I am
satisfied, in awaking, with Thy form!” (Psalm 17:15).
According to the New Testament, Jesus the Christ was “fully human” and “fully God.” This
means that the UC associated with Jesus of Nazareth was a fully realized copy of the UC of the
Holy Spirit, which is another way of saying Jesus never allowed his personal will to contradict
the will of God streaming in from the metaverse. As a fully-realized, enlightened UC, Jesus was
entirely coherent with God’s will, which is to say, Jesus was without sin. Thus, Jesus never
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accrued karmic debt. Since Jesus did not live for himself but for God alone, he never enshrouded
his earthly UC with human memes and karma.
Buddhism shares with Christianity a Sanskrit meme called “bodhisattva” which refers to an
enlightened being who comes to Earth to free others from samsara (sin) and suffering. The
Nyingma school likens the highest form of bodhisattva to a good shepherd who lays down his
life for his sheep, as Jesus described himself in John 10:11. Moreover, Mahayana Buddhism
holds a meme called pariṇāmanā—merit transfer. In merit transfer, the bodhisattva takes away
the sins of his flock, which are washed clean through the bodhisattva’s excess of good
karma. John the Baptist proclaimed this same bodhisattva meme when he said of Jesus: “Behold
the Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world!” (John 1:29).
There are even Hindu sects where Jesus is counted in the lineage of founding gurus, such as Self
Realization Fellowship’s Kriya Yoga sect. Conservative Christians, whose ideological meme
chord is closed to other religious ideologies and non-Orthodox Christian memes, believe that
Jesus was God’s only begotten bodhisattva, and that He, alone, can performpariṇāmanā unto
salvation.
When asked his central message, Jesus responded that we were to “Love God and to love one
another as we love ourselves” (Luke 10:27). In terms of the Simple Explanation model, God
would like us to embrace the information and patterns streaming in from the metaverse whenever
we make a decision; when we do this, we are “loving God,” by acting in concert with God’s will.
Then, God would like us to love ourselves. This means that we are to love our flesh’s aggregate
UCs and do what is best for our organism, as explained in CH. 2. We are also to love our
governing Self UC and act with wisdom in concert with God’s will rather than selfishly
succumbing to Ego. Finally, we are to take the focus off of ourselves and our trove of memes,
and reach out laterally with love and information to our brethren UCs.
All Christians believe that Jesus came to Earth that we might not perish because of the Law but
that we might live life more abundantly (John 10:10). Jesus demonstrated through the example of
his life that it is possible to be a fully-realized UC, living moment-by-moment in the service of
God’s will. “Be therefore perfect, even as your Father in Heaven is perfect” (Matthew 5:48).
“Believing on Christ for salvation” is the meme chord that says the UC of Jesus can cleanse your
UC of sin and the consequences of sin. To be “Born Again” is to make a decision to lay down
your personal meme bundle and allow the Universal UC to shine unobstructed through you
(“Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God, which lives
and stays forever” (1 Peter 1:23). Baptism in Christ is a ritual enactment of washing away your
undesired meme chords so that God’s memes may flow through you.
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Here is a Simple Translation of The Lord’s Prayer:
Our Father from the metaverse, we address you with humility and respect. We invite
your plans and principles to inform and bring order to our universe, trusting that your
intention for us is best.
We acknowledge that you are the source of all that is needed to nourish and sustain our
lives.
We realize that our karmic shortcomings can only be forgiven to the same extent we
forgive others for their shortcomings.
We desire to avoid any memes that stand in the way of doing what is best for ourselves
and others.
We trust you in all things, for your authority and power transcend this universe, and we
are but humble echoes of your perfection.
Amen
Christ, the Word, Logos, chit, Metaversal Law
An Ironic Problem with Religious Memes
Religious doctrines and dogmas are sets of memes called meme chords. The irony is that, since it
is the governing Self UC that seeks union with God (the universal UC), beclouding the Self UC
with meme chords seems counterproductive to that aim. Merely surrounding oneself with
religious meme chords and performing obligatory works in honor of the memes does not grant
access to God. Here's how the Bible puts it:
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21 Not everyone that said to me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but
he that does the will of my Father which is in heaven. 22 Many will say to me in that
day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in your name? and in your name have cast out
devils? and in your name done many wonderful works? 23 And then will I profess to
them, I never knew you: depart from me, you that work iniquity. Matthew 7
What does it mean, to "work iniquity"? It means putting your Ego’s desires ahead of God's will
(or the metaversal plan). When a fractal Unit of Consciousness puts its own well-meaning-butlimited plan into action, karmic debt is created. Seekers after God desire absolution from
sin/karma/iniquity. Building even more karmic debt out of Ego-driven religious effort is the last
thing the seeker wants.
Here's how Verse 18 of the Tao Te Ching (Mitchell translation) puts it:
When the Tao is lost, there is goodness.
When goodness is lost, there is morality.
When morality is lost, there is ritual.
Ritual is the husk of true faith, the beginning of chaos.
This verse describes ritual's fall from grace. The highest state is to be at one with God and God's
plan, herein called the Tao. In The Simple Explanation model, the Tao spoken of by Lao Tzu
refers to the metaversal information and principles of organization that have informed our
universe since the moment before creation. When one loses touch with the universal Unit of
Consciousness, one loses the Tao's information pipeline. But, says Verse 18, even if your UC has
lost its way, you still know goodness when you see it, and your heart may still be in the right
place. But, once your heart loses its way, you no longer have true goodness. Morality is what you
are left with once love departs. Morality is a system of rules meant to engender Godly behavior
in those who no longer personally know God. Once morality is lost, empty ritual takes its place.
Ritualistic behavior no longer serves to bring one closer to God. At this stage, the Way to God
has become replaced by meaningless gestures. "Ritual is the husk of true faith." Lifeless, driedup memes have replaced morality, goodness, love, and communion with God. Verse 18 declares
this state to be chaotic, anarchic, and entropic, because when the Word of God cannot pass its
organizing principles through your Self UC, the opportunity is lost to accomplish whatever part
your UC was to play in making things better.
In the pursuit of knowledge, every day something is added.
In the practice of Tao, every day something is dropped.
Less and less do you need to force things, until finally you arrive at non-action.
When nothing is done, nothing is left undone.
True mastery can be gained by letting things go their own way.
It can’t be gained by interfering.
(Tao Te Ching, Verse 48, Stephen Mitchell translation, Harper Collins, 1988)
People believe that the more they know, the better off they and the world will be. However,
when we drop memes rather than add them, we allow transcendent patterns of organization and
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information to work through us. When we make plans and do work according to our limited
vision and personal desires, we strain to get things right. Acting only when truly inspired, the
metaverse works through us. When a UC does nothing of its own accord, the metaverse can do
exactly what needs to be done. Best results arise from inspired action. The anti-meme of “Let go
and let God” allows the metaverse to use us in the most efficient manner for the greatest good.
Who Am I After Death?
So far we've established that the "soul" associated with this material body is a perfect fractal
replica of the original universal unit of consciousness, albeit obscured by memes.
If, during life, my Unit of Consciousness is affected by earthly memes and the aggregated UCs
of this physical body (“Whoville,” my "mud," “Meat Mountain”), then what, if anything, affects
my UC after this body passes away? The Simple Explanation suggests that the individual "me"
that persists beyond death is the pattern of my ongoing karma. If this is the case, then the "me"
that continues to influence the fate of the Self UC after death is the holographic wave pattern of
all the choices ever made by “my” UC. In life, this karmically-generated vibratory pattern
attracts or repels the memes associated with my personal meme bundle. The memes I think of as
"me" are not mine, but are drawn to me by my karmic pattern. It is my karmic record that attracts
and repels the patterns of memes surrounding my life at any moment.
That the "you" that exists between material incarnations is nothing but your karmic record is
rationally proved by one of our simple philosophy’s basic memes: all UCs are fundamentally one
and the same when they begin their individuated journey. It follows, then, that "I" develop
continually as a result of my choices and the choices of others. "I" am my perfect UC enshrouded
in karma and the memes that my karma attracts, including all the UCs that were attracted to this
Self UC and became part of this body’s current aggregate.
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In Yogic philosophy it is said that an enlightened Yogi has become free of attachments and can
therefore perceive the Oneness of all things. The Simple Explanation of this phenomenon is that
the Yogi has successfully laid down all memes and can therefore perceive the perfect Self UC
stripped of its karmic shroud. Freed of personal memes, the Yogi can align with the Universal
UC and step out of personal karma. In this state the Yogi can instantiate God's will without
delusion. The same phenomenon is known as "buddhahood" in Buddhism, and "sainthood" in
Christianity. According to tradition, these liberated Units of Consciousness are no longer bound
to this material world by their discarded memes and redeemed karma. If they do return to earth,
it is in order to help others by sharing love and information for the betterment of all.
A Simple Explanation of Reincarnation and Evolution
Reincarnation is a meme common to many major world religions and spiritual traditions. Many
ancient as well as modern philosophers also incorporate the reincarnation meme into their
philosophies. Wikipedia defines reincarnation as "entering the flesh again." Depending upon the
particular memes held by one's belief system, it is said that after a human dies they may reenter
their next life as a newborn human, or possibly an animal or some other form.
The Simple Explanation defines reincarnation this way: Death breaks the bonds of a Self UC's
current material instantiation, but not its karmic pattern. The freed Unit of Consciousness
continues its existence at a non-material level until its karmic pattern causes it to reattach to a
particular newly instantiating aggregate, at which time it is born again into Creation.
As just explained, the memes I think of as "me" are not a part of my Self Unit of Consciousness,
but are drawn to me by my karmic pattern. It is my karmic record that attracts and repels the
patterns of memes surrounding my life at any moment. The Simple Explanation suggests that
reincarnations are not random events, but the continuation of karmically-mandated cycles of
consequence that do not end with death. It is not logical to expect the consequences of one's
actions to end at one's death; if you cut off someone's ear and then die, does the person's ear
suddenly grow back? No. Consequences of behavior are not affected by the death of the doer.
Likewise, the memes we attach to are not our personal property or invention to begin with,
therefore it is safe to assume they also continue to live on after death in the shared transpersonal
field.
In this model, “I” consist of my karmic pattern, the memes I hold onto, and the "aggregate UCs
of my material body, from the subatomic particles to molecules to cells, all the way up through
the UCs of the body’s organ systems" overlaid upon my Self's perfect UC. In terms of
reincarnation, it is only the aggregate UCs and their associated material bodies that change from
incarnation to incarnation, and even then, some, maybe most of my aggregates may choose to
“ride along” with my Self UC, co-evolving along with “me” and my ego.
In practical terms, here's how I see the reincarnation meme playing out. This person, Cyd, is
composed of a Self Unit of Consciousness that is a fractal replication of the Universal Unit of
Consciousness, and virtually identical to the Universal UC. Overlaid upon the Self UC is Cyd's
personality, which is largely defined by the memes Cyd holds onto, plus Cyd's karmic record
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which inclines Cyd's choices this way and that, plus Cyd's physical body and its desires and
limitations.
When this particular physical body is no longer able to sustain the constellation of UCs that
make up "Cyd," this particular hierarchical collection of UCs will disband their union, and all
UCs more complex than the molecular level will also "die" along with the governing Self UC.
This means that at death, not just one soul passes away, but the souls of millions of aggregate
UCs, too. (The molecular, atomic, sub-atomic UCs do not pass on at this time, because they are
still able to do their respective jobs after the organism dies.)
Every newly instantiating piece of creation needs a UC to oversee its life. At every conception,
be it a leaf or a seed, a cell, an organ, or an egg, perhaps even a planet or a galaxy, nature's
karmic computer attaches a governing UC. "Cyd's" UC will probably cycle into another newly
aggregated body of UCs who all, in the most perfect way imaginable, "deserve" one another.
This new Cyd will resemble old Cyd to the extent that new Cyd adopts old Cyd's memes.
These memes will be drawn to new Cyd by way of old Cyd's karma, which attracts some memes
and repels others. Cyd's new body may also carry some physical traits forward from the previous
life in the form of epigenetic patterns that cause genetic traits to turn off and on, as karmically
determined. It's likely that new Cyd will be a human, not just because Cyd was human before
but, more persuasively, because Cyd's particular karma and meme bundles best instantiate a
human form. (But if Cyd loved to swim and surf and thought about surfing nonstop and spent all
her time on the water, she might as well reincarnate as a porpoise, and she very well could.)
This reincarnation schema also provides a Simple Explanation of evolution. Here’s how it works:
all of our UCs started out as stardust from the original stars that populated the cosmos soon after
its inception. Some UCs that became stellar gas may still be inhabiting their original elemental
molecules in the intergalactic backwater of some far flung gaseous clouds, but most UCs have
moved on to occupy countless forms in the last 14 billion years.
The most ambitious UCs continue to find themselves occupying larger and more complex
physical forms. Those with the strongest wills eventually find themselves swimming in some
primordial soup or another, perhaps here on planet Earth. Some of the UCs that started in Earth’s
soup have remained in the soup, never attaching themselves to anything more complex than a
single-celled organism. The most ambitious little life forms found themselves returning to
slightly more sophisticated organisms with each incarnation. Lessons learned are carried
forward, always incarnating more and more complex structures and occasionally jumping to a
more complex hierarchical level, driving the evolution of planetary life via memes accrued
through karma.
Was Cyd’s Self UC ever a single-celled organism? Probably was, beginning about 4.5 billion
years ago.
Was Cyd’s Self UC ever a jellyfish? Good chance it was, as the jellyfish is the oldest multiorgan
animal on Earth, swimming our seas for the past 700 million years.
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(Source/Credit:Wikimedia Commons; Dan90266)
Was Cyd’s Self UC ever a dinosaur? Well, probably not; I’d imagine the dinosaur memes and
karma informed the development of reptiles and birds, not Cyd’s line.
Was Cyd’s governing UC ever a lemur? Or a chimpanzee? Or an Australopithecus?
Quite possibly, since their proto-human memes and karma would have informed human
development, and the Self UC is attracted to familiar patterns.
In the Simple Explanation’s evolutionary model, no meme war is needed between natural
selection and creationism, science and religion. The Simple Explanation meme proposes that
everything in the cosmos is created through metaversal principles embodied in all units of
consciousness, and that each UC evolves according to inclination and ability, through established
patterns of meme acquisition and adaptation, and the utterly fair and impartial mechanism of
karma.
In the Simple Explanation’s evolutionary schema, Cyd is currently a human and probably has
been for a very long time. Is Cyd more evolved than her dogs?
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Not really. The family dogs are at the same level of hierarchical sophistication as the humans.
The dogs’ billions of aggregate UCs and their two Self UCs have all made decisions every step
along the way that steered them into this life as these two dogs. Every governing UC is an
integral part of one aggregate or another, hierarchically upline and downline. Every slot needs to
be filled. The most you could say of Cyd’s state of evolution is that ambitious meme collectors
evolve into ever more complex instantiations, and Cyd’s UC and those of her aggregate UCs are
attached to some highly ambitious collections of memes. But whether or not this is anything to
brag about is debatable.
The “Perennial Philosophy” Meme
One day a philosopher friend of mine said of the Simple Explanation, "Excellent retelling of the
Perennial Philosophy!" I was unfamiliar with the expression "Perennial Philosophy," so I looked
it up on Wikipedia. Here's their essential definition:
Perennial philosophy is the philosophical concept which states that each of the world’s religious
traditions share a single truth. Perennial philosophy asserts that there is a single divine
foundation of all religious knowledge, referred to as the universal truth. Each world religion,
independent of its cultural or historical context, is simply a different interpretation of this
knowledge...
Yes, my friend was right. The Simple Explanation is all about identifying the universal truths
embedded underneath ages of confusing memetic overlays. So, just what are these basic memes
all traditions share,and what is the Simple Explanation of these memes?
The first perennial meme is this: There is a Divine Reality underpinning everything;
without This, no thing and no one would exist.
Here is how the Simple Explanation puts it:
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This Divine Reality may be directly perceived under certain conditions,through prayer,
meditation, mystic revelation, near-death experiences, religious ecstasy, inspired ritual, superrational intuition, or visionary psychedelic drugs.
Humans possess a dual nature: the little, egoic "me" of day-to-day living, and a true Self
that reflects the Divine Reality.
Egoic "me" is selfish, competitive, single-minded, short-sighted, meme-bound.
Non-egoic Self reaches out to others with love, aid, and information.
People long to reunite with that divine Reality from whence they came.Various traditions
call this salvation, enlightenment, Self-realization, Buddhahood. The Simple Explanation
describes it as aligning your Self UC with the Universal UC.
Unification is only possible through denial of the earthly self and identification with divine
Reality. The Simple Explanation calls this the “anti-meme,” as it recommends dropping memes
in order to apprehend reality here and now.
Renowned English philosopher and writer, Aldous Huxley, wrote an excellent book on the topic
in 1944 called The Perennial Philosophy, An Interpretation of the Great Mystics East and
West. Huxley’s descriptions fit in perfectly with the Simple Explanation, so if you would like to
read more about the Perennial Philosophy, I'd recommend Huxley's book.
Shed Unwanted Memes Here! Now!
According to the Simple Explanation, the memes we believe in and cling to are like threads
draped over our souls, obscuring our perfect Self UC and filtering our awareness of here and
now. If my Self UC is a perfect fractal expression of the primordial Universal UC, then my
personal meme bundle is the unique garment woven by my mind out of life's experiences and
sustained by my Ego as personal identity.
Once you acquire a meme, it becomes part of your identity. If you would rather not hold that
meme in your personal bundle of strings and chords, you need to detach it from your bundle.
•Some memes fall away of their own accord through disuse.
• Other memes must be consciously detached and laid aside.
• Some memes are pernicious; we call the behaviors associated with them addictions.
• Emotionally evocative memes such as victimhood or jealousy are difficult to detach
due to the intense synergistic coupling of thoughts and emotions.
In the worldly course of events, unwanted memes must be detached through an effort of will,
either through conscious disuse or by acquiring a competing, more desirable meme. Therapies
such as Emotional Freedom Technique (EFT), and Rational Emotive Therapy may help. PastLife Hypnosis is an especially useful tool for detaching troublesome past life memes. Memes
may also be surrendered to one's Higher Power through prayer and meditation. Serenity is
achieved as memes are surrendered.
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Here, now, you may lay down that unwanted meme. If you find yourself accidentally carrying it
around again, lay it down again. If you notice yourself invoking that meme out of habit, good for
you for noticing! Now, lay it down again. You may need to lay down some neighboring memes
as well, if their vibrations are invoking that pernicious meme in you.
No need for guilt, dismay, or despair. As the old song advises, just “pick yourself up, dust
yourself off, and start all over again.” Nature does not bemoan change. There is no clinging to
the past, wishing things had gone differently. Nature always looks around without expectation
other than how best to instantiate metaversal patterns here and now. Given these particular
conditions, what can I do now to be of most use? Onward and upward!
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Dorenbosch, M. M., The Idea of Will
Exploration
The Idea of Will
Michiel M. Dorenbosch
*
Abstract
This article presents a new conceptual view on the conscious will. This new concept approaches
our will from the perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system and not from
our anthropocentric perspective. This approach not only repositions the will at the core of
behavior control, it also integrates the studies of Libet and Wegner, which seem to support the
opposite. The will does not return as an instrument we use to steer, but rather as part of the way
we learn new automatic behavior and of how our neural system steers us. The new concept
suggests that understanding of our will is more about understanding of our daily behavior than
about the will itself.
Keywords: Conscious will, free will, consciousness, need, satisfaction, longing, desire,
affection, intention, motivation, valence, learning, automatic behavior, routine behavior, neural
muscular system, behavior control, anthropocentric, moral responsibility, Libet, Wegner,
Introduction
The free, unfree or conscious will has been keeping mankind and especially philosophers busy
for ages, if not for millennia and remarkably enough without offering a convincing argument for
understanding. The American philosopher John Searle addressed this in 2008 as “something of a
scandal” for philosophy (Searle 2008). Nevertheless, little has changed since then.
How is it possible that the will could hide itself so well for so long while the apparent opinion is
that understanding should be possible. There may be many reasons, however there are two
aspects that catch the eye. One is the unilateral analytical focus of philosophy on free choosing
or deciding (O'Connor 2010) disregarding the understanding of the nature of underlying feelings
of will (fig. 2). The other aspect is the inclination for anthropocentric understanding of the will
(O'Connor 2010), risking to blindfold ourselves from a broader view (fig. 3). Was it not Charles
Darwin who almost two centuries ago, showed us that we have to look outside ourselves to
understand ourselves?
This article addresses these two aspects of understanding the will. The result is a surprising new
concept of what our conscious will might be about. A concept that also might hold a piece of the
puzzle regarding why the will has been keeping us hostage for so long. This new concept does
not try to understand the will from our anthropocentric perspective as the majority of research
explicitly or implicitly seems to do (Baumeister & Bargh 2014, Brass et al. 2013, Cisek &
*
Correspondence: Michiel M. Dorenbosch, Independent Researcher, Italy. E-mail: michieldorenbosch@yahoo.co.uk
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Kalaska 2010, Dennet 2014, Doyle 2011, 2013, Frankfurt 1969, Kane 2014, Mele & Shepherd
2013, Miller & Schwarz 2014, Murphy & Throop 2010, Nahmias 2014, O'Connor 2010,
Pereboom 2014, Seth 2007, Wegner 2002, 2004). The new concept approaches our will from the
perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system (Tab. 1). The concept regards the
neural muscular system as an entity independent from us. The neural muscular system may be a
part of “us” in a physical sense, but we seem to miss the tools to control it, rather it controls us.
The concept focusses on neither freedom nor on deciding, but focusses instead on the
mechanisms and feelings of willing. Therefore, where the concept uses the term conscious will,
it is about conscious willing and not about conscious deciding. However, we may expect that the
mechanisms that create our conscious state of willing also direct what we choose or decide (fig.
2).
Viewed from the perspective of the neural-muscular system this article shows that our conscious
will is not about what we want, but rather about the inability of our system to control this what
automatically. This relationship with control places the will back into the setting of behavior
control from which it seemed to be “expelled” by Wegner’s “Illusion of the conscious will” in
2002 (Wegner 2002). The will returns not in terms of direct steering, as Wegner understandably
doubted, but as part of the learning trajectories that create our daily automatic routines (Bargh et
al. 2001, Graybiel 2008, Wyer 2014). This insight not only offers a natural fit for Wegner’s
challenging “illusion of the will”, but it also fits with Libet’s time delay between neural
initiatives to act (action potential) and the subsequent conscious decision to do so (Libet et al.
1983, Libet 1985). A new framework seems possible that includes freedom as well as unfreedom
of will. However, where the will touches the functionality of consciousness remains a mystery
because the nature of consciousness is still unknown (Seth 2007).
Table 1. DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF WILL
Concept
Perspective of
understanding
Focus of
Source of
understanding behavior
Objective of
will
Result of
willed action
Traditional
Anthropocentric
Free choice/
Free deciding
Conscious
thoughts
Control action
& Satisfaction
Moral
responsible
Wegner**
Anthropocentric
Free choice
& Feelings
of will
Unconscious Create
processing
emotional
markers
Authorship
of action
New
Concept
Neural muscular
system
Mechanisms
& Feelings
of will
Unconscious Explore how
& Conscious to control
learning
satisfaction
Learning
automatic
control
*
* (O'Connor 2010), ** (Wegner 2004).
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This article is an invitation to step into the shoes of our neural muscular system for a moment,
wandering about the will without defining it beforehand, considering that our experiences of will
may not be about us, but rather a part of the instrumentation of our neural muscular system to
control the world around the system. This article starts with the functionality or non-functionality
of conscious perceptions and the relationship between the will and behavior control. Then it
looks at our perception of freedom in relation to neural processing, autonomy and intentions. It
concludes with a vision on how we assign value to everything around us, and with a new
definition of the conscious will.
Fig. 1. A MODEL OF CONSCIOUS WILL AS SUGGESTED BY WEGNER (Wegner & Wheatly 1999
©APA).
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Consciousness
The decision to choose the perspective of the neural-muscular system is not that surprising. In
fact it is rather inevitable, considering that unconscious neural processing may precede our
conscious perceptions, not only in the context of inborn or learned reflexes but also, it seems, in
the context of conscious deciding (Bengson, et al. 2014, Bernácer, & Giménez-Amaya 2013,
Dijksterhuis 2011, D'Ostilio & Garraux 2012, Fried et al. 2011, Grey Walter 1963, Guggisberg
& Mottaz 2013, Libet et al. 1983, Libet 1985, Kühn & Brass 2009, Matsuhashi & Hallett 2008,
Ostrowick 2007, 2014, Soon et.al. 2008, 2013, 2014). This shift in perspective however, is not
without problems. One difficult question is whether our conscious experiences of will can steer
behavior (Block 1998, Gulick 2014). This steering aspect of the conscious will is heavily
doubted in Wegner’s “Illusion of the conscious will” (Wegner 2002, 2004) and this vision has
become one of the main hurdles in the understanding of the will. Wegner’s vision is that
unconscious neural causes create our experience of conscious will and that there is no direct
causal relationship between our conscious will and our actions (fig. 1). Nevertheless he tries to
understand the will from our conscious anthropocentric perspective and not from the perspective
of the neural system (tab. 1 & fig. 1). However, from the perspective of the neural muscular
system the steering potency of conscious perceptions is also a thorny topic.
The main problem is that we do not know the nature of consciousness (Chalmers 1995, Gulick
2014, Seth 2007). Therefore, we also do not know whether conscious experiences of will are
functional or not. Nonetheless, as seen from the perspective of the neural muscular system, it
seems possible to position conscious experiences, including those of will, in a functional context.
To do so we use the insight that a conscious experience, functional or not, generally is correlated
with underlying “unconscious” processing of the neural system that generally is assumed to be
functional (Engel & Singer 2001, Lane et al. 1998, Tononi et al. 1998). This “neural correlation
of consciousness” (Cleeremans 2009, Mormann & Koch 2007, Tononi & Koch 2014) allow us to
consider a conscious experience together with its underlying neural activity as a potential
functional action of the neural muscular system (fig. 3). This offers an opportunity to leave the
question of functionality of consciousness outside the scope of this article.
What and How
That our conscious experiences are preceded and escorted by unconscious neural processing,
suggests that we have to reevaluate what our experience of will stands for. Is the experience of
will an expression of our needs or an expression of the requirements of the neural muscular
system?
From our anthropocentric perspective, the will is clearly about our needs such as food, safety,
sex, autonomy (Maslow 1943). We want to experience satisfaction in terms of relaxation,
happiness, freedom, love, etc.. The conscious will seems to be our focus on what can deliver this
to us (tab. 1). The will can present itself in general terms. For example, ”I want to drink
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OUR CONSCIOUS PERSPECTIVE
PHILOSOPHY
CONSCIOUS WILL
NEED
WHAT
DECISION
FREE
OR
NOT FREE?
HOW
ACTION
SATISFIED,
NOT SATISFIED
Fig. 2. THE CONSCIOUS WILL FROM OUR ANTHROPOCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE:
Our state of CONSCIOUS WILL is preceded normally by a conscious NEED; a longing for
satisfaction. The will seems to enter consciousness when this longing focusses itself on
WHAT might satisfy us best. This may create an intention to move towards it. The longing,
together with this intention, we experience as a motivation to explore HOW we can control
this WHAT in a way that suits us best. Subsequently this may turn into real ACTION. If this
ACTION does NOT SATISFY our needs, we might try again, modifying the NEED, the WHAT
and or the HOW. If the ACTION does SATISFY we may reinforce this behavior by repeating it
in future. In both cases this is to regard as a feedback learning loop. When an ACTION is
initiated in line with our intentions and thoughts, we normally experience this as our
DECISION. PHILOSOPHY strongly focuses on whether we are free in this decision or not.
Whether the relationship between the boxes is causal or not (see fig. 1) is still a subject of
debate (blue arrows).
something”. But it can also have a specific focus toward what may satisfy us best. For example,
”I would give a million for a cold beer!”.
However, seen from the perspective of the neural muscular system, the will seems instrumental
and primarily about how to keep the organism in the comfort zone of its needs (Craig 2010).
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From the neural muscular system’s viewpoint, the will is hardly about what could deliver
satisfaction. To the system, this object of our longing and intention, for example drinking, or
obtaining a cold beer, is already “known”, even in terms of satisfaction. The problem of the
neural muscular system seems to be that it lacks the skills to control this object of satisfaction
automatically in the present setting. The challenge of the neural muscular system is to stimulate
the organism to explore and learn how to control this object also in this setting (tab. 1). For
example, it may move the organism into the exploring mode: “Can I buy a beer here?” “Should I
ask the neighbor?” “I better eat some fruit?”
All But Doing
Despite this difference in scope, in both perspectives the will seems focused on control. In our
perspective, the focus is on what we want. In the perspective of the neural muscular system, it is
on how to control this what in an automatic way. A part of this control is innate in terms of
reflexes and talents. The majority of control, however, we must learn, step by step, day by day,
by exploring, trying and rehearsing (Bengson 2014, Brembs, et al. 2002). For us this learning is
not normally a part of how we experience the will. In our perception, the will is rather about
being in control (Brass et al. 2013) and getting or doing right away.
Seen from the perspective of our neural muscular system, however, the connection with learning
seems inescapable. The will emerges when the organism is outside its comfort zone, lacking the
skills to return to it (McBride 2008, 2012). For example, “I’m thirsty, but can’t find a drink
here!” The organism, therefore, has to learn new skills. Stated the other way around, willing is
hardly relevant when control is adequate. For example, we just open the refrigerator and take a
drink, thirsty but generally without strong feelings or intentions.
One could say that willing means knowing the what, but not perfectly knowing the how to
control this what in the very moment. Conversely, if the how is fully under control, the will fades
and our behavior becomes more or less automatic, as in the refrigerator example. From the
perspective of the neural muscular system, the will seems less about an intention to satisfy an
active need, as we tend to experience it, but more about a mechanism to get the organism to work
by exploring and learning new skills. This is not an easy task when we consider that “willing is
all but doing”.
It may be noteworthy that also the part of the brain that produce our intentional feelings of will
seems to operate independently from the part that triggers concrete action (Desmurget et al.
2009, Desmurget & Sirigu 2012). Also this suggests that the conscious will is rather about error
detection, motivation and learning than about direct behavioral control (Charles et al. 2014).
Daily Behavior
The conscious will seems to be part of exploring, trying and learning new behavioral options.
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When these behavioral options appear successful, normally they will be repeated (Fig. 4). As a
result, control improves and the new options will gradually turn into semi-unconscious routines,
also referred to as cortical reflexes (Bernácer & Giménez-Amaya 2013, Graybiel 2008, Lamme
2010, Lombo & Giménez-Amaya 2014). We seem to activate these routines by consciously or
unconsciously focusing on the triggers (Hassin 2013, Koch & Tsuchiya 2007, Merikle et al.
2001, Shinar et al. 1998), for example, in the way we automatically drive a car. However, life is
not only about driving a car. All routine behavior we tend to perform automatic and semiunconscious; consider, walking, working, eating, talking, etc.. Even thinking seems to follow this
design as seen in our often automatic opinions about others.
Wegner and Libet
Seen from the position of the neural muscular system the will seems about conscious learning in
order to perform better in the future. The will may be an illusion when it is about direct
conscious steering, as Wegner rightly concluded (Wegner 2002), but seen from the perspective
of the neural muscular system the will returns, functional or not, as a part of routine steering by
improving or renewing routines where the existing routines fail. In other words, steering by
doing better next time (Gray 2004, Biggs 2005, Nesse 2005, Woergoetter & Porr 2008).
This approach also creates an unexpected fit for the findings of Libet and others (Libet 1983,
Grey Walter 1963, Matsuhashi & Hallett 2008, Kühn & Brass 2009) on the time delay between
the neural initiatives to act and our conscious perception of deciding. On the one hand, the new
approach skips the need of time-consuming conscious perception as we go about our daily
routines. On the other hand, and more important, the approach suggests that conscious
processing, and therefore also the will, is about trying and learning to behave automatically in
the future and not about being in control. Within this context, Libet’s half-second time delay of
consciousness is no problem as most learning is iterative and slow because of trying, evaluating
and rehearsing. The time delay seems even to make sense in terms of afterward evaluation.
Sleepwalking
The consequence of the foregoing is a remarkable and hardly conceivable notion that our daily
routine behavior may be more or less like sleepwalking in bright daylight, leaving conscious
attention, reflection and evaluation for the moments when control tends to be insufficient. This
could explain why we are capable of very complex behavior when we really are sleepwalking
(Mahowald 2006, Pressman et al. 2007).
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OUR CONSCIOUS PERSPECTIVE
CONSCIOUS WILL
NEED
WHAT
HOW
SENSORY
INPUT
ROUTINE
TRIGGER
NEURAL
TRACT
DECISION
ACTION
ROUTINE
BEHAVIOR
AUTOMATIC ROUTINE
SATISFIED,
NOT SATISFIED
NEURAL MUSCULAR SYSTEM
UNCONSCIOUS
Fig. 3. THE CONSCIOUS WILL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE NEURAL MUSCULAR SYSTEM:
Conscious experiences are generally CORRELATED with underlying unconscious neural
activity, more or less like the two faces of the same coin. However, the new concept
suggests that the CONSCIOUS WILL is not as about the will itself, but rather about the
learning and improving of the underlying AUTOMATIC ROUTINE. In this context the
conscious WHAT may correspond with the automatic ROUTINE TRIGGER that has to be
learned, the conscious HOW with finding and learning the optimal NEURAL TRACT of the
routine and the conscious ACTION with the future automatic ROUTINE BEHAVIOR. It may be
noticed that the “conscious” boxes are only connected through their unconscious
counterparts.
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Pickpockets and magicians have known for ages that we sleepwalk in bright daylight, but for
most of us this notion is hard to believe for various reasons. It may seem as stating the obvious,
but the main reason might be that our conscious world simply does not include what we process
unconsciously. Many may recognize the experience of the miraculous disappearance of the car
keys we just had in our hands one minute ago. It appears, we must have put them somewhere in
an unconscious routine. Not only our car keys disappear in this manner, but all our routines have
the potential to vanish into the void. Nonetheless, we tend to believe that what we do perceive is
all there is (Pronin 2009). Conscious perception is far from accurate and complete, as illustrated
by the famous experiment with the “gorilla” that passes in full sight among basketball players.
When we have the demanding attention task to count the number of ball passes made by one of
the teams, many of us will not even notice the passing primate (Simons 2010).
Another reason may be that our conscious perceptions can be very present and vibrant,
advocating the perfect opposite of sleepwalking. In addition, the nature of our senses
unavoidably puts us in the center of conscious perception and action, suggesting that we are in
charge of full control. Even when we act more or less automatically, as in driving a car while
talking to a fellow passenger, we still have to focus on the trigger context of our driving routines,
creating the impression of active conscious steering (Sumner 2008).
There are many more examples and arguments, but the constant alert for what may run out of
control of our routines, together with the indispensable focus on the routine context, may explain
our impression that we certainly do not sleepwalk and that we, and only we, are steering.
However, when the sleepwalker is also capable of very complex behavior, we could reason that
not us, but rather our neural muscular system is running our routines without the need of
consciousness by using the ongoing stream of information that continuously enters into the brain
(Bargh et al. 2001).
Private Path
We seriously have to take into account that our neural muscular system and not us, directs our
regular behavior and perceptions. But what about the will, which seems to give us the personal
power to freely choose what we prefer. Are we also unfree in our private preferences and
choices? The answer to this question depends very much on the angle in which we approach our
freedom of will. It might be wise to approach it from our perspective as well as from the
perspective of the neural muscular system.
From our perspective, we experience a mental freedom to give preference to what weighs most
for each of us, a preference that undoubtedly has the ability to differ from that of others. As a
result, we all seem to follow a unique private path in life. A path that often originates with
intention of our will, but that may also contain other input, such as the way we deal with the
arguments of others. Whatever the considerations are, they all have one thing in common. They
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all express the values (weight) that we each personally assign to arguments and things around us
depending on our actual knowledge, experiences and needs.
This capacity to follow our own path and to assign personal values to things around us makes it
almost impossible to believe that something other than our conscious will might draw the very
lines of our life, lines that sometimes even seem to challenge logic and common sense. This
perception of willpower strongly suggests that our mind is free from the deterministic laws that
rule the universe (Hoefer 2008). This may, or may not, be true but it is understandable as science
is still incapable of filling the gap between the conscious mind and the physical world of which
we are a part (Chalmers 1995). Omitting a discourse on freedom and determinism, a conclusion
may be drawn that we are organisms that undeniably have the possibility to differ from one
another, mentally, emotionally and behaviorally. This is an autonomy that could be described as
the freedom to have private thoughts, preferences, intentions and emotions, and consequently to
make private choices in life.
Backstage
The possibility to differ mentally and behaviorally from others may explain our feelings of
freedom. But what is happening backstage, out of sight of our conscious perception? Who or
what is initiating and steering our thoughts, intentions and choices? In other words, what are the
degrees of freedom of our autonomy?
That neural mechanisms seem to precede, initiate and guide what we perceive, prefer and choose
(Dijksterhuis 2011, Libet 1983, Soon et al. 2008), suggests that our autonomy is less free than we
experience. Backstage, out of sight of our consciousness, seems to reign the neural muscular
system. By using our senses, it seems to control, more or less automatically, the world outside
and inside our body. It does this, among other means, by reflexes, routines and, when needed, by
putting us on track of attention, exploring and learning. For example, when we are hungry, we
often start to think and talk about food. Intuitively this makes sense, but who or what initiates our
thoughts and words? Do we initiate them because we are hungry? Or does our neural muscular
system initiate them because of a low blood sugar level? Whatever the answer may be, the
undeniable importance of unconscious neural processes widely opens the door for determinism.
There is much to write about the importance of unconscious neural processes (Dijksterhuis
2011), but in this article we will discusses only one aspect of the will that illustrates how
intertwined conscious and unconscious processes are. We will look at the way we assign
personal value, or valence, to everything around us (Colombetti 2005, Frijda et al. 2014, Mauss
& Robinson 2009, Shuman et al. 2013).
Earthworms
In popular terms, one could say that understanding personal value is a little bit like
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“understanding” earthworms. Earthworms seem to move towards what is edible or beneficial,
and away from what is risky. In a way, we seem to do the same. Recognizing something of
importance normally brings us to an intentional state to move towards or away, depending on
whether we may expect a positive or negative effect (Valckx et al. 2011, Lavender & Hommel
2007, Lowe & Ziemke 2011). This primitive impulsive reflex of the body is mostly supported by
other impulses of our autonomic system (Blessing & Gibbins 2008, Schulz et al 2007). In terms
of direct conscious action however, it is normally inhibited by the cortex (Aron 2007, Bradley &
Lang 2000, MacLeod 2007, Schel & Crone 2013, Schel et al. 2014). A cortical inhibition that is
all but perfect, as we see for example in our body language when somebody is sympathetic to us.
In this case, our feet may automatically point towards this sympathetic person, or if not
sympathetic, it is our back that turns.
In our intent to move we seem even more like earthworms than we probably want to know,
especially in our responses to positive stimuli. We not only tend to move towards the object of
sympathy. It seems that we actually want to put it in our mouths. So why do we kiss our loved
ones? Or even more strange, why do we kiss the world cup when victorious? In many cases
adults may hold back this impulsive action as it may be impropriate or unhealthy, but as a baby
we explore all kinds of things by putting them in our mouth.
Valuable Feelings
The conscious perception of the reflex of the body to eat, fight or flight may mirror the
individual’s personal value of things and actions (Damasio 2000, Gelder 2006, Mauss &
Robinson 2009, Schulz et al 2007). However, our neural muscular system also seems to use
another trick to indicate importance. When we recognize something that can satisfy or dissatisfy,
our system automatically allows us to “taste” this effect beforehand. For instance when we are
buying a lottery ticket, the same brain circuits start to boast as if we already won (Clark et al.
2009, Breiter et al 2001). This suggest that value may involve at least two mechanisms. On the
one hand is the motivating mechanism of the automatic body intention to move towards or away,
what we may call attraction, affection and aversion (Lang & Bradley 2010, Craig 2003). On the
other hand is the motivating state of the desire or need to experience the “tasted” satisfaction to
its full extent or if negative, to avoid disgust, what we may call respectively longing and
repulsion (Andrews & Hawthorn 1988, Cisler et al. 2009, Decker 1971, Nesse 2005, Rolls 2012,
2014, Shuman et al. 2013).
From our perspective, value may be defined as, the experienced intent to move towards because
we long for satisfaction, or away because we fear distress. Seen from the perspective of the
neural muscular system, value seems to be part of a mechanism to focus the organism on what
seems most promising in terms of exploring and learning in the actual setting (fig. 4).
Interestingly the experience of value fades when learning is completed and the new behavior has
become a routine (Lewis & Todd 2005). For example, as an experienced driver we may no
longer experience the potential risk of oncoming traffic as we probably did during our initial
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driving experiences.
Personal Data
How do we know the value of things? Our longing for pleasure and satisfaction may be inborn
and also our inclination to explore, but we must learn the value of objects, circumstances and
skills. This learning probably starts while we are in the womb and continues throughout our
lifetime (Heckhausen et al. 2010). When we taste a delicious cake, our neural system will
normally store the experience along with the effort to get the cake and the circumstances in
which we obtained it (Schedlbauer et al. 2014, Watrous et al. 2013). In the same way, we will
remember negative experiences with the intention to avoid these conditions in the future (Gray
2002, Rolls 2014).
As a result of this learning, we create a vast personal “database” of the value of things as a
function of actual needs, circumstances and possible actions (Damasio et al. 1996). This database
of personal values seems hardly active during daily routines, but is immediately activated when
we run out of control over our satisfaction, for example, seeing an appetizing or sexy roadside
billboard.
The database seems to be more or less a private global positioning system, automatically
indicating where to focus when exploring and learning is needed. As part of the brain circuitry,
this database allows fast value assessment based on memory. The high speed at which we
process the database indicates that memory suffices for valuing (Cannon 1927). Nevertheless, the
body may also react at “low” speed when we recognize something or somebody as important, for
example sweating or blushing, and more generally in terms of stress, intentionality or relaxation
(Faigman, et al. 2003, Melo & Gratch 2009). This reaction may play a role in body language
(Gelder 2006) and presumably also in new learning.
Weight of Arguments
The value of things seems to be based on the conscious perception of body-intention and
longing, but what about our preferences based on physical, economical or other discrete values:
the biggest, the longest, the cheapest, the sweetest, etc.? A child may create havoc because his or
her glass has just one millimeter of lemonade less than those of other children. Is this about
physics or feelings? If it were about physics, what would be the common measure when we
compensate for less lemonade with a larger piece of pie? It could be about the physical amount
of food or about the emotional amount of parental affection. However, when we add more and
more aspects to a choice, there seems to be no common physical measure available. In this case,
we normally return to what “feels best” in terms of longing, intentionality and achievable
satisfaction. A powerful and robust value that spontaneously seems to integrate the importance of
what we are perceiving.
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OUR CONSCIOUS PERSPECTIVE
CONSCIOUS WILL
NEED: MOTIVATON (LONGING)
WHAT: FOCUS & MOTIVATION (INTENTION)
HOW: OPTIONS
DECISION
TRYING
ACTION
SENSORY
INPUT
ROUTINE
TRIGGER
NEURAL
TRACT
ROUTINE
BEHAVIOR
AUTOMATIC ROUTINE
REPEATING
SATISFYING ACTION
NEURAL MUSCULAR SYSTEM
UNCONSCIOUS
Fig. 4. THE CONSCIOUS WILL IN THE FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT OF THE NEURAL MUSCULAR SYSTEM:
The CONSCIOUS WILL seems a MOTIVATION to get us to work in finding and TRYING HOW we
can control what may satisfy our needs best. The WILL offers steady conditions and a
focus to explore, try and learn new routine behavior. REPEATING turns SATISFYING ACTIONS
gradually into automatic ROUTINE BEHAVIOR. This behavior may function automatically
and unconsciously as long as the NEURAL MUSCULAR SYSTEM can recognize certain INPUT
as the ROUTINE TRIGGER. What we experience as a DECISION may be the moment in which
we observe that a behavioral option results in real trying. When a new option becomes
routine behavior, deciding also becomes an unconscious automatic step.
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Realizing that the value of things is about feeling, suggests that our will and choices are not
directly based on facts or logical arguments, as they present themselves to us, but rather on the
feelings triggered by this information. Our will and approach may start with the perception of
facts or arguments but our intentions and decisions seem based on the feelings generated. This
also offers a possible explanation as to why our will can challenge logic and common sense. At
the core, we seem to choose what feels best and not what reasons best. Nevertheless, defining,
reasoning and understanding play an important role in our daily choices. Not necessarily because
of logic and understanding as such, but more likely because we want to be sure about triggering
the right feelings, once we have to choose.
New Meaning
A new picture of the conscious will evolves. The new concept shows the will as a conscious state
in which we are encouraged to control what can satisfy us best. An intentional state set off by our
neural muscular system at the moment it can no longer control satisfaction automatically. The
neural muscular system needs us, the organism, to interact physically with the world around the
system to explore, try and learn new options of control. The will seems to offers the steady
conditions for this in terms of focus, motivation to and duration (fig. 4). In this new context, the
conscious will might be defined as a conscious intentional state, characterized by focus,
intention, desire and duration. A state, set off by our neural muscular system in motivating us to
explore and learn the options of control that the neural muscular system needs to control the
world outside the system automatically. A definition that positions the conscious will, functional
or not, central in the context of steering to keep our routine behavior attuned to changing
conditions around the neural muscular system.
This new definition implies an understanding of the will on three levels. First, on our
anthropocentric level, showing a will that targets the satisfaction of our needs. Second, on the
brain level, showing the will as a part of the toolbox of our neural muscular system to control the
world around the system. Third on the integration level, suggesting that our neural muscular
system and not us is running the evolutionary battle of control.
Practically all research about the will tries to understand the will on the first level and
predominantly in a technical sense, for example in relation to determinism or moral
responsibility (O'Connor 2010). It is difficult to grasp why the importance of our feelings of will
have been practically ignored for so long. This seems an omission that might explain, in part,
why traditional philosophy never could produce answers that took hold in society. People feel
what they want and a challenge might be to address also this aspect in the understanding of the
will and deciding. However, it may be clear that there is an even bigger challenge for will-related
studies. That is the challenge to go beyond the present anthropocentric fixation that seems to
blindfold us from understanding the will in the broader context of control and evolution.
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Decision and Choice
This new concept does not address free deciding, the central issue of the free-will debate.
Nevertheless, the new concept may have a substantial impact on the understanding of deciding.
A first notion is that the new concept positions all conscious perception, including conscious
deciding, in the context of learning new routine behavior. This means that studies about
conscious deciding should be about real new learning and not for example about routines that
already exist. This is not only because both mechanisms use different neural networks (Schenk &
McIntosh 2010), but also because the neural activity may differ considerably (Crammond &
Kalaska 2000, Cisek & Kalaska 2010). For example the research of Grey Walter in 1963, that
strongly suggests that the brain decides and not we, seems to be about an existing button-push
routine to change a viewing-slide (Grey Walter 1963, Ostrowick 2007). Also the studies of Libet
and many others seem to use existing routines, such as moving a wrist or a finger. We will not
discuss here the possible impact of the use of existing routines in the studies (see: Klemm 2010,
O'Connor 2009, Pacherie & Haggard 2010) but we have to wonder whether these studies can
show the effect of what conscious deciding should be about: trying and evaluating promising
options in terms of need satisfaction.
A second notion is that the concept suggests that deciding means effecting the only option that
feels best to us. On a neural muscular level only this option will result in motor output (Prescott
2008, Schall 2013). It may be clear that such a mechanism leaves little room for doing otherwise
at the very moment of choice. Nevertheless, we have a possibility to do otherwise. By
postponing the moment of choice, for example because choosing seems risky, we may create
time for additional information. This additional information might change the option that feels
best to us. From our perspective, we may experience this postponing as hesitating, thinking it
over, or asking a friend’s opinion. Nevertheless, also in the new moment of choice, there will
only be room for the option that feels best at the very moment of deciding.
This brings us to a third and final notion on deciding, the conscious vetoing of a decision to act.
The veto debate roots in Libet’s findings of the time delay between a neural initiative to act and
our conscious perception of deciding, suggesting that we have no free will (Libet et al. 1983,
Libet 1985, 2003). Libet wanted to prove that we still can veto the neural “decision” within the
conscious 0.2 seconds before acting. That would leave a little “elbow room” for the free will
(Ostrowick 2007).
Animals need fast stop routines to deal with unexpected impacts as for instance a sudden
predator attack. We can veto an intended action even up to 0.1 before acting (Matsuhashi &
Hallett 2008). A veto that may be a fully willed action, as suggested by Libet. However, given
the time window of 0.2 sec in its research, it rather might be mix of an automatic stop routine
and a conscious afterward assessment of this routine (Kühn & Brass 2009).
We advocated already that Libet’s the time delay does not conflict with the new concept of
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conscious routine learning. So there is little need to save the will by fast vetoing. Moreover, fast
vetoing seems just part of finding and learning the option that might fit us best in order to
perform better next time.
Epilog
This article is written to share the explanatory potency of an approach of the will from the
perspective of the neural muscular system, an approach that resulted in a new concept of the
conscious will.
Does the new concept rescue the free will or free deciding? If we approach the will from our
perspective and if we read free as autonomous, the concept might rescue it in a certain sense. The
concept suggests that we consciously and intentionally are involved in the learning of new
behavior. The correlation of consciousness with neural processing positions our conscious
perception and so our conscious will within the functional context of the neural muscular system.
Of course this correlation does not answer the question about the functionality of our conscious
involvement. Nonetheless, the concept displays a remarkable intertwining of the conscious will
and the learning of new routine behavior. However, not knowing the nature of consciousness the
functionality of this intertwining cannot be proven, but it also should not be excluded.
This nevertheless may be a small anthropocentric spark of good news about our involvement in
the steering of our behavior. However, seen from the perspective of the neural muscular system,
the new concept suggests that our conscious experiences, including those of will, are not about
us, but rather part of the incentives of our neural muscular system. Incentives to get us to work at
the moment that the system needs us to keep up with its outer physical world. It is a double layer,
which positions our explicit conscious world, including us and our conscious will, within the
instrumental context of our neural-muscular system. Without realizing it, all our thoughts,
experiences, actions and emotions, seem to be part of how our neural system controls “its
world”. This is an alien perspective that displays us as unaware puppets on the strings of the
neural-muscular system. A hijacking of our conscious world that is very difficult to see as
potentially real and accordingly we must wonder, are we ready for it. Nevertheless, the new
concept, if true, will unavoidably force us to reflect anew on who we are. A perspective that may
cause us to drift further and further from what we thought to be for ages; beings at the core of
consciousness and creation.
Does this mean that we no longer can be loving or proud of ourselves? The new view on the
conscious will in no way erases our perceptions, values or emotions. Even when every aspect of
our conscious world is instrumental to our neural muscular system, we continue to live within the
same conscious world confined by our personal experiences. We have no other choice, and
emotions such as love, pride and guild inevitably will stay a part of us, individually and as a
society.
There is still a lot to discover about functionality and our conscious will, nonetheless the concept
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Dorenbosch, M. M., The Idea of Will
presented here may open a new door to the mystery of will. This may be a small first step, as
further research is needed to reveal conclusive insights into the nature of the conscious will.
Insights, it seems, no longer of a mysterious free entity but rather the expression of our mental
sovereignty and uniqueness; conscious, autonomous, and at the same time inseparable from the
universe in which we all live, love and die.
Acknowledgements: I wish to thank Catherine Beeker for playing the devil’s advocate and her editorial
contribution.
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Towards a theory of consciousness: Proposal for the resolution of the
homunculus fallacy with predictions*
A. L rincz and G. Szirtes
Department of Information Systems, Eötvös University of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary
Abstract
In this paper we argue that no forms of Turing test are either necessary or sufficient to
establish if a machine is conscious or not. Furthermore, from a modeling point of view, the
problem is that the Turing test does not really provide testable predictions. We believe that the
model structure should explain the function (of consciousness). We argue that the cornerstone
of any model on consciousness is to (partly) overcome the obstacle of the homunculus fallacy
about the use of representations. In this contribution a possible solution is suggested, which
makes use of reflexive architectures. The emerging computational constraints on the proposed
architecture have lead to testable predictions on the dynamical behavior of the biological
substrate. Interestingly, these predictions are in good agreement with recent experimental
observations.
*
submitted to the Journal of Consciousness Studies (http://www.imprint.co.uk/jcs.html)
Introduction
Turing’s famous proposal (Turing, 1950) on a general criterion set for modeling cognition has
begun a new chapter in discovering the nature of consciousness, the problem, which is as old
as the philosophy itself. Turing’s work can be interpreted as an intention to bridge the gap
between the philosophy of the mind and the so-called hardcore sciences (e.g., computational
neuroscience, neurobiology, etc.). However, instead of facilitating and directing experimental
research, the presumed generality of the Turing test gave rise to new and disturbing questions,
many of which, from a modeling point of view, lead us into deadlocks.
We admit that attacking the Turing test (e.g. Searle, 1980) and defending it (see e.g. Harnad
2000a, 2000b, 2003) are both entertaining and useful in clarifying the logic behind the
philosophy of intelligence and/or consciousness and/or thinking. We are afraid, however, that
these routes cannot lead to testable model construction. This is why we feel inspired to chip
on the conversation. We hope that our previous works on neurobiological modeling qualifies
us for such contribution. Our contribution does not pretend to provide a direct solution to the
problem of consciousness. Instead, our remarks are meant to be a call to extend the objectives
of cognitive research.
Problems of Turing tests
In this paper we principally focus on Stevan Harnad’s thoughts from a pragmatic standpoint,
because he addresses many exciting issues and aims to highlight their convergence. From our
modeling perspective, he argues for the interrelatedness of the mind – body problem, the socalled ‘other minds’ problem and the problem of symbol grounding. Summarizing Harnad’s
argument (Harnad 2003, 2000b), we have found the following statements important for our
reasoning: i, While the presence of consciousness in others (from human beings to artificial
creatures to enter the club of conscious things) is an ontological question, having the
knowledge about it is an epistemic problem that is (following Descartes) only our own belief
(based on, e.g., the experience of others’ behavior) can help us in deciding on others’ club
membership (i.e., epistemic inference on ontological problem). ii, The Turing test still
remains the best device to support such an experience based decision.
The weakness of the original form of the Turing test (T2) has been demonstrated by Searle'
s
(1980) Chinese Room argument. As a partial solution, other levels of Turing tests have been
introduced. For example, T4 corresponds to a system, which has indistinguishable internal
functioning (even at the neuro-molecular level), while T5 is indistinguishable in “every
empirically discernible respect” (Harnad, 2000b). The intermediate level of T3 scales up T2 to
full performance capacity to pass the Total Turing Test (T3) (see, e.g., in Harnad, 2000a, b).
In our view, both T3 and T4 (T5 is omitted for the sake of simplicity) have the same
inescapable drawback: they are inherently anthropomorphic, only the mimicking capabilities
are different. In other words, passing Turing test is not a sufficient condition for recognizing
or defining consciousness.
We claim that Turing tests are not necessary conditions either. An illuminating but somewhat
controversial example is the case of patients awoken from coma, who can report consciouslike sensations and mental processes during their coma state, which are not accessible for any
Turing test. Young children before acquiring the ability of language would be another
example, because they would also fail in a communication based Turing test. Thirdly,
although there are famous demonstrations that some monkeys can use some hand signs based
on American Sign Language and could pass certain items of T2-T4 Turing tests, neither of
these tests can tell us, if lower level primates are conscious or not. To escape from this
seemingly vicious circle of a neither necessary nor sufficient test, we suggest looking for
other, possibly less anthropomorphic constraints on functional modeling with explanation
power.
As a first step, by rephrasing the problem with Harnad’s wording, we think that the issue at
hand is how a “ghost in a machine” could convince itself about the presence or absence of “a
ghost in another machine”.
Our proposal is to find key modeling issues, which might lead to a functional explanation of
the “ghost”. When functional models are investigated, one is forced to deal with internal
functioning, which is inherently tied up with the use of representations. However, the concept
of using representations is not without problems. The main attack against such representation
has been clearly described by, e.g., Dennett (1991) and Searle (1992) in the form of the socalled “homunculus” fallacy. According to the fallacy, the internal representation in any
information processing system is meaningless without an interpreter. The paradox claims that
all levels of abstraction require at least one further level containing the corresponding
interpreter. The interpretation – according to the fallacy – is just a new transformation and we
are trapped in an endless recursion. An intriguing property of the fallacy is its generality: it is
hard to think of a conscious being, which does not have any form of any interpreting function.
Thus, the fallacy is not restricted to humans.
It is our firm belief that any model targeting conscious mental processes, such as declarative
memory, decision-making and planning (and feelings if you like), could be questioned by the
arguments of the fallacy. That is, a constructive route to find the “ghost in the machine” is to
resolve the fallacy first. Our thinking is best expressed by the words of Albert Szent-Györgyi
(1951), the famous Hungarian Nobel Laureate: "There is no real difference between structure
and function; they are the two sides of the same coin. If structure does not tell us anything
about function, it means we have not looked at it correctly."
A resolution of the fallacy
First, we note that there can be more than one route to resolve the fallacy. For example, along
the line of the classical black box modeling, the fallacy does not arise at all (see, e.g., Dennett
(1991)). The price to pay is that black box modeling cannot provide structural explanation and
must resort in the Turing tests.
We claim that the paradox stems from vaguely described procedure of ‘making sense’. The
fallacy arises by saying that the internal representation should make sense. To the best of our
knowledge, this formulation of the fallacy has not yet been questioned except in our previous
works (L rincz, 1997, L rincz et al. 2002a, b). The fallacy was turned upside down by
changing the roles: Not the internal representation but the sensory input, e.g., retinal pattern,
or its transformed forms, should make sense: The input makes sense if the same (or similar)
inputs have been experienced beforehand and if the input can be derived or regenerated by
means of the internal representation (L rincz, 1997, L rincz 1998, L rincz et al., 2002a, b, c).
According to this approach the internal representation interprets the input by (re-)
constructing it.
The idea behind this approach is to execute the infinite recursion in a finite architecture. The
change of the roles gives rise to a reconstructing loop structure. The loop has two
constituents; the top and the bottom. The top part contains the internal representation that, in
turn, generates the reconstructed input via the top-down transformation. The bottom part
computes the difference between the actual input and the reconstructed input. This difference,
the reconstruction error is then used to correct the internal representation via the bottom-up
transformation, which generates (modifies) the reconstructed input and so on. This is a finite
architecture with a converging, but – in principle – endless iteration and the fallacy is
simplified to the problem of stability and convergence. It may be important to note that this
route has nothing to do with mirroring (the external world). The input to the mirror and the
mirror image differ in their material qualities and the mirror has no tool to compare the two
and to engage in any iteration to make corrections. One might say that the internal
representation, which reproduces the input, is a (spatio-temporal) model in a general sense: it
predicts and reproduces (internal and external) sensory information (L rincz et al., 2002a, b,
c).
There are relatively strong (mathematical and computational) constraints on how such a
reconstruction network should work. These constraints severely restrict our freedom in
building such architectures (L rincz 2002b).
A few corollaries of the resolution
We followed the aforementioned constructive route and derived a model (L rincz and
Buzsáki, 2000, L rincz et al., 2000a). The model has some emerging mathematical properties
For example, successful reconstruction trivially requires at least two things:
1. The information content of the input should be accessible for the internal
representation
2. The noise content of the input should not be reconstructed and, in turn, it should not be
available for the internal representation
The first request can be ensured by the maximization of information transfer of the bottom-up
transformation – as it has long been suggested by Attneave (1954) and Barlow (1961). To
achieve this, the bottom-up processing channels should be adjusted on the base of the arriving
inputs. Loosely speaking, Point 2 says that (a) information and noise should be distinguished
and (b) the bottom-up filtering should cancel the noise content. Distinction between
information and noise is based on the degree of their compressibility. The concept of
compressibility is related to the recognition of any organized structure in the input. If the
given architecture is able to compile and interpret the input then it can also provide a more
compact description. While a representation can be even more complex than the represented
subject, it is tacitly assumed that a useful description method should yield compact
representations in order to facilitate the recognition and understanding of higher level
organization. The noise component of the input has no structure or its structure is not
recognizable at the given processing level in the hierarchical system. In contrast, information
has structure and in turn, it can be compressed by highlighting the structure.
What if a novel input arrives? Novel input, by definition, has two properties: (i) the input may
have structure, (ii) the input and the embedded structure has not yet been encountered by the
reconstruction architecture. The bottom-up transformation channels let through the
experienced structural components and filter the non-experienced structural component of the
input. The filtering results in slow reconstruction, which is in contrast to the case of familiar
(learned) inputs, when reconstruction is fast. After adjusting the bottom-up transformation to
enable the transmission of the structure in the novel input, reconstruction becomes faster.
Reconstruction is perfect, if the bottom-up transformed input creates an internal
representation, which is able to reconstruct the structural part of the input. This latter process
requires the tuning of the top-down transformation, too. In the case of perfect reconstruction,
bottom-up and top-down transformations invert each other and no error correction and no
iteration are needed. The system‘s functioning can be seen in a feed-forward manner, where
top-down transformation simply reinforces the bottom-up one. We thus conclude that – in
reconstruction networks – familiarity and novelty are tied to reconstruction speed.
Neurobiological consequences
The model was successfully mapped onto the hippocampus and the adjacent medial temporal
lobe structures (L rincz and Buzsáki, 2000, L rincz et al., 2002a, b). This region is thought to
be responsible for higher order memory (re)-organization. One implicit evidence is that lesion
to this area may give rise to anterograde amnesia in which the ability of learning new things is
impaired, whereas past memories are typically spared (Knowlton and Squire, 1994). The
novelty of our mapping was that starting from a relatively small set of hypotheses many
structural and functional features could be derived. These results may be considered as
indirect predictions of the model. Without further assumptions, we could also show the
emergence of some specific low order memory functions. One intriguing example is a
functional explanation of a specific category learning disorder exhibited by patients of
Alzheimer’s disease (Kéri et al., 2002). In our model, we could also demonstrate by means of
simulations the inherent connection between repetition suppression observed in neural activity
upon repeated presentation of external stimuli and priming (Szirtes and L rincz, 2002,
L rincz et al., 2002b), which is a long-suspected relationship (Miller and Desimone, 1994). A
few direct and falsifying predictions could also be made. These predictions have been
reinforced recently: In accord with the model’s prediction on temporal properties, one specific
feature (large and tunable temporal delaying capabilities) of a peculiar sub-region (the dentate
gyrus) has been observed since then (Henze et al., 2002). Another prediction of the model
concerns temporal integration (that is accumulation of information during a longer time
interval) at the internal representation level. Temporal integration is exhibited, e.g., by the
maintenance of spiking after the excitation stops. This property has been found recently in the
deep layers of the entorhinal cortex (Egorov, et al., 2002)., which is exactly the container of
internal representation suggested by our model. This property can be contrasted to other
layers (e.g., the superficial layer of the entorhinal cortex) where activity self-terminates, as it
was demonstrated by the same work.
All these are preliminary results requiring further investigations. We are also aware that
resolving the fallacy will not explain consciousness. On top of that, it is possible that this
single issue may not even be on the right track in understanding the nature of consciousness.
And yet, the method to follow structural considerations while dropping anthropomorphic
features has already lead to testable predictions.
Summarizing our view, instead of being trapped by the Turing test we suggest seeking other
methods for investigating consciousness. We think that armed with the Turing test alone,
makes us too heavy to move on for two fundamental reasons:
1. The Turing test is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish if “there is a ghost in the
machine”.
2. The Turing test is not capable to provide testable predictions about beings with or
without consciousness. It is challenging to think of better alternatives.
Acknowledgements
We are most grateful to Stevan Harnad for his helpful comments and, in particular, pointing
out the importance of the mirroring problem. This work was supported by the Hungarian
National Science Foundation under Grant No. OTKA 32487.
References
Attneave, F. (1954). Informational aspects of visual perception. Psychol Rev 61:183-193.
Barlow, H.B. (1961). Possible principles underlying the transformation of sensory messages. In: Sensory communication,
Ed.: Rosenblith W.A. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
Dennett, D.C. (1991). Consciousness explained. (Little Brown, New York.)
Egorov, A.V. Hamam, B.N., Fransén E., Hasselmo M.E. & Alonso, A.A. (2002).
Graded persistent activity in entorhinal cortex neurons. Nature 420:173-178.
Harnad, Stevan. (2003). Can a Machine Be Conscious? How?
http://cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00002460/
Harnad, Stevan (1982). Consciousness: An afterthought Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 29-47
Harnad, Stevan (2000a). The Convergence Argument in Mind-Modelling: Scaling up from Toyland to the Total
Turing Test. Psycoloquy: 11,#78
Harnad, Stevan (2000b). Minds, Machines and Turing: The Indistinguishability of Indistinguishables, Journal
of Logic, Language, and Information 9(4):425-445.
Henze, D.A., Wittner, L. & Buzsáki Gy. (2002). Single granule cells reliably discharge targets in the
hippocampal CA3 network in vivo. Nature Neuroscience 5: 790-795
Kéri, Sz., Janka, Z., Benedek, Gy, Aszalós, P., Szatmáry, B., Szirtes, G. & L rincz, A. (2002). Categories,
prototypes and memory systems in Alzheimer'
s disease. Trends in Cognitive Science 6: 132-136, 2002.
Knowlton, B.J. & Squire, L.R. (1993). The learning of natural categories: parallel memory systems for item
memory and category-level knowledge. Science 262: 147-149
L rincz, A. (1997) Towards a unified model of cortical computation II: From control architecture to a model of
consiousness. Neural Network World 7:137-152.
http://people.inf.elte.hu/lorincz/Files/lorincz(APCA2).ps
L rincz, A. (1998). Forming independent components via temporal locking of reconstruction architectures: A
functional model of the hippocampus. Biological Cybernetics, 75:37-47, 1998.
L rincz, A. & Buzsáki, Gy. (2000). Two-phase computational model of the entorhinal-hippocampal region. In:
The parahippocampal region: Implications for neurological and psychiatric diseases. Eds.: Sharfman, H.E.,
Witter, M.P. & Schwarcz, R. (Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 911, 2000) pp. 83-111.
s razor at work: Modeling of the '
homunculus'
.
L rincz, A., Póczos, P., Szirtes, G. & Takács B. (2002a). Ockham'
Brain and Mind 3: 187-220.
http://www.wkap.nl/journals/bam
L rincz, A., Szatmáry B. & Szirtes G. (2002b). Mystery of structure and function of sensory processing areas of
the neocortex: A resolution. Joournal of Computational Neuroscience 13: 187–205, 2002.
http://www.kluweronline.com/issn/0929-5313
L rincz, A., Szirtes, G., Takács, B., Biederman, I. & Vogels R. (2002c). Relating priming and repetition
suppression. International Journal of Neural Systems 12: 187-202.
http://www.worldscinet.com/ijns/ijns.shtml
Miller. E.K., & Desimone, R. (1994). Parallel neuronal mechanisms for short-term memory. Science 263: 520522
Searle, J. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind (Representation and Mind), (MIT Press, Cambridge.)
Searle, J. (1999). Consciousness. http://socrates.berkeley.edu/ jsearle/rtf/Consciousness1.rtf
Szent-Györgyi, A. (1951). Chemistry of Muscular Contraction. (Academic Press Inc. New York)
Szirtes, G. & L rincz, A. (2002). Low level priming as a consequence of perception Connectionist Models of
Cognition and Perception, Proc. of the 7th Neural Computation Workshop, Eds.: J.A. Bullinaria and W. Lowe,
World Scientific, Singapore, NCPW7: 223-235, 2002.
Turing, A.M. (1950) Computing Machinery and Intelligence. Mind 49 433-460 [Reprinted in Minds and
machines. A. Anderson (ed.), Engelwood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964.] |
arXiv:physics/0310154v5 [physics.gen-ph] 5 Sep 2005
A thought experiment on consciousness ⋆
Germano D’Abramo
Istituto di Astrofisica Spaziale e Fisica Cosmica,
Area di Ricerca di Tor Vergata, Roma, Italy.
E-mail: Germano.Dabramo@rm.iasf.cnr.it
Abstract
The Mind-Body Problem, which constitutes the starting point for a large part of
the speculations about consciousness and conscious experience, can be re-stated in
an equivalent way, using the ‘brain duplication’ argument described in this paper.
If we assume that consciousness follows from a peculiar organization of physical
matter and energy, namely that it does not transcend physical reality, then the
brain duplication argument gives a possible interesting physical characterization of
the mind: namely, a sort of extensive interdependence of the brain with the whole
surrounding physical world in giving rise to consciousness.
Key words: mind/body problem, mind, consciousness, physical world
PACS: 01.55.+b
1
Introduction
One of the most fundamental problem in dealing with conscious experiences
and consciousness is the following: if I am able to completely describe the
physical state of my brain (conceding that all the physics necessary to such
description is already known), may I safely say to have completely described
my mental state, my subjective experience too? The point is that my subjective experiences, like for example those of pain, joy or smell (generally referred
to as qualia), seem not to get exhausted in a physical-functional description
of my cerebral states, even in the most complete description we are able to
imagine to. Actually, the description of the physical processes which take place
in my brain, when I experience pain for example, seems not to be a complete
description of my subjective experience of pain; at most, it seems to be only
⋆ Dedicated to the memory of my grandfather Giulio-Fiore.
Preprint submitted to Philosophy Now
First draft: August 2003
a complete description of the cerebral states of my brain during my pain experience.
In other words, it seems that a barrier, impassable to every physical theory,
forbids any complete objective description of subjective experience, or, at least,
every complete objective description of a subjective experience simply does
not include the subjective experience itself. The objective description and the
subjective experience seem to belong to different and ‘orthogonal’ dimensions,
the outside and the inside.
What I have described above briefly summarizes the well-known Mind-Body
Problem, the main ingredient of the philosophical investigations of the mind
and a thorn in the side of physicalism, namely of those who believe in a
complete reduction of consciousness to peculiar physical processes of the brain
(for accessible and exhaustive reviews of the Mind-Body Problem see, for
example, Nagel [1] and Chalmers [2]).
In this paper I provide an equivalent formulation of the Mind–Body Problem,
which I will call the ‘brain duplication’ argument, and I will show that if we
assume that consciousness is in any case a physical process which takes place
in the physical world, in the most general sense of these terms, namely that
it does not transcend physical reality, then the human brain, in giving rise to
the mind, might be characterized by the astonishing property of an extensive
interdependence with the whole surrounding physical world.
2
The ‘brain duplication’ argument
For the sake of thought experiment, let us suppose that we manage to create
an exact, physically identical duplicate of my brain, as it is in this precise
moment. Actually, it does not matter whether we do not known operatively
how to do it. The point is that since at least a brain exists physically, then
nothing forbids us to imagine an identical physical duplicate of it, as well as
nothing forbids us to imagine an identical physical duplicate, atom by atom,
of the sheet of paper on which these words are written, just for the fact that
such sheet of paper exists, even if probably we will never be able to do the
actual duplicate.
Now, just after the creation of this duplicate, how would my own consciousness react? As everyone of you can experience directly, one of the leading
characteristics of consciousness is the perception of its own uniqueness, the
uniqueness of oneself and of its own conscious experience, and, in addition,
the perception of the persistence of such uniqueness (I feel to be myself also
in different periods and different places). Therefore, if I were able to exactly
2
duplicate my brain, would my own consciousness change? And if it changes,
how does it change? Would I feel to be here, where I was before the duplication, but at the same time would I feel to be there, where my brain duplicate
is now?
I believe that the most natural answer for everyone is that I will continue
to be myself as I was before the duplication. But then, who or what is my
exact physical duplicate? If the two brains are physically identical and their
consciousnesses are different, in what do they differ? Here two possible approaches to the problem are presented.
3
Non-physical explanation
Consciousness is not physically reproducible in the reality. Namely it does
not depend on physical reality and it is in some sense ‘outside’ it: thus, distinct conscious experiences and consciousnesses may even be attached to two
physically identical brains, or only one of these brains may be conscious (and
the other one may not; the duplicate brain, for example, might be a so-called
zombie). If it is so, there is not much to do; as a matter of fact, consciousness
would constitute a prime and alien property, to be added to the rest of the
physical properties of the brain.
However, such hypothesis seems to be scientifically frustrating and, after all,
not particularly reasonable. I guess that not many researchers would honestly
feel up to deny any link between consciousness and the physical world (even if
such link is not completely clear from a scientific point of view). Even if we assume that the existence of the brain is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the presence of consciousness, the latter must necessarily have a physical
interaction with the brain, otherwise it would not even make sense to talk
about brain as necessary condition, without speaking about the substantial
amount of data achieved nowadays in the neurosciences on the neural correlates of consciousness. Moreover, matter can act on mind and consciousness, as
any physical and chemical interferences on our state of consciousness can easily demonstrate. So, matter, mind and consciousness have to speak the same
‘language’. And therefore consciousness must be a physically characterizable,
a physically tractable entity.
Such physical entity might be completely internal or external (partially or
totally) to the brain. In the first case we just would have that the exact
physical reproduction of one’s brain would give tout court the consciousness of
that person (and hence, the brain duplication dilemma). If, on the contrary,
this entity were external, it might be one and unique, or there might be many,
one of them corresponding to each consciousness currently existing in the
3
Fig. 1. A naı̈ve sketch of the argument described in the text.
world. Yet, this further distinction is not important in our case: plausibly, two
physically identical brains would always interact in the same way with the
same external physical agent (like two equally tuned radio receivers ‘interact’
always with the same radio station, although there are a lot of different radio
frequencies in the air), and again the brain duplication dilemma would be left
untouched. However, I believe that now this dilemma is ready to be tackled
with the possible physical explanation described in the next section.
4
A possible physical explanation
Let us suppose instead that consciousness depends on physical reality, namely
on the peculiar organization of physical matter and energy, in the most general
sense of these terms, and also let us do not exclude the possibility, suggested
in the previous section, that consciousness originates not only in the physics of
the brain but also through the interaction with an external physical process.
A possible explanation of the seemingly paradoxical picture originated in the
brain duplication argument is that (the evolution of) the cerebral processes
involved in the rise of consciousness might physically depend not only on the
physics of the brain itself but actually also on all the things which physically
surround such brain, in the sense that it depends on the organization of all
the surrounding physical matter and energy.
In such framework, the physically exact copy of my brain, which is in the
region of the space B(xc , yc , zc ), interacts with all the surrounding physical
world, and thus also with my original brain which is in the region of space
B(xo , yo , zo ). Similarly, my own original brain, which is in the region of space
B(xo , yo , zo ), interacts with all the surrounding physical world, and thus also
with the physically exact copy of my brain, which is in B(xc , yc , zc ). Therefore,
4
it is clear (see fig. 1) that the boundary conditions for the two identical brains
are not identical, and the evolution of cerebral states, as well as consciousness,
might not be identical (although the memory of all the past experiences might
be the same in every details for both brains). A similar conclusion on the
possibility of an extensive physical interdependence of the human brain with
the whole surrounding physical world in giving rise to mind has been drawn in
another thought experiment (D’Abramo [3]) but through a different approach
involving the notion of algorithmic complexity.
Note that any finite version of this approach, i.e. that the suggested physical
dependence is only on a finite portion of the surrounding physical world, does
not change much the point. As a matter of fact, the brain+‘finite portion of
physical world’ must be a physically isolated system, i.e. a totally isolated
system. For if it were not, two such systems within two different environments
would eventually lead to the same dilemma on consciousness as before, since
the same consciousness will eventually experience different environments at
the same time. Hence, even in any finite approach, the finite portion of the
surrounding physical world is in fact all the surrounding physical world. Now,
whether there are spatial limits to be understood in the word “all ” used before,
and whether they are posed by the concept of visible universe and finite speed
of light, the discussion of this is beyond the scope of the present note.
Thus, the brain might be far from being a semi-closed box, opened only to the
five senses, and the common perception that our brain does not continuously
interact at a deeper physical level with the rest of the physical world might be
simply wrong. As a loose analogy, if the physical reality were the water of a
sea, our brain would not be like a submarine guided by sonar, rather it would
be more like a soaked sponge.
So far, we have never made mention to how consciousness rises, or to which
are the specific physical ‘mechanisms’ at the basis of consciousness, but this
was not the topic of our paper, other than being a very complicated and longstanding issue (irresolvable at the moment, I think). Rather, I have proposed a
possible physical characterization of consciousness and mind: the uniqueness
of conscious experience and consciousness might depend also on the whole
surrounding physical world, in the sense of the organization of its physical
matter and energy. But, if this were the case, it would be very strange if
the rise itself of consciousness and mind did not depend on the extensive
interaction of the brain with whole surrounding physical world.
By the way, if we do not accept the picture of the extensive physical interaction
between brain and the whole surrounding physical world, but want to maintain
the dependence of mind and consciousness on physical reality, and thus that
mind and consciousness completely arise from the physical organization of
the brain alone, all this would inevitably result in another type of ‘extensive
5
interdependence’, a sort of non-locality: as a matter of fact, after the brain
duplication, the very same mind (the very same person) could be in two very
distant places at the same time.
I believe that talking about the necessary physical mechanisms responsible for
the suggested extensive interaction, and actually talking about the detailed
physical dynamics and evolution of such interaction, is premature at the moment. It might be said (and it was actually said already) that the human
brain may be assimilated to a complex dynamical system, extremely sensitive
to all the surrounding physical conditions (in such case we should mention
the so-called deterministic chaos; see for example Newman [4]), or that quantum mechanics may be deeply involved (many people have proposed various
quantum mechanisms to explain consciousness, so to compile a complete list
of references on this topic is hopeless; see for example Bohm [5] and references
therein), or, most probably, that a new kind of physics is needed. However,
although such aspect of the problem is obviously essential in the study of the
origin of consciousness, it is secondary in the present context.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Alessandro Silvestrini for having brought to my attention the
‘brain duplication’ argument, during a conversation around a coffee table. By
the way, the name of the Cafè was ‘Miró’, thus for the sake of joke, I suggest
to call the argument of this paper ‘the Miró hypothesis’. I am also grateful
to William A. Adams for insightful comments on this paper. I wish to thank
Herbert F. Muller for having posted a previous version of this paper on the
Karl Jaspers Forum Website.
References
[1] Nagel, T., 1987. What Does It All Mean? A Very Short Introduction to
Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
[2] Chalmers, D.J., (December 1995). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific
American, pp. 62–68.
[3] D’Abramo, G., 2005. Some non-conventional ideas about algorithmic complexity,
Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, 25/1, pp. 29–32.
Preprint archive http://arxiv.org/abs/math.HO/0211222
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2004.11.040
[4] Newman, D.V., 1997. Chaos, Emergence, and the Mind-Body Problem.
Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 92, no. 2, pp. 180–196.
6
[5] Bohm, D., 1990. A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter.
Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 271–286.
7 |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 11 | pp. 1087-1112
1087
Fumich, P., The Catuskoti
Article
The Catuskoti
Peter Fumich 1
Abstract
An essential principal to Buddhism is non-dualism. However, the Catuskoti is clearly a system still
immersed in dualism. This sort of dualism is more like that of the dual in Tao. Taken by themselves,
the two relative states contain within themselves the nature of the absolutes. The only thing which
differentiates are the notions both, neither. It is much like the yin and yang symbol. However, more
accurately as we go on we see a fractal emerge. Hence, the ultimate truth, one in which we seem to
conceptually call the more subtle truth is an illusion. The infinite recursion of this extension hints at
an ultimate truth arising at ∞. The conception which takes within it this very fractal nature is truly
enlightened. A truth which is free from dualism is either entirely immersed within dualism, or it lacks
the distinction of truth all together. The use of the Catuskoti serves the purpose to hint ultimately at
a non-truth. Speaking in terms of tautologies and ineffables, we will see the Catuskoti is a conceptual
elaboration of traditional dualism, absolute true and false. While this itself is a conceptual elaboration
of the union of true and false, Sunyata or 0. Sunyata is a conceptual elaboration of itself, which of
course cannot be explained conceptually because then it emerges from non-conceptual Sunyata to
conceptual Sunyata of 0. We can hint at it by saying, as a truth space, the non-conceptual Sunyata
be U, then the set of ineffables of U and tautologies of U forms the conceptual elaboration of U. It
should be clear that careful attention to our use of V4 , the Klein 4 group, will be sufficient to realize
a conceptual grasp of the non-conceptual Sunyata.
1
Building Blocks
1.1
definitions and propositions
Definition 1.1.1. A Truth Space U is a collection of objects with a relation, ∗.
For our purposes, the relation will be addition, which behaves in a truth space as exclusive disjunction 2 .
Prop 1.1.1. A truth space is an algebraic group.
Definition 1.1.2. A truth value is an object within the truth space U, written u.
Hence U={u0 , u1 , ..., un |ui ∗ uj ∈ U }, the truth space U is equal to the set of objects such that there is a
relation defined by ∗. Since the truth space is a group, any relation between two truth values will return
a truth value.
Definition 1.1.3. A truth state is a set of truth values, which are treated as a single object. A set of
truth states will be applied to propositions, truth possessing statements.
Hence, a truth space and a truth value are both truth states, and a truth space can have many truth
states.
Prop 1.1.2. There exist some U which may be constructed from a dualistic view to truth states, which
considers absolute and relative truth states.
The above proposition is one of the linguistic approaches we may take investigating truth. It is purely
conceptual, and without a nature of truth there is nothing to be dualistic. Two truth states which form
a dualistic view are called conjugates.
1 Correspondence: Peter Fumich. Email: pkfumich@gmail.com.
2 This is because all of our truth spaces will be equal to some direct sum of sets of integers.integers, direct sum.
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Definition 1.1.4. A symmetry is a reflection or rotation of a geometric realization of a truth
space U, which preserves the geometric orientation.
Prop 1.1.3. The set of symmetries also forms an algebraic group.
Definition 1.1.5. A negation is any map which under the group operation are their own inverse.
Prop 1.1.4. All reflections, and other 2 cycles of the symmetry group, are negations.
Definition 1.1.6. A partial negation is a symmetry which is not its own inverse. A finite number of
iterations of a partial negation forms a negation.
Hence, if we have a truth space with truth values, then taking a symmetry of the geometric realization
of the space will ‘map’ each truth value to another truth value. For a symmetry which is a negation,
then applying the symmetry twice returns the original orientation. A rotation by π/2 radians is not a
symmetric negation of the truth space Z2 , since it is not even a symmetry. More so, even if one conceived
of rotating by π/2 then it wouldn’t be a negation since π/2 + π/2 = π. π is a reflection(or rotation),
which is a negation, so it π/2 is not a negation itself. However, this will not stop us from rotating spaces
in non-symmetric orientations-such as rotating the square π/4 radians.
Definition 1.1.7. An algebraic negation is a map from one collection of truth values to another in
which the map can be defined by an algebraic operation on each and every truth value, regardless of the
geometric realization(or placement on a matrix). In fact, an algebraic negation can be constructed by
adding an element of the truth space to each truth state. Equivalently, an algebraic negation may be
constructed by adding an element of the set of tautologies to the truth space.
Definition 1.1.8. A tautology is a space in which all dualistic constructed views of a set of truth states
are equal.3
The set of tautologies of U is written {U }
Definition 1.1.9. A proposition whose truth state is not a truth value in the given truth space U is said
to be ineffable in U if for each truth state it is distinct4 and symmetric.5
The set of ineffables of U is written {|U |}.
Prop 1.1.5. Given a truth value v in a truth space V, then we can exponentially expand v with respect to
an integer k, v k =< v, v, v, ..., v > k times, for k ∈ Z. The geometric realization or algebraic realization
of the space should be preserved in the exponential expansion.
Definition 1.1.10. An ineffable negation(partial symmetry)(internal symmetry) is a symmetry of a
truth space U which assigns to each truth value in U a truth state with more than 1 truth value, by an
exponential map proposed above, and then permutes these truth values from one state to another along
some path.
Definition 1.1.11. An Infinitesimal Negation is an ineffable negation, where each truth state has an
infinite number of truth values.
1.2
Examples
The following examples roughly go in order of the definitions and theorems. However, the most developed example presented is section 2, the Catuskoti. For practice applying the previous definitions and
propositions try conceptually elaborating further on some of the following examples.
3 Conjugate pairs are equal
4 Distinct here means that it is not an algebraic expression, it is of the same type of truth value as the other states.
5 Conjugate truth states are conjugate values in some truth space. Equivalently the sum of the conjugate states is equal
to some absolutely true tautology
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Example 1.2.1. Let U=Z2 , where our group operation is addition modulus 2. This defines a space
{0, 1|+}, where 0=false, and 1=true. Notice, 1+1=2=0 mod 2. This is traditional dualism, and Boolean
logic is based of this group.
Example 1.2.2. U could be Zn , for any n ∈ Z. Then 0= false, n=true, and all the other values from 1
to (n-1) are intermediate truth values.
For example, if n=3, we have {0,1,2}, and 1=‘between true and false’. It’s not that it is both, or neither,
rather it’s like a path from 0 to 2, and 1 is just an intermediate value.
Example 1.2.3. Let U be the 4 roots of unity, U={1, i, −i, −1}, but the group operation is multiplication.
As a truth space, these roots of unity under multiplication are equivalent to Z4 under addition.
y
(0, i)
90◦
(−1, 0)
180◦
360
0◦ ◦
(1, 0)
x
270◦
(0, −i)
Both these roots of unity and the values of Z4 can be arranged to form the vertices of the square.
Example 1.2.4. The set of symmetries of Z2 is Z2 . We can see the symmetries by arranging the group
as a line segment with endpoints identified as the truth values. Then, there is a trivial rotation by 0, and
a half rotation or reflection such that the line [0,1] goes to [1,0]
0
1
The non trivial negation takes this geometrical realization and ’maps’ it to
1
0
Example 1.2.5. Let U, truth space, equal the integers mod 3, Z3 ={0, 1, 2}. The 3 values can be arranged
in a euclidean space either along the same line, or to form vertices of a triangle. If it were arranged as a
line, then there would still only be 2 negations, and the intermediate value of 1(between true and false)
is an equilibrium point. That is, under any possible symmetry, it is invariant.
Example 1.2.6. For Z2 , all symmetries are negations. Furthermore, there are only 2 ways of algebraically
negating the space. Adding either 0 or 1 to each truth value in the space forms the two algebraic negations.
On Z2 alone, symmetries are algebraic negations. 0 is the trivial rotation, a rotation by 0 radians. 1 is
our only reflection. In general the algebraic negation is not always a symmetric negation. In fact, if U is
not internally symmetric, then the algebraic negation is not equal to the symmetry of the space. Hence,
if we construct a geometric realization of a space, it would be convenient to have an internally symmetric
space.
Example 1.2.7. For Z3 , there are at most 3 reflections, hence at most 4 negations (including the trivial
negation). There are up to 3 rotations of this space. If there are 3 rotations then the space is geometrically
arranged as an equilateral triangle. Then negations can clearly be seen as permutations of vertices. In
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fact, all reflections are 2 cycles and all rotations are 3 cycles: a 2 cycle is by definition a negation. However,
algebraically negating elements poses a greater difficulty, since the sum of any non-zero element with itself
is non-zero: 1 + 1 = 2, 2 + 2 = 4 = 1 modular 3. Hence, adding an element of the truth space to other
elements does not act as a full negation, rather it acts as a partial negation (see definition 1.1.7). Adding
any element to the space maps the set of truth values to itself. However, adding a truth value twice
does not map each element to itself, hence addition of a truth value is not a full negation. A geometric
realization of this space allows us to conceive of some negations, but they’re inverting a subspace of Z3 .
Hence, there is no negation of the space which permutes each truth state, and iterated twice leaves the
identity.
Let’s say that the space was arranged as a line, again there is only 1 non-trivial symmetry (from example
5). There is only 1 non-trivial symmetry, which fixes 1, but 1 does not remain invariant under algebraic
sums(or partial negations). So, while one could perform any combination of symmetries on this space,
one cannot compute a negation of 1 from the symmetries alone.
Example 1.2.8. Let the truth space U=< 0, 1, 1 >. This is odd, because the truth value 1 arises twice
in two separate truth states. Since U is not internally symmetric, algebraic negations will be different
than symmetrical negations. One way of interpreting this is that the space is Z3 , but the states are only
filled with these two values. Algebraically negating the space can be done by adding an element of Z3 to
each truth state. Given U=< 0, 1, 1 >, U+0=U, U+1=< 1, 0, 0 >, U+2=< 2, 0, 0 >. Notice if we add
an element not in U, but in Z3 , to U the resulting truth space is related to the intersection of the two
spaces.
Example 1.2.9. Z3 has at most 2 partial negations, rotations. If the geometric realization is an equilateral triangle then there are 6 symmetries, 3 rotations(including the trivial symmetry), and 3 reflections.
The two non-trivial rotations are partial negations. Assuming there is such a geometric realization for
this space, then we can write the space as < 0, 1, 2 >
Let any non-trivial rotation be ρ, then ρ(< 0, 1, 2 >) =< 1, 2, 0 >, hence,
ρ(ρ(< 0, 1, 2 >))) = ρ(< 1, 2, 0 >) =< 2, 0, 1 >. Rotating once more will leave us with the identity.
Example 1.2.10. From example 3, the geometric realization of the truth space is a square, with vertexes
identified by truth values. There are a total of 8 symmetries, forming the dihedral group of order 4, we
will see this construction again in section 2, constructing the truth space for the Catuskoti.
Example 1.2.11. Consider the space Z2 , then the space is written < 0, 1 >, and the ineffable states
are | < 0, 1 > | and | < 1, 0 > |. To construct an ineffable negation generally would require tautologies
of the system, and then permuting the truth values of the tautologies to form ineffable states. However,
this space is well behaved, and we can infer that the ineffable negation of the entire space will map each
truth value to one of these ineffable states, given only 2 truth values and only 2 negations. Hence, an
ineffable negation of Z2 =< 0, 1 > is < | < 0, 1 > |, | < 1, 0 > | >. Another ineffable negation would be a
symmetry of this, and hence there are only two ineffable negations of this degree.
These ineffables are ineffable in all Zn for all n.
Example 1.2.12. Given the truth space U=Z4 , 2 and 3 are both intermediate to the extremes of 0 and
1, false and true respectively. 0 and 1 are both absolute truth values, and 2,3 are relative.
Example 1.2.13. Let U=Z2 , there is only 1 diametric set(0 and 1 are perceived dualities), hence only
one constructed view of the truth space to form tautologies. Hence, we may write U as a list of tautologies.
U = {< 0, 0 >, < 1, 1 >}. Notice it is a list of the entire space, not an ineffable.
Example 1.2.14. Infinitesimal Negation: Using Z2 , let limk→+∞ 0k =< 0, 0, ..., 0 >, with infinite
elements, and limk→+∞ 1k =< 1, 1, ..., 1 >.
Notice if in this infinite expansion each index in order represents a modular 2 placement holder, like a
decimal place, then 0=0, but 1 is approximated by 1/21 + 1/22 + ... + 1/2n and negations are adding
infinitesimal numbers. An infinitesimal negation of the space {0, 1} is {< 0, 0, .., 0, 1 >, < 1, 1, ..., 1, 0 >}
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1.3
Logical Extension Theorem
If a proposition was described by an ineffable which has the structure of the truth space, it means the
behavior of the proposition under a map will behave as though the states were actually values in the
truth space. If we add two ineffables then we will add their truth states, and thus their truth values.
However, when we interpret the system again, the discrete value which one may actually interpret isn’t
a truth value, but is an ineffable of the same dimension of the propositions.
If a sentence adds two ineffable symmetries then the sum is equivalent to a sentence with two distinct
propositions, v1 , v2 . If one assigns a truth value to v1 or v2 , it does not describe the behavior of v2 or v1
and the result is a set of truth values. One would have to assign a value to both virtual propositions to
have a result which is a truth value.
Theorem 1.3.1. Given a truth space U0 , then there exists an extension of U0 , E : U0 → U1 where
U1 = {|U0 |} ∪ {U0 }. U1 is the union, ∪, of the set of ineffables with the set of tautologies.
Lemma 1.3.2. Given a truth space Uk , using the above extension, we may extend towards infinity, and
retract to a truth space with no truth values.
Theorem 1.3.3. If a,b ∈ |U |, then a+b ∈ U . In fact a+b is an object describing a phase of a+b. This is
because tautologies can be negations, hence the phase difference is what angle or line of symmetry relates
a and b.
2
Building the Catuskoti as a truth space
The Catuskoti is a method of logic 6 7 . Even though it is not the entire theory that we will call V4 , V4 is
easily apprehended linguistically by the Catuskoti8 . In general, the Catuskoti considers a single proposition, which in itself is composed of known propositions, perhaps more accurately considered dharmas9 ,
since they are atomic and essentially uniform. Furthermore these dharmas, the atomic elements of a
proposition, usually in essence are ineffable themselves.
Example 2.0.1. Brahmic philosophers worded a question to the Buddha fully aware of the general nature of the truth space, connectives, and negations.10 The question is based off of the proposition, ‘The
arhat exists after death‘. The arhat is an enlightened person, but not just any enlightened person. The
arhat is like a flame.11
‘How is it, Gautama? Does Gautama hold that the arhat exists after death, and that this view alone
is true, and every other false?
The Buddha and Vaccha go through all 4 possibilities of this proposition in V4 , and each one is rejected when Vaccha proposes that specific orientation is true. Does the arhat exist after death, does the
arhat not exist after death, does the arhat exist and not exist after death, does the arhat neither exist
nor not exist after death. When they have exhausted all 4, Vaccha is confused, he expected some sort of
true value. That is, he expected to find that the arhat had some true nature after death, or at the very
least know his question was dialectically different. To Vaccha’s perspective, when the Buddha rejects the
absolute duality, the nature of the enlightened being must be a type of relative value, but these too are
6 Is it deductive logic, is it inductive logic, is it both or neither?
7 A category which constructs a logic
8 Mathematics presupposes any conceptual nature of emptiness which is conceptually elaborated by the Catuskoti itself
9 A dharma is a philosophical element in Buddhist philosophy which contains within itself its entire nature. That is, it
does not borrow its nature from any other dharma or from any compounded substance or non-substance.
10 That is the following truth space V .
4
11 There are numerous metaphors which explain the conceptual nature of an arhat
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rejected. Therefore, Vaccha is left without any sort of orientation, the answer to his question is not a
value in his logical system.12 Unknowingly perhaps, his views are still dualistic, and cannot in themselves
get to the essential nature of the arhat. Therefore, it would seem that the nature of the arhat is ineffable,
the truth value is not a truth value in V4 . In what sense is it ineffable? Is it locally ineffable, or is it
globally ineffable? That is, is it ineffable only in V4 or some finite extension of V4 , or is it ineffable in all
possible extensions of V4 ?
We will first attempt to yield the same result he expected. To do this, however, we will use both
exclusive disjunction and inclusive disjunction on our binary parts of the sentence. These disjunctions
are ways of saying ”or”. One reason for this is because the Brahmic philosopher does not seem to ask
other negations,13 principally the partial negation of ρ, the π/2 rotation. Though even if it were asked
as a dual pair, it would be simultaneously rejected. The Brahman expects that if all statements are
asked then they will not all be true, and they will not all be false. Hence, he would most likely consider
exclusive disjunction, and that’s essentially how the dialogue appears. The Buddha will show that the
nature of the Arhat is neither nihilistic nor eternalistic. Either interpretation necessitates the assumption
that the premises are all valid, however as Vaccha asks each, they are simultaneously rejected. However,
this negation does not reject all inclusive disjunctive interpretations since the question added that all
other views were false. If this part of the sentence were left out, one could interpret the system using
inclusive disjunction, and then could look for the possibility that two states are both valid. However, as
we will see because of the Buddha’s response, all possible combinations would be rejected.
We will then explain an interpretation of the Buddha’s position. Before we can do either, we need a truth
space, negations, and 3 connectives.
An essential principal to Buddhism is non-dualism. However, the Catuskoti is clearly a system still
immersed in dualism. This sort of dualism is more like that of the dual in Tao. Taken by themselves,
the two relative states contain within themselves the nature of the absolutes. The only thing which differentiates is the notion of both or neither. 14 . It is much like the yin and yang symbol. However, more
accurately as we go on we see a fractal emerge.15 The infinite recursion of this extension hints at an
ultimate truth arising at ∞. As we approach infinity we arrive at more subtle truths, which conceptually
form an illusion. A truth which is free from dualism is either entirely immersed within dualism, or it lacks
the distinction of truth all together. The use of the Catuskoti serves the purpose to hint ultimately at
a non-truth16 . Speaking in terms of tautologies and ineffables, we will see the Catuskoti is a conceptual
elaboration of traditional dualism, absolute true and false. This itself is a conceptual elaboration of the
union of true and false, Sunyata or 017 . Sunyata is a conceptual elaboration of itself, which of course
cannot be explained conceptually because then it emerges from non-conceptual Sunyata to conceptual
Sunyata of 0. We can hint at it by saying that as a truth space, the non-conceptual Sunyata is labeled
by U, then the set of ineffables of U and tautologies of U forms the conceptual elaboration of U.
It should be clear that careful attention to our use of V4 will be sufficient to realize a conceptual grasp of
the non-conceptual Sunyata.
12 It would have been interesting to read the discourse immersing into partial negations, or infinitesimal negations to find
truth. Hence, they would consider specific ineffables which are constructed from unifying conjugate pairs, for which there is
only 1 to consider, and it is called ρ. Being that this doesn’t arise, one would conclude the Brahmic philosophers themselves
did not conceptually elaborate upon other negations.
13 Which would extend their conception beyond the four truth states.
14 Imagine if we were to say some of true, or some of false. Then we might say, z=some true and some false. Though,
we’re always in a mathematical dualism created by our conjugate pairs, so there is z. Furthermore z or z is tautologously
true. It is in this disjunction that ‘true’ always arises again, and we see it embedded within these truth values.
15 If the first error of dualistic thinking is a circle with one side being black the other white{one is 0 the other is 1, one is
false the other is true}, the second is the Tao,{x and y}, perhaps the next could be viewed as ρ and ρ. Which have within
themselves x and y.
16 Not to be confused with a non-true a negation of a perceived absolute true, or even a negation of a perceived absolute
truth. It is a non-truth of any nature.
17 This conclusion is taken from many authors perception on the relationship between mathematics and Buddhism.
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Example 2.0.2. If Atman18 were some sort of permanent dharma, which existed everywhere undifferentiated and equally, then upon the thought of the conjunction of two things as far as the mind extends
there should equally be that which was called Atman. However, all that is eventually found is emptiness
of 0. The conjunction of an infinite series of aggregates, which may appear different than Atman, will
leave only the essential nature of Atman, since it is assumed that Atman will permeate everywhere the
mind extends. One will come to see, because of x and y, the conjunction of this infinite series leaves 0,
emptiness, unless everything is equal to one non-zero truth value. We come to a reinterpretation of an
empty Atman which is ineffable{in V4 }. For some sentence to be valid from this, all states must be equal
upon further constructions.
Theorem 2.0.4. Let U2 =Z2 , a Boolean logic composed of only true and false equal to 1 and 0 respectively
with respect to addition. Then from theorem 1.1.1 we can define U1 ={| < 1, 0 > |, | < 0, 1 > |} ∪
{< 0, 0 >, < 1, 1 >} = V4 = {x, y, 0, 1|∀a ∈ V4 , a + a = 0, x + y = 1}
Lemma 2.0.5. U3 is the Klein group of order 4, V4 . It also represents the truth space for the Catuskoti,
just as Z2 represented the truth space for Boolean logic.
Also, see examples, 1.1.11 and 1.1.13.
Prop 2.0.1. Linguistically:
0 is absolutely false asatya
1 is tabsolutely true - satya
x is neither true nor false - asamvrti
y is both true and false - samvrti
Below are two tables which show the connectives of exclusive disjunction(+) and conjunction( ) on all
+ 0 x 1 y
0 x 1 y
combinations of truth values.
0
x
1
y
0
x
1
y
x
0
y
1
1
y
0
x
y
1
x
0
0
x
1
y
0
0
0
0
0
x
x
0
0
x
1
y
0
0
y
y
Prop 2.0.2. Geometric Realization of V4
(i) We may notice we can write V4 as vertices of the square since from theorem 2.0.4 we notice they look
like Cartesian coordinates which we join to form a square. x=< 1, 0 > and y=< 0, 1 >.
y
1
0
x
(ii)We can also identify the edges with arrows to designate topological paths, as to relate this square to
the path diagram for the topological space which represents the Klein bottle. This designation can be done
in many ways which are all equivalent. There are two paths, the x and y paths, and the arrows can be
oriented by the relation yxy −1 x.
The above orientation is our standard orientation since it is similar to Cartesian coordinates, and it
is called e0 .
18 Ultimate self, some practices suggest realizing that Atman is essentially God.
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Prop 2.0.3. The group of symmetries of the geometric realization of V4 is formed by the group D4 , where
D4 = {0, ρ, 1, ρ, x, y, τ , σ}. Linguistically:
0 the trivial symmetry, this is a basis for our standard orientation.
ρ is a quarter rotation counter clockwise
1 is a half rotation
ρ is a quarter rotation clockwise
x is a reflection horizontally, thus it has a vertical axis of symmetry
y is a reflection vertically, hence it has a horizontal axis of symmetry
τ is a reflection which leaves 1 and 0 fixed
σ is a reflection which leaves x and y fixed.
τ and σ are especially interesting because they leave either an absolute (0 or 1, false or true) diagonal
or a relative(x or y) fixed while reflecting the other. From this perspective, if we limited our view only
to the absolute so we’re essentially within a Boolean logic, then τ behaves as 0 and σ behaves as the 1
negation.
Prop 2.0.4. The set of symmetries of V4 , {|V4 |}, is written {|V4 |}={e0 , ex , ey , e1 , eρ , eρ , eτ , eσ }. As
matrices:
y 1
e0 =
, This is our standard orientation. Without a choice of a standard orientation we will always
0 x
be at a loss to interpreting
of an argument.
any result
1 y
0 x
x 0
ex =
, ey =
, e1 =
x 0
y 1
1 y
1 x
0 y
x 1
y 0
eρ =
, eρ =
, eτ =
, eσ =
y 0
x 1
0 y
1 x
Prop 2.0.5. D4 may be divided into its negations, and partial negations.
Pure negations: {0, 1, x, y, τ , σ}
Partial negations: {ρ, ρ}
However, pure negations are not pure tautologies in an algebraic sense. Hence the only pure tautologies
are those which relate to V4 , 0, x, y, 1.
One might say a pure tautology is one in which all truth values are the same. Hence τ and σ are not
pure negations in V4 , but act as pure negations for Z2 .
We have constructed a geometric realization of the space, considered the set of tautologies, which under
exclusive disjunction and a proposition represented by a symmetry of |V4 | acts as a negation to the space.
To construct sentences or arguments from these blocks requires the study of maps from one space to
another.
There must be parts or objects to our sentence; these objects are either our propositions represented
by a symmetry of |V4 | or they are tautologous or ineffable objects. An ineffable acts in many respects as
its own proposition, hence we may confine our attention to maps using symmetries of |V4 | and elements
of D4 as tautologies or negations.
3
Maps
Negations and symmetries are maps of truth values to other truth values. In general, a map does not
have to map a truth value to a truth value in the space. A map from e0 to e1 maps each truth value to a
distinct truth value in V4 , hence the map is 1-to-1. We can consider compositions of relations with these
symmetries and negations; this is a further classification of maps and relations. If we continue extending
the logic, as we did from Z2 to V4 , there will continue to arise many nested relations; in fact the degree
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in which these relations are interrelated goes to infinity. However, underlying these following definitions
and propositions on maps is a much greater theory: Category theory. Although we will not formally go
into this right now, further revisions will attempt to bring the notion of category theory in conjunction
with the Catuskoti into a clearer light.
Definition 3.0.1. A map has a domain and a range, such that the domain is composed of truth values
arranged in some truth state or space. The range is the set of truth states given by the map along with
the given domain.
Each truth state in the space is said to be mapped to another truth state in the range.
Negations and symmetries are the simplest maps we will use. They are in fact functions. However,
one must connect a symmetry(or negation) with a truth space(a symmetry of |V4 |). We will introduce
our connectives completely in the next section; however, we will concern ourselves with two algebraic
connectives which will relate negations to a truth space. We have actually seen this already in the
previous section when we presented the set of symmetries of the space. These two connectives are
exclusive disjunction as group addition, and conjunction which behaves as multiplication. Applying an
element of D4 to a truth space via one of these connectives is called a negation, and is very well behaved.
Definition 3.0.2. A map which is 1-to-1 and onto is a function from a truth value to another truth
value. All standard symmetries are functions.
Definition 3.0.3. Absolute truth states are along the diagonal with 0 and 1 in e0 . This may be called
the main diagonal. Relative truth states are along the diagonal with x,y in e0 . Recall from section 1, we
called these conjugates. Below conjugates are defined in terms of negations.
Theorem 3.0.6. Exclusive disjunction negation: Given e0 ∈ |V4 | and n ∈ D4 , then e0 +n=en =n+e0 .
Given n,m ∈ D4 , n+m ∈ D4 , and if n+m=1 then m=n the conjugate of n.
en + en = 1, and en en = 0.
(i) u,v ∈ {|V4 |}, u + v ∈ {V4 }
u = |V4 |n , v = |V4 |m , u + v = (V4 )n+m = n + m = l, l ∈ D4
(ii)u,v ∈ {V4 }, u + v ∈ {V4 }
u = n, v = m, n, m ∈ D4 , then u + v = n + m = l, l ∈ D4
(iii) u ∈ {V4 }, v ∈ {|V4 |}, u + v ∈ {|V4 |}
u = |V4 |n , v = m, n, m ∈ D4 , u + v = |V4 |n+m = |V4 |l
Hence tautologies and ineffables have an interdependent, symmetrical relationship. The sum of an ineffable
and a tautology acts both as an algebraic negation, and as a symmetry.
Periodically the term duality, or dichotomy, may be used. When used with respect to the logic, these
are conjugate pairs. A dualistic form of thinking does not apprehend on one form of dualism over another,
but is in essence always oriented with respect to conjugate pairs. Hence, our entire perspective through
this paper is dualistic. Given a sufficient permutation of dualistic views there arises an awareness of
non-dualism. However, it seems unlikely to communicate in some non-dualistic sense.
Definition 3.0.4. Conjugate pairs are dual forms of perception: dualistic views.
Theorem 3.0.7. Conjunction Negation: Given e0 ∈ |V4 | and n ∈ D4 , then e0 n=en =ne0 .
Given n,m ∈ D4 , nm ∈ D̂4 . en + en = e10 = e0 , and en en = 0. en em = nme0 e0 = nme0 = enm . If m = n̄,
then en em = en en̄ = 0.
This exponential notation was used in example 14, with respect to infinitesimal negations. This may
be slightly confusing, given the exponent is an element of the truth space then it’s a conjunctive negation.
If the exponent was an integer then it behaves as the example, increasing the dimension of the element
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with copies of itself. Hence, raising a truth value to a number equal to the number of elements
in acertain
1 1
block structure is a way of constructing tautologies or certain fractal structures. 14 = 1 =
.
1 1
Definition 3.0.5. D̂4 ={nm|n, m ∈ D4 } = {0, x, 1, y, ρ, ρ̄, τ , σ, τ x , τ y , σ x , σ y }.
x 0
y 0
0 x
0 y
τx =
=xτ =τ x, τ y =
=yτ =τ y, σ x =
=xσ=σx, σ y =
=yσ=σy
0 x
0 y
x 0
y 0
D̂4 is the set of conjugate negation elements which is closed with respect to multiplication.
1 y
x x
y 1
Example 3.0.3. ex + x =
+
=
= e0
x 0
x x
0 x
Looking at the indices we can see clearly x+x=0. On the left hand side we add the x from ex , and the
x from the negation giving 0, hence we have a 0 symmetry of our standard space. We started with an x
symmetry and then negated it.
1 y
x 1
y x
Example 3.0.4. ex + eτ =
+
=
=ρ
x 0
0 y
x y
x + τ = ρ. It can be seen that τ is the composition of the rotation counter clockwise and then the
reflection over x, so the order in which we compose symmetries is very important. Had we constructed
x and then the rotation, it would have been σ not τ which we added to x. τ = ρx = yρ σ = ρy = xρ.
xτ = xρx = ρyx = ρ1 = ρ. These are not negations being multiplied, rather it’s an algebraic way of
writing the geometric relationship. For example, xy is reflected along x and then y, hence our composition
is 1-true. Had it been multiplied, we would have 0.
1 0
0 1
Example 3.0.5. τ + σ =
+
= 1. Notice σ and τ are conjugates.
0 1
1 0
We can use maps to define sequences and series. Recall example 1.1.14: in this example we used an
infinitesimal symmetry on a Boolean logic to create a decimal expansion. Hence, sequences can be used
to construct numbers. In example 1.1.14 we may construct any rational number, and approximate many
others.
Definition 3.0.6. A sequence of V4 , Sn ={v1 , v2 , ..., vn }∀vi ∈ V4 .
Permutations are cyclic sequences, hence 3.0.15 is a permutation of e0 and defines a sequence.
Example 3.0.6. Any symmetry is a function of some state e0 . Consider φ : e0 → (e0 )ρn , n = 0...k, then
each truth value follows the cycle 0,y,1,x,0,y,1,x....
Furthermore, we can see the cycle starting with e0 , {e0 , eρ , e1 , eρ , e0 }.
Now that there is a defined space and maps on the space, we can begin to linguistically describe these
systems. This comes down to how we assign states of truth spaces to a proposition, our choice of maps,
and finally interpreting results.
Prop 3.0.6. A propositional statement may be represented by an element of {|V4 |}, the set of symmetries
of V4 , as either a space or as an ineffable.
While in Boolean logic one only has to consider the position of one truth value to know the choice
of a state, here we must know 2 positions, which are not conjugate pairs. Since every symmetry of V4
has conjugate pairs along diagonals, if we know one horizontal or vertical portion of the matrix then we
know exactly which matrix it is. For example, if we knew the left hand side of e0 , then we know y and 0
(top down). There is no other matrix which has that specific configuration, which represents an ineffable
object, or symmetry of the geometric realization of the truth space.
So, linguistically there is quite the challenge when we wish to chose a state for a proposition. There is
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ultimately nothing which stops us from always assigning e0 as our state unless there is more than one
proposition. Then the orientation of different propositions is very important. If a different orientation
is desired, it is through the disjunction with n, a negation, or conjunction with some n that we have a
different orientation.
The four states may only be investigated through the eight lenses of the Catuskoti, the method of using
the eight symmetries, and a discriminative mind which separates one state from the other. The discriminative mind is perhaps the most important part of the entire process: it is the observer principal in many
cases.19 When we refer to a proposition being ineffable, it means the values are not in V4 . However, saying
a proposition is represented by an ineffable does not mean the proposition too is ineffable. These subtle
differences allow one to interpret results, but also show that without the observer there is no conclusion.
If there is no observer then there is no way of interpreting ineffable results.
Prop 3.0.7. A propositional statement may also be represented by an element of V4 .
This means the proposition is a tautology. While it may be a tautology, it still has 4 states, and
since not all tautologies have the same state for every truth value, one must still be aware of the states
themselves. Notice, it shouldn’t matter
if a proposition was represented by 1, 0, x or y; it’s always true.
x y
But if it were represented by ρ =
, then some truth states are not equal. Specifically the absolute
y x
diagonal is y and the relative is x.
Theorem 3.0.8. All algebraic negations of truth spaces represented by elements of U4 (the extension of
V4 ) are equal to some symmetry of the space. The algebraic negation of a composition of propositions will
not necessarily be equal to a single symmetry.
Theorem 3.0.9. Given a matrix whose elements are truth values of V4 , and has been constructed from
a series of connectives and negations, then if there exists an algebraic negation, there also exists a series
of symmetries on the propositional elements of the space and a series of connectives which is equal to the
negation.
This theorem is difficult to grasp. It suggests that if our argument is constructed purely from the
symmetry group of V4 and standard connectives, then the negation of the sentence can be written as a
series of symmetries of |V4 | connected through a list of negations and connectives. Important examples
of this theorem are expanded upon in the equivalences section 20 .
Two other aspects of the truth space which are important to remember are that V4 , Klein Four group, is
abelian, meaning adding or multiplying two elements does not depend on the order that we add them.
This is important because the extension of V4 forms U4 , a non-abelian group. This commutativity of V4
has a direct relationship to our ability to have a linguistic grasp of the system, or to even perceive the
arising of the systems in a psycho-physical universe. The second aspect to be aware of is absolute and
relative diagonals, the absolute being the one with 0 and 1 in e0 , and the relative is the diagonal with x
and y in e0 . These are preserved under symmetries, hence the absolute diagonal in ex has x and y in it.
3.1
Arguments
Definition 3.1.1. An atomic sentence has one proposition and any number of symmetries or maps on
it.
A molecular sentence has more than 1 proposition and a series of maps.
19 Consider observing a quantum system, the very nature of observing it has a direct effect on the state of the system.
Much in the same way, our conceptual elaboration of anything within this field of observation has a direct effect on how it
will be perceived. That is, none of this arises naturally without the discriminative mind observing the system.
20 If, however, a more transcendental function were used, perhaps a piecewise dynamical system on a number of propositions
whose initial conditions are elements of the symmetry group, then a global negation may not necessarily be so easily
apprehended.
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Definition 3.1.2. An argument is constructed of one or more sentences, each composed of propositions.
An argument has inputs(propositions), and an output(conclusion), a statement to prove.
Prop 3.1.1. If through an argument one concludes n for n ∈ D4 then it is a tautology.
Prop 3.1.2. If through an argument one concludes p and pn , for some proposition p(which can be atomic
or molecular) and n ∈ D4 , then one may conclude ppn =pn̄ .
Definition
3.1.3.
Pertaining
to the above proposition, if n were 1 then it is a tautologous false, since
y 1 x 0
P P1 =
= 0.
0 x 1 y
If n=0 then we have our conclusion
p, since P P0 = P .
y 0
If n=σ then consider τ e0 =
: this is relatively valid, but absolutely invalid.
0 x
If n=τ then our statement is absolutely valid, but relatively invalid.
Proposition 3.1.2, and definition 3.1.3 allow us to construct indirect proofs.
Prop 3.1.3. An indirect proof is constructed from a set {Ai }, a set of assumptions, a statement to show
P, and the indirect assumption Pn . Then along the proof there is some (Aj )m . We can deduce from
21
(Aj )m and Aj : (Aj )(Aj )m =Am̄
j
22
Next we can conclude Pn (Am
j ) is valid or P is valid, or they’re both valid, or neither. . It does not say
that validity is exactly the same as absolutely true, but that there is a type of validity which is simultaneously interpreted as absolutely true(this is based on what our expectation or our center of perception is).
Whichever way, we conclude algebraically P+Pn (Am
j ).
m
It may turn out P+Pn (Am
j ) cancels out leaving just P, or it may somehow leave just Pn (Aj ), or it could
leave some combination of the two. Perhaps the solution is a tautologous false: then our interpretation
of validity is neither true nor false. If it were 1 then it would be both true and false(again pertaining to
validity).
4
Connectives
Definition 4.0.4. Given two propositions A, B which can be represented
V
4 ,we may relate
by the space
y 1
y∗ y 1
1∗
y 1
y 1
0 x
0 x Where the 4
A,B using a connective ∗, such that A ∗ B =
∗
=
0 x
0 x
y 1
y 1
0∗
x∗
0 x
0 x
arrays inside the larger array is B while the 4 truth values written to the left of each array correspond to
the states of A.
In general, we will consider A ∗ B=
(y, y) (y, 1) (1, y) (1, 1)
(y, 0) (y, x) (1, 0) (1, x)
(0, y) (0, 1) (x, y) (x, 1)
(0, 0) (0, x) (x, 0) (x, x)
Such that a*b=(a,b) for a and b ∈ V4 . The horizontal and vertical bars are meant to guide the reader to
see the truth states of A. The four quadrants are the 4 possible states of A. Consider then that B is ineffable, then a proposition composed of A and B will yield an ineffable in that quadrant. Specifically each
21 Notice if m is 1 then m is 0 and we have a tautology of 0, and our usual form of contradiction from Boolean logic. If
m=0 then we have Aj .
22 It should be clear that even our interpretations, a statement of validity, is also dependent on V . In Boolean logic
4
validity was dependent on the truth space Z2
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block is the truth state of the resulting sentence since individual truth values may not be discriminated
against for an ineffable.Depending on the connective, the resulting set of ineffables are not necessarily in
U4 .23
The above matrix is read such that the largest block form refers to A, and the smaller blocks are B.
Furthermore, the first coordinate is A the second coordinate is B. If there were three propositions, the
largest block is A, and the smallest is C. The blocks are always read oriented as e0 :0 is in the lower left,
x to the lower right, and conjugates along diagonals. If one maintains the view of the Cartesian plane,
there will be no difficulty naturally orienting oneself.
If A and B were symmetries of the same proposition, then we would not have a 4x4, we would do
calculations as we did for maps on one proposition.
Definition 4.0.5. Exclusive Disjunction: An exclusively disjunctive sentence is false whenever the
disjunctives
share thesame truth value.
0 x x 0
y 1 1 y
A+B=
y 1 1 y Exclusive disjunction is addition modulus 2 over Z2 in Boolean logic. It is group
0 x x 0
addition here too. We’ve seen this connective through the development of the paper. Notice along every
symmetry it is internally symmetric. Along all geometric symmetries there is a corresponding algebraic
symmetry. We use exclusive disjunction when we consider A or B, but we don’t want the case when their
truth values are identical to be true.
Definition 4.0.6. Conjunction, A and B is false whenever A and B have conjugate truth values. A and
B is true
when thetruth value of A and B are both identical to 1. Conjunction is group multiplication.
y y y 1
0 0 0 x
AB=
0 0 0 x
0 0 0 x
Example 4.0.1. A particle P is moving at velocity, v in meters per second, and is at some location z in
a measured space. And is our connective, and our two propositions are velocity and position.
If this sentence refers to observing this behavior of a particle, then from the uncertainty principle there
exists a probability matrix C such that C is equal to the multiple of C1 and C2 , the probabilities of
measuring an expected velocity or position respectively. However we know C1 +C2 ≤ 1. Since we’re
multiplying the two propositions and we can write C2 in terms of C1 , then there is a closed form for
the sentence, C multiplied by AB. This is not so easily done if we’re adding the two propositions. If the
observation was true, the expected position and velocity were both measured, then one reads the upper
right corner of the matrix AB. Since it is also being multiplied by the probability C, there is a certain
probability this observation will be measured. The probability of this event is ≤ a − a2 , a ≤ 1. If a=0
or 1 we cannot make such an observation because we wont know the velocity or position. If we used
disjunction this relationship would not be observed since one proposition having a probability of 0 would
not cause the resulting sentence to also have a probability of 0. In conjunction it is the case since 0
multiplied by any other number is always 0.
Definition 4.0.7. Inclusive disjunction is another way of saying or, as exclusive disjunction. However,
by adding AB it adds the parts of A+B which normally would have been equal to 0, hence it does not
mod out identical truth values.
23 All connectives are formed from addition and multiplication. Addition is symmetry preserving. In multiplication, 0
causes many values to map to 0, so it’s symmetries are not invertible.
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y
y
A∨B=
y
0
1
1
1
x
1
1
1
x
1
1
=A+B+AB.
1
x
Example 4.0.2. Consider the sentence: Either you’re ‘observing’ this paper, or I am.
Let A=You’re observing this paper, B=I am observing this paper.
There is no doubt that A ∨ B is false only when neither of us are observing the paper. However, by
observing, it must be meant that there are 4 states in which this observation can manifest in a truth
space.
Observing is 1(true) if someone had directly read it, and of course is thinking about it. Observing is
x(neither) if it has never been read, but it has been conceived of in an indirect way. Observing is y(both)
if the paper has been read but the content is not being thought about further. Finally, observing is
0(false) if the paper has never been read, and has not even been conceived.
For each of us, we can observe
the paper
up to those truth values. Saying you observed or I did(or
y 1 1 1
y 1 1 1
us both) is to say A∨B=
y 1 1 1 . Hence as long as I have not forgotten about the paper, it
0 x x x
is always observed to be not false. A nice way of saying this is the paper is existent since it is never
false. It could be x, y, or 1. In fact, of course while I’m writing now it’s true, hence the sentence
is true. If I stop writing, and go for a walk, my perspective goes to x. Of course, as you’re reading
this and I am off on my walk, you could be reading it but not thinking of it at all, so together our
combined(inclusively disjunctive) observation makes the sentence true. I’ve underlined this case in the
matrix above. Just as in the previous example, we could even consider a probability distribution on the
propositions which considers the probability of each truth state arising. What is the chance that at some
time, t, I am reading or writing and apprehending what I am reading or writing? This is the probability
for 1. However, does 0 ever show up from my perspective; is the proposition I am observing this paper
ever false from my perspective? Certainly it isn’t arising now as I write, but I cannot be so certain that I
will also be apprehending as you’re observing this. It may even be fair to suggest that often I am neither
apprehending nor am I reading or writing. If it never did, what would this tell us? To consider all of these
scenarios it is helpful to consider probability matrices for the states of observation. There are two types
of probability matrices. Those which distribute the probability of 1(100%) along all states, and a matrix
which distributes two states of probability along each absolute or relative diagonal. Go to quantification
for more on this.
Definition 4.0.8. Implication has the form: if A then B. In Boolean logic, we know this is equal to not
A or B, using inclusive disjunction. A then B is the value of B when the values are conjugate pairs. Doing
this gives
as Boolean logic, and it allows us to easily construct the bi-conditional.
the same equivalence
1 1 y 1
x x 0 x
A→B=
1 1 y 1 =A1 ∨ B
1 1 y 1
Definition 4.0.9. Biconditional If A and B have the same truth value, then A if and only if B is true.
It is false ifA and B areconjugates, A if and only if B is equal to ‘If A then B and If B then A’.
1 y y 1
x 0 0 x
A ⇐⇒ B=
x 0 0 x=(A → B)(B → A) = (A + B)1 .
1 y y 1
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1
x
Proof.
1
1
5
1
x
1
1
y
0
y
y
1 y
1
1 y
x
1 x 0
1 y
1
1
1
x
1
1
1
x
1
=
x x
1
1
y
0
0
y
y
0
0
y
1
x
= (A + B) + 1 = (A + B)1
x
1
Equivalences
Prop 5.0.4. Commutativity of V4
0 x x 0
y 1 1 y
A+B=B+A. This is easy to prove using our notation. A+B=
y 1 1 y . Taking the lower left hand
0 x x 0
corners of each B block, we construct the B block for B+A. Notice that the main corners
remain
the
0 x x 0
y 1 1 y
same? The (0,A) corner for B+A is e0 . Constructing all corners of B we get B+A=
y 1 1 y .
0 x x 0
We can do the same thing for A B. A B=B A, hence the same can be done for A ∨ B, but not for
A → B. That is A → B 6= B → A.
Prop 5.0.5. It is easy to show A1 ∨ B = A → B, just as we would have in propositional logic.
1 1 y 1
y 1 y 1
x x 0 0
x x 0 0 0 x 0 x x x 0 x
Proof. A1 ∨ B = A → B ⇒
1 1 y y ∨ y 1 y 1 = 1 1 y 1
1 1 y 1
0 x 0 x
1 1 y y
Prop 5.0.6. Law of Transposition: B → A = A1 → B1 .
Proof. Take the proposition
B →
A and rearrange the entries so that it is read with A on the outside
1 y 1 1
1 y 1 1
and B on the inside.
x 0 x x.
1 y 1 1
A1 → B1 means to take the symmetric rotation, 1 negation on both propositions. When performing
operations on a group of premises, one must make sure the order of each block is built in the same way.
Hence, again, A → B 6= B → A.
.
Prop 5.0.7. Rules for Natural Deduction
1) Conjunction Exploitation
AB ∴ A(orB)
Given A and B, then we can deduce either A or B.
2) disjunction Exploitation An ∨ Bm
An̄ (or Bm̄ )
∴ Bm (or An )
3) Conditional Exploitation
A → B, A ∴ B. Given A → B, and the predicate A, then we may conclude B.
Proof. See A → B, if A=1, the upper right corner, and we have e0 =B.
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4) Biconiditional Introduction
A → B, B → A ∴ A ⇐⇒ B
This has been proved in definition 4.0.9.
5) Disjunction Exploitation
A ∨ B, A → C, B → C ∴ C
Proof. 1.A ∨ B = A + B + AB
2.A → C = A1 ∨ C = A1 + C + A1 C
3.B → C = B1 ∨ C = B1 + C + B1 C
4. show C
5. [2][3] ⇒ A1 B1 + A1 C + A1 B1 C + B1 C + C + B1 C + A1 B1 C + A1 C + A1 B1 C
6. = A1 B1 + A1 B1 C + C
7. = (A1 B1 ) ∨ C
8. = (A ∨ B)1 ∨ C
9. ∴ C
Prop 5.0.8. Extended De’Morgans Laws
Let A, B both be represented by some symmetry of e0 , then
1)(A + B)n = A + Bn = An + B
2)(AB)n = A1 ∨ B1 + n
3)(A ∨ B)n = A1 B1 + n
The following proof illustrates algebraically (2), though one can clearly see that it simultaneously would
prove (3), and 1 requires no proof other than inspection.
Proof. (AB)n = A1 ∨ B1 + n24 =A1 + B1 + A1 B1 + AB + ABn̄ + An̄ B + An̄ Bn̄ 25 =A + B + (A + 1)(B +
1) + AB + A(B + n̄) + (A + n̄)B + (A + n̄)(B + n̄)=
=A + B + AB + A + B + 1 + AB + AB + An + AB + Bn + AB + An + Bn + n=
=1 + AB + n = AB + n = (AB)n
Prop 5.0.9. More Rules For Natural Deduction
(1)Conditional disjunction A → B = A1 ∨ B
Look at A1 ∨ B and compare this to A → B. A1 ∨ B is the symmetry taking the larger block structure and
reflecting them along their conjugate element: 1 goes to 0, 0 goes to 1, x goes to y, and y goes to x. The
result is A → B.
(2)Conditional Negation (A → B)n = (A1 ∨ B)n = AB1 + n
Proof. By proposition 2.2.6(1), above, (A → B)n =
= (A1 ∨ B) = (A1 + B + A1 B)n
= (A1 + B) + (A1 B)n =
= (A1 + B) + (A ∨ B1 + n) =
= (A1 + B) + (A + B1 + AB1 + n) = AB1 + n
(3)Bi-conditional negation (A ⇐⇒ B)n = (A + B)n
Proof by inspection.
(4)Conditional Exploitation * A → B, andBn ⇒ A1 Bn + ABBn
24 n = (A + A )(B + B )
n
n
25 AB + n = AB + BA + A B
n
n
n n
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Proof. (A → B)Bn =
=(A1 ∨ B)Bn = (A1 + B + A1 B)Bn =
=(A1 Bn + BBn + A1 BBn ) = (A1 Bn ) + BBn (1 + A1 ) =
=A1 Bn + ABBn
Hence, if n=1 ⇒ A1 B1
(5)Bi-conditional Exploitation A ⇐⇒ B, andAn (orBn ) ⇒ AAn + An B1
Proof. (A ⇐⇒ B)(An ) =
= (A + B)1 An =
= (A + B1 )An =
= AAn + An B1 .
Had we let (A + B)1 = (A1 + B) instead, then
(A + B)1 An = (A1 + B)An = A1 An + BAn
If n=1 ⇒ A1 B1
(6)Disjunction Exploitation A ∨ B, and An (orBn ) ⇒ An (AB1 + B)
Proof. (A ∨ B)An =
= (A + B + AB)An = AAn + BAn + AAn B =
= AAn B1 + BAn =
= An (AB1 + B)
If n=1 ⇒ A1 B
5.1
Deduction Examples
The following arguments are taken from Deduction, by Daniel Bonevac. For all negations, since we don’t
know the negation, we will treat it generally, hence the following examples really are illustrating the
different behavior of negations through a proof structure.
In propositional logic, using a Boolean truth space, we create a contradiction by having a proposition
p and p1 (not p). The conjunction of p and not p is false, which tells us that the multiple of a proposition
and a symmetry of it will let us infer the validity of the system.
Example 5.1.1. Given not q or not p, using inclusive disjunction. Show if p then not q.
Proof. 1) pn ∨ qn = pn → qn from prop 2.2.6(1). If n=1, as we have for Boolean logic, then n=0, hence
we have p → q1 , as we would with Boolean logic.
Example 5.1.2. 1) q ⇐⇒ (qp)
2) show q → p
3) q [Assume by conditional proof]
4) q → (qp) [from 1 and bi-conditional exploitation]
5) qp [from 4 and 3]
6) p [from 5, conjunction exploitation]
Here we have the same result as we would from Boolean logic, of course this is because there were no
negations to shift our perspective from a dual system.
Example 5.1.3. 1)p ⇐⇒ (r ∨ s)
2)pn
3)show rn
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Proof. multiplying 1 and 2 ⇒
4) p1 (r ∨ s)n + (r ∨ s)(r ∨ s)n
5)factor: (r ∨ s)n (p1 + (r ∨ s))
6)(r ∨ s)n = rn sn + n
7)rn (sn + n/rn
8)rn
Example 5.1.4. 1)p ∨ (r ∨ q))
2)rn
3) show p ∨ q
Proof. 4)(p ∨ q)n [Assumption by indirect proof]
5)(p1 q1 + n).[Disjunctive negation exploitation]
The next line requires factoring a p1 , look at the end of section 3 at the division algorithm for an
idea how this may be done.
6)(p1 q1 + n) = p1 (q1 + n/p1 )
If the argument were valid, then p1 6= 0, and we would not divide by 0.
7)p1 [conjunction exploitation]
8)(r ∨ q) [disjunction exploitation, using 1 negation]
9)rn (rq1 + q) [from line 2 and 8]
10)rq1 + q
11)q1 (p1 + n/q1 ) [In the same way we have line 6]
12)q1 [conjunction exploitation line 11]
13)rq1 [disjunction exploitation line 12 and line 10]
14)r
15)rrn = rn̄
Recall we started with an indirect proof, we have shown a partial contradiction, rn̄ .Therefore, we know
(p ∨ q) + (p ∨ q)n rn̄ .
16)p1 rn̄ = rpn̄1 .
17)n̄ + pn̄ This is our contradictory element.
18)[AIP][n̄ + pn̄ ]+[Show]
19)(p ∨ q)n (n̄ + pn̄ )=
20)(p1 q1 + n̄)(n̄ + pn̄ )=
21)n̄p1 q1 + n̄ + pn̄ p1 q1 + n̄pn̄ =
22)n̄(p + 1)q1 + n̄ + pn̄ p1 q1 + n̄pn̄ =
23)pn̄ q1 + q1 n̄ + n̄ + pn̄ p1 q1 + pn̄ =
24)pn̄ q1 + q n̄ + pn̄ q1 p1 + pn̄ =
25)pn̄ q1 p + q n̄ + pn̄ =
26)pn̄ q1 + q n̄ + pn̄ =n̄p(q + 1) + qn̄ + pn̄ = n̄pq + n̄p + n̄q + n̄p =
27)pn̄ 1 + q n̄ =n̄q(p + 1) = n̄qp1
[AIP ][n̄qp1 ] + [show]
28)n̄qp1 + p + q + pq=
29)n̄(p + 1)q + p + q + pq=
30)n̄pq + n̄q + p + q + pq=
31)pq(n̄ + 1) + (n̄ + 1)q + p
32)p ∨ (n̄ + 1)q
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33)p ∨ nq
Example 5.1.5. 1)p → r = p1 ∨ r = p1 + r + p1 r
2)(rp)n = r1 ∨ p1 + n = r1 + p1 + r1 p1 + n̄
3)show pn
4)pn̄ [Assumption by indirect proof]
5)[1 and 2] ⇒ r1 p1 + r1 r + r1 p1 r + p1 p1 + p1 r + p1 p1 r + r1 p1 p1 + r1 p1 r + r1 p1 p1 r + n(p1 ∨ r)
6)(r1 p1 + p1 + p1 r1 + n(p1 ∨ r) =
7)p1 + n̄(p1 ∨ r) =
8)p1 + n̄(p1 + r + p1 r) =
9)p1 + n̄p1 + n̄r + n̄p1 r =
10)np1 + n̄rp =
11)n(p + 1) + (n + 1)rp =
12)np + n + npr + rp =
13)npr1 + (rp + n).
Multiply by pn̄ to get a contradiction from line 13.
14)(npr1 + (rp + n))(p1 + n) =
15)p1 (npr1 ) + p1 (rp) + np1 + npr1 + npr + n =
16)n(p + 1) + np(r + 1) + npr + n =
17)n(p + 1) + nor + np + npr + n =
18)np + n + npr + np + npr + n =
19)0. It’s the holy grail!
20)∴[show]+0[AIP]=[show]=pn
Example 5.1.6. 1)p ⇐⇒ r
2)(u → r)n = ur1 + n̄
3)show pn
4)p[AIP ]
5)r
6)r1 [factored r1 from 2]
7)rr1 = 0
8)∴ pn
Example 5.1.7. 1)p ⇐⇒ r
2)show (pn ∨ qn )n → r
Proof. 3)[assumption by conditional proof] (pn ∨ qn )n =
4)=pn qn + n=
5)=pn (qn + n/pn )
6)pn
[6][1]
7)ppn̄ + pn̄ r1 =
8)pn̄ (p + r + 1) =
9)pn̄ p + pn̄ r + pn̄ =
10)p(p1 + n) + (p + n̄)r + p + n̄ =
11)np + pr + n̄r + p + n̄ =
12)p(r + n + 1) + n̄r1 =
13)pr + n̄p + n̄ + r =
14)rp1 + n̄p1 =
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15)p1 rn̄ =
16)rn̄ This example is interesting because we don’t show r from the conditional, but only have managed
to show rn̄ . If n was the Boolean negation, 1, then n̄ is 0 and we have shown r.
6
Higher order maps
Definition 6.0.1. A map from a truth value to an ineffable truth state is an expansion
This map has been used to extend Z2 to V4 . Furthermore, we extend V4 using this map to U4 , the set
of ineffables and tautologies.
Definition 6.0.2. A map from a a truth state represented by an element of U4 to a truth value in V4 is
a contraction. A map from e0 to v, v ∈ D4 , is a contraction onto v from e0 .
Prop 6.0.1. A specific classification of contraction and expansion maps are 0 − e0 , x − ex , y − ey , 1 −
e1 , ρ − eρ , ρ − eρ , τ − eτ , σ − eσ . Where v-ev means a map which could go either way, as an expansion or
contraction. We will call the expansion map the integral, and the contraction map the standard derivative.
The above relation -, which is the class of contraction and expansion maps above, is a recursion. The
dimension of the matrices is a ratio of the number of copies in each recursion. This allows us to view the
relation as a fractal.
Example 6.0.8. Using the above expansion
map, with
our initial condition v0 = e0 , then v1 is defined
0 x x 0
y 1 1 y
by 0 to e0 , y to ey , x to ex , 1 to e1 . v1 =
y 1 1 y . This looks like the truth space for a sentence ‘A
0 x x 0
or B’, using exclusive disjunction. Let v1 = u0 + u1 . Inductively it’s easy to show that we will continue
adding proposition for each expansion. So, v2 = u0 + u1 + u2 .
There are 4 truth states so there are 4 copies.
y 1
Example 6.0.9. Define a map M : e0 7→
e0 x
Let Fk : M k (e0 ). limk→+∞ creates a space with only one 0, at the 0 state.
This map, like the map above creates a space which could be rewritten in terms of ‘virtual’ objects(these
were the u’s). However, such a closed form
is not so easily
constructed.
y
y
1
1
y y 1 1
y 1
If F0 = e0 , then F1 =
, and F2 =
y 1 x x. We can construct a virtual geometric interpree0 x
0 x x x
tation for F∞ which looks like a triangle constructed from the square of V4 , by drawing a diagonal line
between x and y. Considering two elements, whose structure is like this, which are summed, we inscribe
the second element inside the first like we’ve done with V4 . However, there are 4 triangles created by
doing this, only the 3 which each share one of the original vertices are of importance here. Furthermore,
such a construction can be done by identifying the mid point between two nodes as the sum of those
nodes. Hence, the value at one of the vertices
is always 0. We will denote this triangle as E0 which can
y 1
.
be carefully represented by the matrix
e0 x
R
R
e0 e0
Example 6.0.10. If e0 = u1 + u2 and 0 =
.
R e0 e0
Then there exists a symmetry F such that F ( 0) = u1 + u2 .
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R
∆F ( 0)
R = u0 .
∆∆F ( 0) = 0.
F is defined by identifying block structures in some 4x4 matrix. The center block structure, which has
all conjugate elements in it is mapped to the truth state 1. The four corners are mapped to the 0 state.
The 2 paths from 0 to x and y to 1 are grouped and mapped to the x state. The two paths from 0 to y
and x to 1 are grouped and mapped as one block to the y state.
From the above example we see an elegant relationship between 0 and e0 . The reason for studying this
example is simple: the derivative of 0 is not defined, only the derivative from a state matrix to a negation
matrix. The map F allows us to transition between the two, and thus show that the derivative of each is
both equal to 0.
Prop 6.0.2. Integration is a expansion map, with the same index recursion we have used for division,
and the reoccurring fractal patterns. Differentiation is a contraction map.
The map - which defined the standard contraction and expansion maps is identical to integration and
differentiation of the truth space.
6.1
Ineffable Partial Negations
Given e0 (or some symmetry) a partial reflection of e0 is constructed by a tautology expansion map,
mapping each element of the truth space to a tautology of that element, and then translating the elements
in the direction of the fold. Translating from 0 to the base of the negation. For all partial negations,
the flow of truth elements is, for convention, from relative to absolute diagonals. Reflections are written
er/2k , k ∈ [0, 1, 2, ..., K)
y 1 1 y
y y 1 1
1 y y 1
y y 1 1
=
Example 6.1.1. ex/2 =
0 x x 0
0 0 x x
x 0 0 x
0 0 x x x/2
Rotations of a space, e0 , are written as eπ/2n , n ∈ [0, 1, 2, ..., N )
Rotating counter clockwise, the previous truth state’s relative values are mapped to the absolute values in the next state.
It is rotated such that for even n, the entire relative or absolute diagonal is mapped. While for odd
n, each truth value is mapped one at a time, such that in 2 iterations it would map the entire diagonal
like the rotation which is composed of an even n.
The dimension of the ineffable parts is equal to n/2 + 1, rounded down.
y 1 1 x
1 y x 1
Example 6.1.2. eπ/4 = eρ/2 =
0 y x 0
y 0 0 x
1 1 x x
y 1 1 x
x 0 y 0
1 1 x x 1 y x 1 0 x 0 y 0
Example 6.1.3. consider eρ + eρ/2 =
y y 0 0 + 0 y x 0 =y 0 x 0 =ρ /2 This is
y y 0 0
y 0 0 x
0 y 0 x
the ineffable symmetry defined going the opposite direction, that is from one states relative to its own
absolute, from that absolute to the next state’s relative position.
x y
= ρ = π/2 the angle these two elements are separated by.
Example 6.1.4. eρ/2 + e0ρ/2 =
y x
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y
Example 6.1.5. eρ/8 =
y
0
0
y
1
1
y
y
yρ
0
y 0
0 y
Example 6.1.6. eπ/4 = eρ/2 =
0 x
x 0
y 1 1 1
y y x 1
Example 6.1.7. eρ/4 =
0 y x x
0 0 0 x
1
1 x
1
x 1
x
x
xρ
x
1 y
y 1
x 1
1 x
1
Prop 6.1.1. A partial negation n/2 is defined by v1 + v2 + e0 τ + eo σ for some virtual propositions v1 and
v2 .
Going in the opposite direction, v1 + v2 + e0 σ + e0 τ .
In fact all partial negations can carefully be defined as above. A negation of n/8 is defined by
v1 + v2 + v3 + e0 τ + e0 σ.
6.2
division
Theorem 6.2.1. Using an expansion map,
B/y
Given A,B represented by e0 , then B/A =
B/0
ey e1
B/0 =
e e
0 x
y 1
B/1 =
0 x
B1
B/x
In the section on arguments, we used this function to let us factor truth states from symmetry
objects.The other 8 elements are the elements of U4 in some orientation. These 4 matrices can be
arranged in 4 space to form the vertices of a hyper cube.
7
Quantification
Prop 7.0.1. A sequence can be defined by an expansion map. Furthermore, such a map and the sequence
can define a complex number z such that we assign to each v ∈ V4 a complex number. 0=0, x=1, y=i,
and 1=1+i. Then, for each expansion we divide by 2k where k starts at 0 and goes to infinity.
Example 7.0.1. let {vi } = {1, 1, 1, ..., 1} ⇒ S =
k
P
vi /2i = 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + ... + 1/2k ⇒ limk→+∞ S = 2
i=0
Example 7.0.2. let {vi } = (x)τ k = {x, y, x, ..., } = {1, i, 1, i, ...} ⇒ S =
k
P
vi /2i = 1 + i/2 + 1/4 + ... ⇒
i=0
limk→+∞ S = 4/3(1 + i/2)
Definition 7.0.1. The determinant of e0 (or any symmetry) is written det(e0 )=(x+y)(0+1)=1.
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Definition 7.0.2. The trace of e0 (or any symmetry) is written tr(e0 )=(1+0)+(x+y)=1+1=0
Prop 7.0.2. For some v ∈ {|V4 |}, tr(v)+det(v)=1.
For some v ∈ {V4 }, tr(v)+det(v)=0.
Definition 7.0.3. A coefficient matrix C assigns to each truth state of a proposition a complex number
z. We write
these
complex numbers as a,b,c, and d
d c
let C=
a b
Prop 7.0.3. If a proposition P=e0 , then CP means the coefficient of 0 is a, of x is b, of 1 is c, of y is
d. Hence if a is 0 then P is never false.
e
e1
Prop 7.0.4. If q= y
then the state of q is determined by a, b, c, d .
e0 ex
Here, C is a coefficient matrix on states not necessarily values.
Example 7.0.3. letting C be all 0 except the 1 state would tell us q always has a true state, but that in
itself represents e1 without discrimination of values. If values were to be apprehended, then for all states
except1 all values
are 0, while at 1 the distribution is through the entire set.
0ey 1e1
Cq =
0e0 0ex
Prop 7.0.5. C can be a probability matrix such that det(C)=1. Hence C ∈ {|V4 |} is a probability matrix
with det=1.
Prop 7.0.6. C can be a probability matrix such that tr(C)=1
These two probability matrices allow us to discuss rather interesting properties of systems.
Example 7.0.4. Let a single particle be described by 2 propositions, velocity and position propositions.
Consider a particle is moving at s meters/second. Let this be A.
A particle is observed at position z. Let this be B.
Both A and B have probability matrices CA and CB such that 1 = CA + CB . CA is the probability of
observing the particle move at that velocity, and CB is the probability of observing it at position z. Are
these probability matrices of the type tr(C)=1, or det(C)=1? Given that it is det(C)=1, then:
2/3
1
Let CA =
0
1/3
Consider
the
sentence
AB, given our quantified system, we consider CA ACB B=CA CB AB=
2/9 0 1/3
0
2/3 4/9 1
2/3
BA
0
0 1/9
0
0
0 1/3 2/9
In general, there are up to four quantum numbers for a particle, so a particle should be capable
of being determined with no more than 4 distinct matrices and connectives, and quantified coefficient
matrices.
Prop 7.0.7. A matrix D such that D describes the behavior of a system, such as space time. Combined
with a truth space, or series of connectives allows us to discretely manipulate the system through the truth
space. D is not restricted necessarily by the trace or determinant functions. In fact, a value in D can be
any complex number.
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8
Appendix
8.1
Philosophical examples
Example 8.1.1. If ∃ P, Atman, such that ∀ v ∈ E26 P and v have the essential nature of P. We can
write this as
P v → P = (P v)1 ∨ P = (P v)1 + P + P (P v)1 = P1 ∨ v1 + P + (P1 ∨ v1 )P = P1 + v1 + P1 v1 + P + (P1 +
v1 + P1 v1 )P = P1 + v1 + P1 v1 + P + P v1 = 1 + v1 + v1 (P1 + P ) = 1 + v1 + v1 = 1. Therefore this is a
valid argument. Though, it does clearly state if there is such a P. So now we can investigate based on this
valid statement, as we did in section 2 with respect to Atman. In doing so though, we multiply P(atman)
and v, here we are looking for what unifies them. What do P and v have in common except 0? The
product of an infinite series of v and this P will eventually give just the essential nature of P, which turns
out to be 0. Of course, 0 → P is always valid, regardless of the state of P. However, while analyzing the
condition Pv we see that P must be 0, even if all v were never 0. The only way it could not be the case
is if all v were in fact 1, and P was never 0. This would suggest that there is equivalently only 1 state,
for which P and v share, but it would also suggest that all ’existing’ things are absolutely existing, while
atman is not necessarily absolutely existing. However, we know that all phenomena can be described as
an interaction between x and y. If two phenomena have as their base Atman, then the conjunction of
these two with Atman ought to leave the essential nature of Atman. But, the conjunction of x and y is
always 0, thus, if Atman also exists equally or greater than the phenomena, then the essential nature of
Atman must have truth value 0.
We haven’t determined if any of these phenomena, including Atman, actually have truth values. Thus,
it could be that Atman is more appropriately described by e0 .
Example 8.1.2. Recall, one of our motivating examples was the discussion between Vaccha and the
Buddha on the nature of the Arhat.
First, we use the proposition P=’The arhat exists after death’. Letting P be represented by e0 , we
consider P + P1 + Px + Py = 0
Vaccha expects, as he asks each symmetry of P, to get a true statement for one arrangement. He does
not expect that each propositional arrangement will be simultaneously rejected by the Buddha. If none
were rejected the sentence itself would not be valid, so Vaccha does expect some of these arrangements
to be false. The sentence P + P1 + Px + Py is not valid if all propositions are true. For this reason as
Vaccha states each proposition, he says that all other arrangements are false.
By rejecting the sentence Vaccha could consider that the problem lies in that phrase that all other views
are false.
Even if he considered other views which might not be false, the Buddha would fundamentally reject the
concept since Vaccha holds onto the constructed views of self and existence.
The first problem to analyze is in how he asked the question, as an exclusive disjunctive sentence: If he
rearranged the propositions to be the answer the Buddha gave, i.e ”It is not the case the Arhat exists
after death”=P, and considered a similar exclusive disjunction of these 4 symmetries, the sentence would
still not be valid. If Vaccha assumed that each new proposition was true27 it would still be of the form
P + P1 + Px + Py which is not valid. To be valid, some of these arrangements would still have to be
rejected. This would suggest that the negation used by the Buddha is conditional to the question Vaccha
is asking, and it could then be that the sentence ends up being P+P+P+P, if P represented ”It is not
the case that the arhat exists after death”. This doesn’t tell us much about the nature of the Arhat. But
it does suggest that the nature of the Arhat is conditional to how we conceive of it. Hence the inferred
sentence is valid if and only if we consider different negations in response to Vaccha’s questions.
26 Pertaining to all existing things: There is not one thing which can be conceived of outside of this E. I am flying does
not mean in all realms of conception I am flying, but that the one for which the imagined conception that I am flying am I
flying. For any v ∈ E, v may not reciprocally refer back to E. Clearly we may conceive of virtual place holders in E which
can negate E.
27 By the Buddha’s rejection of the previous statement. Notice this is also a dualistic view
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For now, let’s conclude that the sentence itself is not valid, and that the Buddha has rejected all 4
statements of Vaccha.
It could be that the principal problem was the use of exclusive disjunction, or that all other views
were false. Hence, here we would use inclusive disjunction instead. However, this arrangement is still
an attempt at reevaluating the above interpretation given the reassignment of the Buddha’s answer to
Vaccha as our premises. So, we instead consider the sentence (P + P1 ) ∨ (Px + Py ), which is valid, and can
accommodate the reassignment of the Buddha’s answer to the proposition P. The result ends up being
essentially meaningless because it still supposes that there is a self, and that there is existence pertaining
to self of some form.
When the Buddha says it is not the case, he is simply absolutely rejecting the statement that has arose:
it is not a specific negation, it does not imply a symmetry is absolutely the case,though that is what we
had abstractly considered above. We showed that despite this possibility, it would not yield meaningful
results. Another way of perceiving the rejection is that it is ineffable, the true nature of the Arhat is not
contained within the truth space. Much like our final conclusion for 8.1.1, which was that Atman had
truth value of 0, we cannot be sure that it has any ultimate existence so we conceive of it as e0 . In the
same way the nature of self and existence can be characterized by the ineffable of e0 .
If we instead assigned P=’The arhat exists after death’ the ineffable e0 , then we consider the same sentence
P + P1 + Px + Py . Since each is really an ineffable, treating each of these as distinct propositions we get an
equivalent expression: v 1 + v 2 + v 3 + v 4 . The negations cancel out nicely, and we’re left with the sum of 4
propositions. However, this is equivalent in structure to e0 given the recursive map in proposition 6.0.1.
Hence, the answer to the question becomes similar to the nature of the self. In the previous example
we considered Atman, and suggested the nature of Atman was 0. In reality, we notice that Atman is
ineffable, and not ultimately false.
8.2
Conjunction Negation Table
n
e0
ex
ey
e1
0
0
0
0
0
0 x
x 0
0 x
x 0
x
0 x x 0 0 x x 0
y y
y y
0 0
0 0
y
0 0
0 0
y y
y y
1 e0
ex
ey
e1
ex
e1
n e0
ey
0 y
x y
0 0
x 0
ρ
0 x 0 0 y x y 0
y x
y 0
0 x
0 0
ρ̄
0
0
x
0
0
y
x
y
y 0
1 0
0 0
x 0
τ
0 x 0 0 0 1 0 y
0 1
0 y
0 x
0 0
σ
0 0
x 0
y 0
1 0
8.3
Quantification Tables
Given CA a probability
matrix for a proposition A, and CB a probability matrix for B, such that
ay a1
b
b1
CA =
CB = y
a0 ax
b0 bx
Then we can define the following:
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1112
Fumich, P., The Catuskoti
ay by ay b1 a1 by a1 b1
ay b0 ay bx a1 b0 a1 bx
Definition 8.3.1. CA ACB B = CA CB AB =
a0 by a0 b1 ax by ax b1 AB
a0 b0 a0 bx ax b0 ax bx
y(ay + by ) yay + b1
a1 + yby
a1 + b1
yay
yay + xbx
a1
a1 + xbx
Definition 8.3.2. CA A + CB B=
yby
b1
xax + yby xax + b1
0
xbx
xax
x(ax bx )
Definition 8.3.3. Summing the above 2 definitions,
y(ay + by + ay by ) yay (1 + b1 ) + b1
yay
yay + xbx
CA A∨CB B = CA A+CB B+CA ACB B=
yby
b1
0
xbx
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a1 + yby
a1
xax + yby
xax
a1 + b1 + a1 b1
a1 + xbx + a1 bx
xax + b1 + xb1 ax
x(ax + bx + ax bx )
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| March 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | pp. 194-197
Kaufman, S. E., The Thin Veneer That We Call Reality
194
Realization
The Thin Veneer That We Call Reality
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
What we experience as reality, emotional, mental, and physical, is nothing more than the forms
that arise, like a sort of boundary or etching, as That which is actually there, as That which is
beyond reality, as That which is beyond words, as That which is beyond conception, flows in
relation to Itself and so becomes defined in relation to Itself, and then apprehends as reality the
forms, the etchings, the boundaries, that have arisen within Itself as a result of its flow, as a result
of its movement, as a result of its being, in relation to Itself.
Key Words: veneer, reality, reflection, etching.
Reality is a thin veneer
that lies over and obscures
what is actually there
where reality appears to be.
How thin is the veneer of reality?
As thin as a reflection on a pool of water.
But that reflection can only hide
what lies below
as long as you think
it is what you are.
For when you think
it is what you are
you remain focused upon it
and what is actually there
remains hidden
while still in plain sight.
What is actually there
where reality appears to be?
What is it that remains hidden
while still in plain sight?
Nothing that seems important
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
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Kaufman, S. E., The Thin Veneer That We Call Reality
195
as long as the forms
that you apprehend as and call reality
seem to be of primary importance.
And that is how it remains hidden
while still in plain sight.
Because as long as you identify with the forms
that you apprehend as and call reality,
as long as you think those forms
are what you are,
those forms, those realities,
which are only reflections,
only a thin veneer,
seem more real
than the underlying Actuality
upon which they rest,
seem more real
than the underlying Actuality
by which they are apprehended
and known as reality.
So what is actually there
where reality appears to be?
What is it that remains hidden
while still in plain sight?
It cannot truly be said,
because what is actually there
where the forms
that we call reality
appear to be
is not Itself a form
and so is not Itself a reality.
And yet it Is,
else no form, no reality,
could ever exist,
or be known to exist.
And so what is actually there
where reality appears to be
can only be pointed toward
by saying it is That by which
the forms that you call reality
are apprehended and known as reality.
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196
And it can truly be said
that That which is not Itself a form,
not Itself a reality,
and yet is That by which
all forms are known as reality,
is what you truly are
and is also what you can know yourself to be
once you recognize reality
to be but a reflection,
to be but a thin veneer,
and so turn your attention
away from the reflection
toward what lies below,
toward what was always there
but was hidden
while still in plain sight
while your attention remained focused
upon the forms, upon the reality
that you only thought you were,
upon the forms, upon the reality
that you only seemed to be.
What we experience as reality,
emotional, mental, and physical,
is nothing more than the forms that arise
like a sort of boundary or etching
as That which is actually there,
as That which is beyond reality,
as That which is beyond words,
as That which is beyond conception,
flows in relation to Itself
and so becomes defined in relation to Itself,
and then apprehends as reality
the forms, the etchings, the boundaries,
that have arisen within Itself
as a result of its flow,
as a result of its movement,
as a result of its being,
in relation to Itself.
And so it is not that reality
is not real,
because it is.
It is only that reality
is not really
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Kaufman, S. E., The Thin Veneer That We Call Reality
197
what we are.
Put another way,
it is not the realness of reality
that is in question,
it is only the realness of reality
as what we are
that we need to question.
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The Quantum Mechanics of Being and Its Manifestation1
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education
Pondicherry 605002 India
Abstract
How can quantum mechanics be (i) the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics and
(ii) a probability calculus that presupposes the events to which, and on the basis of which, it assigns
probabilities? The question is answered without invoking knowledge or observers, by interpreting the
necessary distinction between two kinds of physical quantities — unconditionally definite quantities and
quantities that have values only if they are measured — as a distinction between the manifested world and
its manifestation.
Quantum mechanics is seen by many as the fundamental theoretical framework of
contemporary physics. To the extent that the theory is testable, however, it is but a probability
calculus: the so-called quantum state is determined by a preparation of the system (which, as
every experimental physicist knows, includes a classical description of the setup), and it assigns
probabilities to the possible outcomes of any subsequent measurement. A quantum state thus
presupposes not only a classically describable setup but also classically describable outcomeindicating devices with classically describable outcome-indicating properties. Since quantum
mechanics presupposes these things, it cannot be called upon to account for their existence.
How, then, can it be the fundamental theoretical framework of contemporary physics?
One way to dispose of this problem is to deny its existence, either by asserting that quantum
mechanics cannot ultimately be the fundamental theoretical framework for physics or by
denying that quantum mechanics is essentially a probability calculus. Among those who haven’t
yet given up on the challenge to understand what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about
the world, the second option is vastly more popular. It does, however, raise the problem of
objectification, and this has been shown to be insoluble (Busch et al., 1996; Mittelstaedt, 1998).
What measurement theorists mean by “objectification” is the coming into existence of an actual
outcome (as against an entangled state of the system, the apparatus, and possibly the observer)
at the end of a measurement process. Insoluble problems are likely to arise from false
assumptions. In this particular case the false assumption is that quantum mechanics ought to
account for the existence of the events to which it serves to assign probabilities.
Proponents of the many-worlds extravaganza claim to have “solved” this problem by letting the
universe, including observers, split into as many copies of itself as there are outcomes every time
1
Published (without the Appendix) in Cosmology Vol. 24, April 2, 2016:
http://cosmology.com/ConsciousnessUniverse3.html.
While the published paper touches on various ways in which quantum mechanics does not have to do with
consciousness, the Appendix concerns what quantum mechanics has to do with consciousness.
1
something qualifying as a measurement takes place. Suffice it to say that many-worlds
interpretations, like other realist interpretations of the wave function, face a number of issues
that have by no means been resolved (Barrett, 1999; Saunders et al., 2010; Marchildon, 2015).
At the root of all such issues is the problem of conjuring correlata out of correlations or events
out of probabilities of events.
Does it help to invoke the consciousness of the observer or to take the view that quantum
mechanics is an epistemic theory, concerned not with the world per se but with our knowledge
or information about it? What can be rejected at once is the view that nature obeys the unitary
laws of quantum mechanics except when an outcome-indicating property “enters” the
consciousness of an observer. It is not surprising that von Neumann (1931), the inventor of the
tripartite formulation of the process of measurement (consisting of system preparation, unitary
evolution, and objectification), felt compelled to hold this view.
Those who hold with Peierls (1991) that a quantum state “represents our knowledge of the
system we are trying to describe” (original emphasis) are saying two things: a quantum state is a
“compendium of probabilities” (Fuchs and Peres, 2000), which is correct, and probabilities are
inherently epistemic, which isn’t. Until the advent of quantum mechanics all known
probabilities were epistemic; they were ignorance probabilities. We resort to such probabilities
whenever there are unknown matters of fact — matters of fact that would allow us to make
predictions with certainty if they were known. If there are no matters of fact that, if known,
would allow us to make predictions with certainty, the reason we cannot do better than assign
probabilities is not lack of knowledge. This gives us every right to look upon the probabilities we
then assign as objective. (It’s just plain unfortunate that the term “objective probability” came to
be used for something that isn’t a probability, to wit, a relative frequency.)
Here is another reason why (or another sense in which) quantum-mechanical probabilities are
objective. The objects of everyday experience “occupy” space (i.e., they have spatial extent), and
they neither explode nor collapse as soon as they come into being. If quantum mechanics has
anything to say about these objects, it is that they are “made” of finite numbers of particles
which lack spatial extent (quarks and electrons), and which are therefore routinely described as
pointlike. (Three quarks “make” a nucleon; a finite number of nucleons “make” an atomic
nucleus; and a finite number of nuclei and electrons “make” the chair you trust to support you.)
Thanks to quantum mechanics, we also know that the existence of space-occupying objects rests
on the objective fuzziness of their internal relative positions and momenta (Mohrhoff, 2009a,
2011a). The standard term for this fuzziness — “uncertainty” — is seriously misleading, for what
“fluffs out” those objects cannot be anyone’s ignorance of the exact values of their internal
relative positions and momenta. It can only be an objective indeterminacy of these values. What,
then, is the proper way to describe the objective indeterminacy of a physical quantity? It is to
assign probabilities to the possible outcomes of a measurement of this quantity. But if we
quantify objective indeterminacies by means of probability distributions, the probabilities used
for this purpose have every right to be considered objective.
As said, quantum mechanics presupposes outcome-indicating devices with outcome-indicating
properties. This means it requires us to distinguish between two kinds of measurable quantities:
those that have definite values if and only if they are measured, and those that possess definite
2
values whether or not they are measured. In a two-slit experiment, for instance, the slit taken by
a particle has a definite value (left or right) only if it is measured, while the outcome-indicating
property, from which the slit taken by the particle can be inferred (no matter whether anyone is
around to make the inference), has an unconditionally definite value. What is the meaning of
this dualism? What does it tell us about the nature of Nature? Arguably this is the most
profound question raised by the quantum theory.
A possible answer is to invoke the age-old metaphysical distinction between the world as we
know or experience it and the world as it is in itself, and to argue that unconditionally definite
quantities belong to the former while quantities that have values only if they are measured
belong to the latter. Nobody has defended this view more persistently and more consistently
than d’Espagnat (1989, 1995), who distinguished between an empirical reality and a reality
independent of human minds, which is “veiled.” Because quantum mechanics forces us to make
this distinction, he argued, “the full elision of the subject” (Bitbol, 1990) cannot be achieved. We
cannot pretend that quantum mechanics describes a reality independent of human minds.
It is, however, possible to make sense of the necessity of distinguishing between the two kinds of
measurable quantities without invoking consciousness, experience, or the subject. The key is to
view the distinction as a distinction between the manifested world and its manifestation
(Mohrhoff 2014ab, 2016). This view has the further advantage of extending our knowledge
beyond the empirical reality of d’Espagnat, which corresponds to the manifested world. While
the correlata belong to the manifested world, the correlations — those between the outcomes of
measurements made on the same system at different times as well as those between the
outcomes of measurements made on different systems at the same or at different times —
extend our knowledge beyond the manifested world. The possibility of knowledge concerning
the manifestation of the world, moreover, argues against a reduction of objectivity to intersubjectivity. If the objective world would correspond to the experienced world (minus the
position and the time whence it is experienced by a subject), there could be no such knowledge.
So what does quantum mechanics tell us about the manifestation of the world? Let us begin by
considering the following scattering experiment. Initially two identical particles — particles
lacking properties by which they can be distinguished — are found moving northward and
southward, respectively. The next thing we know is that the same two particles are found to be
moving eastward and westward, respectively. The question then is: which incoming particle is
identical with which outgoing particle? It is well known that this question has no answer. The
distinction we make between the two possible identifications cannot be objectified (i.e., cannot
be regarded as corresponding to an objective difference).
Here as elsewhere, unanswerable questions tend to arise from false assumptions. In this
particular case, the question implicitly assumes that we are dealing with two things rather than
with the same thing detected twice — a single entity initially moving both northward and
southward and subsequently moving both eastward and westward. If the incoming particles
(and therefore the outgoing ones as well) are one and the same entity, the question “Which is
which?” can no longer be asked. What needs to be borne in mind here is that quantum
mechanics does not tell us what (if anything) happens between measurements, except other
measurements. As Peres (1984) put it succinctly, “there is no interpolating wave function giving
3
the ‘state of the system’ between measurements.” What’s more, there is no compelling reason to
believe that the intrinsic identity of the two particles ceases when it ceases to have observable
consequences owing to the presence of properties by which they can be distinguished and reindentified. We are free to take the view that all particles in existence are identical in the strong
sense of numerical identity. What presents itself here and now with these properties and what
presents itself there and then with those properties is one and the same entity. I shall refer to it
simply as “Being.”
While fundamental particles are routinely described as pointlike, what is meant is that they lack
internal structure. Lack of internal structure is consistent with either a pointlike form or no form
at all. See Mohrhoff (2014a, Sect. 9) for reasons why fundamental particles ought to be
conceived as formless. But if every fundamental particle in existence is (i) identically the same
Being and (ii) formless, then the shapes of things resolve themselves into reflexive spatial
relations — i.e., relations between Being and Being. By entering into (or entertaining) reflexive
spatial relations (relative positions and relative orientations), Being supports (i) what looks like
a multiplicity of relata if the reflexive quality of the relations is ignored, and (ii) what looks like a
substantial expanse if the spatial quality of the relations is reified.
This way of thinking goes farther in relationism — the doctrine that space and time are a family
of spatial and temporal relations holding among the material constituents of the universe — in
that it affirms that the “ultimate material constituents” are (i) formless and (ii) numerically
identical. It also demolishes the notion that the physical world can be understood in terms of (a
multitude of) ultimate constituents and of the ways they interact and combine. The
manifestation of the world is essentially the manifestation of material forms. Instead of being
constituents of material things and parts of the manifested world, subatomic particles, atoms,
and molecules are instrumental in the manifestation of material forms. They occupy a
(conceptual) position intermediate between Being and the manifested world.
Because the manifestation of the world includes the manifestation of space and time, it cannot
be conceived as a process that takes place in time. We keep looking for the origin of the universe
at the beginning of time, but this is an error of perspective. The origin of the universe is Being,
and the manifestation of the universe is an atemporal transition from undifferentiated Being to
a world that is maximally differentiated spacewise as well as timewise. Maximally but not
completely, for the manifested world is not differentiated “all the way down” (Mohrhoff, 2009a,
Sect. 7; 2011a, Sect. 10; 2014a, Sect. 4).
Here, in brief, is why. A detector is needed not only to indicate the presence of a particle in a
region of space but also — and in the first place — to realize or define a region, so as to make it
possible to attribute to a particle the property of being inside. Speaking more generally, a
macroscopic apparatus is needed not only to indicate the possession of a property by a quantum
system but also — and in the first place — to make a set of properties available for attribution to
the system. In addition, macroscopic clocks are needed to realize attributable times. This, of
course, is vintage Bohr (1935), who rightly insisted that the “procedure of measurement has an
essential influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in
question rests.” But if detectors are needed to realize regions of space, space cannot be
intrinsically partitioned. It is partitioned only to the extent that the requisite detectors are
4
physically possible. Because this extent is limited by the “uncertainty” principle, physical space
cannot be realistically modeled as an actually existing manifold of intrinsically distinct points. In
other words, the spatial differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. And because
macroscopic clocks are needed to realize attributable times, a similar argument leads to the
conclusion that the temporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete as well.
Quantum theory thus reverses the explanatory arrow of both common sense and classical
physics. Instead of allowing us to explain wholes in terms of their interacting parts, it suggests to
us how the multiplicity of the world emerges from an intrinsically undifferentiated Being.
The transition from the unqualified unity of Being to the multiplicity of the macroworld passes
through several stages. Across these stages, the world’s differentiation into distinguishable
regions of space and distinguishable objects with definite properties is being gradually realized.
There is a stage at which Being presents itself as a multitude of formless particles. This stage is
probed by high-energy physics and known to us through correlations between the counterfactual
clicks of imagined detectors, i.e., in terms of transition probabilities between in-states and outstates. There are stages that mark the emergence of form, albeit a type of form that cannot yet be
visualized. The forms of nucleons, nuclei, and atoms can only be mathematically described, as
probability distributions over abstract spaces of increasingly higher dimensions. At energies low
enough for atoms to be stable, it becomes possible to conceive of objects with fixed numbers of
components, and these we describe in terms of correlations between the possible outcomes of
unperformed measurements. The next stage, closest to the manifested world, contains the first
objects with forms that can be visualized — the atomic configurations of molecules — but it is
only the final stage — the manifested, macroscopic world — that contains the actual detector
clicks and the actual measurement outcomes that allow us to test the correlations that quantum
mechanics predicts.
Many of the mysteries surrounding quantum mechanics become clear in this light. Why, after
all, is the general theoretical framework of contemporary physics a probability calculus, and why
are its probabilities assigned to measurement outcomes? If quantum mechanics concerns a
transition through which the differentiation of reality into distinguishable objects and
distinguishable regions of space is gradually realized, the question arises as to how the
intermediate stages are to be described — the stages at which the differentiation is incomplete
and the distinguishability between objects or regions of space is only partially realized. The
answer to this question is that whatever is not completely distinguishable can only be described
by assigning probabilities to what is completely distinguishable, namely, to the different possible
outcomes of a measurement. What is instrumental in the manifestation of the world can only be
described in terms of what happens in the manifested world, or else in terms of correlations
between events that could happen in the manifested world. (Think of the textbook descriptions
of the stationary states of a hydrogen atom, which are correlations between preparations —
measurements determining the atom’s energy, its total angular momentum, and a component of
its angular momentum — and probability distributions assigned on the basis of the outcomes of
these measurements.)
But is it even consistent with quantum mechanics to regard certain measurable quantities as
definite per se? Here is a related question: are there localizable particles? According to a
theorem due to Clifton and Halvorson (2002), there is no quantum state such that the
5
probability of finding a particle in a finite region of space is 1. From this, Clifton and Halvorson
have drawn the conclusion that the experience of detecting particles in finite regions of space is
“illusory” and “strictly fictional.” What they have actually shown is that particles cannot be
localized relative to the spacetime manifold M postulated by quantum field theory. But M is not
where experiments are performed. What is illusory is the notion that attributable positions are
defined by spatial regions of M. Attributable positions are defined by the sensitive regions of
detectors, which, according to said theorem, also cannot be localized in any finite region of
space. What is strictly fictional therefore is M, inasmuch as this cannot be localized relative to
the positions that particles can possess.
The positions of detectors, in turn, are defined by the positions of macroscopic objects
(macroscopic positions, for short). “Macroscopic” is one of the most elusive terms routinely used
by physicists. What makes it possible at last to rigorously define it is that the spatial
differentiation of the world doesn’t go “all the way down” (Mohrhoff 2009a, 2014a). Here is the
argument in brief: In a world that is incompletely differentiated spacewise, the next best thing to
an object with a sharp position is an object whose position probability distribution is and
remains so narrow that there are no detectors with narrower position probability distributions
— detectors that could probe the region over which the object’s position extends. The events by
which the values of macroscopic positions are indicated are therefore correlated in ways that are
consistent with the laws of motion that quantum mechanics yields in the classical limit. (There is
one necessary exception: in order to permit a macroscopic object — the proverbial pointer — to
indicate a measured value, its position must be allowed to change unpredictably if and when it
serves to indicate a measured value.) What makes it possible to treat macroscopic positions as
definite per se is that macroscopic objects follow trajectories that are only counterfactually
indefinite. Their positions are “smeared out” only in relation to an imaginary spatiotemporal
background that is more differentiated than the manifested world. In a word, macroscopic
objects follow definite trajectories because they define what we mean by a (definite) trajectory,
and they have persistent identities because they follow (definite) trajectories.
Appendix
What holds the key to the mysterious presence of consciousness in what appears to be a material
universe is the self-identical Being that constitutes every particle in existence. The root of
consciousness is not to be found in the manifested world, nor in the process of manifestation,
but in that which manifests the world. For Being does not simply manifest the world (by
entering into reflexive spatial relations); Being manifests the world to itself. Being relates to the
world not only as the substance that constitutes it but also as the consciousness that contains it.
It is at once the single substance by which the world exists and the ultimate self or subject for
which it exists.
How, then, are we as conscious beings related to this ultimate self or subject? This question has
been answered in considerable detail and on a solid experiential foundation by the Indian
philosopher (and freedom fighter, and mystic) Sri Aurobindo (Heehs, 2008). In keeping with a
more than millennium-long philosophical tradition (Phillips, 1995), Sri Aurobindo (2005) posits
an Ultimate Reality whose intrinsic nature is (objectively speaking) infinite Quality and
(subjectively speaking) infinite Delight. This has the power to manifest its inherent
6
Quality/Delight in finite forms, and the closest description of this manifestation is that of an allpowerful consciousness creating its own content.
In the native poise of this consciousness, its single self is coextensive with its content and
identical with the substance that constitutes the content. There, but only there, it is true that
esse est percipi (to be is to be perceived).
A first self-modification of this supramental consciousness leads to a poise in which the one self
adopts a multitude of standpoints, localizing itself multiply within the content of its
consciousness and viewing the same in perspective. It is in this secondary poise that the
dimensions of experiential space (viewer-centered depth and lateral extent) come into being. It
is also here that the dichotomy between subject and object, or self and substance, becomes a
reality.
Probably the most adequate description of the process by which the one original self assumes a
multitude of standpoints is that of a multiple concentration of consciousness. A further selfmodification of the original creative consciousness occurs when this multiple concentration
becomes exclusive. We all know the phenomenon of exclusive concentration, when
consciousness is focused on a single object or task, while other goings-on are registered
subconsciously, if at all. A similar phenomenon transforms individuals who are conscious of
their essential identity into individuals who have lost sight of this identity and, as a
consequence, have lost access to the supramental view of things. Their consciousness is mental,
which means not only that it belongs to what appears to be a separate individual but also that it
perceives or presents the world as a multitude of separate objects. Mentally conscious beings
thus come into existence not only by an evolution from seemingly unconscious matter but also,
and in the first place, by a multiple exclusive concentration of the creative consciousness
inherent in Being.
If this multiple exclusive concentration is carried to its logical conclusion, the result is a world
whose inhabitants lack both the ability to generate ideas (which is a function of the principle of
mind) and the power to execute them (which is a function of the principle of life). And since the
latter is also responsible for the existence of individual forms, the result is a world of formless
individuals — the fundamental particles of physics. This is how (from our temporal perspective)
the original creative consciousness came to be “involved” in mind, how mind came to be
“involved” in life, and how life came to be “involved” in formless particles. (If the form of a
material object resolves itself into its internal spatial relations, a fundamental particle, lacking
internal relations, is a formless entity.) And because these principles are involved in formless
particles, matter is capable of evolving life, life is capable of evolving mind, and mental
consciousness can and eventually will evolve the supramental consciousness — the power by
which Being manifests the world.
How does Being manifest a cosmos (rather than pure, indeterministic chaos) in which life and
mind (and supermind) are “involved”? Clearly, Being’s reflexive spatial relations must be
governed by seemingly inflexible laws possibly of a statistical nature. Furthermore, setting the
stage for the drama of evolution calls for objects that are spatially extended (they “occupy”
space) and are sufficiently stable (they neither explode nor collapse as soon as they are formed).
7
Because that stage has been set by carrying the multiple exclusive concentration of
consciousness to its logical conclusion, such objects will be, or will appear to be, “made of” finite
numbers of formless particles — particles that do not “occupy” space. As I have argued
elsewhere (Mohrhoff, 2002, 2009b, 2011b), the existence of such objects not only implies the
validity of quantum mechanics but also goes a long way toward establishing the other welltested laws of contemporary physics (the Standard Model and General Relativity). These laws,
then, are preconditions of the possibility of an evolutionary manifestation of Being — a Being
that relates to the world not only as the substance by which it exists but also as a (supramental)
consciousness for which it exists.
References
Barrett, J. A. (1999). The quantum mechanics of minds and worlds (Oxford University Press,
Oxford).
Bitbol, M. (1990). L’ Elision. Preface to Schrödinger, E., L’esprit et la matière (Seuil, Paris).
Bohr, N. (1935). Quantum mechanics and physical reality. Nature 136, 65.
Busch, P., Lahti, P. J., and Mittelstaedt, P. (1996). The quantum theory of measurement, 2nd
revised edition, Sect. III.6.2 (Springer, Berlin).
Clifton, R., and Halvorson, H. (2002). No place for particles in relativistic quantum theories,
Philos. Sci. 69, 1–28.
D’Espagnat, B. (1989). Reality and the physicist (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
D’Espagnat, B. (1995). Veiled Reality (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA).
Fuchs, C. A., and Peres, A. (2000). Quantum theory needs no ‘interpretation.’ Phys. Today 53
(3), 70–71.
Heehs, P. (2008). The lives of Sri Aurobindo (Columbia University Press, New York).
Marchildon, L. (2015). Multiplicity in Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. Stud.
Hist. Philos. M. P. 52B, 274–284.
Mittelstaedt, P. (1998). The interpretation of quantum mechanics and the measurement process,
Sect. 4.3b. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).
Mohrhoff, U. (2002). Why the laws of physics are just so. Found. Phys. 32 (8), 1313–1324.
Mohrhoff, U. (2009a). Objective probability and quantum fuzziness. Found. Phys. 39 (2), 137–
155.
Mohrhoff, U. (2009b). Quantum mechanics explained. Int. J. Quantum Inf. 7 (1), 435–458.
8
Mohrhoff, U. (2011a). A fuzzy world. In Vision of oneness, edited by Licata, I., and Sakaji, A. J.
(Aracne editrice, Ariccia, Italy), pp. 41–61.
Mohrhoff, U. (2011b). The world according to quantum mechanics: why the laws of physics
make perfect sense after all, Chap. 22 (World Scientific Publishing, Singapore).
Mohrhoff, U. (2014a). Manifesting the quantum world. Found. Phys. 44 (6), 641–677.
Mohrhoff, U. (2014b). Quantum mechanics and the manifestation of the world. Quantum Stud.:
Math. Found. 1 (3–4), 195–202.
Mohrhoff, U. (2016). Quantum mechanics in a new light. Found. Sci. DOI 10.1007/s10699-0169487-6.
Peierls, R. (1991). In defence of ‘measurement.’ Phys. World 4 (1), 19–20.
Peres, A. (1984). What is a state vector? Am. J. Phys. 52, 644–650.
Phillips, S. H. (1995). Classical Indian metaphysics (Open Court, Chicago/La Salle).
Saunders, S., Barrett, J., Kent, A., and Wallace, D. (2010). Many worlds? Everett, quantum
theory, and reality. (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
Sri Aurobindo (2005). The life divine (Sri Aurobindo Ashram Publication Department,
Pondicherry, India).
Von Neumann, J. (1931). Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (Springer, Berlin).
English translation: Mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1955).
9 |
A quantum method to test the existence of consciousness
Rui Qi
Institute of Electronics, Chinese Academy of Sciences
17 Zhongguancun Rd., Beijing, China
E-mail: rg@mail.ie.ac.cn
Introduction
As we know, "Who can be said to be a conscious being?" is one of the hard problems in
present science, and no method has been found to strictly differentiate the conscious being from
the being without consciousness or usual matter. In this paper, we will present a strict physical
method based on revised quantum dynamics to test who can be said to be a conscious being, and
the principle is to use the distinguishability of nonorthogonal single states.
Revised quantum dynamics
As to the evolution of the wave function during quantum measurement, present quantum
theory provides by no means a complete description. The projection postulate is just a makeshift,
while the concrete dynamical process of the projection is undoubtedly one of the most important
unsettled problems in quantum theory. Recently the resulting revised quantum dynamics ( Ghiradi
et al, 1986; Pearle, 1989; Diosi, 1989; Ghiradi et al, 1990; Penrose, 1996; Gao, 1999a; Gao, 2000b;
Gao, 2001b ) are deeply studied, in which the linear evolution equation of the wave function is
replaced by stochastic linear or nonlinear equation. Presently, even if the last theory has not been
found, but one thing is certain for the revised quantum dynamics, i.e. the collapse process is one
kind of dynamical process, and it will take a finite time interval to finish. Our method in this paper
only relies on this common character of revised quantum dynamics.
The method to test the existence of consciousness
Now, we will demonstrate how to test the existence of consciousness in the framework of
revised quantum dynamics. The concrete method is to use the distinguishability of nonorthogonal
single states ( Gao, 1999b; Gao, 2000a; Gao, 2000b; Gao, 2001a).
As we know, the usual measurement using physical measuring device can't distinguish the
nonorthogonal single states in revised quantum dynamics, as well as in present quantum theory.
But, if the physical measuring device is replaced by a conscious being, we will demonstrate that it
may distinguish the nonorthogonal single states in the framework of revised quantum dynamics.
Thus the existence of consciousness can be tested by use of this physical method.
We assume the states to be distinguished are the following nonorthogonal single states ψ1
and ψ1 +ψ2 , and the initial perception state of the conscious being is χ0 . Then after interaction
1
the corresponding entangled state of the whole system is respectively ψ1 χ1
and
ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 , where χ1 and χ2 is respectively the perception state of the observer for the
states ψ1 and ψ2 . We assume the observer satisfies the QSC condition ( Gao Shan, 1999b; Gao
Shan, 2000a), i.e. the perception time of the observer for the definite state ψ1 χ1 , which is
denoted by t P , is shorter than the dynamical collapse time for the superposition state
ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 , which is denoted by t C 1 , and the time difference ∆t = t C - t P is large enough
for the observer to identify. Then the observer can perceive the measured state ψ1 or his own
state χ1 after time interval t P , while for the measured superposition state ψ1 +ψ2 , only after
the time interval t C can the observer perceive the collapse state ψ1 or ψ2 , or his own
corresponding state χ1 or χ2 . Since the observer can also be conscious of the time difference
between t P and t C , he can easily distinguish the measured nonorthogonal single states ψ1
and ψ1 +ψ2 . Thus the distinguishability of the nonorthogonal single states can be used as a
quantum method to differentiate man and machine, or to test the existence of consciousness.
Further discussions
In order to understand the unusual conclusion, we will further analyze the above
demonstrations. As we know, it is still unclear that what the perception of the observer in the
entangled state ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 is. Albert had analyzed the similar situation in detail (Albert,
1999b). He called such quantum observer John. He concluded that John's perception is not the
same as χ1 and χ2 , and denoted that the perception may be very strange. In the following, we
will further demonstrate that the above conclusion is irrelevant to the concrete perception of the
observer in the superposed state.
First, we assume that only after the collapse the definite perception about the input
superposition state can appear, which is a well-accepted fact in quantum mechanics Since the
observer can be aware of his perception instant, he can also be aware of the collapse instant. Then
1
It should be noted that, since the collapse time of a single superposition state is an essentially stochastic variable,
which average value is t c , we should consider the stochastic distribution of the collapse time in a strict sense, i.e.
a small number of single states is needed for practical application. In the following discussions, we always simply
take the collapse time as the average value t c unless state otherwise.
2
when the observer satisfies the above assumed QSC condition, the awareness of collapse instant
will permit him to distinguish the input states ψ1 +ψ2 and ψ1 .
Secondly, we assume that the above well-accepted fact is not true, i.e. the observer can have
some definite perception about the input superposition state before the collapse happens. Now we
will demonstrate that the observer can also be aware of the collapse instant for this situation, thus
the observer can also distinguish the input states ψ1 +ψ2 and ψ1 when satisfying the QSC
condition.
(1). If the definite perception of the observer in the superposed state ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 is
neither χ1 nor χ2 , then the observer can be aware of the collapse instant, since after the
collapse instant the perception turns to be χ1 or χ2 , which is different from that before the
collapse instant, and the observer can be aware of the change of his perception.
(2). If the definite perception of the observer in the superposed state ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 is χ1 ,
then due to the randomness of the collapse result, the observer can still be aware of the collapse
instant for one half of the situations, since after the collapse instant the perception will turn to be
χ2 with probability 1/2.
(3). If the definite perception of the observer in the superposed state ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 is χ2 ,
the demonstration is the same as that of (2).
(4). If the definite perception of the observer in the superposed state ψ1 χ1 +ψ2 χ2 is
random2 , i.e. one time is χ1 , another time is χ2 , then due to the independent randomness of the
collapse process, the observer can still be aware of the collapse instant with non-zero probability,
since the perception after the collapse instant will be different from that before the collapse instant
with non-zero probability.
Thus we have demonstrated that if only the observer satisfies the QSC condition, he can
distinguish the measured nonorthogonal single states. The conclusion is irrelevant to the concrete
perception of the observer in the superposed state.
The rationality of QSC condition
Lastly, we will demonstrate that the QSC condition is not irrational, and can be satisfied in
essence, i.e. there should exist some kind of conscious beings satisfying the condition in Nature.
First, the perception time of the conscious being is mainly determined by the structure of his
perception part, while the dynamical collapse time of the observed superposition state during
perception is mainly determined by the energy ni volved for perception. It is evident that the
2
This presumption may be extremely impossible.
3
structure and energy for perception can’t determine each other uniquely, or we can say, they are
relatively independent. Thus the corresponding perception time and dynamical collapse time are
also relatively independent. Then it is natural for some kind of conscious beings the above QSC
condition is satisfied, and for other conscious beings the above QSC condition is not satisfied.
Secondly, with the natural selection the structure of the perception part of the conscious being
will turn more and more complex, and the perception time will turn shorter and shorter. On the
other hand, the energy involved for perception will turn less and less, and the dynamical collapse
time will turn longer and longer. Then there will appear more conscious beings satisfying the QSC
condition with the natural evolution3 .
In one word, it is reasonable that QSC condition is satisfied by some kind of conscious beings,
i.e. for some kind of conscious beings the perception time for the definite state ψ1 is shorter than
the perception time or dynamical collapse time of the perceived superposition state ψ1 +ψ2 , and
the time difference is large enough for the conscious beings to identify. Thus even if our human
being can not satisfy this condition, other conscious beings may satisfy this condition. In fact,
some evidences have indicated that our human being can satisfy this condition (Duane et al, 1965;
Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al, 1994), for example, the subjects can hold the superposition state for a
long time, say at least several minutes, in the experiments performed by Grinberg-Zylberbaum et
al (Grinberg-Zylberbaum et al, 1994). This denotes that the collapse time of the superposition state,
which is the same as the holding time of the superposition state, is much longer than the
perception time, which is generally in the level of milliseconds.
Conclusions
We show that the conscious being may distinguish the nonorthogonal single states when
satisfying the QSC conditions, while the physical measuring device can't. This indicates that the
distinguishability of nonorthogonal single states can be used to test the existence of consciousness.
References
Albert,D. (1992), Quantum Mechanics and Experience (Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass)
Diosi, L. (1989), ‘Models for universal reduction of macroscopic quantum fluctuations’, Phys. Rev.
A, 40, pp.1165-1174.
Duane, D and Behrendt,T. ‘Extrasensory Electroencephalographic Induction Between Identical
Twins’, (1965), Science, 150, 367
Gao Shan (1999a), ‘The collapse problem can be tackled in terms of new motion of particle’,
LANL e-print physics/9907002.
Gao Shan (1999b), ‘How to realize quantum superluminal communication?’, LANL e-print
quant-ph/9906116.
Gao Shan (2000a), ‘Revised quantum dynamics permits superluminal communication’,
3
Owing to the availability of superluminal communication, satisfying the QSC condition will be undoubtedly
helpful for the existence and evolution of the conscious beings.
4
Quantum-Mind Digest, #002628
Gao Shan (2000b), Quantum Motion and Superluminal Communication (Beijing, Chinese B&T
Publishing House)
Gao Shan (2001a), ‘Can consciousness conquer quantum randomness?’, Quantum-Mind Digest,
#002836
Gao Shan (2001b), ‘From quantum motion to classical motion-seeking the lost reality’, Physics
Essays, Vol 14, No.1.
Ghiradi,G.C, Rimini, A. and Weber, T. (1986), ‘Unified dynamic s for microscopic and
macroscopic systems’, Phys. Rev. D, 34, pp.470-491.
Ghiradi,G.C, Rimini, A. and Weber, T. (1990), ‘A Continuous-spontaneous-reduction model
involving gravity’, Phys. Rev. D, 42, pp.1057-1064.
Grinberg-Zylberbaum, J., Dalaflor, D., Attie,L and Goswami,A. (1994), ‘The
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox in the brain: The transferred potential’, Physics Essays, 7, 422
Pearle, P. (1989), ‘Combining stochastic dynamical state-vector reduction with spontaneous
localization’, Phys. Rev. A 39, pp.2277- 2289.
Penrose, R. (1996), ‘On gravity's role in quantum state reduction’, Gen. Rel. and Grav, 28,
pp.581-600.
5 |
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Kaufman, S. E., The Mythology of Materialism
Realization
The Mythology of Materialism
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
The philosophy of materialism holds that Life arises within an otherwise lifeless universe. And
so it is that Consciousness, when viewed through that lens, must be seen as a by-product, as an
accident, as something that only arises through the chance interaction of otherwise lifeless matter
that by chance happens to be involved in the process we call life. However, as there is nothing in
the apple that is not first in the tree from which it grows, there is nothing in us that is not first in
the Universe out of which we grow. Thus, Life seems to arise from within the Universe because
the Universe is already Alive, and Consciousness seems to arise out of Life because the Universe
is already Conscious.
Key Words: mythology, materialism, Consciousness, life, Universe.
The modern day mythology
that is the philosophy of materialism
holds that Life arises
within an otherwise lifeless universe.
In our modern world
this mythology
is as pervasive
as the air we breath.
And although it is just a mythology,
just a set of experiences,
arranged in a particular way
to form what is only an idea
of the nature of reality
and how the universe is,
it has been mistaken for fact
and so has been mistaken
for how the universe actually is.
This is called mistaking the map
for the terrain.
And so we see Life
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
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only where we see the ability
to organically reproduce.
And we see Consciousness
only where we see organic reproduction
produce humanity.
And so Life,
seen through the mythological lens
we call materialism,
becomes a by-product,
an accident,
something that only arises
through the chance interaction
of otherwise lifeless matter.
And so it is that Consciousness,
when viewed through that same lens,
must be seen as a by-product,
as an accident,
as something that only arises
through the chance interaction
of otherwise lifeless matter
that by chance happens to be involved
in the process we call life.
If materialism were actually true
how pointless our lives would be
and suicide would be
the only reasonable action
one could ever take.
If what we are is only an illusion,
then all that we actually live for,
love and joy and happiness,
must itself be only an illusion,
a shadow that appears on a wall
purely by chance.
And if that is true
then nothing is gained by living
and so nothing is lost by dying.
Why suffer day in and day out
for moments of fleeting happiness?
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For the sake of the children?
But they too, according to materialism,
don't actually exist either
any more than we do.
One shadow living and suffering,
and finding occasional happiness,
by keeping another shadow going,
who then lives and suffers,
and finds some happiness,
by giving birth to another shadow,
who then lives and suffers,
and finds some happiness….
And on and on it goes,
without any end,
and without any real point.
A completely pointless journey,
because according to materialism
there is really no one on the journey,
just a shadow
we call our Consciousness,
just an accident
we refer to as I.
But life is not pointless
because what we call our Consciousness
is not a shadow,
and what we refer to as I
is not an accident.
What we are is Life,
what we are is Consciousness,
but what we are does not arise
at the very peak of what materialism tells us
is a randomly evolving universe.
What we are is the Consciousness
that is Itself evolving
into the ever expanding Tree of Life,
which when viewed looking outward
from where we humans grow,
appears as the material universe,
and when viewed looking inward
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from that same position,
appears as the mental universe.
But both appearances are deceiving,
the material and the mental,
because all that is really there
is the Consciousness that creates both,
and apprehends both,
as it Flows in relation to Itself,
and so Grows into Itself.
As there is nothing in the apple
that is not first in the tree
from which it grows,
there is nothing in us
that is not first in the Universe
out of which we grow.
Life seems to arise
from within the Universe
because the Universe
is already Alive.
And Consciousness seems to arise
out of Life
because the Universe
is already Conscious.
Why would you believe otherwise?
Why would you conceive as yourself
as having attributes
that are separate and apart
from the Universe
out of which you grow,
like a fruit on a tree?
Because you were weaned on a mythology
that was created through the dissection
of the indivisible Universe,
the indivisible Life that you Are,
into seemingly separate parts.
When you dissect an organism
the Life that was there
animating the organism
seems to vanish.
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And when you dissect the Universe
the Life that is there
animating the cosmic organism
we call the Universe
also seems to vanish.
But that Life is still there,
you just don't recognize it
because you have been told
it is something else,
something accidental,
something less real
than the objects It perceives.
I could say again what It is,
but I won't,
because It is not that,
not a word,
not a form,
not a thought,
not an object.
But I will point toward It
by saying that,
in the absence of It
no word,
no form,
no thought,
no object,
is ever known.
Realize what you are
and you will see your Self
in everything
and so everywhere,
or keep listening
to the siren song of materialism,
and continue to see yourself
in nothing
and so nowhere.
When the map one is using
accurately reflects the terrain,
then even while mistaking
one for the other,
one may still arrive
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where one intended to go
when the journey began.
But when the map one is using
bears little relation to the terrain,
then in mistaking one for the other
losing one's way
becomes inevitable.
The map of materialism,
which humanity continues to use
in this journey that we are on,
bears very little relation
to the indivisible Universe,
to the intrinsically Alive Universe,
to the intrinsically Conscious Universe,
it pretends to describe.
Is it any wonder then
why the particular fruit of the Universe
that we call humanity
seems to have lost its way?
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arXiv:0712.3609v1 [physics.gen-ph] 21 Dec 2007
Postcorrection and mathematical model of life
in Extended Everett’s Concept
Michael B. Mensky
P.N. Lebedev Physical Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences
53 Leninsky prosp., 119991 Moscow, Russia
August 20, 2007
Abstract
Extended Everett’s Concept (EEC) recently developed by the author to explain the phenomenon of consciousness is considered. A
mathematical model is proposed for the principal feature of consciousness assumed in EEC, namely its ability (in the state of sleep, trance
or meditation, when the explicit consciousness is disabled) to obtain
information from all alternative classical realities (Everett’s worlds)
and select the favorable realities. To represent this ability, a mathematical operation called postcorrection is introduced, which corrects
the present state to guarantee certain characteristics of the future
state. Evolution of living matter is thus determined by goals (first
of all by the goal of survival) as well as by causes. The resulting
theory, in a way symmetrical in time direction, follows from a sort of
antropic principle. Possible criteria for postcorrection and corresponding phenomena in the sphere of life are classified. Both individual and
collective criteria of survival are considered as well as the criteria providing certain quality of life and those which are irrelevant to the life
quality. The phenomena of free will and direct sighting of truth (e.g.
scientific insight) are explained in these terms. The problem of artificial intellect and the role of brain look differently in the framework of
this theory. Automats may perform intellectual operations, but not
postcorrection, therefore artificial intellect but not an artificial life can
be created. The brain serves as an interface between the body and
consciousness, but the most profound level of consciousness is not a
function of brain.
Keywords: Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics; consciousness;
life; antropic principle; poscorrection
1
1
Introduction
From the time of creation of quantum mechanics up to now conceptual problems of this theory, or quantum paradoxes, are not solved. They are often formulated as the problem of measurement. Various interpretations of quantum
mechanics are nothing else than attempts to solve this problem. The origin
of the measurement problem is the fact that, contrary to classical physics,
consciousness of an observer plays an important role in quantum mechanics
(this difference may be formulated as the difference between classical and
quantum concepts of reality). This allowed for the author to suggest the theory of consciousness called Extended Everett’s Concept (EEC) starting from
the principal points of quantum mechanics. Here we shall introduce a mathematical model for this theory and discuss some principal issues resulting
from it.
The reasoning applied in EEC is following (see Sect. 2 for detail):
1) Commonly accepted Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics includes the reduction postulate declaring that a quantum system’s state
is converted, after a measurement, into one of the alternative states corresponding to the alternative measurement outputs (readouts). This postulate
contradicts to linearity of quantum mechanics: the state of the measuring
device and the measured system should, in linear theory, include all the
alternatives as the components of the superposition. In the interpretation
suggested by Hew Everett [1, 2] the linearity was taken as a basic principle
and therefore all alternatives were assumed to coexist (to be equally real).
To explain, why any real observer always watches only a single alternative,
it was assumed that “many classical worlds” (corresponding to various alternatives) exist or, equivalently, that the observer’s consciousness separates
the alternatives from each other (subjectively the observer, when watching
some alternative, cannot watch the others).
2)In the Extended Everett’s Concept (EEC) proposed by the author
[3, 4, 5, 6], the observer’s explicit consciousness is identified with separating
alternatives. This simplifies the logical structure of the theory and results in
new consequences: when the explicit consciousness is disabled (in the states
similar to sleep, trance or meditation) one acquires a sort of “superconsciousness” being able to take information from all alternatives, compare them with
each other and choose the favorable one. This allows one to explain the well
known phenomena of free will, absolute necessity of sleep, as well as such
unusual phenomena as direct sighting the truth (e.g. scientific insights) and
even “control of reality” in the form of “probabilistic miracles”.
According to EEC, the principal feature of consciousness (of human and,
more generally, of any living being) is its ability, overcoming the separation of
2
the alternatives, to follow each of them up to the distant time moment in the
future, find what alternatives provide survival and choose these alternatives
excluding the rest. The evolution of living matter is thus determined not
only by causes, but also by the goals, first of all by the goals of survival and
improvement of the quality of life.
In the present paper we shall introduce the mathematical formalism describing this principal feature of living matter (of its consciousness): the
ability to correct its state making use of the information (about the efficient
way of survival) obtained from the future. It will be assumed that the evolution of living matter includes the correction providing survival at distant
time moments. This correction leaves in the sphere of life only those scenarios of evolution which are favorable for life. Unfavorable scenarios do not
disappear from the (quantum) reality but are left outside the sphere of life
(are absent in the picture appearing in the consciousness).
This correction (selection of favorable scenarios) is represented by the
special mathematical operation which is called postcorrection. It corrects the
present state of the system in such a way that its future state satisfies a
certain criterion.
After defining the operation of postcorrection, various criteria for postcorrection are considered as well as the corresponding aspects of the phenomenon of life. In particular, a simple mathematical model of a collective
criterion of survival is proposed, and the important role played by collective
criteria shortly discussed. Stronger criteria providing not only survival but
also certain levels of the quality of life, are discussed. It is argued that the
postcorrection is possible also according to such criteria which are insignificant for life. Such phenomena as free will and direct sighting of truth may
be explained by the action of postcorrection performed according to such
criteria.
The paper is organized in the following way. After a short sketch of EEC
given in Sect. 2, the operation of postcorrection is defined and the simplest
but most important criterion of survival considered in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 a
simple example of the collective criterion of survival is given. Various criteria
for postcorrection, their classification and the corresponding aspects of the
phenomenon of life are discussed. At last, Sect. 6 supplies comments on the
whole theory. In particular, deep analogy of the postcorrection (providing
survival) with the antropic principle is analyzed.
3
2
Extended Everett’s Concept (EEC)
The “many-worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Everett in 1957 [1] has as its starting point linearity of quantum mechanics.
The von Neumann’s reduction postulate is rejected in this interpretation,
and therefore all components of the superposition which correspond to the
alternative outputs of a measurement are presented in the measured system’s
and measuring device’s state after the measurement (the only change of the
state is entanglement of the measured system with the measuring device).
This suggests that the classical alternatives corresponding to various measurement outputs coexist, even though they are conventionally considered to
be inconsistent (alternative).
Remark 1 The conclusion about coexistence of various alternatives is made
in the Everett’s concept in the course of analysis of the procedure of a quantum measurement. In order to go over to EEC, this conclusion has to be
considered in a more general context. It is not important that the alternatives may appear as a result of a measurement. The only essential issue is
that the state of our (quantum) world may have the form of a superposition,
the components of which represent distinct classical pictures. According to
Everett, all these “classical alternatives” are equally real (coexist). For making the status of these alternative pictures of the world more transparent, they
are often called “Everett’s worlds” [2], the term “many-worlds interpretation”
resulting from this.
Thus, coexistence of the classical alternatives is predicted by the Everett’s
concept. However, real observers never see any evidence of this coexistence,
always watching only a single alternative. In order to explain this real experience in the framework of the Everett’s concept, one has to assume that
the classical alternatives are separated (disconnected) from each other in the
observer’s consciousness. Then, despite of all alternatives being equally real,
an observer, when watching in his (explicit) consciousness one of them, cannot watch at the same time the others. The alternatives coexist but are not
“co-observable”.
The statement “the consciousness separates the alternatives” which is
characteristic of the Everett’s interpretation has been replaced in the Extended Everett’s Concept (EEC) [3, 4, 5, 6] with the stronger one: “the
phenomenon of (explicit) consciousness is nothing else than the separation
of the alternatives”. Such change of the theory simplifies its logical structure, since two unclear (may be even non-definable) notions are identified
with each other and therefore “explain each other”. These are the notion of
4
“consciousness” in psychology and the notion of “alternatives’ separation”
in quantum physics.
Besides simplifying the logical structure of the theory, this identification
results in new very interesting conclusions. In quantum mechanics it becomes
clear, in the light of the above identification, why the alternatives are classical
(because the classical world is “locally predictable” and therefore appropriate
for habitation). In psychology it becomes clear why free will is possible and
why sleep is absolutely necessary for support of life. Moreover, the strange
things characteristic of consciousness, such as direct sighting (revelation)
of truth and probabilistic miracles (realization, by the willpower, of events
having very low probabilities) may be explained [4, 5, 6].
All these conclusions result from the following argument. If the (explicit)
consciousness is identical to the separation of the alternatives, then its disappearance (i.e. the transition to unconscious, for example in sleep, trance
or meditation) means disappearance (or weakening) of this separation. The
consciousness stops to watch the world’s state as separated in classical alternatives, but begins to perceive (in some sense or another) this state as a
whole. The consciousness stops to watch continuous “developing” alternative
scenarios, but views instead the reversible evolution of the quantum world
i.e. actually four-dimensional image of the world in which all time moments
are treated on equal footing.
In other words, when the explicit consciousness is disabled (in the regime
of unconscious), the (implicit) consciousness witnesses, instead of the usual
classical world, something quite different, including particularly all classical
scenarios in all time moments. Such an image of the world can serve as
an enormous “data base” allowing particularly comparing various alternative scenarios between each other. This data base may be used first of all
for support of life. Indeed, usage of this data base makes possible selecting
those scenarios which are favorable for life, i.e. provide survival. Addressing this data base may be performed periodically (for example, in sleep) or
even permanently (since many processes in living organisms are regulated
unconsciously, with no participation of the explicit consciousness).
In the next sections we shall suggest a mathematical formalism describing
this function of consciousness: its ability to use the information obtained in
the future for correcting the present state. To mathematically describe this
function, the operation of postcorrection will be introduced. This mathematical operation performs such a correction of the state of a “living system”
which guarantees the required features of its future state. In the simplest
case the requirement of survival is meant, but this may also be the requirement of a certain level of quality of life or even the requirement of something
that is desirable although not directly connected with the quality of life.
5
3
Life as postcorrection with the criterion of
survival
Life is a phenomenon which is realized by living matter consisting of living
organisms (living beings). Living matter differs from non-living matter in
that its dynamics is determined not only by causes, but also by goals i.e. by
the state this matter should have in future. First of all the goal of survival
(prolongation of life) is important in this context. However, in case of sufficiently perfect forms of life more complicated goals are also actual. They
can be formulated in terms of quality of life.
In the real conditions on Earth, important features of the phenomenon of
life are connected with the balance between all organisms. However, the very
definition of life and essential features of this phenomenon may be illustrated
in case of a single living being. Let us first consider this simple situation (the
case of a group of identical living beings will be considered in Sect. 4).
An organism consists of atoms interacting with each other, therefore it is
in fact a physical system. According to the modern views this is a quantum
system. Let us apply the term “living system” to refer this quantum system.
Denote by H a space of states of this system. The state of the environment
will be considered (in the simple model we are to discuss) to be fixed.1
Let {L, D} (from the initial letters of the words ‘life’ and ‘death’) be
a complete system of orthogonal projectors in the state space H, so that
L + D = 1 and LD = 0. These projectors determine two orthogonal and
complementary subspaces LH and DH in the whole space H. The subspace
LH is interpreted as the space of the states in which the body of the living
being is acting properly (remains alive). The subspace DH, vice versa, is
interpreted as the space of the states in which the processes of life are seriously
violated, the living being is dead. The projector L plays the role of the
criterion of survival.
If a quantum system is in the state |ψ(t0 )i at a time moment t0 , then
its state |ψ(t)i = U(t, t0 )|ψ(t0 )i at time t is determined by the action of
the unitary evolution operator U(t, t0 ). In case of static environment and
invariable properties of the system, the evolution operator depends only on
the increment of time: U(t, t0 ) = Ut−t0 . At the moment we shall assume for
simplicity this is valid, but the generalization onto the generic situation is
straightforward.
The description of evolution by a unitary evolution operator is characteristic of non-living matter, whose dynamics is determined by causes (by
1
This is a sufficiently good approximation if the changes caused by the influence of the
living being on its environment is not essential for its life.
6
the initial state and Hamiltonian). However, such a description of evolution
is not enough for living matter. The dynamics of a living being is partially
determined by goals, i.e. by characteristics of the future state of this living
being.
In the simplest case the goal is survival. According to this goal the living
being has to remain alive, i.e. the state of the living system should be in
the subspace LH at a distant future moment of time. This is provided by
correcting the initial condition in such a way that the evolution of this state
brings it into the subspace LH in the future. Such correction may be called
postcorrection. The operation of postcorrection is a correction of the present
state of the living system, but it is performed according to the criterion which
is applied to the future state of the system.
Let us consider the simplest example of postcorrection. For simplicity of
notation, we shall fix two time moments, “the present time” t = t0 and “the
future time” t = t0 + T . Denote by UT the evolution operator leading from
the present time to the future time.
Let the living system’s state at time t = t0 be presented by the vector
|ψi ∈ H. If only conventional (characteristic of non-living systems) dynamics
act, then after time interval τ the state vector should be Uτ |ψi. However,
life as a special phenomenon is described only by those scenarios in which
the conventional evolution provides survival (prolongation of life). For life
prolonging during the time interval T , it is sufficient to restrict the initial
condition by the requirement for it to be in the subspace UT−1 LUT ·H. Indeed,
any state from this subspace will happen to belong, after the time interval
T , to the subspace UT · UT−1 LUT · H = LUT H = LH, i.e. the living system
will remain alive.2
Thus, the correction selecting the favorable scenarios is described by the
projector LT = UT−1 LUT which may be called the postcorrection operator.
The living system’s evolution, with the postcorrection taken into account,
may be described as a series of short time intervals τ of the usual (causal)
evolutions Uτ , each of them being preceded by the postcorrection LT . This
is described as the action of the operator
cor
Unτ
= Uτ LT · . . . · Uτ LT · Uτ LT
|
{z
n times
}
(1)
which replaces, for the living system, the usual evolution operator Unτ =
Uτ · . . . · Uτ · Uτ that had to be taken if the system were non-living.
2
We took into account that the whole state space H is invariant under the unitary
evolution, UT H = H.
7
Remark 2 A single period τ of the evolution according to the equation (1)
is represented by the operator Uτcor = Uτ LT = UT−1−τ LUT . Applying operator
LUT to the whole state space H, we shall obtain LUT H = LH i.e. the
subspace of alive states (see footnote 2). Therefore, operator LUT brings any
state into an alive state. The operator Uτcor also brings any state into an alive
state, Uτcor H ⊂ LH, provided that UT−1−τ LH ⊂ LH. This is a requirement
which is necessary for the evolution law (1) being correct. This requirement
suggests that the usual causal evolution (represented by a unitary operator
and taking into account not only favorable, but all scenarios) cannot convert
a dead body into alive one. It is of course evident that living matter has this
property.
Selecting favorable scenarios does not suggest violating the laws of nature
as such. The material world is described as usual by all scenarios obtained
by the action of the unitary evolution operators on the arbitrary initial state
vectors. This conventional presentation of the evolution of matter is sufficient
to describe how non-living matter evolves. However, the phenomenon of
life is represented by only a part of the set of all scenarios of evolution.
“Unfavorable” (for life) scenarios are left “outside the sphere of life”. The
picture appearing in the consciousness of an observer may include only one
of the favorable scenarios.3 Subjectively this looks as if the living being could
find out what should be its state in a distant time t0 + T and correct the
state at time t0 in such a way that it provides being alive at time t0 + T .
It could be not quite clear what is meant by the words “the unfavorable
scenarios are left outside the sphere of life”. To clarify this, let us reformulate
this statement in the language utilized in the preceding works on EEC [3, 4,
5, 6] (see also Sect. 2), however with the help of the mathematics introduced
above.
In the preceding works the (explicit) consciousness is identified with the
separation of the alternatives. In the transition to the regime of unconscious
(“at the edge of (explicit) consciousness”) the separation of the alternatives
disappears, and the possibility arises for the (implicit) consciousness to compare all alternatives between each other, select favorable ones and discard the
rest. How could this be expressed in the language of mathematical formulas?
Let the set of the (quasiclassical) alternatives at the present time be defined as the set of subspaces {Hi }. Assume that the favorable (providing
survival in the time interval T ) are the alternatives i ∈ I, while the rest
S
alternatives i′ ∈ I¯ (where I I¯ is the set of all alternatives) are unfavorable.
3
This expresses the very principle of life, without details like accidents and other casual
obstacles for life. In Sect. 4 we shall consider “programmed death” of individuals necessary
for life of a group (collective).
8
¯
This suggests that LUT Hi = UT Hi for i ∈ I and LUT Hi′ = 0 for i′ ∈ I.
−1
Therefore, the postcorrection operator LT = UT LUT conserves any “favorable alternative subspace” and annihilates any unfavorable one, LT Hi = Hi
¯4
for i ∈ I and LT Hi′ = 0 for i′ ∈ I.
Therefore, “to stay in the sphere of life” means “to leave only favorable
(for life) alternatives in the picture appearing in the consciousness”. The
rest alternatives (subspaces) do not disappear (this would be the violation of
the laws of nature), but simply disappear from the sphere embraced by the
consciousness of the living being.
From this point of view the statement that the phenomenon of life is
described by postcorrection performed according to the criterion of survival
is in fact not a postulate but only a mathematical form of the definition
of life. Any reasonable definition should differ from it only in details, but
not in principle. Indeed, the essence of the phenomenon of life reduces to a
strategy of survival, and the efficient survival is provided only by estimating
the future of a living system (from the point of view of its survival) and by
the corresponding correction of the system’s present state.
Some remarks should be made about the evolution law (1).
Remark 3 In the above specified formulas we assumed that the operator of
causal evolution depends only on the time interval, but does not depend of the
initial time moment: U(t, t′ ) = Ut−t′ . If the environment of the living being
is varying with time, this assumption is invalid and one has to make use of
the evolution operator U(t, t′ ) depending on two arguments. The formula (1)
should then be appropriately modified.
Remark 4 We assumed that the evolution of the environment is specified
independently of the state of the living system. This may be justified in many
cases. However, this assumption has to be abandoned in case of those criteria
for postcorrection which include parameters of the environment as well as
the parameters of the living system itself (such criteria will be considered in
Sect. 5). Then H has to be defined as the space of states of the compound
system including the living system and its environment. The operator U(t, t′ )
is then the evolution operator in this more wide space.
Remark 5 The evolution represented by the operator (1) consists of the series of operations, each being the causal evolution preceded by postcorrection.
4
In this reasoning we started from the verbal formulation of EEC given earlier. The real
situation is very close to this, differing only in that the sets I and I¯ do not necessarily cover
the set of all alternatives: the alternatives (subspaces) which are intermediate between
completely favorable and completely unfavorable may exist.
9
Such an evolution is characterized by two time parameters: the period of correction τ and the depth of postcorrection T . It is possible that some processes
in living organisms are adequately presented by such a type of evolution (for
example, higher animals and humans periodically experience the state of sleep
in which the correction of the state of the organism is performed). However,
continuous regime is typical for other correcting processes. In these cases an
evolution law with continuous postcorrection should be applied. The simplest
variant of it can be obtained as a limit of the discrete process.
Remark 6 We considered a transparent mathematical model of life in which
the postcorrection is presented by a projector. This may be (and in fact
should be) generalized. For example, the criterion for postcorrection may be
presented by a positive operator (not a projector). This is evidently necessary
for those criteria for postcorrection that are connected not with survival, but
with less critical parameters of quality of life. Such criteria will be considered
in Sect. 5.
Up to now we considered only the simplest scheme for support of life
of a single living being. This scheme requires only a single criterion of life
called survival and mathematically presented by the projector L. This may
be enough for primitive forms of life in the condition of unlimited resources
(first of all food). However, for realistic description of more sophisticated
forms of life one has to consider more complicated criteria. Besides, the role
played by the living beings in respect to each other should be taken into
account.
All this requires further generalizations of the mathematical model of life.
Not pretending to be quite general and precise in detail, we shall illustrate
possibilities of such generalizations in some typical situations. In Sect. 4
a sort of collective criterion of survival will be considered, and in Sect. 5
the classification of various criteria of life and corresponding aspects of the
phenomenon of life will be presented.
Remark 7 “A future state” of a system has been used by Y. Aharonov,
P.G. Bergmann and J.L. Lebowitz in the paper published in 1964 [7] and by
Y. Aharonov with other coauthors in the subsequent works (see for example
[8, 9]) under name of the formalism of postselection or the two-vector formalism. In this formalism the states of a system at both initial time and
some later moment of time (“final time”) are fixed. In [7] the formula for
the probabilities of various outputs of the measurement performed at an intermediate time (between the initial and final times), given the initial and final
states, was derived. The above defined operation of postcorrection differs
10
from the two-vector formalism (postselection) both formally and essentially.
The formal difference is that in the postcorrection 1) not a single state but
a subspace (of an arbitrary dimension) is fixed in the future (at the “final
time”), and 2) the initial state undergoes a correction. The essential difference is in the physical interpretation (sphere of application) suggested for
these two formalisms. The two-vector formalism was applied for analyzing
events predicted by conventional quantum mechanics for usual material systems. In the paper [9] the two-vector formalism was exploited to formulate
a novel interpretation of quantum mechanics, in which the various outputs
of a measurement were associated with various future state vectors. In contrast with this, the postcorrection describes (in the framework of EEC) not a
usual material system, but a “living system”, or, more precisely, the image
appearing in the consciousness of living beings.5
5
In case of a primitive living being, the expression “the image appearing in the consciousness” stands for the information which is exploited by this living being to manage
its behavior.
11
4
Collective criterion of survival
It was shown in Sect. 3 how evolution of a living being providing its survival
may be described mathematically in terms of the operation of postcorrection.
The simplest form of this operation considered in Sect. 3 was determined by
a single criterion of survival which in turn was presented by a projector L
on the subspace of states in which the living system remains alive. This
model is sufficient for simple forms of life and unlimited resources (first of all
unlimited amount of food).
Let us consider now the model of life in which resources are limited so
that only a limited number of living beings can survive.
It is clear that in this case the relations between various living beings
become important and should be taken into account. One possible strategy
for survival of living beings in these hard conditions is competition (fight)
of them with each other. However, the collective strategy of survival is also
possible in this case. Let us consider the simplest mathematical model of
such a collective strategy.
Consider a group consisting of N similar living beings (living systems),
enumerated by the index i ∈ Ω, where Ω = {1, 2, . . . , N}. The living system
having the number i is described by the state space Hi and projector Li in
this space as a criterion of survival. The corresponding orthogonal projector
is Di . The sum Li + Di is a unit operator in the space Hi . The operators Li
and Li′ commute with each other because they act in different spaces Hi and
Hi′ . Denote by |I| the number of elements in the set I and by I¯ = Ω \ I the
complementary subset in Ω (the set of elements of Ω which are not elements
of I).
In the conditions of unlimited resources all living systems forming the
group can exist (survive) independently of each other. Then each of them
may be described by the simple model considered in Sect. 3 so that all of
them can survive forever.6 Assume however that the resources (for example
food) that can be found in the environment are limited and their amount is
sufficient only for survival of n living systems of this type. In this situation
life may be regulated in such a way that the interests of the whole group are
taken into account. Then a sort of a “super-organism” exists. This means
that the group consisting of N living beings behaves as a single living system.
What has to be taken as a criterion of survival of the whole group in this
case?
6
in the framework of the present simple model
12
The simplest form of the collective criterion of survival is following:
L(n) =
X
LI DI¯
I⊂Ω, |I|=n
Q
Q
where it is denoted LI = i∈I Li and DI = i′ ∈I Di′ . It is not difficult to
show that this operator is a projector, and the
projectors L(n) and oL(n′ ) are
n
′
orthogonal for n 6= n . The set of projectors L(n) |n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N form a
complete system of orthogonal projectors.
The correction described by the operator of survival L(n) guaranties that
in the time interval T precisely n living systems will be alive, the rest will
be dead. This means that the resources will be sufficient for those which are
alive. The death of some members of the group is in this case a condition
for survival of the rest.
It is interesting in such a model that the correction of the state of the
group of the living systems which is expressed by the operator L(n) , describes
not fighting the members of the group between each other, but rather collective regulation of their states. This regulation provides survival of the
group with the maximal possible number of members. The state of each
living system in the group is corrected at the present time moment, and thus
corrected states, simply because of the natural evolution (described by the
unitary operator UT ), results in the death of certain number of the members
of the group. The number of those who have to die, is sufficient for surviving
the rest in the conditions of the available resources.
Such a correction of the state may be called collective programming of
death for some members of the group for the sake of life of the rest. The
collective program of death does not determine which members of the group
have to die (the choice varies for various alternatives). Therefore, this is
actually the strategy of collective survival discriminating none.
The well-known program leading to death of an organism in a certain age
is a sort of the collective strategy of survival for the given species. In this
case the reason for programming death is not the deficit of resources, but the
task of the progress of the species as a whole.
Evidently, in most groups of animals the survival is regulated by collective
criteria. This explains particularly why intraspecific competition is as a rule
absent. In this respect humans radically differ. It seems that they have
collective criteria for the collectives (groups) of various levels: for a nation,
for a social group, for a family and so on, up to the individual criteria. This
makes possible conflicts between different groups of people. In the limit this
may result in fighting anyone against anyone.
In our time the exponential development of technology makes it available
for small collectives. In these conditions individual criteria of survival and
13
even lower levels of the collective criteria of survival (i.e. individualistic consciousness) increase violence so strongly that the very existence of Mankind
is in danger. This crisis may be prevented only by the transition to the
universal (common for all people and even for all living beings) collective
criterion of survival (i.e. to collective consciousness).
It was suggested long time ago [11, 12, 13] that transition to the collective consciousness is necessary for preventing the global crisis. However, it
is unclear up to now how the transition of most people to the collective consciousness may be achieved in practice (the catastrophe may be prevented
only in case of most people changing their consciousness). The theory of
consciousness following from EEC gives grounds for optimism. According to
EEC, the change of the consciousness will happen automatically, the crisis
will be stopped, and the catastrophe prevented.7
7
The transition of almost all people to the universal criterion of survival and collective
consciousness will necessarily happen in one of the alternatives at the moment of the
highest level of the global crisis. The catastrophe will be therefore prevented in this
alternative. Those people who have changed properly their consciousness beforehand, will
witness just this alternative with high probability. Those who have not managed to change
their consciousness, with high probability will watch the end of world.
14
5
Various criteria for postcorrection
In the preceding sections we considered postcorrection with the criterion of
survival, the most important criterion for living beings. In fact this criterion
defines life as such. The simplest model exploiting only this criterion is sufficient to represent the simplest forms of life. However, other operations of
postcorrection, based on other criteria of life, become actual for more sophisticated forms of life. The set of all criteria of life characterize quality of life in
more detail. Several various operations of postcorrection, corresponding to
various criteria, are performed in this case simultaneously. It seems plausible
that in case of human beings criteria for postcorrection may exist which are
connected not only with the parameters of the human organisms (bodies),
but also with the parameters of their environment.
Analyzing various criteria for postcorrection is an interesting problem that
may be approached from various viewpoints. Not pretending to be general
and precise in details, we can suggest a rough classification of possible criteria
of life as follows.
• Criteria of survival
– The criterion of survival for a single creature
– The criterion of survival for a group of creatures
– The criterion of survival for the living matter as a whole
• Parameters of the state of the body
– Evidence of being alive or dead (the criterion of survival)
– Various levels of the quality of life
– Immaterial parameters (insignificant for the quality of life)
• Parameters of the environment (conditions for life)
– Parameters, which are essential for surviving
– Parameters, which are essential for the quality of life
– Immaterial parameters (insignificant for the quality of life)
Let us make some remarks concerning this (of course, oversimplified and
approximate) scheme of classification.
It is clear that a sophisticated structure of living systems allows them to
control not only survival, but also quality of life. In our mathematical model
this may be described by the same scheme of postcorrection as in Sect. 3 but
15
Figure 1: Various criteria for postcorrection: the state of the world s is
determined by the state of the body b and the state of its environment e.
The regions L and D correspond to survival and death. Horizontal lines
separate the regions corresponding to different levels of the quality of life.
Any subregion on the plane determines certain criterion according to which
postcorrection may in principle be performed.
with projecting on a narrower space of states in which not only life keeps
on but the quality of life remains sufficiently high. This suggests that in an
arbitrary state from the given subspace the parameters of the state of the
body are in the limits characterizing the given quality of life.
The question naturally arises why we included immaterial parameters
(those which are insignificant for the quality of life) in the list of the criteria
for postcorrection. Without a doubt, the control on these parameters is unnecessary to provide the main internal needs of life. However, anyone knows
from his own experience that at least human beings (but most probably also
animals) are in command of certain immaterial parameters of their bodies
and do control them. This reveals itself in the phenomenon of free will.
Indeed, a person can, according to his will, choose one or another variant
of behavior with no essential influence on the fact of survival, or even on the
quality of life. For example, he may in certain limits vary the schedule of his
meals, amount of food he eats and its choice (the menu). The more so, one
may decide quite arbitrarily whether he wish to open or close the window,
to read a book or watch TV and so on.
In the framework of our model a free will is an arbitrary choice of some
immaterial parameters of the body, and execution of the free will is the
postcorrection for a short time interval, performed according to the chosen
criteria.
Considering various parameters for postcorrection from somewhat different point of view, one may suggest the following (of course, also tentative)
classification (see Fig. 1). Denote by s (after the word “states”) the set of
various parameters of life (characterizing both the body and the environ16
ment). The parameter s is in fact a pair s = (e, b), where e (after the word
“environment”) stands for the conditions of life, or the state of the environment, and corresponds to the horizontal axis, while the parameter b (after
the word “body”) refers to the state of the body of the living being (the
bodies of a group of the living beings) and corresponds to the vertical axis.
The parameter s lies in some two-dimensional area, in which the very notion
of life makes sense.8 This area is divided with a horizontal line in two parts.
The parameters in the upper part of the area correspond to survival (projector L), while the lower part corresponds to death (projector D). The region
of survival is partitioned in the subregions corresponding to various levels of
the quality of life.
Each subregion in the upper part of the area drawn in Fig. 1 determines
some criterion according to which the postcorrection may in principle be
performed (but is not necessarily performed in reality). Of course, in general
case the criterion for postcorrection is defined as an operator in the space of
states of the whole world rather than the states of the living system itself (as
in the examples discussed in Sects. 3, 4). This is the situation when evolution
of the compound system including both living system and its environment
has to be considered (see Remark 4).
The operations of postcorrection with various criteria describe various
aspects of the phenomenon of life. This may be illustrated by the following
scheme of identifications.
• Life (the principle of life, without details) = postcorrection with the
criterion of survival for the living matter as a whole.
• Survival = postcorrection with the criterion of survival relating to the
body (bodies).
• Support of the health = postcorrection with the criterion of quality of
life relating to the body.
• Free will = postcorrection with the criterion, relating to the own body,
but as a rule immaterial for survival.9
• Control on the appearing reality (probabilistic miracle) = postcorrection
with the criterion relating to an object outside the own body.
8
In reality each of the parameters e and b is multidimensional, thus we talk of the
“two-dimensional” area only for the sake of an obvious image.
9
The exclusions such as suicide require more detailed model accounting for the influence
of the living system onto its environment.
17
The last point concerns an unusual phenomenon, called the probabilistic
miracle. By this term we mean that a human person, by the power of his
consciousness, makes happen such an event in his environment which has
low, though nonzero, probability (we suggest that some persons can do such
things). The ability to perform probabilistic miracles does not seem to be
necessary, in the usual meaning of the word, for life. However, first, this
phenomenon naturally enters the general scheme so that its exclusion could
look artificial, and, secondly, the human experience seems to point out that
the events of this type really take place.
There is one more class of unusual phenomena in the sphere of consciousness (and therefore in the sphere of life) that can be explained by postcorrection:
• Insight = postcorrection with the criterion of truth
This class includes foresights, insights (among them scientific insights), direct
sighting of truth (i.e. conclusions not supported by logic or facts). All these
phenomena can be explained in the following way.
Let a person formulate some question or pose some problem (a scientific
problem is a good example). Then, in order to experience insight, he has to
go over to the regime of unconscious (not necessarily completely disabling his
explicit consciousness but at least disconnecting it from the given problem).
In this regime a faithful solution of the problem comes out sooner or later
without any further effort, as an insight.10
In fact, the true solution of the problem is selected, with the help of
the postcorrection, among all thinkable “attempted solutions”, most of them
wrong.
The selection is performed in this case with the help of the postcorrection with the criterion of truth. Even if the problem cannot be solved at the
present time by conventional methods (on the basis of the known facts and
logical conclusions), it may have evident solution in future. For example,
some future events may point to the correct solution. In case of a scientific
problem new experiments may be realized in future which unambiguously
point to the right solution, singling it out from all seemingly possible “attempted solutions” of the problem. Therefore, a criterion of the true solution
of the given problem may exist in the future even if it is absent in the present.
In all these cases the operation of postcorrection does correct the present
state making it to be in accord to the criterion existing in the future. This
10
This does not mean that hard problems may be solved without any work. In order
for the process to be efficient, the problem should be formulated and preliminarily worked
out in much detail that requires hard work on the first stage.
18
results in the immediate choice of the correct solution of the problem, although its correctness can be confirmed only in the future. Consciousness,
when being in the regime of unconscious, obtains the ability to look into the
future, and makes use of the obtained information in the present.
The idea may be clarified if it is reformulated in terms of the states of
brain. From all states of the brain corresponding to various “attempted
solutions” of the problem (wrong ideas of the solution among them) the
postcorrection selects the state which corresponds to that solution which has
to be confirmed in the future. This change of the state of the brain means
that insight, or direct sighting of truth, occurred.
By the way, it is known from the experience that the person applying
this process for solving a problem, feels to be absolutely confident that the
solution guessed by him in the course of the insight is true. This is not
at all strange because the solution found in this way is not a product of
his imagination but the genuine true observed by the mechanism of direct
sighting.
Great scientists, Albert Einstein among them, confirm the fact that they
always feel absolute confidence in the solution found in the insight, and the
solution found in this way always turns out to be correct in the course of its
verification by conventional methods.
An interesting remark may be made about the criterion of truth used
in the process thus described. This criterion may sometimes coincide with
the “formal proof” which is found by the scientist after he had experienced
instantaneous insight. It is clear that the formal proof may serve as a criterion
of truth for a solution of the given problem. This criterion does not exists
(not yet found) at the moment of the insight, but it arises later on, when the
solution having been guessed in the insight is later deduced by conventional
methods. The whole process looks like lifting oneself by hairs. Does it really
supply any advantage for solving the problem? Let us show it does.
Solving any problem is easier if it is known that the solution exists (may
be it is known that this problem has already been solved by someone else)
and much easier if the final result (not its proof) is available. Just this
situation of the final solution known beforehand is realized in the process of
the scientific insight followed by the formal derivation of the foreseen solution.
Indeed, the scientist anticipates the right solution in the course of insight,
he is completely confident in this solution, and because of this it becomes
much easier for him to formally derive the foreseen solution by conventional
methods. It is curious that in this case the scientist foresees the certainly
right answer which himself will find in some time.11
11
This ability is very exciting in case of great scientists, but it is often is exploited by
19
The operator of postcorrection selecting the right solution of the problem
(among “the attempted solutions”) may be presented in the form PT =
UT−1 P UT , where P is a criterion of the correct solution. The operation of
postcorrection presented by the operator PT is efficient if the criterion P is
not realizable at present, but can be realized in the time interval T .
This leads us to the question about the role of brain. Many attempts
to explain how work of brain can produce the phenomenon of consciousness
gave in fact no result. In each of these attempts either a logical circle is
included (what should be proved is implicitly assumed) or not consciousness
as such is dealt with in the argument, but various operations performed in
the consciousness (for example, calculations or logical conclusions).
From the point of view of the theory we consider here, EEC, consciousness
is not a product of brain, but a separate, independent phenomenon, closely
connected with the very concept of life. What about brain, it is an instrument
of consciousness rather than its origin.
The brain is used by the consciousness to control the body and obtain
information about its state (and, through its perception, about the state of
the environment). In other words, the brain (or rather some regions in it) is
the part of the body which realizes its contact with the consciousness, it is an
interface between the consciousness and the body as a whole. In particular,
when it is necessary the brain forms the queries that should be answered.
Sometimes these queries are answered by the brain itself with the help of the
processes of the type of calculations and logical operations. Other queries
cannot be solved directly in the brain and are solved by the consciousness
with the help of “direct sighting of truth” (by postcorrection).
Remark 8 A. Losev and I. Novikov noted [10] that time machines (spacetimes including closed timelike curves), in case if they exist, may be used
for solving mathematical problems with the help of the methods or technical
devices which are not known at present but can be realized in future. For
this aim, the problem is solved at the time when the necessary methods are
created and then its solution is sent into the past with the help of the time
machine. The above formulated mechanism for solving problems (of arbitrary
types) with the help of postcorrection is quite analogous. The only difference
is that the “time machine” acting in this process is virtual and “exists” only
in human consciousness.
many experienced scientists as well as people from other professions and simple people in
the each-day life.
20
6
Conclusion
Extended Everett’s Concept (EEC) originated as an attempt to improve the
interpretation of quantum mechanics proposed by Everett. Nevertheless,
it is not simply a novel interpretation, but in fact a theory going beyond
the framework of quantum mechanics. Starting from the role played by
consciousness in the conceptual problems of quantum mechanics, EEC finally
results in understanding what is consciousness and, more generally, what are
specific features of living matter.
Considering consciousness on the basis of EEC, one is led to the conclusion that the conventional (causal) laws of nature are insufficient for describing phenomenon of life. The laws of nature elaborated in physics (including
quantum physics), chemistry and other natural sciences correctly describe the
behavior of non-living matter. The behavior of “living matter” cannot be
explained only by the action of usual laws of nature (say, quantum mechanics). Nevertheless, comprehensive analysis of quantum mechanics indicates
at the principal points in which the laws acting in the sphere of life have to
differ from the conventional physical laws. The laws governing living matter
may then be formulated at least in their most general aspects. Just this is
made in EEC.
The novel features that have to be introduced in order to describe the
phenomenon of life, can be formulated in various ways. Restricting himself
by the most general formulation, one may say that not only causes but also
goals play role in behavior of living matter. The main goal, always existing
in connection with living beings, is survival, or persistence of life (this may
be survival of a single living being, or of some group, for example of a herd
or specie of animals). Therefore, the goal of survival has to be accounted in
the evolution law for living matter.
In the preceding works of the author on EEC [3, 4, 5, 6] the laws governing life were formulated on the basis of the concept of consciousness and its
identification with the separation of alternative classical realities (the concept characteristic of the Everett’s interpretation). In this context the term
“consciousness” embraces not only the explicit consciousness, but also the
sphere of unconscious. Moreover, just in the regime of unconscious (or at the
border between the explicit consciousness and unconscious) those features of
consciousness are revealed which is the very essence of the phenomenon of
life: the ability to obtain information from all alternative realities and select
those alternatives which are most favorable for life.
In the present paper we have shown that the evolution of “a living system” (following from EEC) can be described mathematically if one introduce,
besides the usual (unitary) evolution operator, an additional operation called
21
postcorrection. This operation corrects the state of a “living system” to provide necessary features of this state in future: survival of the living system
or even certain quality of its life (for example the health). Introducing postcorrection in the evolution law of the living system allows one to classify
various forms of life and various aspects of the phenomenon of life, depending on what characteristics of life can be provided by the postcorrection.
We shortly discussed only the key points of this classification. The detailed
elaboration of the theory is a question of its future development.
The operation of postcorrection not only supplies a mathematical formulation of the principal feature of EEC, but also simplifies the logical structure
of this theory. In fact, it is sufficient to postulate that the boundaries of the
sphere of life are governed by postcorrection. After this, the concretization
of the theory requires only the choice of the criteria, according to which the
postcorrection is performed.
Unexpected (from the physical viewpoint) interpretation of the operation
of postcorrection, as describing evolution of living matter, became possible
because we did not restrict ourselves strictly by the framework of physics.
Starting from the arguments originated in physics (conceptual problems of
quantum mechanics) and following the ideas of EEC, we were forced to go
beyond the limits of physics as such and to consider at least the principal
points of theory of living matter. Instead of the known (accepted in physics)
statement that each event has its own cause, we had to agree that all important events and processes in the sphere of life are determined not only by
causes but also by goals, first of all by the goal of survival. In the resulting theory the operation of postcorrection is a mathematical formalization of
the almost evident fact that the goals play central role in evolution of living
matter.
Let us remark that theory of consciousness and life following from EEC
essentially differs from the usual mechanistic approach which considers the
phenomenon of consciousness as a function of brain. From the viewpoint of
theory of “quantum consciousness” resulting from EEC, the brain is rather
an instrument exploited by the consciousness (as a specific feature of a “living
system”) to control the body and obtain information about the environment
through the body and its organs.
This, by the way, allows one to look in another way at the problem of
artificial intellect. The conclusion following from EEC is that it is possible to
create an automat possessing intellectual abilities (there are great achievements in this respect nowadays), but it is principally impossible to create a
machine having consciousness as something that can to perform postcorrection, i.e. such that can be called “artificial living being”.
The postulate of postcorrection broadens quantum mechanics, including
22
in the consideration the law of evolution of living matter. The resulting
theory is in a way symmetrical in time direction. Non-living matter evolves in
the causal way (the past determines the future), but in the sphere of life only
those initial conditions are left which provide survival (the future determines
the past). This “influence of the future on the past” is realized as the selection
of favorable scenarios and mathematically described by postcorrection.
Let us make finally one more remark demonstrating how natural for living
systems the evolution law (1) including postcorrection is. This law is, in its
spirit, very similar to what is called the antropic principle. The antropic
principle explains the special “fine tuning” of the parameters of our world by
the fact that in case of any other set of the parameters organic life would not
be feasible and therefore no humans could exist to observe this world. The
principle of life, formulated as the ability of the living system to postcorrect
its state and provide its survival, suggests in fact something quite similar,
even in a softer variant.
In order to explain this, we have to underline once more that the postcorrection describes selecting those scenarios which have to remain in the sphere
of life. The rest scenarios do not disappear. They are just as real as those
selected, but they are not included in the sphere of life, i.e. an observer
cannot watch these “unfavorable for life” scenarios. “The sphere of life” is
such an image of our world which can be observed. If just this image (i.e.
not “the whole world” but only “the sphere of life”) is taken as a starting
point for constructing evolution law, then the result of the construction will
necessarily be the evolution including the postcorrection.
Thus, postcorrection in the evolution of the living matter (of the sphere of
life) does not need even being postulated. Instead of this it may be derived
from the (generalized) antropic principle. Non-living matter satisfies the
usual quantum-mechanical evolution law. The evolution of the living matter
(of the sphere of life) simply by definition should include postcorrection.
23
References
[1] H.Everett III, ‘Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454-462 (1957). Reprinted in Wheeler J.A. and
Zurek W.H., eds., Quantum Theory and Measurement, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1983.
[2] B.S.DeWitt and N.Graham, editors. The Many-Worlds Interpretation of
Quantum Mechanics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.
[3] M.B.Mensky, Quantum mechanics: New experiments, new applications
and new formulations of old questions, Physics-Uspekhi 43, 585-600
(2000).
[4] M.B.Mensky, Concept of consciousness in the context of quantum mechanics, Physics-Uspekhi 48, 389-409 (2005).
[5] M.B.Mensky, Human and Quantum World (Weirdness of the quantum
world and the miracle of consciousness) (in Russian), Fryazino: Vek 2,
2005 [¡vek-2@mail.ru¿, http://www.vek2.ru].
[6] M.B.Mensky, Reality in quantum mechanics, Extended Everett Concept, and consciousness, Optics and Spectroscopy 103, 461-467
(2007)[ArXiv:physics/0608309].
[7] Y.Aharonov, P.G.Bergmann, and J.L.Lebowitz, Time Symmetry in the
Quantum Process of Measurement, Physical Review B134, 1410-1416
(1964).
[8] Y.Aharonov and L.Vaidman, Complete Description of a Quantum System
at a Given Time, Journal of Physics A24, 2315-2328 (1991).
[9] Yakir Aharonov and Eyal Y.Gruss, Two-time interpretation of quantum
mechanics, ArXiv:quant-ph/0507269 (2005).
[10] A.Lossev and I.D.Novikov, The Jinn of the time machine: nontrivial
self-consistent solutions, Class. Quantum Grav. 9, 2309-2321 (1992).
[11] Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, New York:
Harper and Row, 1959.
[12] Satprem, Sri Aurobindo ou L’aventure de la conscience, Bucher Chastel,
1970.
[13] Stanislav Grof, The Cosmic Game, New York: State University of New
York Press, 1997.
24 |
Consciousness, brains and the replica problem
Ricard V. Solé∗
1
ICREA-Complex Systems Lab, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Parc de
Recerca Biomedica de Barcelona. Dr Aiguader 88, 08003 Barcelona, Spain
arXiv:0712.1126v1 [nlin.AO] 7 Dec 2007
Although the conscious state is considered an emergent property of the underlying brain activity
and thus somehow resides on brain hardware, there is a non-univocal mapping between both. Given
a neural hardware, multiple conscious patterns are consisten with it. Here we show, by means of a
simple gedankenexperiment that this has an importan logic consequence: any scenario involving the
transient shutdown of brain activity leads to the irreversible death of the conscious experience. In
a fundamental way, unless the continuous stream of consciousness is guaranteed, the previous self
vanishes and is replaced by a new one.
PACS numbers:
I.
INTRODUCTION
The problem of consciousness has become a hot topic
of scientific enquiry over the last two decades (Searle,
2000, Crick and Koch, 1995, 2003). But in spite of this
increasing attention from the neurosciences, old questions remain open and the phenomenon itself differs from
other biological phenomena in that it is a subjective, firstperson ontology (Searle, 2000). Such special status generates a number of nontrivial questions, some of them
right in the boundaries between science and philosophy.
Most neuroscientists, with few exceptions, would agree
(even with different perspectives) that consciousness is a
self-organized, emergent property of brain activity and
neuronal wiring, although the nature and organization
of the brain-mind mapping is largely unknown (Locke,
1995; Dennett, 1991; Hesslow, 1994; Svenson, 1994; von
Wright, 1994; Crick and Koch, 2003). Multiple questions emerge from the previous scenarios, including the
nature of the new consciousness emerging after recovery
from long-term cryogenization or technological replacement (Moravec, 1988; Egan, 1994; Minsky 1994). Similar problems arise in different contexts, such as teleportation (Penrose, 1989). How can a transient shutdown
of brain activity affect the conscious experience? All the
previous situations inhabit the realm of speculation and
might never be achieved. The potential implications are
mostly a matter of philosophical speculation. There is,
however, an experimentally feasible scenario where no
such speculation is at work.
Recently, advances in suspended animation suggest the
possibility of preserving human life in a reversible state
where completely halted or deeply slowed cellular activity would be possible (Alam et al., 2005). Such state
has been obtained experimentally using different organisms (Nystul and Roth, 2004; Blackston et al., 2005) and
nothing prevents to reach similar results using humans.
In fact, evidence from accidental, long-term suspended
animation is available from a number of case studies. In
∗ Electronic address: ricard.sole@upf.edu
these cases, humans experiencing severe hpothermia over
several hours and showing lack of any vital sign (no pulse
nor brain activity) were able to recover without any longterm complications. Ongoing research on using profound
hypothermia, together with appropriate organ preservation fluids confirm that such reversible states can be induced in a repeatable manner (Alam et al., 2005). The
method, used in swine animal models, results in clinical brain death, but none of the surviving hypothermic
animals displayed detectable neurological deficits or cognitive impairment.
How can a shutdown of brain activity alter the nature
of the self-conscious experience? In principle, you might
think that your consciousness is temporally stopped, just
to be back afterwards. In other words, you and your consciousness weak up altogether. Is that really the case? To
put the question in a more specific form, we consider a
mental (Gedanken) experiment, which we will call the
replica problem. Below we show, using a logic argument,
that something much more fundamental is at work when
considering scenarios involving consciousness and its relation to hardware. Together with brain death (no matter
if permanent of transient) the death of subjective consciousness needs to be considered.
II.
THE REPLICA PROBLEM
The following experiment is an imaginary one, not expected to be ever possible. It is thus a Gedankenexperiment, used as a logic argument to show the unexpected
consequences of the one-to-many brain-mind mapping. It
is important to stress that this is a thought experiment
and is thus not expected to be possible. In this context, we are aware that quantum mechanics forbids the
realization of the ideal experiment to be described below
(Scarani et al., 2005) but that is not relevant to our discussion, particularly because quantum effects should not
be expected to have a real relevance in large scale neural
dynamics. However, although the special case considered
here would require a high-level technology not available
today, some equivalent scenarios (such as the induction
of profound hypothermia discussed above) are likely to
2
a
{A,C}
b
brain copy
{A,C}
S
S
{A’,φc }
{A,φ c }
{A,φc }
R
transfer
{A’,φc }
R
R
A=A’
{A,C’}
{A’,C’}
FIG. 1: (a) The extended replica problem, as defined in the text. Here we start with an individual defined as the brain-mind
pair {A, C}. A copy of the brain hardware is made, with no activity and thus no consciousness, here indicated as {A′ , φc }.
Since the new physical hardware is an exact copy, no experiment would be able to distinguish between A and A′ . If activated
(dashed line, lower right) the copied system would obviously display a separated conscious experience, here indicated as C ′ .
If the A’s brain is extracted and replaced by A′ , we would have exactly the same hardware (so effectively A = A′ ) and no
difference would be measurable. However, once activated again, it would not exhibit the initial subjective conscious experience,
but a different one. The previous experiment is equivalent to the situation shown in (b) where we simply shut down brain
activity and afterwards reverse the unconscious state into a conscious one.
be soon applied to human beings.
Let us take a given individual brain A, experiencing
a given (self-)conscious activity. We can indicate that
the conscious experience C is somehow generated by this
brain A using a mapping:
A −→ C
(1)
Where C must be interpreted as an emergent property
of brain activity and involves both subjectivity and selfawareness. Let us now imagine that thanks to a very
advanced technology a full copy of A can be obtained
instantaneously at t = t0 . Considering instantaneous
formation is not strictly necessary, but makes the argument simpler, since it liberates us from considering the
further divergence of the two replicated systems. Let us
call this new brain hardware A′ . This replica, if active,
would generate a different conscious experience, which
we indicate as C ′ . Clearly we have now:
A′ −→ C ′
(2)
the important point here is that, although exactly the
same hardware is being used, we have C 6= C ′ (different subjective conscious experiences). This is true in
spite that no single experiment made by some external
observer would be able (at t = t0 ) to distinguish between A and A′ . The existence of a replica of A generates a somewhat strange situation, since clearly indicates
that brain activity does not univocally define consciousness. This is what we name the replica problem. This
problem has been explored by a number of authors (see
http://www.benbest.com/philo/doubles.html) and is our
starting point.
Let us now consider A, with an associated conscious
experience C. The brain-mind pair {A, C} thus fully defines the individual. Let us assume that brain activity
is stopped through some process S. If no brain activity
is present, no conscious experience exists. The individual’s brain is dead, and will be indicated as φc , meaning
’no consciousness’ (here the symbol φc indicates lack of
consciousness, without explicit reference to a given C).
Now let us imagine that the brain is reactivated through
some other process R. The standard view considers the
following causal set of events:
S
R
{A, C} −→ {A, φc } −→ {A, C}
(3)
This logical chain of events corresponds to a common
reasoning: my brain is freezed and stops working, but
once a reverse process is used, brain activity returns and
I wake up. Is that a correct answer? Which consciousness
is experienced: the previous one (C) or a new one (C ′ )?
As shown below, a new consciousness is effectively at
work, i. e. the correct sequence is in fact:
S
R
{A, C} −→ {A, φc } −→ {A, C ′ }
(4)
and thus, in terms of consciousness, we never “wake up”.
The reason is that the hardware does not univocally define the conscious experience, and thus there is no reason
why the conscious activity emerging after recovering the
stopped brain would be the same. However, you might
argue that it is the same brain what is at work, and
thus cannot be properly related with the replica problem, where two identical, but different brains are being
used.
3
An additional experiment allows to better understand
the implications of the replica problem. This extended
replica problem can be used to see clearly why the new
conscious experience is necessarily a different one. The
basic steps to be described below are summarized in figure 1.
support) leads to a state of “dead consciousness”. As a
consequence of the non-unique mapping between brain
structure and conscioussness, death of a given conscious
experience will be irreversible.
IV.
III.
THE EXTENDED REPLICA PROBLEM
We now describe a special mental experiment involving the formation of a replica. In figure 1, individuals
involving an active (and thus conscious) brain are indicated as framed black circles. If brain activity is stopped,
the non-conscious state is indicated as an empty circle.
If no brain is present, an empty box is shown.
Let us assume that we start with {A, C} and we make
a material (but not active) copy A′ of the initial brain.
We have a new brain-mind system {A′ , φc } with no consciouss activity (φc ) and physically separated from the
initial one (see upper part of figure 1a). If activated, A′ s
brain would generate its own subjective conscious state,
i. e.
R
{A′ , ¬C} −→ {A′ , C ′ }
(5)
with C ′ obviously different from C (lower right, fig. 1a).
Now we shut down the activity of A i.e.
S
{A, C} −→ {A, φc }
(6)
And now let us replace A by A′ , i. e.
{A, φc } → {A′ , φc }
(7)
Since the two brains are physically identical, no measurement would be able to detect any difference between the
previous and the new hardware, and thus we have the
equivalence:
{A, φc } ≡ {A′ , φc }
(8)
The logic implication is that they can be exchanged by
each other (and any other exact copy) and would not be
distinguished. But it is know obvious that the implanted
brain, though identical, is not going to maintain the subjective conscious experience that we had at the beginning:
it was a copy and following the previous implications we
would have
R
{A, φc } −→ {A, C ′ }
(9)
The sequence of events described above is logically equivalent to starting from {A, C}, stopping A from being active and restoring its function (ending up in {A, C ′ }, as
indicated in figure 1b. This completes our argument. To
summarize: any process that either stops brain activity
(and thus leaves us with a “just hardware” individual)
or replaces a given brain structure by a completely new
one (after stopping consciousness in its previous physical
DISCUSSION
In this paper we have seen how the one-to-many mapping between brain and mind implies that any scenario
involving transient brain death leads to the death of consciousness, as defined by a subjective, first-person ontology. The subjective nature of the self makes brain transfer and teleportation non-viable in terms of a reliable way
of transfering the self to the new individual. These are,
however, science fiction scenarios. However, as shown
above, the same situation must be applied to surgery involving profound hypothermia: you (meaning your self)
would never truly wake up once the normal brain function is recovered again. Someone else will, with exactly
the same external features and memories as you, but experiencing a different consciousness. Under this view, no
true immortality (the immortal nature of your self) is
possible.
Although future technology might allow building a
copy of our brains and make our memories and feelings
survive, something will be inevitably lost. The argument
provided here suggests that the “self” persists (it is alive)
provided that the stream of consciousness flows in a continuous manner and is never interrupted. If it is, death of
the self occurs in a non-reversible manner. This seems to
provide an interesting twist to the mind-body problem.
Although the argument presented here is a logical one,
further extensions of this study would involve brain states
not necessarily associated to a complete lack of activity.
More quantitative analyses could be made, involving different features of consciousness (Seth et al., 2006) and the
possible localization of the conscious self-representation
(Lou et al., 2004 and references therein). In this context,
further questions arise: What are the minimum requirements in terms of brain activity able to sustain a conscious pattern? Are there partial changes inducing a loss
of self-awareness related to our previous discussion?
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the members of the
Complex Systems Lab for useful discussions. Special
thanks to Bernat Corominas-Murtra for comments on
the manuscript. I also thank the editor and referees of
Minds and Machines who kindly rejected this paper with
no rational explanation.
References
1. Alam, H. B. et al. 2005. Profound Hypothermia
4
Protects Neurons and Astrocytes, and Preserves
Cognitive Functions in a Swine Model of Lethal
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2005.
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Moravec, H. 1988. Mind children. The future of
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Theor. Biol. 171, 101-110. |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | November 2014 | Volume 5 | Issue 11 | pp. 1152-1155
Kaufman, S. E., The Ocean of Consciousness
1152
Realization
The Ocean of Consciousness
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
No matter how the world appears, it is still composed of Consciousness, the same Substance, the
same Beingness, flowing in stillness and turbulence. That is why the Universe is one, regardless
of how it appears, because of the singular and unchanging Nature of that of which it is
composed. As the ocean is composed only of water, regardless of how many waves arise from it,
the Universe is composed only of Consciousness, regardless of how many forms arise within it.
Key Words: Consciousness, water, ocean, one, beingness, substance.
That which apprehends form
and That which flows in relation to Itself
and so appears as form
are One.
No matter how turbulent the ocean becomes,
no matter how many forms arise upon its surface,
waves coming and going,
the ocean remains one.
And no matter how turbulent the surface,
at its depths
the ocean remains still.
Observed from the depths,
where there is stillness
the turbulence of the surface
is not disturbing.
Observed from the surface,
where there is turbulence,
there is only disturbance.
No matter how the ocean appears
it is still composed of water,
the same substance
flowing in stillness and turbulence.
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
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Kaufman, S. E., The Ocean of Consciousness
1153
That is why the ocean is one
regardless of how it appears,
because of the singular and unchanging nature
of that of which it is composed.
And no matter how the world appears,
it is still composed of Consciousness,
the same Substance,
the same Beingness.
flowing in stillness and turbulence.
That is why the Universe is one
regardless of how it appears,
because of the singular and unchanging Nature
of that of which it is composed.
As the ocean is composed only of water,
regardless of how many waves arise from it,
the Universe is composed only of Consciousness,
regardless of how many forms arise within it.
And so, if That of which
the Universe is composed
is One, and not two,
then That which apprehends the forms
that arise within the Universe
cannot be different from or other than
That of which the forms
that arise within the Universe
are themselves composed.
The idea that That which apprehends the forms
and That of which the forms are composed
are different, and separate,
only occurs if one takes the forms alone
for all that is there where they appear to be,
thereby obscuring
the Ocean of formless Consciousness
within which they arise.
If one sees only the waves
and not the water,
sees only the forms
and not that of which
the forms are composed,
then the ocean becomes obscured.
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1154
And once the ocean is obscured,
that which connects all the waves
and reveals their oneness
is also obscured,
leaving only the appearance
of separate waves
thrashing about.
Likewise, when the Ocean of Consciousness is obscured
that which connects all the forms
and reveals their Oneness
is also obscured,
leaving only the appearance
of separate forms
thrashing about.
How do you rediscover the Ocean
once it has been lost,
once it has been obscured?
Look within yourself little Wave
and you will find It,
not as a form,
but as That which apprehends form.
And once you are able to do that,
Apprehend That which apprehends,
Know That which knows,
the Ocean of Oneness that was always there
beneath the waves,
beneath the forms,
will reappear.
Then the seeming divisions
between the waves,
between the forms,
that once seemed so real,
while their common Source was obscured,
will simply vanish.
The waves will still be there,
the forms will still be there,
but they will no longer be known,
and so no longer be treated,
as something separable from or other than
what you Are.
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1155
Why does the Ocean appear only within
and not without
until it is rediscovered
by looking within?
Without is the direction
in which you are going.
Within is the direction
from which you are coming.
When a wave looks to the sky
having forgotten the ocean,
having forgotten its nature,
it sees the clouds,
but cannot recognize them
as composed of the same substance
of which it is itself composed,
and so it sees only more forms,
more things that seem other than itself.
But when a wave looks the other way
still having forgotten the ocean,
still having forgotten its nature,
it cannot help but run into itself
on its way to becoming a wave.
And then when it looks back to the sky
having rediscovered the ocean,
having rediscovered its nature,
it once again sees the clouds,
but now recognizes them
as composed of the same substance
of which it is itself composed,
and so what was once seen as other,
is now seen as self.
That is why one must first look within,
and find the truth of what lies there,
before one can look without,
and see the truth of what lies there as well.
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Research Essay
Spiritual Values and Their Biological, Philosophical and
Physical Implications on Behaviour
Jeffery Jonathan (Joshua) Davis*
ישוע
The Embassy of Peace, Whitianga, New Zealand
Abstract
Character, Identity and Personality are spiritual attributes and as such, they are linked to a
Spiritual Living Being. These attributes survive in eternity along with the survival of the soul of
a human being. When a human being still identifies him or herself with biological processes, he
or she is veiled to The Creator’s existence and his or her Spiritual Identity is still a potential
reality. In this Essay, I intend to clarify how different aspects and dimensions, both internal and
external, may in the life of a human being influence the organisation of the brain systems at a
neurobiological level thus shaping perception of reality in relation to the interplay between
Spiritual and Behavioural Values.
Key Words: Spiritual value, living being, Creator, soul, character, identity, biological process.
This essay is intended to clarify how different aspects and dimensions, both internal and external,
may in the life of a human being influence the organisation of the brain systems at a
neurobiological level thus shaping perception of reality in relation to the interplay between
Spiritual and Behavioural Values.
When a human being still identifies him or herself with biological processes (neural activity in
space-time) he or she is veiled to The Creator’s existence and his or her Spiritual Identity is still
a potential reality.
Character, Identity and Personality are spiritual attributes and as such, they are linked to a
Spiritual Living Being. These attributes survive in eternity along with the survival of the soul of
a human being. Usually, the attributes mentioned before have been secularly associated with
information processing and verbal descriptions. However, as some scientists and philosophers
have pointed out (Ramachandran 19981, Metzinger 20002 and 20033) this model of “self” is just
an informational, biological construct with a distorted cognitive map of self, based only on
biological roles, body features and movements. The dissolution of this distorted map is
*Correspondence: c/o Sarah Frew, The Embassy of Peace, Whitianga, New Zealand. http://paradiselanding.weebly.com/
E-mail: sarahinparadise888@gmail.com
1
Ramachandran V.S. and Blakeslee, S; Phantoms in the Brain – Probing the Mysteries of the Human Mind.
“The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the First-Person Perspective.”
3
Being No One – The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.
2
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accompanied with a transformation by the Energeia Pneumatikon or work of The Spirit to lift a
human out of narrow concerns, so that they can embrace the world, themselves and others more
deeply and widely.
I propose this transformation takes place when the human consciousness is affected by the
agency of Spiritual Values whose energetic counterpart in the physical reality registers as
electromagnetic or light waves and fields, therefore affecting the brain and body in large. (Mari
Jibu and Kunio Yasue 1995)4
This is a human whose attention of Identity, Character and Personality shifts to the Spiritual
Values that he or she has become. From now on we can say he or she is a genderless spiritual
personal being who is identified with the Highest Survival Values, the Spiritual Values of The
Value Giver, who gives this being, still in human form, access to Eternal Life. His or her
memories and personal history are stored in fields, electromagnetic and light waves.
The question for research is what are the neural traces or interfaces of such fields for a fully
realised spiritual being in human form? What does the brain of these spiritualised humans look
like? What are the genetic implications for the human species? How is the DNA of the species
altered by such an order of consciousness?
People may respond to these matters in different ways according to their order of consciousness.
For a human in the situation where he or she requires a scientific understanding of the universe
to find happiness and trust, which is derived from unity in personal relationships, an approach to
his or her research in spirituality would be to validate or prove his or her own existence first.
This would be easier than proving the existence of The Creator.
For a person who knows The Creator and finds fulfilment, happiness and trust, unity in personal
relationships, without the need for further proof of his or her experience, a scientific approach is
unnecessary.
For those human beings that it is important to see to believe, both a spiritual or religious
approach to life, as well as a scientific understanding, may contribute to their personal quest for
happiness and trust, unity in personal relationships.
For those human beings that are convinced that happiness and trust, unity in personal
relationships is an impossibility in human experience, neither a religious or scientific approach to
Spiritual Values applies and only a wake up call or strong incident or event in life may shift their
perception.
4
Quantum Theory of Consciousness and Quantum Brain Dynamics, pp. 177-195.
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All these situations have in common the need to deal with Spiritual Values, Character and
Identity, and Neurobiology. This means, how the different aspects and dimensions, both internal
and external, spiritual and biological, may in the life of a human being influence the organisation
of the brain systems at a neurobiological level.
The question of what is a Spiritual Value is a crucial one to pursue. An intellectual exploration of
this kind and the experience of a Spiritual Value is sometimes confined and limited by the ability
to verbalise and articulate the experience clearly to others.
Let’s start this exploration by looking at the difference between the words Unity and Uniformity.
Unity is a good start because most humans have experienced a sense of unity or belonging in
playing a sport that requires team coherence or in playing in a band where every musician feels
the unity of the whole as part of themselves. Unity is something that most people can hardly put
a finger on, if at all, however its presence is felt and it is a Spiritual Presence, Essence or
Value. This is sometimes called “good vibes”, perhaps a field of some kind.
On the other hand the word Uniformity denotes that everyone is sort of equal in appearance,
behaves the same, shares the same dress code (as in uniform). Uniformity is a Behavioural
Value; it is in place with expectations to certain behaviours. Uniformity is very different than
Unity. Unity is associated with good vibes, Uniformity is devoid of any spiritual meaning, and
has nothing to do with vibes or harmony. People exist in Unity without uniformity. People may
be in a uniform behaviour and lack the experience of Unity as in so many schools.
The point here is that Uniformity is neither a requirement nor a guarantee for Unity. Unity and
well being matter more than uniformity and it is reasonable and better for example, to listen to
and to be part of a band of musicians playing in Unity without a uniform (dress code), than a
band dressed in uniform playing without Unity.
Unity provides a connection, a kind of intimacy that uniformity lacks. The kind of connection
Unity provides is a requirement for harmonious living and co-operation in community life.
Because of the strong connection between values and decision making, this essay covers also a
brief exploration of the development of an evaluative system in the orbito-frontal cortex and its
intimate relationship with the limbic system in the process of emotions, spirituality and valuebased decision making.
I also consider important, in order to create the context for this essay, to state that my Spiritual
Identity, the existence and embodiment of Spiritual Values and the order of consciousness akin
to my existence, requires no further proof or scientific verification. It suffices to know and say I
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Am. However, I also consider it of immense value to communicate to my fellow human being,
via a Spiritual-Scientific Synthesis, the possibility to enter this order of existence and some of its
neural implications.
This is related to shaping consciously and in unity with The Value Giver of Life, the human
body’s neural pathways, to the sharing and spreading through interpersonal contact and
expression of the highest form of values. Spiritual Values are both the guarantee for the survival
of the human species, as well as the survival of his and her Spiritual Being, Character and
Identity in Eternity.
Let’s explore briefly a theory that will help in understanding the interplay of mental spaces and
Spiritual Values. Conceptual Blending or Integration is the consequence of more than twentyfive years research in the area of cognitive science, amongst others. There is considerable
evidence that reason is encoded, it appears says Gilles Fauconnier in “Conceptual Integration”:
…that neural architectures that evolved to produce perception, sensation, and bodily
movements are at the heart of what we experience as a rational inference,
conceptualization and meaning construction…C.I. is a basic mental capacity that
leads to new meaning, global insight, and conceptual compressions useful for
memory and manipulation of otherwise diffuse ranges of memory. It plays a
fundamental role in the construction of meaning in everyday life, in the arts and
sciences, in technological development and in religious thinking. (Fauconnier 2001,
p. 1)
It is important to mention that blending is intimately connected to a set of psychological and
neurobiological properties due to the constant shift happening in the brain’s highly
interconnected cells or neural pathways.
Identity and Character can be complex phenomena to describe or validate. Conceptual
Integration Networks serve the purpose to emphasise different types of frames in mental spaces.
Generally speaking, conceptual integration networks arise to emphasise the Blending of
Character and Frame or the Blending of a Character with another Character.
When a person unifies in a mental space with for example Jesus, Buddha, a loving Grandmother
or the Universal Father-Mother, a fusion of characters may emerge as a consequence of an
integration network. This means that a musician for example, lacking the qualities of Love and
Harmony, may get to embody those qualities by unifying in a mental space with any spiritual or
human being embodying those qualities.
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This also means that there is a relationship between the emergent properties in the blend and the
activation patterns of neurons in the brain. This is more than metaphorical mapping, which just
gives the brain access to an experience without necessarily having created a neural pathway to
the embodiment of the experience. Having a Spiritual experience is different than embodying
Spirituality.
Reporting a spiritual experience of “Oneness” with the universe is different than manifesting The
Love of God continuously in actions and words like, “I Am the Love and The Light of God”.
This implies an Identity instead of an experience that happens suddenly to somebody for a short
period of time.
Some of those neural activations come from forces, which are affecting human beings through
the environment, or from what people share and how people interpret those messages from
bodily states, purpose and many others. Some are related to culture, personal experience,
biological evolution, while others are related to a sense of self and identity based on Spiritual
Values and ultimately God Consciousness and Global Awareness.
Most of the work done by different scientists and philosophers (like Ramachandran, Persinger5,
Metzinger and others) to describe the neurobiology of spirituality and religious experience, lack
a clear distinction between Behavioural and Spiritual Values. They simply talk about religious
experiences and a sense of self and identity based on neurochemical interactions in the activation
and deactivation patterns of different areas of the brain and therefore subsequently their research
leads to describe consciousness as an evolving phenomenon out of the interactions of the
material dimension.
So here is the greatest irony of all: that the self that almost by definition is entirely
private is to a significant extent a social construct—a story you make up for others.
(Ramachandran 1998, p. 255)
To my view this creates confusion between information processing and consciousness. From
where I am, the totality of consciousness, God’s Consciousness, lays the foundations and
supports the information processing of different living systems and expressions of life forms. It
defines the perceived boundaries of the elements of expression of His/Her Being, The Universe.
I will propose that, the proximity to God’s Consciousness by any living system is established by
fields resonance, particularly Spiritual Values Fields. These fields must have a neural trace in the
human brain. However, part of that neural trace may be perceived as “random thoughts” by
5
Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs (1987).
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humans before they become fully realised in their Spiritual Identity and are able to discern
consciously “God’s Voice” and its associated field of Presence.
I am proposing that the initial exploration of the distinction between, Behavioural and Spiritual
Values is a necessity whose time has come. I am also proposing that the measurement and
quantification of the effects in the human body of these two categories of values may be possible
as science and technology are advancing, as well as humanity growing spiritually and human
consciousness gets closer to God’s Consciousness!!! This means, that people become
transformed in their innermost beings once the psyche and its dominance of thinking patterns in
terms of basic needs, imaginings and desires is reworked by The Spirit, who resides in the human
and is the Source of all Spiritual Values.
In order to expand on this essay, I consider it necessary to introduce the reader to a verbal
description and some kind of definition of what both Spiritual (Universal) and Behavioural
Values are.
Universal Values are the antidote to greed, fear, anger, guilt, and misuse of power and chaos in
general.
Universal Values are invisible and apprehensible presences, essences and forces, which may
beget noble human thoughts and feelings that are beneficial to the body, our mental, emotional
and physical well being.
Universal Values are the foundation to constructive intelligence and altruistic actions for the well
being of the human family and beyond.
To explore and embody Universal Values leads to the exploration of The Source of All Values,
The Value Giver, The Ultimate Value and Everlasting, Never Changing Presence.
In a voluntary exploration of the Laws of Nature, the Universe, the Mind, and the attainment of a
conscious, everlasting relationship with the Ultimate Value Giver and the Universe, two
categories of values can be identified from a human being’s perspective: Biological Values and
Universal Values.
These two categories may be explored and experienced in the context of their own domain and
nature, and their synthesis may be attained in a human life with the emergence of a fully
conscious human being who physically embodies and expresses Universal Values continuously.
Human Values are Behavioural Values, sometimes limiting and sometimes supporting of human
expression. They are relative in meaning, power, goodness and beauty, mainly related to a
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biological, physical and objective reality. They can be transformed by the agency of Universal
Values.
Universal Values are Spiritual Values, with or without the agency of a human or a behavioural
component, they are always liberating and ever expanding our human consciousness; absolute in
meaning, power, goodness, beauty and Truth, mainly related to our moral, spiritual and
subjective nature.
In a personal letter, later made public via the Internet, Carey Jackman (2007) wrote:
Human Values are Normative Values, they are based on a set of boundaries and
behaviour developed through fear and reward conditioning. They are related to
patterns of behaviour where individuals are entrained to react and feedback to an
external source, separated from the Source of Universal Values. They are also
related to beliefs and thought processes.
Universal Values come straight from the Universal Source, they are directly
sustained and accessible through the acknowledgement and relationship with The
Father-Mother of All Creation. They are Spiritual Values. They are beyond any
mental boundary of social, cultural, racial, and religious behaviour. They are
beyond the behavioural values of honesty and respect, moral codes of conduct. One
can be honest yet not living in Truth.
All of this raises the need of a Scientific-Spiritual Synthesis (SSS), especially in relation to the
exploration, identification, reception, perception and expression of Universal Values.
This may lead to the need to measure and quantify the effects of the interplay between Human
Behavioural Values and Spiritual Values in human bodies, relations and interactions in large.
Even though a subjective experience has a neural trace or component, this is far from being the
only component. The neural trace or component of such an experience is of an objective nature
of the matter field. This also is only part of a collection of effects related to such an experience.
Spiritual Values are different than the subjective experience of those same values. It is different
than qualia and its neural components as portrayed in the book, Phantoms In The Brain, where
Ramachandran and Blakeslee write regarding this subject, “Now you might ask, “Does any of
this yield clues as to where in the brain qualia might be?” (p. 244)
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The situation here is that the brains of different people may look very similar in relation to
Behavioural Values and yet very different in relation to Spiritual Values. Also, the areas of the
brain and the body where they register and leave their trace may be different. An example of this
is when two different people talk very nicely, with a soft voice to another human being. In one
situation the one who talks is hateful while in the other situation the one who talks is beholding
Love towards the other person. To express with a soft voice or to express in a “nice” way is
different than to Be Love in action (The Embodiment of Love).
The traces of a soft voice may be registered in the same area of the brain, with the same or
similar patterns. On the other hand, the presence of Love will register as a different heart beat
pattern and heart magnetic pulse with a different electromagnetic pulse frequency and with
different levels of entrainment and synchronisation between different oscillatory body systems,
like the heart, brain, respiratory and autonomic nervous system.
This means that whatever traces are searched for in the brain must be correlated to this
electromagnetic frequency and levels of synchronisation between different systems. Otherwise,
looking “into the brain” is like going to the movies. This is only capturing a very limited aspect
of reality.
To approach the study of spirituality scientifically requires an understanding of different theories
and hypotheses like, The Holonomic Brain Theory6, Quantum Brain Dynamics Theory7,
Morphic Resonance Theory8 and The Systemic Memory Hypothesis9. When taken together they
provide a framework of reference to understanding what Spiritual Values are.
It is important to note that, for the majority of human beings still living on this earth, Spiritual
Values find their expression in the context of Behavioural Values. These two are intrinsically
related and therefore, inevitably raise the need to investigate also the Neurobiology of
Behavioural Values.
In this regard Michael Persinger (1987) showed the influence of electromagnetic fields in
inducing religious or spiritual experiences. He proposes that humans are biologically wired for a
God experience connected to the reward centres, like the centre of Ecstatic Joy, and that this may
be a purely physical phenomena without the existence of God. However, he falls short in
explaining and clarifying that certain kinds of Electromagnetic fields just are the trigger, and just
6
Prideaux, Jeff; 2002. “Comparison between Karl Pribram’s Holographic Brain Theory and more conventional
models of neural computation.”
7
Jibu, Mari and Yasue, Kunio; 1995.
8
Sheldrake, Rupert. 1981, 1988, 1994, 2003.
9
Schwartz and Russek; “Do All Dynamical Systems Have Memory? Implications of the Systematic Memory
Hypothesis for Science and Society.” In Brain and Values: Is a Biological Science of Values Possible? Edited by
K. Pribram, 1998.
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the trigger for the neural and hormonal experience of reward in the form of Ecstatic Joy. He
lacks an explanation of the origins of these fields in nature and the universe and their connection
to Spiritual Values, something that Rupert Sheldrake (1981, 1988, 1994, 2003) and Stuart
Hameroff10 to name a few, have attempted to explain.
All of these also raise the need to define what an Evaluative System is.
I will define an Evaluative System as the interaction of a Universal Core Value System of
Spiritual Values and a set of Normative Values with implicit mechanisms to boundaries
developed through fear and reward conditioning. The Universal Core Value system comes from
The Source of all Spiritual Values, while the set of Normative Values are a consequence of the
operation of mental spaces, in conjunction with emotional responses and the natural mechanisms
of the human species for survival ends or purposes.
An evaluative system enables the creature (human being) with the capacity to make decisions
based on a combination of reactive responses to stimulus coming from his or her natural
environment in conjunction with the processing of social based rules and Spiritual Values in
perfect interaction with The Source of those values.
Only just recently neuroscientists are beginning to understand, from the point of view of the
brain, the mechanisms by which the orbito-frontal cortex uses emotional information to assist in
decision-making.
Some scientists like Edmund Rolls (1999)11, have suggested that the orbito-frontal cortex is
necessary for quick evaluation of stimulus reinforcement associations and that this evaluation has
its own mechanism of adaptation to changes in the environment. However, most of the scientific
research is usually conducted from a purely material and reductive perspective, like for example,
the work of Ramachandran and Blakeslee which seems to be locked in their views of
consciousness around the temporal lobe, creating confusion between Spiritual Identity and
Physical Identity. The first (Spiritual Identity) requires of an Evaluative System to distinguish
between the two, it is concerned with discernment regardless of biological personal history.
Authors like Damasio12, Edmund Rolls, Howard Eichenbam, Neal Cohen13 and others, agree that
the orbito-frontal cortex plays a significant role in a humans ability to respond and act in a social
environment where there is an exchange of emotional input between people. Also, that the
decision-making process of a human being is based on an evaluative system that is stored in the
10
Consciousness, Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics: The Case for a Connection.
The Brain and Emotion.
12
Descartes” Error - Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (1994).
13
Eichenbaum, Howard and Neal J. Cohen; 2001. From Conditioning to Conscious Recollection.
11
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frontal limbic cortex and takes into consideration the emotional qualities of a stimulus in order to
access how meaningful it is, and what actions are adequate. Most of these scientists also agree
that the amygdala is one of the main neural structures that interact with the orbito-frontal cortex
in emotional processing. This coincides with some of the testimonies of Ramachandran and
Blakeslee.
A radically different view is found in the book, The Keys of Enoch (1977), a Divine Revelation
where J.J. Hurtak writes regarding the broadcasting of mental spaces of spiritual worlds or
realms:
The supra-consciousness continuum, which makes this possible, emanates from the
higher consciousness exercising a superior interpretive and controlling role upon
the neural biological events of mental time interplaying with matter waves and
time-waves of the Light continuum. In actuality, this higher consciousness mind
operates through the divine worlds which, in turn, affects the physical worlds
through consciousness image programs of Light continuum which are not limited to
time differences. The self-realized mind can then modulate time differences to step
in and out of multiple realities between the physical world and the spiritual world
out of which our physical reality is extended. (p. 443, 24-28)
One question to posit is; how important is the bond with the community of human beings that
broadcast these signals, and their associated feelings of Love, Compassion and Grace amongst
others, to guarantee the survival of the species in a higher consciousness state of evolution?
To gain more insight and understanding on the neural biological aspect of this essay, first, I will
propose the exploration of the interaction between the Temporal Lobe and the Prefrontal Cortex
and their relationship to Physical and Spiritual Identity respectively. This sheds some light in
finding the neural traces of such interactions and such a research could be approached on the
basis of a clearer distinction between Spiritual and Behavioural Values.
Secondly, I will propose to search for a phenomena that I will call a “Healthy Blessed Seizure”,
brain activity similar to the ones related to Epileptic Seizures, therefore leading to spiritual and
religious experience. Different values could be explored with the characteristic of this being in
the control of the person and their correlation to waves and fields.
Thirdly, an exploration of the Evaluative Systems pathways related to the perception of the
dissolution of boundaries and the experience of “oneness” leading to the realisation of Spiritual
Identity with the ongoing subsequent experience of continuously embodying Spiritual Values.
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I am suggesting that a “Healthy Blessed Seizure” is part of the chain of events that are related to
the cause of a Spiritual Experience. I am also suggesting that the proper preparation in prayer
and the genuine desire to listen to the “Voice of God” and the readiness to act according to the
will of the Ultimate Value Giver, will produce a synchronisation of different brain areas with the
Prefrontal Cortex. This Synchronisation is caused to provide the long lasting effect of knowing
your Spiritual Identity and the ongoing embodiment of Spiritual Values.
This is very different to an epileptic seizure or an artificially electromagnetically stimulated brain
of a person, who reports only the experience of ecstatic unity with the cosmos. This my Dear
Reader, is a starting point to the exploration and understanding of Spiritual Values !!!
This is where the distinction between Spiritual Values and Behavioural Values becomes crucial
when attempting to detect which kind of experiences have been reported as a spiritual
experience.
To my view, the brain is wired both to develop instinctual survival neural pathways as well as
the capacity to develop a neural cognitive map of reality, which allows a communication with the
source of all Intelligence and Wisdom. This allows a human to act with spiritual awareness and
consciously, instead of merely reacting continuously to his or her environment as animals do for
their survival.
Hamer14, who accepts the possibility of the existence of God or at least presents his work without
denying God’s existence, has introduced some of his views which are also supporting of the idea
of genes for spirituality. He makes a certain distinction between learned religious behaviours and
Spiritual Values related to self transcendence, and proposes through the study of twins that
religious behaviours are learned and spiritual propensity is enabled through genes.
Even though his ideas may require more experiments and data analysis this presents a very
important biological aspect in differentiating Spiritual Values from Behavioural Values. Also, it
is brought to attention the fact that in God’s design of human evolutionary process of time and
space there is a provision for a mechanism to guarantee the survival of the human species, both
biologically in time space as well as spiritually in eternity.
Then, with all this in mind, God can be seen from my perspective as the most important survival
value for the soul, facilitating the possibility to know Him/Her and the spiritual dimension of
reality from generation to generation.
A Righteous Experience of life is derived from an intimate communion and constant connection
and communication with The Creator and life in large, The Universe. A Righteous Experience of
14
Hamer, Dean; 2004. The God Gene - How Faith is Hardwired into our Genes.
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life is associated with the status of Sonship or Daughtership with The Creator as a Father-Mother
of all. Sonship or Daughtership is better defined as a state of being in Unity with God and
attainment of God Consciousness.
A Son or Daughter is only concerned with doing the will of God and finds it easy and amenable
to intermingle and get to know his or her fellow human beings. His or Her love for The Creator
and other humans allows him or her to gracefully and happily participate and serve in the lives of
people with different religious traditions, beliefs or cultures. His or her main service to humanity
is to reveal, and show by example, how to live a life of this kind and therefore make this
experience available and attainable to other humans. From now on I will refer to a Son or
Daughter of The Creator who is fully active in doing the will of God as a Righteous Person (in
Hebrew called a Tzadik).
A Tzadik exists with a Universal Paradigm and a cognitive map tailored to the embodiment and
expression of the Spiritual Values of The Creator. This links them all to one common Origin
(One Universal Family), Source and Centre of Spiritual Values and Life. This enables in the
human being a communication and communion with The Divine Source and re-spatialises his or
her consciousness to comprehend cosmic realities through new and unknown states of
consciousness to the human until then, leading him or her to the desire to do good and God’s
will.
This initial definition opens up the possibility to formulate a paradigm for research about the
Neural Basis for the Brain of a Tzadik and the Neural Correlates of a Righteous Experience.
One of the major needs for expanding in this line of research is the formulation of the
appropriate hypothesis. This kind of hypothesis has to be established in order to validate the
interplay and link between mental activity based on Spiritual Values and brain activity, manifest
by the agency of electromagnetic fields, waves and electrochemical neural dynamics. This is the
study of the interplay between the spiritual being and the physical body, between the Spiritual
Identity and the physical construct of biological neural genetic informational process.
According to this paradigm, even though mental activity as thoughts are invisible and still
undetectable and measurable with current technology, they have a tangible effect in the physical
dimension of reality and particularly a direct effect in the physical body. This is similar to the
study of gravity, because no one has measured, boxed or sold gravity, however its effects can be
measured in the planetary atmosphere and conditions.
So, scientists could start by asking questions like for example; what is the electrodynamic
structure of Love combined with the thought and presence of the Value of Certainty, and what
are its neural correlates and its effect on health? As a consequence of this possibility and the
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validation of such a hypothesis, the reader is left with the implication that, as a species, humans
are sovereign beings with the capability and power to consciously shape future realities, and the
next stage of spiritual and neural genetic evolution! This means my dear reader that you and I
cause evolution by co-creating a loving family of human beings, instead of being a random effect
of evolution.
Like Joshua Ben Joseph prescribed to think and ask for when he said, “Thy Kingdom Come, Thy
Will Be Done On earth, As It Is In Heaven” (Matatyahu,
6:10)
This means that a human being is identified and unified consciously in the image and similitude
of The Creator.
The study of the brain of a Tzadik may have many similarities to the study of the brain of a
surfer. Somehow those surfers who have experienced the pipeline or tube, describe that
experience as one of unity with the universe, total harmony, perfection. They speak about an
eternal moment or now moment whose effect is permanent in the memory of the surfer to the
point that most of them (maybe all) scream the first time that it happens and they are left for days
with a huge sense of Joy and Self Realisation. After that, surfers are always willing to seek that
experience and state of being again.
The problem is that it may be very difficult to study the neural correlates of a surfer in action
with the actual technology. However, what about the neural traces, the memories of that
moment? Is it possible to find the imprint in the brain of why such an experience is reported to
be so powerful and long lasting? The same may apply for those powerful memories and neural
traces of those unusual states that Tzadikim and Mystics report.
One very important issue here is the fact that only some surfers have been in the tube, while the
majority are learning and mastering surfing to the degree that will allow them to ride inside the
tube and attain that experience. This learning may take years and usually surfing is a fun thing to
do. This means that until a surfer gets to experience oneness with the universe inside the tube he
or she derives values from surfing regardless of the status of that possibility.
Now, that creates a society or community (similar to religions or cults) with different
denominations of surfers, each of them with their own rituals and life styles, that are having a
nice social and fun experience surfing by themselves or with one another. However, this category
of surfers, are in a way still different (they are veiled to the experience of the tube) from those
ones who have had the experience of oneness. The neural traces of the experience of the tube are
absent in the brain of most surfers.
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Here there is a similar situation describing the difference between organised, institutionalised
religious groups and mystics or spiritually aware people who become the way showers to the
experience of the pipeline (Oneness, Union with God).
This illustrates the difference between Behavioural Values and Spiritual Values. The Neural
Traces of both categories of values I propose are different. That gives a sense of initial direction
on what to look for in the study of the embodiment of Spiritual Values in a Tzadik; which I have
called, “The Brain of Melchizedek.”
Well, you may recall from the stories about Joshua Ben Joseph, a High Priest after the Order of
Melchizedek, who lived around 2000 years ago, that though uninformed about surfing, he was
able to walk on water. So after all, the question of whether knowingly or unknowingly he set up
a precedent for Surfing, as a stepping stone to oneness and temporal union with God, can be
asked.
I will leave the Reader with some remarks and questions for further research.
1. - Which kind of brain structures and dynamics are associated with the heart and
respiratory systems that contribute or foster the transformation of a human being
from the identity of biological processes (neural activity in space-time) to their
Spiritual Identity. This means, which brain and bodily systems mediate the removal
of the veil to The Creator’s existence?
2. -
Which neurogenetic chemistry is associated with the dissolution or transformation of
the purely behavioural, survival human map of identity by the agency of Energeia
Pneumatikon or work of The Spirit?
3. -
How is the DNA of the species altered by such an order of consciousness, if at all?
4. -
What are the neural traces or interfaces of memories and personal history stored in
fields, electromagnetic and light waves for a fully realised spiritual being in human
form?
5. -
How is it possible to distinguish, measure and quantify the effects in the human body
of the two categories of Values (Spiritual and Behavioural) and what technology is
available to this end?
6. -
What kinds of brain and heart dynamics take place when damage happens to a
marital relationship, where Unity, Integrity and Trust are lost? By marital I mean two
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beings that have become One in The Spirit (perhaps through quantum entanglement quanglement) instead of the social construct of what is considered marriage.
7. -
What kind of fields associated with these values hold the relationship together and
how can they be identified and measured?
8. -
What kind of brain dynamics and fields are present in prayer and meditation, and
how do they affect the behaviour of the physical world (matter and energy)?
9. -
What kind of Behavioural Values are more conducive to a spiritual transformation?
10. - What kind of language, signs and symbols foster a spiritual transformation and what
kind prevent it?
11.- What kind of experiments can be conducted to research on brain-heart coherence
when exploring the neurobiology of spiritual and religious experience, as well as
Spiritual Identity and Character?
To attain Global Peace, the system of humanity requires that each of its elements (each person)
find their connection with The Creator. This individual process of personal peace and coherence
affects the whole of humanity. Each person contributes and is responsible for humanity by
fulfilling his or her own inner state of peace and harmony. As more people enter this state of
peace individually, the whole also changes and peace starts to emerge, which in turn may affect
also the speed at which people attain that state. This can be described as a Dynamical System of
Peace Propagation or Spiritual Values Propagation, something that could be called
Pneumadynamics, Ruachdynamics, Theodynamics or Melchidynamics.
To finish this essay, I will call Melchidynamics the study of the dynamical system associated
with the spiritual, quantum, electromagnetic and matter fields by the agency and interaction
between Spiritual and Behavioural Values and The Brain of Melchizedek to the attainment of
Peace and Harmony. This is to leave the reader with a word that will remind him or her of this
fascinating exploration.
References
Damasio, Antonio R., 1994 “Descartes” Error - Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain. (New York: A
Grosset/Putnam Book).
Eichenbaum, Howard and Neal J. Cohen; 2001 From Conditioning to Conscious Recollection.
(Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press).
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Fauconnier, Gilles and Turner, Mark; 2002 The Way We Think – Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s
Hidden Complexities. (USA: Basic Books).
Fauconnier, Gilles; 2001 “Conceptual Integration,” Emergence and Development of Embodied
Consciousness (EDEC). Accessed on 8 June, 2013 from http://www.google.co.uk/search, the first
entry - Conceptual Integration, Emergence and Development of Embodied Conscious EDEC:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.90.8028&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
Hamer, Dean; 2004 The God Gene - How Faith is Hardwired into our Genes. (New York: Anchor
Books).
Hameroff, Stuart; Consciousness, Neurobiology and Quantum Mechanics: The Case for a Connection,
www.quantumconsciousness.org/springer.htm, accessed on 22 July, 2008.
Hurtak, J.J., 1977 The Book of Knowledge: The Keys of Enoch. (California, USA: The Academy for
Future Science).
Jibu, Mari and Yasue, Kunio; 1995 Advances in Consciousness Research, Quantum Brain Dynamics and
Consciousness - An Introduction. (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co.).
Metzinger, Thomas (Editor); 2000 Neural Correlates of Consciousness - Empirical and Conceptual
Question. (USA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press).
Thomas Metzinger; “The Subjectivity of Subjective Experience: A Representationalist Analysis of the
First-Person Perspective”, (pp. 285-306)
Metzinger, Thomas; 2003 Being No One – The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity. (USA: A Bradford
Book, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press).
Persinger, Michael A., 1987 Neuropsychological Bases of God Beliefs. (New York, USA: Praeger
Publishers).
Pribram, Karl H. (Editor); 1998 Brain and Values: Is a Biological Science of Values Possible? (Mahwah,
New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers).
Gary E. Schwartz PhD. and Linda G. Russek PhD; Department of Psychology, University of Arizona,
Tucson. “Do All Dynamical Systems Have Memory? Implications of the Systematic Memory
Hypothesis for Science and Society”, (pp. 249-276).
Prideaux, Jeff; 2002 Comparison between Karl Pribram’s Holographic Brain Theory and more
conventional models of neural computation. Accessed on line 20 July, 2008 from
http://www.acsa2000.net/bcngroup/jponkp/.
Ramachandran, V.S. and Sandra Blakeslee; 1998 Phantoms in the Brain – Probing the Mysteries of the
Human Mind. (New York, USA: William Morrow and Company, INC.).
Rolls, Edmund T., 1999 The Brain and Emotion. (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press).
Sheldrake, Rupert; 1981 A New Science of Life - Revised and Expanded -The Hypothesis of Formative
Causation. (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc.).
- 1988 The Presence of The Past – The Morphic Resonance and the Habits of Nature. (London:
Collins, 8 Grafton Street).
- 1994 The Rebirth of Nature: The Greening of Science and God. (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions).
- 2003 The Sense of Being Stared At and other aspects of the Extended Mind. (London: Hutchinson).
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arXiv:0711.2058v1 [q-bio.NC] 13 Nov 2007
Computer Model of a ”Sense of Humour”.
I. General Algorithm
I. M. Suslov
Lebedev Physical Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
Leninsky pr., 53, Moscow, USSR 1
Abstract
A computer model of ”a sense of humour” is formulated. The humorous
effect is treated as a specific malfunction in the processing of information,
conditioned by the necessity of a quick deletion from consciousness of a false
version. The biological function of a sense of humour consists in quickenning
the transmission of processed information into conscioussness and in a more
effective use of brain resources.
1. Introduction
In everyday life we use humour for amusement, as ”a means of extracting pleasure from
the psychical process” [1] and we never ask ourselves why nature has provided us with the
sense of humour. The bare fact that there exists a complex biological mechanism which
causes specific muscular contractions (laughter) as a reaction to a definite combination
of sound or visual images leads us to conclude that the sense of humour originated at
early stages of the evolution 2 when the possibility of obtaining pleasure should not have
of appreciable importance. The present paper is an attempt to answer the question about
the biological function of the sense of humour.
In the proposed scheme, the humorous effect is interpreted as a specific malfunction in
the course of information processing conditioned by the necessity to delete some information
transmitted to consciousness. The biological function of a sense of humour consists in
quickening the transmission of processed information into conscioussness and in a more
effective use of brain resources. The proposed model accounts for different susceptibility
of people to humour, the absence of a humorous effect from a hackneyed joke, the role of
timing in telling jokes, etc. Some remarks on other emotions are also given. In the present
1
Present address:
P.L.Kapitza Institute for Physical Problems,
119337 Moscow, Russia
E-mail: suslov@kapitza.ras.ru
2
According to Darwin [2] antropoid monkeys possess a clearly distinct sense of humour.
1
work we formulate a general algorithm for a computer realization of a sense of humour;
in the following paper [3] we discuss the possible realization of the algorithm in neural
networks and the mechanism of laughter.
2. Humour from the psychological viewpoint
In psychology there exist several viewpoints on humour [4, 5, 6], the best – reasoned of
which is the concept of incogruity advanced by the Scotch poet Beattie [7] in l776. Its
concrete treatments are different in different investigations; we accept the viewpoint close
to the one advanced in the paper [5]: the humorous effect is a consequence of the ”commutation” of two mutually exclusive images (versions, estimates) in the human conscioussness.
In the simplest cases the commutation occurs on the level of meanings of a separate word
(the play on words). For example in the joke 3
(1*)
”My Uncle William has a new cedar chest”
”So! Last time I saw him he just had a wooden leg.”
the word ”chest” is at first realized in the meaning of ”box” but later it takes on a meaning
of ”breast”. In other cases the commutation takes place on the level of more complex
images:
(2*)
The horse tradesman: ”If you mount this horse at 4 in the morning
then at 7 in the morning you will be at Pittsburg.”
The customer: ”But what shall I do in Pittsburg at 7 in the morning?”
Here the words of the tradesman realized as ”the characteristic of horse speed” take on the
interpretation ”giving directions how to reach Pittsburg by 7 in the morning”. Example
(3*)
Is this a place where Duke of Wellington said his famous words?
Yes, it is the same place but he never said such words.
shows that the commutation may occur along the line of general estimate of a phrase:
the second remark at first gives the impression of being ”natural” or ”logical” but later is
perceived as ”absurd”.
The existence of two incompatible versions we were able to discover in all jokes; the
explicit ”commutation” of versions takes place in approximately half the cases. The rest
of the jokes are constructed according to the principle which can be called ”the ambiguity
scheme”. In the example
(4*)
Father (reprovingly): ”Do you know what happens to liars when they
die?”
3
A detailed classification of the technical aspects of wit can be found in Freud’s book [1] where examples
2*, 3* are taken from. We give a simplified classification in accordance to the purposes of the present paper;
in principle, it embraces all the cases considered by Freud.
2
Johnny: ”Yes, sir; they lie still.”
the expression ”lie still” may be lnterpreted as (1) ”be motionless” or (2) ”continue to
tell lies”. The speciflc feature of such cases is the practically equal possibility of the two
versions: accordingly there is no definite succession of their appearance in the consciousness.
It may be assumed that the commutation takes place in such cases also, but the order in
which the versions appear is determined by random circumstances; repeated commutations
are also possible.
The humorous effect is caused not only by ”wit” discussed above, but also by the
”comic” (exaggerated movements of a clown, grimaces, caricatures, parodies and so on).
As the main characteristic of the comic, ”the deviation from the norm” can be accepted;
accordingly, the humorous effect is caused by the repeated commutations ”the norm” —
”not the norm”. 4
The laughter from tickling can be connected with the attempt of the brain to localize
the place of irritation of skin; the result of such localization is invariably rejected because
the irritated place is changed unpredictably (that is the reason why the tickling should be
done by another person).
3. Information processing
We begin the formulation of the computer model of ”a sense of humour” by analysing
information processing. Suppose that a succession of symbols A1 , A2 , A3 , . . . (”text”) is
introduced from the outside world to the brain: it can be a succession of words during
visual or auditory percepption. In the brain a set of images {Bn } is associated with each
symbol An : for example a set of meanings (a dictionary family) is put in correspondence
to each word. The problem of information processing consists in choosing one image Bnin
(which is implied in the given context) from the set {Bn }. The text will be considered
as ”understood” if the succession B1i1 , B2i2 , B3i3 , . . . (which visually can be imagined as the
trajectory in the space of images — see Fig. 1) is put in correspondence to the succession A1 ,
A2 , A3 , . . . In principle, the algorithm of information processing consists in the following:
(1) all possible trajectories in the image space are constructed;
(2) a certain probability is ascribed to each trajectory on the basis of the information
on the correlation of images stored in memory;
(3) the most probable trajectory is chosen.
Only step 2 is nontrivial here, i.e. the algorithm of ascribing the probability to a given
trajectory. For example, such algorithm can be based on the binary correlations of images;
in this case the set pij should be stored in the memory where pij is the probablllty of
the event that in a meaningful text image i will be followed by image j; the probability
4
Of course, not every ”deviation from the norm” looks funny; but it should be taken into account that
habitual, oft-repeated deviations are analogous to hackneyed jokes (see below) and the weak deviations are
easily forced out by other emotions (see the following paper [3]).
3
Figure 1: The scheme of information processing: a set of images {Bn } is put in correspondence to each symbol An and one image Bnin should be chosen from the set {Bn }. The
succession B1i1 , B2i2 , B3i3 , . . . looks as a ”trajectory” in the space of images.
of a trajectory ijkl . . . is given by the product pij pjk pkl . . .. The probabilities pij can be
obtained by the statistical treatment in the course of the ”learning” process, during which a
sufficiently long fragment of the ”deciphered” text (i.e. recorded in images but not symbols)
is introduced to the brain. A more complex algorithm can take into account the correlation
between n images with n > 2: then the probabilities pi1 ...in−1 ; in of the succession of images
i1 . . . in−1 followed by image in should be stored in the memory. It is possible to base the
algorithm on binary correlations but with the syntactical connections taken into account 5
and so on. Algorithms of such type are being worked out in the investigations on machine
translation [8]; the concrete form of the algorithm is not essential for the following.
The number of operations required for the realization of any algorithm of such type
increases exponentially with the length of the text. So only fragments of the text containing
no more than a certain number (N) of symbols can be immediately treated by such a
method. How can longer texts be processed? The natural possibility is the following:
during the processing of the first N symbols not one but several (M) of the most probable
trajectories are remembered; then translation on one step made — the fragment from
the second to the (N + 1)-th symbols is considered — and for each of the M conserved
trajectories all possible continuations are constructed; then again M of the most probable
5
The syntactic structure of a sentence has a form of a tree, so that each dependent word is related
with its ”host”. The probability of a trajectory may be represented as a product of binary probabilities
according to the structure of a syntactical ”tree”. The practice of machine translation [8] shows that
the syntactic structure in most cases is clearly established by purely grammatical analysis (word order,
adherence to a part of speach, harmonization of endings, etc.) and for the purpose of the present work
may be taken as known.
4
Figure 2: The visual imagination of information processing: thin lines are trajectories
conserved in operative memory, A is a front, B is the point where the branching is over,
CD is a fragment of deciphered trajectory transmitted to consciousness.
trajectories are conserved and so on. It is reasonable to make the number M variable, so at
each stage as many trajectories are remembered as the operative memory can hold. In the
whole, the process looks as follows (Fig. 2): immediately after the front A the trajectory
is branched heavily; at a certain point B the branching is over (the distance between A
and B is restricted by the volume of operative memory provided for remembering the
trajectories); the deciphered part of the trajectory DC with some delay AC is transmitted
to the consciousness of the man and is realized by him as a thought (while the whole process
takes place in the subconscious and is not perceived immediately).
4. The role of emotions in information processing
If numbers N and M are sufficiently large and the algorithm of calculating the probability of N-symbol trajectory is good enough, then the described scheme will operate successfully. However the probabilitistic nature of the algorithm makes mistakes inevitable: so
a mechanism is desirable for minimizing their consequences. Such mechanism exists and it
consists in communicating to the consciousness some information about the course of the
processing in the subconsciousness; the man perceives such information as emotions.
5
For example, such parameters of the process are essential as the probability pmax of
the trajectory transmitted to consciousness and the probability pcomp of the most probable
of the competing trajectories. The high values of pmax and pmax /pcomp signal a successful
course of the process and are perceived as positive emotions (pleasure, confidence): the
information obtained is considered as reliable. The low values of pmax and pmax /pcomp signal
an unsatisfactory course of the process and are realized as negative emotions (annoyance,
doubt): the corresponding information should not be taken too seriously. For very low
values of pmax no versions are transmitted to consciousness (complete incomprehension)
and so on.
The possible relationship of emotions with the parameters of the process can be illustrated on the basis of the semi-empiric ”emotion formula” proposed by Simonov [9]
E = N (I − I0 )
where E is the emotion strength (which is objectively measured by the pulse rate, the blood
pressure etc.), N is a strength of some need, I0 is the quantity of information demanded for
the satisfaction of this need, I is the quantity of information the subject has at his disposal
(both informations are estimated subjectively). An emotion is positive (E > 0) for I > I0
and negative for I < I0 . We can suppose that in the course of information processing N
is the need in information and the different parameters of the process determine I and I0
for different emotions. For example, pmax can be used as I for the emotion ”pleasure of
understanding — annoyance of incomprehension” (accordingly, I0 is the typical value of
pmax ensuring the satisfactory course of the process). Analogously, pmax /pcomp can be used
as I if E is the emotion ”confidence – doubt” and so on.
These speculations lead us to conclude that the emotion expressing the humorous effect
is also related to some specific situation in the processing of information.
5. The humorous effect
Let us discuss the nature of the delay of point C with respect to front A (Fig. 2). At first
sight, point C in a reasonably organized system should be always behind point B or coincide
with it: it is just the variant we surely choose writing the computer program. However, for
a human as well as for any living creature such a variant is completely unsatisfactory. The
matter is that the delay of point C with respect to front A results in the time interval τAC
during which the information introduced to the brain does not appear in the consciousness
(the man sees a bear but he is not aware of this). The prolongation of the interval AC
is obviously dangerous while the interval AB can drag out for objective reasons (the man
cannot decide what he sees: a bear or a bush shaped like a bear). Therefore, the interval AC
should have the upper bound τmax on the time scale: if time delay τAB corresponding to the
interval AB is less than τmax then point C coincides with point B (Fig.3,a); if τAB > τmax ,
then τAC = τmax and point C leaves behind point B (Fig.3,b). In the latter case, the
6
Figure 3: The parameter τmax is the upper bound of the time interval corresponding to
delay of point C with respect to front A; (a) τAB < τmax , (b) τAB > τmax .
most probable version DE is transmitted to the consciousness while competing versions
(DE ′ ) are conserved in the operative memory (Fig.3,b) — their deletion is unreasonable
because the brain has resources to continue the analysis. If in the course of the subsequent
movement of front A the trajectory DE continues to have the maximum probability, then
the competing trajectory DE ′ will be deleted and the time will be saved as a result. If in
the course of the movement of front A the probability of DE falls below the probability of
DE ′ , then the brain will have a possibility to correct the mistake. In this case, however,
the specific malfunction occurs: the fragment BC transmitted to consciousness should be
immediately deleted and replaced by the fragment of trajectory BE ′ . Psychologically this
malfunction is perceived as interference of two incompatible versions: version BC fixed
by the long-term memory and the newly appeared version BE ′ . The described specific
malfunction can be identified with ”a humorous effect”.
Indeed, the situation described is exactly reproduced in the course of the interpretation
of jocular expressions. For example, in joke (1*) two incompatible versions arise in the
subconsciousness during the analysis of the first remark: in the first of them (DE) the
word ”chest” is treated as ”box” while in the second (DE ′ ) it is treated as ”breast”. In the
context of the given sentence version DE (”box”) is more probable and is transmitted to
consciousness. The appearance of the word ”leg” in the second remark makes version DE
less probable and increases the probability of version DE ′ (”breast”): this gives rise to a
humorous effect.
It is essential to emphasize that the existence of a humorous effect is not to any degree
unavoidable: nature had a possibility to avoid it in one of the two manners: (1) by delaying the transmission of trajectory DE to consciousness till trajectory DE ′ is naturally
discarded, or (2) by quickening the transmission of DE by rejection DE ′ simultaneously.
7
However, in the first case the time the information reaches consciousness is delayed and
in the second case the brain resources are not completely used: so nature resolves this
problem at the cost of psychological confusion.
In the process of evolution the optimal value of τmax is achieved which ensures the
compromise between the reliability of information and the speed of its obtaining (people
with long τmax will be eaten by a bear, while people with short τmax will confuse every
bush with a bear and will be incapable of getting food). For the optimal value of τmax the
inequality τAB < τmax is satisfied as a rule, and a humorous effect is rare enough in the
natural conditions; but it can be easily produced by specially constructed witticisms and
comics.
6. Some consequences
The model described offers a natural explanation for a number of well-known facts.
The failure of a hackneyed joke to produce a humorous effect is a consequence of the
fact that a man knows of the existence of two incompatible versions beforehand and avoids
the transmission of the clearly false version to consciousness (for example, knowing that in
joke (1*) the ”chest” turns out to be a ”breast” he is not tempted to interpret it as ”box”).
The role of intonation in telling jokes is related mainly with temporal characteristics
(pace, arrangement and duration of pauses, etc), which can be taken into account by
incorporating an appropriate number of ”spaces” in succession An . The quick pace of
telling does not give time for the false version to be transmitted to consciousness and
interval BC (Fig. 3) turns out small or absent. The slow pace of telling increases the
lengths of trajectories due to ”spaces” and the competing trajectory BE ′ (Fig. 3) is deleted
from the operative memory; so the commutation of versions becomes impossible. 6
Different susceptibility of people to humour 7 is connected (in case of equal intellectual
level) with the differences in the delay τmax . People with large τmax seldom laugh because
point C seldom outruns point B. Conversely, people with small τmax are aware of a humorous effect even in cases that most people do not see as funny. Supposedly, τmax is diminished
by alcohol and this is a cause of the unmotivated gaiety. At fixed τmax the susceptibility to
humour correlates with the volume of the operative memory, which determines the average
length of the interval AB (Fig. 2).
Nervous laughter. If a mass of unpleasant impressions rushes at a man and there
is danger of the overstrain of the nervous system then the organism forcibly deletes the
6
The dependence of humorous effect on duration of the pause in a certain place is well described in
Mark Twain’s essay ”Public Speaking”.
7
We have in mind the susceptibility to humour in principle, leaving aside the cases when individual
peculiarities give rise to inadequate reaction to a concrete joke. The examples are incomprehension of a
joke due to the absence in memory of a necessary image, peculiar view of the ”norm” while perceiving the
comic, the forcing out of laughter by secondary emotions (see [3]) and so on.
8
unpleasant information and replaces it by neutral: this gives rise to the reflectory laughter.
7. Conclusion
Freud [1] considers the pleasure obtained from laughter as the main cause of the existence of a sense of humour: a man discovers the possibility of extracting pleasure from
the psychical process and begins subconsciously and then consciously to exploit it. Our
viewpoint is the opposite: a sense of humour is biologically conditioned by the necessity
to quicken the transmission of information to consciousness and of a more effective use of
brain resources: so the pleasure obtained from laughter is not an essential factor (similarly,
the two reflexes — sneezing and coughing — exist regardless of the pleasure afforded by
the first and the displeasure caused by the second, because they are dictated by the biological necessity of cleaning out the respiratory system). Of course, if laughter afforded
displeasure the social function of humour would change: the society would try to get rid of
it by censorship, prosecution of witty people and so on.
Is it possible to create a computer program which will ”laugh” in the same cases as
a man? From our viewpoint it is quite possible if we restrict ourselves to the simplest
types of jokes based on the commutation of meanings of separate words (example 1*);
the corresponding program will not be much more complex than the average machine
translation program [8]. Computer modelling of the more complex jokes involves the need
to identify a complete set of images the average human brain contains and to establish the
correct associative connections between these images. This would require many years of
work of psychologists and programmers.
Acknowledgements. I thank L.A. Prozorova for discussion of linguistic aspects of the
paper and D.S. Chemavsky for discussion of results.
References
[1] Freud, S. Jokes and their relation to the unconscious (Norton, New York, 1960).
[2] Darwin, C. The expressions of emotions in man and aniimals (Murray, London, 1872).
[3] I.M.Suslov, Biofizika 37, 325 (1992) [Biophysics 37, 249 (1992)].
[4] Nash, W. The language of humour (Longman, New York, 1985).
[5] Paulos, J.A. Mathematics ana Humor (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1980).
[6] McGhee, P.E. and Goldstein, J.H. (eds). Handbook of Humor Research (Springer,
New York etc., 1983).
[7] Beattie, J. Essays (William Creech, Edinburg, 1776).
9
[8] Hutchins W.J., Harold S.L. An Introduction to Machine Translation, London, Academic Press, 1992.
[9] Simonov, P.V. Emotional brain (Nauka, Moscow, 1981).
10 |
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Kaufman, S. E., That Which Is Hidden
Realization
That Which Is Hidden
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
Blind to the Formlessness of which all forms are composed, we are blind to That which connects
all forms, and so blind to That which makes all forms One. But once you recognize the part of
yourself that has been hiding from you, and yet was always there in plain sight, then what once
seemed most real becomes the shadow, and what seemed to be the shadow becomes what is most
Real.
Key Words: blind, hidden, form, formless, One, shadow, Universe, Consciousness.
We look into the Universe
and see that it consists of objects
and the space out of which
those objects arise.
But when we look at ourselves
we see only an object,
only a form.
And yet even our bodies
consist mostly of space,
just like the Universe
out of which we grow
like fruit on a tree.
We just don't see it,
and so we pretend
that it's not there.
So we look at the Universe
and we see form and formlessness,
but when we look at ourselves
we see only form
and not the Formlessness.
This is our first mistake,
if one wants to call it that,
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com
1171
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Kaufman, S. E., That Which Is Hidden
and really our only mistake,
because all other mistakes
are just the continuation
of this one mistake.
And what is this one mistake,
that is not really a mistake,
but just a necessary part of the game
of cosmic hide and seek
that we came to play?
It is the twin ideas
that what we are is only a form,
and that what we are not
is the Formlessness
in which all forms arise.
If someone said the Universe
consisted of only the objects
and not the space
that is also clearly there,
then we would say
they were either crazy or blind.
But when we know ourselves
as only an object, as only a form,
and not at all as the Formlessness
that is also clearly here
where we are,
we call this normal,
we call this seeing things
as they are.
What is this Formlessness,
in which all forms arise?
What is it within yourself
that is formless?
I will give you a hint.
It is not your mind,
nor is it space,
for mind and space,
as formless as they may seem,
are themselves subtle forms,
from which the less subtle forms
ISSN: 2153-8212
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Kaufman, S. E., That Which Is Hidden
of thought and matter arise.
So what is it within yourself
that is truly formless?
I will give you another hint.
It is That by which you know
both the subtle forms of mind and space,
and the less subtle forms of thought and matter
that arise within mind and space.
It has always been there,
you just do not recognize it
as either a valid part of what you are,
or as the essential part of what you are.
Which is more real,
form or Formlessness?
Which is more enduring,
the objects that arise in space
or the space in which
those objects arise?
The forms seem more real than the Formlessness
when form is all you know yourself to be.
But once you recognize the part of yourself
that has been hiding from you,
and yet was always there in plain sight,
then what once seemed most real
becomes the shadow
and what seemed to be the shadow
becomes what is most Real.
And then the game
becomes much more fun,
becomes much more enjoyable,
becomes much more filled with joy,
and so less filled with the suffering
that seems to make this life
such a burden, such a task, such a chore,
rather than the game
that it really always has been.
When you do not recognize your True Nature,
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Kaufman, S. E., That Which Is Hidden
you cannot recognize the Universe as your Self,
and so then the Universe,
which is really your closest friend,
appears as your opponent.
And then what is really only a game
being played between friends,
being played with your Self,
appears as a battle
between sworn enemies.
And so we find ourselves
in almost perpetual conflict
with this or that form,
with this or that situation,
with this or that person,
with this or that nation,
because we do not see those forms
as our Self,
because we cannot see the Formlessness
within ourself.
Blind to the Formlessness
of which all forms are composed
we are blind to That
which connects all forms,
and so blind to That
which makes all forms One.
Love thy neighbor as thy self
was not a command,
nor even a suggestion,
but simply a statement
regarding how one will feel
about the Universe of things,
about the Universe of forms,
once it is realized that the Kingdom of Heaven
is truly within us,
as the Emptiness,
as the Formlessness,
as the Fullness of Life,
that is already here,
has always been here,
and will always be here,
Now, in this Moment
as our true and essential Nature.
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
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Measures of Entropy and Complexity in altered states of consciousness
D. M. Mateos1 ∗, R. Guevara Erra2 , R. Wennberg3 , J.L. Perez Velazquez1
1 Neuroscience and Mental Health Programme, Division of Neurology, Hospital for Sick Children.
Institute of Medical Science and Department of Paediatrics, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
2 Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, CNRS and Université Paris Descartes, Sorbonne Paris Cité, Paris, France.
3
Krembil Neuroscience Centre, Toronto Western Hospital, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
* mateosdiego@gmail.com
arXiv:1701.07061v1 [q-bio.NC] 9 Jan 2017
January 26, 2017
Abstract
Quantification of complexity in neurophysiological signals has been studied using different methods, especially those from information or dynamical system theory. These studies revealed the dependence on different
states of consciousness, particularly that wakefulness is characterized by larger complexity of brain signals
perhaps due to the necessity of the brain to handle varied sensorimotor information. Thus these frameworks
are very useful in attempts at quantifying cognitive states. We set out to analyze different types of signals
including scalp and intracerebral electroencephalography (EEG), and magnetoencephalography (MEG) in
subjects during different states of consciousness: awake, sleep stages and epileptic seizures. The signals were
analyzed using a statistical (Permutation Entropy) and a deterministic (Permutation Lempel Ziv Complexity)
analytical method. The results are presented in a complexity vs entropy graph, showing that the values of
entropy and complexity of the signals tend to be greatest when the subjects are in fully alert states, falling
in states with loss of awareness or consciousness. These results are robust for all three types of recordings.
We propose that the investigation of the structure of cognition using the frameworks of complexity will reveal
mechanistic aspects of brain dynamics associated not only with altered states of consciousness but also with
normal and pathological conditions.
1
Introduction
Multitude of studies focus on the investigation of patterns of correlated activity among brain cell ensembles
based on magnitudes of a variety of synchrony indices or similar measures. A prominent common aspect that is
emerging from those studies is that of the importance of the variability in the brain coordination dynamics. In
general, neurophysiological signals associated with normal cognition demonstrate fluctuating patterns of activity
that represent interactions among cell networks distributed in the brain [1]. This variability allows for a wide
range of configurations of connections among those net-works exchanging information, and thus it supports the
flexibility needed to process sensory inputs. Therefore, it has been argued that a certain degree of complexity
in brain signals will be associated with healthy cognition, whereas low complexity may be a sign of pathologies
[2, 3, 4]. We sought to obtain evidence for the correlation between complexity in brain signals and conscious
states, using brain electrophysiological recordings in conscious and unconscious states.
There exist a number of statistical measures to analyses electrophysiological recording [5]. In our work we use
two well knows measures, one statistical –Shannon entropy, a measure of unpredictability of information content
in a message [6] and the other deterministic the Lempel-Ziv complexity based in the minimum information required
to recreate the original signal [7]. For both measures, we use use the quantifiers introduced by Bandt and Pompe
[8], called permutation vectors, these are based on the relationship of the neighbour values belonging a time series.
The Shannon entropy applying to the permutation vector is knowing as permutation entropy (HPE) [8]. In a
similar manner the Lempel-Ziv complexity applied to the permutation vectors is called permutation Lempel-Ziv
complexity (PLZC) [9]. We used these two method to obtain information about the signals dynamics from two
differents perspective, probabilistic (HPE) and deterministic (PLZC). The permutation entropy and the LempelZiv complexity have been employed in previous studies analyzing electrophysiological recording in epilepsy, coma
or sleep stages [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Moreover , there is an interesting relation, under certain restrictions, between
the Shannon entropy and the Lempel-Ziv complexity that naturally can extend to the HPE and PLZC [15, 9].
The result we obtain are shown in a complexity-entropy graph. This kind of representation allows us to
visualize better the results. In a recent study on chaotic maps and random sequences, it was shown that the
complexity-entropy graph allows the distinction of different dynamics which are impossible to discern using
1
each analysis separately ( [16], unpublished results). In our work we analyze brain signals recorded using scalp
(EEG), intracranial electroencephalogram (iEEG) and magnetoencephalogram (MEG), in fully alert states and
in two conditions where consciousness is impaired: seizures and sleep. The hypothesis derived from the previous
consideration on the variability of activity is that the brain tends towards larger complexity and entropy in
wakefulness as compared with the altered states of consciousness.
2
Methods
Electrophysiological recordings
Recordings were analysed from 9 subjects using magnetoencephalography (MEG), scalp electroencephalography
(EEG) or intracranial EEG (iEEG). Three epilepsy patients were studied with MEG; one epilepsy patient was
studied with iEEG; 3 epilepsy patients were studied with simultaneous iEEG and scalp EEG; and 2 nonepileptic
subjects were studied with scalp EEG.
For the study of seizures versus alert states, the three subjects with MEG recordings and the one with iEEG
were used. Details of the patients’ epilepsies, seizure types and the recording specifics have been presented in
previous studies (MEG patients in [17], 2005; iEEG patients in [18]). For the study of sleep versus alert states,
the 3 patients with combined iEEG and scalp EEG have been described previously (patients 1, 3, 4 in [19]); the 2
subjects studied with scalp EEG alone had been investigated because of a suspected history of epilepsy, but both
were ultimately diagnosed with syncope, with no evidence of epilepsy found during prolonged EEG monitoring.
In brief, the MEG seizure recordings were obtained in one patient with primary generalized absence epilepsy,
in one patient with symptomatic generalized epilepsy, and in one patient with frontal lobe epilepsy. The iEEG
seizure recordings were obtained from a patient with medically refractory temporal lobe epilepsy as part of the
patient’s routine clinical pre-surgical investigation.
MEG recordings were obtained using a whole head CTF MEG system (Port Coquitlam, BC, Canada) with
sensors covering the entire cerebral cortex, whereas iEEG electrodes were positioned in various locations including
the temporal lobe epilepsy patient, the amygdala and hippocampal structures of both temporal lobes. EEG
recordings were obtained using an XLTEK EEG system (Oakville, ON, Canada). The details of the acquisitions
varied from patient to patient (e.g., acquisition rate varied from 200 to 625 Hz) and were taken into consideration
for the data analyses. The duration of the recordings varied as well: for the seizure study, the MEG sample
epochs were of 2 minutes duration each, with total recording times of 30-40 minutes; the iEEG patient sample
was of 55 minutes duration. The sleep study data segments were each 2-4 minutes in duration, selected from
continuous 24-hour recordings.
Data analysis
The data were analyzed throw the permutation Lempel Ziv complexity (PLZC) and the permutation entropy
(PE). Due the relationship existing between these quantities the result were shown in a complexity-entropy graph,
to extract information from the signals either deterministic to statistic. In this section we give a breve explanation
of both method and the relationship between then.
Permutation entropy
The permutation entropy (HPE) is a measure develop by Bandt and Pompe [8], for time series based on comparing neighboring values. The continuous time series is mapped onto a sequence of symbols which describe the
relationship between present values and a fixed number of equidistant values at a given past time.
To understand the idea let us consider a real-valued discrete-time series {Xt }t≥0 , and let d ≥ 2 and τ ≥ 1 be
two integers. They will be called the embedding dimension and the time delay, respectively. From the original
(d,τ )
time series, we introduce a d-dimensional vector Yt
:
(d,τ )
Yt
→ (Xt−(d−1)τ , ..., Xt−τ , Xt ); t ≥ (d − 1)τ
(d,τ )
There are conditions on d and τ in order that the vector Yt
preserves the dynamical properties of the full
dynamical system1 . The components of the phase space trajectory Y(d,τ ) are sorted in ascending order. Then,
we can define a permutation vector, Πd,τ
t , with components given by the position of the sorted values of the
(d,τ )
component of Yt
Each one of these vectors represents a pattern (or motif). There are d! possible patterns. It
is possible to calculate the frequencies of occurrence of any of the d! possible permutation vectors. From these
1 For EEG signals values of d = 3, ..., 7 have been recommended [8]; For the time lag, it is adequate to use a value of τ = 1 [20],
For all signals in this work we used the parameter d = 3, .., 6 and τ = 1.
2
frequencies, we can estimate the Shannon entropy associated with the probability distributions of permutation
vector. If we denote the probability of occurrence of the i-th pattern by P (Πd,τ )i = Pi with i ≤ d! then the
(normalized) permutation entropy associated with the time series {Xt } is (measured in bits):
Pd!
− i=1 Pi log2 Pi
HP E =
(1)
log2 d!
The fundamental assumption behind the definition of HPE is that the d! possible permutation vectors might not
have the same probability of occurrence, and thus, this probability might unveil knowledge about the underlying
system.
Permutation Lempel-Ziv complexity
Entropy is a statistical characterization of a random variable and/or sequence. An alternative caracterization of
time series is the deterministic notion of complexity of sequences due to Kolomogorof. In this view, complexity
is defined as the size of the minimal (deterministic) program (or algorithm) allowing to generate the observed
sequence [15, Chap. 14]. Later on, Lempel and Ziv proposed to define such a complexity for the class of “programs”
based on recursive copy-paste operators [7].
To be more precise, let us consider a finite-size sequence S1:T = S1 ...ST of size T , of symbols Si that take
their values in an alphabet A of finite size α = |A|. The definition of the Lempel–Ziv complexity lies in the two
fundamental concepts of reproduction and production:
• Reproduction: it consists of extending a sequence S1:T by a sequence Q1:N via recursive copy-paste operations, which leads to S1:T +N = S1:T Q1:N , i.e., where the first letter Q1 is in S1:T , let us say Q1 = Si , the
second one is the following one in the extended sequence of size T + 1, i.e., Q1 = Si+1 , etc.: Q1:N is a
subsequence of S1:T +N −1 . In a sense, all of the “information” of the extended sequence S1:T +N is in S1:T .
• Production: the extended sequence S1:T +N is now such that S1:T +N −1 can be reproduced by S1:T , but
the last symbol of the extension can either follow the recursive copy-paste operation (thus we face to a
reproduction) or can be “new”. Note thus that a reproduction is a production, but the converse is false.
Let us denote a production by S1:T ⇒ S1:N +T .
Any sequence can be viewed as constructed through a succession of productions, called a history H. For
instance, a history of S1:T can be H(S1:T ) : ∅ ⇒ S1 ⇒ S1:2 ⇒ · · · ⇒ S1:T . The number the productions used for
the generation CH(S1:T ) is in this case equals to the size of the sequence. A given sequence does not have a unique
history and in the spirit of the Kolmogorov complexity, Lempel and Ziv were interested in the optimal history,
i.e., the minimal number of production necessary to generate the sequence. The size of the shortest history is the
so-called Lempel–Ziv complexity, denoted as C[S1:T ] = minH(S1:T ) CH(S1:T ) [7]. In a sense, C[S1:T ] describes the
“minimal” information needed to generate the sequence S1:T by recursive copy-paste operations.
As explained above, the Lempel–Zip complexity (CLZ ) needed a alphabet of finite size to be used. In continuos
time series as EEG or MEG it is necessary to discretized the series before calculating the CLZ . Using the same
idea that in permutation entropy can be taken the alphabet as the set of permutation vectors A = {Π(d,τ ) } and
the alphabet large α = |d!|. This is called permutation Lempel–Ziv complexity (PLZC)2 [9]
The most interesting thing is although analyzing a sequence from a completely deterministic point of view,
it appears that CLZ [S1:T ] sometimes also contains the concept of information in a statistical sense. Indeed, it
was shown in references [15, 7] that for a random stationary and ergodic process, when correctly normalized, the
Lempel-Ziv complexity of the sequence tends to the entropy rate of the process; this result were extend to the
permutation Lempel-Ziv complexity and the permutation entropy [9]; i.e.,
lim CLZ [S1:T ]
T →+∞
HP E [S1:T ]
log(T )
= lim
T →+∞
T
T
(2)
where HP E [S0:T −1 ] is the joint permutation entropy of the T symbols, and the righthand side is the permutation
entropy rate (entropy per symbol) of the process. Such a property gave rise to the use of the permutation
Lempel-Ziv complexity for permutation entropy estimation purposes.
3
Results
The results obtained with recordings acquired during conscious state are compared with those acquired during
unconscious states, with include sleep (all stages) and epileptic seizures. We note that while we work at the
2 From now we call the permtation Lempel–Ziv complexity as C
LZ
3
signal level we made the reasonable assumption that the MEG and scalp EEG sensors record cortical activity
underlying those sensors and thus throughout the text we used the term brain signals. On the other hand, the
iEEG, obviously, records signals at the source level. For all the signals the permutation vector parameter used
were d = 3, ..., 6 and τ = 1.
3.1
Entropy-complexity analysis from epileptic recordings
To visualize the dynamics of entropy and complexity in the time, we use a non overlapping running window
(∆ = 625) corresponding to 1s MEG recording points. For each window the PLZC and HPE were calculated.Fig. 1
shows the complexity (PLZC) and entropy (HPE) values correspond to a MEG recording from a patient suffering
primary generalized epilepsy (A), secondary generalized epilepsy (B) and an frontal lobe epilepsy (C). For patients
A and B the entropy and complexity values represented were calculated the average over the 143 channels. For
patient C the values in each plot correspond a particular channel.
One MEG channel corresponding to patient A, are shown in the inset of Fig. 1A), where the seizure is visible as
a high amplitude in signal. The complexity-entropy graph depict clearly the dynamics of the ictal event. During
conscious states (baseline) – when patients remain conscious since they are not having generalized seizures– the
PLZC and HPE tent to maximum values, but as the patients experience seizures both values decrease widely,
returning to the original baseline values after the event.
Similar result can be seen in patient B who had 7 seizures, the seizures are visible in the inset of Fig. 1B.
We can see in the graph that the baseline and the interictal activity – the recording between to seizures – reach
always the highest values in entropy and complexity, declining to values well below in the ictal state (seizure).
This result is repeated for each of the seizures.
In Fig. 1C we show the analysis for 4 different MEG channels corresponding to: left frontal (LF23), left
temporal (LT5), left occipital (LO41) and right occipital (RO43). The first two belong to the region where the
seizure spread. For all channels the values of HPE and PLZC are higher in baseline, however the entropy and
complexity decay in the most affected areas (LF23, LT5), while for the other areas (LO41, RO43) the complexity
doesn’t change, there being a small decrease in entropy. Similar result were found in the signals of the other
epileptic patients, recorded with scalp EEG and iEEG.
A possible explanation for this decreas in complexity and entropy during seizures, is that there is higher
synchrony during ictal periods (seizures), therefore this causes the recording signals become more stereotyped,
the number of permutation vectors used to quantized the signals are smaller and more regular giving a lower
entropy and complexity. This will be further commented in the discussion.
3.2
Entropy-complexity analysis during sleep stages
Te recording in these cases were of 2-4 minutes duration during wakefulness with eyes opened (’Awake’) or closed,
and in sleep stages slow-wave 2 (Sws2), slow-wave 3-4 (Sws3-4) and rapid eye movement (’REM’). Fig. 2A shows
entropy and complexity values applying to 4 whole recording (iEEG channels): left frontal media (LFM1), right
frontal media (RFM4), left temporal anterior (LTA1), right temporal anterior (RTA4). The various stages of
sleep are remarkably differentiated in the graph. Note how during wakefulness entropy and the complexity is in
the higher region of the graph, whereas for the slow wave stages, the values stay in the lower region. The deepest
sleep stage, slow wave 3-4 (sws 3-4), has consistently the lowest entropy and complexity. Interestingly, entropy
during REM sleep is very close, in most cases, to the normal, alert state. This result may not be as surprising
as it appeare, if we consider the mental activity during REM episodes that are normally associated with dreams.
The results are in agreement with those reported in [12, 13].
The results for 4 scalp EEG channels are shown in Fig. 2B, where the same result was obtained: higher
complexity and entropy for awake state and lower for deep sleep state. In this case, during REM, the values
remains between slow-wave period and wakefulness. For the other 2 subjects analyzed we obtained similar results.
This example demonstrates that the same qualitative result is obtained with different recording techniques. The
similarity of the result indicate that these type of analysis is not influenced by the recording methodology.
4
Discusion
Our results indicate a pronounced loss of entropy and complexity in brain signals during unconscious states or
in states that do not represent full alertness (eyes closed). This is consistent with what the signals represent:
the coordinated collective activity of cell ensembles, which, in alert states, are responsible for optimal sensory
processing. This optimality requires certain variability in the interactions among those cell networks, which will
be conceivably represented in greater complexity.
4
Previous work has indicated less variability in the coordinated activity patterns in altered states of consciousness, mainly derived from the analysis of synchronization in patients in coma [21, 22], or during seizures [17, 23].
A common feature of several theories of consciousness is the notion of a broad distribution of cellular interactions
in the brain that results in conscious awareness (reviewed in [24]). This requirement implies that a certain, high
degree of variability in the formation and dissolution of functional cell ensembles should take place [25], and
this variability will be reflected in higher complexity of the brain signals during alert states. Moreover in several
computational studies have revealed as well the lower complexity associated with epilepsy and abnormal cognitive
states, like schizophrenia [26]
In fully alert states, brain recordings exhibit higher frequencies of relatively low amplitude, and are less regular
than during other states where alertness is perturbed, including closing the eyes (when a prominent periodic
alpha rhythm appears in parieto-occipital areas, for instance). Brain cell ensembles that need to integrate and
segregate sensorimotor transformations while they receive rich sensory-motor inputs [27]; it is then conceivable
that these characteristics will be reflected in the high entropy and complexity values we observe. As consciousness
is gradually lost, during sleep, the values of entropy and complexity decrease because brain networks do not need
the richness in states needed to process the sensorium. The lack of arrival of multiple sensory inputs during
unconscious states decreases the need for neurons to display many different firing frequencies, since there is not
much integration/segregation being done at those stages and there is not much sensory load. One consequence of
this change in firing patterns during unconscious states, particularly in sleep (for a comprehensive review of the
neurophysiological mechanisms leading to slow-wave sleep and other thalamocortical phenomena see [28]) is that
the high frequencies (gamma range) become less prominent and there is higher synchrony at lower frequencies. As
well, the amplitude of the slow waves is now high since there are more synchronized cells. Thus, all these events
result in the recording becoming more regular and exhibiting the typical slow wave frequencies, and therefore our
complexity measures decrease as compared to alert states. These results are consistent with measures obtained
from analysis of sleep EEG using permutation entropy [12] and other nonlinear measures, such as approximate
entropy, correlation dimension, recurrence plots and Hurst exponent, amongst others [29, 30, 31].
In the case of the epileptic recordings we have observed that the complexity and entropy values are larger in
the interictal stage (between seizures) and decline sharply in the ictal stage (seizures). This may be due to the fact
that seizures are characterized by excessive synchronous neuronal activity, which generates predominance of large
amplitude waveforms, the frequencies depending on the seizure type; e.g., the frequency is low in absence seizures
(3-4 Hz), but vary substantially in temporal lobe seizures. However, the frequencies remain relatively constant
for certain time periods (originating a distribution of periodic epochs, or laminar phases), that have been used in
the characterization of dynamical regimes in epileptiform activity [32], and therefore the complexity and entropy
tend to decrease. During the sleep stages we also found decreased entropy and complexity as compared with alert
states, a reflection of the aforementioned emergence of highly synchronous cell activity during slow wave sleep.
On the other hand, we found that complexity during REM sleep is similar to that of the awake state. This is
conceivable since REM episodes are normally associated with dreaming, and there is certain cognitive activity
going on in dreams, when there is partial awareness. Previous work has shown decreases in HPE and LZC in
patients under anesthesia effects [14, 10, 33], thus the decreased complexity of brain signals in unconscious states
may be a common phenomenon.
Hence in the final analysis what we measure, at the macro(meso)scopic level (through the recording of collective
cel activity in EEG or MEG), is a reflection of that the brain handles more information during wakefulness. A
larger code is required to manipulate more information. The complexity/entropy of the signals used in this
work have been quantified through the Bandt and Pompe method [8], which focuses on the relative values of
neighbouring data points in a time series. Every embedding vector (or motif Πd,τ
i ) gives an idea of how the
waveform is, in a small section, of the original signal. As the original signal carries more variable information, the
waveform tend to be more fluctuating, and the number of distinct motifs required to map it increases. Because
of that the probability distribution of motifs P (Πd,τ ) tends to be uniform, and this caused entropy increase.
Besides, due to of the waveform fluctuation, the PLZC increases too, since much more information is required
to reconstruct the signal. In contrast, for monotonal repetitive signals which have little new information, just a
limited number of motifs are required, e.g. for a sinusoidal signal the PLZC and HPE tend to be zero.
We note that our present resutls are complementary to those recently obtained using measures of coordinated
activity, namely the number of configurations of connections derived from an index of phase synchronization [1];
we should consider that the present analysis, done on the raw signals, represent too correlated activity as each
local field potential (in case of iEEG) or signals recorded in scalp EEG or MEG represent the collective activity
in cell ensembles, thus these signals are themselves a measure of coordinated cell activity, and therefore it is not
surprising we obtain similar observations
It can be concluded that in the awake state, when information has to be handled is larger, the complexity
and entropy of the signals recorded from the brain tend to be higher than in absence of consciousness, a result
that stems from the distinct waveforms recorded in these mental states.
5
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7
A
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Figure 1:
Represent the permutation Lempel Ziv complexity (CLZ ) vs permutation entropy (HP E ) (with
parameter d = 4 and τ = 1) time tracking values for a MEG signal in epileptic patients during conscious, baseline
(BL) and unconscious, seizure (Sz) states. A) Patient with primary generalized epilepsy, the MEG signal for one
channel is plotted in the inset (the high amplitude represent the seizure). We observe that before the seizure
entropy and the complexity the values remains very high, decreasing in the seizure epoch and return to the
original values after the seizure. B) Patient with secondary generalized epilepsy, who had 7 seizure during the
recording period, is in the inset. When the patient stay in the inter-ictal state (no seizure period) entropy and
complexity values are higher and decreasing in the every attack. C) Patient suffering from frontal lobe epilepsy;
4 channels were analysed separately, left frontal (LF23), left temporal (LT5), left occipital (LO41), right occipital
(RO43). For the two recording areas affecting by the seizure (LF23 and LT5) entropy and complexity change in
the ictal state, but for the areas which are not affected (LO41 and RO43), the CLZ and HP E values are the same
that in baseline state. The same result we obtained for the parameter d = 3, 4, 5, 6 and τ = 1.
8
0.17
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HPE
Figure 2: A) Each windows the channel recording from one iEEG channels analyzing by the permutation
Lempel-Ziv complexity (CLZ ) vs permutation entropy (HP E ) graph (with parameter d = 4 and τ = 1), for a
patient recording during sleep. Data samples were of 2-4 minutes duration during wakefulness with eyes open
(’Aw Oe’) , and sleep stages slow-wave 2 (‘Sws2’), slow-wave 3-4 (‘Sws3-4’) and rapid eye movement (’REM’).
The electrode localization are: left frontal media (LFM1), rigth frontal media (RFM4), left temporal anterior
(LTA1), right temporal anterior (RTA4), the yellow circle show the position of the channel in the brain. When
the patient go in deeper sleep states, both PLZC and HPE decreases across all channels. B) The same analysis
as in A applied to another subject (scalp EEG channel recording), as in the previous one, awake state has the
higher entropy and complexity and the values decrease for deeper state of sleep. For the REM stage the values
are remains between the sleep stages and the wakefulness stage. The same result we obtained for all patient
analyzed with the parameter d = 3, .., 6 and τ = 1.
9 |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 8 | pp. 610-631
Kaufman, S. E., On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness: Part 3: The Identification of the Formless
with Itself (1)
610
Article
On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness:
Part 3: The Identification of the Formless with Itself (1)
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
In the third part of this work what is described is how formless Consciousness, owing to the way
in which it naturally relates to the world of forms once it has lost sight of Itself though
identification with form, unknowingly keeps Itself caught up in, and so bound to, the relation
with Itself that is creating its identification with form, and so unknowingly perpetuates both its
identification with form as well as its inability to become aware or conscious of the Formlessness
that is Itself, thereby also perpetuating the illusion that reality, i.e., apprehended form, is what is
actually there where it appears to be. Also described in the third part of this work is what formidentified Consciousness must do, so to speak, in order to extricate Itself from the cage of formidentification in which it is, owing to the way it naturally relates to Itself through the proxy of
form while still identified with form, unknowingly keeping Itself trapped. And what formidentified Formlessness must do, in order to extricate Itself from the cage of form-identification
in which it has trapped Itself, is change the way it naturally and habitually relates to the universe
of experiential forms, owing to its identification with form, while still identified primarily with
form.
This first article of Part 3 contains the following sections: The mutually exclusive nature of
identification with form and identification with the Formless; The self-perpetuating nature of the
Movement into identification with form; & The way out of form-identification.
Key Words: Consciousness, formless, form, physical reality, creation, nature.
The mutually exclusive nature of identification with form and identification with the Formless
As mentioned previously, the purpose of this writing is not to provide the reader with additional
concepts, with additional form-based knowledge, that one can then add to one's form-identity.
Rather, the purpose of this writing is to demonstrate to the reader the reflection or shadow-like
nature of form in order to weaken the reader's identification with form. And the ultimate purpose
of weakening one's identification with form is to facilitate the turning of one's Attention toward
the Formlessness that must remain hidden in plain sight as long as one's Attention remains fully
fixed upon form, as it does while one is fully identified with form and thereby unavoidably
involved in the reactive Movements of attachment and aversion. To turn one's Attention toward
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
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Kaufman, S. E., On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness: Part 3: The Identification of the Formless
with Itself (1)
611
the Formless, which is an internal Movement, and to thereby become aware of Awareness,
conscious of Consciousness, is to wake up to some degree from the dream of form-identification
in which most of humanity dwells, and to thereby Awaken to some degree to one's true Nature,
which Nature remains unavoidably hidden as long as the dream continues, which is to say, as
long as individualized Beingness continues to move or flow Itself into form-identification at full
Force. Thus, if an individualized Beingness is not able to Move in that direction, i.e., not able to
turn its Attention toward the Formless, such a Beingness must then continue to dream the dream
of form-identification, and while dreaming that dream continue to remain completely unaware
and unconscious of its true Nature, which is not other than the true Nature of the universe itself.
It is important to understand that no one can take this step for you, that no force outside yourself
can turn your Attention away from form and toward the Formless, because you yourself, as you
truly are, are the Force and Flow of formless Beingness, albeit individualized Beingness, but
formless Beingness nonetheless. However, it is quite possible that, as of this writing, you are an
individualized Beingness that is fully identified with form and so flowing Itself only toward
form, flowing all of its Attention toward form, and as a result conscious only of that, conscious
only of form. That having been said, to paraphrase Eckhart Tolle, pointing out the possibility of
your complete identification with form is nothing personal; rather, it is just a statement that has
as its basis the recognition that the vast majority of human Beings are, at the time of this writing,
completely identified with form and so have no idea whatsoever that there is a completely
different, much more pleasant, much more satisfying, and much more fulfilling, way to Be. All
that having been said, in order to flow at least some of your Attention toward the Formless, and
thereby become to some degree conscious of That, conscious of the Formless, conscious of
Consciousness, conscious of what is ultimately your true Self, you must at some point withdraw
some of your Attention from form, i.e., you must direct some of the flow of your Beingness in a
direction other than toward form, because in the absence of that Movement you have no
Attention to give to what is ultimately your Self, and so no way of Knowing what is ultimately
your formless Self.
The Formless can become conscious of Itself, can become conscious of Consciousness, in the
same way it can be conscious of form, but it cannot do so under any and all conditions. For
individualized Consciousness to be conscious of Itself requires the involvement of that
individualized Consciousness in a particular relation with Itself, and because the consciousness
of Consciousness requires a particular relation, and because for every relation there is an
opposite relation, there then must be an opposite relation in which individualized Consciousness
can be involved with Itself in which individualized Consciousness is not conscious of Itself. And
that opposite relation with Itself, in which relation individualized Consciousness is not conscious
of Itself, in which relation individualized Consciousness cannot be conscious of Itself, is the
relation in which individualized Consciousness is involved with Itself when it is identified with
form, which is to say, the relation in which individualized Consciousness must be involved with
Itself in order to create the knowledge or experience of itself as some form. And as long as an
individualized Beingness continues to be involved in that relation, i.e., in the relation that is
creating its identification with form, that individualized Beingness is simply not able to become
involved in the opposite relation necessary for it to become directly conscious of Itself as
Formlessness, directly conscious of its formless Self, directly conscious of its formless Nature,
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 8 | pp. 610-631
Kaufman, S. E., On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness: Part 3: The Identification of the Formless
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612
absent any intervening form, including the concept of formlessness. The impossibility of being
involved simultaneously in opposite and so mutually exclusive relations is not a condition that a
single individualized Beingness is able to overcome. If an individualized Beingness is involved
in one relation with Itself then it is by definition not involved in the opposite relation with Itself.
Thus, in order for an individualized Beingness to become directly conscious of Itself as it Is, i.e.,
as a Formlessness rather than as a form, that Beingness must withdraw to some degree from its
complete involvement in the relation with Itself that is creating its identification with form so
that the possibility of its becoming involved in the opposite relation can arise.
Throughout time there have been many human Beings, many teachers, who have Awoken to one
degree or another from the dream of form-identification, and having done so they did what they
could to point their fellow Beings in the direction of the Formlessness to which they Awoke
when the dream more or less ended, for those who have Awoken to the Formlessness know that
all that can be done with words is to point toward it, because they know that what they are
pointing toward is Itself beyond words, because it is beyond form. And none of those teachers,
living or otherwise, no matter how great, no matter how fully Realized, no matter how fully
Awake, can carry you across the threshold from form into No-form, across the threshold from
form-identification, where what you are remains hidden from you, into identification with the
Formless, where what you are is revealed to you. All those teachers can do, the very most that
any one of them or even all of them can do, is use form to take you to that threshold and then use
form to point you in the direction beyond which no form may pass, which threshold into Noform you may cross because you are not a form, but which threshold into No-form you may not
cross while still carrying with you your form-identity, which is to say, while still knowing
yourself fully as form.
You cannot cross the threshold into No-form while still knowing yourself fully as form because
as long as you remain fully identified with form you remain fully involved in the Movement that
is the opposite of the Movement in which you must become involved in order to cross the
threshold into No-form. Put another way, you cannot cross the threshold beyond which no form
may pass while still primarily identified with form because the ceaseless Movement of one's full
Attention toward form that is part and parcel of both form-identification, as well as the reactive
Movements that identification with form makes so seemingly natural and necessary, is the
opposite of the Movement of Attention toward the Formless that is the awareness of Awareness,
the consciousness of Consciousness, that is itself the crossing of the threshold into No-form.
Every movement of individualized Consciousness, every flow of individualized Beingness,
makes it impossible for that same point of Beingness to simultaneously Move or Flow in the
opposite way. This is the limitation which Beingness that is being in relation to Itself
unavoidably imposes upon Itself. And since this universe is composed of Beingness that is being
in relation to Itself, thereby becoming Form and apprehending form, this is a limitation that we,
as Beingness operating in this universe, cannot ourselves avoid. This limitation produces all
appearance of the world as this or that form, as this limitation makes it impossible for a single
individualized Beingness to simultaneously become involved in the opposite relations with
Beingness necessary to create what that individualized Beingness would apprehend as opposite
forms, so that everything must, in any one moment, appear to a single individualized Beingness
ISSN: 2153-8212
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research| September 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 8 | pp. 610-631
Kaufman, S. E., On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness: Part 3: The Identification of the Formless
with Itself (1)
613
as either this or that form, as either this or that reality. And this same limitation of relation is also
what makes it impossible for individualized Beingness to Know Itself as it Is, i.e., as a
Formlessness, while actively knowing itself as some form. Put another way, it is for the same
reason that when a wave-form is observed that the particle-form becomes hidden, which
phenomenon is referred to as wave-particle duality, or that to the extent to which any form is
observed that to that same extent the opposite form becomes hidden, which phenomenon is
referred to as uncertainty, that to the extent to which we know ourselves as form that to that same
extent our true formless Nature becomes obscured, which phenomenon is referred to as maya,
because in all of these cases, i.e., wave-particle duality, uncertainty, and maya, what is actually
happening in order to allow what is apprehended to be apprehended, whether it is some form that
is being apprehended or the Formless Itself that is being apprehended, is Beingness being in
relation to Itself, Beingness flowing in relation to Itself, and as a result becoming conscious of
what its involvement in that relation has its Attention flowing toward. And because whatever
individualized Beingness is conscious of requires its involvement in some relation, be it the
consciousness of this or that form or of the Formless Itself, and because it is not possible for an
individualized Beingness to be simultaneously involved with Beingness in what are opposite and
so mutually exclusive relations, what a single individualized Beingness can be conscious of in
any one moment is unavoidably limited by whatever relations in which that individualized
Beingness is already and presently involved as it apprehends whatever it is already and presently
apprehending.
However, although individualized Beingness' apprehension of form, as well as its apprehension
of the Formless, both require its involvement in some relation with Beingness, there is a
difference between the apprehension of form and the apprehension of the Formless, because
form must first be created by some relation of Beingness to Itself in order to be apprehended,
whereas the Formless already Is and so does not need to be created in order to be apprehended.
That is, when individualized Beingness apprehends form, i.e., becomes conscious of some
reality, what it is apprehending has been created by some relation of Beingness to Itself. On the
other hand, when individualized Beingness apprehends the Formless, i.e., becomes conscious of
Consciousness, what it is apprehending has not been created, although the apprehension of the
Formless by individualized Beingness does require the coming into being of Form in order to
allow for the relation of Beingness to Itself, i.e., the movement of Beingness toward Itself, that is
the consciousness of Consciousness. Thus, the apprehension of the Formless does involve
Attention being directed primarily toward the Formless rather than primarily toward form, and so
does involve some relation of Beingness to Itself. But what is apprehended when it is the
Formless that is being apprehended is not something that has been created as a result of that
relation, because the Formless already and always Is. The apprehension of the Formless by
individualized Beingness may require a relation, but what individualized Beingness apprehends
as a result of that relation is, unlike what it apprehends as form, Itself Non-relational, Itself not
dependent upon any relation in order to Be. Before the relation it already Was, during the
relation it continues to Be, and absent any relation it still Is. And so the relation is necessary, or
at least seems to be necessary, to bring about, within this universe of Form, the apprehension of
the Formless by the Formless, but that relation is not necessary to bring into Being the Formless
Itself, not necessary to bring into Being either That which apprehends or That which is
apprehended, which are not two different things but are rather a singular formless Non-thing.
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614
Here the mind reaches a limit as we approach with words, with forms, that which is, in its
essence, a formless Singularity lying beyond the concepts of form and No-form. Conversely, in
order for individualized Beingness to apprehend form as reality, the form apprehended as reality
must itself be created by some relation of Beingness to Itself in order for it to even exist as a dual
or two-sided something, one side of which individualized Beingness can then apprehend from its
always limited perspective upon that created form as a particular and polarized reality, i.e., as
this or that, or as some portion of this and some remaining portion of that.
This is why what formless Beingness apprehends as form, even though it is created by and so
arises within formless Beingness, is not Beingness, is not the nature of Beingness, and so creates
delusion when Beingness thinks of itself as being this or that, i.e., as being some form. Beingness
cannot be found within form any more than substance can be found within shadow. Lesser form
is an appearance, an existence; formless Beingness is what Is. Metaphysically speaking,
differentiating between the apprehending Formlessness and the forms which that Formlessness
apprehends has often been referred to as discrimination between the real and the unreal.
However, now that it is possible to understand that reality is simply apprehended form, it seems
more useful and internally consistent to speak of this difference as a discrimination between the
Actual and the real, referring then to What Is Actually There and the reflection or shadow that
only appears to be what is actually there, respectively. This approach does not require that we
redefine reality, but allows us to accept reality as it appears, which is as real, but it does require
that we understand that that which appears as reality, and so that which we call real, is of the
nature of a reflection or shadow, and so only appears to be what is there because it is not what is
actually there where it appears to be. In this way of describing the universe, What Is Actually
There where reality only appears to be is not Itself then a reality, not Itself real, but is something
beyond real, something beyond the collection of diverse reflections that we call reality, and in
this particular classification and conceptualization that something beyond real is referred to as
the Actual. All these words are just signposts, but the more consistent the signposts that we use
are, the more clearly they are able to point, as a group or as a whole, in the direction in which
they are intended.
And it is because from within this Dimension of Form, constructed of formless Beingness
flowing in relation to Itself, that the apprehension of the Formless, the apprehension of the
Uncreated, does require some relation of Beingness to Itself, some relation of the Formless to
Itself, that it becomes possible, within this Dimension of Form, for Beingness to lose sight of
Itself, to obscure Itself. This Self-obscuring becomes possible within the Dimension of Form
because, for the relation that brings about individualized Beingness' apprehension of the
Formless to even be possible, through which relation individualized Beingness can Know Itself
directly as unconditioned and non-individualized Beingness while still flowing through Form, it
must also be possible for individualized Beingness to become involved in the opposite relation
which brings about the opposite apprehension, which opposite apprehension in this case is not
just the apprehension of form, but is individualized Beingness' apprehension of itself as form,
which is another way of saying the identification of individualized Beingness with form. Put
another way, for it to be possible for individualized Beingness to Know Itself as it Is within the
Dimension of Form it must also be possible for individualized Beingness, operating within the
Dimension of Form, to know itself as it is-not. Put yet another way, for there to be the possibility
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615
of Self-knowledge within the Dimension of Form, there must also be within that Dimension the
possibility of Self-ignorance. The wave-form can only be known where there was, prior to that
knowing, also the possibility of knowing the particle-form, and vice versa. Likewise, Selfknowledge can only be had where there was, prior to that Knowing, also the possibility of
acquiring Self-ignorance, and vice versa.
The potential for both Self-knowledge and Self-ignorance has always been there and is always
there, for that potential rests in the Infinite Potentiality that is the Formless. But the Formless did
not evolve Itself into Form, did not become Form, did not mould Itself into the Universe, for the
potential to Know Itself to remain only potential. To the contrary, the Formless moulded Itself
into the Universe, became Form, in order to actualize and realize directly the Infinite Potential
within Itself, the Infinite Potential that is Itself. The Infinite Potential has no form, and also has
no Form. The Infinite Potential is beyond form and even Form. But if the Formless remained
completely formless, i.e., without Form, it would also remain only potential, and not become
either actualized or realized. Converting the Infinite Potential that is the timeless and spaceless
Singularity of unconditioned Beingness into the Actual requires formless Beingness to smear
Itself out, as it were, into space and time, into Form, to provide seemingly different places and
times for the Indivisible Singularity that is the Infinite Potential of Unconditioned Beingness to
become an infinity of Actualities appearing as infinitely varied realities. And the way
unconditioned Beingness spreads Itself out, as it were, becoming different points in space and
different moments in time, while all the while still remaining a spaceless and timeless
Singularity, is through iterative and progressive Self-relation, remaining always what it
unconditionally Is while simultaneously becoming what it conditionally Is in relation to Itself.
What unconditioned Beingness unconditionally Is is Consciousness. What unconditioned
Beingness conditionally Is in relation to Itself is Form.
In this Dimension of Form, constructed of formless Beingness flowing in relation to Itself, where
all relations of Beingness to Itself are potentially possible, and thus where one relation is possible
the opposite relation must also be possible, the only way in which a particular relation of
Beingness to Itself becomes no longer possible in a given moment is because the opposite
relation is, in that same moment, also no longer possible because it has become Actual, or
Actualized. Thus, moving one relation from the realm of the Potential to the Actual also takes the
opposite relation out of the realm of the Potential, but does not create its Actuality, but rather
makes the simultaneous creation of its Actuality impossible. This is how the evolution of Form
has proceeded. We begin with Infinite Potential, and with each relation and each Actualization
that Potential becomes constrained to a particular Form. And yet, although the Form is
constrained by the relation of Beingness to Itself of which it is composed, because the Form is
composed of unconditioned Beingness, albeit unconditioned Beingness flowing in relation to
Itself, the Form nonetheless Itself contains Infinite Potential, leaving that Infinite Potential to
then express Itself through the Form, through some now and newly possible relation of formless
Beingness to Itself that brings into being another constrained Form, through which the Infinite
Potential of which the new Form is composed can then express Itself through some now and
newly possible relation of Beingness to Itself that brings into being another constrained Form,
through which the Infinite Potential of which the new Form is composed can then express Itself,
and on and on and on it goes until here we are, that Infinite Potential, that unconditioned
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616
Beingness, that Consciousness, flowing through a constrained Form of Itself, Individualized but
nonetheless containing ourselves Infinite Potential, and so the potential to become involved in
this relation or that relation and so to bring into being this or that Actuality, this or that Form,
while simultaneously creating this or that form which form we, as the unconditioned Beingness
of which all the Forms are composed, apprehend from a particular perspective within the
Dimension of Form as this or that reality.
But for every relation in which we become involved out of the Infinite Potential of relations that
lies within us and is us, thereby taking one of those relations from the level of Potential to the
level of Actual, thereby bringing into being Form while simultaneously creating form
apprehended as reality, we also simultaneously remove from the level of Potential, at least for
our Individualized Self, the possibility of our becoming involved in the opposite and so mutually
exclusive relation, thereby making it impossible for us to simultaneously bring into being the
opposite Actuality, thereby making it impossible for us to simultaneously create the opposite
form, thereby making it impossible for us to simultaneously apprehend the opposite reality. And
it is only because we ourselves are the Infinite Potential that our involvement in some relation
removes from the realm of the Infinite Potential the opposite relation, because once we become
involved in some relation, and as long as we are involved in a particular relation, we, i.e., the
Infinite Potential, are simply not available and so are simply not able to become involved in the
opposite and so mutually exclusive relation, in which case the opposite relation is, for as long as
we are involved in a particular relation, no longer part of our now constrained, and yet still
infinite, Potential.
However, this removal of a particular relation from the realm of the Potential while we are
Actualizing the opposite relation lasts only so long as we continue to Actualize the opposite
relation, which is to say, as long as we remain involved in the relation that is bringing into being
the Actuality and also creating the form apprehended as reality. That is, if we cease to be
involved in a particular relation, then both relations, i.e., the previously Actualized and the nonActualized, return to the realm of the Potential because we are now available and so able to
become involved in either relation, i.e., our involvement in either relation once again becomes
possible, in which case the bringing into being of either Actuality and so either reality also once
again becomes possible. And so it is that, while involved in the relation in which we bring into
being an Actuality within which is created a form that is apprehended or realized as a particular
reality, e.g., a particle reality, we simultaneously remove from the realm of the Potential the
possibility of our involvement in the opposite and so mutually exclusive relation needed to bring
into being the opposite Actuality within which would be created the opposite form that would be
apprehended or realized as the opposite reality, which in this case would be a wave reality.
However, if we cease to be in the relation that creates a particular reality then our involvement in
either relation once again becomes possible and so both relations once again become potential,
until one is Actualized thereby simultaneously taking the other off the table, so to speak.
Likewise, while involved in the relation in which we identify with form and thereby create Selfignorance, we simultaneously remove the opposite relation from our individualized Potential and
so make impossible our involvement in the relation that is identification with the Formless and
the realization of Self-knowledge. However, if we can, even for a moment, cease to be involved
in the relation in which we identify with form then both relations return to the Potential and
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617
identification with the Formless then becomes possible. But as we shall explore in the next
section, the great barrier to Self-knowledge is not the effort, or really the absence of effort, it
takes to become involved in the relation in which one identifies with the Formless; rather, the
great barrier to Self-knowledge is the difficulty in ceasing to be involved in the relation in which
one identifies with form, once one has become involved in that relation, so that the opposite
relation that would allow us to identify with the Formless can once again become part of our
individualized Potential and so once again becomes even possible.
The self-perpetuating nature of the Movement into identification with form
As described in the last section, the duality between the Knowledge and the Ignorance, which is
to say, between Self-knowledge and Self-ignorance, is not a duality between the apprehension of
form and the apprehension of the Formless, but is a duality between Beingness' apprehension of
itself as form and Beingness' apprehension of Itself as formless Beingness, a duality between
Beingness' identification with what it is aware of or conscious of as form and Beingness'
identification with what it is or can be aware of or conscious of as formless Beingness. And so,
the duality between Self-knowledge and Self-ignorance arises from a duality of opposite and
mutually exclusive movements of Beingness in relation to Itself, one of which Movements
causes individualized Beingness to become identified with form and the other of which
Movements allows individualized Beingness to become aware of Awareness, or conscious of
Consciousness, absent any intervening forms, including the concepts of Awareness and
Consciousness, thereby making it possible for formless Beingness to Know and identify with
Itself. Those then are the two mutually exclusive relations, those are the two mutually exclusive
movements of Beingness within the Dimension of Form, within the Dimension composed of
Itself flowing in relation to Itself, that underlie the opposite states of Being that are Selfknowledge and Self-ignorance.
And as mentioned at the end of the last section, the difficulty individualized Beingness faces
with regard to becoming involved in the relation that would allow it to identify with the Formless
does not confront individualized Beingness as a result of that relation being a difficult relation in
which to become involved, as it is not. Rather, the difficulty faced by individualized Beingness
with regard to becoming involved in the relation with Itself that would allow it to identify with
the Formless is the difficulty that surrounds individualized Beingness' ceasing to be involved in
the relation with Itself that is creating its identification with form, in which relation it must to
some degree cease to be involved in order for there to arise the possibility of its becoming
involved in the opposite relation that would allow it to identify with the Formless. The difficulty
that surrounds individualized Beingness' ceasing to be involved in the relation with Itself that is
creating its identification with form has as its basis the self-perpetuating nature of the movement
of Beingness into the relation with Itself that creates its identification with form. That is, once
individualized Beingness moves or flows Itself into the relation with Itself that causes it to
identify with form, the delusion of form-identification which that Movement and relation creates
sets into motion a process that has as its result the continued and ongoing movement of formidentified individualized Beingness into the relation that causes it to identify with form,
regardless of any effort made by that individualized Beingness to disidentify with form, because,
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618
as will be described, the perpetuation of that process is fueled by the efforts that naturally arise as
individualized Beingness tries to escape the suffering that unavoidably and inevitably arises
within Itself once it has identified with form.
The reason that the movement of individualized Beingness into the relation with Itself that
causes it to identify with form is self-perpetuating, which movement into that relation
simultaneously removes from possibility its opposite movement into the relation with Itself that
would allow for its identification with the Formless, is because, from within the reality of formidentification, any movement that form-identified individualized Beingness makes to extricate its
illusory self from the suffering it inevitably experiences as a result of its identification with form
is actually a Movement that is a continuation and so perpetuation of the movement of Beingness
into the relation with Itself that is causing it to identify with form. Thus, any effort to escape the
suffering created by its identification with form only perpetuates the relation in which
individualized Beingness is involved with Itself that is itself the cause of its suffering. And as
long as an individualized Beingness remains completely involved in the relation that creates its
identification with form, it simply is not possible for that individualized Beingness to become
involved to any degree in the opposite and so mutually exclusive relation with Itself necessary to
allow for its consciousness of and identification with its formless Self, i.e., with the Formless.
This perpetuation of the relation that creates Beingness' identification with form occurs once
individualized Beingness has identified with form because virtually all Movements made from
within the reality of form-identification tend to be reactive Movements that have the
individualized Beingness' identification with form as their basis, as form-identified
individualized Beingness reacts to apprehended form with either attachment, aversion, or
reflexive allowing. In any case, regardless of whether the reaction to form is one of attachment,
aversion, or reflexive allowing, because these reactive Movements have the Movement and so
relation that creates form-identification as their basis, they serve to lock, knot, and bind
individualized Beingness into the relation that creates its identification with form, as shown in
figure 31.
primary Movement and relat ion
of Beingness to Itself
Movement of individualized
Beingness into the relation with Itself
that causes it to identify with form
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secondary Movement and
relation of Beingness to Itself
secondary Movement
of individualized
Beingness into a
relation with Itself
through its reactive
relation to form....
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....that locks into place
the primary Movement
and so relation of
Beingness to Itself that
is creating its
identification with form
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Figure 31 Depicted on the left in the form of a rope or string is the movement or flow of
individualized Beingness into the relation with Itself that creates, for that individualized
Beingness, the reality that is its identification with form. Depicted on the right is a reactive
movement or flow of that now form-identified individualized Beingness into a relation of
attachment, aversion, or reflexive allowing, which reactive Movement follows naturally and
unavoidably once Beingness has identified with form. What this drawing shows is that, since
the movement of individualized Beingness into the reactive relations of attachment, aversion,
and reflexive allowing are secondary Movements and relations that have as their basis the
already present and so primary Movement and relation of individualized Beingness into formidentification, that these reactive secondary Movements must then lock, knot, and bind
individualized Beingness into the primary Movement and relation with Itself that is creating its
identification with form, thereby effectively trapping that individualized Beingness in the reality
of form-identification as long as that Beingness remains engaged and involved in the reactive
Movements and relations that seem to be both natural and necessary while it is identified with
form.
In general, a Movement that has another Movement as its basis can only continue as long as the
Movement that is its basis also continues. Therefore, the presence of a secondary Movement not
only implies the presence of the primary Movement that is its basis, but even more importantly,
the presence of a secondary Movement essentially forces or causes the continuation of the
primary Movement that is its basis. Every movement of Beingness is ultimately a Movement in
relation to Itself, because there actually is nothing else, and so ultimately every movement of
Beingness brings into being some relation of Beingness to Itself. The Movement that brings into
being the relation that allows individualized Beingness to identify with the Formless is one
Movement, whereas the Movement that brings into being the opposite relation that causes
individualized Beingness to identify with form is the opposite Movement. Likewise, the reactive
Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing also bring into being a relation of
Beingness to Itself. However, since the relation that is brought into being by the reactive
Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing has as its basis an already present
Movement and relation, those reactive secondary Movements not only create a new relation of
Beingness to Itself, but they also lock into place the primary Movement and relation that is their
basis, since these reactive Movements are ultimately a progression of the primary Movement of
Beingness into identification with form.
What figure 31 shows is that secondary Movements and relations cannot do other than lock into
place and so perpetuate the primary Movement and relation that is their basis. For this reason, the
reactive, unconscious, and secondary Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing
bind individualized Beingness to the primary Movement and relation that is creating its
identification with form, because it is not possible for individualized Beingness to cease to be
involved in that primary Movement and relation as long as that primary Movement and relation
is serving as the basis for that individualized Beingness' subsequent reactive Movement. Thus, a
reactive Movement is simply a Movement or Action that is actually the continuation and natural
progression of a previous Movement or Action, and is therefore a re-Action, and so is called a
reactive Movement. Put another way, the primary Movement and relation cannot itself cease as
long as it is fueling a secondary Movement and relation, because the secondary Movement and
relation can only be Actualized as long as the primary Movement and relation itself remains
Actualized.
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The reason this binding of individualized Beingness into a primary Movement and relation as the
result of its subsequent involvement in a secondary Movement and relation that has that primary
Movement and relation as its basis is important to understand is because this is the essential
mechanism that causes the perpetuation of form-identification once individualized Beingness has
identified with form. And the reason it is important to understand the essential mechanism that
perpetuates form-identification is because, as long as form-identification is being perpetuated by
this mechanism, which means that as long as individualized Beingness is locked into or bound to
the primary Movement and relation that is creating its identification with form by its subsequent
involvement in the reactive secondary Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive
allowing, then it is not even potentially possible for that individualized Beingness to undertake
the opposite primary Movement and so not even potentially possible for that individualized
Beingness to become involved in the opposite primary relation that would allow it to identify
with the Formless. In other words, as long as form-identified individualized Beingness is moving
or flowing Itself into attachment, aversion, or reflexive allowing, it is not even potentially
possible, in that same moment, for that individualized Beingness to identify with the Formless,
and so not even potentially possible for that individualized Beingness, in that moment, to do
other than remain in Self-ignorance, blind to its true nature as formless Sachchidananda, i.e.,
Beingness-Consciousness-Bliss.
As stated previously, individualized Beingness contains Infinite Potential because it is Infinite
Potential. Thus, even while identified with form individualized Beingness remains Infinite
Potential. However, while identified with form that Infinite Potential seems to be constrained to
reactive Movements, two of which create suffering for the individualized Beingness, and all of
which bind that Beingness to its identification with form. These reactive Movements, i.e.,
attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing, appear to be the only Movements possible once
individualized Beingness has identified with form and so is viewing the world through the egoic
lens, i.e., filtering all experience through the form or collection of forms it takes for itself. For
this reason, once individualized Beingness has identified with form it either reactively Moves to
cling in some way to those forms that seem to be needed to enhance its form-identity, reactively
Moves to push away, run from, or eliminate in some way those forms that seem to diminish its
form-identity, or reflexively allows those forms that already seem to be in some way enhancing
its form-identity, whereas those forms that appear to do nothing to either enhance or diminish the
form-identity are simply ignored.
Here it must be noted that the reactive secondary Movement that is the reflexive allowing of
form, which Movement does not directly produce suffering, only becomes possible and only
arises in those relatively rare moments when the reactive Movements of attachment and aversion
do not seem to be needed in that moment to either enhance or avoid the diminishment of the
form-identity, because the forms being apprehended in that moment appear to have already
reached an optimal arrangement toward those two ends. But the moment a form arises that is not
arranged optimally, then the reactive Movements of attachment and aversion resume, along with
the suffering those Movements create, because the reactive Movement of reflexive allowing,
even though it did not directly produce suffering, nonetheless sustained the primary Movement
into identification with form and so sustained the primary Movement that invariably and
inevitably leads to the reactive secondary Movements of attachment and aversion that do
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621
produce suffering. In this way, even reflexive allowing, which causes Beingness to flow in
alignment with Itself and so produces a form apprehended by Beingness as a wanted emotional
experience or reality, is itself an indirect source of suffering, as it serves to maintain or sustain
the primary Movement into form-identification that invariably and inevitably leads to the
reactive and Self-oppositional Movements of attachment and aversion. Perhaps this is why St.
Francis, as well as many others, sought hardship rather than comfort, and why Lao Tzu wrote,
"Which is more dangerous, success or failure?"
The way out of form-identification
This limitation that arises for individualized Beingness once it has identified with form, limited
to the reactive and unconscious Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing, two
of which Movements directly create suffering, and all of which Movements serve to bind
Beingness to its identification with form, thereby making impossible the identification of that
Beingness with its formless Self, is the only bondage there is. To free one's Self from this
bondage, to free one's Self from being trapped within this self-perpetuating pattern of Flow that
both blinds one to their true Nature and causes one to suffer, is the goal, so to speak, of
Beingness as it flows individualized through human Form. And once that goal has been reached,
to whatever degree, an additional goal arises, and that goal is to assist other individual flows of
Beingness, in whatever way one is Moved, in their attempts to release themselves from that same
bondage. It is toward both of those ends that all of this has been written, and it is toward both of
those ends that I will now describe, to the best of my present ability, understanding, and
Realization, the way out of the seemingly inescapable trap of form-identification into which we
unavoidably Flow as we Flow through human Form.
So much has just been written regarding the way in which we become trapped in formidentification through our involvement in the reactive Movements of attachment, aversion, and
reflexive allowing because once a trap is understood the way out, if there is a way out, becomes
obvious, or if not obvious at least perhaps easier to locate. And there is always a way out,
because there had to be a way in, else one would not find themself trapped. And as has just been
described, the way in which we become trapped in form-identification is not so much through
our identification with form, because that Movement, while necessary, is not itself the Movement
that springs the trap shut. Rather, as shown in figures 32 and 33, the way in which we become
trapped in form-identification, once we have unavoidably wandered into it by virtue of being
born human, is through the secondary and reactive Movements of attachment, aversion, and
reflexive allowing in which we also unavoidably become involved once we have identified with
form.
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secondary Movements into
various and limitless
relations as an expression
of the unconstrained
Infinite Potential of
individualized Beingness
Self-knowledge
liberation-enlightenment
identification with
the Formless
opposite primary Movement
not possible while Moving into
secondary reactive relations of
attachment, aversion, or
reflexive allowing
this primary Movement and relation
only becomes possible while not
reactively Moving into relations of
attachment, aversion, or reflexive
allowing, i.e., while not bound to the
opposite primary Movement
primary Movement into
form-identification
(the human condition)
identification
with form
.....thereby binding
individualized
Beingness to its
Movement into
identification with
form, making ...
the cycle of
Self-ignorance
bondage-delusion
....seemingly natural
and necessary
reactive Movement
into attachment,
aversion, and
reflexive allowing, ....
Infinite Potential of individualized Beingness constrained to the secondary and reactive
Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing that bind it to the primary Movement
that is creating its identification with form
Figure 32 What this drawing shows is, at the bottom, the cycle of Self-ignorance in which
human Beings become trapped once they unavoidably identify with form and so begin to
naturally and reactively move or flow their individualized Beingness into the relations of
attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing with apprehended form. What is shown at the top
is the movement of individualized Beingness into identification with the Formless, which
primary Movement can only occur once individualized Beingness is no longer binding Itself,
through its involvement in the reactive secondary Movements of attachment, aversion, and
reflexive allowing, to the opposite primary Movement that is creating its identification with
form. As long as individualized Beingness is identified with form, its secondary Movements are
limited almost exclusively to reactive Movements, as such a form-identified Beingness feels an
obligation to react to whatever forms it apprehends according to its particular conditioning, i.e.,
according to the particular set of forms it knows as itself. Conversely, once the primary
Movement of individualized Beingness is a Movement into identification with the Formless, its
secondary Movements are no longer reactive and so are no longer constrained, but are instead
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able to fully express the Infinite Potential inherent in the individualized Beingness. Also, the
secondary Movements that have the primary Movement of identification with the Formless as
their basis also serve to bind individualized Beingness to the primary Movement that is their
basis, but because what the individualized Beingness is being bound to in this case is a
Movement into the direct Realization of its nature as the Infinite and Eternal, the Spaceless and
the Timeless, the result of its becoming bound to that primary Movement by any subsequent
secondary Movements is not Self-delusion and bondage, as is the case when the primary
Movement is into form-identification, but is rather a deepening or intensification of the direct
Realization of its formless Nature.
Movement into form-identification
(trap arises as secondary and reactive
Movements of attachment, aversion, and
reflexive allowing then appear as only
possible Movements)
trapped in form-identification
through reactive secondary
Movements of attachment,
aversion, and reflexive allowing
Figure 33 The particular trap in which we find ourselves, i.e., the trap of form-identification, is
sort of like a Chinese finger trap, inasmuch as it is a very easy trap to Move into, but once in
that trap almost any Movement we make, including any effort to try and extricate ourselves
from the trap, is a Movement and effort that only serves to keep us held within the trap, which
in this case means we remain bound to the Movement that creates our identification with form.
This is because the only Movements that seem either reasonable or possible while identified
with form are the reactive Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing, which
Movements are actually secondary Movements that bind us to the primary Movement that is
creating our identification with form, and so are Movements that trap us in the state of formidentification. And while operating completely in the state of form-identification, as occurs
while involved in these reactive secondary Movements, our formless Nature becomes hidden in
plain sight, as all of our Attention is then being directed toward form. Thus, the problem, such
as it is, is not so much our Movement into form-identification; rather the problem, i.e., that
which actually keeps us trapped in form-identification and so keeps hidden from us our formless
Nature, are the reactive Movements in which we remain almost continuously involved once we
have Moved into identification with form.
Thus, the reason so many seek but so few find is because the nature of the trap of formidentification is such that any effort to escape the trap is actually a Movement that activates the
trap, because all efforts to escape the trap, since they are efforts and so Movements that arise
while identified with form, are ultimately reactive Movements of either attachment, aversion, or
reflexive allowing that bind one to the state one is, through one's efforts and Movements,
actually trying to escape. Even trying to feel good and succeeding at it still keeps one trapped
within form-identification, if that success at creating emotional wantedness has as its basis a
reactive and so reflexive allowing of apprehended form. Additionally, what so many are seeking
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but so few find is a way out of the suffering that is unavoidably created as form-identified
individualized Beingness reacts to the world, both inner and outer, through the inherently Selfoppositional Movements of attachment and aversion. And the reason so few find a way out of
that suffering is because in seeking a way out one almost always, without knowing it, eliminates
the only way out, because one almost always seeks the way out through some effort and so
through what is actually a reactive Movement into either attachment or aversion, thereby locking
into place the Movement into form-identification that is ultimately the source of the suffering
one is trying to escape.
It is this understanding of the utter futility and counterproductivity of any effort to escape the
trap of form-identification that itself points the way out of the trap. As just stated, almost all
efforts to escape the trap of form-identification are efforts to escape the suffering we unavoidably
create and endure as a result of our subsequent involvement in the reactive, secondary, and
inherently Self-oppositional Movements of attachment and aversion that follow naturally, but not
effortlessly, from our primary Movement into identification with form. The only way to escape
the trap is to cease trying to escape the trap, the only way to put an end to the suffering is to stop
trying to put an end to the suffering. Thus, the only way out is to cease all efforts to get out. But
how does one cease effort in a way that is not itself just a more subtle effort? That is, how does
one, while still identified with form, cease effort in a way that is not just a more subtle
Movement into the relations of attachment or aversion by which one is unknowingly chaining
themself to the wall of the dark and yet shadow-filled cave that is the state of formidentification? This is where the difficulty arises, and it is the Seeker's failure to understand and
identify this difficulty that keeps one forever seeking, forever looking for a way out of the cave
that one is, through one's own efforts to escape the cave, unknowingly keeping themself chained
within.
Thus, with regard to ceasing to be bound to the primary Movement that creates one's
identification with form so that one is then free to become involved in the opposite primary
Movement that is identification with the Formless, the crux of the matter is as follows: How does
one, while fully identified with form, cease to involve themself in reactive Movements in a way
that is not itself just a more subtle reactive Movement that serves to maintain one's complete
identification with form? And the answer to this perennial conundrum is as follows: One has to
realize, while still identified with form, i.e., from within form-identification, that another
Movement is possible, a Movement that is not a reactive Movement, and having realized the
possibility of this non-reactive Movement, one must then convert that possibility into an
Actuality by simply Moving in that way.
This non-reactive Movement involves nothing more than individualized Beingness being what it
already and always is, but being what it does not know it is while identified with form. And what
individualized Beingness already and always is, but what it does not know it is while identified
with form, is pure Awareness or Consciousness. That is, the non-reactive Movement that
unravels the knot of form-identification while simultaneously Moving one in the direction of
identification with the Formless involves Beingness doing nothing more than simply being aware
or conscious of the forms which it is, in that moment, already aware or conscious, which forms it
would otherwise be reacting toward with attachment, aversion, or reflexive allowing. Thus, it is
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the non-reactive Movement toward apprehended forms in simple or pure Awareness or
Consciousness of those forms, as opposed to the reactive Movement toward those forms in
attachment, aversion, or reflexive allowing, that is the Movement which can free form-identified
individualized human Beingness from the self-perpetuating trap of form-identification into which
it has unavoidably wandered. Any other Movement, from within form-identification, can only be
a more or less subtle reactive Movement that binds one to, rather than fees one from, the formidentification that is itself the source of the suffering that individualized human Beingness is
trying to escape.
There is nothing more natural than your Being Aware or Conscious. Being simply Aware or
Conscious requires no effort because it is intrinsic to and inseparable from your true Nature. You
cannot help but Be Aware or Conscious, because beyond the veil of form that you may think you
are, you actually are, whether you are aware of it or not, Sachchidananda, i.e., BeingnessConsciousness-Bliss. On the other hand, reactive Movement toward form is something extra,
something not actually needed, but something that arises as seemingly needed and necessary, and
so seemingly naturally, from within form-identification, which is to say, once individualized
Beingness has identified with form and so sees itself as something that can be made more or less,
enhanced or diminished. And because that reactivity toward form is a Movement that is a
continuation of the Movement that creates the identification of individualized Beingness with
form, that reactivity toward form is a Movement that can only perpetuate the identification of
individualized Beingness with form, and in so doing also perpetuate the seeming need and
necessity for, and the seeming naturalness of, the reactivity toward form that is perpetuating the
identification with form, which identification with form perpetuates the reactivity, which
reactivity perpetuates the identification with form, and on and on and on it goes. And because
this cycle in which formless Beingness becomes trapped in a Movement into identification with
form is fueled and perpetuated by its own reactive Movement, the only way out is for Beingness
to cease that reactive Movement. But the only way for Beingness to cease that reactive
Movement in a way that is not just a more subtle reactive Movement is to become involved
instead in the opposite Movement, which opposite Movement is the Movement of non-reactivity
toward apprehended form. And because non-reactivity toward form is the Movement that is the
opposite of reactive Movement toward form, and because reactive Movement toward form is a
continuation of the Movement into identification with form, non-reactive Movement is therefore
a Movement that is the opposite of the Movement into identification with form and is therefore
Movement in the direction of realizing and identifying with the Formless, as shown in figure 34.
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Movement into form-identification
(trap arises as secondary reactive
Movements of attachment, aversion, and
reflexive allowing appear as natural
Movements)
...wh ich non-reactive Movement is
actually a primary Movement into
identification with the Formless (trap
eventually dissolves)
626
trapped in form-identification
through secondary reactive
Movements of attachment,
aversion, and reflexive allowing
cessation of secondary reactive
Movements through initiation of
non-reactive Movement opens the
trap....
Figure 34 As shown at the top, once Beingness moves into identification with form, the
reactive Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing then seem to be the natural
Movements, and so then seem to be the only Movements possible. And while involved in any of
these reactive Movements the flow of individualized Beingness becomes bound to the flow that
is creating its identification with form, thereby effectively trapping the flow of that
individualized Beingness completely within form-identification, in which state of complete
form-identification Beingness becomes unaware of the pervasive Formlessness that is its true
nature, owing to its complete Attention being given to the forms that are arising within that
Formlessness, i.e., within its formless Awareness. However, as shown at the bottom, if
individualized Beingness, while still identified with form, is able to not become involved in
these reactive Movements when faced with a form or forms which it would normally react to,
then its non-involvement in those reactive Movements is itself a Movement that is the opposite
of those reactive Movements. And this non-reactive Movement, because it is a Movement that
is the opposite of the reactive Movements, which reactive Movements are continuations of its
Movement into form-identification, is also a Movement that is the opposite of the Movement
into identification with form, and so is the Movement that not only causes form-identified
Beingness to stop depressing the lever that has it trapped in form-identification, but is also the
primary Movement that will, if it is maintained long enough or if it is intense enough, take
individualized Beingness into the direct Realization of its true Nature and so into identification
with the Formless.
This non-reactive Movement is an allowing of form, but it is not a reactive allowing, and so not a
reflexive allowing that derives from identification with form, and so is not a Movement that
perpetuates Beingness' identification with form. This is a subtle but vital distinction. This nonISSN: 2153-8212
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reactive Movement that is a non-reactive and so non-reflexive allowing of form is not a reaction
to form, but is an unconditional allowing of form, which unconditional allowing of form must be
differentiated from the reactive, reflexive, and conditional allowing of form in which formidentified individualized Beingness usually engages. In the reactive and so reflexive allowing of
form Beingness allows, i.e., does not in some way internally oppose, only those forms that
appear to be in some way already serving the needs of its form-identity. This is the condition
under which form-identified individualized Beingness reacts to forms with reflexive allowing or
non-opposition, with all other apprehended forms being either ignored or reacted to with
attachment or aversion. However, when a form that is being reactively, reflexively, and so
conditionally allowed begins to change, such that that form no longer seems or appears to be
serving the needs of one's form-identity, then that reactive and reflexive allowing very quickly
turns into the reactive Movements of either attachment or aversion, in which case the thing or
person that once seemed to make you happy now seems to make you sad or angry instead. On
the other hand, in the non-reactive and so unconditional allowing of form Beingness allows, i.e.,
does not in some way internally oppose, whatever forms appear or arise within its Awareness or
Consciousness, regardless of how those forms seem or appear to affect its form-identity. Thus,
the relation of such a Beingness to form, as well as to Itself, is unconditional, or not dependent
upon a condition, and so does not change from one sort of reactivity to another as the form
invariably changes, but remains instead non-reactive and consistent throughout. Both
Movements, i.e., reactive and non-reactive allowing, create emotional wantedness, but only the
latter Movement allows the veil of form to fall away from the Formless, because the latter
Movement, unlike the former Movement, does not derive from the Movement of individualized
Beingness into identification with form and so does not perpetuate that Movement, and so does
not perpetuate the delusion and illusion that Movement produces through its obscuring of the
Formless, which delusion is the idea harbored by formless Beingness that it is form, and which
illusion is the idea harbored by formless Beingness that form is what is actually there where it
appears to be.
It is important to note that the non-reactive Movement that is the non-reactive allowing of form
does not mean non-action, it only means that whatever action does arise, if action arises, arises
not as a limited and constrained reaction to form based upon whatever idea one has regarding
how that form can best be manipulated to serve the needs of the form-identity, but arises instead
unconstrained from the Formlessness that is the field of Infinite Potentiality from which all
Movement and Action, whether constrained or unconstrained, ultimately arises. Along those
same lines, it is also important to note that what is being discussed here as both reactive and nonreactive Movements refer to internal Movements, to Movements that are occurring at the level of
formless Beingness, as formless Beingness flows Itself this way or that, into this or that relation
with Itself. And it is as an extension of those internal Movements and relations that all external
action or movement arises. Thus, it is relatively easy to predict how a completely form-identified
human Being will act under certain external circumstances, because their actions extend from the
very limited set of internal reactive Movements that are available to such a form-identified
Beingness. Conversely, it is impossible to predict how a human Being that is no longer identified
with form will act under certain external circumstances, because their actions extend directly
from the Infinite Potential of the Formless, as that Potential is allowed to non-reactively flow
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through the Form, and so allowed to non-reactively express Itself through the Form, without
being diverted, inverted, and perverted by any reactive Movements toward form.
If this non-reactive Movement is the way out of form-identification and the suffering such formidentification invariably produces, then why is this non-reactive Movement almost always
overlooked by individualized Beingness as it searches for a way out of the suffering that
unavoidably arises within Itself while it remains identified with form? The reason this nonreactive Movement is almost always overlooked by form-identified Beingness is because, while
fully identified with form, the only Movements that seem reasonable and worthwhile to such a
Beingness are the reactive Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing. This nonreactive Movement is always there as an option, but the non-reactive Movement does not present
itself to form-identified Beingness as a truly valid option, because it is an option that, from the
perspective of form-identified Beingness, i.e., from the perspective of the Ego, not only does not
appear to do anything for the form-identity, which is to say, does not do anything for what formidentified individualized Beingness mistakenly knows itself to be, but even more importantly,
this non-reactive Movement actually seems or appears, from the perspective of the Ego, to be
detrimental to the form-identity, since it seems to the Ego that making no effort to cling to that
which is wanted or to push away that which is unwanted represents a passive diminishment of its
form-identity. It is for these reasons that the non-reactive Movement is actively avoided by the
Ego, which is to say, by form-identified Beingness. Thus, the first difficulty faced by formidentified Beingness in undertaking this non-reactive Movement lies in realizing or becoming
aware, while still identified with form, that such a Movement is both possible as well as
worthwhile.
The second difficulty faced by form-identified Beingness in undertaking this non-reactive
Movement has to do with the mutually exclusive nature of the reactive Movements that bind one
to identification with form and the non-reactive Movement that frees one from identification
with from. That is, while fully involved in any of the three reactive Movements that seems to
naturally follow once one has identified with form, i.e., attachment, aversion, or reflexive
allowing, the non-reactive Movement cannot possibly be Actualized, because the non-reactive
Movement is a Movement that is the opposite of, and so therefore mutually exclusive of, the
reactive Movements into attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing. Thus, the non-reactive
Movement only becomes possible, and so can only be Actualized, in a moment when one is not
already completely involved in one of the reactive Movements, because to not become fully
involved in those reactive Movements when faced with a form or forms that one would, under
"normal" circumstances, i.e., while identified with form, react to with either attachment,
aversion, or reflexive allowing, is itself the non-reactive Movement that is the opposite of the
Movement into identification with form.
All that having been said, how can one put this information to use while still fully identified with
form, and so while fully involved and caught up in the reactive Movements that are mutually
exclusive of the non-reactive Movement that is necessary to free one from complete
identification with form? To begin to become involved in the non-reactive Movement while still
fully identified with form, and so to begin to lessen one's Flow or Movement into identification
with form while still identified with form, and so while still seemingly limited to the reactive
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Movements of attachment, aversion, and reflexive allowing, one need only become aware or
conscious of one's involvement in those reactive Movements as that involvement is occurring,
because to become simply aware of a reactive Movement is itself the non-reactive Movement.
And so, to begin to become aware or conscious of one's involvement in the reactive Movements
is itself the beginning of one's involvement in the opposite Movement, and is also then the
beginning of one's withdrawal from full participation and involvement in those reactive
Movements, because the only way to become aware of one's involvement in those reactive
Movements, while still engaged in those reactive Movements, is to withdraw some portion of the
flow of one's Beingness from that Movement, which withdrawal from one Movement is then, by
definition, an entry into and involvement in the opposite Movement. As an analogy, one cannot
see the flow of a river in which one is completely immersed, But if one steps out of that flow to
some degree, then one is able to see the flow of the river. Likewise, while completely immersed
in reactive Movement one cannot be aware of that Movement. It is only when one steps out of
that Movement to some degree that one is able to become aware of that Movement, which simple
and pure Awareness of that Movement is itself the opposite Movement.
How then does one begin to become aware of one's involvement in the reactive Movements
while still involved in those reactive Movements and so still Moving into identification with
form? One begins to become aware of one's involvement in the reactive Movements by simply
becoming aware of the emotional form or reality that one is creating in that moment through
whatever reactive Movement in which one is, in that moment, involved, without reacting to that
emotional form, because being aware of a form and not reacting to that form is itself the nonreactive Movement. And it is only once one has withdrawn to some degree from involvement in
the reactive Movements, by becoming non-reactively aware of the emotional forms that are most
immediately and directly being created by those reactive Movements, that one is then able, from
that perspective of non-reactive Awareness, to become simply aware of their involvement in the
reactive Movement itself, and so in that way to further withdraw from the reactive Movement by
becoming more involved in the non-reactive Movement.
If you are fully identified with form, which is quite possible, but nothing personal, then you
cannot, in this moment, just cease to identify with form, owing to the self-perpetuating nature of
form-identification, because trying to cease to identify with form is itself a reactive Movement of
aversion that can only perpetuate your Movement into identification with form. However, what
you can do in this moment, and what you can do in any moment, is participate and become
involved in the opposite non-reactive Movement by simply becoming aware or conscious of the
reactive Movements in which you are becoming involved, by becoming non-reactively aware or
conscious of the emotional forms that are arising through those reactive Movements. However,
the trick here is to become aware of your involvement in those reactive Movements and the
emotions they produce without then reacting to your awareness of your involvement in those
Movements or the emotions they produce, because if you do that, then you are just once again
entering into full reactivity and so full Movement into identification with form at a more subtle
level. At this point a concrete example of how one can become involved in these different
Movements would probably be helpful.
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Let us say that you are driving to or from work and are in a hurry to get where you are going
because that is just how form-identified human Beings live, almost always in a hurry to get from
where they are to where they are going, because where one is is almost always never quite
enough, and so where one is going almost always seems more important. In any case, as you are
driving the light turns red just as you get to the intersection and you feel yourself become slightly
or even greatly irritated at this delay. The actual cause of this feeling of irritation is not the red
light itself, but is an internal Movement that is your reactive Movement of aversion to the red
light that is keeping you from getting, for the moment, to where you want to go or be. If there is,
at that moment, only the irritation then there is only the reactive Movement. But if there is, at
that moment, not just the irritation, but an Awareness of the irritation, which Awareness is not
itself caught up in the irritation, but is just observing or aware of the irritation, then that pure
Awareness of the irritation is that portion of your individualized Beingness that is not Moving
reactively, but is instead Moving non-reactively. The portion of your individualized Beingness
that is Moving reactively is also aware of the irritation, otherwise you would not feel irritated,
but the portion of your Beingness that is Moving reactively is not able to be aware of the
irritation as something separate or distinct from itself, but instead only knows itself as irritated,
or as being irritated, because that portion of your Beingness, i.e., the portion that is engaged in
reactive Movement, is fully identified with the forms of which it becomes aware. In contrast, if
you are able to become, to any degree, simply aware of the irritation, and so non-reactively
aware of the irritation, meaning that you are aware of the irritation but not reacting to it, not
trying to push it away, then that non-reactive portion of your Beingness is able to be aware of the
irritation as something separate and distinct from Itself, because that portion of your Beingness is
not identified with the forms of which it becomes aware. Thus, in such a situation, Beingness
that is Moving only reactively thinks "I am irritated," because to such a Beingness what it is and
what it is aware of as the irritation are one, as they are linked through the reactive Beingness'
identification with form. On the other hand, Beingness that is Moving at least to some degree
non-reactively thinks "I feel irritation," because to such a Beingness what it is and what it is
aware of are not one, as non-reactive Beingness is not identifying with that form, and so not
linking or tethering Itself to that form, i.e., to the apprehended irritation. This is a subtle but
important distinction, as this is the difference between continued unconscious Movement
completely into form-identification and the beginning of conscious Movement out of
identification with form and into identification with the Formless.
And so let us say that you become non-reactively aware of your irritation, and so to some degree
have withdrawn from completely reactive Movement and have instead to some degree entered
into non-reactive Movement. At that point what usually happens, at least in the early stages of
withdrawal from complete identification with form, is that once you become aware of the
irritation there then arises a reactive Movement of aversion toward the irritation itself, as you
then think that you should not be irritated by a little red light. In this reactive Movement one then
no longer seems to be irritated just by the red light, but now seems to be irritated also by
themself and their unconscious reaction to the red light, when in actuality the irritation once
again has as its source a reactive Movement toward some apprehended form. Become aware of
the emotion and become aware of the reactive Movement toward form that is creating the
emotion, and then do not react to either. But if you do react to either then just become nonreactively aware of the emotional form that is being created by that reactive Movement. NonISSN: 2153-8212
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reactive Awareness or Consciousness, that is all that is required to withdraw one's Beingness
from continued and ceaseless Movement into identification with form. It does not matter where
you begin to withdraw from reactive Movement, it only matters that you do begin to withdraw, at
some point, by becoming involved instead in the opposite Movement, by doing nothing more
than allowing yourself to be aware of whatever forms you are presently aware of, both internal
and external, without reacting to them. Anything else, any effort to cease or end one's Movement
into identification with form, only ends up being another reactive Movement that binds one to
the Movement one is trying escape.
(Continued in Part 3: The Identification of the Formless with Itself (2))
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Schenberg, E., The Mythical Brain: Is the Science of Movie Lucy Wrong?
1174
Letter to the Editor
The Mythical Brain: Is the Science of Movie Lucy Wrong?
Eduardo Schenberg*
Abstract
The movie Lucy explores the idea that we use only 10% of our brains which, according to an
editorial in Nature Neuroscience, is wrong. However, we may reframe the myth to reveal the
underlying meaning: it is not about using just 10% of the brain, but about perceiving only a very
small fraction of what the brain is doing. If we will, we can stop our usual, daily routine
activities, or our usual day dreaming, and immediately we start noticing more. The alternative
interpretation to Lucy is that the movie is not about the brain, but about consciousness. Change
the metaphor and you get a totally different meaning.
Key Words: Movie Lucy. myth, brain, neuroscience, Consciousness.
In "The mythical brain" editorial1 Nature Neuroscience addressed myths about the brain. That is,
ideas about the brain shown by science to be wrong, but still accepted by the lay public. This is a
recurring theme in science education, not only in neuroscience, and its importance is very clear.
The catalyzer episode for this specific editorial was the movie Lucy, which explores the idea that
we use only 10% of our brains - which according to Nature Neuroscience's editorial, is wrong.
However, one of the movie's main character, played by Morgan Freeman, is a neuroscientist that
gives lectures about the neurons, brains, intelligence and evolution. And the untruth in other
neuroscientific claims in the movie, such that with one neuron, there's life, with two there's
movement, seems to have gone unnoticed in the editorial.
Why was the 10% myth clearly addressed, while other myths related to neuroscience were not?
Maybe because the 10% myth is used in the movie's marketing. But maybe there are other
reasons as well. If unicellular organisms are alive and move, as well as plants and fungi, without
needing neurons to do it, why haven't these myths received attention from the editorial? The
distinction between these examples seems essential. Because a possible alternative interpretation
to the movie is that, although the metaphor is neurocentric, the meaning is not. This alternative
interpretation became even more appealing to me while listening to director Luc Besson talking
about his work and the idea that we only use 10% of our brains: "It’s totally not true. Do they
think that I don’t know this? I work on this thing for nine years and they think that I don’t know
it’s not true? Of course I know it’s not true! But, you know, there are lots of facts in the film that
are totally right."2 The alternative interpretation to Lucy is that the movie is not about the brain,
but about consciousness. Change the metaphor and you get a totally different meaning.
Let's reframe the myth to reveal the underlying meaning: it's not about using just 10% of the
brain, but about perceiving only a very small fraction of the brain's doings. And this is
scientifically true! The brain is intimately connected to all the body, and lot's of its workings
* Correspondence: Eduardo Schenberg, PhD. Email: eduardoschenberg@gmail.com
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have to do with things which are far from our conscious experience. At every single second our
hearts beat, our blood vessels dilate and contract, our lungs bring air in and let it out and the
whole autonomic nervous system operate. Why have we called it autonomous? Because most of
the time it operates independently of our will and consciousness of it. And so it is with many of
the brains activities: it goes on and on, but unnoticed by us.
But if we will, we can stop our usual, daily routine activities, or our usual day dreaming, and
immediately we start noticing more. Oh yes, I am breathing and my heart is beating while I write
this letter, even though it's hard to feel it at the same time I write. And this is exactly the puzzle
experienced by Lucy. How is it to become more conscious than in our everyday experience?
How would it feel to be aware of all the bodily functions at once? What would be the
possibilities if we could, at will, control the neuro-pycho-immune connections? How would it be
to be conscious of all memories and sensations of one's own life? Poetically, Lucy starts
remembering her experience breast feeding, the taste of her mother's milk in her mouth, all the
kisses received from her parents in her entire life. And all this while she's undergoing surgery
without anesthetics: she chose not feel pain. Is all this possible? We don't know. Probably
unlikely. But until the molecular turnover dilemma challenging the neuroscience of memory and
the strong placebo effect in pain are not overcome, impossible to definitively claim it's 100%
wrong.
Not limiting the question to one's own brain and body, Besson has freedom to imagine further:
the movie helps us imagine how would it feel to be conscious of other peoples memories,
thoughts and emotions. Or yet, how would it feel to be aware of all the matter and energy
flowing in a tree? A beautiful scene in the movie helps us see a tree closer to how it really is,
beyond our static perception of it: truly alive, moving and pulsating with flows of matter and
energy. In another surreal scene in an airplane, the movie help us imagine how would it feel to be
aware of every cell and every molecule in the body. Is Lucy transcending the skin-encapsulated
ego3 while under the effects of a psychoactive chemical in an airplane? If it's about
consciousness, and not just about the brain, these other meanings become possible. And they are
there not just to entertain, but to educate. Scientists inclusive. And this other meanings stretch till
the last scene: Why else would Lucy be everywhere after attaining a 100%? Any resemblance
with Vedanta may not be coincidence.
The beautiful imaginative tour about conscious experience depicted in Lucy is, therefore,
scientific valid and welcome, even though not all claims about brains and neurons are precise.
And many of the movie's visuals and the perceptual situations lived by the main character remind
of other questions about consciousness raised before, based on the very real consciousness
changes elicited by psychedelic experiences4. Despite the large disinterest of most brain
scientists in such "mind manifesting" substances for decades5, their effects on conscious
experience and hypothesis of the brain acting as a reducing valve for consciousness continue
challenging neuroscience. And this is precisely the myth that neuroscientists are not always
willing to openly talk about: neuroscience as having the final word about consciousness.
Despite the best efforts and recent advances6,7, we still do not have proofs that the brain generate
consciousness, nor that it is uniquely human8. Going even further, it is indeed possible that
consciousness exists in other living organisms that move, learn and reproduce even without
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neurons7,9. As many questions related to consciousness are still unanswered by modern
neuroscience, attempts to bring this topic to the general public should not be prematurely
dismissed. On the contrary, they should be welcomed as they increase the spirit of enquiry. As
humourously expressed by Luc Besson in The Guardian "If you find yourself asking what's real
and what isn't, I've won"10.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The mythical brain. Nat Neurosci 17, 1137 (2014).
http://www.vulture.com/2014/07/luc-besson-director-lucy-chat.html
Watts, A. The Tao of Philosophy. (Tuttle Publishing, 1999).
Huxley, A. The Doors of Perception and Heaven and Hell. (Harper Collins, 2009).
Nutt, D. J., King, L. A. & Nichols, D. E. Effects of Schedule I drug laws on neuroscience research
and treatment innovation. Nat Rev Neurosci 14, 577–585 (2013).
6. Tononi, G. Phi. (Pantheon, 2012).
7. Koch, C. Consciousness: Confessions of a romantic reductionist. (2012).
8. Chalmers, D. J. In The Cognitive Neurosciences III, MIT Press (2004).
9. Hameroff, S. & Penrose, R. Consciousness in the universe: A review of the ‘Orch OR’theory.
Physics of Life Reviews 11, 39–78 (2014).
10. http://www.theguardian.com/film/video/2014/aug/20/luc-besson-lucy-scarlett-johansson-videointerview
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Research Essay
Consciousness, Science & Values
James R. Arnold*
ABSTRACT
Various features and expressions of consciousness are shown to be beyond scientific
explanation, and yet essential to the appreciation of human values. Thus, the values realized by
consciousness, including life, love, liberty, ethics, morality, art, friends, community, fun and
laughter, are not going to be found on a chalkboard or under a microscope.
Key Words: Consciousness, science, value, nature, explanation, love, emotion, morality.
Considerations about the nature of consciousness are not just academic exercises. Our beliefs
about what we are, even if more-or-less implicit, can have a profound influence on our values,
self-regard, personal relations, and political perspectives.
Science is not very helpful in considering consciousness and values, although it has become, for
many people, the final authority on every question, the arbiter even of which questions are worth
asking. And the appeal to science for beliefs and perspective has been for many of us a liberating
alternative to the domination of religious and superstitious dogmas and institutions. But a
disciplined science is restricted to the analysis of things that can be observed, and scientific
observations involve the reduction of mental activity to biology, and the reduction of biology to
physics. The problem is, if the objects of science are (para-scientifically) assumed to
comprehend all of reality, rather than just the limits of observation, then consciousness becomes
a non-essential bi-product of brain function, and there remains no compelling basis for values
like freedom, rights, culture, love, and life. Physical things can be justifiably destroyed and recycled, biological things can be killed and consumed. Nowhere within the domain of science can
“things” like ourselves be distinguished based on intrinsic worth.
So while science doesn't necessarily eliminate our values, it renders them rationally groundless,
and consequently, more or less heedless.
To look beyond science for the nature of consciousness and justification of values doesn't require
a religious or mystical turn. A naturalistic perspective can appreciate science without regarding it
as an all-encompassing metaphysics. Our own self-awareness, and reflections on the deliberate
things we are able to do in the world, can be considered evidence of something beyond strict
scientific understanding, just by a tentative acceptance that legitimate evidence need not be
directly or exclusively physical. We can’t objectively observe consciousness like we can the
workings of a machine, but we have our personal experience to acknowledge, we can observe the
physical manifestations of our conscious intentions, and we feel an affinity with values that can
be as solid and certain as any sight or sound.
*Correspondence: James R. Arnold, Independent Researcher. E-mail: swprod@sonic.net
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Consider the evidence of these remarkable features of consciousness:
Consciousness can be PURPOSEFUL. We are capable of envisioning an innovation or change of
circumstance, planning various means to achieve it, then performing a number of actions to make
it happen. Each of the actions has a purpose beyond its immediate effect -- the achievement of a
goal, the innovation or change of circumstance envisioned. But there is nothing in the fields of
biology or physics that is recognized as having purpose. Even the most complex chain of
chemical reactions in the metabolism of a cell is believed to be the result of random mutations
that recur and persist only because they enhance the survivability of the organism. Each reaction
is considered to be a singular cause-and-effect event, with no wider significance except in the
interpretations of science.
Purposeful behavior is thus radically different from physical and biological mechanisms, as
science understands them. A science-based metaphysics can speculate that purpose has evolved
in humans (and other animals) simply because there’s an evolutionary advantage in the ability to
combine a number of behaviors to achieve a result, but that only trivializes its significance.
Evolution can only exploit natural possibilities. To be able to make oneself disappear with the
snap of one’s fingers when confronted by a predator would be an evolutionary advantage, but it
is evidently not possible. In contrast, what unites a group of purposeful behaviors is the imagined
goal, and unlike a physical effect, a goal precedes its causes, even if only in concept; and a goal,
the unifying effect that directs a series of behaviors, evidently is possible. And an effect that
precedes and unifies its causes is (remarkably) beyond scientific explanation.
The functionality of computers provides a revealing contrast to actual consciousness, and I’ll
elaborate on the contrast with several comparisons in what follows. Regarding purpose,
computers are thought by some to have it at least in potential; its eventual realization is believed
to be a problem only of developing better technology and increasing complexity. But a computer
is designed to execute planned instructions, each one entirely distinct from the others. What
gives a computer the semblance of purpose is the person who has programmed it by composing a
series of directives to achieve some specific goal or goals. The purpose exists before the
computer is even switched on. And there’s no reason to think that the output of an inorganic,
discrete series of instructions has meaning and purpose except extrinsically, for a conscious
reader of words on a screen or printout.
Consciousness can be RESPONSIVE. Everything that occurs with the objects of physics and
biology involves an immediate reaction, but as conscious beings we are able to respond to
complex situations in the present, in view of implicit values, even of considerations of
consequences that don’t yet exist. When we’re not being “absent minded”, or performing
habitual tasks, we can deal with ambiguous, unexpected, even unprecedented events in the
moments they occur, situated in an ever-weaving fabric of place and time. A policeman can
respond to life-and-death situations for which there can only be general guidelines. A flood
victim without food can ponder whether it is right to procure, or wrong to steal, from an
abandoned store. Rules of behavior (as with “instincts”) can’t apply and regulate reactions to all
situations, but we nonetheless have the evident and distinct ability to respond to our surroundings
as a coherent environment, uniquely, resourcefully, and with a presence in the moment.
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In contrast to responsive consciousness, computer “intelligence” can only react to situations that
have been anticipated and projected into the present by the imaginative responsiveness of the
programmer. At best, a computer programmed for “artificial intelligence” can expand its
repertoire by “learning” new interrelationships that can be identified and reacted to next time.
Consciousness is here and now; an object of science simply is. And a world where
responsiveness is possible is fundamentally different from a world of reaction. A para-scientific
world-view can only attempt to explain the emergence of responsiveness with an utterly
unscientific magical “presto!” whereby a virtual infinity of mutations is claimed to have led to a
whole new kind of reality, where the present awareness of a responsive consciousness supplants
mechanical reaction as if by some miraculous leap.
Consciousness can be TRANSCENDENT. I don’t mean “transcendent” in a metaphysical sense.
To transcend is to encompass, to unify, by getting “outside” the elements of a situation. When a
computer is mistakenly instructed to complete an impossible task it goes into an “endless loop”,
and would continue forever unless it is somehow interrupted. But consciousness is able to
transcend a situation, to comprehend it from beyond the particulars, and immediately say, in
effect, “this can never work – it is pointless to even try.”
The evidence for conscious transcendence is abundant. When we derive meaning from a
collection of words that goes beyond their individual and literal definition we transcend the
elements of language to form a thought. Poetry is a celebration of transcendence; it is the essence
of poetry to evoke an image or concept that can’t be expressed in the literal combination of
words, and poetry would be meaningless in a world defined by discrete linguistic elements and
their serial combination. Even in everyday conversations, our comprehension can transcend the
meanings of words. To hear, for the first time, someone say “that’s bad” and realize they actually
mean “that’s very good”, is to transcend definition -- and to delight in (or abhor) the novel
reformulation of the words. Language can of course be influential in our manner of thinking, but
for transcendent consciousness, language is only the material basis, the stepping-stones of
thought.
Much humor, maybe all humor consists in the enjoyment of suddenly transcending a situation or
juxtaposition. When at the end of each of the old Burns and Allen comedy routines George told
Gracie “say goodnight, Gracie” and she complied daftly, saying “goodnight Gracie”, the
audience laughed at her chronic inability to transcend the literal. When we first heard the
question “why did the chicken cross the road?” we searched for some transcendent explanation
of motive; then when we laughed at the unexpected answer, it was with the sudden appreciation
of our initial and unnecessary transcendence of the immediate and obvious. When the difference
between a reaction and a response sneaks upon us in a joke framed like a trick, it can be a lucid
and funny encounter with our own transcendence.
The transcendence of consciousness is scientifically inexplicable, except by a dismissive
tautology. (“Every characteristic of behavior is simply a physical evolution or bi-product,
therefore every characteristic of behavior is simply a physical evolution or bi-product”.) In the
para-scientific view, thoughts must be reducible to, and determined by their elements -- in
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language, conceived as a product of evolution. The irony here is that transcendence is required to
deny transcendence; there is nothing in language itself to indicate that it may be a conceptual
enclosure.
Just as the science of linguistics has been dominated by the belief that our thoughts are
“determined”, as if imprisoned by our language, anthropology was for a time dominated by a
belief that we are “determined” by our native culture -- until it was realized by some that the
anthropologist has to transcend her own culture in order to conclude that cultures cannot be
transcended. Anyone who is truly confined by their cultural beliefs would be unable to conceive
that their beliefs are only cultural.
It’s been said that “infinity” is a concept beyond comprehension, and yet we have a word for it,
and we can share it with others who understand what we mean. Obviously it can be
comprehended, but (appropriately) only as a transcendent, not specifiable, non-finite concept.
In contrast to conscious transcendence, the main difficulty in learning to interact with a computer
“intelligence” is having to adapt to the need to the give it specific, literal instructions. A
computer, an exemplary object of scientific manufacture, is frustrating, and sometimes funny as
Gracie Allen, for its inability to transcend the elements of communication. No addition of bytes,
or registers, or layers of process can be expected to improve the interaction, except by invoking
the virtual magic of a virtual infinity of technical complications whereby (presto!) literal water
turns to transcendent wine.
Consciousness can be NEGATIVE. By “negative” I don’t mean the common association with
being quarrelsome or pessimistic, although they do involve negativity. To be negative is to
negate what is -- to say “no”, or “not”, to refuse, to decide that something shouldn’t exist, to
imagine that something which doesn’t exist should. And there is no likeness of negativity in the
objects of science.
A chemical interaction is understood to be the product of what-is. Molecule A reacts with
molecule B in a definite way, unless something external and accidental interferes. Genetic
mutations, as understood in biology, are chance modifications; they don’t occur because an
existing gene is not good enough, or because some alteration might be better. Whether a
mutation is an improvement to an organism is irrelevant to its occurrence. But our abilities to
critique, to imagine, to wish for what is-not express conscious, deliberate negations that elude the
scientific world of cause-and-effect, just as they elude the world of supposed randomness and
pointless unpredictability proposed by quantum theory.
It may be easy to say an insight like Einstein’s theory of relativity -- a radical negation of
established beliefs -- was caused by the performance of his most excellent network of neurons,
and at a higher level, by various psychological, sociological, and historical factors. But a
negative insight can only be reduced to a series of positive reactions by a determined refusal to
negate implausibility. A theory is what it is, its inconsistencies are what they are, and for
someone to say that a theory is not complete or not perfect or even wrong is to go beyond what it
is, beyond the convention, to refuse what is given, to negate and conceive something else in its
place -- which is to do something that’s not just un-caused, but un-causable.
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Art is, in general, both the creation and experience of negation. Art is, remarkably, not what it is.
To appreciate art is to negate its material. A painting is not (typically) just a cluster of colors, and
not just the product of an excellent technique. An artistic object has to be negated as-such to be
experienced as art, to be grasped as a whole, as an intangible reference to something else, in
order for it to evoke a thought or feeling that is transcendent of the immediate experience, the
causation of color on the visual cortex, and the recognition of expertise.
A computer can only deal with what is. An instruction may mean something negative to a
programmer, but for the computer it is always a positive command or comparison, typically in
the form of a composite of a number of “plus” and “minus” electrical charges. Even when a
computer reports that something is not true, the report actually consists of a statement that
something specific, somewhere specific, returns a specifically empty datum -- “it is that it is an
empty is.”
Consciousness is CREATIVE. It might seem that only someone disconnected or divested from
their own dreaming could fail to appreciate the amazing creativity expressed in dreams. Fantastic
images that could never have actually been seen through the eyes can be produced when
consciousness is most spontaneous during sleep, just as ideas that have never before been
conceived can be produced when consciousness is most awake and deliberate.
Whereas negativity is a reaction to something that is, might be, or might have been, creativity
produces realizations out of nothing. Scientists argue that elements of prior experiences give the
necessary content to creative ideas, but an inspiration is no more tangible than a dream, and the
inspiration itself, a feature of consciousness, can’t be explained by its incidental, particular
contents — except of course by the same sort of method already discussed that tries to explain
the scientifically inexplicable by explaining it away.
Computer scientists might try to mimic poetry or music by programming random combinations
of likely elements, but how could a computer produce the idea of poetry or music? How could
such a programmed instruction be given, as-in “be creative”? And how could a world of causeand-effect evolve to produce the creative impulse, an affect that is unrelated to cause and
independent of effect?
Consciousness can be WILLFUL. The age-old controversy of whether we are free or causally
determined is an argument between extremes of interpretation. We are, evidently, neither entirely
free nor completely determined by chains of cause-and-effect. To be willful is to be selfdetermined within limits, whether the limits are imposed from the environment without or the
personality within.
We sometimes experience our willfulness by its absence, its nullification, in the frustration we
feel when we’re restricted by external forces. To be truly constrained by cause-and-effect, as
when locked in a room or tied to a table, can be a terrible feeling -- a repression that shocks us
into an immediate recognition of willfulness by the experience of its suppression and duress.
We can experience our willfulness in both the enjoyment and the dread of our ability to make
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choices. We can embrace beliefs, and customs, and dictates, because they enable us to avoid our
willfulness and its attendant dilemmas -- and their sometimes fearsome implications. But we
have to choose not to choose, as when we invoke some given commandment to determine our
behavior, rather than act according to our own inclination.
To stand at the edge of a cliff is to confront the terror of one’s potential for spontaneous and
arbitrary willfulness: In the next moment I can choose to defy my wish to remain alive, to take
the smallest step, to lean the slightest bit, and plunge to a painful death, just by invoking a simple
act of will that I know, without doubt, to be within my power -- as surely as I know the ledge is
beneath my feet.
Consciousness can be RATIONAL. To be rational can be defined in this context as the sum of
our abilities to be purposeful, to transcend and negate the elements of experience, and to choose
deliberate, self-determined courses of action. It allows us to act resourcefully in the world, to
have the world react in a way that confirms both our rationality and the world’s affinity with
reason, as when a bridge stands strong according to its mathematical-rational design.
Reason is a resource beyond the capability of a computer. No matter how intelligent a
computer’s actions may appear, its simulation of reasoning is stored in its bank of data by the
actual reasoning of the programmer. An unanticipated circumstance can render the most
“intelligent” computer utterly stupid, as when a human opponent mischievously interrupts a
match by removing her king from the chessboard.
Consciousness can be FREE. Freedom in these terms is the ability to be purposeful, responsive,
transcendent, negative, willful, and rational – to be an autonomous, unique individual,
(conditionally) independent of physical determination. Freedom, when fully appreciated as such,
can substantiate our most ideal value: It forms the intuitive basis of our recognition of the
speciality of consciousness in a world of apparent thinghood, maybe the ultimate basis of our
love of self and others. And its reduction, its denial, forms the counter-intuitive basis of
devaluation, of dehumanization.
The common and observable manifestations of consciousness -- free and rational behavior -seem as certain as any principle or law of science. It may be difficult to reconcile consciousness
with nature as defined by physics and biology, but it is just as true that the para-scientific worldview is difficult to reconcile with our personal experience. It’s been an age-old problem for
philosophers, and for para-scientists (closet-philosophers!), to correlate the evident subjectivity
of consciousness (“mind”) with the objective world (“matter”). But regardless of how the
seeming duality of mind and matter might one day be resolved, the para-scientific view is clearly
inadequate, as it ignores the evidence of our personal experience and interactions, and our
indomitable sense of values.
Ours is a universe of intricate physical structure, a world of astounding biological organization,
populated with conscious beings able to reflect upon all there is -- capable even of imagining
things that don't exist. Though physical science has discovered much about the rudiments of
existence, though biology has revealed much about the mechanisms of life, to believe they could
be adequate to fully comprehend consciousness -- maybe the most consummate development in
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all the universe -- is to believe that what is expressed in more highly developed and organic
systems is somehow unreal, or alien and disconnected from the more basic and undeveloped. Asif life is to be understood in its reduction to physics, to the exclusion of how it has been able by
its abounding nature to develop into consciousness. As-if consciousness is to be understood in its
reduction to biology, to the exclusion of its manifest powers beyond biological explanation. As-if
physics and biology are to be understood without reference to their fullest expression in
consciousness.
This much seems evident, if we are to trust our own experience rather than defend a philosophy
of analysis, objectification, and reduction: A conscious being (we might better give it the form of
a verb rather than a noun, and say a conscious beingness) is beyond objectification and
reduction, because as a beingness, consciousness is not an object, and as individual, it is
irreducible.
The values realized by consciousness -- including life, love, liberty, ethics, morality, art, friends,
community, fun and laughter -- are not going to be found on a chalkboard, or under a
microscope. A world where consciousness is possible is a world of more wondrous matter, more
wondrous life, more wondrous mind and culture than science with its analysis, objectification,
and reduction can comprehend or evaluate. It’s evident, it’s good, it’s valuable.
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Kaufman, S. E., On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness: Introduction
Article
On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness:
Introduction
Steven E. Kaufman*
ABSTRACT
This universe consists of both experiential forms as well as the formless Consciousness by which
every experiential form is apprehended, and in the absence of which formless Consciousness no
experiential form, i.e., no reality, has ever been, or can ever be, known to exist. In the usual
analysis of the nature of the universe the emphasis is generally placed upon the experiential
forms and their relations to each other, and in the rare instances where Consciousness is even
mentioned it is usually afforded a secondary status, as it is usually assumed that the phenomenon
of Consciousness is somehow produced through some relation or set of relations occurring
between the physical or material realities of which the universe seems to be, and so is assumed to
be, composed. In this work that emphasis is reversed, since this work takes the position that the
universe is actually composed of a singular and formless Consciousness, and that it is the
relations of that Consciousness to Itself that produce the forms which that singular, formless, and
yet individualized Consciousness then apprehends as the universe of experiential forms—
physical, mental, and emotional—that we call reality.
This work consists of the following series of articles: Introduction; Part 1: The Evolution of the
Formless into Form while Creating Lesser Form (1, 2 & 3); Part 2: The Identification of the
Formless with Lesser Form; & Part 3: The Identification of the Formless with Itself (1 & 2).
Key Words: Consciousness, formless, form, physical reality, creation, nature.
Introduction
One aspect of the human condition is that we take reality far too seriously. And we take reality
far too seriously because we think that reality is what is actually there where it appears to be.
And the reason we think that reality is what is actually there where it appears to be is because we
do not know the nature of What Is Actually There where reality only appears to be.
Trying to understand the nature of reality without some understanding of the nature of What Is
Actually There where reality appears to be is as futile as trying to understand the nature of a
reflection while blind to the presence and necessity of the mirror within which the reflection
arises. On the other hand, once one recognizes the presence of the mirror that is actually there
where the reflection only appears to be, the reflection, which was previously impossible to
understand, becomes relatively easy to understand. Likewise, with regard to the nature of reality,
*Correspondence: Steven E. Kaufman, Independent Researcher. http://www.unifiedreality.com
E-mail: skaufman@unifiedreality.com
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once one is able to recognize the nature of What Is Actually There where reality appears to be,
the nature of reality becomes relatively easy to understand.
Understanding the nature of reality involves nothing more than understanding the way in which
What Is Actually There, where reality only appears to be, creates or brings into existence,
through relation to Itself, what it then apprehends as reality. As will be described, what we refer
to as reality is created as a sort of boundary or reflection that arises where the Formlessness or
formless Beingness that is actually there, where reality only appears to be, becomes defined in
relation to Itself owing to its involvement in some relation with Itself. And once that boundary,
reflection, or form has been created, that form is then apprehended as a reality, i.e., as an
experiential reality, by the formless Beingness that has created that form within Itself through its
relation to Itself.
And although the nature of reality will be defined with some precision, it should be noted at the
outset that using words or any form to describe and define What Is Actually There where reality
appears to be is like trying to clean glass using a hammer. That is, it cannot be done, and in
trying to do so one only ends up making a mess of that which one is trying to make more clear.
This is because words are forms that represent concepts, which are also forms, whereas What Is
Actually There where reality appears to be is formless, which is to say, a Formlessness, or
formless Beingness. For this reason, words cannot possibly describe nor define the formless
Beingness that is actually there where reality appears to be. However, words can describe, to a
limited extent, how that Formlessness creates or brings into existence what it then apprehends as
reality, because there is a connection between what the Formless is doing, or perhaps more
accurately, how the Formless is being, and the forms that are created and apprehended by the
Formless as reality. Words can also describe, to a greater extent, what that Formlessness
apprehends as reality, because what that Formlessness apprehend as reality, or experiences as
reality, is itself a form. For these reasons, what will be described in this work is not the
Formlessness or formless Beingness of which the universe is ultimately composed. Rather, what
will be described in this work is the process by which the Formlessness of which the universe is
ultimately composed creates or brings into existence within Itself the forms which that same
Formlessness then apprehends as the universe of experiential forms—physical, mental, and
emotional—that we call reality.
As already mentioned, the process whereby the Formless brings into existence the forms it
apprehends as reality is one of self-relation. More specifically, the process whereby the Formless
brings into existence the forms it apprehends as reality is a process of iterative and progressive
self-relation. This is how it must be, because in creating the forms it apprehends as reality, the
Formless has only Itself to work with, since nothing else Is. Put another way, there is only one
thing that actually Is, and the one thing that actually Is is the non-thing, or no-thing, that is being
pointed toward in this work through the use of the words Formlessness, or formless Beingness.
And so it is left to the Formless to both create and apprehend form, as there is nothing else that
actually Is that can do so, since, as will be described, all else, all experiential form, all that we
call reality, only exists and so only seems to be what actually is, and so only seems to be what is
actually there where it appears to be.
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Kaufman, S. E., On the Nature of & Relation between Form & Formlessness: Introduction
This work consists of three parts. In the first part of this work the evolution of the Formless into
three different levels of Form is described. Also described in the first part of this work is the
coming into existence of a different type of form, or lesser form, within each level of Form, as
each level of Form comes into being through the progressive flow of the Formless in relation to
Itself. Further, the three different types of lesser forms that come into existence within the
Formless, as the Formless, through iterative and progressive relation to Itself, evolves into
different levels of Form, are each shown to correspond to one of the three different types of
experiences or experiential realities of which we are able to be aware or conscious. Specifically,
the lesser form that comes into existence within the first level of Form, as the first level of Form
comes into being, will be shown to correspond to what we apprehend as emotional experience or
emotional reality. Next, the lesser form that comes into existence within the second level of
Form, as the second level of Form comes into being, will be shown to correspond to what we
apprehend as mental experience or mental reality. And finally, the lesser form that comes into
existence within the third level of Form will be shown to correspond to what we apprehend as
physical experience or physical reality.
What is described in the second part of this work is what happens when the Formless, for
whatever reason, begins to identify with, i.e., know itself as, the lesser forms that have come into
existence within Itself as a result of its having become Form, i.e., as a result of its being or
flowing in relation to Itself. Specifically, what the second part of this work describes is the way
in which the misidentification of the Formless with the lesser forms that have come into
existence within Itself causes the Formless to become unable to be aware or conscious of the
Formlessness that is Itself, and so causes the Formless to lose sight of Itself, to become hidden
from Itself, thereby causing the lesser forms that continue to be created within Itself, which
lesser forms the Formless remains aware of or conscious of as reality, to appear as what is
actually there, when What Is Actually There, where the forms apprehended as reality only appear
to be, is the now hidden Formlessness within which those lesser forms have come into existence
and by which those lesser forms are being apprehended as reality. Also described in the second
part of this work is both why and how the Formless naturally tends to relate to the forms of
which it becomes aware or conscious, once it has lost sight of Itself though identification with
form, in a way that causes Itself to suffer.
In the third part of this work what is described is how the Formless, owing to the way in which it
naturally relates to the world of forms once it has lost sight of Itself though identification with
form, unknowingly keeps Itself caught up in and so bound to the relation with Itself that is
creating its identification with form, and so unknowingly perpetuates both its identification with
form as well as its inability to become aware or conscious of the Formlessness that is Itself,
thereby also perpetuating the illusion that reality, i.e., apprehended form, is what is actually there
where it appears to be. Also described in the third part of this work is what form-identified
Formlessness must do, so to speak, in order to extricate Itself from the cage of formidentification in which it is unknowingly keeping Itself trapped. And what form-identified
Formlessness must do, in order to extricate Itself from the cage of form-identification in which it
has trapped Itself, is change the way it naturally and habitually relates to the universe of
experiential forms, owing to its identification with form, while still identified primarily with
form. For, as will be described, it is only once form-identified Formlessness changes the way it is
actually being in relation to Itself through the proxy of its relations to the various forms of which
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it becomes aware or conscious, that its obscured and yet ever-present formless Nature can cease
to be obscured. And it is only once its formless Nature ceases to be obscured that the Formless is
then able to become aware or conscious of Itself, thereby allowing the Formless to identify with
its formless Self rather than with form. And it is through that direct Recognition and Realization
of Itself, absent any intervening form, including the concept of formlessness, that the Formless
comes to Know and Realize Itself to be What Is Actually There wherever the forms it continues
to know and apprehend as reality still appear to be, since once the Mirror Reappears to Itself,
thereby allowing the Mirror to Recognize Itself, the reflections that rest within it, which
reflections it once mistook for itself, and which reflections once obscured Itself while they were
mistaken for itself, do not go away, although they do cease to be known as what is actually there
where they still must, by their very nature, appear to be.
(Continued in Part 1: The Evolution of the Formless into Form while Creating Lesser Form (1))
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Intrinsic Awareness,
The Fundamental State of Consciousness1
Weili Luo
Department of Physics, University of Central Florida, Orlando, Florida, 32816, USA
(Weili.luo@ucf.edu)
Abstract
In an effort to simplify the complexity in the studies of consciousness, the author
suggests to describe the conscious experiences as a fundamental state, the intrinsic
awareness (I.A.), and functions of this fundamental state. I.A. does not depend on
external environment, our sense organs, and our cognitions. This ground state of
consciousness is timeless and irreducible to sub-constituents; therefore reductionism can
apply neither to the analysis nor to the new theory of I.A. The methodology for
investigating I.A. is proposed and the relation between I.A. and the hard problem in
consciousness proposed by Chalmers is discussed.
Keywords: consciousness, intrinsic awareness, fundamental state of consciousness,
space-time and intrinsic awareness, ground state of consciousness.
1. Introduction to Intrinsic Awareness (I.A.)
The question of how the mind or consciousness works has been an important
intellectual pursuit of philosophers and psychologists over centuries and even millennia.
With the advance of technology, it has gone beyond a philosophical issue and has
become one of the most studied topics in science. Because the question encompasses
diverse fields such as psychology, philosophy, biology, cognitive science, neuroscience,
artificial intelligence, etc., it is a daunting task to even just consider where to start to
address the issue of consciousness: should one start from cognition? Should one start
from neurobiology, or from the philosophical question of whether the mind is the
emergent phenomenon of the physical brain or not? Although different expertise all has
something to contribute, the answer to these questions has been entangled in the
complexity of many areas overlapping with the problem [1]. In 1996, David Chalmers
proposed that there are two types of problems in the studies of consciousness [2], the
easy problems, which mainly address the objective mechanisms of the cognitive system,
and the hard problem that involves how physical processes in the brain give rise to
subjective experiences. The easy problems, although many of them were unsolved then
1
This paper has been published in “International Journal of Computing Anticipatory Systems”,
Volume 24, P190-196, 2010. ISSN 1373-5411. ISBN 2-930396-12-1. It is based on the talks
given at CASYS'09, the 9th International Conference on Computing Anticipatory Systems, Liege,
Belgium, August 2009, and 18th Winter Chaos Conference, Tarpon Springs, Florida, March 2010.
and still are as of today, are solvable; while the hard problem is the one that researchers
do not know where to start, and Chalmers was not even sure that current scientific
framework can eventually solve it.
In this article a proposal is made, instead of dividing the consciousness studies
into the easy problems and hard problem, to characterize our conscious experience by a
fundamental state and functions of this state. I argue that the complexity of the studies
of consciousness can be simplified because of the existence of a fundamental
awareness. I terms it the “Intrinsic Awareness” or I.A., which is our basic ability to be
aware, to know. The idea of this fundamental awareness is borrowed from some ancient
contemplative traditions where it has been called different names such as innate basis of
mind, pure mind, illuminating mind, or simply awareness, etc. [3-6].
It is not difficult to realize that I.A. does not depend on our senses and the
external conditions. Taking the example of seeing red roses: the whole process of seeing
red roses can be broken down to several stages: we may first sense something beautiful
in our environment, then our vision comes into focus so we can see the actual flowers;
our brain starts to perform the function of analyzing and comparing the observed object
with other concepts stored in it; afterward the brain comes up with the conclusion that
this is a bunch of red roses. If these flowers are outside our sight at the beginning, our
olfactory organ will be the first to get in contact with the smell from them. And, the
analytical process from the brain leads to the conclusion that these are fragrant flowers.
Although the cognitive process seems to start from the contact of the object with our
visual or olfactory sense, it is our ability to know that leads us to notice that there is
something out there in the first place. This ability itself does not depend on external
objects and it must exist before our sense organs get in contact with the environment. A
blind person may not see things at this moment but his/her ability to see is still there.
When technology is advanced enough to cure the blindness the person is no longer blind
to outside world, and then the ability to see will be able to perform its functions. Just
recently a device has been invented to help blind people to analyze the electric signals
received so they can “see” the environment surrounding them2. Similarly, people who
could not hear may have problems with their sense organ, the ear(s) in this case, but
they do not really lose their ability to hear. With modern technology, it is not hard to
conclude that once a hearing aid is put into place, they are able to hear again, just as we
may not be able to hear in a soundproof room but our ability to hear is still there. Once
we get out of the room, we are able to hear again.
The next example goes beyond our sense organs: suppose we are alone in a
room with our back facing the door when someone walks into the room quietly. Even
we do not hear steps and do not see the person, many of us have the gut feeling that
someone else is in the room. Through some training, most people can achieve the same
ability3 associated with I.A. It is also easy to understand that I.A. can function perfectly
2
“Acoustics help blind people see the world” The Medical News, July 5, 2009. URL: http://www.newsmedical.net/news/20090705/Acoustics-help-blind-people-see-the-world.aspx
3
One way to achieve this is to train our mind to be tranquil so as to be sensitive to surrounding
environment.
well without external stimuli — we can be aware of internal activities such as our
thoughts, emotions, pains, etc.; we know when we are hungry, thirsty, or when we are in
love. These examples demonstrate that our ability to be aware depends neither on the
external environment nor on our sense organs.
2. All Conscious Experiences Are Functions of I.A.
If I.A. does not depend on sense organs, the consciousnesses associated with the
five sense organs4 must not be fundamental. Then, what is the relation between I.A. and
those conscious experiences we are more familiar with? It is common sense that our
daily activities depend on awareness. We have to be aware of our environment and of
ourselves to live a normal life, implying that, rather than separating from I.A., our
everyday experiences are expressions of I.A. through a specific sense organ or mental
activities. When I.A. manifests through our visual organ, the eyes, it becomes what we
know as the visual consciousness; when I.A. expresses itself through the hearing organ,
it becomes what we know as the hearing consciousness; the same is true for smell, taste,
and tactile consciousnesses.
Besides the five sense organs we also have consciousness related to mental
activities such as thoughts, concepts, and being conscious of self, etc. Some people,
especially those who believe that mind is the emergent phenomenon of brain, may
conclude that I.A. must be the product of our mental activities. In the previous example
of being aware of someone walking into the room, one learned that I.A. does not depend
on the mental discriminative ability based on concepts. At the very first moment, before
we make connection with any concept or even any sense organ, we just have a hunch
that someone is in the room. In fact, we all have experiences in which we had a hunch
about something or some situation that we could not quite put it into words. This
realization that we know or feel something but could not express it indicates that 1) our
language is not sufficient to describe what we experience; 2) the “inner knowing”
comes before any concept or words. This “knowing” before the conceptual mind arises
is our basic ability to know, i.e. our intrinsic awareness, I.A. These examples
demonstrate that this fundamental awareness is always with us whether we experience
something or not. This leads to the conclusion that I.A. is independent of, instead of the
product of, mental activities.
Because all our conscious experiences, either through physical senses or mental
cognitions such as thinking, perception, judging, remembering, and problem solving,
depend on the instinct ability to be aware, none of them is fundamental − they are all
functions of I.A.
3. Timeless and Non-Reducible I.A. as the Ground State of
Consciousness
The fact that I.A. is the foundation to all conscious experiences indicates that it
4
The five consciousnesses associated with the five sense organs are: the visual consciousness, the
auditory consciousness, the nasal consciousness, the taste consciousness, and the tactile consciousness.
cannot be further divided into sub-constituents: it is neither a part of anything else nor
an entity depending on anything else; I.A. is irreducible. Thus, the current reductionist
approach, where a system is analyzed by its subunits plus the interactions between
them, will not apply to the study of I.A. Inasmuch as I.A. is irreducible, I.A. does not
need the concept of “space coordinate”, which is based on the potential divisibility, as
in the concepts of left and right, up and down, inside and outside, etc.5 [7]. Because I.A.
cannot reduce itself to something else and because I.A. is always with us, nothing
changes in this state. Therefore, there is no “time” if one resides in this pure awareness.
Apparently, I.A. is the ground state of consciousness.
4. How to Investigate I.A.
If one accepts that I.A. is the root awareness from which all conscious
experiences emerge and I.A. is not the product of physical and mental activities, one has
to acknowledge the possibility that physical instruments we use in modern science, may
not be suitable to measure properties of I.A. directly. It is very likely that these
apparatus, at the best, probe only the results of interaction between the mental activities
in the brain and I.A. Thus the statement “you do not have experimental evidence to
show that I.A. is independent of mental activities” is not a valid argument against the
existence of I.A.
In quantitative science such as physics, we develop theories through mental
construct based on concepts, fundamental laws, and experimental facts; or the other way
around, we perform experiments to test theoretical predictions. In all these activities, we
use our discriminating ability to differentiate right and wrong, reasonable versus
unreasonable. We use concepts, knowledge, even experience stored in our memory to
compare with the object under study. There is, however, nothing in our experience or
concepts that we learned through analytical or reductionist methodology nearly
resembles I.A. Then, the question is how do we learn and understand I.A.? During many
years of investigating the nature of consciousness, I realized that, to truly know or even
to get familiar with I.A., one must directly experience it through introspection [8] or
contemplative practice6. In this direct perception our stereotype, culture background, or
special training that leads to a special way of thinking, have to be put aside so they will
not interfere with the experience.
Although this introspection may seem rather subjective, therefore lack of
5
One should be careful not to equate the space in space-time and the spaciousness. When we say:
“someone’s mind is as vast as space” we mean spaciousness, not the space coordinate in space-time
framework used in modern science.
6
The contemplative practice is no longer a taboo in our society, even in higher education. Numerous
research works have been done to investigate the effect of contemplative practices [9]. Some laboratories
and centers for contemplative studies have been established in higher education such as: The Center for
Investigating the Healthy Mind at the University of Wisconsin (URL:
http://www.investigatinghealthyminds.org); The Association for Contemplative Mind in Higher
Education (URL: http://www.acmhe.org); Contemplative Studies Initiatives at Brown University, Emory
University, and other institutions.
scientific objectivity, this in fact is not the case. In exploring I.A., as long as we follow
the same procedure step by step, different people should have the similarly reportable
result about the existence of I.A., albeit the details about how to reach that conclusion
may differ. Therefore, the seemingly subjective introspection is verifiable.
5. I.A. Versus “The Hard Problem” in Consciousness
There are commonalities between “the hard problem” of consciousness proposed
by David Chalmers [2] and I.A. discussed by the author of this article. According to
Chalmers, the mechanism associated with the interaction between human and
information received by the subject, i.e. the cognitive process, and the mechanisms
related to it, are the easy parts of consciousness study, meaning at least one can expect
to solve them sometime down the road. The subjective experience is hard because one
does not even know where to start to address it. In fact one is not even sure that science
can provide an answer to the hard problem in consciousness. Chalmers demonstrated
the difficulties encountered by reductionist approach when dealing with the hard
problem in consciousness. As far as the inapplicability of the reductionism to the
underlying problems is concerned, I.A. and the hard problem proposed by Chalmers
face the same situation. Nevertheless, characterizing conscious experience as I.A. and
functions of I.A. actually simplifies the complexity involved in studies of
consciousness. Once we know the fundamental state of the consciousness we know
where to start to proceed. Furthermore, this work gives a clear answer to the question
“why doesn’t the reductionism apply to the ‘hard problem’ in consciousness study?”
There are clear distinctions between the “hard problem of consciousness” and
I.A.: most of David Chalmers’ examples as the hard problem of consciousness are
subjective experiences that depend on personal history. For example, the experience of
color blue may reflect our living environment, our mood at certain time period, or other
things involving individual experiences. If one grew up in the proximity to ocean, then
the color blue is associated with his/her childhood memory with the ocean. If someone
lives in the open space of countryside, thus blue sky is the constant companion, then the
color blue may represent openness and spaciousness. On the other hand, if one is often
depressed, he or she may feel sad whenever the blue color shows up7. I.A., instead, is
independent of personal history, culture, and our stereotype, as the ability to be aware is
universal among all living things.
6. Conclusions and the Final Comments
From these discussions we can reach the following main conclusions: The
intrinsic awareness (IA) that we all have is a universal phenomenon among all living
beings. I.A. is the ground state of our conscious experiences that is timeless and
irreducible. The non-applicability of reductionism to study of I.A. challenges the current
“theories of everything” in which consciousness is ignored.
Recently, Rowlands has developed a new theory, “universal computational
7
In American idiom, “feeling blue” means feeling depressed or unhappy.
rewrite system”, with significant applications in particle physics and cosmology [10].
Basically, Rowlands can generate all mathematics, structure of nature, including space
and time, from a zero totality. It seems that this is a unified theory that is relative simple
and promising, as far as physical world is concerned. However, it is not clear how
consciousness and the fundamental awareness can come out of this universal rewrite
system. Although I.A. is beyond concept and space-time, consciousness, as function of
I.A., can be and should be addressed by any theory that is complete and unifying. Linde
has proposed that consciousness should be one of the fundamental variables, such as
space, time, matter, in any unifying theory [11].
More than thirty years ago, some physicists have speculated that there are
parallels between modern physics and Eastern philosophies, even suggesting that
vacuum state coming out of the quantum field theory of modern physics resembles the
concept of emptiness in Buddhism [12, 13]. Recently, this parallel was revisited by
Buddhist scholar Wallace [14]. Even though there are some similarities between the
concept of ultimate reality in Eastern thought and the basic state of nature in physics,
and these similarities will be further explored, the vacuum state addressed in quantum
field theory, at least in the current form, does not explicitly involve conscious mind.
I.A. is different from the “field” in the unified field model for consciousness
based on the “coherent field” developed when many people practicing meditation
together [15-17]. This “coherent, unified consciousness” was suggested being similar to
the “field” concept in physics. First of all, the “pure consciousness state” discussed in
these articles is not necessarily the intrinsic awareness. Just because one’s mind is calm,
quiet, and no thoughts does not guarantee it is in the intrinsic awareness as defined in
this work. Secondly, the so-called “unified, global conscious field” requires many
people to establish; while each one of us has I.A. with us; there is no need for anyone
else’s presence to experience I.A.
7. Acknowledgement
The author thanks Dr. Gilles Nibart for his encouragement and suggestions for
references.
References:
1. For a review on the problems encountered by the studies of consciousness, please
see: “Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings”, Ed. by David
Chalmers, Oxford University Press, 2002, and references therein.
2. Chalmers, David, “Facing Up the Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, pp. 200-219, 1995; David Chalmers, “The Puzzle of
Conscious experience”, Scientific American Dec 1995.
3. Sheng, Yen, “Illuminating Silence”, Watkins Publishing, London, 2002.
4. Suzuki, S., “Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind”, Weatherhill, 2005.
5. Nyima, Chokyi, “The Union of Mahamudra and Dzogchen”, Rangjung, Yeshe
Publications, 1986.
6. Xuan, Hua, “Shurangama Sutra”, Dharma Realm Buddhist Association, 1992.
7. One of the earliest concepts of space involves the “void” between the discrete
numbers. See, for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1080 b 33.
8. Boring, Edwin G., “A history of introspection”, Psychological Bulletin, vol. 50 (3),
pp. 169–189, 1953.
9. For a comprehensive review of research on contemplative practices, see: Shapiro,
Shauna, Walsh, Roger, and Britton, Willoughby B., “An Analysis of Recent
Meditation Research and Suggestions for Future Directions”, J. for Meditation and
Meditation Research, vol. 3, pp. 69-90, 2003; and references therein.
10. Rowlands, Peter, “From Zero to Infinity”, World Scientific, 2007.
11. Linde, Andrei, “Particle Physics and Inflationary Cosmology”, Harwood Academic
Publishers, 1990.
12. Capra, Fritjof, “Tao of Physics”, Shambhala Publications, 1976.
13. Zukav, Gary, “Dancing Wuli Master”, William Morow and Company, 1979.
14. Wallace, Alan, “Vacuum State of Consciousness: A Tibetan Buddhist View”
presented at the 5th Biennial International Symposium of Science, Technics and
Aesthetics: Space, time, and Beyond,” Lucerne, Switzerland, January 19, 2003.
http://www.neugalu.ch/english.htm.
15. Orme-Johnson, DW. Dillbeck, MC. Wallace, RK., and Landrith, GS. “Intersubject
EEG coherence: is consciousness a field?” International Journal of Neuroscience,
vol. 16(3), pp. 203-209, 1982.
16. Hagelin, J., “Is consciousness the unified field? A field theorist’s perspective”,
Modern Science and Vedic Science, vol. 1, pp. 29-87, 1987.
17. Pockett, Susan, “Field theories of consciousness/Field theories of global
consciousness” And references therein. Scholarpedia, ISPN 1941-6016, 2009.
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Field_theories_of_consciousness/Field_theorie
s_of_global_consciousness. |
arXiv:0909.5064v1 [cs.OS] 28 Sep 2009
A Conceivable Origin of Machine Consciousness in
the IDLE process
Norbert Bátfai
University of Debrecen
Department of Information Technology
batfai.norbert@inf.unideb.hu
November 22, 2021
Abstract
In this short paper, we would like to call professional community’s
attention to a daring idea that is surely unhelpful, but is exciting for
programmers and anyway conflicts with the trend of energy consumption in computer systems.
Keywords: Machine consciousness, IDLE process, Minix.
Contents
1 Introduction
1
2 Upright Operating Systems
2.1 What would be the cons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 What would be the pros? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 What should we compute? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Time delayed systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
2
2
2
3
3 Implementations
3
4 Conclusion and further work
4
1
Introduction
Operating systems are very sophisticated programs that can create a dream
world for users, in which there are processes, files, windows and etc. In a
similar manner, the human consciousness has also created a perfect dream
world for us, in which there are smells, colors, words, numbers an so on.
However operating systems are still passive programs in this sense that they
1
do exactly what we programmed into them. It is not at all surprising because
machines have neither free will nor consciousness today. Namely, in the case
of operating systems, the IDLE process will be scheduled if there is nothing
to do in the system. In the idle process our computer is doing nothing.
A brief outline of the content of this paper is as follows. In the next
section, we introduce the idea of Upright Operating Systems in conceptual
level. In section 3, first step will have been taken towards implementation
in such a way that we will have a closer look to the replacing IDLE process
in Minix operating system.
2
Upright Operating Systems
We set ourselves the aim of making some computing task in the idle process
of the kernel. An open source operating system needs to be selected if this
goal is to be achieved. We have chosen the Minix3 system [Herder et al.,
2006]. The operating systems in which the IDLE process is replaced with
some computing task will be called Upright Operating Systems.
The using of the word ”Upright” is an indication of the Upright Man,
more specifically of the period of becoming human during which Homo Erectus may have taken an upright position.
2.1
What would be the cons?
Why would a computing have to be supported in the kernel space? Why
not sufficient a simple, entirely user level server program, which is started
by the user, whenever the user wishes to run it? In addition to the exclusion
of the classical IDLE process goes against the trend of energy consumption
in computer systems.
2.2
What would be the pros?
We have only one argument that is principled or even also ethical: this would
not be a stoppable program. We will not be able to stop the computing
whenever we decide to use an Upright Operating Systems.
2.3
What should we compute?
What computing should be taken at kernel level? Essentially, two approaches may be envisaged. In the first approach, the operating system
would observe itself operating, in such a way that it would make notes during its operation, which notes will be processed in idle periods. For example,
in the case of Minix, the IPC traffic may be observed by the Minix kernel
[Tanenbaum and Woodhull, 2005, examples on pp. 219], which in turn en-
2
abled the kernel to modify settings of a possible SJF (Shortest Job First) or
a preemptive SJF (Shortest Remaining Time First) scheduler.
In the other approach, the operating system, for example, with maintaining a common AIML (Artificial Intelligence Markup Language, [Epstein
et al., 2008, chap. 13]) file, would converge toward human consciousness.
But we should remark that the most ideas arisen in this approach are also
implementable in the user level and are typically distributed.
2.3.1
Time delayed systems
It is an interesting question, how can Libet and Kornhuber’s results on
the timing of consciousness [Libet et al., 1979], [Kornhuber et al., 1976] be
implemented into an upright operating system?
3
Implementations
The first step towards implementation is to replace the IDLE process. In
the case of choosing Minix operating system, it is easy to find the source
code which implements IDLE process [Tanenbaum and Woodhull, 2005]. It
can be found in file kernel/arch/i386/klib386.s. Here the IDLE process
is not only a simple infinity loop, but which contains HLT statement which
reduces the CPU energy consumption.
We don’t have to do nothing else than to replace the idle task reference with an own one in the system image table in source kernel/table.c.
Our simple own ”Hello, World!” style uos task that demonstrates replacing
idle task defined in source kernel/uos.c is the following.
#include "kernel.h"
#include "../lib/other/random.c"
/* ==================================================== *
*
uos_task
*
*===================================================== */
PUBLIC void uos_task()
{
long l = LONG_MIN;
srandom(get_uptime());
for (;;) {
if (random() < l++) {
kprintf("Hello, Vilag!\n");
l = LONG_MIN;
}
}
}
3
4
Conclusion and further work
In the near future, we are going to accomplish the same firs step described
above in Linux kernel. For the time being, we are thinking about the question: what computing should be taken at kernel level?
References
R. Epstein, G. Roberts, and G. Beber. Parsing the Turing Test: Philosophical and Methodological Issues in the Quest for the Thinking Computer.
Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 2008. ISBN 1402096240,
9781402096242.
J. N. Herder, H. Bos, B. Gras, P. Homburg, and A. S. Tanenbaum. Minix
3: a highly reliable, self-repairing operating system. SIGOPS Oper. Syst.
Rev., 40(3):80–89, 2006. ISSN 0163-5980. doi: http://doi.acm.org/10.
1145/1151374.1151391.
H. H. Kornhuber, L. Deecke, and P. Scheid. Voluntary finger movement in
man: Cerebral potentials and theory. Biological Cybernetics, (23), 1976.
B. Libet, E. Wright, B. Feinstein, , and D. K. Pearl. Subjective referral of
the timing for a conscious sensory experience. Brain, (102):193–224, 1979.
A. S. Tanenbaum and A. S. Woodhull. Operating Systems Design and Implementation (3rd Edition). Prentice-Hall, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ,
USA, 2005. ISBN 0131429388.
4 |
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Deshpande, P. B., Experimentations on Enhancing Internal Excellence
Exploration
Experimentations on Enhancing Internal Excellence
Pradeep B. Deshpande*
Professor Emeritus of Chemical Engineering, University of Louisville, & Six
Sigma & Advanced Controls, Inc., Louisville, KY 40222 USA
Abstract
In the article, the author describes and discusses his experimentations on enhancing internal
excellence. The state of chakras has been selected for scrutiny in this investigation. If the chakras
are on target, the rest of the system should be equally good. The notion of chakras, or energy
channels, is an ancient Indian concept developed thousands of years ago. There are seven
chakras, whose state is correlated with energies of the ten fingers. When the appropriate fingers
of the right hand and the left both have the correct amount of energy, the associated chakra will
be of the correct size and perfectly aligned at the central vertical line. The state of the chakras is
influenced by both the physiological and psychoemotional state of the subject and so this is a 2input 1-output problem. When the emotions come under control - they will with meditation, it
will reduce to a 1-input 1-output problem. The selected meditation process should address both
the size of all the chakras, and their balance, meaning closeness to the central line.
Keywords: Internal excellence, consciousness, enhancement, measurement.
Yogastha Kuru Karmani (Be always in the state of Yoga): Bhagvad Geeta, 2.48)
Introduction
Yogis say that every individual has the same capacity to rise to the fullest extent possible for a
human being. The difference now is that the efficacy of the age-old wisdom can be ascertained
with a scientific device to measure progress. “Rising to the fullest extent possible” means to
achieve a significantly higher level of internal excellence (Figure 1 provides the definition).
Mindset Components:
•
Emotions:
Positive Emotions: Unconditional love, kindness, empathy,
compassion
Negative Emotions: Anger, hatred, hostility, despair,
resentment, guilt, frustration, jealousy, fear, worry,
helplessness, sorrow
Max S
Max T
Max Positive
Emotions
Level of Internal
Excellence
S: Truthfulness, honesty, steadfastness, equanimity
R: Attachment, bravery, ego, ambition, greed, desire to live
T: Lying, cheating, causing injury in words or deeds, sleep
Level of Internal
Excellence
Max Negative
Emotions
Figure 1. Level of Internal Excellence Explained
*
Correspondence: Prof. Pradeep B. Deshpande, Six Sigma & advanced Controls, Inc., 1209 Holsworth Lane, Louisville,
KY 40222, http://www.sixsigmaquality.com E-mail: pradeep@sixsigmaquality.com
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There are two approaches to raising the level of internal excellence: (1) A conscious approach,
and (2) A process whose side-effect is a rise in the level of internal excellence. In the conscious
approach, the S, R, T components of the mindset are meticulously tracked to insure that the S
component remains high and nudges higher while the R and T components remain low and
nudge lower. The conscious approach is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for progress.
The sufficiency condition is reached when a process whose side-effect is a rise in the level of
internal excellence is included and it is meditation. Prospects of success with meditation are
enhanced with proper diet and physical and pranic exercises.
Methods of Measurement
An important indicator of progress amenable to self-assessment in the pursuit of higher levels of
internal excellence is the capacity to remain centered (Yogastha Kuru Karmani) in the face of the
most challenging external situations that are part and parcel of life. For example, if you stub your
toe, what is your instant reaction before you have had a chance to think? Another example, let us
say you are driving, obeying all the traffic laws and someone cuts into your lane nearly causing
an accident, what is your instant reaction? As depicted in Figure 2 if the disturbances in the
internal condition are sustained for long periods of time, then the level of internal excellence is
inadequate. If the changes in the internal conditions are small and temporary then that is
indicative of a higher level of internal excellence. Among other indicators of high levels of
internal excellence are: (1) Spontaneous affection shown by animals, birds, butterflies and
children; (2) Just being among individuals with a high level of internal excellence brings a sense
of serenity and calm; and (3) Perfectly balanced chakras.
External Condition
Max Positive
Emotions
External Condition
Scale of Internal
Excellence
Scale of Internal
Excellence
Max S
Max T
Time
(a)
Max Negative
Emotions
Time
(b)
Figure 2. Influence of External Conditions on the Level of Internal Excellence
Each of the 6 ½ billion of us on Earth have many trillions cells. Each of these cells has a nucleus
which contains 46 chromosomes. We inherit 23 X, X chromosomes from our mother and 23 X,
Y chromosomes from our father. The chromosomes are made of atoms which in turn are made
up of subatomic particles. In other words, at the fundamental level, we are all made up of
vibrations which is light not necessarily visible light. Just as the atomic configuration determines
if a substance is iron or gold, the cellular configuration determines whether the cells are healthy
or not. That is, the frequency of vibrations of light we are emitting unknown to us is what
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Deshpande, P. B., Experimentations on Enhancing Internal Excellence
determines our health and even the level of internal excellence. Change the vibrational
frequencies and the cellular configuration will change for the better as will health.
Ancient Chinese and Indian masters have known this for thousands of years. Konstantin
Korotkov has developed a clever way to measure this light we emit to estimate the physiological,
psycho-emotional, and internal excellence state of humans. This device called Bio-Well, based
on the principle of Gas Discharge Visualization, utilizes a completely harmless current applied to
each finger of our two hands and measures the light emitted by them. Correlating the pixels so
emitted to the state of tens of thousands of subjects in the database allows for the prediction of
the physiological and psychoemotional state of the subject under scrutiny at a high probability.
This device has been approved by the Russian Ministry of Health as a medical diagnostic device
for use in Russian hospitals and doctors’ offices.
Bio-Well produces several outcomes. They are: (1) Overall energy, J, (2) Stress level & balance
between physiological and psychoemotional state, (3) Chakras, (4) Yin Yang meridians energy
distribution, (5) Health Status, and (6) Energy reserve. The state of Chakras has been selected for
scrutiny in this investigation. If the chakras are on target, the rest of the system should be equally
good. The notion of chakras, or energy channels, is an ancient Indian concept developed
thousands of years ago. There are seven chakras, whose state is correlated with the ten finger
energies. When the appropriate fingers of the right hand and the left both have the correct
amount of energy, the associated chakra will be of the correct size and perfectly aligned at the
central vertical line. The selected meditation process should address both the size of all the
chakras, and their balance, meaning closeness to the central line.
Six sigma principles suggest that perfection is not in the plan of nature meaning that it would be
extremely difficult to achieve the correct size and perfect alignment of all chakras at all times.
Variation occurs because of many factors that are either known or unknown/uncontrollable
which statisticians refer to as common cause variability. One source of difficult-to-control
variation is what we inherit from our ancestors. Not only do we inherit potential diseases from
our ancestors but also emotional traits and this has a bearing on the level of internal excellence.
We further complicate our lives beginning with the time we are in our mother’s womb when
things are beyond our control but also later by our own actions to the present age. There are only
two ways to rid ourselves of the ill effects of past negative emotions that are lodged in the energy
channels: Either suffer from them or eliminate them. The results of meditation suggest that the
effects of past negative emotions are attenuated.
For the seven chakras, the outcomes are: (1) Energy level (size) of each of the seven chakras,
Joules, and (2) Balance of each of the seven chakras, closeness to the central vertical line, %.
Thus there are fourteen outputs to regulate. The target value of the energy level of each chakra is
5 J, and the target value of the Balance of each chakra is 100.0 %. This is an interacting
multivariable control problem as several of the finger energies influence more than one chakra.
The goal is to drive each chakra energy towards 5 Joules and the Balance towards 100.0.
Perfection is not possible and so we would be content with achieving the correct mean value of
each chakra energy and the Balance while minimizing the variance of the size and Balance for all
seven chakras.
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Meditation Process
The author has included in his practice a variant of the asanas and pranic exercises of some yoga
gurus. The meditation practice was developed by Sanjeev A. Aroskar who holds a B. tech in
Electronics and Computers from the Indian Institute of technology, Mumbai. Earlier in his
career, he had the opportunity to work on more than fifteen projects for the former President of
India the late Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam when the latter was a Project Director. At the author’s
request, Aroskar has strived to insure that the meditation practice is consistent with six sigma
principles. The frequency of the program is twice a day. For more details on meditation for
materialization of intentions, the reader is referred to Reference 4.
When we strive for perfection, it is nice to have an ideal to work against. For example, the
author’s graduate students developed control algorithms that could theoretically deliver perfect
control in manufacturing applications. We also understood the problem with specifying
perfection and therefore designed control laws which were a suitable compromise. Such is the
case here as well. In this case, self-realized masters who remain connected much of the time have
the best performance. One such individual is the author’s Guruji, Gurumahan Maharishi
Paranjothiar who has an Ashram in the Thirumurthi Hills, Tamil Nadu, India. For the last
twenty-five years, he has spent three weeks every year in meditation in a Pyramid-shaped
structure for world peace with little or no food or drink (www.universalpeacefoundation.org).
Figure 3 depicts his chakras from the bioenergy measurements in May of 2013. For the vast
majority of us, such performance is nearly impossible to achieve. Nonetheless, the benefits from
achievable performance are very significant.
Figure 3. Guruji’s Chakras on May 26 2013
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Current Results
Figure 4 depicts the results of meditation over many days. In these figures there was one day
when all seven chakras were nearly balanced and of near-perfect size. This is significant as the
author had arrived from India carrying a 9 ½ hours of jetlag two days earlier. On several other
days, five or six of the seven chakras were nearly balanced and nearly on target. On the days they
were off-balanced/off-target size-wise, discernable causes could be identified. For example, on
one of the days the author had taken a flu shot and had developed a reaction the following
morning. On another occasion, when it was not possible to do meditation in the morning due to
some overseas calls that had to be made, the effect was visible in the measurement. When
meditation was added that evening, several of the chakras became more balanced. These and
other data not included here suggest that the entire program needs to be done sequentially in one
shot, preferably in the morning. Furthermore, the author suggests that if he can progress to this
extent, anyone can.
Figure 4(a). October 18, 2015 (58 Joules)
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Figure 4(b). October 25, 2015 (Reaction to Flu Shot) 51 Joules
Figure 4(c). October 27, 2015 (56 Joules)
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Figure 4(d). October 28, 2015 (60 Joules)
Figure 3(e). October 30, 2015 (59 Joules)
Figure 4(f). November 1, 2015 (61 Joules)
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Figure 4(g). Nov 2 2015 Pranayam Only in AM (60 Joules)
Figure 4(h). Nov 2 2015 Meditation only in PM (54 Joules)
Figure 4(i). Nov 3 2015 (64 Joules)
Figure 4. Chakra Measurements of the Author
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Generally speaking, the state of the chakras are influenced by both the physiological and
psychoemotional state of the subject and so this is a 2-input 1-output problem. When the
emotions come under control, and they will with meditation, it will reduce to a 1-input 1-output
problem. Then, it will be easier to link the state of each chakra to specific problems with the
physiological state. This information is valuable since our bioenergy field is the first to be
affected well before the symptoms of ailments are revealed in the body.
Discussion
An MRI or a CT scan depicts the state of the specific subject. In contrast, the bioenergy
measurements answer the question, compared to the tens of thousands of subjects in the
database, how does this subject stack up with a high confidence level. The bioenergy
measurements may be important predictors of future problems as the bioenergy of a human being
is the first to be affected well before the symptoms of ailments appear in the body.
Although this article has focused on raising the level of internal excellence, there are numerous
side-benefits: Health & wellness, creativity & innovativeness, improved performance in all
walks of life, better leadership decisions, and less discord. Elizabeth Blackburn has linked high
levels of stress to shortening of telomeres and accelerated aging and various diseases. AMA says
80% of all diseases occur because of stress. Stress being a byproduct of negative emotions and
since meditation relieves negative emotions from the inside, it is no wonder meditation has been
found to relieve stress.
When combined with the scientific framework for external excellence (six sigma), the ideas in
this paper extend to organizational excellence, national transformation, and to a better and more
peaceful world (Reference 4). Just as a person has an individual level of internal excellence, so
do nations. A nation whose population has an increasing level of internal excellence (rising S
component), rises while a nation whose average level of internal excellence is falling (rising T
component), declines. There is only one way for a developing nation to emerge as a developed
nation: Raise the level of internal excellence of the population!
Experimental investigations will confirm that the benefits of spending sufficient time on the
program during working hours to an organization and to the individuals will far outweigh the
cost to the company of allocating the time for the activity. Success is not likely if the staff is
asked to do this on their time. Although meditation brings about changes from within, it is
important to also consciously strive to cultivate positive emotions and avoid negative emotions.
The yogi says, external conditions only have 3% effect on us but how we respond to them has
97% effect.
It is advisable to remain committed to relying on data alone for decision-making everywhere else
except when you sit for meditation. Then, the rational mind must be sent on a vacation or else it
will become your worst enemy. Open-mindedness is essential for progress. Rationalism need not
equate to tunnel-version. Prospects of success with meditation are enhanced by Shraddha,
Bhakti, Vishwas (faith, devotion, and confidence/trust) but this need not make us superstitious.
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Everyone will benefit from the program but not equally because each of us carry a varying
amount of common cause variability.
The results are sensitive to how one places the fingers on the glass electrode of the Bio-Well
device. For example, Figure 5(a) depicts two measurements taken one after the other. The tester
needs to follow all the protocols during the measurements. That said the measurements cannot go
from those in Figure 5 to those in Figure 5(b) due to errors. The subject is advised to cultivate a
neutral mindset at the time of measurement. Expectations of a certain result may bring about an
unwelcome change.
Figure 5(a). Two Measurements Nov 5 2015 Energy 60 J (Left) and 61 J (Right)
Figure 5(b). Stomach Cancer Patient Jul 27 2014 (Energy 30 J)
(Courtesy Konstantin Korotkov)
To see how much of a difference the program was making, the before-and-after measurements
were made on November 10th. The results in Figure 6 show substantial improvement. One
reason for the before results is that the author had gone to see an emotion-stirring James Bond
movie, Spectre, and had gone to bed very late but the inability to remain centered in the face of
these simple external conditions point to a scope for additional improvement.
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Figure 6. Before (Left - Energy – 55 Joules); After (Right – Energy 65 J) Nov 10 2015
Epilogue
Some scientists have suggested that how it couldn’t be anything else but consciousness that
created the universe since there was nothing physical left at the moment of the Big Bang.
Scientists have also conducted experiments in recent decades showing that everything is
connected to everything else even though not physically linked with a field of energy that
responds to the power of human emotions. Since everything is connected to everything else, it
follows that our individual consciousness must also be connected to the universal consciousness.
This implies that we too must possess the capacity to create. If we could demonstrate this
capacity, then the hypothesis that the universal consciousness created the universe strengthens.
The meditation process is designed to materialize intentions and it contains a mechanism to
create physical reality. The noblest intention worthy of creation is to rise on the scale of internal
excellence. Now, we have a scientific measurement device with which to assess progress. Still,
the author wanted to find additional evidence supportive of the hypothesis, intention can create
physical reality.
With this mind, the author approached Sanjeev A. Aroskar in India who designed a program
which included an explicit intention to become light as cotton so as to lift from the ground. The
rational mind objects to this as it appears to violate Newton’s Law of Gravity. Actually, we have
lifted from the ground because we have become light as cotton and so Newton’s Law really has
nothing to say about it. Sanjeev gathered a group of six fellow meditators and practiced for
several months and during the author’s next visit to India, demonstrated the result. Figure 7 is a
still-frame from the video taken with the author’s IPhone camera showing Aroskar lifting from
the ground by more than a foot. There is some spring-action involved here as the meditator was
seen to be pushing himself up by pressing with his hands to the ground but this feat would be
impossible to achieve with spring action alone. Readers will realize that sitting cross-legged it is
impossible to lift even an inch by spring action of the hands pushing down. Four others in the
group had lifted by various amounts but none as high as Sanjeev. One individual showed no
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response at all. Just be sure, the author had an associate accompany him to witness the program
and to take a video with his IPhone.
W. A. Tiller explains that space can become conditioned for example through a meditation
process and then if an intention is introduced, it materilizes. The author this article adds,
conditioning of space requires a sufficiently high level of internal excellence.
Figure 7. Aroskar Lifting off the Ground
Musings of the Author
Scientific theories are always provisional in that as more and more data comes in that conforms
to the predictions of the theory, our confidence in the theory rises but if a single data point
presents itself that conflicts with the theory, then that theory must be abandoned in favor of a
new or modified theory.
One of the side-benefits of the program is creativity and innovativeness. May be some scientists
already engaged in deep research on renewable energy, desalination, global warming, etc., would
make breakthrough discoveries by embracing these practices. A theory in the absence of a
validated measurement is but a conjecture.
Capacity to learn is a gift; ability to learn is a skill; desire to learn is a choice: Source - Unknown.
Progress requires a change of perspective from how much we know to how little we know. There
is nothing wrong with making money. Trying to make it under false pretenses is where the
problem lies. In the absence of emotions, the notion of God has no relevance. The teachings of
all incarnations are nearly identical. This implies that they were all connected to the one and only
source. In an ego-bursting admission, no one invents anything; we only discover them.
The wisdom of self-realized yogis is profound. Unfortunately, there are too many instances of
unwholesome activities involving individuals pretending to be evolved souls. No wonder, there
is so much confusion in the minds of many in the society. Trust but verify. Mysticism is science
not yet discovered but take care, mysticism and superstition are close cousins and so validate all
observations with six sigma principles.
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Science is God already discovered but God is science yet to be discovered – Baba Shivanand Ji.
Science demands that measurements must be repeatable and reproducible and that is the way it
should be. On the hand, six sigma posits that there will always be a certain amount of
unavoidable variation in any outcome under scrutiny due to uncontrollable and unknown causes.
This concept is especially relevant in the present instance.
The scale of internal excellence (Figure 1) is nonlinear and contains chaotic orbits. Therefore, it
is possible to traverse the entire distance from the bottom to the top or the top to the bottom in
short order if you happen to hitch a ride on one of the strange attractors. Conversely, there could
be little progress over an entire lifetime despite best efforts.
Some people erroneously link meditation to religion. However, it is clear that there is no scope
for religious discord in the domain of universal consciousness. The world has become
increasingly rational minded since the days of Copernicus perhaps stung by Aristotle’s false
claims of an earth-centric existence. Therefore, a scientific explanation is necessary to win the
hearts and minds of the people.
Today’s students are tomorrow’s leaders and so it is important to introduce the program at an
early age. Otherwise, we will find ourselves complaining about high healthcare costs, now over
$2.7 trillion and climbing, when we are much older when the time to act would have passed by
several decades. The same reasoning applies for why the world is not more peaceful.
David R. Hawkins explained that only 25% of the world is transformable. In this connection, two
questions arise: (1) How then can the world become more peaceful? and (2) How to reach the
25% who are transformable. The answer to the first question comes from the work of Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi and his scientist followers. They conducted experiments which showed that a mere
fraction of the people meditating has a profound positive effect even on those who are not
participating in the exercise. As to how to reach the 25% transformable ones, the answer has to
be via the World Wide Web. The strategy should be to bring the ideas and concepts to the
attention of the 100% of the people knowing fully well that only a quarter of them are likely to
embrace them but that should be sufficient to bring about a significant positive change in the
society.
There are a small number of self-realized yogis who have come out to teach the practices of
internal excellence. The work reported here shows that scientists too can teach the science and
practices of internal excellence to a significant extent. Scientists may not have the capacity to
take an aspirant to the top of the scale of internal excellence but the progress aspirants will make
should be sufficient for national and global transformation and peace. This is significant since
there are tens of thousands of scientists. So, national and global transformation is not a
theoretical concept; it can actually be done. Aspirants desirous of reaching even higher levels of
internal excellence may not find it difficult to reach a self-realized yogi who resonates with them.
Acknowledgement: This paper is written with the explicit blessings of Guruji Paranjothiar and implicit
blessings of Baba Shivanand Ji. The author thanks Konstantin Korotkov and Krishna Madappa for their
review and comments on the paper.
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References
1. Abdul Kalam, APJ and Tiwari, Arun, Transcendence: My Spiritual Experiences with Pramukh
Swamiji, Harper Element Publishers, Noida, India 201301 2015.
2. Abdul Kalam, APJ, Emerging India: India Vision 2020, India Today, March 17, 2003.
3. Deshpande, P. B., Profound Implications of Minimum Variance Control, Dr. Mikel Harry’s Blog,
Business Improvement Times, May 2015.
4. Deshpande, Pradeep B., PhD and Kowall, James P., MD, PhD, The Nature of Ultimate Reality and
How It Can Transform Our World: Evidence from Modern Physics; Wisdom of YODA, SAC 2015
(available on amazon).
5. Deshpande, P. B., Six Sigma for Karma Capitalism, Six Sigma and Advanced Controls, Inc., 2015
(available on amazon).
6. Deshpande, P. B., Kulkarni, B. D., Aroskar, S. A., and Bhavsar S. N., Levitation during Meditation:
A Scientific Investigation, Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research, 2, 4, June 2011.
7. Gefter, Amanda, Trespassing on Einstein’s Lawn: A Father, a Daughter, the Meaning of Nothing, and
the Beginning of Everything Random House, 2014.
8. Korotkov, K., Energy Fields Electrophotonic Analysis in Humans and Nature, Available on Amazon
as Kindle Edition or from www.korotkov.org, 2012.
9. Hagelin, John S., et al., Effects of Group Practice of the Transcendental Meditation Program on
Preventing Violent Crime in Washington, DC: Results of the National Demonstration Project, JuneJuly 1993, Social Indicators Research, 47, 2, 153-201, 1999.
10. Hawkins, David, R., Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis and Calibration of the Level of Human
Consciousness, Veritas Publishing, W. Sedona, AZ 1995.
11. Kowall, James P., How is the World Created from Nothing, Journal of Consciousness Exploration &
Research, 6, 6, June 2015.
12. Orme-Johnson, David W., et al., International Peace Project in the Middle East – The Effects of
Maharishi Technology of the United Field, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32, 1988 pp 776-812.
13. Tiller, W. A., Psychoenergetic Science: Second Copernican Revolution, www.amazon.com, 2007.
14. Wallace, R. K., Physiological Effects of Transcendental Meditation, Science, New Series, Vol. 167,
No. 3926 (Mar. 27, 1970), pp. 1751-1754.
15. http://www.sot.sixsigmaquality.com
16. http://www.slideshare.net/search/slideshow?searchfrom=header&q=krishna+madappa
ISSN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
www.JCER.com |
Response to Nauenberg’s “Critique of Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters
Consciousness”
(accepted 11/01/07 by Foundations of Physics, DOI: 10.1007/s10701-007-9195-8)
Fred Kuttner
Department of Physics
University of California, Santa Cruz, CA 95064
Abstract
Nauenberg’s extended critique of Quantum Enigma rests
on fundamental misunderstandings.
In his brief abstract, as a summary of his extensive paper1, Michael Nauenberg
incorrectly states that the “central claim” of our book, Quantum Enigma2, is that
“understanding quantum mechanics requires a conscious observer.” In fact, we are
explicit that understanding quantum mechanics, for all practical purposes, need not
address the issue of consciousness. We rather note that physics has encountered
consciousness. The major theme of Nauenberg’s critique is that we are wrong, even
doing something improper, by raising the issue of consciousness in connection with
quantum mechanics. We must reply to this charge.
A dictionary’s first definition of “encounter” is: “to meet, usually unexpectedly.” It fits
our use of the word. One such meeting early on was von Neumann’s demonstration that,
while for all practical purposes a wavefunction can be considered collapsed at any
macroscopic point in the measurement chain, nevertheless, in principle no physical
system described by quantum mechanics can collapse a wavefunction. The final collapse
must take place at the level of consciousness3. We might also cite Wigner’s famous
comment that “…it was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a
fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness.”4
More recently a foremost exponent of “decoherence” in the measurement process, Zurek,
has written: “An exhaustive answer to this question [the perception of a unique reality,
i.e., a measurement] would undoubtedly have to involve a model of ‘consciousness’…”5
And in their discussion of the quantum potential interpretation of quantum mechanics,
Bohm and Hiley write: “However, the intuition that consciousness and quantum theory
are in some sense related seems to be a good one…”6 Many examples where quantum
mechanics has led physicists to speculate about a connection with consciousness could be
cited.
And, of course, the connection has influenced philosophers. For example, Chalmers’
landmark book7 introducing the now much-discussed “hard problem” of consciousness
has a final chapter titled “The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics.” With quantum
mechanics, physics has at the very least encountered consciousness.
The tack we take in our book is to present the undisputed experimental facts with a
quantum-theory-neutral demonstration. We have presented a technical version of such a
quantum-theory-neutral demonstration some years ago.8 Our book presents this to the
general reader with the invitation to readers to decide on the extent of the encounter with
consciousness for themselves. We present the quantum theory explanation of these
demonstrations. But we leave the issue an unresolved mystery, an enigma, one that
should stimulate meaningful and disciplined speculation.
In our book we are explicit that the encounter of physics with consciousness likely has no
practical consequences for physics. It is metaphysics. Nauenberg criticizes us for talking
of “metaphysics,” as if metaphysics were pseudoscience. A major point of our book is
that quantum mechanics brings us to an encounter with something beyond what
physicists usually think of as physics. Something beyond physics is essentially the
definition of metaphysics. We are clear in our book, that physicists, as physicists, need
not concern themselves with consciousness. But we, and our readers, are more than just
physicists. There is more to life than physics. Quantum mechanics tells of something
mysterious that seems beyond “physics.”
Exploring beyond testable physics, several interpretations of the meaning of quantum
mechanics currently contend with the Copenhagen interpretation--which we all use in our
teaching and research. In our book we treat nine of these (and in the paperback version
planned by Oxford University Press, we treat ten). Many of these interpretations
explicitly treat consciousness. For example, the most famous alternative to the
Copenhagen interpretation, the “many worlds” interpretation, has also been seen as the
“many minds” interpretation. Even when consciousness is not explicitly addressed, every
interpretation has speculative implications for the nature of consciousness.
We are acutely aware that the strange implications of consciousness have increasingly
been exploited to promote quantum nonsense. We not only consider this a serious societal
problem, but we feel it to be the responsibility of physicists to address it. In fact, evading
the enigma, or worse, denying it, cedes the field to the field to the purveyors of
pseudoscience. We have urged our colleagues to teach the quantum mysteries honestly
as an antidote to their misuse.9
Nauenberg refers to our “misunderstanding” of the physics and does so with very
extensive quotations. We will not reply in detail to his many incorrect claims that we
have the physics wrong. We just note that our book has been extensively reviewed and
praised by physicists, and, other than Nauenberg’s misinterpretations, no errors were
noted. See our book’s website, www.quantumenigma.com, for many reviews.
Some physicists can be unsettled by having our “hard” discipline of physics connected
with the mysterious, “soft,” and emotional subject of consciousness. Historian of science
Jed Buchwald has noted that: “Physicists…have long had a special loathing for admitting
questions with the slightest emotional content into their professional work.”10 At times
we can, to an extent, share this reaction of our fellow physicists, but we are trying, along
with many experts in the fundamentals of quantum theory, to move beyond it.
Early on John Bell wrote that it is likely that “the new way of seeing things will involve
an imaginative leap that will astonish us.”11 Bell expressed similar views in what was
probably the last article he ever published.12 By “us” Bell did not just mean physicists.
The astonishment Bell refers to might well involve consciousness.
1. Nauenberg, M. : Found. Phys. (in press). DOI 10.1007/s10701-007-9179-8 (2007)
2. Rosenblum, B., Kuttner, F. : Quantum Enigma: Physics Encounters Consciousness.
Oxford University Press, New York (2006)
3. von Neumann, J.: Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton
University Press, Princeton (1955)
4. Wigner, E.: Remarks on the mind-body problem. In: Wheeler, J.A., Zurek, W.H. (eds.)
Quantum Theory and Measurement, pp. 168-181. Princeton University Press, Princeton
(1983)
5. W. H. Zurek,: Preferred states, predictability, classicality, and the environmentinduced decoherence. Prog. Theor. Phys. 89(2), 281 (1993)
6. Bohm, D., Hiley, B. J.: The Undivided Universe. Routledge, London (1993)
7. Chalmers, D.J.: The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press, New York (1996)
8. Rosenblum, B., Kuttner, F.: The observer in the quantum experiment. Found. Phys. 32,
1273-1293 (2002)
9. Kuttner, F., Rosenblum, B.: Teaching physics mysteries versus pseudoscience. Physics
Today 59(11), 14 (2006)
10. Glanz, J.: ESSAY; A Physicist Considers the Cosmos, Through the Prism of 9/11.
New York Times, 21 May 2002, p. F4.
11. Bell, J.S., Nauenberg, M.: The moral aspects of quantum mechanics. In: De Shalit,
A., Feschbach, H., van Hove, L. (eds.) Preludes in Theoretical Physics, pp. 279–286.
North Holland, Amsterdam (1966). Reprinted in J.S. Bell Speakable and Unspeakable in
Quantum Mechanics, p. 22. Cambridge Univ. Press (1987)
12. Bell, J.S.: Against ‘Measurement'. Physics World 8, 33–40 (1990) |
Illusions - a model of mind
Markos Maniatis
UBB, Departamento de Ciencias Basicas, Chillan, Chile
Recognizing that all mental processes have to be unfree and passive, we develop a model of
behavior and perceptions. We shall see how misleading our intuition is and shall understand how
consciousness arises.
arXiv:1707.09379v1 [q-bio.NC] 28 Jul 2017
I.
INTRODUCTION
We are convinced to be like the captain of a ship
- equipped with navigation systems like radar, depth
sounder on the one hand und rudder, radio equipment,
switches and levers for valves and locks on the other hand.
Similar, we get on the one hand visual, auditive, haptic
and other sensory informations and on the other hand
we control and steer our body, walk, grasp, gesticulate
und communicate. We are convinced to be free in the
sense, to indeed have informations available about our
surrounding and our body, but at least expect to be able
to control ourselves to a certain level arbitrary. Of course,
we know that certain processes are unconscious, like, for
instance, the control of our heart. However, we expect to
be free at least with respect to conscious behavior.
This picture of a ”captain” on board of our body reveals at a closer look as an illusion; on general grounds it
appears to be meaningless to present the sensory signals
to any kind of inner ”captain”; our senses have accomplished this task already in transferring the perceptions
to our nervous system, that is, have made the information accessible for further processing. Why should these
informations be presented once again to an inner ”captain” [1]? In particular, the informations would have
to be processed once again within the ”captain” and we
were no step further. In fact, the incoming signals, for
instance of the visual system, are processed already behind the retina and are directed to different regions in
the cortex. Accordingly, there is no localisation in our
brain in which the visual signals converge. Obviously, we
have to abandon the illusion of a ”captain”. But how
does this illusion arise?
A further illusion of the ”captain” is his freedom: we
think of a ”captain”, who has information available for
instance on monitors, about the current position of the
ship and its velocity, but we imagine that the ”captain”
is in principle free. We expect the ”captain” to balance
different options and to have a certain range of possibilities to decide and act. In this sense we speak of a kind of
responsibility of the ”captain”. We will see that also this
freedom of the ”captain” is an illusion when we consider
the ”captain” in our nervous system.
The absence of our freedom is the crucial point in order
to understand our behavior, thinking, our perceptions,
and eventually consciousness. The quest for free will is
certainly very old [2, 3] - and it is still subject to discussions today. In section II we shall discuss in detail this
question about our freedom.
Historically it seemed to be obvious that we are not
free, since two break thoughts have been achieved in science: firstly, it became clear that physiological processes
are in principle not different from other natural phenomena [4]. Secondly, the principle of cause and effect, the
determinism, was recognized as a fundamental and universal principle. These two findings lead to the following
question: how could we be free, if our physiological processes have to follow the principle of cause and effect,
that is, are deterministic processes? We want to discuss
some aspects of this discussion in the section II and we
will argue that our freedom is an illusion, in a certain
sense independent of the question of determinism.
If we are not free, the question arises, how do we come
to our decisions and actions? Since the free ”captain” in
us turns out to be an illusion, the question is, how do we
steer our ship without any type of ”captain”? Obviously
it appears that we in general do not behave like a ghost
ship - we act in general purposively. As a consequence
of the absence of freedom it is required to replace the
”captain” by a non-free, that is, passive ”mechanism”
in order to understand our decisions and actions consistently. This ”mechanism” has to connect the incoming
signals from our perceptions, which arrive at our nervous
system with the outgoing ones, which represent our decisions and actions. In section III we shall present the
”mechanism” which allows us to replace the ”captain”
and shall give a consistent explanation of our behavior
and thinking.
In section IV we will focus on our perceptions. If we,
for instance, watch the sunset our sensation seems not to
be in accordance with electrical action potential in the
neurons of our nervous system. With other words, the
question arises, how does the electric action-potential activity of neurons correspond to the sensation of watching
a sunset? What is the meaning of pain when we cut
accidentally our skin with a knife in contrast to the electrical or biochemical neuronal activity? We recognize the
problem already when we ask the simple question of the
sensation of a color, say red: the color red corresponds
physically to a range of wave length of an electromagnetic wave. This electromagnetic wave excites charges to
oscillate in special cells in our retina which in turn induce
electrical actions potentials in the neurons. The signals
are transferred to the cortex and the whole processing in
our nervous system is performed in form of action potentials. The color red, in form of our sensation, seems to
not exist neither outside nor inside our brain. How do
we come to the illusion of the color red? In the literature
2
this aspect of sensations of perceptions is often denoted
as qualia [5–8].
In section V we shall discuss eventually how we come
to the illusion of a ”captain”. It is the same question
asking for our ”consciousness”, ”self”, or ”I”. Why are
we convinced to have a form of ”I”? And what is the
true meaning of ”consciousness”? Based on the preceding discussion about freedom and about decisions and
acts we shall arrive at an interesting model of mind. The
mathematician G. W. Leibnitz has discussed this questions about consciousness already centuries ago [9]. In
his monade 17 he is studying the question about consciousness comparing our brain with a mill. We want to
reconsider this remarkable thought experiment and shall
try to reveal the Nature of consciousness.
It is our aim to develop a consistent model of mind
which provides a principal understanding of perceptions,
actions and eventually consciousness. We shall reveal
the illusions we have in mind and the main focus will be
to show how and why these illusions arise. Let us emphasize, that we are looking for a basic model of mind,
which will not consider all the interesting details. For
example, when we discuss our actions, in a general sense
also reflexes belong to actions. But reflexes occur in a
very different manner than conscious actions like shooting a ball towards a goal. Reflexes follow inevitable on a
certain stimulus; they are ”wired” firmly and they follow
therefore a different principle than when we shoot a ball.
But reflexes do not appear to be in contradiction to our
imagination, since we accept them as ”mechanical”.
We will see that our imagination is very misleading
compared to our true nature. We shall see, how in our
model of mind these illusionary imaginations arise and
shall understand how consciousness appears.
II.
UNFREE WILL
The central point in the development of a model of
mind is to realize that the freedom of will is an illusion.
The old quest for freedom is still today subject to discussions with very different opinions. This quest for freedom
was discussed already by the ancient greeks Democritus
[2] and Aristotele [3], newer discussion can be found, for
instance, by [1, 10–16],
In general we are convinced to be masters of our actions
and thoughts, to weight and eventually decide freely. A
consequence of this imagination of freedom is our understanding of responsibility and guilt, concepts which are
deeply rooted in our fundamental law; being guilty of a
criminal offense means to commit a violation of criminal
law. Finally, to a more or less large extend, our understanding of good and evil, responsibility, guilt and atone
are related to religion: if we violate God’s law we sin
and are guilty. Despite this big historical heritage with
respect to the body-mind problem we shall argue, that
under simple assumptions we never can be free. First,
we have to define what we mean by free. Let us consider
a concrete example: suppose, a waiter offers two kinds of
muffins, say a vanilla and a chocolate muffin. We choose
one of both, say the chocolate muffin. If this choice were
free this means that we could, at the same time, that is,
under the exact same conditions, have made an alternative choice. In this example we mean to be free, when we
could have chosen the vanilla muffin instead. We preliminary define freedom as the capability to have made an
alternative choice, under the same conditions. We will
see that this definition not quite gives what we actually
expect from freedom; therefore we denote this definition
as preliminary.
Let us note that in praxis it is not possible to restore
the exact same conditions since this would require to go
back in time. Could we repeat the ”experiment” of the
choice of two types of muffins, we would be able to immediately verify whether we always take the same choice
or not. However, we will see that this is not necessary to
understand that we are not free.
At a first glance, it appears not questionable that we,
following our definition, do have the freedom to choose
the alternative vanilla muffin. But looking at it again this
appears to be impossible, at least under certain assumptions: we suppose that our nervous system follows the
same basic principles as the rest of Nature does. In detail these principles are electromagnetic and biochemical
interactions in the neurons and its joints, the synapses.
If we follow natural processes, then the choice of a muffin is the result of a cascade of preceding processes. Every
process conditions the following. When we have made
a choice, while we extend our arm towards the chocolate muffin, then this choice arises from preceding (electromagnetic and biochemical) processes. An alternative
choice means that there were alternative preceding processes present, what obviously was not the case.
This argumentation is the determinism, the principle
of cause and effect. Our choice appears to be determined,
that is, not free, because we could not have taken another choice under the same conditions or equivalently,
at the same time. Let us mention that this contradicts
our imagination of free will. We will come back to this
interesting point later.
Firstly, let us consider the assumption that we follow
natural processes. Nowadays we undestand the elementary biochemical and electromagnetic processes in our
nervous system. Even that we certainly do not understand our brain as a whole, we do understand its basic elementary units, the neurons, together with its joints, the
synapses. Electromagnetic action potentials are transmitted through the neurons and in response, neurotransmitters, that is, signaling molecules, are released and excite the receptors of another neuron. Obviously, the basic
interactions, that is, its biochemical processes are principally the same interactions as we observe in Nature
elsewhere.
A milestone in this context was the synthetic production of urea. Before, the chemistry of life, the organic
chemistry, was strictly separated from the non-organic
3
chemistry of the remaining, dead, substances. This reflected the idea that chemistry of life is fundamentally
different from that of other substances. With the synthetic production of urea in 1828 by Wöhler [4], that is,
the production of an organic substance from non-organic
substances, this distinction had to be given up. The
chemists today denote the molecules based on carbon
for historical reasons as organic chemistry, in contrast
to non-organic chemistry. This is certainly a strong evidence supporting our assumption. A further evidence
that we follow natural processes is that material influences change our thoughts and actions. An example of
this is the consumption of alcohol. We recognize the
close relation between the material substance alcohol and
mind. A further example of this close relation is given
by lesion of certain areals of the brain which result in
mental changes. But let us note, that the assumption,
that our nervous system is based exclusively on natural interactions is plausible but difficult to prove. We
will nevertheless make this assumption in our model of
mind and shall see that we can in deed understand our
thoughts and actions in principle.
Secondly, let us take a closer look at the principle of
cause and effect, the determinism. It reflects our daily
experience that every effect has a cause: if the stone
hits the window with sufficient momentum, the glass will
break. When a action potential arrives at a synapse, it
reveals a certain amount of neurotransmitters. However,
we know that this principle of cause and effect has fundamental limitations: quantum mechanics, discovered by E.
Schrödinger [17], tells us that under the exact same conditions we can observe different effects. In Nature there
are processes which occur spontaneously. An example of
this is the decay of a radioactive element, which decays
spontaneously: if we observe two such radioactive atoms
they in general decay at different times. Before their decay, both atoms are in every detail identical. The reason
is not, that we do not know the exact details of the instable atoms, but merely it is Nature itself following this
rule. For a sufficient large number of radioactive atoms
we can only give the half-life time, the time after which
about half of the atoms have decayed. However, for a single atom we can not know this time of decay, it appears
to be undeterminable. We can compare this with throwing a coin. When we throw a coin sufficiently often, we
find that about half of them fall on one specific side. For
a single throw we can not determine the outcome with
certainty.
If we suppose, that our nervous system underlies the
same interactions as everything else we observe in Nature, then we cannot exclude that there are spontaneous
processes. With other words, in the cascade of processes
it may happen that there appear processes which are not
determined. Hence, the processes in the nervous system
are natural but not necessarily determined! Following
our preliminary definition of freedom, that is, the ability
to make an alternative choice under the same conditions,
we appear to be free!
However, we have to realize that this kind of freedom
does not satisfy our idea of freedom. Obviously, considering a machine, employing a spontaneous mechanism,
for instance triggered by radioactive decays of instable
atoms, we would not call free, even that it satisfies our
defintion. Instead, what we mean by free is to make
an alternative choice under the same conditions but not
spontaneously or randomly. Therefore, let us define freedom eventually as the ability to take an alternative choice
under the same conditions but not spontaneously.
Accordingly, following this revised definition, our decisions and actions are not free, supposed we underly
natural processes.
Let us comment on the current discussion about freedom. The physicist Max Planck was also engaged in the
quest of freedom [18, 19]. He realizes that the spontaneous, random processes do not make our actions free,
but he tries by a kind of ”inner” dialog to declare us
free. His argument can be sketched following our example of the choice of muffins. Suppose the waiter offeres
the two types of muffin but we are accompanied by a
friend. We discuss with our friend the preferences of the
two muffins. Evidently this discussion will influence the
process of decision and this may result eventually in an
alternative choice. Max Planck states that this process of
discussion can take place in our brain in a similar form
without our friend present and this makes us free, because, following Planck, this may result in an alternative
outcome. But there is a flaw in this argument: of course
the friend can affect our decision and we may even come
to an alternative choice. However, under the same conditions, taking into account our friend, there appears no
alternative process, disregarding for the moment spontaneous processes. When we think of our friend as a kind
of a ”inner” dialog, we get again to an illusory kind of
”captain”. The ”inner” dialog in reality is part of the
cascade of processes which never can be free. As we have
argued, spontaneously processes do not change the argument, because ramdom processes do not count following
our definiton.
In the literature we can find many variants of this argumentation of Planck; see for instance [14, 15, 20–23].
Typically there appears a kind of ”captain” on board of
our body in order to save our freedom. The crucial point
is to realize the illusion of this kind of ”captain”.
We see, that in order to be free, there appears only
the possibility to reject the assumption that mind processes are natural. We mentioned some evidences which
indicate that the interactions in our nervous system are
not anything special, compared to interactions elsewhere,
although it appears to be difficult to prove this. The argument to look for something beyond our nervous system
is essentially the believe in a ”soul” which is believed to
have some kind of existence beyond our body. Of course,
we can not accept this and will instead try to develop a
model of mind under the assumption that mind processes
do not go beyond natural processes elsewhere.
In section VI we shall briefly mention some conse-
4
quences of the absence of freedom. In particular it might
appear to be unacceptable to be unfree since this contradicts our imagination. We postpone this discussion after
we discuss in chapter V how we arrive at the illusion of
consciousness.
Let us close this section with an illustration by Carl
Ginet [12] who compared our illusion of freedom with
a little child in a ghost train: the child sits in a small
vehicle, equipped with a little unconnected, decorative
wheel. The child is moving the wheel in the illusion to
steer the vehicle which in reality is guided by the rails.
III.
THINKING AND ACTING
For the moment we want to extend our findings with
respect to the lack of freedom to our thinking. So far we
have considered the freedom with respect to decisions,
like in the example of the two kinds of muffins. But
similar to our decisions, thoughts represent also natural processes, at least relying on our assumption that all
processes in our nervous system are of the same nature
as processes elsewhere. Without knowledge about the
detailed realization of thoughts in our nervous system
we therefore assume that they represent neuronal processes. Strictly speaking it is in this context irrelevant
that thoughts are neuronal processes, it is only relevant
to assume that they are any kind of natural processes.
Then, our argumentation with respect to our decisions
can directly be applied to our thoughts; thoughts follow
from a cascade of processes, disregarding for the moment
spontaneous processes. Any process of thinking is preceded by a cascade of other processes, which in turn determine this thinking.
Similar to our definition of freedom of decisions we
mean by free thinking the capability to develop an alternative thinking under the same conditions, but not in
a spontaneous way. We see that in analogy to decisions
there is no freedom in our thoughts.
We see how misleading our illusion of a free ”captain”
is. The freely acting and thinking ”captain” is to abandon. Let us emphasize the passivity of the process of
thinking: at a closer look it is not ”us”, who develop this
or that thought, but the thoughts appears in a passive
way in our nervous system. An active form of thinking,
the creation of thoughts, in contrast, would correspond
to a kind of illusionary ”captain”. How could a thought
arise, if not caused by other processes, respectively spontaneously? While I am writing these lines, it is in fact my
nervous system, generating this thoughts - it is not my
autonomous ”I” in a sense of a ”captain”, who develops
this thoughts.
In detail, the process of thinking is certainly very complicated, for instance, it is affected by experiences and
memories. These experiences go back probably to our
earliest childhood. In addition we are typically confronted with many perceptions, for instance, a sound
which distracts us. Nevertheless, these details should
not obscure the fact that thinking is a passive, unfree
process.
We shall look closer at the Nature of thinking in section V, but we already see, that under the plausible and
simple assumption, that thinking is represented by natural processes, thinking is as little free as actions and
decisions.
If actions, decisions and thoughts are unfree, the question arises, how they are developed instead? The question is, what instead of a ”captain” is the principal, unfree ”mechanism” between the ”input” given by the monitors, the echo sounder and so forth, and the output, that
is, the steering of the ship.
Let us fist consider as an example a reflex, which is in
a general sense a kind of action. For a reflex it is immediate to see the principal unfree ”mechanism”: when the
rubber hammer hits the sensor area at the kneecap then
we move our lower leg. The evolution has equipped us
with reflexes in order to react fast and the reflex connects
the incoming signals going towards our nervous system
with the outgoing signals, the motor function given by
the muscle contraction. In the example of a reflex we
recognize immediately that the action is not free: the
movement follows inevitably on the stimulus. However,
this action does not contradict our imagination. We accept the reflex as ”mechanical”, in accordance with reality.
In general, our actions are not reflexes and we can in
general adapt our actions to changing circumstances. In
case of the choice of the muffin the ”mechanism” appears
to be more complicated and this ”mechanism” is of course
not a reflex. We weigh the advantages and disadvantages,
have memories, experiences, visual perceptions and many
more aspects which lead to our decision. What is the
principle, or the ”mechanism”, which has to be passive
and cannot be free, in order to reach the decision?
We propose that our system of desire and pain signals provides the fundamental principle. The principle,
we postulate, is to maximize desire signals and minimize
pain signals. We will see that actions can arise based on
this principle as required in an unfree manner. Reflexes
are excluded from this principle, as discussed already.
Considering once again the choice of muffins, the eventual choice corresponds to stronger desire signals: our experiences, memories, the visual impression and so forth
guide our nervous system to the choice, because it is accompanied by stronger desire signals than the alternative
choice. Maybe, having chosen the chocolate muffin, we
are disappointed, because the taste does not meet our
expectations. We will memorize this experience and this
may lead to an alternative choice in the future. Let us
note that we are talking about desire signals and pain
signals and not about desire and pain in order to emphasize the ”mechanism”. The sensation or the experience
of desire and pain will be discussed later in section IV. To
summarize, we postulate that the principal ”mechanism”
of our nervous system is to reach certain signals and to
avoid others.
5
Some remarks are in order: apparently, the principle
of maximizing desire signals and minimizing pain signals
is often not immediately obvious. However we want to
emphasize that it nevertheless may be the basic principle
- excluding reflexes. If we are hungry this is a pain signal
which we avoid, when we eat. We take care of our body,
avoid injuries and other forms of dangers, following this
principle. But if we get up early in the morning and go
to work, we can ask, where we can see this principle?
But of course, we have made the experience that based
on this habit we keep our job. This is in the long term
reflected by a regular salary and other benefits, which
indirectly correspond to more desire signals. In most
cases we do not follow this basic ”mechanism” directly,
but by a closer look we can nevertheless recognize it as
a fundamental principle. Even when we share our meal
with someone, this can be seen as a gain of desire signals:
we have experienced, for instance, that it is advantageous
for us to share since we expect that if we do so others will
also share with us.
Of course we see the difference between reflexes and
other actions based on the gain of desire signals (together
with the avoidance of pain signals). Reflexes are fixed,
firmly wired, and do not allow to adapt our behavior
to changing circumstances. We move the lower leg constantly, when the hammer triggers the stimulus. But
if we have bad experiences with the chocolate muffin,
we will probably take an alternative choice. Learning as
a change of behavior due to experiences is not possible
with reflexes, but certainly following the principle of desire and pain signals. Both principles have in common
that we can understand them as unfree ”mechanisms”,
as required.
We can illustrate the principle of maximizing desire signals and minimizing pain signals with a chess programm:
the chess programm calculates different variants of possible moves and values the different positions reached in
memory. It then chooses the movement corresponding
to the highest value. This is similar to the choice of the
muffin where we ”value” both possible moves and choose
the muffin corresponding to the highest ”value”, that is,
desire signal.
Let us in this context consider a rat experiment performed by James Olds and Peter Milner [24]. In this
experiment an electrode was put into a certain areal of
the brain of a rat. The rat itself can release an electric
signal to this electrode by pressing a button. Before, the
rat has been trained to use another button which triggers
a mechanism such that feed drops into the box of the rat.
In the experiment the rat presses the button connected
to the electrode continuously. The rat does not consider
the other botton to the point of exhaustion. We easily
understand this based on our principle of desire signals.
The electrode hits obviously an area of the nervous system triggering a strong desire signal.
We may argue that this experiment shows the principle in rats and not in humans. But considering persons
addicted to drugs, we recognize parallels. These people
typically lose their job, neglect social relationships, and
often have a tendency to crime - only in order to gain the
desire signal, triggered by drugs. The brain has found a
fatal way to maximize desire signals. This may explain,
by the way, why it is so difficult to get people addicted
to drugs to give up this destructive way.
There is no contradiction if we consider someone who
hurts himself on purpose. If the pain signal is over compensated by a desire signal this can be understood based
on our principle. Many actions may appear to not follow
this principle on the first sight, but at a closer inspection we can recognize its underlying mechanism at work.
As has been mentioned, reflexes are excluded from this
principle.
Moreover, we have seen that a ”mechanism” is required
in order to explain our actions. Which fundamental principle do we have available except from our system of desire and pain signals? We can also ask what is the meaning of this sophisticated system of pain and desire signals
other than providing a mechanism of assessment? Hence,
it appears to be exactly the required principle to replace
the inner ”captain”. This principle explains our actions
and decisions in a consistent and unfree, that is passive
manner. To summarize, we postulate in our model of
mind that the principle, maximizing desire signals and
minimizing pain signals is the basic principle of actions
and decisions apart from reflexes.
IV.
PERCEPTION
Suppose we watch the sunset with its deeply red sky.
We know that this perception of a color is another illusion: before the light hits our retina, it is an electromagnetic wave in a certain range of wavelength. Of course,
nothing of the electromagnetic wave is red. In the retina,
the incoming wave excites charges to oscillate in specialized cells. In turn these cells transform the incoming signal into an electric action potential [25]. The complete
remaining processing proceeds in neurons in terms of action potentials which seem to have nothing to do with the
sensation of the color red. Neither we can understand the
sensation relying on an inner ”captain” who could get the
signals presented on a kind of inner screen. As we have
seen in the discussion in section II, this ”captain” is an
illusion.
Moreover, the stimulus, after being translated into the
”language” of the nervous system, that is, being available
in form of action potentials, is already decomposed on its
way to the cortex and gets to different separated areas.
Of course, the signals do not converge anywhere but are
processed further.
What is then our perception of the color red? We realize how difficult this is to answer, if we try to explain the
color red to a blind person (someone who was born blind
so that he/she has never experienced this sensation). It
appears to be impossible. This problematic can be extended to other sensation in an analogous way, and we
6
see that all our perceptions appear to be illusions.
The guiding principle to reveal the nature of perceptions is the finding that this process is required to be
passive and can not be free. Free or active would mean
that the perception is ”internally” represented to a kind
of ”captain” on a kind of screen. Suppose there would be
an inner representation, then, this representation would
have to be watched by some kind of ”inner eye” and
we arrive at a senseless loop, also known as infinite
regress [1]. Since the perception has to be a passive
process we have to replace the ”captain” by a passive
”mechanism”.
Of course we know that the meaning of perception is
to adapt our behavior to the surrounding. With our findings in the last section we know that perceptions serve
to provide informations such that our system of gaining
desire signals and avoiding pain signals generates actions
and decisions. Hence, we have to consistently explain
perceptions satisfying the following requirements:
• Perceptions cannot be any form of ”inner” representation.
• Perceptions have to be a passive process.
• Perceptions have to satisfy the functionality to get
informations, eventually in order to adapt our behavior.
If we ask ourselves what is red, we would describe this
perception in the following or similar way: the color red
is the color of an apple, of the sunset, of the ember of
fire, our blood and we think of red when we listen to
the sound red or read the word red. Obviously we find
that we associate the perception with a bunch of other
sensations. We immediately see that these associations
indeed satisfy all the mentioned requirements. Therefore
we postulate that these associations are the perception
which is triggered by the initial stimulus. Building associations to the stimulus given by red light, occurs without
any kind of inner representation, is a passive process, and
provide us with information about our surrounding.
Let us now consider an auditory perception, when we
for example press the key of a piano keyboard. In an analogous way to the visual perception, the sound waves are
nothing but fluctuations of pressure in the air which are
transformed into action potentials in the hearing. What
is then in a passive form the sensation when we listen to
the sound of a piano?
We associate the auditory signal with a bunch of sensations, for instance the visual impression of a piano,
piano music in our memory, the visual perception of a
concert hall and certainly much more. The whole bunch
of associations, triggered by the initial stimulus is, as we
postulate, the sensation of the piano sound.
A blind person, without memories about visual sensations, has never experienced the color sensation red and
is therefore not able to build associations. Of course, we
see, that the perceptions are individually different and in
particular are influenced by culture. Accordingly, we expect that the Inuits in Greenland have certainly another
sensation of the color white than someone how grew up
closer to the equator.
A little child, told by his parents, ”The apple is red”,
”This toy is red” learns the perception, triggered by the
initial stimulus of light of a certain range of wavelength
by the association to the sound of the spoken word ”red”.
The child does accordingly not learn to recognize the
color red on a kind of screen, but learns the perception
itself, building associations.
We should mention that our system of perceptions
is remarkable sophisticated and typically gives very extended associations. But we are interested in the basic
principle here without considering all the details.
Eventually, let us consider the sensation of pain, for
instance, when we accidentally cut our skin with a knife.
In an analogous way the stimulus, triggered by specialized receptor cells in the skin, generates action potentials
which are transferred to our nervous system. But there
is a principal difference between these signals referring to
pain, and the visual perception for instance. The difference is, that our nervous system, stimulated by the cut,
tries to avoid this kind of signals. As we have seen in the
last section, our actions are driven by the passive principle to avoid pain signals. This distinguishes desire and
pain sensations from all other perceptions, which are not
a part of our assessment system.
How do we explain the visual perception, when we consider a landscape? We have discussed already, that the
landscape does not appear in form of an ”inner” representation. When we watch the landscape, we actually recognize different details, a birch there or a cloud above and a
lodge over there. We associate different visual stimulus’
entering our eye from different directions with sounds
like ”birch”, or ”lodge”. All together we associate the
perception maybe with ”valley”, but for this to happen,
different details have to appear from different directions.
In fact we are not aware of many details, say, a horse,
which has been there all the time but only through its
whinnies got our attention and now compounds to our
sensation. The ”picture”, that is, the bunch of associations, has changed in this moment, even that the visual
stimulus has not. Our visual system is able to distinguish
different directions and locations and to recognize patterns. We note that the visual system is very advanced.
This is reflected by the fact that the visual system in our
cortex occupies a large part. If we consider the photo of
a landscape, this photo does not show our ”inner” representation, but the photo triggers a sensation which is
similar to the landscape itself. We therefore associate the
landscape with a ”picture” of it.
V.
CONSCIOUSNESS
Let us start the discussion of consciousness following a
thought experiment by G. W. Leibniz from his monade
7
17; see for instance [9]:
Besides, it must be admitted that perception, and
anything that depends on it,
cannot be explained in terms of mechanistic causation –
that is,
in terms of shapes and motions.
Let us pretend that there was a machine, which was
constructed in
such a way as to give rise to thinking, sensing, and
having perceptions.
You could imagine it expanded in size (while retaining
the same proportions),
so that you could go inside it, like going into a mill.
On this assumption, your tour inside it would show you
the working parts pushing each other, but never
anything which
would explain a perception. So perception is to be
sought,
not in compounds (or machines), but in simple
substances.
Furthermore, there is nothing to be found in simple
substances,
apart from perceptions and their changes.
Again, all the internal actions of simple
substances can consist in nothing other than perceptions
and their changes.
We would like to reconsider Leibniz thought experiment, presented about three centuries ago. Today we
know, that at a tour inside the elementary working parts
are the neurons, which are pushing each other by means
of electrical and biochemical activity. Following Leibniz
closely it is evident that we can not find at any special
location anything from which we could explain perception, sensing or thinking. This illusionary special location
of perception, sensing or thinking we have denoted as a
”captain” earlier. The illusion of a ”captain” corresponds
to our imagination of what we would call consciousness
or self or I.
We have seen, that any special location of perception,
sensing and thinking leads to contradictions: as Leibniz
argues, suppose, we could detect a special location, then,
in a further expansion in size we could again go inside
and would only find working parts, pushing each other.
Indeed, in terms of neurons, we know that the neuronal
signals do not converge anywhere. Besides, as we have
seen in section IV, any kind of convergence at some location of perception would require some new kind of inner
”eye”.
Leibniz discusses two solutions, to understand consciousness: firstly, looking for consciousness in the ”simple substance” itself, that is, from a modern point of
view, in the neurons itselves. However, we know that
the fundamental function of the neurons is to transmit
action potentials. This is consistent with our assumption
we have made in section II that the interactions in the
nervous system, based on electromagnetic and biochemical processes, are in principle not different from Nature
elsewhere. Hence, we do not agree with the identification
of the ”simple substance” to be the location of consciousness. But let us mention that nevertheless there are attempts, following Leibniz, to understand consciousness
in the neurons itself; see for instance [14, 15, 21, 22, 26].
The second possibility, as Leibniz mentions, is to understand consciousness from the compound. Contrary to
Leibniz we want to follow this way, and try to undestand
consciousness like the phenomena of perceptions, sensing,
and thinking from the interplay of the neurons.
Realizing that perception, sensing, and thinking appear from the cascade of neuronal processes in an unfree
manner we talk about the emergence of these phenomena.
Using the expression emergence we emphasize that perceptions, sensing, and thinkings are as required passive
processes.
Let us think about this point further. Imagine, under
anesthetic, one neuron after the other would be replaced
by an exact copy. Of course, in practise this is not possible, but let us consider this as a thought experiment.
Since no neuron would be a special location of perception,
sensing or thinking, we would in no step replace this special location simply because this location does not exist.
The essential point is to see that every neuron is nothing
more then a ”mechanical” device which is replaced by an
equivalent one.
After recovering from anesthesia we would not recognize any change. The neurons would interact in the same
manner as before and our perception, sensing, and thinking would appear in the same way. Here we see clearly
the illusion of our imagination of we. Following our misleading imagination we would expect that at a certain
point our we would have been removed, that is, the illusionary ”captain” we expect has left the ship. In reality,
there is no ”captain” who could leave.
Of course, it makes no difference whether we replace
the neurons one by one, or all at once. Evidently, this
means that, replaced by a copy, we would develop perception, sensing, and thinking in the same way! Hence,
suppose that under anesthetic our body is replaced by
a copy, nothing like I or consciousness or self would be
lost. That is, our perception, sensing, and thinking is
not attached to certain neurons, but appear from their
processes. The emergence of our thinking, sensing and
actions is clearly seen as originating form the interplay
of neurons in this thought experiment.
Let us further imagine that we replace each neuron
in turn by an electronic device, which replicates exactly
the functionality of the original neuron. As before we
would not remove in any step a location of perception,
sensing or thinking. In this way we eventually would be
replaced by a machine under anesthetic and this machine
would develop the same perception, sensing and thinking
and we could not feel any difference! In the circuit there
would emerge the same processes as before - supposed the
electronic devices work like the original neurons. We rec-
8
ognize that our imagination is contrary to the emergence
of perception, sensing and thinking. We are convinced to
have some kind of I – a location where perception, sensing, and thinking is formed. Why are we subject to this
illusion?
The question is how do we come to this illusion of consciousness or ”self” or ”I” [27]? In order to understand
this, let us see how the I appears in our thoughts. To
this end let us consider an example of a perception, for
instance the smell of an apple. If we communicate to
someone this perception, we say, for instance: “I smell
the scent of a fresh apple”. We use grammatical firstperson in order to communicate our own perception, distinguishing it from a perception of someone else. In contrast, with the communication of ”She smells the scent
of a fresh apple” we use grammatically third-person in
order to denote the sensation of a third person.
But what happens if we do not communicate this statement but only realize the smell? As we have discussed,
this thinking must be emergent, that is, occur in a passive
manner. We postulate now that thinking is nothing but
silent communication. Thinking then represents a communication actually directed to another person. When
we smell the scent of a fresh apple, then we associate
the sensation with the silent communication ”I smell the
scent of a fresh apple”.
First of all we see, that thinking in this form occurs in
a passive way, as required by our findings. We further
see, that we have to use grammatical first-person in the
thought. We silently communicate our sensation and not
the sensation of someone else. The first person ”I” appears inevitably in our thought. This ”I” or ”self” is the
same as our consciousness.
In this way the illusion of a location of perception,
sensing, and thinking appears automatically - a machine
would develop the same illusion of a location of perception, sensing, and thinking. We understand now what
would happen in the copy of our nervous system in terms
of an equivalent electrical device: in the copy would in a
passive manner emerge the same illusion of ”I”. Our copy
would be convinced to be conscious, it would associate
the same silent communication using grammatical firstperson - compare with the “zombie” in [10]. The machine
would be equivalent, and just as litte a ”zombie” as we or with equal right we would be as much a ”zombie” as
the machine.
Now we can easily understand what it means to be
aware of something: being aware of the scent of a fresh
apple means that there emerge associations to the silent
communication. If we are conscious of a sensation we
communicate it, but not necessarily verbalize this association.
Let us consider another example, for instance the haptic sensation at our soles of our feet. Before we have
read these lines, we were probably not aware of this sensation. This we can now understand easily. Triggered
by the words written here, in particular ”haptic sensation” and ”soles” we associate the perception with the
silent communication of the form: ”I feel the ground at
the soles of my feet”. Since it is a silent communication,
we use grammatical first-person and it appears the illusion of an I. Before we have read these lines, we were
not aware of this sensation, even that the stimulus was
constantly there. What was missing was the association
with the silent communication.
If we think about something, we imagine to develop
these thinkings. We realize that thinking happens to be
in reality very different: thinking revealed as a passive
process emerges in form of silent communication - if ”I”
cannot concentrate, this means that the emergent thinking does not follow a certain subject.
Let us emphasize that it appears in principal possible
to copy our ”I” on a machine. What appears in the machine would not be a copy - it would be ourself. Our
perception, sensing, and thinking would appear in the
same manner in the copy. As we have argued, our ”I”
would not be lost in the process of copying. Of course,
nowadays computers are not sufficiently sophisticated to
simulate the tens of billions of neurons, but there are already attempts - see for instance [28]. Let us summarize
what he have found: our ”self” or ”I” is an illusion in
the following sense, it is not the ”I” that wakes up in the
morning, thinks and feels, but it is passive communications that inevitable emerges involving the grammatical
first-person.
VI.
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen how misleading our imaginations about
our mind are: under the assumption that the processes in
our nervous system are basically the same as in Nature
elsewhere we find that our freedom is an illusion. We
have seen that we have to understand perceptions and
likewise actions and thoughts as passive processes. The
imagination of a ”captain” on board of our body has to
be abandoned. Our behavior, we have argued, follows
the principle of maximizing desire signals and minimizing pain signals. This ”mechanism” we have identified
replacing our illusionary ”captain”. We understand consciousness which appears in a form of silent communication as a passive process as required. Eventually, we
arrive at a model of mind which at a glance may appear
to reduce us to will-less ”machines”. But what if we are
”machines”?
However, we should realize how powerfull these ”machines” are. These machines have composed the St
Matthew Passion (see for instance the discussion in [29])
and are investigating the Universe. Artificial machines
are far away from these achievements. We are made of a
vast amount of neurons, equipped with dedicated sensors
and very complex motor functions. Robots appear to be
ridiculous compared to us, even that they already play
better chess than every human, recognize speech and can
build associations artificially.
Let us note that as a consequence of our findings, con-
9
cepts like responsibility and guilt have no meaning if we
are not free. How could we be guilty or be responsible for
something if we do not have a choice? We obviously have
to think these concepts of guilt and responsibility over.
Suppose someone steals a bike, then we actually can not
blame the thief, but still we can blame the action itself.
We have seen that thoughts appear in a passive manner and in reality, we are not able to create thoughts
in a free way. This could be misunderstood as a kind
of compulsive behavior. But compulsive behavior refers
to a mental disorder which is characterized by repetitive
actions or thoughts. This is quite different from the required passivity of thoughts and actions. We are not free
in our actions and thinking but this is by no means a
compulsive behavior since this is in general not a repetitive process.
The concept of creativity, in a inspirational sense of
thinking, has certainly to be given up. The process of
new insights and ideas is merely a synthesis, which originates from the vast amount of impressions and memories.
This is the price we have to pay for giving up freedom.
The creator in us would be nothing but the illusionary
”captain”.
Eventually, there arises an interesting feature: replaced
by a machine, we could be become immortal, supposed it
is possible to exactly simulate tens of billions of neurons.
Acknowledgement(s)
Many thanks go to M. Rezgaoui for very fruitful discussions.
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arXiv:1303.6539v5 [physics.gen-ph] 27 Aug 2023
Quantum Gravity Framework 4.1: Fully Path Integral Framework,
Structure Formation and Consciousness in the Universe.
Suresh Maran
www.sureshmaran.com
www.qstaf.com
www.uniteserve.com
www.linkedin.com/in/sureshmaran
June,24,2021
Abstract
In this paper I give a major update of quantum gravity framework project. The heuristic conceptual
framework proposed in previous versions is expanded to include structure formation and consciousness
in the universe. A Path Integral version of decoherence in curved space-time is introduced as major
update. Then we discuss the philosophical insights into structure formation in the universe and consciousness. We introduce various mathematical concepts to describe structure formation in the universe
and consciousness.
Contents
Contents
1
1 Review and Introduction
2
2 Path Integral Form of Decoherence
2.1 The theory for simple systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
4
3 Quantum gravity framework 4.0
3.1 Simple Quantum System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.1 Relative-Time Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1.2 Relative-Time Decoherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 General Curved Space Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1 Relative-Time evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2 Relative-Time Decoherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.3 Global quantum reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.4 Determinism, Continuum Limit and Scale invariance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Covariant Rest Frame foliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
9
9
4 Application to Quantum Gravity
11
4.1 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.1 Cosmology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.2 Example: Spherically symmetric space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.3 Resolution of singularities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1
5 Universe, Consciouness and Structure formation
13
5.1 Consciousness and Framework 3.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.1 Consciousness and Global Quantum Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.2 Conscious and Rest frame foliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2 Structures and Conscious Observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.1 Relational Harmonic Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.2 Perception and Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.3 Universe and Relationship structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3.1 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.3.2 The future of the universe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.3.3 Consciousness and Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
6 Conclusion
22
References
22
1
Review and Introduction
In this paper1 , I do the next update of the proposal for the conceptual framework of quantum general
relativity [3]. The previous quantum gravity framework update of the papers is canonical in formalism. But
the universe as described by the established laws is overwhelmingly covariant in formalism. So in this paper,
I update the framework to make it covariant. Here we will be also generalizing the entire project further to
include consciousness and structure formation in the universe.
In section 2.0, I introduce the Lagrangian formulation of the Lindblad-type evolution equation. This is
the generalization of the non-covariant formalism as introduced in the previous version [4]. In this paper, in
general, I don’t do a detailed study of the idea, as the formalism is not yet ready for application. But simply
formally discuss how to apply it to some mathematical simple situations. The relevance of self-time and
rest-frame foliation is relevant if the world is observed by an observer who converts states into pure states.
The Lagrangian formulation also requires a preferred foliation to be observed by an observer that converts
states into pure states.
In quantum gravity framework 3.0, I discussed the rest frame evolution, in which gravitational fields and
other fields are least changing. Rest frame evolution is the most natural foliation in which the observer
observes the world, and the observer is the universe itself observing itself. In section 3.3, I also discuss
the covariant generalization of the rest frame evolution to be combined with the Lagrangian formulation of
quantum gravity framework 4.0.
In section 4 we discuss the application of the path integral form of decoherence to cosmology. I introduce a decoherence function. I briefly discuss the application to various simple cases and the resolution of
singularities.
In section 5, I start extending the quantum gravity framework project to include consciousness and
structure formation in the universe. I build on philosophical insights from my book [32]. In section 5.1, I
discuss how global quantum reduction and rest-frame foliation are related to consciousness.
In section 5.2, I discuss the theoretical aspects of understanding relationship structures and consciousness. In section 5.3 I discuss how structures are related to conscious experience based on insights from
neuroscience. When the universe was created during the Big Bang expansion, initially it was mostly structureless. But eventually, structures rise out of the universe at various scales: galaxies, stars, planets, matter,
etc. Matter which initially was inorganic, evolved into organic and eventually into living biological entities
that consciously observe the Universe. To develop proper unification of concepts in fundamental physics we
1 Originally published on June 24 2021 as the 4.0 version. In this version 4.1, updated on August 27 2023, references are
added, proofreading was done and a few modifications are made in various sections and explained there. An important update
in 4.1 is in section 3.3, in the end, where trace-free extrinsic curvature is introduced to detect the rest frame foliation.
For the latest updates proper discussions, comments, and issues, please visit www.qstaf.com. Much of the discussions, updates,
and supplementary downloadable materials regarding this project will be mostly available on www.qstaf.com, and other websites
referred to such as the researchgate. Update information will be provided on social media (www.qstaf.com/links).
2
need a sufficient conceptual foundation that describes the universe fully. This will also address structure
formation in the universe and consciousness.
Until now we have discussed only the universe without relevance to the conscious observer. But including
conscious observer is important for many different reasons:
1. Quantum mechanics needs an observer in the quantum measurement process.
2. Many things about the universe such as the value of physical constants can be explained easily by the
presence of observers such as in the anthropomorphic principle.
3. Matter naturally evolves into the living thing and consciousness arises as an inherent property of matter
in the universe.
So discussing the universe without discussing life and consciousness is incomplete. In this section we
will explore the rise of structures in the universe, and consciousness. To understand the rise of structures
and consciousness, I build on insights from my book [32]. To understand the grand unification of human
knowledge based on this paper I refer to [30].
There are some important changes in this update, I don’t assume space or time is discretized. If I use
the discrete model in this paper, it is only for explanatory purposes. Further research needs to be done
regarding this. The framework presented is not-yet ready for application, because it is not yet complete.
The ideas are brief and quite heuristic in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to establish an initial
conceptual framework for quantum gravity. Further research needs to be done to complete the framework.
This research will be further updated. Please follow the updates online in the sources mentioned in footnote
1.
I apologize for typos and grammatical mistakes in this paper, and the previous papers related to this
paper. This paper is only a rough draft of work in progress.
We follow the following conventions in this article:
Convention 1: In any integral, the variables over which the integration is done are the same as those used
in the measure placed at the right-most end of the integral, unless explicitly indicated otherwise.
Convention 2: Summation is assumed for all repeated Greek indices in the explicit elementary products of
the basic variables of the theories discussed.
Convention 3: In the differential measures of the
the multiplication over all the suffixes and the
Q integrals,
prefixes are assumed, for example dxβ dyγ mean
dxβ dyγ .
β,γ
Convention 4: For functions with arguments that have suffixes, prefixes, and parameters: The function
depends on all the collection of the arguments for all different values of the suffixes, the prefixes and the
α
parameters. Example: f (xα
γ (t), yα ) = f (X), where X = {xγ (t), yβ , ∀α, β, γ, t}.
Convention 5: No other summation or multiplication of repeated indices is assumed other than those defined
in conventions 2 and 3. Examples:
in fα (xα , yα ), the three α’s are independent, 2)
P α1) there noγ summation
Q
α
α
α
(pβ xα + fβ (x , yα ))dx dyα = ( pβ xα + fβ (x , yδ )) η,ε dyη dxε .
α
Convention 6: It is assumed that ~ = c = G = 1, unless specified.
3
2
Path Integral Form of Decoherence
All the notations used in this section were defined in section 2.2 of the previous update [3].
2.1
The theory for simple systems
The version of equations involving decoherence described in quantum gravity framework 3.0 [4] is not in
path integral form unlike the other three proposals of the framework. For this purpose, in this section I
will propose the path integral formulation of decoherence as an alernative. In this section, I will work out
different formalism of understanding density matrix and from there proceed to a path integral formulation
of decoherence2 .
In this section let me work in flat space-time. Let me consider the density matrix as an element of the
space of outerproducts of the Hibert Space H and its Hermitian Conjugate space H† of a system. In the
following let tilde represent operators that only act on the variables that belong to the Hermitian conjugate
space. Let me explain this in a simple example in one dimension. If x and x̃ are element of H and H† . Then
we have ρ(x, x̃) as a quantum state in H ⊗ H† . Then the Hamiltonian evolution of the evolution is
dρ(x, x̃)
= iHρ(x, x̃) − iρ(x, x̃)H̃
dt
R
Above H̃ only acts on x̃. Because of the commutator in the left, the trace ρ(x, x)dx is preserved in this
evolution. If we choose ρ(x, x̃) = ρ̄(x̃, x) and set the trace to be one, we then have that ρ(x, x̃) is a density
matrix, as the above evolution preserves these conditions.
The path integral form of this is formally,
< ρ(x1 , x̃1 , t1 )|ρ(x2 , x̃2 , t2 ) >=
Z
γ,γ̃
exp(iL(γ) − iL̃(γ̃))DγD γ̃
where γ and γ̃ are paths from x1 to x2 and x̃1 to x̃2 respectively, Dγ and Dγ̃ are path integral measure
corresponding to paths in H and H† space, and, 1 and 2 represent initial and final states. If the ρ(x, x̃) is
such that ρ(x, x̃, t) = ψ(x, t)ψ̄(x̃, t), that is pure, then both the Hamiltonian and Path integral forms splits
into two separate pieces.
dψ(x)
dt
dψ̄(x̃)
dt
= iHψ(x, t)
= −iψ̄(x̃, t)H̃
< ψ(x1 , t1 )|ψ(x2 , t2 ) >=
Z
exp(iL(γ))Dγ
γ̃
< ψ(x̃1 , t1 )|ψ(x̃2 , t2 ) >=
Z
exp(−iL̃(γ̃))D γ̃
γ
Here, essentially, we have doubled the Hilbert Space. The two evolutions are independent. This description is redundant if the states or pure or if there is no decoherence. Now we will introduce decoherence in
the path integral formulation to make it covariant in the quantum field theory sense.
Proposition 1 The covariant evolution of state ρ(t) of the system is formally given by
Z
exp iL(γ) − iL(γ̃) − βd(γ, γ̃)2 DγD γ̃
< ρ(t1 )|ρ(t2 ) >=
(1)
γ,γ̃
2 While the path integral idea is independently derived for the quantum gravity framework project by me, it has been studied
before by many researchers. The idea was initiated by Feynman and Vernon in 1963 [33]. It was further developed in various
work in the following references: [34], [35], [36], [37].
4
where d(γ 1 , γ 2 ) is a measure of distance between field configuration paths γ 1 and γ 2 in the topological
space of field configurations, such that d(γ, γ) = 0. The Lagrangian L and distance d are to be covariant under
Lorentz transformations in special relativity. The β is constant representing the strength of decoherence,
which is small enough that the Hamiltonian evolution is not severely affected.
The d(γ, γ̃) can considered to a distance function as in the definition of a metric space. The d(γ, γ̃)2 term
helps to implement decoherence. Let me call d(γ, γ̃) as the decoherence function. The differential form of
this equation is heuristically,
dρ(x, x̃) = iHρ(x, x̃)dt − iρ(x, x̃)H̃dt − βd(x, x̃)ρ(x, x̃)
The presence of d(x, x̃) removes the cross terms over time and only preserves the diagonal terms.
Let me try to decide what must be d(γ, γ̃). The simplest choice is something like this in one dimensional
case:
d(γ, γ̃) =
Z
(x(t) − x̃(t))2 dt
In full space-time situation, we want this to be coordinate independent in the general relativistic sense. We
will give a choice in the next section.
3
Quantum gravity framework 4.0
3.1
Simple Quantum System
Let me review the the relative time formulations discussed in the previous updates of the quantum gravity
framework project [2], [3] and [4]. Consider a simple quantum system that is described by a Hamiltonian
constraint only. Let the internal configuration space of the quantum system is of dimension d, and is made
of canonical variables pα and q α . Let q α takes values in configuration space Rn . Let mαβ , a function of q α ,
is the metric in the internal configuration space. Hereafter I will use mαβ and its inverse mαβ (assuming it
exists), to raise and lower indices. Usually mαβ is simply a delta matrix δ αβ multiplied by mass m.
Let me define a scalar product using the metric:
< a, b >=
1
aα bβ mαβ .
2
I will assume mαβ is positive definite for now.
We can make the following standard definitions:
Norm |p| =
Unit Vector p̄α
3.1.1
=
q
+ mαβ pα pβ
(2)
α
p
|p|
Relative-Time Evolution
Given any smooth classical path η defined by qα (τ ) in the configuration space R n We also assume the
function qα (τ ) has smooth first and second-order derivatives. We can always define the quantum evolution
for a given Lagrangian as a function of q α and q̇ α . Let L be the Lagrangian of the system which depends on
q α and q̇ α .
1. Define vα (t) = q̇α (τ ) and pα = vβ mαβ (qγ (τ )), where I have assumed mαβ is a function of qγ .
5
2. Define a one parameter family of hyperplanes S(τ ) isomorphic to R n−1 orthogonal to pα (τ ) going
through qα (τ ). If xα is the points on this plane, then it satisfies mαβ (qγ (τ ))(xα − qα )pβ (τ ) = 0. We can
denote the hyperplanes by S(τ ) ≡ S(pα (τ ), qα (τ )) as it depends on qα (τ ) and pα (τ ). S(τ ) describes a
foliation of the configuration space if the surfaces don’t cross each other.
α
α
α
α
takes values in Rn but is restricted to
3. Define quantum states ρ(q⊥
, q̃⊥
, τ ) on S(τ ). Here q⊥
and q̃⊥
S(τ ).
α α
4. Define a single step path integral from S(τ ) to S(τ + dτ ) for ρ(q⊥
, q̃⊥ , τ )
α
α
α
α
Gs+ (q⊥ 1 , q⊥ 2 , q̃⊥ 1 , q̃⊥ 2 ; η, τ , ∆τ ) =
1
Z q3α =qα 2 ,q̃3α =q̃α 2
⊥
d−1
(2π)
⊥
q3α =qα 1 ,q̃3α =q̃α 1
⊥
⊥
exp(i L(γ) − L̄(γ̃) ∆τ )dγdγ̃.
(3)
Here γ stands for q3α . The path integral is evaluated between S(τ ) and S(τ +dτ ) with boundary conditions
as described above. We can use the relative path integral to define the quantum evolution of states on S(τ )
of the configuration space:
Z
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
ρ(q⊥2
, q̃⊥2
, τ ) = Gs+ (q⊥
1 , q⊥ 2 , q̃⊥ 1 , q̃⊥ 2 ; η, τ , ∆τ )ρ(q⊥1 , q̃⊥1 , τ )dq⊥1 dq̃⊥1
For this path integral formulation to genuinely describe the evolution of wavefunction we need to have η
smooth enough such that S(τ ) don’t intersect each other, at least in the region where the wavefunctions are
finite.
3.1.2
Relative-Time Decoherence
In the previous versions [3] we discussed the inclusion of this using the diffusion equation method [11].
We will generalize the formalism to include time relative quantum evolution. I define the relative quantum
decoherence evolution equation as follows.
α
α
α
α
Gs+ (q⊥
1 , q⊥ 2 , q̃⊥ 1 , q̃⊥ 2 ; η, τ , ∆τ ) =
1
d−1
(2π)
Z q3α =qα 2 ,q̃3α =q̃α 2
⊥
⊥
q3α =qα 1 ,q̃3α =q̃α 1
⊥
⊥
exp(i L(γ) − L̃(γ̃) − βd(γ, γ̃)2 ∆τ )dγdγ̃. (4)
where d(γ, γ̃) is the decoherence function. Here γ the paths and it stands for q3α .Here the evolution
α α
α α
, q̃⊥ , τ ) defines
of ρ(q⊥
, q̃⊥ , τ ) depends on η. That is why I refer to this as Relative-Time decoherence.ρ(q⊥
probability density states at each value τ during relative-time decoherent evolution with respect to η.
3.2
General Curved Space Time
Let’s now apply the formalism that we discussed in the previous subsections to field theory on general
curved space-time. We will see in this update of the quantum gravity framework, all constraints including
the Hamiltonian constraint need not be explicitly needed for formulating dynamics..
Assume we have an initial hypersurface. To each point on x we can apply the theory for single point
systems. There will be internal fields at each point qxα . Let L be the Lagrangian which depends on qxα and
q̇xα .We are using simplified version of the fields to make discussion easy. There will be one classical curve
x α
α
ηα
x (τ x ) for each point, smooth upto second derivative, one parameter family of hyperplanes S (η̇ x (τ x ), qx (τ x )
in the configuration space of fields at each point, and one free (dummy) parameter τ x for each point. For
each point, the physics is identical to the single-point system discussed in the previous section. The only
major difference is that the Lagrangian contains interaction terms as functions of the qxα of adjacent points.
Let me assume that space is discretized for simplicity and is made of countable number pieces of volume
elements such as in cubic lattice. I am assuming this discretization only for simplicity and explanatory
purpose.
Let B be the number of lattice points, and for simplicity let us assume B is finite. Let ∆V be the
coordinate volume associated with the coordinate volume element associated with each lattice element of
the 3D manifold.
6
3.2.1
Relative-Time evolution
Now consider the path integral defined in the previous section in equation (3). For each system at x, we
have one curve η x assigned. Then we have the combined one-step relative path integral is
Proposition 2 The relative time evolution instantaneous path integral defined as function of η x , τ x is as
follows:
α
α
α
α
Gs+ (qx,⊥
1 , qx,⊥ 2 , q̃x,⊥ 1 , q̃x,⊥ 2 ; η x , τ x , ∆τ x )
α
α
α
α
Z q3 =q 2 ,q̃3 =q̃ 2 Y
x,⊥
x,⊥
1
=
{exp(iL(γ) − iL(γ̃))dγdγ̃},
BD
(2π)
q3α =qα 2 ,q̃3α =q̃α 2
x
x,⊥
(5)
x,⊥
Here γ are the paths in configuration space and it stands for q3α . This formulation does not contain
constraints at all. In this form it is not necessary to have constraints. We can ask why do you need a relative
time evolution since one don’t have Hamiltonian constraint. Because in the next section we will see that
decoherence defined depends on η x .
We can use the relative path integral to define the quantum evolution of states on S(τ ) of the configuration
space:
Z
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
ρ(qx,⊥,2
, q̃x,⊥,2
, τ + dτ ) = Gs+ (qx,⊥
,1 , qx,⊥ ,2 , q̃x,⊥, 1 , q̃x,⊥ ,2 ; η x , τ x , ∆τ x )ρ(qx,⊥,1 , q̃x,⊥,1 , τ )dqx,⊥,1 dq̃x,⊥,1
3.2.2
Relative-Time Decoherence
We can generalize the single system form of the Lagrangian form of decoherence to (3+1)D case.
Now we can define relative decoherence as the following:
Proposition 3 The relative decoherent evolution of the ρ is given by the following path integral as functional
of η x , τ x , where d(γ, γ̃) is the decoherence functional and β is the decoherence constant.
α
α
α
α
Gs+ (qx,⊥
1 , qx,⊥ 2 , q̃x,⊥ 1 , q̃x,⊥ 2 ; η x , τ x , ∆τ x ) =
(6)
1
(2π)BD
Z q3α =qα
,q̃α =q̃α 2
x,⊥ 2 3
x,⊥
q3α =qα
x,⊥ 2
,q̃3α =q̃α
x,⊥ 2
exp iL(γ) − iL(γ̃) − βd(γ, γ̃)2 DγDγ̃
This evolution depends on η x for each point. So, this is relative-time decoherence. The choice of η x needs
to be discovered by further research. One of the best choice of η x is the self-time evolution in which η x is the
classical expectation value of qxα . This is what I referred to as the rest-frame evolution in the configuration
space of fields. This will be later discussed in this section.
In quantum gravity framework 2.0 and 3.0, we had that the decoherence part was in Hamiltonian evolution
form, while the other three components of the framework were in the path integral approach. Now the form
of relative decoherence is path integral like the other three components of the framework.
Since the path integral directly deals with the evolution of the density matrix, there is a need to take the
square of the wavefunction. Summing the product of the density matrix with other operators will give the
α
expectation values. For example, if A is an operator, a function of the q̃x,⊥
1 , and their conjugate momenta’s,
then, the expectation value is,
< A >=
tr(ρA)
.
tr(ρ)
The quantum states can be derived from ρ by diagonalizing it:
ρ=
X
pi |λi >< λi |
7
where |λi > are the probable states with the probability of pi , associated to a hypersurface. And it is
dependent on η x , τ x . So, evolution of ρ describes a relative probable evolution of states.
3.2.3
Global quantum reduction
Let me define dτ x = nx (τ ) dτ , where the nx (τ ) are continuous functions of τ , one of them for each lattice
point x. The repeated application of the one-step path integral for infinitesimal dτ evolves the quantum
state along the spatial hypersurfaces. The nx (τ ) functions defines the various ways to foliate the discretized
geometry, whose topology is B point ⊗ 1D. Here nx (τ ) is essentially is the lapse. Now depending on the
choice of nx (τ ) we will have different foliations of the classical space-time geometry relating to the quantum
geometry.
The evolution defined by relative time decoherence evolution generates a time-dependent quantum state
α
α
α
α
ρ(qx,⊥
, q̃x,⊥
, τ ) which evolves from the initial quantum state ρ(qx,⊥
, q̃x,⊥
, 0). If we express each step in
Hamiltonian form, we can include relative decoherence discussed in this evolution. This evolution evolves
the initial state |ψ τ > continuously to generate an entire quantum space-time. But this evolution depends
on η x and nx (τ ).
The relative decoherence formulation helps calculate the density matrix, it simply converts any pure state
into a mixed state. Continuous reduction due to observation requires continuous probabilistic reduction of
mixed states into pure states. This once again depends on foliation. The sequence of continuously reduced
pure states in one foliation is not equivalent to a sequence of pure state and they depend on η x and nx (τ ).
Now there are two ways to understand the relative decoherence formulation used to evolve ρ over a region
of space-time.
Proposition 4 Proposal 3.1: Observer-less Interpretation- We can also use ρ̂ to calculate averages
and other statistical values.
For example, we can calculate the following: classical metric gαβ of the corresponding classical geometry
using
gαβ =
tr(ρ̂ĝαβ )
.
tr(ρ̂)
In the trace we sum over all paths with γ = γ̃. But this still depends on η x and nx (τ ), which we will
discuss how to deal with this in global quantum reduction in the next proposition. Now we can use the G for
continuous evolution over a finite space-time region to calculate correlations between values of qxα in different
space-time points. This is similar to the calculation of propagation amplitudes using Feynman diagrams.
The only difference is we don’t need to do squaring to calculate the probability amplitudes, as G deals with
evolution of density matrix. Here is an example:
α
α
< qx,⊥ 1 qx,⊥ 2 >∆τ x ,x,ηx =
Z
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
qx,⊥
1 qx,⊥ 2 Gs+ (qx,⊥ 1 , qx,⊥ 2 , qx,⊥ 1 , qx,⊥ 2 ; η x , τ x , ∆τ x )dqx,⊥ 1 dqx,⊥ 2
α
α
α
α
where < qx,⊥
1 qx,⊥ 2 >∆τ x ,x is the correlation between qx,⊥ 1 and qx,⊥ 2 seperated by time parameter ∆τ x .
Lets deal with the dependence on η x and nx (τ ) next.
Proposition 5 Proposal 3.2: Global Quantum Reduction - The quantum evolution and reduction
process occurs along a spatial foliation such that the C 1 smooth functions nx (τ ) and η x take smooth values,
such that relative probability weight is given by exp(−cr Υ − cr Υ̃), where cr is a fundamental constant, where
Υ is Υ(qxα , nx (τ ), η x ) is measure discussed above, and Υ̃ isΥ(qxα , nx (τ ), η x ) corresponds to qxα , cr and n are
to be discovered and verified experimentally.
Now the Lagrangian density is of the form:
L4 = L(γ) − iL(γ̃) + iβd(γ, γ̃)2 + icr Υ(γ, nx (τ ), η x ) + icr Υ(γ̃, nx (τ ), η x )
8
L4 is the total Lagrangian described including the decoherence and global reduction fields. The constant
cr needs to be small enough that the imaginary terms don’t disturb the usual Lagrangian quantum evolution.
I have assumed Υ as a function of (gµν , nx (τ ), η x ) only. But in reality, could be function other variables
depending on the fields we are dealing with. The value of exp(−cr Υ − cr Υ̃) for different (gµν , nx (τ ), η x ) gives
relative probability weight for each of these values. In addition to the probabilistic nature of the theory due
to ρ, we also have an additional statistical nature due the probability weights exp(−cr Υ − cr Υ̃). The physical
interpretation of these probability weights depends on Υ. In quantum gravity framework 2.0 and 3.0, we
discussed various possible choices for Υ depending on various physical motivations. One of the important
case is the rest frame foliation introduced in [4]. Later we will discuss the covariant generalization of this
field.
3.2.4
Determinism, Continuum Limit and Scale invariance
Proposition 6 The fourth postulate is unchanged and is the same as the previous versions [3] and [4]. The
only generalization is we need two σ x instead of one in the Lagrangian.
L −→ L + i
X1
2
x,s
α
σ x (qy,s
)+i
X1
2
x,s
α
σ x (q̃y,s
)
(7)
such that σ x are
β
1) smooth real functions of the variables q̂x,s
with a lower bound,
2) functions of quantum variables at x and adjacent (or nearby) quantum systems to point x, and
3) are increasing functions as |qxα − qxα′ |− > ∞.
In [3] we discussed scale invariance. A full understanding of determinism, continuum Limit and scale
invariance requires extensive study of the other two principles. This is one possible future course of research.
3.3
Covariant Rest Frame foliation
Let’s do the generalization of rest frame foliation to a covariant formulation. The propagator was defined
formally defined in the section on global quantum reduction. We need to discuss the dependence of the Υ
on η x and nx (t) . First let us look at η x . Let me assume that dependence on these two is additive.
Υ(γ, nx (τ ), η x ) = Υ(γ, 0, η x ) + Υ(γ, nx (τ ), 0)
Let me define
Υ1 (γ, η x ) =
Υ2 (γ, nx (τ )) =
Υ(γ, 0, η x )
Υ(γ, nx (τ ), 0)
The η x determines the time flow in the configuration space of fields at each point. The most natural
general proposal for dependence of η x is as follows:
α 2
Υ1 (γ, η x ) = |η α
x − qx |
This basically restricts the possible values of η x to be close to expectation values of qxα . The norm squared
is calculated in the internal metric of the fields.
Now let us focus on Υ(γ, nx (τ ), 0). The self-time constrained evolution and rest frame foliation discussed
in ( [4]) are in which global reduction could occur naturally. It was defined by
Υ3 =
Z
(
X1
< π ab
f π f ab >
~ 2 ) √1 dx3
+
E
cg
2 f h
f
9
where the suffix 3 indicates it quantum framework version 3.0. The above proposal is not covariant. So we
need to generalize this fully into an appropriate form. This will be done at the end of this section.
To generalize this idea, we need a time-like killing field. In the Schwarzschild metric, we have the time-like
killing field, which defines a good time parameter in weak gravitational fields. This would be good around
planets. But if we go to the initial state of the universe, the universe is expanding and so there is no time
like killing fields. The appropriate form is a conformal killing field, which was discussed as one of the options
in the previous version ( [3]). It can define the natural time parameter both during the universe’s expansion
phase and around a spherically symmetric matter field.
Let T γ be a time vector field that generates a one-parameter family of space-time diffeomorphism, such
that a given initial surface St1 is mapped to a different surface St2 of the foliation. So, specifying T γ ,
assuming it is integrable, is another way to define the foliation. Now instead of nx we are going to use T γ .
The relation between nx and T γ is not so obvious. We want T γ such that it can detect movement of the
metric upto a scaling factor, and also give foliation locally, even though it may not be globally. If we a have
specific choice of T γ in a region then normal surfaces to T γ gives that foliation. For example, t = constant
surfaces in Schwarzschild or inflationary universe. We need to replace n(x) by T γ in our theory to describe
evolution in all the four parts of quantum gravity framework 4.0 defined in this section.
Now let try to find a possible choice of function for Υ2 (γ, T γ ). Let me define tensor Cαβ defined as a
function of space-time metric gµν by
1
Cαβ (gµν , T η ) = £T (gαβ ) − (g γδ £T (gγδ ))gαβ ,
4
where £T is the lie derivative along T α . For a vector T α to be conformal killing, Cαβ is to be zero.
For measuring the smallness of Cαβ ,consider the most obvious norm:
Z
Z
√
γδ √ 4
Cαβ C
gd x = g αγ g βδ Cαβ (gµν , T η )Cγδ (gµν , T η ) gd4 x
η
The second line makes the depends on g αγ and
explicit. Since the metric is Lorentzian, the measure
R T to be
√
is not positive definite. So the smallness of Cαβ C γδ gd4 x does not imply the smallness of components of
Cαβ . To surmount this, the metric can be Euclideanized so that the norm is positive definite.
Z
√
αγ βδ
E
E
Υ2 (γ, T γ ) = gE
gE Cαβ (gµν
, T η )Cγδ (gµν
, T η ) gE d4 x
µν
E
E
where gµν
is the Euclidean version of the Lorentzian metric gµν , and gE
is the inverse of gµν
. This was
discussed in the previous version. But this approach seems unnatural and not simple. The most natural
form is
Υ2 (γ, T γ ) =
Z
|g αγ g βδ Cαβ (gµν , T η )Cγδ (gµν , T η )|n
p
|g|d4 x
In the case of the covariant decoherence we also have the g̃µν field, for which can define another norm,
Υ2 (γ, T γ ) =
Z
|g̃ αγ g̃ βδ Cαβ (g̃µν , T η )Cγδ (g̃µν , T η )|n
p
|g̃|d4 x
The transition probability is peaked when T η is close to the conformal killing vector of the metric fields
gµν and g̃µν .
Originally this discussed in the June 24 2021 version of this paper. Let me make a change. Please note
while this choice of Υ2 (γ, T γ ) works for Schwarschild metric where the metric is constant along the intuitive
time like killing vector, it does not work well for Big Bang cosmology, as this choice doesn’t pick the intuitive
time like direction, based on private calculations. Many choices for Υ2 (γ, T γ ) were given in the previous
updates [3]. One of the alternative definition that can overcome this problem is
10
1
K̃αβ (hµν , T η ) = £T (hαβ ) − (hγδ £T (hγδ ))hαβ
4
(8)
where hαβ = gαβ − nα nβ , is the spatial metric defined on hypersurfaces orthogonal to T γ flow.The nα is
γ
the normal vector parallel to T γ , |TT γ | . K̃ is the tracefree extrinsic curvature. Now Υ4 (γ, T γ ) can be defined
as the following:
γ
Υ4 (γ, T ) =
Z
Z
√
K̃αβ K̃ γδ gd4 x =
η
η √ 4
hαγ hβδ
αβ K̃(gµν , T )K̃γδ (gµν , T ) gd x
In this, we don’t need to Euclidianize the metric, as it has a positive signature on the hypersurfaces
and zero on projection to the normal direction. My private calculations with computer tensor algebra give
satisfactory behavior for this definition of Υ. That is it predicts intuitive time direction for both Big Bang
cosmology and the Schwarzschild case.
Also we can include the electric fields in Υ4 if use Kaluza-Klein unification of gauge fields with gravity.
These suggest that Υ4 and Υ3 are closely related. It will be quite interesting to study how in the linear limit
Υ4 (gµν , T η , n) defined above leads to the rest frame foliation.
Now the total Lagrangian density is as follows:
L4
=
L(γ) − iL(γ̃) + iβd(γ, γ̃)2 + icr Υ1 (γ, η x ) + icr Υ1 (γ̃, η x )
γ
(9)
γ
+icr Υ4 (γ, T ) + icr Υ4 (γ̃, T )
1
1
+i σ x (γ) + i σ x (γ̃)
2
2
where I have included the terms for smoothness defined in equation (7). In theory with this Lagrangian
density we need to use T γ to describe the foliation of space-time locally. We do this analysis in detail in a
future version.
4
Application to Quantum Gravity
Let us discuss a specific application to quantum gravity. A simple possibility for the decoherence term is the
following 3 :
R
1
Proposition 7 The covariant distance operator is: d = ch (gab − g̃ab )(g ab − g̃ ab )(gg̃) 4 dtd3 x
This is a simple proposal that measures the distance between two metrics which is diffeomorphism
invariant on simultaneous diffeomorphism of both tilde and non-tilde space-times. The gab and g̃ab are the
1
metrics on the tilde and non-tilde space-times. g and g̃ are the determinants. (gg̃) 4 is for maintaining
coordinate independence of the integral giving equal importance to non-dual and dual space. This is a very
formal definition.
In density matrix formulation the evolution heuristically is as follows:
ρ̇ =
Z n
1o
1
i[H, ρ] − ch g 4 8ρ − g ab ρgab − gab ρghab g 4 d3 x
(10)
3 This a covariant generalization of gravity induced decoherence, which was investigated before in various forms in references
[40], [41], and [39], but it leads to different formulation of gravity decoherence when simplified to 3+1 form in the weak field
limit of spherically symmetric case.
11
where ρ = ρ( qxα , q̃xα̃ ; Sx , ∀x, , t), and H is the effective Hamiltonian density. The above equation is an
operator equation. To understand the derivation of the decoherence terms from path integral, please note
that from the path integral:
(gab − g̃ab )(g ab − g̃ ab ) = 8 − gab g̃ ab − gab g̃ ab
1
The g 4 factors form the density for the volume measure.
4.1
Examples
4.1.1
Cosmology
For isotropic and homogenous cosmology the density evolution equation reduces to the following, with scale
factor a as the time:
gab = diag(−1, a2 , a2 , a2 )
3
3
ρ̇ = i[H, ρ] + ch a 4 6ρ − 3a−2 ρa2 − 3a2 ρa−2 a 4
(11)
where a is the scale factor acting as the only configuration variable. Explicitly
3
3
ρ̇(a, a′ ) = i ha| [H, ρ] |a′ i + ch a 4 a′ 4 ρ(a, a′ )(a − a′ )(a−1 − a′−1 )
The H need to be derived using symmetry conditions. Below are two cases, with the first for an expanding
universe with only a cosmological constant, and the second the universe with scalar field φ included. The π
below are conjugate momentas.
L =
H
=
L =
H
=
π 2a
3
− ak + Λa
−
π a ȧ − N dtcg
a
π 2a
3
cg N
−
− ak + Λa
a
)
π 2φ
a3 φ 2
π 2a
3
− ak + 3 +
+ Λa
π a ȧ + π φ φ̇ − N dt cg −
a
2a
2
π 2φ
π2
a3 φ 2
cg − a − ak + 3 +
+ Λa3
a
2a
2
(
The notations have standard interpretation and were introduced in the previous version [3].
4.1.2
Example: Spherically symmetric space.
Consider the spherically symmetric case of spherically symmetric macroscopic matter of radius R with center
mass at x:
gab = diag(−1 + φ, 1 + φ, 1 + φ, 1 + φ)
where φ is gravitational potential. Here I don’t assume the spherically symmetric matter is a point particle,
but certain mass of order of Planck mass or more than that. We also assume the matter distribution is
12
uniform, so that there is no spike in the gravitational field. A detailed calculation yields the following:
Z
1
(gab − g̃ab )(g ab − g̃ ab )(gg̃) 4 d3 x ≈ 4
Z
|φ(y − x) − φ(y − x′ )|2 d3 y
Then the quantum mechanics of the macroscopic spherical matter at the center of mass is described by
a simple model as follows:
′
′
ρ̇(x, x ) = i hx| [H, ρ] |x i − 4ch ρ
Z
|φ(y − x) − φ(y − x′ )|2 d3 y
(12)
H can be derived from the Hamiltonian analysis of the standard Hamiltonian. Based on private calculations, I believe, the decoherence integrals both in cosmology and spherically symmetric case seems to
be convergent and seems promising. This is different from previous formulations, as explained in the last
footnote. Further analysis will be discussed in the future.
4.1.3
Resolution of singularities
When we go towards the singularities the metric weight h goes towards zero. The Hamiltonian has inverse
h factors. So, the Hamiltonian formalism is not of much use near the singularities. In such cases, the
Lagrangian formulation is useful for study physics near singularities.
5
Universe, Consciouness and Structure formation
In this section we now discuss ideas regarding consciousness and structure formation. We will discuss how
consciousness involves quantum gravity through rest frame foliation. We introduce concepts to understand
structure formation and how consciousness is linked to it.
5.1
Consciousness and Framework 3.0
5.1.1
Consciousness and Global Quantum Reduction
Now we will try to understand the physical relevance of the global quantum reduction proposal4 . When we
are involving only Schrödinger evolution, it really doesn’t matter what foliation you are using in space-time
or what foliation we are using in the configuration space of fields at each point to evolve the wavefunction.
But if we include decoherence as discussed in framework 2.0, then for that foliation matters. Continuous
reduction of a quantum system is given by the Bloch equations in the Lindblad form [26] governing the
evolution of density matrix (reviewed in [27]):
ρ̇τ = i[ρ̂τ , Ĥ] +
X
m,x
+
+
(2L̂m,x ρ̂τ L̂+
m,x − L̂m,x L̂m,x ρ̂τ − ρ̂τ L̂m,x L̂m,x ),
(13)
with
ρτ =
M (|ψ τ >< ψ τ |)
,
< ψ τ |ψ τ >
Even if we use the path integral form of decoherence described in this paper, foliation still matters.
We expand ρ̂τ into a sum of pure states. Essentially |ψ τ >< ψ τ | is a sequence of pure states got by
probabilistically reducing ρ̂τ at each instant into pure state. This sequence of states |ψ τ > obtained this
4 The relation of quantum measurement to conscious reduction in this section is inspired independently and also by that
of Roger Penrose [8]. For example, when I read about quantum measurement in my high school days, 35 years ago, I always
believed this may be the best way how consciousness selection happens can be explained.
13
way depends on the foliation. That is, this conversation of mixed to pure state is the measurement process
which depends on the foliation. For this we need to find the most natural foliation that nature uses to it, if
that is the way this happens.
We have discussed possible foliations for global reductions in the previous paper [3]. Now there are three
questions to be addressed: 1) whether the reduction process occurs along a preferred foliation , 2) what
is the choice of the foliation along which the reduction occurs, and 3) whether this can be addressed as
experimental questions.
The answer to the first question is ’NO’ if we take into account the spirit of general relativity: Basic
laws of physics are supposed to be independent of foliation in which we analyze the process of evolution.
But the answer is yes if we take into account the presence of conscious observers as human beings. We
observe the world through our brains. The process of observation receives information from the environment
to be entered into a quantum state of matter in the brain in relevant regions. This is entangled with the
quantum state of matter around the observer. During observation, the observer converts mixed to
pure states, and it is registered in his consciousness. This is the lesson from quantum mechanics,
both in theory and experiment.
Now to answer the third question, yes we can come to certain answers for the first two questions. Consider
the first two facts:
1) When an observer observes a quantum superposed state it is probabilistically projected into a single
state. This process is decoherence described by the second proposal: conversion of mixed states into pure
states.
2) Second we know the observer observes in his rest frame.
3) The choice of foliations described for global quantum reduction are those in which the fields and matter
are relatively at rest. We will discuss this in detail after the observation.
Combining these three ideas we can come to the following proposal:
Proposition 8 Global quantum reduction is the process of continuous observation of conscious observers.
Now we would like to go into more detail regarding this. We observe the world through our brains. The
information we perceive is distributed throughout the brain. The synchronized pattern of firing of neurons
in our brain is perceived by conscious information. But somehow they combine together to give us a 4d
picture of the world, which is seen from a particular reference frame. The reference frame is usually the
co-moving reference frame of the observers. But we see the observer as a collection of neurons in the human
brain, then we ask the question What precisely is the hypersurface foliation used by neurons to synchronize
themselves? In other words, what is the foliation along which we observe the world?
Each neuron is sitting still in the human brain. If we keep our head still in an inertial reference frame,
then all our neurons have the same four velocities, then the orthonormal hypersurfaces to these four velocity
is clearly, is the foliation along which the neurons synchronize. Then the information in neurons at each of
these hypersurfaces gets bound together somehow and presented as an instantaneous sequence of perceptions
to the conscious observer.
But usually, the observer keeps shaking his head. Then in this case each neuron no longer have the same
four velocity, so the reference frames and the orthonormal hypersurfaces of each of each neuron are slightly
different. Even though differences are very small in a relativistic context, but yet we have a conceptual
problem. How do we specify this velocity in the field theory concept? In the case of a moving head, the
hypersurfaces are slightly curved, because each neuron is at a different velocity. So in general the hypersurface
along which the brain organizes information is curved.
Why should the conscious observer observe the universe from the hypersurfaces (reference frame) decided
by the four velocities of the neurons of the brain? Many other reference frames are equally possible. The
question is how does the brain (neurons) choose this reference frame? My question is more technical, How
does the brain sense its reference frame? or the sequence of spatial hypersurfaces associated with the reference
frame? This is the fundamental question that we need to answer. This is the spatial hypersurface that is
relevant to humans. The brain is matter, and this matter seems to sense the hypersurface along which it
moves to organize the information it receives. Most neuroscientists consider consciousness as a fundamental
capability of many of the lower mammals. Many important scientists such as Wigner, consider that even
14
an electron may have an elementary conscious capability. If we want to link quantum measurement to
consciousness, understanding the link between the hypersurfaces and dynamics of brain matter becomes
more relevant and this requires further research. In this section, we will discuss some proposals.
But how do we specify these hypersurfaces using quantum field theory. The four-velocity of the brain
is not a fundamental concept in field theory. We need to specify the hypersurfaces using the fundamental
quantum field theory, so that they can be specified at each point of the universe in an objective manner. For
this, consider the set up used for studying continuum canonical general relativity. Consider space-time with
metric gαβ and one parameter spacial foliation St , where St is the spacial hypersurface for a given t. This
foliation can be specified by function t(x), x is a point in space time, with t(x) = constant describing the
surface St . We can choose t to be the time coordinate. Consider the vector field, T γ = ( ∂∂t )γ . T γ generates
a one-parameter family of space-time diffeomorphism, such that a given initial surface St1 is mapped to a
different surface St2 of the foliation. So specifying T γ , assuming it is integrable, is another way to define the
foliation. Let nγ be the unit normal to the hypersurfaces.
There are many fundamental quantities that can be used to calculate T γ : Energy momentum tensor T αβ ,
extrinsic curvature Kαβ = £n (hαβ ), or the lie derivative of the metric Lαβ = £T (gαβ ). All these three have
a special relationship to the hypersurface along which a conscious observer obeserves the universe. T 0β for
moving matter is parallel to the direction in which it is moving. K αβ is zero along the moving observer, if
the gravitational field is of its own. Usually, the Lie derivative of the metric is zero along a moving matter,
if the gravitational field is of its own.
Let us first consider the energy-momentum tensor T αβ , which is a field theory concept. Consider the
classical expectation value. T 0β gives the direction along which matter and energy travels. But the human
brain is a noisy environment. T 0β differs from point to point in a random manner. Also T αβ is zero if there
is no matter. So it is difficult to link T αβ to the hypersurfaces in a one-to-one manner.
Lets consider the other two cases Kαβ = £n (hαβ ) and Lαβ = £T (gαβ ). Consider an static observer
moving in free space in an inertial reference frame, with his neurons moving in the inertial reference frame.
The observer generates a static field around him. By symmetry, the two Lie derivatives are zero if T is given
by the time like killing field ( ∂∂t )γ along which the field moves. Then we can determine the hypersurfaces
R
R
along which V Kαβ K αβ or V Lαβ Lαβ is zero or the smallest, where integration is done over the region of the
observer and along a hypersurface of the foliation. But Lαβ Lαβ is not positive definite because the metric
has (− + ++) signature. Then Kαβ K αβ which is positive definite seems to be the best possible choice. The
smaller the Kαβ K αβ , the smaller the variation in hab the spatial metric along the direction movement of the
observer. This seems to be the most appropriate surface along which the observer moves. The quantity that
is directly related to Kαβ in canonical formalism is the canonical momentum π αβ ,
π αβ =
√
h (Kαβ − Khαβ )
which may play an important role in formulation of the theory and we will explore this in future. In the case
of an observer in the gravitational field of a celestial object, Kαβ K αβ is minimal along the static foliations
of the body. So the foliations are determined by the gravitational field in the region in which the observer
lives. But there is the electric field of the conscious matter that we also need to take into account. This
was discussed in [4]. Before this paper we discussed the possible covariant generalization of the rest frame
foliation using conformal killing vector.
Version update: Kαβ K αβ is not minimal in the expanding universe along the direction of expansion. As
discussed before we need to replace Kαβ by the trace-free extrinsic curvature as in 8 to solve this.
5.1.2
Conscious and Rest frame foliation
As we discussed before usually observer keeps moving his head. Then in this case each neuron is no longer
have the same four velocity, so the reference frames and the orthonormal hypersurfaces of each of each neuron
are slightly different. In the case of a moving head the hypersurfaces in which the observes the universe is
slightly curved, because each neuron is at a different velocity. So, in general the hypersurface along which
the brain organizes information is curved. The most natural form is the rest frame foliation, in which moving
matter is most at rest.
15
So, we have the following proposal:
Proposition 9 The rest frame foliation is the foliation in the mixed quantum state of the universe that is
converted into a pure quantum state continuously and in which a conscious observer observes the universe
In our theory both conversion of mixed state to pure state and vice-versa happens all over the universe.
This doesn’t mean that the universe is consciously observing itself. In conscious matter such as in people or
living organisms, conscious observation is used for conscious observation and behavioral choice.
The rest frame foliations are quite natural for an observer, or any object such as a camera, or a microorganism, to observe the world as a sequence of events. How to calculate this foliation? and make it useful
for the study of movement needs to be studied further. Further relevance of this foliation will be discussed
further in the full version of this paper to be published later. In the previous paper [3], I discussed some
experimental tests to understand the effect of foliation dependence on decoherence. It needs to be further
studied.
5.2
Structures and Conscious Observers
5.2.1
Relational Harmonic Structures
In section we discuss a theory of consciousness5 . In the book [32] I have argued that the purpose of the
universe is the creation of relational harmonic structures. The competition between gravity and entropy
creates these structures. In our theory the gravity provides the necessary organizing force, while the stochastic
component (decoherence mechanisms) creates the entropy. In between these two we have other forces such as
electromagnetic, weak and strong nuclear forces. These create the relationship structures out of particles to
create composite particles such as atoms and molecules. These relationship structures further create complex
structures such as bulk matter. Here we describe a formula to measure relational complexity which has also
been described in the book [32]. Let {xi } be the free variables relating to a quantum system, say N atoms.
Then the joint probability distribution is
Pf = Pf ({xi })
From this we can derive the probability distribution for each variable.
Pi (xi ) =
X
{xj , ∀j6=i}
Pf ({xj })
The Shannon information associated with the entire system is
If = −
X
{xi }
Pf ({xi }) log2 Pf ({xi })
The Shannon information associated to each variable xi is
Ii = I(Pi ) = −
X
Pi (xi ) log2 Pi (xi )
xi
Then the sum of all this information is
5 This section is inspired by the integrated information theory of consciousness by Tononi Giulini but the formulations and
basic ideas are different [38] . There is also work by other other scientists. The ideas on the phenomena of consciousness may
overlap with other’s work. A much more detailed discussion of its relation to other consciousness theories will discussed in
further updates.
16
IsT =
X
Ii
i
The mutual information that is associated due to connectivity between the variables is as follows.
Im = IsT − If
The average information per variable is
Is =
IsT
N
where N is the number of variables.
The average independent information per variable that is associated with the variables subtracting the
mutual information is as follows:
Ii = Is − Im
Then the strength of the relationships network in the system is the geometric mean of the last two.
Ir =
p
Im ∗ Ii
We normalize this information as follows:
Ir =
1p
Im ∗ Ii
Is
Ir measures the strength of the relationship structure. If ir is maximum it means, there is the maximum
relational complexity. That is they not only have as much self-independence as possible, but also as much
mutual connection in the system. The smaller the ir is, either mutual connection reduces or self-independence
reduces.
The most typical application of ir is the measure of the relational complexity of living things. Assume
xi is the locations of each of the individuals of a colony of species. If ir is the maximum for a living colony
it means they have a balance of independence and at the sametime mutual connection.
For matter in free space, Ii is the independent information associated with each degree of freedom of
particles, and measures the effect of self-entropy. Im measures the connectivity between free particles, in
planetary scale is a measure of gravitational clumping. Ir is the geometric mean of these two is the measure
of relationship structure as a balance between defensive and connective factors as discussed in the book [32].
We can also measure the mental complexity of the neural network of a living brain. Here we can measure
xi to be the voltage inside the axon of the neuron. Ir is low mean either the neurons are two independent or
they are too connected. The more the information a brain stores more the complexity of information with
both interconnectivity and relational independence.
If there are entities with their state described by variables x1 and x2 then we can calculate the connectivity
as follows. It can be calculated as follows:
C12 =
Im,12
Is,12
Consider we have a system with many entities described by variables xi . We divide the system into two
regions by a cross-sectional area Σ. Then let k and k ′ refer to a pair of connected entities across the surface
Σ. Then the total connectivity between the two parts on the two sides of Σ is given by
17
CΣ =
X
Ckk′
k
The fractional connectivity is given by
cΣ =
CΣ
N
where N is the number of links across Σ.
The concept of connectivity can be used to understand how a system is. If it can be divided into two
parts by a surface Σ with CΣ = 0, then it is not connected. The smaller the cΣ is, the less connected the
parts are.
5.2.2
Perception and Consciousness
The human brain is a conscious structure. It perceives the world as a sequence of perceptions. The perceptions are nothing but a combination of sensations, which I would like to refer to as a sensation complex. This
has been described in chapter 3 of [31]. We need to understand the link of sensational complex to physics.
Let me frame the following axioms.
• Each quantum of reality, like a particle, is capable of elementary sensation and the sensation happens
when it splits into or merges with a different quantum. The extent of sensation depends on the energy
involved in a split or merger.
• When one or more quantum particles bond together they become a bigger observer and their elementary sensation merge to form a bigger sensational complex. The elementary sensational complex is
bound together by quantum entanglement and electromagnetic forces to become the bigger sensational
complex.
• Qualia are sensational complexes mapped to objects by a living entity through its memory systems
and reproduced on demand by it. The objects could be external objects such as trees or stones. The
objects could be another sensation complex such as a word image or sound.
• The time of flow of sensation is given by the rest frame foliation. The sensational complex information
on each of the hypersurface of the rest frame foliation is an instant of consciousness.
How quantum systems are put together technically becomes the qualia observed by living brains needs
to be researched. This may involve understanding the role of cortical columns in the cerebral cortex of the
living brain. These cortical columns may be considered as pixels of the sensational complex observed by the
living brains...
We can use the above list of ideas to give some mathematical descriptions. But before going into that
please note that in this paper consciousness is described as a sequence of sensational complexes that is all.
There is nothing deeper than that. For example, when a human being becomes self-aware, he doesn’t feel
everything about himself. He just feels the sensational complex that is provided in the brain based on the
information stored in the brain, to give a sense of self-awareness in combination with other sensations such
as visual, tactile, and sound sensations at that time. We look at something and feel that we know it, it is
just a sensation generated by the brain as feedback based on what it remembers. When we pay attention to
something basically our brain processes that information isolating it from the rest of the environment. Once
the processing is done, it provides the necessary sensational complex to identify it, along with a sense of
knowing it. Our brain over the course of time has evolved to generate its sensational complex to give a sense
of self, feedback about the immediate environment, also feedback about its internal mental states which in
themselves is a sensational complex, and mechanical biological mechanisms to use the information it learned
to promote its own survival.
18
Let Hi (t) be the time-dependent Hamiltonian associated with each quantum particle in a living brain.
Let energy ei =< H > is the expectation value. Then the sensational strength of the sensational complex is
given by
si (t) =
dei (t)
.
dt
The qualia is essentially described by the interconnectivity between the various entities in the brain.
Consider the brain of a living thing. If Ψ({ei (t)}) is the wavefunction of the system, then the joint probability
density is
P ({ei (t)}) = |Ψ({ei (t)})|2
Using P ({ei (t)}) we can calculate various information associated with respect to the system, and we can
define the connectivity and relational strength Ir . The fractional connectivity of any division tells how the
sensational complex is. If the fractional connectivity is zero it means that the system is made of two more
conscious entities. Relational strength indicates how strong the mental development of the system is. The
more the relational strength is, the more complex the information stored with strong interconnectivity with
them.
In the case of neuron-based brains, we don’t need to deal will each atom. But we can deal with neuronal
level-information. Let si (t) represent the average rate of change of the voltage of the axon of the human
brain. It tells the strength of the sensational complex at the neuron. Our perceptual content is stored in
our neural network as bonds between atoms. This energy level fluctuates as the electric field in the brain
changes. We perceive many frames of information in the brain, one frame per gamma cycle. As per our
proposal in the last section, these gamma cycles are synchronous with the rest frame evolution of our brain.
Let PJs be the probability distribution values of si (t) during the ∆T time interval of the Gamma Oscillation
beginning at T , T + ∆T > t > T − ∆T . This probability can be calculated from the neural network itself.
PJs (T ) = PJs ({si })
where the left side is the function of all si at each points. When J stands for joint probability.
Then we can define the joint information in many steps as described below.
Pi (si , T ) =
Z
∀sj ,j6=i
PJε ({sj })
Y
dsj
sj, ∀j6=i
where integral is performed over the range of possible values of the potential of each neuron.
Ii (T ) = −
Z
IJ (T ) = −
Is (T ) =
Pi (si , T ) log2 Pi (si , T )dsi
si
X
sj, ∀j
X
PJs ({sj }) log2 PJs ({sj })
Y
dsj
sj, ∀j
Ii (T )
i
Im (T ) = Is (T ) − IJ (T )
19
Im (T ) measures the sensational complex content of gamma oscillation during time interval starting at
instant T. Each gamma cycle defines a different instant of sensation.
Proposition 10 Im (T ) is a measure of consciousness of a system.
This is our fifth postulate. It is one candidate of many other possible definitions available in the literature.
5.3
Universe and Relationship structures
5.3.1
Theory
One of the important question regarding consciousness, is its relation to its free will. In the book [32] I
proposed that macroscopic superposition is the best possible way to link physics to free will. If the neural
network of living brain becomes a superposition of many possible feature courses Mi , the quantum state of
the entire neural
X network is
|Mi >,
|M >=
i
Mi is the ith possible mental state. Eventually it decoheres, possibly based on the decoherence model
that I have given in this paper to take one of the possible mental states |Mi >. But the important question
is, if any new physics is involved in the decoherence to link consciousness to free will. That is whether the
decoherence is not consistent with quantum mechanics, but slightly modified under the influence of free will
in the brain. Further research needs to be done on this.
Now I would like to propose an interesting proposition based on the unification scheme developed in my
work in [30] and also based on ideas in the previous section. Consider the measure of the relational structure
defined Ir before.
Proposition 11 The transition probability of a synchronous system is an increasing function Ir of the past
state and decreasing function Ir of the future state.
The last proposition is a mathematical statement of what has been discussed in chapter two of [32]
and [30]. One possible realization is that in terms of relative time propagator
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
α
Gs+ (qx,⊥
1 , qx,⊥ 2 , q̃x,⊥ 1 , q̃x,⊥ 2 ; η x , τ x , ∆τ x )− > g(qx,⊥ 1 , qx,⊥ 2 , q̃x,⊥ 1 , q̃x,⊥ 2 ) exp(−cr Υ12 −cr Υ̃12 ) exp(−dr Ir1 +dr Ir2 )
Where the arrow indicates that Gs+ depends on various parts of its various similar to what has been
written on the left-hand side. Υ12 is the restriction of Υ for global reduction to the slice containing the
two hypersurfaces of space-time separated in time parameters τ x by ∆τ x . The most general possible way to
understand the relationship structure dependence of a system transition amplitudes is to all a new term to
the action of the system:
S− > S − i
Z
ξ(Ir )dτ
where ξ is an increasing function of ξ(Ir ).This will make transition amplitudes increase with increase in
Ir .
Then we can generalize the action of the universe from 9 to:
S
=
Z
L5 =
Z
[L(γ) − iL(γ̃) + iβd(γ, γ̃)2 + icr Υ1 (γ, η x ) + icr Υ1 (γ̃, η x )
1
1
+icr Υ4 (γ, T γ ) + icr Υ4 (γ̃, T γ ) + i σ x (γ) + i σ x (γ̃)]
2
2
Z
Z
−i ξ(γ, Ir )dτ − i ξ(γ̃, Ir )dτ
20
(14)
where ξ is assumed to depend on foliation through γ.
Let’s analyze the implications of the last proposal on the universe. In other words, a synchronized system
tries to become more relationally harmonic. Since synchronization is also a measure of relational harmonic
nature, synchronization also tends to increase. So, to put it together, synchronization and relational harmonic
structures tend to increase together. It is one possible implication of the above proposition. This can help
us understand the evolution of the relationship structure of the universe: The formation of galaxies, stars,
crystals, organic molecules, DNA, and life so on. This has been discussed in [32] and [30], that the universe
tends to evolve with the evolution of relationship structures.
5.3.2
The future of the universe
Now in the universe we can see three forces that shape its structure:
1. Entropy: This continues to increase as the universe evolves.
2. Blackholes: They tend to become stronger and stronger, and influence the matter around.
3. Harmonic Relationship structures: Harmonic Relationship structures tends to the increase as universe
evolves.
Now if harmonic relationship structures are related to consciousness then it is the third force that shapes
the future of the universe in addition to entropy and blackholes. Consciousness fights against the effects of
gravity and entropy to keep the structures in the universe. The future of the universe is determined by the
battle between these three factors. The ultimate state of the universe is determined by who wins the fight.
5.3.3
Consciousness and Experience
Synchronization, that is consciousness, is also a measure of relational harmonic nature. Now if you assume
the extent of Ir is a measure of consciousness, from the last proposal, a conscious system tries to become
more relationally harmonic. In other words, consciousness tends to increase itself.
In general, in a relational harmonic structure defined in space and time, the synchronization and the
spatial relational structure tell about the extent of consciousness. Based on EEG studies of the human
brain, the extent of synchronization tells about the extent of conscious activation, while the spatial relational
structure tells about information content.
If a conscious system is entangled with the environment, then the relational structure of the environment
tends to be reflected in the mental state of the system. This means the conscious system tries to promote
the increase in complexity of the relational harmonic structure of the environment. So to understand the
psychological experience I have the following proposal:
Proposition 12 1)Various different harmonic relationship states corresponds to different feelings, emotions
or qualia of a conscious system. 2) Ir is a measure of the pleasure sensation by the synchronous system.
3)Increase in Ir is felt as happiness and decrease in Ir is felt as sadness
This proposition has various parts that helps understand consciousness as discussed in chapter two of [32].
There are various important research needs to be done in relation to this proposal.
• Map the relation between various harmonic relationship structures in the human brain and various
sensory information. This is a pure experimental study which might probably lead to a new theory
• Which of the brain structures and phenomena evolved due to pure wants? As I have discussed in the
book [30] artistic wants are pure wants. It relates to the proposition that nature wants to increase
harmonic relationship structures. Consciousness promotes it, and it is felt by it a positive feeling if Ir
increases and a negative feeling if Ir decreases.
• Which of the brain structures and phenomena evolved due to pure needs? The human brain evolved
to accommodate pleasure and pain depending on where the needs are met or not. Usually, neurotransmitters are involved in such phenomena. What is the mechanism, chemistry, and physics behind
it?
• How do pure needs and wants interact, to create life activities?
21
6
Conclusion
This paper describes only the heuristic setup. Application of this setup to study decoherence in a simple
context needs to be done. Even though I believe the formalism is ready for application, further research
needs to be done in the future to develop the formalism before applying it. Further updates to this paper
will be done soon.
References
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[3] Suresh K Maran, Quantum Gravity Framework: 2.0. A Complete Framework of Principles for Quantum General Relativity with Time and Measurement, http://www.qstaf.com/QGframework2.0 . First
published in arxiv: http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.6539v3, dated 30 Mar 2016. Research gate direct link:
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[4] Quantum Gravity Framework: 3.0. Submitted to ResearchGate.Net on June 24, 2021. DOI
Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.15044.55688/1. Quantum Gravity Framework 3: Relative
Time Formulation and Simple Applications to derive conventional Hamiltonians: arxiv preprint
http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.6539v4
[5] Changes
from
the
previous
version
http://www.qstaf.com/QGframework2.0
are
available
in
the
official
website:
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S2CID 44038399.
24 |
Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | pp. 354-356
354
Pitkänen, M., How Imagination Could Be Realized p-Adically?
Essay
How Imagination Could Be Realized p-Adically?
Matti Pitkänen 1
Abstract
One of the original motivations for identifying p-adic physics as a possible correlate for cognition,
imagination and intentionality was that p-adic differential equations allow pseudo constants as integration constants - piecewise constant functions depending on finite number of pinary digits have
vanishing p-adic derivatives. The naive idea about the realization of intentional action is that a quantum phase transition changes p-adic space-time sheet representing intention to a real one representing
action. This idea was too simplistic and in the following a more refined mathematical realization based
on strong form of holography is proposed. Imaginations are identified as being represented by string
world sheets and partonic 2 -surfaces which can be continued to p-adic preferred extremal for various
p-adic primes but not necessarily real ones. Only realizable intentions can be continued also to the
real preferred extremals.
1
p-Adic pseudo constants and imagination
The vision about p-adic physics as physics of cognition has gradually established itself as one of the key
idea of TGD inspired theory of consciousness. There are several motivations for this idea.
The strongest motivation is the vision about living matter as something residing in the intersection of
real and p-adic worlds [?]cognic,numbervision. One of the earliest motivations was p-adic non-determinism
identified tentatively as a space-time correlate for the non-determinism of imagination. p-Adic nondeterminism follows from the fact that functions with vanishing derivatives are piecewise constant functions in the p-adic context.
More precisely, p-adic pseudo constants depend on the pinary cutoff of their arguments and replace
integration constants in p-adic differential equations. In the case of field equations this means roughly
that the initial data are replaced with initial data given for a discrete set of time values chosen in such
a manner that unique solution of field equations results. Solution can be fixed also in a discrete subset
of rational points of the imbedding space. Presumably the uniqueness requirement implies some unique
pinary cutoff. Thus the space-time surfaces representing solutions of p-adic field equations are analogous
to space-time surfaces consisting of pieces of solutions of the real field equations. p-Adic reality is much
like the dream reality consisting of rational fragments glued together in illogical manner or pieces of child’s
drawing of body containing body parts in more or less chaotic order.
The obvious interpretation for the solutions of the p-adic field equations is as a geometric correlate of
imagination. Plans, intentions, expectations, dreams, and cognition in general are expected to have p-adic
cognitive space-time sheets as their geometric correlates. A deep principle seems to be involved: incompleteness is characteristic feature of p-adic physics but the flexibility made possible by this incompleteness
is absolutely essential for imagination and cognitive consciousness in general.
If one accepts the idea that real and p-adic space-time regions are correlates for matter and cognitive mind, one encounters the question how matter and mind interact. The original candidate for this
interaction was as a phase transition leading to a transformation of the real space-time regions to p-adic
ones and vice versa. These transformations would take place in quantum jumps. p-Adic-to-real phase
transition would have interpretation as a transformation of thought into a sensory experience (dream or
hallucination) or to an action. The reverse phase transition might relate to the transformation of the
sensory experience to cognition. Sensory experiences could be also transformed to cognition by initial
1 Correspondence: Matti Pitkänen http://tgdtheory.com/. Address: Karkinkatu 3 I 3, 03600, Karkkila, Finland. Email:
matpitka6@gmail.com.
ISBN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | pp. 354-356
355
Pitkänen, M., How Imagination Could Be Realized p-Adically?
values realized as common rational points of a real space-time sheet representing sensory input and a
p-adic space-time sheet representing the cognitive output. In this case the cognitive mental image is
unique only in case that p-adic pseudo constants are ordinary constants.
It turned out that this interpretation leads to grave mathematical difficulties: one should construct
U-matrix and M-matrix for transitions between different number fields, and this makes sense only if all the
parameters involved are rational or algebraic. A more realistic view is that the interaction between real
and p-adic number fields is that p-adic space-time surfaces define cognitive representations of real spacetime surfaces (preferred extremals). One could also say that real space-time surface represents sensory
aspects of conscious experience and p-adic space-time surfaces its cognitive aspects. Both real and p-adics
rather than real or p-adics. The notion of p-adic manifold [4] tries to catch this idea mathematically.
2
Strong for of holography
Strong form of holography [5] implied by strong form of General Coordinate Invariance leads to the
suggestion [2, 1] that partonic 2-surfaces and string world sheets at which the induced spinor fields are
localized in order to have a well-defined em charge [3] (this is only one of the reasons) and having discrete
set as intersection points with partonic 2-surfaces define what might called space-time genes. Space-time
surfaces would be obtained as preferred extremals satisfying certain boundary conditions at string world
sheets and carrying vanishing classical Noether charges for a sub-algebra of super-symplectic algebra
isomorphic to the entire algebra. Space-time surfaces are defined only modulo transformations of supersymplectic algebra defining its sub-algebra and acting as conformal gauge transformations so that one
can talk about conformal gauge equivalences classes of space-time surfaces.
The map assigning to real space-time surface cognitive representation would be replaced by a correspondence assigning to the string world sheets preferred extremals of Kähler action in various number
fields: string world sheets would be indeed like genes. Mathematically this formulation is much more
elegant that that based on p-adic manifold since discretization seems to be un-necessary at space-time
level and applies only to the parameters characterizing string world sheet.
String world sheets and partonic 2-surfaces would be in the intersection of realities and p-adicities in the
sense that the parameters characterizing them would be algebraic numbers associated with the algebraic
extension of p-adic numbers in question. It is not clear whether the preferred extremal is possible for
all p-adic primes but this would fit nicely with the vision that elementary particles are characterized by
p-adic primes. It could be also that the classical non-determinism of Kähler action responsible for the
conformal gauge symmetry corresponds to p-adic non-determinism for some particular prime so that the
cognitive map is especially good for this prime.
3
Figments of imagination as 2-surfaces which allow continuation to p-adic space-time surfaces only?
The idea about p-adic pseudo constants as correlates of imagination is too nice to be thrown away without
trying to find an alternative interpretation consistent with strong form of holography. Could the following
argument allow to save p-adic view about imagination in a mathematically respectable manner?
1. The construction of preferred extremals from data at 2-surfaces is like boundary value problem.
Integration constants are replaced with pseudo-constants depending on finite number pinary digits
of variables depending on coordinates normal to string world sheets and partonic 2-surfaces.
2. Preferred extremal property in real context implies strong correlations between string world sheets
and partonic 2-surfaces by boundary conditions a them. One cannot choose these 2- surfaces completely independently. Pseudo-constant could allow a large number of p-adic configurations involving
string world sheets and partonic 2-surfaces not allowed in real context and realizing imagination.
ISBN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research | June 2015 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | pp. 354-356
356
Pitkänen, M., How Imagination Could Be Realized p-Adically?
3. Could imagination be realized as a larger size of the p-adic sectors of WCW? Could the realizable
intentional actions belong to the intersection of real and p-adic WCWs? Could the modes of WCW
spinor fields for which 2-surfaces are extendable to space-time surfaces only in some p-adic sectors
make sense? The real space-time surface for them be somehow degenerate, for instance, consisting
of string world sheets only.
Could imagination be search for those collections of string world sheets and partonic 2-surfaces,
which allow extension to (realization as) real preferred extremals? p-Adic physics would be there as
an independent aspect of existence and this is just the original idea. Imagination could be realized
in state function reduction, which always selects only those 2-surfaces which allow continuation to
real space-time surfaces. The distinction between only imaginable and also realizable would be the
extendability by using strong form of holography.
I have the feeling that this view allows respectable mathematical realization of imagination in terms of
adelic quantum physics. It is remarkable that strong form of holography derivable from - you can guess,
strong form of General Coordinate Invariance (the Big E again!), plays an absolutely central role in it.
References
[1] M. Pitkänen. Construction of WCW Kähler Geometry from Symmetry Principles. In Quantum Physics as Infinite-Dimensional Geometry. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/
tgdgeom/tgdgeom.html#compl1, 2006.
[2] M. Pitkänen.
Identification of the WCW Kähler Function.
In
Quantum Physics
as Infinite-Dimensional Geometry. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdgeom/
tgdgeom.html#kahler, 2006.
[3] M. Pitkänen. WCW Spinor Structure. In Quantum Physics as Infinite-Dimensional Geometry.
Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdgeom/tgdgeom.html#cspin, 2006.
[4] M. Pitkänen. What p-Adic Icosahedron Could Mean? And What about p-Adic Manifold? In TGD
as a Generalized Number Theory. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdnumber/
tgdnumber.html#picosahedron, 2013.
[5] M. Pitkänen. Unified Number Theoretical Vision. In TGD as a Generalized Number Theory. Onlinebook. http://tgdtheory.fi/public_html/tgdnumber/tgdnumber.html#numbervision, 2014.
ISBN: 2153-8212
Journal of Consciousness Exploration &Research
Published by QuantumDream, Inc.
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