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B54-6-12/2016

PLAINTIF ETIQA TAKAFUL BERHAD (266243-D) DEFENDAN 1. ) ADIBAH BINTI ZAINAL ABIDIN (No. K/P : 600404-03-5488) 2. ) MOHAMAD ROHAIZAD BIN ZUKI (No. K/P : 921219-03-5125) 3. ) NURHIDAYAH BINTI HAMIDON (No. K/P : 951129-01-5742) 4. ) NUR FAZILAH BINTI AHMAD (No. K/P : 951215-06-5762) 5. ) HAMIDON BIN MD SAID

14/06/2017

DATO' HABIBAH BINTI MOHAMED YUSOF

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1d3840c8-10ac-4f63-9619-f7320f88e136&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI KUANTAN DALAM NEGERI PAHANG DARUL MAKMUR, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO : B54-6-12/2016 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 96(10 dan (3) Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 DAN Dalam Perkara Seksyen 41 Relief Spesifik 1950. DAN Dalam Perkara Polisi insurans No. TGPC-01159214-BRTZHQT yang melindungi kenderaan No. WNL5657 bagi tempoh 02/11/2013 sehingga 01/11/2014 DAN Dalam Perkara kemalangan jalanraya pada 07/01/2014 di Antara motokar No. WNL5657 dan motosikal No. JKT 1706 di Jalan Pantai Hiburan, Rompin, Pahang ANTARA ETIQA TAKAFUL BERHAD (266243-D) ….PLAINTIF DAN 1. ADIBAH BINTI ZAINAL ABIDIN (No. K/P : 600404-03-5488) 2. MOHAMAD ROHAIZAD BIN ZUKI (No. K/P : 921219-03-5125) 3. NURHIDAYAH BINTI HAMIDON (No. K/P : 951129-01-5742) 4. NUR FAZILAH BINTI AHMAD (No. K/P : 951215-06-5762) 5. HAMIDON BIN MD SAID … DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN ALASAN KEPUTUSAN Pendahuluan [1] Ini adalah satu Saman Pemula di mana pihak Plaintif menuntut; (i) Masa (jika perlu) dilanjutkan untuk memfailkan Saman Pemula ini; (ii) Keseluruhan peruntukan polisi insurans bernombor TGPC-01159214-BRTZHQT yang melindungi motokar No WNL 5657 bagi tempoh 2.11.2013 sehingga 1/11/2014 adalah terbatal(“void”) dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan (“unenforceable”) terhadap Plaintif; (iii) Selanjutnya, Pemohon tidak bertanggungjawab (“not liable”) untuk menanggung sebarang perintah dan penghakiman di bawah Seksyen 96 Akta Pengangkutan Jalanraya 1987 untuk sebarang tuntutan yang difailkan di bawah polisi ini termasuk tetapi tidak terhad kepada mana-mana tindakan yang akan/atau telah difailkan berikutan kemalangan jalanraya itu. (iv) Lain-lain relief dan/atau perintah dan/atau arahan lanjut yang dianggap sesuai dan manfaat oleh Mahkamah Yang Mulia ini. (v) Kos. Latarbelakang Kes [2] Adibah bt Zainal Abidin, Defendan Pertama adalah pemilik berdaftar bagi sebuah kereta No WNL 5657 (kereta tersebut). Plaintif dalam kes ini telah mengeluarkan satu polisi insurans bernombor TGPC-01159214-BRTZHQT (polisi tersebut) bagi melindungi kereta tersebut bagi tempoh 2.11.2013 sehingga 1.11.2014. [3] Kereta tersebut yang dikatakan dipandu oleh Defendan Kedua telah terlibat dengan kemalangan jalanraya pada 7.1.2014 dengan sebuah motorsikal No JKT 1706 yang ditunggang atau dibonceng atau dimiliki oleh Defendan Ketiga, Keempat dan Kelima di Jalan Pantai Hiburan, Rompin, Pahang. [4] Berikutan itu Plaintif telah diserahkan dengan satu notis di bawah Seksyen 96(2) Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987(APJ) dan laporan-laporan polis berkaitan kemalangan itu. Satu guaman sivil juga telah difailkan oleh Tetuan Ravi Moorthi Noriza Mala & Partners di Mahkamah Sesyen Kuantan No: A53KJ-22-01/2015 bagi pihak Defendan-defendan Ketiga, Keempat dan Kelima yang menuntut gantirugi am dan khas. Kes Plaintif [5] Plaintif mengatakan bahawa pihaknya telah melantik penyelaras untuk menyiasat berhubung kemalangan itu. Siasatan mendapati kereta tersebut telah dijual oleh Defendan Pertama kepada anak saudaranya, Defendan Kedua pada 7.1.2014 tanpa pengetahuan Plaintif. [6] Defendan Kedua mengakui bahawa beliau telah membeli kereta tersebut daripada Defendan Pertama pada tahun 2011 atas dasar sambung bayar pinjaman bank Defendan Pertama dan hanya akan menukar nama selepas selesai keseluruhan pinjaman kereta tersebut. [7] Berdasarkan fakta di atas Plaintif mengatakan bahawa kereta yang diinsurankan oleh Defendan Pertama tidak berada di bawah kawalannya sebaliknya oleh Defendan Kedua pada setiap masa yang merupakan “unauthorized driver” pada masa kemalangan berlaku.Oleh kerana berlaku “transfer of interest” juga maka tidak terdapat “insurable interest”. [8] Selain itu Plaintif mengatakan bahawa keseluruhan polisi insurans yang dikeluarkan atas nama Defendan Pertama adalah terbatal dan tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan kerana polisi tersebut tidak dibeli untuk kereta WNL 5657 kerana kereta tersebut telah dijual pada 2011. Maka tuntutan Defendan Ketiga hingga Kelima tidak dilindungi di bawah insurans itu. Ini kerana telah berlaku kemungkiran terma dan syarat asas polisi tersebut yang menyebabkan ia tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan terhadap Plaintif. Kes Defendan [9] Defendan mengatakan isu-isu yang ditimbulkan oleh Plaintif antaranya bahawa polisi itu telah terbatal, pemindahan kepentingan dan pemandu yang tidak mempunyai kebenaran untuk memandu kereta tersebut adalah isu antara Defendan Pertama dengan agen Plaintif serta Plaintif sahaja dan tidak boleh mengatasi atau memberi kesan kepada perlindungan insuran pihak ketiga di bawah Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987(APJ). [10] Mengenai kemungkiran terma dan syarat asas polisi tersebut, Plaintif boleh mendapatkan remedi terhadap agennya atau Defendan Pertama. Syarat dan terma yang dikatakan dilanggar juga tidak dikemukakan. [11] Plaintif telah menerima Notis di bawah Seksyen 90(2) APJ dan telah melantik Peguamcara serta telah memfailkan pembelaan untuk Defendan Pertama dan Kedua maka Plaintif harus di tahan (“estopped”) daripada mendapatkan deklarasi pada tahap ini. [12] Seterusnya Peguam Defendan Ketiga hingga Kelima mengatakan Defendan Pertama telah pun memberi kebenaran kepada Defendan Kedua untuk menggunakan kereta tersebut. [13] Carian JPJ adalah carian rasmi yang muktamad menunjukkan Defendan Pertama adalah pemilik berdaftar kereta dan seharusnya mengikat pihak-pihak. Jelas dari carian JPJ, Defendan Pertama adalah pemilik kereta dan Plaintif sebagai penanggung insurans yang harus bertanggungan atas kemalangan kerana ia adalah satu “statutory liability”. Penilaian dan Keputusan Mahkamah [14] Adalah menjadi undang-undang yang mantap sepertimana dihujahkan oleh pihak Plaintif bahawa kontrak berkaitan polisi insurans adalah satu kontrak berasaskan prinsip “uberrima fide” atau “utmost good faith”. Kes-kes yang dipetik oleh pihak Plaintif sememang dengan jelasnya menunjukkan bahawa pihak insurans tidak mempunyai obligasi untuk menanggung rugi dalam keadaan berlakunya kegagalan untuk menyatakan fakta–fakta material (non-disclosure of material facts) serta berlaku pemindahan kepentingan (transfer of interest). [15] Bagi kes-kes insuran yang melibatkan kemalangan jalanraya dua perkara utama yang perlu diputuskan oleh mahkamah dalam menentukan samada pihak insurans perlu bertanggungan adalah samada kenderaan yang terlibat dengan kemalangan telah dipandu dengan keizinan “insured” dan wujud “insurable interest” semasa kemalangan berlaku seperti diputuskan dalam kes Nanyang Insurance Co. Ltd v Salbiah & Anor [1967] 1MLJ 94 yang dirujuk oleh pihak Plaintif. [16] Pihak Plaintif melalui afidavit Haslenda bt Md Moktar Rudin, Ketua Bahagian Tuntutan Motor di bahagian tuntutan Plaintif (pegawai Plaintif) bertarikh 6.12.2016 mengatakan bahawa penyelaras yang dilantik Plaintif telah membuat siasatan yang menyeluruh mendapati kereta yang terlibat dengan kemalangan yang diinsuranskan atas nama Defendan Pertama telah dijual pada masa kejadian kemalangan. [17] Dalam afidavit tersebut juga pihak Plaintif menyokong dakwaan mereka dengan mengemukakan dua surat akuan bersumpah dan satu laporan polis di ekshibit “HMM-4”. Kandungan ketiga-tiga dokumen ini yang dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama Adibah bt Zainal Abidin pada 3.11.2016 dan Defendan Kedua, Mohamad Rohaizad b Zuki bertarikh 14.10.2016 adalah sama pada asasnya. [18] Kedua-dua penama ini mengakui mereka mempunyai tali persaudaraan sebagai ibu saudara dan anak saudara. Seterusnya kedua-dua mereka mengakui bahawa Defendan Pertama telah menjual kereta yang terlibat dengan kemalangan itu pada tahun 2011 kepada Defendan Kedua dengan harga RM18 500.00 secara sambung bayar pinjaman bank di atas nama Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua hanya akan menukar nama pada geran kereta tersebut setelah pinjaman dilangsaikan. [19] Defendan-defendan menafikan hal ini dengan mengemukakan afidavit oleh peguambelanya yang diikrarkan pada 21.2.2017 dan 18.5.2017 yang mengekshibitkan maklumat insurans kenderaan dari pihak Jabatan Pengangkutan Jalan Malaysia (JPJ) yang menunjukkan bahawa pada masa material kereta tersebut masih dimiliki Defendan Pertama. [20] Secara sepintas lalu jika Mahkamah menimbangkan fakta yang dikemukakan Plaintif sudah semestinya Mahkamah mesti mengatakan bahawa pihak Plaintif tidak lagi bertanggungan kerana berlakunya “transfer of interest” sekaligus ini bermakna tiada lagi “ insurable interest” serta berlakunya perlanggaran terma dan syarat asas kontrak iaitu “duty of disclosure” kerana penjualan kereta oleh Defendan Pertama kepada Defendan Kedua tidak dimaklumkan kepada pihak Plaintif. [21] Walau bagaimanapun Mahkamah melihat keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak Defendan-defendan ketiga hingga kelima adalah lebih “credible” dan boleh diterimapakai serta mengatasi keterangan Plaintif dari segi nilainya. [22] Ini kerana akuan sumpah dan laporan polis yang dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah hanyalah dilampirkan sebagai ekshibit melalui afidavit pegawai Plaintif sedangkan penyelaras yang dikatakan telah membuat siasatan tidak dikemukakan affidavitnya di Mahkamah bagi menyokong fakta dan dakwaan ini. [23] Malah Plaintif mendakwa bahawa pihaknya telah mengarahkan penyelarasnya supaya membuat satu siasatan berkaitan kemalangan tersebut tetapi laporan hasil siasatan itu langsung tidak dikemukakan kepada pihak Mahkamah. [24] Tambahan lagi tiada penjelasan dalam afidavit pegawai Plaintif bagaimana surat-surat akuan sumpah yang dikatakan dibuat oleh Defendan Pertama dan Kedua serta laporan polis Defendan Kedua seperti di ekshibit “HMM-4” diperolehi. Mahkamah ini berpandangan penyelaras adalah individu yang selayaknya untuk mengemukakan dokumen-dokumen itu memandangkan beliaulah yang mempunyai maklumat langsung (firsthand knowledge) dalam hal ini. [25] Sedangkan di pihak Defendan-defendan pula, peguambela yang membuat carian tersebut telah mengemukakan sendiri maklumat dari carian rasmi dari pihak yang tidak berkepentingan menunjukkan fakta bahawa Defendan Pertama masih kekal sebagai pemilik kereta tersebut. [26] Apabila Mahkamah ini membuat dapatan bahawa tidak berlaku pemindahan kepentingan dan tanpa keterangan sebaliknya, dengan sendirinya bermakna bahawa kereta tersebut telah dipandu dengan keizinan pemiliknya sepertimana diputuskan dalam kes Lee Chong Keong v Cheang Kok Weng & Anor [1996] 4 MLJ 133 di mukasurat 134 (rujuk “held” di para 5). [27] Dalam kes ini tidak dipertikaikan bahawa pihak Plaintif telah menerima notis statutori di bawah Seksyen 96(2) APJ 1987 malah telah memasukkan pembelaan bagi pihak Defendan Pertama dan Kedua dalam kes A53KJ-22-01/2015 maka pada peringkat ini tidak sepatutnya Plaintif sebagai pihak penginsurans mengelakkan tanggungjawabnya. [28] Seterusnya walaupun Defendan Pertama dan Kedua tidak memasukkan sebarang afidavit membantah permohonan deklarasi Plaintif di sini, memandangkan permohonan ini melibatkan budi bicara Mahkamah, Mahkamah mengikuti keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan No: W-02(NCVC) (A)-1717-09/2016 Tirumenivar a/l Singara Veloo v Malaysian Motor Insurance Pool, 14 April 2017 sepertimana dalam hujahan pihak peguam Defendan Ketiga hingga Kelima dan memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah ini tidak sepatutnya memberikan perintah deklarasi terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Kedua semata-mata atas kegagalan kehadiran dan kegagalan memfailkan afidavitnya. [29] Maka atas sebab-sebab seperti di atas Mahkamah ini menolak permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 3 dengan kos RM1 500.00 (DATO’ HABIBAH BINTI MOHAMED YUSOF) Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen 2 14hb Jun 2017 s.k . 1) Tetuan Ravi Moorthi Noriza Mala & Partners Peguambela dan Peguamcara A-3, Tingkat 1, Lorong Tun Ismail 10 Jalan Tun Ismail 25000 Kuantan, Pahang (RMNM/ACC/3528/14/H/Ros 2) Tetuan Sabarudin Othman & Ho No. C-8-2, Megan Avenue 11 No. 12 Jalan Yap Kwan Seng 50450 Kuala Lumpur. (SO/KL/L/ETIQA/4225/16) 14

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-76-01/2017

PLAINTIF DA LAND SDN BHD [COMPANY NO: 922835-H] DEFENDAN ONG KOH HOU @ WON KOK FONG

13/06/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4466e98d-34c3-4278-baee-c82420e522a7&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

JA-12B-46-08/2016

PERAYU 1. ) Devi a/p Magamuthu ...Perayu Pertama/Plaintif 2. ) Steven Sawridennis a/l Yanasekaran (seorang yang tidak berupaya dan diwakili oleh ibunya, ANNIE A/P SAWRI sebagai wakil litigasinya) ...Perayu Kedua/Plaintif RESPONDEN 1. ) Wong Wai Hoong ...Responden/Defendan 2. ) Wong Wai Hoong ...Responden/DefendanPIHAK KETIGA1. Devi a/p Nagamuthu ...Perayu Ketiga/Pihak Ketiga 2. Prasanth a/l Rames ...Perayu Keempat/Pihak Ketiga

12/06/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f2767d90-2be6-4603-b9df-9c5d4869b229&Inline=true

Page 1 of 9 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR, MALAYSIA RAYUAN SIVIL NO: JA-12B-46-08 TAHUN 2016 ANTARA DEVI A/P MAGAMUTHU PERAYU PERTAMA/ PLAINTIF DAN WONG WAI HOONG RESPONDEN/ DEFENDAN ```````````````````````````````````````````````` ANTARA STEVEN SAWRIDENNIS A/L YANASEKARAN (seorang yang tidak berupaya dan diwakili oleh ibunya, ANNIE A/P SAWRI sebagai wakil litigasinya) PERAYU KEDUA/ PLAINTIF DAN WONG WAI HOONG RESPONDEN/ DEFENDAN DAN 1. DEVI A/P NAGAMUTUHU PERAYU KETIGA/ PIHAK KETIGA 2. PRASANTH A/L RAMES PERAYU KEEMPAT/ PIHAK KETIGA Page 2 of 9 [Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor, Malaysia Guaman No. A53KJ-997-08/2014] Antara Devi A/P Nagamuthu Plaintif Dan Wong Wai Hoong Defendan ``````````````````````````````````` [Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen Di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor, Malaysia Guaman No. A53KJ-712-07/2015] Antara Steven Sawridennis A/L Yanasekaran (seorang yang tidak berupaya dan diwakili oleh ibunya, Annie A/P Sawri sebagai wakil litigasinya) Plaintif Dan Wong Wai Hoong Defendan Dan 1. Devi A/P Nagamithu 2. Prasanth A/L Rames Pihak Ketiga JUDGMENT CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Date: 12.06.2017 Page 3 of 9 Introduction [1] Two civil suits, namely, suits A53KJ-997-08-2014 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the first suit’) and A53KJ-712-07-2015 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the second suit’), were amalgamated and jointly heard at the Sessions Court of Johor Bahru. [2] The two plaintiffs in the respective civil suits were involved in a motor accident which involved the same defendant in the two suits. [3] In the first suit, the plaintiff, Devi a/p Nagamuthu, was the rider (hereinafter referred to as ‘the rider’), whereas, in the second suit, the plaintiff, Steven Sawaridennis, was the pillion passenger (hereinafter referred to as ‘the pillion rider’), and both were riding on a motorcycle JLW 4744 at the time they met with the accident. [4] The accident occurred along Jalan Johor Bahru-Air Hitam, KM 6.5, heading toward Skudai, when the defendant, Wong Wai Hoong, who was driving his motor vehicle KBE 7576, collided onto the rear of the motorcycle JLW 4744. The rider and pillion rider had separately brought civil suits against the driver of the motor vehicle KBE 7576. [5] In the second suit, the driver being the defendant had filed a third party action against the rider and the owner of the motorcycle, Prasanth a/l Rames (hereinafter referred to as ‘the owner’). [6] At the Sessions Court, the learned Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) held as follows: Page 4 of 9 The First Suit - A53KJ-997-08-2014 Liability : Plaintiff (the rider) is 30% liable Defendant (the driver) is 70% liable Quantum : RM40,261.07 (General and Special damages based on 100%) The Second Suit – A53KJ-712-07-2015 Liability : Plaintiff (the pillion rider) is not liable Defendant (the driver) is 70% liable Third Party (the rider/owner) is 30% liable Quantum : RM204,508.77 (General and Special Damages based on 100%) [7] The defendant in the second suit had paid in full the total damages awarded to the pillion rider, i.e. RM204,508.77. The defendant in the second suit was entitled to claim 30% of the total damages from the third party (the rider), which amounted to RM61,352.63, since the third party (the rider) was found to be 30% liable for the pillion rider’s claim. [8] Based on the above, the SCJ allowed the amount of damages awarded to the rider in the first suit be used to set-off with the sum which the rider owes to the defendant in the second suit. [9] Unfortunately, the sum awarded to the rider in the first suit was only RM28,182.75 (based on 70% of the total damages, i.e. RM40,261.07). Page 5 of 9 The amount of RM28,182.75 is not enough to be used to set-off the sum of RM61,352.63 which the rider (as third party) owes to the defendant in the second suit. As such, after having set-off the amount awarded to the rider in the first suit, the rider still owes RM33,169.88 (RM61,352.63 – RM28,182.75) to defendant. The Appeals at the High Court [10] In the first suit, the rider (plaintiff) appealed against the SCJ’s decisions both on liability and quantum. [11] In the second suit, the pillion rider (plaintiff) appealed against the SCJ’s decision on quantum only. [12] Also in the second suit, the rider and owner (third party) appealed against the SCJ’s decision ordering the sum awarded to the rider in the first suit be used to set-off the amount the rider and owner owe to the defendant in the second suit. [13] On 20.4.2017, this Court dismissed the appellants’ appeals and maintained the decisions of the SCJ. The reasons for the decision of this High Court are set down as below. Brief Facts [14] As mentioned earlier, an accident occurred along Jalan Johor Bahru-Air Hitam, KM 6.5, heading toward Skudai. The defendant’s motor vehicle KBE 7576 collided onto the rear of the motorcycle JLW 4744. Both the defendant and the rider were heading toward the same Page 6 of 9 direction. The accident occurred in the middle of the night at around 2.20 a.m. [15] The rider and pillion rider were with a group of friends riding their motorcycles on the highway when the accident occurred. The rider’s account of the accident was that the pillion rider had consumed some alcohol over dinner, therefore, he was not fit to ride alone on a motorcycle. The rider was sending the pillion rider back home when the accident occurred. [16] The defendant’s account of the accident was that the rider was overtaking another motorcycle (presumable the rider’s friends on another motorcycle). The defendant collided onto the rear of the rider’s motorcycle when the rider was overtaking another motorcycle. The traffic police had summoned the defendant, and he had paid the fine. [17] With regard to the pillion rider, after the accident, he was diagnosed as suffering from retrograde amnesia and post traumatic amnesia. His medical condition has been certified by two medical experts. The pillion rider could not remember what had happened that fateful night. Hence, he was unable to give evidence during the trial. The Findings of this Court [18] After having perused the judgment of the learned SCJ, this Court found the learned SCJ did not err in her finding of facts which led to the apportionment of liabilities on the respective parties. The learned SCJ found the rider was indeed riding in the middle of the road when the accident occurred. The rider was not supposed to be riding in the middle Page 7 of 9 of the road (between A1 and A2, see p. 256 Rekod Rayuan, Rajah Kasar, exhibit P2 [hereinafter referred to as the sketch plan]). [19] The rider’s account of the accident was that she was riding on the left side of the road, i.e. closer to point ‘A’ (see sketch plan) when the accident occurred. If that was true, the damage on the defendant’s vehicle ought to be on the left side. But the damage was found almost at the centre of the front of the defendant’s vehicle (see pictures ‘F’ and ‘D’ of Rekod Rayuan, pp. 250-1). Hence, an inference could be made out that the accident occurred at the centre of the road which is consistent with the defendant’s version where the collision took place. No evidence was led that the defendant had driven his vehicle on the far left of the road. Thus, the finding of fact by the learned SCJ that the rider was on the middle of the road when the collision took place was highly probable. It was in evidence that the rider did not possess a motorcycle licence at the material time of the accident. After taking into account of these facts, the apportionment of 30% liability on the rider as contributory negligent to the accident was justifiable. This Court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the learned SCJ on the issue of apportionment of liabilities on the parties. [20] With regard to the damages awarded to the rider as well as to the pillion rider, this Court could not hold the learned SCJ had committed any error in the application of the principles of law in relation to award of damages in an accident case. [21] The damages awarded for each claim were within the range of the compendium. They were not excessive or manifestly low. The award of the damages is purely at the discretion of the trial court. An appellant Page 8 of 9 court will only disturb the finding of quantum if there is a serious error of law committed by the trial judge, otherwise, the decision ought not to be disturbed. [22] In the present case, the learned SCJ had exercised her discretion judiciously. This Court sees no reason to disturb the SCJ’s judgments on quantum. This Court agreed with the defendant’s counsel’s written submissions on the issue of quantum. [23] The appellants’ counsel’s submission on the issue of quantum referred to the recommended amounts for the injuries suffered. The counsel submitted those recommended amounts ought to be awarded because they were the fair values. An appellate court cannot disturb the trial judge’s award of damages based on a consideration of whether the amount awarded by the trial judge is fair or not. Further, it is not necessary for every head of claims pleaded by the claimant to be allowed and awarded. The trial judge has the discretion to grant or not to grant any claim made based on the facts before the court. [24] With regard to the part of the judgment where the learned SCJ ordered the amount awarded to the rider in the first suit to be set-off against the 30% liability of the rider, as third party, in the second suit, this Court is of the considered view that the learned SCJ was entitled to make such order. This is not a case where the SCJ had ordered the third party pay 30% of the damages to the pillion rider and the defendant to pay 70% of the damages. [25] In the present case, the defendant had in fact paid in full the total damages awarded to the pillion rider. As such, the defendant is entitled Page 9 of 9 in law to claim from the third party (the rider) a sum amounting to 30% of the total damages which the defendant had paid to the pillion rider. The first and second suits were amalgamated and heard together, therefore, any sum awarded against a party could be used to set-off against any sum awarded to the same party. Conclusions [26] Based on the above reasoning, this Court dismissed all the appeals and ordered costs of RM1,000.00 for each of the appeal to be paid by the plaintiffs and third party respectively to the defendant. -Signed- ………………………………….. (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Appellants’/Plaintiffs’/ : Kala Lakshmi Third Party’s counsel Tetuan Teo & Associates Respondent’s/Defendant’s Counsel : N. Ganesarajah Tetuan Ganes & Partners

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-66-10/2015

PLAINTIF LIM CHOON SENG DEFENDAN LIM POH KWEE

12/06/2017

YA DATUK WIRA HALIJAH BINTI ABBAS

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DALAM Mnugflgg TINGGI MALAVA DI MUAR NEGERI JQHOR DARUL rAKzIM GUAMAN SIVIL: mum -55-WYAHUN 2015 ANTARA LIM cnoou sens {Mendukwa sehagai PagawaiAwnm Pumnr rasnsnum ENG cnoow . MUAR. JOHDFI (ENG CHOON HUAY KUAN. mum) DAN LIM PDH KWEE DEFENDAN 1 dsn/alau semua many yang menunnn di bawahnya 22:. man Hashim. 34000 Muar, Juhnr ) FENGHAKIMAN mm 5. nu I.I>a(1u7m1xmc v u. r-9:1 DALAM MAHKAMAN TINGGI MALAVA DI MUAR NEGERI Jouon DARLIL TAKZIM GUAMAN SIVIL :22Ncvc -66-10 rnnuu 2015 ANYARA um cuoou ssms (Msndakwa sshagai Pegawm Awam PERSATUAN ENG cnoow , MUAR. JOHOR (ENG CHOCIN HUAV KUAN. MUAH) PLAINTIF DAN um PDH xws: nsrsnmu man/arau semua orang yang meuunlul m bawahnya 224, Jam Hash!’ . 34|Xl0 Muar‘ Juhar ) FENGHAKIMAN 71 caveman gagzl buknkan mm alau penlpuan yang telah dllakukzn oleh plamm Tanpa mm: Ianya dwanggap penya|aan kzysang sahap Juga Kexerangan mengenax amanah mkaoakan mpegang oleh pemegang amanah sebagax ‘Trustees mm sun/Ivolsmp “ a} Deiendan max ada |oous slandw unmk mmunan balas mereka Dan kaerangan delendan sendln. defendan-delendan aflalah cuma wans kepada konannya penevoka asa\ Ianah tersebut lm ‘alga max pernah dlplldkan up Delendan 1} Tanah mdaflarkan eras nama ac»-u< melalun sm peflakuan «rod, penlpuan dart vepvesemasl pansu, pemamxan ( fabrication) dan pengubahan émpenng» Yang lidak sah yang mbual seem herpenngkat aleh wakI—wak1\ ECHK 2] Hamhf gagal memnangkn sebarang pembeksan Kerhadap <su-Isu letsebut 3] Pembalvan Kanah lersehu|pada1926 oleh keluarga penduduk-penduduk Penaanamn pods 1926 max menyaaakan sebavang nama Eng Choon aeau ECHK. zzmmmmznxs uw:>u7m4::Nc V uw*uw<wEl M. m sedengkan ECHK |e4ah wujua se1aklE94 dengan nama’Eng Chhun Huey Kean‘ Muav. Surat Vkaban Amanah dlbualpzda was Ianu m xanun kemudlan selepas Iunah amen 4) Fmd xelah mlauukan helpenngkal. Froa yang panama pads Iahun was. kemudiarmya dalam Iahun 1955 dan 1977. Fred was, doitumen axau vekad pembenan (idak dapa| ECHK kemukakan, Juga tidak mungkin paua masa pembenan pada Iahun I926, 9 many zdalah nsmegang amanah dan I orang adalah pemlllk (Gan Tlan) In: adalah ulsshabkan anak Gan nan mkslakan (alah menjual bahaglannya kspada Lwm Tax Ching. Surat Amanah adalah dalam Eahasa mggens flan Imak mempunym juval. Tamm mall um sun wan pada ranun 1935, lelapl saman pemula plamul ()5 new on 1955 yang msakung oleh amavn Vee Km Kam xeran mengalakan Lim Sim Kelah maniuggax aama psda tahun was SP1 senuiu mengaku bahawa Lxm Sum |e\ah menlnggal duma uada cahun 1936. 51 oaen mu Surat Ikalan Amanah vetssbul wax sah, Iemalal dan hdak baleh dngunakxn. Tambahan pula Ievdapsl pemolongan dan penamhahan nama di Suva! ckavan Amanah tersebut. saw paknr dan Jabatan nmia juga telah —.:._ mcvouum w.ms—uu:uov)m.Nu . L..;m..m p...“ mengasahkan Izldapamya pemolmgan nan penamhahan cu Surat Ikalan Amanan xersebul. Sural Vkalan Amanah yang lslah drbual pemcmngan dan penambahan lmak bo\eh mgunakan unluk sebarang Itansaksn alau plndanmmk nananah Cersabut. 6] Pejnhal Tanah guga Ielah hanya mendanarkan I0 orang penandaumgan lersehul sebagal - Trustees wnh surwvorsllfp’ pada 3 JJQ36 Jelas Surat lks|an Amanah Ilu Ildak boleh dlgunakan unmk sebarang uansam. penuaflanin alau pmdah rmllk unluk rnendallarkan nama benelslan kepada Ianah Kersebut atau amanah lersebul . Psmnlnkan dan plndahmmk lanah Ievsebm kepads ECNK hanya berdasarkan kepada salu uokumen lawn Surat lkslan Amanah lersehut. Oleh kerana terdapa| lvod, penipuan. vepmsentas palsu, dan temapamya pengubahan (Iampenng) narna beneltslari Ianpa kebenamn penandatangan. make Surat lkalan Amanah nu amen Iidak san. Ierba|a1 dan Imak omen digunakan umuk memhukvkan pemlllk mnah Aersehul avau unluk pmdah mrhk Ianah ISISEDUI. 7] Psrmcuhunan ECHK pada lahun 1977IsIsehn1 Vanpa sebarsng om" alau uokumen yang menunjukksn hahawa tanah Iersebul adalah dipegang senagax amanah unvuk poavnm ;.T z1r<Lv(4Mnrmmzm5 umummwmm Tunranxwxz p... n 1zm:4( wmmmus uncrcnmumc V uuwmxwzv. telapl maumiv lelah manuma Mahkzmah unmk Vevaklcan Ianan |ersebu( kepada pemegang amanah Imluk pramm ECHK alau wakflnya xelah menyembunylkan daripadi Mahkamah cam canawa lanah lenaehul aaaxan dipegang oieh pemegang amanah ssbagll "Tmsrees mm surv/vars»-.p". Apa yang dikemukakan oleh ECHK man wamnnya dalnm parmuhonan tarsebul hanyakln Mmnt Mesyuaval Agony. a] Permian 1977 juga xecan udak mpamm. Penman 1977 Isiah mamemnamn 9 orang unanuu sabagan pemegang amanah Ialapi ECHK cuma mendahar name 7 many samya. Dua many lag! Ianlu Gan vew Tc-h dan Chew Kang Hung yang unannk as bawah pevmlah 1955 Iidak dldalvavkan sehagan pemegang amanah. olsn nu penaanaran nu max san dan adalah lemulal kerana berlenlangan dengan penman Mahkamah. Saksyen aw Kanun Tanan Negava uses adalah Ievpakal an permacmran lelsebul peuu flikatemkan. 9] Hanya tardapau dua penanpan sewa, sedangkan ceruapac 37 guaman sivil aan 41 bangunan berkenaan Ianah im. Pev’pan|\an dnamalangan: kerana Irdak dapal dupaslikan siapakah yang Ielall mandinkan hangunsn Iersebux. Surat plalnlll benankn 21.12.2003 juga menyacaxan ECHK aaalan penguvus bag: lanai: Ievsebul P-I.-.1? 101 Terdapal perbezaan dxamala sewa dengan pemmkan kerana nombor mmah yang ganm. max mempunyax sebarang peuanuan sews den cukax «anan manakala yang bemambov genap mempunyal peryarman sewa dau sewaan $02 dalam kemrangannya Ae\ah mengalakan Ixahawa ma te\ah memhayar cukaw dan cukal puma kerzna lanah |ersebu| adalah Ianzh mlhknya 11} SP1 sendm mengakul banawa Udak pemah melma| apa— apa sewaan yang mempunyau angka akhuannya Jumlah “ sen‘ lm membukllkan bayaran Ievsebul bnkannya bayavan sewa teiapw nu adalah bayaran cukal (anah dan ammp oleh pnamm sebagai Fengums Tanah Iersehut 12] Plazmllmempunyalmanerlat(malarflde) Pada Mesyualal Agang ECHK hanya so orang danpada 1119 orang arm yang hadxr Am Jsweoankuasa dan Lnm Choon Seng cerah mengambu kesempatan unluk memhual keputusan dan memberl kuzsa kepada gawalankuasa yang haham unluk memhual kepuman berkenaan pembangunan Ianzh 13] Keputusan ECHK levsebul ndak mengxkm penduduk- penduduk kaana hukan semua meveka a ECHK dan plamm bukan penuhk sebenar Ianah Ievseblll nncvc ssunammmn um :41 TunIu|an bawas detendan adalah unluk mvhk aavenuan nawtu generasr mm uan mempakan kammnan /wans kepada pemwpeneraxa asar vanah Iersebut Defendan mewausw lanah |ersebul secara pemmkan beflerusan dan Ianpa gangguan max ada sebarang dckumen mmkan pada waklu mrsebul kemna belum ada undang»undang yang memeflukan alau mewajxhkannya sns , Er Econ Chye ielah memben ketevangan bahawa myangnya uam |s1en Lwm Sim lelah drkebumlkan dx (anah lersebul Defendan memjuk kepada kerakan akhhar dan xeerangan SD3 want: wanawan akhbar Iersehul F-Iamnuga max mengambu undakan guaman untuk mvllkan kosong Iumah keluarga sns <5] Delendan flan penduduk-penduduk Iidak mendapalkan gevan prone: ztau suran kuasa mentadbvr bag: ibu/bapa axau keluarga mereka alas alasan berlknt — at Menurut pengetahuan keluarga pendlmulv penduduk‘ Ianah (ersebm dlpsgang nleh pemegang amanah b) ‘ndak ada kevenuan kerana lanah ada\ah drdailzrkan anas nama pemegang amarlah den ndak ada suuanan Hakrmhk alau Geran Tanah alas nama kemarga mereka UM Pun Kwzz c) max ada hananah nam yang mwans. flan Iwdak ada kepenuan unluk geran pmbet alau suralkuasa menladbu aynnuakan guaman dmmlakan men pnamw, dan devendarmeqendan ndak mempunyaw plllhan selam dan memasukkan kehadlran dan membual (unmlan was Lmluk mehndungl hak meveka bagi Ianah lersebut 16] ndak ads Ak<a “Probate and Admlmslvalvnn Act 1959' kelika mu Ak|a hanya berkualkuasa padalahun 1966 17] Tunlutan balas delendan max amalang oleh had masa dan pemakavan doklnn ketewalan melampau (laches) ndak |erpaka\ kerana tuntulan hams defendan ada>ah berdasarkan xsu fmd. pempuan, replesentasl parsu dan pemalsuan. Masa unluk lrod lserrnlfla hanya selepas frod mkecahm Fmd hanya dsseaan selepas B 5 2015 Sehsyen 29 , Ana had Masa 1953 menyalakan - “ §m«on 29 Pasgganamam of I ugg an genud mcase at lraud ar rm§tgk§ Where ‘ in the case cl any action m wmch a varied 01 «mnanon Is presenbeu by Ims Act emer- 12:<:vt»Irn=mnzI1|s Lwmmuonxzmca ummm u C) the penod 0! hrmlauon shall not begin |a run unm the main!!! has msmereu me (rand 151 nnuaxan Hod men ac»-o< hanya maapau selepas snasatan Iamm mane: mm selepas peguamcava delendzn membual canzn IEIY ke alas saman penuh No 161 of I955 clan Saman PemuIa131 M1976 dl Mahkamah pada 8 S 2D\5 19] Juga, deiendan mak lahu segak hula xanah lelsebm dmvndah mum kepada ECHK . semnggalah selepas swasatan yang dwbual IaI|u selepas Dvsember 2013 Swasalan dsbual anamla Ierdapal permlnk m alas lanah lersebur menenma nous umuk keluar danpada peguamcala plamm 20] Tlndakan plndah mmk jugs le\ah bdak amemanu uleh ECHK an dalam Mesyuara| Agorvg alau membemahu ahlnrahln plamlvf alau penfludukrpenduduk DAPATAN DAN KEF TUSAN NIAHKAMAN w] Pxhak deiendan leiah memhangknkan wsu frud an dalam pembelaannya mahunun dv dalam hmahannya Hupahan dan 22»m..m..wms um.....mm V umvmumff mm kelerangan defarvdan hanya berganwng keuida dckumem dokumen yang ada. man ada saksl-Saks: Lflpanggvl umuk memben kelsnangan sscara lingsung mengenan perlakuan mm nleh nihak plamm. dukumen yang ads dan Pmak cxetanaan hanya menggunlkan memmm mletensl din nndalan semaia-mna lanua drsukong olah kelerangan yang Ia . 2] Mahkamah vm belselwu uangan hujahan Plamlll bahawa beban huku sdalnh mnecak dmahu delendan. hukannya sekadav msmbangkmn isu Iersebul dun mewaxakkan hshan kepafla ptamm unluk membuklikan ssnallknya. Dar] ketefangan saxsl-saksi delandan flan ma hupahan pegualrmya, Ayala kesemuanya msngulas flan msniukneralkan aksn kelemnhun segalu dokumen yang ada Hhak aenenam man rnenggunakan kesllapan dun kebmahan dnkumen lersebux umuk membuktikun bahawa sam arm Iahh mlakukan oleh mm pmnm . lm adalnh nyala ianya Imak manoukupi Imluk memhuklikan saw pevlakusn man man dxlakukan Apa yang ads as hadapan Mahkamah im ialah alega anomak detendan (erhadao pnaxrmc. Jugs amauakan perlakuan «ma tslah Makukan betsama oengan plhak berkuasa ilu delam uwsan pindah tanah. Magus» alau Iuduhan iuga Ielah dmuax temadao plamnl dengan msrujuk saman pemula yang d|faAIkan diMankamah. Namun lidak ada kelemngan snkmgan can pmak uecsman yang holeh memuaskan Mahkamah behawa cm Ialah benaku. mm mu 3) Pevkala Im lerah bevlaku berpuluh tahun dahulu Delendan memnangmkan rsu pevlntah yang drben uleh hakvm flan peguam MN Mcleod yang memeankan saman pemula Pnhak aevendan lelah menghuuahkan bahawa sum Ykalan Amanah bertankh 1935 Ielah mperorem dengan memzlsukan landalangan seorang yang bemama “Lvn sun“ yang mkalakan lelah menmggal duma pada lahun I935 Namun Ildak ada mkemukakan m Mankamah m» apa—apa kelerangan yang membuk|vI<an Lrm Svm le(ah memnggar dunla pada (ahun tevsebu| max aua kelerangan Ilsan mahupun ke(erangan dnkumemar Hanya delendan Oelah memangga so 5 yang dwkalakan cucu kepada Lvm Svm Namun $05 .uga lrdak dapat membuknkan bilakah Iankh sebenar Lvm Sun memngga\ dunla Sebailknya, mhak delendan (slab menggunakan afidavn sokongan yang dukrarkan men panama Vee K-m Kaw flan mg: Lee Poy Koon yang dllallkan uleh p\a|rm1 untuk menyokonq saman pemma 151 ul 1955 fevsebm Im ada\ah dokumen plalrml bukannya dari plhak dalendan Plainm xeran menghuuahkan kemungkman nu adalah merunakan salu kesllapan memandangkan saman pemma telssbut dxlallkan pads Iamm 1955 sedangkan “Lvn swr Isiah merwuggal dunla hamp1120lahun sebelumnya Mihkamah vm menenma huyahan plalrmf (ersebut memandangkan plhak aevenaan lelah max dapal rnembukllkan (ankh sebenar atau "um sm- Iersebul sememangnya Ielah memngganauma pad: («mm "M ""‘j"T~m"—»«xw:L=%—$' £ ’ A. PENDAHULUAN 1 Plamhl adslzh salu Persaluarv yang mxenan sebagir Persaluan Eng chm Muavy Jahnr dam memulikan gunman m. melalm negawal awamnya um Chocn Sang Setepas Inn duuyuk sebagm “ECHK‘ 2 Tefdapa| 37 guaman swul (elah dllznikan oleh mamm |emadap 37 dofendarv-defendzn yang merupakan penduduk—penduduk nanan yang dalam pen-wan my Gelan 91504: Lot Mm, Bandar Mahavam. Daerah Muar, Negeri Janor 3 Kapmusan Mahkamah dmam Undakan rm akan mengwkal 35 kes yang lam Kerana aavam salu nnuakan pramm |e\ah mendapal pengnamman Ingkar 4 mnnucan plamm Iemaaap deaenaan zdalah unluk vel|l—relfl benku|— a) Sam peuman supaya delendan dan /atau semua o1ang— orang yang menunlu| dmawahnya mxenenaak. keluav flan mznyevahkan rmllkan kosang pmms yang dvkenall sehagax 227 1-Ja\an Hassan,840|X1 Muer Jnhcr bj Ganmugw am dan/alau khus unluk dlxakslry cj Faedah y zzwzvtannmunzoxs Mnmmvszm: y uwmm Z was mvsehm sns sendm udak dapalmembukukannya Hanya aengan menganansa tiakumen dan xemumannya menemm kesdanan yang ads, pmak ueoenaan le\ah mengalakan bahawa saw lvod telan nilakukan oleh puamuc unluk mendapalkan pennlah malalui saman pemula nevsenuc. 41 Begim mg: dengan mm yang dnkaukan dllakukan oleh plalnul dllakukan pada lahun me, 1955 Gan 1977 yang kesemuanya nemangm dan kecanalan dokumen yang ada. Pinak defendan lelan memanggll saksidari Jabatan Karma \a||u sue umuk mensnlusahkan Sum lkavan Amanah dan sallnan sum: ikavan Amanah Iersebul. Kelemngan so a jugs max dapal membanlu Mahkamah ml unluk membual kepulusan banawalrod Ielah dilakukan men plamm. sna ielah dlmmla mengenax pemuaannya sahaja dan kelerangan so 5 Ielah mengesahkan Ievdapamya wldaan, pemomngan Gan tambahan msallnan Surat lkatan Amansh. Walau nagalmanapun‘ sue wan naak dmekalkan dengan sailnan yang asal umuk membual - finding” alau dapalan yang Iepal Di dalam keceangannya so a Ielah mengalxkan : ‘ Hawevev. my Imdinw has us Immanun as me examinalron wele based on phmowpiss‘ me original must be submitted for convirmauan. -‘ xzumx.-an mmms 'umumm ~T.m.mwu m 2.» Kelevangan SD13 Irll hukamah menunyukkan SDB Ielah msmbual sa|u uapalan yang kmklusw Jrks dapatan zeusebm Aidak konklusil. bagamanakah I/Iankamah W DOVE?! menerima ksxevangan bahawa salnnan Sum lkalan Amanah lersebul bukan aan Suva! Ikalan Amanah yang asal? ouen nu Mahkamnh um nerpemapau nanya bemssavkan nengan kelerangan sna yang ndak konklusn Mankamah im ndak boteh memuluskan bahawa salman Sulfll lkalan Amanah (ersebul Ielah mpalsukan dan Hod Ie\ah drlakukan oleh pihak plamlfl 51 Delendan juga menyavakan hehawa permuhonsn plalnm umuk melanlvk 7 many pemegang amanan baharu sebagax * pemegang amanah bag: persaluan uainuv " unluk mengganll an 7 orang pemegang amanan juga lelah dllskukan secsra had. In: memandangkan pmak plainm dxkalakan le\ah menyemhunylkan «am bahawa lanah fersebut adalah dipegang area pemegang amanah sebagai Tmslee mm su/vivoIsn1p' Mmul Mesyuarax Agang yang dlkemukakan dr dahm pemlohunan 1977 tevssbul max rnencnkupi nan lidak mengemukakan lakta sebenav. Oleh um aemnnan menghunahkan hahawa penmah Mahkamah Derlarikn 2v.2.1977 terseoul psrlu diketepikan ken-ma tanya dlperolem melaluv mm flan pempuan. mm e] Mahkamah inn telah mennlak akan hujahan de(endan unluk membatalkan Suva| lkalan Amanah Ielsehul , pennlah Mahkamah Kihun I955 dan psviniah Mahkamah camn 1977 kevana m dalam xumuxan bamsnya. uevenaan Vangsung Ildak memonon unluk semua dokumen nanu Surat lkaun Amanah. p:nmah—penmah Mahkaman Iersebm m baiankan alau dikelepikan, Juga lmak an pevmohonan dlhual aleh delendan paua lahun-Lshun sebelum uni un|uk pennnampennxan umuk mengexepman auau memhnlalkan dokumen emu pennlah» peuman xersebm, ouen nu Mahkamah Im max dapat msmperllmhangkan sesualu yang langsung ndak mpohon dan lidak mpuaxan didalam plmmgnya Mahkamah 1m max senalmnya member: penman avau penghaklman unluk sesualu yang Ildak pemah mponon oleh sasualu pmak. Tambahan pula jika Iidak mpmkan, ml mengemukaxan sesualu yang dnluar jangkaan kepada pthak yang lagi sslu can xexan menlmbulkan keudakaanan kepada pmak tersebul, ‘am plainul dl dalam kas mi. 71 Juga, msmanaangkan plhak Dedendan |elan udak memonan unmk rem-rem tersehul. Mahkamah ini berseluyu dengsn hujahan pnamm bahawa semua dokumen tersebul adalah maslh sah dan berkualkuasa. Tamhahan pula semua hujahan delenaan bevdasarkan «ma unouk mengehepikan flan membalalkan dokumen swaukanan Amanah dan penmah~ m.»..nz...s u.m...mm M.m.4mm r... 22 panman lersebm ada\a7\ mevupakan salu huphan yang man udak dlsoknng oleh apa—apa kelelangan men nu nmanan delendan yang memohon wuuem tensebm |e\ah hdak dapat umemmbangkan oxen Mahkamah m. 8] Mahkamah wm plga Ielah menolak kelerangan dan nu,anan delendan yang menyalakan ma aaalan pemmk lanah tersebm secava wansan den Mamm uanya merupakan pengums lanah telsebul Namun pmak delendan melauu. dokumerr dokumennya sendm mengakm bahawa plamm a-wan pemlllk Aanah Im men anmaa m dalam laporan pahs seovang yang bernama Mg mm Sang yang Ielah mempemkaman pevlanukan peguam nleh plhak plalnlll Juga‘ an dalam laperan polns Iersebul, Ng Km: Seng menyalakan " penyewarpenyewa lanah >am “ yang merujuk kepeda dmnya yang mewakm defendarr defendan yang <am D: sum dvpellk semula din laporan pulvs Ng Kim Seng m muka swat 127 (Ian 12:; Vkalan B yang menyatakan ‘ saya bersama penyewaagenyewa (anah m tapak telsebui mengukm arahan pemmk L-man, Eng Chuon Huay Kuan, Muar m«m.m...mzuu mMo<oo>- we V um-m<K\m_ mm Karm menuns sepucuk sum me\alu> PERSATUAN KETURUNAN ENG CHDON GONG sou JALAN BAKRL MUAR, salu pers.-«uan yang dnubuhkan khas unluk semua penyewa tanah yang levlmal ‘ Jelas mhak delendan mengakm bahawa meveka ada\ah penyewa aan plalnul ada\ah pemlhk Ianah Mengapakah barn sekavang meveka telah membangknkan Isu dan mengakm bahawa meveka adalah pemlhk lanah yang le¢ah mwansa dan nenek moyang mereka" 9} Mahkamah lelah merujuk kepada Seksyen 17(1) dan Seksyen IE(1)AkIa Kelerangan 1950 sepem yang dmuuk a\eh plhak mawnhi, dan Mahkamah berpendapal bahawa perunlukan dmawah keduaadua seksyen dlbawah Akla tersebur adalah levpakal Layman pans Ng Kvm Sang lelah menyalakan bahawa mereka adalah penyewa dan plalnnf ada\ah pemmk dan le1ah menunjukkan wznya merupakan Sam pengakuan mhak defendan mengenan status flan kedudukan mereka d1 (anah Aevsebut. Pvhak dedendan jugs Ildak menzflkan levdapatnya hukfl bayaran sewa lanah yang |Elah dIhua| u1eh mereka 1zNLvc»Iu'r: nms nM0<oo>~ UM mu xwz: vo] Hflak mpemkawkan man delevldanruelendan hahawa no1rs— nuns unluk keluav dvkcluarkan oxen peguam walnut lelah drlemna aleh mereka Oleh nu meteka max omen manankannya sekarang dan meveka |e\2h gagax alau enggan unluk keluav aan menyenahkan mmkan kosong bahaguan tanah yang mmmm oleh mereka 1:] Mankamah Im wga lelah menelm segalz keterzngan dalendan yang menyaiakzn bahawa meveka adalan pemdxk lznah yang dtwansx dan nenek moyang mereka Namun udak ada seurang pun dan mereka yang balen menunyukkau bahawa mereka peman mendapal smal kuasa menladbu unluk nananan mmk penemka asai Delendan menghuuahkan bahawa pada |ahurHahun yang bemanan, meveka \e1ah menyangkakan bahawa plaumfl hanyalah pemegang amanah aan Ak|a Probale and Admlnxslramn hanya belkualkuasa pada lahun 195:: Mahkamah menolak hujahan Im kerana penmah Mahkamah camm 1977 |elah mpewlehu melalul Mum Mesyuaval Agcng Persaluan tersebul. olen «nu ma benav mereka adalah perm mere!/.a sepammya mengambtl hnoakan hermula dan lahun tersebut aaitu iahun 1977 dan se1elah 17 lahun Akta telsebm berkualkuasa Alasan yang mengmakan Ildak ada keperman unmx bemual demnklan ketana udak ada Lanah pusaka lain setam darl eanan tersebut adslah salu alasan yanglldak mlcvcnsnun nlflli 1...m.umsm y un mnxwze v::r7§ ruunasrlbah dau udak wish on mna men Mahkauwah nn Perscman umbul dv svm. adakavu nanya delendan yang menaumm hahagxau «anan Ievsebut mempakan warns mnggal penemka «emanmnn Twdak adahah wans yang Yam sewn delendan yang juga hemak temadan harla pesaka pemnggalan nenek moyang masks” Delendan gagal membukukzrmya, den kelerzngan ddendan |elah 1-dak dapal memuaskzn Mahkamah um max ada Ketevangan Iangsung yang [mien menuruukkan hzhawa defendan adalah wan: Iunggal yang berhak mewansl hananah lersebut Oieh nu locus delendan un|uk membuzt |unIuLan . zdaLah dlragukan dan mpemkalkan Memandangkan lldak ada Iangsung ketevangan yang menyukoug‘ Mankaman berpendapal delendan tldzk mempunyax locus stand: un|uk menunwl bahawa Aanah leisebul aadalah nullknya Jugs, dais.-ndan max mempunyar locus stand: nnluk mempenahankan ksdudukannya an alas Lanah tevsebot Wa\aupun Mahkamah nu lelah mengamhll maklum bahawz perkala Im lelah bedamtan sakuan lama. dan kesemua saw Iallu pembual dokumen jugz «e<an menlnggal auma, namurv sekurang-kurangnya defendan mengemukakan Saks: alau keterangan yang boleh menyokong pemyalaznnya Pernbelaannya hanya bempa andalan semaca-maxa Andalan amuan bahawa ma mempunyax Vocus s1andI dan adalah wans zzuuuu ulanunznn um 0400043524-2 W um mm. Pay 1. kexaua Ielah Vama memelap ax lanah tense). nan anaaan bevlakunya vma den pempuan hanya bevdasavkau kecacman dokumen yang me 121 Juga‘ hdak dnphdkzn bahawa mereka zdalah waus sejak <anar. amen dan dvlamlkzn u. |anah Iersebul Tuntmarl halas marexa unluk keluanpunyaan lanah Detendan senam Ielah mengakul dx dalam plldmgnya bahzwa Surat Ikalan Amanah udak menyatakan smpakan benellslan dan max dapat aapasukan svapakan benanaan yang mnyavakan dalam Suva| lkaian Amanah Oleh ||u ‘ bagawmanakah pxhak defendan omen mengatakan bahawa mereka ada\an pewans harlanah |eIsebul7 13] Mahkamah mu ,uga telah meneuu keterangan delendan untuk memnluskan sama ada Ianah lersehnl dnpegang aleh plamm sebagax pemegang amanah hag! defendandefendan alau lldak Unluk mengwujudkan saw pegangan amanah, aelendan perm membukllkan uga keletapan yang penlmg lam: ketentuan perkalaan , kelentuan subyek dan ke|enluan oqex saka defendan , SD1 . Ielah gagal memben kérerangan mengena: sxapakah keluarga pemrllkauemllxk asa! yang dukacakan pembeln canan tersebm soc [Inga hdak dapal member! kepasuan berapakah mmlah bayalan yang Aelah dwbuat oteh sesebuahkeluarga Dan yang new. menank,SDHidak mrvusw ;m.»..m.s mooksnlc umou mun |ahu Derapa keluerga yang lclah mengumpu! Wang dan lmrsamasama member: «anan Iersehm 0\eh Ilu. lvmhm pe(sc-aban wanu sm m. clan kelualga yang mana flan berapa banyakkah sumnangan yang letah dlhen man keluarganya unluk mumhelllanah lelsehul sm mengakul hahawa ma lrdak aua ava—apa huklw unluk menumukkan keluarganya Ieiah membvn sumhangan uncuk memben Ianah |ersebuI 141 Pmak defendan rmya berganlung kepada perkauan " Iempal Eng Choon Gong Suo - yang lertelaknyn mmah asap dan uga man guaang, unluk memhuknkan cam Ielsehul adalah mmk mereka. Detenaan belgsmung kepada dakumen di muka swat I49 flan 150 lkalan B unluk menalikan Lanah tersebul adalah rmlik pllnnlfl. Small! flan dokumen tecsebul aetenaan Udak adn spa-spa dokumen yang lam yang dapal memuukllkannya dl Mankamah Inv. Beban pembubman adalah Ievlerak di bahu delendan, flan pelas elendan xevan gagal membukmuamyn 151 Kemmgan pihak delendan yang menyalakan sDs lelah tidak diserahkan nous -mm kem: alau telah Hank dnserahkan wm flan Penyala Tunluvan p{aIlIM Ierhadapnya mempakan saxu keterangan yang lldak benar. sD5 (elah diserahlxan wm aan Fenynla rumunm flan penghakiman ingkar Ielah mmasukkan zznnvcswwmunzvxs Lmmomtshcc V Immuxwxi mm Vevhadapnya Nyala an 5 lelah ndak bemakap benav dw Mahkamah wm Gan Pnnyala Tunlulau |s\ah mradkan m Mahkamah Sesyen Muar dan so 5 telah hdak haw! atau memlarlkan nous kehaduan menyebabkan pengnaman dlmasukkan lemadapnya Pengnamman lersebm unluk ma kaluav den menyerahkzn mlllkan kosong menus kepada plalnm Sehmgga km: pengnaxman mgxar |evsebu| maslh berkuaikuasa sns lndak ada rnengambrl mmam unluk mengelenikannya 16} Pmak dedendan |e\zh mempunyas peluang unluk memnukmxan Ieldapalnya (rod sepem yang dnplndkannya Delervdau man memanggnl pegawal darn Pe;aba| Fengarah Tanzh aan Galxan‘ Negen Juhor, |elapI hanya unluk mengemukakan dnkumen sahaja Pegawal levsebul langsunglidak dnanya unmk mendapalkan ke|erangan bahawa um |elah dulakukan Eagalmanakah petlakuan lrod Aasebuk terjadl alau anakukan men plamm saw Iersebut Vangsung udak dvkanya mengenal prosedur dan juga proses yang hdak dlpaluhl yang boleh dlkatakan fwd lelah dtlakukan 17] Mahkamah Inl le\ah menemm sahrlan Sufi! lkalan Amanah kerana salman Ietsebut Ielah chkeluavkan dan Pegabat Pengarah Tanah dan Gallan yang merupakan sallnan dan zmcvou mum 2...; warmxm: . uumnxw may a) K03 an e) Laxmam rem yang mana Mahkamah yang muna um mmkan perm din sual manlaa1 5 Plhak defendan memfaflkan luniulan balas — a) saw deklarasl bahawa kesemua delendan merupakan pemlhk befszma bag: lanah lersebu| , by Secava Varqm satu pznnteh supaya Pendaflar alau Peruadbw Tanah dan /alau Penna: Pengarah Tanah dan Gahan Juhor menaanarxan pemmkpemlluk Iersehux sebagal permluk bersama lanuh letsebut c) Secars anemam , salu pennlah supaya caveman dan kelumnan-kelurunannya dlbenarkan un|uk (ems mendudutu menus lersebut an alas (anah tetsehut ‘ a; saw mjuksx menghalang Mamul darlpada mengusaha‘ menjua{ mencagar‘ menggadax. memmdahmxllk alau membual sebarang umsan uanszksx tanah lewebul‘ ej Sam mjunksl mengnalang plamm darn meneruskan pengusahaan (anah lersehul ‘ mtzvcssmnnuuzuxs uucrmonswc w um um: um. sahnan Asa: Suml Ikalan /unanan yang maepasmn d: Pemha: Tanah can Gamsn lclsehm ouen nu Mankamah mennlak huyahan defendan yang menyalakan lumulan p:a:n::: hams dllolak kerana harlya mengguuakan salmzn dan salmzn asal aura: xkaxan Amanah Delendan sepalulnya mendapalkan kelelangan dan pegawal :ersenu: mengensv Isu mm sepem yang dlkalskannya Namun, aevenaan {angsung hdak menyoa: pegawa: |ersebn( dan dengan nu defendsn gage: membukhkan lerdapatnya find lelah anakukan dalam menyemaxan Sural Ikalan Amanah lersebul :3] so: hdak lahu rnengenal kaerangannya sendln sepen: a: dalam penyala szks1 mengena: pem:.:na:an a: Pqabai ranan melamw perupuan oxen p:a:n::: 5:3: unak aapa: mengawab saanan peguam plalnlll apanua ananya srapakah yang membua( pempuan so: senlxasa mengelak unluk meruawab seam dengan menga|aKan ma hanyalah senrang ':aymen“ Jlka uegnu, :n: beverl: ssgala kaerzngannya mengenal pelupuzn dan lmd yang dlkaiakannya Aelah dilakukan oieh Plamm Vzngsung max belaszs su: hanya membual maunan (anpa dcsnkong oleh apa—apa kelerangan yang Ian Alegas: atau pemyalaan fwd pevlu dubuklxkan dzngan lebwh lerperincl untuk menumukkan hahawa plalnlll Ielah me\akukan (rod dan sememangnya Ierhhal d: dalam penakuan lersebul n.m...:m.n:.u..s :m..m..m ll Iw:>uI4xw:'e man :91 mam lelah dnpal mevulzukllkan |un(u|annya ala; mmangan ><ebe:aHgkaI4arv hahawa pnmm admah pemmk lauah flan bevhak lJfl||AkII1E7IdEDa|lVllN<ar7 kcsnng nevenuamexan man dapal msmalahkan lurdulan pxamm karsehul Dan dengan lzlda darn alasan sepem yang dInya|akan d|a1as‘Mahk.amah (elah memben penghaknman sepem yang dlnyalakan a. cam penghakumzn kepada p\a\nlI( Tuntulan aalas delendarv telah dnlolak Delendan pew: membayat kas prwamg kepada plamm F KESIMPULAN 1 Tunlulan plalnul Ielah dlbenarkan kerana pmak delendan \elah gagafl memhuklrkan (evdapalnya non, pempuan dan represemzsx salah dflakukan oleh mamuv 2, Tunlulan bales delendan dnclak kevana semua permtah yang mpohon mak dlplsdkan u. dalaln pnmng dan defender: sendm um ada lows s1and\ urvtuk herbual demlklan ( DATUK WIRA H LIJAH sum ABBAS) Hakim Mahkamah Tlnggl Malaya Muar Tankh' 12 JUN 2:117 n|cvc6n.w\'-nunxlns Lmtnuuusznc 1 “mum. mm Peguam Cara Bag P ak Perayu TETUAN «.9. uuex a. PARTNERS Peguambexa & Peguamzzra No 44 Jalan KL 3/7 Taman Kola lakszmana Sek 3 7500 Meeaka (Ru; OKP/LlTl17lENG1ll) F-‘eguarncara Bag! Flhak Resgn-ten TEYUAN K.H. TAN & co. Peguamoelax. Peguamcar: No. 5-13. 1" Flour Jafsn Imamm 34000 muan mm (Ru; TKHlurl753I14lms| zm«v¢4«-lvnlwnzlus Lwmmusru. V LIMl'()>1KwlL um 0 Satin imunksl mengnalang plainm flaripadn menghaxau defeman daripsna Iansh lersehul dun mangambll ssbarang tmdakan unluk mamaksa aecenaan memhenkan millkln kosang premslersswl: g) Ganamg am danlalau ganlvrugv khas divakslr : m Secara ahevnaul, salu penman hahawa psmlhkan lanah Iscssbut didaflarkan gamma kepada Lim Kheng . Lim Sum, Ten Bonn Pwah, Luu Puay Smw, Les Hm Fang. Chew Eoey , Ng Len Sum, ran mam , Lau Hsv flan Um Thai Chung sehagai pemagang Imanah dengin kernenmnan rTr|slsas wm su~;vm-.~n.z); .) Kns; ]) Ssbarang rem lanjnl yang dianggan sesuau. s. sexalan penmaraan penuh man dnyalankan Mahkamah Kelan membenarkan lunlulan p\aAnm unluk prayev (5) dan m an kursong disenahkan dalam Iempch e (snamj bulan aan Iarlkh penghaklmsn. Tumman was deiendan Islah dilmak. Kas presiding FlM25.000.m lenakluk kepafla alokatur. 1z)<LVr«»xm‘a-mmxfi ummm.‘ H... E FAKTA KES sEcA3A RlNGKA§ 1 Pmax-pmax ne«sem,u kepaaa iakla-Iakla bankul 7 a) Persaluan Eng Chem, Muar‘ Johor (Eng cmmn Huay Kuan‘ Muar) adaluh sebuah perlubuhan yang drlubuhkan dz bawah Am Perlubuhan (996 dan mempunyax alamal Devdallamya .1. Jalan Mahararu‘ moon‘ Muar , Johor by Eng cmmn Huay Kuan Muar No Fenumman 249 adalah sekarang dudaflarkan sebagax pemmk berdaflar (anah yang dvpegang an hawah hak rnmk geran axsoa (dahulunya Granl s1sa; Lat not Bandar Mahararu, Daerah Muar, Negen Johor uanan levsebul) c) Yerdapat salu dokumen berlankh 23 31936 yang mengalakan bahawa Lxm Kheng , um sun Ten Bum: man, Lau Puay Slew. Lee Hui Peng, Chew Eoey . Ng Len Slm. Tan Thnam . Lau Her dan Llm Thav Chang lelah memegang lanih |evsebu\ sehagal pemegang-pemegang amanah 2 Tmdakan Im lelah mcankan cleh p\a<nlI! lemadap defendan kemna de1endan dikaiakan penyewa canunan premls yang drdwlkan dw zzm.I/Lsoxvrmunmws ;.m.m~sma V Iu4!unKWi[ alas sehahagxan |anah lelsebut paaa kadar sews lanunan sebanyak RMZEE 55 3 Dev-anaan man memecah |errna penyewaan‘ K-Nah gagal , enggan dan/atau man unluk membayar sewa vamman P\a|nlvl telah memben nuns umuk ueaenaan mengusongkan pvemls den member! mmkan kosong 4 Plamul rnemanggd seorang saxsu manakala delendan memanggil lapan ovang saksx Iswsu YANG DIBICARAKAN smexan pemicaraan diia\ankan_ Mahkamah Im le\ah memmuskan xsu-rsu yang dibxcarakan ada>an sepem benkul 1 Adakah pVaInlfl permlvk sebenar lanah lemebut alau cum: pemegang amanah hagx de1sndan7 2. sama ads (anah tersebm dvdaflarkan a|as nama ma-mu dengan menggunakan dnkumen yang «flak ham 3 Sauna ada delendan adalah permhk sebihagxsn (anah lersebul, rmsmc V Lmwuukwzz ’ ‘ a|au pembelv a|au penyewa7 4 Sama ada dokumen sum Ixacan Amanah benankn 23 31936 adalah san den same ada Ianya amen mkuackuasakan 5 Sama ada aevenuan mempunyaw locus stand: unluk membual lunlutan balas D KES DAN HUJANAN PIHAK-PIHAK a) Plamfl 11 Flamli! Ie\ah memanggu seorang saksA Kelerangan sans. watnlll um (SP1) mengenal memm plamm lelah max msangkau am» pmak aevenaan sm lelah mengavakan bahawa Persaluan Eng Chem. Muan Johm 4 Eng Chem Huay Kuan‘ Muarj juga mkenah sebagal Eng cnnon Hoe Kuan AssucIa|Inn_ Eng Choun Huay Kuan‘ Eng Chnon Hoe Kuan Muav alau Eng Chhun Hoe Kean alau Eng Choon Huay Kuan alau Eng Choon Wal Ken Muar alau Eng Onoon Huay Kuan Muar alau Persaluan Eng Choan, Muar, Johor Delendan leiah gagal mznyombalas SP1 flan kelerangan SP1 W dwznggap celan dmerima aleh aerenaan 22m/c ssmnmun ms 2] oevanaan man mangaku menerima ‘Nance lo Dull“ benankh 12.122013 lelapn «swan gagar menyevah rlullkan kosang premvs lavsshul. :1 Dslendan Ielah mengakuu pialnlit auauan man punya uevuavm «anan dan mereka pula aaaxan penyewa-penyewa nu mien didapau nan dukumen mereka sendin Iaim nan Surat yang msnjawab nous unluk keluar nan juga dalam laporan pans salsh semang deiendan belnama Eng Kxm Sang. Dldalam sum manqawab mm unluk kemav, pmak defendan (elan rnengatakanr ‘ Our Association. Fevsaxuan Kemrunan Eng Choon Gong Sun Ja\an Baku Muav, mnsrsllng 01 Ground Tenanls 0| (be above land whose names appear harem DEIUN man an dalam lapuran polis Ng Kim Sena -‘ Saya helsama penyewa-penyewa Ianah m lapak Iarsebut Islah menenms sural pengusaran (Evi ion Notice) daxipada peguam ,. ' dan salerusnya mengataksw» mnm.2nu-u>4c»mNs:.wc Y umnxwur p... u ‘Kaml memnen sepucuk sure! 1ne1a1u1 Persaluan Kexuvunan Eng Chuun Gong Sun, Jalan Bakn, Muav, saw pevsaluan yang dwuuuhkan knas unluk semua penyewa Ianan yang (er1\ba|, 41 Kmeiangan yang mengalakan defend:-1n adalah warns kspada psnawka flan sekavang menunlulunmk menaapal kemanpurvyaan \anan lidak uupnaxan. Apaapa ksnya|aan yang ndak mpunxan palm dnolak oleh Mahkamsh. Kelevaugan mangenm wans hanyn terdapal 111 dalam penysla saksn. 5} Tunlulan bales defendan Imak mbuklikan, devenuan gags! membukukan s1apa sebenamya Dsnefismrl, belapa sumbangan yang Ielah flibual dan bevapa banagian mereks. 6] Sural lkatan Amanan berlaxlkh 23.3.1966. rekod penshwa Eng Chnnn Huay Kuan. Mum, 1930 4995. smart pendaflar Fevsaluan, Jonor kepada Seuausaha Kerajaan Neged Jonnr. pennlah Mahkalnah Tmggl Muar benankn 13.12.1555 dan pennlah Mahkamah nngg. Muav neruam. 21 7.1977 (slab gagal dlcahar, niketeplkan dan dibaval. Oleh 1111 dokumen-dnkumen lersehul adaIah mssnh herkualkuasa dan kesahannya ndak mnafikan. Hanya mbangkilksn sekalang oleh sebab ilu, Deiendan terhalang oleh kelswatan yang mslsmpau (laches). zmcvcumnrm..n1a|s.uur:»mN§.v1n « Lvnrunxwn

Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-24-979-09/2016

PLAINTIF LEE HWA YANG DEFENDAN 1. YAHAYA BIN BUJANG 2. KHALID BIN HABIB 3. MOHD NOR BIN HASSAN

09/06/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=712f2141-3254-480c-a890-b7800e3ea278&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-979-09/2016 In the Matter of a Trust Deed dated 8/12/2002 and a Shareholders Agreement dated 8/12/2002 at the Shah Alam High Court in Selangor AND In the Matter of the Rules of Court 2012 AND In the Matter of S.60 of the TRUSTEE ACT 1949 AND In the Matter of the Trustees (Incorporation) Act 1952 BETWEEN 2 LEE HWA YANG PLAINTIFF AND 1. YAHAYA BIN BUJANG 2. KHALID BIN HABIB 3. MOHD NOR BIN HASSAN DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1 & Enclosure 25) A. BRIEF BACKGROUND [1] The present Originating Summons concerns a Trust Deed executed on 8.12.2002 (the said “Trust Deed”) between the Plaintiff and the three Defendants pertaining to ordinary shares of a company. [2] The three Defendants who were trustees had opted to breach their duties as holders of a trust under the Trust Deed, in the face of unambiguous, clear, and concise terms of the Trust Deed. 3 [3] As much as the three Defendants here attempt to muddy the waters with unnecessary convoluted narratives on facts, and even a supposition of fraud, it is patently obvious that this Court finds no necessity to delve and indulge in all these distractions and rightfully enforce and respect the party autonomy in entering into a Trust Deed, and the terms codified within it. [4] From the outset, this Court must emphasise that the terms of the trust deed and even the supporting document to the trust deed is sublimely clear that there is not even an inch of room for this Court to derail itself from what the parties had meant to be agreed, and in fact had already been codified into the trust deed. [5] The underlying facts of the present Originating Summon is verily simple. The Plaintiff (“Beneficiary”) had under trust deed dated 8.12.2002 (“said Trust Deed”) agreed to put his shareholdings in Syarikat Sujaman Sdn Bhd (“Company”), on trust to the holding of the three Defendants. In view of the said Trust Deed, a shareholders’ agreement was entered into between the three Defendants and Lee 4 Wah Lian on the same date of the said Trust Deed to give effect to the said Trust Deed (“said Shareholders’ Agreement”). [5] The terms of the said Trust Deed is simple, logical, easy to understand, and leaves very little room for extrinsic interpretation beyond the four corners of the said Trust Deed. The salient terms of the Trust Deed entails as follows: i. In clear and capital letters, the Defendants holds the Plaintiffs’ shares on trust to the benefit of the Plaintiff (Preamble and paragraph (i) of the said Trust Deed); ii. It was agreed, admitted, acknowledged that the Defendants had not furnished even a single cent’s worth of consideration for the shares and this agreement, admission and acknowledgment holds true notwithstanding anything stated in any other documents (Clause B of the said Trust Deed); and iii. Whenever it is required or recalled, at the request of the Plaintiff, the Defendants are contractually required to expend 5 every single effort and necessities to ensure that the shares are transferred or re-transferred back to the Plaintiff (paragraph (ii) of the said Trust Deed) [6] In line and in compliance with the said Trust Deed, there was never any evidence tendered by any/all the Defendants to prove that any consideration was ever paid to the Plaintiff, which adds further weight to the probability that the Defendants unequivocally hold the shares on trust for the benefit of the Plaintiff. [7] The Plaintiff filed the present Originating Summons to vitiate the said Trust Deed and have the shares returned to his legal ownership considering that the trustees have in total breach of the said Trust Deed, refused to adhere to the terms they themselves have agreed and return the shares at the request of the Plaintiff. Owing to the same breach, the Plaintiff has rightfully lodged a police report against the Defendants. B. THE RULES OF CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION DOES NOT AID THE DEFENDANTS’ CASES 6 [8] There is no doubt in the Court’s comprehension and understanding that a trust deed is a contract and the same rules of interpretation of contract should apply. This Court has no intention to contradict this time-celebrated principle of law. Nonetheless, under the scrutiny and application of the same contractual interpretative rules, it is more probable than not that the parties have all mutually and unequivocally agreed that the shares were to be held on trust. [9] This Court is minded of the barrage of cases which have decided that a trust deed is a contract which were submitted by the Defendants. (See CIMB Bank Bhd v Maybank Trustees Bhd and other appeals [2014] 3 MLJ 169; Pavilion Yields Sdn Bhd v Universal Trustee (Malaysia) Berhad & Ors [2016] MLJU 1389). Nonetheless, even having said that the said Trust Deed is a contract, it gleaned from the rules of interpretation of contracts that none of the rules would lend any support or credence to the Defendants’ cases. In fact, the rules of interpretation of contracts lend more credibility and probability to the Plaintiff’s case. 7 [10] By and large the counsel for the Defendants has furnished two trite principles in interpretation of contracts: iv. That the Court ought to consider the surrounding facts and circumstances of the said Trust Deed. Here the Defendants’ counsel had referred to numerous decisions from the Courts of Common Law (see Prenn v Simmons [1971] 1 WLR ; Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 ; Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896) as well as a Federal Court decision of our jurisdiction in SPM Membrane Switch Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2016] 1MLJ 464; v. That the Court ought to look at the subsequent conduct of parties after the culmination of the said Trust Deed. Again the Defendants’ counsel had referred to numerous decisions from the Courts of Common Law (see Schuler (L.) A. G. v Wickam Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235 ; AG Securities v Vauhan [1990] 1 AC 417) as well as a case from our jurisdiction in Kedah Cement Sdn Bhd v Masjaya trading Sdn Bhd [2007] 3 MLJ 597. 8 [11] Nonetheless, just these mere two rules of interpretation are not even close to cover the entire breadth of the trite rules of interpretation of contracts. The Defendants’ counsel has undoubtedly skipped and omitted an equally commanding and celebrated rule of interpretation which is a precursor or the first hurdle before the other two principles above even come into relevance. It is the most fundamental rule of interpretation of contracts that the Courts ought not to interfere with the terms of a contract, when the terms of a contract are sufficiently clear and unambiguous. And indeed the clauses that the Defendants are attempting to vary in interpretation is sublimely clear and leaving no room at all for any addition or subtraction of intent or meaning. [12] The rule of interpretation in cases of clear and unambiguous terms had already been clearly set out in the landmark decision in the case of Brett Andrew Macnamera v Kam Lee Kuan [2008] 7 CLJ 450: “When the words used were clear and unambiguous it was not the court’s business to go behind those written terms or read new terms to it. There was not the slightest doubt about the intention of the parties. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were very 9 conscious of the fact about the ownership of the property which was purchased on the very same day of the execution of the trust deed, and both knew their relative positions, one being the trustee and the other the beneficiary of the trust” [13] Directly applying the same excerpt above, the terms of the said Trust Deed was supremely clear. The clauses clearly spell out that the Defendants shall hold the shares in trust to the benefit of the Plaintiff. The parties are very well aware and conscious of their intended positions and in fact the said Shareholders’ Agreement was entered into the very same day the said Trust Deed was executed. [14] Lim Beng Choon J in the case of The Royal Selangor Golf Club v Anglo-Oriental (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 995 has brilliantly digested the plethora of authorities that have upheld the same pinnacle rule of interpretation of contracts. It is clear from the following excerpt that the first hurdle before any consideration could be paid to the factual matrix surrounding the contract, the Court must first identify if the wordings of the contract are clear or otherwise. If they are clear, then the Court ought not go beyond those wordings: 10 “In considering the dispute of the parties, I must first of all bear in mind the general principles of construction of contract as enunciated in National Coal Board v Neill (William) & Son Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 555 where it is said at p 560: The first two issues involve the construction of the contract. I bear in mind the principles of construing a contact. The relevant ones for the purpose of this case are: (1) construction of a contract is a question of law; (2) where the contract is in writing the intention of the parties must be found within the four walls of the contractual documents; it is not legitimate to have regard to extrinsic evidence (there is, of course, no such evidence in this case); (3) a contract must be construed as at the date it was made: it is not legitimate to construe it in the light of what happened years or even days later; (4) the contract must be construed as a whole, and also, so far as practicable, to give effect to every part of it. In Central Bank of India v Hartford Fire Insurance Co Ltd AIR 1965 SC 1288, the Supreme Court of India lays stress on the second 11 principle advocated in the Neill & Son Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 555 case when it says at p 1290: Now it is common place that it is the court's duty to give effect to the bargain of the parties according to their intention and when that bargain is in writing the intention is to be looked for in the words used unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If those words are clear, there is very little that the court has to do. The court must give effect to the plain meaning of the words however much it may dislike the result. [15] The first wisdom and guidance that can be extrapolated from the excerpt above is that if the terms of the contract is clear, then it is not lawful to construe the contract based on whatever that may have transpired “years or even days later” from the contract. [16] The second wisdom and guidance is that if the words of the contract is clear, there is very little for the Court has to do or can do to derogate or derail itself from the clear terms of the contract. It is 12 incumbent upon the Court to enforce the word of the contract to its plain meaning notwithstanding the sentiments of the parties of the contract. [17] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the terms of the said Trust Deed is ultimately clear, vivid, and unambiguous. There is no room or necessity for this Court to be overtly vigilant to scrutinize any extrinsic facts outside of the said Trust Deed when the terms of the trust deed is clearly identifiable, understandable, sensible and logical. [18] For the sake of completeness, even if this Court were too look at the factual matrix of the case, and even the subsequent events following the said Trust Deed, there were no evidence or facts which were put forth to Court which would indicate that the Plaintiff intends to relinquish the trust or his beneficial ownership. It is pertinent to highlight here that whatever arrangement, communication and understanding (leading up to the said Trust Deed) which was deposed by the Defendants in their affidavits were sheer bare assertions with glaring absence of any exhibit evidence to support the Defendants’ cases. 13 [19] In fact, the only subsequent events which were put forth by the Defendants are mere evidence of businesses which the company has obtained. None of these evidences evinced any intention of the Plaintiff to relinquish the trust and surrender his beneficial ownership over the shares. On the same note, none of these facts and evidences ever evinced any intention of the parties to have the profits of the Company to be considered as consideration paid for the shares held by the Defendants. There is simply no evidence, no contemporaneous documents to indicate these averments. [20] Clearly the Defendants’ case by and large is heavily reliant on bare assertion of facts, mere presumptions and baseless inferences. There is no feasible nexus that can be drawn between mere statements of business and profits with the intent to relinquish the trust and beneficial ownership over the shares. [21] It is opportune for this Court to discuss the sheer fact that the Defendants themselves have ultimately either failed to or willingly withheld material evidence to prove the payment of consideration of RM840,003.00 for the supposed purchase of the shares. Here, the 14 Defendants have attempted to prove that the Plaintiff had intended to derail himself from the terms of the said Trust Deed in accepting the alleged sum. [22] Nonetheless, even after repeated challenges by the Plaintiff, and after the string of affidavits the Defendants have affirmed and filed, the Defendants have consistently failed or willingly withheld any evidence to prove the payment of this alleged consideration. Clearly the proof of the payment of this alleged consideration is utterly material to the case and if the Defendants are attempting to prove such payment, it is incumbent upon the Defendants to prove the same, in line with Section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950. But this is exactly what the Defendants have failed to do. Thus, it is only appropriate for this Court to draw an adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act 1950 against the Defendants for failing or willingly withheld such material evidence. (see also Juahir bin Sadikon v Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Johor [1996] 3 MLJ 627) 15 C. MISCELLANEOUS [23] Just as a side note, this Court would like to comment on the Defendants’ supposed allegation on the illegality of the said Trust Deed. Clearly from the outset, this Court ought not to delve into such facts when the terms of the Trust Deed are already clear and unambiguous. [24] But it is interesting to this Court that the Defendants would take this trajectory in attempting to defeat the Trust Deed when the Defendants themselves are clearly complicit to the same alleged illegality that the Defendants are pressing against the Plaintiff. [25] It is a classic case of the pot calling the kettle black. Now, if the Defendants should contend that the Court ought not to assist the Plaintiff for being complicit in an illegal contract, the same contention would work against the Defendants for consciously entering into, benefiting and profiting from the same alleged illegal contract. It is then incumbent for the Court to ensure that no parties shall retain any benefits from the alleged illegal contract. 16 [26] Nonetheless, it is utterly unnecessary for this Court to delve deeply (or at all) into this issue when the true nature of the present Originating Summons is simply for a breach of contract (said Trust Deed) which terms are completely clear and unambiguous. The supposition of fraud here is merely an attempt by the Defendants to inflate the issues to be bigger than they really are. It is verily proper for the present case to be determined via an Originating Summons. D. DECISION ON ENCLOSURE 1 [27] Having all of the above findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons be allowed. Consequently this Court grants order-in-terms to the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons. [28] In view of clause B (ii) of the Trust Deed, this Court also further orders that there will be no order as to costs in respect of Enclosure 1. 17 E. GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT IN RESPECT OF ENCLOSURE 25 [29] Prior to the disposal of the substantive application in Enclosure 1, this Court had dismissed the Defendants’ application in Enclosure 25 on 6.6.2017 with costs of RM 5000.00 to the Plaintiff. [30] Enclosure 25 is the Defendants’ application filed pursuant to Order 28 rule 4(3), Order 28 rule 4(4) of the Rule of Court, 2012 read with Order 38 rule 2(2) of the Rules of Court, 2012 seeking for an order that the Plaintiff be cross examined on all his affidavits sworn by him namely the: (i) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support affirmed on 19th September 2016 [Enclosure 2]; (ii) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the 1st Defendant’s Affidavit affirmed on 31st October 2016 [Enclosure 7]; (iii) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the 2nd Defendant’s Affidavit affirmed on 31st October 2016 [Enclosure 8]; 18 (iv) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the 3rd Defendant’s Affidavit affirmed on 31st October 2016 [Enclosure 9]; (v) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the 1st Defendant’s 2nd Affidavit affirmed on 18th November 2016 [Enclosure 13]; (vi) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the 2nd Defendant’s 2nd Affidavit affirmed on 18th November 2016 [Enclosure 14]; (vii) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the 3rd Defendant’s 2nd Affidavit affirmed on 18th November 2016 [Enclosure 15]; (viii) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the Defendants’ 3rd Affidavit affirmed on 8th December 2016; and (ix) Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Reply to the Defendants’ 4the Affidavit affirmed on 30th December 2016 [Enclosure 23]; F. THE LAW ON APPLICATION TO CROSS EXAMINE OF DEPONENT UNDER ORDER 38 RULE 2(2) OF THE RULES OF COURT 2012 (ROC 2012) 19 [31] The law and the principle relating to an application for cross- examination of a deponent are trite and well settled. It is trite law that where in any matter or cause which had been begun by Originating Summons and in such proceedings, on the application by any party the Court has discretionary power to order or to compel a deponent of an affidavit to attend court for cross-examination on his/her affidavit. [32] The Court’s wide discretionary power to summon attendance of a deponent to be cross-examined is clearly stipulated under Order 38 Rule 2(2) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012) which reads; “ In any cause or matter begun by originating summons and on any application made by notice of application, evidence shall be given by affidavit unless in the case of any such cause, matter or application any provision of these Rules otherwise provides or the Court otherwise directs, but the court may, on the application of any party, order the attendance for cross examination of the person making any such affidavit, and where, after such an order has been made, the person in question does not attend, his affidavit 20 shall not be used as evidence without the leave of the Court.” [33] While this Court recognizes the conferment of such general and unlimited power under Order 38 Rule 2(2) of the ROC 2012, this Court also acknowledges that this discretionary power must be judiciously exercised with due regard to the principle of law and authorities binding on it. Thus it would be apt for this Court at this juncture to address and digest the cases which were brought to this Court’s attention by both solicitors of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant in light of this discretionary power. i. In Tetuan Kumar Jaspal Quah & Aishah (suing as a firm) v The Co-Operative Central Bank Ltd [2007] 4 MLJ 638, it was held in paragraph [25] that there are three prime considerations which would influence the Court in the exercise of its discretion to allow or disallow cross-examination on affidavits, namely:- i) the truth of the averment in the affidavit must be challenged or the issues of fact identified. 21 ii) cross-examination would only be allowed if the disputed fact is relevant to the issue to be decided and must be limited to that issue only; and iii) cross-examination would not advance the cause of justice and should be refused if there is sufficient affidavit evidence or contemporaneous documents to enable the court to property decide without the need of cross-examination. ii. In Regional Centre for Arbitration v Ooi Beng Choo & Anor [1998] 2 MLJ 383, it was held at page 391 that:- “It is settled law that the court retains an absolute discretion whether or not to allow to cross-examine a deponent on his affidavit. Generally, cross- examination will not be allowed unless there is a 22 question of fact to be tried which requires viva voce testimony tested by cross-examination (see Arab- Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd v City Properties Sdn Bhd [1992] 4 CLJ 2123), or where there are ‘special circumstances’” Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 542; [1942] Ch 304. In the sphere of judicial review proceedings, it is matter for the discretion of the court; it should not be allowed except where the court believes that it is necessary in order that justice may be done between the parties (per Lord Denning MR in George v Secretary of State for Environment & Anor (1979) 38 P & CR 609…” iii. In Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189, Salleh Abas FJ in considering whether to exercise his discretion as regards the respondent’s application for cross-examination at page 190 had stated this: “It is necessary for me to see how the proposed cross-examination would be relevant to the issue in 23 the appellant’s application. An examination of this issue is therefore essential…” iv. In Emporium Jaya (Bentong) Sdn Bhd v Emporium Jaya (Jerantut) Sdn Bhd (No. 2) [2002] 5 MLJ 675, Ramly Ali J (as he then was) stated at page 685 C-D:- “In order to enable me to exercise my judicial discretion as regards the present application made by the applicants in the present case, it is necessary for me to see how the proposed cross-examination would be relevant to the issue in the petition. An examination of this issue is therefore essential in order to enable me to determine whether the applications are made ‘without just cause, or motivated by desire to delay proceedings or without bona fide or sham or vexatious.” v. In Indrani a/p Rajaratnam & Ors v Fairview Schools Bhd [2001] 4 MLJ 56, the Court of Appeal held inter-alia: 24 (1) (Per Siti Norma Yaakob, NH Chan JJCA and KC Vohrah J concurring) As to whether the dismissal of the appellants' oral application fell within the ambit of ss 67(1) and 68 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 so as to be a judgment or order which was appealable, the instant case was concerned with a substantive application under O 38 r 2(3) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 ('the RHC'). The lack of formal application here which the parties were prepared to do away with due to a constraint of time did not change the character of the application. As such, when the judge decided that the petition could proceed without the necessity of cross- examining any deponent, he had made an order on a substantive application for which a dissatisfied party could appeal (see pp 60H, 61D-E); Re Products Ltd [1985] 1 NZLR 710 distinguished. 25 (2) (Per Siti Norma Yaakob JCA, KC Vohrah J concurring) The grant or refusal of an application under O 38 r 2(3) of the RHC was very much an exercise of a judge's power of discretion and the question which had to be determined was whether the judge had exercised his discretion judicially. He had taken into consideration that the appellants had never identified the issues for which they maintained cross-examination had become necessary, nor had they shown that the factual disputes which they alleged were raised by the respondents' affidavits were relevant to their petition to warrant cross-examination. The judge had also taken into consideration the appellants' delay in making the application to cross-examine. Under these circumstances, the trial judge had not erred in law or in principle when he exercised his discretion, as he had put his mind to 26 relevant considerations in deciding as he did (see pp 61F-I, 62A, C). (3) (Per KC Vohrah J, Siti Norma Yaakob JCA concurring) It was important to take into account all factors when considering an application for cross-examination and if it has little relevance or little weight to the issue which the judge has to decide, then cross-examination should not be permitted (see p 64B); Comet Products v Hawkex Plastics [1971] 1 All ER 1145 (folld) and Leisure & Allied Industries Pty Ltd v Udaria Sdn Bhd [1980] 1 MLJ 189 (folld) followed. The judge below had certainly considered the issue of relevancy. He was mindful that although the petition was grounded under s 218 of the Act, yet counsel for the petitioners had argued that cross-examination was necessary because the basis of the petition was not only mismanagement of the affairs of https://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.11161023178603158&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25109011358&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23GB%23ALLER%23vol%251%25sel1%251971%25page%251145%25year%251971%25sel2%251%25 https://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.11161023178603158&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25109011358&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23GB%23ALLER%23vol%251%25sel1%251971%25page%251145%25year%251971%25sel2%251%25 https://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.637232566522607&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25109011358&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23vol%251%25sel1%251980%25page%25189%25year%251980%25sel2%251%25 27 the company, which fell under s 218 of the Act, but also oppression of minority rights, which fell under a different provision, s 181 of the Act. Quite clearly, the bringing in of the ground of oppression of minority rights under s 181 of the Act was completely irrelevant (see pp 64H-65A). vi. In Wako Merchant Bank (Singapore) Ltd v Lim Lean Heng [2003] 5 MLJ 56), Abdul Aziz J (as he then was) held inter alia: “It is, therefore, not true in every case that the court is equipped to deal with conflicts in affidavit evidence without resort to cross-examination. Where it is necessary to come to a determination of the matter that is the subject of a conflict of affidavit evidence and it is not possible to reject the evidence of one side for any of the stated reasons, the court is not equipped to deal with the conflict without resort to cross-examination.” 28 [34] The Plaintiff had objected to the Defendant’s application on the ground that there are no merits in the Defendant’s application. G. THE DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT [35] The Defendant’s application to cross-examine Lee Hwa Yang (LHY – the Plaintiff) was grounded on the following arguments: (i) There is a clear conflict of evidence in the Plaintiff’s Affidavits and Defendant’s Affidavits. (ii) The purpose of the cross-examination of Lee Hwa Yang, the Plaintiff, would be directed towards challenging his pleaded claim that the Trust Deed accurately represents the understanding between the parties. (iii) The matters in dispute are relevant to the Originating Summons and warrant cross-examination to determine the veracity of the averments and/or allegations contained in the Plaintiff’s Affidavits as the Defendants have credibly challenged the same in the Defendant’s Affidavits. 29 (iv) It is in the interest of justice to permit cross examination of the Plaintiff so as to assist the Court in determining the matters in dispute. H. THERE IS NO NECESSITY TO CROSS-EXAMINE LHY TO DETERMINE THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS [36] This Court is very much guided by the principles laid down by numerous decided authorities on the exercise of court’s power under Order 38 of the ROC 2012. [37] In the present case, for this Court to determine whether the cross examination of LHY is necessary to enable this Court to make its finding on the issues raised, this Court needs only to refer to the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff in his Enclosure 1. On the premise of the Trust Deed, the Plaintiff being the beneficiary of the Trust Deed, sought for an order from this Court pursuant to section 60 of the Trustees Act 1949 (TA) that the Trust Deed be revoked and the shares held by the Defendants be transferred to the Plaintiff. 30 [38] Section 60 of the TA provides as follows: Persons entitled to apply for orders 60. (1) An order under this Act for the appointment of a new trustee or concerning any interest in land, stock, or thing in action subject to a trust may be made on the application of any person beneficially interested in the land, stock, or thing in action, whether under disability or not, or on the application of any person duly appointed trustee thereof. (2) An order under this Act concerning any interest in land, stock, or thing in action subject to a charge may be made on the application of any person beneficially interested in the property charged, whether under disability or not, or of any person interested in the money secured by the charge. [39] Having considered the Defendants’ application and the grounds supporting the application, this Court opines that in this present case there was no necessity at all to call LHY to be cross examined. The affidavits filed by the Plaintiff and the Defendants relevant to the case 31 are ample and sufficient to enable this Court to decide and determine the issues raised. [40] This Court also opines that the arguments/grounds raised by the Defendants in support of their application to cross examine LYH were baseless and of no merits. [41] Based on the reasons mentioned above, this Court had dismissed Enclosure 25 with costs of RM5000.00 to the Plaintiff. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judge High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 09th June, 2017 32 For the Plaintiff - Messrs B.Espran & Nor Karlidaa Mr. K. Periasamy For the Defendant - Messrs Dorairaj, Low & Teh Ms. Annete Rachel Edwin Mr. Robert Lazar Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co Ms. Lai Wai Fong

Tika 2.6.0

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42(S)-81-06/2014&42(S)-86-07/2014

PENDAKWARAYATPR Pn Rullizah bt. Hj Abdul Majid & En Khairul Fikrie Ahmad Zubaid [Jabatan Peguam Negara Kuala Lumpur] PERAYU En. Mohd Daud Leong En Devanandan S. Subramaniam En Haresh Mahadevan En Ramzani Idris [Tetuan Mohd Daud Leong & Co)

31/05/2017

YA DATO' PADUKA HJ AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH

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1 DI DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR DI DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN JENAYAH) RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42(S)-81-06/2014&42(S)-86-07/2014 [Dalam Perkara Mahkamah Sesyen Jenayah (3) Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur] [Perbicaran Kes Tangkap: No:3-62-768-2010, 3-62-[585 hingga 628]-2010, 3-62-[674 hingga 675]-2011 & 3-62A-291-2011, 3-62-[629-767]-2010, 3-62[2040-2051]-2010, 3-62-[676 hingga 677]-2010 & 3-62A-290-2011, 3-62A-289-2011 & 3-63-[804 hingga 805]-2011] ANTARA 1. LEONG GUAN YEW [NO. KP. 670720-08-6299] 2. LIM YONG YEW [NO. KP. 711207-10-5725] LAWAN PENDAKWARAYA ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN PENDAHULUAN [1] Perayu Pertama [T1] dan Perayu Kedua [T2] dan Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing sebagai Tertuduh Ketiga [T3] telah dihadapkan ke Mahkamah Sesyen Kuala Lumpur. Ketiga-tiga mereka telah didapati bersalah. Namun hanya T1 dan T2 yang merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi ini atas sabitan dan hukuman, manakala T3 tidak merayu. 2 [2] Mahkamah Tinggi setelah meneliti keseluruhan rekod rayuan dan hujahan bertulis dan lisan pihak-pihak telah memutuskan menolak rayuan ke atas sabitan terhadap T1 dan T2. Manakala membenarkan sebahagian rayuan atas hukuman ke atas T1 dan T2. [3] Pihak pendakwaan tidak berpuas hati atas hukuman yang dibenarkan sebahagian dan pihak T1 dan T2 tidak berpuas hati ke atas sabitan dan hukuman. [4] Dengan itu penumpuan alasan penghakiman ini ditulis atas rayuan sabitan oleh T1 dan T2 dan alasan penghakiman ke atas hukuman rayuan oleh T1, T2 dan pendakwaan. PERTUDUHAN DAN HUKUMAN DI MAHKAMAH SESYEN. [5] T1, T2 dan T3 dituduh dan disabitkan bersalah di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan 9 pertuduhan di bawah s. 25(1) BAFIA. [6] T1 juga dituduh dan disabitkan dengan 130 pertuduhan di bawah kesalahan s. 4(1) Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 [AMLATFA]. [7] T2 juga dituduh dan disabitkan dengan 472 pertuduhan di bawah s. 4(1) yang sama. [8] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen [HMS] telah memutuskan pada 11.06.2014 kesemua tertuduh T1, T2 dan T3 didapati bersalah ke atas kesemua pertuduhan. 3 [9] Hukuman oleh HMS adalah seperti berikut: a) T3 (Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing) Kesalahan BAFIA Pertuduhan 1 – 9; Denda RM20,000.00 bagi setiap pertuduhan. b) T1 (Leong Guan Yew) Kesalahan BAFIA Pertuduhan 1- 9; 1 tahun penjara dan denda RM20,000.00 gagal membayarnya dipenjara 2 bulan bagi setiap pertuduhan. Hukuman berjalan serentak. Kesalahan AMLATFA Pertuduhan 1-130 1 tahun penjara bagi setiap pertuduhan. Hukuman kesalahan AMLATFA hendaklah berjalan serentak. Manakala hukuman di bawah BAFIA dan AMLATFA berjalan secara berasingan. c) T2 (Lim Yong Yew) Kesalahan BAFIA Pertuduhan 1- 9; 6 tahun penjara dan denda RM20,000.00 gagal membayarnya dipenjara 2 bulan bagi setiap pertuduhan. Hukuman berjalan serentak. Kesalahan AMLATFA Pertuduhan 1- 472; 4 tahun penjara bagi setiap pertuduhan dan denda RM3,000.00 gagal membayarnya dipenjara 1 bulan penjara bagi setiap pertuduhan. Hukuman kesalahan AMLATFA hendaklah berjalan serentak. Manakala hukuman dibawah BAFIA dan AMLATFA berjalan secara berasingan. 4 [10] Atas sabitan dan hukuman tersebut T1 dan T2 tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen seterusnya telah memfailkan rayuan. FAKTA KES [11] Leong Guan Yeu (T1) dan Lim Long Yew (T2) merupakan pengarah kepada Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn Bhd (T3). Perniagaan “customer base” mereka melibatkan perniagaan seramik di mana di dalam perniagaan mereka, mereka akan mempengaruhi pelabur- pelabur untuk melabur di dalam perniagaan mereka dan akan mendapat keuntungan dari pelaburan tersebut. [12] Perkara menarik di dalam pelaburan mereka adalah pelabur- pelabur dijanjikan dengan Sell Back Programme. Untuk program ini, pelabur akan membayar RM155.00 sebagai bayaran pendaftaran. Kemudian Pelabur akan ditawarkan dengan 3 pakej utama; a) Pakej pertama adalah bayaran RM900.00 dan akan menerima 2 cek bernilai RM500.00 setiap satu. b) Pakej kedua adalah bayaran RM1,800.00 dan akan menerima 2 cek bernilai RM1000.00 setiap satu. c) Pakej ketiga adalah bayaran RM3,800.00 dan akan menerima 3 cek bernilai RM1,500.00 setiap satu. [13] Pelabur kemudiannya akan memilih satu pakej dan selepas bayaran dibuat, mereka akan diberi pilihan untuk menerima seramik atau menjual semula seramik tersebut seperti dijanjikan di dalam pakej-pakej yang telah dipilih. Program ini dinamakan sebagai Sell Back Program. 5 [14] Kebanyakan pelabur akan memilih untuk menjual semula dan program ini melibatkan ramai pelabur dan pelanggan. Pada mulanya pejabat mereka adalah di Taman Connaught Cheras dan kemudiannya berpindah ke pejabat yang lebih besar di Excella Business Park, Ampang Hilir. [15] Perniagaan mereka berkembang dan akhirnya mendapat perhatian Bank Negara Malaysia. Selepas disemak, syarikat ini tidak mempunyai lesen untuk menerima deposit. PERTUDUHAN-PERTUDUHAN. [16] Leong Guan Yeu adalah Tertuduh Pertama( T1), Lim Long Yew adalah Tertuduh Kedua (T2) dan Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. (T3) telah masing-masing dituduh sebanyak 9 perutuduhan di bawah s.25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-institusi Kewangan 1989 (BAFIA). T1 juga menghadapi 130 pertuduhan di bawah s. 4(1) Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram dan Anti Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 (AMLATFA) manakala T2 menghadapi 472 pertuduhan di bawah provision yang sama. [17] 9 pertuduhan di bawah s. 25(1) BAFIA (kesalahan BAFIA) ialah seperti berikut: Pertuduhan Pertama: “Bahawa kamu, pada 15 Mei 2008 di Malayan Banking Berhad, Cawangan Wisma Lee Kay Huan, Lot 14408, Jalan Genting Kelang, 53200 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM900.00 daripada Harilasikin bt. Othman (780613-01-5484) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta 6 Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Kedua: “Bahawa kamu, pada 10 Julai 2008 di No. 231-1, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM900.00 daripada Abdullaj bin Tahar (No. K.P. 760825-05-5199) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Insitusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Ketiga: “Bahawa kamu, pada 19 September 2008 di CIMB Bank Berhad, Cawangan Taman Connaught, 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM3800.00 daripada Mohd Aizat bin Abd Rahman (No. K.P. 861007-56-5253) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi 7 Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Keempat: “Bahawa kamu, pada 16 September 2008 d CIMB Bank Berhad, Cawangan Taman Connaught, 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM3800.00 daripada Sianie binti Patrick (No. K.P. 820409-12- 5380) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Kelima: “Bahawa kamu, pada 16 September 2008 di CIMB Bank Berhad, Cawangan Taman Connaught, 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, 56000 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM900.00 daripada Yayin bin Kimsim (No. K.P. 820409-12- 5380) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah 8 subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Keenam: “Bahawa kamu, pada 10 September 2008, di Malayan Banking Berhad, Cawangan Wisma Lee Kay Huan, Lot 14408, Jalan Genting Kelang, 53200 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM900.00 daripada Saiful Azman bin Dollah (670122-11- 5109) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Ketujuh: “Bahawa kamu, pada 5 Ogos 2008 di Malayan Banking Berhad, Cawangan Wisma Lee Kay Huan, Lot 14408, Jalan Genting Kelang, 53200 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM1800.00 daripada Ramila binti Daot (701122-04-5322) tanpa suatu lessen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah sub- seksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu 9 kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Kelapan: “Bahawa kamu, pada 25 Ogos 2008 di Malayan Banking Berhad, Cawangan Wisma Lee Kay Huan, Lot 14408, Jalan Genting Kelang, 53200 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyal RM3800.00 daripada Sarimah binti Che Ya (750602-03-5458) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah sub- seksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. Pertuduhan Kesembilan: “Bahawa kamu, pada 10 September 2006 di Malayan Banking Berhad Cawangan Wisma Lee Kay Huan, Lot 14408, Jalan Genting Kelang, 53200 Kuala Lumpur, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah menerima deposit sebanyak RM19,900.00 daripada Raihan binti Haji Wan Ibrahim (560629- 03-5070) tanpa suatu lesen yang sah yang diberikan di bawah subseksyen 6(4) Akta Bank dan Institusi-Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah seksyen 25(1) Akta Bank dan Institusi- Institusi Kewangan 1989 (Akta 372) dan boleh dihukum 10 di bawah seksyen 103(1)(a) Akta yang sama dibaca bersama Nombor Siri 20 dalam Jadual Keempat Akta yang sama.”. [18] Pertuduhan Pertama terhadap T1 bagi kesalahan dibawah seksyen 4 AMLATFA 2001 adalah seperti berikut: Pertuduhan Pertama AMLATFA(162-585-10) “Bahawa pada 18 Julai 2008, Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat 780794-T) di CIMB Bank Berhad, No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, di dalam Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, telah melibatkan diri dalam pengubahan wang haram iaitu menerima wang ke dalam akaun bernombor 14580001466058 milik Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat 780794-T) berjumlah RM5,000.00, yang merupakan hasil daripada aktiviti haram, daripada akaun bernombor 14580005383524 milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo (No. K/P: 731129-10-5807) di bank yang sama melalui “online transfer” dan oleh itu kamu sebagai pengarah dalam Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat 780794-T) telah melakukan satu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah subseksyen 4(1)(a) Akta Pencegahan Pengubahan Wang Haram dan Pencegahan Pembiayaan Keganasan 2001 dibaca bersama subseksyen 87 (1)(a) Akta yang sama.”. [19] Ringkasan 130 pertuduhan terhadap T1 bagi kesalahan seksyen 4 AMLATFA 2001 adalah seperti berikut: [Untuk pertuduhan penuh keseluruhannya sila lihat Rekod Rayuan.] 11 No. Pertuduhan Tarikh Jumlah/ Transaksi Bank Kesalahan 1 18.7.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln.Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 2 22.7.2008 RM 1055 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln.Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 3 29.7.2008 RM 4600 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 4 31.7.2008 RM 800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln.Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 5 1.8.2008 RM 2855 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 6 31.7.2008 RM 4805 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 7 9.8.2008 RM 8000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 8 12.8.2008 RM 4550 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199,Jln. Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 9 13.8.2008 RM 1430 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd.No. 197&199,Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 10 14.8.2008 RM 1430 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 11 13.8.2008 RM 1430 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 12 13.8.2008 RM 1430 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 12 13 26.8.2008 RM 800,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 14 4.9.2008 RM 1700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 15 4.9.2008 RM 900 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 16 8.9.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 17 10.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 18 11.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 19 15.9.2008 RM 1500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 20 16.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 21 18.9.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 22 19.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 23 22.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 13 24 23.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 25 24.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 26 25.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 27 26.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 28 29.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 29 30.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 30 1.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 31 6.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 32 8.10.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 33 13.10.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 34 14.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln.Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 35 20.10.2008 RM 200,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln.Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 14 36 20.10.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 37 20.10.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur. Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 38 23.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 39 24.10.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 40 24.10.2008 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 41 7.11.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 42 8.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 43 12.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 44 14.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 45 17.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 46 21.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 15 47 22.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 48 26.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 49 28.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 50 1.12.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 51 13.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 52 19.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 53 30.12.2008 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 54 7.1.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 55 13.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 56 21.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 57 22.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 16 58 4.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 59 10.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 &199, Jln.Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 60 13.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 61 14.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 62 18.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 63 24.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur. Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 64 25.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 65 28.2.2009 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 66 2.3.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 67 3.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 68 4.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 17 69 5.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 70 16.3.2009 – 19.3.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 71 16.3.2009 – 20.3.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 72 17.3.2009 RM 2300 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 73 17.3.2009 RM 1800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 74 18.3.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 75 17.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 76 23.3.2009 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 77 24.3.2009 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 78 24.3.2009 – 25.3.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 79 24.3.2009 – 25.3.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 18 80 25.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 81 26.3.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 82 27.3.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 83 28.3.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 84 1.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 85 2.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 86 7.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 87 7.4.2009 – 8.4.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 88 8.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 89 9.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 90 10.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 19 91 10.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 92 17.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 93 22.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur. Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 94 24.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 95 24.4.2009 – 27.4.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 96 29.4.2009 – 30.4.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 97 29.4.2009 – 30.4.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 98 30.4.2009 RM 3,400 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 99 5.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 100 6.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 101 7.5.2009 – 12.5.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 20 102 7.5.2009 – 1.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 103 8.5.2009 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 104 9.5.2009 – 21.5.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 105 9.5.2009 – 2.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 106 10.5.2009 – 3.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 107 13.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 108 14.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 109 15.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 110 15.5.2009 – 18.5.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 111 18.5.2009 – 27.5.2009 RM 28,664.20 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 112 19.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 113 21.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 21 114 21.5.2009 – 22.5.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 115 27.5.2009 – 28.5.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 116 2.6.2009 – 3.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 117 4.6.2009 – 5.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 118 5.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 119 12.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 120 13.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 121 16.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 122 19.6.2009 – 22.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 123 19.6.2009 – 22.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 124 26.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 22 125 26.6.2009 – 29.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 126 1.7.2009 – 2.7.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 127 10.7.2009 – 13.7.2009 RM 47, 763.95 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 128 16.7.2009 RM 4800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 129 19.10.2009 RM 1,292,785.27 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. 130 19.10.2009 RM3,041,927.23 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408 Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram. [20] Pertuduhan penuh adalah lebih kurang dengan pertuduhan pertama T1 di atas. Ringkasan 472 pertuduhan terhadap T2 bagi kesalahan seksyen 4 AMLATFA 2001 adalah seperti berikut: [Pertuduhan penuh sila lihat Rekod Rayuan] No. Pertuduhan Tarikh Jumlah/ Transaksi Bank Kesalahan 1. 4.7.2008 RM 2700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 2. 5.7.2008 RM 1800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 3. 12.7.2008 RM 1020 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 23 4. 16.7.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 5. 18.7.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 6. 20.7.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 7. 21.7.2008 RM 1700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 8. 22.7.2008 RM 1055 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 9. 25.7.2008 RM 4810 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 10. 28.7.2008 RM 1300 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 11. 29.7.2008 RM 4600 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 12. 31.7.2008 RM 800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 13. 1.8.2008 RM 2855 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 14. 3.8.2008 RM 3800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 24 15. 5.8.2008 RM 4805 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 16. 6.8.2008 RM 2400 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 17. 6.8.2008 – 7.8.2008 RM 100,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 18. 6.8.2008 – 8.8.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 19. 7.8.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 20. 7.8.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 21. 8.8.2008 RM 2400 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 22. 9.8.2008 RM 800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 23. 9.8.2008 RM 800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 24. 12.8.2008 RM 4550 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 25. 13.8.2008 RM 1430 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 25 26. 14.8.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 27. 16.8.2008 RM 1060 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 28. 18.8.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 29. 19.8.2008 RM 1320 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 30. 19.8.2008 RM 2860 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 31. 20.8.2008 RM 4450 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 32. 20.8.2008 RM 250 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 33. 22.8.2008 RM 750 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 34. 24.8.2008 RM 1600 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 35. 26.8.2008 RM 900 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 36. 26.8.2008 RM 800,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 26 37. 28.8.2008 RM 1800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 38. 29.8.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 39. 30.8.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 40. 31.8.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 41. 1.9.2008 RM 3800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 42. 2.9.2008 RM 600,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 43. 4.9.2008 RM 2100 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 44. 4.9.2008 RM 1700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 45. 4.9.2008 RM 900 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 46. 6.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 47. 7.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 27 48. 8.9.2008 RM 4800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 49. 8.9.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 50. 9.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 51. 10.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 52. 11.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 53. 15.9.2008 RM 1500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 54. 16.9.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 55. 16.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 56. 17.9.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 57. 18.9.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 58. 19.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 28 59. 22.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 60. 23.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 61. 24.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 62. 25.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 63. 26.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 64. 29.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 65. 30.9.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 66. 1.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 67. 6.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 68. 6.10.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 69. 7.10.2008 RM 4200 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 29 70. 8.10.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 71. 8.10.2008 RM 1700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 72. 9.10.2008 RM 4690 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 73. 10.10.2008 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 74. 11.10.2008 RM 2700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 75. 11.10.2008 RM 1700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 76. 12.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 77. 13.10.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 78. 13.10.2008 – 14.10.2008 RM1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 79. 14.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 80. 15.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 30 81. 17.10.2008 RM 2450 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 82. 17.10.2008 RM 1200 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 83. 18.10.2008 RM 1800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 84. 20.10.2008 RM 200,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 85. 20.10.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 86. 20.10.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 87. 22.10.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 88. 23.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 89. 24.10.2008 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 90. 24.10.2008 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 91. 24.10.2008 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 31 92. 26.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 93. 27.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 94. 28.10.2008 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 95. 29.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 96. 31.10.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 97. 4.11.2008 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199 Jln.Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 98. 4.11.2008 RM2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 99. 5.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 100. 6.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 101. 7.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 102. 7.11.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 32 103. 8.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 104. 11.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 105. 12.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 106. 13.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 107. 14.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 108. 15.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 109. 17.11.2008 RM 500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 110. 17.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 111. 19.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 112. 21.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 113. 22.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 33 114. 24.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 115. 25.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 116. 26.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 117. 27.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 118. 28.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 119. 29.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 120. 30.11.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 121. 1.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 122. 1.12.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 123. 2.12.2008 RM1,500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 124. 4.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 34 125. 5.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 126. 6.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 127. 7.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 128. 8.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 129. 9.12.2008 RM 800,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 130. 9.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 131. 10.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 132. 11.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 133. 12.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 134. 13.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 135. 14.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 35 136. 16.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 137. 17.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 138. 18.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 139. 19.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 140. 20.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 141. 21.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln. Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 142. 22.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 143. 23.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 144. 24.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 145. 25.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 146. 26.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 36 147. 27.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 148. 28.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 149. 30.12.2008 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 150. 31.12.2008 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 151. 1.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 152. 2.1.2009 RM 1,800,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 153. 3.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 154. 5.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 155. 6.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 156. 7.1.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 157. 8.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 37 158. 9.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 159. 10.1.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 160. 13.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 161. 14.1.2009 RM 1,500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 162. 14.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 163. 15.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln. Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 164. 16.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 165. 17.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 166. 18.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 167. 20.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 168. 21.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 38 169. 22.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 170. 23.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 171. 27.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 172. 28.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 173. 29.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 174. 30.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 175. 31.1.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 176. 1.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 177. 2.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 178. 3.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 179. 4.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 39 180. 4.2.2009 RM2,500,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 181. 6.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 182. 7.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 183. 8.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 184. 10.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 185. 11.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln. Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 186. 13.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 187. 14.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 188. 15.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 189. 17.2.2009 RM 3600 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 190. 18.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 40 191. 22.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 192. 23.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 193. 24.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 194. 25.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 195. 26.2.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 196. 27.2.2009 RM 1900 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 197. 28.2.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 198. 28.2.2009 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 199. 1.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 200. 2.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 201. 2.3.2009 - 3.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 41 202. 3.3.2009 RM5,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 203. 3.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 204. 4.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 205. 5.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 206. 6.3.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 207. 6.3.2009 RM2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln. Sarjana Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 208. 7.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 209. 8.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 210. 10.3.2009 RM 3800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 211. 10.3.2009 RM 1200 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 212. 11.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 42 213. 12.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 214. 14.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 215. 15.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 216. 16.3.2009 – 19.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 217. 16.3.2009 – 20.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd, Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 218. 17.3.2009 RM 2300 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 219. 17.3.2009 RM 1800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 220. 18.3.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 221. 19.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 222. 20.3.2009 RM 2400 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 223. 20.3.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 43 224. 21.3.2009 RM 3800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 225. 22.3.2009 RM 2300 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 226. 23.3.2009 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 227. 24.3.2009 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 228. 24.3.2009 - 25.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking BHD, Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 229. 24.3.2009 - 25.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 230. 25.3.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 231. 26.3.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 232. 27.3.2009 RM 4000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 233. 27.3.2009 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 234. 28.3.2009 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 44 235. 28.3.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 236. 29.3.2009 RM 4300 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 237. 1.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 238. 1.4.2009 RM5,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 239. 2.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 240. 3.4.2009 RM 3000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 241. 7.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 242. 7.4.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 243. 8.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 244. 9.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 245. 9.4.2009 RM4,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 45 246. 10.4.2009 RM1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 247. 10.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 248. 11.4.2009 RM 1000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 249. 12.4.2009 RM 4500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 250. 13.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 251. 14.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 252. 15.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 253. 16.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 254. 17.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 255. 18.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 256. 21.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 46 257. 22.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 258. 23.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 259. 24.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 260. 24.4.2009– 27.4.2009 RM2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 261. 25.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 262. 26.4.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 263. 29.4.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 264. 29.4.2009 RM 2000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 265. 29.4.2009 RM2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 266. 30.4.2009 RM 3400 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 267. 1.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 268. 4.5.2009 RM 4700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 47 269. 5.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 270. 6.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 271. 6.5.2009 RM6,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 272. 6.5.2009 RM 200,000.00 pembelian unit trust – Principal China Recovery Structured Fund CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menggunakan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 273. 6.5.2009 RM 300,000.00 pembelian unit trust– MaxInvest-i CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menggunakan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 274. 6.5.2009 RM 500,000.00 membuka akaun CIMB simpanan tetap - 14580005713685 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menggunakan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 275. 7.5.2009 – 12.5.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 276. 7.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 277. 7.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 278. 7.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd.No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 279. 7.5.2009 – 1.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 48 280. 8.5.2009 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 281. 8.5.2009 RM 10,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 282. 9.5.2009 RM 20,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 283. 9.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 284. 9.5.2009 dan 21.5.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 285. 9.5.2009 dan 2.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 286. 10.5.2009 dan 3.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 287. 10.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 288. 10.5.2009 RM 20,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 289. 11.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 290. 11.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 49 291. 12.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 292. 12.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 293. 13.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 294. 13.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 295. 13.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 296. 14.5.2009 RM 20,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 297. 14.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 298. 14.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 299. 14.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 50 300. 14.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 301. 14.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 302. 15.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 303. 15.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 304. 15.5.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 305. 16.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 306. 17.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 307. 18.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 308. 18.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 309. 18.5.2009 RM 28,664.20 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 51 310. 19.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 311. 19.5.2009 RM 40,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 312. 19.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 313. 20.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 314. 20.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 315. 21.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 316. 21.5.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 317. 21.5.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 318. 21.5.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 319. 21.5.2009 – 22.5.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 52 320. 22.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 321. 23.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 322. 23.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 323. 24.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 324. 24.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 325. 25.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 326. 25.5.2009 RM 50,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 327. 26.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 328. 26.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 53 329. 27.5.2009 RM100,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 330. 27.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 331. 27.5.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 332. 28.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 333. 28.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 334. 29.5.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 335. 29.5.2009 RM50,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OK 2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 336. 29.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 337. 30.5.2009 RM100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 338. 30.5.2009 RM100,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 54 339. 31.5.2009 RM50,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 340. 31.5.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 341. 2.6.2009 RM 3,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 342. 2.6.2009 – 3.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 343. 4.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 344. 4.6.2009 – 5.6.2009 RM 2,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 345. 5.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 346. 6.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 347. 7.7.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 348. 7.7.2009 RM 2500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 55 349. 10.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 350. 10.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 351. 11.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 352. 11.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 353. 11.6.2009 RM 2800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 354. 12.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 355. 12.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 356. 13.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 357. 13.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 358. 14.6.2009 RM100,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 56 359. 14.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 360. 16.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 361. 16.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 362. 17.7.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 363. 18.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 364. 18.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 365. 19.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 366. 19.6.2009 RM 100,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 367. 19.6.2009 – 22.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 368. 19.6.2009 – 22.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 57 369. 21.6.2009 RM 2700 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 370. 21.6.2009 RM 200,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 371. 22.6.2009 RM 200,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 372. 22.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 373. 23.6.2009 RM 200,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 374. 24.6.2009 RM 200,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 375. 25.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 376. 25.6.2009 RM 200,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 377. 26.6.2009 RM 300,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 378. 26.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 58 379. 26.6.2007 dan 29.6.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 380. 27.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 381. 27.6.2009 RM 300,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 382. 28.6.2009 RM 300,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd, No 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 383. 28.6.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 384. 29.6.2009 RM 300,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 385. 1.7.2009 RM 300,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 386. 1.7.2009 – 2.7.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. Wisma Lee Lay Huan, Lot 74408, Jln Genting Klang Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 387. 2.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 388. 2.7.2009 RM 4,100.00 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197& 99, Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 59 389. 3.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 390. 4.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 391. 5.7.2009 RM 500,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 392. 6.7.2009 RM 5,000.00 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197&199, Jln Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 393. 7.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 394. 8.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 395. 8.7.2009 RM 250,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 396. 9.7.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 397. 9.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 398. 10.7.2009 RM500,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 60 399. 10.7.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 400. 10.7.2009 – 13.7.2009 RM 47, 763.95 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 401. 12.7.2009 RM 5000 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 402. 12.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 403. 13.7.2009 RM 3500 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 404. 15.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 405. 16.7.2009 RM 4800 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Menerima wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 406. 17.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 407. 21.7.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 408. 19.10.2009 RM 3,597, 051.73 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 61 409. 19.10.2009 RM1,292,785.27 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 410. 19.10.2009 RM3,041, 927.23 CIMB Bank Bhd. No. 197 & 199 Jalan Sarjana, Taman Connaught, Cheras, Kuala Lumpur Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 411. 15.12.2008 RM 400,000.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 412. 15.12.2008 RM 100,000.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 413. 7.1.2009 RM 200,000.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 414. 14.1.2009 RM 100,000.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 415. 4.2.2009 RM 600,000.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 416. 18.3.2009 RM 1,000,000.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 417. 28.5.2009 RM 540,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 418. 29.5.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 419. 30.5,2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 420. 6.6.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 62 421. 7.6.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 422. 8.6.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 423. 16.6.2009 RM 20,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 424. 19.6.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 425. 22.6.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 426. 23.6.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 427. 26.6.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 428. 28.6.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 429. 29.6.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 430. 1.7.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 63 431. 3.7.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 432. 4.7.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 433. 5.7.2009 RM30,000 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 434. 6.6.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 435. 9.7.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 436. 11.7.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 437. 12.7.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 438. 14.7.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 439. 15.7.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 440. 16.7.2009 RM 30,000.00 daripada akaun milik OKT 2 sendiri ke akaun OKT2 yang lain di bank yang sama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 64 441. 18.7.2009 RM30,000.00 dari akaun milik OKT2 sendiri ke akaun OKT 2 yang lain di bank yang ama Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 442. 19.10.2009 RM 1,579,532.00 Public Bank Bhd. No. 3,4,5, Jln. CKC 1, Batang Kali, Selangor. Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 443. 17.6.2008 RM 650,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 444. 2.7.2008 RM 300,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K.Selangor,Slg. Memindahkan wang hasil dari aktiviti haram 445. 9.7.2008 RM 500,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 446. 22.7.2008 RM 400,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 447. 5.8.2008 RM 850,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 448. 13.8.2008 RM 450,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 449. 2.9.2008 RM 900,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 450. 10.9.2008 – 11.9.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 451. 23.9.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 452. 7.10.2008 dan 13.10.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 453. 20.10.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 454. 29.10.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 65 455. 12.11.2008 RM 1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 456. 26.11.2008 RM 1,500,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 457. 19.12.2008 RM 2,500,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 458. 6.1.2009 RM2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Slg. Memindahkan wang hasil dari aktiviti haram 459. 6.1.2009 RM2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Slg. Memindahkan wang hasil dari aktiviti haram 460. 22.1.2009 RM2,500,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Slg. Memindahkan wang hasil dari aktiviti haram 461. 28.1.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Slg Memindahkan wang hasil dari aktiviti haram 462. 11.2.2009 RM3,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Slg. Memindahkan wang hasil dari aktiviti haram 463. 16.2.2009 RM 500,000.00 daripada akaun milik Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 464. 23.2.2009 RM1,300,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 465. 4.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 466. 25.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 467. 27.3.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 468. 24.4.2009 RM3,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 469. 7.5.2009 RM1,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 66 470. 12.6.2009 RM2,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 471. 14.7.2009 RM 4,000,000.00 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memindahkan wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram 472. 19.10.2009 RM 1,113,318.51 Malayan Banking Bhd. No. 11-13, Jln. Raja Jalil, K. Selangor, Selangor. Memiliki wang hasil daripada aktiviti haram [21] Di Mahkamah Sesyen, semasa kes pendakwaan, pendakwaan telah memanggil seramai 70 orang saksi. T1, 2 dan T3 kemudiannya telah dipanggil untuk memberi pembelaan, 6 orang saksi pembelaan memberi keterangan. KES PENDAKWAAN DI MAHKAMAH SESYEN [22] Di dalam pertuduhan-pertuduhan AMLATFA yang telah dirujuk, pendakwaan telah memasukkan penama Mohamad Azizi bin Parjo, SP69 sebagai seseorang yang namanya digunakan untuk memasukkan deposit ke dalam akaun syarikat T3. [23] Mohamad Azizi Bin Parjo telah memberi keterangan sebagai SP69 dan beliau adalah seorang ahli untuk Asia Ceramic Marketing pada awalnya tahun 2008. Pada tahun 2009, beliau telah dilantik sebagai Marketing Director. Di dalam keterangannya, Azizi ada mengakui bahawa ‘downline’ beliau membayar ke dalam akaunnya dan beliau akan memindahkan wang tersebut ke dalam akaun syarikat. Maka atas sebab itulah nama ini terdapat di dalam hampir kebanyakan pertuduhan AMLATFA. 67 [24] SP10, juga bersetuju dengan peranan SP69 sebagai salah seorang Managing Director untuk syarikat ini. SP 10 juga memberitahu bahawa En Azizi selalu menghadiri mesyuarat bersama pelanggan dalam membuat rekrut ahli. [25] Bagi pertuduhan di bawah BAFIA, di antara 15 Mei 2008 hingga 19 Mei 2008, T3, T1 dan T2 tidak memiliki lesen yang sah di bawah s. 6(4) BAFIA untuk menerima deposit daripada orang awam. 25.1 Keterangan SP11, SP8, SP13, SP15, SP16, SP17, SP20, SP22, SP25, SP26, SP27, SP31, SP37, SP52, SP60, SP61, SP62, kesemuanya pernah menjadi ahli dan pelabur untuk Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. membuktikan kewujudan barangan ceramic yang dijual dan dibeli. Ahli-ahli mempunyai pilihan untuk menjual semula dan berdasarkan kepada ‘willing seller & willing buyer’ yang telah didokumenkan di dalam ‘Sell Back Agreement’. Ini adalah konsep perniagaan yang dikhususkan kepada ahli dan ahli yang mempunyai pilihan bukannya syarikat. Maka ianya adalah satu kontrak yang sah yang mematuhi semua peruntukkan undang-undang kontrak dan konsep dan ini bukanlah merupakan satu pengambilan deposit tetapi sebaliknya adalah merupakan satu perniagaan jual beli set ceramic secara terus diantara ‘willing seller & willing buyer’; 68 25.2 SP6 seorang Eksekutif di SSM mengesahkan jenis perniagaan T3 yang didaftarkan adalah perniagaan ‘wholesale of retail product’ ceramic dan lain-lain produk untuk jual beli (Ekshibit P23); 25.3 Saksi-saksi yang merupakan pelanggan atau ahli T3 mengatakan telah pergi ke pejabat T3 dan setelah berpuas hati melihat produk dan pejabat perniagaan mereka memang wujud, baru mereka membuat keputusan menjadi ahli dan membeli pakej yang ditawarkan; 25.4 SP70, sebagai Pegawai Penyiasat Kanan Bank Negara bersetuju bahawa ‘Sell Back Agreement’ ialah transaksi di antara syarikat dan individu dan adalah transaksi yang bona fide dan ‘genuine’; 25.5 SP7 sebagai Pengurus Unit Penyiasat Bank Negara dan SP10, bekerja di Sales Eurocode (sebelum ini sebagai Pegawai Admin untuk Asia Ceramic Marketing) mengesahkan bahawa perniagaan T3 telah disahkan tidak melanggar apa-apa undang-undang setelah disiasat dan diperiksa oleh pegawai Kementerian Perdagangan Dalam Negeri Dan Kepenggunaan (KPDNKK) (Ekshibit P73); 25.6 SP10 menyatakan bahawa- “…The ceramic sets we had were displayed on display cabinets. I can’t remember how many more kept in office. I think there were 7 to 8 sets kept in office. 69 We do give members the documents the documents called Sell Back Agreement. No ceramic sets were given to the customers.”. 25.7 SP24, sebelum ini sebagai Kerani Akaun di Asia Ceramic Marketing menyatakan bahawa:- “…Sumber syarikat ialah daripada member. Mereka akan bank in duit. Ahli akan bank in kepada syarikat apabila pakej atau semasa menjadi ahli. Tidak ada sumber lain. Expenses syarikat ialah gaji, voucher, rental, member expenses dan donation for school computers. Bayaran kepada member ialah satu Sell Back Agreement kepada customer dalam bentuk cek selepas ahli beli pakej daripada syarikat. Duit yang diperolehi daripada member digunakan untuk bayar Sell Back Agreement kepada member. Bayaran kepada member dibuat untuk beli balik ceramic daripada member.’ …Saya ada pernah nampak set ceramic ditunjukkan kepada customer mereka yang minat untuk tengok set itu. Ada customer yang ambil set ceramic itu. Tetapi saya tidak pasti sama ada customer lain gunakan points ataupun Elektronic Value. Tidak semua customer yang beli pakej ambil produk itu. Saya tidak tahu berapa ramai yang beli pakej beli produk itu.”; 70 25.8 SP28, sebagai Senior Marketing Executive of Akojaya Sdn. Bhd. menyatakan bahawa Akojaya Sdn. Bhd. telah menjual 349 set pelbagai barangan seramik kepada Asia Ceramic Trading Sdn. Bhd. (ACT) (Eksibit P178-P187) daripada tarikh 18/11/2008 sehingga 12/8/09; 25.9 SP29 sebagai Pengarah Syarikat Sweet Touch Ceramic Bhd. menyatakan bahawa Sweet Touch Ceramic Bhd. telah menjual 274 set pelbagai barangan seramik kepada T3 (Eksibit P194A-P207) daripada tarikh 18/11/2008 sehingga 12/8/09; 25.10 SP30 sebagai pekerja akaun di Granics Holdings Sdn. Bhd. dan SP32 sebagai CEO syarikat Granics Holdings Sdn. Bhd. mengesahkan bahawa Granics Holding Sdn. Bhd. telah menjual 999 set pelbagai barangan seramik kepada ACT (Eksibit P211A(1) – P211A(12A) daripada tarikh 5/12/2007 sehingga 18/8/2008; 25.11 SP10 juga menyatakan bahawa T3 mempunyai satu ‘database’ yang menyimpan maklumat daripada semua pembeli pakej. Maklumat yang disimpan adalah berdasarkan kepada ID nombor akaun bank setiap pembeli untuk mengelakkan pembeli memanipulasi penggunaan nombor K/Pengenalan yang palsu. Pada masa T3 diserbu, jumlah pembeli pakej seramik ada sebanyak 40,000 orang di mana maklumat ini boleh didapati di laman utama website T3; 71 25.12 SP23, sebagai freelance pada tahun 2009. SP23 menjaga sistem berinternet untuk Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing, mengesahkan bahawa Eksibit P34A-D adalah didapati daripada database dalam website T3. Database ini menyimpan semua maklumat setiap pembeli. Database tersebut telah “diburn” dalam Eksibit P157 dan P163 dan telah diserahkan kepada SP35; 25.13 SP35 sebagai Juruanalisa Forensic Digital Cyber Security Malaysia mengesahkan bahawa pembeli pakej yang memilih untuk menjual semula barangan seramik adalah seramai 287,649 transaksi dan hanya 19 yang memilih untuk membeli pakej seramik tanpa memilih untuk menjual semula; 25.14 SP28, seorang pekerja Akojaya Sdn. Bhd. juga mengesahkan bahawa barangan yang dijual oleh SP28 kepada ACT bukannya barangan ‘collectable items’ dan tidak menawarkan pakej pembelian semula barangan seramik yang mereka jua; 25.15 1SP29 dan SP32 mengesahkan bahawa mereka tidak menawarkan skim seperti yang ditawarkan oleh T3; 25.16 SP23 dan SP25 menjaga sistem berinternet syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing dan seorang pelabut menerangkan bahawa daripada jumlah 287,649 transaksi, hanya 19 transaksi tidak direkodkan “sell back”; 72 25.17 Maka, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana berpuashati bahawa perniagaan sebenar T3 bukannya jual beli barangan set ceramic. T1, T2 dan T3 sebenarnya menerima deposit; 25.18 SP1, seorang Pengurus Jabatan Penyeliaan Konglomerate di Bank Negara Malaysia mengesahkan bahawa- (a) T3, T1 dan T2 tidak pernah memohon lesen di bawah seksyen 6(4) BAFIA; (b) lesen di bawah s. 6(4) BAFIA tidak pernah diberikan kepada T3, T1 dan T2 bagi tahun 2008 hingga 2009; dan (c) T3, T1 dan T2 tidak disenaraikan di dalam Warta Kerajaan. 25.19 Maka, pendakwaan telah membuktikan bahawa T1 dan T2 tidak memiliki lesen yang sah untuk menerima deposit. [26] Di antara 15 Mei 2008 hingga 19 September 2008, T1 dan T2 ialah Pengarah Syarikat T3 semasa T3 menerima deposit tanpa lesen; 26.1 SP10, SP24, SP31 dan SP69, sebagai bekas pekerja, pegawai dan pengarah Syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. mengesahkan bahawa T1 dan T2 ialah pengarah kepada syarikat tersebut di mana T1 dan T 2 bertindak aktif dalam pengurusan operasi T3. 73 [27] T1 dan T2 telah menerima, menggunakan atau memiliki wang seperti dalam pertuduhan; 27.1 Saksi-saksi pendakwaan dan Eksibit-Eksibit menunjuk- kan T1 dan T2 melibatkan diri dalam penerimaan, pemindahan, penggunaan dan memiliki wang. [28] Wang yang diterima, digunakan atau dimiliki adalah hasil daripada aktiviti haram; 28.1 Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen berpuashati bahawa 14 akaun bank dan 2 jenis Unit Trust merupakan milikan T1 dan T2 dan dalam kawalan mereka. Akaun-akaun dan Unit Trust digunakan untuk menjalankan kegiatan pengubahan wang haram. [29] Daripada hal keadaan hakikat objektif T1 dan T2 tahu atau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa harta-harta yang dipindahkan, digunakan dan dimiliki oleh beliau adalah hasil daripada kesalahan pengambilan deposit secara haram; 29.1 SP10 menyatakan bahawa terdapat lebih kurang 40,000 ahli dalam database T3; 29.2 Sudah semestinya ia melibatkan jumlah wang yang besar. Oleh itu, “hal keadaan hakikat objektif” akan menunjukkan tertuduh tidak ada alasan untuk syak wang yang diterima ialah daripada aktiviti haram; 29.3 SP33, sebagai Peguam yang telah membantu Syarikat T3 untuk mendaftar lesen-lesen perniagaan telah memberi keterangan bahawa T3 berniat mematuhi undang-undang hakcipta, cap dagangan dan harta 74 intelek yang lain. Permohonan telah dibuat untuk mendaftarkan cap dagangan dan logo oleh T3; 29.4 SP25 (sbg ahli dan introducer), SP60 (sbg ahli e-point dan introducer), SP62 (sbg Ahli E.V dan introducer) dan SP69 (ahli, introducer dan pengarah syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing) menyatakan bahawa adalah kebiasaan untuk bayaran dibuat kepada T2 kerana menurut T2 ianya bertujuan untuk mempercepatkan proses sedangkan T3 memiliki beberapa akaun yang dibuka bagi tujuan perniagaan seramik tersebut. 29.5 SP69 (ahli, introducer dan pengarah syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing) juga menyatakan bahawa sebanyak 276 transaksi dimasukkan ke dalam akaun T2 dan T3 melibatkan wang-wang dalam gandaan yang besar bagi tujuan pelaburan dalam T3; 29.6 SP24 (sbg Account Clerk) mengesahkan bahawa T3 tiada sumber pendapatan lain kecuali daripada bayaran pembelian pakej atau bayaran untuk menjadi ahli. Sumber pendapatan T3 adalah mencukupi kerana T3 menerima bayaran daripada ahli-ahli yang membeli pakej yang turut digunakan untuk membayar kos perbelanjaan (expenses) T3 serta ACT. Selain daripada keuntungan hasil daripada pembelian pakej seramik oleh ahli, T3 tidak memiliki keuntungan lain; 29.7 SP31 sebagai CEO Asia Ceramic Trading menyatakan bahawa amat kurang ahli yang gunakan e-points untuk beli barang di E-mart ikut pengalaman beliau. Beliau 75 kurang pasti berapa ahli yang top up e-points untuk beli barang daripada E-mart. Semasa beliau jadi CEO Asia Ceramic Trading belum ada Asia Ceramic Trading catatkan keuntungan; dan 29.8 Keterangan SP31 disahkan oleh SP24. [30] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah menggunapakai tahap penelitian maksima yang betul apabila memutuskan pihak pendakwaan berjaya membuktikan satu kes prima facie dan memanggil T1, T2 dan T3 membela diri berasaskan keterangan pendakwaan di atas. PEMBELAAN DI MAHKAMAH SESYEN [31] SD1 (T1), SD2 (T2), SD3 (sebagai Pegawai Penyiasat Bank Negara), SD4 (pernah bekerja dengan Syarikat T3), SD5 (pemilik e-mart kedai serbanika syarikat T3) dan SD6 (sebagai Penolong Pegawai Penguatkuasa KPDNKK), secara ringkas memberi keterangan bersumpah berikut:- a) Menerangkan konsep perniagaan dan modul perniagaan yang menekankan ‘customer’ atau ‘consumer base’ dengan menubuhkan CBC dan mewujudkan website bernama ‘Ceramic Club.net’; b) Telah sediakan pelbagai kemudahan dan ‘privileges’ kepada ahli kelab seperti khairat kematian; c) Telah mendirikan tabung bernama ‘Ceramic Service Program’ dan menyumbangkan komputer untuk sekolah luar Bandar; 76 d) Perkenalkan ganjaran shopping point untuk tebus shopping voucher di Ceramic E-Mart; e) Perkenalkan package privilege untuk ahli CBC untuk membeli ceramic set dengan adanya kemudahan Sell Back kepada T3 sekali sebulan; f) Konsep perniagaan ini memerlukan consumer base yang besar dan pelbagai initiative diperkenalkan untuk mengadakan base yag lebih besar itu seperti menubuhkan Ceramic E-Mart dan kenalkan kad privilege CBC, adakan latihan dan pelbagai aktiviti lain; g) SD1 mengaku beliau seorang yang banyak berpengalaman dalam perniagaan termasuk direct selling, seorang yang kreatif dan pemikir di luar kotak untuk cari kaedah supaya mengembangkan ‘customer base’ dengan pesat dan mengekalkan kesetiaan pelanggan atau ‘loyal customer’; h) SD1 juga telah mementingkan penjenamaan atau branding ‘Asia Ceramic’ dan memperkenalkan franchise holder licensing; i) T3 dan/atau CBS telah dalam masa singkat berjaya mencapai 40,000 ahli; j) SD1 mengaku T3 tidak mempunyai lesen di bawah s. 6 BAFIA kerana T3 ialah sebuah syarikat yang membuat ‘trading’ jual beli produk ceramic dan bukan syarikat berkaitan perbankan; 77 k) SD2 berperanan lebih kepada bahagian pentadbiran T3; l) SD2 telah meletak jawatan sejak 2 Mac 2009; m) SD3 sahkan butir-butir dalam Eksibit D544 (carian rasmi SSM) mengenai T3 ialah benar; n) SD3 sahkan tiada undang-undang yang mengawalselia pembelian EV yang memerlukan lesen; dan o) SD3 menyatakan bahawa T3 tidak telibat dengan apa- apa pengambilan deposit tetapi terlibat dengan jual balik barang-barang yang ‘legitimate’. [32] Setelah mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi pembelaan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana berpuas hati dan dengan tepat telah membuat dapatan-dapatan bahawa seperti berikut: a) Sepanjang masa material T1 dan T2 merupakan pangarah T3; b) T2 telah menggubal deraf ‘Sell Back Agreement’ dan deraf tersebut dipersetujui oleh T1; c) Terdapat “sell back transactions” di antara individu yang menjadi ahli CBC dan T3; d) “sell back transactions” diperkenalkan sebelum perniagaan lain seperti E-mart dan café; 78 e) T1 dan T2 sahkan SP9, SP13, SP16, SP18, SP20, SP22, SP26, SP27 dan SP39 telah menyertai “sell back transactions” dengan T3; f) Terdapat ‘huge number of purchases of ceramic transactions between individuals and T3’ tetapi hanya 19 transaksi melibatkan pembelian terus; g) Pembelian set ceramic oleh T3 daripada pembekal ceramic tidak bersepadanan dengan jumlah transaksi antara pelanggan dan T3; h) Penggunaan Electronic Value (EV) bertujuan untuk ‘facilitate transactions between individual members of CBC and T3’. Ia juga melibatkan ‘sell back transactions’; i) Penggunaan electronic value (EV) diantara ahli CBC dan T3 atau E-mart tidak semata-mata tertakluk di bawah s. 7 Electronic Commerce Act 2006 tetapi juga hendak memenuhi s. 4 Akta tersebut; dan j) E-commerce juga adalah tertakluk kepada s. 25(1) BAFIA jika melibatkan pengambilan ‘deposit’. [33] Berhubung dengan pembelaan bahawa wang yang diterima daripada pelanggan atau ahli ialah untuk pembelian EV dan pembayaran itu ialah sesuatu yang bona fide, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana sekali lagi secara tepatnya bersetuju dengan pendakwaan bahawa pembelian EV adalah bertujuan untuk membeli pakej dan oleh itu, pembelian EV ini tidak termasuk di dalam pengecualiaan bona fide item (f) Bahagian 2, Jadual Pertama BAFIA. 79 Keterangan daripada SP10, SP52, SP60, dan SP 62 menjelaskan perkara ini. HUJAHAN PENDAKWAAN DI MAHKAMAH TINGGI [34] Rayuan hanya difailkan oleh T1 dan T2 sahaja. Pendakwaan menekankan bahawa pihak syarikat (T3) tidak memfailkan rayuan ini. [35] Pendakwaan menghujahkan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi seharusnya perlahan dalam mengganggu keputusan Mahkamah rendah yang mendengar perbicaraan kerana Mahkamah rendah mempunyai kelebihan dalam meneliti dan menilai saksi-saksi yang dipanggil seperti diputuskan dalam kes Dato’ Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim lawan Pendakwa raya dan 1 lagi APPEAL [2015] MLJU 34. [36] AMLATFA ialah satu undang-undang yang digubal khusus untuk menangani kes-kes penggubahan wang haram. Pendakwaan atau pembuktian kes bergantung sepenuhnya kepada peruntukan sedia ada di bawah akta ini memandangkan AMLATFA 2001 mengandungi undang-undang khusus mengenainya seperti kes Rashdi Bin Amran lawan Bank Negara Malaysia [2015] 9 MLJ 520. Selain itu, kesalahan di bawah seksyen ini masih boleh dibuktikan walaupun tiada pendakwaan bagi kesalahan predikat seperti kes Azmi Osman lawan PP [2015] 9 CLJ 845 [37] Pendakwaan menggunapakai hujahan yang sama seperti di Mahkamah Sesyen dan menghujahkan bahawa adalah jelas Pendakwaan telah membuktikan pertuduhan-pertuduhan kepada T1 dan T2. Pendakwaan menghujahkan perkara berikut: 80 37.1 Semua transaksi yang melibatkan pemindahan, penerimaan dan kemasukan wang dibuat ke dalam akaun T1 dan T2 sendiri selain akaun syarikat; 37.2 T1 dan T2 merupakan pengarah kepada syarikat Asia Ceramic Marketing Sdn. Bhd. [T3] semasa tempoh jenayah dilakukan; 37.3 Harta yang diterima oleh T1 dan T2 merupakan harta haram. Mereka telah menerima deposit daripada orang ramai tanpa mempunyai lesen yang sah di bawah BAFIA. Terlalu banyak transaksi pemindahan wang, penggunaan wang dan pemilikan wang yang dilakukan oleh T1 dan T2 antara 17.6.2008 sehingga 19.10.2009. Syarikat berkenaan tidak mempunyai pendapatan lain selain menerima deposit daripada ahli; dan 37.4 Daripada ‘hal hakikat objektif’ (Objective factual circumstances), T1 dan T2 tahu atau mempunyai sebab untuk mempercayai bahawa wang itu adalah hasil daripada aktiviti haram dan tanpa alasan yang munasabah tidak mengambil sebarang tindakan untuk menentukan wang itu adalah dari hasil haram atau tidak. [38] Keterangan daripada T1 dan T2 hanyalah rekaan dan cuba menidakkan fakta yang sebenarnya. Keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah sah dan berdasarkan prinsip-prinsip yang mantap. 81 Hukuman yang diberikan oleh Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah bersesuaian dan setimpal dengan kesalahan T1 dan T2. HUJAHAN PERAYU DI MAHKAMAH TINGGI [39] Dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah satu “misdirection by way of non-direction” memandangkan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak mengarahkan minda beliau kepada niat parliamen semasa meluluskan Banking and Financial Institution Bill 1989. La Ode Ardi Rasila v. PP [2016] 1 MLJ 358. Mohammedderfan Eshtyaghi Ahmad v. PP [2015] MLJU 301. [40] SP23 dan SP35 menyatakan terdapat sebanyak 19 transaksi pembelian terus tanpa penjualan balik dan tiada seorang pun daripada 19 orang ini dipanggil memberi keterangan. Dihujahkan bahawa bukanlah tanggungjawab T1 dan T2 untuk melengkapi kes Pendakwaan. Dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen pada para 16 (d) m/s 41 Jilid 1 RR yang menyatakan bahawa pembelaan gagal untuk menentukan identiti pembeli seramik adalah salah dan terarah kepada salah. PP v. Lee Jun Ho & Ors [2009] 4 CLJ 90. Sia Soon Suan v. PP [1966] 1 MLJ 116 (FC). [41] HMS tidak langsung mempertimbangkan hujahan pihak T1 dan T2 berkenaan invokasi sesyen 114(g) Akta Keterangan 1950. [42] HMS telah membuat dapatan yang salah apabila mendapati bahawa wang yang diterima dan digunakan oleh T1, T2 dan T3 adalah hasil daripada aktiviti haram dan mereka tahu tentang hal ini. Dalam mencapai keputusan ini, HMS tidak langsung mengambil penilaian 82 terhadap payment vouchers, invoices, quotations, dan purchase orders yang telah dikemukakan. [43] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah gagal untuk meneliti kesemua eksibit yang telah dikemukakan di mana dokumen- dokumen tersebut secara jelas menunjukkan perniagaan T1, T2 dan T3 adalah bona fide dan perayu tidak mempunyai sebab untuk mengatakan perniagaanya adalah haram. [44] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menggunapakai keterangan SP33 seorang peguam yang mengatakan bahawa terdapat pelbagai usaha untuk T1, T2 dan T3 mematuhi undang-undang Intelectual Property. Ini telah memudaratkan kes perayu/pembelaan. Rujukan kes Mohammad Reza Lajevardi Taghi v. PP [Rayuan Jenayah No.B-05-85-06/2013 (IRN)]. [45] Berkenaan hukuman, adalah dihujahkan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai kuasa untuk mengganggu keputusan dan hukuman Mahkamah Rendah. Rujukan kes-kes PP v. Mohamed Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200 ms 202 Abdul Rahman bin Ibrahim v. PP [1938] 1 MLJ 219, Liow Chow & Anor v. PP [1939] 1 MLJ 170 dan Ramli bin Kechik v. PP [1986] 2 MLJ 33. [46] Jika diteliti, hukuman yang diberi oleh Mahkamah Sesyen adalah terlalu tinggi dan tidak munasabah seperti: i) BAFIA – 6 tahun penjara dan denda RM180,000.00 jika ingkar 18 bulan penjara. ii) AMLATFA - 4 tahun penjara dan denda RM1.416 juta juka ingkar 472 bulan penjara (39 tahun 4 bulan); dan 83 iii) HMS mengarahkan hukuman berjalan berasingan maka jumlah keseluruhan adalah 10 tahun penjara dan denda RM1.596 juta jika ingkar 490 bulan (40 tahun 10 bulan) penjara. Jika perayu gagal untuk membayar denda, jumlah hukuman adalah 50 tahun dan 10 bulan. [47] Hukuman denda adalah terlalu tinggi dan dan menyalahi undang-undang. Dihujahkan juga bahawa HMS telah gagal untuk mempertimbangkan sewajarnya kepada keadaan kesemua kes dan meritnya tersendiri apabila menjatuhkan hukuman. T1, T2 dan T3 bukanlah pesalah tegar yang telah kerap kali melakukan kesalahan. Hukuman penjara dan denda yang diberikan adalah terlalu excessive, melampau dan tidak masuk akal. ALASAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI ATAS SABITAN. [48] Mahkamah Tinggi ini bersetuju dengan dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen tidak menerimanyabahawa duit yang dibayar kepada T3 adalah untuk ‘other benefits’ kerana duit yang diterima oleh T3 itu adalah pengambilan deposit tanpa lesen. ‘Other benefits’ yang dinikmati itu adalah tidak relevan. Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia memutuskan di dalam soal pengambilan deposit tanpa lessen adalah di antaranya di dalam kes Arba’ei Othman & Yang Lain v PP [20014] 7 CLJ 32 di mana perayu dituduh telah melakukan kesalahan di bawah s. 25(1) BAFIA 1981 iaitu menerima deposit dari beberapa orang pendeposit tanpa suatu lesan yang sah di bawah s. 6(4) BAFIA. Mahkamah Rayuan memutuskan sebagai berikut: “The prosecution did not need to prove that PLSB was undertaking banking or financial company activities. There was clear and sufficient evidence that PLSB had conducted an activity of receiving “deposits” where investors were promised of capital and investment returns. Further, 84 although the deposits received and taken by PLSB was called “Purchase of Product Vouchers Contract”, it was in fact a “deposit” as defined under s. 2(1) and s. 25(3) of the BAFIA. The provisions of ss. 25(1) and 106(1) were drafted to avoid adverse impact on the public resulting from individuals or companies that accept deposits without license that could lead to depositors not receiving their capital returns. Therefore, the offence under s. 25(1) read together with s. 106(1) was a ‘regulation for the public welfare of a particular activity. By making the offence under s. 25(1) read with s. 106(1) an offence of strict liability, it would help the enforcement of the said laws to be more effective. In this case, the appellants had failed to prove that the offence committed by PLSB was not agreed upon by them or that they had exercised all efforts to prevent PLSB from committing such offences.”. [49] Mahkamah ini mendapati juga bahawa dari keterangan untuk pertuduhan di bawah AMLATFA, T1, T2 dan T3 tidak mencabar bahawa mereka telah menerima, memindahkan, menggunakan dan memiliki wang seperti di dalam pertuduhan-pertuduhan AMLATFA. Pembelaan T1, T2 dan T3 semata mata ialah tidak ada keterangan yang menunjukkan bayaran yang dibuat oleh tertuduh ke dalam pelbagai akaun banknya adalah transaksi yang melibatkan hasil daripada kegiatan haram. [50] Mahkamah Tinggi ini sependapat dengan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bersetuju dengan pendakwaan bahawa T1 dan T2 telah menyamarkan wang haram dan membersihkannya dengan memasukkannya ke dalam akaun-akaun lain sebelum menguruskan- nya semula. Jumlah transaksi adalah terlalu banyak dan jumlah wang yang dimasukkan dalam akaun-akaun adalah terlalu besar dalam jangka masa yang pendek dan ini telah jelas menimbulkan ‘suspicious transactions’. 85 [51] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dengan betul membuat dapatan dengan jelas bahawa transaksi-transaksi menerima, memindahkan, menggunakan dan memiliki wang seperti wang seperti di dalam pertubuhan-pertubuhan AMLATFA melibatkan wang hasil daripada wang hasil daripada kegiatan haram. Kegiatan haram telah dibuktikan oleh pendakwaan ialah kesalahan-kesalahan di bawah s. 25(1) BAFIA. [52] Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia di dalam kes PP v. Billion Nova Sdn. Bhd. & Ors [2016] 2 CLJ 763, memutuskan bahawa pihak perayu [pihak Pendakwaan] gagal membuktikan Seksyen 56(1) AMLATFA, di mana permohonan bagi pelucuthakkan wang responden -responden dalam pelbagai akaun bank dibuat, adalah berkenaan kuasa Pendakwa Raya memohon penyitaan harta di mana tiada dakwaan terhadap kesalahan di bawah s. 4(1) AMLATFA dan kuasa Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi untuk membuat perintah bagi penyitaan harta tersebut. Syarat pelaksanaan kuasa Pendakwa Raya di bawah s. 56(1) telah dipenuhi oleh perayu iaitu wang dalam pelbagai akaun bank responden-responden dilihat telah dirampas oleh perayu menurut s. 50(1) AMLATFA dan responden-responden tidak didakwa dengan kesalahan di bawah s. 4(1)(a) AMLATFA. Malah, permohonan dibuat dalam tempoh masa yang dinyatakan di bawah s. 56(1). [53] Manakala peruntukan seksyen 87(1) (a) dan (b) AMLATFA yang dibaca bersama-sama dengan pertuduhan adalah meliputi T1 dan T2 sama ada sebagai; “(a) who is its director, controller, officer, or partner; or (b) who is concerned in the management of its affairs.”. 86 [54] Mengenai pertikaian T1, T2 dan T3 berkenaan Seksyen 51A Kanun Tatacara Jenayah, Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menyatakan bahawa sekiranya pendakwa tidak memenuhi syarat di bawah seksyen 51A ianya tidak menjadikan perbicaraan itu ‘nullity’. Masa telah juga diberi kepada pembelaan untuk meneliti dokumen-dokumen yang diserahkan oleh pendakwaan sebelum dikemukakan sebagai keterangan. Ini adalah tepat dengan pindaan kepada seksyen 51A [3] dari yang asal iaitu; “(3) A document shall not be inadmissible in evidence merely because of non-compliance with subsection (1).”. Dengan itu keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen adalah betul dan tepat. [55] Maka dapatan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen yang bijaksana adalah betul dan selamat apabila memutuskan bahawa Tertuduh- Tertuduh dan T3 gagal membangkitkan keraguan yang munasabah dan pendakwaan telah membuktikan kesnya tanpa sebarang keraguan munasabah untuk kesemua pertuduhan di bawah kesalahan BAFIA dan AMLATFA dan mensabitkan T1, T2 dan T3. Dengan itu, rayuan atas sabitan oleh T1 dan T2 serta T3 adalah ditolak. KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI ATAS HUKUMAN. [56] Berikut adalah diringkaskan keputusan rayuan ke atas hukuman yang telah dibenarkan sebahagian oleh Mahkamah Tinggi ini. i) Dengan mana Hukuman penjara di bawah kesalahan s. 25(1) BAFIA ke atas T1 dikurangkan dari 6 tahun 87 penjara kepada 3 tahun penjara manakala perayu pertama dikekalkan hukuman 1 tahun penjara. Kesemua denda RM20,000 untuk setiap pertuduhan di bawah BAFIA dikekalkan untuk kedua-dua perayu dalam kesembilan pertuduhan kedua-dua perayu. ii) Hukuman penjara di bawah s. 4(1)(a) AMLATFA ke atas perayu kedua dikurangkan dari 4 tahun penjara dikurangkan kepada 2 tahun penjara. Hukuman 1 tahun penjara terhadap perayu pertama dikekalkan. iii) Manakala hukuman penjara berasingan ditukar kepada berjalan serentak kesemuanya sama ada di bawah kesalahan BAFIA atau AMLATFA. iv) Denda di bawah BAFIA dikekalkan, denda AMLATFA dibenarkan sebahagian. Kesemua denda RM20,000 untuk setiap pertuduhan di bawah BAFIA dikekalkan untuk kedua-dua perayu dalam kesembilan pertuduhan kedua-dua perayu. v) Denda ke atas Perayu Kedua di bawah AMLATFA: sebanyak RM3,000.00 jika gagal 1 bulan penjara untuk setiap kesalahan [kesemua 472 pertuduhan] dikurangkan kepada RM1,000.00 setiap pertuduhan jika gagal membayarnya dipenjara selama 10 hari penjara untuk setiap pertuduhan. 88 ALASAN MAHKAMAH TINGGI ATAS HUKUMAN. [57] Pihak tertuduh dan pendakwaan masing-masing memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia kerana tidak berpuas hati dengan penghakiman ini. Di mana tertuduh memfailkan rayuan ke atas sabitan dan hukuman kesemua pertuduhan manakala pendakwaan memfailkan rayuan ke atas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi ini mengurangkan sebahagian rayuan atas hukuman. [58] Atas hukuman pemenjaraan Mahkamah Tinggi ini berkeputusan ianya adalah tidak terlalu berat jika dibandingkan dengan hukuman penjara maksima. Oleh itu, hukuman ini adalah sah dan sederhana tidak terlampau berat dan juga tidak terlampau ringan. [59] Hukuman berjalan serentak antara kesalahan di bawah BAFIA dan AMLATFA adalah kerana ianya di bawah transaksi yang sama. Jika diberi alasan ianya dari tarikh yang berlainan sudah tentu beratus-ratus hukuman tersebut dari transaksi yang tarikh yang berbeza kebanyakannya, maka adakah perlu dipenjara secara berasingan. Jika demikian, hukuman pemenjaraan akan mencecah beribu tahun. Ini sudah tentu terlampau berat. Keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan Malaysia di dalam kes Tuan Mat Tuan Lonik v. PP [2009] 4 CLJ 638 menyatakan; “To impose a sentence that will take him until the age of 123 years old, and knowing fully well that he never will serve the full term, not only is bizarre but strains the intelligence of the court. Any illogical sentence may attract unnecessary scrutiny and negative comments from the public on how we awkwardly conduct ourselves.”. 89 [60] Manakala hukuman denda di Mahkamah Sesyen pula adalah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi ini sebagai terlalu berat apabila jumlah denda dan kegagalan membayar denda digantikan dengan pemenjaraan yang boleh mencecah sehingga beratus tahun pemenjaraan. Jika seseorang gagal membayar denda maka hukuman penjara yang diganti perlu dijalani setiap hari sepenuhnya. Di dalam kes ini yang mana terdapat pertuduhan melebihi 500 sudah tentu jika gagal membayar denda tertuduh boleh dipenjara berkurun lamanya semata-mata atas hukuman denda pada asalnya. [61] Peruntukan hukuman kesalahan di bawah s. 4 AMLATFA adalah seperti berikut: “….shall on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen years and shall also be liable to a fine of not less than five times the sum or value of the proceeds of an unlawful activity or instrumentalities of an offence at the time the offence was committed or five million ringgit, whichever is the higher.”. [62] Meneliti hukuman untuk setiap pertuduhan di bawah s. 4 AMLATFA peruntukan ialah RM5 juta oleh sebab terdapatnya perkataan “whichever is the higher.” Dengan itu denda yang sesuai dan sah untuk T1 dan T2 ialah didarap dengan 130 untuk T1 dan darap dengan 472 pertuduhan untuk T2. Jika hukuman asal di Mahkamah Sesyen pihak pendakwaan tidak memfailkan rayuan atas hukuman maka pihak pendakwaan menerimanya. 90 [63] Manakala peruntukan hukuman kesalahan di bawah BAFIA s.103(1)(a) adalah sebagai berikut: “S. 103. (1) Any person who contravenes– “(a) any provision of this Act set out in the second column of the Fourth Schedule; or (b)……. shall be guilty of an offence under such provision and shall onconviction be liable to be punished with imprisonment not exceeding the term set out in the fourth column of the Fourth Schedule or with a fine not exceeding the amount set out in the fifth column of the Fourth Schedule, or with both such imprisonment and fine, and in the case of a continuing offence, shall, in addition, be liable to be punished with a daily fine not exceeding the amount set out in the sixth column of the Fourth Schedule for every day during which the offence continues Provided that where the person found guilty of such offence is a body corporate, the punishment of imprisonment set out in the fourth column of the Fourth Schedule shall not apply to it. 5thcolumn / 4th Sch: Maximum fine RM3 million and RM3,000.00 daily fine. 4th column / 4th Sch: Maximum Imprisonment 10 years maximum.”. 91 [64] Peruntukan hukuman denda di bawah BAFIA adalah maksima RM10 juta namun perlu di ingatkan terdapat beratus pertuduhan ke atas setiap mereka bukannya satu atau dua pertuduhan. Oleh itu, prinsip hukuman adalah perlu mengikuti fakta kes masing-masing bukannya terlalu ketat menetapkan peratusan minima dari segi hukuman maksima untuk setiap pertuduhan. [65] Dengan itu Mahkamah menolak rayuan perayu-perayu atas sabitan manakala atas hukuman dibenarkan sebahagian. Bertarikh: 31 Mei 2017 t.t. ( AZMAN BIN ABDULLAH ) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Kuala Lumpur. Pihak-Pihak: Bagi pendakwaan: TPR Pn Rullizah bt. Hj Abdul Majid En Khairul Fikrie Ahmad Zubaid [Jabatan Peguam Negara Kuala Lumpur] Bagi perayu: En. Mohd Daud Leong En Devanandan S. Subramaniam En Haresh Mahadevan En Ramzani Idris [Tetuan Mohd Daud Leong & Co)

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-133-11/2016 & WA-24C-151-12/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) SQA Builders Sdn Bhd 2. ) Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd 2. ) SQA Builders Sdn Bhd

31/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5af7c188-3f88-422b-b2e3-ab6791767eb2&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-133-11/2016 In the matter of adjudication between SQA Builders Sdn Bhd and Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd And In the matter of the Adjudication Decision dated 25.10.2016 by Ar. Thurai Das Thuraisingham And In the matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) And In the matter of Order 92 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN SQA BUILDERS SDN BHD … PLAINTIFF (Company No: 455815-D) AND 2 LUXOR HOLDINGS SDN BHD … DEFENDANT (Company No: 157908-U) (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C -151-12/2016 In the matter of a Construction Contract (PAM Form of Contract – Without Quantities – 2006) between Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd (Employer) and SQA Builders Sdn Bhd (Contractor) dated 27.11.2012 And In the matter of an adjudication between SQA Builders Sdn Bhd as Claimant and Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd as Respondent (Adjudication Ref No: KLRCA/D/ADJ-0399-2016) And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision by Adjudicator, Mr Thurai Das Thuraisingham dated 25.10.2016 And 3 In the matter of an Sections 6, 13, 15, 16 and/or 26 of the Construction Industry Payment & Adjudication Act 2012 (Act 746) And In the matter of Arbitration Act 2005 (Act 646) And In the matter of Orders 7, 28 and/or 92 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN LUXOR HOLDINGS SDN BHD … PLAINTIFF (Company No: 157908-U) AND SQA BUILDERS SDN BHD … DEFENDANT (Company No: 455815-D) THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] These two applications by way of two Originating Summons is with respect to an application to enforce an adjudication decision and the other filed subsequently is for setting aside and stay of the adjudication 4 decision under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ('‘CIPAA’'). The Court directed both applications to be heard together as one is the flip side of the other and the same issue would straddle and settle both applications. [2] The issue that calls for determination is not new and has been canvassed before the Courts until the Court of Appeal. It is this issue: does the Adjudicator have jurisdiction to hear a defence raised for the first time in the Adjudication Response when there was no Payment Response served. [3] SQA Builders Sdn Bhd ("SQA") had filed in an Originating Summons dated 10.11.2016 for the enforcement of the adjudication decision dated 25.10.2016 (“the Adjudication Decision”) against Luxor Holdings Sdn Bhd ("Luxor"). Luxor thereafter filed an application to set aside the said adjudication decision by way of an Originating Summons dated 2.12.2016. Project [4] Luxor is the owner of Lot 1 (situated at Lot PT 9922, Jalan Teknologi, Kota Damansara, PJU 5, Daerah Petaling, Selangor Darul Ehsan). SQA is the contractor appointed, inter alia, to construct a 6 story office building and warehouse on Lot 1. The Construction Contract dated 5 27.11.2012 was a PAM Form of Contract (Without Quantities – 2006) with the necessary changes and modifications. The commencement of the work was on 27.11.2012 and completion was scheduled on 31.12.2013. Proceedings in Adjudication [5] SQA as Claimant in the Adjudication claimed for the Interim Certificates Nos. 25a, 26a & 27a in respect of Lot 1 against Luxor. According to Luxor there was an extension of time given until 12.09.2014. Luxor's defence raised in the first time in the Adjudication Response was that the project was only completed late on 02.02.2015 with defects in workmanship. Luxor’s counterclaim and set-off set out for the first time in its Adjudication Response were for the defective works and Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (“LAD”) against SQA. [6] The Adjudicator had little difficulty analysing the evidence of the Claimant's Payment Claim as the three Interim Certificates No. 25a, 26a and 27a found in the Adjudication Claim were issued by the Architect under the PAM Form of Contract. Furthermore there were the Quantity Surveyor's Interim Valuation for these three payment certificates and the valuations were the same as the certified payment sums by the Architect. The Adjudicator found as a matter of fact that the Architect's Payment Certificates and the Quantity Surveyor's valuations are not 6 disputed by the Respondent Luxor. See paragraphs 42-44 of the Adjudication Decision. [7] The Adjudication Decision was in favour of SQA, whereby Luxor was ordered to make a payment of RM3,497,222.59, being the adjudicated sum together with cost of the adjudication proceedings in the sum of RM55,306.70. [8] The Adjudicator held that he has no jurisdiction to hear Luxor's set- off and counterclaim not raised in the Payment Response as none was served, and so he rejected the said defence of set-off and counterclaim. Prayers [9] SQA applied to enforce the Adjudication Decision under section 28 CIPAA as there was no payment from Luxor after the expiration of 10 days from the date of the Adjudication Decision as ordered. The application is founded on the following reasons: a. The Adjudicator had considered all submissions, documents and authorities served on him by both parties; b. The Decision was delivered within 45 working days from the date of the service of the Adjudication Reply, pursuant to section 12(a) CIPAA; 7 c. The Decision was made in writing, reasoned and had set out the adjudicated sum awarded, the manner of payment and time for payment as required by sections 12(3) and 12(4) CIPAA; d. The Decision is valid and the Adjudicator did not contravene any of the provisions set out in section 15(a) – 15(d) of CIPAA. [10] SQA's learned counsel emphasized the point that in enforcing an Adjudication Decision, the Court should not dwell into whether the Adjudicator had indeed achieved the right answer but merely whether the Adjudicator had answered the right questions. He referred to the following cases in support of what is said to be a trite proposition and position of the law: Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1358; ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd [Civil Appeal No. W- 02(C)(A)-1165-07/2015]; Bouygues (UK) Limited v Dahl-Jensen (UK) Limited [2000] BLR 522; View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695. [11] Luxor had opposed the enforcement proceedings on the ground that the Adjudication Decision is invalid and liable to be set aside as the Adjudicator had erred in law in failing to consider the counter claims 8 and/or set-offs raised by Luxor against SQA’s claims in the Adjudication proceedings. [12] The grounds advanced by Luxor for setting aside the Adjudication Decision under section 15(b) and (d) CIPAA may be summarized as follows: a) The Adjudicator had breached the principles of natural justice in his failure to consider the counter-claims and/or set-offs raised by Luxor in its Adjudication Response; b) The Adjudicator had breached the principles of natural justice when it failed to give an opportunity for Luxor to be heard before coming into the said Adjudication Decision on 25.10.2016; c) The Adjudicator had acted beyond its jurisdiction when it failed to consider the counter-claims and/or set-offs raised by Luxor in its Adjudication Response; d) The Adjudicator’s failure to consider the counter-claims and/or set-offs raised by Luxor is in breach of the provisions of sections 6(4) and 26(1) CIPAA. 9 [13] For consistency of reference the parties shall be referred to by their names as SQA and Luxor or sometimes as Claimant and Respondent respectively as they appeared in the Adjudication. Principles Whether the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in not hearing the defence of counterclaim and set off raised for the first time in the Adjudication Response, there being no Payment Response served [14] The importance of a Payment Response cannot be over emphasized. It was made very clear in the case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695 where her Ladyship Mary Lim Thiam Suan J (now JCA) held that: “[66]…It may be said that by virtue of subsection 27(1), the Payment Claim and the Payment Response is to adjudication what pleadings are to civil litigation. Parties are bound by their pleadings under the rules of procedure in civil litigation; in adjudication, those pleadings are to be found in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response; and not in the Adjudication Claim, Adjudication Response or the Adjudication Reply.” 10 [15] SQA submitted that the Adjudicator in the Adjudication Proceedings is only bound by the Payment Claim and Payment Response pursuant to Section 27(1) CIPAA. The Adjudicator does not have the jurisdiction to deal with any other matters raised for the first time in the Adjudication Claim, Response and/or Reply unless parties have agreed to extend his jurisdiction. [16] In this instance, there were no agreement between both SQA and Luxor to extend the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to cover any new matters raised in the Adjudication Response specifically with regard to Luxor’s counter-claims and/or set-offs raised for the first time in its Adjudication Response. [17] The Adjudicator had deliberated on this jurisdictional challenge pursuant to section 27(1) and decided that as there was no agreement in writing between parties to extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator, the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction would be limited to matters referred to by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6 CIPAA. [18] Section 27(2) CIPAA provides as follows with respect to extending the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction beyond the matters raised or to include matters not raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response or because there was no Payment Response: 11 "27(2) The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6." (emphasis added) [19] This extension in writing has to be an agreement made between the Claimant and Respondent in the Adjudication. The Adjudicator cannot assume jurisdiction to decide on a matter not referred to in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response without the express consent in writing of both the Claimant and the Respondent in the Adjudication. The Adjudicator cannot overrule the parties if they do not or cannot agree in writing on extending the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. Should the Adjudicator decide the dispute on a matter not referred to him in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response, then he would have exceeded his jurisdiction and such a Decision would be liable to be set aside under section 15(d) CIPAA. [20] There is a prescribed form in Form 10 of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure to be used for this purpose of extending the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. Of course an agreement in writing would still be acceptable even if it does not follow the format of Form 10 so long as it is clear what is the matter that has now been referred to the Adjudicator to decide which was not previously within his jurisdiction. 12 [21] This is a case where Luxor had failed to serve a Payment Response pursuant to section 6 CIPAA. It is not a dispute whereby matters were raised in the Payment Response and the Adjudicator had failed to take into consideration or decide on the issue. This is the case where the Adjudicator had declined to exercise jurisdiction on the matter of a set-off and counter-claim for defective works and LAD claim not raised in the Payment Response. [22] The fact that Luxor in its Adjudication Response raised this defence of counterclaim and set-off of defective works and LAD and that the Claimant had objected to this new matter in its Adjudicator Reply on ground of jurisdiction but nevertheless replied and refuted the Respondent's allegations without prejudice to their objection on ground of lack of jurisdiction, does not amount to an agreement in writing to extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. [23] It does not make sense that if there is no Payment Response served then the Respondent as the non-paying party is deemed to have disputed the whole of the Payment Claim under section 6(4) CIPAA and then the non-paying party as Respondent can canvass any defences in the Adjudication Response served. There is then created a genuine disincentive to file a Payment Response where the non-paying party is confined to the reasons raised there for disputing the Payment 13 Response but that by not serving the Payment Response, the non- paying party suffers no detriment but can raise it for the first time in the Adjudication Response. [24] That sounds like smart strategy but the law simply does not allow it because the Adjudicator, unlike a High Court and Superior Courts, does not have unlimited jurisdiction. His jurisdiction is conferred by and confined to the matters raised as provided in section 27(1) CIPAA with respect to the matters raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response as follows: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator (1) Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6." [25] Section 5 is on Payment Claim and section 6 is with respect to Payment Response. [26] All that is redeeming when a Payment Response is not served either out of mistake or without appreciating the significance and importance of it is that the non-paying party is deemed to have disputed the whole of the unpaid party Payment Claim. The unpaid party cannot take a judgment in default as it were or have an Adjudication Decision in 14 default in its favour. It would still have to prove its claim but that the non- paying party cannot raise positive defences other than answering what was raised in the unpaid party's Adjudication Claim. [27] Learned counsel said that the law here is not settled yet as the Federal Court had granted leave to appeal to the Appellant from the decision of the court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717. However for the moment, the decision made by the High Court which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal remains good law and I agree with the Claimant's submission that the Adjudicator is right in following the principles decided in the View Esteem case both in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal. [28] Learned counsel for the Claimant SQA referred to the High Court the recent case of BM City Realty & Construction Sdn Bhd v Merger Insight (M) Sdn Bhd and another case [2016] MLJU 1567 where, the Respondent in the Adjudication alleged that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction in failure to consider the issue of set-off for damages, in particular its LAD claim not raised in its Payment Response. The High Court held at paragraphs 84 and 85 that: “[84] In the first place for the Adjudicator to properly consider the issue of LAD claimed as a set-off, BMCRC must raise it in its Payment Response under S 6 CIPAA so as to allow the 15 Adjudicator to assume jurisdiction in determining the issue before him. [85] It was not raised as a specific Defence of set-off but only raised for the first time in the Adjudication Response. That simply would not do…” [29] Likewise in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 941 it was observed as follows in a case where the counterclaim raised only in the Adjudication Response was not heard by the Adjudicator: "Counterclaim of applicant [10] The main point raised by the applicant is that the Adjudicator committed an error by holding that he had no jurisdiction under the CIPAA to decide on the applicant’s counterclaim of RM13,544,690.45. Counsel for applicant submitted that this alleged error resulted in a breach of natural justice as well as in a jurisdictional error. He said that the Adjudicator took a restrictive view of his jurisdiction and did not consider the counterclaim which was related to the overpayment defence. Counsel for applicant submitted that Adjudicator came to this conclusion because the applicant had not served any Payment Claim in respect of the 16 counterclaim to the respondent under section 5 of CIPAA. Counsel for applicant said that the applicant had no opportunity to address this point as it was not raised by the parties. He said that the Adjudicator could have invoked section 25 of CIPAA which grants wide ranging powers to the Adjudicator before he decided that he had no jurisdiction to consider the counterclaim. Counsel for applicant even submitted that under section 25, the Adjudicator could have appointed an independent expert to determine technical matters. With due respect, I disagree that the Adjudication Decision is tainted with “excess of jurisdiction” merely because the Adjudicator refused to decide on the counterclaim of the applicant that was raised in the Adjudication Response. My reasons are as follows. Section 27(1) of CIPAA clearly circumscribes the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. It reads as follows: 27. Jurisdiction of adjudicator (1) Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6. [11] The dispute raised in the Payment Claim is in respect of the payments allegedly due under the said Interim Claims. The 17 applicant did not file a Payment Response to raise the issue of counterclaim of RM13,544,690.45. In the premises, as the Adjudicator does not possess inherent jurisdiction, his jurisdiction is limited to the dispute raised under section 5 and 6, ie the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. Sub- section (2) provides for the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator by agreement. It reads as follows: (2) The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6. However, in the instant case, it is common ground that the parties did not execute an agreement pursuant to the above provision to extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to enable him to decide the counterclaim of the applicant. In the premises, the Adjudicator cannot be faulted for holding that he had no jurisdiction to decide the counterclaim of the applicant that was raised belatedly in the Adjudication Response. Counsel for applicant also submitted that he had no opportunity to argue the said point as it was not raised in the submissions and there it resulted in a breach of natural justice. The limits of jurisdiction of 18 the Adjudicator is a matter that is governed by law, ie section 27 of CIPAA. Therefore, there can be no breach of natural justice if the Adjudication had referred to the correct law to properly direct himself as to what he can or cannot do. In any event, although the Adjudicator declined to decide the counterclaim of the applicant that was only raised in the Adjudication Response, he considered the overpayment defence which is related to the counterclaim of the applicant. I shall consider it below." (emphasis added) [30] I agree with learned counsel for SQA that the Adjudicator had clearly not exceeded its jurisdiction in not determining the set-off and/or counterclaim as these were not pleaded by Luxor in a payment response, and therefore is outside the scope of section 27(1) CIPAA. The Adjudicator had stayed within jurisdiction and confined himself to the dispute and matters raised for his decision in the Payment Claim, there being no Payment Response filed. [31] The Adjudicator had decided the Payment Claim on its merits and so this being not an appeal, this Court would not interfere with such a Decision. Whether there was a Breach of Natural Justice when the Adjudicator did not hear the defence of counterclaim and set off 19 raised for the first time in the Adjudication Response, there being no Payment Response filed [32] Luxor had also alleged that by failing to consider its LAD claim, there was a breach of natural justice and therefore the Decision ought to be set aside. The Court of Appeal in ACFM Engineering (supra) had laid out the principles with regard to an allegation of breach of natural justice in the context of CIPAA by stating that ‘when one speaks of natural justice, it is nothing more than what we call the concept of “procedural fairness” which needs to be accorded to the parties in dispute of a hearing’. [33] In the case of Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) the Court held inter alia that it is only a breach of natural justice if the adjudicator goes off on a frolic of his own, that is wishing to decide a case upon a factual or legal basis which has not been argued or put forward by either side, without giving the parties an opportunity to comment or, where relevant, put in further evidence. If either party has argued a particular point and the other party does not come back on the point, there is no breach of the rules of natural justice in relation thereto. [34] Luxor had relied on two main grounds in its allegation that there has been a breach of natural justice, namely: 20 a. Failure to consider Luxor’s LAD claim and/or counterclaims; b. Failure to allow Luxor to be heard. [35] Learned counsel for Luxor referred to the case of Thermal Energy Construction Limited v AE & E Lentjes UK Limited [2009] EWHC 408 (TCC) (High court), where His Lordship Davies J, at paragraphs 16, 26 & 37, observed as follows: “16. ... What Mr. Furst has submitted is that this is a case where the Defendant, having raised the defence of set-off and counterclaim, was entitled to have the Adjudicator consider that question, and the Adjudicator was indeed obliged to consider that question as being one of the matters raised by the Defendant in its defence. He submits that by failing to do so, that failure being evidenced by an absence of any reasons given in relation to that element of the defence, the Adjudicator failed to comply with his obligations under the contractual adjudication scheme. ... 26. It seems to me that in those circumstances, the position is that the Adjudicator has not, evidently, dealt with this issue at all, and he has not given any reasons which would indicate that 21 he has dealt with this issue. That this is therefore one of those cases, one envisages rare, where the Adjudicator has failed to comply with his obligations. ... 37. For all these reasons I have reached the conclusion that this is one of those relatively rare cases where the Court must decline to enforce the decision of the Adjudicator.” (emphasis added) [36] In the case of PC Harrington Contractors Limited v Tyroddy Construction Limited [2011] EWHC 813 (TCC) (High Court), His Lordship Akenhead J, in paragraphs 21(e) & (g), decided that: “(e) It seems to me, therefore, that, by wrongly deciding that this was a matter outside his jurisdiction, he put himself in the position whereby he did not consider the final account evidence and argument in any detail or indeed really at all. He has, therefore, put himself in a comparably similar position to the adjudicators in the CJP v William Verry and the Humes Building Contractors cases in that, by ruling on his jurisdiction in such a way that he has denied himself the opportunity to consider the merits of the exercise which 22 Harrington had asked him to determine, he has committed a breach of natural justice.” (emphasis inherent) ... (g) These points are material and certainly more than peripheral breaches of the rules of natural justice. ... The consequence of the above is that on this ground the decisions of the Adjudicator should not be enforce.” (emphasis added) [37] In the case of Paul Boardwell t/a Boardwell Construction v k3D Property Partnership Ltd [2006] Adj. C.S. 04/21 (High Court), His Lordship HHJ Raynor, QC, decided that: “... The Defendant relied upon paragraph 49 of Quietfield Ltd v Vascroft Contractors Ltd [2006] EWHC 174 (TCC) and more particularly paragraph 51 – “... the adjudicator ought to have considered Vascroft’s substantive defence, but he failed to do so. In those circumstances, as Quietfield have fairly conceded, the adjudicator’s decision cannot be enforced because he failed to abide by the rules of natural justice.” (emphasis added) 23 [38] The Court refused to uphold the Adjudicator’s decision in the Claimant’s favour. [39] A similar decision can be found in the case of Buxton Building Contractors Ltd v Govenors of Durand Primary School [2004] EWHC 733 (TCC) (High Court). [40] According to learned counsel for Luxor, based upon the aforesaid cases, it is clear that the failure of the Adjudicator to consider and determine the Luxor's counterclaim and/or set-off for the defective works and LAD, is/are a breach of the principles of natural justice, i.e. the audi alteram partem rule. As such, the Adjudication Decision ought to be set aside. [41] Those cases referred to by learned counsel for Luxor are cases where the defence of counterclaim and set-off had been properly raised before the Adjudicator. Where these have been properly raised and pleaded, it would be a breach of natural justice for the Adjudicator not to have considered the defence altogether. [42] Furthermore the UK scheme of statutory adjudication does not have the equivalent of our section 27(1) with respect to restricting matters that an Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide to matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. In the UK jurisdiction 24 the matters and disputes for the adjudicator to decide is found in the Notice of Adjudication and the Referral Notice served by the referring party under Regulation 1(1) of the Schedule to The Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 for cases where the construction contract does not comply with the requirements of Section 108(1)-(4) of the Housing Grant, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 ("HGCRA"). What is stated in Regulation 1(3) with respect to the contents of the Notice of Adjudication is similar to our section 5(2) of our Payment Claim. [43] Under Regulation 7(1) where an adjudicator has been selected the Referring Party shall not later than seven days from the date of the Notice of Adjudication, refer the dispute in writing ("the Referral Notice") to the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator under Regulation 13 may take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law necessary to determine the dispute. He shall consider any relevant information submitted to him by any of the parties to the dispute and shall make available to them any information to be taken into account in reaching his decision. The other relevant regulation is Regulation 20 where the adjudicator shall decide the matters in dispute and "may take into account any other matters which the parties to the dispute agree should be within the scope 25 of the adjudication or which are matters under the contract which he considers are necessarily connected with the dispute..." [44] The emphasis in the Schedule to The Scheme for Construction Contracts (England and Wales) Regulations 1998 under the HGCRA seems to be to ascertain the scope of the dispute as carved out in the Notice of Adjudication and the Referral Notice and that the Respondent may dispute the claim in the documents that the adjudicator would direct the Respondent to file. [45] The Adjudicator had acknowledged these set-offs and/or counterclaims raised by Luxor in its Adjudication Response at paragraphs 19 to 22 of the Adjudication Decision but decided that as there was no Payment Response filed by Luxor pursuant to section 6 CIPAA, the set-offs and/or counterclaim would not fall within his jurisdiction pursuant to section 27(1) CIPAA. There is no equivalent in the UK of a Payment Response to be served before the adjudicator is appointed where the reasons for disputing the Payment Claim must be set out, for otherwise the non-paying party is deemed to have disputed the whole of the Payment Claim. [46] There is no question of procedural unfairness in the Adjudication proceedings as Luxor was given the opportunity to file its Payment Response within 10 working days from the receipt of the Payment Claim. 26 The importance of the filing of payment response was set out by his Lordship Sundaresh Menon CJ in the Singapore Court of Appeal case of WY Steel Construction Pte Ltd v Osko Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 32. This case was quoted in the Malaysian Court of Appeal case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings [2016] 6 MLJ 717 as follows: “[49]… I find the decision of the Court of Appeal Singapore in WY Steel Construction Pte Ltd v Osko Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 32 provides useful guidance on the point and I quote from the judgment of Lordship Sundaresh Menon CJ: 40. …A respondent is given a chance to respond to a payment claim by producing, first, a payment response and then (if the claimant proceeds to apply for adjudication of his payment claim) an adjudication response. If he fails to provide a payment response and if, as a result, the adjudicator is mandated not to consider material that he seeks to introduce later, he has not been denied his right and opportunity to be heard. Rather, he has simply chosen not to exercise it and the rules of natural justice cannot then be called in aid. Simply put, in such a scenario, the respondent has had his opportunity, for the purposes of the hearing that culminates in the provisional 27 ruling that has temporary finality, to make his case and he has failed to take that opportunity."(emphasis added) [47] Luxor had also alleged that it was not given the right to be heard on its set-offs and/or counterclaims. I agree with the Claimant SQA that it is unclear from the affidavits filed by Luxor on the exact reason for this ground as there was no specific request from Luxor for an oral hearing before the Adjudicator. In fact natural justice does not necessarily mean the decision-maker has to meet the parties face to face – "Natural justice does not generally demand orality". See Rok Building Ltd v Celtic Composting Systems Ltd (No.2) (2010) 130 Con LR 74 at 87; R. (Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd.) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] EWCA Civ 329, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 255 at 286 and the case of Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd v Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd & another case [2017] MLJU 377 at para [66]. [48] Furthermore, there was no obstruction or limitation imposed by the Adjudicator on the submission of evidence or documents by the Respondent Luxor in its Adjudication Response. The Respondent was given every opportunity to file in its Payment Response and Adjudication Response and the Adjudicator had taken into consideration both parties’ arguments and decided the SQA’s claims on its merits. 28 [49] There is no automatic or inherent right for an oral hearing in an adjudication proceeding under CIPAA as was held in Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd & Anor case [2017] 1 CLJ 101. The Adjudicator has broad powers to conduct an Adjudication proceeding under section 25 CIPAA and part of which is reproduced below: "25. Powers of the Adjudicator The adjudicator shall have the powers to— (a) Establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties; ... (f) Call for meetings with the parties; (g) Conduct any hearing and limiting the hearing time; ..." [50] The Court would be slow to interfere with the way the Adjudicator went about in conducting the hearing unless the way he went about it was grossly unfair or blatantly a breach of natural justice in that the parties were not heard at all or that only one party was heard. An oral hearing is not a requirement of natural justice. 29 [51] The above principle of course cannot be stretched out of context in requiring that a matter must be heard orally even though that matter is not within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator in that it was not properly raised under section 27(1) CIPAA. [52] Surely it cannot be a breach of natural justice not to hear a matter not properly raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response for if it were a breach of natural justice, then to avoid that by hearing the matter not so raised, the Adjudicator would be acting in excess of jurisdiction under section 27(1) CIPAA! Parliament had not intended a situation where for the same issue, the Adjudicator would be damned if he does not hear and damned if he does hear. [53] If Luxor's complaint is that they should be heard before the ruling of the Adjudicator on the issue of jurisdiction, then there is no indication that they had requested for this other than that they have put in their Adjudication Response and that in the Adjudication Reply of SQA the objection on jurisdiction had been raised. [54] In any event this Court on an issue of jurisdiction in a setting aside application under section 15(b) and (d) CIPAA would hear the issue afresh, independent of and unfettered by the reasons given by the Adjudicator on his ruling on jurisdiction. 30 [55] This is not a case where the Adjudicator heard one party and not the other on a jurisdictional challenge. This is one where the matter having been raised by the Claimant, the Adjudicator inquired into his jurisdiction and decided accordingly. It has not been shown how his ruling on jurisdiction has been wrong and so this ground of setting aside on breach of natural justice is totally devoid of merits. Whether there has been contravention of section 6(4) and 26(1) CIPAA by the Adjudicator [56] Luxor in its setting aside application had also raised that the Adjudicator's decision in not considering the counter-claims and/or set- offs in SQA’s claim due to the absence of a Payment Response is in breach of the provisions of Section 6(4) and 26(1) of CIPAA. [57] As stated section 6(4) is there to prevent a default Adjudication Decision from being given by the Adjudicator. Granted even the Claimant itself may serve a Payment Claim without the same being drafted by solicitors or be served by solicitors on their letterhead, the non-paying party receiving it might not perceive it as a legal document requiring a response in writing within 10 working days of receipt of it if the non-paying party is disputing the Payment Claim. 31 [58] All that section 6(4) says is that the non-paying party is deemed to have disputed the whole of the Payment Claim. In other words the unpaid party is then put to proof of its Payment Claim and the Adjudicator must be satisfied as to the validity and veracity of the claim before allowing it. [59] I cannot see how section 6(4) CIPAA had been breached in this case as the Adjudicator proceeded to consider the Payment Claim on its merits by analysing the documents submitted to see if the Payment Claim is substantiated. [60] Learned counsel for Luxor referred to the case of Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC) (High Court), where His Lordship Akenhead J, at pages 18 & 19, decided that: “[54] It is, I believe, accepted by both parties, correctly in my view, that whatever dispute is referred to the adjudicator, it includes and allows for any ground open to the responding party which would amount in law or in fact to a defence of the claim with which it is dealing. Authority for that proposition includes KNS Industrial Services (Birmingham) Ltd v Sindall Ltd (2001) 75 ConLR 71. 32 [55] ... In my view, one should look at the essential claim which has been made and the fact that it has been challenged as opposed to the precise grounds upon which it has been rejected or not accepted. Thus it is open to any defendant to raise any defence to the claim when it is referred to adjudication or arbitration. ...The adjudicator or arbitrator must then resolve the referred dispute, which is essentially the challenged claim or assertion but can consider any argument, evidence or other material for or against the disputed claim or assertion in resolving that dispute.” (emphasis added) [61] The provisions in the UK is of course different from our CIPAA. In that case, the Court was referring to a defence that was properly raised as disputing the Claimant's claim and so therefore in such a case the defence raised must be considered by the Adjudicator. [62] Learned counsel for Luxor also referred to the case of Quartzelec Limited v Honeywell Control Systems Limited [2008] EWHC 3315 (TCC) (High Court), where His Lordship Stephen Davies J, in paragraph 30, observed as follows: “I respectfully agree with what is said by Akenhead J (i.e. paragraphs 54 and 55 above). Where the dispute referred to adjudication by a claimant is one which involves a claim to be 33 paid money, it is difficult to see why a respondent should not be entitled to raise any defence open to him to defend himself against the claim, regardless of whether or not it was raised as a discrete ground of defence in the run-up to the adjudication, and subject to any considerations of natural justice. The adjudicator has jurisdiction to, and should, consider any such defence.” (emphasis added) [63] He rounded up with his trilogy of cases by citing the case of Quietfield Ltd v Vascroft Contractors Ltd [2006] EWHC 174 (TCC) (High Court), where His Lordship Jackson J, at page 40, affirmed that: “[49] ... Vascroft was entitled in this adjudication to advance any available defence, irrespective of whether that defence had been notified when the relevant dispute arose (see William Verry (Glazing Systems) Ltd v Furlong Homes Ltd [2005] EWHC 138 (TCC).” (emphasis added) [64] I have no quarrel with the proposition that a non-paying party should be allowed to advance any ground which would amount in law or in fact to a defence of the claim provided always that under our scheme of statutory adjudication it is raised under section 6 and subject to the conferring and confining jurisdiction provision under section 27(1) CIPAA. 34 [65] With regard to Luxor’s allegation of a breach of Section 26(1) and (2) of CIPAA, SQA submitted at the outset that this was never pleaded by Luxor during the adjudication proceedings proper. [66] SQA referred to the Court of Appeal judgment of Justice Dr. Prasad Sandosham Abraham JCA in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717 at p 748 wherein His Lordship held that: “[42] To come within the purview of section 26(1), a party must invoke the provisions of section 26(2) of CIPA relying on the subsection most suitable to the facts of the dispute before the adjudicator. [43] The appellant should have move the adjudicator formally to allow matters not raised under the payment response pursuant to Section 26(2)(b)/(c) of the said section. The adjudicator would have had to deal with that question and rule accordingly and such a ruling would not in my view be reviewable. If the adjudicator had refused to entertain the application on a point of jurisdiction, then the same would be subject to review” [67] From the facts of the case, the appellant in the case had in fact submitted a payment response and was seeking to add further 35 counterclaims. This is very much different from the facts of this adjudication where Luxor did not file any payment response and also did not make a formal application to the Adjudicator during the course of the proceedings pursuant to section 26 CIPAA. As such, I agree that Luxor’s allegation that there has been a breach of section 26 is clearly baseless and without merits. [68] Even if the Respondent Luxor in the Adjudication had asked the Adjudicator to invoke his power under section 26(2) CIPAA, it is doubtful if the Adjudicator could extend his jurisdiction to consider matters not raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response otherwise than by agreement in writing of the parties under section 27(2) CIPAA. [69] It would appear that an Adjudicator would only have the discretion to exercise his powers under section 26 CIPAA if in the first place he already has the jurisdiction under section 27(1) or 27(2) CIPAA. As stated, vast as his powers are, where his jurisdiction is concerned, he cannot venture outside the Payment Claim and Payment Response unless the parties agree in writing to extend his jurisdiction. It is only when the Adjudicator has jurisdiction that he can venture to exercise his powers under section 26 to waive irregularities or to abridge time for compliance with the filing or service of documents. 36 Whether being a final claim with the completion of the works the Claimant should not have proceeded with Adjudication but with Arbitration [70] Luxor had also in its setting aside application averred that the said Adjudication Decision ought to be set aside as parties ought to have referred the dispute to arbitration instead, in accordance to the Contract. [71] I agree with SQA that its right to refer a payment dispute under the Contract is a statutory right created under the introduction of CIPAA and should not be circumvented by the operation of Clause 34.1 of the PAM Form of Contract 2006. In any event, section 37 CIPAA provides that an adjudication proceeding, arbitration and court litigation may proceed concurrently and in parallel. [72] In the case of Martego Sdn Bhd v Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd, (supra)this Court observes at paragraph 88 and 89 as follows: “[88] To accede to Martego’s argument would mean that where there is an arbitration clause in a construction contract which is no different from an arbitration clause provided for in the Architect’s Act, then there can be no adjudication of a payment claim under CIPAA. That can only lead to a disastrous situation for almost all standard form construction contract would have an arbitration 37 clause and surely that cannot mean that as arbitration is the agreed mode of dispute resolution then adjudication cannot apply at all. [89] Statutory adjudication does not require the agreement of the parties to commence the process and prevails over any contractual agreements to the contrary between the parties. Statutory adjudication stand alone and aloof of all other alternative modes of dispute resolution like arbitration or litigation. In Ranhill E&C Sdn Bhd v Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1435 the High Court held at paragraph [40] of the judgment that “…the right to refer to adjudication is a statutory right the (SIC) cannot be rendered meaningless by reason of a good contractual promise to arbitrate” (emphasis added)” [73] No where in the Act is it stated that a Claimant is prohibited from proceeding with Adjudication under CIPAA if the claim is based on a final certificate or that the works have been completed. [74] The meaning of a "Payment Claim" is wide enough under CIPAA to cover even a claim based on a final certificate or claim. "Payment" is defined under section 4 to mean a "payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." So long as 38 a Payment Claim complies with the requirements of section 5 CIPAA, one would be entitled to bring a claim in Adjudication whether it be a final certificate or claim. [75] Even if the definition is such that it is doubtful whether a claim based on a final certificate or claim is within the scope of CIPAA, then one may be permitted to look at the purpose of CIPAA. The long title to the Act encapsulated its purpose as follows: "An Act to facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters." (emphasis added) [76] I do not accept that a final certificate or final progress claim is not related to a regular or timely payment and that it does not fall within the purview of CIPAA 2012. It is only too obvious that a progression in a continuum of claim would end with a final claim either under a final progress claim or certificate. [77] The purpose of CIPAA is not just in facilitating regular and timely payment for construction works but rather for the construction industry as a whole. The Act is concerned with the construction industry as a 39 whole and not just claims as arising out of construction works done for a construction project which the Respondent Luxor now says is not affected as the works have been completed. It would be an awfully artificial distinction if one were to take the view that as the works or project has been completed, the protection of recovery of payment is no longer present. [78] It would be difficult to tell a contractor that as he has been more resourceful in sourcing for funding perhaps even at a high interest rate to complete the project and that he has been more persevering in completing the works and in patiently waiting for the last payment to come with the issuance of the final certificate or final progress claim, he has no protection under CIPAA. Neither is it realistic to expect a contractor to have only one project at a time and that should he be successful in completing one project, he will just have to patiently wait for the payment due under the final certificate or final progress claim for that claim is not one that is amenable to the speedy resolution of dispute under CIPAA. [79] In Singapore, in the case of Tiong Seng Contractors Pte Ltd v Chuan Lim Construction Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 364, where the issue to be decided on was whether the term “progress payment” includes “final progress payment”, the High Court held as follows at page 5-6: 40 “[27] Looking at the structure and wording of the provision, it appears that an exclusion of “final payment” from the ambit of the Act can only be justified by express wording to that effect. It would not suffice to infer a legislative intention to exclude simply on the basis that “final payments” were not included in a non-exhaustive supplementary definition, ostensibly provided for clarification. If the Legislature had intended to exclude final claims from the adjudicatory ambit of the Act, it could have clearly included a proviso or provision to that effect. In the absence of such express exclusion, the primary broad-ranging definition in the main limb must be determinative. [28] In addition, a plain reading of “a payment that is based on an event or a date” or a “single or one-off payment” clearly encompasses final payments. Such a conclusion is vindicated by the fact that the Act at no time makes any distinction between “final claims” and “non-final claims”. Implying such a distinction from the supplementary limb would severely impair the protection afforded by the Act, as it would create a carte blanche for contractor to renege on the final stages of payment, which would have an equally deleterious effect on cash flow affecting other ongoing construction projects.” 41 ... ... [33] From the above extract, it appears that the Act is primarily directed at safeguarding the continued financial viability of contractors who are victims of payment delays or disputes made in bad faith perpetuated by upstream contracting parties. From this perspective, it makes no sense to draw an artificial distinction between allegedly “final” and “non final” payments, as the withholding of either would create the exact same downstream ripple effect intended to be “deterred and weeded out” by the Act.” (emphasis added) [80] The Singapore Court of Appeal in Lee Wee Lick Terence (alias Li Weili Terence) v Chua Say Eng (formerly trading as Weng Fatt Construction Engineering) and another appeal [2013] 1 SLR 401 in affirming that their Security of Payment Act applied to a final claim held as follows at page 438: “95 The other point to note in this case is that PC6 was a final claim for payment and not a progress payment. The Act is expressed to apply to progress payments (s 5). The expressions “progress payment” is defined in s 2 as follows: 42 ... Even though no argument has been made to us on whether a final payment is a progress payment as defined, it seems to us that the definition is wide enough to include a final payment as it is payment, albeit final, to which a person is entitled for the carrying out of construction works (see also Tiong Seng Contractors (Pte) Ltd v Chuan Lim Construction Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR (R) 364 at [27].” [81] Under the Singapore Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Chapter 30B) a "progress claim" under its section 2 means a payment to which a person is entitled for the carrying out of construction work, or the supply of goods or services, under a contract, and includes - (a) a single or one-off payment; or (b) a payment that is based on an event or a date... [82] I see no good reason why the Payment Claim that includes a final progress claim or certificate should be outside the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to decide. 43 [83] Learned counsel for Luxor raised the fear of multiplicity of proceedings but that fear has been addressed in section 37 which reads as follows: "37. Relationship Between Adjudication and Other Dispute Resolution Process (1) A dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. (2) Subject to subsection (3), a reference to arbitration or the court in respect of a dispute which is being adjudicated shall not bring the adjudication proceedings to an end nor affect the adjudication proceedings. (3) An adjudication proceeding is terminated if the dispute being adjudicated is settled by agreement in writing between the parties or decided by arbitration or the court. [84] It would be an infantile fixation to fear of multiplicity of proceedings when Parliament had intended the decision in arbitration or the court of the same dispute to override that of adjudication. A speedy dispute resolution mechanism in Adjudication producing a decision of temporary 44 finality cannot be said to be the precursor to a multiplicity of proceedings simply because they operate on separate tracks. [85] This Court was informed by Luxor in their written submission that the costs of the present Adjudication Decision alone, as decided by the Adjudicator, is RM55,306.70. Luxor then submitted that it is obviously wrong, for the parties to incur, at least, another RM55,306.70 for the fresh Adjudication or Arbitration proceeding on the said defective works and LAD. [86] Luxor has failed to see it from the contractor's perspective in that had Luxor paid based on the Interim Certificates issued, there would have been no necessity for this Adjudication for work already done by the Claimant and so the parties only need to proceed with arbitration for the rectification works and LAD claim if there is still a dispute. As it is arbitration has not even commenced with a Notice to Arbitrate whereas the Adjudication has been concluded. The speedy and swift mechanism through Adjudication to facilitate regular and timely payment for work done is certainly working. Whether the Adjudicator should not have decided on the jurisdictional challenge raised and instead should have proceeded to complete the adjudication proceedings as if he had jurisdiction 45 [87] Learned counsel for Luxor submitted that it is trite law that an Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to decide his own jurisdiction. He cited the following cases in support of the said proposition: a) PC Harrington Contractors LTD v Systech International Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1371 (Court of Appeal). Davis MR, in paragraph 31, inter alia, decided that: “31. ... Even the adjudicator’s decision on the jurisdiction issue to which I referred at para 3 above was of no value in itself. It did not produce a decision which was binding in any future adjudication: it well established that an adjudicator does not have inherent power to decide his own jurisdiction: see Coulson, Construction Adjudication (2nd edition) at para 7.09.” (emphasis added) b) Pegram Shopfitters Ltd v Tally Weijl (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1750 (Court of Appeal), May LJ, in paragraph 10, inter alia, decided that: “10. ... that the adjudicator has no jurisdiction to decide his own jurisdiction ...” c) Lorraine Lee v Chartered Properties (Building) Limited [2010] EWHC 1540 (TCC) (High Court), Akenhead J, in paragraph 23, inter alia, decided that: 46 “23. ... I disagree because he (Adjudicator) had no authority or jurisdiction to decide his own jurisdiction.” [88] The rationale, it seems, for an Adjudicator to have no jurisdiction to decide his own jurisdiction is because no one may be a judge in his own cause, i.e. nemo judex in causa sua. [89] Learned counsel for Luxor then sought to persuade this Court that the Adjudicator’s decision on his own jurisdiction as shown in paragraph 34 of the Adjudication Decision, is void ab initio and ultra vires. Consequently, he submitted that the said Adjudication decision ought not to be enforced and indeed, ought to be set aside. [90] That is not the position in UK under their scheme of statutory adjudication if learned counsel is saying that each time an Adjudicator decides on the issue of his own jurisdiction then the Court must ipso facto set aside his decision, rightly or wrongly made, because to begin with the Adjudicator cannot decide on that issue at all. [91] Coulson J himself explained the position of a jurisdictional challenge and an adjudicator's decision in the matter in Pilon Ltd v Breyer Group Plc [2010] EWHC 837 (TCC) as follows "4. Was the adjudicator’s decision on his own jurisdiction binding on the parties? 47 11 On behalf of Pilon, Ms Gough contended that the adjudicator’s decision, to the effect that he did not have the jurisdiction to consider the alleged overpayment on batches 1-25, was temporarily binding on the parties. She submitted that the parties had debated the question of jurisdiction before the adjudicator, and he had reached a decision on it, so that, whether he was right or wrong, that decision was at least temporarily binding on the parties and therefore the court. Thus, she argued, the jurisdiction point now taken by Breyer was simply not open to them on this application for summary judgment. 12 I am unable to accept that submission. The law on this topic is clear. Jurisdictional issues often arise during the course of an adjudication, and it is usually sensible for the parties to ask the adjudicator to investigate the issue and state his conclusion. But, unless the parties have also agreed to be bound by the result of the adjudicator’s investigation into his own jurisdiction, his ruling on that issue will not be determinative, and the challenger can defeat any subsequent enforcement proceedings by showing a respectable case that the adjudicator had reached an erroneous conclusion as to jurisdiction: see, in particular, para 10 of the judgment of May LJ 48 in Pegram Shopfitters Ltd v Tally Weijl (UK) Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 1750; [2004] 1 WLR 2082; [2004] 1 All ER 818."(emphasis added) [92] To be sure section 27(3) reads as follows: "(3) Notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, the adjudicator may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28(1)." (emphasis added) [93] What is obvious is that a discretion is vested in the Adjudicator with respect to whether he may proceed to decision or not to proceed at all or to proceed only with respect to matters that he is clear he has jurisdiction to decide. If Parliament had wanted the Adjudicator to proceed to completing the Adjudication without deciding on the issue of his jurisdiction then the word used would have been "shall." Otherwise an Adjudicator who is convinced that based on the submissions filed, he should decline jurisdiction, he must nevertheless doggedly decide to continue to completing the Adjudication because section 27(3) bars him from deciding this issue of his jurisdiction and compels him to disregard the jurisdictional challenge raised other than to record it and to decide the dispute as if he has jurisdiction. 49 [94] Thus if a jurisdictional challenge is raised in that a counterclaim and set-off is outside the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator for non- compliance with section 27(1) CIPAA, then the Adjudicator may proceed to decide if that is indeed so, for if he does not have jurisdiction, then he would have exceeded his jurisdiction if he should proceed to decide on matters not raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. [95] If the issue is too difficult for him to decide, he may proceed as if he does have jurisdiction and leave it to the party aggrieved with his decision to set it aside under section 15(d) CIPAA. [96] I do not think CIPAA requires of the Adjudicator to act against his conviction and conscience when considering the issue of jurisdiction and that he should snuff and suppress that and proceed to decide on the assumption he has jurisdiction. [97] To be clear there is no prohibition against him deciding on a jurisdictional challenge. For example if the challenge is raised that the Adjudicator should decline jurisdiction as there was evidence before him that there are circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality and independence in spite of his earlier declaration in writing under section 24 CIPAA, then I think if he is satisfied that the concern is justified, he should decline jurisdiction. 50 [98] I cannot say that the Act requires of him especially section 27(3) that he must proceed irrespective of the concerns raised by one of the parties and that even if he is satisfied that the jurisdictional challenge raised is valid he must nevertheless act against his conscience and conviction that he should decline jurisdiction. [99] There are also cases where the jurisdictional challenge is obvious such as in a case where the claimant is a natural person and the dispute is with respect to a building less than four storeys high which is wholly intended for his occupation under section 3 CIPAA. [100] Clearly we do not expect the Adjudicator to pretend and assume he has jurisdiction and to continue to complete the adjudication, only to have it set aside. It would be a waste of time and resources to continue when it is obvious that the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction. There would also be the corresponding question as to whether he would be entitled to his fees and who would bear the costs and expenses of the adjudication if the matter that is so obvious is confirmed by the Court in a setting aside application as in that the Adjudicator had no threshold or core jurisdiction to begin with as in the adjudication could not even be set on train. [101] I can understand that where the jurisdictional challenge raised is a difficult one with respect to threshold or core jurisdiction in some matters 51 like whether the contract is one a construction contract in that it is a ship that has been converted into a Floating Production Storage and Off- loading ("FPSO") platform and work is being done on that FPSO with respect to oil and gas production and the jurisdictional challenge that the FPSO is a ship and so the work done on a ship is not construction work. See the case of MIR Valve Sdn Bhd v TH Heavy Engineering Berhad [2017] AMEJ 0538. [102] An Adjudicator has a strict time frame to complete the Adjudication Proceedings and deliver his Decision and in that sense he is not required to, as it were, crack his head over a complex issue of jurisdiction if he is not minded to. The saving grace is found in section 27(3) CIPAA in that any party aggrieved by his decision given in excess of jurisdiction may apply to set it aside under section 15(d) CIPAA. [103] I cannot see how an Adjudicator could have committed as it were an unpardonable sin merely because he decided on the jurisdictional challenge correctly but because he should not have decided it, that decision made whilst correct where jurisdiction is concerned has nevertheless to be set aside, only to have it re-adjudicated again! [104] Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) while sitting in the Construction Court in Kuala Lumpur had occasion to address this in Ranhill E&C Sdn 52 Bhd v Tioxide (M) Sdn Bhd & other appeals [2015] MLJU 1873 as follows: "[41] But first, let me say that this issue of the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to hear and determine the dispute to start with is one that may or may not be disposed of by the adjudicator. The fact that an adjudicator decides on the issue, as was the case with Adjudicator Leon, or declines to do so, as was the case with Adjudicator Murali, is no reason to say that either is wrong or right. [42] This issue of jurisdiction in any sense, whether that of the adjudicator’s competence to hear the dispute, or whether the dispute concerned a matter that was within CIPAA 2012, may be brought up and dealt with at the adjudication proceedings. The fact that it was not; or, if brought up, how it was dealt with, does not deprive any party from raising the same issue again in proceedings in Court, be it in the setting aside application; or any other proceedings. [43] The reasons are quite simple: at the time of the adjudication proceedings, the adjudicator should be allowed to get on with the substantive issues given the strict and limiting conditions that adjudication operates within. The fact that section 15 recognises the ground of excess of jurisdiction, without defining 53 the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’, indicates that a challenge of jurisdiction is not lost if it was not raised in the adjudication proceedings; or if raised, cannot be brought up again. In either of our present situations, and we have two contrasting approaches, the adjudicators were not wrong; neither were the parties." (emphasis added) [105] An Adjudicator is not required to stop the whole proceedings and refer the jurisdictional challenge to the Court for decision or that the party raising the jurisdictional challenge is entitled to stay the proceedings and have the matter referred to Court before the Adjudicator may validly proceed. That would be to defeat the purpose of CIPAA with its speedy procedure to determine the issue of the unpaid party's claim. [106] Parliament deems it faster and neater for the Adjudicator to exercise his discretion to proceed as if he has jurisdiction without having to contradict himself and for the issue of jurisdiction to be raised afresh during the setting aside application under section 15 CIPAA where the Court hearing the issue of jurisdictional challenge will decide independently without being bound by the reasons given by the Adjudicator in deciding either way and also where he has not decided at all. 54 [107] Viewed in that light, there really is no difficulty if the Adjudicator should rule on the jurisdictional challenge raised if it is a case where he should be careful to confine himself to the jurisdiction conferred on him by virtue of section 27(1) CIPAA. Having delineated and defined his jurisdiction under section 27(1) I do not think that Parliament wanted him to disregard his jurisdiction under section 27(1) the moment a party should raise a jurisdictional challenge as in contending that a matter is within or without his jurisdiction. In a difficult case he may understandably proceed without deciding but in a clear case, he would risk having exceeded his jurisdiction if he were to decide on the assumption that he has jurisdiction. At any rate the ruling he made on a jurisdictional challenge is a non-binding ruling in that when raised in a setting aside application under section 15(d) CIPAA, the Court would consider the matter afresh and not be fettered in any way by the reasons given by the adjudicator for deciding one way or the other on jurisdiction. [108] Indeed the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717 would discourage any matter arising in the course of an Adjudication to be brought to the High Court for determination other than under a section 15 application to set aside or a section 16 application for stay of the adjudication decision and 55 understandably so, for the strict timeline might be scuttled otherwise. His Lordship Hamid Sultan JCA expounded as follows: "[20] Once the adjudication is triggered, the only way to challenge the adjudication award in Malaysia is to make an application to set aside the award. There is no provision unlike the Arbitration Act 2005 (‘the AA 2005’) to make separate challenges on the issue of jurisdiction, biasness, qualification of adjudicator, etc. That is to say, there cannot be an application as in the instant case to challenge the jurisdiction of the adjudicator purportedly under s 41 of the CIPAA 2012. We take the view that the learned trial judge ought to have dismissed the purported s 41 application at limine. The purported s 41 complaint (if any) can only be raised in an application to set aside the adjudication award. The provisions in statutes and case laws in other jurisdiction may differ. [21] Unlike the AA 2005, the CIPAA 2012 does not provide active or passive remedy. The one and only remedy to question the adjudicator or adjudication process or jurisdiction, etc is pursuant to s 15 to be read with s 13 of the CIPAA 2012. These are the hallmark sections of the CIPAA 2012 to demonstrate that it is a summary process and the court jurisdiction is limited to setting aside of the award and/or stay of the award under s 16. 56 There is no jurisdiction for the court to hear a purported application under s 41 of the CIPAA 2012." (emphasis added) [109] His Lordship also considered the Singapore position under their system of Statutory Adjudication by referring to the Singapore Court of Appeal case in Lee Wee Lick Terence (alias Li Weili Terence) v Chua Say Eng (formerly trading as Weng Fatt Construction Engineering) and another appeal [2013] 1 SLR 401 as follows: "[28] Chan Sek Keong CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal related to the jurisdiction or power of the adjudicator, had this to say: "36. In our view, if the respondent’s objection to the jurisdiction or power of the adjudicator to conduct the adjudication is based on an invalid appointment, such a jurisdictional issue should be raised immediately with the court and not before the adjudicator. The reason is that since the objection is against the adjudicator’s jurisdiction as an adjudicator, he has no power to decide if he has jurisdiction or not. He cannot decide his own competency to act as an adjudicator when such competency is being challenged by the respondent. An adjudicator who decides the issue may face one or other of the following 57 consequences. If he accepts the respondent’s objection and dismisses the payment claim, the claimant may commence court proceedings against him to compel him to adjudicate the payment claim. If he dismisses the respondent’s objection and makes an award, the respondent could still raise the same objection in enforcement proceedings with respect to his award. Accordingly, the adjudicator should proceed with the adjudication and leave the issue to the court to decide." (emphasis added) [110] His Lordship also issued a cautionary note when interpreting similar provisions in other jurisdictions with a scheme of statutory adjudication as follows: "[26] It is also essential to note that the equivalent Act related to CIPAA 2012 in other countries such as England, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, etc. are not similarly worded though it provides a summary process to secure interim payments for construction related works (see ‘Statutory Construction Adjudication: Analysis of the New Zealand and Malaysian Legislations’ by Noushad Ali Nassem Amer Ali (PhD Thesis)). For example, Singapore Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (‘the BCISP 2005’) does not have a specific provision 58 to set aside the adjudication award and/or the grounds to do so in contrast to our s 15 and/or a provision to stay the award as per our s 16. However, Singapore has provision to review the adjudicator’s award but not by the courts. Their s 27(5) impliedly recognises that the adjudication award can be set aside but with a condition of payment into court the adjudicated sum (see ss 18, 19 and 27 of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2005)..." [111] The Adjudication Society of the U.K. in their publication "Construction Adjudication Practice Guideline - Jurisdiction of the U.K. Construction Adjudicator", last revised 1.1.2016 accessible at www.adjudication.org tackles the question of jurisdiction head-on in their Practice Guideline as follows at page 28: "5. Adjudicator’s power to decide whether or not he has jurisdiction 5.1 The general rule is that, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, an adjudicator does not have the power to make a binding ruling on his own jurisdiction. Whilst it has been said that there is an exception where “substance and jurisdiction overlap”, this is doubtful. http://www.adjudication.org/ 59 5.2 Whilst an adjudicator does not generally have the power to make a binding ruling on his own jurisdiction, the courts have confirmed that it is not appropriate for an adjudicator to refuse to deal with a jurisdictional challenge on the basis that the adjudicator cannot make a binding decision. It is therefore best practice to deal expressly with any jurisdictional challenge. 6. Dealing with jurisdictional challenges 6.1 An adjudicator should not be entirely passive when it comes to determining his jurisdiction and should satisfy himself that he appears to have jurisdiction at the beginning of the process by asking himself the questions outlined in the section on threshold jurisdiction above... ... 6.3 If a challenge to an adjudicator’s jurisdiction is made by one of the parties (typically the respondent) then he should investigate the matter as soon as possible. An adjudicator should ensure he avoids becoming too jaundiced as a result of the challenge and should apply common sense when dealing with it. Depending on the nature of the objection, such an investigation could involve 60 asking for written submissions, holding a meeting or holding a teleconference. 6.4 If an adjudicator concludes that the challenge is well- founded, he must decline to act. Alternatively, if he finds that the challenge is weak, he must continue with the substance of the adjudication. The courts have approved of adjudicators continuing to act if they believe it is at least arguable they have jurisdiction on the basis that to do otherwise would undermine the objective of the HGCRA. As outlined above, whilst an adjudicator should continue with the adjudication, his decision as regards his jurisdiction will not be binding on the parties unless the parties agree to be bound by it." (emphasis added) [112] The above approach is supported by a wealth of authorities in the UK under their scheme of statutory adjudication. In the case of Fastrack Contractors Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd [2000] BLR 168, Judge Thornton QC gave the following guidance to Adjudicators when a jurisdictional challenge is raised: "5.3. When a Jurisdictional Challenge Arises on the Grounds that there is no Dispute 61 30. It is first necessary to consider the nature of the jurisdictional dispute that arises when a party contends that there is no underlying dispute that can be referred to an adjudicator. If it is contended that there is no dispute at all since, for example, the whole of the subject-matter of the proposed adjudication has not been claimed, notified or rejected, the dispute raises a genuine jurisdictional dispute since, if that challenge is made out, there is no statutory power to appoint the adjudicator. If, on the other hand, the essence of the complaint is that what has been referred is broadly the same dispute as pre-existed the challenge but that there have been amendments of detail and degree, the challenge is not to jurisdiction since within the matters referred is a common core of disputed material which can legitimately form the subject- matter of a potentially valid adjudication. It would then be for the adjudicator, assisted by the referral notice, to identify that common core and adjudicate upon it whilst deciding that the residue should be dismissed or should not be determined at all. The second alternative is possible since the Scheme only requires the adjudicator to decide "the matters in dispute" (paragraph 20) and this residue would not consist of matters "in dispute". 62 31. If a party challenges the entire jurisdiction of the adjudicator, as Morrison does, it has four options. Firstly, it can agree to widen the jurisdiction of the adjudicator so as to refer the dispute as to the adjudicator's jurisdiction to the same adjudicator. If the referring party agrees to that course, and the appointed adjudicator accepts the reference to him of this second dispute, the jurisdiction of the adjudicator could then be resolved as part of the reference. The challenging party could, secondly, refer the dispute as to jurisdiction to second adjudicator. This would not put a halt to the first adjudication, if that had already led to an appointment, since the adjudicator has a statutory duty, unless both parties agree otherwise, to decide the reference in a very short timescale. The challenging party could, thirdly, seek a declaration from the court that the proposed adjudication lacked jurisdiction. This option is of little utility unless the adjudicator has yet to be appointed or the parties agree to put the adjudication into abeyance pending the relatively speedy determination of the jurisdiction question by the court. The Technology and Construction Court can, for example, resolve questions of that kind within days of them being referred to it. Fourthly, the challenging party could reserve its position, participate in the adjudication and then challenge any attempt to enforce the adjudicator's 63 decision on jurisdictional grounds. That is the course adopted by Morrison. 32. The adjudicator can, of course, investigate any partial or entire jurisdictional challenge. He could, if he was satisfied it was a good one, decline to adjudicate on the part of the reference he regarded as lacking jurisdiction. Alternatively, he could decide that the challenge was a bad one and proceed with the substance of the adjudication. That is what happened in this adjudication. However, unless the parties have vested the jurisdictional dispute in the hands of the adjudicator in addition to the underlying dispute, the adjudicator cannot determine his own jurisdiction and the challenging party may seek to avoid enforcement proceedings by showing that the sum claimed was decided upon without jurisdiction. The court would give appropriate weight to any findings of fact relevant to that jurisdictional challenge but would not be bound by them and would either have to bear out the challenge with evidence or, if that was not necessary, determine the challenge and either enforce or decline to enforce the whole of part of the adjudicator's decision depending on the decision reached as to jurisdiction. The role of the court in a jurisdictional challenge 64 summarised here is supported by recent decisions in the Technology and Construction court, particularly the decision of my own in Sherwood & Casson Ltd. v Mackenzie, unreported, 30 November 1999; The Project Consultancy Group v The Trustees of the Gray Trust, unreported, 16 July 1999, Dyson J.; and dicta in Macob Civil Engineering Ltd. v Morrison Construction Ltd., [1999] Building Law Reports 93, Dyson J."(emphasis added) [113] I would conclude that based on the authorities cited, whilst generally an Adjudicator may not decide on his own jurisdiction, he may nevertheless inquire into it. He may proceed in some clear cases and on matters involving his conscience to make a non-binding ruling on his lack of jurisdiction or that for valid reasons, he ought to decline jurisdiction. He may similarly give reasons why he thinks he has jurisdiction and proceed to complete the adjudication with delivering the decision. The party challenging his jurisdiction, if aggrieved by his decision, would be at liberty to apply to set it aside under section 15(d) CIPAA and the Court will decide the issue of his jurisdiction or the lack of it unfettered by any reasons he may have given in support of his decision either way. 65 Whether jurisdiction of an Adjudicator may be extended by applying the analogous principle applicable to pleadings in litigation [114] Learned counsel for Luxor submitted that even in a Court of law, one of the exceptions is where evidence, when presented and developed in argument during trial will have the effect of curing the absence of such plea, or in other words, the effect of overcoming such defect in pleading. [115] At the outset, I must observe that factually, as soon as the defence of a counterclaim and set-off was raised in the Adjudication Response, the Claimant SQA had already objected to it in the opening paragraph of their Adjudication Reply filed in paragraph 8 and further in paragraphs 14 and 27. This is thus not a case where the Claimant by conduct had not objected to the evidence of a counterclaim and set-off introduced by the Respondent Luxor. [116] Learned counsel for Luxor referred to the case of Ang Koon Kau & Anor v Lau Piang Ngong [1985] CLJ (Rep) 24 (Federal Court), His Lordship Wan Suleiman, FJ, at page 27, decided that: 66 “... Evidence given at the trial can therefore in appropriate circumstances overcome defects in the pleadings where the net result of such evidence is to prevent the other side from being taken by surprise. The same consideration was again the basis of the decision in K.E.P. Mohamed Ali v K.E.P. Mohamed Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10 where, although the statement of claim was statute barred on 11 April 1974 there had been an acknowledgment of the debt in 1976. Although the acknowledgment was not pleaded in the statement of claim or the reply, this Court held that the case has been satisfactorily presented and developed in the proceedings before the High Court and that there was therefore sufficient evidence on record from which a decision to that effect could be arrived at.” (emphasis added) [117] Again I have no quibble nor quarrel with such a proposition as the High Court of law and superior courts are courts of unlimited jurisdiction, limited only by statute with respect to the subject matter and remedies by statute. Its jurisdiction is not conferred by or confined to the pleadings of the parties. Even then the general rule is still that it cannot decide on matters outside the pleadings and certainly not in breach of statute. In the Federal Court case of Badiaddin Bin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v 67 Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 1 MLJ 393 at p 426 it was observed as follows: "It is one thing to say that an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction must be obeyed until it is set aside. It is quite a different thing to say that a court of unlimited jurisdiction may make orders in breach of written law. Isaacs v Robertson is certainly not authority for the latter proposition. I take it to be well settled that even courts of unlimited jurisdiction have no authority to act in contravention of written law. Of course, so long as an order of a court of unlimited jurisdiction stands, irregular though it may be, it must be respected. But where an order of such a court is made in breach of statute, it is made without jurisdiction and may therefore be declared void and set aside in proceedings brought for that purpose. It is then entirely open to the court, upon the illegality being clearly shown, to grant a declaration to the effect that the order is invalid and to have it set aside. It is wrong to assume that such an order may only be corrected on appeal." (emphasis added) [118] Statutory Adjudication is a creature of statute i.e. CIPAA 2012. Adjudicators appointed under CIPAA must confine themselves to the jurisdiction to decide only on matters raised in section 5 Payment Claim 68 and section 6 Payment Response as provided expressly by section 27(1) CIPAA unless his jurisdiction has been extended by agreement in writing by all the parties to the Adjudication. Where CIPAA has provided the mode and mechanism for extending the Adjudicator's jurisdiction to cover matters not stated in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response, the Respondent cannot bypass the agreement in writing and by a backdoor way persuade the Adjudicator to assume jurisdiction over a matter or issue or dispute not raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Claim. For an Adjudicator to succumb to such an approach in contravention of section 27(1) CIPAA would be exceed his jurisdiction and the Decision arrived at would be liable to be set aside under section 15(d) CIPAA. [119] Learned counsel for Luxor also referred to similar decisions found in the following cases: a) K.E.P. Mohamed Ali v K.E.P. Mohamed Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10 (Federal Court), at page 12; and b) O.C.B.C. Ltd v Philip Wee Kee Puan [1984] 1 CLJ (rep) 25 (Privy Council), at page 28. 69 [120] In the present case, Luxor's counterclaim and/or set-off for the defective works and LAD were not raised and presented in the Payment Response and were only raised for the first time in the Respondent Luxor's Adjudication Response. [121] Learned counsel for Luxor said that this Court must take cognizance that, recently on 05.01.2017, the Federal Court granted leave to View Esteem Sdn Bhd to appeal against the Court of Appeal and High Court decisions in View Esteem Sdn Bhd's case (supra). [122] While the scope of section 6(4) CIPAA might still be alive, this Court has to apply the law as currently expounded by the Court of Appeal. [123] Luxor further argued that estoppel should apply as SQA is currently doing rectification works in Lot 1. It was further submitted that at the moment, it cannot be ascertained with any degree of certainty, whether after the said rectification works, there is any amount due, either from the Luxor or SQA, or vice versa. By Luxor's very own submission then, a complete cause of action had not arisen where rectification works is concerned! 70 [124] As has been said ever so often, the scheme of statutory yields a result of interim finality. Luxor is not precluded from bringing its claim for damages for rectification works or for LAD in arbitration. Strangely while Luxor made much fuss that the issues should be more conveniently and completely resolved in arbitration, it has not taken any steps to commence arbitration even at the date of subsequent application for stay of the Adjudication Decision pending arbitration. [125] Any attempt to stay the Adjudication Decision until arbitration must at least meet the threshold condition under section 16(1)(b) CIPAA in that the subject matter of the Adjudication Decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court. Here not only has the threshold condition not been met, there has been no evidence adduced by way of affidavit that if the Adjudicated Sum is paid now, there is reasonable apprehension that the Claimant SQA would not be able to repay back should the arbitration be in favour of Luxor. See Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818. [126] I had therefore dismissed the application to stay the Adjudication Decision. 71 Pronouncement [127] For the reasons given above, the application for setting aside the Adjudication Decision was dismissed and correspondingly the application to enforce the Adjudication Decision was allowed with a single costs of RM15,000.00. Dated: 31 May 2017 Sgd YA LEE SWEE SENG Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in WA-24C-133-11/2016 : (Enforcement applications) : Lam Wai Loon together with Serene And for the Defendant in : Hiew WA-24C-151-12/2016 : (Messrs Harold and Lam Partnership) (Setting aside) : For the Defendant in WA-24C-133-11/2016 : Manpal Singh Sachdev together with (Enforcement applications) : Ee Kim Hau 72 And for the Plaintiff in : (Messrs Manjit Singh Sachdev, WA-24C-151-12/2016 : Mohammad Radzi & Partners) (Setting aside) : Date of Decision: 13.2.2017

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-141-11/2016

PLAINTIF Wong Huat Construction Co. DEFENDAN Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd

Construction contract - Adjudication Decision - setting aside and striking out application - whether the Plaintiff, the Claimant in the Adjudication having received a very much smaller sum in his favour than what was claimed is nevertheless “an aggrieved person” with the locus to apply to set aside the Adjudication Decision - whether the application to set aside the Adjudication Decision should be struck out - whether there was a denial of natural justice when the Adjudicator appeared not to have decided on the application for discovery - whether the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he decided on a lesser sum admitted by the Defendant when the Defendant had earlier in their Payment Response had cross-claimed for overpayment - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746], section 5,12 (a) and 12(2)(c),15(b) and (d), 25, 27(1); National Land Code [Act 56], section 428; Legal Profession Act 1976 [Act 166], section 103E; Rules of Court 2012, Order 7, Order 18 rule 19(1) (b) and (d).

30/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1066aeac-fe4b-42fd-a246-2bd49fcca21d&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-141-11/2016 In the Matter of an Adjudication Between Wong Huat Construction Co. (Claimant) and Ireka Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd (Respondent) under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the Matter of the Adjudication Decision by Ir. Balakrishnan Etty Gaunder dated 6.9.2016 And In the Matter of Section 15 under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012; And In the Matter of Order 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN WONG HUAT CONSTRUCTION CO. ... PLAINTIFF AND 2 IREKA ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The Plaintiff here is the Claimant in the Adjudication against the Defendant. The Claimant had obtained the Adjudication Decision in its favour but was not happy with the paltry sum of RM29,791.73 that was adjudged in his favour out of the sum of RM231,277.17 claimed for painting works done for the Defendant who was the Respondent in the Adjudication. Project [2] Pursuant to a bespoke Domestic Sub Contract dated 12.09.2011 (the “Contract”), the Defendant appointed the Plaintiff as the sub- contractor for the supply and application of painting works for a proposed office and hotel development in Kuala Lumpur (the “Works”) for a consideration of RM1,019,570.40. [3] According to the Plaintiff, pursuant to variation orders and/or site instructions issued by the Defendant, the Plaintiff also performed 3 additional works amounting to RM169,349.17 from September 2012 to August 2013. (the “Additional Works”). [4] The Plaintiff said that he duly completed the Works and the Additional Works on or about 07.08.2013. According to him, the Defendant duly accepted the said works without any objections and/or reservations. In this regard the Plaintiff issued a total of eleven (11) Progress Claim for the works amounting to RM1,137,653.75. These Progress Claims were issued between December 2011 to August 2013. [5] The Defendant had only made a total payment of RM906,376.58 including its debit notes. The Defendant had also released RM23,066.59 on 05.02.2016 being a part of the Retention Sum. [6] To the Plaintiff, the partial release of the Retention Sum is taken to mean that the Employer had accepted the full completion of the works. That would leave an outstanding amount of RM231,277.17 due and payable to the Plaintiff for the completed works which have been accepted by the Defendant. [7] The main Project was completed on 21.11.2012. This is reflected in the Certificate of Practical Completion ("CPC") dated 15.12.2012 issued by Transmission Technology Sdn Bhd (“TTSB”), the employer for the Project. 4 The Proceedings in Adjudication [8] On 21.03.2016, the Plaintiff served a Payment Claim on the Defendant pursuant to Section 5 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) to claim for the outstanding RM231,277.17. [9] On 31.03.2016, the Defendant served its Payment Response pursuant to Section 6 of CIPAA disputing the Plaintiff’s Payment Claim. The Defendant further made a cross claim of RM16,740.71. This was based on what the Defendant said was an omission of RM249,547.62 to the original contract price and valuation for the Additional Works amounting to RM152,640.62 only. [10] The Defendant also issued its Payment Certificate No. 11 dated 31.03.2016 together with the Payment Response to substantiate its cross claim. [11] After being served with the Adjudication Claim on 10.06.2016, the Defendant served its this Adjudication Response dated 27.06.2016, in which they sought to include its Payment Certificate No. 11 (revised) and its Final Certificate No. 12 (both dated 23.06.2016). [12] The Defendant abandoned its cross claim of over payment and conceded that the final contract sum payable to the Plaintiff is only 5 RM936,167.81 which consists of RM770,022.78 for the Works and RM166,145.03 for the Additional Works. Therefore, according to the Defendant only RM29,791.73 is due and payable to the Plaintiff. [13] The Plaintiff disputed the Defendant’s unilateral re-measurement and objected to the inclusion of the two (2) payment certificates dated 23.06.2016. The Plaintiff also took the position that the Adjudication Response contains matters that were never raised in the Payment Response. [14] The Plaintiff also reserved the right to apply for an order of discovery of documents issued by the consultants in the main project pursuant to Clauses 9.1 to 9.3, 17.1(a) and 18.2 of the Contract. The Plaintiff said that these documents are relevant to determine the dispute between the parties. The Plaintiff subsequently applied to the Adjudicator for an order for discovery pursuant to Section 25 of CIPAA. [15] The Adjudicator decided on 06.09.2016 that the Contract between the parties stated that the final quantities shall be based on measurement of the actual work done. He adjudged a sum of RM29,791.73 in the Claimant's favour out of the sum of RM231,277.17 claimed in the Payment Claim. He also ordered a sum of RM2,213.51 being the interest due to the delay in the release of the part 1st and whole of the 2nd moiety retention sum to be paid by the Defendant to the 6 Plaintiff. He further ordered that the Defendant shall reimburse the Plaintiff a sum of RM5,624.58 being the costs of adjudication. [16] The Defendant had complied with the Adjudication Decision by honouring the awarded sum in full through a cheque to the Plaintiff on 22.9.2016. However, the Plaintiff subsequently decided to waive its rights to payment under the Adjudication Decision by returning the same cheque to the Defendant on 17.11.2016. Prayers [17] The Claimant as Plaintiff filed this application in Enclosure 1 by way of this Originating Summons ("OS") to set aside the Adjudication Decision in its favour on grounds of denial of natural justice under section 15(b) and that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction under section 15(d) of CIPAA. [18] Meanwhile the Defendant has filed an application by way of a Notice of Application in Enclosure 7 to strike out the said OS on ground that it is scandalous, frivolous and vexatious and otherwise an abuse of the court process. [19] The parties shall be referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant and sometimes as Claimant and Respondent respectively. 7 Principles [20] Section 15 (b) and (d) provides as follows: “15. Improperly Procured Adjudication Decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds: b) There has been a denial of natural justice; .... d) The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction.” (emphasis added) Whether the Claimant having received a very much smaller sum in his favour than what was claimed is nevertheless an "aggrieved person" with the locus to apply to set aside the Adjudication Decision [21] Who then is an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of section 15 CIPAA who would have the locus to set aside an Adjudication Decision? It would certainly include a person against whom an Adjudication Decision is made. But should it be confined to a person against whom an Adjudication Decision is made? If it should be so confined then that expression should have been used in section 15 8 CIPAA because that expression is used in section 30(1) and (2) CIPAA as follows: "30. Direct Payment from Principal (1) If a party against whom an adjudication decision was made fails to make payment of the adjudicated amount, the party who obtained the adjudication decision in his favour may make a written request for payment of the adjudicated amount direct from the principal of the party against whom the adjudication decision is made. (2) Upon receipt of the written request under subsection (1), the principal shall serve a notice in writing on the party against whom the adjudication decision was made to show proof of payment and to state that direct payment would be made after the expiry of ten working days of the service of the notice." (emphasis added) [22] It is a principle of interpretation of statutes that when different words are used in the same statute to express a particular matter, the legislature must have intended a different meaning; otherwise for clarity and consistency same words or expressions should be used. [23] If authority is needed one can refer to the seminal work by Bennion on "Statutory Interpretation" as was so referred by the Court of Appeal in 9 the case of Yung Ing Ing v Hunfara Construction Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ 668. Justice Mohd Hishamudin Yunus JCA applied this principle of interpretation when he observed as follows: "[29] In my judgment it is a principle of interpretation of statutes that where the Legislature includes a particular term in one part or section of a statute but omits it in another part or section of the same, it must be presumed that the Legislature acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. There are the principles of construction as pointed out by Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis (5th Ed) at pp 1157 & 1160): Construction as a whole requires that, unless the contrary appears, three principles should be applied. These are that every word in the Act should be given a meaning, the same word should be given the same meaning, and different words should be given different meanings. Every word to be given meaning. On the presumption that Parliament does nothing in vain, the court must endeavour to give significance to every word of an enactment. It is presumed that if a word or phrase appears, it was put there for a purpose and must not be disregarded. 10 Different words to be given different meanings. Similarly it is presumed that the drafter did not indulge in elegant variation, but kept to a particular term when wishing to convey a particular meaning ..." (emphasis added) [24] One can say quite confidently that "an aggrieved person" is not confined to a person against whom an adjudication decision is made. It may well include a person who has received an adjudication decision in his favour but who is aggrieved as in he should have received more if for instance there has not been a denial of natural justice. Here we are not talking about the merits of applying to set aside but merely the locus to set aside an adjudication decision. It would also apply to a person whose whole Payment Claim has been dismissed by the Adjudicator. [25] I appreciate in such an instance the Claimant who is aggrieved would have to set aside the whole of the decision and not just a part of it unless the part affected is severable from the part not affected by the vitiating grounds under section 15 CIPAA. [26] Generally, "an aggrieved party" is the non-paying party in the Adjudication who is normally the Respondent who is required to pay the Claimant an adjudicated sum. Here the Respondent has no problem paying the said sum and in fact is not applying to set aside the 11 Adjudication Decision. It is the Claimant who has obtained an Adjudication Decision in its favour that is applying to set it aside. [27] As the word "aggrieved" is not defined, one would be permitted to apply the ordinary and natural meaning of the word. In the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wu Shu Chen (Sole Executrix of the estate of Goh Keng How, deceased) & Anor v Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hussin [1997] 2 MLJ 487, at p.499 (CA) it was held as follows: “To my mind, the word ‘aggrieved’ must be given its ordinary meaning. To be aggrieved means one is dissatisfied with or adversely affected by a wrongful act of someone. An aggrieved person is therefore a person whose legal right or interest is adversely affected by the wrongful act or conduct of another person or body. The category of aggrieved persons is never closed.” (emphasis added) [28] In Ex p Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch D 458, at p.465, it was held that: “A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully 12 refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.” (emphasis added). [29] In Black’s Law Dictionary 7th Edn, the word ‘aggrieved party’ is defined as: “A party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment.” [30] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff/Claimant had listed down the reasons for stating that the Claimant is "an aggrieved party" in this case as follows: 1. The Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to fully prosecute and present its case when the Adjudicator did not entertain and/or ignored the Discovery Application; 2. The Adjudicator proceeded to give the Decision without the benefit of important and relevant documents which will finally determine the issue of actual quantities of the works; 3. The Adjudicator had determined that the Documents requested are relevant to the dispute when he directed the Clarification Exercise and when he made the Discovery Order; 13 4. The Adjudicator fully accepted the Defendant’s final 2 payment certificates despite the Plaintiff’s position that the said certificates were issued in bad faith and merely as an afterthought to defeat the Plaintiff’s adjudication claim; 5. The Adjudicator did not give any reason for accepting the figures contained in the said payment certificates despite the Plaintiff’s objection to the same; 6. The Adjudicator failed to give any reason and/or address the Plaintiff’s position that that the said certificates were issued in bad faith and as an afterthought; 7. The Adjudicator did not issue any fresh directions and/or make any finding against the Defendant despite the Defendant’s continuous failure to comply with the Clarification Exercise and the Discovery Order; 8. However, the Adjudicator appeared to have punished the Plaintiff for its non-competence to participate in the Joint Re- measurement Exercise when he directed for parties to cease all communications and he will deliver his decision in light of the fact that the re-measurement exercise could not be carried out; 14 9. Based on paragraphs 7 and 8 above, the Adjudicator appeared to have given undue preference to the Joint Re- Measurement Exercise though the Clarification Exercise was supposed to be carried out simultaneously. 10. The Adjudicator’s acceptance of the Defendant’s final 2 certificates to be the actual quantities of the Works is not in accordance with the standard industry practice. This is especially when the actual quantities can be conclusively determined from the Documents; and 11. The others matters as elaborated in this submission, including the Adjudicator’s acceptance of matters and documents which were not part of the Payment Response. [31] As stated, at this stage we are not concerned with the validity or viability of the grounds to set aside the Adjudication Decision by a Claimant who has obtained a Decision in his favour but merely whether that party has the locus to apply to set aside the Adjudication Decision. [32] It would be helpful to look at other jurisdictions that has a similar scheme of statutory adjudication to see who may apply to set aside an adjudication decision and the actual words used to describe such a party. 15 [33] In Singapore, Section 27(5) of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Chapter 30B) provides that: "Enforcement of adjudication determination as judgment debt, etc. (5) Where any party to an adjudication commences proceedings to set aside the adjudication determination or the judgment obtained pursuant to this section, he shall pay into the court as security the unpaid portion of the adjudicated amount that he is required to pay, in such manner as the court directs or as provided in the Rules of Court (Cap. 322, R 5), pending the final determination of those proceedings." (emphasis added) [34] In deciding that "any party" may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication determination, the High Court of Singapore, in Quanta Industries Pte Ltd v Strategies Construction Pte Ltd [2015] 2 SLR 70, at para [19] held that: “As it turned out, this facet of the dispute is now moot as the Court of Appeal has held in Citiwall Safety Glass Pte Ltd v Mansource Interior Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 797 (“Citiwall”), a judgment that was handed down on 27 November 2014 after I heard the parties, that 16 a court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction in hearing and determining an application to set aside an adjudication determination (Citiwall at [41]). It is unthinkable that this jurisdiction is only exercisable when the respondent makes the application, and in any event, it is plain from s 27(5) that “any party to an adjudication” may apply to set aside an adjudication determination.” (emphasis added) [35] Western Australia, for instance, in section 46(1) of the Construction Contracts Act 2004 adopts the similar wording of “aggrieved” as follows: “46. Review, limited right of (1) A person who is aggrieved by a decision made under section 31(2)(a) may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision.” (emphasis added) [36] In fact the Supreme Court of Western Australia, in holding that a ‘respondent’ could also be aggrieved by an adjudication decision that dismissed the claimant’s application, held in Perrinepod Pty Ltd v Georgiou Building Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 217, at para [82] as follows: “The appellant submitted that because s 46(1) begins with the words '[a] person who is aggrieved' and not 'the applicant', s 46(1) 17 should be taken to apply both to decisions 'to dismiss' and decisions 'not to dismiss'. Implicit in that submission is the proposition that a respondent to an adjudication application could only be aggrieved where the adjudicator does not dismiss the application and, therefore, because the words of s 46(1) do not limit applications for review to the applicant, it should be construed as affording a right of review to the Tribunal where an adjudicator does not dismiss an application and proceeds to make a determination. I do not accept that submission. There is no reason why a respondent to an adjudication application could not be aggrieved by a decision to dismiss the application. One example would be where the respondent is of the view, contrary to the applicant's assertions, that it in fact owes no money and is desirous of having an early determination made to that effect.” (emphasis added) [37] The word "aggrieved" is used in section 428 of our National Land Code as follows: “Appeals to the Court (1) Any person or body aggrieved by any decision under this Act of the State Director, the Registrar or any Land Administrator may, at any time within the period of three 18 months beginning with the date on which it was communicated to him, appeal therefrom to the court.” (emphasis added) [38] The High Court in Ambank (M) Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Gombak [2013] 10 CLJ 87, at para 11 commenting on the locus of the applicant as “an aggrieved person” held that the words are not confined to only registered owners and that the applicant was competent to make the appeal. [39] In the context of Section 103E of the Legal Profession Act 1976, the Federal Court in Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam v Hoo Lin Coln & Anor [2008] 4 MLJ 1 (FC) at para [11] had observed that: “The position in England has now changed. As Drost J observed in College of Dental Surgeons v Findlay [2000] BCTC Lexis 1574: However, the law of England has changed since then. That narrow interpretation of a ‘person aggrieved’ is no longer accepted. The tide began to turn with the judgment of Lord Denning in Attorney General of the Gambia v N’Jie [1961] 2 All ER 504, where, at p 511, he said: The words ‘person aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not 19 include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.” (emphasis added) [40] Similarly, in IEV International Pty Ltd v Sadacharamani a/l Govindasamy [2008] 2 MLJ 754 (HC) in the context of the Patents Act 1983, Ramly Ali J (now FCJ) held that: “[18] Under s 56(1) of the Patents Act 1983 only ‘an aggrieved person’ may initiate proceedings against the owner of the patent for invalidation order. The words ‘person aggrieved’ has no special and technical meaning and should be liberally construed. The expression includes anyone who would be or in respect of whom there was a reasonable possibility of his being disadvantaged in a legal or practical sense by the Register being uncertified” (emphasis added) [41] KJ Aiyer’s Judicial Dictionary (LexisNexis, 14th Edition, 2007), pp.55-56, has this light to shed on the meaning of the term “aggrieved person" as follows: 20 “The words ‘aggrieved person’ should not be given a very restricted meaning as including only those against who a decision has been pronounced, which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something. The expression ‘aggrieved’ includes a person who has suffered a legal grievance. [Abdul Rahim v State (1978) LW (Cr) 195, p.198 (Mad)]” (emphasis added) [42] The Supreme Court of India in Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan v State of Maharashtra & Ors [2012] 8 Mad LJ 679 (SC), para 10, citing its previous decision, held that the expression “aggrieved person” should not be confined within the bounds of a rigid definition: “In A. Subhash Babu v State of A. P., AIR 2011 SC 3031; (2011) 4 MLJ (Crl) 88, this Court held: “The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an elastic and an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of complainant’s interest and the 21 nature and the extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by the complainant.” (emphasis added) [43] One can also surmise that "an aggrieved party" should not be confined to the party in whose favor an Adjudication Decision is given when one considers that the rationale of section 15 CIPAA was to address any procedural breaches which might has caused injustice to any party. Surely it cannot be the intention of Parliament that an adjudication decision is immune from judicial scrutiny as long as the Adjudicator awards some amount, be it nominal or otherwise, to the unpaid party. [44] An order given in breach of rules of natural justice is null and void. In National Union of Bank Employees v Director General of Trade Unions & Anor [2015] 1 MLJ 881 (CA), para 17, the Court of Appeal noted that: “Common sense and rule of natural justice will dictate that the views of the appellants ought to have been heard before deciding to register. Failure to strictly comply with the statutory obligations set-out in the section will make the decision or decision making process a nullity ab initio without the need even to consider the concept and parameters of judicial review.” (emphasis added) 22 [45] I agree with the Claimant that if an order or decision is a nullity, it is devoid of any effect and will not bind the parties. In Eu Finance Bhd v Lim Yoke Foo [1982] 2 MLJ 37 (FC), at p.39, it was held that: “In the circumstances it is abundantly clear that the second order on which the respondent relies is no order at all within and for the purposes of section 263 and is a nullity and devoid of any effect”.(emphasis added) [46] What would be the effect of a successful setting aside of an Adjudication Decision? All parties will be restored to their original positions as though the earlier adjudication did not take place. This would entitle the unpaid party to commence fresh adjudication proceedings on the Payment Claim which decision has been set aside. I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that there is no basis to hold that once an adjudication decision is set aside on any of the grounds under section 15 CIPAA, a party is barred from subsequently initiating a fresh adjudication proceeding and that the only recourse would be to arbitrate or litigate the dispute. See the case of Westwood Structural Services Ltd v Blyth Wood Park Management Company Ltd [2008] EWHC 3138 (TCC) where several adjudication proceedings were brought by the claimant in respect of the same subject matter. 23 Whether the Claimant's application should be struck out [47] The application by the Respondent to strike out the Claimant's OS was brought under Order 18, rule 19(1)(b) and (d) of the ROC, which is reproduced below: “Striking out pleadings and endorsements (O 18 r 19) 19(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that – (a) ... (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) ... or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed orp judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be..." (emphasis added) 24 [48] The tests for striking out are as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7 are that: a. it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under the rule; b. this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it “obviously unsustainable”; c. it cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence; d. If there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 of the ROC; and e. The court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable. (emphasis added). 25 [49] The recent Federal Court case of Seruan Gemilang Makmur Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Negeri Pahang Darul Makmur & Anor [2016] 3 CLJ 1 (FC) at paragraph [28] held as follows: “[28] The basic test for striking out as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bandar Builder (supra) is that the claim on the face of it must be 'obviously unsustainable'. The stress is not only on the word 'unsustainable' but also on the word 'obviously' ie, the degree of unsustainability must appear on the face of the claim without having to go into lengthy and mature consideration in detail. ...” (emphasis added) [50] The Defendant submitted that the Plaintiff, is not an aggrieved party as the Adjudicator had adjudged a total sum of RM37,629.32 in favour of the Plaintiff. The Defendant further argued that there is no bona fide basis to set aside the Adjudication Decision pursuant to section 15 CIPAA as the Defendant is not enforcing the Adjudication Decision in Court, and further that the Plaintiff as Claimant did not suffer any temporary detriment or worse off position in having to make any interim payment under the Adjudication Proceedings. In fact the Defendant had paid the Plaintiff in full through a cheque on 22.9.2016. [51] The Defendant tried to persuade the Court that Enclosure 1 is clearly unsustainable and ought to be struck out. 26 [52] With respect to learned counsel for the Defendant, to hold that the Plaintiff/Claimant is not an aggrieved party because a certain sum had been adjudged in its favour when it had claimed for a higher sum in its Payment Claim, would be to tell the Claimant that irrespective of the valid grounds for setting aside the Adjudication Decision, it would have to wait for arbitration or litigation to be concluded arising out of the same issues raised in the Adjudication. That would be render the 4 grounds under section 15 CIPAA inoperative even if it can be shown that those grounds are applicable and can be proved or shown. [53] Thus if the Adjudicator had wrongly declined jurisdiction for one head of claim and dismissed it altogether when indeed he has jurisdiction, the Claimant would end up having a lesser sum adjudged in his favour because the Adjudicator in breach of natural justice had not heard the Claimant's claim. [54] In such a circumstance I see no good reason why the Claimant could not be said to be an "aggrieved party" in that he had been awarded a lesser sum compared to a bigger sum had jurisdiction been rightly exercise. [55] Likewise if the Adjudicator had allowed the defence of set-off for defective works to be deducted from the Claimant's Payment Claim when it was not raised in the Payment Response and so the Adjudicator 27 had no jurisdiction to consider the defence of set-off. Having exceeded his jurisdiction in deducting defective works claim from the Claimant's Payment Claim, the Claimant ended up with a much lesser sum than the amount claimed. Again in such a situation the Claimant should be able to set aside the Adjudication Decision for the lesser sum on ground of excess of jurisdiction. [56] Learned counsel for the Defendant highlighted the dicta in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v. Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728 (HC) of Justice Ravinthran Paramaguru J at paragraph [10] where it was held as follows: “... under CIPAA, there is no right of appeal against the decision of the adjudicator which is interim in nature or of temporary finality only. ... Since an application under s. 15 is not an appeal, the decision of the adjudicator cannot be reviewed on merits.” (emphasis added) [57] I am mindful that in deciding on the issue of locus of the party to apply to set aside an Adjudication Decision under section 15, I do not and have not ventured into the prohibited province of considering the merits of the case. I merely have to deal with the issue of assuming for a moment that grounds (b) and (d) of section 15 CIPAA are applicable, 28 would the party applying to set aside the Adjudication Decision have locus. [58] Learned counsel for the Defendant argued with considerable persuasion that at the end of the day, what the Plaintiff as Claimant was dissatisfied with was actually with the quantum of the claim. [59] It is different if the quantum is the result of the Adjudicator arriving at the assessment on account of accepting some evidence and rejecting some evidence. For the Court to disturb that would be to interfere with the merits. However, as here, the issue is not arising from evidence and weight to be attached to it but purely grounds falling under a breach of natural justice and excess of jurisdiction which are purely procedural as in how the decision is arrived at rather than the merits of the decision and the other being jurisdictional issue. [60] Whether or not those grounds are meritorious is best considered not in a striking out application taken out by the Defendant but in the Plaintiff's OS for setting aside the Adjudication Decision. [61] It would have been different if the Plaintiff as Claimant lacks locus altogether as an "aggrieved party" in which instance the OS would have to be struck out in limine without even the need to consider whether the 29 grounds of denial of natural justice and excess of jurisdiction are validly grounds raised. [62] I would therefore dismiss the Defendant's application in Enclosure 7 to strike out the Plaintiff's OS to set aside the Adjudication Decision. [63] I shall proceed to consider whether there are merits in the denial of natural justice and excess of jurisdiction grounds under section 15(b) and (d) CIPAA respectively. Whether there was a denial of Natural Justice when the Adjudicator appeared not to have decided on the Claimant's application for discovery [64] The Adjudicator initiated two approaches as set out in para 60 of his Decision with respect to deciding the dispute before him. They are as follows: 1. Facilitating a joint re-measurement of the final quantities by qualified personnel from both sides based on endorsed drawings from the project consultants (the “Joint Re- Measurement Exercise”) and 2. Seeking clarifications and additional documents from the parties (the “Clarification Exercise”) 30 [65] In respect of the Clarification Exercise, the Adjudicator requested, amongst others, for the Defendant to provide the following documents: 1. The Conditions of Contract (the “COC”) between the Defendant and TTSB (the employer of the Defendant); 2. The final Bill of Quantities (“Final BQ”) for painting works used in the approved final claim certificates as certified by the consultant quantity surveyor, architect and/or contractor administrator between the Defendant and TTSB; 3. The Certificate of Completion (“CPC”) issued by TTSB to the Defendant for the project; and 4. The Certificate of Making Good Defects (“CMGD”) issued by TTSB to the Defendant for the project. [66] In the meantime on 18.08.2016, the parties together with their nominated representatives attended the Adjudicator’s office to carry out the Joint Re-Measurement Exercise as directed by the Adjudicator. [67] However the Plaintiff did not send a competent representative to carry out the joint re-measurement. The Adjudicator wrote to the solicitors for both the parties on 18.08.2016 as follows: "During the meeting, Mr Jonathan Kok, the representative from the Claimant has stated that the persons representing the Claimant at 31 the meeting today (18 August 2016) for the joint re-measurement of the Final Quantities do not have the the adequate competence to perform the joint re-measurement exercise and do not wish to continue with the exercise. Therefore the Joint Re- Measurement exercise could not be carried out." (emphasis added) [68] At para 72 of the Decision the Adjudicator put on record as follows: "On 18 August 2016, I ... put in record that the joint re- measurement was not able to be carried out because the representatives from the Claimant present at the joint re- measurement do not (have) adequate competence to perform the joint re-measurement. The nominated qualified person from the Claimant vide letter dated 5 August 2016 was not present at the meeting." [69] On 25.08.2016 the Plaintiff made a formal application for discovery of the Documents and all instructions issued by the main project’s quantity surveyor and/or architect in relation to painting works for the project pursuant to section 25 CIPAA (the “Discovery Application”). [70] The reasons for the Discovery Application are found in the Plaintiff’s solicitors’ letter dated 25.08.2016 and it stated that the Final 32 BQ prepared, approved and certified by the project consultants will show the actual quantities of the works including the painting works performed by the Plaintiff. [71] The Defendant replied to the Discovery Application via its solicitors’ letter dated 28.08.2016 and disputed the relevancy of the Documents. The Plaintiff contended that while the Discovery Application was still pending, the learned Adjudicator on 28.08.2016, informed all parties to cease all communications with the Adjudicator on the basis that the decision will be delivered before 08.09.2016 as the re- measurement exercise could not be carried out. Subsequently, the Adjudicator delivered the Adjudication Decision on 06.09.2016. [72] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff argued that the Adjudicator had failed to allow the Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard on its Discovery Application. He further argued that by failing to consider the Discovery Application, the Adjudicator had deprived the Plaintiff the right to present and prosecute its claim in a fair manner. The Plaintiff said that the Adjudicator did not decide on the Discovery Application before he delivered the Decision. [73] To be fair to the Adjudicator he had stated at para 82 of his Decision that the Defendant had furnished the CPC and the CMGD. He had also noted the reasons given by the Defendant (who is the 33 Respondent in the Adjudication) for not furnishing a copy of the Main Contract COC and the approved Final Quantities in their award with their Employer, Transmission Technology Sdn Bhd ("TTSB") ("the Documents") at para 83 as follows: "... the Respondent denied that there is no (sic) such document for approved Final Quantities in their award with their Employer Transmission Technology Sdn Bhd (TTSB). The Respondent as a subcontractor to TTSB is not privy to the Conditions of Contract and approved final quantities between TTSB and the Employer. The Respondent also reiterated that these documents are irrelevant to the disputes." [74] On 15.08.2016, the Adjudicator made an order for specific discovery for the production of the above Documents as noted by him at paragraph 84 of his Decision. [75] At paragraph 85 the Adjudicator further noted: "...The Respondent reiterates their position that these documents are irrelevant to the adjudication proceedings and the arrangement between the Respondent and TTSB is mutually exclusive from the one between the Respondent and the Claimant. In light of this 34 argument, the Respondent is not agreeable to provide these documents." [76] The Defendant had submitted in the Adjudication Proceedings that there was no such Document for approved Final Quantities in the letter of award between TTSB and the Defendant. The documents adduced by the parties, namely Provisional Bill of Quantities, site instructions, drawings and calculation and measurement details were sufficient for the Adjudicator to make a decision because the Claimant's entitlement to payment, if any, which was denied, was to be determined under a re- measurement of the actual works executed pursuant to Clause 3.2 of the Contract. [77] The Defendant had also brought to the attention of the Adjudicator that the discovery of the Conditions of Contract of the Main Contract between the Defendant and TTSB, all Architect’s Instructions in relation to the alleged omission and the Works, all certificates for payment, Final Accounts, claims and supporting documents between the Defendant and TTSB are not necessary and wholly inappropriate for the purpose of the Adjudication Proceedings. This is because the Claimant had never disputed all the previous certificates certified by the Defendant nor have the parties disputed the specifications of work done. The Defendant said they had never raised any alleged omission of the Works. 35 [78] At paragraph 105 of the Decision, the Adjudicator ruled that: “I also used the powers vested in me under the Section 25(b) of CIPAA 2012 to obtain the approved final quantities in the Main Contract between the Main Contractor and his Employer (known as TTSB) which may assist in this adjudication process. The Respondent has refused to furnish these documents as their claim these documents are irrelevant to the adjudication proceedings as the arrangement between the Respondent and TTSB is mutually exclusive from the one between the Respondent and the Claimant. As per clause 9 of the Subcontract Agreement, the Subcontractor shall have access to the Main Contract document except for the details of the prices.” (emphasis added) [79] However the non-production of the Documents did not in any way hamper the Adjudicator from deciding on the dispute based on the documents and evidence before him. It was of course open to him to draw the necessary adverse inferences against the Defendant if he was not satisfied with the reasons given by the Defendant for the non- production of the Documents. [80] Whilst it would be ideal and indeed, good practice, to set out clearly his decision on the Discovery Application by the Plaintiff, I am of the considered view that the Adjudicator had accepted the reasons given 36 by the Defendant and that in the rush to get out the Decision on time, he could have missed out altogether this matter as in setting out his reasons for dismissing the formal Discovery Application. [81] I said that because had he made the order following the Discovery Application he would have given a time frame for the Defendant to comply with it and it has to be before the deadline for the Decision to be made on 8.9.2016. In all probability he would have dismissed the Discovery Application as he had no difficulty arriving at his Decision though he might have initially thought that the Documents were relevant. From reading paragraph 104 of his Decision, it may be safely said that the Adjudicator is deemed to have dismissed the Discovery Application as being unnecessary and irrelevant for the purpose of his Decision. It reads as follows: “104 The Claimant has also claimed that the Respondent also unreasonably denied and/or refused the Claimant’s request and its contractual entitlement to peruse the Architect’s Instructions (if any) issued to the Respondent to support its unilateral re- measurement of the works and also to peruse any instructions to that effect including any re-measurement of the Contract Bill of Quantities by the independent Consultant Quantity Surveyor. Based on the Subcontract Agreement, there is no provision 37 for this in the Subcontract to support the Claimant argument." (emphasis added) [82] What is more important is that the Adjudicator, after setting out the reasons operating in his mind with respect to the Discovery Application, had no difficulty deciding on the dispute without reference to the Documents prayed for by the Plaintiff/Claimant as can be seen at paragraph 106 below: “106 Notwithstanding the above, the Claimant is not entitled for his full claim based on the following reasons: 1) The second and main issue of the Claimant is fully linked to the dispute in the final quantities for both the Original Contract and Variation Works between the parties. 2) It is clearly stated in the Subcontract Agreement that the final quantities shall be based on measurement of the actual works done. 3) The Claimant is fully aware that this re-measurable Subcontract and he has not taken any initiative on his own to carry out re-measurement of the final quantities to submit his final claim. 38 4) The Claimant was furnished with the final quantities by the Respondent and he has not disputed these quantities based on measurement. 5) The Claimant has also refused to the request by the Respondent to carry out a joint re-measurement of the quantities. 6) The Claimant has also not taken the initiative to participate in the joint re-measurement exercise arranged by me to resolve the final quantity quantum.” [83] I would ask myself the reverse question which is, assuming that the Adjudicator had wrongly dismissed the Discovery Application, would this Court interfere in that decision? I do not think so. I should restrain myself from interfering with the decision made by an Adjudicator in interlocutory applications made before him or in the way he conducts the Adjudication proceedings by utilizing the powers available to him under section 25 CIPAA unless the way he went about it is manifestly unfair and a material breach of natural justice or that he had exceeded his jurisdiction in the result. [84] Here the Adjudicator had considered the reasons given by the Claimant for the Discovery Application and the objection taken by the 39 Respondent to the said Application. Even if he had made a wrong decision on the Application, this Court would not interfere for it is only a step towards arriving at his Decision. If his Decision cannot be interfered with except for the narrow grounds set out in section 15 CIPAA, none of which goes towards the merits of the case as it is not an appeal, then a fortiori, I would not interfere with his decision made on an Application before him. [85] In as much as I cannot review the Adjudication Decision on merits, I would also not review the Adjudicator's decision on an interlocutory application on its merits. [86] Generally the Court would not interfere with a decision made in an interlocutory application as that has to do with the exercise of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator in deciding within his vast powers under section 25 with respect to the way the Adjudication proceedings should be conducted. The Court would confine itself to the ultimate Decision made and see if it is susceptible to setting aside for the grounds set out in section 15 CIPAA for otherwise a decision of interim finality would be saddled with as many interlocutory applications as lawyers assisting the parties may think of, unnecessarily stretching the Adjudication process to beyond the strict statutory period to deliver the Decision. 40 [87] What was designed to be a speedy and simple process should not be converted into a cumbersome and convoluted one akin to full-blown litigation proceedings adrift with applications. [88] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff suggested that the Adjudicator ought to have requested additional time from parties to enable him to consider the Discovery Application. This he said can be seen from the judgment of Humphrey Lloyd QC in Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC), at para [35]: “[35] An adjudicator, acting impartially and in accordance with the principles of natural justice, ought in such circumstances to inform the parties that a decision could not properly reasonably and fairly be arrived at within the time and invite the parties to agree further time. If the parties were not able to agree more time then an adjudicator ought not to make a decision at all and should resign.” (emphasis added) [89] It must be borne in mind that an Adjudicator has to deliver his Decision within the strict time frame provided for in section 12(a) CIPAA which in this case is within 45 working days from the service of the Adjudication Reply. 41 [90] The Plaintiff as Claimant only made a formal application for discovery of documents at the eleventh hour, especially after it had refused to carry out a joint re-measurement exercise and approximately ten (10) days before the Adjudicator was statutorily obliged to deliver his Adjudication Decision. [91] At any rate, at that stage of intense contestation it does not appear to be a matter where parties would mutually agree to extend time under section 12(2)(c) CIPAA for the Adjudicator to deliver his Decision. [92] I understand that the other alternative would be for the Adjudicator to resign but I do not think that he should after having heard the parties for so long unless it is a matter that he would not be able to decide without the Documents prayed for. As it turned out, he could decide and he did decide for the reasons given by him. Any attempt to vary the sum adjudged by him would descend into the merits of the claim which this Court must resist as this is not an appeal. [93] There is yet another option open to the Adjudicator which is to draw the necessary adverse inference against the Defendant but apparently he did not go down that route for the reasons given for his Decision at paragraph 106 of his Decision set out above. 42 [94] A further reason why no adverse inference was drawn against the Defendant can be surmised from paragraph 103 of his Decision as follows: "The argument by the Claimant that the Final Quantity measurement by the Respondent is unilateral, without any basis and without any substantiation cannot be accepted because the Claimant has been furnished with the quantities measured by the Respondent and forwarded to them on 27 January 2014. The full take-off sheets of the quantities have also been furnished in the Adjudication Response (Annexure 1 to 3 of RBD). The Claimant has also not requested for the full details of the measurement from the Respondent after receiving the final quantities on 27 January 2014. From the furnished evidence, the Respondent has given ample opportunities to the Claimant to verify the re-measured quantities and the Claimant has not used it." [95] It is not every breach of or denial of natural justice in an Adjudication case that will result in the Decision being set aside. The breach must be material and not minor, it must be patent and not peripheral. Such was the approach affirmed in Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] EWHC 282 (TCC), at para [57] as follows: 43 “[57] From this and other cases, I conclude as follows in relation to breaches of natural justice in adjudication cases: (a) it must first be established that the adjudicator failed to apply the rules of natural justice; (b) any breach of the rules must be more than peripheral; they must be material breaches; (c) breaches of the rules will be material in cases where the adjudicator has failed to bring to the attention of the parties a point or issue which they ought to be given the opportunity to comment upon if it is one which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome of the resolution of the dispute and is not peripheral or irrelevant; (d) whether the issue is decisive or of considerable potential importance or is peripheral or irrelevant obviously involves a question of degree which must be assessed by any judge in a case such as this; (e) it is only if the adjudicator goes off on a frolic of his own, that is wishing to decide a case upon a factual or legal basis which has not been argued or put forward by either side, without giving the parties an opportunity to comment or, 44 where relevant put in further evidence, that the type of breach of the rules of natural justice with which the case of the Balfour Beatty Construction case was concerned comes into play. It follows that, if either party has argued a particular point and the other party does not come back on the point, there is no breach of the rules of natural justice in relation thereto” (emphasis added) [96] In SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733 (HC), SEF Construction Pte Ltd applied to set aside the adjudication application on the ground that the adjudicator had breached the rules of natural justice by failing to consider SEF’s submissions on two out of the four jurisdictional issues. Judith Prakash J (now JA) at paragraphs [58] and [59] held that: “[58] Having given this question somewhat anxious consideration since affording natural justice is a fundamental requirement of the adjudication procedure, I have decided that the Adjudicator’s failure to discuss the submissions in his Adjudication Determination was not a breach of natural justice. In coming to this conclusion I was fortified by the views of Dyson J and the AR quoted above (at [51]-[52]). I also found useful and practical guidance from the Australian cases, notwithstanding their http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/high-court-judgments/13923-sef-construction-pte-ltd-v-skoy-connected-pte-ltd-2009-sghc-257#p1_51 http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-of-singapore/case-law/free-law/high-court-judgments/13923-sef-construction-pte-ltd-v-skoy-connected-pte-ltd-2009-sghc-257#p1_52 45 references to good faith which is a concept that I have found not to be applicable in Singapore. ... [59] The following passage of the judgment of Palmer J in Brookhollow Pty Ltd v R&R Consultants Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1 was particularly useful: 57 Where both claimant and respondent participate in an adjudication and issues are joined in the parties’ submissions, the failure by an adjudicator to mention in the reasons for determination a critical issue (as distinct from a subsidiary or non-determinative issue) may give rise to the inference that the adjudicator has overlooked it and that he or she has therefore failed to give consideration to the parties’ submissions as required by s 22(2)(c) and (d). Even so, the adjudicator’s oversight might not be fatal to the validity of the determination: what must appear is that the adjudicator’s oversight results from a failure overall to address in good faith the issues raised by the parties. 58 In some cases, it may be possible to say that the issue overlooked was of such major consequence and so much to the forefront of the parties’ submissions that no adjudicator attempting to address the issues in good faith could 46 conceivably have regarded it as requiring no specific examination in the reasons for determination. In other cases, the issue overlooked, although major, may be one of a large number of issues debated by the parties. If the adjudicator has dealt carefully in the reasons with most of those issues, it might well be a possibility that he or she has erroneously, but in good faith, omitted to deal with another major issue because he or she did not believe it to be determinative of the result. Error in identifying or addressing issues, as distinct from lack of good faith in attempting to do so, is not a ground of invalidity of the adjudication determination. The Court must have regard to the way in which the adjudication was conducted and to the extent and content overall of the adjudicator’s reasons: the Court should not be too ready to infer lack of good faith from the adjudicator’s omission to deal with an issue when error alone is a possible explanation. (emphasis added) [97] Whatever may be the reason for the Adjudicator’s omission to state categorically his decision on the Discovery Application, there was no breach of natural justice. Natural justice requires that the parties 47 should be heard; it does not require that they be given responses and determinations on all submissions made. See the case of AM Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National Golf and Country Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260. Whether the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he decided on a lesser sum admitted by the Defendant as the non-paying party when the Defendant had earlier in their Payment Response had cross-claimed for overpayment [98] It is trite that the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator is confined to the matters contained in the Payment Claim and Payment Response. This can be seen from Section 27(1) CIPAA: “27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator 1) Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6. (emphasis added)” [99] In View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695, at para [66], Mary Lim J (now JCA) held that: “[66] With respect, the Court finds these concerns misplaced. It may be said that by virtue of subsection 27(1), the Payment 48 Claim and the Payment Response is to adjudication what pleadings are to civil litigation. Parties are bound by their pleadings under the rules of procedure in civil litigation; in adjudication, those pleadings are to be found in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response; and not in the Adjudication Claim, Adjudication Response or the Adjudication Reply." (emphasis added) [100] The above decision has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717. [101] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that based on the established legal principles, the matters and documents that were not referred to in the Payment Response must not be considered by the Adjudicator. He then referred to paragraphs 107-108 of the Decision where the Adjudicator made specific reference to the revised certificates that were not referred to in the Payment Response and accepted the amount therein. He urged the Court to conclude that in view of the above, the Adjudicator had clearly acted in excess of his jurisdiction. [102] In the Payment Response filed the Defendant as Respondent in the Adjudication had denied owing the amount claimed by the Plaintiff/Claimant and had in fact cross-claimed the amount of RM16,740.71 being overpayment to the Claimant. 49 [103] In the Adjudication Response filed by the Defendant, the Defendant abandoned the cross claim and admitted that upon a proper calculation under a re-measurement of the actual works executed pursuant to the express provision of Clause 3.2 of the Contract there is a sum of RM29,791.73 due and payable to the Plaintiff after a review of the quantities of works done. The Defendant admitted there was an inadvertent mistake in the Certificate of Payment No. 11 where an additional sum of RM13,504.41 for variation orders nos. 2(R), 5, 6 and 7 were omitted by them. [104] This payment took into account the balance of payment for Certificate of Payment No. 10, Certificate of Payment No. 11 (Revised) and Certificate of Payment No. 12 as explained in Part D of the Adjudication Response. Since the original Contract Sum had been revised to RM936,167.81 after the re-measurement, the Defendant did not need to make any further payment to the Plaintiff/Claimant, except for the sum of RM29,791.73. [105] There is nothing improper in abandoning a cross claim made in a Payment Response. The Payment Response had nevertheless denied the amount owing to the Plaintiff as Claimant. There is equally nothing improper in now conceding at the Adjudication Response stage that the amount owing is for a lesser sum than what the Claimant has claimed. 50 The Defendant admitted to a sum of RM29,791.23 owing to the Plaintiff as Claimant. [106] It is within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator, in the light of the concession and admission made, to then ascertain what is the actual amount owing to the Plaintiff/Claimant by the Defendant/Respondent. The Adjudicator had not transgressed outside the Payment Claim and the Payment Response because the Adjudicator rightly understood his jurisdiction to determine the amount owing to the Claimant for the construction work done. [107] The rules of pleading must not be made more stringent in Adjudication than in Litigation. If in a Court of law, a defendant is allowed to make concession and admission at the trial when in its Defence it had denied the whole sum claimed and even put in a counterclaim, I see no good reason why in an Adjudication the same concession and admission cannot be made by the Respondent non-paying party and even to abandon its cross claim altogether. [108] The Adjudicator would still have to decide based on the evidence adduced, as to whether the Claimant is entitled to the whole of its claim and if not, how much of the claim as may have been proven. In this case, the Adjudicator was satisfied, for the reasons given, that the 51 amount owing is as admitted by the Defendant from the re-measurement done and the revised Certificate and the final Certificate issued. [109] Whilst it is true that the Defendant had revised its Certificate of Payment No. 11 and had also issued its final Certificate of Payment No. 12 for the release of the 2nd moiety Retention Sum on 23.6.2016 yielding a sum of RM29,791.23 owing to the Claimant, the Adjudicator is not obliged to accept this sum ipso facto or unquestioningly. [110] The Adjudicator is entitled to look at the fresh concession and admission and see whether the Payment Claim is nevertheless supported by the evidence before him. He has vast powers under section 25(m) to review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued and any valuation of the parties. In other words, even if the Defendant had not made those concession and admission, the Adjudicator is entitled to exercise his vast powers under section 25(m) and (n) CIPAA to review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued and any valuation arising out of the re-measurement exercise suggested by him as the factual matrix of the dispute may demand. Section 25(m) and (n) CIPAA provide that: “25. The adjudicator shall have the powers to- 52 (m) review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued pursuant to a construction work contract, decision, instruction, opinion or valuation of the parties or contract administrator relevant to the dispute; (n) decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate had been issued in respect of the matter;” [111] The Adjudicator had evaluated the evidence as set out at paragraphs 99, 103, 107 and 108 of the Adjudication Decision as follows: “[99] The Respondent has instructed the Claimant to carry out Additional Works which is not part of the Contract scope through variation orders and/or site instructions. This was not disputed by the Respondent … The Claimant has also confirmed vide his letter dated 12 August 2016 on the clarification from me. … the Claimant has estimated the value to be RM169,349.17 in his final progress claim and the Respondent has valued this in the Final Certificate of Payment of No. 12 as RM166,145.03. This difference can be verified in the final re-measurement between the parties. The Claimant has also confirmed through the clarifications that the difference of RM3,204.14 is only related to quantity dispute. This can also be verified in the final re-measurement of the quantities. 53 ... [103] … The argument by the Claimant that the Final Quantity measurement by the Respondent is unilateral, without any basis and without any substantiation cannot be accepted because the Claimant has been furnished with the quantities measured by the Respondent and forwarded to them on 27 January 2014. The full take-off sheet of the quantities have also been furnished in the Adjudication Response … The Claimant has also not requested for the full details of the measurement from the Respondent after receiving the final quantities on 27 January 2014. From the furnished evidence, the Respondent has given ample opportunities to the Claimant to verify the re-measurement quantities and the Claimant has not used it. ... [107] Respondent has carry out the final measurement of the quantities and furnished the full details of the take-off as attached in Adjudication Response (Annexure 1 to 5 of RBD). [108] In absence of any valid objection by the Claimant on the proposed final quantities by the Respondent, I have to consider that the Respondent Final Quantities produced in the Certificate of Payment No. 11 (Revised) represent the 54 actual final quantities under the present condition.” (emphasis added) [112] At this juncture, it must not be forgotten and indeed one must always remember that the above are findings of facts made by the Adjudicator based on the evidence tendered. The findings of facts by an Adjudicator does not warrant the intervention of this Court in setting aside the Adjudication Award as the Adjudicator had addressed all the right issues before him. [113] It cannot be over-emphasized that it is not for this Court to re-hear, re-open or re-evaluate the findings of fact made by the Adjudicator in this Setting Aside Application. Any invitation to go down that road under the guise of excess of jurisdiction must be resisted. [114] Admittedly the Plaintiff is not satisfied with the amount adjudged for he had expected to be awarded the whole of his claim. Where quantum is concerned, he would have to correct it in arbitration or litigation lest this application be turned into an appeal. [115] The Adjudicator found nothing mala fide in the Defendant's Certificate No. 11 (Revised) being a valuation of Additional Works according to the re-measurement rules under the Contract. I agree with the Defendant that the revision in the amount of Plaintiff/Claimant's 55 certificate no. 11(revised) does not change the basis of its defence that the Claimant's entitlement to payment is to be determined under a re- measurement of the actual works executed pursuant to Clause 3.2 of the Contract. [116] The Adjudicator has the jurisdiction to deal with an adjusted quantum of cross-claim and more so when the net result is a positive sum owing to the Claimant. The decision of the English High Court in Working Environments Ltd v Greencoat Construction Ltd [2012] 142 ConLR 149 is illustrative of this as follows: “[30] The ambit of the dispute included at the very least the first nine quantified items within the withheld items referred to in the 2 December 2011 certificate. The fact that they were re-quantified, in part, by Tabs 2 and 6 did not, in my judgement, take them out of the ambit of the referred dispute. It must be open to the parties within reason to adjust the quantum of disputed items; it would be extraordinary for instance if a claiming or defending party could not, jurisdictionally, reduce its claim or cross claim within a referred dispute. The extent to which a party could increase such a claim or cross claim after the dispute has been referred would be a matter of degree and reason; for instance, if it was so increased such that it was no longer the same 56 claim, it may well be that the adjudicator would have no jurisdiction to deal with the increased claim. …” (emphasis added) [117] In Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd (supra) case, Ravinthran Paramaguru J found as follows: “[87] … In fact, s. 25(n) of CIPAA states that the adjudicator has power to "decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued in respect of the matter". Under s. 25(m), the adjudicator is also empowered to "review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued". This simply means, even if the contractual agreement between the parties provides for issuance of a certified interim or progress claim, the absence of certification cannot deprive the unpaid party from availing the adjudication process. Furthermore, in the instant case, the adjudicator, in para. 80 of his decision, invoked his power to "review and revise" under s. 25(m) to assess the work done by the respondent. He is entitled to do so although no certificate was issued by the applicant as s. 25(m) covers cases where a certificate "is to be issued" or in other words covers cases where no certificate was actually issued.” (emphasis added) [118] In Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd (supra) case, Ravinthran Paramaguru J had further observed astutely that: 57 “[14] As I said earlier s. 15 does not envisage that the decision of the adjudication can be reviewed on its merits. Therefore, it is immaterial if the adjudicator had erred in his finding of facts. The decision of an adjudicator is only of temporary finality pending final settlement of accounts. In the premises, unless that there is a clear cut breach of natural justice or excess of jurisdiction, the court should be slow to set aside the decision of the adjudicator. This approach has been adopted in England where the adjudication process was introduced much earlier. In oft-cited Carillion Construction Ltd v. Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1358, Chadwick LJ said as follows: The task of the adjudicator is to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. Parliament may be taken to recognise that, in the absence of an interim solution, the contractor (or sub-contractor) or his sub-contractors will be driven into insolvency through a wrongful withholding of payments properly due. The statutory scheme provides a means of meeting the legitimate cash-flow requirements of contractors and their sub-contractors ... The need to have the ‘right’ answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly ...” (emphasis added) 58 [119] In the case of Beumer Group UK Ltd v Vinci Construction UK Ltd [2016] EWHC 2288 (TCC) Fraser J. held as follows: “12. It is trite law that adjudication is a speedy process designed only to provide what is called “interim finality” on construction disputes. Parliament intended that the parties should be given a quick answer, and that quick answer should be binding on the parties until the dispute, whatever it may be, is resolved finally either by litigation or arbitration… Adjudicators' decisions will be enforced by the court by summary judgment regardless of errors of fact and/or law by the adjudicator. Aggrieved losing parties can and should comply with the adjudicator's decision, as long as that decision was made by an adjudicator with jurisdiction over the dispute, who has conducted the adjudication fairly and in accordance with the rules of natural justice."(emphasis added) [120] An adjudication under the CIPAA merely provides an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. If a party wishes to pursue a claim in court or arbitration proceedings, it is at liberty to do so after the completion of or concurrently with the pursuit of the claim in adjudication proceedings. I cannot do better than to quote the words of Mary Lim J (now JCA) in Ranhill E & C Sdn Bhd v Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & 59 other Appeals [2015] MLJU 1873 in citing Carillion Construction Limited v Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited [2005] EWHC 778: “83. It is only too easy in a complex case for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision of an adjudicator to comb through the adjudicator's reasons and identify points upon which to present a challenge under the labels of "excess of jurisdiction" or "breach of natural justice". It must be kept in mind that the majority of the adjudicators are not chosen for their expertise as lawyers. Their skills are as likely (if not more likely) to lie in other disciplines. The task of the adjudicator is not to act as arbitrator or judge. The time constraints within which he is expected to operate are proof of that. The task of the adjudicator is to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. Parliament may be taken to have recognised that, in the absence of an interim solution, the contractor (or sub-contractor) or his subcontractors will be driven into insolvency through a wrongful withholding of payments properly due. The statutory scheme provides a means of meeting legitimate cash-flow requirements of contractors and their subcontractors. The need to have the "right" answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly. The 60 scheme was not enacted in order to provide definitive answers to complex questions. Indeed, it may be open to doubt whether Parliament contemplated that disputes involving difficult questions of law would be referred to adjudication under the statutory scheme. We have every sympathy for an adjudicator faced with the need to reach a decision in a case like the present.” (emphasis added) [121] There is thus no basis for the allegation that the Adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction in considering the revised Certificate No. 11. Pronouncement [122] I had therefore dismissed the Plaintiff's OS in Enclosure 1 to set aside the Adjudication Decision. As I had also earlier dismissed the Defendant's application in Enclosure 7 to strike out the Plaintiff's OS, I exercised my discretion and made no order as to costs. Dated: 30 May 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur 61 For the Plaintiff : Alliff Benjamin Suhaimi with Balan Nair (Messrs Thomas Philip) For the Defendant : Paul Kwong together with S Y Lim : (Messrs Azman Davidson & Co.) Date of Decision: 26 January 2017

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22C-76-10/2016

PLAINTIF L.K. Insulation Engineering (M) Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Apex Energy Sdn Bhd

Construction contract - application for leave to enter Summary Judgment - whether there is an issue or question which ought to be tried - The Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978, Rule 6(a) and 24(a); Rules of Court 2012, Order 14 rules 1(1), 2(1), 3(1) and 4(1).

30/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d7ae2c76-1ff7-471a-a944-105181f623eb&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22C-76-10/2016 BETWEEN L.K INSULATION ENGINEERING (M) SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (Company No: 501952-D) AND APEX ENERGY SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (Company No: 333730-U) JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] What happened here is rather uneventful. It is an atypical debt- recovery claim for work done and services rendered under a construction contract, which explains why it is filed in this construction court. The Plaintiff had applied in Enclosure 6 by way of a Notice of Application dated 17.11.2016 for leave to enter summary judgment against the Defendant. 2 [2] It is for the sum of RM 2,915,434.66 being the balance sums due and owing by the Defendant to the Plaintiff for services rendered in the form of installation and erection and rental of construction equipment known as scaffoldings and for the supply of manpower. [3] The Plaintiff had an affidavit in support of the application in Enclosure 7 dated 16.11. 2016. The Defendant had an affidavit dated 20.12.2016 to oppose the application. Then the Plaintiff had another affidavit dated 28.12.2016 to reply to the Defendant's affidavit. Postponement of Proceedings [4] This might be an opportune time to state that on the date fixed for hearing of this application on 27.1.2017, learned counsel for the Defendant informed the Court that he had been appointed 2 days ago to take over conduct of the case and so was applying for a postponement to file a further affidavit. As expected, learned counsel for the Plaintiff objected to the postponement application. [5] Counsel appearing before the courts must know by now that they must be ready for the hearing of the application fixed or for trial save for the most extenuating of circumstances. Whilst there are the emergencies and the exigencies of life, they do not all come close to a valid reason for 3 postponement. We all know one when we see one and no useful purpose would be served by giving a list of approved events that qualify for a postponement of a hearing. [6] Taking over conduct of a case is certainly not a good enough reason for a postponement of a hearing. Learned counsel for the Defendant would have asked his client the hearing date fixed or to call up the solicitors for the Defendant to check on the progress of the case in court or perhaps do an electronic search of the case in court. [7] The Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 addressed this situation in Rule 6 and 24 as follows: "Rule 6. An advocate and solicitor not to accept brief if unable to appear. (a) An advocate and solicitor shall not accept any brief unless he is reasonably certain of being able to appear and represent the client on the required day. (b) An advocate and solicitor shall not ordinarily withdraw from an engagement once accepted, without sufficient cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notice is given to the client. 4 ... Rule 24. Advocate and solicitor to be ready for the day fixed for trial. (a) An advocate and solicitor shall make every effort to be ready for trial on the day fixed. (b) An advocate and solicitor may apply for postponement of a case fixed for hearing for good and cogent reasons only. (c) Except in an emergency, it is improper for an advocate and solicitor to apply for a postponement in the absence of counsel or the other side unless he has given the counsel concerned at least forty eight hours notice of his intention to make the application."(emphasis added) [8] Rule 6(a) requires of an advocate and solicitor not just to appear for a client on the day fixed for hearing of an application but to represent the client on the day fixed for the hearing and not to ask for a postponement save for a good and cogent reason. Rule 24(a) requires him to be ready for trial and that includes the hearing of an application as envisaged in Rule 24(b). To be ready would mean to proceed to represent the client and not to ask for a postponement of the hearing. 5 [9] There is also a need to give prior notice of 48 hours to the counsel concerned. In other words, a postponement of a case should be avoided like plague. The rule and norm should be that a case fixed will go on and that a postponement must be as rare as hens' teeth and rarer than rubies! [10] At any rate the reason given is not cogent enough: that of wanting to file a further affidavit. Generally only 3 affidavits are allowed for an application: an affidavit in support, an affidavit in opposition and a further affidavit in reply to that affidavit in opposition. Unless there are cogent reasons for affirming a further affidavit as in the documents that were sought to be referred to were not available previously or that what has been referred to in the last affidavit filed is a lie, courts generally would not allow further affidavits to be filed. Otherwise there would be no end to affidavits filed because, human nature being what it is, everyone wants to have the final and last word! Therefore if in an affidavit in reply there is more than a reply to the affidavit filed in opposition, I would disregard the new matters raised which should have been raised in the affidavit in support. [11] In any event the time for exhausting affidavits is over and whatever that the Defendant had hoped to say cannot derogate from what had been sworn as the truth in the affidavit of the Defendant to oppose the summary judgment application. 6 Project [12] The Plaintiff specializes in providing scaffolding installation/erection to its clients in various industries. The Defendant is one of a consortium of companies involved in the mega project known as the Sabah Ammonia- Urea (SAMUR) in Sipitang which is located approximately 150 km from Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, East Malaysia. Problem [13] The Defendant issued and handed to the Plaintiff, by fax and e-mail, their Purchase Order No. APEX/SAMUR/136/151109, dated 1.10.2015 ("Purchase Order") appointing the Plaintiff to provide ‘competent manpower, supervision and materials complete with PPE to carry out scaffolding works’ (“the services”) to assist the Defendant in their execution of the Defendant’s project. [14] The Defendant’s Purchase Order was signed by the Defendant’s authorised signatory, En. Mustafa Bin Ali who is the Defendant’s Vice President and Director. The scope of the Plaintiff’s contractual obligations pursuant to the Purchase Order may be summarised as follows: 7 1. To install/erect scaffolding at locations designated by the Defendant and based on and guided by the Defendant’s sketch plans/drawings; 2. At the Defendant’s request, to provide workforce/manpower to modify/vary the frameworks scaffolding installed previously; 3. To supervise, monitor and verify the safety of the frameworks scaffolding that has been installed; and 4. Rental of scaffolding that has been installed for the Defendant; [15] The fees payable for the services provided by the Plaintiff are based on the scale of rates listed in the Purchase Order and are, inter alia, as follows: 1. "External Scaffolding with Tower type" wherein the scale agreed upon depends on the height involved and calculated in units price per cubic meters (“M3”); 2. "External Scaffolding with Hanging / Suspended Type" wherein the scale agreed upon depends on the height involved and calculated in unit price per M3; 8 3. "Scaffolding Rental" applies after 30 days of erection of the scaffolding and is calculated in unit price of RM0.35 per M3 per day; 4. "Scaffolding Rental Green Tag Inspection During Rental Period" applies per tag per week after 30 days of scaffolding erection and calculated in unit price of RM250.00 for every Green Tag per week 5. The scale for payments for Manpower Supply/Standby are dependent on the following: i) Categories of workers Plaintiff ii) Normal working hours iii) Overtime iv) On Sunday v) Public holidays 6. Other terms: i. Scale payment are excluding of GST; ii. Claims must be paid within 7 days from the date of invoice issued; and 9 iii. Late payment interest is charged at a rate of 1.5% per month. [16] The Plaintiff narrated that in performance of the contract it did the following: 1. Installed/erected the Plaintiff’s Scaffolding frameworks for the Defendant’s Project based on and guided by the sketch plans (drawings) that was provided by the Defendant; 2. Modified/varied and/or amended the Scaffolding framework, that was originally installed, in accordance to the directions and amended sketch plans as provided by the Defendant; 3. Supplied workforce/manpower to carry out the modifications/variations to the scaffolding works at the request of the Defendant. [17] What is more important from the point of a summary judgment application is that the Defendant and or their representatives, upon being satisfied with: 1. The installation/erection of the scaffolding works; 2. The modifications/variations to the scaffoldings works; and 10 3. The supply of workforce/manpower approved and signed off on the relevant supporting documents such as: (i) the Scaffolding-Erection Job Order, (ii) the Scaffolding Job Completion Certificate; (iii) the Photo Report – Job Completion Certificate; and (iv) the Scaffolding-Manpower Supply to confirm that the Plaintiff has duly completed their job. [18] Copies of all the supporting documents, duly approved and signed off by the Defendant were attached together with the Plaintiff’s Invoices and submitted to the Defendant for payment. [19] What is important here is that the Defendant did not at any material time after receiving the Plaintiff’s Invoices raise any query or objection. [20] The Plaintiff had collated and categorized these relevant documents, consisting of the Invoices, the Scaffolding-Erection Job Order, the Scaffolding Job Completion Certificate, the Photo Report-Job Completion Certificate, the Scaffolding-Manpower Supply and the Defendant’s sketch plan/drawings are found in the Affidavit in Support, Exhibit B and Exhibit G as follows: 11 1. Invoices for Scaffolding installation/erection and their supporting documents may be found at pages 11 to 32, 36 to 51, 55 to 74, 81 to 109, 112 to 124, 128 to 152, 160 to 188, 193 to 205, 212 to 237, 238 to 265, 269 to 298, 303 to 312, 313 to 326, 335 to 359, 374 to 378, 379 to 393, 404 to 433, 434 to 452 and 453 to 470 of Exhibit B; 2. Invoices for Scaffolding rental and their supporting documents may be found at pages 52 to 54, 153 to 156, 206 to 209 and 327 to 330 of Exhibit B and pages 481to 488 and 489 to 492 of Exhibit G; and 3. Invoices for the supply of workforce/manpower and their supporting documents may be found at pages 33 to 35, 75 to 78, 79 to 80, 110 to 111, 125 to 127, 157 to 159, 189 to 192, 210 to 211, 266 to 268, 299 to 302, 331 to 334, 360 to 365, 366 to 373 and 394 to 403 of Exhibit B. [21] Despite receiving the Plaintiff’s Invoices, the Defendant failed, refused or neglected to make payments that were due to the Plaintiff for the services rendered. 12 [22] Confronted with this wall of silence, the Plaintiff instructed its former solicitors to issue a notice of demand dated 11.7.2016 to the Defendant to claim for all monies due and owing in the sum of RM 2,222,723.18 as at 11.7.2016 ("the Plaintiff’s Notice") [23] This met with a response as most lawyer's letter would. Silence would be unacceptable in the light of such a claim to the tune of RM2.2million. The Defendant, vide letter dated 15.7.2016 addressed to the Plaintiff’s former solicitors, replied informing that they were in the midst of verifying the Plaintiff’s claim and requested for details to ease verification and confirmation by the Defendant as the Defendant allegedly claimed that Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s records are in conflict. [24] The Plaintiff’s former solicitors responded to what seemed to be a reasonable request. By their letter dated 25.8.2016 they submitted and presented to the Defendant a hardcover binder of all supporting documents totaling 460 pages in the form of the Invoices, the Scaffolding-Erection Job Order, the Scaffolding Job Completion Certificate, the Photo Report-Job Completion Certificate and the Scaffolding-Manpower Supply by hand which was duly acknowledged receipt by the Defendant on 26.8.2016. 13 [25] After receiving the detailed supporting documents from the Plaintiff’s former solicitors, the Defendant on 30.8.2016 made a payment of RM219,930.71 to the Plaintiff without raising any further query. Prayers [26] The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant in the summary judgment application the sum of RM2,915,434.66, includes the sums paid by the Plaintiff to the Royal Malaysian Customs Department for Goods and Services Tax (GST) on the Invoices issued by the Plaintiff to the Defendant's despite the Defendant’s failure, refusal and neglect to pay the Plaintiff’s Invoices. [27] In summary, the Plaintiff claims against the Defendants is for the aggregate amount of RM2,915,434-66 divided into 3 the components: a. Cost of installation and opening (erection and dismantle) scaffolding RM1,266,959.17 b. The cost of renting scaffolding until 5 September, 2016 RM1,592,581.69 c. Labor cost for the work of the variation and amendment of the original framework scaffolding RM 55,893.80 Total: RM2,915,434.66 14 Principles [28] I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff/Applicant that the following trite principles apply in deciding this summary judgment application: 1. Once the Plaintiff has fulfilled the following 3 preliminary requirements as laid down by Order 14 rules 1(1) and 2(1) of the Rules of Court 2012, namely: (i) The Writ and Statement of Claim has been served on the Defendant; (ii) The Defendant has entered an appearance; and (iii) The Plaintiff’s deponent has affirmed an affidavit verifying the facts on which the Statement of Claim is based and the belief of the Plaintiff’s deponent that there is no defence by the Defendant to the claim the burden then shifts to the Defendant to resists Enclosure 6 by satisfying this Honourable Court under Order 14 rules 3(1) and 4(1) that there is an issue or question which ought to be tried. 15 2. The jurisprudence submitted to above is clear from the Rules of Court 2012 and the following 2 Federal Court cases: (i) Order 14, Rules of Court 2012, TAB 1 Plaintiff’s Bundle of Authorities; (ii) National Company for Foreign Trade v Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 MLJ 300; and (iii) Cempaka Finance Bhd v Ho Lai Ying (trading as KH Trading & Anor) [2006] 2 MLJ 685 at pages 689 and 690. 3. In the case of Bank Negara Malaysia v Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 MLJ 400, the Supreme Court at page 408 of the report, held on the determination of whether an issue is or is not triable as follows: “In our view, basic to the application of all those legal propositions, is the requirement under O 14 for the court to be satisfied on affidavit evidence that the defence has not only raised an issue but also that the issue is triable. The determination of whether an issue is or is not triable must necessarily depend on the facts or the law 16 arising from each case as disclosed in the affidavit evidence before the court. ... Under an O 14 application, the duty of a judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other in an affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent, or is inherently improbable in itself, then the judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue not triable” (emphasis added) 4. Further, in the case of Suppuletchimi v Palmco Bina Sdn Bhd [1994] 2 MLJ 368, the Court held at page 382 of the report as follows: “The crucial question the court would have to ask itself in applications under O 14 or O 18 r 19(1)(a) – (d) is first, whether the piece or pieces of evidence 17 essential to make out a reasonable prima facie cause of action or a prima facie triable issue of fact are of the nature such that they are adducible by affidavit evidence; and secondly – if the answer to this question is in the positive – whether such essential prima facie evidence had been so adduced in the supporting affidavits. Such affidavits ought not to contain bare averments but must condescend or come definitely into particulars for serious argument such that they are sufficient to satisfy the court that there is a reasonable prima facie cause of action or a triable issue or issues of fact or law in the defence as the case may be.” (emphasis added) [29] I find merits in the submission of learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the matters raised by the Defendant in the Defendant’s Affidavit in Reply are vague and bare averments without condescending into particulars or adducing any evidence in support of their averments. There was no Statement of Defence filed by the Defendant. [30] In paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15 of the Affidavit in Opposition, the Defendant appears to be taking the stand that there is no contract 18 entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and therefore the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant is frivolous, vexatious and scandalous. [31] The Defendant’s averments in these paragraphs are as follows: 25.1 “Saya juga telah dinasihati oleh Peguamcara saya dan saya sesungguhnya percaya bahawa pada setiap masa yang material, Plaintif tidak mempunyai apa-apa kontrak, liability, duty of care dan atau tanggungjawab secara terus kepada Plaintif untuk membolehkan Plaintif mendapatkan ganti-rugi atau pampasan daripada Defendan” – paragraph 7 Affidavit in Reply; 25.2 “Saya menegaskan dan tidak bersetuju perenggan 7 Afidavit Sokongan bahawa Defendan telah memberi arahan Plaintif untuk melakukan pesanan pembelian untuk membantu Defendan dalam perlaksanaan Projek Defendan” – paragraph 9 Affidavit in Reply; 25.3 “Defendan pada setiap masa yang material adalah tidak memberi apa-apa arahan rasmi atau surat tawaran kepada Plaintif untuk perkhidmatan seperti yang terkandung di dalam 19 perenggan 8 (a) (b) (c) (d) Afidavit Sokongan” – paragraph 10 Affidavit in Reply; 25.5 “Tuntutan Plaintif ini juga suatu yang mengaibkan dan telah mengganggu dan mencemarkan imej Defendan sebagai Syarikat Perkhidmatan Kejuruteraan Bertauliah sedangkan pada setiap masa yang material, Plaintif tidak pernah melantik Defendan untuk melakukan apa-apa kerja sekalipun” – paragraph 12 Affidavit in Reply; 25.6 “Saya merujuk kepada perenggan 9, 10 dan 11 dan menegaskan tidak bersetuju dengan perenggan tersebut kerana pihak Plaintif tidak mempunyai tanggungjawab kontrak dan tanggungjawab professional kepada pihak Defendan” – paragraph 13 Affidavit in Reply; and 25.7 “Saya juga tegaskan sekali lagi bahawa Plaintif tidak sekali-kali dilantik oleh Defendan dan tidak mempunyai apa-apa nexus atau pertalian secara kontrak atau tort terhadap pihak Plaintif” – paragraph 15 Affidavit in Reply. [32] The Defendant’s averments above appear hollow and totally unconvincing as the Defendant had not explained away the various 20 documents furnished by the Plaintiff following the request of the Defendant for substantiating the Plaintiff's claim after the Defendant received the Plaintiff's Letter of Demand. [33] The Defendant’s attempt to deny the existence of a contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is not supported by the contemporaneous documents. A Defendant who has no contact or contract whatsoever with the Plaintiff would be vigorously and vehemently denying the claim to the colossal sum of RM2.2 million. The Defendant would naturally be horrified and hasten to lodge a police report. It would be nothing short of the Plaintiff trying to cheat the Defendant into parting with RM2.2 million on fabricated or forged documents. [34] I can do no better than to quote from the Court of Appeal's case of David Wong Hon Leong v Noorazman Adnan [1995] 4 CLJ 155 at p 159 as follows: "During argument, we registered our surprise at the learned Judge’s reluctance to enter judgment for this sum of RM100,000. After all, the appellant had failed to respond to the letter of 17 December. If there had never been an agreement as alleged, it is reasonable to expect a 21 prompt and vigorous denial. But, as we have pointed out, there was no response whatsoever from the appellant. In this context, we recall to mind the following passage in the judgment of Edgar Joseph Jr. J. in Tan Cheng Hock v Chan Thean Soo [1987] 2 MLJ 479-487: In Wiedemann v. Walpole [1891] 2 Q.B. 534, 537 an action for breach of promise of marriage, it was held, that the mere fact that the defendant did not answer letters written to him by the plaintiff in which she stated that he had promised to marry her, was no evidence corroborating the plaintiff’s testimony in support of such promise. Lord Esher M.R., in his judgment, remarked, Here, we have only to see whether the mere fact of not answering the letters, with nothing else for us to consider is any evidence in corroboration of the promise.’ (Emphasis added). Earlier, in his judgment, he said, ‘Now there are cases - business and mercantile cases in which the Courts have taken notice that, in the ordinary course of business, if one man of business states in a letter to another that he has 22 agreed to do certain things, the person who receives that letter must answer it if he means to dispute the fact that he did so agree. (The emphasis is ours.)" [35] On the contrary, the Defendant made some part payments after receiving the voluminous file of documents substantiating the Plaintiff's claim. If there is no contract the Defendant would be foolhardy to pay towards the sum claimed. If the contract was mistakenly with another corporate entity, one would have expected the Defendant to say so. [36] To put it mildly, the Defendant is masquerading in misinformation as the Defendant's stand goes against the contemporaneous documents in this case such as the Purchase Orders, the Invoices, the Scaffolding- Erection Job Order, the Scaffolding Job Completion Certificate, the Photo Report-Job Completion Certificate and the Scaffolding-Manpower Supply. It would be stretching to incredulity to suggest that the details of all the work and services rendered are a figment of the Plaintiff's invidious imagination; an attempt to defraud the Defendant! [37] The deponent of the Defendant’s Affidavit in Reply is one En. Rashid Ibrahim. En. Rashid Ibrahim is the Defendant’s Project Director and also the individual who signed the Defendant’s letter dated 15.7.2016 (page 23 477, Exhibit LKS-D, Affidavit in Support) replying to the Plaintiff’s former solicitor’s notice of demand dated 11.7.2016 (page 475 and 476 Exhibit LKS-C, Affidavit in Support). [38] In the Defendant’s letter dated 15.7.2016, En. Rashid Ibrahim, inter alia, replied as follows: “We wish to inform your goodselves that we are in the midst of verifying the above said amount with our account record. As our record does not reflect the same amount as claimed and demanded, it would be appropriate for your client to provide us with the details. Kindly inform your client that this matter pending verification and we shall let you know when everything is in order. We look forward for your cooperation in resolving this matter amicably.” [39] I must say that such a reply is both candid and courteous. It is a natural response from someone who had received the benefit of the work done and services rendered to want to ascertain the correct amount owing. It would of course shore up tremendous credibility if the Defendant would follow up descending to details as to where the discrepancies and disparities lie. To make a reverse turn-around of saying that there is no contract at all with the Plaintiff is inherently incredible! 24 [40] The Defendant in its letter dated 15.7.2016 clearly had acknowledged the contract between the Plaintiff and merely asked for supporting documents to verify the Plaintiff’s demand for payment. [41] After receiving the hardcover binder of supporting documents totaling 460 pages from the Plaintiff’s former solicitors, the Defendant made a part payment to the Plaintiff in the sum of RM219,930.71 on 30.8.2016 (page 479 Exhibit LKS-F, Affidavit in Support). [42] Nowhere in the Defendant’s letter dated 15.7.2016 did the Defendant raise any of the matters raised in paragraphs 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 15 of the Defendant’s Affidavit in Opposition. [43] The Defendant’s averments in the Affidavit in Opposition are afterthoughts and not bona fide. [44] I agree with the Plaintiff that the Defendant is estopped from asserting that there is no contract, no instruction to proceed with the works and no confirmation of the completion of the work done for the following reasons: 1. The Defendant has not denied issuing the Purchase Orders to the Plaintiff. 25 2. The Defendant has not denied receiving the 39 Invoices issued by the Plaintiff. In fact the Defendant has not, anywhere in the Defendant’s Affidavit in Opposition, answered the Plaintiff’s averment in paragraph 15 of the Affidavit in Support that the 39 Invoices were sent by the Plaintiff to the Defendant from time to time. The Defendant’s failure to answer or reply must be treated as an admission. [45] It is the kind of silence that is deafening. When speech is expected as in an admission, denial or disputing the amount claimed, then that silence is damning; and damaging to the Defendant's case. [46] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff called in aid the case of Ng Hee Thoong & Anor v Public Bank Bhd [1995] 1 MLJ 281, where at page 286 of the report, the Court held that: “Now, it is well settled principle governing the evaluation of affidavit evidence that where one party makes a positive assertion upon a material issue, the failure of his opponent to contradict it is usually treated as an admission by him of the fact so asserted”. [47] The 39 Invoices clearly provide that “Any complaint regarding to this invoice should be lodged within (7) days from the date hereof”. After having 26 receiving the 39 Invoices, the Defendant is now estopped from disputing the Plaintiff’s 39 Invoices. [48] The Defendant has also not, in the Defendant’s Affidavit in Opposition, replied to the Plaintiff’s averments at paragraphs 17 and 22 of the Affidavit in Support that the Plaintiff sent Statement of Accounts to the Defendant. The Defendant’s failure to reply to the Plaintiff’s positive averment must be deemed as an admission that the Defendant did in fact received the Plaintiff’s Statement of Accounts as enunciated in Ng Hee Thoong’s case (supra). [49] The Plaintiff’s Statement of Accounts, which can be found at page 476 of Exhibit C and pages 480 and pages 493 to 494 of Exhibit G, Affidavit in Support, also contains the remark “Any discrepancy in this statement must be reported to us writing within 10 days”. The Defendant is now estopped from disputing the contents of the Plaintiff’s Statement of Account. [50] The Defendant has failed to reply to paragraph 15 of the Affidavit in Support where the Plaintiff made a positive averment that the Defendant had duly approved and signed off on all documents forming the contemporaneous documents in this case such as the Scaffolding- Erection 27 Job Order, Scaffolding-Job Completion Certificate, Photo Report-Job Completion Certificate and Scaffolding-Manpower Supply. [51] The Defendant did not contemporaneously dispute the Plaintiff’s claim, on all or any of the alleged grounds raised in the Defendant’s Affidavit in Support, upon receiving the Plaintiff’s former solicitor’s letter dated 11.7.2016 attaching the Plaintiff’s Statement of Account and demanding for the payment of RM2, 222,723.18 (page 475 to 476, Exhibit C). [52] I could not agree more with the Plaintiff's learned counsel that, in fact, the contemporaneous conduct of the Defendant shows that the Defendant, vide their letter dated 15.7.2016 (page 477, Exhibit D, Affidavit in Support), requested from the Plaintiff’s former solicitors for supporting documents on the alleged ground that the Defendant’s records did not reflect the same amount that was being claimed by the Plaintiff. [53] The Defendant after being given a hardcover binder totalling 460 pages of Invoices and the Scaffolding-Erection Job Order, Scaffolding-Job Completion Certificate, Photo Report-Job Completion Certificate and Scaffolding-Manpower Supply supporting documents certified by the Plaintiff’s former solicitor’s vide their letter dated 25.8.2016 (page 478, 28 Exhibit E, Affidavit in Support) did not dispute any of the documents but made a part payment of RM219,930.71 to the Plaintiff (page 479, Exhibit F, Affidavit in Support). Human nature being what it is, we tend to act consistent with what we believe to be true. The Defendant making part payment after receipt of the documents asked for must be contextually consistent with admission of the amount claimed. [54] The estoppel principle applies in a myriad of situations being a doctrine of wide utility and according to the Federal Court case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab- Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331, at pages 339, 344 and 345, it was held: “It is common ground that the appellant did not make any complaint about any of the invoices thus indorsed and sent by the respondent to it within the period of 14 days prescribed by the endorsement. Neither did the appellant make any contemporaneous challenge as to the right of the respondent to impose the 14-day period by way of the endorsement. It is also not in issue that the appellant, without raising any question on either of these points paid the respondent on several of the invoices. However, the appellant refused to make payment on about 20 invoices sent in by the respondent and these are the only ones that form the subject matter of the litigation between the parties. 29 ... The time has come for this court to recognize that the doctrine of estoppel is a flexible principle by which justice is done according to the circumstances of the case. It is a doctrine of wide utility and has been resorted to in varying fact patterns to achieve justice. Indeed, the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate are endless. ... We would add that it is wrong to apply the maxim 'estoppel may be used as a shield but not a sword' as limiting the availability of the doctrine to defendants alone. Plaintiffs too may have recourse to it. The true nature of the doctrine in this context is that stated by Lord Russell of Killowen in Dawsons Bank v Nippon Menkwa Kabushiki Kaisha LR 62 IA 100 at p 108: Estoppel is not a cause of action. It may (if established) assist a plaintiff in enforcing a cause of action by preventing a defendant from denying the existence of some fact essential to establish the cause of action, or (to put it in another way) by preventing a defendant from asserting the existence of some fact the existence of which would destroy the cause of action." 30 [55] The averment that there is no contract is nothing but a sham. No useful purpose can be served for going for trial. There are no circumstances in this case which ought to be investigated further by this court in a full trial. The factual matrix of this case militates against any necessity of going for trial. It would be a waste of time and resources of the Court for a case as classically suitable for summary judgment as this case. [56] The contemporaneous documentary evidence in the context of this commercial transaction are just overwhelming and no pretense should be allowed to obfuscate the obvious. Pronouncement [57] For all the reasons given above I have no hesitation in granting the summary judgment prayed for together with interest and costs. [58] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff was gracious and accommodating in accepting interest at the usual 5% per annum instead of 1.5% contractual interest per month. [59] This Court therefore allowed judgment to be entered with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from the date of writ to realization and costs of RM5,000.00. 31 [60] At the request of the Defendant and with the consent the Plaintiff, this order and judgment would not be enforced until after the expiry of 21 days from the date of the order and judgment. Dated: 30 May 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Malaya For the Plaintiff : M.Vinoben (Messrs Tay L.E & Co) For the Defendant : Shaharudin Ali together with Mohd Khairul Azam (Messrs Adzly & Co) Date of decision: 27 January 2017.

Tika 2.6.0

BA-12A-25-04/2016

PERAYU 1. Ridzuan Ahmad Bin Idrus 2. Wasmaziah Binti Noordin RESPONDEN Mohd Yusof Bin Omar

29/05/2017

YA DATIN ZALITA BINTI DATO' HJ. ZAIDAN (PK)

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5d946d7d-92b1-440a-ac28-38c2e0430b13&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. : BA-12A-25-04/2016 DI ANTARA 1. RIDZUAN AHMAD BIN IDRUS (No. K/P: 600116-08-5501) 2. WASMAZIAH BINTI NOORDIN (No. K/P: 640102-08-8898) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN MOHD YUSOF BIN OMAR (No. K/P: 610313-06-5293) ... RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Dalam Selangor Darul Ehsan GUAMAN NO: B52-68-04/2015) ANTARA MOHD YUSOF BIN OMAR (No. K/P: 610313-06-5293) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. RIDZUAN AHMAD BIN IDRUS (No. K/P: 600116-08-5501) 2. WASMAZIAH BINTI NOORDIN (No. K/P: 640102-08-8898) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the Sessions Court which had, after a full trial, dismissed the application by the Appellants (the First Defendant and the Second Defendant) to set aside Judgment in Default of Appearance (JID) of 5.4.2016. The Appellants are husband and wife and the Respondent was the Plaintiff. [2] At the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal, I dismissed the appeal against the decision of the Sessions Court. This judgment contains the full grounds for my decision. Background Facts [3] The dispute before me is regarding friends (the Appellants and the Respondent) who entered a friendly loan agreement where the Respondent agreed to loan the Appellants the sum of RM320,000.00 and the said amount to be repaid on 31 July 2013. It was alleged that on 11 October 2012, the Appellants borrowed from the Respondent another RM80,000.00 which is to be repaid on 31 July 2013. [4] There was a sworn statement (SD) made by the Appellants of 27 June 2011 declaring that a friendly loan agreement of RM320,000.00 was made with the Respondent. The SD also provides the following terms, briefly: (i) the Appellants had received all the loans by cash and cheque in stages; (ii) the Appellants are to repay all the loans on or before 31 July 2013; (iii) if the Appellants breached the friendly loan agreement, legal action can be taken against the Appellants and all legal cost including interest ordered by court will be borne by the Appellants; (iv) all demand notices delivered will be deemed to have been accepted by the Appellants either delivered via normal post or delivered personally to the Appellants’ address as stated; (v) the Appellants made the declaration believing that all statements are true according to the Statutory Declaration Act 1960. [5] The Appellants failed to repay the Respondent on the promised date and the Respondent claimed that he had on several occasions demanded for the repayment of RM320,000.00 but the Appellants failed or refused to repay. The Respondent also claimed that the Appellants failed to repay the loan of RM80,000.00 on the promised date and had demanded the same from the Appellants and the Appellants had failed to repay. [6] The Respondent had on 12 November 2014 through his Advocate & Solicitors, Messrs Mazwan & Nasar served the letter of demand to the Appellants but the Appellants failed to repay or refuse to repay the Respondent. [7] The Writ and Statement of Claim of the Respondent was sealed on 1 April 2015 and the Respondent through Messrs Mazwan & Nasar filed the Writ and Statement of Claim on 9 April 2015. The Respondent claimed to have served the Writ and Statement of Claim together with Counsel’s letter of 9 April 2015 via AR registered post to the Appellants’ house address. The service was endorsed by the server-notice, one Azlizan Bin Abdul Aziz of Messrs Mazwan & Nasar on 9 April 2015. The Case Management was fixed on 8 May 2015 at the Shah Alam Sessions Court. [8] In default of appearance, a Judgment In Default (JID) was entered against the Appellants on 12 May 2015 for the sum of RM400,000.00, interest at the rate of five per centum (5%) per annum for the judgment sum calculated from 31.07.2013 to the date of full settlement and the cost for the legal action of RM906.00 to be paid by the Appellants to the Respondent. [9] The application to set aside JID was filed by the Appellants on 28 January 2016. The Respondent alleged that the application to set aside the JID was filed and served by the Appellants almost 9 months after the JID was obtained against them at which material time the Respondent proceeded with bankruptcy action against the Appellants. A Bankruptcy Notice of 8 December 2015 was personally served on the Appellants on 30 December 2015. The application for setting aside was dismissed by the Session Judge and hence the appeal herein. The Appellants’ Submission [10] The Appellants’ brief grounds of appeal based on their written submissions are as follows: “(a) the service of Writ and Statement of Claim was improper. Therefore, the JID obtained was irregular and must be set aside; (b) there are merits / triable issues present in the defence that warrant an investigation at trial; and (c) the learned judge fell into error when she failed to examine the evidence. Had she done so, the JID would have been set aside at first instance.” [11] The learned counsel for the Appellants submitted in writing the two grounds of appeal with issues, that is the service of writ is bad and JID is irregular. On the first ground, the Appellants claimed that the Respondent did not serve the papers by using A.R. Register Post following Order 10 Rule 1(1) Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012) but instead using mere Registered Post. The Appellants’ Counsel submitted that there is no evidence that the Appellants received the cause papers and that “Given that service is bad, the JID must be set aside as of right. The question of there being a delay does not arise.” [12] The Appellants submitted that such evidence must be present and relied on the authority of the Kuala Lumpur High Court, Wilken Sdn Bhd v Chua Beng Hock & Ors [2004] 2 CLJ 164 that where a plaintiff decides to effect service by way of prepaid AR registered post, “it will be then incumbent upon him to produce the duly acknowledged AR card as proof of effective service…” [13] The Counsel for Appellants also submitted that the Session Judge was erred in law for accepting that the cause papers were served properly by Registered Post based on paragraph 5 of the SD which states that all notices and cause papers will be deemed accepted by the Defendants so long as they were sent via normal post (as in paragraph (b) at page 10 of her Ground of Judgment). The Counsel submitted that the learned Judge fell into error because all Court procedures is governed by ROC 2012 and cannot be superseded by a private treaty. [14] The Counsel further submitted that the Session Judge relied on the case of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 that there was no need to demonstrate that the papers had been been received if they were sent by AR Registered Post. The Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the issue in that Federal Court case was to construe the word ‘post’ contained in Clause 17 of one Letter of Guarantee and therefore there was a deeming provision that a letter is deemed received once posted out. In that case it concerns a Notice of Demand unlike in this case, a Writ. [15] The Appellants submitted that there are merits to their defence and that the dispute ought to be investigated at trial. The Appellants’ Counsel submitted in his written submission three issues: (a) “1st Issue:- whether the SD for RM320K and the Letter for RM80K can form the basis for the Plaintiff’s claim for RM400,000.00 against the Defendants.” (b) “2nd Issue:- if at all, how much is the Plaintiff entitled to be repaid? In this regard:- (i) there is a big question over the veracity of both the SD for RM320,000 and the letter for RM80K. Their contents are inaccurate; (ii) the Plaintiff insists that he is owed RM400,000.00. However, the money trail suggests that only RM280,000.00 is due (if at all); (iii) is the Plaintiff inflating his claim? This must be investigated at trial; (iv) …. (v) … (vi) …. “ (c) “3rd Issue:- is D2 even liable? In this regard:- (i) All the monies were received exclusively by D1, and never by D2; (ii) In the absence of any formal loan agreement, only D1 can be made liable because he received the monies; (iii) D2 cannot be made liable since she never received any monies; and (iv) If at all, this is an issue to be tried in Court….” The Respondent’s Submission [16] The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted they objected to the Appellants’ application in setting aside JID on the reason for failure to adhere to Order 42 Rule 13 of the ROC 2012. The counsel pointed out that there was a delay of almost 9 months where based on the First Defendant’s affidavit, the JID was only received in late May 2015 and the application to set aside the JID was only filed on 18 January 2016. The counsel relied on the case Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Agni Energie Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 6 MLRH 477 for filing the application to set aside JID out of time. [17] The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the service was done via post A.R. Registered to the Appellants’ address which is the same address as in First Defendant’s Affidavit and Affidavit In Reply, as in Exhibit ‘MYO 2’ at pages 75, 76 dan 77 of the Appeal Record. Exhibit ‘MYO 2’ is the Appellants’ address affirmed by the National Registration Department based on its reply of 7 April 2015. The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Writ and Statement of Claim had thus properly been served on the Appellants and as to whether the AR Registered card should be returned or otherwise is no longer an issue based on the case of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 where the Federal Court held that the AR Registered card need not be the proof of acceptance but suffice to show the notice was to the correct address with prepaid AR registered post with the postal receipt as proof of posting. The counsel submitted that the service was done in accordance with Order 10 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 and is therefore regular. [18] On the issue of defence of merits, the learned counsel further submitted that the delay of 9 months on the part of the Appellants with no reasons for the delay even though a lawyer was appointed on 2 June 2015 following the letter from the lawyer to Respondent’s counsel of 2 June 2015. The authority relied was the case of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Agni Energie Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 6 MLRH 477 that the Appellants did not show that he has a defence on the merits. The learned counsel further submitted that if the application to set aside is allowed it will be prejudicial to the Respondent as the Respondent had given ample time for the Appellants to react and repay the loan and that the Respondent had incurred cost in starting a bankruptcy action. Decision of the Sessions Court [19] The Session Judge allowed the Respondent’s application to set aside the Appellants’ application. She wrote in her ground, “ALASAN DAPATAN Setelah Mahkamah meneliti segala kertas kausa dan membaca hujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah mendapati segala kertas kausa adalah teratur dan Penghakiman Ingkar yang dimasukkan adalah teratur serta mendapati bahawa: 1) SERAHAN WRIT DAN PENYATAAN TUNTUTAN ADALAH SEMPURNA a) Serahan sesalinan bermeterai Writ dan Penyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 1 April 2015 kepada Defendan-defendan diserah secara AR berdaftar di alamt Defendan-defendan di No. 38 Jalan 5/69 Gasing Indah 46000 Petaling Jaya, Selangor pada 9 April 2015 sepertimana mengikut perenggan 5 Surat Akuan Defendan-Defendan (Eksibit R-2 Defendan). b) Merujuk kepada Perenggan 5 Surat Akuan tersebut di atas, Defendan-Defendan secara jelas telah menyatakan bahawa segala notis dianggap terima oleh Defendan-Defendan samada dihantar melalui mel biasa atau diserha ke rumah Defendan-Defendan di alamt seperti diatas. Rujuk surat Akuan Bersumpah Defendan, Ekshibit R-2 Afidavit Sokongan dan cabutan alamat Defendan-Defendan dari JPN, Ekshibit MYO 2 Afidavit Jawapan. Serahan kepada Defendan-Defendan dibuat melalui AR Berdaftar di alamat yang sama tertera pada ekshibit-ekshibit di atas) c) Sehubungan dengan itu juga, berkaitan isu penyempurnaan penyerahan kertas kausa, Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kepada Penghakiman kes Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1, yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa AR Berdaftar tidak perlu dibukti penerimaannya dengan sempurna tetapi cukup dengan menunjukkan bahawa notis di alamatkan dengan betul berbayar dan dihantar serah ke Pejabat pos diakui untuk penyampaian oleh pihak pos. Justeru itu, Mahkamah tidak perlu mengambil kira merit permohonan Defendan (sekiranya ada) memandangkan serahan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan adalah teratur. Walaupun sedemikian, setelah meneliti kertas kausa dan Affidavit sokongan Defendan, Mahkamah mendapati tiada pembelaan yang bermerit yang menunjukkan terdapat kebarangkalian peluan untuk Defendan-Defendan berjaya dalam kes ini mahupun sebarang isu yang seharusnya dibicarakan…..” COURT’S FINDINGS [20] After perusing the Appeal Record and hearing the submissions, I dismissed the appeal. The principle issue in this appeal is whether the setting aside application for the judgment of default should be allowed when it was made out of time. [21] Based on Order 42 rule 14 of the ROC 2012, a party intending to set aside or vary the order must make his application to the court and serve it on the party who has obtained the order or judgment within 30 days after the receipt of the order or judgment by him. [22] The setting aside judgment in default of appearance is a judgment given to the Plaintiff without the court hearing the merits of the Plaintiff’s case. Therefore where a party intending to make application to the court to set aside a JID, it must be served on the party who has obtained the judgment within 30 days after the receipt of the judgment. [23] On an application to set aside a JID, I refer to the Court of Appeal case of Yap Ke Huat & Ors v Pembangunan Warisan Murni Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 5 MLJ 112 where the Court of Appeal held at page 120: “[15] It is trite that when considering to set aside a judgment in default, the first task is to ascertain whether it is regular or irregular judgment. If it is an irregular judgment, then the default judgment ought to be set aside ex debitio justitiae. If it is regularly obtained, then the principle expounded in Evans v Bartlem [1937] AC 473 applies - see the judgment of the Federal Court in Hasil Bumi Perumahan Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 312. This requires the defendant to show that he has a defence on merits. Delay in making such an application is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant or refuse the application – see Tuan Haji Abdul Rahman v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 30.” [24] It is pertinent to verify the service effected on the Appellants had been properly made, that is the means of bringing to their notice the action being taken against them so that they can either defend or otherwise. In this regard, we must carefully scrutinize firstly whether the service was regular and secondly, if the service was regular, whether there was a defence with merit to justify the delay. Service of cause papers [25] On the issue of irregularity raised by the Appellants, I looked at the Respondent’s submission namely in its Affidavit In Reply that the Writ and Statement of Claim were posted using A.R. Registered to the address of the Appellants, the same address as in the First Defendant’s Affidavit’s address and as affirmed by the National Registration Department of 7 April 2015 (exhibit ‘MYO 2’ of the Appeal Record). [26] I now return to the First Defendant’s defence on the service of the Writ and Statement of Claim. I reproduce here an extraction of the First Defendant’s Affidavit for easy reference as to whether the irregularity was specified in the application: “6. Saya telah dinasihati oleh peguamcara kami dan sesungguhnya percaya dan menyatakan bahawa JID tersebut adalah ‘irregular’ kerana:- a) kami tidak pernah menerima sesalinan Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif pada bila-bila masa. Dokumen tersebut tidak pernah disampaikan ke atas diri kami; b) saya cuma mendapat tahu berkenaan dengan tuntutan disini apabila disampaikan dengan salinan JID tersebut pada lewat bulan Mei 2015; c) selepas menerima sesalinan JID tersebut, saya telah melantik peguamcara dan mengarahkannya untuk membuat carian Mahkamah untuk mendapat tahu lebih lanjut berkenaan tuntutan disini; d) setelah meneliti affidavit penyampaian bertarikh 7.5.2015 yang difailkan oleh pihak peguamcara Plaintiff, hanya adanya bukti pengeposan dan tidak adanya kad A.R. Berdaftar’ yang dikembalikan; Sesalinan Afidavit Penyampaian bertarikh 7.5.2015 ditunjukkan kepada saya dan ditanda sebaga Eksibit “R-1” e) ianya jelas bahawa tiadanya bukti penerimaan oleh pihak kami. Oleh itu, JID tersebut patut diketepikan terus-menerus kerana prosedur penyampaian dokumen tidak dipenuhi.” [27] The Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, the First Defendant’s Affidavit and Plaintiff’s Affidavit In Reply can be found at pages 12 -14, pages 20 - 24 and at pages 57- 63 of the Appeal Record. [28] The Appellants stated that they have never received the Writ and the Statement of Claim but they were served with the JID in late May 2015. Upon careful scrutiny of the Appeal Record I find the affidavit by one Azlizan Bin Abdul Azizi, a notice-sender with the Respondent’s counsel (exhibit “AA-1” at pages 27-30 of the Appeal Record) stating that he had served the copies of Writ and Statement of Claim of 1 April 2015 on 9 April 2015 through A.R. Registered post to the Defendants’ last known address. The postal receipts were tendered as exhibit “AA-2” at page 34 of the Appeal Record. This is corroborated with the First Defendant’s Affidavit admitting that there was proof of posting but there was no A.R. Registered card. [29] The learned counsel for Respondent referred to the Federal Court case of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 which held that there is no need for proof of posting and suffice to show that the notice was properly addressed with a prepaid stamped and a receipt of posting by the post office. [30] The learned counsel for the Defendants argued in its written submission that the case of Amanah Merchant Berhad v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ be distinguished from the instant case as the issue before that Federal Court was to construe the word ‘post’ contained in one clause 17 of one Letter of Guarantee as it was concerning the postage of a Notice of Demand and unlike a Writ in this case which should be governed by Order 10 Rule 1(1) ROV 2012. [31] Based on Order 10 Rule 1(1) ROC 2012: “(1) Subject to the provisions of any written law and these Rules, a writ shall be served personally on each defendant or sent to each defendant by prepaid A.R. registered post addressed to his last known address and in so far as is practicable, the first attempt at service must be made not later than one month from the date of issue of the writ. …” [32] I had a close look at the notice-server’s affidavit which stated that the cause papers were sent via A.R. Registered post. The Respondent’s counsel’s clerk can effect service based on the case of Commerzbank (South East Asia Ltd v Tow Kong Liang [2011] 3 CLJ 127, Court of Appeal where Heliliah JCA (as she then was) held that the Rules of High Court 1980 (then) permits the mode of service to be effected by an agent. [33] This Court looked at previous cases decided on the service issue that is the case of MBF Finance Bhd v Tiong Kieng Seng [2001] 4 CLJ 38, the case of Pengkalan Concrete Sdn Bhd v Chow Mooi [2003] 3 MLJ 67 and the case of CIMB Bank Bhd v Comsa Layer Farms Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 118. In the case of MBF Finance Bhd [2001] (supra), it was held that once the writ and statement of claim are sent by AR registered post, it is prima facie proof of service unless the defendant is able to rebut this. [34] Following the case of Pengkalan Concrete Sdn Bhd v Chow Mooi [2003] 3 MLJ 67, Suryadi J (as he then was) held that there is nothing under Order 10 rule 1(1) ROC 2012 that the plaintiff must evidentially prove that the named person in the writ must be the very person who had received the summon if it was sent via prepaid AR Registered post. It was also held at page 73 that whether the writ had physically arrived or had been received at the last known address was not legislated in the court’s rules and stated that, “On that score, if the plaintiff had direct and cogent evidence of that writ having been received by the intended person, that was a plus factor for the former, otherwise s 12 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 would immediately come into play when invoked….” [35] In the case of CIMB Bank Bhd v Comsa Layer Farms Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 118, the High Court held that the plaintiff was not contractually bound under the facility agreement to produce the AR Registered cards as contended by the defendants even if service of the writ was effected by AR Registered post. [36] A close scrutiny of the Order 10 Rule 1 ROC 2012 finds that whether the writ must be physically arrived or received at the last known address is not legislated in the provision. In fact, there is nothing in Order 10 Rule 1 to state in express terms that there is a need to produce the AR Registered cards as proof of service. [37] In the current case, the friendly loan agreement was supported by the SD specified that all demand notices delivered will be deemed to have accepted by the Appellants either delivered by normal post or delivered personally. The cause papers comprising the Writ and Statement of Claim together with the Respondent’s Counsel’s letter however had been claimed by the Respondent to be sent via A.R. Registered post. [38] The cause papers had been served via A.R. Registered post as required by Order 10 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. In addition, the Appellants were not sued under the SD. I stand to be guided by the Federal Court’s decision of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 attributed by the counsel for the Respondent. In that Federal Court decision at page 5, clause 17 referred in the letter of guarantee did not provide that the notice should either be sent by registered post or AR registered post. For the reasons stated above, as the cause papers were posted by A.R. registered, it is suffice to show that the cause papers had been properly addressed with the postal receipt as proof of service which the Respondent here had clearly complied under Order 10 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. [39] The burden is on the Respondent, who was the plaintiff, on the balance of probabilities, to prove that the service was regular as in accordance with Order 10 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012. Upon evaluation of the law and the evidence before this Court that is the proof of receipt as exhibit ‘AA-2, at page 34 of the Appeal Record and the affidavit of the server-notice, the Respondent has proven that the Writ and Statement of Claim were sent via A.R. Registered post to the known address of the Appellants. No merits to the Defence [40] In order to apply to set aside a regular judgment, the Appellants must show that they have defence with merits. On this context I refer to the Federal Court case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Majlis Amanah Ra’ayat [1979] 1 MLJ 24 where the Federal Court stated, “It is axiomatic that if the judgment is regular, then it is an inflexible rule that there must be an affidavit of merits, that is, an affidavit stating facts showing a defence on the merits.” [41] It is trite law that the defence must come with merits. In Barnes v Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep at page 544, Lord Denning MR stated that a ‘defence on the merits’ means a defence which discloses an arguable and triable issue. This was also decided in the case of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Agni Energie Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 6 MLRH 477 at page 480 as submitted by the Respondent’s Counsel that in order to show a defence with merits, a draft defence must also be filed. Whether Judgment Sum is Incorrect [42] A friendly loan is a loan given by the lender to the borrower based on mutual trust whereby the borrower is to repay the loan within the specified time with no interests charged: Tan Aik Teck v Tang Soon Chye [2007] 5 CLJ 441 at page 442. In that case, it was an appeal against the decision of the High Court which allowed the plaintiff’s claim for the repayment of a friendly loan given by the plaintiff to the defendant. In that case, the defendant admitted that he received the money but denied that it was a friendly loan. No loan agreement was made between the plaintiff and the defendant but there were cheques issued to the defendant which the Court of Appeal held that it is irrelevant as to how the plaintiff got the amount and the defendant’s argument that the cheque cashed did not belong to plaintiff was plainly not true. The Court of Appeal decided that the defendant made up the evidence to avoid paying the friendly loan given by plaintiff. [43] The friendly loan agreement made orally is binding as in the case of Tan Aik Teck (supra) although there was no promissory note made for instance stating the amount of debt and date of repayment as decided in one Singapore case of Lena Leowardi v Yeap Cheen Soo [2014] SGCA 57 at paragraph 25. A promissory note is a written promise to pay money between lender and borrower where normally it would state the amount of debt and the date of repayment or a repayment schedule. [44] If the Appellants denied that there were such amount loaned and if there were such loan, the amount was incorrect. In this case, the evidence adduced as in exhibit MYO-3 at pages 79, 80 and 81 of the Appeal Record and exhibit MYO-4 particularly at pages 83 and 84 of the Appeal Record clearly showed that there were loan made and the second loan taken clearly stated that it was a friendly loan. [45] Based on the documents tendered as in exhibit MYO-3 and MYO-4, I cannot disregard that those documents claimed as scribbled notes by the Appellants do not amount to a friendly loan agreement. The fact that there was a SD made by the Appellants stating the amount borrowed from the Respondent, the repayment date and the notice of demand if the repayment is defaulted is clear evidence that the friendly loan existed. I would think the second loan was made by a promissory note as it expressly stated the amount taken from the Respondent and the terms of repayment that is by way of a cheque dated 31 July 2013. In addition, the existence of the friendly loan is corroborated by the SD taken under oath by the Appellants. [46] Although no execution of a formal agreement, it can infer that the SD is also a form of security for the Respondent to get the return of his money from the Appellants. The amount loaned RM400,000.00 is not a small amount. I would say that it is a reasonable inference from the SD that there was a friendly loan made and a promise to return the money. A reasonable inference as Lord Wright had stated in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Association Collieries Ltd [194] AC 152 at page 169, “Inferences must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation …” [47] The SD was made by the Appellants and sworn before the Commissioner for Oath, it is definitely not a conjecture or a speculation. It is also a reasonable inference to connote that the SD is a form of guarantee for the Respondent as the Appellants had benefitted from the friendly loan. [48] The Respondent bears the burden to prove that there were loans given to the Appellants firstly and that the total amount was RM400,000.00. The Appellants claimed as in their proposed defence that the Respondent will contribute to the Appellants that is the First Defendant’s business, RM200,000.00 if the First Defendant will repay the RM200,000.00 with interest amounting to RM120,000.00 (Appellants’ Defence & Affidavit In Reply, pages 53-54 of Appeal Record). [49] The Respondent on the other hand claimed that out of the RM320,000.00, the Appellants had received RM120,000.00 by cash as per signed receipt of the Appellants of 11 July 2011 (as in exhibit MYO-3). The allegation of RM120,000.00 as interest was denied by the Respondent. [50] The Court had the opportunity to study the evidence as exhibited on the sum RM 320,000.00 which includes the RM120,000.00 cash and the second loan of RM80,000.00 alleged to be borrowed from the Respondent by the Appellants as in the SD of 27 June 2011 (the Appellants’ document exhibit ‘R-2)’ at page 44 of the Appeal Record. [51] There was a bank transaction of RM100,000.00 made to the Appellants as at page 48 of the Appeal Record. There was a cheque of 11 July 2011 for the amount of RM100,000.00 made to the First Defendant cheque bearing the number 40-01032 with notes stating having been received by the Appellants. There is also a note signed by the Appellants of 11 July 2011 that the Appellants received RM120,000.00 with their identification card numbers (at page 79 of the Appeal Record) and with copies of their identification cards (at pages 80-81 of Appeal Record). [52] The second loan was a signed note of 11 October 2011 with the heading “Friendly loan” where the Appellants took a second loan of RM80,000.00 signed by the First Defendant accompanied with a cheque of RM80,000.00 in the name of the Respondent at pages 83-84 of the Appeal Record. In relation to the second loan, the Respondent stated in his Affidavit In Reply that the there was an email following the second loan after the Appellants failed to repay on the promised date where the Appellants deferred the payment of RM80,000.00 and suggested an instalment payment instead (at pages 86-88 of the Appeal Record). There was no security pledged for the friendly loan except for the SD to guarantee the repayment of the two loans to the Respondent, an affirmation under oath and signed by the Appellants. Moneylending Transaction [53] The illegal moneylending raised by the Appellants was not in the written submission of the learned counsel for the Appellants but was submitted orally at the hearing of this appeal of 18 April 2017, in the Appellants’ Affidavit In Support (at page 20 of the Appeal Record) and in the Proposed Defence and Counterclaim (at page 53 of the Appeal Record). An extraction of paragraph 7 (c) and (j) of the Affidavit In Support is reproduced here: “c) namun, saya ingin menyatakan bahawa yang sama tidak tepat. Pinjaman yang kononnya diberikan tersebut sebenarnya adalah suatu transaksi pinjam-wang (moneylending transaction) di mana Plaintiff sedang cuba menuntut faedah ke atas wang yang diberipinjamkan walaupun Plaintiff tidak mempunyai lesen peminjam wang dan bukanlah ‘licensed moneylender’; …. j) ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa suatu ‘underlying moneylending transaction dibelakan kesemua ini. Kesemua ini telahpun dimasukkan ke dalam bentuk suatu Pembelaan & Tuntutanbalas Defendan-Defendan yang Dicadangkan yang kami akan memfailkan sekiranya Permohonan tersebut dibenarkan.” [54] The Proposed Defence and Counterclaim of the Appellants stated that the Respondent had informed the Appellants that the Respondent is desirous to support First Defendant’s work in one Company and will remit the money as loan if the Appellants were to repay the RM200,000.00 with interest at RM120,000.00. The Appellants also stated that in the alternative, there was a moneylending transaction without license (at paragraph 2.9) and such transaction is illegal. [55] Based on the First Defendant’s affidavit, it was claimed that the amount claimed is incorrect and that the loan was a moneylending transaction where the Plaintiff, not a licensed moneylender, is trying to make a profit on the moneylending transaction. The Respondent in its Affidavit In Reply stated that the money RM400,000.00 was at all material time a friendly loan agreement made between the Respondent and the Appellants and was upon Appellants’ request. The Respondent claimed that it was never as a claim under service agreement nor as moneylending transaction. [56] The Appellants submitted that the amount is incorrect based on the banking transactions made as exhibited before the Sessions Court that the only “money trail” available showed that there was only RM200,000.00. The Appellants however offered no explanation to the note of receipt for the amount of RM120,000.00 in cash, the First Defendant’s cheque of RM80,000.00 made to the Respondent and the email by the First Defendant to the Respondent on his proposed schedule of repayment of RM80,000.00. Despite the allegation of illegal moneylending activity by Respondent, there was a second loan taken as per “promissory” note by the Appellants. [57] The Respondent’s claims for the friendly loan had been denied by the Appellants. It was a friendly loan and no other parties nor witnesses to the loans. There was no mention of the Company receiving the loan but only the Appellants as stated in the notes receiving the loan, the cheque made under the Respondent’s name and the SD. There was no other documentary evidence from the Appellants to rebut the Respondent’s claims. Having found that the Plaintiff has proven that there such loans and are still owing to the Plaintiff, the onus then shifts to the Defendants to show that they have a good defence for the incorrect judgment sum in justifying the delay in setting aside the JID. [58] This is a friendly loan agreement. There was no denial from the Appellants that they had borrowed a sum of money from the Respondent. Under the Moneylenders Act 1951, the law does not prohibit one from giving a friendly loan and one need not have a license to give a friendly loan. It is however for the court to decide if the primary principal object of the lender’s business was of moneylending: Ngui Mui Khin & Anor v Gillespie Bros & Co. ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 9. [59] Based on the evidence adduced, the friendly loan is a separate matter altogether from the service agreement that is purportedly entered between the Respondent and the Appellants. As claimed by the Appellants in their Proposed Defence and Counterclaim, the loan by the Respondent need not be returned until the Company has made its profits. In addition to that, the Appellants claimed that the Respondent’s claim for the loan has yet to “crystallize”. The Respondent had denied these. [60] This Court is dissatisfied with the statements made by the Appellants. The SD that the Appellants had made in this regard is governed by the Statutory Declarations Act 1960 and needless to say that making a false statutory declaration is, by virtue of section 3 thereof, an offence punishable under the Penal Code. The Appellants submitted that they were economically pressured to return the loan however no documentary proof to proof as such for instance by making a police report against the Respondent. The Appellants failed to offer some credible explanations as to why they had copies of their identification cards and address in the receipt notes of RM120,000.00 which as alleged by the Respondent a loan given to the Appellants in cash. I take the view that the weight of documentary evidence outweighs everything else: Low Keang Guan v Sin Heap Lee-Marubeni Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 289. [61] This Court also considered the fact that if the application to set aside is allowed, it will be prejudicial to the Respondent. The amount RM400,000.00 was a friendly loan to the Appellants and setting aside the application would mean that the Respondent is denied the money owed to him and will face unjust delay in getting his money back. In addition, the Respondent had given ample time for the Appellants to react and to repay the Respondent coupled with the fact that the Respondent had incurred cost in starting a bankruptcy action to get his money back. Is Second Defendant liable? [62] Based on the receipt notes where both the First Defendant and Second Defendant received the loan, the defence that only the First Defendant had received all the monies and the Second Defendant did not, could not hold water as the documentary evidence adduced stated clearly that the Appellants supported by the SD had received all the friendly loans totaling RM400,000.00. CONCLUSION [63] I am hard pressed to accept that by allowing the appeal it will defeat the purpose of having the mandatory provisions of Order 42 Rule 13 ROC 2012. Where the law provides a particular method or form of procedure for effecting service, then there must be strict compliance with those provisions: PT Pelajaran Nasional Indonesia v Joo Seang & Co Ltd [1958] 24 MLJ 113 at pages 115-116. I am of the view that if the Appellants believed that they have a triable issue, they would have filed the application to set aside the judgment entered immediately upon receiving the Writ and Statement of Claim and not to wait for almost 9 months. The claim that this is an illegal moneylending transaction is an afterthought. [64] Based on the foregoing, I am satisfied that there is no merit to the Appellants’ proposed defence. There are no bona fide triable or arguable issues raised by the First Defendant either. On that note, I have no compunction in dismissing this appeal with costs. Dated: 29 May 2017 (DATIN ZALITA BINTI DATO’ ZAIDAN) Judicial Commissioner Alam High Court, Selangor Counsel for Appellants/Defendants Messrs. Dinesh Praveen Nair C3-3-15, Solaris Dutamas Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Respondent/Plaintiff Messrs Mazwan Dee Nasar & Shima 12-2-1, Jalan Medan Pusat Bandar 4A, Bandar Baru Bangi 43650 Bangi 27

Tika 2.6.0

BA-12A-25-04/2016

PERAYU 1. Ridzuan Ahmad Bin Idrus 2. Wasmaziah Binti Noordin RESPONDEN Mohd Yusof Bin Omar

29/05/2017

YA DATIN ZALITA BINTI DATO' HJ. ZAIDAN (PK)

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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (BAHAGIAN RAYUAN) RAYUAN SIVIL NO. : BA-12A-25-04/2016 DI ANTARA 1. RIDZUAN AHMAD BIN IDRUS (No. K/P: 600116-08-5501) 2. WASMAZIAH BINTI NOORDIN (No. K/P: 640102-08-8898) … PERAYU-PERAYU DAN MOHD YUSOF BIN OMAR (No. K/P: 610313-06-5293) ... RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Dalam Selangor Darul Ehsan GUAMAN NO: B52-68-04/2015) ANTARA MOHD YUSOF BIN OMAR (No. K/P: 610313-06-5293) … PLAINTIF DAN 1. RIDZUAN AHMAD BIN IDRUS (No. K/P: 600116-08-5501) 2. WASMAZIAH BINTI NOORDIN (No. K/P: 640102-08-8898) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT Introduction [1] This is an appeal against the decision of the Sessions Court which had, after a full trial, dismissed the application by the Appellants (the First Defendant and the Second Defendant) to set aside Judgment in Default of Appearance (JID) of 5.4.2016. The Appellants are husband and wife and the Respondent was the Plaintiff. [2] At the conclusion of the hearing of the appeal, I dismissed the appeal against the decision of the Sessions Court. This judgment contains the full grounds for my decision. Background Facts [3] The dispute before me is regarding friends (the Appellants and the Respondent) who entered a friendly loan agreement where the Respondent agreed to loan the Appellants the sum of RM320,000.00 and the said amount to be repaid on 31 July 2013. It was alleged that on 11 October 2012, the Appellants borrowed from the Respondent another RM80,000.00 which is to be repaid on 31 July 2013. [4] There was a sworn statement (SD) made by the Appellants of 27 June 2011 declaring that a friendly loan agreement of RM320,000.00 was made with the Respondent. The SD also provides the following terms, briefly: (i) the Appellants had received all the loans by cash and cheque in stages; (ii) the Appellants are to repay all the loans on or before 31 July 2013; (iii) if the Appellants breached the friendly loan agreement, legal action can be taken against the Appellants and all legal cost including interest ordered by court will be borne by the Appellants; (iv) all demand notices delivered will be deemed to have been accepted by the Appellants either delivered via normal post or delivered personally to the Appellants’ address as stated; (v) the Appellants made the declaration believing that all statements are true according to the Statutory Declaration Act 1960. [5] The Appellants failed to repay the Respondent on the promised date and the Respondent claimed that he had on several occasions demanded for the repayment of RM320,000.00 but the Appellants failed or refused to repay. The Respondent also claimed that the Appellants failed to repay the loan of RM80,000.00 on the promised date and had demanded the same from the Appellants and the Appellants had failed to repay. [6] The Respondent had on 12 November 2014 through his Advocate & Solicitors, Messrs Mazwan & Nasar served the letter of demand to the Appellants but the Appellants failed to repay or refuse to repay the Respondent. [7] The Writ and Statement of Claim of the Respondent was sealed on 1 April 2015 and the Respondent through Messrs Mazwan & Nasar filed the Writ and Statement of Claim on 9 April 2015. The Respondent claimed to have served the Writ and Statement of Claim together with Counsel’s letter of 9 April 2015 via AR registered post to the Appellants’ house address. The service was endorsed by the server-notice, one Azlizan Bin Abdul Aziz of Messrs Mazwan & Nasar on 9 April 2015. The Case Management was fixed on 8 May 2015 at the Shah Alam Sessions Court. [8] In default of appearance, a Judgment In Default (JID) was entered against the Appellants on 12 May 2015 for the sum of RM400,000.00, interest at the rate of five per centum (5%) per annum for the judgment sum calculated from 31.07.2013 to the date of full settlement and the cost for the legal action of RM906.00 to be paid by the Appellants to the Respondent. [9] The application to set aside JID was filed by the Appellants on 28 January 2016. The Respondent alleged that the application to set aside the JID was filed and served by the Appellants almost 9 months after the JID was obtained against them at which material time the Respondent proceeded with bankruptcy action against the Appellants. A Bankruptcy Notice of 8 December 2015 was personally served on the Appellants on 30 December 2015. The application for setting aside was dismissed by the Session Judge and hence the appeal herein. The Appellants’ Submission [10] The Appellants’ brief grounds of appeal based on their written submissions are as follows: “(a) the service of Writ and Statement of Claim was improper. Therefore, the JID obtained was irregular and must be set aside; (b) there are merits / triable issues present in the defence that warrant an investigation at trial; and (c) the learned judge fell into error when she failed to examine the evidence. Had she done so, the JID would have been set aside at first instance.” [11] The learned counsel for the Appellants submitted in writing the two grounds of appeal with issues, that is the service of writ is bad and JID is irregular. On the first ground, the Appellants claimed that the Respondent did not serve the papers by using A.R. Register Post following Order 10 Rule 1(1) Rules of Court 2012 (ROC 2012) but instead using mere Registered Post. The Appellants’ Counsel submitted that there is no evidence that the Appellants received the cause papers and that “Given that service is bad, the JID must be set aside as of right. The question of there being a delay does not arise.” [12] The Appellants submitted that such evidence must be present and relied on the authority of the Kuala Lumpur High Court, Wilken Sdn Bhd v Chua Beng Hock & Ors [2004] 2 CLJ 164 that where a plaintiff decides to effect service by way of prepaid AR registered post, “it will be then incumbent upon him to produce the duly acknowledged AR card as proof of effective service…” [13] The Counsel for Appellants also submitted that the Session Judge was erred in law for accepting that the cause papers were served properly by Registered Post based on paragraph 5 of the SD which states that all notices and cause papers will be deemed accepted by the Defendants so long as they were sent via normal post (as in paragraph (b) at page 10 of her Ground of Judgment). The Counsel submitted that the learned Judge fell into error because all Court procedures is governed by ROC 2012 and cannot be superseded by a private treaty. [14] The Counsel further submitted that the Session Judge relied on the case of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 that there was no need to demonstrate that the papers had been been received if they were sent by AR Registered Post. The Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the issue in that Federal Court case was to construe the word ‘post’ contained in Clause 17 of one Letter of Guarantee and therefore there was a deeming provision that a letter is deemed received once posted out. In that case it concerns a Notice of Demand unlike in this case, a Writ. [15] The Appellants submitted that there are merits to their defence and that the dispute ought to be investigated at trial. The Appellants’ Counsel submitted in his written submission three issues: (a) “1st Issue:- whether the SD for RM320K and the Letter for RM80K can form the basis for the Plaintiff’s claim for RM400,000.00 against the Defendants.” (b) “2nd Issue:- if at all, how much is the Plaintiff entitled to be repaid? In this regard:- (i) there is a big question over the veracity of both the SD for RM320,000 and the letter for RM80K. Their contents are inaccurate; (ii) the Plaintiff insists that he is owed RM400,000.00. However, the money trail suggests that only RM280,000.00 is due (if at all); (iii) is the Plaintiff inflating his claim? This must be investigated at trial; (iv) …. (v) … (vi) …. “ (c) “3rd Issue:- is D2 even liable? In this regard:- (i) All the monies were received exclusively by D1, and never by D2; (ii) In the absence of any formal loan agreement, only D1 can be made liable because he received the monies; (iii) D2 cannot be made liable since she never received any monies; and (iv) If at all, this is an issue to be tried in Court….” The Respondent’s Submission [16] The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted they objected to the Appellants’ application in setting aside JID on the reason for failure to adhere to Order 42 Rule 13 of the ROC 2012. The counsel pointed out that there was a delay of almost 9 months where based on the First Defendant’s affidavit, the JID was only received in late May 2015 and the application to set aside the JID was only filed on 18 January 2016. The counsel relied on the case Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Agni Energie Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 6 MLRH 477 for filing the application to set aside JID out of time. [17] The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the service was done via post A.R. Registered to the Appellants’ address which is the same address as in First Defendant’s Affidavit and Affidavit In Reply, as in Exhibit ‘MYO 2’ at pages 75, 76 dan 77 of the Appeal Record. Exhibit ‘MYO 2’ is the Appellants’ address affirmed by the National Registration Department based on its reply of 7 April 2015. The learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Writ and Statement of Claim had thus properly been served on the Appellants and as to whether the AR Registered card should be returned or otherwise is no longer an issue based on the case of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 where the Federal Court held that the AR Registered card need not be the proof of acceptance but suffice to show the notice was to the correct address with prepaid AR registered post with the postal receipt as proof of posting. The counsel submitted that the service was done in accordance with Order 10 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012 and is therefore regular. [18] On the issue of defence of merits, the learned counsel further submitted that the delay of 9 months on the part of the Appellants with no reasons for the delay even though a lawyer was appointed on 2 June 2015 following the letter from the lawyer to Respondent’s counsel of 2 June 2015. The authority relied was the case of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Agni Energie Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 6 MLRH 477 that the Appellants did not show that he has a defence on the merits. The learned counsel further submitted that if the application to set aside is allowed it will be prejudicial to the Respondent as the Respondent had given ample time for the Appellants to react and repay the loan and that the Respondent had incurred cost in starting a bankruptcy action. Decision of the Sessions Court [19] The Session Judge allowed the Respondent’s application to set aside the Appellants’ application. She wrote in her ground, “ALASAN DAPATAN Setelah Mahkamah meneliti segala kertas kausa dan membaca hujahan kedua-dua pihak, Mahkamah mendapati segala kertas kausa adalah teratur dan Penghakiman Ingkar yang dimasukkan adalah teratur serta mendapati bahawa: 1) SERAHAN WRIT DAN PENYATAAN TUNTUTAN ADALAH SEMPURNA a) Serahan sesalinan bermeterai Writ dan Penyataan Tuntutan bertarikh 1 April 2015 kepada Defendan-defendan diserah secara AR berdaftar di alamt Defendan-defendan di No. 38 Jalan 5/69 Gasing Indah 46000 Petaling Jaya, Selangor pada 9 April 2015 sepertimana mengikut perenggan 5 Surat Akuan Defendan-Defendan (Eksibit R-2 Defendan). b) Merujuk kepada Perenggan 5 Surat Akuan tersebut di atas, Defendan-Defendan secara jelas telah menyatakan bahawa segala notis dianggap terima oleh Defendan-Defendan samada dihantar melalui mel biasa atau diserha ke rumah Defendan-Defendan di alamt seperti diatas. Rujuk surat Akuan Bersumpah Defendan, Ekshibit R-2 Afidavit Sokongan dan cabutan alamat Defendan-Defendan dari JPN, Ekshibit MYO 2 Afidavit Jawapan. Serahan kepada Defendan-Defendan dibuat melalui AR Berdaftar di alamat yang sama tertera pada ekshibit-ekshibit di atas) c) Sehubungan dengan itu juga, berkaitan isu penyempurnaan penyerahan kertas kausa, Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kepada Penghakiman kes Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1, yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan memutuskan bahawa AR Berdaftar tidak perlu dibukti penerimaannya dengan sempurna tetapi cukup dengan menunjukkan bahawa notis di alamatkan dengan betul berbayar dan dihantar serah ke Pejabat pos diakui untuk penyampaian oleh pihak pos. Justeru itu, Mahkamah tidak perlu mengambil kira merit permohonan Defendan (sekiranya ada) memandangkan serahan writ dan pernyataan tuntutan adalah teratur. Walaupun sedemikian, setelah meneliti kertas kausa dan Affidavit sokongan Defendan, Mahkamah mendapati tiada pembelaan yang bermerit yang menunjukkan terdapat kebarangkalian peluan untuk Defendan-Defendan berjaya dalam kes ini mahupun sebarang isu yang seharusnya dibicarakan…..” COURT’S FINDINGS [20] After perusing the Appeal Record and hearing the submissions, I dismissed the appeal. The principle issue in this appeal is whether the setting aside application for the judgment of default should be allowed when it was made out of time. [21] Based on Order 42 rule 14 of the ROC 2012, a party intending to set aside or vary the order must make his application to the court and serve it on the party who has obtained the order or judgment within 30 days after the receipt of the order or judgment by him. [22] The setting aside judgment in default of appearance is a judgment given to the Plaintiff without the court hearing the merits of the Plaintiff’s case. Therefore where a party intending to make application to the court to set aside a JID, it must be served on the party who has obtained the judgment within 30 days after the receipt of the judgment. [23] On an application to set aside a JID, I refer to the Court of Appeal case of Yap Ke Huat & Ors v Pembangunan Warisan Murni Sdn Bhd & Anor [2008] 5 MLJ 112 where the Court of Appeal held at page 120: “[15] It is trite that when considering to set aside a judgment in default, the first task is to ascertain whether it is regular or irregular judgment. If it is an irregular judgment, then the default judgment ought to be set aside ex debitio justitiae. If it is regularly obtained, then the principle expounded in Evans v Bartlem [1937] AC 473 applies - see the judgment of the Federal Court in Hasil Bumi Perumahan Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd [1994] 1 MLJ 312. This requires the defendant to show that he has a defence on merits. Delay in making such an application is a factor to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant or refuse the application – see Tuan Haji Abdul Rahman v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1996] 1 MLJ 30.” [24] It is pertinent to verify the service effected on the Appellants had been properly made, that is the means of bringing to their notice the action being taken against them so that they can either defend or otherwise. In this regard, we must carefully scrutinize firstly whether the service was regular and secondly, if the service was regular, whether there was a defence with merit to justify the delay. Service of cause papers [25] On the issue of irregularity raised by the Appellants, I looked at the Respondent’s submission namely in its Affidavit In Reply that the Writ and Statement of Claim were posted using A.R. Registered to the address of the Appellants, the same address as in the First Defendant’s Affidavit’s address and as affirmed by the National Registration Department of 7 April 2015 (exhibit ‘MYO 2’ of the Appeal Record). [26] I now return to the First Defendant’s defence on the service of the Writ and Statement of Claim. I reproduce here an extraction of the First Defendant’s Affidavit for easy reference as to whether the irregularity was specified in the application: “6. Saya telah dinasihati oleh peguamcara kami dan sesungguhnya percaya dan menyatakan bahawa JID tersebut adalah ‘irregular’ kerana:- a) kami tidak pernah menerima sesalinan Writ dan Pernyataan Tuntutan Plaintif pada bila-bila masa. Dokumen tersebut tidak pernah disampaikan ke atas diri kami; b) saya cuma mendapat tahu berkenaan dengan tuntutan disini apabila disampaikan dengan salinan JID tersebut pada lewat bulan Mei 2015; c) selepas menerima sesalinan JID tersebut, saya telah melantik peguamcara dan mengarahkannya untuk membuat carian Mahkamah untuk mendapat tahu lebih lanjut berkenaan tuntutan disini; d) setelah meneliti affidavit penyampaian bertarikh 7.5.2015 yang difailkan oleh pihak peguamcara Plaintiff, hanya adanya bukti pengeposan dan tidak adanya kad A.R. Berdaftar’ yang dikembalikan; Sesalinan Afidavit Penyampaian bertarikh 7.5.2015 ditunjukkan kepada saya dan ditanda sebaga Eksibit “R-1” e) ianya jelas bahawa tiadanya bukti penerimaan oleh pihak kami. Oleh itu, JID tersebut patut diketepikan terus-menerus kerana prosedur penyampaian dokumen tidak dipenuhi.” [27] The Plaintiff’s Statement of Claim, the First Defendant’s Affidavit and Plaintiff’s Affidavit In Reply can be found at pages 12 -14, pages 20 - 24 and at pages 57- 63 of the Appeal Record. [28] The Appellants stated that they have never received the Writ and the Statement of Claim but they were served with the JID in late May 2015. Upon careful scrutiny of the Appeal Record I find the affidavit by one Azlizan Bin Abdul Azizi, a notice-sender with the Respondent’s counsel (exhibit “AA-1” at pages 27-30 of the Appeal Record) stating that he had served the copies of Writ and Statement of Claim of 1 April 2015 on 9 April 2015 through A.R. Registered post to the Defendants’ last known address. The postal receipts were tendered as exhibit “AA-2” at page 34 of the Appeal Record. This is corroborated with the First Defendant’s Affidavit admitting that there was proof of posting but there was no A.R. Registered card. [29] The learned counsel for Respondent referred to the Federal Court case of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 which held that there is no need for proof of posting and suffice to show that the notice was properly addressed with a prepaid stamped and a receipt of posting by the post office. [30] The learned counsel for the Defendants argued in its written submission that the case of Amanah Merchant Berhad v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ be distinguished from the instant case as the issue before that Federal Court was to construe the word ‘post’ contained in one clause 17 of one Letter of Guarantee as it was concerning the postage of a Notice of Demand and unlike a Writ in this case which should be governed by Order 10 Rule 1(1) ROV 2012. [31] Based on Order 10 Rule 1(1) ROC 2012: “(1) Subject to the provisions of any written law and these Rules, a writ shall be served personally on each defendant or sent to each defendant by prepaid A.R. registered post addressed to his last known address and in so far as is practicable, the first attempt at service must be made not later than one month from the date of issue of the writ. …” [32] I had a close look at the notice-server’s affidavit which stated that the cause papers were sent via A.R. Registered post. The Respondent’s counsel’s clerk can effect service based on the case of Commerzbank (South East Asia Ltd v Tow Kong Liang [2011] 3 CLJ 127, Court of Appeal where Heliliah JCA (as she then was) held that the Rules of High Court 1980 (then) permits the mode of service to be effected by an agent. [33] This Court looked at previous cases decided on the service issue that is the case of MBF Finance Bhd v Tiong Kieng Seng [2001] 4 CLJ 38, the case of Pengkalan Concrete Sdn Bhd v Chow Mooi [2003] 3 MLJ 67 and the case of CIMB Bank Bhd v Comsa Layer Farms Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 118. In the case of MBF Finance Bhd [2001] (supra), it was held that once the writ and statement of claim are sent by AR registered post, it is prima facie proof of service unless the defendant is able to rebut this. [34] Following the case of Pengkalan Concrete Sdn Bhd v Chow Mooi [2003] 3 MLJ 67, Suryadi J (as he then was) held that there is nothing under Order 10 rule 1(1) ROC 2012 that the plaintiff must evidentially prove that the named person in the writ must be the very person who had received the summon if it was sent via prepaid AR Registered post. It was also held at page 73 that whether the writ had physically arrived or had been received at the last known address was not legislated in the court’s rules and stated that, “On that score, if the plaintiff had direct and cogent evidence of that writ having been received by the intended person, that was a plus factor for the former, otherwise s 12 of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 would immediately come into play when invoked….” [35] In the case of CIMB Bank Bhd v Comsa Layer Farms Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 118, the High Court held that the plaintiff was not contractually bound under the facility agreement to produce the AR Registered cards as contended by the defendants even if service of the writ was effected by AR Registered post. [36] A close scrutiny of the Order 10 Rule 1 ROC 2012 finds that whether the writ must be physically arrived or received at the last known address is not legislated in the provision. In fact, there is nothing in Order 10 Rule 1 to state in express terms that there is a need to produce the AR Registered cards as proof of service. [37] In the current case, the friendly loan agreement was supported by the SD specified that all demand notices delivered will be deemed to have accepted by the Appellants either delivered by normal post or delivered personally. The cause papers comprising the Writ and Statement of Claim together with the Respondent’s Counsel’s letter however had been claimed by the Respondent to be sent via A.R. Registered post. [38] The cause papers had been served via A.R. Registered post as required by Order 10 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. In addition, the Appellants were not sued under the SD. I stand to be guided by the Federal Court’s decision of Amanah Merchant Bank Bhd v Lim Tow Choon [1994] 2 CLJ 1 attributed by the counsel for the Respondent. In that Federal Court decision at page 5, clause 17 referred in the letter of guarantee did not provide that the notice should either be sent by registered post or AR registered post. For the reasons stated above, as the cause papers were posted by A.R. registered, it is suffice to show that the cause papers had been properly addressed with the postal receipt as proof of service which the Respondent here had clearly complied under Order 10 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. [39] The burden is on the Respondent, who was the plaintiff, on the balance of probabilities, to prove that the service was regular as in accordance with Order 10 Rule 1 of the ROC 2012. Upon evaluation of the law and the evidence before this Court that is the proof of receipt as exhibit ‘AA-2, at page 34 of the Appeal Record and the affidavit of the server-notice, the Respondent has proven that the Writ and Statement of Claim were sent via A.R. Registered post to the known address of the Appellants. No merits to the Defence [40] In order to apply to set aside a regular judgment, the Appellants must show that they have defence with merits. On this context I refer to the Federal Court case of Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v Majlis Amanah Ra’ayat [1979] 1 MLJ 24 where the Federal Court stated, “It is axiomatic that if the judgment is regular, then it is an inflexible rule that there must be an affidavit of merits, that is, an affidavit stating facts showing a defence on the merits.” [41] It is trite law that the defence must come with merits. In Barnes v Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep at page 544, Lord Denning MR stated that a ‘defence on the merits’ means a defence which discloses an arguable and triable issue. This was also decided in the case of Lembaga Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja v Agni Energie Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 6 MLRH 477 at page 480 as submitted by the Respondent’s Counsel that in order to show a defence with merits, a draft defence must also be filed. Whether Judgment Sum is Incorrect [42] A friendly loan is a loan given by the lender to the borrower based on mutual trust whereby the borrower is to repay the loan within the specified time with no interests charged: Tan Aik Teck v Tang Soon Chye [2007] 5 CLJ 441 at page 442. In that case, it was an appeal against the decision of the High Court which allowed the plaintiff’s claim for the repayment of a friendly loan given by the plaintiff to the defendant. In that case, the defendant admitted that he received the money but denied that it was a friendly loan. No loan agreement was made between the plaintiff and the defendant but there were cheques issued to the defendant which the Court of Appeal held that it is irrelevant as to how the plaintiff got the amount and the defendant’s argument that the cheque cashed did not belong to plaintiff was plainly not true. The Court of Appeal decided that the defendant made up the evidence to avoid paying the friendly loan given by plaintiff. [43] The friendly loan agreement made orally is binding as in the case of Tan Aik Teck (supra) although there was no promissory note made for instance stating the amount of debt and date of repayment as decided in one Singapore case of Lena Leowardi v Yeap Cheen Soo [2014] SGCA 57 at paragraph 25. A promissory note is a written promise to pay money between lender and borrower where normally it would state the amount of debt and the date of repayment or a repayment schedule. [44] If the Appellants denied that there were such amount loaned and if there were such loan, the amount was incorrect. In this case, the evidence adduced as in exhibit MYO-3 at pages 79, 80 and 81 of the Appeal Record and exhibit MYO-4 particularly at pages 83 and 84 of the Appeal Record clearly showed that there were loan made and the second loan taken clearly stated that it was a friendly loan. [45] Based on the documents tendered as in exhibit MYO-3 and MYO-4, I cannot disregard that those documents claimed as scribbled notes by the Appellants do not amount to a friendly loan agreement. The fact that there was a SD made by the Appellants stating the amount borrowed from the Respondent, the repayment date and the notice of demand if the repayment is defaulted is clear evidence that the friendly loan existed. I would think the second loan was made by a promissory note as it expressly stated the amount taken from the Respondent and the terms of repayment that is by way of a cheque dated 31 July 2013. In addition, the existence of the friendly loan is corroborated by the SD taken under oath by the Appellants. [46] Although no execution of a formal agreement, it can infer that the SD is also a form of security for the Respondent to get the return of his money from the Appellants. The amount loaned RM400,000.00 is not a small amount. I would say that it is a reasonable inference from the SD that there was a friendly loan made and a promise to return the money. A reasonable inference as Lord Wright had stated in Caswell v Powell Duffryn Association Collieries Ltd [194] AC 152 at page 169, “Inferences must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation …” [47] The SD was made by the Appellants and sworn before the Commissioner for Oath, it is definitely not a conjecture or a speculation. It is also a reasonable inference to connote that the SD is a form of guarantee for the Respondent as the Appellants had benefitted from the friendly loan. [48] The Respondent bears the burden to prove that there were loans given to the Appellants firstly and that the total amount was RM400,000.00. The Appellants claimed as in their proposed defence that the Respondent will contribute to the Appellants that is the First Defendant’s business, RM200,000.00 if the First Defendant will repay the RM200,000.00 with interest amounting to RM120,000.00 (Appellants’ Defence & Affidavit In Reply, pages 53-54 of Appeal Record). [49] The Respondent on the other hand claimed that out of the RM320,000.00, the Appellants had received RM120,000.00 by cash as per signed receipt of the Appellants of 11 July 2011 (as in exhibit MYO-3). The allegation of RM120,000.00 as interest was denied by the Respondent. [50] The Court had the opportunity to study the evidence as exhibited on the sum RM 320,000.00 which includes the RM120,000.00 cash and the second loan of RM80,000.00 alleged to be borrowed from the Respondent by the Appellants as in the SD of 27 June 2011 (the Appellants’ document exhibit ‘R-2)’ at page 44 of the Appeal Record. [51] There was a bank transaction of RM100,000.00 made to the Appellants as at page 48 of the Appeal Record. There was a cheque of 11 July 2011 for the amount of RM100,000.00 made to the First Defendant cheque bearing the number 40-01032 with notes stating having been received by the Appellants. There is also a note signed by the Appellants of 11 July 2011 that the Appellants received RM120,000.00 with their identification card numbers (at page 79 of the Appeal Record) and with copies of their identification cards (at pages 80-81 of Appeal Record). [52] The second loan was a signed note of 11 October 2011 with the heading “Friendly loan” where the Appellants took a second loan of RM80,000.00 signed by the First Defendant accompanied with a cheque of RM80,000.00 in the name of the Respondent at pages 83-84 of the Appeal Record. In relation to the second loan, the Respondent stated in his Affidavit In Reply that the there was an email following the second loan after the Appellants failed to repay on the promised date where the Appellants deferred the payment of RM80,000.00 and suggested an instalment payment instead (at pages 86-88 of the Appeal Record). There was no security pledged for the friendly loan except for the SD to guarantee the repayment of the two loans to the Respondent, an affirmation under oath and signed by the Appellants. Moneylending Transaction [53] The illegal moneylending raised by the Appellants was not in the written submission of the learned counsel for the Appellants but was submitted orally at the hearing of this appeal of 18 April 2017, in the Appellants’ Affidavit In Support (at page 20 of the Appeal Record) and in the Proposed Defence and Counterclaim (at page 53 of the Appeal Record). An extraction of paragraph 7 (c) and (j) of the Affidavit In Support is reproduced here: “c) namun, saya ingin menyatakan bahawa yang sama tidak tepat. Pinjaman yang kononnya diberikan tersebut sebenarnya adalah suatu transaksi pinjam-wang (moneylending transaction) di mana Plaintiff sedang cuba menuntut faedah ke atas wang yang diberipinjamkan walaupun Plaintiff tidak mempunyai lesen peminjam wang dan bukanlah ‘licensed moneylender’; …. j) ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa suatu ‘underlying moneylending transaction dibelakan kesemua ini. Kesemua ini telahpun dimasukkan ke dalam bentuk suatu Pembelaan & Tuntutanbalas Defendan-Defendan yang Dicadangkan yang kami akan memfailkan sekiranya Permohonan tersebut dibenarkan.” [54] The Proposed Defence and Counterclaim of the Appellants stated that the Respondent had informed the Appellants that the Respondent is desirous to support First Defendant’s work in one Company and will remit the money as loan if the Appellants were to repay the RM200,000.00 with interest at RM120,000.00. The Appellants also stated that in the alternative, there was a moneylending transaction without license (at paragraph 2.9) and such transaction is illegal. [55] Based on the First Defendant’s affidavit, it was claimed that the amount claimed is incorrect and that the loan was a moneylending transaction where the Plaintiff, not a licensed moneylender, is trying to make a profit on the moneylending transaction. The Respondent in its Affidavit In Reply stated that the money RM400,000.00 was at all material time a friendly loan agreement made between the Respondent and the Appellants and was upon Appellants’ request. The Respondent claimed that it was never as a claim under service agreement nor as moneylending transaction. [56] The Appellants submitted that the amount is incorrect based on the banking transactions made as exhibited before the Sessions Court that the only “money trail” available showed that there was only RM200,000.00. The Appellants however offered no explanation to the note of receipt for the amount of RM120,000.00 in cash, the First Defendant’s cheque of RM80,000.00 made to the Respondent and the email by the First Defendant to the Respondent on his proposed schedule of repayment of RM80,000.00. Despite the allegation of illegal moneylending activity by Respondent, there was a second loan taken as per “promissory” note by the Appellants. [57] The Respondent’s claims for the friendly loan had been denied by the Appellants. It was a friendly loan and no other parties nor witnesses to the loans. There was no mention of the Company receiving the loan but only the Appellants as stated in the notes receiving the loan, the cheque made under the Respondent’s name and the SD. There was no other documentary evidence from the Appellants to rebut the Respondent’s claims. Having found that the Plaintiff has proven that there such loans and are still owing to the Plaintiff, the onus then shifts to the Defendants to show that they have a good defence for the incorrect judgment sum in justifying the delay in setting aside the JID. [58] This is a friendly loan agreement. There was no denial from the Appellants that they had borrowed a sum of money from the Respondent. Under the Moneylenders Act 1951, the law does not prohibit one from giving a friendly loan and one need not have a license to give a friendly loan. It is however for the court to decide if the primary principal object of the lender’s business was of moneylending: Ngui Mui Khin & Anor v Gillespie Bros & Co. ltd [1980] 2 MLJ 9. [59] Based on the evidence adduced, the friendly loan is a separate matter altogether from the service agreement that is purportedly entered between the Respondent and the Appellants. As claimed by the Appellants in their Proposed Defence and Counterclaim, the loan by the Respondent need not be returned until the Company has made its profits. In addition to that, the Appellants claimed that the Respondent’s claim for the loan has yet to “crystallize”. The Respondent had denied these. [60] This Court is dissatisfied with the statements made by the Appellants. The SD that the Appellants had made in this regard is governed by the Statutory Declarations Act 1960 and needless to say that making a false statutory declaration is, by virtue of section 3 thereof, an offence punishable under the Penal Code. The Appellants submitted that they were economically pressured to return the loan however no documentary proof to proof as such for instance by making a police report against the Respondent. The Appellants failed to offer some credible explanations as to why they had copies of their identification cards and address in the receipt notes of RM120,000.00 which as alleged by the Respondent a loan given to the Appellants in cash. I take the view that the weight of documentary evidence outweighs everything else: Low Keang Guan v Sin Heap Lee-Marubeni Sdn Bhd [2005] 1 LNS 289. [61] This Court also considered the fact that if the application to set aside is allowed, it will be prejudicial to the Respondent. The amount RM400,000.00 was a friendly loan to the Appellants and setting aside the application would mean that the Respondent is denied the money owed to him and will face unjust delay in getting his money back. In addition, the Respondent had given ample time for the Appellants to react and to repay the Respondent coupled with the fact that the Respondent had incurred cost in starting a bankruptcy action to get his money back. Is Second Defendant liable? [62] Based on the receipt notes where both the First Defendant and Second Defendant received the loan, the defence that only the First Defendant had received all the monies and the Second Defendant did not, could not hold water as the documentary evidence adduced stated clearly that the Appellants supported by the SD had received all the friendly loans totaling RM400,000.00. CONCLUSION [63] I am hard pressed to accept that by allowing the appeal it will defeat the purpose of having the mandatory provisions of Order 42 Rule 13 ROC 2012. Where the law provides a particular method or form of procedure for effecting service, then there must be strict compliance with those provisions: PT Pelajaran Nasional Indonesia v Joo Seang & Co Ltd [1958] 24 MLJ 113 at pages 115-116. I am of the view that if the Appellants believed that they have a triable issue, they would have filed the application to set aside the judgment entered immediately upon receiving the Writ and Statement of Claim and not to wait for almost 9 months. The claim that this is an illegal moneylending transaction is an afterthought. [64] Based on the foregoing, I am satisfied that there is no merit to the Appellants’ proposed defence. There are no bona fide triable or arguable issues raised by the First Defendant either. On that note, I have no compunction in dismissing this appeal with costs. Dated: 29 May 2017 (DATIN ZALITA BINTI DATO’ ZAIDAN) Judicial Commissioner Alam High Court, Selangor Counsel for Appellants/Defendants Messrs. Dinesh Praveen Nair C3-3-15, Solaris Dutamas Jalan Dutamas 1, 50480 Kuala Lumpur Counsel for Respondent/Plaintiff Messrs Mazwan Dee Nasar & Shima 12-2-1, Jalan Medan Pusat Bandar 4A, Bandar Baru Bangi 43650 Bangi 27

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-122-03/2014

PLAINTIF KUMARABABU A/L KARUPPEN & 9 YANG LAIN DEFENDAN VERTICAL SUCCESS SDN BHD

28/05/2017

YA DATO' SURAYA BINTI OTHMAN

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=81046749-6193-4c80-8eca-377147c480c5&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAI-I TINGG| MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN GUAMAN SIVIL 22Ncv<:.1 2247312014 ANTARA KUMARASABU AIL KARUPPEN & 5 VANS LAIN FLAINTIF DAN VERTICAL success SDN BHD DEFENDAN PENGHAKIMAN Lalar Eelakang K-5 [1] [2] [3] Pada alau sekuar lankh berbeza pada tahun 2013, pxainm-pxamm le\ah memasukx penanpan penyewaan dengan defendan bag! unli- umt yang mxenan sebagai ‘nan Crest beralamat .1. ss era Kelana Jaya, 47301 F'e¢.a\mg Jays Sslangor Pads ssuap masa malena\ delendan adalzh Iuan punya yang berlanggungjzwab dalam pengulusan mm Crest Plalnlrf-p\amlI! adalah penye'wa—penyewa kepada senap umt-unll dx da\am Tuerra Cresl ceysebm yang memalankan permagaan kecul den sedemana dan merualankan pemlagaan sntara lamnya daiam Industri percmakan dan a\a| nuns, makanan dan mmuman dan a\atan (elekomumkasi Plalnllhplavlmf mendakwa bahawa delendan (elah mengwklankan peluang penyewaan dan/alau pajakan um:-um: kosong m ‘herra Crest Iersebut melalux medxum sepem kam remang (banner), Internet, Vaoebook, brochure ("man Sewa tersebum dan me\z\m men harlanah. Melalul Imevnel ‘loaned behind Kenn. J. 5 pollce muon Ind remmm Malaytla suiramg. :2 ml noun moan MW student: mm m. vlrmu: (mu... :2! us mm mm. umrAmmm.uo...: unlmsnr Me\a\m epen hananah den brosur [24] [25] "bahlva Derdls-than pmfil, mm Creskldal-It mmpmn sebuah pm: mmnw wan klmanan (n-Innnoumooa mam dl Kolana Jaya: amw. Tilrn Crust dijlngkl n mam pm mu... 4.41.: 2m,- Bah-wn penyewl mama mm Crest mm. ummz lntemnllonll ummrsr-y: Bahnwl umwz melylnglukan nkan mompunyil nlamal enam nbu (6,009)/umlah ptlinryarry mu momullk-n Bplrlsrbnrmuln plngambllln SIplAmDlr2l71.7." Melahu kelerangan saksI—saksx pmnni pma, sak aksw menyalakan msreka (erpsngavuh unluk menyewa uni! dl Tiena Crest sekepas membaca \kIan- !an ddendan, membual Vawalan ke bangunan Tlerra Crest, membuat perlanyaan kepada wakn delandan‘ pemyacaan melalul lacebuok dan Prom Txerra Crest Saks:-saks\ plamm menyacakan bahawa nnangan wmlah sebenar pe1aJar unmm yang terdapal an dalam bangunan Tlerra C195! 11 [26] [271 R5] hanyalah dawn Iingkungan soc mngga soc pemar sahqa dan bukannya auoo orang pelajar Saks! my Ennk Kumarabahu Karupan (caveman penama) dalam Pememaan ueama menyatakan n lzzgarmana kamu mengstanm jumlalv pswar urv/ma my; dalam mgmg... am: mug palajur dun buksn s,ooa mung gels/Hr” A perhaps my says ketanur sefiepas mam: ssndm keadaan sebum! aengunan Trsrva Crust, psnanyaan knpada pulijur-pshyur UN/TAR sarvdm L1... mam» xelepu: gays mendapal maklumal mslafm swat khabarlzerlarvkn 19.12.2013 Me\aM lakta yang dukemukakan, mahkamah dapa\ membual salu dapatan bahawa pemyalaan devendan bukamah suam pemyalaan salah lsalah nyata) sepem dxuaxwa oleh p\ain|lf—p|a\nt\f F\amM juga gagax memhukllkan bahawa pemyaxaam zevsebuz Ie\ah mempengarum plalnllf-p\amfii umuk menyewa unn dl bangunan Tlerra Crest Im kelana mahkamah berpendapal bahawa pernyataan-psrnyalsan delendan yang dwdakwa sebagaw pemyalaan salah (salah nyata) nleh plalnm-plslnui max secara spasm menyalakan kewuwdan 5,000 orang pemar umnn amangunan Iersebul Me\alm lakta dan kelerangan besena pmfll Tlerra Crest Iarmasuk Iklan melalm [29] [30] I31] facebaok, mternet dan nmsur, secara yewas pemyalaan tersebm adalah anggaran(expedalIun)saI1a;a dan bukannya secara pasm, Mahkamah jugs berpendapat uanawa, pada senap masa material‘ uevendan ada\ah bercakap benar mengsnal anggaran Iexpeclslvon) mengenal some orang pelajar a. UNITAR memandangkan UNVTAR sendiri merneriukan mug yang luas bag) menempatkan hllangan pe\a;ar yang rams: lm dwbuktikan dan lakla yang max dxperllkaikan hahawa UNVTAR menyewa 35°/1 danpada xewuasan new eves: dengan fingkaan seramal 5,000 pelajar, F\amtW»p\a\n\if dalam keterangan menyacakan tslah menggunakan kaedah pemerhanan sendm dan penanyaan kepada pe|a}ar serta kakwangan UNVTAR unluk mengenalpasll jumlah sebenar pelqar UNITAR. Pememanan yang dlbual sendin oxen plainlwl-plairmf adaxan berdasarkan buangan ps\a1ar Kemar dan masuk ks bangunan Txerra Crest Semasa sua\ bales sakswaksn pwamm mengskm bahawa kaedah mengira sendm pe\a]ar—pela;ar adalah fldak memadaw. Mahkamah berpendapal bahawa pemerhailan sendm uleh puamun plamlll bukamah mm. yang «spa: taming yumlah Mangan power du UNITAR PlaIn(\l—p\aInt\f .uga semasa seal balas mengakm bahawa Ilada perlanyaan kepada pmax UNVTAR (elah umuat hagl mengexahm u [32] wmlah pelajar dxbangunan tersebut P|aIn|\I—p|aInM hanya mermuk kepadi kevatan akhbar (CED1G— ml: 24) yang mempunyax Leuuk berbunyi ~s.mn.: m p.:.,-.1 um empu hkum clan dua nkalan uumm mvmbuang umupaaa pflillinraya k.InIpu.I buhlnun... - Me\a\m arIIke\ ax dalam akhbav lersebul‘ naak dapat dipasllkan bahawa wmlah populasl m UNVTAR hanyaxah 573 orang pelajar la lldak mewanmangkan muan sebenar pelsjar an uumm pads masa malenal Tambahan xagu, p\ain\i1—p\am|If sendln mengakm hdak pernan membual penanyaan mengenaw jumlah bllangan pe\aJar Kepada plhak UNITAR Jus1evu, keratin akhbzv yang dvkemukakan bukanlah hum dan fakla yang menyekong kelerangan sakslvsaksx plamlfl vamnahan pula dckumsn lersebul mlanda VD-3 FERNVATAAN BERHUBUNG ‘NEIGHBOURHOOD MALL‘ [33] [34] Dakwaan lain yang an kalakan sehagai sa|u pemyalaan salah men p1amm—p\ain(i( ada\ah mengenm konsep 'Neighbaumoad Maw yang teVah dw reprevsenlast men detendan memul medium-medmm yang msenmkan dnalas Saks: PW3 memnen gambaran ‘nenghbourhaud mall‘ man sebuah pusac membeli belah menyerupaw cemre Pam Eangsar Village 2, u [35] [36] Nils‘ Jnya Supermavket dan Cold Storage Saks: plain!!! msnyalakan bahawa pernyafaan mengenaw Tlerva Crest sebagau sebuall pusal membeu belah ke]Iranan1Na\ghbou(hood Man) adalah sa\ah dan hdak benar Menurut dakwaan plain!!!-plaunlit delendan Udak pemah bevmat memadikan fierra Cres| sebuah pusal membelt be1ah Kenranan dangan akasan «anus mama UNITAR Iebm mudah dmhal berbandmg (anda name bangunan Tlerra Crest Lain dan Ilu. Ilada perkataan 'Ma\|‘ dupamerksn Dada bsngunan Tlena C1551 Ievsebul saksx de!endan nwa‘ Encxk vong Shang Ming, yang mempakan seorang Pangarah Eksekuui plavnm. seluju bahzwa kansep ‘Neighbourhood MaH‘ adalah clplaan belxau dan Nada aras hagx mengukur Haswfikasw sesualu bangunan sebagax ‘Mall’ seperli may yang mempunym klaslfikasx 1 blntang ssmngga 5 blnlang MBVMLH kelerangan saksl delenoan, kansep ‘Neighbourhood MaH' d1 TVENE Cresl adalah ‘grab s gm‘ dimana urang awam hanya lavu dan smggah umuk lempoh yang singkat‘ Melahu kelerangan yang dlkemukakan kepada mahkamah‘ gambaran ‘Nmgnboumoaa Maw aleh plalnllf-Mamlii adahlh berdasarkan Huslvasl dudalam bmsur prom nerra crest. Me\aluI brosur cersebug Ierdapat Ilustrasw mengenm ouuemutlet sepem Borders‘ Eurgev Kmg dan Starbucks Ie\ah mengehmkan pumm- 15 (371 [351 [39] plalnlfl sekallgus mempengarum plalnlwlplalnfll dalam membuat kepulusan menyewa mm di bangunan lelsebut Pememahan yang mbuax aleh mahkamah temadap brusur pmm (ersehul dw dalam CED 3, ms 633 msndapan bahawa ilusfrasv tevsebuf hanyawh conloh sahaja dlmana afla mnyatakan dlbahagxan bawah iluslrasx 'Examp/es Only‘ Perkalaan 'Examp\es ow «mam menumukkan Mausa nerkscuan texempllen clause) dimana wa semafamlaia hanya\ah comoh dan bukan gambaran sebenar. Tlada pemyalaan sa\ah nVeh defender! dlslnl Tambiman lagl. pemyataan Iklan yang dwbual oxen defsndan d1 dalam bvosur Iersebul aamn pelawaan tawaran nnmamn :0 my dan bukan berbentuk Iawaran bffer’ yang szh bagi membentuk wkatan konlrak Mahkamah Rsyuan damn kes Bounty Dynamics Sdn Bndv Chow Tat Ming .4 0r:(2D15) 9 cu 422 memutuskan "As farms lugnl mndmgness ofme replesentatran m ms arivemssmsm brochure as a pmomcw aocumenl, u was common Wm max mam utstvd an axemplmn clausz, no mum 1,. m. customary mm pm! As am:/1 me rspvsasnlal/ans mm mm be read as mew 'pulVs'arvd nu! mmtmg Wmmses A! most, (has: wore a. 1». nature clan rnvllsban »a Deal /sm..m Mame man V smn, Man cam warm, Sersmbarv 5 Drs) Mzlalul kelerangan an hadapan mahkamah adalah uuak dxpemkawkan bahawa Txerra Crest pada asasnya adalah sebuah pusat memnen 15 be\ah kemanan dlmana bangunan Twerra Crest teflelak di kawasan yang mempunyax papulasn pedal ax Ke\ana Jsya Bsngunan ‘Hana Cvesl lersebul mga mempunyan Pflsekllaran yang dwkehlnngx dengan kediaman dan bangunan-nangunan peiabat Saks: plamm juga hdak mananxan bahawa permalan mereka (erhadap ‘hem. Crest sebagal sebuah bangunan yang herpmensx Lmtuk kemajuan pemiagaan olen yang demlkxan pemyataan delendan mengenax ‘Neighbourhood Mall’ bukanlah pemyalaan salah (salah nyalaj la adalah pemyalaan yang benar dan delendan percaya sebagav benar HAK EKSKLUSIF FLAINTIF [40] P\am\\f-p\amIi1 mempmkan hahawa dehandan (e\ah melanggar jamman unluk hak eksldusii plalnllf Saksksaksw p\amIAf menyalakan bahawa wakll delendan ianu Encxk Kewm Pcok Iemv memanukan hak eksklusw Kepada aeuap pwainm-plamm dalam pemiagaan m bangunan Tuerra Crest lm bermakna, setlap plamm mempunyav hak ekskmsli mammal barangan dagangan dzn maua penlaga lam memnunyax aagangan yang sama dengan P\am|\f—p|amM amen (P3) yang dlkemukakan oleh pVam\\f berbunyw (411 [421 as per Mr Kumsfs man, .1 rs mime! mm the Rom! ol fieaamg dvscussmn wmn I: m Saplombev 2m, :5 liar my krmw/5:19!‘ (WW) is me anly an: winch mu :2; sel/mg WBMEJ “ Melalw emel yang avkemuxaxan, dapal dlmmuskan bahawa ems! tersebut hznya menuuk kepada perblnczngan tdvscusswun) anlara plhakpmak sebelum penalulan penyewaan mmas-nu Tambahan pula, Ierma-lerma mengenm hak eksklusxi lersebut mak dimasukkan (incorporated) ke da\am Denanjlan penyewaan yang drmasukw max- pmak Menquk kepada klausa 12.u penanuan penyewaan, ada\ah je\as hahawa uaaa monopaln pemnagaan amenaman dan uada hak emxusw Dermagaan kepada D\a\nIIH1|a\nIi¢ Perlanjian tersebut mam a\eh saksksaksl nlamm dam lerma N98 lelah dneranykan kepada plawmifrmai K|ausa12 a Denanuan penyewaan iuga menyalakan sebagai benkul Exams/on o//mghsd Terms -nus agmmm consnmtas ma wnwe and only sgraernenl ouwm ms pamns rulah/1;! la me lensncy 9! me damned premues and supersedes any pnar agreemsm (W3! 9: wnlma} and me pamss sxpmssb’ agree and declare ms! nu Ilmherm athfirrrovarunls, agmlmims, mwfsmns, cmvdvlmrlx ar (am! mu be deemed 10 be mwhed Imam ma me smslsnve 9? any sum Amp!-mm .5 mamny nsgalla‘ ns [431 [44] [45] [45] Ada\ah ‘alas me\aM (Erma penarman sepenl da\am Hausa 12 3 m alas‘ p\amm‘—p\amM ada\ah d\ha\ang memnangmkan sebavang pzvbmcangan, jalw dan pemya|aan yang dndakwa dnbenkan meh mana-mane pihak sebagaw pemyalaan yang salah nan max benar Me\alu| kemangan nwsh saks:-saxsx pwainm, Enmk Kewm Puck te\ah memhua| representasx mengsnan hak ekskxusw pamuagaan, namun p\ain(W—plaInM gagal membukllkan secara tepat apakah represenlast an ‘arm nsan yang dwbual wanya mak dapal mpasnkan secara tepal F\amN jugs gags! memanggu Enclk Kelvm Pook sebagal saksl hag! rnembuktlkan dakwaan lersebul Mahkamah mendapau plalnlfl telah gage‘ memenum kewajlpan beban pembuklxan yang lerlelak Dada plamlli Beban pembuklnan adalah Ke alas pmak yang mandakwa menenma pemyalaan sa\ah musrepresemasup dslam mengemukakan kelerangan dan nuku Mahkamah Pevsekuluan di dalam kes Lelchumanan Chevmzr Alagnppan @ L Iagappan 1.-bugai pclaluana wasiallaxecular kepada SL Alnmeloo Achi III-I! Son: LOIII Alamelu Acho. Si rllati) & Am)! V Secure Planlatlon Sdn Blvd [1017] MLJU 379 menyalakan bahawa Seksyen 101 (1) Akla Keqerangan Ie\ah memperunfukkan bahawa pmak yang menghendakw manarmana mahkamah membenkan penghaklman tenlang apa—apa hak undang— In undang acau nan-um‘ bergantung kepada kewujudan fakta yang mlegaskan ulehnya. meslilah membuknkan bahawa fakla nu wumd "sum mm pmwdss msl -mom: flextrls W E :1 L9 V! r m mar/Iabm as memmm. umence oflacts mm. he um; M mngjg ma! mass lacls ugfl "Sannwr vm states that me mmal amen of pmwng . grimn Inna in ms /at/cur ,5 055! on ma p/amml lwmm and Am»! All Law awsmm «gm Edmorv mm 1 , mg 3194. mmam 4»; In mm. 1471puIsr‘IDfiyum1 «mum max me -mm. alyma/' rut: mmughouton ma plamnlfi snag" m pruvvdes mm - he mm at Eu .,. . we 9. mcee In Wm led me svvdencs .: gu wsw mvsn on saw me’ ‘The -ml onus ol proving m. LS zmrays an we p7amM' [sum Law ol 5mm 15». am’. al 1593 umm. (E, In ssclnun 1:72 puts yr beyond me: that a prammmas the ma: onus alproui The me .5 that ‘me anus atpma/or any particular ran: M5 on Mt parly vma sums M, »m an Ium wlm dame: n, u mumm pmnamm qul decn, non qmnogac Actantncibtlpmbatvurv The pwnun rs bound m the my mslamz, to show a plum lam case, and mm: haw: mmpsnscz, the marl mu not mm mm Hence me maxim Potter is! mrldmon du/smiarms. A p/ambfl czarmal obvrouxlr savzmsqe hrmseif by me weakness or nu zn [4] I5} [5] [7] Melalm "Man Sewa tersebuf“ p\a\n|IV mendakwa bahawa delendan lelah membual vepresenlasx dengan menyalakan bar-gunan Twerva Crest mernpunyav pevkara benkur . Tlerra cresc merupakan sehuah pusat membeh nevan keuranan (Nelghbnumuud Man) an Kelana Jaya‘ u Tlena Crest akan menempalkan s,uoo nrang pelajar UNVTAR, (selepas Iru dirmuk sebaga\"F'enyalaan1kIan Deiendan") Plaunnpplaunm kemumannya menyalakan bahawa meraka mempercayax representasx defendan an dalam Penyalaan Vkian Defendan dan dengan nu lelah berseluju unluk menyewa um\—umt (1! Terra Crest Plairmf-p\amt\l kzmudiannya Ie\ah memasukl peqanjlan penyewaan unn-unit di ‘nan; Crest dengan devendan m amara bulan Julal mngga Oktcbev 2013 Wa\au bagaImanapun,9e\epastIga(3)bu1an bemperasw, permagaan p|am|fl—p|a|n|\l ludak menaapac keuntungan sepem yang duangkaan dan permagaan p\awmf—p|a\nI\V(e1ah menga\amI deficit sepamang tempoh 3 bulan tersebu! Plainlw-wawnni Ielah memaklumkan kepada delendan mengenai represenlasl sa\ah lersebux, anlara lain. nuangan pemar UNITAR seramau 5,000 orang dan Tlerra Crest adalah sebuah pusat beh newan kejxranan (newghbnumnnd Mall) yang «max benar defence A ghinliifs ma must 1-nnd or Ian ugan the evldeoce adduced by him‘ [411 Selain nu, Mankaman Rayuan di dalarn kes Arab Malaysian Fmanca Bhd v Kan Molar co Sdn mm [2010] 5 MLJ 1o sepemmana yang an tegaskan men penghakxman Mahkamah Persekuwan an dalam kes Lelchumanan Chettiar Alzgappan @ L Allaguppan [supra], menya|akan banawa behan buku da\am sesuam kes Ienenlu bergantung kepada keadaan an mana tuntutan Nu txmbul Secara prinsip kewaflpan beban pernbuknan yang ferpakai ada\ah baham ‘beban bag] membuktlkan sesuatu fakta rersebur akan tenelak m Dahu Qmak yang membual runtulan darl bukan/an gmak yang menafikan Iuntutarf ’H£vmg pumxed Nvmugh M: appeal record, .1 n appmpnale n bass Mrs salrsnt ausslmn. ‘Has the glamnll drse/wand rt: mmn a! my ‘ Azmr L P m nanmg u...:2gm.... (1555 San. am: V. Mow Swn Poh[1B7I7 mu 145 no. wntma separate majonrmaymanm aptly saw '1 nm nfrsrd r cannal urvderslnnd W: Hrvumem Wscounk Mnugnnm in Jasyh Canstmflnn Snimsmg um Ltd. v. Iglglrvll Smulting Cnmnrltlon m m. Kingxwoad (19411 2 All 5.12 «:5 m daslmq wnn me wssbun albumen 07127001 m Mal case says this 11 ’AgIvImg with m. Inal mdgd, I mm me am." argmm W fimcular me aemas on me mumuances m whmh me um ansss m anus! ms M1 wmclv tesrsar uumm-at M Q gm ma: fmrumbtt ma.:.'a /a rs ... sncnsnt rule (anndsd on mnsrdemlronx n( 9.1 sense mu should not be next mam wrmoul mung rgmg; mmu. mm an. mm... a/any n Iacnvsbs on me fly who suhslnnlva/ix mm the ammm or the Assue and not 1 . u gum TM mamsd authors av Samar on Emma sxpvsxs me view that ssclrarl 101 D} the Ewdsnce Ordinance .; based on me rule.‘ [48] Melahu um dan ketevangan yang dxkemukakan, adalah ]elas bamwa plalrml \e|ah gagal membukukan bahawa pemyataan yang dibuat oleh defendan adalah suazu pemyamm samh nyaba. Berdasarkan xemrangan den jugs nas undang-Imdang an mas, mnmtan planrmv-pxamm adalah mmak 21 TUNTUTAN BALAS [491 Ttmluian balas aeienuari lemadip piaintit-piaintii adalah bagi bayaran lunggakan eewai nil-tzii utility air dart eiektrik uari iuga bayaran sewa bagl Iempnh belum tamet (unexpked term) Security Dnpolitl utility Deposit [50] [51] [52] Melalui kelerangan sakswaksl piairitii, delendarl maeiri boleh riieriggttriakaii deposit ieiiiirian (securily deposll) dan depnsll mimy (utility deposit) sebagai pariipasan iitmiati sewaan aari LflIIl|y tenungaak Meriurm Hausa 5 2 Perianiian Penyewaari menyebul. -upon termirretrori at me rrt pursuant to cram 51, the defemianl srtaii luflstl ms sectmly atipasit aria may recat/era/Inulxlunding rental and damages Inrrhz rm aitrie (arm ' Kiausa 3.3 pula menyebut ‘Nermer me security oepasit nor trie umfly aspen: sriaii be aesrrioa to be or trutea as P"V’Ii:n1 Dr rerir or any arrter IHIDMIIIS tmzl ttie tenant may be inquired In my Hilda! trtis egreerrierit, imiess amerwlse consented in wnlmg by trie iariaioru - 1; Aaarah jelas memm «euna penarwan penyewaan bahawa man lanah bevhak merampas secunly depusit dan unmy aaposn selepas penanjlan an lamalkan alas ssbzh kegagaxan p\amm—p\a|nhf memalum penarman (evsebul O\eh nu |un|ulan was defendan hagw Jumlah sewa terlunggak dan bayaran mml mum dan ca] ssms ada\ah dlbenarksn Tunggakan Sewn Ea Tempoh Ealum Lupm [53] Penamatan penaruian penyewaan nleh detendan aaalah menumt klausa a 1 peqarulan dlmana plamhf—p\amhi gagal membual bayaran sewa, bayavan our-nu uulm den ca;-ca] servls Terma penanuarl membcflehkan defendan menunlul lunggaksn sewa hagw tempoh belum Iupuc (unexpwen term) uka sskwanya penamalan dibual secara unilateral Lfleh plalnm D: da\am kes W penamalan amuax oleh pmak defendan Jusleru mu (unlutan was Aldak dmenarkan Ganllrugi Am nunuuan kn: pambalkan premis) [54] Delendan menumut halas temadau plalrvtwi-plamlvf bag! kerosaksn terhadap premwsqzremws aeiendan Saksl uerendan mengaxm ssndm bahawa ada szhahaglan unn-umt yang sehenamya hanya mempunyax kekmnran din bukan kemsakan Kerosakan terhadap 2» [55] pvelws lersebul pxa amnax danpada gambar yang dxkemukakan dan N93 kelsvangan saksl owa‘ Ra.a Shaman Raja Azlddlm Penguvus Kanan aanagxan Pengurusan dan Hana delendan, ndak mehbalxan Kemsakan yang besav Ia hanya kerosakan mmlma O\eh mu ganllrugx nommifl ada\ah bersesualan :1: awadkan Mahkamah berpandapat RMZDD Du bag! sanap um: adalah nerpaunan O\eh yang dermklan, sehahaglan Iunlulan ba\as mbenarkan dengan kos Seramaw 15 saksx telah memben kelevangan aavam Kes w (pwamur 10 urang dan delendan 5 many) «an Mahkamah ls\ah mengambul masa 10 run unluk rnendengar Kes ml Walau hagawmanapun kelerangan saksl-saksx kesemuanya bemsar kepada salah nyafa yang dmakwa dlbuat man defendan Oleh nu Mahkamah nerpenaapau bahawa kas sebanyak RM40.0UD oo adalah bemamcan dnawad kepada delendan bag! lunmlan plavmf yang mcaxak dan RM10,U(!D no bag! tunlutan ba\as yang mbenarkan sebahagxannya an p/arnm-p/arnwmto/ak mnmran bales delendsn dibenarkan s ahagla/mya Shah A m. selangar. Berlankh Zflhb Mai. 2017 Kes-Kes dlruju ~ Eamknshnan an Devara] &. Arm v Admiral Cave Development Sdn Ehd (2010) MLJU 575‘ Bounty Dynamics sun Ehd v Chow Tat Mmg s Ors (2015; 9 cm 422 Letdmmanan Chemar Nagappan @ L Anagappan [sebagai pelaksana waslal/executor kspada SL Alamelaa Acm A-was suna Lena Alamekw Adm‘ sl mam 5. Anor v Secuve Hanlauon Sdn and [2017] MLJU 379 Arab Malaysian 10 nuance arm u Kah Motor Co San BM [2010] 5 MLJ Farundangan dlrujuk: 1 Peguamcar|»Peguzmca Seksyen us dan 19 Akla Komrak 195a (Akta 135; En Mnhd Faazu Abd Kanm Tainan Khanrm man 5. Assocuaces GaHery 3, Third Leven, Conmme Halel shah Nam 3, Jalan Tengku Ampuan Zabedah C9/C 40000, Shah Nam SELANGOR. En vap Hsang Chwan. En Kong zm mu dan En cmng Hun vao Tainan vip 2. co. Peguambela a. Feguamcara L01 5 21‘ 5‘" Fhuol, Plaza Prim: Jalan Kelang Lama‘ 55200 KUALA LUMPUR. zn K5] [9] [10] Delendan menanxan represenvasl sa\ah lsrsebut dan menamalkan Ferjarman Penyewaan rrvelamx nuns penamacan pada 172 2014 dan menumul mlhkan knsung urut-umt yang wsewa me?! p\a1nM-p\amM Plaunm-plamm kemudlan te\ah memfallkan Imdakan Im terhadap delendan bag: muan menunlut penglsyhharan bahawa perjanfian penyewaan adalah max sah msebabkan represemasu salah dan menunlut gamirugi anlara lam alas kemgian pendapatan‘ garmrugx pelusng keumungan dan gannmg: hllang punca pendapalan Delendan menaixkan dakwaan represenlasw salah oleh p\aIn\If—p\amM dun memfaflkan luntulan ba\as temadap p\am(iV-plauml alas kemungklvan penarmsn penyewaan dan menumul antara lain wmlah lemmggak hagw hayaran sewa prerms, mum eleklnk flan aw, bnl ca] perkhldmalsn dan ca. servws premis Iasebm Isu-Isu Unluk nuucmknn [11] Kedua—dua pmak plamm-plamm dan aevannan lelah bersemu dengan wslmsu unluk dibicarakan sepem yang telah diiailkan dan dnandakan sebagal "|T“. Bagl Imuan penghaklman ini, dapal dmngkaskan bahawa nswsu yang perlu dwbxcarakan adalah sepeni benkut (w) Samada devendan telan me\aKukan lepresenlasw salah (mvsrepresenlasw), alau kecuaxan‘ alau xasuapan fakla unluk mempengarum plaunnma-nm memasum peuannan penyewaan terssbul: qu) sam.-ma penarman penyewaan meruadx «max sah akmax mpresentay sa¥ah cersebm, (m) Samada p\aInli(-p\amm‘ «em. mamungkm penannan penyewaan apanna gagal, aha: dan/atau cum unmk membual pemhayaran (erhadap sewa buvanan, bll-hxl ulilxli flan can perkhidmatan mengtkuk Ierma-(evma perjamvan dan benanggungan Iemadap delendan bag: ;umYah lertunggak Perunlukan Und:nq—Und:ng [121 Mlsrepresentasi an bawah sek 1a Akta Kcntrak 1950 (Akta 136) berbunyi seaemimn 'MIsrsprs:srIIaImn'»nv:mde5— 1;) me posmve memon, m a manner no: warmnled Dy Ills Inlurmamm olthe person making u, olmal which LG rmllrul nmugn nu be/rave: :1 meme: (:1 any much o/duly winch wulvour an lnlen! Ia dccetve. gfvus an mnnlags lo the person commlmng n. or anyone clmlmrvg under mm‘ by Imxleadmg mm: In ms pm/name, or to the plajumca av anyons crannmg urvdermm, and (c) cnustng hnwsvur hvnacsrmy, . my to an aglvemant :9 mm 5 rmslzks as In me sunslancz av ms lmng whnrlv Is the subjact arms awacmerv! - [13] Seksyen 19 Akla Kantyak menyebm "W I/mdubdfly oragmmams wvthuullvee mnxenl 41; cansant to an agreement rs caused by mam-Ion, mu-tar rmsrepresenlahon‘ 1». agreement .5 a mntracl vwame at me Dphan arms party whose mrvsen! was so caused (2; A my to a minimal whosu canssnl was caused by ma Lwr mxsmprasultanon. may, .« he mm m, rims! met me mnnvl man be peflormad, and may he gun he put In ms pasmon m Whfich no wnuld have been n m. repmsentitrarvs made new been my [14] Menuru\ perunlukan seksyen 15 Akla Kunlrak‘ defin musrapresemasu di fla\am seksyen Iersebm adalah ‘mc/usrvs‘ dan tevhuka ianu tudak exsklusiv hanya kepada mntah mlsrepressmasi yang dlnyalakan an dakam perumukan Iersehm Adaxan meruadw lugas Mahkamah menflaw fans dan mas. kes semasa, samada lskta-lakta tersabul Iermasuk d1 da\am salah sam alau lehm danpada Liga perenggan (a), (D) den 10) menurut seksyen 1s tersebuf 115] Seksyen 19 pma jeias memperuntukkan bahawa rmsrepresemasu samada ‘mnocenr acau ‘/bauau»snrmewa;arkan pihak yang laranlaya unluk membaxalxan perjanylan (kantrak) (ersebm [I6] Perbezazn anlara mnsrepresemasu (salah nyaca) darn «rod ada disebul dw dalam Kes Bnlukrishnnn a/I Devarqi 5. Ana: v Admiral Cove Dtvolopment Sun and (2010) MLJII 575,- “The dmsrsrms bsrwaorv mmpmemuon and new rs ms In fraud, me pirmn makmg me rsmasenranon does not hmlsefl bzlrevem Ms mm. m mlniprusanlnlmn, the renrsssnlor my behave Ifremprusanlnfmn m its (me By mm ofssclron 1941) or me Cvnlmms Act 1950 a mantras! enlsmd min In a yzmy edher mmugh mnocsnr or lraudulenl mismpreservlalron rs vmdalz/s a: ma aplmn of the new whose consent was so abtlrnad Thus, the mnonsvvl parly who nan um. mducsd :9 mar mm me mnlrac! Ihmugh an mnmm murepreaentabon, may choose m :21 ands me oamract at In: own accord or by seekma ma assrslznce or me mun under me Specific nshema 195:; (Anam Rank bm mm Abu Saman V Shah Nam Prupamas Sdn Blvd 4 Anor Aposal 11993112 MLJ 590 Q /199912 AMR 2:51.01) - [17] Penyaoaan pra-konnak alau vepresentasl bmeh mklasmkasikan sepem benkul [151 [19] Anal [20] \) Represemasn yang tidak mempengamm pmak memasuku peqanuan (kanlrakj amamaxan sebagax ‘hanya yepresamasn il) Represeniasi yang mempengamm pmak msmasukl peuarman (kormak) Repvesemasl adalah malena\ dalam sesuam keadaan sekuranya ia menumukkan kecenderungan unluk mernpengaruhl orang yang menenma represemasi -mm memasukl sesuam knntrak. Aaawan meruadi Iugas pmak yang menanma representasl unluk membukllkan bahawa xa Ie\ah dengan sebenamya dlpengaruhi unluk memasuki sesualu kumrak oleh pembual vepresenlasx. Ada\ah menjadw undang—undang mamap bahawa behan pammxnan adakah «enevak ke alas plhak yang menenma repveseneas: unmk membukukan bahawa nusrepresentasi (ersebu! (e\ah mempengaruhinya dan mqadv punca sesualu konnak an senai Fm: Plalnlfl m dalam Kes an hadapan mahkamah bergamung kepada represennasi me\a\u1 medmm sepem emel, kam remang (banner), mlemel. lacebook‘ qen nananah dan brosur (Drochuvej Du [21] senarawkan Kemhalv pernyataan-pemyataan yang mdaxwa plamm sebagax pemyalaan salah oxen delendan, [para 15 penyalaan mmman dmuuk} Eerdasarkan senarax penyacaan salah yang dldakwa oven plamhf dx dalam Penyataan Tunmtan. dapal mrumnskan bmwa pemyavaan salah (Valse slalemenl) alau rmsrepresemasx yang mxaxaksn Kelah dinyalakan cfleh delendan adalah sepsm henkut, Bilangan pelajar yang mengvkun pembelajaran ax UNITAR pada mass yang malerm hanya seramal son urang pela}ar den bukannya anon orang palajsr sepem pemyalaan delendan, ‘nerve Crest bukanlah sehuah pusat membefi belah kejiranan (newghbuurhoud Man). in. Tidak adi pembukaan rasmi (Grand Opemng) nena Crest pads Oklobar 2013, w max aaa hak sksklusw Jualan sepemmana dijammkan defendan FERNVATAAN JUMLAM PELAJAR UNITAR [22] [23] P\amM barman bahawa de!endan reum membenkan pemyataan pnsmv yang menumukkan bahawa bangunan ‘menu Cvesl lelsebul akan menempalkan alau mempunyaw seramal atau Vebih 5,000 orang peIa.ar UNITAR uan bangunan Ievsebut juga merupakan sebuah pusal membeln be\ah kejiranan (Neighbourhood Mam vans msasavkan akan dwkumungl pe\a]ar kale}, eksekum knrporaf dan ahlx kehxarga, Plamm menyalakan bahawa pemyataan ;um\ah pelajar dam pemyalaan newghbuumoud mall |ersehul merupakan laktor ulsma yang mempengamm p|amnl—p|aml'rf unluk menyewa mm d\ bangunan Tlerra crest Pemyataan yang mdakwa salah Kelah dwbual men defendan kepada p\amUf—p\amhf me\ahA1 beberapa medium Me\alui eme\ ummz is upama tn commence their opeallons sumng mane m August/September 201:... ...mm in lmmomarn populatvon oIE,I3M mmm wmm. mu building Melahn faoelmok "baluwa mm cm: mlmplknn aumn pm: mombvlr wan kafirirvarv ( Nmghbourhood Mam dl Kvlana Jay: - “hanawa mm cm: 4., n pun: unmk klmpus ummz yanv barn m-Aunihi l,D00jumI:h pelt r m

Pytesseract-0.3.10

WA-24C-108-19/2016 & WA-24C-113-10/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Tidalmarine Engineering Sdn Bhd 2. ) Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd 2. ) Tidalmarine Engineering Sdn Bhd

Construction contract - Adjudication Decision - setting aside and enforcement application - whether there was a breach or denial of natural justice when the Adjudicator did not allow the parties to file their written submissions and authorities - whether the Adjudicator had failed to act independently or impartially - whether the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide based on a Final Claim or a Final Account Claim - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746] section 5(2), 8(3), 12(2) (c), 15, 25(a) and (p), 27(3), 28(1); Rules of Court 2012, Order 7 and 28.

26/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6880704f-424b-4f3b-8e79-af741bb428d6&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-108-10/2016 In the matter of Adjudication No.: KLRCA/D/AJ-0324-2016 between Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd (Claimant) and Tidalmarine Engineering Sdn Bhd (Respondent) And In the matter of the Amended Adjudication Decision dated 14.9.2016 issued by Samrith Kaur And In the matter of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of Order 92 Rule 4 of Rules of Court 2012 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court BETWEEN TIDALMARINE ENGINEERING SDN BHD … PLAINTIFF (Company No.: 272759-T) 2 AND CONLAY CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD … DEFENDANT (Company No. : 464072-W) (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: WA-24C -113-10/2016 In the matter of Adjudication between Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd and Tidal Marine Engineering Sdn Bhd under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of Adjudication Decision dated 14.9.2016 issued by Samrith Kaur, Adjudicator And In the matter of Section 28 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And 3 In the matter of Orders 7 and 28 of Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN CONLAY CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD … PLAINTIFF (Company No. : 464072-W) AND TIDALMARINE ENGINEERING SDN BHD … DEFENDANT (Company No.: 272759-T) THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] Tidal Marine Engineering Sdn Bhd ("Tidal") appointed Conlay Construction Sdn Bhd ("Conlay") as its sub-contractor to carry out some construction works for a project. The terms and conditions were contained in a Letter of Award dated 3.8.2010 (“the Letter of Award”). Project [2] The project was for the Construction and Completion of Institut Perguruan Guru Malaysia Kampus Bahasa Melayu which includes the supply for all labour, material, machineries, tools, equipment and everything necessary for the execution and completion of the Building works (“the Works”) for the Contract Sum of RM27,750,874.85 4 [3] The essential terms and conditions of the Letter of Award are as follows: a. Conlay was obliged to commence the sub-contract works on 1.3.2010. b. The works shall be completed on 11.5.2011. c. The defect liability period shall be 12 months from the date of issuance of the certificate of practical completion. d. The final contract sum shall be based on the actual value of works certified by Tidal Marine and Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia. e. Progress Payment is based on works progress at site as approved and certified by the Main Contractor’s Project Manager. [4] Conlay commenced and completed the Works under the said Contract and the Certificate of Practical Completion ("CPC") was issued on 18.4.2013. [5] Pursuant to Clause 17.2, Appendix 1 of the said Contract, the defect liability period was to run for a period of twelve (12) months from the date of issuance of the CPC i.e 18.4.2013 until 17.4.2014. 5 Problem [6] On 1.6.2013, Conlay submitted its Progress Payment Claim No. 30 for the sum of RM31,567,931.00 which was approved and agreed by Tidal’s Project Manager and Quantity Surveyor. [7] However, Tidal has thus far only paid the sum of RM26,277,266.79 leaving a balance outstanding of RM5,290,664.21 due and owing. [8] Pursuant to a letter dated 8.4.2015, Tidal forwarded their updated Statement of Account and Final Certificate No. 29 which shows that the sum due to Conlay is only RM384,483.60. However Conlay was not agreeable to this as Tidal’s Project Manager and Quantity Surveyor have earlier confirmed and certified that the sum due to Conlay is as per the Conlay’s Progress Claim No. 30. Proceedings in the Adjudication [9] Conlay as Claimant served a Payment Claim dated 3.2.2016 on the Tidal as Respondent pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”), claiming a sum of RM5,290,664.21 for balance outstanding for work done. The Claimant argued that its Payment Claim is premised upon Progress Payment Claim No. 30 for the sum of RM31,567,931.00 which was approved and agreed by Tidal’s Project Manager and Quantity Surveyor. As the 6 Respondent had paid the sum of RM26,277,266.79 there was a balance outstanding of RM5,290,664.21 due and owing to the Claimant. [10] The Respondent thereafter served a Payment Response dated 19.2.2016 on the Claimant denying the sum claimed. The Notice of Adjudication was issued by the Claimant on 4.5.2016. An Adjudicator was duly appointed by the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (“KLRCA”) on 3.6.2016. [11] The Claimant issued its Adjudication Claim on 16.6.2016 and the Respondent issued its Adjudication Response on 30.6.2016. Thereafter the Claimant issued its Adjudication Reply on 11.7.2016. [12] The Adjudicator vide her Amended Adjudication Decision dated 14.9.2016 allowed the Claimant's Claim as follows: (a) That the Respondent shall pay the Claimant the sum of RM5,290,664.21 (“Adjudicated Amount”); (b) That the Respondent shall pay the Adjudicated amount within four weeks from the date of this decision in a form of secured financial instruments; (c) That the Respondent shall pay the Claimant interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the Adjudicated Amount from 15.9.2016 until the actual realization of the said payment by the Claimant; 7 (d) That the Respondent shall bear the full Costs of the Adjudication amounting to RM84,752.21 only comprising as follows: (i) Adjudicator’s fees of RM53,425.92; (ii) KLRCA’s Administrative fees of RM10,685.18 (iii) GST on Administrative Fees of RM641.11; and (iv) Costs of RM20,000.00. Prayers [13] The Respondent applied in Originating Summons No: WA-24C- 108-10/2016 to set aside the Adjudicator’s Decision on the following grounds: a. There has been a denial or breach of natural justice; b. The Adjudicator failed to act independently or impartially; c. The Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to decide on the matter. [14] There is also another application in Originating Summons No: WA- 24C-113-10/2016 filed by the Claimant for enforcement of the Adjudication Decision. [15] Both applications were by consent heard together as one is the flip side of the other. To avoid confusion on the identities of the parties whether as Plaintiff or as Claimant, the Court shall refer to the parties 8 the way they were referred to in the Adjudication as Claimant and Respondent respectively or sometimes as Conlay and Tidal respectively. [16] If the Court allows the setting aside of the Adjudication Decision, then the application to enforce would be dismissed. Conversely if the Court dismisses the setting aside application, then the application for enforcement of the Adjudication Decision would be allowed. Principles Whether there was a Breach or Denial of Natural Justice when the Adjudicator did not allow the parties to file their written submissions and authorities [17] The Respondent submitted that they were denied the right to put in and file written submissions and bundle of authorities in regard to the issues raised by the parties in their respective adjudication claim, adjudication response and adjudication reply. [18] The Respondent on 4.8.2016 requested from the Adjudicator to enable the parties to file their respective written submissions and bundle of authorities to explain the issues of fact and law. [19] The Adjudicator on 5.8.2016 rejected the Respondent's request to file written submissions and bundle of authorities on the basis that the Respondent should have included the said documents in the 9 Adjudication Reply. Whilst it should have been the Adjudication Response and not Reply, nothing turns on this. [20] The Respondent contended that the need to file in their written submission and authorities is critical as they were raising a jurisdictional challenge to the Adjudicator having jurisdiction to hear the dispute. [21] The Respondent contended that it was a clear breach of natural justice for the Adjudicator at one instance to have rejected their application to file in written submissions and bundle of authorities to support their contention and at the same time to have rejected the Respondent's contention on the basis that there are no authorities produced by the Respondent to support their contention. [22] The Respondent submitted that the least the Adjudicator should have done is to direct the Respondent to produce the authorities to support its contention on the jurisdictional challenge bearing in mind that the Respondent's earlier application to file written submissions and bundle of authorities was rejected by the Adjudicator. [23] I agree with the Claimant's counsel that there is no denial of natural justice in the manner described by the Respondent as the Adjudicator has very wide powers under Section 25(a) of CIPAA to move the adjudication proceedings forward and to ultimately decide the 10 dispute. In particular, Section 25(a) provides, inter alia, that the Adjudicator shall have the power to: “establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties”. [24] In the case of ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 1951, the High Court held at page 7 that: “[41] ...The adjudicator is conferred discretion as to how the adjudication is to be conducted. To assist the adjudicator in carrying out that responsibility, the adjudicator is endowed with certain unusual and arguably extensive powers which one does not often see spelt out in other legislations. There is no equivalent provision in say the Arbitration Act 2005. ... [43] ... it is for the adjudicator to deal with how the adjudication proceedings are to proceed. This could include the calling of meetings and whether there will be hearings including oral hearings where witnesses may or may not be called ... In the matter of documents, the adjudicator has the power to give 11 directions on the discovery, submission and production of any documents” (emphasis added) [25] The Claimant submitted that since it is entirely within the Adjudicator’s discretion whether to conduct or dispense with the filing of any submissions or authorities, there is no breach of natural justice on the part of the Adjudicator in declining to allow the filing of written submissions and bundle of authorities as requested by the Respondent. Such a decision cuts evenly across both parties. [26] An Adjudicator after reading the Payment Claim and the Payment Response filed and the documents and explanations substantiating them in the Adjudication Claim, Adjudication Response and Adjudication Reply, may exercise his discretion to decide whether he would still need further clarification by way of written submissions on the law and the authorities. [27] In fact, following the prescribed format of the Adjudication Response in Form 8 of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure, there would have been sufficient information set out for the Adjudicator to decide on the disputes as follows: "ADJUDICATION RESPONSE A: Parties 12 1. [Describe the parties, if it differs from the Claimant’s description] B: The Construction Contract and/or Default Statutory Provisions 2. [Describe the Construction Contract, if it differs from the Claimant’s description, e.g. the date of contract was made, the description of the work and project, the contract sum, the contract is oral or partly oral and partly in writing, etc.] 3. [Set out the any part of the default provisions in section 36 of the CIPA Act 2012, where relevant] 4. Relevant extracts of the contract are attached hereto as Schedule 1 [e.g. the relevant contractual provisions relating to the valuation and claimed amount (where the Respondent is an Unpaid Party), or to the set-off, abatement and/or cross-claim (where the Respondent is the Non-Paying Party)]. C: Background facts relating to the claim in dispute 5. [set out the relevant background facts relating to the dispute if they differ from the Claimant’s view ] D: Relevant contractual provisions and/or statutory default provisions relating to dispute 13 6. The following are the relevant terms and conditions of the contract [and/or the relevant default provisions in section 36 of the CIPA Act 2012]: [Set out the relevant contractual provisions relating to the valuation and claimed amount (where the Respondent is an Unpaid Party), or to the set-off, abatement and/ or cross-claim (where the Respondent is the Non-Paying Party) and/or statutory default provisions (if relevant)] E: Payment Claim, Payment Response (if any) and Notice of Adjudication 7. [Identify and describe the Payment Claim, Payment Response (if any) and Notice of Adjudication, if they differ from the Claimant’s view]. F: The nature and description of the dispute 8. [Set out the nature and description of the dispute, if it differs from the Claimant’s view] G: Respondent’s answer to the Adjudication Claim 9. [Set out the grounds and basis thereof in response to the claim(s) made in the Adjudication Claim] 14 10. The Respondent relies on the following documents in support of its contentions [and/or claim]: a) [set out all the relevant documents], a copy of which is attached hereto as Schedule 2; b) [factual witness statement(s) of (Name(s) of the witness(es))], a copy of which is attached hereto as Schedule 3; c) [expert witness statement(s) of (Name(s) of the witness(es))], a copy of which is attached hereto as Schedule 4. [Set out the relief(s) or remedy(ies) on which the Respondent seeks a determination from the adjudicator, if any]" [28] Learned counsel for the Claimant referred to the case of GPS Contractors Ltd v Ringway Infrastructure Services Ltd [2010] BLR 377 which is illustrative of the broad discretionary powers of an Adjudicator to order as well as limit the submissions filed. The Adjudicator had at the outset directed a procedure by which there was to be a Response and Reply. The Reply was to be restricted to any relevant matters raised by the Respondent that are not addressed in the claimant’s referral notice. The parties complied with the Adjudicator’s direction. However, after the claimant filed its Reply, the Respondent wrote to the Adjudicator stating that it would be putting in a submission 15 in a week, which was two days before the date for the Adjudicator’s decision. The Adjudicator responded to the Respondent’s letter stating that he had made it clear that he had limited the submissions and that the Respondent had assumed, wrongly, that it could make a submission in response to the Reply. The Respondent served a response to the Reply nevertheless, but this was not considered by the Adjudicator in his decision. The Adjudicator issued an award in favour of the claimant. The claimant then applied for summary judgment based on the Adjudicator’s decision. One of grounds raised by the Respondent in resisting the enforcement application was that there had been a breach of the rules of natural justice on the part of the Adjudicator in limiting the submissions. This argument was rejected by the court. Ramsey J said that the Adjudicator was entitled to and needed to limit the number of rounds of submissions, and wish of the Respondent to serve a rejoinder two days before the date of the Adjudicator’s decision was something which the process had not, and could not, allow. [29] The Claimant's learned counsel highlighted that though the Adjudication Reply was served by the Claimant on 11.7.2016, the Respondent had only on 4.8.2016 via email decided to suddenly write to the Adjudicator to request for parties to put in written submission (See Exhibit “A-8” at page 682 of the Tidal’s Affidavit In Support). 16 [30] Although the Claimant did not object to the same, however the Claimant was of the opinion that there is no necessity for parties to put in written submission unless the Adjudicator required parties to do so. [31] The Adjudicator also highlighted in her Adjudication Decision that Adjudication is meant to be a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution, hence all timelines must be observed to enable the Adjudicator to deliver the decision in a timely manner within the time-frame stated in the Act. [32] Further the Respondent did not give any reasons for failing to put in their submission if needed in the Response stage or why they needed to do so at such a late stage of the proceedings. i.e. only 3 weeks plus after the Adjudication Reply was served did the Respondent request to put in submissions. This was very late in the proceedings, knowing very well that the Adjudicator had strict timeline to meet in delivering her decision after the service of the Reply. [33] The Adjudicator had indicated that any submissions should have been raised by the Respondent in its Adjudication Response. [34] In any event, it is evident from the Adjudication Decision that the Adjudicator has considered all issues and the contemporaneous documents in arriving at her decision. It might be opportune to observe 17 here that there is a need to restrain from converting the Adjudication Proceedings into a full-blown litigation proceedings in a Court. [35] The intention of Parliament was to make the procedure and proceedings in Adjudication as simple as possible and to ensure that it, being a speedy mechanism to dissolve disputes that has only the effect of temporary finality, does not become unduly convoluted and cumbersome. This can be seen in the fact that under section 8(3) CIPAA a party to the adjudication proceedings may represent himself or be represented by any representative appointed by the party. [36] One must bear in mind that it is not every breach of natural justice that would result in the setting aside of the Adjudication Decision. [37] The Respondent bears the burden of showing that the alleged breach of natural justice was material in order for the Court to exercise its discretion to set aside the Adjudication Decision. As was aptly observed in the case of ACFM (supra) where the High Court held at pp 9 – 10 that: “[53] ... It is not simply any breach or denial which will forestall the enforceability of the adjudication decision or be a ground for setting aside that decision. The breach must be “either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome and not 18 peripheral or irrelevant”; it must be material. ...” (emphasis added) [38] Such was the view expressed in the case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695 at page 10, para 94. [39] As the brunt of the Respondent's complaint on the breach of natural justice was that of being deprived of the opportunity to submit on a jurisdictional ground, that cannot be material as when confronted with such a challenge, the Adjudicator under section 27(3) CIPAA, notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28(1). [40] Simply put, it means this: irrespective of how elaborate and exhaustive the explanation may be on the jurisdictional challenge raised, the Adjudicator need not be embroiled in it and is entitled to proceed to hear the parties on merits and deliver his decision accordingly. [41] That elaborate and exhaustive submission may now be canvassed at the setting aside stage under a section 15 CIPAA application, as it 19 now is being canvassed before me and on which I shall shortly deal with in this judgment. [42] There is thus no basis for arguing that there was a breach of natural justice merely because the Adjudicator had not allowed the parties to file their written submissions on the issues raised and in particular, on the jurisdictional challenge taken. Whether the Adjudicator had failed to act Independently or Impartially [43] The Respondent contended that the Adjudicator failed to act independently or impartially in that she failed to give any consideration to the position put forward by the Respondent. [44] The Respondent contended that there was an accord and satisfaction on the part of the Claimant when the Claimant agreed with the Respondent's proposal to set off the Respondent's fixed deposit against the agreed sum of RM2,496,532.05. [45] The Respondent's position is that both parties agreed that the total amount outstanding to be paid to the Claimant is RM2,496,532.05. This was proposed by the Respondent to the Claimant via its email dated 17.6.2014. It was contended that this proposal was duly accepted by the Claimant through its letter dated 18.6.2014. 20 [46] Pursuant to this agreement, a total sum of RM2,111,748.45 was paid to the Claimant (by way of set-off with the Respondent's fixed deposit) leaving the balance sum of RM384,783.60. Thereafter the Respondent paid a sum of RM100,000.00 to the Claimant reducing the balance outstanding to RM284,783.60. [47] The Respondent submitted that the Adjudicator erred in failing to consider that the conduct of the Claimant in utilizing the Respondent's fixed deposit as proposed by the Respondent in their email dated 17.6.2014 amounted to an act of accord and satisfaction on part of the Claimant and acceptance by the Claimant of the terms stated in the Respondent’s email dated 17.6.2014. [48] Learned counsel for the Respondent further stated that in the event the Claimant was not agreeable to the terms stated in the Respondent's email dated 17.6.2014, the Claimant should not have utilized the Respondent's fixed deposit to reduce the agreed outstanding sum as proposed by the Respondent in its email dated 17.6.2014. In the Federal Court decision in Kerpa Singh v Bariam Singh [1966] 1 MLJ 38, the Federal Court took into account the conduct of the Appellant in accepting the payment from the Respondent in deciding that there was an accord and satisfaction. 21 [49] Learned counsel for the Respondent also stated that the Adjudicator had acted partially when the Adjudicator accepted the Claimant’s reliance on the alleged final agreed statement of account. This document clearly shows that the amounts stated in the said document are subject to measurement. There was no agreement reached on the final amount. [50] The Respondent argued that, in any event, the Adjudicator had failed to consider that the alleged agreed statement of account was superseded by the parties’ subsequent agreement in which the Claimant accepted the Respondent's terms as stated in the email dated 17.6.2014 by utilising the fixed deposit sum. [51] It was also argued that the Adjudicator failed to take into account the last payment of RM100,000.00 made by the Respondent to the Claimant. As such, the Respondent contended that the Adjudicator had failed to act independently and/or impartially. [52] The Claimant's position is that they did not at any point agree that the total outstanding to be paid by the Respondent is RM2,496,532.05. [53] The Respondent's email dated 17.6.2014 merely shows that they were agreeable to allow the Claimant to utilize Tidal's Fixed Deposit of RM6,100,000.00 for the Claimant to secure an Overdraft Facility with 22 Ambank. The said amount of RM6,100,000.00 was to be used to set off part of the sums that are due and owing by Tidal to Conlay under 2 projects namely KHEDN Project and IPGM Project. KHEDN Project is another project involving the same parties whereas IPGM Project is the project that is involved in this matter (See pages 418 – 427 of Exhibit “A- 4” of the Tidal's Affidavit in Support). [54] According to the Claimant, from the RM6,100,000.00, it was agreed that a sum of RM2,038,637.45 shall be utilized to set-off against the amounts that is due and owing from the Respondent to the Claimant under the said Contract. The Claimant at all material times did not agree that the final sums due under the said Contract is RM2,496,532.05. This can be clearly seen in the Claimant's letter dated 12.6.2014 which was referred to in the Respondent's email dated 17.6.2014 (See page 659 i.e. Exhibit “A-6” of the Tidal's Affidavit In Support). [55] In fact, the Respondent in their email dated 17.6.2014 had stated that the sum of RM2,496,532.05 is subject to “final discussion”. Hence there was no agreement that the outstanding sum is RM2,496,532.05 as the Respondent itself had not finalized the outstanding amount. The only agreement reached inter alia was that the sum of RM2,038,637.45 from the Fixed Deposit will be used as part payment to set off the amounts due and owing to the Claimant under this Contract. This agreement was 23 confirmed by the Claimant in its letter dated 18.6.2014 which can be found at pages 421 – 422 of Exhibit “A-4” of the Tidal's Affidavit in Support. [56] The Claimant confirmed that a sum of RM100,000.00 was paid to them on 15.1.2016. However the balance sum due from the Respondent after taking into account the set off of RM2,038,637.45 and RM100,000.00 is RM5,290,644.21 and not RM384,783.60. [57] It is evident from the Adjudication Decision (at pages 660 – 681 of the Tidal's Affidavit in Support) that the Adjudicator did take into consideration all facts and evidence produced in arriving at her decision. [58] The Claimant submitted that from the reading of the emails and relevant letters, it is evident that parties had only agreed on the fixed deposit sum which will be used to set off part of the outstanding amount. [59] The Respondent further alleged that all amounts are subject to measurement. The Claimant submitted that all measurement of works were carried out by the Respondent's own Quantity Surveyor and was confirmed and agreed by the Project Manager which clearly shows that the Claimant did carry out the works wherein the outstanding sum is now RM5,290,644.21. The Quantity Surveyor would not have agreed or confirmed the documents attached to the Claimant's Progress Claim No. 24 30 without carrying out valuation or measurement to ascertain the works done (see the “Final Summary” which shows details of the Claimant's claim at pages 658 of Exhibit “A-6” of the Tidal's Affidavit in Support). [60] In setting out the opposite and opposing arguments of both the Claimant and the Respondent, one cannot help but conclude that we are venturing into the merits of the Payment Claim in determining what was the amount outstanding as in whether there was accord and satisfaction in part of the Payment Claim and if so what was the original amount outstanding and hence what is the balance outstanding for which an Adjudication Decision should be confined to. [61] Such an exercise was set out to show the inherent infirmity of this ground of a lack of impartially or independence on the part of the Adjudicator, venturing as it does into a consideration of the merits of the Decision. This is not a case where the Decision has been arrived out when there is no evidence to support it altogether. In the Singapore case of AM Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National Golf and Country Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260 Judith Prakash J (now JA) held as follows: “25. ...However dissatisfied Laguna may be with those decision, it cannot ask for the Adjudication Determination to be set aside 25 because it considers the decision to be against the weight of the evidence” [62] The salutary speech of Humphrey Lloyd J in Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC) at pages 22 and 23 is worthy of repetition as follows: “[29] Nevertheless, in my judgment, that which is applicable in arbitration is basically applicable to adjudication but, in determining whether a party has been treated fairly or in determining whether an adjudicator has acted impartially, it is very necessary to bear in mind that the point or issue which is brought to the attention of the parties must be one which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant. It is now clear that the construction industry regards adjudication not simply as a staging post towards the final resolution of the dispute in arbitration or litigation but as having in itself considerable weight and impact that in practice goes beyond the legal requirement that the decision has for the time being to be observed. Lack of impartiality or of fairness in adjudication must be considered in that light. It has become all the more necessary that, within the rough nature of the process, decisions are still made in a basically fair manner so 26 that the system itself continues to enjoy the confidence it now has apparently earned. The provisional nature of the decision also justifies ignoring non-material breaches. Such errors, if apparent (as they usually are), will be rectified in any negotiation and settlement based upon the decision. The consequence of material issues and points is that the dispute referred to adjudication will not have been resolved satisfactorily by any fundamental standard and the chances of it providing the basis for a settlement are much less and the chances of it proceeding to arbitration or litigation are much greater. However the time limits, the nature of the process and the ultimately non- binding nature of the decision, all mean that the standard required in practice is not that which is expected of an arbitrator. Adjudication is closer to arbitration than an expert determination but it is not the same” ("emphasis added") [63] The fact that the Adjudicator did not agree with the Respondent but accepted the Claimant's position is no basis for alleging that the Adjudicator had not acted independently or impartially. It is in actual fact a back door method to attack the Adjudication Decision on its merits. [64] Likewise the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695 referred to the guidelines of 27 the English Court of Appeal case in Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard [2005] EWHC 778 (TCC), which would be helpful to hearings under a section 15 application under CIPAA as follows: “…The English Court of Appeal had asserted: (a) the unsuccessful party must pay the adjudication award and if he is not happy, must challenge it through arbitration proceedings; (b) challenges based on excess of jurisdiction and/or breach of natural justice (save in the plainest cases) ought not be entertained or words to that effect… 85. The objective which underlies the Act and the statutory scheme requires the courts to respect and enforce the adjudicator’s decision…" [65] It is a serious allegation leveled at a decision maker and in the absence of clear and cogent evidence, this ground of a lack of impartiality or independence should not ever be countenanced. This is clearly not a ground for setting aside the Adjudication Decision pursuant to Section 15 of CIPAA. I have no hesitation in dismissing this ground of setting aside the Adjudication Decision. 28 Whether the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide based on a Final Claim or a Final Account Claim [66] The Respondent had raised a preliminary objection as to the Claimant's entitlement to commence adjudication proceedings against the Respondent pursuant to CIPAA. [67] The Respondent submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to bring its claim to the Adjudication as the Claimant's claim is premised on a disputed statement of final account. [68] The Respondent had prepared a final account to settle the entire dispute and difference between the parties pursuant to the agreement reached between the parties subsequent to the alleged agreed statement of final account. It was argued that as the Claimant is no longer at the site and no works are being carried out by the Claimant, CIPAA has no application to the Claimant's claim. [69] However the Adjudicator was of the view that she has the jurisdiction to hear the adjudication claim commenced by the Claimant. [70] The Respondent contended that the Adjudicator had failed to consider that CIPAA was meant to be for temporary relief during the progress of the works. According to learned counsel for the Respondent, CIPAA was not created to have final disposal of the disputes between 29 the parties. The final disposal of the dispute between the parties is to be decided in an arbitration or in court. [71] Learned counsel for the Respondent argued that when the alleged final account has been issued which is done after the works are completed, CIPAA should not apply. The Respondent stated that CIPAA which provides temporary relief should be limited to instances that arose during the currency of the contract and not when dealing with final account matters as is in this instant case. [72] The Claimant's claim is based on the difference between the alleged final statement of account sum against the amount which they have received as payment. Learned counsel for the Respondent said that to allow CIPAA to apply to dispute in relation to the final account will deprive the Respondent of its rights to exercise set off. This would be unfair and prejudicial to the Respondent. [73] The Respondent further contended that the intention of Parliament was very clear that CIPAA was designed to assist the cash flow of sub- contractors in order to facilitate the smooth completion of the project. [74] It was also stated that in Malaysia, CIPAA does not provide that final account matters can be dealt by the Adjudicator. In the Court of Appeal decision in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd 30 [2016] 6 MLJ 717 it was held that CIPAA does not apply to final account matters between the parties. However learned counsel for the Respondent conceded that this statement was a mere obiter dictum as the Payment Claim there was based on Interim Certificates. [75] With respect to final progress claim, the current jurisprudence is that there is no good reason why a final progress claim is not adjudicatable. In UDA Holdings Bhd v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2015] 11 MLJ 499 it was held that CIPAA 2012 applies to interim and final progress claims as in an “adjudication is a mechanism to speedily settle payment disputes which are in reality are disputes over interim and final progress claims." [76] It may fairly be said that CIPAA does not differentiate between a progress claim and a final progress claim or a final claim. [77] So long as a Payment Claim comes within the definition of a "Payment" in section 4 CIPAA as in "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract" and further that the "Payment Claim" can satisfy the requirements under section 5(2) CIPAA, it would appear that it is a valid Payment Claim under CIPAA. To be clear there is no express provision in CIPAA to exclude a claim under a final progress claim or a final claim or for that matter a claim under a final account. 31 [78] Section 5(2) CIPAA provides as follows: "(2) The payment claim shall be in writing and shall include— (a) The amount claimed and due date for payment of the amount claimed; (b) Details to identify the cause of action including the provision in the construction contract to which the payment relates; (c) Description of the work or services to which the payment relates; and (d) A statement that it is made under this Act." [79] Payment based on a final account claim is only an extension of a payment based on a final progress claim or certificate and it is still nevertheless coming within the meaning of a "Payment Claim" that would fulfill all the requirements of section 5(2) CIPAA. [80] Once a Payment Claim comes within the requirements of section 5(2) CIPAA with respect to a construction contract, then the Adjudicator would have the jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. A claim premised on a statement of final accounts issued by the superintending officer though disputed by the Respondent as a non-paying party would be within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to decide based as it is on the meaning of a "Payment Claim” being a claim for work done or services 32 rendered under the express terms of a construction contract and further capable of fulfilling the requirements of section 5(2) CIPAA. [81] Where the words, given its ordinary and natural meaning are clear, there is no need to fall back on the purpose of the statute. It is only when the words are unclear that one must consider the purpose of the statute and to pursue an interpretation that would best serve the purpose of the statute. If authority is needed for such a proposition, one may refer to the case of Mudajaya Corporation Berhad v Leighton Contractors (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 293 where Mary Lim Thiam Suan J (now JCA) expressed as follows at page 3: “[18] I start with two basic principles of statutory interpretation. These principles are relevant and applicable whether interpreting substantive or subsidiary legislation;... [19] The first principle is that the legislation must be read as a whole; any specific provision must be read with or against the rest of the Act or in the case of any Orders issued, such Orders must be read against the substantive or parent Act... [20] The second principle of statutory interpretation is that legislation must be construed according to its plain meaning and understanding. However, when that plain meaning is in 33 doubt, a purposive approach must be explored. A reading which would advance the intent and purpose for which the legislation was enacted in the first place ought to be adopted; provided of course such an approach does not strain or do violence to the language used in the legislation. This principle is encapsulated in section 17A of the Interpretation Acts of 1948 and 1967 [Act 388]. For guidance on this principle, I need to go no further than to cite the Federal Court’s decision in Andrew Lee Siew Ling v United Overseas Bank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 449. At page 458, the Federal Court said: On the proper application of the provisions of the s 17A of the Interpretation Act we would refer to the case of All Malayan Estates Staff Union v Rajasegaran & Ors [2006] 6 MLJ 97 wherein this court had laid down the principles, inter alia, as follows: In summarizing the principles governing the application of the purposive approach to interpretation, Craies on Legislation (8th Ed) says at p 566: (1) Legislation is always to be understood first in accordance with its plain meaning. 34 (2) Where the plain meaning is in doubt the courts will start the process of construction by attempting to discover, from the provisions enacted, the broad purpose of the legislation. (3) Where a particular reading would advance the purpose identified, and would do no violence to the plain meaning of the provisions enacted, the courts will be prepared to adopt that reading. (4) Where a particular reading would advance the purpose identified but would strain the plain meaning of the provisions enacted, the result will depend on the context and, in particular, on a balance of the clarity of the purpose identified and the degree of strain on the language. (5) Where the courts conclude that the underlying purpose of the legislation is insufficiently plain, or cannot be advanced without any unacceptable degree of violence to the language used, they will be obliged, however regretfully in the circumstances of a particular case, to leave to the legislation the task of extending or modifying the legislation. 35 The choice prescribed in a 17A of a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose of object’ can only arise when the meaning of a statutory provision is not plain and is ambiguous. If therefore, the language of a provision is plain and unambiguous s 17A will have no application as the question of another meaning will not arise. Thus, it is only when a provision is capable of bearing two or more meanings can s17A be resorted to in order to determine the one that will promote the purpose or object of the provision, such an exercise must be undertaken without doing any violence to the plain meaning of the provision..." (emphasis added) [82] Assuming for a moment that the meaning of a "Payment Claim" is such that it is doubtful whether a claim based on final account is within the scope of CIPAA, then one may be permitted to look at the purpose of CIPAA to clarify to doubt and to bring certainty to the position of a Payment Claim made under a statement of final account. [83] The long title to the Act encapsulated its purpose as follows: "An Act to facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the 36 construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters." (emphasis added) [84] I do not accept that the final account is not related to a regular or timely payment and that it does not fall within the purview of CIPAA 2012. It is only too obvious that a progression in a continuum of claim would end with a final claim either under a final progress claim or certificate or ultimately ending with a claim on a final account. A final payment is equally applicable to a final progress claim as well as a final claim under a statement of final account. [85] Learned counsel for the Respondent drew a distinction between a final progress claim and a final account claim. It was submitted that in the context of a final progress claim and the timeline when a final progress claim is issued, there will be further works to be complied with namely defects and rectification works. As such, the contractor would obviously need cash to carry out the said defects and rectification works. On the other hand, final account will only be issued at the conclusion of the project, after the defects and rectification of works are completed. [86] It was further submitted that there would not be any further work required for the contract/project to be carried out after the issuance of the final account. Therefore, when a final account is issued, there will not exist a situation where the sub-contractor requires cash in order to 37 continue with works pertaining to the contract/project. However to say that is to forget for a moment that the contractor as the unpaid party is still out of pocket for having done the work, he has still not been paid by the employer, now under the final account. [87] However the purpose of CIPAA is much broader than the Respondent's perceived purpose in facilitating regular and timely payment for construction works but rather for the construction industry as a whole. [88] The Act is concerned with the construction industry as a whole and not just claims as arising out of construction works done for a construction project which the Respondent now says is not affected as the works have been completed. The fear, it was said, was that if the progress claims are not paid regularly and timely, then the progress in the works would be affected and the project abandoned altogether. [89] However while the fear may be more real and present in an uncompleted work or project, it would be an artfully artificial distinction if one were to take the view that as the works or project has been completed, the protection of recovery of payment is no longer present. [90] There is no good reason for us to tell a contractor that as he has been more resourceful in sourcing for funding perhaps even at a high 38 interest rate to complete the project and that he has been more persevering in completing the works and in patiently waiting for the last payment to come with the finalization of final accounts, he has no protection under CIPAA. Neither is it realistic to expect a contractor to have only one project at a time and that should he be successful in completing one project, he will just have to patiently wait for the payments due under under the final accounts for that claim is not one that is amenable to the speedy resolution of dispute under CIPAA. [91] We would then be punishing and depriving the more resourceful and resolute contractors and protecting the employers who have a penchant for either delaying in issuing the final accounts or disputing what is approved by its own architect or engineer in the final accounts. [92] There is equally the danger of giving a carte blanche to unscrupulous employer to delay as long as possible for Adjudication is now not available to the contractor and the contractor would have to take the longer and more expensive route and recourse of arbitration or litigation. [93] That would be a most unhappy state of affairs for by and large, the final accounts would in all probability be approved by the superintending officer be he the architect or the engineer and the contractor might even has accepted the sum stated in the final account with the Employer still 39 not able to agree. To suggest that the contractor is deprived of the speedy mode of resolving the dispute via Adjudication would be to miss the purpose of CIPAA altogether. [94] Just because CIPAA provides temporary relief, it should not be limited to disputes on instances that arise during the currency of the contract and not when dealing with final account matters as is in this instant case. [95] The Claimant’s claim in this case is based on a final account basis and it is premised on the difference between the total value of work done as against the amount which they have received as payment. [96] The final account was allegedly prepared and consented to by both parties and the Adjudicator treated this dispute as a final account dispute. I cannot understand how to allow CIPAA to apply at this stage would deprive the Respondent of its rights to exercise its set off. The Respondent as the non-paying party and employer can always raise the defence of set-off whether it be because of rectification costs incurred or because of a claim under Liquidated and Ascertained Damages ("LAD") raised as a set-off. Indeed there is no defence that may be raised in disputing a Payment Claim in the nature of a Progress Claim which could not be raised in disputing a Payment Claim based on a final account. 40 [97] In Singapore in the case of Tiong Seng Contractors Pte Ltd v Chuan Lim Construction Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR 364, where the issue to be decided on was whether the term “progress payment” includes “final progress payment”, the High Court held as follows at page 5-6: “[27] Looking at the structure and wording of the provision, it appears that an exclusion of “final payment” from the ambit of the Act can only be justified by express wording to that effect. It would not suffice to infer a legislative intention to exclude simply on the basis that “final payments” were not included in a non-exhaustive supplementary definition, ostensibly provided for clarification. If the Legislature had intended to exclude final claims from the adjudicatory ambit of the Act, it could have clearly included a proviso or provision to that effect. In the absence of such express exclusion, the primary broad-ranging definition in the main limb must be determinative. [28] In addition, a plain reading of “a payment that is based on an event or a date” or a “single or one-off payment” clearly encompasses final payments. Such a conclusion is vindicated by the fact that the Act at no time makes any distinction between “final claims” and “non-final claims”. Implying such a distinction from the supplementary limb would severely impair the protection 41 afforded by the Act, as it would create a carte blanche for contractor to renege on the final stages of payment, which would have an equally deleterious effect on cash flow affecting other ongoing construction projects. ... [33] From the above extract, it appears that the Act is primarily directed at safeguarding the continued financial viability of contractors who are victims of payment delays or disputes made in bad faith perpetuated by upstream contracting parties. From this perspective, it makes no sense to draw an artificial distinction between allegedly “final” and “non final” payments, as the withholding of either would create the exact same downstream ripple effect intended to be “deterred and weeded out” by the Act.” (emphasis added) [98] The rationale for allowing a claim under a final payment claim would be equally applicable under a claim based on final account for such a claim is still a claim for work done or service rendered under the express terms of a construction contract. [99] The Singapore Court of Appeal in Lee Wee Lick Terence (alias Li Weili Terence) v Chua Say Eng (formerly trading as Weng Fatt Construction Engineering) and another appeal [2013] 1 SLR 401 in 42 affirming that their Security of Payment Act applied to a final claim held as follows at page 438: “95 The other point to note in this case is that PC6 was a final claim for payment and not a progress payment. The Act is expressed to apply to progress payments (s 5). The expressions “progress payment” is defined in s 2 as follows: ... Even though no argument has been made to us on whether a final payment is a progress payment as defined, it seems to us that the definition is wide enough to include a final payment as it is payment, albeit final, to which a person is entitled for the carrying out of construction works (see also Tiong Seng Contractors (Pte) Ltd v Chuan Lim Construction Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR (R) 364 at [27].” [100] Under the Singapore Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Chapter 30B) a "progress claim" under its section 2 means a payment to which a person is entitled for the carrying out of construction work, or the supply of goods or services, under a contract, and includes - (a) a single or one-off payment; or 43 (b) a payment that is based on an event or a date; " [101] Reference may be made to the Parliament of Singapore debates recorded in Hansard in respect of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Bill where the Minister of State for National Development’s speech at the Second Reading of the Bill stated generally that the intention of parliament to introduce the Act was to “preserve the rights to payment for work done and goods supplied of all the parties in the construction industry. It also facilitates cash flow by establishing a fast and low costs adjudication system...” [102] There is nothing in our Hansard to suggest that CIPAA is not applicable to final account claims. [103] In New South Wales, the Hansard extract in respect of the Second Reading of Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Bill, it was stated at page 4 as follows: “Minor changes have been made to remove possible ambiguities, for example, to ensure that progress payments include milestone payments, that progress claims under the Act can be made under construction contracts that have no provision for progress payments, and that progress claims can include the final amount claimed and retention moneys....” (emphasis added) 44 [104] In the Australian Capital Territory, section 10(2) of their Building and Construction Industry (Security of Payment) Act 2009 provides as follows: "A progress payment may include - (a) the final payment for construction work carried out, or for related goods and services supplied, under a construction contract; or ...." (emphasis added) [105] Under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 of Victoria, "progress payment" has been defined to include final payment as well. [106] The position is the same in both South Australia and Tasmania wherein progress payment has been defined to include final payment as well. [107] In New Zealand, Section 3 of the Construction Contracts Act 2002 sets out the purpose of their Act as follows: “3 Purpose The purpose of this Act is to reform the law relating to construction contracts and, in particular,- 45 (a) To facilitate regular and timely payments between the parties to a construction contract; and (b) To provide for the speedy resolution of disputes arising under a construction contract; and (c) To provide remedies for the recovery for payments under a construction contract” [108] As for "progress payment" under this Act in New Zealand, it is defined to include “any final payment under the contract”. [109] The purpose of our CIPAA can be said to be even broader than that of New Zealand as where the providing of remedies for the recovery of payments is concerned it is "under a construction contract" whereas ours is "in the construction industry." [110] As for the definition of a "Payment" and hence a "Payment Claim" it is broad enough to cover a final claim or a final account claim as it is generally defined to mean "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract" with no restriction on whether it is a final claim or a final account claim. [111] If the argument raised against adjudicating a claim based on final account as being tedious and time-consuming then the Adjudicator can either resign or alternatively ask for the parties to grant him extension of 46 time to deliver the Adjudication Decision under section 12(2)(c) as well as exercising his concomitant powers under section 25(p) CIPAA to extend any time limit imposed on the parties under the Act as may be reasonably required. The panoply of powers at his discretion and disposal are designed to arm him with the necessary array of ammunition to undertake even a convoluted case in a construction dispute so long as it is a dispute involving a Payment Claim. By reading his vast powers in section 25 CIPAA one gets the impression that not all cases of a Payment Claim before him with the varied defences that may be filed in disputing such a Claim would be a walk in the park. There will be the difficult cases involving even disputes on final accounts that would require him to deploy some of the powers at his disposal to decide fairly even though his decision has only interim finality. His powers in section 25 CIPAA are reproduced below: "25. Powers of the Adjudicator The adjudicator shall have the powers to— a) Establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties; b) Order the discovery and production of documents; 47 c) Set deadlines for the production of documents; d) Draw on his own knowledge and expertise; e) Appoint independent experts to inquire and report on specific matters with the consent of the parties; f) Call for meetings with the parties; g) Conduct any hearing and limiting the hearing time; h) Carry out inspection of the site, work, material or goods relating to the dispute including opening up any work done; i) Inquisitorially take the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision; j) Issue any direction as may be necessary or expedient; k) Order interrogatories to be answered; l) Order that any evidence be given on oath; m) Review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued pursuant to a construction work contract, decision, instruction, opinion or valuation of the parties or contract administrator relevant to the dispute; 48 n) Decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued in respect of the matter. o) Award financing costs and interest; and p) Extend any time limit imposed on the parties under this Act as reasonably required." (emphasis added) [112] Even an arbitrator is not arrayed with such an amoury of powers at his disposal. An Adjudicator is "endowed with certain unusual and arguably extensive powers which one does not often see spelt out in other legislations", as was observed by Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 1951 at para [41]. Even an arbitrator would be envious of such powers as "there is no equivalent provision in say the Arbitration Act 2005," as her Ladyship further noted. [113] I cannot see how allowing for a Payment Claim based on the statement of final account issued by the superintending officer in charged may be said to be defeating the purpose of the Act. [114] In fact looking at the wide ranging powers that an Adjudicator has in his armoury of powers, there is nothing impeding him to decide on a Payment Claim premised on a final account. 49 Pronouncement [115] Therefore I would dismiss the Respondent’s Originating Summons for setting aside the Adjudication Decision and correspondingly allow the Claimant's Originating Summons for enforcement. [116] As both applications were heard together I had allowed one single costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by the Respondent in the Adjudication to the Claimant Dated: 26.5.2017. Sgd YA LEE SWEE SENG Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in WA-24C-108-10/2016 : K. Gobinath And for the Defendant in : (Messrs Mohanadass Partnership) WA-24C-113-10/2016 : 50 For the Defendant in WA-24C-108-10/2016 : K. Sarasvathi And for the Plaintiff in : (Messrs Dorairaj, Low & Teh) WA-24C-113-10/2016 : Date of Decision: 26.1.2017

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C(ARB)-44-12/2016

PLAINTIF Bella Builders Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. Kerajaan Malaysia; 2. Malayan Banking Berhad

Construction contract - application for an injunction to prevent 1st Defendant from calling on Performance Bond - whether the non-approval of the variation order claim and the applications for extensions of time and the imposition of liquidated and ascertained damages by 1st Defendant made the conduct of 1st Defendant unconscionable in calling on the Performance Bond - whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of 1st Defendant in the circumstances of the case - Arbitration Act 2005 [Act 646], section 11 (1)(h); Rules of Court 2012, Order 69 rule 2 and 4.

19/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0c96aff5-34a2-4ff8-91d5-83f9c174c64d&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C(ARB)-44-12/2016 In the matter of Letter of Acceptance (Ref: (48)JKR:UB(S)123/PUB/159 Jld 2) and contract agreement (Ref:JKR/IP/CKUB/149/2011) dated 11.10.2011 between Bella Builders Sdn Bhd (Company No:70798-U) and Government of Malaysia And In the matter of Notice of Termination of the Employment of Contractors dated 08.12.2016 and Clause 10.7 of the terms of the Contract Agreement And In the matter of Malayan Banking Berhad performance bond (Company No: 3813-K) (Ref: 99010BGP 5851031) dated 02.12.2011 And In the matter of section 11 (1)(h) of the Arbitration Act 2005 or Order 69 Rule 2 or 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 2 BETWEEN BELLA BUILDERS SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO:70798-U) AND 1. KERAJAAN MALAYSIA 2. MALAYAN BANKING BERHAD ... DEFENDANTS (COMPANY NO: 3813-K) THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] The First Defendant ("D1") had employed the Plaintiff as the Design and Build Contractor for the project known as “Projek Pembinaan Infrastruktur Bagi Pesawat Helikopter Di Pangkalan Udara TUDM: Pakej 1 – Pangkalan Udara TUDM Kuantan (Reka Dan Bina)” ("the Works”) that was based at TUDM, Kuantan, Pahang for the original contract sum of RM108,888,999.00. [2] The terms binding on the Plaintiff and D1 are contained in the Letter of Award (Ref: (48) JKR: UB(S)123/PUB/159 Jld 2) and the contract agreement (Ref: JKR/IP/CKUB/149/2011) dated 11.10.2011 (“the Contract”). As part of the terms of the Contract the Plaintiff was required to procure a Performance Bond in favour of D1 which the 3 Plaintiff duly complied in furnishing the Performance Bond (Ref: 99010BGP 5851031) dated 02.12.2011 from the Second Defendant ("D2") which is Malayan Banking Berhad in favour of D1. [3] The Performance Bond was in the sum equivalent to 5% of the contract sum i.e. RM5,444,449.95. [4] The Works were divided into 2 sections: (i) section (i) which consisted of the following items “Hangar, Apron, Taxiways, Sekolah Sistem dan SAR Aircraft Shelter”. Section (i) had the sectional completion date of 11.03.2013; and (ii) section (ii) which consisted of the remaining job scope under the Works. Section (ii) had the overall completion date of 14.08.2013. [5] Vacant possession of the site was given to the Plaintiff on 25.10.2011. [6] There were delays to the Works and the Plaintiff contended that these delays were caused and compounded by D1 through: (i) their refusal, failure or neglect to appropriately and timely consider the Plaintiff’s variation order(s) ("VO") applications; 4 (ii) their refusal, failure or neglect to appropriately and timely consider the Plaintiff’s extensions of time ("EOT") applications; and (iii) following thereto, their unreasonable imposition of liquidated and ascertained damages ("LAD”) on the Plaintiff in the circumstances. [7] The Plaintiff contended that the termination of its employment under the Contract is unlawful and ultimately, D1’s call on the Performance Bond is similarly, unlawful. [8] The start of the problem, the Plaintiff argued, may be traced to D1’s refusal to recognise and approve the VO on the “expansion of the building spaces” for all buildings under the Works, which then led to the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s EOT applications. [9] For ease of reference, D2 shall be referred to as “Maybank” while the D1 shall be referred to as the Government of Malaysia where relevant. Prayers [10] The Plaintiff had filed this Originating Summons ("OS") under section 11(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act 2005 or under Order 69 rule 2 or 4 of the Rules of Court 2012. 5 [11] Section 11(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act 2005 provides that a party may, before or during arbitral proceedings, apply to a High Court for any interim measure and the High Court may make the following orders for an interim injunction or any other interim measure. [12] The Plaintiff filed the present OS seeking inter alia – a) an injunction to prevent D1 or their agents from calling or forfeiting the Performance Bond held with D2 till the disposal of the arbitration proceeding to determine the dispute regarding the termination of the project; b) an ad-interim injunction to prevent the D1 and their agents from calling or forfeiting the bond till the disposal of the present summon; and c) an ad-interim injunction to prevent D2 and their agents to make payment from Performance Bond. [13] The Plaintiff contended that D1 had wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff’s employment through a notice dated 08.12.2016, which the Plaintiff only received on 09.12.2016 at about 2:00pm. [14] In this notice, D1 also indicated that they will be calling on the Performance Bond. 6 Principles Whether the non-approval of the VO claim and the applications for EOT and the imposition of LAD by D1 made the conduct of D1 unconscionable in calling on the Performance Bond [15] The position of the law on restraining a call on a Performance Bond has been clarified and confirmed in the Federal Court case of Sumatec Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd v Malaysian Refining Company Sdn Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 1. It is now recognised that unconscionability is a ground for restraining a call on a Performance Bond. The Federal Court speaking through his Lordship Abdull Hamid Embong FCJ, endorsed the approach taken by the Court of Appeal as follows: “[17] The Court of Appeal used the following tests and principles in coming to its conclusion, in determining the issue at hand as found in the following passages from its judgment: (i) The principle concerning ‘unconscionability’ was initially propounded by Lord Denning in the case of Lloyds Bank v Bundy [1975] QB 326 where it was held that unconscionable transaction between parties may be set aside by the court of equity. This ‘unconscionable’ category is said to extend to all cases where unfair advantage has been gained by an 7 unconscientious use of power by a stronger party against a weaker (see also Halsbury’s Law of England, (3rd Ed), Vol 17 [1956] at p 682). (ii) On an application for relief against unconscionable conduct, the court looks to the conduct of the party attempting to enforce, or retain benefit of, a dealing with a person under a special disability in circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he should do so (see Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio and Another [1983] 46 ALR 402). (iii) In the Singapore High Court, Lai Kew Chai J in the case of Min Thai Holdings Pte Ltd v Suniable Pte Ltd & Anor [1999] 2 SLR 368 opined that ‘the concept of unconscionability involves unfairness, as distinct from dishonesty or fraud, or conduct so reprehensible or lacking in good faith that a court of conscience would either restrain the party or refuse to assist the party’. (iv) It is not possible to define ‘unconscionability’ other that to give some very broad indications such as lack of bona fides. What kind of situation would constitute ‘unconscionability’ would have to depend on the facts of each case. This is a question which the court has to 8 consider on each occasion where its jurisdiction is invoked. There is no pre-determined categorization (see Dauphin Offshore Engineering and Trading Pte Ltd v The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khadifa bin Zayed Al- Nahyan [2000] 1 SLR (R) 117; and Shanghai Electric Group Co Ltd v PT Merak Energi Indonesia [2010] 2 SLR 329) (v) Based on the above considerations, we are of the view that there is no simple formula that would enable the court to ascertain whether a party had acted unconscionably in making a call on an on-demand performance bond or bank guarantee. In the final analysis, whether or not ‘unconscionability’ has been made out is largely dependent on the facts or each case. In every case where ‘unconscionability’ is made out, there would always be an element of unfairness or some form of conduct which appears to be performed in bad faith. (vi) In Bocotra Construction Pte Ltd v AG [1995] 2 SLR (R) 262, the Singapore Court of Appeal, stated that ‘a higher degree of strictness applies, as the applicant will be required to establish a clear case of fraud or unconscionability in the interlocutory proceedings. It is clear that mere allegations are insufficient’.” (emphasis added) 9 [16] In restraining a beneficiary from calling on a bond, the Court of Appeal in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Nam Fatt Construction Sdn Bhd [2011] 7 CLJ 442 held that the provisions of the underlying contract between the beneficiary and the applicant would be relevant to justifying a restrain on the call on the bond by the Defendant beneficiary: “[70] In dealing with an application for injunctive relief (as in the present case) the court must, first of all, differentiate or distinguish whether it is to restrain the beneficiary from making a call or demand on the performance bond; or to restrain the bank/issuer from making payment out of the performance bond to the beneficiary. If it is for the earlier one, the provisions of the underlying contract between the parties must be considered and cannot be disregarded...” (emphasis added) [17] With respect to the threshold test of a seriously arguable case, the Federal Court in Sumatec Engineering (supra) explained as follows: “[39] We are of the considered view that the 'seriously arguable and realistic inference' test as used by the learned judicial commissioner in Focal Asia is equally applicable to the extended exception of unconscionability. That test therefore needs to be applied to the relevant material facts before the court. The same 10 test which results in a ‘strong prima facie case’ was utilized by the Court of Appeal at the intermediate appeal stage. And the Court of Appeal said this of the required burden now rested on the shoulder of Sumatec: As in the case of fraud, to establish ‘unconscionability’ there must be placed before the court manifest or strong evidence of some degree in respect of the alleged unconscionable conduct complained of, not a bare assertion. Hence, the respondent has to satisfy the threshold of a seriously arguable case that the only realistic inference is the existence of ‘unconscionability’ which would basically mean establishing a strong prima facie case. In other words, the respondent has to place sufficient evidence before the court so as to enable the court to be satisfied, not necessarily beyond reasonable doubt, that a case of ‘unconscionability’ being committed by the beneficiary (the appellant) has been established to an extent sufficient for the court to be minded to order injunction sought. This additional ground of ‘unconscionability’ should only be allowed with circumspect where events or conduct are of such degree such as to prick the 11 conscience of a reasonable and sensible man.” (emphasis added) [18] What is the test to be applied with respect to showing an unconscionable conduct on the part of the beneficiary of the bond? The Court of Appeal case in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd v Nam Fatt Construction Sdn Bhd [2011] 7 CLJ 442 explained the test as follows as summarised in the headnotes: “(6) In order to rely on the ground of ‘unconscionable conduct’ to restrain an abusive call on a performance bond the plaintiff must show manifest or strong evidence of some degree of the conduct complained of; not a bare statement. The evidence need not necessarily be beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances or conduct must be of such degree as to prick the conscience of a reasonable and sensible man.” (emphasis added) [19] Therefore the test to be applied may be summarised as follows: 1. The applicant must be able to satisfy the court that he has a “seriously arguable case that the only realistic inference is that unconscionability has been made out"; 12 2. The applicant has to place manifest or strong prima facie case of the alleged unconscionable conduct and not a bare assertion. [20] As for the meaning of “unconscionability”, the Court of Appeal in Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd (supra) broadly indicated that unconscionability is tantamount to actions that lack bona fides where there are an element of unfairness or some form of conduct which appears to be performed in bad faith as follows: “[47] It is not possible to define “unconscionability” other than to give some very broad indications such as lack of bona fides. What kind of situation would constitute “unconscionable conduct” would have to depend on the facts of each case. This is a question which the court has to consider on each occasion where its jurisdiction is invoked. There is no pre-determined categorization (see: Dauphin Offshore Engineering and Trading Pte. Ltd. v. The Private Office of HRH Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa bin Zayed Al- Nahyan [2000] 1 SLR (R) 117; and Shanghai Electric Group Co Ltd v. PT Merak Energi Indonesia & Anor [2010] 2 SLR 329). [48] Based on the above considerations, we are of the view that there is no simple formula that would enable a court to ascertain whether a party had acted unconscionably in making a call or demand on an “on demand” performance bond. In the final 13 analysis, whether or not “unconscionability” has been made out is largely dependent on the facts of each case. In every case where “unconscionability” is made out, there would always be an element of unfairness or some form of conduct which appears to be performed in bad faith.” (emphasis added) [21] Having set out the position of the law, I shall now consider if the conduct of D1 in the circumstances of the case may be said to be unconscionable to justify the injunction prayed for. [22] The Plaintiff argued that D1 themselves had stated in Exhibit MZ-8 inter alia that: “1.2 Beliau (Tuan Pengerusi – En. Mat Rosly Mat Daud [Ketua Pen. Pengarah Kanan, CPUM]) juga memaklumkan bahawa jika terdapat sebarang penambahan ‘floor area’ lanjutan daripada SOA yang telah ditetapkan maka pihak Kontraktor adalah layak untuk menuntut ‘variation order’ (VO). Jika rekabentuk yang dikeluarkan oleh pihak Kontraktor kurang daripada yang telah disyorkan di dalam dokumen brief project, maka ‘v.o omittion diisu bagi pengurangan kerja berkenaan.” (emphasis added) 14 [23] On 02.11.2012, the Plaintiff issued the notice that they will be submitting a claim on the expansion of building office space and that the notice there was based on an estimation only. The Plaintiff further argued that it was unconscionable for D1 to reject the VO only on 10.01.2014. [24] That is not quite correct. As pointed out by D1, they had issued a letter dated 03.01.2013 requesting the Plaintiff to submit further supporting documents for the said VO claim. The Plaintiff replied on 26.02.2013. Thereafter D1 had their meetings with respect to the VO claims on 06.06.2013 and 11.06.2013. On 16.12.2013 the Plaintiff resubmitted their VO claims and D1 asked for additional documents on 23.12.2013. D1 stated that it was after a few requests for supporting documents to no avail that they rejected the Plaintiff's VO on 16.01.2014. [25] Briefly, D1 had given the following reasons for rejecting the VO as stated: “2. Merujuk sesi mesyuarat tersebut, ahli mesyuarat bersetuju menolak permohonan tuan bagi perkara di atas untuk kerja tambahan pembesaran ruang-ruang bangunan seperti berikut: 15 a. Sekolah Sistem b. Stor Matra c. Komplek Bomba d. Markas Pangkalan Udara e. Wisma Bintara f. Wisma Perwira g. Wisma Ahli Udara 3. Pejabat ini menolak permohonan tuan bagi perkara di atas, kerana tiada bukti yang jelas dan nyata yang menyatakan terdapat arahan perubahan kerja diberikan.” (emphasis added) [26] I do not see the above reasons given for rejecting the VO as being contradictory to D1's earlier assurance or statement that the Plaintiff would be entitled to claim for additional floor space. Surely it must be additional floor space as instructed in writing by D1 or at least there must be some minutes of meetings referring to such an instruction. [27] In D1's letter of 03.01.2013 in Exhibit LSF 2, D1 had asked for letter of instruction/ minutes of meetings from TUDM stating the need for the additional floor/room space. They had also asked for breakdown cost/BQ for the each additional item as well as the submission of pre-bid 16 drawings and construction drawings that had been approved to show clearly the locations for the additional floor space. [28] D1's stand was that there was no instruction for VO for the expansion of the building office space and the only expansion of office space was for the hangar which was approved on 31.03.2014 (APK 6). [29] At any rate this is a contractual dispute that would have to proceed to arbitration. Such a dispute is not uncommon in the construction industry with respect to whether a VO was approved especially when there were no supporting documents that instructions had come in writing from D1. It cannot be elevated to an unconscionable conduct. [30] I therefore can see the logic of D1's reply on the application for the corresponding EOT which the Plaintiff took umbrage with as follows: “2. Lanjutan daripada keputusan Mesyuarat Membincangkan Pertambahan Kerja dan Lanjutan Masa No. 2 (Bahagian ii) & No. 3 (Bahagian ii) bertarikh 01 April 2014 yang telah diadakan di bilik mesyuarat utama CPUM, permohonan tuan bagi lanjutan masa No. 2 (Bahagian ii) dan No. 3 (Bahagian ii) masih belum dapat dipertimbangkan kerana asas permohonan berkaitan “isu pertambahan ruang 17 bangunan masih belum diluluskan sebagai pertambahan kerja”. (emphasis added) [31] The Plaintiff said that D1 was still undecided on the application of EOT arising out of the VO claim when in reality what D1 was saying was that the EOT application could not be considered as the "issue of additional building space has not been approved as additional works”. There is thus no basis for stating that D1’s rejection of the Plaintiff’s VO claim through their letter dated 16.01.2014 had been premature. [32] D1 took the stand that since no VO was approved for the expansion of the building office space other than the hangar office, there was no need for any EOT to be given except for the expansion of the hangar office for which an EOT of 71 days for EOT Number 1 was given for section (i). [33] As for EOT Number 3 even though the Plaintiff only applied for 90 days, D1 had more than fairly and justly given 173 days to the Plaintiff for EOT Number 3 section (i). [34] As for section (ii) of the Project, D1 approved 170 days for EOT Number 1. D1 contended that they had more than acted fairly, justly and in good faith and it is the Plaintiff who had failed to complete the Works even after 3 EOTs had been given. 18 [35] A Certificate of Non-Completion was issued in January 2014 and it was only after its issuance that LAD was imposed. The amount of LAD was: (i) for section (i); RM11,388.00 per day; and (ii) for section (ii); RM8,648.00 per day. [36] This makes it approximately RM601,080.00 per month. [37] According to the Plaintiff the net effect of the above was severely detrimental on them because then for the Plaintiff to obtain any net positive amount from D1 (through the progress claims), the value of the Plaintiff’s progressive claims per month had to exceed RM601,080.00. [38] According to D1, they continued to make payment to the Plaintiff for work done and the Plaintiff only ceased to receive payment for work done after December 2014 after the value of work done was less than the LAD as can be seen in the contract ledger exhibited as Exhibit LSF 7. [39] The Plaintiff argued that D1 had started to impose LAD since January 2014 and that it is unconscionable for D1 to do so and to now call upon the Performance Bond as on 12.10.2016 (some 2 years and 9 months later since rejecting the VO for expansion of office space on 19 10.04.2014), they had approved the VO albeit with a significantly lesser sum. [40] However D1's approval of the VO claim on 12.10.2016 was not under additional works but under a streamlining of contract price or in its original language "satu Pelarasan Harga Kontrak (PHK)" and not under a VO. As it was not a VO there was no justification for an EOT by D1. [41] The Plaintiff's unhappiness with the amount allowed of RM3,409,778.16 is a contractual dispute that has to be sorted out at arbitration. There is nothing unconscionable on a dispute of this nature. However the Plaintiff said that D1 has contradicted themselves because in the other “pelarasan harga kontrak”, they had granted the appropriate EOT. For example, when the change from the “intermediate column” in the hangar design to the “free column” (ie. PHK 2), an EOT of 173 days was granted. A closer look at the reasons given for the EOT was that there was a change of design of the hangar from "intermediate column" to "column free" design as can be seen in Exhibit LSF 3. [42] The Plaintiff also stated in their affidavit that there were various VOs that had not been approved under the Contract. Again this is issue under the Contract which ought to be determined in the arbitration. As a matter of fact D1 had approved and paid 6 VOs under the said Project. 20 [43] D1 had granted 3 EOTs for section (i) of the Project and an extension for time for section (ii) of the Project. The new completion date for section (i) was 22.05.2014 and section (ii) on 31.01.2014. Since the Plaintiff had failed to complete the Project on the completion date, D1 had imposed LAD of RM11,388.00 a day for section (i) and section (ii) a sum of RM8,648.00 a day in accordance with the terms of the Contract. There is no evidence adduced to show a prima facie case of unconscionable conduct on the part of D1. [44] The calculation of the LAD as at 11.10.2016 appearing at Exhibit LSF 7 is as follows: LAD section (i) @ RM11,388.00 X 873 days = RM 9,941,724.00 LAD section (ii) @ RM 8,648.00 X 984 days = RM 8,509,632.00 RM18,451,356.00 [45] Even assuming that the Plaintiff is entitled to the 365 days asked for in the EOT application, the Plaintiff could only deduct RM3,156,520.00 calculated as follows: (RM8,648.00 X 365 days) and leaving still a balance sum due of RM15,294,836.00 to D1 for the rest of the LAD. [46] D1 had highlighted that they cannot be blamed for the Plaintiff's failure to complete the Works. Indeed the Plaintiff had received as at 21 04.12.2014 the sum of RM103,454,900.00 for works done throughout the contract period out of the original contract sum of RM108,888,999.00. See a summary of the claims and payments in Exhibit LSF 7. [47] It cannot be seriously denied that the Plaintiff's works on the Project had come to a standstill since May 2015. See the report at Exhibit LSF 8. At that time the Plaintiff had completed up to 97% for section (i) and 93.09% for section (ii) of the Project. There was thus no further progress on the Works till the date of termination on 08.12.2016. [48] D1 had issued the Notice for the Purpose of termination on 17.11.2016 directing the Plaintiff to complete work within 14 days. However the Plaintiff failed to complete the work within that duration. As a consequence, D1 had issued the termination notice on 08.12.2016. The ground for the termination is the Plaintiff had failed to carry out work regularly and diligently. [49] Whether or not such a termination is lawful or unlawful is to be thrashed out in the arbitration. Surely D1 cannot be expected to wait forever for the completion of the balance 3% for section (i) and the balance 6.91% for section (ii) of the Works. I cannot see how the termination of the Contract for failure to proceed regularly and diligently 22 with the Works can be said to be unconscionable after the complete standstill in the Works from May 2015 till termination on 08.12.2016. [50] I am satisfied that Clause 10.4 of the Contract clearly provides that D1 is entitled to call the Bond when the Plaintiff fails to carry out their obligation under the Contract. Clause 10.7 of the Contract also allows D1 to forfeit the Bond in the event the Contract is terminated due to failure of the Plaintiff to carry out works regularly and diligently as specified under the Contract. [51] Like most terminations of construction contracts, there will be the ensuing arbitration or litigation. Invariably in a construction dispute arising out of termination of the contract, a claim is often met with a counterclaim. There is the all too familiar tune being played of one party contending the termination is lawful and the other claiming that it is not. [52] However, in the absence of unconscionable conduct on the part of the beneficiary of the Bond, this Court would not restrain such a call for to do so would denude a Performance Bond of its efficaciousness and the raison d'être of insisting on the Performance Bond as part of the terms of the Contract to begin with and more so when, as here, D1 had to make an advance of RM10 million for the commencement of the Works. 23 [53] It would be apposite to refer to a summary of the law with respect to restraining a call on a bond as distilled by Judge Thornton QC in the UK TCC in TTI Team Telecom International Ltd and Another v Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 914, at p. 930-931 as follows: "[46] In the light of these authorities, the law may be summarised in this way. (1) A third party seeking to restrain a beneficiary from calling a bond must initially show that such an application is supporting an underlying entitlement or claim based on a breach by the beneficiary of the underlying contract or on some other cause of action or basis for injunctive relief such as fraud, restitution or a breach of faith. (2) When a third party seeks to restrain a beneficiary from calling a bond, or from receiving the product of a call, the court's starting point is that a call will ordinarily only be restrained where there has been fraud in setting up or calling the bond or where there is a lack of a breach of faith by the beneficiary in threatening a call. (3) The basis for a contention of a breach of faith must be established by clear evidence even for the purposes of 24 interim relief. A breach of faith can arise in such situations as: a failure by the beneficiary to provide an essential element of the underlying contract on which the bond depends; a misuse by the beneficiary of the guarantee by failing to act in accordance with the purpose for which it was given; a total failure of consideration in the underlying contract; a threatened call by the beneficiary for an unconscionable ulterior motive; or a lack of an honest or bona fide belief by the beneficiary that the circumstances, such as poor performance, against which a performance bond had been provided, actually exist. (4) In addition, where it appears that the call would be a nullity, a court will intervene to restrain that invalid call. Examples are where a condition precedent to a call has not yet been fulfilled; where the bond is a 'see to it' bond necessitating prior proof of loss by the beneficiary or poor performance by the third party which has not yet been established; or where the demand or the supporting documents show that the demand does not conform to the requirements imposed by the bond for a valid demand. (5) Otherwise, a threatened call will not be restrained. In particular an allegedly incorrect calling of a performance bond will not be restrained merely because the factual basis of the call 25 arising out of the underlying contract is disputed. Thus disputes as to whether a breach of contract, a determination of a contract for cause, a repudiation of a contract or the incurring of loss have occurred, where these are events covered by the performance guarantee, will not be allowed to found an application to restrain a call unless these disputes reveal a breach of faith by the beneficiary. Any consequent payment under the bond to the beneficiary which over- compensates the beneficiary may be recouped in the 'accounting' exercise that the third party may claim in subsequent litigation against the beneficiary under the underlying contract. (6) If interim relief is being sought, a court will not intervene unless a third party has a real prospect of succeeding in both the entitlement to restrain the call and in its underlying claim which ought to be tried out before a call is made. This conforms to the overriding objective of proportionality required by the CPR. (7) Where these principles point to the grant of interim injunctive relief, it will also be necessary to consider and apply the balance of convenience." (emphasis added) 26 [54] The Performance Bond will be expiring on 31.08.2017 and D1 had called for the Bond on 13.12.2016. The call on the on-demand Performance Bond on account of the failure of the Plaintiff to complete the Works cannot be unconscionable in the circumstances of the case. Whether the Balance of Convenience lies in favour of the Government in the circumstances of the case [55] This is a case where the balance of convenience would lie in favour of D1. In the event that the Plaintiff should be proved right at the arbitration, there is no issue of the Government of Malaysia as D1 to pay damages to the Plaintiff. Conversely in the event that the Plaintiff is proved wrong, the Project which may be presumed to be a Project in the interest of the nation, would have been delayed further as the Government would have to seek further allocation to complete the Project if the Performance Bond could not be forfeited. [56] Indeed the Project is for the construction for a military helicopter infrastructure in TUDM, Kuantan. Learned SFC submitted that this project has the national interest of enhancing the country’s security. This is a case where the Government had paid almost RM100 million for the Project. The balance work that needs to be done is estimated about RM13.1 million. Therefore the sum of RM5,444,449.95 from the Performance Bond will go towards the completion of the Project. 27 [57] As the Plaintiff did not proceed with any further works from May 2015 to date of termination of the Contract in December 2016, one can surmise, as it is admitted by the Plaintiff itself, that they had cash flow problem arising by what they said is the unjustifiable dismissal of their VO claim and an imposition of a LAD claim on them. If the Government of Malaysia should succeed at the end of the day in the arbitration, there is no certainty that they would be able to recover from the Plaintiff the damages arising out of the LAD and the additional costs incurred in completing the unfinished Works. The LAD already amounted to RM 18,451,356.00 not counting the amount advanced of RM10,000.000.00. [58] In Transfield Projects (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor v Malaysian Airlines Systems Bhd [2000] 7 MLJ 583, it was summarized in the headnotes at p. 583 as follows: “(3) The court do not think an injunction should be granted to restrain the defendant, who now has the proceeds of the performance bond, to set it aside in an account on trust pending arbitration. There is no existence of any obligation on the part of the defendant to do so. To grant such an injunction as prayed for would allow a departure from the contract to which the parties have committed themselves. There is clearly no subsisting obligation on the defendant who has already received the monies 28 as the result of the call made on the performance bond to set it aside and not to appropriate it. Clause 37(c) provides the defendant or the superintending officer on its behalf may utilize and make payments out of or deductions from the said performance bond, i.e. they may have recourse thereto for payments. The court is now asked to grant an injunction when there is clearly no obligation imposed on the defendant anywhere in the contract to set the proceeds as a separate trust fund to be kept until the outcome of the arbitration (see pp 596H-I, 597A-B)” [59] I agree with the learned SFC that D1's officer in demanding for the Performance Bond under the contract is only performing their public duty as provided under the terms of the Contract. Furthermore the money for the Project is from the public coffer. Such money should be returned to the Government to enable the Government to complete the Project and to perform other duties. [60] I would follow the approach taken by learned brother George Varghese JC (later JCA) in Tidalmarine Engineering Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia (Jabatan Kerja Raya Malaysia Cawangan Terengganu) [2011] 2 MLJ 400 at 401 where it is summarized in the headnotes as follows: 29 “[2] On the totality of evidence, a case on ‘unconscionability’ in respect of the demand issued by the defendant or of the conduct of the defendant had not been made out for the court to make any restraining order as applied for by the plaintiff. Whether the termination by the defendant was proper or wrongful was for another forum to determine. There was nothing to indicate ‘unconscionability’ on the part of the defendant in taking the contractual action they were entitled to as was done here (see paras 27 & 29(b). (3) While there may be a case to allow interlocutory injunctions against the government in appropriate cases, it should be restricted to only where it is obvious and clear that the government’s discharge of public duties are not interfered with in any way. A restraining order as applied for here, if issued, will interfere with the ‘public duty’ or ‘public element’ of the defendant’s role and obligations on the road project (see paras 36-37). [61] I would further endorse the sentiments expressed at p. 412, that balance of convenience is to be interpreted more widely in cases where "public duty" of the Government and "public element" of the project is concerned as observed by Justice George Varghese as follows: 30 "[32] The decisions of the Supreme Court in Lim Kit Siang v United Engineers (M) Bhd & Ors [1987] 2 CLJ 195 and the recent judgment of the Court of Appeal in Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Kuching Division & Ors v Kuching Waterfront Development Sdn Bhd [2009] 5 MLJ 607; [2009] 6 CLJ 751 are cited as authority for the position in law that the courts discretion to grant injunctions are limited statutorily and do not extend to granting injunctions against the government, regardless of whether the injunction sought is interim/interlocutory or permanent. [33] On the other hand, the decision of our Court of Appeal in Sabil Mulia (M) Sdn Bhd v Pengarah Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah & Ors [2005] 3 MLJ 325; [2005] 2 CLJ 122 and the dicta found in the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Kekatong Sdn Bhd v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd [2003] 3 MLJ 1; [2003] 3 CLJ 378 and of the High Court in Tengku Haji Jaafar & Anor v Government of the State of Pahang [1978] 2 MLJ 105 are relied on to argue that s 29 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 does not prohibit the grant of a temporary or interlocutory injunction against the government. [34] The plaintiff's arguments in this instant case was to the effect that a temporary injunction or interlocutory injunction should lie 31 against the government and in any case, that the subject matter in question in this case was not to interfere with the public duties of any department or of the government. Counsel for the plaintiff's argued that the contract in this case was akin to a 'private contract' and was not caught by the limitation in s 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 as it did not involve a 'public duty'. [35] The learned SFC’s submission, on the other hand, was that the road works project was for the benefit of the rakyat. The money secured by the bonds were to go towards the costs of completing the project now necessitated by the appointment of another contractor. In any case, the monies guaranteed by the advance payment bond was the refund of the balance of monies already advanced by the defendant to the plaintiff at the commencement of the contract. The element of ‘pubic duty’ was therefore, it was argued – clearly discernable here as the beneficiaries of the road project was the general public. The learned SFC for the defendant also laid stress on the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Smith and others v Inner London Education Authority [1978] 1 All ER 411 that in any event where the defendant is a public authority performing duties to the public, one must look at the balance of convenience more widely and take into account 32 the interest of the public in general to whom the duties are owed. [36] While there may be a case to allow interlocutory injunctions against the government in appropriate cases on the rationale forcefully stated in Sabil Mulia, Kekatong and Tengku Haji Jaafar's cases, I am inclined to restrict it to only where it is obvious and clear that the government's discharge of public duties are not interfered with in any way. [37] After giving due consideration to the arguments of the respective counsel whether or not a ‘public duty’ would be interfered with or not in this case I take the position and accordingly hold that a restraining order as applied for here, if issued, will interfere with the ‘public duty’ or ‘public element’ of the defendant’s role and obligations on the road project. [38] My conclusion therefore is that on all counts, the plaintiff failed in this application. I therefore dismissed encl 3 with costs and dissolved the ad interim order issued by me on 31 May 2010.” (emphasis added) [62] I agree with the learned SFC that public interest is always a relevant consideration in the granting of specific relief. If the Government 33 is prevented from calling of the Performance Bond and have to wait till the completion of the arbitration proceedings, the Bond would have expired. When the bond has expired, D1 would be prevented from demanding the sum secured by the said Bond. [63] The public interest element here would lean heavily in favour of the Government. [64] Besides this is a matter where damages would be more than an adequate remedy considering that it is the Government of Malaysia in D1 that has to make the payment out to the Plaintiff in the event that the call is held to have been unlawfully made. [65] In Ganad Media Sdn Bhd v Dato’ Bandar Kuala Lumpur (No 2) [2002] 6 CLJ 6, Abdul Malik Ishak J (later JCA) decided at p. 31 as follows: “Once damages are the proper remedy, an injunction will not be issued. In this connection, the following germane passages appearing in Saw Seng Kee’s case (supra – particularly at p. 81 to p. 82) are certainly useful to remember: This brings me to the next ground on which I dismissed their applications. ‘The very first principle of law,’ said Lindley L.J. 34 in London Blackwall Railway Co. Cross [1886] 31 Ch. D. 354, 369: ... is that prima facie you do not obtain an injunction to restrain actionable rights in which damages are the proper remedy. In the Cyanamid case, Lord Diplock made the same point at p. 408 B & C in the following terms: [T]he court should first consider whether, if the plaintiff were to succeed at the trial in establishing its right to a permanent injunction, he would be adequately compensated by an award of damages for the loss he would have sustained as a result of the defendants continuing to do what was sought to be enjoined between the time of the application and the time of the trial. If damages ... would be adequate remedy and the defendant would be in a financial position to pay them, no interlocutory injunction should normally be granted, however strong the plaintiff’s claim appeared to be at that stage. 35 In these circumstances, as I had no doubt as to adequacy of the plaintiffs’ remedy lying in damages should they succeed in their claims at the final hearing, there was no need for me to consider the further question of the balance of convenience (see the Cyanamid case at p. 408). But, had it been necessary to do so, then I was satisfied that the balance of convenience favoured the Urban Development Authority rather than the plaintiffs. [66] Further at p. 32 of the Ganad Media's case (supra): "Lord Diplock in the American Cyanamid case (supra) said at p. 511 that: ... where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available to either party or to both, that the question of balance of convenience arises. To determine the balance of convenience or the “balance of justice” as was said by Sir John Donaldson MR in Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [1984] 2 All ER 408 at p. 413g, one must examine all the relevant facts and give appropriate weight to it accordingly. The facts would certainly vary from case to case. 36 In the present case, the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favour of the defendant who was merely performing a duty under the statute. It was indeed a statutory duty ...” (emphasis added) Pronouncement [67] For all the reasons given above I had dismissed the application against both D1 and D2 with costs of RM5,000.00 for D1 as suggested by the SFC and as for D2 the costs of RM2,000.00. [68] The Plaintiff learned counsel had asked for a temporary stay pending their application for an Erinford injunction. D1 objected to the said application for a temporary stay. [69] I had granted a temporary stay until the disposal of the Erinford injunction provided that the notice of appeal and the application is filed within 1 week from date of the decision i.e. until 14.02.2017. Dated: 19 May 2017. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur 37 For the Plaintiff : James Ding (Messrs SS Ng & Lim) For the 1st Defendant : Ahmad Hanir (Senior Federal Counsel– AG’s Chambers) For the 2nd Defendant : Dazz Narayanan and Al Muazzim (Messrs Azam Lim & Pang) Date of Decision : 7 February 2017 [subject to minor editorial corrections and amendments]

Tika 2.6.0

22-242-03/2016

PLAINTIF 1. MOHD FOWZI BIN ABDUL HAMID (NO. K/P: 581112-10-6925) 2. ROSLAN BIN MAULUD (NO. K/P: 500618-10-5439) DEFENDAN 1. ARAS PROPERTIES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 610583-V) 2. MADARUDDIN BIN MASARI (NO. K/P: 580418-10-6245)

18/05/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=261f2cb3-d76e-44f3-b111-75642c3a5f81&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: 24-242-03/2016 Dalam Perkara Hartanah yang berada di bahawa Hakmilik GM 2243, Lot 2225, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan; dan Hartanah yang berada di bawah Hakmilik GM2244, Lot 2227, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan; Dan Dalam Perkara Kaveat Persendirian yang didaftarkan atas Hartanah GM 2243 di atas pada 23.11.2015 melalui nombor perserahan 5880/2015; dan Kaveat Persendirian yang didaftarkan atas hartanah GM 2244 di atas pada 23.11.2015 melalui nombor perserahan 5881/2015; Dan 2 Dalam perkara Seksyen 327 dan Seksyen 329 (1) Kanun Tanah Negara 1965; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 5 dan Aturan 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. MOHD FOWZI BIN ABDUL HAMID (NO. K/P: 581112-10-6925) 2. ROSLAN BIN MAULUD (NO. K/P: 500618-10-5439) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. ARAS PROPERTIES SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 610583-V) 2. MADARUDDIN BIN MASARI (NO. K/P: 580418-10-6245) … DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN Kandungan 1 3 A. PENGENALAN [1] Saman Pemula di Kandungan 1 ini adalah permohonan Plaintif- Plaintif menurut seksyen 327 dan seksyen 329(1) Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) untuk mendapatkan daripada Mahkamah ini perintah- perintah antara lain seperti berikut: i. Kaveat persendirian yang didaftarkan di atas hartanah yang berada di bawah Hakmilik GM 2243, Lot 2225, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (hartanah GM 2243, Lot 2225) pada 23.11.2015 melalui nombor perserahan 5880/2015 adalah dibatalkan; dan ii. Kaveat persendirian yang didaftarkan di atas hartanah yang berada di bawah Hakmilik GM 2244, Lot 2227, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (hartanah GM 2244, Lot 2227) pada 23.11.2015 melalui nombor perserahan 5881/2015 adalah dibatalkan; dan 4 [2] Hartanah GM 2243, Lot 2225 dan hartanah GM 2244, Lot 2227 selepas ini akan kadang kala dirujuk sebagai "hartanah-hartanah tersebut". B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [3] Latar belakang kes yang membawa permohonan ini difailkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 3.1 Plaintif Pertama (Mohd Fowzi bin Abdul Hamid K/P: 581112-10- 6925) dan Plaintif Kedua (Roslan bin Maulud K/P: 500618-10- 5439) adalah tuanpunya-tuanpunya atau pemilik-pemilik berdaftar hartanah-hartanah tersebut yang masing-masing memegang setengah (1/2) bahagian. 3.2 Plaintif Pertama telah diberi kuasa untuk mengikrarkan afidavit- afidavit-afidavit ini bagi pihak Plaintif Kedua. 3.3 Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua kadang kalanya juga akan dirujuk sebagai “kedua-dua Plaintif”. 5 3.4 Berdasarkan geran hakmilik hartanah-hartanah tersebut (Geran hakmilik hartanah-hartanah di "Eksibit MF-l", Kandungan 2), hartanah-hartanah tersebut telah dipindah milik kepada nama kedua-dua Plaintif oleh sebuah syarikat bernama Aras Properties Sdn Bhd (Defendan Pertama). Pindahmilik tersebut telah dilaksanakan pada 10.1.2013 melalui Perserahan No: 13412013 (bagi hartanah GM 2243, Lot 2225 ) dan Perserahan No: 135/2013 (bagi hartanah Hakmilik GM 2244,Lot 2227). 3.5 Pada tahun 2014, hartanah-hartanah tersebut telah terlibat di dalam Pelan Pengambilan Balik Tanah Di Bawah Seksyen 8, Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 @ Daerah Hulu Langat) bagi tujuan pembinaan lebuhraya East Klang Valley Expressway (EKVE). Cadangan Pengambilan Tanah untuk hartanah- hartanah tersebut telahpun didaftarkan oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri pada 04.03.2014 melalui Perserahan No.98/2014 (Eksibit “MF-2” Kandungan 2). 3.6 Prosiding perbicaraan untuk Cadangan Pengambilan hartanah hartanah tersebut telah dijalankan oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri 6 pada 02.09.2015 melalui prosiding Pengambilan No: 50/2015 (Warta Kerajaan No.43I0/07.11.2013) untuk hartanah GM 2243, Lot 2225, Mukim Hulu dan 49/2015 (Warta Kerajaan No.43I0/07.11.2013) untuk hartanah bawah GM 2244, Lot 2227. (Salinan Borang H untuk Hartanah-hartanah tersebut "Eksibit MF-3 ", Kandungan 2). 3.7 Di dalam prosiding pengambilan hartanah-hartanah tersebut Pihak Berkuasa Negeri telahpun mengawadkan wang pampasan berjumlah RM 2,741,108.00 untuk hartanah GM 2243, Lot 2225, manakala jumlah pampasan bagi hartanah GM 2244, Lot 2227 adalah RM 2,302,579.00.(Jadual dalam Eksibit MF-3, Kandungan 2) 3.8 Namun, pada 23.11.2015 Defendan Pertama telah memasukkan kaveat-kaveat persendirian kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut) ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut yang telah didaftarkan melalui perserahan nombor 5880/2015 dan 5881/2015. 7 3.9 Permohonan untuk memasukkan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut telah disokong oleh Surat Akuan Pengarah Defendan Kedua bernama Madaruddin bin Masari, No. KP: 580418-10- 6245). 3.10 Akibat daripada kewujudan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut, wang pampasan yang sepatutnya diterima oleh kedua-dua Plaintif telah ditahan oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri, Bahagian Pengambilan Tanah, Negeri Selangor. 3.11 Sebagai pemilik-pemilik berdaftar dan benefisial ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut, kedua-dua Plaintif mendakwa mereka adalah pihak-pihak yang terkilan atas kewujudan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut dan dengan yang demikian telah mengarahkan peguamcara mereka (Tetuan Risma & Idris) untuk memfailkan Kandungan 1 bagi mendapatkan perintah untuk membatalkan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut yang telah bagi membolehkan bayaran pampasan yang diterima daripada Pihak Berkuasa Negeri akibat 8 pengambilan balik hartanah-hartanah tersebut dibayar kepada kedua-dua Plaintif. 3.12 Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Pertama kadang kalanya akan dirujuk sebagai Defendan. C. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG [4] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat adalah jelas. Di dalam sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Mahkamah hendaklah menentu dan mempertimbangkan persoalan-persoalan berikut: i. samada pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. ii. samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan. 9 iii. samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan. iv. samada terdapat keadaan istimewa di pihak pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah. [5] Di dalam perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Majlis Privy di dalam kes Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 telah memutuskan berikut: “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.” 10 [6] Di dalam kes Kho Ah Soon V Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah sekali lagi menekankan berkenaan prinsip undang-undang di dalam pembatalan kaveat di mana Peh Swee Chin, HMP telah menyatakan di muka surat 184 seperti berikut: “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated by Lord Diplock, the serious question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. [7] Di dalam perkara ini juga, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719 telah menggariskan ujian-ujian yang harus digunapakai di dalam menentukan dan menimbangkan sesuatu permohonan untuk 11 membatalkan kaveat di mana mukasurat 724, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan berikut: “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary one. At first stage, the court will examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat to see whether they show a caveatable interest. Once the court is satisfied that the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim disclosed a serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the court must decide where the balance of convenience” [8] Di dalam kes Institut Teknologi Federal Sdn Bhd. v IIUM Education Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2008] 1 CLJ 745 Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan antara-lain bahawa: [27]…it is settled that caveatable interest must be definite right relating to land and capable of enforcement and a caveator must be in a position to institute a suit for a specific performance of claim…” 12 [9] Manakala di dalam kes Hj Md Radzi Ismail v Mesti Unggul Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 CLJ 208, Mahkamah Rayuan telah yang menegaskan seperti berikut: “[17] The next issue is whether there is a serious question meriting a trial. On the facts averred by both the appellant and the respondent in their respective affidavits in this case we have no hesitation to conclude that there is. D. TENTANGAN DEFENDAN [10] Defendan Pertama telah mempertahankan dengan kerasnya kaveat- kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkinya dan menegaskan bahawa Defendan mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat 'caveatable interest' ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut. [11] Di dalam Borang 19B (Permohonan Untuk Memasukkan Kaveat Persendirain dan Surat Akuan Berkanun yang menyokong permohanan kemasukan kaveat, alasan-alasan Defendan Pertama memasukkan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut telah dinyatakan seperti berikut: 13 2. Alasan-alasan tuntutan saya ke atas *tanah/kepentingan itu ialah – 1. Pihak syarikat tiada niat dan tidak akan berniat untuk menjual mana-mana hartanah milik syarikat kepada sesiapa pun termasuk penama-penama yang terbaru. (Lot 2225, GM 2243). 2. Pihak syarikat tidak langsung tahu menahu tentang pindah milik telah berlaku. 3. Tidak ada kelulusan dari Pengarah-Pengarah Syarikat untuk berbuat demikian dan pihak syarikat juga tidak pernah mengeluarkan resolusi untuk menjual mana-mana hartanah syarikat (resolusi tidak wujud). 4. Pihak syarikat tidak pernah melantik atau mewakilkan individu tertentu dari pengarah-pengarah yang ada untuk menjalankan urusan penting seperti penjualan aset/hartanah. 5. Tiada cop mohor atau meterai syarikat “ARAS PROPERTIES SDN BHD” di dokumen pemindahan hak milik. 6. Kedua-dua abang saya yang bernama Shaharudin bin Mohd Sharif dan Naharudin bin Mhd Shariff yang juga selaku pengarah syarikat yang menandatangani surat permindahan tersebut 14 adalah pesakit kencing manis yang kronik dan juga pesakit jantung. Di dalam keadaan yang uzur, mereka tidak berkeupayaan untuk berfikir dengan baik dan memahami butir/kandungan dokumen yang ditandatangani apatah lagi untuk membuat keputusan atas perkara yang penting sebegini. 7. Locus penama-penama tersebut telah tiada memandangkan hakmilik telah dipindahkan kepada Aras Properties Sdn Bhd awal lagi. [12] Di dalam membantah permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua telah memfailkan afidavit-afidavit berikut: i. Afidavit Jawapan Defendan-Defendan diikrarkan oleh Madaruddin Bin Masari pada 22.04.2016. ii. Afidavit Sokongan Defendan-Defendan untuk memfailkan Afidavit jawapan (2) diikrarkan oleh Madaruddin Bin Masari pada 21.06.2016. iii. Afidavit Jawapan (2) Defendan-Defendan diikrarkan oleh Madaruddin Bin Masari pada 21.06.2016. 15 [13] Afidavit-afidavit Defendan-Defendan telah diikrarkan oleh Defendan Kedua yang merupakan Pengarah Defendan Pertama. [14] Selepas daripada ini, Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua akan kadang kala dirujuk sebagai Defendan. [15] Defendan telah mempertahankan kaveat-kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkinya dengan membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut: i. Hakmilik kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut adalah dipertikaikan dengan kerasnya oleh waris- waris kadim (beneficiaries) yang sebenar-benarnya berhak ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut dan menegaskan bahawa adalah hakmilik kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut adalah suatu hakmilik yang boleh sangkal kerana transaksi pindah milik yang dilaksanakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif di Pejabat Tanah dan Daerah Ulu Langat Selangor Darul Ehsan telah diperolehi secara salah, tipu daya, salahnyata, konspirasi, frod, tidak 16 sah dan transaksi pindak milik tersebut telah dilaksanakan melalui instrument-instrumen yang tidak sah dan tidak teratur ii. kaveat-kaveat persendirian itu hendaklah dikekalkan kerana Defendan Pertama telah memfailkan tindakan sivil terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif ,dua orang waris kadim yang berhak kepada hartanah-hartanah tersebut (Naharuddin bin Mhd Sharif dan Shaharuddin Mohd Sharif) dan Zariati binti Muhamed (sebagai Peguambela & Peguamcara yang menjalankan amalan guaman di bawah nama, gaya & cara Tetuan Zariati & Co. [Peguambela & Peguamcara) di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Guaman No: BA-22NCVC- 428 - 07/2016 untuk mendapatkan relif-relif berbentuk deklarasi yang antara lain perintah mengisytiharkan bahawa transaksi pindah milik hartanah-hartanah tersebut oleh Defendan Pertama kepada kedua-dua Plaintif pada 10.1. 2013 adalah tidak sah dan terbatal. 17 E. SAMADA DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN MEMPUNYAI KEPENTINGAN BERKAVEAT KE ATAS HARTANAH TERSEBUT. Alasan i. Hakmilik kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah-hartanah ersebut adalah dipertikaikan dengan kerasnya oleh waris- waris kadim (beneficiaries) yang sebenar-benarnya berhak ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut dan menegskan bahawa adalah hakmilik kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut adalah suatu hakmilik yang boleh sangkal kerana transaksi pindah milik yang dilaksanakan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif di Pejabat Tanah dan Daerah Ulu Langat Selangor Darul Ehsan telah diperolehi secara salah, tipu daya, salahnyata, konspirasi, frod, tidak sah dan transaksi pindak milik tersebut telah dilaksanakan melalui instrument-instrumen yang tidak sah dan tidak teratur. [16] Di dalam kes ini walaupun kedua-dua Plaintif adalah tuanpunya- tuanpunya atau pemilik-pemilik berdaftar hartanah-hartanah tersebut sejak 10.1.2013, namun pemilikan atau keempunyaan mereka 18 berdua ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut adalah dipertikaikan dengan sekeras-kerasnya oleh waris-waris yang sebenarnya berhak ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut dengan dakwaan bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif sebenarnya tidak berhak langsung ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut kerana mereka berdua bukanlah waris- waris yang berhak terhadap hartanah-hartanah. [17] Defendan telah menegaskan bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif hanyalah cicit kepada tuanpunya/pemilik asal hartanah-hartnah tersebut dan dari segi keturunan dan undang-undang perwarisan harta pusaka Islam (hukum faraid), kedua-dua Plaintif adalah tidak termasuk langsung di dalam waris-waris yang berhak ke atas perwarisan pusaka tuanpunya asal hartanah-hartanah tersebut, Justeru itu, hakmilik kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap hartanah-hartanah tersebut didakwa sebagai suatu hakmilik yang boleh disangkal. [18] Bagi menyokong dakwaannya, Defendan di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya telah memperincikan secara komprehensif susur galur keturunan dan kaitan perwarisan serta urusan pentadbiran pusaka si Mati 2 berhubung hartanah-hartanah tersebut seperti berikut: 19 18.1 Pemilik asal hartanah-hartanah tersebut adalah seorang yang bernama Khatib Besar Bin Jainas @Rava Acheh @ Juacheh @ Khatib Besar @ Sultan Palembang (si Mati 1). Apabila si Mati 1 meninggal dunia, hartanah-hartanah tersebut telah diturunkan kepada anaknya bernama Mohamad Sarip @ Mohd Shariff @Masari @ Masri bin Khatib (Masri bin Khatib - si Mati 2). 18.2 Apabila Masri bin Khatib (si Mati 2) meninggal dunia, melalui Surat Kuasa Mentadbir (Permohonan Petisyen No: 31-201- 1996 Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam) estet / harta pusaka si Mati 2 termasuk hartanah-hartanah tersebut telah ditadbirkan oleh dua orang Pentadbir Bersama bernama Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (No. KP:410606-10-5221) dan Naharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (No. KP:470604-10-5599) (Geran Pentadbiran Surat Kuasa Mentadbir di Eksibit MM-1, Kandungan ….). 18.3 Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (si Mati 3) telah juga meninggal dunia pada 2.01.2016. (Sijil Kematian Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif - Eksibit MM-2) 20 18.4 Waris-waris kadim yang sebenarnya berhak ke atas harta pusaka si Mati 2 adalah seperti berikut: i. Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (Pentadbir Bersama - si Mati 3); ii. Nordinah Binti Mat Shahrip (No. l(P: 440502-10-5558); iii. Naharudin Bin Mhd Shariff (Pentadbir Bersama); iv. Salleh Bin Mamat (No. KP: 510314-11-5055); v. Nazaruddin Bin Mohd Shariff @ Masari (No. KP.560429- 10-5039); vi. Madaruddin Bin Masari (Defendan Kedua); vii. Rozidin Bin Masari (No. KP: 591017-10-5069) & viii. Noreharizan Binti Masari (No. KP: 630323-10-5728). 18.5 Waris-waris si Mati 2 kemudiannya telah bersepakat dan bersesama bersetuju untuk menubuhkan Defendan Pertama dengan tujuan antara lainnya memudahkan dan melancarkan urusan perolehan, pengurusan dan pentadbiran harta pusaka si Mati 2 dengan secara keseluruhannya. (Eksibit MM-3). 21 18.6 Kesemua waris-waris si Mati 2 kecuali Nordinah Binti Mat Shahrip adalah pengarah-pengarah dan pemegang saham- pemegang saham di dalam Defendan Pertama. 18.7 Berikutan daripada pembentukan Defendan Pertama tersebut dan selaras dengan satu Perintah Mahkamah bertarikn 22.03.2006 (Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Saman Pemula No: MT3-24-714-2004), Pentadbir Bersama telah memindah milik keseluruhan bahagian (1/1) hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan Pertama melalui Perserahan No: 112008 bertarikh pada 02.01.2008. 18.8 Pindah milik hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada nama Defendan Pertama dan bukan kepada nama-nama individu waris-waris si Mati 2 adalah dengan persetujuan kesemua waris si Mati 2 dan dengan tujuan untuk memudahkan segala urusan pentadbiran dan pengurusan hartanah - hartanah tersebut. 22 [19] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan bahawa apabila salah seorang waris-waris si Mati 2 bernama Nazaruddin telah dipanggil oleh pihak Jabatan Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Persekutuan (JKPTG) pada 20.04.2015 bagi tujuan perbincangan atas urusan pengambilan tanah oleh pihak Kerajaan ke atas hartanah - hartanah tersebut, Nazaruddin telah mendapat tahu bahawa tanpa pengetahuan Defendan Pertama, pada 10.1.2013 terdapat suatu urusan pindahmilik telah didaftarkan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat di mana catatan pindahmilik yang tertera di dalam caraian geran hakmilik menunjukkan bahawa hartanah-hartanah tersebut telah dipindah milik kepada kedua-dua Plaintif oleh Defendan Pertama. [20] Adalah menjadi tegasan Defendan bahawa bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif bukanlah waris kadim kepada susur galur si Mati 2 yang digalurkan dari susur keturunan si Mati 1. Menurut Defendan lagi kedua-dua Plaintif adalah generasi lapisan ketiga {moyang (si Mati 1), datuk (Kamin bin Katib), anak Kamin (Arina bt Kamin) dan Plaintf Pertama (anak Arina)}. 23 [21] Kamin Bin Khatib adalah juga anak lelaki kepada si Mati 1. Namun pertalian kedua-dua Plaintif dan si Mati 1 adalah moyang dan cicit. Kedua-dua Plaintif adalah anak kepada Arina Binti Kamin. Arina Bt Kamil telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 1999. Arina mempunyai dua adik-beradik seorang perempuan bernama Ramnah Binti Kamil (telah meninggal dunia) dan seorang lelaki bernama Alaldin Bin Kamil yang masih hidup sehingga kini. [22] Dari segi perwarisan harta pusaka, kedua-dua Plaintif berada di generasi cicit sahaja, maka berdasarkan undang-undang perwarisan menurut lslam (hukum faraid), saudara lelaki kepada Arina iaitu Alaldin mempunyai bahagian yang lebih berbanding dengan Arina. Di dalam keadaan ini, kedua-dua plaintif sebenarnya tidak boleh menjadi kepada waris-waris keturunan Kamin Bin Khatib apatah lagi bertindak bagi pihak mereka. [23] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan bahawa berdasarkan kepada Borang Pindah Milik 14A yang ditandatangani oleh kedua-dua Pentadbir Pusaka (Shaharudin dan Naharuddin) di mana kedua-dua mereka ini tidak lagi boleh bertindak sebagai Pentadbir Bersama ke 24 atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut kerana hartanah-hartanah tersebut telahpun dipindahmilik kepada Defendan Pertama sebuah syarikat [24] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan lagi bahawa pindah milik hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada kedua-dua Plaintif kononnya dari Defendan Pertama telah dilaksana dengan dengan penuh tipu daya, helah, salahnyata, frod, konspirasi, di samping instrumen-instrumen urusan pindak milik itu tersebut adalah sangat diragukan akan kesahihan dan keesahannya. Dakwaan-dakwaan yang dibangkitkan Defendan adalah bersandarkan kepada perkara-perkara berikut: a. Tidak ada bukti langsung tentang pembayaran harga balasan RM 180,000.00 bagi setiap hartanah oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepda Defendan Pertama seperti yang didakwa oleh kedua-dua Plaintif dan juga apa yang tertera di dalam Borang 14A bertarikh 9.10.2012. b. Defendan tidak pernah membuat sebarang urusan pindahmilik ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut dengan balasan sebanyak RM 180,000.00. 25 b. Rekod perakaunan syarikat Defendan Pertama dan rekod kewangan syarikat menunjukkan bahawa tidak ada menunjukkan transaksi yang berjumlah sebanyak RM 360,000.00 telah diterima oleh Defendan Pertama bagi penjualan hartanah-hartanah tersebut. c. Di dalam Borang 14A yang telah ditandatangani pada 9.10.2012 dan pindah milik telah dilaksanakan pada 10.1.2013, telah dinyatakan bahawa balasan pindah milik dilaksanankan kepada kedua-dua Plaintif oleh Defendan Pertama adalah RM180,000.00 bagi setiap hartanah. Sehingga kini kedua-dua Plaintif tidak dapat membuktikan kebenaran pembayaran wang RM360,000.00 kepada Defendan Pertama tetapi amat meragukan dan disangsikan, peguamcara yang mewakili kedua-dua Plaintif, Zariati binti Muhamed (Tetuan Zariati & Co.) pula telah mengesahkan bahawa Wang Balasan RM360,000.00 tersebut telah dibayar lama dahulu dan telah diselesaikan lama sebelum transaksi pindahmilik hartanah- hartanah dilaksanakan. Namun tidak dinyatakan pula bila 26 dibayar, kepada siapa dibayar dan apakah mod atau cara bayaran yang telah dibuat. Dakwaan peguamcara tersebut lebih menimbulkan syak yang sebenarnya telah berlaku penipuan, manipulasi dan konspirasi. d. Adalah menjadi tegasan Defendan bahawa tidak ada orang dengan akal yang waras yang akan memberikan / membayar wang sebanyak RM360,000.00 untuk urusan pindahmilik yang akan dijalankan pada masa hadapan yang tidak diketahui tarikh transaksi tersebut hendak dijalankan. e. Defendan Pertama tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa bersetuju melalui apa-apa resolusi atau surat notis mesyuarat dan persetujuan Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah untuk memindahmilikkan hartanah- hartanah tersebut kepada kedua- dua Plaintif. f. Pentadbir Bersama (Shaharuddin dan Naharuddin) hanyalah Pentadbir Bersama harta pusaka si Mati 2. Apabila hartanah- 27 hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada Defendan Pertama sebuah syarikat, kedua-dua mereka tidak lagi mempunyai kuasa / otoriti / locus bagi menandatangani Borang 14A sebagai Pentadbir. Maka, tandatangan yang diturunkan oleh mereka tersebut juga tidak membawa apa - apa kesan / implikasi undang undang. g. Shaharuddin dan Naharuddin tidak boleh bertindak secara bersendirian selaku Pentadbir Bersama ataupun Pengarah Syarikat atas kapasiti Pengarah Syarikat Defendan. Tiada resolusi yang diberikan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada mereka berdua untuk berbuat demikian. h. Defendan adalah sebuah syarikat sendirian berhad . Namun di di Borang 14A tiada cop mohor syarikat Defendan Pertama tertera di Borang 14A tersebut dan ini menunjukkan bahawa bahawa ianya dilakukan tanpa pengetahuan dan kebenaran Defendan Pertama. 28 [25] Adalah menjadi tegasan Defendan bahawa selepas mendapat tahu wujudnya transaksi pindahmilik kepada kedua-dua Plaintif, pemegang saham dan pengarah syarikat kemudiannya membuat laporan polis pada 22.5.2015, 22.10.2015 dan 26.10.2015 (Eksibit MM-5). [26] Kemudian daripada itu, atas fakta hartanah-hartanah syarikat tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada kedua-dua Plaintif dan kemasukkan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut, telah berlaku beberapa siri koresponden antara peguam Defendan (Tetuan Mohaji Hazury & Ismail) dan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif (Tetuan Risma & Idris) berkenaan hartanah-hartanah tersebut. Surat Tetuan Risma & Idris bertarikh 24.06.2015 [27] Melalui surat bertarikh 24.06.2015, Tetuan Risma & Idris (Tn. Risma) yang mewakili Plaintif Pertama yang dikatakan seorang waris dan cucu kepada Kamil bin Katib telah membangkitkan beberapa isu berkaitan harta pusaka yang termasuklah isu / pertikaian berkaitan Hartanah-Hartanah tersebut. Di perenggan 2 dan 4 surat itu berbunyi berikut: 29 2. Pihak kami selanjutnya difahamkan oleh anakguam kami tersebut bahawa telah berlaku pertikaian ke atas hartanah-hartanah yang diwarisi oleh Pihak Pertama dan Pihak Kedua di atas di mana atas sebab tidak berpuas hati dengan tindakan waris-waris Pihak Kedua, waris-waris daripada Pihak Pertama kemudiannya telah memasukkan Kaveat Persendirian ke atas Hartanah-Hartanah yang berada di bawah milikan anakguam kami dan abang beliau En. Roslan Maulud (No. K/P: 500618-10-5439) iaitu bagi Hartanah yang berada di bawah Hakmilik GM 2243, Lot 2225 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Lot 2225) dan GM 2244, Lot 2227 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Lot 2227) yang kedua-duanya berada di Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Negeri Selangor. 3. ….. 4. Pihak kami seterusnya difahamkan bahawa ketidakpuasan hati waris-waris Pihak Pertama dengan waris-waris Pihak Kedua berpunca apabila anakguam kami telah membuat Permohonan untuk membatalkan pemilikan Masri bin Katib ke atas Hartanah yang berada di bawah Hakmilik GM 2242, Lot 864 (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai Lot 864) daripada Pemilik Berdaftar kepada Pentadbir yang sah untuk Lot 864 tersebut. 30 Surat Tetuan Mohaji Hazury & Ismail bertarikh 9.9.2015 [28] Sebagai balasan kepada surat Tn Risma tersebut Tetuan Mohaji Hazury & Ismail (Tn Mohaji ) peguamcara Defendan Pertama melalui surat bertarikh 09.09.2015 telah mempersoalkan kapasiti Plaintif Pertama yang dikatakan mewakili waris Kamil bin Khatib. Peguam menegaskan bahawa Plaintif Pertama yang hanyalah cucu/cicit kepada Kamil bin Khatib tidak boleh bertindak bagi pihak waris - waris di sebelah Kamil bin Khatib (Kamil) untuk sebarang tujuan dan maksud berhubung hartanah-hartanah tersebut. Waris-waris Kamil mestilah bertindak sendiri ataupun terdapatnya Surat Kuasa Wakil yang memberikan kuasa kepada Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua untuk mewaklil waris Kamil. Di dalam surat ini Tn. Mohaji telah membangkitkan tentang pindahmilik yang dilaksanakan kepada kedua-dua Plaintif oleh Defendan dan mencabar kesahihan dan keesahan transaksi tersebut dan mendakwa adanya unsur-unsur frod di dalam tranksaksi pindahmilik tersebut. 31 Surat Tetuan Risma & Idris bertarikh 2.10.2015 [30] Sebagai balasan kepada surat Tn. Mohaji bertarikh 9.9.2015, Tn. Risma di dalam suratnya bagi pihak Plaintif Pertama telah mendakwa di perenggan 4,5 dan 6 seperti berikut: 4) Pihak kami juga difahamkan oleh anakguam kami bahawa Shaharudin Bin Mohd Shariff (No. K/P: 410606-10-5221) dan Naharudin bin Mohd Shariff (No. K/P: 470604-10-5599) yang merupakan di antara waris-waris kepada Pihak Pertama iaitu anakguam tuan di dalam perkara ini didapati telah secara salah dan penipuan memperolehi surat kuasa mentadbir daripada Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada sekitar tahun 1996 tanpa persetujuan dan pengetahuan waris-waris yang berhak di mana adalah dipercayai bahawa Shaharudin Bin Mohd Shariff dan Naharudin Bin Mohd Shariff tersebut telah memberikan sumpah palsu ketika memohon Surat Kuasa Mentadbir ke atas segala aset-aset dan hartanah kepada Allahyarham Sultan Palembang Bin Raja Acheh atau Khatib Besar Bin Jainas atau Katib Besar Bin Raja Acheh. 5) Atas maklumat yang diberikan oleh anakguam kami, ketika permohonan untuk mendapatkan Surat Kuasa Mentadbir dibuat oleh Shaharudin Bin Mohd Shariff dan Naharudin bin Mohd Shariff tersebut pada sekitar tahun 1996, waris-waris Pihak Kedua iaitu 32 Ramnah Binti Kamil, Arina Binti Kamil dan Alaldin Bin Kamil masih hidup, namun malangnya mereka tidak dimaklumkan langsung berkenaan permohonan tersebut dan tiada sebarang persetujuan diperolehi daripada mereka yang membenarkan perlantikkan anakguam tuan selaku Pentadbir yang sah ke atas segala aset dan hartanah milik Allahyarham Sultan Palembang Bin Raja Acheh atau Khatib Besar Bin Jainas atau Katib Besar Bin Raja Acheh tersebut dan untuk makluman juga Alaldin Bin Kamil yang merupakan waris yang sah iaitu Anak Lelaki Kandung kepada Pihak Kedua masih lagi hidup sehingga ke hari ini. [31] Di dalam surat bertarikh 02.10.2015 tersebut, dalam erti kata lain keddua-dua Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa di pihak waris si Mati 2 telah berlaku penyelewangan pentadbiran di atas harta-harta si Mati 1. Plaintif Pertama dengan itu mendakwa bahawa atas sebab tersebut terdapat usul penyelesaian dibuat oleh Pentadbir Bersama (Shaharuddin dan Naharuddin) di mana Plaintif Pertama mendakwa Pentadbir Bersama telah menyelesaikan isu salah laku Pentadbir Bersama berkaitan pentadbiran hartanah-hartanah tersebut atas dasar persaudaraan inilah yang menggerakkan / menjadi motif kepada Pentadbir Bersama untuk memindahmilik hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada kedua-dua Plaintif. 33 Surat Tetuan Mohaji Hazury & Ismail bertarikh 3.11.2015 [32] Defendan melalui peguamcaranya telah menafikan dakwaan- dakwaan penyelewengan oleh Pentadbir Bersama yang dibangkitkan Plaintif Pertama dan menegaskan bahawa perjanjian penyelesaian yang dibangkitkan tersebut belumlah lagi sempurna dan selesai sehingga kini. Sekali lagi telah ditegaskan bahawa Plaintif Pertama tidak boleh bertindak bagi waris Kamil atas alasan-alsan awal yanbg telah diberikan. [33] Peguam Defendan telah membalas bagi pihak Defendan bahawa dakwaan kedua-dua Plaintif yang perjanjian penyelesaian adalah asas kepada pemindahmilikan hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada kedua-dua Plaintif oleh Defendan Pertama adalah tidak berasas atas fakta-fakta berikut: i. Anak guam tuan tidak ada mandat untuk mewakili waris-waris lain di pihak kedua; ii. Anak guam tuan sendiri pun tidak mendapatkan waris yang masih hidup bagi tujuan tersebut; & 34 iii. Anak guam kami menegaskan bahawa Pindakmilik lot kepada anak guam Puan adalah tidak sah & terbatal kerana menyalahi undang-undang atas alasan-alasan berikut: F. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH ATAS ALASAN I. [34] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa daripada afidavit- afidavit difailkan oleh kedua-dua pihak dan keterangan-keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan sememangnya jelas bahawa terdapatnya isu-isu serius yang dipertikaikan di mana isu-isu ini perlu dibicarakan di dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh. [35] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa begitu banyak isu yang perlu dibicarakan di dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh rentetan daripada pengataan-pengataan kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan bersama keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan, di antaranya adalah: a. Defendan-Defendan tidak mengetahui tentang pindahmilik hartanah- hartanah tersebut kepada kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan Pertma tidak pernah membuat sebarang urusan atau perjanjian pindahmilik dengan kedua-dua Plaintif atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut. Pihak 35 Defendan mempertikaikan kewujudan perjanjian jualbeli antara Defendan Pertama dan kedua-dua Plaintif. b. Defendan-Defendan mempertikaikan dan/atau mencabar hakmilik kedua-dua Plaintif di atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut yang mana kini, hak kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah-Hartanah tersebut adalah suatu hakmilik yang boleh sangkal dan bukanlah Tak Boleh Disangkal menurut Seksyen 340 (2) KTN 1965. c. Transaksi pindahmilik yang dijalankan kedua-dua Plaintif adalah adalah suatu transaksi yang dilaksanakan secara tipu helah,frod, salahnyata, manipulasi dengan menggunakan instrument-instrumen yang cacat & tidak sah dan bertentangan dengan peruntukkan undang-undang. d. Terdapat pertikaiaan bagaiamana kedua-dua Plaintif diberi pindahmlik hartanah-hartanah tersebut oleh Defendan Pertama, Pertama, tidak ada bukti berkenaan wang balasan RM360,000.00 yang kononnya dibayar oleh kedua-dua Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama bagi pindahmilik hartanah-hartanah kepunyaan Defendan Pertama tersebut. Tidak dokumen perjanjian jualbeli berkenaan harga balasan RM360,000.00. Waaupun Borang 14A dinyatakan balasan pindah milik adalah wang sebanyak RM180,000.00 dan 36 terdapat dokumen menunjukkan duti ad valorem dibayar tetapi memandangkan ia melibatkan transaksi pindah milik oleh sebuah syarikat kepada dua orang individu, instrument-instrumen pindah milik adalah isu-isu yang serius dipertikaikan. e. Tambahan lagi di dalam kes lagi kedua-dua Plaintif telah memberi dua versi yang berbeza dan bertentangan berkenaan pindahmilik hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada mereka berdua. Versi pertama, kedua-dua Plaintif telah mengatakan dan mendakwa bahawa balasan kepada pindahmilik hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada mereka berdua adalah wang sebanyak RM180,000.00 bagi setiap tanah. Mereka telah menyokong kenyataan tersebut dengan bergantung kepada Borang Pindahmilik 14A dan bukti duti ad valorem dibayar bagi jumlah RM180,000.00 bagi setiap hartanah. Di samping itu terdapat pengesahan oleh peguamcara yang bayaran telah dibuat lama sebelum pindahmilik diaksanakan. Namun, pada masa yang sama di dalam koresponden antara peguam-peguam kedua Plaintif dan Defendan, kedua-dua Plaintif menyatakan pula bahawa pndahmilk yang dilaksanakan oleh Defendan Pertama kepada mereka berdua adalah berasaskan suatu perjanjian penyelesaian persaudaraan. Perjanjian Penyelesaian Persaudaraan ini kononnya atas penyelewengan yang dilakukan oleh Pentadbir Bersama terhadap hartanah si Mati 1 yang didakwa oleh Plaintif Pertama. 37 f. Di samping itu, sekiranya diandaikan dakwaan kedua-dua Plaintif wujud perjanjian penyelesaian dengan Pentadbir Bersama (yang mana dinafikan dengan kerasnya oleh Defendan), kenapa pula hartanah-hartanah tersebut itu dipindah milik kepada keddua-dua Plaiintif yang merupakan cicit si Mati 1 dan cucu Kamin, sedangkan anak lelaki Kamin (Aladin) dan anak perempuan-anak perempuan (Arina, ibu Plaintif Kedua dan Ramnah) masih hidup. Walhal bahagian anak lelaki menurut hukum faraid adalah jauh lebih besar berbanding anak perempuan. Apatah lagi, berdasarkan hukum faraid, kedua-dua Plaintif sebagai cicit (si Mati 1) dan cucu (Kamin) tidaklah berhak atas pewarisan harta-harta si Mati 1 ataupun Kamin kerana anak-anak Kamin masih hidup. [36] Di dalam keadaan-keadaan ini, tidak syak lagi wujudnya kepentingan berkaveat di pihak Defendan dan jelas terdapatnya pendedahan isu- isu serius untuk dibicarakan di dalam suatu perbicaraan penu. G. IMBANGAN KESELESAAAN Alasan ii. Kaveat-kaveat persendirian itu hendaklah dikekalkan kerana Defendan Pertama telah memfailkan tindakan sivil terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif, dua orang waris kadim yang berhak kepada hartanah-hartanah tersebut (Naharuddin bin 38 Mhd Sharif dan Shaharuddin Mohd Sharif) dan Zariati binti Muhamed Peguambela & Peguamcara yang menjalankan amalan guaman di bawah nama, gaya & cara Tetuan Zariati & Co.) di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Guaman No: BA- 22NCVC-428-07/2016 untuk mendapatkan relif-relif berbentuk deklarasi yang antara lain perintah mengisytiharkan bahawa transaksi pindah milik hartanah- hartanah tersebut oleh Defendan Pertama kepada kedua- dua Plaintif pada 10.1. 2013 adalah tidak sah dan terbatal. [37] Defendan telahpun memfailkan guaman sivil terhadap terhadap kedua-dua Plaintif, dua orang waris kadim yang berhak kepada hartanah-hartanah tersebut (Naharuddin bin Mhd Sharif dan Shaharuddin Mohd Sharif) dan Zariati binti Muhamed (peguam yang yang melaksanakan urusan pindakmilik pada 9.10.2012 dan 10.1.2013 di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Guaman No: BA- 22NCVC-428-07/2016 (Guaman 428) untuk mendapatkan relif-relif berbentuk deklarasi yang antara lain perintah mengisytiharkan bahawa transaksi pindah milik hartanah-hartanah tersebut oleh 39 Defendan Pertama kepada kedua-dua Plaintif pada 10.1. 2013 adalah tidak sah dan terbatal. [38] Malahan sebelum pemfailan Guaman 428, pada awalnya di bulan Mac 2016, Defendan telahpun memfailkan Guaman Sivil No: BA- 22NCVC-84-03/2016 (Guaman 84), namun Guaman 84 ini telah ditarikbalik telah ditarikbalik dengan kebebasan memfailkan semula kerana Defendan akan membawa tindakan terhadap peguam yang mengendalikan transaksi pindahmilik hartanah-hartanah tersebut kepada kedua-dua Plaintif. [39] Di dalam keadaan ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa imbangan keselesaaan sememangnya memihak kepada kaveat tersebut dikekalkan sehingga pelupusan Guaman 428. [40] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Kandungan 1 kedua-dua Plaintif ditolak dengan kos dan kaveat-kaveat persendirian tersebut hendaklah dikekalkan sehingga pelupusan Guaman 428. 40 [41] Kedua-dua Plaintif adalah juga diperintahkan untuk membayar kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 kepada Defendan-Defendan. t.t. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 18hb Mei 2017 Peguam Plaintif-Plaintif - Tetuan Ahmad Sukeri & Associates Encik Ismail bin Yahya Peguam Defendan-Defendan - Tetuan Manjit Singh Sachdev, Mohd Radzi & Partners Encik Manpal Singh Cik PH Cheah Cik Parvinder K

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-916-09/2016

PLAINTIF 1. NAHARUDIN BIN MHD SHARIFF (NO. K/P: 470604-10-5599) 2. NAZARUDDIN BIN MOHD SHARIFF@MASARI (NO. K/P: 560429-10-5039) DEFENDAN MOHD FOWZI BIN ABDUL HAMID (NO. K/P: 581112-10-6925)

18/05/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=90dec3d6-433a-4781-baab-9ddb0f0dc7a6&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24-916-09/2016 Dalam Perkara Hartanah No. Hamilik: GM 2242, Lot 864, Sungai Sub, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Selangor Darul Ehsan (Hartanah tersebut); Dan Perkara-Perkara lainnya (Tajuk Tindakan diringkaskan menurut Aturan 41 Kaedah 1 (2) & (3) KKM 2012) ANTARA 1. NAHARUDIN BIN MHD SHARIFF (NO. K/P: 470604-10-5599) 2. NAZARUDDIN BIN MOHD SHARIFF@MASARI (NO. K/P: 560429-10-5039) …PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN MOHD FOWZI BIN ABDUL HAMID (NO. K/P: 581112-10-6925) …DEFENDAN 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) A. PENGENALAN [1] Saman Pemula di Kandungan 1 ini adalah permohonan Plaintif- Plaintif menurut seksyen 323, seksyen 327 dan seksyen 329(1) Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) untuk mendapatkan daripada Mahkamah ini perintah-perintah antara lain seperti berikut: i. Suatu Perisytiharan bahawa Defendan langsung tidak mempunyai sebarang Kepentingan Berkaveat atas Hartanah tersebut, yang tidak melayakkan Defendan untuk memasukkan Kaveat Sendirian No. Perserahan 1096/2016 bertarikh 02.03.2016, ke atas Hartanah tersebut; ii. Suatu Perisytiharan bahawa Surat Akuan Berkanun bertarikh 02.03.2016 dan Borang 19B bertarikh 02.03.2016 yang diikrarkan oleh Defendan tersebut, sama sekali tidak mendedahkan atau menunjukkan apa-apa Kepentingan Berkaveat oleh Defendan atas Hartanah tersebut. 3 iii. satu perintah kaveat persendirian nombor perserahan 1096/2016 bertarikh 2.3.2016 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan di atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Hakmilik GM 2242, Lot 864, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (hartanah tersebut) yang telah dimasukkan secara salah adalah dibatalkan dan dipotong serta merta dari daftar geran hakmilik hartanah tersebut. [2] Permohonan Plaintif-Plaintif ini adalah disokong oleh afidavit-afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif seperti berikut: i. Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif-Plaintif bertarikh 01.09.2016; ii. Afidavit Jawapan Defendan bertarikh 14.10.2016; dan iii. Afidavit Balasan Plaintif-Plaintif bertarikh 01.12.2016. [3] Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua kadang kalanya juga akan dirujuk sebagai “kedua-dua Plaintif”. B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [4] Latar belakang kes yang membawa permohonan ini difailakan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 4 4.1 Di dalam Carian Rasmi Geran Hakmilik hartanah tersebut bertarikh 9.5.2012 di eksibit “NH-8,” Kandungan 3 {Afidavit Sokongan Naharuddin bin MHD Sharif (Plaintif Pertama)} telah menunjukkan bahawa tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut untuk 1/1 (keseluruhan) bahagian adalah Masri bin Khatib. 4.2 Namun, tiga tahun kemudian adalah didapati bahawa di dalam Carian Rasmi Geran Hakmilik hartanah tersebut bertarikh 16.4.2015 di eksibit “NH-9”, Kandungan 3 tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut untuk 1/1 (keseluruhan) bahagian telah ditukar kepada Masri bin Khatib sebagai Pentadbir. 4.3 Plaintif Pertama (Naharuddin bin MHD Shariff, No. KP: 470604- 10-5599) dan Plaintif Kedua (Nazaruddin Bin Mohd Shariff@ Masari, No. K/P: 560429-10-5039) adalah waris-waris kadim (beneficiaries) Masri bin Khatib, No. K.P 1745912 (si Mati 1). 5 4.4 Apabila Masri bin Khatib (si Mati 1) telah meninggal dunia pada 23.3.1988 dan semasa si Mati 1 meninggal dunia beliau meninggalkan waris-waris kadim berikut: i. Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (Pentadbir Bersama - si Mati 3); ii. Nordinah Binti Mat Shahrip (No. l(P: 440502-10-5558); iii. Naharudin Bin Mhd Shariff (Pentadbir Bersama); iv. Salleh Bin Mamat (No. KP: 510314-11-5055); v. Nazaruddin Bin Mohd Shariff @ Masari (No. KP.560429- 10-5039); vi. Madaruddin Bin Masari (Defendan Kedua); vii. Rozidin Bin Masari (No. KP: 591017-10-5069) & viii. Noreharizan Binti Masari (No. KP: 630323-10-5728). 4.5 Tuanpunya/pemilik asal hartanah tersebut adalah adalah seorang yang bernama Khatib Besar Bin Jainas @Rava Acheh @ Juacheh @ Khatib Besar @ Sultan Palembang (si Mati 2) yang telah meninggal dunia pada tahun 1942. Si Mati 2 mempunyai dua orang anak lelaki iaitu si Mati 1 dan seorang bernama Kamin bin Katib (Kamin). Kamin adalah saudara tua si 6 Mati 1 pada jarak umur 10 tahun. Kamin telah meninggal dunia pada sekitar tahun 1948 akibat dibunuh komunis. 4.6 Pada sekitar tahun 1930an semasa hayat semati si Mati 2 hidup, si Mati 2 telahpun mewariskan hartanah-hartanah kepunyaannya kepada kedua-dua warisnya si mati dan Kamin. Setakat tahun 1930an dan 40an pembahagian harta-harta si Mati 2 telah selesai dan muktamad di mana kedua-dua waris si Mati 2 telah mendapat bahagian masing-masing. 4.7 Adalah menjadi pengataan Plaintif-Plaintif semasa arwah bapa mereka masih hidup (si Mati 1) telah memaklumkan bahawa memandangkan beliau adalah anak yang lebih muda beliau telah akur kepada pembahagian-pembahagian hartanah yang dibua oleh bapanya walaupun abangnya Kamin telah mendapat bahagian/kedudukan tanah yang lebih baik dan lebih bernilai. Si Mati 2 telah mewariskan hartanah tersebut kepada si Mati 1 dan demikian si Mati 1 telah menguruskan hartanah tersebut sehinggalah beliau meninggal dunia pada tahun 1988. 7 4.8 Oleh kerana pembahagian kedua-dua waris telah diselesaikan semasa hidup dan hayat si Mati 2, si Mati 2 tidak meninggalkan wasiat semasa kematiannya. Si Mati 1 telah dinyatakan telah mentadbirkan dan menguruskan hartanah tersebut seperti yang diwariskan kepadanya selepas si Mati 2 meninggal dunia. 4.9 Apabila si Mati 2 meninggal dunia, si Mati 1 telah dikeluarkan dengan suatu geran pentadbiran kuasa bertarikh 11.11.1957 untuk pentadbiran hartanah tersebut. 4.10 Namun pada tahun 1957 inilah Tanah Melayu mengalami pergolakan politik yang hebat di mana Tanah Melayu baru mencapai kemerdekaan, maka si Mati 1 tidak dapat menguruskan hal ehwal hartanah tersebut kerana pada masa itu masyarakat kampung seperti beliau mengalami peralihan hidup yang keluar dari kepompong penjajahan. 4.11 Oleh kerana pada masa itu, si Mati 1 mengalami kekangan wang dan masalah-masalah berbangkit, walaupun telah dikeluarkan geran pentadbiran kuasa telah dikeluarkan kepada 8 si Mati 1, si Mati tidak dapat membawa tindakan untuk mengisytiharkan dan membuat pengesahan bahawa hartanah tersebut sememangnya telah diwariskan kepadanya oleh ayahnya (si Mati 2), maka urusan formaliti untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepadanya tidak dibuat. 4.12 Selepas kematian si Mati 1 pada tahun 1988, suatu permohonan untuk Surat Kuasa Mentadbir harta pusaka/estet si Mati 2 telah difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Petisyen No: 31-201-1996) termasuk hartanah tersebut telah dibuat oleh waris-waris si Mati 1. 4.13 Selepas daripada itu, suatu Surat Kuasa Mentadbir telah dikeluarkan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi melantik dua orang Pentadbir Bersama bernama Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (No. KP: 410606-10-5221) dan Naharudin Bin Mohd Sharif (No. KP:470604-10-5599) (Geran Pentadbiran Surat Kuasa Mentadbir di Eksibit “NH-1”, Kandungan 3) bagi harta pusaka si Mati 2 (Khatib Besar Bin Jainas @ Rava Acheh @ 9 Juacheh) ditadbirkan bernama kedua-dua Pentadbir Bersama tersebut. “GRANT OF LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BE IT KNOWN that at the date hereunder-written Letters of Administration of all and singular the movable and immovable property situate within the jurisdiction of late of deceased KHATIB BESAR BIN JAINAS @ RAVA ACHEH @ JUACHEH BATU 11 ½ KG SG SERAI, 43100 HULU LANGAT, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN who died on the 12th day of MARCH, 1947 leaving property situate within the jurisdiction of the Court were granted to NAHARUDIN BIN MOHD SHARIF SHAHARUDIN BIN MOHD SHARIF BATU 11 ½ , KG SG SERAI, 43100 HULU LANGAT, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN” 4.14 Pada 27.11. 2015, satu Surat Kuasa Wakil telah dilaksanakan oleh Pentadbir Bersama dengan persetujuan waris-waris kadim si Mati 1 memberikan kuasa undang-undang (lawful attorney) 10 kepada Nazaruddin bin Mohd Shariff @ Masari Plaintif Kedua) untuk bertindak dan mewakili mereka. 4.15 Pentadbir Bersama bernama Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif telah meninggal dunia pada 2.01.2016. (Sijil Kematian Shaharudin Bin Mohd Sharif - Eksibit NH-1) 4.16 Hartanah tersebut telah terlibat di dalam Pelan Pengambilan Balik Tanah Di Bawah Seksyen 8, Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (APT 1960) bagi tujuan pembinaan lebuhraya East Klang Valley Expressway (EKVE). 4.17 Berikutan dengan itu, satu perisytiharan berhubung cadangan pengambilan menurut sekyen 8 APT 1960 telah diwartakan melalui Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor No.4310 bertarikh 7.11.2013. Di dalam Warta Kerajaan bertarikh 7.11.2013 tersebut hartanah tersebut (No. Lot Ukur - 864, Hakmilik atau Pendudukan - 2242) telah tertera nama Masri bin Katib 1/1 bhg. Di samping itu, Carian Rasmi geran hakmilik tersebut 11 bertarikh 7.2.2013 juga menunjukkan bahawa Pemilikan Hartanah dan Alamat adalah seperti berikut: MASRI BIN KATIB Warganegara Malaysia, 1/1 bahagian 4.18 Berhubung dengan pengambilan hartanah tersebut, Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan di sini dengan mengambil notis kehakiman bahawa terdapat satu guaman Saman Pemula (BA-24-1371-12/2016 – Guaman 1371) telah difailkan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif terhadap oleh Jabatan Ketua Pengarah Tanah dan Galian (JKPTG) yang mencabar tindakan-tindakan yang dilaksanakan oleh JKPTG di dalam perkara pengambilan hartanah tersebut. Mahkamah ini akan menyentuh berkenaannya kemudian nanti. 4.17 Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua akan kadang kalanya akan dirujuk sebagai Plaintif. [5] Pada 2.3.2016 Defendan Mohd Fowzi bin Abdul Hamid telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian (kaveat persendirian tersebut) ke 12 atas hartanah tersebut yang telah didaftarkan melalui perserahan nombor 1096 / 2016. [6] Plaintif yang terkilan akan kemasukan dan kewujudan kaveat persendirian tersebut, kini memfailkan Kandungan 1 bagi mendapatkan perintah untuk membatalkan kaveat persendirian tersebut. C. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG [7] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat adalah jelas. Di dalam sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Mahkamah hendaklah menentu dan mempertimbangkan persoalan-persoalan berikut: i. samada pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. ii. samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan. 13 iii. samada imbangan keselesaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan. iv. samada terdapat keadaan istimewa di pihak pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah. [8] Di dalam perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Majlis Privy di dalam kes Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 telah memutuskan berikut: “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.” 14 [9] Di dalam kes Kho Ah Soon V Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah sekali lagi menekankan berkenaan prinsip undang-undang di dalam pembatalan kaveat di mana Peh Swee Chin, HMP telah menyatakan di muka surat 184 seperti berikut: “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated by Lord Diplock, the serious question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. [10] Di dalam perkara ini juga, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719 telah menggariskan ujian-ujian yang harus digunapakai di dalam menentukan dan menimbangkan sesuatu permohonan untuk 15 membatalkan kaveat di mana mukasurat 724, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan berikut: “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary one. At first stage, the court will examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat to see whether they show a caveatable interest. Once the court is satisfied that the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim disclosed a serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the court must decide where the balance of convenience” [11] Di dalam kes Institut Teknologi Federal Sdn Bhd. v IIUM Education Sdn Bhd & Another Appeal [2008] 1 CLJ 745 Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan antara lain bahawa: [27]…it is settled that caveatable interest must be definite right relating to land and capable of enforcement and a caveator must be in a position to institute a suit for a specific performance of claim…” 16 [12] Manakala di dalam kes Hj Md Radzi Ismail v Mesti Unggul Sdn Bhd [2016] 5 CLJ 208, Mahkamah Rayuan telah yang menegaskan seperti berikut: “[17] The next issue is whether there is a serious question meriting a trial. On the facts averred by both the appellant and the respondent in their respective affidavits in this case we have no hesitation to conclude that there is. D. TENTANGAN DEFENDAN [13] Defendan (Mohd Fowzi bin Abdul Hamid K/P: 581112-10-6925) adalah seorang individu yang merupakan cicit si Mati 2 dan cucu Kamin. [14] Defendan telah mempertahankan dengan kerasnya kaveat persendirian yang dimasukinya dan menegaskan bahawa Defendan mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat 'caveatable interest' ke atas hartanah-hartanah tersebut. 17 [15] Di dalam Borang 19B (Permohonan Untuk Memasukkan Kaveat Persendirian) dan Surat Akuan Berkanunnya bertarikh 2.3.2016, alasan-alasan Defendan memasukkan kaveat persendirian tersebut telah dinyatakan seperti berikut: “Saya adalah seorang Pentadbir yang sah yang dilantik oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Kuala Lumpur melalui Surat Kuasa Mentadbir Saman Pemula No :- WA- 31NCVC-49-01/2016 atas harta-pusaka Haji Kamil Bin Haji Ismail Bin Khatib @ Kamin Bin Khatib (si Mati) dengan ini memasukkan Kaveat Persendirian ke atas hartanah yang berada di bawah Hakmilik GM 2242, Lot 864, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Batu 13 1/2, Sungai Sub, Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) atas sebab bahawa pihak Pentadbir yang dilantik iaitu Masri Bin Khatib telah gagal memberikan keterangan yang benar sewaktu beliau memohon Surat Kuasa Mentadbir ke atas hartanah tersebut. Pihak saya percaya bahawa Masri Bin Katib telah menafikan hak-hak waris kepada Haji Kamil Bin Haji Ismail @ Kamil Bin Katib @ Kamin Bin Katib di mana beliau didapati telah secara sengaja tidak memaklumkan kepada Bahagian Harta Pusaka Kecil, Pejabat Tanah Ulu Langat bahawasanya pemilik asal hartanah tersebut iaitu Arwah Moyang saya yang bernama Sutan Palembang Bin Raja Acheh @ Haji Ismail Bin Raja Acheh @ Khatib Besar Bin Jainas @ Khatib Besar Bin Raja Acheh turut mempunyai seorang lagi anak lelaki iaitu Haji Kamil Bin Haji Ismail @ Kamil Bin Khatib @ Kamin Bin Khatib sebagaimana yang dinyatakan di atas. 18 Saya selaku salah seorang Cucu Kandung kepada Haji Kamil Bin Haji Ismail @ Kamil Bin Katib @ Kamin Bin Khatib dengan memasukkan Kaveat Persendirian ini bagi memastikan hak-hak saya serta waris-waris yang lain ke atas hartanah tersebut tidak diketepikan kerana kami percaya waris-waris kepada Masri Bin Katib sedang di dalam usaha untuk mendapatkan wang pampasan hartanah tersebut yang mana hartanah tersebut telah terlibat dengan Pengambilan Tanah di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri bagi tujuan pembinaan Lebuhraya “East Klang Valley Expressway” (EKVE). “ [16] Di dalam membantah permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif, Defendan telah memfailkan Afidavit Jawapannya yang diikrarkan pada 14.10.2016 (Kandungan 5). [17] Di dalam percubaan Defendan mempertahankan kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkinya Defendan telah membangkitkan alasan berikut: Beliau sebagai cicit si Mati 2 dan cucu Kamin serta waris- waris Kamin adalah juga berhak ke atas hartanah tersebut kerana hartanah tersebut adalah harta peninggalan/pusaka si Mati 2. Geran Pentadbiran bertarikh 18.1.2016 (WA- 31NCVC-49-01/2016) telah dikeluarkan bagi melantik Defendan dan seorang lagi cucu Kamin bernama Roslan 19 bin Maulud (adik beradik tiri Defendan) sebagai Pentadbir harta pusaka Kamin (nama di dalam geran pentadbiran: Haji Kamil Bin Haji Ismail @ Kamil Bin Khatib @ Kamin Bin Khatib). Hak waris-waris Kamin terhadap pusaka Si Mati 2 telah dinafikan oleh si Mati 1 (Masri bin Katib). E. SAMADA DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN MEMPUNYAI KEPENTINGAN BERKAVEAT KE ATAS HARTANAH TERSEBUT. [18] Di dalam kes Plaintif telah menafikan dengan sekeras-kerasnya dakwaan Defendan yang beliau mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. [19] Plaintif telah menafikan dengan sekeras-keras dakwaan Defendan bahawa Defendan dan/atau waris-waris Kamin berhak ke atas hartanah tersebut atas alasan pewarisian harta si Mati 2. Adalah menjadi tegasan Plaintif bahawa hartanah tersebut sememangnya telah diwarisi oleh si Mati 1 kerana pembahagian harta-harta si Mati 2 telah dibuat kepada anak-anaknya Masri dan Kamin semasa hayat si 20 Mati 2. Selepas si Mati 2 meninggal dunia, si Mati 1 telah mentadbirkan hartanah tersebut sebagai haknya. [20] Adalah menjadi tegasan Plaintif, namun apapun alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan di dalam Borang 19B nya tidak langsung mengujudkan atau membangkitkan sebarang kepentingan berkaveat di pihak Defendan ke atas hartanah tersebut berdasarkan alasan- alasan berikut: i. Defendan tidak mempunyai tuntutan yang sah dan yang diiktiraf oleh undang-undang. Ketiadaan tuntutan yang sah dan diiktiraf disisi mana mungkin membangkitkan kepentingan berkaveat. ii Tidak ada isu serius yang perlu dibicarakan di dalam kes ini, iii. Defendan dihalang oleh had masa. 21 iv. Defendan sehingga kini tidak ada langsung memfailkan sebarang tindakan undang-undang berhubung dakwaannya tersebut. [21] Adalah menjadi hujahan Plaintif, Defendan hanyalah merupakan cicit kepada tuanpunya/pemilik asal hartanah-hartanah tersebut (si Mati Dari segi keturunan dan undang-undang perwarisan harta pusaka Islam (hukum faraid), Defendan adalah tidak termasuk langsung di dalam linkungan (garisan-lineage) waris-waris yang berhak ke atas perwarisan pusaka si Mati 2. [22] Bagi menyokong tegasannya, Plaintif di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya telah memperincikan secara komprehensif susur galur keturunan dan kaitan perwarisan serta urusan pentadbiran pusaka si Mati 2 berhubung hartanah tersebut seperti berikut: 22.1 Pemilik/tuanpunya asal hartanah tersebut adalah seorang yang bernama Khatib Besar Bin Jainas @Rava Acheh @ Juacheh @ Khatib Besar @ Sultan Palembang (si Mati 2). 22 22.2 Apabila si Mati 2 meninggal dunia, hartanah tersebut telah diturunkan kepada anaknya bernama Mohamad Sarip @ Mohd Shariff @Masari @ Masri bin Khatib (Masri bin Khatib - si Mati 2). 22.3 Apabila Masri bin Khatib (si Mati 1) meninggal dunia, melalui Surat Kuasa Mentadbir (Permohonan Petisyen No: 31-201- 1996 Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam) estet / harta pusaka si Mati 2 termasuk Pentadbir Bersama telah dilantik untuk mentadbir pusaka tersebut. 22.4 Adalah menjadi tegasan Defendan bahawa bahawa Defendan bukanlah waris kadim kepada susur galur si Mati 1 yang digalurkan dari susur keturunan si Mati 2. Defendan adalah generasi lapisan ketiga {moyang (si Mati 1), datuk (Kamin bin Katib), anak Kamin (Arina bt Kamin) dan Defendan (anak Arina)}. 22.5 Pertalian Defendan dan si Mati 2 adalah cicit dan moyang. Plaintif adalah anak kepada Arina Binti Kamin. Arina Bt Kamin 23 mempunyai dua adik-beradik lain iaitu seorang perempuan bernama Ramnah Binti Kamin dan seorang lelaki bernama Alaldin Bin Kamil. Ibu Defendan Arina telah meninggal dunia pada tahun1999. 22.6 Dari segi perwarisan harta pusaka Islam (hukum faraid), Defendan berada di generasi cicit sahaja, maka berdasarkan undang-undang perwarisan hukum faraid, saudara lelaki kepada Arina iaitu Alaldin (yang masih hidup) mempunyai bahagian yang lebih berbanding dengan Arina. Dengan anak- anak Kamin yang masih hidup iaitu Alaldin, menurut Plaintif di dalam keadaan ini, Defendan sebenarnya tidak boleh menjadi kepada waris keturunan Kamin Bin Khatib apatah lagi bertindak bagi pihak mereka bagi maksud pusaka Kamin. [23] Di dalam kes ini apa yang jelas Defendan adalah cicit kepada si Mati 2 dan kini mendakwa bahawa beliau dan waris-waris datuknya Kamin adalah berhak kepada hartanah tersebut yang dikatakan harta pusaka si Mati 2. Defendan di sini telah cuba mengatakan bahawa hanya kerana hartanah tersebut pada asalnya milik moyangnya (si 24 Mati 2), maka dia sebagai cicit dan/atau waris-waris Kamin yang lain berhak juga terhadap hartanah tersebut berdasarkan hak perwarisian melalui keturunan yang membangkitkan kepentingan berkaveatnya terhadap hartanah tersebut samada sebagai waris ataupun sebagai Pentadbir Bersama Pusaka Kamin. [24] Di dalam percubaan mempertegakkan dakwaan pewarisan melalui keturunan tersebut, Defendan telah meletakkan kesalahan kepada seorang yang telah meninggal dunia 29 tahun dahulu iaitu si Mati 1 (Masri bin Khatib) yang meninggal dunia pada tahun 1988. Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan, si Mati 1 telah dengan sengaja memberi keterangan yang tidak benar semasa beliau memohon Geran Pentadbiran bagi hartanah tersebut kerana beliau tidak menzahirkan kepada Bahagian Pembahagian Harta Pusaka Kecil, Pejabat Tanah Ulu Langat bahawa si Mati 2 ada lagi seorang anak bernama Kamin. Maka, oleh sebab itu geran pentadbiran bertarikh 11.11.1957 (Geran 1957) dikeluarkan kepada Masri tanpa nama Kamin di dalamnya. [25] Seterusnya, Defendan telah cuba membuat dakwaan terhadap Pentadbir Bersama pusaka si Mati 2 yang telah diberi geran 25 pentadbiran pada tahun 1998, telah dikatakan secara salah menukarkan secara salahnya meminda senarai aset dan tanggungan mereka dengan memasukkan hartanah tersebut di bawah senarai pentadbiran mereka sedangkan hartanah tersebut katanya adalah harta-pusaka yang diwarisi bersama oleh Kamin Bin Katib dan Masri Bin Katib dan bukannya hakmilik Masri Bin Katib seorang. F. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [26] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa dakwaan-dakwaan yang dibangkitkan Defendan ini adalah dakwaan-dakwaan kosong semata-mata yang tidak disokong langsung oleh mana-mana keterangan. Defendan telah cuba menggunakan Geran 1957 dan telah meletakkan kesalahan kepada si Mati 1 yang telah meninggal dunia yang tidak boleh mempertahankan atau menjustifikasikan tindakannya. Bagaimana pula Defendan boleh membuat dakwaan bahawa si Mati 1 gagal menzahirkan Kamin adalah anak si Mati 2, sedangkan Defendan tidak tahu apakah yang telah ditetapkan oleh si Mati 2 berhubung harta-hartanya dengan kedua orang anaknya. Hanya si Mati 1 sahaja yang mengetahui. Lagipun Defendan pada tahun 1957 belum lahir lagi dan apa tah lagi semasa Defendan lahir 26 Kamin telahpun meninggal dunia. Defendan tidak boleh mengandaikan sesuatu yang berlaku 60 tahun lalu dan membuat asumpsi daripadanya. [27] Bagi Mahkamah ini, si mati 1 (Masri Bin Katib) telah hanya mendapatkan Geran Pentadbiran bagi Hartanah tersebut pada tahun 1957 selepas lebih kurang 10 tahun ayahnya (si Mati 2) meninggal dunia pada tahun 1947 dan abangnya Kamin meninggal dunia pada tahun 1948. Pada masa permohonan dibuat oleh si Mati 1, Kamin sememangnya telah lama meninggal dunia. Anak si Mati 2 yang tinggal pada masa itu adalah hanya si Mati 1. Di dalam hal ini, diandaikan lah benar bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah harta pusaka si mati 2 yang sepatutnya diwarisi oleh si Mati 1 dan anak-anak Kamin. Maka, Alaldin bin Kamin, Ramnah binti Kamin dan Arina binti Kamin yang masih hidup sudah pasti boleh mendapatkan kepastian mengenai hartanah tersebut daripada si Mati 1 kerana si Mati telah hidup sehingga tahun 1988. Tambahan pula, walaupun Geran 1957 adaalah geran Pentadbiran, namun di muka surat akhir geran tersebut memang telah tercatit nama Masri bin Katib. 27 28 29 30 [28] Di dalam keadaan di mana cacatan yang telah dibuat 60 tahun dahulu, Defendan tidak boleh sewenanag-wenangnya membuat andaian/anggapan hartanah tersebut dipegang oleh Masri sebagai pentadbir untuk faedah pusaka Si Mati 2 yang mesti diwarisi oleh Kamin juga. Geran Pentadbiran juga dikeluarkan untuk maksud pentadbiran pusaka bagi orang yang berhak terhadap sesuatu harta diberikan kuasa untuk memindahmilik hartanah tersebut kepada dirinya atau mana-mana orang yang telah dinamakan di dalam senarai waris. Di dalam geran 1957 ini, nama yang ada adalah nama si Mati 1 iaitu Masri bin Katib. [29] Kalaulah benar ianya pusaka si Mati 2, selama tempoh 30 tahun (dari tahun 1957 ke tahun 1988) waris-waris Kamin (Alaldin/Ramnah/ Arina) yang kononnya berhak terhadap pewarisan pusaka tersebut telah hanya berdiam diri, menerima dan mengendos keadaan, tidak bertindak, tidak bertanyakan hal kepada si Mati 1, tidak membuat semakan atau carian di Pejabat Tanah untuk mendapat pengesahan ataupun memfailkan/membuat tuntutan untuk mendapatkan hak mereka di atas hartanah tersebut terhadap si Mati 1. Walhal Alaldin anak Kamin masih hidup sehingga kini. Malahan semasa geran 31 pentadbiran kuasa 1998 diambil oleh Pentadbir Bersama, Alaldin dan Arina masih hidup ketika itu tetapi tidak berbuat tindakan-tindakan yang dinyatakan oleh Mahkamah sebentar tadi. [30] Kini, pada tahun 2015, setelah 60 tahun berlalu dan apabila hartanah tersebut di dalam proses pembayaran pampasan pengambilan tanah, Defendan tampil ke hadapan dan cuba mendapat wang pampasan hartanah tersebut dengan berasaskan geran 1957 dan atas dasar waris dan pentadbir sah pusaka Kamin. Bagaimana ini boleh menjadikan Defendan sebagai pihak yang mempunyai kepentingan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut? Atas alasan ini sahaja kaveat persendirian tersebut mestilah dibatalkan dan diketepikan. [31] Berbalik semula kepada Borang 19B Defendan bertarikh 2.3.2016. Defendan selain dari mengatakan yang haknya sebagai waris sebagai cucu Kamin, beliau juga bertindak sebagai Pentadbir Pusaka Kamin. [32] Namun, penelitian dekat Mahkamah kepada Geran Pentadbiran yang dikeluarkan kepada Defendan dan Roslan bin Maulud bertarikh 32 18.1.2016, kuasa pentadbiran yang diberikan kepada kedua-dua pentadbir ini bagi mentadbir pusaka Kamin adalah bagi perkara – perkara yang terhad seperti yang dinyatakan di dalam Senarai Aset & Tanggungan [33] Di dalam Senarai Aset dan Tanggungan jelas tertera seperti berikut: SENARAI ASET & TANGGUNGAN ASET A.HARTA TAK BOLEH ALIH NILAI TIADA B.HARTA BOLEH ALIH NILAI Wang Pampasan hasil daripada pengambilan RM836,595.00 setakat Tanah di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1969 9.6.2015 oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri yang disimpan di Amanah Raya Berhad Cawangan Shah Alam ke atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai GM2749, Lot 2231, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub Negeri Selangor. C.TANGGUNGAN NILAI TIADA 33 [34] Oleh itu, pada tarikh 18.1.2016, geran dikeluarkan, pentadbiran yang diberi kuasa kepad Defendan dan Roslan adalah hanya berhubung Wang Pampasan hasil setakat 9.6.2015 RM836,595.00 daripada pengambilan Tanah di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1969 oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri yang disimpan di Amanah Raya Berhad Cawangan Shah Alam ke atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai GM2749,Lot 2231, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub Negeri Selangor. [35] Hartanah tersebut (GM 864. Lot 2242) tidak disenaraikan. Kaveat persendirian Defendan atas kapasiti pentadbir ekoran geran bertarikh 18.1.2016 telah dimasukkan oleh Defendan pada 2.3.2016. Oleh yang demikian, pada masa kaveat persendirian tersebut dimasukkan, Defendan tidak mempunyai sebarang kuasa/kapasiti undang-undang untuk bertindak sebagai Pentadbir pusaka Kamin terhadap hartanah tersebut kerana jelas kuasa Defendan dan Roslan tidak termasuk hartanah tersebut. [36] Menyedari keadaan ini, enam bulan kemudian kemudian Defendan telah memfailkan satu permohonan di dalam petisyen, di mana pada 2.8.2016 memohon untuk meminda Senarai Aset dan Tanggungan di dalam Geran Pentadbirannya untuk memasukkan hartanah tersebut. 34 [37] Walau apapun, apa yang jelas pada masa memasukkan Borang 19B pada 2.3.2016 dan membuat Akuan Berkanunnya pada 2.3.2016 Defendan tidak mempunyai kapasit / lokus sebagai Pentadbir Pusaka Kamin dan dalam keadaan ini, amatlah nyata dan jelas bahawa berdasarkan Borang 19B dan Surat Akuan Berkanun Defendan tersebut sahaja Defendan tidak layak untuk memasukkan Kaveat Sendirian tersebut atas hartanah tersebut. Defendan sememangnya tidak mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut. [38] Malahan di dalam kes ini apa dicerminkan oleh Defendan di dalam Borang 19B dan Surat Akuan Berkanunnya adalah membuat dakwaan terus terhadap si Mati 1 dan bukannya membangkitkan hak dan/atau kepentingan berkaveat di atas hartanah tersebut. [39] Di samping itu jika dilihat pindaan yang dipohon oleh Defendan, Defendan sebenarnya bukannya berminat kepada hartanah tersebut tetapi hanya berminat kepda wang pampasan yang akan diperolehi dari pengambilan tanah yang dilaksanakan kerajaan. Motif Defendan adalah semata-mata berbentuk kewangan. 35 CADANGAN PINDAAN SENARAI ASET & TANGGUNGAN ASET A.HARTA TAK BOLEH ALIH NILAI TIADA Setengah (1/2) bahagian hartanah yang dikenali sebagai GM 2242, Lot 864, Mukim Hulu Langat, yang bernilai lebih kurang Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Batu 13 ½, Sungai RM1,600,000.00 Sub Negeri Selangor. B.HARTA BOLEH ALIH NILAI Wang Pampasan hasil daripada pengambilan RM836,595.00 setakat Tanah di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1969 9.6.2015 oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri yang disimpan di Amanah Raya Berhad Cawangan Shah Alam ke atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai GM2749, Lot 2231, Mukim Hulu Langat, Daerah Hulu Langat, Tempat Sungai Sub Negeri Selangor. Jumlah Keseluruhan : RM2,436,595.00 C.TANGGUNGAN NILAI TIADA [40] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa telah menjadi prinsip-prinsip undang-undang mantap bahawa faktor 36 atau sebab kewangan bukan terjumlah sebagai suatu Kepentingan Berkaveat. (Sila lihat: Taipan Focus Sdn Bhd v Baiduri PJ Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 CLJ 73, yang mana Hakim Suriyadi telah menyatakan seperti yang berikut: “…suffice to say that a mere debt being monetarily based does not fall within the purview of an interest in land, and hence falls outside the realm of caveatable interest. Such debt does not relate to the land.)” G. Saman Pemula (BA-24-1371-12/2016 – Guaman 1371) [41] Berhubung hartanah tersebut, Mahkamah ini telah menyatakan di awal penghakiman perenggan 4.1 dan 4.2 bahawa: 4.1 Di dalam Carian Rasmi Geran Hakmilik hartanah tersebut bertarikh 9.5.2012 di eksiibit “NH-8,” Kandungan 3 {Afidavit Sokongan Naharuddin bin MHD Sharif (Plaintif Pertama)} telah menunjukkan bahawa tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut untuk 1/1 (keseluruhan) bahagian adalah Masri bin Khatib. 37 4.2 Namun, tiga tahun kemudian adalah didapati bahawa di dalam Carian Rasmi Geran Hakmilik hartanah tersebut bertarikh 16.4.2015 di eksiibit “NH-9”, Kandungan 3 tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut untuk 1/1 (keseluruhan) bahagian telah ditukar kepada Masri bin Khatib sebagai Pentadbir. [42] Geran hakmilik hartanah tersebut pada tahun 2012 telah menunjukkan bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah milik Masri bin Katib 1/1 bahagian. Tetapi pada 9.4.2015, catatan pada hakmilik Masri bin Kahatib telah dipinda kepada Masri bin Khatib 1/1 bahagian sebagai Pentadbir oleh Pentadbir Tanah Ulu Langat. [43] Berhubung dengan pindaan catatan di dalam geran hakmilik dan pengambilan hartanah tersebut, Mahkamah ini telah menyatakan awal tadi bahawa Plaintif Kedua dan Aras Properties Sdn Bhd (Aras Properties) telah memfailkan Guaman 1371 yang telah mencabar tindak-tanduk JKPTG yang menjalankan urusan-urusan berhubung pengambilan hartanah, khasnya berkenaan tata cara siasatan menurut seksyen-seksyen 12, 13 dan 14 APT 1060. Sekyen 12 adalah berhubung Siasatan oleh Pentadbir Tanah, seksyen 13 pula 38 adalah Kuasa Pentadbir Tanah untuk memanggil saksi-saksi, dsb, manakala seksyen 14 adalah berkenaan Award Pentadbir Tanah. Di akhir siasatan, Pentadbir Tanah (JKPTG) telah memutuskan bahawa teerdapat pertikaian tentang hak atau hakmilik orang yang menerima pampasan tersebut. Justeru itu menurut seksyen 29 (2) APT 1960, Pentadbir Tanah telah mendepositkan wang pampasan bagi hartanah tersebut ke Mahkamah. [44] Di dalam Guaman 1371 ini. Plaintif Kedua dan Aras Properties telah mempertikaikan dengan kerasnya tindak tanduk Pentadbir Tanah yang menjalan siasatan pada 20.4.2015 dan 8.9.2015 dan mencabar perlaksanaan tindakan-tindakan JKPTG yang samada mengenai kekhilafan undang-undang berhubung tatacara prosiding siasatan yang dijalankan, penerimaan dokumen-dokumen yang tidak ada asas/ tidak berasas yang bertentangan dengan undang-undang, seperti menerima Surat Akuan bertarikh 18.10.2010 iaitu surat akuan yang telah dibuat lima tahun sebelaum tarikh siasatan, telah menerima Surat Akuan Defendan bertarikh 2.3.2016 selepas siasatan-siasatan selesai pada 8.9.2015, merujuk kepada dokumen 39 hakmilik yang salah dan banyak lagi kekhilafan yang sangat jelas dan ketara. [45] Di dalam Guaman 1371 in, Plaintif Kedua dan Aras Properties telah memohon daripada Mahkamah ini perintah-perintah deklarasi berikut: 1. Satu Deklarasi bahawa dapatan “pertikaian” yang dibuat JKPTG di dalam prosiding melalui Saman Pemula No: 24-64-01/2016 iaitu permohonan JKPTG untuk mendepositkan wang pampasan milik arwah Masri Bin Khatib ke dalam akaun Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam selaras dengan butiran Borang H bertarikh 08.09.2015, adalah salah, tidak sah, tidak berasas dan merupakan suatu skandal. 2. Suatu Deklarasi bahawa dapatan “pertikaian” yang dibuat JKPTG di dalam prosiding melalui Saman Pemula No: 24-64-01/2016 iaitu permohonan JKPTG untuk mendepositkan wang pampasan milik arwah Masri Bin Khatib ke dalam akaun Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam selaras dengan butiran Borang H bertarikh 08.09.2015, diketepikan dan/atau dikeluarkan daripada rekod Mahkamah; 40 3. Suatu Deklarasi bahawa sebenarnya tidak ada langsung “pertikaian” yang wujud, bertentangan dengan dakwaan atau dapatan JKPTG di dalam permohonan Saman Pemula No: 24-64-01/2016 tersebut; 4. Suatu Deklarasi bahawa bukti muktamad dan/atau konklusif bagi menunjukkan wujudnya pertikaian seperti yang didakwa JKPTG tersebut adalah kewujudan dan/atau pemfailan Borang N di bawah Seksyen 37(1) (c) atau (d) & Seksyen 38 yang dibaca dengan Seksyen 39 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960. [46] Guaman 1371 ini telah dibicarakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini pada 25.4.2017. Mahkamah ini pada tarikh yang sama telah membenarkan permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif dengan memutuskan antara lain bahawa JKPGT sememangnya telah khilaf undang-undang dan fakta di dalam pemutusannya bahawa terdapatnya pertikaian di dalam prosiding siasatan di hadapannya. Mahkamah ini perlu menekankan bahawa dapatan JKPTG berkenaan wujud pertikaian tersebut bukan sahaja salah dan tidak berasas malah tidak terbukti langsung. Malahan di dalam guaman 1371 tersebut, Mahkamah juga memutuskan bahawa tindak-tanduk JKPTG dari segi keputusan dan tindakan-tindakannya adalah tidak berlandaskan kepada lunas 41 undang-undang. Justeru itu, Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan kesemua relif-relif deklarasi yang dipohon Plaintif Kedua dan Aras Properties. [47] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa penelitian ke atas Borang 19B dan Akuan Berkanun Defendan, Defendan sememangnya tidak termasuk di dalam kategori yang melayakkan Defendan untuk memasukkan kaveat ke hartanah tersebut. H. SAMADA WUJUD ISU SERIUS UNTUK DIBICARAKAN [48] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa daripada afidavit- afidavit difailkan oleh kedua-dua pihak dan keterangan-keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan sememangnya jelas bahawa tidak terdapat atau timbul sebarang isu serius yang dipertikaikan di mana isu-isu ini perlu dibicarakan di dalam suatu perbicaraan penuh. I. IMBANGAN KESELESAAN Fakta yang jelas, dakwaan Defendan adalah setakat dakwaan, Defendan sehingga kini, gagal memfailkan sebarang tindakan sivil di 42 Mahkamah bagi (kononnya) menguatkuasakan apa-apa jua hak yang dipercayai Defendan sebagai wujud di atas tanah tersebut yang telah diganggu atau dicabuli sebagaimana yang didakwanya di dalam Borang 19B & Akuan Berkanun tersebut J. HALANGAN HAD MASA [49] Atas dapatan-dapatan Mahkamah di atas berhubung masa, Defendan sememangnya telah dihalang oleh had masa. [50] Atas alasan-alasan di atas, Kandungan 1 Plaintif di perenggan (1), (2), (3),(4),(5)(6) dan (7) dibenarkan. [51] Defendan adalah juga diperintahkan untuk membayar kos sebanyak RM15,000.00 kepada Plaintif. 43 t.t. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 18hb Mei 2017 Peguam Plaintif-Plaintif - Tetuan Ahmad Sukeri & Associates Encik Ismail bin Yahya Peguam Defendan-Defendan - Tetuan Manjit Singh Sachdev, Mohd Radzi & Partners Encik Manpal Singh Cik PH Cheah

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-602-06/2016

PLAINTIF MOHAMED AMINUDEEN BIN ABDUL HAMID DEFENDAN 1. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH KLANG 2. RESOLUTION ALLIANCE SDN BHD

17/05/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d3a072d0-9ca6-4c42-8a5b-a40bdb395ab5&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DI DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA BA-24-602-06/2016 Dalam Perkara mengenai Seksyen 263, 417 dan 418 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 55A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 41 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Gadaian keatas hartanah yang dipegang dibawah hakmilik H.S.M 17794, No. P.T 201513, Taman Sri Andalas (Ladang Tremelbye), Mukim Klang, Daerah Klang melalui perserahan No. 5553/2000 Jil 533 Fol 2 kepada 2 Malayan Banking Berhad/ Resolution Alliance Sdn Bhd yang didaftarkan pada 17 Ogos 2000. ANTARA MOHAMED AMINUDEEN BIN ABDUL HAMID …PLAINTIF DAN 1. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH KLANG 2. RESOLUTION ALLIANCE SDN BHD …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) A. Pengenalan [1] Saman Pemula di dalam Kandungan 1 ini adalah permohonan Plaintif untuk mendapatkan antara-lain perintah-perintah berikut: i. suatu deklarasi untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa perintah jualan yang dibuat oleh Defendan pada 8.3.2016 adalah tidak sah kerana terdapatnya ‘cause to the contrary’. 3 ii. bahawa tarikh lelongan hartanah yang dipegang dibawah hakmilik H.S.M 17794, No. P.T 201513, Taman Sri Andalas (Ladang Tremelbye), Mukim Klang, Dalam Negeri Selangor yang ditetapkan pada 22.7.2016 dibatalkan dan/atau ditangguhkan sementara menunggu keputusan Mahkamah berkenaan keesahan perintah jualan yang dibuat pada 8.3.2016. B. Latar belakang kes [2] Latar belakang kes yang membawa kepada pemfailan permohonan oleh Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 2.1 Plaintif (Mohamed Aminudeen Bin Abdul Hamid) di dalam kes ini adalah seorang ahli perniagaan dan tuanpunya berdaftar asal hartanah yang dipegang dibawah hakmilik H.S.M 17794, No. P.T 201513, Taman Sri Andalas (Ladang Tremelbye), Mukim Klang, Dalam Negeri Selangor (“hartanah tersebut”). 4 2.2 Melalui satu Perjanjian Fasiliti bertarikh 10.8.2000, Malayan Banking Berhad (“MBB”) telah memberikan pinjaman wang sebanyak RM234,000.00 (pinjaman tersebut) kepada Plaintif. 2.3 Sebagai jaminan kepada pinjaman tersebut Plaintif telah melaksanakan satu gadaian ke atas hartanah tersebut kepada MBB melalui Nombor Perserahan 5553/2000 Jil 533 Fol. 2 bertarikh 17.8.2000. 2.4 Kemudian daripada itu, pada 3.1.2008 MBB telah memasuki satu Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan sebuah syarikat bernama Glorious Flame Sdn Bhd (Glorious Flame) di mana MBB telah menjual ‘non-performing loans’ miliknya kepada Glorious Flame. 2.5 Glorious Flame kemudiannya telah ditukar nama kepada Resolution Alliance Sdn Bhd yang merupakan Defendan Kedua di dalam tindakan ini. 5 2.6 Berikutan dengan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, melalui Saman Pemula No. D6-24-99-2008, Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah mengeluarkan suatu perintah Perletakhakan ‘Vesting Order’ bertarikh 17.4.2008 di mana dengan perintah ini MBB telah meletakhak segala hak-hak, manfaat-manfaat, faedah- faedah dan kepentingannya ke atas akaun-akaun Plaintif kepada Defendan Kedua yang telah didaftarkan melalui Nombor Perserahan 5901/2010 bertarikh 28.12.2010. 2.7 Selain daripada hartanah tersebut, terdapat satu lagi tanah kepunyaan Plaintif yang telah juga dicagar oleh Plaintif kepada MBB bagi satu lagi kemudahan pinjaman fasiliti bertarikh 17.9.1999. Tanah tersebut adalah tanah yang dipegang di bawah GRN 42112 Lot No. 34169, Mukim Damansara, Daerah Petaling (“Hartanah Damansara”) yang telah dicagarkan oleh Plaintif kepada MBB sebagai sekuriti untuk kemudahan sebanyak RM265,905.00 yang terdiri daripada pinjaman terma 1 sebanyak RM103,905.00 (di bawah akaun no. 412231903255) dan pinjaman terma 2 sebanyak RM162,000.00 (di bawah akaun no. 412231903262). 6 2.8 Untuk memudahkan pengenalan hartanah yang terlibat di dalam guaman ini akan dirujuk sebagai Hartanah Klang, manakala hartanah yang dinyatakan di perenggan 3.5 akan dirujuk sebagai Hartanah Damansara. 2.9 Gadaian ke atas Hartanah Damansara dan akaun-akaun Plaintif ke atasnya juga termasuk di dalam non performing loans yang merangkumi perjanjian jual beli MBB dan dengan Glorious Flame. 2.10 Plaintif telah memungkiri syarat dan terma-terma pinjaman- pinjaman fasiliti yang diberikan kepadanya apabila beliau gagal membuat pembayaran ansuran yang ditetapkan di dalam pinjaman-pinjaman fasiliti tersebut. 2.11 Di atas kemungkiran Plaintif di dalam menyelaraskan akaun pinjaman fasiliti tersebut, Defendan Kedua melalui peguamcaranya telah memulakan tindakan menguatkuasakan hak dan remedi statutorinya ke atas gadaian-gadaian yang didaftarkan di atas Hartanah Damansara dan Hartanah Klang 7 tersebut dengan memohon perintah-perintah menjual hartanah- hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam. 2.12 Hartanah Klang di dalam guaman ini adalah tanah yang di dalam pegangan Pejabat Tanah. Justeru itu, Defendan Kedua telah memohon untuk perintah menjual Hartanah Klang tersebut melalui lelongan awam di Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang (Defendan Pertama) menurut seksyen 263(1) Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) 1965. 2.13 Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan di sini bahawa behubung penguatkuasaan hak statutori Defendan Kedua ke atas kedua- dua Hartanah Klang dan Hartanah Damansara tersebut beberapa prosiding atau tindakan yang secara berterusan telah difailkan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan Kedua (D2) di Mahkamah Tinggi dengan membangkitkan pelbagai dakwaan dalam usahanya menentang penguatkuasaan hak statutori Defendan Kedua tersebut. Berikutan daripada prosiding/tindakan tersebut terdapat juga rayuan-rayuan yang difailkan di Mahkamah Rayuan. 8 2.14 Prosiding-prosiding/ tindakan-tindakan /rayuan tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 1. Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Saman Pemula No.: S-24NCVC- 230-2010 (Tindakan 230); Tindakan 230: - Defendan Kedua telah memperolehi satu perintah jualan terhadap Hartanah Damansara (Eksibit PLH-4, Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua) - Plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan untuk mengenepikan perintah jualan. - Permohonan Plaintiff telah ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM5,000.00 pada 20.12.2012. Tiada rayuan difailkan oleh Plaintif atas penolakan permohonannya. 2. Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur Perlaksanaan No. 38-1040-2011 (Tindakan 1040); Tindakan 1040: - Defendan Kedua telah memohon arahan-arahan lelongan awam bagi penjualan Hartanah Damansara. Plaintif telah 9 membantah permohonan dengan dakwaan-dakwaan di muka surat 245 - 256, Eksiibit PLH-7 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua. - Dakwaan-dakwaan yang ditimbulkan Plaintif ditolak Mahkamah Kuala Lumpur pada 16.7.2013 (muka surat 258 - 260, Exhibit PLH-8 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua) - Hartanah Damansara telah dijual melalui lelongan awam pada 16.8.2013. 3. Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Saman Pemula No. 24-1132-07/2013 (Tindakan 1132); Tindakan 1132 : - Atas dakwaan-dakwaan dibuat oleh Plaintif di dalam laporan polisnya bertarikh 8.3.2013, Kaveat Pendaftar telah dimasukkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah terhadap kedua-dua Hartanah Klang dan Hartanah Damansara. (Eksibit PLH-10 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua). - Tindakan 1132 difailkan untuk membatalkan kedua-dua Kaveat Pendaftar tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam 10 memerintahkan supaya kedua-dua Kaveat Pendaftar tersebut dibatalkan. (muka surat 274 - 424, Eksibit PLH-11 and Eksibit 12 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua). 4. Mahkamah Rayuan Rayuan Sivil No. B-02-2654-12/13 (Rayuan 2654) Rayuan 2654 : - Plaintif failkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan atas tindakan 1132. - Rayuan 2654 dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan pada 21.3.2014 dengan kos RM1,000.00 (muka surat 426 - 427, Exhibit PLH-13 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua). 5. Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Saman Pemula No. 24-949- 08/2014 (Tindakan 949) ; dan Tindakan 949 : - Atas dakwaan-dakwaan, Plaintiff telah memfailkan tindakan 949 di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 25.8.2014 terhadap Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua (muka surat 429 - 566, Eksibit PLH-14 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua) 11 - Tindakan Plaintif ditolak di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 6.7.2015 (muka surat 568 - 569, Eksiibit PLH-15 14 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua) 6. Mahkamah Rayuan Rayuan Sivil No. B-02(IM)-1344-08/2015 (Rayuan 1344). Rayuan 1344: - Plaintif merayu terhadap keputusan tindakan 949. - Rayuan 1344 dibatalkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan pada 5.1.2016 (muka surat 571-572, Eksiibit PLH-16 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua) 2.15 Tindakan 1132, Rayuan 2654, Tindakan 949 Suit and Rayuan 1344 telah difailkan oleh Plaintif dan digunakan oleh Plaintif sebagai alasan menangguhkan siasatan-siasatan terhadap Hartanah Klang oleh Defendan Kedua. Malahan saman pemula tindakan 949 tidak termeterai telah diserahkan kepada Defendan Kedua sehari sebelum tarikh siasatan yang ditetapkan pada 26.8.2014. 12 2.16 Sehari sebelum siasatan pada 8.3.2016, Defendan Kedua telah diserahkan dengan Writ Saman belum termeterai (muka surat 608-618 Eksibit PLH-18 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua). Tindakan baru ini telah difailkan Plaintif juga atas dakwaan- dakwaannya. 2.17 Berbalik semula kepada kes ini, Defendan Kedua telah seterusnya memulakan prosiding untuk menguatkuasakan hak statutorinya terhadap Hartanah Klang dengan membuat permohonan pada 20.4.2011 kepada Defendan Kedua untuk mengeluarkan satu perintah menjual Hartanah Klang tersebut melalui lelongan awam. 2.18 Sebelum mengeluarkan perintah jualan yang dipohon oleh Defendan Kedua, selaras dengan peruntukan seksyen 261(1) KTN, Defendan Pertama telah menjalankan siasatan terhadap hartanah tersebut. 2.19 Namun, Defendan Pertama tidak dapat menjalankan siasatan- siasatan pada tarikh yang ditetapkan kerana Plaintif telah 13 memohon penangguhan siasatan pada tarikh-tarikh yang ditetapkan dengan menggunakan alasan bahawa prosiding/guaman/rayuan yang telah beliau failkan dan belum dilupuskan oleh Mahkamah. 2.20 Siasatan bagi Hartanah Klang ini telah ditangguhkan sebanyak 15 kali iaitu pada 1.11.2011, 8.2.2012, 10.7.2012, 19.12.2012, 12.3.2013, 29.5.2013, 17.9.2013, 19.3.2014, 26.8.2014, 17.9.2014, 18.11.2014, 24.2.2015, 19.5.2015 and 8.12.2015 (muka surat 574- 606, Eksibit PLH-17, Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua). 2.21 Dakwaan-dakwaan yang telah Plaintif bangkitkan di dalam prosiding/tindakan yang beliau failkan dan dakwaan-dakwaan yang sama telah ditimbulkan di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini boleh dilihat dengan jelas di dalam jadual di bawah ini. Dakwaan- dakwaan Plaintif di dalam Rayuan Plaintif Dakwaan-dakwaan Plaintif di dalam Saman terdahulu Jawapan Defendan Kedua ke atas dakwaan-dakwaan Plaintif di dalam Saman terdahulu dan 14 di dalam Rayuan Plaintif Perintah Perletahakan tidak didaftarkan dengan CCM [perenggan 6 Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif] Perenggan 13 Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif yang difailkan oleh Plaintif dalam Guaman 1132 [ms. 297 hingga 298, Eksibit PLH-11 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua]. Perenggan 18 Afidavit Jawapan yang difailkan oleh Plaintif dalam Guaman 949 [ms. 490, Eksibit PLH- 4 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua]. Perintah Perletakhakan telah pun didaftarkan. Bagaimanapun ini hanya perkara pentadbiran dan tidak akan menjejaskan keesahan Perintah Perletakhakan. Perenggan 13 Afidavit Jawapan No.2 yang difailkan oleh Defendan Kedua dalam Guaman 1132 [ms. 322, Eksibit PLH-11 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua]. Perenggan 15 Afidavit Jawapan (II) yang difailkan oleh Defendan Kedua dalam Guaman 949 [ms. 500, Eksibit PLH-14 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan]. Defendan Kedua tidak boleh menguatkuasakan haknya sebagai pemegang gadaian sebelum pendaftaran Perintah [perenggan 7 dan 8 Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif] Mukasurat 5 Hujahan Lanjut yang difailkan oleh Plaintiff dalam Guaman 230 [ms. 199, Eksibit PLH-5 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua]. Perenggan 24 Afidavit Jawapan Plaintif dalam Guaman 1132 [ms. 300, Eksibit PLH-11 Afidavit Jawapann Defendan Kedua]. Perintah Perletakhakan itu berkuatkuasa dari tarikh kuat kuasa dan tetap sah tanpa mengambil kira undang-undang lain. Perenggan 24 hingga 30 Hujahan Jawapan Ringkas yang difailkan oleh Defendan Kedua dalam Guaman 230 [ms. 230 hingga 232, Eksibit PLH-5 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua]. 15 Perenggan 19 Afidavit Jawapan No.2 yang difailkan oleh Defendan Kedua 2 dalam Guaman 1132 [ms. 325, Eksibit PLH-11 Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua]. 2.22 Selepas siasatan yang kelima belas (15) pada 8.12.2015 ditangguhkan, satu Saman Kepada Penggadai bertarikh 15.2.2016 telah dikeluarkan sekali lagi kepada Plaintif untuk memaklumkan Plaintif untuk menghadiri tarikh siasatan pada 8.3.2016 {tarikh siasatan yang keenam belas (16)}. 2.23 Saman Kepada Penggadai telah diserahkan kepada Plaintif pada 25.2.2016. 2.24 Pada 8.3.2016 Defendan Pertama telah mengeluarkan perintah jualan untuk menjual Hartanah Klang tersebut melalui lelongan awam dan tarikh lelongan awam ditetapkan pada 22.7.2016. 16 2.25 Namun, sebelum tarikh lelongan (22.7.2017), pada 13.6.2016, Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan Saman Pemula (Kandungan 1) ini. [3] Plaintif telah cuba mengetepikan perintah jualan bertarikh 8.3.2016 dengan memohon daripada Mahkamah ini satu perintah untuk mengisytiharkan bahawa perintah lelongan awam yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama bertarikh 8.3.2016 adalah tidak sah kerana terdapat atau wujudnya kausa yang bertentangan “cause to contrary”. [4] Kedua-dua Defendan di dalam menentang permohonan Plaintif telah memfailkan afidavit-afifdavit berikut: i. Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua Jilid 1 dan Jilid 2 bertarikh 26.7.2016. ii. Afidavit tambahan Defendan Kedua bertarikh 5.8.2016. iii. Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Pertama bertarikh 2.9.2017. iv. Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua bertarikh 5.10.2016. 17 [5] Di dalam menentang keras permohonan Plaintif, Defendan Pertama (D1) dan Defendan Kedua (D2) telah membangkitkan bantahan- bantahan berikut: i. permohonan Plaintif yang dibuat berdasarkan rayuan di bawah seksyen 418 KTN adalah dihalang oleh had masa yang diperuntukan oleh seksyen 418 KTN. ii. permohonan/tindakan Plaintif adalah diestop/ dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata. iii. proses perlaksanaan dan tindakan Defendan Pertama di dalam mengeluarkan perintah jualan hartanah tersebut adalah teratur dan selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah KTN. iv. tindakan Defendan Pertama telah dibuat suci hati dan dilindungi oleh peruntukkan KTN. v. tidak wujud kausa yang bertentangan bagi menghalang satu perintah jualan dikeluarkan oleh Defendan Pertama (D1). 18 Alasan i: Halangan Had Masa Di bawah sekyen 418 [6] Mahkamah ini telah merujuk kepada intitulmen saman pemula Plaintif dan mendapati Plaintif telah membawa permohonannya ke Mahkamah ini menurut seksyen-seksyen 263, 417, 418 KTN dan prosidur rayuan di bawah Aturan 55A Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012). [7] Di samping itu, Plaintif juga telah cuba membawa permohonannya di bawah seksyen 41 Akta Relif Spesifik 1950 (ASR) dengan memohon perintah deklarasi bagi mengisytiharkan perintah D1 tersebut adalah tidak sah. [8] Pertama, Mahkamah ini perlu menekankan bahawa seksyen 417 KTN semestinya tidak terpakai bagi kes Plaintif. [9] Begitu juga dengan seksyen 41 ARS 1950. Relif di bawah Seksyen 41 ARS ini tidak terbuka ‘available’ kepada Plaintif kerana undang- undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila undang-undang statut memperuntukan remedi dalaman, mana-mana pihak yang terkilan atas perintah yang dikeluarkan menurut statut tersebut hendaklah 19 menggunakan kesemua remedi dalaman yang diperuntukkan sebelum ke Mahkamah. [10] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas dengan merujuk kepada kes-kes berikut: i. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd v Cecil Abraham (Executor of the Estate of Loo Cheng Ghee) [1998] 4 MLJ 651: “It is beyond dispute that the remedy of declaration is discretionary in nature. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 reads as follows: Any person entitled to any legal character, to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to the character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, the plaintiff need not in that suit ask for any further relief: 20 Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, omits to do so. Explanation — A trustee of property is a 'person interested to deny' a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.' (Emphasis added.) Although s 41 is not a complete code upon the subject of declaratory decrees (Attorney General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan Chik & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 620) and the power to make a declaration is almost unlimited (Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] 2 Ch 490 at p 507 per Lord Sterndale MR), yet, the remedy of declaration may be refused upon settled principles. Thus, generally speaking, the court will not grant a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41).” ii. Hakim K.C Vohrah (YA pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Lokmanal Hakim Ramli & Ors v. Hj. Ismail Ishak & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 795, di dalam memutuskan di dalam perkara-pekara pesaka kecil yang di bawah bidang kuasa Pentadbir Pesaka 21 dan terdapatnya peruntukan rayuan di bawah seksyen 29(1) Akta Pembahagian Pesaka Kecil 1955 telah menyatakan berikut di muka surat 798 dan 798: “In this case the matters complained of relate to a small estate which under the Act are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector; the plaintiffs should under s.29(1) of the Act have appealed against both orders of the Collector made on 22 February 1987, the order made under s.13 relating to the distribution of the property and the other order made under s. 14 relating to the colleteral dispute. I am not unmindful of the Supreme Court case of Development and Commercial Bank Bhd. v. Land Administrator, Wilayah Persekutuan [1991] 2 MLJ 181 on the availability of the remedy available to him to redress a grievance he has against a decision or order of an authority constituted under a statute. The Plaintiffs in this case are indeed applying, inter alia, for a declaration that the defendants had renounced their beneficial share in the property of deceased Ishak and for a consequential order to set aside the Collector’s order of distribution. However, all the plaintiffs being aggrieved parties within the meaning of 2. 29(1) of the Act they had a right of appeal 22 and they should have appeal and they should have appealed under s. 29(1) and the remedy of declaration is not open to them.” iii. Di dalam Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41, Mahkamah Persekutuan di muka surat 44 telah memutuskan antara lain seperti yang berikut: “It is well settled law that the court will not make a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume 22, page 749, paragraph 1611). To quote but a few authorities in support of that proposition, Lord Herschell said in Barraclough v Brown: "It was argued for the appellant that, even if not entitled to recover the expenses by action in the High Court, he was, at all events, entitled to come to that court for a declaration that on the true interpretation of the statute he had a right to recover them. It might be enough to say that no such case was made by the appellant's claim. But, apart from this, I think it would be very mischievous to hold that when a party is compelled by statute to resort to an inferior court he can come first to the High Court to have his right to recover – the very matter relegated to the inferior court – determined. Such a 23 proposition was not supported by authority, and is, I think, unsound in principle." In Pasmore v The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council Earl of Halsbury L.C. said: "… The principle that where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very familiar and which runs through the law." In the more recent case of Wilkinson v Barking Corporation Asquith L.J. said: "… It is undoubtedly good law that where a statute creates a right and, in plain language, gives a specific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal for its enforcement, a party seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedy or that tribunal, and not to others." iv. Hakim Hepworth di dalam kes Chop Chuah Seong Joo v. Teh Chooi Nai & Ors. (1963) 29 M.L.J. 96, di muka surat 100 telah menyatakan: “In the present case the plaintiffs were not without a remedy. They were specifically given a right of appeal on a point of law by section 24 11 of the 1956 Ordinance. They have suffered no injustice because they have only themselves to blame for not pursuing the appeal. In my opinion section 11 of the 1956 Ordinance provides for an aggrieved party an entirely adequate alternative remedy and accordingly this is not a case in which a claim to a declaration should be entertained.” [11] Justeru itu, di dalam kes ini adalah jelas bahawa Plaintif tidak berhak untuk mendapatkan satu perintah mengisytiharkan perintah jualan bertarikh 8.3.2016 itu tidak sah atau terbatal menurut seksyen 41 ARS 1950. [12] Peruntukan yang tinggal untuk Plaintif bergantung adalah seksyen 418 KTN. [13] Seksyen 418 memperuntukkan berikut: “418. Appeals to the Court (1) Any person or body aggrieved by any decision under this Act of the State Director, the Registrar or any Land Administrator may, at any time within the period of three months beginning with the 25 date on which it was communicated to him, appeal therefrom to the Court. (2) Any such appeal shall be made in accordance with the provisions of any written law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure; and the Court shall make such order thereon as it considers just. (3) In this section ‘decision’ includes any act, omission, refusal, direction or order.” [14] Seksyen 418 KTN ini memperuntukkan bahawa mana-mana pihak yang terkilan terhadap mana-mana perintah yang dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah, bolehlah dalam tempoh masa tiga bulan daripada keputusan itu disampaikan kepadanya, merayu ke Mahkamah. [15] Di dalam kes ini, perintah jualan telah dikeluarkan oleh D1 pada 8.3.2016 dan namun saman pemula ini telah hanya difailkan oleh Plaintif pada 13.6.2016. Plaintif telah disampaikan mengenai perintah jualan itu pada pada 8.3.2016 (pada tarikh perintah jualan 26 dikeluarkan D1) di mana Plaintif sendiri telah hadir pada masa siasatan dijalankan oleh D1 pada 8.3.2016. Plaintif sememangnya telah mengetahui keputusan D1 yang telah mengeluarkan perintah jualan Hartanah Klang pada tarikh tersebut. Apabila perintah jualan dikeluarkan oleh D1 pada 8.3.2016 maka tempoh tiga bulan untuk merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi akan luput pada 7.6.2016. [16] Berhubung dengan pematuhan masa tiga bulan menurut seksyen 418 KTN, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada peruntukan dan kes-kes berikut:- i. Seksyen 38 Akta Prosiding Kerajaan 1956 Limitation of Acts 38. Any written law relating to the limitation of time for bringing proceedings against public authorities may be relied upon by the Government as a defence in any civil proceedings against the Government. ii. Alias bin Ismail v Hairuddin bin Mohamad & Anor [1997] 4 CLJ 669 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan telah memutuskan bahawa Mahkamah tiada budi bicara untuk mengenepikan pembelaan had masa: 27 “The Court has no discretion to set aside a defence of limitation.” iii. Credit Corp. (M) Bhd. V. Fong Tak Sin [1991] 1 CLJ 69, Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan bahawa: “The limitation law is promulgated for the primary object of discouraging plaintiffs from sleeping on their actions and more importantly, to have a definite end to litigation. This is is accord with the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litiup that in the interest of the State there must be an end to litigation. The rationale of the limitation law should be appreciated and enforced by the Courts.” [17] Di dalam perkara ini, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Defendan Pertama berdasarkan peruntukan seksyen 418 KTN, rayuan Plaintif terhadap keputusan Defendan Pertama sememangnya adalah di luar had masa tiga bulan yang ditetapkan. Plaintif juga telah tidak langsung mengemukakan sebarang alasan ke atas kelewatan tersebut. Justeru itu, atas isu had masa ini sahaja rayuan Plaintif terhadap Defendan Pertama semestinya gagal. [18] Di dalam perkara Plaintif ini, Mahkamah ini perlu menekankan bahawa Plaintif di dalam kes ini bukanlah seorang litigan yang baru 28 pertama kali berhadapan dengan prosiding Mahkamah. Plaintif sendiri telah memfailkan lebih daripada lima tindakan terhadap D1 ataupun D2 Dengan keadaan ini, Plaintif sememangnya sedar dan mempunyai pengetahuan mengenai keperluan undang-undang berhubung pematuhan tempoh masa di dalam pemfailan sesuatu tindakan di Mahkamah, bahkan ini bukan kali pertama seksyen 418 KTN digunakan oleh Plaintif. Prosiding berhubung Hartanah Klang ini telah bermula sejak tahun 2011 sehinggalah kini. Plaintif di dalam kes semestinya dan sewajarnya ada pengetahuan mengenai tempoh masa yang diperuntukan oleh seksyen 418 KTN bagi beliau membuat rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. [19] Di samping itu, kalau melihat sejarah pemfailan tindakan-tindakan Plaintif dan tindak-tanduk (perlakuan) Plaintif, kebanyakan tindakan- tindakan Plaintif telah difailkan pada saat-saat akhir sebelum sesuatu perintah dikeluarkan oleh pihak Pentadbir Tanah terhadap hartanahnya. Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif telah memfailkan saman pemula ini sebelum pentadbir tanah dapat melaksanakan lelongan awam Hartanah Klang pada 22.07.2016. 29 Alasan ii. Permohonan / tindakan Plaintif adalah diestop/ dihalang oleh doktrin res judicata. [20] Plaintif di dalam memohon perintah-perintah di dalam Kandungan 1 telah bersandarkan kepada dua alasan iaitu: Alasan i: Semasa Borang 16D dikeluarkan, Defendan Kedua belum lagi sah berdaftar sebagai pemegang gadaian yang menerima perletakhakan daripada MBB kerana proses pendaftaran Perintah Perletakhakan belum disempurnakan. Alasan ii: Memandangkan Defendan Kedua adalah sebuah syarikat yang mempunyai pemegang asing, maka ini menjadikan Defendan Kedua sebuah syarikat asing, Sebagai syarikat asing, Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan Kedua perlu mendapatkan kebenaran pihak berkuasa negeri di bawah seksyen 433B KTN 1965, sebelum berurusan dengan sebarang hal tanah. 30 [21] Mahkamah ini di perenggan 2.14 alasan penghakiman ini telahpun menggariskan tindakan-tindakan yang timbul daripada tindakan penguatkuasaan hak statutori D2 terhadap Hartanah Damanasara dan Hartanah Klang. Kesemua prosiding/tindakan/ rayuan ini telah diterangkan oleh D2 secara terperinci di dalam Afidavit Jawapan Defendan Kedua. [22] Di dalam perkara permohonan Plaintif di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah ini mestilah merujuk Tindakan 949. Melalui Perintah bertarikh 6.7.2015, Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, telah menolak permohonan di dalam Tindakan 949. [23] Alasan ii telah telahpun diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam pada 06.07.2015. Justeru, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa atas prinsip doktrin res judicata Plaintif adalah diestop/dihalang daripada membawa alasan ii ke dalam guaman ini kerana ia telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah pada 6.7.2017. [24] Prinsip doktrin res judicata boleh dirujuk dalam kes Mahkamah Agung Asia Commercial Finance (M) Berhad v. Kawal Teliti Sdn 31 Bhd [1995] 3 CLJ 783, di mana Y.A Hakim Peh Swee Chin dalam membicarakan prinsip res judicata adalah seperti berikut: “[1] The significance of res judicata lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum, which may take the form of either cause of action estoppel or issues estoppel. The cause of action estoppel raises when rights or liabilities involving a particular right to take a particular action in Court for a particular remedy are determines in a final judgment and such right of action, that is the cause of action, merges into the said final judgment. The issue estoppel, on the other hand, means simply an issue which party is estopped from arising in a subsequent proceeding. [2] The doctrine of res judicata is not confined to causes of action or issues which the court is actually asked to decide or has already decided. It covers also cases of action or issues or facts which, though not already decided as a result of the same not being brought forward due to negligence, inadvertence or deliberately, are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised, that it would be 32 an abuse of the process of the Court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.” [25] Di dalam kes Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Lim Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228: “(a) Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. (b) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth – res judicata pro veritate accipitur.” Kausa yang bertentangan [26] Permohonan Plaintif untuk membantah terhadap perintah jualan hartanah tersebut kerana mendakwa wujudnya kausa yang bertentangan atas alasan i dan ii. 33 [27] Undang-undang berhubung bidang kuasa Pentadbir Tanah mengeluarkan satu perintah jualan terhadap tanah-tanah di bawah pegangan pejabat tanah adalah jitu dan mantap. [28] Mana-mana pemegang gadaian boleh memulakan prosiding halang tebus/ menguatkuasakan hak atau remedi statutori yang ada kepada bagi tanah-tanah pegangan pejabat tanah dengan memohon untuk satu perintah jualan dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah menurut seksyen 263(1) KTN 1965. [29] Di akhir siasatan yang dijalankan menurut seksyen 261 KTN, Pentadbir Tanah adalah berhak / mempunyai kuasa untuk mengeluarkan satu perintah jualan atas permohonan mana-mana pemegang gadaian kecuali jika wujud / terdapat kausa yang bertentangan. [30] Seksyen 263(1) KTN 1965 telah jelas memperuntukkan: “(1) At the conclusion of any enquiry under section 261, the Land Administrator shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the 34 charge in question relates unless he satisfied of the existence of the cause to the contrary” [31] Justeru itu, mana-mana pemberi gadaian yang berhasrat untuk menepis satu perintah jualan melalui lelongan awam oleh Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah membuktikan bahawa wujudnya kausa yang bertentangan. [32] Di dalam pentakrifan frasa kausa yang bertentangan, di dalam kes Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad [1997] 1 MLJ 77, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menerangkan bahawa kausa yang bertentangan boleh dijelaskan antara lain seperti berikut: “It is not sufficient to allege mere breaches by the charge of the loan agreement between the charge and the borrower, or even of the terms of the annexure to the charge in order to resist an application under s.256(3) of the NLC. An allegation that the charge acted in breach of contract, while it may give rise to an independent action in personam, is sufficient per se to defeat 35 the ad rem rights of a charge under his registered charge to an order for sale. These are the following categories of cases where cause to the contrary within s.256(3) of the NLC may be established: i. Firstly, a chargor who is able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine housed in s.340 of the NLC. ii. Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s.256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order of sale, for e.g. failure on part of the to prove the making of a demand or service upon the chargor of a notice in Form 16D would constitute cause to contrary. Similarly where the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the charge. 36 iii. Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order of sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule or equity.” [33] Di dalam mencapai pendekatan terhad dengan memberikan tiga kategori kausa yang bertentangan ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan di dalam kes Low Lee Lian tersebut telah memberikan alasan- alasannya dengan menyatakan seperti berikut: “We are conscious that the approach we have adopted results in a very narrow and restrictive interpretation of s.256(3) of the Code. But there are good reasons of policy for such an interpretation. It must not be forgotten that in the ordinary way, banks and other financial institutions loan moneys deposited with them by their customer to a borrower on the faith of the security of a charge created over the landed property of the borrower, or as here, of a third party. In the event of a default by the borrower, the lending institution normally looks to early recovery of all or a substantial part of the money due to them from a sale of a security. If the courts of this country interpret 37 the phrase ‘cause to contrary’ appearing in s.256(3) of the Code liberally, then, institutional lenders would loose confidence in their right to realize their security through an order for sale. Financial institutions would then become reluctant to lend money to bonafide entrepreneurs. Commerce would come to a standstill and the development of land and industries in this country which are largely dependent upon loans from banks would cease. No judgment of this court will be designed to produce such a consequence.” “Although each case turns upon its own facts, we propose to consider by way of illustration only, the usual kind of case with which this court has been faced on numerous occasions. An application under s.256 is opposed by the chargor on the ground that the charge has acted in breach of contract, e.g. by not releasing moneys due under the loan agreement or by increasing the rate of interest without proper notice or by not giving any proper account of the sums paid by the borrower. A judge faced with such complaints will merely say that they do not, on proper reading of s.256(3) and the authorities which have considered the section, constitute cause to the contrary. He will not, and ought 38 not to, to enter upon a discussion of the question whether any or all of these complaints have or are devoid of any merit.” Alasan i: Semasa Borang 16D dikeluarkan, Defendan Kedua belum lagi sah berdaftar sebagai pemegang gadaian yang menerima perletakhakan daripada MBB kerana proses pendaftaran Perintah Perletakhakan belum disempurnakan. [34] Plaintif telah menghujahkan bahawa semasa D2 mengisukan Notis Borang 16D (Notis 16D) bertarikh 24.9.2010 kepada Plaintif, D2 bukanlah pemegang gadaian yang sah kerana Perintah Perletakhakan bertarikh 17.4.2008 belum lagi didaftarkan dengan Pendaftar Syarikat. [35] Adalah dihujahkan lagi oleh Plaintif bahawa apabila Perintah Perletakkan tersebut belum didaftarkan di Pejabat Pendaftar Syarikat, hak-hak dan kepentingan MBB yang wujud di dalam akaun-akaun Plaintif belum lagi diletakkan (vested) sepenuhnya ke atas D2 dan ini bermakna D2 belum lagi meletakkan dirinya menggantikan MBB 39 dengan sepenuhnya. Maka D2 belum lagi berhak menguatkuasakan gadaian tersebut. [36] Adalah dihujahkan seterusnya oleh Plaintif bahawa pada masa D2 memulakan prosiding halang tebus iaitu pada masa notis 16D dikeluarkan oleh D2, D2 bukanlah pemegang gadaian hartanah tersebut kerana hak-hak/kepentingan-kepentingan belum disempurnakan (crystallised). [37] Benarkah apa yang dihujahkan oleh Plaintif bahawa untuk D2 menguatkuasakan hak-hak/kepentingan-kepentingan yang telah letakkanhak ke atasnya, Perintah Perletakhakan bertarikh 17.4.2008 mestilah didaftarkan di Pendaftar Syarikat terlebih dahulu. [38] Saya bersetuju dengan peguam D2 bahawa hujahan Plaintif tidak mempunyai merit langsung. [39] Perenggan 1, 3, 3.4 dan 3.9, Perintah Perletakhakan bertarikh 17.4.2008 (Eksibit ‘MAAH-3’) berbunyi berikut:- 40 “1. Penjualan dan pindahmilik Aset tersebut (yang mendefinisikan dibawah) membentuk sebahagian daripada perniagaan Pemberi Pindah Milik dan yang telah dijual oleh Pemberi Pindah Milik kepada Penerima Pindahan di bawah dan menurut perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 3.1.2008 yang dibuat antara mereka (“Perjanjian Jual Beli”) kini diberi efek di bawah Seksyen 50 Akta Bank dan Institusi Kewangan 1989 pada dan berkuatkuasa dari Hari Perniagaan ketiga (3) dari tarikh pemberian Perintah ini (“Tarikh Pindahan”). 3. Bahawa, sebagai tambahan dan tidak kurang daripada perenggan-perenggan di atas, perintah-perintah berikut diberikan dan mempunyai efek pada dan dari Tarikh Pindahan untuk memudahkan dan memberi efek kepada pindahmilik… 3.4 bahawa berhubung dengan mana-mana suratcara sedia ada yang dikeluarkan berkenaan dengan atau yang berhubung dengan Aset-Aset tersebut, sama ada dalam 41 bentuk surat ikatan, surat ikatan pol, indenture, wasiat atau sebaliknya, atau perintah mana-mana mahkamah, di bawah atau oleh apa-apa hartanah yang diletakhak kepada pemberi pindahmilik, dianggap dan mempunyai efek seperti untuk apa-apa rujukan didalamnya kepada pemberi pindahmilik, terdapat penggantian rujukan kepada penerima pindahan. 3.9 bahawa apa-apa sekuriti berkenaan dengan dan yang berkaitan dengan Aset-Aset tersebut yang dipegang oleh Pemberi Pindah Milik sebaik sahaja sebelum Tarikh Pindahan, atau oleh agen atau penama, pemegang amanah, untuk Pemberi Pindah Milik, sebagai sekuriti untuk bayaran atau pelepasan apa-apa liability obligor, akan dipegang oleh penerima pindahan..” [40] Di dalam kes ini, adalah jelas bahawa D2 di dalam kes ini telahpun menerima hak-hak/ kepentingan- kepentingan daripada MBB sebagai pemegang gadaian pada 22.4.2008 iaitu sebelum Borang 16D diisukan pada 24.9.2010. 42 [41] Di dalam kes Alliance Bank Malaysia v. MCK Development Sdn Bhd [2005] 5 CLJ 77 telah diputuskan bahawa: “In my view, parliament enacted s. 50(6)(a) of the BAFIA merely for the purpose of laying down the subsequent administrative procedures to be taken for the formal registration of the vesting order at the relevant land registry in accordance with s. 420 of NLC. I can see no ambiguity in the said provision. To my mind, it is irrelevant and of no consequence in this matter that the vesting order had subsequently been registered formally at the land registry after the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings. In my view, the registration of the vesting under s. 420 of NLC is not a precondition to the commencement of the charge action, as I have stated at the outset that s. 50(3) of BAFIA expressly provides that notwithstanding the provisions in any law the charged properties shall be vested in the plaintiff automatically on 31-12-2000. Thus, with the vesting order the plaintiff is not required to carry out any further administrative act, for instance registering the order with the land registry, in order to enforce the charge.” 43 [42] Di dalam kes EON Bank Berhad v. Gandarama Sdn Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 247, telah diputuskan seperti berikut: “On the other hand, it is also important to state that the omission to register the said vesting order is curable so long as no real prejudice will result to the defendant and further, the defendant has not shown any prejudice having been caused. There is also no fundamental breach which goes to the root of the charge to such an extent to vitiate the foreclosure proceedings filed by the plaintiff. If at all the said vesting order is required to be registered or served on the Registrar of Title, it may be remedied by presently causing a copy of the said vesting order to be served on the Registrar of Title.” [43] Seterusnya di dalam kes Johannes Koplan v Aw Chen [1970] 1 MLJ 220, Ong CJ menjelaskan bahawa: “Legal technicalities which stand in the way of any aggrieved person seeking and obtaining his remedy in court should not be allowed to prevail so as to frustrate any just claim.” 44 [44] Berdasarkan kes-kes di atas, adalah jelas bahawa pendaftaran Perintah Perletakhakan hanyalah satu tanggungjawab administratif dan bukanlah pra-syarat serta satu halangan untuk D2 melaksanakan dan menguatkuasakan hak dan remedi statutori sebagai pemegang gadaian untuk memohon untuk perintah jualan melalui lelongan awam. [45] Kalaupun ianya perlu didaftarkan, Mahkamah mempunyai bidang kuasa sedia untuk memperbaiki dan untuk menemui keadilan dengan mengarahkan sedemikian sebelum mengambil langkah selanjutnya dalam prosiding tersebut. Sebagaimana di dalam kes ini, Perintah Perletakhakan telahpun didaftarkan oleh MBB dengan Pendaftar Syarikat pada 3.5.2011. [46] Pendaftaran Perintah Perletakhakan yang tidak didaftarkan adalah boleh diperbaiki selagi mana tiada prejudis yang sebenar disebabkannya kepada Plaintif dan seterusnya Plaintif tidak menunjukkan mana-mana prejudis yang disebabkannya. Tidak terdapatnya perlanggaran dasar atau undang-undang substantif yang 45 menyebabkan prosiding lelongan awam yang difailkan Defendan Kedua rosak. [47] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Perintah Perletakkan yang tidak didaftarkan di Pendaftar Syarikat bukanlah sesuatu yang tergulung atau terjumlah kepada satu kausa yang bertentangan. Alasan ii: Defendan Kedua adalah sebuah syarikat yang mempunyai pemegang asing, maka ini menjadikan Defendan Kedua sebuah syarikat asing, Sebagai syarikat asing, Plaintif mendakwa bahawa Defendan Kedua perlu mendapatkan kebenaran pihak berkuasa negeri sebelum berurusan dengan sebarang hal tanah. [48] Adalah menjadi hujahan Plaintif bahawa memandangkan D2 mempunyai pemegang saham asing, ini menjadikan D2 sebuah syarikat asing. Sebagai syarikat asing, Plaintif seterusnya berhujah bahawa untuk meneruskan tindakan prosiding yang melibatkan perkara tanah perlu mendapat kebenaran Pihak Berkuasa Negeri menurut Seksyen 433B KTN 1965 ini. 46 [49] Seperti yang diputuskan di perenggan [23] alasan penghakiman Plaintif adalah dihalang untuk membangkitkan alasan ii kerana ia telahpun diputuskan di dalam Tindakan 949. Namun, demi kesempurnaan, Mahkamah ini akan mempertimbangkan dan menentukan isu ini juga. [50] Seksyen 433B(3) KTN memperuntukan seperti berikut: “433B. Non-citizens and foreign companies may acquire, etc., land only with approval of State Authority. (3) Notwithstanding sub-section (1), but subject to sub-section (4), it shall not be necessary for a non-citizen or a foreign company to obtain the approval of the State Authority for the purpose of a charge or a lien in respect of any alienated land or any subdivided share in such land or any lease of such land under Part Sixteen.” [51] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif telah khilaf undang- undang dalam perkara ini. Undang-undang di dalam kebenaran menurut Seksyen 433B(3) KTN adalah jelas. 47 [52] Mahkamah ini suka merujuk kepada kes CIMB Investment Bank Bhd v. Metroplex Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 9 CLJ 1012, yang mana Mahkamah Persekutuan telahpun memutuskan seperti berikut: “Where the dealing is a land charge or lien, it shall not necessary for a non-citizen or a foreign company to obtain the prior approval of the State Authority for the registration and endorsement of the charge. Hence, it could not be contended that the instant charge violated s.433B in that six of the guarantors under the GFA were foreign companies which failed to obtain the requisite approval of the State Authority. Further, the alleged breach of cl.18(G) of the GFA, which, even if true, was not a contravention that defied an express statutory provision.”( Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [53] Maka berdasarkan peruntukkan dan kes di atas, jikapun Defendan Kedua adalah sebuah syarikat asing yang ingin menjalankan haknya sebagai pemegang gadaian, Defendan kedua tidak perlu untuk mendapat kelulusan daripada Pihak Berkuasa Negeri bagi maksud gadaian di bawah Bahagian Enam Belas KTN 1965. 48 [54] Justeru, berbalik kepada isu kausa yang bertentangan, Mahkamah dengan ini berpandangan jelas bahawa alasan-alasan yang dibangkitkan Plaintif di atas yang menyatakan bahawa Defendan Kedua bukan pemegang gadaian yang sah berdaftar kerana Perintah Perletakhakan belum lagi didaftarkan dengan Pendaftar Syarikat. [55] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini juga bahawa proses perlaksanaan dan tindakan D1 di dalam mengeluarkan perintah jualan hartanah tersebut adalah teratur dan selaras dengan peruntukan di bawah KTN. Tindakan D1 telah dibuat suci hati dan dilindungi oleh peruntukkan KTN. [56] Adalah menjadi dapatan mahkamah ini bahawa alasan-alasan yang ditimbulkan Plaintif di dalam percubaannya untuk membuktikan atau menunjukkan sebab atau mewujudkan kausa yang bertentangan bagi menghalang satu perintah penjualan melalui lelongan awam adalah alasan-alasan yang tidak bermerit langsung. 49 [57] Atas alasan-alasan di atas, Saman Pemula Plaintif dalam Kandungan 1 dengan ini ditolak dengan kos. Mahkamah ini juga memerintahkan supaya Plaintif membayar kos sebanyak RM5000.00 kepada Defendan Pertama dan RM10,000.00 kepada Defendan Kedua. [58] Memandangkan D1 telah tidak dapat melaksanakan tugasnya menurut undang-undang dengan lancar dan D2 pula terpaksa berhadapan dengan halangan-halangan di dalam menguatkuasakan haknya di sisi undang-undang dengan tindak-tanduk Plaintif yang telah memulakan prosiding undang-undang yang bertalu-talu sehingga prosiding Mahkamah telah berterusan sekian lama, maka Mahkamah ini juga memerintahkan bahawa Plaintif adalah tidak dibenarkan membuat apa-apa permohonan ataupun tindakan undang-undang terhadap D1 ataupun D2 sehinggalah kos-kos yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah ini dibayar sepenuhnya terhadap D1 dan D2. 50 ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 17hb Mei 2017 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Lope Maizura Cik Farahlisa bersama Cik Nadia Peguam Defendan Pertama - Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Selangor Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Peguam Defendan Kedua - Tetuan Rahmat Lim & Partners Encik Jack Yaow

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24NCVC-131-06/2016

PLAINTIF PETRONAS GAS BERHAD DEFENDAN MAJLIS BANDARAYA SHAH ALAM

15/05/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5e60e8e4-670b-4cbd-b9f2-1acb05d1fb83&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO.: BA-24NCVC-131-06/2016 Dalam perkara rayuan oleh PETRONAS GAS BERHAD (No Sykt: 10167-H) (“PGB”) menurut Seksyen 145 Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976 yang difailkan di sini tanpa prejudis kepada bantahan PGB terhadap (a) caj retrospektif yang dikenakan oleh Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam (‘MBSA’) terhadap PGB; (b) keesahan pindaan yang dibuat atau cuba dibuat oleh MBSA kepada Senarai Nilaian yang terpakai termasuk keesahan notis yang diberikan oleh MBSA kepada PGB untuk membuat atau cuba membuat pindaan tersebut; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 5 Kaedah 3 dan Aturan 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Keputusan Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam melalui notis bertarikh 16 Mei 2016 yang diterima pada 26 Mei 2016 berkenaan nilaian tahunan atau cukai taksiran yang dikenakan untuk pegangan-pegangan tersebut. ANTARA PETRONAS GAS BERHAD ...PLAINTIF DAN MAJLIS BANDARAYA SHAH ALAM ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) A. PENGENALAN [1] Plaintif (Petronas Gas Bhd) adalah merupakan sebuah syarikat minyak dan gas yang menjalankan perniagaan pemprosesan gas dan utiliti serta penyaluran gas. 3 [2] Defendan (Majlis Bandaraya Shah Alam) pula adalah Pihak Berkuasa Tempatan yang mempunyai bidangkuasa-bidangkuasa antara-lain untuk melaksanakan cukai taksiran dengan menentukan nilai tahunan bagi maksud kadaran dan seterusnya mengenakan cukai taksiran berdasarkan kepada nilai tahunan dengan kadar tertentu bagi hartanah / pegangan yang terletak di dalam kawasan pentadbirannya. [3] Melalui satu surat bertajuk Bantahan Ke Atas Nilai Tahunan Bagi Pegangan, Alamat Pegangan: Laluan Paip Gas Milik Petronas Gas Berhad (PGB) (Stesen Meru City Gate – Batu 3 City Centre dan Stesen Buki Kemuning – Stesen Bukit Badak) bertarikh 16.5.2016, Defendan telah menilai pegangan-pegangan Plaintif pada nilai tahunan RM26,505,000.00 dan dengan nilai tahunan tersebut, cukai taksiran yang dikenakan kepada Plaintif pada kadar 7.50% daripada nilaian tahunan iaitu RM1,987,875.00. [4] Plaintif yang tidak berpuashati terhadap nilaian tahunan yang dinilaikan ke atas pegangan-pegangannya serta cukai taksiran yang dikenakan tersebut telah memfailkan rayuan melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan 1) ini menurut seksyen 145 Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976 (AKT 1976). 4 [5] Perlu juga dinyatakan di sini bahawa di dalam Kandungan 1 Plaintif, selain daripada merayu terhadap cukai taksiran sebanyak RM1,987,875.00 yang dikenakan atas nilaian tahunan pegangan pada RM26,505,000.00 dengan memohon remedi-remedi yang bersangkutan cukai taksiran yang dikenakan tersebut di perenggan (a), (b), (c) dan (d), namun di perenggan (e) dan (f) , Plaintif juga telah memohon perintah-perintah atau relif berkenaan dakwaan bahawa Plaintif telah dikenakan oleh Defendan caj atau cukai taksiran kebelakang / restropektif (“restrospective”). [6] Namun demikian, pada bulan September 2016 Plaintif telah memaklumkan kepada Mahkamah ini bahawa bagi isu caj kebelakang / restropektif (“restrospective”) ini, Plaintif telah memfailkan satu permohonan semakan kehakiman ke atas isu ini di Mahkamah LJC No. kes BA-25-12-03/2016 (di hadapan Hakim Mohd Yazit), justeru itu perenggan (e) dan (f) Kandungan 1 tidak akan diteruskan di hadapan Mahkamah ini dan akan diputuskan di Mahkamah LJC. [7] Mahkamah ini dengan yang demikian akan hanya mempertimbangkan dan menentukan remedi-remedi yang dipohon Plaintif di perenggan a), (b), (c) dan (d) Kandungan 1 5 B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [8] Latar belakang kes yang membawa kepada pemfailan rayuan ini oleh Plaintif adalah seperti berikut 8.1 Plaintif memiliki saluran-saluran paip gas bawah tanah yang merentasi / melalui tanah-tanah yang terletak di dalam kawasan pentadbiran Defendan. Tanah-tanah tersebut dipegang oleh Plaintif di bawah pegangan pajakan. Di atas tanah-tanah yang direntasi oleh saluran-saluran paip gas tersebut terdapat pula stesen-stesen injab dan “block valves”. 8.2 Bagi kemudahan rujukan, saluran-saluran paip gas di bawah tanah beserta stesen injab dan “block valves” di atas tanah akan dirujuk sebagai “Saluran Gas tersebut” manakala tanah-tanah yang direntasi oleh Saluran Gas tersebut tersebut pula akan dirujuk sebagai “tanah-tanah tersebut”. 8.3 Secara keseluruhannya Saluran Gas Plaintif tersebut adalah lebih kurang 44 kilometer panjang dengan paip berdiameter 30 dan 36 inci di mana sebahagian daripadanya telah dibina 6 pada tahun 1991 manakala sebahagian lagi telah dibina pada tahun 2006. 8.4 Tanah-Tanah tersebut pula merangkumi 37 bidang tanah industri yang berbentuk tidak sekata dengan luas lebih kurang 924,895 meter persegi dan dengan kelebaran 30 meter ke 40 meter serta mempunyai kepanjangan lebih kurang 27 kilometer. 8.5 Oleh kerana secara amnya sesuatu pegangan dianggap dan disifatkan sebagai merangkumi bukan sahaja tanah, tetapi juga bangunan dan struktur lain yang berada di tanah yang berkaitan, maka Plaintif telah merujuk saluran Gas tersebut dan Tanah-Tanah tersebut secara kolektif sebagai “Pegangan-Pegangan Plaintif”. 8.6 Melalui notis bertarikh 1 Disember 2015 (Notis Pindaan Senarai Nilaian) yang dikeluarkan oleh Defendan kepada Plaintitf, Defendan telah memberi notis dan memaklumkan bahawa mereka akan meminda Senarai Nilaian yang telah dibuat pada tahun 2005 dan masih terpakai setakat 31 Disember 2015. 7 8.7 Di dalam perenggan 3, Notis Pindaan Senarai Nilaian tersebut juga, Defendan telah memberi notis kepada Plaintif bahawa nilai tahunan Pegangan-Pegangan Plaintif adalah berjumlah RM32,000,000.00. Dengan nilai tahunan tersebut, cukai taksiran pada kadar 7.5% akan dikenakan kepada Plaintif mulai 1.1.2015 RM2,400,000.00 setahun. 8.8 Plaintif telah menerima Notis Pindaan Senarai Nilaian tersebut pada 9 Disember 2015. 8.9 Atas Notis Pindaan Senarai Nilaian tersebut, melalui surat bertarikh 10 Disember 2015, Plaintif telah mengemukakan bantahan terhadap Notis Pindaan Senarai Nilaian tersebut dan menyatakan bahawa ia akan menyatakan alasan-alasan bantahan dan laporan bertulis pada tarikh perbicaraan yang akan ditetapkan. Di dalam surat ini juga, Plaintif telah memohon penjelasan Defendan berhubung lot-lot yang terlibat dan asas nilaian yang diguna pakai di dalam menentukan nilai tahunan pegangan Plaintif. 8.10 Defendan kemudian telah menetapkan tarikh pendengaran bantahan pada 10.2.2016 jam 12.00 tengahari. 8 8.11 Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa pegangan-pegangan Plaintif sebelum ini tidak pernah dikenakan sebarang cukai taksiran oleh Defendan. 8.12 Pada tarikh pendengaran 10.2.2016 wakil Plaintif telah hadir namun tiada laporan penilaian telah dikemukakan oleh pihak Plaintif kepada Defendan. 8.13 Kemudian daripada itu Defendan telah mengeluarkan Invois Cukai (Notis Taksiran) (Invois) bertarikh 12.2.2016 yang menilaikan nilai tahunan pegangan-pegangan Plaintif pada RM32,000,000.00 dan cukai taksiran yang dikenakan pada 7.50% adalah RM2,400,000.00. 8.14 Melalui suratnya bertarikh 22.2.2016, Plaintif telah membantah dan mempertikaikan invois tersebut atas alasan yang laporan penilaian bagi pihaknya masih belum dikemukakan kepada Defendan. 8.15 Melalui suratnya bertarikh 07.03.2016, Defendan telah menjawab segala surat-surat Plaintif bertarikh 12.01.2016, 17.02.2016 dan 22.02.2016 (Ekshibit KI-1 dan KI-2). 9 8.16 Pada 10.3.2016, Plaintif telah mengemukakan kepada Defendan satu laporan penilaian yang telah disediakan oleh Jurunilai yang dilantiknya iaitu Tetuan Raine & Horne + Zaki International Sdn Bhd (Tetuan Raine) bertarikh 27.3.2016. 8.17 Di dalam laporan penilaian mereka bertarikh 27.3.2016, Tetuan Raine telah menilaikan pegangan-pegangan Plaintif dengan nilai tahunan berjumlah RM10,596,821.91. 8.18 Penilaian nilai tahunan pegangan Plaintif yang dibuat oleh Tetuan Raine bernilai RM10,596,821.91 hanya merupakan lebih kurang 30% dari nilai tahunan berjumlah RM32,000.000.00 yang ditetapkan oleh Defendan di dalam Notis Pindaan Senarai Nilaian tersebut. 8.19 Defendan telah menyediakan Laporan Penilaian Ke-2 oleh jurunilainya Tetuan Azami & Co (Tetuan Azami) bertarikh 21.3.2016. 8.20 Plaintif telah pada 04.04.2016 telah mengemukakan Laporan Penilaian Ke-2 Plaintif bertarikh 27.3.2016; 10 8.21 Kemudiannya Defendan telah menetapkan tarikh bagi Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Mendengar Bantahan Nilaian pada 19.4.2016. 8.22 Setelah mengkaji alasan dan fakta yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Mendengar Bantahan Nilaian Bil.3/016 (Mesyuarat Bil.3/2016) yang diadakan pada 19.4.2016. Defendan telah memutuskan bahawa nilai tahunan bagi tanah pegangan Plaintif diturunkan daripada RM32,000,000.00 kepada RM26,505,000.00. Dengan penurunan nilai tahunan kepada RM26,505,000.00 tersebut, cukai taksiran yang dikenakan pada kadar 7.5% setahun, dikurangkan daripada RM2,400,000.00 kepada RM1,987,875.00 setahun berkuatkuasa dari 1.1.2015. 8.23 Keputusan Mesyuarat Bil.3/2016 tersebut kemudiannya telah disampaikan kepada Plaintif oleh Defendan melalui surat Defendan bertarikh 16.5.2016 yang antara lain berbunyi: Berdasarkan kajian tersebut, sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Majlis mempertimbangkan Nilai Tahunan bagi pegangan di atas diturunkan daripada RM32,000,000.00 kepada RM26,505,000.00 11 dan Cukai Taksiran daripada RM2,400,000.00 kepada RM1,987,875.00. Penurunan ini berkuatkuasa mulai 1 Januari 2015. 8.24 Sungguhpun terdapat penurunan pada nilai tahunan pegangan Plaintif dan cukai taksiran yang dikenakan, namun Plaintif berpendapat dan menegaskan bahawa berdasarkan kepada penilaian yang dibuat oleh jurunilai yang dilantiknya (Tetuan Raine) yang telah menilaikan pegangan Plaintif pada nilai tahunan RM10,596,821.91, nilai tahunan yang ditetapkan oleh Defendan masih terlalu tinggi dan telah diputuskan berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang tidak relevan dan prinsip-prinsip penilaian ynag digunapakai secara salah. 8.25 Plaintif masih berpegang kepada penilaian nilai tahunan yang dibuat oleh Tetuan Raine pada RM10,596,821.91 dan justeru itu telah memfailkan rayuan ini. C. UNDANG-UNDANG [9] Bagi mentadbirkan kawasan-kawasan di bawah pentadbirannya, Pihak berkuasa Tempatan seperti Defendan telah diperuntukkan bidangkuasa-bidangkuasa di bawah AKT 1976 yang antara 12 lainnya termasuk melaksanakan dan mengenakan cukai taksiran dengan menentukan nilai tahunan bagi maksud kadaran dan seterusnya mengenakan cukai taksiran berdasarkan kepada nilai tahunan dengan kadar tertentu bagi hartanah/pegangan yang terletak di dalam kawasan pentadbiran masing-masing. [10] AKT 1976 juga telah memperuntukkan kepada Pihak Berkuasa Tempatan peruntukan-peruntukan berhubung dengan bidang kuasa kewangan. [11] Peruntukan berhubung bidang kuasa kewangan Pihak Berkuasa Tempatan diperuntukan di bawah sekyen 39 AKT 1976. Seksyen 39 AKT 1976 memperuntukkan berikut: Hasil pihak berkuasa tempatan 39. Hasil sesuatu pihak berkuasa tempatan adalah terdiri daripada— (a) semua cukai, kadar, sewa, bayaran lesen, dius dan lain- lain wang atau caj yang kena dibayar kepada pihak berkuasa tempatan itu menurut peruntukan Akta ini atau mana-mana undang-undang bertulis yang lain; 13 (b) semua caj atau keuntungan yang terbit daripada apa-apa perdagangan, perkhidmatan atau pengusahaan yang dijalankan oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan itu di bawah kuasa yang terletak hak padanya; (c) semua bunga atas apa-apa wang yang dilaburkan oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan itu dan semua pendapatan yang terbit daripada harta alih dan tak alih pihak berkuasa tempatan itu; dan (d) semua hasil lain yang terakru kepada pihak berkuasa tempatan itu daripada Kerajaan Persekutuan atau Kerajaan mana-mana Negeri atau daripada mana-mana badan berkanun, lain-lain pihak berkuasa tempatan atau daripada mana-mana punca lain sebagai pemberian, sumbangan, endowmen atau lain-lain. [12] Seksyen 127 AKT 1976 pula telah memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Kuasa Untuk Mengena Kadar 14 Pihak berkuasa tempatan boleh, dengan kelulusan Pihak Berkuasa Negeri, dari semasa ke semasa sebagaimana difikirkan perlu, mengenakan sama ada secara berasingan atau sebagai suatu kadar yang disatukan, kadar atau kadar tahunan dalam sesuatu kawasan pihak berkuasa tempatan bagi maksud Akta ini atau bagi maksud lain yang mana adalah kewajipan pihak berkuasa tempatan itu menyempurnakannya di bawah mana-mana undang-undang bertulis yang lain. [13] Seksyen 2 AKT 1976 pula mentakrifkan nilai tahunan sebagai “nilai tahunan” ertinya anggaran kasar sewa tahunan yang munasabah dijangka akan diperolehi dari setahun ke setahun dari pegangan yang berkenaan jika disewakan, dengan tuan tanah membayar belanja bagi pembaikan, insurans, penyenggaraan atau pemeliharaan dan segala kadar dan cukai awam. [14] Seksyen 145 AKT 1976 pula telah memperuntukkan bahawa: “Jika seseorang telah membuat suatu bantahan mengikut cara yang ditetapkan oleh seksyen 142 atau 144 dan dia tidak puas hati dengan keputusan pihak berkuasa tempatan mengenai bantahan itu orang itu boleh merayu kepada Mahkamah Tinggi dengan cara usul permulaan.” 15 [15] Manakala Seksyen 142 AKT 1976 pula telah memperuntukkan bahawa: “(1) Seseorang yang terkilan atas mana-mana daripada alasan yang berikut: (a) bahawa sesuatu pegangan yang baginya dia dikenakan kadar adalah dinilai lebih daripada nilainya yang boleh dikenakan kadar; (b) bahawa sesuatu pegangan yang dinilai adalah pegangan yang tidak boleh dikenakan kadar; (c) bahawa seseorang atau sesuatu pegangan yang sepatutnya termasuk dalam Senarai Nilaian itu adalah ditinggalkan daripadanya; (d) bahawa sesuatu pegangan adalah dinilai kurang daripada nilainya yang boleh dikenakan kadar; atau (e) bahawa sesuatu pegangan atau pegangan-pegangan yang telah dinilai secara bersesama atau berasingan sepatutnya dinilai secara lain”. 16 D. BANTAHAN-BANTAHAN PLAINTIF [16] Bantahan-bantahan Plaintif yang telah dibuat menurut seksyen 142 AKT 1976 adalah seperti berikut: i. Kaedah penilaian - Terdapat perbezaan yang ketara dari nilaian tahunan yang diperolehi jurunilai Plaintif (Tetuan Raine) dan jurunilai Defendan (Tetuan Azami & Co) bagi pengiraan nilaian Saluran gas dan juga nilaian terhadap nilai semasa Tanah-Tanah. ii. Defendan gagal memberikan butir-butir tentang tanah- tanah yang terlibat dengan penetapan nilai tahunan tersebut dengan penetapan nilai tahunan tersebut. iii. Transaksi-transaksi perbandingan defendan melibatkan tanah-tanah yang jauh lokasinya dari tanah-tanah Plaintif dan transaksi-transaksi perbandingan Defendan melibatkan tanah-tanah yang bentuknya lebih lazim dan seimbang berbanding dengan tanah-tanah Plaintif. 17 E. TENTANGAN DEFENDAN [17] Defendan sebaliknya di dalam Afidavit Jawapan (Kandungan 5) yang menentang rayuan Plaintiff yang diikrarkan oleh Hajah Nor Akma binti Hj Ahmad yang merupakan Pengarah Penilaian dan Pengurusan Defendan telah menegaskan bahawa setelah mengambil kira bantahan yang dikemukakan oleh Plaintif, Defendan telah membuat semakan nilaian semula terhadap Pegangan Plaintif melalui suatu Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa mendengar Bantahan Nilaian pada 19.04.2016 (Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Bantahan). [18] Adalah menjadi tegasan Defendan bahawa keputusan Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Bantahan mengurangkan nilai tahunan pegangan Plaintif daripada RM32,000,000.00 kepada RM26,505,000.00 telah diputuskan dan dicapai setelah Mesyuarat Jawatankuasa Bantahan mempertimbangkan kesemua butiran di dalam Laporan Penilaian Plaintif (Tetuan Raine), Laporan Penilaian Tetuan Azami & Co dan menggunakan budi bicara dan kuasa yang ada. [19] Defendan telah menegaskan bahawa di dalam pemutusan nilaian tahunan pegangan Plaintif pada RM26,505,000.00, Defendan sebagai Pihak berkuasa Tempatan telahpun menjalankan tugas 18 dan tanggungjawab menilai sesuatu pegangan menurut undang- undang, prosedur dan tatacara yang sedia ada dan terpakai terhadapnya dengan suci hati (bona fide). F. ANALISA AM MAHKAMAH ATAS PENILAIAN YANG DIBUAT OLEH KEDUA-DUA JURUNILAI PLAINTIF DAN DEEFENDAN [20] Terdapat empat (4) Laporan Penilaian yang telah dikemukakan dan telah dipertimbangkan oleh Defendan di dalam mencapai keputusannya iaitu: i. Lapuran Penilaian Plaintif 1 (Tetuan Raine) bertarikh 2.3.2016 (Eksibit”NA-7“), Kandungan 6. ii. Lapuran Penilaian Plaintif 2 (Tetuan Raine) bertarikh 27.3.2016 (Eksibit K1-5“),Kandungan 2. iii. Lapuran Penilaian 1 (Tetuan Azami) bertarikh 7.12.2015 (Eksibit ”NA-2“),Kandungan 5. iv. Lapuran Penilaian 2 (Tetuan Azami) bertarikh 21.3.2016 (Eksibit”NA-8“)“),Kandungan 6. [21] Bagi mendapatkan nilai-nilai tahunan pegangan Plaintif, penilai- penilai Plaintif dan Defendan telah membuat analisis kritikal ke atas nilai terkini tanah-tanah dan juga membuat pengiraan bagi mendapatkan nilai Saluran Gas. 19 [22] Secara umumnya, kedua-dua penilai Plaintif dan Defendan telah menggunakan kaedah kos (juga dikenali sebagai “Contractors Method/Basis”) untuk menentukan nilai pasaran Saluran Gas tersebut. [23] Manakala bagi mendapatkan nilaian Tanah-Tanah, kedua-dua penilai Plaintif dan Defendan telah menggunakan kaedah perbandingan (juga dikenali sebagai “comparison method”) untuk menentukan nilai pasaran Tanah-Tanah tersebut. [24] Kaedah kos bagi mengetahui nilai saluran gas dibuat penyelarasan yang sewajarnya untuk mengambil kira keadaan fizikal, fee, keuntungan dan “obsolescence” yang dikenali sebagai “Depreciated Replacement Costs”. [25] Kedua-dua penilai Tetuan Raine dan Tetuan Azami telah menggunakan kaedah perbandingan bagi menentukan nilaian pasaran Tanah-Tanah tersebut. Bagi mendapatkan nilaian pasaran tanah, dengan menggunakan kaedah perbandingan akan melibatkan analisis kritikal ke atas nilai terkini hartanah yang serupa (industri), di dalam kawasan yang sama dan dibuat penyesuaian terhadap mana-mana perbezaan lokasi, masa, 20 lapisan, jalan masuk, saiz, bentuk dan muka bumi tanah, kegunaan (zoning) dan keadaan tanah, tempoh dan jenis pegangan, sekatan hakmilik (sekiranya ada), dan lain-lain faktor. Bantahan i. Kaedah penilaian - Terdapat perbezaan yang ketara dari nilaian tahunan yang diperolehi jurunilai Plaintif (Tetuan Raine) dan jurunilai Defendan (Tetuan Azmi) bagi pengiraan nilaian Saluran gas dan juga nilaian terhadap nilai semasa Tanah- Tanah. G. Nilaian Tahunan Saluran Gas [26] Bagi nilaian tahunan Saluran Gas Tetuan Raine telah mengaplikasikan kaedah Depreciated Replacement Cost yang cenderung kepada prinsip bahawa saluran gas tersebut akan semakin kurang nilainya apabila usianya semakin meningkat. Dalam kes ini, saluran gas tersebut terdiri daripada “PGU Main Line" dan “CB Lateral” yang kedua-duanya dibina pada tahun 1991 iaitu lebih kurang 15 tahun sebelum tarikh senarai nilaian yang terpakai iaitu 2006 dan lama sebelum pindaan yang dicadangkan di dalam notis Defendan bertarikh 1 Disember 2015. 21 [27] Dengan memenggunakan kaedah Depreciated Replacement Cost tersebut dengan kaedah garis lurus, Penilai Plaintif telah membuat pengiraan susut nilai Saluran Gas tersebut pada tempoh 15 tahun iaitu sejak ia dibina pada tahun 1991 serta mengambil kira faktor jangka hayat Saluran Gas tersebut selama 40 tahun, yang mana kadar susut nilai tahun pada tahun pertama pada kadar 10% dan kemudian dengan susut nilai berterusan pada kadar 2.5% untuk tempoh 14 tahun, penilai Plaintif telah menetapkan Depreciated Replacement cost atau nilai pasaran saluran gas tersebut sebanyak 45%. Tahun pertama = 10% Tahun 2 - tahun 15 pada kadar 2.5% setahun: 14 x 2.5% =35% Depreciated Replacement cost: 10% + 35% = 45% [28] Penilai Plaintif setelah ia memperolehi kos susut nilai “Depreciated Replacement Cost” Saluran Gas tersebut pada kadar 45%, telah kemudiannya menggunakan kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “Decapitalisation Rate” pula pada kadar 5.75% bagi mendapatkan nilai tahunan Saluran Gas tersebut. [29] Pihak Defendan telah menegaskan bahawa dengan menggunakan kaedah Depreciated Replacement cost atau kos susut nilai 22 pasaran saluran gas tersebut sebanyak 45%, Plaintif telah sebenarnya mengenakan kadar susut nilai yang terlalu tinggi terhadap saluran paip gas tersebut. Menurut Defendan, kaedah garis lurus yang digunakan Plaintif adalah tidak bersesuaian disebabkan saluran paip berfungsi sebagai saluran menyalurkan gas dan bukannya sebagai sebuah jentera ataupun kenderaan. Di samping itu juga, menurut Defendan biarpun saluran paip gas tersebut telah dibina sejak tahun 1991, sebagai saluran-saluran gas ia telah diselenggara dengan sempurna oleh Plaintif dan untuk itu masih berfungsi dengan baik. [30] Oleh yang demikian, adalah ditegaskan oleh Defendan bahawa oleh kerana keadaan saluran paip gas tersebut adalah di dalam keadaan baik, maka kos susut nilai “Depreciated Replacement Cost” sepatutnya pastinya adalah lebih rendah. Maka justeru itu, menurut Defendan lagi, walaupun penilai Defendan juga telah menggunakan kos susut nilai “Depreciated Replacement Cost” pada kadar 2.5 % setahun untuk seluruh tempoh 15 tahun tanpa penambahan iaitu menggunakan kaedah garis lurus dengan memberi kadar kos susut nilai untuk tahun pertama pada kadar 10% sepertimana yang dibuat penilai Plaintif. 23 [31] Oleh itu, kos susut nilai yang dipakai oleh penilai Defendan adalah 2.5% x 15 tahun = 35%. Kadar kos susut nilai “Depreciated Replacement Cost” 35% ini adalah sesuatu yang munasabah dan wajar. B. Nilai Tahunan Tanah-Tanah [32] Seperti yang telah dinyatakan di awal penghakiman tadi, bagi menentukan nilai tahunan pegangan-pegangan Tanah-Tanah tersebut kedua-dua jurunilai Plaintif dan Defendan telah menggunakan kaedah perbandingan. [33] Dengan menggunakan kaedah perbandingan tersebut di mana analisis dibuat bersandarkan atau berasaskan faktor-faktor yang dinyatakan di perenggan [17] alasan penghakiman, kedua-dua jurunilai Plaintif dan Defendan kemudian telah menggunakan kaedah kos susut nilai “Depreciated Replacement Cost”. [34] Adalah menjadi hujahan Defendan, di dalam pemakaian cost method’ ini, jurunilai Defendan telah menyelaraskan depreciated replacement cost” pada kadar 35% yang mana menurut Defendan ia adalah satu penyelarasn yang menyeluruh dan komprehensif 24 berbanding dengan apa yang diselaraskan oleh jurunilai Plaintif sebanyak 25%. [35] Seterusnya Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa cost method yang digunakan oleh jurunilai Defendan diselaraskan dengan nilai tanah ditambah dengan binaan dan ditolak dengan susut nilai binaan atas Tanah-Tanah Tersebut seperti berikut: Cost Method = Nilai Tanah + (Nilai Binaan –Susut Nilai) [36] Menurut Defendan lagi, jurunilai Defendan telah menggunapakai 8%-10% daripada nilai pasaran pegangan-pegangan tanah tersebut yang mana adalah selaras dengan Seksyen 2 Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976 (selepas ini akan dirujuk sebagai “Akta tersebut”). [37] Menurut Defendan lagi, kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas "Decapitalisation rate" yang digunakan oleh Plaintif untuk mendapatkan nilai tahunan “annual value” sebanyak 5.75% dan didarabkan dengan nilai tanah adalah bertentangan dengan proviso di bawah Seksyen 2 (c) Akta tersebut berkenaan interpretasi 'nilaian tahunan' seperti berikut: 25 "nilai tahunan" ertinya anggaran kasar sewa tahunan yang munasabah dijangka akan diperolehi dari setahun ke setahun dari pegangan yang berkenaan jika disewakan, dengan tuan tanah membayar belanja bagi pembaikan, insurans, penyenggaraan atau pemeliharaan dan segala kadar dan cukai awam: Dengan syarat bahawa- (a) pada menganggar nilai tahunan tiada apa-apa perkiraan boleh diambil tentang apa-apa sekatan atau kawalan ke atas sewa setakat mana sekatan atau kawalan itu menghadkan sewa yang mungkin dikehendaki oleh seseorang tuan tanah atau dituntut daripada seseorang penyewa sesuatu pegangan; (b) pada menganggar nilai tahunan sesuatu pegangan yang ada pada atau di atasnya apa-apa jentera yang digunakan bagi mana-mana atau semua daripada maksud yang berikut: (i) membuat apa-apa benda atau sebahagian daripada sesuatu benda; (ii) mengubah, membaiki, menghiasi atau menyiapkan apa-apa benda; (iii) menyesuaikan apa-apa benda untuk jualan, nilai tambahan yang diberi kepada pegangan itu oleh sebab adanya jentera itu tidak boleh diambil kira, dan bagi maksud perenggan ini "jentera" termasuklah, enjin stim, 26 dandang atau lain-lain kuasa gerak yang berkaitan dengan jentera itu; (c) mengenai mana-mana tanah – (i) yang sebahagiannnya diduduki atau sebahagiannya ada apa-apa binaan di atasnya; (ii) yang kosong, tidak diduduki atau tidak ada apa-apa binaan di atasnya; (iii) yang ada atasnya suatu bangunan yang belum siap; atau (iv) yang ada di atasnya suatu bangunan yang telah diperakui oleh pihak berkuasa tempatan sebagai ditinggalkan atau buruk atau tidak layak untuk kediaman manusia, nilai tahunan, mengenai subperenggan (i) ialah sama ada nilai tahunan sebagaimana ditakrifkan di dalam ini sebelum daripada ini atau sepuluh peratus dari nilainya dalam pasaran terbuka mengikut budi bicara mutlak Pegawai Penilai mengenai subperenggan (ii), (iii) dan (iv), nilai tahunan ialah sepuluh peratus dari nilainya dalam pasaran terbuka seolah-olah, berhubungan dengan subperenggan (iii) dan (iv), ia adalah tanah kosong tanpa apa-apa bangunan di atasnya dan dalam segala hal pihak berkuasa tempatan boleh, dengan kelulusan Pihak Berkuasa Negeri, mengurangkan peratus itu hingga minimum lima peratus. [38] Menurut peguam Defendan, apa yang telah dilakukan oleh penilai Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 27 Nilai Modah Tanah sebanyak RM99,031,279.95 x 5.75% (kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas "Decapitalisation rate") x 7.5% (kadar cukai taksiran bagi kategori industri) = Cukai Taksiran. [39] Walhal yang sepatutnya menurut seksyen 2 AKT 1976 adalah 10% seperti berikut: Nilai Pasaran Tanah x 10% x 7.5% (kadar cukai taksiran bagi kategori industri) = Cukai Taksiran [40] Adalah menjadi tegasan Defendan bahawa kadar pengiraan telahpun diperuntukan di bawah Akta, maka apabila kadar pengiraan telah diperuntukkan di dalam sesuatu Akta, maka peruntukan di dalam akta tersebut akan mengatasi segala kaedah penilaian yang lain. [41] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam Defendan seterusnya bahawa pengiraan penilai Plaintif adalah tidak tepat dan tidak wajar dirujuk dalam menentukan nilai pegangan-pegangan Plaintif kerana pengiraan yang digunakan adalah jauh menyimpang daripada kaedah yang diperuntukkan oleh Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976. 28 F. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [42] Di dalam menimbang dan menentukan berhubung bantahan i. Defendan ini, Mahkamah ini perlu menekankan bahawa pihak Defendan sememangnya tidak mempertikaikan fakta yang Saluran Gas tersebut telah beroperasi sejak tahun 1991 iaitu lebih kurang 15 tahun dan jangka hayat sesuatu saluran gas adalah selama 40 tahun. [43] Begitu juga fakta yang tidak disangkal bahawa Saluran Gas tersebut masih berada dalam keadaan yang baik dan sempurna berikutan penjagaan serta penyeliaan rapi yang dibuat oleh Plaintif dengan jadual penyelengaraan yang berkala. [44] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Defendan bahawa kos susut nilai “depreciated replacement cost” pada kadar 45% yang digunapakai oleh penilai Plaintif adalah kadar kos susut nilai yang terlalu tinggi dan adalah satu kadar yang tidak wajar bagi Saluran Gas- Saluran Gas. [45] Satu fakta yang tidak boleh dipertikaikan apa yang dinilai di dalam kesi ni adalah saluran-saluran gas yang merentasi bawah tanah. Mahkamah ini perlu menekankan bahawa saluran gas-saluran gas 29 adalah merupakan satu prasarana yang memerlukan pada setiap masa dan ketika di dalam keadaan yang terbaik “tip top” dan selamat pengoperasiannya. [46] Bagi memastikan keadaan sebegitu, ia memerlukan pemantauan rapi, penyelenggaraan dan penyeliaan yang berterusan. Penyelengaraan dan penyeliaan Saluran Gas bukanlah sepertimana menyelenggara sebuah jentera ataupun kenderaan yang mana walaupun kenderaan atau jentera itu diselenggara dengan baik namun bagi nilai semasanya pada tahun pertama akan jatuh pada kadar yang besar atas keadaan nilai pasaran kenderaaan dan jentara yang begitu terlalu banyak di dalam pasaran. [47] Berbeza dengan Saluran Gas di mana Saluran Gas adalah dibina khas “custom made” yang terhad untuk Plaintif atau kegunaan Plaintif dan bukanlah sesuatu yang boleh diperolehi dengan jumlah yang banyak di pasaran apatah lagi sepertimana yang Mahkamah ini katakan tadi ianya adalah prasarana khusus yang dimestikan untuk berada di dalam keadaan yang terbaik “tip top”dan selamat pada setiap masa, maka pastinya susut nilainya tidaklah akan jatuh dengan begitu besar sehingga 10% pada tahun pertama seperti yang dikira oleh penilai Plaintif. 30 [48] Justeru itu, Mahkamah juga bersetuju dengan hujahan Defendan bahawa selagi saluran paip gas tersebut diselenggara dengan baik dan sempurna dan mengikut jadual dania seharusnya berfungsi dengan baik, fakta ini menjadikan kos susut nilai “depreciated replacement cost” nya tidak boleh menurun sehingga 45% atau hampir kepada 50%. [49] Oleh itu, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini pengiraan susut nilai Saluran Gas pada kadar 2.5% setahun untuk seluruh tempoh 15 tahun dan kos susut nilai “depreciated replacement costs” pada 35% tersebut adalah wajar, munasabah dan berpatutan. [50] Bagi membuat penentuan penilaian dan pengiraan nilai pasaran terbuka Tanah-Tanah pula, terdapat dua kaedah yang berbeza yang digunapakai oleh Penilai Plaintif dan Penilai Defendan. [51] Penilai Plaintif telah menggunakan kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “Decapitalization rate” sebanyak 5.75 %. Manakala penilai Defendan telah menggunakan kadar 10% sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 2 (c) Akta Kerajaan Tempatan 1976. 31 [52] Di dalam laporan penilaian Plaintif yang dieksibitkan sebagai KI-5 di dalam Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif, ianya telah dinyatakan bahawa kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “Decapitalization Rate” adalah berdasarkan satu kadar diskaun berasaskan kepada kadar pinjaman bank untuk membina bangunan atau struktur. [53] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa apabila penilai Plaintif menngunakan kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “Decapitalization Rate” yang mana Penilai Plaintif telah mengakui sendiri di dalam laporan penilaiannya bahawa pemakaian “decapitalization rate” sememangnya formula yang belum pernah digunakan oleh di Malaysia. [54] Dengan penggunaan kaedah yang tidak diperuntukkan di dalam undang-undang oleh Penilai Plaintif, ia pastinya telah menimbulkan keraguan kepada Mahkamah ini untuk menerima pakai formula penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “Decapitalization Rate Cost” tersebut. Sedangkan berhubung perkara ini peruntukan di bawah seksyen 2 AKT 1976 telah secara jelas dan terang memperuntukkan kadar 10% bagi menentukan nilai tahunan melibatkan pegangan yang separuhnya dibina dan 32 separuhnya kosong iaitu situasi atau keadaan yang paling hampir atau dekat dengan gambaran keadaan pegangan- pegangan Plaintif. [55] Di dalam perkara ini, Mahkamah ini perlu merujuk kepada proviso (d) kepada seksyen 2 AKT 1976 yang mana telah diperuntukkan bahawa: “(d) jika berkenaan dengan sesuatu pegangan tertentu, Pegawai Penilai berpendapat bahawa tidak ada keterangan yang cukup untuk membolehkan suatu penilaian dibuat berasaskan keterangan itu tentang nilai tahunan Pegawai Penilai boleh menggunakan apa-apa cara penilaian yang pada pendapatnya sesuai untuk menentukan nilai tahunan; [56] Oleh demikian, bagi menjawab kepada bantahan Pertama Plaintif mengenai perbezaan yang ketara berkenaan nilai kadaran yang diperolehi masing-masing dari jurunilai Plaintif dan jurunilai Defendan, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini laporan penilaian yang disediakan oleh penilai Defendan hendaklah diterima pakai. 33 [57] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini juga, kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “decapitalization rate” yang cuba digunakan oleh jurunilai Plaintif (berupa kadar diskaun berasaskan kepada kadar pinjaman bank untuk membina bangunan) dengan mengguna pakai proviso (d) Seksyen 2 yang kononnya “Pegawai Penilai berpendapat bahawa tidak ada keterangan yang cukup untuk membolehkan suatu penilaian dibuat berasaskan keterangan itu tentang nilai tahunan Pegawai Penilai boleh menggunakan apa-apa cara penilaian yang pada pendapatnya sesuai untuk menentukan nilai tahunan”. [58] Maka, di dalam perkara ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa pemakaian kaedah penyahmodalan atau pengurangan modal asas “decapitalization rate” oleh jurunilai Plaintif di dalam menilai nilai tahunan adalah bercanggah atau tidak selaras dengan peruntukan nilaian tahunan menurut yang diperuntukkan oleh seksyen 2 Akta 1976. Oleh itu Laporan Penilaian jurunilai Plaintif yang tidak berdasarkan peruntukan Akta atau undang- undang semestinya tidak boleh diterima. 34 Bantahan ii: Defendan gagal memberikan butir-butir tentang tanah-tanah yang terlibat dengan penetapan nilai tahunan tersebut. [59] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Plaintif bahawa apabila Defendan menilaikan nilai tahunan pegangan-pegangan Plaintif pada RM32,000,000, penilaian yang dibuat tersebut adalah termasuk nilaian tanah-tanah yang didakwa milik Plaintif tanpa memberi sebarang butir tentang lot-lot tanah yang diambil kira oleh Defendan. [60] Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah secara salah mengambilkira nilaian tanah-tanah yang sebenarnya bukan milik Plaintif. Plaintif telah menegaskan bahawa ia tidak boleh dikenakan cukai taksiran untuk tanah-tanah yang bukan miliknya. Cukai taksiran untuk tanah-tanah sedemikian harus dikenakan ke atas pemilik tanah-tanah tersebut dan bukan Plaintif. [61] Plaintif seterusnya mengatakan bahawa had sempadan kawasan pentadbiran Defendan adalah tidak jelas dan Defendan sendiri tidak dapat mengenalpasti atau menghuraikan kawasan 35 pentadbirannya dengan jelas atau mengemukakan sebarang pelan yang menunjukkan kawasan pentadbirannya. [62] Bagi menyangkal pernyataan Plaintif tersebut, Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa Pegawai Penilai boleh menurut budi bicaranya menilai sesuatu pegangan atau pegangan-pegangan secara bersesama atau berasingan. Ini adalah selaras dengan seksyen 139 Akta tersebut. [63] Plaintif sendiri melalui afidavitnya telah mengakui bahawa saluran paip gasnya adalah merentasi bukan sahaja tanah-tanah milik Plaintif yang mempunyai dokumen hakmilik tetapi juga merentasi tanah-tanah yang bukan milik Plaintif dan juga tanah-tanah yang tidak mempunyai dokumen hakmilik seperti tanah-tanah yang di atasnya adalah jalanraya, lebuhraya dan sungai. [64] Di dalam hal yang demikian, Defendan telah menggunapakai seksyen 138 AKT 1976. Seksyen 138 AKT 1976 memperuntukkan berikut: “Jika nama penduduk atau pemunya tidak diketahui, maka memadailah memperihalkan pemunya atau penduduk itu 36 dalam Senarai Nilaian dan dalam apa-apa tindakan untuk menuntut apa-apa kadar sebagai "pemunya" atau "penduduk" pegangan atas mana kadar itu ditaksirkan tanpa perihal tambahan”. [65] Seksyen 138 ini hendaklah dibaca bersama seksyen 2 berkenaan definisi atau takrifan “Penduduk” seperti berikut: "Penduduk" ertinya orang yang menduduki premis yang mengenainya perkataan itu digunakan atau yang berkuasa menjaga, mengurus atau mengawalnya sama ada bagi faedahnya sendiri atau sebagai ejen seorang lain tetapi tidak termasuk sesesorang penumpang. [66] Justeru itu, berdasarkan kepada kedua-dua seksyen 138 di atas dan juga pengakuan Plaintif sendiri bahawa saluran paip gasnya merentasi tanah bukan sahaja milik Plaintif, ini membuktikan bahawa Plaintif merupakan "penduduk" sepertimana yang ditakrifkan. [67] Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif sendiri di mana wakil Plaintif telah mengakui secara bersumpah bahawa tanah-tanah yang direntasi dengan saluran-saluran gas tersebut 37 dirujuk sebagai Tanah-tanah tersebut yang juga didefinisikan sebagai pegangan-pegangan Plaintif. [68] Bukan itu sahaja, Plaintif seterusnya juga mengakui bahawa sesuatu pegangan dianggap dan disifatkan sebagai merangkumi bukan sahaja tanah, tetapi juga bangunan dan strukutur lain yang berada di tanah yang berkaitan. [69] Justeru, Mahkamah tidak dapat lari dari membuat dapatan yang menyebelahi Defendan bahawa walaupun sekiranya Plaintif bukan pemilik berdaftar seperti yang dikatakan, pihak Plaintif adalah merupakan “penduduk” yang memiliki hak eksklusif untuk menggunakan keseluruhan tanah-tanah tersebut. Pihak-pihak lain tidak boleh menggunakan dan/atau membina sebarang struktur, bangunan di atas tanah tersebut. [70] Mahkamah ini juga berpandangan bahawa sebagai penduduk yang mempunyai hak eksklusif terhadap pegangan tersebut, cukai taksiran adalah berhak dikenakan oleh Defendan ke atas Plaintif. [71] Jika sekalipun Plaintif berpendapat bahawa tanah-tanah tersebut juga terdiri daripada tanah Kerajaan Negeri atau tanah yang 38 disimpan khas untuk tujuan awam, Defendan masih mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk mengenakan cukai taksiran bagi bahagian tanah tersebut kerana Plaintif mempunyai hak eksklusif dari segi penggunaan kesemua tanah-tanah di dalam jajaran saluran paip gas milik Plaintif. Pihak lain tidak boleh dengan sewenang- wenangnya memasuki, mengusaha dan/atau menduduki tanah- tanah yang berada di jajaran saluran paip gas tersebut. Selagi jajaran saluran paip gas Plaintif berada di atas tanah-tanah tersebut, penggunaan tanah-tanah tersebut hanyalah untuk kegunaan Plaintif semata-mata. [72] Berhubung perkara ini, Mahkamah ini perlu merujuk kepada peruntukan-peruntukan berkaitan dibawah AKT 1976. i. Seksyen 163 (1) memperuntukkan: “Mengenai bangunan yang terletak di atas tanah Kerajaan Negeri atau di atas tanah yang dirizabkan untuk sesuatu maksud awam dan yang tidak diduduki oleh Kerajaan Persekutuan atau Kerajaan Negeri, pihak berkuasa tempatan boleh, dengan kelulusan Pihak Berkuasa Negeri, mengenakan kadar yang tersebut dalam Seksyen 127 ke atas nilai tahunan atau nilai tambah semua atau mana-mana 39 bangunan itu dan penduduk bangunan itu adalah bertanggungan membayar kadar tersebut. ii. Seksyen 127 memperuntukkan: “Pihak berkuasa tempatan boleh, dengan kelulusan Pihak Berkuasa Negeri, dari semasa ke semasa sebagaimana difikirkan perlu, mengenakan sama ada secara berasingan atau sebagai suatu kadar yang disatukan, kadar atau kadar tahunan dalam sesuatu kawasan pihak berkuasa tempatan bagi maksud Akta ini atau bagi maksud lain yang mana adalah kewajipan pihak berkuasa tempatan itu menyempurnakannya di bawah mana-mana undang-undang bertulis yang lain”. [73] Mahkamah ini suka merujuk kepada kes Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v Bukit Jalil Estates Sdn Bhd & Another Case [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 25, di mana Mahkamah Agung telah memutuskan bahawa: "So living on the land is not the only circumstances under which a person may be said to occupy it. A person is said to 40 occupy a piece of land which he cultivates and of which he has the possession and control to the exclusion of others although nobody lives there. This is the true meaning of the word "occupy". ….. When a Collector is authorised to occupy a piece of an alienated land after the requirements of those provisions have been complied with, certainly the Collector is not required to send people to live on it”. [74] Berdasarkan kepada peruntukan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah bahawa pihak Defendan adalah berhak mengenakan cukai taksiran terhadap Plaintif oleh kerana Piaintif mempunyai saluran paip gas yang merentasi tanah-tanah yang dikatakan sebagai Iain-lain tanah bagi maksud nilaian tersebut. Bantahan iii: Transaksi-transaksi perbandingan Defendan melibatkan tanah-tanah yang jauh lokasinya dari tanah-tanah Plaintif dan transaksi-transaksi perbandingan Defendan melibatkan tanah-tanah yang bentuknya lebih lazim dan seimbang berbanding dengan tanah-tanah plaintif. 41 [75] Plaintif telah menghujahkan bahawa untuk menilai tanah-tanah tersebut, Penilai Defendan telah menggunakan transaksi-transaksi perbandingan yang melibatkan tanah-tanah yang jauh lokasinya dari Tanah-Tanah tersebut berbanding dengan tanah-tanah yang terlibat di dalam transaksi-transaksi perbandingan yang digunakan oleh penilai Plaintif. [76] Selain itu, Plaintif juga telah menyatakan bahawa pelarasan harga oleh penilai Defendan untuk transaksi-transaksi yang dirujuk oleh mereka juga terlalu rendah dan oleh itu, harga tanah di dalam transaksi-transaksi tersebut harus dikurangkan lagi sebelum perbandingan dapat dilakukan. [77] Adalah menjadi tegasan Plaintif bahawa memandangkan tanah- tanah tersebut digunakan khas untuk laluan Saluran Gas yang merentasi kawasan pentadbiran Defendan dan ia terdiri daripada 37 bidang tanah yang tidak sekata dan yang berbentuk sempit dan memanjang, tanah-tanah tersebut hanya sesuai digunakan untuk saluran paip gas dan penggunaannya untuk aktiviti lain adalah amat terhad. Keadaan tersebut akan menurunkan lagi nilai pasaran Tanah-Tanah tersebut. 42 [78] Oleh itu, Plaintif menghujahkan bahawa harga yang boleh diminta dari pasaran umum untuk tujuan penjualan Tanah-Tanah tersebut sudah tentu adalah rendah berbanding dengan tanah yang bentuknya lebih seimbang seperti yang lazim dijumpai. [79] Namun,menurut Plaintif faktor rupa bentuk Tanah-Tanah tersebut telah tidak diambil kira oleh Penilai Defendan dan oleh yang demikian, Penilai Defendan telah menetapkan satu nilai yang terlalu tinggi untuk Tanah-Tanah tersebut. [80] Di dalam menyangkal pernyataan Plaintif yang kononnya Defendan telah melibatkan tanah-tanah yang jauh lokasinya daripada tanah-tanah Plaintif bagi tujuan perbandingan, Defendan telah menegaskan bahawa tanah-tanah yang dibandingkan masih di dalam mukim yang sama, kategori kegunaan tanah yang sama iaitu industri dan keluasan tanah dengan pegangan-pegangan Plaintif. [81] Untuk ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes NANYANG MANUFACTURING CO V THE COLLECTOR OF LAND REVENUE, JOHORE [1954] 20 MLJ 69 di m/s 71: di mana Buhagiar, J (pada ketika itu) telah mengatakan: 43 “I consider that the safest guide to determine the fair market value is evidence of sales of the same land or similar land in the neighbourhood, after making due allowance for all the circumstances”. [82] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah transaksi perbandingan yang dibuat oleh penilai Defendan adalah tidak jauh menyimpang dengan tanah-tanah Plaintif. Dengan membuat pelarasan harga terhadap tanah-tanah perbandingan tersebut dengan mengambil kira aspek lokasi, masa, lapisan, jalan masuk, saiz, bentuk dan muka bumi, zoning, jenis pegangan dan juga pembangunan atas tanah. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa kaedah perbandingan yang dibuat oleh Penilai Defendan di dalam Laporan Penilaiannya adalah wajar, tidak khilaf dan tidak cacat. [83] Berhubungan dengan itu juga, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah juga bahawa keputusan Defendan di dalam penilaian nilai tahunan pegangan-pegangan Plaintif tersebut telah dicapai oleh Defendan setelah penilaian diperolehi dari jurunilai bertauliah Defendan, Tetuan Azami & Co dengan mempertimbangkan secara teliti semua faktor yang berkaitan, laporan penilaian yang telah 44 disediakan oleh Jurunilai Plaintif dan juga mengambil kira bantahan yang telah dikemukakan oleh Plaintif dan perbincangan- perbincangan lanjut antara pihak Plaintif dan Defendan. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa bantahan-bantahan yang dibangkitkan oleh Plaintif bagi membantah nilaian tahunan yang ditetapkan dan cukai taksiran yang dikenakan adalah tidak berasas dan tidak boleh dipertahankan. Keputusan Mahkamah [84] Bersasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, rayuan Plaintif menurut seksyen 145 AKT 1976 di dalam Kandungan 1 ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM18,000.00 untuk dibayar kepada Defendan. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 15hb Mei 2017 45 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Skrine Encik Vijay Raj & Cik Tan Hui Wen Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Zahir Khailani En Nurzali bin Mohd Taib, En Mohd Khairul Khailani, Puan Siti Maspuah Maulan & En Hassharii B Johari

Tika 2.6.0

JA-22NCVC-95-05/2016

PLAINTIF 1. Leong Fook Lim (No K/P: S0003286G) 2. Leong Cheong Lim Philip (No K/P: S1394895Z) [sebagai Pentadbir-Pentadbir kepada harta pusaka Leong Kwan On, simati] DEFENDAN 1. Lawrance Leong Pui Lim (L) (No K/P: S02247731) [sebagai Pentadbir kepada harta pusaka Leong Kwang Pang @ Leong Quan Pung @ Leong Kwan Pong, simati] 2. Leong Kwai Lam (L) (No. K/P: S0763229J) [sebagai Pentadbir kepada harta pusaka Leong Tuck Wah @ Leong Kwan Woh, simati]

14/05/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7edf1bc3-0c98-49c1-9feb-ebdd315bf951&Inline=true

Page 1 of 13 DALAM MAHKAMH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM GUAMAN SIVIL NO. JA-22NCVC-95-05/2016 ANTARA 1. LEONG FOOK LIM (NO. K/P: S0003286G) 2. LEONG CHEONG LIM PHILIP (NO. K/P: S1394895Z) [sebagai Pentadbir-Pentadbir kepada harta pusaka Leong Kwan On, simati] PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. LAWRANCE LEONG PUI LIM (L) (NO. K/P: S02247731) [sebagai Pentadbir kepada harta pusaka Leong Kwan Pang @ Leong Quan Pung @ Leong Kwan Pong, simati] 2. LEONG KWAI LAM (L) (NO. K/P: S0763229J) [sebagai Pentadbir kepada harta pusaka Leong Tuck Wah @ Leong Kwan Woh, simati] DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN JUDGMENT CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Date: 14.5.2017 Page 2 of 13 Introduction [1] This case concerns a dispute over what the rightful proportion of the shareholdings were/are in relation to five pieces of land which once belonged to three siblings who have all passed away. The dispute arose when the administrators of the estate of a deceased sibling brought up a hand-written „agreement‟ alleging that the deceased sibling and his beneficiaries are entitled to 50% of the shareholdings of the five pieces of land, whereas the other two deceased siblings and their beneficiaries are entitled only to 25% each. [2] On 10.4.2017, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs‟ claim after a full trial. This Judgment serves as the reasons for the decision. The reasons are set down as below. The Background Facts [3] For ease of reference, diagram A below shows the relationships between the parties in this suit: The Three Deceased Siblings Leong Kwan On Leong Kwan Pang Leong Tuck Wah (Deceased) - LKO @ Leong Quan Pung @ Leong Kwan Woh @ Leong Kwan Pong (Deceased) - LKW (Deceased) - LKP Leong Fook Lim (1 st Plaintiff) Lawrence Leong Pui Lim Leong Kwai Lam Leong Cheong Lim (1 st Defendant) (2 nd Defendant) Philip [Administrator] [Administrator] (2 nd Plaintiff) [Administrators] Diagram A Page 3 of 13 [4] The plaintiffs are the administrators for the estate of their deceased father, Leong Kwan On (LKO). The 1st defendant is the administrator for the estate of his deceased father, Leong Kwan Pang @ Leong Quan Pung @ Leong Kwan Pong (LKP). Likewise, the 2nd defendant is the administrator for the estate of his deceased father, Leong Tuck Wah @ Leong Kwan Woh (LKW). [5] The deceased siblings, LKO, LKP and LKW, were the co- registered proprietors of the five pieces of land (hereinafter be referred to as the „said lands‟) since inception. The deceased siblings held the said lands in equal shares. The shareholdings and particulars of the said lands are as shown in diagram B below: Diagram B Land Title LKO LKP LKW Geran Mukim 4838, Lot 1244, Mikim Jeram Batu, Daerah Pontian, Negeri Johor 1/3 1/3 1/3 Geran Mukim 4839, Lot 1247, Mikim Jeram Batu, Daerah Pontian, Negeri Johor 1/3 1/3 1/3 Geran Mukim 4840, Lot 1248, Mikim Jeram Batu, Daerah Pontian, Negeri Johor 1/3 1/3 1/3 Geran Mukim 4841, Lot 1249, Mikim Jeram Batu, Daerah Pontian, Negeri Johor 1/3 1/3 1/3 Geran Mukim 4842, Lot 1250, Mikim Jeram Batu, Daerah Pontian, Negeri Johor 1/3 1/3 1/3 Page 4 of 13 [6] The shareholdings of LKP and LKW are now registered in the names of 1st defendant and 2nd defendants respectively as administrators for the estates of LKP and LKW respectively. The Plaintiffs‟ Case [7] The plaintiffs‟ claim is premised on a document dated 17.12.1988 (hereinafter be referred to as the „purported agreement‟) which the plaintiffs alleged to be an agreement signed by the following parties: (i) LKO (the plaintiffs‟ father); (ii) LKP (the 1st defendant‟s father); (iii) 2nd defendant; and (iv) Leong Foo Lum, deceased. [8] The plaintiffs contended that the above persons had in the purported agreement agreed that LKO shall have 50% shareholdings of all the said lands, and whereas, LKP and LKW shall have 25% each in the remaining shareholdings of the said lands. The purported proportion of shareholdings for LKW was allegedly agreed by the 2nd defendant and Leong Foo Lum (deceased) who were the children of LKW. [9] The contents of the purported agreement set out various calculations for the distribution of the compensation paid out by the Government of Singapore in relation to the acquisition by the Government of Singapore of a property which formed part of the estate of Leong Cheong Yee, deceased. [10] Leong Cheong Yee (deceased) was the father of the three deceased siblings (LKO, LKP and LKW). In other words, the Page 5 of 13 grandfather of the plaintiffs and defendants. LKO, the plaintiffs‟ father, was appointed as the administrator for the estate of Leong Cheong Yee. [11] The purported agreement apparently contains the agreement between the parties who signed the document for the distribution of the compensation from the Government of Singapore. However, there is one part which the plaintiffs had relied on as the basis of their claims. The relevant part in the purported agreement states as follows: [Leong Kwan On (50%), Leong Kwan Woh (25%) and Leong Kwan Pang (25%)] These are the agreed-upon share allotment for the rubber-estate for the treatment of expenses to be apportioned out late when the estate is sold. (c) Therefore, the correct share expenditure for the S$16,500 incurred by Leong Kwan On earlier to „reclaim‟ back the estate should be in flg (presumably means „following‟) ratio: Leong Kwan On (50%) of $16,500, and Leong Kwan Woh (25%) ″ Leong Kwan Pang (25%) ″ (the above excerpt in the said purported agreement shall hereinafter be referred to as the „impugned paragraph‟). Page 6 of 13 [12] It is based on this impugned paragraph that the plaintiffs had asserted that their father‟s shareholdings (LKO‟s shareholding) in the said lands was entitled to 50%. The plaintiffs sought an order to enforce the purported agreement and to declare the shareholdings of the parties in the said lands to be as follows: Title LKO (the Plaintiffs) LKP (the 1 st defendant) LKW (2 nd defendant) The said lands ½ 1/4 1/4 Diagram C The Defendants‟ Case [13] Simply put, the defendants refuted and denied the plaintiffs‟ claims and put the plaintiffs to strict proof of their case. The defendants also contended that the purported agreement was invalid, unenforceable, and null and void. The defendants also relied on the Limitation Act, 1953 to plead that the plaintiffs‟ action is time-barred. The defendants asserted that the shareholdings currently stated in the title deeds of the said lands are legally correct, and the information stated therein represents the true shareholdings of the parties. The Findings of this Court [14] The parties had agreed that there was only one issue before this Court for determination which was - “Whether on the facts and circumstances then and currently prevailing, the agreed shareholdings ratio of the 5 parcel of lands (“the Lands”) particularised below is as follows: Page 7 of 13 Or [15] The counsels for the parties had addressed several issues raised in their respective submissions. However, this Court is of the view that the most crucial issue which needed to be addressed is what the true meaning of the impugned paragraph is. In other words, what did the parties (the signatories) intend to address in the impugned paragraph? [16] In the heading of the impugned paragraph, the names of the respective deceased siblings are followed by a stated percentage, namely, LKO – 50%, LKW – 25% and LKP – 25%. What did these percentages represent? The plaintiffs averred that they represented the shareholdings of the parties in relation to the said lands, whereas the defendants contended that they represented the portions for outgoing expenses in respect of each party‟s contribution. [17] This Court, after having examined the impugned paragraph, could not agree with the plaintiffs‟ averment. The percentages indicated Landowner Shareholding of the Lands Leong Kwan On 50% - 1/2 Leong Kwan Pang @ Leong Quan Pung @ Leong Kwan Pong 25% - 1/4 Leong Tuck Wah @ Leong Kwan Who 25% - 1/4 Landowner Shareholding of the Lands Leong Kwan On 1/3 Leong Kwan Pang @ Leong Quan Pung @ Leong Kwan Pong 1/3 Leong Tuck Wah @ Leong Kwan Who 1/3 Page 8 of 13 therein have to be read and understood in reference to the following passage within the impugned paragraph which states as follows: These are the agreed-upon share allotment for the rubber-estate for the treatment of expenses to be apportioned out late when the estate is sold. [18] The phrase “these are the agreed-upon share allotment” refers to the percentages, i.e. 50%. 25% and 25%. The phrase follows with a conjunction “for” which refers to the rubber-estate (the said lands). However, the sentence does not stop there. The sentence follows with another conjunction “for” which refers to the treatment of expenses to be apportioned out late (after) the said lands are sold. [19] An analysis of the entire sentence grammatically shows that it has an independent clause which is: “These are the agreed-upon share allotment”, followed by two dependant clauses which are: “for the rubber-estate” and “for the treatment of expenses…”. [20] The conjunctive word for is used twice in the sentence, and they are used in the sense of having the purpose of something. The last conjunctive word for refers to the “treatment of expenses” which was the ultimate intent the second dependant clause intended to refer to in the sentence. Hence, the percentages found in the sentence are meant for the purpose of dealing with how the proportion of expenses will be accounted for by each party therein. [21] Based on the above analysis, this Court could not agree with the plaintiffs‟ averment and interpretation that the percentages referred to in Page 9 of 13 the said sentence are the entitlement or shareholdings for the said lands. It is the finding of this Court that the percentages found in the impugned paragraph referred to the percentage each party was liable to contribute to the expenses in the event the said lands were sold. [22] The only surviving party to the purported agreement is the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant‟s testimony is consistent with the interpretation that the percentages in the impugned paragraph referred to liability for expenses, instead of shareholdings in the said lands. [23] The plaintiffs had adduced evidence in the trial that the outgoing expenses in relation to the said lands in the past had been based on the said percentages stated in the impugned paragraph. The plaintiffs submitted that their father as well as they have been paying 50% of the outgoing expenses, such as quit rents, of the said lands. Thus, this fact supported their averment that their father‟s shareholding ought to be 50% in the said lands. This Court could not agree with the plaintiffs‟ submission. The evidence in fact supports the interpretation that the impugned paragraph was meant to state clearly how the proportion of outgoing expenses of the said lands ought to be shared by the parties. [24] Based on the above reasoning, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have not discharged their burden of proof on a balance of probabilities that their father‟s shareholdings in the said lands ought to be 50%. [25] For completeness, I will now address some of the issues which were raised in the parties‟ counsels‟ submissions. First, the issue whether the purported agreement is a valid and enforceable agreement? As stated earlier, the purported agreement mainly deals with the Page 10 of 13 distribution of the compensation paid by the Government of Singapore in relation to a property in Singapore. The calculations and distributions are not in dispute and the parties appear to have acted on the purported agreement. The Court, therefore, finds it is academic for the defendants to argue that the purported agreement is invalid, unenforceable and/or null and void for whatever reasons. [26] Secondly, the purported agreement was entered into by the parties on 17.12.1988, and LKO passed away on 28.3.2007. LKO did not take step to assert his alleged 50% entitlement over the said lands during his lifetime. There was a gap of around 19 years from the time the purported agreement was signed to the date LKO passed away. For 19 years, the plaintiffs‟ father did nothing to protect his so-called 50% shareholdings in the said lands. LKO did not take any step to amend the title deeds of the said lands that had provided the shareholding allotments of the three siblings (LKO, LKP and LKW) in equal shares from the time the title deeds were issued up to the time LKO passed away. [27] The conduct of LKO does not appear to be consistent with the plaintiffs‟ argument that LKO was really entitled to 50% shareholdings in the said lands. After having considered these facts, this Court is of the considered view that this claim came about because of the plaintiffs‟ own understanding and interpretation of the impugned paragraph. This is supported by the evidence of the only surviving party to the said purported agreement, i.e. the 2nd defendant. He gave evidence which contradicted what the plaintiffs had asserted. The 2nd defendant‟s evidence was not discredited. There is no reason why this Court should not accept his evidence as true. Page 11 of 13 [28] With regard to the authenticity of the purported agreement, i.e. the stamped copy and the unstamped copy in the bundle of documents, this issue would not affect the findings of this Court in regard to the meaning and intention of the impugned paragraph. Hence, the issue raised by the defendants‟ counsel is irrelevant. [29] Lastly, this Court wishes to address one final point which is why was LKO willing to bear 50% of the outgoing expenses for the said lands if he did not have 50% shareholdings of the said lands. [30] This Court is persuaded by the unchallenged evidence of the defendants that LKO was originally in possession of six title deeds in relation to six pieces of lands which he shared equally with LKP and LKW. The title to the said six pieces of lands had reverted to the State government due to LKO‟s failure to make certain payments in relation to the lands. LKO later applied to the State government for re-alienation of the said lands. His application was approved, and the said lands were registered in the names of LKO, LKP and LKW in equal shares, i.e. each having 1/3 shares. [31] It was the contention of the defendants that LKO had secretly disposed one piece of the original 6 pieces of lands. As a result, there were/are presently only 5 lands in the names of LKO, LKP and LKW. It was contended that for this reason LKO had to be responsible for the bigger share in the liability of the outgoing expenses for the remaining 5 pieces of the lands, i.e. the said lands. Although the defendants did not produce any document to show LKO had secretly disposed the one piece of land, the defendant‟ story is reasonable and logically, and it supports a plausible reason as to why LKO was to bear a bigger share in Page 12 of 13 the liability for the outgoing expenses of the remaining 5 pieces of lands. This Court is persuaded and satisfied that the defendants‟ version of the facts is equally or more probable than the plaintiffs‟ version. As such, the plaintiffs have failed to prove their case on a balance of probabilities. Therefore, the defendants are entitled to retain their father‟s shareholdings in the said lands, i.e. 1/3 each, as reflected in the current title deeds of the said lands. [32] With regard to other issues raised in the counsels‟ submissions, this Court had examined them and found that they could not upset the main findings of this Court. To surmise, this Court finds the evidence adduced and the interpretation adopted by the plaintiffs in relation to the impugned paragraph in the purported agreement could not support the plaintiffs‟ claim. Conclusion [33] Based on the above reasons, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs claim and ordered costs of RM20,000.00 to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants. -signed- ………………………………….. (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Page 13 of 13 Plaintiffs‟ Counsel : LM Looi (with TY Lee) Messrs. Dennis Nik & Wong Defendants‟ Counsel : RK Menon Messrs. RK Menon & Co.

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-109-10/2016

PLAINTIF 1. Syarikat Bina Darul Aman Berhad; 2. Pembinaan Kery Sdn Bhd [Collectively referred as BDB-Kery (Joint-Venture)] DEFENDAN Government of Malaysia

Construction Law - Adjudication - Setting aside Adjudication Decision - Payment claims - Claim for loss of expenses - Whether the Claimant whose Payment Claim was disallowed by the Adjudicator is an aggrieved party - Whether the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide on the claims made in the Payment Claim as the Claimant had not prayed for the certificate to be revised -Whether adjudicator had jurisdiction to revise certificate issued by Superintending Officer - Whether the Loss and Expense Claims is a valid Payment Claim -Whether intervention warranted - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746], section 4, 5, 6, 15, 17(4), 25 (b) (i) (l) (m) (n) and (p), 27(1), 28(1), 29 (1) (3) and (4) (b) (c), 30 (1); Rules of Court 2012, Order 7, 28 and 92 rule 4.

12/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=565f0f8d-ac42-4c62-b751-57fa1fa74139&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-109-10/2016 In the matter of Section 15 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision by Mr. Yapp Chu Chon @ Norbet Yapp made on 8th August 2016 pursuant to Adjudication Proceedings between 1. Syarikat Bina Darul Aman 2. Pembinaan Kery Sdn Bhd and Government of Malaysia (Adjudication Reference No.: KLRCA/D/ADJ-0312-2016) And In the matter of Order 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of Order 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN 2 1. SYARIKAT BINA DARUL AMAN BERHAD 2. PEMBINAAN KERY SDN BHD … PLAINTIFFS [Collectively referred to as BDB-Kery (Joint Venture)] AND GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA … DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] The Plaintiff here is the Claimant in the Adjudication under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). The Plaintiff here had commenced Adjudication against the Defendant who was the Respondent in the Adjudication. Project [2] The parties had entered into a contract in writing dated 23 January 2006, wherein the Defendant appointed the Plaintiff as the Contractor for the construction and completion of Trans Eastern Kedah Interland Highway, from Durian Burung to Kupang Kedah (Package A) ("the Project") in Kedah for a contract sum of RM287,000,000.00 which was subsequently varied bringing the total contract sum to RM347,070,267.53. 3 [3] The Plaintiff subsequently awarded the construction of the whole Works under the Contract to Bayu Melati Sdn Bhd (“Bayu Melati”) who in turn subcontracted the Works to Ho Hup Construction Co Berhad (“Ho Hup”). The Plaintiff stated that at all material times, the Defendant was aware of the sub-contract arrangement between the Plaintiff, Bayu Melati and Ho Hup. Nothing really turns in this subcontracting though it might explain the nature of some of the documents produced by the Claimant to substantiate its loss and expense claim in its Payment Claim. [4] The form of contract between the parties is the PWD 203A Standard Form of Contract (Rev 10/83) which further incorporates 6 addenda and a “Special Provisions of the Conditions of Contract” which itself incorporates the variation of price (“VOP”) provision (“the Contract”). [5] Pursuant the Contract, the Plaintiff had proceeded to perform the Works commencing in August 2005. The Plaintiff was granted 5 extensions of time for reasons beyond its control, extending the Contract commencement date of 20 August 2005 to 28 October 2010. 4 Problem [6] Upon completion of the Works and vide a letter dated 26 January 2011, the Plaintiff submitted its claim pursuant to Clause 48(a) of the Contract to the Defendant claiming the amount of RM22,188,726.00. [7] The Defendant and PJS Consultants Sdn Bhd (“PJS”), the Defendant’s engineering consultant, requested the Plaintiff to supply the Defendant with the supporting documents to substantiate its claim pursuant to Clause 48(a) of the Contract. [8] There was a long waiting period after that and it was only by a letter dated 5 January 2014 that the Defendant informed the Plaintiff that they had made a Decision that only RM137,512.95 was due and owing to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was unhappy with the amount claimed and the paltry amount approved by the Defendant and so it asked vide its letter of 13 January 2014 to provide details of the amount approved and the reasons and supporting evidence as to why the amount it claimed was not approved. The Defendant replied by its letter of 30 January 2014 stating that they were unable to provide details regarding the Defendant’s Decision as it was confidential! [9] The Plaintiff as Claimant proceeded with Adjudication. The Plaintiff's Payment Claim was for the sum of RM24,061,739.29 due to it 5 under a Final Claim. The Superintending Officer SO only certified by way of a Final Account the sum of RM137,512.95 which certified sum had been duly paid to the Claimant before the commencement of the Adjudication. [10] The Respondent's defence as set out in the Payment Response was that the payments were not due under the terms of the Contract and that the said claims were not in accordance with the terms of the Contract and as such the Respondent stated that the Claimant was not entitled to each of the claims in the Payment Claim. Prayers [11] The parties shall be referred to as Claimant and Respondent as they appeared in the Adjudication. [12] The Adjudicator dismissed the whole of the Claimant's claim. The Claimant, being dissatisfied with the Adjudication Decision, has applied by this Originating Summons for the following orders: a) The Adjudication Decision be set aside and/or declared a nullity as: i) the Adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction; and ii) there has been a denial of natural justice. 6 b) The Plaintiff be entitled to re-commence Adjudication Proceedings from the Notice of Adjudication dated 25th March 2016 with a new Adjudicator to be appointed by the Director of KLRCA; c) The Defendant pay the costs and expense of this Application; d) Such further and other reliefs as this Honourable Court deems fit. [13] Unlike most applications before this Court for setting aside of an Adjudication Decision that are normally made by the Respondent who has to pay the sum stated in the Decision, here there is no such application because the Respondent was not made to pay any sum to the Claimant. Likewise unlike most applications for enforcement of an Adjudication Decision that would be made by a successful Claimant, here there is none because the whole of the Claimant's Payment Claim was dismissed. [14] What we have is peculiarly the Claimant's application to set aside the whole of the Decision which it said it is an "aggrieved party" within the meaning of section 15 CIPAA even though it was not required to pay any sum to the Respondent. 7 Proceedings in the Adjudication [15] The Payment Claim served by the Claimant on the Respondent under section 5 CIPAA was for the sum of RM24,061,739.29, particulars of which are as follows: Description of Work / Services Amount (1) Total Contract Sum (a) Original Contract Sum (b) Total Variation confirmed/approved TOTAL RM 287,000,000.00 RM 60,070,267.53 RM 347,070,267.53 WORKS CLAIMED AMOUNT DUE (1) Total works claimed for Variation of Price (VOP) for Diesel. (2) Total works claimed for Excess Gunite Thickness (3) Total works claimed for Geotechnical Work (4) Total works claimed for Loss & Expense pursuant to Extension of Time of 25 months from 1.3.2008 to 30.3.2010 RM 9,225,107.92 RM 4,001,496.59 RM 2,511,999.60 RM 8,323,135.18 TOTAL DUE AMOUNT RM 24,061,739.29 [16] The Respondent served its Payment Response dated 21 March 2016 on the Claimant denying all the claims put forward by the Claimant on grounds that the said claims were not in accordance with the terms of 8 the Contract and as such the Respondent stated that the Claimant was not entitled to each of the claims in the Payment Claim. [17] The Plaintiff served its Adjudication Notice on the Defendant on 25 March 2016, and consequently on 22 April 2016, the Kuala Lumpur Centre for Arbitration (“KLRCA”) appointed an Adjudicator for the dispute. The Claimant followed up with the service of the Adjudication Claim and the Respondent with the service of its Adjudication Response. An Adjudication Reply was also filed by the Claimant. [18] The Claimant subsequently withdrew its claim for VOP for Diesel in the sum of RM9,225,107.92, reserving its right to pursue this head of claim against the Respondent in arbitration proceedings instead. [19] Pursuant to the directions given by the Adjudicator, both parties filed their respective written submissions with authorities on 24 June 2016. The Claimant subsequently filed its written submissions in Reply on 29 June 2016 while the Defendant did not file any written submissions in reply. [20] The Adjudicator rendered his Decision on 8 August 2016 (“the Adjudication Decision”), dismissing the Claimant's entire claim with cost awarded to the Respondent. The Adjudicator held that the Payment Claim was invalid as it had not been based on what was certified by the 9 SO which in any event had been paid and that to entertain the Claimant's claim he would have to revise the Certificate issued and as that was not prayed for, he does not have the jurisdiction to do so. [21] He further stated that with respect to Claim No. 2 and No. 3, based on the evidence adduced through the documents, the Claimant had not proved its claim. As for Claim No. 4 the Adjudicator held that a claim for "loss and expense" is outside the purview of CIPAA and that he has no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the claim. Principles Whether the Claimant whose Payment Claim was disallowed by the Adjudicator is an aggrieved party under section 15 CIPAA [22] Under section 15 CIPAA, only an aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an Adjudication Decision. The question is "Who is an aggrieved party?" [23] Generally it is the Respondent who is required to make a payment to the Claimant under an Adjudication where the unpaid party is claiming against a non-paying party, in a case where the Claimant is the successful party. In such a case the aggrieved party who may apply to set aside the Adjudication Decision is the Respondent who is required to make payment to the Claimant. 10 [24] In the case where the Claimant is successful only in part or for far less than what it claims, or as here, where the whole of its claim is dismissed, is the Claimant then an aggrieved party even though it is not required to make any payment to the Respondent/non-paying party? [25] I would give a broad meaning to the words "aggrieved party" consistent with what the Court of Appeal held in Wu Shu Chen (SOLE EXECUTIVE OF THE ESTATE OF GOH KENG HOW, DECEASED) & Anor v Raja Zainal Abidin bin Raja Hussin [1997] 2 MLJ 487 at paragraph F of page 499: “To my mind, the word ‘aggrieved’ must be given its ordinary meaning. To be aggrieved means one is dissatisfied with or adversely affected by a wrongful act of someone. An aggrieved person is therefore a person whose legal right or interest is adversely affected by the wrongful act or conduct of another person or body. The category is never closed.” (emphasis added) [26] The Claimant further referred to the Federal Court case of Lembaga Tatatertib Peguam-Peguam v Hoo Lin Coin and Anor [2008] MLJU 226, a case involving a party’s right to appeal within section 103E of the Legal Profession Act 1976, where the Federal Court in considering the definition of party aggrieved took guidance from the English courts and inter alia held at pages 2 and 3 as follows: 11 “The position in England has now changed. As Drost J observed in College of Dental Surgeons v Findlay [2000] BCTC Lexis 1574: "However, the law of England has changed since then. That narrow interpretation of a 'person aggrieved' is no longer accepted. The tide began to turn with the judgment of Lord Denning in Attorney General of the Gambia v N'Jie [1961] 2 All ER 504, where, at p 511, he said: 'The words "person aggrieved" are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests'.”(emphasis added) [27] In Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd v Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Hamid & Ors [1994] 1 MLJ 136 at paragraph B of page 142, his Lordship James Foong, J (later FCJ) with regard to interpretation of a Statutory Instrument held: ‘A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.26063131230179615&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25326306257&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%2523GB%2523ALLER%2523vol%25252%2525sel1%25251961%2525page%2525504%2525year%25251961%2525sel2%25252%2525 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.26063131230179615&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25326306257&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%2523GB%2523ALLER%2523vol%25252%2525sel1%25251961%2525page%2525504%2525year%25251961%2525sel2%25252%2525 12 which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.’ [28] I agree with the Claimant that an “aggrieved party” within the context of CIPAA must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, that is to say a party is aggrieved so long as the party has been adversely affected or wrongfully deprived of its right to have its entitlement validly and justly decided pursuant to CIPAA. [29] Here the Claimant had his whole Payment Claim dismissed and so is naturally an "aggrieved party". If Parliament had intended only "the party against whom the adjudication decision is made" to be the only party who could set aside an adjudication decision, it could expressly have used that expression which was used in section 30(1) CIPAA with respect to "Direct Payment from Principal". [30] If Parliament had wanted to confine "the party who obtained an adjudication decision in his favour" as the party who could enforce the adjudication decision, it would also have stated so as such an expression was used in section 30(1) CIPAA which is reproduced below: "30. Direct Payment from Principal 13 (1) If a party against whom an adjudication decision was made fails to make payment of the adjudicated amount, the party who obtained the adjudication decision in his favour may make a written request for payment of the adjudicated amount direct from the principal of the party against whom the adjudication decision is made." (emphasis added) [31] The Legislature must have intended a different meaning when different words are used in the same statute; otherwise the same words would be used for consistency of expression. One can surmise that "an aggrieved party" is not necessarily "a party against whom an adjudication decision was made." While it would certainly include such a party, it is broad enough to cover a party that is dissatisfied with the Adjudication Decision either because its whole Payment Claim has been dismissed or that it was only given a part of several heads of Claim or that it was given a sum less than what was claimed in its Payment Claim. [32] It would of course be a case where the "aggrieved party" would have to set aside the whole of the Decision in its favour if it is minded to apply to set aside the Decision unless it is a case where the heads of claim without jurisdiction can be severed from those that are within 14 jurisdiction in which instance, only so much of the claim that is erroneously excluded as being without jurisdiction needs to be set aside. [33] In a case where it is not severable, then it would be very difficult if not impossible to set aside part of the Decision on ground of excess of jurisdiction or breach of natural justice for generally the whole of the Decision would then have to be set aside. [34] Presumably a Claimant who got much less than what was claimed in the Payment Claim would have to set aside the whole of that Decision if it can be shown that the Decision was procured through fraud or bribery. [35] It is generally understood that in an Adjudication under CIPAA, the worst that a unpaid party/Claimant may suffer is to have its whole Payment Claim dismissed and costs awarded against it and it would not be a case where the Claimant has to end up paying the Respondent/non-paying party other than costs. [36] Conversely under section 28(1) CIPAA it is not necessarily a "party who obtained the Adjudication decision in its favour" that is entitled to enforce an Adjudication Decision though it would certainly include such a party. It may well include a Respondent to whom costs has been awarded and for which payment had not been made by the Claimant. 15 [37] All said, a Claimant whose Payment Claim has been dismissed is certainly a party who is aggrieved with the Decision and in applying to set aside the Decision, the Court may be minded to only set aside that part of the Decision that was made when the Adjudicator erroneously declined jurisdiction on ground that the Payment Claim is not a Payment Claim within the meaning of CIPAA. Whether the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide on the Claims made in the Payment Claim as the Claimant had not prayed for the Certificate to be revised [38] The 3 Claims of the Claimant are set out in the Payment Claim and the Respondent in its Payment Response had disputed and denied the whole of the Payment Claim on ground that the Claims are not due under the terms of the Contract and not in accordance with the terms of the Contract. [39] The matters raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response under section 5 and 6 respectively of CIPAA would confer and confine the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to matters raised there as stated in section 27(1) CIPAA. [40] The Adjudicator therefore has the jurisdiction to proceed to hear the matters raised there by considering the evidence adduced in the 16 documents tendered. There was no oral hearings requested by the parties and in any event, the Adjudicator had in his Decision stated that there was no real need for an oral hearing. [41] The Adjudicator had initially proceeded on a narrow sense of his jurisdiction by stating that since it was not specifically pleaded by the Claimant that he should exercise his powers under section 25 (m) to review and revise the Certificate issued by the SO, then he has no jurisdiction to decide on the Claims of the Claimant. [42] In dealing with the issue on whether the Plaintiff was entitled to seek a revision of the Final Certificate, the Adjudicator made the following observations: At paragraph 113 of the Adjudication Decision “In any event, the Plaintiff did not seek for any remedy in its Adjudication Claim for a revision of the Final Certificate. It is not open to me to revise the Final Certificate on my own volition. That would be an excess of jurisdiction.” (emphasis added) At paragraph 118 of the Adjudication Decision “It must be borne in mind that an Adjudicator does not step into the shoes of the certifier named in the contract.” (emphasis added) At paragraph 123 of the Adjudication Decision 17 “If the Plaintiff is unhappy with the alleged under certification of its Final Claim, then it should invoke the arbitration clause in the Contract to refer the alleged under certification to arbitration. CIPAA is not the proper course for this.” (emphasis added) [43] Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Adjudicator had taken an erroneously restrictive view of his own jurisdiction under section 25 CIPAA by deciding not to review or revise the Final Certificate. The Claimant further argued that the Adjudicator has misconstrued his powers under section 25(m) CIPAA which states: "Section 25 (m) Review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued pursuant to a construction work contract, Decision, instruction, opinion or valuation of the parties or contract administrator relevant to the dispute.” [44] In interpreting section 25(m) CIPAA, learned counsel for the Claimant referred to the guidance laid down in the book Construction Adjudication in Malaysia by Lam Wai Loon and Ivan Loo at page 212 where the Learned Authors had commented on section 25(m) CIPAA as follows: 18 “Pursuant to section 25(m) of CIPA Act 2012, the Adjudicator has the power to review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued pursuant to a construction contract, decision, instruction, opinion or valuation of the parties or contract administrator relevant to the dispute referred to him, which he considers erroneous. With this power, the Adjudicator is effectively put in the position of the certifier or the decision maker or the person who possesses the power under the construction contract to issue instructions, provide opinions or conduct valuations relating to the subject matter of the Adjudication.” (emphasis added) [45] The Claimant further referred to the case of Vaultrise Ltd v Paul Cook [2004] Adj.C.S. 04/06, where the Court held as follows: “…that an adjudicator can consider whether or not a certificate should have been issued and if a missing certificate was due he could determine the sum. The adjudicator had found that a final certificate should have been issued on or before the 30th July. He went on to determine the amount and held that that sum was due. There was no reason why a dispute in those terms, viz whether or not a certificate should be issued and if so what it 19 should contain, should not be referred to adjudication.” (emphasis added) [46] By the same token, an Adjudicator may declare and decide how much is properly due under a correct Certificate if the Certificate issued is an under-certification or over-certification. [47] I derived some comfort from the observation made in Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] 117 ConLR 1: "[67] ... As the authorities established that the responding party can put forward any arguable defence in adjudication, ... it must follow that the adjudicator can rule not only on that defence but also upon the ramifications of that defence to the extent that it is successful in so far as it impacts upon the fundamental dispute." (emphasis added) [48] The powers under section 25 are vast powers granted to an Adjudicator so that he can decide on a dispute effectively and efficiently. Before he can exercise any of the powers given to him under section 25, he must first have the jurisdiction to hear the dispute under section 27. Once he has the jurisdiction, it is then within his powers to be exercised at his discretion, to decide on whether the Claimant is entitled to the whole or part of its Claims based on the evidence adduced. There is 20 nothing to state that he can only exercise his powers upon request of the parties either in their Payment Claim as in this case when there was no prayer for the Certificate to be reviewed or revised. For instance his power under section 25(b) to order the discovery and production of documents need not be premised upon an application by a party but that he may on his own initiative do so consistent with his powers under section 25(i) to inquisitorially take the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision. [49] So too if he should decide that there should be an oral hearing and order that any evidence be given on oath under section 25(l). In as much as he could under section 25(n) CIPAA decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued in respect of the matter, I would say that he has the power to decide how much is due to the Claimant even if a certificate has been issued which the Claimant felt is an under-certification and more so here when there is no breakdown as to what is the sum of RM137,512.95 consists of. [50] The fact that he has the power to review and revise any certificate issued would mean that if in the process of finding a higher sum is due than what is stated in the Certificate, he is of course at liberty to review and revise the Certificate. Such vast powers are granted to him when parties have given him the jurisdiction to decide on the dispute; the 21 Claimant stating a certain sum is due and the reasons for it and the Respondent stating nothing is due as anything due under the certificate has been paid already. [51] Here was a case where the Claimant had submitted the original claims on 26 January 2011 and no reply was forthcoming from the Respondent until 5 January 2014. Basically the Adjudicator would have to decide whether the various sums claimed under the various heads of claim are due and if so, how much. [52] Whether the Adjudicator decides on the amount owing by way of reviewing or revising the certificate is a matter left to him in the exercise of his powers under section 25(m) CIPAA. To say that he has no jurisdiction to decide on the Payment Claim because the Claimant had not asked him to review and revise the certification of the SO would be to take an unduly narrow and restrictive view of jurisdiction conferred on him to decide on the Claimant's Payment Claim. [53] Bearing in mind that a lot of Payment Claims are drafted by the parties themselves at that stage and even at the Adjudication proceedings the parties are allowed to represent themselves as provided for under section 8(3) CIPAA, it behooves upon the Court not to take an unduly technical and legalistic approach to procedural niceties. 22 [54] In support of the Claimant's contention, the Claimant relied on the Singapore High Court case of Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd v Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd [2009] SGHC 237, where Judith Prakash J (now JA) made the following observations: “…the respondent had been advised that the Determination ought to be set aside on the ground that the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the application because: (a) The claimant had failed to serve on the respondent a valid payment claim under the SOP Act… …The claimant, apart from making substantive arguments in reply to the respondent, also raised the issue of whether the respondent was entitled to challenge the Determination by disputing the validity of the payment claim and/or the adjudicator’s jurisdiction when these questions had not been previously raised in either the adjudication proceedings or before the AR. As this was a preliminary issue I had to consider it first before proceeding to the substantive issues… … The claimant, in responding to the respondent’s arguments, drew to my attention various steps that the respondent had 23 taken in the prior proceedings before the Adjudicator and the AR. These were: (a) Payment Certificate No 5 and the Adjudication Response did not dispute the validity of Progress Claim 5 (the respondent’s argument that Progress Claim 5 was an invalid document was the basis of its contention that the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction); (b) In the adjudication proceedings, the respondent had proceeded on the basis that Progress Claim 5 was valid and the Adjudicator had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter; (c) The respondent did not dispute the validity of the Payment Claim or the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator; (d) The respondent had specifically raised the issue of whether the Adjudicator could proceed with the adjudication in view of the fact that the contract between the parties had been terminated and by this submission, the respondent had accepted that, apart from determination of the contract, the Adjudicator did have jurisdiction … The claimant paid particular attention to the positions taken by the respondent in the first affidavit of Ahn Kook Jin which 24 was filed in support of SUM 3242. It asserted that the respondent had taken the following positions in the same: (a) It acknowledged that the claimant had served its payment claim dated 20 April 2008, which was the subject of the adjudication; (b) It acknowledged the validity of the payment claim in conceding that it had to serve a payment response to the claimant’s payment claim, and explained that its delay in doing so was simply due to “other pressing issues”… [55] Based on the above, Her Ladyship Judith Prakash J (now CA) concluded at paragraph 32 by stating: “I was satisfied on the above facts that the actions of the respondent both before the Adjudicator and before the AR were sufficient to establish a waiver of its right to challenge the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction. This was because the facts subsequently raised by the respondent to challenge the jurisdiction (ie the alleged inadequacy of Progress Claim 5) must have been known to the respondent and its legal advisers if not at the time Progress Claim 5 was served then shortly thereafter. The question 25 that I had to consider was whether such facts could be relied on in law to constitute a waiver.” [56] In coming to his conclusion, Her Ladyship Judith Prakash J (now CA) had made reference to the Australian case of Parist Holdings Pty Ltd v Wt Partnership Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 365 where she made the following observations: “In Parist, the defendant sought a declaration that the plaintiff must pay to it an adjudicated amount determined by an adjudicator in adjudication proceedings under the NSW Act. The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that the adjudicator had acted ultra vires in carrying out the adjudication and in making the determination and that therefore, the determination was a nullity. One ground of its argument was that the defendant’s payment claim was invalid because it did not comply with the requirements of the relevant statutory provisions. The plaintiff submitted that as a consequence of the invalidity of the payment claim, the initiation and conduct of the statutory adjudication process was fatally flawed so as to deprive the adjudicator of jurisdiction to determine the amount to be paid. The plaintiff, however, had not put in issue the validity of the statutory payment claim when it appeared before the 26 adjudicator. It only raised this issue when it filed its summons in the subsequent court proceedings. The court held that because the plaintiff had not raised the issue of jurisdiction earlier and had instead participated in the adjudication process, it was no longer entitled to make this argument...” (emphasis added) [57] I find merit in the Claimant's submission that it is only now that the Respondent has raised these issues and has enthusiastically agreed with the position taken by the Adjudicator. If the Respondent had wanted to raise the validity of the Payment Claim on ground that the Claims are premature or that for some reasons the payment due dates are wrong, it must be specifically pleaded and argued in the submissions. [58] However, to be fair to the Adjudicator, he proceeded on an abundance of caution and continued to determine the merits of the Claimant's Payment Claim for Claims No. 2 and 3. At para 126 of the Decision he stated this cautious approach as follows: "Assuming that I was wrong in my finding that the Payment Claim is invalid, what would be my findings on the existing 3 heads of claim if the Claimant has satisfied the requirements of section 5? I 27 will deal with them in the order that the Claimant has done in its Adjudication Reply...." [59] At para 133-136 of the Decision, the Adjudicator made a finding on Claim No. 3 on Geotechnical Works as follows: "133. Having examined the relevant clauses in the Contract, I agree with the Respondent's contention that the Claim under this head is based on erroneous clause under the Contract. 134. It is also my finding that since the Claimant had signed the PHK No. 2 and PHK No. 14 (Certificate of Adjustment of Contract Sum) valuation pertaining to the slope works, it is reasonable to infer that the Claimant had agreed with the calculation by the Respondent pertaining to the slope works. As to the Claimant's contention that it had signed the 2 documents merely as acknowledgment, I find it hard to believe because the signatures on the said documents is not by a junior person like a clerk of the Claimant but that of the Group Managing Director. Accordingly, I find that the Claimant has waived its claim under Claim No. 3. 135. However, I make no finding as to the allegations whether the slope failures were caused by the Respondent's design failure or 28 the poor workmanship of the Claimant. This is beyond the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. 136. Hence, it is my finding that the Claimant has failed to prove I its entitlement to payment under Claim No. 3." (emphasis added) [60] The Adjudicator having made a finding of mixed fact and law, it is not for this Court to interfere on merits. This is not an appeal and the Adjudicator having applied his mind to the clauses before him and the documents, have come to a decision which he is entitled to. It is a decision of temporary finality and it will be overtaken by the award in the Arbitration if the Claimant in the Arbitration to be commenced is able to persuade the Arbitrator that the Adjudicator had made a wrong finding of mixed law and fact. It is not for this Court to enter into the realm of sufficiency of evidence with respect to the findings arrived at unless there is clear evidence of a lack of independence or impartiality which is not the ground relied on by the Claimant to set aside the Decision. There is also no evidence of a breach of natural justice in the Adjudicator arriving at his Decision to dismiss this head of Claim for he heard both sides before arriving at his Decision. 29 [61] So too with respect to Claim No.2 on Excess Guniting Works. The Adjudicator had made a finding of mixed law and fact when he held as follows: "138. ...the Claimant has failed to prove the total slope area where the gunite thickness was more than 100 mm thick. The Claimant cannot claim for the total area where the gunite is more than 100 mm thick by using the average depth covering the area to prove the total area where the guniting exceeded the 100 mm thickness. In addition, the Claimant had signed the PHK No. 2 and PHK No. 14 (Certificate of Adjustment of Contract Sum) valuation pertaining to the slope works. The Claimant's is estopped from claiming the said item again." [62] Again for the reasons given above, I would not disturb this finding of mixed law and fact as to do so would be descending into the merits of the Decision. As what was decided here is not in excess of jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice, this head of claim must remain intact until it is overtaken by an Arbitral Award. 30 Whether the "Loss and Expense Claims" is a valid Payment Claim under CIPAA [63] This is the main plank of the Claimant's complaint on the Decision of the Adjudicator. I note that the Adjudicator had stated that "Loss and Expense Claim" is not a valid claim to be initiated under CIPAA where he made the following comments at para 130-131 of the Adjudication Decision: “130. ...Evaluating a loss and expense claim is a very tedious exercise which requires some expertise. It cannot be done within the short timelines given in CIPAA. In fact, in our present case the claim has been evaluated by the S.O. and certified for payment. It is just that the Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the assessment and wants the Tribunal to reopen the matter, which I am not prepared to do. 131. Accordingly, it is my finding that the loss and expense claim is not a valid payment claim to be pursued in this adjudication proceedings. I will refrain from expressing any views on the merit of the said claim since the Plaintiff may still want to refer the matter to arbitration.” (emphasis added) 31 [64] Having made such an observation and despite not making a finding on the "Loss and Expense Claims", the Adjudicator at paragraph 139 of the Decision stated: “In the premises, I have no choice but to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claim in toto. I also struck out the Plaintiff’s Claim No.1 as it had been withdrawn by the Plaintiff.” [65] The Claimant submitted that based on the foregoing reasons, the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction by dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim in its entirety despite concluding he had no jurisdiction to decide the matter. [66] I agree that the Adjudicator should have struck out the Claim under this head of the Payment Claim. To dismiss this head of the Payment Claim would mean that the merits had been considered and found wanting, resulting in a dismissal of the Claim. [67] However what is more important is not the nomenclature but the nub of the issue which is whether a "Loss and Expense Claim" in this Contract is claimable as a Payment Claim. [68] The Adjudicator's stand and stated position was that a "Loss and Expense Claim" is not a Payment Claim under section 5 CIPAA in that it is not "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express 32 terms of a construction contract" as "payment" is defined in section 4 CIPAA. [69] My attention was drawn to the fact that the Adjudicator had, at paragraph 97 of the Adjudication Decision, made the following observation: “No oral hearings were conducted nor was there any request from the parties for me to hold an oral hearing. In any event, in light of the nature and complexity of the disputes raised by the parties, it would not have been practical to conduct a viva voce hearing within the tight time frame stipulated under section 12 of CIPAA 2012.” [70] A refusal to assume jurisdiction and decide on the matter submitted to it on the erroneous understanding of his lack of jurisdiction would be equally a breach of natural justice in that the Claimant's Claim, in this case, under Claim No.4 for "Loss and Expense Claim" was not heard at all when it has been properly submitted for Adjudication. [71] As authority for this proposition, the Claimant referred this Court to the case of Pilon Ltd v Breyer Group Plc [2010] EWHC 837 (TCC) where the court held at paragraph 17 of the judgment as follows: 33 “An Adjudicator can make an inadvertent mistake when answering the question put to him, and that mistake will not ordinarily affect the enforcement of his Decision: see Bouygues (UK) Ltd v Dahl- Jensen (UK) Ltd [2000] BLR 49. If, on the other hand, he considers and purports to decide an issue which is outside his jurisdiction, then his decision will not be enforced: see the discussion in Sindall Ltd v Solland [2001] 3 TCLR 712. But there is a third category, which is where the adjudicator takes an erroneously restrictive view of his own jurisdiction, with the result that he decides not to consider an important element of the dispute that has been referred to him. This failure is usually categorised as a breach of natural justice.” (emphasis added) [72] At paragraph 22 of the judgment, the Court stated that when an Adjudicator erroneously takes a restrictive view of his own jurisdiction, it is tantamount to a breach of natural justice: “As a matter of principle, therefore, it seems to me that the law on this topic can be summarised as follows: 22.1 The adjudicator must attempt to answer the question referred to him. The question may consist of a number of separate sub-issues. If the adjudicator has endeavoured generally to address those issues in order to answer the 34 question then, whether right or wrong, his decision is enforceable: see Carillion v Devonport. 22.2 If the adjudicator fails to address the question referred to him because he has taken an erroneously restrictive view of his jurisdiction (and has, for example, failed even to consider the defence to the claim or some fundamental element of it), then that may make his decision unenforceable, either on grounds of jurisdiction or natural justice: see Ballast, Broadwell, and Thermal Energy. 22.3 However, for that result to obtain, the adjudicator's failure must be deliberate. If there has simply been an inadvertent failure to consider one of a number of issues embraced by the single dispute that the adjudicator has to decide, then such a failure will not ordinarily render the Decision unenforceable: see Bouygues and Amec v TWUL. 22.4 It goes without saying that any such failure must also be material: see Cantillon v Urvasco and CJP Builders Limited v William Verry Limited [2008] EWHC 2025 (TCC). In other words, the error must be shown to have had a potentially significant effect on the overall result of the adjudication: 35 see Keir Regional Ltd v City and General (Holborn) Ltd [2006] EWHC 848 (TCC). 22.5 A factor which may be relevant to the court's consideration of this topic in any given case is whether or not the claiming party has brought about the adjudicator's error by a misguided attempt to seek a tactical advantage. That was plainly a factor which, in my view rightly, Judge Davies took into account in Quartzelec when finding against the claiming party.” (emphasis added) [73] On the issue of time constraint as highlighted by the Adjudicator in the Adjudication Decision, I agree with the Claimant's submission that if the circumstances render it impossible for the Adjudicator to fairly and properly arrive at a conclusion within the permitted time period for making the Decision, he ought to have exercised his powers under section 25(p) CIPAA to extend the time period as reasonably required or in the alternative, resign as an Adjudicator pursuant to section 17(4) CIPAA. However, in the present case, the Adjudicator had failed to do both and had gone on to make the following observations: At paragraph 124 of the Adjudication Decision 36 “Furthermore, I do not think the nature and quantum of the claims is a suitable one to be dealt with under the provisions of CIPAA. I am not prepared to nor do I think it is fair for me to carry out a revaluation of the Final Claim within the tight timelines provided in CIPAA. It would not be fair to the parties. I believe the Act does not require me to reach a Decision if unable to do so within the time limits imposed by the section.” [74] I further agree with the Claimant that the Adjudicator must always have in the forefront of his mind the intent and objective of CIPAA which is to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through Adjudication. The dicta of Coulson J in the case of Enterprise Managed Services Ltd v Tony McFadden Utilities Ltd [2010] BLR 89, at paragraph 93 of the judgment is instructive to all Adjudicators faced with a seemingly tedious task: “In such circumstances, where the sheer volume/size of a claim may make it unmanageable in an adjudication, the course to be adopted by the adjudicator is clear. As the same judge explained in CIB Properties Limited v. Birse Construction Limited [2004] EWHC 2365 (TCC), the adjudicator has to decide at the outset whether or not he can discharge his duty to reach a decision impartially and fairly within the time limit prescribed by the 37 Act. If he cannot, he ought to resign. Thus, at the outset, the adjudicator, Mr. Robert Shawyer of Always Associates, had to ask himself that question. In arriving at the answer, he was of course entitled to assistance from the parties.” (emphasis added) [75] At paragraph 99 of the judgment, Coulson J continued as follows: “In my judgment, the adjudicator ought to have taken more of a grip on this adjudication at the start, and reached early views both as to jurisdiction and as to whether it could be dealt with fairly in the time period. Had he done so, I think it likely that for one, or maybe even both, of these reasons he would have concluded that the adjudication could not be properly or fairly progressed and that the right course was resignation. That would have obviously saved a good deal of time and money, not least the costs of these Part 8 proceedings which, as I understand it, are now put at the barely credible figure of £240,000. The fact that, as a matter of practicality and fairness, this claim was not suitable for the summary adjudication process only supports my conclusion that the reference to adjudication was inappropriate as a matter of law.” (emphasis added) [76] I appreciate that whilst a "Loss and Expense Claim" may in some instances be a claim for special damages arising out of breach by the 38 principal, there are cases where contractually such a claim is allowed to be "added to the Contract Sum" or as in some cases like the present PWD 203A Standard Form of Contract it is to be claimed under a Final Account and hence payable as part of the amount claimable for the additional costs incurred for work done. [77] The learned author Lim Chong Fong (now Justice Lim Chong Fong) in his book entitled The Malaysian PWD Form of Construction Contract, at page 111 observed as follows: "As soon as is practicable but not later than ninety (90) days after practical completion of the Works, the Contractor shall submit full particulars of all claims for direct loss or expense under clause 44.1 together with all supporting documents, vouchers, explanations and calculations which may be necessary to enable the direct loss or expense to be ascertained by the S.O. The amount of such direct loss or expense ascertained by the S.O. shall be added to the Contract Sum." (emphasis added) [78] Clause 44 to the PWD 203A Standard Form of Contract signed by the parties provides as follows: 39 “44. Loss and Expense Caused by Delays “If the regular progress of the Works or any part thereof has been materially affected by reason as stated under Clause 43 (c), (f) or (i) hereof (and no other), and the Contractor has incurred direct loss and/or expense for which he would not be reimbursed by a payment made under any other provision in this Contract, then the Contractor shall within one (1) month of the occurrence of such event of circumstance give notice in writing to the S.O. of his intention to claim for such direct loss or expense together with an estimate of the amount of such loss and/or expense, subject always to Clause 48 hereof.” (emphasis added) [79] Finally Clause 48(a) of the PWD 203A Standard Form of Contract provides as follows: "So soon as is practicable but not later than three (3) months after practical completion of the Works, the Contractor shall submit full particulars of all claims made by him under Clause 5(d) and/or 44 together with any documents, supporting vouchers and any explanation and calculations including documents relating to the accounts of Nominated Sub-contractors or Nominated Suppliers, which may be necessary to enable the Final Account to be 40 prepared by the S.O. provided always the Contractor had given the notice of claim in writing within the stipulated time or times in the said provisions." [80] The learned authors Lam Wai Loon and Ivan Y F Loo of Construction Adjudication in Malaysia, CCH a Wolters Kluwer Business, drew support for the proposition that a claim for losses incurred as a result of extension of time is claimable under a Payment Claim from the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in George Developments Ltd v Canam Construction Ltd [2006] 1 NZLR 177, CA. It was held that so long as such an entitlement is provided for under the written contract between the parties, such a claim can be mounted. I do appreciate that under section 19 Interpretation of the New Zealand Construction Contracts Act 2002, “payment” means – (a) a progress payment for construction work carried out under a construction contract; or (b) another type of payment under construction contract to which a party who has agreed to carry out construction work under the contract is entitled for, or in relation to, construction work carried out by that party under the contract. 41 [81] In the New Zealand Court of Appeal case of George Developments Ltd (supra), His Lordship Robertson J said at paragraph 55 of the judgement: “On the inclusion of extension of time costs, we adopt the New South Wales approach. The New South Wales Act is not identical to the Act (as it requires that a payment claim identify the construction work “or related goods and services” to which it relates, in contrast to s 20(2)(c) of the Act), but we do not think the difference is material in this context. Although the definition of construction work in s. 6 of the Act refers to physical work, the force and thrust of the Act cannot be limited to claims for physical work actually done as opposed to costs which inevitably arise from carrying out the work. This might include insurance costs, interest, costs of preparing a programme or an extension of time entitlement. As long as the construction contract provides for the payee to be paid the claimed amount in consideration for its performance of construction work (whether or not entitlement is contingent on a factor such as an extension of time being granted), the payee is entitled to make a claim for payment in a payment claim. If the payer’s stance is 42 vindicated, the particular amount will not have to be paid, but that will not prejudice the entitlement of the payee to be paid the other amounts claimed in the payment claim or invalidate the payment claim as a whole.” (emphasis added) [82] It is worth noting that the New Zealand Court of Appeal in construing the New Zealand’s Construction Contracts Act 2002, with which our CIPAA shares almost identical purpose and objectives, stated the following in the same paragraph: “It is not necessary that every amount claimed in the payment claim can be directly linked to a physical task involved in the construction of the building or structure. The Act was specifically intended to avoid artificial distinctions. Cash flow was intended to be protected by the Act and it is to be interpreted so as to achieve its object of speeding up payments.” (emphasis added) [83] The same position was also propounded in the book Adjudication of Construction Payment Disputes in Malaysia, LexisNexis, authored by Chow Kok Fong, Lim Chong Fong and Oon Chee Kheng, wherein it is stated that: 43 “[5.16] The items which are frequently tendered in a payment claim may be conveniently considered under four broad heads: (1) The first relates to the permanent works. This is the building, facility, structure or system which the contract intends the contractor to construct or install and hand over to the employer on completion. (2) The second relates to variations which are changes made to the design or the employer requirements. Variations may take the form of an addition or omission of work. (3) The third component is described as temporary works. These are items of work which are undertaken to enable the permanent works to be carried out and which are intended to be dismantled and removed from the site upon completion of the works. Examples include earth shoring systems and diaphragm walls used during excavations, formwork for the casting of concrete, scaffolding used for finishing work and 44 temporary site buildings to house site personnel and workers while the construction is in progress. (4) The final category consists of costs associated with expenses which are necessary for the organising and execution of the works. These items are sometimes referred to as site preliminaries and include items such as insurance, bonds, maintenance of site facilities, wages and utilities. … [5.30] It is clear from this quick survey of the authorities that the widest berth is accorded by the HGCRA…While the position in Australia and New Zealand are more circumscribed, the thread of judicial comments maintain quite consistently that the admissibility of a claim is determined by reference to the contract – in effect whether the contractual intention envisages that an item is claimable as part of the contract price or on some basis derived from or extrapolated from the contract price. Thus in both New South Wales and New Zealand, it is envisaged that items for site preliminaries and site overheads will be clearly claimable where the contract 45 clearly envisages such claims being made as part of the progress payment process. … [5.32] In Malaysia, the expression ‘loss and expense’ typically embrace items which fall to be described as site preliminaries. … In these situations…it is considered that on the authorities in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand they should properly form part of a payment claim.” (emphasis added) [84] I have no problem associating with and adopting the views expressed by the two (2) seminal books on Adjudication in Malaysia. Based on the principles enunciated above, there is no good reason why payments pertaining to "Loss and Expense Claims" due to the delay in completion of works cannot come within the ambit of CIPAA. Indeed, “payment” under section 4 CIPAA means “a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." Clauses 44 and 48(a) of the PWD 203A Standard Forms of Contract are the express terms under which the Payment Claim was made. 46 [85] I am further fortified in my view having regard to section 29(4)(c) CIPAA where under section 29(1) CIPAA a party may suspend performance or reduce the rate of progress or performance of any construction work if the adjudication decision has not been paid wholly or partly after the receipt of the Adjudication Decision. Under section 29(4)(c) CIPAA the Claimant who has obtained an Adjudication Decision in his favour is entitled to recover any loss and expenses incurred as a result of the suspension or reduction in the rate of progress of performance from the other party. [86] Quite obviously the Payment Claim for this loss and expense is made because the contract is still subsisting and there are further claims due after the suspension of work because of further work done. It also flows naturally from section 29(4)(b) CIPAA where the party who exercises his right under section 29(3) CIPAA is entitled to a fair and reasonable extension of time to complete his obligations under the contract. 47 [87] As this is a case where the Adjudicator had erroneously held that he had no jurisdiction under CIPAA to hear the Payment Claim, this Court is at liberty to interfere with the decision made as it is a decision that goes towards jurisdiction. Not to hear a dispute submitted for his Adjudication is equally a breach of natural justice for the Adjudicator did not hear the parties at all. [88] As this head of Claim in Claim No.4 is severable from Claims No. 3 and 4 which had been decided on merits and for which I would not interfere, I may set aside that part of the Decision that is affected. Pronouncement [89] For the reasons given, I had set aside only the part of the Adjudication Decision wherein the Adjudicator had dismissed Claim No.4 with respect to the "Loss and Expense Claim". [90] The Plaintiff/Claimant shall be entitled to re-commence Adjudication Proceedings on Claim No.4 only from the Notice of Adjudication dated 25 March 2016 with a new Adjudicator to be appointed by the Director of KLRCA. 48 [91] In view of the peculiar circumstance of this case and the novelty of the issue raised, I had exercised my discretion and made no order as to costs. Dated: 12 May 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff : James Monteiro, K Kirubakaran together with Suren Rajah : (Messrs James Monteiro) For the Defendant : Chandra Devi a/p Letchuman (SFC) together with Firdaus Jamaludin (SFC) : (Attorney General’s Chambers) Date of Decision: 17 January 2017

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-63-04/2014

PLAINTIF 1. Tan Kim Seng (No K/P: 571201-01-5057) 2. Lee Bak Tek (No K/P: 580110-01-6075) 3. Soo Yuh Mian (P)(No K/P: 680126-01-6342) DEFENDAN Trade Secret Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 732408-W)

10/05/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d249e72f-01b6-468a-a06f-a974cd4555c2&Inline=true

Page 1 of 21 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO. 22NCVC-63-04/2014 ANTARA 1. TAN KIM SENG (NO. K/P: 571201-01-5057) 2. LEE BAK TEK (NO. K/P: 580110-01-6075) 3. SOO YUH MIAN (P) (NO. K/P: 680126-01-6342) PLAINTIF- PLAINTIF DAN TRADE SECRET SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 732408-W) DEFENDAN JUDGMENT CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Date: 10.5.2017 Page 2 of 21 Introduction [1] This case concerns a sale and purchase of four compartments (hereinafter be referred to as ‘the parcels’) which are located in a building in which is specifically constructed for harvesting bird swifts for the purpose of collecting bird nest. The parcels and other parcels in the said building were sold to individual purchasers. The defendant was the owner and vendor of these parcels. The plaintiffs had purchased the parcels from the defendant. Both the plaintiffs and defendant had alleged that it was the opposing party who had committed a breach of the contracts entered into by the parties. [2] On 29.3.2017, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim and allowed the defendant’s counter-claim after a full trial. This is the judgment of this Court. The reasons for the decision are set down as below. The Salient Facts [3] On 9.4.2008, the defendant and the plaintiffs entered into four Sale and Purchase Agreements (all four Sale and Purchase Agreements shall collectively hereinafter be referred to as ‘the SPAs’). [4] The defendant agreed to sell and the plaintiffs agreed to purchase the parcels stated in the SPAs respectively. The parcels are located in a building identified as ‘Building A’. The details of the parcels are particularized as below: Page 3 of 21 No. Parcel Storey Building Area Size Approximate in sq. ft. Purchase Price (RM) 1 7 1 A 1,356 215,000.00 2 8 1 A 1,853 215,000.00 3 8 2 A 1,853 225,000.00 4 8 3 A 1,853 235,000.00 Total Purchase Price 890,000.00 The Plaintiffs’ Case [5] The plaintiffs in their statement of claim asserted, inter alia, that they would not have entered into the SPAs with the defendant if not for the fact that the defendant had misrepresented to them that the individual parcel was to be built at a height of 3000mm, instead of the actual height upon completion of the construction of the building, which is only 2700mm. [6] The plaintiffs referred to the Second Schedule of the SPAs where the floor plans for the building were attached. The plaintiffs asserted that according to the floor plans, the height for each parcel (or each floor) was stated to be 3000mm. [7] The plaintiff also asserted that before the SPAs were signed, the defendant was fully aware that the actual height for each floor was only 2700mm, and not 3000mm. But, the defendant did not inform the plaintiffs that the actual height was 2700mm which was the approved height by the authority. [8] The defendant did not reveal this material fact to the plaintiffs before the execution of the SPAs. The defendant’s failure to reveal the Page 4 of 21 actual height to the plaintiffs before the execution of the SPAs would tantamount to a misrepresentation of fact to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs argued. [9] For the above reasons, the plaintiffs sought for a declaration to declare that the SPAs entered into between the parties are invalid and terminated. The plaintiff also sought for the refund of RM86,000.00 (hereinafter be referred to as ‘the deposit’) from the defendant being the deposit paid to the defendant for all the parcels. The plaintiffs also claimed other damages as consequential losses for the termination of the SPAs. The Defendant’s Case [10] The defendant denied and refuted the plaintiffs’ assertion that the defendant had misrepresented to the plaintiffs. The defendant relied on the terms and conditions of the SPAs and stated that in fact it was the plaintiffs who had breached the terms and conditions of the SPAs. The defendant averred that the plaintiffs had failed to settle the balance purchase price of the SPAs after several extensions of time had been granted to the plaintiffs to pay the balance purchase price by the defendant. As a result of the plaintiffs’ breach, the defendant is entitled to terminate the SPAs and forfeit the deposit. [11] The defendant, therefore, counter claimed the plaintiffs and sought for a declaration that the plaintiffs had breached the SPAs. The defendant also sought for a declaration that the SPAs have been terminated, and the defendant is entitled under the terms and conditions of the SPAs to forfeit and keep the deposit. Page 5 of 21 The Findings of this Court [12] The defendant through its solicitors, Messrs Lim & Hooi, had prepared a template sale and purchase agreement for the sale of the parcels. The defendant’s solicitors had used the template agreement as the standardized sale and purchase agreement for the sale of the parcels and other parcels, both before and after the completion of the construction of the building. The defendants’ solicitors merely inserted the details of the purchasers and units which are stated in the First and Third Schedule and the execution page. [13] On 9.4.2008, the parties entered into the SPAs. On this date, the construction of the building had been completed. The relevant clauses in the SPAs are stated as below. [14] Clause 12.1 states as follows: 12.1 The position of the Parcel in relation to the other units shown in the proposed Building Plans, and the measurements, boundaries and area of the Parcel as given therein are believed but not guaranteed to be correct and if the measurements, boundaries and area of the Parcel shown in the proposed Building Plans shall be different from its measurements, boundaries and/or area as stated in the approved Building Plans and/or strata title when issued, no such discrepancy or inaccuracy shall annul the sale herein nor shall it entitle the Page 6 of 21 Purchaser to withdraw from the sale or purchase herein or to claim for any damages arising therefrom. [15] Clause 12.1 has stated explicitly that the Building Plans (Second Schedule) attached thereto in the SPAs were a proposed Building Plan. A proposed building plan simply means that it is not the approved building plan from the relevant authority. [16] Clause 35 of the SPAs has explicitly stated that this proposed Building Plan shall form an essential part of the SPAs. Clause 35 states as follows: 35. The First, Second, Third and Fourth Schedules hereto shall form part of this Agreement and shall be read taken and construed as an essential part of this Agreement. [17] Reading clauses 12 and 35 together connotes that the defendant had notified the plaintiffs that the proposed Building Plan in the Second Schedule was not the final and approved building plan, and that it could differ from the approved building plan or strata title. This in turn means the plaintiffs were made aware that the height of each floor stated in the proposed Building Plan was not the final approved building plan. [18] It was not in dispute that the plaintiffs were aware that the building has been fully constructed, although the terms in SPAs are worded as if the building has yet to be built. The plaintiffs did not enquire whether there was any approved building plan before executing the SPAs. The Page 7 of 21 plaintiffs accepted the clause on the proposed Building Plan, despite knowing the building had been fully constructed. Hence, the plaintiffs had accepted the term that there could be modification to the proposed Building Plan based on clause 12.1 of the SPAs. [19] The plaintiffs did not enquire further with the defendant whether there was an approved building plan before executing the SPAs or whether there were any changes in the Second Schedule. [20] There was no representation, whether in writing or oral, made to the plaintiffs by the vendor that no changes would be or had been made to the information stated in the proposed Building Plan (Second Schedule). [21] The plaintiffs had been notified and were fully aware that they could not annul the SPAs in the event of any derivations from plans, details and specifications in the Second Schedule as directed or required by the appropriate authority. Clause 39 states as follows: 39. The Vendor shall at its costs and expense proceed to construct the Parcel in accordance with the plans as annexed in the Second Schedule hereto which plans are hereby declared to have been inspected by the Purchaser and have been expressly accepted by the Purchaser as the Purchaser hereby acknowledges. The Vendor however reserves the right from time to time to make such deviations from the said plans details and specifications if the Appropriate Authority shall so Page 8 of 21 direct or require of if the Vendor’s Architect shall in the circumstances of the case consider it necessary or expedient without incurring any liability of any kind whatsoever to the Purchaser in respect thereof without the Purchaser being entitled to annul this Agreement or to any reduction of the Purchase Price or any damages in respect thereof. [22] Clause 42.1 explicitly states that the plaintiffs shall be deemed to have inspected the Building Plan and accepted the contents stated therein. Clause 42.1 states as follows: “42.1 It is hereby expressly acknowledged agreed and declared by the parties hereto that the Vendor has not printed distributed and/or permitted to be printed distributed any sales brochure and/or other promotional materials for the said Land and Building and/or the Parcel and the Vendor dose [sic] not give any warranty whatsoever with regard to the Agreed Purpose or anything in relation thereto and the Purchaser shall be deemed to have satisfied himself by examination search and inspection as to the title deed to the said Land the Building Plan in every respect and shall be deemed to have full knowledge of the nature and effect thereof and the Purchaser shall be deemed to have entered into this Agreement for purchase of the Parcel voluntarily and with notice and not upon or pursuant to any representation statement warranty Page 9 of 21 guarantee covenant and/or condition whatsoever made to the Purchaser and the Purchaser shall not have any claim against the Vendor for costs, damages, compensation or otherwise which the Purchaser may suffer for the purchase of the Parcel.” [23] It is also stated clearly that the plaintiffs had entered into the SPAs not pursuant to any representation statement made by the defendant. [24] Reading all the above clauses together, it could be surmised that: (i) the plaintiffs shall be deemed to have inspected the Second Schedule and accepted the contents therein; (ii) the defendant had notified the plaintiffs the building plans in the Second Schedule was a proposed Building Plan and not the final or approved building plan; (iii) although the plaintiffs were aware (a) the building had been constructed and completed, and (b) the Second Schedule was only a proposed building plan, the plaintiffs did not enquire further whether the building was constructed in accordance with the proposed building plan, i.e. the height of 3000mm, before entering into the SPAs; and (iv) by executing the SPAs, the plaintiffs had accepted that changes could be made to the proposed building plan and that the measurements, boundaries and area as the parcels could differ from that shown in the proposed building plan; and (v) there was no representation made to the plaintiffs by the defendant that the actual or built height of the floors in the building was 3000mm. Page 10 of 21 [25] Based on the above terms and conditions of the SPAs, this Court finds the plaintiffs had accepted that the height of the parcels could differ from what is shown in the proposed Building Plan. Despite being put on notice the height of the as built building could differ from what is shown in the proposed Building Plan, yet the plaintiffs did not carry out any physical inspection or measurement of the floor height of the building. The plaintiffs also did not enquire further whether there was any change made to the information shown in the Second Schedule. The plaintiffs had accepted and were bound by the terms and conditions which they had agreed in the SPAs. [26] This Court observed that one of the plaintiffs, the 1st plaintiff, Tan Kim Seng, had previously entered into two sale and purchase agreements with the same terms and conditions as the SPAs. The 1st plaintiff had bought two parcels which are also located in the same building (Building A) together with two other co-purchasers from the defendant. For these two transactions, the sale and purchase of the parcels had been completed, and the said parcels in these transactions had been delivered to the 1st plaintiff and the co-purchasers on 27.11.2008. In view of this fact, the 1st plaintiff ought to have full knowledge of the height of the parcels which were constructed at the height of 2700mm in every floor. However, the 1st plaintiff did not raise any issue about the floor height of the delivered parcels. The plaintiff also did not seek to terminate the sale and purchase agreements by reason of any purported misrepresentation made by the defendant in these two transactions. Page 11 of 21 [27] After the 1st plaintiff had taken delivery of the two parcels in the previous transactions with the height of 2700mm, the plaintiffs continued to take steps to complete the SPAs. The plaintiffs had on several occasions requested the vendor to grant them extension of time to complete the SPAs, i.e. to postpone the date to pay the balance purchase price. The defendant had acceded to the plaintiffs’ requests. The plaintiffs even managed to negotiate with the defendant to settle the balance purchase price at a discounted price of RM700,000.00. [28] On 14.1.2011, the plaintiffs via their loan solicitors, Messrs T.S. Chong & Co. forwarded a letter (Ikatan dokumen bersama, bahagian B, m/s 495) to the defendant’s solicitors, Messrs Lim & Hooi, enclosing a banker’s cheque for a sum of RM700,000.00 as full and final settlement of the balance purchase price for the four parcels. This fact shows the plaintiffs were at the material time ready and willing to conclude the sale and purchase of the parcels. [29] The completion of the sale and purchase came to a standstill when the defendant’s solicitors returned the banker’s cheque to the plaintiffs’ loan solicitors on 19.1.2011 via its letter dated 18.1.2011 (Ikatan dokumen bersama, bahagian B, m/s 497). The defendant’s solicitors returned the said banker’s cheque to the plaintiffs’ loan solicitors because the defendant’s solicitors could not accede to the conditions imposed in the plaintiffs’ loan solicitors’ letter. [30] The plaintiffs’ loan solicitors’ letter stated, inter alia, as follows: “The aforesaid sum is forwarded to you upon the following expressed conditions: Page 12 of 21 1. that the properties shall be built as per the specification in the Sale and Purchase Agreement with all the relevant approvals from local government authorities; and 2. on your undertaking not to release the cheque to clients until and unless you have obtained an independent certificate stating that the building is built in accordance with the specification in the Sale and Purchase Agreement and with approvals from local authorities.” [31] In reply to the above plaintiffs’ loan solicitors’ letter, the defendant’s solicitors stated, inter alia, as follows: “Please be informed that we as Solicitors are not in a position to confirm the first expressed condition imposed therein as we are neither a qualified architect nor we are obliged under the provisions of the Sale and Purchase Agreement to give our confirmation that the abovementioned properties have been built as per the specification in the Sale and Purchase Agreement with all the relevant approvals from local government authorities. Please also be informed that there is also no provisions as contained in the Sale and Purchase Agreement obliging us as Solicitors to engage an Page 13 of 21 independent party to certify that the abovementioned properties have been built as per the specification in the Sale and Purchase Agreement with all the relevant approvals from local government authorities. In view of us not being able to give or perform the undertaking/conditions required, we return herewith the bankers cheque no. Bank Islam 017412 in the sum of RM700,000.00 to your goodselves in accordance with the Conveyacing Practice Rules by the Bar Council. However, your goodselves may forward the cheque to our client directly.” [32] The above excerpts of the two solicitors’ letters clearly reveal that the plaintiffs had imposed additional conditions for the payment of the balance purchase price. The additional conditions were outside the terms and conditions of the SPAs. The parties’ obligations could only be confined to the four corners of the SPAs. Any conditions outside the four corners of the SPAs would tantamount to additional conditions. A party has no obligation to perform a condition imposed by the other party if such condition is not stated anywhere in the terms of the written agreement between them. [33] Further, the conditions imposed were directed at the defendant’s solicitors, instead of the defendant. The defendant’s solicitors had no obligation to comply with the conditions imposed therein by the plaintiffs’ loan solicitors. Hence, the defendant’s solicitors had rightfully returned the said banker’s cheque to the plaintiffs’ loan solicitors. Page 14 of 21 [34] After the return of the said banker’s cheque on 19.1.2011, no further attempt was made by the parties, especially the plaintiffs, to complete the SPAs. After a lapse of more than three years, the plaintiffs brought this action claiming for the refund of the deposit and other damages. [35] During the trial, the plaintiffs adduced four sale and purchase agreements (ikatan dokumen, m/s 498-548, bahagian C – P1A-D) which were all dated 24.12.2009. The parties in the four said sale and purchase agreements were the plaintiffs, as vendor, and one Boosa Bio- Tech Sdn Bhd, as the purchaser, for the sale and purchase of all the four parcels respectively for a total sum of slightly less than RM2 million. Based on the plaintiffs’ claim, the plaintiffs asserted that they have suffered a loss of profit amounting to RM1,132,000.00 because the transactions of the SPAs had not been completed due to the defendant’s fault. [36] On the issue of the sale of the four parcels to Boosa Bio-Tech Sdn Bhd. by the plaintiffs, according to clause 23(a) of the SPAs, the plaintiffs could not sell, assign, transfer, etc. their rights, interest and obligation of the parcels to a third party before the individual strata title of the respective parcels have been issued by the relevant authority without first having obtained the consent of the defendant. The plaintiffs did not obtain the consent of the defendant before they decided to sell the parcels to Boosa Bio-Tech Sdn Bhd on 24.12.2009. The plaintiffs, therefore, had in fact breached clause 23(a) of the SPAs, and the defendant could not be liable for the loss of profit of the plaintiffs as alleged. Page 15 of 21 [37] Based on the evidence before the Court, the defendant had submitted the necessary applications for the issuance of individual strata title of the parcels, and the strata titles of the parcels have not been issued. [38] With regard to the substratum of the plaintiffs’ claim, i.e. they were mispresented to by the defendant, this Court is not satisfied that the plaintiffs have discharged the burden of proving there was a misrepresentation as defined in s. 18 of the Contracts Act 1950. First, there is no evidence of any positive assertion made by the defendant to the plaintiffs which is not true. There is no written statement by the defendant to the plaintiffs that the building was built as per the proposed Building Plan. Therefore, the plaintiffs could not have relied on any positive assertion made by the defendant before entering into the SPAs. Secondly, the defendant did not owe any duty to the plaintiffs other than what is provided in the SPAs. The defendant did not breach any duty in the SPAs which had misled the plaintiffs to their prejudice. The plaintiffs had accepted the terms and conditions in the SPAs including that the proposed Building Plan was not the final Building Plan and that the information stated therein was subject to modification or changes. Lastly, the defendant did not cause the plaintiffs to make a mistake as to the substance of anything which forms the subject of the agreement. There was no evidence from the plaintiffs which could suggest that they had relied on any representation of the defendant to believe that the height of the parcel was 3000mm. [39] Based on the above finding of facts, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiffs had filed this action on hindsight riding on the fact that there is a discrepancy between the actual height of the building and Page 16 of 21 the height stated in the proposed Building Plan in the Second Schedule as the reason to frame their claims and the ground to seek a declaration from the court to terminate the SPAs and to claim for the refund of the deposit and other ancillary damages. [40] With regard to the defendant’s counter claim, clause 4.2 of the SPAs states as follows: 4.2 The instalments shall be paid by the Purchaser to the Vendor within fourteen (14) days from the date of a notice in writing from the Vendor requesting payment of the same and every request for the payment of such instalments shall be supported by the requisite certificate of the Vendor’s Architect and the same shall be accepted by the Purchaser without any objection or enquiry and as conclusive proof of the fact that the works referred therein have been duly commenced/completed. [41] On 25.4.2008, the defendant through its solicitors forwarded the Certificate of Fitness for the parcels to the plaintiffs’ solicitors for the SPA, Messrs S.L. Song & Co., and requested for the payment of the balance purchase price. After several postponements of the final date to pay the balance purchase price, the balance purchase price remained unpaid. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had, through their loan solicitors, attempted to pay the reduced balance purchase price, in fact and in law, the balance purchase price was not settled upon the due date. Page 17 of 21 [42] Based on clause 4.1 above read together with clause 8 of the SPAs which stated that time shall be of essence of the contract (see s. 56(1) of the Contract Act 1950), therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiffs had breached the SPAs and that the defendant was at liberty to terminate the SPAs on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to perform their obligation, i.e. the pay the reduced balance purchase price. [43] The failure on the part of the plaintiffs to resolve the return of the banker’s cheque connotes the plaintiffs had no intention to continue to perform their obligations under the SPAs. When the plaintiffs refused, omitted and/or failed to resolve the return of the banker’s cheque, this tantamount to an act of refusal to perform or disabled themselves from performing their promise, i.e. to pay the reduced balance purchase price. Hence, in law, the defendant could put an end to the SPAs (see s. 40 of the Contract Act 1950), as the SPAs had become voidable at the option of the defendant. [44] Based on the termination clause 10.1, the defendant is entitled to forfeit any sums paid by the purchasers. In this case, only a sum of RM86,000.00 was paid. [45] Based on the above findings and explanation, the issues to be tried as submitted by the parties are answered by this Court as below: Plaintiff’s issues to be tried Answer: Whether the defendant had misled the plaintiffs into believing that the 4 parcels Negative. Page 18 of 21 purchased from the defendant vide [sic] the 4 SPAs were constructed in accordance with the plans attached in the 2nd Schedule of the 4 SPAs which inter alia stated that the height of each parcel was 3000mm and not 2700mm? Whether the defendant being full aware that the height of each parcel had been reduced from 3000mm to 2700mm and that the roof of the Building was not constructed in accordance with the plans attached had deliberately concealed these facts from the plaintiffs at the time of the execution of the 4 SPAs? Negative Whether the Defendant had at any time made available for inspection by the Plaintiffs the amended building plans as opposed to the plans attached to the 4 SPAs prior to the execution of the 4 SPAs by the Plaintiffs? Affirmative Whether the Plaintiffs would have entered into the said 4 SPAs if the Defendant had informed them of the reduction in height of the Parcels from 3000mm to 2700mm plus the fact that the roofs were not constructed in accordance with the plans attached to the 4 SPAs? Irrelevant. The parties were bound by the terms and conditions of the SPAs. Further, the plaintiffs had not expressly indicated to the defendant that they wanted the height of the parcel Page 19 of 21 at 3000mm before executing the SPAs. Whether 3000mm is the minimum height required for each of the Parcels for the purpose of harvesting swiftlets and collecting their bird nests? Irrelevant Whether by unilateral reducing the height of Parcels from 3000mm to 2700mm and by failing to procure the individual strata title the Defendant had committed a fundamental breach of the contract and as a result therefrom the Plaintiffs has suffered losses? Negative. Whether there is any merit in the Defendant’s counter claim Affirmative Defendant’s issues to be tried Whether the Plaintiffs had paid the balance of the purchase price together with the late payment interest to the Defendant according to the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreements? Negative Whether the Plaintiffs had breached the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreements? Affirmative Page 20 of 21 Whether the Defendant is entitled to forfeit the 10% deposit paid under the Sale and Purchase Agreements? Affirmative Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to impose additional conditions on the Defendant which were not expressly provided under the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreements? Negative (Note: the above questions for issues to be tried were framed by the parties and approved by the previous Judge) Conclusion [46] Based on the above reasoning, this Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim and ordered costs of RM20,000.00 to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiffs. With regard to the defendant’s counter-claim, this Court allowed its counter-claim and ordered costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid to the defendant by the plaintiffs. -signed- ………………………………………….. (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Page 21 of 21 Counsel for the Plaintiffs : Mohd Faizal B Ahmad Tetuan Hazelin & Associates Counsel for the Defendant : Wong Boon Lee (with Chua Yee Leng) Tetuan Gulam & Wong

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-139-11/2016, WA-24C-143-11/2016 & WA-24C-144-11/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) MIR Valve Sdn Bhd 2. ) TH Heavy Engineering Berhad DEFENDAN 1. ) TH Heavy Engineering Berhad 2. ) MIR Valve Sdn Bhd

Contract for the procurement of equipment for works done on a ship - applications to enforce and to set aside Adjudication Decisions - whether works done on a ship to convert it into a Floating Production Storage (“FPSO”) vessel is construction work within the meaning of construction contract under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746] - Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 [Act 746], section 2, 4, 5, 6(4), 7, 15 (1)(b), 15(d), 16, 27(3) and 28; Courts of Judicature Act 1964 [Act 91], section 23; Petroleum Development Act 1974 [Act 144], section 10; Factory and Machinery Act 1967 [Act 139], section 3; Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967 [Act 388], section 17A; Construction Industry Development Board Act 1994 [Act 520]; Construction Industry Development Board (Amendment) Act 2011 [Act A1407]; Rules of Court 2012, Order 7, 28 and 92 rule 4.

02/05/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=7dc7c151-0904-4a35-8b25-63f39674a274&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-139-11/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 between MIR Valve Sdn Bhd (Company No: 757636-V) and TH Heavy Engineering Berhad (Company No: 634775-D) And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 4.11.2016 by Mr. Krishna Raj T. Rajagopal (Adjudicator) (KLRCA/D/ADJ-0419- 2016) And In the matter of Section 13 and Section 28(1) Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of Order 7 Rule 2, Order 7 Rule 7, Order 28 Rule 1 and Order 92 Rule 4, Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN 2 MIR VALVE SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 757636-V) ... PLAINTIFF AND TH HEAVY ENGINEERING BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 634775-D) ... DEFENDANT (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-143-11/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication between TH Heavy Engineering Berhad (Plaintiff) and MIR Valve Sdn Bhd (Defendant) And In the matter of Adjudication Decision dated 4.11.2016 between MIR Valve Sdn Bhd and TH Heavy Engineering Berhad on supplying of complete package of actuated shutdown valve for Layang Project. And In the matter of Section 5, 6, 7, 15(b), 15(d), 16, 27, 28 and other relevant provisions in the Construction 3 Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012. And In the matter of Order 7, 28, 92 Rule 4 and other relevant provisions in the Rules of Court 2012. And Section 23 in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 BETWEEN TH HEAVY ENGINEERING BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 634775-D) ... PLAINTIFF AND MIR VALVE SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 757636-V) … DEFENDANT (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-144-11/2016 4 In the matter of an Adjudication between TH Heavy Engineering Berhad (Plaintiff) and MIR Valve Sdn Bhd (Defendant) And In the matter of Adjudication Decision dated 4.11.2016 between MIR Valve Sdn Bhd and TH Heavy Engineering Berhad on supplying of complete package of actuated shutdown valve for Layang Project. And In the matter of Section 5, 6, 7, 15(b), 15(d), 16, 27, 28 and other relevant provisions in the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012. And In the matter of Order 7, 28, 92 Rule 4 and other relevant provisions in the Rules of Court 2012. And Section 23 in the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 BETWEEN 5 TH HEAVY ENGINEERING BERHAD (COMPANY NO: 634775-D) ... PLAINTIFF AND MIR VALVE SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 757636-V) … DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] These applications that are before the Court raise an interesting issue with respect to whether works done on a ship to convert it into a Floating Production Storage and Offloading ("FPSO") vessel is construction work within the meaning of "construction contract" under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). Like most ships, she had a fanciful name: Nordic Laurita or Deep Producer 1. [2] The answer to that would determine whether the Claimant's claim in the Adjudication involving the Provision to Supply Complete Package of Actuated Shutdown Valve ("the valves") for the Layang FPSO Project ("the Project") is one falling within CIPAA. Layang is off the coast of Sarawak and the supply of the valves to the Project was in Perak. 6 [3] It is not in dispute that the Project is a FPSO Vessel Conversion Project. MIR Valve Sdn Bhd (“MIR”), was appointed by TH Heavy Engineering Berhad (“TH”) to supply the valves which will be installed and would form a part of the vessel. It was also agreed by the parties that the supply and installation of the valves onto the FPSO is to fit it for the production and processing of gas condensate and crude oil. [4] There are 3 applications before the Court by way of Originating Summons ("OS"). In OS WA-24C-139-11/2016 the Plaintiff there is MIR who is the successful Claimant in the Adjudication. They have applied to enforce the decision of the Adjudicator. [5] The other 2 applications are OS WA-24C-143-11/2016 and OS WA-24C-144-11/2016 where TH have applied to set aside 2 related Adjudication Decisions involving the supply of valves by MIR to them for the same Project. [6] By consent the 3 applications were heard together. For the avoidance of confusion the parties shall be referred to by their designations as Claimant and Respondent as in the Adjudication or as MIR and TH respectively. 7 Proceedings in the Adjudication [7] The dispute between the two parties relates to two disputes both arising from a purchase order dated 17.12.2015. The contract sum for the supply of the valves was USD1,017,513.00 ("the Purchase Sum"). [8] On 2.2.2016, a variation to the value of USD139,432.00 was ordered by way of Variation Order No. H100000315-VO1-1. This had the effect of revising the Sum upwards to USD1,156,945.00 (“the Revised Purchase Sum”). [9] The Claimant submitted to the Respondent a total of 3 Tax Invoices for the sum of USD752,014.25 (excluding GST) for work done carried out since 2.3.2016. The details of the 3 Tax Invoices are set out below: (i) CD201500199B for USD347,083.50; (ii) CD201500199C for USD289,236.25; and (iii) CD201500199D for USD115,694.50. [10] The Respondent failed to honour the 3 Tax Invoices resulting in a payment dispute between them. The Claimant served a Payment Claim on the Respondent and subsequently followed through with the service of an Adjudication Claim on or about 12.7.2016 on the Respondent 8 pursuant to CIPAA. On 4.11.2016, the Adjudicator, Mr. Krishna Raj T. Rajagopal, gave Decision in favour of the Claimant. [11] The Claimant also submitted 2 Tax Invoices for the sum of USD404,930.75 (excluding GST) for work carried out since 2.3.2016. The details of those tax invoices are as follows: (i) CD201500199A for USD115,694.50; and (ii) CD201500199 for USD289,236.25. [12] The Respondent failed once again to honour the 2 Tax Invoices resulting in a payment dispute. The Claimant proceeded with Adjudication under CIPAA and on 17.10.2016, the Adjudicator, Mr. Chen Mian Kuang, gave the Decision in favour of the Claimant. This Decision was duly registered on 22.11.2016 under section 28 CIPAA as a judgment of the Court in an enforcement application filed. [13] In both Adjudications, no Payment Response was filed by the Respondent with the result that the Respondent is deemed to have disputed the Claimant's claim under section 6(4) CIPAA. The Respondent did however raise the issue of a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Adjudicators to hear the Payment Claim as the contract in question, it was submitted, is not a construction contract. 9 [14] Under section 27(3) CIPAA, when a jurisdictional issue is raised the Adjudicator is permitted to proceed to hearing the dispute and deliver his decision. Section 27(3) reads: "Notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, the adjudicator may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28(1)." [15] The Respondent has now applied under the 2 applications to set aside both the Decisions under section 15(1)(b) and (d) CIPAA on ground chiefly that both the Adjudicators had acted in excess of their jurisdiction when they found in favour of the Claimant and/or that the Respondent had been denied natural justice when the Adjudicators proceeded to hear the dispute and deliver the Adjudication Decisions. [16] The ground of breach of natural justice can immediately be dismissed as the express language of section 27(3) CIPAA clearly allows the Adjudicator to proceed to hear and complete the Adjudication including delivering his Decision without prejudice to the rights of the party affected to apply to set it aside. I shall thus focus on the jurisdiction issue which is the main plank of the Respondent's submission before this Court. 10 Principles [17] The very limited grounds for setting aside an Adjudication Decision are as provided for under section 15 CIPAA which reads as follows: "15. Improperly Procured Adjudication Decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds: a) The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery; b) There has been a denial of natural justice; c) The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or d) The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction." (emphasis added) [18] In a case involving an Adjudicator's core jurisdiction as in the types of construction contracts to which CIPAA applies under section 2 or that which CIPAA excludes as in section 3, then if an Adjudicator assumes jurisdiction to hear a dispute arising out of such a contract, he would then be said to have exceeded his jurisdiction since he has no jurisdiction to begin with. Therefore if an Adjudicator misinterpret his jurisdiction with respect to assuming jurisdiction when there is none, 11 then this Court would be constrained under section 15(1)(d) CIPAA to set aside the whole of the Adjudication Decision. Whether the conversion work from a ship to the FPSO vessel is construction work and hence the contract for the procurement of valves for that work [19] Under section 2 CIPAA, it is provided that the Act applies to every construction contract made in writing relating to construction work carried out wholly or partly within the territory of Malaysia including a construction contract entered into by the Government. [20] A “construction contract” is further defined in section 4 to mean a construction work contract or construction consultancy contract. [21] What then is "construction work"? The meaning is a technical and legal one, seeing that the Act has seen it fit to define it. It is thus not the meaning that would ordinarily be given to the expression "construction work" for then the scope would be as wide and as varied as one can possibly give to it. Section 4 CIPAA defines it as follows: "construction work” means the construction, extension, installation, repair, maintenance, renewal, removal, renovation, alteration, dismantling, or demolition of: 12 a) Any building, erection, edifice, structure, wall, fence or chimney, whether constructed wholly or partly above or below ground level; b) Any road, harbour works, railway, cableway, canal or aerodrome; c) Any drainage, irrigation or river control work; d) Any electrical, mechanical, water, gas, oil, petrochemical or telecommunication work; or e) Any bridge, viaduct, dam, reservoir, earthworks, pipeline, sewer, aqueduct, culvert, drive, shaft, tunnel or reclamation work, and includes— a) Any work which forms an integral part of, or are preparatory to or temporary for the works described in paragraphs (a) to (e), including site clearance, soil investigation and improvement, earth-moving, excavation, laying of foundation, site restoration and landscaping; and b) Procurement of construction materials, equipment or workers, as necessarily required for any works described in paragraphs (a) to (e)." (emphasis added) 13 [22] To come within a "construction contract" to which CIPAA applies, the contract between the Claimant and Respondent must either fall within the meaning of construction work or as in this case the procurement of equipment for construction work. [23] Under our CIPAA, unlike that of other jurisdictions, "construction work" under (d) cover any gas, oil and petrochemical work. As can be seen, it is the nature of the work rather than what is being constructed that is more determinative when it comes to gas, oil and petrochemical. It is the purpose served by the structure built that is important rather than the structure built. Implicit in such a definition is that if the structure is more of a ship or vessel, if it nevertheless is work done for the gas, oil and petrochemical industry, then it would still qualify to be construction work being any gas, oil and petrochemical work. [24] Once it is established that the conversion work from a ship to a FPSO vessel is construction work then the contract for the procurement of an equipment such as valves for the FPSO vessel would qualify to be a "construction contract." [25] One can immediately appreciate that the conversion of the ship to a FPSO vessel is such that the ship no longer serves the purpose of a ship but is now transformed into a different purpose; that of the oil and gas industry. This is where one must of necessity look at the functional 14 purpose served by the conversion works and not the form of the structure with respect to its type of structure. [26] With the conversion, it no longer serves the purpose of a ship in transporting people or goods from one place to another. Its predominant purpose is that of serving the gas, oil and petrochemical industry with respect to drilling for oil, gas and petrochemical, processing it, storing and offloading it. In short it is now functioning like a refinery. True, it can still be moved from one place to another in exploring for gas, oil and petrochemical but no longer in the sense of transporting people or goods from one place to another. [27] Its total character and purpose have been transformed such that though it bears the shape and structure of its former form, its function is now fitted for the oil, gas and petrochemical work. Its focus is forged with the fundamental change and alteration in what it can now do which previously it could not. It is now no longer a ship, but converted now into an oil rig cum refinery. [28] The Wikipedia, accessed on 18.1.2017 defines and explains a FPSO unit as “a floating vessel used by the offshore oil and gas industry for production and processing of hydrocarbons, and for the storage of oil. A FPSO vessel is designed to receive hydrocarbons produced by itself or from nearby platforms or subsea template, process them, and 15 store oil until it can be offloaded onto a tanker or, less frequently, transported through a pipeline. FPSOs are preferred in frontier offshore regions as they are easy to install, and do not require a local pipeline infrastructure to export oil. FPSOs can be a conversion of an oil tanker or can be a vessel built specially for the application. ... “ [29] It is an agreed fact that what was being procured and supplied in the valves, is peculiarly necessary for it to serve the gas, oil and petrochemical activities. It was installed onto the converted ship; converted it into a FPSO vessel. The valves function as a connector of the pipes within which gasses and crude oil are extracted and funneled to the FPSO vessel. [30] Like all definitions, one must look at pre-existing definition before any modification was done to it to discern what Parliament might have in mind with the modification introduced. [31] Under the Petroleum Development Act 1974 there is already a definition for "petroleum" in section 10 which is defined as follows: "10. DEFINITION. For the Purpose of this Act, the expression "petroleum" means any mineral oil or relative hydrocarbon and natural gas existing in its natural condition and casinghead petroleum spirit including 16 bituminous shales and other stratified deposits from which oil can be extracted." (emphasis added) [32] Really then, oil, referred to as mineral oil which has to do with exploration and exploitation of it and petrochemical referred to as relative hydrocarbon and gas referred to as natural gas are all inter- related and coming within the rough rubric of petroleum or what in industry parlance is called the "oil and gas industry". [33] Then we have the definition of "construction works" under a prior statute in the Construction Industry Development Board Act 1994 ("CIDB Act") which is word for word identical to that of CIPAA except for the missing word "oil" between "gas" and "petrochemical". [34] It is only too obvious that the definition of "construction work" has been taken from or to use a perforation term, "cut and paste" from the CIDB Act. That is not uncommon if an existing definition serves fine for another statute. [35] If one were to trace back earlier, there was already the definition for "work of engineering construction" in section 3 of the Factory and Machinery Act 1967 as follows: 17 "work of engineering construction" means the construction, extension, installation, repair, maintenance, renewal, removal, renovation, alteration, dismantling, or demolition of — (a) any erection, edifice, structure, caisson, mast, tower, pylon, wall, fence or chimney, whether constructed wholly or partly above or below ground level; (b) any road works, dock, harbour works, railway, siding, cableway, tramway line, inland navigation, air field or aerodrome; (c) any drainage, sewer, sewage works, irrigation, river control works, sea defence work or earth retaining structure; (d) any electrical, mechanical, water, gas, petrochemical or telecommunication works; or (e) any bridge, viaduct, dam, reservoir, lagoon, earthworks, pipeline, sewer, aqueduct, culvert, drive, shaft, tunnel or reclamation works, and includes— (aa) any formwork, falsework, scaffold or any works which form an integral part of, or are preparatory to or temporary to, the works described in paragraphs (a) to (e); 18 (bb) site clearance, soil investigation and improvement, earth- moving, excavation, laying of foundation, site restoration and landscaping; and (cc) such other works as may be specified by the Minister." [36] One cannot escape the similarities. Interestingly, "premises" is defined in section 3 to include any building, place, or floating structure. [37] If the site where the construction work is carried out is so important as in it must be affixed to the ground, then one would have thought that under section 2 CIPAA the bracketed words [at the site] would have been included as in: "This Act applies to every construction contract made in writing relating to construction work carried out [at the site] wholly or partly within the territory of Malaysia including a construction contract entered into by the Government." [38] Even if it had been included, the definition of "site" in section 4 is as follows: “site” means the place where the construction work is affixed whether on-shore or off-shore;" (emphasis added) 19 [39] Therefore even though the valves are installed on a converted ship that is now a FPSO structure that floats, that is nevertheless "off-shore" as there is no requirement that the site must be affixed on the "seabed". [40] It is true that "site" is used with respect to site clearance and site restoration in section 4 of the definition of "construction work" and in that context, it has reference to land which of course is on-shore as is discernible from the context in which it was used as follows: “any work which forms an integral part of, or are preparatory to or temporary for the works described in paragraphs (a) to (e), including site clearance, soil investigation and improvement, earth- moving, excavation, laying of foundation, site restoration and landscaping”. [41] Be that as it may, one must give meaning nevertheless to the word "off-shore" for as they say, it was not placed there for decorative purpose only! It is placed there purposefully to include gas, oil and petrochemical works done on a FPSO whether it be floating as in semi- submersible rig or in a floating platform or in a jack-up platform. In some of these structures, they are kept in place over the designated place of exploration and drilling by anchors on the seabed. 20 [42] Learned counsel for the Respondent was prepared to make a distinction between a FPSO that is affixed to the seabed as qualifying to be affixed off-shore and hence not a chattel but would qualify to be construction work which must have some degree of affixation to the site. However that must be differentiated from floating FPSO and semi- submersible rigs or platforms or vessels which he said are chattels. [43] Surely such a fine distinction would do the "oil and gas industry" no good for in the case of a jack-up rig, as pointed out by the Claimant's learned counsel, initially it is affixed on the seabed and later jack-up! The degree of affixation is of no relevance but what is relevant is whether the work done on it is “construction work” done in relation to the "oil and gas" industry. [44] From the drift and definition in the drafting, it is inescapable that the CIDB has jurisdiction over those working as contractors in any works in the gas, oil and petrochemical industry. The CIDB Act provides for registration of contractors defined as “a person who undertakes to carry out and complete any construction works” and any person not registered or holding a valid certificate of registration issued by the CIDB shall not undertake and is expressly prohibited from carrying out and completing any “construction works”. 21 [45] Learned counsel for the Respondent rightly pointed out that as to what type of contractors are required to register with CIDB, CIDB has issued a “Contractor Registration Requirements and Procedures Handbook” where the contractor registration categories are divided into three (3) distinct categories namely, Civil Engineering construction, Construction of Buildings and Mechanical and Electrical with the guide as to which category to register for set out in Annex 4 and specialization under Annex 5. [46] However learned counsel was at pains to point out that from Annex 4 and Annex 5, it can be seen that ship building or ship builders is not under any of the categories of contractors required to be registered with CIDB in order to carry out “construction works” as defined under the CIDB (Amendment) Act 2011. [47] While that may be true, in Annex 5 it is provided under “Registration of Contractor Specialization” the following under category and grade in the Contractor Registration Certificate at p 66 – 76 of the Handbook: CE09 Oil or gas main pipeline, M13 Offshore drilling structure, B20 Internal gas piping system, CE15 Oil and gas rig. At category M14 Pollution control system, the works is described as “construction, maintenance and repair of offshore drilling structure, including drilling rig. One cannot escape the fact that registration of 22 contractors is required under CIDB Act for “gas, oil and petrochemical” works in a FPSO vessel. [48] The reason is obvious. Whilst ship building is excluded from the definition of "construction work" under CIPAA, where the nature of work is concerned, be they electrical, mechanical, water, gas, oil, petrochemical or telecommunication, they are nevertheless covered under CIPAA and the contractors are required to be registered under CIDB Act before executing the said “construction works”. [49] For instance if electrical and mechanical works were done on a satellite that is later launched into space for telecommunication works, would that not be covered under (d) of the definition of "construction work"? I would think it is covered because it covers any telecommunication works done as well as electrical and mechanical works done. [50] The addition of "oil" to the already existing definition of "construction work" in CIPAA is clearly to erase any doubt as to whether "oil" exploration and exploitation activities, be they upstream or downstream are covered under CIPAA. The rationale is not difficult to find. The "oil and gas" industry is the major contributor of economic growth in our country. If those who are involved in it are excluded from the speedy resolution mechanism of statutory adjudication under CIPAA 23 for work done or services rendered, they would be greatly affected to the detriment of the industry and even economy, as a whole. [51] Little wonder that whilst other countries have excluded "oil and gas" works in their scheme of statutory adjudication, we have expressly included it and for good reason. [52] The United Kingdom excludes it under section 105(2)(a) of their Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 as follows: "The following operations are not construction operations within the meaning of this Part - (a) Drilling for, extraction of, oil or natural gas; ..." [53] There are similar provision in the New South Wales Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1997 in section 5(2). In New Zealand under its Construction Contracts Act 2002 it is similarly excluded under section 6(2). There is no express exclusion of oil and gas work under the Singapore Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Chapter 30B). [54] I bear in mind the salutary principle of interpretation of statute as contained in section 17A of the Interpretation Act 1948 & 1967 which provides that “In the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether 24 that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object”. [55] The purpose or object of CIPAA is captured in its preamble as follows: “An Act to facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters.” (emphasis added) [56] The meaning of "construction industry" must of necessity be based on the types of "construction work" as defined in CIPAA. [57] Learned counsel for the Respondent was concerned that Adjudicators appointed under CIPAA would be unnecessarily burdened in dealing with claims not within the construction industry thereby slowing down the entire payment adjudication process. I think that is beside the point. If a claim falls under CIPAA then it is for KLRCA to train enough adjudicators to expeditiously decide on all disputes falling under it. 25 [58] Likewise the fear expressed by learned counsel that injustice may also occur in the form of denial of natural justice or rough justice as in having to deal with far too many claims from beyond the construction industry, and that adjudicators may not have the time to allow for a proper hearing and taking of evidence, is with respect, misplaced. [59] The cure for bottleneck arising out of proper application is not to exclude or constrict application, but to clear the bottleneck with more properly-trained adjudicators. To exclude players in the oil and gas industry which is the main contributor to our economic growth would do a great disservice to all in that key industry. [60] Whilst I do not for a moment doubt that the works described to be in the construction industry in the Parliamentary discussions are mainly drawn from the examples in the building and/or infrastructure work which is affixed to land, that does not necessarily exclude any construction, installation, alteration works done with respect to the gas,oil and petrochemical works. To restrict the application of CIPAA to examples referred to in Parliamentary debates would be to unduly restrict the application of CIPAA to examples that our lawmakers could think of and failing in the process to follow the cardinal rule of interpreting the ordinary and natural meaning of those words used in the definition section. 26 [61] I have no quarrel with the wisdom expressed by the learned authors Chow Kok Fong, Lim Chong Fong and Oon Chee Kheng of Adjudication of Construction Payment Disputes in Malaysia, Lexis Nexis in the following passage in the context of excluding ship-building contracts from CIPAA at para [4.12] at p 30: “Construction works, per se, are annexed to the real property and when completed form part of the real property. It follows that any component or material which is incorporated as part of the works becomes part of the real property, in contrast with chattels which retain their character as personal property. For this reason it is considered that the Act would not apply to, for example, a shipbuilding contract notwithstanding that these share many characteristics with that of a construction contract.” (emphasis added) [62] I would say "ship building" contract is excluded because it does not come under (a) the structures which are mainly buildings on earth, expressed as below or above ground level or (b) the infrastructures as in road, harbour works, railway, cableway, canal or aerodrome for example. 27 [63] It is more in the form of a chattel but the fact that it may be a chattel is not conclusive that it is not construction work if the chattel is now being converted for use in the "oil and gas industry". [64] My attention was also drawn by learned counsel for the Respondent to an article published by Lim Chong Fong in the KLRCA Newsletter Jul – Dec 2012 at p 9 (now Judge of the High Court of Malaya) entitled “The Legal Implication of CIPAA”, wherein he opined as follows: “It is unclear as to whether ship building such as a FPSO vessel common in the oil & gas industry is encompassed by the CIPAA. Again, it is submitted that the CIPAA does not apply because the genus of the definition of construction work relates to fixtures whereas the FPSO is a chattel.” (emphasis added) [65] It is my unfortunate lot to have to agree to disagree with my learned brother Justice Lim Chong Fong on this issue for the reasons given above. [66] Learned counsel for the Respondent was further fortified in his view that work done on all chattels have to be excluded when he drew 28 deep from the definition of “building” under Section 2 of the CIDB (Amendment) Act 2011 where building is described as follows: “any permanent or temporary building or structure including any house, hut, shed or roofed enclosure, whether used for the purpose of human habitation or otherwise, and also any wall, roof, fence, platform, staging, gate, post, pillar, paling, frame, hoarding, slip, dock, wharf, pier, jetty, landing-stage, road or bridge, or any structure support or foundation connected to the foregoing and any other erection, as the Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, declare to be a building;” (emphasis added) [67] He highlighted that what can be noted is that all of the buildings or structures described are clearly affixed and immovable including docks, wharf, pier, jetty and bridge, whether on-shore or off-shore. [68] I would however say that the words emphasized in the definition of building is broad enough to cover the construction, installation or alteration of a platform out in the sea with respect to gas, oil and petrochemical work. Otherwise one would be confining gas, oil and petrochemical works to factories processing such works or pipes carrying gas, oil and petrochemical or tanks build for such purpose but then that would have already been covered under any building, structure 29 under (a) or pipeline under (e) of the definition of "construction work" in section 4 CIPAA. [69] Surely the legislature did not intend an overlap in definition and that any gas,oil and petrochemical works must be broader than works envisaged in the other definitions under (a) and (e) bearing in mind that the "oil and gas industry" would peculiarly and particularly involve activities that are off-shore in the nature of exploration, exploiting, drilling, extracting from the seabed, storing and offloading as are typically the activities of a FPSO vessel or platform. It would not be presumptuous to say that Parliament must have in mind that some of these works are done on board rigs, or even vessels or even ships modified, altered or converted for such a purpose [70] It is a case consistent with Parliament's intention to extend CIPAA to the "oil and gas" industry as well, that the functional purpose served by structures such as a FPSO vessel or platform would be the determinative factor rather than is it a chattel or a building with affixation to the earth whether below, on ground or above. Whilst the definition of building is with respect to form and structure, the definition for oil, gas and petrochemical works is with respect to function or functional purpose. 30 [71] He saw something of a revelatory significance in that the definition of "building" was not previously in the CIDB Act 1994 and the purpose of the word “building” in the CIDB (Amendment) Act 2011 appears to be for the purposes of imposing statutory duties on contractors under the new Sections 34B to 34E. Of particular note is Section 34C(1)(a) which provides that the CIDB may engage a qualified person or specialist to carry out investigations and test and advise the CIDB on all matters relating to the safety of the “building in respect of which construction works are being carried out or have been carried out”. [72] He then went on to conclude that under the scheme of the CIDB Act, “construction works” are always in respect of buildings (which by definition includes structures) and this is exemplified by the fact that something as important as safety is confined to buildings because under the construction industry and consequently CIDB, it is only works to buildings, being real property of an immovable nature, that properly qualify as construction works. [73] I must interject here to state that there is no need to restrict and confine CIDB's safety concerns to that of buildings or structures on- shore. As defined these structures need not be for human habitation. Granted there will be a need for human persons to be there at the 31 structures be they on-shore or off-shore to monitor, supervise and manage the gas, oil and petrochemical work that is being carried out. In fact under the Factory and Machinery Act 1967, a factory would include "premises" defined in section 3 to include any building, place, or floating structure. [74] Learned counsel further pressed home the point that a FPSO is not a building or structure as defined by making reference to a paper entitled “An Overview of the Shipbuilding Industry in Malaysia” presented by Datuk Seri Ahmad Ramli Mohd Nor, Chairman, Association of Marine Industries of Malaysia and Nazery Khalid, a senior fellow of the Maritime Institute of Malaysia presented at the 5th Asia Maritime Conference 2008 at Kuala Lumpur on 24.6.2008 which clearly acknowledges FPSOs to be ships fabricated at shipyards (not construction sites) as follows: “Focusing on servicing the oil and gas sector and related industries, it has can accommodate the drydocking of vessels of up to 450,000 DWT and has a shiplift system capable of handling ships up to 50,000 DWT. It is also capable of designing, fabricating, installing and commissioning such as Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) vessels and Floating Storage Offloading (FSO) vessels.”(emphasis added) 32 [75] If I may say here that the place where a FPSO vessel is prefabricated is not important as in whether it be in a shipyard or a steelyard. What is important is the purpose for which the FPSO vessel is put to use. If it is designed for the shipping industry then it does not fall within CIPAA but here, as it is being converted, modified, altered and designed for the oil and gas industry, then it falls neatly and nicely under "construction work" being defined as such work done in any "gas, oil and petrochemical work". [76] In further support of his stand that ships such as the FPSO vessel does not come within the construction industry he referred to the fact that the ship building and repair industry in Malaysia is governed by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (“MITI”) with the licenses for ship building issued by MITI. In short, he concluded, CIDB has no jurisdiction or authority over ships and consequently FPSOs as they do not come within the construction industry. [77] I am inclined to agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that parking the registration of ships under MITI is partly because of the need to collect date on international trade. However as CIDB is now tasked with registration of contractors for the "gas and petrochemical" works, the fact that registration of a FPSO vessel is under MITI is immaterial as 33 one looks at the nature of work carried out. There is also nothing wrong or unusual to have a chattel registered under MITI but work carried out on the chattel must be executed by contractors registered under CIDB. [78] According to learned counsel for the Respondent, yet another reason why a ship-building contract cannot be considered as a construction contract is derived from the fact that a ship building contract is essentially a “supply of goods” contract. This was loosely defined in the case of NGV Tech Sdn Bhd and Anor v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] MLJU 439 at para 16, where Azizah J stated that : “From the Recital of the Agreement, the subject matter of the contract is the purchase of the Vessels by the Defendant, which was to be built by the First Plaintiff. As the Agreement is for the purchase of the Vessels, under section 2 of the Sale of Goods Act 1957 (‘SOGA 1957’), Vessel falls within the meaning of “goods”, that is “every kind of movable property”. The Agreement is then subject to SOGA 1957. This is in line with the case of Re Blyth Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company Limited [1926] 1 Ch 494 where it was held that a shipbuilding contract to be “unquestionably a contract for the sale of future goods within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act 1893.” http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.7771269596040423&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T24735905562&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%2523MY%2523USM_PA%2523act%2525382%2525section%25252%2525 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.03702930854162112&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T24735905562&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%2523MY%2523USM_PA%2523act%2525382%2525 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.03702930854162112&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T24735905562&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%2523MY%2523USM_PA%2523act%2525382%2525 34 [79] I have no problem with the above position of the law as here we are not talking about the sale of a chattel but work that is being done on the chattel and the supply of valves to such a work which qualifies to come under the meaning of "construction work" as it is any "gas, oil and petrochemical work". Such an interpretation would be promoting the purpose of the Act which Parliament had in mind to extend it to the oil and gas industry when other jurisdictions have expressly excluded it. [80] It is also a reflection on the importance of this oil and gas industry to our economy. Pronouncement [81] I had therefore dismissed the 2 OS filed for setting aside the Adjudication Decision and correspondingly I had allowed the OS for enforcement. As stated earlier, other than challenging the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to hear the dispute, the Respondent had not raised any valid defence to the Claimant's claims and indeed both the Adjudicators had found that the Claimant had proved its Payment Claims. [82] Being a novel point both counsel agreed that this Court may exercise its discretion and make no order as to costs. 35 [83] I agreed and I made no order as to cost. Dated: 2.5.2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in the OS WA-24C-139-11/2016 : Faisal Moideen together with Nereen Kaur Veriah For the Defendant in OS WA-24C-143-11/2016 & : (Messrs Moideen & Max) OS WA-24C-144-11/2016 : For the Plaintiff in OS WA-24C-143-11/2016 & : OS WA-24C-144-11/2016 : Wong Guo Bin together with John Kan For the Defendant in OS WA-24C-139-11/2016 : (Messrs Izral Partnership) Date of Decision: 8.2.2017

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22C-66-10/2016

PLAINTIF The Ara Joint Management Body DEFENDAN Mammoth Land & Development Sdn Bhd

29/04/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=253d893e-3b7e-4ea6-9e44-bd718011eb39&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22C-66-10/2016 BETWEEN THE ARA JOINT MANAGEMENT BODY … PLAINTIFF AND MAMMOTH LAND & DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD … DEFENDANT JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The Ara Bangsar is an exclusive enclave consisting of a gated and guarded residential community comprising 30 exclusive 3½ storey linked bungalow homes built in a unique Balinese architecture. Each bungalow comes with a private pool and garden and several carpark bays. [2] Amenities and exclusivity come with a price. Having invested substantially in these homes, there are expectations which when not met, are bound to result in disappointments. The purchasers of the bungalow 2 homes claimed that they have suffered much because of leakage and cracks that have appeared in the common property to the development. Problem [3] Their Joint Management Body ("JMB") in the Plaintiff, being the statutory entity that manages The Ara Bangsar, took up their complaint and sued the Defendant who is the Developer that developed The Ara Bangsar. The private pools and garden are located on the ground floor whereas the carpark bays are located at the basement. There are also a common area and common garden area on the ground floor. [4] Since the handover of the vacant possession in December 2007, the owners of units in the Ara Bangsar have encountered defects due to material and/or workmanship which resulted in the recurring water leakage and/or penetration in their respective units and water seeping through the reinforce concrete slab and/or beams of the ground floor level. Pleadings [5] The Plaintiff said in its statement of claim that the water leakage and/or penetration issue has been highlighted to the Defendant and the Defendant had acknowledged the same before the expiry of the defect liability period in December 2009. 3 [6] The Plaintiff pleaded in its statement of claim that the Defendant, through their representatives, have on numerous and separate occasions represented and promised that they will rectify the water leakage and/or penetration issue. The Defendant, it was alleged, have failed, refused and/or neglected to do so. [7] The Plaintiff stated in its statement of claim that as to date, the Ara Bangsar still suffers from water leakage and/or penetration wherein water seeps through the reinforce concrete slab and/or beams of the ground floor level (“the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration Issue”) which caused, inter alia, the following at the ground floor solfit level (“Basement Flat Roof”): 1. water stain marks and damage plaster ceiling; 2. formation of efflorescent and stalactite; and 3. water intrusion into the concrete elements which led to corrosion of rebars and ultimately to the spalling of concrete. [8] It was further pleaded that apart from the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration Issue, the Plaintiff discovered cracks (“the Cracks”) along secondary beams supporting the swimming pool from units no. 23 to 28 sometime around 2014 (“the Cracked Beams”). It was explained that 4 pursuant to an inspection and assessment conducted by DPI Konsult Sdn Bhd (“DPI”), it was found that the Cracks were due to shear bond failure where the main bars are not secured into the main beams. The Plaintiff's stand as stated in the statement of claim is that the Cracks were a latent defect and would not have been discovered had it not been for the inspection conducted by DPI. [9] The Plaintiff prayed for an order compelling the Defendant to take steps to rectify the defects including but not limited to the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration and/or the Cracks and in lieu thereof, an order for assessment of damages. [10] The defence of the Defendant is that the Plaintiff's action in tort is barred by the Limitation Act 1953. The Defendant also denied the allegations of negligence and the various representations made by the Defendant through its representatives. Prayer The Defendant filed an Application in Enclosure 6 to strike out the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim and action under Order 18 rule 19(1) (b) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 ("ROC") on ground that it is "frivolous, scandalous and vexatious" and/or "an abuse of the process of the Court". 5 Principles Whether the Plaintiff's claim should be struck out for being barred by limitation when it was alleged that the Defendant through its various representations that it would rectify the defects, is estopped from raising limitation [11] The Defendant submitted that this is a clear-cut case to strike out the Plaintiff’s claim as it is clearly “frivolous, vexatious and/or an abuse of the process of the court”. It is confidence that stems comfortably from the claim of the Plaintiff that since the handover of the vacant possession the unit owners have encountered the alleged defects due to material and/or workmanship which caused the water leakage where water seeps through the reinforce concrete slab and/or beams of the ground floor level (“the Defects”) resulting in the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration and hence the Plaintiff has suffered damages since then. [12] The handover was on 14.12.2007 and so under the Limitation Act 1953 the claim ought to have been brought by December 2013 and it was not brought until October 2016, it was some 3 years out of time. [13] The Defendant argued that it is clear that the Plaintiff’s cause of action against the Defendant herein is based on the alleged negligence of 6 the Defendant and it is in the nature of tortious claim, wherein Section 6 of Limitation Act 1953 states that: “Save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say- (a) actions founded on a contract or on tort;…” (emphasis added) [14] In AmBank (M) Bhd v. Abdul Aziz Bin Hassan & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 784 at page 799, the Court of Appeal held that: “[34] … A cause of action founded in tort accrues when the appellant suffers damage.” [15] Based on the aforesaid, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on or around 14.12.2007, when the owners of the Property encountered the Defects and/or suffered damages after the vacant possession of the Property was given. [16] In this regard, the Plaintiff’s cause of action had already expired on or around 13.12.2013, after the expiration of six (6) years from the date on which its cause of action accrued (on or around 14.12.2007). 7 [17] The Defendant highlighted that the Plaintiff had slept on its right at all material times and did not take any legal action until 5.10.2016 which is eight (8) years after its cause of action accrued. [18] Based on this ground alone of limitation having set in, the Defendant concluded that the Plaintiff's claim, no matter how meritorious, has to be struck out. [19] The Defendant further argued that, without derogating from the aforesaid, the defect liability period of the Property ended on or around June 2009. In this regard, the Defendant is exempted from any liability in relation to the Defects and/or has no obligation to repair the Defects. Hence, the Plaintiff is also not entitled to any reliefs claimed herein. However that proposition is misconceived. Whilst I accept that arguably the Plaintiff might not be able to make a claim in contract after the contractual Defect Liability Period is over, that is no bar to the Plaintiff pursuing an action in tort for negligence provided it is brought within 6 years from the date the cause of action arose. [20] If authority is needed one can refer to the case of Fong Wan Realty Sdn Bhd v PJ Condominium Sdn Bhd [2009] MLJU 1428 where his Lordship Harmindar Singh Dhaliwal JC (now JCA) opined as follows: 8 "As for the law in this regard, it is now accepted and settled that the defect liability clause does not take away the right to sue in respect of defects which were not discoverable. Even if the defects were discovered within the defect liability period, the provision of an express remedy for making good the defects does not take away the rights of the purchaser which follow at common law in a case of breach of contract. The reason for this is that the provisions in the Agreement are statutory requirements governed by the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 and the regulations made thereunder. The relevant regulations are the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 and the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Amendment Regulations 1994 and 1995. These provisions are there for the protection of the purchaser and cannot be used to limit their rights under common law. Their purpose was to improve and supplement common law remedies (see City Investment Sdn Bhd v Koperasi Serbaguna Cuepacs Tanggungan Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 69; Teh Khem On & Anor v Yeoh & Wu Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 2 CLJ 1105; KC Chan Brothers Development Sdn Bhd v Tan Kon Seng & Ors [2001] 4 CLJ 9 659; Raja Lob Sharuddin Raja Ahmad Terzali & Ors v Sri Seltra Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 CLJ 284). In my view, the defendants therefore cannot escape liability. Even if the plaintiff could not rely on Clause 26 of the Agreement, the plaintiff could surely rely on the common law principle that I had adverted to in the pursuit of this claim. Considering the evidence that was adduced, I find that the plaintiff has proven that the defendant was responsible for the defects in the piping system which caused water to leak and caused damaged to the condominium unit of the plaintiff." [21] Likewise the Defendant's argument that all the JMB meetings were held after the end of defect liability period of the Property where the Defendant is exempted from any liability in relation to the Defects, would only hold true for a claim under contract, and not a claim under tort, if brought before the limitation period expires. [22] However, the Plaintiff's stand is that the Defendant is estopped from claiming that the Plaintiff’s action herein is barred by Limitation Act 1953. Whilst the initial sign of the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration problem arose many years ago, the same was acknowledged by the Defendant as can be seen in the minutes of the JMB's meetings. 10 [23] The Plaintiff had explained why it did not commence an action against the Defendant prior to this. The Plaintiff chronicled the various key events supported by minutes of the JMB's meetings where admissions and acknowledgements were made by the Defendant's representatives of the Defects that have arisen and representations from the Defendant that it would attend to the repairs. The Defendant's promises made on numerous occasions to rectify the same as set out below: 1. The Defendant’s representative, Mr. Edward Yap who attended the Joint Management Committee (JMC) meeting on 5.12.2009 had acknowledged the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration issue [See the minutes of JMC meeting 5.12.2009 found at Enclosure 9 page 18 at item no. 3.2] 2. At the JMC meeting on 2.1.2010, the Defendant vide Mr. Edward Yap again had represented that the Defendant will prioritize rectification of the water leakage and/or penetration at the individual units [See the minutes of JMC meeting on 2.1.2010 found at Enclosure 9 page 21 at item no. 3.2] 3. The Plaintiff vide Mr. Edward Yap again acknowledged the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration issue and represented 11 that they will rectify the same at the JMC meeting on 6.3.2010 [See the minutes of JMC meeting on 6.3.2010 found at Enclosure 9 page 25 at item no. 3.1]; 4 At the JMC meeting on 7.8.2010, the Defendant vide Mr. Edward Yap represented that the Defendant has completed rectifying the water leakage and/or penetration at the individual units and the Defendant will commence rectification works at the common area on 15.8.2010 which includes the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration at the Basement Roof [See the minutes of JMC meeting on 7.8.2010 found at Enclosure 9 page 29 at item no. 2.5]; and 5 However, at the JMC meeting on 2.10.2010, the Defendant vide Mr. Edward Yap represented that the Defendant will commence rectification works on the common areas had to be postponed from 15.8.2010 to 6.10.2010 as the Defendant has relocated its workers to work on another project [See the minutes of JMC meeting on 2.10.2010 found at Enclosure 9 page 33 at item no. 3.2]; and 12 6 The Defendant again repeated the same on 27.7.2011 but this time vide Mr. James Cheah who represented that the Defendant’s top management will take action to rectify the defects at the common area as well as the individual units and they are awaiting the assessment report from Architect Centre (“AC”) who was appointed by the Defendant themselves although the same had been submitted to the Defendant on 5.4.2011 [See the minutes of JMC meeting on 27.7.2011 found at Enclosure 9 page 38 at item no. 3.2]. [24] The Plaintiff submitted that had it not been for the representations and promises made, the Plaintiff would have commenced an action sooner. The Plaintiff also argued that the Defendant knew full well that their representations or promises will influence or cause the Plaintiff not to take legal action or delay in taking an action against them. [25] The Plaintiff urged upon this Court that by virtue of their own conduct, the Defendant has estopped themselves out of Limitation Act 1953 and that it would be unjust and inequitable to allow the Defendant to renege on their promise to rectify the said defect. 13 [26] The Plaintiff relied on the locus classicus of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 at p 347 where, it was held that to invoke the doctrine of estoppel, all a person has to prove is there is inducement by other party to act in a certain manner. As stated at page 347 it was observed that: “The traditional view adopted by jurists of great learning is that a litigant who invokes the doctrine must prove that he was induced by the conduct of his opponent to act in a particular way. All that a representee… need do is to place sufficient material before a court from which an inference may fairly be drawn that he was influenced by his opponent’s actings. Further, it is not necessary that the conduct relied upon was the sole factor which influenced the representee. It is sufficient that ‘his conduct was so influenced by the encouragement or representation …that it would be unconscionable for the representor thereafter to enforce his strict legal rights (per Robert Goff J in Amalgamated Investment [1982] 1 QB 84 at p 105).” (emphasis added) [27] In Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202, the plaintiff was led to believe that they have a right of way and their right was acknowledged by the defendant in a meeting. His 14 Lordship Justice Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in adjudicating upon this issue of estoppel and its effect on limitation, held that one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act by conduct at page 244. [28] His Lordship's careful exposition and analysis of the law is reproduced in extenso below for a fuller appreciation of the development of the doctrine of estoppel: “I must lastly consider whether one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act. I confess this is a fine point of law which is not free from difficulty. In Combe v. Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, Denning LJ (as he then was) enunciated the doctrine of promissory estoppel in these terms: ... where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him... 15 The language of the learned judge would seem apt to deal with a defendant who, it is alleged, has caused a plaintiff to delay proceedings. Moreover, the so-called equitable proprietary estoppel has been expanded to create a cause of action. In other words, it can be used not just as a shield but also as a sword. I have, when considering the plaintiffs' claim to a declaration as to entitlement to an equitable easement, referred to an array of cases to illustrate the propositions that rights arising from proprietary estoppel can be given effect to in various ways. I have in mind especially the cases where the court has made orders analogous to specific performance by directing the transfer to the promisee of the property or some other interest in the property in question. In particular, I have in mind cases such as Crabb v. Arun District Council [1975] 3 All ER 865, Duke of Beaufort v. Patrick (1853) 17 Beav 60, Dillwyn v. Llewelyn [1862] 4 De GF & J 517 and Thomas v. Thomas [1956] NZLR 785 which I have already discussed. Only six years ago, in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. v. Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. [1982] QB 84 Lord Denning emphasized the return to estoppel as a sword when he 16 synthesized the cases and announced that the doctrine of estoppel had become "overloaded" with cases and that "the separate developments" of estoppel by representation, promissory and proprietary estoppel could now be seen "to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations." That general principle was that where a man by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it would be "unjust or inequitable" for him to do so. Lord Denning's actual words will repay reading and they are as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general 17 principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption - either of fact or of law whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on which they have conducted the dealings between them - neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands. In Kok Hoong v. Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd. [1964] AC 993, a decision of the Privy Council from the then Federal Court of Malaysia, in a case of moneylenders, their Lordships said: …there are statutes which, though declaring transactions to be unenforceable or void, are nevertheless not absolutely prohibitory and so do not preclude estoppels. One example of this is the Statute of Frauds (see Humphries v. Humphries (1910) 2 KB 531 CA in which it was no doubt considered that... the statute ought to be treated as regulating procedure, not as 18 striking at essential validity)… a more direct test to apply... is to ask whether the law that confronts the estoppel can be seen to represent a social policy to which the court must give effect in the interest of the public generally or some section of the public, despite any rules of evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduct or otherwise. These words are widely drawn and suggest that the Limitation Act can give way to estoppel. Indeed, there are dicta in Turberville v. West Ham Corporation [1950] 2 KB 208 which suggest that a defendant will not be heard to rely on a statute of limitation if his acts on statements during the currency of the period have induced the plaintiff to delay proceedings. And, in Othman & Anor. v. Mek [1972] 2 MLJ 158, Ong CJ said: ... Statutes of limitation which bar the enforcement of a right by action are rules of procedure only: see 24 Halsbury 15 Law of England (3rd Edn.) p. 181. A right which becomes unenforceable merely by reason of limitation does not ipso facto perish or vanish into thin air: see Holmes v. Cowcher 19 [1970] 1 WLR 835 where it was held that although under s. 18(5) of the Limitation Act 1939, arrears of mortgage interest outstanding for more than six years are irrecoverable by action, the mortgagors were only entitled to the equitable remedy of redemption provided that they paid all arrears of mortgage interest, whether statute-barred or not. If, as in that case, equitable rights did not perish by reason of limitation, can this same defence be set up here to deny the rights of a beneficial owner to be granted his claim to be a legal title? So far as may be necessary, I would hold that based on these dicta the Limitation Act is purely procedural: see Othman & Anor. v Mek [1972] 2 MLJ 158 and cf. Michell v. Harris Engineering Co. Ltd.) [1967] 2 QB 703 (CA). And, therefore, in certain circumstances, one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act by conduct. … I would conclude this part of the case by applying the approach adopted by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment and Property case [1982] QB 84 that when, as here, the defendant company has by its words and conduct led the plaintiffs to believe 20 that they would be provided a right of way from their lots, which otherwise would be landlocked, it should not be allowed to go back on them when it would be unjust or inequitable for it to do so. If, contrary to my primary view, the defendant could not or did not estop itself out of the Limitation Act, then I would hold that by reason of the promises made by its managing director to the first plaintiff at the meetings held in early 1980 at the Federal Hotel and at its registered office in Ipoh Road to provide for a right of way, it had acknowledged the plaintiffs' right or title to a right of way as claimed. (See, by analogy the case of Eddington v Clark [1964] 1 QB 367). The writ herein having been issued on 26 September 1981, the action is not barred by limitation." (emphasis added) [29] This Court would certainly agree that at the very least the issue of whether or not estoppel would apply would be fact-sensitive and it is a matter that can only be established at trial where the Defendant's representatives who are alleged to have given the representations that the defects would be attended to, may be cross-examined by the Plaintiff. [30] The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendant had clearly intended to cause or bait the Plaintiff from commencing any action until after the 6 21 years limitation period or the defect liability period has expired in view of the repeated reassurances given as referred to and recorded in the JMC's minutes. Whether and to what extent the minutes is true is a matter for trial and not for decision at this striking out stage. [31] It would be unconscionable and inequitable to allow the Defendant to rely on Limitation Act to defeat the Plaintiff’s claim. See Loh Hoot Yeang v Derrick Edwin David [2006] 2 CLJ 66 where the doctrine of estoppel can be used to defeat a defence of limitation. [32] The Federal Court in Asia General Equipment And Supplies Sdn Bhd & Ors v Mohd Sari Datuk Hj Nuar & Ors [2011] 8 CLJ 749 at 762 reaffirmed the principle set out on Alfred Templeton's case (supra) in that under certain circumstances it may be unconscionable for the Defendant and indeed the Defendant may be estopped from raising limitation as a defence to the Plaintiff's claim. His Lordship James Foong FCJ explained as follows: [28] Regrettably, the Court of Appeal has failed to consider the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v. Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd (supra) in their judgment. In this case, the Federal Court has declared that: 22 The time has come for this Court to recognize that the doctrine of estoppel is a flexible principle by which justice is done according to the circumstance of the case. It is a doctrine of wide utility and has been resorted to in varying fact patterns to achieve justice. Indeed, the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate are endless. Edgar Joseph Jr (as he then was) in an illuminating judgment in Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202 at p. 244 applied the doctrine in a broad and liberal fashion to prevent a defendant from relying upon the provisions of the Limitation Act 1953. [29] In fact, the factual matrix in Alfred Templeton & Ors v. Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 CLJ 693; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 219 is very similar to that of our present case. There, the sale of the land to the defendant was conditional upon a right of way preserved in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant disregarded this condition in the agreement and set up limitation as a defence when they were sued by the plaintiff for breach of this condition. Justice Edgar Joseph Jr J decided that: 23 So far as may be necessary, I would hold that based on these dicta the Limitation Act is purely procedural: see Othman and Anor v. Mek and Michell v. Harris Engineering Co Ltd. And, therefore, in certain circumstances, one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act by conduct. ... [31] However, we must stress that though the equitable doctrine of estoppel is available in law, to be successfully invoked requires meticulous examination of the facts in each case to ascertain whether there was any inequitable conduct - see Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd v. Cecil Abraham [1998] 4 CLJ 812; [1998] 4 MLJ 651 @ 664. [32] In this instance, when the trial judge having undertaken this onerous task and came to a conclusion that the plaintiffs have successfully established estoppel, the Court of Appeal should not have disturbed this finding of fact. [33] Further, the trial judge also found that due to the 1st defendant's improper conduct the plaintiffs were prevented from filing this action earlier. Again, this is a finding of fact supported by cogent evidence. The Court of Appeal should not have replaced it with one of its own to 24 prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their claim by a defence of limitation." (emphasis added) [33] In spite of high authorities on the proposition that estoppel may apply to defeat the defence of limitation, the Defendant stuck to its position that it is trite law that there can be no estoppel against statute. I think one must draw a distinction between an express prohibition by statute and one where it is merely procedural where parties may by conduct waive the requirement or agree that the defence would not be invoked. As the Limitation Act 1953 is purely procedural, one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act by conduct. It is even provided for under section 4 Limitation Act 1953 that to rely on the defence of limitation, one must specifically plead and invoke it, further fortifying the proposition that the Limitation Act is purely procedural. It does not prohibit an action from being brought outside the limitation period if parties by consent agree. A fortiori a Defendant may be estopped from raising the defence of limitation because of its conduct and representation made, that had induced the Plaintiff to believe that the Defendant would not raise this defence based on its very own actions. 25 [34] In Machinchang Skyways Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lembaga Pembangunan Langkawi & Anor and another appeal [2015] 2 MLJ 373 at page 383 and 384, the Court of Appeal held that: “[28] The plaintiffs had relied on the ‘without prejudice’ letter dated 3 January 2003… to contend that the defendants had represented that the plaintiffs are at liberty to refile an action and is therefore estopped from pleading the issue of limitation. ... [30] ...There is nothing in the said letter to suggest that the defendants had agreed to the refiling of a fresh suit outside the limitation period. It is reasonable to expect the plaintiffs to comply with the requirement of the law on limitation in the event they decided to file a fresh suit.” (emphasis added) [35] As the facts supporting estoppel would vary from one case to another, one must look at the particular circumstances of each case. In the above case the Court held that there was nothing in the said letter to suggest that the defendants had agreed to the refiling of a fresh suit outside the limitation period. 26 [36] The Defendant alluded to the case of Toh Huat Khay v Lim A Chang [2010] 4 MLJ 312 at page 326 where the Federal Court held: “[25] I do think that it can be assumed or implied that the state authority had complied with s 124 of the Code in the instant appeal. It was held in United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd v Syarikat Perumahan Luas Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1988] 3 MLJ 352 that if the terms of a statute are absolute and do not admit of any relaxation or exemption, anything done in contravention thereof will be ultra vires and no person can be estopped from putting forward the contention that what was done was illegal or void. ... [27] I am of the view that s 124 of the Code is a mandatory statutory provision and any requirement contained therein has to be complied with before the state authority can exercise its power to consent for the transfer any land which is subject to a restriction in interest such as the one found in the instant appeal. Section 214(2)(b) of the Code provides that the power to transfer shall be so exercisable subject to any restriction in interest to which the land in question is for the time being subject to. Unless the said restriction in interest has been struck off the document of title or a note of its rescission has been 27 indorsed on the document of title, I cannot see how there can be any dealing over the said land. It is only when the document of title to the said land has been cleansed of the said restriction in interest would the state authority be able to give its consent for the transfer of the said land to the defendant.” (emphasis added) [37] As can be clearly seen, the above case has nothing to do with estoppel in the context of extending the time period within which to bring an action under the Limitation Act 1953. On the contrary it has to do with the National Land Code prohibiting a transfer subject to a restriction in interest in the transfer until the express consent of the State Authority has been obtained. It is only too obvious in such a context that parties cannot consent to waive the requirement of the National Land Code for to allow that would be to allow parties to circumvent the intention of Parliament. Hence the principle of law that there is no estoppel against a statute. [38] The same too with the Supreme Court's decision in Hotel Ambassador (M) Sdn Bhd v Seapower (M) Sdn Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 404, where at page 407 it was observed as follows: “On the question of issue estoppel we agree with the learned judge that on the facts of this case the appellants cannot invoke the 28 doctrine of issue estoppel. There can be no estoppel as against statutory provisions..." [39] That case has nothing to do with the Limitation Act 1953 and the application of estoppel. It has to do with a provision of the National Land Code ("NLC") where a tenancy was entered into by the chargor after the creation of a charge in favour of the chargee bank. The chargee bank auctioned the property by way of a public auction under the NLC. The question was whether the successful bidder who is now the registered owner is bound to recognise the interest of a tenant under a tenancy registration. The Supreme Court held as follows at p 408: "It must be understood that by then the ownership of the said property had already passed to the respondents. It is not correct to say that the abandoning by the previous owners of the claim for possession should be construed so as to create a further tenancy for they were then no longer the registered owners of or have any interest in the said property. Section 267 of the National Land Code 1965 provides for the effect of sale pursuant to an order of sale made by the court under s 256 of the Code. Section 267 states that any certificate of sale given to a 29 purchaser under s 259(3) of the Code should be treated for all purposes under the Code to be an instrument of dealing and shall be registrable and upon registration thereof the title or interest of the chargor shall pass to and vest in the purchaser, freed and discharged from all liability under the charge. Section 267(2) further provides that notwithstanding that it was granted with the consent in writing of the chargee, no tenancy exempt from registration granted by the chargor after the date of registration of the charge shall be binding on the purchaser unless prior to the date of registration of the certificate of sale, the tenancy had become protected by an endorsement on the register document of title. This statutory provision is crucial in this case because it is not disputed here that there was no endorsement of any tenancy." [40] The Defendant also referred to the case of Muhamad Solleh bin Saarani & Anor v Norruhadi bin Omar & Ors [2010] 9 MLJ 603 at pages 609, 610 & 611, where the High Court held that: “[4] This court is of the considered view that the period of limitation statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be relaxed or departed on the ground of equitable consideration. The provision of s 6(1)(a) of the said Act are 30 mandatory in nature. This court has no discretion or inherent powers to condone the delay if the action is filed beyond the prescribed statutory period of limitation or if the cause of action is barred by limitation unless the matter is covered by any of the exceptions which is not the case in the present case. ... ... [7] In this jurisdiction, the period within which a cause of action under the law of tort ought to be filed in court or instituted is prescribed by the Limitation Act 1953. ... [8] ... The Limitation Act is special law and is a complete code by itself and excludes the operation of or the benefit of calling in the aid of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 to construe the period of limitation prescribed in s 6(1)(a) of the said Act. The language of s 6(1)(a) of the said Act is plain and clear, and that the period of limitation refers to the ‘cause of action’. In the present case, the cause of action arose on 21 May 1998 when the plaintiffs suffered injuries and damage. ... It is also not the function of this court to scan, engraft, add or imply anything which is not expressly stated in the said Act in order to assist the plaintiffs to circumvent the limitation period of six years.” (emphasis added) 31 [41] Again the above case was not one that considers the application or otherwise of estoppel to the cause of action. It was a running down case where the cause of action arose from the date the injuries were sustained and so it was a straight forward case of applying the Limitation Act 1953 as seen at paragraph 9 below: "[9] On the facts in the present case, the cause of action in tort for damages for the injuries and loss suffered by the plaintiffs allegedly caused by the first defendant's negligence arose on the date when the plaintiffs had suffered the injuries or the plaintiffs had suffered physical damage on 21 May 1998. The plaintiffs' cause of action therefore had accrued on 21 May 1998 when the plaintiffs suffered physical damage as a result of the alleged negligent act of the first defendant. The commencement of the limitation period in the present case against the defendants was on 21 May 1998 (Pirelli General Cable Works Ltd v Oscar Faber & Partners (A Firm) [1983] 2 AC 1; Sparham-Souter and another v Town and Country Developments (Essex) Ltd and another [1976] QB 858; Thomson v Lord Clanmorris [1900] 1 Ch 718 at pp 728–729). In the present case, the period of limitation, being the six years period commenced to run from the date the bodily injury was suffered by the 32 plaintiffs ie on 21 May 1998 which is the date when the cause of action accrued (Mt Bolo v Mt Koklan & Ors AIR 1930 PC 270)." (emphasis added) [42] Learned counsel for the Defendant further pointed out that the "Acknowledgment" doctrine applies only to an action in contract and not tort and so it cannot extend the limitation period. [43] Section 26(2) of Limitation Act 1953 states that: “Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment…” (emphasis added) [44] I agree that the Plaintiff’s action herein is in the nature of tortious claim as abovementioned, but not “liquidated pecuniary claim” as envisaged under Section 26(2) of Limitation Act 1953. [45] Learned counsel for the Defendant further cited the case of Dwr Cymru v Carmarthenshire County Council [2004] EWHC 2991 (TCC) at 33 page 8 (which was subsequently adopted by Court of Appeal of United Kingdom in Philips & Co (a firm) v. Bath Housing Co-operative Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1591, where the High Court inter alia held that: “[49] …Any claim for damages in tort falls outside the scope of section 29(5)(a) of the Limitation Act 1980 [which is similar to our Section 26(2) of Limitation Act 1953]…In all legislation prior to 1939, the doctrine of acknowledgment applied only to claims in contract. If Parliament had intended to extend this doctrine to tortious claim it would have done so expressly. There is no express reference to tort in the subsection." (emphasis added) [46] I further agree that the requirement of an acknowledgment in writing as required under section 27 Limitation Act 1953 has not been fulfilled as the relevant minutes were not signed by the Defendant. Section 27(1) provides that: “every such acknowledgment as is referred to in s 26 or in the proviso to s 16 of this Act shall be in writing and signed by the person making the acknowledgment;...” (emphasis added) 34 [47] The Defendant also relied on Wee Tiang Teng v Ong Chong Hooi and another [1978] 2 MLJ 54 and Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Kamarstone Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 749. [48] I have no quarrel with the above proposition. However that is not how the Plaintiff has pitched and pleaded its claim. The Plaintiff's main plank is that the Defendant through its representatives had made numerous promises, representations and assurances that they would be attending to the rectification works for the Unresolved Water Leakage/Penetration and the Cracked Beams defects. As such the Defendant is now estopped from raising the defence of limitation to defeat the Plaintiff's claim. [49] Having established that the Federal Court in Asia General Equipment And Supplies Sdn Bhd & Ors v Mohd Sari Datuk Hj Nuar & Ors (supra) had approved the proposition of law laid down in Alfred Templeton's case, the question is whether or not the Defendant's conduct can in the present case amount to estoppel. That can only be established at trial where relevant witnesses are called, especially the Defendant's representatives named by the Plaintiff in its Statement of Claim. [50] Therefore whilst the minutes of the JMB or Joint Management Committee ("JMC") are not relevant for the purposes of an extension of 35 time under section 26 and 27 of the Limitation Act 1953, they are nevertheless relevant for the purposes of proving whether or not there were the representations, promises and assurances given that the Defects would be attended to. [51] The fact that the Defendant does not verify and/or approve all the minutes of the JMB meetings and/or the alleged representations made during the JMB meetings is a matter that goes to the weight to be attached to these documents. Under section 4(4) of the Building and Common Property (Maintenance and Management) Act 2007, the Developer is a necessary member of the Joint Management Body. [52] Learned counsel for the Defendant also referred the Court to the doctrine of stare decisis lest this Court may be minded not to follow the argument of the Defendant that estoppel has no application where statute provision is concerned. He cited the case of Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor [2006] 2 MLJ 293 at page 297. He further argued against this Court following Alfred Templeton's case stating that it was confined to its own peculiar facts. That of course is a convenient device often used when one does not wish to follow a case which has been affirmed by the apex court. Learned counsel even went to the extent of stating that Alfred Templeton's case was wrongly decided. The strictures of the Federal 36 Court in Asia General Equipment And Supplies Sdn Bhd & Ors v Mohd Sari Datuk Hj Nuar & Ors (supra) against any attempt to avoid a binding precedent of the apex court are thus both prophetic and pertinent as follows: "[30] In the present case, the Court of Appeal attempted to distinguish Loh Hoot Yeang v. Derrick Edwin David [2006] 2 CLJ 66, a decision of the same court which has also accepted that estoppel can defeat a defence of limitation on facts. The Court of Appeal circumvented this by saying that the pronouncement in Loh Hoot Yeang v. Derrick Edwin David is restricted "to that part of the trial judge's finding only". We cannot appreciate this kind of reasoning when the general principle of law has been clearly set out not only by the Court of Appeal in an earlier case but also by the Federal Court. To disregard such an established principle under the guise of some flimsy and incomprehensible reason is highly unsatisfactory and must be discouraged. Here we like to reiterate that the doctrine of stare decisis must be adhered to by a court or courts below otherwise there will be uncertainty in the law and this would cause severe confusion. Judges in the court below should refrain from changing the law set by a superior 37 court under the guise of distinguishing the case on facts. Unless the factual matrix is fundamentally different, established principle laid down by a superior court must be followed. Failure to do so, as in this case, amounts to a wrong application of the law." (emphasis added) [53] There was also the side issue as to whether the Cracked Beams that needed rectification works were in relation to the units no. 23 to 28 of the Property. What the Plaintiff pleaded was that these Cracks were discovered along the secondary beams supporting the swimming pool from units 23 to 28. Whether these secondary beams are "Common Property” which gives a right to the Plaintiff to sue, is something to be decided at trial. [54] The term “Common Property” is defined in the Sale and Purchase Agreement, at clause 35(c) as follows: “So much of the land as is not comprised in any parcel (including any accessory parcel), or any provisional block and the fixtures and fittings including lifts, refuse chutes, drains, sewers, pipes, wires, cables and ducts and all other facilities and installations used or capable of being used or enjoyed in common by all the purchasers” (emphasis added) 38 [55] Whilst the swimming pools are comprised in part of the parcels belonging to the respective units of the Property, I cannot say at this stage of the secondary beams which support the swimming pools where the Cracks have appeared on the beams. [56] Section 143(2) of Strata Management Act 2013 states that: “Where all or some of the parcel owners or proprietors of the parcels in a development area- (a) are jointly entitled to take proceedings for or with respect to the common property in that development area against any person or are liable to have such proceedings taken against them jointly;… The proceedings may be taken- (A) in the case of paragraph (2)(a), by or against the joint management body or management corporation…"(emphasis added) [57] The Defendant submitted that it is trite law that the Plaintiff’s cause of action accrues or starts to accrue since the Cracks occurred, regardless of whether the Plaintiff discovers it or not. 39 [58] In AmBank (M) Bhd v Abdul Aziz Bin Hassan & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 784 at page 798, the Court of Appeal held that: “In Malaysia, the only test to ascertain limitation is housed in s.6 of the Act (Limitation Act) which provides that limitation runs from the date on which the cause of action accrues regardless of whether the Plaintiff discovers the damage.” [see paras 28 & 29] [59] In a recent Court of Appeal case of Vista Specialist Eye Center Sdn Bhd v. Dato’ Loo Son Yong and another appeal [2016] 5 MLJ 832 at page 835, the Court of Appeal adopted the above case of Ambank and held that: “According to section 6(1)(a) of the Act (Limitation Act 1953), it is clear that the computation of six years limitation must run from the date the cause of action arose and not from the time the alleged negligence was discovered. The Respondent’s claim was barred by limitation, hence plainly unsustainable and was suitable to be struck out under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of Court.” (emphasis added) [see para 8] [60] Again I have no problem with the above statement of the law. However, as with most cracks, it has the property of becoming bigger and 40 more severe with the passage of time depending on the nature of the cracks. [61] It is only at the trial where experts are called, would we be able to ascertain if these Cracks were already there when vacant possession was delivered or that these cracks appeared later and if so when, irrespective of when it was discovered. It may also be relevant whether these Cracks have become worse as in bigger Cracks or new Cracks and if so when does the cause of action arise quite apart from the Plaintiff's allegation of estoppel having set in to prevent the defence of limitation from being raised. [62] I appreciate the fact that we do not have the Latent Damage Act 1986 in the UK as was highlighted in the case of Pang Yeow Chow (practicing at Messrs YC Pang, Chong & Gordon) v Advance Specialist Treatment Engineering Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 MLJ 490 at page 502 as follows: “[22] …This is not a case of latent defect and even English cases which relied on Latent Damage Act 1986 such as Nykredit which was relied on in the judgment must be read with caution as we do not have equipollent section in our Limitation Act.” (emphasis added) 41 [63] This area of law with respect to latent defect is not free from problems and certainly cannot be decided and applied to facts that are at the moment being vigorously contested with respect to when the Cracks appeared. With respect to the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant pursuant to the Cracked Beams, the Plaintiff said it only uncovered the same sometime in 2014 and thus, could not have possibly commence an action any earlier. The Plaintiff referred to the case of Peninsular Concord Sdn Bhd v Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor [2014] 5 AMR 586 where the learned judge adopted the principle enunciated in the Court of Appeal case of AmBank (M) Bhd v Kamariyah bt Hamdan & Anor [2013] 5 MLJ 448 and held that: “It seems to be unreasonable and untenable in principle that a cause of action should be held to accrue before it is possible to discover any injury. To require a plaintiff to bring cause of action before he could reasonably have discovered that he had a cause of action would be unjust. The diligence rationale for the limitation regime would not be undermined by the application of the discoverability rule. Any additional difficulty that a defendant may have to face in dealing with a claim years afterwards cannot be a justification to deny a plaintiff the right to bring an action before he 42 even knows he has one. It is inequitable to accept a rule of interpretation which would favour the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff.” (emphasis added) [64] The Plaintiff has deposed in their Affidavit that the Cracked Beams were only uncovered pursuant to an assessment or inspection conducted by DPI Konsult Sdn Bhd to assess the extent of defects at The Ara Bangsar. The Defendant did not dispute the same. The Plaintiff further submitted that it also has locus standi to commence this action as the subject Defects affect the common area and the Basement which certainly form part of the "Common Property" as all residents and visitors must use the access the Basement in order to reach the porch or main door to the residence. Pronouncement [65] Based on the criteria in Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 3 MLJ 36, at page 43, I am not in a position to say that the claim is obviously unsustainable or that it has to be struck out at this stage. No matter how weak the Plaintiff's case may be, it is no excuse of refusing it to proceed to trial. 43 [66] More importantly whether or not estoppel applies to prevent the Defendant from raising the defence of limitation would be fact-centric and a matter to be determined at trial. So too with respect to when the Cracks and Defects appeared would be very much a finding of fact with the assistance of expert witnesses that parties may have to call to support or refute the position taken as the case may be. [67] I had therefore dismissed the Defendant's application to strike out the Plaintiff's claim with costs in the cause. [68] I proceeded to fix the matter for case management for eventual trial set for 12 to 14.7.2017. Dated: 29 April 2017. Sgd Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Malaya For the Plaintiff : Gideon Tan together with Irene Wong (Messrs Gideon Tan Razali Zaini) 44 For the Defendant : Justin Voon together with Lum Kok Kiong (Messrs Justin Voon Chooi & Wing) Date of decision: 18 January 2017

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-147-11/2016 & WA-24C-164-12/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd 2. ) Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd 2. ) Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd

28/04/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2f49db7b-74a9-41b8-8508-f219c88f9556&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-147-11/2016 In the Matter of Award Letter dated 2.4.3013 Between Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd and Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd And In the Matter of Sections 28(1), (2) and (3) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the Matter of Order 7 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN TEGUH WIRAMAS SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 925641-T) ... PLAINTIFF AND THIEN SENG CHAN SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 299325-X) ... DEFENDANT (heard together with) 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-164-12/2016 In the matter of Adjudication Reference No. KLRCA/ADJ-0352- 2016 between Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd and Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd And In the Matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 15.10.2016 And In the Matter of Orders 7 and 28 Rules of Court 2012 And In the Matter of Sections 15 and 16 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (Act 746) BETWEEN THIEN SENG CHAN SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 299325-X) ... PLAINTIFF AND 3 TEGUH WIRAMAS SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 925641-T) ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The were two Originating Summonses that were heard together. In OS WA-24C-147-11/2016 the Plaintiff is Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd ("Teguh Wiramas") who was the Claimant in the Adjudication and the Defendant is Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd ("TSC") who was the Respondent in the Adjudication. The Plaintiff is seeking to enforce an Adjudication Decision pursuant to section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). [2] In OS WA-24C-164-12/2016 the Plaintiff is TSC who is applying to set aside the Adjudication Decision and also to stay the Adjudication Decision pending the disposal of a suit that it has filed in court against the Defendant, Teguh Wiramas. [3] For consistency and to avoid confusion, the parties shall be referred to as Claimant and Respondent as they appeared in the Adjudication and sometimes by their names as Teguh Wiramas and 4 TSC respectively. By consent of the parties, both the Originating Summonses were heard together. Prayers [4] The Respondent was dissatisfied with the Adjudication Decision delivered on 15.10.2016. The Respondent applied to set aside the Adjudication Decision on grounds of breach of natural justice and a failure of the Adjudicator to act independently or impartially as provided for under section 15 (b) and (c) CIPAA. Section 15 reads as follows: "15. Improperly Procured Adjudication Decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds: (a) The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery; (b) There has been a denial of natural justice; (c) The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or (d) The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction." [5] The Respondent said that it had at all times informed the Adjudicator that one YL Design Consultants which issued the Letter of Award dated 2.4.2013 ought to be made a party to the proceedings so 5 that YL Design Consultants can be questioned by the Plaintiff but this was denied by the Adjudicator. [6] The Claimant, as the unpaid party, had served its Payment Claim dated 14.4.2016 through its solicitors Messrs P.Y. Hoh & Tai to the Respondent. The Claimant had claimed for works amounting to RM 2,637,932.65 under Progress Claim No. 14 (RM1,885,189.50) and Progress Claim No. 15 (RM752,743.15) and 2.5% of the retention sum of RM 275, 494.56 (“retention sum”). [7] There was no Payment Response filed by the Respondent as the non-paying party. [8] In the Adjudication Response filed by the Respondent, it stated that Respondent had refused to pay Progress Claim 14 and Progress Claim 15 and the 2.5% retention sum as the Claimant had failed to produce a certificate from YL Design Consultants to justify the said claims. The Respondent also contended that there was no evidence from YL Design Consultants to confirm or authorize the payment of the said claims. [9] The Respondent also raised a set-off and counterclaim for costs of rectifying defects and also a claim for Liquidated and Ascertained Damages ("LAD") for what it alleged was delay in the Claimant 6 completing the works on time. The sum claimed for rectification costs was RM1,598,586.00 and that for LAD was RM1,710,000.00. [10] The Adjudicator had stated that he did not have the jurisdiction to hear the defence of set-off and the counterclaim of the Respondent as it was not raised in the Payment Response in that no Payment Response was filed. The Respondent argued that it is a breach of natural justice for the Adjudicator not to have considered the set-off and counterclaim raised as these were raised in the Adjudication Response. The Claimant in its Adjudication Reply served had raised its objection to the defence of set-off raised with respect to the claims for defective works and LAD claim as these were not raised in the Payment Response as it was not filed. [11] The Adjudicator had allowed the Claimant's claim as follows: (i) for Progress Claim No. 14 with an amount of RM1.888,043.93 due for payment on 24.4.2015; (ii) for Progress Claim No. 15 with an amount of RM354.43 due for payment on 12.12.2015; (iii) for Release of 2.5% Retention Sum with an amount of RM275,494.56 due for payment on 26.10.2015. 7 [12] The Adjudicator also awarded interest at 5.0% per annum on the sums above from their respective due dates to date of full payment, besides Adjudicator's fees, KLRCA's fees and party and party costs. [13] It was argued that as YL Design Consultants evidence is important in the Respondent's claim, it ought to have been called by the Adjudicator in the exercise of his powers under section 25 (g), (i), (k), (l) of CIPAA so that YL Design Consultants could be cross-examined by the Respondent. As the Adjudicator did not so exercise his powers, the Respondent submitted that natural justice was denied the Respondent and that the Adjudicator did not act independently or impartially. Principles Whether there was a breach of natural justice in the Adjudicator declining to consider the Respondent's set-off and counterclaim on ground that there was no Payment Response filed [14] The Adjudicator had understood his jurisdiction correctly in that it was conferred as well as circumscribed by the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response as provided for under section 27(1) CIPAA which reads as follows: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator 8 (1) Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6." (emphasis added) [15] Thus in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728 it was observed as follows: "[12] ...as the adjudicator does not possess inherent jurisdiction, his jurisdiction is limited to the dispute raised under sections 5 and 6, i.e. the payment claim and the payment response. [13] ...The limits of jurisdiction of the adjudicator is a matter that is governed by law, i.e. s. 27 of CIPAA. ..." [16] In not filing a Payment Response, all it means is that the unpaid party in the Respondent is deemed to have disputed the Payment Claim. The burden is then on the unpaid party, who is the Claimant, to prove its claim. In disputing the claim in a case where no Payment Response is filed, the non-paying party cannot raise any positive defences of a set-off not raised in the Payment Response. [17] The Adjudicator's jurisdiction is not derived from the Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Response or the Adjudication Reply. It does not stand to reason that a more prudent non-paying party is confined to 9 the matters raised in its Payment Response but that one that did not bother to serve a Payment Response on time may canvas every possible defence for so long as it is raised in its Adjudication Response! In WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd & other case [2015] 1 LNS 1236 it was observed as follows: "[27] Subsection 27(1) restricts the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to the matters found in sections 5 and 6. In short, the Adjudicator takes jurisdiction from the payment claim and the payment response; not from the adjudication claim, adjudication response or even the adjudication reply. This is materially significant and important as this brings to bear the whole scheme of CIPAA 2012; that the adjudication proceedings is to deal with or resolve a payment dispute. That dispute is then referred to adjudication with the payment claim and payment response reduced into the formal forms as set out in sections 7 to 10." (emphasis added) [18] In View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695, Mary Lim J (now JCA) examined section 27 of CIPAA and held as follows: 10 “[60] Subsection 27(1) limits the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to the matters referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6; namely the claims in the Payment Claim and the responses or defences in the Payment Response. This limitation is subject to subsection 27(2) which allows the parties to the adjudication to extend that jurisdiction by written agreement to matters beyond or outside sections 5 and 6. In the absence of such agreement, the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction does not extend to or include matters in the Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Response or even Adjudication Reply found in sections 9, 10 and 11. It is obvious from subsections 27(1) and (2) that where the parties feel that the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction is insufficient to deal with their particular dispute; the parties can sit down and agree on extending that jurisdictional cover. In the present case, the parties could have dealt with this through a written agreement amongst themselves. There was no such effort; and the Court is not required to look into the reasons for the lack of such an effort. View Esteem could easily have brought up these three additional defences, responses or matters in its Payment Response; but it chose not, for whatever reason it may have. Having exercised that option, it is not open to View Esteem to now complain. 11 ... [63] Again, it is easy to appreciate why Parliament has seen it fit to limit the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to only the matter(s) referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6 when determining the dispute. Adjudication under CIPAA 2012 is both specific and special. It is specific in that it is intended only for payment disputes under construction contracts. It is special in that it offers a speedy provisionally binding resolution to that dispute. A payment dispute exists the moment a claim for payment for work or services rendered under a construction contract is not paid by the other party, or there is no response to that claim. In either event, the payment dispute comes into being or it “crystallises”. The whole adjudication process that takes place after that, from the appointment of the Adjudicator to the filing of the Adjudication Claim, the Adjudication Response and the Adjudication Reply are substantially formal manifestations of the dispute containing greater details of the claim, response or reply, as the case may be of that first Payment Claim and Payment Response. [64] Because adjudication is intended to provide a speedy resolution of that payment dispute [within the time lines found in 12 section 12, where an adjudication decision rendered outside the prescribed time lines is void unless extended by the written consent of the parties], the Adjudicator cannot be expected to deal with issues, legal and/or factual, which may still be “evolving” or in the making as the Adjudicator sits down to determine the dispute. Unrestricted arguments may unnecessarily prolong or even protract adjudication proceedings rendering the whole process impractical, inefficient or unwieldy. There should be certainty in the issues or matters that any party is expected to face in the adjudication proceedings so that the rules of fair play can be readily met. That cannot possibly be achieved if issues or matters are still or yet to be identified.” (Emphasis added) [19] Hamid Sultan JCA in the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717, also adopts a similar view of section 27 of CIPAA. His Lordship stated as follows: “[16] Arriving at the CIPAA 2012 adjudication award is a two stage process. First stage is related to payment claim and payment response. Parties at this stage may settle the matter and if the matter is not settled. The dispute as borne out in the payment claim and response can only be referred to the adjudicator. This is statutorily a strict requirement (subject 13 only to section 26) as set out in section 27, thereby making the first stage as important stage in the adjudication process.” (emphasis added) [20] The Adjudicator was right in saying that he did not have jurisdiction to hear and consider the set off and counter claim for the Respondent– see paragraphs 54 (f) dan (g) of his Adjudication Decision. [21] The Respondent's learned counsel submitted that the Adjudicator’s decision to refuse to hear and consider the Respondent’s set off and counter claim is an error of law and the Respondent had been denied natural justice. With respect I must disagree. If the Adjudicator had proceeded to consider the defence of set-off and the counterclaim when these were not raised as no Payment Response was filed, he would have exceeded his jurisdiction and the Adjudication Decision would be liable to be set aside. [22] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Adjudicator should have exercised his powers under section 26(1) CIPAA which allows him to consider the Plaintiff’s set off and counter claim. Section 26(1) and (2) read as follows: "(1) Subject to subsection (2), the non-compliance by the parties with the provisions of this Act whether in respect of time limit, form 14 or content or in any other respect shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not invalidate the power of the adjudicator to adjudicate the dispute nor nullify the adjudication proceedings or adjudication decision. (2) The adjudicator may on the ground that there has been non- compliance in respect of the adjudication proceedings or document produced in the adjudication proceedings— (a) Set aside either wholly or partly the adjudication proceedings; (b) Make any order dealing with the adjudication proceedings as the adjudicator deems fit; or (c) Allow amendment to be made to the document produced in the adjudication proceedings." (emphasis added) [23] The powers of an Adjudicator are to be exercised only in cases where he has jurisdiction. If he has no jurisdiction with respect to deciding a dispute before him, then it does not make sense to talk of his exercising his powers, be it to cure a non-compliance with any provision of the Act or to extend his jurisdiction which he does not have to begin with. 15 [24] More particularly, the powers are with respect to matters of "non- compliance in respect of the adjudication proceedings or document produced in the adjudication proceedings" as stated in section 26(2). [25] When then does an Adjudication proceeding commence? Under section 8 CIPAA on "Initiation of Adjudication", an Adjudication Proceeding is initiated with the service of a written Notice of Adjudication. Section 8 reads: (1) A claimant may initiate adjudication proceedings by serving a written notice of adjudication containing the nature and description of the dispute and the remedy sought together with any supporting document on the respondent. [26] Therefore if the Adjudicator's jurisdiction does not extend to consider the defence of set-off, then the Adjudicator cannot extend his own jurisdiction by extending the time for the Respondent to serve the Payment Response or to allow matters raised in the Adjudication Response in the form of the defence of set-off to be considered when it was not raised in the Payment Response in that no Payment Response was filed. [27] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Adjudicator's powers may be extended under section 26 CIPAA. With 16 respect, I do not think so. It is only under section 27(2) CIPAA that his jurisdiction may be extended beyond the matters raised in the Payment Claim (section 5) and the Payment Response (section 6). Section 27(2) reads as follows: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator (2) The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6"(emphasis added) [28] There is a prescribed form to be used for this purpose in Form 10 of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure. [29] An Adjudicator has vast powers under section 12(1) and section 25 of CIPAA with respect to the manner in which the arbitration proceedings should proceed. [30] Section 12(1) of CIPAA provides as follows: "The adjudicator shall conduct the adjudication in the manner as the adjudicator considers appropriate within the powers provided under section 25 " [31] It is not for this Court to set aside his Decision on the ground that had a certain procedure been followed, the Decision would have been 17 different. It is only when the exercise of his vast powers under section 25 CIPAA infringes the rules of natural justice or causes him to act in excess of his jurisdiction that this Court would interfere. The relevant powers complained of which the Respondent submitted he should have exercised in a certain manner are section 25(a),(g), (i), (k), (l) and (p) which read as follows: "25. Powers of the Adjudicator The adjudicator shall have the powers to— (a) Establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties;... (g) Conduct any hearing and limiting the hearing time;... (i) Inquisitorially take the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision;... (k) Order interrogatories to be answered;... (l) Order that any evidence be given on oath;... (p) Extend any time limit imposed on the parties under this Act as reasonably required." 18 [32] The broad powers and discretion given to the Adjudicator under section 25 CIPAA are to aid and assist him in arriving at a fair and reasonable decision within the strict time frame prescribed. In Ranhill E & C Bhd v Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd & Another cases [2015] 1 LNS 1435 Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) observed as follows: "[65] ...Subsection 12(1) provides that the adjudicator is to conduct the adjudication in the manner as the adjudicator considers appropriate within the powers provided under section 25. The adjudicator is conferred discretion as to how the adjudication is to be conducted. To assist the adjudicator in carrying out that responsibility, the adjudicator is endowed with certain unusual and arguably extensive powers which does not often see spelt out in other legislations ... [66] Section 25 provides the adjudicator with a long list of powers, that is, the power to: (a) establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including the submission of documents by the parties ..." "[67] In other words, it is for the adjudicator to deal with how the adjudication proceedings are to proceed. This could include 19 the calling of meetings and whether there will be hearings including oral hearings where witnesses may or may not be called ..."(emphasis added) [33] The Respondent contended that as the consultant of the project, YL Design Consultants refused to cooperate with the Respondent, the Respondent was very much prejudiced in the filing of the Payment Response during the stipulated time period. It was further submitted that YL Design Consultants should have been made a party to the proceedings and that it should have been called by the Adjudicator so that it may be cross-examined by the Respondent. [34] This proposition is misconceived. It is for the un-paid party to decide on who it has to claim against with respect to its Payment Claim for "Payment" is defined in section 4 CIPAA as "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." [35] Not any anyone can be brought in as a party to an adjudication under CIPAA but only the un-paid party and the non-paying party with respect to a Payment Claim as defined. The Adjudicator has no powers to add another party as a party to the Adjudication. 20 [36] Further an Adjudicator does not have the power to compel the attendance of any witness before him. There is no equivalent provision to that of section 29 the Arbitration Act 2005 that reads: "Court assistance in taking evidence 29. (1) Any party may with the approval of the arbitral tribunal, apply to the High Court for assistance in taking evidence. (2) The High Court may order the attendance of a witness to give evidence or, where applicable, produce documents on oath or affirmation before an officer of the High Court or any other person, including the arbitral tribunal." [37] The matter of evidence and witnesses are matters for the parties to prevail upon the Adjudicator and here, as the Adjudicator was of the view that the matters can be decided with reference to the documents filed, there was no need for him to hear witnesses. It has not been shown how there has been a breach of natural justice. [38] When one considers that the Respondent had not applied to the Adjudicator to conduct a hearing for the parties to be given the opportunity to cross examine the witnesses, one would have thought that the Respondent was satisfied and had no objection to the procedure indicated by the Adjudicator. Having not objected to the procedure 21 adopted by the Adjudicator, it is too late to object to it just 5 days before the deadline for the delivery of the Adjudication Decision. It is clearly an afterthought. [39] There is also no basis for the Respondent to allege that the Adjudicator had failed to act independently and impartially. The fact that the Adjudicator did not agree with the Respondent's position on the law is no proof that he had failed to act independently and impartially. Such an allegation should not be launched without some evidence pointing inexorably to a lack of independence or impartiality in the hearing and the delivery of the Adjudication Decision. [40] We do well to hearken to the dicta of Humphrey Lloyd J in the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v. Mayor & Burgess London Borough of Lambeth Balfour [2002] Adj LR 04/12 where the following observations on a complaint of denial of natural justice in the adjudication proceedings was made: "29. Nevertheless, in my judgment, that which is applicable in arbitration is basically applicable to adjudication but, in determining whether a party has been treated fairly or in determining whether the adjudicator has acted impartially, it is very necessary to bear in mind that the point or issue which is to be brought to the attention of the parties must be one of which is either decisive or of 22 considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant. It is now clear that the construction industry regards adjudication not simply as a staging post towards the final resolution of the dispute in arbitration or litigation but as having in itself considerable weight and impact that in practice goes beyond the legal requirement that the decision has for the time being to be observed. Lack of impartiality or of fairness in adjudication must be considered in that light. It has become all the more necessary that, within the rough nature of the process, decisions are still made in a basically fair manner so that the system itself continues to enjoy the confidence it now has apparently earned. The provisional nature of the decision also justifies ignoring non-material breaches. Such errors, if apparent (as they usually are), will be rectified in any negotiation and settlement based upon the decision. The consequence of material issues and points is that the dispute referred to adjudication will not have been resolved satisfactorily by any fundamental standard and the chances of it providing the basis for a settlement are much less and the chances of it proceeding to arbitration or litigation are much greater. However the time limits, the nature of the process and the ultimately non-binding nature of the decision, all mean that the standard required in practice is not 23 that which is expected of an arbitrator. Adjudication is closer to arbitration than an expert determination but it is not the same."(emphasis added) [41] Considerable restrain must be exercised when it is sought to be argued that there has been a breach of natural justice in trying to set aside an Adjudication Decision. The observation in Carillion Construction Limited v. Devonport Royal Dockyard Limited [2005] EWHC 778, by the English Court of Appeal resonates well with the experience of our Courts where invariably an attempt by a successful Claimant to enforce an Adjudication Decision is often met with an application to set aside the said Decision: "85. The objective which underlies the Act and the statutory scheme requires the courts to respect and enforce the adjudicator's decision unless it is plain that the question which he has decided was not the question referred to him or the manner in which he has gone about his task is obviously unfair. It should only be in rare circumstances that the courts will interfere with the decision of an adjudicator. The courts should give no encouragement to the approach adopted by DML in the present case; which (contrary to the DML's outline submissions, to which we have referred in paragraph 66 of this judgment) may, indeed 24 aptly be described as "simply scrabbling around to find some argument, however tenuous, to resist payment." 86. It is only too easy in a complex case for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision of an adjudicator to comb through the adjudicator's reasons and identify points upon which to present a challenge under the labels "excess of jurisdiction" or "breach of natural justice". It must be kept in mind that the majority of the adjudicators are not chosen for their expertise as lawyers. Their skills are as likely (if not more likely) to lie in other disciplines. The task of the adjudicator is not to act as arbitrator or judge. The time constraints within which he is expected to operate are proof of that. The task of the adjudicator is to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. Parliament may be taken to have recognised that, in the absence of an interim solution, the contractor (or sub-contractor) or his subcontractors will be driven into insolvency through a wrongful withholding of payments properly due. The statutory scheme provides a means of meeting the legitimate cash-flow requirements of contractors and their subcontractors. The need to have the "right" answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly. The scheme was not enacted in order to 25 provide definitive answers to complex questions. Indeed, it may be open to doubt whether Parliament contemplated that disputes involving difficult questions of law would be referred to adjudication under the statutory scheme; or whether such disputes are suitable for adjudication under the scheme. We have every sympathy for an adjudicator faced with the need to reach a decision in a case like the present. 87. In short, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the proper course for the party who is unsuccessful in an adjudication under the scheme must be to pay the amount that he has been ordered to pay by the adjudicator. If he does not accept the adjudicator's decision as correct (whether on the facts or in law), he can take legal or arbitration proceedings in order to establish the true position. To seek to challenge the adjudicator's decision on the ground that he has exceeded his jurisdiction or breached the rules of natural justice (save in the plainest cases) is likely to lead to a substantial waste of time and expense - as, we suspect, the costs incurred in the present case will demonstrate only too clearly." (emphasis added) 26 [42] The grounds for setting aside on a breach of natural justice and that the Adjudicator had failed to act independently and impartially have not been made out. The Adjudication Decision remains intact. Whether there should be a stay of the Adjudication Decision merely because the Respondent has filed a claim in Court against the Claimant [43] The Respondent said that as it has also filed an action against the Claimant and YL Design Consultants in KL High Court Civil Suit No: WA- 22C-92-12/2016. The subject matter of the Adjudication Decision in particular the Respondent's set off and counter claim and the wrongdoings of YL Design Consultants are included in that civil action. Learned counsel for the Respondent said that section 16(b) CIPAA has been satisfied and stay of the Adjudication Decision should be allowed till the disposal of the civil action in Court. Section 16(1) states as follows: “16. Stay of Adjudication Decision (1) A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: (a) an application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or 27 (b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court; [44] The fact that there is a pending arbitration or as in this case a litigation in court involving the same issues that had been decided by the Adjudicator does not mean that there should invariably be a stay of the Adjudication Decision. The fact of a litigation having been afoot is just a threshold condition and not determinative of a stay order. [45] If that were not so, then all that a Respondent need to do to avoid paying a Claimant pursuant to a successful Adjudication would be to just file a civil action in Court involving the same matters. It would be a backdoor way of stultifying the Adjudication Decision and stymieing the purpose of CIPAA which was designed to speed up the process of payment by principals to contractors for work done or services rendered, giving the construction industry its much needed cashflow, cascading down to those carrying out the works. [46] That cannot be right. Little wonder that in Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818, her Ladyship Mary Lim J (now JCA) argued forcefully that the Court would retain its discretion on stay of an Adjudication Decision and a stay would always be under exceptional circumstances only, having in mind always the purpose of CIPAA. Her Ladyship observed astutely as follows: 28 "[30] It is this court's view that in the exercise of discretion of whether to grant the stay or make an order for payment to the Director of KLRCA, the court must weigh into play in a fairly extensive way, the object of CIPAA; and that it is for a speedy disposal of a payment dispute. This is regardless of the fact that this is a payment dispute that arose in the final days of the construction contract, a point which the parties appear to have no issue with and there is no challenge in this respect anyway. Having gone through the hoops of adjudication, there is now decision in the defendant's favour. [31] This court is of the view that the defendant should not be deprived of the very benefit of why it resorted to adjudication in the first place; save if satisfactory reasons are present for a stay of that adjudication decision. [32] It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 29 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration." (emphasis added) [47] Here in this case there is no evidence shown as to a reasonable apprehension that the Claimant would not be able to pay back should the Court find for the Respondent on the suit that has been commenced. There is no averment that if the Adjudication Sum is paid now then there is a reasonable fear that it would likely not be recoverable from the Claimant. Pronouncement [48] For the reasons given above, I had dismissed the Respondent/TSC's application to set aside the Adjudication Decision 30 and for stay of the Decision pending disposal of the civil action filed in this Court by the Respondent against the Claimant/Teguh Wiramas. [49] Correspondingly I allowed the Claimant's application to enforce the Adjudication Decision under section 28 CIPAA as if it is a judgment of the Court. [50] As both the applications were heard together, I had ordered the Respondent to pay the Claimant costs of RM10,000.00. Dated: 28 April 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in : OS WA 24C-147-11/2016 : Tan Chi Sian and for the Defendant in : (Messrs P.Y. Hoh & Tai) OS WA 24C-164-12/2016 : For the Plaintiff in : OS WA 24C-164-12/2016 : Patrick Dass and C W Chan and for the Defendant in : (Messrs Patrick Dass & Co) OS WA 24C-147-11/2016 : Date of Decision: 23 January 2017

Tika 2.6.0

42S-76-12/2015

PERAYU RUZAINI BINTI ROSLI RESPONDEN PENDAKWA RAYA

25/04/2017

YA DATO' SURAYA BINTI OTHMAN

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4cd93ad0-c55b-4644-88fb-5e141d8d571c&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: 42S-76-12/2015 ANTARA RUZAINI BINTI ROSLI ... PERAYU LAWAN PENDAKWA RAYA ... RESPONDEN JUDGMENT 2 INTRODUCTION [1] The accused in this case is appealing against the decision of the Sessions Judge (“SJ”) sentencing her to 7 years’ imprisonment (to run concurrently from the date of sentence) for 10 charges under s. 471 of the Penal Code read together with s. 467 of the same. FINDINGS OF THE SJ The gist of the learned SJ’s findings are as follows: The cheques were forged [2] This is based on SP3’s evidence that she did not sign those cheques because the receivers were not suppliers to Selecta Enterprise, which was corroborated by SP8, SP2, SP5 and SP7. Not only that, expert evidence (SP8) confirmed that the signature of the cheques were forged. [3] Furthermore, SP2, SP5 and SP3’s evidence showed that some of the cheques were transferred to two accounts over which the accused had control and access of and the evidence of SP2 and SP5 showed that they had no knowledge of 3 transactions relating to the mentioned accounts after the accounts were handed over for the accused’s use. [4] There was also evidence that part of the monies were transferred to SP7 (an employee of SP3) when SP7 was to be paid his salary in cash and the amount transferred was not the same as his salary. SP7 had testified that the accused had borrowed his bank account and he would withdraw the monies and give them to the accused. [5] The learned SJ took the view that there was a material failure by accused to explain why company-owned cheques were issued and deposited to accounts where the accused had control and access of. The accused had used as genuine the forged cheques [6] The learned SJ found that the cheques in question had been deposited in the accounts of SP2, SP5, and SP7, and the accused’s handwriting was on the front and back of the cheques; 4 [7] According on SP7’s evidence, 6 out of 10 of the cheques were paid into his account by the accused based on the handwriting on the front and back of the cheques. [8] To the learned SJ, the fact that the accused’s handwriting was on the cheques showed that she used as genuine the cheques and the accused herself had admitted that it was her handwriting on those cheques; [9] In the SJ’s view, being supervisor of the petrol station meant that the accused was aware that SP3’s signature was required before any payments could be made and she also knew that the recipients of the cheques were not suppliers entitled to receive payment from Selekta Enterprise. The accused had reason to believe that the cheques were forged and had used as genuine the forged cheques [10] This ingredient was present as the accused by virtue of her position as supervisor of the company must have had reason to believe that the cheques were forged. There was also a failure on the accused’s part to challenge SP3’s evidence. 5 The accused’s defence [11] With regard to the accused’s defence, the learned SJ found that there was no dispute by the accused that the cheques were prepared by her and deposited in the accounts of SP2, SP5 and SP7. If the cheques were prepared and deposited by someone else, the accused would not have known that monies were deposited in said accounts. [12] The learned SJ held that the non-production of the logbook and CCTV recordings were not fatal to the Prosecution’s case as they are corroborative evidence and in this case the Prosecution had proven its case successfully. [13] Referring to the accused’s police report (D18), the learned SJ felt that it was an afterthought because in it the accused stated that on 6.8.2011 she received an SMS from the complainant’s husband asking her to repay the monies that she misappropriated. This showed that D18 was made after the complainant and her husband found out about the accused’s wrongdoing. 6 SUBMISSIONS BY THE ACCUSED [14] The accused’s appeal rests on the following grounds: i. the failure by the SJ to take note of material discrepancies in the evidence of SP2 (the complainant), SP7, SP9, SD1 and SD2 ii. SP2, SP7, SP9 and SD1’s evidence that the company’s cheques were not managed by the accused alone as two other supervisors had access to those cheques. iii. SP2, SP7, SP9 and SD1’s evidence that the cheques were kept in a locked drawer in a special room for the accused contrasts with the evidence of SP7 and SD1 that there was no special room and many employees had access to said room including other supervisors. iv. SP2, SP7, SD1’s evidence that if the accused was on leave, someone else would prepare the voucher and cheques which contrasts with SP3’s evidence that only the accused handled the cheques. 7 v. failure of the SJ to find that SP2 acted with mala fide against the accused as SP2 is facing financial difficulties and the accused is just a convenient scapegoat vi. failure of the SJ to invoke s. 114(g) Evidence Act 1950 for the Prosecution’s failure to produce evidence / a sample of the accused’s signature, the CCTV recordings and logbook. SUBMISSIONS BY THE PROSECUTION [15] On the other hand, we have the prosecution’s submissions which can be summarized as thus: i. SP3’s evidence confirming that the signatures on the cheques were not hers which is supported by SP8 who is an expert document examiner. ii. the failure of the Prosecution to produce a sample of the accused’s signature was not used to cross-examine SP9. 8 iii. The Prosecution does not have a burden to compare the sample signature with the accused’s signature as its duty is to show that the signatures are not SP3’s. iv. SP3 and SP7 have both confirmed that the handwriting on the cheques is the accused’s and SP7’s evidence is especially credible as he revealed that he was “more than a friend” to the accused (see p 169, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1). v. The signature of the cheques were so different that it prompted SD2 (an officer of Al-Rajhi Bank) to contact SP3 for verification (see p 246, Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1). DECISION [16] Section 471 of the Penal Code reads: “Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document.” 9 [17] Under s. 471 the Prosecution has to prove that the document in question is forged and the accused fraudulently or dishonestly used as genuine the forged document. [18] The evidence shows that the documents were indeed forged. Secondly, the fact that various amounts were banked into accounts over which the accused had control and access and withdrawn by her subsequently was never explained plausibly. [19] In my view, the learned SJ has made the correct finding of fact as to the elements of the offence and rightly convicted the accused. Having answered that in the affirmative the remaining issue confronting the court is whether the sentence meted out on the accused is adequate. [20] Under s. 467 of the Penal Code, the accused “shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years, and shall be liable to fine.” [21] In the case of PP v Jaffa bin Daud (1981) 1 MLJ 315 Mohamed Azmi J (as he was then) expressed the correct stand for the sentencing principle:- 10 “Sentence according to law ”means that the sentences must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in according with established judicial principles..” The accused in this case is a first offender (PP v Nazarudin Ahmad & Ors [1993] 2 CLJ 543 at 547 referred). She has three children who require the care of their mother. In light of this, I am of the opinion that the sentence of seven (7) years imprisonment imposed by the learned SJ is manifestly excessive. A more appropriate punishment would be imprisonment of three (3) years for each charge, and the sentences are to run concurrently commencing today. The appellant’s appeal is hereby allowed as to the extent of her sentence. (SURAYA OTHMAN) Judge, Criminal Court, High Court of Malaya, Shah Alam, Selangor. Dated 25th April 2017 11 Cases (s) referred to: 1. PP v Jaffa bin Daud (1981) 1 MLJ 315; 2. PP v Nazarudin Ahmad & Ors [1993] 2 CLJ 543 at 547. Legislation (s) referred to: 1. Section 471 and Section 467 of the Penal Code. Solicitors: 1. Puan Aidatul Azura binti Zainal Abidin Timbalan Pendakwaraya Jabatan Peguam Negara No.45, Persiaran Perdana Presint 4, 62100 PUTRAJAYA 2. Encik Nik Zarith bin Nik Mustapha Tetuan Nailah Rani & Partners Peguambela & Peguamcara 27-1, Jalan Setiawangsa 9 Taman Setiawangsa, 54200 KUALA LUMPUR

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C(ARB)-9-04/2016

PLAINTIF Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Serdang Baru Properties Sdn Bhd

21/04/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a0da77ba-a5a4-4063-9e5c-fb82d8f759f8&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C(ARB)-9-04/2016 In the matter of Section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 and Order 69 of the Rules of Court 2012; . And In the matter of the Arbitration Act, 2005 and In the matter of an Arbitration between Serdang Baru Properties Sdn Bhd (Claimant) and Kejuruteraan Bintai Kindenko Sdn Bhd (Respondent); And In the matter of a Final Award published by David Cheah Ming Yew on 9.3.2016 and the Final Award Corrective Notice dated 7.4.2016. BETWEEN KEJURUTERAAN BINTAI KINDENKO SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO. 89776-P) AND SERDANG BARU PROPERTIES SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (COMPANY NO. 16558-W) 2 THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] This is the Plaintiff's application under section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 to vary an Arbitration Award granted in its favour. The Plaintiff, had been appointed as a turnkey contractor by the Defendant here who was the Claimant in the Arbitration. The Plaintiff was the Respondent in the Arbitration. [2] The Plaintiff's appointment was via a Letter of Acceptance dated 5.6.2000 wherein it agreed to design, construct and complete the development which comprises a 19 storey retail commercial centre with residential apartments. The parties subsequently entered into a formal contract based on the JKR Conditions of Contract for Design and Build and Turnkey Projects 1999 edition subject to certain modifications. [3] Under Clause 4.1 of the Letter of Acceptance the contract was estimated at RM95,700,000.00. It was provided under Clause 5.9 that the date of completion was to be 37 months from the date possession of the site was delivered to the Plaintiff. [4] The parties subsequently entered into a Revised Supplementary Agreement on 27.4.2004 wherein the development was scaled down to 3 a 16 storey retail commercial centre with residential apartments and 2 storey basements. [5] Clause 5.8 of the Letter of Acceptance on Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD) has now come to the fore and is the focus of this application of the Plaintiff for the Award to be varied. As an LAD clause it seems to be drafted in a language designed to bypass the application of section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 and the position of the law as declared in Selva Kumar A/L Murugiah v Thiagarajah A/L Retnasamy [1995] 1 MLJ 817. The parties agreed that liquidated damages may be imposed if there were delays to the completion of the works. Clause 5.8 of the Letter of Acceptance provides as follows: “The liquidated and ascertained damages (LAD) shall be at the rate of RM40,000.00 per day. The LAD is deemed to be as actual loss which the Employer will suffer and the contractor shall be liable to pay the same without the need for the Employer to prove the actual damages or loss.” (emphasis added) [6] The parties had agreed for the works to be undertaken in sections and had agreed to a sectional completion date for part of the works which are specifically defined. Clause 5.10.3 of the letter of acceptance dated 5.6.2000 deals with the imposition of liquidated damages in respect of sectional completion, which provides as follows: 4 “Liquidated and ascertained damages in respect of the section shall be at the rate of RM15,000.00 per day.” [7] There is a significant difference in the manner in which the liquidated damages clause for the completion of all of the works and for sectional completion was drafted. In Clause 5.10.3, which relates to sectional completion, it is not provided that the LAD amounted to the actual loss that will be suffered by the Defendant or that there is no need to prove the said loss. [8] Apart from the clauses in the Letter of Acceptance, the conditions of contract also contain a contractual provision in relation to liquidated damages for delay in completing the works. Clause 41 of the conditions of contract reads: “If the Contractor fails to complete the Works by the Date of the Completion stated in Appendix 1 or within any extended time under Clause 41 hereof, the Contractor shall pay the Employer a sum calculated at the rate stated in Appendix 1 as Liquidated and Ascertained Damages for the period during which the said works shall so remain and have remained incomplete and the ER may deduct such damages from any money due to the Contractor under this Contract and failing which such damages shall be recovered from the Performance Bond or as a stipulated demand 5 in money and the ER shall inform the Contractor in writing of such deduction”. [9] In relation to sectional completion, Clause 42 of the conditions of contract addresses the impact of delay to the completion of the work and the right of the Employer to impose liquidated damages in the event of such delay. The LAD for sectional completion has a different rate for each day of delay and is treated differently from the completion of the main works. Problem [10] Disputes and differences arose between the parties. The Plaintiff did not complete the works by the completion date. The Defendant terminated the Plaintiff's employment by a letter of termination dated 2.6.2008. [11] This was after the Defendant through its Solicitors issued a notice of default on 30.4.2008 which stated that the Plaintiff had suspended the construction of the Works, failed to proceed regularly and diligently in the performance of its obligations under the contract and that it had failed to execute work in accordance with the contract or persistently neglected to carry out its obligations under the contract. The Defendant terminated 6 the employment of the Plaintiff on 2.6.2008 when the Plaintiff failed to remedy the default. [12] One of the Employer's claims as Claimant in the Arbitration was the issue of the right of the Employer to impose LAD on the Plaintiff. On 19.5.2003, the Defendant had issued a notice to the Plaintiff to take site possession. Based on the terms of the contract, the Plaintiff would have to complete the sectional works by 2.7.2005 and the whole of the works by 2.7.2006. It was alleged that the Plaintiff had delayed the completion of the works and that the Plaintiff did not meet the sectional completion and the main works completion dates. [13] The project architect issued a Certificate of Non Completion for the sectional works contending that LAD of RM15,000.00 per day was deductible for the period between 2.7.2005 and 2.8.2007. This amounted to the sum of RM11,445,000.00. [14] In relation to the main building works, the project architect issued a Certificate of Non-Completion contending that the works should have been completed by 2.7.2006. The project architect in the Certificate of Non-Completion was of the view that LAD of RM40,000.00 per day for the period between 2.7.2006 until 2.8.2007 (398 days). This amounted to RM9,950,000.00. 7 [15] The Defendant sought to impose further LAD at the rate of RM40,000.00 per day from 3.8.2007 to 2.6.2008 (the date the contract was terminated by the Defendant). This amounted to RM12,160,000.00. [16] As such, the total amount of LAD claimed by the Defendant as Claimant in the arbitration was RM33,555,000.00 made up as follows : a. RM11,445,000.00 b. RM 9,950,000.00 c. RM12,160,000.00 RM33,555,000.00 [17] The Arbitrator decided that the Employer was so entitled and there was no need for the Employer to prove its loss. [18] The Arbitrator however, was of the view that the Plaintiff was entitled to some extension of time and therefore only awarded the Defendant the sum of RM32,235,000.00 as liquidated damages. [19] The Plaintiff as Respondent in the arbitration had counterclaimed for a declaration that the Letter of Acceptance and the Revised Supplementary Terms had been superseded and rendered null and void by virtue of a restructuring agreement contained in the Respondent's letter of 6.11.2006. The Plaintiff prayed for specific performance of the restructuring agreement and alternatively for the sum of 8 RM25,525,624.87 being the value of works carried out by them as of 29.5.2007 together with a turnkey factor of 15%. The Respondent also claimed for a return of the Advances made and monies paid to the Claimant. [20] The Arbitrator found that there was no concluded restructuring agreement and granted the Respondent's counterclaim for the value of work done including a 15% turnkey factor and also for the return of the Advances made and payment back of the monies paid to the Claimant. The nett sum payable by the Claimant to the Respondent was RM1,718,943.99. The learned Arbitrator also awarded simple interest at 5% per annum from 3.6.2008 (a day after termination date) up to 9.3.2016 (date of Award) and thereafter at 5% simple interest per annum until realisation. [21] The learned Arbitrator also made some apportionment on costs of the Award and of the Arbitration which is not the subject matter of challenge in this application. Prayers [22] The focus of this application is whether the Defendant was entitled to deduct LAD from the work which the Plaintiff had carried out. It is not a disputed fact that the Plaintiff had carried out works amounting to 9 RM25,525,624.87. This valuation was carried on or about the time of termination by the Defendant of the Plaintiff’s contract. [23] In this section 42 application the Plaintiff here as Respondent in the arbitration had prayed that paragraph 954 of the Award dated 9.3.2016 and paragraph 5 of the corrective award dated 7.4.2016 be set aside and the entitlement for payment as set out therein be set aside and that it be substituted as follows: Item Description Claimant/ Defendant Respondent/ Plaintiff (a) Total value of work done by Respondent on 2/6/08 – at termination [including the 15% turnkey factor (RM3,266,222,25) to the Respondent] (Exhibit RW2D) RM25,525,624.87 (b) Return of advances to Respondent RM8,428,319.12 (c) Money paid to Respondent RM500,000.00 (d) Sub-total due to Respondent RM34,453,943.99 (e) LESS LAD due to Claimant RM32,235,000.00 RM6,233,659.55 (f) Payment due to Respondent RM28,220,288.44 10 [24] Briefly, the learned Arbitrator was of the view that: a. That Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 did not apply in the case as the parties according to the arbitrator had agreed to contract out of the Contracts Act. b. That despite the fact that the Employer’s Representative had not given the necessary notice as required by the terms of the conditions of contract, the Defendant was still nevertheless entitled to impose LAD. c. That despite the fact that the Arbitrator had assessed damages to the Defendant to be RM6,233,659.55 the Defendant was still entitled to impose LAD amounting RM32,235,000.00. [25] The Plaintiff contended that the decision by the learned Arbitrator to award LAD was wrong in law for the following reasons: a. That as a matter of law, parties cannot contract out of Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950. b. That a reading of the relevant clauses makes it clear that the parties did not intend to contract out of Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950. 11 c. That as a matter of law, the Certificate of Non Completion issued by the architect is defective and void in law and therefore the Defendant was not entitled to impose liquidated damages. d. That as a matter of law, as the Arbitrator had assessed damages to be RM6,233,659.55 the Arbitrator should not have awarded LAD amounting to RM32,235,000.00. Principles [26] The questions of law that the Plaintiff had referred to this Court pursuant to an application filed under section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 are set out in Annexure A to this Originating Summons. For the purposes of this application only the Second and Third Questions of Law are relevant as follows: Second Question of Law: Given that the Arbitrator has assessed the damages suffered by the Defendant to be RM6,233,659.55, can he as a matter of law award the Defendant a higher sum? Third Question of Law: 12 a. Whether there must be an express provision to state that parties are contracting out of Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 in the light of Clause 56 of the Conditions of Contract. b. Whether as a matter of law given that Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 deals with the award of damages parties can agree to contract out of the Contracts Act 1950. c. Whether upon a reading of Clause 5.8 and/or Clause 5.10 of the Main Contract, parties had in fact contracted out Section 75 of the Contract 1950. [27] The broad requirements of section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 are as follows and they have been fulfilled: a. That the question of law must arise out of the award. b. That the question of law must substantially affect the rights of the parties. [28] Section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 reads: "Reference on questions of law 42. (1) Any party may refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of an award. 13 (1A) The High Court shall dismiss a reference made under subsection (1) unless the question of law substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties. (2) A reference shall be filed within forty-two days of the publication and receipt of the award, and shall identify the question of law to be determined and state the grounds on which the reference is sought. (3) The High Court may order the arbitral tribunal to state the reasons for its award where the award— (a) does not contain the arbitral tribunal’s reasons; or (b) does not set out the arbitral tribunal’s reasons in sufficient detail. (4) The High Court may, on the determination of a reference— (a) confirm the award; (b) vary the award; (c) remit the award in whole or in part, together with the High Court’s determination on the question of law to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration; or (d) set aside the award, in whole or in part. 14 (5) Where the award is varied by the High Court, the variation shall have effect as part of the arbitral tribunal’s award. (6) Where the award is remitted in whole or in part for reconsideration, the arbitral tribunal shall make a fresh award in respect of the matters remitted within ninety days of the date of the order for remission or such other period as the High Court may direct. (7) Where the High Court makes an order under subsection (3), it may make such further order as it thinks fit with respect to any additional costs of the arbitration resulting from that order. (8) On a reference under subsection (1) the High Court may— (a) order the applicant to provide security for costs; or (b) order that any money payable under the award shall be brought into the High Court or otherwise secured pending the determination of the reference." [29] In the recent decision of Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 697, the Court of Appeal was of the following view at paragraph 6: “We agree with the approach of the learned judge that the court must intervene where the award is manifestly unlawful 15 and unconscionable. Section 42 has no equivalent in the model law or in parallel jurisdictions. Section 42 is not a provision as to appeals but a reference on a question of law. There has been a line of authorities with regards to the limiting of judicial intervention in arbitration awards and we set out the following decisions on the point ie intervention should only be exercised in clear and exceptional circumstances (see Chain Cycle Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 MLJ 681; [2015] AMEJ 1479. We are of the opinion that with the pre requirements of s 42, it followed there would be no danger of ‘opening the flood gates’ in respect of review of arbitral awards”. [30] In Chain Cycle Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 MLJ 681, the Court of Appeal at paragraphs 20 and 21 of the judgment agreed with the views set out in the decision of High Court in Exceljade v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 AMR 253. In Exceljade at paragraph [17], the learned Judge considered the decision of Finelvet AG v Vinava Shipping Co Ltd, The Chrysalis [1983] 1 WLR 1469, which set out a 3 stage test when considering a question of law. [31] With reference to the 3 stage tests, the relevant test is at 2nd stage, which is as follows: 16 “Stage (2) of the process is the proper subject matter of an appeal under the Act 1979. In some cases an error of law can be demonstrated by studying the way in which the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons. It is, however also possible to infer an error of law in those cases where a correct application of the law to the facts would lead to inevitably to one answer, whereas the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons in a manner which appears to be correct, for the court is then driven to assume that he did not properly understand the principles which he had stated.” (emphasis added) [32] This approach was also adopted in the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kerajaan Malaysia v Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 126. At paragraph 60 of the judgment, the Court of Appeal was of the following view: “In practical terms, we are persuaded that we should be looking at stage (2) of the process of reasoning as the proper focus of the inquiry under s 42, which will mean ascertaining not so much a clear position of the ‘law’ without regard to the underlying facts, but as analysed, the arbitrator will be ascertaining the ‘law’ as a process comprising ‘not only the identification of all material rules of statute and common law, but also the identification and 17 interpretation of the relevant parts of the contract, and the identification of those facts which must be taken into account when the decision is reached’. Typically, this process will involve a mixed consideration of relevant statutory rules, case laws and legal principles, and an identification of the relevant facts on which to apply the ‘law’.” [33] The Plaintiff submitted that based on the above authorities it is clear that when the Arbitrator has failed to properly appreciate or apply the law, this Court is at liberty to set aside or vary the Award as deemed appropriate. Whether the learned Arbitrator had failed to apply the law on section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 as pronounced in Selva Kumar's case [34] Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 provides: "Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to 18 receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for." (emphasis added) [35] The Arbitrator found that parties had contractually agreed to exclude the application of Section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 and that therefore the amounts stipulated as liquidated damages will apply as the agreed measure of damages. The Plaintiff stated that the decision of the Arbitrator is in error and inconsistent with the existing principles of law. [36] The Plaintiff submitted that the above-mentioned questions of law address the failure of the Arbitrator to correctly analyse and apply the correct principles of law. The question is whether the learned Arbitrator can ignore and disregard the position of the law under section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 as declared by the Federal Court in Selva Kumar's case. [37] The decision of the Federal Court in Selva Kumar A/L Murugiah v Thiagarajah A/L Retnasamy [1995] 1 MLJ 817 makes it clear that there is no distinction between liquidated damages and penalties and further provides that the Defendant would have to prove actual damages. At page 827 of the judgment, the Federal Court declared as follows: 19 “Secondly, we therefore further hold that the words in question, viz ‘whether or not actual damages was proved to have been caused thereby, are limited or restricted to those cases where the court would find it difficult to assess damages for the actual damage or loss, as distinct from or opposed to all other cases, when a plaintiff in each of them will have to prove the damages or the reasonable compensation for the actual damage or loss in the usual ways.” (emphasis added) [38] In Johor Coastal Development Sdn Bhd v Constrajaya Sdn Bhd [2009] 4 MLJ 445, the Federal Court was of the view that pursuant to section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950, a party claiming liquidated damages is legally obliged to prove its damages in accordance with the principles set out in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341. As such, the Federal Court has decided that the Defendant could not simply rely on the amount stipulated as liquidated damages as damages but instead has to prove its damages. [39] It must not be forgotten that in Johor Coastal a valiant attempt was made to dislodge the position of the law as propounded in Selva Kumar's case with respect to section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950. The first question posed for the Federal Court was: 20 "Whether that part of the decision in Selva Kumar a/l Murugiah v Thiagarajah a/l Retnasamy [1995] 1 MLJ 817 which obliges a party having the benefit of a liquidated damages clause to prove its losses, notwithstanding the words in s 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 ‘whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby’, is correct." [40] The relevant dicta of the majority is set out below: "[32] Reverting to the first question posed to us, based on the authorities considered above, it is my view that the legal position may be summarised as follows: The appellant/vendor cannot recover or retain without proof by evidence of the loss or damage suffered as a result of the breach of the agreements. This is because s 75 of the Act provides that in every case, the court must determine what is reasonable compensation, ‘whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby.’ [33] And as was held in Selva Kumar actual damages or reasonable compensation must be proved in accordance with the principles set out in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341. 21 [34] The appellant urged this court to depart from Selva Kumar and the long series of decisions on s 75 relying on a recent two bench decision of the Supreme Court of India in Oil & Natural Gas Corp Ltd v Saw Pipes Ltd [2003] LR 1 348. [35] Upon close examination, I find that Oil & Natural Gas falls in the category of cases where the loss suffered is incapable of assessment. Hence, the amount stipulated may be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of damages and therefore it is recoverable. Further in Selva Kumar itself the court recognised that where the court finds it difficult to assess damages as there is no known measure of damages employable, the stipulated sum may be recoverable. It should also be noted that no where in Oil & Natural Gas the Indian Supreme Court stated that the provisions of the Indian Contracts Act can be contracted out. [36] In view of the above, I am of the view that Selva Kumar is still good law. [37] For the above reasons, I would therefore answer the first question in the affirmative." (emphasis added) 22 [41] The learned Arbitrator in this case simply relied on the rates stipulated as liquidated damages and therefore when he ruled that the Defendant was entitled to damages amounting to RM32 million this was not done in accordance with the principles set out in Hadley v Baxendale (supra). In fact the assessment of damages was done in complete disregard of the principle set out in Selva Kumar which requires the proof of actual loss. [42] It may fairly be said that the Federal Court had the opportunity to answer the question that many in the construction industry have been awaiting. However the apex court does not answer hypothetical question unless it has arisen from the facts as found by the Court. As the Federal Court had held that section 75 had not been expressly excluded by the relevant clause in the contract, the need to answer the second question of law posed did not arise. [43] It would be presumptuous to then say, as the learned Arbitrator seemed to have understood, that had there been a clear exclusion of section 75 by contract, then the sum stated in the LAD would automatically apply. The Federal Court did not answer the question as to whether section 75 can be excluded by consent of parties. The position of the law then on section 75 is as declared in Selva Kumar's case, whatever one's misgivings may be. It is not for the learned Arbitrator to 23 prefer his own position which may even have the support of the stakeholders in the construction industry as can be seen in the relevant amendments made to the various standard form contracts like PAM and PWD Contracts. [44] The position of the Federal Court with respect to the second question of law posed is clearly stated below: "[38] Moving on to the second question, I must say that whether or not this court should answer this question would depend firstly on whether, on the proper construction of the agreements, the parties had in effect excluded the application of s 75 of the Act. This issue was raised for the first time in the Court of Appeal. This, in my view, is nothing more than an attempt to salvage what is otherwise a weak case. In this regard, I am in agreement with the view expressed by the Court of Appeal, which is found at p 925 of the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA which reads: In our judgment, when these agreements are read as a whole, what cl 16.2 means is that the 10% or 12% which is to be forfeited by the appellant is not to be challenged by the respondent as not being fair and reasonable compensation. If you look at the objective aim of the transaction you will see 24 why cl 16.2 was put in. Mark you, both parties knew that this was not a straightforward sale and purchase of land. As earlier rehearsed, there was other consideration here. The appellant as vendor of the land obviously did not want to face a challenge that it ought not to keep any of the sums it had received from the respondent on the ground that this was not an outright sale and purchase. That is why cl 16.2 is crafted in the way we find it. Hence, cl 16.2 does not produce the effect that Mr Pradhan’s ingenious argument says it does. Alternatively; and this is the second obstacle; if there is any conflict or contradiction between cll 8.2 and 16.2, then there arises an ambiguity as to what the joint effect of these two clauses is. Since it is the appellant who relies on cl 16.2 to justify the forfeiture, that clause should be read contra proferentum the appellant and the resulting ambiguity between it and cl 8.2 must be resolved in the respondent’s favour.What that means is that it is not open for the appellant to keep all the monies. [39] In short there is no clear provision in the agreements which excludes the application of s 75 of the Act. 25 [40] For the above reasons, I agree with the Court of Appeal that, in the circumstances of this case, the second question does not therefore arise." (emphasis added) [45] When one looks at the relevant contractual clause that was considered by the Federal Court in Johor Coastal, one would find that it is as clear if not clearer than Clause 5.8 in the present case. The clause on reasonable compensation is reproduced below: “16.2 Reasonable Compensation Both parties hereby unconditionally and irrevocably acknowledge that the sums stipulated in this Agreement to be payable by the defaulting party would constitute reasonable compensation to the non-defaulting party and each party hereto hereby waives any objection it may now or hereafter have that those sums would be otherwise than fair and reasonable compensation.” [46] The Federal Court ruled that the parties had not excluded the application of section 75. By the same token the learned Arbitrator in the present case should have ruled the same in that the parties had not excluded the application of section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950. [47] Even assuming that this Court should not disturb his interpretation of Clause 5.8 in that parties had intended to exclude the application of 26 section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950, the learned Arbitrator would still have to apply the position of the law as propounded in Selva Kumar's case. [48] The Plaintiff further contended that a party cannot by agreement contract out of section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950. It was argued that section 75 regulates the obligations of parties and the compensation for breach of contract. It was submitted that as a matter of law given that section 75 regulates the basis on which damages are awarded parties should not be permitted to as a matter of policy contract out of section 75 of the Contracts Act 1975. [49] The Courts have always been concerned that what is exacted from a defaulting party in the event of breach is reasonable compensation and not a penalty. Therefore irrespective of a sum stated as agreed liquidated damages, the Courts' hands are never tied such that it is always required to enquire into and assess what is reasonable compensation based on the evidence adduced by the innocent party. The rationale is obvious for even a non-defaulting party should not take advantage of a defaulting party and to capitalise on the default and reap a windfall at the expense of the defaulting party. [50] Granted there will be that category where it is difficult if not impossible to assess damages though substantial damage has been 27 suffered by the innocent party. Such an exception is addressed in Selva Kumar's (supra) case as follows at the headnotes at page 818: "(3) However, for cases where the court finds it difficult to assess damages for the actual damage as there is no known measure of damages employable, and yet the evidence clearly shows some real loss inherently which is not too remote, the words in question will apply. The court ought to award substantial damages as opposed to nominal damages which are reasonable and fair according to the court’s good sense and fair play. In any event, the damages awarded must not exceed the sum so named in the contractual provision." [51] The learned author IR Harbans Singh KS opined in his book Harban's Engineering and Construction Contracts Management - Commencement and Administration, Second Edition, 2014, LexisNexis at page 945 as follows: "Legally, it has been accepted that the liquidated damages for public sector contracts fall within the category of contracts where loss and damage is incapable of proper assessment by settled legal principles. Hence, following the Selvakumar and Johor Coastal decisions, the courts would be prepared to regard the liquidated damages stipulated in the contract as a genuine pre- 28 estimate of the loss or damage suffered and allow its recovery. See Keen Builders Sdn Bhd v Utara Dua (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (Samudra (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd)(Garnishee) [1998] 2 CLJ Supp 256. This is reinforced by Lim Chong Fong's following statement in The Malaysian PWD Form of Construction Contract (2nd End) p 93: ... be that as it may, it is submitted that whatever approach is adopted, the Government being a non-commercial and non- profit-making entity should be entitled to recover the Liquidated and Ascertained Damages simpliciter as reasonable compensation simply by reason that the actual damage or loss is unlikely to be truly quantifiable in pecuniary terms." [52] The learned author IR Harbans Singh KS had earlier referred to the case of Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Abagarus Pty Ltd [1992] 33 NSWLR 504 as support for the above proposition. [53] Here the learned Arbitrator had no difficulties assessing the damage suffered by the Claimant/Defendant to be RM6,233,659.55 based on the evidence adduced by the Claimant. For the Arbitrator then to allow the Defendant’s claim for LAD amounting to RM32,235,000.00 would be to allow a penalty claim rather than reasonable compensation. 29 [54] In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Ltd v New Garage and Motor Company Ltd [1915] AC 79, Lord Dunedin explained the term 'penalty' as: "The essence of a penalty is the payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the offending party ... If the sum is 'extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss that could conceivably be proved to have followed the breach', it will be regarded as a penalty and unenforceable..." [55] That is not a principle countenanced in law where section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 is concerned. I would agree with the Plaintiff that this award of damages by the Arbitrator is contrary to all recognized principles of law and as such should be set aside. [56] I agree with the Plaintiff that as a matter of a general principle of law, where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, that party, so far as money can do, is to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed. [57] The damages awarded by the Arbitrator were far in excess of the sum which he assessed to be the losses suffered by the Defendant. The decision of the Arbitrator was in effect relieving the Defendant from having to satisfy the fundamental requirement of having to prove their 30 loss arising from those breaches. One must hearken to the principle propounded by the Federal Court in Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777 at page 788 as follows: “It goes without saying that if the effect of allowing a plaintiff’s claim is to put him in a better position than he would have been if there had been no breach, then this would be contrary to the principles enunciated in the cases cited above. This means that any profit which he stands to make because of the breach must be deducted from the damages awarded- a point aptly put by Mr Hugh Beale in his most useful book on Remedies for Breach of Contract: The basis of assessment … These deductions are made in accordance with the general principle that an award of damages should not put the victim in a better position that if the contract had been performed; he should recover no more than he had lost”. (emphasis added) [58] The decision of the Arbitrator in awarding the Defendant the sum of RM32,235,000.00 amounts to a windfall for the Defendant. It is a decision that is contrary to all acceptable and recognized legal principles in relation to assessment of damages. It ought to be set aside and 31 replaced with the amount actually assessed based on actual loss of RM6,233,659.55. [59] Clearly this is not a case falling under the exception envisaged in Selva Kumar's where it is difficult to assess the loss as there is no known formula. The fact that it can be easily calculated based on the report of the Claimant's expert Sr Saw Soon Kooi, a Quantity Surveyor, which the learned Arbitrator was able to accept as a reasonable amount of the actual loss to complete the balance of the works, goes to confirm that this is not a case falling within the exception envisaged in Selva Kumar's case where proof may be dispensed of and the LAD sum as agreed be accepted without the need for proof. [60] Much has been touted about the freedom to contract which the Court should uphold and promote. Whilst the Courts would generally give effect to the intention of the parties, the Courts are also mindful of the fact that there are many standard form contracts where the party with the project is able to dictate terms to the party desiring to perform the works with the hope of making some profits, the so-called pre- agreed LAD sum on a "take it or leave it" basis. The employer and the contractor are hardly on an equal bargaining power with the balance tilting in favour of the stronger party, the employer. The imbalance become more acute when there is no cap on the LAD. 32 [61] It is settled law that even though parties are entitled to contract out of the Contracts Act 1950, parties cannot do so if it is inconsistent with the Contracts Act 1950. (Isito Electronics Sdn Bhd v Teh Ah Kiam & Anor [2004] 7 MLJ 513 and PT Vision Renewable Fuels v Export- Import Bank of Malaysia Bhd [2015] 8 MLJ 706). [62] In Isito Electronics Sdn Bhd's case, his Lordship Ramly Ali J (now FCJ) observed as follows: "43 In the present case, the exclusion of liability of the defendant was clearly stipulated in the letters dated 6 March 1995 and 11 April 1995. The clause is clear and unambiguous and the clear words should be given effect to. The exclusion clause has been agreed to by the plaintiff and the said clause clearly states that the receiver is not accepting any personal liability under the contract he signed as an agent. This would include contractual and tortious liability in negligence.In this respect, the Court is in full agreement with Abdul Malek Hj Ahmad J (as he then was) in Robert Bosch (SEA) Pte Ltd v Goh Ban Huat Bhd [1996] 1 AMR 714 when he cited the House of Lords' case of Photo Production Ltd v Sucuricor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 where it was held as follows: … that the question whether and to what extent an exclusion clause was to be applied to any breach of contract was a 33 matter of construction of the contract and normally when parties were bargaining on equal terms they should be free to apportion the risks as they thought fit, making provision for their respective risks according to the terms they chose to agree..." (emphasis added) [63] The decision of the Privy Council in Ooi Boon Leong v Citibank NA [1984] 1 MLJ 222 relates to the whether parties can contract out of Sections 86, 92 and 94 of the Contracts Act 1950. The decision of Ooi Boon Leong does not deal with general principles of law but rather deals with the contractual relationship between the parties. [64] Section 86 reads: "Discharge of surety by variance in terms of contract 86. Any variance, made without the surety's consent, in the terms of the contract between the principal debtor and the creditor, discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance." [65] There was of course nothing wrong for the surety to have given his prior consent to any variance that the lender may make to the contract. That is nothing inconsistent with the Contracts Act 1950. [66] Section 92 provides as follows: 34 "92. If the creditor does any act which is inconsistent with the rights of the surety, or omits to do any act which his duty to the surety requires him to do, and the eventual remedy of the surety himself against the principal debtor is thereby impaired, the surety is discharged." [67] Section 94 reads: "Surety's right to benefit of creditor's securities 94. A surety is entitled to the benefit of every security which the creditor has against the principal debtor at the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into, whether the surety knows of the existence of such security or not; and, if the creditor loses or, without the consent of the surety, parts with the security, the surety is discharged to the extent of the value of the security." [68] The surety may give his prior consent for the creditor to act even in a manner that may be inconsistent with the surety's rights or to give his prior consent to the creditor to part with the security. [69] Little wonder when the Government wanted to impose a sum as agreed liquidated damages for breach of scholarship contracts it introduced the Contracts (Amendment) Act 1976. Section 5 on "Remedy in the event of breach" reads as follows: 35 "5. Remedy in the event of breach. Where a scholarship agreement has been broken by the scholar - (a) if a sum is named in the agreement as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the principal Act, the scholar and the surety shall be liable jointly and severally to pay and the appropriate authority shall be entitled to be paid the whole of such named sum whether or not actual damage or loss has been caused by such breach, and no deduction shall be made from the said named sum on account of any partial period of service performed by the scholar on completion of his course of study; or (b) if no such sum is mentioned in the scholarship agreement, the scholar and the surety shall be jointly and severally liable to pay and the appropriate authority shall be entitled to be paid - (i) the whole amount expended by the appropriate authority under the agreement; and (ii) the whole of such further amount as it will cost the appropriate authority or another authority designated 36 by it to engage a person with qualifications and experience similar to those which were to be obtained by the scholar to perform the services required of the scholar on the completion of his course of study for the period specified in the scholarship agreement." (emphasis added) [70] One can surmise that the introduction of a separate legislation was necessary as otherwise any sum named as agreed liquidated damages would be subject to section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950 where there is a need for the Government to prove its loss. [71] Likewise in cases involving claim for damages for late delivery of houses by purchasers under the Standard Form Sale and Purchase Agreement under Schedule G and H of the relevant Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 made under the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966, it has been held the relevant clauses on damages for late delivery in the prescribed Schedules would prevail over the Contracts Act 1950. See the cases of Tai Kim Yew & Ors v Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd [2004] 4 MLJ 227. [72] In Brisdale Resources Sdn Bhd v Law Kim [2004] 6 MLJ 76, the Sale and Purchase Agreement was in accordance with Schedule H which is a statutory contract and it was held that that the agreed 37 liquidated damages for late delivery of vacant possession as in the Schedule H Agreement was a mandatory provision and therefore there was no requirement for the purchaser to prove its losses pursuant to section 75 of the Contracts Act 1950. [73] I am not unaware of what was clearly the industry's reaction to Selva Kumar's decision by the redrafting the LAD clauses in Standard Form Contracts like Clause 40.3 of the PWD Form 203 & 203A (Rev 1/2010), Clause 45.3 of PWD Form DB (Rev 1/2010) and Clause 22.2 of PAM Contract 2006. Some of these were referred to be the learned Arbitrator at paragraphs 437- 439 of his Award. These were attempts to circumvent the ramifications and fall-out from Selva Kumar's case. [74] Thus Clause 40.3 of the PWD Forms 203 & 203A reads as follows: "The Liquidated and Ascertained Damages stated in Appendix 1 shall be deemed to be a reasonable amount of the loss which the Government will suffer in the event that the Contractor is in breach of this clause. The Contractor by entering into this Contract agrees to pay the Government the same amount(s) if the same became due without the need of the Government to prove his actual damage or loss." (emphasis added) 38 [75] Clause 22.2 of the PAM Contract 2006 (With Quantities) and (Without Quantities) reads: "Agreed Liquidated Damages amount The Liquidated Damages stated in the Appendix is a genuine pre- estimate of the loss and/or damage which the Employer will suffer in the event that the Contractor is in breach of Clauses 21.0 and 22.0. The parties agree that by entering into the Contract, the Contractor shall pay to the Employer the said amount, if the same became due without the need for the Employer to prove his loss and/or damage unless the contrary is proven by the Contractor." (emphasis added) [76] To the credit of the learned Arbitrator, though he had erroneously stated that he could proceed on the basis that the parties had dispensed with the need of proof when agreeing to the LAD sums, he had nevertheless went on to find the sum of RM6,233,659.55 as an alternative method of assessing damages. In paragraph 484 (page 103) of his Award the Arbitrator states: “484. Similarly, the LAD clause in cl.5.8 and 5.10 formulated by the parties have dispensed with the requirement of proof of actual loss. In the event the LAD clause in cl.5.8 and 5.10 39 is not given effect by the courts, I am prepared to accept the alternative method of assessing damages (method 1) below”. (emphasis added) [77] It needs only be said that the learned Arbitrator has no liberty and certainly no license to decide based on his own preference of the law with respect to how to interpret section 75 with respect to assessment of damages when there is an agreed LAD sum that seems to dispense with the need for proof. He must apply the law as pronounced by the Federal Court whatever his misgivings may be. The law as pronounced by the apex court gives certainty and predictability and surely the result on the same issue cannot be dependent on which Arbitrator is hearing the issue but rather what the law is as propounded and not as preferred by Arbitrators hearing the issue. [78] In other words by applying the 3-tier test in The Chrysalis (supra) as set out by Lord Mustill, this is a case where only one result can be arrived at which is the actual loss suffered by the Claimant assessed at RM6,233,659.55. [79] Reverting to the question of law posed: 40 Given that the arbitrator had assessed the damages suffered by the Defendant to be RM 6,233,659.55 can he as a matter of law award the Defendant a higher sum?; the answer is a resounding and resolute "NO."! Whether the Questions of Law were questions specifically referred to the learned Arbitrator for decision such that it falls within the Absalom's exception and that this Court should not interfere [80] The Defendant submitted that the questions are not amenable to curial intervention, relying on the principle that has come to be known as the Absalom exception that was referred to in the decision of the Federal Court in The Government of India v Cairn Energy India Pty Ltd & Anor [2011] 6 MLJ 441 which in turn cites the judgment of Raja Azlan Shah J (as His Royal Highness then was) in Syarikat Pemborong Pertanian & Perumahan v Federal Land Development Authority [1971] 2 MLJ 210 as follows: “[29] This court in Intelek Timur Sdn Bhd v Future Heritage Sdn Bhd [2004] 1 CLJ 743 upheld the distinction that was made in Sharikat Pemborong in the following terms — 'As to the determination of whether the award has been improperly procured, this must depend on the issues or the questions that have been 41 referred to the arbitrator. It is from these issues or questions that the arbitrator has to make findings of fact on the evidence adduced before him and more often than not, questions of law arise from his findings of fact. It is under these circumstances that Raja Azlan Shah J in Sharikat Pemborong sounded a warning that reads as follows — ‘It is essential to keep the distinction between a case where a dispute is referred to an arbitrator in the decision of which a question of law becomes material, from the case in which a specific question of law has been referred to him. The wealth of authorities make a clear distinction between the two classes of cases and they decide that in the former case the Court can interfere if and when any error appears on the face of the award but in the latter case no such interference is possible upon the ground that the decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one’. [30] With respect we are not persuaded that we should depart from the long line of authorities holding such a distinction. Thus, where a specific matter is referred to arbitration for consideration, it ought to be respected in that ‘no such interference is possible upon the ground that the decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one’. However, if the matter is a general reference, 42 interference may be possible ‘if and when any error appears on the face of the award’ (see Sharikat Pemborong Pertanian & Perumahan v Federal Land Development Authority [1971] 2 MLJ 210. (See also King v Duveen [1913] 2 KB 32, Absalom Ltd v Great Western (London) Garden Village Society, Ltd [1933] AC 592). [81] In Sharikat Pemborong Pertanian & Perumahan v Federal Land Development Authority (supra), Raja Azlan Shah J. (as His Royal Highness then was) said at pages 210-211 as follows: "The key question before the arbitrator was whether the plaintiffs were justified in abandoning the contract before completion. In order to decide this question the arbitrator had to consider from the evidence before him whether the 5 specific allegations enumerated above had been proved. Those were findings of fact. From those findings of fact a question of law became material. The present case bears no resemblance to the case where a specific question of law is referred to the arbitrator. It is essential to keep the distinction between a case where a dispute is referred to an arbitrator in the decision of which a question of law becomes material from the case in which a specific question of law has been referred to him. The wealth 43 of authorities make a clear distinction between these two classes of cases and they decide that in the former case the court can interfere if and when any error appears on the face of the award but in the latter case no such interference is possible upon the ground that the decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one. Instances of the former are afforded by Absalom Ltd v Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd [1933] AC 592, British Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Railways Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673 Hodgkinson v Fernie 3 CB (NS) 189; 140 ER 712, and Attorney- General for Manitoba v Kelly and others [1922] 1 AC 268 281 PC. Government of Kelantan v Duff Development Co Ltd [1923] AC 395 411, and In re King and Duveen [1913] 2 KB 32 are instances of the latter. In the present case I have on consideration come on the conclusion that no question of law was referred. What was submitted to the arbitrator was a question of law which incidentally, and indeed necessarily, arose in applying ascertained facts. The reference involved both composite questions of law and fact. The court can therefore review the 44 award if and when there is error apparent on the face of the award.” (emphasis added). [82] The Court of Appeal in Chain Cycle Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 MLJ 681 affirmed at page 699 that: “[32] ... the Absalom exception was still necessary and relevant even in a s. 42 of the Arbitration Act scenario as well. This was so in order that the “reference on question of law” under that provision was not turned into a wholesale “appeal” against the arbitral tribunal’s decision or ruling. The court had to guard against the proceedings brought to court related to arbitrations; especially post-award, were not in substance and effect on appeal or a re- hearing, or like here, providing an opportunity for regurgitation of the competing arguments on that specific issue of law that had by agreement of the parties been chosen and referred to the arbitral tribunal for determination conclusively”. [83] The Defendant submitted that the above questions now posed were in fact the very same issues that were before the Arbitrator for his decision as can be seen paragraph 109(2) of the Award. It was further argued that whether the Arbitrator arrived at a correct or erroneous interpretation on this issue is not amenable to curial intervention and as such this Court must decline to intervene. 45 [84] I have scrutinized paragraph 109(2) of the Award. It reads as follows: "THE ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 108 AS A RESULT OF THE EVENTS, THE ISSUES WHICH ARISE ARE: (1) ... (2) WHETHER THE CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO LIQUIDATED AND ASCERTAINED DAMAGES (LAD)? Sub-issues: (a) Is the Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD) provision enforceable?" [85] As can be seen, the questions of law posed in this reference is different from the one that was stated as issues for the Arbitrator to decide which is whether the Claimant was entitled to LAD. It was a question that arose from the issue that the parties wanted the Arbitrator to decide. In determining whether LAD was payable and if so how much, the Arbitrator had to decide on whether the LAD provision was enforceable. 46 [86] The LAD provision was of course enforceable if the termination was properly done as it was held to be. The question posed was not what was posed here which is: Given that the arbitrator had assessed the damages suffered by the Defendant to be RM6,233,659.55 can he as a matter of law award the Defendant a higher sum? [87] I must say that it was more a question that arose for decision in the course of the Arbitrator deciding on the broader issue of whether the claimant was entitled to LAD. I am inclined to this view after giving careful consideration to the following as highlighted by the Plaintiff in its submission as follows: (a) It is only at paragraph 2.2.5 of the Points of Claim that the LAD clauses are referred to, and even then it sets out the clause verbatim. (b) The Defence does not specifically raise a question of law pertaining to the validity of the LAD clause. (c) The issues that the Arbitrator had to decide were essentially whether there was a breach of contract, and if so the quantum of compensation. 47 (d) It is in that context that the discussion on the validity of the LAD clause in the context of Selva Kumar took place in the submissions made to the Arbitrator. [88] To sustain the point that a specific question on the validity of the LAD clauses were not referred to the Arbitrator, learned counsel for the Plaintiff referred to the following paragraphs in the Final Award dated 7.4.2016 where it could be seen that it was the Arbitrator himself who had requested for submissions on this point at paragraphs 35-37 of the Award as follows: “Further Submissions 35. On 9/1/15, I requested the Respondent’s counsel to provide a further submission on its position together with authorities, whether s.75 of the Contracts Act 1950 may be contracted out, in response to para 10.2.2 of the Claimant’s Written Submission. 36. After the authorities were submitted by the Respondent’s counsel on 28/1/15, in support of the Respondent’s submissions in reply, I wrote to the Claimants counsel on 28/7/15 for its views. 37. The Claimant submitted its clarification together with a bundle of authorities on 27/2/15.” 48 [89] In the Award at paragraphs 89-95 at page 025 the dispute extant between the parties was described as follows: “THE DISPUTES 89. … According to the Amended Points of Claim dated 16/8/11, the following reliefs are claimed: 90. A declaration that the employment of the Respondent has been determined on 2/6/08. 91. A finding that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of RM11,445,000.00 as Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD) for failure to complete a Section of the Works from 2/7/05 to 2/8/07 at RM15,000.00 per day. 92. A finding that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of RM9,950,000.00 as Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD) for failure to complete the Main Building Works from 2/7/06 to 2/8/07 at RM25,000.00. This claim is for RM25,000.00 and not RM40,000.00 per day because the delay is concurrent with the delay of the completion of the Section. 93. A finding that the Claimant is entitled to the sum of RM12,160,000.00 as Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD) for failure to complete the Section and Main Building Works from 49 3/8/07 to 2/6/08 (date of determination of the contract) at RM40,000.00 per day. 94. Alternatively, the sum of RM6,233,659.55 as loss and damages for escalated costs required to complete the Works as provided for in cl.53.3 of the contract (V.8, p.3169) (CER-2/11 paras 11.3 to 11.7). This claim is the difference between the original anticipated cost to complete the project and the total cost to complete the project as of November 2010 (excluding the 15% turnkey factor). 95. Alternatively, general damages in the form of monetary compensation for delayed receipt of 8% per annum development profit on a development profit of RM67,518,522.00, which is RM14,798.58 per day from 2/6/08 to the date of the Final Award (CER-1/22 para 10.00).” [90] The following paragraphs of the Award are also relevant to show that there was no specific questions of law referred to the Arbitrator but rather that the questions have arisen for determination in the course of the submission on whether the Claimant was entitled to the LAD claim. 50 “The gist of the Respondent’s submission 111. The Respondent’s position is pressed on five (5) fronts. In its written submissions, counsel contends: (v) LAD is not proven and is unlawful” ... Introduction 116. There was a thorough response and a myriad of issues raised by the Respondent. Counsel identified several defences why Liquidated and Ascertained Damages (LAD) cannot be imposed, which can be categorised as follows: (i) is the LAD proven?” ... THE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS The Respondent 361. The Counsel’s argument that LAD is not payable is pressed on 2 fronts: (a) Counsel alleges the Claimant is not entitled to LAD as it failed to prove actual damages as Section 75 of the 51 Contracts Act 1950 cannot be contracted out and cites Selva Kumar a/l Murugiah v Thiagarajah a/l Retnasamy [1995] 1 MLJ 817.” [91] I am persuaded that there was no specific question in the validity of the LAD clauses that were referred to the Arbitrator with respect to dispensing with proof of the agreed LAD sum in the relevant clauses. It was more a case where the question of construction of the LAD clauses arise as being material in the decision of the matter which has been referred to Arbitration. [92] Such was the case in Absalom v GW Garden Village [1933] AC 592 pages 610-612, where the dicta of Lord Russell in the House of Lords case is relevant and reproduced below: . "... This is a question of some difficulty, as indeed it was in the Kelantan case [1923] A.C. 395. In that case Lord Cave seems to have thought that a specific question of law had been submitted. Lord Trevethin thought not. Lord Parmoor thought it unnecessary to decide that point. In the present case I have on consideration come to the conclusion that no specific question of law was referred. The primary quarrel between the parties was whether, if the value of work executed and materials on site up to and including March 11, 1929, had been truly assessed, the net value 52 available for certification on that date was in excess of (as the contractor alleged) or less than (as the employer contended) the amount which had actually been certified up to and including that date - namely, 9434l. Those were the disputes which were the foundation of the suspension of work on the one hand and the service of the notice on the other. Those were the disputes "in regard to the issue of certificates and the validity of the notice" which were in general terms submitted to the arbitrator. No specific question of construction or of law was submitted. The parties had, however, been ordered to deliver pleadings, and by their statement of claim the contractor had claimed that the arbitrator should under his powers revise the last certificate issued so as to include therein the excess net value which they had alleged and which the arbitrator has found (though for a reduced amount) to have existed on March 11, 1929. It is at this point that the question of the construction of condition 30 arose as a question of law, not specifically submitted, but material in the decision of the matters which had been submitted. This question of law the arbitrator has decided; but if upon the face of the award he has decided it wrongly his decision is in my opinion open to review by the Court. 53 Is his decision erroneous? In my opinion it is. He has construed condition 30 as though the reference therein to actual work to the value of 1000. In some way affected or qualified the contractor's right to receive payment of the full 90 per cent. of the value of the work executed and materials actually on the site on the relevant date - namely, March 11, 1929. In my opinion this is wrong. The words "when in the opinion of the architect actual work to the value of 1000, has been executed in accordance with the contract" merely refer to and define the point of time before which no certificate can be given. After that point of time has arrived, if and when a certificate is given in regard to any particular date, the contractor is entitled to receive a certificate covering the true value of the work executed in accordance with the contract on the building and materials actually on the site for use on the works up to and including that date. In certificates subsequent to the first certificate, the value of work executed will only be the value of work executed since the date in reference to which the last preceding certificate was given. The result is that the arbitrator has misconstrued condition 30 and has thereby erred in law. He should have revised the certificate which was given in relation to March 11, 1929, in such a way as to 54 entitle the contractor to payment thereunder of an additional sum of 793l. 17s. 10d. From this it would follow that paras. 3, 4 and 5 could no longer stand. There still remains the question whether this error of law is apparent on the face of the award. I think it is. The award recites the contract and refers in terms to the provisions of condition 30. Condition 30 accordingly is incorporated into and forms part of the award just as if the arbitrator had set it out verbatim and had then proceeded to state the construction which he placed upon it. The Court can look at it just as it looked at the answers of the Divisional Court in the British Westinghouse Co.'s case [1912] A.C. 673, at the contract in Landauer v. Asser [1905] 2 KB 184 and at the pleadings in the Kelantan case [1923] AC 395. In my opinion this appeal should succeed and an order should be made sending the award back to the arbitrator for him to reconsider and amend so as to bring it into consonance with the true construction of condition 30. The respondents should pay the costs of the appellants of this appeal and of the proceedings in the Courts below." (emphasis added) [93] Even if a specific question of law was referred to an arbitrator, his finding could still be set aside if he had proceeded on principles on 55 construction not countenanced by the law. The position was succinctly set out by Barakbah SCJ in Ganda Edible Oils Sdn Bhd v Transgrain BV [1988] 1 MLJ 428: “If a specific question of law is submitted to the arbitrator for his decision and he decides it, the fact that the decision is erroneous does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit its being set aside; and where the question referred for arbitration is a question of construction, which is, generally speaking, a question of law, the arbitrator’s decision cannot be set aside only because the court would itself have come to a different conclusion; but if it appears on the face of the award that the arbitrator has proceeded illegally, as, for instance, by deciding on evidence which was not admissible, or on principles of construction which the law does not countenance, there is error in law which may be ground for setting aside the award.” (emphasis added) [94] Granted the above case was decided under the old regime but it appears to be consistent with section 42 Arbitration Act 2005 where the Court is entitled to vary or set aside an Award. 56 Pronouncement [95] The Court, in a reference on questions of law, may under section 42(b) vary the award or under section 42(d) set aside the award, in whole or in part. [96] For the reasons given above, I had therefore varied the Award as follows: That paragraph 954 of the Award dated 9.3.2016 and paragraph 5 of the corrective Award dated 4.5.2016 be set aside and the entitlement for payment as set out therein be set aside and it was further ordered that the Claimant/Defendant shall pay the Respondent/Plaintiff the sum of RM28,220.284.44 as set out in the table above instead of the sum awarded of RM1,718,943.99. [97] That paragraph 966, 967 and 968 of the Award dated 9.3.2016 and paragraph 6 of the corrective award dated 4.5.2016 be set aside and it was ordered as follows: a) that the Claimant/Defendant shall pay the Respondent/Plaintiff simple interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the sum of RM28,220,284.44 from 3.6.2008 up to 9.3.2016. 57 (b) that the Claimant/Defendant shall pay the Respondent/Plaintiff simple interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the sum of RM28,220,284.44 from the date of the award until the actual realisation of the said payment by the Claimant/Defendant. [98] I had also ordered the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff costs of RM20,000.00 for this application. Dated: 21 April 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff : Robert Lazar together with Sanjay Mohan and Adam Lee (Messrs Mohanadass Partnership) For the Defendant : Felix Dorairaj (Messrs Dorairaj, Low & Teh) Date of Decision : 8 December 2016

Tika 2.6.0

24-818-07/2015

PLAINTIF 1. YIT SOON ENGINEERING SDN BHD 2. NG SENG HUA 3. LOW YOKE YING 4. YONG CHEE YIN 5. YONG CHEE KEONG 6. YONG CHEE HUANG 7. WONG YAP MOOI 8. YAP TIM FAH 9. YIP FATT @ YAP POI YONG 10 CHOW SAU HING 11 SEOW CHEE KONG DEFENDAN 1. TLS TRADING (M) SDN BHD 2. MUN LIN HO @ MUN KWAN YOW 3. WONG WAI KHUM 4. WONG CHEE CHEONG 5. WONG WAI MUN 6. WONG WAI NGOH 7. LOKE HENG SANG 8. SING LAI MIN 9. MAJLIS PERBANDARAN SUBANG JAYA

21/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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Failed Extraction

BA-24FC-1463-10/2016

PLAINTIF 2 SOUTHEAST ASIA SPECIAL ASSET MANAGEMENT BERHAD CIMB BANK BERHAD (No. Syarikat: 13491) [melalui Perintah Letakhak yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam Saman Pemula No. 24NCC-104-2009 bertarikh 15.1.2010, yang mana kesemua aset-aset, dengan segala hak faedah dan kepentingan yang berterusan di bawah hakmilik CIMB Bank Berhad dipindahmilik dan diletakhak kepada SEASAM Berhad] DEFENDAN SRI RIMBA MENTARI DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD

20/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24FC-1463-10/2016 Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 256 dan 257 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965. DAN Dalam perkara mengenai Gadaian Perserahan No. 25086/2009 ke atas tanah yang dipegang di bawah Geran No: 34366/M1-B/4/47, Lot No: 18262 Bangunan No:M1-B Tingkat No.4, Petak No:47 yang terletak di Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan. DAN Dalam perkara Aturan 83 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012. ANTARA 2 SOUTHEAST ASIA SPECIAL ASSET MANAGEMENT BERHAD CIMB BANK BERHAD … PLAINTIF (No. Syarikat: 13491) [melalui Perintah Letakhak yang diberikan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam Saman Pemula No. 24NCC-104-2009 bertarikh 15.1.2010, yang mana kesemua aset-aset, dengan segala hak faedah dan kepentingan yang berterusan di bawah hakmilik CIMB Bank Berhad dipindahmilik dan diletakhak kepada SEASAM Berhad] DAN SRI RIMBA MENTARI DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1- Permohonan Untuk Perintah Jualan) A. PENGENALAN [1] Plaintif (CIMB Bank) telah memfailkan Saman Pemula (Kandungan 1) memohon kepada Mahkamah ini untuk satu perintah jualan melalui lelongan awam ke atas hartanah Defendan (Sri Rimba Mentari Development Sdn Bhd) yang telah dicagarkan kepada Plaintif. 3 [2] Namun, pada 16.1.2017, Plaintif telah memfailkan satu permohonan iaitu Kandungan 8, memohon kebenaran daripada Mahkamah ini untuk meminda Kandungan 1 bagi maksud meminda nama Plaintif kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad. Pindaan nama Plaintif yang dipohon adalah selaras dengan suatu Perintah Perletakanhak yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dalam Saman Pemula No. 24NCC-104-2009 bertarikh 15.1.2010, yang mana kesemua aset- aset, dengan segala hak faedah dan kepentingan yang berterusan di bawah hakmilik CIMB Bank Berhad dipindahmilik dan diletakhak kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad (SEASAM Berhad). [3] Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 8 pada 17.4.2017. [4] Kandungan 1 Plaintif ini telah disokong oleh afidavit-afidavit diikrarkan oleh Ahmad Kamal Bin Kadir pada 18.10.2016 (Afidavit Sokongan – Kandungan 2) dan 15.12.2016 (Afidavit Jawapan – Kandungan 4). Ahmad Kamal Bin Kadir adalah merupakan Naib Presiden Corporate & Commercial Recovery Plaintif. 4 B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [5] Melalui surat tawaran bertarikh 11.4.1997 (Surat Tawaran) yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif kepada Defendan bersama Perjanjian Kemudahan bertarikh 5.9.1997 (Perjanjian Kemudahan), Plaintif telah memberi dan Defendan telah bersetuju menerima pelbagai kemudahan perbankan termasuk antara lain; kemudahan overderaf bagi jumlah RM100,000.00 dan kemudahan terma berjumlah RM RM120,000.00 dan jumlah keseluruhan kemudahan yang diterima oleh Defendan daripada Plaintif adalah berjumlah RM220,000.00 (kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan tersebut). [6] Bagi menjamin kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan tersebut, Defendan yang merupakan tuanpunya berdaftar tanah yang dipegang di Geran No: 34366/M1-B/4/47, Lot No: 18262 Bangunan No:M1-B Tingkat No.4, Petak No:47 yang terletak di Mukim Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (hartanah tersebut) telah bersetuju menggadaikan hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif melalui Gadaian Perserahan No. 25086/2009 yang didaftarkan pada 18.11.2009. [7] Defendan kemudiannya telah memungkiri syarat-syarat yang terkandung di dalam terma-terma perjanjian kemudahan- 5 kemudahan perbankan tersebut apabila gagal membuat pembayaran ansuran yang ditetapkan. [8] Di atas kemungkiran berterusan Defendan tersebut, pada 2.3.2015 Plaintif melalui peguamcaranya Tetuan Shaikh David Raj telah menyampaikan sesalinan Notis Kemungkiran Terhadap Gadaian melalui Notis Borang 16D di bawah seksyen 254 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (KTN) bertarikh 2.3.2015 untuk Defendan meremedikan kemungkiran tersebut dalam tempoh masa empat belas (14) hari dari tarikh penyampaian Notis Borang 16D tersebut diterima bagi menuntut pembayaran balik keseluruhan jumlah wang yang terhutang bagi kemudahan overderaf dan kemudahan terma termasuk faedah yang patut dibayar dan terhutang oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif. [9] Defendan telah gagal/mungkir untuk mematuhi Notis Borang 16D tersebut dan sehingga kini masih gagal meremedi kemungkirannya. [10] Setakat tarikh 20.4.2017, jumlah yang terhutang oleh Defendan kepada Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 6 Bagi Kemudahan Overdraft - Jumlah terhutang setakat 20.4.2017 adalah RM646,107.80. Bagi Kemudahan Terma - Jumlah terhutang setakat 20.4.2017 adalah RM390,446.53. C. KEDUDUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG PROSIDING HALANG TEBUS Kausa yang bertentangan [11] Undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa di dalam sesuatu prosiding halang tebus, bagi penguatkuasaan hak atau remedi statutori yang ada kepada pemegang gadaian (chargee), Mahkamah akan hanya mengeluarkan satu perintah menjual sesuatu hartanah yang digadai oleh pemberi gadaian (chargor) melalui lelongan awam sekiranya mahkamah berpuas hati bahawa tidak wujud suatu kausa yang bertentangan. [12] Seksyen 256 (3) Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) telah memperuntukkan seperti berikut: “(3) On any such application, the Court shall order the sale of the land or lease to which the charge relates unless it is satisfied of the existence of cause to the contrary”. 7 [13] Di dalam pentakrifan frasa kausa yang bertentangan, Mahkamah ingin merujuk kepada kes Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Berhad [1997] 1 MLJ 77. Di dalam kes Low Lee Lian ini, di muka surat 82 Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menerangkan tiga kategori kes yang mewujudkan kausa yang bertentangan menurut seksyen 256(3) KTN seperti berikut: “In our judgment, 'cause to the contrary' within s 256(3) may be established only in three categories of cases. First, it may be taken as settled that a chargor who is able to bring his case within any of the exceptions to the indefeasibility doctrine housed in s 340 of the Code establishes cause to the contrary. That section provides as follows: 340(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of this section, be indefeasible. (2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible – (a) in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body, or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or (b) where registration was obtained by forgery, or by means of an insufficient or void instrument; or (c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written law. (3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason of any of the circumstances specified in sub-s (2) – 8 (a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to whom it may subsequently be transferred; and (b) any interest subsequently granted thereout shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being vested: Provided that nothing in this subsection shall affect any title or interest acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser. (4) Nothing in this section shall prejudice or prevent – (a) the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or (b) the determination of any title or interest by operation of law. In other words, a chargor who is able to demonstrate that the charge, the enforcement of which is sought, is defeasible upon one or more of the grounds specified under sub-ss (2) and (4)(b) above will be held to have established cause to the contrary under s 256(3). The decision of Smith J in Subchent Kaur v Chai Sau Kian [1958] MLJ 32, of the former Federal Court inPhuman Singh v Kho Kwang Choon [1965] 2 MLJ 189, of Raja Azlan Shah J (as he then was) in Overseas Union Finance Ltd v Lim Joo Chong [1971] 2 MLJ 124 and that of Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in United Malayan Banking Corp Bhd v Syarikat Perumahan Luas Sdn Bhd (No 2) [1988] 3 MLJ 352 (affirmed on appeal) sufficiently illustrate the proposition now under discussion. Secondly, a chargor may show cause to the contrary within s 256(3) of the Code by demonstrating that the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale. For example, failure on the part of the chargee to prove the making of a demand or service http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.8728547800246143&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T26657263987&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23sel1%251958%25page%2532%25year%251958%25 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.05483784016566984&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T26657263987&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23vol%252%25sel1%251965%25page%25189%25year%251965%25sel2%252%25 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.2933549850111363&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T26657263987&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23vol%252%25sel1%251971%25page%25124%25year%251971%25sel2%252%25 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.41983896810888066&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T26657263987&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23vol%253%25sel1%251988%25page%25352%25year%251988%25sel2%253%25 9 upon the chargor of a notice in Form 16D would constitute cause to the contrary. So too, where the notice demands sums not lawfully due from the chargee. See Co-operative Central Bank Ltd v Meng Kuang Properties Bhd [1991] 2 MLJ 283. However, in such a case, it would be open to the chargee to subsequently serve a notice or a proper notice (as the case may be) before commencing proceedings afresh as the cause shown to the contrary does not in substance affect the chargee's right to apply for an order for sale. Thirdly, a chargor may defeat an application for an order for sale by demonstrating that its grant would be contrary to some rule of law or equity. This principle finds its origins in the judgment of Aitken J in Murugappa Chettiar v Letchumanan Chettiar [1939] MLJ 296 at p 298 where he said: I agree that equitable principles should not be invoked too freely for the purpose of construing our Land Code, but surely a chargor, who shows that there would be no need to sell his land if the chargee paid up in full what is due from himself in another capacity, has shown good and sufficient cause why the land should not be sold. Section 149 of the Land Code obviously contemplates that there may be cases in which charged land should not be sold, even though there has been a default in payment of the principal sum or interest thereon secured by the charge; and it seems to me that a chargor may 'shew cause' either in law or equity against an application for an order for sale, and that the courts should refuse to make an order in every case where it would be unjust to do so. By 'unjust' I mean contrary to those rules of the common law and equity which are in force in the Federated Malay States. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) [14] Di dalam mencapai pendekatan terhad dengan memberikan tiga kategori kausa yang bertentangan ini, Mahkamah Persekutuan http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.9641194943869744&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T26657263987&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23vol%252%25sel1%251991%25page%25283%25year%251991%25sel2%252%25 http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.3004786877978387&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T26657263987&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23sel1%251939%25page%25296%25year%251939%25tpage%25298%25 10 telah memberikan alasan-alasannya dengan berkata di muka surat 87 begini: “As earlier observed, unless a chargor can bring himself within one of the three categories of cases set out earlier in this judgment, no cause to the contrary would be shown and the court will be obliged to make an order for sale. It would not be sufficient, as was done in the instant case, to allege mere breaches by the chargee of the loan agreement between the chargee and the borrower or even of the terms of the annexure to the charge in order to resist an application under Section 256(3) of the Code. An allegation that the chargee acted in breach of contract, while it may give rise to an independent action in personam, is insufficient per se to defeat the ad rem rights of a chargee under his registered charge to an order for sale. We are conscious that the approach we have adopted results in a very narrow and restrictive interpretation of s 256(3) of the code. But there are good reasons of policy for such an interpretation. It must not be forgotten that in the ordinary way, banks and other financial institutions loan moneys deposited with them by their customers to a borrower on the faith of the security of a charge created over the landed property of the borrower, or as here, of a third party. In the event of a default by the borrower, the lending institution normally looks to early recovery of all or a substantial part of the money due to them from a sale of a security. If the courts of this country interpret the phrase ‘cause to the contrary’ appearing in s 256(3) of the Code liberally, then, institutional lenders 11 would loose confidence in their right to realize their security through an order for sale. Financial institutions would then become reluctant to lend money to bonafide entrepreneurs. Commerce would come to a standstill and the development of land and industries in this country which are largely dependent upon loans from banks would cease. No judgment of this court will be designed to produce such a consequence.” D. TENTANGAN DEFENDAN [15] Permohonan Plaintif ini telah ditentang oleh Defendan. Di dalam menentang permohonan Plaintif ini, Defendan telah memfailkan Afidavit Jawapan (Kandungan 3) dan Afidavit Lanjutan (Kandungan 5) yang diikrarkan oleh Abu Zahar bin Abu Bakar yang masing-masing diikrarkan pada 21.11.2016 dan 27.12.2016. Abu Zahar bin Abu Bakar adalah seorang pengarah Defendan. [16] Defendan di dalam percubaannya untuk membuktikan wujudnya kausa yang bertentangan, di dalam afidavit-afidavitnya telah menimbulkan alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan tidak tahu terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian kerana Defendan tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan draf gadaian ataupun dokumen gadaian. Apabila 12 Defendan telah tidak dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian, Defendan tidak boleh dikatakan telah memungkiri terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. ii. Penyampaian Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan adalah tidak sah dan defektif kerana Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D ke alamat yang bukan lagi diduduki oleh Defendan. iii. Defendan pada 2.11.2006 telah memfailkan tindakan writ saman terhadap Plaintif melalui Guaman Sivil S1-22- 1092-2006 untuk membantah penjualan hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam yang dijadualkan pada 6.11.2006 di mana di dalam tindakan tersebut Mahkamah telah mengeluarkan perintah injunksi menghalang Plaintif untuk meneruskan jualan hartanah tersebut. permohonan Plaintif ini adalah satu penghinaan Mahkamah. iii. Tindakan Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa menurut seksyen 21(2) Akta Had Masa 1953. 13 iv. Tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh prinsip / doktrin res judicata. v. Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan prosiding halang tebus ini terhadap Defendan. Alasan i: Defendan tidak tahu terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian kerana Defendan tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan draf gadaian ataupun dokumen gadaian. Apabila Defendan telah tidak dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian, Defendan tidak boleh dikatakan telah memungkiri terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. [17] Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian atau draf gadaian. Oleh kerana tidak pernah dibekalkan dengan draf ataupun dokumen gadaian, maka Defendan juga telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan tidak tahu mengenai terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. Di dalam keadaan begini, adalah menjadi pengataan Defendan bahawa Defendan tidak boleh dikatakan telah memungkiri terma- terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian. 14 [18] Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa alasan yang ditimbulkan oleh Defendan ini adalah satu alasan yang tidak berasas dan tidak bermerit langsung. [19] Adalah tidak dipertikaikan bahawa berdasarkan Eksibit “AZ-1” yang terkandung di Afidavit Jawapan Abu Zahar bin Abu Bakar (Kandungan 3), Defendan telah memberikan suatu surat wakil kuasa kepada Plaintif melalui Surat Penyerahanhak bertarikh 5-9- 1997 (“Surat Penyerahanhak”) di mana pihak Defendan melantik Plaintif dan/atau mana-mana pegawainya sebagai wakil pihak Defendan yang antara lain bagi membenarkan untuk pengwujudan dan pendaftaran gadaian ke atas hartanah tersebut. [20] Adalah tidak dinafikan oleh Defendan bahawa pada 5.9.1997 Defendan dan Plaintif telah menandatangani suatu Deed of Assignment (Ikatan Penyerahanhak) yang mana Defendan sebagai Penyerah hak (Assignor) dan Plaintif adalah Penerima / Pemegang serah hak (Assignee). [21] Artikel 2, Artikel 3 dan Artikel 4 Ikatan Penyerahanhak bertarikh 5.9.1997 telah jelas memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 15 ARTICLE II RECITALS 2.01 FACILITY The Assignee has granted the Facility to the Assignor for the Purpose. 2.02 TITLE TO THE PROPERTY Individual issue document of title or subsidiary title to the Property has not been issued as yet. 2.03 TERM OF FACILITY AGREEMENT It is term of the Facility Agreement, inter-alia, that prior to issue of the document of title or subsidiary title to the Property and the registration of the Charge in respect in respect of the Property in favour of the Assignee as security for the Indebtedness, the Indebtness shall be secured by this Assignment. ARTICLE III ASSIGNMENT 3.01 ASSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT In consideration of the Facility to be granted and to continue to grant to the Assignor upon the terms and conditions contained in the Facility Agreement, the Assignor as beneficial owner hereby absolutely all of the Assignor’s rights and title to and interest whatsoever in the property including all rights and title to and interest whatsoever of the Assignor in the Pricipal Agreement and/ or the Sale and Purchase Agreement to the Assignee as security for the Indebtness. 3.02 TITLE TO THE PROPERTY It is expressly agreed, however, that notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the Assignor shall remain liable under the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement to observe and perform all of the conditions and obligations therein provided to be observed and performed by him, and the Assignee shall have no obligation or liability under the Principal Agreement and/ or the Sale Purchase Agreement by reason of or arising out of this Assignment, nor shall the Assignee be required or obligated in any manner to observe or perform any of the conditions or obligations of the Assignor under or pursuant to the Principal 16 Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement (except to make progressive releases out of the proceeds of the Facility to the Developer/Vendor under the terms and conditions of the Facility Agreement) or to present or file any claim, or to take any other action to enforce the terms of the Sale and Purchase Agreement. ARTICLE IV COVENANTS 4.01 ASSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT The Assignor hereby convenants with the Assignee that he: (a) Will duly observe and perform all of the conditions and obligations imposed upon him under the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement. (b) Will deliver the individual issue document of title or subsidiary title to the Property immediately upon its issue; (c) Will not without the prior written consent of the Assignee in writing: (i) Terminate or agree to terminate the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement; or (ii) Agree to any variation of the terms of the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement; or (iii) Assign or transfer or sell or create or suffer to be created any assignment of his right and title to and interest whatsoever in the Property including all his rights and interest under the Principal Agreement and/or the Sale and Purchase Agreement. (d) Will upon the issuance of the individual issue document of title to the Property, immediatelyexecute and deliver to the Assignee: (i) The Memorandum of Transfer, as transferee to the Property; and (ii) The Charge and the annexture thereto, as Chargor in favour of the Assignee, as Chargee upon such terms and conditions as are provided in the Facility Agreement or as the Assignee may then at its absolute discretion determine; 17 (e) To be responsible for and to pay to the Government or any local or other authority all charges due and outgoings whatsoever whether by way of fines, premia, assessment rates, quit rents, stamp duty, registration fees or any other charges fees or impositions issue of any separate document of title of any separate document of title to the Property; (f) To indemnify the Assignee against all claims, demands, actions, fines, penalties and the legal proceedings whatsoever made against or charged or imposed upon the Assignee by the Government or local or other authority or any person or body or corporation whatsoever arising from or in connection with any act or omission done or omitted to be done by any person whatsoever in respect of or pertaining to the property; and (g) Will executed and delivered such further documents and do such other acts and thing as the Assignee may from time to time request. [22] Berdasarkan peruntukan-peruntukan Ikatan Penyerahanhak yang ditandatangani antara Plaintif & Defendan, oleh Defendan tidak boleh mengatakan bahawa mereka tidak tahu akan terma-terma dan syarat-syarat yang termaktub di dalam gadaian yang didaftarkan hanya semata-mata kononnya telah tidak dibekalkan dengan dokumen gadaian atau drafnya. Walhal Defendan sememangnya mempunyai pengetahuan penuh akan gadaian yang didaftarkan dan telahpun memberikan kuasa mutlak kepada Plaintif untuk pendaftaran gadaian ke atas hartanah kepunyaan Defendan tersebut. Alasan Defendan bahawa memandangkan dokumen gadaian telah tidak dibekalkan kepadanya maka 18 Defendan tidak tahu terma-terma dan syarat-syarat gadaian adalah satu “lame excuse” yang merupakan rekaan semata-mata yang sengaja diada-adakan. Alasan ii: Penyampaian Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan adalah tidak sah dan defektif kerana Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D ke alamat yang bukan lagi diduduki oleh Defendan. [23] Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa penyampaian Notis Borang 16D adalah tidak sah dan defektif kerana Defendan tidak pernah menerima sesalinan Notis Borang 16D kerana Notis Borang 16D telah dihantar oleh Plaintif ke alamat Defendan di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. [24] Defendan telah cuba mengatakan bahawa alamat Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur (Menara City One) adalah merupakan pejabat berdaftar bagi Ming Consultants (M) iaitu alamat setiausaha syarikat Defendan. Defendan di dalam percubaan menafikan penerimaan Notis Borang 16D telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan telah berpindah ke alamat lain pada tahun 2007 iaitu Lot 02-AD, Level 19 5. Menara Pandan B, Pesiaran MPAJ, Pandan Indah, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. [25] Menurut Defendan kononnya pada masa penyerahan Notis Borang 16D dibuat penyampai pada tarikh 18.03.2015, ketika itu (18.03.2015), pejabat berdaftar Defendan tidak lagi di Menara City One tetapi adalah di alamat Lot 02-AD, Level 5, Menara Pandan B, Persiaran MPAJ, Pandan Indah, 55100 Kuala Lumpur (“Pejabat Berdaftar No. 2 tersebut”) semenjak tahun 2007 (lebih kurang 9 tahun). [26] Untuk pengataan ini, Defendan telah merujuk kepada Carian Rasmi SSM bertarikh 9.11.2016 yang telah mengesahkan bahawa pada 05.09.2007 pejabat berdaftar Defendan telah bertukar. Defendan telah juga mendakwa bahawa Plaintif mempunyai pengetahuan penuh bahawa alamat perniagaan Defendan juga telah bertukar ke Suite No. 4.07, Tingkat 4, Plaza Prima, Batu 4 1/2, Jalan Kelang Lama, 58200 Kuala Lumpur (“Alamat Perniagaan No. 2 tersebut”).:- [27] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Surat Akuan penyampaian oleh Karunakaran A/L Thuraikannoo (Eksibit “AKK-6”, Kandungan 2) 20 yang telah ditugaskan oleh Tetuan Shaikh David Raj untuk menyampaikan Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan yang telah menyatakan seperti berikut: SURAT AKUAN “Saya, KARUNAKARAN A/L THURAIKANNOO (No. K/P: 640321-08-5857), seorang warga Malaysia yang cukup umur yang beralamat di No. 1 Blok R, Jalan 25/28, Taman Sri Muda, Shah Alam, 40400 Selangor Darul Ehsan dan seorang Kerani bagi Tetuan Shaikh David Raj, M-2-19 Plaza Damas, 60 Jalan Sri Hartamas 1, Sri Hartamas, 50480 Kuala Lumpur dengan sesungguhnya dan sebenarnya mengaku seperti berikut: 1. Seperti diarah oleh Tetuan Shaikh David Raj, Peguamcara bagi CIMB Bank Berhad beralamat di Corporate & Commercial Recovery, Tingkat 6, Menara Bumiputra Commerce, No. 11 Jalan Raja Laut, 50350 Kuala Lumpur, saya telah pada 18.3.2015 menyampaikan “Notis Kemungkiran Mengenai Suatu Gadaian” bertarikh 2.3.2015 ke atas Penggadai, SRI RIMBA MENTARI DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD dengan cara Kediri berserta dengan surat pendua Tetuan Shaikh David Raj bertarikh 2.3.2015 di alamat berdaftar iaitu Level 5, Menara City One, No. 3 Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur dan juga di alamat perniagaan di Suite 6.36-6.37, 6th Floor, Plaza Imbi, No. 28 Jalan Imbi, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. 2. Sesalinan surat bertarikh 2.3.2015 dengan Notis Kemungkiran Mengenai Suatu Gadaian bertarikh 2.3.2015, dilampirkan disini dan ditanda sebagai eksibit “A”. 21 [28] Di dalam kes ini Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D secara Kediri ke dua-dua alamat pejabat berdaftar dan alamat tempat perniagaan Defendan iaitu di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur dan di Suite 6.36-6.37, 6th Floor, Plaza Imbi, No. 28 Jalan Imbi, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. [29] Menurut Plaintif sebelum penghantaran Notis Borang 16D tersebut pada 18.3.2015, Plaintif telahpun membuat carian rasmi ke atas alamat berdaftar Defendan pada 2.3.2015 di Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia (SSM) dan hasil carian rasmi SSM tersebut telah mendapati bahawa alamat berdaftar Defendan adalah di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. Carian rasmi telah juga dibuat pada 20.9.2016 dan hasil yang sama iaitu alamat berdaftar Defendan adalah di Level 5, Menara City One, No.3, Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur dan alamat perniagaan adalah Suite 6.36-6.37, 6th Floor, Plaza Imbi, No. 28 Jalan Imbi, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. (Sila lihat Eksibit “AKK-1”, Kandungan 4). 22 [30] Di dalam perkara berhubung cara penyampaian dan penyerahan, seksyen 431(1)(d) dan seksyen 431(2) di dalam Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 telah memperuntukkan: “431. Methods of service. (1) Without prejudice to any other method of service, a notice may be served on a person or body for the purposes of this Act- (d) by sending the notice by pre-paid registered post to the person or body at an address for service given in pursuance of any provision of this Act, or, where no such address has been given- (i) at the person's usual or last known abode or place of business; or (ii) at the body's registered office or usual or last known place of business; or (2) A notice served by pre-paid registered post under paragraph (d) of subsection (1) shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter containing the notice would be delivered in the ordinary course of post; and it shall be sufficient proof of service that the letter was [31] Berhubung dengan perkara penyampaian dan penyerahan kertas- kertas kausa kepada Defendan, Mahkamah ini merujuk pertamanya kepada klausa 10.4 dokumen gadaian. Klausa 10.4 memperuntukkan berikut: 23 10.4 In the event of any breach by the Borrower of any of the agreement, convenant, term, stipulation and undertaking herein and on the part of the Borrower to be observed and performed occurring and continuing for a period of not less than fourteen (14) days it shall be lawful for the Bank fourthwith to give notice to Borrower under section 254 of the National Land Code 1965 or Section 148 of the Sabah Land Code (Cap 81) or section 111 of the Sabah Land Ordinance (Cap 68) requiring the Borrower to remedy the said breach within a period of not less than fourteen (14) days and service of such notice shall be effected in the same manner as a notice demanding payment of the balance due as herein provided. [32] Manakala klausa 18.1 dokumen gadaian pula telah memperuntukkan berkenaan penyampaian notis dan proses. “18. SERVICE OF NOTICES AND PROCESS 18.1 Every notice, demand or other communication under this Charge shall be in writing and may dispatched as follows:- (a) if to the Bank, by registered letter sent to its address specified at the head of this Charge; (b) if the borrower it may, at the option of the Bank, be delivered personally or by prepaid letter, and be sent to his address specified in Section 1 of the schedule hereto OR his usual OR last known place of residence”. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini) 24 [33] Di dalam perkara penyampaian Notis Borang 16D, Defendan seterusnya cuba menyatakan bahawa Plaintif di dalam kes ini ada mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan alamat Defendan yang lain. [34] Di dalam kes ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Plaintif telahpun menyampaikan Notis Borang 16D kepada Defendan dengan sempurna di mana Plaintif mempunyai pilihan untuk menyerahkan kertas kausa saman pemula kepada Defendan berpandukan mod penyampaian di dalam dokumen gadaian tersebut yang jelas menyatakan “be sent to his address specified in Section 1 of the schedule hereto OR his usual OR last known place of residence”. [35] Di dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah menghantar Notis Borang 16D ke kedua-dua alamat berdaftar dan alamat perniagaan yang tertera di kedua-dua carian SSM dan alamat-alamat adalah alamat Defendan yang biasa dan alamat Defendan yang terakhir diketahui oleh Plaintif” (OR his usual OR last known place of residence). [36] Di dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada kes Hong Leong Bank Bhd v. HGM Machinery Sdn Bhd (formerly known as 25 Handee Engineering & Consultancy Services Sdn Bhd) & Ors [2013] 9 MLJ 412 yang telah memutuskan antara lain bahawa: “The plaintiff were justified and entitled to issue or send the said notices of demand to the address as stated in the guarantee notwithstanding the said letter of 5 January 1999 stating the purported ‘new address’ of the fifth defendant given that under cl 21 of the said guarantee, the plaintiff were entitled to issue the said notices of demand EITHER to the last known address of the fifth defendant or the address as stated in the said guarantee (see para 150)”. [37] Di dalam kes Bank Pertanian Malaysia Bhd v. Rinta ak Dali (A) Chayar ak Dali (F) & Anor [2014] 9 MLJ 263, Mahkamah telah menggariskan seperti berikut: “From the letters of demand sent to the defendants, the plaintiff was obviously aware of other addresses used by the defendants. Although the plaintiff had served the letters of demand at these other addresses, it did not mean that all cause papers or proceedings must be served on the defendants at all these addresses. There was no requirement 26 and no necessity to include these other addresses in the proceedings and to serve all cause papers and proceedings at all these other addresses”. [38] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa kalaupun Plaintif mempunyai pengetahuan berkenaan alamat Defendan selain daripada yang tercatat di dalam carian SSM, Plaintif adalah tidak bertanggungan atau tidak bertanggungjawab untuk menyerahkan Notis Borang 16D kepada alamat Defendan yang lain selain daripada alamat berdaftar. Apa yang jelas di sini adalah; Notis Borang 16D telahpun diserahkan kepada alamat yang merupakan alamat berdaftar Defendan dan alamat perniagaan yang telah dinyatakan di carian SSM yang merupakan alamat terakhir yang diketahui Plaintif sebelum penyampaian Notis Borang 16D tersebut pada 18.3.2015. [39] Berpandukan kepada kes-kes yang telah diputuskan serta berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Notis Borang 16D telah diserahkan dengan sempurnanya kepada Defendan. 27 Alasan iii: Defendan pada 2.11.2006 telah memfailkan tindakan writ saman terhadap Plaintif melalui Guaman Sivil S1-22- 1092-2006 untuk membantah penjualan hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam yang dijadualkan pada 6.11.2006 di mana di dalam tindakan tersebut Mahkamah telah mengeluarkan perintah injunksi menghalang Plaintif untuk meneruskan jualan hartanah tersebut. Permohonan Plaintif ini adalah satu penghinaan Mahkamah. Tindakan Plaintif dihalang oleh prinsip- prinsip res judicata, waiver dan estoppel. [40] Di dalam perlupusan muktamad guaman sivil yang difailkan Defendan terhadap Plaintif melalui Guaman Sivil S1-22-1092- 2006, Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telahpun mengeluarkan perintahnya pada 9.3.2011. Perintah bertarikh 9.3.2011 tersebut adalah seperti berikut: “(a)Defendan dihalang samada mereka sendiri ataupun melalui pengarah-pengarah atau pengkhidmat-pengkhidmat atau agen- agen-agen atau sesiapa di antara mereka atau sebaliknya dari melupuskan Hartanah Plaintif yang dipegang di bawah Geran 34366/M1-B/4/47, No. Petak 47 dalam Tingkat No. 4, Bangunan 28 No. 41B, Lot 18262, Daerah Petaling, Mukim Sungai Buluh, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan [“Hartanah tersebut”] melainkan pelupusan melalui jualan lelongan selaras dengan perintah jualan di bawah kanun Tanah Negara 1965; (b) Defendan diwajibkan memperolehi Perintah Jualan di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 sekiranya Defendan ingin melupuskan Hartanah tersebut. (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini). [41] Adalah jelas daripada Perintah bertarikh 9.3.2011 bahawa pihak Plaintif adalah diberikan kebenaran untuk melupuskan Hartanah tersebut melalui jualan lelongan selaras dengan suatu Perintah Jualan dibawah Kanun Tanah Negara. [42] Kandungan 1 ini adalah saman pemula yang telah dimulakan oleh Plaintif selaras dengan perintah yang diberikan pada 9.3.2011. [43] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini prinsip-prinsip res judicata, waiver dan estoppel yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan adalah tidak terpakai di dalam kes Plaintif. 29 [44] Plaintif di dalam kes ini telah memulakan prosiding halang tebus terhadap gadaian yang telah didaftarkan bagi pihaknya atas hartanah tersebut. Prinsip undang-undang di dalam suatu prosiding halang tebus adalah jelas dan mantap bahawa di mana hak pihak pemegang untuk gadaian menguatkuasakan hak atau remedinya atas gadaian tersebut adalah mantap dan jitu. (Sila lihat: Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad v Saujana Pertiwi Sdn Bhd [2003] 7 MLRH 243: “The Plaintiff further contended that even though the 3 actions arose from the granting of the same Overdraft facility but each of the actions taken was based on different documents by different parties and concerning different issues. In support of its contention the Plaintiff referred to the case of Co-operative Central Bank Bhd. v. Belaka Suria Sdn. Bhd. [1991] 2 CLJ 453 (Rep); [1991] 3 CLJ 2131; [1991] 3 MLJ 43, where the learned Judge ruled:- "In principle, a chargee has a right to institute an action for recovery of the debt and also a right to assert the power of sale on the incumbered property, the 2 actions are not the same." After having considered this matter carefully, I agreed fully with the contention by the Counsel for the Plaintiff. The decision of the Federal 30 Court case of Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. [1997] 2 CLJ 36; [1977] 1 MLJ 77 which states:- "Now, it is trite that a chargee/creditor may pursue any or all remedies to recover monies lent by him. He may enforce his statutory charge against the chargor by way of proceedings in under S. 256 of the Code. He may sue the principal debtor (who may or may not be the chargor) upon the personal covenant contained in any loan agreement that was entered into between the parties. He may proceed against the surety who has guaranteed the loan. And he may sue all these courses simultaneously, contemporaneously or successively." (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini). Alasan iv: Tindakan Plaintif dihalang oleh had masa menurut seksyen 21(1) dan 21(2) Akta Had Masa 1953. [45] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan bahawa tindakan Plaintif terhadapnya adalah satu tindakan yang lapuk yang dihalang oleh had masa menurut seksyen 21 Akta Had Masa 1953 (AHM 1953). [46] Defendan di dalam kes ini telah cuba menghujahkan bahawa kausa tindakan Plaintif seharusnya dianggap bermula pada 16.3.1998 apabila tindakan in personam dimulakan oleh Plaintif 31 dan/atau pada 21.3.1998 berdasarkan surat-surat tuntutan Mazwan/Plaintif. [47] Benarkah dakwaan Defendan bahawa tindakan Plaintif adalah dihalang oleh tempoh had masa yang diperuntukan di bawah seksyen 21 AHM 1953? [48] Seksyen 21 AHM 1953 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: Section 21. Limitation of actions to recover money secured by a mortgage of charge or to recover proceeds of the sale of land. (1) No action shall be brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge on land or personal property or to enforece such mortgage or other charge on land or personal property or to enforce such mortgage or charge, or to recover proceeds of the sale of land or personal property after the expiration of twelve years from the date when the right to receive the money accrued. (2) No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued. 32 Provided that if, after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, the right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to have accrued until the date on which his possession discontinued. (3) The right to receive any principal sum of money secured by a mortgage or ther charge and the right to foreclose on the property subject to the mortgage or charge shall not be deemed to accrue so long as that property comprises any future interests or any life insurance policy which has not matured or been determined. (4) Nothing in the preceding subsections of this section shall apply to a foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged land but the provisions of this Act relating to actions to recover land shall apply to such an action. (5) No action to recover arrears of interest payable in respect of any sum of money secured by a mortgage or other charge or payable in respect of proceeds of the sale of land, or to recover damages in respect of such arrears shall be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the interest became due. Provided that – (a) Where a prior mortgagee or other incumbrancer has been in possession of the property mortgaged or charged, and an action is 33 brought within one year of the discontinuance of such possession by the subsequent incumbrancer, he may recover by that action all the arrears of interest which fell due during the period of possession by the prior incumbrancer or damages in respect thereof, notwithstanding that the period exceeded six years. (b) Where the property subject to the mortgage or charge comprises any future interest or life insurance policy and it is term of the mortgage or charge that arrears of interest shall be treated as part of the principal sub of money secured by the mortgage or charge, interest shall not be deemed to become due before the right to receive the principal sum of money has accrued or is deemed to have accrued. (6) This section shall not apply to any mortgage or charge of a ship. [49] Berhubung dengan tempoh masa 12 tahun menurut seksyen 21 (2) AHM 1953 ini, molek sekiranya Mahkamah ini merujuk kepada keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Peh Lai Huat v. MBF Finance Bhd [2009] CLJ 69. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Peh Lai Huat ini telah memutuskan antara lain bahawa: “…Similarly, S 21(2) of the Limitation Act which reads:- 34 (2) No foreclosure action in respect of mortgaged personal property shall be brought after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right to foreclose accrued: Provided that if after that date the mortgagee was in possession of the mortgaged property, right to foreclose on the property which was in his possession shall not, for the purposes of this subsection, be deemed to have accrued until the date on which his possession discontinued. Also has no application to this case. That is because the cause of action here, that is to say, the right to exercise the statutory remedy of an Order for Sale did not arise until after the Appellate had failed to remedy the default specified in the Form 16D notice…” [50] Mahkamah ini juga merujuk kepada kes Jigarlal K. Doshi @ Jigarlal A/L Kantilal Doshi v. Resolution Alliance Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 MLJ 61 di mana Mahkamah Rayuan juga telah memutuskan antara lain seperti berikut: “The law is clear that the cause of action by a chargor does not accrue from the date of default of repayment of the loan but instead from the time the chargor fails to remedy the default as specified in the Form 16D Notice”. 35 [51] Di dalam kes di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif melalui peguamcaranya telah mengeluarkan Notis Borang 16D bertarikh 2.3.2015 terhadap Defendan dan Borang 16D tersebut telahpun disampaikan kepada Defendan untuk memberikan notis kepada Defendan supaya meremedikan kemungkirannya terhadap pinjaman-pinjaman tersebut. Defendan telah tidak mematuhi notis tersebut dan gagal meremedikan kemungkirannya. [52] Justeru itu, Plaintif telah memfailkan saman pemulanya di Kandungan 1 pada 18.10.2016. Di dalam hal, adalah jelas di sini bahawa tindakan saman pemula Plaintif adalah tidak dihalang oleh had masa langsung. Alasan v: Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan prosiding halang tebus ini terhadap Defendan. [53] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan bahawa Plaintif tidak mempunyai locus standi untuk memfailkan Saman Pemula kerana letakhak kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad (“SEASAM Berhad”) namun tajuk saman pemula masih lagi atas nama CIMB Bank Berhad. 36 [54] Berhubung perkara ini Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 15.1.2010 jelas menyatakan bahawa semua hak-hak, manfaat-manfaat dan kepentingan-kepentingan CIMB adalah letakhak kepada Southeast Asia Special Asset Management Berhad (“SEASAM Berhad”) termasuk akaun kemudahan-kemudahan perbankan yang telah diberikan kepada Defendan beserta gadaian ke atas hartanah tersebut. Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini telahpun membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda nama Plaintif kepada SEASAM BHD. Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini isu locus standi yang ditimbulkan oleh Defendan adalah suatu isu yang tidak berasas dan tidak mempunyai merit langsung. KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH [55] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa alasan-alasan yang ditimbulkan Defendan di dalam percubaannya untuk membuktikan atau menunjuk sebab atau mewujudkan kausa yang bertentangan bagi menghalang satu perintah penjualan hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam adalah alasan-alasan penafian semata-mata yang tidak langsung termasuk di dalam mana-mana tiga kategori yang telah diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Agung di dalam kes Low Lee Lian. 37 [56] Justeru, Mahkamah ini membenarkan permohonan Plaintif di dalam Kandungan 1 dengan memberikan perintah bahawa hartanah tersebut dijual melalui lelongan awam atas terma-terma yang dinyatakan dalam Kandungan 1. Defendan juga adalah diperintah untuk membayar kos kepada Plaintif sebanyak RM6000.00. Tarikh lelongan awam ditetapkan pada 25.5.2017. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 20 April 2017 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Shaikh David Raj Cik Anita Natalia Peguam Defendan - Tetuan W.P Leong & Partners Encik Leong Wey Pyu

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24FC-1239-09/2016

PLAINTIF RHB BANK BERHAD DEFENDAN PATHMANATHAN A/L M. KUMARASAMY

19/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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Failed Extraction

JA-24NCVC-700-11/2016

PLAINTIF Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia DEFENDAN 1. Low Fook Lai (No K/P: 500808-01-5215/3519550) 2. Lee Chai Eng (No K/P: 590501-01-5853/5637806) 3. Siaw Swee Mie (No K/P: 740118-01-5288/A 2681088)

18/04/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAVA DI JOHDR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JDHOR DARUL TAKZIM N0. SAMAN PEMULA: JA-24-NCVC-70041/2016 Dzlam perkara mengenai Aturan 7 Kaedah—Kaedah Mahkamah TmggI,2012 Dan Dalam Derkara mengenax Ana Fengamman Tanah, wean ANTARA LEMBAGA LEBUHRAVA MALAYSIA PLAINTIF DAN 1. Low FOOK LAI (NO. K/F sooeos-01-5215/3519550) 2. LEE CHM ENG (NO. K/F. 59U5UI»U1-5853/5637505) 3 SIAW SWEE MIE (NO. KIP 74m1a—u1-s2as1A 2531093) DEFEDAN— DEFENDAN DECISION (Enclosure 4 0.18 ms Roc) cuoo KAH SING Judxcial Commissxoner High Conn‘ Johor Bahru Da1e:1e.4 2017 Paneias lnlroducllon [1] Thvs 15 a deli ' on endasure 4 wmch is an mlenoculory appficallun filed by the 3'“ defendant In endosure 4, ma a~ deiendantsnughno snrnre our me plalnlllfs orrgrnaung Summons cos‘) undev Order 15 rules 19(3), (b)am.1(d)o1lha Rules nl Cour! 2012 (‘RoC'). [2] on 11 4.2017. «hrs Court dismissed enclosuve 4 and urdered the names to proceed wilh me 05 The 3" deoendam was run sausfied with me decrsrun unms own and Had an appeal lo we Cuun oi Appeal The reasons for me Declsian are sel down as bebw. Brinf Fans [3] The plaintiffs claim Is premrseu on a High Cnun older da|ed 4.11 21:11 (‘the Com Order dated 4.11,2om we a land relerence proceeding suit No. 15-2u-2010. The pweirrm was the anprrcam m me said land relevence pruoeedmg [4] The prarnm was en aequrnng agent in a land soquisnion exercise. The pVamliff was nut satisfied wuh me cumpensa|Ion amount of RM19,7ou,oou no vmlth was awarded Io me uetenuams by me Land Admmisllamr. [5] Afler a lapse cf several years, Ihe piarmirr obcarned leave from Ihe wan to me e Bulang N Io reier me nrauer Ia Ihe High coun by way 0! a wand reverence proceeding prolesung me Land Aumrmstraxors award ma zare [6] Tlie High ceun neard lne land rererence prooeeding and neld lhal me Land Adrninisiraiors award nad over—oumperisaled lne deleridanis. The plainlirl had, lnerelore, succeeded in reducing lhe compensalian eniouril ol the Land Adrninislrelors award. The High couri also hair! a sum of RM3,518,63A.OO bad been over-paid lolne delendanls. ii is based an lnis backdrop or facts mar me piainriil is now seeking ler a reiund oi RM3,5la,sa4 no lrorri me delendanis in the 05 proceedings m The lollewlng laeis are nor dispuied rirsi, lne delendens were ‘inleresled persons‘ in llie land acquisilion exercise. Semmfly, Ihe run the amount awarded by me Land Adrninisn-ardr. Lasily, ine derendanis bad received me over-eornperisaied amount. i e. RM3,5I8,634.U0 deleridarics had received The Finding of (his Court [3] This is not a plain and obvious case in wriicri me 05 could be struck out undero. is r I9 onne Ron. {9} ‘rrils com is ol are considered View ilial [here are many lriable issues which require a lull delioerauen by me coun in me 05 proeeedirigs me 3'' delenderirs counsel contended «vial lbs 3'‘ delendeni was never made a parry in me lend relererice proceedings, and lnereidre, lrie 3” delendaril IS nol bound by me ooun order dated 4.11.2011. This mnteniion alone raises a serious liiable issue wliicb warrants a lull deliberaiion by inis coun. wage 3 ols [10] The secand issue raised hy the 3'“ delendant's counsel. whether the plaintm has locus to brtltg an afllun against the detandant based on the court Orderdaled 4 112011 is another triaole issue. [ti] in addition to the above, another triaole issue which this court regards necessary ldr the parties to deliberate in the os proceedings is that whether the alleged ndiwornpliance oi the provisions in the Land Aeduisiuoii Act 1960 by the Land Administrator could e the entire land ieleienee prooeeding and the court order dated 4.11 2011. Flowing lrairi the same issue. a question arises as to whether this cam is the right torum to declare the court order dated A 11 2011 as iiivatld [12] it is trite law that no mailer how weak a pliiintiirs case ‘is, it is not appropriate «or the court to strike out the plaintilrs clairri without giving a proper hearing for the Plaintiff. [ta] This court appreciates the Iacltlal matrix and legal points mised in the 3"’ delandanrs oounsers submission But, this own is 01 the view that the triatzle issues mentioned above should be vantltatad in a full hearing Hence. this case is riot in to he disposed byway of 0 123 r. 19 at the Roc [14] The plaintitl was the paymaster oi‘ the acquisition mtercisa. and the land reference court has ruled the plaintiil had ovewlald the delendants A pertinent question that has to be considered is whether the delendants can keep the ever-compensated amount notwithstanding that the oourt had in a court order dated 4.11 2011 held that the daiendants had oeen avehctumpensated in an amount at RM3,51B,634.00, P:m94L7l5 (151 Based on me quesuan raised in me prenedmg paragraph, «ms Caun ls oflha conswdered view Iha| the OS brought by me plamun against me uevendams is no! mvnlous or vexauous (see Middy Indusmes sun Ehd L Ords vAIensI-Marley (M) Sdn Ehd[2013] 3 MLJ 511) and is csrlainly nm an abuse utcbun process Conclusion [16] Based on the above reasoning. (his cum dlsrmssed me 3'" defendanfs applmauen and ordered the 3"’ delendant ta pay ocsls M RM3,oo0 co to me plamuu A heanng aale has been fixed «or ms 03. (CH00 KAH SING) Judlclll Commissioner Hlgh CnuI1..|ahor Bahru Plainliws counsel : Yusn Kamaludm [Federal cbunseu 3'“ delendanvs counsel : AIM Bemamm Teuuan Thomas Ph p P-an s as

Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-24-1314-12/2016

PLAINTIF 1. JAFFRI BIN ABU BAKAR (No. K/P: 571130-07-5959) 2. ROSHIA BINTI ABDULLAH (No. K/P: 300325-08-5300) DEFENDAN 1. MAZLAN BIN ABD. RASHID (NO. K/P : 621223-10-5325) 2 2. MOHD ZAINURI BIN SAM (NO. K/P : 690219-01-5743) 3. NOORAH BINTI SHAFIEI (NO. K/P : 680814-10-6472) 4. TIAP-TIAP ORANG LAIN YANG MENDUDUKI TANAH GERAN MUKIM 186 LOT 1548 MUKIM SETAPAK, DAERAH GOMBAK SELANGOR

18/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=387bca24-c2a8-4f3d-a242-546b906f0db0&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24-1314-12/2016 Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan 89 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai semua bahagian tanah yang dipegang dibawah Geran Mukim 186 Lot 1548, Mukim Setapak, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor. ANTARA 1. JAFFRI BIN ABU BAKAR (No. K/P: 571130-07-5959) 2. ROSHIA BINTI ABDULLAH (No. K/P: 300325-08-5300) PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. MAZLAN BIN ABD. RASHID (NO. K/P : 621223-10-5325) 2 2. MOHD ZAINURI BIN SAM (NO. K/P : 690219-01-5743) 3. NOORAH BINTI SHAFIEI (NO. K/P : 680814-10-6472) 4. TIAP-TIAP ORANG LAIN YANG MENDUDUKI TANAH GERAN MUKIM 186 LOT 1548 MUKIM SETAPAK, DAERAH GOMBAK SELANGOR …DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) A. PENGENALAN [1] Melalui Saman Pemula (Kandungan 1) yang difailkan pada 14.12.2016, Plaintif-Plaintif telah memohon antara lain perintah- perintah berikut:- i. Plaintif-Paintif diberikan pemilikan bagi hartanah tersebut atas alasan bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif berhak mendapatkan balik pemilikan itu dan bahawa orang yang mendiami ‘Tanah Tersebut’ telah menduduki tanpa kebenaran; 3 ii. Kaveat Persendirian Nombor Perserahan 2608/2016 yang telah dimasukkan oleh Defendan Ketiga, Noorah Binti Shafiei ke atas hartanah tersebut hendaklah dibatalkan oleh Pentadbir, Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak dengan serta merta; iii. Bekalan elektrik di kesemua premis yang terletak di atas hartanah tersebut’ hendaklah diputuskan dan atau diberhentikan bekalannya dengan serta merta oleh Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB); iv. Bekalan air di kesemua premis yang terletak di atas Tanah tersebut hendaklah diputuskan dan/atau diberhentikan bekalannya serta merta oleh Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor (Syabas); v. Bahawa Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (MPS) atau pihak berkuasa yang berkenaan hendaklah merobohkan serta merta kesemua premis-premis atau struktur-struktur binaan diatas tanah Geran Mukim 186 Lot 1548 Mukim Setapak, Daerah Gombak, Selangor Darul Ehsan ; [2] Kandungan 1 ini telah difailkan menurut Aturan 89 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012). 4 B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [3] Plaintif Pertama (Jaffri bin Abu Bakar) dan Plaintif Kedua (Roshia binti Abdullah) adalah merupakan tuanpunya berdaftar bersama sebidang hartanah yang dipegang di bawah Geran Mukim 186 Lot No. 1548 Mukim Setapak Daerah Gombak, Selangor (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “hartanah Tersebut”). [4] Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua masing-masing memegang ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut. Plaintif Pertama telah mewarisi ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut pada tahun 2009 di mana apabila bapanya (Abu Bakar Bin Hussain - pemilik asal hartanah tersebut) meninggal dunia, hartanah tersebut telah dipindahmilik kepada beliau menurut pewarisan pusaka. [5] Manakala Plaintif Kedua pula telah memiliki bahagiannya ke atas hartanah tersebut sejak 40 tahun yang lalu. Arwah bapa Plaintif Pertama adalah merupakan rakan sekerja suami Plaintif Kedua. 5 [6] Di dalam alasan penghakiman ini, Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua akan kadangkala dirujuk juga sebagai kedua-dua Plaintif. [7] Kedua-dua Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk menjual hartanah tersebut kepada seorang individu bernama Wan Abdullah Bin Wan Hamat (No.K/P: 700101-11-7919). [8] Menurut Plaintif Pertama, pada 28 Julai 2016 beliau telah pergi melihat hartanah tersebut tetapi telah mendapati di atas hartanah tersebut telah didirikan dengan struktur-struktur binaan seperti rumah-rumah dan sebahagiannya diduduki oleh penghuni yang tidak dikenali. [9] Menurut kedua-dua Plaintif, mereka tidak pernah memberi kebenaran kepada sesiapapun untuk menduduki hartanah tersebut dan kemasukan penghuni di atas hartanah tersebut adalah tanpa kebenaran Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua. 6 [10] Setelah mendapati hartanah tersebut telah dicerobohi, Plaintif Pertama kemudiannya pada hari yang sama telah membuat satu laporan polis berhubung pencerobohan hartanahnya tersebut. (Eksibit “JAB-2”, Kandungan 2 - Laporan Polis bertarikh 28 Julai, 2016). [11] Plaintif Pertama juga telah membuat aduan rasmi kepada Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) dan Syarikat Bekalan Air Selangor (Syabas) kerana mereka telah membekalkan elektrik dan air tanpa mendapat kebenaran atau menerima permohonan rasmi dari Plaintif Pertama mahupun Plaintif Kedua sebagai pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut dan meminta TNB dan Syabas untuk memotong bekalan letrik dan air yang diberikan. [12] Plaintif Pertama juga telah membuat aduan rasmi kepada Majlis Perbandaran Selayang (MPS) bagi memohon supaya struktur - struktur binaan yang terdapat di hartanah tersebut dirobohkan. 7 [13] TNB, Syabas dan MPS telah memaklumkan kepada Plaintif Pertama bahawa mereka tidak boleh mengambil tindakan untuk memotong bekalan elektrik, bekalan air ataupun merobohkan struktur binaan atau premis-premis di atas hartanah tersebut melainkan terdapatnya perintah mahkamah untuk mereka berbuat demikian. [14] Plaintif Pertama kemudiannya telah melantik seorang bernama Wan Najmudin sebagai wakil mereka untuk berbincang secara baik dengan kesemua Defendan-Defendan agar mereka keluar dan mengosongkan hartanah tersebut. Namun usaha penyelesaian secara baik telah gagal. [15] Apabila usaha penyelesaian secara baik gagal dicapai, kedua- dua Plaintif telah seterusnya mengeluarkan satu Notis bertarikh 22 Ogos, 2016 (Eksibit “JAS-4”, Kandungan 2) kepada Defendan-Defendan untuk mengosongkan hartanah tersebut. Namun Defendan-Defendan masih berdegil dan telah enggan untuk mematuhi Notis tersebut. 8 [16] Malah, di sebaliknya, Defendan Ketiga (Noorah binti Shafiei) selepas menerima Notis bertarikh 22 Ogos, 2016 telah memasukkan satu kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut pada 25 Ogos 2016 dengan alasan yang beliau mempunyai kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. [17] Di dalam Ekshibit “JAB-6”, Kandungan 2 iaitu Borang 19B Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) Defendan Ketiga menyatakan kepentingannya atas hartanah tersebut adalah atas alasan- alasan berikut: i. Saya telah menduduki tanah tersebut selama lebih 40 tahun atas arahan pemilik tanah asal kepada arwah bapa saya oleh Hj. Abu Hanifah dan Puan Hajah Roshia bt Abdullah. ii. Pihak saya telah menjelaskan pembayaran cukai tanah yang tertunggak melebihi 20 tahun dari tari tahun 1975 hingga 1996. iii. Pihak saya telah menyediakan segala kemudahan asas seperti elektrik, air, jalan dan penambakkan tanah dari 9 paya hingga 20 kaki supaya menjadi tapak tanah yang lebih strategik. iv. Kami telah mengusahakan tanaman pokok buah-buahan dan membina kediaman dengan jumlah melebihi RM500,000.00. Saya memasukkan kaveat ini adalah untuk menjaga kepentingan saya pada tanah tersebut. [18] Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua menyatakan dengan tegas bahawa mereka sememangnya tidak pernah mengenali kesemua Defendan-Defendan di dalam tindakan ini atau mana-mana orang lain yang menduduki hartanah tersebut. [19] Kandungan 1 kedua-dua Plaintif ini disokong oleh Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif yang diikrarkan oleh Jaffri bin Abu Bakar (Jaffri) pada 13.2.2016 (Kandungan 2) dan Afidavit Balasan Plaintif juga diikrarkan oleh Jaffri. Plaintif Kedua yang berumur 87 tahun telah memberikan kuasa kepada Jaffri untuk mendeposkan afidavit bagi pihaknya. 10 C. TENTANGAN DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN [20] Di dalam menentang keras permohonan kedua-dua Plaintif ini, Defendan Pertama bernama Mazlan bin Abdul Rashid telah memfailkan Afidavit Balasannya yang diikrarkan pada 16.2.2017. Defendan Pertama (Mazlan) juga telah mendeposkan afidavit balasan ini bagi pihak defendan- defendan yang lain. Mazlan adalah suami kepada Defendan Ketiga. Defendan Kedua di dalam kes ini adalah Mohd Zainuri bin Sam. Manakala Defendan Keempat adalah Tiap-Tiap Orang Lain Yang Menduduki Tanah Geran Mukim 186 Lot 1548 Mukim Setapak, Daerah Gombak,Selangor. [21] Di dalam afidavit balasan tersebut, Defendan-defendan telah menimbulkan pengataan-pengataan berikut: 21.1 Defendan-defendan telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak dari tahun 1976 iaitu sejak 40 tahun yang lepas. 21.2 Bapa Defendan Ketiga bernama Shafiei telah mula menduduki hartanah tersebut semenjak tahun 1976. Shafiei telah menduduki tanah tersebut daripada seorang 11 bernama Pak Mastor yang telah meneroka tanah tersebut sebelum pemilikan tanah tersebut diberikan kepada Plaintif Pertama dan bapa kepada Plaintif Pertama. 21.3 Plaintif Kedua dan Abu Bakar yang merupakan pemilik asal tidak pernah membantah, menghalau atau meminta Shafiei untuk mengosongkan hartanah tersebut. 21.4 Pada tahun 1991, Plaintif Kedua bersama suami dan anaknya telah memberi kebenaran kepada Defendan- defendan untuk terus menduduki serta membangunkan hartanah tersebut dan kemudiannya Defendan-defendan telah menambak paya di atas hartanah tersebut dan membina jalan akses memasuki hartanah tersebut. Kemudian rumah-rumah yang telah didirikan di atas tanah tersebut dan mereka telah menerima bekalan elektrik sejak tahun 1984 dan bekalan air sejak dari tahun 2014. 21.5 Defendan telah mendakwa membuat bayaran cukai tanah hartanah tersebut sejak dari tahun 1976 sehingga 1991. 12 21.6 Atas dakwaan-dakwaan di atas Defendan Ketiga telah memasukkan kaveat persendiriannya ke atas hartanah tersebut. D. KEDUDUKAN UNDANG-UNDANG BAGI PEMOHONAN UNTUK MENDAPATKAN MILIKAN TANAH DI BAWAH ATURAN 89 KAEDAH-KAEDAH MAHKAMAH 2012 (KKM 2012) [22] Aturan 89 Kaedah 1, KKM 2012 memperuntukkan berikut: 1. Prosiding hendaklah dibawa melalui Saman pemula Jika seseorang menuntut milikan ke atas tanah yang dia dikatakan diduduki semata-mata oleh seseorang atau beberapa orang (yang bukannya penyewa atau penyewa-penyewa yang memegang lepas masa selepas tamatnya penyewaan) yang masuk ke dalam atau terus memduduki tanpa izin atau persetujuannya atau tanpa izin atau persetujuan mana-mana pendahulu dalam hakmilik daripadanya, maka prosiding itu boleh dibawa melalui saman pemula mengikut peruntukan ini. 2. ..... 3. Afidavit Sokongan (A.89.k.3) 13 (1) Plaintif hendaklah memfailkan sebagai menyokong saman pemua itu suatu Afidavit yang menyatakan --- (a) Kepentingan mengenai tanah itu; (b) Hal keadaan mana-mana tanah itu telah diduduki tanapa izin atau persetujuan dan dalam mana tuntutannya untuk milikan itu berbangkit; dan; (c) ....... (d) ........ [23] Di dalam kes CAHAYA IDEAL (M) SDN BHD V. ORANG- ORANG YANG MENGENALI DIRI SEBAGAI “PONGA” & ORS [1999] 3 CLJ 257) telah diputuskan: “Once the plaintiff proved its title and intention to regain possession, it was for the defendants to prove that they could set out a title or a right to possession inconsistent with the plaintiff’s ownership. The burden would be on the defendants to show that they had the right to occupy the land on a balance of probabilities”. 14 [24] Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes LEE BENG LAI & ORS V. TETUAN TOKOYAKI PROPERTY SDN BHD [2002] 3 CLJ 365) telah memutuskan seperti berikut: “The learned judge found that on the undisputed facts the plaintiff is the registered owner of the said land and the defendants did not have any proof that they had been given the permission or licence by the plaintiff or the owner of the land (ie, the State) prior to the plaintiff’s occupation of the said property and that it was proper and appropriate for the High Court to make the order under O. 89 RHC to evict the defendants as they were no serious issues.” [25] Di dalam kes SUHIMI ITAM SHAARI & YANG LAIN LWN ANGAMAL RAJOO & YANG LAIN [2008] 10 CLJ 573, Hakim Balia Wahi (YA pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan antara lain: “Pada hemat saya isu samada kebenaran dari Ali Am yang dikatakan sebagai pemunya terdahulu ke atas tanah tersebut bukanlah merupakan suatu ‘triable issue’. Ali Am tiada sebarang hak atau otoriti untuk memberikan kebenaran atau persetujuan kepada 15 defendan dan keluarganya pada ketika itu. Isu kesahihan kebenaran tersebut adalah tidak menjadi isu dan persoalan untuk dibicarakan. Prosidur A. 89 hanya tidak akan terpakai sekiranya terbukti bahawa kemasukan atau pendudukan defendan di atas tanah tersebut adalah tidak menyalahi undang-undang dan terdapat isu-isu untuk dibicarakan”. [26] Di dalam kes TOH KHENG HENG & ANOR V AHMAD FAUZI BIN MOHD TAUFEK [1994] 1 MLJ 357, Selventhiranathan PK (YA pada ketika itu) telah memutuskan antara lain seperti berikut: “(1) The defendant himself did not seek to confer or claim any higher status as to his occupation of the land than as a licensee. He was therefore a gratuitous licensee and in that capacity, his licence to occupy the land was properly terminated when the notice to quit was served on him. Thereafter he became a trespasser on the land and the plaintiffs were entitled to apply under O 89 for the defendant to be evicted. (2) Order 89 was the proper procedure to be applied in this case. The defendant could not equate his position with that of the 16 appellants in Bohari bin Taib & Ors v Pengarah Tanah Galian Selangor 1 on which the defendant sought to rely. In that case, the appellants had shown that they had an arguable case by submitting affidavit evidence to show that they had acquired a legal right or expectation to be issued with land titles. Here, the defendant did not for one moment contend that a licence or consent had been granted to him to occupy the land by the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title. There were no arguable issues making the summary procedure in O 89 improper in the present case. (3) Order 89 applies to situations where persons entered into occupation of land without the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession or any predecessor-in-title of his as well as to situations where persons enter into occupation of land with a licence from the person entitled to possession or any predecessor-in-title of his but subsequently remains in such occupation without the licence or consent of the person entitled to possession of the land or a predecessor in title of his. Thus, the defendant's objection to use of the procedure to evict licencees failed. (4) The defendant's claim to protection by equity could not stand on the facts. The National Land Code 1965 does not provide for principles of equity. In order for equity to intervene, the 17 defendant had to show evidence of some inducement or encouragement by the plaintiffs or some expectation held out by them to him on the strength of which he had expended money on the land. There was nothing on the facts to support the application of any equitable doctrine in favour of the defendant. (5) Although the defendant's house could be demolished as a result of the order of this court, a stay of execution was not granted to the defendant pending his appeal to the Supreme Court. The fact that any appeal to the Supreme Court even if successful, would be rendered nugatory, was not by itself a special circumstance for the court to order a stay of execution. The purpose of the legislature in enacting the O 89 summary procedure would be defeated as such an argument would be raised in virtually all cases where the procedure is used. E. PENGHUJAHAN PEGUAM KEDUA-DUA PLAINTIF [27] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa kedua-dua Plaintif adalah tuanpunya berdaftar yang sah dan yang tidak dapat disangkal keempunyaan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Suratan Hakmilik di ekshibit “JAB-1”, dan “JAS-6” 18 telah membuktikan dengan jelas dan nyata hak dan ketuanpunyaan kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut. [28] Justeru di dalam kes ini, telah dihujahkan bagi pihak Plaintif bahawa Defendan-Defendan mempunyai beban untuk membuktikan bahawa mereka telah diberikan kebenaran atau keizinan oleh kedua-dua Plaintif atau pendulu mereka (predeccessor in title) untuk menduduki hartanah tersebut. [29] Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa Defendan-Defendan telah gagal untuk mengemukakan sebarang bukti bagi menyokong pengataan-pengataan mereka selaras dengan Seksyen 103 Akta Keterangan 1950 dan pengataan-pengataan yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan- defendan di dalam afidavit balasan Mazlan adalah pengataan- pengataan kosong semata-mata. F. PENGHUJAHAN PEGUAM DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN [30] Berdasarkan pengataan Defendan-defendan melalui afidavit balasan Mazlan, telah dihujahkan oleh peguam Defendan- 19 defendan bahawa Defendan-defendan telah menduduki hartanah tersebut dengan kebenaran tuanpunya tanah terdahulu dan juga daripada Plaintif Kedua pada tahun 1991. Maka Defendan-defendan bukanlah setinggan tegar ataupun squatter simpliciter yang boleh dikeluarkan daripada hartanah tersebut melalui Aturan 89 KKM 2012. [31] Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam Defendan-defendan bahawa selain daripada isu bahawa Defendan-defendan bukanlah setinggan tegar, terdapat juga isu yang perlu dibicarakan di mana kedua-dua Plaintif perlu mendedahkan bagaimana hartanah ini boleh diduduki tanpa kebenaran mereka. Ini menjadikan prosiding di bawah Aturan 89 KKM tidak sesuai digunakan. G. DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [32] Di dalam kes ini, keterangan yang tidak dapat disangkal adalah kedua-dua Plaintif adalah merupakan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Adalah menjadi undang-undang bahawa sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar, hak, kepentingan dan 20 keempunyaan kedua-dua Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut tidak boleh dinafikan. [33] Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam kedua-dua Plaintif bahawa pengataan Defendan-defendan berhubung kemasukan mereka ke dalam hartanah tersebut daripada sejak tahun 1976 lagi sebelum bapa Plaintif menjadi tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut adalah tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [34] Begitu juga dengan pengataan kononnya bapa Plaintif Pertama dan Plaintif Kedua telah tidak membantah kemasukan Shafiei ke atas hartanah tersebut dan pengataan bahawa Plaintif Kedua dan keluarganya telah datang ke tanah tersebut pada tahun 1991 dan membenarkan Defendan-defendan untuk terus tinggal disitu dan membangunkan hartanah tersebut juga merupakan satu pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun. [35] Mahkamah ini berkata begitu atas alasan-alasan berikut: 21 a. Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa hartanah tersebut telah mula diduduki oleh Shafiei semenjak tahun 1976 dan beliau telah menduduki hartanah tersebut dengan kebenaran daripada seorang bernama Pak Mastor yang telah meneroka tanah tersebut sebelum ini. b. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti geran hakmilik “JAB-1” (Borang 5DK Kanun Tanah Negara) dan mendapati bahawa hartanah tersebut adalah Lot 1548 dengan nombor hakmilik 186 yang mana sebelum ini nombor hakmilik hartanah tersebut adalah EMR 2803 Mukim Setapak. Hartanah ini telahpun mula-mula diberimilikan pada 9.1.1903 dan ini bermakna hartanah ini telah mempunyai tuanpunya hartanah sejak tahun 1903. c. Bagaimana mungkin Pak Mastor ini telah meneroka hartanah tersebut pada tahun 1976 sedangkan hartanah ini telahpun mempunyai pemiliknya pada tahun terdahulu daripada itu. Di samping itu dokumen “JAB-1” juga telah tertera di atasnya butiran yang menunjukkan bahawa 22 pemberimilikan hartanah ini telah bermula pada 09 Januari 1903. Catitan tersebut adalah seperti berikut: Tarikh mula-mula pemberimilikan : 9 Januari 1903 No hakmilik asal (Tetap atau sementara) : A PP85/03 Mukim Setapak No hakmilik yang terdahulu daripada ini : EMR 2803 Mukim Setapak Ini bermakna bahawa hartanah tersebut mempunyai tuanpunya sejak ia diberi milikan. d. Pemilikan hartanah ini telah diberikan sebelum tahun 1976 (tahun Pak Mastor kononnya meneroka) lagi telah disokong oleh geran hakmilik hartanah Eksibit “JAB-1” yang mana hartanah tersebut telah melalui dua pengambilan tanah oleh kerajaan dengan pengeluaran Borang K. Borang K adalah suatu borang yang dikeluarkan menurut seksyen 22 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 bagi tujuan memberi notis bahawa tanah ini telah diambil milik oleh kerajaan daripada pemiliknya. Di dalam kes ini hartanah tersebut telah terlibat dengan pengambilan tanah oleh kerajaan pada tahun 1975 23 (No warta: 391 bertarikh 25 September 1975 untuk keluasan lebiih kurang 62700 kaki dan pada tahun 1995 (No. warta :334 bertarikh 16 Februari 1995) untuk kawasan seluas lebih kurang 0.221 hektar. Kedua-dua endosman yang tertera di Eksibit “JAB-1” adalah seperti berikut: No Pers 63/1977 Jil.1 Fol. 33 Pengambilan Sebahagian Tanah – Borang K Seluas lebih kurang 62700 Kaki Persegi Cukai tanah dipinda kepada RM16.00 Didaftarkan pada 29 April 1977 jam 12:09:00 petang (No Warta : 391 bertarikh 25 September 1975) No Pers 5183/1995 Jil.3 Fol. 109 Pengambilan Sebahagian Tanah – Borang K Seluas lebih kurang 0.221 Hektar Cukai tanah dipinda kepada RM16.00 Didaftarkan pada 09 Oktober 1995 jam 08:00:00 pagi (No Warta : 334 bertarikh 16 Februari 1975) e. Defendan sendiri di dalam afidavit balasan Mazlan telah mengeksibitkan Borang K bagi pengambilan hartanah yang kedua pada tahun 1995 di Eksibit “MAR-1” bahawa keluasan sebanyak 0.221 hektar telah diambil oleh kerajaan dan di dalam Borang K ini telah jelas menunjukkan bahawa TUANPUNYA BERDAFTAR HARTANAH ini adalah Plaintif 24 Kedua sebagai Pemegang Amanah ½ bahagian dan bapa Plaintif Pertama memegang ½ bahagian yang lain. f. Defendan telah pada awalnya telah mengatakan Shafiei telah mula menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak tahun 1976 dengan kebenaran Pak Mastor yang meneroka hartanah tersebut walhal tanah tersebut sememangnya bukan dimiliki Pak Mastor dan bukanlah tuanpunya hartanah tersebut. Pak Mastor sendiri tidak berhak meneroka tanah milikan orang lain dan oleh itu kalaupun benarlah Pak Mastor membenarkan Shafiei menduduki hartanah tersebut, Pak Mastor juga adalah seorang penceroboh yang tidak mempunyai apa-apa hak di sisi undang-undang untuk memberi kebenaran kepada Shafiei untuk memasuki hartanah tersebut kerana Pak Mastor sendiri telah memasuki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran tuanpunya hartanah. g. Pengataan Defendan bahawa wang pampasan pengambilan kedua telah telah dimasukkan kepada Amanah Raya 25 Malaysia kerana pemilik hartanah tidak ditemui adalah pengataan satu kosong Defendan yang tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan. Di samping itu, kedua-dua Plaintif telah mengatakan wang pampasan pengambilan tanah telahpun dituntut oleh pemilik-pemilik hartanah. h. Setelah itu pula, Mazlan bertukar versi daripada penerokaan awal Shafiei sejak tahun 1976 atas kebenaran Pak Mastor kepada pengataan yang bapa Plaintif dan Plaintif Kedua tidak pernah menghalau daripada hartanah tersebut atau meminta Shafiei keluar atau mengosongkan hartanah tersebut. i. Kemudian Mazlan mengatakan Plaintif Kedua selalu datang datang mengutip buah. Seterusnya, Plaintif Kedua dan keluarganya dikatakan telah datang bersama suami dan anaknya untuk menemui Defendan pada tahun 1991 dan memberitahu bahawa Defendan boleh terus menduduki hartanah tersebut dan kemudian kononnya menyerahkan geran mereka seperti di eksibit “MAR-2”, Kandungan 4 untuk 26 simpanan. Salinan geran kononnya membuktikan kehadiran Plaintif Kedua ke hartanah tersebut pada tahun 1991. j. Mahkamah ini telah meneliti Eksibit “MAR-2”. Dokumen adalah satu dokumen yang tidak jelas butirannya. Rupanya berkemungkinan geran lama tetapi catitan-catitan yang ada di dalammya adalah tidak jelas dan banyak butiran penting yang sewajarnya ada bagi sesuatu geran tidak ada di dalam geran ini. Apa yang ada adalah tulisan yang merujuk kepada hartanah tersebut dengan tulisan tangan butiran lot, keluasan hartanah ini dan cukai tanah adalah 21 ringgit. Ia semestinya satu geran lama yang masih menggunakan ringgit dan bukan RM. k. Kalau benarlah ini “MAR-2”. diberikan Plaintif Kedua pada tahun sebagai bukti beliau hadir dan memberi kebenaran, ianya adalah sesuatu yang tidak menasabah. Geran ini adalah satu geran lama yang tidak tahu dari mana asal usulnya kerana cukai tanah bagi hartanah ini masih menggunakan 21 ringgit. Kenapa pula dokumen ini diberikan 27 oleh Plaintif Kedua kepada Defendan sedangkan di dalamnya tidak ada butiran siapakah tuanpunya hartanah dan apatah lagi nama Plaintf Kedua pun tidak ada tertera di dalamnya bagi menunjukkan keempunyaan beliau. Kalau namanya pun tidak ada di dalam geran tidak ada sebab Plaintif memberikannya kepada Defendan. Apa tah lagi di dalam kes ini pengambilan tanah pertama telah dilaksanakan pada tahun 1977 dan cukai tanah telah dipinda kepada RM16.00. Dengan proses pengambilan tanah ini, geran hakmilik baru akan dikeluarkan kepada tuanpunya dan geran baru akan dikeluarkan. Geran baru yang dikeluarkan semestinya bukanlah sepertimana “MAR-2” . Kalaulah Plaintif Kedua hendak memberi geran pada tahun 1991, semestinya geran baru hartanah tersebut. l. Pengataan Defendan bahawa MAR-2 diberikan oleh Plaintif Kedua kepadanya pada tahun 1991 adalah sesuatu yang sangat meragukan dan merupakan pengataan kosong semata-mata. 28 m. Kemudian Defendan telah mendakwa telah membangunkan hartanah tersebut dan menambak paya dan membina jalan akses serta membina rumah di atasnya. Defendan juga mendakwa mereka telah mendapat bekalan api dari tahun 1984 dan bekalan air pada tahun 2014. Pengataan- pengataan Defendan ini adalah semata-mata pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan pun kerana tidak ada bukti telah dikemukakan oleh Defendan bahawa bekalan api telah diperolehi sejak tahun 1984 dan bekalan air telah didapati pada tahun 2014. o. Defendan cuba mendakwa bahawa beliau telah membayar cukai hartanah tersebut dari tahun 1976 sehingga tahun 1991 dengan merujuk kepada Eksibit “MAR-3”. Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan di sini bahawa dokumen “MAR-3” bukanlah suatu resit pembayaran cukai tanah yang dikeluarkan oleh Pejabat Tanah yang menunjukkan bayaran- bayaran cukai tanah yang telahpun dibayar. Borang seperti di dalam “MAR-3” adalah satu format borang resit hasil tanah Pejabat Tanah yang akan dikeluarkan oleh pejabat 29 tanah kepada tuanpunya tanah namanya tertera di geran hakmilik tanah untuk tujuan bayaran cukai tanah dan apabila bayaran telah dibuat, bayaran itu akan tercatit di atas borang tersebut sebagai bukti pembayaran. Di dalam “MAR- 3“ yang dikemukakan Defendan, nama di tulis Mazlan Abdul Rashid telah ditulis tanpa alamat. Butiran tanah tidak lengkap dan tahun pengeluaran borang tidak ada. Kononnya cukai untuk tahun 1975 hingga tahunnya tidak jelas Kononnya lagi untuk denda lewat sebanyak RM321.50. Catitan-catitan di dalam borang ini ditulis dengan tangan. Melihat kepada “MAR- 3“ ini, Mahkamah ini menyimpulkan ianya adalah satu dokumen yang direka-reka dan ianya bukanlah suatu resit pembayaran cukai tanah. p. Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah seterusnya bahawa pengataan-pengataan kosong Defendan menjadi lebih jelas lagi dan Mahkamah katakan ianya ke peringkat pembohongan Mahkamah ini di mana Mazlan yang merupakan suami kepada Defendan Ketiga telah mendeposkan di perenggan 4 afidavitnya bahawa beliau 30 telah menduduki hartanah tersebut sejak dari tahun 1976 walhal beliau lahir pada tahun 1962 dan jika dibuat pengiraan ke belakang kepada 1976, adakah beliau telah menduduki hartanah sejak berumur 14 tahun. Pada umur 14 tahun, Mazlan cuba mengatakan dia telah berkahwin dengan Defendan Ketiga. Ini jelas satu pengataan yang tidak masuk akal dan tidak logik. q. Berhubung dengan perkara bohong dan tidak logik juga, Mahkamah ini juga perlu merujuk kepada Borang 19B Defendan Ketiga bertarikh 25.8.2016 di dalam memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut. Di antara alasan yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan bagi menunjukkan kepentingannya atas hartanah tersebut, Defendan Ketiga telah menyatakan dia telah menduduki hartanah tersebut selama 40 tahun atas arahan pemilik asal tanah Hj Abu Hanifah dan Hajah Roshia kepada arwah bapanya. Bagaimana pula Defendan boleh menduduki hartanah tersebut selama 40 tahun sedangkan pada tahun 1976, Defendan baru beumur 8 tahun dan 31 menurut Mazlan pula rumah hanya telah dibina kononnya selepas pembangunan tanah telah dibenarkan pada tahun 1991 di mana kononnya tanah paya telah ditambak dan jalan akses dibuat. r. Cerita Mazlan dan isterinya berbeza. Mazlan mengatakan Pak Mastor yang benarkan Shafiei masuk ke hartanah tersebut, manakala isterinya Defendan Ketiga mengatakan pula Plaintif Kedua dan suaminya yang mengarahkan arwah bapanya yang tinggal di situ. Defendan Ketiga juga berbohong apabila memberikan alasan bahawa cukai tanah tertunggak dari tahun 1975 sehingga 1996 telah dijelaskan, walhal Eksibit “MAR-3” bukanlah satu resit pembayaran cukai tanah. [36] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini segala pengataan- pengataan yang cuba dibangkitkan oleh Defendan-Defendan tentang penerokaan hartanah oleh Pak Mastor atau kebenaran atau arahan yang kononnya diberikan pengataaan kosong dan cerita rekaan semata-mata, Pengataan-pengataan tersebut 32 sudahlah bercanggah, ianya juga tidak disokong oleh mana- mana keterangan lain samada keterangan dokumentar ataupun sebagainya. [37] Plaintif Pertama dan Kedua tidak pernah pada bila-bila masa memberikan sebarang bentuk kebenaran kepada Defendan- defendan untuk menduduki tanah tersebut dan Defendan- defendan telah memasuki hartanah tersebut tanpa kebenaran/keizinan kedua-dua Plaintif dan Defendan-defendan telah sebenarnya telah menceroboh masuk ke dalam hartanah tersebut. [38] Pengataan-pengataan Defendan-Defendan yang merupakan pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong dengan keterangan mana-mana lain keterangan tidak langsung mengwujudkan isu- isu untuk dibicarakan. Kes-kes Juta Permai Sdn Bhd v Mohd Zain Jantan & Ors [2001] 2 CLJ 151 dan Salim Ismail & Ors v Lebbey Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 105, yang disandarkan oleh peguam Defendan-defendan tidak terpakai langsung untuk 33 Defendan-defendan. Justeru Kedua-dua Plaintif berhak untuk mendapat perintah yang dipohon. [39] Memandangkan kedua-dua Plaintif telah memfailkan tindakan ini menurut Aturan 89 KKM 2012 untuk mendapatkan balik milikan terhadap hartanah tersebut, Mahkamah ini dengan ini membenarkan perenggan 1, Kandungan 1 kedua-dua Plaintif di mana Defendan-defendan hendaklah menyerahkan milikan hartanah tersebut kepada kedua-dua Plaintif dalam tempoh 45 hari dari tarikh perintah ini. [40] Relif-relif yang dipohon oleh kedua-dua Plaintiff di bawah perenggan 2, 3, 4 dan 5 Kandungan 1 telah ditarik balik oleh kedua-dua Plaintif, maka tidak ada perintah diberikan untuk relif- relif tersebut. [41] Akhirnya, Mahkamah ini memerintahkan supaya Defendan- defendan membayar kos sebanyak RM5000.00 kepada Plaintif. 34 ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 18 haribulan April, 2017 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Hadmin Zahar & Rohaine Shariffudin Puan Rohaine Mohd Shim Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Shukor & Associates Encik Meor Amir

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-19-01/2016

PLAINTIF LIM KOK SIONG DEFENDAN 1. ) LIM SENG HONG 2. ) LIM SENG LIAN

11/04/2017

YA DATUK WIRA HALIJAH BINTI ABBAS

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=fa9c1d07-e600-42df-b2ed-1602c1ab4706&Inline=true

‘GIN T M mum umcnxsaoua PuuN'nF y . 1. msalsuoua r£raInm- ' Da=amu 2. uusaaum Paaawwum A M 1. Pads 24.9.2013, Plllmll flan Deaendan-Devsndan Ielah mennndatanganl Parjsnjlan Jual Bell Hamnan :51 mm Hslnm bersemuiu umuk rnembeu tanan mifl( Deisndan-Deisndun yang S é 5 E .§ E dlkenali hakmilik HS(M)5022 Pro ams, Mukim 01 Simpanu Kanan. Daarah Bulu mm. Juhnr [selapas lni dlrujuk sanagal - hamnah Iarsebux“). Plainlfl memisilkan kavesl ks atas hanxnsh uavssbuv. 2. ms 3.42014, Plalnm dun nerenaanmtenann halal: dengen mam sumela tslah hememju menamatkan perienjian tersebut dun telah jugs berssluju unlnk menanuarangani sum perlanjlln Jullbsfi yang mu. Kedua-due plhak benemlu supaya Kaveal Plalnm dikekalkan. 3. Pujanllan ksma ms man dlpersetujul hahawa hannnah larsebnrl diiual dengan rarqa nMssu,oou.oo can dapasn sebanysk RM2au.ooo.uu dlheyar keilrs perjlnjlnn dilandalnnganl. 4. Amara Jualbeli dan Imikn lanlutan 2.32015. syaral periannan Isrsabul, mum penyampurraan mum 2.2.2015 Delsndan-Defenden [uga dikehenflaki meqiuaum babes am sebarang bebansn. p...z pernhaylIm1 daposn. Pervmayarun mien dlbull, psdfl xazlmnya menglkul peyselujuan keduadua pihak_ DI dalam kas ini, pmak Dafmuen»DefendIn um mamhuialknn hnmwa plmknyn ma msngalunrloan rash yang membukllkan jumlah nembaynran dihua1 oleh Phimil flan unerima olehnyn. Dleh nu, Mankatnah lnl bevpanflapn! In: In! um boleh usaangkmn. karma dianngaplslsh flank aipenmamn alsh plhakumln Pihak Plaimif Islah um memimx rsuit buktl pemhuyurun den luau plhak Devfendan juga max mmgauaman resn mum pensflmaan. my Kasamul kelaangan oetenuan-nets-man mengemi parsawjuan yang uieupai adalah herhangkfldaxi pmjaman wlng adnlah hanyn katenngnn seem-I: kin. Pmak Devemnn mengemukskan keoarengan um nu dalam msmnukukan kesnya. Lanasung flaak ad- kstemngln yang barhsnmk dokumsmal La. reslwaran : mccvraul/nxl um um: mmuum-. Ivuscum r...u dikemukakan «nmk mamhuklikan pernynlaannya . Ana yang ms at Mdapan Mahkamnh lni amalah nenanlbn Jua|beIlTsnah yang telah pull makui nlah Devenaan. Dsfendnn sendlri Ielah menandalanganinyu. Mnmernan cm rnamluk Impede Ssksyen 92. Anna Keterangan 1950 yang mempsrun1ukkan:- ~' 92. Apahlla (sans munamnna kmnrak, pembenan alau penny-nan lain ham, atsu apalila spams Derkara yang dlkehendaki olah undlnq» undunq wpaya dlubah he dalam bamuk dokumen. menan dlbuktiuan mennlkm Seksyen 91. tiada kslemngan menuarul apn-ape aerianilnn Illu panyamn |Lsan bolsh mama aman pihak kepada manamana sum care in: man wakilnys darl sag: keueminuan haul mnknua menyangkal, rnengqubnl, menamban alau menumangknn tsrmanya mc u-mm ummnmuc umlunwunxvn-cum ' nuexz am Plalnlif Isiah msmbuklikan dckumen pnrianjlan verssbut mangilnut perunlukan Ssksyan m, malua Idalah lugus pmak Deiuman unmk msmhukII<anhanawake1/amngan lisannya yang manyanuoal boleh dlharima mangikul penmlukan Snknysn 92 Akin Keusrannan I950 Iersebul. 121-LN Bsvdasalkan alasan-alasan yang dirvyatnkan at eras, atas pemmbangan ksbalanukalan Mahkarnan inl tetah membenarkan mmman Plaimil umuk peaaksunun spasmk mp: member! award untuk gamimgi yang dlpohnn. muumaunnédns) Hakim Mah|wnahT1nggW|a|.:yaMuaI (DAT\l( Turlkn: 11 APRIL 2017 we Nu/am mm mm umtcuvw. nmcunl mu: Plh YETUAN mono vmm ISMAIL & mrrur-zns Poguambcls a. Psguamura No. Mm. fingkat 1, Jalan Rahmal moo Batu Fahal JDIIDI (Hu]: MYP/I206/I5/MISC/yatl) ‘res-IPI k as n TEIUAN S.K_ KOH a. co. Psguambsla & Psguammra sune 2. men a, Wisrna Sing Laing 9, Jalen zahsaah 83000 Batu Pahal. Joher ' (fiul : KSKlBPII4o74IOON/65/D0) zznwmwl/mu p...« 5. Kemudiannya eras pslsetufuan keuua-dun nihsk Psrlunjlan mlanjulkan lrspidl Iarikh 1.10.2015 dun [lads raaaah dikanalmn untuk kelewaaan penyempurnun Inl. B. Plds 14.2015 Defandnn Pefllma lellh memaaukkan Kaveal persendim-nu ks am hananah lsrsebul, clan pads 5.1.2016 Pailrmr Islah menslirna 2 Borang vac di hamh Seksysn 326 Kanan Tanah Negam umuk manmong Kavant Plalnxlf. Ptalnlfl man rnangnamn: nurs melalui peguamnya supaya samua pelknm aipsmemman den ingin menysmpurnnkan pelianfian. 7. Defsndan gag:-1| unluk bem.a{uan.:a-a.. dan Plainm mernfallkan Iindnkan Ini din mamomn perlnmh-psrinuh amam Iainnyn:- I) Suam pelivtah deklsrasl bahawa psrisniian Jualbul benarith 3.4.2014 aduan ssh dan menalknl Defendan- Delamtan. mm M1/Inns Mmusmmvlmmmuuunnvnmunl M .1 in) suam perlntah psnaksanaan speslfik snpaya Defendan- Delandan mnnyempumlkan per-jinllan bertzvikh 3.4.2014 dun mamlnflahmlllk hnnanah an bnwuh Derlanjlan. ill) Gamirugi am, punnif dln taladan. a. Diakhlv perbioaraan. Manimmah memhanarkan mmuvan Plalmir-Plalnriv unluk p-Iaksuunn apesifik. Mammong knveax nsmnuluan ynng fllrnaauldnan oleh Datenaan Panama can msmlndihmlllk hsnanah manglkal parlanllan. fisda gamirugi diawlidknn. 9. Daienumnevendan flask barpuasmni dan merayu ke Mahhamahnayuan. B fig-BU 1. Maker: transaksl yang dhardatanganl oleh pi|*ek~plhak adalah saxu Peuianjlan Jualbeli mun: atau vnansaksi pin]alnan wang? unzvmuu/au mm: mvcv mnncnnwanvnmum r... G 1. De6endan~Ds1endan Ielah memplldlmn dl ualam pembelasnnya bahawa Parjanjian Jualbali unmk hananah Ismabut merupnksn saw urusnlaqa pinjumnn wing. Msmnnflingknn Plllnflf bulmnlah aeomng pembsu pimam wang Derlsssn, urusan pinjaman wang larsebuldlsslinduwksn dengm menanditanuanl perhnjian Jualben. 2. Parblcanaan psnuh aijuamn dengan Plainlfl memanggll seuranu sdrsl lain: Flainlil sendiri manlknla Defandan»D91endan memanggll figs arung saksl. 3. Hniahan Deflendln-Dafevldan dan jug. melnlui menngan meneka. wunsalxsl Iersehul ademh mempalmn um «nnsaksi pinjuman wang betdasstkan iakm-fakva barikm:- so Serrma bayauan yang dihuat olah Plalmfl kepeda Deiendsn-Defsndan Iidnk dldalam jumlah penuh yam n..s sspmmnyu, temp? bayarln yang dilerima Inlah dunrak Iuedah. Buynrambuyurun oemsmn adalan aspen: berlkutv i) Eaynran panama RM5o.00n.uo umpi PI-Inm man msnenma fiM4125n.ou. Ir) Beyamn kaauu. RuI1oo,ooo.uo talapi aimlak HM5.5oo.oo nan Plalmlf nanya Ierlma nM9l,7sn.no den III) Bayamn kmlga berjumlun HMS0.00D.00 tsmpi dllohk FIM11.000.D0 Iv) Begin: ma baymln yang dlkalakan Fhimil sebanyak RM1oo,aoo.oo yam tslih dmuat sewn dua peringm. Plflnfl! hany: msnflapm RM4a.250.oo can yang sspaunnw RM5o,ooo.oo. ._n nmomu/ms unnxsmcv mmm p... . b) Selain davi nu, DeIsndIn»Daflendan munghujuhkan nahaw: pwamn sdulah melalul seovang yang bemama Ah euan dun orang yang bernama Ah Guan Ielah Iidak dipanaail cosh Plaimlf. Kaglullan Pluinlif rnemlngdl Ah Gum Inlnh msnumukkan Plalnfll lalan gaqal mamnuman naruwa verianilan Ievsebul buksnlah rnempakan Iransaksi pinj-man wnng. c) Huiahan Defemianvnnlandun ma. Plaintil ma tzelnh algal memhuktikan Bnhlwa pambnyaran dapnall dun ma nmoo,ooo.oo yang lain fldak cllbukfilun dsngan apa-spa resin Tsmbahan pula pemhaysran tldak fihual melflul pswam. 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Bebun pemnukuan halvawn Detemanbefeman ndak menaapax bsyaran sepenuhnya tallh pun berpindah kepnda - nucvc mm. mm mvu-saanmmvwuu I’-:- ‘ Devan-nn-Detnnaan umuk mernbukllkannya. Seksyen . 103 Aktx Katerangun I950tsL:h memperunlukkan:- " tun. Bahln memnukaoan lemang spa-up-Ileku temenm pads orang yang hsrkehandakkan Mahkamah msrnpanayll hamang kswuludnn ram Mu. melalnkan Ilia uflpelunlukkan oleh manaqnana urdangdmdang mrmwa huktl mengenal fakta itu Ierlatak pad: mane-man: nmny Isnanlu. - iii) Tuiak am dmnjukksn dan dlmkvikan oleh pihak Defsndln buhawa baylran yang dharlms ndalah mm mennukupl. Msmanaungnan Detaman-nevenaan yang lslah msmbenwnkan lsu ini, plhak Defsndan»De1amBn peflulah mambukfiknnxvya. uumm, ups yang eon dl hadapan Mahknmah um hanyalah msrupskan kererangan knsmg sematammx wanna psmbukllan yang kukuh aleu dsokong nlah ape-ups bukli ddtumemnr. gzzmunénnm wum umummammum. p...- aznwcluums iv] Hulahun Defendan yang menya1akan bshawa Plalmfl xsplmmya memanggll An euan unluk menyokung lnemangan hahawu uangaiual tarsebut adalah sam Iransaksi iualbsli June dimlak olah Mankamam im. Mahkamah lni balpandanul plnak Detenuanluh yang sapamnya memenggil penama larssbul unmk damnu membsli ketaranuan bug! membuktlkan sabaliknyn. V) Muhkamah In? juga oslnh meoolak huhhm uevendan-outs:-can yang rmngalakan dari hansakui tarssbul mm mangmai pemblyalan am melalui peguam. Imsreu balah dlbuat bahawa Iransaksl lersebut bukmlah nlnsuksr pevianjlan funlbaii. Mahknman nu menolak nuwmn mvsebul karma Mahlmmah berpenflupal bahawa cam hayaran dsposn Iidak alnyauakan swam mums di dallm pedlnjlan. Tldsk mu um-na yang mengalaknn pemhayslan pem dibuat melami peguam, sama ada psmhayaran name beliin mahupnn mmm uunnclwuc mm». rum

Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-24-542-05/2016

PLAINTIF CHIN AH KEOW @ CHIN LAI SITT (NO K/P: 470616 – 08 – 5361) DEFENDAN 1. SOLIHA BINTI AHMAD NASARUDIN (NO K/P: 590529 – 08 - 5730) 2. KETUA PENGARAH INSOLVENSI MALAYSIA [Sebagai Penerima untuk harta Muliyono Bin Tukiman (No K/P 540623 – 10 – 5691), seorang bankrap] 3. CIMB ISLAMIC BANK BERHAD

11/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=64751665-a215-44a5-b079-6eddc19caab1&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

S-22-287-2009

PLAINTIF BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD DEFENDAN 1. ) 1. MOHAMAD NAJIB BIN SHAHARUDDIN 2. ) 2. RAJA ZAINAL ALAM SHAH BIN RAJA ABDULLAH OMAR 3. ) 3. ABDUL AZIZ BIN ISMAIL 4. ) 4. ISHAK BIN YAHYA

06/04/2017

YA DATUK SU GEOK YIAM

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=65409847-c9db-4b33-b8f4-f5a0111ceb74&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGU MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: S-22-287-2009 BETWEEN BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD ... PLAINTIFF AND 1. MOHAMAD NAJIB BIN SHAHARUDDIN 2. RAJA ZAINAL ALAM SHAH BIN RAJA ABDULLAH OMAR 3. ABDUL AZIZ BIN ISMAIL 4. ISHAK BIN YAHYA … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (No. 2) Background 1. The plaintiff is a public company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965. 2. The plaintiff owns a subsidiary, namely Bank Islam (Labuan) Ltd (“BILL”). BILL was incorporated under the Offshore Companies Act 1990. 3. BILL was granted a licence by the Labuan Offshore Statutory Authority (“LOFSA”) to carry out offshore banking business in Labuan. 4. The Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and the Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of BILL were responsible for the management and operation of BILL. 5. Mohamad Najib Bin Shaharuddin, the 1st defendant, was the COO from 1 January 2000 and the CEO from 1 January 2003. Subsequently, the 1st defendant was appointed as the director of BILL at the 54th Board of Directors’ meeting on 25 June 2003. 6. Raja Zainal Alam Shah Bin Raja Abdullah Omar, the 2nd defendant, was the CEO of BILL from 1 May 1997 i.e. prior to the 1st defendant’s tenure of office as the CEO from 1 January 2003. 7. Between July 2000 and August 2004, the 2nd defendant served as a member of the Board of Directors of BILL. 8. At all material times, Abdul Aziz Bin Ismail, the 3rd defendant, was an employee of BILL and served as the Head of the Operations Department of BILL from 1 October 2000. 9. Ishak Bin Yahya, the 4th defendant, joined the plaintiff as a bank officer on March 1984. In April 2001, he was transferred to BILL. 10. At all material times, the 4th defendant, was an employee of BILL and served as the Head of the I.T. and Finance Department of BILL from April 2001 until 2005. 11. At all material times, there was a Management Committee (“MC”) in BILL. The role of the MC was, inter alia, to consider and to recommend credit facilities to the Board of Directors for the latter’s approval. 12. The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants were appointed as members of the MC. Subsequently, the 1st and 2nd defendants also held the post of the Chairman of the MC at different times. 13. The 3rd defendant, as a member of the MC, was also involved in the performance and discharge of the functions and role of the MC i.e. the recommendation of loans and their disbursal for the approval of the Board of Directors. 14. On 10 December 2004, the High Court ordered all the undertakings and the assets of BILL to be vested in the plaintiff. 15. According to the plaintiff, at all material times, the defendants’ in their capacity as the employees of BILL owe to BILL statutory duties under section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990, a common law duty of care and skill and express and/or implied contractual duties. Plaintiff’s suit 16. In this suit, the plaintiff is claiming for damages against the defendants for losses suffered as a result of their breaches of duties in respect of four credit facilities. The four credit facilities 17. The four credit facilities are as follows: (1) the Farris facility; (2) the Commerce Trading facility; (3) the Crest Group facility; and (4) the Crestek facility; The Farris facility 18. The briefs facts of this facility are as follows: (1) This facility was granted by BILL to Farris. (2) It is an Al-Bithaman Ajil facility for USD$ 485,000.00. One of the securities required under the facility comprised a 3rd party Cash Deposit. It provided 100% security and the Cash Deposit was made by one Dato' Afifudin bin Haji Omar. (3) The facility was recommended by the MC to BILL’s Board of Directors and the facility was disbursed to Farris. (4) Prior to the execution of the security documents, the 1st defendant signed a letter which was addressed to Tabung Haji. The letter instructed Tabung Haji to release the plaintiff’s charge over Dato' Afifuddin’s account with Lembaga Tabung Haji. (5) However, the charge over the security i.e. the Cash Deposit, was never perfected. Hence, the Farris facility was unsecured since 19 January 2004 (6) Subsequently, Farris defaulted on the repayment of the facility. (7) The plaintiff’s claim is against the 1st defendant. The Commerce Trading facility 19. The brief facts of this facility are as follows: (1) The facility was recommended by the MC and approved by the Board of Directors of BILL to Commerce Trading and disbursement was made to Commerce Trading. (2) While they were in the MC, all the defendants recommended to BILL’s Board of Directors for the latter’s approval, a USD$ 4,800,000.00 Al-Ijarah Al-Muntahiah Bit Tamlik facility in favour of Commerce Trading. (3) The defendants proposed to BILL’s Board of Directors that the facility be secured by joint and several guarantees to be given by one Kamaruddin Awang and one Datuk Hiew (the “2 guarantors) even though Datuk Hiew was not an appropriate guarantor for the facility. (4) Subsequently, Commerce Trading defaulted on the repayment of the facility. (5) The plaintiff also failed to recover the amounts owed by Commerce Trading to BILL from the two guarantors. (6) The plaintiff’s claim is against all the defendants. The Crest Group facility 20. The brief facts of this facility are as follows: (1) This is a Master Al Bai Bithaman Ajil facility which was granted by BILL to the Crest Group. (2) The facility was to be secured by two debentures i.e. one on the fixed and floating assets of Martin Walter Ultrashllteknik AG and another on the fixed and floating assets of Rinco Ultrasonics AG (the “2nd securities). (3) A change of security arrangement was later recommended and approved whereby the 2 securities were cancelled and replaced by a negative pledge. (4) Nevertheless, notwithstanding that the negative pledge was not obtained, the 1st and 2nd defendants approved the disbursal of the facility to the Crest Group. (5) Subsequently, the Crest Group defaulted on the repayment of the facility to BILL. (6) The plaintiff’s claim is against the 1st and 2nd defendants. The Crestek facility 21. The brief facts of this facility are as follows: (1) This is a facility which was granted by BILL to Crestek. (2) Contrary to the practice of BILL, the 3rd defendant prepared the Memorandum of Financing Approval to Crestek which approved the disbursal of the facility. (3) Subsequently, Crestek defaulted on the repayment of the facility. (4) The plaintiff’s claim is against the 3rd defendant. Documents filed by the parties for use in the full trial 22. The parties have filed the following documents for use in the full trial pursuant to the directions given by the Court during case management proceedings: (1) Bundle of Pleadings (enclosure (39A)); (2) Bundle of Documents in 4 volumes; (3) Summary of case (plaintiff) (enclosure (39B)); (4) Summary of case (4th defendant) (enclosure (40A)); (5) Summary of case (1st and 2nd defendants) (enclosure (42)). (6) Agreed Facts (enclosure (45)); (7) Issues to be tried (enclosure (46)); (8) Plaintiff’s Opening Statement (enclosure (44)); (9) List of 4 (four) Witnesses (plaintiff) (enclosure (47)); (10) List of 2 (two) Witnesses (1st and 2nd defendants) (enclosure (43)); (11) List of 1 (one) Witness (4th defendant) (enclosure (48)); (12) 4 Witness Statements (plaintiff) (enclosures (58), (59), (60) and (61)); (13) 1 Witness Statement (4th defendant) (enclosure (56)); and (14) 2 Witness Statements (1st and 2nd defendants) (enclosures (65) and (66)). Issues for the determination of the Court 23. The parties have framed the following 3 (three) issues for the determination of the Court: (1) Whether all the defendants at the material times, owe duties (statutory, common law and/or contractual) to the plaintiff? (2) Whether all the defendants had, at all material times, acted in breach of their duties owed to the plaintiff? and (3) Whether the plaintiff has suffered loss and/or damage by reason of the defendants’ breaches of their statutory, common law and/or contractual duties and, if so, what is the quantum of such loss and/or damage? Additional issues for the determination of the Court 24. The Court has framed the following 3 (three) additional issues for the determination of the Court, which have arisen as a result of the submissions of the parties on the 3 (three) issues as set out above: (1) Whether the Court ought to apportion liability between the 4 (four) defendants and the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff? (2) Whether the non-calling of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff as witnesses is fatal to the plaintiff’s suit and claims against the 4 (four) defendants? (3) Who bears the burden of proof on mitigation of losses that are claimed by the plaintiff? The full trial 25. The parties called 7 (seven) witnesses altogether. 26. The plaintiff called 4 (four) witnesses. They are as follows: (1) Mdm. Maria binti Mat Said, the Company Secretary and Head of Legal and Secretarial of the plaintiff, who had joined the plaintiff on 1 August 2005 and whose evidence is based on documents and records maintained by the plaintiff to which she has access, as PW1; (2) Mr. Suffian bin Ariffin, who, at the material time, was assigned to the Capital Market and Syndication Unit under the Corporate Banking Department of BILL, as PW2; (3) Mr. Mohamed bin Jusoh, the Investigating Officer from the Special Investigations Unit of the plaintiff since 2007, as PW3; and (4) Mr. Nurulzahar bin Ghazali, the present Assistant General Manager of the Business Support Division of the plaintiff, who had joined the plaintiff on 6 June 2005, whose evidence is based on his personal knowledge and also the documents of the plaintiff to which he has full access, as PW4. 27. The defendants called 3 (three) witnesses. They are as follows: (1) Mr. Mohamad Najib bin Shaharuddin, the 1st defendant himself, who had commenced his employment with the plaintiff in 1986 and who was transferred to BILL in 1997, as DW1; (2) Mr. Raja Zainal Alam Shah bin Raja Abdullah Omar, the 2nd defendant himself, who had commenced his employment with the plaintiff on 16 December 1996 as a bank officer, and who was tasked with the setting up of BILL and who was transferred to BILL in June 1997, after BILL was set up and had commenced operations, as DW2; and (3) Mr. Ishak bin Yahaya, the 4th defendant himself, who had commenced his employment with the plaintiff on 15 March 1984 as a bank officer and in April 2001, he reported for duty in BILL and about 3 to 4 months later he was appointed as one of the members of the Management Committee of BILL, as DW3. 1st and 2nd defendants’ submissions 28. Encik Azhar Arman Ali, the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants, submitted that the plaintiff’s claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants ought to be dismissed based on the following reasons: (1) He relied on clause 1 of the Supplementary Agreement, which was drafted by the legal advisors of BILL, (at Bundle E, p. 304) which states as follows: “In consideration of the Customer procuring the said Third Party Memorandum of Charge Over Shares in favour of the Bank, the Bank hereby agrees to release the Memorandum Of Deposit with effect from the date hereof.” (2) Based on the wordings of clause 1 as set out above, it seems that BILL’s own legal adviser, i.e. Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co, had found it safe to allow BILL to immediately release the Tabung Haji deposit “with effect from the date hereof”, when Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co themselves had known fully well that the Memorandum of Charge Over Shares i.e. of Digi.com Bhd, was yet to be perfected. This is because Bambang Sugeng had not executed the Memorandum of Charge Over Shares. This knowledge is clear from recital D of the Supplementary Agreement, which states that the Memorandum of Charge Over Shares was “to be executed by Bambang Sugeng in favour of the Bank”; (3) It is worth noting that Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. was not a legal firm which was called in at the last minute to draft the Supplementary Agreement without knowledge of the background facts. Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. was duly engaged by BILL as its legal counsel at the inception of the Faaris Facility in the year 2000. BILL’s own papers dated 14 July 2000 (see Bundle E, p. 297) states clearly that Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co was the ‘Financier’s Legal Counsel’ for this loan transaction. It is safe to assume that Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co’s had full knowledge of the Faaris Facility and its securities; (4) If BILL’s own legal advisor (i.e. Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co.) had deemed it all right to release the Tabung Haji deposit even though Bambang Sugeng had not executed the Memorandum of Charge over the Digi.com Bhd’s shares, why would the blame be placed on the 1st defendant for authorizing the release of the Tabung Haji deposit?; (5) By virtue of executing the Supplementary Agreement (on 26 January 2004), an agreement which was prepared and advised upon by Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co., the 1st defendant had no choice but to authorize the release of the Tabung Haji deposit. The words in clause 1 of the Supplementary Agreement are crystal clear. These are i.e. “... the bank hereby agrees to release the Memorandum of Deposit with effect from the date hereof”; (6) Since the undated Supplementary Agreement was actually executed on 26 January 2004 (a fact which PW4 himself had agreed), and in the absence of any documentary evidence to show the actual date Tabung Haji received the release letter, we have to assume that the release of the deposit was made on or after 26 January 2004; (7) In the light of the Supplementary Agreement drafted by BILL’s own legal counsel, authorizing an early release, i.e. prior to the execution of the Memorandum of Charge over the Digi.com Bhd’s shares, the 1st defendant had done nothing wrong in the circumstances; (8) The plaintiff’s only witness who testified on this issue was PW3. PW3 claimed that he was an internal investigator appointed to investigate the alleged irregularities in approving the Commerce Trading Facility; (9) His evidence is highly suspect. First and foremost, there was no document whatsoever to corroborate his appointment to investigate. His authority to investigate, functions and scope of investigation, remains a mystery; (10) It is inconceivable for the plaintiff (as a licensed bank) to authorize an investigation of an alleged irregularity without any documentation (since none was tendered in evidence). There was also no report of the so-called investigation, made or produced in Court; (11) PW3 also gave conflicting testimonies in Court. In his evidence-in-chief (i.e. in his witness statement, P30) he said he investigated the Commerce Trading Facility. In cross-examination, PW3 agreed to the suggestion that he investigated the defendants but did not make any conclusion because he found that the 1st and 2nd defendants were not at fault. However, in re-examination, PW3 said that he did not investigate the 1st and 2nd defendants at all; (12) It would be wrong in law and in fact to find liability on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants based on the suspicious evidence of PW3. This is bearing in mind that PW3 is the only witness for the plaintiff in respect of the Commerce Trading Facility; (13) The presumption in section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 ought to apply against the plaintiff in respect of PW3 in that, the investigation documents (if any), such as any letter of appointment or notes of investigations, if produced, will adversely affect the plaintiff’s case against the 1st and 2nd defendants; (14) Much like the Faaris Facility, the plaintiff also failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff had taken the necessary steps to enforce the various securities under the Commerce Trading Facility when the facility was in default. There was no evidence that the plaintiff attempted to enforce any security under the Commerce Trading facility when the same was in default; (15) The plaintiff also failed to prove that the loan default and the amount outstanding under the Commerce Trading Facility was a consequence of the failure to determine Datuk Hiew’s financial status. Hence, the plaintiff’s loss is not caused by the 1st and 2nd defendants and the damage is remote; (16) The ad hoc facility for USD 200,000.00 was also governed by various collaterals. It would be grossly unjust to blame the 1st and 2nd defendants (solely on the issue of Datuk Hiew’s status) when the plaintiff had the benefit of all the other collaterals. The failure of Commerce Trading to repay its loan and the failure of the plaintiff to enforce the available securities diligently were the probable causes that the loan remained outstanding and it has nothing to do with Datuk Hiew’s financial status; (17) In respect of the Crest Group Facility, the plaintiff’s case rests solely on the failure to secure a certain ‘negative pledge’ but it is important to note the evidence of PW4 when he said (in cross-examination) that a ‘negative pledge’ is in fact a reduction in security (compared to a debenture). In essence, the conversion of the originally intended security i.e. from a debenture to a ‘negative pledge’, is effectively reducing the net value of the security. Therefore, taking into consideration all the other securities and collaterals under this facility, and on the balance of probabilities, the ‘negative pledge’ should not be regarded as a ‘deal breaker’; (18) Since none of the members of the Board of Directors (past and present) was called to give evidence for the plaintiff it would be wrong to assume that the action taken by the Board of Directors of BILL would be any different if the ‘negative pledge’ was not obtained; (19) Further, Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. was engaged to carry out its duties to secure the ‘negative pledge’ and there was no evidence of any follow-up action on the matter; (20) Similar with the other facilities discussed above (like the Commerce Trading Facility, for example) there were other ample securities to cover the plaintiff’s risk in the event of default; (21) In this case, the plaintiff had adduced evidence of a loan settlement between the plaintiff and the borrower (i.e. Crest Group) for a sum of RM RM 8,049,980.00. In such a situation, it would be wrong to impose any finding of liability on the defendants, especially, when there is no longer any amount outstanding under the Crest Group Facility because the settlement is a full settlement and the total outstanding balance is recorded as nil in the the statement of account as at 7 October 2013 (see Bundle D, page 2); (22) There is no evidence adduced at trial of any written contract of employment for both the 1st and 2nd defendants. Hence, it would be wrong in law and in fact to speculate the exact contractual obligations of these defendants, in the circumstances of the above loan facilities. There was also no evidence of the industry practice in the given circumstances. Therefore, the case for a breach of contract against the 1st and 2nd defendants is not made out; (23) Hence, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the 1st and 2nd defendants were, in fact and in law, negligent or that they have breached their, respective, employment contracts or that they have breached the provisions of section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990; (24) On the contrary, the failures of the, respective, borrowers, (namely, Faaris and Commerce Trading, bearing in mind that Crest Group had made payment and there is no amount outstanding), to repay their loans were not caused by the alleged failures of the 1st and 2nd defendant. This is because the failure to repay is a distinct issue quite separate from the issue concerning the alleged failures of the 1st and 2nd defendants to perform and fulfil their duties to BILL. The failure to repay coupled with the fact that there is no evidence of recovery or the enforcement of available securities were the likely causes why the loans were outstanding. In other words, there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence of the 1st and 2nd defendants and the alleged damage suffered by the plaintiff; (25) The evidence of the plaintiff’s key witnesses (PW3 and PW4) left a lot to be desired and none of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL or the plaintiff was called to give evidence; and (26) Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, there was no negligence, breach of contract and/or breach of statute on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants. 4th defendant’s submissions 29. Encik Mohd Mohyiddin bin Mohd. Mesbah, the learned counsel for the 4th defendant, submitted that the plaintiff’s suit and claims against the 4th defendant ought to be dismissed with cost based on the following reasons: (1) With regard to the Faaris Facility, the 4th defendant was not involved at all and the plaintiff’s witnesses has not adduced any evidence to implicate the 4th defendant for this facility; (2) With regard to the Commerce Facility, the 4th defendant ought not to be held liable because he had relied solely on the paper that was presented by the 1st defendant to BILL’s Board of Directors for the granting of the facility to the borrower; (3) With regard to the ad hoc facility for the USD 200,000.00 and USD 150,000.00 for Commerce Trading, the 4th defendant ought not to be held liable because he was not responsible for the recommendation to the Board of Directors of BILL for the granting of this facility to the borrower; (4) Furthermore, even though the 4th defendant had released the loan of USD 350,000.00 to the borrower, the release was made subject to conditions (see P29) and it was the responsibility of the Corporate Banking Department of BILL to ensure that the conditions were complied with before the moneys were released to the borrower; (5) The above is also applicable to the reduction of the security from a sum of USD 146,000.00 to a sum of USD 74,763.00; (6) With regard to the Crestek Facility, the plaintiff has not implicated the 4th defendant in its statement of claim; and (7) With regard to the Crest Group Facility, the 4th defendant is also not implicated by the plaintiff in its statement of claim. Decision of the Court after the full trial 30. On 16 June 2015, upon the conclusion of the full trial, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff had proved on a balance of probabilities as follows: “1. All four (4) defendants at all material times owed statutory, common law and/or contractual duties to Bank Islam (L) Ltd (“BILL”); 2. All four (4) defendants had acted in breach of their duties owed to BILL; and 3. BILL had suffered the following losses and damages by reason of the said breaches: (a) In respect of the Faaris facility, damages in the sum of USD 501,379.17 against the 1st defendant; (b) In respect of the Commerce facility, damages in the sum of USD 5,510,287.60 against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants jointly; (c) In respect of the Crest Group facility, damages in the sum of USD 1,397,964.84 against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly; and (d) In respect of the Crestek facility, damages in the sum of USD 24,384,068.56 against the 3rd defendant.” 31. Therefore, the Court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff as follows: “(1) for damages in the sum of USD 501,379.17 against the 1st defendant as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Faaris facility; (2) for damages in the sum of USD 5,510,287.60 against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants jointly being as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Commerce facility; (3) damages in the sum of USD 1,397,964.84 against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Crest Group facility; and (4) damages in the sum of USD 24,384,068.56 against the 3rd defendant as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Crestek facility.” 32. The Court further ordered the respective defendants to pay to the plaintiff interest on the respective judgment sums as specified above at 5% per annum from the date of judgment until the date of full realization and the costs of this action. 33. The Court then invited the parties to propose the amount of costs to be awarded to the plaintiff by the defendants. 34. The learned plaintiff’s counsel proposed a sum of RM 30,000.00 as cost against the 1st defendant, a sum of RM 30,000.00 as cost against the 2nd defendant, a sum of RM 10,000.00 as cost against the 3rd defendant and a sum of RM 20,000.00 as cost against the 4th defendant. 35. The learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants left the amount of cost to be awarded to the plaintiff to the discretion of the Court. 36. The learned counsel for the 4th defendant also left the amount of cost to be awarded to the plaintiff to the discretion of the Court. 37. The Court then ordered the 1st defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 30,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action, the 2nd defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 30,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action, the 3rd defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 10,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action and the 4th defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 20,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action. Reasons for the decision of the Court 38. The reasons why the Court decided in that manner are as follows: 39. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is on the basis that the defendants owed statutory, common law and/or contractual duties to BILL and that the defendants had breached those duties. Issue (1): Whether all the defendants at the material times, owe duties (statutory, common law and/or contractual) to the plaintiff? 40. The Court was of the considered view that based on the facts and the law that is applicable, issue (1) ought to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiff. The law 41. Under section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990, officers and employees of an offshore company such as BILL, at all material times, owe statutory duties, a common law duty of care and skill and express and/or implied contractual duties to their employer, who is BILL in the instant case. 42. Section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990 provides as follows: “Section 92. Duty and liability of officers. (1) Every officer of an offshore company shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office. (2) An officer of an offshore company shall not make improper use of any information acquired by reason of his office to gain, whether directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or any other person or to cause detriment to the company. (3) An officer of an offshore company who contravenes this section shall be - (a) liable to the company for any profit made by him and for any damage suffered by the company as a result of such breach; and (b) guilty of an offence against this Act. (4) This section is in addition to and not in derogation of any other written law or rule of law relating to the duty or liability of directors or officers of a company.” 43. In Malayan Banking Bhd v Basarudin bin Ahmad Khan [2007] 1 MLJ 613, the Federal Court allowed the appeal of the Bank-employer against a former employee of the Bank in a claim for damages for breach of contract of employment. The Federal Court held at page 623 that the “employee of the appellant owes a contractual duty of care to the appellant and breach of that duty would render him liable to the appellant in damages for breach of contract. This is the common law right of the appellant as the employer”. 44. In The State of South Australia & Anor v Timothy Marcus Clark [1996] SASC 5499, the Supreme Court of South Australia found the Managing Director and CEO of the State Bank of South Australia liable for negligence and in breach of fiduciary duties in connection with a transaction. On the duty of care owed by the defendant, the Court held at paragraph 157 as follows: “[a]s the chief executive officer and managing director of a large bank, he was obliged to bring to bear an appropriate level of skill having regard to the responsibilities which that office entailed. No doubt, as is the case with all large corporations, it was necessary for him to delegate responsibility for the operation of different functions of the bank, in circumstances where no further oversight could be expected. But he must unquestionably be regarded as responsible for the overall control of the operations of the bank …” and at paragraph 160 that “[t]here is no question but that the requirements of his office imposed upon Mr. Marcus Clark a duty to act in accordance with the highest standards of competence and integrity applicable to the banking industry.” 45. In Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Dato’ Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by the Appellant/employer’s claim for breach of fiduciary duties owed by the respondent/employee which resulted in losses to the appellant. 46. Reverting back to the instant case, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that there were indeed breaches of duties by the respective defendants in respect of the four (4) facilities. The plaintiff has relied on the oral evidence of its witnesses and also the evidence as contained in the documents filed and produced before the Court to prove that the breaches had indeed occurred. 47. In Malaysia Airline System Bhd v Wan Sa’adi @ Syed Sa’adi bin Wan Mustafa [2015] 1 MLJ 757, the Federal Court held at page 771D as follows: “We also find no merit in the complaint of the respondent that the failure by the appellant to call the witnesses who testified during the domestic inquiry had deprived him of the opportunity to cross-examine them. There was nothing to prevent the respondent from calling those witnesses even though the appellant did not call them. Obviously the appellant was satisfied with the evidence it had adduced without having to call those witnesses. …” (Emphasis added). The Faaris Facility 48. The Court shall now deal with the Faaris Facility. 49. The Faaris Facility dated 27 July 2000 was entered into by BILL and Investment Holding Plc (“Faaris”) for USD 485,000.00 in favour of Faaris (see Bundle C, p. 216-276). The sale price for the Faaris Facility is USD 506,098.00 (see Bundle C, p. 216-276, at p. 262). 50. Among the principal terms and conditions of the Faaris Facility were that the facility was to be secured by, inter alia, a 3rd Party Cash Deposit providing 110% security at any one (1) time in the plaintiff or Lembaga Tabung Haji and held on lien to BILL (“the Memorandum of Deposit/Charge”). 51. A Cash Deposit was made by one Dato’ Affifudin bin Haji Omar (“Dato’ Affifudin”) in his Lembaga Tabung Haji account and was charged to BILL (“the Charge over Cash Deposit”). Whether the 1st defendant has breached his duties in respect of the Faaris Facility? 52. Prior to the execution of the security documents to give effect to a change in the security arrangement from the Charge over Cash Deposit to 2,000,000 units of Digi.com Berhad shares belonging to one Kamarudin Jaffar, the 1st defendant signed a letter dated 19 January 2004 addressed to Lembaga Tabung Haji releasing BILL’s charge over Dato’ Affifudin’s account (“the Release of Security”) (see Bundle E, p. 302). What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 53. Prior to the Release of Security, the Faaris Facility was secured by the Ringgit Malaysia equivalent of USD 673,115 in Tabung Haji deposit charged to BILL (see Bundle E, p. 338). As at 1 July 2002, there remained RM 2,557,837.79 in Dato’ Affifudin’s Tabung Haji account (see Bundle E, p. 346-347). 54. The security of the Digi.com Berhad shares to be obtained as the replacement security had a market value of USD 1,789,474 (see Bundle E, p. 348-349). Accordingly, had this Digi.com Berhad shares been obtained as security, the plaintiff would have been fully secured for the outstanding amount under the Faaris Facility. 55. The Court found that based on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered losses of USD 501,379.17 in respect of the Faaris Facility, which comprise the outstanding Selling Price as at 30 July 2004 of USD 499,647.00 and legal fees incurred of USD 1,732.17 (see Bundle D, p. 1). 56. The Court found that the plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that the person who has caused this loss to the plaintiff is the 1st defendant. Whether the plaintiff took steps to mitigate its loss? 57. The Court was satisfied that the plaintiff had undertaken the following steps to mitigate its losses in relation to the Faaris Facility: (1) Upon default in making instalment payments by Faaris, BILL’s solicitors had sent a letter of demand dated 16 December 2004 to Faaris (see Bundle C, p. 87-88); (2) Numerous telephone calls were made to Faaris to request for the transfer of the Digi.com Berhad shares (see Bundle C, p. 211-212, at p. 211); (3) BILL’s solicitors issued a Notice of Recall of the Faaris Facility dated 9 March 2005 (see Bundle C, p. 213-214); and (4) BILL’s solicitors had sent a letter of demand dated 21 March 2005 for the execution and delivery of the Third Party Memorandum of Charge Over Shares in favour of BILL to replace the Charge over Cash Deposit (see Bundle C, p. 85-86). Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st defendant? 58. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st defendant with regard to the 1st defendant’s liability towards the plaintiff for the Faaris Facility. The First Commerce Facility 59. The Court shall now deal with the First Commerce Facility. 60. By a Memorandum of Approval dated 5 February 2002, the Management Committee consisting of all defendants recommended for approval to the Board of Directors a USD 4,800,000.00 Al-Ijarah Al-Muntahiah Bit Tamlik facility in favour of Commerce Trading (“First Commerce Facility”) to be secured by inter alia, a joint and several guarantee by Kamaruddin Awang (“Kamaruddin”) and Datuk Hiew Min Yong (“Datuk Hiew”) (see Bundle B, p. 17-29). 61. The recommendation for the First Commerce Facility was tabled at the 9th Credit Meeting of BILL but based on the results of a CTOS search carried out and presented, was then deferred for the Management Committee to obtain clarification on legal proceedings against Kamaruddin and Datuk Hiew and to consider additional securities for the facility (see Bundle B, p. 30). 62. In a letter dated 5 September 2001, Messrs. Zul Rafique & Partners, BILL’s solicitors, had advised BILL in relation to a related facility, Commerce Resources Inc which was also secured inter alia by a joint and several guarantee by Datuk Hiew that there was every danger that Datuk Hiew may be made a bankrupt at any time in view of the fact that a receiving order had already been made against him (see Bundle F, p. 902-904). Whether the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants have breached their duties in respect of the First Commerce Facility? 63. The Management Committee consisting of all defendants, nonetheless, submitted a further recommendation for approval of the First Commerce Facility dated 11 March 2002 (see Bundle B, p. 31-45) based on a letter dated 28 February 2002 from one C. Robertson, the legal counsel of Datuk Hiew, clarifying the legal proceedings against Datuk Hiew (see Bundle F, p. 905-906). 64. At its 38th Board meeting held on 28 March 2002 attended by the 1st and 2nd defendants, the Board of Directors of BILL approved the First Commerce Facility based on the recommendation by the Management Committee with several additional conditions (see Bundle B, p. 46). 65. By an internal memorandum dated 4 April 2002 addressed to the 2nd defendant and copied to the 1st defendant, BILL’s officers recommended to the Management that the signing of the First Commerce Facility agreement be deferred to protect BILL’s interests (see Bundle F, p. 909-911). 66. By another internal memorandum dated 5 April 2002 addressed to the 2nd defendant and copied to the 1st defendant, BILL’s officer expressed concerns regarding, inter alia, the strength of the security in the form of a personal guarantee from Datuk Hiew in view of the fact that a receiving order had been made against him (see Bundle F, p. 912-914). 67. Despite the concerns raised by BILL’s officers, no action was taken by the 1st and 2nd defendants and/or the Management Committee to address these issues. 68. The disbursement of the First Commerce Facility was approved by the Management Committee which included the 1st defendant on 30 April 2002 (see Bundle B, p. 49-60). Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the First Commerce Facility? 69. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the First Commerce Facility. The Second Commerce Facility 70. The Court shall now deal with the Second Commerce Facility. 71. By a memorandum dated 11 November 2002 signed by the 2nd defendant, a proposal was made to the Finance Exco of BILL for the provision of an ad-hoc Murabahah Working Capital Financing (“MWCF”) facility of USD 200,000.00 to Commerce Trading. The security proposed was, a joint and several guarantee by Kamaruddin and Datuk Hiew, and the placement of USD 146,000.00 in a Mudharabah Investment Account (see Bundle B, p. 61-70). Whether the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants have breached their duties in respect of the Second Commerce Facility? 72. No further checks or clarification were obtained as to the financial status of Datuk Hiew notwithstanding that a receiving order had been made against Datuk Hiew. This issue was not highlighted to the Finance Exco. The proposal for the ad-hoc facility was recommended by the Management Committee comprising all defendants without further questions or reverting back to the Corporate Banking Department for further credit evaluation. 73. On 20 November 2002, the facility was approved by the Finance Exco of BILL which included the 2nd defendant based on this recommendation (see Bundle B, p. 70). 74. By a letter dated 2 January 2003, Commerce Trading requested for an additional amount of USD 150,000.00 over and above the approved amount of USD 200,000.00. This additional facility was again recommended by the 4th defendant upon the same terms and conditions as the USD 200,000.00 MWCF facility without enquiry (see Bundle B, p. 71-75). 75. On 28 January 2003, the additional amount of USD 150,000.00 was approved by the Finance Exco, which included the 1st and 2nd defendants, based on this recommendation (see Bundle B, p. 75 and p. 76-81). 76. Subsequently, on 11 January 2003, the 4th defendant approved a request for disbursal of the full amount of USD 350,000.00 and the same was accordingly disbursed (see Bundle F, p. 915-917). 77. Vide a memorandum from the Corporate Banking Department dated 6 February 2003, it was requested that the Management Committee approve the reduction of the security deposit from USD 146,000.00 to USD 74,736.00, as a sum of USD 72,000.00 from the security deposit had already been used by Commerce Trading to finance the quarterly instalments for the First Commerce Facility (“Reduction of Security”) (see Bundle F, p. 907-908). 78. The request for Reduction of Security was approved by the Management Committee which included the 4th defendant but it was a condition and in accordance with practice and procedure that the Reduction of Security be ratified by the Finance Exco and/or the Board of Directors as approving authority. The ratification was not obtained. 79. Contrary to the terms and conditions upon which the Second Commerce Facility had been approved, the amount in the Mudharabah Investment Account at the time of disbursal was only USD 73,736.00. What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 80. The Court found that based on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered losses of USD 5,510,287.60 which consists of the judgment sum for the First Commerce Facility of USD 5,150,800.00, the judgment sum of USD 352,240.00 for the Second Commerce Facility, the amounts advanced by BILL on behalf of Commerce Trading in the sum of USD 1,026.34 and costs on a full indemnity basis of USD 6,221.28 (see Bundle D, p. 4). 81. The Court also found that the persons who had caused these losses to the plaintiff are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. Whether the plaintiff had taken steps to mitigate its loss? 82. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff had undertaken the following steps to mitigate its losses in relation to the Commerce Trading Facility: (1) BILL’s solicitors had sent letters of demand dated 15 June 2004 (see Bundle F, p. 918-920) and 20 October 2004 to Commerce Trading and the guarantors of the Commerce Trading Facility (see Bundle C, p. 281-283); (2) BILL obtained a judgment in relation to the First Commerce Facility on 25 May 2005 in the sum of USD 5,150,800; and (3) BILL obtained a judgment in relation to the Second Commerce Facility on 25 May 2005 in the sum of USD 352,240.00. Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the Second Commence Facility? 83. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court found that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the Second Commence Facility. The Crest Group Facility 84. The Court shall now deal with the Crest Group Facility. 85. The Crest Group Facility for USD 11,000,000.00 was granted by BILL on 9 December 2000 to Crest Group Inc. (“the Crest Group”). The Crest Group Facility was to be secured by, inter alia, debentures by subsidiaries of the Crest Ultrasonics Group which was part of the Crest Group (see Bundle E, p. 472-528). 86. By a Memorandum for Approval dated 28 January 2001, a recommendation was submitted by the Management Committee, which included the 1st and 2nd defendants for, inter alia, a change of the security arrangement by cancelling the security of a debenture on the fixed and floating assets of two (2) subsidiaries and requiring a ‘negative pledge’ instead due to tax reasons (see Bundle E, p. 316-319). 87. On 8 March 2001, the proposal for ratification by the Board of Directors of BILL was recommended by the Management Committee which included the 1st and 2nd defendants. The change of security arrangement was, subsequently, ratified by the Board of Directors of BILL at the 33rd Board of Directors’ meeting held on 23 March 2001 (see Bundle E, p. 320-321A). 88. By a letter dated 16 March 2001, BILL’s solicitors, Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. advised that the Crest Group Facility could be disbursed subject to resolution of several outstanding conditions precedent (see Bundle E, p. 322-328). Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants have breached their duties in respect of the Crest Group Facility? 89. Notwithstanding the outstanding conditions precedent, disbursal of the Crest Group Facility was approved by the Management Committee comprising the 1st and 2nd defendants, and the Crest Group Facility was, subsequently, disbursed (see Bundle E, p. 325). 90. To date, the negative pledges have not been executed nor perfected nor have the outstanding conditions precedent been fulfilled. Crest Group, subsequently, defaulted on the repayment of the Crest Group Facility. 91. Hence, the Court was satisfied that the 1st and 2nd defendants have breached their duties in respect of the Crest Group Facility What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 92. Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement entered into with Crest Group, the outstanding sum of USD 1,397,964.84 was waived (see Bundle D, p. 2). 93. Based on the evidence, the Court found that this loss was caused to the plaintiff by the 1st and 2nd defendants. Whether the plaintiff had taken steps to mitigate its loss? 94. The Court found that the plaintiff had taken steps to mitigate its loss. BILL’s solicitors had sent numerous reminders, among others, by letters dated 19 June 2002 (stated as “12th Reminder”) (see Bundle C, p. 93-97) and dated 11-7-2002 (stated as “13th Reminder”) (see Bundle C, p. 98) to Crest Group to request for the outstanding conditions precedent. Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of the Crest Group Facility? 95. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of the Crest Group Facility. The Crestek Facility 96. The Court shall now deal with the Crestek Facility. 97. On 26 November 1999, the Board of Directors of BILL had approved an Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil facility of USD 20,000,000.00 to Crestek Inc and USD 10,000,000.00 to Crest Group Inc. for the period of three (3) years and the repayment of the principal was a “bullet repayment” at the end of maturity of the facility. The said facilities were to mature on 12 October 2002 and 23 November 2002, respectively (see Bundle E, p. 32 and p. 332-336). 98. A Memorandum for Financing Approval for a USD 30,000,000.00 Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil facility in favour of Crestek (“Crestek Facility”) as an extension of the earlier facilities to Crestek Inc and Crest Group respectively was recommended by the Management Committee which consisted of the 1st and 4th defendants (see Bundle C, p. 124-210). 99. Crestek and BILL entered into a facility agreement dated 19 June 2003 (see Bundle E, p. 529-590). It was a condition precedent that all security documentation must be executed and perfected prior to disbursement of the facility. Whether the 3rd defendant has breached his duties to the plaintiff in respect of the Crestek Facility? 100. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the 3rd defendant has breached his duties to the plaintiff in respect of the Crestek Facility. This is because a pre-disbursement checklist dated 19 June 2003 was also forwarded to the Management Committee for their review and their approval disclosing several outstanding condition precedents (see Bundle C, p. 114-123). 101. However, the Memorandum for Approval of Disbursement was approved singly by the 3rd defendant, instead of by two (2) members of the Management Committee (see Bundle C, p. 113). What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 102. Based on evience, it is undisputed that Crestek, subsequently, defaulted on the repayment of the facility. Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement entered into with Crestek, the outstanding sum of USD 24,384,068.56 was waived (see Bundle D, p.3). 103. Hence, the plaintiff has claimed for this amount against the 3rd defendant. Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 3rd defendant in respect of the Crestek Facility? 104. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 3rd defendant in respect of the Crestek Facility. Additional issue (1): Whether the Court ought to apportion liability between the 4 (four) defendants and the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff? 105. Since none of the defendants has pleaded contributory negligence, the Court cannot grant any apportionment of liability. Hence, the Court found for the plaintiff in respect of the plaintiff’s claims for the whole amount of the losses suffered against the respective defendants (see Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & Anor [1995] 2 MLJ 276 where the Court held at 283F as follows: “… apportionment of liability cannot be granted when contributory negligence was not pleaded by the appellants - see the case of Hamizan bin Abd Haid v Wong Kok Keong & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 630.” 106. In Hamizan bin Abd Hamid v Wong Kok Keong [1994] 3 MLJ 630, the Court held at page 634E as follows:- “Though the common law position is somewhat altered, the principle of contributory negligence as a defence does not seem to have changed. It is still required to be pleaded by the defendant and, failure to do is fatal to the defence even though contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is found to exist. The decision of Fookes v Slayton [1979] 1 All ER 137; [1978] 1 WLR 1293 supports this principle. In this case, the English Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in awarding damages based on contributory negligence of the claimant when the defendant did not even file his defence or appeared in court. The award was reversed by the Court of Appeal and altered to a 100% liability against the Defendant. Fookes v Slayton has been accepted in our courts for some time and, in fact it was reiterated by KC Vohrah J in the case of Anuar bin Mat Amin v Abdullah bin Mohd Zain [1989] 3 MLJ 313.” and further at 635C, “From the aforesaid authorities, one element is certain and that is, the issue of contributory negligence must be brought to the court’s consideration before it can be deliberated. If it is not, then apportionment of liability based on contributory negligence of the claimant cannot succeed. In a vast majority of cases where the cause of action is based on negligence, the defence normally pleads contributory negligence in their statement of defence. Once this is pleaded, it becomes an issue before the court which requires the court’s consideration. As it has become an issue, there is no necessity for the plaintiff to plead the same. However, if the defendant does not plead contributory negligence in his defence, it does not become an issue before the court. In such an event, if the plaintiff is able to prove any degree of negligence against the defendant, he will succeed in his case despite the fact that he may have contributed towards it. He will be entitled to damages based on a 100% liability. The cases of Fookes v Slayton and Anuar bin Mat Amin v Abdullah bin Mohd Zain support this principle. …” (Emphasis added). 107. Based on the above authorities that were cited by Mr. Oommen Koshy, the plaintiff’s learned counsel, the Court agreed with and accepted the plaintiff’s submissions that since the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving liability on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to damages based on a 100% liability against the, respective, defendants. 108. Further, since the defendants are attempting to shift the blame to the members of the Board of Directors of BILL, it was incumbent upon the defendants to ensure that the relevant members of the Board of Directors were added as third parties or co-defendants in this suit. Here, only the 4th defendant has issued indemnity proceedings against the 1st and 2nd defendants. For the rest of the defendants, it is too late to raise this issue now. 109. In Dr Aishah Tul Radziah bt L Hussin v Dr Suresh a/l Kumarasamy & Ors [2014] 11 MLJ 702, the Court held at page 726D as follows:- “As a matter of fairness, fairplay and justice, since Dr Aishah had shifted the blamce to HPP and its doctors in the first suit, she should have joined HPP and its doctors either as third parties or co-defendants in the first suit and thereafter made all necessary interlocutory applications by way of further and better particulars or discovery or interrogatories. In the result, I am impelled to the view that everything that is being articulated against HPP and its doctors in the present suit could have been done in the first suit. In my view, in the circumstances of the situation which prevailed in the first suit and in particular having regard to Dr Aishah’s trial strategy of shifting the blame to HPP and its doctors, it was incumbent upon Dr Aishah to ensure that HPP and its doctors were added as third parties or co-defendants in the first suit. …” (Emphasis added). Additional issue (2): Who bears the burden of proof on mitigation of losses that are claimed by the plaintiff? 110. The 1st and 2nd defendants have raised the issue of “follow-up” during cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses and as an alternative defence in the 1st and 2nd defendants’ submissions (see the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Written Submissions, pages 16-18, paragraphs 32-36) in alleging that the losses suffered by the plaintiff could have been averted had “follow-up” actions been taken by BILL. 111. Nevertheless, the Court agreed with and accepted the plaintiff’s submissions that it is trite law that the burden of proving grounds for mitigation rests on the defendants and the defendants have failed to discharge this burden as the defendants did not lead any evidence of fact in mitigation of damages. 112. In Leong Yoong v Lee Sem Yoong [1968] 2 MLJ 72, the Federal Court held at page 76I (right) as follows:- “The damages suffered by the respondent in this case are by no means remote. The respondent said in his oral evidence that he had told the appellant that he wanted to sell the land. There has been no denial of that allegation. If there were grounds for mitigation it was for the appellant to have alleged and proved them:- ‘The question of what is reasonable for a plaintiff to do in mitigation of his damages is not a question of law, but one of fact in the circumstances of each case, the burden of proof being upon the defendant’ (see Halsbury, vol. 11, (3rd Ed.), para. 476, age 290). In the present action the appellant has not pleaded or proved any fact in mitigation of damages. … The appeal is dismissed with costs …” (Emphasis added). 113. In any event, the Court found that the plaintiff was only vested with the assets and undertakings of BILL pursuant to the Vesting Order in 2006. Prior to that, the day-to-day management of BILL was under the purview of the defendants themselves, either as members of the Management Committee or as the CEO of BILL. Therefore, the Court agreed and accepted the plaintiff’s submission that this is not an issue which should prevent the plaintiff from succeeding in a claim for damages against the defendants. Additional issue (3): Whether the non-calling of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff as witnesses is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim? 114. In Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Dato’ Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284, it can be seen from the Grounds of Judgment that one of the members of the Appellant’s Board of Directors testified as a witness on behalf of the Appellant. However, the calling of the member of the Board of Directors concerned may have been necessary in that case as the sole complaint of the Appellant was that the Respondent caused the Appellant to enter into loan agreements despite not getting the approval from the Board of Directors. This is not the situation in the present case. 115. In any event, the Court was of the considered view that the non-calling of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL as witnesses is not fatal to the plaintiff’s claim. This is because the issue that none of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL was called as the plaintiff’s witnesses was never raised by any of the defendants during the trial. Even then, it was open to any of the defendants to call them as witnesses, but none did. Conclusion 116. In the premises, based on the reasons as set out above, the Court found follows: (1) That all four (4) defendants at all material times owed statutory, common law and/or contractual duties to BILL; (2) That all four (4) defendants had acted in breach of their duties owed to BILL; and (3) That BILL had suffered losses and damages by reason of the said breach: (a) In respect of the Faaris Facility, damages in the sum of USD 501,379.17 against the 1st defendant; (b) In respect of the Commerce Facility, damages in the sum of USD 5,510,287,60 against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants jointly; (c) In respect of the Crest Group Facility, damages in the sum of USD 1,397,964.84 against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly; and (d) In respect of the Crestek Facility, damages in the sum of USD 24,384,068.56 against the 3rd defendant. 117. Therefore, the decision and orders of the Court in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants are in order. Dated: 6 April 2016 (DATUK SU GEOK YIAM) Judge High Court Civil NCvC 11 Kuala Lumpur COUNSELS 1. Mr. Oommen Koshy and Miss Eyza Farizan Mokhtar, the learned counsels for the plaintiff at: Messrs. Skrine Advocates & Solicitors Unit No. 50-8-1, 8th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50, Jalan Dungun Damansara Heights 50490 Kuala Lumpur 2. Mr. Azhar Arman Ali and Miss Elly Azrin Khalid, the learned counsels for the 1st and 2nd defendants at: Messrs. Arman-Yunos Advocates & Solicitors No. 3-5, Jalan 15/48A Off Jalan Sentul 51000 Kuala Lumpur 3. Mr. Mohd Mohyiddin bin Mohamad Mesbah, the learned counsel for the 4th defendant at: Messrs. Mohyiddin & Co. Advocates & Solicitors 284-1B, Jalan Haruan 5/7 Pusat Commercial Oakland II Seremban 2 70300 Seremban CASE REFERENCE: 1. Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & Anor [1995] 2 MLJ 276. 2. Hamizan bin Abd Hamid v Wong Kok Keong [1994] 3 MLJ 630. 3. Dr Aishah Tul Radziah bt L Hussin v Dr Suresh a/l Kumarasamy & Ors [2014] 11 MLJ 702. 4. Malayan Banking Bhd v Basarudin bin Ahmad Khan [2007] 1 MLJ 613. 5. The State of South Australia & Anor v Timothy Marcus Clark [1996] SASC 5499. 6. Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Dato’ Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284. 7. Malaysia Airline System Bhd v Wan Sa’adi @ Syed Sa’adi bin Wan Mustafa [2015] 1 MLJ 757. 8. Leong Yoong v Lee Sem Yoong [1968] 2 MLJ 72. LEGISLATION REFERENCE: 1. S 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990. 2. S 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950. 39

Tika 2.6.0

S-22-287-2009

PLAINTIF BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD DEFENDAN 1. ) 1. MOHAMAD NAJIB BIN SHAHARUDDIN 2. ) 2. RAJA ZAINAL ALAM SHAH BIN RAJA ABDULLAH OMAR 3. ) 3. ABDUL AZIZ BIN ISMAIL 4. ) 4. ISHAK BIN YAHYA

06/04/2017

YA DATUK SU GEOK YIAM

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=65409847-c9db-4b33-b8f4-f5a0111ceb74&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGU MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF MALAYSIA CIVIL SUIT NO: S-22-287-2009 BETWEEN BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD ... PLAINTIFF AND 1. MOHAMAD NAJIB BIN SHAHARUDDIN 2. RAJA ZAINAL ALAM SHAH BIN RAJA ABDULLAH OMAR 3. ABDUL AZIZ BIN ISMAIL 4. ISHAK BIN YAHYA … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (No. 2) Background 1. The plaintiff is a public company incorporated under the Companies Act 1965. 2. The plaintiff owns a subsidiary, namely Bank Islam (Labuan) Ltd (“BILL”). BILL was incorporated under the Offshore Companies Act 1990. 3. BILL was granted a licence by the Labuan Offshore Statutory Authority (“LOFSA”) to carry out offshore banking business in Labuan. 4. The Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and the Chief Operating Officer (“COO”) of BILL were responsible for the management and operation of BILL. 5. Mohamad Najib Bin Shaharuddin, the 1st defendant, was the COO from 1 January 2000 and the CEO from 1 January 2003. Subsequently, the 1st defendant was appointed as the director of BILL at the 54th Board of Directors’ meeting on 25 June 2003. 6. Raja Zainal Alam Shah Bin Raja Abdullah Omar, the 2nd defendant, was the CEO of BILL from 1 May 1997 i.e. prior to the 1st defendant’s tenure of office as the CEO from 1 January 2003. 7. Between July 2000 and August 2004, the 2nd defendant served as a member of the Board of Directors of BILL. 8. At all material times, Abdul Aziz Bin Ismail, the 3rd defendant, was an employee of BILL and served as the Head of the Operations Department of BILL from 1 October 2000. 9. Ishak Bin Yahya, the 4th defendant, joined the plaintiff as a bank officer on March 1984. In April 2001, he was transferred to BILL. 10. At all material times, the 4th defendant, was an employee of BILL and served as the Head of the I.T. and Finance Department of BILL from April 2001 until 2005. 11. At all material times, there was a Management Committee (“MC”) in BILL. The role of the MC was, inter alia, to consider and to recommend credit facilities to the Board of Directors for the latter’s approval. 12. The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants were appointed as members of the MC. Subsequently, the 1st and 2nd defendants also held the post of the Chairman of the MC at different times. 13. The 3rd defendant, as a member of the MC, was also involved in the performance and discharge of the functions and role of the MC i.e. the recommendation of loans and their disbursal for the approval of the Board of Directors. 14. On 10 December 2004, the High Court ordered all the undertakings and the assets of BILL to be vested in the plaintiff. 15. According to the plaintiff, at all material times, the defendants’ in their capacity as the employees of BILL owe to BILL statutory duties under section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990, a common law duty of care and skill and express and/or implied contractual duties. Plaintiff’s suit 16. In this suit, the plaintiff is claiming for damages against the defendants for losses suffered as a result of their breaches of duties in respect of four credit facilities. The four credit facilities 17. The four credit facilities are as follows: (1) the Farris facility; (2) the Commerce Trading facility; (3) the Crest Group facility; and (4) the Crestek facility; The Farris facility 18. The briefs facts of this facility are as follows: (1) This facility was granted by BILL to Farris. (2) It is an Al-Bithaman Ajil facility for USD$ 485,000.00. One of the securities required under the facility comprised a 3rd party Cash Deposit. It provided 100% security and the Cash Deposit was made by one Dato' Afifudin bin Haji Omar. (3) The facility was recommended by the MC to BILL’s Board of Directors and the facility was disbursed to Farris. (4) Prior to the execution of the security documents, the 1st defendant signed a letter which was addressed to Tabung Haji. The letter instructed Tabung Haji to release the plaintiff’s charge over Dato' Afifuddin’s account with Lembaga Tabung Haji. (5) However, the charge over the security i.e. the Cash Deposit, was never perfected. Hence, the Farris facility was unsecured since 19 January 2004 (6) Subsequently, Farris defaulted on the repayment of the facility. (7) The plaintiff’s claim is against the 1st defendant. The Commerce Trading facility 19. The brief facts of this facility are as follows: (1) The facility was recommended by the MC and approved by the Board of Directors of BILL to Commerce Trading and disbursement was made to Commerce Trading. (2) While they were in the MC, all the defendants recommended to BILL’s Board of Directors for the latter’s approval, a USD$ 4,800,000.00 Al-Ijarah Al-Muntahiah Bit Tamlik facility in favour of Commerce Trading. (3) The defendants proposed to BILL’s Board of Directors that the facility be secured by joint and several guarantees to be given by one Kamaruddin Awang and one Datuk Hiew (the “2 guarantors) even though Datuk Hiew was not an appropriate guarantor for the facility. (4) Subsequently, Commerce Trading defaulted on the repayment of the facility. (5) The plaintiff also failed to recover the amounts owed by Commerce Trading to BILL from the two guarantors. (6) The plaintiff’s claim is against all the defendants. The Crest Group facility 20. The brief facts of this facility are as follows: (1) This is a Master Al Bai Bithaman Ajil facility which was granted by BILL to the Crest Group. (2) The facility was to be secured by two debentures i.e. one on the fixed and floating assets of Martin Walter Ultrashllteknik AG and another on the fixed and floating assets of Rinco Ultrasonics AG (the “2nd securities). (3) A change of security arrangement was later recommended and approved whereby the 2 securities were cancelled and replaced by a negative pledge. (4) Nevertheless, notwithstanding that the negative pledge was not obtained, the 1st and 2nd defendants approved the disbursal of the facility to the Crest Group. (5) Subsequently, the Crest Group defaulted on the repayment of the facility to BILL. (6) The plaintiff’s claim is against the 1st and 2nd defendants. The Crestek facility 21. The brief facts of this facility are as follows: (1) This is a facility which was granted by BILL to Crestek. (2) Contrary to the practice of BILL, the 3rd defendant prepared the Memorandum of Financing Approval to Crestek which approved the disbursal of the facility. (3) Subsequently, Crestek defaulted on the repayment of the facility. (4) The plaintiff’s claim is against the 3rd defendant. Documents filed by the parties for use in the full trial 22. The parties have filed the following documents for use in the full trial pursuant to the directions given by the Court during case management proceedings: (1) Bundle of Pleadings (enclosure (39A)); (2) Bundle of Documents in 4 volumes; (3) Summary of case (plaintiff) (enclosure (39B)); (4) Summary of case (4th defendant) (enclosure (40A)); (5) Summary of case (1st and 2nd defendants) (enclosure (42)). (6) Agreed Facts (enclosure (45)); (7) Issues to be tried (enclosure (46)); (8) Plaintiff’s Opening Statement (enclosure (44)); (9) List of 4 (four) Witnesses (plaintiff) (enclosure (47)); (10) List of 2 (two) Witnesses (1st and 2nd defendants) (enclosure (43)); (11) List of 1 (one) Witness (4th defendant) (enclosure (48)); (12) 4 Witness Statements (plaintiff) (enclosures (58), (59), (60) and (61)); (13) 1 Witness Statement (4th defendant) (enclosure (56)); and (14) 2 Witness Statements (1st and 2nd defendants) (enclosures (65) and (66)). Issues for the determination of the Court 23. The parties have framed the following 3 (three) issues for the determination of the Court: (1) Whether all the defendants at the material times, owe duties (statutory, common law and/or contractual) to the plaintiff? (2) Whether all the defendants had, at all material times, acted in breach of their duties owed to the plaintiff? and (3) Whether the plaintiff has suffered loss and/or damage by reason of the defendants’ breaches of their statutory, common law and/or contractual duties and, if so, what is the quantum of such loss and/or damage? Additional issues for the determination of the Court 24. The Court has framed the following 3 (three) additional issues for the determination of the Court, which have arisen as a result of the submissions of the parties on the 3 (three) issues as set out above: (1) Whether the Court ought to apportion liability between the 4 (four) defendants and the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff? (2) Whether the non-calling of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff as witnesses is fatal to the plaintiff’s suit and claims against the 4 (four) defendants? (3) Who bears the burden of proof on mitigation of losses that are claimed by the plaintiff? The full trial 25. The parties called 7 (seven) witnesses altogether. 26. The plaintiff called 4 (four) witnesses. They are as follows: (1) Mdm. Maria binti Mat Said, the Company Secretary and Head of Legal and Secretarial of the plaintiff, who had joined the plaintiff on 1 August 2005 and whose evidence is based on documents and records maintained by the plaintiff to which she has access, as PW1; (2) Mr. Suffian bin Ariffin, who, at the material time, was assigned to the Capital Market and Syndication Unit under the Corporate Banking Department of BILL, as PW2; (3) Mr. Mohamed bin Jusoh, the Investigating Officer from the Special Investigations Unit of the plaintiff since 2007, as PW3; and (4) Mr. Nurulzahar bin Ghazali, the present Assistant General Manager of the Business Support Division of the plaintiff, who had joined the plaintiff on 6 June 2005, whose evidence is based on his personal knowledge and also the documents of the plaintiff to which he has full access, as PW4. 27. The defendants called 3 (three) witnesses. They are as follows: (1) Mr. Mohamad Najib bin Shaharuddin, the 1st defendant himself, who had commenced his employment with the plaintiff in 1986 and who was transferred to BILL in 1997, as DW1; (2) Mr. Raja Zainal Alam Shah bin Raja Abdullah Omar, the 2nd defendant himself, who had commenced his employment with the plaintiff on 16 December 1996 as a bank officer, and who was tasked with the setting up of BILL and who was transferred to BILL in June 1997, after BILL was set up and had commenced operations, as DW2; and (3) Mr. Ishak bin Yahaya, the 4th defendant himself, who had commenced his employment with the plaintiff on 15 March 1984 as a bank officer and in April 2001, he reported for duty in BILL and about 3 to 4 months later he was appointed as one of the members of the Management Committee of BILL, as DW3. 1st and 2nd defendants’ submissions 28. Encik Azhar Arman Ali, the learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants, submitted that the plaintiff’s claim against the 1st and 2nd defendants ought to be dismissed based on the following reasons: (1) He relied on clause 1 of the Supplementary Agreement, which was drafted by the legal advisors of BILL, (at Bundle E, p. 304) which states as follows: “In consideration of the Customer procuring the said Third Party Memorandum of Charge Over Shares in favour of the Bank, the Bank hereby agrees to release the Memorandum Of Deposit with effect from the date hereof.” (2) Based on the wordings of clause 1 as set out above, it seems that BILL’s own legal adviser, i.e. Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co, had found it safe to allow BILL to immediately release the Tabung Haji deposit “with effect from the date hereof”, when Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co themselves had known fully well that the Memorandum of Charge Over Shares i.e. of Digi.com Bhd, was yet to be perfected. This is because Bambang Sugeng had not executed the Memorandum of Charge Over Shares. This knowledge is clear from recital D of the Supplementary Agreement, which states that the Memorandum of Charge Over Shares was “to be executed by Bambang Sugeng in favour of the Bank”; (3) It is worth noting that Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. was not a legal firm which was called in at the last minute to draft the Supplementary Agreement without knowledge of the background facts. Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. was duly engaged by BILL as its legal counsel at the inception of the Faaris Facility in the year 2000. BILL’s own papers dated 14 July 2000 (see Bundle E, p. 297) states clearly that Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co was the ‘Financier’s Legal Counsel’ for this loan transaction. It is safe to assume that Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co’s had full knowledge of the Faaris Facility and its securities; (4) If BILL’s own legal advisor (i.e. Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co.) had deemed it all right to release the Tabung Haji deposit even though Bambang Sugeng had not executed the Memorandum of Charge over the Digi.com Bhd’s shares, why would the blame be placed on the 1st defendant for authorizing the release of the Tabung Haji deposit?; (5) By virtue of executing the Supplementary Agreement (on 26 January 2004), an agreement which was prepared and advised upon by Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co., the 1st defendant had no choice but to authorize the release of the Tabung Haji deposit. The words in clause 1 of the Supplementary Agreement are crystal clear. These are i.e. “... the bank hereby agrees to release the Memorandum of Deposit with effect from the date hereof”; (6) Since the undated Supplementary Agreement was actually executed on 26 January 2004 (a fact which PW4 himself had agreed), and in the absence of any documentary evidence to show the actual date Tabung Haji received the release letter, we have to assume that the release of the deposit was made on or after 26 January 2004; (7) In the light of the Supplementary Agreement drafted by BILL’s own legal counsel, authorizing an early release, i.e. prior to the execution of the Memorandum of Charge over the Digi.com Bhd’s shares, the 1st defendant had done nothing wrong in the circumstances; (8) The plaintiff’s only witness who testified on this issue was PW3. PW3 claimed that he was an internal investigator appointed to investigate the alleged irregularities in approving the Commerce Trading Facility; (9) His evidence is highly suspect. First and foremost, there was no document whatsoever to corroborate his appointment to investigate. His authority to investigate, functions and scope of investigation, remains a mystery; (10) It is inconceivable for the plaintiff (as a licensed bank) to authorize an investigation of an alleged irregularity without any documentation (since none was tendered in evidence). There was also no report of the so-called investigation, made or produced in Court; (11) PW3 also gave conflicting testimonies in Court. In his evidence-in-chief (i.e. in his witness statement, P30) he said he investigated the Commerce Trading Facility. In cross-examination, PW3 agreed to the suggestion that he investigated the defendants but did not make any conclusion because he found that the 1st and 2nd defendants were not at fault. However, in re-examination, PW3 said that he did not investigate the 1st and 2nd defendants at all; (12) It would be wrong in law and in fact to find liability on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants based on the suspicious evidence of PW3. This is bearing in mind that PW3 is the only witness for the plaintiff in respect of the Commerce Trading Facility; (13) The presumption in section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950 ought to apply against the plaintiff in respect of PW3 in that, the investigation documents (if any), such as any letter of appointment or notes of investigations, if produced, will adversely affect the plaintiff’s case against the 1st and 2nd defendants; (14) Much like the Faaris Facility, the plaintiff also failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the plaintiff had taken the necessary steps to enforce the various securities under the Commerce Trading Facility when the facility was in default. There was no evidence that the plaintiff attempted to enforce any security under the Commerce Trading facility when the same was in default; (15) The plaintiff also failed to prove that the loan default and the amount outstanding under the Commerce Trading Facility was a consequence of the failure to determine Datuk Hiew’s financial status. Hence, the plaintiff’s loss is not caused by the 1st and 2nd defendants and the damage is remote; (16) The ad hoc facility for USD 200,000.00 was also governed by various collaterals. It would be grossly unjust to blame the 1st and 2nd defendants (solely on the issue of Datuk Hiew’s status) when the plaintiff had the benefit of all the other collaterals. The failure of Commerce Trading to repay its loan and the failure of the plaintiff to enforce the available securities diligently were the probable causes that the loan remained outstanding and it has nothing to do with Datuk Hiew’s financial status; (17) In respect of the Crest Group Facility, the plaintiff’s case rests solely on the failure to secure a certain ‘negative pledge’ but it is important to note the evidence of PW4 when he said (in cross-examination) that a ‘negative pledge’ is in fact a reduction in security (compared to a debenture). In essence, the conversion of the originally intended security i.e. from a debenture to a ‘negative pledge’, is effectively reducing the net value of the security. Therefore, taking into consideration all the other securities and collaterals under this facility, and on the balance of probabilities, the ‘negative pledge’ should not be regarded as a ‘deal breaker’; (18) Since none of the members of the Board of Directors (past and present) was called to give evidence for the plaintiff it would be wrong to assume that the action taken by the Board of Directors of BILL would be any different if the ‘negative pledge’ was not obtained; (19) Further, Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. was engaged to carry out its duties to secure the ‘negative pledge’ and there was no evidence of any follow-up action on the matter; (20) Similar with the other facilities discussed above (like the Commerce Trading Facility, for example) there were other ample securities to cover the plaintiff’s risk in the event of default; (21) In this case, the plaintiff had adduced evidence of a loan settlement between the plaintiff and the borrower (i.e. Crest Group) for a sum of RM RM 8,049,980.00. In such a situation, it would be wrong to impose any finding of liability on the defendants, especially, when there is no longer any amount outstanding under the Crest Group Facility because the settlement is a full settlement and the total outstanding balance is recorded as nil in the the statement of account as at 7 October 2013 (see Bundle D, page 2); (22) There is no evidence adduced at trial of any written contract of employment for both the 1st and 2nd defendants. Hence, it would be wrong in law and in fact to speculate the exact contractual obligations of these defendants, in the circumstances of the above loan facilities. There was also no evidence of the industry practice in the given circumstances. Therefore, the case for a breach of contract against the 1st and 2nd defendants is not made out; (23) Hence, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the 1st and 2nd defendants were, in fact and in law, negligent or that they have breached their, respective, employment contracts or that they have breached the provisions of section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990; (24) On the contrary, the failures of the, respective, borrowers, (namely, Faaris and Commerce Trading, bearing in mind that Crest Group had made payment and there is no amount outstanding), to repay their loans were not caused by the alleged failures of the 1st and 2nd defendant. This is because the failure to repay is a distinct issue quite separate from the issue concerning the alleged failures of the 1st and 2nd defendants to perform and fulfil their duties to BILL. The failure to repay coupled with the fact that there is no evidence of recovery or the enforcement of available securities were the likely causes why the loans were outstanding. In other words, there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence of the 1st and 2nd defendants and the alleged damage suffered by the plaintiff; (25) The evidence of the plaintiff’s key witnesses (PW3 and PW4) left a lot to be desired and none of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL or the plaintiff was called to give evidence; and (26) Therefore, on the balance of probabilities, there was no negligence, breach of contract and/or breach of statute on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants. 4th defendant’s submissions 29. Encik Mohd Mohyiddin bin Mohd. Mesbah, the learned counsel for the 4th defendant, submitted that the plaintiff’s suit and claims against the 4th defendant ought to be dismissed with cost based on the following reasons: (1) With regard to the Faaris Facility, the 4th defendant was not involved at all and the plaintiff’s witnesses has not adduced any evidence to implicate the 4th defendant for this facility; (2) With regard to the Commerce Facility, the 4th defendant ought not to be held liable because he had relied solely on the paper that was presented by the 1st defendant to BILL’s Board of Directors for the granting of the facility to the borrower; (3) With regard to the ad hoc facility for the USD 200,000.00 and USD 150,000.00 for Commerce Trading, the 4th defendant ought not to be held liable because he was not responsible for the recommendation to the Board of Directors of BILL for the granting of this facility to the borrower; (4) Furthermore, even though the 4th defendant had released the loan of USD 350,000.00 to the borrower, the release was made subject to conditions (see P29) and it was the responsibility of the Corporate Banking Department of BILL to ensure that the conditions were complied with before the moneys were released to the borrower; (5) The above is also applicable to the reduction of the security from a sum of USD 146,000.00 to a sum of USD 74,763.00; (6) With regard to the Crestek Facility, the plaintiff has not implicated the 4th defendant in its statement of claim; and (7) With regard to the Crest Group Facility, the 4th defendant is also not implicated by the plaintiff in its statement of claim. Decision of the Court after the full trial 30. On 16 June 2015, upon the conclusion of the full trial, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff had proved on a balance of probabilities as follows: “1. All four (4) defendants at all material times owed statutory, common law and/or contractual duties to Bank Islam (L) Ltd (“BILL”); 2. All four (4) defendants had acted in breach of their duties owed to BILL; and 3. BILL had suffered the following losses and damages by reason of the said breaches: (a) In respect of the Faaris facility, damages in the sum of USD 501,379.17 against the 1st defendant; (b) In respect of the Commerce facility, damages in the sum of USD 5,510,287.60 against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants jointly; (c) In respect of the Crest Group facility, damages in the sum of USD 1,397,964.84 against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly; and (d) In respect of the Crestek facility, damages in the sum of USD 24,384,068.56 against the 3rd defendant.” 31. Therefore, the Court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff as follows: “(1) for damages in the sum of USD 501,379.17 against the 1st defendant as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Faaris facility; (2) for damages in the sum of USD 5,510,287.60 against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants jointly being as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Commerce facility; (3) damages in the sum of USD 1,397,964.84 against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Crest Group facility; and (4) damages in the sum of USD 24,384,068.56 against the 3rd defendant as claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the Crestek facility.” 32. The Court further ordered the respective defendants to pay to the plaintiff interest on the respective judgment sums as specified above at 5% per annum from the date of judgment until the date of full realization and the costs of this action. 33. The Court then invited the parties to propose the amount of costs to be awarded to the plaintiff by the defendants. 34. The learned plaintiff’s counsel proposed a sum of RM 30,000.00 as cost against the 1st defendant, a sum of RM 30,000.00 as cost against the 2nd defendant, a sum of RM 10,000.00 as cost against the 3rd defendant and a sum of RM 20,000.00 as cost against the 4th defendant. 35. The learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd defendants left the amount of cost to be awarded to the plaintiff to the discretion of the Court. 36. The learned counsel for the 4th defendant also left the amount of cost to be awarded to the plaintiff to the discretion of the Court. 37. The Court then ordered the 1st defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 30,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action, the 2nd defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 30,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action, the 3rd defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 10,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action and the 4th defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum of RM 20,000.00 as the cost of the plaintiff’s action. Reasons for the decision of the Court 38. The reasons why the Court decided in that manner are as follows: 39. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendants is on the basis that the defendants owed statutory, common law and/or contractual duties to BILL and that the defendants had breached those duties. Issue (1): Whether all the defendants at the material times, owe duties (statutory, common law and/or contractual) to the plaintiff? 40. The Court was of the considered view that based on the facts and the law that is applicable, issue (1) ought to be answered in the affirmative in favour of the plaintiff. The law 41. Under section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990, officers and employees of an offshore company such as BILL, at all material times, owe statutory duties, a common law duty of care and skill and express and/or implied contractual duties to their employer, who is BILL in the instant case. 42. Section 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990 provides as follows: “Section 92. Duty and liability of officers. (1) Every officer of an offshore company shall at all times act honestly and use reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office. (2) An officer of an offshore company shall not make improper use of any information acquired by reason of his office to gain, whether directly or indirectly, an advantage for himself or any other person or to cause detriment to the company. (3) An officer of an offshore company who contravenes this section shall be - (a) liable to the company for any profit made by him and for any damage suffered by the company as a result of such breach; and (b) guilty of an offence against this Act. (4) This section is in addition to and not in derogation of any other written law or rule of law relating to the duty or liability of directors or officers of a company.” 43. In Malayan Banking Bhd v Basarudin bin Ahmad Khan [2007] 1 MLJ 613, the Federal Court allowed the appeal of the Bank-employer against a former employee of the Bank in a claim for damages for breach of contract of employment. The Federal Court held at page 623 that the “employee of the appellant owes a contractual duty of care to the appellant and breach of that duty would render him liable to the appellant in damages for breach of contract. This is the common law right of the appellant as the employer”. 44. In The State of South Australia & Anor v Timothy Marcus Clark [1996] SASC 5499, the Supreme Court of South Australia found the Managing Director and CEO of the State Bank of South Australia liable for negligence and in breach of fiduciary duties in connection with a transaction. On the duty of care owed by the defendant, the Court held at paragraph 157 as follows: “[a]s the chief executive officer and managing director of a large bank, he was obliged to bring to bear an appropriate level of skill having regard to the responsibilities which that office entailed. No doubt, as is the case with all large corporations, it was necessary for him to delegate responsibility for the operation of different functions of the bank, in circumstances where no further oversight could be expected. But he must unquestionably be regarded as responsible for the overall control of the operations of the bank …” and at paragraph 160 that “[t]here is no question but that the requirements of his office imposed upon Mr. Marcus Clark a duty to act in accordance with the highest standards of competence and integrity applicable to the banking industry.” 45. In Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Dato’ Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal by the Appellant/employer’s claim for breach of fiduciary duties owed by the respondent/employee which resulted in losses to the appellant. 46. Reverting back to the instant case, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that there were indeed breaches of duties by the respective defendants in respect of the four (4) facilities. The plaintiff has relied on the oral evidence of its witnesses and also the evidence as contained in the documents filed and produced before the Court to prove that the breaches had indeed occurred. 47. In Malaysia Airline System Bhd v Wan Sa’adi @ Syed Sa’adi bin Wan Mustafa [2015] 1 MLJ 757, the Federal Court held at page 771D as follows: “We also find no merit in the complaint of the respondent that the failure by the appellant to call the witnesses who testified during the domestic inquiry had deprived him of the opportunity to cross-examine them. There was nothing to prevent the respondent from calling those witnesses even though the appellant did not call them. Obviously the appellant was satisfied with the evidence it had adduced without having to call those witnesses. …” (Emphasis added). The Faaris Facility 48. The Court shall now deal with the Faaris Facility. 49. The Faaris Facility dated 27 July 2000 was entered into by BILL and Investment Holding Plc (“Faaris”) for USD 485,000.00 in favour of Faaris (see Bundle C, p. 216-276). The sale price for the Faaris Facility is USD 506,098.00 (see Bundle C, p. 216-276, at p. 262). 50. Among the principal terms and conditions of the Faaris Facility were that the facility was to be secured by, inter alia, a 3rd Party Cash Deposit providing 110% security at any one (1) time in the plaintiff or Lembaga Tabung Haji and held on lien to BILL (“the Memorandum of Deposit/Charge”). 51. A Cash Deposit was made by one Dato’ Affifudin bin Haji Omar (“Dato’ Affifudin”) in his Lembaga Tabung Haji account and was charged to BILL (“the Charge over Cash Deposit”). Whether the 1st defendant has breached his duties in respect of the Faaris Facility? 52. Prior to the execution of the security documents to give effect to a change in the security arrangement from the Charge over Cash Deposit to 2,000,000 units of Digi.com Berhad shares belonging to one Kamarudin Jaffar, the 1st defendant signed a letter dated 19 January 2004 addressed to Lembaga Tabung Haji releasing BILL’s charge over Dato’ Affifudin’s account (“the Release of Security”) (see Bundle E, p. 302). What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 53. Prior to the Release of Security, the Faaris Facility was secured by the Ringgit Malaysia equivalent of USD 673,115 in Tabung Haji deposit charged to BILL (see Bundle E, p. 338). As at 1 July 2002, there remained RM 2,557,837.79 in Dato’ Affifudin’s Tabung Haji account (see Bundle E, p. 346-347). 54. The security of the Digi.com Berhad shares to be obtained as the replacement security had a market value of USD 1,789,474 (see Bundle E, p. 348-349). Accordingly, had this Digi.com Berhad shares been obtained as security, the plaintiff would have been fully secured for the outstanding amount under the Faaris Facility. 55. The Court found that based on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered losses of USD 501,379.17 in respect of the Faaris Facility, which comprise the outstanding Selling Price as at 30 July 2004 of USD 499,647.00 and legal fees incurred of USD 1,732.17 (see Bundle D, p. 1). 56. The Court found that the plaintiff has proven on a balance of probabilities that the person who has caused this loss to the plaintiff is the 1st defendant. Whether the plaintiff took steps to mitigate its loss? 57. The Court was satisfied that the plaintiff had undertaken the following steps to mitigate its losses in relation to the Faaris Facility: (1) Upon default in making instalment payments by Faaris, BILL’s solicitors had sent a letter of demand dated 16 December 2004 to Faaris (see Bundle C, p. 87-88); (2) Numerous telephone calls were made to Faaris to request for the transfer of the Digi.com Berhad shares (see Bundle C, p. 211-212, at p. 211); (3) BILL’s solicitors issued a Notice of Recall of the Faaris Facility dated 9 March 2005 (see Bundle C, p. 213-214); and (4) BILL’s solicitors had sent a letter of demand dated 21 March 2005 for the execution and delivery of the Third Party Memorandum of Charge Over Shares in favour of BILL to replace the Charge over Cash Deposit (see Bundle C, p. 85-86). Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st defendant? 58. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st defendant with regard to the 1st defendant’s liability towards the plaintiff for the Faaris Facility. The First Commerce Facility 59. The Court shall now deal with the First Commerce Facility. 60. By a Memorandum of Approval dated 5 February 2002, the Management Committee consisting of all defendants recommended for approval to the Board of Directors a USD 4,800,000.00 Al-Ijarah Al-Muntahiah Bit Tamlik facility in favour of Commerce Trading (“First Commerce Facility”) to be secured by inter alia, a joint and several guarantee by Kamaruddin Awang (“Kamaruddin”) and Datuk Hiew Min Yong (“Datuk Hiew”) (see Bundle B, p. 17-29). 61. The recommendation for the First Commerce Facility was tabled at the 9th Credit Meeting of BILL but based on the results of a CTOS search carried out and presented, was then deferred for the Management Committee to obtain clarification on legal proceedings against Kamaruddin and Datuk Hiew and to consider additional securities for the facility (see Bundle B, p. 30). 62. In a letter dated 5 September 2001, Messrs. Zul Rafique & Partners, BILL’s solicitors, had advised BILL in relation to a related facility, Commerce Resources Inc which was also secured inter alia by a joint and several guarantee by Datuk Hiew that there was every danger that Datuk Hiew may be made a bankrupt at any time in view of the fact that a receiving order had already been made against him (see Bundle F, p. 902-904). Whether the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants have breached their duties in respect of the First Commerce Facility? 63. The Management Committee consisting of all defendants, nonetheless, submitted a further recommendation for approval of the First Commerce Facility dated 11 March 2002 (see Bundle B, p. 31-45) based on a letter dated 28 February 2002 from one C. Robertson, the legal counsel of Datuk Hiew, clarifying the legal proceedings against Datuk Hiew (see Bundle F, p. 905-906). 64. At its 38th Board meeting held on 28 March 2002 attended by the 1st and 2nd defendants, the Board of Directors of BILL approved the First Commerce Facility based on the recommendation by the Management Committee with several additional conditions (see Bundle B, p. 46). 65. By an internal memorandum dated 4 April 2002 addressed to the 2nd defendant and copied to the 1st defendant, BILL’s officers recommended to the Management that the signing of the First Commerce Facility agreement be deferred to protect BILL’s interests (see Bundle F, p. 909-911). 66. By another internal memorandum dated 5 April 2002 addressed to the 2nd defendant and copied to the 1st defendant, BILL’s officer expressed concerns regarding, inter alia, the strength of the security in the form of a personal guarantee from Datuk Hiew in view of the fact that a receiving order had been made against him (see Bundle F, p. 912-914). 67. Despite the concerns raised by BILL’s officers, no action was taken by the 1st and 2nd defendants and/or the Management Committee to address these issues. 68. The disbursement of the First Commerce Facility was approved by the Management Committee which included the 1st defendant on 30 April 2002 (see Bundle B, p. 49-60). Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the First Commerce Facility? 69. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court was satisfied that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the First Commerce Facility. The Second Commerce Facility 70. The Court shall now deal with the Second Commerce Facility. 71. By a memorandum dated 11 November 2002 signed by the 2nd defendant, a proposal was made to the Finance Exco of BILL for the provision of an ad-hoc Murabahah Working Capital Financing (“MWCF”) facility of USD 200,000.00 to Commerce Trading. The security proposed was, a joint and several guarantee by Kamaruddin and Datuk Hiew, and the placement of USD 146,000.00 in a Mudharabah Investment Account (see Bundle B, p. 61-70). Whether the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants have breached their duties in respect of the Second Commerce Facility? 72. No further checks or clarification were obtained as to the financial status of Datuk Hiew notwithstanding that a receiving order had been made against Datuk Hiew. This issue was not highlighted to the Finance Exco. The proposal for the ad-hoc facility was recommended by the Management Committee comprising all defendants without further questions or reverting back to the Corporate Banking Department for further credit evaluation. 73. On 20 November 2002, the facility was approved by the Finance Exco of BILL which included the 2nd defendant based on this recommendation (see Bundle B, p. 70). 74. By a letter dated 2 January 2003, Commerce Trading requested for an additional amount of USD 150,000.00 over and above the approved amount of USD 200,000.00. This additional facility was again recommended by the 4th defendant upon the same terms and conditions as the USD 200,000.00 MWCF facility without enquiry (see Bundle B, p. 71-75). 75. On 28 January 2003, the additional amount of USD 150,000.00 was approved by the Finance Exco, which included the 1st and 2nd defendants, based on this recommendation (see Bundle B, p. 75 and p. 76-81). 76. Subsequently, on 11 January 2003, the 4th defendant approved a request for disbursal of the full amount of USD 350,000.00 and the same was accordingly disbursed (see Bundle F, p. 915-917). 77. Vide a memorandum from the Corporate Banking Department dated 6 February 2003, it was requested that the Management Committee approve the reduction of the security deposit from USD 146,000.00 to USD 74,736.00, as a sum of USD 72,000.00 from the security deposit had already been used by Commerce Trading to finance the quarterly instalments for the First Commerce Facility (“Reduction of Security”) (see Bundle F, p. 907-908). 78. The request for Reduction of Security was approved by the Management Committee which included the 4th defendant but it was a condition and in accordance with practice and procedure that the Reduction of Security be ratified by the Finance Exco and/or the Board of Directors as approving authority. The ratification was not obtained. 79. Contrary to the terms and conditions upon which the Second Commerce Facility had been approved, the amount in the Mudharabah Investment Account at the time of disbursal was only USD 73,736.00. What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 80. The Court found that based on the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered losses of USD 5,510,287.60 which consists of the judgment sum for the First Commerce Facility of USD 5,150,800.00, the judgment sum of USD 352,240.00 for the Second Commerce Facility, the amounts advanced by BILL on behalf of Commerce Trading in the sum of USD 1,026.34 and costs on a full indemnity basis of USD 6,221.28 (see Bundle D, p. 4). 81. The Court also found that the persons who had caused these losses to the plaintiff are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants. Whether the plaintiff had taken steps to mitigate its loss? 82. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff had undertaken the following steps to mitigate its losses in relation to the Commerce Trading Facility: (1) BILL’s solicitors had sent letters of demand dated 15 June 2004 (see Bundle F, p. 918-920) and 20 October 2004 to Commerce Trading and the guarantors of the Commerce Trading Facility (see Bundle C, p. 281-283); (2) BILL obtained a judgment in relation to the First Commerce Facility on 25 May 2005 in the sum of USD 5,150,800; and (3) BILL obtained a judgment in relation to the Second Commerce Facility on 25 May 2005 in the sum of USD 352,240.00. Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the Second Commence Facility? 83. Based on the evidence before the Court, the Court found that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against all the 4 (four) defendants in respect of the Second Commence Facility. The Crest Group Facility 84. The Court shall now deal with the Crest Group Facility. 85. The Crest Group Facility for USD 11,000,000.00 was granted by BILL on 9 December 2000 to Crest Group Inc. (“the Crest Group”). The Crest Group Facility was to be secured by, inter alia, debentures by subsidiaries of the Crest Ultrasonics Group which was part of the Crest Group (see Bundle E, p. 472-528). 86. By a Memorandum for Approval dated 28 January 2001, a recommendation was submitted by the Management Committee, which included the 1st and 2nd defendants for, inter alia, a change of the security arrangement by cancelling the security of a debenture on the fixed and floating assets of two (2) subsidiaries and requiring a ‘negative pledge’ instead due to tax reasons (see Bundle E, p. 316-319). 87. On 8 March 2001, the proposal for ratification by the Board of Directors of BILL was recommended by the Management Committee which included the 1st and 2nd defendants. The change of security arrangement was, subsequently, ratified by the Board of Directors of BILL at the 33rd Board of Directors’ meeting held on 23 March 2001 (see Bundle E, p. 320-321A). 88. By a letter dated 16 March 2001, BILL’s solicitors, Messrs. Mohamed Ismail & Co. advised that the Crest Group Facility could be disbursed subject to resolution of several outstanding conditions precedent (see Bundle E, p. 322-328). Whether the 1st and 2nd defendants have breached their duties in respect of the Crest Group Facility? 89. Notwithstanding the outstanding conditions precedent, disbursal of the Crest Group Facility was approved by the Management Committee comprising the 1st and 2nd defendants, and the Crest Group Facility was, subsequently, disbursed (see Bundle E, p. 325). 90. To date, the negative pledges have not been executed nor perfected nor have the outstanding conditions precedent been fulfilled. Crest Group, subsequently, defaulted on the repayment of the Crest Group Facility. 91. Hence, the Court was satisfied that the 1st and 2nd defendants have breached their duties in respect of the Crest Group Facility What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 92. Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement entered into with Crest Group, the outstanding sum of USD 1,397,964.84 was waived (see Bundle D, p. 2). 93. Based on the evidence, the Court found that this loss was caused to the plaintiff by the 1st and 2nd defendants. Whether the plaintiff had taken steps to mitigate its loss? 94. The Court found that the plaintiff had taken steps to mitigate its loss. BILL’s solicitors had sent numerous reminders, among others, by letters dated 19 June 2002 (stated as “12th Reminder”) (see Bundle C, p. 93-97) and dated 11-7-2002 (stated as “13th Reminder”) (see Bundle C, p. 98) to Crest Group to request for the outstanding conditions precedent. Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of the Crest Group Facility? 95. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 1st and 2nd defendants in respect of the Crest Group Facility. The Crestek Facility 96. The Court shall now deal with the Crestek Facility. 97. On 26 November 1999, the Board of Directors of BILL had approved an Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil facility of USD 20,000,000.00 to Crestek Inc and USD 10,000,000.00 to Crest Group Inc. for the period of three (3) years and the repayment of the principal was a “bullet repayment” at the end of maturity of the facility. The said facilities were to mature on 12 October 2002 and 23 November 2002, respectively (see Bundle E, p. 32 and p. 332-336). 98. A Memorandum for Financing Approval for a USD 30,000,000.00 Al-Bai Bithaman Ajil facility in favour of Crestek (“Crestek Facility”) as an extension of the earlier facilities to Crestek Inc and Crest Group respectively was recommended by the Management Committee which consisted of the 1st and 4th defendants (see Bundle C, p. 124-210). 99. Crestek and BILL entered into a facility agreement dated 19 June 2003 (see Bundle E, p. 529-590). It was a condition precedent that all security documentation must be executed and perfected prior to disbursement of the facility. Whether the 3rd defendant has breached his duties to the plaintiff in respect of the Crestek Facility? 100. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the 3rd defendant has breached his duties to the plaintiff in respect of the Crestek Facility. This is because a pre-disbursement checklist dated 19 June 2003 was also forwarded to the Management Committee for their review and their approval disclosing several outstanding condition precedents (see Bundle C, p. 114-123). 101. However, the Memorandum for Approval of Disbursement was approved singly by the 3rd defendant, instead of by two (2) members of the Management Committee (see Bundle C, p. 113). What are the losses suffered by the plaintiff? 102. Based on evience, it is undisputed that Crestek, subsequently, defaulted on the repayment of the facility. Pursuant to a Settlement Agreement entered into with Crestek, the outstanding sum of USD 24,384,068.56 was waived (see Bundle D, p.3). 103. Hence, the plaintiff has claimed for this amount against the 3rd defendant. Whether the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 3rd defendant in respect of the Crestek Facility? 104. Based on the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff has discharged its burden of proof against the 3rd defendant in respect of the Crestek Facility. Additional issue (1): Whether the Court ought to apportion liability between the 4 (four) defendants and the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff? 105. Since none of the defendants has pleaded contributory negligence, the Court cannot grant any apportionment of liability. Hence, the Court found for the plaintiff in respect of the plaintiff’s claims for the whole amount of the losses suffered against the respective defendants (see Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & Anor [1995] 2 MLJ 276 where the Court held at 283F as follows: “… apportionment of liability cannot be granted when contributory negligence was not pleaded by the appellants - see the case of Hamizan bin Abd Haid v Wong Kok Keong & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 630.” 106. In Hamizan bin Abd Hamid v Wong Kok Keong [1994] 3 MLJ 630, the Court held at page 634E as follows:- “Though the common law position is somewhat altered, the principle of contributory negligence as a defence does not seem to have changed. It is still required to be pleaded by the defendant and, failure to do is fatal to the defence even though contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff is found to exist. The decision of Fookes v Slayton [1979] 1 All ER 137; [1978] 1 WLR 1293 supports this principle. In this case, the English Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in awarding damages based on contributory negligence of the claimant when the defendant did not even file his defence or appeared in court. The award was reversed by the Court of Appeal and altered to a 100% liability against the Defendant. Fookes v Slayton has been accepted in our courts for some time and, in fact it was reiterated by KC Vohrah J in the case of Anuar bin Mat Amin v Abdullah bin Mohd Zain [1989] 3 MLJ 313.” and further at 635C, “From the aforesaid authorities, one element is certain and that is, the issue of contributory negligence must be brought to the court’s consideration before it can be deliberated. If it is not, then apportionment of liability based on contributory negligence of the claimant cannot succeed. In a vast majority of cases where the cause of action is based on negligence, the defence normally pleads contributory negligence in their statement of defence. Once this is pleaded, it becomes an issue before the court which requires the court’s consideration. As it has become an issue, there is no necessity for the plaintiff to plead the same. However, if the defendant does not plead contributory negligence in his defence, it does not become an issue before the court. In such an event, if the plaintiff is able to prove any degree of negligence against the defendant, he will succeed in his case despite the fact that he may have contributed towards it. He will be entitled to damages based on a 100% liability. The cases of Fookes v Slayton and Anuar bin Mat Amin v Abdullah bin Mohd Zain support this principle. …” (Emphasis added). 107. Based on the above authorities that were cited by Mr. Oommen Koshy, the plaintiff’s learned counsel, the Court agreed with and accepted the plaintiff’s submissions that since the Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has succeeded in proving liability on the part of the defendants, the plaintiff is entitled to damages based on a 100% liability against the, respective, defendants. 108. Further, since the defendants are attempting to shift the blame to the members of the Board of Directors of BILL, it was incumbent upon the defendants to ensure that the relevant members of the Board of Directors were added as third parties or co-defendants in this suit. Here, only the 4th defendant has issued indemnity proceedings against the 1st and 2nd defendants. For the rest of the defendants, it is too late to raise this issue now. 109. In Dr Aishah Tul Radziah bt L Hussin v Dr Suresh a/l Kumarasamy & Ors [2014] 11 MLJ 702, the Court held at page 726D as follows:- “As a matter of fairness, fairplay and justice, since Dr Aishah had shifted the blamce to HPP and its doctors in the first suit, she should have joined HPP and its doctors either as third parties or co-defendants in the first suit and thereafter made all necessary interlocutory applications by way of further and better particulars or discovery or interrogatories. In the result, I am impelled to the view that everything that is being articulated against HPP and its doctors in the present suit could have been done in the first suit. In my view, in the circumstances of the situation which prevailed in the first suit and in particular having regard to Dr Aishah’s trial strategy of shifting the blame to HPP and its doctors, it was incumbent upon Dr Aishah to ensure that HPP and its doctors were added as third parties or co-defendants in the first suit. …” (Emphasis added). Additional issue (2): Who bears the burden of proof on mitigation of losses that are claimed by the plaintiff? 110. The 1st and 2nd defendants have raised the issue of “follow-up” during cross-examination of the plaintiff’s witnesses and as an alternative defence in the 1st and 2nd defendants’ submissions (see the 1st and 2nd defendants’ Written Submissions, pages 16-18, paragraphs 32-36) in alleging that the losses suffered by the plaintiff could have been averted had “follow-up” actions been taken by BILL. 111. Nevertheless, the Court agreed with and accepted the plaintiff’s submissions that it is trite law that the burden of proving grounds for mitigation rests on the defendants and the defendants have failed to discharge this burden as the defendants did not lead any evidence of fact in mitigation of damages. 112. In Leong Yoong v Lee Sem Yoong [1968] 2 MLJ 72, the Federal Court held at page 76I (right) as follows:- “The damages suffered by the respondent in this case are by no means remote. The respondent said in his oral evidence that he had told the appellant that he wanted to sell the land. There has been no denial of that allegation. If there were grounds for mitigation it was for the appellant to have alleged and proved them:- ‘The question of what is reasonable for a plaintiff to do in mitigation of his damages is not a question of law, but one of fact in the circumstances of each case, the burden of proof being upon the defendant’ (see Halsbury, vol. 11, (3rd Ed.), para. 476, age 290). In the present action the appellant has not pleaded or proved any fact in mitigation of damages. … The appeal is dismissed with costs …” (Emphasis added). 113. In any event, the Court found that the plaintiff was only vested with the assets and undertakings of BILL pursuant to the Vesting Order in 2006. Prior to that, the day-to-day management of BILL was under the purview of the defendants themselves, either as members of the Management Committee or as the CEO of BILL. Therefore, the Court agreed and accepted the plaintiff’s submission that this is not an issue which should prevent the plaintiff from succeeding in a claim for damages against the defendants. Additional issue (3): Whether the non-calling of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL and/or the plaintiff as witnesses is fatal to the plaintiff’s claim? 114. In Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Dato’ Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284, it can be seen from the Grounds of Judgment that one of the members of the Appellant’s Board of Directors testified as a witness on behalf of the Appellant. However, the calling of the member of the Board of Directors concerned may have been necessary in that case as the sole complaint of the Appellant was that the Respondent caused the Appellant to enter into loan agreements despite not getting the approval from the Board of Directors. This is not the situation in the present case. 115. In any event, the Court was of the considered view that the non-calling of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL as witnesses is not fatal to the plaintiff’s claim. This is because the issue that none of the members of the Board of Directors of BILL was called as the plaintiff’s witnesses was never raised by any of the defendants during the trial. Even then, it was open to any of the defendants to call them as witnesses, but none did. Conclusion 116. In the premises, based on the reasons as set out above, the Court found follows: (1) That all four (4) defendants at all material times owed statutory, common law and/or contractual duties to BILL; (2) That all four (4) defendants had acted in breach of their duties owed to BILL; and (3) That BILL had suffered losses and damages by reason of the said breach: (a) In respect of the Faaris Facility, damages in the sum of USD 501,379.17 against the 1st defendant; (b) In respect of the Commerce Facility, damages in the sum of USD 5,510,287,60 against the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants jointly; (c) In respect of the Crest Group Facility, damages in the sum of USD 1,397,964.84 against the 1st and 2nd defendants jointly; and (d) In respect of the Crestek Facility, damages in the sum of USD 24,384,068.56 against the 3rd defendant. 117. Therefore, the decision and orders of the Court in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants are in order. Dated: 6 April 2016 (DATUK SU GEOK YIAM) Judge High Court Civil NCvC 11 Kuala Lumpur COUNSELS 1. Mr. Oommen Koshy and Miss Eyza Farizan Mokhtar, the learned counsels for the plaintiff at: Messrs. Skrine Advocates & Solicitors Unit No. 50-8-1, 8th Floor Wisma UOA Damansara 50, Jalan Dungun Damansara Heights 50490 Kuala Lumpur 2. Mr. Azhar Arman Ali and Miss Elly Azrin Khalid, the learned counsels for the 1st and 2nd defendants at: Messrs. Arman-Yunos Advocates & Solicitors No. 3-5, Jalan 15/48A Off Jalan Sentul 51000 Kuala Lumpur 3. Mr. Mohd Mohyiddin bin Mohamad Mesbah, the learned counsel for the 4th defendant at: Messrs. Mohyiddin & Co. Advocates & Solicitors 284-1B, Jalan Haruan 5/7 Pusat Commercial Oakland II Seremban 2 70300 Seremban CASE REFERENCE: 1. Metroplex Development Sdn Bhd v Mohd Mastana bin Makaddas & Anor [1995] 2 MLJ 276. 2. Hamizan bin Abd Hamid v Wong Kok Keong [1994] 3 MLJ 630. 3. Dr Aishah Tul Radziah bt L Hussin v Dr Suresh a/l Kumarasamy & Ors [2014] 11 MLJ 702. 4. Malayan Banking Bhd v Basarudin bin Ahmad Khan [2007] 1 MLJ 613. 5. The State of South Australia & Anor v Timothy Marcus Clark [1996] SASC 5499. 6. Malaysia Building Society Berhad v Dato’ Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284. 7. Malaysia Airline System Bhd v Wan Sa’adi @ Syed Sa’adi bin Wan Mustafa [2015] 1 MLJ 757. 8. Leong Yoong v Lee Sem Yoong [1968] 2 MLJ 72. LEGISLATION REFERENCE: 1. S 92 of the Offshore Companies Act 1990. 2. S 114 (g) of the Evidence Act 1950. 39

Tika 2.6.0

MT4-24-189-2009

PLAINTIF AUGUSTIN RAJ A/L AUGUSTIN (No. K/P: 681231-10-5149 / A1108172) DEFENDAN SELVA KUMAR A/L PARMAL (No. K/P: 740806-08-6397 / A2850438)

04/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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Failed Extraction

BA-24FC-1096-08/2016

PLAINTIF CIMB BANK BERHAD DEFENDAN 1. WAN ZUBAIDAH BT WAN MAHMOOD (juga sebagai wakil diri harta pusaka Nik Ab. Rahman Bin Nik Mat, Si Mati) 2. NIK AB. RAHMAN BIN NIK MAT, Si Mati

04/04/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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Failed Extraction

29NCC-4455-12/2015

LAIN-LAIN1. ) Berkenaan: Md Shariff bin Ahmad ...Penghutang Penghakiman 2. ) Ex-Parte: Abdul Rashid bin Abas Norashfah Hanim binti Ya'akop Yahaya Al-Haj ...Pemiutang Penghakiman

03/04/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

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Page 1 of 8 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR\ DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA DALAM KEBANKRAPAN NO. 29-NCC-4455-12/2015 BERKENAAN : MD SHARIFF BIN AHMAD (NO. K/P: 420627-01-5451) …PENGHUTANG PENGHAKIMAN EX-PARTE : ABDUL RASHID BIN ABAS (NO. K/P: 621123-01-6099) NORASHFAH HANIM BINTI YA’AKOP YAHAYA ALHAJ (NO. K/P: 720417-71-5032) …PEMIUTANG PENGHAKIMAN JUDGMENT CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Date:3.4.2017 Page 2 of 8 Introduction [1] This was an appeal to the Judge in Chambers filed by the Judgment Debtor (JD) against the decision of a Senior Assistant Registrar (SAR) dated 26.10.2016 dismissing the JD’s application (encl. 25) to set aside the Creditor’s Petition dated 21.4.2016 (CP). [2] On 9.3.2017, this Court dismissed the JD’s appeal and affirmed the SAR’s decision. The JD was not satisfied with the decision of this Court and appealed to the Court of Appeal. This judgment serves as the reasons for the decision, and the reasons are set out at below. Brief Facts [3] The Judgment Creditors (JCs) filed this bankruptcy action against the JD based on a judgment dated 3.4.2014 obtained in the Kuala Lumpur High Court via suit No. 22NCC-164-02/2012. The JCs were the plaintiffs and the JD was the 2nd defendant in the suit. [4] A Bankruptcy Notice dated 21.12.2015 (BN) was issued against the JD by the JCs. The BN was served on the JD by way of substituted service; and on 18.3.2016, the JD committed an act of bankruptcy when he failed to satisfy the BN. The bankruptcy proceeding took its course. On 8.8.2016, the JD filed an application (encl. 25) to set aside the CP, but the application was dismissed by the SAR. The JD filed an appeal to the Judge in Chambers against the decision of the SAR. [5] At the hearing of the JD’s appeal before me, the counsel for the JD informed the Court that she would rely only on two issues to support the Page 3 of 8 appeal although she had raised numerous issues in her written submission. First, the BN was defective because the amounts stated therein were incorrect, excessive and not based on the judgment sum obtained. Secondly, the JCs’ CP did not comply with FORM 9 of the Schedule of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969, and this therefore rendered the whole proceeding defective. The Findings of this Court First Issue [6] The counsel for the JD contended that the sums stated in the BN were incorrect, excessive and not according to the judgment dated 3.4.2014. The counsel for the JD submitted that the wording in the judgment did not state the amounts for the chargeable interest which the JCs were entitled. The counsel for the JD submitted that the total amount stated in the BN for the chargeable interest was exorbitantly high. [7] This Court could not agree with the JD’s counsel’s submission. Reference is made to the relevant part of the judgment, it states as follows: “5. Seterusnya Plaintif-Plaintif mempunyai pilihan sama ada sebelum atau selepas penyiasatan forensic tersebut untuk mendapatkan 50% pemegangan syer Plaintif-Plaintif dalam ekuiti di dalam syarikat Defendan Pertama atau jumlah wang sebanyak RM1,290,000.00 dibayar bersama dengan faedah pada kadar 8% setahun dikira dari tarikh wang Page 4 of 8 dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif-Plaintif kepada Defendan Pertama sehingga penyelesaian penuh yang mana perlu dibayar oleh Defendan Kedua dan Ketiga kepada Plaintif-Plaintif. Sekiranya, Plaintif-Plaintif memilih untuk mendapatkan syer, pendaftaran syer Plaintif-Plaintif hendaklah dilakukan serta-merta; salinan asal Borang 32A diserahkan kepada Plaintif- Plaintif untuk didaftarkan dengan Suruhanjaya Syarikat Malaysia.” [8] The words in bold above clearly allow the JCs to charge interest at the rate of 8% based on the amount paid to be calculated from the date the JCs paid the money to the 1st defendant until the date of full settlement. Based on this decree, the JCs worked out the different amounts paid out. There were a total of seven payments made on different dates. The interest chargeable for these seven amounts was calculated based on the dates the money was released up the date of the BN. The JCs have tabulated in the BN as to how the amounts of the chargeable interest were derived. The JCs stated the total number of days the interest was calculated based on each and every amount released. The submission of the counsel for the JD on this first issue was without any basis. There were no supporting facts in the application to suggest the amounts for the chargeable interest were incorrect, excessive or not based on the judgment. Second Issue [9] The counsel for the JD submitted that the JCs’ CP did not follow the wording in FORM 9 of the Schedule, and therefore, the CP is defective and invalid, and should be set aside. The JD’s counsel Page 5 of 8 submitted that the CP has omitted the whole of paragraph 3 of FORM 9 which concerns security for payment. As such, the CP was defective. FORM 9 is a mandatory statutory form, and failure to comply with it renders the whole bankruptcy proceeding invalid, the JD’s counsel submitted. [10] This Court refers to s.131 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 and Rule 274 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969. They state as follows: “s.131 Formal defect not to invalidate proceedings No proceeding in bankruptcy shall be invalidated by any formal defect or by any irregularity, unless the court before which an objection is made to the proceeding is of opinion that substantial injustice has been caused by the defect or irregularity and that the injustice cannot be remedied by any order of that court.” “274. Effect of non-compliance with Rules Non-compliance with any of these Rules or with any rule of practice for the time being in force shall not render any proceeding void unless the Court shall so direct but such proceeding may be set aside either wholly or in part as irregular or amended or otherwise dealt with in such manner and upon such terms as the Court may think fit.” Page 6 of 8 [11] This Court also refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd v Mohd Zakaria Salim [2002] 3 CLJ 530, pp. 532-3, wherein in the judgment of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) stated as follows: “It is our judgment, the time has long passed when courts are troubled by the question as to whether in the initiation of prosecution or conduct of proceedings, the breach of a rule of court amounts to a mere irregularity or a nullity. The modern approach is exemplified by the judgment of Lord Woolf MR in Nicholls v. Nicholls [1997] 147 NLJ 61. That was a case of contempt of court where the breach of an order made in matrimonial proceedings was the subject matter of the complaint. It was held, after a discussion of the earlier authorities on the subject, that a breach of a rule of the court, even in such a serious matter as contempt of court, would be overlooked unless such breach produced a miscarriage of justice or serious prejudice to the alleged contemnor. Nicholls v Nicholls was applied by our Federal Court in the judgment of Mohammed Azmi FCJ in a case concerning the non-observance of the requirements of the Rules of the High Court 1980. See, Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 3 CLJ 305. Further, very recently this court in Maril-Rionebel (M) Sdn Bhd v Perdana Merchant Bankers Berhad [2001] Page 7 of 8 3 CLJ 248 took the same approach to a breach of the Companies Winding-up Rules which are not dissimilar in context and consequence to adjectival bankruptcy legislation.” [12] Having regard to the relevant law above and the approach taken by our Malaysian Courts in regard to non-compliance of rules, be it the Rules of Court, Companies Winding-up Rules or Bankruptcy Rules, the litmus test is whether such breach has occasioned a miscarriage of justice to the extent that it has caused substantial injustice to the other party. But in a case of breach of the bankruptcy rules, the injustice caused must be to the degree that it cannot be remedied by any order of that court. [13] Applying the above test to the present case, this Court is of the considered view that the omission of paragraph 3 could not occasion such a serious miscarriage of justice to the JD. Paragraph 3 in FORM 9 provides several situations in which a petitioner may be holding any security for payment. When a petitioner does not hold any security, he may elect to state the first part of paragraph 3 and to cancel/delete the rest of the paragraph. [14] Since the entire paragraph 3 of FORM 9 was omitted in the CP, it would mean that the JCs were not holding any security for payment. It is observed that the JCs were not a secured creditor as defined in s. 5(2) read together with s. 2 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, and therefore, did not hold any security for payment. Hence, the fact that paragraph 3 of FORM 9 of the Schedule is not found in the CP would, in the opinion of this Court in this given set of facts, not in any way have caused any Page 8 of 8 miscarriage of justice to the JD. Further, there was no injustice caused to the JD which requires the Court to grant any remedy. Reading s.131 of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 and Rule 274 of the Bankruptcy Rules 1969 together, such non-compliance of FORM 9 of the Schedule could not in any manner render the bankruptcy proceeding invalid. [15] The Court has also considered other issues raised in the JD’s counsel’s written submission, but is not satisfied that the CP or the bankruptcy proceeding is invalid. Conclusion [16] Based on the above reasoning, this Court dismissed the JD’s appeal and ordered costs of RM1,000.00 to be paid to the JCs by the JD. -Signed- …………………………………….. (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru JD’s counsel : Suhaidi Zakaria Tetuan Mastura & Associates JCs’ counsel ; Azad B Akhtar Khan Tetuan Kesavan

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-40-04/2015

PLAINTIF Best Amity Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Merah Jaya Sdn Bhd

02/04/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=d817e0a1-af04-4d75-bef7-382fa787a1cd&Inline=true

Page 1 of 17 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA GUAMAN NO. 22NCVC-40-04/2015 ANTARA BEST AMITY SDN BHD (1072157-V) PLAINTIF DAN MERAH JAYA SDN BHD (175304-T) DEFENDAN JUDGMENT CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Date: 2.4.2017 Page 2 of 17 Introduction [1] This case concerns a landlord unilaterally terminated a tenancy agreement because the rental for the month of September 2014 was not paid by the due date by the tenant. The tenant was not satisfied with the unilateral termination of the tenancy agreement and brought this action against the landlord for wrongful termination of the tenancy agreement and claimed damages. [2] The questions before this Court was who was to be blamed for the delay in the payment of the September 2014 rental and whether the termination of the tenancy agreement was legal or not. [3] On the one hand, the plaintiff/tenant alleged that the defendant/landlord had breached the tenancy agreement in that the defendant did not abide by the terms of the tenancy agreement. On the other hand, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff failed to pay the agreed monthly rental on the due date, and therefore, the plaintiff had breached the tenancy agreement, and the defendant was entitled to terminate the tenancy agreement. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff had occupied an area of the land beyond what the plaintiff had agreed to rent. The defendant contended that as a result of the alleged breaches by the plaintiff, the defendant was entitled to reclaim possession of the property. The defendant filed a counter-claim against the plaintiff for expenses and losses incurred in relation to reclaiming possession of the property. Page 3 of 17 [4] The parties‟ counsels agreed that the issue for determination before this Court was only on liability; any issues with regard to the quantum of damages, if relevant, will be dealt with by a Senior Assistant Registrar. [5] On 21.2.2017, this Court allowed the plaintiff‟s claim and held that the defendant had wrongfully terminated the tenancy agreement, and consequently, the defendant had committed a trespass. This Court held that the defendant was to be liable for the plaintiff‟s losses, if any, and made an order for damages to be assessed before a Senior Assistant Registrar. [6] The defendant was not satisfied with the decision of this Court and filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. This judgment serves as the reasons for the decision. The reasons are set down as below. Brief Facts [7] By way of a letter dated 14.7.2014, the defendant offered to let to the plaintiff a piece of land known as PTD 3163, Mukim Tanjung Kupang, Kg. Pekajang, Johor (herein before and after referred to as „the property‟). In the said letter, the defendant set down the terms and conditions of the tenancy (hereinafter referred to as „the tenancy agreement‟). [8] The salient terms and conditions of the tenancy agreement were, inter alia, a monthly rental of RM5,500.00 was to be paid over a period of 2 years, and that the tenancy was to commence on 1.8.2014. The rental shall be paid within 7 days of each month, and the plaintiff agreed to rent the property on a “as is where is” basis. The plaintiff through its Page 4 of 17 representative accepted the terms and conditions offered by the defendant by signing on the duplicate copy of the said letter dated 14.7.2014 and returning the same to the plaintiff as instructed. [9] The plaintiff is dealing in the recycling business. The plaintiff paid all the necessary deposits to the defendant, including one month advance payment. A sum of RM11,000.00 was paid to the defendant via a Public Bank cheque 004679 on 18.7.2014. [10] The tenancy commenced on 1.8.2014. Around the end of August 2014, the plaintiff‟s representative requested for the defendant‟s bank account details in order to make a direct payment into the defendant‟s account for the rental for the month of September 2014. The defendant‟s representative, one Mr. Hua Lai Hock (a.k.a Francis Hua) (DW1), did not provide the defendant‟s bank account number to the plaintiff. Instead, he provided his personal bank account number to the plaintiff. DW1 requested the plaintiff to pay the September 2014 rental into his personal account. At the same time, DW1 also requested the plaintiff to pay a further sum of RM2,473.80 as expenses incurred to purchase accessories in relation to the supply of electricity and water to the property. DW1 said that he had paid the said sum out of his own pocket. [11] The plaintiff suspected something was amiss, therefore, did not accede to DW1‟s request. As a result, the rental for the month of September 2014 was not paid on or before the 7th day of the month. On the 9.9.2014, the plaintiff‟s representative, one Ms. Kew Khuan Ying (PW1), went to the property and found the ingress and egress to the property was obstructed by a metal container. Further, the gate to the property was locked. PW1 tried to contact DW1 on his mobile phone, but there was no response. Page 5 of 17 [12] It is not in dispute that the metal container was placed at the entrance to the property by DW1, and it was DW1 who locked the gate to prevent the plaintiff‟s representatives, agents and/or workers from entering the property. [13] In the months of September and October 2014, the defendant had through its solicitors sent numerous letters (dated 12.9.2014, 30.9.2014 and 9.10.2014) to the plaintiff alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff had breached the tenancy agreement. Those solicitors‟ letters were addressed to the plaintiff‟s company secretary firm, instead of the plaintiff‟s place of business address. All these letters were received by the plaintiff‟s company secretary firm in the month of October 2014, even though two out of the three letters were dated in September 2014. All these letters were brought to the attention of PW1 only on 21.10.2014. [14] On 26.10.2014, the plaintiff through its solicitors replied the defendant‟s solicitors‟ letters. The plaintiff refuted the allegations in the said letters. A banker‟s cheque for a sum of RM5,500.00 payable in favour of the defendant company was enclosed in the said plaintiff‟s solicitor‟s letter. The payment was meant for the rental for the month September 2014. The payment was made on condition that the defendant shall return possession of the said property to the plaintiff. The banker‟s cheque was released to the defendant by the defendant‟s solicitors. The defendant took the money, but did not return possession of the said property to the plaintiff. Instead, the defendant used the money to off-set the expenses it had incurred, such as clearing of the plaintiff‟s belongings from the said property. The defendant listed its claims against the plaintiff in its counter-claim for expenses incurred totalling a sum of RM88,303.80 (after deducting the sum RM5,500.00 paid by the plaintiff). Page 6 of 17 [15] The defendant‟s main contention was that it would not matter whether the rental payment was to be paid into the defendant‟s account or into the personal account of DW1. As long as the rental payment was not received by the defendant by the due date, that was a breach of the tenancy agreement, and the defendant was entitled to terminate the same and claim any losses thereby so incurred. [16] The defendant contended that the plaintiff was liable to pay the expenses incurred for the purchase of the accessories because the defendant had provided a generator at the property and affixed the necessary water piping and such costs were incurred by DW1 personally. The defendant also contended that no matter what excuses the plaintiff had raised in evidence, the fact remained that the rental for the month of September 2014 was not paid on the due date which was on the 7th day of the month of September 2014. [17] The defendant further contended that it took 2 months for it to remove all the rubbish left by the plaintiff at the property. The defendant claimed it was entitled to be reimbursed for the costs incurred to remove all the rubbish. The Finding of the Court [18] During the trial, the defendant raised a fact which was not pleaded in the defence or counter-claim. The defendant referred the Court to a second tenancy agreement signed by DW1 and one Mr. New Ken Seng (PW2) who purportedly represented the plaintiff company. PW2 placed his signature on this second tenancy agreement on 15.7.2014 as acceptance of the terms and conditions stipulated therein. Page 7 of 17 [19] This second tenancy agreement was also dated 14.7.2014 and its salient terms and conditions were similar to the earlier tenancy agreement. The defendant wanted to adduce and rely on this second tenancy agreement in its defence case. The learned counsel for the plaintiff vigorously objected to the admission of the said document because the said document and the evidence adduced in relation to this second tenancy agreement were not pleaded in the defence case from the onset. [20] It is trite law that parties are bound by their own pleadings, and evidence to be adduced in the trial must necessarily relate to the pleaded facts. In Pembinaan SPK Sdn Bhd v Jalinan Waja Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 MLJ 322, the Court of Appeal held at p.332 as follows: “[26] A decision based on an unpleaded case will as a rule occasion a failure of natural justice and will be liable to be set aside on appeal. It denies the litigant the right to present his case fully before the judge on the unpleaded issue before the decision is made by the court. A corollary to this principle is the following: it is not the duty of the court to make a case for the party when that party does not raise, or wish to raise, a point in the litigation. Janagi v Ong Boon Kiat [1971] 2 MLJ 196, states the portion very clearly thus: A judgment should be based upon the issues which arise in this suit. If such a judgment does not dispose of the questions as presented by the parties it renders itself liable not only to grave criticism but also to a miscarriage of justice. It becomes worse and is unsustainable if it goes Page 8 of 17 outside the issues. Such a judgment cannot be said to be in accordance with the law and the rules of procedure.” [21] In Malaysian Civil Procedure 2013 at p. 218 it states as follows: “Each party must plead all the material facts on which he means to rely at trial as he will otherwise not be entitled to adduce evidence on the same at the trial. Accordingly, no averment must be omitted which is essential to success. A court is bound to decide a case on the issues on record and may not decide issues which are not on record: see Haji Mohamaed Dom v Sakiman [1956] MLJ 45, applying Blay v Pollard and Morris [1930] 1 KB 628, CA (Eng);….” [22] Having regard to the above authorities, the purported second tenancy agreement which the defendant‟s counsel wanted to adduce as evidence and the oral evidence revolving around the existence and contents of the said document were rejected and not considered by this Court. [23] Coming back to the two questions raised earlier, namely, first, who was to be blamed for the delay of the rental payment for the month of September 2014, and secondly, whether the termination of the tenancy agreement was lawful or not? [24] This Court shall deal with the first issue by referring to the witness statement of DW1 (encl. 73), particularly Q&A numbers 6, 7, 9 and 10. DW1 stated as follows: Page 9 of 17 6. Q: Selain pencerobohan, ada kamu cuba hubungi Plaintif untuk perkara lain? A: Ya, sekitar akhir bulan Julai 2014, saya ada cuba hubungi New untuk pembayaran yang telah saya keluarkan untuk pemasangan wayar dan paip air tetapi tidak berjaya. Seterusnya saya ada berjumpa dengan Encik Ramesh yang saya percaya adalah kontraktor bebas bagi Plaintif untuk mengankut sampah sarap bagi pihak Plaintif. 7. Q: Apa yang berlaku antara kamu dan Ramesh? A: Saya diberitahu oleh Ramesh dari Perniagaan Ruban atau Ruban Recycling Sdn Bhd atau R&R Recycling Enterprise yang beliau hanya menyewa dari New untuk menggunakan tanah serta air dan elektrik tersebut dan Ramesh tidak patut bayar kos pemasangan atau bil air dan elektrik yang telah dibayar oleh saya. Ramesh mencadangkan agar saya menuntut wang air dan elektrik serta kos pemasangan dari New atau isterinya. Dan Ramesh juga menyatakan sekiranya tidak Berjaya saya patut menuntut dari seorang pengarah syarikat Plaintif yang lain yang dikenali sebagai Sakura. …. 9. Q: Nombor akaun siapa yang anda berikan kepada isteri New? A: Memandangkan saya telah membeli barangan dengan wang saya sendiri maka saya telah Page 10 of 17 memberikan akaun perseorangan saya sendiri. Saya ingin menyatakan saya ada memberitahu akan jumlah barangan yang telah dibeli…. 10. Q: Ada Plaintif membayar ini? A: Setakat 7.9.2014 Plaintif gagal membayar bil ini dan juga pada setakat masa ini Plaintif juga gagal membayar sewa bulan September, 2014. [25] DW1 had requested the plaintiff to bank in a sum to repay the money that he had incurred and September 2014 monthly rental into his personal account. The tenancy agreement does not state how payments are to be made to the defendant. The question is whether was the plaintiff had rightfully refused to pay the September 2014 rental and repay the sum incurred by DW1 into DW1‟s personal bank account? [26] It is not in dispute that the tenancy agreement was entered into between two companies. The plaintiff owes the obligation under the tenancy agreement to the defendant, and not to the individual representing the defendant. Although DW1 had personally incurred certain expenses in relation to the property, if there is any money owing to DW1, the party who owes the money to DW 1 ought to be the defendant company, not the plaintiff. Further, it is the defendant who has the right under the tenancy agreement to claim from the plaintiff a sum to cover such expenses, and not DW1 personally. [27] The plaintiff is only responsible to and answerable for claims made by the defendant company, not by DW1 personally. DW1‟s request to the plaintiff to pay money into his personal account would be outside the Page 11 of 17 ordinary course of business. The plaintiff‟s refusal to accede to DW1‟s request was, in the opinion of this Court, justifiable in law. [28] Based on the evidence, plaintiff‟s representative had requested from DW1 the defendant‟s account number before the due date, i.e. the 7th day of September 2014. An inference could be made out from the evidence that the plaintiff was ready to pay the rental for the month of September 2014 even before the due date. If DW1 had provided the defendant‟s bank account number to the plaintiff before the due date, the plaintiff would have paid the rental for the month of September 2014 on time. In the event the defendant had given its bank account number to the plaintiff, and yet, the plaintiff did not pay the rental on time, the plaintiff would have breached the tenancy agreement. But, that was not the case. The plaintiff had explained the reason for its delay in paying the rental for the month of September 2014 and such delay was justifiable. The plaintiff was entitled to refuse to pay the rental to DW1. The defendant had no obligation to pay the rental into DW1‟s personal account or to pay DW1 any sum of money claimed by DW1. [29] The plaintiff had through its solicitors delivered a banker‟s cheque payable to the defendant company at the first available opportunity after having found out that the defendant had purportedly terminated the tenancy agreement. DW1 did not contact with the plaintiff‟s representative and did not provide the defendant‟s bank account number to the plaintiff‟s representative for the whole of September 2014, and this left the plaintiff with no choice but to withhold payment until it could find a proper way to make payment to the defendant. [30] The plaintiff only became aware of a proper way to pay the defendant in October 2014 when it received the defendant‟s solicitors‟ Page 12 of 17 letters. It was prudent for the plaintiff to deliver a banker‟s cheque to the defendant‟s solicitors. The defendant accepted the banker‟s cheque given by the plaintiff notwithstanding there was a condition attached thereto. The condition was that the defendant was supposed to deliver possession back to the plaintiff in the event the defendant accepted the banker‟s cheque. But, the defendant did not adhere to the condition. The defendant went on to use the money to off-set what the defendant thought it was entitled to. The defendant‟s action was clearly in breach of the condition. The defendant was wrong not returning possession of the said property to the plaintiff after having received the banker‟s cheque and after having cashed the money. [31] The unilateral termination of the tenancy agreement by the defendant, in the opinion of this Court, was not in accordance with s.40 of the Contracts Act 1950 which states as follows: “40. Effect of refusal of party to perform promise wholly. When a party to a contract has refused to perform, or disabled himself from performing, his promise in its entirety, the promisee may put an end to the contract, unless he has signified, by words or conduct, his acquiescence in its continuance.” [32] I find that the plaintiff did not refuse to perform its promise, i.e. to pay monthly rental, or had disabled itself from performing its promise. The plaintiff could not perform its promise because DW1 did not provide the defendant‟s bank account number to the plaintiff, but had required the plaintiff to make payment into DW1‟s personal account, which the Page 13 of 17 plaintiff was entitled to refuse to do so. Hence, the defendant was not entitled in law to put an end to the tenancy agreement. [33] Further, s. 39(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 states as follows: “39. Effect of refusal to accept offer of performance (1) Where a promisor has made an offer of performance to the promise, and the offer has not been accepted, the promisor is not responsible for non-performance, nor does he thereby lose his rights under the contract.” [34] The plaintiff made an offer to pay the monthly rental into the defendant‟s bank account, which the plaintiff had a contractual obligation to do, but that offer was not accepted by DW1 on behalf of the defendant. DW1 insisted for the monthly rental to be paid into his personal account. The offer made by the plaintiff was not accepted, thereby, in law the plaintiff could not be responsible for its non- performance upon the due date where it supposed to perform its promise. The plaintiff did not breach the tenancy agreement; the plaintiff just could not perform its obligation because DW1 did not accept the offer of performance. The plaintiff was not responsible for the non- performance on the due date, nor did it thereby lose its rights under the tenancy agreement. [35] Flowing from the above finding, this Court will now address the second question. The defendant contended that DW1 had left a hand written note at the entrance of the property informing the plaintiff to Page 14 of 17 contact him immediately. The hand written note was placed by DW1 at the property on 9.9.2014, the date DW1 had blocked the entrance and locked the gate. DW1 did not regard the hand written note as a termination notice. This means that the defendant had entered the property and reclaimed possession of the property even before any proper termination notice was issued. [36] DW1 stated that he instructed the defendant‟s solicitors to inform the plaintiff of the defendant‟s instruction to terminate the tenancy agreement after he had placed the metal container at the entrance and locked the gate to the property: 13. Q: Apa yang kamu telah buat selepas itu? A: Saya telah mengarahkan peguam saya untuk memaklumkan kepada Plaintif akan hasrat saya untuk menamatkan perjanjian sewa yang sedia ada dan peguam saya ada menghantar surat kepada alamat daftar Plaintif tetapi surat ini tidak dituntut. [37] DW1‟s evidence clearly shows the defendant had not terminated the tenancy agreement before DW1 entered into the property and reclaimed possession. The action taken by the defendant‟s representative was clearly wrong in law. [38] The first letter from the defendant‟s solicitors was dated 12.9.2014. Even if that letter was to be construed as a termination notice, the fact remains that the defendant had entered into the property and reclaimed possession of the property before the letter was issued. This means the defendant had entered into the property without the plaintiff‟s permission, Page 15 of 17 in other words, the defendant‟s representative had entered into the property unlawfully. [39] The defendant had in evidence alluded to other reasons as to why the plaintiff did not pay the rental, such as, suggesting that the plaintiff was not financially sound at that material time. This Court was not prepared to accept such evidence because, firstly, it was never pleaded that the plaintiff was in financial problem, and secondly, the evidence adduced by the defendant was mere conjecture and without proof. [40] The defendant had in its evidence raised other issues to support its counter-claim, especially its allegation that the plaintiff had occupied an area of the property beyond what the plaintiff had rented. I find the defendant‟s allegation of fact was not proved on a balance of probabilities. [41] In any event, the plaintiff‟s alleged encroachment into a small part of the land outside the rented property could not, in my view, give rise to any right for the defendant to put an end to the tenancy agreement under s. 40 of the Contracts Act 1950. Conclusion [42] Based on the above analysis, this Court held that the delay in the payment of the rental for the month of September 2014 was caused by the action of the defendant‟s representative. The plaintiff could not be faulted for the delay and did not breach the tenancy agreement as alleged by the defendant. Page 16 of 17 [43] The entry into the property by defendant‟s representative was unlawful because the tenancy agreement was still subsisting and valid at the material time. DW1‟s actions of placing the metal container and locking the gate without proper termination of the tenancy agreement was unlawful. [44] The Court held that the defendant‟s termination of the tenancy agreement was unlawful. The Court further held that the defendant is liable for the losses incurred by the plaintiff as pleaded in its statement of claim. The Court, therefore, has allowed the plaintiff‟s claim and ordered the quantum of damages to be assessed by a Senior Assistant Registrar, and dismissed the defendant‟s counter-claim. The defendant is hereby ordered to pay costs of RM10,000.00 for the main suit and RM5,000.00 for the counter-claim to the plaintiff. -Signed- ……………………………………… (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Page 17 of 17 Plaintiff‟s counsel : Ram Karpal Singh Tetuan Karpal Singh & Company Defendant‟s counsel : KT Leow Tetuan SL Teh & Co.

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-842-08/2016

PLAINTIF 1. TAN WEI MIA 2. TAN WAI CHEONG 3. TAN BOON CHIT (As trustees and Executors of Tan Bok Yin @ Tan Hon Yin) DEFENDAN PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH, GOMBAK

31/03/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b77b99a7-468c-4823-b65f-681355f6702e&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

WA-22C-11-02/2016

PLAINTIF Menta construction Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. SPM Property & Management Sdn Bhd; 2. Ismail bin Yoop Razali

31/03/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22C-11-02/2016 BETWEEN MENTA CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO: 83199-M) AND 1. SPM PROPERTY & MANAGEMENT SDN BHD (Company No: 212249-M) 2. ISMAIL BIN YOOP RAZALI ... DEFENDANTS (I/C NO: 540822-08-5435) JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Parties and Project [1] The 1st Defendant had appointed the Plaintiff as a subcontractor under a Construction Agreement dated 3.2.2005 for a Proposed Mixed Development on 45.29 acres of Land at Kg Kuala Kemaman called Site A, a further Proposed Commercial Development on 9.75 acres of Land along 2 Jalan Chukai, Air Puteh, Mukim Binjai known as Site B and finally a Proposed Ice Factory Development on 5.30 acres of Land at Kuala Kemaman called Site C (the "Project") (hereinafter known as the Construction Agreement). The 2nd Defendant is Encik Ismail Bin Yoop Razali, the Managing Director and 99% shareholder of the 1st Defendant. [2] The scope of the Plaintiff’s Works was to carry out site clearance, earthworks and retaining wall works for the Project. The subcontract price had initially been fixed at RM12,552,782.00 but after re-measurements and/or omissions, the final subcontract price was fixed at RM7,230,687.96. [3] The 1st Defendant had also, on 5.3.2005, executed a Loan Agreement with the Plaintiff wherein at the request from the 1st Defendant for a loan sum of RM2,000,000.00 for the purposes of financing part of the costs of constructing the Project, the Plaintiff had agreed to advance the said loan to the 1st Defendant, subject to the terms and conditions therein. The purposes of the loan sum included the payments that were needed to be made to the relevant authorities and for the premiums and/or other costs payable for 66 parcels of land. [4] The Plaintiff commenced its Project Works in April 2005 and from time to time, issued its progressive invoices and progressive statement of 3 accounts to the 1st Defendant for its payment. Upon receiving such progress claims/invoices/statements, the Project Architect would verify the Plaintiff’s progress claims and subsequently issue Progress Payment Certificates instructing the 1st Defendant to make payments to the Plaintiff according to the recommended certified amount of the Progress Payment Certificates. The Plaintiff duly completed on 3.2.2005 its Subcontract Works as required under the Construction Agreement. The Project Architect issued a Certificate of Practical Completion on 3.3.2006 Problem [5] The Plaintiff on 6.10.2006 and on other dates, enquired with the 1st Defendant on the status of payment of monies under the Construction Agreement. The letter is at page 250 of PBOD1. [6] The 1st Defendant replied by its letter of 12.10.2006 and had agreed and admitted to monies owing by it to the Plaintiff. It however sought the Plaintiff’s indulgences on these payments due because of its financial constraints. The letter is at page 251 of PBOD1. [7] The Plaintiff, on 17.10.2006, granted indulgences to the 1st Defendant on the postponement of payment for monies due and owing by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff. (See page 252 of PBOD1) 4 [8] The 1st Defendant, on 27.1.2010, instructed the Project’s Consultant Quantity Surveyor (Juru Kos) to forward the draft Final Account to the Project Engineer and thereafter to prepare the complete set of Final Account for the Project. (See page 253 of PBOD1). [9] The Project Consultant Quantity Surveyor (Juru Kos) subsequently issued the Project’s Final Account dated 25.11.2010 wherein a sum of RM7,230,687.96 was recognised as being the value of works done by the Plaintiff towards the Project. The Plaintiff said it is entitled to be paid such sum. (See pages 255-258 of PBOD1). The 1st Defendant contended that the Architect had not certified the Project's Final Account. The 1st Defendant also argued that the sum assessed by the Project Consultant QS is not binding as the 1st Defendant had not signed off the Statement of Final Account. [10] The Plaintiff, on 28.12.2010, forwarded the Statement of Final Account to the 1st Defendant for its endorsement and early payment at page 259 of PBOD1. [11] On 30.9.2011 the Plaintiff issued a formal statement of account to the 1st Defendant containing all of the details of the sums due and owing to the Plaintiff under the Construction Agreement, including interest accrued 5 thereon as at 30.9.2011 amounting to RM8,929,475.82 (“the Construction Statement of Account”). (See page 260 of PBOD1). [12] The Plaintiff also issued a formal statement of account to the 1st Defendant, setting out a breakdown of the monies due and owing to the Plaintiff under the Loan Agreement (“the Loan Statement of Account”) which at that point in time amounted to RM1,875,622.22. (See pages 261- 262 of PBOD1) [13] Subsequently on 3.10.2011 the Plaintiff’s Managing Director, Mr. Tan Choon Hock PW 1 and the 2nd Defendant DW 1 had a meeting on at the 2nd Defendant’s office wherein Mr. Tan Choon Hock had personally handed over both the Construction Statement of Account and Loan Statement Account dated 30.9.2011 to the 2nd Defendant. [14] Upon receipt of the Construction and Loan Statements of Accounts, the 2nd Defendant, on behalf of the 1st Defendant, acknowledged the debt due and owing therein and requested for more time to repay the same. The Plaintiff also contended that the 2nd Defendant also further warranted, represented, undertook, and promised to be personally liable for the debt in the event the debt was not paid by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff. (See 6 pages 260-262 of PBOD1). This was vigorously and vehemently denied by the Defendants. [15] According to the Plaintiff, on 10.11.2011 the Defendants again sought indulgences from the Plaintiff on the postponement of payment of monies due and owing and had agreed to proposals towards settlement of its dues to the Plaintiff by various means including the transfer of properties into the Plaintiff’s name as a means of set-off. To this effect, a valuation of the 66 parcels of land was carried out to enable parties to ascertain the actual value of the said properties that were intended to be set-off with the 1st Defendant’s debts due and owing to the Plaintiff. (See page 254 of PBOD1) [16] In early 2015, a draft Settlement Agreement was also prepared by the Plaintiff for the purposes of the contra of properties however it was not executed by the 1st Defendant. (See pages 263-287 of PBOD1) [17] Whatever indulgences and patience the Plaintiff had extended to the 1st Defendant had finally dried up and on 10.2.2016 the Plaintiff commenced this suit against the 1st Defendant as well as against the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff contended that the 2nd Defendant's liability is under the warranty, representation, undertaking and promise given by him to the 7 Plaintiff that he would be personally liable for the debts under the Construction Agreement and the Loan Agreement. Prayers [18] The Plaintiff’s total claim against the Defendants is for a sum of RM14,756,519.31 being monies due and owing by the Defendants to the Plaintiff under the Construction Agreement dated 3.2.2005 and Loan Agreement dated 5.3.2005. [19] The breakdown of the total claim of RM14,756,519.31 (as at 31.12.2015) is as follows with the Plaintiff praying for the following reliefs: a) An order that the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM7,230,687.96 being the outstanding principal sum under the Construction Agreement; b) An order that the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM5,204,953.10 being interest at 8.8% per annum on the principal sum as at 18.12.2015 under the Construction Agreement; c) An order that the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM1,200,000.00 being the outstanding principal sum under the Loan Agreement; 8 d) An order that the 1st Defendant and/or 2nd Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM1,120,878.25 being interest at 8.8% per annum on the principal sum as at 18.12.2015 under the Loan Agreement; e) Further interest in the sum of RM2,320,878.25 and RM12,435,641.06 respectively at the contracted rate of 8.8% per annum from 19.12.2015 until full realization; f) Costs; and g) Any further or other reliefs as deemed fit by this Court. [20] The Plaintiff called 3 witnesses : 1) Tan Choon Hock PW 1 – Plaintiff’s Managing Director, 2) K. Kalaiselvan PW 2 – Plaintiff’s General Manager and 3) Kuh Chon Sen PW 3 – Project’s Quantity Surveyor (Subpoenaed Witness). The Defendant’s only witness was Encik Ismail Bin Yoop Razali – 1st Defendant's Managing Director and the 2nd Defendant herein. Principles Whether the principal amount due under the Construction Agreement is the amount as certified by the Project’s Quantity Surveyor as per 9 the Statement of Final Account dated 25.11.2010 or the amount admitted in the Construction Statement of Account of 30.9.2011 [21] The Plaintiff submitted that it is widely recognised in the Construction Industry that the Statement of Final Account issued in a Project is a statement of the final value of the works executed by a contractor under a construction contract. I have no quarrel with that proposition. [22] It was also submitted by the Plaintiff that the Statement of Final Account is conclusive with respect to the actual value of works carried out by a contractor in the Project as it has been independently valued and/or quantified and/or certified by the Project Appointed Consultant (either quantity surveyor or architect). [23] This proposition is supported by the authors of ‘Construction Law in Malaysia by Sundra Rajoo & Harbans Singh KS; Sweet & Maxwell Asia; 2012 edition’ which said at page 486: “If not, resort will have to be made to the authoritative texts which basically describe it as ‘a statement prepared following the completion of all work under a construction contract and the defects liability maintenance period…It is generally expected to show the original contract sum and a tabulated breakdown of 10 the items which arise from variations…From these figures, the final contract sum is computed… Therefore, it is basically a statement of the value of the works executed by the contractor under the construction contract together with all further sums which show the final adjustment of the contract sum.” (emphasis added) [24] The High Court case of Shen Yuan Pai v Dato Wee Hood Teck & Ors [1976] 1 MLJ 16, in applying English case-law, adopted the findings that a final certificate is conclusive in nature. It held at page 21: “The same principle to which reference was earlier made was enunciated in Hosier & Dickinson Ltd v P&M Kaye Ltd (a decision affirmed on appeal to the House of Lords in Kaye v Hosier) where Lord Denning said at page 305: ‘After all, the architect is the agent of the employers. He owes a duty to the employers to use due care in giving his final certificate. If he should negligently give a final certificate barring the employers from a good claim, he would, I think, be liable in damages. (See Satcliffe v Thackrah [1974] 1 All ER 859, a recent House of Lord’s decision)’ 11 and lower down: ‘If the architect was satisfied that the work had been properly completed, he was quite entitled to bring the matter to a close and to issue his final certificate. Once issued, it was conclusive." [25] Likewise in the case of James Png Construction Pte Ltd v Tsu Chin Kwan Peter [1991] 1 MLJ 449 it was held at page 452 as follows: “I therefore hold that the final certificate issued by the architect on 12 June 1989 was perfectly valid. Its conclusiveness cannot be impugned. If the defendant contends, as he does, that the architect had not listed all the defects which he ought to have listed or that the listed defects were not satisfactorily done, then the defendant's redress is against the architect. He cannot, as the authorities now stand, withhold payment to the plaintiffs.” (emphasis added) [26] In the present case, the Project Consultant Quantity Surveyor (Juru Kos) had issued a Statement of Final Account dated 25.11.2010 (See pages 255-258 of PBOD1) which recognised, valued and quantified that the Plaintiff had carried out a total value of works towards the Project 12 amounting to RM7,230,687.96 and that the Plaintiff was entitled to be paid the said sum by the Defendants. [27] The said assessment and valuation of the Project Consultant Quantity Surveyor (Juru Kos) as per its Statement of Final Account is reproduced as page 258 of PBOD1. [28] The Project’s Quantity Surveyor PW 3 (Mr. Kuh) in confirming that the Plaintiff was entitled to be paid a sum of RM7,230,687.96 being the total value of works carried out by the Plaintiff towards the Project, testified during the trial (See pages 72, 84 of NOE): Q: Pg 257 PBOD 1. Would you agree that this St of Final Ac is to quantify that the P has carried out the total value of works carried out by the P is RM7,230,687.96. A: Yes. ... Q: Whether the D signed it does not detract from the valuation done by you i.e. RM7.23m. A: Yes. 13 [29] The Plaintiff stated that its claim for the principal sum due and owing by the Defendants to the Plaintiff under the Construction Agreement is for a sum of RM7,230,687.96 (paragraph (a) at page 34 of Bundle IP). This amount claimed by the Plaintiff against the Defendants is as per the Project Consultant Quantity Surveyor’s (Juru Kos) Statement of Final Account dated 25.11.2010 (See pages 255-258 of PBOD1). [30] It must be noted that notwithstanding the Plaintiff having sent its various Progress Claims to the 1st Defendant in the years of 2005 and 2006 which totals RM7,838,641.27 (as recognised in the Statement of Final Account – see page 258 of PBOD1) and Interim Certificates had been issued to that effect without any payment thereto, the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is not as per its Progress Claims totaling RM7,838,641.27 (which was subject to re-measurement), but its claim against the Defendants is as per the Project Consultant Quantity Surveyor’s (Juru Kos) certified amount of RM7,230,687.96 (See page 258 of PBOD1). [31] This was confirmed by the 2nd Defendant (En Ismail) himself when he testified in cross-examination (See pages 273, 275, 287 of NOE): 14 DNN So would you agree with me now that all these interim certificates, the valuation and the quantification and all so on and so forth are all subject to be re-measured in the final account. Agree or disagree? ISMAIL Agree. ... DNN And would you agree with me, En Ismail, that this final account that is issued by the QS will quantify and measure the actual works carried out by the Plaintiff for the project? ISMAIL Yes. … DNN Paragraph 8, page 34, paragraph 8. What the Plaintiff is claiming in its pleadings is RM7.2 million. So now my question is, would you agree with me that the Plaintiff’s claim for principal sum under the Construction Agreement is, you look at now compare page 258, is as per the QS certified, certifications value of work and not the own Plaintiff’s progress claims of RM7.8 million in there. 15 ISMAIL Yes. [32] Learned counsel for the Defendants' stand was that since the 1st Defendant had not countersigned the Statement of Final Accounts, it would mean that the 1st Defendant had not agreed on the Statement. That is not very helpful and no weight could be placed on such a statement from the 1st Defendant when it should be stating the reasons for its disagreement with the Statement of Final Accounts and which particular items in the Statement it disagreed with. A bare and bald statement that the 1st Defendant had not signed the Statement of Final Accounts and so is not binding on the 1st Defendant is a hollow statement bereft of any credibility unless it descends to detailing the areas of disagreement and the reasons for it. [33] However subsequent to the issuance of the Statement of Final Accounts by the QS, the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant had agreed to a lesser principal sum owing as can be seen in the Construction Statement of Account dated 30.9.2011 prepared by the Plaintiff for the 1st Defendant to confirm and agree. See page 260 of PBOD1. [34] The 1st Defendant, through its Managing Director who is the 2nd Defendant, acknowledged receipt of the Statement on 3.10.2011 and 16 requested for the Plaintiff's kind consideration to give the 1st Defendant more time to pay the debt. [35] This Construction Statement of Account dated 30.9.2011 was nearly a year after the Statement of Final Account dated 25.11.2010. As the Plaintiff had signed the Statement of Final Account and the 1st Defendant for reasons best known to itself, had refused to sign, this subsequent Construction. Statement of Account prepared by the Plaintiff and confirmed by the 1st Defendant must be taken to be a new negotiated sum that both parties could agree. [36] The evidence of PW 1 the Managing Director of the Plaintiff and confirmed by DW 1, the Managing Director of the 1st Defendant, was that the parties met almost every month after the completion of the Works to discuss on the mode of payments of the outstanding amount. There is no need to go behind the reason for the reduced sum of RM6,094,565.27 from the sum of RM7,230,687.96 for businessmen must be deemed to have their reasons for agreeing to a reduced sum both for business resolution and finality. 17 Whether there has been a fresh acknowledgment of debt within the meaning of Section 26 of the Limitation Act 1953 thus reviving the cause of action of the Plaintiff [37] I agree with the Defendant that there is no need to wait for the Statement of Final Accounts before the Plaintiff could sue for the various amounts due under the various Interim Certificates issued. Clause 17 of the Construction Agreement makes it very clear that an Interim Certificate becomes due after 30 days after its issuance. Thereafter the Plaintiff could sue and recover all monies based on Interim Certificates 1 to 9. The Plaintiff’s cause of action would arise after 30 days of the issuance of the Interim Certificates, as per Clause 17. [38] One need not go further than to quote the relevant passage in the Federal Court case of Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Kamarstone [2014] 2 MLJ 749 on the meaning of an accrual of a "cause of action": “[16] Gill FJ, then thus enunciated on ‘the date of accrual’ in the case of a debt: This expression, ‘cause of action’, has been repeatedly the subject of decision, and it has been held, particularly in Hemp v Garland LR 4 QB 509 at p511, decided in 1843, that the cause 18 of action arises at the time when the debt could first have been recovered by action…” (emphasis added) [39] The purpose served by the Statement of Final Accounts does not in any way postpone the commencement of a cause of action based on the Interim Certificates issued. Once the Statement of Final Accounts is issued, both the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant may then compare what is stated in the Statement of Final Accounts as against what has been paid by the 1st Defendant to Plaintiff under all the Interim Certificates. In the event the 1st Defendant has overpaid the Plaintiff then the 1st Defendant can claim the amount overpaid. In the event there is a balance outstanding shown as owing to the Plaintiff, then the Plaintiff would be able to claim this amount. [40] The Plaintiff's own witness in the Quantity Surveyor as PW 3 had testified that the Plaintiff had taken up to 4 years to hand over all the documents to the QS to prepare the Final Accounts when it was supposed to be done within 12 months of the CPC. This delay is not so much the cavalier attitude of the Plaintiff but rather that the 1st Defendant had requested to withhold finalizing the accounts as the 1st Defendant had cash flow problem in making payments to the Plaintiff. [41] Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 states as follows: 19 “6. Limitation of actions of contract and tort and certain other actions: (1) Save as hereinafter provided the following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say - (a) actions founded on a contract or on tort; (b) actions to enforce a recognisance; (c) actions to enforce an award; (d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any written law other than a penalty or forfeiture or of a sum by way of penalty or forfeiture.” (emphasis added) [42] The Plaintiff's submission that a cause of action can only accrue from the date the actual debt materializes and/or is ascertained is misplaced in the context and circumstances of this case. The whole purpose of Interim Certification is such that it allows for the Plaintiff contractor who has done the work to be paid for the work done. The amount is as stated in the Interim Certificate. The fact that the Certificate is interim gives no right to the Defendant as Employer to refuse payment. To agree with the Plaintiff's submission would be to cause a grave injustice to contractors who cannot 20 claim or sue for payments due for work done progressively but that it must wait until the Statement of Final Accounts is prepared which is normally after CPC has been issued. That would be to require the Contractor to fund and finance the whole works and the Employer can just sit back and collect from the purchasers the monies due to it from its Progress Certificates to the purchasers. I know of no surer recipe for disaster in construction projects! [43] The question may be asked in reverse: if the Plaintiff were to sue for amount due under the various Interim Certificates, can the Defendant apply to strike out the Plaintiff's claim on ground that the cause of action has not arisen? Surely not! Very obviously the cause of action has arisen once the deadline for payment is due; in this case after the expiry of 30 days from the date the Interim Certificate is issued. In fact in the Plaintiff's own Construction Statement of Account dated 30.9.11 has a third column from the left that is entitled "Due Date" where it is set out the due dates for the Certificates of Payments No.1-9. That must be taken to mean that the Plaintiff itself acknowledges that the various Certificates were due for payment on those dates stated. [44] The Plaintiff's reliance on the Privy Council case of Loh Wai Lian v Sea Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd [1987] 2 MLJ 1 is misplaced as in the 21 present case the amount owing has been ascertained by the Interim Certificate. There in Loh Wai Lian (supra) the single sum to be calculated and ascertained at a particular date with respect to a late delivery claim for a house could not be ascertained as the house has not been delivered and that until that sum has been ascertained it does not become due and cannot be sued for. [45] That is no justification for saying that in our present case, the debt of the Defendants to the Plaintiff only crystallized upon the issuance of the Statement of Final Account on 25.11.2010. [46] Ordinarily then the cause of action, having arisen in 2005/6 the suit ought to have been filed in 2011/12 and not in 2016. [47] A far more important question in this case is whether there has been a fresh acknowledgment of debt within the meaning of section 26(2) of the Limitation Act 1953 such that the cause of action has been revived. Section 26(2) reads as follows: "26. Fresh accrual of action on acknowledgment or part payment: (2) Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or 22 interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment…” (emphasis added) [48] On 30.9.2011, the Plaintiff issued a formal statement of account to the 1st Defendant containing all of the details of the sums due and owing to the Plaintiff under the Construction Agreement, including interest accrued thereon as at 30.9.2011 amounting to RM8,929,475.82 (“the Construction Statement of Account”) (See page 260 of PBOD1). [49] On the same day, the Plaintiff also issued a formal statement of account to the 1st Defendant under the Loan Agreement, setting out a breakdown of the monies due and owing to the Plaintiff (“the Loan Statement of Account”) which at that point in time amounted to RM1,875,622.22 (See pages 261-262 of PBOD1). [50] At a meeting held on 3.10.2011 between Mr. Tan and En. Ismail, after discussions on the 1st Defendant’s proposed method of payment of its debts due and owing to the Plaintiff, Mr. Tan had then personally handed 23 over both the Construction Statement of Account and Loan Statement Account dated 30.9.2011 to En. Ismail. [51] This was confirmed by the 2nd Defendant (En Ismail) himself when he testified in cross-examination (See pages 312-313 of NOE): DNN Correct? Now, just a little back track of this statement of accounts. Do you agree with me that in October 2011, Mr Tan and you held a meeting somewhere in October 2011? Do you remember that you held a meeting with Mr Tan Choon Hock of the Plaintiff? ISMAIL Yes. DNN Agree? ISMAIL But we have many meetings. DNN Ok, so in October 2011, do you remember having a meeting with Mr Tan? ISMAIL I believe there is because every month he meets up with me. ... DNN What was the purpose of the meeting then? 24 ISMAIL Basically asking me how am I going to pay him. DNN Ok. So the meeting was then for the methods of payment. How is the First Defendant going to pay the Plaintiff. The amounts due, correct? ISMAIL Yes. DNN And during this meeting, you told Mr Tan the First Defendant can't make payment now to the Plaintiff because the First Defendant is dormant, correct? ISMAIL Yes. DNN So now my question to you, En Ismail, would you agree with me that if the First Defendant at that point of time, if the First Defendant was not dormant, the First Defendant would have been able to make payment to the Plaintiff, correct? ISMAIL Yes. DNN So after you all discussed, you told him dormant, cannot pay and all that, Mr Tan then handed over to you these two statement of accounts, correct? 25 ISMAIL Yes. [52] Upon receiving the said two Statements of Accounts, the 2nd Defendant thereafter affixed the 1st Defendant’s chop and signed at the bottom of both the Statement of Accounts below the words, “I acknowledge receipt of the above and request your kind consideration to give me more time to pay these debts” (See pages 260-262 of PBOD1). The said acknowledging pages are reproduced as below: 26 27 [53] The 1st Defendant's contention was that it only acknowledged receipt of the Statement of Account and did not acknowledge the debt owed. That is an artificial distinction seeking to avoid the consequences of what was stated in the acknowledgment of receipt of the Statement as well as in requesting the Plaintiff in extending its kind cooperation to give the 1st Defendant more time to pay the debt outstanding. The question might well be asked: if there is no acknowledgment of debt but merely the acknowledgment of receipt, why then would the 1st Defendant request for "more time to pay these debts." One would instead expect a vigorous challenge to a vile concoction of a debt outstanding to the tune of RM6 million where the principal sum is concerned! [54] The fresh acknowledgement of debt need not be in any prescribed format. So long as the debt is clearly identified and the acknowledgment of indebtedness is clear and unequivocal, there is a fresh acknowledgment of debt from the date of that acknowledgment which is 3.10.2011. [55] DW 1 En Ismail cannot claim that he did not understand what he had signed or that he had signed it hurriedly without fully appreciating its contents. The words are simple enough to understand. He is himself an architect and in his giving of evidence in Court he had chosen to speak in English. Judging by the quality of English spoken by him in Court during 28 cross-examination, I can say that he is very confident and comfortable with the English language. He spoke with clear diction, crisp pronunciation and with impeccable inflexion. There is the flow and fluency of language possessed by one with a good command of it. DW 1 knew full well that he was acknowledging the debts on behalf of the 1st Defendant and imploring for time to pay. He could have qualified the acknowledgment of the debts owing by stating that it is only for the Plaintiff's income tax purpose as he had wanted this Court to believe or that it is an acknowledgment on a without prejudice basis, but he did not do that. There was no trickery or trap involved in getting him to acknowledge the 2 debts outstanding under the Construction Statement of Account and the Loan Statement of Account. [56] One might recall the salutary words of his Lordship James Foong J (later FCJ) in the case of Chai Then Song v Malayan United Finance Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 640 where in deciding that a party has only himself to blame when signing documents without finding out the contents therein, observed at page 643 as follows: “I find the aforesaid authorities laid down sound principles of law on persons executing blank documents. A person who chose to be careless, or not bothered to find out the contents therein, or relied completely upon others to complete the same, is 29 responsible for his own actions and, he is prevented from denying the contents therein do not bind him.” (emphasis added) [57] There was no evidence that those words were 'foisted' or 'forced' upon him as in some form of coercion as DW 1 would have wanted the Court to believe. There was no contemporaneous police report lodged if really there was coercion. In Lee Teck Seng v Lasman Das Sundra Shah [2000] 8 CLJ 317 it was observed at pages 320 as follows: “[1] When a document containing contractual terms is signed, then in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the party signing it is bound and it is wholly immaterial whether he has read the document or not. His signature is irrefutable evidence of his assent to the whole contract including the exempting clauses, unless the signature is shown to be obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. … [1b] Furthermore, the fact that the defendant took no action to report to the police the matter of threats or the fact that he was coerced into signing the document was inconsistent with his 30 claim that he had been constantly harassed and that he feared for his life. … [2b] Moreover, on a careful scrutiny of the page, the defendant's signature was carefully placed on the designated spot, where signatures are normally placed with the defendant's identity card number placed below the signature in the same style of writing as his signature. This is inconsistent with the defendant's claim that he was intoxicated at the material time.” (emphasis added) [58] To a question from the Court as to whether he had genuinely wanted to pay when he asked for more time to pay, he stated that he was genuine in expressing his intention to pay. The relevant transcript at pages 363-364 of the Notes of Evidence is reproduced below: YA When you signed on 260 and 262, you genuinely wanted to pay? You genuinely wanted to pay? Because the words there says ‘Give me more time to pay.’ You genuinely wanted to pay, is it? ISMAIL But this is not my words. YA I know, but you know what those words mean? 31 ISMAIL Yes, yes. YA Did you genuinely want to pay or you didn’t have intention to pay? ISMAIL No, of course I wanted to pay. YA You wanted to pay? ISMAIL Yes. YA When you signed at page 92, genuinely want to pay. Answer ‘of course I wanted to pay.’ So the words correctly reflect your intention? The words correctly reflect your intention? ISMAIL Yes. [59] The fact that those words are pre-typed by the Plaintiff in both the Statements of Account does not derogate from or denude the intention of the 1st Defendant as reflected in those words and as confirmed by this Court from DW 1. As DW 1 had confirmed that his intention to pay was genuine, this Court does not see the acknowledgment of debt as a sinister attempt to circumvent the effect of section 6 of the Limitation Act though a proper acknowledgment as in this case has that effect. 32 [60] There is also no merit in the Defendants' argument that the acknowledgment of debt is not valid because the Statements concerned do not bear the signature of the Plaintiff or the name of the Project or the description of the Loan. Even a short messaging system (SMS) of acknowledgment was held valid in the more recent case of Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 6 CLJ 285 at 304, where the Federal Court found that liability was established upon the defendant’s admission on the fresh acknowledgement of debt via SMS. The Court held as follows: “[38] From the above mundane approach of alluding to authoritative books and cases it has been satisfactorily established that signatures need not be written. Suffice if there be any mark, written or not, which identifies the act of the party, perhaps in the form of mark or by some distinguishing feature peculiar only to that person, then the acknowledgement has been signed. Analogically we hold the view that the conventional paper is substituted by the mobile phone, which holds features that can preserve information or transmissions in the like of the SMS, with the telephone number representing the caller or the sender of some message. In fact it is the norm nowadays to substitute the number of an identified person with his name to assist 33 instant recognition. The fact that the respondent admitted sending the SMS sealed his liability.” [61] There is no evidence that the Defendant could have been confused as to some other Projects that the Plaintiff might be referring to or that there were some other Loans other than the single loan of RM1.2 million. [62] In Southern Bank Bhd v Shin Huat Joo Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors [1998] 3 CLJ 941, his Lordship Suriyadi Halim Omar J (now FCJ) in deciding that there was a fresh accrual of action upon the debtor’s acknowledgement of debt, explained at page 953 as follows: “Currently the law, as I understand it regarding acknowledgement of debts, is that if at any time after a debt is due and the debtor renews that promise to pay it or acknowledges that debt as being due, he therefore renews his liability on the date of such promise or acknowledgement. If a suit is filed within six years, after that promise or acknowledgement had been made, the debtor thereafter cannot avail himself of the protection of Limitation Act 1953, s. 6(1) of the Limitation Act 1953 (Act 254). This promise or acknowledgement in reality does not create a new debt but merely 34 revives the old debt. Lord Sumner in Spencer v Hemmerde [1922] 2 AC 507 viewed that that acknowledgement "continues or 'renews' or 'establishes' the original promise... corresponds with and is not at variance from or in contradiction of that promise". Lawton J in Busch v Stevens [1962] 1 All ER 412 equated that acknowledgement or payment for any debt equivalent to being "given a notional birthday and on that day... rises again in renewed youth." These views were met with approval by the Federal Court in the case of K.E.P. Mohamed Ali v K.E.P. Mohamed Ismail [1981] 2 MLJ 10 when Raja Azlan CJ in no uncertain terms said that an acknowledgement of a statute-barred claim did not raise a new claim or a new cause of action but constituted the accrual of a right of action to recover the debt. Lord Bridge of Harwich for the Privy Council in Oversea- Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd v Philip Wee Kee Puan [1984] 2 MLJ 1 approved that view and thenceforth reversed the decision under appeal…” (emphasis added) [63] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff also referred to the case of Malayan Banking Bhd v Wembley Industries Holdings Bhd [2012] 5 CLJ 956 where after examining the law on “clear and unequivocal acknowledgement within the meaning of section 26(2) of the Limitation Act 1953”, the Court 35 held in that case that there was fresh acknowledgement of debt and as such, the cause of action accrues from the said acknowledgment date. [64] Learned counsel for the Defendant also made some fuss about the fact that there was no inclusion of Certificate No. 10. That is no prejudice at all to the Defendants as it could only mean that the Plaintiff intended to exclude that Certificate No. 10 which the Defendants are disputing any way and only intended to claim until Certificate No. 9. [65] Learned counsel for the Defendants warned against accepting the acknowledgment of the Construction Statement of Account as correct as the amount is much less than the Statement of Final Accounts prepared by the QS at pages 255-258 of PBOD1. That is the Defendant's blowing hot and cold; approbating and reprobating. In the first place it had argued that the Statement of Final Accounts is not binding on the 1st Defendant as it had not signed it without giving its version of what is the correct Statement. Now that the 1st Defendant had signed the Construction Statement of Account on 3.10.2011 it now wants to backtrack and prevail upon this Court that the sum acknowledged cannot be correct. Why then asked for time to pay if the sum acknowledged is not correct? 36 [66] Looking at the whole circumstances of this case, there is a fresh acknowledgment of debt on 3.10.2011 which is clear and unequivocal and so a fresh cause of action accrued or was renewed on that date and as the suit was filed in February 2016, it was brought well within the limitation period of 6 years as prescribed for a claim in contract under section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953. [67] The same applies to the claim for the Loan sum which was expressed in Clause 4.1 of the Loan Agreement dated 5.3.2005 that the Advanced Sum shall be repaid with administrative charges by 30.9.2005. Even though the cause of action had arisen on the date of agreed repayment, yet it was revived with the fresh acknowledgment of debt on 3.10.2011 at pages 261- 262 PBOD 1, when the 2nd Defendant on behalf of the 1st Defendant signed beside the 1st Defendant's rubber stamp at the bottom of the line containing the Loan Statement of Account as at 30.9.2011 that reads: "I acknowledge receipt of the above and request your kind consideration to give me more time to pay these debts." 37 Whether the 2nd Defendant has warranted, represented and undertaken to be personally liable for the debt of the 1st Defendant [68] However the debt is that of the 1st Defendant and not that of the 2nd Defendant. The Plaintiff had addressed both the Construction Statement of Account and the Loan Statement of Account to the 1st Defendant and so any acknowledgment by the 2nd Defendant must be understood to be on behalf of the 1st Defendant. The rubber stamp used is that of the 1st Defendant and so when the words "I" and "me" are used in the acknowledgment and request for time to pay, it must be understood in terms of the company i.e. the 1st Defendant. [69] This is so even though in this case the 1st Defendant is almost wholly owned by the 2nd Defendant in that all the 1,900,004 shares of the 1st Defendant are owned by the 2nd Defendant save for one. See page 291 of the CCM search in PBOD 1. [70] It is trite law that a company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders and directors and in the absence of fraud, the controlling director cannot be made personally liable for the debts which remain that of the company, the 1st Defendant. This is so even if the 1st Defendant be a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 2nd Defendant. If the Plaintiff had wanted to 38 make the 2nd Defendant jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 1st Defendant, the Plaintiff should have insisted on an irrevocable guarantee and indemnity from the 2nd Defendant. It is too late in the day to now make the 2nd Defendant liable as well for the debts of the 1st Defendant. [71] There is no evidence that the 2nd Defendant has warranted, represented or undertaken to be personally liable for the debts of the 1st Defendant. The Plaintiff had not pleaded fraud by the Defendants or that the corporate veil ought to be lifted to find the 2nd Defendant personally liable as well. Whether parties, by conduct, have agreed to postpone the limitation period [72] This is a case where the main protagonists of the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, i.e. PW 1 Mr Tan Choon Hock and DW 1 Encik Ismail Yoop Razali, have known each other for years. For the Plaintiff to have to sue the Defendants, it would have to be an action of last resort where all else have failed. [73] This is not a case where the Plaintiff through its own indolence, has failed to bring an action to recover the Construction debt and the Loan debt. Who would not want to claim back monies owing to it for work done or 39 loan advanced when not a single cent has been paid. This is not a case where the Defendants have complained about the quality of work done or that there are defective works. In fact a Certificate of Practical Completion was issued on 3.3.2006 at page 248 PBOD 1. [74] There were the letters from the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant, dated 6.10.2006 and 17.10.2006, requesting very politely for payments for the Construction Works done as can be seen from pages 250-252 PBOD1. The replies from the 1st Defendant were equally polite: always thanking the Plaintiff for tolerating with the non-payment and assuring the Plaintiff that the 1st Defendant would be settling in due cause and stating the actions taken to source and raise financing and apologizing for any inconvenience caused. [75] Through the years, the Plaintiff would forward its progressive invoices and progressive statement of accounts to the 1st Defendant for its payment (See pages 294-537 of PBOD2). However, the Defendants would always seek indulgences from the Plaintiff on the postponement of payment of any monies due and owing. Such conduct continued until as late as 28.12.2010 when the Plaintiff by letter to the 1st Defendant, enclosed 4 sets of the Final Account prepared by the QS Juru Kos, for the 1st Defendant's endorsement and for payment soonest. If there is any delay in the finalization of the 40 accounts it is in all probability due to the 1st Defendant's perennial plea for patience on the Plaintiff's part in that the 1st Defendant is hopeful of securing some financing. It is not a case of the Plaintiff sitting on its rights. After the completion of the Project both PW 1 and DW 1 would meet almost monthly to explore how the 1st Defendant may be able to pay. [76] I can believe PW 1 when he testified that towards settlement of its dues by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff, various options were explored including the transfer of properties into the Plaintiff’s name as a means of set-off. To this effect, a valuation of the 66 parcels of shoplots and a parcel of Petrol Station was carried out to enable parties to ascertain the actual value of the said properties that were intended to be set-off with the 1st Defendant’s debts due and owing to the Plaintiff. There was a letter dated 10.11.2011 from the Valuer Henry Butcher Malaysia to the 1st Defendant at page 254 of PBOD1, stating the Market Value of those parcels to be RM11,670,000.00 and the Forced Sale Value to be RM8,170,000.00. [77] In addition, there was a draft Settlement Agreement prepared by the Plaintiff for the purposes of the contra of properties to settle both the debt due under the Construction Agreement as well as under the Loan Agreement. However it was not executed by the 1st Defendant leaving the 41 Plaintiff with no other choice but to file this suit against the Defendants. (See pages 263-287 of PBOD1). [78] There was also the evidence of the Plaintiff’s Second Witness PW 2 (Mr. Kalai) and the Defendants’ Witness PW 1 (En. Ismail) during trial which showed the conduct of parties and the Defendants’ intentions on negotiating/proposing settlement throughout all these years. (See pages 222, 225, 307-308, 328-329 of NOE): DNR So what Menta wanted was for En Ismail to acknowledge his debt and request for some time to pay his debt. It was what Menta wanted, right? KALAI No, that’s what he also agreed with Mr Tan. Not Menta wanted, he agreed with Mr Tan to give him more time to pay this. DNR Alright. Fair enough. But he was always asking for more time. Isn’t that correct, Mr Kalai? KALAI Correct. DNR So he was always asking for more time from the year 2005 till the year 2016. Isn’t that correct? 42 KALAI Yes. … DNN Now the next question, Mr Kalai, several questions were asked in regard to the draft settlement agreement, what was, you know… you said he asked to prepare or it was prepared by the Plaintiff’s solicitors and all that. My question is fairly simple, Mr Kalai, why was this draft settlement prepared? What was its purpose? KALAI Because En Ismail wanted to give, what you call, want to show Mr Tan that he has the ability to pay and there are some lands that he can always transfer to Mr Tan if it doesn’t, is not able to settle the money. … DNN And would you agree with me that the Plaintiff had sent all these statement of accounts to the First Defendant to inform the First Defendant on the amount due and owing by the First Defendant to the Plaintiff, correct? ISMAIL Statement of account, yes. 43 DNN Correct? Agree? ISMAIL Yes. DNN Now, if I can refer En Ismail to page… before that, would you agree with me that throughout all this period, when the statement of accounts were sent and even before that – YA Which period is it? DNN I would say from, after the Defects Liability Period, from 2008 onwards. Statements were sent from – YA 2008 to? DNN 2010. YA 2010. DNN Yes, from 2010. Since the statements were from 2010. YA ‘Throughout out this period from 2010 to’? DNN To 2015. It’s the last date of the statement of account. Would you agree with me that the First Defendant and the Plaintiff were in negotiations on the repayment of 44 the amount due and owing by the First Defendant to the Plaintiff? Throughout this period, both parties were always talking and negotiating about the payment method, how much to pay, when to pay and all that. Negotiations only. Agree or disagree? ISMAIL We were just talking but there was no negotiation yet. DNN No negotiation. What were you talking about? ISMAIL How do I make the payment. DNN So the method of payment? ISMAIL Yes. YA You were talking on method of payment. … DNN 263 to 287, My Lord. Do you agree that this was the draft settlement agreement? ISMAIL Yes. DNN And would you agree with me that this settlement agreement was discussed and handed over to you in a 45 meeting between Mr Tan and Mr Kalai from the Plaintiff and you on behalf of the First Defendant. Agree or disagree? ISMAIL That was the second, third meeting, I think. DNN So there were few meetings? ISMAIL Before this. DNN In regards the draft settlement agreement. ISMAIL Yes. DNN And would you agree with me that throughout all this, the meetings for the draft settlement agreement, the purpose for the meeting was to discuss on the settlement terms between the parties. Agree or disagree? ISMAIL Agree. [79] Whilst there was no concluded agreement in that the Settlement Agreement prepared in 2015 at page 263 PBOD 1 was not signed, there is undisputed evidence that parties were still negotiating a settlement right till 2015. I agree with the Plaintiff that the Defendants’ conduct in entering into 46 negotiations for settlement of the debt owing to the Plaintiff led the Plaintiff to believe that they would be compensated for all the monies owing by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was restrained from filing this suit against the 1st Defendant at that material time as a result of the 1st Defendant's promises to settle its debt owing to the Plaintiff. As such, the 1st Defendant is estopped now from denying the Plaintiff’s claim and on relying on the defence of limitation. [80] In support of this proposition, the Plaintiff relied on the case of Alfred Templeton & Ors v Mount Pleasure Corp Sdn Bhd [1989] 1 CLJ Rep 219 where Justice Edgar Joseph Jr J (as he then was) in adjudicating upon this issue of estoppel and its effect on limitation, held that one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act by conduct. [81] His Lordship's adroit analysis of the law is reproduced below from pages 287 to 290: “I must lastly consider whether one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act. I confess this is a fine point of law which is not free from difficulty. In Combe v Combe [1951] 2 KB 215, Denning LJ (as he then was) enunciated the doctrine of promissory estoppel in these terms: 47 ... where one party has, by his words or conduct, made to the other a promise or assurance which was intended to affect the legal relations between them and to be acted on accordingly, then, once the other party has taken him at his word and acted on it, the one who gave the promise or assurance cannot afterwards be allowed to revert to the previous legal relations as if no such promise or assurance had been made by him... The language of the learned Judge would seem apt to deal with a defendant who, it is alleged, has caused the plaintiff to delay proceedings. Moreover, the so-called equitable proprietary estoppel has been expanded to create a cause of action. In other words, it can be used not just as a shield but also as a sword. I have, when considering the plaintiffs' claim to a declaration as to entitlement to an equitable easement, referred to an array of cases to illustrate the propositions that rights arising from proprietary estoppel can be given effect to in various ways. I have in mind especially the cases where the Court has made orders analogous to specific performance by directing the transfer to the promisee of the property or some other interest in the property in question. In particular, I have in mind cases such as 48 Crabb v Arun District Council (ibid), Duke of Beaufort v Patrick (ibid), Dillwyn v. Llewelyn (ibid) and Thomas v Thomas (ibid) which I have already discussed. Only six years ago, in Amalgamated Investment and Property Co. Ltd. v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd. [1982] QB 84 Lord Denning emphasised the return to estoppel as a sword when he synthesized the cases and announced that the doctrine of estoppel had become "overloaded" with cases and that "the separate developments" of estoppel by representation, promissory and proprietary estoppel could now be seen "to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations." That general principle was that where a man by his words or conduct, has led another to believe in a particular state of affairs, he will not be allowed to go back on it when it would be "unjust or inequitable" for him to do so. Lord Denning's actual words will repay reading and they are as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by 49 representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption - either of fact or of law whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on which they have conducted the dealings between them - neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the Courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands. In Kok Hoong v Leong Mines Ltd. [1964] AC 993, a decision of the Privy Council from the then Federal Court of Malaysia, in a case of moneylenders, their Lordships said: 50 There are statutes which, though declaring transactions to be unenforceable or void, are nevertheless not absolutely prohibitory and so do not preclude estoppels. One example of this is the Statute of Frauds (see Humphries v. Humphries [1910] 2 KB 531 in which it was no doubt considered that... the statute ought to be treated as regulating procedure, nor as striking at essential validity) a more direct test to apply... is to ask whether the law that confronts the estoppel can be seen to represent a social policy to which the Court must give effect in the interest of the public generally or some section of the public, despite any rules of evidence as between themselves that the parties may have created by their conduct or otherwise. These words are widely drawn and suggest that the Limitation Act can give way to estoppel. Indeed, there are dicta in Turberville v West Ham Corporation [1950] 2 KB 208 which suggest that a defendant will not be heard to rely on a statute of limitation if his acts on statements during the currency of the period have induced the plaintiff to delay proceedings. And, in Othman & Anor v Mek [1972] 2 MLJ 158 Ong, CJ said: 51 ... Statutes of Limitation which bar the enforcement of a right by action are rules of procedure only: see 24 Halsbury, 3rd Edn., p. 181. A right which becomes unenforceable merely by reason of limitation does not ipso facto perish or vanish into thin air: see Holmes v Cowcher [1970] 1 WLR 835 where it was held that although under s. 18(5) of the Limitation Act 1939, arrears of mortgage interest outstanding for more than six years are irrecoverable by action, the mortgagors were only entitled to the equitable remedy of redemption provided that they paid all arrears of mortgage interest, whether statute barred or not. If, as in that case, equitable rights did not perish by reason of limitation, can this same defence be set up here to deny the rights of a beneficial owner to be granted his claim to be a legal title? So far as may be necessary, I would hold that based on these dicta the Limitation Act is purely procedural. (See Othman & Anor v Mek [1972] 2 MLJ 158 (ibid) and cf. Michell v Harris Engineering Co. Ltd.) [1967] 2 QB 703 and, therefore, in certain circumstances, one can estop oneself out of the Limitation Act by conduct. … 52 I would conclude this part of the case by applying the approach adopted by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment and Property case (ibid) that when, as here, the defendant company has by its words and conduct led the plaintiffs to believe that they would be provided a right of way from their Lots, which otherwise would be landlocked, it should not be allowed to go back on them when it would be unjust or inequitable for it to do so. If, contrary to my primary view, the defendant could not or did not estop itself out of the Limitation Act, then I would hold that by reason of the promises made by its Managing Director to the first plaintiff at the meetings held in early 1980 at the Federal Hotel and at its registered office in Ipoh Road to provide for a right of way, it had acknowledged the plaintiffs' right or title to a right of way as claimed. (See, by analogy the case of Eddington v Clark.) [1964] 1 QB 367. The writ herein having been issued on 26 September 1981, the action is not barred by limitation." (emphasis added) [82] The above cited case and principle was affirmed by the Federal Court in the case of Asia General Equipment And Supplies Sdn Bhd & Ors v Mohd Sari Datuk Hj Nuar & Ors [2011] 8 CLJ at 762 where the Federal Court in deciding that the doctrine of estoppel bars a litigant who is guilty of 53 unconscionable conduct from raising and relying on limitation as a defence, held: “[28] Regrettably, the Court of Appeal has failed to consider the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd (supra) in their judgment. In this case, the Federal Court has declared that: The time has come for this Court to recognize that the doctrine of estoppel is a flexible principle by which justice is done according to the circumstance of the case. It is a doctrine of wide utility and has been resorted to in varying fact patterns to achieve justice. Indeed, the circumstances in which the doctrine may operate are endless. Edgar Joseph Jr (as he then was) in an illuminating judgment in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 2 MLJ 202 at p. 244 applied the doctrine in a broad and liberal fashion to prevent a defendant from relying upon the provisions of the Limitation Act 1952. [29] In fact, the factual matrix in Alfred Templeton & Ors v Low Yat Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 CLJ 693; [1989] 1 CLJ (Rep) 219 54 is very similar to that of our present case. There, the sale of the land to the defendant was conditional upon a right of way preserved in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant disregarded this condition in the agreement and set up limitation as a defence when they were sued by the plaintiff for breach of this condition… … [32] In this instance, when the trial judge having undertaken this onerous task and came to a conclusion that the plaintiffs have successfully established estoppel, the Court of Appeal should not have disturbed this finding of fact. [33] Further, the trial judge also found that due to the 1st defendant's improper conduct the plaintiffs were prevented from filing this action earlier. Again, this is a finding of fact supported by cogent evidence. The Court of Appeal should not have replaced it with one of its own to prevent the plaintiffs from pursuing their claim by a defence of limitation.” [83] I agree that through the years the 1st Defendant in the present case is on the one hand imploring for indulgences from the Plaintiff, meeting almost every month to explore options open to settle the debts and 55 negotiating on the mode of payment of its debts but on the other hand audaciously asserting that the Plaintiff ought to have brought its claim against it at the earliest available opportunity or within a 6-year period from the due dates of the various Certificates of Payment from September 2005 to February 2006! [84] I agree with the Plaintiff that by applying the above principles established and supported by various case law, the 1st Defendant’s conduct throughout the years has clearly estopped it from now denying the debts due and owing by them to the Plaintiff and especially from relying on the defence of limitation to bar the Plaintiff from bringing this claim against the 1st Defendant. [85] The 1st Defendant's conduct in leading the Plaintiff on with the assurances that settlement is coming and that the Plaintiff only needed to be more patient would combine to make it both inequitable and unreasonable for the 1st Defendant to now raise the defence of limitation. The law does not approve of such a conduct that is designed to lull the Plaintiff into thinking that the 1st Defendant needed only more time and when sued, to then say that the Plaintiff is out of time! 56 [86] The Plaintiff commenced this suit soon after realizing that it was really hoping against hope for the 1st Defendant refused to sign the Settlement Agreement prepared in 2015. The action having being commenced in February 2016 was well within time. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to impose interest at 8.8% per annum on the amount due under the Construction Agreement [87] The Plaintiff submitted that this rate of 8.8% per annum is an agreed term by parties as incorporated in Clause 18(a)(i) of the Construction Agreement (See page 9-10 of PBOD1). However a closer reading seem to suggest that the interest of 8.8% per annum may only be imposed and calculated in the following restrictive manner in that if for any reason the amount in any progress payment certificate is not paid, the 1st Defendant has the option to defer paying the amount inter-alia subject to interest of 2% above Public Bank’s Base Lending Rate would accrue on the overdue amount on a monthly rest basis. See Clause 18(a)(i). [88] This Deferred Payment Scheme shall only be valid for a duration of six (6) months from the Date of Commencement and not any time thereafter. See Clause 18(a)(iv). Thus interest on Late Payments and also Payment Certificates attracting interest is limited to only 6 Months. Interest 57 is only to be imposed on and accrues on all progress payment certificates that are issued within the 6 month period of the Deferred Payment Scheme (i.e between 1.3.2005 to 1.9.2005). [89] Given that the Deferred Payment Scheme is valid for only six (6) months, the interest chargeable on all progress payment certificates that are issued within that period is limited to a maximum period of six (6) months and not longer. If it was intended that all progress payment certificates issued outside the 6 month period of the Deferred Payment Scheme should attract interest then it must be expressly stated. It may thus be argued that the interest sum of 2% above Public Bank’s Base Lending Rate does not attach to or accrue on all progress certificates that are issued outside the period of six (6) months from the Date of Commencement i.e. from 2.9.2005 onwards. [90] Whilst the clause on pre-judgment interest may be doubtful, the power of the Court to grant pre-judgment interest is by virtue of Section 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 which states: “11. Power of Courts to award interest on debts and damages: In any proceedings tried in any Court for the recovery of any debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there 58 shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arose and the date of the judgment.” [91] In a case like this where the Plaintiff has to take some responsibility for the delay in the finalization of accounts, though this is more likely than not at the behest of the 1st Defendant this Court would exercise its discretion and grant interest at 5% per annum simple interest from the date of the acknowledgment of debt which is 3.10.2011 to date of realization on the principal sum of RM6,094,565.27. Whether the Plaintiff is an unlicensed moneylender notwithstanding only giving a one-off loan transaction and the Loan Agreement void and unenforceable under the Moneylenders Act 1966 [92] The Plaintiff’s managing director, Mr. Tan, and the 2nd Defendant, En. Ismail, who is also the 1st Defendant’s managing director, have been good friends for a long period of time. (See page 260 of NOE). As the saying goes, a friend in need is a friend indeed! 59 [93] At the request of En. Ismail and against the backdrop of trust and an on-going business relationship in the completion of the Project, the Plaintiff agreed to advance to the 1st Defendant a sum of RM 2,000,000.00 (Ringgit Malaysia Two Million) to help the 1st Defendant out financially with the financing of part of the costs of constructing the Project. This included the payments that were needed to be made to the relevant authorities for the premiums and/or other costs payable for 66 parcels of land. (See pages 92-229 of PBOD1). It was not disputed that finally only RM1.2 million was advanced by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant. The Loan Agreement dated 5.3.2005 are found at pages 93-96 PBOD 1. [94] Under Clause 3.1 the 1st Defendant agreed and undertook to repay the Advanced Sum together with the administrative charges calculated at the rate of 8.8% per annum on monthly rests basis from the date of release of the Advanced Sum to the date if full repayment. [95] Further under Clause 4.1 the 1st Defendant shall repay the Advanced Sum together with the administrative charges to the Plaintiff by 30.9.2005. [96] This loan given by the Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant at the 1st Defendant's request, was a single loan transaction or more familiarly termed as a one-off friendly loan transaction. In this regard, the testimony 60 of the Plaintiff’s 2nd Witness PW2 (Mr. Kalai) is relevant at pages 225-226 of NOE: DNN Alright. And questions were also put to you, Mr Kalai, in regards that the Plaintiff is not a money lender, cannot impose interest, and all that. It’s fairly simple question, Mr Kalai, how many loans has the Plaintiff given to the First Defendant? KALAI Only one. YA How many? KALAI Only one. DNN So would you term it as one off loan transaction? KALAI Yes. [97] This was confirmed by the Defendants’ Witness (En. Ismail) himself where he said (See page 304 of NOE): DNN En Ismail, would you agree with me that in all of these years, 2005 or however long that you have known Mr Tan or the First Defendant knows the Plaintiff, from 2005 the date of the agreements, the Contract Agreement, the 61 Loan Agreement, right up till today. Would you agree with me that the Plaintiff has only entered into one Loan Agreement with the First Defendant? There have not been any other Loan Agreements between the parties. Agree or disagree? ISMAIL Repeat please? DNN There has only been one Loan Agreement between Plaintiff and First Defendant. No other Loan Agreements between Plaintiff and First Defendant. Agree or disagree? ISMAIL Agreed. [98] There were major amendments introduced on 1 November 2003, with respect to the Moneylenders Act 1951. The changes brought about by the Moneylenders (Amendment) Act 2003 (MAA 2003) Act A1193 - PU(B) 332/2003. The watershed amendment was in the definition of "moneylender" which was amended to read: "moneylender" means any person who lends a sum of money to a borrower in consideration of a larger sum being repaid to him. 62 [99] Under such a definition, it would appear that even a single transaction would be caught if the agreed amount to be repaid would be more than the amount lent if one is not a licensed moneylender. Parliament must have realised that the net might have been cast too broadly such that even genuine friends who want to help might be caught even if they were to merely charged the borrower the costs of their funds. [100] There was a further amendment effected in 2011 (vide Moneylenders (Amendment) Act 2011) of which the definition of “moneylender” under the old regime (Moneylenders Act 1951) has been re-introduced and re- adopted again. In Leong Chooi Peng v Tee Yam [2011] 1 LNS 1709, I had made this comment at the postscript as follows: “Perhaps Parliament has cast its net too wide in that in trying to stamp out the bad loan sharks it had also stymied the benign friends who can only be beneficial when in one's hour of need, help comes in a friendly loan where a borrower would not mind covering the cost of fund of the lender. Call it interest, call it a consideration of a larger sum being repaid - it is a harsh reality in a real world where the love of money in as much as the lack of money is a root of all kinds of evil. 63 There seems to be a change of heart in the Moneylenders (Amendment) Act 2010 (Act A 390) which came into force on 15 April 2011 vide P.U.(B) 174/2011. ‘Moneylender' has now been redefined to mean any person who carries on or advertises or announces himself or holds himself out in any way as carrying on the business of moneylending, whether or not he carries on any other business. A new section 10OA now reads: "Where in any proceedings against any person, it is alleged that such person is a moneylender, the proof of a single loan at interest made by such person shall raise a presumption that such person is carrying on the business of moneylending, until the contrary is proved." Being a rebuttable presumption, those cases that deal with the meaning of 'the business of moneylending' as referred to in Muhibbah Teguh's case (supra) might well prove relevant again in the future in resolving a once-off friendly loan transaction with interest.” (emphasis added) [101] Therefore, even though admittedly this is a once-off or one-off transaction, the burden is now shifted to the lender to show that it is not in 64 the business of moneylending. The guidance provided in the case of Muhibbah Teguh Sdn Bhd v Yaacob Mat Yim [2005] 4 CLJ 853 would be helpful where Justice Vincent Ng J (as he then was) held, at page 857: “It is axiomatic that one or two moneylending transactions (even in consideration of a larger sum) does not make the lender a moneylender within the purview of the definition of 'moneylender' in s. 2 of the Act. It is also axiomatic that the Act is intended to apply to moneylenders exclusively and not to moneylending transaction or transactions per se. This statement of law was again affirmed by Federal Court in Yeep Mooi v Chu Chin Chua & Ors [1960] 1 LNS 169; [1981] 1 MLJ 14 which I shall discuss later in this judgment. (See also Cheong Kim Hock [1992] 2 SLR 349, Lek Peng Lung [1992] 2 SLR 150 and Subramaniam Dhanapakiam [1991] 2 MLJ 447.)” [102] Here there is no evidence of regularity, continuity or system where the Plaintiff has also either before or after this particular Loan Agreement, also lent to others. Neither has the Plaintiff made further loans to the 1st Defendant other than this particular transaction covered under the Loan Agreement. The loan is in relation to an existing construction project where the Plaintiff is a contractor and the 1st Defendant the employer. It is 65 incidental in that sense to a continuing business relationship where the Plaintiff was helping the 1st Defendant with the latter's temporary cashflow problem. The intention of the parties then was that the loan was to be repaid in 6 months. [103] I would hold that the Plaintiff has rebutted the presumption of being involved in the business of moneylending. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to charge administrative charge on the Loan Sum [104] The Plaintiff submitted that a party is entitled to charge interest on a one-off transaction notwithstanding that party not being a moneylender. The Plaintiff relied on the case of Floral Trends Ltd v Li Onn Floral Enterprise (M) Sdn Bhd [2006] 6 CLJ 525 at 536 Justice Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) held: “[17] Next, it was argued that the loan granted by the plaintiff to the first defendant was illegal pursuant to the Moneylenders Act 1951 (Revised 1989) (Act 400). At all material times the plaintiff was running a floral business and this was not denied by the defendants in their affidavits. The plaintiff was not required to have a licence in order to give a loan with interest to the first defendant because the 66 plaintiff was not operating a moneylending business and that the loan given to the first defendant was in the words of the plaintiff a "one off transaction".” [105] I would prefer the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tan Aik Teck v Tang Soon Chye [2007] 5 CLJ 441 at 451 where no interest is generally allowed to be charged on a friendly loan. It was held as follows: "[12] The defendant contended that he hardly knew the plaintiff before the friendly loan was given to the defendant. As such the plaintiff could not be his friend. The defendant contended that from the evidence of the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff met the defendant about two or three times before the loan was given and as such it could not be a friendly loan. It is clear to me that the defendant, in particular his counsel, was under the misconception what is meant by a friendly loan. A friendly loan is opposed to the normal borrowing from a moneylender or financial institution. A friendly loan is a loan between two persons based on trust. There may be an agreement such as an I.O.U. or security pledged to repayment but most important there will be no interest imposed." (emphasis added) 67 [106] The Lender should not be complaining about being worse off than a licensed moneylender because there is the costs of funds and the risk element that he has to bear. It is not a business to begin with otherwise even a single transaction might be struck down. The Courts are entitled to take a stricter view on interest charged in the light of the rebuttable presumption that even a single transaction is presumed to be moneylending until the contrary is proved. This is to ensure that no lender takes advantage of a borrower in need and capitalise of the desperation of the borrower. [107] Here there were no services rendered that justify an administrative charge of 8.8% per annum on a monthly rest on the RM1.2 million advanced. It is to put it bluntly interest that the Plaintiff wanted to charge the 1st Defendant and to which the 1st Defendant had little choice but to agree. The expression "administrative charge" is used as a camouflage for interest and to make the Loan Agreement more palatable and respectable. [108] Here is a case where going by the amended statement of claim at paragraph 23, the interest of 8.8% per annum calculated from the due dates of the different tranches of release of the principal sum to 18.12.2015 had ballooned to RM1,120,878.25, in other words nearly the whole of the principal sum! 68 [109] This is compounded by the fact that upon the date of repayment being up by 30.9.2005 there was no claim made, the Plaintiff was happy with interest continuing to run. No doubt the 1st Defendant was not in a position to repay and had requested for more time but the Court may strike down the interest element in a friendly loan transaction if the interest is exorbitant, excessive and unconscionable. [110] There was no prior demand made for the repayment of the Loan Sum and so this Court is entitled to take the filing of the Statement of Claim as a formal demand for the repayment of the Loan Sum. In the circumstance I would allow simple interest at 5% per annum on the loan of RM1.2 million from the date of statement of claim to realization. [111] Assuming for a moment that the transaction is that of moneylending, I would still hold that the principal sum is recoverable under section 66 of the Contracts Act 1950 with interest on the principal of 5% per annum from the date of the statement of claim until realization. In the case of Muhibbah Teguh (supra) Justice Vincent Ng J (as he then was) held, at page 864: “In any event, even should the plaintiff fail in both the above hurdles, yet since it is only contended by the defendant that the moneylending transaction(s) is (or are) void rather than illegal, s. 66 of the Contracts 69 Act 1950 requires the defendant to refund the sum received, as the provision states 'When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under the agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it.' Thus, even should the plaintiff be held to be a moneylender and the loan in exh. P1 declared void, then in my view, the sum of RM150,000 would still be ordered to be refunded to the plaintiff under s. 66 of the Contracts Act. The reason being that s. 15 of the Moneylenders Act does not negate s. 66 of the Contracts Act. Section 15 only states that a loan contract in violation of the Act is 'unenforceable'. This is axiomatic, as a void contract is unenforceable. It must be noted that as such loan contract is a void but not an illegal contract s. 66 should be applicable considering that s. 66 is a specific provision to cater to an agreement which 'is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void'. (emphasis added) [112] See also the cases discussed on the applicability of section 66 Contracts Act 1950 to an unenforceable and void contract in Leong Chooi Peng v Tee Yam (supra). 70 Pronouncement [113] To summarize, I had allowed the Plaintiff's claim against the 1st Defendant under the Construction Agreement based on the principal sum of RM6,094,565.27 and I had also granted interest at 5% per annum simple interest from the date of the acknowledgment of debt which is 3.10.2011 to date of realization on the principal sum of RM6,094,565.27. [114] I had also allowed the Plaintiff to enter judgment based on the principal loan sum of RM1,200,000.00 together with interest at 5% per annum simple interest from date of the statement of claim to realization. As for costs, I had allowed costs of RM50,000.00 to be paid by the 1st Defendant to the Plaintiff. [115] The Plaintiff's claim against the 2nd Defendant was dismissed with costs of RM20,000.00 to be paid by the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant. Dated: 31 March 2017. - Signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Malaya Kuala Lumpur 71 For the Plaintiff : Dinesh Nandrajog, Pradeep Nandrajog together with Henna Nandrajog (Messrs Syarikat K.L. Rekhraj) For the Defendants : Dinesh Nair with Melvinder Singh (Messrs Melvin Yasmin & Associates) Date of decision: 28 November 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C(ARB)-3-02/2016 & WA-24C(ARB)-4-02/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd 2. ) Iswarabena Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Iswarabena Sdn Bhd 2. ) Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd

28/03/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=e9c428d9-6a4d-4878-8f66-51799959f788&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C(ARB)-3-02/2016 In the matter of an Arbitration between Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd and Iswarabena Sdn Bhd And In the matter of a Final Award made and published on 11.1.2016 by Mr. Chong Thaw Sing And In the matter of Sections 38 and 50 of the Arbitration Act 2005 (revised 2011) And In the matter of Orders 7 and 69 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of the Inherent Jurisdiction of this Honourable Court BETWEEN PANCARAN PRIMA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 483605-H) ... PLAINTIFF 2 AND ISWARABENA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 454984-U) ... DEFENDANT (Heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C(ARB)- 4-02/2016 In the matter of an Arbitration between Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd and Iswarabena Sdn Bhd And In the matter of a Final Award dated 11th January 2016 delivered by the Arbitrator, Chong Thaw Sing And In the matter of Section 37 of the Arbitration Act 2005 And In the matter of Section 37 and Section 42, Arbitration Act 2005 And 3 In the matter of Order 7 Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN ISWARABENA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 454984-U) ... PLAINTIFF AND PANCARAN PRIMA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 483605-H) ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG Project [1] The Plaintiff in the Setting Aside Originating Summons ("OS") for an arbitral award is Iswarabena Sdn Bhd ("Main Contractor"). It was employed by Projek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan ("PLUS") as the main contractor to construct the Sungai Buaya Interchange and Toll Plaza (“Project”) at the North South highway. [2] The Main Contractor in turn appointed the Defendant, Pancaran Prima Sdn Bhd (“Subcontractor”) as its domestic Subcontractor in respect of vehicular box culvert and drainage works (“VBC Works” and 4 “Drainage Works” respectively and “Works” collectively). The appointment was by way of a letter of appointment dated 18.7.2011 (“Subcontract”). [3] Clause 12 of the Subcontract (“Termination Clause”) is the watershed that governs the Main Contractor's right to terminate the Subcontract. It provides inter-alia as follows: “Iswarabena Sdn Bhd reserves the right to terminate this agreement by giving the Subcontractor fourteen (14) days prior written notice if the works is delay (sic) more than 20% financially” Problem [4] The Main Contractor had exercised its right to terminate the Subcontract (“Termination”) on ground that the Works had been delayed more than 20% financially. It issued a 14 day notice of intention to terminate dated 26.3.2012. It was rectified by a letter dated 2.4.2012 but nothing turns on that. It followed up by issuing a termination notice dated 12.4.2012. [5] On or about the date of Termination, the parties conducted a joint measurement and signed a joint measurement sheet agreeing to the quantities of work done under the Subcontract (“Agreed Quantities”). 5 [6] The Subcontractor, dissatisfied with what it considered to be wrongful termination, commenced arbitration against the Main Contractor (“Arbitration”) before a sole arbitrator. The main issue at the Arbitration was whether the Termination was wrongful. [7] The learned Arbitrator, by way of a final award dated 11.1.2016 (“Award”), held that the Termination was wrongful (“Termination Ruling”) as the condition in the Termination Clause requiring “the works is delay (sic) more than 20% financially” (“Delay Threshold”) had not been met as at the date of the Termination. As a result, the learned Arbitrator awarded inter-alia the following to the Subcontractor: 1. Costs of the completed Works amounting to RM1,409,154.75 valued at 28% of the total Subcontract sum (“Value of Completed Works Ruling”); and 2. Loss of profits amounting to RM942,109.52 for uncompleted Works as at the date of Termination using a profit margin of 7.5% for VBC Works and 10% for Drainage Works (“Loss of Profit Ruling"). 3. The whole of the Main Contractor's Counterclaim in the Arbitration as Respondent was dismissed. 6 Prayers [8] There are 2 applications made in this Setting Aside Originating Summons: 1. First, an application made under section 37(1)(a)(v) and 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act 2005 (“Act”) in that the learned Arbitrator had breached the rules of natural justice and/or had exceeded his jurisdiction (“Section 37 Application”) which challenges the Loss of Profit Ruling; and 2. Secondly, an application made under section 42 of the Act which challenges all 3 Rulings on the ground that the learned Arbitrator had committed errors of law (“Section 42 Application”). [9] The principal relief applied for by the Main Contractor is to vary the Award to the extent that the Termination Ruling be reversed resulting in the Termination being held to be lawful and as a consequence that the claims of the Subcontractor be dismissed and the counterclaims of the Main Contractor be allowed. Other alternative reliefs are possible by virtue of section 42(4) of the Act. [10] The Subcontractor by another Originating Summons has applied for the Award to be enforced. The parties shall be referred to as Plaintiff 7 and Defendant in the Setting Aside OS or as Main Contractor and Subcontractor respectively. Where reference is made to the parties at the Arbitration the Claimant is the Subcontractor and the Respondent the Main Contractor. [11] Both parties agreed that both the OS shall be heard together as the result of the Setting Aside OS shall correspondingly affect the Enforcement OS. Principles [12] Under section 36(1) of the Act, an arbitral award is final and binding on the parties. Consistent with the Model Law, our Courts have taken a minimalist intervention approach to arbitral awards under the Act. [13] This has been reiterated in several appellate decisions (a) in the Kerajaan Malaysia v Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 126 case - decision of Mohd Ariff Yusof JCA (b) in the case of Awangku Dewa bin Pgn Momin & Ors v Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Limbang Division [2015] 3 MLJ 161 ; (c) in the case of Cairn Energy India Pty Ltd & Anor v The Government of India [2009] 6 MLJ 795 ; (d) the decision of Varghese George JCA in the case of Chain Cycle Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 CLJ 218. 8 [14] This is underscored by section 8 of the Act (amended in July 2011) with the proviso “except so provided by this Act” and by section 42 (1A) of the Act (introduced in July 2011) which qualifies intervention on a question of law with reference to the expression “shall dismiss” unless the question of law “substantially affects the rights”. [15] The limited intervention is only for curing a perverse or corrupt finding basically under two broad grounds namely (a) challenges on serious grounds of the likes of jurisdiction, public policy and breach of rule of natural justice within the framework of section 37 of the Act and (b) challenges for errors of law affecting substantial rights within the framework of the said section 42. [16] As parties had agreed that disputes be determined through arbitration, the Act does not permit the court to engage on the facts as the same belong to the parties’ contracted forum, namely the arbitral tribunal. By way of example reference is made to the case of Geogas S.A v Trammo Gas Ltd.; The Baleares [1993] 1 LLR 215 (The “Baleares”) where the English Court of Appeal through Steyn LJ stated “[t] the arbitrators are the masters of the facts” and there is a need for the Court to be constantly vigilant to ensure that attempts to question or qualify the arbitrator’s findings of fact, or to dress up questions of fact on question of law are carefully identified and firmly discouraged”. 9 [17] The dictum in The Baleares has been embraced by our Courts in for instance, the decision in the High Court (Nallini, J, now JCA) in the case of Exceljade Sdn Bhd v Bauer (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 1470, the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Brunsfield Project Management Sdn Bhd v Igeniur Bersekutu Consulting Engineers (W-02(C)(A)-1786-10/2014). Even drawing different reasonable inferences of fact from that of the Arbitrator is prohibited. In the case of Geogas S.A. v Trammo Gas Ltd.; The Baleares [1993] 1 LLR 215; the English Court of Appeal (Steyn LJ) was also mindful of attempts by an unsuccessful party to invite the Court, in an oblique way, to challenge the facts by suggesting that a court could engage in some form or another on the facts to “draw reasonable inferences from the arbitrator’s findings of fact”. [18] In a section 42 application there must be not a hint of any reference or reliance to disputed facts. As held by our Court of Appeal (Mohd Hishamudin JCA) in the case of Awangku Dewa bin Pgn Momin & Ors v Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Limbang Division [2015] 3 MLJ 161: “... there should not be any suggestion in the affidavits of parties … of facts being disputed or of any disagreement on the part of the applicants/appellants with the evaluation of the evidence by the arbitrator”. 10 [19] Even when a limited challenge of an Award is allowed through a question of law posed under section 42 there is the strict requirement to be fulfilled in that the answer to the question referred must substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties as contained in section 42(1A). [20] As legal ingenuity and innovativeness know no bounds, the Court “must always be” vigilant to ensure section 42 is not utilized “as a backdoor avenue for appealing against the decision of an arbitral tribunal” and “must summarily dismiss … without even attempting to answer the ‘question of law’ posed” (see the case of Awangku Dewa bin Pgn Momin & Ors v Superintendent of Lands and Surveys, Limbang Division [2015] 3 MLJ 161. [21] In the Court of Appeal in the case of Kerajaan Malaysia v Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 126 at paras. 57(e) and 57 (g) it was stated that the question of law must be a legitimate question of law and the jurisdiction under section 42 is “not to be likely exercised and should be exercised in clear and exceptional cases” A Court will not entertain a challenge of an award under section 42 when the very legal issue has been specifically referred to an arbitral tribunal, for example a dispute specifically calling for an interpretation of a contract. Such questions of law are not considered by the courts as 11 legitimate questions of law to be revisited under section 42. See The Government of India v Cairn Energy India Pty Ltd & Anor [2012] 3 CLJ 423 (paras. 29-30); Chain Cycle Sdn Bhd v Kerajaan Malaysia [2016] 1 CLJ 218 (paras. 26-33). [22] It is evident from the case of Exceljade (supra) such questions of law will only be entertained in limited circumstances. First, such questions cannot be entertained on the ground that the court may come to a different conclusion from that reached by the arbitral tribunal. Second, such questions will only be entertained if there is only one possible answer to the question. In other words, a question will only be entertained if the conclusion that the arbitral tribunal had come to on the question was one that no reasonable person, applying the test of reasonableness, could have reached the conclusion that the arbitral tribunal did. It has to be shown that the arbitral tribunal’s conclusion on the proposed question was necessarily inconsistent with the application of the right test. Whether the Termination Ruling was an Error of Law - The Section 42 Application in Questions 1 and 2 [23] Questions 1 and 2 of the section 42 Application read as follows: 12 Question 1: Whether Clause 12 of the Contract, read in its entirety and within the context of the Contract itself, allows physical progress of the Defendant to be applied as the contractual benchmark for termination? Question 2: Whether on a true construction of Clause 12 within the context of the Contract, 28% could have been applied as the financial progress of the Defendant at the time of termination? [24] The Termination Clause provides inter-alia as follows: “Iswarabena Sdn Bhd reserves the right to terminate this agreement by giving the Subcontractor fourteen (14) days prior written notice if the works is delay (sic) more than 20% financially” (emphasis added) [25] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that although the learned Arbitrator had correctly interpreted clause 12 in the sense that the Delay Threshold justifying Termination must be based on financial delay, he had committed errors of law by misapplying this legal test to the facts arising out of his misunderstanding of this legal test and applying the wrong law to the facts and arriving at his conclusion which is perverse and/or unsupported by any evidence. The learned Arbitrator had instead applied the physical delay test. 13 [26] In Telekom Malaysia Bhd v Eastcoast Technique (M) Sdn Bhd and another summons [2014] 11 MLJ 525, the Court adopted the test set out in Finelvet AG v Vinava Shipping Co Ltd, The Chrysalis, as the test to be applied to our section 42 application as follows: “[38] ... Starting therefore with the proposition that the court is concerned to decide on the hearing of the appeal whether the award can be shown to be wrong in law, how is this question to be tackled? In a case such as the present, the answer is to be found by dividing the arbitrator's process of reasoning into three stages: (1) The arbitrator ascertains the facts. This process includes the making of findings on any facts which are in dispute. (2) The arbitrator ascertains the law. This process comprises not only the identification of all material rules of statute and common law, but also the identification and interpretation of the relevant parts of the contract, and the identification of those facts which must be taken into account when the decision is reached. (3) In the light of the facts and the law so ascertained, the arbitrator reaches his decision. … Stage (2) of the process is the proper subject matter of an appeal under the Act of 1979. In some cases an error of law can be 14 demonstrated by studying the way in which the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons. It is, however, also possible to infer an error of law in those cases where a correct application of the law to the facts would lead inevitably to one answer, whereas the arbitrator has arrived at another; and this can be so even if the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons in a manner which appears to be correct, for the court is then driven to assume that he did not properly understand the principles which he had stated. Whether stage (3) can ever be the proper subject of an appeal, in those cases where the making of the decision does not follow automatically from the ascertainment of the facts and the law, is not a matter upon which it is necessary to express a view in the present case. Pioneer Shipping Ltd v BTP Tioxide Ltd [1982] AC 724 and Kodros Shipping Corporation v Empresa Cubana de Fletes (No 2) [1983] 1 AC 736, show that where the issue is one of commercial frustration, the court will not intervene, save only to the extent that it will have to form its own view, in order to see whether the arbitrator's decision is out of conformity with the only correct answer or (as the case may be) lies outside the range of correct answers. 15 … [39] The foregoing to my mind succinctly and comprehensively sets out the test to be adopted by a court in applying s 42. … [40] I have set out in the material background facts the specific findings of the arbitrator in relation to undue influence. A perusal of the award, more particularly at p 12 to the first half of p 17 makes it clear that: (a) the arbitrator made a bare finding or conclusion that Eastcoast had been able to show in evidence that specific terms in the six agreements were obtained by undue influence. However there is absolutely no evidence to support this bare finding. In other words, the conclusion appears to be arrived at with absolutely no evidence to support it; (b) while correctly citing the law relating to undue influence from Sinnadurai's Law of Contract, there was no application or nor proper application of such law to the factual matrix of the case. Again after citing the law correctly, the arbitrator simply made a conclusion that as Eastcoast was a 16 bumiputra company operating under a programme to assist bumiputras, it was 'at the mercy' of Telekom 'in respect of any bargaining power'. This, to my mind amounts to an erroneous application of the law to the bare facts of the identity of Eastcoast and Telekom. Put another way, the fact that Eastcoast is a bumiputra company under the EDP programme and Telekom is a government linked company does not in itself warrant a conclusion law that undue influence is thereby established. This, as stated in Finelvet AG v Vinava Shipping Co Ltd, The Chrysalis, amounts to an error of law because the arbitrator, while stating the law correctly has misapplied the same or misunderstood the law. If the arbitrator had applied the law correctly the only answer he could plausibly have arrived at would have been that undue influence did not arise as a consequence of the relationship between the parties. Neither was there any evidence of dominance of will to enable an application of the principles of law relating to undue influence;” (emphasis added) 17 [27] Telekom’s case (supra) at page 536 also states that a perverse decision will amount to an error of law for the purposes of a section 42 application in that: “It is, however, also possible to infer an error of law in those cases where a correct application of the law to the facts would lead inevitably to one answer, whereas the arbitrator has arrived at another; and this can be so even if the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons in a manner which appears to be correct, for the court is then driven to assume that he did not properly understand the principles which he had stated. ... The court will not intervene, save only to the extent that it will have to form its own view, in order to see whether the arbitrator's decision is out of conformity with the only correct answer or (as the case may be) lies outside the range of correct answers.” (emphasis added) [28] The learned Arbitrator found (and the Main Contractor accepts) that the Threshold Delay is calculated by way of the following formula: % of Scheduled Financial progress - % Actual Financial progress = Threshold Delay 18 [29] What the Main Contractor disputes is the learned Arbitrator’s finding at paragraph 80 and 92 of the Award that the Actual Financial Progress was in fact 28% when Termination occurred. [30] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the error of law relied upon in respect of this finding is as follows: When the test under the Termination clause is applied properly i.e. using financial delay as the proper basis, there is only one inevitable answer that can be arrived at when calculating the Actual Financial Progress as at the date of Termination and that figure is 9%. Learned counsel was however prepared to accept the Subcontractor's pleaded financial progress of 11.37%. The learned Arbitrator's decision that this figure should be 28% instead is perverse. [31] The calculation of financial delay is a mathematical calculation yielding only one objective answer. Financial delay as at Termination is calculated using the following formula: Quantity of work done on Termination date x BQ rates/Subcontract Sum (expressed as a percentage %) 19 [32] As can be seen from this formula, the only uncertain variable is Quantity of work done on Termination date; the BQ rates and Subcontract Sum being stated in the Subcontract. [33] The Quantities of work done as at the date of Termination cannot be disputed since the parties conducted a joint measurement and jointly signed a measurement sheet with Agreed Quantities. Based on the Agreed Quantities the Actual Financial progress as at 12.4.2012 i.e. the date of Termination is only 9%. I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff that "This is simple mathematics, leading to only one inevitable conclusion and cannot be disputed." According to this indisputable figure the Delayed Threshold of 20% has been reached and the Termination must be valid. [34] How then did the learned Arbitrator come to the finding that the Actual Financial progress is 28% as contained in the table found at paragraph 80 of the Award? In unraveling this mystery, learned counsel for the Plaintiff found the source of the error to be the following: According to paragraph 80 of the Award, these figures (including those as at 31.3.2012 and 30.4.2012 being the relevant ones for the purposes of the Termination) are extracted and calculated from the Main Contractors progress reports submitted to the Owner. 20 [35] However, the figures used by the learned Arbitrator from these reports refer to physical progress and NOT financial progress. This is expressly and specifically stated to be so in the reports themselves. [36] Clearly, the learned Arbitrator took figures expressly stated to be in respect of physical progress of works between the Main Contractor and the Employer and then confused them to be financial progress at paragraph 80 of his Award, and then fit them into the terms of the Termination Clause to arrive at the conclusion that the Termination was wrongful as financial delay had not reached 20%. This is bizarre and amounts to an error of law producing the opposite effect flowing from what was held to be an unlawful termination of the Subcontract. The wrong premise that the learned Arbitrator proceeded from had led to the perverse conclusion as can be seen from paragraphs 80-82 of the Award set out below: Date of Meeting Scheduled Financial progress, % Actual Financial progress, % Delay in Financial progress, % Comments 31.10.2011 1.72 3.29 +1.57 CBD8/255 30.11.2011 2.84 8.35 +5.51 CBD8/323 31.1.2012 18.12 19.15 +1.04 CBD8/485 29.2.2013 27.70 27.20 -0.5 CBD2/42 21 31.3.2012 35.02 27.90 -7.0 CBD2/46 30.4.2012 47.49 28.48 -19.0 CBD9/708 "The Claimant is understandably livid with the Respondent’s records showing its progress of work deteriorated from 1.05% delay on 14.3.2012 to a massive 73.6% delay, within a period of some three weeks. In fact, a reference to the report of progress of drainage work made by the Respondent in the Main contract to the Employer showed the inconsistency of the computation of the progress of the drainage work in the main and the subcontract. The main contractor’s reported financial progress of drainage work computed from the main contract minutes of meeting endorsed by the Respondent’s Project Manager 1, the Resident Engineer and the Opus construction manage are: The glaring inconsistency between the Respondent’s allegation of a massive delay of 52% in March 2012 was reported to the Employer as a mere 7.0% delay. This assertion is clearly wrong because the Respondent reported to the Employer that by the end of March the drainage work was delayed 7.0%. Even by end of April 2012 (the subcontract was terminated on 12.4.2012) the drainage work 22 was only delayed by 19.0% in financial progress term. It is therefore, preposterous for the Respondent to allege on 26 March 2012 that the Claimant’s drainage work has been delayed by 52%. It must be noted that the Respondent had subcontracted the entire drainage work for this main contract to the Claimant, hence the progress of work reported in the main contract progress report is that entirely that of the Claimant’s work and nobody else’s. The inconsistent computation of delay in financial progress reported in the main contract progress of work report and the subcontract technical meeting is of a great cause of concern to the Claimant. It is a settled law that the court will construe any forfeiture clause strictly with the full rigor of the contra preferentum rule. And Clause 12 is obviously a forfeiture clause..." (emphasis added) [37] I agree with the inevitable conclusion of learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the decision of the learned Arbitrator was perverse especially taking into account that there can only be one undisputable and mathematically calculated financial progress i.e. 9% or that pleaded by the Subcontractor which is 11.37%. 23 [38] The learned Arbitrator seemed to have been influenced by other erroneous and extraneous considerations. The learned Arbitrator tried to justify his conclusion by referring to the figure of 26% of financial progress stated in the notice of termination but he must have forgotten that this was actually corrected in writing a week later to reflect physical completion instead of financial completion. [39] The learned Arbitrator, at paragraph 78 of the Award, also referred to the inconsistencies of work progress stated in the minutes of meetings. But when one looks at these minutes there is no indication whether the progress was measured physically or financially. Moreover even the learned Arbitrator accepted, at paragraphs 55, 59, 77 and 78 of the Award, that these discrepancies arose as a result of using original or revised work programmes due to the Subcontractors application for 162 days of extensions of time where 42 days were granted. [40] One must ask why is there such a large discrepancy between physical progress (28%) and financial progress (11.37%) as at the date of Termination? The explanation was actually provided by the Subcontractor himself. According to the Subcontractor there are errors in the BQ in that the rates in the Subcontract BQ (which were filled in by the Subcontractor) were deliberately low and that Subcontract BQ quantities are higher than the as-built quantities. If the BQ quantities are 24 higher than as-built quantities than physical progress will always be higher than financial progress. In fact this was the stand taken by the Subcontractor which was actually reflected in the Award. See: Award at paragraphs 110 and 145. [41] The mystery that manifested itself lies in the misreading by the learned Arbitrator in relying on progress reports reporting physical progress of 28% as if the figure of 28% represented financial progress instead. The learned Arbitrator appeared to have misapplied the contra preferentum rule. This will amount to an error of law since this rule is meant to be used to interpret ambiguous contracts and not facts. There is nothing ambiguous about the Delayed Threshold before the termination clause may be activated by the Main Contractor. [42] The learned Arbitrator purported to use the contra preferentum rule to interpret clause 12. This is totally misplaced considering that (a) clause 12 which is the Termination Clause is clear and (b) the interpretation of clause 12 was not even disputed by the parties who accepted that the Delay Threshold is based on Financial Delay and not Physical Delay. The only dispute was regarding the percentage of financial delay and not whether financial delay applied to clause 12. [43] At the end of paragraph 82, the learned Arbitrator after discussing this rule at length began to discuss the facts. He mentioned the main 25 contract progress reports and in the same breath concluded that the figures therein refer to financial delay when these reports expressly refer to its figures as representing physical delay. I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff that in applying the contra preferentum rule to come to the factual conclusion that the 28% mentioned in the progress reports is in fact financial delay when reported to be physical delay is a gross misapplication of the law. [44] Learned counsel for the Subcontractor argued that it is the learned Arbitrator's finding of fact that the Subcontract had been validly terminated when he found at paragraph 93 of the Award as follows: “Taking all the above reason (sic) (we have underscored) into consideration, I cannot but conclude that all evidence lean towards an incorrect exercise of the right of termination provided in Clause 12. It would be unsafe for this Tribunal to find that the subcontract had lawfully terminated” [45] It was a finding of fact arrived at not based on Clause 12 which the learned Arbitrator correctly stated but based instead on a disparity in the physical progress of 20% instead of financial progress. The learned Arbitrator cannot rewrite the terms of the Subcontract where Clause 12 is concerned in spite of his misgivings. He must apply Clause 12 as it is worded and not as he would like it to be worded. The learned Arbitrator 26 was on spot when he made the following observation of Clause 12: “this clause included a definite threshold of delay in progress of work exceeding 20% in financial term before the right to terminate accrues …” (emphasis added) [46] However the learned Arbitrator ventured to find ambiguity when there was none. He appeared to be perturbed by the input parameters necessary to compute the financial progress. He listed in paragraph 88 of his Award the following: "...For example, the appropriate work programme to be used in the computation, the EOT the Claimant is entitled to receive at any point in time particularly before the notice of intention to terminate, the appropriate method of computation of the financial progress etc...." [47] To resolve the ambiguity he invoked the contra proferentum rule and found as follows: “...There is no dispute that Clause 12 was drafted and inserted into the subcontract by the Respondent. It is settled law that in the event of ambiguity in the terms of contract drafted and inserted by the Respondent, the ambiguous term must be construed strictly 27 against the party who had drafted it and who now wish to rely on it to its advantage” (para. 89). [48] The Arbitrator found at paragraph 89 of his Award as follows: “...According to the rules of contra proferentum, the ambiguity in Clause 12, as to the correct work programme to be used in the computation of work progress must be construed in favour of the Claimants’ interpretation that the latest work programme incorporating all EOTs right up to the date in question should be used.” (page 45-46 of Award). [49] Under the Subcontract it is the Subcontractor who is to furnish the Work Programme and it was not an issue before the Arbitrator that the proper Work Programme had not been furnished. The complaint of the Subcontractor was that they should have been given the EOT applied for because there was delay in giving them the site possession necessary for them to commence the Drainage Works. [50] The learned Arbitrator was of the view that the Main Contractor was the self-certifier and that the Main Contractor “... is not entitled to rely on his own position as the main contractor to certify the subcontractor’s default without giving due consideration to the Claimant’s plead of not been given access to the site. By so doing, the 28 Respondent has assumed a greater power than even a Court has in an application for summary judgment where arguable defence is raised before its decision to terminate the subcontractor." (paragraph 87 of Award) [51] The learned Arbitrator appeared to have contradicted himself here as he had earlier held in paragraph 64 that the delay was not caused by the Main Contractor's agent but by an independent contractor. This has not been challenged in a reference under section 42 of the Act and this matter must be deemed res. In fact he described this issue as a major issue raised by the Subcontractor and likened it to the “Elephant in the Room”. The learned Arbitrator expressly decided in favour of the Main Contractor at paragraphs 74 and 75 of the Award where the Arbitrator held as follows: “I find and hold that the prevention principle would not operate against the Respondent because of any delay by the earthwork subcontractor to hand over sites for drainage work. The Claimant has neither demonstrated that the contract has no provision for extension of time nor that the delay to the drainage works was caused by the employer or its agents”. [52] In so finding, the Arbitrator must also have at least impliedly agreed that the Subcontractor cannot be entitled to 162 days EOT 29 applied for based on lack of possession of site. The learned Arbitrator cannot then make a round-about turn to then hold that the delay in site possession was the cause of the delay and hence taking a leap of logic that the termination was unlawful. [53] In coming to the “Scheduled Financial progress %” as at 31.3.2012, the Arbitrator had used the figure of 35.02% which is in fact the exact figure put forward by the Subcontractor as stated in his work program on the basis that he is entitled to EOT of 162 days (see PCB Vol 2/page 4 – 9 at page 9). [54] I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the figure of 35.02% is a very generous figure since, according to the Subcontractor, it is based on the assumption of EOT entitlement of 162 days (which the Arbitrator already held in paragraph 75 of the Award to be unjustified). The alternative figures put forward by the Main Contractor of 46.15% based on an assumed EOT of 162 days and 77.91% based on the actual EOT granted of 46 days (see Vol 3 of supporting affidavit at page 920) was obviously rejected by the Arbitrator. [55] In any event the Main Contractor is not challenging this figure of 35.02% being the “scheduled financial progress” although it is generous in favour of the Subcontractor and it is taking the position that there are good grounds for such challenge. 30 [56] The figure being questioned is the “actual financial progress” where the mathematically unchallengeable figure based on agreed quantities as at the date of termination, contractual rates and the contract sum is 9% based on PCB tab 5A derived by dividing RM1,183,301.36 by RM13,300.000 and multiplying by 100%. However the Main Contractor was agreeable to be bound by the Subcontractor's pleaded figure of 11.37% since both figures will lead to rightful termination as follows: Date of Meeting 31.3.2012 31.3.2012 3.3.2012 % Scheduled Financial progress (Using the figure supplied by the Subcontractor) 35.02 35.02 35.02 % Actual Financial progress 27.90 9 11.37 % Delay in Financial progress -7.0 % -26.02 -23.65 Date of Meeting Scheduled Financial progress, % Actual Financial progress, % Delay in Financial progress, % Comments 31.3.2012 35.02 27.90 -7.0 Arbitrator held that termination was invalid since delay < 20% 31 31.3.2012 35.02 9 (based on PCB tab 5A) -26.02 Delay >20% therefore termination valid 31.3.2012 35.02 11.37 (pleaded sum) -23.65 Delay >20% therefore termination valid [57] It has been conceded by the learned counsel for the Subcontractor that although the words used were “Financial progress” the figure of 27.90% imported from CBD2/46 actually refer to physical progress. [58] There is no doubt that the delay threshold of 20% must contractually be based on financial delay and not physical delay. But the learned Arbitrator paid lip service to this. Although he had stated that the test to be applied is that of financial progress delay, he had in fact applied physical progress delay in finding that the threshold of 20% financial progress delay had not been reached. This is clearly wrong as the Arbitrator must enforce the Contract as it is and cannot rewrite the Contract for the parties. The learned Arbitrator has neither the license nor the liberty to apply a different criterion for termination using delay in physical progress test as he did below: 32 Date of Meeting Scheduled Financial progress, % Actual Financial Physical progress, % Delay in Financial progress, % Comments 31.3.2012 35.02 27.90 -7.0 CBD2/46 [59] The Subcontractor did not seem to have made any submissions that the Delay Threshold of 20% had not been met. Having held that the termination was rightly made, there is then no basis for awarding the Defendant the loss of profits which would only arise in a case of wrongful termination, which is not the case here. I would therefore set aside that part of the Award where the learned Arbitrator had held that the termination of the Subcontractor was unlawful and with that the loss of profits as assessed for the Subcontractor. Whether the Value of Completed Works Ruling was an Error of Law The Section 42 Application on the 3rd Question of Law [60] The 3rd Question of Law was whether the learned Arbitrator has misconstrued Clauses 2 and 12 in the context of the Subcontract to award the value of completed works based on the percentage of 28%. 33 [61] Both counsel for the Plaintiff Main Contractor and the Defendant Subcontractor are agreed that irrespective of whether the termination by the Main Contractor is lawful or otherwise, the Subcontractor must still be paid for the work done as at the date of termination of the Subcontract. [62] The learned Arbitrator correctly identified the issue before him when he stated at paragraph 120 of the Award as follows: “one of the issues before this Tribunal is the proper method to compute the work done should the contractor’s employment be terminated before completion”. [63] The learned Arbitrator dealt with Clause 2 of the subcontract and found at paragraph 121 that “notwithstanding Clause 2, the actual contract however is a mixed of lump sum and provisional quantities” and at paragraph 122 goes on to state “it is quite apparent that this is a mixed contract with the lump sum component found in BQ1 and BQ4 whereas the provisional quantities is confined to BQ11A and BQ11B." Indeed the lump sum component is with respect to the Drainage Works whereas the provisional quantities is with respect to the VRC Works. 34 [64] The learned Arbitrator correctly distilled the issue at paragraphs 108 and paragraph 122 of the Award where he states: “Quite clearly the parties differ in the method of computation of the value of drainage work the Claimant is entitled to recover. The Claimant contends that BQ4 is a lump sum bill for drainage work price at RM9,250,464.00 and is entitled to recover the sum based on stage of completion of the lump sum portion of the subcontract whereas the Respondent insists the correct approach in the computation is to use the re-measured quantity of work done at termination applied to the rates in the contract bill BQ4”. [65] I agree with learned counsel for the Defendant that the learned Arbitrator then made the following findings of fact in the Award: (a) para. 124 – “I find no evidence that the Claimant had agreed whether expressly or by conduct to vary the lump sum contract to that of a re-measured or provisional quantities subcontract. On the contrary I find the parties have had a separate arrangement for interim valuations by agreement for whatever reasons but at termination the full force of law governing the contract must be allowed to take its course”; 35 (b) para. 124 – “The Respondent had agreed that re-measured quantities is only for the purpose of payment of progress of work. Therefore at the stage of final account whether because of premature termination or at completion of the subcontract, the subcontractor must be compensated under the terms of the subcontract”; (c) para. 124 (page 72) – RW1 explanation of his letter in CBD1/155 that lump sum payment only applies when the subcontract is 100% is unacceptable and has no legal basis. Such interpretation opens the contractor to abuse by self- serving employer or main contractor to either lawfully or unlawfully terminate the contractor before reaching 100% completion thereby reaping the benefit of lower compensation based on actual quantities; (d) it is fair and reasonable to compensate the Claimant the sum compensated as 28% of RM9,250,464.00 (lump sum portion of the drainage subcontract) or RM2,590,129.92 which is essentially the progress represented by the Plaintiff to the Employer at page 38 of the Award. 36 [66] The question of what is a fair and reasonable method of compensating the Subcontractor for work done before termination is at best a question of mixed law and fact and so does not fall within the purview of section 42 of the Act. There is no ground for judicial intervention under the guise of wrong legal principles of calculating the method of compensating a subcontractor for a lump sum contract terminated before completion. [67] The matter can also be looked at from the perspective of the 3- stage test propounded by Lord Mustill in The Chrysalis case (supra) in that if there is a range of possible answers from applying the law to the facts, the Court would not then interfere. The Arbitrator had to choose between the following methods of computing the value of Work done as at the date of Termination. On the one hand the Subcontractor contended that it should be based on physical progress at 28%; whereas the Main Contractor states that it should be 11.37% based on financial progress being the Agreed Quantities multiplied by the BQ rates. [68] The Subcontractor stated in their written submissions that using physical progress resulting in 28% of the Contract Sum would be the fair mode of calculation since it contended that the BQ rates were 37 depressed and that the Subcontract BQ quantities were in error. Furthermore if one were to use the remeasured quantities approach the Subcontractor would not be able to recover his lump sum in full even if they were to complete the Works. The Arbitrator agreed and adopted this mode of calculation. The Subcontractor submitted that since the Subcontract was silent on the mode of how such value should be calculated when premature termination occurs, then the Arbitrator could choose which mode to adopt. [69] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff on the other hand submitted that the short answer to this is that the Subcontract is not silent on this point. According to him, Clause 2 of the Contract, which reads as follows, necessitates that the value of work must be measured based on financial progress: “The quantities and rates in the attached BQ are deemed to include all the necessary works required by you to complete the whole of the said works, no fluctuation any (sic) additional quantity will be allowed. Any discrepancy with regards to drawings and quantities shall be deemed to have been taken into consideration. All quantities are lump sum (sic). The following Bill of Quantities (BQ) Appendix A shall be the basis of the works.” (emphasis added) 38 [70] With respect I do not read Clause 2 above as addressing how the Subcontractor is to be paid upon a termination before the completion of the Works. All that is said is that the lump sum figure would remain and there shall be no variation in the lump sum figure arising either out of under-estimation or error on the part of the Subcontractor. That is to be expected of a lump sum contract anyway. [71] Upon early termination before completion of the Drainage Works, the Subcontract remains a lump sum contract and it does not change character to a measurement contract or a provisional quantities contract. I can see nothing wrong or perverse in the interpretation given by the learned Arbitrator and on the contrary the reasons given by the learned Arbitrator is both sensible and sound. At any rate it falls within a range of possible answers and this Court would not disturb it under the guise of a section 42 reference on a question of law. [72] I would dismiss the reference on Question 3 as being devoid of merits. Pronouncement [73] Having disposed of the Questions of Law under the section 42 reference, there is no necessity to continue further with the section 37 39 application to set aside the whole of the Award and indeed the issue raised in the section 37 application has become rather academic. It remains for this Court to make the necessary directions and orders under section 42 of the Act. As I have held that the termination of the Subcontract was lawful in answer to Questions 1 and 2 of the reference, I shall set aside that part of the Award at paragraph 158 item 5 where the loss of profit claimed by the Subcontractor is concerned. [74] In answer to Question 3 of the reference, having held that the learned Arbitrator was entitled to assess the value of the Works done by Subcontractor at the date of termination based on stage completion, the Award of the learned Arbitrator at Item 4 paragraph 158 is confirmed. The rest of the Award shall be set aside and be remitted together with the above determinations and directions to the learned Arbitrator for the reconsideration of the Main Contractor's/Respondent’s counterclaim in that Items 2, 3, 5 and 6 of paragraph 158 of the Award be set aside to be substituted by an appropriately award after such reconsideration with respect to Items 2,3 and 6. [75] I shall also extend the time frame under S 42(6) of the Act to 120 days for the Arbitrator to make his fresh award. [76] As a corollary the Subcontractor's/Claimant’s application for enforcement of the Award is dismissed accordingly. 40 [77] After hearing parties on costs, I award cost of RM10,000.00 to the Plaintiff for the Setting Aside OS and costs of RM5,000.00 to the Plaintiff for the Subcontractor's/Claimant’s OS that is dismissed for enforcement of the Award. Dated: 28 March 2017. - sgd - LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur For Plaintiff in Enforcement OS WA -24C(ARB)-3-02/201 6 : Felix Dorairaj together with and Defendant in Setting Aside Annette Rachel OS WA-24C(ARB)-4-2/2016 : (Messrs Dorairaj, Low & Teh) For Plaintiff in Setting Aside Chang Wei Mun together with OS WA-24C(ARB)-4-2/2016 : JL Foo and Hoh Foong May and Defendant in Enforcement and Lee Xin Div OS WA-24C(ARB)-3-02/2016 : (Messrs Gan Partnership) Date of Decision : 22 November 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-801-08/2019

PLAINTIF 1. BHAKIAM A/P PAKARY (NO. K/P:470514-10-5528) 2. BHAVANI A/P RAMASAMY (NO. K/P:760801-14-5536) 3. GEETHA A/P RAMASAMY (NO. K/P:810305-14-5732) 4. HEMALATHA A/P RAMASAMY (NO. K/P:790530-14-5768) 2 5. MEENAMBAL A/P RAMASAMY (NO. K/P: 720221-14-5568) 6. VIMALA A/P RAMASAMY (NO. K/P: 730608-08-6864) 7. KAMALA A/P RAMASAMY (NO. K/P:730608-08-6872) DEFENDAN SASETHARAN A/L VELAYUTHAN (No. K/P: 651106-10-6583)

22/03/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a6855ec3-567b-4cf6-9335-639c4033d108&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

BA-B52NCVC-411-11/201

PLAINTIF Hazli Bin Ibrahim DEFENDAN Saujana Triangle Sendirian Berhad

Applications for summary judgment, strike out and counter claim - whether the late delivery of vacant possession and the late completion of the common facilities were caused by force majeure - whether the computation of liquidated damages should be based on the discounted price - whether the plaintiff was unjustly enriched by the calculation - Rules of Court 2012, Order 14 rule 1; Order 18 Rule 19 (1).

21/03/2017

TN IZRALIZAM BIN SANUSI

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6493deaa-9ad0-4221-9f77-befb71376451&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR 68 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO BA-B52NCVC-411-11/201 ANTARA HAZLI BIN IBRAHIM (No. K/P: 630713-03-5497) … PLAINTIF DAN SAUJANA TRIANGLE SDN BHD (No Pendaftaran Perniagaan: 339170-W) ... DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [Enclosure 4 and Enclosure 8] Background [1] These are two applications brought by the plaintiff here. The first application is to enter summary judgment (Enclosure 4) against the defendant and the second application is to strike out the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the defendant (Enclosure 8). [2] The background facts of the plaintiff’s action against the defendant are these: The defendant was a housing developer and the plaintiff as purchaser entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 20.2.2006 (“the SPA”) for the sale and purchase of one unit condominium known as Parcel No. B-2-B02A, Tingkat No.2, Block B, Accessory Parcel No.Lg6-90/Lg6-90a, with common facilities at a purchase price of RM664,578.00 (clause 3 of the SPA) in a project known as ‘Bandar Damansara Perdana, Armanee Terrace (Precinct 1)’(“the Property”). [3] The SPA (Exhibit “HI-2” of the Supporting Affidavit) was in the form prescribed in Schedule H to the Housing Development (Control & Licensing) Regulations 1989 (“the 1989 Regulations”). Clauses 26(1) and 28(1) of the SPA provided that vacant possession of the Property together with the common facilities shall be handed over to the plaintiff within 36 months from the date of the SPA, i.e. on or before 19.2.2009. Clause 8 of the SPA further stipulates that time shall be of the essence of the contract in relation to all provisions of the SPA. [4] The defendant failed to deliver vacant possession of the Property within the specified time. It is a term of the said agreement (clause 26(2) of the SPA) that the defendant should pay liquidated damages at the rate of 10% per annum on the purchase price for any delay in the completion of the Property up to the date of the plaintiff take vacant possession of the said parcel. Pursuant to clause 28(2) of the SPA, the defendant further agreed that if the common facilities are not completed in time, the defendant shall pay immediately to the plaintiff liquidated damages at the rate of 10% per annum of the last twenty per centum (20%) of the purchase price until completion. The Writ (Enclosure 1) [5] On 1.11.2016, the plaintiff commenced an action claiming liquidated ascertained damages (“LAD”) for late delivery of vacant possession of the Property amounting to RM489, 966.95 with interest of 5% on the said amount and RM97, 993.40 for late completion of the common facilities calculated until full settlement together with interest and costs. [6] It is the plaintiff’s case that the vacant possession of the Property was delivered to the plaintiff only on 4.7.2016, a delay of 2691 days, and that the common facilities was completed only on 4.7.2016, a delay of 2691 days. The LAD based on the formula specified in clauses 26(2) and 28(2) of the SPA as follows: (i) a sum of RM489,966.95 as LAD for late delivery of vacant possessions of the Property (for 2691 days); (ii) a sum of RM97,993.40 as LAD for late completion of the common facilities (for 2691 days) [7] The defendant entered appearance on 21.11.2016 and later filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 2.12.2016. In the Counterclaim, the defendant is claiming for the following Order: (a) A declaration that there was force majeure event during the construction; (b) A declaration that the force majeure event to be implied into the SPA; (c) A declaration that the purchase price paid for the Property is RM578, 182.86 [8] The plaintiff thereafter on 1.12.2016 filed an application under Order 14 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) to seek a summary judgment against the defendant vide Enclosure 4. Subsequently on 22.12.2016, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (vide Enclosure 8) for: (i) The Statement of defence and Counterclaim by defendant against the plaintiff dated 2.12.2016 be struck out; (ii) Costs. [9] The parties were directed to submit on the issues in all the enclosures above. The issues will be dealt with accordingly throughout this judgment. Application under Order 14 Rule 1 the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 4) The Law [10] O. 14 r. 1(1) and O. 14 r. 3(1) of the ROC provide as follows: “Application by plaintiff for summary judgment (O. 14, r. 1) 1. (1) Where in an action to which this rule applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance in the action, the plaintiff may, on the ground that the defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part thereof except as to the amount of any damages claimed, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant."; “Judgment for plaintiff (O. 14, r. 3) 3. (1) Unless on the hearing on the hearing of an application under rule 1 either the Court dismisses the application or the defendant satisfies the Court with respect to the claim, or the part of a claim, to which the application relates that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant on that claim or part as may be just having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.". [11] In an application for summary judgment, this Court is guided by the principles laid down in Doshi v. Yeoh Tiong Lay [1975] 1 MLJ 85. In this case, the Federal Court held as follows: “The purpose of O. 14 of the Rules of Supreme Court 1975 is to enable the Plaintiff to obtain summary judgment without trial if he can prove his case clearly, and if the defendant is unable to set up a bona fide defence or raise an issue against the claim which ought to be tried, final judgment should be allowed”. (emphasis added). [12] This Court also guided by the principles laid down in National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 CLJ 220, where it was stated by the Federal Court as follows: “... We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under O. 14, the first considerations are (a) whether the case comes within the order and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under O. 14. For the purposes of an application under O. 14, the preliminary requirements:- (i) the statement of claim must have been served on the Defendant; (ii) the defendant must have entered an appearance; (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of r. 2 of the O. 14 ... If the Plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he becomes entitled to judgment. This burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the court why judgment should not be given against him...” [13] In the present case, the plaintiff had satisfied the preliminary requirements as laid down in the case of National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd (supra) that is: (i) the Statement of Claim have been served on been served on the defendant; (ii) the defendant entered appearance; and (iii) the Affidavit in Support is in compliance with O. 14 r. 2 ROC 2012. [14] In Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail [1992] 1 CLJ 627 the Supreme Court held that the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as the fact is asserted by one party, or denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. The Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial if such assertion or denial is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or is inherently improbable. The Court will have to identify the issues of fact or law and to determine whether they are triable. “.....Under an O. 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a Judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially under an O. 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the Court should exercise its duty under O. 14. If the legal point is understood and the Court is satisfied that it is unarguable, the Court is not prevented from granting a summary judgment, merely because “the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understand”.” [15] Having considered the affidavits and the submission of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case as it is not in dispute that the defendant had delayed in delivering vacant possession. As regard to the completion of common facilities, this Court opined that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that the defendant had delayed in completing the common facilities of Block B. [16] Therefore, the burden lies with the defendant to raise triable issues, which would require the case to proceed with trial. The defendant raised the following main points in its written submission: (i) The late delivery of vacant possession was caused by force majeure; (II) The computation of liquidated damages (LAD) should be based on the Discounted Price; (iii) The Common property had been completed. The Findings of the Court [17] Having considered the submissions advanced by both parties, this Court shall consider each of the issues advanced by the defendant separately. (a) Whether the late delivery of vacant possession and the late completion of the common facilities were caused by force majeure. [18] The defendant contended that the delay was due to dispute with its main contractor, the escalation of cost of raw materials, the escalation of finance charges and the rectification works by previous contractors. The defendant submitted that the above problems are not within its control and therefore they constitute force majeure. Because of this, the defendant contended that the completion time must be extended so that the defendant can avoid paying the LAD. The defendant further submitted that the force majeure is an implied term of the SPA. The defendant, in trying to convince the Court that the delay was caused by force majeure, adduced an affidavit affirmed by the Senior Manager (Credit Control) himself, Mr Syed Mahadi Al Jafree bin Syed Mustafa (see ‘Afidavit Jawapan Defendan’). The defendant, in support of the position that its take, also relies on Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd v Tan Peng Foo [2013] 3 CLJ 663 , Liau Fung Kiong & Ors v Tinagat Properties Sdn Bhd [2010] MLJU 1480 and the case of Sababumi (Sandakan) Sdn Bhd v Datuk Yap Pak Leong [1998] 3 MLJ 151. [19] With respect, this Court is unable to accept the defendant’s argument. Instead, this Court is in agreement with the plaintiff that the force majeure clause only applicable if the clause is provided for in the SPA. When a party refers to force majeure it essentially refers to the contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over which the parties have little or no control, that might impede or obstruct performance of the contract. See Magenta Resources (S) Pte Ltd v China Resources (S) Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR 62 where Justice Rajendran opined: “What is referred to as force majeure in our law (as opposed to French law from which that term originates) is really no more that a convenient way of referring to contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over which the parties have little or no control, that might impede or obstruct performance of the contract. There can therefore be no general rule as to what constitutes a situation of force majeure. Whether such a (force majeure) situation arises, and, where it does arise, the rights and obligations that follow, would all depend on what the parties, in their contract, have provided for.” [20] The relevant statutory provision regulating and controlling the activity of the defendant is regulation 11(1) of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 enacted pursuant to the Minister’s powers under s 24 of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act 1966. For ease of reference, regulation 11(1) is reproduced below: “Every contract of sale for the sale and purchase of a housing accommodation together with the subdivisional portion of land appurtenant thereto shall be in the form prescribed in Schedule G and where the contract of sale is for the sale and purchase of a housing accommodation in a subdivided building, in the form of a parcel of a building or land intended for subdivision into parcels, as the case may be, it shall be in the form prescribed in Schedule H.” [21] It is pertinent to observe that the SPA is a Schedule H agreement provided pursuant to Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989. The Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 makes it mandatory for the defendant to use the same without addition or modification. The decision in Encony Development Sdn Bhd v Robert Geoffrey Gooch & Anor [2016] 1 CLJ 893 serves as a good guide here. In that case, the Court of Appeal held: “The SPA between the respondents and the appellant, who is a housing developer, is governed by a statutory form of contract as prescribed in sch. H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 [PU(A) 58/1989] (‘the regulations’). As such, the provisions in the SPA are not merely contractual, but are in effect statutory provisions, as they are actually provision of sch. H of the Regulations. Which have been imposed by law upon the parties. …. The SPA, which has statutory force, cannot, in other words, be effectively amended of varied by inferring the existence of a collateral contract subsisting alongside it.” [22] In the case of Sea Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd V Lee Poh Choo [1982] 2 MLJ 31, the Federal Court had the occasion to decide whether the developer can add the force majeure clause. The Federal Court held: “As to the rules which govern the transaction between the parties, rule 12 is relevant. That rule provides that every contract of sale - such as the one here - shall be in writing and shall contain within its terms and conditions provisions to the effect set out in the various paragraphs of that rule. Paragraph (o) is relevant; that says that the agreement must specify: "the date of delivery of the vacant possession of the housing accommodation to the purchaser which date shall not be later than 18 months after the signing of the contract of sale." That, as we have seen, was done. Then there is paragraph (r) which provides that the agreement must contain: "provisions binding on the licensed housing developer that he shall indemnify the purchaser for any delay in the delivery of the vacant possession of the housing accommodation. The amount of indemnity shall be calculated from day to day at the rate of not less than eight per cent per annum of the purchase price commencing immediately after the date of delivery of vacant possession as specified in the contract of sale." That too was done, as we have seen. But then the developer says, as we have seen, that it is excused from liability by clause 32 of the agreement which reads: "The vendor shall not be liable to purchaser for any failure to fulfil any terms of this Agreement if such fulfilment is delayed, hindered or prevented by force majeure including but not limited to acts of God strikes lockouts riots civil commotion acts of war or the disability of contractors and subcontractors employed by the vendor either commencing, carrying on or completing their work or failure to obtain any necessary sanction or approval of any local authority or any other circumstances of whatsoever nature beyond the control of the vendor." It is said here that owing to the then building boom and resultant shortage of building materials and labour which was beyond the control of the developer it is not liable because of this clause 32. With great respect to Mr. Chelliah for the developer we do not agree that it is open to the developer to escape liability by inserting clause 32 in the agreement. It is common knowledge that in recent years, especially when government started giving housing loans making it possible for public servants to borrow money at 4% interest per annum to buy homes, there was an upsurge in demand for housing, and that to protect home buyers, most of whom are people of modest means, from rich and powerful developers, Parliament found it necessary to regulate the sale of houses and protect buyers by enacting the Act. That was why rule 12 was enacted and in particular paragraphs (o) and (r) thereof. With respect we do not agree with Mr. Chelliah that it was open to a developer to get round these paragraphs by the inclusion of such a clause as clause 32 in this agreement. In Daiman Development Sdn Bhd v Mathew Lui Chin Teck [1978] 2 MLJ 239 we said at page 243 that developers are bound by the rules and if an agreement of sale is subject to contract, "only details may be inserted into the further agreement." Mr. Chelliah argued that clause 32 is such a detail. With respect we do not agree. In our judgment such details as are inserted into a written agreement must be details consistent, not inconsistent with the Act and rules. Clause 32 is inconsistent with paragraph (r) of rule 12(1). When Daiman went to the [1981] 1 MLJ 56 their Lordships observed at page 60, second column: "... it seems to their Lordships that upon the proper construction of the proforma [used in that case] the solicitors [for the developer there] would not be able to include in the contract of sale any term or condition which was not appropriate to effectuate the sale which had been made, including for that purpose, of course, provisions to comply with the requirements of the rules." Thus it is clear that only terms and conditions designed to comply with the requirements of the rules that may be inserted in a contract of sale of land that is governed by the Act and rules, and that on the contrary terms and conditions which purport to get round the Act and rules so as to remove the protection of home buyers may not be so inserted. With respect, the provisions in question here are similar to those in Johnson v Moreton [1978] 3 All ER 37, a House of Lords decision, where at page 49 Lord Hailsham said: "The policy of the law has been repeatedly used to protect the weaker of two parties who do not contract from bargaining positions of equal strength. (line a). The truth is that it can no longer be treated as axiomatic that, in the absence of explicit language, the courts will permit contracting out of the provisions of an Act of Parliament -- as was attempted here -- where that Act, though silent as to the possibility of contracting out, nevertheless is manifestly passed for the protection of a class of persons who do not negotiate from a position of equal strength, but in whose well-being there is a public as well as a private interest." (lined onwards). It would appear that only "contracting out" in favour of the weaker party -- i.e. the purchaser -- might be countenanced by the courts. The construction we place on the rules is not as harsh as it seems to a developer -- for he has a safeguard in subrule (2) of rule 12 which provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Rule, where the Controller [of Housing] is satisfied that owing to special circumstances the compliance with any provisions of this Rule is impracticable or unnecessary he may by a certificate in writing waive or modify such provisions in respect of any contract of sale." Thus in the circumstances of this case it would have been open to the developer to try and persuade the Controller to modify the rigours of paragraphs (o) and (r) of rule 12(1). If it had succeeded it would have escaped liability. But it made no attempt to do so. But Mr. Chelliah says that under the terms of rule 12(2) the developer could have done so only before a contract of sale had been finalized and not after. With respect we do not agree; in our judgment it is open to a developer to take advantage of this provision after as well as before such a contract has been finalized. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that clause 32, being inconsistent with rule 12 and not designed to comply with the requirements of the rules and in the absence of waiver or modification by the Controller of Housing under rule 12(2), is void, and that therefore the developer is liable in damages for the delay in completion.” [23] Applying the proposition of law as explained above, this Court opined that the defendant could not use those incidents to escape from its obligation under the SPA. This Court will not imply terms that contradict any express terms of the SPA. Therefore, the issue of force majeure cannot be a triable issue in this present case. (b) Whether the computation of liquidated damages (LAD) should be based on the Discounted Price. [24] The defendant contended that since a discount is given, the damages must be computed based on the discounted sum, RM578, 182.86 and not the purchase price stated in the SPA. The defendant further submitted that otherwise the plaintiff would be unjustly enriched. [25] However, this Court is of the considered opinion that the parties are bound by the purchase price stated in the SPA. Clause 3 defines what purchase price is: “The purchase price of the said Parcel is Ringgit Malaysia Six Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Eight Only (RM664, 578.00) and shall be payable in the manner hereinafter provided.” Clause 26(2) and 28(2) stipulated that the LAD must be computed based on the purchased price as defined under clause 3. Therefore, in the present case, the LAD should be calculated based on the purchase price stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. [26] The defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s claim herein, if allowed, would lead to an unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the defendant’s expense. With respect, this Court unable to accept the defendant’s argument. As explained above, the parties are not permitted to alter or amend the terms and condition of the SPA. Thus, the parties are bound by the purchase price stated in the SPA when computing the LAD payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under clauses 26(2) and 28(2) of the SPA. The issue of unjust enrichment does not arise in the present case. [27] In the case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Vitalmont Development Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 LNS 1402, the Learned Sessions Court Judge found that the plaintiff had proven their claim on a balance of probabilities and allowed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the defendant submitted that the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred when decided that the plaintiff is entitled to calculate the LADs based on the purchase price as stated in the SPA amounting to RM658, 300.00, instead of RM592, 470.00, because this would amount to unjust enrichment at the expense of the defendant since the Plaintiff had received a 10% bonus/discount from the Appellant. The High Court held: “The Purchase price of the Apartment is RM658, 000.00 as stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. On the issue of unjust enrichment, it is the submission of the Appellant (defendant) that a 10% discount was given to the Respondent (Plaintiff) as a promotional price. Therefore on that basis the LAD must be calculated based on the purchase price less 10%. Since clause 3 stipulates that the purchase price is RM658,000.00 any calculation of LAD must be based on that amount as agreed. The Appellant did not adduce any evidence to the contrary. The salient terms of the SPA must therefore be applicable.” 22 (c) The completion of common facilities. [28] The defendant submitted that the development area is phase development, which consists of Block A and Block B buildings. As such, the common facilities which serve the said development area, are to be shared by the residence of both buildings. Block A of the said development area was completed on 8.12.2005 whilst residence from Block B could enjoy the common facilities at the Block A area. The defendant further contended that the claim for LAD in respect of the common facilities is totally flawed and amounted to a triable issue. [29] However, this Court is of the considered opinion that Schedule 2 of the SPA stipulates and defines the common facilities for Block B, which the defendant undertook to build. Clause 28(1) states that the common facilities must be completed within 36 months from the date of the SPA. In the present case, the defendant has not provided any evidence that the common facilities for Block B are completed within 36 months of completion period. [30] This Court is of the opinion that the defendant has failed to raise any bona fide triable issue which warrants the dismissal of the plaintiff’s application, and which must go for full trial for witnesses to be called and be cross-examined. In the circumstances, This Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has proven his case and summary judgment ought to be entered as prayed. Application under Order 18 Rule 19 (1) the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 8) The Law [31] The plaintiff filed the application under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 8) for the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim be struck out. [32] Order 18 rule 19(1) of the ROC provides that:- “(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that:- (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.” [33] The law on striking out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the ROC is settled. In the Supreme Court case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, the application of O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of High Court (in pari materia with O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of Court 2012) has been held as follows: “The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N.W. Ry. Co. [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 (which is in para materia with our O. 33 r. 2 Rules of the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” [34] Anantham Kasinather JCA held as follows in the court of appeal case of Khairy Jamaluddin v. Dato' Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim [2013] 6 CLJ 849 : “[13] The Court of Appeal in England in the case of European Asian Bank AG v. Punjab and Sind Bank (No 2) [1983] 2 All ER 508 opined that, in an appropriate case, a* 21 court of law should decide a point of law in O. 14 proceedings even: 'if the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes 'a little longer to understand'. Our Supreme Court in the case of Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 14; [1992] 1 MLJ 400 accepted this proposition of law as good law through the judgment of Mohamed Azmi FCJ (as he then was) when His Lordship said: Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the court should exercise its duty under O. 14. If the legal point is understood and the court is satisfied that it is unarguable, the court is not prevented from granting a summary judgment merely because 'the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understand (see Cow v. Casey and European Asian Bank AG v. Punjab & Sind Bank at p 516). [14] In our judgment, the aforesaid principle of law pronounced by our Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail & Ors is not limited in its application to O. 14 proceedings but extends to applications under O. 18 r. 19. We opine to this effect because both applications are summary in nature..." [35] In the present case, the defendant (in the Counterclaim), is claiming for the following declarations: (a) A declaration that there was force majeure event during the construction; (b) A declaration that the force majeure event to be implied into the SPA; (c) A declaration that the purchase price paid for the Property is RM578, 182.00 [36] It is pertinent to note that the issues requiring determination in the main suit and the Counterclaim are identical, namely: a) Whether force majeure event had taken place; b) if yes, whether force majeure must be implied into the SPA; and c) Whether the actual price of the said Property is RM578, 182.86 [37] In allowing the application under order 14 of the ROC (Enclosure 4), this Court determined the issues under contention as follows: a) The incidents complained by the defendant do not constitute force majeure; b) Even if the incidents constitute force majeure, such clause cannot be implied into a statutory contract; and c) The Purchase price of the Property is RM664, 578.00 as stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. [38] The Counterclaim of the defendant is inextricably connected to the defendant's defence to the plaintiff's claim and in effect the converse of the plaintiff's claim. The relevant issues requiring determination have been answered and discussed at length earlier in this judgment. Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the defendant's Counterclaim ought to be struck out as prayed. Conclusion [39] In a nutshell, after going through all relevant evidence and hearing all submissions by both parties, it is hereby ordered as follows: a. Enclosure 4 is allowed with costs of RM3000.00; b. The Counterclaim by the defendant against the plaintiff dated 2.12.2016 be struck out with costs of RM2000.00 (Enclosure 8). (IZRALIZAM BIN SANUSI) Sessions Court Judge Shah Alam Dated: 21.3.2017 Counsel for the plaintiff: Encik Robin F S Lim Messrs Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co Advocates & solicitors Unit 210, Level 2, Block A Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 2 Jalan 16/11 off Jalan Damansara 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Counsel for the defendant: Cik Zaitul Naziah binti Mohd soib Messrs Andrew Davis & Co Advocates & Solicitors P-3-13, No.60 Plaza Sri Hartamas 1 (1/70A) Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur. 68

Tika 2.6.0

BA-B52NCVC-411-11/201

PLAINTIF Hazli Bin Ibrahim DEFENDAN Saujana Triangle Sendirian Berhad

Applications for summary judgment, strike out and counter claim - whether the late delivery of vacant possession and the late completion of the common facilities were caused by force majeure - whether the computation of liquidated damages should be based on the discounted price - whether the plaintiff was unjustly enriched by the calculation - Rules of Court 2012, Order 14 rule 1; Order 18 Rule 19 (1).

21/03/2017

TN IZRALIZAM BIN SANUSI

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=6493deaa-9ad0-4221-9f77-befb71376451&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR 68 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO BA-B52NCVC-411-11/201 ANTARA HAZLI BIN IBRAHIM (No. K/P: 630713-03-5497) … PLAINTIF DAN SAUJANA TRIANGLE SDN BHD (No Pendaftaran Perniagaan: 339170-W) ... DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [Enclosure 4 and Enclosure 8] Background [1] These are two applications brought by the plaintiff here. The first application is to enter summary judgment (Enclosure 4) against the defendant and the second application is to strike out the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim of the defendant (Enclosure 8). [2] The background facts of the plaintiff’s action against the defendant are these: The defendant was a housing developer and the plaintiff as purchaser entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 20.2.2006 (“the SPA”) for the sale and purchase of one unit condominium known as Parcel No. B-2-B02A, Tingkat No.2, Block B, Accessory Parcel No.Lg6-90/Lg6-90a, with common facilities at a purchase price of RM664,578.00 (clause 3 of the SPA) in a project known as ‘Bandar Damansara Perdana, Armanee Terrace (Precinct 1)’(“the Property”). [3] The SPA (Exhibit “HI-2” of the Supporting Affidavit) was in the form prescribed in Schedule H to the Housing Development (Control & Licensing) Regulations 1989 (“the 1989 Regulations”). Clauses 26(1) and 28(1) of the SPA provided that vacant possession of the Property together with the common facilities shall be handed over to the plaintiff within 36 months from the date of the SPA, i.e. on or before 19.2.2009. Clause 8 of the SPA further stipulates that time shall be of the essence of the contract in relation to all provisions of the SPA. [4] The defendant failed to deliver vacant possession of the Property within the specified time. It is a term of the said agreement (clause 26(2) of the SPA) that the defendant should pay liquidated damages at the rate of 10% per annum on the purchase price for any delay in the completion of the Property up to the date of the plaintiff take vacant possession of the said parcel. Pursuant to clause 28(2) of the SPA, the defendant further agreed that if the common facilities are not completed in time, the defendant shall pay immediately to the plaintiff liquidated damages at the rate of 10% per annum of the last twenty per centum (20%) of the purchase price until completion. The Writ (Enclosure 1) [5] On 1.11.2016, the plaintiff commenced an action claiming liquidated ascertained damages (“LAD”) for late delivery of vacant possession of the Property amounting to RM489, 966.95 with interest of 5% on the said amount and RM97, 993.40 for late completion of the common facilities calculated until full settlement together with interest and costs. [6] It is the plaintiff’s case that the vacant possession of the Property was delivered to the plaintiff only on 4.7.2016, a delay of 2691 days, and that the common facilities was completed only on 4.7.2016, a delay of 2691 days. The LAD based on the formula specified in clauses 26(2) and 28(2) of the SPA as follows: (i) a sum of RM489,966.95 as LAD for late delivery of vacant possessions of the Property (for 2691 days); (ii) a sum of RM97,993.40 as LAD for late completion of the common facilities (for 2691 days) [7] The defendant entered appearance on 21.11.2016 and later filed his Statement of Defence and Counterclaim dated 2.12.2016. In the Counterclaim, the defendant is claiming for the following Order: (a) A declaration that there was force majeure event during the construction; (b) A declaration that the force majeure event to be implied into the SPA; (c) A declaration that the purchase price paid for the Property is RM578, 182.86 [8] The plaintiff thereafter on 1.12.2016 filed an application under Order 14 rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) to seek a summary judgment against the defendant vide Enclosure 4. Subsequently on 22.12.2016, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (vide Enclosure 8) for: (i) The Statement of defence and Counterclaim by defendant against the plaintiff dated 2.12.2016 be struck out; (ii) Costs. [9] The parties were directed to submit on the issues in all the enclosures above. The issues will be dealt with accordingly throughout this judgment. Application under Order 14 Rule 1 the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 4) The Law [10] O. 14 r. 1(1) and O. 14 r. 3(1) of the ROC provide as follows: “Application by plaintiff for summary judgment (O. 14, r. 1) 1. (1) Where in an action to which this rule applies a statement of claim has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance in the action, the plaintiff may, on the ground that the defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular part of such a claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part thereof except as to the amount of any damages claimed, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant."; “Judgment for plaintiff (O. 14, r. 3) 3. (1) Unless on the hearing on the hearing of an application under rule 1 either the Court dismisses the application or the defendant satisfies the Court with respect to the claim, or the part of a claim, to which the application relates that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that claim or part, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant on that claim or part as may be just having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.". [11] In an application for summary judgment, this Court is guided by the principles laid down in Doshi v. Yeoh Tiong Lay [1975] 1 MLJ 85. In this case, the Federal Court held as follows: “The purpose of O. 14 of the Rules of Supreme Court 1975 is to enable the Plaintiff to obtain summary judgment without trial if he can prove his case clearly, and if the defendant is unable to set up a bona fide defence or raise an issue against the claim which ought to be tried, final judgment should be allowed”. (emphasis added). [12] This Court also guided by the principles laid down in National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 CLJ 220, where it was stated by the Federal Court as follows: “... We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every application under O. 14, the first considerations are (a) whether the case comes within the order and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the preliminary requirements for proceeding under O. 14. For the purposes of an application under O. 14, the preliminary requirements:- (i) the statement of claim must have been served on the Defendant; (ii) the defendant must have entered an appearance; (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of r. 2 of the O. 14 ... If the Plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he becomes entitled to judgment. This burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the court why judgment should not be given against him...” [13] In the present case, the plaintiff had satisfied the preliminary requirements as laid down in the case of National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd (supra) that is: (i) the Statement of Claim have been served on been served on the defendant; (ii) the defendant entered appearance; and (iii) the Affidavit in Support is in compliance with O. 14 r. 2 ROC 2012. [14] In Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail [1992] 1 CLJ 627 the Supreme Court held that the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as the fact is asserted by one party, or denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. The Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial if such assertion or denial is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or is inherently improbable. The Court will have to identify the issues of fact or law and to determine whether they are triable. “.....Under an O. 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby rendering the issue as not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a Judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially under an O. 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the Court should exercise its duty under O. 14. If the legal point is understood and the Court is satisfied that it is unarguable, the Court is not prevented from granting a summary judgment, merely because “the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understand”.” [15] Having considered the affidavits and the submission of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case as it is not in dispute that the defendant had delayed in delivering vacant possession. As regard to the completion of common facilities, this Court opined that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case that the defendant had delayed in completing the common facilities of Block B. [16] Therefore, the burden lies with the defendant to raise triable issues, which would require the case to proceed with trial. The defendant raised the following main points in its written submission: (i) The late delivery of vacant possession was caused by force majeure; (II) The computation of liquidated damages (LAD) should be based on the Discounted Price; (iii) The Common property had been completed. The Findings of the Court [17] Having considered the submissions advanced by both parties, this Court shall consider each of the issues advanced by the defendant separately. (a) Whether the late delivery of vacant possession and the late completion of the common facilities were caused by force majeure. [18] The defendant contended that the delay was due to dispute with its main contractor, the escalation of cost of raw materials, the escalation of finance charges and the rectification works by previous contractors. The defendant submitted that the above problems are not within its control and therefore they constitute force majeure. Because of this, the defendant contended that the completion time must be extended so that the defendant can avoid paying the LAD. The defendant further submitted that the force majeure is an implied term of the SPA. The defendant, in trying to convince the Court that the delay was caused by force majeure, adduced an affidavit affirmed by the Senior Manager (Credit Control) himself, Mr Syed Mahadi Al Jafree bin Syed Mustafa (see ‘Afidavit Jawapan Defendan’). The defendant, in support of the position that its take, also relies on Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd v Tan Peng Foo [2013] 3 CLJ 663 , Liau Fung Kiong & Ors v Tinagat Properties Sdn Bhd [2010] MLJU 1480 and the case of Sababumi (Sandakan) Sdn Bhd v Datuk Yap Pak Leong [1998] 3 MLJ 151. [19] With respect, this Court is unable to accept the defendant’s argument. Instead, this Court is in agreement with the plaintiff that the force majeure clause only applicable if the clause is provided for in the SPA. When a party refers to force majeure it essentially refers to the contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over which the parties have little or no control, that might impede or obstruct performance of the contract. See Magenta Resources (S) Pte Ltd v China Resources (S) Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR 62 where Justice Rajendran opined: “What is referred to as force majeure in our law (as opposed to French law from which that term originates) is really no more that a convenient way of referring to contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over which the parties have little or no control, that might impede or obstruct performance of the contract. There can therefore be no general rule as to what constitutes a situation of force majeure. Whether such a (force majeure) situation arises, and, where it does arise, the rights and obligations that follow, would all depend on what the parties, in their contract, have provided for.” [20] The relevant statutory provision regulating and controlling the activity of the defendant is regulation 11(1) of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 enacted pursuant to the Minister’s powers under s 24 of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act 1966. For ease of reference, regulation 11(1) is reproduced below: “Every contract of sale for the sale and purchase of a housing accommodation together with the subdivisional portion of land appurtenant thereto shall be in the form prescribed in Schedule G and where the contract of sale is for the sale and purchase of a housing accommodation in a subdivided building, in the form of a parcel of a building or land intended for subdivision into parcels, as the case may be, it shall be in the form prescribed in Schedule H.” [21] It is pertinent to observe that the SPA is a Schedule H agreement provided pursuant to Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989. The Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 makes it mandatory for the defendant to use the same without addition or modification. The decision in Encony Development Sdn Bhd v Robert Geoffrey Gooch & Anor [2016] 1 CLJ 893 serves as a good guide here. In that case, the Court of Appeal held: “The SPA between the respondents and the appellant, who is a housing developer, is governed by a statutory form of contract as prescribed in sch. H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 [PU(A) 58/1989] (‘the regulations’). As such, the provisions in the SPA are not merely contractual, but are in effect statutory provisions, as they are actually provision of sch. H of the Regulations. Which have been imposed by law upon the parties. …. The SPA, which has statutory force, cannot, in other words, be effectively amended of varied by inferring the existence of a collateral contract subsisting alongside it.” [22] In the case of Sea Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd V Lee Poh Choo [1982] 2 MLJ 31, the Federal Court had the occasion to decide whether the developer can add the force majeure clause. The Federal Court held: “As to the rules which govern the transaction between the parties, rule 12 is relevant. That rule provides that every contract of sale - such as the one here - shall be in writing and shall contain within its terms and conditions provisions to the effect set out in the various paragraphs of that rule. Paragraph (o) is relevant; that says that the agreement must specify: "the date of delivery of the vacant possession of the housing accommodation to the purchaser which date shall not be later than 18 months after the signing of the contract of sale." That, as we have seen, was done. Then there is paragraph (r) which provides that the agreement must contain: "provisions binding on the licensed housing developer that he shall indemnify the purchaser for any delay in the delivery of the vacant possession of the housing accommodation. The amount of indemnity shall be calculated from day to day at the rate of not less than eight per cent per annum of the purchase price commencing immediately after the date of delivery of vacant possession as specified in the contract of sale." That too was done, as we have seen. But then the developer says, as we have seen, that it is excused from liability by clause 32 of the agreement which reads: "The vendor shall not be liable to purchaser for any failure to fulfil any terms of this Agreement if such fulfilment is delayed, hindered or prevented by force majeure including but not limited to acts of God strikes lockouts riots civil commotion acts of war or the disability of contractors and subcontractors employed by the vendor either commencing, carrying on or completing their work or failure to obtain any necessary sanction or approval of any local authority or any other circumstances of whatsoever nature beyond the control of the vendor." It is said here that owing to the then building boom and resultant shortage of building materials and labour which was beyond the control of the developer it is not liable because of this clause 32. With great respect to Mr. Chelliah for the developer we do not agree that it is open to the developer to escape liability by inserting clause 32 in the agreement. It is common knowledge that in recent years, especially when government started giving housing loans making it possible for public servants to borrow money at 4% interest per annum to buy homes, there was an upsurge in demand for housing, and that to protect home buyers, most of whom are people of modest means, from rich and powerful developers, Parliament found it necessary to regulate the sale of houses and protect buyers by enacting the Act. That was why rule 12 was enacted and in particular paragraphs (o) and (r) thereof. With respect we do not agree with Mr. Chelliah that it was open to a developer to get round these paragraphs by the inclusion of such a clause as clause 32 in this agreement. In Daiman Development Sdn Bhd v Mathew Lui Chin Teck [1978] 2 MLJ 239 we said at page 243 that developers are bound by the rules and if an agreement of sale is subject to contract, "only details may be inserted into the further agreement." Mr. Chelliah argued that clause 32 is such a detail. With respect we do not agree. In our judgment such details as are inserted into a written agreement must be details consistent, not inconsistent with the Act and rules. Clause 32 is inconsistent with paragraph (r) of rule 12(1). When Daiman went to the [1981] 1 MLJ 56 their Lordships observed at page 60, second column: "... it seems to their Lordships that upon the proper construction of the proforma [used in that case] the solicitors [for the developer there] would not be able to include in the contract of sale any term or condition which was not appropriate to effectuate the sale which had been made, including for that purpose, of course, provisions to comply with the requirements of the rules." Thus it is clear that only terms and conditions designed to comply with the requirements of the rules that may be inserted in a contract of sale of land that is governed by the Act and rules, and that on the contrary terms and conditions which purport to get round the Act and rules so as to remove the protection of home buyers may not be so inserted. With respect, the provisions in question here are similar to those in Johnson v Moreton [1978] 3 All ER 37, a House of Lords decision, where at page 49 Lord Hailsham said: "The policy of the law has been repeatedly used to protect the weaker of two parties who do not contract from bargaining positions of equal strength. (line a). The truth is that it can no longer be treated as axiomatic that, in the absence of explicit language, the courts will permit contracting out of the provisions of an Act of Parliament -- as was attempted here -- where that Act, though silent as to the possibility of contracting out, nevertheless is manifestly passed for the protection of a class of persons who do not negotiate from a position of equal strength, but in whose well-being there is a public as well as a private interest." (lined onwards). It would appear that only "contracting out" in favour of the weaker party -- i.e. the purchaser -- might be countenanced by the courts. The construction we place on the rules is not as harsh as it seems to a developer -- for he has a safeguard in subrule (2) of rule 12 which provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Rule, where the Controller [of Housing] is satisfied that owing to special circumstances the compliance with any provisions of this Rule is impracticable or unnecessary he may by a certificate in writing waive or modify such provisions in respect of any contract of sale." Thus in the circumstances of this case it would have been open to the developer to try and persuade the Controller to modify the rigours of paragraphs (o) and (r) of rule 12(1). If it had succeeded it would have escaped liability. But it made no attempt to do so. But Mr. Chelliah says that under the terms of rule 12(2) the developer could have done so only before a contract of sale had been finalized and not after. With respect we do not agree; in our judgment it is open to a developer to take advantage of this provision after as well as before such a contract has been finalized. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that clause 32, being inconsistent with rule 12 and not designed to comply with the requirements of the rules and in the absence of waiver or modification by the Controller of Housing under rule 12(2), is void, and that therefore the developer is liable in damages for the delay in completion.” [23] Applying the proposition of law as explained above, this Court opined that the defendant could not use those incidents to escape from its obligation under the SPA. This Court will not imply terms that contradict any express terms of the SPA. Therefore, the issue of force majeure cannot be a triable issue in this present case. (b) Whether the computation of liquidated damages (LAD) should be based on the Discounted Price. [24] The defendant contended that since a discount is given, the damages must be computed based on the discounted sum, RM578, 182.86 and not the purchase price stated in the SPA. The defendant further submitted that otherwise the plaintiff would be unjustly enriched. [25] However, this Court is of the considered opinion that the parties are bound by the purchase price stated in the SPA. Clause 3 defines what purchase price is: “The purchase price of the said Parcel is Ringgit Malaysia Six Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Five Hundred Seventy Eight Only (RM664, 578.00) and shall be payable in the manner hereinafter provided.” Clause 26(2) and 28(2) stipulated that the LAD must be computed based on the purchased price as defined under clause 3. Therefore, in the present case, the LAD should be calculated based on the purchase price stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. [26] The defendant submitted that the plaintiff’s claim herein, if allowed, would lead to an unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the defendant’s expense. With respect, this Court unable to accept the defendant’s argument. As explained above, the parties are not permitted to alter or amend the terms and condition of the SPA. Thus, the parties are bound by the purchase price stated in the SPA when computing the LAD payable by the defendant to the plaintiff under clauses 26(2) and 28(2) of the SPA. The issue of unjust enrichment does not arise in the present case. [27] In the case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Vitalmont Development Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 LNS 1402, the Learned Sessions Court Judge found that the plaintiff had proven their claim on a balance of probabilities and allowed the plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the defendant submitted that the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred when decided that the plaintiff is entitled to calculate the LADs based on the purchase price as stated in the SPA amounting to RM658, 300.00, instead of RM592, 470.00, because this would amount to unjust enrichment at the expense of the defendant since the Plaintiff had received a 10% bonus/discount from the Appellant. The High Court held: “The Purchase price of the Apartment is RM658, 000.00 as stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. On the issue of unjust enrichment, it is the submission of the Appellant (defendant) that a 10% discount was given to the Respondent (Plaintiff) as a promotional price. Therefore on that basis the LAD must be calculated based on the purchase price less 10%. Since clause 3 stipulates that the purchase price is RM658,000.00 any calculation of LAD must be based on that amount as agreed. The Appellant did not adduce any evidence to the contrary. The salient terms of the SPA must therefore be applicable.” 22 (c) The completion of common facilities. [28] The defendant submitted that the development area is phase development, which consists of Block A and Block B buildings. As such, the common facilities which serve the said development area, are to be shared by the residence of both buildings. Block A of the said development area was completed on 8.12.2005 whilst residence from Block B could enjoy the common facilities at the Block A area. The defendant further contended that the claim for LAD in respect of the common facilities is totally flawed and amounted to a triable issue. [29] However, this Court is of the considered opinion that Schedule 2 of the SPA stipulates and defines the common facilities for Block B, which the defendant undertook to build. Clause 28(1) states that the common facilities must be completed within 36 months from the date of the SPA. In the present case, the defendant has not provided any evidence that the common facilities for Block B are completed within 36 months of completion period. [30] This Court is of the opinion that the defendant has failed to raise any bona fide triable issue which warrants the dismissal of the plaintiff’s application, and which must go for full trial for witnesses to be called and be cross-examined. In the circumstances, This Court is satisfied that the plaintiff has proven his case and summary judgment ought to be entered as prayed. Application under Order 18 Rule 19 (1) the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 8) The Law [31] The plaintiff filed the application under Order 18 rule 19 (1) (b), (c) and/or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 8) for the Statement of Defence and Counterclaim be struck out. [32] Order 18 rule 19(1) of the ROC provides that:- “(1) The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the endorsement, of any writ in the action, or anything in any pleading or in the endorsement, on the ground that:- (a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as the case may be; (b) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious; (c) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the action; or (d) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court, and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment to be entered accordingly, as the case may be.” [33] The law on striking out pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 of the ROC is settled. In the Supreme Court case of Bandar Builder Sdn Bhd & Ors v. United Malayan Banking Corporation Bhd [1993] 4 CLJ 7, the application of O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of High Court (in pari materia with O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of Court 2012) has been held as follows: “The principles upon which the Court acts in exercising its power under any of the four limbs of O. 18 r. 19(1) Rules of the High Court are well settled. It is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under this rule (per Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 QB 86, p. 91), and this summary procedure can only be adopted when it can be clearly seen that a claim or answer is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable" (Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L. & N.W. Ry. Co. [1892] 3 Ch. 274, CA). It cannot be exercised by a minute examination of the documents and facts of the case, in order to see whether the party has a cause of action or a defence (Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 WLR 1238; [1965] 2 All ER 871, CA.). The authorities further show that if there is a point of law which requires serious discussion, an objection should be taken on the pleadings and the point set down for argument under O. 33 r. 3 (which is in para materia with our O. 33 r. 2 Rules of the High Court) (Hubbuck v. Wilkinson) (supra). The Court must be satisfied that there is no reasonable cause of action or that the claims are frivolous or vexatious or that the defences raised are not arguable.” [34] Anantham Kasinather JCA held as follows in the court of appeal case of Khairy Jamaluddin v. Dato' Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim [2013] 6 CLJ 849 : “[13] The Court of Appeal in England in the case of European Asian Bank AG v. Punjab and Sind Bank (No 2) [1983] 2 All ER 508 opined that, in an appropriate case, a* 21 court of law should decide a point of law in O. 14 proceedings even: 'if the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes 'a little longer to understand'. Our Supreme Court in the case of Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail & Ors [1992] 1 CLJ Rep 14; [1992] 1 MLJ 400 accepted this proposition of law as good law through the judgment of Mohamed Azmi FCJ (as he then was) when His Lordship said: Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the court should exercise its duty under O. 14. If the legal point is understood and the court is satisfied that it is unarguable, the court is not prevented from granting a summary judgment merely because 'the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understand (see Cow v. Casey and European Asian Bank AG v. Punjab & Sind Bank at p 516). [14] In our judgment, the aforesaid principle of law pronounced by our Supreme Court in Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail & Ors is not limited in its application to O. 14 proceedings but extends to applications under O. 18 r. 19. We opine to this effect because both applications are summary in nature..." [35] In the present case, the defendant (in the Counterclaim), is claiming for the following declarations: (a) A declaration that there was force majeure event during the construction; (b) A declaration that the force majeure event to be implied into the SPA; (c) A declaration that the purchase price paid for the Property is RM578, 182.00 [36] It is pertinent to note that the issues requiring determination in the main suit and the Counterclaim are identical, namely: a) Whether force majeure event had taken place; b) if yes, whether force majeure must be implied into the SPA; and c) Whether the actual price of the said Property is RM578, 182.86 [37] In allowing the application under order 14 of the ROC (Enclosure 4), this Court determined the issues under contention as follows: a) The incidents complained by the defendant do not constitute force majeure; b) Even if the incidents constitute force majeure, such clause cannot be implied into a statutory contract; and c) The Purchase price of the Property is RM664, 578.00 as stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. [38] The Counterclaim of the defendant is inextricably connected to the defendant's defence to the plaintiff's claim and in effect the converse of the plaintiff's claim. The relevant issues requiring determination have been answered and discussed at length earlier in this judgment. Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the defendant's Counterclaim ought to be struck out as prayed. Conclusion [39] In a nutshell, after going through all relevant evidence and hearing all submissions by both parties, it is hereby ordered as follows: a. Enclosure 4 is allowed with costs of RM3000.00; b. The Counterclaim by the defendant against the plaintiff dated 2.12.2016 be struck out with costs of RM2000.00 (Enclosure 8). (IZRALIZAM BIN SANUSI) Sessions Court Judge Shah Alam Dated: 21.3.2017 Counsel for the plaintiff: Encik Robin F S Lim Messrs Azri, Lee Swee Seng & Co Advocates & solicitors Unit 210, Level 2, Block A Pusat Dagangan Phileo Damansara 2 Jalan 16/11 off Jalan Damansara 46350 Petaling Jaya, Selangor. Counsel for the defendant: Cik Zaitul Naziah binti Mohd soib Messrs Andrew Davis & Co Advocates & Solicitors P-3-13, No.60 Plaza Sri Hartamas 1 (1/70A) Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur. 68

Tika 2.6.0

12BC-7-06/2016

PLAINTIF Lexobumi Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN SK M&E Bersekutu Sdn Bhd

20/03/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=84e73510-3e13-47d3-ba4a-e654708a1231&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE FEDERAL TERRITORY OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) CIVIL APPEAL NO: 12BC-7-06/2016 BETWEEN LEXOBUMI SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 799150-M) ... APPELLANT AND SK M&E BERSEKUTU SDN BHD ... RESPONDENT (COMPANY NO: 357427-K) THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The Plaintiff as Sub-Contractor and the Defendant as Main Sub- Contractor had entered into a Sub-Contract dated 9.4.2012 (pages 393-405 of the Record of Appeal) in respect of the “supply, installation, coordination, testing and commissioning of ICT services system for UITM, Pasir Gudang” (“the said works”) for the sum of RM1,006,145.00. As the Defendant had wanted the works to start earlier, the Plaintiff had, prior to the Sub-Contract, entered into the site and started work since April 2011. 2 Problem The Plaintiff progressively performed the works and had rendered the following invoices to the Defendant. Date Amount Found in page of the Record of Appeal 10/8/2012 RM26,676.00 page 551-552 17/10/2012 RM42,298.00 page 546-548 23/11/2012 RM72,172.00 page 543-545 28/11/2012 RM11,972.00 page 537-542 10/9/2012 RM32,994.00 11/1/2012 RM29,430.00 29/1/2013 RM28,122.00 page 531-537 19/2/2013 RM48,443.00 page 453-454 10/4/2013 RM41,724.00 page 447-449 6/6/2013 RM45,065.00 page 553 Total RM378,896.00 The Defendant had only made the payment of RM84,187.43 including the following payments to the Plaintiff: 3 Date Amount 28/5/2012 RM20,000.00 15/8/2012 RM11,187.43 19/10/2012 RM 8,000.00 6/12/2013 RM10,000.00 8/2/2013 RM15,000.00 18/4/2013 RM15,000.00 [2] Throughout the period when the Plaintiff was doing the works, the Defendant did not give any letter to dispute the quantum claimed by the Plaintiff in their invoices to the Defendant from 10.8.2012 till 6.6.2013. As the Plaintiff did not receive certification for the works done save for two and as the balance outstanding remained unpaid, the Plaintiff could not risk continuing further works and so eventually they stopped work altogether and sued for their losses arising out of what they said is the Defendant's breach in failure to certify their work done and to pay them accordingly. Prayers [3] The Plaintiff claimed the balance sum of RM294,709.17 against the Defendant and also for loss of profit of RM106,632.00 together with interest at 5% per annum on the judgment sum till realization and costs. 4 [4] The Defendant's defence was that the Plaintiff had wrongfully terminated the Sub-Contract by stopping works and leaving the site in December 2012 without giving any notice. It was also alleged that the Plaintiff had acted in breach of the Sub-Contract by failing to carry out and complete the works in respect of the Project as agreed. It was admitted that a sum of RM84,187.43 had been paid to the Plaintiff so far for preliminary works. [5] The Defendant on the other hand, counterclaimed for RM505,926.39 being damages, loss and expense due to the Plaintiff's unilateral termination of the Sub-Contract by stopping works and leaving the site without notice. The Defendant also claimed interests and costs. [6] The learned Sessions Court Judge ("SCJ") had, after full trial, dismissed the whole of the Plaintiff's claim and allowed the whole of the Defendant's Counterclaim with interest and costs. [7] Against that decision the Plaintiff as Appellant has appealed to this Court. The parties shall be referred to by their designation in the trial at the Sessions Court as Plaintiff and Defendant. 5 Principles Whether the Plaintiff had a right to terminate the Sub-Contract when the Defendant did not certify the works invoiced by the Plaintiff and so did not pay the Plaintiff according to the Sub-Contract [8] Contractually, it is provided vide Clause 1 Part V of the Sub-Contract (at page 404 of the Record of Appeal) as follows: “Interim Payment Certification for the Sub-Contract works shall be prepared by the Main Sub-Contractor monthly. Save no interim payment certificate shall be prepared if there is not any significant progress of the Sub-Contract works during that particular period”. [9] The Defendant have a contractual obligation and duty to certify all the invoices rendered by the Plaintiff. The Interim Payment Certificate is to certify and/or confirm what work the Plaintiff had done. The Defendant had only certified two (2) Interim Payment Certificate dated 28.5.2012 and 23.7.2012. There was a third Interim Payment Certificate dated 2.10.2012 but it was not handed to the Plaintiff at that juncture. [10] In this case, I find merit in the Plaintiff's submission that the Defendant did not even certify on time in accordance with the Sub-Contract the Plaintiff’s work which leaves the Plaintiff in a limbo and quandary 6 whether its works are verified, approved and confirmed and whether he would be paid. Obviously the Plaintiff was anxiously concerned whether or not the works done by him is acceptable to the Defendant for without certification, there would be no payment forthcoming. True enough, the payments trickled in as and when the Defendant felt like paying. [11] The Plaintiff had little choice but to accept what had been paid and they could only appeal for more prompt payment and also more importantly, a prompt and proper certification of works done so that they know where the non-compliance had been. [12] Such a conduct of the Defendant in willy nilly making payments as and when they like, did not inspire confidence in the Plaintiff as a Sub- Contractor who is out of pocket in having done the works and not having paid. What then is the Plaintiff supposed to do if his works are not certified and he is not paid based on the invoices he had submitted? Must he continue to finish the whole works assigned to him and then wait for payment? That does not seem to be the position of the law. [13] Even contractually, it is envisaged that there are circumstances when the Plaintiff may validly suspend works. In Clause 17(a) of the Sub- 7 Contract on “Determination of Sub-contract by Main Sub-Contractor”; it is provided as follows: "If the Sub-Contractor shall make default in any of the following respects viz: i. If without reasonable cause he wholly suspends the carrying out of the Sub-Contract Works before Completion thereof; ii. ....." [14] I would say that it is not unreasonable for the Plaintiff to suspend works if he was not paid for the amount invoiced of RM378,896.00 and was only paid RM84,187.43 thus far. It is also not unreasonable for the Plaintiff to do so if the Defendant had persisted in not certifying the works done by the Plaintiff. Even if the Defendant were to certify for less than the amount invoiced, at least the Plaintiff would have a rough idea as to the part of the works not so certified and hence would know the works that are being disputed. [15] The Plaintiff would then be in a position to rectify the works not done in compliance with the Sub-Contract and have them certified in the next invoice. Here the Plaintiff had set out in its invoices the details of what had been done. The details included a description of the items installed and 8 services provided, the quantities, the unit price, the total sum and the percentage of work done. One would have expected that the Defendant would then revert on which part of the works done they were disputing with respect to quantity of items installed or quality of the services provided or the calculation of the completion of the works. Nothing of that sort was forthcoming from the Defendant. [16] All the invoices and delivery orders of the Plaintiff were duly acknowledged by the Defendant and they contained the following terms: "Payment Term: 30 days from the date of invoice. All goods are received in good conditions." [17] I can do no better than to adopt the approach taken by Justice Lim Chong Fong JC (as he then was) in KC Leong Holdings Sdn Bhd v Datin Moh Bee Ling [2015] 7 MLJ 10 at p 21: "[30] As for the unit rate costing, I also prefer the testimony of the plaintiff by reason that progressive payments were received from the defendant as claimed by the plaintiff without contemporaneous protest or challenge on the unit rate used by the plaintiff. In fact, the defendant did not even at that material time queried or demanded for the detail method and breakdown of the plaintiff's claims. Moreover 9 no contemporaneous protest was made by the defendant on the written invoices of the plaintiff dated 28 May 2007 and 18 June 2007 when the project was nearing completion..." (emphasis added) [18] The learned SCJ seemed to be influenced by the fact that DW2 had testified that there were no joint site verification as the Plaintiff had left the site. A far more important question would be why was there no written notices from the Defendant calling for a joint site verification of works done when the Defendant is contractually obliged to prepare a monthly Interim Payment Certification. Why was there no joint site verification when the Plaintiff was at the site? It is not for the Plaintiff to call for a meeting of joint site verification but the duty is on the Defendant to call for the meeting and to come up with the monthly Interim Payment Certification. I cannot agree more with the Plaintiff's counsel that a phone call from the Defendant would have sorted out the request to meet at the site for verification. The following evidence is relevant here at page 205 of the Record of Appeal : “ KLW : Mr Law, I put it to you that under the subcontract you are supposed to do the interim payment certification each month to verify the accounts. Why didn’t you do that? 10 LAW : Kerana pihak Plaintif tidak hantar sesiapa untuk pergi ke site bersama Defendan untuk… HAKIM : Kerana Plaintif tidak hantar sesiapa untuk pergi ke site? LAW : Bersama Defendan HAKIM : Bersama Defendan? LAW : … untuk melakukan verifikasi. KLW : Did you give any letter to the Plaintiff to the effect ask them to go and go to the site to verify with you? Yes or no? Did you give any letter? LAW : Tidak." [19] Surely the Sub-Contractor cannot be expected to fund the whole of the works and then wait upon the goodwill of the Defendant as the Main Sub-Contractor to pay. [20] The directors of the Defendant (DW1 and DW2) gave evidence (page 170 of Record of Appeal) that the two (2) sums of RM15,000.00 each paid on 8.2.2013 and 18.4.2013 was merely as an inducement to the Plaintiff to continue working rather than a payment for the outstanding works. 11 [21] It shows a pattern on the part of the Defendant in not following the Sub- Contract. “KLW : Mr Lee, was there any payment by the Defendant to the Plaintiff after December 2012? LEE : Ada, Puan, Kami membuat bayaran pendahuluan untuk tujuan supaya Plaintif kembali ke site." [22] As there were ongoing invoices by the Plaintiff on 19.2.2013, 10.4.2013 and 6.6.2013 and that there were ongoing payments by the Defendant on 8.2.2013 and 18.4.2013 it is more likely than not that the Plaintiff continued to do the works until then. If indeed the Plaintiff had invoiced for works not done that would be fraud on the part of the Plaintiff but it is not the defence of the Defendant that they were invoiced for work not done. [23] The point is plainly made that one cannot refuse to certify the works done by one's contractor and then later raise the allegation that the works were not properly done. If the Defendant as the Main Sub-Contractor is exercising its right to withhold payments under Clause 3 of Part V of the Sub-Contract for all unsatisfactory work done and unreasonable claims, then they are legally obliged to state what these are so that the Plaintiff 12 may be able to properly appraise the situation. This the Defendant had not done. [24] In a case where the Defendant had refused or failed to certify the works done and with that their failure to pay the Plaintiff for the works done, such a conduct may amount to a repudiatory breach of the Sub-Contract. The Plaintiff had shown its intention to terminate the Sub-Contract in its various oral representations to the Defendant and finally terminated the Sub-Contract by stopping works altogether and leaving the site. [25] I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff that Certification of the Interim Payments and/or Invoices and being paid on time are obviously very important matters as without payment on time, the Contractor would have no confidence and more importantly, no capital to continue for the Sub-Contract of RM1,006,145.00. [26] DW1 (Lee) and DW2 ( Law ) (2 directors of the Defendant) admitted that the Defendant did not comply with Clause 1 Part V of the Sub- Contract. DW2 (Law) also admitted that the Defendant had breached the Clause 1 PART V of the Sub-Contract at page 195 of the Record of Appeal: 13 “ KLW : I put it to you that the defendant is in breach of … this is page 17… in breach of Part V clause 1 of the subcontract. Do you agree ? LAW : Saya setuju, tetapi Plaintif membuat…" [27] DW2 stated that the Plaintiff did not go to the site to talk to the Defendant to seek the Interim Payment Certification and therefore the Defendant is not in breach. Nothing could be further from the truth. There is no need for any kowtowing here. Contractually the onus and responsibility is on the Defendant to do the monthly Interim Payment Certification of the Plaintiff’s invoices and thereafter to make the necessary payments. [28] There was no letter or document at all from the Defendant to the Plaintiff telling them they should go to the site to get the monthly Interim Payment Certification rather than just handing the invoices to the Defendant (which the Defendant had acknowledged receiving). [29] It seems incredible that the Plaintiff had given the Defendant more than ten (10) invoices over a period of one (1) year and the Defendant claimed that it is the Plaintiff’s fault that the Invoices are not certified at all other than 2 invoices belatedly certified. It shows the Defendant’s lack of bona fide and fair play in dealing with the Plaintiff. 14 [30] The evidence of DW1 and DW2 on the one hand is that they were not in the know about the Interim Payment Certification. DW1 at pages 173 and 193 of the Record of Appeal gave testimony that he did not know much about the Interim Payment Certification and had relied on the staff. At page 173 of the Appeal Record: “ KLW : I put it to you there is only two interim payment certification from the Defendant. Do you agree? LEE : Saya tidak tahu kerana bukan saya yang in charge. KLW : So nobody in the Defendants office know about this interim payment now? LEE : Setiausaha saya mungkin akan tahu." [31] DW4 (Queenie Tan) on the other hand at page 234 of the Record of Appeal contradicted this testimony when she said that the instructions on Interim Payment Certification had come from the bosses and that DW1 and DW2 would probably know about the Interim Payment Certification. At page 234 of the Appeal Record: “KLW : Would Mr Low or Me Lee know about interim payment certificate matters? 15 QUEENIE : By right they should know,Puan dengan izin.” [32] It is the case of the bosses pushing to the staff and the staff feeling rather embarrassed about it. Everybody is keen to wriggle their way out of an unexplained non-certification of the invoices. No explanation has been forthcoming as to why this contractual obligation was not discharged with the result that there was no regular payments other than a paltry sum of RM84,187.43 paid so far. The lackadaisical attitude and the lamentable lack of interest in certifying can only lead one to conclude that they could not be bothered about making payments to the Plaintiff for the works done. [33] The learned SCJ seemed to have been persuaded by the case of Jia Min Building Construction Pte Ltd v Ann Lee Pte Ltd [2004] SGHC 107 as authority for the proposition that generally the contractor would have no right to suspend his work for non-payment of interim certificates. However that general proposition is subject to various exceptions. Justice VK Rajah JC (as he then was) was careful to clarify as follows: "60 ... It cannot be denied that “an absolute refusal to carry out the work or an abandonment of the work before it is substantially completed, without lawful excuse, is a repudiation” (see Keating on 16 Building Contracts ([57] supra) at para 6-84. The defendant exercised an express right to terminate the contract (see [1]). 61 The plaintiff also argued that the defendant is precluded from terminating the contract. It raised two quixotic arguments in this context. It first said that a party cannot rely on its own wrong. I have no quarrel with the principle. This principle applies to all facets of the common law and has its origins in Roman law – “Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria”. The principle is explained in the decision of Roberts v The Bury Improvement Commissioners (1870) LR 5 CP 310 at 326 thus: [H]e cannot sue for a breach of contract occasioned by his own breach of contract, so that any damages he would otherwise have been entitled to for the breach of the contract to him would immediately be recoverable back as damages arising from his own breach of contract. In short, the plaintiff’s position on this issue is tenable only if the non- payment of the 15 November 2000 claim “caused” the work to stop. The word “caused” is used here to emphasise the nexus between the cause and effect. A close relationship between these two elements 17 will attract the inference that this principle applies. “Partial” causation could conceivably justify a suspension but the party invoking the principle will then have to satisfy the court it was reasonable in all the circumstances to suspend work. This is not usually an easy burden to discharge in the instance of “partial” causation. In the final analysis, the test is not whether there is complete or partial causation but whether there is effective causation. Employers or contractors are not in the normal course of events viewed as financial insurers of their contracting parties. Each case will have to be decided independently and no overarching principle can be stated. 62 I have found no factual basis for the plaintiff’s belated argument on causation. However, if indeed the failure to pay the 15 November 2000 claim had caused the work to stop, I see no reason in principle why the plaintiff could not have invoked this principle to defeat the defendant’s right to terminate the contract and to mount its counterclaim. Despite some misgivings expressed by academics as to whether this principle ought to extend to the non-payment of money as opposed to physical acts of impediment, I believe it stands to reason that the principle is of general application and can be invoked apropos all types of disenabling acts. I find the views on this 18 issue, expressed by McMullin J in Canterbury Pipe Lines Ltd v Christchurch Drainage Board [1979] 2 NZLR 347 at 371, persuasive." (emphasis added) [34] McMullin J in his judgment in Canterbury Pipe Line Ltd v. Christchurch Drainage Board [1979] 2 NZLR 347 at p 371 opined as follows: “Although I have been unable to find any case where the wrongful withholding of a progress payment has been held to be a breach of the rule that a party to contract shall not profit by his own wrong and, to that extent the judgment may break new ground, there would be no difference in principle between an employer who keeps a contractor out of his land ...,or fails to supply the requisite plans ... and an employer who keeps his contractor out of payment for work already done, declares his intention to keep him out of payments in the future, ... and requires him to continue with the work.” (emphasis added) [35] May LJ in Lubenham Fidelities and Investments Ltd v. South Pembrokeshire DC 33 BLR 39 at p 70 alluded to the need to consider all the surrounding circumstances of the case with respect to the nexus 19 between the defaulting act of the employer and the suspension by the contractor as follows: “We are quite satisfied that there was no legal basis on which the suspension of work could be justified in this case. Nevertheless was there a sufficient link between the issue of the defective certificates and the prolonged suspension of work to support the contention that the issue of the certificates “caused” the suspension? In answering this question it is necessary to look at all the surrounding circumstances ...” (emphasis added) [36] The Federal Court in Ban Hong Joo Mines Ltd v Chen & Yap Ltd [1969] MLJ 83 at p 86 held that a breach in the employer's obligations to make payments to the contractor when they have fallen due may amount to a repudiation of the contract entitling the contractor to sue for payment for the work done. It was observed by Gill FJ (as he then was) as follows: "In the present case, as was stated by the learned trial judge, the appellants were in breach of their obligation to make fortnightly payments. Their deliberate refusal to pay what was already due by way of fortnightly payments was an important element on the question of their repudiation of the contract. Furthermore, they 20 ordered the respondents to stop work. This stoppage of work by them clearly went to the root of the contract. In the circumstances, the respondents had no option but to treat the contract as at an end and to sue for payment for the work which they had already done. In our judgment they were entitled to recover the amount claimed either on the basis of work done by them at the appellants' request or by way of damages on the basis of quantum meruit." (emphasis added) [37] Here there is a need for the SCJ to determine if it was a lawful excuse and indeed reasonable for the Plaintiff Sub-Contractor to suspend works and finally to stop work altogether if the works they had done was refused certification by the Defendant and if the Defendant did not pay the Plaintiff other than as and when they chose to and even then, a very patchy payment of a paltry sum. There was no valid excuse or explanation for the refusal to certify the works done as evidenced in the invoices. There was no complaint in writing that the invoices had not correctly reflected the works done and if indeed it is a case where the works were not done or not properly done, one would have expected a response in writing from the Defendant as well as a certification for a lesser amount. 21 Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim the sum of RM294,709.17 for the work done [38] The SCJ found as a matter of fact that the Plaintiff's claim for the balance sum of RM294,709.17 was not proportionate to the works carried out by the Plaintiff at paragraph 35 of her judgment. The SCJ failed to make a finding as to what then is the proper proportion of work done or the value of the work done. At paragraph 42 she found that the Plaintiff was duly paid by the Defendant based on the actual works carried out. [39] However the Defendant's own documents at page 422 of the Appeal Record (Jilid II) show the amount of work done as verified based on the Defendant's Employer, Conlay's Certification to be RM218,848.19 and after deducting RM84,187.43 would leave a balance of RM134,660.76 due and owing to the Plaintiff. That statement also captured the work done by the Plaintiff until May 2013. [40] The learned SCJ found as a matter of fact at paragraph 3 of her grounds of judgment that the Plaintiff had, prior to the formal Sub-Contract being entered into, entered the site and started work since November 2011. Even going by what the SCJ had held that the Plaintiff stopped work in December 2012, then the fact that Plaintiff had been paid only 22 RM84,187.43 would indicate that after a year hardly 8% of the works had been completed based on financial progress. Surely for such a delay there would have been some contemporaneous letters or notices to the Plaintiff that they had fallen back substantially on the progress of the works. There were no such letters or notices produced before the Sessions Court. [41] The SCJ gave credence to the Defendant's evidence that the Plaintiff only had 4 workers at the site but the important factor is not the number of workers but whether work has been done according to schedule. No proper accepted Schedule of works was produced before the trial Court. [42] The SCJ also took into consideration that under Clause 3 of Part V of the Sub-Contract the Defendant has the right to withhold payment for all the unsatisfactory work done and unreasonable claim made by the Plaintiff. If indeed the Plaintiff had been guilty of that, there was no documentary evidence from the Defendant setting out the so-called unsatisfactory work done and the unreasonable claim made by the Plaintiff. [43] The SCJ at paragraph 26-27 of the Grounds of Judgment (at page 31 of Further Record of Appeal) had, on her own accord, without counsel having made any submissions on the matter, made the finding that “since the Plaintiff accepted payment made by the Defendant for the preliminary 23 works carried out by the Plaintiff without objections or challenge is estopped from challenging the manner in which the Defendant had certified the claims and the amount paid by the Defendant .“ [44] To begin with, this finding was made without the Defendant pleading estoppel in the Statement of Defence. It is accepted that the word "estoppel" need not be mentioned in the pleadings but that so long as the material facts pleaded supports the fact of estoppel, that would be quite sufficient. However here is a case where the facts supporting the plea of estoppel were not pleaded or adduced in evidence or even submitted upon. [45] I agree that the Plaintiff had been prejudiced because it was not given a chance to argue or rebut this issue of estoppel which was not raised or argued before by the parties. [46] The locus classicus on estoppel is the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283 at p 284 where it was summarized at the headnotes as follows: "It is correct to state that estoppel is a matter which requires to be pleaded under the rules of court, as exemplified by r 7(1) and 8(1) of O.18 Rules of the High Court 1980. However the requirement of these rules is sufficiently met if the material facts giving rise to 24 estoppel are sufficiently pleaded without actually using the term “ estopped”. (emphasis added) [47] Not only were the material facts not pleaded, here it is a case where the Plaintiff had no choice but to accept whatever that had been paid even though no proper certification had been done not because it had agreed to no certification but that it had no choice or otherwise the paltry and irregular payments would have been delayed longer. No contractor in the right frame of mind would agree to no certification of its works for then it is at the mercy of the Employer to pay as the Employer may feel like it. It certainly does not make commercial sense. The Plaintiff‘s witness PW1 (Badrol) in his witness statement (at page 248 of the Record of Appeal) stated that he had made many complaints about the late and/or non payments of the interim payments to the Defendant. [48] Both the Defendant’s witness Mr Lee (at page 173-176 of Record of Appeal) and Mr Law (at page 193-195 of Record of Appeal) agreed that the Defendant had breached Clause 1 Part V of the Sub-Contract with respect to Interim Payment Certification. [49] Assuming for a moment that the Plaintiff has wrongly terminated the Sub-Contract, it does not mean that they would not be paid for the works 25 already carried out for which the Defendant had invoiced its Employer. The SCJ would still have to determine the value of the works completed by the Plaintiff. Whether the Defendant has proved its claim of damages, losses and back charges in its counterclaim against the Plaintiff [50] The Defendant had a Counterclaim of RM505,926.39 against the Plaintiff. Assuming that the Plaintiff had terminated the Sub-Contract unlawfully, has the Defendant proved its Counterclaim? [51] The Plaintiff also contended that the Counterclaim for RM46,859.23 for materials supplied and RM177,139.59 for labour supplied cannot succeed in any event. [52] The Defendant had not been able to point to any agreement, be it written or oral, that the Plaintiff would pay the Defendant for the labour and materials. [53] The DW1 readily admitted that there was no proof of agreement between the parties to pay. Page 198 of the Record of Appeal : 26 “KLW : Mr Law, pihak defendan tuntut RM 46,859 untuk bahan bahan yang di bekal. Mana bukti yang pihak plaintif telah setuju? No no, just say where is the proof? LAW : Site record sebagai bukti, Puan, site record. KLW : Do you have the proof in the court today? LAW : …yang mereka telah setuju. Site record sebagai bukti yang mereka telah setuju. Hari ini tidak ada." [54] If the Defendant had supplied labour and materials to be used on the Defendant’s site for the Defendant’s project then one would have expected the Defendant to reduce the Plaintiff's scope of work accordingly. As the Plaintiff did not claim from the Defendant these so called labour and materials supplied, why then should the Plaintiff be paying for these 2 items. If indeed all that the Plaintiff had done was only worth RM84,187.43 which the Defendant had paid, then the Counterclaim for the RM46,859.23 for materials supplied and RM177,139.59 for labour supplied cannot make sense. Why would the Plaintiff have to pay for materials and labour supplied of RM223,998.62 to produce works for which the Defendant said is worth the value of RM84,187.43. As this is supplied by the Defendant one would have expected nothing wrong with the quality of the material or 27 specifications and nothing unskilled about the labour. The figures just do not add up! There is no commercial sense for anyone to do that kind of a business. At any rate there is no evidence of the parties having agreed on the price of these materials or the rate of the labour. It appeared to have been unilaterally imposed by the Defendant. [55] The Plaintiff had ignored the Defendant’s subsequent letters and debit notes because they had already terminated the Sub-Contract. The Defendant cannot imply, much less impose consent to the debit notes issued after the termination of the Sub-Contract just because the Plaintiff had not responded to the sums claimed in the Debit Notes. [56] It is both mind-boggling and baffling for the Defendant to claim RM223,998.62 for a brief period of work but the Plaintiff could only claim RM84,187.43 out of the sum of RM378,896.00 for work done from roughly 1.12.2011 till 1.4.2013. [57] The Plaintiff had actually in their various letters dated 22.4.2015, 5.5.2015 and 9.7.2015 (page 410, 416 and 429 of the Record of Appeal) claimed for the outstanding sum of RM294,709.17 and refuted the Defendant’s claim for damages. 28 [58] On top of that there was the Defendant's claim of Letter of Credit issued by the Defendant's Employer, Conlay, on behalf of the Plaintiff, for RM717,142.16. If that is for goods supplied to the Plaintiff to do the works then it does not make sense to have this charged to the Plaintiff for there is no evidence to show that the Plaintiff had invoiced the Defendant for this. [59] There was also the backcharges from Conlay to the Defendant for work done by third party contractors of RM289,795.57. As stated the Defendant cannot charge to the Plaintiff all that which the Employer Conlay had charged to the Defendant. We do not have the benefit of the contract between the Defendant and Conlay in order to know how much that is charged by Conlay is attributable to the Plaintiff. [60] I recall the analysis of such unsubstantiated invoices, debit notes and backcharges by Justice Lim Chong Fong JC in KC Leong Holdings's case (supra) at p 33 as follows: "[63] The defendant's cross-claim is massive comprising of essentially three heads of claim. Firstly there is special damages amounting to RM1,065,370.92 for remedying and rectifying multiple, gross and latent defects as submitted. In this respect, the defendant has in substantiation produced the invoices of her rectification 29 contractors such as Walk & Turn Builders, Shin Tat Construction Trading Sdn Bhd, DJ Deconway Furniture, Itex Power Enterprises, Kim Soon Electrical Engineering, etc that accumulated to that amount. There is no serious dispute that the defendant has paid against these invoices [64] On scrutiny of the invoices, I find that the items therein comprise of purported remedial work beyond those dealt under the third issue herein. In other words, there is a lot of other unexplained work. The defendant has merely collated all her payments made to the rectification contractors and held them entirely to the account of the plaintiff. This is plainly unsatisfactory and does not meet the requirement of proof of damages as held by the court of appeal in Sony Electronics (M) Sdn Bhd v Direct Interest Sdn Bhd [2007] 2 MLJ 229; [2007] 2 AMR 229. In building contract litigation, I have expected the complainant to carefully sieve through and tabulate each and every relevant defect and the costs of remedying them systematically preferably also in a Scott schedule. The tabulation must cross-refer to the defect as substantiated preferably by photographic records or other cogent mode of proof together with the corresponding item of 30 expenses or costs incurred to remedy the defect as substantiated by the work invoices. The complainant must in honesty disregard those works that constituted improvement or addition/modification rather than rectification. In short, the complainant cannot 'throw the whole kitchen sink' of alleged unprocessed defects and expenses to the court to have them sorted out as presented by the defendant here. [65] Moreover, it is incumbent on the defendant to satisfy the court that she has mitigated her damages, see Kabatasan Timber Extraction Co v Chong Fah Shing [1969] 2 MLJ 6. The defendant is thus obliged to show that she had acted reasonably in the appointment of the rectification contractors by calling tenders or alternative quotations, otherwise to satisfactorily explain why such steps were not carried out. The defendant has not led any evidence on this aspect." (emphasis added) [61] The Defendant cannot charge to the Plaintiff the costs of completing the balance works even if it be a case where the Plaintiff had wrongfully terminated the Sub-Contract. The Defendant must show what is the additional costs that they had incurred in completing the works left unfinished by the Plaintiff. It cannot be that the Plaintiff has to pay the 31 Defendant the whole sum that the Defendant had to spend to finish the uncompleted works. It has to be confined to only the additional costs being the difference in the contracted sum and the increased sum. It cannot be the whole of the labour and material costs but the additional labour and material costs. For that one needs to know the percentage of works not completed by the Plaintiff and the agreed price for that uncompleted works. Then only can one determine what is the new increased price to complete that uncompleted works. [62] The way the Defendant had presented a breakdown of its Counterclaim at page 421 of the Appeal Record is to add up all the various heads of claim for materials supplied by Conlay, labour and materials supplied by Defendant, payments made by Conlay to third parties and other back charges by Conlay and to charge them to the Plaintiff as their Counterclaim for damages and losses suffered. [63] The incisive analysis of his Lordship Edgar Joseph Jr SCJ (as he then was) in Tan Ah Chim & Sons Sdn Bhd v Ooi Bee Tat & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 633 at p 668 comes to my mind: "Thirdly, I have kept in the forefront of my mind certain well- established principles in the field of building contract claims; they are 32 conveniently distilled for me by Prof Vincent Powell-Smith and John Sims in their well-regarded book, Building Contract Claims (2nd Ed), at pp 136, 137 and 144 as follows: (1) Loss of profit normally to be expected, which the contractor would otherwise have earned but for the delay or disruption, is an allowable head of claim under the rule in Hadley v Baxendale. (2) However, a contractor would not be entitled to recover an exceptionally high profit on another contract unless this fact were known to the employer at the time the delayed or disrupted contract had been entered into. (See Victoria Laundry (Windsor) Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd.) (3) Additional expenditure on labour, materials or plant due to increases in cost during a period of delay is an allowable head of claim. (4) The correct measure would be the difference between what the contractor would have spent on labour, materials and plant and what he has actually had to spend over the whole period of the work as a result of the delay and disruption concerned. 33 Also relevant to this part of the case is what Megaw J (as he then was) said in Wraight Ltd v PH & T (Holdings) Ltd, a case where a contractor had made a successful claim for loss of profit: In my judgment, the position is this: prima facie, the claimants are entitled to recover, as being direct loss and/or damage, those sums of money which they would have made if the contract had been performed, less the money which has been saved to them because of the disappearance of their contractual obligation." (emphasis added) [64] So it is not for the SCJ to merely say that the Plaintiff's claim is disproportionate to the works done but to determine what is the portion of works completed by the way Plaintiff and the agreed price of the uncompleted works as well as the proof of the extra costs incurred in completing the uncompleted works. [65] The Defendant's Counterclaim is in the debit notes issued by the Defendant in their letter dated 4.11.2014 to the Plaintiff where they had informed the Plaintiff that should it fail to issue a response by the end of November 2014, the debit notes will be deemed agreed and confirmed. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows: 34 “Enclosed herein the list of debit note for your easy references and checking. Should you failed to respond by end of November 2014, SK M&E Bersekutu Sdn Bhd will deem the debit notes given are agreed and confirmed.” [66] The SCJ seemed to have been persuaded by case law that states that if there is no objection to debit notes issued by one to the other, than one would have the basis to conclude that the amount claimed in the debit notes is correct. Those cases that say that can be distinguished for it was in the context of on-going contractual relationship. Where the contract has been terminated one cannot infer agreement to the sum claimed merely because one party has unilaterally imposed a condition that if the other party does not revert within a stated time frame, then there is a deemed admission that the sum claimed in the debit notes is correct. That would be to change the law of contract which requires a consensus as idem for there to be a contract. It is different if at the outset the parties had agreed to the deeming provision at the point when the contract was entered into. Likewise if parties by conduct had accepted the goods or the services rendered which had come with the deeming provision. A failure to respond cannot give rise to an imposition of the terms not responded to as part of a contract that is sought to be imposed. 35 [67] In the case of Cobrain Holdings Sdn Bhd v Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 496, it was a specific finding of fact that the plaintiff had by their correspondence and dealings with the defendant, readily accepted the sums due under the debit notes without reservation. [68] It was in that context that Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in dealing with claims pursuant to debit notes issued held as follows at page 525 of the decision: “Dealing first with the debit notes. In this regard, the plaintiff's own actions in relation to the debit notes, though not acknowledged, but over quite a substantial period July 2008–July 2010, with the meetings and correspondence exchanged between parties, in fact confirms DW1's testimony. The correspondence reveal that the plaintiff itself was not in doubt over the debit notes, the amount stated therein, or what they signify. As seen earlier, the plaintiff never objected to any of these records but instead, in its correspondence and dealings with the defendant, the plaintiff readily accepted the sums due under the debit notes without reservation." (emphasis added) 36 [69] By relying totally on debit notes that the Plaintiff did not respond to mean the Plaintiff have accepted the claims, would result in a miscarriage of justice such that the Defendant need not have to prove but that the sum claimed is deemed proved. [70] It is also not correct for the learned SCJ to state that as DW4 (Queenie Tan Chai Ling), who was the Account Assistant of the Defendant, was not cross-examined on the details and amount set out in the debit notes, the said issue is deemed to be admitted. The learned SCJ had relied on the case of Sin Hong Huat Industries v Berjaya General Insurance Bhd [2014] 8 MLJ 144 at p 151, where it was held as follows: “The plaintiff's counsel did not challenge SD2's evidence on this issue during cross-examination. Hence, it is trite law that the plaintiff is deemed to have accepted SD's evidence on this issue.” [71] At page 237 of the Appeal Record Jilid I, under cross-examination, DW4 admitted that she was not the person in charged of the Sub-Contract and so she has no personal knowledge of the management or termination of the Sub-Contract. 37 Pronouncement [72] In the light of all the reasons given above, I had allowed the appeal as the decision of the SCJ could not supported by the evidence adduced and so has to be set aside. [73] The evidence before the Sessions Court is totally unsatisfactory with respect to how the Sessions Court had come to award the whole sum counterclaimed by the Defendant of RM505,926.39. Further with respect to the Plaintiff's claim the SCJ would have to determine the proportion of the works completed by the Plaintiff seeing that the Defendant's own documents showed a sum of RM134,660.76 being the value of work done owing by the Defendant to the Plaintiff at page 422 of the Appeal Record Jilid II. [74] This is not a case where I could make a substitute finding of the amount that could be entered for the Plaintiff or for the Defendant or for both of them where the Claim and Counterclaim is concerned. The finding of facts has to be made by a trial judge and the way the evidence has been adduced, assessed and analyzed leaves much to be desired such that at the end of the day, the whole of the evidence adduced has not been sufficiently appreciated for the decision arrived at. It would not be tenable 38 for this Court to undertake the task of making primary findings of facts in respect of the Claim and the Counterclaim. See the principle enunciated for a retrial in Court of Appeal case of Kamdar Sdn Bhd v Bipinchandra Balvantrai & Ors [2017] 1 CLJ 369. [75] Very reluctantly I would have to remit the case for a retrial before another Judge in the Sessions Court. The deposit of the appeal is to be refunded to the Plaintiff/Appellant. No costs is ordered for the appeal. Dated: 20 March 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur For the Appellant : KL Wong (Messrs Yeo & Yeo) For the Respondent : Rohan Arasoo together with Lynn Foo (Messrs Harold & Lam Partnership) Dates of Decision: 28 November 2016

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24FC-1074-07/2016

PLAINTIF HONG LEONG ISLAMIC BANK BERHAD [NO. SYARIKAT: 686191-W] DEFENDAN PENTADBIR TANAH GOMBAK

14/03/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24FC-1074-07/2016 Dalam Perkara mengenai perintah jualan bertarikh 05/10/2015 oleh Pentadbir Tanah Gombak berkaitan gadaian yang didaftarkan pada 11/02/2011 di bawah no. perserahan 718/2011 ke atas hartanah di bawah pegangan Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 6287 Lot 22893 Seksyen 2, Bandar Ulu Kelang, Daerah Gombak, Selangor Darul Ehsan. Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai lelongan awam yang telah diadakan pada 17/03/2016; Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai keputusan Pentadbir Tanah Gombak dalam membenarkan komisyen pada kadar 2% ke atas harga jualan di lelongan awam 2 pada 17/03/2016 sepertimana yang dituntut oleh pelelong berlesen, JAR Auctioneers di bawah bil no. (702 GOMBAK); Dan Dalam perkara mengenai seksyen 418 Kanun Tanah Negara, 1965 BETWEEN HONG LEONG ISLAMIC BANK BERHAD [NO. SYARIKAT: 686191-W] …PLAINTIFF AND PENTADBIR TANAH GOMBAK …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) 3 A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is an appeal filed under Section 418 of the National Land Code 1965 (NLC) against the decision of the Land Administrator of the District of Gombak that had to approved and agreed to the auctioner’s fees/commission amounting RM44,000.00 claimed (inserted) by the auctioneers, JAR Auctioneers. [2] The Plaintiff in its Appeal had prayed for the following Orders from this Court: a. Keputusan Defendan dalam membenarkan komisyen sebanyak RM44,000.00 yang dikira pada kadar 2% ke atas jumlah RM2,200,000.00 iaitu harga jualan hartanah di bawah pegangan Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 6287 Lot 22893 Seksyen 2, Bandar Ulu Kelang, Daerah Gombak, Selangor Darul Ehsan (“hartanah tersebut”) di lelongan awam pada 17/03/2016 sepertimana yang dituntut oleh pelelong berlesen, JAR Auctioneers di bawah bil no. (702 GOMBAK)(“bil tersebut”) diketepikan; b. Defendan diperintahkan untuk meluluskan semula bil tersebut mengikut skala komisyen yang terpakai kepada lelongan awam yang 4 dijalankan di Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di mana komisyen maksima yang dibenarkan adalah RM2,000.00; c. Defendan diperintahkan untuk membayar kos prosiding ini atas dasar indemniti penuh. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [3] The background facts leading the Plaintiff to file the present Appeal is simple and brief. 3.1 The Plaintiff (Hong Long Islamic Bank berhad) is a chargee of a property held under title Pajakan Mukim No. Hakmilik 6287 Lot 22893 Seksyen 2 Bandar Ulu Kelang, Daerah Gombak, Selangor Darul Ehsan (“the said Property”). The said Property is under the territorial jurisdiction of the Defendant (Land Administrator of the District of Gombak). 3.2 On the failure of the debtor (Yap Ching Fa) to service the term loan facility granted to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had enforced its 5 statutory rights on the said charge vide obtaining an order for sale over the said Property by public auction dated 15.10.2015. 3.3 The 1st and the 2nd public auctions, respectively held on 26.11.2015 and 4.2.2015 with reserve prices at RM2,800,000.00 and RM2,500,000.00 had been postponed as there were no bidders. 3.4 The 3rd public auction was conducted by the Defendant on 17.3.2016 with the aid of the auctioneers, JAR Auctioneers. On this date of 17.3.2016, the said Property was auctioned off at a price of RM2,200,000.00 to an individual by the name of Low Pack Seng. 3.5 For the works done, JAR Auctioneers then had issued to the Defendant a bill dated 17.3.2016 to the amount of RM46,992.00 whereby this amount includes a sum of RM44,000.00 being the commission at the rate of 2% off of the sale price of the said Property. 6 3.6 This JAR Auctioneers Bill inclusive of the commission of RM44,000.00 was approved and allowed by the Defendant. The Plaintiff unsatisfied with the Defendant’s conduct of approving the commission at the rate of RM2% of the sale price to the sum of RM44,000.00 had filed the present Appeal under Section 418 of the NLC on 19.7.2016. C. UNDISPUTED FACTS [4] The Public auction held over the said Property was an auction under a Land Office title within the jurisdiction of the Land Administrator of Gombak. [5] The Auction Sales Enactment F.M.S CAP 91 (No. 2 of 1929) and the Auction Sales Rules (Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang) and Surat Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya bertarikh 29/8/1995 are only applicable to public auctions conducted by the Court. Thus, the scale commission for public auctions at the High Court and the Land Office of the Federal Territories is not applicable in the public auctions conducted by the Land Office in Selangor. 7 [6] Public auctions conducted by the Land Office of all the nine (9) districts of Selangor, verily does not have any scale or guidelines for the auctioneer’s commission in a public auction conducted by the Land Office in Selangor. [7] The Land Office of Selangor through its letter dated 17 January 2017 to the office of the Selangor State Legal Advisor had confirmed the following: i. kadar komisyen kepada pelelong untuk lelongan awam yang dibuat oleh Pentadbir Tanah di Pejabat Tanah Daerah di Selangor adalah sama untuk kesemua Sembilan (9) daerah di Selangor iaitu sebanyak 2%. ii. kadar 2% ini tidak dapat dikenalpasti asal usul penetapannya. iii. atas semakan yang telah dibuat, tiada sebarang arahan, pekeliling mahupun surat pentadbiran yang dikeluarkan oleh Pejabat ini berkaitan kadar komisyen tersebut. iv. sehingga kini, tiada sebarang arahan bertulis dan /atau kaedah-kaedah yang dibuat oleh Pihak Berkuasa Negeri untuk 8 penetapan kadar komisyen sebagaimana kedua-dua undang- undang sedemikian. D. PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSION [8] It is the Plaintiff’s contention that the Plaintiff is an aggrieved party to the Defendant’s decision upon realizing that the Defendant had approved and allowed the JAR Auctioneers Bill dated 17.3.2016 at the time that the auctioneers issued the bill to the Plaintiff for payment on 20.4.2016 [9] The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant’s conduct of approving and allowing the auctioneers bill for commission at 2% of the sale price totaling up to RM44,000.00 is a positive act in carrying out the Defendant’s statutory duty under Section 268(1)(b) of the NLC. Thus, it is a “decision” within the ambit of Section 418(3) of the NLC. [10] Thus, such decision entitles the aggrieved Plaintiff to Appeal against the same decision to the High Court under Section 418 of the NLC. 9 [11] It is also the Plaintiff’s submission that the said decision was unreasonable and seemingly made arbitrarily without any basis, deeming the decision to be tainted and thus, necessitates the intervention of this Court on the following grounds: (i) The Defendant itself has admitted that there is no scale or guidelines applicable for auctioneer’s commission in a public auction conducted by the Land Administrator of Selangr in carrying out or conducting its statutory duties under Section 268(1)(b) of the NLC. Thus, when the said bill was issued for approval, the Defendant is required to act in good faith and not simply approve the commission at the rate claimed by auctioneers arbitrarily; (ii) The Defendant’s conduct in approving the commission at the rate of 2% is not only made arbitrarily and in bad faith, it also prejudices the chargor who has to bear the high commission rate after having his property sold off through the public auction; (iii) The Defendant is misconceived in contending that it is not at all involved in the matters of setting the appropriate rate of auctioneer’s commission as only with the approval of the said bill, that the Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the bill arises; 10 (iv) The Defendant’s contention that the 2% commission on the sale price is reasonable cannot be accepted as the Defendant had approved the rate of 2% without stating anything or any grounds of the Defendant’s approval; (v) The Defendant’s contention that the Plaintiff and the auctioneers may still amend the amount of commission based on their agreement is contradictory to the provision of the NLC and the Defendant is misconceived of its statutory duty under Section 268(1)(b) of the NLC; (vi) The Defendant’s act in approving the said bill is not an administrative conduct but instead is a conduct in carrying out its quasi judicial statutory duty that obligates the Defendant to account for the interests of all parties inclusive of the interest of the chargor and to act in good faith. (vii) The Defendant’s contention that the approval of the auctioneer’s bill was not an order to pay is misconceived/baseless/unmeritorious as Section 268A(2) of the NLC has clearly stipulated the following: “Pemegang gadaian hendaklah menggunakan wang belian mengikut cara yang dinyatakan seperti berikut:- 11 (a) Pertama, untuk membayar wang yang genap masa yang dinyatakan dalam perenggan (a) dan (b) subseksyen (1) seksyen 268 tidak kurang daripada empat belas hari dari tarikh penerimaan wang belian penuh dari jualan itu; dan…” [12] In support of its submission, the Plaintiff’s learned counsel has referred this Court to the warning of the Federal Court in deciding an appeal under Section 418 of the NLC, regarding the exercise of power and the responsibility of civil servants under the NLC in the case of Pow Hing & Anor vs. Registrar of Titles, Malacca [1981] 1 MLJ 155 whereby the Federal Court had held the following: “In tune with the prelude with which we commenced at the outset, we would by way of postlude in restating the message this decision delivers enjoin every official concerned with or involved in exercising powers and duties under the Code and related legislation to regard this judgement as a regrettably necessary but solemn caveat; giving warning, loud and clear, against any wanton disregard or sloppy application of express statutory provisions in the exercise of their functions, and one to understood, marked and digested as such. We would add that they must strive to be au fait with the law they have to administer and should not hesitate in the 12 course of their statutory duties to seek legal advice whenever necessary from the State Legal Adviser or his confreres and should never put the latter in the invidious and perhaps even intolerable position they found themselves in these proceedings of having both in the court below and before us to make feeble attempts at ex post facto justification for the inexcusable defaults of others on a post hoc ergo propter hoc premise, quite apart from unnecessarily constsraining the just aggrieved to pit themselves in curial combat against the massive and bottomless purse of the State – much to the delight , perhaps , of the legal profession.” [13] The Plaintiff’s learned counsel also submits that regarding the Defendant’s decision, the Defendant cannot seek refuge under the protection afforded by section 22 of the NLC as the Plaintiff’s action to file the present Appeal under Section 418 of the NLC is to appeal against the Defendant’s decision which had aggrieved the Plaintiff and not merely against the Defendant as an officer in its personal capacity in relation to the conduct or omission in the exercise of its duties/obligations under the NLC. (See: Bagan Serai Housing Estate Sdn. Bhd vs. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah & Anor [2002] 2 CLJ 237. 13 At page 244:-“… I am satisfied that in this case the Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seberang Perai Tengah being the Land Administrator having charge of district where the subject property. I am also satisfied that the Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Penang, being the State Director of Land and Mines is named as the 2nd Defendant in the capacity of his office in whose name any action to establish any liability on the part of the State Authority is to be brought . In the circumstances, it is my judgement that the defence provided by s.22 of the NLC is not open to the Defendants…”) F. THE DEFENDANT’S SUBMISSION [14] The Defendant instead submitted that indeed the scale commission for public auction in the High Court and the Land Office of the Federal Territory is not applicable in the public auction held by the Land Office in Selangor. Nonetheless, although there is no such scale or guideline for the setting of the appropriate rate of auctioneer’s commission, the Defendant had exercised its discretion reasonably in approving the said bill. [15] In the Affidavit in Reply affirmed by Abdul SharizIzwan bin Abdul Shukor (Land Administrator of the Land Office of the District of Gombak)(Enclosure 3) to challenge the Plaintiff’s Appeal, Mr Shariz 14 Izwan averred that he had scrutinized the bill and upon scrutiny, he had found that the commission at 2% is a reasonable sum. Thus, there is no issue of arbitrariness, bad faith or misconception arises from the Defendant. In this matter, he averred that he had carried out his administrative duties under the NLC in good faith, thus he reserves the right to be protected under section 22 of the NLC. Thereto, the Defendant’s learned counsel had referred this Court to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of JW Properties Sdn Bhd v. Perbadanan Kemajuan Pertanian Selangor & Anor [2016] 1 CLJ 13. G. THE COURT’S ANALYSIS [16] In the present case, the Defendant in its Affidavit in Reply (Enclosure 3) had challenged the Plaintiff’s Appeal on the ground that there is no decision that the Plaintiff may Appeal against as the approval of the auctioneer’s bill was done by the Defendant as an administrative duty and not an Order to pay. 15 [17] Nonetheless, upon examination and scrutiny of the Defendant’s written submission, this contention was left totally untouched by the Defendant’s learned counsel. Thus, it is safe for this Court to assume that the Defendant abandons and is no longer pursued by the Defendant. [18] Nonetheless, section 418 of the NLC clearly stipulates that: 418. Rayuan kepada Mahkamah (1) Mana-mana orang atau badan yang terkilan dengan apa-apa keputusan Pengarah Negeri, Pendaftar atau mana-mana Pendaftar atau mana-mana Pentadbir Tanah di bawah Akta ini, bolehlah, pada bila-bila masa dalam tempoh tiga bulan bermula dari tarikh bilamana ia dikomunikasikan kepadanya, merayu mengenainya kepada Mahkamah (2) Apa-apa rayuan sedemikian hendaklah dibuat selaras dengan peruntukan-peruntukan mana-mana undang-undang bertulis buat masa itu berkuatkuasa berhubungan dengan prosedur sivil; dan Mahkamah hendaklah membuat apa-apa perintah atasnya sepertimana ia memikirkan adil. 16 [19] It is undisputable that the validation and approval of a bill issued to the Land Administrator is a decision which would bind the Plaintiff as a chargee and is also a duty under section 268(1)(b) of the NLC which reads: “(b) secondly, in the payment of the expenses (as certified) by the Registrar of the Court or Land Administrator, as the case may be incurred in connection with the making and carrying into effect, of the order for sale.” (emphasis given) [20] This Court is fully aware and agrees that the auction which is the core of the present proceeding is an auction conducted by the land administrator for mukim lands/Land Office title and is not an auction conducted by the High Court. Thus, the Auction Sales Enactment F.M.S CAP 91 (No. 2 of 1929) and Auction Sales Rules (Selangor, Negeri Sembilan and Pahang) and Surat Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya bertarikh 29/8/1995 which informs that the rate of auctioneer’s commission effective on 01/01/1995 and kaedah 43(3) kaedah-kaedah Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur 1995 are not applicable. 17 [21] With the inapplicability of the scale commission for public auctions at the High Court, there are no scales or guidelines issued by the Land Office of Selangor to be made as guidance to the Land Administrators of Selangor in relation to the rate of auctioneer’s fees/commission which would aid the Land Administrator to conduct the public auction. [22] In this situation, how then would the rate of commission be determined? In the absence of any guideline or directive, thus the determination of the proper rate of commission to the auctioneer shall be based on the discretion of the Land Administrator. In other words, the Land Administrator must examine whether or not the rate stated in the bill is reasonable or otherwise. [23] It is a fundamental principle of law that when a matter is to be determined or decided by a discretionary power, the discretionary power must be exercised justly and reasonably on the principles of fairness. The Land Administrator in the present case must give consideration to all relevant factors in determining the reasonable rate that could be paid to the auctioneer while being able to give the 18 right direction to his own self in ensuring that the rate determined is just and reasonable. In other words, the Land Administrator must ask himself the right question and his decision must be accorded to the justice of the case. [24] In the present case, at exhibit “EE-4”, Enclosure 2 the endorsement and approval of the Land Administrator was made vide a rubber stamp which completely does not reflect that he has scrutinized and considered whether or not the commission claimed is reasonable and just. Similarly in his Affidavit in Reply, there is only a mere averment that he agreed to the 2% rate after he had scrutinized the bill. What were the matters or factors which were scrutinized which led to the decision that the rate of 2% was reasonable? There is no justification afforded by the Land Administrator in allowing the 2% rate. Thus, this Court is in agreement with the Plaintiff’s learned counsel that considering that Land Administrator’s decision without justification, scrutiny and consideration of the relevant factors in determining the proper rate, an inescapable conclusion may be drawn that the decision to validate and approve the 2% rate was an arbitrary, 19 baseless decision not in line with the real principle of the law, which is justice for all parties. [25] Clearly, the issue before this Court is whether the Defendant here in exercising his discretionary power in allowing the auctioneer to be paid a commission of RM44,000.00 i.e at the rate of 2% of the sale price has exercised the power vested upon him reasonably and justly. In Ratnam v Cumarasamy & Allor [1965] 1 MLJ 228, the Privy Council held that it will not interfere with the discretion exercised by a lower court unless it is clearly satisfied that the discretion had been exercised on a wrong principle. Similarly, the Federal Court in Vasudevan v T Damodaran & Anor [1981] 2 MLJ 150, held that an exercise of discretion ought not to be interfered with unless there is satisfactory evidence that the judge was wrong because of the presumption that the judge has rightly exercised his discretion. [26] In this case, the decision of the Defendant was clearly against the basic and fundamental principle of exercise of discretion and thus warranted this Court intervention. Under these circumtances, this 20 Court as an appellate and the court of justice has to step in to remedy the situation. [27] Therefore, based on the above grounds, the decision of the Land Administrator to validate and approve/allow the auctioneer’s commission at 2% of the sale price is unsustainable and must be set aside by this Court. [28] The Plaintiff in its Enclosure 1 had also prayed to this Court an Order that the Defendant to reaffirm the said bill in accordance with the commission applicable to public auctions conducted by the High Court whereby the maximum commission allowable is RM2000.00. [29] In relation to this, this Court stresses that the law is clear that when a statute/law has granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Land Administrator to determine the proper commission to be paid to the auctioneer and there is no law or rule made in Selangor to apply the same scale as a public auction held at the High Court, this Court cannot give a binding effect to the said scale to an auction held by the Land Administrator which is his exclusive jurisdiction. Doing so would 21 mean that this Court had usurped the jurisdiction of the Land Administrator and this cannot be allowed. [30] What the Court may strongly suggest here is that, until a rule is made for a scale of auctioneer’s commission for auctions held by Land Administrators in Selangor, in view of overcoming this problem of the arbitrary or mechanical determination, and for the sake of uniformity, all Land Administrators should consider the scale commission of public auctions at the High Court as a guideline in determining the appropriate rate of auctioneer’s commission. In the event that any Land Administrator refuses to follow this scale, that Land Administrator must exercise his discretion justly and reasonably based on strong grounds while affording justifications to support his decision. Such decisions outside of the scale commission shall be opened to the scrutiny of the High Court as an Appellate Court. [31] Considering the aforementioned grounds, this Court shall return/ remit the present case to the Land Office of Gombak for the determination of the rate of commission that should be paid to the JAR Auctioneers. 22 [32] Regarding the applicability of the protection under Section 22 of the NLC, it is this Court’s finding that the Defendant cannot seek refuge behind this provision as the Defendant’s conduct is not a conduct of the Defendant on his own personal capacity in his acts or ommissions in exercising his obligations under the NLC but instead is a conduct under the office of the Land Office which had prejudiced and aggrieved the Plaintiff. [33] No cost on full indemnity shall be granted to the Plaintiff as per the Plaintiff’s prayer. The Plaintiff is only entitled to be granted costs on the proceedings to the sum of RM5,000.00. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judge High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 14th March of 2017 23 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Satish Alli & Associates Mr Satish V Nair For the Defendant - Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Tuan Khairul Nizam bin Mohd Kamal

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-117-10/2016 & WA-24C-105-10/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd 2. ) Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd 2. ) Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd

28/02/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-117-10/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication Reference No.: KLRCA/D/ADJ-0294- 2016 Between Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd (223507-A) and Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd And In the matter of the Adjudication Decision dated 15.7.2016 And In the matter of Order 7 and Order 28 Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of Section 15 and 16 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 BETWEEN PERMINTEX JSK RESOURCES SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO: 888262-A) AND FOLLITILE (M) SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (COMPANY NO: 223507-A) (heard together with) 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-105-10/2016 In the Matter of an Adjudication Reference No.: KLRCA/D/ADJ-0294- 2016 pursuant to Construction Industry Paymeng and Adjudication Act 2012 Between Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd (223507-A) and Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd (888262-A). And In the Matter of the Adjudication Decision dated 15.7.2016 made by Mr Shannon Rajan And In the Matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the Matter of Order 7, Order 28 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN FOLLITILE (M) SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO: 223507-A) AND PERMINTEX JSK RESOURCES SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (COMPANY NO: 888262-A) 3 THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] This is an application by Permintex JSK Resources Sdn Bhd ("Permintex") to set aside an Adjudication Decision given on 15.7.2016. There was also a corresponding application by Follitile (M) Sdn Bhd (“Follitile”) to enforce the Adjudication Decision as if it is a judgment of the Court. [2] Permintex was the non-paying party in the Adjudication brought by Follitile as the unpaid party under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”). In August 2015 Permintex had appointed Follitile as its subcontractor to supply labour to install aero foil inclusive of all necessary framing, sub-frames in respect of a construction project known as "Projek Mass Rapid Transit Lembah Kelang: Jajaran Sungai Buloh-Kajang Package S3; Construction and Completion of Elevated Stations and Other Associated Works at the Curve, One Utama and Taman Tun Dr Ismail." [3] Follitile said they were not paid for the works done and so demanded for payment. On 26.1.2016 Permintex made part payment of RM50,000.00. Follitile then proceeded to serve a Payment Claim on the Permintex pursuant to section 5 CIPAA on 8.3.2016 for the balance sum of RM379,510.83. There was no Payment Response served by Permintex 4 on the Claimant pursuant to section 6 CIPAA. Neither was there an Adjudication Response filed by Permintex. Their request for an extension of time to file the Adjudication Response was rejected by the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator had awarded a sum of RM262,018.62 (inclusive of GST) to the Claimant based on Permintex's admission of debt contained in its letter dated 1.4.2016. He also awarded interest and costs in favour of the Claimant. [4] The parties shall be referred to by their names or sometimes by their designation in the Adjudication as Claimant for Follitile and Respondent for Permintex. By consent both applications were heard together as the substratum of facts are the same for both the applications and in the event that the Adjudication Decision is not set aside, it will generally be enforced. Prayers [5] The Respondent in the Adjudication had applied to set aside the Adjudication Decision under section 15 (b) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") on ground of denial of natural justice and also under section 15(d) CIPAA on ground that the Adjudicator had not acted independently or impartially. 5 Principles [6] As there was no Payment Response served on the unpaid party, Follitile, the non-paying party is deemed under section 6(4) CIPAA to have disputed the entire Payment Claim. Follitile then as Claimant initiated the adjudication proceedings by serving a written notice of adjudication dated 25.03.2016 on the Respondent, Permintex, containing the requisite documents pursuant to section 8(1) CIPAA. [7] Section 8(2) CIPAA provides that upon receipt of the Respondent of the notice of adjudication, an adjudicator shall be appointed in the manner prescribed in section 21. At paragraph 7 of the said Notice of Adjudication the Claimant had proposed the name of an Adjudicator and further had stated as follows: "Please indicate your agreement on the proposed person to be appointed as adjudicator, or any other suitable person of your choice for our consideration. If we do not receive any response from you by 01.04.2016, we will proceed to make a request to the Director of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration to appoint an adjudicator pursuant to section 21(b)(i) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012." 6 [8] As there was no response from the Respondent on the proposed named Adjudicator, the Claimant wrote to the KLRCA by their letter of 19.04.2016 requesting their assistance to appoint an Adjudicator pursuant to section 21(b)(i) of CIPAA. The whole of section 21 CIPAA is reproduced below to show that under the circumstances of this case, section 21(b) (i) is the applicable subsection to apply: "21. Appointment of Adjudicator An adjudicator may be appointed in the following manner: a) By agreement of the parties in dispute within ten working days from the service of the notice of adjudication by the claimant; or b) By the Director of the KLRCA- i) Upon the request of either party in dispute if there is no agreement of the parties under paragraph (a); or ii) Upon the request of the parties in dispute." [9] On 24.04.2016 the KLRCA wrote to the Mr Shannon Rajan to inform him of his appointment as an Adjudicator for the dispute. The said Adjudicator then wrote to the parties by his letter of 25.04.2016 and stated as follows: 7 "3. Pursuant to section 23(2) of CIPAA, I am required to propose and negotiate my terms of appointment including fees chargeable with the parties. I hereby enclose my proposed standard terms of appointment for your perusal.” [10] The said Adjudicator also requested for the parties' response by 6.5.2016 as he would have to revert back to KLRCA by 9.5.2016. On 5.5.2016 the Claimant reverted and accepted the proposed terms. The Respondent did not revert at all. However that does not prevent the Adjudication from proceeding as Rule 6 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Rules 2014 provides as follows: "6. KLRCA’s standard fees for services and expenses of adjudicator The KLRCA’s standard fees for the services and expenses of an adjudicator as specified in the Schedule shall apply if the parties in dispute and the adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the adjudicator." [11] Likewise in section 19(2) CIPAA it is provided as follows: "If the parties and the adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the adjudicator, the KLRCA's standard terms of appointment and fees for Adjudicator's shall apply." 8 [12] The said Adjudicator by his letter of 9.5.2016 to both the Claimant and Respondent, sent by both email, registered post and fax, accepted his appointment as Adjudicator by enclosing a copy of Form 6 of the Notice of Acceptance of the Appointment to Act as Adjudicator as provided for in the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure. At paragraph 2 of the said Notice is a declaration by the said Adjudicator that he accepted the appointment to act as Adjudicator as per the KLRCA's standard terms of appointment and fees for the services of an Adjudicator in force as of the date of the said letter and a copy of said standard terms was attached. [13] The said Adjudicator also made the requisite declaration under section 24 CIPAA at paragraph 4 of the said Notice. He also at paragraph 6 of the said Notice set out the Adjudicator's fees payable and the KLRCA Administrative Fees as well as the 6% GST payment. He further gave directions for both parties to contribute and make deposit with KLRCA for the Adjudicator's fees and expenses and the KLRCA's administrative fees and any taxes in equal share as security in advance within 10 working days from the date of receipt of the said Notice. [14] On 16.5.2016 Permintex's solicitors wrote to the KLRCA stating that they are not agreeable to the matter being referred to this adjudication proceeding and this matter be referred to the civil court for litigation and 9 that they would not be paying the deposit requested. Another letter with the same contents was also sent to the solicitors for the Claimant. [15] In Harlow & Milner Ltd v Mrs Linda Teasdale [2006] EWHC 1708 at para 16 it was held that "any party who was on the receiving end of the adjudicator's decision could, if they wanted to avoid the result, commence arbitration proceedings against the successful party, and then argue that the adjudicator's decision should abide the eventual outcome of that arbitration. It was precisely to avoid such delaying tactics that the statutory adjudication process was created in the first place..." [16] It must be stated here that CIPAA gives a Claimant the right to proceed with Adjudication for a Payment Claim and "payment" is defined in section 4 CIPAA as "a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." Once the process of Adjudication has been properly activated with the service of a Notice of Adjudication under section 8(1) CIPAA on the Respondent, the Respondent cannot skirt or stall the Adjudication proceedings by saying that they do not agree to submit to Adjudication. To allow them to do so would be to stymied the implementation of the CIPAA which in its long title is stated its avowed aim to "facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, 10 to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry." [17] Such a statutory right to an unpaid Party cannot be denied or denuded by the non-paying party refusing to participate in the Adjudication. A party like the non-paying party would naturally prefer to delay the matter as long as possible for Adjudication is a speedy process whereby it is meant to yield a result of interim finality which is enforceable as if it is a judgment of the Court. [18] Parliament had anticipated this obstacle that may be thrown at the unpaid party so as to derail Adjudication and so under section 37 CIPAA it is provided as follows: "37. Relationship Between Adjudication and Other Dispute Resolution Process 1) A dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. 2) Subject to subsection (3), a reference to arbitration or the court in respect of a dispute which is being adjudicated shall not bring the adjudication proceedings to an end nor affect the adjudication proceedings. 11 3) An adjudication proceeding is terminated if the dispute being adjudicated is settled by agreement in writing between the parties or decided by arbitration or the court." (emphasis added) [19] Whilst there is nothing preventing the Respondent from proceeding with litigation, there is equally nothing that would prevent the Claimant from proceeding with Adjudication. Surely a Claimant's reference of the dispute to Adjudication cannot be dependent on whether the Respondent is agreeable to Adjudication. To give the Respondent such a choice would be to allow the Respondent to paralyze the purpose of CIPAA and to render it a toothless piece of legislation. [20] The KLRCA replied the Respondent's solicitors by its letter of 19.5.2016 stating that any issues relating to the dispute should be raised with the appointed Adjudicator and the said letter was copied to both the Adjudicator and the solicitors for the Claimant. [21] The Adjudicator wrote to the Claimant's solicitors as well as the Respondent's solicitors via his letter dated 23.5.2016, inviting the parties to make further submissions with regard the matters raised “by the end of the business day tomorrow i.e. 24.5.2016”. [22] The matters raised were with respect to the Respondent's solicitors' letter to KLRCA stating that the Respondent was not agreeable to the 12 matter being referred to Adjudication and that the matter should be litigated in the civil courts. [23] The Claimant's solicitors replied by their letter of 24.5.2016 stating that their client was exercising their statutory right under section 7 CIPAA and that the answer to the Respondent's objection can be found in section 37 CIPAA that allows for concurrent proceedings in Adjudication as well as in Adjudication. [24] The Respondent's solicitors, Messrs Patrick Dass & Co, on the other hand, replied via letter dated 23.5.2016 to the Adjudicator’s letter dated 23.5.2016 stating that they could not comply with the deadline which they submitted was ridiculously short, as their Mr. Dass had a trial in Temerloh court from 24.5.2016 to 26.5.2016. [25] By the same letter the Respondent's solicitors had requested for the evidence of Mr. Shannon Raj’s appointment as the Adjudicator and also asked under what authority he had requested for submissions to be made. The relevant paragraphs of the said letter reads: "In any event, our client instructs us that they have not consented to refer the matter for adjudication or your appointment as adjudicator. Kindly let us have evidence of the same." [26] The Adjudicator in his letter dated 25.5.2016 replied as follows: 13 “I have considered the submissions and arguments from both parties and I have reached the conclusion that this adjudication proceeding has been validly instituted by the Claimant and that I have been properly appointed as an adjudicator by the KLRCA pursuant to the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPAA). I direct the parties to comply with the procedures and timelines set out under CIPAA”. [27] Apparently learned counsel for the Respondent was not satisfied that the said Adjudicator had been duly appointed by KLRCA and insisted that he must produce evidence of his appointment. The KLRCA had earlier written to the said Adjudicator on his appointment by their letter of 25.4.2016 which letter was copied to both the solicitors for the Claimant as well as to Permintex by both fax, email as well as by courier. The KLRCA had also attached to the said letter the Letter of Acceptance of the said Adjudicator. That is sufficient compliance with section 23(1) by the Director of KLRCA. Section 23(1) CIPAA reads: "The Director of the KLRCA shall appoint an adjudicator under paragraph 21(b) within five working days upon receipt of a request and shall notify the parties and the adjudicator in writing." [28] If the Respondent's solicitors was under the preconceived notion that their consent is necessary for the appointment of the said 14 Adjudicator, then such a notion is misconceived. This was a clear case where the parties could not agree on the appointment of an Adjudicator and what more when the Respondent would not even agree to Adjudication and would have no participation in its proceedings as they insisted that the matter should proceed to litigation. [29] Even with respect to arbitration, the Respondent had not proceeded to issue any Notice to Arbitrate on the Claimant. [30] As for the authority to ask for submission that comes under the vast powers given to an Adjudicator under section 25 CIPAA. He has the power, under section 25(a), to establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties. Under section 25(j) he shall have the powers to issue any direction as may be necessary or expedient. [31] Since the reason given by the Respondent for not submitting to Adjudication was merely that they have not consented to it, there was no necessity for the Adjudicator to reply more than what he had done. There is also no basis for the Respondent to then conclude that by so responding in the Adjudicator's reply, the Adjudicator had demonstrated his biasness in favour of the Claimant. To be fair to the Adjudicator he did not completely shut off the Respondent for in his Order for Direction No.2 dated 25.5.2016 at paragraph 4 thereof he wrote: 15 "4. The Respondent is at liberty to raise further submissions in respect of its position contained in its letters dated 16.05.2196 and 23.05.2016 in the Adjudication Response for my consideration." [32] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that under section 19(1) CIPAA the parties and the Adjudicator shall be free to agree on the terms of appointment of the adjudicator and the fees to be paid to the adjudicator. The submission is that the Respondent had never agreed to the Adjudicator’s appointment and the fees to be paid to him. The Respondent alleged that the requirement of this section appeared to have been bypassed by the Adjudicator. [33] As pointed out the consent of the Respondent to the Adjudication is not necessary, for otherwise all that a non-paying party needs to do is to refuse to consent and the whole scheme of statutory adjudication under CIPAA would be frustrated. As for the non-agreement on fees, section 19(2) CIPAA provides that if the parties and the Adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the Adjudicator, the KLRCA's standard terms of appointment and fees for Adjudicators shall apply. [34] It makes tremendous sense for the KLRCA, as the Adjudication Authority under CIPAA as provided for in section 32 thereof to be responsible under section 32(b) for the determination of the standard terms of appointment of an Adjudicator and fees for the services of an 16 Adjudicator. This the KLRCA had done with the Schedule under Regulation 6 of the Construction Industry Payment & Adjudication Regulations 2014 which is the KLRCA's Standard Fees for Services and Expenses of Adjudicator. [35] The KLRCA Standard Terms of Appointment is found in Schedule II of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure. [36] It does away with the hassle of haggling over terms of appointment and fees and the abuse that may come with it in the non-paying party's reluctance to participate in the Adjudication proceedings by refusing to agree on the terms of appointment of the Adjudicator or his fees or both. Bearing in mind that the Adjudicator appointed by KLRCA has only 10 working days to indicate his acceptance and terms of his appointment, the default Standard Terms of Appointment and Standard Fees make a lot of sense, saving time and energy as in a protracted negotiation over terms and fees of the Adjudicator, not to mention the possible embarrassment that may ensue when a decision maker has to be involved in negotiating his fees with the parties. There is thus absolutely no merits in the allegations of learned counsel for the Respondent that there was a breach of section 23(2) CIPAA in that there was no negotiation on his terms of appointment nor his fees. 17 [37] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that section 19(4) CIPAA has not been complied with by the said Adjudicator in that the Respondent has not received any direction from the Adjudicator on how much fees they should deposit with KLRCA. Again that is not just contradictory to the stand that they have taken but also that the evidence show otherwise. The Notice of Acceptance of the Appointment to Act as Adjudicator was sent by the Adjudicator to the Respondent by registered post, fax and email and paragraph 6 and 7 read as follows: "6. The fees will be based on KLRCA's Standard Fees for Sercices and Expenses of Adjudicator which is set out below: Adjudicator's fees. : RM11,995.72 KLRCA Administrative Fees : RM2,399.14 Total. : RM14,394.86 Add 6% GST. : RM863.69 Total Fees RM15,258.55 7. I further direct the parties to contribute and deposit with the Director of the KLRCA a sum of RM15,258.55 representing a reasonable proportion of the adjudicator's fees and expenses, the KLRCA's administrative fee and any taxes as may be imposed by the Government, in equal share as security in advance within 10 working days from the date of receipt of this notice." 18 [38] Thereafter KLRCA had written to both the Claimant and the Respondent with its invoice seeking the payment of RM7,629.28 from each of the, by its letter of 11.5.2016 pursuant to section 19(4) CIPAA. [39] The Respondent cannot now feign ignorance. Perhaps it was a case of forgetfulness, floundering on fickleness, for the Respondent had, by their letter of 16.5.2016 taken the stand that they would not agree to the Adjudication and neither would they be depositing the fees requested by KLRCA. [40] Likewise the Respondent's allegation that section 24 CIPAA had not been complied with by the said Adjudicator is also not borne out by the evidence. Section 24 states that the Adjudicator shall at the time of the acceptance of appointment as an Adjudicator make a declaration in writing that there is no conflict of interest in respect of his appointment, that he shall act independently, impartially and in a timely manner and avoid incurring unnecessary expense, that he shall comply with the principles of natural justice and there are no circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to the Adjudicator’s impartiality and independence. The said Adjudicator had declared this in the Form 6 which he had sent to the Respondent by his letter dated 9.5.2016 by way of registered post, fax and email. Perhaps it is a case where the 19 Respondent had not handed over to their solicitors all the documents that they had received from both the Adjudicator and KLRCA. [41] The Respondent took umbrage with the said Adjudicator over his letter to the Claimant's solicitors, Messrs Mar & Co, dated 7.6.2016, when the Adjudicator wrote directing that the Claimant do pay on the Respondent's behalf the remaining portion of the advance security deposit of RM7,692.29 to the Director of KLRCA. [42] Learned counsel for the Respondent, Mr Patrick Dass, alleged quite audaciously, that this request that the Claimant do pay the full security deposit (which substantially is the Adjudicator’s fee) and the Claimant gladly paying it on 13.6.2016 gives rise to the probability of the Adjudicator being biased in favor of the Claimant, bearing in mind that the Respondent was, after all, still disputing the Adjudicator's authority to act as adjudicator. This, it was argued by learned counsel, put the said Adjudicator in a position of conflict of interest! [43] I must be forgiven for not been able to follow the flow of argument of learned counsel for the Respondent. [44] Rule 9(4) of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure states as follows: 20 “If any parties fails to make payment within the time ordered by the adjudicator, the adjudicator shall within seven (7) days thereafter issue such direction as he thinks fit including inviting another party or parties to make such payment and notify the Director of the KLRCA accordingly”. [45] The Adjudicator's said letter to Messrs Mar & Co dated 7.6.2016 was copied to the Director of KLRCA and Messrs Patrick Dass & Co by hand, post and fax. [46] Rule 9(4) both empowers and enjoins the Adjudicator to so proceed when there is default in one party to pay its portion of the fees and expenses of the Adjudicator and of the Adjudication. Otherwise a party who is not interested to participate in the Adjudication can simply and surreptitiously stall the Adjudication by refusing to pay the costs of Adjudication. I can neither understand nor appreciate how an Adjudicator in exercising his powers as allowed under Rule 9(4) can be said to be bias in favour of the party that has complied with his directions! [47] Even if it be true that such a payment by the Claimant of the Respondent's portion of its fees would inspire biasness on the part of the Adjudicator in favour of the Claimant , the Respondent can avoid that fear of biasness, by paying his portion of the fees and charges as required under section 19(4) CIPAA. 21 [48] The Respondent's argument becomes more ludicrous when its learned counsel took the view that Rule 9(4) contravenes section 19(4) CIPAA which states that both parties shall contribute and deposit with the Director of KLRCA a reasonable proportion of the fees in equal shares. In effect learned counsel is taking the position that if the Respondent does not pay its portion of the fees then the Adjudicator should not proceed with the Adjudication. It is rather illogical for the Respondent to assert that it must be allowed to pay its portion of the fees and then in the next breath assert that if it does not so pay, the Adjudicator has no right to call on the Claimant to pay. [49] To allow that to happen would be to allow the purpose of CIPAA to be frustrated by defaulting non-paying parties who have every reason to stall an Adjudication so as not to have to make payment of an Adjudicated sum, knowing full well that arbitration or litigation would take time. [50] Little wonder that learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the said Adjudicator had no right to proceed with the Adjudication proceedings until the issue of his appointment and payment of his fees are determined according to the rules of natural justice. [51] It cannot be said that the Claimant gladly paid the Respondent's portion of his contribution to the fees. No one would want to be out of 22 pocket more than is necessary. The Claimant had no choice for if it does not pay then Rule 9(5) would apply for it reads: "In the event full payment of the fees and expenses, including the KLRCA’s administrative fee and any taxes as may be imposed by the Government, are not deposited with the Director of the KLRCA under Section 19(5) of the Act, the adjudicator shall not release the adjudication decision to the parties." [52] If there is any comfort it is that at the end of the day there is some hope of recouping the fees so advanced if the Claimant should succeed in its Payment Claim. Section 18(1) CIPAA provides as follows: "The adjudicator in making the adjudication decision in relation to costs of the adjudication proceedings shall order the costs to follow the event and shall fix the quantum of costs to be paid." [53] It is not correct to say that the Adjudicator must resolve the issue of his appointment before he could proceed with the Adjudication. Where a challenge to the appointment of an Adjudicator is concerned, section 29(3) CIPAA expressly authorised the Adjudicator to proceed and complete the Adjudication. It reads: "Notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, the adjudicator may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings 23 without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28(1)." [54] On 16.6.2016, the Respondent's solicitors wrote to the said Adjudicator requesting for an extension of time to put in the Respondent's Adjudication Response. The application was made pursuant to section 25 CIPAA . Under section 25(p) the Adjudicator has the power to extend any time limit imposed on the parties under CIPAA as may be reasonably required. The Claimant objected to the request by their letter of 17.6.2016. The Claimant pointed out that the last day to file the Adjudication Response was 6.6.2016, i.e. 10 working days from 23.5.2016, the date the Claimant's Adjudication Claim was received by the Respondent. The Claimant's solicitors further stated at paragraph 19 of their letter of 17.6.2016 as follows: "19. The Respondent's request for an extension of time (EOT) today 17.6.2016 (after 11 days from 06.06.2016) will not only prejudice the Claimant's interest and fairness under CIPAA as the Claimant had at all material times, complied with the procedures, timelines, directions as requested by CIPAA and the Adjudicator but also delay the Adjudication Decision on this matter, pursuant to section 12(2)(b) of CIPAA." 24 [55] Section 12(2)(b) CIPAA provides as follows: "Subject to subsection 19(5), the adjudicator shall decide the dispute and deliver the adjudication decision within — ... b) Forty-five working days from the expiry of the period prescribed for the service of the adjudication response if no adjudication response is received; ..." [56] On the next day, via his letter dated 17.6.2016, the Respondent's learned counsel said that the Adjudicator promptly and flatly rejected the request, without asking parties to submit further on the law. [57] Learned counsel for the Respondent further argued that even in a court of law, the Respondent would be allowed to make submissions, but the said Adjudicator chose to give a decision without hearing submissions on law. He argued that there was no prejudice to the proceedings or to the Claimant by granting an extension of time. It was argued that there was still ample time to adjudicate and deliver his decision. Learned counsel for the Respondent castigated the Adjudicator's decision as having deprived the Respondent of the opportunity to be heard and to present their case. It was further submitted that his decision given without 25 hearing the Respondent on arguments of law showed that he was biased in favor of the Claimant. [58] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant, Mr Nandakumar, that the Adjudicator was perfectly entitled to dismiss the Respondent's application under section 25 CIPAA as the application was made only after the deadline for filing the Adjudication Response had expired and that ample time had been given for them to so file their Adjudication Response. The only reason given was that the Respondent was still looking for certain documents required to respond to the claim. [59] I cannot fault the exercise of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator had given cogent reasons for dismissing the application for an extension of time to file the Adjudication Response in its letter of 17.6.2016 to parties' respective solicitors as follows: "4. I am of the view that there was ample time given for the Respondent to examine the Adjudication Claim and prepare its Adjudication Response within the prescribed time under CIPAA or at the very least make its EOT Application before the expiry of the time limited under CIPAA to file the Adjudication Response or within a reasonable time thereafter. I note that the EOT Application was only made after a lapse of 7 working days from the filing deadline of 26 the Adjudication Response. This delay is significant under the framework of CIPAA. 5. I further find that the Respondent's reason for an EOT that it "is still looking for certain documents required to respond to the claim" is grossly inadequate to explain the delay in making an EOT Application within reasonable time. I agree with the Claimant's submissions that the Respondent was afforded every opportunity to comply with the provisions of CIPAA but the Respondent had clearly not done so." [60] At any rate the Respondent had not shown how the decision could well have been different had the relevant documents it had been looking for had been allowed to have been served out of time in the Adjudication Response or that the discretion would have been exercised differently had the Adjudicator had allowed for submission of law. [61] In this respect on the issue of natural justice and fairness rule, Humphrey Lloyd J in Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth London Borough Council [2002] EWHC 597 (TCC), had this advice for us: "29. Nevertheless, in my judgment, … in determining whether a party has been treated fairly or in determining whether the 27 adjudicator has acted impartially, it is very necessary to bear in mind that the point or issue which is to be brought to the attention of the parties must be one of which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant. It is now clear that the construction industry regards adjudication not simply as a staging post towards the final resolution of the dispute in arbitration or litigation but as having in itself considerable weight and impact that in practice goes beyond the legal requirement that the decision has for the time being to be observed. Lack of impartiality or of fairness in adjudication must be considered in that light. It has become all the more necessary that, within the rough nature of the process, decisions are still made in a basically fair manner so that the system itself continues to enjoy the confidence it now has apparently earned. The provisional nature of the decision also justifies ignoring non-material breaches. Such errors, if apparent (as they usually are), will be rectified in any negotiation and settlement based upon the decision. The consequence of material issues and points is that the dispute referred to adjudication will not have been resolved satisfactorily by any fundamental standard and the chances of it providing the basis for a settlement are much less and the chances of it proceeding to arbitration or litigation are much greater however 28 the time limits, the nature of the process and the ultimately non- binding nature of the decision, all mean that the standard required in practice is not that which is expected of an arbitrator. Adjudication is closer to arbitration than an expert determination but it is not the same." (emphasis added) [62] Yet another complaint that there has been a breach of natural justice was that the Adjudicator had not even cared to invite parties for a meeting, to clarify pending issues, to explain the procedure, the timelines, how he would be conducting the proceedings, and to give guidance or directions or to extend any time limit imposed on the parties under CIPAA as may be reasonably required – all of which comes under an adjudicator’s powers under section 25 CIPAA. Instead, it was argued rather seriously and strenuously that he had preferred to take a “short cut” method of corresponding via emails and letters. It was highlighted that the parties had not even met him. Learned counsel for the Respondent continued his ramblings of discontent as follows: "How would the Plaintiff even know that the alleged Mr. Shannon Raj was the Mr. Shannon Raj that he claimed to be? Would it not be fair or courteous for Mr. Raj to at least introduce himself to the parties before starting the adjudication proceedings? After all, he 29 would be paid by them. Parties should at least know the person they are addressing instead of addressing a ‘virtual person’." [63] The Adjudicator had in the Notice of Acceptance of the Appointment to Act as Adjudicator in the prescribed Form 6 under the KLRCA Adjudication Rules & Procedure stated the "Mode of Service:By Fax, E- mail & Post." The solicitors for the Respondent had also communicated with the said Adjudicator via fax, post and email. It is too late in the day to complain of the mode of correspondence between the parties and the Adjudicator when all along during the proceedings, no objection had been raised and indeed parties have followed the said mode of service of documents. [64] The Respondent submitted that CIPAA 2012 does not expressly allow the Adjudicator to conduct proceedings via correspondences, concealed from sight, without hearing the parties or their counsel in person. It was further argued by way of analogy that even a court of law requires parties to appear before it for case management and for trial. [65] The Respondent had via their solicitors’ letter dated 21.6.2016 highlighted all the matters raised above, complaining that the said Adjudicator had acted in a high handed, arbitrary manner, showing biasness in favor of the Claimant and requesting that in the interest of justice and fairness, he immediately should withdraw himself from 30 adjudicating the matter. It was further submitted by the Respondent that the Adjudicator's silence is deafening. [66] The CIPAA confers broad and vast powers on an Adjudicator so that he may proceed with all speed and diligence in arriving at a decision within the tight time frame prescribed. Section 25(a) grants him powers to establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including limiting the submission of documents by the parties. If any party so feel strongly that he should hear witnesses or that a meeting should be called to address certain issues, then that party can always write in to ask him to exercise his powers under section 25(f) with respect to calling meetings with the parties or under section 25(g) to conduct any hearing or under section 25(l) with respect to ordering that any evidence be given on oath. The Adjudicator had issued a total of 4 Orders for Directions to the parties. There is nothing to say that the rules of natural justice is not satisfied if parties are not heard in person. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard in writing, depending on the circumstances of the case, this Court would not set aside an Adjudication Decision on ground that the Adjudicator did not allow an oral hearing to be had. In fact natural justice does not necessarily mean the decision- maker has to meet the parties face to face – "Natural justice does not generally demand orality". See R. (Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd.) v 31 Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] EWCA Civ 329, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 255 at 286, para. 47, C.A. (England & Wales) where it was held as follows: "The submission that a taxpayer or adviser at risk of compulsory disclosure of confidential documents ought to have an opportunity of deflecting the application is at first sight attractive. To see why, one need go no further than Lord Loreburn LC's celebrated remark in Board of Education v Rice [1911] AC 179 that acting in good faith and listening fairly to both sides "is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything". But in the same passage Lord Loreburn made clear, as other judges of high authority have done many times since, that how this is done is in principle a matter for each decision- maker: natural justice does not generally demand orality. And there is a further, small, group of cases, of which Mr Brennan submits this is one, in which the exigencies of the legislative scheme make an inter partes procedure impossible." [67] Even in our country in the context of dismissal of a police officer and the right to be heard under Article 135(2) of the Federal Constitution, it does not mean that there must always be an oral hearing before the dismissal. Article 135(2) reads: 32 "No member of such a service shall be dismissed without being given a reasonable opportunity of being heard." [68] In a case where the dismissed officer does not request for an oral hearing, he cannot later be heard to complain. The Federal Court in Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v Tay Chai Huat [2012] 3 MLJ 149 at page 162, held as follows with respect oral hearing and natural justice: [24] In the instant appeal the plaintiff sought a declaration that his dismissal from the police force is unlawful, null and void and of no effect and that he is still an inspector and entitled to all the salaries, emoluments and benefits due. The trial judge ruled that due to the nature of the disciplinary charges preferred against the plaintiff, the disciplinary authority should have held an oral inquiry and that their failure to do so is a breach of the rules of natural justice. As discussed earlier, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by the defendants. [25] In Utra Badi this court held that the right to be heard given by art 135(2) of the Federal Constitution does not require that the member of the service facing the disciplinary charge be given an oral hearing and it could not be argued that the failure to give that person an oral hearing was a denial of justice. 33 [26] In Vickneswary, this court held as follows: (i) from the provisions of the general orders it is clear that it is never the intention of the legislators that the courts should step into the shoes of the disciplinary authority in deciding whether it was fair to the respondent, ie, the member of service facing the disciplinary charge to have granted him a right to make oral representations or whether he should be given such right although he did not ask for it; (ii) it is clear from the facts that the respondent was given an opportunity to be heard whereby he had given a lengthy written representation explaining in detail his innocence; and (iii) it is not the court, but the disciplinary authority which has to decide the question of whether the respondent had exculpated himself by his written representation. [27] I dare say that the law is settled in cases of this genre. This can be gleaned from several decisions which were decided prior to Utra Badi and Vickneswary, see Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj Kamaruddin v Public Services Commission, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 61, Ghazi bin Mohd Sawi v Mohd Haniff bin Omar, Ketua Polis Negara, Malaysia & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 114, Zainal bin Hashim 34 v Government of Malaysia [1979] 2 MLJ 276 and Najar Singh v Government of Malaysia & Anor [1974] 1 MLJ 138. [28] From the authorities referred to above I am of the view that the law is settled. Thus, an oral hearing may be given in instances where the disciplinary authority considers that the case against the officer requires further clarification and consequently appoint a Committee of Inquiry pursuant to general order 26(5) of the GO (Chapter D). If the disciplinary authority considers that no further clarification is required, I do not think that the officer concerned can insist or demand that a Committee of Inquiry be appointed." [69] Here there was no Payment Response filed and no Adjudication Response filed. There was an open letter dated 1.4.2016 from the Respondent to the Claimant way after the deadline for the Respondent to serve a Payment Response. The Payment Response is to be served within 10 working days of receipt of the Payment Claim on 8.3.2016. In that letter the Respondent stated categorically as follows: "Herewith are the status of the said claim taking into consideration after verification and payment made earlier: Amount Claim : RM379,510.83 Amount after verified : RM 297,187.38 35 Payment on 19/1/16 : RM 50,000.00 Balance : RM247,187.38 (excluding GST)” [70] Though in the same letter the Respondent did raise the issue of deductions and back-charges, these were not properly before the Adjudicator in the form of a Payment Response. The Adjudicator's jurisdiction is confined by section 27(1) CIPAA to the matters raised in the Payment Claim in section 5 and in the Payment Response in section 6. As there is no Payment Response the Respondent is deemed under section 6(4) CIPAA to have disputed the whole of the Payment Claim. The Respondent may still dispute the whole of the Payment Claim by responding to the matters raised by the Claimant in its Adjudication Claim by the Respondent serving its Adjudication Response on time. This the Respondent also had failed to do. There was also no submissions filed by learned counsel for the Respondent as directed by the Adjudicator via his Order for Directions No. 4 dated 8.6.2016 where he had set 17.6.2016 as the date by which submissions were to be filed and and further submissions on costs shall be submitted by 24.6.2016. The Respondent did not request for an oral hearing. 36 [71] In the circumstances it is within the exercise of the broad discretion of the Adjudicator to conduct a documents-only Adjudication without the need to hear oral evidence. [72] I recall the decision of the Court of Appeal Singapore in WY Steel Construction Pte Ltd v Osko Pte Ltd [2013] SGCA 32 where Justice Sundaresh Menon CJ, with respect to compliance by the Adjudicator of the rules of natural justice, had this to say: "40 In our view, none of these provisions either individually or collectively permit an adjudicator to ignore s 15(3). Section 16 sets out generally the rules relating to the commencement of adjudication and the adjudication process. Under s 16(3)(c), an adjudicator must comply with the principles of natural justice; these must include the duty to give the parties adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. However, these rules are always contextual. We have already discussed the centrality of the concept of temporary finality to the adjudication scheme under the Act. A respondent is given a chance to respond to a payment claim by producing, first, a payment response and then (if the claimant proceeds to apply for adjudication of his payment claim) an adjudication response. If he fails to provide a payment response and if, as a result, the adjudicator is mandated not to consider 37 material that he seeks to introduce later, he has not been denied his right and opportunity to be heard. Rather, he has simply chosen not to exercise it and the rules of natural justice cannot then be called in aid. Simply put, in such a scenario, the respondent has had his opportunity, for the purposes of the hearing that culminates in the provisional ruling that has temporary finality, to make his case and he has failed to take that opportunity." (emphasis added) [73] The litany of complaints are baseless and frivolous and to reply the caustic letter of the Respondent's solicitors of 21.6.2016 would be to descend into the arena of dispute which the Adjudicator wisely restrained himself. [74] There is no basis whatsoever for the allegations of a breach of natural justice in the conduct of the Adjudication proceedings or that the conduct of the said Adjudicator was such that he could not be said to have acted independently or impartially. Pronouncement [75] The application of the Respondent to set aside the Adjudication decision is singularly devoid of merits and so I had dismissed the said application with costs of RM10,000.00 to the Claimant. I had 38 correspondingly allowed the Claimant to enforce the Adjudication Decision as if it is a judgment of the Court with costs of RM5,000.00 to the Claimant. Dated: 28 February 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court, Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in OS : Mr Patrick Dass WA-24C-117-10/2016 (Messrs Patrick Dass & Co.) For the Defendant in OS WA-24C-105-10/2016 For the Defendant in OS : Mr Nandakumar A/L S.Haridas WA-24C-117-10/2016 (Messrs J Nee) For the Plaintiff in OS WA-24C-105-10/2016 Date of Decision: 23 November 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22C-2-01/2016

PLAINTIF Bond M & E (KL) Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Isyoda (M) Sdn BhdPIHAK KETIGABrampton Holdings Sdn Bhd

27/02/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a9825092-9d10-4659-8d0f-0b408f9e75b6&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22C-2-01/2016 BETWEEN BOND M & E (KL) SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 188492-W) ... PLAINTIFF AND ISYODA (M) SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 53013-W) ... DEFENDANT AND BRAMPTON HOLDINGS SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 616008-T) ... THIRD PARTY THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] This case explores the question of who a sub-contractor should sue for payment due to it under a Sub-Contract with its main contractor when 2 there is a separate agreement between the main contractor and its employer that the employer would pay the sub-contractor direct. The sub- contractor is not a party to that agreement between the main contractor and its employer. There has been some previous direct payments from the employer to the sub-contractor. [2] Here we have a curious case where when sued by the Plaintiff for an amount not disputed, the Defendant is saying they are not liable because the Third Party should be paying under the contract between the Defendant and the Third Party and the Third Party is pushing it back to the Defendant saying that they are not liable to pay as the Defendant has breached the Settlement Agreement between them and the Defendant! The Project and the Parties [3] On 7.2.2007, the Plaintiff, as sub-contractor, was awarded a contract by the Defendant, as main contractor, for Electrical Services in respect of a project known as “Cadangan Pembangunan Enterprise Komersial Dan Perdagangan (Parcel B) Yang Mengandungi: i) ‘Retail’, ‘Supermarket’, ‘Foodcourt’ & ‘Cafe’, ‘Techno Centre’ dan ‘Mega Tutorial’ di Tingkat Sub Basement hingga Tingkat 7, ii) Pangsapuri Servis, iii) Hostel, iv) Tempat Letak Kereta di Tingkat Basement dan Sub Basement di Atas Sebahagian 3 Lot 365, 262 dan 174, Seksyen 92, Jalan LokeYew Kuala Lumpur-Zon. e@ Fraser.Biz.Park” (“the said Project”) according to the terms contained therein for the total contract sum of RM11,742,471.00 (“the Sub-Contract”). [4] Earlier on 27.11.2006, the Third Party had awarded the main contract to the Defendant as the turnkey (design & build) contractor. The contract document between the Third Party and the Defendant was executed on 11.12.2006 (collectively referred as the “Main Contract”). [5] For ease of reference, consistency and where relevant, the Plaintiff shall also be referred to as “Bond”, the Defendant as “Isyoda” and the Third Party as “Brampton”. [6] Subsequent to the said Sub-Contract and from time to time, Isyoda also issued variation orders and instructed Bond to proceed with additional works in respect of the Sub-Contract for the amount stated in each variation order based on the instructions of the client in the said Project, Brampton. The total amount of the variation orders in the Sub-Contract is RM1,944,543.54 (“the said Variation Orders”). As a result, the total Sub- Contract sum was revised from RM11,742,471.00 to RM13,687,014.54 (“the Final Contract Sum”). 4 [7] The electrical system was duly handed over by Bond to Brampton on 23.9.2010. Bond's letter dated 27.9.2010 referred to that and Isyoda had also confirmed the same with Brampton via its letter dated 30.9.2010. Based on the agreement between the parties, the maintenance period for Bond’s works commenced on 23.9.2010 and expired on 22.3.2012. [8] Brampton issued a statement of partial possession dated 6.10.2010 confirming that all works carried out by Isyoda in the said Project including the electrical system works carried out by Bond pursuant to the Sub- Contract has been completed and handed over (except for one lot of external car park at Grid 11 under the Defendant’s job scope) to Brampton. This was also communicated by Isyoda to the Bond via its letter dated 1.8.2011. [9] Simply put, Bond had fulfilled its obligations under the Maintenance Period (Defect Liability Period) pursuant to the Sub-Contract. On 18.10.2012, Isyoda prepared and forwarded the Final Account and the relevant Statutory Declaration to be executed by Bond. Bond duly executed both the Final Account and the Statutory Declaration and returned the same to Isyoda via its letter on 19.10.2012. 5 [10] According to the Final Account and Statutory Declaration, it was confirmed that the sum of RM2,521,043.96 was still owing by Isyoda under the Sub-Contract. [11] By way of introduction, it should also be mentioned here that Isyoda awarded a Sub-Contract to GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd (“GAE”) for the Project’s air-conditioning and ventilation system (“ACVS”) works via a letter of award dated 7.2.2007 (“GAE’s Sub-Contract”). The ACVS is also referred to as the ACMV i.e. air-conditioning and mechanical ventilation system in some documents exhibited. This will feature in the discussion with respect to the claim by Isyoda under the indemnity agreement with Brampton. Prayers [12] On 19.8.2011, 29.1.2012 and 26.11.2014, Bond received part payments in the sum of RM800,000.00, RM400,000.00 and RM50,000.00, direct from Brampton, leaving a total balance outstanding sum of RM1,271,043.96 which remains unpaid by Isyoda. Bond as Plaintiff, sued Isyoda as Defendant, for the said sum together with interest and costs. 6 [13] The Defendant denied the claim, contending that there was a “Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement” between the all the three parties where Bond will be paid by Brampton directly. [14] The Defendant also commenced Third Party proceedings against the Third Party to seek an indemnity from the Third Party under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. [15] The Defendant brought in Brampton as Third Party, claiming an indemnity under the following agreements entered into between them subsequent to the completion of the Project: 1. Supplemental Agreement (Issues) dated 15.6.2011; See: pages 89-133 of CBOD1 2. Supplemental Agreement (M&E) dated 15.6.2011; See: pages 134-139 of CBOD1 3. Settlement Agreement dated 4.2.2013. See: pages 140-146 of CBOD1 7 [16] Isyoda as Defendant, prayed for the following against Brampton as Third Party: a) An order for indemnity of the sum of RM1,271,043.96 or any sum that the Court orders to be paid to the Plaintiff; b) Alternatively, an order that the sum of RM1,271,043.96 (or any part thereof) to be paid by the Third party to the Plaintiff; c) An order for indemnity for interest that the Courts orders to be paid to the Plaintiff; d) An order for indemnity of costs that the Court orders to paid to the Plaintiff; e) An order for indemnity on any other monetary relief that the Court orders to be paid to the Plaintiff; f) Interest at the rate of 5% per annum on any sum that the Third Party fails to pay to the Defendant pursuant to the order made herein; g) Costs of the Third Party proceeding; h) Any further relief and other relief that the Court deems fit to grant. 8 Principles Whether there is a Direct Dealing and Payment Agreement between Bond, Isyoda and Brampton whereby Isyoda no longer has the obligation to make payment to Bond under the said Sub-Contract (“Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement issue”) [17] It was argued on behalf of Isyoda that the said “Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement” among Bond, Isyoda and Brampton was such that: a) Brampton would deal directly with Bond thereby releasing and discharging Isyoda’s obligations in respect of the Sub-Contract; and b) Brampton would pay Bond directly thereby releasing and discharging Isyoda’s obligation to pay Bond. [18] Isyoda had relied on the following documents and events to support its alleged “Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement”: a) direct handover by Bond to Brampton in relation to the works completed under the Sub-Contract; b) Supplemental Agreement dated 15.6.2011; 9 c) Bond’s letters dated 16.8.2011 and 17.8.2011 requesting, inter alia, for direct payment from Brampton; d) Brampton’s direct payments of RM800,000, RM400,000 and RM50,000 to Bond; e) Assignment Agreement prepared by Bond; f) the Settlement Agreement between Isyoda and Brampton dated 4.2.2013. [19] Learned counsel for Bond, Mr Deepak Mahadevan, argued that Isyoda’s contention is misplaced. With respect to the direct handover by Bond to Brompton, I agree that it was done with the consent of Isyoda. There was a letter from Isyoda to Help University dated 22.9.2010, copied to Bond, wherein Isyoda states that it is agreeable to the request for temporary power supply to Help University, subject to Bond’s consent. [20] On the same day, Isyoda notified Bond that since the Project is now handed over to Brampton, the electrical services/systems are still contractually under the custody and maintenance of Bond. As a result, Isyoda gave Bond the liberty to impose conditions to safeguard its interest. 10 [21] Under the circumstances it was reasonable for Bond to take Isyoda’s letter dated 22.9.2010 to mean that consent was given by Isyoda for Bond to handover its works directly to Brampton. As a consequence, Bond proceeded to hand over the electrical system to Brampton on 23.9.2010 under the supervision of Mr. CP Lee, a representative of Isyoda. This was notified to Isyoda via Bond’s letter dated 27.9.2010. [22] There is no basis for Isyoda's allegation that Bond bypassed Isyoda and directly handed over its works to Brampton. Not only was Isyoda involved in the handover, it also provided its consent for Bond to handover its works directly to Brampton. [23] I agree with learned counsel for Bond that Isyoda's reliance on 2 separate agreements to support their contention of the so-called “Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement” i.e. the Supplemental Agreement and Settlement Agreement, is also missing the mark. [24] To begin with, the Supplemental Agreement and Settlement Agreement is between Isyoda and Brampton. Bond is not a party. Whilst such an agreement may confer a benefit to Bond, it does not allow Bond to sue for that benefit under the Agreements to which Bond is not a party. 11 Bond would still have to look to its contracting party Isyoda to demand for payments. [25] In fact a similar matter had come before our High Court involving the Defendant here. In the case of Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 10 MLJ 635, the High Court had decided on a similar project involving another sub-contractor against Isyoda. The factual substratum is the same, involving the same Supplemental Agreement and Settlement Agreement. In that case, Isyoda also attempted to escape liability by suggesting that the direct payment clause in the Settlement Agreement discharged Isyoda from its obligations to pay the sub-contractor and that it was Brampton who has to pay the sub- contractor. [26] Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) had no difficulty untying the knot of legal relationships and placing the legal obligation to pay on the rightful contracting party. She observed as follows: “[61] It is equally obvious from the SA that it is an agreement that does not involve Sigma. By no means is it a tripartite agreement between the three parties before the court where it was agreed that Sigma is to be paid directly by Brampton. It is 12 simply an agreement reached between Isyoda and Brampton for the purpose of a ‘global’ settlement of the then pending disputes between the parties. The parties did not include Sigma directly as a contracting party. Nevertheless, it affects Sigma indirectly as a party who would stand to benefit, as the SA does provide for direct payments to Sigma for work it has done. [62] Be that as it may, the existence of the SA does not absolve Isyoda from its obligations to pay Sigma for work done under the subcontract. For that, Isyoda remains very much liable under the subcontract to pay Sigma for work that Sigma has completed." (emphasis added) [27] Our present position is no different. Back to basics, the rule of privity of contracts dictate that only parties to a contract may sue and be sued contractually. Even if a benefit is conferred on a non-party, that non-party cannot sue unless made a party in a tripartite agreement where the initial obligation of Isyoda to pay Bond is now taken over by Brampton with the corresponding rights of Brampton to sue Bond for any defective works during the Defect Liability Period. 13 [28] If authorities are needed one can refer to the Court of Appeal case of Tsang Yee Kwan v Majlis Perbandaran Batu Pahat [2011] 8 CLJ 913 at p 914 where it was reiterated as follows: "The doctrine of privity established that only parties to a contract incurred rights and obligations under the contract. Third parties could not sue or be sued under a contract." [29] Likewise the Court of Appeal in Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd v Dynaforce Corporation Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 CLJ 533 at p 561 said: "Bluntly put only the parties to the contract have enforceable rights and obligations under the contract. As an established principle of contract law, the common law doctrine of privity of contract stands for the simple proposition that, 'no one but the parties to a contract can be bound by it or be entitled under it.'” [30] I agree with the Plaintiff that the Defendant had been selective in its reliance on Bond’s letters dated 16.8.2011 and 17.8.2011 to support its alleged Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement. On 16.8.2011, Bond merely made a request to Isyoda for direct payment from Brampton. This request was rejected by Isyoda via its letter dated 17.8.2011. 14 [31] There were 2 further letters by Bond to Isyoda dated 17.8.2011 and 23.8.2011. In these letters, Bond referred to the Supplemental Agreement which was extended to them and stated that it will deal directly with Brampton and claim for direct payment from Brampton. Both letters by Bond were replied by Isyoda via its letters dated 18.8.2011 and 24.8.2011, as follows: Isyoda’s letter dated 18.8.2011 reads: “…the subcontract above is still binding between Bond M&E (KL) Sdn Bhd and Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd as far as above subcontract work is concerned.” Isyoda’s letter dated 24.8.2011 reads: “…We reiterate that the subcontract between you and us is still binding and enforceable.” [32] As a result of the above letters from Isyoda, Bond could hardly be faulted for accepting and respecting Isyoda’s position and for proceeding to claim all outstanding sums from Isyoda. Acting consistently throughout, after Isyoda’s last letter dated 24.8.2011 stating its position that the Sub- Contract remains binding, Bond continued to pursue its claim directly from 15 Isyoda vide its letters to Isyoda dated 18.4.2012 and 24.4.2102 for the outstanding sums under the Project. [33] Throughout this period, Isyoda never once informed Bond that it was not liable to pay under the Sub-Contract at the material time. The first time a contrary intention was communicated by Isyoda to Bond was on 21.11.2014 where Isyoda took the position that they are not liable to pay Bond under the Settlement Agreement. [34] In reply, Bond stated via its letter dated 19.12.2014 to Isyoda that it is not privy to the Settlement Agreement and Bond maintains that Isyoda remains their contracting party. There was no reply by Isyoda to this letter. [35] In its defence, Isyoda had sought to rely on the direct payments made by Brampton to Bond to establish the alleged “Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement”. [36] To be clear, there had been 2 direct payments made by Brampton to Bond i.e. RM800,000.00 on 19.8.2011 and RM400,000.00 on 29.1.2012. Even when these payments were made, it was made by cheques payable to Bond but handed over to the Isyoda for it to in turn transmit it to Bond. There was subsequently another payment of RM50,000.00 from Brampton to Bond on 26.11.2014. I agree that these direct payments do not 16 corroborate Isyoda’s alleged Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement for the following reasons: a) Brampton’s main contract conditions (incorporated in the Sub- Contract) allows Brampton to make direct payment to Bond under clause 30A of the Main Contract Conditions; b) Bond continued to demand and pursue its claim against Isyoda even after receiving direct payments from Brampton; c) Section 2(d) of the Contracts Act 1950 allows for consideration to come from a third party. [37] Clause 30A.1 of the Main Contract conditions provides as follows: “30A.1 If the Contractor fails to make payment due to any of his sub- contractor for works properly executed in respect of this Contract, the Employer, having reasonably satisfied himself that the Contractor is in default of such payment, is entitled (but not obliged) to make all payments direct to such sub-contractor of all or any amounts due or which may subsequently become due to the sub-contractor… 17 30A.2 The exercise of the entitlement under this clause 30A.1 shall not create any privity of contract between the Employer and the sub-contractor nor shall it in any respect relieve or absolve the Contractor from any obligations or liabilities under or in connection with this Contract” (emphasis added) [38] This clause 30A of the Main Contract conditions also forms part of the Sub-Contract. This was also confirmed by DW1 during cross examination. It was also established during cross examination of TPW2, that Brampton had exercised its rights to make direct payments of RM800,000.00 on 19.8.2011 and RM400,000.00 on 29.1.2012 pursuant to the Supplementary Agreement which is read together with clause 30A of the Main Contract Conditions. [39] As for section 2(d) Contracts Act 1950, it was explained by the Court of Appeal in Boustead Naval Shipyard Sdn Bhd v Dynaforce Corp Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 MLJ 284 that it merely provides that consideration for a promise may move from the promisee or any other party. Hence, the fact that Brampton has made payments to Bond does not make them a contracting party as Isyoda have alleged. 18 [40] As for the draft Assignment Agreement which Isyoda asked Bond to prepare on or around 11.10.2012, with respect to a release and waiver whereby Bond will release Isyoda from all and any liability under the Sub- Contract in return for payment from Brampton, that remained unsigned. [41] Bond was not agreeable to this draft release and waiver. As a result, Bond prepared another Assignment Agreement and forwarded the same to Isyoda on 19.10.2012 and requested for the same to be returned. To date, the said Assignment Agreement has not been signed or executed by both Isyoda and Brampton i.e. assignor and assignee. I agree with learned counsel for the Plaintiff that there was no concluded contract between all parties regarding the said Assignment Agreement (Kopeks Holdings Sdn Bhd v Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd [2012] 4 MLJ 337). The Court cannot cannot infer or ink an agreement for the parties when they could not agree on the terms no matter how close they were to achieving a consensus-ad- idem! Either there is a concluded agreement involving all three parties or there is none. Here there is none. [42] There was no further performance of the contract according to the terms that could not be agreed. Again, the dicta of Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in the Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 10 MLJ 635 case bears repetition: 19 “[46] It is obvious that the letter of release and waive bears only the signature of Sigma. Both Brampton and Isyoda did not sign the letter. Isyoda argues that its signature is immaterial or unnecessary whereas Sigma says otherwise. [47] In my judgment, the affixing of a signature by the contracting party is important and material as it signifies agreement and commitment to the terms as appearing in the relevant document upon which the signature appears… [48] When Sigma signed the letter of release and waiver, it was on Isyoda’s assurance that it would form a tripartite agreement. Isyoda was to procure Brampton’s signature on that letter of release and waiver… [49] Sigma’s particular requirement of a tripartite agreement is not a bare averment but, a real and substantial defence…At that meeting the minutes of which can be found at p. 575 of CBD 3, it is recorded that a tripartite agreement was initially proposed to formalize the direct payments to some of the M&E subcontractors, which would include Sigma. This proposal was subsequently dropped and replaced by the settlement agreement found at p. 539 CBD 3. I must 20 immediately reject any suggestion that the settlement agreement signed one a half years after Sigma had signed the letter of release and waiver is the tripartite agreement that the parties, especially Sigma, required from Isyoda.” (emphasis added) Whether the conduct of the Plaintiff, Defendant and Third Party was such that the Plaintiff is estopped from denying the existence of a Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement [43] Isyoda took the position that it was just a conduit to facilitate the payment of monies for work done directly from Brampton to Bond and that Bond was effectively dealing with Brampton direct. In effect Isyoda is saying that it was an unnecessary appendix in the implementation of the contract until completion. [44] It even pointed out to the fact that the Sub-Contract price and details were pre-agreed between Bond and Brampton before Isyoda came into the picture. This, Isyoda explained, was why Bond was willing to accept the payment term stated in the Sub-Contract. [45] I must say that this is not borne out by the evidence adduced. There was clear evidence of the quotation from Bond to Isyoda on 22.12.2006 where reference was made to Bond’s letter dated 22.11.2006 21 and the discussion between DW1 and Bond’s representative on 21.12.2006. [46] Further to that, Bond wrote another letter on 28.12.2006 to revise its Schedule of prices in line with Isyoda’s requirement. Subsequent thereto, the Sub-Contract was issued by Isyoda on 7.2.2007. [47] From the evidence adduced, the negotiations and pricing of the Sub-Contract was discussed between Bond and Isyoda. Brampton was not involved in this negotiations. In fact, there is not a single evidence led by Isyoda to show any correspondence between Bond and Brampton prior to the Sub-Contract. [48] During trial, DW1 was not able to show any evidence that Brampton negotiated directly with Bond on the Sub-Contract price or other terms. Thus, Isyoda's contention regarding any alleged pre-existing relationship between Bond and Brampton before the Sub-Contract remained unproven. Even if it be true, it does not and cannot alter the contractual relationship contained in the Sub-Contract between Isyoda and Bond. Surely Isyoda cannot have consented to assuming liabilities without corresponding gain as it was not doing charity work but rather entering into a construction contract with corresponding risks and rewards. 22 [49] Isyoda further submitted that Bond took instructions from one Mr. CP Lee during the construction project which is evidence of the direct dealing between Bond and Brampton. I agree with the Plaintiff that this argument is misplaced for following reasons: a) All correspondence and dealings were only between Bond and Isyoda throughout the construction project. This is evidenced via the exchange of letters between the parties. b) There is evidence that Mr. CP Lee was appointed by Isyoda in 2 Letters of Appointment from Isyoda. Hence, for all intents and purposes, Mr CP Lee who held himself out as the Project Manager of Isyoda, was acting for Isyoda during the implementation stage. c) There were numerous correspondence and dealings between Bond and Isyoda only both prior to, during and even after the construction as seen in the following letters: i) Bond’s letter dated 22.12.2006 to Isyoda regarding pricing (Pre-contract) ii) Bond’s letter dated 28.12.2006 to Isyoda regarding pricing (Pre-contract) 23 iii) Bond’s site memo to Isyoda dated 26.10.2008 regarding CPC outstanding issue (Implementation Stage) iv) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 31.12.2009 regarding non- completion of works (Implementation Stage) v) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 18.1.2010 regarding variation order (Implementation Stage) vi) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 7.7.2010 regarding work progress certification and payment (Implementation Stage) vii) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 21.7.2010 regarding demand for progress payment (Implementation stage) viii) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 27.9.2010 regarding handover of works (Implementation Stage) ix) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 19.1.2011 regarding final account (Post Completion Stage) x) Bond’s letter to Isyoda dated 24.7.2013 regarding statement of final account (Post Completion Stage) [50] The above letters show that Bond has dealt only with Isyoda in relation to its scope of works under the Sub-Contract. In fact, during cross 24 examination of DW1, these letters were referred to him and he confirmed the following: “DPM : Ok. Mr Tan, I’ve shown you a total of nine letters. There are many more letters. I’m not going to go on to all the letters. Alright. These letters were issued from Bond to Isyoda prior to the letter of award, after the letter of award, during the execution of the project, handover of the electrical works and also regarding the final account. All these letters were issued during this period from Bond to Isyoda. Correct? TAN: Yes, correct. DPM : And during this period, there is no letter in the bundle directly between Bond to Brampton. TAN: Correct.” [51] To a question from the Court, the following was also agreed by DW1: "YA: So, from 2006 up 2013, there were direct dealings between Plaintiff and Defendant by exchange of letters. No letters issued by Plaintiff to Third Party for this period. So, you agree? 25 TAN: No letters, I agree, My Lord.” [52] Based on the above, it can confidently and comfortably be said that there is no basis for Isyoda to say that Bond received instructions from Brampton directly during the implementation stage. In fact, the written correspondence shows otherwise and as admitted by DW1 above, there is no written correspondence between Bond and Brampton during this period. [53] The fact of direct handing over of the Plaintiff's completed works to Brampton does not derogate from the fact of the binding contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant and as the Defendant had consented to the direct handing over, it cannot now be a cause of complaint. [54] Even with respect to post-completion conduct, the relevant letters from Bond dated 16.8.2011, 17.8.2011 and 23.8.2011 referred by Isyoda in their submission were replied by Isyoda. In all its reply letters, Isyoda had rejected Bond’s request for direct payment and maintained that the Sub-Contract remains binding and enforceable. Isyoda’s last letter stating the same was dated 24.8.2011 and there was no further correspondence by Isyoda to state otherwise. As for the Assignment Agreement, there was no conclusion to this Agreement and both Isyoda and Brampton 26 never executed this agreement. [55] Even Bond’s last letter dated 19.12.2014 to Isyoda states that the Sub-Contract between Isyoda and Bond remain binding. DW1 admitted that there was no reply and thereafter, agreed that the Sub-Contract remains binding and enforceable. I agree with the Plaintiff that even by looking at the conduct of the parties and especially that between Bond and Isyoda, one cannot say that there was a Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement. [56] One must hearken to the guidance provided by the Federal Court in the case of Tractors Malaysia Bhd v Kumpulan Pembinaan Malaysia Sdn Bhd 1 MLJ 129 at page 130 para C where it was held that: “In dealing with the issue before us, we bear in mind the following: Where a contract has been reduced to writing, “it is in the writing that we must look for the whole of the terms made between the parties.” Per Viscount Haldane LC in Dunlop v Selfridges at page 854. And in such a circumstance, section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 does not enable any party to that agreement to lead evidence 27 contradicting varying adding to or subtracting from its terms” [57] I agree with the Plaintiff that although the proviso to section 92 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides that evidence to show the existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract is permissible, this is not applicable here considering that Isyoda attempts to lead evidence which is a combination of either isolated letters by Bond taken out of context or Agreements not concluded between the parties to support its frivolous Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement. [58] I would hold that even by conduct of the parties, it could not be inferred that the Plaintiff had agreed to a Direct Dealing & Payment Agreement with the Third Party and if at all estoppel does apply, it is that the Defendant is estopped from contending that there was such an Agreement, absolving them from liability to pay under the Sub-Contract with the Plaintiff. [59] This Court agreed with Bond’s contention that Isyoda ought to be estopped from claiming it is not liable to pay Bond under the Sub-Contract. At all material times, Isyoda had in writing and by conduct, represented that the Sub-Contract is binding and enforceable (Boustead Trading (1985) 28 Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 4 CLJ 283). There is no place for Isyoda to blow hot and cold. Whether clause 2.0 of the Sub-Contract regarding payment to Bond being made within 14 days upon receipt of the same by Isyoda from Brampton is void pursuant to section 35 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA")? (“Enforceability of Back to back clause”) [60] Isyoda appears to rely on the back to back payment clause contained in the said Sub-Contract to avoid liability to pay, namely: “2.0 Payment Terms Progress payments will be made to the sub-contractor within fourteen (14) days upon receipt of the same from the client ...” [61] The Plaintiff tried to rely on section 35 CIPAA to support the argument that the above clause is in the nature of a conditional payment clause and is thus void. Section 35(2) reads as follows: "For the purposes of the said section, it is a conditional payment when the obligation of one party to make payment is conditional upon that party having received payment from a third party.” 29 [62] Although CIPAA 2012 came in force on 15.4.2014, it was submitted by learned counsel for the Plaintiff that the said Act has retrospective effect considering the express wordings of the sections 2, 3 and 41 of CIPAA. [63] Further, it was argued for the Plaintiff that the High Court in Uda Holdings Bhd v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor and Another case [2015] 5 CLJ 527 has held that CIPAA 2012 has retrospective effect. Upon appeal, this decision has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal on 13.7.2015. [64] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff then concluded it would mean section 35 of CIPAA 2012 would render clause 2.0 of the said Sub-Contract as void. Therefore, it was argued, Isyoda cannot rely on the back to back clause contained in the said Sub-Contract to avoid liability to make payment of the outstanding sum owing to Bond. [65] However it is clear from section 35(2) CIPAA that such a clause is void only for the purposes of the said section; in other words it is only void for the purpose of Adjudication. If Parliament had wanted the prohibition to be of general application in the construction industry, it would have amended the Contracts Act 1950 and not confine and restrict its operation to statutory Adjudication under CIPAA. 30 [66] Isyoda appears to be taking an inconsistent position. On the one hand, it argued that it is not liable to pay until it receives payment from Brampton. On the other hand, Isyoda relies on the Settlement Agreement to say it is no longer liable to pay Bond. [67] By virtue of the Settlement Agreement which was entered into between Isyoda and Brampton on 4.2.2013 (6 years after the Sub-Contract with Bond), Isyoda and Brampton agreed in clause 11 of the Settlement Agreement that Brampton would make direct payments to Bond. This would mean that Isyoda would never receive any further payments from Brampton as of 4.2.2013 onwards. Surely both main contractor and employer cannot enter into an arrangement where the sub-contractor would not be paid at all in that the main contractor would be permitted to say "I don't have to pay you because I've not been paid," and the employer saying to the sub-contractor that "You won't be paid because I'm not going to pay the main contractor and you cannot sue me either because though I agreed with the main contractor to pay you direct, there is no contract between you and me!" It is a case of head I win and tail you lose. It can be graphically encapsulated in the Malay proverb of two elephants disputing with each other and fighting it out and in the meanwhile the mouse deer dies in the middle! 31 [68] Therefore, its reliance on the back to back clause in the Sub-Contract is self-contradictory and should be struck down. [69] A similar dilemma was presented in Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 10 MLJ 635 where the High Court held that Isyoda cannot hold on to both arguments which were inconsistent to one another. Even assuming that the said clause is binding, it certainly does not absolve the Defendant Isyoda from paying especially when the Plaintiff has completed its work and the Project too is completed. [70] This argument appears to be a rehashed argument from Sigma Elevator (M) Sdn Bhd v Isyoda (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [2016] 10 MLJ 635 where the High Court held as follows: “(2) The issue or defence of pay when paid under the subcontract was not available to Isyoda. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Isyoda will never be paid by Brampton for work done by Sigma since Brampton was to pay Sigma directly whereas the argument of a back to back agreement was that Isyoda will only pay Sigma when it was paid by Brampton.” (emphasis added) 32 [71] I agree with the Plaintiff that by virtue of its Settlement Agreement between Isoda and Brampron, Isyoda cannot now rely on the enforceability of its back to back clause. Whether Bond’s claim for the sum of RM1,271,043.96 or any part thereof is time barred under section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953? (“Limitation Issue”) [72] Isyoda had stated in its defence that Bond’s claim is partially time barred. However, no evidence was led at trial to establish its contention. [73] I agree with the Plaintiff that there is merit in invoking Section 26(2) of the Limitation Act 1953 provides that: “Where any right of action has accrued to recover any debt or other liquidated pecuniary claim, or any claim to the personal estate of a deceased person or to any share or interest therein, and the person liable or accountable therefor acknowledges the claim or makes any payment in respect thereof, the right shall be deemed to have accrued on and not before the date of the acknowledgment or the last payment” [74] It is not disputed that Isyoda prepared and forwarded the Statement of Final Account to the Plaintiff on or around October 2012. Subsequently, 33 Isyoda executed the said Statement of Final Acount on 19.10.2012 which confirms the total outstanding balance of RM2,521,043.96 under the Sub- Contract. Hence, the signed Final Account by Isyoda amounts to an acknowledgment of Bond’s claim pursuant to section 26(2) of the Limitation Act 1953. [75] Further, PW1 also confirmed that the last payment received from Isyoda was via cheque no. 354669 dated 1.6.2010 which was cleared into Bond’s accounts on 7.6.2010. This was payment made by Isyoda towards Isyoda’s interim payment certificate no.24 which was the last certificate Bond received from Isyoda. Therefore time would also deem to have run from the date of the last payment by Isyoda on 7.6.2010 and considering that Bond’s action herein was filed in January 2016, it was filed well within time. [76] I agree that Isyoda’s contention that Bond’s claim is partially time barred is without any basis. Perhaps realizing this, there was no submission forthcoming on this issue from Isyoda. [77] I would for the reasons given above grant judgment for the sum claimed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant together with interests and costs. 34 Whether the Third Party can disclaim liability under their indemnity given to the Defendant [78] The Defendant submitted that in the event that it is liable to pay the Plaintiff, then the Third Party ought to indemnify the Defendant for whatever amount that the Court orders the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff, including all interests and costs. [79] I agree that the Defendant’s claim for an indemnity from the Third Party against the Plaintiff's claim is straightforward. It is based on Clause 12 of the Settlement Agreement, which reads: “12. Brampton shall indemnify and save harmless Isyoda from all and any claims made by the M&E Subcontractors, CP Consultants Pte. Ltd. or any of them whatsoever and howsoever. However, the liability under this clause in respect of claims made by the M&E Subcontractors and CP Consultants Pte. Ltd. shall be limited to those amounts respectively remaining due to them as stated in clause 11 above.” See: page 145 of CBOD1 [80] In this connection, Clause 11 of the Settlement Agreement is also relevant for it provides that: 35 “11. Brampton shall directly liaise with the M&E Subcontractors and CP Consultants Pte. Ltd. with a view to rectifying those defects in respect of the M&E Works of the Project and shall make direct payment to them of those sums remaining due under the M&E Subcontracts and the Consultancy Contracts as follows: … (c) the sum of RM2,521,043.96 due to Bond M&E (KL) Sdn Bhd;” See: page 145 of CBOD1. [81] It is not in dispute that the Settlement Agreement is a valid and binding contract between the Defendant and the Third Party. The provisions of Clauses 11 and 12 are clear and the present claim by the Plaintiff against the Defendant clearly falls within that. Clause 11 is clear in that the Third Party has a contractual duty under the Settlement Agreement to make direct payment to the Plaintiff for the sum of RM2,521,043.96. It is also clear that the amount of RM1,271,043.96 claimed by the Plaintiff against the Defendant in this action was part of the RM2,521,043.96 that the Third Party was liable to pay the Plaintiff under the Settlement Agreement. Once the direct payment of RM1,250,000.00 had been taken into account, then it would arrive at the exact amount of RM1,271,043.06 that the Plaintiff is claiming now. 36 [82] I would agree with learned counsel for the Defendant, Mr Choon Hon Leng, that had the Third Party honoured its obligation under Clause 11 and paid the Plaintiff, then this action would not have been initiated at all as it would have been totally unnecessary. [83] The Defendant had succinctly stated that the Third Party’s defence actually only has one point i.e. the Third Party claimed that the Defendant was in breach of the Settlement Agreement due to the Defendant’s alleged failure to take action against another M&E sub-contractor GAE Technical Services Sdn Bhd (“GAE”) in respect of defects in air-conditioning and mechanical ventilation work (“ACMV Works”). That the Third Party claimed was a breach by the Defendant that releases the Third Party from any obligation to pay the Plaintiff under its indemnity obligation under Clause 12 of the Settlement Agreement. [84] However there is already an action in the Sessions Court between GAE as Plaintiff and Isyoda as Defendant with Brampton as Third Party. Almost concurrently with the present action, GAE has filed a similar action against the Defendant at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court Suit No. WA- B52C-9-01/2016 (“Existing GAE Action”). The Defendant has similarly taken third party proceedings against the Third Party. 37 See: pleadings filed by the parties at pages 650-665, 668-703, 704-720, 721-741 of CBOD4 and pages 742-795, 796-828, 829-846 of CBOD5 [85] In that action, based on the same allegation of defects in GAE’s Works, particularly on the temperature issue, the Third Party claimed that the Defendant was in breach of the Settlement Agreement and hence sought an order from the Sessions Court compelling the Defendant to take action against GAE in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. See: Third Party’s Counterclaim against the Defendant at pages 742-795 of CBOD5, particularly pages 789-795 [86] I can appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the Defendant that, if the Sessions Court in the Existing GAE Action allows the Third Party’s counterclaim against the Defendant, then the Third Party’s complaint here i.e. failure by the Defendant to take action against GAE would have been fully remedied. [87] If the Third Party was able to prove that the Defendant was in fact in breach of the Settlement Agreement due to failure to take action against GAE, then the Third Party would be entitled to the remedy that it prayed for in the Existing GAE Action. 38 [88] When such relief is given, then the Defendant could no longer be said to be in breach of the Settlement Agreement, in which case the Third Party’s defence in this action must fall. [89] If the Third Party is not able to prove that there was a breach by the Defendant and the Sessions Court in the Existing GAE Action does not grant the Third Party the reliefs that it prayed for, then it just shows that the Third Party’s allegations are unsustainable. [90] The Third Party cannot use the same “breach” twice. The Third Party had elected to raise a counterclaim in the Existing GAE Action to seek its full remedy. [91] I agree with the Defendant that in the circumstances, the defence raised by the Third Party in this action can be safely disregarded and struck out by this Court since the substantive merits of such defence and the consequential relief is now properly within the purview and jurisdiction of another Court of competent jurisdiction. [92] In this connection, GAE is also a party in the Existing GAE Action and nobody is in a better position than GAE to answer to the allegations of defects in GAE’s Works. This Court does not have the benefit of GAE’s evidence but the Sessions Court in the Existing GAE Action has. Premised 39 on the above, this Court should decline deciding on the issue of defects in GAE works and any allegation of breach arising from such matter. Such matter should be properly left with the Sessions Court in the Existing GAE Action to decide. [93] Learned counsel for the Third Party, Miss Chong Poh Ken, argued that this Court, being a High Court, should decide on whether the Defendant has breached the Settlement Agreement by not taking action against GAE and that such a decision would be binding on the Sessions Court in the Existing GAE Action. I do not think that this is an issue that can be decided properly without GAE being a party. In fact in the Existing GAE Action in the Sessions Court, all the relevant parties are before the Court; GAE as Plaintiff claiming for amount owing to it by Isyoda; Isyoda having a claim under the indemnity in the Settlement Agreement against the Third Party Brampton and the Third Party having a counterclaim against Isyoda for breach of the Settlement Agreement. When all the parties are properly before the Sessions Court, this High Court should not venture to decide on a matter that can be more properly decided at the Sessions Court. [94] Further, it is a finding of fact that there are no defects which respect to the Plaintiff/Bond's works in the Sub-Contract and indeed this Court had granted judgment on the sum claimed against the Defendant/Isyoda. It is 40 also not the Third Party's contention that Isyoda had not taken action against Bond but rather that Isyoda has not taken action against GAE. That can be more properly decided in the Existing GAE Action in the Sessions Court where GAE is the Plaintiff, Isyoda the Defendant and Brampton the Third Party. [95] This Court should not allow a multiplicity of proceedings on the same issue in two different courts and more so when the issue can be more properly decided in the Sessions Court in the Existing GAE Action. To allow that would be an abuse of the court's process. [96] Then there is the argument that the indemnity clause in Clause 12 is contingent on or conditional upon the Defendant complying with Clause 5 of the Settlement Agreement. Clause 5 reads as follows: Clause 5 "...Isyoda shall, upon Brampton's request and direction, take all necessary steps and action as permitted by law and/or under the M&E Subcontracts to enforce its rights and remedies under the M&E Subcontracts for the benefit of Brampton. All such steps taken by Isyoda at Brampton's request shall be at Brampton's costs..." 41 [97] No where is it provided that Clauses 11 and 12 of the Settlement Agreement are subject to Clause 5. I agree with the Defendant that Clauses 11 and 12 can and should be enforced independently. If the Third Party opined that the Defendant was in breach of Clause 5, then the Third Party is at liberty to seek appropriate remedy against the Defendant, which the Third Party is already doing by raising a counterclaim against the Defendant in the Existing GAE Action. [98] In other words, the contractual obligations are independent if performance of that obligation by a party is not conditioned upon the performance of another reciprocal obligation by the other party; otherwise the obligations are dependent in that performance of the obligation by a party is a condition precedent to the performance or readiness and willingness to perform the reciprocal obligation by the other party. [99] The Privy Council in Keng Soon Finance Bhd v MK Retnam Holdings Sdn Bhd & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 457 at 459 observed as follows: '‘… the question whether covenants are to be held dependant or independent of each other is to be determined by the intention and the meaning of the parties as it appears on the instrument, and by the application of common sense to each particular case; to which 42 intention once discovered, all technical forms of expression must give way'’. [100] The Third Party could only be discharged from its obligations under the Settlement Agreement if the Settlement Agreement had been terminated. That did not happen. At all material times the Settlement Agreement remains valid and binding between the Defendant and the Third Party. In fact, the reliefs prayed for by the Third Party in the counterclaim in the Existing GAE Action show that the Third Party had no intention of repudiating or terminating the Settlement Agreement but wanted the Settlement Agreement to be enforced. [101] An indemnity clause in the context of a global settlement that requires the Third Party to pay the sub-contractors like the Plaintiff here, must be given its ordinary and natural meaning. Both the Defendant and the Third Party could not have intended that for a sum of more than RM2.5 million owing then to the Plaintiff, the Defendant would not be paid merely because it has not taken action against some sub-contractors as required of them and as instructed by the Third Party/Brampton. [102] Here there was no instruction from Brampton to Isyoda for action to be taken against Bond/Plaintiff but rather for action against GAE which is 43 already the subject of the Existing GAE Action in the Sessions Court. The Third Party/Brampton should not be allowed to use a pending proceeding in the Existing GAE Action in the Sessions Court which is unrelated to the works done by the Plaintiff/Bond here to justify their refusal to make payments to the Defendant for the payments that the Defendant has now to make to the Plaintiff. [103] The overall justice of the case is such that if really there is a breach on the part of the Defendant to take action against GAE, then it is for Brampton to bring the necessary action against the Defendant/Isyoda and to prove its loss. This it has done in the Existing GAE Action when it put up a counterclaim as Third Party against Isyoda as Defendant. [104] In terms of sequence, it was clear that the first breach that occurred was the Third Party’s failure to pay the M&E sub-contractors including the Plaintiff as provided for under Clause 11 of the Settlement Agreement. The instruction to pursue action against GAE was only given to Isyoda on 24.6.2015 whereas the Settlement Agreement with the agreed sum which Brampton was required to pay the Plaintiff was entered into on 4.2.2013. [105] Clearly the Third Party cannot use its own breach as an excuse for not complying with the indemnity clause just because a subsequent event 44 had happened which is a breach by the Defendant/Isyoda in taking action against GAE. [106] The Third Party alleged that they have issued instructions to the Defendant via letter dated 24.6.2015, demanding the Defendant to take action against the Plaintiff to rectify the alleged defects and non-compliance of GAE’s works. See:pages 850-883 of CBOD6 [107] In reply, the Defendant issued a letter dated 26.8.2015. At the material time, there was a Previous Court Action where GAE had sued Brampton in the Sessions Court for the amount due for work done and Brampton had counterclaimed for defective works that had to be rectified. The Sessions Court had allowed GAE's claim and dismissed Brampton's counterclaim. At that time there was pending the appeal and thus it is only appropriate for the Defendant to wait for the outcome of the appeal before taking any action against GAE. The Defendant requested the Third Party’s update on the outcome of the appeal and that the Defendant would act in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. See:pages 646 of CBOD4. [108] There was no reply nor update after the Defendant’s letter. In the circumstances the so-called instruction of 24.6.2015 was spent. In this connection, the instruction from Third Party is important because only the 45 Third Party knew what they wanted to do. The Defendant could not be expected to take action on its own volition as the Defendant has no interest in it and the Defendant may risk non-indemnity if it took action without the Third Party’s instruction. In short, without such instruction, which was in fact not given, the Defendant had no obligation to act and as such there was no breach or failure by the Defendant. [109] This Court is of the view that even if the Defendant/Isyoda here has breached its promise to take action against GAE as instructed by the Third Party/Brampton, that by itself, in the absence of any evidence as to the loss suffered by Brampton, cannot be a valid excuse to say that the indemnity clause in the Settlement Agreement is rendered inoperative and unenforceable until Isyoda takes legal action against Isyoda. At any rate Brampton has counterclaimed against Isyoda in the Existing GAE Action in the Sessions Court and the full reliefs will be granted to Brampton in terms of damage suffered by Brampton as a result of the alleged breach by Isyoda to take legal action against GAE. [110] The Third Party also claimed that the Third Party’s liability to indemnify the Defendant was limited to the principal sum claimed by the Plaintiff only, and does not include interest or costs that the Plaintiff is entitled to. 46 [111] Clause 12 of the Settlement Agreement is a contract of indemnity within the meaning of section 77 of the Contracts Act 1950. As such, section 78 of the Contracts Act 1950 is also applicable. Section 78 of the Contracts Act 1950 provides that: “The promisee in the contract of indemnity, acting within the scope of his authority, is entitled to recover from the promisor: (a) all damages which he may be compelled to pay in any suit in respect of any matter to which the promise to indemnify applies; (b) all costs which he may be compelled to pay in any such suit if, in bringing or defending it, he did not contravene the orders of the promisor, and acted as it would have been prudent for him to act in the absence of any contract of indemnity, or if the promisor authorised him to bring or defend the suit; and …” [112] I would agree with the Defendant that since this Court has allowed the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant with costs and interest, then the Third Party has to indemnify the Defendant against such costs and 47 interests. Such an order is not repugnant to Clause 11(c) and 12 of the Settlement Agreement that limits the Defendant to the amount outstanding to the Plaintiff. Surely the Defendant cannot be expected to be out of pocket with respect to what the Defendant has been ordered to pay the Plaintiff which should have been paid by the Third Party in the first place without the need of the Plaintiff to commence any legal action. [113] Such costs should only be confined to party-to-party costs and not solicitor-client costs as the latter is not provided for in the indemnity agreement and neither has the Court awarded a solicitor-client costs against the Defendant with respect to the Plaintiff nor in favour of the Defendant with respect to the Third Party. Pronouncement [114] For all the reasons given above, I had allowed the Plaintiff to enter judgment against the Defendant for the balance sum of RM1,271,043.96 together with interest of 5% per annum from the date of writ till realization. [115] After hearing parties on costs, I ordered the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM50,000.00 for costs and allocator to be paid before extracting the order on costs. Judgment is therefore entered by the 48 Defendant against the Third Party for the sum above plus interest and costs of RM 50,000.00. [116] The interest between the Defendant and the Third Party shall be at the same rate of 5% per annum until realization as in any delay in the Third Party paying the Defendant the sum that the Defendant has to pay the Plaintiff. [117] As between the Defendant and the Third Party, as the Defendant has succeeded, costs should follow the event and the Court ordered the Third Party to pay the Defendant costs of RM20,000.00 and allocator to be paid before extraction of order of costs. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur Dated: 27 February 2017. 49 For Plaintiff : Deepak Mahadevan together with Abdullah Abbas (Azmi Fadzly Maha & Sim) For Defendant : Choon Hon Leng together with Magdalene Soon (Raja, Darryl & Loh) For Third Party: Chong Poh Ken together with Lim Tsu Ming (Ong, Chong & Tan) Date of Decision: 3 November 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-57-07/2016 & WA-24C-82-08/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd 2. ) Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd 2. ) Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd

24/02/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=4776c606-74db-4b45-b330-be63659e502e&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-57-07/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication between Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd And In the matter of and Adjudication Decision made by Chong Thaw Sing on 13.6.2016 And In the matter of Sections 15(b), 15(d), 16(I)(a), 16(I)(b) and/or 16(2) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 And In matter of Orders 7, Order 28, and Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012 2 BETWEEN TERMINAL PERINTIS SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 910573-T) ... PLAINTIFF AND TAN NGEE HONG CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 301495-M) … DEFENDANT (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-82-08/2016 In the matter of the Adjudication between Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd and Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd And In the matter of the Adjudication before Chong Thaw Sing And 3 In the matter of the Adjudication Decision dated 13.6.2016 by Chong Thaw Sing And In the matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 And In the matter of Order 7, Order 28 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN TAN NGEE HONG CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 301495-M) ... PLAINTIFF AND TERMINAL PERINTIS SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (COMPANY NO: 910573-T) 4 THE JUDGMENT OF YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG Project [1] Terminal Perintis Sdn Bhd ("Terminal Perintis") as Employer had entered into a contract with Tan Ngee Hong Construction Sdn Bhd as Contractor for the construction and completion of a project known as: “Cadangan Pembangunan Berstrata Komersial Bercampur, 1 Blok Apartment Servis Dan 1 Blok Hotel 27 Tingkat Yang Mengandungi : 1 Blok Apartment Servis – Blok A, 2 Tingkat (265 Unit); 1 Blok Hotel – Blok B, 22 Tingkat (303 Unit); Podium 5 Tingkat Yang Melibatkan: Ruang Tempat Letak Kereta Bertingkat, Termasuk 2 Tingkat Aras Bawah Tanah, Berserta Aras Kemudahan 1 Tingkat (Aras Tingkat 3); 19 Lot Ruang Perniagaan Pejabat Pengurusan, Pusat Pengumpulan Sampah Dan 1 Unit Stesen Suis Utama (SSU) Aras Tanah; 1 Unit Rumah Pengawal Di Atas PTD 166944, Mukim Pulai, Daerah JohorBahru, Johor Darul Takzim – Pinetree Marina Resort” (“Contract” or “Project”). [2] The commencement date of the Contract was 1.4.2014 and the completion date was 31.7.2016, for a total construction duration of 28 months. A formal contract was executed by the 5 parties on 23.12.2014 following the PAM 2006 standard conditions of contract with amendments. [3] Arising out of what the Architect perceived to be the Contractor's falling behind time in the schedule of completion, the Architect had by letter dated 4.8.2015 to the Contractor (“Notice of Default”) under clause 25 of the Contract, specified the Contractor's defaults, namely: i. without reasonable cause, the Contractor wholly/ substantially suspended carrying out works at site before completion; ii. the Contractor failed to proceed regularly and diligently with the works at site; iii. the Contractor persistently refused or neglected to comply with Architect’s Instructions (“AI”); and iv. the Contractor failed to comply with assignment and sub- contracting. [4] The Contractor responded to the said Notice of Default by their letter dated 10.8.2015 to the Architect, disagreeing that it was in default. It further stated that it would try its “best endeavour to resolve matters and to prevent any causes to the delay in the 6 progress of works”. It further referred to its proposed mitigation plan dated 10.6.2015 (which included employing additional manpower and working overtime, purchasing equipment and early awarding of sub-contractors) and said that all these plans “demonstrate our effort and commitment toward the completion of project on time ...”. [5] The Employer subsequently by a letter dated 18.8.2015 to the Contractor (“Notice of Determination”), exercised its right to determine the Contractor's employment pursuant to Clause 25.1 of the Contract. The Employer further stated that the Contractor must vacate and return the site possession and it shall pay other person to carry out and complete the Works and make any good defects pursuant to Clause 25.4. The Employer also drew the Contractor's attention to Clause 25, which sets out the latter’s duties and obligations upon determination of the Contract, and to comply with the provisions. Problem [6] The Contractor as Claimant commenced adjudication proceedings against the Employer as Respondent (“Adjudication Proceedings”) under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”).On 11.11.2015, the Contractor 7 as the unpaid party, served a Payment Claim on the Employer, as the non-paying party, pursuant to section 5 of CIPAA. On 30.11.2015, the Employer served its Payment Response pursuant to section 6 of CIPAA. [7] The Contractor, in its Payment Claim, claimed for: i. Payment for value of works done as certified in Interim Certificate No.14 dated 15.7.2015 in the sum of RM2,103,364.69 (“Interim Certificate No. 14”); ii. Payment for value of works done under Progress Claim No. 15 submitted on 3.8.2015 in the sum of RM2,708,618.91 (“Progress Claim No. 15”) iii. The release of the retention sum constituting a percentage of value of works done in the sum of RM4,577,933.70 (“Retention Sum”); and iv. Payment of value of variations carried out constituting works done in the sum of RM385,427.33 (“Variation Orders”). [8] The Employer in its Payment Response claimed for: i. Defective works by the Contractor in the sum of RM9,562,751.50; 8 ii. Increase of costs for firefighting subcontract in the sum of RM520,822.01; and iii. Extended preliminaries incurred due to the extension of the period of insurance to account for the Contractor's delay in the sum of RM162,214.84; iv. The Employer also contended that pursuant to Clause 25.4(d) of the Contract, it was not obliged to make any further payments to the Contractor. [9] Meanwhile the Claimant also commenced arbitration proceedings by serving a Notice of Arbitration on the Contractor on 11.11.2015 (“Arbitration Proceedings”). The hearing dates for the Arbitration Proceedings were on 4 to 6, 9 to 13, 16 and 17 January 2017. The parties had mutually agreed to adopt the KLRCA Arbitration Rules, which specifically provides that the arbitral tribunal shall render its final award within 3 months from the date of the closing of the final oral or written submissions. [10] The Adjudicator decided as follows in his Adjudication Decision: i. The Employer shall pay the Contractor the principal sum of RM8,227,073.40 (“Adjudicated Amount”); 9 ii. The Employer shall pay the Adjudicated Amount within four weeks from the date of the decision in a form of secured financial instruments; iii. The Contractor is entitled to impose a further simple interest at 5% per annum for the amount of the Adjudicated Amount remaining unpaid after four weeks from the date of the decision until payment; iv. The Employer's set-off claims are dismissed; v. The Employer shall pay the Contractor RM91,712.81 as the party and party costs within four weeks from the date of the decision failing which the Defendant is entitled to impose a simple interest of 5% per annum until payment; and vi. The Employer shall bear in full the cost of the Adjudication Decision that is RM116,574.38 that is to be taxed according to the parties’ pre-agreed Adjudicator Fee Schedule. The Contractor shall be entitled to recover the sum RM52,287.19, which was paid to the KLRCA during the Adjudication Proceedings. [11] In brief, the Adjudicator allowed all of the Defendant’s claims subject to certain deductions. 10 Prayers [12] Terminal Perintis as the Respondent in the Adjudication had applied in OS WA-24C-57-07/2016 to set-aside or stay the Adjudication Decision dated 13.6.2016 (“Adjudication Decision”) pursuant to section 15(b) and (d) and section 16(1) and (2) CIPAA respectively. [13] Learned counsel for the Respondent had confined his submissions to the following: a. the Adjudication Decision ought to be set-aside because the Adjudicator had acted in excess of jurisdiction; or alternatively; b. the Adjudication Decision ought to be stayed or the Adjudicated Amount ought to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA. [14] Meanwhile the Claimant had applied in OS WA-24C-82- 08/2016 to enforce the Adjudication Decision as a Judgment of the Court under section 28 CIPAA. [15] By consent and for good reasons both the Originating Summonses were heard together as parties agreed that if the Adjudication Decision is set aside and there is no stay of the 11 Adjudication Decision, then the Claimant shall be entitled to enforce the Adjudication Decision as if it is a judgment of the Court. [16] Parties shall be referred to Terminal Perintis and TNH Contractors and by their designation in the Adjudication as Respondent and Claimant or as Employer and Contractor respectively. Principles [17] Learned counsel for the Respondent, Mr Ivan Loo, submitted that the Adjudication Decision ought to be set-aside because the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction based on the following circumstances: a. The Adjudication Proceedings and/or Decision is a nullity because the Payment Claim did not comply with the requirements under sections 5 of CIPAA and the Claimant failed to invoke section 26(2) of CIPAA (“First Ground”); b. The validity of the Respondent's determination of the Claimant's employment under the Contract was not one which the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide as it was not a matter which was referred to adjudication by the Claimant 12 in the Payment Claim or by the Respondent in the Payment Response (“Second Ground”); and c. The Adjudicator, after in effect agreeing with the Respondent's submissions that it has no jurisdiction to deal with the issue of validity of the Respondent's determination of the Claimant's employment, had in excess of its jurisdiction made a finding on the said issue to the effect that the determination was unlawful/wrongful (“Third Ground”). [18] Section 27(1) CIPAA provides: “Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to section 5 and 6”. [19] The only instance where the Adjudicator would have the jurisdiction over a matter not contained in the Payment Claim or Payment Response is if the parties to the adjudication by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to decide that matter pursuant to section 27(2) of CIPAA, which is not the case here. This section provides: “The parties to the adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator 13 to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6.” [20] The core purpose and intent behind the enactment of CIPAA was to provide a speedy dispute resolution mechanism for parties to resolve payment disputes in the construction industry. This is also why Parliament saw it fit to limit the jurisdiction of the adjudicator purely to matters raised in the payment claim and payment response. In View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695, Dato’ Mary Lim J (now JCA) examined section 27 of CIPAA and held as follows: “[60] Subsection 27(1) limits the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to the matters referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6; namely the claims in the Payment Claim and the responses or defences in the Payment Response. This limitation is subject to subsection 27(2) which allows the parties to the adjudication to extend that jurisdiction by written agreement to matters beyond or outside sections 5 and 6. In the absence of such agreement, the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction does not extend to or include matters in the Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Response or even Adjudication Reply found in sections 9, 10 and 11. It is obvious from subsections 27(1) and (2) that where the 14 parties feel that the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction is insufficient to deal with their particular dispute; the parties can sit down and agree on extending that jurisdictional cover. In the present case, the parties could have dealt with this through a written agreement amongst themselves. There was no such effort; and the Court is not required to look into the reasons for the lack of such an effort. View Esteem could easily have brought up these three additional defences, responses or matters in its Payment Response; but it chose not, for whatever reason it may have. Having exercised that option, it is not open to View Esteem to now complain. ... [63] Again, it is easy to appreciate why Parliament has seen it fit to limit the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to only the matter(s) referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6 when determining the dispute. Adjudication under CIPAA 2012 is both specific and special. It is specific in that it is intended only for payment disputes under construction contracts. It is special in that it offers a speedy provisionally binding resolution to that dispute. A payment dispute exists the moment a claim for payment for work or services rendered under a construction contract is not paid by the other party, or there is no 15 response to that claim. In either event, the payment dispute comes into being or it “crystallises”. The whole adjudication process that takes place after that, from the appointment of the Adjudicator to the filing of the Adjudication Claim, the Adjudication Response and the Adjudication Reply are substantially formal manifestations of the dispute containing greater details of the claim, response or reply, as the case may be of that first Payment Claim and Payment Response. [64] Because adjudication is intended to provide a speedy resolution of that payment dispute [within the time lines found in section 12, where an adjudication decision rendered outside the prescribed time lines is void unless extended by the written consent of the parties], the Adjudicator cannot be expected to deal with issues, legal and/or factual, which may still be “evolving” or in the making as the Adjudicator sits down to determine the dispute. Unrestricted arguments may unnecessarily prolong or even protract adjudication proceedings rendering the whole process impractical, inefficient or unwieldy. There should be certainty in the issues or matters that any party is expected to face in the adjudication proceedings so that the rules of fair play can be 16 readily met. That cannot possibly be achieved if issues or matters are still or yet to be identified.” (Emphasis added) [21] Justice Dr. Hamid Sultan JCA in the Court of Appeal in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] 6 MLJ 717, also adopts a similar view of section 27 of CIPAA. His Lordship stated as follows: “[16] Arriving at CIPAA 2012 Adjudication Award is a two stage process. Parties at this stage may settle the matter and if the matter is not settled. The dispute as borne out in the payment claim and response can only be referred to the adjudicator. This is statutorily a strict requirement (subject only to section 26) as set out in section 27, thereby making the first stage as important stage in the adjudication process.” (Emphasis added) [22] Learned counsel for the Claimant, Mr P Gananathan, had no quarrel with the propositions of the law as gleaned from the cases cited above except to highlight that the facts in the present case are patently different for in the View Esteem case, the Respondent there did not to raise specific issues in its Payment Response and then later sought to introduce various new issues and disputes in the Adjudication Response. 17 Whether the Payment Claim served herein is not a valid Payment Claim in that it did not comply with the requirements under sections 5(2) CIPAA [23] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that the main thrust of the Respondent's argument is that the Payment Claim is dependent on the fact of wrongful determination of the employment of the Claimant, which was never raised in the Payment Claim. As such, it was argued by the Respondent that the Payment Claim is not a valid Payment Claim and the Adjudicator had exceeded its jurisdiction in deciding on the amounts owing under the Payment Claims. [24] In particular, learned counsel for the Respondent argued that with respect to the claims for Progress Claim No. 15, the Retention Sum and Variation Orders, the Claimant has not set out a valid cause of action as required under section 5(2)(b) CIPAA in that there were insufficient details to identify the cause of action including the provision in the construction contract to which the payment relates. The Claimant, it was argued, should have pleaded the fact of unlawful termination, before they could found their action in claiming for (ii) Progress Claim No. 15, (iii) Retention Sum and (iv) Variation Orders. It was further argued by 18 the Respondent's counsel that the termination having been effected, under Clause 25.4(d) there is no obligation for the Respondent as Employer, to pay until the Final Accounts are prepared after the completion of the Project. [25] He further argued that such non-compliance is of a material provision of CIPAA such that without a valid Payment Claim, the appointment of the Adjudicator is invalid and that the whole Adjudication Proceedings and Decision is null and void. [26] The claims raised by the Claimant in the Payment Claim are: a) non-payment for value of work done as certified under Interim Certificate No. 14, relying on clauses 30.1 and 30.2 of PAM 2006; b) non-payment for value of work done under Progress Claim No. 15, relying on clauses 30.1 and 30.2 of PAM 2006; c) non release of retention sum constituting a percentage of the value of work done, relying on clauses 30.2, 30.5 and 30.6(a) of PAM 2006; and 19 d) non-payment for value of variation carried out constituting work done, relying on clauses 11.2, 11.5, 11.6 and 11.9. See: Payment Claim dated 11.11.2015 – Enclosure 2 at Exhibit “OYN-3”, pages 63 to 68 [27] I agree that the starting point in determining what falls within the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator is to first consider what is raised in the Payment Claim in the context of section 5 of CIPAA, which is reproduced herein: “5. Payment Claim 1) An unpaid party may serve a payment claim on a non-paying party for payment pursuant to a construction contract. 2) The payment claim shall be in writing and shall include- a) The amount claimed and due date for payment of the amount claimed; b) Details to identify the cause of action including the provision in the construction contract to which the payment relates; c) Description of the work or services to which the 20 payment relates; and d) A statement that it is made under this Act.” [28] Whilst it is true that CIPAA does not define a “payment claim”, its meaning is implicit in section 4 CIPAA which does provide what “payment” means, which is essentially a claim for payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract. I agree that the entitlement to be paid on the wording of CIPAA on standard form contract is an entitlement that accrues on the date when an interim certificate is due for payment or on the date where the certifier should have issued the relevant certificate pursuant to the timeline prescribed in the terms of these specific contracts. [29] The question is whether each and every one of the four (4) claims are claims that qualify under CIPAA as payment due for work carried out under the express terms of the construction contract. [30] The next step would be to consider whether the Payment Claim satisfies the requirement under section 5(2) of CIPAA. Each of the four (4) claims shall now be examined separately to see whether it has complied with section 5(2) CIPAA. 21 Work Done as Certified in Interim Certificate No. 14 [31] I agree that the amount claimed and the due date for payment are stipulated in the Payment Claim. The cause of action relates to provisions in the Contract and it becomes apparent that the Respondent did not honour the certified sum within the due date for payment of 15.8.2015. The description of the works to which the payment relates and the fact that the claim is made under CIPAA is stipulated in the Payment Claim. I further agree with the Claimant that this claim is not dependent on wrongful determination of the employment of the Claimant. Work Done as Claimed under Progress Claim No. 15 [32] Here too, the amount claimed and the due date for payment are stipulated in the Payment Claim. The cause of action relates to provisions in the Contract and it becomes apparent that the claim (if certified) would have been due for payment on 23.9.2015. The description of the works to which the payment relates and the fact that the claim is made under CIPAA is stipulated in the Payment Claim. This claim is not dependent on wrongful determination of the employment of the Defendant. 22 Non-Release of Retention Sum [33] I agree with the Claimant that the retention sum is the value of work done under the construction contract, save that a percentage of the total value of work was retained under the express provisions of the Contract. The fact that the Employer may retain these amounts does not change the character of what is being claimed, i.e. the value of work done as certified under the certification provision. Refer: Lee Kam Chun v Syarikat Kukuh Maju Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 444 at 448D-E. [34] The Claimant had taken the position that the amount in the retention sum is due by reference to the due date of payment of 18.8.2015, which is the date on which the Claimant ceased to be under the employment of the Respondent/Employer. The Claimant/Contractor seeks release of the retention sum, it being trust monies, which can no longer be held by the Employer. I agree that this claim is not dependent on wrongful determination of the employment of the Claimant. Refer: Qimonda Malaysia Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) v Sediabena Sdn Bhd [2012] 3 MLJ 422 at 432 (paragraph 19). 23 Value of Variations Carried Out [35] I agree that the amount claimed is stipulated in the Payment Claim, as is the due date for payment. The cause of action relates to provisions in the Contract and it becomes apparent that the claim (if submitted and certified) would have been due for payment. The Claimant did not have an opportunity to make the claim or have it certified and therefore, relies on the due date for payment of 18.8.2015, which is the date on which the Claimant ceased to be under the employment of the Respondent/Employer. The description of the works to which the payment relates and the fact that the claim is made under CIPAA are stipulated in the Payment Claim. This claim is not dependent on wrongful determination of the employment of the Claimant. [36] For all the 4 claims, the Claimant when making the claim, took the position that the claim is due and no dispute arises until the claim is rejected or not admitted by the Respondent/Employer by issuance of a Payment Response under section 6 of CIPAA. [37] The Claimant need not rely on any other provision in the Contract to come under what is a valid Payment Claim for which it contends that payment is due under the Contract. Neither is the 24 Claimant required to anticipate the kind of defence that the Respondent would raise in the Payment Response. [38] If one were to look from the perspective of the Payment Claim being the pleadings, the requirements of section 5 have been met. In a litigation on a contractual claim, the plaintiff only needs to state the material fact of what work was done or services rendered, what payment is due and when it is due and the fact of the breach. If indeed no cause of action has arisen, the Court before whom the claim is brought, would dismiss the claim. It is certainly not a case where the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the matter. [39] Transposing this back to the Adjudication scenario, the Adjudicator has the jurisdiction to determine whether the Payment Claim is a valid Payment Claim, where prima facie, it has all the elements of a Payment Claim in that it has stated what amount is due and when it was due, the cause of action and the provisions of the contract to which the payment relates, the nature of the work done and the fact that the claim is made under CIPAA. It is a finding of mixed question of fact and law. So long as the right question of law is asked, this Court would not interfere in a setting aside application that the wrong answer was given. As stated 25 many a time, this is not an appeal where the Court would be permitted to assess the merits of the claim. [40] The Respondent is left with options under section 6 CIPAA, namely to either admit the Payment Claim or to dispute wholly or partly the Payment Claim and to “serve a payment response in writing on the unpaid party stating the amount disputed and the reason for the dispute”. If the Plaintiff fails to respond to the Payment Claim, it is deemed to have disputed the entire Payment Claim. [41] The question then is whether the decision on whether there is a valid Payment Claim is a question that goes towards jurisdiction in that it questions the very validity of the appointment of the Adjudicator or whether it is for the Adjudicator to decide as a matter of fact whether there was a valid cause of action and that at best would go to the validity of the Adjudication Decision only. [42] Courts in Australia and Singapore have wrestled with the issue as can be seen from the cases discussed below. [43] Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to the case of In Brodyn Pty Ltd v Davenport & Anor [2004] NSWCA 394, which involves a subcontract for concreting work for 12 26 townhouses based on the standard form AS4303-1995 General Conditions of Subcontract. Eight months into the subcontract, the main contractor served a notice on the subcontractor alleging that the latter had repudiated the contract and purporting to accept the same. On 27.6.2003, the subcontractor served a payment claim under the NSW SOP Act and the main contractor responded by serving a payment schedule. On 28.8.2003 and 28.9.2003, the subcontractor served further documents stated to be payment claims under the NSW SOP Act. On 29.9.2003, the main contractor served a further payment schedule. On 2.10.2003, the subcontractor made an adjudication application under the NSW SOP Act. On 16.10.2003, the adjudicator made his determination. The main contractor contended that the payment claim was not a valid payment claim under the NSW SOP Act. The trial judge noted that if the assertion was correct, then the adjudicator mistakenly exercised a power which he did not have but refused the relief. [44] On appeal, Hodgson JA opined that before a document purporting to an adjudicator’s determination can be enforced, it must satisfy certain essential conditions laid down by the said Act, which defines the validity of the determination. Non-compliance 27 with these conditions will render the purported adjudicator’s determination void. The judge identified the basic and essential requirements as follows: a. the existence of a construction contract between the claimant and the respondent, to which the Act applies (sections 7 and 8); b. the service by the claimant on the respondent of a payment claim (section 13); c. the making of an adjudication application by the claimant to an authorised nominating authority (section 17); d. the reference of the application to an eligible adjudicator, who accepts the application (sections 18 and 19); and e. the determination by the adjudicator of this application (sections 19(2) and 21(5)), by determining the amount of the progress payment, the date on which it becomes or became due and the rate of interest payable (section 22(1)) and the issue of a determination in writing (section 22(3)(a)). Hodgson JA went on to qualify this proposition by stating that the list may not be exhaustive. 28 [45] The relevant sections contain more detailed requirements, for example: section 13(2) as to the content of payment claims; section 17 as to the time when an adjudication application can be made and as to its contents; section 21 as to the time when an adjudication application may be determined; and section 22 as to the matters to be considered by the adjudicator and the provision of reasons. A question arises whether any non-compliance with any of these detailed requirements has the effect that a purported adjudicator’s determination is void. Hodgson JA thought that it was preferable to ask whether a requirement being considered was intended by the legislature to be an essential pre-condition for the existence of an adjudicator’s determination. [46] The judge opined that what was intended to be essential was compliance with the basic requirements, a bona fide attempt by the adjudicator to exercise the relevant power relating to the subject matter of the legislation and no substantial denial of the measure of natural justice. If the basic requirements are not complied with, or if a purported determination by the adjudicator is not such a bona fide attempt, or if there is a substantial denial of this measure of natural justice, then a purported determination by the adjudicator will be void because there will then not be satisfaction 29 of requirements that the legislature has indicated as essential to the existence of a determination. [47] The Court therefore held that once the basic and essential requirements were satisfied, the question as to whether the document complies in all respects with the requirements of the NSW SOP Act are generally for the adjudicator to decide. [48] I do not think the position under our CIPAA is materially different. Looking at the grounds for setting aside an Adjudication Decision, one can say that a Court of law would uphold the Decision unless it can be shown that it was procured through fraud or bribery, or that there was a breach of natural justice or that the Adjudicator was not independent or impartial or that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of jurisdiction or that the Decision was not in compliance with the provisions of CIPAA. [49] Learned counsel for the Respondent then referred to the case of Napean Engineering Pty. Ltd. v Total Process Services Pty. Ltd (In Liquidation) [2005] NSWCA 409, where the subcontractor (Total) was engaged as a subcontractor to the contractor (Napean) for the supply and installation of pipes for a large construction project. When a dispute arose, Total served on Napean a document purporting to be a payment claim under the 30 SOP Act. No payment schedule was served by Napean. During the course of the adjudication proceedings, Napean claimed that the document served by Total was not a payment claim within the meaning of the SOP Act as it failed to identify the construction work to which the progress payment related. Hodgson JA in the Court of Appeal, after having considered some casespost Brodyn said as follows: “That is, I do not think a payment claim can be treated as a nullity for failure to comply with s. 13(2)(a) of the Act, unless the failure is patent on its face; and this will not be the case if the claim purports in a reasonably way to identify the particular work in respect of which the claim is made.” [50] Learned counsel for the Respondent then submitted that, the corollary of this proposition is that a payment claim can be treated as a nullity if it does not on its face reasonably purport to comply with section 13(2)(a) of the NSW SOP Act. I can agree with that proposition. Simply put, it the Payment Claim on the face of it, complies with the requirements of our section 5(2)(a) to (d) CIPAA, this Court would not interfere with the decision of Adjudicator on ground that he should have decided that there was 31 no valid Payment Claim on the merits or on the interpretation of the law. [51] The following analysis in Pacific GNRL Securities v Soliman and Sons [2006] NSWSC 13 is helpful. The New South Wales Supreme Court had to decide on whether non-compliance with some provisions of their Act with respect to the Payment Claim makes the Adjudication Determination void. It was observed as follows: "Is the determination void for insufficient specificity in the payment claim? 44 The Owners submit that there was non-compliance with a basic and essential requirement prescribed in the Act for there to be a valid determination, in that the payment claim did not sufficiently specify the construction work in respect of which it was made. 45 Although precision and particularity is required to a degree sufficient to apprise the parties of the real issues in dispute, regard may be had to the familiarity which the parties will have with construction industry practices and the formality and particularity of a 32 pleading is not expected [Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Luikens [2003] NSWSC 1140, [76]]. A payment claim is not a nullity for non-compliance with s 13(2)(a), at least unless the non-compliance is patent on the face of the claim [Napean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 409, [34] – [39] (Hodgson JA), [46] – [48] (Santow JA)]. Moreover, compliance with s 13(2) is not a basic requirement fundamental to the validity of an adjudication, but one of the “more detailed requirements”, exact compliance with which is not essential to a valid determination [Brodyn, [54] – [55]]. 46 In fact, it is plain that the “period” referred to in the payment claim is the period since the last progress claim (of June 2004), and the claim is apportioned across several heads showing the percentage complete under each. Mr Dixon conceded in cross-examination that he understood precisely what was being claimed. 47 It follows that the determination is not void for insufficient specificity in the payment claim, since it sufficiently specified the construction work in respect of 33 which it was made, and even if it did not, the sufficiency of a payment claim is not a basic and essential requirement non-compliance with which results in invalidity, but a matter within the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to determine, rightly or wrongly." (emphasis added) [52] In other words, if the complaint is about the contents of the Payment Claim as in whether it shows a cause of action and the provisions of the contract relating to the claim, that is a matter that the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide, rightly or wrongly. For this Court to interfere with his finding on the validity of the Payment Claim from that perspective would be to descend into the merits of his findings, which is not permitted by section 15 CIPAA in a setting aside application. This is not a case where the complaint of the validity of the Payment Claim affects the validity of his appointment as Adjudicator such as in a case where the Payment Claim was not served at all. [53] The position on the kind of objection to a Payment Claim that goes to a jurisdiction of an Adjudicator was further clarified and crystallized in Brookhollow Pty Ltd v R&R Consultants Pty Ltd & Anor [2006] NSWSC ], where Palmer J stated that the judgment in Napean had changed somewhat the law as stated in 34 Brodyn. In paragraph 41 of his judgment, the learned Judge said as follows: “The law as to compliance with s. 13(2) of the Act as it emerges from Brodyn and Napean, may be summarised thus: (i) a payment claim which is never served on the respondent under s.13(1) of the Act cannot set in motion the machinery of Pt 3 so that any purported adjudication of that payment and any other enforcement procedures in Pt 3 founded upon that payment claim must be a nullity. (ii) there are some non-compliances with the requirements of s.13(2) of the Act which will result in a nullity of a payment claim for all purposes under the Act; there are other non- compliances which will not produce that result; (iii) a payment claim which does not, on its face, purport in a reasonable way to: - identify the construction work to which the claim relates; or - indicate the amount claimed; or - state that it is made under the Act, 35 fails to comply with an essential and mandatory requirement of s.13(2) so that it is a nullity for the purposes of the Act; (iv) a payment claim which, on its face, purports reasonably to comply with the requirements of s. 13(2) will not be a nullity for the purposes of engaging the adjudication and enforcement procedures of Pt 3 of the Act; (v) in the case of a payment claim which purports reasonably on its face to comply with s.13(2): - if the respondent wishes to object that it does not in fact comply so that it is a nullity for the purposes of the Act, the respondent must serve a payment schedule under s.14(4) and an adjudication response under s. 20, in which that objection is taken; - if the respondent does not serve a payment schedule within the time limited under the Act and the claimant ultimately seeks the entry of judgment under s.15(4), the respondent may not resist summary judgment on the ground that the payment claim was not a valid payment claim by reason of non-compliance with the 36 requirements of s.13: the respondent has only one chance to take that objection, namely in a timeously served payment schedule; (vi) in the case of a payment claim which was never served on the respondent or which does not purport reasonably on its face to comply with the requirements of s. 13(2): - the payment claim is a nullity for the purposes of the Act; - an adjudication founded upon that payment claim is a nullity, regardless of whether the objection to the validity of the payment claim was taken in a timeously served payment schedule; - an application under s.15(4) for judgment for the statutory debt created by s.14(4) may be defeated on the ground that there was no payment claim in existence for the purposes of s.15(1)(b).” (emphasis added) [54] In the present case, the Respondent did not say in its Payment Response that the Claimant's Payment Claim is invalid or defective or that it is not in compliance with a basic or essential 37 requirement in failing to provide details as to its cause of action. In fact the Respondent was able to set out 5 pages of Payment Response consisting of 23 paragraphs. In paragraph 8 of the Payment Response, the Respondent/Employer stated as follows: "As a result of the Terminal Perintis' determination of TNHC's employment pursuant to Clause 25.1, Terminal Perintis contends that pursuant to Clause 25.4(d), it is not bound by the (sic) any contractual provision to make further payment to the TNHC including payments, which have been certified but not yet paid when the TNHC's employment was determined. TNHC is therefore not obliged to make any payment for all the claims in the Payment Claim." [55] That was the basis of the Respondent/Employer disputing the whole of the Claimant's Payment Claim. There was no objection raised that the Payment Claim does not comply with the requirements of section 5(2)(b) CIPAA. [56] In Protectavale Pty Ltd v K2K Pty Ltd. [2008] FCA 1248, Finkelstein J in the Federal Court of Australia said in relation to section 14 of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 (Vic), which is equivalent to section 13 of the New South Wales legislation, as follows: 38 “[10] It is necessary to decide whether the invoice meets the requirements of s 14. The test is an objective one; that is, it must be clear from the terms of the document that it contains the required information: Walter Construction Group Ltd v CPL (Surry Hills) Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 266 at [82]. But the terms must be read in context. Payment claims are usually given and received by parties experienced in the building industry who are familiar with the particular construction contract, the history of the project and any issues which may have arisen between them regarding payment. Those matters are part of the context: Multiplex Constructions [2003] NSWSC 1140 at [76]. [11] The manner in which compliance with s 14 is tested is not overly demanding: Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd v Campbelltown Catholic Club Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1103 at [54] citing Hawkins Construction (Aust) Pty Ltd v Mac’s Industrial Pipework Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 136 at [20] ("[T]he requirements for a payment claim] should not be approached in an unduly technical manner ... As the words are used in relation to events occurring in the construction industry, they should be applied in a 39 common sense practical manner"); Multiplex Constructions [2003] NSWSC 1140 at [76] ("[A] payment claim and a payment schedule must be produced quickly; much that is contained therein in an abbreviated form which would be meaningless to the uninformed reader will be understood readily by the parties themselves"); Minimax Fire Fighting Systems Pty Ltd v Bremore Engineering (WA Pty Ltd) [2007] QSC 333 at [20] ("The Act emphasises speed and informality. Accordingly one should not approach the question whether a document satisfies the description of a payment schedule (or payment claim for that matter) from an unduly critical viewpoint"). [12] Nonetheless a payment claim must be sufficiently detailed to enable the principal to understand the basis of the claim. If a reasonable principal is unable to ascertain with sufficient certainty the work to which the claim relates, he will not be able to provide a meaningful payment schedule. That is to say, a payment claim must put the principal in a position where he is able to decide whether to accept or reject the claim and, if the principal opts for the latter, to respond appropriately in a payment schedule: Nepean 40 Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (2005) 64 NSWLR 462, 477; John Holland Pty Ltd v Cardno MBK (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 258 at [18] - [21]. That is not an unreasonable price to pay to obtain the benefits of the statute.” [57] It cannot be gainsaid that in the present case, the Respondent had no problem responding to the Claimant's Payment Claim, giving reasons why it is disputing the whole of the Claim. The Respondent, had been able through their solicitors, to respond astutely and appropriately. The Court should not exact a stricter requirement of pleadings on Adjudication than if it were a Court proceeding. One should not be unduly critical or technical to the point of exacting an overly demanding treatment of a Payment Claim when it comes to whether it has met the requirements of section 5(2)(b) CIPAA. [58] Moreover the Payment Claim is prepared by the Claimant itself and not served through solicitors. Section 8(3) further allows a party in the Adjudication Proceedings to represent himself or by appointing his representative. The intent is to save costs and not to make it unduly technical or convoluted. As a Payment Claim it 41 has conformed with the form and format prescribed under Form 1 of the KLRCA Adjudication Rules and Procedure. [59] No doubt the expression of a "cause of action" is used in section 5(2)(b) CIPAA but that is nothing more than saying that the Claimant must set out the basis of their claim in contract. [60] In fact learned counsel for the Respondent/Employer, Mr Ivan Loo, in his book Construction Adjudication in Malaysia, CCH a Wolters Kluwer Business, with his co-author Lam Wai Loon at p 74 have taken this approach to making a payment claim necessary for triggering an adjudication process: “the amount claimed and due date for payment of the amount claimed” 4.26 The unpaid party is required to state in his payment claim the amount claimed and the due date for payment of the amount claimed. These requirements necessarily imply that every construction contract should provide an adequate mechanism for determining what, when and how payments are due under the construction contract. In the absence of such terms, or if the contract does not provide an adequate mechanism for determining what, when and how payments 42 are due under the construction contract, the default provisions on the terms of payment provided by section 36(1) of the CIPA Act 2012 would be imported into the construction contract. 4.27 The unpaid party is only required to state in the payment claim the amount claimed to be due. It does not matter whether the amount claimed may not in law be due. The right of an unpaid party to serve a valid payment claim is predicated on an amount being claimed, and not on there being an actual entitlement to the amount so claimed. Therefore, the fact that a payment claim also includes amounts which the claimant is not entitled to claim under the construction contract does not affect the validity of the payment claim. The unpaid party’s entitlement will be adjudicated upon and determined by the adjudicator in the adjudication proceedings. The ‘due date’ for payment of the amount claimed refers to the date by which payment should be made. Thus, if the construction contract provides that payment of a progress payment certificate should be made within 30 days from the date of the certification, then the due date for payment of a progress 43 payment certificate is the 30th day from the date of the certification of the progress payment certificate. However, the fact that a payment claim also includes amounts which the unpaid party is not entitled to claim does not affect the validity of the payment claim." (emphasis added) [61] If the Payment Claim were to be a Statement of Claim, I do not think that the defendant would be able to strike out the claim on the ground that there is no valid cause of action pleaded. In fact the test would be that the Court assumes the pleadings of facts to be true and based on such a plea, would there be a cause of action. I do not think we should exact a stiffer requirement of Adjudicators when it comes to determining whether there was a valid Payment Claim for the Adjudicator to assume jurisdiction. Beyond that, it becomes a question of evidence and finding of fact or a mixed question of fact and law which this Court has no business to interfere unless the grounds for setting aside are made out under section 15 CIPAA. Whether or not the Claim could succeed would be for trial in a case of litigation in as much as in an Adjudication, it would be for the Adjudicator to decide. 44 [62] I would hold that the Payment Claim served herein is a valid Payment Claim in that prima facie, it purports reasonably to have complied with the requirements of section 5(2) CIPAA. Whether the issue of a valid Payment Claim served herein goes to jurisdiction of the Adjudicator as in the validity of his appointment and his competence to adjudicate [63] Learned counsel for the Respondent pointed out that, in Chase Osyter Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190, the Court of Appeal sounded a general retreat from its own decision in Brodyn. I agree that the basis for this retreat was a reconsideration of the distinction between jurisdictional and non- jurisdictional error by the Australian High Court in Kirk v IRC [2010] HCA 1. The majority of the High Court considered that there were three categories of jurisdictional error: a. the mistaken denial or assertion of jurisdiction, or misapprehension or disregard of the nature of or limits on functions and powers; b. making a decision of a kind that lies, wholly or partly, outside the limits on functions and powers as provided in the relevant statutory context; and 45 c. proceeding in the absence of a jurisdictional fact; disregarding something that the relevant statute requires to be considered as a condition of jurisdiction, or considering something required to be ignored; and misconstruction of the statute leading to misconception of functions. [64] It was submitted that the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error is considered to be at odds with the line of reasoning in Brodyn, particularly that part of the judgment where the narrower formulation of “basic and essential conditions” was preferred over the more general threshold of “jurisdictional error”. There is a sense in which on our jurisdiction, we need to read this distinction with caution, as in those jurisdictions in Australia, setting aside is by way of judicial review. [65] In Chase Oyster, the parties entered into a contract for fit- out work. The contractor served a payment claim under NSW SOP Act. The owner did not provide a payment schedule in response. The contractor did not serve notice of adjudication until after the expiry of the 20-day period prescribed under section 17(2)(a) of the NSW SOP Act but nonetheless proceeded to make an adjudication application. The adjudicator decided that the contractor had served the notice within the prescribed period. The 46 owner argued that the adjudicator’s jurisdiction was founded on compliance with section 17(2)(a) and as it had not been complied, it amounted to a jurisdictional error. The NSW Court of Appeal held that the adjudicator had incorrectly concluded that the notice was served in compliance with section 17(2)(a) and that the determination should be quashed for jurisdictional error. [66] Spigelman CJ in analysing Brodyn held that Hodgson JA’s comments in rejecting the applicability of the distinction between “jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” error, on the basis that it “cast the net too widely” should be re-considered following the Kirk’s decision, which represented the centre piece of Australian administrative law. [67] Spigelman CJ held that it was not possible to point to “a single test or theory or logical process by which the distinction between jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional error can be determined”. The judge however agreed with the statement of principle in the case of Project Blue Sky v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28, that: “A better test for determining the issue of validity is to ask whether it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid. This has been preferred approach of 47 courts in this country in recent years, particularly in NSW. In determining the question of purpose, regard must be had to ‘language of the relevant provision and the scope and object of the whole statute.’” (emphasis added) [68] Spigelman CJ in Chase Oyster further observed as follows with respect to the objectives of NSW SOP Act and the need to comply with the strict statutory provision with respect to activating the Adjudication process: “[207] The Security of Payment Act operates to alter, in a fundamental way, the incidence of the risk of insolvency during the life of a construction contract. As Keane JA said, of the not dissimilar Queensland statute, the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Qld), in RJ Neller Building Pty Ltd v Ainsworth [2009] 1 Qd R 390; [2008] QCA 397 at [40], the statute “seeks to preserve the cash flow to a builder notwithstanding the risk that the builder might ultimately be required to refund the cash in circumstances where the builder’s … inability to repay could be expected to eventuate”. It followed, his Honour said, that the risk of inability to repay, in the event of successful action by the other party, must be regarded as one that the legislature has 48 assigned to that other party. The same is true of the regime established by the Security of Payment Act. [208] Further, the Security of Payment Act operates in a way that has been described as “rough and ready” or, less kindly, as “Draconian”. It imposes a mandatory regime regardless of the parties’ contract: s 34. It provides extremely abbreviated time frames for the exchange of payment claims, payment schedules, adjudication applications and adjudication responses. It provides a very limited time for adjudicators to make their decisions on what, experience shows, are often extremely complex claims involving very substantial volumes of documents: see, for example, my decision in Laing O’Rourke Australia Construction v H&M Engineering and Construction [2010] NSWSC 818 at [8]. [209] The Security of Payment Act gives very valuable, and commercially important, advantages to builders and subcontractors. At each stage of the regime for enforcement of the statutory right to progress payments, the Security of Payment Act lays down clear specifications of time and other requirements to be observed. It is not difficult to understand that the availability of those rights should 49 depend on strict observance of the statutory requirements that are involved in their creation. … [211] The language of section 17(2) is clear. Where there has been no payment schedule and no payment, an adjudication application “cannot be made unless” the requisite notice is given within the specified time. The words “cannot be made” suggest strongly that, in the absence of notice, there is no right to make an application." [69] It can be appreciated that statutory adjudication, being a creature of statute, there must be strict compliance with respect to activating the Adjudication Proceedings. However, not every non- compliance goes towards jurisdiction and one must look at the legislative intent. [70] In the application of our CIPAA, we are free from the shackles of the language of administrative law and judicial review. The word "jurisdiction" is used in section 15(d) as in the Adjudicator having acted in "excess of his jurisdiction" as a ground for setting aside an Adjudication Decision. It is also used in section 27(1) with respect to an Adjudicator's jurisdiction being 50 limited to the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. Then there is a reference to it in section 27(2) with respect to extending his jurisdiction by way of agreement in writing to deal with matters not specifically raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response. Finally there is the reference to a "jurisdictional" challenge, which when raised, does not prevent the Adjudicator from proceeding and completing the Adjudication without prejudice to the rights of any party to set it aside under section 15 or to oppose its enforcement under section 28. [71] There are many senses in which the word "jurisdiction" may be understood. We need only to differentiate between core jurisdiction, competence jurisdiction and contingent jurisdiction. [72] Core jurisdiction would be the question of whether the subject matter of the dispute is one which the Act has conferred on the Adjudicator. Thus if a contract is not a construction contract, but a shipping or mining contract or a contract for legal fees with respect to advice given in construction contract, or that the contract is with respect to construction of a dwelling house for a natural person, then this Court will interfere if the Adjudicator got it wrong. It is a case where the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction to 51 begin with. So too if the construction contract is carried out wholly outside Malaysia. [73] If it is a question of the competence of the Adjudicator as in he has not been properly appointed in that what purported to be a Payment Claim, is not on the face of it a Payment Claim or that the Payment Claim was not served or that it was not expressly stated as a claim made under CIPAA, then this Court would be at liberty to set aside the Adjudication Decision on ground of excess of jurisdiction. This is not only because the Adjudicator cannot decide on his own competence or capacity to adjudicate when the very validity of his appointment is questioned but also that it is part of the legislative intent that if there is non-compliance with a basic and essential requirement of CIPAA with respect to a Payment Claim under section 5, then the Adjudication Proceedings and the Decision made would be a nullity. [74] In a case of contingent jurisdiction, it would be a case where for there to be jurisdiction, there must be further compliance with the requirements of the Act as in that the dispute must be one falling within the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response as provided for under section 27(1) CIPAA. In that example the word "jurisdiction" is used in the sense of the 52 scope of the dispute that is before the Adjudicator for decision. So for example an Adjudicator may not be able to decide on the defence of set-off arising out of costs of rectifying defective works if this has not been raised in the Payment Response. If he so decides, then this Court may set it aside as been made in excess of jurisdiction. [75] Issues as to whether there is a valid cause of action, does not go towards jurisdiction but rather to the merits of the claim which in our system of statutory Adjudication, is not a matter for the Court to interfere unless the grounds under section 15 CIPAA apply. So long as the cause of action disclosed in the Payment Claim complies with the outward requirement, it is then for the Adjudicator to descend into the merits of the claim and to decide whether there is a complete cause of action or for some reasons, the cause of action has been postponed until for example there is a final account prepared after the completion of the Project. [76] The question of the lack of a proper cause of action has nothing to do with the validity of the Adjudicator's appointment as in his competence to hear the dispute but at most, it has to do with the exercise of his jurisdiction with respect to the validity of his Decision. 53 [77] The Singapore Court of Appeal in Lee Wee Lick Terrence (alias Li Weili Terence) v Chua Say Eng (formerly trading as Weng Fatt Construction Engineering) and another appeal [2013] 1 SLR 401, sought to reconcile the seeming contradiction between the position taken in Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd v Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 658, SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733 and AM Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National Golf and Country Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260, all decided by Judith Prakash J. on the one hand and that of Sungdo Engineering & Construction (S) Pte Ltd v Italcor Pte Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 459, by Lee Seiu Kin J on the other. [78] In Chip Hup Hup Kee's case, the respondent argued that the right to adjudication under Singapore Building Industry Security of Payment Act (“SSOP Act”) would only arise when a claimant serves a proper payment claim on the respondent. It was further argued that there must be strict compliance with the SSOP Act with respect to the time of service of the Payment Claim as well as the form and contents of the Payment Claim. Judith Prakash J (as she then was) disagreed and considered that the 54 adjudicator’s jurisdiction “could not depend on such adventitious elements” as to whether the claimant had followed the requirements of the SSOP Act in connection with the form and content of the payment claim and the time at which it had to be served or not. Judith Prakash ruled as follows: “[T]he Adjudicator's jurisdiction arose from his appointment by an authorised nominating body under s 14(1) of the SOP Act and from his acceptance of such appointment. Whether the payment claim was in proper order or not would not have an impact on the Adjudicator's jurisdiction, though of course if it was not in order, the Adjudicator would be able to throw out the claim on that basis. Once an appointment had been made and confirmed to the parties by the authorised nominating body under s 14(3), jurisdiction would have been conferred on the Adjudicator in relation to that particular adjudication application.” [79] The position is no different from our section 22 and 23 of our CIPAA with respect to the appointment of an Adjudicator by agreement of the parties and that by KLRCA and the Adjudicators's acceptance of his appointment. The Adjudicator has jurisdiction to hear the dispute as in he is competent and has 55 the capacity to hear the dispute. The scope of his jurisdiction is to decide on matters specifically referred to him as provided for in section 27(1) under the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. [80] The judge further agreed with the views expressed by Nicholas J in Parist Holdings Pty Ltd v Wt Partnership Australia Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 365 on the operation of the NSW SOP Act: “[56] Similarly, under our legislation, the jurisdiction of an adjudicator stems from his appointment. It does not stem from a properly completed and served payment claim. The powers and functions of the adjudicator come from section 16 of the SOP Act and not from any action on the part of the claimant. The respondent's argument in respect of the Adjudicator's jurisdiction was analogous to an argument that the High Court's jurisdiction to hear any particular dispute depends on whether the writ of summons or other originating process is in proper form when in fact the court's jurisdiction comes from the provisions of the SCJA or other relevant legislation, depending on the nature of the proceedings.” 56 [81] A different approach appears to be taken in the case of Sungdo Engineering & Construction (S) Pte Ltd v Italcor Pte Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 459 where Lee Seiu Kin J held that a court may review an Adjudicator’s Decision on whether a document properly constitutes a Payment Claim under the Act or whether a Payment Claim was proper. Lee Seiu Kin J decided that the one-page claim letter was not a payment claim under the SSOP Act even though (a) the document contained all the particulars required by the relevant provisions of the SSOP Act and the SOP Regulations and (b) it was accompanied by all the required enclosures. He held that for any document to amount to a payment claim, it must comply with the requirements for a payment claim as prescribed under the SSOP Act. [82] Clearly Justice Lee Seiu Kin J was referring to a Payment Claim that on the face of it, does not comply with the requirements of a Payment Claim in that it was not expressed to be made under CIPAA or that it was not served at all. In such a case, the appointment of the Adjudicator would be invalid. It is a case where there has been a failure to comply with the strict requirement of the Act with respect to activating the Adjudication Proceedings. 57 [83] The Court of Appeal in Lee Wee Lick Terence (supra) reconciled it this way: "[30] ... If there is no payment claim or if a payment claim is not served on the respondent, then the power of the [authorised nominating body] to nominate an adjudicator would not have arisen, and an appointment made in such circumstances would not be valid. The power of nomination under s 14 (1) of the Act is predicated on the existence of a payment claim and the service thereof on the respondent. An acceptance of an invalid nomination would not clothe the acceptor with the office of adjudicator. It is in this sense that an adjudicator appointed in such circumstances is said to have no jurisdiction in the matter because he has not been validly appointed under the Act. Any issue arising in relation to the validity of the appointment of the adjudicator is a jurisdictional issue which must be reviewable by the court. This was the kind of issue that Lee J was concerned with in Sungdo." [31] However, we do not think that this was the same kind of jurisdictional issue that Prakash J had in mind when she held in Chip Hup Hup Kee ([14] supra) that whether the 58 payment claim was in proper order or not would not have an impact on the adjudicator’s jurisdiction, as she also held that the court’s power of review should be restricted to supervising the appointment of adjudicators, i.e., the validity or otherwise of an appointment was subject to review by the court. What she had in mind was the case of a payment claim that was intended as a payment claim but which did not comply with all the requirements of the Act: it would still be a payment claim, but the adjudicator could “throw [it] out” for non-compliance (see [20] above). The distinction between Lee J’s proposition in Sungdo and that of Prakash J in Chip Hup Hup Kee is that the former proposition was made in relation to a payment claim which was in form a payment claim but not intended to be such, and therefore did not have the effect of a payment claim, and the latter proposition was made in relation to a payment claim which was in form a payment claim and was intended to be such, but which did not satisfy all the requirements of the Act. In the first situation, a payment claim has not come into operation as a payment claim. In the second situation, a payment claim operates as a payment claim but it is defective for non-compliance with the requirements of the Act. The first situation goes to the validity of the appointment of the 59 adjudicator. The second situation goes to the validity of the adjudication determination." (emphasis added) [84] The Court of Appeal in that case gave the following advice with respect to the role of the Adjudicator and the Court when a so-called jurisdictional issue is raised with respect to a Payment Claim: "The role of the adjudicator [64] We are of the opinion that the only functions of an adjudicator are to: (a) decide whether the adjudication application in question is made in accordance with s 13 (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act (see s 16 (2) (a)); and (b) to determine the adjudication application (see s 17 (2)). If the adjudication application complies with s 13 (3) (a), (b) and (c), the adjudicator should proceed with the adjudication. He is not competent to decide whether he was validly appointed to adjudicate the matter (see [36] above). Thus, in this case, the Adjudicator need not and should not have decided issues (a) to (d) (at [10] above). [65] If the respondent wishes to argue that the adjudicator was not validly appointed or that the adjudicator has not 60 exercised his power to determine the adjudication application properly (for example, because the adjudicator has not complied with s 16 (3) the Act), such argument should be made to the court. The respondent may apply to court to set aside the adjudication determination on this basis. If the respondent’s objection is that there is no valid payment claim, this should be raised as soon as possible in the payment response so as not to delay the adjudication process. The role of the court in a setting-aside action [66] Turning now to the court’s role in a setting-aside action, we agree with the holding in SEF Construction ([14] supra) that the court should not review the merits of an adjudicator’s decision. The court does, however, have the power to decide whether the adjudicator was validly appointed. If there is no payment claim or service of a payment claim, the appointment of an adjudicator will be invalid, and the resulting adjudication determination would be null and void. [67] Even if there is a payment claim and service of that payment claim, the court may still set aside the 61 adjudication determination on the ground that the claimant, in the course of making an adjudication application, has not complied with one (or more) of the provisions under the Act which is so important that it is the legislative purpose that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid, whether it is labelled as an essential condition or a mandatory condition. A breach of such a provision would result in the adjudication determination being invalid." (emphasis added) [85] The learned author Chow Kok Fong in Security of Payments and Construction Adjudication (Second Edition) summarised the trilogy of cases by Judith Prakash J at paragraph [13.62] as follows: a. The jurisdiction of the adjudicator in the sense of his power to hear a matter stems from his appointment by the authorised nominating body (“ANB”). Once the appointment has been made under section 14(3) of the SSOP Act, jurisdiction would have been conferred on the adjudicator. The adjudicator’s jurisdiction does not depend, therefore, on the form and contents of the subject payment claim and the time at which it had to be served. 62 b. The court’s role is limited to determining that the basic requirements (or essential condition) as set out in Brodyn are present. This includes whether “prior to making an adjudication application the claimant had served a purported payment claim: and whether the appointment and conduct of the adjudicator complied with the relevant statutory provisions.” c. It is not for the courts to undertake an investigation into the merits of the dispute in order to ascertain whether the adjudicator has reached the same decision as a court would have done. [86] I agree with the above analysis is being in accord with our scheme of statutory adjudication under CIPAA. When a challenge is made to the Payment Claim filed as lacking in details in that it does not disclose a valid cause of action, that is a challenge on merits assuming that the Payment Claim has complied outwardly with the requirements of section 5(2)(b) CIPAA. It has nothing to do with the validity of the appointment of the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator appointed would then have to consider the merits of whether there exists a valid cause of action with respect to the matters raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. 63 [87] Section 25 CIPAA sets out the Powers of an Adjudicator and section 26 provides that the Powers of Adjudicator shall not be affected by some non-compliance with the Act. Section 26 deals with the Jurisdiction of an Adjudicator. [88] It goes without saying that the powers of an Adjudicator are to be exercised only in cases where he has jurisdiction. If he has no jurisdiction with respect to deciding a dispute before him, then it does not make sense to talk of his exercising his powers, be it to cure a non-compliance with any provision of the Act or to extend his jurisdiction which he does not have to begin with. [89] Section 26 CIPAA reads as follows: "(1) Subject to subsection (2), the non-compliance by the parties with the provisions of this Act whether in respect of time limit, form or content or in any other respect shall be treated as an irregularity and shall not invalidate the power of the adjudicator to adjudicate the dispute nor nullify the adjudication proceedings or adjudication decision. (2) The adjudicator may on the ground that there has been non- compliance in respect of the adjudication proceedings or document produced in the adjudication proceedings— 64 (a) Set aside either wholly or partly the adjudication proceedings; (b) Make any order dealing with the adjudication proceedings as the adjudicator deems fit; or (c) Allow amendment to be made to the document produced in the adjudication proceedings." [90] The powers is with respect to matters of "non-compliance in respect of the adjudication proceedings or document produced in the adjudication proceedings" as stated in section 26(2). Under section 8 CIPAA on "Initiation of Adjudication", an Adjudication Proceeding is initiated with the service of a written Notice of Adjudication. Section 8 reads: (1) A claimant may initiate adjudication proceedings by serving a written notice of adjudication containing the nature and description of the dispute and the remedy sought together with any supporting document on the respondent. [91] The supporting judgment in View Esteem Sdn. Bhd. v Bina Puri Holdings Bhd [2016] MLJU 662 at page 662, Prasad Sandosham Abraham JCA (now FCJ) examined the operation of section 26 of CIPAA and noted that the said provision is peculiar to the Malaysian context only as it does not appear in similar 65 legislation of comparable jurisdiction. The judge further held as follows: “[6] The intention of Parliament is clear in that any irregularity in wide terms will not render the adjudication proceedings a nullity in consonance with the spirit of the act i.e. “to facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication. [7] To come within the purview of section 26(1), a party must invoke the provisions of section 26(2) of CIPA relying on the subsection most suitable to the facts of the dispute before the adjudicator. [8] The appellant should have moved the adjudicator formally to allow matters not raised under the payment response pursuant to section 26 2(b)/(c) of the said section. The adjudicator would have had to deal with that question and rule accordingly and such a ruling would not in my view be reviewable. If the adjudicator had refused to entertain the application on a point of jurisdiction, then the same would be subject to review.” (emphasis added) 66 [92] It would appear that section 26 of CIPAA is only applicable to non-compliances which the adjudicator has jurisdiction to decide and which would not be reviewable by the Court. I would agree with the Respondent that section 26 does not apply to non- compliances which affects the adjudicator’s very own jurisdiction or capacity to hear and decide the matter with respect to competence and 'capacity to hear' jurisdiction. In such a challenge, it is the Court and not the Adjudicator who will decide on such non-compliances. The distinction is important. In Chip Hup Hup Kee, Judith Prakash J at p.675: “[44] Thus, it seemed that what was being alleged was an absolute lack of jurisdiction on the part of a particular tribunal or court to hear a particular dispute, “jurisdiction” being used in the strict sense of capacity to hear, then if the tribunal concerned does not have the jurisdiction, any party to the dispute may assert the lack of jurisdiction at any stage and can never be held to be estopped from doing so or to have waived its right to protest. On the contrary, when it is a question of irregularity of procedure or contingent jurisdiction or non-compliance with a statutory condition precedent to the validity of a step in the litigation, such irregularity or non-compliance can be waived because the effect of the waiver 67 would not be to create or confer any jurisdiction that did not previously exist. [45] It therefore appeared to me that I could not answer the preliminary question of whether the respondent was entitled to raise its challenges to jurisdiction until I determined whether or not such related to competence to hear or only to the exercise of the jurisdiction. I therefore had to consider the substantive question in order to determine the preliminary point”. [93] This passage was referred to and quoted by the Court of Appeal in the case of View Esteem where Prasad Sandosham Abraham JCA said: “[12] The issue of jurisdiction encompassed in Section 26 of CIPAA concerns jurisdiction on the question of irregularity of procedure or of a defect in a contingent jurisdiction or non- compliance with statutory conditions precedent to the validity in the step in the proceedings.” [94] I have no problem accepting the proposition of learned counsel for the Respondent that with respect to the competence or capacity of the adjudicator to hear itself, we can, to be consistent with other jurisdictions such as Singapore and 68 Australia, apply the test of whether the provision(s) of CIPAA which had not been complied with was so important that it is the legislative purpose that an act done in breach of that provision should be invalid (whether it is labelled as a basic and essential requirement or condition or mandatory condition) and result in the adjudication decision being invalid. [95] Having held that the Payment Claim filed in the instant case is a valid Payment Claim in that it has complied with the material requirements of section 15(2) CIPAA, there is no necessity then to go under section 26(2) for the curing of any irregularity. [96] It is well within the power and province of the Adjudicator to decide on the validity of the Payment Claim served as in whether at the end of the day, there is a valid cause of action shown, after hearing the evidence and considering the submissions of counsel on the proper interpretation to be given to relevant provisions of the PAM Contract. [97] That would involve going into the merits of the case and this Court would not generally interfere with such a finding of mixed law and fact unless the circumstances under section 15 CIPAA have been shown. 69 Whether the Adjudicator exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding on the validity of the Respondent's determination of the Claimant's employment with respect to compliance with the Notice Period [98] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that once the Respondent in its Payment Response raises the defence of the applicability of Clause 25.4(d) PAM Contract in that once there is an act of determination of the employment of the Claimant/Contractor, no further payment will be due until a final account is prepared, then the Adjudicator must of necessity decide whether Clause 25.4(d) has been properly activated, invoked or applied. [99] It becomes a matter for the Adjudicator to decide without delving into the merits of the grounds of determination of the employment, as in whether the facts justify the grounds relied on for the determination of the employment. The Adjudicator was consciously confining himself to this narrow point on whether Clause 25.4(d) can be relied on by the Respondent/Employer as in being properly invoked, stating further that the merits or 70 otherwise of the termination on the grounds stated is for the Arbitral tribunal to decide. [100] CIPAA only allows a Payment Claim and a Payment Response to be filed and there is no Payment Reply allowed for the Claimant. Thus the matters for the Adjudicator to decide are conferred as well as circumscribed by the matters raised in the Payment Claim and Payment Response. [101] Section 6(2) requires of the non-paying party to state its reasons for disputing the claim and certainly once that is done, it would be remiss of the Adjudicator not to decide whether the reasons given are valid reasons. I agree with the learned counsel for the Claimant that by relying on the determination of the Claimant's employment pursuant to Clause 25.1, the Respondent has in a very real sense submitted the issue of determination as forming part of its defence and consequently clothed the Adjudicator with the requisite jurisdiction to decide the matter. The issue was very much a live issue and at play during the Adjudication and parties submitted fully on it. The Adjudicator confirmed the Respondent's jurisdictional challenge in this Adjudication Decision as follows: 71 “Jurisdiction challenge 5) The Claimant raises in its Reply of 29.6.2016 a jurisdiction challenge on the Respondent entitlement for set-off claim for liquidated and ascertained damages (LAD). Likewise, the Respondent in its further submission of 7.4.2016 questioned the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to deal with the validity of the Notice of Determination. The respective challenges are: … c. This adjudication tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the validity or otherwise of the notice of determination as it was never pleaded by the Claimant in S5 Payment Claim.” (Emphasis added) [102] The Adjudicator was careful to correctly state that he was not delving into the merits of the grounds for determination of the Contract as in whether those grounds are supported by facts justifying determination of the Claimant's employment. [103] The Adjudicator, in dealing with the jurisdictional challenge, decided as follows: 72 “19) ... But in this instant dispute, reading S5 and S6 more broadly to deal with grounds surrounding the termination of the Claimant’s contract may take this proceeding into an uncharted territory. This Tribunal should not attempt to deal with the issue surrounding the proper termination of the Claimant’s contract when the circumstances of the termination under Clause 25.1 were not even adduced. It is my respectful view that the lawfulness of the termination of the contract should be more fully and properly dealt with in the ongoing arbitration proceeding. The Claimant only sought this Tribunal to declare the notice of determination invalid or defective. 20) Since the correctness of the Respondent’s activation of Clause 25.4(d) is central to this action, I am of the opinion this tribunal should confine its decision to whether the Respondent had correctly activated the operation of Clause 25.2(d)” (emphasis added) [104] Section 27(1) of CIPAA provides that the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the “matter” referred to adjudication by the parties in the Payment Claim and 73 the Payment Response (unless otherwise extended by agreement in writing by the parties). [105] In WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1236, Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) said as follows: “[27] Subsection 27(1) restricts the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to the matters found in sections 5 and 6. In short, the Adjudicator takes jurisdiction from the payment claim and the payment response; not from the adjudication claim, adjudication response or even the adjudication reply. This is materially significant and important as this brings to bear the whole scheme of CIPAA 2012; that the adjudication proceedings is to deal with or resolve a payment dispute. ... The Adjudicator’s sole task is to resolve that dispute for the reasons already made known between the parties; and nothing else. Any change to those rules of engagement requires a written consent between the parties and that is clear from subsection 27(2). Were it otherwise, there would be no fair play and ultimately, no confidence in the mechanism that has been so elaborately set up by Parliament...” (emphasis added) [106] The dispute referred to Adjudication was the refusal of the non-paying party in the Respondent/Employer to pay for the 74 reason given in the Payment Response in that Clause 25.4(d) applies. That essentially is the reason for not paying the entire of the claims made in the Payment Claim. No matter how one looks at the dispute that has arisen, one cannot run away from deciding on the applicability of Clause 25.4(d) at least in the limited sense of whether it could be properly applied. [107] It was argued that the Claimant only raised for the first time the issue of the wrongful determination in its Adjudication Claim. The Respondent then raised a jurisdictional challenge in the course of the Adjudication Proceedings that the Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to deal with this issue of the validity of the determination of the Claimant's employment as it was not a matter which had been referred to Adjudication by the Claimant in the Payment Claim or by the Respondent in the Payment Response. [108] The Claimant however contended that it was entitled to raise the issue of wrongful determination because in the Payment Response, the Respondent contended that none of the Claimant's claims were payable by virtue of the operation of clause 25.4(d) “As a result of Terminal Perintis’ determination of TNHC’s employment pursuant to clause 25.1”. 75 [109] I do not think that the Respondent/Employer can validly argue that they were stating as a matter of undisputed fact that the Claimant's employment was determined pursuant to Clause 25.1. It cannot be denied that the reason for the Respondent/Employer to state that is to support the argument that under that Clause 25.4(d) no payment is due to the Claimant. [110] It is then open to the Claimant to show the Adjudicator why the said Clause 25.4(d) cannot be applied in the circumstances of the case by reference to the non-compliance with the notice period for the Notice of Determination. I cannot follow the Respondent's submission that the Claimant can only confirm itself to the argument that its employment was not determined or that there was no determination. That would be to split hairs! The Claimant is surely at liberty to argue why Clause 25.4(d) cannot be applied in the way the Respondent wanted it to. [111] I agree with the Claimant that once the Respondent raises the defence of reliance of clause 25.4(d) then the Claimant cannot be precluded from defending its claim by contending that the procedural requirement under clause 25 were not met. The ramifications of the defence raised in the Payment Response 76 must be considered by the Adjudicator. As was held in Cantillon Ltd v Urvasco Ltd [2008] 117 ConLR 1: "[67] .....As the authorities established that the responding party can put forward any arguable defence in adjudication, ......it must follow that the adjudicator can rule not only on that defence but also upon the ramifications of the defence to the extent that it is successful in so far as it impacts upon the fundamental dispute." (emphasis added) [112] I agree with the Claimant that it would be a defeating exercise to over-analyze what the dispute constitutes in an adjudication under CIPAA. Many Adjudicator's are not lawyers by training. Their expertise is drawn from engineering, architecture, quantity surveying and the like. They do not sit as judges or arbitrators. However most would appreciate what a dispute is when they see one as evidence from the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. They have to decide within a tight time frame and their decision might not be on spot but they serve a purpose under CIPAA, which is to allow the Claimant to be paid for work done or services rendered. It is a very rough kind of justice and the refined part of it would have to be pursued at arbitration or 77 litigation. His decision is provisional in nature and of temporary finality. [113] The important thing is that the parties are fully aware of what they have to answer arising from the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. Hence the need to avoid being pedantic or overly technical or legalistic where the determination of the issues of the dispute is concerned. [114] Akinhead J in Witney Town Counsel v Beam Construction (Cheltenham) Ltd [2011] 139 ConLR 1 at 18 (paragraph 38), provides guidance in this respect: “[38]… (iv) What a dispute in any given case is will be a question of fact albeit that the facts may require to be interpreted. Courts should not adopt an over-legalistic analysis on what the dispute between the parties is, bearing in mind that every construction contract is a commercial transaction and parties cannot broadly have contemplated that every issue between the parties would necessarily have to attract a separate reference to adjudication.” 78 [115] The entire rationale of the pleadings submitted by way of the Payment Claim and Payment Response is that the Plaintiff is not to be caught by surprise. One must not miss the wood for the trees. Judge Toulmin CMG QC in AWG Construction Services Ltd v Rockingham Motor Sppedway Ltd [2004] EWHC 888 (TCC) at paragraph 141 said: “[141] In my view, each case must depend on the circumstances and the context in which a referral is made. In some cases the issues referred are very specific. In other cases it is clear that the issues are more general and have been so treated by the parties, and that there is significantly more room for the case to be developed. The test in each case is first what dispute did the parties agree to refer to the adjudicator? And, secondly, on what basis? If the basis which is argued in the adjudication is wholly different to that which a defendant has had an opportunity to respond in advance of the adjudication, this may constitute a different dispute not referred to the adjudicator or, put another way, in so far as adjudicator reaches a decision on the new issues, it is not responsive to the issues referred to him.” 79 [116] Simply put, the Claimant's claim was for works carried out in respect of all four (4) claims. It was entitled to make a claim under section 5 of CIPAA. This became an issue when the Respondent claimed that the Claimant was precluded from receiving payment under clause 25.4(d). The parties therefore agreed to refer this issue or dispute to the Adjudicator. The Adjudicator cannot be hamstrung from deciding a matter of a consequential and ancillary nature necessary to exercise or complete the exercise of his jurisdiction conferred by the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. It would be skirting the issue for the Adjudicator not to decide on whether the reason given for non-payment being the event of determination of the contract is a valid reason and for that to decide on the limited ground of whether the notice period for issuing the Notice of Determination has been complied with. It was not a different dispute that was referred to the Adjudicator. In this regard the New Zealand Construction Contracts Act 2002 is instructive where its section 38 is concerned: “38 Jurisdiction of adjudicators (1) An adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute that has been referred to adjudication is limited to determining— (a) the matters referred to in sections 48, 49(1)(c), and 50(1)(c); and 80 (b) any other matters that are of a consequential or ancillary nature necessary to exercise or complete the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by paragraph (a). (2) However, the parties to an adjudication may, at any time, by written agreement, extend the jurisdiction of an adjudicator to determine any matters in addition to those mentioned in subsection (1)." (emphasis added) [117] The Respondent's submission is that although the Adjudicator re-framed the question to whether the Claimant had correctly activated the operation of Clause 25.4(d), however, the Adjudicator nevertheless approached and answered this question by examining and deciding the issue of the validity of the Respondent's determination of the Claimant's employment. The Adjudicator’s decision dealing specifically with the issue of the validity of the determination is set out in below: “49) We all know untimely termination of a contractual relationship brings to the fore whole hosts of questions relating to the proper way to handle the aftermath of this broken relationship. Amongst others, one of the most contentious is the operation of Clause 25.4(d). As a result of the far reaching effects a terminated contractual relation has 81 on the obligations of the parties, the Malaysian court has taken a specific stance on the acceptable way to end this relationship. The emphasis of the Court is the party whose contract is being terminated must be accorded fair treatment prior to the the termination. In particular, the Court in Fajar Menyinsing Sdn Bhd v Angsana Sdn Bhd [1998] 6 MLJ 80 expressed the view that in interpreting the operation of a termination clause in a contract, the court (and also the tribunal) ought to adopt a strict approach. Nik Hashim J (as he then was) explained what it meant by taking a strict approach. He said: “It is obvious by its provision and the marginal note that Clause 25.(1) is a determination clause and as such, it must be construed strictly. Its provision is mandatory in nature. Therefore, any formal or procedural requirement stipulated in the determination clause must be complied with exactly and meticulously. Hudson’s Building and Engineering Contracts (11th Ed, 1995) Vol. 2, p 1244 said: ... exact and meticulous compliance by the determining party with any formal or procedural requirements laid down in the termination clause, for example, as to notices 82 or time limits, will usually be required if a contractual termination is to be successful ... (Emphasis added) 50) The Claimant insisted that Clause 25.2 requires the Respondent as the determining party to give the Claimant as the contractor a notice of default stating precisely the defaults the contractor had incurred. This notice shall be either delivered by hand or by way of a registered post. Thereafter, the contractor shall be given 14 clear days to either rectify the defaults sufficiently to persuade the Employer not to proceed with the determination or if the contractor allows the defaults to continue, then the Employer has the option after the 14 days notice period to give the notice of determination within 10 days thereafter. It the Employer chooses to issue the notice of determination, it shall not be given unreasonably or vexatious. 51) An equally important duty of the determining party is to comply exactly and meticulously the manner the notice determination ought to be issued. According to the stance of the Malaysian courts for contract under PAM standard conditions of contract, the determining party should only issue the notice of determination after the expiry of the 14 83 clear days of the notice period stated in Clause 25.2. Unfortunately in this case, the Respondent went ahead to issue the notice of determination on 18.8.2015 which mathematically is one day too early. The one premature notice would under ordinary circumstances have been deemed as de minimis and the error overlooked. Therefore, the validity of the notice should not be affected. But the approach of the court in Fajar Menyensing, with good reasons, thinks otherwise. Faja Menyensing’s approach was subsequently adopted in Pembinaan LCL Sdn Bhd v SK Styfoam (M) Sdn Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 113 and more recently by Dato’ Mary Lim J (as she then was) in DC Contractor Sdn Bhd v Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia [2014] 11 MLJ 653. The Claimant now sought this tribunal’s ruling that as a result of the Respondent’s mis-step in issuing the Notice of Determination it has breached Clause 25.2 and that the notice of determination should be deemed invalid. Therefore, Clause 25.4(d) had not been correctly activated. Hence, it is not entitled to invoke Clause 25.4(d) defence. 52) However, the Respondent’s contention in the light of the above arguments that the Claimant had in accepting the 84 Notice of determination agreed to the content of the said notice served one day early on 18.8.2015, thereby waived its right to the object. The Respondent further argues that the doctrine of estoppel should operate to deny the Claimant’s CEO changed in position in his written statement that he only acknowledged receipt of the notice not the truth of its content. The Respondent contends, even if this Tribunal finds that the notice of Determination was issued one day too early, this agreement by the Claimant’s conduct should override the apparent mis-step by the Respondent. 53) Whilst not diluting the force of such arguments in other fora, I am reminded by the statement of the learned judge Dato’ Mary Lim that the doctrine of estoppel would generally not apply in CIPAA 2012 unless the occasions or conduct or some special circumstances presents are so convincing or valid that suggest the doctrine of estoppel ought to apply. Even if such occasion arose, her ladyship believes it should be an exception. The occasions relied on by the Respondent; (1) in the partial handover, (2) post determination reference by the Claimant to official determination and (3) the signed Notice of Determination, 85 would not be sufficient in my humble view be considered as an exception to allow the operation of estoppel. In my opinion the doctrine cannot make right the wrong of the determining party in the breach of Clause 25.2. To do so tantamounts to allowing the Respondent to benefit from its own wrong doing. The principle was enunciated by Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Pentabdiran Tanah Daerah Petaling v Swee Lin Sdn Bhd 12 where the learned judge said: “But as I have said, the principle is of universal application. In the present case, that principle produces the following results. A landowner who has erected a building on his land contrary to law ought not to receive any benefit from it from an acquiring authority under the Act.” I am convinced the ratio decidendi in the aforesaid case equally applies in this case where the Respondent had breached the Clause 25.2 notice period but sought to benefit from this mis-step by citing the operation of the doctrine of estoppel. 54) The Claimant averred the respondent’s reliance on Clause 25.4(d) defence is misconceived and wrongful. I am 86 persuaded that the Respondent breach of 25.2 is fatal to its right to activate Clause 25.4(d).” (emphasis added) [118] I would say that the Adjudicator has carefully couched and crafted his decision to make it clear that he was dealing with whether the said Clause 25.4(d) can be validly relied on from the limited perspective of its proper activation with respect to the relevant notice period. The Adjudicator was clear in that he is not venturing to decide on the validity of the grounds of determination to answer the question of whether the determination of the contract was lawful from that perspective. [119] Whilst the Adjudicator might have misunderstood the dicta of Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) with respect to the context in which estoppel does not apply to Adjudication, I do not think that in any way materially affect the finding of fact of the Adjudicator that the Claimant in acknowledging receipt of the Notice of Determination dated 18.8.2015, did not agree to the contents of the Notice of Determination. The evidence given was that the Director of the Claimant, Mr Tan Ze Guan, had specifically written the words "acknowledge received" in the column provided though the Respondent's printed words said "We have read, understood and agreed to the contents of the above letter.” See Exhibit TZG 7 87 Enclosure 6 of Claimant's affidavit to oppose the setting aside of the Adjudication Decision. There was also the Claimant's letter to the Respondent dated 23.9.2015 in Exhibit TZG 8 stating that the termination was wrongful for non-compliance with the 14-day period after the Notice of Default was issued. [120] The Adjudicator nevertheless was entitled on the facts as found by him that the Claimant was not estopped from raising the issue of premature determination of the Claimant's employment by the Respondent/Employer and that the Claimant had not accepted the factual allegations in the grounds of termination. [121] At any rate a misapprehension of the law in a finding of fact is no justification for setting aside the said finding of fact when there are evidence forming the basis of the Adjudicator's finding of fact. Here the finding of fact was that the Notice of Determination was issued prematurely and not in strict compliance with the period of 14 clear days to rectify the defaults as required under Clause 25.2. [122] Further as pointed out by learned counsel for the Claimant in the Adjudication Reply, both the Notice of Default and the Notice of Determination were marked "without prejudice", supporting 88 their contention that the parties were at the material time, still discussing the possibility of an amicable resolution. [123] All said, findings of facts and findings of mixed facts and law are matters within the sole province of the Adjudicator and this Court would not be able to interfere in a section 15 CIPAA application for breach of natural justice or excess of jurisdiction. In the context in which the above findings were made, there is nothing that goes to jurisdiction of the Adjudicator as in the validity of his appointment. Even if the Adjudicator had come to a wrong finding of fact premised on his wrong understanding of the law, this Court would not generally interfere unless that finding of fact and interpretation of the law go to jurisdiction or that the other grounds for setting aside in section 15(a) or (c) CIPAA apply. [124] I am satisfied that the Adjudicator did not decide beyond his jurisdiction in that he did not decide on the merits of the determination as to whether the grounds for determination were valid. He merely decided on the peripheral and preliminary issue as to whether the Notice of Determination had been issued in compliance with the strict time frame requirement of Clause 25.2 PAM Contract. That he is permitted to do before he could decide 89 on where the Respondent/Employer may validly rely of Clause 25.4(d) to validly withholding payment. Whether section 35 CIPAA applies to Clause 25.4(d) PAM Contract to make it a conditional payment clause and hence void and unenforceable [125] Learned counsel for the Claimant submitted that the Claimant is not entitled to payment for all the sums claimed under the Payment Claim because pursuant to Clause 25.4(d) of the Contract, the Respondent as Employer is not bound by any contractual provision to make any further payment to the Claimant as Contractor, including payments which have been certified but not yet paid when he Contractor's employment was determined. This, it was argued, is a complete defence against the whole of the Claimant's claims. Clause 25.4(d) provides as follows: “25.4 In the event that the employment of the Contractor is determined under Clause 25.1 or 25.3, the following shall be the respective rights and duties of the Employer and the Contractor: 25.4(d) the Contractor shall allow or pay to the Employer all cost incurred to complete the Works including all loss and/or expenses suffered by the Employer. Until after completion of 90 the Works under clause 25.4(a), the Employer shall not be bound by any provision in the Contract to make any further payment to the Contractor, including payments which have been certified but not yet paid when the employment of the Contractor was determined” [126] The Claimant however argued that following the case of Econpile (M) Sdn Bhd v IRDK Ventures Sdn Bhd & Another case [2016] 5 CLJ 882 (“Econpile”), Clause 24.5(d) of the Contract is void and unenforceable as it is a conditional payment provision prohibited under Section 35 of CIPAA. As such it cannot be relied on as a reason for not paying the four claims in the Payment Claim. [127] Learned counsel for the Respondent advanced the following arguments in support of his position: a. In Sundra Rajoo, Dato’ Bill WSW Davidson and Ir Harbans Singh in “The PAM 2006 Standard Form Building Contract” LexisNexis, 2010, the learned authors commented on Clause 25.4(d): “Clause 25.4 deals essentially with the specific procedures, rights and duties of the parties following the determination of 91 the contract’s employment under the contract by the employer due to performance defaults under Clause 25.1 or should automatic determination occur pursuant to Clause 25.3... Clause 25.4(d) : Procedures regulating accounts between parties ... Upon the occurrence of the determination event, the question that frequently arises is whether the employer is obliged to make any payment to the original contractor. Clause 25.4(d) answers the said question by stipulating in the second sentences that ‘until after the completion of the Works under Clause 25.4(a), the Employer shall not be bound by any provision in the Contract to make any further payment to the Contractor, including payment that have been certified but not yet paid when the employment of the Contract was determined’. Hence, the employer is relieved expressly from his contractual obligation to make any further payments to the contractor for money due to the latter as at the date of determination which would include payments certified but not paid, payments outstanding for work done but not certified, retention Fund (if applicable), etc. Such an approach is a prudent one as the 92 sums retained may be used to eventually off-set the employer’s claim against the contractor in the Final Account. The PAM Contract 2006 has expressly expanded the restricted on the employer’s scope of payment to include ‘payment which have been certified but not yet paid when the employment of the Contractor was determined’, although it would have been advantageous to also list out the other categories of the said restriction. Nonetheless, this is an improvement over the previous provision.” (emphasis added) There is no mention that this clause amounts to a conditional payment clause or a “pay-when-paid” or “pay-if-paid” clause which is/was not an uncommon construction industry practice. The sums retained by an employer pursuant to Clause 25.4(d) may be used to off-set the cost incurred by the employer to complete the works and all loss and/or expenses suffered by the employer. In this regard, Clause 25.4(d) does not have the effect of postponing payment due until the happening of a later event (in this case until after the final accounts are concluded and works completed) because in all likelihood there would be less or even no payment due to the contractor when that event 93 occurs. This is unlike Section 35(2) when full payment would still be due to the contractor if and when the event occurs. b. Clause 25.4(d) is not peculiar to standard form contracts under PAM but similar variations of the clause are also found in other major standard from contracts such as clause 44.3 of the CIDB Standard Form of Contract for Building Works (2000 Edition), clause 61.4 IEM. CE 2011 and IEM. ME 2012 and clause 56.0 of the PWD Form 203A (Rev 1/2010). These clauses have never been classified or treated as a conditional payment clause or “pay-when-paid” or “pay-if-paid” type clause. c. In addition, the courts in other jurisdictions, which have similar prohibitions to conditional payment clauses in their equivalent to CIPAA legislation have not found that the equivalent to Clause 25.4(d) of their standard form building/construction contracts are in law conditional payment provisions and therefore void. These jurisdictions include UK, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. d. The purpose and object of CIPAA can be derived from the following: 94 i. The long title of Act, which provides that CIPAA is “to facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters”; ii. The Explanatory Statement of the CIPAA Bill, which provides that “The Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2011 (“the proposed Act”) seeks to facilitate regular and timely payment in respect of construction contracts and to provide for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication. The purpose of the proposed Act is to alleviate payment problems that presently prevails pervasively and which stifles cash flow in the construction industry. The proposed Act further provides default payment terms in the absence of provisions to that effect and prohibits conditional payment terms that inhibit cash flow. The Act also seeks to provide remedies for the recovery of payment upon the conclusion of adjudication.” (emphasis added) 95 [128] With respect to the above arguments, it must not be forgotten the context in which the learned authors had opined their views of Clause 25.4(d). It was at a time when CIPAA has not come into being yet and certainly has not come into force yet. The question as to whether that Clause could be caught by the prohibition of section 35 CIPAA was thus not addressed. [129] While there are other major standard form contracts that have a similar clause, the question is whether they fall foul of section 35 CIPAA and not so much as to how many of such similar clauses would be affected if the decision in Econpile were to be upheld. Likewise, though uniformity with other jurisdictions where statutory adjudication is concerned would be a good thing, one would readily admit that while the core concept is the same in many jurisdictions, yet when it comes to the scope of the contracts that comes under the respective Acts and the manner of setting aside the Adjudication Decision and enforcing it is different in different jurisdictions. [130] At the end of the day, our CIPAA is sui generis and that the Courts when confronted with strong opposing arguments as here, with respect to whether a clause is a conditional payment clause, would have to interpret it, giving meaning to the words used in the 96 relevant sections and not forgetting the over-arching purpose of the Act. [131] It is conspicuously clear that our particular provision on what is a conditional payment clause is worded differently from that of other jurisdictions. If our Parliament had wanted to follow other jurisdictions, it could have followed the same definition of a conditional payment clause. In a very real sense there is no need to reinvent the wheel. Instead it had drafted it by way of a clear declaration as a matter of principle in section 35(1) CIPAA that "Any conditional payment provision in a construction contract in relation to payment under the construction contract is void." [132] My reasoning for embarking on a more expansive approach to determining whether a provision in a contract is a conditional payment provision in Econpile is reproduced below for ease of reference: "[80]We are aware that when if the subsection had use the words "(2) For the purpose of this section, "conditional payment" means-",then we are left in no doubt that the 2 examples are exhaustive and permits of no other additional instances of conditional payment terms. If that subsection had used the word "includes" instead of "means" we would 97 also be quite clear and confident that the examples given are by no means exhaustive. [81] However seeing that Parliament had chosen to state a general principle first in s 35(1) and has couched it to be all- encompassing as in the use of the expression "Any conditional payment provision..." I would prefer a more expansive interpretation that would accord with the purpose of the Act. Parliament could have used the expression in s 35(1) as "A conditional payment provision within the meaning of subsection (2)......is void." It could be safely concluded that Parliament had left it to the Court to determine on a case by case basis as to whether a conditional payment term would be defeating the purpose of the Act. [82] For instance if a conditional payment term is merely that the unpaid party as contractor must show proof of payment to his subcontractors before the Employer needs to pay the contractor, such a condition might not be unreasonable and might be good in enhancing corporate governance and efficiency in contracts management. There might well be a myriad of conditions not all of which would be defeating the purpose of the Act. In fact the Explanatory Statement to the 98 Bill reads: "The proposed Act further provides default payment terms in the absence of provisions to that effect and prohibits conditional payment terms that inhibit cash flow." (emphasis added) [83] On the contrary, a condition like Clause 25.4(d) has the effect, upon the termination of the contract, of postponing payment due until the final accounts are concluded and the works completed and that would be defeating the purpose of the Act. Therefore such a clause is void and unenforceable and the Adjudicator may disregard it altogether." [133] As can be seen from the Explanatory Statement to the Bill, it is not every conditional payment provision that will be prohibited; it is only those which has the effect of inhibiting cash flow. Parliament has left it to the Courts to determine whether the condition in the conditional payment provision has the effect of inhibiting cash flow and so thwarting the purpose of the Act. [134] I fully endorse the proposition of law that where the language of an Act of Parliament is clear and explicit, effect must be given to it: 99 a. Hong Leong Bank Berhad v Khairulnizam Bin Jamaludin [2016] 7 CLJ 335, FC; b. Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan v Victoria Jayaseele Martin and Another Appeal [2016] MLJU 41, FC; and c. Andrew Lee Slew Ling v United Overseas Bank (Malaysia) Bhd [2013] 1 MLJ 449, FC. [135] Further where the language used in legislation is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to it. (Chin Chov & Ors v Collector of Stamp Duties [1979] 1 MLJ 69 at 70, FC). [136] It was submitted by the Respondent/Employer that our Parliament intended conditional payment provisions to be confined to the instances expressed under subsection 2(a) and (b) of section 35. It was further argued that any expansion of the definition of conditional payment can be done through Parliament, as was the case in UK. I would venture to say that whilst this is one approach, being a relative latecomer to Adjudicator, we have the experience of hindsight of other jurisdictions and instead of leaving it to Parliament or the Minister (as in Singapore) in charged to make clear other provisional payment terms that may http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.15780491083264703&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T24974860811&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%2523MY%2523MLJ%2523vol%25251%2525sel1%25252013%2525page%2525449%2525year%25252013%2525sel2%25251%2525 100 have the effect of inhibiting cashflow and so is inimical to the object of CIPAA, our Parliament has left it to our Courts to so determine as and when the clauses are so challenged and so to develop the law further from case to case. [137] In fact as pointed out by learned counsel for the Respondent, the experience in the UK that started off with confining a conditional payment provision to a "pay when paid" clause and defining what that means, has now moved to a more expansive approach and to broaden the ambit of such a clause. The UK Parliament later supplemented the section 113 of the Housing Grants, Construction & Regeneration Act 196 ("HGCRA") by introducing section 142 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 that provides as follows: “(1) In the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, section 110 (dates for payment) is amended as follows. (2) After subsection (1) insert— “(1A)The requirement in subsection (1)(a) to provide an adequate mechanism for determining what payments become due under the contract, or when, is not satisfied 101 where a construction contract makes payment conditional on— a. the performance of obligations under another contract, or b. a decision by any person as to whether obligations under another contract have been performed.” (Emphasis added) [138] For instance, if a contract has a clause to state that before a certified payment is released to the Contractor, the Contractor shall show proof of payments to its sub-contractors, one would say that such a condition promotes good corporate governance and contract management for if sub-contractors are not paid, there is every likelihood of not meeting work schedule. Likewise if retention sum shall be released upon the procurement of a Bond in favour of the Employer for the amount released; one would see that as a reasonable condition for release of the retention sum being a security to ensure that defects are being rectified by the Contractor. There may well be a myriad of conditions and certainly not all have the effect of inhibiting cash flow. 102 [139] Singapore thus preserved a measure of latitude with respect to what a "pay when paid" provision is and so left open possible expansion of conditional payment provision in their definition in section 9 SSOPA Act as follows: "pay when paid provision" , in relation to a contract, means a provision of the contract by whatever name called - (a) that makes the liability of one party (referred to in this definition as the first party) to pay money owing to another party (referred to in this definition as the second party) contingent or conditional on payment to the first party by a further party (referred to in this definition as the third party) of the whole or any part of that money; (b) that makes the due date for payment of money owing by the first party to the second party contingent or conditional on the date on which payment of the whole or any part of that money is made to the first party by the third party; (c) that otherwise makes the liability to pay money owing, or the due date for payment of money owing, contingent or conditional on the operation of any other contract or agreement; or 103 (d) that is of such kind as may be prescribed." (emphasis added) [140] Further in Singapore there is an express provision of no contracting out of the Act and with that any clause which has the effect of restricting or prejudicing the operation of their Act may be struck down. Its section 36 reads as follows: "No contracting out 36. (1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any contract or agreement. (2) The following provisions in any contract or agreement (whether in writing or not) shall be void: a) a provision under which the operation of this Act or any part thereof is, or is purported to be, excluded, modified, restricted or in any way prejudiced, or that has the effect of excluding, modifying, restricting or prejudicing the operation of this Act or any part thereof; 104 b) a provision that may reasonably be construed as an attempt to deter a person from taking action under this Act. (3) The Minister may, for the purpose of subsection (2) (a), prescribe the type of provisions in any contract or agreement, or any class thereof, which are deemed to have the effect of excluding, modifying, restricting or prejudicing the operation of this Act or any part thereof. (4) Nothing in this Act shall, except as provided in subsection (1), limit or otherwise affect the operation of any other law in relation to any right, title, interest, privilege, obligation or liability of a person arising under or by virtue of a contract or an agreement." (emphasis added) [141] One may say that the Singapore SOPA has the in-built mechanism to preserve on the one hand the freedom of contract and on the other hand the object of their SOPA in facilitating payments for construction work done. 105 [142] It cannot be denied that the party most affected when there is no regular and timely payments would be the contractors and subcontractors. It is not the Employer for it only needs to pay upon certification whereas the contractor would have to expend time and costs both in labour and material to build to any stages for the purpose of submitting a progress claim to be certified. Though it can be argued that CIPAA is designed for the overall benefit of the construction industry, it is undeniably to help contractors who are most painfully affected when they are not paid for work done or services rendered. They are the more vulnerable ones in the chain of construction and Parliament recognizes that they need protection under CIPAA. Generally it is the contractors who would be in a position to make a Payment Claim and not the Employer and that is because the Employer claim against a contractor would be more in the nature of a damages claim whether under LAD claim, rectification costs or additional costs incurred in engaging a new contractor. These are not Payment Claims under CIPAA but they may be set up as valid defences of set-off against a claimant's claim. [143] It is no comfort to say to a contractor that he no longer has cash flow problems because he does not have to incur more costs 106 in doing further works. The point is that he is already out of pocket for work done. He has to pay his workers, suppliers and bankers. Whilst much may be said about freedom of contract, it is precisely because of the anomalies and aberrations that have arisen that Parliament has intervened to address this undesirable state of affairs. [144] There is nothing preventing an unscrupulous Employer from terminating a contract just to skirt payments of amounts due for work done by the Contractor. Rightly or wrongly, the Contractor would have to vacate the site. Though it is true that the Employer would be exposed to a claim for damages for wrongful termination, the question is whether the Contractor has the financial endurance and resilience to pursue the claim which may not be due until final accounts is completed with the completion of the Project. If the Project is abandoned, the Contractor might have to wait a long while to sue and in the meanwhile it might not be able to pay its sub-contractors who have done the work and if they cannot wait to be paid, they might well wind up the Contractor. Being in liquidation brings in its wake many disabilities with respect to suing and recovering amounts due to it by debtors. 107 This is certainly the kind of domino-effect that CIPAA was designed to avoid. [145] I can appreciate that an Employer too would have its claim when the determination of the contractor's employment is validly done. However, many a time such a claim would not have crystallized yet at point of determination and is still subject to proof even in a case of an Employer's LAD claim because of section 75 Contracts Act 1950 as enunciated in the case of Selva Kumar a/l Murugiah v Thiagarajah a/l Retnasamy [1995] 1 MLJ 817. One does not know how long the contractor would have to wait if he can only claim after final accounts have been issued. The next contractor that is engaged to take over might also default and so the first contractor would have to wait longer still. While the Employer can wait for arbitration to resolve its claim, the contractor has no luxury of time and might well have to languish further inspite of the over-aching principle of the Legislature in facilitating cash flow which for the moment, does not seem to be flowing to him. [146] By no means am I suggesting that Malaysian Employers have a propensity to determine the employment of Contractors to avoid the provision of CIPAA. However clearly Parliament is at 108 liberty to take into consideration past experiences of wrongful termination by Employers and to tailor the Act to meet the problems often suffered by contractors at the receiving end of a wrongful determination of termination of the construction contract. [147] One thing must not be forgotten: that at the end of the day in all these debates into what is a conditional payment clause under section 35 CIPAA and whether Clause 25.4(d) PAM Contract is such a clause, it is a matter of interpreting the relevant clauses on why no payments need to be made and that clearly does not go towards jurisdiction of the Adjudicator. It is a mix finding of fact and law and this Court would not interfere even if the Adjudicator's interpretation is not one that this Court would agree. Whether there has been a breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator referred to case law authorities not cited by the parties [148] The Respondent complained that there has been a breach of natural justice as the Adjudicator had cited cases and made reliance on these decided cases of the courts not cited by either parties and more importantly, they had no opportunity to submit on. It was also contended that these case authorities related to material aspects of the Adjudication Decision in respect of the claim and set-off raised in the Adjudication. 109 [149] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that CIPAA gives vast powers to an Adjudicator with respect to how to determine a dispute before him. It provides under section 25 for the following: "25 The adjudicator shall have the powers to - ...... (d) Draw on his own knowledge and expertise; ..... (i) Inquisitorially take the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision...." (emphasis added) [150] These powers confer upon the Adjudicator the right to draw upon his own experience, knowledge, initiative and industry to consider whatever legal propositions that may be relevant as supported by the cases decided by the courts in our jurisdiction or elsewhere. I do not see this as a breach of natural justice as the breach contemplated by section 15 CIPAA is a material one where the notion of fair play and right to be heard has been blatantly disregarded resulting in patent prejudice to the parties producing a perverse decision. 110 [151] The salutary words of Dyson J in Macob Civil Engineering Ltd v Morrison Construction Ltd [1999] 64 ConLR 1 are worthy of repetition lest we get entangled and ensnared in unnecessary technicalities that have come to characterize many a litigation and arbitration: "14. It will be seen at once that, if this argument is correct, it substantially undermines the effectiveness of the scheme for adjudication. The intention of Parliament in enacting the Act was plain. It was to introduce a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in construction contracts on a provisional interim basis, and requiring the decisions of adjudicators to be enforced pending the final determination of disputes by arbitration, litigation or agreement: see section 108(3) of the Act and paragraph 23 (2) of Part 1 of the Scheme. The timetable for adjudication’s is very tight (see section 108 of the Act). Many would say unreasonably tight, and likely to result in injustice. Parliament must be taken to have been aware of this. So far as procedure is concerned, the adjudicator is given a fairly free hand. It is true (but hardly surprising) that he is required to act impartially (section 108(2)(e) of the Act and paragraph 12 (a) of Part 1 of the Scheme). He is, however, permitted to take the initiative in ascertaining the 111 facts and the law (section 108(2)(f) of the Act and paragraph 13 of Part 1 of the Scheme). He may, therefore, conduct an entirely inquisitorial process, or he may, as in the present case, invite representations from the parties. It is clear that Parliament intended that the adjudication should be conducted in a manner which those familiar with the grinding detail of the traditional approach to the resolution of construction disputes apparently find difficult to accept. But Parliament has not abolished arbitration and litigation of construction disputes. It has merely introduced an intervening provisional stage in the dispute resolution process. Crucially, it has made it clear that decisions of adjudicators are binding and are to be complied with until the dispute is finally resolved." (emphasis added) [152] Likewise in Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Lambeth London Borough Council [2002] EHWC 597 (TCC), it was clarified that the standard applicable to Adjudicator's on the issue of fairness and impartiality and for that matter, natural justice is not the same degree as that required in arbitration or litigation: "29. Nevertheless, in my judgment, that which is applicable in arbitration is basically applicable to adjudication but, in determining whether a party has been treated fairly or in 112 determining whether an adjudicator has acted impartially, it is very necessary to bear in mind that the point or issue which is to be brought to the attention of the parties must be one of which is either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant. It is now clear that the construction industry regards adjudication not simply as a staging post towards the final resolution of the dispute in arbitration or litigation but as having in itself considerable weight and impact that in practice goes beyond the legal requirement that the decision has for the time being to be observed. Lack of impartiality or of fairness in adjudication must be considered in that light. It has become all the more necessary that, within the rough nature of the process, decisions are still made in a basically fair manner so that the system itself continues to enjoy the confidence it now has apparently earned. The provisional nature of the decision also justifies ignoring non- material breaches. Such errors, if apparent (as they usually are), will be rectified in any negotiation and settlement based upon the decision. The consequence of material issues and points is that the dispute referred to adjudication will not have been resolved satisfactorily by any fundamental 113 standard and the chances of it providing the basis for a settlement are much less and the chances of it proceeding to arbitration or litigation are much greater. However the time limits, the nature of the process and the ultimately non- binding nature of the decision, all mean that the standard required in practice is not that which is expected of an arbitrator. Adjudication is closer to arbitration than an expert determination but it is not the same." (emphasis added) [153] Looking at the cases cited which the Respondent counsel said he had no opportunity to submit on and distinguish, I am more than satisfied that they do no more than set out basic propositions of law that the Adjudicator was relying on. They do not material affect the outcome of the decision. It would be as good as the cases have not been referred to at all. [154] I doubt even in an appeal, where the merits of a decision can be delved into, one would be able to succeed on the ground the trial judge had referred to cases not cited by the parties. That would be to discourage further research and initiative by the Judge especially when in some cases, research by counsel or the lack of it is so telling that the trial Judge could not wrote a proper speaking judgment of substance and coherence with 114 substantiating it with court decided cases, always of course within the disputes as set out in the pleadings. [155] This ground of breach of natural justice is therefore dismissed as being unmeritorious. Whether the Requirements of Section 16(1)(a) or (b) of CIPAA 202 are met for stay of the Adjudication Decision [156] The Respondent had applied for stay of the Adjudication Decision under section 16(1)(a) or (b) CIPAA. Alternatively, the Respondent shall deposit the Adjudicated Sum with the Director of KLRCA pursuant to section 16(2) CIPAA. [157] S. 16(1)(b) CIPAA provides that “A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: b) the subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or court.” [158] It was submitted by the Respondent that this requirement was met when the Claimant commenced arbitration proceedings by serving a Notice of Arbitration on the Respondent on 11.11.2015. [159] However the condition that there is a pending arbitration is only a threshold condition for the Court to consider stay. In 115 Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 286, Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in deciding on whether to grant a stay of the Adjudication Decision under CIPAA, examined the cases in other jurisdictions namely; England, Singapore, New South Wales, Australia and found that the Malaysian context of CIPAA is no different. The Judge further held: “[27] Since the defendant has itself issued a notice of arbitration in which it has raised the very same matters that it had raised in the adjudication, sub-s 16(2) operates. That is not to say that simply because the dispute or subject matter of the adjudication decision is now in the arbitration mode regime, the grant of stay is automatic. It is not, let alone as of right or as a matter of course. Being in arbitration merely puts the plaintiff’s case as one within s 16 for consideration; or one which has crossed the threshold. The existence of concurrent proceedings merely prequalifies the plaintiff for this application. [28] At all times, the court retains the discretion as to whether or not to grant a stay and that is obvious from the language and terms of s 16. In fact, sub-s 16(2) vests the court with discretion whether to grant the stay sought; whether to order 116 the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of KLRCA; or make any other order as the court thinks fit. Upon overcoming the threshold set in sub-s 16(1), the plaintiff still has to show how the discretion is to be exercised in its favour. ... [56] ...The purpose of the (CIPAA) Act is to ensure that successful claimants are paid and paid promptly even though the adjudication decisions are provisional in nature. The Defendant must pay the adjudicated sum failing which it is available to the successful claimant to consider the next appropriate course of action. Notwithstanding these provisions, the Court retains the power to grant stay of the enforcement of the adjudication decision. It does so in order to secure the ends of justice. [57] Therefore, to allow stay to be explored in any other circumstances may be argued to stymie the efforts of Parliament where payment disputes in construction contracts are concerned. It may even render the laudable benefits which the Act is intended to bring, illusory and unachievable. 117 [58] Here, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has simply not offered any reason, cogent or worthy of examination, to warrant a stay. As amply shown in case law from other jurisdictions, reasons must be offered. Each of those reasons will be examined. If those reasons pertain to the financial status of the Defendant as one of doubtful solvency or near insolvency, the Court still needs to examine why that may be the case. In our present case, the Plaintiff has not even offered those reasons for the Court’s consideration. Instead, it has offered evidence of its own financial status; that it is in the position to pay up.” (emphasis added) [160] Likewise in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 305, Ravinthiran Paramaraguru J observed inter alia that “an application for stay of an Adjudication Decision under section 16 of CIPAA is sui generis. It must be considered against the scheme and purpose of CIPAA. The discretion under section 16 must not be exercised in the same manner as ordinary applications for stay of execution or stay of proceedings as it may defeat the objective of Parliament in promulgating CIPAA in the first place.” 118 [161] It would not be right to say that in the present case that a stay would not defeat the purpose of CIPAA as the Claimant has already been terminated and therefore would not need to expend further monies on the Project. Such an argument glosses over what is due to the Claimant for work already done and the practical reality that the Claimant has to pay its workers, suppliers, sub-contractors and financiers to name a few. Practically too one does not expect a Contractor worth its salt to have just one project on-going for his success, if not survival; he would have other projects afoot which would require cash flow as well. It is the construction industry as a whole that CIPAA is concerned with. [162] Learned counsel for the Respondent marshaled a vast array of reasons to show that it has a meritorious case on appeal. That I must say is not relevant for the purpose of a stay application for the obvious reason that if one's appeal is not meritorious, one should not even have contemplated and pursued an appeal. I can do no better than to draw from the wisdom of Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in Subang Skypark when she observed as follows: "[31] This court is of the view that the defendant should not be deprived of the very benefit of why it resorted to 119 adjudication in the first place; save if satisfactory reasons are present for a stay of that adjudication decision. [32] It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration." (emphasis added) 120 [163] Nothing has been shown by the Respondent with respect to doubting the solvency of the Claimant or for being anxious of a near insolvency situation. Aspersions were cast on the Claimant's financial viability by the Respondent's reliance on a hearsay evidence of one Mr Goh Kok Kheng, an architect practising in Johor Bahru, who could vouch for the fact that the Claimant has difficulty paying its sub-contractors and suppliers on time. That is speculative and "clutching at straws". Surely more cogent and convincing proofs are necessary to further deprive of the Adjudicated Sum until the disposal of the Arbitration. [164] Who would not have such a problem, assuming that it be true, when kept out of a sum of RM8.2 million (Adjudicated Amount) since 2015? As was observed by Coulson J in Wimbledon Construction Company 2000 Ltd v Vago [2005] EWHC 1086 (TCC) at para 26: "(f) Even if the evidence of the claimant’s present financial position suggested that it is probable that it would be unable to repay the judgment sum when it fell due, that would not usually justify the grant of a stay if: (i) the claimant’s financial position is the same or similar to its financial position at the time that the 121 relevant contract was made (see Herschell Engineering Limited v Breen Property Limited); or (ii) the claimant’s financial position is due, either wholly, or in significant part, to the defendant’s failure to pay those sums which were awarded by the adjudicator (see Absolute Rentals v Glencor Enterprises Limited, unreported 16th January 2000)." [165] I am satisfied that the contemporaneous documents before the Court demonstrated that the Claimant is in a reasonably healthy financial position inspite of being deprived of payments under the Payment Claims. Its audited account of 2015 showed a net asset of RM37 million. See Exhibit TZG 3 Enclosure 6 in the Claimant's Affidavit to oppose the setting aside. [166] The Respondent has also relied for its stay application, on the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in S A Shee & Co (Pte) Ltd v Kaki Bukit Industrial park Pte Ltd [2000] SGCA 7 where the Court held in paragraph 36 that: “Furthermore, the rationale for giving temporary finality to an interim certificate could no longer hold good when the contract had come to an end. The contractor would not be 122 carrying out any more work. So the need to minimise “cash flow problems” for the project no longer existed.” [167] The above case does not deal with the issue of a stay but rather with whether a summary judgment is not appropriate under circumstances where the party treating the contract as repudiated is entitled to withhold payment on interim certificate. I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant, Mr Gananathan, that it provides little assistance as a guide to the exercise of discretion under section 16 CIPAA. [168] The Respondent highlighted that this is not a case of the impecunious construction Contractor who has not been paid at all by the Employer. On the contrary, the Respondent has already paid to the Claimant a substantial amount of monies amounting to RM33,139,605.55 for Certificates 1 to 13. It needs only be said that the fact of previous payments for work already done is no justification for withholding payments for work subsequently done. It matters not that the Claimant has been previously paid for the previous interim certificates. It certainly cannot be a case where "if I have been generous and a good paymaster in the past, you must extend some grace to me in the present". 123 [169] The fact that the Respondent/Employer is financially capable to pay and secure the Adjudicated Sum, if required by this Court, is no justification for not paying the Claimant the Adjudicated Sum. [170] I find no real justification to grant either unconditional stay or a stay subject to terms of the Adjudication Decision bearing in mind the overarching purpose of CIPAA which is to facilitate cash flow in the construction industry and to give effect to an Adjudication Decision unless it is overtaken and superseded by an Arbitral Award or a Judgment of the Court after litigation. Pronouncement [171] In the upshot I would dismiss the application to set aside the Adjudication Decision and the other prayers in the said OS and allow the application in the OS to enforce the Adjudication Decision with a single costs of RM20,000.00 and allocator to be paid before order of costs is extracted. The payment of the Judgment Sum is to be made before the expiry of 14 days from today. [172] The Respondent/Employer's application for stay of the Adjudication Decision under section 16(1)(b) CIPAA is also 124 dismissed as there is no valid ground to grant stay. It has not been shown that the Respondent can reasonably conclude that they would not be able to get the payment back in the event they should succeed in arbitration. Dated: 24 February 2017. - sgd - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in : Ivan Loo together with OS WA-24C-57-07/2016 : Shannon Rajan and and for the Defendant in : Tatvaruban Subramaniam OS WA-24C-82-08/2016 : (Messrs Skrine) For the Plaintiff in : P Gananathan and Ng Yee Chien OS WA-24C-82-08/2016 (Messrs Gananathan Loh) and for the Defendant in OS WA-24C-57-07/2016 Date of Decision: 17 November 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-83-11/2013

PLAINTIF KER CHOON SIONG DEFENDAN 1. ) LIM KOK HWA 2. ) XIANG YI ENTERPRISE SDN BHD 3. ) XIANG YE ENTERPRISE

23/02/2017

YA DATUK WIRA HALIJAH BINTI ABBAS

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=fef65134-7fcf-470d-8342-ca7378e904e5&Inline=true

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Mahkamah Ini man merIo|ak kslsmngan Pnanlmersezm Mamcamn ini Isiah msnalifi kalsrlngan sp 1 Iain: peguam yang msnyediakan ' Snare Agreement ~ bersehm. sp 1 law Feguam yang manyudiskan ' Shale Agreement ' Ielah memheri kenurangan behawa warms-Kenna ~ Snare Agreement " «em. amass uleh Plsinlii dan Delendan Penama av dalam Bmssa Gina. Memandangkan sv 1 tidak bnlah msmbaca Iukan clna, kadua-dua meuska ram beraaaama zzmvr.-$u—2au ~1mIuxwNsn4A'.vuMmxMwAuv.u<r.um rnsnjalaskan semua henna-Ierma yang tslnh dipazselujui eleh mereka kepaaa sm sebelnm SP1 menurunkan semula Carma-lerma Iarsebul at flalam ' Shale Aglaamanr ' SP1 luga nexah mernbeli ketarangsn bahawa Plainllt ddak we |angsung menimbulkln Ianung apmapa wanu yang dlkatalmn wmmang nlah Darsnnen Penarna atau netenuan Ksdua kepadanya ssmasa mereim dsnang wjumpa dengannya. Oieh ‘nu iika terdnpalnyi perjanjlan nsan, Mahkamah inl berpsndapal sudah semeslmya Plnimif akan menyuavakannya kepada SP1. fidak ad: kaunangan Iengsung mangaual rardnpatnya pajanjian lain mu perjanllan Isan rnengenai - amourvl due to dirsnols ' unluk penjualan saham ash Plamm kapam Datenaan Panama di dulam syalikal Ienabut. s) Terma dl dawam " Sham Agreement " adalah hams.-sarkan kapma pernelujunn kadul plhsk dan Karma- terma versebnt Ielahpun disadiakan aleh keduamua pinak 2zru:v(.l1~n-Inn Kncuoonslnnnvuumxnwnnzvnunum u... u walaupun Kaila "LI dlssdlskan dl dalum Banam Gnu. Teadapal Hausa di dalam ' Sluts Agrsemsm ' Iersshm manganai penqumsan syarlkal dan ohllgasi syarlkat lelah beiplndah seasnuhnya kapma Dstsndan Panama mm psmbali. Tidak ana langsung klansa yang msmpevumukkan menfienai ubliqisi syarikal Defandan Ksuua unmk msmbuat pemhayatan lain yang akan limbo! selevas ‘ Shale Apmemenz ' lersebnt dmmdaungnnv. Plainlil telah masih rnsnjadi Penglrah av dallm Dafendln Ksdua analan bsrlulnan umuk memaslikan haknya mau kepermngannya fidak lsrgngal atau diaaiahgune oiah Dafandan Panama sanagi pemblyalan RM2.5 Ma belum dllslaskan sepemmnya oleh Detendan Panama. Dalnm erfikala lain, kenadrannya sebaqli Penqarnh adalah unluk mumasfikan pembuyllsn pemm dlbaal kepmenya dan unluk memasnkan Delendsn Panama fidsk memecah perjanjian yang dilandatanganl. zxrtcvuuzu nu —nxLunn)<smwnvuMxnxwAnvAucu|n mus 1) Mahkamah lnl jnga valan mennnnengkan man keterangan $02 Iaiau Juruaudn bebas yang dilamik umuk mengnudil kawangan flan akaun caveman Ksdua. suz. «am: Member! keuanangan bahawa melalui nudk yang dijalankannys. dis Isiah Inendapan‘ ' amount due 10 dimI:1oIs ' Ialaehut «elm dihuynr kepeda Plnimif Dada tanun 2011. S132 lelah memhali penlelasan dengan pan1ang lebat akan meugapalahun 2011 «snysmnmak tsruafllllaflihulang alnu ‘amount due to «mm-' Iallu kapudaFlalmJ1. sue menyalakan den lejurdan msokong oleh - balance sheet -, dia man rnsnaspsu syariknl hanyn parlu membayar kepudl seuvang Pengarah sans]: unluk «apman kewangan mhun 2:111 dan 2012. sn2 telah menyataknn dis tnlah manawnakan perkataan “ amount due to dmsciou ' dl dalnm llmuan kerwangsn zon kerana am pemandingan dengan lahun 2010. s02 telah jugn memben kelsmngan hahawa audvtan yang dijalarfxannya bemuazkan kaaadl dnkwuen-flokumen yang Isiah disaulakan clan pmak Peugumsm Syarikal itu z:ucK—u.n.zu1:.x'nLL»wNsIwavuMunxuwu2v.u<:un m-mm. sendlri. snz man msngemukmn lapurau tsisabut kepada pihak Fengurusan sebelum din menendalangani lapuran wersehul. Msnnrul SD2. an Ierdlpat we-Ipa kesilupan. snz nkun memhannrkan plhnk Pangurusan rnembual pembelulan sebsmm auditan muktamad fllkeluavkan. Nsmun. pembelulan hanya huleh dibual jika msokong nleh dokumen-dokumen yang sah dan bevkenaan. Tsaak temapalnya pemheaulan yang dlbual oleh plhak Fangurusnn syavikal yang balah menunjukkan lsvdapatnya jumlah 'smnunt due ro dlrscmls ' uepaua Plaintif. Olen nu so 2 Isiah mangsaahkan bahawa jumlah HMuo.vJ2s.9s Inrsnbul yang nlkalakan - amount due to wrecnars tehn dinayan seoemmnya bemasaman semul dokurnen yang dihekalkan oleh pihak Pengnruun. g) spa, iaitu amnq yang bsnanggungjawab di dalam panyedllnn Iknun syflrikul Nga lslnh bsrulujn .14 dalam kelerangannya bahawa bayauamnayavan yang dibunl bngw znu -IrucuwM:mNuvLn4mxuwAnvAMu|l n-17 plhak Plalmfl kepada Lembaqa Has'| Dalsm Negen mes1i dirakamkln di daxam new ~ amount due In diractols " Ker Chnnn Slang. Tedapi Inl max dllnkukan. n) Mehkamah . telah rnenuklk nuilhnn Plnimil bahawn behan man belplnnah kepena Derlanuan Panama urwuk me-nbukukan bahava pembayaran telah dimm kepeda Puaanm saperluhrvyn rrlangsnni --mom auu no A1lr9c1ms" lnl. seksyenunuma Keterangan 1950 adalah jevas memperumumn bahawa aesispa yang ingin msndupal pangn-man Ives ape yang dllunlul hendaklah dla rnernbukflkannya. olen nu bemmman vans flan ksletunqnn yang saa, Plainm mlah gagsl mambukllkln hamawu beldapllnyn |umIah yang xsmuung ksgadanyu. Juga Piuimif man gags! msrnhukfikan hahavra ism-iaalnya salu palisnjian yang beraslngan menganal mnmmn ‘ amount due to dnscrurs " lnl. Dsiendan Penarna juga Ielah gagal memhuktikan jumlah zamm n—2au —1nmLum><szmK.vuMmK)ntAA2mmLAm m. u E13 bersabut lug: mmmang kspedanya keiana manurul ksievangan S02 lam Juruauusx yang dslang mambsri kemermgan Ialah manymakan prruk xyallkat Hdak ads bsvhumng dengan Pangarnh am kesemua nayuan lelanpun dibual Men pihak syalikat. Sam: am parkongslan caveman Kama man pun diseluuikan ulanwa Ptaimit dan Delendan Panama? Jlka belum ulselesalkan banana jumlah wung yang masih (emmang oleh nersnuan Panama dan /Atau zzucvux. perkongsian Deiandan Kefiga kupadn Hnlmm Plainlil telah menunwt unmk iumllh-iumk-1h harikul di dalam perkongalan Delandan Kaugu a) Jumlah RM25I.B03.31 iailu sepaluh daripada jumlah nM5na,a1e.e2 yang Ielalu wamnu ulah oelenaan Ferlama darl akaun perkongsian. mu -I:EI<avmNmnnvuHxnxnwAnvuIcun1 r... I9 b) RM45.:9u2.o1 yang masih lag herhnmng blah perkongsinn Delendan Kaliga. c) RM75,0au.Do Jumlnh modal yang Maburkan. .1) nM15a.72a.19 separuh dari iurnlah kaunmngan - Iemlned aamlng " nebanyak HM:sos,4ss.as yang balum dlaglhkan dalaln pevkcngsian Defendan Ksfiga. u) Pmnm berganlung kepada Botany Nyata Psrkongsian Devendan Ketiga begi txhun takslran 2011 knususnya av AI/so yin); msnyalaken pelknngsian tarsebui mempunyal asst semasa RMa59,594.oo, akaun mmal RM15o,ooo.on dan baki akaun semasa hamar adalah sshanyak RM3W.458.00. Plalnm ]ugu mengnujshkan bahawa Boning Nyatn Parkmgmu ini mun dlsahkan oieh Datendan Kaligu. Plalnllf meluluk kepaaa kelevangan SD5, ilhu " tax age!!! ' yang min?! hlflll sehagai saksi saniua netenamnetenuan. z1uLvc4x—u¢unrxncnoauslmuzvuulnxmtnn zumiunl r...:o s. Juga Plninlif dnn Doconum Panama havsama due ornng lain mempakan perknugslan dl aaiam sehuah parkangsian bemama LV Mum Enterprise. 7. Fada seknar bnlan Mei dun/stau Jun 2011, Delendan Panama bercadsnu msmblli semna saham Plamiv di dalam syazikm Datendan Kedua. Sam ' share Agrssmam ' (Perianjlnn Jual Bah Saham) «gun H dilandstangsni bananikh 2016/2011. Namun, Pininlfl masih kekal ‘r,;|sn]adi Pengavan Defovman Kadua sahinggalah keaamua huge pembelian saham mbayni sepenuhnya nleh De-fendan Pennmu. e. Plaimlf ma ingin mmnk diri dari lunar Spring Emarprise dan Plamm (alah manerlma HM2.5 luta‘ Semua baki us: flan wung dalam Super spnng Enterprise nkan dvniliki nlah Defendan Panama. Paugakuan penerimaan RM 25 IBVIGDIII (Shh dhandumngani olsh Plalnm pads 20/6/20! 1. 11.uI:v:-n:x- mu Knu¢mNsmw.vuMmx)<ItIu1vAML4II< u...s n.N:v( III) sos lelah mermeri keterurmn bahawl penghurnng syariksk umuk kesemua jumhh versemn adalah Defendan Panama. SD 5 rnamber‘: kslavangan berdasarkan Iejardi A1/34a dan AI/551‘ wauubagulmana pun apanua dlsoal semula oleh pegunm Dsfendun-Delenaan SD 5 telah memberi kemrangan bahavm menulul ' nulance sheaf ' semua Wang vunwl Ielah pun dlkslualkan sepenuhnya‘ Dh.SoanI1ynumann'on9dthalthh.smnIIas been My mm arawni By the Partners. Fuliy wimirawn by We fialfn9I!7 Yes. Because it's qune mzsleadxng mo, 9 Ifweconlinuefnpmmalmanasseruflhe company. Because ssoms hka, rnspatmsris notgulngtadolfvebusnessinthscanlparvy anymore. Because they have wnmrawn me 1unm*bnnmsL'ompany1n2011“ mu -xnc>|1>m1:uMmvuMmu»wAnvAvIcLAn »...u sn 5 juga menyatakan kssemua wang an dalam Defendan 3 telnh dikalunrkan dalnm Iamm 2011 keouali baki RM! 279.77. Namun SD 5 Ida): menymakan bahawa unluk penyam 2011. innya bsrkail dungun pervyala 2011 mg menunjukkan mnsih (amapal yang temmana seoanyak nm5s,4sa.aa ssdanqkan di ualam ksternngannya lerdahulu Isiah menyatakan sejumlah nesar wang telah flikeluarkan ulah psngknngai-pengkongsi dalam tahun 2011 dam hnnys finpgal RM1,2Ts.77 sahuja. sos member! kelerangan menglkul pendapalnya tardapat kaitan kerana nemasarkan yang dis Islsh mellhat kepada - Balance Shea! " yang ada. ‘a: mked back which has been wim\1rxwn7 A: I want nu say it linked bank. because If they st!/I can withdrawn anufher I59.ooo, means /think meir Balance sum 1: not suppnssdm be zzm' zznzva-:ux—2nu—1axn¢m>4 mus vuu rmtmvuu 1 mm LADI »...zz iv) Setanjulnya so 5 Ielah mamban kexauangan yang hslbsu. bemeza iawwannya apabila disoal nleh psguam Plahllfl dun dlsoal samulu men peguam Defendan rnengenal mnang oleh pengkangsi. "a: Ok.IIparIneIsowh-zgmoneytcmepannershbvwrhe business‘, yau saidmersmustbe, youbeflsve Mere musfbea - A: The Balance Sheet sure they have same ngures of nn9dabo'1andonecmdIlsIds,appearIn masses! and Ilabllity account. Fallaw m 2012 BaL5nc9 Sheet. basicalw man can I say ls , /‘us! now. me pamsra ms wimdrnwn amyming Irom ms conwany. ‘rhelelsnoparmersuwtnglolhe wmpanyarvdlhecompanynlsanolowfngmme partners. Nothing an inside this company.’ zmcvc-u.n.2m:.xunmx1N5I»<uVm4n:KnwuzvMIcLAm Saberusnya SD 5 menyamkan: ‘O: Saar-onenam1th'smoneybek:ng,romspumers. on the minor mm-1, this money As owing oyme ;nrIn9I& 0: Hovnhawvdawsbalallca I‘IIaf70nlIrsonHhandft ihoutdbegn/enralhapanners. onanenandts awingbymspam-»ers.sahowdowehaksncs7 A: it they want, still want ra mnnlng mls lhsrakcanpmltbacktlndruthpsnnsrship account. 1: may want aaminus running ml: oonpany. Jug: so 5 manyataksn. -a: So meallinymsayonlyiflheywsrmm continue mnning the partners. partnership then they will pm back In money? zn<cv:u.n«1m3 mllcuwu smvun wKnwAazvAm um v...» unam- A: Ag-In. Yes a: $omat’sMIyyvJusEyi(‘suwingbythem1nIhs pannelsnlp. am um money rghlly belongs Ia mm ofthemi A: Yes,/HIIe;ywaIntucoI|rIrIue,rInsyIxnpuI)rDack again. - v. ouen an an ;nwapan-jawapnn sos bersabul. Mahlcamah ini Iidak dspal sam jawaoan yang nepat dan spesmk umuk diuhkan behuwa aamemangnyu Deleman Panama tslnh bemulang kepada Piaindl. Esmnsanran cam flan ketsrangan sus yang Plalnflf bersanaarkannn. Mahkamah in? iidak mamapal mu lawupln yang lapul dun wan mengssahkan kabsmutangan Dslandan Panama an dalam perkongsnan Delendan Kaaiga. Uleh nu hujahan Flainlil dinolak oleh Mankanun hi. znu »nluwu><sM<avuumxIMAnvAmu|u runs uxmcm V1. Begum lugs dengan kelarangan spa. spa man mung yang manguruskan nan mmyediakan kswsngan oevenaan Katina mas perssluiuan kedua-dna phak. Narnun kalsmngan sF4 lnl luga Iidak komlstan mangsnal penyedlaan pervyala akaun dhual ulsnm. spa «scan member! keterangan bahnwa nenyma kawnnuan mm dluhah ataudipinda. SP4jum lslah mengaku bnnawa \a]ar-law amen munch dengan menggnnakan kovnpnlsv uas. sn=4 luga telah menyllin dokumsn- dekumsn dl dallm uas Accounting smsm ke mum pen awe sehqgai -' back-qn copy '. levtnpl malangnya spa sendvi Hank ingal samada temapalnya ‘pen drive’ tsrsehul dislmpan olahnya. Hnnya mum bevbincang dengan pagunmnya, bahamlah sm ledngat Gan Vela): cubn menrali Psn dnvs tsrsebut. Persoalan Iimbul disini. msngapakah “ Pen nmve " Ieraabut mm mm dikemuknn pufla panngkll Iwal man Keleungan spa adalah sangai meeagukan: 5.“ selapas knml hinmng darvgan Jumn vam, ham flaps! rahu aua pen dnve lni uan bamlah says cari pen dlivs in’ Kanapa spc menggunakan perkataan ' ham dapa! mm "7 Adakah Ielar Isiah diubnh unmk «man nmnmm ini? Leinr-leiar umun zon ]ug| mum mm dlkamuknknn dl Mnhkamah umuk diperllmbangkan ulah Mahkamah ini. vll. Keslmpulan yang dlpelolnhl man Mahkamah ml lalan: a) Iknun-Iklun dun dokumem-uokumen perkonuslan tslah dlkemukakan kepeda Jmuaunn umuk mluan Isanran audit kawungan pevkongsian dan Iuga umuk LHDN. . n) Semua penyala aéaun dan dakumen yang dlaudll severli leiar dan“baIancsshset" umuk Iahun oalam pmaman disedllkan olah plhlk punyurusun iaim oleh SP4. m«JI-:xLu—zmz —n.|cuwuslwc.vuMmKm(Auum um 7-an nutvols. 1:) SP4’ nl mar]: dnngln Plalnllf am merrlpunynl ksdskapan am. kewangan flan mempunyal kebolshan umuk menguhah man meminda nkaun. d) _,Hu|ahan Prainfit sandiri menyalakan tzrdapal dua set dokumen danlateu akaun yang bsvmnmah. 019?: mu bagalmanakah Mnhkumah inlumuk msmasllkan bumawa mmmxn Plainhf ini adalan mnmtan nemasaman um penyaln nkaun yang mum e) Saksi Defandan juga sue orang yang menoetak ksluar aluun lug: lidnk mu manuaula Iavdapamya pememn m nahaghn reference mengenal ttansalmi. asrnasaman !akta di ma Iur"nuIan Plainfii mengenau Iumlah-jumlah yang dkmakan maslh uemuung kapwdnnya Ielnh mmak olen Mahkamuh mi. Ion .mzc>InnN§m<nvuMInKwwA|1‘mccLAm . « 1! Lanaaung rind. bnkll msnganal um ylng ad: an da|amSunev5Dv1ng Emevpvise. A 3., gm} My mum mgak Meuurmi Glnflrufi Dlsebnhlmn Psngmhilan Pekafi Ming. 5 s 4 1. Flalnmlalah magnujmuagu bahawa Delsndan Panama Ielah seem? salah merrI'ndahkan'Iebm kulang 45 orang pekeria using yang dimiliki olah perkongsian uevanmn mg: kepndu Dsleodan Kedua Ianpa apaaraa balasan flarlpada plhak Delsndan Kedua tanpa palselujuan Plaimif. walaubagasmam pun nujnnan Ini dilolwlx oleh Mahlcamah lnl berdasarkan iakla berikm:- a) Plamlif sendiri Isiah bersstuju unmk menandacangani dokumen unmk meminuahkan pemm pakeua using perkongainn Daiandun Kaligu ks Delandln Kedua. Fermohonan Isiah hdak bsqaya. mm ;S . ,1‘ h} smslah kalnar can parkonglnn uana Inhun 2011. Platnm telah meugunan likinannya dan lelah mammal Iaporsn poxis meuueuas kefieuaan permit peitarjn asing den perkmguau Detendun Kedua pudn Inrlun zuvz. ‘VDe1endan Fenama man berjaya mendapatksn pamm unmk pekaril aszng Iersahnl Plainm menaalakan parmononan Deiendan Panama pads lanun 2012 masbul Iidsk msndapul parsetujuannya. men nu beliau bemak , mandapaflun gumlrugi. Walaubagalmana nun. kelulusan dlbual oleh Ksmamerlin Damn Nagavl. Walaupun kemungkinan Defendan Panama lslah meodauat kaumungan nan hlsil pekaria Mina Iersebnn. Plainlfl sepatulnyn llflak lagi berhak Havana Flallllfl lelah pun meningqankgn pevknngsian.1”n1ak dibuklikan sama ad: persefizjuan Pluimif yang Isiah dwandnmnuininya «emu fllgunakan oleh netanaan umuk psmlndahan palceril axing pads Iahun 2012 nersebut. Plainuf lugs lelah muméum aduan nudamnun zomamaaap zzucv(4:—1|—1nu—xntunaN xmomvuu x m. xvmmn n.» 9. ma Sentembev eon. Defsndnn Panama Ielah memasukl saw "Shares Agreement’ uengan Plaimil, Ker Chmzn Boon dsn Lim Cher Kwsng can Deqanun Panamn belah manjunl 25% saham yang Lflmillkinya kepada Pminm Ka Choon Boon flan Um cm Kwang. * '1"o. Pads zsm/zon, Plnlnm man msnyadlakan aerao Ikatan Pembubaran Perkongslan unluk membubarkan perkongsun merska fli dslam Dalenoun Kmiga. Nnmun fiduk ma peqannan an tandatanganl oleh kedua pmak. 1: Plain!!! menynlukan vardapot ‘amount due za «mm - maxlh mg. mmurang kepadanya dan belum mnmr oleh Deéendan Ksdua kepaua Plaimil walau RM2.5juIn welsh awn‘ uerima nlshnya. 12. F'ihak»Plhak bememju akan fakta bahawa ksarnua akaufu 31/gr“-i<ac Deténdan Kedm dun akaun parkungsian Defevman Kefiga adulan dlumskan aleh sm. mlcnwr<mNoVuMmKuwAnvAmLAlII mu Datendan-Dsiandan kepada pihakbblis flan iuga pihak Imsqman. Tlngluhlnku Pleinm am mum manunjukkan dla mm lagi berminm Iamadaa peueua mung tersebul. Halnm aiesmo dari membum mnlman ksrann man narsenuu pad: rvgulanya‘ c} Tlada mnyaukan apakan keruglan yang dialaminya. Oleh nu, herdasman kstemngan dan lama yang we. wntulan gamimgi ocah Plamm lelah dmlak oleh Mnnkuuanlnl. 4- Mahkamah Inl lelah membenarlran runmlan bales Delendan Panama umuk prayer (n) ningga (:1) sanajn. ’ 1. Prayer (a) ~ deklarasl hahawa pérkongszan amara Plainfil dsngan Deraman Psnzuna dalam perkmlgsian Ksfiga di bubarkan nun man dinnguan lelan dlhublr pads mm/2m 1. zxmm mum —Knuno~sAm4z.vuulnKw«AAzvAmuuI w... n Pvayev. (a) ini dibenarkan anus alasan-alasan berikul:— I) Plamm Ielah msngnamar Dseduiulssalulion of Pamlsrshb kepada Defiendan Ferrama nanamm 2::/11/2011 yang manyamkan ' I am olme view ml snnum no ranger remain as a pam-»eIa!X;angW Enterpfse ' Bevdlsarlmn aural lni, Mahkamsh berpsndapak Iarikh nu bermuuanya pevknngslan Inl dlbubatkan mennml seksyen 34 M03 Pelknngsian 1951. Untuk mernbsri ksssn kspada pemmnamn ini. Mahlmmah membenarkan prayer :1 my nlnggn 37 (a) Penyata Pemhelaan flan Tumutan aauas Defeudan Perlama. IV) Mahkamah In: jugs telah menlmbangkan akan ketevangan sos yang telah membed kwtsrangsn bahaws (lmk Iemapalnyn lugihakiwang avdaum benyaxa akaun perknngslan. su 5 Lela]: memberi merangan bahawa pe«ongsvan—perkougsian cezan mangsmbfl kaluar mndal umcmmu -KnnmxmxM<uv|.|u mkuwnozvnau um mm fiM15o.oao.uo um keunlungm rarkumpul sahanynk fiM309;458.38 pads tahun 201 I. no mm» jugs mm berseauju ax dnlnm kelulngannya , bshavga dis lalah mengambllkira wanglhulang yang hslum «mum; uan hnnranwsuraru yang bohm dibayar saperi di dalam keteranqannyn :* ‘» ‘A: Yang Am, uni an. akuun yang moat. Dleh llu kaml Kira da)am Isnm kurang sahaja ' um menumukkan xeauwua piuak relah barawuju urwuk msmbuhaman palknngslan mevaka an dalam perkongstan ; Deiendan Kenna nan mmeka velar: rrvendapat bahajan mnsing-maxing satalnh perkiraan dibual olsll murska. iv) Sum dam ‘renuan Abdnllsh & co jugs Isiah manymakan husml phlk-plhlk umnk msmhuharkan zzNI:«;1a.n—2uu—Knmx1nsnNuvLx>4mK>lwAAzvAnzLAn1 n. :2 psrkangsiun mereka di dnlnm perkmgsian Deiandan Ksliga. 2. Prayev (e) a (I) asuuak ksmna lsrdapalnya maungan bahawn Iidak ada Dengiraan den mun yang laps! msngenainya. Hujahan ‘Defamlan aendiri rnangalakan mhlwa sajnmlnh nM2.5 Jma adalah ' lumlah yang mdkuunsd umuk margmnamn psmzngauan (araehm. Juga. Plainfll Isiah mengakul dan lerdapat akaun terlma akans (enam) kewna cek Alianoe Bank and. an oak Super Spnng Emarprise can akaun at uos Bank Malaysia aemaa yang kesemuanya beriumlah HM2.5 iura. 3. Mankamah bemendapal, unluk prayet (g) lam unluk mmuran gamrimgi unaksmn iaitu oevrnasnk ganlirugi am, khas, leladan denlnlau mamburukkan parlu almk keranl um an. spa-spa ksmangan yang manynknng bagi mambolehkan Mahkamah ini membenarkannya. zzncvuuml-znll-xacnnmcsammvu-4InxnwAn2vAunm)1 mm gguruuu Mas imhangsn keberangkadlarb 1. Tumnan Hamm monk kersns Iidak am keterangan yang tepal mengenai akaun yang mennnjuklvan nemapaxm bukli hntang yang halum dinayu kepadanya ouen nevandan- Defendan. 2. Tunlman balas netanaan Penxrna ainananun umuk pembubllan pelkangalan ax dalam parkougslan Deiandan Kaliga kerana Ieldapatnya kererauqafi yang manunjukuuan nermm pihakvpihak rnompnnyli Illa! bevsnma unluk membuhavkannya‘ (DATUK VIIRA LIJAH Bum ABBAS) aklm Mahkamah nnggl Malaya Muav Tankh: 23FEaHuARI 2n17 mmmmou .m muonmnavun um um nuns uun u..- is KEs-kss um: DIRUJUK‘: 1. E330 Malaysia and. v. Hilb Agsno; (In) sun. and & Ons [1994] I MLJ 740, 752. 2. vap Kong Sang &Anor v."I’sa Wang Kal [2u14]4 ML.) 473 gun can Bugl PIM Plgmu TEI'UAN NG, GAN & PARYNER5 Peguambela & Peguamcam mm. Bangunan Pemagsngén D6 80!. Jalan Senwl svooo Kuala Lumpur (Ru]: LKC/LIOO1Ilz3I20I6(KCS)] Peguamearu Blgl Plhgk aggpggmn TETUAN son vox LAM aco. Psguamhela 2; Peguemcam NO. 23. Gmund Floor Ja!an Majidi. aaooo Muar Johov (aw: Tce/on/3794/1 am.-n zm:vr,a:»n.znn .xuc»m><xIm<nvuu mxuwnnvumum p...» 13‘ Tunnnnn Plalnfll Iemadap Delamsn-Dsfandan blah mmgenai:- 1. :- ' Amount due to directors ' befiulnhh RM425.980.2S yang dummn masih mnmang olah Delendan Kedua. 2. mnmap Davenaan Pemumn danlamu perkungsian DefsndanKa1lga:- a] Jumluh amz.-s1.aoa.a1 awaruh aan lurnlah RM5DG.S16.62 yang telah dhmbll oleh Delendan Panama dnri almun peikongsiln. n) HM45,ao2.m ynng masih hgi berhulang. * ' G) Jumlah subamyak RM75.wELDO talm |umla7I modal yang mlaburknn aleh Plainciv dalsm perknngaian. zmcvcu rus a) fiM154.729 Ialln sapaluh durlpilda lumlah keunmngan ‘retained earning’. Sebanyak RM309,456.38 yang belum dilgihkan. 14. Defendan Panama memhuat tunmtan helas antara lainnys sepeni ha1ikut- 3 Sam deklarasi bahuwa parkonusian mm P\aim'V dan Deveuaan Panama dalam nevenaan Keuga telah dlbubar flan/man dilnggap man dibuhaz pads an/11/2011 dan pnrin1ah- perintah selaniulnyn meugannl pouakaan-an pambubalan syar(kaL u] Plamufl nandnkwm membayur RM5D.0l9.68 lsilu slplluh danpada wang beuumlah fiM1oo,1s3,aa besem faedah. am “Amount due to wnzmrs" dalam lumluh yang smm denuan Plammdan Iaedah. uIx1NmNuvLn4rnxuwAnzvAur.unv 15 Pemscaraan telah flljalankan selama 15 hari dengan masingv masing msmanugil 5 Drum; um. I. Samfl ada Delendan Panama belah memhayal ‘ «moan! due to dlractors ' kepada Plainm begl pihak Defendan Keane? 2. Sam am pavkongsian Daiendan Kaliga lalnhpun fliselssalksn dlanlara Pvarnxir dan Delendan Penama7 Jlka belum diselesaikan. bempn jumlnh wnnu yang rnesbh Vagi Iamutang oleh Dstaman Panama darn/aiau perkongslan Ddlsndan Ksnga kspafla mum? 3. Sums ma Flalnlfl berhak manumm ganlilugl flisahabkan pengamhrllan pekerla aslng oieh Delandan Kedua uan/acau Delendan Panama uaripada nerkonasinn Devendan Kenqa7 zmcvuunou -Kacnwnnnnnvutqmu m.mmu.u. r... 1 DAPAYAN DAN Kawuruuu MAHKAMAH L$JL.| D RM44o.u25.95 aualah jumhh ' amoum due tn dinscrors ". In: Plalnm telah menghujahkan bahawa seiurniah berdasarkln kuvada ysnuakuan nmanaen Kenna dldslam penyawan pembehannya wnlaupun mengikul mknd mama iumlah yang vemmmg kspndanys nlah Delandan Kedua auaaah RM425.9eo.2a. Plalnflf menumux jumlah «ambux karana pads mum 2011 Phlnfil masih Isgi msnjadi Pengarah Syarlkal Dsfendan Kedua suhlngga harga pembelian saham sshanwk RM2.5 jut: Iarsehul fllbnyat sapsnuhnya oieh Dalendan Pennrm In Kadus umuk Iahun 2011 yang menyatakan ' amount due to Flnlnm mem|uk keoada penyma kawangan Deflendan directors " sehanyak nMs23.9os.oo adalah memiuk kepada nulang-hulung Dsfanuan Kadua kapuda wanaan Panama nan kapads Piainfl. Dan ainyalaknn di "Akaun Knd «on/K01 ' xucumn3aNuvLlMmK)lwAAnAIIuuIl n.- diczualkan selumlah nM42s,oao.2s sabngal ‘Amount owing Io Directors V Ker Cnocn Sianq no Marnandangkan Deisndan Kedua Ialah mengakulnyu an ualam psnyala pemhalssnrvya Plsinlfl menghuiahkan hahawa ' admlulon are we strangest evidence posstole '. Plaimlf melujuk kspma kas-k«:- a) Essa Malaysia and. v. Huus Agency (M) Sdn. End a Ons [1994] 3 ML.) 740. 752. b) Vap Knng Sang .5 Amr v. Tau Wang Kai [am] 4 ML.) 478 unluk menyakong hujjnhnyu. iv) walaunamimana pun, isu yang perlu mpmuskan ialah aamn ma lumlah Iarsebul Ielah dlblyav kspaaa Plalnfll. Delendan Panama flan Defsndan Kedua (elah mengnakan zn4cvu.x.n-wu r1nxuam»(§a><cvuI4InI<w«Au‘1Aut.I4nc y... a jumlah lersebul lean dibayar olen mereka kerana jumlan RM2.5 Ma wrsebul marannkumi ksssmunnya. v) Mnnknman ini Isiah juga mellhal kepada lunnutan bales Deiendnn Panama Y-lflfi iuflfl rIV9VIum|l| illnlnh WW same aepenl yang dhumul olah Flalnfll. seaenan meneliu semua kecerangan yang ada. Mahkamah ‘mi telah menalak turmnan Flaimif flan ma Iunluuan balsa Devfendan Penamn mangonai jurmah - amaunr due to mnaooors - lersebul. Alasanalasan Mahkamah ini adalah seperli beri a) Mahkamah lnl berpendapal kesemun peniknian di dalam pengambihlimn synrikat Dshndsn Ksdua nleh Defendan Panama lelnhnun nflsalaulkan Ispenuhnya uengnn pembayaran sejnmlah RM 2.5 jutaaleh Delendan Panama kspsda Plaintil Walaupun tsmapamya marnngnn yang menyaukan Pmmn mun menjnul zz.m:v<-lz.n.znu »xucumn:m1nvuMnor<)w4Anv.uzun n. n.

Pytesseract-0.3.10

22NCVC-10-08/2014

PLAINTIF HASSAN BIN LAMUSUK DEFENDAN 1. ) MOHMED BIN PALISU 2. ) TAN KIAN ENG

22/02/2017

YA DATUK WIRA HALIJAH BINTI ABBAS

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=55cc3457-a36c-4647-bd20-17c3df55ad8f&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAIIIAH TINGGI MALAVA DI MUAR NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM GUAMAN SIVIL: ZZNCVC-10-08 TAHUN 2014 ANTARA HASSAN BIN LAMusuK PLAINTIF DAN 1. MOHMED BIN PALISU 2. TAN KIAN ENG DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN PENGHAKIMAN A. 25553551; AM my E51515 §ECA§A RINQKAS 1 Plamm adalah seowng mdmdu flan menyatakan hahawa ma sdalah saxah searang waus kepada harlanah yang m dalam pemkalan pm mcu»mv:xvm4 1AvI1u1M<u annAxsAM1INuM\/sun<v:Ma)<m:us Nusu m 1vANr.\.\vr4 Page n z Defender: Panama adalah seorang Indlwdu yang juga mempakan saudara sepupu kspada Plalnm 3 Delendan Kedua adaiah pembeh hananah yang dalam pertlkaxan dan membeh hananah tevsehul can Delendan Panama A Penlkalan plhalvpllwak adalah mengenaw hananan GM 1357 Lot 529 Muklm Sungax Kluang, Daeran nengn, Ea|u Paha|, Johov marlanah cemem) 5 Flam: menyalakan baharwa Devenazn Panama lelah secara mm rnemalsukan cap ‘an pemmk asal harlanah ml ‘am: orang yang dlkalikan bapa kspada Plalnm dan empaf olang luau punya bzvsama yang lain dan memlndah mmk harlanah (ersebut kepada dlnnya sendm melalm perjanjwan jual nan dan surax kuasa walul oenankn 2e 8 2005 sedangkzm orang yang mkatakan sebagal bapa Wamllf \e\ah memnggal dunla paua 13 5 1594 muum uAuAN$w1LNu22N£ nan»-1un2ou><AsxAu 1.\Mus1AKvsMn><ML|vm4rM.|:u »».m»m.w r. -2 14 Same: ads Delendan Penama leluh menenrna hug: mnlan harlanzh Iersebul danpana Defendan Kedua 55 Sam: ads sum Akuan yang amua: aleh Delendan Panama ada\ah 'aRar umugm" 15 Same zda zumumn Planmif adalah salu Iekaan untuk msngam keunmrlnarl mg max berasis G1 sisi undarlirunoany 17 Sam ada Tahu adalah Delendan Kedus 13 Sama ada nndakan mu dmalang oteh Akta Had Masa 1953 mnuwcumnmv NDZZN cmasn)<uhzo1mAxsA 1.\Musukv:MLmM5ms1NvAL\s» W n \'ANm.\w mm-1| c. DAPATAN DAN KEPUTUSAN MAHKAMAH Selelah mendengav kelevangan saksr-saksx dan juga setemh menelm muahan benulls dan keduatiua plhak Mahkamah ml Ie\ah membual kapulusan alas rmbangan kabarangkahln menmak mnxuxan Plamm dengan kos darl membenavkan Iunfulan bales Deferldan Kedua A\asan— alasan Mahkamah adalah sepem benkul — m F\avnM telsh gagal unmk membuklvkan alas Imbangan kebarangkanan hahawa ma mempunyan locus stand: unluk memmakan tmdakan Im — (a) Pia-nm Ielah mengalakan dx daram nlidingnya bahawa ma adalah anak keoada Lamusuk hm [small PlaInII1Ie\ah memolnukan bahawa Lamusuk um Ismail :da\ah wga dw kenah sebagan uamusux um Somme Iawu name pemwk berdaflar d4 dalam hakmlllk hananah Mmuw/cuAMANs|vm<n21Nt, nuonmumgnunmmumumuwmmmsnummm vmnvnNn:1mN Vaxc 12 Walauhaganmanapun, m dalam keterangan an Mahkamah mt, Plamm |aIah mengatakan bahawa nama Lamusuk bm Sukarno adalah nama yang lldak dlkenah mehnya ‘A Say: mm kenal dengan orangorang yang be/nama Kodvk bm solomo Becmk bm so/amo, Kamberk Dmlt Sole-mo dan Lamusuk am so/omo * O\eh nu, Mahkamah um berpendapal pnamg F\aInlI{ adalah bevcanggah dengan Keterangan yang dxbenkannya an dalam Mahkamah ml Eagaumanakah ma hendak mzngamxan bahawa Lamusuk hm Ismail dengan Lamusuk bin Salome adalah mang yang sama sadangkan ma ssndlrl lelan member: kelerangan bahawa ma Mak mengenall slapakah Lamusuk bm Sclomo lemabul Mml/Ax/cu,\MAN5w1LNo 22Nrw m ns1AHura2oxor<As:A>< Im LAMusI)KvsMmmEumN mm. nmmmm mm (b) Flamm le\ah gagal mengemukakan apa-apa dakumen yang menuruukkan bzhaw: ma maxan wane yang sah yang |e\a7I dlben kuasa unluk memadburkan hana pusaka 5! mail P\a|nM Isiah memfallkan nous permohunan untuk memlnda panya«a mnnnannya Imluk mernasukknn fakla bahawa ma adalah Pemaamr Pusaka bsrsama unluk nananah pesaka Kersebul Namun, permuhonan nu man dflallkan sehelum keputusan dxberi oxen Mahkamah xm dan wawaupun m dengar oxen Mahkarnnh ml. wanya hdak membevl apa—apa kesan lamadap permcaraan dan kelerangan yang lemh dlbenkan olehnya m mam permcaraan m Mahkamah W le\ah mehhal bahawa Surat Kuzsa Pentadblr bersams Iersehm xaxan dlpemlehr selepas sana;a perblcaraan Kelah selesaw dw dengar‘ dan surav kuasa tersebul Ielah mefipuu hartanah dan merupakan hana pusaxa pemvlnk yang lam yang lalan memnggan duma Pllmm lelahpun membevr kelevangan permfik yang le\aII merwlggal mMuAk/ muxzvuuo n 0aa'm1uMrn4HanmumLamusuxvxmomznxmMusll mm \ nun Mm Page 14 dunla levsebm mempunya. anak dan wans yang maslh hldup man an, Mahkamah ml memadn vagu nagamanakan surax Penman Pusaka Iersebm dwperolehfl Mihkamah vm ndak peman mmaklumkan akan lakla bahavwa Plamlrl Ie\ah mendapal Surat Femadmr Pusaka lersebut pada blla-blla masa pun samrlgaalah pevbwcivaan Im seVesa\ dljalankan Ia) Plmnm juga Ielan gags! membukukan bahawa ma ada\aI1 wans xeselumhan hana pusaks «mam melaluu sml mam auu mus’ ouen nu Mahkamah mu max dzpal memperlumbangkan akan penyalaannya bahawa ma adalah seurang wans yang sah lemadap nan: pusaka an sehngai wan: ma herhak dan mempunyai hocus unluk membual mm-nan di Mahkamah Tambahan pula Plamnl mengakm ma adalah wens uruuk semua bahaguan sedangkan penyataan um adalah nercanggan denyin kelevangannya sendm buhawa Ierdapal wans—\-tans mmmum n/mm, NEV wnannu max muamLAMusm<vsMonMEI>nlMPAL\sv W. \ wmc LMN l‘:u:u 15 pemmx yang telzh merunggal duma flan wens-wans lersebur aaa yang masm mdup Plamnr ;uga lxdek tahu sama aua wans« wans leIsebuHe¥ah mempevweht Sura| Kuzsa Pemadbv Hana Pusaka unmx pemmk-pemmk yang Ielah menIngga\ duma lelsehul (a) Plavrmf pemah memtaukan nuns permahonan unluk memmda penyala Iuntutan dengan memasukkan bulAr—butIr nonmm Kati pangenaxan dan numbor paspon panama yang lelcalal u. dalam nakmmk harlanah Kersebul Permahonan Cersebul dlbuat memzndangkan hahawa nama pemlllk yang ledeva dx suralan naknunk ludak memplmyaw namhov kad pengenalan Namun‘ Mankaman Inr telah menmak permohunan Plavmlflersebui dan rayuan Plamlfl ma Ielah dv lalak oven Mankamah Rayuan M1\¢uAR,'G(uMAN5vv1LNn 12Ncvr— W nmmznn msmw Lmusu mmmzmn mm W mm mm ms. is 1e) SP1, Fenolong Femadbxr Tanan Daerah Kecrl Rengn ;uga |e\an member: kecerangan bahawa gevan asal max ada nambur kad pengenalan pemI|Ik~pemI|Ik asal Olen nu, SP1 (elah belseiuju dengan soalan peguam banawa nama yang same boleh umenxan Vebuh dunpada saiu crang sm jug: lelah menyztakan bahawa ma fldak dapal mengesahkan slap: pemlhk asal bahagvarrhahagxan yang max an pecahkan ulsebabkan llada nombar kad Dengenalan "a Soalan says‘ cadangan says man sen-1m max bo/sh merrgesahkan siapa pemf/rk asal Izallagtambahagran yang max dipeczahkan dtsshubkan Nada nambar 1/09 A Esta/‘ (n Plamm mak uapac memnuxukan Dahowa Lamusuk hm Ismail ada\ah many yang sama dengan Larnusuk bin Snlomu. men nu mmunz/L:\MMA>mV\Lrlo mm w4n37A><m< 2n1cms:AN lw umuxl/KvsMn><M:nnm Mus» vw<\vANr:ImN mun Mahkamah um herpendapat Flamlfl Ielah max dapa| membuktrkan banawa ma adalah Hassan bun Lamusuk bin Salerno sepefll name pemlhk .11 Suralan Hakmxllk harlanah Iersebut lg) Wa\aupulI levdapalnya keterangan hahawa neaenaan Perlama telah mengaku salah m da\am pmsldmg jenayah yang dva felah membual pemalsuan landalangan m dalam pnndahlmlnk hnnanih kspada Daiandan Kedua, namun lunlulan Plamnf Iru udak dapal benahan kerana kegagalannya umuk membuknkan hahawa ma ada locus slam: sebagax wans yang sah umuk membawa lmdakan im (nu Nama-nama swmali yang dxsebul Flalnlvf sebagaw pemmk hananih yuga mempunyal perunggahan qaun sun Kemauan ummmcum mozzuu woman au><1A:uNs x.\MusuKvsMm<MLIvawvM.lsI\ M». mm. um rm. n1 yang mkemukakan Isiah an M45 dengan ejaan nama yang benamin darn nama permllk dr dalam Suvatan Hakmmk Ie Lebrk Me Pakawaru yang dmalat -1. dalam geran berkompmev telapl dx dalam sun Kemauan Lemk me Eakzwavu Juga sum Kemallan yang dnkalakan bapa Plamnl bernama Lamusuk hm Ismau yang xelan d1ka|akan lelah mamnggm dunla pada 13 51994 tersebul. lercatan name Sealing yang lain lam: Sahan bm Ismail Jelas dl sml Plamm telah hdak dapal membuktxkan alas xmbangan kebarangkalmn bahawa ma adalah Hassan bin Lamusuk bm Ismawl atau hm Solomo Sedangkan sun Kemax-an yang dskernukakan ada1ah sun Kemauan yeerang yang Vain Aallu Sahan om Ismaxl wmIAr</«'.uAMANsvvm4 . Mcvc 111 nx1AHuN1nn)<AssaNaIN LAMusv|<vsMmMz|nwrAu5u mm x mm Lam mg. 1-2 m Mahkamah ml bersetuyu dengan hmahan peguam Delendan Kedua bahawz iunlman Hamw ml bukamah salu nunnman yang bona fide Nama pemllvk dv davam Suralan Hakmlllk Iuada nombrx kad pengenaxan, oleh flu pmak P\amIfl perlu memuaskan Mahkamah Im dengan membukhkan bahawa ma adalah wans yang yang sah dan me-npunyau locus stand: unluk membawa nndakan um uy Memandangkln Fmrmi Ie\ah ndak dapal melepasw penngkax pembuknan mengenaw Isu locus slandi alas «mbangan kebarangkahan, maka Mahkamah mu (e\ah mak mengupas dengan laruul akan 1su~isu yang lam an dalam permcaraan ml (kj Berdassrkan ¢akta-vakta m alas Mahkamah um telah meno\ak Iumulan Plamm nan membenarkan lunlularv balas Ds1endan DAM mun LAW pm In e Selerusnya Defendan Panama lelah menundah mmk harlanah lsrsebul kepada Defendan Kedua 7 Plalrml menyalakan pindahmmk lanah adalah udak sah keaana dlhual secau pempuan nan true a Defendan Fenama mewalm sural akuan benankh 712010 telah mengaku bahawa dokumendokumen “Agreement of Sale and Paws! ol Auomey benmkh 29 2 2005 Gan borang pmdahmvllk MA bagi hinanah tevsebut adalah palsu dan Ianaaeangan peguam yang menyaks4kan dokumen Lersebul tum! dlpalsukan 9 Delendan Perlama (elah dnuduh dl Mahkamah Maiisne< Batu Pahat dan ma Ielah mengaku salah dan Mahkamah man menpatuhkan hukuman salu 41) han penjava dan demia RM 4500 no MTAIIIAR ummsxvlwa u xmunul/N2»x4HA<sA><xINuMumI<vsMa)«ms nusu W 1 Wm um raga x E. KESIMPULAN Tunlutan Plamhf ml dv Io\ak kerana Plaxmvflelah gagal membuklrkan bahawa ma mempunyal locus stand: umuk memfaxlkan undakan ml. (DATIIK WIRA HAL JAN élrm AaBA.s) Hakim Mihkamah Tmggl Malaya Muar Tankh 22 FEBRUAI-R! 2n11 mmmmms.vu»a um: m as ':,\Hu»1nz4 HASSANEIN Lnunsuxvsmnxnznnm nus» DM 11/ml. um Va: 21 Fguamcara hagl 9: Flam! Teluan Maman K Marapnan a. Company Peguambewa s Peguamcara suns 1-02, 7'" Floor Wrsma Sing Long No 9‘ man Zabedah BSODD Ealu Pahal Juhnr [Ru] MKMIBPl5994I2013Isue) Te|uan Tsh Foh Teik 5 cnmpany Feguambela a. Feguamcara No 7595. Jalsn ran: ezooo Punllan Jahor (No Ru] EMlaI42l2D14) ..........T_._...._.__........___._ mmuax/cumm umzzm 1n47a1AHu:<zI/14HA:$AN|1I:<LAMIASUKVMUMMLMVNnmsu DAN . mm LAIIV vane 12 m Defendan Fenama telah mak memasukl kehadvan, Penyaea Pembelaan dan Fenghakmlan Ingkar «em mmasuxkan lerhadapnya Namun, Plairml ceran rnensapma Defendzn Panama unmk namr ke Mahkamah unluk meruam saksi bagw plhaknya 11 Hamil! memahon unmk remdan perlnlah sepem benkuf 1:) Debdarasa bahawa keduadua Peryanjwan Jua\ Hen flan xedua— due sum Kuasa waku berlarikh 23 a zone adalah max sah «ma kesan undangmndang (H) DeK\aras4 bahawa pmdahmfllk kapada Deiendan Panama adalah lldak sah dan Ierbatal MTMUAR/6vAMArasIv\LNoz2Ncv 14:oawmunznslHAssMsmLAMI/w|<V:ML7><I4: nusu um’ x mm um: mas» o nu) Fundahmlllk-pmdahmmk kepada Derendan-Devendan amatauxan danpada Suratan Hakrmllk Keluaran den daflar hananah fersebul dan dndanarkan semula atas nama pemmk asal av) Defendan-De4endan hendaklah menyelahkan suralan hakmmk asa\ kepada Peguamcara Plamm 12 Defendan Kedua Ielah memiankan mmman baVas u) Plarnm dan I atau agennya mnarang danpada mengganggu Defendan Kedua dan memkmau hahagxan Ianah mlhk Delendan Kedun (ll) Semua kaveat peusenaman yang dimasukkan oleh mam flan! auau agennya hendaklah mxeluaman dengan senamena Mnxuwaummwmm zzmzv mnsmmnznmmw um 1,\Mu5uKvsMnnMEunm,\L\s\I nAu1vAr4(.uw my < (my Garmmgl untuk kemasukan kaveat secara saw- (w) Faedan dan kus 13 mamm te\ah memsnggn Vapan my many salsw untuk memben kelerangan dan Detendan Kedua Ielah hamr sendm member: kmerangan B. Iswsu YANG DIBICARAKAN 1 Sam; ada mam mempunyai locus stand: urvluk rnembavwa nndakan 1m lerhadap De6endan—De!endan 2 sama ada Lamusuk bin Ismail den Lamusuk bin smomo mawidu yang sama mum/cum ummnzun masTA>«1ur4zn1A><AsSA uMusuxv2Mo>¢M:|vaw1>AL\54A mm . w.m.\m vwa Sama ada Plalnlfl zdalah wans yang sah dan pemmk beneflslan was/mvzo bahagtan «max pecan mpegang an bawah GM 1357 Lol 520. Mukxm Sungm Kluang‘ Daerah Ren51i|, Batu Pzhal. Negen Johor Sam: ada Lamusuk um rsmau adulah bapa Plamul sama ada Lamusuk hm Ismail Ielah memnggal dunla pada 1351994 Sama ada Dada 23 3.2005, Defendan Perlama secala pempuan newan menandauangan. F'enam<an Jual Bell flan Surat Kuasa waxu dengan memalsukan cap m .an umusux aw SOLOMO mama sebenamya LAMUSUK BIN ISMNL [Ne Kad Pengenavan ceo51so1.5u15/1511102; yang telah memnggal dam: pada WMUAK/cuAMA>45\v1LNu zmtv an on IAHU)-zuxnussnm LAMIm»<v$Mo»1MEnmN:-Ausu MAN . Mm. MW rm: 1351994, dan sekarang Vagl bemama KODOK aw soLoMo pemegang Paspon Indonesia Na R 95410:: 7 Sama ada paaa 2882008, Defender: Penama juga «swan secara pennpuan lelah menandanlangann Fenanyvan Jual Beh dan Surat Kuasa waku dengan BECHIK aw SOLOMO Paspon No R 994059 Kehlaran Vndoneswa‘ KAMBERK BVNTI SOLOMO Paspcd Nu E 934057 Kemaran Ponuanak Indonesia den LEEIK EYE PAKAWARU weorang warganeglra Malaysia 5 Sama ada pada 1211 2008, Delendan Panama dengan rnenggunakan Peuanuan Jual Bel: dan Surat Kuasa W!kI\ beflirlkh 2552008 (elah menandalangam Borang 14A berlankh 2292008 flan membuat peodaflaran pmdahmllik rnemul perserahan No 525/2009 fll Psjabll Tanah Daerah Ba|u Pahal 61 Rengll‘ Juhnr Ierhadip 9314/30720 bahagxan mak penah harlanah lersebul MPMUAR uAMANsMn4ozzNu mamm rmHASSANNN|.u«msuk\'5Mu><Mznawr su wm1VAtmu1N mm danpada pemxmqyemlllk asa\ mu EECHNK am soLoM0 KAMEERK sum SOLOMO dan LEEIK STE FAKAWARUU 9 Sama ads selaruulnya pads 12 11 zoos. 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Pytesseract-0.3.10

BA-24-1299-12/2016

PLAINTIF MUJUR ZAMAN SDN BHD ...PLAINTIF F (NO. SYARIKAT: 495108) DEFENDAN CITRA TANI SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 189592-X)

14/02/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5a6ffaac-c37c-4cdd-9e95-37dfce79a0fd&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24-1299-12/2016 Dalam Perkara Mengenai Seksyen 323, 327 dan 329 Kanun Tanah Negara, 1965 Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai tanah- tanah di bawah PN100453 Lot 6234, PN100459 Lot 6241, PN100460 Lot 6242, PN100461 Lot 6244 dan PN100447 Lot 6228 kesemuanya di Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai Kaveat Persendirian Perserahan No. 49182/2012 yang bertarikh 16/08/2012, Kaveat Persendirian Perserahan No. 44096/2015 yang bertarikh 02/09/2015, Kaveat Persendirian Perserahan No. 2 47645/2012 yang bertarikh 09/08/2012 dan Kaveat Persendirian Perserahan No. 44095/2015 yang bertarikh 02/09/2015. BETWEEN MUJUR ZAMAN SDN BHD ...PLAINTIFF (NO. SYARIKAT: 495108) AND CITRA TANI SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 189592-X) …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] The present Application is a clear cut case for the Plaintiff to remove caveats lodged by the Defendant unto the Plaintiff’s Properties. The facts are overwhelmingly clear that the Defendant has no caveatable 3 interest and had in fact admitted to not having any caveatable interest upon the Plaintiff’s properties. The relevant properties owned by the Plaintiff in the present case consist of the following: i. PN100453 Lot 6234, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5468 PT 9143 Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan) ii. PN100459 Lot 6241, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5469 PT 9144 Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan) iii. PN100460 Lot 6242, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5470 PT 9145 Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan) 4 iv. PN100461 Lot 6244, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5471 PT 9146 Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan) v. PN100447 Lot 6228, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5462 PT 9137 Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan) (collectively referred to as “Properties”) [2] Mujur Zaman Sdn Bhd (“Plaintiff”) and Citra Tani Sdn Bhd (“Defendant”) are both wholly owned subsidiaries of the parent company, Fountain View Development Berhad (“FVDB”). As an internal management measure between the parties, five Sale and Purchase Agreements dated 15.3.2010 (“SPAs”) were signed between the Plaintiff and Defendant regarding the Plaintiff’s Properties. However, although these SPAs do exist, it is utterly clear that these SPAs were entered into without any real intent for the sale 5 and purchase to take effect. It is just a measure for the companies to restructure their assets and liabilities. No purchase price was ever fixed for the SPAs. In fact to date, no purchase price had ever been paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff as consideration. In fact against the essence of the SPAs itself, the Defendant had written to agree that the Plaintiff is allowed to sell the same properties to another third party. [3] It is pertinent to note that the Properties have with them a Restriction- in-interest which stipulates that any dealings against the properties require the consent of the state authority. The same restriction is incorporated as terms in all of the SPAs. It remains undisputed that this consent was never obtained by any of the parties, particularly the Defendant. Thus, the consequence of the Defendant not having any caveatable interest remains constant, irrespective of the fact that the SPAs were valid agreements or otherwise. The question of the SPAs legitimacy is already moot. Whether or not the SPAs were valid, the SPAs remain to be unenforceable as the State Authority had never consented to the SPAs. 6 State Authority has not consented to the SPAs and has no intention to consent to the SPAs [4] It transpired that the State Authority has already stated that it is not at all interested to consent to the transfer under the SPAs between the parties. The State Authority instead circa 2012, intended to acquire the properties and re-alienate the properties to Pemerbadanan Menteri Besar Selangor (“MBI”) for purposes of development. The Plaintiff had since brought the acquisition to the Courts through multiple suits and applications stretching to the Federal Court level in Federal Court Civil Appeal No. 01(i)-14-04/2014(W). The Plaintiff also filed for judicial review in Application No. 25-252-11/2012 against the acquisition. In conclusion of the Federal Court appeal as well as the judicial review, it was agreed that the matter would be settled once and for all vide two Consent Judgments dated 17.5.2016 (“Consent Judgment”) recorded in the FC Appeal as well as the judicial review application. The salient terms of the Consent Judgment stipulate that the parties agreed that the Properties shall be sold to Paragon Pinnacle Sdn Bhd (“PPSB”) and that the State Authority shall only consent to the sale of the Properties to PPSB. 7 [5] Consequent to the Consent Judgment, the State Authority has (upon the Plaintiff’s request) granted its consent for the transfer of the Plaintiff’s Properties to PPSB. The Defendant vide its letter dated 4.11.2016 had in plain terms agreed that the Defendant has no objection against the transfer of the Plaintiff’s properties to PPSB (in total disregard of the same SPAs that the Defendant now is suddenly ferociously defending). [6] To date, the Defendant has refused to remove its caveats in a confusing attempt to resuscitate the SPAs which the Defendant itself has willingly abandoned. It is this refusal that forms the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Application in Enclosure 1. B. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT HAS ANY CAVEATABLE INTEREST [7] The Defendant, after abandoning the SPAs, now made a u-turn and contends that it is the beneficial owner of the Properties as purchaser under the SPAs. However, it is easy for this Court to find that the Defendant clearly has no caveatable or any registrable/beneficial 8 interest in the Properties. This is simply because of the following facts: i. Even if the SPAs were valid, the State Authority had never consented and will never give the consent to transfer the Properties to the Defendant. Thus, however the stone is turned, the SPAs remain unenforceable and the Defendant shall never be the owner or prospective owner of the Properties. ii. The Defendant has itself admitted to the non-enforceability of the SPAs and the Defendant shall be estopped to contend against its own admission. [8] Firstly, it is trite law that no future rights or rights contingent to a future condition can be good basis of a caveatable interest. The restriction in interest attached to the Properties as well as the terms of SPAs stipulate that consent of the State Authority is required. It remains undisputed that to date, and at all material times, the consent of the State Authority was never obtained or even applied for in view of the SPAs. Thus, at the time when the Defendant lodged the 9 caveats hinging on the SPAs, the Plaintiff was never in any position to transfer good title to the Defendant and the Defendant was never in any position to obtain good title over the Properties. At the time when the caveats were lodged, the SPAs remain unenforceable. Clearly now, that no rights, be it registrable or beneficial rights, can ever be found in an agreement which in essence is entirely unenforceable. Thus, this Court similarly should not allow such contention of a right as doing so would contradict the very fabric of land law as well as the law of contract. [9] This finding is not without precedent. This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of Mahadev Shanker J (as he then was) in the case of Goh Hee Sing v Will Raja & Anor [1993] 3 MLJ 610 which had held the following: “In order to file a caveat, the caveator must have a caveatable interest. What is a caveatable interest has been the subject of many decisions, some of the most recent cases being Tan Heng Poh v Tan Boon Thong &Ors 1, Hew Sook Ying v Hiw Tin Hee 2, and Khoo Cheng Yee (f) in Khoo Teng Seong & Anor 3. 10 To put it in a nutshell, on 29 September 1989, the plaintiff should have been able to claim title to the said land, or a right to such title by virtue of the deed of sale aforesaid. Alternatively, he should be a person who could validly claim a right to such title. The point however is that the claim must be to title or a right thereto in praesenti, and not to some contingent title or right thereto in futuro. This to my mind raises a question of paramount importance to the administration of land law in Malaysia, whenever the title contains a restriction in interest of the present kind. Because the prohibition in dealing with the land is total, nothing can happen without the consent of the pihak kuasa negeri. Consequently, it must follow that a prospective purchaser, chargee, or lessee of such land can have no caveatable 11 interest in such land until the consent of the pihak kuasa negeri has first been irrevocably obtained.” [10] The same principle was echoed by the Federal Court where YAA Arifin Zakaria CJ has decided in the case of Score Options Sdn Bhd v Mexaland Development Sdn Bhd [2012] 6 MLJ 475: It is also our considered view that the caveator under s 323(1)(a) of the NLC must have a present interest as opposed to a potential interest in the land. The registrable interest that the caveator is claiming for, must be an existing interest. The caveator under s 323 (1)(a) of the NLC must be limited to those who are claiming to an existing interest in the land or right to such existing interest and cannot include potential interest or interest in future”… … This principle is also applied by other jurisdictions where the Torrens system is in place, Shannon Lindsay in her book 12 Caveats Against Dealings in Australia and New Zealand, the Federation Press Australia, 1995 at p 67 states that: “A caveator must have an interest in the land at the time that it lodges the caveat – it is insufficient that it has some potentially enforceable right against the registered proprietor which has not yet ripened into an interest in particular land” [11] Similarly so in the present case, the Defendant’s claim for interest in the SPAs, not only has not yet ripened, in fact the Defendant’s claim in the SPAs has no chance at all to ripen as the State Authority has no interest to transfer the land to the Defendant. [12] Very similar to the present case, Mohamed Dzaiddin J (as he then was) had dealt with an application to remove caveat in view of a sale agreement which was contingent upon the approval of the Johore State Government. In allowing the application and ordering the removal of the caveats, the Court had held the following: 13 “Relying on the above authorities, in my judgment, the completion of sale of the said lands was contingent upon the defendants obtaining the approval of the Johore State Government. Hence, the refusal of the Johore State Government had put the agreement to end because of the non- fulfilment of one of the conditions under Clause 3.1 of the agreement. In the result, the plaintiffs can no longer claim any right to such title or interest in the said lands. In another word, the plaintiffs ceased to have any caveatable interest in the said lands. For these reasons the defendants' application was allowed with costs.” [13] Thus, even at this juncture it is patently clear that the Defendant does not have any caveatable interest whether or not the SPAs were valid. [14] Secondly, this Court finds that it is verily more probable than not that the SPAs were never intended to be legally enforceable or executed as the Defendant itself has admitted that the Plaintiff may deal with the Properties in total abandonment and contradiction of the SPAs. In response to the Consent Judgment and the intended transfer of the 14 Properties to PPSB, the Defendant has issued a letter dated 13.3.2016 stating that the Defendant has no objection against the transfer to PPSB. The letter reads: “Kami, CITRA TANI SDN BHD (No. Syarikat 189592-X) … dengan ini mengesahkan bahawa kami tidak mempunyai apa-apa halangan kepada Penjual di atas untuk memindahmilik hartanah yang tersebut di atas kepada Penerima/Pembeli dan seterusnya untuk Penerima/Pembeli menggadaikan hartanah tersebut kepada mana-mana institusi kewangan dengan syarat bahawa kepentingan kami sebagai Pemegang Kaveat Persendirian tidak terjejas” [15] Albeit that the Defendant wrote that it intends to preserve their rights as caveat holders, it must be made clear that what interest the Defendant purports to preserve here is non-existent. It is clear that the Defendant itself is unsure of what right it is attempting to protect or preserve. What remains undisputed is that, in direct contradiction of this supposed preservation of a non-existent right, the Defendant itself has admitted to abandon and to put the SPAs to their demise. It 15 is illogical that the Defendant is allowed to contend a right over the properties as a prospective purchaser under the SPAs, while at the same time the Defendant is agreeable to have the properties be transferred to PPSB. The Defendant is clearly confused itself. The only rights that may arise under the SPAs is the rights to be the consequent owner of the Properties, and this is the same rights that the Defendant agrees should be transferred to PPSB. In agreeing that the SPAs may be abandoned, the Defendant automatically agrees that it abandons any rights or prospective rights under the SPAs. This unequivocal abandonment of rights is verily indicative that the SPAs were never intended to take effect in the first place. The preservation of rights purported by the Defendant is merely a confused preservation of a non-existing right. [16] Be that as it may that the Defendant may have attempted (but failed to) preserve its rights (which were never in existence) under the SPAs, the Defendant cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate its stance. It is only fitting that the Defendant be estopped from going against its own words, especially when the Plaintiff has already acted on the Defendant’s agreement to not object against the transfer to 16 PPSB. The Defendant has already agreed to the transfer of the Properties to PPSB and accordingly, the Defendant shall not be allowed now to go against its own agreement, admission and acknowledgement to the abandonment and non-enforceability of the SPAs. Furthermore, it has been years since the SPAs were initially entered into in 2010, and the Defendant has done absolutely nothing to ensure the performance of the SPAs. In fact the caveats were only lodged between 2012 and 2015. These facts certainly add more indication that the SPAs were never intended to be enforced upon and were merely internal measures of management. [17] This Court draws guidance from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: 17 The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” 18 [18] Thus, with the foregoing deliberations in mind, it is this Court’s finding that the Defendant has no caveatable interest at all over the Properties be it a registrable interest or a beneficial interest. This Court also finds that the SPAs are unenforceable and no caveatable interest may arise out of the SPAs. [19] Consequently, the Plaintiff as the current owners of the Properties is an aggrieved party to the entry of the caveats as the Plaintiff has never surrendered its rights as proprietor of the Properties or ever held the same rights on trust to the Defendant. Therefore the Plaintiff’s present application falls squarely on Section 327(1) of the National Land Code 1956 (“NLC”). [20] Thereto, the Defendant is liable to compensate the Plaintiff for its wrongful entry of the caveat under Section 329(1) of the NLC as the Defendant has been proven to have wrongfully entered the caveats. C. COURT’S DECISION 19 [21] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has ultimately succeeded to prove its case. [22] This Court accordingly allows the Plaintiff’s Application and grants order-in-terms to the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons. [23] This Court accordingly orders that the Defendant shall remove all of the following caveats which were lodged onto the Plaintiff’s Properties: i. Presentation No. 49182/2012 dated 16.8.2012 on title PN100453 Lot 6234, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5468 PT 9143 Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan). ii. Presentation No. 44096/2015 dated 2.9.2015 on title PN100459 Lot 6241, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5469 PT 9144 Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan). 20 iii. Presentation No. 47645/2012 dated 9.8.2012 on title PN100460 Lot 6242, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5470 PT 9145 Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan). iv. Presentation No. 47646/2012 dated 9.8.2012 on title PN100461 Lot 6244, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5471 PT 9146 Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan). v. Presentation No. 44095/2015 dated 2.9.2015 on title PN100447 Lot 6228, Mukim Ijok, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (previously known as HS(D) 5462 PT 9137 Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan). [24] This Court further orders that the Defendant shall compensate the Plaintiff for the wrongful entry of the caveats calculable from the date of this judgment until the Defendant effectively removes all of the caveats on the Plaintiff’s Properties. This amount of compensation shall be assessed before the Senior Assistant Registrar. 21 [25] In view of the fact that the Plaintiff has moved its application to this Court under sections 323, 327 and 329 of the NLC, this Court would therefore decline to grant the Plaintiff the relief sought in prayer (b) of the Plaintiff’s Enclosure 1 namely; for a mandatory injunction to restrain the Defendant whether by its agent or employee, representative or otherwise from lodging further caveats unto the properties. On the issue of costs [26] Having heard the submission from the learned counsels for the Plaintiff and the Defendant, this Court hereby orders that the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff a sum of RM 25,000.00 in costs. 22 t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 14th February of 2017 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Mohanadass Partnership Tan Sri Dato’ Cecil Abraham Mr Sunil Mr Sanjay Mohanasundram Mr Gobinath Karuppan For the Defendants - Messrs Lee & Lim Datuk Ben Mr Lim Kian Huat Mr Kent Chai Watching brief for 987 Felda Settlers - Mr Sivarasa Rasiah

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-87-09/2016 & WA-24C-91-09/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Milsonland Development Sdn Bhd 2. ) Macro Resources Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Macro Resources Sdn Bhd 2. ) Milsonland Development Sdn Bhd

31/01/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a7437d06-ac4b-4625-94e3-b1a5585d2c51&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-87-09/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication Decision by Mr Kamraj Nayagam dated 04.08.2016 received by Macro Resources Sdn Bhd against Milson Development Sdn Bhd under Adjudication Reference No. KLRCA/D/ADJ-0244-2016 And In the matter of Section 15 Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of Order 5, 7, 28 and Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN MILSONLAND DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (COMPANY NO:890523-W) ... PLAINTIFF AND MACRO RESOURCES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 165826-X) … DEFENDANT (heard together with) 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-91-09/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication Decision by Mr Kamraj Nayagam dated 04.08.2016 received by Macro Resources Sdn Bhd against Milsonland Development Sdn Bhd under Adjudication Reference No. KLRCA/D/ ADJ-0244-2016 And In the matter of Section 28 Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the matter of Order 5, 7, 28 and Order 92 Rule 4 the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN MACRO RESOURCES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 165826-X) ... PLAINTIFF AND MILSONLAND DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 890523-W) ... DEFENDANT 3 THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] Milsonland Development Sdn Bhd ("Milsonland"), as employer, had appointed Macro Resources Sdn Bhd ("Macro Resources") as the main contractor vide a Letter of Award, to carry out the contract for earthwork and RC retaining walls, building and infrastructure works ("the Works") on Lot 3527 and 3528, Jalan Bukit Serdang 3/1, Seri Kembangan, Mukim Petaling, District of Petaling, Selangor. [2] It was part of a Project known as “Cadangan Pembangunan Perumahan dan Perdagangan yang mengandungi Kedai Pejabat (3-5 Tingkat), Rumah Bandar (5 Tingkat) dan tempat letak kenderaan di atas Lot No. 3527 dan Lot No. 3528, Jalan Bukit Serdang 3/1, Seri Kembangan, Mukim Petaling, Daerah Petaling, Selangor Darul Ehsan." [3] The contract sum was stated to be RM42,561,017.22. Problem [4] Disputes arose between the parties, with Macro Resources alleging that Milsonland had failed to pay the payments certified in its favour. Macro Resources proceeded with Adjudication under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). 4 [5] Macro Resources, as the unpaid party, served a Payment Claim dated 11.12.2015 on Milsonland claiming as follows: 1. Work done as certified vide Interim Certificate No. 29 dated 21.4.2014 by Zone Architect due for payment on 21.5.2014 pursuant to Clause 9 of Letter of Award dated 24.2.2011; and 2. Work done as certified vide Interim Certificate No. 30 dated 31.3.2015 by Zone Architect due for payment on 29.4.2015 pursuant to Clause 9 of Letter of Award dated 24.2.2011. [6] The calculation of the Payment Claim is as follows: Certificate No. 29 = RM39,793,758.73 (Add) Certificate No. 30 = RM 1,064,025.43 (Less) Retention Money = RM 2,128,050.86 (as per Clause 9 Letter of Award) (Less) Total amount previously paid= RM35,500,000.00 Total amount claimed = RM 3,229,733.30 [7] There was no Payment Response served. [8] Thereafter, Macro Resources as Claimant, proceeded with the filing of the Adjudication Notice on 19.1.2016 and followed up with the service of the Adjudication Claim on Milsonland as Respondent. 5 [9] The Respondent in the Adjudication served its Adjudication Response dated 19.5.2016 raising the following points: 1. That the Claimant had failed to complete the Works by the completion date of 30.6.2012 (paragraph 6 Adjudication Response); 2. That the Works carried out by the Claimant had defects (paragraph 10 Adjudication Response); 3. That the Claimant's claim is not in accordance with Certificates of Payment No. 29 and 30, and that the Claimant has erroneously based its claim on the provisional contract sum of RM42,561,017.22 (paragraphs 13 and 14 Adjudication Response). [10] The Adjudicator made his Decision on 4.8.2016 that the Respondent do pay the Claimant as follows: i. RM3,229,733.30; ii. Interest on RM3,229,733.30 at 5% per annum from 30 April 2015, amounting to RM205,023.64 at the date of the Decision and continuing at RM442.00 daily until the date of satisfaction; 6 iii. RM108,285.30 being interest on RM2,165,707.87 at 5% per annum from 30 April 2014 to 30 April 2015; iv. RM50,000.00 in respect of party and party costs; v. RM23,745.15 being reimbursement of sums and paid to KLRCA by the Claimant. Prayers [11] Aggrieved with the Adjudication Decision, the Respondent in the Adjudication filed in the Originating Summons No: WA-24C-87-09/2016 to set aside the Decision pursuant to section 15 CIPAA, particularly section 15 (b) and (d) of CIPAA whereby the Respondent relied on the ground that the Adjudicator has acted in breach of natural justice and more particularly that he had acted in excess of his jurisdiction. Section 15 CIPAA reads as follows: "15. Improperly Procured Adjudication Decision An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds: a) The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery; b) There has been a denial of natural justice; 7 c) The adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or d) The adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction." (emphasis added) [12] Meanwhile the Claimant had also filed an Originating Summons No: WA-24C-91-09/2016 to enforce the said Adjudication Decision as if it is a judgment of the High Court under section 28 (1) CIPAA which reads: "28. Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment (1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court." [13] By consent of the parties and for good reason, both the Originating Summonses were heard together for if the application for setting aside the Adjudication Decision is dismissed then generally the Court would correspondingly grant an order to enforce the Adjudication Decision. [14] The parties shall be referred to as Claimant and Respondent as they appeared in the Adjudication or as Macro Resources and Milsonland respectively, to avoid the confusion of referring to them sometimes as Plaintiff and sometimes as Defendant. 8 Principles Whether the Adjudicator had ventured outside the Payment Claim and thus acted in excess of his jurisdiction [15] The Adjudicator had correctly appraised himself of what the Claimant needed to prove with respect to value of Work done as certified by the two Payment Claims in Certificate 29 and 30 and the amount paid to date by the Respondent. Based on the decision in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695, I agree with the approach taken by the Adjudicator in that the failure of the Respondent to file its Payment Response is that the Claimant is merely put to proof of its Claim and the Respondent cannot assert positive defences, for example by way of set-off or counterclaim. This stems from the deeming provision in section 6 (4) CIPAA in that by a failure of the non-paying party in the Respondent to serve its Payment Response, the non-paying party is deemed to have disputed the entire of the Payment Claim. [16] The Adjudicator was thus right to have disregarded the matters raised in the Adjudication Response except in so far as they go to disproving the assertions made in the Payment Claim and the Adjudication Claim as served by the Claimant. [17] The jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to hear the dispute before him is confined only to matters raised in the Payment Claim (section 5) and the 9 Payment Response (section 6) as provided for in section 27 (1) CIPAA. In other words his jurisdiction to hear the dispute is both conferred and circumscribed by section 5, 6 and 27 (1) CIPAA. Section 27 (1) CIPAA reads: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator 1) Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6." [18] The Adjudicator had to decide whether the Claimant is entitled to claim for the amount owing for the Work done, certified in Certificate No. 29 and 30 after taking into consideration the amount paid by the Respondent so far. The jurisdiction of an Adjudicator is undisputedly and strictly confined to the four corners of Payment Claim and Payment Response (if any). [19] It then remained for the Claimant to prove its Payment Claim. As the Adjudication Response is served pursuant to section 10 (1) CIPAA in answer to the Adjudication Claim, it is open for the Adjudicator to find common grounds between the parties if any. The Adjudicator pointed out quite perceptively that the Respondent agreed and admitted that the total value of the Works certified is RM39,793,758.73. 10 [20] As submitted by learned counsel for the Claimant, the Respondent is thus estopped from denying that Certificates 29 and 30 certified that the total value of the Works done is RM39,793,758.73. [21] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that it is trite law, that a payment certificate for work done shall bind the parties and particularly the employer to abide and honour the same in favour of the contractor. The significance of payment certificate for work done has been ruled by Kang Hwee Gee J (later JCA) in the case of L’Grande Development Sdn Bhd v Bukit Cerakah Development Sdn Bhd [2007] 4 MLJ 518 at page 532, paragraph 63 as follows: “[63] A certificate is in essence a statement of ascertained and verified fact which is to be accepted as a statement of truth at face value. The interim certificate therefore constitutes a finality of the assessed value of work done by the contractor which under the terms of the construction contract oblige the employer to pay the contractor the sum certified forthwith. The certificate cannot be varied or cancelled unless agreed to by both the contractor and the employer.“ (emphasis added) [22] It is clear that work done in a certificate is value of work done by contractor which has been assessed where the employer shall be obliged to pay. 11 [23] The Respondent's contention is that even if they were to accept the Certificate of Payments as a correct reflection of work done, it would not add up to RM3,229,733.30 but only RM1,363,379.94 as follows: a) Certificate No. 29: RM 299,354.51 b) Certificate No. 30: RM1,064,025.43 Total : RM1,363,379.94 [24] It was argued that should the Adjudicator confine his jurisdiction to the Claimant's Payment Claim in pursuant to Certificate No. 29 and No. 30 then he would not have fallen into the error of having acted in excess of his jurisdiction by considering what it seems to be, amounts owing under previous Certificates of Payment which the Respondent is not admitting. [25] However a closer look at the Payment Claim would show that the Claimant is claiming not so much amount owing under the 2 Certificates of Payment 29 and 30 but rather the amount owing as evidenced by the Works done duly certified by the said 2 Certificates taking into consideration the amount paid so far. [26] Thus in the Payment Claim under "Particulars of Claim" is set out the following: (1) Total Contract Sum RM42,561,017.22 12 (2) Total Value of Works Certified under (a) Certificate No. 29. RM39,793,758.73 Certificate No. 30. RM 1,064,025.43 TOTAL RM40,857,784.16 LESS (3) Retention Sum 5% as per Clause 9 of the Letter of Award RM 2,128,050.86 (4) Total amount previously paid RM35,500,000.00 TOTAL DEDUCTION RM37,628,050.86 AMOUNT CLAIMED RM 3,229,733.30 [27] The key issue simply stated was what was the amount that the Respondent had paid the Claimant for the Works done since both parties were not in dispute that the value of Works done was valued at RM39,793,758.73. [28] As the Respondent had not bothered to give its reasons for disputing the Claimant's Claim, it would mean that the Claimant had to show some evidence of the sum of RM35,500,000.00 paid by the Respondent so far. There was no evidence in the Adjudication Claim or the Adjudication Response of the sum paid by the Respondent to the Claimant. 13 [29] The Claimant in the Adjudication Reply produced as Schedule 8 a spreadsheet indicating that the Claimant had been paid a sum of RM39,330,000.00 out of RM47,539,085.23 certified as work done. See paragraph 17 of the Adjudication Decision. [30] As the sum shown as certified in the spreadsheet was in excess of the contract sum of RM42,561,017.22, at the meeting on 4.7.2016, the Adjudicator enquired of the parties' counsel as to the reason for this. [31] The Claimant's counsel stated that the additional sums were paid in respect of works for an additional phase of the same project, but not under the Contract, and hence were reflected on the Project spreadsheet. On the other hand, the Respondent's counsel took the stand that the sum of RM39,330,000.00 reflected the total sum paid under the Contract. This is found at paragraph 18 of the Adjudication Decision. [32] Under the broad powers given to the Adjudicator under section 25 CIPAA, the Adjudicator is at liberty to under section 25 (i) and (j): "(i) Inquisitorially take the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision; (j) Issue any direction as may be necessary or expedient;" 14 [33] The Adjudicator therefore at the meeting of 4.7.2016 directed the parties to lodge Statutory Declarations as to the amounts paid to the Claimant by the Respondent by 18.7.2016. A Statutory Declaration is of course a declaration in writing made under oath before a Commissioner for Oaths such that if the declarations therein were found to be false, then the maker is exposed to a criminal charge for the offence of making a false statutory declaration. [34] Parties duly filed their statutory declarations with the Claimant's representative explaining that the additional sums was with respect to works for Phase 2 of the same Project. [35] The Respondent's statutory declaration on the other hand was evasive and non-committal when viewed against the backdrop of the reason behind the statutory declaration. It reads: "I confirm that the payment made by Milsonland Sdn Bhd to Macro Resources Sdn Bhd to date amounts to RM39,330,000.00". [36] The Respondent also exhibited the same spreadsheet that was produced in the Claimant's Adjudication Reply. [37] The Respondent had clearly avoided what was critical for it to clarify, which is whether the additional sum RM463,758.73 15 (RM39,793,758.73 - RM39,330,000.00) was paid with respect to Phase 1 or Phase 2 of the Project. [38] The Adjudicator had given his reasons for believing the Claimant's version as to the amount paid and for rejecting the Respondent's version. The Adjudicator's reasons are both cogent and comprehensive as set out in his Adjudication Decision at paragraph 21 below: "In the absence of any explanation from the Respondent as to why sums considerably in excess of the Contract sum have been certified as due, I accept the Claimant's explanation. I am further strengthened in this conclusion by the fact that the Respondent in the Adjudication Response has stated as follows at Paragraph 14 "The Respondent states that the value of the Works certified is RM39,793,758.73..." This is inconsistent with the certified sum in the spreadsheet, and the failure to explain this inconsistency leads me to conclude that the Claimant's version of events is to be preferred. I also note that if the Respondent had in fact paid the Claimant the sum of RM39,330,000.00 in respect of the works done under the contract, it would have paid all but RM463,758.73 (RM39,793,758.73 - RM39,330,000.00) of the amount certified to the Claimant, thereby in effect releasing the second moiety of Retention Sum. I can see no documents evidencing such release, 16 and further fortifies me in my decision to accept the Claimant's evidence." [39] I have no good reason to disagree with the Adjudicator. At any rate, these are findings of fact and this being not an appeal, this Court should not be reviewing the merits of the Decision on a setting aside application. [40] It does not lie for the Respondent to now argue that the Adjudicator should have referred to the Architect the issue of how much has been paid by the Respondent. I further agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that there is also no need for the Adjudicator to obtain assistance from the Architect that has issued the Certificates of Payment to certify the amount paid for the said Project. The Certificates of Payments are evidence of directions and findings of the Architect and it means that the payment has been approved by the Architect for payment to be made to the Defendant. This would be in compliance of the Letter of Award as well as the Articles of Agreement executed by both parties and both parties are bound by this. [41] It is a matter within the knowledge of the Respondent as the party paying to be candid and to be able to say confidently and more importantly, correctly how much it has paid which has not been accounted for! 17 [42] It is for the Adjudicator to establish under section 25 (a) the procedures in conducting the Adjudication proceedings and in a case where the expertise of an Architect is not required for the dispute if at all, is on a proper accounting of payments made, it would be pointless and a dissipation of precious time to call on the Architect to give his expert report. [43] This part of accounting starting as it is from the common base of the value of work done as certified by the Architects has only two deductions which is the retention sum and the amount paid so far. It is simple arithmetic and not algebra or algorithm! [44] I am not persuaded that the Adjudicator had acted in excess of his jurisdiction. On the contrary he had acted within the scope and ambit of the matters referred to him in the Payment Claim in the absence of a Payment Response. Whether there was a breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator disregarded the issue of delay and defects raised for the first time by the Respondent in its Adjudication Response [45] The dicta of her Ladyship Mary Lim J (now JCA) in View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holding Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695, Dato‘ Mary 18 Lim Thiam Suan J (as she was then) at page 11, paragraph 60, is both illuminating and instructive: “[60] Subsection 27(1) limits the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction to the matters referred to adjudication pursuant to sections 5 and 6; namely the claims in the Payment Claim and the responses or defences in the Payment Response. This limitation is subject to subsection 27(2) which allows the parties to the adjudication to extend that jurisdiction by written agreement to matters beyond or outside sections 5 and 6. In the absence of such agreement, the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction does not extend to or include matters in the Adjudication Claim and the Adjudication Response or even Adjudication Reply found in sections 9, 10 and 11. It is obvious from subsections 27 (1) and (2) that where the parties feel that the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction is insufficient to deal with their particular dispute; the parties can sit down and agree on extending that jurisdictional cover. In the present case, the parties could have dealt with this through a written agreement amongst themselves. There was no such effort; and the Court is not required to look into the reasons for the lack of such an effort...“ (emphasis added) 19 [46] The Respondent had raised the issue of alleged delay and defects on the part of the Claimant. I agree that the Respondent had not raised this issue in the Payment Response and as such the Respondent had no right to raise this issue at this juncture of the Adjudication Response stage. In any event, the liability of the Respondent as employer to pay to the Claimant and the right and entitlement of the Claimant to be paid by the Respondant as provided by the said Clause 9 are not subject to the duty of the Claimant to remedy and rectify any defects during the Defects Liability Period. [47] Under Certificate No. 30 only half of the Retention Sum is due for release under the first moiety. The Defects Liability Period has not yet lapsed as at the date of the Adjudication Response, and in fact would only come to an end on 8.8.2016 according to the Certificate of Practical Completion dated 10.2.2015. Therefore the Claimant cannot be said to be in default of any duty to rectify any defects as at the commencement of these Adjudication proceedings nor even as at the date of the Adjudication Response. If at all there are defects not rectified, there is still the second moiety not yet due to be released. [48] In any event the Adjudicator also went on to find in paragraph 12 of the Decision that the Adjudication Response contains no averment of actual damage caused by the Claimant's alleged breaches of the 20 Contract. He also observed that there was no allegation of a right to set- off damages against the Claimant's claim. He concluded by stating that even if he were wrong in holding that he was precluded from considering these matters, he would still not have found them, on the facts, to constitute a reason for not allowing the Claimant's Payment Claim. [49] This Court would reaffirm the Adjudicator's stand in not considering the matters not stated in the Payment Response as being perfectly proper and certainly provided for in sections 5,6 and 27 (1) CIPAA. [50] The Adjudicator had placed reliance on the authority of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 695 whereby the effect of the failure to file Payment Response is that the Claimant is merely put to the proof of its claim and the Respondent cannot assert positive defences. In that case, Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) held in paragraphs 65 – 68 that: “[65] According to learned counsel for View Esteem, a reading of subsection 6 (4) seems to suggest that a party who has complied with the procedural requirements of the Act by filing a Payment Response is, in a sense, worse off from a party who has not. Learned counsel suggests that non-paying parties who do not file payment responses appear to be able to claim the benefit or 21 protection of subsection 6 (4) and raise any defence for the first time in the Adjudication Response. [66] With respect, the Court finds these concerns misplaced. It may be said that by virtue of subsection 27(1), the Payment Claim and the Payment Response is to adjudication what pleadings are to civil litigation. Parties are bound by their pleadings under the rules of procedure in civil litigation; in adjudication, those pleadings are to be found in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response; and not in the Adjudication Claim, Adjudication Response or the Adjudication Reply. [67] The failure to file a Payment Response will only afford the non-responding party some security or comfort of not having had a default judgment of sorts entered against them because subsection 6(4) deems the Payment Claim to be disputed. [68] For the unpaid party, the absence of a Payment Response means that the unpaid party as a claimant in the adjudication proceedings will only be required to prove the matters raised in the payment claim without having to meet any onus of proof which may, in a defended payment 22 disputed through the Payment Response, shift back to the unpaid party or claimant.” (emphasis added) [51] Her Ladyship also had occasion to observe in similar vein in WRP Asia Pacific Asn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1236, paragraph 27 as follows: “[27] Subsection 27 (1) restricts the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to the matters found in sections 5 and 6. In short, the Adjudicator takes jurisdiction from the payment claim and the payment response; not from the adjudication claim, adjudication response or even the adjudication reply. This is materially significant and important as this brings to bear the whole scheme of CIPAA 2012; that the adjudication proceedings is to deal with or resolve a payment dispute. ...“ (emphasis added) [52] Learned counsel for the Claimant made reference to the case of Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 941. In brief, Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd carried out some subcontract works and submitted interim claims. Bina Puri disputed those claims because it alleges a gross miscalculation in one of the payment certificates. There is in fact a pending suit whereby Bina Puri is claiming for refund of overpayment from Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd. Unfortunately, when a Payment Claim was raised by Hing 23 Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd under CIPAA, Bina Puri did not file any Payment Response. Failure to file a Payment Response was considered to be a dispute of the entire amount under section 6 (4) CIPAA. However, it limited Bina Puri to only disputing the claim without allowing them to raise the issue of their counterclaim. His Lordship Ravinthran Paramagaru J held as follows: "[11] The dispute raised in the Payment Claim is in respect of the payments allegedly due under the said Interim Claims. The applicant did not file a Payment Response to raise the issue of counterclaim of RM13,544,690.45. In the premises, as the Adjudicator does not possess inherent jurisdiction, his jurisdiction is limited to the dispute raised under section 5 and 6, ie the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. Sub-section (2) provides for the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator by agreement. It reads as follows: (2) The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6. However, in the instant case, it is common ground that the parties did not execute an agreement pursuant to the above provision to 24 extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to enable him to decide the counterclaim of the applicant. In the premises, the Adjudicator cannot be faulted for holding that he had no jurisdiction to decide the counterclaim of the applicant that was raised belatedly in the Adjudication Response. Counsel for applicant also submitted that he had no opportunity to argue the said point as it was not raised in the submissions and there it resulted in a breach of natural justice. The limits of jurisdiction of the Adjudicator is a matter that is governed by law, ie section 27 of CIPAA. Therefore, there can be no breach of natural justice if the Adjudication had referred to the correct law to properly direct himself as to what he can or cannot do. In any event, although the Adjudicator declined to decide the counterclaim of the applicant that was only raised in the Adjudication Response, he considered the overpayment defence which is related to the counterclaim of the applicant. I shall consider it below." (emphasis added) [53] Therefore there was no breach of natural justice when as constrained by the clear provision of section 27 (1) CIPAA, the Adjudicator did not consider the issues of delay and defective works raised for the first time in the Respondent's Adjudication Response. 25 Whether the Adjudicator had acted in excess of jurisdiction in granting interest on the amount outstanding [54] It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the interest awarded by the Adjudicator was never claimed by the Claimant in its Payment Claim. That being the case, parties are bound by the Payment Claim and the Payment Response served. [55] A claim for interest was made in the Adjudication Claim and the Respondent had opportunity to respond to it. This claim for interest may be regarded as consequentially and naturally flowing from the amount claimed in the Payment Claim. It is more a submission of law on whether interest may be allowed upon a successful claim under a Payment Claim. [56] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that the Adjudicator had acted well within his powers pursuant to section 25 (o) CIPAA wherein the Adjudicator shall have the power to award financing costs and interest. It is more an argument of law when it comes to a claim under a construction contract as to whether a contractor should be entitled to interest for being kept out of the monies due to him for work 26 already done for which he had expanded labour, material and financing costs. In fact it is so axiomatic that it is hardly argued against. [57] I cannot fault the Adjudicator as having acting in excess of his jurisdiction when it was clearly within his power to award interest and when the Respondent cannot seriously argue against it. The Adjudicator reasoned this way at paragraph 24 of the Adjudication Decision as follows: "The Claimant has prayed for interest at the rate of 5% per annum. I am of the view that this is reasonable. I am of the view that this should be awarded on the sum of RM3,229,733.30 from 30 April 2015 (i.e. 30 days after Certificate Number 30) until satisfaction. I am further of the view that the Claimant should be awarded interest at 5% on the sum of RM2,165,707.87 (i.e. RM3,229,733.30 - RM 1,064,025.43) from 30 April 2014 (being a convenient date taking into account that some monies appear to have been outstanding for a longer period) to 30 April 2015, i.e. A period of one year." Pronouncement [58] In the upshot, for all the reasons given above, I would dismiss the Originating Summons for setting aside the Adjudication Decision and 27 allow the Originating Summons for enforcement with a single costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by the Respondent Milsonland to the Claimant Macro Resources. [59] Allocator to be paid before extracting order of costs. Dated: 31 January 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in the Setting aside : Ben Lee Kam Foo OS WA-24C-87-09/2016 together Shafihani Md Ali For the Defendant in the Enforcement : (Messrs Gan & Zul) OS WA-24C-91-09/2016 For the Plaintiff in the Enforcement : Barry Goh together with OS WA-24C-91-09/2016 Chow Yee Wan For the Defendant in the Setting Aside : (Messrs Iza Ng Yeoh & OS WA-24C-87-09/2016 Kit) Date of Decision: 25 October 2016

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C(ARB)-22-08/2016 & WA-24C(ARB)-20-07/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Sime Darby Property Berhad 2. ) Garden Bay Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Garden Bay Sdn Bhd 2. ) Sime Darby Property Berhad

31/01/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=251152a9-6428-4e58-a767-5aaa55b4a46e&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C(ARB)-22-08/2016 In the matter of Sections 37(1)(a)(iv), 37(1)(a)(v), 37(1)(b)(ii), 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act 2005, and 42(1)(1A), 42(4)(b) and 42(5) of the Arbitration Act 2005 And In the matter of Order 7 Rule 2 and Order 69 Rules 2 & 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of the Arbitration between Garden Bay Sdn Bhd as Claimant and Sime Darby Property Berhad as Respondent And In the matter of the Award dated 6.11.2014 BETWEEN 2 SIME DARBY PROPERTY BERHAD (Company No.: 15631-P) … PLAINTIFF AND GARDEN BAY SDN BHD (Company No.: 385521-K) … DEFENDANT (Heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C(ARB)-20-07/2016 In the matter of the Arbitration between Garden Bay Sdn Bhd and Sime Darby Property Berhad; And In the matter of the Arbitration Award dated 6.11.2014 given by Menaha Ramanath; And In the matter of the Supplementary Arbitration Award dated 28.10.2015 given by Menaha Ramanath; And 3 In the matter of Section 38 of the Arbitration Act 2005; And In the matter of Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN GARDEN BAY SDN BHD (Company No.: 385521-K) … PLAINTIFF AND SIME DARBY PROPERTY BERHAD (Company No.: 15631-P) … DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] Sime Darby Sdn Bhd (“Sime Darby”) had issued a Letter of Acceptance ("LoA") dated 8.2.2011 and duly accepted by Garden Bay Sdn (“Garden Bay”), appointing Garden Bay as a Contractor for turfing and landscaping works for a project known as “Cadangan Pembangunan Landskap bagi Membina 132 Unit Rumah Teres Dua Tingkat Dan Tiga 4 Tingkat Serta Dua Unit Pencawang Elektrik Di Fasa I-8, Seksyen U16, Denai Alam, Shah Alam, Selangor Darul Ehsan” for a lump sum of RM846,175.50 (the Project"). [2] The Date of Site Possession was stated to be 1.3.2011 and the Date For Completion was stated to be on 24.5.2011 i.e. the overall completion period was stated to be 12 weeks. [3] Disputes and differences arose between the parties and these were then referred to arbitration as stipulated in Clause 54 of the Conditions of Contract. The Parties could agree on a single Arbitrator and the learned Arbitrator appointed duly gave directions on pleadings, bundle of documents and witnesses statements to be filed. [4] Garden Bay was the Claimant at the Arbitration and it claimed for the sum of RM338,666.39 being the balance remaining unpaid, interests and costs. [5] Sime Darby as Respondent in the Arbitration counterclaimed for the sum of RM246,978.00 together with general damages for the Claimant's delay in completing the landscape works to be assessed by the Arbitrator together with interests and costs. 5 [6] As directed by the Arbitrator, the parties filed their respective pleadings, bundles of documents and witnesses’ statements. The learned Arbitrator heard witnesses from both the parties and on 6.11.2014, handed down her Arbitration Award (Exhibit A-1 Sime Darby's Affidavit in Support). [7] In paragraph 5.0 of the Arbitration Award, the Arbitrator determined and awarded the following: a) Sime Darby pays Garden Bay the sum of RM282,512.00 as the final amount due to Garden Bay as at 23.10.2013; b) Sime Darby pays Garden Bay simple interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the said sum of RM282,512.00 calculated from 23.10.2013 until the date of the Arbitration Award; c) Sime Darby pays Garden Bay simple interest at the rate of 5% per annum on the said sum of RM282,512.00 from the date of the Arbitration Award until full and final satisfaction of the said sum; d) Sime Darby pays Garden Bay the cost of the Arbitration of RM20,500.00; 6 e) Sime Darby pays its own cost and the cost of its solicitor; and f) Sime Darby pays Garden Bay cost and the cost of its solicitor on a client - solicitor basis to be taxed by the Court. [8] On the Respondent's Counterclaim the learned Arbitrator found as follows at paragraph 4.40: "Considering all the facts and circumstances available to the Arbitrator for this arbitration, I find and hold the Claimant is liable to pay LAD of RM35,000.00 to be set off from the Final Certificate Amount of RM338,666.39 due to the Claimant. As to costs for rectification work not completed as at 26 December 2012, I find and hold that the amount of Claimant's liability is 2 1/2% of Contract Sum amounting to RM21,154.39 as per Para 2.35, to be set off from the Final Certificate Amount of RM338,666.39 due to the Claimant." 7 [9] There was a previous Consent Judgment where the parties had agreed that the learned Arbitrator, pursuant to Section 42(3) AA 2005 be ordered to state in sufficient detail the reasons for the finding that Garden Bay is liable for RM21,154.39 as costs of rectification of defects when Sime Darby's claim for rectification of defects by the third party was at RM246,978.00. [10] The Arbitrator then handed down the Supplementary Arbitration Award dated 28.10.2015. As the previous Originating Summonses had already been closed by the Court after the record of the Consent Judgment, parties had filed their respective current Originating Summonses referred to above. Prayers [11] Sime Darby had filed an Originating Summons under section 37 and alternatively under section 42 of the Arbitration Act 2005 (AA) to set aside the whole of an Arbitration Award made partly in favour of Garden Bay where the claim is concerned and partly in Sime Darby's favour where the rectification work is concerned. 8 [12] In particular Sime Darby had prayed for the setting aside of the whole Award under sections 37(1)(a)(iv), 37(1)(b)(ii), 37(2)(b)(i) and 37(2)(b)(ii) AA. [13] The questions of law referred to the Court by Sime Darby under section 42 AA are as follows: (1) Whether the Arbitrator could make a finding based on an issue, which was never presented or argued before her; and (2) Whether by not inviting parties to present or argue on the issue which formed the Award, the Arbitrator had acted beyond her jurisdiction and breached the rules of natural justice. On the other hand, Garden Bay filed an Originating Summons for recognition of the Arbitration Award made pursuant to Section 38 AA. Both Sime Darby's and Garden Bay's Originating Summonses were heard together by consent of the parties. [14] The parties shall be referred to as Claimant and Respondent as they appeared in the Arbitration or sometimes by their names as Garden Bay and Sime Darby respectively. 9 Principles [15] The interplay between a section 37 vis-a-vis a section 42 application under the AA had been discussed in the recent case of Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLRA 407, 2 MLRA 687. The Court of Appeal had succinctly differentiated between the basis of applications filed pursuant to sections 37 and 42 AA as follows : “[29] An application to set aside an award under s 37 largely deals with issues relating to the award making process and has nothing to do with error of facts and/or law on the face of record unless the exception applies; such as public policy. An application under s 42 has nothing to do with the award making process but has everything to do with the award per se and error of law on the face of record which error substantially affects the rights of one or more of the parties. The distinction between ss 37 and 42 is that like of an apple and an orange... [31] The threshold to satisfy under s 37 is very low (though the courts are slow in setting aside the award) and upon proof if successful, the court has an option to send back the matter to the https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= 10 arbitral tribunal to eliminate the grounds for setting aside, as set out in s 37(6). This was not done in this case. To put it in another way when a party to the arbitration complains of breach related to s 37(1)(a)(iv) and/or (v) etc, he must invite the court's attention to s 37(6) and cannot rely on s 42 as it will be an abuse of process, as he is relying on omission or excess of jurisdiction which is covered under s 37 and not s 42 of AA. [32] In addition, once the applicant had chosen to rely on s 37 grounds as stated earlier, that will mitigate a no-case under s 42. I do not think it will be a proper exercise of judicial power to entertain an application under s 42 when the applicant is relying on the same facts as advocated for a s 37 application. In my considered view, a trial court ought not to entertain an application under s 42 at all. I will explain this further. [33] The threshold to satisfy s 42 requirements is very high and I will say in consequence of case laws, it is extremely high. That is to say, if a party cannot succeed under s 37, on the same facts and complaint the general jurisprudence will dictate an application under s https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= 11 42 will be futile as s 37 relates to arbitral process and s 42 relates to arbitral award.” [16] Section 37 AA provides: “(1) An award may be set aside by the High Court only if - (a) the party making the application provides proof that - (i) a party to the arbitration agreement was under any incapacity; (ii) the arbitration is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or, failing any indication thereon, under the laws of Malaysia; (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present that party's case; (iv) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration; https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOW7y5jSwnP6aoNC5y+VvPZA= 12 (v) subject to subsection (3), the award contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; or (vi) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this act from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this act; or (b) the High Court finds that - (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of Malaysia; or (ii) the award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia. (2) Without limiting the generality of subparagraph (1)(b)(ii), an award is in conflict with the public policy of Malaysia where - 13 (a) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption; or (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred- (i) during the arbitral proceedings; or (ii) in connection with the making of the award. (3) Where the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside. (4) An application for setting aside may not be made after the expiry of ninety days from the date on which the party making the application had received the award or, if a request has been made under section 35, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal. (5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an application for setting aside on the ground that the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. 14 (6) On an application under subsection (1) the High Court may, where appropriate and so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for such period of time as it may determine in order to allow the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will eliminate the grounds for setting aside. (7) Where an application is made to set aside an award, the High Court may order that any money made payable by the award shall be brought into the High Court or otherwise secured pending the determination of the application.” (emphasis added) Whether there has been a breach of natural justice when the Arbitrator decided that by conduct, the parties have accepted that the Respondent's claim for rectification works is the sum retained as Retention Sum under the Contract [17] It is generally agreed that if there has been a breach of natural justice under section 37(2) (b) either (i) during the arbitral proceedings; or (ii) in connection with the making of the Award, then the whole Award has to be set aside. 15 [18] In Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd (supra), the Court of Appeal held that: [4] “It is our view that s 37 only allows the court to set aside the award save for the limited exception under s 37(3) of the said Act.” [19] Thus even in a case that succeeds under section 37(1)(a)(iv) AA, the Court would be constrained to set aside the whole of the Award. In Magna Prima Construction Sdn Bhd v Bina BMK Sdn Bhd [2015] 3 MLRH 116, MLJU 291 the High Court held that: “[27] Learned counsel argued that the New Zealand Act had combined both the limbs found in our sub paragraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and (v) under one section, allowing the court to set aside part of an award on either ground. As such, it was submitted that our subsection (3) is equally applicable to subparagraph 37(1)(a)(v)(sic). [28] With respect, the court disagrees. As can be seen from the provisions, the legislative content of the relevant provision of the law (cl 5 in Schedule 2 of New Zealand's Arbitration Act 1996) is quite different from our s 37. The differences in the two pieces of legislation can only be said to be deliberate on the part of our Parliament. In https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= 16 view of the express provision in sub paragraph 37(1)(a)(v), it is furthermore not the function of this court to read otherwise, just because that is how another jurisdiction has chosen to draft its law. [29] In determining this issue of jurisdiction under s 37, it is also correct to say that where the plaintiff is seeking to set aside only a part of the award, which is the case here, then subparagraph 37(1)(a)(iv) is not available to the plaintiff. When the conditions of sub paragraph 37(1)(a)(iv) are met, the whole award will be set aside; and not just that part which is challenged; unless of course, if the same complaints can be raised under subparagraph 37(1)(a)(v). This is clear from a plain reading of subparagraphs 37(1)(a)(iv) and (v). [30] Only subparagraph 37(1)(a)(v) provides that it is "Subject to subsection (3)" while subparagraph 37(1)(a)(iv) is silent. As opined earlier, the absence of these critical words in subparagraph 37(1)(a)(iv) is deliberate. The court must heed that clear intention of Parliament, especially in view of s 8 which reminds the court of a minimalistic approach in its intervention in arbitration and arbitration related matters.” https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tOXqmVcU+ccX0gaUizz1y6uI= https://www.elaw.my/legislationSectionDisplayed.aspx?info=oCFzsY7+rEDHVjZCjm5tORu/xPdGxpk5gFyIoAjhFcA= 17 [20] The Court of Appeal in Petronas Penapisan (Melaka) Sdn Bhd v Ahmani Sdn Bhd [2016] 2 MLJ 697 gave some guidance on the scope of a breach of natural justice in the setting aside of an Arbitral Award. Justice Prasad Abraham JCA observed as follows: "[2] In dealing with the defendant’s counterclaim, the arbitral tribunal in this case found the defendant was not entitled to recover any loss or damages arising from the termination of the contract. The arbitral tribunal found absence of evidence to support its counterclaim. The arbitral tribunal then went on to say that it would proceed to use the factor of inflation set at 20% being a reasonable sum and the arbitral tribunal proceeded to find on the following basis. The balance of 30% of the contract price RM260,470.20 add 20% inflation RM52,094.04 = RM312,564.24. [3] This issue was not brought up by the parties nor were the parties alerted to it nor invited to address that point and therefore the award in our view contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration in breach of 18 ss 37(1)(a)(v) and 37(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act 2005 (‘the Act’) and raises question of law under s 42 of the said Act. ...... [9] We refer also to the case of OAO Northern Shipping Co v Remolcadores de Marin SLp, The Remmar [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 302 and to the judgment of Gloster J, DBE which we quote: 16 The primary ground relied upon by Buyers in the present case is: ‘(a) failure by the tribunal to comply with section 33 (general duty of tribunal)’. Section 33 provides as follows: (1) The tribunal shall – (a) act fairly and impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting his case and dealing with that of his opponent, and (b) adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the matters falling to be determined. 19 (2) The tribunal shall comply with that general duty in conducting the arbitral proceedings, in its decisions on matters of procedure and evidence and in the exercise of all other powers conferred on it. 17 Alternatively, Mr Henton submitted that the application can be dealt with underground (c), as set out in section 68(2) , of ‘failure by the tribunal to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties’. 18 Mr Henton recognised that the section 68 threshold is a high one, the aim being to eliminate technical and unmeritorious challenges and promote finality of dispute resolution. Section 68 must not be used for disguised challenges to the correctness of a decision on the facts or law, especially where (as here) the right of appeal under section 69 has been excluded by agreement. In the words of the DAC’s Report on the Arbitration Bill (referred to in Lesotho at paragraph 27): [s 68] is really designed as a long stop, only available in extreme cases where the tribunal has gone so wrong in its 20 conduct of the arbitration that justice calls out for it to be corrected. 19 Having said that, the DAC, and their lordships in Lesotho, also recognised that a party’s right to a fair and impartial hearing is a fundamental one. An inability on the part of the court to intervene could seriously undermine the international reputation of English arbitration. 20 Where the challenge is made under section 68(2)(a), the seriousness of the irregularity must be judged in accordance with the fundamental principles laid down in a series of cases which ante-date the 1996 Act, but which have been repeatedly upheld as reflecting the principles enshrined in section 68(2)(a): 21 Thus, Ackner LJ in The Vimeira [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 66, 76) stated: The essential function of an arbitrator … is to resolve the issues raised by the parties. The pleadings record what those issues are thought to 21 be and, at the conclusion of the evidence, it should be apparent what issues still remain live issues. If an arbitrator considers that the parties or their experts have missed the real point … then it is not only a matter of obvious prudence, but the arbitrator is obliged, in common fairness or, as it is sometimes described, as a matter of natural justice, to put the point to them so that they have an opportunity of dealing with it … the adequacy of the turning area was not at the conclusion of the evidence – eventhough it was a possible issue at the commencement of the arbitration – any longer a live issue. The arbitrators clearly thought otherwise. They should have so informed the parties … and (per Bingham LJ) in Zermalt Holdings SA v Nu Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd [1985] 2 EGLR 14 at p 15: If an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never been raised by either side then it is his duty to 22 put it to them so that they have an opportunity to comment. If he feels that the proper approach is one that has not been explored or advanced in evidence or submission, then again it is his duty to give the parties a chance to comment. If he is to any extent relying on his own personal experience in a specific way, then that again is something that he should mention so that it can be explored. It is not right that his decision should be based on specific matters which the parties never had the chance to deal with, nor is it right that a party should first learn of adverse points in a decision against him. That is contrary both to the substance of justice and to its appearance … 22 These principles apply to unargued points of law or construction as they do to unargued questions of fact. In such cases, whilst it is not necessary for the tribunal to refer back to the parties each and every legal inference which it intends to draw from the primary facts on the issues placed 23 before it, the tribunal must give the parties ‘a fair opportunity to address its arguments on all of the essential building blocks in the tribunal’s conclusion’ (ABB AG v Hochtief Airport [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1, paragraph 70). [10] We are therefore in agreement with the learned judge that the arbitral tribunal had by the manner it had proceeded, caused substantial injustice and the whole process was irregular." (emphasis added) [20] It may be surmised that Parliament had allowed an Arbitration Award to be set aside on ground of breach of natural justice as an Arbitral Tribunal is enjoined under section 20 AA by the use of the mandatory “shall” to - (i) treat equally all parties; and (ii) give every party a fair and reasonable opportunity of presenting that party’s case. [21] The Singapore Arbitration Act also has a similar provision in their section 48(1)(a)(vii) of the Act which reads as follows: "48.—(1) An award may be set aside by the Court — 24 (a) if the party who applies to the Court to set aside the award proves to the satisfaction of the Court that— … (vii) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced;" [22] Cases across the causeway would be relevant in helping to throw some light on the ambit of the breach of natural justice as a ground to set aside an Arbitration Award. In Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 (“Soh Beng Tee”), the Singapore Court of Appeal held at [29] that a party challenging an Arbitration Award as having contravened the rules of natural justice has to establish the following: (a) which rule of natural justice was breached; (b) how it was breached; 25 (c) in what way the breach was connected to the making of the award; and (d) how the breach prejudiced its rights. [23] The Singapore Court of Appeal then summarized the principles relating to the application of rules of natural justice which should be adopted for both international and domestic arbitration at [65] some of which are as follows: (a) Parties to arbitration have, in general, a right to be heard effectively on every issue that may be relevant to the resolution of a dispute … The best rule of thumb to adopt is to treat the parties equally and allow them reasonable opportunities to present their cases as well as to respond. An arbitrator should not base his decision(s) on matters not submitted or argued before him … (d) The delicate balance between ensuring the integrity of the arbitral process and ensuring that the rules of natural justice are complied with in the arbitral process is preserved by strictly adhering to only the narrow scope and basis for challenging an arbitral award that has been expressly acknowledged under the Act and the IAA. In 26 so far as the right to be heard is concerned, the failure of an arbitrator to refer every point for decision to the parties for submissions is not invariably a valid ground for challenge … (f) Each case should be decided within its own factual matrix. I must always be borne in mind that it is not the function of the court to assiduously comb an arbitral award microscopically in attempting to determine if there was any blame or fault in the arbitral process; rather, an award should be read generously such that only meaningful breaches of the rules of natural justice that have actually caused prejudice are ultimately remedied. [24] The Singapore Court of Appeal further clarified in L W Infrastructure Pte Ltd v Lim Chin San Contractors Pte Ltd and another appeal [2013] 1 SLR 125, what is meant by breaches of rules of natural justice which have actually caused prejudice that warrants the Court's intervention in setting aside the award: "The test of prejudice in determining whether an arbitral award should be set aside 27 50 To begin, it is the last of the quoted paragraphs above that warrants some attention. What is the threshold of prejudice that must be crossed before a court may intervene under s 48(1)(a)(vii) of the Act? It is undoubtedly the case that not every breach of the rules of natural justice will in itself amount to the required “prejudice” (see Soh Beng Tee at [83]–[84]). In Soh Beng Tee, this court was careful to state that there must be some causal connection between the breach of natural justice and the making of the award in order to establish actual or real prejudice. This is reflected in Soh Beng Tee at [86] and [91]: 86 It is necessary to prove that the breach, if any, had caused actual or real prejudice to the party seeking to set aside a award. It may well be that though a breach has preceded the making of an award, the same result could ensue even if the arbitrator had acted properly..... 91 … It appears to us that in Singapore, an applicant will have to persuade the court that there has been some actual or real prejudice caused by the alleged breach. While this is obviously a lower hurdle than substantial prejudice, it certainly does not 28 embrace technical or procedural irregularities that have caused no harm in the final analysis. There must be more than technical unfairness. It is neither desirable nor possible to predict the infinite range of factual permutations or imponderables that may confront the courts in the future. What we can say is that to attract curial intervention it must be established that the breach of the rules of natural justice must, at the very least, have actually altered the final outcome of the arbitral proceedings in some meaningful way. If, on the other hand, the same result could or would ultimately have been attained, or if it can be shown that the complainant could not have presented any ground-breaking evidence and/or submissions regardless, the bare fact that the arbitrator might have inadvertently denied one or both parties some technical aspect of a fair hearing would almost invariably be insufficient to set aside the award. 51 These passages should not be understood as requiring the applicant for relief to demonstrate affirmatively that a different outcome would have ensued but for the breach of natural justice. Nor conversely do they mean that the application for relief is bound to fail if there is a possibility that the same result might have been arrived at even if the 29 breach of natural justice had not occurred. However, this was the way in which counsel, Mr Tan Liam Beng (“Mr Tan”), framed his arguments for the Defendant. In our view, the principal requirement that was highlighted in Soh Beng Tee at [91] is the demonstration that “there has been some actual or real prejudice caused by the alleged breach … [which] is obviously a lower hurdle than substantial prejudice, [though] it certainly does not embrace technical or procedural irregularities that have caused no harm in the final analysis”. 52 The threshold of “substantial injustice” is adopted in s 68(2) of the UK Arbitration Act 1996. In Soh Beng Tee ([48] supra), this court considered (at [91]) that the threshold to be applied in Singapore should indeed be lower: 91 … It does, however, appear that Parliament, in steering away from the ‘substantial injustice’ formula adopted in the UK Arbitration Act 1996, had intended to set a lower bar to establish a remediable ‘prejudice’. The statutory formula adopted in England would only bite in those cases where it can be said that what has happened is so far 30 removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that the court would take action. … 53 Robert Merkin and Louis Flannery, having reviewed the authorities interpreting s 68(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996, summarised the position in their book as follows (see Robert Merkin & Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996 (Informa Publishing, 4th Ed, 2008) at p 158): … the Court’s task on [an application alleging the breach of the right of fair hearing] is not to second-guess the tribunal’s views on any additional submissions which one side might have made if called upon to do so. It may be sufficient if that party has been deprived of the opportunity to advance submissions which were ‘at least reasonably arguable’, or even simply something better than ‘hopeless’ [emphasis added] 54 The proliferation of labels may not ultimately be helpful. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that it is never in the interest of the court, much less its role, to assume the function of the arbitral tribunal. To say that the court must be satisfied that a different result would definitely ensue before prejudice can be said to have been demonstrated would 31 be incorrect in principle because it would require the court to put itself in the position of the arbitrator and to consider the merits of the issue with the benefit of materials that had not in the event been placed before the arbitrator. Seen in this light, it becomes evident that the real inquiry is whether the breach of natural justice was merely technical and inconsequential or whether as a result of the breach, the arbitrator was denied the benefit of arguments or evidence that had a real as opposed to a fanciful chance of making a difference to his deliberations. Put another way, the issue is whether the material could reasonably have made a difference to the arbitrator; rather than whether it would necessarily have done so. Where it is evident that there is no prospect whatsoever that the material if presented would have made any difference because it wholly lacked any legal or factual weight, then it could not seriously be said that the complainant has suffered actual or real prejudice in not having had the opportunity to present this to the arbitrator (cf Soh Beng Tee at [86])." (emphasis added) [25] Our courts are not shackled by the "prejudice" test as in Singapore or the "substantial injustice" test as in the UK. Any breach of natural justice not in the manner of a technical or inconsequential breach would be 32 sufficient for the court to intervene under a section 37(1)(b)(ii) read with section 37(2)(b) application to set aside. [26] Translated into practical terms, the test to be applied whenever there is a setting aside of an arbitration award on ground of breach of natural justice would be as follows as explained in the Soh Beng Tee's case: “29 It has been rightly held in John Holland Pty Ltd v Toyo Engineering Corp (Japan) [2001] 2 SLR 262 ("John Holland"), at [18], that a party challenging an arbitration award as having contravened the rules of natural justice must establish: (a) which rule of natural justice was breached; (b) how it was breached; (c) in what way the breach was connected to the making of the award; and (d) how the breach prejudiced its rights. The rule of natural justice alleged to have been breached in the present case is the alleged right of Fairmount to be heard on an issue that it maintains was crucial to the outcome of the Arbitrator’s decision in the circumstances, the core issues on appeal telescoped into the following: 33 (a) whether the Disputed Issue was alive during the arbitration or whether it was, as the trial judge found, "entirely the arbitrator's own idea"; (b) if there was a breach of natural justice, how that breach affected the Award; and (c) whether the breach was merely technical or whether it has caused prejudice to Fairmount. ... 41 In addition, even if we were to determine that the issue of whether time was at large was not truly alive during the arbitration, that per se would not be sufficient to inexorably lead to the conclusion that the Arbitrator had necessarily failed to adhere to the rules of natural justice in denying Fairmount an occasion to present its contentions on the issue. It is frequently a matter of degree as to how unexpected the impugned decision is, such that it can persuasively be said that the parties were truly deprived of an opportunity to argue it. As helpfully summarised in Sir Michael J Mustill & Stewart C 34 Boyd,The Law and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in England (Butterworths, 2nd Ed, 1989) ("Commercial Arbitration") at p 312: If the arbitrator decides the case on a point which he has invented for himself, he creates surprise and deprives the parties of their right to address full arguments on the base which they outside the course of the oral hearing, he breaks the rule that a party is entitled to know about and test the evidence led against him. [emphasis added]” (emphasis added). [27] See also the recent Singapore Court of Appeal case of AKN & Anor v ALC & Ors, and other appeals [2015] SGCA 18. [28] Learned counsel for Garden Bay argued that Sime Darby's counterclaim for the alleged costs of rectification works is one of the issues put forward by Sime Darby in its counterclaim and its witness had in fact given testimony on this issue. Both parties also submitted on this in great detail. These can be seen in Sime Darby's Affidavit in Support at pages 598 – 599, 605 – 609, 625 – 630, 652 – 655 and 680 - 692. 35 [29] According to him, the Arbitrator, after considering the facts in this case, went on to hold that Garden Bay was liable in the sum of RM21,154.39 as cost of rectification of defects. Learned counsel for Garden Bay then submitted that the determination of the quantum of damages by the Arbitrator is a determination of fact. [30] Whilst this Court has no business to question the finding of facts of the Arbitrator, this Court may nevertheless set aside the said finding if it was made outside the pleadings of the parties and if it was not an issue in play at the end of the Arbitration and neither was it an issue submitted on by the parties. [31] The Arbitrator had held at paragraph 4.23 of the Award that the Claimant has to be liable for rectification works under its scope as instructed by the SO. She then went on to hold that: "By conduct, both Parties had accepted Retention Sum as a mode to allocate funds for rectification works as per the usual practice in construction contracts, although not provided for in the Contract for this matter." 36 [32] When the parties had not conducted the case in that manner, the Respondent Sime Darby was rather perplexed as to how such a determination had been arrived at. The Claimant's case was that they had done all the rectification works. The Respondent's case was that they had engaged a third party contractor to rectify the defective works and that under Clause 5(b) of the Conditions of Contract they were entitled to recover all costs incurred thereby. [33] The relevant clauses in the Conditions of Contract are Clause 4 and Clause 5(b) which reads as follows: "4. The Contractor shall upon and subject to these Conditions construct and complete the Works shown upon the Contract Drawings and described by or referred to in the Bills of Quantities and/or Specification and in the Articles of Agreement and these Conditions in compliance therewith, using materials, moods and workmanship of the quality and standards therein specified. The Contractor shall also make good any defect, imperfection, shrinkage or any other fault whatsoever which may appear during the Defect Liability Period in accordance with Clause 45 hereof. 37 .... 5(b) The Contractor shall (subject to sub-clause(c) hereof) forthwith comply with all instructions issued to him by the S.O. If within seven (7) days after receipt of a written notice from the S.O. requiring compliance with an instruction the contractor does not comply therewith, then the S.O. without prejudice to any other rights or remedies available to the Government under the Contract may employ and pay other persons to execute any work whatsoever which may be necessary to give effect to such instruction and all costs incurred in connection with such employment shall be recoverable from the Contractor by the Government or the S.O. on its behalf as a debt or maybe deducted by the Government from any monies due or to become due to the Contractor under this Contract." [34] After the consent judgment recorded by the parties for the Arbitrator to give her reasons for the said finding, the Arbitrator maintained the reason as stated in paragraph 2.5 of the Supplementary Award that: 38 " By conduct, both Parties had accepted Retention Sum as a mode to allocate funds for rectification works as per the normal practice in construction contracts. As per F/A Para 2.35, the Respondent had retained RM21,154.39 as Retention Sum under Employer's Payment Advice dated 29 March 2012 as the cost of the Claimant's liability for outstanding rectification of defects." [35] Though the word limit was not used by the Arbitrator, clearly the Arbitrator was limiting the Respondent's counterclaim in the Arbitration to the Retention Sum. I find merits in the submission of learned counsel for the Respondent Sime Darby that the issue of whether the costs of rectification works that can be claimed is limited to the amount of the Retention Sum, was not an issue which arose in the pleadings or in the course of the Arbitration proceedings. The parties were not alerted to this issue by the Arbitrator and were not invited by the Arbitrator to submit on this issue. 39 [36] Learned counsel for Sime Darby further submitted that during the course of the Arbitration proceedings, the contention that parties had agreed to limit the rectification costs to the Retention Sum was never put to Sime Darby's witnesses by the Claimant's counsel during cross- examination. [37] I can appreciate the Respondent's counsel argument that when there is an express clause in Clause 5(b) of the Conditions of Contract that unambiguously provided for all costs to be recoverable from the Claimant without any provisions limiting such sums to be recovered, the Arbitrator cannot assume that parties had accepted otherwise in contradistinction to the pleadings and to the conduct of the parties' case. [38] It was not the Claimant's case that the parties had expressly agreed by conduct to limit the rectification costs to the Retention Sum; indeed their position was based solely on the argument that the appointment of Muzqi (third party contractor) was unnecessary and contractually unjustified as the Claimant had completed all works and had rectified all defects. [39] The proper course for the Arbitrator to take would be to invite the parties to submit on this new issue that had irked her on whether parties by 40 their conduct accepted the Retention Sum as the amount to be forfeited to the Respondent in full payment for whatever might be the costs of the rectification works. However this was not done and so the Arbitrator went on to decide on an issue not at play and not pleaded and in that pejorative sense, an 'invented issue' and thus was in breach of natural justice in not allowing the parties to be heard on this new issue. [40] As the Arbitrator had ordered that this Retention Sum of RM21,154.39 be set off from the Final Certificate Amount of RM338,666.39, it is a decision that taints the whole Award such that the whole Award has to be set aside. It is not possible to extricate the part of the Award not affected from the part that is affected because one sum is extricably intertwined with the other such that one would affect the other. [41] It is not for this Court to second-guess what her decision would have been if she had heard the parties on this issue of the Retention Sum being all that the Respondent could claim for rectification works. It is sufficient to be set aside if this Court finds that the Respondent had been prejudiced as a result of not having the opportunity to address the Arbitrator on this new issue not at play and certainly not in the pleadings. So long as it is 41 reasonably arguable that the Arbitrator's decision might have been different had she had the benefit of submission from both parties, that would be enough for the Court to set aside the Award on ground of breach of natural justice. [42] It may further be added that if the Arbitrator had wanted to rely on her knowledge of what she understood to be the usual practice in construction contracts, then she should inform the parties about it and invite them to challenge such an understanding of usual practice. I am not unaware that an Arbitral tribunal shall have the power under section 21(3)(b) AA to draw on its own knowledge and expertise in deciding on a dispute before it. Likewise an Arbitrator shall decide based on the usual practice in the building industry as provided for under section 30(5) AA which reads: “(5) The arbitral tribunal shall, in all cases, decide in accordance with the terms of the agreement and shall take into account the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.” I am also mindful of section 26(5) AA that reads: 42 "Any expert report or evidentiary document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision shall be communicated to the parties.” [43] However that is no liberty nor license to decide on an issue dehors the pleadings and what is submitted for decision for an Arbitrator's jurisdiction is derived by consent of the parties in the agreement to submit to Arbitration as may be gathered from the pleadings and submissions of the parties. [44] I would follow the approach taken by Justice Wong Kian Kheong JC in Sigur Ros Sdn Bhd v Master Mulia Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1094 where his Lordship observed as follows: "49. Section 21(3)(b) AA allows the Arbitrator to “draw on its own knowledge and expertise”. According to s 26(5) AA, any expert report or document relied on by a Tribunal in making its decision, should be communicated to parties. I am of the opinion that in view of ss 20, 26(5), 37(1)(b)(ii) and 37(2)(b) AA, if a Tribunal draws on its own expertise, experience and knowledge pursuant to s 21(3)(b) AA, the Tribunal should have informed the parties of 43 such a matter and invite parties to adduce evidence (or expert evidence) and submit on such a matter. I rely on Ackner LJ’s (as he then was) judgment in the English Court of Appeal case of Interbulk Ltd v Aiden Shipping Co Ltd, The Vimeira [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 66, at 76, as follows – “If an arbitrator considers that parties or their experts have missed the real point – a dangerous assumption to make, particularly where, as in this case, the parties were represented by very experienced Counsel and solicitors – then it is not only a matter of obvious prudence, but the arbitrator is obliged, in common fairness or, as it is sometimes described, as a matter of natural justice, to put the point to them so that they have an opportunity of dealing with it.” (emphasis added). [45] Having found that there was a breach of the rules of natural justice under section 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) AA that had occurred during the Arbitral proceedings and in connection with the making of the Award, this Court would be constrained to set aside the whole Award. Surely in the 44 circumstance the Respondent cannot be expected to pay the Claimant the final sum awarded in the Award that had allowed the sum for rectification works arrived at in breach of natural justice to be deducted from the Final Certificate Amount yielding the sum of RM282,512.00. Whether the Award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to Arbitration when the Arbitrator decided that by conduct, the parties have accepted that the Respondent's claim for rectification works is the sum retained as Retention Sum under the contract [46] The Court of Appeal in Kerajaan Malaysia v Perwira Bintang Holdings Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 CLJ 617 had explained how an Arbitrator might fall into the jurisdictional error as in acting in excess of his jurisdiction as envisaged in section 37(1)(a)(iv) AA as follows: “Finding Of New Difference” By The High Court [22] The learned High Court Judge considered the background facts in some detail. Her Ladyship also evaluated the issues formulated by the arbitrator, as agreed and modified by both parties. Her Ladyship considered the detailed finding of the 45 arbitrator, which was quoted in extenso, but concluded that the arbitrator had decided on a dispute which was not contemplated by, or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration. This is an area of arbitration law which allows the court to set aside an award on the ground that an arbitrator had decided on a “new difference” which is irrelevant to the claim, the “new difference” being understood as a new dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the arbitration submission. The underlying rationale for this rule rests on the consensual nature of arbitration. Parties are not compelled to resort to arbitration contractually, but if they provide for it and refer their dispute to arbitration, the mandate of the arbitrator must be limited to the terms defined by the parties for him to exercise his jurisdiction. If the arbitrator strays from the confines of this mandate, he will be acting in excess of his jurisdiction, even though he may have the initial and primary jurisdiction to arbitrate between the parties. This rationale is stated succinctly by the Court of Appeal, Singapore in PT Prima International Development v. Kempinski Hotel SA & Other Appeals [2012] SGCA 35: 46 An arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to resolve disputes which have not been referred to it in the submission to arbitration. Simply put, a party cannot raise a new dispute in an arbitration without the consent of the other party. These propositions flow inexorably from the consensual nature of arbitration. [23] This case was cited by Her Ladyship, together with several other decisions of the Singapore Courts, such as PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR (R) 597, CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara [2011] 4 SLR 305 and Sui Southern Gas Co Ltd v. Habibullah Coastal Power Co (Pte) Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 1. [24] These persuasive cases, and others, that have been addressed by our courts lay down one basic principle – an arbitrator must decide the dispute according to the scope of the arbitration and he cannot decide the dispute on issues that have not been raised or addressed by the parties. This basic principle arose in the High Court case of Government of the Lao 47 People’s Democratic Republic v. Thai-Lao Lignite Co Ltd (“TLL”) A Thai Company & Anor [2013] 1 LNS 83, where Lee Swee Seng JC (as he then was) said: Whilst it is generally stated that under the Model Law regime as reflected in the AA 2005, there is a palpable shift towards non-interference in international arbitration award especially on issues of error of law so called, yet where jurisdiction is concerned, the Model Law does recognize and respect court’s interference where arbitrators have acted outside their jurisdiction and this principle is reflected in ss. 37(1)(a)(iv) and (v) of the AA 2005 ... (at pg. 18 of the Judgment) [25] Lee Swee Seng, JC expressly referred to and adopted the reasoning shown in the Singapore authorities, namely PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA, supra, and CRW Joint Operation v. PT Perusahaan Gas Negara, supra. 48 [26] A differently constituted panel of this court agreed with the High Court’s decision and dismissed the appeal.” (emphasis added). [46] Here, while it was within the parties’ submission to arbitration that the Arbitrator should decide on whether the Respondent was entitled to the sum of RM 246,978.00 being the costs of rectification works or such other amount as may be assessed by the Arbitrator or not at all, it certainly was not within the submission and contemplation of the parties that the Arbitrator would be deciding on whether there was consent between the parties by conduct that the Respondent had accepted the Retention Sum as the amount they are entitled to in the event that rectification works have to be done. What is even more perplexing is that in the very next breath the Arbitrator had held that this is so "although not provided for in the Contract for this matter." [47] The Arbitrator had earlier set out Clause 5(b) which is the provision in the Contract for this matter. [48] Here we are not quibbling or questioning the finding of fact of the Arbitrator but we are dealing with a far more basic issue which is whether 49 the parties had agreed in their submission to Arbitration that the Arbitrator should be deciding on this very matter of whether there was such a conduct of the parties on the acceptance of the Retention Sum as all that the Respondent could claim in the event of rectification works that are needed to be done. [49] The answer is a resounding 'no'!, being not a matter pleaded or at play in the Arbitral proceedings or in the submission filed by both parties. [50] That being the case, the Award has ventured into a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration and as such the consequence is that the whole of the Award has to be set aside. [51] As I had decided for the Respondent Sime Darby under the setting aside application under section 37 AA, there is no need then to continue to consider the Respondent's application under section 42 AA. 50 Pronouncement [52] For all the reasons above, I allowed the application to set aside the Arbitration Award under section 37(1)(a)(iv) and 37(1)(b)(ii) and 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) AA and accordingly dismissed the application to enforce the Award. After hearing the parties I made no order as to costs. Dated 31 January 2017. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For OS WA-24C-20-07/2016 as Plaintiff : Colin Victor For OS WA-24C-22-08/2016 as Defendant (Messrs James Edwin & Co) For OS WA-24C-22-08/2016 as Plaintif : Raymond Mah together with Liow Pei Xia For OS WA-24C-20-07/2016 as Defendant (Messrs Mah Weng Kwai & Associates) Date of Decision: 7 November 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-94-09/2016 & WA-24C-103-09/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Zana Bina Sdn Bhd 2. ) Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd 2. ) Zana Biina Sdn Bhd

27/01/2017

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=640ee8ed-736c-4edb-9c62-aec623549c4a&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-94-09/2016 In the matter of a Letter of Award dated 15.5.2015 between Zana Bina Sdn Bhd and Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd And In the matter of Sections 28 (1), (2) and (3) of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012. And In the matter of Order 7 and/or Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN ZANA BINA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO:918580-W) ... PLAINTIFF AND COSMIC MASTER DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 406984-V) … DEFENDANT (heard together with) 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-103-09/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 12.8.2016 by Mr Loo Chun Kok as the adjudicator in the matter of Adjudication between Zana Bina Sdn Bhd as the Claimant and Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd as the Respondent (Adjudication Reference No: KLRCA/D/ADJ-0320- 2016) under Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012. (Act 746) And In the matter of an application to set aside the said Adjudication Decision and a declaration that the decision is null and void. And In the matter of Sections 15 (b) and (c) of the Act 746, Section 41 Specific Relief Act 1950 (Act 137) and Rule 7, Rule 15 Order 16, and other Rules under the Rules of Court 2012. BETWEEN COSMIC MASTER DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 406984-V) ... PLAINTIFF 3 AND ZANA BINA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 918580-W) ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG Project [1] The Claimant in the Adjudication had been appointed by the Respondent vide a Letter of Award ("LoA") dated 15.5.2015 for the execution and completion of the “balance remaining works for Main Building Works, Infrastructure Works, M&E Works and Associated Works for Taman Seri Perdana Molek ("the Project"). [2] The Claimant is Zana Bina Sdn Bhd ("Zana Bina") and the Respondent is Cosmic Master Development Sdn Bhd ("Cosmic Master"). [3] The Project is an abandoned housing development project in Johor undertaken by Syarikat Perumahan Negara Berhad ("SPNB") who had awarded it to the Respondent to complete with its official description as follows: “Cadangan Pembangunan 6 Block Yang Mengandungi 112 Unit Rumah Pangsa Kos Rendah 700KP, 112 Unit Rumah Pangsa Kos Rendah 750KP, 160 Unit Rumah Pangsa Kos Rendah 850KP, 520 4 Unit Pangsapuri 1000KP, 30 unit Pangsapuri 2000KP, 24 Unit Kedai 850KP (Di Bawah Bangunan) serta Kemudahan Yang Terdiri Daripada 1 Unit Stesen Suis Utama (SSU), 4 Unit Pencawang TNB, 1 Unit Pondok Pengawal Dan 3 Unit Pusat Pengumpulan Sampah Secara Serah Balik Kurnia Semula Di Atas Lot 1158, 1991 Dan 2156, Mukim Plentong, Daerah Johor Bahru, Johor Darul Takzim” Payment Claim [4] The Claimant commenced work and by the time they were terminated by the Respondent, they had two outstanding claims. They served a Payment Claim dated 9.3.2016 on the Respondent for the combined sum of RM2,211,569.86 consisting of two parts; the first amount RM1,792,253.11 on a document identified as Valuation for Interim Certificate No.1 dated 5.11.2015 bearing both the signatures of the Architect and Quantity Surveyor ("QS") and the second claim for RM419,316.75 in the aggregate on a document identified as Valuation for Interim Certificate No.2 dated 28.12.2015 which bears the signature of the QS but not the Architect. [5] The basis of the Payment Claim was stated as “Section 36 Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA") and/or Clause 30 of the PAM Contract 2006”, with the ‘Due Date for 5 payment’ 5.12.2015 and 27.1.2016 respectively. Page 2/4 of the Payment Claim reads as follows: Original Contract Sum: RM16,146,000.00 Attachment: Supporting Document of the Unpaid Party (“SD”) Total Claimed Amount: Description of works done for amount claimed Due date for payment Basis of Claim RM2,211,569.86 The unpaid works done under the Letter of Award for the balance remaining works for Main Building Works. Infrastructure Works, M & E Works and Associated Works dated 15.5.2015 with reference number CMD/TSMP/ ZBSB /150515 incorporating the scope of works and conditions of appointment as set out therein including the Agreement and Condition of PAM Contract 2006 (With Quantities) - Section 36 of CIPAA ; and/or - Clause 30 of the PAM Contract 2006 Valuation for Interim Certificate No 1 dated 5.11.2015. 5.12.2015 - Section 36 (4) of CIPAA ; and/or - Clause 30 of the PAM Contract 2006 Valuation for Interim Certificated No 2 dated 28.12.2015. 27.1.2016 - Section 36 (4) of CIPAA ; and/or - Clause 30 of the PAM Contract 2006 6 [6] There was no Payment Response. In the Notice of Adjudication issued by the Claimant dated 30.3.3016, the dispute was described as this: i. Nature and Description of the Payment Dispute: 1. The Claimant refers to their Payment Claim with ref. no ZB/CMD/ PC/MARCH/2016 dated 9.3.2016 arising from the Project. 2. Pursuant to the Payment Claim, a dispute has arisen between the Claimant and the Respondent under the contract for the appointment of the Claimant by the Respondent as the contractor for the Balance Remaining Works for Main Building Works, Infrastructure Works and Mechanical and Electrical Works and Associated Works. 3. The Payment Claim dated 9.3.2016 was served on the Respondent by hand on 14.3.2016. No Payment Response was received from the Respondent and hence, the Respondent is deemed to have disputed the entire Payment Claim. 4. The disputes include the following: i. Non-payment of RM1,792,253.11 of works done for the Valuation for Interim Certificate No 1 dated 5.11.2015; ii. Non-payment of RM419,316.75 of works done for Valuation for Interim Certificate No 2 dated 28.12.2015. 7 [7] The Claimant proceeded to serve its Adjudication Claim, setting out the basis of its contractual claims and the reliefs claimed as well as attaching the relevant documents in support of its claim. Problem [8] The Respondent duly served its Adjudication Response raising jurisdictional challenge as well as substantive issues. The jurisdictional challenge is that the LoA dated 15.5.2015 is not a valid and binding contract, without any express terms for the Claimant to claim the work done. The Claimant's entitlement is in quantum meruit which is not a subject matter for Adjudication. The Respondent further contended that the LoA is not a valid and enforceable contract as it does not have a Bill of Quantities ("BQ"), preliminaries, preambles, contract drawings, specification, schedule of works, schedule of rate, etc. [9] Under substantive issues, the Respondent contended that there was no valid cause of action on the Payment Claim under Clause 30 of PAM Conditions and section 5 or section 36 CIPAA. The Respondent also argued that the Valuation for Interim Certificate No. 1 is not a valid Payment Certificate due to the collusion between the Claimant and the Architect in that the Certificate was issued after the termination of the Architect's services and that both Certificates are invalid and without contractual foundation. 8 [10] In the Adjudication Reply served by the Claimant on 27.6.2016, the Adjudicator was urged to ignore the Adjudication Response; the Claimant’s contention being that the scope of his inquiry under the provision of section 27 (1) did not extend to points raised in the Adjudication Response in the absence of any Payment Response. The Adjudicator’s jurisdiction is limited to the dispute raised in the Payment Claim only; there being no Payment Response served. [11] The Adjudicator conducted a site inspection in the exercise of his powers under section 25 (h) CIPAA and directed parties to attend on 16.7.2016. The Claimant did not attend the site inspection but the Respondent did. The Adjudicator stated in paragraph 11.3 of his Decision that he had "interrogated the Respondent to explain the scope of works and the works that were done by the Claimant. The site inspection started from 10am and finished at 3pm. [12] The Adjudicator delivered his Adjudication Decision on 12.8.2016. He decided in favour of the Claimant for both claims under the two Interim Certificates amounting to RM2,211,569.86. The payment due date was stated as within 10 days from the date of the decision i.e. on or before 22.8.2016. Interest at the rate of 5% per annum was also awarded on the amount due from the date of due payment 22.8.2016 to 9 date of full payment. He also awarded the costs of Adjudication to the Claimant. Prayers [13] By Originating Summons No.: WA-24C-103-09/2016 the Respondent in the Adjudication is the Plaintiff and the Claimant the Defendant. The Respondent sought to set aside the Adjudication Decision on ground of excess of jurisdiction by the Adjudicator and also on ground of breach of natural justice under section 15 CIPAA. [14] In Originating Summons No.: WA-24C-94-09/2016 the Claimant as Plaintiff is applying to enforce the Adjudication Decision as if it is a judgment of the Court pursuant to section 28 CIPAA against the Respondent as Defendant. [15] Both Originating Summonses were by consent of the parties, heard together as one is the flip side of the other. Parties agreed that if the Adjudication Decision is not set aside, then the Adjudication Decision will correspondingly be enforced by this Court. [16] For the avoidance of confusion, the parties shall be referred to as they appeared in the Adjudication as Claimant and Respondent and by their names i.e. Zana Bina and Cosmic Master respectively. 10 Principles Whether the Respondent, having been deemed to have disputed the Claimant's Payment Claim, is entitled to raise new defences in its Adjudication Response filed [17] As the Respondent did not file a Payment Response, it is deemed to have disputed the whole of the Claimant's Payment Claim as provided for under section 6 (4) CIPAA. By disputing the Payment Claim, the Claimant is then put to proof on the balance of probabilities its Payment Claim. It is a position that the non-paying party Cosmic Master had taken. The non-paying party has not given any reason for refusing to pay. [18] If the Respondent has a specific matter to raise by way of a defence to the Payment Claim in giving reasons for not paying the amount claimed or any part thereof in the Payment Claim, the Respondent as the non-paying party must raise it in its Payment Response that is to be filed. Section 6 (3) CIPAA provides as follows: "A non-paying party who disputes the amount claimed in the payment claim, either wholly or partly, shall serve a payment response in writing on the unpaid party stating the amount disputed and the reason for the dispute." (emphasis added) 11 [19] However the Respondent had raised for the first time in its Adjudication Response the invalidity of the Interim Certificate of Payment of the Architect. Section 27 (1) CIPAA is clear in that the Adjudicator's jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to him for Adjudication under section 5 and 6 CIPAA. It reads as follows: "27. Jurisdiction of Adjudicator 1) Subject to subsection (2), the adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute is limited to the matter referred to adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6." [20] I would refer to this as "contingent jurisdiction" in that for an Adjudicator to have jurisdiction, parties must fulfill the contingent condition of having referred to the matter in the Payment Claim under section 5 and the Payment Response under section 6 CIPAA. Be that as it may, parties may extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator by agreement in writing even though the matter had not been referred to in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response as provided for under section 27 (2) which reads: "2) The parties to adjudication may at any time by agreement in writing extend the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to decide on any 12 other matter not referred to the adjudicator pursuant to sections 5 and 6." [21] Thus In Bina Puri Construction Sdn. Bhd. v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn. Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 728, Bina Puri did not file a Payment Response but went on to raise cross claims in the Adjudication Response. These cross claims amounting to RM13,544,690.45 were those of the subjects of a set off and counterclaim it filed in a High Court civil action running side by side with the adjudication proceedings. It was held that the Adjudicator was correct when he ruled that the cross claims (i.e. the subjects of the set off and counterclaim) were outside the remit of his jurisdiction because a Payment Response (into which these cross claims could have been incorporated) was not served in the adjudication. The High Court in Bina Puri (supra) observed as follows: “[12] the Adjudicator does not possess inherent jurisdiction, his jurisdiction is limited to the dispute raised under sections 5 and 6 i.e. the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. [13] ...The limits of jurisdiction of the adjudicator are a matter governed by law, i.e. Section 27(2) of CIPAA." (emphasis added) [22] Likewise in View Esteem Sdn. Bhd. v Bina Puri Holdings Sdn. Bhd. [2015] MLJU 695, View Esteem (the non-paying party) filed a 13 Payment Response but went out of bound when it asserted a counterclaim or set-off against the Payment Claim in order to recoup advance payment and loss and expense and other damages it alleged suffered due to breaches of contract on the part of the unpaid party. It was held that the Adjudicator was correct when he ruled that the cross claims (by way of set off and/or counterclaim) that the non-paying party raised for the first time in the Adjudication Response were outside the dispute referred to him because the Payment Response that the non-paying party served did not make reference to any of these cross claims. [23] Her Ladyship Mary Lim J (now JCA) explained as follows in View Esteem (supra): "[66] ...It may be said that by virtue of subsection 27 (1), the Payment Claim and the Payment Response is to adjudication what pleadings are to civil litigation. Parties are bound by their pleadings under the rules of procedure in civil litigation; in adjudication, those “pleadings” are to be found in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response; and not in the Adjudication Claim, Adjudication Response or the Adjudication Reply. [67] The failure to file a Payment Response will only afford the non-responding party some “security” or comfort of not having had 14 a “default judgment” of sorts entered against them because subsection 6 (4) deems the Payment Claim to be disputed. [68] For the unpaid party, the absence of a Payment Response means that the unpaid party as a claimant in the adjudication proceedings will only be required to prove the matters raised in the payment claim without having to meet any onus of proof which may, in a defended payment disputed through the Payment Response, shift back to the unpaid party or claimant.” (emphasis added) [24] Further in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1236, it was reiterated as follows: “[27] Subsection 27 (1) restricts the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to the matters found in sections 5 and 6. In short, the Adjudicator takes jurisdiction from the payment claim and the payment response; not from the adjudication claim. This is materially significant and important as this brings to bear the whole scheme of CIPAA 2012." (emphasis added) [25] This is to be differentiated from core jurisdiction of the Adjudicator in that if CIPAA does not confer jurisdiction on the Adjudicator, then he does not have jurisdiction. Section 2 CIPAA provides that: 15 "This Act shall apply to every construction contract made in writing relating to construction work carried out wholly or partly within the territory of Malaysia including a construction contract entered into by the Government.” [26] A "construction contract” means a construction work contract or construction consultancy contract as defined in section 2 CIPAA. [27] For instance if CIPAA does not apply to shipping or mining contract as generally these are not construction contracts within the meaning of "construction work" as defined in section 2, then the Adjudicator does not have jurisdiction to begin with. [28] A jurisdictional challenge may be raised at any time and when raised the Adjudicator may proceed and complete the adjudication proceedings, and the same issue may be raised in a setting aside application by an aggrieved party under section 15 CIPAA under the ground of "excess of jurisdiction" or in opposing an enforcement application under section 28 CIPAA. [29] This is expressly allowed for under section 27 (3) CIPAA which reads: "Notwithstanding a jurisdictional challenge, the adjudicator may in his discretion proceed and complete the adjudication 16 proceedings without prejudice to the rights of any party to apply to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 or to oppose the application to enforce the adjudication decision under subsection 28 (1)." (emphasis added) [30] Thus as the scheme of statutory Adjudication applies only to construction contract in made in writing, the fact that it is raised for the first time in the Respondent's Adjudication Response that there is no construction contract, much less in writing, cannot be disregarded by the Adjudicator. The learned Adjudicator may proceed with the Adjudication proceedings and deliver his decision and the issue of lack of jurisdiction may be taken up during the setting aside stage or the enforcement stage. [31] Learned counsel for the Respondent, Cosmic Master, argued that nowhere in CIPAA does it say that the Adjudication Response or any issue raised therein shall be disregarded if a non-paying party did not file a Payment Response. While that may be so for a core jurisdiction challenge, it does not apply to matters of contingent jurisdiction which is not raised in the Payment Response as section 27 (1) CIPAA clearly provides for the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction in relation to any dispute to be limited to the matter referred to Adjudication by the parties pursuant to sections 5 and 6. [32] Thus in having been deemed to have disputed the Claimant's Payment Claim, the Respondent in the Adjudication is in effect telling the 17 Claimant to prove its Payment Claim without giving its reasons for disputing the Claimant's Payment Claim. [33] If the Claimant is disputing the correctness of the sum claimed and the veracity of it as well as the validity of the Interim Certificates of the Claimant in that it was procured through collusion or that it was not in compliance with the contract in that no Architect's Instruction had been issued for the work done as required under the PAM Contract, then it should expressly say so in its Payment Response. It would be too late in the day to raise it in the Adjudication Response. The Adjudicator was right in dismissing the above reasons given as defences for the first time in the Adjudication Response under section 27 (1) CIPAA as his jurisdiction in confined to the matters raised in and defined by the Payment Claim and Payment Response (not served). There is thus no breach of natural justice on the part of the Adjudicator in not considering these defences not raised because no Payment Response was filed pursuant to section 6 (2) CIPAA. [34] The Adjudicator had summarized the issues for his determination as follows in paragraph 14 of the Adjudication Decision as follows: “14.1 Whether the Claimant is entitled to claim the sum of amount RM1,792,253.11 claimed under the Valuation For Interim Certificate No. 1 dated 5.11.2015 and if not, what is the reasonable amount? 18 14.2 Whether the Claimant is entitled to claim the sum of amount RM419,316.75 claimed under the Valuation For Interim Certificate No. 2 dated 28.12.2015, and if not, what is the reasonable amount? [35] It cannot be that a more prudent non-paying party who has taken the trouble to give reasons for disputing or refuting the Payment Claim is confined to those issues with respect to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator to decide and that a non-paying party who by indolence or ignorance did not serve a Payment Response is at liberty and indeed having the license to canvass all possible reasons for disputing the Payment Claim in the Adjudication Response to be served after receipt of the Adjudication Claim. [36] The learned Adjudicator therefore was right in holding as follows at paragraph 13.2 and 13.3 of his Decision: "13.2 The collusion/falsity of architect payment certificate dated 5.11.2015 and the issue of the works done are without the requisite (sic) prior to AI for the provisional sums of type contract shall also be dismissed due to sub-section 27 (1) CIPAA. 13.3 The Claimant's Adjudication Reply which mentioned the Adjudicator's jurisdiction is limited to disputes raised in the Payment Claim is accepted." 19 [37] However, with respect to issue of core jurisdiction, as in here the issue of whether there was a construction contract made in writing, I would say it is not too late to raise it for the first time in the Adjudication Response or at any time during the Adjudication proceedings and even at the stage of setting aside under section 15 CIPAA or in opposing an enforcement of the Adjudication Decision under section 28 CIPAA. [38] By the same token, the Respondent is entitled to raise in its Adjudication Response, filed in answer to the Adjudication Claim, that it is objecting on ground that the Payment Claim is not a valid Payment Claim for non-compliance with CIPAA, whether as a pure question of law or a mixed question of law and fact. Whether there was a construction contract made in writing upon which a dispute has arisen which is referable to Adjudication under CIPAA [39] The Adjudicator had found as a matter of fact that the LoA dated 15.5.2015 is a construction contract made in writing. It was duly signed by the Managing Director of Cosmic Master and acknowledged acceptance by the Claimant, Zana Bina wherein it declared that it agreed and accepted all the terms and conditions set out in the LoA. The LoA and the supporting documents were marked as Exhibit P-2 in Enclosure 3 of the setting aside application. 20 [40] Granted there were further documents as "Contract Documents" to be signed by the parties but these were nothing than incorporating all the agreed terms of the Tender referred to in Clause 1) of the LoA. It was to be signed within thirty (30) calendar days from the site possession date. [41] Site possession under Clause 3)(a) was on 1.6.2015. The contract duration for the Works under Clause 3)(b) shall be Six and a half (6 1/2) months commencing from the Site Possession Date. The Date of Completion of the Works was on 15.12.2015. The Contract Sum for the Works under Clause 3)(c) is RM16,146,000.00 and shall be on a Provisional Sum - Cost Plus (with Quantity) basis. [42] What is pertinent is that it is expressly provided for in Clause 2) of the LoA that: "Pending the execution of the Contract Documents, the terms and conditions contained in this LOA and Appendix A (Summary of Contract Sum), Appendix B (PAM Form of Contract) and C (Formula of Recoupment of Advance Payment) herein attached shall collectively form a legal and binding contract between you and CMDSB." (emphasis added) 21 [43] The LoA was expressly stated in the caption to be for “the balance remaining works for Main Building Works, Infrastructure Works, M&E Works and Associated Works in Taman Seri Molek Perdana." [44] In Appendix A of the Summary of Contract Sum is stated the breakdown of the Provisional Sums for the various items of Works. In the Interim Progress Claim No. 1 submitted by the Claimant to the Respondent dated 30.10.2015, the Architect and the QS have no difficulty certifying the amount and value of Works done for each of the items. [45] For Interim Progress Claim No. 2 submitted by the Claimant to the Respondent dated 12.12.2015, the QS had no problem certifying the valuation of Works done. [46] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the LoA was only an anticipated contract on PAM 2006 terms which did not materialize and to that extent void due to want of definition of the works in a Bill of Quantities, an essential document and without which BQ the mechanism of the LoA did not and could not operate as intended, and that therefore the Works as claimed were works under an anticipated contract as opposed to under the express terms of a concluded contract. 22 [47] Learned counsel for the Respondent cited the following cases in support of the above proposition: Q2 Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v PJI-LFGC (Vietnam) Ltd & Ors [2013] 8 MLJ 157, from para. [56] - [72] Delmere Holdings Pty Ltd v Green [2015] WASC 148, from para. 37-44, 96, 102, 114-135 Syarikat Binaan Utara Jaya v Koperasi Serbaguna Sungai Glugor Bhd [2009] 1 CLJ 786 [48] Learned counsel for the Respondent further submitted that the object and purpose of the transaction was to enter into a BQ Contract on PAM 2006 terms for an exhaustive definition of the ‘balance remaining works’ to which all the provisional sums relate, all on a cost-plus basis. [49] On the meaning of ‘provisional sum’, learned counsel for the Respondent referred to the opening statement of Lord Justice May in Midland Expressway Ltd v Carillion Construction Ltd and others [2006] EWCA Civ 936 (pp. 88-96) as follows: “The term “provisional sum” is generally well understood in the construction industry. It is used in pricing construction contracts to refer either to work which is truly provisional, in the sense that it may or may not be carried out at all, or to work whose content 23 is undefined, so that the parties decide not to try to price it accurately when they enter into their contract. A provisional sum is usually included as a round figure guess. It is included mathematically in the original contract price but the parties do not expect the initial round figure to be paid without adjustment. The contract usually provides expressly how it is to be dealt with. A common clause in substance provides for the provisional sum to be omitted and an appropriate valuation of the work actually carried out to be substituted for it. In this general sense, the term “provisional sum” is close to a term of art but its precise meaning and effect depends on the terms of the individual contract." (emphasis added) [50] It was also submitted that there is no basis for estoppel to operate here as there was simply no contract to begin with: Cobbe v Yeoman's Row Management Ltd [2008] UKHL 55. [51] The learned Adjudicator had considered the jurisdictional objection raised in that there was no construction contract made in writing. In paragraph 13.1 of his Decision, the learned Adjudicator found as follows: "13.1 ...I found that it is a valid and enforceable construction contract in writing between the Claimant and the Respondent to which shown (sic) relationship of the parties as the 'Contractor' vs 24 'Employer'. Therefore, according to section 2 of CIPAA, the Claimant is entitled to refer the payment disputes and claims of the unpaid work done under the CIPAA. The Respondent's jurisdiction (sic) challenge to dispute the validity of LoA shall be dismissed." [52] Admittedly, the reason given is brief but brevity is not a ground for setting aside a finding of jurisdiction. I agree that if the learned Adjudicator had arrived on a wrong conclusion of jurisdiction, this Court in deciding the matter unfettered by any finding of fact of the learned Adjudicator, is at liberty to arrive at its own finding on jurisdiction. [53] I see no good reason to disagree with the learned Adjudicator. The fact that there is a construction contract between the Claimant and the Respondent as borne out by Clause 2) of the LoA is self-evident. It was on the strength of this LoA together with the supporting documents that the Claimant was allowed possession of site and to commence the balance Works. [54] Parties apparently know what are the remaining balance Works to be done and if indeed the Claimant had begun work without the approval of the Architect appointed by the Respondent, surely the Architect or the Respondent would have stopped the Claimant. As Clause 1) of the LoA provides that the execution of the Contract Documents must take place within thirty (30) calendar days from the site possession date, one would 25 have expected this requirement to have been waived if by that time there was no further Contract Documents executed. The Respondent did not terminate the LoA nor did it stop the Claimant from commencing or continuing with the Works. Finally when termination of the Claimant's employment came after some 6 months of attending to the balance Works, it was on ground of delay in the completion of the Works! [55] This Court finds the following Guideline issued by KLRCA helpful with respect to whether there is a construction contract made in writing: “Circular CIPAA 03 KLRCA’s Guideline on the meaning of “Construction Contract Made In Writing”’’ 28 Apr 2014 The Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) came into operation on 15 April 2014. Section 2 of the Act provides that statutory adjudication regime shall apply to construction contracts made in writing. However, no definition or further elaboration is provided in the Act as to what ‘construction contract made in writing’ means. Given the fact that there are various means by which a construction contract may be made, a clear guideline on the meaning of a ‘construction contract made in writing’ will ensure 26 that parties to a construction contract are guided as to whether or not payment disputes arising under their contract can be referred to adjudication under the Act. Further, it will eliminate the need for the adjudicator who may not be legally trained to grapple with the complexity of the issue of whether a construction contract is in writing. As such the KLRCA is of the view that it would be expedient and/or necessary to provide clear guidance and definition as to what the phrase ‘construction contract made in writing’ mean, for giving full effect and the better carrying out of the provisions of the Act. The KLRCA adopts the following definition of a ‘construction contract in writing’: ‘Construction Contract In Writing’ (1) There is a contract in writing:- (a) if the contract is made in writing (whether or not it is signed by the parties); (b) if the contract is made by exchange of communications in writing; or (c) if the contract is evidenced in writing. 27 (2) Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms which are in writing, they make a contract in writing. (3) A contract is evidenced in writing if a contract made otherwise than in writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the authority of the parties to the contract. The KLRCA Guideline on Construction Contract in Writing shall apply to all adjudication cases commenced under CIPAA. A copy of the KLRCA Guideline can be found at: www.klrca.org.my Dated 28th day of April, 2014. director-signature Professor Datuk Sundra Rajoo Director of KLRCA [56] Clearly an expansive and generous interpretation is to be given to the meaning of a "contract made in writing" in line with the purpose of CIPAA which is captured to some extent by its long title that reads: "An Act to facilitate regular and timely payment, to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters." 28 [57] It must be borne in mind that generally it is the Employer that would rely on the fact that there is no construction contract in writing to defeat or delay a Payment Claim for work done. The Claimant/Contractor on the other hand has a limited time frame to complete the works and it cannot be that if he does the work, he is damned if there is no concluded contract in that further documents are to be signed! Conversely, if he does not commence work, as in this case when completion date is from the date of site possession which had already been given, he runs the risk of late completion and be damned with LAD claims! [58] When the Respondent here had every opportunity to stop the Claimant from starting the balance Works until those further Contract Documents are signed, it must mean that the Respondent had waived that requirement or is otherwise estopped from contending otherwise by their very conduct. [59] The justification for that becomes more understandable when, as here, it is the Architect and QS appointed by the Respondent that had certified the Interim Progress Claims. [60] I would therefore hold that there is a construction contract in writing from which a dispute has arisen and that the Adjudicator has jurisdiction to hear the dispute and decide accordingly. 29 Whether there was a valid Payment Claim in compliance with CIPAA before the Adjudicator [61] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Payment Claim of the Claimant was not a valid Payment Claim as it was not in reference to "Payment" which under section 2 CIPAA "means a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract." (emphasis added) [62] He contended that the works or claims items to which the Payment Claim relates were dehors or not under the express terms of the LoA at the very least. Consequently, the decision of the learned Adjudicator is a nullity in that it was made in excess of jurisdiction. [63] The payment claim that an unpaid party serve must meet the requirements of s 5 (1) and s 5 (2) for it to qualify as a valid payment claim under the Act; ss 5 (1) and 5 (2) read as follows: "5. Payment Claim (1) An unpaid party may serve a payment claim on a non-paying party for payment pursuant to a construction contract. (2) The payment claim shall be in writing and shall include— (a) the amount claimed and due date for payment of the amount claimed; 30 (b) details to identify the cause of action including the provision in the construction contract to which the payment relates; (c) description of the work or services to which the payment relates; and (d) a statement that it is made under this Act." (emphasis added) [64] Learned counsel for the Respondent sought to persuade this Court that this non-compliance with the requirements of CIPAA in section 5 (2) goes towards jurisdiction and as such, the learned Adjudicator has no right to get it wrong! In other words, if the learned Adjudicator held that it is a valid Payment Claim when it is not as it is not a claim under the provisions of the construction contract, then this Court must set aside the entire Adjudication Decision as no valid appointment of an Adjudicator can proceed from an invalid Payment Claim served. [65] I appreciate that this question of when a seeming non-compliance with the requirement of a Payment Claim under an Act is a jurisdictional issue has vexed the Courts in many jurisdictions. [66] In Nepean Engineer Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) [2005] 64 NSWCA 409, with reference to a payment 31 claim under section 13 (2) of the (NSW) Building And Construction Industry Security Of Payment Act 1999, which provision is almost similar to that of our section 5 (2) CIPAA, Hodgson JA said at page 457 para [36] of the judgment as follows: “That is, I do not think a payment claim can be treated as a nullity for failure to comply with s. 13 (2)(a) of the Act, unless the failure is patent on its face.” [67] In Pacific GNRL Securities v Soliman and Sons [2006] NSWSC 13, the New South Wales Supreme Court had to decide on whether non- compliance with some provisions of their Act with respect to the Payment Claim makes the Adjudication Determination void. Brereton J argued as follows in his judgment: "Is the determination void for service out of time of the payment claim? 30 The Owners submit that there was a non-compliance with a basic and essential requirement prescribed in the Act for there to be a valid determination, in that the payment claim was not made within 12 months of performance of the latest of the construction work to which it relates. 31 Section 13 of the Act relevantly provides as follows: 32 13 Payment claims (1) A person referred to in section 8 (1) who is or who claims to be entitled to a progress payment (the claimant) may serve a payment claim on the person who, under the construction contract concerned, is or may be liable to make the payment. (2) A payment claim: (a) must identify the construction work (or related goods and services) to which the progress payment relates, and (b) must indicate the amount of the progress payment that the claimant claims to be due (the claimed amount), and (c) must state that it is made under this Act. (3) The claimed amount may include any amount: (a) that the respondent is liable to pay the claimant under section 27 (2A), or 33 (b) that is held under the construction contract by the respondent and that the claimant claims is due for release. (4) A payment claim may be served only within: (a) the period determined by or in accordance with the terms of the construction contract, or (b) the period of 12 months after the construction work to which the claim relates was last carried out (or the related goods and services to which the claim relates were last supplied), whichever is the later. (5) A claimant cannot serve more than one payment claim in respect of each reference date under the construction contract. (6) However, subsection (5) does not prevent the claimant from including in a payment claim an amount that has been the subject of a previous claim. 32 Amongst the basic and essential requirements which are preconditions to a valid adjudicator’s determination is “service by the claimant on the respondent of a payment claim (s 13)” [Brodyn, [53]. Were the matter unaffected by authority, Mr Parker’s 34 argument - that that requirement was not satisfied, in the light of s 13 (4), by purported service of a claim more than 12 months after the construction work was last carried out – might have warranted closer consideration, but decisions of Campbell J and McDougall J, which I am far from prepared to say are plainly wrong, are to the contrary. 33 In Lifestyle Retirement Projects No.2 Pty Ltd v Parisi Homes Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 705, Campbell J (at [19]) held that precise compliance with s 13 (4) was not a basic requirement essential to validity of a determination. His Honour said: 18 It must immediately be noted that the language of section 13 (2) is in one sense mandatory, in stating what a payment claim “must” do. By different verbiage, section 13 (4) is likewise, in that same sense, mandatory by saying that the payment claim “may be served only within” a particular period of time. 19 In my view, consistently with Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 390-391, the question of what was intended to be essential for compliance with the basic requirements of a determination is not decided solely by these textual matters. 35 The fact that the language of section 13 (4) is in one sense mandatory shows that it sets out a “requirement”, but not that it is a basic and essential requirement. Rather, the question of what is essential needs to be decided, bearing in mind the object and purpose of the legislation. It is concerned with providing a quick and relatively easy way in which an obligation to make a payment on account of what ultimately might be found to be due can be established. Viewed in that light, I do not find that precise compliance with section 13 (4) is a basic requirement which is essential to a purported determination actually being a determination under the Act. Rather, section 13 (4) is one of the “more detailed requirements”, which Hodgson JA held exist in the Act. When there has been a document which purports to be a Payment Claim served, the fact (if it were a fact) that the construction work to which the claim relates was last carried out more than 12 months before the payment claim was served does not mean that the “basic and essential requirement” of “service ... of a payment claim (s 13)” has not been complied with. And even if it turned out that the adjudicator was mistaken in deciding that section 13 (4) had been complied with, that would not mean that his 36 determination was void, when he has addressed in a bona fide way the question of whether section 13 (4) has been complied with. 34 And in Energetech Australia Pty Ltd v Sides Engineering Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 801, McDougall J (at [25]) concluded that compliance with s 13 (4) was not “basic and essential” in the relevant sense. His Honour explained why: 25 Secondly, I think (and this may be no more than a variant or consequence of the first reason) the requirement of s 13 (4) is not "basic and essential" within the meaning of that phrase as it was explained by Hodgson JA in Brodyn. It may be readily understood (if I may say so with respect) why the matters identified by his Honour in that paragraph have the "basic and essential" quality to which he refers. As to the first, the terms of the Act are not engaged if there is no construction contract. Equally, in terms of the second, third and fourth alternatives, there is no valid adjudication unless they are engaged. Finally, in the case of the fifth requirement, it is simply a reflection of the statutory duty cast upon the adjudicator. 37 26 Those matters do not by and large require the investigation and resolution of difficult questions of fact or law. Usually, it will be clear whether or not there is a construction contract (particularly having regard to the wide definition of that expression in s 4 of the Act); and equally it will usually be clear whether (for example) a document of the kind described by s 13(1) has been served. 27 However, when one looks at the question of s 13 (4), a determination of the point raised by that question necessarily involves considerations of questions of fact, in the context of the relevant statutory provisions. The entitlement may well be conditional upon (in this case) service of a payment claim within the period determined or in accordance with the terms of the contract. That, however, I think, is a matter for the adjudicator to determine. If it is a matter for the adjudicator to determine, then, consistent with the approach indicated in Brodyn at 441 [54], it is a matter that, prima facie, does not fall within the "basic and essential requirement". [68] Therefore when a challenge is made which is said to go to the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator, the Adjudicator is still at liberty to decide on the exact nature of the non-compliance to see if it falls within the 38 "basic and essential requirement" of the Act or that it is a matter of construction with respect to whether there is a Payment Claim due under the construction contract as he understands it. The following analysis in Pacific GNRL Securities (supra) is helpful: "Is the determination void for insufficient specificity in the payment claim? 44 The Owners submit that there was non-compliance with a basic and essential requirement prescribed in the Act for there to be a valid determination, in that the payment claim did not sufficiently specify the construction work in respect of which it was made. 45 Although precision and particularity is required to a degree sufficient to apprise the parties of the real issues in dispute, regard may be had to the familiarity which the parties will have with construction industry practices and the formality and particularity of a pleading is not expected [Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Luikens [2003] NSWSC 1140, [76]]. A payment claim is not a nullity for non- compliance with s 13(2)(a), at least unless the non-compliance is patent on the face of the claim [Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 409, 39 [34] – [39] (Hodgson JA), [46] – [48] (Santow JA)]. Moreover, compliance with s 13(2) is not a basic requirement fundamental to the validity of an adjudication, but one of the “more detailed requirements”, exact compliance with which is not essential to a valid determination [Brodyn, [54] – [55]]. 46 In fact, it is plain that the “period” referred to in the payment claim is the period since the last progress claim (of June 2004), and the claim is apportioned across several heads showing the percentage complete under each. Mr Dixon conceded in cross- examination that he understood precisely what was being claimed. 47 It follows that the determination is not void for insufficient specificity in the payment claim, since it sufficiently specified the construction work in respect of which it was made, and even if it did not, the sufficiency of a payment claim is not a basic and essential requirement non-compliance with which results in invalidity, but a matter within the jurisdiction of the adjudicator to determine, rightly or wrongly." (emphasis added) [69] Whilst in New South Wales' Act, the setting aside of an Adjudication Determination is by way of judicial review, the observations on jurisdiction can be analogously applied in our context when a 40 jurisdictional point is raised in a setting aside as in the Adjudicator had acted in excess of jurisdiction. In Brodyn Pty Ltd t/as Time Cost and Quality v Davenport & Anor [2004] NSWCA 394, it was explained as follows: "51 I agree with McDougall J that the scheme of the Act appears strongly against the availability of judicial review on the basis of non-jurisdictional error of law. The Act discloses a legislative intention to give an entitlement to progress payments, and to provide a mechanism to ensure that disputes concerning the amount of such payments are resolved with the minimum of delay. The payments themselves are only payments on account of a liability that will be finally determined otherwise: ss 3 (4), 32. The procedure contemplates a minimum of opportunity for court involvement: ss 3 (3), 25 (4). The remedy provided by s 27 can only work if a claimant can be confident of the protection given by s 27 (3): if the claimant faced the prospect that an adjudicator's determination could be set aside on any ground involving doubtful questions of law, as well as of fact, the risks involved in acting under s 27 would be prohibitive, and s 27 could operate as a trap. 41 52 However, it is plain in my opinion that for a document purporting to an adjudicator's determination to have the strong legal effect provided by the Act, it must satisfy whatever are the conditions laid down by the Act as essential for there to be such a determination. If it does not, the purported determination will not in truth be an adjudicator's determination within the meaning of the Act: it will be void and not merely voidable. A court of competent jurisdiction could in those circumstances grant relief by way of declaration or injunction, without the need to quash the determination by means of an order the nature of certiorari. 53 What then are the conditions laid down for the existence of an adjudicator's determination? The basic and essential requirements appear to include the following: 1. The existence of a construction contract between the claimant and the respondent, to which the Act applies (ss 7 and 8). 2. The service by the claimant on the respondent of a payment claim (s 13). 3. The making of an adjudication application by the claimant to an authorised nominating authority (s 17). 42 4. The reference of the application to an eligible adjudicator, who accepts the application (ss 18 and 19). 5. The determination by the adjudicator of this application (ss 19 (2) and 21 (5)), by determining the amount of the progress payment, the date on which it becomes or became due and the rate of interest payable (ss 22 (1)) and the issue of a determination in writing (ss 22 (3) (a)). 54 The relevant sections contain more detailed requirements: for example, s 13 (2) as to the content of payment claims; s 17 as to the time when an adjudication application can be made and as to its contents; s 21 as to the time when an adjudication application may be determined; and s 22 as to the matters to be considered by the adjudicator and the provision of reasons. A question arises whether any non-compliance with any of these requirements has the effect that a purported determination is void, that is, is not in truth an adjudicator's determination. That question has been approached in the first instance decision by asking whether an error by the adjudicator in determining whether any of these requirements is satisfied is a jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional error. I think that approach has tended to cast the net too widely; and I think it is preferable to ask whether a requirement being 43 considered was intended by the legislature to be an essential pre-condition for the existence of an adjudicator's determination." (emphasis added) [70] I am not unaware that the decision in Brodyn was rejected in Chase Oyster Bar v Hamo Industries [2010] NSWCA 190. There the NSW Court of Appeal held that in the light of the decision of the High Court of Australia in Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1 (“Kirk”): "33 There is no single test or theory or logical process by which the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional error can be determined …" [71] In Oyster Bar the NSW Court of Appeal was concerned with the service of a payment claim that did not comply with a mandatory requirement of the NSW Act as to the period within which it was required to be served, and the court held that as a consequence, the adjudicator’s award was also invalid. The court held that the adjudicator who decided that the payment claim was served within the mandatory prescribed period made an error of fact (which the court characterised as a “jurisdictional error”), and that certiorari was available to quash or set aside the adjudicator’s determination. The court rejected the decision in Brodyn that the court should be restricted to reviewing whether the 44 basic requirements (essential conditions) set out at [53] of Brodyn had been complied with. Spigelman CJ referred (at [37]-[38]) to the traditional distinction between mandatory and directory conditions, which had been replaced in Australia by the current test of whether “it is the purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of a provision should be invalid", following the test laid down by the High Court Australia in Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28. The legislative purpose can be discerned from the language of the provision itself and of the associated provisions. [72] The Singapore Court of Appeal wrestled with this nebulous question of jurisdiction in the context of their Act on statutory adjudication. In Lee Wee Lick Terence (alias Li Weili Terence) v Chua Say Eng (formerly trading as Weng Fatt Construction Engineering) and another appeal [2012] SGCA 63; [2013] 1 SLR 401 the Court of Appeal had to reconcile the seemingly conflicting approaches to the issue of jurisdiction in adjudication under their Act. The first approach was developed in the cases of Chip Hup Hup Kee Construction Pte Ltd v Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 658, SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733 and AM Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National 45 Golf and Country Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260, all decided by Judith Prakash J. In Chip Hup Hup Kee, Prakash J held that the formal validity and service of a Payment Claim were not jurisdictional issues. In SEF Construction and AM Associates, Prakash J held that the court’s role extended only to reviewing a closed list of “basic requirements” for the validity of an adjudication determination (see SEF Construction at [45]; AM Associates at [19]). This is to be contrasted with the second approach, set out in the case of Sungdo Engineering & Construction (S) Pte Ltd v Italcor Pte Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 459 by Lee Seiu Kin J. On Lee J’s reasoning, a court may review an Adjudicator’s Decision on whether a document properly constitutes a payment claim under the Act or whether a Payment Claim was proper. The Court of Appeal in Lee Wee Lick Terence (supra) reconciled it this way: "[30] ... If there is no payment claim or if a payment claim is not served on the respondent, then the power of the [authorised nominating body] to nominate an adjudicator would not have arisen, and an appointment made in such circumstances would not be valid. The power of nomination under s 14 (1) of the Act is predicated on the existence of a payment claim and the service thereof on the respondent. An acceptance of an invalid nomination would not clothe the acceptor with the office of adjudicator. It is in 46 this sense that an adjudicator appointed in such circumstances is said to have no jurisdiction in the matter because he has not been validly appointed under the Act. Any issue arising in relation to the validity of the appointment of the adjudicator is a jurisdictional issue which must be reviewable by the court. This was the kind of issue that Lee J was concerned with in Sungdo." [31] However, we do not think that this was the same kind of jurisdictional issue that Prakash J had in mind when she held in Chip Hup Hup Kee ([14] supra) that whether the payment claim was in proper order or not would not have an impact on the adjudicator’s jurisdiction, as she also held that the court’s power of review should be restricted to supervising the appointment of adjudicators, i.e., the validity or otherwise of an appointment was subject to review by the court. What she had in mind was the case of a payment claim that was intended as a payment claim but which did not comply with all the requirements of the Act: it would still be a payment claim, but the adjudicator could “throw [it] out” for non-compliance (see [20] above). The distinction between Lee J’s proposition in Sungdo and that of Prakash J in Chip Hup Hup Kee is that the former proposition was made in relation to a payment claim which was in form a payment claim but not 47 intended to be such, and therefore did not have the effect of a payment claim, and the latter proposition was made in relation to a payment claim which was in form a payment claim and was intended to be such, but which did not satisfy all the requirements of the Act. In the first situation, a payment claim has not come into operation as a payment claim. In the second situation, a payment claim operates as a payment claim but it is defective for non-compliance with the requirements of the Act. The first situation goes to the validity of the appointment of the adjudicator. The second situation goes to the validity of the adjudication determination." (emphasis added) [73] The Court of Appeal in that case gave the following advice with respect to the role of the Adjudicator and the Court when a so-called jurisdictional issue is raised with respect to a Payment Claim: "The role of the adjudicator [64] We are of the opinion that the only functions of an adjudicator are to: (a) decide whether the adjudication application in question is made in accordance with s 13 (3) (a), (b) and (c) of the Act (see s 16 (2) (a)); and (b) to determine the adjudication application (see s 17 (2)). If the adjudication application complies with s 13 (3) (a), (b) and (c), the adjudicator should proceed with 48 the adjudication. He is not competent to decide whether he was validly appointed to adjudicate the matter (see [36] above). Thus, in this case, the Adjudicator need not and should not have decided issues (a) to (d) (at [10] above). [65] If the respondent wishes to argue that the adjudicator was not validly appointed or that the adjudicator has not exercised his power to determine the adjudication application properly (for example, because the adjudicator has not complied with s 16 (3) the Act), such argument should be made to the court. The respondent may apply to court to set aside the adjudication determination on this basis. If the respondent’s objection is that there is no valid payment claim, this should be raised as soon as possible in the payment response so as not to delay the adjudication process. The role of the court in a setting-aside action [66] Turning now to the court’s role in a setting-aside action, we agree with the holding in SEF Construction ([14] supra) that the court should not review the merits of an adjudicator’s decision. The court does, however, have the power to decide whether the adjudicator was validly appointed. If there is no payment claim or service of a payment claim, the appointment of an adjudicator will 49 be invalid, and the resulting adjudication determination would be null and void. [67] Even if there is a payment claim and service of that payment claim, the court may still set aside the adjudication determination on the ground that the claimant, in the course of making an adjudication application, has not complied with one (or more) of the provisions under the Act which is so important that it is the legislative purpose that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid, whether it is labelled as an essential condition or a mandatory condition. A breach of such a provision would result in the adjudication determination being invalid." (emphasis added) [74] Learned counsel for the Respondent argued that the BQ and Architect Instruction are the sine quo non of the purported contract and the necessary foundation of the existence of a cause of action for both the Claims in the document (i.e. the purported Payment Claim) the Claimant served under s 5 (1). According to him, the express provision on all these requirements are on the face of the supporting material (i.e. the LoA) of the purported Payment Claim. He concluded that the purported Payment Claim is not a valid payment claim under section 5 (1) due to a manifest failure contrary to the requirement of section 5 (2) 50 (b) of identification of the cause of action in that the document did not assert as a fact nor did the supporting materials show the existence of any BQ or Architect’s Instruction for the works or costs underlying the claims. (para 26/30 Supporting Affidavit) [75] Again here I have no good reason to disagree with the learned Adjudicator. The learned Adjudicator has succinctly set out his reasoning as follows: "15.3 a) In the LoA's mode of Payment clearly stated that 'the Interim Payment Certificate shall be issued by the Architect.' and refers to Clause 30.1 of PAM Contract 2006 (With Quantities) is (sic) stated clearly that the certificate of payment for the work done shall be certified and valuated (sic) by the Architect and QS and do not need the direction and approval of the Respondent. Therefore, the sum of amount claimed under the Valuation For Interim Certificate No.1 is valid." [76] The clause referred to above is Clause 3)(d) Mode of Payment where under ii) it is provided as follows: 51 "ii) Subsequent payment will be subject to the (sic) any amount due in Interim Payment Certificate issued by the Architect and availability of fund in the HDA Account." (emphasis added) [77] Clause 30.1 of the PAM Contract (With Quantities) which, though not executed, is still part of a construction contract made in writing as Clause 2) of the LoA expressly provides that Appendix B (PAM Form of Contract) attached to the LoA shall form a legal and binding contract between the parties. Clause 30.1 states as follows: "The Contractor shall submit a payment application at the Interim Claim Interval stated in the Appendix with complete details and particulars as required by the Architect and Quantity Surveyor, to enable them to consider and ascertain the amount to be included in an Interim Certificate. Upon receipt of the Contractor's details and particulars, the Architect after having received the payment valuation from the Quantity Surveyor shall, within twenty one (21) Days from the date of receipt of the Contractor's application, issue an Interim Certificate to the Employer with a copy to the Contractor, and the Employer shall thereafter pay the amount certified to the Contractor within the Period of Honouring Certificates ..." 52 [78] However rudimentary may be the express terms of payment, clearly the Architect and QS must have been satisfied with the complete details and particulars before issuing the Interim Certificate No. 1. This is a finding of fact of the learned Adjudicator and this being not an appeal, this Court shall not review that finding based on sufficiency of evidence. Suffice to say here that it is a finding that the learned Adjudicator is entitled to come to based on the facts before him. [79] Likewise when it comes to Interim Certificate No. 2 the learned Adjudicator made the following finding: "15.6 a) Refer to Clause 30.1 of the PAM Contract 2006 also indicate clearly that the Certificate of Payment for work done shall be evaluated and recommended by the QS prior (to) certification of the Architect and do not need the direction and approval of the Respondent. Although the Valuation for Interim Certificate (was) yet to be certified by the Architect, but the Claimant (is) still entitled to claim the sum of amount under the Valuation for Interim Certificate No. 2 pursuant to section 36 of CIPAA. Therefore, the sum of amount claimed under the Valuation For Interim Certificate No. 2 is valid." 53 [80] Section 36 (3) and (4) CIPAA provides as follows with respect to "Default Provisions in the Absence of Terms of Payment": "3) The frequency of progress payment is: a) Monthly, for construction work and construction consultancy services; and b) Upon the delivery of supply, for the supply of construction materials, equipment or workers in connection with a construction contract. 4) The due date for payment under subsection (3) is thirty calendar days from the receipt of the invoice." (emphasis added) [81] Apparently the learned Adjudicator took the view that the failure of the Architect to certify the progress claim made is no bar to the Claimant/Contractor submitting their Payment Claim for Adjudication under the default provision for payment. As the services of the Architect had been terminated by then, the Claimant was entitled to fall back on section 36 (4) CIPAA and to treat payment as due 30 days after the submission of the Interim Certificate No. 2 dated 18.12.2015 duly evaluated and recommended by the QS and so the due date for payment was taken to be 27.1.2016. This Court finds nothing 54 objectionable with this approach, treating the Valuation for Interim Certificate No. 2 dated 12 December 2015 as an "invoice" within the meaning of section 36 (4) CIPAA. [82] Even if the learned Adjudicator did not answer correctly the question of law posed for him to answer, this does not merit this Court in a section 15 application to review his decision on merits and to reverse it unless it is a case of patent non-compliance affecting his core jurisdiction, which in this case, it is not. [83] Any further consideration as to what is the proper amount due under the Valuation Interim Certificate No.1 and 2 would involve descending into the merits of the Adjudicator's decision. [84] The learned Adjudicator did not accept unquestioningly the Claimant's Payment Claim under the 2 Valuation Interim Certificates. He exercised his powers under section 25 (h) CIPAA and directed both parties to attend a site inspection for the Project on 16.7.2016 during the time 10am until 3pm. The Claimant objected, saying no useful purpose could be achieved insisting that amounts ‘certified’ and would have to be allowed as such (Exhibit ‘P-16’). Access to site was granted on 16.7.2016, during which Sr. Lim Keng Heng the Q.S. of KH Alliance Sdn. Bhd. and Ir. Teo Yuan Hwa, the M&E Consulting Engineer of JP Ace 55 Sdn. Bhd., both being the experts of the Respondent, substantiated the basis of their respective findings/reports to Adjudicator. [85] The Adjudicator had given his reasons for rejecting the report of the Respondent's experts: "11.3. ...During the site inspection, I had interrogated the Respondent to explain the scope of works and the works were done by the Claimant. The site inspection started from 10am and finished at 3pm. ... 15 b) After site inspection with the Respondent for the project, I found that the Respondent’s third parties’ expertise valuation reports was not evaluated based on completed works done of the Claimant and has excluded the Claimant’s rectification/repairing works for the Project. Further to this, the calculation used in valuation was based on the quantities and rates which are proposed by the Respondent’s expertise (sic) and did not follow the terms and conditions of the contract. I hereby reject the valuation report." (emphasis added) [86] It might also be stated here that the Adjudicator also has under his armoury of powers the power under section 25 (i) to inquisitorially take 56 the initiative to ascertain the facts and the law required for the decision. Perhaps the use of the word "interrogated" is misplaced for that is used more for the police in interrogating a suspect in a crime; the Adjudicator probably meant he "inquisitorially took the initiative to inquire in depth into the veracity of the Payment Claims made" and the objections taken out by the Respondent with their alternative valuation of the works done." [87] It must also be noted that under section 25 (n) the Adjudicator has the power to decide or declare on any matter notwithstanding no certificate has been issued in respect of the matter. Even if it be a case where the Architect should not have issued the Valuation Interim Certificate No.1 and that the Valuation Interim Certificate No.2, not being issued by the Architect is not valid, the Adjudicator still could ascertain the value of work done through the site inspection and through the questions asked of the parties present. [88] There is no basis for alleging a breach of natural justice just because the Adjudicator had not disclosed his findings to the parties after the site inspection as these fall within the realm of finding of facts which this Court would be slow to interfere save for conduct so egregious that no reasonable fact finder would have come to the conclusion that had been arrived at unless there was a lack of 57 independence or impartiality on the part of the Adjudicator as a fact- finder. This is not the case here. [89] The Respondent had contended that their experts in their report had re-evaluated the Claimant's work done for the Project and recommended that the work done amounted to RM632,045.86. It would appear at the end of the day, the Respondent is not happy with the quantum that was adjudicated in favour of the Claimant. I am of course conscious of the fact that the Respondent is mounting this argument in the context that there was no construction contract to begin with and that what the Claimant may be entitled is a restitutionary quantum meruit claim which is not the subject matter of Adjudication under a Payment Claim as properly understood, citing as authority a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Delmere Holdings Pty Ltd v Green [2015] WASC 148. [90] The Respondent also expressed its consternation that in spite of the controversies highlighted in its Adjudication Response, the Adjudicator had opted for what is referred to generally as a document- only Adjudication without a full hearing as it were where witnesses are called and submissions and clarification thereafter before decision. I can do no better than to quote from Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in Ranhill 58 E & C Sdn Bhd v Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1435 where her Ladyship observed astutely as follows: “[65] ...Subsection 21 (1) provides that the adjudicator is to conduct the adjudication in the manner as the adjudicator considers appropriate within the powers provided under section 25. The adjudicator is conferred discretion as to how the adjudication is to be conducted. To assist the adjudicator in carrying out that responsibility, the adjudicator is endowed with certain unusual and arguably extensive powers which does not often see spelt out in other legislations ... [66] Section 25 provides the adjudicator with a long list of powers, that is, the power to: (a) establish the procedures in conducting the adjudication proceedings including the submission of documents by the parties ... [67] In other words, it is for the adjudicator to deal with how the adjudication proceeding are to proceed. This could include the calling of meetings and whether there will be hearings including oral hearings where witnesses may or may not be called ...“ (emphasis added) 59 [91] It would appear that at the end of the day the Adjudicator had taken a plain and prosaic approach to ascertaining if there was a valid Payment Claim under CIPAA in that there was a claim for work done in this case that was traceable to a construction contract made in writing; having in mind the over-arching purpose of CIPAA which is to facilitate regular and timely payment and to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry. [92] It is not for this Court under a section 15 CIPAA setting aside application to disturb or vary the finding of facts of the Adjudicator or to correct his so-called wrong interpretation of the provisions of the contract or of the law. This can be done in arbitration or litigation as the final decision there will supersede the Adjudication Decision here. The Adjudication Decision here has only the element of temporary finality; it is binding unless under section 13 (c) CIPAA the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the court. [93] In reaching the decision that the Adjudicator did, I am not satisfied that he had exceeded his jurisdiction or that he failed to act independently or impartially or that there has been a breach of natural justice. 60 Whether there was a valid appointment of the Adjudicator under CIPAA [94] Learned counsel for the Respondent contended that the appointment of the Adjudicator was invalid because he failed to indicate an acceptance of appointment and to accept his appointment on intelligible terms within the ten (10) working days period as prescribed under section 23 (2) read together with section 24 CIPAA. [95] On 26.4.2016, the Adjudicator received the KLRCA notice of appointment under section 23 (1). The 10 working days he was required to indicate his acceptance of appointment along with the terms under section 23 (2) and section 24 expired on 11.5.2016. On 6.5.2016 and on 9.5.2016 he gave the Respondent and Claimant respectively a ‘Notice of Acceptance’ dated 5.5.2017, purportedly it was contended, to indicate his acceptance of appointment under section 23 (2) and under section 24 on terms that reads: “…as per the Terms and Conditions of the Appointment agreed by the parties, a copy of which is attached the KLRCA’s standard terms of appointment and fees as following for the services of an adjudicator in force as of the date of this letter." (emphasis added) 61 [96] It was submitted by learned counsel for the Respondent that the bold words which appear to make reference to two distinct sets of Terms and Conditions of the Appointment is unintelligible; the first being the Terms and Conditions of Appointment dated 27.4.2016 which he had extended to the Respondent that day, and the second one the so-called KLRCA standard terms of appointment was not shown. [97] It was further argued that the Respondent could not comprehend the terms and did not comply with his direction. Upon receiving advice, the Respondent vide solicitors’ letter dated 2.6.2016 to the Adjudicator, pointed out the confusion, by which time the 10 working days to 11.5.2016 under section 23 (2) had expired, and the Respondent sought for an extension of time to serve an Adjudication Response. The explanation was accepted and the notice of extension of time granted reads: “Pursuant to section 29 (p) …, I hereby direct the Respondent to serve a written adjudication response containing the nature and description of the dispute and the remedy sought together with any supporting documents on the Claimant …” [98] Adjudication Response dated 17.6.2016 was served on 17.6.2016 and copied to Adjudicator on or about 20.6.2016. 62 [99] The provisions of sections 21 to 24 are reproduced below: 21. Appointment of Adjudicator An adjudicator may be appointed in the following manner: (a) By agreement of the parties in dispute within ten working days from the service of the notice of adjudication by the claimant; or (b) By the Director of the KLRCA- (i) Upon the request of either party in dispute if there is no agreement of the parties under paragraph (a); or (ii) Upon the request of the parties in dispute. 22. Appointment of Adjudicator by Parties (1) The claimant shall notify the adjudicator to be appointed under paragraph 21 (a) in writing and provide him with a copy of the notice of adjudication. (2) The adjudicator shall propose and negotiate his terms of appointment including fees chargeable with the parties and shall within ten working days from the date 63 he was notified of his appointment, indicate his acceptance and terms of his appointment. (3) If the adjudicator rejects his appointment or fails to indicate his acceptance of the appointment within the period specified in subsection (2), the parties may proceed to appoint another adjudicator in the manner provided under section 21. 23. Appointment of Adjudicator by Director of the KLRCA (1) The Director of the KLRCA shall appoint an adjudicator under paragraph 21 (b) within five working days upon receipt of a request and shall notify the parties and the adjudicator in writing. (2) The adjudicator shall propose and negotiate his terms of appointment including fees chargeable with the parties and shall within ten working days from the date he was notified of his appointment, indicate his acceptance and terms of his appointment. (3) If the adjudicator rejects his appointment or fails to indicate his acceptance of the appointment within the period specified in subsection (2)- 64 (a) The parties may agree to appoint another adjudicator in the manner provided under paragraph 21 (a); or (b) The Director of the KLRCA may proceed to appoint another adjudicator in the manner provided under paragraph 21 (b). 24. Duties and Obligations of the Adjudicator The adjudicator shall at the time of the acceptance of appointment as an adjudicator make a declaration in writing that — (a) There is no conflict of interest in respect of his appointment; (b) He shall act independently, impartially and in a timely manner and avoid incurring unnecessary expense; (c) He shall comply with the principles of natural justice; and (d) There are no circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to the adjudicator’s impartiality and independence. [100] The argument of learned counsel for the Respondent must be reproduced in full to appreciate its argument, if at all possible: "The words ‘acceptance and terms of his appointment’ and ‘acceptance of appointment’ in section 23 (2) and section 24 read 65 alongside each other and in the context of sections 23 (2), 23 (3) and 24 as a whole are not two separate subject matters. It is submitted that an acceptance of appointment takes meaning from its terms. In other words, we submit that if the terms have not been agreed upon there cannot be an indication of acceptance for the purpose of section 23 (2) much less an acceptance under section 24. Clearly, when Mr. Loo gave the purported indication of acceptance via the purported ‘Notice of Acceptance’ dated 5.5.2017 the terms were not then agreed and the indicated ‘terms’ to which his acceptance relates indecipherable. In the circumstances, Mr. Loo failed to indicate ‘his acceptance of appointment and terms of his appointment’ within the 10 working days as required under section 23 (2) and his purported ‘acceptance of appointment’ under section 24 is invalid due to want of certainty or agreement on the terms. Consequently, he was not competent to embark on any adjudication at all and his decision is null and void." [101] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant that the Respondent ought to be estopped from raising this issue at this late juncture now. Such objection ought to have been taken by the Respondent in the Adjudication proceeding then and certainly not now. The issue cannot 66 now be a ground for setting aside the Adjudication Decision since it is no longer material and relevant. [102] First, the Respondent had written to the very Adjudicator for extension of time to file the Adjudication Response, whose appointment, it said was not agreed to because it could not decipher the Standard Terms and Conditions of KLRCA that was attached to the acceptance of the appointment. It must be stated here that the Adjudicator is not the one who has problem deciphering the Standard Terms and Conditions of KLRCA for the appointment of the Adjudicator. Rather it is the Respondent and so they are at liberty not to accept the said appointment because they are not agreeable to whatever they said are the undecipherable terms and conditions of appointment. [103] Section 19 (b) CIPAA provides that: "If the parties and the adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the adjudicator, the KLRCA’s standard terms of appointment and fees for adjudicators shall apply." [104] Admittedly the KLRCA standard terms of appointment and fees are designed to save the time required under section 23 (2) CIPAA for the Adjudicator and the parties to negotiate to agreement within 10 days (of 67 the Adjudicator being notified of his appointment by KLRCA) the terms and conditions and the fees with respect to the appointment of the Adjudicator. [105] Rule 6 of the Construction Industry Payment & Adjudication Regulations 2014 reads: "KLRCA’s standard fees for services and expenses of adjudicator The KLRCA’s standard fees for the services and expenses of an adjudicator as specified in the Schedule shall apply if the parties in dispute and the adjudicator fail to agree on the terms of appointment and the fees of the adjudicator." [106] The Adjudicator had used the form provided for under Form 6 entitled "Notice of Acceptance of the Appointment to Act as Adjudicator" in the Schedule to the KLRCA Rules & Procedure. [107] Secondly, the Respondent had participated fully in the Adjudication proceedings without raising a whimper that there can be no valid appointment because they do not agree to the Standard Terms and Conditions of Appointment of Adjudicator. [108] One would have thought that if really that was bothering the Respondent, they could through their solicitors, write in for a clear copy or inquire from KLRCA. Their action and conduct belie their lack of 68 acceptance of the appointment of the said Adjudicator. It is as flimsy as it is frivolous an argument, to now say that the Adjudicator could not have accepted his appointment, on terms that the Respondent could not have known because the Terms and Conditions were indecipherable! Pronouncement [109] In the upshot, I had dismissed the Originating Summons for setting aside the Adjudication Decision with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid by the Respondent, Cosmic Master to the Claimant, Zana Bina. Correspondingly I had allowed the Originating Summons for enforcement of the Adjudication a Decision with costs of RM3,000.00 to be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant. Dated: 27 January 2017. Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Kuala Lumpur 69 For the Plaintiff in OS: WA-24C-103-09/2016 : Goh Boon Yee and Chew Hao Nan For the Defendant in (Messrs B K Goh & Goh) OS: WA-24C-94-09/2016 For the Plaintiff in OS: WA-24C-94-09/2016 : Tan Chi Sian For the Defendant in (Messrs P Y Hoh & Tai) OS: WA-24C-103-09/2016 Date of Decision: 24 October 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

BA-B52NCVC-260-08/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Harun Azlan bin Sufian 2. ) Zaireen Ayu Ibrahim DEFENDAN Saujana Triangle Sendirian Berhad

Summary Judgment Late Delivery of Vacant Possession

26/01/2017

TN IZRALIZAM BIN SANUSI

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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA, KUALA LUMPUR 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI SHAH ALAM 5 DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA GUAMAN SIVIL NO.BA-B52NCVC-260-08/2016 ANTARA 10 1. HARUN AZLAN BIN SUFIAN (No. K/P: 750601-12-5005) 2. ZAIREEN AYU IBRAHIM (No. K/P: 820925-14-5046) ... PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF 15 DAN SAUJANA TRIANGLE SDN BHD ... DEFENDAN (No. Pendaftaran Syarikat: 339170-W) 20 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT [Enclosure 5] Background of the Case 25 [1] The background facts of the Plaintiffs’ action against the defendant are these: The defendant was a housing developer and the plaintiffs as purchasers entered into a sale and purchase agreement dated 28.07.2010 (“the SPA”) for the sale and purchase of one unit condominium with 30 common facilities at a purchase price of RM1, 078, 000.00 (clause 3 of the SPA) in a project known as „Bandar Damansara Perdana Armanee Terrace‟ (“the Property”). 2 [2] The SPA (Exhibit A-1 of the Supporting Affidavit) was in the form 5 prescribed in Schedule H to the Housing Development (Control & Licensing) Regulations 1989 (“the 1989 Regulations”). Clauses 26(1) and 28(1) of the SPA provided that vacant possession of the Property together with the common facilities shall be handed over to the plaintiffs within 36 months from the date of the SPA, i.e. on or before 27.07.2013. Clause 8 of 10 the SPA further stipulates that time shall be of the essence of the contract in relation to all provisions of the SPA. [3] The defendant failed to deliver vacant possession of the Property within the specified time. It is a term of the said agreement (clause 26.2 of 15 the SPA) that the defendant should pay liquidated damages at the rate of 10% per annum on the purchase price for any delay in the completion of the property up to the date of the plaintiffs take vacant possession of the said parcel. Pursuant to clause 28.2 of the SPA, the defendant further agreed that if the common facilities are not completed in time, the 20 defendant shall pay immediately to the plaintiffs liquidated damages at the rate of 10% per annum of the last twenty per centum (20%) of the purchase price until completion. The Writ (Enclosure 1) 25 [4] On 4.8.2016, the plaintiffs commenced an action claiming liquidated ascertained damages (“LAD”) for late delivery of vacant possession of the Property amounting to RM316, 607.00 with interest of 5% on the said amount and RM62, 553.00 for late completion of the common facilities calculated until full settlement together with interest and costs. 30 3 [5] It is the plaintiffs’ case that the vacant possession of the property was 5 delivered to the plaintiffs only on 3.7.2016, a delay of 1072 days, and that the common facilities was completed only on 20.6.2016, a delay of 1059 days. The LAD based on the formula specified in clauses 26(2) and 28(2) of the SPA as follows: (i) a sum of RM316, 607.00 as LAD for late delivery of vacant 10 possessions of the property (for 1072 days); (ii) a sum of RM62, 553.00 as LAD for late completion of the common facilities (for 1059 days) [6] The defendant entered appearance and later filed his Statement of Defence and Counter Claim on 2.9.2016. The plaintiffs thereafter on 15 7.9.2016 filed an application under Order 14 rule 1 to seek a summary judgment against the defendants vide Enclosure 5. Application under Order 14 Rule 1 the Rules of Court 2012 (Enclosure 5) 20 The Law [7] O. 14 r. 1(1) and O. 14 r. 3(1) of the Rules of Court 2012 (ROC) provide as follows: “Application by plaintiff for summary judgment (O. 14, r. 1) 1. (1) Where in an action to which this rule applies a statement of claim 25 has been served on a defendant and that defendant has entered an appearance in the action, the plaintiff may, on the ground that the https://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.34469192780069313&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25022076968&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23USM_SL%23order%2514%25year%252012%25local-rule%25PUA0226%25 javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=3perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=3perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=3perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() 4 defendant has no defence to a claim included in the writ, or to a particular 5 part of such a claim, or has no defence to such a claim or part thereof except as to the amount of any damages claimed, apply to the Court for judgment against that defendant."; “Judgment for plaintiff (O. 14, r. 3) 10 3. (1) Unless on the hearing on the hearing of an application under rule 1 either the Court dismisses the application or the defendant satisfies the Court with respect to the claim, or the part of a claim, to which the application relates that there is an issue or question in dispute which ought to be tried or that there ought for some other reason to be a trial of that 15 claim or part, the Court may give such judgment for the plaintiff against that defendant on that claim or part as may be just having regard to the nature of the remedy or relief claimed.” [8] In an application for summary judgment, this Court is guided by the principles laid down in Doshi v. Yeoh Tiong Lay [1975] 1 MLJ 85. In this 20 case, the Federal Court held as follows: “The purpose of O. 14 of the Rules of Supreme Court 1975 is to enable the Plaintiff to obtain summary judgment without trial if he can prove his case clearly, and if the defendant is unable to set up a bona fide defence or raise an issue against the claim which ought to be tried, final judgment 25 should be allowed”. (Emphasis added). [9] This Court also guided by the principles laid down in National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd [1984] 2 CLJ 220, where it was stated by the Federal Court as follows: “... We think it appropriate to remind ourselves once again that in every 30 application under O. 14, the first considerations are (a) whether the case comes within the order and (b) whether the plaintiff has satisfied the javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=3perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispCase=window.open('/Members/DisplayCase.aspx?CaseId=2262761986&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayCase','');DispCase.focus() javascript:DispCase=window.open('/Members/DisplayCase.aspx?CaseId=2262761986&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayCase','');DispCase.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() 5 preliminary requirements for proceeding under O. 14. For the purposes of 5 an application under O. 14, the preliminary requirements:- (i) the statement of claim must have been served on the Defendant; (ii) the defendant must have entered an appearance; (iii) the affidavit in support of the application must comply with the requirements of r. 2 of the O. 14 10 ... If the Plaintiff fails to satisfy either of these considerations, the summons may be dismissed. If however, these considerations are satisfied, the plaintiff will have established a prima facie case and he becomes entitled to judgment. This burden then shifts to the defendant to satisfy the court why 15 judgment should not be given against him...” [10] In the present case, the Plaintiffs had satisfied the preliminary requirements as laid down in the case of National Company for Foreign Trade v. Kayu Raya Sdn Bhd (supra) that is: 20 (i) the Statement of Claim have been served on been served on the Defendant; (ii) the Defendant have entered appearance; and (iii) the Affidavit in Support is in compliance with O. 14 r. 2 ROC 2012. [11] In Bank Negara Malaysia v. Mohd Ismail [1992] 1 CLJ 627 the 25 Supreme Court held that the duty of a Judge does not end as soon as the fact is asserted by one party, or denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. The Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial if such assertion or denial is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or is inherently improbable. The Court will have 30 to identify the issues of fact or law and to determine whether they are triable. javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_2012_205&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispCase=window.open('/Members/DisplayCase.aspx?CaseId=2443182593&SearchId=0perpm10A','_DisplayCase','');DispCase.focus() 6 “.....Under an O. 14 application, the duty of a Judge does not end as soon 5 as a fact is asserted by one party, and denied or disputed by the other on affidavit. Where such assertion, denial or dispute is equivocal or lacking in precision or is inconsistent with undisputed contemporary documents or other statements by the same deponent or is inherently improbable in itself, then the Judge has a duty to reject such assertion or denial, thereby 10 rendering the issue as not triable. In our opinion, unless this principle is adhered to, a Judge is in no position to exercise his discretion judicially under an O. 14 application. Thus, apart from identifying the issues of fact or law, the Court must go one step further and determine whether they are triable. This principle is sometimes expressed by the statement that a 15 complete defence need not be shown. The defence set up need only show that there is a triable issue. Where the issue raised is solely a question of law without reference to any facts or where the facts are clear and undisputed, the Court should exercise its duty under O. 14. If the legal point is understood and the Court is 20 satisfied that it is unarguable, the Court is not prevented from granting a summary judgment, merely because “the question of law is at first blush of some complexity and therefore takes a little longer to understand”.” [12] Having considered the affidavits and the submissions of the parties, this court is of the considered view that the Plaintiffs have established a 25 prima facie case as it is not in dispute that the Defendant had delayed in delivering vacant possession and in completing the common facilities. [13] Therefore, the burden lies with the Defendant to raise triable issues, which would require the case to proceed with trial. The Defendant raised the following points in its written submission: 30 javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_1980_050&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=8perpm10B','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() javascript:DispAct=window.open('/Members/DisplayAct.aspx?CaseActCode=MY_FS_PUA_1980_050&ActSectionNo=14.&SearchId=8perpm10B','_DisplayAct','');DispAct.focus() 7 (i) The late delivery of vacant possession and the late completion 5 of the common facilities were caused by force majeure; (II) The computation of liquidated damages (LAD) should be based on the Discounted Price; (iii) Want of Notice. 10 The Findings of the Court [14] Having considered the submissions advanced by both parties, this court shall consider each of the issues advanced by the defendant separately. (a) The late delivery of vacant possession and the late completion 15 of the common facilities were caused by force majeure. [15] The defendant contended that the delay was due to dispute with its main contractor, the escalation of cost of raw materials, the escalation of finance charges and the rectification works by previous contractors. The defendant submitted that the above problems are not within its control and 20 therefore they constitute force majeure. Because of this, the defendant contended that the completion time must be extended so that the defendant can avoid paying the LAD. The defendant further submitted that the force majeure is an implied term of the SPA. The defendant, in trying to convince the court that the delay was caused by force majeure, adduced 25 an affidavit affirmed by the Finance Manager himself, Mr Zulkifli bin Mohd Isa (see enclosure 8). The defendant, in support of the position that they 8 take, also relies on Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd v Tan Peng Foo 5 [2013] 3 CLJ 663 and the case of Liau Fung Kiong & Ors v Tinagat Properties Sdn Bhd [2010] MLJU 1480. [16] With respect, this court is unable to accept the defendant’s argument. Instead, this court is in agreement with the plaintiffs that the force majeure clause only applicable if the clause is provided for in the SPA. When a 10 party refers to force majeure it essentially refers to the contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over which the parties have little or no control, that might impede or obstruct performance of the contract. See Magenta Resources (S) Pte Ltd v China Resources (S) Pte Ltd [1996] 3 SLR 62 where Justice Rajendran 15 opined: “What is referred to as force majeure in our law (as opposed to French law from which that term originates) is really no more that a convenient way of referring to contractual terms that the parties have agreed upon to deal with situations that might arise, over which the parties have little or no control, 20 that might impede or obstruct performance of the contract. There can therefore be no general rule as to what constitutes a situation of force majeure. Whether such a (force majeure) situation arises, and, where it does arise, the rights and obligations that follow, would all depend on what the parties, in their contract, have provided for.” 25 [17] The relevant statutory provision regulating and controlling the activity of the defendant is regulation 11(1) of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 enacted pursuant to the Minister’s powers under s 24 of the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act 1966. For ease of reference, regulation 11(1) is reproduced below: 30 9 “Every contract of sale for the sale and purchase of a housing 5 accommodation together with the subdivisional portion of land appurtenant thereto shall be in the form prescribed in Schedule G and where the contract of sale is for the sale and purchase of a housing accommodation in a subdivided building, in the form of a parcel of a building or land intended for subdivision into parcels, as the case may be, it shall be in the form 10 prescribed in Schedule H.” [18] It is pertinent to observe that the SPA is a Schedule H agreement provided pursuant to Regulation 11(1) of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989. The Housing Development 15 (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 makes it mandatory for the defendant to use the same without addition or modification. The decision in Encony Development Sdn Bhd v Robert Geoffrey Gooch & Anor [2016] 1 CLJ 893 serves as a good guide here. In that case, the Court of Appeal held: “The SPA between the respondents and the appellant, who is a housing 20 developer, is governed by a statutory form of contract as prescribed in sch. H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 [PU(A) 58/1989] („the regulations‟). As such, the provisions in the SPA are not merely contractual, but are in effect statutory provisions, as they are actually provision of sch. H of the Regulations. Which have been imposed 25 by law upon the parties. …. The SPA, which has statutory force, cannot, in other words, be effectively amended of varied by inferring the existence of a collateral contract subsisting alongside it.” 10 [19] In the case of Sea Housing Corporation Sdn Bhd v Lee Poh Choo 5 [1982] 2 MLJ 31, the Federal Court had the occasion to decide whether the developer can add the force majeure clause. The Federal Court held: “As to the rules which govern the transaction between the parties, rule 12 is relevant. That rule provides that every contract of sale - such as the one here - shall be in writing and shall contain within its terms and conditions 10 provisions to the effect set out in the various paragraphs of that rule. Paragraph (o) is relevant; that says that the agreement must specify: "the date of delivery of the vacant possession of the housing accommodation to the purchaser which date shall not be later than 18 months after the signing of the contract of sale." 15 That, as we have seen, was done. Then there is paragraph (r) which provides that the agreement must contain: "provisions binding on the licensed housing developer that he shall indemnify the purchaser for any delay in the delivery of the vacant possession of the housing accommodation. The amount of indemnity 20 shall be calculated from day to day at the rate of not less than eight per cent per annum of the purchase price commencing immediately after the date of delivery of vacant possession as specified in the contract of sale." 25 That too was done, as we have seen. But then the developer says, as we have seen, that it is excused from liability by clause 32 of the agreement which reads: "The vendor shall not be liable to purchaser for any failure to fulfil any terms of this Agreement if such fulfilment is delayed, hindered or 30 prevented by force majeure including but not limited to acts of God strikes lockouts riots civil commotion acts of war or the disability of contractors and subcontractors employed by the vendor either commencing, carrying on or completing their work or failure to obtain any necessary sanction or approval of any local authority or any 35 other circumstances of whatsoever nature beyond the control of the vendor." It is said here that owing to the then building boom and resultant shortage of building materials and labour which was beyond the control of the developer 40 it is not liable because of this clause 32. 11 With great respect to Mr. Chelliah for the developer we do not agree that it is 5 open to the developer to escape liability by inserting clause 32 in the agreement. It is common knowledge that in recent years, especially when government started giving housing loans making it possible for public servants to borrow 10 money at 4% interest per annum to buy homes, there was an upsurge in demand for housing, and that to protect home buyers, most of whom are people of modest means, from rich and powerful developers, Parliament found it necessary to regulate the sale of houses and protect buyers by enacting the Act. That was why rule 12 was enacted and in particular 15 paragraphs (o) and (r) thereof. With respect we do not agree with Mr. Chelliah that it was open to a developer to get round these paragraphs by the inclusion of such a clause as clause 32 in this agreement. In Daiman Development Sdn Bhd v Mathew Lui Chin Teck [1978] 2 MLJ 239 we said at page 243 that developers are bound by the rules and if an 20 agreement of sale is subject to contract, "only details may be inserted into the further agreement." Mr. Chelliah argued that clause 32 is such a detail. With respect we do not agree. In our judgment such details as are inserted into a written agreement 25 must be details consistent, not inconsistent with the Act and rules. Clause 32 is inconsistent with paragraph (r) of rule 12(1). When Daiman went to the [1981] 1 MLJ 56 their Lordships observed at page 60, second column: "... it seems to their Lordships that upon the proper construction of 30 the proforma [used in that case] the solicitors [for the developer there] would not be able to include in the contract of sale any term or condition which was not appropriate to effectuate the sale which had been made, including for that purpose, of course, provisions to comply with the requirements of the rules." 35 Thus it is clear that only terms and conditions designed to comply with the requirements of the rules that may be inserted in a contract of sale of land that is governed by the Act and rules, and that on the contrary terms and conditions which purport to get round the Act and rules so as to remove the 40 protection of home buyers may not be so inserted. 12 With respect, the provisions in question here are similar to those in Johnson 5 v Moreton [1978] 3 All ER 37, a House of Lords decision, where at page 49 Lord Hailsham said: "The policy of the law has been repeatedly used to protect the weaker of two parties who do not contract from bargaining positions of equal strength. (line a). 10 The truth is that it can no longer be treated as axiomatic that, in the absence of explicit language, the courts will permit contracting out of the provisions of an Act of Parliament -- as was attempted here -- where that Act, though silent as to the possibility of contracting out, nevertheless is manifestly passed for the protection of a class of 15 persons who do not negotiate from a position of equal strength, but in whose well-being there is a public as well as a private interest." (lined onwards). It would appear that only "contracting out" in favour of the weaker party -- i.e. 20 the purchaser -- might be countenanced by the courts. The construction we place on the rules is not as harsh as it seems to a developer -- for he has a safeguard in subrule (2) of rule 12 which provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Rule, where the Controller [of Housing] is satisfied that owing to special 25 circumstances the compliance with any provisions of this Rule is impracticable or unnecessary he may by a certificate in writing waive or modify such provisions in respect of any contract of sale." Thus in the circumstances of this case it would have been open to the 30 developer to try and persuade the Controller to modify the rigours of paragraphs (o) and (r) of rule 12(1). If it had succeeded it would have escaped liability. But it made no attempt to do so. But Mr. Chelliah says that under the terms of rule 12(2) the developer could have done so only before a contract of sale had been finalized and not after. 35 With respect we do not agree; in our judgment it is open to a developer to take advantage of this provision after as well as before such a contract has been finalized. For the reasons given above, we are of the opinion that clause 32, being inconsistent with rule 12 and not designed to comply with the requirements 40 of the rules and in the absence of waiver or modification by the Controller of Housing under rule 12(2), is void, and that therefore the developer is liable in damages for the delay in completion.” 13 5 [20] Applying the proposition of law as explained above, this court opined that the defendant could not use those incidents to escape from its obligation under the SPA. This court will not imply terms that contradict any express terms of the SPA. Therefore, the issue of force majeure cannot be 10 a triable issue in this present case. (b) The computation of liquidated damages (LAD) should be based on the Discounted Price [21] The defendant contended that since a discount is given the damages 15 must be computed based on the discounted sum and not the purchase price stated in the SPA. The defendant further submitted that otherwise the plaintiffs would be unjustly enriched. [22] However, this court is of the considered opinion that the parties are bound by the purchase price stated in the SPA. Clause 3 defines what 20 purchase price is: “The purchase price of the said Parcel is Ringgit Malaysia One Million Seventy Eight Thousand only (RM1, 078,000.00) only and shall be payable in the manner hereinafter provided.” Clause 26(2) and 28(2) stipulated that the LAD must be computed based 25 on the purchased price as defined under clause 3. Therefore, in the present case, the LAD should be calculated based on the purchase price stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. 14 [23] The defendant submitted that the plaintiffs’ claim herein, if allowed, 5 would lead to an unjust enrichment of the plaintiffs at the defendant’s expense. With respect, I am unable to accept the defendant’s argument. As explained above, the parties are not permitted to alter or amend the terms and condition of the SPA. Thus, the parties are bound by the purchase price stated in the SPA when computing the LAD payable by the defendant 10 to the plaintiffs under clauses 26(2) and 28(2) of the SPA. The issue of unjust enrichment does not arise in the present case. [24] In the case of View Esteem Sdn Bhd v. Vitalmont Development Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 LNS 1402, the Learned Sessions Court Judge found 15 that the Plaintiff had proven their claim on a balance of probabilities and allowed the Plaintiff's claim. On appeal, the defendant submitted that the learned Sessions Court Judge had erred when decided that the Plaintiff is entitled to calculate the LADs based on the purchase price as stated in the SPA amounting to RM658, 300.00, instead of RM592, 470.00, because this 20 would amount to unjust enrichment at the expense of the Defendant since the Plaintiff had received a 10% bonus/discount from the Appellant. The High Court held: “The Purchase price of the Apartment is RM658, 000.00 as stipulated in clause 3 of the SPA. On the issue of unjust enrichment, it is the submission of the 25 Appellant (Defendant) that a 10% discount was given to the Respondent (Plaintiff) as a promotional price. Therefore on that basis the LAD must be calculated based on the purchase price less 10%. Since clause 3 stipulates that the purchase price is RM658,000.00 any calculation of LAD must be based on that amount as agreed. The Appellant did 30 15 not adduce any evidence to the contrary. The salient terms of the SPA must 5 therefore be applicable.” (c) Want of Notice [25] The Defendant submitted that time is no longer of the essence as the plaintiffs had let the time for delivery of vacant possession pass without 10 objection and without any notice to claim damages. [26] However, this court is of the considered opinion and in agreement with the Plaintiffs that requiring the plaintiffs to issue a notice in order to entitle themselves of damages in akin to imposing additional terms to the statutory contract agreement. This court is guided by the case of Sentul 15 Raya Sdn Bhd v Hariram Jayaram & Ors and Other Appeals [2008] 4 CLJ 618, where the Court of Appeal held: “So far as s.56(3) of the Contract Act 1950 is concerned, it deals with contracts generally. The contract which has fallen for construction in the present cases is a special contract. It is prescribed and regulated by 20 statute. While parties in normal cases of contract have freedom to make provisions between themselves, a housing developer does not enjoy such freedom. Hence, parties to a contract in form H cannot contract out of the scheduled form. Terms more onerous to a purchaser may not be imposed. So too, terms imposing additional obligations on the part of a purchaser 25 may not be included in the statutory form of contract. It follows that the requirement of notice under s.63(3) which is an additional obligation to the detriment of the purchaser cannot be imposed on the respondents here in the light of the statutory scheme under the Act. This evident in the language of cl.22(2). On its proper construction, the clause makes a 30 16 16 housing developer immediately liable to a purchaser in liquidated damages 5 once the date for completion passes. Put differently, cl. 22(2) excludes the operation of s.56(3). This another reason for holding that s.56(3) of the Contract Act 1950 does not apply in cases falling under the Act.” 10 Conclusion [27] This court is of the opinion that the defendant has failed to raise any bona fide triable issue which warrants the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ application, and which must go for full trial for witnesses to be called and be cross-examined. 15 [28] The defendant did not challenge the calculation of the liquidated damages set out in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim or that it was wrong or incorrect. On the facts and circumstances in this case, the defendant was liable to pay the plaintiffs the liquidated damages in accordance to the SPA. 20 Decision [29] The facts and the law as aforesaid do not favour the defendant. There are no triable issues that are raised by the defendant and this court therefore would allow the application of summary judgment for the plaintiffs 25 with costs of RM 3000.00 to be paid by the defendant for this application. 17 (IZRALIZAM BIN SANUSI) Sessions Court Judge Shah Alam Dated: 26.1.2017 Counsel for the plaintiffs: Encik M. Muthuraman Messrs Muthu & Partners Advocates & solicitors No.14B Lorong Rahim Kajai 14 Taman Tun Dr Ismail 60000 Kuala Lumpur. Counsel for the defendant: Cik Zaitul Naziah binti Mohd soib Messrs Andrew Davis & Co Advocates & Solicitors P-3-13, No.60 Plaza Sri Hartamas 1 (1/70A) Sri Hartamas 50480 Kuala Lumpur

Tika 2.6.0

21-283-1992

PEMOHON PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH GOMBAK PENCELAH MUHAMMAD SHAM BIN ABDULLAH

20/01/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO: 21-283-1992 Dalam perkara Seksyen 29(2), Akta Pengambilan Tanah, 1960 Dan Dalam perkara Pengambilan Tanah: Dan Dalam perkara Pengambilan Tanah: Hakmilik : G.7636 No. Lot : 6 Sek 1 Mukim : Hulu Kelang Daerah : Gombak Tuanpunya Berdaftar : Md Nazar B. Kasah ANTARA PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH GOMBAK …..PEMOHON 2 DAN MUHAMMAD SHAM BIN ABDULLAH …BAKAL PENCELAH ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 10) A. PENGENALAN [1] Kandungan 10 ini telah difailkan oleh seorang individu bernama Muhammad Sham Bin Abdullah (Muhammad Sham) bagi mendapatkan perintah berikut: a) Muhammad Sham bin Abdullah (No. K/P: 781021-14-5423) dibenarkan untuk mencelah dalam prosiding di sini sebagai Responden; b) Wang pampasan berjumlah RM71,874.00 yang dideposkan ke dalam Mahkamah menurut Perintah bertarikh 25.2.1993 oleh Pemohon dilepaskan dan dibayar kepada Responden melalui akaun anak guam peguamcara Responden, Tetuan S. Mathews Associates. 3 c) Caj lewat bayaran pada kadar 8% setahun dari 21.8.1991 sehingga tarikh pembayaran pampasan tersebut pada 17.8.1993 selaras dengan Seksyen 32(1) dan 32(1c) Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dibayar kepada Responden oleh Pemohon; d) Tiada kos untuk permohohonan ini; dan e) Relif selanjutnya dianggap suaimanfaat oleh Mahkamah. [2] Muhammad Sham pada dasarnya telah cuba mendapatkan daripada Mahkamah ini supaya beliau dibenarkan untuk mencelah di dalam prosiding ini dan seterusnya mengeluarkan satu perintah untuk wang pampasan berjumlah RM71.874.00 yang telah didepositkan ke dalam Mahkamah pada 25.2.1993 dibayar atau dilepaskan kepada beliau. B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [3] Saman Pemula 21-283-1992 ini adalah berkaitan dengan pengambilan tanah oleh Kerajaan Negeri Selangor terhadap suatu hartanah yang terkandung di dalam Hakmilik G 7636, Lot 6, 4 Seksyen 1 Mukim Hulu Klang, Daerah Gombak (hartanah tersebut). [4] Apa yang yang tertera pada dokumen hakmilik hartanah tersebut adalah tuanpunya berdaftarnya bernama Md Nazar bin Kasah. Nama Md Nazar bin Kasah yang tertera adalah tanpa nombor kad pengenalan bagi pengenalan spesifik tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. [5] Menurut seksyen 8 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 (Akta), hartanah tersebut telah terlibat di dalam pengambilan tanah bagi tujuan membina dan menyiapkan Jalan Lingkaran Tengah oleh Jabatan Kerja Raya Malaysia (JKR). Pengambilan hartanah tersebut telah diwartakan melalui nombor Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor No. 1628 bertarikh 9.11.1989. [6] Pengambilan keseluruhan hartanah tersebut melibatkan keluasan 8.8 Rods (bersamaan 222.578 meter persegi). Minit siasatan bertarikh 6.12.1990 PHTG.8/84/84 Jld.2 SJ 2 bagi perbicaraan pengambilan hartanah tersebut menunjukkan bahawa siasatan yang dijalankan pada 6.12.1190 telah tidak dihadiri oleh tuanpunya berdaftar Md Nazar bin Kasah kerana beliau tidak dapat dikesan 5 dan perbicaraan telah dijalankan secara ex parte oleh Pentadbir Tanah Gombak, Bahari b. Mohamed Jabar (PTG). [7] Pada tarikh tersebut PTG telah mengawadkan pembayaran pampasan hartanah tersebut berjumlah RM71,874.00 dan membuat perintah supaya wang pampasan didepositkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi. Berdasarkan perintah PTG tersebut Borang G, seksyen 14 Akta dan Borang H, seksyen 16 Akta telah dikeluarkan. [8] Susulan daripada itu, Pentabir Tanah Daerah Gombak (PDTG) telah memfailkan Saman Pemula ini bagi mendapatkan perintah supaya wang pampasan berjumlah RM71,874.00 (wang pampasan tersebut) didepositkan di Mahkamah Tinggi. Kemudiannya 25.3.1993 Penolong Kanan Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam telah mengeluarkan perintah pendepositan wang pampasan tersebut ke dalam Mahkamah Tinggi. C. PERMOHONAN MUHAMMAD SHAM (BAKAL PENCELAH) [9] Di dalam menyokong permohonannya untuk mencelah dan mendapatkan perintah supaya wang pampasan tersebut dibayar kepadanya, di dalam afidavit sokongannya di Kandungan 11, 6 bakal pencelah telah bersandarkan kepada pengataan-pengataan berikut: 9.1 Beliau mempunyai kepentingan terhadap pendepositan wang pampasan ke dalam Mahkamah pada tahun 1993 kerana beliau adalah adalah pihak yang sah taraf dan berhak menerima wang pampasan tersebut kerana beliau adalah tuanpunya berdaftar terkini hartanah tersebut. 9.2 Beliau telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada tuanpunya asal hartanah tersebut bernama Mohd Nazar bin Kasah (No. kad pengenalan baru 520407-10-5523 / no. kad pengenalan lama 2280376) melalui satu perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 19.5.2010 (Eksibit “R-1”, Kandungan 11) pada harga belian RM 350,000.00. 9.3 Berikutan dengan perjanjian jual beli tersebut, beliau telah didaftarkan sebagai pemilik hartanah tersebut pada 31.3.2011 (Eksibit “R-2”, Kandungan 11) 9.4 Atas surat peguamcara (Tetuan S. Mathews & Associates) kepada Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak bertarikh 7 25.11.2015 kepada Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak yang telah dijawab oleh Encik Ibrahim bin Abdul Rashid (Pentadbir Tanah Gombak) pada tarikh yang sama (25.11.2015 - Eksibit “R-3”, Kandungan 11), Tetuan S. Mathews & Associates (Tetuan S. Mathews) telah dimaklumkan oleh Encik Ibrahim bahawa hartanah tersebut telah terlibat dalam satu pengambilan tanah sebelum ini dan wang pampasan telah didepositkan ke dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya Shah Alam. Encik Ibrahim juga mengelatkan bersekali Borang H, dan sesalinan perintah Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam bagi pendepositan wang pampasan. 9.5 Namun, sebelum surat 25.11.2015 tersebut, terdapat komunikasi di antara Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak (PDTG) dan Tetuan S. Mathews daripada tarikh 14.8.2015 di mana melalui surat PTDG bertarikh 1.9.2015 yang menjawab surat Tetuan S. Mathews bertarikh 14.8.2015 telah mengemukakan kepada Tetuan S. Mathews sesalinan Borang K bertarikh 23.11.1991 yang telah dibuat pindaan ke atas nama tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah di mana nama Md Nazar bin Kasah telah dipotong secara tangan “manual” kepada nama Muhammad Sham bin Abdullah (dengan 8 pengindorsan rubber stamp Pejabat Tanah dengan tandatangan). 9.6 Menurut bakal pencelah juga terdapat Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor No. 2981 bertarikh 30.7.2015 (Eksibit “R- 3”, Kandungan 11 di muka surat 32) yang membuat pindaan seperti berikut: Md Nazar bin Kasah kepada Mohd Nazar bin Kasah. Kemudian daripada Mohd Nazar bin Kasah kepada Muhammad Sham. 9.7 Memandangkan En Mohd Nazar bin Kasah tidak pernah memohon untuk mengambil wang pampasan tersebut, maka adalah menjadi dakwaan bakal pencelah bahawa perjanjian jual beli antara beliau dan Mohd Nazar bin Kasah telah disempurnakan dan beliau berhak untuk mendapatkan wang pampasan tersebut. [10] Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam bakal pencelah bahawa berdasarkan pengataan-pengataan di atas yang bersandarkan kepada dokumen-dokumen Eksibit “R-2”, Eksibit “R-3”dan Borang 9 K yang telah dipinda, bakal pencelah adalah orang yang berkepentingan (any person interested) di bawah seksyen 37(1) Akta di mana seksyen 2 Akta telah mendefinasikan orang yang berkepentingan (any person interested) sebagai: “includes every person claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act, but does not include a tenant at will.” D. BANTAHAN PTG [11] PTDG telah membantah sekeras-kerasnya akan permohonan bakal pencelah atas alasan bahawa bakal pencelah tidak mempunyai kepentingan langsung terhadap hartanah tersebut. Bagi membantah permohonan bakal pencelah, PTDG telah memfailkan dua afidavit iaitu Afidavit Jawapan yang dikrarkan oleh Ibrahim bin Abdul Rashid (Penolong Pegawai Tadbir di Bahagian Perlupusan Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (Kandungan 12) dan Afidavit Tambahan yang diikrarkan oleh Mohd Abdul Hakim bin Mohd Ali, pegawai undang-undang di Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Kandungan 13). 10 [12] Menurut PTDG pada masa pengambilan tanah dilaksanakaan hartanah tersebut (Hakmilik G 7636 Lot 6 Seksyen 1 Mukim Hulu Klang, Daerah Gombak) adalah hakmilik Pendaftar, Pejabat Pengarah Tanah dan Galian Selangor didaftarkan di atas nama Md Nazar bin Kasah yang tidak mempunyai nombor kad pengenalan. Begitu juga nama Md Nazar bin Kasah di dalam Warta No.1628 bertarikh 9.11.1989, Borang K, Borang G, Borang H dan minit siasatan tidak mempunyai nombor kad pengenalan. [13] Menurut, PTDG lagi, di dalam pengambilan hartanah tersebut Borang K (Pemberitahuan bahawa tanah telah diambil milik) di bawah seksyen 22 Akta telah dikeluarkan pada 23.11.1991, namun bagi maksud menyelaras dan pengemaskinian rekod dan endorsan Borang K ke dalam Sistem Pendaftaran Tanah Berkomputer (SPTB) telah pun dibuat melalui Pindaan Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor No. 2981 bertarikh 30.7.2015. [14] Adalah dihujahkan bagi pihak PTDG, walaupun terdapat Warta Pindaan Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor No. 2981 bertarikh 30.7.2015 yang telah menukarkan nama tuanpunya hartanah daripada Mohd Nazar bin Kasah kepada Muhammad Sham bin Abdullah, namun apabila Borang K telah dikeluarkan oleh PTDG 11 pada 23.11.1991 hartanah tersebut telah menjadi hakmilik kerajaan dan tidak sebarang urusniaga terhadap tanah tersebut boleh dilaksanakan oleh tuanpunya hartanah dengan mana-mana pihakpun. Adalah menjadi hujahan peguam PTDG juga bahawa sebarang urusniaga hartanah tersebut selepas hartanah diambil pemilikannya adalah tidak sah dan terbatal (void ab initio). [15] Di samping itu, semakan yang telah dibuat oleh PTDG terhadap Mohd Nazar bin Kasah yang kononnya telah melaksanakan perjuanjian jual beli dengan bakal pencelah dengan kad pengenalan 520407-10-5523, Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara Malaysia (JPN) telah mengesahkan bahawa nama Mohd Nazar bin Kasah dengan nombor kad pengenalan 520407-10-5523 tidak pernah dikeluarkan oleh JPN (Eksibit “IAR-1”, Kandungan 12). JPN juga mengesahkan bahawa nombor kad pengenalan lama iaitu Kad Pengenalan No. 2280376 Nama: Mohd Nazar Bin Kasah / Md Nazar Bin Kasah adalah TIDAK MERUJUK kepada sabjek tersebut. E. ANALISA MAHKAMAH 12 [16] Sebelum Mahkamah ini memberi pertimbangan terhadap perjanjian jual beli 2010 dan dokumen-dokumen yang telah dirujuk oleh bakal pencelah bagi menyokong permohonannya, Mahkamah ini akan menyentuh terlebih dahulu apakah kedudukan undang- undang apabila sesuatu pengambilan tanah telah berlaku dan disempurnakan di bawah Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960. [17] Seksyen 3 memperuntukkan kuasa kepada Pihak Berkuasa Negeri untuk membuat pengambilan tanah bagi tujuan-tujuan yang dinyatakan di bawah seksyen 3(1)(a), (b) atau (c). [18] Seksyen 8 memperuntukkan: Pengisytiharan bahawa tanah dikehendaki bagi maksud awam. (1) Apabila Pihak Berkuasa Negeri memutuskan bahawa mana-mana tanah yang disebut dalam seksyen 7 diperlukan bagi apa-apa maksud yang disebut dalam seksyen 3, maka pengisytiharan dalam Borang D hendaklah disiarkan dalam Warta. [19] Seksyen 9 pula memperuntukkan bahawa: Tanah hendaklah ditandakan dan notis dicatatkan dalam daftar, dsb. 13 (1) Apabila tersiarnya menurut seksyen 8 pengisytiharan dalam Borang D yang menyatakan bahawa mana-mana tanah diperlukan untuk maksud yang dinyatakan dalam Borang itu, maka - [20] Seksyen 10 memperuntukkan berkenaan dengan kuasa Pentadbir Tanah di dalam memulakan prosiding pengambilan tanah. 10. Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah memulakan prosiding. (1) Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah, setelah menyempurnakan tindakan yang dikehendaki oleh seksyen 9, memulakan prosiding untuk pengambilan tanah itu dengan memberi notis awam dalam Borang E mengikut cara yang ditetapkan oleh seksyen 53, dan dengan menetapkan tarikh siasatan bagi perbicaraan tuntutan pampasan untuk semua kepentingan yang ada pada tanah itu. (2) Pentadbir Tanah tidak boleh mengadakan siasatan itu lebih awal daripada dua puluh satu hari selepas tarikh tersiarnya notis yang disebut dalam subseksyen (1). (3) Suatu salinan jadual kepada pengisytiharan dalam Borang D yang diwartakan di bawah subseksyen 8(2) hendaklah dilampirkan pada tiap-tiap notis dalam Borang E. 14 [21] Seksyen 12 pula memperuntukkan siasatan yang perlu dijalankan oleh pentadbir tanah di dalam penilaian tanah dan pentaksiran jumlah award atau pampasan. 12. Siasatan oleh Pentadbir Tanah. (1) Pada tarikh yang ditetapkan di bawah subseksyen 10(1) Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah membuat siasatan penuh tentang nilai kesemua tanah dijadualkan dan hendaklah dengan secepat mungkin selepas itu mentaksir amaun pampasan yang pada pendapatnya adalah berpatutan bagi tiap-tiap kes, mengikut pertimbangan yang dinyatakan dalam Jadual Pertama: Dengan syarat bahawa Pentadbir Tanah boleh memperoleh suatu pendapat secara bertulis tentang nilai semua tanah dijadualkan daripada penilai sebelum membuat suatu award di bawah seksyen 14. [22] Setelah siasatan dibuat oleh Pentadbir Tanah, award bertulis hendaklah disediakan oleh Pentadbir Tanah. 14. Award Pentadbir Tanah. (1) Apabila selesainya siasatan di bawah seksyen 12 berhubungan dengan mana-mana tanah dijadualkan Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah menyediakan suatu award bertulis di bawah tandatangannya dalam Borang G, dalam mana dia hendaklah, berkenaan dengan tiap-tiap kawasan tanah dijadualkan yang berlainan, membuat award yang berasingan berkenaan 15 dengan tiap-tiap orang yang kepentingannya pada tanah itu telah dibuktikan dalam siasatan tersebut. [23] Penyampaian award diperuntukkan dibawah seksyen 16 Akta yang berbunyi berikut: 16. Penyampaian award. (1) Apabila membuat apa-apa award di bawah subseksyen 14(1) berkenaan dengan mana-mana tanah dijadualkan Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah menyediakan dan menyampaikan suatu notis dalam Borang H kepada setiap orang yang berkepentingan pada tanah itu. (2) Tiap-tiap notis dalam Borang H hendaklah disertai dengan suatu cabutan dari award bertulis yang dibuat oleh Pentadbir Tanah dalam Borang G, berhubungan dengan tanah yang mana orang yang kepadanya notis itu dialamatkan mempunyai kepentingan. [24] Setelah segala peruntukkan undang-undang di atas dilaksanakan, maka, seksyen 22 memperuntukkan berkenaan milikan terhadap tanah-tanah yang terlibat dengan pengambilan. 22. Milikan formal 16 (1) Pentadbir Tanah boleh mengambil mana-mana tanah dijadualkan dengan menyampaikan kepada penduduk tanah itu atau, sekiranya dia tidak dapat dijumpai, dengan mengeposkan kepadanya notis dalam Borang K. (2) Suatu salinan senarai tanah yang diwartakan di bawah subseksyen 8(1), atau mana-mana bahagiannya yang relevan, hendaklah disertakan sebagai jadual notis di dalam Borang K. (3) Apabila mengambil milik tanah di bawah subseksyen (1) Pentadbir Tanah hendaklah juga menyampaikan suatu salinan notis dalam Borang K kepada- (a) empunya berdaftar tanah itu, jika dia bukan penduduknya; dan (b) pihak berkuasa pendaftaran yang berkenaan, jika ada bukannya Pentadbir Tanah itu sendiri. [25] Seksyen 23 memperuntukkan tatacara yang harus dilaksanakan oleh Pentadbir Tanah apabila milikan formal telah diambil. 23. Catatan dalam daftar. Pihak berkuasa pendaftaran yang berkenaan, apabila menerima notis dalam Borang K, atau Pentadbir Tanah dengan kehendaknya sendiri telah menyempurnakan Borang K hendaklah, pada dokumen hakmilik daftar atau rekod lain yang sesuai dalam miliknya sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam 17 subseksyen 9(2) atau (3), membuat ingatan berkenaan dengan mana-mana tanah dijadualkan- (a) Bahawa keseluruhan tanah itu telah diambil dan telah diletakhak pada Pihak Berkuasa Negeri atau, dalam hal suatu bahagian sesebuah bangunan yang dipecah bahagi, pada orang atau perbadanan bagi pihaknya bahagian itu telah diambil; atau (b) Bahawa sekian banyak daripada tanah itu sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam ruang terakhir jadual kepada Borang itu telah diambil. [26] Di dalam hal ini, borang K telahpun dikeluarkan bagi memberitahu bahawa milikan formal hartanah tersebut telah diambil milik oleh kerajaan dan atas kedudukan ini, tiada apa-apa urusniaga boleh dilaksanakan oleh mana-mana pihak lagi terhadap hartanah tersebut yang kini adalah milikan kerajaan. [27] Bakal pencelah di dalam kes ini telah cuba untuk mencelah di dalam prosiding Saman Pemula ini dan seterusnya memohon supaya wang pampasan yang telah didepositkan ke dalam Mahkamah pada tahun 1993 dibayar kepadanya atas alasan bahawa beliau adalah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut yang telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada seorang yang bernama 18 Mohd Nazar bin Kasah Kad Pengenalan No: 520407-10-5523 melalui perjanjian jual beli yang tandatangani pada 19 Mei 2010 (perjanjian jual beli 2010). [28] Berbekalkan perjanjian jual beli 2010 ini, Muhammad Sham kemudiannya telah dikeluarkan dengan geran hakmilik Borang 5 BK, suatu geran baru dengan nombor hakmilik No.44422 yang menamakan beliau sebagai tuanpunya tanah di mana pendaftaran hak milik Nombor 100971GRN00044422 telah dilaksanakan pada 31.3.2011 atas versi 3. Di samping itu, di Borang B1 Jadual Keempat Belas KTN hakmilik C T 7636 yang dipinda daripada G 2136 dengan dipotong dengan garisan telah dikeluarkan dengan geran baru atas hak milik GRN No.44422. Borang BK ini bertarikh 9 Okt 2001. Malahan warta kerajaan negeri Selangor No.2981 bertarikh 30 Julai telah membuat pembetulan nama-nama tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut kepada bakal pencelah. Penelitian ke atas perjanjian jual beli 2010 [29] Di dalam perjanjian jual beli 2010 ini tuanpunya berdaftar telah dinyatakan sebagai Mohd Nazar bin Kasah dengan nombor kad pengenalan baru 520407-10-5523 / no. kad pengenalan lama 19 2280376 yang beralamat di No.162, Villa Laman Tasik 16 Jalan 7/106 Bandar Sri Permaisuri Kuala Lumpur. [30] Perjanjian jual beli 2010 ini telah cuba memberi gambaran bahawa penama Md Nazar bin Kasah di dalam geran hakmilik yang wujud sebagai Mohd Nazar bin Kasah ini wujud dan pada tahun 2010 beliau beralamat di No.162, Villa Laman Tasik 16 Jalan 7/106 Bandar Sri Permaisuri Kuala Lumpur dan kononnya Md Nazar atau Mohd Nazar ini telah menjual hartanah tersebut kepada bakal pencelah hartanah tersebut dengan harga RM350,000.00. Harga jualan RM350,000.00 penuh telah dibuat oleh bakal pencelah kepada Mohd Nazar/Md Nazar ini sehingga dokumen-dokumen seperti pembayaran duti stem dibayar oleh bakal pencelah dengan Notis Taksiran Pindah Milik Harta Tanah (Duti Ad Valorem dikeluarkan oleh Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN), Borang Pindah Mililk (Borang 14A), Borang K bertarikh 21.9.1991 dipinda kepada nama pencelah dan pindahmilik hartanah dibuat serta cukai-cukai tanah yang telah dibuat bayaran oleh bakal pencelah. [31] Namun demikian, adalah menjadi pandangan Mahkamah apabila satu pengesahan telah dibuat oleh Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara (JPN) yang telah mengesahkan bahawa penama yang bernama 20 Mohd Nazar dengan nombor pengenalan samada nombor baru ataupun lama adalah tidak wujud sama sekali. Malah Kad Pengenalan No. 2280376 Nama: Mohd Nazar Bin Kasah / Md Nazar Bin Kasah adalah TIDAK MERUJUK kepada Mohd Nazar Bin Kasah. Pengesahan berkenaan Mohd Nazar bin Kasah oleh JPN telah menimbulkan kesangsian dan keraguan yang tidak boleh Mahkamah ini memandang ringan. Identiti Mohd Nazar bin Kasah tidak langsung wujud dan yang paling nyata dan jelas adalah bahawa Mohd Nazar bin Kasah ini bukanlah Md Nazar bin Kasah yang namanya tertera sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. [32] Pengesahan JPN jelas menyatakan berikut: “2. Untuk makluman tuan, berdasarkan semakan rekod jabatan Nombor Kad Pengenalan 520407-10-5523 nama Mohd Nazar bin Kasah / Md Nazar bin Kasah TIDAK WUJUD dan tidak pernah dikeluarkan oleh Jabatan ini. Kad Pengenalan No. 2280376 Nama: Mohd Nazar Bin Kasah / Md Nazar Bin Kasah adalah TIDAK MERUJUK kepada sabjek tersebut. Sila pihak tuan kemukakan nombor Kad Pengenalan yang betul bagi memudahkan cabutan daftar kad pengenalan dibuat semula.” 21 [33] Di dalam kes ini Md Nazar bin Kasah yang tertera pada Warta (seksyen 8), Borang K bertarikh 2.1.1991 adalah Md Nazar yang tidak dinyatakan nombor pengenalannya. Maka, persoalannya perjanjian jual beli yang menjadi asas dokumen-dokumen yang ditransaksi /dilaksanakan adalah dengan orang yang sebenarnya tidak wujud langsung. Di dalam hal ini juga, dengan pengesahan JPN yang sebegini, jelas menunjukkan bahawa bahawa Mohd Nazar bin Kasah dengan Nombor Kad Pengenalan 520407-10- 5523 Nombor Kad Pengenalan 520407-10-5523 / 2280376 nama Mohd Nazar bin Kasah / Md Nazar bin Kasah TIDAK WUJUD. [34] Dengan orang yang bernama Mohd Nazar bin Kasah yang kononnya merupakan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut tidak wujud, maka, adalah satu kesimpulan yang tidak boleh dielakkan untuk dibuat oleh Mahkamah ini adalah Mohd Nazar bin Kasah yang menandatangani perjanjian jual beli 2010 dengan bakal pencelah adalah seorang yang palsu (fake). [35] Adalah menjadi pandangan Mahkamah ini juga di dalam keadaan yang sebegini, mana mungkin bakal pencelah boleh dikatakan sebagai orang mempunyai kepentingan di dalam prosiding ini dan mempunyai hak terhadap wang pampasan tersebut. 22 [36] Di dalam keadaan ini juga, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa samada bakal pencelah boleh berlindung dengan perlindungan yang diberikan oleh seksyen 340 KTN atas pemilikan tuanpunya berdaftar yang tidak disangkal hakmiliknya tidak boleh ditentukan di dalam kes ini kerana di dalam saman pemula ini di hadapan ini adalah satu proses undang-undang yang mana wang pampasan telah dimasukkan oleh PTDG kepada Mahkamah Tinggi atas alasan tuanpunya hartanah tidak dapat dikesan. [37] Wang pampasan hanya boleh dikeluarkan kepada pihak-pihak yang dapat membuktikan dengan sahihnya yang ia adalah berhak terhadap wang pampasan tersebut. Dalam perkara ini, Mahkamah ini berpandangan yang sama dengan PTDG bahawa bakal pencelah adalah diletakkan beban bukti yang kukuh bahawa urusniaga diantara Mohd Nazar bin Kasah dan Muhamad Sham bin Abdullah No. Kad pengenalan 781021-14-5423 adalah urusniaga yang sah disisi undang-undang dengan ketidakwujudan orang yang bernama dan bernombor kad pengenalan sebegitu. [38] Selain daripada keraguan berkenaan identiti Md Nazar bin Kasah ini, adalah menjadi tanggungjawab Mahkamah ini juga untuk 23 menyenaraikan beberapa kesangsian atau keraguan lain di dalam dokumen-dokumen yang telah dikemukakan dan dieksibitkan oleh PTDG sendiri yang telah mengeksibitkan dokumen-dokumen berikut kepada Mahkamah ini di dalam Kandungan 11 melalui afidavit Ibrahim bin Abdul Rashid. Kesangsian- kesangsian/keraguan ini perlu diambil perhatian oleh Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor supaya perkara ini boleh dijadikan asas kepada PTDG untuk membuat siasatannya terhadap kes ini yang melibatkan pentadbiran PTDG dan wujudnya pemalsuan identiti. [39] Kesangsian-kesangsian / keraguan yang Mahkamah nyatakan awal tadi adalah seperti berikut: 39.1 Borang K yang dieksibitkan di Eksibit “R-4”, Kandungan 11 muka surat 36. Kalau melihat kepada Borang K di atas nama Md Nazar bin Kasah telah dipotong dengan garisan sebegitu sahaja dan nama bakal pencelah telah ditulis dengan pen dengan pengindosan rubber stamp Pejabat Tanah Gombak yang 24 ada tandatangan di dalamnya tanpa diketahui siapakah penandatangan bagi Pejabat Tanah Gombak. Persoalannya: a) Bolehkah Borang K dipinda sebegini rupa dan kalaupun dibenarkan bolehkah pindaan Borang K ditarikhkan kebelakang (backdated) kepada 23.11.1991. b) Bolehkah Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak meminda Borang K tanpa dinyatakan tarikh ianya telah dipinda. 39.2 Bagaimana pula hartanah yang telah dibuat pengambilan tanahnya di mana Borang K telahpun dikeluarkan bagi maksud pemberitahuan hartanah telah diambil milik oleh Kerajaan telah dikeluarkan dengan geran-geran baharu dengan nombor hakmilik yang berbeza dan pendaftaran nama pemilik yang berbeza dan bukannya kepada penama asal yang telah diketahui tidak dapat dikesan iaitu Md Nazar bin Kasah. Adakah ini tidak menimbulkan pertanyaan di fikiran PTDG untuk membuat siasatan mengenainya? 25 39.3 Bagaimana pula boleh terjadi suatu transaksi jual beli di antara bakal pencelah dengan seorang yang bernama Mohd Nazar bin Kasah bernombor kad pengenalan baru 520407- 10-5523 / no. kad pengenalan lama 2280376 sedangkan PTDG sebagai pihak yang bertangggungjawab akan pentadbiran tanah di bawah jagaannya sepatutnya sedar bahawa hartanah tersebut telah terlibat dengan suatu pengambilan tanah oleh kerajaan dan wang pampasan telah dimasukkan ke Mahkamah Tinggi kerana tuanpunya berdaftar tidak dapat dikesan. PTDG sewajarnya melalui rekod-rekod yang ada pada mereka mengetahui berkenaan fakta-fakta pengambilan tanah, tuanpunya berdaftar bernama Md.Nazar bin Kasah dan bukannya Mohd Nazar bin Kasah dan pendepositan wang pampasan atas alasan tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tidak dapat dikesan. Namun, transaksi jual beli bakal pencelah dan Mohd Nazar bin Kasah telah dapat dilaksanakan melalui Borang 14A, KTN yang ditandatangani sendiri oleh bakal pencelah dan Mohd Nazar bin Kasah Kad pengenalan yang telah diterima oleh PTDG pada 30.3.2011. 26 39.4 Bagaimana pula hartanah yang telah diambil milik kerajaan boleh dikeluarkan pengurusan bayaran cukai tanah atas nama bakal pencelah atas nombor akaun pembayaran cukai tanah. 39.5 Adalah bertambah pelik apabila, bil-bil cukai tanah telah dikeluarkan dari tahun 2000 dengan tunggakan sehingga bil cukai tanah bertarikh 1.1.2010 dengan bil-bil tidak dibayar dan tertunggak sehingga tahun 2009 tetapi tiba-tiba terdapat pembayaran sebanyak RM23,570.20 dibuat pada 22.1.2010, walhal perjanjian jual beli hanya ditandatangani pada 19.5.2010 dan hartanah hanya telah dipindahmilik kepada bakal pencelah pada 31.3.2011. Siapa pula yang telah membuat bayaran cukai tanah pada 22.1.2010 sedangkan pada masa itu hartanah masih atas nama Md. Nazar bin Kasah yang tidak dapat dikesan. 39.6 Informasi hakmilik di dalam di dalam system eSPHT juga perlu dirujuk. Di dalam sistem jelas dinyatakan berikut: 27 PENGURUSAN AKAUN ... Kod Transaksi : 150 – HAKMILIK SAMBUNGAN Kod Batal : 202 – HAKMILIK DIBATALKAN KERANA PENGAMBILAN BALIK SEPENUHNYA ... ... ... Status : 12 - BATAL TETAPI penyata cukai bertarikh 23.12.2016 telah mempamerkan butir-butir pembayaran cukai dari 31.12.2000 sehingga 15.9.2015. 39.7 Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor No. 2981 yang meminda nama-nama tuanpunya berdaftar daripada Md Nazar bin Kasah kepada Mohd Nazar bin Kasah dan seterusnya kepada Muhammad Sham bin Abdullah telahpun digazetkan terlebih dahulu pada 30.7.2015 tetapi yang peliknya perserahan di Borang K yang telah dipinda secara tangan atau manual telah dibuat melalui nombor perserahan 3220/2015 pada 20.8.2015. 28 39.8 Terdapat dua perbezaan ketara dan nyata di dalam Borang K yang telah dipinda secara tangan atau manual yang dieksibitkan oleh bakal pencelah di Eksihibit “R-3” dengan yang dieksibitkan oleh Ibrahim bin Mohd Jabar iaitu: i. tandatangan PTDG pada “R-3” adalah di dalam lingkungan rubber stamp tetapi di dalam Borang K yang dieksibitkan oleh Ibrahim bin Mohd Jabar.tandatangan PTDG telah terkeluar sedikit dari lingkungan rubber stamp. ii. tandatangan PTDG pada “R-3” adalah berbeza daripada tandatangan di dalam Borang K yang dieksibitkan oleh Ibrahim bin Mohd Jabar. 39.9 Borang K yang telah dipinda secara tangan atau manual yang dieksibitkan oleh bakal pencelah di Eksihibit “R-3” telah dikemukakan oleh PTDG kepada Tetuan S, Mathews pada melalui surat PTDG bertarikh 1.9.2015 tidak mempunyai endosmen PTDG sepertimama yang terdapat di dalam Borang K yang dieksibitkan oleh Ibrahim bin Mohd 29 Jabar WALHAL endosmen tersebut telah dibuat pada 22.8.2015. [40] Pengambilan hartanah telah berlaku pada tahun 1991 dan perjanjian jual beli hanya telah dilaksanakan pada tahun 2010. Ini adalah tempoh masa selama 19 tahun. PTDG di dalam afidavitnya di perenggan 20 telah mendeposkan bahawa 2 penyewa iaitu Din bte Ahmad kad pengenalan 7689040 (pemilik gerai makanan) dan Liung Choy Ling kad pengenalan A 1261151 (pemilik gerai aksesori) yang menduduki tanah tersebut telah diperintahkan oleh pihak berkenaan untuk mengosongkan hartanah (kedua-dua penyewa telah hadir perbicaraan pada 16.1.1991) dan telah dibayar wang pampasan. Adalah satu perkara yang menimbulkan kesangsaian apabila setelah hartanah dikosongkan, pemilik hartanah (Md Nazar Bin Kasah) yang tidak lagi menerima sewaan selama 19 tahun telah hanya mendiamkan diri tanpa berbuat apa-apa terhadap penyewa- penyewa di atas tanah tersebut dan tiba-tiba melaksanakan satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut dengan bakal pencelah. 30 [41] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas dengan kesangsian- kesangsian/ keraguan-karaguan yang wujud di dalam kes ini, permohonan bakal pencelah di dalam Kandungan 10 hendaklah ditolak dengan kos sebanyak RM3000.00. t.t. .................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 20hb Januari 2017 Peguam Plaintif - Pejabat Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Tuan Mohd Abdul Hakim bin Mohd Ali Bakal Pencelah - Tetuan S.Mathews & Associates Dato’ Jason Chan Wa Chiang Encik Ashwin Kumar Encik Venka Arun

Tika 2.6.0

JA-24NCVC-465-07/2016

PLAINTIF Nodedua Sdn. Bhd. (No. Syarikat: 785777-A) DEFENDAN Rubayah binti Atan (No. K/P: 630420-71-5018) dan 34 Defendan-defendan lagi, DLL

13/01/2017

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

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Page 1 of 8 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM SAMAN PEMULA NO. JA-24-NCVC-465-07/2016 Dalam perkara Aturan 89 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Prosiding Terus untuk mendapatkan pemilik tanah Dan Dalam perkara ke atas Hartanah yang dipegang di bawah HS(D) 454097, PTD 72272, Mukim Pulai, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor Antara NODEDUA SDN BHD (NO. SYARIKAT: 785777-A) Plaintif Dan Rubayah Binti Atan (No. K/P: 630420-71-5018) Dan 34 Defendan-defendan lagi Dan Penghuni-penghuni/ Penduduk-Penduduk Yang Menduduki Hartanah Di atas HS(D) 454097, PTD 72272, Mukim Pulai, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor Defendan- Defendan JUDGMENT CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Date: 13.1.2017 Page 2 of 8 Introduction [1] This was an Originating Summons filed under Order 89 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 (RoC) by the plaintiff seeking summary possession of a piece of land known as HS(D) 454097, PTD 72272, Mukim Pulai, Daerah Johor Bahru, Negeri Johor (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Land’) against the defendants. [2] On 21.12.2016, this Court allowed the application. The defendants were not satisfied with the decision and have filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. This judgment serves as the reasons for the decision of this Court. Background Facts [3] In 2009, the plaintiff acquired the said Land from Iskandar Waterfront Development Sdn Bhd. Prior to that, the said Land was a State Land. It was first alienated to one company by the name of Kumpulan Prasaraya Rakyat Johor Sdn Bhd on 5.10.2000. A year later, the said Land was transferred to Danga Bay Sdn Bhd. Subsequently, Danga Bay Sdn Bhd transferred the said Land to Iskandar Waterfront Development Sdn Bhd on 11.2.2008. More than a year later, the said Land was transferred to the plaintiff. [4] On 15.9.2014, the plaintiff through their solicitors served the occupiers a Notice to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the said Land. The occupiers did not comply with the Notice. On 26.1.2016, the plaintiff through their solicitors served a second Notice to vacate and Page 3 of 8 deliver vacant possession to the occupiers. Since then, some of the occupiers had vacated and left the said Land. [5] At present, the defendants are the only occupiers who did not vacate and leave the said Land. The defendants wanted the plaintiff to pay compensation to them so that they can relocate to other places. The defendants through their solicitors have vigorously opposed the plaintiff’s application, in particularly the mode adopted by the plaintiff to seek vacant possession of the said Land. The Finding of this Court [6] The defendants contended that before the said Land was alienated to Kumpulan Prasaraya Rakyat Johor Sdn Bhd on 5.10.2000, the defendants had entered and occupied the said Land. The defendants averred that the State government and Kumpulan Prasaraya Rakyat Johor Sdn Bhd, which is a state-owned company, had given an implied consent to the defendants to enter and remain on the said Land. The State government and state-owned company did not evict them from the Land at the material time when the State government and state-owned company were the owners. The defendants argued that since that time an implied consent was given to them, therefore, the defendants have entered and remained on the said Land with the consent by the predecessors in title until the present time. On this footing, it was argued that the mode adopted by the plaintiff via Order 89 RoC was inappropriate. Page 4 of 8 [7] Order 89 Rule 1 of the RoC states as follows: 1. Proceedings to be brought by originating summons (O. 89 r. 1) Where a person claims possession of land which he alleges is occupied solely by a person or persons (not being a tenant or tenants holding over after the termination of the tenancy) who entered into or remained in occupation without his licence or consent or that of any predecessor in title of his, the proceedings may be brought by originating summons in accordance with the provisions of this Order. [8] The courts have decided in previous cases that the burden is on the defendants to adduce evidence, not make mere allegation, that any of the predecessors in title had given consent, permission or agreement to the defendants to enter and continue occupation of the land concerned (see Court of Appeal decision Lee Beng Lai Ords v Tetuan Tokoyaki Property Sdn Bhd [2002] 3 MLJ 287). [9] In the present case, the defendants could not adduce any proof that there was consent, permission or agreement granted by the predecessors in title to them to enter and remain on the said Land. The defendants averred that only an implied consent, not explicit consent, was granted to them by the predecessors in title. Page 5 of 8 [10] The defendants averred that one of the defendant’s relative (deceased) had applied to the State government for a temporary occupied licence (TOL). However, there was no documentary evidence that could support an approval was granted by the State government which could prove a TOL in relation to the said Land was once granted. [11] The defendants contended they had proof that implied consent was obtained. They relied on the fact that the sign for the settlement was put up - ‘Kampung Bakar Batu’, a TNB sub-station was erected for the supply of electricity and connection of water supply from Syarikat Air Johor was available. [12] The supply of electricity, water and even telephone-poles and phone-lines do not indicate the defendants have right to remain and occupy on the said Land. This has been decided by the Court of Appeal in Chong Wooi Leong & Ors v Lebbey Sdn Bhd [1998] 1 MLRA 423 (see also Tetuan Tokoyaki Property Sdn Bhd v Sam Kok Sang & Tham Sow Seng & Ors [2001] 1 MLJ 585; Shak Keaw v NCC Development & Credit Sdn Bhd [2012] MLJU 406). [13] The law requires the defendants to show more than the supply of public amenities to the said Land. The Federal Court in Shaheen bte Abu Bakar v Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor [1999] 1 CLJ 74 held that there must be evidence to show that local authorities had encouraged settlers to develop the land, such as to open up the land and improve the land for their livelihood. In such circumstances, it could argue that there was an implicit consent granted by the State authority. Page 6 of 8 [14] The defendants averred that some defendants were granted fishing vessel licences from the Johor Fisheries Department to support their livelihood and to encourage them to settle at the said Land. This Court could not accept the argument because the fishing vessel licences obtained by the defendants were in relation to their livelihood at sea. The licence had nothing to do with opening and improving the said Land. [15] The averment that that the defendants were once granted implied consent from the predecessor in title, Kumpulan Prasarana Rakyat Johor Sdn Bhd, the State-owned company, was not correct. The State- owned company has refuted the defendants’ claim in writing. The plaintiff adduced a letter from the State-owned company stating the same (see exhibit TTK-13, Affidavit Tan Teow Keat affirmed on 28.11.2016 – encl. 19). [16] The defendants also averred that the State government was fully aware of their existence on the said Land, and that the Private Secretary to the DYMM Sultan of Johor had written to the State government to look into their plea for time to vacate the said Land (see exhibit ABA-3, Defendants’ Affidavit-in-Reply affirmed on 12.10.2016 – encl. 13). These letters do not give rise to any proof of acquiescence or consent of the State government that the defendants were allowed to remain on and occupy the said Land. On the contrary, these letters supported the fact that the defendants were supposed to vacate the said Land, but they needed more time to do so. [17] The knowledge of the State authority of the presence of the defendants on the said Land could not be equated to implicit consent by Page 7 of 8 the State authority for the defendants to enter and remain on the said Land. Likewise, the knowledge of the predecessors in title of the presence of the defendants on the said Land also could not be equated to implicit consent by the predecessor in title for the defendants to enter and remain on the said Land. [18] With regard to the other predecessors in title, Danga Bay Sdn Bhd and Iskandar Waterfront Developmenty Sdn Bhd, they had not granted their consents for the defendants to occupy the said Land. Although they did not take actions to evict the defendants; their inaction does not mean implicit consent has been granted to the defendants to occupy the said Land. The defendants could not prove any of the predecessors in title had given their consent for the defendants to remain and occupy the said Land. [19] Lastly, the defendants had also averred that they were recognised as settlers on the said Land because their Identity Cards issued by the relevant authorities stated their residential addresses as located on the said Land. This Court does not accept this as proof of rights to occupy the said Land. Long standing occupation is not sufficient for the defendants to refute the plaintiffs’ claim for summary vacant possession. Conclusion [20] Based on the above reasoning, this Court had rejected all of the defendants’ arguments opposing the plaintiff’s originating summons filed under Order 89 Rule 1 of RoC. This Court was satisfied that the plaintiff’s application ought to be allowed. Hence, this Court allowed the Page 8 of 8 plaintiff’s application and ordered costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid to the plaintiff by the defendants jointly. -Signed- ……………………………………………. (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johor Bahru Plaintiff’s Counsel : Rachel Chacko Tetuan Tea, Kelvin Kang & Co. Defendants’ Counsel : Hassan Karim Tetuan Hassan Karim & Co.

Tika 2.6.0

24-65-01/2013

PLAINTIF 1. TWT HARDWARE SDN BHD 2. ELITPROP SDN BHD DEFENDAN RHB BANK

09/01/2017

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: 24-65-01/2013 In the matter of all that piece of land known as HSD 222965, Lot PT 8659 held under the Township of Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, the District of Petaling, the State of Selangor; And In the matter of Private Caveat registered vide Presentation No.: 44795/2011 dated 25th August 2011; And In the matter of Section 323, 327 and 329 of the National Land Code, 1965; And In the matter of Order 7 rule 2 and Order 92 Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN 1. TWT HARDWARE SDN BHD 2. ELITPROP SDN BHD …PLAINTIFFS 2 AND RHB BANK …DEFENDANT GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosures 20 & 23) A. INTRODUCTION [1] Enclosures 20 and 23 are appeals to the Judge in Chambers against the decisions made by the learned Deputy Registrar (DR) on 23.12.2015. [2] Both appeals had arose from two separate Originating Summons namely; Originating Summons No. 24-62-01/2013 and Originating Summons No. 24-65-01/2013. The two originating summons filed by all the Plaintiffs concern a private caveat lodged on a piece of land held under HS(D) 222965, PT No. 8659 Pekan Baru Sungai Buloh, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor together with a two and a half storey bungalow erected thereon (“the said caveat”) by RHB Bank, the Defendant in both cases. 3 [3] The parties in Originating Summons No. 24-62-01/2013 are namely; the 1st Plaintiff (Ng Tim Foo), the 2nd Plaintiff (Tan Hoi Wah) and the 3rd Plaintiff (Elitprop Sdn Bhd). This action was initiated against RHB Bank (the Defendant). [4] While in Originating Summons No. 24-65-01/2013, the Plaintiffs are TWT Hardware Sdn Bhd (1st Plaintiff) and Elitprop Sdn Bhd (2nd Plaintiff). RHB Bank was also the Defendant in this action. [5] In both originating summonses, the Plaintiffs sought for the removal of the said caveat. [6] The DR had earlier allowed Elitprop Sdn Bhd (the 3rd Plaintif in OS 62 & also the 2nd Plaintiff in OS 65)’s applications in Enclosure 13 and Enclosure 14 respectively for an extension of time to file its notice for directions pursuant to Order 37 r 1 of the Rules of Court 2012 pursuant to the assessment of damages as ordered by the Court of Appeal on 21.5.2014. 4 [7] At the outset, parties had agreed that this Court’s decision in Enclosure 20 (OS 65) would bind Enclosure 23 in OS 62. B. BACKGROUND FACTS [8] The background facts which gave rise to both of the appeals are as follows: 8.1 On 5.9.2009 Elitprop Sdn Bhd (Elitprop) had purchased the said property from a company known as Janavista Sdn Bhd at a purchase price of RM 300,313.30. Thereafter Elitprop was then registered as the registered owner of the property. The said property was part of the 6 abandoned bungalow units that Elitprop had purchased with the view to undertake the construction, completion and sale of the six (6) units. 8.2 Elitprop successfully completed the construction of the six (6) units and thereafter on 26.07.2012, the relevant 5 authorities had issued Certificate of Fitness to each of the six bungalow units. 8.3 On 28.6.2010, Elitprop had entered into a Sale & Purchase Agreement (“the 1st SPA) with Tan Hoi Wah (Tan) and Ng Tim Foo (Ng). By this 1st SPA, Tan and Ng agreed to purchase the said property at a purchase price of RM2,205,200.00. 8.4 To partially finance the purchase of the said Property, Tan and Ng had obtained a loan from Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia (“the Bank”). 8.5 Tan and Ng were then registered as the proprietor of the Property on 29.7.2011 and a charge was duly registered in favour of the Bank’s over the said Property on the same date. 8.6 The Bank had however failed / refused to disburse the loan sum of RM1,523,659.20 (being the balance purchase 6 price) to the Tan and Ng due the said caveat lodged by the Defendant on 25.8.2011. 8.7 The Defendant’s refusal to remove its caveat on the said property has led the Plaintiffs to commence an action against the Defendant vide OS 62 and OS 65 for removal of the said caveat. 8.8 The Plaintiffs’ Originating Summons was dismissed on 27.6.2013 by the High Court. The Plaintiffs had then appealed against the said decision to the Court of Appeal. On 21.5.2014, the Court of Appeal allowed the Plaintiffs’ appeal and ordered, inter alia, that the said caveat be removed and RHB Bank is to pay damages to the Plaintiffs for all loss and damage suffered by the Plaintiffs caused by the wrongful entry of the said caveat upon assessment. 8.9 Pursuant to the Court of Appeal’s order, the caveat was removed sometime on 25.9.2014 (four months after the Court of Appeal’s order. 7 8.10 The Plaintiffs claimed that although the said caveat had been removed, the bank loan could not be disbursed as the availability of the facility had lapsed (after 3 months). This left the SPA in a limbo. 8.11 The 1st Plaintiff and the 2nd Plaintiff agreed to terminate the 1st SPA and proceeded to enter into the Deed of Mutual Termination dated 11.3.2015 agreeing to transfer the Property to a new purchaser nominated by the 2nd Plaintiff and part purchase price previously paid by the 1st Plaintiff to be refunded. 8.12 The 2nd Plaintiff (Elitprop) claimed that it had to spend a sum of RM280,000.00 to restore the said property as it had dilapidated. After the restoration works completed, a new purchaser was found and thereafter a sale and purchase agreement was entered on 4.9.2015 (“the 2nd SPA”) with the new purchaser. 8 8.13 The 2nd Plaintiff also claimed that due to the economic downturn it was forced to sell the said property at a lower price i.e at RM2,100,000.00. The new purchaser was registered as the proprietor of the said property on 27.11.2015. 8.14 After more than one and the half year (19 months) from the date of the decision of the Court of Appeal, on 23.12.2015 pursuant to Order 3 rule 5 and Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2013 (ROC 2012), the 2nd Plaintiff (Elitprop) and the 3rd Plaintiff (Elitprop) filed Enclosure 13 (OS 65) and Enclosure 14 (OS 62) respectively applied for an extension of time to file a notice for directions for assessment of damages under Order 37 rule 1 of the ROC 2012. 8.15The learned DR had allowed the Plaintiff’s applications, hence these appeals were filed by RHB Bank. [9] Order 37 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 reads: 9 “(1) Where judgement is given for damages to be assessed and no provision is made by the judgment as to how they are to be assessed, the damages shall, subject to the provisions of this Order, be assessed by the Registrar, and the party entitled to the benefit of the judgment shall, within one month from the date of the judgment, apply to the Registrar for directions and the provisions of Order 34 shall, with the necessary modifications, apply.” [10] Order 37 rule 1 of the ROC 2012 clearly stipulates that a party entitled for damages to be assessed by the Registrar is required to file their notice for directions within 1 month from the date of the judgment. [11] In the present case, the Plaintiff had obtained the judgment for damages to be assessed from the Court of Appeal on 21.5.2014. However, they had only filed its applications for extension of time to file the necessary Notice of Directions nineteen (19) months after the Court of Appeal’s order. [12] On the delay of 19 months in filing the application for extension of time, the RHB Bank took a strong objection and raised a prelimary objection that the Plaintiff’s application was clearly 10 filed outside the one month’s period stipulated under Order 37 rule 1. It was also contended on behalf of the RHB Bank that the word “shall” used in Order 37 rule 1 ROC prescribed mandatoriness and must strictly be complied with. The second preliminary objection raised by RHB Bank is that this application should be filed in the Court of Appeal and not in High Court Shah Alam. [13] To support the contention on the Plaintiff’s delay, the counsel for the Defendant drew this Court’s attention to the following cases: i. Koay Hean Khoon v. Abdul Jamil Abdul Mutalib & Anor [2015] 8 CLJ 410 it was held inter alia that:- “(4) There had been an inordinate delay on the part of the Plaintiff and it would be unjust and oppressive to extend time to enable the Plaintiff to assess damages after a lapse of 18 months and 18 days since the ROC came into force and 26 months since the date of the HC Order was made. Regardless of how blatant or contumelious or reprehensible the conduct of the Defendants was, there was no valid grounds for exercising the discretion to extend time in favour of the Plaintiff.” 11 ii. Perbadanan Nasional Insurans Sdn Bhd v. Pua Lai Ong [1996] 3 CLJ 321, the Court of Appeal has held the word “shall” connotes mandatoriness. “The word ‘must’ is equated in meaning to the word ‘shall’ and implies a peremptory mandate as opposed to a mere direction or discretion as the word ‘may’ implies.” iii. Khor Cheng Wah v. Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396, the Court of Appeal had emphasised the need of to act timeously in seeking judicial intervention. “It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the Court in a matter that affects his rights he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a Court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant.” iv. Tetuan Sri Ling & Associates v. Lian Meng Wah [2015] 3 CLJ 63, the Court of Appeal held inter alia: “In the case of Duli Yang Amat Mulia Tunku Ibrahim Ismail Ibni Sultan Iskandar Al-Haj v Datuk Captain Hamzah Mohd Noor & Anor appeal [2009] 4 CLJ 329; [2009] 4 MLJ 149 the Federal Court held that there is a mandatory prerequisite, that should be complied with and non-compliance rendered the service defective. The Court in Aminah Abas v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Kuantan [2004] 5 CLJ 1; [2003] 4 MLJ 669 and Low Cheng Soon v TA Securities Sdn Bhd 12 [2003] 1 CLJ 309; [2003] 1 MLJ 389 also gave similar interpretation to the word “shall” which means mandatory and not directory and that the word reflects a measure of mandatoriness in it.” [14] Although this Court is mindful that Order 37 rule 1 does prescribe that an application for notice of directions must be filed within one month from the date of the judgment and in prescribing time the word used is “shall” which connotes mandatoriness and the compliance with time frame is significantly important as emphasized by some of the authorities, however at the same time, this Court must also be minded that in our own ROC 2012, namely Order 3 rule 5 has vested upon all Courts a wide discretionary power with regard to extension or abridgement of time. [15] Order 3 rule 5 clearly provides: Extension of time (O.3, r. 5) 5. (1) The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is required or authorized by these Rules or by any judgment, order or direction, to 13 The law relating to an application for an extension of time [16] It is trite law that the granting of extension of time is always within the discretionary power of court. It is also trite law even though the Court's discretionary power to extend and/or abridge time is very wide but nevertherless it must be exercised judiciously based on established principles. (See i. Ratnam v. Cumarasamy & Anor [1964] 3 All ER 933. ii. Ong Guan Teck & Ors v. Hijjas [1982] 1 MLJ 105. iii. Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd v. Seok Kim Leow [1996] 5 MLJ 241. iv. Gan Hay Chong v Siow Kian Yuh & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 41. v. Cheah Teong Tat v Ho Gee Seng & Ors [1974] 1 MLJ 31.) [17] Alauddin J (as his Lordship then was) in the case of Abdul Rahim Ponniah bin Abdullah v. Kulim Intensive Driving Centre Sdn. Bhd. [2000] 6 MLJ 584, held inter alia that : “…In exercising the discretion, the following factors will be considered (1) whether the delay caused by the defendant company unjustified or unreasonable (2) what are the reasons for the delay (3) whether the defence raised by the defendant company had any 14 merits; and (4) will the plaintiff prejudiced in any way should the application be granted.” [18] In the case of Abdul Hamid Mohd Amin v. Ramacon Corporation Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 CLJ 111, it was held inter alia: “An application for extension of time may be made even after the expiration of the relevant period stated in the Rules. In Thiruchelvasegaram Manickavasegar v. Mahadevi Nadchatiram [1998] 4 MLJ 297 the Court of Appeal held: Under O.3 r 5(1) and (2) of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (‘the RHC’), the court has jurisdiction to extend time even if the application is made after expiry of the period. The primary consideration in exercising discretion to extend time is whether the party can clearly demonstrate that there was no intention to ignore or flout the order and that the failure to obey was due to extraneous circumstances.” [19] Mah Siew Seng & Anor v. Seema Development Sdn Bhd & Another case [2013] 8 CLJ 1058:- 15 “The Defendant was way past the deadline. There was no doubt that the court would have discretion to extend the time for such an application but cogent reasons must be given. The Defendant’s late application smacks of a lack of bona fide and an afterthought and was stained with scarlet from sitting and sleeping on its right. Such a long delay was deleterious and damaging to the Defendant. Clearly, if the Defendant itself had bothered to hound its solicitors on the progress of the case, it would not be haunted now by the lamentable lapses on the part of its solicitors. [20] Koay Hean Khoon v. Abdul Jamil Abdul Mutalib & Anor [2015] 8 CLJ 410 - “The plaintiff was only entitled to damages suffered or incurred up to the date of the HC order. The events complained by the plaintiff, which occurred after the date of the HC Order, gave rise to separate causes of action and for which the plaintiff was entitled to pursue separate legal action.” “There had been an inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff and it would be unjust and oppressive to extend time to enable the plaintif to assess damages after a lapse of 18 months and 18 days since the ROC came into force and 26 months since the date of the HC Order was made. Regardless of how blatant or contumelious or reprehensible the conduct of the defendant was, there were no valid grounds for exercising the discretion to extend time in favour of the Plaintiff.” 16 [21] In Saeed U Khan v Lee Kok Hooi [2001] 5 MLJ 416, it was held that, the court should consider certain factors, when exercising its discretion to extend time, namely: (1) the delay in making an application; (2) whether or not there are cogent reasons for the litigant not to have made the application within the prescribed time; and, (3) the likelihood and degree of prejudice, as well as injustice to the opposite party should the court exercise its discretion. [22] In the present case, it was not disputed that the Plaintiff was clearly out of time. The Plaintiff sought from this Court an order for extension of time to file their notice of directions to seek the Registrar’s direction for the assessment of damages be carried out. [23] Guided by the well-settled and established principles, this Court shall now proceed to consider whether the Plaintiff’s application here warranted the exercise of discretionary power by this Court and whether the Plaintiff has successfuly afforded their reasons for delay to this Court’s satisfaction. 17 REASONS FOR DELAY [24] The 2nd Plaintiff (Elitprop)’s application for extension of time is supported by an affidavit in support affirmed by Woon Jing Yu, the Elitprop’s director (“Woon’s affidavit”) on 23 .12.2015. [25] At paragraph 19 of Woon’s affidavit, the reasons for the delay were set out as follows: 19. In the premises, the Plaintiffs wish to humbly seek for an extension of time for the purpose of filing the summons for directions on the following reasons:- 19.1 Had the Plaintiffs proceeded with assessment proceedings within a month from the Appeal Order, the Plaintiffs would not be able to confirm or show any loss or damage resulting from the caveat, which was at the most speculative at that point in time. 19.2 Had the 1st SPA been completed, there would not have been any loss due to the lower price obtained by the 2nd Plaintiff from the 2nd SPA. Alternatively, had the 2nd Plaintiff been able to dispose the Property at a higher price compared to the 1st SPA, there would also be no 18 loss and in fact, a profit to the Plaintiffs. As such, there was simply no way the Plaintiffs could predict the extent of the actual loss and damage caused by the Defendant’s wrongful entry of caveat at the point in time. 19.3 It is only with the confirmed sale and disposal of the Property to the new buyer that the actual loss suffered by the 2nd Plaintiff has crystallized. Once crystallized, the Plaintiffs are seeking for the assessment promptly in less than 1 month. 19.4 The Plaintiffs had no intention to flout or disobey any Order or Rules. However, they could not bring an application to the court at that point in time due to the extraneous reasons as stated above. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs had acted reasonably in attempting to mitigate the loss and damage suffered in the best possible way before seeking to commence the assessment proceeding and should not be penalized for it. [26] It was submitted for the Elitprop (Plaintiff) that the reason for filing of the application for extension of time 19 months from the 19 order of the Court of Appeal was because if Elitprop were to file the notice for directions under Order 37 rule 1 within the one month period from the order of the Court of Appeal, at that point in time the full extent of the loss and damage caused by the wrongful caveat had not been crystallized and any claim that they would put forward would have been speculative. And had the assessment of damages be carried out then, the Defendant would have argued that there were no losses suffered by the Plaintiff as the same cannot be proven by the Plaintiff. [27] It was also contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that had the 1st SPA been completed after the wrongful caveat was removed, there would not have been any loss due to the lower price obtained by the Plaintiff from the 2nd SPA, and the Plaintiff need not have to even proceeded to seek any damages from the Defendant. Alternatively, had the Plaintiff been able to dispose the Property at a higher price compared to the 1st SPA, there would also be no loss and in fact, garners profit to the Plaintiff. As such, there was simply no way the Plaintiff could predict the 20 extent of the actual loss and damage caused by the Defendant’s wrongful entry of caveat at the point in time. [28] The counsel for the Plaintiff also submitted that when the 2nd SPA was entered with the new purchaser on 4.9.2015 and the property was finally registered under the name of the new purchaser on 27.11.2015, the Plaintiff had filed this application on 23.12.2015 which was less than 1 month from the date of the conclusion of the 2nd SPA. The Plaintiff claimed that the Plaintiffs had therefore acted with reasonable promptitude. It was also further contended by the Plaintiff that they had to hold off their assessment of damages proceeding until the said property was sold off as to mitigate their losses. According to the Plaintiff, far from being prejudiced, the Defendant has in fact benefited from the Plaintiff’s act of mitigation. [29] To succeed in their application the Plaintiff must provide this Court with cogent reasons and satisfactory explanation on the reason their applications were not filed within the prescribed 21 time and why was there a delay of 19 months after the Court of Appeal’s order. [30] The procedural requirement of filing a notice of directions under Order 37 rule 1 is basically in place so that the conduct or the manner on how the assessment of damages should be carried out is clear to the parties and the manner of producing evidence whether by way of affidavit evidence or oral evidence is determined. It must be noted that hearing of an assessment of damages / assessment of damages procceedings may resemble that of a trial and thus the conduct or manner on which the proceedings to be carried out must first be determined to ensure the proceedings is conducted systematically within the confines of the directions given by the Registrar. This will also ensure that the parties will not be caught by surprise and the rules of natural justice are adhered to in the assessment of damages proceedings. [31] In the present case the Plaintiff did not comply with the requirement under Order 37 rule1 but instead 19 months later 22 filed the application and stated that they cannot file the Notice of Direction as required by the Order 37 on the grounds that if they were to file their notice within the one month, they would not be able to prove their losses yet as their losses had not yet crystallised. According to the Plaintiff, their losses were only cystallised when the property being the subject matter in the case on which the private caveat had been lodged by the RHB Bank was sold off and all the losses suffered or incurred by the Plaintiff can be accounted for. The Plaintifff claimed that due to the lodging of the caveat (even though the caveat had been removed four (4) months after the Court of Appeal’s order) the losses that they had suffered are amongst others; expenses on restoring the said property to its former condition as it had dilapidated, the caveat lodged had resulted in the 1st SPA could not be completed and thereafter mutually terminated as the financier had withdrawn the facility, the selling the said property with the new purchase (2nd SPA) was at a very much lower price because of the economic downturn the prices of properties had depreciated. 23 [32] As such the question this Court must now determine is whether the reasons afforded by the Plaintiff are cogent reasons and are satisfactory explanation of their delay. [33] With utmost respect to the counsel for the Plaintiff, the reasons given by the Plaintiff are simply unacceptable. This Court finds so because, if all parties are allowed to have their assessment of damages be carried out only upon the crystallization of their losses or upon the maximum losses being calculated this would give rise to absurdity and obvious contradiction against the trite principles of damages. [34] The principle underlying awarding of damages is well settled. (See: i. Halbutt’s Plasticine Ltd v Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd. [1970] 1 All E.R. 225, Wildgerry LJ held as follows: “Each and every case depends on its own facts. It being remembered, first that the purpose of the award of damages is to restore the plaintiff to his position before the loss occurred or damage caused and secondly, that the plaintiff must act reasonably to mitigate the loss. If the article damaged is a motor car of popular make, the plaintiff cannot charge the defendant with the cost of repair when it is cheaper to buy a similar car in the market. On 24 the other hand, if no substitute for the damaged articles is available and no reasonable alternative can be provided, the plaintiff should be entitled to the cost of repair in the eye of law.”, ii. Lord Blackburn in Livingstone v Raywards Coal Co [1880] 5 App. Cas. 25 as per the following text: “I do not think there is any difference of opinion as to its being a general rule that, where any injury is to be compensated by damages, in settling the sum of money to be given for reparation of damages you should as nearly as possible get at that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured, or who suffered, in the same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his compensation or reparation. See also: Datuk Mohd Ali bin Hj Abdul Majid & Anor (both practicing as Messrs Mohd Ali & Co) v Public Bank Bhd [2014] 4 MLJ 465,Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777.) [35] This Court is of the view that when the ROC 2012 came into force on 1 August 2012, Order 37 rule 1 was amended and prescribed that the party entitled to the benefit of an order for damages to be assessed must apply to the Registrar within one month of the grant of the order for damages for directions for an 25 assessment of damages to be carried out. It was therefore the intention of the law namely; the Rules (ROC 2012) that in instances of infringement of rights against any parties, and that the innocent party suffers injuries, the damages suffered must be assessed as soon as possible. Thus, Order 37 rule 1 requires that the party entitled to benefit of the judgment (entitled to their damages being assessed) must file their notice of directions within one month from the judgment so that the assessment proceeding could be carried out immediately. This Court opines that the one month period stipulated by the ROC must be read to mean that the assessment of damages must be carried out expeditiously and without unnecessary delay. The time limitation was set to one month so that the damages suffered by the parties can be minimized and any other extenuating factors/circumtances which can aggravate the amount of losses suffered which would then be prejudicial to the Defendant can be avoided. [36] It has never been the law’s intent to punish the Defendant or coerce the Defendant to pay a compensation which was 26 maximized as much as possible for the Defendant’s infringement of rights or wrongdoings. [37] This Court also opines that the delay in having the assessment of damages proceeding being carried out earlier is highly prejudicial to the Defendant. [38] This Court simply cannot allow such contention by the Plaintiff to become a precedent. There are great and imminent reasons behind the necessity of an expedient assessment of damages. [39] This Court is not going to sit idly by while the Plaintiff go about their way to crystallize whatever damages which were dependent on external factors or occurrence of events years after the Court of Appeal’s order. The economic downturn was not at all at the fault of the Defendant and the Defendant cannot simply be made responsible for the Plaintiff’s inability to sell the properties at a higher price during a worldwide spiraling down of the economy. 27 [40] The consequence if this Court were to allow the Plaintiff’s contention is absurd and unconscionable. Such precedent would leave immeasurable room for abuse and manipulation. Any litigant then, would pursue a paper judgment for breach of contract, and then wait for months until they can simply sell the property at any low price. Subsequently, the litigant then would use the same contention to claim whatever ‘loss’ from the lower price against the Defendant who had for months had been prejudiced and had been put in a constant state of agitation of the litigation. [41] This Court shall not be any conduit to allow the Plaintiff to unduly profit from the litigation by having a shortcut to sell the property at a low price. If that shall be the case, then the Plaintiff are unduly allowed to not endeavor to diligently sell the properties at a high price at the expense of the Defendant who would be prejudiced by the Plaintiff’s ‘shortcut’. [42] Furthermore, even assuming that the assessment of damages was made in compliance with the rules, this Court does not 28 agree with the Plaintiffs that the Plaintiff would be left with no avenues at all to prove their losses. If indeed there is any economic downturn, and the Plaintiff stood to have their properties depreciated, having the 2nd Agreement is not the only gauge to measure such depreciation. The Plaintiff could have simply have the properties evaluated and ascertain the depreciation (if any). [43] There is no necessity at all for the Plaintiff to have this Court wait for 19 months for the Plaintiff to find a buyer to sell the properties at a lower price. Furthermore, the damages from the recovery of the properties from dilapidation could have been ascertained earlier. Any delays would only aggravate the dilapidation and depreciation of the Property. If indeed the Plaintiffs were sincere in their efforts of mitigation, the Plaintiff should and would have applied for directions for assessment of damages as soon as possible. [44] Considering the reasons afforded by the Plaintiff as to the delay in filing the application, the Court is therefore of the view that 29 the DR had erred in law in granting the Plaintiff an extension of time to file the requisite notice of diection under Order 37 rule 1. Hence the appeal is allowed with costs of RM 5000.00. [45] Since the parties had earlier agreed that the decision of this appeal is binding on the other appeal, thus Elitprop’s appeal in Enclosure 23 (OS 62) is also dismissed with costs of RM5000.00. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) High Court Judge High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 09th January of 2017 For the Plaintiff - Messrs S Mathews & Associates Ms Ashwin Kumar For the Defendants - Messrs Che Mokhtar & Ling Mr Ooi Hean Ping Ms Zuratul

Tika 2.6.0

B-02(IM)-1995-12/2015

PERAYU 1. ) YAKIN TENGGARA SDN BHD … APPELLANT 2. ) DATUK LIM SUE BENG … APPELLANT RESPONDEN 1. RHB BANK BERHAD 2. GULA PERAK BERHAD 3. AMBANK (M) BERHAD 4. DATUK LIM SUE BENG 5. FAITHMONT ESTATE SDN BHD … RESPONDEN TS

Companies and Corporations — Lands — Company in liquidation — Land held under charge — Scheme of compromise — Application for approval allowed by High Court — A compromise between three parties — Effect in law of a compromise to sell estate land without first obtaining the approval of the Land Board — Issue of infringement — Whether pursuant to National Land Code, approval must be obtained first — Effect of non-compliance with National Land Code — Whether render the compromise order void and unenforceable — Whether the agreement as prima facie proof of infringement — The compromise infringed section 214A(1) — Reverse the compromise order and to reinstate the position of the parties — Companies Act 1965 [Act 125], s 236(1)(d), s 237(1); Courts of Judicature Act, s 69(4);National Land Code, s 214A, s 215

03/01/2017

YA DATO' ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLIKorumYA DATUK SERI HAJI MOHD ZAWAWI BIN SALLEHYA DATO' ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLIYA DATUK DR. PRASAD SANDOSHAM ABRAHAM

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f8fafc71-d614-42ff-b2b9-a2819eba2b5f&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

B-02(IM)-1995-12/2015

PERAYU 1. ) YAKIN TENGGARA SDN BHD … APPELLANT 2. ) DATUK LIM SUE BENG … APPELLANT RESPONDEN 1. RHB BANK BERHAD 2. GULA PERAK BERHAD 3. AMBANK (M) BERHAD 4. DATUK LIM SUE BENG 5. FAITHMONT ESTATE SDN BHD … RESPONDEN TS

Companies and Corporations — Lands — Company in liquidation — Land held under charge — Scheme of compromise — Application for approval allowed by High Court — A compromise between three parties — Effect in law of a compromise to sell estate land without first obtaining the approval of the Land Board — Issue of infringement — Whether pursuant to National Land Code, approval must be obtained first — Effect of non-compliance with National Land Code — Whether render the compromise order void and unenforceable — Whether the agreement as prima facie proof of infringement — The compromise infringed section 214A(1) — Reverse the compromise order and to reinstate the position of the parties — Companies Act 1965 [Act 125], s 236(1)(d), s 237(1); Courts of Judicature Act, s 69(4);National Land Code, s 214A, s 215

03/01/2017

YA DATO' ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLIKorumYA DATUK SERI HAJI MOHD ZAWAWI BIN SALLEHYA DATO' ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLIYA DATUK DR. PRASAD SANDOSHAM ABRAHAM

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f8fafc71-d614-42ff-b2b9-a2819eba2b5f&Inline=true

Failed Extraction

B-02(IM)-1995-12/2015

PERAYU 1. ) YAKIN TENGGARA SDN BHD … APPELLANT 2. ) DATUK LIM SUE BENG … APPELLANT RESPONDEN 1. RHB BANK BERHAD 2. GULA PERAK BERHAD 3. AMBANK (M) BERHAD 4. DATUK LIM SUE BENG 5. FAITHMONT ESTATE SDN BHD … RESPONDEN TS

Companies and Corporations — Lands — Company in liquidation — Land held under charge — Scheme of compromise — Application for approval allowed by High Court — A compromise between three parties — Effect in law of a compromise to sell estate land without first obtaining the approval of the Land Board — Issue of infringement — Whether pursuant to National Land Code, approval must be obtained first — Effect of non-compliance with National Land Code — Whether render the compromise order void and unenforceable — Whether the agreement as prima facie proof of infringement — The compromise infringed section 214A(1) — Reverse the compromise order and to reinstate the position of the parties — Companies Act 1965 [Act 125], s 236(1)(d), s 237(1); Courts of Judicature Act, s 69(4);National Land Code, s 214A, s 215

03/01/2017

YA DATO' ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLIKorumYA DATUK SERI HAJI MOHD ZAWAWI BIN SALLEHYA DATO' ABDUL RAHMAN BIN SEBLIYA DATUK DR. PRASAD SANDOSHAM ABRAHAM

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Failed Extraction

22C-54-11/2015

PLAINTIF Dato' Hew Hoi Lam @ Kew Hoi Lam (I/C NO: 470717-06-5087) (practising as Akitek Supra) DEFENDAN Michigan Properties (M) Sdn Bhd

29/12/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=14105587-75f0-4523-9097-a3982ee39956&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: 22C-54-11/2015 BETWEEN DATO HEW HOI LAM @ KEW HOI LAM ... PLAINTIFF (I/C NO: 470717-06-5087) (practising as Akitek Supra) AND MICHIGAN PROPERTIES (M) SDN BHD ... DEFENDANT (Company No: 218700-P) JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Parties and Project [1] This dispute arose as a result of the plaintiff having fallen out with two other shareholders in a Shareholders' Agreement that had been entered into. The Shareholders' Agreement is with respect to the plaintiff's fees as Architect and Project Manager in a development project on a project land in Ampang Jaya ("the Project"). They started off as friends and neighbours of 2 adjacent lots of vacant residential land, united in a common enterprise to develop the project land into 20 subdivided units of high-end semi detached houses in a gated and guarded community called TAR Villas. [2] The plaintiff's single lot in the project land was an inner lot designated as Lot No 5. The other 2 shareholders, one Tan Loy Fatt ("Robert Tan") and Dato' Azizi ("Azizi") owned the other 9 Lots. Lots 1 to 4 faced the main road, Jalan 4K. [3] The defendant company was incorporated to undertake the said development with the plaintiff, Robert Tan and Azizi as directors and as shareholders according to the respective proportion of their lands. Problem [4] Under the Shareholders' Agreement ("Agreement") of 11 July 2008, it was provided as follows where clauses 2 and 3 were concerned: "2. Akitek Supra (A.S.) is appointed the sole architect and project manager. 3. A.S. fee shall be 10% of the construction costs." [5] The plaintiff practises under the name of Akitek Supra. He admitted that the fees for architectural services would generally be between 3.75% 3 to 4% of the total construction costs. He said that he was paid a higher fees as an inducement for him to consent to the development of the project land as without his inner Lot No 5, apparently the Lots facing the main road could not be pushed back to allow for the creation of a road reserve to pave the way for the fencing of the project land as a gated and guarded community. To the plaintiff that would result in Robert Tan's and Azizi's Lots fetching less than what they could get. To the plaintiff his Lot was that strategic and determinative Lot without which the gated and guarded development would not be possible. [6] It may be stated here that both Robert Tan and Azizi did not see the plaintiff's Lot as the pivotal Lot in the development of the project land into a gated and guarded development. The picture painted by them was that if the plaintiff had not agreed to join them, then they would proceed without the plaintiff and that their working together was for the common benefit of all the 3 of them. [7] They had explained that the 10% fees, admittedly higher than the usual 3.75% to 4% of the construction work was because the plaintiff had agreed to be not just the Architect for the project but also its Project Manager as well. 4 [8] The defendant contended that the plaintiff did not perform his job as a Project Manager of the project at all and that further he was negligent in the discharge of his professional duties as an Architect, resulting in what was said to be the losses suffered by the defendant. [9] Little wonder that when the plaintiff sued for the balance of his fees upon completion of the project with his issuance of the Certificate of Practical Completion, the defendant counter claimed for damages for negligence. Prayers [10] The plaintiff claims the balance of his fees in the sum of RM1,600,324.00 against the defendant. The total construction cost is RM16,984,190.57 as evidenced by the Final Certificate dated 14 August 2014. [11] The defendant disputed that this should be the construction cost taken for the calculation of the plaintiff's fees as he had not supervised the Nominated Subcontractors (“NSCs”) work of RM6,966,628.64 and that this sum ought to have been deducted from the construction costs for the calculation of the plaintiff's fees. A further sum of RM4,796,080.87 as stipulated in paragraph 31 of the Defence and Counter Claim also ought to 5 have been deducted for the construction costs. Alternatively the defendant claimed that the plaintiff is only entitled to scale fees as statutorily provided or on a quantum meruit basis. [12] The defendant also counter claimed for damages suffered as a result of the plaintiff's negligence in discharging his duties as an architect for the project consisting of claims for: 1. Additional piling works caused by negligent design of the plaintiff RM111,573.00; 2. The plaintiff's contribution towards the infrastructural works of RM56,966.19; 3. Additional payments to the contractors for "additional flashing, fascia capping" arising out of the plaintiff negligently not providing for it in the drawings; 4. Interest and costs. [13] The other counterclaims of the defendant had been abandoned including a claim for general damages to be assessed for the plaintiff's breach. 6 Pleadings and Principles Whether the fees of 10% of the construction costs is higher than usual because the plaintiff's Lot is the controlling Lot [14] It is admitted by the plaintiff that the fees of 10% of the construction costs is higher than what is normally the scale of prescribed fees under the Architects (Scale of Minimum Fees) Rules 2010. It was common ground that the scale of fees should be between 3.75% to 4% of the construction costs for architectural fees alone without Project Management fees. [15] Parties are of course at liberty to agree on what should be the fees for the engagement of the services of an architect for so long as it is not below the prescribed minimum fees. Where a higher fees structure is said to have been agreed and later that is challenged, the Court is of course entitled to look at the factual matrix of the case to see the justification for the higher fees. [16] Here, the evidence adduced was that Robert Tan and Azizi had 9 Lots in the project land and the plaintiff had one Lot called Lot 5. Lots 1 to 4 belonging to Robert Tan and Azizi, faced the main road Jalan 4K. As stated Robert Tan and Azizi wanted to develop the project land by converting all 9 Lots to 20 Lots. Robert Tan and Azizi needed the plaintiff to surrender his 7 Lot 5 to convert the 9 Lots to 20 Lots. Once the plaintiff had surrendered Lot 5, Lots 1 to 4 which faced the main road, Jalan 4K, could be pushed in with the other lots. When Lots 1 to 4 are pushed in with the other lots, a Simpanan Jalan or Road Reserve of 40 feet is created in front of Lots 1 to 4. The creation of the Simpanan Jalan in front of Lots 1 to 4 made Lots 1 to 4 more saleable. [17] It would be inconvenient and what more, potentially dangerous if one's gate opens direct to a main road. What is more important is that with the pushing in of the fronting Lots and the other Lots, a gated and guarded development can then be created with the Road Reserve to serve the community for ingress and egress. In short, the plaintiff's surrender of his inner Lot 5 would allow the project to take off with the greater attraction that comes with a gated and guarded development catering to the more affluent who do not mind paying higher guard fees for the sake of safety and security. It is not unnatural that the higher fees structure was packaged as an incentive and inducement to the plaintiff to surrender his Lot 5 to pave the way for the development of the 20 units into a gated and guarded community. Though the application for subdivision was made somewhere in 2007 and the Shareholders’ Agreement was entered into only on 11 July 2008, I would say that here is a case where the subsequent agreement is a 8 reflection of the terms that as friends the parties have agreed with one another earlier. [18] The plaintiff's Answers to Questions 24 to 29 of the plaintiff's witness statement explain this rather logical and reasonable approach to the development of the 9 Lots. [19] The plaintiff's Answer 28 in his witness statement sums up very succinctly the controlling position of his Lot 5: "From the plan PC/MPMSB/MPAJ/DO/2000 (3) at page 18 of the Plaintiff’s Bundle of Documents, Lot number 1, 2, 3 and 4 face the main road. There is no reserve or private road in front of Lot 1, 2, 3 and 4. After the layout of TAR Villas was approved, you can see in the plan number 1009/JP/CAD/SEL/2008/PCPI at page 20 of Jilid 1 of the Plaintiff’s Bundle of Documents that Lot 1, 2, 3 and 4 has been broken into 10 lots and there is a “SIMPANAN JALAN” in front of these 10 lots. The main road, Jalan 4k is in front of the “SIMPANAN JALAN”. The “SIMPANAN JALAN” is the private access to the 10 semi-detached homes (formerly Lot 1, 2, 3 and 4) and is a part of the gated and guarded area of TAR Villas. If I did not agree to allow Lot 5 to be sub-divided, Michigan would not have been able to break the 9 9 lots into 20 lots and redo the layout to create a private road for the houses on the outer layer that face Jalan 4K. Also, it would be very hard to sell 4 lots that face the main road, Jalan 4K, because driving into the house from the main road would not be convenient. Michigan would not have been able to sell TAR Villas as a gated and guarded community because there is no private access road to Lot number 1, 2, 3 and 4." [20] Of course the development could still proceed without involving the plaintiff's Lot 5, but then the disadvantage of not having a Road Reserve would be very real and posing considerable inconvenience to the owners of these Lots fronting a main road. Whilst the defendant may not want the plaintiff to be seen as holding the trump card to a potentially more attractive and successful development, the fact of the matter is that the location of the plaintiff's Lot 5 is both controlling and critical for the development of the project land into a gated and guarded community. It is of course undeniable that the plaintiff also stands to gain with his 2 units developed from his Lot 5 but both Robert Tan and Azizi stand to gain more as they have 18 units of semi detached houses for sale which can now fetch a higher price. This point was even conceded by Robert Tan in his cross-examination except that he added a rider, which is that it is subject to the plaintiff discharging 10 his duties as both Architect and Project Manager. This shall be discussed further below. [21] A court is entitled to look at the factual matrix forming the background to a transaction especially when a relevant and reasonable clause is being challenged and the factual matrix which forms the background to the transaction includes all material that was reasonably available to the parties; see the case of Berjaya Times Square Sdn Bhd (dahulunya dikenali sebagai Berjaya Ditan Sdn Bhd) v M Concept Sdn Bhd [2010] 2 AMR 205. [22] Likewise a contract must be construed as at the date it was made. It is not legitimate to construe it in the light of what happened years or even days later; see The Royal Selangor Golf Club v Anglo-Oriental (Malaya) Sdn Bhd [1990] 1 CLJ 995. [23] I can accept the evidence of both Robert Tan and Azizi that they both have their respective profession and business to attend to. Robert Tan himself is a Chartered Surveyor and Registered Valuer. Azizi had other housing development projects and would be there to provide the financing as and when necessary. They had expected the plaintiff, with the payment of higher fees for being the Architect and Project Manager, to be able to 11 devote his time and attention to the project. Indeed under the PAM Contract between the defendant and the main contractor, the plaintiff as the Architect is also the superintending officer. [24] I find that there is a reasonable explanation that a higher rate of 10% of the construction costs was agreed upon for the reasons given above. Whether the fees of 10% of the construction costs covers both the plaintiff's fees as Architect and Project Manager [25] Clauses 2 and 3 of the Agreement are clear in that the plaintiff was appointed to be the Architect as well as the Project Manager for the project. The evidence of the plaintiff was that after signing the Agreement he had put it aside and that he did not realize that he was also to act as Project Manager as well. Therefore by his own admission he did not discharge his duties as a Project Manager. His understanding was that he was only required to act as the project's Architect. [26] In Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No. 8) [2002] EWHC 2037 (TCC); 88 Con LR 1 Judge Humphrey Lloyd QC described the Project Manager as “co-ordinator and guardian of the client's interest” at [23]. In Pride Valley Ltd v Hall & Partners (Contract Management) [1998] TCC 574, the Court remarked : https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I90625880E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I90625880E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 12 “There is an initial difficulty in accepting expert opinion evidence in relation to the duties of Project Managers. There is no chartered or professional institution of Project Managers nor a recognizable profession of Project Managers. In so far as it may be appropriate to accept expert evidence, the nature of the evidence that might be acceptable will depend on what the Project Manager has agreed to do. In some cases the Project Manager will be the Architect who will design the project and then, acting as Project Manager, supervise the contractor and the sub-contractors in carrying out the work. This is the role with which Mr Forbes Bramble is familiar. At the other end of the scale the Project Manager will supervise the work of the contractor and sub-contractors and ensure that the work is carried out in conformity with the design drawings. In these circumstances the Project Manager will have no design function even to the extent of providing an outline specification. This bears no relation to the function of the Architect acting to project manage his project.” (emphasis added) [27] It seems clear then that whatever the Architect is supposed to do as a Project Manager, is quite distinct and different from his role as an Architect. His scope of duty as a Project Manager is very much dependent then in his 13 contract of appointment and if the Agreement in this case, does not spell out the scope of his work, then one would fall back on the statutory definition as to what is envisaged and expected by the expression "Project Management". [28] I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that the role of the Project Manager is to oversee the entire Project and he is the main Consultant reporting to the Client. It is also his role to appoint and coordinate with all the professionals so as to ensure that they carry out their respective duties with due care, diligence and professionalism. [29] I further agree with the defendant that generally a Project Manager is needed to ensure a project is tracking along to plan and the Project Manager manages the project to finish on time and on budget and that his team completes its task according to budgeting codes, plans and specs. The obvious benefits to the owner/developer would be the control of costings and timely completion. The raison d'être of appointing a Project Manager is that the owner would be relieved of managing the project himself. [30] The Architects (Scale of Minimum Fees) Rule 2010 provides as follows: 14 20. Project Management Consultancy Services The project management consultancy services that may be provided by the architectural consultancy practice shall be any or all of the following: (a) providing total project management consultancy services from the inception to completion of a project, including preparing of project briefs, appointing and coordinating with all consultants, contractors and suppliers, preparing various levels of project schedules for the planning, implementation and monitoring all the activities and elements related to the agreed targets, preparing reports and their submission to the client and accepting the completed works on behalf of the client; (b) providing periodic or full time site staff for frequent or constant inspection of the works; (c) providing the full services required for construction management in serving as the overall coordinator where separate contracts for each trade are awarded; 15 (d) ... (e) ... [31] Whilst the agreement does not set out or define the scope of the plaintiff’s appointment as “Project Manager”, I do find that the parties had in mind the expectation that the plaintiff would be supervising the work of the main contractor, the subcontractors and the clerk-of-works. Though under the scheme of the contract between the defendant and the main contractor, the plaintiff was not required to do this as an Architect for the project as the main contractor reported direct to the defendant, I find that as a Project Manager the plaintiff is required to supervise the work of the main contractor and subcontractors. [32] At the end of the day, the plaintiff did not in his capacity as Project Manager, appoint a Quantity Surveyor, or Electrical and Mechanical Engineer or a Civil and Structural Engineer for the project. Further all appointment of NSCs where handled by the defendant through Robert Tan. [33] I further agree with the learned counsel for the defendant that management of the NSCs goes far beyond mere site attendance. The management starts from day one, where the NSCs are identified, quotations called and evaluated, designs approved, materials selected, 16 prices negotiated, appointment, supervision of works during construction, valuation of works in progress and certifying progress payments etc. All these works were carried out by the defendant through Robert Tan. Neither the main contractor nor the plaintiff was involved. [34] There was also the issue as to whether this so-called agreed fees was consortium fees in that from this fees, the plaintiff is to pay the other consultants appointed by him such as Quantity Surveyor, Electrical and Mechanical Engineer and Civil and Structural Engineers. As this point was not pleaded I shall not proceed to delve into it. At any rate, if the defendant had wanted it to be treated as consortium fees, then it should have been made very clear to him at the outset when the agreement was signed. Anyway there was not a single letter on consortium fees at all between the parties throughout the project and even after the dispute has arisen and I would conclude that this position taken by the defendant is an afterthought. [35] From the evidence adduced it is clear that this Project Management work was done by Robert Tan and the staff under him. As pointed out earlier, the plaintiff had kept away the Agreement after it had been signed and had admitted that he did not realize that he was supposed to be the Project Manager as well. He had even thought that his fees was 9% 17 instead of 10% of the construction costs and indeed had initially claimed in his letter of demand the sum of 9%. Whether the defendant is estopped from insisting the plaintiff is the Project Manager [36] Learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the evidence showed that the defendant had never alleged that the plaintiff failed to carry out his role as Project Manager whilst the construction of the 18 Semi Detached houses were ongoing. It was also argued that there was no mention of Project Manager or Project Management at Site Meetings. There were a total of 60 site meetings held every 2 weeks from 4 March 2010 to 2 October 2012 over a course of 942 days. The defendant had a representative present at every site meeting. [37] To be fair to the defendant, its finance manager, one Nurwahidah lbrahim, had written a complaint letter to the plaintiff. It is to be noted that the letter was written on the defendant's letterhead. As stated by the learned counsel for the defendant, three particular parts stand out: “This memorandum is prepared to seek your consideration in paying me a project allowances for services rendered on your behalf for semi D project." 18 11. The above jobs that I done are part of your job in which MPM has agreed to pay you 9%. l have spent a lot of my time including my weekend to carry out task which were supposed to be carried out by your company and I have not been paid accordingly. Due to this, l'm looking forward for your consideration to either Pay monthly project allowance to me since last June 2010, and all job carry out by me are considered being carried out by architect: or Agree for deduction in fees and MPM to pay me directly Thus, l'm looking forward for your kindness to compensate me fair amount for work that I did on your behalf.” [38] "MPM" is the acronym for Michigan Properties (M) Sdn Bhd, the defendant herein. [39] Moreover, at the Shareholders' Meeting of 20 March 2012, the issue of Project Management had again been raised. In the light of this evidence, I agree with the defendant that the plaintiff cannot feign ignorance of the Project Management issue until this Suit was filed. 19 [40] Robert Tan, the key witness for the defendant, admitted that he could have brought this up more expressly, but he did not. I do not see this as a waiver of the scope of appointment to cover work as a "Project Manager" or that this scope has been deleted by the parties or even that the defendant is now estopped from claiming that the fees should be reduced because the plaintiff did not do the portion of his work as a Project Manager. [41] This is more a case where because of the friendship between the plaintiff and Robert Tan and Azizi, stretching back many years, it would be something that could not be comfortably raised, much less recorded in minutes, without hurting feelings and straining, if not severing, friendship altogether. [42] It was not so much a case where Robert Tan was doing the work normally expected of a Project Manager with all glee and gladness, but that as the plaintiff was not discharging his role as a Project Manager, Robert Tan was constrained to step in as someone has to supervise the construction work to ensure that work schedule was complied with, works were properly done and that claims were correctly made. Robert Tan has a personal stake in all these as he, together with Azizi are majority shareholders of the defendant; the plaintiff being a minority shareholder of 14.12%. 20 [43] Of course as Robert Tan admitted under cross-examination, he was not forced or compelled to do the work of Project Management. However, I find that this is a case where, seeing the way things have evolved on the ground, he felt constrained to. [44] There was also a dissipation of interest in the project as the plaintiff's 2 units had been completed already to be on time for one of his son's wedding. This is not a case where the plaintiff as Architect and Project Manager, can turn round to the defendant and say that it is the defendant that must tell the plaintiff his scope of work as a "Project Manager". Where a professional Architect would know full well what is expected of a "Project Manager", it is assumed that he should know the scope of work involved and if in doubt, to clear it with the defendant who appointed him. It is not for the defendant to point out to the plaintiff his failings in the discharge of his duties as a Project Manager. [45] Learned counsel for the plaintiff referred to the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 3 AMR 2871 and TL MAC Motorsport Sdn Bhd v Mitsubishi Motors Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2012] 3 MLJ 78, in support of his proposition that estoppel would apply to prevent the defendant from now asserting that the plaintiff's scope of work covers Project Management as well. 21 [46] In Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Berhad [1995] 3 AMR 2871 at p. 2890, the Federal Court explained that the doctrine of estoppel may be applied to enlarge or to reduce the rights or obligations of a party under a contract and one of the more pertinent passages quoted is from the English Court of Appeal’s decision in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd (1982) QB 84: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: “The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with cases. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties http://login.westlaw.com.my/maf/wlmy/app/document?src=doc&linktype=ref&&context=38&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I5D6616C0E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 http://login.westlaw.com.my/maf/wlmy/app/document?src=doc&linktype=ref&&context=38&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I5D6616C0E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 22 to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law - whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on which they have conducted the dealings between them - neither of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one of them does seek to go back on it, the courts will give the other such remedy as the equity of the case demands.” (Emphasis added.)” [47] The passage from Hughes v Metropolitan Railways (1877) 2 App. Cas 439 was further cited in support of the plaintiff's position: “ ... it is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results - certain penalties or legal forfeiture - afterwards by their own act or with their own consent enter upon a course of negotiation which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise might have enforced those rights will not be http://www.lawnet.com.sg/lrweb/jsearch.do?jaction=getDocByCitation&dcit=(1877)_2_App._Cas_439 http://www.lawnet.com.sg/lrweb/jsearch.do?jaction=getDocByCitation&dcit=(1877)_2_App._Cas_439 23 allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties.” [48] However in the present case, both the requirements of fairness and reasonableness would constrain this Court to only allow him the claim for his architectural consultancy fees and not his Project Management fees as by his own admission he did not carry out this portion of the work; this Court having found that the defendant is not estopped from asserting this in their defence. Estoppel being a creature of equity, it would be grossly inequitable for the plaintiff to be paid for what, by his own admission, he did not do and when someone else in the person of Robert Tan had to expend time and energy to attend to that work. [49] It was contended that when the defendant first objected by their letter of 16 January 2012 to the plaintiff's invoice for his fees, the defendant had not stated that the plaintiff had not carried out his duties as a Project Manager. I do not think one should be too pedantic about this as the plaintiff's invoice had been for his architectural fees and not for his fees for Project Management anyway. At any rate the ground stated was broad enough to allow specifics to be raised later as the ground was that the plaintiff had not complied with the Architects Act 1967, where the charging of his fees was concerned. 24 [50] Learned counsel for the plaintiff also referred to the defendant’s letter dated 15 July 2011 fortifying the fact that the defendant no longer insisted on the plaintiff being Project Manager. This was in response to the plaintiff's initial response to resign as the Architect for the project. It is true that the contents of this letter clearly only refers to the plaintiff as Architect and not Project Manager. It also referred to a “new architect” being formally engaged – see paragraph 4. I would not want to read too much in between the lines in support of the plaintiff's contention that the defendant is estopped from insisting that the plaintiff was also the Project Manager for the project. As the plaintiff had expressed his desire to resign as the Architect, the response from the defendant was understandably referring to the same subject matter. [51] The plaintiff's contention is that as there was no mention made about the plaintiff continuing as Project Manager or engaging another Project Manager, then it must mean that the defendant only regarded the plaintiff as Architect and not as Project Manager. I would say that this is a case where for a project of this size of just 18 units of semi detached houses, the defendant sees the 2 roles of Architect and Project Manager both wrapped up in one person the Architect. In the context of the appointment and the relationship of the parties, this is not a case where the plaintiff, if he was 25 resigning as Architect, could nevertheless continue as Project Manager. It does not make sense for a project of this size to have 2 persons appointed; one as the Architect and the other as Project Manager. [52] Hence when the Site Minutes of Meeting 33 dated 27 July 2011 at page 92 PBOD 6 referred to the appointment of the “new architect” and when eventually the minutes say “Dato’ Hew will carry on as Project Architect” with nothing mentioned about Project Manager, it simply means that what had been agreed upon at the time of appointment in the Agreement should continue on the same terms as before. There was no change as in the duties now as a Project Manager had been removed from the plaintiff's scope of duties. [53] In passing I would also hold that when the plaintiff retracted his resignation as Architect, the defendant accepted it and reinstated his appointment on the same terms and before; with the duties of Project Manager being part of the package of his fees at 10% of the construction costs. Whether the fees should be based on the construction costs less the amount of nominated subcontractors' works and variation works [54] Clause 3 of the Agreement dated 11 July 2008 specifically states: 26 “A.S fee shall be 10% of the construction costs." [55] I agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff that Clause 3 should be given its natural and ordinary meaning - see Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36 where Lord Neuberger and Lord Hodge emphasised on “the natural meaning of the words” when giving effect to a contract, since parties have control of the language therein. There is no ambiguity in the clause. It is just 10% of the construction costs. The components of the “construction costs” is not broken down into the costs paid to the suppliers or contractors (whether the main contractor or subcontractor or NSCs). I find merits in the plaintiff's submission that "construction costs" therefore means the costs of completing the construction of the 18 Semi Detached houses without any distinction or breakdown of the components of the costs and who it is paid to. [56] Robert Tan had admitted under cross-examination on at least 3 occasions that the "construction costs" is RM16,984,190.57 as evidenced by the Final Certificate dated 14 August 2014. [57] There is no distinction in the Agreement between Main Contractor’s portion and “NSCs’” portion of the "construction costs." The plaintiff further emphasized that the fee of 10% based on the construction cost is in https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I90B275700F9011E5BEA090C85C5BD722&keep-search-state-crumb=true https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I90B275700F9011E5BEA090C85C5BD722&keep-search-state-crumb=true 27 consideration of the plaintiff’s agreement to surrender his inner Lot 5 for the project. The defendant support for contending that the plaintiff’s 10% fee should exclude the NSCs' portion for the project is because the plaintiff did not manage the NSCs as Project Manager. [58] However there are merits in the plaintiff's contention that the contractual structure shows that the NSCs' are managed and controlled by the main contractor, Hasil Construction Sdn Bhd (“Hasil Construction”). Conversely there is also nothing strange and indeed everything sensible to have someone to manage the main contractor and NSCs as Project Manager. The defendant had expected the plaintiff to manage this in his capacity as Project Manager but he had not discharged his duties here. [59] Learned counsel for the plaintiff highlighted the following in support of this contractual structure: 1. Clause 5 of Hasil Construction’s letter of award dated 26 June 2010 provides that “all specialist subcontractors will be appointed by you through the client’s recommendation”. This means Hasil Construction appoints the NSCs; 28 2. Item 2 of Appendix B says Hasil Construction consent is required for all payments to the NSCs to ensure the work is properly done; 3. Items 6 and 10 of Appendix B says the NSCs have to follow Hasil Construction’s master programme and schedule of work and attend Hasil Construction’s site meetings; 4. Item 2 of Site Meeting 53 where Hasil Construction said it is fully aware of its responsibility to monitor all NSCs' work quality; 5. Sri Salan Sdn Bhd invoices Hasil Construction directly and Sri Salan Sdn Bhd is the specialist piling subcontractor 6. Most telling of all, clause 27 (b) in Section A states very clearly that: “The Contractor will be fully responsible for all Subcontractors ... and will be responsible for the supervision and administration of all Subcontractors ... and will be required to arrange a programme schedule with each of the nominated firms. These schedules will be subjected to the approval of the S.O.” 29 [60] The above confirms that Hasil Contruction is responsible for all NSCs including their supervision and administration. The plaintiff only has to approve the programme schedule arranged for the NSCs. When confronted with clause 27 (b), Robert Tan admitted in cross examination on 15 April 2016 that it is Hasil Construction that controls, manages and supervises the NSCs : CCM Ok. So, we’ll take it one step at a time. So, Hasil Construction is fully responsible for all subcontractors. Correct? TAN Correct. CCM And Hasil Construction is also responsible for supervision. Correct? TAN Correct. CCM And Hasil Construction is also responsible for administration of all subcontractors. TAN Yes, My Lord. CCM So, Clause 27(a) together with Appendix B at page 7, would you agree, actually gives Hasil Construction control over the subcontractors? 30 TAN Yes, My Lord. [61] As pointed out by learned counsel for the plaintiff, Robert Tan went on to admit that the plaintiff did not have to deal with the subcontractors under the contractual structure: CCM So, would you agree then, based on the contract that you have with Hasil Construction, Akitek Supra does not deal with the subcontractors? TAN Correct, My Lord. [62] I agree that Robert Tan's answers in cross-examination above puts an end to the allegation that the 10% fee should exclude the NSCs or subcontractors' portion of works because Akitek Supra was “not involved” with the NSCs or subcontractors. [63] I would say that there is a discernible difference between Robert Tan being constrained to manage the NSCs as opposed to being compelled to manage them because of Hasil Construction's dereliction of their duties or of the plaintiff not rising to the occasion as contractually expected, to manage the main contractors and NSCs. Understandably the defendant would want to deduct RM6,966,628.64 from the calculation of the fees entitlement of the plaintiff as an Architect but any deduction would have to 31 be from the Project Management portion of the fees for the Project Management work not done by the plaintiff. [64] It has emerged during cross-examination that the NSCs “voluntarily” reported to Robert Tan and he wanted to manage them although he did not have to because it is Hasil Construction who has to manage the NSCs. [65] Learned counsel highlighted Robert Tan's answers in cross- examination as revealing and reflecting the defendant's true intention: CCM Ok. Let’s break it down. You said, under oath, they voluntarily reported to you. The subcontractors voluntarily reported to you. Correct? TAN Correct. CCM And you had no obligation to entertain them because Hasil Construction is responsible for them. Correct? TAN Correct. CCM But you did anyway, right? TAN Correct. 32 CCM So, you were not forced to manage them but you did anyway. Correct? TAN Correct, My Lord. CCM So, that means you wanted to manage them, right? TAN Correct, My Lord. [66] It is also significant that Robert Tan also withdrew the allegation at paragraph 32 of the counterclaim that he had been forced to manage the NSCs because of the failure of the plaintiff to manage them. The cross- examination is as follows: CCM That...Ok. So, if they report to you voluntarily, you are not forced to manage them. Correct? You can say ‘No, I don’t want to entertain you. Go and deal with Hasil Construction.’ Would I be correct? TAN Yes, I can say so. CCM Yes. So, in other words, you were not forced to manage the subcontractors as alleged at paragraph 32 of your counterclaim. Correct, Mr Tan? TAN Yes, I’m supposed to, yes. 33 [67] I agree with the plaintiff that since Robert Tan admitted in cross- examination he himself wanted to manage the NSCs, the defendant has no basis to deduct the sum of RM6,966,628.64 from the construction cost to compute the Plaintiff’s 10% fee where architectural consultancy fees is concerned. [68] Neither can an abdication of duties on the part of Hasil Construction as the main contractor in managing the NSCs result in a reduction of fees for the plaintiff. The defendant called Loh Seow Huei, the director of Great Living Builders Sdn Bhd to give evidence. Great Living Builders Sdn Bhd was one of the NSCs. In Answer 14 of DW4 WS, the witness says whenever they referred to Hasil Construction, Hasil Construction asked them to refer to Robert Tan or Puan Nurwahidah, the finance manager for the defendant. [69] From Answer 14 of DW4 WS, the truth of the matter is that the NSCs dealt with Robert Tan because Hasil Construction asked them to do so. Hasil Construction was only too happy to be relieved of their duty to control, supervise and manage the NSCs as required under clause 27 (b) and Appendix B at pages 41 PBOD 1 and page 4 and 9 PBOD 8. 34 [70] The defendant alleges that RM2,193,312.44 ought to be deducted from the project cost for “Variation Order” proposed and handled by Robert Tan at paragraph 31(g) of the counterclaim. However Robert Tan's witness statement, DW1 WS makes no mention at all of the “Variation Order” totaling RM2,193,312.44 which was purportedly handled by him and his “team”. Pleading is no substitute for evidence and in the absence as to the particulars of these "Variation Order”, I hold that it has not been proved why these sums should be deducted from the "construction costs" used to calculate the plaintiff's fees. [71] At any rate, these variation order works would be generally part of the contract sum and so would be the additional costs of RM2,060,203.96 because of the change of tiles and flooring according to Robert Tan's different preference after the drawings were signed by him and approved by the local authority. [72] Lest I be misunderstood, the requirement under the scheme of the contract for the main contractor is to report direct to the defendant and the NSCs to report to main contractor, is not in any way incompatible with or in contradiction to the fact that the plaintiff as Project Manager is to supervise and manage these relationships to ensure a smooth and safe progress of works. Whilst the defendant then is not entitled to have the value of the 35 NSCs' work deducted from the calculation of the plaintiff's fees of 10% of the construction costs as the plaintiff's architectural fees, the defendant is nevertheless entitled to deduct from the plaintiff's entitlement of his fees, the Project Management work not done by him. [73] Therefore whether it is a case of Robert Tan appointing himself or assuming or even arrogating to himself the role of a Project Manager, that part of the work as Project Manager not discharged by the plaintiff must be considered in the assessment of the plaintiff's fees. What would be the reasonable fees of the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case [74] Learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff is entitled to the agreed fee of 10% of the construction cost as he had discharged his role as the Architect. Learned counsel had consciously left out the reference to "Project Management" works as it cannot be said, without fear of contradiction, that no such works were done. [75] The question then is, how does one assess the reasonable fees payable for architectural consultancy services rendered without the Project Management fees. Where professional services are concerned, it is very subjective when it comes to fees; regard being had to the novelty of the 36 work, the scope and value of the work, the experience of the professional and the time within which the work is to be completed. If both the client and the professional have agreed on the fees, then generally the Court would not interfere unless it is shown that what was charged for was not for what was agreed to be done or was not done at all. [76] Granted, the plaintiff had discharged his professional architectural consultancy services generally required of an architect for a housing project of 20 houses. Learned counsel for the plaintiff's company, Akitek Supra, submitted that the plaintiff had discharged his duties with respect to the project which included the following duties: 1. prepared all the drawings for the 18 units of Type B, C and D houses including the details - page 213 - 242 PBOD 6; 2. prepared the amended drawings to show the changes made by the defendant through Robert Tan - page 243 - 256 PBOD 6; 3. prepared the as built drawings on completion - page 257 - 268 PBOD 6; 4. held site meetings every 2 weeks from the time the project started - page 1 to 181 of PBOD 6; 37 5. held design meetings - page 182 to 212 in PBOD 6; 6. held a nominated sub-contractor interview - page 49 - 50 PBOD 7; 7. held joint inspections and listing the defects to be rectified - page 618 - 699 PBOD issued architect’s instructions - page 700 to 891 of PBOD 5; 8. prepared the valuation certificates for Hasil Construction’s claims - page 70-373 PBOD 2; 9. prepared and issued the certificate of practical completion - page 595 - 612 PBOD 5; 10. prepared and issued the certificate of making good defects - page 575-592 PBOD 5; 11. prepared and issued the Final Certificate - PBOD 2 page 70 - 72; 12. assessed the extension of time for Hasil Construction - PBOD 3 page 374 - 376 and PBOD 5 page 613 - 615 and PBOD 3 page 377 - 380. 13. In addition, Appendix B to PW1-WS and PW2-WS shows the many changes made by Robert Tan to the houses and Appendix C to PW1- WS and PW2-WS shows the discussion of these changes at the site meetings. 38 [77] Learned counsel for the plaintiff drew the Court's attention to the explanation by the plaintiff on one of the changes made by Robert Tan and the action taken to effect the changes in Answer 72 of PW1-WS : “The additional brickwall in Hasil Construction’s letter dated 25 November 2011 at page 790 of Jilid 5 is an example of a technical issue because this additional brickwall is 1 meter over and above the 3.35 meter wall. We needed the engineer’s input to assess whether this additional brickwall affected the structural integrity. This was discussed in Site Meeting 38 on 12 October 2011 in item 4.02 at page 76 of Jilid 6 of the Plaintiff’s Bundle of Documents. We had to wait for the engineer’s assessment before allowing the work to proceed. In Site Meeting No. 46 on 23 February 2012, PPR confirmed the extra load from the additional brickworks is still within acceptable range in item 4.01 at page 54 Jilid 6 of the Plaintiff’s Bundle of Documents.” [78] The plaintiff's Answer 95 of PW1-WS provides more insight into the response that the plaintiff had to make to the drawings in the course of the construction of the houses for the project: 39 “Akitek Supra had to prepare amended drawings and re-submit them to Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya (“MPAJ”). For some changes, Akitek Supra had to ask the engineer to check beforehand. As an example, the engineer had to study the structural integrity for the additional brickwork to the 1st floor - see item 4.02 of Site Meeting No.38 at page 76 Jilid 6.” [79] Sometimes changes were made at the special requests of Robert Tan and Azizi to their units and the plaintiff duly responded with the revised drawings. In his Answer 98 he explained the delay in the submission of the amended drawings to MPAJ : “The main reason is because Robert Tan and Azizi made changes to their units. Akitek Supra had to come up with new revised drawings to show the changes. Michigan had to approve the drawings before it is submitted to MPAJ. The minutes of Design Meeting No. 5 on 28 October 2011 at page 193 Jilid 6 explains why the amended drawings were submitted in February 2012. It states that “the submission of amendment to MPAJ should be put on hold, as ponds will be added to Lot 1, 19 and 20.” 40 [80] I agree with the plaintiff that the evidence showed that changes were being made to the layout and design throughout the project and the plaintiff had to attend to these changes with the other consultants on the project and then prepare amended drawings for the defendant’s approval before submission to MPAJ. [81] The Project was successfully completed and the units sold and further there was no dispute between the main contractor and the defendant. [82] The defendant has its catalogue of complaints against the plaintiff, summarized as follows by its learned counsel: (a) Failure to provide detailed drawings; (b) The plaintiff had only evaluated the Main Contractor's Tender; (c) All Subcontractors' tenders were evaluated by the defendant; (d) In fact, all progress payments were checked and evaluated by the defendant. (e) The plaintiff had appointed a junior staff without proper Architectural background to handle the project. That person was found to be lacking in experience, knowledge and know-how and was unable to 41 handle the Project. He could not issue instructions. Nevertheless, that junior staff, How Eng Soon, claimed in his Testimony that he had chaired all 60 Site Meetings; (f) There was delay in getting the show-house ready; (g) The plaintiff's staff hardly visited and/or inspected the site; (h) The plaintiff hardly attended meetings. [83] ln fact, from the evidence adduced and the record of the Minutes kept, the plaintiff attended only about 3 or 4 meetings out of the 60 meetings held. Further, the plaintiff had issued only a total of 9 Architects Instructions which were copied from the instructions of the defendant to Hasil Construction in respect of the Variation Orders. This, learned counsel for the defendant submitted, was inadequate considering there were 26 Sub-Contractors involved. The plaintiff did not issue any instructions to the NSCs. The defendant therefore has a basis to ask for the plaintiff to revise his fee claim. [84] Whilst the defendant may be unhappy with the services provided whether in terms of response time or quality of the work, the fact remains that he did perform his work as the Architect for the project. Most of the 42 above complaints of the defendant has to do with the expectations not met with respect to the plaintiff's work as a Project Manager. In the circumstance the Project Management fees has to be excised from the overall fees of 10% of the construction costs. [85] The minimum scale fees payable for Project Management is 3.5% under the Rule 25 (3) of the Architects (Scale of Minimum Fees) Rules 2010. [86] I assess that under the circumstances of this case where the plaintiff was not involved in managing the NSCs works or that of the main contractor and not involved in the overall Project Management work, and considering some shortcomings in the discharge of the plaintiff's duties as an Architect, a 4% of the construction costs of RM16,984,190.57 should be deducted from the 10% fees and that gives a sum of RM1,019,051.43 . [87] I reckon this proportion of 60:40 for architectural fees:project management fees is reasonable as architectural services would require more specialized skills and only a registered architect would be able to submit plans for approval of the local authorities. As for Project Management work, a non-architect like Robert Tan who is a Quantity 43 Surveyor and even an Engineer with experience in construction would be able to do it with some experience. [88] It is agreed that RM200,000.00 has been paid and so there is a case balance to be paid of RM819,051.43. This shall carry interest of 5% pa from date of filing i.e. 5 November 2015. Whether the plaintiff as the Architect for the project, had been negligent in the discharge of his professional duties as an Architect [89] The role of an Architect in a construction project has been explained in Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] A.C. 727 in the dicta of Lord Reid at p 737 as follows: “It has often been said, I think rightly, that the architect has two different types of function to perform. In many matters he is bound to act on his client's instructions whether he agrees with them or not, but in many other matters requiring professional skill he must form and act on his own opinion. Many matters may arise in the course of the execution of a building contract where a decision has to be made which will affect the amount of money which the contractor gets. Under the RIBA contract many such decisions have to be made by the architect and the parties agree to accept his decisions. For 44 example, he decides whether the contractor should be reimbursed for loss under clause 11 (variation), clause 24 (disturbance), or clause 34 (antiquities), whether he should be allowed extra time (clause 23) or when work ought reasonably to have been completed (clause 22). And, perhaps most important, he has to decide whether work is defective. These decisions will be reflected in the amounts contained in certificates issued by the architect. The building owner and the contractor make their contract on the understanding that in all such matters the architect will act in a fair and unbiased manner, and it must therefore be implicit in the owner's contract with the architect that he shall not only exercise due care and skill but also reach such decisions fairly, holding the balance between his client and the contractor.” (emphasis added) [90] At p. 751 Lord Morris made the following important observations: “He must certainly so act because, there being a contract for work to be done according to the terms of the contract, his function is to see that the contract is carried out. But that does not, without more, make him an arbitrator. His duty is to act fairly when exercising his professional skill in considering whether work done satisfied the 45 contract requirements as to work to be done. If that circumstance constituted him an arbitrator then at almost every stage he would be an arbitrator. His duty to act fairly does not conflict with, but rather is part of, his duty to safeguard and look after the interests of the building owner who has employed him.” (emphasis added) [91] Nearer home in Singapore, the Singapore Court of Appeal explained thus in Sim & Associates v Tan Alfred [1994] 3 SLR (R) 169, what must be done to prove negligence against an architect : “An architect’s liability is not absolute in the sense that he is liable whenever loss results from his acts. It must be shown that he has been negligent in that he has failed to exercise the requisite standard of care. A person alleging negligence against an architect must call evidence as to what constitutes lack of care in the circumstances. As the editors of Keating on Building contracts, infra, indicate at p 313: Unless there are special circumstances, the normal measure of an architect’s skill is that of ordinarily skilled architects. An error of judgment may or may not amount to negligence. If the majority of architects would, under the circumstances, have done the same 46 thing this normally provides a good defence, for ‘a defendant charged with negligence can clear himself if he shows that he acted in accord with general and approved practice’. Where there is no accepted practice, he will not be negligent if he acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of architects, even if another body of competent professional opinion considered the practice wrong.” (emphasis added) [92] Further in Jameson v Simon (1899) 1 F (Court of Session) 1211 it was held that the architect’s representative can also be at the site to inspect the works : “It is contended that the architect cannot be constantly at the work, and this is obviously true. But he or someone representing him should undoubtedly see to the principal parts of the work before they are hid from view, and if need be I think he should require a contractor to give notice before an operation is to be done which will prevent his so inspecting an important part of the work as to be able to give his certificates upon knowledge, and not on assumption, as to how work hidden from view had been done.” (emphasis added) 47 [93] The defendant here has made a general allegation at paragraph 17 of the defence that the plaintiff is negligent and says the particulars of the negligence are set out in the counterclaim. The particulars of the negligence are in paragraph 30(a) to (k) of the counterclaim. As the plaintiff is a professional, he is to be judged by the standards of his fellow architects to determine whether or not he was negligent as alleged. [94] I agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant can only discharge the burden of proving negligence against the plaintiff by calling another architect to give evidence. [95] It is in this context that the case of Pantelli Associates Ltd v Corporate City Developments No. 2 Ltd [2010] EWHC 3189, and the observation of Coulson J at [16] and [17] is pertinent in many an allegation of negligence against a professional: “There is a second, separate reason why I am in no doubt that those parts of this Amended Defence and Counterclaim that purport to be allegations of professional negligence should be struck out. That is because, even though the work that is now the subject of these purported allegations was carried out three years ago, there is no expert evidence of any kind to suggest that that work was 48 carried out inadequately, or was in some way below the standard to be expected of an ordinarily competent quantity surveyor. Not only is it simply not good enough to turn a positive contractual obligation into an allegation of professional negligence by adding the words "failing to" to the obligation, but it is also wholly inappropriate to do so in circumstances where there is no expert input to allow CCD to make such an allegation in the first place. Save in cases of solicitors' negligence where the Court of Appeal has said that it is unnecessary (see Brown v Gould & Swayne [1996] 1 PNLR 130) and the sort of exceptional case summarised at paragraph 6-009 – 6-011 of Jackson & Powell, Sixth Edition, which does not arise here, it is standard practice that, where an allegation of professional negligence is to be pleaded, that allegation must be supported (in writing) by a relevant professional with the necessary expertise. That is a matter of common sense: how can it be asserted that act x was something that an ordinary professional would and should not have done, if no professional in the same field had expressed such a view?" (emphasis added) 49 [96] Coulson J’s stand has the support of Bingham LJ’s dissenting judgment in Eckersley & Others v Binnie & Others [1955-95] P.N.L.R 348: “The law requires of a professional man that he live up in practice to the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have his special professional skill. He need not possess the highest expert skill; it is enough if he exercises the ordinary skill of an ordinary competent man exercising his particular art. So much is established by Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, which has been applied and approved time without number. No matter what profession it may be, the common law does not impose on those who practise it any liability for damage resulting from what in the result turn out to have been errors of judgment, unless the error was such as no reasonably well-informed and competent member of that profession could have made”. (Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co. [1980] A.C. 198 at 220D, per Lord Diplock). From these general statements it follows that a professional man should command the corpus of knowledge which forms part of the https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I765413D0E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I765413D0E42711DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I973DDE90E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=I973DDE90E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 50 professional equipment of the ordinary member of his profession. He should not lag behind other ordinarily assiduous and intelligent members of his profession in knowledges of new advances, discoveries and developments in his field. He should have such awareness as an ordinarily competent practitioner would have of the deficiencies in his knowledge and the limitations on his skill. He should be alert to the hazards and risks inherent in any professional task he undertakes to the extent that other ordinarily competent members of the profession would be alert. He must bring to any professional task he undertakes no less expertise, skill and care than other ordinarily competent members of his profession would bring, but need bring no more. The standard is that of the reasonable average. The law does not require of a professional man that he be a paragon, combining the qualities of polymath and prophet.” (emphasis added). [97] To have been wrong does not invariably mean that one has been negligent. Whether one has been negligent would depend on the particular circumstances of the case. In Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727 Viscount Simonds said at page 760: https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=IC6A35A70E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=IC6A35A70E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 51 “It by no means follows that a professional valuation or opinion was negligently given because it turns out to have been wholly wrong. … Whether or not there has been negligence is, of course, a pure question of fact depending upon the particular circumstances of each case.” The Car Porch / Driveway [98] The defendant alleged that the plaintiff was negligent in designing a car porch that is too short and the defendant had to redo it - paragraph 30(h) of the counterclaim. The defendant illustrated the difference in the length of the porch through an extract of the drawings showing Lots 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 called “Old Plan (Short Porches)” and a “New Plan (Long Porches)”. The defendant’s complaint is that the short driveway will not accommodate a “luxury” car like a BMW or Mercedes. [99] The defendant had not adduced any expert evidence whether this “shortened” porch or driveway is what an ordinary member of the architectural profession would have done or whether no other architect would have designed such a short porch/driveway - Pantelli Associates Ltd v Corporate City Developments No. 2 Ltd [2010] EWHC 3189 and Eckersley & Others v Binnie & Others [1955-95] P.N.L.R 348. 52 [100] In the absence of a contrary view expressed by another expert, I can accept the reasons why the plaintiff had so designed the porch and driveway in the front, leaving more land at the back. Already the front could take in 3 to 4 cars and so the availability of more space at the back would allow for family functions and gatherings like for barbecue and also for future expansion at the back. These are matters of aesthetic appreciation and even if for some, practicality would have to be sacrificed, that does not necessarily mean that just because the defendant is right, the plaintiff must have been wrong. [101] This is a case where the drawings had been discussed with Robert Tan and he had later signed on them before submission to the local authority for approval. Surely Robert Tan for the defendant and being a Quantity Surveyor himself, would have understood the drawings and plans with a more discerning pair of eyes. He admitted he could have commented on it and suggested suitable changes before submission but he did not. The drawing HL-X/103/09/01 dated 10 March 2009 was approved by MPAJ on 21 July 2007. [102] For the defendant to then later say that it suddenly dawned upon them that the driveways were shorter for these 5 units would appear to be an afterthought. By that time some piling works had been done according 53 to the position of the beams and to now move the front porch backwards to allow for more parking space and correspondingly less space at the back would entail new piling to be done at the specific positions affected which is the extra expenses incurred which the defendant said is the damage they suffer which could have been avoided if the drawings and plans had been properly done. The defendant offered no evidence to show that allowing more space for the back of the house for future use and family barbecues is not what an ordinary architect would have done - Eckersley & Others v Binnie & Others [1955-95] P.N.L.R 348. [103] Even assuming for a moment that the plaintiff were wrong in allowing more space for the back of the house, it does not necessarily mean the plaintiff is negligent – see Viscount Simmonds at 760 in Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727. [104] This is not a case where the defendant had instructed the plaintiff that the driveway or porch for Lots 15 to 19 should be “long”. Neither has the defendant shown that it was a term of the plaintiff’s contract that all houses needed to have driveways or porches to accommodate “luxury” cars. Having approved the drawings for submission in 2009, it smacks of bad faith to now say that the plaintiff had been negligent when the 18 units have long been completed and sold save for one. https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=IC6A35A70E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 https://login.westlawasia.com/maf/app/document?src=doc&maintain-toc-node=true&linktype=ref&&context=&crumb-action=replace&docguid=IC6A35A70E42811DA8FC2A0F0355337E9 54 [105] It appears more like a case where because the plaintiff is suing for his balance fees, the defendant is now resurrecting past unhappiness with the plaintiff in the hope that at least some might go towards reducing the plaintiff's claim; if not to scare the plaintiff to dropping his claim altogether as, if all of the defendant's claims for negligence were allowed, it would more than overwhelm the plaintiff's claim. [106] I agree with learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant is estopped from denying it had approved the drawing showing the shorter porch and it would be unconscionable for the defendant to now assert negligence against the plaintiff for something it had approved and signed off. See the case of TL MAC Motorsport Sdn Bhd v Mitsubhisi Motors Malaysia Sdn Bhd [2012] 3 MLJ 78 at [39]. Insufficient Drawings [107] The defendant also contended that the plaintiff did not prepare the drawings for the floor finishes, bathroom details, electrical layout and driveway. This allegation is misconceived as these drawings are set out in Answer 54 of PW2WS and are found at POBOD 6: a. Floor finishes – drawing HL-X/103/09/D07-b at page 237 is the tiling layout for Type B; 55 b. Floor finishes – drawing HL-X/103/09/D07-b at page 238 is the tiling layout for Type C and D; c. Bathroom details – drawing HL-X/103/09/D01-b1 at page 223 is the Toilet Detail 2 for Type B; d. Bathroom details – drawing HL-X/103/09/D01-d2 at page 228 is the Toilet Detail 2 for Type D; e. Electrical layout – drawing HL-X/103/09/E01-b at page 241 is the Electrical Layout for Type B; f. Electrical layout – drawing HL-X/103/09/E01-cd at page 242 is the Electrical Layout for Type C & D; g. Driveway – drawing HL-X/103/09/D07-b at page 237 shows the car porch for Type B; h. Driveway – drawing HL-X/103/09/D07-cd at page 238 shows the car porch for Type C and D; i. Roof fascia – this is shown in the sectional part of the drawings for Type B, C and D Floor Finish. 56 [108] Robert Tan when cross-examined on these drawings on 12 May 2016 had admitted that he would have signed these drawings though he could not recall with clarity. I find that on the balance of probabilities, the defendant had not proved that the above plans and drawings had not been prepared. It is more than probable that the plaintiff had prepared the plans and drawings for the above for how else could the contractor discharge their duties to build as per the plans and drawings? The Roof Fascia [109] The defendant contended that the drawing for roof fascia was not prepared. The roof fascia is the vertical finishing edge connected to the ends of the rafters, trusses or the area where the gutters are attached to the roof. It is said that the primary role of the fascia is to act as a layer between the edge of the roof and the outdoors. [110] The plaintiff did not deny that he did not prepare this. There is merit in the defendant's contention that as the roof fascia was not prepared, the main contractor had to do additional works to supply what was lacking in the roof fascia by way of Variation Orders and the extra works came up to RM99,967.40. The plaintiff did not produce detailed drawings for the roof fascia and had exposed the defendant to a Variation Order claim of 57 RM99,967.40 by the main contractor [DBOD-4 page 334]. This claim was made by the main contractor, Hasil Construction during Site Meeting No.20 on 3 January 2011 [PBOD-6, page 138, Item 2.02]. I agree with learned counsel for the defendant that the Architect should have issued a direction or instruction that this cost was not to be paid to the main contractor if he was of the opinion that this design had incorporated the roof fascia. This, he did not do. [111] The plaintiff did not dispute that this was the sum incurred except to say that no loss was suffered as the contract with the main contractor was a lump sum contract. [112] I do not see how that could be sustained as a defence as water would flow in during rain if there is no roof fascia and to supply what is lacking would of course incur additional costs in the form of Variation Orders. Robert Tan has a point to make when he aptly likened the embarrassing episode to buying a pair of shoes without shoe laces! [113] Where a matter is so obtrusively obvious, there is no need for an expert to be called to refute the fact that the roof fascia has to be provided for in the drawings, otherwise there would be a gap between the roof and the top part of the house where the construction ends. This is an exception 58 to the need to call an expert which is ordinarily required to disprove what is common practice among members, in this case of the architectural profession. Against the backdrop of the plaintiff's admission that he did not prepare the drawings for the roof fascia and the damage suffered which is not unforeseeable in the extra costs in the Variation Orders for the roof fascia, I would hold that the plaintiff had been negligent here and that the damage suffered had been proved. The plaintiff's portion of infrastructure costs [114] As for the claim for the contribution for the infrastructure costs of RM56,966.19 that has to be borne by the plaintiff, this is based on his shareholding in the defendant of 14.12%; the balance being held by Robert Tan and Azizi. [115] I agree with the learned counsel for the defendant that the development being that of a gated and guarded community, the facilities are shared in common. The infrastructure costs are specifically stated for the 20 units of semi detached houses in the plaintiff's Certificate of Payment [DBOD 4 pages 335-336]. [116] I find that the plaintiff has received the benefits of the common infrastructure in terms of earthworks, water reticulation, electrical cabling, 59 street lights, roads access, landscaping, boundary walls, guard house, roads and drains and sewerages. The plaintiff should pay his portion. These are standard utilities and facilities. This claim is not seriously disputed by the plaintiff and I would allow the defendant's claim for this sum. Pronouncement [117] On the balance of probabilities, I had allowed judgment for the plaintiff for his claim for the balance fees due to him of RM819,051.43. This shall carry interest of 5% per annum from date of filing i.e. 5 November 2015 to realization. [118] I had also allowed the defendant to enter judgment on their counterclaim for the sum of RM99,967.40 which had been incurred by them because of the plaintiff's negligence in not providing the drawings for the roof fascia. [119] A further judgment was also entered for the contribution of the plaintiff to the defendant for the infrastructure costs of RM56,966.19. [120] Interest in the counterclaim allowed shall be at 5% per annum from date of the counterclaim from 10 December 2015 to realization. 60 [121] After hearing parties on costs, this Court gave a single costs of RM18,000.00 to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff and allocator to be paid before extracting the order of costs. Dated: 15 December 2016. Sgd Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Malaya Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff : Chew Chang Min Messrs Chew Chang Min For the Defendant : Patrick Samuel The Law Office of Patrick Samuel Date of decision: 25 August 2016

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-65-08/2016

PLAINTIF Sazean Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd

29/12/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=aa0d3787-b2c4-4b16-94db-734f778ca308&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-65-08/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication between Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd as Claimant and Sazean Engineering & Constructions Sdn Bhd as Respondent (Adjudication Reference No. KLRCA/D/ADJ-0193- 2015) In the matter of the Adjudication between Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd as Claimant and Sazean Engineering & Constructions Sdn Bhd as Respondent (Adjudication Reference No. KLRCA/D/ADJ-0195- 2015) In the matter of the Adjudication between Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd as Claimant and Sazean Engineering & Constructions Sdn Bhd as Respondent (Adjudication Reference No. KLRCA/D/ADJ-194- 2015) And In the matter of Adjudication Decision dated 7.3.2016 by Lee Eu Kong In the matter of Adjudication Decision dated 14.3.2016 by Ramsun Ho Chii Huey 2 In the matter of Adjudication Decision dated 3.2.2016 by Edwin Lee Peng Khoon And In the matter of Sections 12, 15, 16, 24 and 32 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 and Rule 4 and 5 of the Construction Industry Payment & Adjudication Regulations, 2014 And In the matter of Order 7 and/or Order 92 Rule 4, Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN SAZEAN ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 738211-W) ... PLAINTIFF AND BUMI BERSATU RESOURCES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 858396-K) ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The nub of the complaint of the Respondent in the adjudication decisions granted in favour of the Claimant in the adjudication is that the Claimant does not have the capacity to proceed with the adjudication then 3 and now to oppose the various applications filed by the Respondent, in particular the setting aside of the adjudication decisions and correspondingly, to proceed with the enforcement of the adjudication decisions as a judgment of the Court. [2] Arising out of that, the solicitors who represented the Claimant then in the adjudication proceedings and now in the various applications, do not have the authority to represent the Claimant before this Court. It was argued that the Claimant had only one valid director then and that the other director had been made a bankrupt prior to the adjudication. It was also argued that the Claimant, being a company, had ceased to exist and that at the very least, it was paralyzed from bringing the adjudication proceedings and now, opposing the applications to set aside the adjudication decision. It was also argued that the adjudication decision was null and void for illegality and ought to be set aside. [3] In the adjudication proceedings, there was no Payment Response filed and neither was there an Adjudication Response filed by the Respondent. The learned adjudicators, had given the adjudication decision in all the three adjudications in favour of the Claimant. 4 Prayers [4] There are several actions filed by Sazean Engineering and Construction Sdn Bhd ("Sazean Engineering") arising out of the adjudication decisions given in favour of Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd ("Bumi Bersatu") the Claimant in the 3 adjudications. [5] In Originating Summons No. WA-24C-52-07/2016, Sazean Engineering as Plaintiff had prayed for the following against Bumi Bersatu as Defendant: That the Court do declare that the three Notices (Form No. 3) issued by the Defendant, in respect of the following adjudications by (i) Edwin Lee Peng Khoon, (ii) Lee Eu Kong and (iii) Ramsun Ho Chii Huey did not comply with the requirements of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act, 2012 (“CIPAA 2012“) and therefore the Court do declare that the appointment of the said three (3) adjudicators mentioned above for the three (3) adjudication proceedings between the Plaintiff and the Defendant is null and void, among others. [6] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering, after realizing that the Court was not with him in his argument in support of the above 5 Originating Summons, had withdrawn the Originating Summons and the Court had duly struck it out with no order as to costs. [7] Sazean Engineering as Plaintiff in this action in Originating Summons No. WA-24C-65-08/2016 had prayed for the following: That the three adjudication decisions by the said three (3) adjudicators as follows be set aside under section 15 CIPAA: (i) Adjudication Decision dated 3.2.2016 given by the adjudicator, Edwin Lee Peng Khoon; (ii) Adjudication Decision dated 7.3.2016 given by the adjudicator, Lee Eu Kong; and (iii) Adjudication Decision dated 14.3.2016 given by the adjudicator, Ramsun Ho Chii Huey. [8] Meanwhile Bumi Bersatu as successful Claimant had filed the following Originating Summons: 1. Originating Summons No. WA-24C-30-05/2016 for registering the adjudication decision at the High Court given by Adjudicator Ramsun Ho Chii Huey on 14.3.2016 for an adjudicated sum of RM749,462.30. 6 2. Originating Summons No. WA-24C-32-05/2016 for registering the adjudication decision at the High Court given by Adjudicator Lee Eu Kong on 7.3.2016 for an adjudicated sum of RM556,510.35. 3. Originating Summons No.: WA-24C-33-05/2016 for registering the adjudication decision at the High Court given by Adjudicator Edwin Lee Peng Khoon on 3.2.2016 for an adjudicated sum of RM2,007,605.42. [9] For all the 3 Originating Summonses, Sazean Engineering had filed an application to stay the Originating Summonses pending the disposal of Civil Suit No. WA-22C-33-05/2016 filed by Sazean Engineering as Plaintiff. [10] In Civil Suit No. WA-22C-33-05/2016 there are three (3) Defendants including Bumi Bersatu Resources Sdn Bhd (First Defendant), the Second Defendant (Bernard Lim Peng Hong) as director of the First Defendant and the Third Defendant (Misbahudin Bin Saringat) being a former employee (manager) of the Plaintiff. [11] This suit is by the Plaintiff is for the following prayers:. (i) That an Independent Quantity Surveyor be appointed by this Court to assess, re-value the work that has been done by the 7 Defendant in connection with the three sub-contracting and to assess the losses suffered by the Plaintiffs in the appointment new contractor in place of the Defendant and to assess the loss suffered by the Plaintiff in performing defective work and/or works that have not been completed by the Defendant to the sub-contract works known as 1B and 1C; (ii) Consistent with the Plaintiff’s affidavit claim in the above paragraph, the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the amount of damages to be assessed and/or evaluated by an Independent Quantity Surveyor for the appointment of new contractors and in rectifying the defective work and/or works that have not been completed by the Defendant in sub contract works known as 1B and 1C; (iii) RM2,065,247.46 as damages towards “LAD“ paid by the Plaintiff to house buyers in sub-contract known as Phase 1B and 1C; (iv) A compensation of RM10 million from the Defendants jointly and/or severally being liable for acts of misconduct, fraud, false claims, the intention of enriching themselves illegally, defaming the Plaintiff, breach, obligations and negligence; 8 (v) Costs. [12] Encik Halim Shah, Senior Federal Counsel from the Official Assignee's office has graciously come to Court to assist the Court on the position of Bernard Lim, a bankrupt, being sued by Plaintiff Sazean Engineering. He confirmed that no leave of Court had been obtained to proceed against the bankrupt and this Court had, at a later date, struck out the claim against the Second Defendant, Bernard Lim. [13] For the avoidance of confusion in the reference to the parties as Plaintiff or Defendant, the parties shall be referred to by their names or as Claimant or Respondent as they appeared in the adjudication. Principles Whether the various construction contracts executed by the bankrupt director of the Claimant are valid contracts upon which adjudication could proceed [14] It is clear from both the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 1965 and the Bankruptcy Act 1967 that a bankrupt cannot be or continue to be a director of a company or to be involved, directly or indirectly, in the management of a company. The question then is, what happens to contracts executed by the bankrupt director on behalf of the company? 9 [15] Section 125 of the Companies Act 1965 provides as follows: "Undischarged bankrupts acting as directors (1) Every person who being an undischarged bankrupt acts as director of, or directly or indirectly takes part in or is concerned in the management of, any corporation except with the leave of the Court shall be guilty of an offence against this Act. Penalty: Imprisonment for five years or one hundred thousand ringgit or both. (2) The Court shall not give leave under this section unless notice of intention to apply therefore has been served on the Minister and on the Official Receiver and the Minister and the Official Receiver or either of them may be represented at the hearing of and may oppose the granting of the application." [16] Section 38(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 reads as follows: "38. Consequences of refusal of discharge (1) When a bankrupt has not obtained his discharged: 10 (d) the bankrupt shall not, except with the previous permission of the Official Assignee or of the Court, enter into or carry on any business either alone or in a partnership, or become a Director of any company or otherwise directly or indirectly take part in the management of any company." (emphasis added)” [17] However there is a significant and saving provision in section 127 of the Companies Act 1965 which was considered in the recent case of Phang Tat Meng t/a Tat Meng Company v Reka Cipta Solusi Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 LNS 88 by Justice Lim Chong Fong JC. His Lordship captures the interplay between section 127 saving provision and section 125(1) disqualification provision as follows: “35. On the facts herein, the Defendants pointed out that the fraud alleged by the Plaintiff is plainly answered by s. 127 of the Companies Act 1965 which reads: 127. Validity of acts of directors and officers The acts of a director or manager or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification. 11 It is thus submitted that the Consent Judgment remains valid notwithstanding that the Plaintiff has subsequently discovered that the director who authorized the execution of the Consent Judgment is unfit to hold office as director by virtue of his bankruptcy. In other words, the bankruptcy of the director has no bearing on the validity of the Consent Judgment. The Defendants pointed out that Edgar Joseph Jr FCJ held as follows in the Federal Court case of Co-operative Central Bank Ltd (In receivership) v Feyen Development Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 313 at p.321 : “Nevertheless, the general rule is that a contract, the making of which is prohibited by statute expressly or by implication, and which stipulates for penalties for those entering into it, shall be void and unenforceable, unless the statute itself saves the contract or there are contrary intentions which can reasonably be read from the language of the statute itself. (See Holman v Johnson [1775] 98 ER 1120 at p 1121; Chung Khiaw Bank Ltd v Hotel Rasa Sayang Sdn Bhd & Anor [1990] 1 MLJ 356). However, the general rule is subject to exceptions and, at the end of the day, it is question of construction of the particular statute. This point 12 was aptly put by Gibbs CJ in Yango Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v First Chicago Australia Ltd [1978] 139 CLR 410 thus wise: “It is often said that a contract expressly or impliedly prohibited by statute is void and unenforceable. That statement is true as a general rule, but for complete accuracy it needs qualification, because it is possible for a statute in terms to prohibit a contract and yet to provide, expressly or impliedly, that the contract will be valid and enforceable …Where a statue imposes a penalty upon the making or performance of a contract, it is a question of construction whether the statue intends to prohibit the contract in this sense, that is, to render it void and unenforceable, or whether it intends only that the penalty for which it provides shall be inflicted if the contract is made or performed ”. (Emphasis supplied) ... “I am aware that by s.125(1) of the Companies Act 1965, an undischarged bankrupt cannot act as director …” ... 13 36. Reading ss 125(1) and s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 together, I am of the view that the statue contemplates only a penalty to be imposed on the undischarged bankrupt who has acted on behalf of the company but the statue does not avoid contracts entered into by him on behalf of the company such as in the case of the Consent Judgment herein. 37. Accordingly, the provisions in s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 is in my view sufficient to negate the fraud argument raised by the Plaintiff in attempt to set aside the Consent Judgment …the Plaintiff has also not adduced any evidence in the affidavits to illustrate how the Plaintiff was prejudiced or unduly influenced by the alleged fraud by deception through the non revelation or concealment of his bankruptcy by the bankrupt director. It must be borne in my mind that the First Defendant as a company is a separate legal entity from its directors and shareholders... 38. For completeness, I further hold that s.127 of the Companies Act 1965 herein overrides the common law specie of fraud due to concealment of material facts with knowledge of the materiality …” (emphasis added) 14 [18] The same principle was also enunciated in Stem Resources Sdn Bhd v Kekal Lestari Sdn Bhd & Satu Lagi [2013] 10 CLJ 727 where in the headnotes it is summarized as follows beginning at page 728: “Isu-isu yang timbul … sama ada perjanjian tersebut adalah tidak sah dan void ab initio memandangkan SP2 yang menandatangani perjanjian itu bagi plaintif merupakan seorang bankrap... (1) Perbuatan SP2 menandatangani perjanjian tersebut tidak menjejaskan kesahan atau kesahihan perjanjian tersebut menurut kuasa peruntukan s. 127 Akta Syarikat 1965 (‘Akta 125’). Seksyen 127 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan apa-apa perbuatan seseorang pengarah, pengurus atau setiausaha walaupun kemudiannya didapati ada kecacatan pada pelantikan atau kelayakannya. Seksyen 127 terpakai apabila terdapat pelantikan yang defektif seperti yang berlaku dalam hal pelantikan SP2 melalui resolusi bertarikh 15 Jun 2004. D1 dan D2 tidak boleh menyatakan perjanjian tersebut terbatal kerana s.127 Akta 125 mempunyai kesan mengesahkan perbuatan SP2 menandatangani perjanjian tersebut dan dengan itu, perjanjian yang ditandatangani adalah sah dan mengikat defendan. ... 15 (3) Perjanjian tersebut wujud, sah kerana ditandatangani dengan rela dan tanpa paksaan oleh D2 dan mengikat D1 kerana D2 sebagai seorang pengarah telah diberikan mandat oleh D3 untuk menandatanganinya walaupun mandat tersebut tidak dibuat dalam bentuk resolusi lembaga pengarah D1. Bukan menjadi tanggungjawab plaintif untuk memastikan bahawa D1 telah meluluskan resolusi memberi kebenaran kepada D2 untuk menandatangani perjanjian tersebut berdasarkan kepada prinsip pengurusan dalaman; Thong Guan Co (Pte) Ltd v Lam Kong Co Ltd (No 2) [1998] 3 CLJ 964 (dirujuk )”. (emphasis added) [19] The learned author in Walter Woon on Company Law (3rd Edition) Sweet & Maxwell, 2005 at pp 245-246 has this helpful explanation and rationale: Effect of Disqualifications 7.58 Generally, the effect of a disqualification under s 148, 149, 154 or 155 is to make it an offence for the disqualified person to be a director of a company or to manage companies whether directly or indirectly. This is not to say that the acts of such a person as a director are void. Nowhere in any of the sections is it said that a disqualified person automatically vacates office or that he lacks capacity to be a director. In fact, it is not unknown for a disqualified person to 16 continue to be a director despite the disqualification. An analogy may be drawn to a person who is disqualified from driving. He still may drive, but if he is caught doing so while under disqualification the authorities will throw the book at him. 7.59 Given that the sections do not provide for automatic vacation of office, the acts of the disqualified director must still be binding upon the company. He is still a director as far as the outside world is concerned. If he is not caught and prosecuted, there are no adverse consequences for him. On principle, his actual and apparent authority to bind the company must still continue, notwithstanding the fact that he is committing an offence by remaining in office. Any other rule would prejudice third parties who deal with the company because there is no way a third party can discover whether the person he is dealing with is disqualified. Moreover, s 151 provides that the acts of a director shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification. This section would protect outsiders against having transactions set aside because the company's directors are disqualified in some way. Because of the rule in Royal British Bank v Turquand, an outsider would not have to check whether the directors were properly appointed and qualified..." (emphasis added) 17 [20] Though the learned author was referring to sections 148, 149, 154 and 155 of the Singapore Companies Act, these provisions are similar to sections 125, 130, 130A of our Malaysian Companies Act 1965. [21] One cannot ignore the clear words of the saving provision in section 127 Companies Act 1965. It is there not just to protect third parties dealing with the company but also to protect the company itself against those who may want to take advantage of the act of bankruptcy of the director concerned. [22] Likewise should the adjudication decision or for that matter an arbitration award be in favour of the Respondent, the Claimant cannot claim that the contracts are null and void and unenforceable just because a bankrupt director had executed it on behalf of the company. The saving provision cuts both ways. In passing it should be stated that in Civil Suit No. WA-22C-33-05/2016, the Plaintiff there as Sazean Engineering had subsequently agreed with the Defendant Bumi Bersatu to stay the proceedings and have the matter referred to arbitration because of the arbitration clause. [23] Attention may also be drawn to what regulation 89 of the Fourth Schedule Table A, which is part of the Articles of Association of the Claimant, says: 18 "89. All acts done by any meeting of the directors or of a committee of directors or by any person acting as a director shall, notwithstanding that it is afterwards discovered that there was some defect in the appointment of any such director or person acting as aforesaid, or that they or any of them were disqualified, be as valid as if every such person had been duly appointed and was qualified to be a director." (emphasis added) [24] Therefore the construction contracts entered into by the Claimant and executed on its behalf by the bankrupt director Bernard Lim, are nevertheless valid construction contracts upon which adjudication may proceed. It is not null and void or illegal and because of the saving provision, the adjudication decision given is not one improperly procured through fraud under section 15(a) CIPAA under which provision the Respondent Sazean Engineering has sought to set it aside. Whether the Claimant's Counsel Mr. Steven Seah Shu Keen and the legal firm of Messrs. P.Y. Hoh & Tai have due authority to act for the Claimant in these proceedings before this Court. [25] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering as Respondent in the adjudications had raised this preliminary objection based on the fact that Bumi Bersatu, at the material time i.e. from the time the 3 adjudications were commenced right to the present time when these applications were 19 filed in Court, did not have a valid Board of Directors as required under the Companies Act, 1965 in that the company did not meet the requirement of a minimum of two (2) directors to be in compliance with Section 122 of the Companies Act, 1965. Thus, it was submitted that the said counsel and the said solicitors did not have instructions to act for Bumi Bersatu and/or any such instructions received was improper and unauthorized. [26] It was argued that the invalid Board had arisen from the fact that at the material time, in fact long before the adjudication process was commenced, i.e. since 5 October 2012, one of the only two directors, that is one Bernard Lim Peng Hong had already been adjudicated a bankrupt. It was highlighted that no official sanction from the DGI as required under the bankruptcy laws was obtained for Bernard Lim Peng Hong to continue to act as a Director of the Claimant company. The only other director of the Claimant company was one Rosnah Binti Madan. [27] Therefore, in law, it was argued that the Claimant Company cannot function with only one Director since the Claimant was in breach of Section 122(1) of the Companies Act, 1965. The discovery of the bankruptcy of Bernard Lim was made by Sazean Engineering through a bankruptcy search dated 28 July 2016 wherein it was discovered that he had been made a bankrupt on 5 October 2012. Bernard Lim Peng Hong 20 had affirmed an Affidavit on 6 September 2016 in opposing the setting aside Originating Summons wherein at paragraph 5 thereof he has admitted that he only came to know on 6 February 2014 that he has been made a bankrupt. [28] In support of the above proposition, learned counsel for Sazean Engineering had referred to the case of Basi Controls (M) Sdn Bhd v Nirex Engineering & Automation (M) Sdn Bhd [2009] 10 CLJ 48 at page 52, where the Court observed as follows: "[10] Menurut s. 125(1) Akta Syarikat 1965 seorang bankrap, dalam kes ini Ravindranathan T Subramaniam, hendaklah memperolehi kebenaran mahkamah untuk bertindak sebagai pengarah syarikat bagi Basi Controls (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd. Larangan yang sama juga terdapat dalam s. 38(1)(d) Akta Kebankrapan 1967. Namun saya dapati tiada keterangan yang dikemukakan untuk menunjukkan bahawa kebenaran untuk beliau bertindak sebagai pengarah itu telah diperolehi. ... [13] Memandangkan fakta bahawa salah seorang pengarah telah pun dijatuhkan bankrap dan dua pengarah yang lain telah pun meletakkan jawatan sebagai pengarah-pengarah Basi Controls 21 (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, dan tiada pula keterangan yang adanya pengarah-pengarah lain yang dilantik, maka amatlah nyata hanya tinggal seorang sahaja pengarah iaitu Thavaratnaraja T Subramaniam di dalam Syarikat Basi Controls (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd; syarikat plaintif. [14] Fakta tentang jumlah pengarah yang ada di dalam syarikat Basi Controls (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd amat penting untuk menentukan sama ada T/n K Mano & Associates mempunyai autoriti untuk bertindak bagi pihak syarikat plaintif itu. Jika diteliti lagi peruntukan Akta Syarikat 1965, s. 122(1) nya jelas memperuntukkan bahawa "every company shall have at least two directors who each has his principal or only place of residence within Malaysia". Berdasarkan kepada peruntukan s. 122(1) ini, adalah jelas bahawa sebenarnya tiada kuorum di dalam Syarikat Basi Controls (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd sejak awal lagi, iaitu sebelum tindakan ini difailkan pada 26 Disember 2007 dan juga dalam memberikan autoriti kepada Tetuan K Mano & Associates untuk memfailkan tindakan ini. ... 22 [17] Di dalam kes William Jacks & Co (M) Sdn Bhd v Chemquip (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 1 CLJ 184; [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 218 mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa: In my view the correct proposition is that the method of raising the question of want of authority is usually by a substantive application to stay proceedings. That is not the only permitted manner. The Court may in its inherent jurisdiction entertain the challenge made orally at any stage of the proceedings and may refuse to proceed further with the proceedings if the Court can come to a conclusion on sufficient or admitted evidence that there is no action properly before it. In this case the challenge had been made. The burden of proving that the suit had been instituted with proper authority therefore rests on the plaintiff company (see United Investment & Finance Ltd, v. Tee Chin Yong & Ors [1966] 1 LNS 207; [1967] 1 MLJ 31) Counsel for the plaintiff did not produce any evidence to show that there was proper authority. I find there is sufficient evidence before me to conclude that there was lack of authority to 23 institute the proceedings. I therefore find the action irregular and should be struck out. [18] Sentimen yang sama telahpun diikuti di dalam kes Yukilon Manufacturing Sdn Bhd & Anor v. Dato' Wong Gek Meng & Ors [1997] 2 CLJ 467 di mana telah diputuskan antara lain bahawa: The lack of authority of the solicitors to act can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings. Once the challenge has been advanced, like the present case, the burden of proving that the suit has been instituted with proper authority must rest on the plaintiffs. [19] Pihak plaintif telah cuba menunjukkan satu resolusi pengarah yang bertarikh 20 Disember 2007 di dalam kandungan (24) eks. TVR1 bahawa persaraan tiga orang pengarah, Bengt - Olof Crister Sten, Edna Concepcion atas alasan sudah tidak berada di Malaysia selama lebih 15 tahun dan Ravindranathan a/l T Subramaniam telah diterima dan diluluskan serta pelantikan T/n K Mano & Associates sebagai peguam syarikat dan juga pelantikan Sahadevan a/l Munusamy sebagai setiausaha syarikat. Namun soalnya, siapakah yang menerima dan memutuskan ini bagi pihak lembaga pengarah? Pada pandangan saya lembaga pengarah syarikat plaintif pada ketika itu telah tidak tertubuh 24 dengan sempurna. Malahan setiausaha pun tidak ada. Jadi di manalah autoriti lembaga pengarah untuk membuat keputusan? [20] Jadi berdasarkan fakta-fakta yang ada di hadapan saya, saya dengan jelasnya berpendapat bahawa sama ada plaintif mahu pun peguamnya T/n K Mano & Associates sendiri telah gagal untuk mengemukakan autoriti dalam memfailkan tindakan ini bagi pihak Basi Controls (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd memandangkan keadaan Syarikat Basi Controls (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd yang tidak teratur ketika itu. Sebagai peguam beliau sepatutnya peka dengan situasi syarikat itu yang sudah tidak mematuhi peruntukan undang-undang yang berkaitan. ... [27] Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa kos tindakan ini dibayar oleh T/n K Mano & Associates. Peguamcara defendan dalam hujahan telah merujuk kepada dua keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang akan saya perturunkan di bawah. [28] Pertamanya, dalam kes Mohd Yusof Awang & Anor v Malayan Banking Bhd & Anor [1995] 1 LNS 296 YA Zakaria J (ketika itu) telah mengikut prinsip yang diputuskan dalam 25 kes Yonjee v Toynbee [1909] 1 KB 215 dan menyatakan seperti yang berikut: ... The Court of Appeal allowed the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that the solicitors who had taken on themselves to act for the defendant in the action had thereby impliedly warranted that he had authority to do so, and therefore were liable personally to pay the plaintiff's costs of the action. [29] Keduanya, dalam kes Syawal Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Anor v Davasari Sdn Bhd [1993] 2 CLJ 568 Mahkamah Tinggi telah memutuskan seperti yang berikut: [1] The writ having been caused to be issued by the solicitors purporting to act as agents of the plaintiffs and it having been found that the plaintiffs had not in fact appointed the solicitors to cause the writ to issue or at all, the solicitors have to bear the consequences of their unauthorized dragging of the defendants to Court. [2] The defendants are entitled to have an order against the solicitors in respect of the costs of the action." (emphasis added) 26 [29] The above case can be distinguished from the present case. There, when challenged on the authority of solicitors to act for the Plaintiff company, the remaining one director was not able to produce any affidavit of the last director agreeing to the action being commenced. If the last director that resigned or vacated the office would leave the company with fewer than 2 directors, then his resignation or vacation of office is ineffective under section 122(6) Companies Act 1965. Presumably that director would still be a valid director and he could agree to the action being taken if he had wanted to. [30] It would appear that it was the bankruptcy of the director that was the act that had caused the number of qualified directors to fall below 2, for the other 2 directors had resigned earlier as they had left the country. For the purpose of the validity of the action of the company, the so-called disqualified director shall still be considered a director of the company as there is no automatic vacating of an office. If he had authorized the action of the company, the authority to appoint the said solicitors could still be given. From the facts narrated that does not seem to have been obtained. [31] It does not appear that the significance and saving provision of section 127 Companies Act 1965 has been brought to the attention of the Court in Basi Controls case (supra). Section 127 reads as follows: 127. Validity of acts of directors and officers 27 The acts of a director or manager or secretary shall be valid notwithstanding any defect that may afterwards be discovered in his appointment or qualification. [32] The other equally relevant provision is section 122(6) Companies Act 1965 which provides that the resignation or vacation of office as a director is not valid if the result would be that the remaining number of directors is just one. [33] There were initially 2 directors of the Claimant i.e. Bernard Lim and Rosnah. After Bernard Lim had been adjudicated a bankrupt, though he is disqualified as a director, his office as a director is not vacated immediately. He would have committed an offence both under section 125(1) of the Companies Act 1965 as well as under section 38(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967. [34] However his action continues to bind the company that he represents. It would have, of course, been prudent for a new director to be appointed in his place as his offence would be a continuing offence with a continuing fine for each day the offence is being committed. His actions bind outsiders who would be dealing with the company, unaware of his disqualification. 28 [35] I cannot agree with the submission of learned counsel for Sazean Engineering that the Claimant company is non-functional, paralyzed or much less, non-existent altogether. According to learned counsel the reason is that there was insufficient quorum needed to form the Board of Directors and as such the Claimant could not have legitimately authorized the said solicitors. [36] Just because the number of directors has fallen below the minimum number of 2 does not mean that company is non-functional or paralyzed as the salaries will still have to be paid, contractual commitments have still to be met, statutory filings would still have to be and assets of the company are still available for judgment creditors to execute on. A company would exist until it is wound up, dissolved and finally struck out by the Registrar of Companies. Until then it could sue and be sued provided the last 2 directors would still authorise the action though an offence would have been committed by the disqualified directors. [37] The saving provision is not only to protect innocent third parties who do not know of the disqualification of any of its directors but also to protect the company itself which is a separate legal entity from its shareholders and directors from being taken advantage of by third parties. However any attempt to continue as a director after an act of disqualification such as being adjudicated a bankrupt would expose that 29 director to criminal prosecution. The company of which the bankrupt is a director is still safe and intact by virtue of the combined operation of section 122(6) and 127 of the Companies Act 1965. [38] Here work has been done by the Claimant as subcontractor for Sazean Engineering as main contractor in a construction contract with respect to the construction of link houses in Shah Alam and based on the evidence and in the absence of a payment response, the learned adjudicator had found a sum due to the Claimant from the Respondent. [39] Here both the 2 initial directors, Bernard Lim and Rosnah binti Madan have each affirmed affidavits to authorize the current actions and the adjudication. That alone would be sufficient as it is not denied that the said counsel and solicitors have prepared the various cause papers and affidavits filed in both the adjudication and the current court proceedings. [40] Leaned counsel for Sazean Engineering referred to the Court of Appeal case of Hoh Kiang Ngan & Ors v Hoh Han Keyet [2013] 4 MLJ 199 at p 210 and 212 where it held as follows with respect of a company having one director only: "[13] ... Issue 3 — Whether with the removal of the respondent as a director of the company, the company was in breach of s 122(1) of the 30 Companies Act 1965 in that the company did not have at least two directors who each has his principal or only place of residence in Malaysia. At the AGM held on 12 July 2011, four directors were elected on to the board of directors namely George Hoh, Frank Hoh ('the first appellant') Jonathan Hoh ('the fourth appellant') and Leonard Hoh ('the tenth appellant'). The respondent contended that with his non re-election as a director, the company did not have as at 12 July 2011, at least two directors whose 'principal or only place of residence' is in Malaysia in compliance with s 122(1) of the Companies Act 1965. It is not disputed that Jonathan Hoh and Leonard Hoh, the directors nominated and elected to represent the family branches of Derek Hoh and Richard Hoh respectively, do not reside in Malaysia as their principal place of residence is in Australia. It is also not disputed that George Hoh has his principal residence in Malaysia. However, what is in dispute and hotly contested is the principal residence of Frank Hoh (the first appellant). The learned judge found that Frank Hoh's principal place of residence was not in Malaysia but in Australia and consequently the company was in breach of s 122(1) of the Companies Act 1965. It would follow therefor that the resolutions passed at the AGM are null 31 and void and that pursuant to s 122(6) of the Companies Act 1965 the removal of the respondent as a director is invalid; ... [17] And that as Frank Hoh did not have his principal place of residence in Malaysia and with the removal of the respondent, the number of directors with a principal place of residence in Malaysia fell below two and the company was thus in breach of s 122(1) of the Companies Act 1965. Consequently the resolutions passed at the AGM are null and void." (emphasis added) [41] I have no problem with such a proposition of the law. The removal of the resident director is of course not valid under section 122(6) Companies Act 1965 as the removal or non-election leaves the company with just 1 resident director. Consequently the resolutions passed at the AGM were null and void. [42] In the present case the disqualification to be a director having set in with Bernard's bankruptcy, his vacating the office of a director is not valid until a new director is appointed in his place. His action in authorizing the adjudication proceedings and the court proceedings is nevertheless valid under section 122(6) read with section 127 Companies Act 1965 and 32 when raised, the remaining director Rosnah had affirmed her affidavit confirming the adjudication proceedings and the court proceedings. [43] To avoid the continuing commission of offences under the Companies Act and Bankruptcy Act, a new director Allan Loong has been appointed in place of Bernard Lim. [44] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering also cited the case of Wong Ha & Anor v Albert Ng Keng Wan @ Ng King Wan & 3 Ors [2010] 1 LNS, 1830, where Justice Tengku Maimun Tuan Mat J. (now JCA) stated the following in respect of an undischarged bankrupt director and Section 122(1) of the Companies Act, 1965: "On 20.7.2010, a notice of change of solicitors acting for the plaintiffs was filed (end 10) and on 21.7.2010 an application was filed to substitute the 1st plaintiff (end 11). From the chronology, it is clear to me that there had been inaction on the part of the plaintiffs. In respect of the deceased 1st plaintiff, probate was granted on 11.1.2010 yet the application to substitute was not made until the action is fixed for show cause. No explanation was given as to the delay in taking the necessary steps to substitute the 1st plaintiff. 33 Further, in respect of the 2nd plaintiff, he was adjudged a bankrupt on 6.5.2009. Nothing was done to obtain leave of the court pursuant to section 38 (1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967. Again there is no explanation on why nothing was done to regularize the proceedings in respect of the 2nd plaintiff. As submitted by learned counsel for the defendants, the Notice of change filed in respect of the 2nd plaintiff is in effect a nullity (see Chin Kon Nam & Anor v Chai Yun Phin Development Sdn Bhd [1996] 1 CLJ 444). The burden is on the plaintiff to explain the reason or reasons for his inaction if he does not desire the action to be dismissed. If no satisfactory explanation is offered by the plaintiff for the delay it would mean that his action amounts to intentional and contumelious conduct warranting the Court to strike out the suit. In the instant case, there is no explanation for the delay as no affidavit was filed by the plaintiffs on the show cause. The fact that there is an application pending in the court file to substitute the plaintiff does not in itself offer any explanation on the delay. Further, it must be noted that essentially the relief sought by the plaintiffs against the defendants is to reinstate the 1st plaintiff who had since died and the 2nd plaintiff who is an undischarged bankrupt as directors of the 3rd and 4th defendant. 34 Under section 38(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, the 2nd plaintiff shall not, except with the previous permission of the Director General of Insolvency or of the Court become the director of any company. Similar provision is present in section 122 of the Companies Act. There is no evidence that the previous permission of the DGI or the Court has been obtained. Given that the 2nd plaintiff is incompetent to be a director, the only other person left is the 1st plaintiff, the deceased. Pursuant to section 122 of the Companies Act, every company shall have at least two directors. In the circumstances, no purpose would be served to allow the action to remain. To conclude, I was satisfied that there was an intentional and contumelious default on the part of the plaintiffs in prosecuting the action. I accordingly made the order as stated above." (emphasis added) [45] In the above case, there was of course, nothing that could prevent death from overtaking a director or for that matter, anyone. If the remaining single director had been interested in continuing with the action, he could have asked the company to convene a meeting of the shareholders for 2 new directors to be appointed or to apply to court for a 35 new directors to be appointed even though the quorum has fallen below 2. His disinterest has resulted in the Court striking out the action. [46] Whilst it is true that Bernard Lim Peng Hong is an undischarged bankrupt at all material times and that he did not obtain a sanction from the DGI to continue to act as a director, that is not the equivalent of no board of directors being functional as Parliament has intervened in section 127 Companies Act 1965 to prevent incapacity or paralysis of a company to set in, affecting the rights of innocent third parties and rights of the company itself that has accrued. If the company has assets, the assets would still belong to the company in spite of a director's disqualification so that creditors are not prejudiced. Likewise amounts due and owing to the Claimant for work done and certified under a Certificate of Payment does not cease to be due and owing merely because a director is disqualified and there is only one remaining director. [47] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering also referred to the Memorandum and Articles of Association ("M & A") of the Claimant company, Bumi Bersatu wherein Regulation 1 at page 4 of the said M & A incorporates Table A of the Fourth Schedule of the Companies Act, 1965 to be applicable to the Claimant company. The relevant regulations of the Table A in the Fourth Schedule are reproduced below for easy reference: Regulation 66 which states: 36 "The company at the meeting at which a director so retires may fill the vacated office by electing a person thereto, and in default the retiring director shall, if offering himself for re- election and not being disqualified under the Act from holding office as a director, be deemed to have been re-elected, unless at that meeting it is expressly resolved not to fill the vacated office unless a resolution for the re-election of that director is put to the meeting and lost." Regulation 72(b) which states: "72. The office of director shall become vacant if the director - (b) becomes bankrupt or makes any arrangement or composition with his creditors generally.” Regulation 83 which states: "83. The quorum necessary for the transaction of the business of the directors may be fixed by the directors, and unless so fixed shall be two." [48] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering submitted that the Claimant was not in compliance with its own M & A when the number of directors fell below 2 with the directorship of Bernard Lim falling vacant because of bankruptcy. However the Articles of Association of a company 37 is subject to the Companies Act 1965 and here the Act itself has provided by way of section 122(6) that such a vacation of office would be invalid if it causes the number of directors to fall below 2. [49] Section 122 reads as follows: "122. Directors (1) Every company shall have at least two directors, who each has his principal or only place of residence within Malaysia. (1A) In subsection (1), "director" shall not include an alternate or substitute director. (2) No person other than a natural person of full age shall be a director of a company. (3) The first directors of a company shall be named in the memorandum or articles of the company. (4) Any provision in the memorandum or articles of a company which was in force immediately before the commencement of this Act and which operated to constitute a corporation as a director of the company shall be read and construed as if it authorized that corporation to appoint a natural person to be a director of that company. 38 (5) On the commencement of this Act any corporation which holds office as a director of a company shall cease to hold office and the vacancy may be filled as a casual vacancy in accordance with the articles of the company. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in the memorandum or articles of a company or in any agreement with a company, a director of a company shall not resign or vacate his office if, by his resignation or vacation from office, the number of directors of the company is reduced below the minimum number required by subsection (1) and any purported resignation or vacation of office in contravention of this section shall be deemed to be invalid. (7) Subsection (6) shall not apply where a director of a company is required to resign or vacate his office if he has not within the period referred to in subsection 124(1) obtained his qualification or by virtue of his disqualification under this Act or any other written law." (emphasis added) [50] Section 122(6), starting as it does with the words "Notwithstanding anything ...", is in the nature of a non-obstante clause in that it has the power to override other provisions of the same Act or the memorandum 39 or articles of association of the company. This is so in spite of the fact that an offence would have been committed by giving section 122(6) an overriding effect over other provisions of the Act in the event of a conflict. [51] Thus whilst Bernard Lim cannot continue to act as a director and it would be an offence for him to do so by virtue of section 125(1), yet he cannot effectively vacate the office of a director under section 122(6) Companies Act 1965. [52] This is in spite of Regulation 72 Table A that seems to provide for an automatic vacating of a director's office for it reads: "72. The office of director shall become vacant if the director— (a) ceases to be a director by virtue of the Act; (b) becomes bankrupt or makes any arrangement or composition with his creditors generally; (c) becomes prohibited from being a director by reason of any order made under the Act; (d) becomes of unsound mind or a person whose person or estate is liable to be dealt with in any way under the law relating to mental disorder; (e) resigns his office by notice in writing to the company; 40 (f) for more than six months is absent without permission of the directors from meetings of the directors held during that period; (g) without the consent of the company in general meeting holds any other office of profit under the company except that of managing director or manager; or (h) is directly or indirectly interested in any contract or proposed contract with the company and fails to declare the nature of his interest in manner required by the Act" (emphasis added) [53] As stated above, the non-obstante clause prevails over a contrary provision even in the memorandum and articles of association as well. Parliament provides an exception in section 122(7) where failure to attain share qualification of a director is concerned under section 124(3) Companies Act 1965. [54] It is not a case of Parliament encouraging the breaking of the law in allowing an offence to continue under section 125(1) but that it has to protect outsiders having a contractual relationship with the company and the company having continuing rights as well as obligations. In other words, both the outsiders and the company should not suffer just because a director of the company has been adjudged a bankrupt. 41 [55] Little wonder that there is Regulation 68 in Table A to allow for this impasse to be ironed out in that the remaining single director may have the power to appoint another director to fill the vacancy caused by the bankrupt director's disqualification. This is normally done by the bankrupt director resigning and a new director being appointed. [56] Regulation 68 Table A reads as follows: "68. The directors shall have power at any time, and from time to time, to appoint any person to be a director, either to fill a casual vacancy or as an addition to the existing directors, but so that the total number of directors shall not at any time exceed the number fixed in accordance with these regulations. Any director so appointed shall hold office only until the next following annual general meeting, and shall then be eligible for re-election but shall not be taken into account in determining the directors who are to retire by rotation at that meeting." [57] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering had referred the court to Regulation 83 which requires a quorum of 2 directors to transact the business of the directors without referring to Regulation 84 Table A which is pertinent to the issue at hand and it reads as follows: 42 "84. The continuing directors may act notwithstanding any vacancy in their body, but if and so long as their number is reduced below the number fixed by or pursuant to the regulations of the company as the necessary quorum of directors, the continuing directors or director may act for the purpose of increasing the number of directors to that number or of summoning a general meeting of the company, but for no other purpose." (emphasis added) [58] As commented by the learned author Chen Thim Wai in "Guide to Table A - Articles of Association", LexisNexis 2012 at page 187: "Regulation 84 allows the continuing directors even if their number is less than the quorum to exercise the powers provided in regulation 68 to appoint additional directors to make up the quorum, but for no other purpose. The usefulness of regulation 84 is illustrated in Liwa Holdings Sdn Bhd v Chi Liung Holdings Sdn Bhd [1998] 4 MLJ 465 at p 471 where the remaining director, after the death of the other director, was able to invoke the article with provisions similar to regulation 84 to appoint a new director to fill the vacancy." (emphasis added) [59] Learned counsel for Sazean Engineering sees something suspicious and sinister when he submitted that the appointment of the 43 new director, namely Allan Loong Hock Meng on 11 July 2016 and the resignation of Bernard Lim Peng Hong on the same day is a deceptive and dishonest trickery on the part of the Claimant company and is an afterthought. [60] Learned counsel surmised that when he raised the issues of Bernard Lim Peng Hong's status at the hearing on 28 July 2016 and at subsequent hearings, presumably, the Claimant had, in order to show that there was a change in the company's records, i.e. prior to the objection being raised, the Claimant had via the Claimant's First Affidavit in Reply affirmed on 22 August 2016 produced the Form 49 as exhibit A-1 of the said affidavit. The said Affidavit affirmed by Lee Kee Loong verified that the Form 49 was dated 11 July 2016. However the Form 49 was not lodged until 8 August 2016. [61] Nothing turns on this. The statutory period for lodging the relevant Form 49 has been complied with. The Form 49 was signed by the other director Rosnah binti Madan on 11 July 2016. Under section 141(6) the Form 149 is to be lodged with the Registrar of Companies within a month from the date of a person ceases to be a director or becomes a director. The date of lodgment of the Form 49 being on 8 August 2016 is within the statutory prescribed timeframe. Section 141(6)(b) reads as follows: 44 "(b) within one month after a person ceases to be, or becomes, a director of the company, a return in the prescribed form notifying the Registrar of the change and containing, with respect to each then director of the company, the particulars required to be specified in the register;" [62] When a challenge is raised by an outsider that a certain director, in this case, Bernard Lim, has no authority to cause the Claimant company to bring this action or to commence the adjudication, the burden of proof of having such authority lies on the person claiming the authority. Going by the saving provision of section 127 read together with section 122(6) Companies Act, the said Bernard Lim, has the authority to bring the adjudication proceedings and these various actions in Court. The other director Rosnah Binti Madan had on 22 August 2016, affirmed an affidavit to that effect. In fact all the 3 Notices of Adjudication were signed by Rosnah. [63] Even assuming that the said Bernard Lim has no authority to commence these various actions, that has been ratified with the appointment of Allan Loong Hock Meng as a director in place of Bernard Lim and by the Affidavit of Allan Loong dated 22 August 2016. [64] It was also submitted that Bernard Lim Peng Hong had purportedly transferred his 50,000 shares in the Claimant company. [Please refer to 45 Exhibit "D-4" in the Afidavit Balasan Ketiga Defendan Pertama by Lee Kee Loong in O.S. No.: WA-24C-52-07/2016 affirmed on 5.8.2016]. This exhibit is Form 32 i.e. Form of Transfer of Securities to be lodged with CCM. This particular averment is not relevant with respect to the issue of the authority of solicitors to act. At any rate there is the other shareholder Rosnah Binti Madan with 50,000 shares. In any event this particular Originating Summons had been withdrawn by Sazean Engineering and struck out. [65] I agree that as Bernard Lim Peng Hong is an undischarged bankrupt, he cannot transfer his shares in a company which has become vested with the DGI and such transfer cannot be done without the sanction of the DGI. No such sanction has been obtained. However nothing turns on this with respect to the directors of the Claimant company authorizing and ratifying the action of the Claimant in the adjudication and in the current court proceedings. As was held in Malayan Land Investment Co (Pte) Ltd v Sathask Realty Sdn Bhd [2001] 1 MLJ 451, when the authority of a director is being challenged, the Court would, on an application made by the person claiming such authority, grant a stay of the action for the company to ratify the bringing of the action. 46 [66] I also find that there is merits in the submission of learned counsel for the Claimant that indeed both Allan Loong and Lee Kee Loong were acting as de facto directors of the Claimant during the material time as confirmed by Bernard Lim and so they are both directors within the meaning of section 4 of the Companies Act 1965. [67] Section 4 under the definition of "director" reads as follows: "director" includes any person occupying the position of director of a corporation by whatever name called and includes a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a corporation are accustomed to act and an alternate or substitute director” [68] It was submitted with considerable persuasion by learned counsel for the Claimant that a director is not defined by the label given to him but rather by his function in a company. The cases cited in support of this proposition are as follows: 1 Ravichanthiran Ganesan v Percetakan Wawasan Maju Sdn Bhd & Ors [2008] 9 CLJ 546 summarizes as follows in the headnotes: “(1) The plaintiff was in law a director of the first defendant in accordance with the definition of the word ‘director’ in s.4 as well as s.122 of the Companies Act 1965. From documentary evidence, 47 it was axiomatic that the plaintiff had voluntarily offered himself to be a director of the first defendant and had even procured steps to push / expedite for an extraordinary general meeting … Hence if the plaintiff was to be remunerated in his capacity as a director, then it was only fair and reasonable for him to assume and undertake the responsibilities attached to the said position, as a director of the first defendant company…” (emphasis added) 2 Peninsular Fibre Industries Sdn Bhd v Tan Yoke Chin [2013] 1 LNS 119 states as follows: “23. The existence de facto and a shadow director is also recognized by the Companies Act 1965…This could be gleaned from the interpretation of the word of ‘director’ in section 4 of the Companies Act 1965 which states that a ‘director’ includes any person occupying the position of a director and includes a person in accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors of a corporation are accustomed to act and an alternate or substitute director. ... 23. It is not necessary to demonstrate the existence of actual directions or instructions to constitute directorship. What the plaintiff 48 needed to do was to show evidence of controlling or commanding role exercised by the shadow director over the de jure directors” (emphasis added) 3 Cepat Wawasan Group Bhd & Anor v Tengku Dato’ Kamal Ibni Sultan Sir Abu Bakar & Ors [2008] 2 CLJ 620 states as follows: “[12] A director is not necessarily defined by his designation as such but rather by the dominant or controlling role that he plays in running the company. The above definition encompasses a de facto as well as a shadow director." (emphasis added) [69] It is not necessary for this Court to go down that road having found that the vacating of office of a director by Bernard Lim is ineffective and invalid. At any rate there was a valid board for the Claimant with respect to the adjudication and court actions filed, whether comprising of Bernard Lim and Rosnah Binti Madan or of the de facto directors Allan Loong and Lee Kee Loong. [70] With that too, both the counsel and solicitors for the Claimant have the proper authority to act for the Claimant. It cannot be seriously disputed that all the 4 of them, Bernard Lim, Rosnah Binti Madan, Allan Loong and Lee Kee Loong have instructed the said solicitors and all have signed affidavits prepared by the said solicitors upon their instructions. 49 [71] Much reliance was placed by the learned counsel for Sazean Engineering on the case of Foo Fatt Chuen v Jacobson Cheong Weng Hin & Ors [2012] 3 CLJ 632 and Lee Soo You (Trading Under The Name And Style Of Ak Piling Construction) v Pembinaan Wincon Sdn Bhd [2014] 5 MLJ 522. However those cases are not cases where a director of a company has subsequently become a bankrupt but rather cases involving an individual bankrupt contracting with a third party. Such a contract is void for illegality and unenforceable. [72] By way of passing, learned counsel for Sazean Engineering had submitted that the adjudication decisions should be set aside on ground of breach of natural justice. It has not been shown how natural justice has been breached in arriving at the decisions that the 3 Adjudicators did as there were no Payment Response nor Adjudication Response filed. It is too late in the day to now say that the learned adjudicators had not taken into consideration the effect of a "Stop Order" issued by PKNS or that there were 2 different versions of the Statement of Final Accounts. In any event these are matters that can be fully ventilated in the arbitration that the parties have agreed to proceed with. There is also no evidence to show that the 3 adjudicators had failed to act independently or impartially in arriving at their respective decisions. 50 Whether stay of the adjudication decision should be made in the circumstances of this case pending the disposal of the civil suit filed [73] There is no good reason shown in the affidavits for stay. The fact that there is a fresh suit just filed in WA-22C-33-05/2016 is only a threshold triggering condition under section 16 CIPAA. [74] Section 16 reads as follows: "16. Stay of Adjudication Decision (1) A party may apply to the High Court for a stay of an adjudication decision in the following circumstances: (a) An application to set aside the adjudication decision under section 15 has been made; or (b) The subject matter of the adjudication decision is pending final determination by arbitration or the court. (2) The High Court may grant a stay of the adjudication decision or order the adjudicated amount or part of it to be deposited with the Director of the KLRCA or make any other order as it thinks fit." 51 [75] Sazean Engineering must show special circumstance as in that should they pay now to Bumi Bersatu, they would not reasonably be able to get their money back. Nothing close to that has been shown. The Claimant is certainly not insolvent and if it is a case where the Claimant's account is not too healthy, that is partly attributed to the adjudicated sum of about RM3.2 million outstanding which has not been paid by Sazean Engineering. [76] The following guidelines propounded by Justice Peter Coulson QC in the Wimbledon Construction Company 2000 Ltd v Vago [2005] EWHC 1086 (TCC) are helpful in deciding how discretion for stay of an adjudication decision ought to be exercised having in mind always the special circumstances of each case: "26. In a number of the authorities which I have cited above the point has been made that each case must turn on its own facts. Whilst I respectfully agree with that, it does seem to me that there are a number of clear principles which should always govern the exercise of the court's discretion when it is considering a stay of execution in adjudication enforcement proceedings. Those principles can be set out as follows: a) Adjudication (whether pursuant to the 1996 Act or the consequential amendments to the standard forms of building 52 and engineering contracts) is designed to be a quick and inexpensive method of arriving at a temporary result in a construction dispute. b) In consequence, adjudicators' decisions are intended to be enforced summarily and the claimant (being the successful party in the adjudication) should not generally be kept out of its money. c) In an application to stay the execution of summary judgment arising out of an Adjudicator's decision, the Court must exercise its discretion under Order 47 with considerations a) and b) firmly in mind (see AWG). d) The probable inability of the claimant to repay the judgment sum (awarded by the Adjudicator and enforced by way of summary judgment) at the end of the substantive trial, or arbitration hearing, may constitute special circumstances within the meaning of Order 47 rule 1(1)(a) rendering it appropriate to grant a stay (see Herschell). e) If the claimant is in insolvent liquidation, or there is no dispute on the evidence that the claimant is insolvent, then a stay of execution will usually be granted (see Bouygues and Rainford House). 53 f) Even if the evidence of the claimant's present financial position suggested that it is probable that it would be unable to repay the judgment sum when it fell due, that would not usually justify the grant of a stay if: (i) the claimant's financial position is the same or similar to its financial position at the time that the relevant contract was made (see Herschell); or (ii) The claimant's financial position is due, either wholly, or in significant part, to the defendant's failure to pay those sums which were awarded by the adjudicator (see Absolute Rentals)." (emphasis added) [77] The fact that the parties have agreed to proceed with arbitration to resolve the issues that have arisen between the parties is merely the satisfaction of the threshold condition as to whether a stay of the adjudication decisions should be granted pending the disposal of the arbitration. The Court must always bear in mind the overarching purpose of CIPAA which is to facilitate cash flow in the construction industry by ensuring that employers that derive benefits from the construction works do pay the various progress claims as may be certified and that such payments should cascade down to the contractors and sub-contractors below the chain. The case of Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius 54 Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818 in instructive where her Ladyship Mary Lim J (now JCA) provided the rationale as follows: "[30] It is this court's view that in the exercise of discretion of whether to grant the stay or make an order for payment to the Director of KLRCA, the court must weigh into play in a fairly extensive way, the object of CIPAA; and that it is for a speedy disposal of a payment dispute. This is regardless of the fact that this is a payment dispute that arose in the final days of the construction contract, a point which the parties appear to have no issue with and there is no challenge in this respect anyway. Having gone through the hoops of adjudication, there is now decision in the defendant's favour. [31] This court is of the view that the defendant should not be deprived of the very benefit of why it resorted to adjudication in the first place; save if satisfactory reasons are present for a stay of that adjudication decision. [32] It is my further view that stay should only be granted in exceptional circumstances; and such circumstances must necessarily refer to the financial status of the other party. The merits of the case before the arbitration or the court; or even the chances of success in setting aside the adjudication decision are 55 not relevant considerations. The grant of any stay must always weigh in the primary object of the CIPAA 2012; that it is to ensure a speedy resolution of a payment dispute; that it is to inject much needed cashflow into the contractual arrangements between parties that saw progressive payments of claims as the recognised and accepted way of doing business in construction contracts. It would be futile to encourage parties to resort to adjudication and then deprive a successful claimant of its claim by staying the access to the cash simply because there is another proceeding of the nature described in sub-s 16(1) which is pending. The whole concept of temporary finality would be lost and the object of the Act defeated if such was the consideration." (emphasis added) Pronouncement [78] For all the reasons given above, this Court had dismissed this Originating Summons of Sazean Engineering for the setting aside of the 3 adjudication decisions with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid to the Claimant. [79] As this Court had dismissed the application to set aside the 3 adjudication decisions, as a corollary, this Court had allowed the enforcement of the 3 adjudication decisions in the 3 Originating 56 Summonses as a judgment of the Court and correspondingly, had dismissed the 3 stay applications of Sazean Engineering with costs of RM1,000.00 each to be paid to the Claimant. Dated: 29 December 2016. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff : S. Ravichandaran, P. Tharuny and Mohd Khairul Azri bin Mohd Badroldin (Messrs S. Ravichandaran & Anuar) For the Defendant : Steven Seah (Messrs P.Y. Hoh & Tai) For the Official Assignee : Halim Shah (DGI Officer) Date of Decision: 20 September 2016.

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-607-12/2014

PLAINTIF TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD DEFENDAN OSCAR CANARY SDN BHD

23/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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Failed Extraction

22NCVC-607-12/2014

PLAINTIF TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD DEFENDAN OSCAR CANARY SDN BHD

23/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH A,LAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA WRIT SAMAN NO.: 22NCVC-607-12/2014 ANTARA TENAGA NASIONAL BERHAD ...PLAINTIF DAN OSCAR CANARY SDN BHD ...DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 61 & Kandungan 63) A. PENGENALAN [1] Mahkamah ini telahpun menulis alasan penghakiman bagi perbicaraan penuh bagi kes ini. Di samping itu, Mahkamah ini juga telah menulis alasan penghakiman bagi dua permohonan interlokutori (Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27) yang mana kedua-dua permohonan ini telah difailkan oleh Plaintif setelah perbicaraan penuh tamat dan kes telah ditetapkan untuk keputusan serta pihak-pihak 2 telah diarahkan untuk memfailkan hujahan-hujahan bertulis mereka pada tempoh masa yang ditetapkan. [2] Kandungan 25 adalah permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutannya, manakala Kandungan 27 pula adalah permohonan Plaintif untuk membuka semula kes dan memanggil saksi Plaintif SP4. [3] Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan kedua-dua permohonan Plaintif dan Defendan yang telah tidak berpuas hati telah memfailkan notis- notis rayuan bagi merayu terhadap keputusan-keputusan tersebut ke Mahkamah Rayuan. [4] Sejurus selepas Mahkamah ini membenarkan kedua-dua permohonan Plaintif tersebut, Defendan kemudiannnya telah memfailkan dua permohonan juga iaitu Kandungan 61 dan Kandungan 63. Kandungan 61 adalah permohonan Defendan untuk penggantungan prosiding di hadapan Mahkamah ini sehingga perlupusan rayuan-rayuan Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27. Manakala Kandungan 63 adalah merupakan permohonan Defendan 3 untuk diberi kebenaran untuk memfailkan Pembelaan Terpinda setelah Mahkamah ini membenarkan Plaintif meminda Penyata Tuntutannya. B. LATAR BELAKANG RINGKAS [5] Untuk latar belakang ringkas kes yang membawa kepada pemfailan kedua-dua permohonan Defendan, Mahkamah ini akan menyalin semula perenggan 2 sehingga 9 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah yang disediakan bagi perbicaraan penuh, Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 seperti di bawah ini: [2] Di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah suatu guaman sivil yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif iaitu syarikat nasional yang menjana dan membekal tenaga elektrik kepada pengguna-pengguna di Malaysia (Tenaga Nasional Berhad) terhadap pelanggannya Oscar Canary Sdn Bhd (Defendan) atas penggunaan tenaga elektrik oleh Defendan. [3] Plaintif telah menuntut jumlah terhutang atas kerugian/kehilangan hasil yang dialaminya (loss of revenue) bagi penggunaan bekalan elektrik yang telah tidak direkodkan dengan tepat dan benar di dua premis perniagaan Defendan yang beralamat di Lot 5765, Kilang Metal Can, Jalan Kuala Selangor, Batu 22, Mukim Ijok, 45620 Bestari 4 Jaya (Premis Pertama Defendan) dengan nombor akaun pemasangan meter pelanggan 01500060180109 dan premis di Lot 262, Jalan Kuala Selangor, Batu 22, Mukim Ijok, 45620 Bestari Jaya (Premis Kedua Defendan) dengan nombor akaun pemasangan meter pelanggan 01500058754910. [4] Perlu juga dinyatakan di sini bahawa di dalam alasan penghakiman ini, kadang kalanya premis pertama dan premis kedua Defendan ini akan dirujuk sebagai “kedua-dua Premis Defendan”. [5] Di perenggan 19 Penyata Tuntutannya, Plaintif telah menuntut terhadap Defendan untuk pembayaran wang berjumlah RM4,451,900.51 bagi kerugian atau kehilangan hasil ditanggung oleh Plaintif yang timbul daripada pengusikan terhadap pepasangan meter di kedua-dua premis Defendan termasuk kos perbelanjaan operasi yang ditanggung atas pengusikan meter tersebut. Plaintif juga menuntut faedah pada kadar 8% setahun ke atas kedua-dua jumlah tersebut dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian sepenuhnya beserta kos tindakan. [6] Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan di sini bahawa terdapat pindaan kepada jumlah tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan bagi kedua-dua premis Defendan tersebut kerana Mahkamah ini telahpun 5 membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda Penyata Tuntutannya (Kandungan 25) untuk meminda jumlah tuntutan daripada RM4,451,900.51 kepada RM4,037.491.00 pada 4.12.2016 walaupun perbicaraan penuh telah dijalankan dan kes telah ditetapkan untuk keputusan pada 4.12.2016. [7] Keputusan Mahkamah bertarikh 4.12.2016 yang membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutannya bagi meminda jumlah yang dituntut telah dirayu oleh Defendan apabila suatu Notis Rayuan bertarikh 6.12.2016 telah difailkan. [8] Isu-isu berkenaan pindaan yang dibenarkan dan kebenaran membuka semula kes serta pemanggilan semula SP4 oleh Mahkamah ini akan dibincangkan di dalam penghakiman ini kemudian. C. TUNTUTAN PLAINTIF [9] Tuntutan Plaintif terhadap Defendan adalah bersandarkan kepada seksyen 38 Akta Bekalan Elektrik 1990 (Akta). Seksyen 38 Akta antara lain memperuntukkan berikut: 38. (1) Jika mana-mana orang yang diambil kerja oleh pemegang lesen mendapat keterangan di mana-mana premis yang pada pendapatnya membuktikan bahawa suatu kesalahan telah dilakukan di bawah subseksyen 37(1), (3) 6 atau (14), pemegang lesen atau mana-mana orang yang diberi kuasa sewajarnya oleh pemegang lesen boleh, dengan memberi notis tidak kurang daripada dua puluh empat jam, dalam apa-apa bentuk sebagaimana yang ditetapkan, menyebabkan bekalan elektrik dipotong daripada premis tersebut. (1A)… (2)… (2A) … (3) Pemegang lesen boleh menghendaki pengguna membayar kepadanya apa- apa kerugian hasil yang disebabkan oleh kesalahan yang dilakukan di bawah subseksyen 37(1), (3) dan (14) dan apa-apa perbelanjaan yang dilakukan oleh pemegang lesen di bawah seksyen ini termasuk perbelanjaan yang dilakukan berkenaan dengan penyambungan semula bekalan elektrik. (4) Suatu pernyataan bertulis oleh seseorang pekerja pemegang lesen yang diperakui dengan sempurnanya oleh pemegang lesen atau mana-mana orang yang diberi kuasa oleh pemegang lesen, yang menyatakan— (a) amaun kerugian hasil atau perbelanjaan yang dilakukan oleh pemegang lesen; dan (b) orang yang bertanggungan bagi pembayarannya, 7 hendaklah menjadi keterangan prima facie mengenai pembayaran yang kena dibuat oleh pengguna di bawah subseksyen (3). (5) Amaun yang dinyatakan dalam pernyataan bertulis itu hendaklah, dalam tempoh yang dinyatakan dalam pernyataan itu, menjadi genap masa dan kena dibayar kepada pemegang lesen dan jika tidak dibayar, amaun itu hendaklah didapatkan kembali melalui tindakan sivil di mahkamah. [6] Bagi membuktikan kesnya, Plaintif telah memanggil lima (5) orang saksi berikut: 1. SP1 - Cik Sharifadila bt Sulaiman yang merupakan juruteknik Plaintif yang menjalankan pemeriksaan di premis kedua Defendan. 2. SP2 - Encik Wan Mohd Hafiz Auri bin Wan Mustafa yang merupakan juruteknik Plaintif yang menjalankan pemeriksaan bersama SP1 di premis kedua Defendan. 3. SP3 - Encik Asmizi bin Ahmad Mohamed yang merupakan juruteknik Plaintif yang menjalankan pemeriksaan di premis pertama Defendan. 8 4. SP4 - Encik Ramli bin Baba yang merupakan seorang jurutera membuat pengiraan-pengiraan perlarasan bil Defendan untuk kedua-dua akaun Defendan. 5. SP5 - Encik Faidil bin Mustafa Kamal yang merupakan juruteknik Plaintif yang menjalankan pemeriksaan di premis pertama Defendan bersama SP3. [7] Permohonan Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif adalah cetusan atau ekoran daripada soal balas yang telah dikemukakan oleh peguam Defendan kepada SP4. Untuk memudahkan kefahaman, alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini untuk perbicaraan penuh, Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 di perenggan [69] sehingga [84] disalin semula di bawah ini. [69] Dokumen di muka surat 48 dan 49 B1 adalah dokumen-dokumen Plaintif dalam format EXCEL yang telah dibuat entri data-data bagi pengiraan bil ke belakang dan tajuk bagi dokumen muka surat 48 adalah ANGGARAN PENGIRAAN PELARASAN DAN KOS KERUGIAN dan butiran yang tertera adalah bagi akaun 150587549 premis Defendan di Lot 252, Jalan Kuala Selangor Bt 22 Mukim Ijok Bestari 9 Jaya 45620 Rawang (Akaun Kedua Defendan - Premis Kedua) (dokumen 48). Manakala muka surat 49 pula adalah bagi akaun 150601801 premis Lot 5765,Kilang Metal Can Jalan Kuala Selangor, Mukim Ijok Bestari Jaya 45620 Rawang (Akaun pertama Defendan - Premis Pertama) (dokumen 49). [70] Peguam Defendan semasa menyoal balas SP4 telah merujuk kepada dokumen 48 dan dokumen 49 dan telah mempertikaikan jumlah- jumlah ini dengan jumlah yang dituntut di dalam penyata tuntutan asalnya. Apa yang telah dicabar dan ditekankan oleh Defendan hanyalah perbezaan pada jumlah besar di penyata tuntutan asal dan jumlah yang tertera di dokumen 48 dan dokumen 49. [71] Setelah perbicaraan penuh selesai di mana Plaintif dan Defendan telah menutup kes mereka dan Mahkamah ini telah memberi arahan- arahan kepada kedua-dua peguam memfailkan hujahan bertulis pertama mereka pada atau sebelum 29.9.2016 dan hujahan balas sekiranya ada pada atau sebelum 5.10.2016. Di samping itu juga, Mahkamah ini telah menetapkan kes ini untuk keputusan pada 26.10.2016. 10 [72] Namun, dua hari sebelum Mahkamah ini memberikan keputusannya, pada 24.10.2016, Plaintif telah memfailkan dua permohonan di Mahkamah ini iaitu: i. permohonan untuk mendapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah ini meminda Penyata Tuntutannya bertarikh 19.12.2014 menurut Aturan 20 Kaedah 5(1) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) - Kandungan 25. ii. permohonan untuk mendapat kebenaran Mahkamah ini untuk membuka semula kes dan memanggil semula SP4 untuk memberi keterangan - Kandungan 27. [73] Bagi kedua-dua permohonan ini Plaintif telah juga memfailkan suatu Perakuan Segera memohon supaya Mahkamah ini mendengar kedua- dua permohonan pada kadar yang segera. [74] Mahkamah ini pada 6.12.2016 telah membenarkan kedua-dua permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 dan memberikan kepada Defendan kos sebanyak RM3000.00 dan RM2000.00 masing-masing bagi permohonan-permohonan tersebut. [75] Defendan telah tidak berpuas hati di atas keputusan-keputusan Mahkamah ini dan telah memfailkan Notis Rayuan bagi merayu terhadap keputusan-keputusan tersebut. 11 G. PERMOHONAN MEMINDA PENYATA TUNTUTAN (KANDUNGAN 25) DAN MEMBUKA SEMULA KES DAN MEMANGGIL SEMULA SP4 (KANDUNGAN 27). KANDUNGAN 25 [76] Sepertimana yang dikatakan awal tadi, walaupun kes telahpun ditutup dan ditetapkan untuk keputusan, Plaintif melalui Kandungan 25 nya telah memohon kebenaran Mahkamah ini untuk meminda Penyata Tuntutannya menurut Aturan 20 Kaedah 5(1) Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (A.20 K.5 KKM 2012). [77] Di dalam Kandungan 25 ini, Plaintif memohon untuk meminda jumlah kerugiannnya di perenggan 14 dan 19 penyata tuntutan asalnya seperti berikut: Perenggan 14 (2) RM1,931,519.46 yang merupakan kehilangan hasil dan perbelanjaan yang ditanggung bagi tempoh antara 15.8.2007 hingga 27.1.2011 (berkenaan dengan Premis Pertama Defendan); dan (3) RM2,520,381.05 yang merupakan kehilangan hasil dan perbelanjaan yang ditanggung bagi tempoh antara 12.2.2007 hingga 27.1.2011 (berkenaandengan Premis Kedua Defendan). 12 Perenggan 19 (a) Jumlah yang perlu dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaiontif sebanyak RM4,451,900.51; (b) Faedah atas jumlah RM4,451,900.51 pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. Cadangan Pindaan kepada kedua-dua perenggan 14 dan 19 yang dipohon oleh Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: Perenggan 14 (2) RM1,931,519.46 RM1,853,196.55 yang merupakan kehilangan hasil dan perbelanjaan yang ditanggung bagi tempoh antara 15.8.2007 hingga 27.1.2011 (berkenaan dengan Premis Pertama Defendan); dan (3) RM2,520,381.05 RM2,184,295.25 yang merupakan kehilangan hasil dan perbelanjaan yang ditanggung bagi tempoh antara 12.2.2007 hingga 27.1.2011 (berkenaan dengan Premis Kedua Defendan). Perenggan 19 (c) Jumlah yang perlu dibayar dan terhutang kepada Plaiontif sebanyak RM4,451,900.51 RM4,037,491.80; 13 (d) Faedah atas jumlah RM4,451,900.51 RM4,037,491.80 pada kadar 8% setahun dari tarikh penghakiman hingga tarikh penyelesaian penuh dan muktamad. [78] Menurut peguam Plaintif Kandungan 25 yang difailkannya adalah disebabkan oleh soalan-soalan yang telah diajukan oleh peguam Defendan kepada SP4 semasa pemeriksaan balasnya di mana peguam Defendan telah mempersoalkan pengiraan SP4 sebagai tidak tepat dan tidak menunjukkan kehilangan pendapatan sebenar yang ditanggung oleh Plaintif sepertimana yang dituntut oleh Plaintif di dalam penyata tuntutan asalnya. [79] Menurut peguam Plaintif lagi, pindaan-pindaan yang dicadangkan adalah secara khususnya untuk membetulkan jumlah kehilangan hasil Plaintif yang diakibatkan oleh pengusikan meter untuk akaun- akaun Defendan di mana di dalam perkara ini, SP4 yang telah memberi keterangan berkenaan pengiraan hasil TNB tersebut. Semasa perbicaraan SP4 telah dirujuk oleh peguam Defendan kepada jumlah-jumlah yang berbeza di dalam tuntutan Plaintif di dalam penyata tuntutan dan jumlah yang didapati daripada jumlah- jumlah yang diperolehi daripada pengiraan-pengiraan ‘calculations’ butiran-butiran di dokumen 48 dan dokumen 49. 14 [80] Menurut Plaintif lagi, setelah telah menyedari bahawa terdapat kesilapan-kesilapan kecil matematik berkenaan pengiraan yang dilakukan, Plaintif telah membuat pelarasan-pelarasan yang sewajarnya dan seterusnya telahpun mendapat jumlah kehilangan hasil yang tepat. [81] Menurut peguam Plaintif seterusnya, kesilapan-kesilapan pengiraan ini telah hanya dibawa kepada perhatian Plaintif ketika perbicaraan kes ini iaitu semasa pemeriksaan balas saksi SP4 dan juga melalui keterangan saksi tunggal Defendan. [82] Peguam Plaintif telah berhujah bahawa pindaan-pindaan yang dicadangkan juga adalah merupakan pembetulan ketidaktepatan kecil di dalam pengiraan kehilangan pendapatan Plaintif yang merupakan pindaan-pindaan bona fide susulan keterangan- keterangan oleh kedua-dua saksi Plaintif dan Defendan iaitu SP4 dan SD1 semasa perbicaraan. [83] Dalam apa jua keadaan, peguam Plaintif telah menghujahkan bahawa Defendan sememangnya boleh dipampas dengan kos sekalipun jika terdapat sebarang prejudis atau prasangka yang timbul. [84] Defendan walau bagaimanapun telah menentang dengan kerasnya permohonan Plaintif atas alasan-alasan berikut: 15 i. Faridah Mohd Fauzi tidak mempunyai kuasa mengikrarkan afidavit sokongan yang menyokong permohonan pihak Plaintif. Justeru, afidavit sokongan tersebut adalah tidak sah dan tidak boleh digunakan bagi menyokong permohonan untuk meminda penyata tuntutan Plaintif. ii. Terdapat kelewatan selama dua bulan di pihak Plaintif di dalam memfailkan permohonan. iii. Permohonan pindaan yang terlalu lewat dan menimbulkan prejudis kepada Defendan yang tidak boleh dipampas dengan kos. iv. Permohonan telah dibuat dengan niat mala fide dan sesuatu yang fikiran yang ke belakang ‘afterthought’. [8] Alasan-alasan Mahkamah ini di dalam membenarkan kedua-dua permohonan Plaintif telah dinyatakan di perenggan 92 sehingga 111 alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini bagi perbicaraan penuh, Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 seperti berikut: [92] Berbalik kepada permohonan Plaintif di dalam kes ini, walaupun permohonan Plaintif telah dibuat setelah kes ini selesai tetapi 16 cadangan pindaan telah dicetuskan oleh Defendan sendiri yang mempersoalkan pengiraan salah “calculation or mathematical errors” bagi jumlah yang dicampurkan keseluruhan atau ditotalkan bagi butiran-butiran yang terdapat di dokumen 48 dan dokumen 49 dibandingkan dengan jumlah yang dituntut Plaintif di dalam penyata tuntutan asal. Perbezaan pengiraan di dokumen 48 dan 49 dan jumlah pada tuntutan asal ini tidak langsung ditimbulkan oleh Defendan semasa menerima masuk dokumen ini sebagai dokumen bahagian B yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah ini pada 7.8.2016. Defendan walaupun mengetahui bahawa terdapatnya silap pengiraan tetapi telah memilih untuk mempertikaikan jumlah-jumlah tersebut pada saat-saat terakhir iaitu semasa SP4 memberi keterangan. [93] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa kini Defendan tidaklah boleh membangkitkan isu kelewatan di dalam memfailkan permohonan dan membantah Plaintif untuk membuat pindaan di dalam membetulkan pengiraan dan menerangkan kenapakah bagaimana kesilapan itu timbul. Kelewatan dua bulan dari tarikh kes ditutup pada 17.8.2016 sehingga permohonan difailkan pada 26.10.2016 yang telah dibangkitkan oleh Defendan adalah sesuatu yang tidak bermerit kerana tempoh dua bulan bukanlah suatu tempoh yang tidak menasabah berdasarkan apa yang berlaku di dalam perbicaraan kes 17 ini. Lagipun isu kelewatan telahpun Mahkamah ini pertimbangkan bersandarkan otoriti-otoriti yang telah dirujuk awal tadi. [94] Di dalam hal pendeposan afidavit sokongan bagi menyokong permohonan pindaan oleh Faridah Mohd Fauzi (Faridah), perlu dinyatakan di sini bahawa Faridah adalah seorang Pengurus dari Jabatan Perkhidmatan Undang-Undang Plaintif dan sewajarnya beliau mempunyai pengetahuan akan fakta-fakta yang dideposkan berdasarkan pengetahuan sendiri dan daripada rekod-rekod Plaintif yang mana beliau mempunyai akses. [95] Di dalam kes ini lagi, apa yang jelas peguam Defendan telah merujuk kepada SP4 bahawa terdapat perbezaan jumlah di dalam penyata tuntutan asal dan dokumen 48 dan 49. Mahkamah ini menegaskan bahawa apa yang tersilap di sini yang menjadikan perbezaan yang dipersoalkan oleh peguam Defendan adalah di antara jumlah besar di dalam penyata tuntutan asal berbanding jumlah keseluruhan total butiran-butiran yang dicampurkan di muka surat 48 dan 49 Jilid B1 adalah jumlah yang ditotalkan bagi penggunaan bil serahan yang telah dikeluarkan yang telahpun dibayar oleh Defendan berdasarkan bil-bil yang telah dikeluarkan. 18 [96] Pengiraan pelarasan adalah bermula dari bil-bil serahan yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif bermula pada 18.5.2007 – bagi akaun premis pertama dan 12.2.2007 bagi akaun premis kedua. [97] Kesilapan pengiraan total bil-bil yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan tertera di dalam dokumen di muka surat 48 dan 49 Jilid B1 Plaintif dan bukannya kesilapan asas pengiraan bil ke belakang oleh Plaintif. Kesilapan pengiraan butiran-butiran di dokumen 48 dan 49 tidak langsung mencacatkan pengiraan pelarasan bil ke belakang Defendan bagi kedua-dua premis tersebut kerana di jawapan 1, soalan 9 SP4 telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa pengiraan pelarasan adalah bermula daripada bil bertarikh 18.5.2007 yang mana ini adalah konsisten dengan tarikh pengiraan menunjukkan apabila meter ditukar pada 3.5.2007. Begitu jua dengan premis kedua defendan pengiraan pelarasan telah dibuat bermula dari bil bertarikh 12.2.2007 dan pengiraan tenaga letrik yan tidak dibilkan bermula dari meter ditukar pada 7.2.2007. [98] Kesilapan pengiraan total (total calculation) jumlah ini hanya timbul kepada dokumen muka surat 48 dan 49 yang di dalam catitan format EXCEL yang telah mengira bahawa bil-bil yang telah dibayar telah dikira daripada bil 11.6.2008 dan 15.6.2008. Jumlah total ini tidak langsung menggugat pelarasan pengiraan bil ke belakang pun. Apa 19 yang sebenarnya berlaku adalah di mana pengiraan bayaran bil serahan yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan atas bil yang telah dikeluarkan dengan penggunaan format excel, apabila tarikh yang salah ditekan click dan dihighlight pengiraan secara automatik dibuat. Akan tetapi kesilapan pengiraan atas format EXCEL ini tidak menukar keterangan SP4 di penyata saksinya bahawa pemulaan pelarasan bil ke belakang dari bermula dari 18.5.2007 dan 1.2.2007 dan bukannya Jun 2008. [99] Untuk lebih jelas dan mudah difahami, dokumen 48 dan 49 diperturun di bawah ini: 20 Dokumen 48 21 Dokumen 49 22 [100] Di samping itu juga Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima bantahan Defendan atas cadangan pindaan kerana sememangnya dari awal lagi, Defendan tidak langsung memplidkan jumlah yang kononnya silap. [101] Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan Plaintif membuat pindaan atas jumlah total kerana ia bukanlah kesilapan dari segi jumlahnya tetapi adalah jumlah total yang tidak dikira atas bil-bil yang dikeluarkan kepada Defendan dan telahpun dibuat bayaran oleh Defendan. Kesilapan jumlah ini bukanlah satu kesilapan pengiraan bil ke belakang tetapi kesilapan penjumlahan bil yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan telah silap tidak dicampur dalam format excel sahaja. [102] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa permohonan pindaan adalah dibuat secara suci hati (bona fide), tidak ada prasangka yang dtimbul terhadap Defendan, kalaupun sekiranya ada ianya dengan mudah boleh dipampas dengan kos dan pindaan yang dipohon tidak langsung menukar ciri/ karakter guaman ini kerana tuntutan Plaintif untuk kerugian hasil atas penggunaan elektrik yang tidak drekodkan masih kekal dan tidak berubah. [103] Malahan cadangan pindaan bagi meminda jumlah yang dituntut adalah untuk jumlah yang jauh lebih kurang daripada yang dituntut pada awalnya di Penyata Tuntutan Asal kerana bayaran atas bil 23 serahan yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan telah dikira daripada 7.2.2007 (bagi Dokumen 48) dan 3.5.2007 (bagi Dokumen 49) dan bukannya 11.6.2008 dan 15.6.2008 dimana jumlah-jumlah bulanan itu perlu ditolak dari jumlah yang tertunggak belum lagi dibayar bagi menjadikan jumlah yang sebenar perlu dibayar oleh Defendan. Cadangan pindaan ini perlu untuk berlaku adil antara pihak-pihak. [104] Bagi Mahkamah ini juga, sebenarnya Defendan telah mengambil kesempatan di dalam ke sini apabila mendapati dokumen di 48 dan 49 telah tersilap dalam total calculation walhal semenjak dari awal kes lagi Defendan langsung tidak mempertikaikan jumlah yang tertera di dokumen 48 dan 49 yang telah dijilidkan di dalam Ikatan Dokumen Plaintif yang telah difailkan pada 14.4.2016 lagi yang telah diserahkan kepada Defendan dan juga tidak mempertikaikan jumlah - jumlah yang tertera di dalam penyata tuntutan asal Plaintif. KANDUNGAN 27 Undang-undang mengenai permohonan bagi membuka semula kes dan memanggil semula SP4 menurut seksyen 138 (4) Akta Keterangan 1950 dan Aturan 38 Kaedah 1 KKM 2012 24 [105] Undang-undang mengenai kuasa budi bicara mahkamah di dalam membuka semula kes dan pemanggilan semula saksi adalah juga jitu dan mantap. [106] Seksyen 138(4) Akta Keterangan 1950 memperuntukkan berikut: “The Court may in all cases permit a witness to be recalled either for further examination-in-chief or for further cross-examination, and if it does so, the parties have the right of further cross.” [107] Di dalam kes Ong Yoke Eng & Anor v. Lim Ah Yew [1982] 1 MLJ 226 telah diputuskan antara lain seperti berikut: “In civil proceedings, it is in the discretion of the court of first instance to recall a witness or call further witnesses after his case is closed. Although under ordinary circumstances it may not be necessary or permissible to allow a witness once examined and dismissed by a party to be recalled for it is expected that the advocate will interrogate him on all material points touching his case, unforeseen situations may develop and there may be also inadvertent omissions. In such a case the court may at its discretion allow a witness to be recalled, but surprise or prejudice to the other party should be guarded against. The objection by the defendant to the application was however not on these anticipated grounds. Nevertheless on allowing the application the court granted liberty to the defendant to cross-examine the recalled witness and further witnesses and call evidence in rebuttal. 25 [108] Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Tan Ah Kiam v. Liew Chin Chuan & Anor [2007] 2 MLJ 445 memutuskan antara lain: [7] In contradistinction to the decision in Yah bte Aji, Arulanandom J in Ong Yoke Eng & Anor v Lim Ah Yew [1982] 1 MLJ 226 held (so far as is material to the present instance) that: In civil proceedings, it is in the discretion of the court of first instance to recall a witness or call further witnesses after his case is closed. Although under ordinary circumstances it may not be necessary or permissible … unforeseen situations may develop and there may be also inadvertent omissions. [8] In my judgment, the better view is that expressed in Ong Yoke Eng. A trial judge must be given a wide discretion on matters relating to evidence. After all, theEvidence Act 1950 itself places the matter of relevance and therefore admissibility upon the court for it provides as follows in s 136(1): When either party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the court may ask the party proposing to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant; and the court shall admit the evidence if it thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant, and not otherwise. [9] The view I have to make is supported by the decision in TD Canada Trust v McMaster et al [2003] BCD (Civ) 16394, where Garson J said: In Dudas v Munroe [1993] BCJ 2035 (SC) (QL), Braidwood J (as he then was) summarised the law concerning the court's discretion to re-open a trial before judgment is entered as follows: http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.16162655726756048&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25580711285&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23vol%251%25sel1%251982%25page%25226%25year%251982%25sel2%251%25 26 In deciding whether or not to re-open a case, the governing considerations are first, would a miscarriage of justice probably occur without a re- hearing; and second, would a re-hearing probably produce a change of result?. The discretion to re-open a trial before judgment is entered is an unfettered discretion but one that should be used sparingly (Sykes v Sykes (1995) 6 BCLR (3d) 296 (CA)) and has as its purpose the correction of what would otherwise be a miscarriage of justice (Kemp v Wittenberg, 1999 BCJ 810 (SC) … … …In any event, the principle as to the recall of witnesses is the same in both civil and criminal cases. And all I really need do is to quote from the judgment of Ali J (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Boo Chew Hia [1963] MLJ 33: The law permits a witness to be recalled whenever it is essential to the just decision of the case. Merely recalling a witness is not in itself an irregularity. [109] Aturan 38 KKM 2012 pula memperuntukkan: “Kaedah am: Saksi hendaklah diperiksa secara lisan (A. 38, k. 1) 1. Tertakluk kepada peruntukan Kaedah-Kaedah ini dan Akta Keterangan 1950 [Akta 56] dan mana-mana undang-undang bertulis lain yang berhubungan dengan keterangan, apa-apa fakta yang dikehendaki dibuktikan dalam perbicaraan mana-mana tindakan yang dibuktikan dengan pemeriksaan saksi di Mahkamah terbuka.” [110] Berdasarkan pindaan yang telah dibenarkan dan bersandarkan kepada kes-kes yang telah dirujuk, maka permohonan Plaintif di http://www.lexisnexis.com/my/legal/search/runRemoteLink.do?A=0.7117328344233409&bct=A&service=citation&risb=21_T25580711285&langcountry=MY&linkInfo=F%23MY%23MLJ%23sel1%251963%25page%2533%25year%251963%25 27 dalam Kandungan 27 ini adalah satu permohonan yang wajar dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini. [111] Mahkamah ini juga perlu menyatakan bahawa setelah Mahkamah ini membenarkan Plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutanya, Mahkamah juga telah menolak permohonan Defendan untuk meminda penyataan pembelaan Defendan. Mahkamah memutuskan sedemikian kerana pindaan yang dibuat adalah hanya terhadap jumlah kerugian yang dituntut oleh Plaintif atas kesilapan pengiraan format EXCEL. Di dalam hal ini berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang telah Mahkamah nyatakan di dalam membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutannya, Mahkamah tidak nampak keperluan di pihak Defendan untuk meminda penyata pembelaannya. C. KANDUNGAN 61 [9] Mahkamah ini telah tidak menulis alasan penghakimannya terhadap Kandungan 61 dan Kandungan 63 kerana perbicaraan ini telah diteruskan sehingga selesai dan Mahkamah ini telah membuat keputusannnya berhubung kebertanggungan Defendan ke atas penggunaan letrik yang telah digunakan Defendan yang tidak dibilkan disebabkan pengusikan meter letrik di kedua-dua premis Defendan. 28 [10] Memandangkan perbicaraan kes telahpun selesai dan keputusan kes telahpun diberikan, maka bagi kes ini tidak ada apa-apa lagi yang tinggal untuk digantung atau ditangguhkan. Oleh yang demikian, isu penggantungan prosiding dan juga Pindaan Penyata Pembelaan telah menjadi akademik dan tidak akan memberikan apa apa kesan/manfaat ataupun will not serve any purpose. [11] Namun, peguam Defendan telah menulis kepada Mahkamah ini meminta supaya alasan-alasan penghakiman bagi Kandungan 61 dan Kandungan 63 kerana dikatakan Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Rayuan telah memberi arahan bahawa alasan penghakiman bagi kedua-dua permohonan ini perlu ada sebelum rayuan-rayuan perbicaraan penuh, Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 dapat ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan. Justeru itu alasan-alasan penghakiman bagi Kandungan 61 dan Kandungan 63 disediakan oleh Mahkamah ini. C. KANDUNGAN 61 [12] Di Kandungan 61 nya, Defendan telah memohon supaya Mahkamah ini menggantung atau menangguhkan prosiding perbicaraan penuh 29 ini sementara menunggu penyelesaian rayuan-rayuan bagi Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 di Mahkamah Rayuan. [13] Menurut afidavit yang diikrarkan oleh Oo Kwang Tung, pengarah Defendan pada 8.12.2016 bagi menyokong Kandungan 61, permohonan Defendan untuk penangguhan penggantungan prosiding ini adalah bersandarkan kepada alasan-alasan berikut: i. pada 6-12-2016, Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan permohonan- permohonan plaintif melalui Kandungan 25 (meminda pernyataan tuntutan) dan Kandungan 27 [membuka semua kes dan memanggil semula saksi plaintif (SP-4) (“keputusan tersebut”). ii. Defendan tidak puas hati dengan keputusan tersebut dan mengarahkan peguamcara defendan memfailkan rayuan ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Rayuan telah difailkan pada 7-12-2016. iii. alasan rayuan adalah bahawa Plaintif telah mengambil sikap sambil lewa dan tidak serius di mana telah menunggu selama melebihi 2 bulan setelah kes ditutup pada 17-8-2016 dan sehingga 2 hari sebelum keputusan kes dijadualkan pada 26-10-2016 barulah 30 memfailkan permohonan meminda Pernyataan Tuntutan dan memanggil semula saksi pada 24-10-2016. iv. tidak ada penjelasan kelewatan yang ketara (‘inordinate delay’) dan kenyataan-kenyataan dalam Afidavit plaintif hanyalah mengelakkan daripada memberikan apa-apa penjelasan. Kegagalan menjelaskan telah melanggar prinsip dan undang-undang yang sedia ada, khususnya prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Foe & Anor Appeal [2015] 8 CLJ 1. v. segala prosiding seterusnya akan menjadi sia-sia sekiranya rayuan terhadap keputusan bertarikh 6-12-2016 dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. Defendan mempunyai peluang yang cerah untuk berjaya dalam rayuan, khususnya kegagalan plaintif mematuhi prinsip- prinsip undang-undang yang sedia ada dalam permohonannya. vi. penggantungan prosiding ini juga harus dibenarkan untuk memfailkan cadangan Pembelaan apabila pindaan Penyataan Tuntutan dibenarkan dan kegagalan telah amat memprejudiskan defendan. Tidak ada prejudis langsung terhadap plaintif sekiranya pindaan Pembelaan dibenarkan, khususnya segala kesulitan adalah berpunca daripada sikap plaintif yang sambil lewa dan tidak serius. 31 D. PRINSIP UNDANG-UNDANG BERHUBUNG PERMOHONAN UNTUK PENGGANTUNGAN PROSIDING. [14] Budibicara mahkamah samada untuk membenarkan atau menolak sesuatu permohonan untuk penggantungan prosiding telah diperuntukan dalam pelbagai otoriti. Pertimbangan utama yang perlu dipertimbangkan dan ditekankan oleh mahkamah di dalam perlaksanaan kuasa budibicaranya samada membenarkan atau tidak sesuatu permohonan untuk penangguhan prosiding adalah samada wujud keadaan-keadaan khas. Adalah juga menjadi undang-undang bahawa prinsip yang terpakai di dalam sesuatu permohonan permohonan penggantungan perlaksanaan adalah terpakai sama bagi permohonan untuk penggantungan prosiding. (Sila lihat kes Re Hj Abdul Malik Khan; Ex P Bank Bumiputra Bhd [2006] 8 CLJ 534). [15] Di dalam kes Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86, Raja Azlan Shah, H (Tuanku pada waktu itu) yang telah mendefinisikan keadaan-keadaan khas seperti berikut: 32 “Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common”. [16] Walau bagaimanapun, apa yang membentuk dan merangkumi keadaan-keadaan khas adalah berbeza antara satu kes dengan satu kes yang lain kerana ianya bergantung kepada fakta-fakta kes. Beban bagi membuktikan wujudnya keadaan-keadaan khas untuk menjustifikasikan penggantungan adalah terletak di bahu Pemohon. (Sila lihat Kosma Palma Oil Mills Sdn Bhd & Ors Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257.) [17] Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan, Zawawi Bin Salleh dalam kes Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 47 di dalam menekankan perlaksanaan kuasa budibicara mahkamah tanpa batasan di dalam membenarkan penangguhan atau penggantungan prosiding telah menggariskan beberapa pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang telah diambil kira oleh mahkamah yang membentuk keadaan-keadaan khas sebagai panduan. Memetik Mahkamah Rayuan dalam muka surat 221 adalah seperti berikut: 33 “...Now, what factors or principles will, and should, guide the courts in applications for a stay of an order granted by a court. These factors or principles have been reiterated in very many of cases decided by our courts. The factors or principles so enumerated are in exhaustive, and not all of them are application to every case. Each has its own peculiar principle. Some of the principles to be considered in the motions may be stated as follows; a) the courts have an unimpeded discretion to grant or refuse stay. In this, like in all other instances of discretion, the court is bound to exercise that discretion both judicially as well as judiciously and not erratically (see Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 1 MLJ 116; Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86; b) an unsuccessful party applying for a stay must show “special circumstances”. What will constitute “special circumstances” will no doubt vary from case to case. The fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one (see Kosma Palma Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Markmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257; [2003] 4 CLJ 1 and Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd &Ors (No.2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131). The application is not granted as matter of routine and it is not an automatic or mechanical relief slavishly followed after filing an appeal. In every matter or suit before a court of law, whether in its original or appellate stage of proceedings, the court will consider the competing rights of both parties including the applicant and respondent to justice; 34 c) there is a need to preserve the res or preservation of the subject matter of litigation. The courts have an obligation to protect the res for the purpose of ensuring that the appeal, if successful, will not be rendered nugatory (see Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Counsil [1974] 2 WLR 749). But where it is shown by affidavit evidence, say by the respondent that the res will not be destroyed or there is in fact no res, an application may not be granted. d) where an application is an abuse of the court process, then the stay of proceedings will not be granted. A typical example of abuse of court process is where a suit is duplicated or where a party employs improper and perverse procedure to obtain an advantage undeservedly; e) it is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings, it will be refused. Some applications, on seeing the weakness of their client’s case, would resort to application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not a encourage such unwholesome practice; and f) an application for stay of proceedings must come with clean hands because what he is asking is an equitable relief. Equity will not assist the 35 unclean. That is why the court has to look into the antecedents of the parties”. [18] Di dalam kes ini, Defendan telah memohon Mahkamah ini untuk menangguh atau menggantung prosiding Plaintif atas alasan bahawa rayuan-rayuannnya terhadap Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 masih belum dilupuskan dan menghujahkan bahawa sekiranya penggantungan prosiding tidak diberikan oleh Mahkmah ini segala prosiding seterusnya akan menjadi sia-sia sekiranya rayuan terhadap keputusan bertarikh 6-12-2016 dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. [19] Peguam Defendan juga telah menghujahkan bahawa Defendan mempunyai peluang yang cerah untuk berjaya dalam rayuan, khususnya kegagalan plaintif mematuhi prinsip-prinsip undang- undang yang sedia ada dalam permohonannya. [20] Defendan di dalam menentang permohonan-permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27 telah juga membangkitkan alasan bahawa Plaintif telah mengambil sikap sambil lewa dan tidak serius di mana telah menunggu selama melebihi 2 bulan setelah kes ditutup pada 17-8-2016 dan sehingga 2 hari sebelum keputusan kes 36 dijadualkan pada 26-10-2016 barulah memfailkan permohonan meminda Pernyataan Tuntutan dan memanggil semula saksi pada 24-10-2016. [21] Peguam Defendan juga telah menghujahkan bahawa Plaintif telah gagal memberi penjelasan atas kelewatan yang ketara (‘inordinate delay’) dan kenyataan-kenyataan dalam Afidavit plaintif hanyalah mengelakkan daripada memberikan apa-apa penjelasan. Adalah dihujahkan selanjutnya oleh peguam Defendan bahawa kegagalan Plaintif menjelaskan kelewatan tersebut telah melanggar prinsip dan undang-undang yang sedia ada, khususnya prinsip undang-undang yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Hong Leong Finance Bhd v Low Thiam Foe & Anor Appeal [2015] 8 CLJ 1. [22] Di dalam kes ini, Mahkamah ini telahpun memutuskan bahawa Plaintif wajar diberi kebenaran untuk meminda Penyata Tuntutannya serta diberi kebenaran untuk membuka semula kes bagi memanggil semula SP4 (Ramli bin Baba) yang merupakan seorang jurutera yang 37 membuat pengiraan-pengiraan perlarasan bil Defendan untuk kedua- dua akaun. [23] Mahkamah ini telah katakan bahawa pemanggilan SP4 ini timbul oleh kerana peguam Defendan semasa menyoal balas SP4 telah menjadikan jumlah kerugian yang dituntut oleh Plaintif di dalam penyata tuntutan asalnya berbeza dengan jumlah yang tertera pada dokumen di muka surat 48 dan muka surat 49, B1. [24] Perbezaan jumlah ini, sebelum ini tidak pernah ditimbulkan oleh Defendan, walhal writ dan penyata tuntutan telahpun diserahkan kepadanya sejak tahun 2014 lagi dan dokumen muka surat 48 dan 49 yang telah dijilidkan sebagai Dokumen Bersama Bahagian B yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah ini sejak 7.8.2016 lagi. Defendan telah hanya menimbulkan perbezaan jumlah tersebut pada 16.12.2016 iaitu semasa perbicaraan kes sedang berjalan dan kes telahpun sampai ke peringkat SP4 disoal balas oleh peguam Defendan. [25] Mahkamah ini telahpun membuat keputusan di perenggan [93] alasan penghakiman bagi Kandungan 25 bahawa isu kelewatan 38 selama dua bulan yang ditimbulkan oleh Defendan adalah sesuatu yang tidak bermerit. [26] Oleh itu isu kelewatan dan kegagalan penjelasan kelewatan telahpun dipertimbangkan dan diputuskan oleh Mahkamah ini dan ianya bukanlah satu keadaan khas yang membolehkan Mahkamah ini memberikan satu perintah penggantungan prosiding. [27] Mahkamah ini telahpun menjelaskan secara terperinci pindaan yang yang hendak dibuat oleh Plaintif. Untuk lebih jelas, perenggan [95] sehingga [98] alasan penghakiman Kandungan 25 diulang sekali di bawah ini: [95] Di dalam kes ini lagi, apa yang jelas peguam Defendan telah merujuk kepada SP4 bahawa terdapat perbezaan jumlah di dalam penyata tuntutan asal dan dokumen 48 dan 49. Mahkamah ini menegaskan bahawa apa yang tersilap di sini yang menjadikan perbezaan yang dipersoalkan oleh peguam Defendan adalah di antara jumlah besar di dalam penyata tuntutan asal berbanding jumlah keseluruhan total butiran-butiran yang dicampurkan di muka surat 48 dan 49 Jilid B1 adalah jumlah yang ditotalkan bagi penggunaan bil serahan yang 39 telah dikeluarkan yang telahpun dibayar oleh Defendan berdasarkan bil-bil yang telah dikeluarkan. [96] Pengiraan pelarasan adalah bermula dari bil-bil serahan yang dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif bermula pada 18.5.2007 – bagi akaun premis pertama dan 12.2.2007 bagi akaun premis kedua. [97] Kesilapan pengiraan total bil-bil yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan tertera di dalam dokumen di muka surat 48 dan 49 Jilid B1 Plaintif dan bukannya kesilapan asas pengiraan bil ke belakang oleh Plaintif. Kesilapan pengiraan butiran-butiran di dokumen 48 dan 49 tidak langsung mencacatkan pengiraan pelarasan bil ke belakang Defendan bagi kedua-dua premis tersebut kerana di jawapan 1, soalan 9 SP4 telah menyatakan dengan jelas bahawa pengiraan pelarasan adalah bermula daripada bil bertarikh 18.5.2007 yang mana ini adalah konsisten dengan tarikh pengiraan menunjukkan apabila meter ditukar pada 3.5.2007. Begitu jua dengan premis kedua defendan pengiraan pelarasan telah dibuat bermula dari bil bertarikh 12.2.2007 dan pengiraan tenaga letrik yan tidak dibilkan bermula dari meter ditukar pada 7.2.2007. [98] Kesilapan pengiraan total (total calculation) jumlah ini hanya timbul kepada dokumen muka surat 48 dan 49 yang di dalam catitan format 40 EXCEL yang telah mengira bahawa bil-bil yang telah dibayar telah dikira daripada bil 11.6.2008 dan 15.6.2008. Jumlah total ini tidak langsung menggugat pelarasan pengiraan bil ke belakang pun. Apa yang sebenarnya berlaku adalah di mana pengiraan bayaran bil serahan yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan atas bil yang telah dikeluarkan dengan penggunaan format excel, apabila tarikh yang salah ditekan click dan dihighlight pengiraan secara automatik dibuat. Akan tetapi kesilapan pengiraan atas format EXCEL ini tidak menukar keterangan SP4 di penyata saksinya bahawa pemulaan pelarasan bil ke belakang dari bermula dari 18.5.2007 dan 1.2.2007 dan bukannya Jun 2008. [28] Mahkamah ini telah menyatakan dan ingin menegaskan sekali lagi bahawa Mahkamah ini telah membenarkan Plaintif membuat pindaan atas jumlah total kerana ia bukanlah kesilapan dari segi jumlahnya tetapi adalah jumlah total yang tidak dikira atas bil-bil yang dikeluarkan kepada Defendan dan telahpun dibuat bayaran oleh Defendan. Kesilapan jumlah ini bukanlah satu kesilapan pengiraan bil ke belakang tetapi kesilapan penjumlahan bil yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan yang telah silap tidak dicampur dalam format excel sahaja. 41 [29] Mahkamah juga telah membuat dapatan bahawa permohonan pindaan adalah dibuat secara suci hati (bona fide), tidak ada prasangka yang ditimbulkan terhadap Defendan, kalaupun sekiranya ada ianya dengan mudah boleh dipampas dengan kos dan pindaan yang dipohon tidak langsung menukar ciri/ karakter guaman ini kerana tuntutan Plaintif untuk kerugian hasil atas penggunaan elektrik yang tidak drekodkan masih kekal dan tidak berubah. [30] Mahkamah ini telah juga membuat dapatan bahawa cadangan pindaan bagi meminda jumlah yang dituntut adalah untuk jumlah yang jauh lebih kurang daripada yang dituntut pada awalnya di Penyata Tuntutan Asal kerana bayaran atas bil serahan yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan telah dikira daripada 7.2.2007 (bagi Dokumen 48) dan 3.5.2007 (bagi Dokumen 49) dan bukannya 11.6.2008 dan 15.6.2008 dimana jumlah-jumlah bulanan itu perlu ditolak dari jumlah yang tertunggak yang belum lagi dibayar bagi menjadikan jumlah yang sebenar perlu dibayar oleh Defendan. Cadangan pindaan ini perlu untuk berlaku adil antara pihak-pihak. 42 [31] Malahan pada alasan penghakiman Kandungan 25, Mahkamah ini telah berpandangan bahawa sebenarnya Defendan telah mengambil kesempatan di dalam kes ini apabila mendapati dokumen di 48 dan 49 telah tersilap dalam total calculation. Walhal semenjak dari awal kes lagi Defendan langsung tidak mempertikaikan jumlah yang tertera di dokumen 48 dan 49 yang telah dijilidkan di dalam Ikatan Dokumen Plaintif yang telah difailkan sejak 14.4.2016 lagi dan telah diserahkan kepada Defendan yang tidak mempertikaikan jumlah - jumlah yang tertera di dalam penyata tuntutan asal Plaintif. [32] Justeru, berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, hujahan peguam Defendan yang rayuan-rayuannya akan menjadi sia-sia sekiranya perintah penggantungan tidak diberi adalah satu hujahan yang tidak berasas dan tidak mempunyai merit. Di samping itu, alasan-alasan yang dikemukakan Defendan untuk satu perintah penggantungan bukanlah satu alasan-alasan khas ataupun istimewa yang membolehkan Mahkamah ini menjalankan kuasa budi bicaranya untuk membenarkan suatu penggantungan prosiding. 43 [33] Oleh yang demikian, atas alasan-alasan di atas permohonan Defendan di dalam Kandungan 61 ditolak dengan kos C. KANDUNGAN 63 [34] Kandungan 63 adalah permohonan Defendan untuk diberikan kebenaran bagi meminda penyata pembelaannya berikutan perintah Mahkamah yang membenarkan Kandungan 25 (permohonan untuk meminda penyata tuntutan Plaintif). [35] Defendan telah menimbulkan alasan-alasan berikut bagi menyokong permohonan Kandungan 63 nya: a. pada 6-12-2016, Mahkamah yang mulia telah membenarkan permohonan-permohonan plaintif melalui Kandungan 25 (meminda pernyataan tuntutan) dan Kandungan 27 [membuka semua kes dan memanggil semula saksi plaintif (SP-4) (“keputusan tersebut”). b. setelah pindaan Penyataan Tuntutan dibenarkan, Mahkamah yang Mulia ini seharusnya membenarkan Pembelaan Terpinda difailkan 44 tetapi Mahkamah yang Mulia ini tidak melayan permintaan secara lisan oleh pihak Defendan dan terus menetapkan tarikh panggilan semula saksi plaintif pada 15-12-2016. c. Defendan seharusnya diberi kebenaran untuk memfailkan Pembelaan Terpinda apabila pindaan Penyataan Tuntutan dibenarkan dan kegagalan telah amat memprejudiskan defendan. d. menurut prinsip undang-undang yang sedia ada, defendan seharusnya diberi kebenaran untuk memfailkan Pembelaan Terpinda setelah pindaan Pernyataan Tuntutan dibenarkan. Lebih-lebih lagi kelewatan prosiding ini adalah disebabkan oleh plaintif sendiri dan bukannya Defendan. Tidak ada prejudis langsung terhadap plaintif atau mana-mana pihak sekiranya Mahkamah yang Mulia ini membenarkan Pembelaan Terpinda difailkan sebelum panggilan semula saksi. [36] Mahkamah ini mengguna pakai alasan-alasan Mahkamah ini di dalam membenarkan permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 25 di perenggan [101] sehingga [105]. 45 [37] Mahkamah ini juga mengulangi dapatan Mahkamah ini di perenggan [111] bagi Kandungan 25 dan Kandungan 27, di mana Mahkamah ini menegaskan sekali lagi bahawa setelah Mahkamah ini membenarkan Plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutannya, Mahkamah juga telah menolak permohonan Defendan untuk meminda penyataan pembelaan Defendan. Mahkamah memutuskan sedemikian kerana pindaan yang dibuat adalah hanya terhadap jumlah kerugian yang dituntut oleh Plaintif atas kesilapan pengiraan format EXCEL. Di dalam hal ini berdasarkan alasan-alasan yang telah Mahkamah nyatakan di dalam membenarkan permohonan Plaintif untuk meminda penyata tuntutannya, Mahkamah tidak nampak keperluan di pihak Defendan untuk meminda penyata pembelaannya. [38] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa permohonan Defendan di dalam Kandungan 63 juga tidak mempunyai merit dan oleh itu Mahkamah ini menolak Kandungan 63 dengan kos. Bagi kedua-dua Kandungan 61 dan Kandungan 63, Defendan hendaklah membayar Plaintif kos sebanyak RM2000.00. 46 t.t. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 23hb Disember 2016 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Shook Lin & Bok Encik David Dinesh Mathew Encik Hadi Mukhlis Bin Khairulmaini Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Bahari, Choy & Nongchik Encik Lai Chee Meng Encik Dinesh Nair

Tika 2.6.0

24-163-02/2015

PLAINTIF Ng Sin Chai DEFENDAN 1. Ng Ah Bee 2. Eng Dian @ Ng Chin Poi

15/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f09184ec-5bfa-4eb9-abea-d8f97f4b6887&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: 24-163-02/2015 BETWEEN NG SIN CHAI ... PLAINTIFF AND 1. NG AH BEE 2. ENG DIAN @ NG CHIN POI ... DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] The issue for determination in the present Originating Summons is a simple one. Ng Sing Chai (“Plaintiff”) together with Ng Ah Bee and Ng Chin Poi (“Defendants”) are siblings. The Plaintiff and the Defendant are also joint-holders of savings accounts in Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad consisting of accounts number (collectively referred to as “Bank Accounts”): 2 i. 708-3-5677136-3 ii. 708-3-5677142-8 iii. 708-3-5677146-0 iv. 708-3-5677150-9 v. 708-3-5677154-1 vi. 708-3-5677206-8 vii. 708-3-5677210-6 viii. 708-3-5677214-9 [2] Notwithstanding that the Plaintiff and the Defendants are the joint- holders of the Bank Accounts, it remains undisputed that the monies in the Bank Accounts were solely contributed by the Plaintiff and the Defendants’ late mother, Ong Siew Gem (“OSG”). It was averred by the Defendants and was never refuted by the Plaintiff that the Bank Accounts were maintained solely for the convenience of caretaking and upkeep of OSG after she suffered a stroke. [3] The Plaintiff’s case is that the Plaintiff remains as the beneficial owner of 1/3 shares of the monies in the Bank Account while the Defendants are the beneficial owners of 2/3 of the monies in the Bank Account. Simply put, the Plaintiff’s case largely is that the 3 monies in the Bank Account are inter-vivos gifts by the late mother for the benefit of the Plaintiff and Defendants after her demise. Hence, the Plaintiff seeks a declaration that he is entitled to 1/3 shares of the monies in the Bank Account and orders that 1/3 shares of the monies in the Bank Accounts be liquidated and be paid to the Plaintiff while the 2/3 balance be maintained in the name of the Defendants of which the Plaintiff no longer has claim over. B. WHETHER THE BANK ACCOUNTS ARE INTER-VIVOS GIFTS [4] This Court must highlight that the Plaintiff in his case had made blank suppositions without any reference to any law or precedents. The entirety of the Plaintiff’s submission is a baseless supposition of the Plaintiff’s own sentiments with no reference to any law or precedents. The Plaintiff had not exhibited any evidence to support the supposition that the late OSG had intended the Bank Accounts to be inter-vivos gifts. In fact, it was admitted that the Plaintiff and the Defendants had never contributed monies of any amount to the Bank Accounts. 4 [5] This Court finds that the Bank Accounts were not inter-vivos gifts in consideration of the plain and simple facts that: i. It remains undisputed that the monies in the Bank Accounts were maintained under the names of the Plaintiff and the Defendants for the convenience, benefit of caretaking and upkeep of the late OSG who had suffered a stroke; and ii. It remains undisputed that the monies in the Bank Accounts were solely contributed by the late OSG herself without any contributions by the Plaintiff and the Defendants. [6] It is legally impossible for this Court to deem the Bank Accounts to be gifts when the parties are in agreement that the Bank Accounts were maintained only for the sole purpose of caretaking OSG who is of ill-health and was unable to care for herself on her own. This fact was never disputed and was never averred against in the Plaintiff’s own Affidavits. Furthermore, the Plaintiff had not exhibited any evidence to proof the late OSG’s intent that the Bank Accounts be given as gifts. 5 [7] This Court finds valuable guidance in the English case of Marshall v Crutwell [1870] 20 LR Eq. 328 at pages 330 to 331. Sir G. Jessel, M.R, had dealt with a case verily similar to the present Originating Summons. There, a widow claims that monies held in joint-account with her late husband were gifts for her benefit upon her husband’s death. Nonetheless, in disagreeing with the contention, the Court had held that the existence of a trust or a gift would by and large depend on the circumstances of a case. If the surrounding circumstances indicate that the accounts were not gifts, then the Court cannot deem the accounts to be gifts: “As I understand, the law is this: The mere circumstance that the name of a child or a wife is inserted on the occasion of a purchase of stock is not sufficient to rebut a resulting trust in favour of the purchaser if the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that a trust was intended. Although a purchase in the name of a wife or a child, if altogether unexplained, will be deemed a gift, yet you may take surrounding circumstances into consideration, so as to say that it is a trust, not a gift. … 6 But here we have the actual fact, that the man was in such a state of health that he could not draw cheques, and the wife drew them. Looking at the fact that subsequent sums are paid in from time to time, and taking into view all the circumstances (as I understand I am bound to do), as a juryman, I think circumstances shew that this was a mere arrangement for convenience, and that it was not intended to be a provision for the wife in the event which might happen, that at the husband’s death there might be a fund standing to the credit of the banking account. I take into account the circumstance that the wife could draw upon the fund in the husband’s lifetime, so that it would not necessarily be a provision for her after his death… having regard to the rule which is now binding on me, that I must infer from the surrounding circumstances what the nature of the transaction was, I come to the conclusion that it was not intended to be a provision for the wife, but simply a mode of conveniently managing the testator’s affairs, and that it leaves the money therefore still his property.” 7 [8] The principle above falls squarely on the present Originating Summons. It remains undisputed and admitted that the Bank Accounts were maintained for the sake of caretaking the sickly late OSG as she was unable to care for herself on her own. Thus, it is resoundingly clear that the monies in the Bank Accounts were never intended to be gifts to the Plaintiff or the Defendants and had always been intended to remain as the late OSG’s property (now her estate) C. WHETHER THE MONIES IN THE BANK ACCOUNTS IS HELD ON TRUST FOR THE LATE OSG’S ESTATE AND SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED UNDER HER ESTATE [9] Naturally entailing the finding above, this Court finds that the Bank Account is held on trust for the benefit of late OSG’s estate. Accordingly, the monies in the Bank Account should be included in the late OSG’s estate to be properly distributed vide a probate action according to the law. [10] Thus, the Plaintiff would have sufficient remedy in the probate action to ensure that he would receive the appropriate shares under the estate. Clearly then, this Court should not allow the 8 declaratory reliefs sought by the Plaintiff as an adequate alternative remedy is readily available for the Plaintiff. (See: i. Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd v Cecil Abraham (Executor of the Estate of Loo Cheng Ghee) [1998] 4 MLJ 651: “It is beyond dispute that the remedy of declaration is discretionary in nature. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 reads as follows: Any person entitled to any legal character, to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to the character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, the plaintiff need not in that suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, omits to do so. Explanation — A trustee of property is a 'person interested to deny' a title adverse to the title of someone who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.' (Emphasis added.) 9 Although s 41 is not a complete code upon the subject of declaratory decrees (Attorney General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan Chik & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 620) and the power to make a declaration is almost unlimited (Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] 2 Ch 490 at p 507 per Lord Sterndale MR), yet, the remedy of declaration may be refused upon settled principles. Thus, generally speaking, the court will not grant a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41).” ii. Lokmanal Hakim Ramli & Ors v. Hj. Ismail Ishak & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 795, “In this case the matters complained of relate to a small estate which under the Act are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector; the plaintiffs should under s.29(1) of the Act have appealed against both orders of the Collector made on 22 February 1987, the order made under s.13 relating to the distribution of the property and the other order made under s. 14 relating to the colleteral dispute. I am not unmindful of the Supreme Court case of Development and Commercial Bank Bhd. v. Land Administrator, Wilayah Persekutuan [1991] 2 MLJ 181 on the availability of the remedy available to him to redress a grievance he has against a decision or order of an authority constituted under a statute. The Plaintiffs in this case are indeed applying, inter alia, for a declaration that the defendants had renounced their beneficial share in the property of deceased Ishak and for a consequential order to set aside the Collector’s order of distribution. 10 However, all the plaintiffs being aggrieved parties within the meaning of 2. 29(1) of the Act they had a right of appeal and they should have appeal and they should have appealed under s. 29(1) and the remedy of declaration is not open to them.” iii. Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41, “It is well settled law that the court will not make a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume 22, page 749, paragraph 1611). To quote but a few authorities in support of that proposition, Lord Herschell said in Barraclough v Brown: "It was argued for the appellant that, even if not entitled to recover the expenses by action in the High Court, he was, at all events, entitled to come to that court for a declaration that on the true interpretation of the statute he had a right to recover them. It might be enough to say that no such case was made by the appellant's claim. But, apart from this, I think it would be very mischievous to hold that when a party is compelled by statute to resort to an inferior court he can come first to the High Court to have his right to recover – the very matter relegated to the inferior court – determined. Such a proposition was not supported by authority, and is, I think, unsound in principle." In Pasmore v The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council Earl of Halsbury L.C. said: 11 "… The principle that where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very familiar and which runs through the law." In the more recent case of Wilkinson v Barking Corporation Asquith L.J. said: "… It is undoubtedly good law that where a statute creates a right and, in plain language, gives a specific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal for its enforcement, a party seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedy or that tribunal, and not to others." [11] The notion that the Defendants are clinging onto the “Survivorship Clause” to gain a bigger share (in anticipation of the Plaintiff’s death) is plainly misconceived. The Defendants never stood in any position to claim 2/3 shares of the Bank Accounts to begin with. Even should the Plaintiff meet his demise, the Defendants cannot simply split the Bank Accounts to 1/2 shares each. The monies in the Bank Accounts would inevitably be sourced back on trust to the late OSG’s estate and accordingly be distributed by a probate Court to all of the late OSG’s successors. 12 D. COURT’S DECISION [12] In view of all of the findings, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has ultimately failed to prove his case. [13] This Court accordingly dismisses the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons. This Court hereby orders that the Plaintiff to pay both the Defendants a global costs of RM5000.00. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 15th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Abu Hassan & Associates Loo Chay Meng For the Defendants - Messrs Lovelace & Hastings Steven Pung

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24FC-906-06/2016

PLAINTIF Mystique Bay Sdn Bhd (731691-H) (yang telah mengambil alih tindakan ini dari Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad Melalui Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 20.11.2007) DEFENDAN 1. LAM YOKE HENG 2. ONG LEE PHING

14/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=39caf0d5-fda7-44f3-85b2-f391852a5f48&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24FC-906-06/2016 Dalam Perkara Mengenai Hartanah yang dipegang dibawah No. Hakmilik GRN 296517, Lot 5771, Bandar Subang Jaya, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan Dan Dalam Perkara Mengenai Kaveat Persendirian di bawah Perserahan No. 42977/2008 bertarikh 10.09.2008 dan kaveat persendirian di bawah perserahan No. 21710/2015 bertarikh 28.04.2015 yang dimasukkan oleh Lam Yoke Heng dan Ong Lee Phing melalui suatu Permohonan untuk memasukkan kaveat persendirian di Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Petaling Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Mengenai Seksyen-Seksyen 327, 328, 329 dan 417 Kanun Tanah Negara Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 28 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA Mystique Bay Sdn Bhd (731691-H) (yang telah mengambil alih tindakan ini dari Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad Melalui Perintah Letakhak bertarikh 20.11.2007) ...Plaintif DAN 1. LAM YOKE HENG 2. ONG LEE PHING …Defendan- Defendan 3 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1 - Pembatalan kaveat persendirian) A. PENDAHULUAN [1] Plaintif (Mystique Bay Sdn Bhd) adalah sebuah syarikat kewangan yang berdaftar di Malaysia dan beralamat di Tingkat 23, Plaza See Hoy Chan, Jalan Raja Chulan, 50200 Kuala Lumpur. [2] Defendan-Defendan (i. Lam Yoke Heng & ii. Ong Lee Phing) adalah individu-individu yang telah memasukkan dua siri kaveat-kaveat persendirian ke atas tanah yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik GRN 296517, Lot 5771, Bandar Subang Jaya, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (hartanah tersebut). [3] Defendan-Defendan di dalam alasan penghakiman ini kadang kala juga akan dirujuk sebagai kedua-dua Defendan. B. LATAR BELAKANG KES 4 [4] Latar belakang kes yang membawa kepada permohonan ini difailkan oleh Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Melalui Surat Tawaran bertarikh 1.10.2003, Standard Chartered Bank Malaysia Berhad (“SCB”) telah meluluskan dan memberikan kemudahan pinjaman perumahan berjumlah RM230,000.00 (“kemudahan pinjaman tersebut”) kepada tuanpunya-tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut iaitu Thunisinigam @ Thuraisingam A/L R. Kuppusamy (No. K/P: 520122-08-5727) dan Vijayaletchumy A/P Arunasalam (No. K/P: 590316-08-6262) (peminjam-peminjam). 4.2 Bagi menjamin pembayaran kemudahan pinjaman tersebut, peminjam-peminjam telah menandatangani suatu Gadaian No Perserahan 1290/2004 yang telah didaftarkan pada 12.1.2004 untuk faedah Plaintif. 4.3 Melalui Perintah Letak Hak bertarikh 20.11.2007 yang diperolehi di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur melalui Saman Pemula No. D4-24-323-2007, pihak Plaintif telah mengambil 5 alih hak, kuasa, kepentingan dan liabiliti / tanggungan SCB di atas kemudahan pinjaman tersebut. 4.4 Pada sekitar tahun 2007, peminjam-peminjam tersebut telah gagal membuat pembayaran balik ansuran bulanan mereka di bawah akaun kemudahan pinjaman tersebut dan oleh itu SCB telah seterusnya melaksanakan prosiding halang tebus terhadap hartanah tersebut. Tarikh lelongan awam bagi hartanah tersebut telah ditetapkan pada 21.11.2007. 4.5 Namun, prosiding halang tebus telah tidak diteruskan oleh Plaintif kerana Defendan-Defendan melalui ejen hartanahnya IProp Realty (SJ) Sdn Bhd (IProp) telah menghubungi Plaintif dengan menyatakan hasrat kedua-dua Defendan untuk menebus hartanah tersebut dan kedua-dua Defendan dan peminjam-peminjam telah memasuki dan menandatangani satu OFFER TO PURCHASE bagi hartanah tersebut peminjam pada 7.11.2007. 6 4.6 IProp kemudiannya menulis surat bertarikh 27.11.2007 kepada Plaintif dengan mengkelatkan/ melampirkan dokumen-dokumen berikut: 4.7 Seterusnya melalui surat peguamcaranya Tee Bee Kim & Partners, bertarikh 14.12.2007 (surat 14 Disember), Defendan- Defendan telah memohon persetujuan daripada Plaintif untuk menjual hartanah tersebut melalui Triti Persendirian. Surat bertarikh 14 Disember 2007 tersebut berbunyi seperti berikut: “We refer to the above matter and the telephone conversation held this morning between Mr. Melvin and ours Ms. Tee. As discussed, we seek your consent for a private sale of the said Property by the Vendor to the Purchaser subject to the following terms and conditions:- i) the purchase price for the said Property shall be RM275,000.00. ii) that the redemption sum for the said Property is to be fixed at RM212,000.00 after taking into account the sum of 7 RM63,000.00 paid by the Purchaser into the above account on 7/11/2007. iii) the said Property is to be redeemed within 3 months after the private caveat lodge by Varatbaraju a/l Munusamy vide Presentation No. 18771/2006 is being removed by the registrar of the land office at the Purchaser’s costs and expenses. Kindly let us have written consent to enable us to prepare the Sale and Purchase Agreement for parties execution.” 4.8 Plaintif telah bersetuju dengan tawaran dan syarat-syarat Defendan-Defendan tersebut dan melalui surat peguamcaranya (Tetuan Shan & Su) bertarikh 21.12.2007 kepada peguamacara Defendan-defendan telah menyatakan berikut: “In this regard, we have been forwarded copies of your letter dated 14.12.2007, wherein we have been instructed that our clients are agreeable to the said disposal and the removal of the caveat lodged against the said property (costs to be borne by your client), on condition that the draft Sale and Purchase Agreement (SPA) to be prepared by your goodselves on behalf of the Purchaser shall be 8 forwarded to us for our comments and approval before the same is finalised. Our main concern shall be with regards to the situation where the caveat is not removes within stipulated time as prescribed by your goodselves in item (iii) of your letter and as such, we have been instructed by our client to peruse the said Draft SPA to ensure that our clients rights are safeguarded.” 4.9 Sehubungan dengan itu, peguamcara Defendan-Defendan melalui surat mereka bertarikh 28.12.2007 telah memajukan deraf perjanjian jual beli untuk semakan dan persetujuan oleh peguamcara Plaintif. 4.10 Selepas kesemua terma-terma dan klausa-klausa dipersetujui oleh Tetuan Shan & Su, Defendan-Defendan dan peminjam- peminjam telah seterusnya menandatangani Perjanjian Jual Beli hartanah tersebut pada 25.01.2008. 4.11 Plaintif kemudian melalui surat bertarikh 23.06.2008 telah bersetuju memberi persetujuan untuk proses jualan hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan-Defendan melalui Triti Persendirian 9 dengan syarat kaveat persendirian yang telah dimasuki oleh seorang bernama Varatbaraju a/l Munusamy melalui perserahan no. 18771/2006 dikeluarkan dalam tempoh 6 bulan dari tarikh perjanjian jual beli tersebut. 4.12 Kaveat persendirian perserahan no. 18771/2006 tersebut telah kemudiannya dipotong pada 26.08.2008. 4.13 Pada 29.08.2008, Defendan-defendan telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian (kaveat pertama) ke atas hartanah tersebut dan alasan yang dinyatakan di dalam Borang 19B Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN), bagi kemasukan kaveat pertama adalah yang “sementara menunggu proses taksiran disempurnakan”. Kaveat pertama ini telah didaftarkan pada 10.09.2008 di bawah No. Perserahan: 42977/2008. 4.14 Selepas perjanjian jual beli tersebut ditandatangani dan di dalam proses mendapat pinjaman bank bagi membiayai pembelian hartanah tersebut, Defendan-Defendan telah 10 dimaklumkan bahawa kedua- dua peminjam adalah individu- individu yang telah dijadikan bankrap. 4.15 Sehubungan dengan itu juga, Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia melalui surat mereka bertarikh 14.05.2012 telah menyatakan bahawa memandangkan bahawa pada tarikh 25.1.2008 tersebut, peminjam-peminjam adalah bankrap, maka perjanjian jual beli tersebut adalah batal dan tidak sah. 4.16 Walaupun perjanjian jual beli telah ditandatangani oleh kedua- dua Defendan dan peminjam-peminjam ditandatangani sejak tahun 2008 dan kaveat Varatbaraju a/l Munusamy telah dikeluarkan pada tahun 2008 lagi, sehingga tahun 2015 (satu tempoh melebihi tujuh (7), Defendan-defendan telah tidak mengambil apa-apa langkah atau inisiatif untuk menebus hartanah tersebut. Di samping itu, walaupun telahpun mengetahui bahawa peminjam-peminjam semasa menandatangani perjanjian jual beli tersebut dengan mereka adalah si bankrap-si bankrap, namun Defendan-defendan tidak mengambil apa-apa langkah mengenainya. 11 4.17 Dalam pada itu, apabila carian rasmi dibuat oleh Plaintif ke atas peminjam-peminjam di Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia, carian rasmi bertarikh 11.3.2016 telah menunjukkan dan mengesahkan bahawa peminjam-peminjam tersebut sememangnya telahpun dihukumkan sebagai bankrap pada tahun 2005 lagi. Peminjam Thunisinigam @ Thuraisingam A/L R. Kuppusamy telah dijadikan seorang bankrap pada 5.9.2006, manakala peminjam Vijayalatchumy A/P Arunasalam telah dijadikan bankrap pada 28.12.2005. 4.18 Walaupun tujuh tahun telah berlalu tanpa mengambil apa-apa tindakan untuk menebus hartanah tersebut, namun apabila kaveat pertama Defendan-Defendan tersebut tamat tempoh keesahannya pada tahun 2015, Defendan-Defendan sekali lagi pada 27.04.2015 telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian yang baru dan kaveat baru ini telah didaftarkan di bawah No. Perserahan: 21710/2015 (kaveat 2015) dengan alasan yang sama seperti kemasukan kaveat pertama iaitu “sementara menunggu proses taksiran disempurnakan”. 12 4.19 Memandangkan sehingga tahun 2016, tidak ada sebarang penebusan telah dibuat oleh Defendan-Defendan ke atas hartanah tersebut (tempoh telahpun melebihi lapan (8) tahun) dan gadaian Plaintif masih berterusan dan berkuatkuasa ke atas hartanah tersebut, Plaintif telah berhasrat untuk melaksanakan prosiding halang tebus ke atas hartanah tersebut, namun Plaintif-Plaintif tidak dapat berbuat sedemikian dengan kehadiran kaveat 2015 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan-defendan. [5] Justeru, Plaintif yang mendakwa ia adalah orang yang terkilan atas kehadiran kaveat 2015 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan-defendan, telah memfailkan saman pemula di dalam Kandungan 1 bagi memohon antara lain perintah-perintah berikut: (a) suatu perintah di bawah seksyen 327 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 supaya Kaveat Persendirian dibawah No. Perserahan 21710/2015 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan-Defendan pada 28.04.2015 ke atas tanah yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik GRN 296517, Lot 5771, 13 Bandar Subang Jaya, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan dibuang atau dibatalkan serta-merta; (b) suatu Perintah di bawah Seksyen 328 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 supaya Kaveat Persendirian dibawah No. Perserahan 42977/2008 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan-Defendan pada 10.09.2008 ke atas tanah yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik GRN 296517, Lot 5771, Bandar Subang Jaya, Daerah Petaling, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan dibuang atau dibatalkan serta-merta; (c) Pentadbir Tanah di Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Petaling membatalkan dan/atau memotong kaveat persendirian No. Perserahan: 42977/2008 dan 21710/2015 dan yang telah dimasukkan oleh Defendan-Defendan untuk memberi kesan kepada perintah sepertimana di perenggan (a) dan (b) di atas. [6] Undang-undang mengenai perlanjutan tempoh kaveat ataupun permohonan untuk pembatalannya adalah jelas dan jitu. Di dalam sesuatu permohonan untuk melanjutkan atau membatalkan kaveat, Mahkamah hendaklah menentu dan mempertimbangkan persoalan- persoalan seperti berikut: 14 i. samada pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. ii. samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan. iii. samada imbangan keselesaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan. iv. samada terdapat keadaan istimewa di pihak pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah. [7] Di dalam perkara kepentingan berkaveat dan peruntukan seksyen 323 KTN, Mahkamah ini suka merujuk kepada perenggan B-D, muka surat 755 alasan penghakiman Gopal Sri Ram, HMR di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719. Di muka surat 755 ini, YA Gopal Sri Ram telah menerangkan ruang lingkup kepentingan berkaveat yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 323 dengan menyatakan berikut: 15 “CAVEATABLE INTEREST To paraphrase s 323(1)(a) of the Code, a private caveat may be entered at the distance of any person or body who claims either: (1) the title to land; or (2) any registrable interest in land. The parameters of caveatability under s 323(1)(a) are therefore circumscribed by these words: ’title’ and ‘registrable interest’. It is only one who makes a claim to either of these in land may enter a private caveat. Although the words ‘title’ and ‘registrable interest’ are not defined by the Code, their meaning may be gathered from the scheme of the Code and from indefeasibility provision, namely, s 340(1). The latter points to a bifurcation between title (the equivalent of the English fee simple) and registrable interests, that it, leases, charges and easements. [8] Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719 juga telah menggariskan ujian-ujian yang harus digunapakai di dalam menentukan dan menimbangkan sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat di mana muka surat 724, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan berikut: 16 “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary one. At first stage, the court will examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat to see whether they show a caveatable interest. Once the court is satisfied that the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim disclosed a serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the court must decide where the balance of convenience” [9] Di dalam perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat juga, Majlis Privy di dalam kes Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 telah memutuskan berikut: “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.” 17 [10] Di dalam kes Kho Ah Soon V Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah sekali lagi menekankan berkenaan prinsip undang-undang di dalam pembatalan kaveat di mana Peh Swee Chin, HMP telah menyatakan di muka surat 184 seperti berikut: “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated by Lord Diplock, the serious question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. C. Samada Defendan-Defendan mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut [11] Defendan-defendan di dalam kes ini telah cuba bergantung kepada perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 25.01.2008 yang dimasuki mereka 18 dengan peminjam-peminjam sebagai asas atau alasan bagi memasukkan kaveat 2015 dengan penyataan “sementara menunggu proses taksiran disempurnakan”. Alasan yang sama telah juga digunakan oleh Defendan-Defendan semasa kemasukan kaveat pertama pada tahun 2008 iaitu tujuh tahun dahulu. [12] Adalah menjadi dakwaan Defendan-defendan bahawa memandangkan mereka telah membuat bayaran pendahuluan sebanyak 10% (RM63,000.00) kepada Plaintif, maka Defendan- Defendan mempunyai kepentingan ke atas hartanah tersebut. [13] Namun Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan bahawa daripada dokumen di Eksibit “B”, AFIDAVIT JAWAPAN DEFENDAN-DEFENDAN (Kandungan 4) adalah jelas dan nyata bahawa bayaran RM63,000.00 yang dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan tersebut bukan suatu pembayaran deposit kepada pembelian hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif tetapi adalah pembayaran yang telah dibuat oleh Defendan- Defendan kepada akaun pinjaman perumahan peminjam-peminjam dengan SCB (Akaun 38060612) yang mana Defendan-Defendan telah membayar jumlah tunggakan ansuran yang tidak dibayar oleh 19 peminjam-peminjam ke dalam akaun pinjaman perumahan mereka. Oleh sebab itulah, Plaintif tidak pernah mengeluarkan sebarang resit penerimaan pembayaran kepada Defendan-Defendan. [14] Justeru, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa wang RM63,000.00 tersebut bukanlah suatu bayaran deposit kepada satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut tetapi hanya merupakan pembayaran hutang tertunggak peminjam-peminjam pada ketika itu yang telah dibayar oleh Defendan-Defendan bagi pihak peminjam-peminjam. Di dalam hal bayaran RM 63,000.00 ini juga, Defendan-Defendan di dalam (Kandungan 4) mereka bagi menentang permohonan Plaintif telah juga menuntut Plaintif memulangkan kepada mereka bayaran RM 63,000.00 tersebut serta ganti rugi. Berkaitan perkara ini, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan peguam Plaintif bahawa tuntutan untuk mengembalikan wang deposit tersebut merupakan suatu tuntutan monetari kediri ‘personal monetary claim’ terhadap peminjam-peminjam tersebut dan bukanlah terhadap Plaintif. Undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahwa suatu tuntutan monetari atau berbentuk wang/kewangan tidak membangkitkan apa-apa kepentingan berkaveat yang membolehkan 20 kaveat 2015 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan-Defendan tersebut berada di atas hartanah tersebut. (Sila lihat kes: Kundang Lakes Country Club Bhd v Garden Masters (M) Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 MLJ 537). [15] Apatah lagi di dalam kes ini, ‘personal monetary claim’ Defendan- Defendan tersebut adalah terhadap peminjam-peminjam tersebut dan bukannya terhadap hartanah tersebut. Di samping itu juga tuntutan persendirian di antara Defendan-Defendan dan peminjam-peminjam adalah tidak ada kena mengena langsung dengan Plaintif. [16] Perlu juga dinyatakan bahawa persetujuan Plaintif terhadap perjanjian jual beli yang dimasuki kedua-dua Defendan dan peminjam-peminjam tersebut adalah tertakluk kepada syarat-syarat yang dipersetujui sendiri oleh Defendan-defendan dan sehingga kini hartanah tersebut masih tidak ditebus oleh Defendan-Defendan dari pihak Plaintif. [17] Perjanjian bertarikh 25.1.2008 tersebut sudah lama tamat tempoh dan telah terbatal kerana syarat-syarat persetujuan Plaintif yang 21 dinyatakan di dalam surat bertarikh 21.12.2007 telah tidak dipatuhi oleh Defendan-Defendan sendiri. Daripada tarikh perjanjian jual beli tersebut (25.1.2008) sehingga kini iaitu selama lebih lapan (8) tahun berlalu (selain daripada menulis surat terakhir pada tahun 2009 kepada Jabatan Insolvensi Malaysia), Defendan-Defendan telah tidak mengambil sebarang langkah dan tindakan lanjut untuk membayar wang penebusan ataupun menyelesaikan pembayaran RM275,000.00 kepada Plaintif. Defendan-Defendan nampaknya di dalam memasukkan kaveat 2015 telah menggunakan alasan “sementara menunggu proses taksiran disempurnakan” bagi perjanjian yang telah dimasuki lapan tahun lalu di mana perjanjian ini bukan sahaja telah luput tempohnya serta batal atas kegagalan pematuhan syarat-syarat yang tidak dipatuhi oleh Defendan- Defendan tetapi juga tidak boleh dikuatkuasakan oleh Defendan- Defendan kerana perjanjian tersebut telah dimasuki oleh Defendan- Defendan dengan peminjam-peminjam yang pada masa perjanjian ditandatangani mereka adalah orang-orang yang bankrap yang peminjam-peminjam tidak mempunyai kapasiti untuk melaksanakan atau meneruskan perjanjian jual beli tersebut. Perjanjian jual beli tersebut sememangnya adalah terbatal (void contract) dan tidak sah. 22 [18] Dengan perjanjian yang batal dan tidak sah, alasan bagi kemasukan kaveat persendirian yang baru pada tahun 2015 yang diberikan oleh kedua-dua Defendan di dalam Borang 19B Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) pada 27.04.2015 adalah “sementara menunggu proses taksiran disempurnakan” (alasan yang sama digunakan untuk kaveat pertama pada tahun 2008) menjadi tidak relevan kerana tidak ada proses taksiran yang perlu disempurnakan. [19] Atas alasan-alasan di atas Defendan-Defendan adalah jelas dan nyata tidak mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut. [20] Di dalam keadaan ini, apabila Defendan-Defendan telah gagal melepasi ujian peringkat pertama iaitu membuktikan bahawa mereka mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut, maka peringkat-peringkat seterusnya samada terdapat pendedahan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan, samada imbangan keselesaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan ataupun samada terdapat keadaan istimewa untuk pengekalan status quo menjadi tidak relevan lagi. 23 [21] Justeru itu, Mahkamah ini membenarkan Kandungan 1 Plaintif dengan kos sebanyak RM10,000.00. t.t. .................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 14 haribulan Disember 2016 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Sidek Teoh Wong & Dennis Dato’ John Clark Aiman Syafiq Peguam Defendan-Defendan - Tetuan Tee Bee Kim & Partners Siti Sarah binti Mohamed

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-57-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a1738461-25bd-4942-92fd-2a47504688a0&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-14-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f78dddba-1d9b-4106-87ee-e210cf258430&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-518-05/2016

PLAINTIF VALENCIA DEVELOPMENT SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 474040-U) DEFENDAN 1. GOH CHING CHEE (NO. K/P: 600225-10-6797) 2. HO CHAI YOONG (NO. K/P: 650824-10-7738) 3. GO LEE BIN (NO. KIP: 641217-02-5066) 4. LILY NEO (NO. K/P: 530327-01-5086) 5. LEE KONG FOO (NO. K/P: 620216-10-6689)

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=286a2460-0119-450f-9a4e-0a7907150ef8&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR ORIGINATING SUMMON NO: BA-24-518-05/2016 Dalam perkara mengenai 5 (lima) parcel yang dipegang di bawah Hakmilik No.: PN 75480/L5, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L5, Hakmilik No.: PN 75480/L7, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L7, Hakmilik No.: PN 75480/L15, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L15, Hakmilik No.: PN 75480/L18, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L18 dan Hakmilik No.: PN 75480/L23, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L23, kesemuanya di bawah No. Lot: 67078. Bandar Sungal Buloh, Daerah Gombak,Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan. Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Kaveat Persendirian No. Perserahan: 5953/2011, 5954/2011, 5955/2011, dan 5914/2011. 2 Dan Dalam perkara Kaveat Persendirian No.:1466/2016, 1467/2016, 1469/2016 dan 1465/2016 kesemuanya dimasukkan pada 25.2.2016 dan Kaveat Persendirian No. Perserahan: 3626/2016 dimasukkan pada19.4.2016. Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen- Seksyen 327, 329 dan 417 Kanun Tanah Negara, 1965. Dan Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012. BETWEEN VALENCIA DEVELOPMENT SDN. BHD. (No. Syarikat: 474040-U) … PLAINTIFF 3 AND 1. GOH CHING CHEE (NO. K/P: 600225-10-6797) 2. HO CHAI YOONG (NO. K/P: 650824-10-7738) 3. GO LEE BIN (NO. KIP: 641217-02-5066) 4. LILY NEO (NO. K/P: 530327-01-5086) 5. LEE KONG FOO (NO. K/P: 620216-10-6689) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] The present case is a simple Application by the Plaintiff Developer for the removal of caveats which were lodged onto the Plaintiff’s lands by the Defendants. [2] It is pertinent to note at this early juncture that the issue as to whether or not the Defendants have caveatable interest is already moot considering that the Defendants have duly removed their 4 caveats in due course of this Court’s proceedings following the final determination by the Federal Court regarding the Defendants’ appeals against the decisions of this High Court, as well as the Court of Appeal (in affirming this High Court’s earlier decision). The only remainder issue for determination is the appropriate damages to compensate the Plaintiff. [3] Valencia Development Sdn Bhd (“Plaintiff”) is the landowner and developer of lands held under the following titles (“Properties”). i. The parcel held under PN 75480/L5, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L5, Lot No: 67078, Bandar Sungai Buloh, District of Gombak, State of Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Parcel L5”); ii. the parcel held under PN 75480/L15, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L15, Lot No: 67078, Bandar Sungai Buloh, District f Gombak, State of Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Parcel L15”); iii. the parcel held under PN 75480/L18, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L18, Lot No: 67078, Bandar Sungai Buloh, District of Gombak, State of Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Parcel L18”); 5 iv. the parcel held under PN 75480/L7, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L7, Lot No.: 67078, Bandar Sungai Buloh, District of Gombak, State of Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Parcel L7”); and v. the parcel held under PN 75480/L23, Bangunan/ Tingkat/ Petak L23, Lot No.: 67078, Bandar Sungai Buloh, District of Gombak, State of Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Parcel L23”). [4] Goh Ching Chee and the four other Defendants (“Defendants”) are allegedly purchasers under a Sale and Purchase Agreement in which the Plaintiff allegedly agreed to develop and sell the Properties while the Defendants agreed to purchase the Properties from the Plaintiff. In view of preserving the Defendants’ alleged rights on the Properties, the Defendants have lodged a series of caveats unto the Properties in the year 2011, and another series of caveats in 2016. [5] Prior to the present Application to remove the caveats, the Defendants have initially filed an action in the High Court in 2009 (“2009 suit”) to specifically enforce the alleged sale and purchase agreement. This High Court has earlier decided on 26.5.2015 that there are no binding sale and purchase agreements between the 6 Plaintiff and the Defendants and that the Plaintiff is not compelled to sell the Properties to the Defendant. This decision has later been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No: B-02-(W)- 1194-07/2015. Accordingly, the Plaintiff filed the present Application (“Enclosure 1”) to remove all of the caveats lodged by the Defendants unto the Properties. [6] Pending the determination of the 2009 suit, the Defendants have lodged a series of caveats in 2011 (“2011 caveats”). However even after full determination of the 2009 case and the Court of Appeal’s decision affirming the High Court’s decision, the Defendants remained delinquent and instead of removing the caveats, have filed a another series of caveats in 2016 (“2016 caveats”). [7] Together with the lodgement of the 2016 caveats, the Defendants filed for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision at the Federal Court, which the Federal Court, rightfully so, has also dismissed. Following the Federal Court’s decision, in the midst of the proceedings of the present Enclosure 1, the Defendants have effectively removed all caveats, both 2011 and 2016 caveats. 7 Thus, the only issue left for this Court’s determination is the assessment of damages. B. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PAY COMPENSATION TO THE PLAINTIFF [8] There is no reason for this Court to go at extreme lengths to determine this issue. It is clear from the proceedings as well as submissions filed that the issue to be determined is to what extent was the Defendants liable under Section 329 of the National Land Code 1965 (“NLC”) for wrongful entry or failure to withdraw the caveats. [9] It must be minded that there are two series of caveats lodged, at two different periods of time. The 2011 caveats (“the first series”) were lodged before the determination of the 2009 suit which had found that the Defendants have no interests over the Properties. [10] Meanwhile, the 2016 caveats (“the second series”) were lodged after the determination of the 2009 suit and also after the Court of Appeal had affirmed the decision of this High Court in the 2009 suit. 8 [11] The Plaintiff contends that the liability to pay under Section 329 of the NLC should run from the date of the High Court’s decision of the 2009 suit in the year 2015 until the date that all of the caveats are removed. [12] It must be noted that an entire year has already passed after the High Court’s decision before the present Application is filed (“Silent Period”). In fact the present Application was only filed after the Defendants have lodged the 2016 caveats. [13] The Plaintiff claims that this Court should account for the Defendant’s failure to remove both the 2011 and 2016 caveats in assessing the damages payable to compensate the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff essentially refers to numerous precedents that had held that the liability to compensate is automatic upon proving wrongful entry or failure to remove caveat. The Plaintiff mainly refers to the decision in the case of Sayang Plantation Bhd v Koh Siak Poo [2006] 1 MLJ 230: “I would agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that ss 329(1) and ss 331(4) are significantly different in that the liability in the former is automatic whereas the latter is 9 subject to preconditions being met. The words ‘shall be liable to pay compensation’ in s. 329(1) are self- explanatory in that liability attaches at the moment the wrongful entry or failure to withdraw a private caveat is proven.” [14] There is no flaw in this principle and this Court does not intend to contra the same. However, as much as it is this Court’s duty to uphold the same principle, it is equally as much as this Court’s duty to not allow a litigant to profit from his delays to act on his rights. Proving liability is one matter, and sitting on that proven liability to garner profits is altogether an entirely different matter. [15] The Plaintiff claims damages on the basis that it was unable to deal with the land for the entire duration of time the caveat is lodged onto the Properties (inclusive of the Silent Period). However, it is far too convenient for the Plaintiff to keep silent and sleep on its rights to apply the present Application for the entirety of the Silent Period and simply claim for damages under Section 329 of the NLC without any real effort to pursue such claims. 10 [16] As much as it is wrong for the Defendant to not withdraw the 2011 caveats during the Silent Period, it is equally wrong for the Plaintiff to sit idly by and hope that this Court would grant damages the Plaintiff otherwise has to put in effort to gain. [17] It was well within the Plaintiff’s option to pursue the enforcement of the High Court’s judgment of the 2009 suit soon after the judgment was issued but the Plaintiff instead chose to sit on the same right to enforcement. This Court is not excusing the Defendant’s failure to withdraw the 2011 caveats, but rather disallowing the Plaintiff from manipulating the judicial process to rake in profits which the Plaintiff could all too conveniently gain from merely sitting idle. [18] If indeed the sale or the dealing of the Properties is utterly urgent and that the Plaintiff indeed stands to lose profits during the Silent Period, then the Plaintiff should have immediately spring into action to enforce the judgment and have the 2011 caveats removed. Instead, further highlighting the non-urgency of the matter, the Plaintiff waited for an entire year before filing the present Application to have the caveats removed. 11 [19] Clearly here that it is more probable than not that the Plaintiff did not stand to lose any profits or suffer any damages during the Silent Period. Therefore, any damages granted for the failure to remove the 2011 caveats during the 1 year Silent Period, would be easy profits for the Plaintiff, which this Court shall not allow. Simply put, although the liability to compensate is automatic under Section 329 of the NLC, the same provision is not exempted from other trite principle of law. Particularly so, the Plaintiff is not exempt from the rule that no litigant shall be allowed to unduly profit from its litigation, more so from a litigant’s delay in its litigation. [20] This Court’s finding is not without basis or precedent. This Court draws valuable guidance from the Court of Appeal’s decision in the case of Khor Cheng Wah v Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 396 at p. 401 where the Court of Appeal had stated the following: “It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the Court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus non dormientibusjurasubveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases 12 where a right is exercisable ex debitiojustitiae, a Court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant…” [21] The Plaintiff’s delay in applying for the removal of the 2011 caveats sits right on the nose of the same trite principle above. Although the Plaintiff’s right for compensation is automatic upon proving the failure to withdraw under Section 329 of the NLC, it remains this Court’s discretion to refuse damages owing to the Plaintiff’s delays. C. COURT’S DECISION [22] Thereto, it is this Court’s decision that the assessment of damages owing to the failure to remove the caveats shall not take into account the Defendant’s failure to withdraw the 2011 caveats as the Plaintiff has slept on its rights to enforce the judgment to have the same caveats removed in the Plaintiff’s own indolence during the Silent Period. [23] Nonetheless, it is this Court’s decision that the assessment of damages shall take into account of the Defendant’s wrongful entry of the 2016 caveats as well as the Defendant’s failure to withdraw 13 the 2016 caveats from the date that the 2016 caveats were lodged until the 2016 caveats were effectively withdrawn. [24] This Court takes a retrospective approach to the Defendants’ liability to the wrongful 2016 caveats simply because it was already proven since the High Court Judgment of the 2009 suit in the year 2015 that the Defendants have no interest at all in the Properties. [25] Furthermore, it was also decided in a separate Application by the Plaintiff to remove caveats lodged by the Defendants in 2014 (vide Shah Alam High Court Originating Summons No: 24-1383- 11/2015) that the Defendants have no caveatable interest over the Properties. In the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons No: 24-1383- 11/2015 (filed on 20.11.2015), Akhtar Tahir J had on 22.2.2016 allowed the Plaintiff’s application to remove all the caveats lodged by the Defendants in 2014 unto the properties on 12.12.2014 (Private caveats Presentation nos. 13020/2014, 13019/2014, 13022/2014, 13021/2014 dan 13016/2014). [26] Thus, the Defendants have lodged the 2016 caveats notwithstanding having full knowledge that the Court has decided 14 that the Defendants have no caveatable interest. The Defendants’ blatant disregard to these decisions is thoroughly inexcusable. [27] The amount of damages above shall be assessed before the Senior Assistant Registrar. On the issue of costs [28] This Court finally orders that the Defendants do pay the Plaintiff the sum of RM5000.00 as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) High Court Judge High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Khaw & Partners Ms JC Yong For the Defendants - Messrs William Leong & Co Mr Abd Halim Bin Abdul Karim

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-57-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2f254da2-ee91-4918-8224-4242775bd6c7&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-14-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=cad7f700-c6da-48ff-a53d-74bc0a07b67f&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-14-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=0576dc7e-c6a9-4c24-9fa5-e24b425ebfc2&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-57-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3a21839d-a27a-455d-8f64-ef5043f4b723&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-57-01/2016

PLAINTIF UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DEFENDAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-57-01/2016

PLAINTIF Uma Devi A/P Elangovan DEFENDAN 1. Pejabat Daerah Dan Tanah Gombak 2. Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor 3. Unit Perancang Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor

09/12/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=91bbc867-72fb-41b4-916f-522828a31ea7&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-57-01/2016 Dalam Perkara No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No. 3671) MukimBatu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor didaftarkan di bawah Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05-5144); Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 3 Akta Pengambilan Tanah 1960 dan pengambilan tanah dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671 Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor Dan Dalam Perkara itu “Akujanji” berhubung dengan Lot No, 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A, diperuntukkan oleh undi kepada Uma Devi A/P Elangovan (No. Kad Pengenalan: 740320-05- 5144) Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 4, Seksyen 11 dan Seksyen 18 dan Seksyen 44 Akta Relief Spesifik 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 10, Seksyen 52, Seksyen 53, Seksyen 54 dan Seksyen 74 Akta Kontrak 1950; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA UMA DEVI A/P ELANGOVAN ...PLAINTIF (NO. K/P :740320-05-5144) DAN 1. PEJABAT DAERAH DAN TANAH GOMBAK 2. PERBADANAN KEMAJUAN NEGERI SELANGOR 3. UNIT PERANCANG EKONOMI NEGERI PEJABAT SETIAUSAHA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR ...DEFENDAN- DEFENDAN 3 GROUNDS OF JUGDMENT (Enclosure 1) A. INTRODUCTION [1] The present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is basically a claim for a breach of contract on the basis of an alleged unilateral termination of the contract as well as a claim for breach of public and/or statutory duty. [2] Vide Enclosure 1, the Plaintiff sought inter alia for the following reliefs: i. Satu perintah kebenaran untuk memfailkan permohonan ini; dan atau ii. Satu perintah kebenaran kepada Plaintif untuk melanjutkan tempoh masa memfailkan permohonan ini; dan iii. Satu perintah diberi kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya diteruskan tawaran jualan satu (1) Tingkat Unit No 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang 4 dalam Perumahan Projek Penempatan Semula Setinggan Bukit Botak, Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bandar Baru Selayang kepada Plaintif; dan iv. satu perintah kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya memberikan kepada Plaintif wang pampasan sebanyak RM16,140.00 akibat pengambilan tanah yang dipegang dibawah Hakmilik hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan atau v. Satu perintah diberikan kepada Defendan-Defendan supaya Defendan-Defendan memberikan tuntutan kompensasi kepada Plaintif ke atas nilai hartatanah semasa sebanyak RM350,000.00 dan atau nilai semasa ke atas tanah yang digazzetkan dalam hakmilik: 66531 Plot No: 1381 (PT No: 3671) Mukim Batu, Daerah Gombak Negeri Selangor; dan [3] The Plaintif in this case is an individual by the name of Uma Devi a/p Elangovan. The Plaintif was the registered proprietor of a 5 piece of land held under title number HS(D) 66531, PT No 3671, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (“property”). [4] Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak (“1st Defendant”) is the land office in which the property was situated within the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the 1stDefendant. [5] Perbadanan Kemajuan Negeri Selangor (“2nd Defendant”) is the 2nd contractor (replacing the initial contractor, Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (“Delpuri”)) contracted to construct houses under the scheme which the Plaintiff was party to. [6] Unit Perancangan Ekonomi Negeri Pejabat Setiausaha Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (“3rd Defendant”) is the governing planning authority of which the property is located in. B. PRELIMINARY ISSUE The 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant were wrongly cited [7] Both the 1st and the 3rd Defendants had contended that the Plaintiff had wrongly cited them. The Plaintiff had named the offices of the two Defendants instead of the person/persons responsible 6 inmanaging and administering both offices. According to the counsels for the 1stand 3rdDefendants, in respect of the 1st Defendant, the party that should be sued or cited is the Land Administrator himself namely, the Pentadbir Pejabat Daerah dan Tanah Gombak. Whilst in respect of the 3rd Defendant, it was contended that the Director General of Economic Planning Unit should be named instead of his office. [8] On this contention, this Court only has this to say, if the 1st and the 3rd Defendantsverily believe that the wrong partieshave been sued or wrong name shave been cited, and thus the legal capacity of the parties is disputed, then the proper step that should have been taken by both the Defendants is to apply to strike out the Plaintiff’s originating summons against them for want of legal capacity. But this was not done. Instead, both the 1st Defendant and the 3rd Defendant had proceeded to file their affidavits in reply in opposing the Plaintiff’s application and submitted to this Court’s jurisdiction. Hence, on this reason, the contention of the 1st and the 3rd Defendant must fail. C. BACKGROUND FACTS 7 [9] In order to further understand the context of this case and the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff, this Court must first set out the chronology of events that led the Plaintiff to file Enclosure 1 against the three Defendants. The 1st Contract 9.1 The Plaintiff was a squatter on the property before the Majlis Mesyuarat Kerajaan Negeri Selangor (MMKN) planned to develop the entire area. In relocating the squatters in the area, MMKN had planned to build a housing scheme which was called Penempatan Setinggan Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. 9.2 The 1st Defendant by its letter dated 20.7.2000 entitling TAWARAN PENEMPATAN SETINGGAN PROJEK TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA, BUKIT BOTAK, BANDAR BARU SELAYANG, GOMBAK, SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN (Exhibit “UD-5”, Enclosure 2) which was addressed to the Plaintiff personally, had offered the Plaintiff one unit (Property) of the housing scheme/project which will be developed by Syarikat Delpuri Corporation SdnBhd (Delpuri), the developer/contractor appointed by MMKN. 8 9.3 In its offer letter to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant had stated as follows: “2. Sukacita dimaklumkan bahawa Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak telah mengesyorkan nama tuan/puan kepada Kerajaan Negeri Selangor untuk diluluskan satu lot tanah seluas 2,200 kaki persegi bagi didirikan rumah berkembar yang akan dipilih samada jenis A atau B atau C di Projek Taman Selayang Mutiara. Bagi mempastikan pihak tuan/puan menyertai projek ini pihak tuan/puan perlu membayar “bayaran komitmen” sebanyak RM1,000.00 pada masa dan alamat seperti berikut: Delpuri Corporation Sdn. Bhd. No. 18 (Ting. Bawah) Jalan 26 Bandar BaruSelayang 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Tarikh : 28 Julai, 2000 Masa : 9.00 pagi hingga 5.00 petang.” 9.4 The Plaintiff had then paid the sum RM1,000.00 on 29.9.2003 as commitment for the purchase of the Property. Delpuri, the initial 9 contractor followed-up with the payment of the commitment with a demand for payment for execution of works on 30.9.2003 in which the Plaintiff contracted to purchase one unit of house on the property on a booked price of RM 79,900.00 with allotted Lot no. 1526. The Plaintiff again, duly paid the sum RM 7684.44 being the amount demanded by Delpuri. 9.5 The circumstances have it that during the performance of this scheme as well as the contracts, the contractor employed to conduct the construction of the housing has once been replaced. 9.6 Owing to this replacement, the original contract for the relocation has been rescinded and a new fresh offer was made which was again accepted by the Plaintiff. 9.7 Vide a letter dated 25.6.2005 (Exhibit “UD-3”, Enclosure 2) which was again addressed to the Plaintiff personally, the 1st Defendant had informed the Plaintiff that in the meeting held by MMKN on 30 March 2005, MMKN had approved the alienation of the property to the Plaintiff under the Rancangan Penempatan Semula Setinggan Selayang Mutiara (“Project”). In the said letter it was also stated 10 that that the approval was made by the MMKN, in the mesyuarat ke 6/2005 of the MMKN. 9.8 As a result of the disposal by way of the alienation of the said property to the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff had accordingly paid the premium for the alienation and cancellation of the Property as state land. There upon, the Property was alienated and registered to the holding of the Plaintiff.The Plaintiff was then issued with a Hakmilik Sementara in Borang 11AK which was registered on 3.12.2008 ( Exhibit “UD-1”, Enclosure 2) 9.9 The Plaintiff ownership of the said property was further corroborated by the State Government of Selangor gazette dated dated 6.11.2009. In the Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor at page 3467, Plaintiff was recorded the “Tuan punya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan”. As a matter of fact the full particulars of the gazette were as follows: WARTA KERAJAAN NEGERI SELANGOR (6hb Nov 2009) 3467 No. Lot Hakmilik Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Keluasan Anggaran Ukur atau Penduduk Lot Keluasan Penduduk yang Direkodkan yang akan Direkod 11 H.S.(D) Meter Persegi Meter Persegi ... P.T.3671 66531 Uma Devi a/p Elangovan 269 269 …. The 2nd contract and 3rd Contract 9.10 In a turn of events, Delpuri was unable to perform the contract to construct the house. Thus, the State Government took it upon itself and devised another arrangement to keep the Project in motion. 9.11 The 2nd Defendant (the development arm of the State of Selangor) was appointed as the new contractor to undertake the construction under the Project. The 2nd Defendant issued a letter dated 15.5.2006 admitting to shouldering the contractual responsibility to construct and develop the houses as a developer under the Project: “Dengan ini saya ingin mengesahkan kepada pihak tuan bahawa PKNS telah menerima arahan daripada Mesyuarat MMKN bil 30/2005 bertarikh 30 November 2005 untuk mengambilalih projek pembangunan semula setinggan di 12 Taman Selayang Mutiara, Bukit Botak daripada Delpuri Corporation Sdn Bhd. Sehubungan dengan itu PKNS bertanggungjawab sebagai pemaju untuk menyediakan sebanyak 1,440 unit rumah berkembar 1 tingkat dengan keluasan 40’ x 60’ untuk setinggan yang terlibat” 9.12 The 2nd Defendant in its own offer dated 22.3.2009 to undertake the construction works had offered their undertaking to construct save if the Plaintiff agrees to certain conditions precedent. The conditions precedent includes: “Kesemua penduduk yang terlibat dengan projek ini memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan pihak PKNS untuk tujuan membina rumah berkembar 1 tingkat” 9.13 The Plaintiff has duly complied with the above condition precedent along with all other conditions precedent in the 2nd Defendant’s offer. 13 9.14 Following the Plaintiff’s agreement to allow the State Government via the 2nd Defendant to undertake the construction, the Property was put under acquisition in which the State Government acquired the land under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. All the relevant statutory notices and forms under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 were issued. 9.15 Following the acquisition, while the 2nd Defendant undertakes to shoulder the responsibility of construction, the 3rd Defendant itself offers to undertake to ensure the completion of the entire Project. 9.16 The 3rd Defendant thereafter issued an undertaking and offer dated 28.2.2011 which is entitled: “AKUJANJI BAGI MELAKSANAKAN DAN MENYEMPURNAKAN PROJEK PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN BUKIT BOTAK (TAMAN SELAYANG MUTIARA) (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai “Projek”) 9.17 The content and terms of the undertaking and/or offer entails that the 3rd Defendant makes the following offers, in view of the 14 Plaintiff’s willingness to authorise the State Government (inclusive of the 2nd and 3rd Defendants) to perform and complete the project: i. To sell 1 unit of a single storey semi-detached house with a build-up area of 850 square feet on the Property measuring 2,200 square feet at a price of RM99,000.00; ii. that the total compensation from the acquisition shall be fixed at RM12,300.00 and this amount is not inclusive of the fixed price above; and iii. the 3rd Defendant guarantees completion of the Project as agreed. Appended together with this letter of undertaking and offer is a draft Surat Persetujuan. 9.18 Following the 3rd Defendant’s undertaking and offer, the Plaintiff opted to agree and submit its Surat Persetujuan dated 24.3.2011. 9.19 At this moment in time, the Plaintiff has entered into two separate contracts with the 2nd and 3rd Defendants respectively. Upon the 15 2nd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Construction Contract (“2nd Contract”) with the 2nd Defendant. Upon the 3rd Defendant’s offer, the Plaintiff entered into a Contract to Complete the Project (“3rd Contract”) with the 3rd Defendant. Both contracts have its own sets of terms which were agreed to by the Plaintiff. Under the 2nd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to enter into a new contract with the 2nd Defendant and nullify the earlier contract with Delpuri while under the 3rd Contract, the Plaintiff agrees to not oppose the compensation offered from the acquisition and not to withdraw the Plaintiff’s acceptance of the 3rd Contract. 9.20 Entailing these two contracts above, the Plaintiff was invited by the 2nd Defendant to confirm a unit of house under the Project which was duly attended by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was then confirmed with Project: 1422 Unit Rumah Berkembar 1 Tingkat (Bukit Botak) via the 2nd Defendant’s Letter confirming housing lot dated April 2012. The sudden u-turn and disqualification of the Plaintiff 9.21 However, in a sudden turn of events, by a letter dated the Plaintiff was informed that she does not qualify for the relocation scheme 16 on the supposed reason that she was not the original settler or “setinggan asal” of the property. For this reason, the 2nd offer was withdrawn and the contract was terminated. 9.22 Inexplicably, after 7 years since the 1st contract, and the entering into the 2nd and 3rd Contract, the 1st Defendant had somehow ‘investigated’ the Plaintiff’s qualification for the Project and suspected that there was a “penyelewengan” or fraud regarding the Plaintiff’s qualification. The 1st Defendant in its letter dated 8.10.2012 introduced a new consideration which was never mentioned in any of the correspondence and contracts that the Project only confers rights to Setinggan Asal or original squatter of the Property (“requirement”). It was allegedly found that the Plaintiff is only the 2nd generation of squatters and the original squatter of the Property was one Alyamah d/o Sellam (based on a supposed Buku Bancian 1985) and that the Plaintiff’s father has already been offered a semi-D house. 9.23 Consequent to this investigative finding, the 2nd Defendant unilaterally terminated the 2nd Contract while the 3rd Defendant remains to not perform the 3rd Contract. 17 9.24 It is this withdrawal of offer and termination of contracts that form the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons and the reliefs sought. [10] Thus, in the present Originating Summons, the Plaintiff intends to challenge the legality and validity of the unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract, the failure to perform the 3rd Contract and the interference of the 1st Defendant causing the termination and non- performance in the course of the 1st Defendant’s public duty. [11] This Court must also emphasise that although this case involves the state government, however by and large the present dispute revolves around the non-performance of contracts entered between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants regarding the relocation of the Plaintiff under a housing scheme planned by the State Government of Selangor. [12] Inthis present case, this Court must not lose sight of the fact that the Plaintiff here has not only been offered a deal for relocation, but the Plaintiff has been offered the same deal twice and the Plaintiff accordingly has accepted three (3) different contracts (1 18 contract for the 1st deal and 2 contracts in the 2nd deal) in view of gaining the same property under the relocation scheme. [13] It must be firmly noted that all letters and contract by the Defendants were addressed to the personal name of the Plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the 1st Defendant has lawfully passed good title of the Property to the Plaintiff while Delpuri has contracted with the Plaintiff to develop and construct the house according to the Project. B. WHETHER THERE ISA REQUIREMENT TO BE AN ORIGINAL SQUATTER TO BE QUALIFIED IN THE PROJECT AND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR THE HOUSING SCHEME [14] The Court does not have to go at lengths to determine this issue as a simple reading of the contemporaneous documents and correspondence is sufficiently telling that the requirement of being an original squatter was never a term in the offer, acceptance, and the contracts themselves. All of the documents and correspondences were addressed to the Plaintiff personally, and all of the documents and correspondences acknowledge and admit the Plaintiff’s entitlement to the Property. At no point in time in any 19 of the documents even since the offer in 2003 leading up to the 2nd and 3rd Contracts that there was ever any mention the requisite of being an original squatter. i. Admission in State Government Gazette [15] It has already been admitted by the State Government through Warta Kerajaan Negeri Selangor dated 5.11.2009 at page 3467 that it was recorded that the Plaintiff was the “Tuanpunya berdaftar atau Penduduk yang Direkodkan” ii. The 2005 offer by the 1st Defendant for alienation and the 2005 offer by Delpuri for the 1st Contract never mentioned the requirement to be an original Settler [16] When the 1st Defendant approves the alienation to the Plaintiff, it was approved under the scheme entitled “RANCANGAN PENEMPATAN SEMULA SETINGGAN SELAYANG MUTIARA (BUKIT BOTAK)”. The Project per se was made clear to the general qualification of a setinggan and not a setinggan asal. If indeed the requirement to be setinggan asal is that essential, then it should have been explicitly mentioned so. But it was never mentioned. The same letter even referred to the Plaintiff as Pemilik 20 Tanah without any mention of the requirement to be an original squatter. [17] Similarly, the requirement was also never mentioned in Delpuri’s demand for payment for the execution of the Project as well as the “projek pembinaan” (Construction Contract) iii. The 2nd Contract with the 2nd Defendant has no mention of the requirement [18] The 2nd Defendant’s letter of offer dated 22.3.2009 was personally addressed to the Plaintiff with clear admission of the Plaintiff being the “Penduduk” qualified under the Project. The 2nd Defendant had called the Plaintiff to enter into a new construction contract (2nd Contract) under the Project without any fuss about having to be an original settler. iii. Notice in Forms E and G under the Land Acquisition Act 1960 also admits to Plaintiff’s entitlement [19] Even in the column for Tuanpunya Berdaftar atau Penduduk Yang Direkodkan in Form E was ascribed the full name, ic number and 21 the Plaintiff’s shares over the Property notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. The Plaintiff’s full name, ic number and shares over the property was also ascribed in Form G’s column for Orang yang berkepentingan notwithstanding the fact that the Plaintiff was not a setinggan asal. iv. The 3rd Defendant’s Letter of Offer and Undertaking admits to Plaintiff’s qualification with no mention of the requirement [20] Even the 3rd Defendant’s letter dated 28.2.2011 was addressed personally to the Plaintiff and has admitted to the Plaintiff’s qualification to enter into the 3rd Contract and continue to participate in the Project without a single mention of the requirement. The requirement of an original squatter was never an issue or never discussed and was never a term [21] Thus, it is patently clear that all the while since the year 2003 when the Plaintiff was first offered alienation of the property, it remains consistent right through time leading up to the existence of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Contracts, that the requirement for the Plaintiff to be a 22 Setinggan Asal was never a term, consideration, or even mentioned to begin with. If there was any “penyelewengan” it is more likely to be the Defendants’ fault. It was never communicated at all material times when the contracts were entered into, that the Defendants intended the Project only to cover original squatters. It is vividly clear that the requirement was never intended to be part of the Project or the Contracts. [22] Thus, the Defendants cannot be allowed to turn back on their own representation and acknowledgment of the status quo for at least 8 years before the 1st Defendant introduced the requirement utterly late in the Project and the Contracts. For this Court to allow the Defendants to do so is akin to the Court allowing the Defendants to approbate and reprobate as well as unilaterally varying and adding foreign terms into the contracts. [23] The Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd& Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 23 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another: he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] Further guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the Amalgamated Investment case which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through 24 them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [25] Similarly in the present case, the Defendants cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold and contend two contradicting stances under one and the same breath. And considering the constant and consistent status quo that the requirement was never an issue or consideration in the correspondence, the Project and the 25 Contracts, it is this Court’s finding that it is verily more probable than not that there was never any requirement for the Plaintiff to be a Setinggan Asal for the Plaintiff to be qualified under the Project. [26] No evidence has been exhibited or contended by the Defendants that there was any element of “penyelewengan” on the part of the Plaintiff as there are also no evidence that the Plaintiff was even asked to confirm if she was an original settler or otherwise. C. WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS WERE RIGHT IN DISQUALIFYING THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE PROJECT The 2nd and 3rd Defendants’ wrong in contract [27] Reiterating the above findings, it is clear that the 2nd and 3rd Defendant are contractually bound to the Plaintiff vide the 2nd and 3rd Contracts respectively. Upon the 1st Defendants wrongful discovery of the Plaintiff’s disqualification from the Project, the 2nd Defendant had terminated the contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant remained with non-performance of the 3rd Contract. 26 [28] Thus, the 2nd Defendant has unlawfully terminated the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff while the 3rd Defendant has persisted to unlawfully fail to perform its obligations under the 3rd Contract. Both wrongs are wrongs against contracts and are breaches to the contracts. [29] This Court does not find any necessity to discuss whether the 2nd Contract and 3rd Contract were merely undertakings or promises as in essence, even if the 2nd Contract or the 3rd Contracts were undertakings or promises, it remains that the same obligations are enforceable against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. This Court refers to the King’s Bench decision in the case of Central London Property Trust Limited v High Trees House Limited [1947] 1 KB 130 which had held that: “…where parties enter into an arrangement which is intended to create legal relations between them and in pursuance of such arrangement one party makes a promise to the other which he knows will be acted on and which is in fact acted on by the promise, the court will treat the promise as binding on the promisor to the extent that it will not allow him to act inconsistently with it…” 27 [30] Furthermore, owing to the nature of the correspondences having offers, terms, lawful considerations as well as acceptance letters by the Plaintiff, it is ultimately indicative that there were valid contracts between the Plaintiff and the 2nd and 3rd Defendants and not mere undertaking or promises. (see Section 10 of the Contracts Act 1950) [31] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant (in cancelling and terminating the 2nd Contract,) and the 3rd Defendant (in failing to perform the 3rd Contract) is in total breach of the Contracts with the Plaintiff. 1st Defendant’s wrong in the course of its duty [32] Echoing the earlier finding, it is utterly clear that the 1st Defendant has pulled the requirement and the 1985 bancian (which was never an essential term of qualification for the Project) as an afterthought in attempting to defeat the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and the Project. [33] And this Court is inclined to agree that the 1st Defendant had breached its public duty to respect and uphold the Plaintiff’s 28 entitlement over the property when there is no reason at all to deny the Plaintiff from her entitlement. All the while since the alienation of the Property to the Plaintiff, the 1st Defendant is under a statutory and public duty to protect and respect the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property. Furthermore, the whole exercise of the state acquisition of the Property was conducted on the understanding and acknowledgment that the Plaintiff is entitled to the Property. For the 1st Defendant now to defeat this understanding and acknowledgment is a wrongful exercise of the 1st Defendant’s statutory and public duty. [34] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant owes a public and statutory duty to protect and uphold the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and consequently the 1st Defendant has breached the same public and statutory duty against the rights of the Plaintiff. D. FINDINGS OF LIABILITIES AND THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION [35] Now, before this Court embarks to discuss the issue of liabilities with the issue raised on limitation, this Court must stress again, that as found earlier, all of the Defendants committed wrong against the Defendant. 29 [36] However, owing to the issue of limitation raised it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s action against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. This is because the limitation period of 36 months as per Section 2(a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948 (“PAPA”) applies in the context of the 1st Defendant’s wrongful exercise of statutory and public duty. [37] The differing application of the provision between Defendants was made for a simple reason. And that reason is that, the 1st Defendant has committed a wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty while the 2nd and 3rd Defendants had committed wrongs in the performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts. [38] It is settled law that the limitation in the Section 2(a) of the PAPA only applies when the public authority complained of has committed wrong in the exercise of its public or statutory duty. Section 2(a) reads: Where, after the coming into force of this Act, any suit, action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the Federation against any person for any act done in 30 pursuance or execution or intended execution of any written law or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such written law, duty or authority the following provisions shall have effect: (a) the suit, action, prosecution or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within thirty-six months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of injury or damage, within thirty-six months next after the ceasing thereof; [39] This Court finds valuable guidance in the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Bradford Corporation v Myers [1916] AC 242 whereby the House of Lords had deliberated on the limitation of time in respect of a public authority’s private conduct and a public authority’s conduct of its statutory or public duty and held the following: “…that the act complained of was not an act done in the direct execution of a statute, or in the discharge of a 31 public duty or the exercise of a public authority, and that the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, afforded no defence to the action. [40] It must be noted that the principle in Bradford Corporation applies mutatis mutandis to the present case as the provision in the Bradford Corporation is largely similar to Section 2(a) of the Malaysian PAPA. [41] Further guidance is drawn from the decision in the case of Baltim Timber Sdn Bhd v Director of Forests &Ors [1996] 4 MLJ 103 where the High Court had held that: “The license was revoked not because there was a breach of the terms of the license but because there was a breach of statutory provision, that is, s 2(2) of the Forest Ordinance. Accordingly, the revocation of the license was an act done in the execution of a public duty, and under s 2(a) of the PAPA, any claim arising from such an act must be made within 36 months from the date of revocation. 32 [42] Thus having in mind the above decisions, it is only appropriate for this Court to find that the 1st Defendant falls within the ambit of Section 2(a) of the PAPA for its wrongful exercise of public and/or statutory duty in unlawfully depriving the Plaintiff’s rights over the Property and qualification under the Project. [43] The 2nd and 3rd Defendants however do not fall within the application of the same provision as their conducts are breaches of the 2nd and 3rd’s Defendant contractual duty under the 2nd and 3rd Contracts with the Plaintiff and are not conducts in the exercise of their public or statutory duty. [45] The Limitation Period for the Plaintiff’s claim accrues at the time when her rights were first deprived and that is when the Plaintiff was first informed by the 1st Defendant that she was disqualified from the Project on 8.10.2012. [46] Thus, under the PAPA, the 3 years limitation period for an action against the 1st Defendant lapses on 8.10.2015, while under Section 6 of the Limitation Act 1953, the 6 years limitation period for an action for breach or termination of contracts as 33 against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants lapses on 8.10.2018. The present Originating Summons was filed in early 2016. [47] Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is unfortunately time-barred. Nonetheless, the Plaintiff’s claims against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants on their contractual obligations are well within time. [48] Consequently, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant is indeed liable for a wrongful exercise of its statutory and/or public duty although unfortunately, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [49] It is also this Court’s finding that the 2nd Defendant is liable for its blatant unilateral termination of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. This Court further finds that the 3rd Defendant is liable for its blatant persisting non-performance of the 3rd Contract with the Plaintiff. E. COURT’S DECISION 34 [50] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case against the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. [51] It is also this Court’s decision that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants has utterly failed to prove any defence to challenge the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons. [52] It is also the decision of this Court that although the Plaintiff has proven that the 1st Defendant had unlawfully exercised its public and/or statutory duty, the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred. [53] Thus, this Court grants the following reliefs to the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summons: i. This Court orders specific performance of the 2nd and 3rd Contracts under the Project to uphold the Plaintiff’s rights regarding over the Property as well as the sale of a 1 storey unit No. 7, Jalan Mutiara 3A (Bukit Botak) Bandar Baru Selayang under the Project; 35 ii. Considering that this Court has granted specific performance of the above contracts, together with the fact that this Court has earlier found that the Plaintiff’s claim against the 1st Defendant is time-barred, this Court therefore declines to grant the Plaintiff an order that the Plaintiff be paid the sum of RM 16,140.00 being compensation monies for the acquisition of the Property. [54] This Court also minded not to grant the Plaintiff any additional compensation (in addition to the specific performance) under Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act as the Plaintiff has not furnished any grounds which this Court should grant additional compensation on top of the specific performance. The Plaintiff prays for the current value of the Property on top of the specific performance. This clearly tantamount to double claiming. The Plaintiff cannot be compensated with both the Property itself and the value of the Property. On the issue of costs [55] In view of the above decision, this Court orders that the 2nd Defendant and the 3rd Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the sums of 36 RM8000.00 and RM5000.00 respectively as costs. On the other hand, the Plaintiff is ordered to pay the sum of RM5000.00 to the 1st Defendant as costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 9th December 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Guna Perumal & Associates Encik Guna Perumal For the Defendants - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor (Representing the 1st and 3rd Defendants) Puan Nurhamimah binti Amrah Messrs Lainah, Yaacob & Zulkepli (Representing the 2nd Defendant) Encik Zulkepli Omar

Tika 2.6.0

J-05(SH)-34-01/2016

PERAYU HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH RESPONDEN PENDAKWA RAYA

Dangerous Drugs — Accused appeals against conviction and sentence — Accused originally charged with trafficking cannabis weighing 4854 grams — Trial court convicted and sentenced accused to a reduced charge of possession — Appeal by Public Prosecutor against amended charge, conviction and sentence — Whether amendment and reduction of charge by trial judge flawed — Whether trial judge mishandled facts presented before him — Whether the accused was only in passive possession of the said drugs — Whether conviction of accused on charge safe — Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234], sections 2, 6, 39B(1)(a), 39B(2)

01/12/2016

YA DATUK NALLINI PATHMANATHANKorumYA DATO' AHMADI BIN HAJI ASNAWI

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ac57e350-3ef1-4b4e-8f49-afcbdec8f9d2&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PUTRAJAYA, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-34-01/2016 & RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 DI ANTARA HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWARAYA … RESPONDEN DAN DI ANTARA PENDAKWARAYA … PERAYU LAWAN HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Bahru Darul Takzim, Malaysia Perbicaraan Jenayah No 45A-10-04/2014) Di Antara Pendakwaraya Lawan Harvinder Singh A/L Joginder Singh (No. KP: 851015-01-5543) 2 CORUM: AHMADI HAJI ASNAWI, JCA NALLINI PATHMANATHAN, JCA KAMARDIN HASHIM, JCA JUDGMENT OF NALLINI PATHMANATHAN Introduction [1] In this case there are two related appeals, where the accused was charged with trafficking in drugs under section 39B (1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’). [2] At the close of the defence case, the learned High Court judge found that the accused had only committed an offence under section 6 of the DDA, which is punishable under section 39A(2) of the same Act. The accused was accordingly sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and 10 strokes of the rotan. [3] Both the accused and the prosecution appealed against this decision. The accused appealed both in respect of the finding of guilt under section 6, as well as the sentence imposed pursuant to section 39A(2) of the DDA. The prosecution appealed against the reduction of the charge to one under section 6, maintaining that the learned judge had erred in failing to convict the accused under section 39B DDA. 3 Salient Facts [4] Very briefly, this is a case where the accused testified that he went to the house of SP-4 (the star prosecution witness) to purchase RM100-00 worth of syabu. He left his home at about 7.30 p.m. on a motorcycle. He was carrying nothing else (save for his helmet on his head and his jacket which he wore (according to him and his mother, and corroborated by the friend whom he was visiting, namely SP-4). [5] When he arrived at the premises in Taman Munsyi (not SP- 4’s home, but a house belonging to SP-4’s friend) he parked his motorcycle outside the house and placed his jacket and helmet on the same. At this point, SP-4 emerged from the house and handed him keys to the car parked in front of the house. The vehicle belonged to SP-4’s wife, SP-6. [6] SP-4 asked the accused to pick up his friend by the name of ‘Saintis’ from a prescribed place. The accused stated that he knew ‘Saintis’ by that name as he had met him before at the same premises. [7] SP-4 was the ‘star’ prosecution witness. SP-4’s version of events, on the other hand, is that the accused asked to borrow his car and for that purpose came by to the house at Taman Munsyi. SP-4 says that he asked a few questions and the accused then took the car. SP-4 states that the accused took the car at 6.30 p.m. SP- 4’s testimony on this point is contradicted by his wife, SP-6, who testified that SP-4 took the car out from 5 - 5.30 p.m., and then returned home and went out again at 8 pm and returned at 8.30 p.m. 4 [8] If SP-4 had given the car to the accused at 6.30 p.m., then he could not have returned home and had his dinner as stated by his own wife. [9] The accused then drove the car to a point near where he was to pick up Saintis. This was between 8.40 and 8.50 p.m. As soon as he arrived, he realized that there was a police ambush waiting for him (pursuant to a tip off to the raiding officer). The police raiding team found nothing on the accused’s person, but found two plastic bags containing two containers sealed with sellotape, with cannabis within these containers, weighing approximately 4.8 kg. The two plastic bags were on the floor well or foot rest of the passenger’s seat, adjacent to the driver’s seat. [10] The accused denied all knowledge of the drugs, maintaining that they were not his, that he had not even noticed the plastic bags until he was driving mid-way to pick up Saintis, and that in any event, he was not particularly suspicious, as the two plastic bags contained boxes, one of which was marked Sustagen which he assumed to be milk powder. [11] The accused was arrested. He pointed the police to SP-4, so they went to the house where SP-4 was, and found other drugs, namely syabu there. The accused was charged with trafficking. SP- 4 was released in respect of the drugs marked as P7A and B. [12] SP-4’s evidence, which the prosecution relies upon heavily, but which the trial judge does not appear to have accepted, impliedly, is his statement that there was nothing in the car (i.e. no 5 P7A and B) when he handed over the keys to the accused. SP-4 also denied all knowledge of the 4.8 odd kg of cannabis in P7A and B. [13] SP-4 however, confirms two important things: (a) The accused was not carrying anything when he turned up at the Taman Munsyi house; (b) the drugs which were found in sealed boxes and placed in plastic bags (P-7A and B) did not belong to the accused. [14] The judge found the existence of a prima facie case at the close of prosecution, but after hearing the defence concluded, inter alia, as follows: (a) It was reasonable for the accused to infer that the plastic bags contained milk powder, as the containers, one of which was marked Sustagen, were sealed, and then placed in containers. (b) However even if the accused had no mens rea knowledge about the drugs, he remained in ‘passive’ possession of the drugs, hence the reduction of the case to a charge under section 12(2). The Dissenting View [15] It is evident from the foregoing, that the trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, believed the accused when he said that he did not know that there were 4 kg of cannabis in the two plastic bags. If he did not know that the two plastic bags contained 6 cannabis, then it follows that he could not possibly have possession of the drugs, because knowledge is not mere physical custody, but includes mens rea knowledge of the existence of those drugs. It would further follow, therefore, that the accused could not possibly be trafficking either. [16] It therefore appears that the learned judge erred in law in his comprehension and application of the law on ‘possession’, there cannot be ‘passive possession’. Possession necessarily includes knowledge of the existence of the drugs. Therefore there should be appellate intervention only on this issue of law. It would, however, follow that the accused should be acquitted because neither possession nor trafficking was established. [17] In the Singapore Court of Appeal case of Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v Rex (1949) 15 MLJ 54, Gordon-Smith Ag. C.J stated: “Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise in presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal.” [18] The High Court in Saad Ibrahim v PP [1968] 1 MLJ 158 referred to and followed the case of Toh Ah Loh (above). Yong J (as he then was) distinguished between “mere possession” and “possession with mens rea”. 7 [19] Mohd Saari JCA in the Court of Appeal case of Basil bin Omar v PP [2003] 1 MLJ 191 explained that: “Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case.” [20] In the case of Basil (above), the court found from the conduct of the accused that he had knowledge that he was carrying drugs – inter alia he tried to avoid the police roadblock, he tried to run away and put up a struggle when caught. [21] Gopal Sri Ram (JCA) (as he then was) in PP v Karim Ab Jabar [2008] 5 CLJ 173, stated that: “….the essence of circumstantial evidence is not the effect of the individual strands of evidence but the combined effect of all the circumstances when taken together… not only must the prosecution prove the factum of physical possession but also the knowledge of the respondent as to the nature and quality of drug possessed… The mental element in a crime must, in the absence of an admission by the respondent, be established through circumstantial evidence from which admissible inferences may be drawn.” The Majority View [22] My learned brothers differ with my analysis. They are of the view that the learned judge erred in his assessment of the facts. The primary reason for this is the submission by the prosecution that SP- 8 4’s statement that there were no drugs, i.e. that P7A and B were not in the car when he handed over the keys to the accused, was not challenged. As such that becomes, it is argued, a statement of truth. They are of the further view that the only inference that can be drawn from this is that the accused placed the drugs in the car. No other inference is either reasonable or plausible, in their view. The Dissenting View [23] Again I beg to differ with my learned brothers on this point. I take the view that although not cross-examined on this sole statement, it is not possible to state with any degree of certainty that the only or sole conclusion or inference to be drawn is that the drugs were placed in the car by the accused. Other inferences are possible, namely that: (a) SP-4’s statement is not without doubt, given the other parts of his evidence, which are inaccurate – in short his credibility is in issue. SP-4’s evidence has to be assessed as a whole. The weight or probative value to be accorded to his evidence should not be inordinate or excessive, given the inconsistencies in his testimony, and the evidence of his wife, in relation to his habits and mental state, which show that it is unsafe to rely on his evidence alone, to convict the accused of trafficking, particularly on the basis of one unchallenged sentence of his testimony; (b) The learned trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, after hearing SP-4 and the defence case, 9 concluded that it was reasonable for the accused to believe that the plastic bags contained sealed containers of milk powder, and secondly, that the accused was only in momentary or temporary possession of the car as he only drove it for 20 minutes. There is insufficient basis for an appellate court to overturn or reverse this finding of fact, based on the sole consideration that SP-4 was not cross- examined on his statement to the effect that the bags, P7A and B were not in the vehicle when the keys to the vehicle were given to the accused; (c) There was no evidence that SP-4 had inspected the car prior to handing over the keys; (d) There was no reason for the accused to “borrow” SP-4’s car to “carry” or “collect” such drugs when he had his own motor-cycle and could easily have done so without the use of a car. For this reason, the accused’s version of events to the effect that he came to purchase syabu from SP-4 and was instructed/directed to fetch ‘Saintis’ from a designated place, appeared far more plausible and credible. This was clearly the finding/thinking of the trial judge who accepted the defence case to the effect that the accused had no knowledge of the contents of the plastic bags; (e) The background relating to SP-4, as testified by his wife, SP-6 cannot simply be ignored. It is relevant evidence by his own wife, which evidences the fact that he is a user of 10 drugs, and he suffers from mental illness. Taken together with the accused’s version of events that he went to purchase syabu from SP-4 at premises other than his home, it is equally plausible that the drugs in question belonged to SP-4. [24] Given these facts, it appears to me that taken cumulatively, these matters are sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s case. In other words it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is a trafficker of the 4.8 odd kilograms of cannabis. [25] Further, the facts of our present case can be distinguished from the Court of Appeal case of Roslan bin Sabu @ Omar v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 MLJ 244. In that case, the court held that the accused was guilty of “wilful blindness” and had “shut his eyes to what was obvious”. He “could not have missed the glaring sight of the drugs since the plastic used to wrap them was transparent, and so were the two carrier bags”. The Court of Appeal in the case of Roslan referred to the factual matrix in two other cases (discussed below) and commented that in those cases, there was a likelihood that due to the colour of the bag or wrapper containing the drugs, the accused might not have known what the contents were. [26] In PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685, the plastic bag containing the drugs was orange while in Taib Mohamad v PP [2002] 3 MLJ 476, the plastic bag containing the drugs was black and the drugs were wrapped with brown tape. In the latter case, KC 11 Vohrah JCA in the Court of Appeal held that in was not possible for the accused to know that the bag contained cannabis. [27] In the former case, the Federal Court by a majority decision of 4:1 upheld the principle against double presumptions as laid down in Muhammed bin Hassan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 273. The Federal Court in Muhammad bin Hassan had decided that to constitute 'possession' under s 37(da) of the Act, there must be an express affirmative finding of possession and not a legal presumption of possession as provided in s 37(d) of the Act. After the case of PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685 settled the law on double presumptions, another panel of the Federal Court (only 3 members instead of 5) decided that the High Court had erred in finding the accused guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs, and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal in convicting the accused on a reduced charge of possession. [28] In addition, in the case of Roslan (above), James Foong JCA (as he then was) stated”: “There must be direct proof or inference that the accused knew what he was carrying was illicit drug…. To successfully infer such knowledge in this kind of situation, there must only be one exclusive inference to this fact to the exclusion of other possibilities.” [29] In the present case, there are multiple inferences which may be drawn, as postulated in paragraph 23 above. 12 [30] It is trite in criminal law that an accused should be given the benefit of the doubt. As far back as 1948, Spenser Wilkinson J in the Court of Appeal case of Tai Chai Keh v Public Prosecutor [1948 – 49 MLJ Supp. 105] stated: “Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be drawn from a set of facts in a criminal case, we are of the opinion that the inference most favourable to the accused should be adopted.” [31] This sentiment was reiterated in 2009 by KN Segara JCA in the case of Sridhar v Arunasalam v PP [2009] 6 CLJ 595, although His Lordship did not refer to the case of Tai Chai Keh. His Lordship went on further to say that the prosecution must prove its case without relying on any adverse inference against the accused: “….the well-settled principles in criminal law that an accused must be accorded the benefit of any inference favourable to him from a given set of facts must be strictly adhered to and the prosecution cannot shirk its responsibility to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt by invoking any adverse inferences from the said facts, to establish any ingredient of the offence.” [32] For the reasons above, it is my view that this is an unsafe conviction and the accused should therefore be acquitted. [33] I do not agree that the finding of the learned trial judge of guilt under section 6 of the DDA, should be enhanced to one of guilt under section 39B of the DDA. For these reasons, I am constrained to dissent from the majority. Accordingly Appeal No. J-05(SH)-34- 13 01/2016 is allowed and Appeal No. J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 is dismissed. Nallini Pathmanathan Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated : 1st Disember 2016 For the Appellant : Dato’ Jagjit Singh a/l Bay Singh (Wan Muhd Ariff Akeer bin Wan Normazlan with him) Tetuan Jagjit Ariff & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite D1-1-9 Solaris Dutamas No. 1 Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent : Puan Tetralina binti Ahmed Fauzi Timbalan Pendakwaraya Jabatan Peguam Negara Signed

Tika 2.6.0

J-05(SH)-34-01/2016

PERAYU HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH RESPONDEN PENDAKWA RAYA

Dangerous Drugs — Accused appeals against conviction and sentence — Accused originally charged with trafficking cannabis weighing 4854 grams — Trial court convicted and sentenced accused to a reduced charge of possession — Appeal by Public Prosecutor against amended charge, conviction and sentence — Whether amendment and reduction of charge by trial judge flawed — Whether trial judge mishandled facts presented before him — Whether the accused was only in passive possession of the said drugs — Whether conviction of accused on charge safe — Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234], sections 2, 6, 39B(1)(a), 39B(2)

01/12/2016

YA DATUK NALLINI PATHMANATHANKorumYA DATO' AHMADI BIN HAJI ASNAWI

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=ac57e350-3ef1-4b4e-8f49-afcbdec8f9d2&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PUTRAJAYA, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-34-01/2016 & RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 DI ANTARA HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWARAYA … RESPONDEN DAN DI ANTARA PENDAKWARAYA … PERAYU LAWAN HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Bahru Darul Takzim, Malaysia Perbicaraan Jenayah No 45A-10-04/2014) Di Antara Pendakwaraya Lawan Harvinder Singh A/L Joginder Singh (No. KP: 851015-01-5543) 2 CORUM: AHMADI HAJI ASNAWI, JCA NALLINI PATHMANATHAN, JCA KAMARDIN HASHIM, JCA JUDGMENT OF NALLINI PATHMANATHAN Introduction [1] In this case there are two related appeals, where the accused was charged with trafficking in drugs under section 39B (1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’). [2] At the close of the defence case, the learned High Court judge found that the accused had only committed an offence under section 6 of the DDA, which is punishable under section 39A(2) of the same Act. The accused was accordingly sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and 10 strokes of the rotan. [3] Both the accused and the prosecution appealed against this decision. The accused appealed both in respect of the finding of guilt under section 6, as well as the sentence imposed pursuant to section 39A(2) of the DDA. The prosecution appealed against the reduction of the charge to one under section 6, maintaining that the learned judge had erred in failing to convict the accused under section 39B DDA. 3 Salient Facts [4] Very briefly, this is a case where the accused testified that he went to the house of SP-4 (the star prosecution witness) to purchase RM100-00 worth of syabu. He left his home at about 7.30 p.m. on a motorcycle. He was carrying nothing else (save for his helmet on his head and his jacket which he wore (according to him and his mother, and corroborated by the friend whom he was visiting, namely SP-4). [5] When he arrived at the premises in Taman Munsyi (not SP- 4’s home, but a house belonging to SP-4’s friend) he parked his motorcycle outside the house and placed his jacket and helmet on the same. At this point, SP-4 emerged from the house and handed him keys to the car parked in front of the house. The vehicle belonged to SP-4’s wife, SP-6. [6] SP-4 asked the accused to pick up his friend by the name of ‘Saintis’ from a prescribed place. The accused stated that he knew ‘Saintis’ by that name as he had met him before at the same premises. [7] SP-4 was the ‘star’ prosecution witness. SP-4’s version of events, on the other hand, is that the accused asked to borrow his car and for that purpose came by to the house at Taman Munsyi. SP-4 says that he asked a few questions and the accused then took the car. SP-4 states that the accused took the car at 6.30 p.m. SP- 4’s testimony on this point is contradicted by his wife, SP-6, who testified that SP-4 took the car out from 5 - 5.30 p.m., and then returned home and went out again at 8 pm and returned at 8.30 p.m. 4 [8] If SP-4 had given the car to the accused at 6.30 p.m., then he could not have returned home and had his dinner as stated by his own wife. [9] The accused then drove the car to a point near where he was to pick up Saintis. This was between 8.40 and 8.50 p.m. As soon as he arrived, he realized that there was a police ambush waiting for him (pursuant to a tip off to the raiding officer). The police raiding team found nothing on the accused’s person, but found two plastic bags containing two containers sealed with sellotape, with cannabis within these containers, weighing approximately 4.8 kg. The two plastic bags were on the floor well or foot rest of the passenger’s seat, adjacent to the driver’s seat. [10] The accused denied all knowledge of the drugs, maintaining that they were not his, that he had not even noticed the plastic bags until he was driving mid-way to pick up Saintis, and that in any event, he was not particularly suspicious, as the two plastic bags contained boxes, one of which was marked Sustagen which he assumed to be milk powder. [11] The accused was arrested. He pointed the police to SP-4, so they went to the house where SP-4 was, and found other drugs, namely syabu there. The accused was charged with trafficking. SP- 4 was released in respect of the drugs marked as P7A and B. [12] SP-4’s evidence, which the prosecution relies upon heavily, but which the trial judge does not appear to have accepted, impliedly, is his statement that there was nothing in the car (i.e. no 5 P7A and B) when he handed over the keys to the accused. SP-4 also denied all knowledge of the 4.8 odd kg of cannabis in P7A and B. [13] SP-4 however, confirms two important things: (a) The accused was not carrying anything when he turned up at the Taman Munsyi house; (b) the drugs which were found in sealed boxes and placed in plastic bags (P-7A and B) did not belong to the accused. [14] The judge found the existence of a prima facie case at the close of prosecution, but after hearing the defence concluded, inter alia, as follows: (a) It was reasonable for the accused to infer that the plastic bags contained milk powder, as the containers, one of which was marked Sustagen, were sealed, and then placed in containers. (b) However even if the accused had no mens rea knowledge about the drugs, he remained in ‘passive’ possession of the drugs, hence the reduction of the case to a charge under section 12(2). The Dissenting View [15] It is evident from the foregoing, that the trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, believed the accused when he said that he did not know that there were 4 kg of cannabis in the two plastic bags. If he did not know that the two plastic bags contained 6 cannabis, then it follows that he could not possibly have possession of the drugs, because knowledge is not mere physical custody, but includes mens rea knowledge of the existence of those drugs. It would further follow, therefore, that the accused could not possibly be trafficking either. [16] It therefore appears that the learned judge erred in law in his comprehension and application of the law on ‘possession’, there cannot be ‘passive possession’. Possession necessarily includes knowledge of the existence of the drugs. Therefore there should be appellate intervention only on this issue of law. It would, however, follow that the accused should be acquitted because neither possession nor trafficking was established. [17] In the Singapore Court of Appeal case of Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v Rex (1949) 15 MLJ 54, Gordon-Smith Ag. C.J stated: “Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise in presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal.” [18] The High Court in Saad Ibrahim v PP [1968] 1 MLJ 158 referred to and followed the case of Toh Ah Loh (above). Yong J (as he then was) distinguished between “mere possession” and “possession with mens rea”. 7 [19] Mohd Saari JCA in the Court of Appeal case of Basil bin Omar v PP [2003] 1 MLJ 191 explained that: “Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case.” [20] In the case of Basil (above), the court found from the conduct of the accused that he had knowledge that he was carrying drugs – inter alia he tried to avoid the police roadblock, he tried to run away and put up a struggle when caught. [21] Gopal Sri Ram (JCA) (as he then was) in PP v Karim Ab Jabar [2008] 5 CLJ 173, stated that: “….the essence of circumstantial evidence is not the effect of the individual strands of evidence but the combined effect of all the circumstances when taken together… not only must the prosecution prove the factum of physical possession but also the knowledge of the respondent as to the nature and quality of drug possessed… The mental element in a crime must, in the absence of an admission by the respondent, be established through circumstantial evidence from which admissible inferences may be drawn.” The Majority View [22] My learned brothers differ with my analysis. They are of the view that the learned judge erred in his assessment of the facts. The primary reason for this is the submission by the prosecution that SP- 8 4’s statement that there were no drugs, i.e. that P7A and B were not in the car when he handed over the keys to the accused, was not challenged. As such that becomes, it is argued, a statement of truth. They are of the further view that the only inference that can be drawn from this is that the accused placed the drugs in the car. No other inference is either reasonable or plausible, in their view. The Dissenting View [23] Again I beg to differ with my learned brothers on this point. I take the view that although not cross-examined on this sole statement, it is not possible to state with any degree of certainty that the only or sole conclusion or inference to be drawn is that the drugs were placed in the car by the accused. Other inferences are possible, namely that: (a) SP-4’s statement is not without doubt, given the other parts of his evidence, which are inaccurate – in short his credibility is in issue. SP-4’s evidence has to be assessed as a whole. The weight or probative value to be accorded to his evidence should not be inordinate or excessive, given the inconsistencies in his testimony, and the evidence of his wife, in relation to his habits and mental state, which show that it is unsafe to rely on his evidence alone, to convict the accused of trafficking, particularly on the basis of one unchallenged sentence of his testimony; (b) The learned trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, after hearing SP-4 and the defence case, 9 concluded that it was reasonable for the accused to believe that the plastic bags contained sealed containers of milk powder, and secondly, that the accused was only in momentary or temporary possession of the car as he only drove it for 20 minutes. There is insufficient basis for an appellate court to overturn or reverse this finding of fact, based on the sole consideration that SP-4 was not cross- examined on his statement to the effect that the bags, P7A and B were not in the vehicle when the keys to the vehicle were given to the accused; (c) There was no evidence that SP-4 had inspected the car prior to handing over the keys; (d) There was no reason for the accused to “borrow” SP-4’s car to “carry” or “collect” such drugs when he had his own motor-cycle and could easily have done so without the use of a car. For this reason, the accused’s version of events to the effect that he came to purchase syabu from SP-4 and was instructed/directed to fetch ‘Saintis’ from a designated place, appeared far more plausible and credible. This was clearly the finding/thinking of the trial judge who accepted the defence case to the effect that the accused had no knowledge of the contents of the plastic bags; (e) The background relating to SP-4, as testified by his wife, SP-6 cannot simply be ignored. It is relevant evidence by his own wife, which evidences the fact that he is a user of 10 drugs, and he suffers from mental illness. Taken together with the accused’s version of events that he went to purchase syabu from SP-4 at premises other than his home, it is equally plausible that the drugs in question belonged to SP-4. [24] Given these facts, it appears to me that taken cumulatively, these matters are sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s case. In other words it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is a trafficker of the 4.8 odd kilograms of cannabis. [25] Further, the facts of our present case can be distinguished from the Court of Appeal case of Roslan bin Sabu @ Omar v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 MLJ 244. In that case, the court held that the accused was guilty of “wilful blindness” and had “shut his eyes to what was obvious”. He “could not have missed the glaring sight of the drugs since the plastic used to wrap them was transparent, and so were the two carrier bags”. The Court of Appeal in the case of Roslan referred to the factual matrix in two other cases (discussed below) and commented that in those cases, there was a likelihood that due to the colour of the bag or wrapper containing the drugs, the accused might not have known what the contents were. [26] In PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685, the plastic bag containing the drugs was orange while in Taib Mohamad v PP [2002] 3 MLJ 476, the plastic bag containing the drugs was black and the drugs were wrapped with brown tape. In the latter case, KC 11 Vohrah JCA in the Court of Appeal held that in was not possible for the accused to know that the bag contained cannabis. [27] In the former case, the Federal Court by a majority decision of 4:1 upheld the principle against double presumptions as laid down in Muhammed bin Hassan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 273. The Federal Court in Muhammad bin Hassan had decided that to constitute 'possession' under s 37(da) of the Act, there must be an express affirmative finding of possession and not a legal presumption of possession as provided in s 37(d) of the Act. After the case of PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685 settled the law on double presumptions, another panel of the Federal Court (only 3 members instead of 5) decided that the High Court had erred in finding the accused guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs, and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal in convicting the accused on a reduced charge of possession. [28] In addition, in the case of Roslan (above), James Foong JCA (as he then was) stated”: “There must be direct proof or inference that the accused knew what he was carrying was illicit drug…. To successfully infer such knowledge in this kind of situation, there must only be one exclusive inference to this fact to the exclusion of other possibilities.” [29] In the present case, there are multiple inferences which may be drawn, as postulated in paragraph 23 above. 12 [30] It is trite in criminal law that an accused should be given the benefit of the doubt. As far back as 1948, Spenser Wilkinson J in the Court of Appeal case of Tai Chai Keh v Public Prosecutor [1948 – 49 MLJ Supp. 105] stated: “Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be drawn from a set of facts in a criminal case, we are of the opinion that the inference most favourable to the accused should be adopted.” [31] This sentiment was reiterated in 2009 by KN Segara JCA in the case of Sridhar v Arunasalam v PP [2009] 6 CLJ 595, although His Lordship did not refer to the case of Tai Chai Keh. His Lordship went on further to say that the prosecution must prove its case without relying on any adverse inference against the accused: “….the well-settled principles in criminal law that an accused must be accorded the benefit of any inference favourable to him from a given set of facts must be strictly adhered to and the prosecution cannot shirk its responsibility to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt by invoking any adverse inferences from the said facts, to establish any ingredient of the offence.” [32] For the reasons above, it is my view that this is an unsafe conviction and the accused should therefore be acquitted. [33] I do not agree that the finding of the learned trial judge of guilt under section 6 of the DDA, should be enhanced to one of guilt under section 39B of the DDA. For these reasons, I am constrained to dissent from the majority. Accordingly Appeal No. J-05(SH)-34- 13 01/2016 is allowed and Appeal No. J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 is dismissed. Nallini Pathmanathan Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated : 1st Disember 2016 For the Appellant : Dato’ Jagjit Singh a/l Bay Singh (Wan Muhd Ariff Akeer bin Wan Normazlan with him) Tetuan Jagjit Ariff & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite D1-1-9 Solaris Dutamas No. 1 Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent : Puan Tetralina binti Ahmed Fauzi Timbalan Pendakwaraya Jabatan Peguam Negara Signed

Tika 2.6.0

J-05(SH)-34-01/2016

PERAYU HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH RESPONDEN PENDAKWARAYA

Dangerous Drugs — Appeal by public prosecutor — Accused appeals against conviction and sentence — Accused originally charged with trafficking cannabis weighing 4854 grams — Possession and knowledge — Trial court convicted and sentenced accused to a reduced charge of possession — Whether amendment and reduction of charge by trial judge flawed — Whether trial judge mishandled facts presented before him — Whether evidence of trafficking rebutted — Whether the accused was only in passive possession of the said drugs — Whether there was any entrapment — Whether conviction of accused on charge safe — Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234], sections 2, 6, 37(da), 39B(1)(a), 39B(2)

01/12/2016

YA DATUK NALLINI PATHMANATHANKorumYA DATO' AHMADI BIN HAJI ASNAWIYA DATUK NALLINI PATHMANATHANYA DATUK KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f10e49c9-b904-4421-be34-9c1ab886f9c4&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PUTRAJAYA, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-34-01/2016 & RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 DI ANTARA HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWARAYA … RESPONDEN DAN DI ANTARA PENDAKWARAYA … PERAYU LAWAN HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Bahru Darul Takzim, Malaysia Perbicaraan Jenayah No 45A-10-04/2014) Di Antara Pendakwaraya Lawan Harvinder Singh A/L Joginder Singh (No. KP: 851015-01-5543) 2 CORUM: AHMADI HAJI ASNAWI, JCA NALLINI PATHMANATHAN, JCA KAMARDIN HASHIM, JCA JUDGMENT OF NALLINI PATHMANATHAN Introduction [1] In this case there are two related appeals, where the accused was charged with trafficking in drugs under section 39B (1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’). [2] At the close of the defence case, the learned High Court judge found that the accused had only committed an offence under section 6 of the DDA, which is punishable under section 39A(2) of the same Act. The accused was accordingly sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and 10 strokes of the rotan. [3] Both the accused and the prosecution appealed against this decision. The accused appealed both in respect of the finding of guilt under section 6, as well as the sentence imposed pursuant to section 39A(2) of the DDA. The prosecution appealed against the reduction of the charge to one under section 6, maintaining that the learned judge had erred in failing to convict the accused under section 39B DDA. 3 Salient Facts [4] Very briefly, this is a case where the accused testified that he went to the house of SP-4 (the star prosecution witness) to purchase RM100-00 worth of syabu. He left his home at about 7.30 p.m. on a motorcycle. He was carrying nothing else (save for his helmet on his head and his jacket which he wore (according to him and his mother, and corroborated by the friend whom he was visiting, namely SP-4). [5] When he arrived at the premises in Taman Munsyi (not SP- 4’s home, but a house belonging to SP-4’s friend) he parked his motorcycle outside the house and placed his jacket and helmet on the same. At this point, SP-4 emerged from the house and handed him keys to the car parked in front of the house. The vehicle belonged to SP-4’s wife, SP-6. [6] SP-4 asked the accused to pick up his friend by the name of ‘Saintis’ from a prescribed place. The accused stated that he knew ‘Saintis’ by that name as he had met him before at the same premises. [7] SP-4 was the ‘star’ prosecution witness. SP-4’s version of events, on the other hand, is that the accused asked to borrow his car and for that purpose came by to the house at Taman Munsyi. SP-4 says that he asked a few questions and the accused then took the car. SP-4 states that the accused took the car at 6.30 p.m. SP- 4’s testimony on this point is contradicted by his wife, SP-6, who testified that SP-4 took the car out from 5 - 5.30 p.m., and then returned home and went out again at 8 pm and returned at 8.30 p.m. 4 [8] If SP-4 had given the car to the accused at 6.30 p.m., then he could not have returned home and had his dinner as stated by his own wife. [9] The accused then drove the car to a point near where he was to pick up Saintis. This was between 8.40 and 8.50 p.m. As soon as he arrived, he realized that there was a police ambush waiting for him (pursuant to a tip off to the raiding officer). The police raiding team found nothing on the accused’s person, but found two plastic bags containing two containers sealed with sellotape, with cannabis within these containers, weighing approximately 4.8 kg. The two plastic bags were on the floor well or foot rest of the passenger’s seat, adjacent to the driver’s seat. [10] The accused denied all knowledge of the drugs, maintaining that they were not his, that he had not even noticed the plastic bags until he was driving mid-way to pick up Saintis, and that in any event, he was not particularly suspicious, as the two plastic bags contained boxes, one of which was marked Sustagen which he assumed to be milk powder. [11] The accused was arrested. He pointed the police to SP-4, so they went to the house where SP-4 was, and found other drugs, namely syabu there. The accused was charged with trafficking. SP- 4 was released in respect of the drugs marked as P7A and B. [12] SP-4’s evidence, which the prosecution relies upon heavily, but which the trial judge does not appear to have accepted, impliedly, is his statement that there was nothing in the car (i.e. no 5 P7A and B) when he handed over the keys to the accused. SP-4 also denied all knowledge of the 4.8 odd kg of cannabis in P7A and B. [13] SP-4 however, confirms two important things: (a) The accused was not carrying anything when he turned up at the Taman Munsyi house; (b) the drugs which were found in sealed boxes and placed in plastic bags (P-7A and B) did not belong to the accused. [14] The judge found the existence of a prima facie case at the close of prosecution, but after hearing the defence concluded, inter alia, as follows: (a) It was reasonable for the accused to infer that the plastic bags contained milk powder, as the containers, one of which was marked Sustagen, were sealed, and then placed in containers. (b) However even if the accused had no mens rea knowledge about the drugs, he remained in ‘passive’ possession of the drugs, hence the reduction of the case to a charge under section 12(2). The Dissenting View [15] It is evident from the foregoing, that the trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, believed the accused when he said that he did not know that there were 4 kg of cannabis in the two plastic bags. If he did not know that the two plastic bags contained 6 cannabis, then it follows that he could not possibly have possession of the drugs, because knowledge is not mere physical custody, but includes mens rea knowledge of the existence of those drugs. It would further follow, therefore, that the accused could not possibly be trafficking either. [16] It therefore appears that the learned judge erred in law in his comprehension and application of the law on ‘possession’, there cannot be ‘passive possession’. Possession necessarily includes knowledge of the existence of the drugs. Therefore there should be appellate intervention only on this issue of law. It would, however, follow that the accused should be acquitted because neither possession nor trafficking was established. [17] In the Singapore Court of Appeal case of Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v Rex (1949) 15 MLJ 54, Gordon-Smith Ag. C.J stated: “Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise in presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal.” [18] The High Court in Saad Ibrahim v PP [1968] 1 MLJ 158 referred to and followed the case of Toh Ah Loh (above). Yong J (as he then was) distinguished between “mere possession” and “possession with mens rea”. 7 [19] Mohd Saari JCA in the Court of Appeal case of Basil bin Omar v PP [2003] 1 MLJ 191 explained that: “Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case.” [20] In the case of Basil (above), the court found from the conduct of the accused that he had knowledge that he was carrying drugs – inter alia he tried to avoid the police roadblock, he tried to run away and put up a struggle when caught. [21] Gopal Sri Ram (JCA) (as he then was) in PP v Karim Ab Jabar [2008] 5 CLJ 173, stated that: “….the essence of circumstantial evidence is not the effect of the individual strands of evidence but the combined effect of all the circumstances when taken together… not only must the prosecution prove the factum of physical possession but also the knowledge of the respondent as to the nature and quality of drug possessed… The mental element in a crime must, in the absence of an admission by the respondent, be established through circumstantial evidence from which admissible inferences may be drawn.” The Majority View [22] My learned brothers differ with my analysis. They are of the view that the learned judge erred in his assessment of the facts. The primary reason for this is the submission by the prosecution that SP- 8 4’s statement that there were no drugs, i.e. that P7A and B were not in the car when he handed over the keys to the accused, was not challenged. As such that becomes, it is argued, a statement of truth. They are of the further view that the only inference that can be drawn from this is that the accused placed the drugs in the car. No other inference is either reasonable or plausible, in their view. The Dissenting View [23] Again I beg to differ with my learned brothers on this point. I take the view that although not cross-examined on this sole statement, it is not possible to state with any degree of certainty that the only or sole conclusion or inference to be drawn is that the drugs were placed in the car by the accused. Other inferences are possible, namely that: (a) SP-4’s statement is not without doubt, given the other parts of his evidence, which are inaccurate – in short his credibility is in issue. SP-4’s evidence has to be assessed as a whole. The weight or probative value to be accorded to his evidence should not be inordinate or excessive, given the inconsistencies in his testimony, and the evidence of his wife, in relation to his habits and mental state, which show that it is unsafe to rely on his evidence alone, to convict the accused of trafficking, particularly on the basis of one unchallenged sentence of his testimony; (b) The learned trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, after hearing SP-4 and the defence case, 9 concluded that it was reasonable for the accused to believe that the plastic bags contained sealed containers of milk powder, and secondly, that the accused was only in momentary or temporary possession of the car as he only drove it for 20 minutes. There is insufficient basis for an appellate court to overturn or reverse this finding of fact, based on the sole consideration that SP-4 was not cross- examined on his statement to the effect that the bags, P7A and B were not in the vehicle when the keys to the vehicle were given to the accused; (c) There was no evidence that SP-4 had inspected the car prior to handing over the keys; (d) There was no reason for the accused to “borrow” SP-4’s car to “carry” or “collect” such drugs when he had his own motor-cycle and could easily have done so without the use of a car. For this reason, the accused’s version of events to the effect that he came to purchase syabu from SP-4 and was instructed/directed to fetch ‘Saintis’ from a designated place, appeared far more plausible and credible. This was clearly the finding/thinking of the trial judge who accepted the defence case to the effect that the accused had no knowledge of the contents of the plastic bags; (e) The background relating to SP-4, as testified by his wife, SP-6 cannot simply be ignored. It is relevant evidence by his own wife, which evidences the fact that he is a user of 10 drugs, and he suffers from mental illness. Taken together with the accused’s version of events that he went to purchase syabu from SP-4 at premises other than his home, it is equally plausible that the drugs in question belonged to SP-4. [24] Given these facts, it appears to me that taken cumulatively, these matters are sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s case. In other words it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is a trafficker of the 4.8 odd kilograms of cannabis. [25] Further, the facts of our present case can be distinguished from the Court of Appeal case of Roslan bin Sabu @ Omar v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 MLJ 244. In that case, the court held that the accused was guilty of “wilful blindness” and had “shut his eyes to what was obvious”. He “could not have missed the glaring sight of the drugs since the plastic used to wrap them was transparent, and so were the two carrier bags”. The Court of Appeal in the case of Roslan referred to the factual matrix in two other cases (discussed below) and commented that in those cases, there was a likelihood that due to the colour of the bag or wrapper containing the drugs, the accused might not have known what the contents were. [26] In PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685, the plastic bag containing the drugs was orange while in Taib Mohamad v PP [2002] 3 MLJ 476, the plastic bag containing the drugs was black and the drugs were wrapped with brown tape. In the latter case, KC 11 Vohrah JCA in the Court of Appeal held that in was not possible for the accused to know that the bag contained cannabis. [27] In the former case, the Federal Court by a majority decision of 4:1 upheld the principle against double presumptions as laid down in Muhammed bin Hassan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 273. The Federal Court in Muhammad bin Hassan had decided that to constitute 'possession' under s 37(da) of the Act, there must be an express affirmative finding of possession and not a legal presumption of possession as provided in s 37(d) of the Act. After the case of PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685 settled the law on double presumptions, another panel of the Federal Court (only 3 members instead of 5) decided that the High Court had erred in finding the accused guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs, and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal in convicting the accused on a reduced charge of possession. [28] In addition, in the case of Roslan (above), James Foong JCA (as he then was) stated”: “There must be direct proof or inference that the accused knew what he was carrying was illicit drug…. To successfully infer such knowledge in this kind of situation, there must only be one exclusive inference to this fact to the exclusion of other possibilities.” [29] In the present case, there are multiple inferences which may be drawn, as postulated in paragraph 23 above. 12 [30] It is trite in criminal law that an accused should be given the benefit of the doubt. As far back as 1948, Spenser Wilkinson J in the Court of Appeal case of Tai Chai Keh v Public Prosecutor [1948 – 49 MLJ Supp. 105] stated: “Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be drawn from a set of facts in a criminal case, we are of the opinion that the inference most favourable to the accused should be adopted.” [31] This sentiment was reiterated in 2009 by KN Segara JCA in the case of Sridhar v Arunasalam v PP [2009] 6 CLJ 595, although His Lordship did not refer to the case of Tai Chai Keh. His Lordship went on further to say that the prosecution must prove its case without relying on any adverse inference against the accused: “….the well-settled principles in criminal law that an accused must be accorded the benefit of any inference favourable to him from a given set of facts must be strictly adhered to and the prosecution cannot shirk its responsibility to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt by invoking any adverse inferences from the said facts, to establish any ingredient of the offence.” [32] For the reasons above, it is my view that this is an unsafe conviction and the accused should therefore be acquitted. [33] I do not agree that the finding of the learned trial judge of guilt under section 6 of the DDA, should be enhanced to one of guilt under section 39B of the DDA. For these reasons, I am constrained to dissent from the majority. Accordingly Appeal No. J-05(SH)-34- 13 01/2016 is allowed and Appeal No. J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 is dismissed. Nallini Pathmanathan Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated : 1st Disember 2016 For the Appellant : Dato’ Jagjit Singh a/l Bay Singh (Wan Muhd Ariff Akeer bin Wan Normazlan with him) Tetuan Jagjit Ariff & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite D1-1-9 Solaris Dutamas No. 1 Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent : Puan Tetralina binti Ahmed Fauzi Timbalan Pendakwaraya Jabatan Peguam Negara Signed

Tika 2.6.0

J-05(SH)-34-01/2016

PERAYU HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH RESPONDEN PENDAKWARAYA

Dangerous Drugs — Appeal by public prosecutor — Accused appeals against conviction and sentence — Accused originally charged with trafficking cannabis weighing 4854 grams — Possession and knowledge — Trial court convicted and sentenced accused to a reduced charge of possession — Whether amendment and reduction of charge by trial judge flawed — Whether trial judge mishandled facts presented before him — Whether evidence of trafficking rebutted — Whether the accused was only in passive possession of the said drugs — Whether there was any entrapment — Whether conviction of accused on charge safe — Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 [Act 234], sections 2, 6, 37(da), 39B(1)(a), 39B(2)

01/12/2016

YA DATUK NALLINI PATHMANATHANKorumYA DATO' AHMADI BIN HAJI ASNAWIYA DATUK NALLINI PATHMANATHANYA DATUK KAMARDIN BIN HASHIM

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN DI PUTRAJAYA (BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN) DALAM WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN PUTRAJAYA, MALAYSIA RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-34-01/2016 & RAYUAN JENAYAH NO: J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 DI ANTARA HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … PERAYU DAN PENDAKWARAYA … RESPONDEN DAN DI ANTARA PENDAKWARAYA … PERAYU LAWAN HARVINDER SINGH A/L JOGINDER SINGH (NO. KP: 851015-01-5543) … RESPONDEN (Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya di Johor Bahru Dalam Negeri Johor Bahru Darul Takzim, Malaysia Perbicaraan Jenayah No 45A-10-04/2014) Di Antara Pendakwaraya Lawan Harvinder Singh A/L Joginder Singh (No. KP: 851015-01-5543) 2 CORUM: AHMADI HAJI ASNAWI, JCA NALLINI PATHMANATHAN, JCA KAMARDIN HASHIM, JCA JUDGMENT OF NALLINI PATHMANATHAN Introduction [1] In this case there are two related appeals, where the accused was charged with trafficking in drugs under section 39B (1)(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (‘DDA’). [2] At the close of the defence case, the learned High Court judge found that the accused had only committed an offence under section 6 of the DDA, which is punishable under section 39A(2) of the same Act. The accused was accordingly sentenced to 14 years imprisonment and 10 strokes of the rotan. [3] Both the accused and the prosecution appealed against this decision. The accused appealed both in respect of the finding of guilt under section 6, as well as the sentence imposed pursuant to section 39A(2) of the DDA. The prosecution appealed against the reduction of the charge to one under section 6, maintaining that the learned judge had erred in failing to convict the accused under section 39B DDA. 3 Salient Facts [4] Very briefly, this is a case where the accused testified that he went to the house of SP-4 (the star prosecution witness) to purchase RM100-00 worth of syabu. He left his home at about 7.30 p.m. on a motorcycle. He was carrying nothing else (save for his helmet on his head and his jacket which he wore (according to him and his mother, and corroborated by the friend whom he was visiting, namely SP-4). [5] When he arrived at the premises in Taman Munsyi (not SP- 4’s home, but a house belonging to SP-4’s friend) he parked his motorcycle outside the house and placed his jacket and helmet on the same. At this point, SP-4 emerged from the house and handed him keys to the car parked in front of the house. The vehicle belonged to SP-4’s wife, SP-6. [6] SP-4 asked the accused to pick up his friend by the name of ‘Saintis’ from a prescribed place. The accused stated that he knew ‘Saintis’ by that name as he had met him before at the same premises. [7] SP-4 was the ‘star’ prosecution witness. SP-4’s version of events, on the other hand, is that the accused asked to borrow his car and for that purpose came by to the house at Taman Munsyi. SP-4 says that he asked a few questions and the accused then took the car. SP-4 states that the accused took the car at 6.30 p.m. SP- 4’s testimony on this point is contradicted by his wife, SP-6, who testified that SP-4 took the car out from 5 - 5.30 p.m., and then returned home and went out again at 8 pm and returned at 8.30 p.m. 4 [8] If SP-4 had given the car to the accused at 6.30 p.m., then he could not have returned home and had his dinner as stated by his own wife. [9] The accused then drove the car to a point near where he was to pick up Saintis. This was between 8.40 and 8.50 p.m. As soon as he arrived, he realized that there was a police ambush waiting for him (pursuant to a tip off to the raiding officer). The police raiding team found nothing on the accused’s person, but found two plastic bags containing two containers sealed with sellotape, with cannabis within these containers, weighing approximately 4.8 kg. The two plastic bags were on the floor well or foot rest of the passenger’s seat, adjacent to the driver’s seat. [10] The accused denied all knowledge of the drugs, maintaining that they were not his, that he had not even noticed the plastic bags until he was driving mid-way to pick up Saintis, and that in any event, he was not particularly suspicious, as the two plastic bags contained boxes, one of which was marked Sustagen which he assumed to be milk powder. [11] The accused was arrested. He pointed the police to SP-4, so they went to the house where SP-4 was, and found other drugs, namely syabu there. The accused was charged with trafficking. SP- 4 was released in respect of the drugs marked as P7A and B. [12] SP-4’s evidence, which the prosecution relies upon heavily, but which the trial judge does not appear to have accepted, impliedly, is his statement that there was nothing in the car (i.e. no 5 P7A and B) when he handed over the keys to the accused. SP-4 also denied all knowledge of the 4.8 odd kg of cannabis in P7A and B. [13] SP-4 however, confirms two important things: (a) The accused was not carrying anything when he turned up at the Taman Munsyi house; (b) the drugs which were found in sealed boxes and placed in plastic bags (P-7A and B) did not belong to the accused. [14] The judge found the existence of a prima facie case at the close of prosecution, but after hearing the defence concluded, inter alia, as follows: (a) It was reasonable for the accused to infer that the plastic bags contained milk powder, as the containers, one of which was marked Sustagen, were sealed, and then placed in containers. (b) However even if the accused had no mens rea knowledge about the drugs, he remained in ‘passive’ possession of the drugs, hence the reduction of the case to a charge under section 12(2). The Dissenting View [15] It is evident from the foregoing, that the trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, believed the accused when he said that he did not know that there were 4 kg of cannabis in the two plastic bags. If he did not know that the two plastic bags contained 6 cannabis, then it follows that he could not possibly have possession of the drugs, because knowledge is not mere physical custody, but includes mens rea knowledge of the existence of those drugs. It would further follow, therefore, that the accused could not possibly be trafficking either. [16] It therefore appears that the learned judge erred in law in his comprehension and application of the law on ‘possession’, there cannot be ‘passive possession’. Possession necessarily includes knowledge of the existence of the drugs. Therefore there should be appellate intervention only on this issue of law. It would, however, follow that the accused should be acquitted because neither possession nor trafficking was established. [17] In the Singapore Court of Appeal case of Toh Ah Loh & Mak Thim v Rex (1949) 15 MLJ 54, Gordon-Smith Ag. C.J stated: “Possession, in order to incriminate a person, must have the following characteristics. The possessor must know the nature of the thing possessed, must have in him a power of disposal over the thing, and lastly must be conscious of his possession of the thing. If these factors are absent, his possession can raise in presumption of mens rea, without which (except by statute) possession cannot be criminal.” [18] The High Court in Saad Ibrahim v PP [1968] 1 MLJ 158 referred to and followed the case of Toh Ah Loh (above). Yong J (as he then was) distinguished between “mere possession” and “possession with mens rea”. 7 [19] Mohd Saari JCA in the Court of Appeal case of Basil bin Omar v PP [2003] 1 MLJ 191 explained that: “Intention is a matter of fact which in the nature of things cannot be proved by direct evidence. It can only be proved by inference from the surrounding circumstances. Whether these surrounding circumstances make out such intention is a question of fact in each individual case.” [20] In the case of Basil (above), the court found from the conduct of the accused that he had knowledge that he was carrying drugs – inter alia he tried to avoid the police roadblock, he tried to run away and put up a struggle when caught. [21] Gopal Sri Ram (JCA) (as he then was) in PP v Karim Ab Jabar [2008] 5 CLJ 173, stated that: “….the essence of circumstantial evidence is not the effect of the individual strands of evidence but the combined effect of all the circumstances when taken together… not only must the prosecution prove the factum of physical possession but also the knowledge of the respondent as to the nature and quality of drug possessed… The mental element in a crime must, in the absence of an admission by the respondent, be established through circumstantial evidence from which admissible inferences may be drawn.” The Majority View [22] My learned brothers differ with my analysis. They are of the view that the learned judge erred in his assessment of the facts. The primary reason for this is the submission by the prosecution that SP- 8 4’s statement that there were no drugs, i.e. that P7A and B were not in the car when he handed over the keys to the accused, was not challenged. As such that becomes, it is argued, a statement of truth. They are of the further view that the only inference that can be drawn from this is that the accused placed the drugs in the car. No other inference is either reasonable or plausible, in their view. The Dissenting View [23] Again I beg to differ with my learned brothers on this point. I take the view that although not cross-examined on this sole statement, it is not possible to state with any degree of certainty that the only or sole conclusion or inference to be drawn is that the drugs were placed in the car by the accused. Other inferences are possible, namely that: (a) SP-4’s statement is not without doubt, given the other parts of his evidence, which are inaccurate – in short his credibility is in issue. SP-4’s evidence has to be assessed as a whole. The weight or probative value to be accorded to his evidence should not be inordinate or excessive, given the inconsistencies in his testimony, and the evidence of his wife, in relation to his habits and mental state, which show that it is unsafe to rely on his evidence alone, to convict the accused of trafficking, particularly on the basis of one unchallenged sentence of his testimony; (b) The learned trial judge, who had the audio-visual advantage, after hearing SP-4 and the defence case, 9 concluded that it was reasonable for the accused to believe that the plastic bags contained sealed containers of milk powder, and secondly, that the accused was only in momentary or temporary possession of the car as he only drove it for 20 minutes. There is insufficient basis for an appellate court to overturn or reverse this finding of fact, based on the sole consideration that SP-4 was not cross- examined on his statement to the effect that the bags, P7A and B were not in the vehicle when the keys to the vehicle were given to the accused; (c) There was no evidence that SP-4 had inspected the car prior to handing over the keys; (d) There was no reason for the accused to “borrow” SP-4’s car to “carry” or “collect” such drugs when he had his own motor-cycle and could easily have done so without the use of a car. For this reason, the accused’s version of events to the effect that he came to purchase syabu from SP-4 and was instructed/directed to fetch ‘Saintis’ from a designated place, appeared far more plausible and credible. This was clearly the finding/thinking of the trial judge who accepted the defence case to the effect that the accused had no knowledge of the contents of the plastic bags; (e) The background relating to SP-4, as testified by his wife, SP-6 cannot simply be ignored. It is relevant evidence by his own wife, which evidences the fact that he is a user of 10 drugs, and he suffers from mental illness. Taken together with the accused’s version of events that he went to purchase syabu from SP-4 at premises other than his home, it is equally plausible that the drugs in question belonged to SP-4. [24] Given these facts, it appears to me that taken cumulatively, these matters are sufficient to cast a reasonable doubt on the veracity of the prosecution’s case. In other words it is not beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is a trafficker of the 4.8 odd kilograms of cannabis. [25] Further, the facts of our present case can be distinguished from the Court of Appeal case of Roslan bin Sabu @ Omar v Public Prosecutor [2006] 5 MLJ 244. In that case, the court held that the accused was guilty of “wilful blindness” and had “shut his eyes to what was obvious”. He “could not have missed the glaring sight of the drugs since the plastic used to wrap them was transparent, and so were the two carrier bags”. The Court of Appeal in the case of Roslan referred to the factual matrix in two other cases (discussed below) and commented that in those cases, there was a likelihood that due to the colour of the bag or wrapper containing the drugs, the accused might not have known what the contents were. [26] In PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685, the plastic bag containing the drugs was orange while in Taib Mohamad v PP [2002] 3 MLJ 476, the plastic bag containing the drugs was black and the drugs were wrapped with brown tape. In the latter case, KC 11 Vohrah JCA in the Court of Appeal held that in was not possible for the accused to know that the bag contained cannabis. [27] In the former case, the Federal Court by a majority decision of 4:1 upheld the principle against double presumptions as laid down in Muhammed bin Hassan v Public Prosecutor [1998] 2 MLJ 273. The Federal Court in Muhammad bin Hassan had decided that to constitute 'possession' under s 37(da) of the Act, there must be an express affirmative finding of possession and not a legal presumption of possession as provided in s 37(d) of the Act. After the case of PP v Tan Tatt Eek [2005] 2 MLJ 685 settled the law on double presumptions, another panel of the Federal Court (only 3 members instead of 5) decided that the High Court had erred in finding the accused guilty of trafficking in dangerous drugs, and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal in convicting the accused on a reduced charge of possession. [28] In addition, in the case of Roslan (above), James Foong JCA (as he then was) stated”: “There must be direct proof or inference that the accused knew what he was carrying was illicit drug…. To successfully infer such knowledge in this kind of situation, there must only be one exclusive inference to this fact to the exclusion of other possibilities.” [29] In the present case, there are multiple inferences which may be drawn, as postulated in paragraph 23 above. 12 [30] It is trite in criminal law that an accused should be given the benefit of the doubt. As far back as 1948, Spenser Wilkinson J in the Court of Appeal case of Tai Chai Keh v Public Prosecutor [1948 – 49 MLJ Supp. 105] stated: “Where there is more than one inference which can reasonably be drawn from a set of facts in a criminal case, we are of the opinion that the inference most favourable to the accused should be adopted.” [31] This sentiment was reiterated in 2009 by KN Segara JCA in the case of Sridhar v Arunasalam v PP [2009] 6 CLJ 595, although His Lordship did not refer to the case of Tai Chai Keh. His Lordship went on further to say that the prosecution must prove its case without relying on any adverse inference against the accused: “….the well-settled principles in criminal law that an accused must be accorded the benefit of any inference favourable to him from a given set of facts must be strictly adhered to and the prosecution cannot shirk its responsibility to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt by invoking any adverse inferences from the said facts, to establish any ingredient of the offence.” [32] For the reasons above, it is my view that this is an unsafe conviction and the accused should therefore be acquitted. [33] I do not agree that the finding of the learned trial judge of guilt under section 6 of the DDA, should be enhanced to one of guilt under section 39B of the DDA. For these reasons, I am constrained to dissent from the majority. Accordingly Appeal No. J-05(SH)-34- 13 01/2016 is allowed and Appeal No. J-05(SH)-36-01/2016 is dismissed. Nallini Pathmanathan Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated : 1st Disember 2016 For the Appellant : Dato’ Jagjit Singh a/l Bay Singh (Wan Muhd Ariff Akeer bin Wan Normazlan with him) Tetuan Jagjit Ariff & Co Peguambela & Peguamcara Suite D1-1-9 Solaris Dutamas No. 1 Jalan Dutamas 1 50480 Kuala Lumpur For the Respondent : Puan Tetralina binti Ahmed Fauzi Timbalan Pendakwaraya Jabatan Peguam Negara Signed

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-306-03/2016

PLAINTIF SOO CHEE MING [No. K/P: 730107-08-6161] DEFENDAN LETCHUMY A/P RAMACHANDRAN [No. K/P: 630801-10-8158]

30/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO : BA-24-306-03/2016 Dalam Perkara Hartanah Yang dipegang Dibawah H.S.(D), No Hakmilik: PM3887 No Lot 44846, Seksyen 15, Bandar Ampang, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor; Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 327, Kanun Tanah Negara, 1965; Dan Dalam Perkara Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 22.11.2013 di antara Letchumy a/p Ramachandran dan Soo Chee Ming ANTARA SOO CHEE MING [No. K/P: 730107-08-6161] …PLAINTIF 2 DAN LETCHUMY A/P RAMACHANDRAN [No. K/P: 630801-10-8158] …DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1 - Pembatalan Kaveat persendirian) A. PENGENALAN [1] Di dalam Saman Pemula (Kandungan 1) ini, Plaintif (Soo Chee Ming) telah memohon daripada Mahkamah ini perintah-perintah berikut: (b) bahawa Kaveat Persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Pendaftar Pejabat Tanah Negeri Selangor melalui No. Perserahan 8304/2013 pada 9/12/2013 ke atas hartanah yang dikenali sebagai Block AA1- 8, Jalan Pandan Indah 3/6, Pandan Indah, 55100, Kuala Lumpur yang dipegang dibawah H.S.(D) PM 3887 Lot No. 44846 Seksyen 15 Bandar Ampang Daerah Negeri Selangor (“Hartanah tersebut”) dibatalkan; (c) bahawa Plaintif diberikan milikan kosong terhadap premis tersebut; 3 (d) Pendaftar/Pentadbir Tanah mengambil langkah yang sewajarnya untuk membatalkan kaveat yang didaftarkan sebagai 8304/2013 pada 09/12/2013 [2] Defendan telah membantah permohonan Plaintif dengan memfailkan afidavit jawapan Defendan (Kandungan 6) yang diikrarkan pada 1.7.2016. [3] Apabila semua kertas kausa telah difailkan, Timbalan Pendaftar (TP) telah menetapkan kes untuk pengurusan kes pada 26.7.2016. Pada tarikh pengurusan kes tersebut, TP telah mengarahkan pihak-pihak untuk memfailkan hujahan bertulis mereka sebelum atau pada 20.8.2016 dan menetapkan tarikh pengurusan kes seterusnya pada 20.9.2016. [4] Pada 20.9.2016 apabila kes dipanggil oleh TP, Mahkamah telah dimaklumkan bahawa peguam Defendan Chambers of Kanaga telah menarik diri daripada mewakili Defendan dan telah digantikan oleh Tetuan Ganeson Gomathy & Partners melalui Notis Penukaran Peguamcara yang difailkan pada 22.8.2016. Namun, peguam Defendan daripada Tetuan Ganeson Gomathy & 4 Partners telah tidak hadir kerana Defendan telah gagal membayar fi peguam. Peguam Plaintif telah memfailkan hujahan bertulis mereka dan TP telah mengarahkan peguam Plaintif menyerahkan hujahan bertulis mereka kepada Tetuan Ganeson Gomathy & Partners yang masih lagi mewakili Defendan berdasarkan Notis Penukaran Peguamcara yang telah difailkan. TP telah menetapkan Kandungan 1 ditetapkan untuk perbicaraan di hadapan hakim pada 9.11.2016. [5] Pada 9.11.2016, apabila kes ini dipanggil untuk perbicaraan Kandungan 1, Cik S.Vasanthi telah hadir bagi pihak Plaintif, namun peguam Defendan dan Defendan telah tidak hadir. Oleh itu, Mahkamah ini telah menangguhkan perbicaraan Kandungan 1 ke 30.11.2016 dengan mengarahkan peguam Plaintif untuk memaklumkan kepada Plaintif akan tarikh perbicaraan pada 30.11.2016 dan memaklumkan Plaintif bahawa sekiranya Plaintif gagal hadir pada tarikh perbicaraan tersebut, Mahkamah akan meneruskan perbicaraan tanpa kehadirannya. [6] Apabila kes dipanggil untuk perbicaraan pada 30.11.2016, peguam Cik S.Vasanthi telah hadir bagi mewakili Plaintif, manakala Cik Gomathi telah hadir bagi mewakili Defendan. Cik 5 Gomathi telah memaklumkan Mahkamah bahawa beliau telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk menarik diri daripada mewakili Defendan kelmarin dan tidak memperolehi apa-apa arahan daripada Defendan. [7] Di dalam keadaan ini, Mahkamah ini telah meneliti dan mempertimbangkan afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan di hadapannya serta meneliti hujahan bertulis Plaintif dan telah seterusnya memberikan keputusan terhadap Kandungan 1. B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [8] Latar belakang kes yang membawa kepada pemfailan Kandungan 1 oleh Plaintif adalah seperti berikut: 8.1 Defendan (Letchumy a/p Ramachandran) adalah tuanpunya berdaftar sekeping tanah yang di pegang dibawah H.S.(D), No Hakmilik : PM3887 No.Lot 44846, Seksyen 15, Bandar Ampang, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor (hartanah tersebut). 6 8.2 Pada 22.11.2013, Plaintif dan Defendan telah memasuki perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut dengan harga belian RM104,000.00. Bayaran penuh harga belian telah dibuat kepada Defendan pada 22.11.2013 di mana bayaran dibuat seperti berikut: i. Wang tunai sebanyak RM 55,000.00 ii. Cek Malayan Banking Berhad (MBB) bernombor 284415 untuk nilai RM 44,000.00 iii. Cukai Tanah dan Cukai taksiran sebanyak RM5000.00 8.3 Untuk pembayaran wang sebanyak RM104,000.00 satu resit pembayaran (payment voucher) bertarikh 22.11.2013 telah dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif yang telah ditandatangani oleh Defendan dan Plaintif sendiri. (Eksibit “SCM-2“, Kandungan 2). 8.4 Setelah membuat pembayaran penuh harga belian hartanah tersebut kepada Defendan, Plaintif dan Defendan telah menyempurnakan borang pindahmilik 14A. 7 8.5 Plaintif mendakwa dengan kebenaran Defendan, Plaintif telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas tanah tersebut bagi melindungi hak dan kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut dipindahmilik kepadanya. 8.6 Notis Taksiran Pindahmilik Harta Tanah (Duti Ad Valorem) telah dikeluarkan oleh Lembaga Hasil Dalam Negeri (LHDN) bertarikh 6.6.2014 di mana duti sebanyak RM1,080.00 telah dibayar. (Eksibit “SCM-3“, Kandungan 2). 8.7 Plaintif telah tidak mendapat meneruskan pindahmilik hartanah tersebut kerana kewujudan kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan. Di samping itu, Plaintif kini telah mendapat seorang pembeli baru yang berhasrat untuk membeli hartanah tersebut. C. UNDANG-UNDANG MENGENAI PERMOHONAN PEMBATALAN KAVEAT [9] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat adalah jelas. Di dalam sesuatu permohonan untuk 8 membatalkan kaveat, Mahkamah hendaklah menentu dan mempertimbangkan persoalan-persoalan berikut: i. samada pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. ii. samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan. iii. samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan. iv. samada terdapat keadaan istimewa di pihak pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah. [10] Di dalam perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Majlis Privy di dalam kes Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 telah memutuskan berikut: “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the 9 evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.” [11] Di dalam kes Kho Ah Soon V Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah sekali lagi menekankan berkenaan prinsip undang-undang di dalam pembatalan kaveat di mana Peh Swee Chin, HMP telah menyatakan di mukasurat 184 seperti berikut: “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated by Lord Diplock, the serious 10 question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. [12] Di dalam perkara ini juga, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719 telah menggariskan ujian-ujian yang harus digunapakai di dalam menentukan dan menimbangkan sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat di mana mukasurat 724, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan berikut: “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary one. At first stage, the court will examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat to see whether they show a caveatable interest. Once the court is satisfied that the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim disclosed a serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the court must decide where the balance of convenience” D. Samada Defendan mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut [13] Di dalam kes ini Plaintif telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Defendan melalui perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 22.11.2013. 11 Sebagai pembeli, Plaintif telah melaksanakan segala tanggungjawab atau obligasinya sebagai pembeli dengan membuat pembayaran penuh harga belian hartanah tersebut. Malangnya, Plaintif tidak dapat melaksanakan transaksi pindah milik hartanah kepadanya kerana telah wujud kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan sejurus selepas perjanjian ditandatangani iaitu pada 9.12.2013. [14] Defendan telah cuba menggugat kepentingan dan hak Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut dengan mempertahankan kemasukan kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut (hartanahnya sendiri kerana pindah milik hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif masih belum dilaksanakan) dengan menimbulkan alasan bahawa kesemua tandatangan yang tertera di dalam dokumen-dokumen berhubung pembelian hartanah tersebut iaitu perjanjian jual beli (Borang 19G Kanun Tanah Negara, Borang Pindah Milik 14A) bukanlah tandatangan beliau. Defendan telah mendakwa tandatangan yang terdapat di atas dokumen-dokumen tersebut adalah tandatangan palsu dan terdapat penipuan di dalam kes ini. [15] Untuk menyokong dakwaannya itu, Defendan telah mengemukakan di dalam afidavit jawapannya (Kandungan 6) dua 12 salinan laporan polis yang dibuatnya pada 4.12.2013 dan 21.7.2015. [16] Di dalam kes ini, apa yang menghairankan Mahkamah ini, laporan polis yang pertama dibuat oleh Defendan adalah pada 4.12.2013 dan laporan polis beliau menyatakan berikut: “PADA NOVEMBER 2013 SAYA TELAH MENYERAHKAN GERAN TANAH RUMAH SAYA DI ALAMAT BLK AA 1-8, JALAN PANDAN INDAH 3/6, PANDAN INDAH KEPADA KAWAN LELAKI SAYA NAMA SURESH DI RESTORAN CINA PETALING JAYA STATE BERDEKATAN LOTUS PANGUNG WAYANG. SURESH BERJANJI UNTUK MEMBANTU MENJUAL RUMAH SAYA. APABILA SAYA MENGHUBUNGINYA SEMALAM UNTUK BERTANYAKAN MENGENAI HAL RUMAH SAYA TETAPI SURESH TIDAK DAPAT DIHUBUNGI SEHINGGA SEKARANG. SAYA TELAH MEMBUAT SEMAKAN DI PEJABAT MPAJ DAN SAYA MENDAPAT TAHU SURESH TELAH MENJELASKAN TUNGGAKAN CUKAI PINTU. SAYA SYAKI SURESH TELAH MENJUAL RUMAH SAYA TANPA PENGETAHUAN SAYA ATAU SUDAH MENCAGARKAN RUMAH SAYA ITU. SAYA JUGA TELAH MEMBERI WANG KEPADA SURESH SETIAP KALI BERJUMPA DENGANNYA UNTUK MENYELESAIKAN HUTANG RUMAH SAYA JUMLAH LEBIH KURANG RM9,000. SAYA DATANG KE BALAI BUAT LAPORAN.” [17] Di dalam laporan polis 4.12.2013 tersebut, Defendan menyatakan bahawa geran hartanah tersebut telah diserahkan kepada kawan 13 lelakinya bernama Suresh pada awal November 2013 yang berjanji untuk membantu beliau menjual hartanah tersebut. Tetapi Suresh telah tidak dapat beliau hubungi daripada 3.12.2013 sehingga 4.12.2013 (tarikh laporan dibuat). Defendan kononnya telah pergi membuat semakan di Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya dan mendapati segala tunggakan cukai pintu telah dibayar Suresh dan mengesyaki Suresh telah telah menjual hartanah tersebut atau telah mencagarkannya, Defendan di dalam laporan polisnya juga telah mendakwa setiap kali berjumpa Suresh telah memberi wang kepada Suresh bagi menyelesaikan hutangnya dan jumlah yang diberi Suresh sehingga laporan polis dibuat adalah RM9000.00. [18] Di dalam laporan polis bertarikh 25.7.2015 pula, Plaintif telah mendakwa sekitar Julai 2015, beliau telah mendapat pembeli untuk hartanah tersebut dan telah melantik Tetuan S. Nalina S. Amutha & Partners untuk menguruskan jual beli tersebut. Tetuan S. Nalina S. Amutha & Partners telah membuat carian ke atas hakmilik tersebut untuk tujuan penyediaan perjanjian jual beli dan mendapati terdapat perserahan untuk pindahmilik dan permohonan untuk Tarik balik kaveat yang dipohon oleh Tetuan 14 John & Associates pada 21.1.2015 tetapi masih belum diproses oleh pihak pejabat tanah. [19] Di dalam laporan polis bertarikh 12.8.2015 iaitu dua tahun selepas laporan polis pertama beliau dan sebulan selepas laporan polis kedua dibuat, Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa carian persendirian beliau ke atas hak milik strata hartanah tersebut pada 14.7.2015 mendapati bahawa Plaintif telah membuat perserahan untuk dokumen-dokumen bagi tujuan pindah milik hartanah tersebut. Menurut Defendan lagi, Notis Penarikan balik kaveat persendirian beliau (perserahan 8304/2013) dan borang 14A yang telah diserahkan kepada pejabat tanah adalah tanpa kebenaran dan pengetahuan beliau. Di akhir laporan polis tersebut, Defendan telah menyatakan bahawa beliau telah memperolehi sesalinan Borang pindah milik 14A dan resit perserahan Borang 19G daripada Encik Khairul Fahmi seorang pegawai pendaftar tanah di pejabat tanah tersebut. [20] Di dalam kes ini, Defendan telah cuba mempertahankan kaveat persendiriannya nombor perserahan 8304/2013 yang dimasukkan ke atas hartanah tersebut atas dakwaan bahawa beliau tidak pernah menandatangani segala dokumen-dokumen berkaitan 15 penjualan hartanah tersebut dengan Plaintif dan mendakwa tandatangan beliau telah dipalsukan. Bagi menyokong dakwaan- dakwaan tersebut bahawa Defendan telah hanya bersandarkan kepada tiga laporan polis yang dibuatnya iatu laporan polis bertarikh 4.12.2013, 21.7.2015 dan 12.8.2015. [21] Plaintif pula telah menyatakan bahawa Defendan bukan sahaja setakat menandatangani kesemua dokumen-dokumen berkaitan dengan penjualan hartanah tersebut, tetapi Plaintif telah hadir secara kediri di pejabat Tetuan John & Associates dan telah menandatangani dokumen-dokumen tersebut di hadapan Plaintif dan Encik John Henry Louis, peguam yang mengendalikan transaksi jual beli tersebut. [22] Menurut Plaintif lagi di Ekshibit ‘SCM-2’, Kandungan 2 adalah cek Maybank bernombor 284415 bernilai RM44,000.00 dan merupakan merupakan satu cek tunai di atas nama Defendan sendiri (a/c payee telah dibatalkan) di mana pada hari yang sama, Plaintif telah menyerahkan cek tersebut kepada Defendan. 16 [23] Menurut Plaintif, pada hari tersebut juga Defendan telah hadir secara kediri di bank untuk mengeluarkan jumlah RM44,000.00 tersebut di mana salinan penyata akaun Maybank Berhad kepunyaan pemilik cek High Earnings Sdn Bhd (Ekshibit ‘SCM-6’, Kandungan 7) telah menunjukkan bahawa penunaian cek tersebut telah dibuat oleh Defendan sendiri (cek atas nama Defendan) pada 22.11.2013 dan penerimaan cek dan penunaian cek ini telah membuktikan bukti bahawa Defendan sememangnya telah hadir secara Kediri pada 22/11/2013 untuk menunaikan cek dan mengeluarkan duit tersebut. [24] Di dalam perkara ini kehadiran Kediri Defendan pada masa penandatangan perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 22.11.2013, penandatangan payment voucher bertarikh 22.11.2013, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan Plaintif bahawa Defendan tidak boleh menafikan bahawa beliau telah hadir secara kediri di pejabat Tetuan John & Associates kerana atas satu fakta nyata bahawa cek High Earnings Sdn Bhd bernombor 2884415 telah dikeluarkan atas nama Kediri/personal Letchumy a/p Ramachandran bagi jumlah RM44,000.00 bertarikh 22.11.2013. Di dalam voucher payment bertarikh 22.11.2013 telah dinyatakan bahawa selain bayaran tunai sebanyak RM55,000.00 dan bayaran bagi cukai 17 tanah dan cukai taksiran (Quit Rent & Assessment) sebanyak RM5000.00, terdapat pembayaran bagi pembelian hartanah tersebut sebanyak RM44,000.00 dibayar melalui cek no.284415. Cek 284415 (dari akaun Maybank 514365203263) ini jelas menunjukkan bahawa perkataan A/C PAYEE ONLY telah dibatalkan oleh pihak pengeluar cek di Ekshibit ‘SCM-6’, Kandungan 7, yang merupakan penyata akaun Maybank High Earnings Sdn Bhd (no. akaun Maybank 514365203263) jelas menunjukkan bahawa cek 284415 ini telah ditunaikan pada 22.11.2013. Di dalam perkara penunaian cek tunai, adalah satu prosedur ketat oleh bank-bank atau institusi kewangan bahawa mereka tidak akan membenarkan sesiapa sahaja menunaikan cek di atas nama seseorang melainkan penama cek itu sendiri hadir sendiri ke bank bagi menunaikan cek tersebut. Di dalam kes Defendan telah menunaikan sendiri cek tersebut dan beliau kini tidak boleh mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak ada pengetahuan tentang transaksi jual beli tanah tersebut. [25] Defendan juga telah cuba mendakwa bahawa tandatangan- tandatangannya yang tertera pada kesemua dokumen transaksi jual beli hartanah tersebut telah dipalsukan. Namun Mahkamah ini tidak dapat menerima pengataan ini atas alasan-alasan berikut: 18 i. Defendan telah cuba mengambarkan bahawa adanya satu penipuan dan frod terhadapnya berhubung penjualan tanah tersebut dengan mengatakan di dalam afidavit jawapannya membantah permohonan Plaintif mendakwa bahawa sekitar tahun 2012 ,beliau telah mengalami masalah kewangan disebabkan hartanahnya di Rawang (hartanah Rawang) hampir dilelong oleh pihak bank atas kegagalannya membuat bayaran ansuran bulanan yang tertunggak sebanyak RM40,000.00. Beliau telah mewar-warkan kepada kenalannya niat untuk menjual hartanah Rawang tersebut dan menghubungi saya sekiranya terdapat pembeli yang berminat. Sekitar awal tahun 2013 kenalannya bernama Suresh telah menawarkan diri untuk membantunya menyelamatkan hartanah Rawang. Di dalam pada itu juga, Suresh kononnya telah memujuk beliau untuk menjual hartanah tersebut dan berpindah ke tempat yang lebih selesa.Tawaran bantuan Suresh telah diterimanya kerana Suresh telah merepresentasikan kepadanya beliau adalah pegawai bank CIMB dan oleh sebab itulah beliau telah menyerahkan geran hartanah tersebut kepada Suresh bagi mendapatkan penilaian hartanah tersebut. 19 Namun, di laporan polis yang dibuatnya pada 4.12.2013 (yakni selepas 12 hari dari tarikh perjanjian jual beli ditandatangani) perkara-perkara yang dinyatakan di dalam afidavit tidak langsung dinyatakan, apa yang dikatakan oleh Defendan hanyalah beliau telah memberikan geran hartanah tersebut kepada Suresh kerana Suresh telah berjanji untuk membantu beliau menjual hartanah tersebut. Usaha untuk mendapatkan geran semula tidak berjaya kerana Suresh tidak dapat dihubungi. Semakan di MPAJ mendapati tunggakan cukai pintu telah dibayar oleh Suresh. Sehingga laporan polis dibuat, RM9000.00 telah beliau berikan kepada Suresh untuk menyelesaikan hutangnya. ii. Bagi Mahkamah ini, sudahlah pengataan Defendan di dalam afidavitnya adalah tidak selari dengan laporan polisnya, tindakan beliau pula adalah bertentangan dengan perbuatannya. Kalau benar Suresh telah menggunakan geran hartanah untuk menjual atau mencagar hartanahnya dan usaha untuk mendapatkan geran mestilah dibuat. Selain daripada laporan polis 4.12.2013, tidak ada sebarang keterangan dokumentar telah dikemukakan oleh Defendan untuk menunjukkan usaha-usaha Defendan mendapatkan 20 geran hartanahnya yang kononnya ada ditangan Suresh. Malah kalau benar, geran hartanah telah disalah gunakan Suresh, dengan laporan polis pastinya polis menjalankan siasatan. Sekiranya polis tidak menjalankan siasatan atas laporan yang dibuat, memandangkan geran hartanah tersebut adalah hak Defendan, Defendan boleh memfailkan tindakan di Mahkamah terhadap Suresh untuk pengembalian geran tersebut. Ini langsung tidak dibuat oleh Defendan. Tujuan laporan polis 4.12.2013 menimbulkan suatu tanda tanya kenapa ia dibuat. Apa yang Mahkamah nampak, tujuannya adalah bagi menyokong kemasukan kaveat persendiriannya pada 9.12.2013 walhal pada masa itu pemilikan hartanah di dalam geran tersebut adalah di atas namanya. iii. Adalah menghairankan apabila Defendan telah tidak berbuat apa-apa apabila mengetahui tunggakan cukai pintu telah dibayar Suresh dan pembayaran yang dibuat telah diterima oleh Defendan tanpa soal dan ini seolah-olah ianya dalam pengetahuan Defendan. 21 iv. Setelah apa yang berlaku dan dua tahun berlalu pula, pada 21.7.2015, kononnya Defendan telah mendapat pembeli bagi hartanah tersebut dan apabila membuat semakan di Pejabat Tanah Hulu Langat beliau mendapati Plaintif telah membuat perserahan dokumen-dokumen untuk mendaftarkan pertukaran hakmilik tanpa pengetahuannya. Setelah mengetahui perkara ini, Defendan masih tidak berbuat apa- apa tindakan undang-undang melainkan membuat satu lagi laporan polis pada 12.8.2015. Laporan polis 12.8.2015 mempunyai butiran yang sama dengan laporan polis 21.7.2015. v. Di samping itu, adalah sesuatu yang pelik dan tidak munasabah akan dakwaan Defendan lagi, di mana sebelum beliau membuat laporan polis pada 4.12.2013, nama Plaintif telahpun diketahui oleh Plaintif pada bulan November sehinggalah laporan polis 4.12.2013 di mana di dalam di afidavit jawapannya Defendan telah mengatakan bahawa setiap kali beliau meminta Suresh untuk memulangkan geran hakmiliknya, Suresh telah berdalih dengan pelbagai alasan tetapi pada masa yang sama Suresh ada memaklumkan kepadanya bahawa terdapat seorang pembeli bernama Soo 22 Chee Ming (Plaintif) yang berminat untuk membeli hartanah tersebut tetapi selepas itu tiada berita. vi. Kalaulah benar tandatangan Defendan telah dipalsukan dan wujudnya penipuan, dari tempoh November 2013 dan/atau dari tarikh 14.7.2015 (tarikh laporan polis dibuat berhubung dokumen-dokumen perserahan Plaintif untuk pindah milik) sehingga Plaintif memfaikan permohonan ini, Defendan sudah pasti memfailkan satu tindakan terhadap Plaintif untuk mencabar tandatangan yang terdapat pada segala dokumen transaksi jual beli tersebut. Apa yang pasti sehingga kini tidak ada tindakan telah dibawa oleh Defendan. vii. Di dalam afidavitnya, Defendan cuba mengatakan beliau masih menunggu hasil siasatan pihak polis atas laporan- laporan polis yang dibuatnya dan pihak polis telah memaklumkannya masih dalam proses penyiasatan. Namun, pengataan ini adalah semata-mata pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang keterangan dokumentar. Begitu juga berhubung pengataan yang Defendan telah membuat aduan terhadap Tetuan John & Associates kepada Majlis Peguam Malaysia. Pengataan ini adalah semata-mata 23 pengataan kosong yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang keterangan dokumentar. [26] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas Defendan sememangnya tidak mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut. Di dalam keadaan ini, apabila Defendan gagal melepasi ujian peringkat pertama iaitu membuktikan bahawa beliau mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut, maka peringkat- peringkat seterusnya samada terdapat pendedahan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan, samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan ataupun samada terdapat keadaan istimewa untuk pengekalan status quo menjadi tidak relevan lagi. [27] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini, di dalam kes ini Defendan adalah tidak berhak di sisi undang-undang untuk mencabar pelupusan hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif kerana Plaintif telah menyempurnakan segala obligasinya di bawah perjanjian jual beli termasuklah telah membuat bayaran penuh harga belian. 24 [28] Atas alasan-alasan di atas permohonan Plaintif di Kandungan 1 dibenarkan dan Mahkamah telah memerintahkan Defendan membayar kos RM2000.00 kepada Plaintif iaitu kos yang dipohon oleh Peguam Plaintif. t.t. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 30hb November 2016 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan K. Sugu & Associates S.Vasanthi Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Ganeson Gomathy & Partners Gomathi

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-56-07/2016 & WA-24C-62-08/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Rimbunan Raya Sdn Bhd 2. ) Wong Brother's Building Construction Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Wong Brother's Building Construction Sdn Bhd 2. ) Rimbunan Raya Sdn Bhd

30/11/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=1ef52481-01a0-49ec-9c8e-566123d84a06&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-56-07/2016 In the Matter of Section 15 (b), (c) and (d) the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012; And In the Matter of the Adjudication Decision dated 6.6.2016; And In the Matter of Order 7 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN RIMBUNAN RAYA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 53120-P) ... PLAINTIFF AND WONG BROTHERS BUILDING CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 583311-V) ... DEFENDANT (heard together with) 2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-62-08/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 between Wong Brothers’ Building Construction Sdn Bhd and Rimbunan Raya Sdn Bhd And In the Matter of Decision dated 6.6.2016 issued by Mr Gurubachan Singh Johal And In the Matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 And In the Matter of Order 7, Rule 2 and Rule 3 and Order 92 the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN WONG BROTHERS BUILDING CONSTRUCTION SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 583311-V) ... PLAINTIFF 3 AND RIMBUNAN RAYA SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 53120-P) ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Parties and Project [1] Rimbunan Raya Sdn Bhd ("RRSB") is the Employer for a project known as "Cadangan Pembangunan Kediaman Yang Mengandungi 16 Unit Rumah Berkembar 2 1/2 Tingkat, 25 Unit Rumah Sesebuah 3 Tingkat Jenis A dan 4 Unit Rumah Sesebuah 2 1/2 Tingkat Jenis B di Atas Lot 15646s (PT 157477) M.S(D) KA 74418, Bandaraya Ipoh, Daerah Kinta, Perak Darul Ridzuan ("the Project"). [2] RRSB appointed Wong Brothers Building Construction Sdn Bhd ("WB") as the main contractor for the Project. RRSB and WB executed the formal contract document premised on the PAM Conditions of Contract 2006 (with Quantities) ("the Main Contract"). This can be found at Attachment 1 to the adjudication claim. 4 [3] WB completed the said Project and the Certificate of Practical Completion ("CPC") was issued on 16.9.2011 and the Certificate of Making Good Defects ("CMGD") was issued on 1.3.2014. Problem [4] WB is the Claimant in the adjudication against RRSB as Respondent under the scheme of statutory adjudication provided for in Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 ("CIPAA"). WB's claim is for the balance amount certified as due under the Penultimate Certificate and the outstanding sum under Final Certificate issued by the Superintending Officer who is the Architect appointed by the RRSB as the Employer under the Main Contract. There was also a claim of late interest payment. The details are reproduced below: (a) the balance outstanding sum of RM691,296.54 pursuant to the Penultimate Certificate dated 22.9.2014; (b) the late payment interest for the sum of RM63,480.43 pursuant to the Penultimate Certificate dated 22.9.2014 at the rate of 7.85% (Maybank Base Lending Rate 6.85% + 1%) as at 14.8.2015; 5 (c) the outstanding sum of RM600,422.30 pursuant to the Final Certificate dated 16.3.2015; (d) the late payment interest for the sum of RM15,624.96 pursuant to the Final Certificate dated 16.3.2015 at the rate of 7.85% (Maybank Base Lending Rate 6.85% + 1%) as at 14.8.2015; (e) the late payment interest for the sum of RM753,286.73 for Interim Certificate No. 1 to No. 25 at the rate of 7.85% (Maybank Base Lending Rate 6.85% + 1%) as at 14.8.2015. [5] At the adjudication each party called one witness. The Claimant's witness was Mr Lim Chong Jin, the Contract Administrator and Assistant Contract Manager for the project. (CW-l). [6] The Respondent's witness was Encik Ahmad Bokhar Bin Khalid, the person who conducted an audit on the said project (RW-l). Prayers [7] There are 2 Originating Summonses ("OS") before the Court, which by consent of the parties, were heard together. OS WA-24C-56-07/2016 dated 28.7.2016 is RRSB's application made pursuant to Section 15 (b), (c) 6 and (d) of CIPAA, to set aside the decision of the adjudicator dated 6.6.2016. [8] The grounds as set out in section 15 are that there has been a denial of natural justice, the adjudicator had not acted independently and impartially and that the adjudicator had acted in excess of its jurisdiction. [9] OS WA-24C-62-08/2016 dated 5.8.2016 is WB's application pursuant to Section 28 of CIPAA to enforce the said adjudicator's decision. [10] The parties shall be referred to as Claimant and Respondent as they were so referred to in the adjudication so as to avoid confusion. Principles [11] There is no provision for appeal against an adjudication decision made by an adjudicator under CIPAA. CIPAA however provides for the setting aside of an adjudication decision under the limited grounds set out in section 15. [12] It reads as follows: “An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds; 7 (a) ... (b) there has been a denial of natural justice; (c) the adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or (d) the adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction” [13] The Respondent is applying to set aside the adjudication decision on grounds (b), (c) and (d). Whether the finding of the Adjudicator that there has been no double claim between the Penultimate Certificate and the Final Certificate is a finding made in breach of natural justice. [14] Under section 27(1) CIPAA it is clear that the adjudicator's jurisdiction is both circumscribed by and confined to the Payment Claim filed under section 5 and the Payment Response filed under section 6 CIPAA. [15] It is not unlike the Statement of Claim and Defence filed in the pleadings before a Court in litigation. In as much as a Judge should not stray beyond the pleadings, likewise an adjudicator has to confine himself to the issues raised in the Payment Claim and the Payment Response. 8 [16] The Claimant's Payment Claim dated 2.9.2015 and served on the Respondent on 4.9.2015 is as follows, as at 14.8.2015 consisting of the balance amounts due under the Penultimate Certificate, the Final Certificate and the late payment interest under these 2 Certificates as well as Certificates 1-25: Penultimate Certificate 691,296.54 Late Payment Interest 63,480.43 Final Certificate 600,422.30 Late Payment Interest 15,624.96 Late Payment Interest on Cert 1-25 753,286.73 TOTAL 2,124,110.96 [17] The Respondent's Payment Response dated 15.9.2015 only states as follows: "We are not in agreement with the amount claimed by your goodselves. We have on numerous occasions requested documentation supporting your claim but regret to note that to date we have not received any reply except for your current claim. 9 We wish to emphasize that we are not opposed to settling claims that we can verify, hence our request for substantiation. If we can be provided with the substantiation requested, we need not resort to the adjudication process provided for under the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (CIPA). As you would have to provide the same substantiation in the adjudication process, we fail to see the reason why we cannot be provided with the same substantiation. As such, we renew our request for documentation previously conveyed in our letters to you dated 5th August 2014, 30th April 2015 & 10th June 2015. If we can be provided the information requested, we will be in a position to verify your claims and make payment without the need to resort to CIPA." (emphasis added) [18] In the written submission of RRSB, learned counsel stated that the issues before the adjudicator are whether the Claimant is entitled to Variation orders Nos. 25, 28 and 40 until 44 and rate of late payment interest. Learned counsel for RRSB then set out the details in the table below: 10 The Variation Orders Variation Order Date Variation Order Number Description Amount (RM) 17.6.2011 25 Re-measurement of structure works 305,711.03 17.6.2011 28 Changes as TNB approval on design 15,755.52 30.10.2012 40 Re-measurement of Surface Water Drainage 201,344,07 30.10.2012 41 Re-measurement of Water reticulation 12,868.57 30.10.2012 42 Re-measurement of sewerage Works 887.54 30.10.2012 43 Re-measurement of External Works Outside Boundary 52,581.73 30.10.2012 44 Re-measurement of perimeter fencing 11,273.84 Total RM600,422.30 [19] This sum of RM600,422.30 is detailed and supported by the documents filed with the Adjudication Claim at paragraph 33 (c). This is the sum in the Architect's Final Certificate. This is the second part of the Claimant's claim. The first part consists of the Claimant's Claim under the Penultimate Certificate. 11 [20] Learned counsel for RRSB contended that WB's claim for RM691,296.54 as per paragraph 33(a) of the Adjudication Claim is not sustainable as this is the Penultimate Certificate sum which is already taken into account and adjusted when the Final Certificate is issued. To claim for the sum stated in the Penultimate Certificate as well as the Final Certificate sum is akin to making a double claim. He argued that in the decision handed down, the adjudicator did not address his mind to this double claim. [21] As can be seen this was not raised in the Payment Response filed by RRSB, the Respondent. All that the Respondent raised was that they denied the claim and that they had asked for substantiation of the Claimant's claim. [22] As the matter of a double claim was raised for the first time in the submissions filed, the Claimant's solicitors have rightly objected to it being raised and had nevertheless replied it to the satisfaction of the adjudicator who did not find any double claim between the Penultimate Certificate and the Final Certificate. [23] The adjudicator's reasoning is set out below in the adjudication decision: 12 "12.5 The terms and conditions governing the Project are found in the Main Contract pursuant to which the Architect being the agent of the Respondent issues the certificates for payment. 12.6 The Architect is responsible for the administration and supervision of the Project and certifies the completion of the Project at various stages. 12.7 It is a finding of fact that there was no agreement between the Claimant and Respondent that works be verified and certified by the Respondent's General Manager and Tender Committee. 12.8 The Consultants are appointed and employed by the Respondent's and are therefore bound by their certification for payments. 12.9 This is all the more so as there was a joint measurement inspection carried on 5.3.2014 and 6.3.2014 in the presence of the representatives from the Claimant and the Respondent. The QS recommended and certified the Final Account which was forwarded to the Respondent on 16.5.2014. 13 12.10 Similarly, the SO had on 16.3.2015 issued the Final Certificate for the sum of RM600,422.30 in tabulating the sums payable in the Final Certificate, the SO had certified that the entire works value to be the same sum as recommended by the QS, namely RM31,114,718.84 which included the Variation Orders No. 25,28,40 and 44. 12.11 It is clear that the Claimant had on 4.10.2012 provided all the documents requested for by the Respondent to the QS and SO prior to the issuance of the Final Account. 12.12 The QS in turn had on 8.11.2013 prepared and issued a draft Final Account which recognized the entire works value at the sum of RM31,114,718.84 which included the Variation Order No. 25, 28, 40 and 44. 12.13 On 16.5.2014, the Claimant forwarded the Final Account to the Respondent. The Respondent did not dispute the Final Account pursuant to Clause 30.12 of the Main Contract." [24] In paragraph 2.5 of the adjudication decision, the learned adjudicator had set out Clause 30.12 of the Main Contract as follows: 14 "...Unless a written notice for the arbitration shall have been given under Clause 34.0 by either party within the stipulated time stated in Clause 30.10 of the Final Account or the last amended Final Account shall be conclusive and deemed agreed by the parties other than any outstanding items to be received separately between the Employer and Contractor under Clauses 30.11(e) to 30.11(g), except where the Final Account is erroneous by reason of 30.12 (a) fraud, dishonesty or fraudulent concealment relating to the Works; or 30.12(b) any arithmetic all errors in any computation." [25] The learned adjudicator had also set out Clause 30.15 of the Main Contract which provides as follows: "...The Final Certificate shall state: 30.15(a) the Final Account; less 30.15(b) the total sums certified in previous payment certificates [whether paid or not paid] to the Contractor; 15 and the difference, if any, between the sums shall be the balance due to the Contractor by the Employer or conversely as the case may be..." (emphasis added) [26] I agree with learned counsel for the Claimant in his Submissions in Reply, that based on the format of reporting for the Final Certificate as provided in Clause 30.15, the amounts which had already been certified (whether paid or not) have already been excluded and deducted from the amounts payable and claimed in the Final Certificate. As such there is no double claim as alleged by the Respondent. [27] The Final Certificate found at Attachment 13 of the Adjudication Claim is set out below: Contract Sum RM30,207,912.60 ADD: Net Additions/Omissions RM 906,806.24 Revised Contract Sum RM31,114,718.84 DEDUCT: Previous Certificates No. 1 to 26 (Penultimate Certificate) (Kindly note that this amount represents the amount as certified regardless if it has in fact been paid or otherwise) RM30,514,296.54 Amount Certified in the Final Certificate RM 600,422.30 16 [28] This is to be compared with the Payment Claim found at Attachment 16 of the Adjudication Claim as follows: Contract Sum RM30,207,912.60 ADD: Net Additions/Omissions RM 906,806.24 Total Adjusted Contract Sum RM31,114,718.84 Less: a) Total amounts previously paid in previous Certificate No. 1 to 26 (Penultimate Certificate) b) Balance to be paid for Penultimate Certificate RM 29,823,000.00 RM 691,296.54 Balance to be paid in the Final Certificate RM 600,422.30 [29] I can agree with the Claimant's learned counsel that the above 2 Tables demonstrate that there has not been any double claim in the Penultimate Certificate and the Final Certificate. The amounts in the Penultimate Certificate amounting to RM691,296.54 does not overlap with the certified amount in the Final Certificate of RM600,422.30. [30] Thus the learned adjudicator had found both sums remain due and payable to the Claimant. 17 [31] This is a finding of fact which this Court has no basis to interfere with in a setting aside application. It is a finding arrived at by considering the evidence adduced before him and the written submissions filed. [32] Even assuming for a moment that the learned adjudicator had been wrong, that is to be corrected at arbitration if the Respondent is minded to pursue as the adjudication decision is of temporary finality only. I agree with the learned counsel for the Claimant that: (a) the learned adjudicator had given adequate and equal opportunity to both parties to present their case. In fact, additional opportunity was given to both parties to submit additional documents over and above those attached to the Adjudication Claim or Adjudication Response. Parties were also afforded opportunity to submit witness statements, written submissions as well as reply submissions; (b) the Claimant had in fact submitted sufficient documentation for the consideration of the learned adjudicator. Such documentation had also included the supporting documents for various Variation Orders No. 25, 28 and 40 to 44 which were disputed by the Claimant; 18 (c) the learned adjudicator had given adequate and equal opportunity to the parties to call its respective witness to give oral testimony during the adjudication hearing. [33] There is clearly no good ground for asserting that there has been a breach of natural justice just because the learned adjudicator had, even assuming for a moment, failed to appreciate the evidence or had even misconstrued the evidence before him. Much less can it be alleged that the learned adjudicator had failed to act impartially or independently merely because the Respondent is unhappy with the decision arrived at. Whether the payments under the Variation Orders are due even without the signature of the Respondent's representatives [34] Learned counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Variation Price Request and the Variation Order has a column at the bottom for the employer to sign which contained these words: "l/we the undersigned acknowledged that I/we have received the variation details and agreed to the value shown above”. [35] At page 127, there is a column each for the signatures for CHECKED By Assistant Project Manager (RRSB), ENDORSED FOR CORRECTNESS 19 the General Manager (RRSB). Below these there are columns for the TENDER COMMITTEE's APPROVAL to be signed by representatives from RRSB. [36] At the hearing, the Claimant's witness CW-1 confirmed that this format was used by both parties. [37] It is true that RRSB representatives' signatures appear on the Variation Price Request form, which is found in WB’s bundle, at pages 127, 132, 136, 140, 144, 148 and 155. However as pointed out by learned counsel for the Claimant, payments had in the past been made even when the forms were not duly countersigned and that there had been part payments towards the Penultimate Certificate. To be precise, payments had been made by the Respondent on 23 of the 44 Variation Price Request as set out in pages 165 to 167 of the Adjudication Claim. [38] The relevant clauses in the Main Contract are clauses 11.7, 11.7(a) and 11.7(b). There is no provision for signatures by the Respondent. However the Respondent contended that there was a business practice wherein RRSB's representatives would approve the Variation Orders. [39] It must be highlighted that this was not the defence raised by the Respondent in the Payment Response. Nevertheless the learned 20 adjudicator had considered it as the parties had submitted on it. At paragraph 12.7 to 12.9 of the Adjudication Decision, the learned adjudicator had made his finding as follows: "12.7 It is a finding of fact that there was no agreement between the Claimant and the Respondent that works be verified and certified by the Respondent's General Manager and Tender Committee. 12.8 The Consultants are appointed and employed by the Respondent's and are therefore bound by their certification for payments. 12.9 This is all the more so as there was a joint measurement inspection carried on 5.3.2014 and 6.3.2014 in the presence of the representatives from the Claimant and the Respondent. The QS recommended and certified the Final Account which was forwarded to the Respondent on 16.5.2014." (emphasis added) [40] There is no need for the Claimant to call the Architect or the Quantity Surveyor as there is no need to go behind the Penultimate and the Final Certificates issued. At any rate the parties are bound by clause 30.12 on the conclusiveness of the Final Account unless a written notice of 21 arbitration has been given. There is no evidence that such a notice has been given by the Respondent. [41] The only issue raised with respect to the disputed Variation Orders is that the Claimant had not substantiated it. As submitted by the Claimant's counsel, there was the agreed measurement at site which was also attended by the Respondent themselves. The purpose of this joint measurement was to verify the works carried out by the Claimant in the disputed Variation Orders. The Respondent's representative had in fact jointly signed on the Joint Measurement Sheet at pages 117-121 of Attachment 6 of the Adjudication Claim. [42] After the joint site measurement, the Claimant had on 7.11.2014 resubmitted all the substantiating documents for the disputed Variation Orders. I see no good reason to interfere with the decision of the adjudicator on ground of breach of natural justice or that there has been biasness or a lack of impartiality on the part of the learned adjudicator. [43] Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to the case of Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR pg 989 where the approach taken by Lord Wilberforce at page 995 is as follows in interpreting contractual terms: 22 "No contracts are made in a vacuum: there is always a setting in which they have to be placed. The nature of what is legitimate to have regard to is usually described as "the surrounding circumstances" but this phrase is imprecise: it can be illustrated but hardly defined. In a commercial contract it is certainly right that the court should know the commercial purpose of the contract and this in turn presupposes knowledge of the genesis of the transaction, the background, the context, the market in which the parties are operating. And, he continues [at p 997]: "...what the court must do must be to place itself in thought in the same factual matrix as that in which the parties were'.” [44] However, where the words of the contract are clear, there is no need to rely on context to clarify, confirm or give colour to the clear words used. The Court will have to give effect to the plain meaning of the words; see the Federal Court case of City Investment Sdn Bhd v Koperasi Serbaguna Cuepacs Tanggungan Bhd [1985] 1 MLJ 285. The Respondent further complained that the learned adjudicator had not addressed his mind to the aforementioned issues canvassed by them. Whilst it can be said that the 23 reasons given were brief, it is no doubt sufficiently cogent and clear and a Court would be slow to conclude that there has been a breach of natural justice or that there has been biasness or a lack of impartiality on his part, just because fuller reasons should have been given. [45] Learned counsel for the Respondent referred to Pilon Limited v Breyer Group Plc [2010] BLR 452 where at page 452 of the headnotes it was summarized as follows: “(2) Although an adjudicator can make a mistake when answering the question put to him, and such a mistake will not affect the enforceability of his decision; a wrongful and material decision by an adjudicator not to consider a particular defence to a dispute amounts to a breach of natural justice such that the decision will not be enforced.” (emphasis added). [46] In the instant case before this Court, the only defence raised in the Respondent's Payment Response was that the Claimant had not furnished documents to substantiate its claim. It therefore can hardly be said that the learned adjudicator had not fully considered the defence raised; indeed he had given every opportunity to the Respondent to even raise matters not 24 specifically pleaded such as whether a business practice had come into being. [47] Learned counsel for the Respondent cited the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd v Mayor & Burgess London Borough of Lambeth [2002] BLR 288 at paragraph number 33. “33. Thus, in my judgment, the adjudicator not only took the initiative in ascertaining the facts but also applied his own knowledge and experience to an appreciation of them and thus, in effect, did BB’s work for it. Lambeth knew of course, that Mr Richards intended first to verify the "as built programme" and it made submissions on it and on each of the Relevant Events. Mr Richards did not however inform Lambeth of what he then intended to do with the facts. He did not invite their comments on whether the "as built programme" or chart that he had drawn to depict the actual progress of the work was a suitable basis from which to derive a retrospective "critical path”. Nor did Mr Richards inform either party of the methodology that he intended to adopt or to seek observations from them as to the manner in which it or any other methodology might reasonably and property be used in the circumstances to establish or to test BB's 25 case. ln my judgment he ought to have done so. BB had not presented its case on that basis. Lambeth had criticised BB both at the outset and in its final, if belated, submissions that it had failed to establish its case in any proper way. One would ordinarily expect the appropriate method of analysis to be agreed before it was used by an architect or other contract administrator. The adjudicator steps into the shoes of such a person. lf an adjudicator intends to use a method which was not agreed and has not been put forward as appropriate by either party he ought to inform the parties and to obtain their views as it is his choice of how the dispute might be decided. An adjudicator is of course entitled to use the powers available to him but he may not of his own volition use them to make good fundamental deficiencies in the material presented by one party without first giving the other party an proper opportunity of dealing both with that intention and with the results. The principle of natural justice applied to an adjudication may not require a party to be aware of "the case that it has to meet” in the fullest sense since adjudication may be “inquisitorial" or investigative rather than “adversarial". That does not however mean that each party need not 26 be confronted with the main points relevant to the dispute and to the decision.” (emphasis added) [48] Further down the decision his Lordship observed as follows: “38 ...In my judgment Lambeth does not have to do more than establish that there is real and serious issue that the decision may be flawed by reason of the manner in which it was arrived at, which it has done. 39. I have therefore come to the conclusion that Lambeth has established that, for the purpose of a Part 24 application, it has realistic prospects of success that Mr Richards did not act impartially and that he failed to comply with the rules of natural justice in significant respects which cannot be disregarded and that the consequences may be sufficiently serious that they too cannot be disregarded. In my judgment an observer would conclude that by making good the deficiencies in BB's case and by overcoming the absence of a sustainable as-built programme with a critical path and the complete lack of any analysis as to which of the relevant events were critical and non-critical, the adjudicator moved into the danger zone of being impartial or liable to "apparent bias", as it is now 27 recognised. That lack of impartiality or supposed bias can easily be cured by disclosure to the other party of what is being done or thought about. In truth this case may be more a question of whether Mr Richards failed to comply with the principles of natural justice rather than whether he lacked impartiality. Certainly I have no reason to conclude that Mr Richards personally was lacking in impartiality. There is no question of actual bias. However the authorities make it clear that a person in the position of an adjudicator is obliged in certain circumstances – and these are some of them-to tell both parties of what he has in mind and give them the opportunity of either endorsing or deflecting him from that course. That Mr Richards did not do and accordingly for that reason alone the application must be dismissed since Lambeth have established reasonable prospects of success, as I have indicated.” (emphasis added) [49] Whilst I have no problem appreciating the proposition of law in that case, the facts here are poles apart. Both parties have more than enough opportunities to submit on the issue of whether a business practice has developed to require compliance in the approving of the Variation Orders 28 when the relevant clauses of the Main Contract stipulated a particular mode of approval that had already been complied with. Whether the Maybank Base Lending Rate is 6.85% and that the late interest payment of 1% above that may be imposed on late payment [50] Clause 30.17 of the Main Contract provides that in the event of any late payment, interest at the rate of Maybank Base Lending Rate plus 1% shall be payable by the defaulting party on such outstanding amount until the date payment is made. [51] There is no merits in the Respondent's contention that the interest for late payment must be included in the Final Accounts. In fact Clause 30.11 of the Main Contract provides that in preparing the Final Accounts, the consultants need not include the late payment interest as set out in Clause 30.11(g). [52] While it is true that the rate of interest charged i.e. the Maybank rate, is not found in the documents tendered at the adjudication, the Claimant's witness when questioned, had stated that he had checked this with Maybank. In the absence of evidence to the contrary produced by the Respondent, the learned adjudicator is justified to accept as proof on the balance of probabilities that the Base Lending Rate is correct. At any rate 29 the Respondent had not disputed this as an issue in their Payment Response. If they had done so, then it would be reasonable to require the Claimant to call the Banker to come as a witness or to give a letter to confirm the Base Lending Rate. [53] Learned counsel for the Respondent contended that there has also been a breach of natural justice here in that the learned adjudicator had not been independent and impartial. The test is an objective test. He cited the case of Glencot Development and Design Co Limited v Ben Barrett & Son (Contractors) Limited [2001] BLR 207 at page 219 as follows: “21. Accordingly is Mr Talbot's conduct such as to be regarded not "impartial”? lt must be emphasised that there is no question of actual bias. lt is a case of "apparent bias". Mr Talbot's personal impartiality is presumed. ln Gough Lord Woolf reiterated that "bias operates in such an insidious manner that the person alleged to be biased may be quite unconscious of its effect”. Hence there is a need for an objective test. The views of the person involved are either irrelevant or not determinative. The test is whether the "circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to conclude that 30 there was a real possibility or a real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased”.” (emphasis added) [54] Whilst it may be true that there are circumstances where the conduct of an adjudicator can lead the Court to reasonably infer that there has been a failure to act impartially and independently, the case before us is clearly not one. The matter of sufficiency of evidence to prove what is a Bank's Base Lending Rate in the absence on a contrary evidence from the Respondent other than to dispute it, would be something within the pure province of the adjudicator to decide. Even if the adjudicator should get it wrong there, it cannot by itself or even with other findings he had made, lead one to conclude that he had not acted impartially or independently. [55] The dicta of Judith Prakash J. in the Singapore case of Am Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National Golf and Country Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260, in a context not dissimilar to ours, is illuminating and is set out below: “23. There are two rules of natural justice: the first is that a man should not be the judge in his own cause and the second is that the judge or Adjudicator or other arbiter must hear both side of the dispute. The second rule is often referred to by its Latin tag, audi 31 alteram partem. Laguna’s submission, while not specifically identifying which rule of natural justice had been breached, appeared to refer to the second one. 24. Laguna submitted that the Adjudicator had failed to comply with the rules of natural justice in that in coming to the Adjudication Determination, he had failed to take into consideration and/or give proper weight to materials tendered by AMA which showed a discrepancy in AMA’s claim, in particular, its claim that the Concept Design had been approved. Its submissions went into the evidence in order to establish the alleged discrepancy and it then argued that if the Adjudicator had given proper consideration and weight to such discrepancy and had taken into consideration the relevant evidence tendered by the parties, he would have held that all payment claim made by AMA had been made prematurely. 25. Although the paragraph above contains only a brief summary of Laguna’s contentions, it can be gathered from such summary that what Laguna was complaining about was not really a failure on the part of the Adjudicator to hear both sides of the dispute but a failure on his part to decide the dispute as Laguna considered it should be decided. The audi alteram partem rule required the Adjudicator to 32 receive both parties submissions and consider them; it did not require him to decide the dispute in accordance with Laguna’s submissions. It was clear from the Adjudication Determination that the Adjudicator had conducted the adjudication in accordance with the principles of natural justice: he had called an adjudication conference at which both parties were able to make their submissions, an opportunity which Laguna had availed itself of. Thereafter, as the Adjudication Determination itself made plain, the Adjudicator gave consideration to all points raised and he then came to certain conclusions for which he gave his reasons. However dissatisfied Laguna may be with those decisions, it cannot ask for the Adjudication Determination to be set aside because it considers the decisions to be against the weight of the evidence. 26. The principles of natural justice are concerned with the provision of a fair hearing to contending parties. They do not mandate any particular result. As long as the parties have been given a fair hearing, the decision cannot be set aside for failure to comply with natural justice. A party who is dissatisfied with the decision on its merits cannot use the principles of natural justice to have the decision set aside...” (emphasis added) 33 [56] It was also argued that the learned adjudicator had exceeded his jurisdiction but learned counsel for the Respondent had not shown how the learned adjudicator had so exceeded his jurisdiction. The matter of interest on late payment was clearly in the Payment Claim filed and I find that there is absolutely no merits in this argument. [57] For the reasons given above, I find that there has not been any breach of natural justice and neither can it be said that the learned adjudicator had not acted impartially or independently, much less that he had acted in excess of his jurisdiction. [58] Learned counsel for the Respondent also argued that this Court should not allow the adjudication decision to be enforced as the learned adjudicator had not properly addressed his mind to the issues raised in the adjudication and that he did not give reasons for coming to his decision on crucial issues. He cited the case of Thermal Energy Construction Limited v AE & E Lentjes UK Limited [2009] EWHC 408 (TGC) as follows: “37. For all of these reasons I have reached the conclusion that this is one of those relatively rare cases where the Court must decline to enforce the decision of the Adjudicator. I should say that on the 34 evidence before me there is no reason to believe that the claimant itself or its advisers is in any way to blame for what has happened. lt may well be, and this is pure speculation, that what has happened here is that the Adjudicator was so overwhelmed by the mass of detail in terms of documentation and submission, that in seeking to provide his decision within the short timetable that he simply, through oversight, neglected to deal with an issue which he ought to have dealt with. 38. However, be that as it may, it seems to me that he failed to deal with the point, that as a result there is substantial prejudice to the Defendant, and that therefore the decision cannot be enforced. For those reasons, if seems to me that the application for Summary Judgment must be dismissed." (emphasis added) [59] Whilst the procedure in UK is by way of a summary judgment application for the enforcement of an adjudication decision as a judgment of a Court, the procedure under CIPAA is that of an Originating Summons to register the adjudication decision as a judgment of the Court. [60] It would be very rare for a Court having found that there are no good grounds to set aside an adjudication decision, to then nevertheless, refuse 35 to allow the decision to be enforced under section 28 CIPAA on ground of substantial prejudice to the Respondent in the adjudication. [61] At any rate this Court has held that the learned adjudicator had given proper consideration to the issues before him in spite of the Respondent's vague pleading in the Payment Response filed. He had also given sufficient reasons to justify his findings, conclusion and decision though the reasons be brief. Pronouncement [62] Therefore this Court would dismiss the OS for setting aside the adjudication decision with costs of RM10,000.00 to the Claimant and as for OS for enforcement of the adjudication decision, this Court would grant an order in terms of the application to enforce the decision with costs of RM5,000.00 to the Claimant. Dated: 30 November 2016. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur 36 For the Plaintiff in the Setting Aside OS WA-24C-56-07/2016 : Allen Miranda (Messrs Suraiya Arif, For the Defendant in the Miranda & Tan) Enforcement OS WA-24C-62-08/2016 : For the Plaintiff in the Enforcement OS WA-24C-62-08/2016 : Kevin Wong, Ng Dee Ming and Michelle Yoong For the Defendant in the (Messrs Yeap, Yong & Amy) Setting Aside OS WA-24C-56-07/2016 : Date of Decision: 17 August 2016

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-37-06/2016

PLAINTIF Perfect Stone Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Syarikat Pembenaan Yeoh Tiong Lay Sdn Bhd

25/11/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3a09357a-a316-4588-9c35-ff49a77f2ceb&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-37-06/2016 BETWEEN PERFECT STONE SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 593743-D) ... PLAINTIF AND SYARIKAT PEMBENAAN YEOH TIONG LAY SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 12479-V) ... DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The Defendant is the Main Contractor appointed by Sunway City Berhad (“Employer”) for a project known as “Cadangan Pembangunan 2 Blok Pangsapuri 20 Tingkat (160 unit), Tempat Letak Kereta 4 Tingkat, Kemudahan Penduduk dan Tembok Penahan Di Atas Lot 48629 (F2), Jalan Sri Hartamas 3, Mukim Kuala Lumpur, Wilayah Persekutuan” (“the Project”). 2 [2] The Defendant appointed the Plaintiff for the Supply and Installations of Stoneworks (“the Subcontract Works”) for the contract sum of RM7,550,000.00. The Contractual Documents consist of the Letter of Acceptance (Award) of Nominated Subcontract for the Supply and Installation of Stone works dated 11.10.2008 (hereinafter referred to as “Letter of Acceptance”) and the Subcontract Documents dated 11.11.2008 and Article of Agreement and Conditions of Building Subcontract dated 11.11.2008 (hereinafter referred to as “the Subcontract”). [3] Under the letter of Acceptance, the date of commencement of the Subcontract Works was on 5.01.2009 and the completion date was to be on or before 11.11.2009. The terms of the Conditions of the Subcontract are inter alia as follows: 1. The Plaintiff shall commence the Subcontract Works on the date as stipulated in the Letter of Acceptance; 2. If the Plaintiff fails to complete the Subcontract Works within the stipulated time, the Plaintiff is responsible for all the loss and damage suffered or incurred by the Defendant; and 3. If there is any dispute between the Main Contractor and the Subcontractor whether during execution or after completion or 3 abandonment of Subcontract Works or after Subcontract has been terminated it has to be referred to the arbitration. [4] On 27.09.2010 the Main Contract between the Defendant and the Employer was terminated as a result of nonpayment by the Employer. Prayer [5] The Plaintiff commenced this action in the High Court against the Defendant alleging that a sum of RM3,153,759.07 is due from and owing by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. [6] The Plaintiff, probably taking the stand that there are no disputes on facts, commenced this action by way of an Originating Summons ("OS") supported by an affidavit. The OS and affidavit in support were duly served on the Defendant, who on 4.07.2016, after having entered its appearance, filed its application for stay of proceeding pending reference to arbitration in Enclosure 5. [7] The Defendant disputes the Plaintiff’s claim and states that there was a delay by the Plaintiff in completing the Subcontract Works and therefore the Plaintiff is responsible for all the loss and damage suffered by the Defendant due to the Plaintiff’s failure to complete the Subcontract Works within time. 4 Principles [8] The law on stay of proceedings pending reference to arbitration is set out in Section 10 (1) of the Arbitration Act 2005 which states as follow: “10. Arbitration Agreement and Substantive Claim before the Court (1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” (emphasis added) [9] So long as the matter is within the scope of the arbitration agreement, and that the party seeking a stay of the proceedings has not taken any other steps in the proceedings, the Court shall grant the stay of the proceedings unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 5 Whether the requirements of section 10 Arbitration Act 2005 have been met, to justify a stay of the proceedings in Court [10] Section 10(1) Arbitration Act 2005 is couched in mandatory language in that once the requirements found in the subsection are fulfilled, the stay of the court proceedings is mandatory. In other words the Court shall hold the parties to the bargain and shall give effect to the arbitration agreement. [11] This is consistent with the principles enunciated in the UNCITRAL Model Law upon which the Arbitration Act 2005 is based. Parties in electing for arbitration as opposed to litigation must have addressed their mind to the benefits of arbitration as the preferred mode of resolving any disputes that may arise between the parties arising out of the contract. In the event that the party applying for stay has taken any other steps in the proceedings, it could then be argued that in spite of the arbitration agreement that party has agreed to submit to litigation as the mode of resolving the dispute between the parties. As an arbitration agreement is a term of the contract, that term can be waived or varied by subsequent agreement or conduct. Here it has not been suggested that the Defendant has taken further steps in the proceedings and indeed they have not as they have forthwith filed this application for stay of the proceedings. 6 [12] Neither has it been suggested or submitted that the arbitration agreement is invalid, or that it is null and void, inoperative or that it is incapable of being performed. Absent that, there is a plethora of cases to support the proposition that the Court shall grant a stay of the proceedings. [13] In ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 633 at page 643, Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) highlighted the use of the word "shall" in section 10(1) as opposed to "may" in the old Arbitration Act 1952 in section 6 thereof signifying a significant shift in the stand and stance of the Court in favour of stay of proceedings when the arbitration agreement is valid: “[26] It will be appreciated that the language in sub-s 10(1) is couched in mandatory terms with the use of the word ‘shall’. Where the terms of sub-s 10(1) are met, the court is obliged to stay court proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration. The only exception to this is provided within sub-s 10(1) itself and that is where the court finds the “agreement to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." 7 [14] This discernible directional shift towards upholding the bargain of the parties to arbitration and the readiness of the Courts to grant a stay of proceedings with the advent of the Arbitration Act 2005 have been alluded to in a number of cases. In CMS Energy Sdn Bhd v Poscon Corp [2008] 6 MLJ 561 at pages 569 it was observed as follows: “[18] In my view if s 10 and s 18 of the Act are read together there is no unmistakable intention of the Legislature that the court should lean towards arbitration proceedings. Under s 10-(1) of the Act, the Court shall stay all proceedings before it in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, and refer the parties to arbitration unless the court is satisfied as to any of the condition in para (a) or (b) of the section as shown above. And in this case none of the condition is applicable.” [15] In Rightmove Sdn Bhd v YWP Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 7 MLJ 687 at page 693 it was emphasized as follows: “[14] Thus, from a reading of s 10(1) of the Act in its current form and the case authorities referred to above, it appears to me that the conditions requisite to the granting of stay of proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement are: (i) the current proceedings 8 are in respect of a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement and (ii) the applicant has not taken any other steps in the proceedings. Once these are met, the court is mandatorily required to refer the parties to arbitration unless the plaintiff can show that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed...." (emphasis added) [16] Whilst under the old Arbitration Act 1952 the word used was "may", under the new Arbitration Act 2005 the word used is now "shall", such that once the requirements of the subsection are met, the Courts no longer have any discretion to refuse stay but that the Court would be obliged to refer the parties to arbitration. The most recent authority on this is the Federal Court case of Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417 where it was held as follows: "[31] Prior to the 2005 Act, the applicable law was the Arbitration Act 1952 (‘the 1952 Act’). The issue of stay of proceedings in the 1952 Act was dealt with under s 6 thereof which reads: "If any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the arbitration, or any person claiming through or 9 under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration, any party to the legal proceedings may, before taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceedings, and the court, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement, and that the applicant was at the time when the proceedings were commenced and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an order staying the proceedings." [32] The clear effect of the present s 10(1) of the 2005 Act is to render a stay mandatory if the court finds that all the relevant requirements have been fulfilled; while under s 6 of the repealed 1952 Act, the court had a discretion whether to order a stay or otherwise." (emphasis added) [17] What is relevant now is that the subject matter of the Plaintiff's claim must be within the subject of the arbitration agreement as was explained by Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 633 as follows: 10 “[36] Subsection 10 (1) requires the court to first and foremost examine whether the ‘proceedings’ in court today are ‘brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement’. If the proceedings are indeed brought in respect of a matter which the parties have agreed should be resolved by arbitration, then the court is obliged to stay these proceedings and ‘refer the parties to arbitration’. ... [38] As to whether the proceedings in court are in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement; that depends on what is the ambit of the arbitration agreement. But, even before that, it must first be recognized that it is the plaintiffs’ claim before the court and not what the defendant’s response or defence is to that claim which bears the brunt of scrutiny." [18] Exactly what is the Plaintiff claiming here in this action? The Plaintiff is claiming for the sum of RM3,153,759.07 from the Defendant for Subcontract Works carried out in the said Project. The Defendant disputes this amounts as it does not take into account the loss and damage suffered by the Defendant due to the Plaintiff’s failure to complete the Subcontract Works within the stipulated time. 11 [19] The Defendant contended that the Plaintiff's claim is with respect to a matter which is within the subject of the arbitration agreement. Clause 22 of the Subcontract on referring disputes or differences to arbitration would be relevant and it reads as follows: "Disputes or differences to be referred to Arbitration 22.1 In the event of any dispute between the Contractor, or the Architect on his behalf and the Subcontractor, whether arising during the execution or after the completion or abandonment of the Subcontract Works or after the determination of the employment of the Sub-Contractor under this Subcontract or breach of this Subcontract as to: (i) the carrying out and completion of the Subcontract Works; or (ii) any matter of thing of whatsoever nature arising there under or in connection therewith, including any matter or thing left by this Subcontract to the discretion of the Architect; or (iii) the withholding by the Architect of any certificate to which the Subcontract may claim to be entitled to; or (iv) the withholding by the Contractor of any payment to which the Subcontract may claim to be entitled to; or (v) the measurement and valuation under Clauses 4.4 and 4.5; or 12 (vi) the unreasonable withholding of consent or agreement by the Contractor or the Subcontractor." (emphasis added) [20] Clearly Clause 22.1 (iv) of the Subcontract states that any disputes or differences between the contractor or the architect on his behalf and the subcontractor including withholding payment is to be referred to arbitration. Equally clear is that the Plaintiff's claim is with respect to a matter within the scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and in particular clause 22.1(iv) above. [21] I agree that the Defendant has not taken any other steps in the proceedings other than filing this application before the Court. The Plaintiff's counsel had complained that instead of replying to the Plaintiff's affidavit filed in support of the OS, the Defendant had instead filed this application in Enclosure 5 for stay, leaving the allegations in the Plaintiff's OS and affidavit in support, unanswered. I do not think so. If the Defendant had succumbed to the temptation to file an affidavit to oppose the Plaintiff's OS, the Defendant would have fallen for the bait in that the Plaintiff can then argue that the Defendant has taken a further step in the proceedings. That would disqualify and disentitle the Defendant from filing this application for stay of proceedings. 13 [22] I agree that the Defendant has fulfilled the two requirements needed for a stay which is that the Plaintiff's claim is with respect to a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement and that the Defendant has not taken any other steps in the proceedings. The Plaintiff has not alleged that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [23] There is thus every reason for this Court to grant a stay of the proceedings. Whether there is a dispute between the parties that should be referred to Arbitration [24] The Plaintiff's learned counsel argued that there is really no dispute at all and that this Court should be able to discern the lack of bona fide on the part of the Defendant in trying to create one. According to the Plaintiff there is no need to go behind the architect's Statement of Final Valuation of Works as at 27.09.2010 which Statement was issued on 16.11.2010. [25] According to learned counsel for the Defendant, there was an amendment effected on section 10(1) of the Arbitration Act 2005 vide Act A1395 which came into force on 1 July 2011 ("the 2011 Amendment") 14 which effectively dispensed with the need to prove that there is a dispute that has arisen between the parties. It deleted the old section 10(1)(b) as follows: "(b) that there is in fact no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters to be referred." (emphasis added) [26] Notwithstanding the above learned counsel for the Defendant submitted that there is definitely a dispute between parties which are as follows: 1. There were delays by the Plaintiff in completing the Subcontract Works before the termination of Main Contract. 2. Pursuant to the Defendant’s letter dated 14.10.2001, purely out of goodwill and on a without prejudice basis, the Defendant agreed to make advance payment to the Plaintiff based on the calculated amounts withheld under Interim Certificates No. 30 & 31; the Plaintiff in turn would not initiate any action towards the Defendant until their joint claims to the Employer have been settled. The Plaintiff had breached this agreement by filing this action against the Defendant. 15 3. The Defendant’s claim against the Employer in the arbitration is in the submission stages, where witnesses and documents have been submitted and decision will be made after submissions. 4. Further the Employer vide its letter dated 24.09.2010 had informed the Defendant that they will make interim payment for certificate No. 32 onwards to the Subcontractor directly. [27] Thus the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff should make a claim to the Employer direct instead of the Defendant. There was also no Interim Certificate No. 32 issued. [28] Based on the above I would agree that there is a dispute that has arisen between the parties that should be referred to arbitration for resolution. [29] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff referred to the case of Assar Senari Holdings Sdn Bhd v Teratai Sanjung Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd [2011] 1 LNS 1278, where the High Court held as follows: "... Section 9(1) defines the nature of an arbitration agreement as follows: 16 "... an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not. " (emphasis supplied) By way of analogy, section 10(1)(b) enacts that the High Court must stay proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration if there is an arbitration agreement unless: "there is in fact no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters to be referred" (emphasis supplied)... " [30] As is plainly obvious the decision was made before the 2011 Amendment where the requirement to show a dispute must first be met before there is a reference to arbitration. The 2011 Amendment had repealed section 10(1)(b). [31] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff also referred to Bangsue Chia Meng Rice Mill Co. Ltd V Rekadjaya Sdn Bhd And Axisjaya Construction Sdn Bhd [2014] 1 LNS 1251. The High Court there had referred to Celcom (M) Sdn Bhd v Sarawak Electricity Supply Corp [2002] 4 MLJ 593 where Justice Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) held at page 597: 17 "... It is that there must be a dispute falling within the scope of the arbitration clause or agreement. If there is no dispute, then it follows that there is nothing to refer to arbitration." [32] Justice Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) also referred to the decision of Justice George J (later JCA) in ELF Petroleum SE Asia Pte Ltd v Winelf Petroleum Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 177 where His Lordship held that where the claim has been admitted, there is nothing to refer to arbitration. At page 179, His Lordship added: "In my judgment what we have here is a mere refusal to pay upon a claim which had been admitted as being owing to the plaintiffs. There is nothing to be settled by arbitration. On a true construction of clause XIV only claims which are bona fide disputes or are bona fide controversies that call for settlement by arbitration. When a claim is admitted it does not call for a settlement by arbitration. All that is called for is for payment of the admitted amount which can be by action in the Courts as has been done in the instant case... " (emphasis added) 18 [33] Again it must be noted that cases decided before the 2011 Amendment to section 10 Arbitration Act 2005 and also those decided under the Arbitration Act 1952 must be read with caution as requiring a need to show a dispute. [34] At any rate I am more than satisfied that here there is no admission of the Plaintiff's claim and on the contrary there was a genuine dispute that has arisen between the parties. [35] The Defendant referred to the case of TNB Fuel Services Sdn Bhd v China National Coal Group Corp [2013] 4 MLJ 857 where the Court of Appeal at page 870 states as follows: “[24] The present form of s 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005 is the result of the amendment to that section which came into force on 1 July 2011 (Act A1395). It is generally accepted that the effect of the amendment is to render a stay mandatory unless the agreement is null and void or impossible of performance. The court is no longer to delve into the facts of the dispute when considering an application for stay.” 19 [36] Another case cited in favour of the above proposition by the Defendant is that of KNM Process Systems Sdn Bhd v Mission Biofuels Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 CLJ 993 where it was held at page 1000 as follows: “[16] it is also evident with the amendment that it is now mandatory on the court to grant stay where the matter before it is the subject of an arbitration agreement unless the arbitration agreement is, in the words of the statute, “null and void, inoperative and incapable of being performed. [17] It is no longer possible to argue that in respect if the controversy between the parties there is no “dispute” with regards to the matter to be referred to arbitration, which is a test that invites unnecessary ambiguity and requires the court to determine whether there is “dispute” between the parties not dissimilar to the functions performed by the court in determining whether there is a triable issue in a summary judgment application. The test is now the simpler test of whether the matter before the court is the subject of an arbitration agreement or otherwise. To decide on the simpler test, it would become a matter of construction of the relevant arbitration agreement, where it exists.” (emphasis added) 20 Learned counsel for the Defendant also pointed out that KNM Process’ decision (supra) was followed in Rightmove Sdn Bhd v YWP Construction Sdn Bhd [2015] 7 MLJ 687 wherein Justice Mairin Idang JC states as follows: “[14] Thus, from a reading of s 10 (1) of the Act in its current form and the case authorities referred to above, it appears to me that the conditions requisite to the granting of stay of proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement are: (i) the current proceedings are in respect of a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement and (ii) the applicant has not taken any steps in the proceeding. Once these are met, the court is mandatorily required to refer the parties to arbitration unless the plaintiff can show that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” [37] The most recent pronouncement of the Federal Court in Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd's case (supra) is most illuminating: "[28] The present s 10 (1) of the 2005 Act (as amended vide Act A1395 which came into force on 1 July 2011 (the 2011 Amendment) reads: 21 10 (1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [29] Prior to the 2011 Amendment, s 10(1) provided as follows: 10 Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court (1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds – (a) that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed; or (b) that there is in fact no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters to be referred. 22 [30] Paragraph (b) of s 10(1) was completely repealed by the 2011 Amendment. Previously, there must be in existence a dispute between the parties with regard to the matter to be referred, before a court is empowered to make an order under s 10(1). With the deletion of para (b) the only remaining exception under the present s 10(1) is that the arbitration agreement between the parties is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. ..... [33] What the court needs to consider in determining whether to grant a stay order under the present s 10(1) (after the 2011 Amendment) is whether there is in existence a binding arbitration agreement or clause between the parties, which agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The court is no longer required to delve into the details of the dispute or difference (see TNB Fuel Services Sdn Bhd). In fact the question as to whether there is a dispute in existence or not is no longer a requirement to be considered in granting a stay under s 10(1). It is an issue to be decided by the arbitral tribunal." (emphasis added) 23 [38] It is clear therefore under section 10(1) Arbitration Act 2005 as amended by the 2011 Amendment, the existence of a dispute is no longer a criterion in deciding whether a stay should be granted. The simple test is for the Defendant to show that the current proceedings are in respect of a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement and the applicant has not taken any other steps in the proceedings and further that the arbitration agreement is valid. Once these are met the Court is required to grant a stay of proceedings pending referral to arbitration. Pronouncement [39] For the above reasons, the Court granted a stay of the current proceedings pending reference to arbitration and made an order in terms of prayers 1 and 2 of Enclosure 5. I exercised my discretion and made no order as to costs. Dated: 25 November 2016. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur 24 For the Plaintiff : Danny Ng (Messrs Danny & Co) For the Defendant : Dolorish Sarim and KSarasvathi (Messrs Dorairaj, Low & Teh) Date of Decision : 17 August 2016

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-256-03/2016

PLAINTIF Kalaimathi A/P Pachaiappan DEFENDAN 1. Rajamah A/P Raju 2. Chandra A/P Pachaiappan 3. Manimaran A/L Poongavanam

24/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=80496943-bf7f-470e-a23f-9bca23304009&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-256-03/2016 Dalam hal harta pusaka PERIAKANNU A/P RAMAN, simati; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Saman Pemula No. 24-1163-09/2012; Dan Dalam perkara mengenai Geran Probet Petisyen No. 32-190-2005 dan Saman Pemula No. 24-1163- 09/2012; Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 71 Kaedah 38(1) dan (2) Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 BETWEEN 2 KALAIMATHI A/P PACHAIAPPAN (No. K/P: 600311-01-5218) (menuntut sebagai benefisiari bagi harta pusaka PERIAKANNU A/P RAMAN, simati menurut Geran Probet bertarikh 21/4/2006 dan Perintah bertarikh 10/10/2012) ...PLAINTIFF AND 1. RAJAMAH A/P RAJU (No. K/P: 600311-01-5218) 2. CHANDRA A/P PACHAIAPPAN (No. K/P: 590423-10-6214) 3. MANIMARAN A/L POONGAVANAM (No. K/P: 670324-05-5597) (dituntut sebagai pemegang kuasa bagi harta pusaka PERIAKANNU A/P RAMAN, simati menurut Geran Probet bertarikh 21/4/2006 dan Perintah bertarikh 10/10/2012) …DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) 3 A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] The present Originating Summons is basically an Application by the Plaintiff for the transfer of land from the estate of the parties’ mother, Periakannu a/p Raman (“deceased”) to the Plaintiff’s holding as beneficiary to the estate. [2] The manner and terms of distribution of the estate had been mutually agreed by all beneficiaries under a Surat Persetujuan dated 28.7.2012 (“Agreement”). The same Agreement had been incorporated in a Court Order dated 10.10.2012 for the deceased’s estate to be distributed (“Court Order”). [3] Kalaimathi a/p Pachaiappan (“Plaintiff”) together with Rajamah a/p Raju, Chandra a/p Pachaiappan, Manimaram a/l Poovangam (collectively “Defendants”) are all beneficiaries to the deceased’s estate. [4] The only relevant part of the deceased’s estate in the present Originating Summons is a piece of land held under title number GM 899, Lot 283, Mukim and Daerah Sepang, Selangor (“Plaintiff’s Lot”) which has yet to be rightfully transferred to the 4 Plaintiff’s registered proprietorship. The salient terms of the Agreement are as follows: i. All portions of the Plaintiff’s Lot shall be transferred to the Plaintiff on the condition that; ii. The Plaintiff shall transfer his 1/3 shares in a terrace house located in No.10 Jalan Murni 5, Taman Murni, 43900 Sepang (“House No.10”), and agree that the deceased’s 1/3 share in House No. 10 be transferred to the 2nd Defendant. [5] In the course of executing all the transfers of the deceased’s estate, the Defendants have suddenly and unilaterally imposed new conditions (outside of the Agreement) against the Plaintiff in order for the Plaintiff to have proprietorship of the Plaintiff’s Lot. The Defendant had unilaterally imposed the conditions (“Unilateral Terms”) vide their solicitor’s letter dated 6.11.2014 (“Defendants’ Letter 1”) which are as follows: 5 i. The Planitiff must bear and pay the remainder legal fees of G. Ram, Rozetta & Associates (“Defendants’ lawyers”) to the amount of RM4,000.00; and ii. The Defendant shall hand over the original sale and purchase agreement of House No. 10 dated 28.7.2012. [6] Although disputing the unilateral terms, the Plaintiff out of his goodwill has agreed to the unilateral terms. Nonetheless, the original sale and purchase agreement of House No.10 was never in her possession to begin with and this fact had duly been informed to the Defendants by the Plaintiff. [7] Amidst all the terms under the Agreement as well as the unilateral terms under the Defendants’ Letter 1, the Defendants have only contended that the Plaintiff had failed to pay the Defendant’s lawyers’ fees as well as executing the transfer of the Plaintiff’s shares in House No. 10 to the 2nd Defendant. All other terms were never disputed and shall be deemed to have been performed, admitted and acknowledged to be performed. 6 [8] It has been more than two (2) years since the Defendants’ agreement to transfer the Plaintiff’s Lot to the Plaintiff and the Defendants had continuously throughout the time remained delinquent in breaching the terms of the Agreement as well as the Unilateral Terms. This continuous failure to honour the terms and transfer the rightful ownership of the Plaintiff’s Lot becomes the basis of the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons. B. PRELIMINARIES [9] In a desperate attempt to salvage the Defendants’ failing case, the Defendants contended that the present case is not fit to be addressed merely by Affidavits and that there shall be clashes of testimony that warrants the case to be dealt with under a writ due to the alleged necessity to refer to parol evidence. [10] This Court has no hesitation to dismiss this contention. The terms of the Agreement and the Unilateral terms are vividly clear. In fact, the Defendants have very little to aver against the Plaintiff’s Affidavits. 7 [11] There is no clash of testimony here. The Plaintiff has successfully averred and exhibited evidence that she has exhausted her best efforts to adhere to the Agreement and Unilateral Terms while the Defendant has the liberty to aver and exhibit evidence that the Plaintiff has not performed her end of the bargain. This is prime example of a case that could and should be disposed by way of Affidavits. [12] There is no reason for this Court to resort to parol evidence when the evidence before this Court is sufficient to determine the case. The terms are clearly set, and evidences have been exhibited. The mere fact that the Defendants could not effectively contra the Plaintiff’s averments and evidence is sheer proof that the Plaintiff has made strong irrefutable averments proving her due performance of the terms of the Agreement and the Unilateral Terms. [13] There is not even a single shred of evidence exhibited by the Defendants to refute the Plaintiff’s efforts to adhere to the terms which was curbed by the Defendant’s own failure to reciprocate and respond. The Plaintiff has averred and given evidence of the Plaintiff’s willingness and readiness to perform her end of the 8 bargain. The Plaintiff accordingly has averred and given evidence that the Defendants have fell dead silent to move forward with the Agreement and in fact, have shown total refusal to honour the Agreement and the Unilateral terms. And the Defendant in return, had only averred (although without evidence) that the Plaintiff had failed to transfer her 1/3 share in House No 10 to the 2nd Defendant (which is totally and completely the Defendants’ own fault in failing to reciprocate and honour the arrangements to exchange documents which was set by the Defendants themselves). There is no clash of testimony here. There are only evidences to prove the Defendants’ failure and unwillingness to honour the Agreement, and total lack of evidence of the Plaintiff’s alleged breaches. Thus, the Defendant’s reliance to the case of Seah Soon Chye v Saraswathy Devi [1971] 1 MLJ as well as Ng Wan Siew v Teoh Sin (1963) 29 MLJ is sorely misplaced and misconceived. C. THE ALLEGED BREACHES OF THE PLAINTIFF IS INSTEAD THE DEFENDANTS’ BREACHES IN REFUSING TO SET THE AGREEMENT IN MOTION 9 [14] There are no other averments on the Plaintiff’s alleged breaches of the Agreement and Unilateral Terms save and except for: i. the Plaintiff’s alleged failure to pay RM4000.00 of the Defendants’ Lawyer’s fees; and ii. the Plaintiff’s failure to transfer 1/3 of his shares in House No. 10 to the 2nd Defendant. [15] This Court has no hesitation to find that the above non- performance is not at all the Plaintiff’s fault. A plain appreciation of the correspondence between the Defendants’ Lawyers and the Plaintiff’s lawyers would unravel the Defendants’ delinquency in delaying and withholding performance of the Agreement. [16] The Defendants vide their lawyers have written the manner and method they intend to exchange the transfer of ownership of the Plaintiff’s Lot with the transfer of the Plaintiff’s shares in House No. 10 vide a letter dated 6.11.2014 (“Defendant’s Letter 2”). Essentially, the Defendants wrote that the exchange for the two Lots shall take place concurrently at the same time: 10 “We write to confirm the exchange of the following documents:- a) On the part of the trustees / executrix (i) Original title held under EMR 2340, Survey No. 283, Mukim of Sepang, District of Kuala Langat, State of Negeri Selangor; (ii) Memorandum of Transfer entered between the trustee/executrix and Madam Kalaimathi dated 20.05.2013 (iii) Notis taksiran dated 24.06.2013 b) On the part of Madam Kalaimathi (i) Deed of Assignment duly executed by Madam Kalaimathi for the transfer of the two shares in the property bearing postal address at No.10, Jalan Murni 5, Taman Murni, 43900 Sepang, Selangor in favour of Madam Chandra a/p Pachaiappan Shall take place on the 07.11.2014 at your good office. [17] This Court must highlight that it is verily insidious for the Defendants to push the Plaintiff to adhere to the deadline of 7.11.2014 which is exactly the day after the date of the 11 Defendants’ Letter 2. Verily, if the parties are in agreement with the exchange, then some time would be required to have all the documents in order. Thus, the Plaintiff has accordingly replied to this letter on 12.11.2014. [18] The Defendants also wrote in the same letter to confirm if the Plaintiff is agreeable to pay the Defendants’ Lawyers’ fees. [19] In response to Defendants’ Letter 2, the Plaintiff had written in a letter dated 12.11.2014 vide her solicitors (Plaintiff’s Letter 1) and confirmed that she is altogether willing and ready to execute the transfer of her shares in House No. 10. The Plaintiff also wrote to confirm if the Defendants are prepared to reciprocate by handing over all relevant documents duly executed to enable the transfer of the Plaintiff’s Lot together with the requisite payments for the registration fees and late penalties. The Plaintiff also has agreed although in protest, to pay the remainder fees of the Defendants’ Lawyers. [20] Now, up unto this point, the Defendants then fell dead silent. There were no other correspondences sent by the Defendants to keep the ball rolling in ensuring the performance of the Agreement. 12 Instead, the Defendants opted to leave the process in stagnation in refusing to respond to the Plaintiff’s letter requesting for the Defendants to honour the arrangement of exchange that the Defendants themselves have set. [21] Two months have passed with the Defendants nowhere in sight. It is verily telling that the Defendants are totally disinterested to go through with the exchange. The Plaintiff wrote yet again to the Defendants vide her solicitors in a letter dated 20.1.2015 (“Plaintiff’s Letter 2”) the following year, now alleging outright the Defendants’ failure to discharge their duties and obligation to cause and facilitate the exchange. The Plaintiff demanded that the Defendants to return all of the necessary documents to enable the transfer of the Plaintiff’s Lot. [22] To date, the Defendants have failed to exhibit any proof that the Defendants have replied or denied any of the allegations in the Plaintiff’s Letter 2. Apart from the clear disinterest and failure to facilitate the exchange and performance of the Agreement, the Defendants in failing to exhibit any reply to this letter is clear proof of the Defendants’ admission to the allegations. Thus, the Defendants in admitting to these allegations coupled with the 13 sheer fact of their failure and refusal to facilitate the exchange, cannot now go against their own admission by contending on the Plaintiff’s alleged breach of failing to transfer her shares in House No 10 (which altogether was the Defendants’ own fault). [23] This Court is guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another : he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [24] The Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 14 had referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the case of Amalgamated Investment which had held the following: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no 15 difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” (See also Talam Corporation berhad & Anor v bankok Bank Berhad & Anor [2015] MLRHU 1) [25] Regarding the payment of the Defendants’ Lawyers’ fees, the Defendants’ Lawyers even until now had not issued any invoice to the Plaintiff for payment. Even if the Defendants’ lawyers did issue an invoice, there are no reasons whatsoever for the Plaintiff to honour the invoice as the Defendants have not performed their end of the bargain in facilitating the exchange as well as the transfers under the Agreement. [26] Now, it is preposterous that the Defendants now attempt to pin the blame for the non-payment of the Defendants’ Lawyer’s fees as well as the failure to transfer the shares in House No. 10 against the Plaintiff, when it is patently clear that the Defendants were the delinquent parties that had stagnated and hindered the process of the exchange and transfer. These failures are the Defendants’ own 16 doing. The only reason the shares in House No. 10 were not yet transferred is because the Defendants themselves had not stepped up to their part of the bargain. As much as the Plaintiff is obligated to transfer his shares in House No. 10, it is equally as much of an obligation for the Defendants to facilitate the transfer of the Plaintiff’s Lot. [27] The Plaintiff had duly signed the deed of assignment and had already written to the Defendants that she was at the ready to execute the transfer of her shares in House No. 10 pending the Defendants’ response. But the Defendants fell totally silent. There are no reasons whatsoever for the Plaintiff to pay the Defendants’ Lawyers’ fees and execute the transfer of her shares in House No. 10 when the Defendants have shown total disinterest in honouring their part of the Agreement. It is instead the Defendants’ total breach of the Agreement that led to the non-performance of the Agreement to date. [28] Accordingly, the Defendants cannot hide behind their own breaches to make a defence against the Plaintiff’s case. This is a trite principle of law and the Defendants clearly are no exception to it. This Court draws valuable guidance from the case of Sangka 17 Bin Chuka & Anor v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Mersing, Johor & Ors [2016] MLJU 01 which had held the following: “Thirdly, the argument that there is no exclusivity or sufficient control to prevent interference because the third Respondent had built permanent structures on the claimed lands within the Endau Rompin National Park is clearly flawed by reason of the trite principle that one cannot take advantage of one’s own default. The application of the legal principle that a party cannot benefit from his own breach or default can be seen in the case of Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Petaling v Swee Lin Sdn Bhd [1999] 3 MLJ 489 where the Court of Appeal decided that a land owner who erected a warehouse on his land in breach of the requirement to obtain planning permission should not receive any benefit from it from any compensation to be paid in respect of the acquisition of the land. Similarly in the case of Khoo Cheng & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Muar [2008] 3 CLJ 534, the order of forfeiture in favour of a party was set aside because of prior non-compliances with a number of mandatory requirements of the NLC by the same party. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Sagong bin Tasi too stated that it would not be correct for the 18 State Government to argue that no compensation ought to be paid on account of the non-gazetting of the relevant customary lands, which should have been but failed to have been undertaken by them in the first place. In the instant case, the third Respondent should probably not have built the Structures on a land that rightfully belonged to the Applicants. At least not without acknowledging the pre- existing customary land rights of the Applicants.” [29] It has been similarly decided by the High Court in the case of Bank Simpanan Nasional v Rudysham bin Abdul Raof [2016] MLJU 909 that: “(h) No Benefit from Own Default [87] It is also my finding that the appellant is additionally subject to the trite principle of law that a party cannot benefit from his own wrong or default, which in this case, being the negligent mistake by the appellant. It is an established presumption in law that parties to a contract do not intend that either party should be able rely on its own breach of obligations to 19 avoid a contract or obtain any benefit under it, unless the contrary is clearly provided for by the contract…” [30] Thus, with all of the above in consideration, this Court finds that it is instead the Defendants who had breached the terms of the Agreement. It is also this Court’s finding that the Defendants had shown total disinterest to honour the Agreement and transfer the Plaintiff’s Lot to the rightful proprietorship of the Plaintiff. [31] The Defendants in hiding behind their own breaches and hindering the process of the exchange and transfer had not acted justly, appropriately and reasonably. It is patently clear that the Defendants have unjustly and unreasonably failed to ensure that they have acted in the interest of all the beneficiaries to the deceased’s estates without favouring the interest of one beneficiary over another. (see the Federal Court’s decision in Ong Thye Peng v Loo Choo Teng & Ors [2008] 4 MLJ 31). [32] It is also patently clear that the Defendants have unjustly and unreasonably delayed or attempted to avoid from performing their obligation in hiding behind technicalities in which were the 20 Defendants’ own fault. (see Lim Wuay Chern Dan Satu Lagi – LWN- Lee Wee Kuan Dan Satu lagi [2007] 8 MLJ 100). D. COURT’S DECISION [33] In view of all of the findings above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has ultimately succeeded to prove her case. [34] This Court accordingly allows the Plaintiff’s Application and grants order-in-terms to the Plaintiff’s present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1). [35] This Court accordingly orders that the Defendants shall perfect and finalize the transfer of the Plaintiff’s Lot held under title GM 899, Lot 283 Mukim Sepang, District of Sepang, to the registered proprietorship of the Plaintiff within thirty (30) days of this Order. [36] This Court further orders that the Defendants shall completely bear and pay any penalties on the stamp duty on the Memorandum of Transfer (Form 14A) dated 20.5.2013 that will be imposed by the Stamp Duty Collector. The Plaintiff on the other hand shall bear the stamp duty on the Form 14A dated 20.5.2013 as well as the 21 costs for prefecting the transfer, save and except for the penalties that shall be solely paid by the Defendants. [37] This Court also orders that the Defendants do pay the Plaintiff a sum of RM4000.00 as costs. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 24th November 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Kuna & Co M. Kunasegaran For the Defendants - Messrs Devadason & Devadason Rabindran Devadason

Tika 2.6.0

22NCVC-271-05/2015

PLAINTIF Institut Profesional Baitulmal Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN Asharuddin bin Ahmad

23/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=08587d0a-47b1-4dec-85ed-7a317a640e3f&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI KUALA LUMPUR 1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN GUAMAN SIVIL NO: 22NCVC-271-05/2015 ANTARA INSTITUT PROFESIONAL BAITULMAL SDN BHD … PLAINTIF DAN ASHARUDDIN BIN AHMAD … DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Selepas perbicaraan penuh) [1] Plaintif di dalam kes ini adalah sebuah institusi pendidikan yang diperbadankan atas nama Institut Profesional Baitulmal Sdn Bhd (IPB) dan mempunyai alamat penyampaian di Lot 1363, Jalan Perkasa, Off Jalan Kampung Pandan, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. Plaintif juga adalah anak syarikat Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan (MAIWP). 2 [2] Defendan adalah seorang individu bernama Asharuddin bin Ahmad yang sebelum meletakkan jawatannya telah memegang jawatan sebagai Ketua Eksekutif syarikat Plaintif. [3] Plaintif di dalam tindakan ini telah memfailkan tuntutan terhadap bekas Ketua Eksekutifnya (Defendan) atas dakwaan bahawa Defendan telah melakukan kemungkiran tugas fidusiari (‘breach of fiduciary duty’) Defendan semasa perkhidmatannya dengan Plaintif. Atas pemecahan atau kemungkiran tugas fidusiari (‘breach of fiduciary duty’) tersebut, Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa ia telah menanggung kerugian dan dengan yang demikian berhak menuntut daripada Defendan antara lain relif-relif berikut: a) Gantirugi am atas kemungkiran tanggungjawab fidusiari Defendan; b) Injunksi mandatori terhadap Defendan untuk mengembalikan kesemua aset-aset Plaintif iaitu Komputer Acer (3 unit), Broadband Celcom (3 unit), telefon bimbit jenama Apple Iphone 5 (1 unit), telefon bimbit Samsung Galaxy Note II (1 unit) dan telefon bimbit blackberry Z10 (1 unit), dalam masa 7 hari daripada tarikh Penghakiman ini; 3 c) Secara alternatifnya, Defendan membayar pampasan wang untuk kesemua nilai aset-aset tersebut di atas; d) Bahawa Defendan menggantirugi (indemnify) Plaintif atas sebarang kerugian wang yang dialami oleh Plaintif akibat daripada sebarang tindakan undang-undang yang dimulakan oleh seorang pihak ketiga, Salwa terhadap Plaintif. [4] Bagi pemahaman jelas mengenai tuntutan Plaintif ini, latar belakang ringkas kes wajar dinyatakan di sini: 4.1 Defendan telah dilantik sebagai Ketua Eksekutif Plaintif melalui surat pelantikan bertarikh 25.1.2013 (Eksibit P1- muka surat 13, IKatan Dokumen Bersama – Jilid B). 4.2 Berdasarkan Surat Pelantikan P1 tersebut, terma-terma perkhidmatan, syarat pelantikan dan kewajipan Defendan di dalam menjalankan tugasnya sebagai Ketua Eksekutif Plaintif antara lain adalah seperti berikut: i. Lantikan berkuatkuasa pada 1.3.2013 ii. Gaji pokok RM9,985.25 sebulan iii. Kontrak perkhidmatan selama 2 tahun dari tarikh melapor diri iv. Hari & Waktu Bekerja Normal 4 Isnin-Jumaat: 8.30 pagi – 5.30 petang Waktu Rehat : i. 12.45 tgh – 2.00 petang (Isnin-Khamis) ii. 12.30 – 2.45 petang (Jumaat) v. Kewajipan sebagai Kakitangan Profesional Baitulmal (IPB) - Menunaikan solat apabila masuk waktu dan meninggalkan segala perkara yang dilarang oleh agama islam - Semua kakitangan lelaki wajib menunaikan solat Jumaat. Kakitangan lelaki dilarang berada di premis syarikat semasa waktu solat Jumaat. - Memahami, menghayati dan cuba merealisasikan misi, visi dan objektif syarikat. - Melaksanakan tugas yang telah dipertanggungjawabkan dengan penuh dedikasi, amanah dan bersungguh- sungguh. - Menjaga kerahsiaan dalam setiap tugas yang dilaksanakan. - Menjaga nama baik IPB. - Mematuhi segala peraturan-peraturan yang telah ditetapkan oleh IPB. - Tidak menyalahgunakan jawatan di IPB mahupun aset IPB untuk kepentingan peribadi. - Melaksanakan tugas yang diarahkan dari semasa ke semasa. 5 4.3 Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa di dalam perlaksanaan tugas Defendan sebagai Ketua Eksekutif, Defendan telah melakukan salahlaku-salahlaku yang memungkiri terma-terma pelantikan dan perkhidmatan beliau dan ianya terjumlah kepada pemecahan-pemecahan tanggungjawab fidusiari beliau terhadap Plaintif. 4.4 Aduan mengenai salahlaku-salahlaku Defendan telah dimaklumkan kepada Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif (Lembaga Pengarah) dan Lembaga Pengarah di dalam mesyuaratnya telah mengarahkan Defendan untuk memberikan maklumbalas dan/atau penjelasan terhadap salahlaku-salahlaku yang didakwa terhadap beliau. 4.5 Melalui surat bertarikh 1.12.2013 yang ditujukan kepada Pengerusi Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif, Defendan telah menyerahkan Plaintif notis peletakan jawatannya di mana peletakan jawatannya adalah berkuatkuasa pada 1.1.2014 (muka surat 4, Jilid B (Dokumen Bahagian B). 4.6 Sebagai balasan kepada notis peletakkan jawatan Defendan itu, Plaintif melalui suratnya bertarikh 23.1.2014 (Eksibit P11- muka surat 94, Jilid B) telah menerima peletakan jawatan 6 Defendan, namun di dalam surat bertarikh 23.1.2014 tersebut Plaintif telah juga menyatakan seperti berikut: “….bahawa tindakan tuan untuk memberikan notis peletakan jawatan telah tuan lakukan semasa pihak kami di dalam proses mengambil tindakan tatatertib terhadap pihak tuan di atas kesalahan-kesalahan berikut (yang mana butir-butirnya berada di dalam pengetahuan pihak tuan):- (i) Perlantikkan Pengurusan Pemasaran, Puan Salwa binti Othman dan kenaikan pangkatnya tanpa kelulusan dari Lembaga Pengarah IPB; (ii) Perlucutan jawatan Pendaftar En Wan Mohamed bin Wan Ibrahim tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah; (iii) Pelantikan firma guaman Lee Oliver & Gan untuk kes Mahkamah Perusahaan Encik Rosli bin Kari tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah; (iv) Kegagalan tuan hadir ke pejabat mengikut masa yang ditetapkan di mana tarikh mula berkerja sehingga Oktober 2013, hanya sekali thumb print di pejabat iaitu pada 4hb Mac 2013. 7 Pihak kami berhak untuk mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap pihak tuan bagi menuntut keseluruhan gantirugi yang dialami oleh IPB di atas kegagalan tuan untuk mematuhi Garis Panduan Syarikat Milik MAIWP bagi membuat sebarang keputusan mahupun perlantikkan. Oleh kerana perlantikkan Pengurusan Pemasaran yang dibuat oleh pihak tuan tidak mematuhi syarat-syarat perlantikkan maka pihak IPB juga terpaksa membuat keputusan untuk menamatkan perkhidmatan Puan Salwa di mana kini Puan Salwa telah mengambil tindakan undang-undang dan membuat aduan kepada Jabatan Buruh. Ini akan juga menyebabkan satu kerugian kepada IPB yang mana boleh dituntut terhadap tuan sekiranya perkara ini dipanjangkan ke Mahkamah Perusahaan dan menyebabkan pihak IPB terpaksa membuat bayaran pampasan. Walaubagaimanapun dan tanpa prejudis terhadap hak pihak kami untuk mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap tuan terhadap pihak tuan bagi menanggung rugi pihak kami di atas kesalahan- kesalahan yang pihak tuan lakukan kami mencadangkan opsyen- opsyen berikut:- (i) Perletakkan jawatan tuan adalah muktamad dan pihak tuan tidak akan mengambil sebarang tindakan undang-undang atau menuntut sebarang gantirugi daripada pihak kami; (ii) Pihak tuan hendaklah memastikan bahawa Puan Salwa yang telah dilantik secara salah oleh pihak tuan menarik balik 8 tindakan/aduannya kepada pihak Jabatan Buruh dan selanjutnya membuat satu surat akujanji bahawa beliau tidak akan mengambil sebarang tindakan undang-undang terhadap IPB.” 4.7 Melalui surat Plaintif bertarikh 20.2.2014 (muka surat 97, Jilid B) Plaintif telah memberi notis peringatan terakhir kepada Defendan supaya memberi maklumbalas kepada Plaintif sepertimana di dalam kandungan surat Plaintif bertarikh 23.1.2014. 4.8 Namun, Defendan telah gagal memberi maklumbalas yang diminta. Justeru itu, tindakan undang-undang ini dimulakan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan. [5] Kemungkiran terma atau pemecahan-pemecahan tugas fidusiari yang menjadi asas dakwaan Plaintif terhadap Defendan adalah seperti berikut: i. Kegagalan Defendan untuk mematuhi jadual kehadiran hari bekerja seperti yang termaktub di dalam dalam Kontrak Pekerjaaan - hanya hadir satu (1) hari sahaja. 9 ii. Defendan telah sewenang-wenangnya melantik dan menaikkan pangkat Salwa binti Othman dengan tidak mematuhi prosedur pelantikan dan kenaikan pangkat yang ditetapkan oleh Plaintif. iii. Defendan telah dengan secara salah menurunkan pangkat En Wan Mohamed Bin Wan Ibrahim. iv. Defendan telah membuat pelantikan firma peguamcara T/n Lee Oliver & Gan sebagai peguamcara Plaintif tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif. [6] Defendan telah menentang tuntutan Plaintif terhadapnya dan di dalam Penyata Pembelaannya telah menimbulkan pembelaan- pembelaan berikut: i. Beliau telah hadir bertugas mengikut jadual operasi yang telah ditetapkan Plaintif. ii. Pelantikan Salwa bt Othman adalah dibuat hasil penilaian dan persetujuan bersama pegawai atasan Plaintif dan mematuhi prosedur yang ditetapkan oleh Plaintif. Segala prosedur pelantikan adalah dibuat oleh Unit Sumber 10 Manusia Plaintif Defendan hanya bertindak sebagai penandatangan surat pelantikan sebagai Ketua Eksekutif. Salwa telah diberi kenaikan pangkat sebagai Pendaftar atas keupayaannya melaksanakan tanggungjawab dan mempunyai kelayakan untuk jawatan tersebut, walaupun telah dinaikkan pangkat sebagai Pendaftar, Salwa masih memikul tanggungjawab sebagai Pegawai Pemasaran. iii. En Wan Mohamed Bin Wan Ibrahim telah diturunkan pangkatnya daripada jawatan Pendaftar atas pengakuan beliau sendiri yang tidak mampu memikul tanggungjawab jawatan tersebut. Di samping itu Defendan telah menerima aduan daripada kakitangan seliaan En Wan Mohamed mengenai ketidakcekapan En Wan Mohamed di dalam mentadbir urus jabatan. iv. Pelantikan firma peguamcara T/n Lee Oliver & Gan sebagai peguamcara Plaintif adalah dibuat selepas memperolehi persetujuan/ lampu hijau daripada Pengerusi Plaintif kerana kesuntukan masa untuk mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah. 11 [7] Bagi membuktikan kesnya, Plaintif telah memanggil dua orang saksi. Kedua mereka adalah: i. SP1 (Encik Wan Mohamed Bin Wan Ibrahim yang merupakan Pendaftar Plaintif.) ii. SP2 (Puan Noraziah Binti Hashim yang merupakan Bendahari Plaintif). [8] Bagi Defendan pula, di samping telah memberi keterangannya, Defendan telah juga memanggil Puan Salwa bt. Othman sebagai saksi bagi menyokong kesnya. I. KEGAGALAN DEFENDAN UNTUK MEMATUHI KEHADIRAN HARI BEKERJA SEPERTIMANA TERMAKTUB DI DALAM KONTRAK PEKERJAAN - DEFENDAN HANYA HADIR SATU HARI SAHAJA [9] SP1 telah berkhidmat dengan Plaintif selama 24 tahun dan jawatan terkini beliau adalah Pendaftar IPB. SP1 telah memberi keterangan bahawa kesemua kakitangan IPB termasuk Ketua Eksekurif adalah diwajibkan hadir ke pejabat berdasarkan waktu kerja yang ditetapkan. Perekodan atau daftar kehadiran dan kepulangan di IPB adalah melalui imbasan dan cetakan cap jari (thumb print detector). 12 [10] Berhubung dengan rekod kehadiran/kedatangan Defendan ke pejabat, SP1 di dalam keterangannya telah memberitahu bahawa rekod daripada cetakan mesin imbasan jari (P2 - Staff Movement Analysis dan P3 – imbasan jari) telah menunjukkan bahawa sejak pelantikan Defendan sebagai Ketua Eksekutif bermula pada 1.3.2013 dan sehingga beliau meletakkan jawatan beliau melalui suratnya bertarikh 1.12.2013, Defendan hanya hadir untuk satu hari sahaja iaitu pada 4.3.2013. [11] Peguam Defendan telah membantah sekeras-kerasnya penerimaan masuk rekod imbasan cap jari P2 dan P3 sebagai keterangan, Adalah dihujahkan oleh peguam Defendan bahawa Ekshibit P-2 dan P3 adalah dokumen-dokumen yang dicetak daripada sistem komputer Plaintif di dalam keadaan penggunaan yang biasa (‘the course of its ordinary use’). Menurut peguam Defendan lagi, untuk membolehkan dokumen-dokumen tersebut (P2 dan P3) diterima masuk sebagai keterangan, pembuat dokumen-dokumen tersebut perlulah dipanggil sebagai saksi bagi mengesahkan kewujudannya. Menurut peguam Defendan lagi, P2 dan P3 ini tidak boleh diterima masuk sebagai keterangan melalui SP1 yang bukan pembuat dokumen tersebut. Menurut peguam Defendan lagi, sekiranya Plaintif tidak memanggil pembuat dokumen tersebut untuk membolehkan penerimaan masuk P2 dan P3, maka Plaintif adalah berkewajipan 13 undang-undang untuk mengemukakan sijil di bawah seksyen 90A (2) Akta Keterangan, 1950 bagi membolehkan Ekshibit P2 dan P3 diterima sebagai bukti tanpa kehadiran pembuat (‘maker’). Bagi menyokong hujahannya, peguam Defendan telah merujuk kepada seksyen 90A (2) Akta Keterangan, 1950 dan kes Mohamad Fauzi Che Rus v. JR Joint Resources Holdings Sdn Bhd [2016] 3 MLRH 441. [12] Di samping mempertikaikan kemasukan P2 dan P3 sebagai keterangan, Defendan telah cuba mempertahankan kehadirannya bertugas mengikut jadual operasi yang telah ditetapkan oleh Plaintif dan membangkitkan pembelaan bahawa beliau adalah tidak terikat dengan peraturan untuk merekodkan kehadirannya melalui mesin perekod imbasan jari tersebut. [13] Menurut Defendan lagi, beliau hanya dikehendaki merekodkan kehadirannya apabila dipohon oleh Unit Sumber Manusia Plaintif kerana unit tersebut hanya ingin merekodkan bacaan jarinya ke dalam sistem sekali sahaja di mana apabila Plaintif mula memperkenalkan sistem baharu bacaan jari tersebut yang sebelum ini menggunakan “punch card”, Pembantu Sumber Manusia (‘HR Assistant’) telah meminta beliau untuk mencubanya dan seterusnya menyimpan rekod cap jari Defendan di dalam sistem tersebut. 14 [14] Namun, Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan bahawa apabila disoal balas Peguam Plaintif, Defendan telah mengakui bahawa cetakan imbasan jari pada 4.3.2013 tersebut adalah hari pertama beliau melaporkan diri sebagai Ketua Eksekutif Plaintif. [15] Defendan juga telah memberitahu Mahkamah ini bahawa beliau telah diberikan opsyen oleh Pengerusi Plaintif bahawa memandangkan beliau (Defendan) adalah mewakili Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif (‘representing the board’), beliau adalah berhak untuk memilih samada mahu menggunakan sistem bacaan cap jari ataupun sistem ‘punch card’. Defendan telah memilih untuk menggunakan ‘punch card’ dan bukannya sistem imbasan jari ‘biometric thumb print’ tersebut. [16] Adalah dihujahkan bagi pihak Defendan bahawa sekiranya berdasarkan P2, Plaintif mengatakan bahawa Defendan hanya hadir 1 hari sahaja untuk bekerja bagi membuktikan kehadiran Defendan bekerja, ianya bermakna Defendan telah gagal hadir bekerja sepanjang perkhidmatan bermula 01.03.2013 hingga 01.12.2013. Kalaulah ini benar, Plaintif tidak ada pada bila-bila masapun mengambil tindakan terhadap Defendan untuk ketidakhadirannnya bertugas sedangkan Defendan masih menerima gaji penuh dan 15 elaun-elaun lain sepanjang sembilan (9) bulan perkhidmatannya dengan Plaintif. Oleh itu, adalah menjadi hujahan Defendan bahawa P2 tidak boleh dijadikan bukti untuk menjustifikasikan dan/atau mewajarkan dakwaan Plaintif terhadap Defendan mengenai kehadirannya bekerja dengan Plaintif. [17] Di dalam kes ini, Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa Defendan telah mengingkari terma pekerjaannya yang termaktub di dalam P1 di mana mewajibkan Defendan untuk hadir bekerja mengikut jadual iaitu: Hari & Waktu Bekerja Normal : Isnin-Jumaat: 8.30 pagi – 5.30 petang [18] Mengenai kemasukan P2 dan P3 iaitu rekod imbasan cap jari Defendan yang telah ditentang oleh peguam Defendan akan kemasukkannya, Mahkamah ini perlu merujuk kepada Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif di perenggan 12 yang menyatakan berikut: “12. Adalah didapati bahawa berdasarkan rekod cetakan jari tersebut, hanya wujud satu kehadiran sahaja yang direkodkan iaitu pada 4/3/2013 pada 3.27pm. Oleh itu, akibat daripada ketiadaan rekod rasmi kehadiran Defendan ke pejabat, pihak Defendan telah gagal untuk mematuhi jadual kehadiran beliau ke pejabat seperti yang digariskan dalam kontrak beliau sendiri.” 16 [19] Berdasarkan perenggan 12 ini, Defendan sendiri telah mengetahui bahawa adalah menjadi kes yang diplidkan Plaintif terhadap Defendan atas kehadirannya satu hari sahaja iaitu pada 4.3.2013 jam 3.27 petang dan ianya adalah bersandarkan kepada rekod cetakan atau imbasan jari Defendan. Defendan sendiri mengetahui akan kewujudan rekod imbasan jari tersebut tetapi telah hanya membuat tegasannya mengenai rekod cetakan jari dengan jawapan begini: “Perenggan 12 Pernyataan Tuntutan adalah dirujuk dan dinafikan. Sebagai jawapan, Defendan sekali lagi menegaskan dan memplidkan bahawa Defendan tidak pernah gagal untuk hadir bertugas sepanjang tempoh perkhidmatan dengan Plaintif. Plaintif adalah dengan ini diletakkan di bawah beban pembuktian kukuh untuk membuktikan sebaliknya.” [20] Namun apabila rekod ini dikemukakan ke Mahkamah ini, Defendan cuba membantah kononnya kemasukannnya tidak dibuat menurut seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950. Bagi Mahkamah ini, rekod cetakan atau imbasan jari ini adalah hanya merupakan satu salinan kedatangan melalui imbasan cap jari yang dicetak dari rekod yang didapati daripada mesin biometrik cap jari yang diletakkan di IPB. Mesin biometrik cap jari ini adalah digunakan untuk merekodkan kehadiran harian semua kakitangan Plaintif termasuklah Defendan. 17 Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa P2 dan P3 adalah salinan cetakan yang diambil daripada mesin biometrik cap jari yang berada di dalam kawalan pengurusan Plaintif. Di dalam hal ini, salinan cetakan cap jari ini adalah berbeza dengan dokumen-dokumen yang dimaksudkan di bawah seksyen 90A Akta Keterangan 1950 yang memerlukan pematuhan ketat di mana dokumen-dokumen yang dikeluarkan oleh komputer “in the course of its ordinary use” perlu dibuktikan “by tendering to the court a certificate signed by a person who either before or after the production of the document by the computer is responsible for the management of the operation of that computer, or for the conduct of the activities for which that computer was used’’. P2 adalah cetakan daripada mesin biometrik cap jari yang sememangnya di dalam kawalan Plaintif dan bagi Mahkamah ini P2 ini boleh dikemukakan melalui SP1 yang merupakan Pendaftar Plaintif yang juga merupakan pegawai atasan dan pengurusan (Senior Management) Plaintif. [21] Diandaikanlah pengataan Defendan benar bahawa beliau tidak pernah gagal untuk hadir bertugas sepanjang tempoh perkhidmatannya dengan Plaintif dan beliau yang telah diberi opsyen untuk memilih samada menggunakan sistem bacaan cap jari ataupun sistem ‘punch card’ dan telah memilih untuk menggunakan ‘punch card’, Defendan sewajarnya membuktikan kehadirannya 18 dengan ‘punch card’ yang dikatakannya tersebut. Namun, pengataan-pengataan Defendan ini hanyalah sekadar pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak disokong oleh mana-mana keterangan dokumentar ataupun lisan. [22] Di dalam isu kehadiran ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Defendan di dalam kes ini telah dengan jelas tidak mematuhi waktu kehadiran yang telah ditetapkan terhadapnya sepertimana yang termaktub di P1 iaitu Hari & Waktu Bekerja Normal : Isnin-Jumaat: 8.30 pagi – 5.30 petang. Dengan kehadiran bekerja yang tidak mematuhi kontrak pekerjaannya, Defendan telah memecahkan tanggungjawab fidusiarinya terhadap Plaintif. II. DEFENDAN TELAH SEWENANG-WENANGNYA MELANTIK DAN MENAIKKAN PANGKAT PUAN SALWA BINTI OTHMAN DENGAN TIDAK MEMATUHI PROSEDUR PELANTIKAN DAN KENAIKAN PANGKAT. Pelantikan Puan Salwa bt Othman sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran [23] Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa Puan Salwa bt Othman (Pn Salwa) telah dilantik ke dalam organisasi Plaintif tanpa mematuhi prosedur yang ditetapkan oleh Plaintif iaitu pelantikan Pn Salwa yang dibuat 19 oleh Defendan adalah tanpa sebarang kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif. [24] SP1 di dalam keterangannya telah memberitahu Mahkamah ini mengenai prosedur-prosedur yang ditetapkan oleh Plaintif yang perlu dilaksanakan di dalam pengambilan mana-mana orang bagi mengisi kekosongan jawatan di IPB. Prosedur pertama yang perlu diambil adalah membuat pengiklanan jawatan kosong bagi memberi peluang kepada orang-orang berkelayakan untuk memohon dan juga memberi IPB banyak pilihan untuk memilih calon yang terbaik untuk berkhidmat dengan IPB. Selepas itu pemohon-pemohon yang berkelayakan akan dipanggil untuk sesi temuduga oleh panel khas. Apabila proses temuduga telah selesai dijalankan, penilaian akan dilakukan oleh panel khas temuduga tersebut dan pelantikan pemohon yang berjaya hendaklah melalui Lembaga Pengarah, begitu juga dengan kelulusan pelantikan, ia juga hendaklah atau wajib datang daripada Lembaga Pengarah. Keterangan SP1 mengenai prosedur-prosedur lantikan jawatan ke IPB ini telah disokong oleh keterangan SP2 yang mengesahkan bahawa pelantikan untuk jawatan Pengurus Pemasaran ianya adalah wajib untuk mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah. 20 [25] Adalah satu yang tidak dipertikaikan bahawa Puan Salwa bt Othman (Pn Salwa) sememangnya telah dilantik sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran Plaintif. Pn Salwa telah dilantik melalui satu surat pelantikan bertarikh 25.3.2013 (Ekshibit P4) yang ditandatangani sendiri oleh Defendan. Plaintif telah mendakwa pelantikan Pn Salwa ini telah dilakukan oleh Defendan sendiri yang tidak mematuhi peraturan-peraturan yang ditetapkan di samping tidak mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah. Tindakan Defendan ini menurut Plaintif adalah suatu pemecahan tangggungjawab fidusiarinya sebagai Ketua Eksekutif. [26] Berhubung dengan pelantikan Puan Salwa ini, bagi menentukan samada benar atau tidak ianya telah dibuat dengan tidak mematuhi prosedur Plaintif, Mahkamah ini perlu melihat keterangan-keterangan yang telah dikemukakan oleh kedua-dua pihak Plaintif dan Defendan di dalam perkara ini. Pn Salwa telah dilantik melalui surat pelantikan bertarikh 23.3.2013. Apa yang jelas, daripada keterangan saksi Plaintif SP1 dan SP2 bahawa sebelum surat pelantikan Pn Salwa dikeluarkan sememangnya tidak ada sebarang pengiklanan untuk jawatan kosong Pengurus Pemasaran dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif. Daripada keterangan yang ada, Plaintif juga tidak pernah pada bila- bila masa sebelum 23.3.2013 memberi sebarang arahan untuk mengiklankan kekosongan jawatan Pengurus Pemasaran di IPB 21 tersebut. Maka, di sini prosedur pengiklanan kekosongan jawatan Pengurus Pemasaran sememangnya tidak dipatuhi. [27] Soalan seterusnya ialah adakah proses temuduga telah dijalankan terhadap Pn Salwa sebelum pelantikan atau pengambilan beliau sebagai Pegawai Pemasaran. Defendan telah mempertahankan tindakannya dengan mengatakan bahawa kononnya satu proses temuduga terhadap Pn Salwa telah dijalankan pada 5.3.2013 jam 2.30 petang di mana temuduga itu telah dijalankan oleh panel temuduga yang dianggotai oleh SP1, SP2 dan Dr Adanan bin Mat Junoh (bekas Pengarah Akademik Plaintif). Untuk menyokong penyataan tersebut, Defendan telah merujuk Mahkamah ini kepada dokumen-dokumen di muka surat 52, 53, 54 dan 56 Jilid 1 (D6) iaitu satu Borang Temuduga Jawatan Pengurus Pemasaran yang telah ditandatangani oleh SP1, SP2 dan Dr Adanan bin Mat Junoh (Dr Adanan - telah meninggal dunia). Menurut Defendan lagi pelantikan Pn Salwa telah dibuat hasil daripada penilaian dan persetujuan bersama pegawai atasan IPB (SP1, SP2 dan Dr Adanan) dan beliau hanya menurunkan tandatangan pada surat pelantikan sahaja. [28] Namun, SP1 dan SP2 di dalam keterangan mereka telah menafikan bahawa pertemuan mereka dengan Pn Salwa pada 5.3.2013 adalah untuk satu proses temuduga tetapi sekadar pertemuan yang telah 22 diatur atau dirancang sendiri oleh Defendan. SP1 dan SP2 telah memberi keterangannya seperti berikut: Keterangan SP1 “Defendan telah memaklumkan saya dan Puan Noraziah untuk berjumpa dengan Defendan pada waktu petang pada 05.03.2013 jam 2.30 petang. Defendan tidak langsung memaklumkan kepada saya tujuan perjumpaan tersebut dan oleh yang demikian saya hanya bersetuju untuk berjumpa dengannya tanpa mengesyaki apa-apa yang salah. Apabila saya hadir pada waktu tersebut di Bilik Meeting 1 Tingkat 4, Pn Salwa telah memberikan resume beliau kepada saya dan Puan Noraziah dan semasa Cik Salwa memberikan resume itulah saya merasa hairan kenapa Cik Salwa bertindak sedemikian kerana sangkaan saya, beliau hanyalah seorang kawan yang hadir bersama Defendan. Yang hadir pada waktu itu adalah Salwa, Defendan. Puan Noraziah binti Hashim, saya sendiri dan Allahyarham Dr. Adanan bin Mat Jusoh.” Keterangan SP2 “Defendan telah memaklumkan saya untuk berjumpa dengan Defendan pada waktu petang pada 05.03.2013 jam 2.30 petang. Defendan tidak langsung memaklumkan kepada saya tujuan perjumpaan tersebut dan oleh yang demikian saya hanya bersetuju untuk berjumpa dengannya tanpa mengesyaki apa-apa yang salah. Apabila saya hadir pada waktu tersebut di Bilik Meeting 1 Tingkat 4, saya telah diperkenalkan kepada seorang individu bernama Salwa. Pada waktu itu, Cik Salwa telah memberikan 23 resume beliau kepada saya dan semasa Cik Salwa memberikan resume itulah saya merasa hairan kenapa Cik Salwa bertindak sedemikian kerana sangkaan saya, beliau hanyalah seorang kawan yang hadir bersama Defendan. Saya menyatakan bahawa kos guaman ini telah hanya terjadi akibat daripada Defendan melantik Salwa bekerja tanpa mematuhi prosedur serta melalui prosedur yang salah dari awal. Pembatalan pelantikan yang dibuat oleh ahli Lembaga Pengarah tersebut merupakan adalah penyelesaian terhadap tindakan Defendan yang tidak mengikut garis panduan yang wajib diikuti dalam proses mengambil kakitangan baru.” [29] Malah menurut SP1 dan SP2 semasa di soal balas oleh peguam Defendan mengenai tandatangan mereka yang tertera di atas dokumen di muka surat 52, mereka telah menyatakan bahawa selepas seminggu dari tarikh pertemuan dengan Pn Salwa tersebut, Defendan telah meminta mereka meletak tandatangan mereka ke atas dokumen di muka surat 52 itu. SP1 dan SP2 seterusnya memberitahu Mahkamah ini bahawa mereka terpaksa menandatangani dokumen tersebut kerana mereka adalah tertakluk kepada arahan Ketua Eksekutif. [30] SP1 dan SP2 juga telah memberi keterangan bahawa pertemuan pada 5.3.2013 adalah merupakan suatu keadaan yang ganjil dan di 24 luar prosedur apabila Defendan sendiri telah menjemput Pn Salwa untuk hadir pada hari tersebut. [31] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa pertemuan yang dirancang dan diadakan oleh Defendan untuk Pn Salwa bertemu dengan SP1, SP2 dan Dr Adanan bukanlah satu proses temuduga biasa atau yang dimaksudkan di bawah peraturan IPB. Pertemuan 5.3.2013 hanya boleh dikatakan sebagai sesi perkenalan SP1, SP2 dan Dr Adanan dengan Puan Salwa. Pada masa pertemuan tersebut, borang-borang 52 dan 53 telah tidak diberikan kepada SP1 dan SP2. Di samping itu tidak ada penilaian telah dibuat oleh ketiga- tiga mereka terhadap Pn Salwa. SP1 dan SP2 telah hanya menandatangani borang di muka surat 53 atas arahan Defendan dan penilaian-penilaian yang dibuat ke atas Pn Salwa bukan dibuat oleh mereka. Sebagai pegawai bawahan, SP1 dan SP2 terpaksa menuruti atau akur terhadap arahan Defendan yang merupakan ketua jabatan mereka dan atas kapasiti itu juga mereka tidak boleh ingkar arahan ketua jabatan. Oleh itu, Defendan tidak boleh berkata bahawa penilaian telah dibuat oleh pegawai atasan IPB sedangkan mereka sendiri tidak diminta untuk memberi penilaian tetapi sekadar menandatangani dokumen tersebut atas arahan ketua mereka. Perbuatan Defendan ini adalah satu perbuatan yang tidak 25 bertanggungjawab, tidak amanah dan telah menyalahgunakan jawatan bagi kepentingannya. [32] Adalah menjadi keterangan yang jelas bahawa sememangnya tiada kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah telah diperolehi oleh Defendan bagi pelantikan Pn Salwa olehnya. [33] Daripada keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa sememangnya pelantikan Pn Salwa sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran Plaintif oleh Defendan adalah telah tidak mematuhi prosedur-prosedur/peraturan-peraturan yang telah ditetapkan oleh Plaintif dan untuk tindakan ini Defendan telah memecah tanggungjawab fidisuari yang terletak di atas bahunya sebagai Ketua Eksekutif Plaintif. [34] Bagi hujahan Defendan bahawa pelantikan Pn Salwa telah dibuktikan secara rasmi dan direstui Lembaga Pengarah IPB, apabila Pn Salwa telah dibayar gaji dan elaun-elaun serta caruman Kumpulan Wang Simpanan Pekerja (KWSP) dan Perkeso telahpun dibuat selama 7 bulan beliau berada IPB dan tiada isu ditimbulkan berkenaan pelantikan Pn Salwa sehinggalah beliau dinaikkan pangkat ke jawatan Pendaftar dan seterusnya mengambil alih tugas dan tanggungjawab SP1. 26 [35] Di dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa samada Pn Salwa telah dibayar gaji/elaun dan caruman-caruman KWSP dan Perkeso telah dibuat, ianya tidak boleh membaikpulih atau mengesahkan ketakpatuhan-ketakpatuhan Defendan atas peraturan- peraturan yang telah ditetapkan. Tindakan Defendan ini telah mengingkari terma-terma perjanjian Defendan untuk melaksanakan tugasnya dengan bertanggungjawab, amanah, dan mengikut atau mematuhi peraturan-peraturan yang ditetapkan di dalam pelantikan mana-mana orang ke dalam organisasi Plaintif. Oleh itu, anggapan bahawa dengan pembayaran gaji, elaun dan caruman yang dibuat maka pelantikan Pn Salwa adalah rasmi dan telah direstui oleh Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif adalah tidaklah boleh dipertahankan. Begitu juga alasan yang mengatakan tindakan Plaintif ini adalah semata-mata untuk menganiaya Defendan tidak boleh dipertahankan juga kerana tiada keterangan langsung samada secara lisan atau dokumentar berhubung dengan dakwaan penganiayaan tersebut. Kenaikan pangkat Salwa oleh Defendan [36] Berdasarkan Eksibit P4, Puan Salwa telah dilantik sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran mulai 1.4.2013. Di dalam P4, telah dinyatakan bahawa tempoh percubaan bagi Puan Salwa telah ditetapkan untuk tempoh 6 bulan ke satu tahun bermula dari tarikh pelantikannya. Menurut keterangan SP1, tidak sampai tiga bulan bekerja dengan IPB, dan 27 ketika masih dalam tempoh percubaan, Defendan telah menaikkan pangkat Puan Salwa sebagai Pendaftar pada 16.6.2013 dan disahkan jawatannya oleh Defendan pada 1.7.2013. [37] SP1 juga telah memberitahu Mahkamah ini bahawa dengan kenaikan pangkat yang tidak sampai tiga bulan bekerja dan masih berada di dalam keadaan “probationary period” enam (6) bulan, dengan jelas merupakan satu perlanggaran prosedur yang jelas dan serius oleh Defendan. [38] Menurut SP1 lagi, kenaikan pangkat seseorang hanya boleh dibuat selepas tempoh percubaan dan seseorang sebelum pegawai diberi kenaikan pangkat suatu penilaian terhadap pegawai tersebut hendaklah dibuat dan berdasarkan hasil penilaian oleh Penyelia dan Ketua Jabatan tersebut, pegawai bolehlah dinaikkan pangkat. Namun begitu, kenaikan pangkat bagi jawatan Pendaftar ini hendaklah diluluskan oleh Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif. Seterusnya SP1 memberitahu Mahkamah bahawa bagi kenaikan pangkat Pn Salwa sebagai Pendaftar tersebut tidak pernah diluluskan oleh Lembaga Pengarah. [39] Keterangan amat jelas dan nyata bahawa sememangnya kenaikan pangkat Pn Salwa ke jawatan Pendaftar tidak mendapat kelulusan 28 Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif. Merujuk kepada Eksibit P5 Surat yang ditandatangani oleh Dato’ Dr Ismail bin Haji Ibrahim (Pengerusi Lembaga Pengarah IPB bertarikh 30.9.2013, Jilid B (Bahagian B)) kepada Defendan telah memaklumkan bahawa Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah pada 19.9.2013 telah membincangkan aduan salahlaku- salahlaku yang dilakukan Defendan termasuklah mengenai kenaikan pangkat Puan Salwa kepada jawatan Pendaftar tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah. [40] Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif yang bermesyuarat pada 19.9.2013, setelah mendapati tindakan-tindakan salah laku Defendan termasuk menaikkan pangkat Pn Salwa sebagai Pendaftar tanpa kelulusannya telah mengarahkan Defendan membatalkan pelantikan Pn Salwa serta membatalkan pengesahan Pn Salwa sebagai Pendaftar. [41] Kedudukan atau posisi Lembaga Pengarah mengenai aduan salahlaku-salahlaku Defendan termasuk kenaikan pangkat Pn Salwa tanpa kelulusannya adalah jelas digambarkan di dalam P5 seperti berikut: “ Mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah Kali Ketiga (3) / 2013 yang bersidang pada 19hb September 2013 telah membincangkan berkaitan aduan kepada Lembaga 29 Pengarah IPB yang melibatkan Y. Brs Dr., sebagai Ketua Eksekutif IPB seperti berikut:- 1) Pelantikan Pengurusan Pemasaran, Puan Salwa Binti Othman, mulai 1hb April 2013 dan kenaikan pangkatnya kepada jawatan Pendaftar yang disahkan jawatannya pada 01/07/2013, 2) Pelucutan jawatan Pendaftar daripada Encik Wan Mohamed bin Wan Ibrahim pada 17hb Jun 2013 yang dikembalikan ke jawatan Pustakawan IPB tanpa mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah; 3) Pergaulan mesra diantara Ketua Eksekutif dengan Puan Salwa binti Othman yang terlalu intim, dan 4) Rutin kerja Ketua Eksekutif tidak mengikut masa bekerja yang telah ditetapkan. Setelah berbincang dan mendengar penjelasan, Mesyuarat telah bersetuju agar Y.Brs. Dr. mengambil tindakan- tindakan berikut dengan serta-merta:- 1) Membatalkan pelantikan Puan Salwa binti Othman sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran serta membatalkan pengesahan jawatan beliau sebagai Pendaftar IPB kerana tidak mendapat kelulusan Lembagai Pengarah IPB; 30 2) Membatalkan pertukaran jawatan En. Wan Mohamed bin Wan Ibrahim dari jawatan Pendaftar IPB je jawatan Pustakawan IPB kerana tidak mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah dan mengembalikan En. Wan Mohamed ke jawatan Pendaftar IPB; 3) Membuat semula pengambilan jawatan Pegawai Pemasaran melalui proses pengiklanan dan memastikan urusan temuduga serta pemilihan calon yang berjaya mendapat pengesahan Lembaga Pengarah; 4) Menghentikan semua transaksi / sebarang tindakan berkaitan Pusat Latihan Korporat yang ditubuhkan sehingga perkara berkaitan penubuhan pusat latihan tersebut dibentangkan untuk penelitian dan kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah; 5) Membuat pengambilan bagi memenuhi kekosongan jawatan pengarah Akademik IPB mengikut proses pengiklanan dan memastikan urusan temuduga serta pemilihan calon mendapat pengesahan Lembaga Pengarah; 31 6) Memperbaiki masa bekerja dan menjaga batas pergaulan. Sebagai anak syarikat MAIWP, ini adalah perkara serius dan perlu diberi perhatian dan diperbaiki secepat mungkin. Y.Brs. Dr. juga diminta untuk memastikan semua tindakan yang diambil adalah mengikut garis panduan anak syarikat oleh MAIWP dan prosedur IPB sedia ada yang telah ditetapkan.” [42] Defendan sendiri mengetahui tindakannya melantik Pn Salwa sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran dan menaikkan pangkat Pn Salwa yang masih dalam tempoh percubaan adalah tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah dan tidak mematuhi arahan Lembaga Pengarah. Begitu juga penurunan pangkat SP1 oleh beliau yang tidak mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah. Sejurus selepas mendapat arahan Lembaga Pengarah melalui P5 yang diterimanya pada 3.10.2013, Defendan pada 16.10.2013 telah menghantar draf- draf surat pembatalan pelantikan dan kenaikan Pn Salwa dan pembatalan pertukaran jawatan SP1 dari Pendaftar kepada Pustakawan (P12 dan P13 muka surat 49-51, Jilid B) seperti mana berikut: 32 “Salam Dato, Herewith I append the draft letter as requested by the board to forward to Puan Salwa and En. Wan Mohamed for your approval. Thank you. Regards, DR.ASHARUDDIN AHMAD Chief Executive Institute Profesional Baitulmal Lot 1363, Jalan Perkasa Off Jalan Kg. Pandan 55100 Kuala Lumpur Tel: 03-9281 4054 Fax: 03-9581 4052 Website: www.ipb.edu.my ---------------------------------------- Draft Letter 1: Salwa bt Othman Puan, PEMBATALAN PELANTIKAN SEBAGAI PENGURUS PEMASARAN SERTA PEMBATALAN PENGESAHAN JAWATAN SEBAGAI PENDAFTAR INSTITUT PROFESIONAL BAITULMAL (IPB) Dengan segala hormatnya, perkara di atas dirujuk. Dukacita dimaklumkan bahawa merujuk kepada keputusan mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah yang bersidang pada 19hb September 2013 serta surat makluman daripada Pengerusi Lembaga Pengarah berhubung perkara tersebut yang diterima pada 3hb Oktober 2013, adalah saya diarahkan untuk membatalkan pelantikan puan sebagai Pengurus Pemasaran serta membatalkan pengesahan jawatan puan sebagai Pendaftar IPB dengan serta-merta disebabkan kedua-dua pelantikan tersebut tidak mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah IPB. Saya mengucapkan terima kasih atas segala usaha, tenaga dan dedikasi yang puan berikan sepanjang berkhidmat di IPB. Sekian, terima kasih. http://www.ipb.edu.my/ 33 Saya yang menurut perintah, DR.ASHARUDDIN AHMAD Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif s.k : Pengerusi Lembagai Pengarah IPB : Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif MAIWP : Unit Sumber Manusia IPB ---------------------------------------- Draft Letter 2: Wan Mohamed bin Wan Ibrahim Tuan, PEMBATALAN PERTUKARAN KE JAWATAN PUSTAKAWAN IPB PENGEMBALIAN SEMUA JAWATAN PENDAFTAR IPB Dengan segala hormatnya, perkara di atas dirujuk. Dukacita dimaklumkan bahawa merujuk kepada keputusan mesyuarat Lembaga Pengarah yang bersidang pada 19hb September 2013 serta surat makluman daripada Pengerusi Lembaga Pengarah berhubung perkara tersebut yang diterima pada 3hb Oktober 2013, adalah saya diarahkan untuk membatalkan pertukaran jawatan tuan dari jawatan Pendaftar IPB ke jawatan Pustakawan IPB kerana tidak mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah dan mengembalikan jawatan Pendaftar IPB kepada tuan. Diharapkan dengan pengembalian jawatan tersebut, tuan dapat melaksanakan tanggungjawab yang diberikan dengan cekap dan amanah demi kemajuan dan perkembangan IPB. Sekian, terima kasih. Saya yang menurut perintah, 34 DR.ASHARUDDIN AHMAD Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif s.k : Pengerusi Lembagai Pengarah IPB : Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif MAIWP : Unit Sumber Manusia IPB ” [43] Berdasarkan draf-draf di atas yang dibuat oleh Defendan atas arahan Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif, Defendan sememangnya mengetahui dan sedar bahawa perbuatan atau tindakan beliau melantik Pn Salwa sebagai Pegawai Pemasaran dan kemudiannya menaikkan pangkat Pn Salwa sebagai Pendaftar telah dibuat olehnya bertentangan dengan peraturan-peraturan yang ditetapkan dan adalah perbuatan-perbuatan pemecahan tugasnya sebagai Ketua Eksekutif. [44] Berdasarkan draf-draf yang dibuat dan disediakan oleh Defendan tersebut, Plaintif telah membatalkan pelantikan dan kenaikan pangkat Pn Salwa. Di atas pembatalan pelantikan dan kenaikan pangkatnya tersebut, Pn Salwa telah memfailkan tindakan saman di Mahkamah Perusahaan terhadap Plaintif. [45] Defendan di dalam kes ini telah cuba menafikan pengetahuannya mengenai penerimaan peletakan jawatannya oleh Plaintif serta 35 menafikan pengetahuan beliau berkenaan kesalahan-kesalahan yang didakwa telah dilakukannya yang menyebabkan Plaintif di dalam proses mengambil tindakan tatatertib terhadap beliau dengan mengatakan beliau tidak pernah menerima Ekshibit P11 (surat Plaintif bertarikh 23.01.2014). [46] Peguam Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa eksibit P11 tidak boleh dijadikan keterangan kerana ianya telah dikategorikan sebagai bahagian C dan untuk menerima masuk P11 ini, pembuat dokumen (‘maker of document’) tersebut perlu dipanggil untuk mengesahkan kewujudan P11 tersebut dan membuktikan P11 telah diterima oleh Defendan. [47] Bantahan Defendan atas ketidakpanggilan pembuat P11 untuk membuktikan penyerahannya kepada Defendan adalah tidak berasas. Dengan berkuatkuasanya Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) pada 1.8.2012 KKM 2012 telah memperkenalkan Aturan 34 iaitu satu prosedur yang memperuntukkan pengurusan kes dijalankan sebelum perbicaraan bagi menjamin dan memastikan penyelesaian kes yang adil, cepat dan ekonomi. Manakala Aturan 34 kaedah 2 (2) KKM 2012 pula telah memperuntukkan berkenaan pemfailan ikatan semua dokumen yang akan digunakan semasa perbicaraan kelak dan pengkategorian dokumen-dokumen samada 36 bahagian A, B atau C. Menurut Aturan 34 kaedah 2 (2)(e) (ii), dokumen yang diletakkan di bahagian C adalah dokumen yang kesahan dan kandungannya dipertikaikan. [48] Peguam Defendan di dalam kes ini, nampaknya telah cuba menolak P11 dengan menggunakan pengkategorian dokumen bahagian C bukan atas kesahan atau kandungannya tetapi atas alasan ianya tidak diterima oleh Defendan. [49] Perlu dinyatakan disini, ikatan dokumen bersama Jilid B ini adalah dokumen-dokumen bersama yang telah difailkan oleh pihak-pihak Plaintif dan Defendan pada 13.5.2016. Perkara mengenai penerimaan P11 atau bukti P11 itu diterima atau tidak oleh Defendan ini tidak pernah dibangkitkan oleh Defendan sejak dari mula kes ini difailkan. Bantahan yang Defendan tidak pernah menerima P11 ini hanya dibuat oleh peguam Defendan apabila rujukan dibuat kepada P11 oleh peguam Plaintif semasa SP1 memberi keterangan sebagai pihak pengurusan Plaintif. [50] Mahkamah ini perlu menegaskan bahawa kes ini telah berterusan begitu lama sejak bulan Mei 2015 lagi. Bagi kes ini, pengurusan kes/ permohonan interlokutori telah dijalankan di hadapan Timbalan/ Penolong Kanan Pendaftar sebanyak 8 kali dan di hadapan Hakim 37 sebanyak 7 kali. Malahan kes ini pernah ditetapkan untuk mediasi tetapi tidak berjaya diselesaikan. Pada 27.1.2016 pula, Penghakiman Ingkar Kehadiran telah dimasukkan terhadap Defendan atas kegagalan Defendan dan peguamnya hadir pada tarikh pengurusan kes. Namun Penghakiman Ingkar tersebut telah diketepikan oleh YA Hakim atas permohonan Defendan. Malahan apabila kes ini dipanggil untuk pengurusan kes pada 16.5.2016, peguam Defendan iaitu Encik Jason Singh bersama Encik Fahmi telah hadir dan telah juga menyebut bagi pihak Plaintif dan memaklumkan Mahkamah bahawa Ikatan Dokumen Bersama pihak-pihak telahpun difailkan. Selama ini, Defendan langsung tidak memberikan sebarang notis kepada Plaintif bagi membangkitkan isu yang Defendan kononnya tidak pernah menerima P11. [51] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini, di dalam keadaan sebegini, adalah tidak terbuka bagi Defendan untuk menggunakan pengkategorian dokumen di bawah Aturan 34 KKM 2012 bagi membangkitkan bantahan penerimaan masuk P11 kerana Plaintif tidak memanggil pembuat P11 bagi membuktikan bahawa Defendan telah menerima P11, walhal Defendan tidak langsung mempertikaikan isu kesahan (authenticity) dan/ ataupun kandungan (contents) P11. 38 [49] Di dalam hal ini, Mahkamah perlu menegaskan bahawa P11 boleh diterima masuk sebagai keterangan dengan pemanggilan SP1 yang merupakan Pendaftar Plaintif. [52] Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan bahawa Defendan telah hadir ke Mahkamah dan mengatakan bahawa beliau tidak pernah menerima P11. Memandangkan beliau yang menegaskan bahawa beliau tidak menerima P11, maka beban pembuktian untuk membuktikan ketidakpenerimaan P11 yang dialamatkan kepada nama dan alamat: DR. ASHARUDDIN BIN AHMAD No. 391, Jalan B6, Taman Melawati, Hulu Kelang 68100 Ampang Selangor D.E adalah terletak dibahu Defendan sendiri. [53] Pengataan Defendan bahawa beliau tidak menerima P11 ini adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata yang tidak disokong oleh sebarang keterangan dokumentar atau lisan. [54] Lagi pun Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa bantahan tidak menerima P11 ini, yang dibuat di saat-saat akhir perbicaraan adalah satu taktik tidak jujur Defendan yang Mahkamah ini tidak boleh benarkan. 39 [55] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah bahawa Defendan telah menaikkan pangkat Pn Salwa kepada jawatan Pendaftar dengan tidak mematuhi prosedur yang telah ditetapkan oleh Plaintif dan tindakan-tindakan Defendan yang tidak bertanggungjawab, tidak beramanah dan tidak berintegriti ini telah mendedahkan Plaintif kepada tindakan undang-undang yang diambil oleh Pn Salwa terhadapnya. Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini ianya adalah merupakan suatu pemecahan tanggungjawab fidusiari terhadap Plaintif. III. PENURUNAN PANGKAT EN WAN MOHAMED BIN WAN IBRAHIM DENGAN SECARA SALAH [56] SP1 telah memberi keterangan kepada Mahkamah bahawa pada 17.6.2013, Defendan telah menurunkan pangkatnya daripada Pendaftar kepada jawatan Pustakawan IPB. Penurunan pangkat SP1 ini telah diakui sendiri oleh Defendan di dalam keterangan semasa disoal balas oleh peguam Plaintif di mana menurut Defendan SP1 diturunkan pangkat atas alasan bahawa beliau tidak mampu untuk memikul jawatan sebagai Pendaftar. Selanjutnya, Defendan juga menegaskan bahawa Defendan sendiri kerap menerima aduan daripada kakitangan seliaan Encik Wan Mohamed 40 bin Wan Ibrahim tentang ketidakcekapan beliau dalam mentadbir urus jabatan. [57] Tindakan Defendan yang sewenang-wenangnya menurunkan pangkat SP1 kepada Pustakawan dan penurunan pangkat ini juga adalah tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah, adalah satu tindakan tidak bertanggunjawab Defendan dan merupakan suatu pemecahan tanggungjawab fidusiari Defendan terhadap Plaintif. iv. MEMBUAT PELANTIKAN T/N LEE OLIVER & GAN SEBAGAI PEGUAMCARA PLAINTIF TANPA KELULUSAN LEMBAGA PENGARAH PLAINTIF [58] SP2 di dalam keterangannya telah memberitahu Mahkamah bahawa Defendan telah melantik firma guaman tersebut tanpa sebarang kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif. Tindakan Defendan yang melantik firma peguamcara T/n Lee Oliver & Gan sebagai peguamcara Plaintif tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif adalah satu yang tidak boleh dipertikaikan kerana Lembaga Pengarah sepertimana yang tertera di dalam P5 telah menyatakan bahawa tindakan Defendan melantik firma guaman tersebut sememangnya tanpa kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah. 41 [59] Defendan telah cuba menimbulkan pembelaan bahawa sebelum pelantikan firma guaman Tetuan Lee Oliver & Gan, beliau telahpun berbincang dengan Pengerusi Plaintif dan mendapat kebenaran Pengerusi Plaintif sendiri dan telah memaklumkan kepada salah seorang ahli Lembaga Pengarah iaitu En Saharuddin Sarwan. Menurut Defendan lagi, kelulusan dari Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif tidak diperolehi olehnya kerana Plaintif (IPB) ketika itu telah kesuntukan masa untuk membela tindakan yang difailkan terhadap Plaintif, maka tindakannya ini tidak membentuk kemungkiran tanggungjawab beliau terhadap Plaintif. [60] Bagi Mahkamah ini pengataan Defendan ini adalah hanya suatu pengataan semata-mata kerana ianya tidak disokong oleh apa-apa atau mana-mana keterangan lisan mahupun dokumentar. Apa yang nyata dan jelas IPB adalah sebuah syarikat, apa-apa pelantikan peguamcara hendaklah mendapat kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah serta satu resolusi mengenai pelantikan firma peguamcara perlu dikeluarkan oleh Plaintif. [61] Dakwaan Defendan tentang pemakluman kepada salah seorang ahli Lembaga Pengarah adalah tidak berasas langsung. Pemakluman ini, walaupun jika benar tidak melepaskan tanggungjawab Defendan untuk mendapatkan kelulusan Lembaga Pengarah Plaintif. 42 [62] Hujahan Defendan yang mengatakan bahawa Plaintif gagal mengemukakan sebarang manual Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) untuk membuktikan apakah tugas fidusiari terhadap Plaintif yang telah dimungkiri oleh Defendan adalah tidak berasas. Samada SOP dikemukakan atau tidak, tidak merosakkan pembuktian Plaintif terhadap pemecahan tanggungjawab fidusiari. Di dalam kes ini, kontrak perkhidmatan Defendan di P1 adalah jelas dan nyata menggariskan tanggungjawabnya sebagai Ketua Eksekutif, di samping itu SP1 dan SP2 yang merupakan pegawai atasan dan pengurusan Plaintif telahpun memberi keterangan mereka. Menurut SP1 dan SP2, prosedur-prosedur yang telah dinyatakan oleh mereka di dalam keterangan adalah berasaskan garis panduan yang telah ditetapkan oleh (MAIWP) yang terpakai kepada IPB sebagai anak syarikatnya. Di samping itu, secara logiknya pun, tindakan-tindakan yang dilakukan oleh Defendan adalah tidak masuk akal dan tidak munasabah bagi seorang Ketua Eksekutif, yang memegang jawatan tertinggi di dalam sesebuah organisasi. KEGAGALAN DEFENDAN MENGEMBALIKAN ASET-ASET PLAINTIF [63] Di dalam tuntutan Plaintif untuk pengembalian aset-asetnya, Plaintif telah memplidkan di perenggan 28 Penyata Tuntutannya aset-aset 43 yang tidak dipulangkan oleh Defendan kepadanya adalah seperti berikut: a) Komputer riba jenama Acer – 3 unit. b) Broadband Celcom – 3 unit. c) Telefon bimbit jenama Apple Iphone 5 – 1 unit. d) Telefon bimbit jenama Samsung Galaxy Note II – 1 unit. e) Telefon bimbit jenama Blackberry Z10 – 1 unit. [64] Bagi menjawab dakwaan Plaintif tersebut, Defendan di perenggan 16 Penyata Pembelaannya telah memplidkan seperti berikut: i) Komputer Riba jenama Acer – 3 unit telah dipulangkan kepada Bendahari, Pendaftar, Ketua Pengarah Akademik (telah dipulangkan selepas kematian beliau – Allahyarham Dr. Adanan) dan Pengurus Kewangan. ii) Broadband Celcom – 3 unit telah dipulangkan kepada Bendahari, Pendaftar, Ketua Pengarah Akademik (telah dipulangkan selepas kematian beliau – Allahyarham Dr. Adanan) dan Pengurus Kewangan. iii) Telefon bimbit jenama Apple Iphone 5 – 1 unit telah dipulangkan kepada Ketua Eksekutif. 44 iv) Telefon bimbit jenama Samsung Galaxy Note II – 1 unit telah dipulangkan kepada Bendahari, Pendaftar, Ketua Pengarah Akademik (telah dipulangkan selepas kematian beliau – Allahyarham Dr. Adanan). v) Telefon bimbit jenama Blackberry Z10 – 1 unit telah dipulangkan kepada Pengurus Pemasaran Plaintif. [65] Pembelaan Defendan ini menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah tidak menafikan bahawa beliau telah menerima aset-aset Plaintif iaitu i. Komputer Acer (3 unit), ii. Broadband Celcom (3 unit), iii. telefon bimbit jenama Apple Iphone 5 (1 unit), iv. telefon bimbit jenama Samsung Galaxy Note II (1 unit) dan v. telefon bimbit jenama Blackberry Z10 (aset-aset tersebut) seperti yang diplidkan oleh Plaintif di dalam Penyata Tuntutannya, akan tetapi Defendan telah mendakwa bahawa beliau telahpun memulangkan kesemua aset- aset tersebut kepada penama-penama yang dinyatakan di dalam perenggan 16 tersebut. [66] Namun di hadapan Mahkamah ini, Defendan telah menukar posisinya dengan mengatakan bahawa aset-aset yang telah dipulangkan adalah 1 unit komputer riba jenama Acer dan 1 unit Celcom Broadband berserta 1 unit telefon bimbit jenama Apple akan 45 tetapi bagi aset-aset yang lain, Defendan mendakwa bahawa aset- aset tersebut sebenarnya tidak pernah diberikan dan digunakan oleh beliau. Oleh yang demikian, Defendan menegaskan bahawa tidak timbul isu pemulangan aset yang tidak berada dalam simpanan Defendan. [67] Di hadapan Mahkamah ini, adalah nyata dan jelas bahawa Defendan telah gagal membuktikan melalui keterangan dokumentar ataupun lisan bahawa aset-aset tersebut telah dikembalikan kepada Plaintif. [68] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti dan menimbangkan keterangan Defendan di Mahkamah ini dan adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini, keterangan-keterangan Defendan pada keseluruhannya adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata tanpa sokongan mana-mana keterangan lisan mahupun dokumentar. [69] Mahkamah ini telah juga meneliti secara menyeluruh keterangan- keterangan Defendan di dalam penyata saksinya dan semasa beliau disoalbalas oleh peguam Plaintif. Mahkamah ini bersependapat dengan peguam Plaintif bahawa kredibiliti Defendan perlu dipertimbangkan oleh Mahkamah kerana sebahagian besar keterangan Defendan adalah pengataan kosong dan penafian banyak perkara fakta sehingga Defendan sanggup berbohong, 46 berdolak-dalik dalam keterangannya dan banyak keterangannya bercanggah dengan keterangan dokumentar yang dirujuk kepadanya. [70] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa Mahkamah ini tidak perlu menyenaraikan satu persatu pembohongan-pembohongan Defendan kerana ianya terlalu banyak tetapi memadai untuk Mahkamah ini memberi beberapa contoh untuk menunjukkan bahawa keterangan- keterangan Defendan adalah tidak boleh dipercayai. Sebagai contoh, Mahkamah ini merujuk beberapa pembohongan Defendan seperti berikut: i. Defendan cuba mengambarkan seolah-olah beliau telah hadir ke IPB seawal 25.1.2013 yakni menurut tarikh P1 tetapi sebenarnya pelantikannya hanya berkuatkuasa pada 1.3.2013. Kalau berdasarkan rekod cetakan imbasan 4.3.2013, Defendan telah pertama kali hadir bertugas pada 4.3.2013. Kehadiran beliau bertugas pertama kali sebagai Ketua Eksekutif IPB adalah pada 4.3.2013 diakui sendiri oleh Defendan. Tidak sampai satu hari bertugas di IPB, Defendan telah membawa Pn Salwa untuk bertemu SP1, SP2 dan Dr Adanan pada 5.3.2013 yang kononnya untuk temuduga. Adalah suatu yang tidak munasabah untuk mempercayai seorang Ketua Eksekutif yang baru bertugas satu hari, telah terus mengadakan temuduga untuk Pengurus Pemasaran tanpa apa-apa 47 pengiklanan, tawaran, pempanelan panel temuduga, kekosongan jawatan dan sebagainya. Malah Defendan sendiri telah membawa Pn Salwa pada 5.3.2013 ke IPB untuk berjumpa SP1 dan SP2 . ii. Defendan cuba menafikan bahawa ‘Draft Letter to Puan Salwa & Encik Wan Mohamed’ melalui emel P12 dan P13 dalam pengetahuannya dan bukan dibuat beliau sedangkan emel-emel telah dibuat melalui alamat emelnya < asharuddin@ipb.edu.my > kepada Dato’ Dr Ismail Haji Ibrahim < pengerusi@ipb.edu.my> pada 16.Oct, 2013 at 11.05AM. iii. Apabila dirujuk kepada Borang Penilaian Prestasi Dan Pembangunan Kerjaya Kakitangan Institut Profesional Baitulmal Sdn Bhd (Bagi kakitangan Pengurusan Tertinggi Kategori Ketua Jabatan) di muka surat 20-28, Jilid B, Defendan cuba menafikan bahawa dokumen ini adalah dokumen yang beliau sediakan untuk menjustifikasi kenaikan pangkat Pn Salwa. iv. Menafikan penerimaan P11. Walhal P11 telah dihantar kepada alamat penyampaian Defendan. Ini jelas dengan merujuk kepada perenggan 2 Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif seperti berikut: “Dalam setiap masa yang material, Defendan adalah bekas pekerja Plaintif yang beralamat penyampaian di No. 391, Jalan B6, Taman Melawati, Hulu Kelang, 68100 Ampang, Selangor D.E. (alamat tersebut).” mailto:asharuddin@ipb.edu.my mailto:pengerusi@ipb.edu.my 48 Defendan telah mengakui alamat tersebut apabila menjawab perenggan 2 Penyata Tuntutan Plaintif di perenggan 2 Penyata Pembelaannya yang berbunyi berikut: “Merujuk kepada perenggan 2, 3, 4, 5 dan 6 Pernyataan Tuntutan Defendan mengakuinya.” Di samping itu, perenggan 2 fakta yang dipersetujui oleh pihak-pihak juga merujuk kepada alamat penyampaian defendan sebagai alamat tersebut. v. Menafikan penerimaan P5, walhal di muka surat 3, Jilid B, jelas menunjukkan bahawa Defendan telah menerima P5 apabila membuat pengesahan penerimaan P5 dengan menandatangani dokumen tersebut. vi. Menafikan pengetahuannya tentang aduan salahlaku-salahlaku yang telah dilakukannya, walhal salahlaku-salahlaku tersebut telah digariskan oleh Lembaga Pengarah di dalam P5 dengan jelas. Defendan telah diarahkan untuk memberi maklumbalas atas aduan- aduan tersebut tetapi apa yang Defendan lakukan bukanlah memberi maklumbalas atas aduan salahlaku-salahlaku tersebut, Defendan telah sebaliknya telah meletakkan jawatannya pada 1.12.2013 sebelum sempat IPB memulakan proses tindakan tatatertib terhadap beliau. [71] Saksi Defendan (SD2) iaitu Puan Salwa binti Othman sendiri telah memberi keterangan untuk cuba membantu Defendan di dalam 49 pembelaannya. Namun, bagi Mahkamah ini keterangan SD2 tidak langsung dapat membantu Defendan bagi menyokong kesnya kerana keterangan-keterangan SD2 juga adalah pengataan kosong semata-mata. [72] Berhubung dengan gantirugi am bagi pemecahan tangggungjawab Defendan yang dituntut oleh Plaintif, peguam Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa tiada keterangan saksi-saksi atau dokumen- dokumen telah dikemukakan oleh Plaintif kepada Mahkamah ini mengenai sebarang kerugian yang telah dialami oleh Plaintif. Menurut peguam Defendan lagi, setakat pemfailan tindakannya, Plaintif telah gagal membuktikan kerugian yang telah dialaminya akibat tindakan-tindakan Defendan tersebut. Tambahan lagi, tindakan undang-undang yang diambil oleh Pn Salwa terhadap Plaintif masih belum diputuskan, samada memihak kepada Plaintif atau sebaliknya. [73] Oleh itu, menurut peguam Defendan lagi, kegagalan Plaintif membuktikan kerugiannya secara tepat dan terperinci, maka Mahkamah ini tidak berada dalam kedudukan yang sesuai untuk memerintahkan sebarang jumlah gantirugi kepada Plaintif. 50 [74] Setelah mempertimbangkan dengan teliti keterangan-keterangan lisan dan dokumentar yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa pada imbangan kebarangkalian Plaintif telah membuktikan kesnya terhadap Defendan. Oleh itu tuntutan Plaintif adalah dibenarkan dengan kos. [75] Bagi tuntutan ganti rugi am yang dituntut oleh Plaintif, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa kemungkiran fidusiari yang dilakukan oleh Defendan telah dilakukan oleh seorang yang memegang jawatan tertinggi di dalam menjalankan pentadbiran sesebuah organisasi iaitu Ketua Eksekutif. Seorang Ketua Eksekutif sepatutnya menjalankan tugasnya secara profesional, wibawa dan berintegriti tetapi di dalam kes ini Defendan telah bertindak disebaliknya. Ini adalah perbuatan tortious yang dilakukan oleh Defendan sebagai Ketua Eksekutif dengan pengetahuan bahawa apa yang telah dilakukan beliau adalah sesuatu yang bertentangan dengan terma pekerjaan dan kewajipannya. Dengan itu Mahkamah perlu mengiktiraf (recognized) hak Plaintif sebagai sebuah organisasi yang menjalankan institusi pendidikan yang mempunyai hak atau berhak untuk mendapatkan perkhidmatan yang terbaik, menguntungkan, profesional, amanah dan jujur daripada Defendan. Apatah lagi dengan nama Plaintif Institut Baitulmal ia merupakan sebuah institusi yang digerakkan atas dana Baitulmal. Hak ini bukan sahaja telah dimungkiri oleh Defendan 51 tetapi juga telah mendedahkan Plaintif kepada guaman yang diambil terhadap Plaintif atas perbuatan Defendan yang tidak bertanggungjawab, tidak berwibawa dan tidak berintegriti tersebut. Justeru bagi mempampas hak ini, Mahkamah ini mengawadkan RM 40,000.00 sebagai ganti rugi am kepada Plaintiff. [76] Seterusnya Mahkamah ini membenarkan tuntutan Plaintif seperti berikut: i. Injunksi mandatori terhadap Defendan untuk mengembalikan kesemua aset-aset Plaintif iaitu Komputer Acer (3 unit), Broadband Celcom (3 unit), telefon bimbit jenama Apple Iphone 5 (1 unit), telefon bimbit jenama Samsung Galaxy Note II (1 unit) dan telefon bimbit jenama Blackberry Z10, dalam masa 7 hari daripada tarikh Penghakiman ini; ii. Secara alternatifnya, pampasan wang untuk kesemua nilai aset-aset tersebut di atas; iii. Bahawa Defendan hendaklah menggantirugi (indemnify) Plaintif atas sebarang kerugian wang yang dialami oleh Plaintif akibat daripada sebarang tindakan undang-undang oleh Pn Salwa terhadap Plaintif di Mahkamah Perusahaan. 52 Isu Kos [77] Setelah mendengar hujahan ringkas peguam Plaintif dan peguam Defendan mengenai kos, Mahkamah ini memerintahkan Defendan membayar kos sebanyak RM 20,000.00 kepada Plaintif. t.t. .................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 23 haribulan November 2016 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Jason Singh & Rakan-Rakan Encik Jason Singh a/l U.Letchman Singh Encik Mohammad Fahmi bin Mat Rodzi Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Ram Reza & Muhammad Encik Ismail Ariffin

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-295-03/2016

PLAINTIF Chan Siew Yen DEFENDAN Pentdbir Tanah Hulu Langat

22/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=b64fa960-d78c-4804-8bbd-00c455951873&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24-295-03/2016 ANTARA CHAN SIEW YEN (No. K/P: 430502-08-5586) … PLAINTIF DAN PENTADBIR TANAH HULU LANGAT … DEFENDAN Dalam Perkara mengenai Aturan 7 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam Perkara Hartanah yang dipegang dibawah hakmilik HS(M)504 PT 1203 Mukim Ampang, Selangor yang dikenali Lot 1203, Kaw Perindustrian Ringan KWS Ringan Pandan Indah/Tasek T, 55100 Kuala Lumpur; Dan Dalam perkara Seksyen 33, 261, 262, 263(i), 264(iii) National Land Code 1965. 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Saman Pemula – Kandungan 1) A. PENDAHULUAN [1] Kandungan 1 adalah merupakan permohonan Plaintif untuk mendapatkan perintah-perintah berikut: i. Satu deklarasi yang menyatakan bahawa Lelongan Awam yang telah dijalankan pada 14.05.2015 oleh Defendan adalah salah di sisi undang-undang dan batal dan tidak sah; dan ii. Satu deklarasi yang menyatakan bahawa Plaintif adalah pemilik berdaftar bagi hartanah yang dipegang di bawah HS(M) 504, PT 1203, Mukim Ampang, Tempat Kampung Baru Ampang, Daerah Hulu Langat, Selangor Darul Ehsan ( hartanah tersebut). [2] Sebelum Mahkamah mempertimbangkan merit permohonan Plaintif (Chan Siew Yin), Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan di sini latar belakang kes yang menyebabkan Plaintif memfailkan permohonan di Kandungan 1 dan juga mengenai kedudukan Plaintif. 3 2.1 Adalah tidak dinafikan bahawa sebelum 14.5.2015. Plaintif adalah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Namun, pada tahun 1998, Public Bank Berhad yang merupakan pemegang gadaian bagi hartanah tersebut telah mengeluarkan satu borang Perintah Jualan Atas Permintaan Pemegang Gadaian dalam Borang 16 H (Borang 16H) untuk bagi untuk satu perintah jualan untuk menjual hartanah tersebut melalui lelongan awam. Borang 16H bertarikh 3.3.1998 yang dikeluarkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat telah menetapkan hartanah tersebut untuk dijual melalui lelongan awam pada 11.6.1998. Pengeluaran Borang 16H bertarikh 3.3.1998 (Borang 16H tersebut) adalah titik permulaan kepada beberapa siri tindakan undang-undang yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif terhadap pemegang gadaian (Public Bank Berhad). 2.2 Bagi mengenepikan perintah jualan Borang 16H bertarikh 3.3.1998 tersebut, Plaintif telah memfailkan satu Notis Usul Pemula No. MT2-21-52-98 terhadap Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Langat (Defendan sebagai Responden Pertama) dan Public Bank Berhad (Public Bank sebagai Responden Kedua). Notis Usul Pemula Plaintif telah dibenarkan dan Mahkamah Tinggi 4 Shah Alam yang telah memerintahkan bahawa Borang 16H 1998 tersebut diketepikan. 2.3 Public Bank yang tidak puas hati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam telah mefailkan rayuannya ke Mahkamah Rayuan melalui Rayuan Sivil No. B-02-402-98. Mahkamah Rayuan telah membenarkan rayuan Public Bank dengan memerintahkan perintah jualan bertarikh 03.03.1998 tersebut adalah dikekalkan; 2.4 Plaintif yang tidak puas hati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan tersebut, telah memfailkan pula satu Notis Usul untuk kebenaran merayu untuk merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam Rayuan B-02-402-98. Mahkamah Persekutuan telah menolak Notis Usul 8-92-2005(B) yang difailkan Plaintif 2.5 Walaupun kebenaran merayu tidak diperolehi, Plaintif tidak berhenti di situ tetapi sebaliknya beliau telah memfailkan satu lagi tindakan baru bagi mengenepikan perintah jualan yang sama dengan memfailkan melalui Saman Pemula No. 24- 5 2099-2008. Mahkamah Tinggi telah menolak permohonan Plaintif tersebut; 2.6 Pada 25.04.2012, Plaintif memfailkan notis rayuan di Mahkamah Rayuan melalui Rayuan Sivil No. B-02-1403-2010 untuk merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tersebut, tetapi kemudiannya Plaintif telah menarik balik rayuan yang telah beliau failkan. 2.7 Tidak habis di situ, Plaintif kemudiannya pada tahun 2013, telah memfailkan satu tindakan melalui Writ Saman melalui guaman sivil No. 22NCVC-419-06/2013 (guaman sivil 419 ini) terhadap Public Bank untuk relif yang sama. Di dalam guaman sivil 419 ini, pada 26.11.2013 Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur (YA Hakim John O’Hara) telah mengisytiharkan Plaintif sebagai seorang litigan yang menyusahkan “vexatious litigant”. Di samping mengisytiharkan Plaintif adalah seorang “vexatious litigant” YA Hakim juga telah juga memberikan perintah bahawa Plaintif adalah dihalang daripada memulakan sebarang tindakan undang-undang terhadap Public Bank melainkan dengan kebenaran Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur. 6 2.8 Plaintif kemudiannya pada 11.5.2015 telah memfailkan satu lagi saman pemula di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula 24-564-05/2015) terhadap Public Bank sebagai Defendan Pertama dan Pentadbir Tanah Hulu Langat sebagai Defendan Kedua. Di dalam saman pemula 24-564-05/2015 tersebut, Plaintif telah memohon perintah-perintah berikut: i. Plaintif dibenarkan untuk membawa suatu prosiding dibawah S.418 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 di Mahkamah terhadap Defendan-Defendan. ii. Plaintif dibenarkan membela diri terhadap tuduhan yang dinyatakan oleh Defendan Pertama dalam Perintah Jualan yang telah dikeluarkan terhadap Hartanah tersebut. 2.9 Mahkamah ini telah menolak saman pemula 24-564-05/2015 tersebut pada 15.7.2015 dengan kos sebanyak RM5000.00. 2.10 Plaintif telah merayu kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini bertarikh 15.7.2015 dan rayuan Plaintif tersebut telah didaftarkan sebagai rayuan B-01(A) -249- 08/2015. 7 2.11 Mahkamah Rayuan pada 27.10.2015 telah menolak rayuan Plaintif dengan kos sebanyak RM5000.00. [3] Memandangkan kedudukan Plaintif yang sebegini, Plaintif kini mengambil strategi lain dengan cara jalan belakang (back door) dengan mengambil tindakan terhadap Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat bagi mencabar lelongan awam bertarikh 14.5.2015 bukan menurut seksyen 418 Kanun Tanah Negara (rayuan kepada Mahkamah Tinggi) tetapi dengan memohon suatu perintah untuk mengisytiharkan Lelongan Awam hartanah tersebut adalah salah di sisi undang-undang, batal dan tidak sah. Plaintif juga memohon Mahkamah ini supaya mengisytiharkan bahawa beliau adalah pemilik berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Plaintif telah tidak menamakan Public Bank sebagai pihak walaupun Public Bank adalah pemegang gadaian yang mempunyai kepentingan undang-undang terhadap lelongan awam yang dijalankan kerana untuk berbuat demikian Plaintif perlu melalui tugas yang sukar (uphill task) iaitu memdapatkan kebenaran Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur untuk memulakan tindakan terhadap Public Bank atas hal perkara yang sama lelongan awam atas hartanah tersebut. 8 B. PERMOHONAN PLAINTIF [4] Bersandarkan apa yang tertera di dalam perihal perkara intutilement saman pemulanya, Plaintif telah cuba mengerakkan tindakannya di hadapan Mahkamah bagi mendapatkan perintah-perintah deklarasi bersandarkan kepada peruntukan-peruntukan Aturan 7 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) dan seksyen-sekyen 33, 261, 262, 263(i), 264(iii) Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 (KTN). [5] Aturan 7 KKM 2012 adalah merupakan peruntukan am berhubung dengan proses saman pemula iaitu berhubung dengan perkara- perkara am saman pemula seperti borang, kandungan, pengeluaran, jangka masa, saman serentak dan saman pemula exparte. Manakala seksyen-seksyen di dalam KTN yang mana menjadi naungan atau sandaran Plaintif adalah pada dasarnya adalah berhubung dengan kuasa-kuasa Pentadbir Tanah di dalam pengeluaran perintah jualan hartanah-hartanah yang dipegang di bawah seksyen 261 (1) KTN dan juga perlaksanaan lelongan awam oleh Pentadbir Tanah. Dalam erti kata yang lain peruntukan- peruntukan seksyen-seksyen 261, 262, 263(i), 264(iii) KTN tersebut adalah kuasa-kuasa khas dan spesifik yang telah diperuntukkan kepada Pentadbir Tanah untuk perlaksanaannya serta membuat 9 keputusan yang selaras dengan kuasa-kuasa yang diperuntukkan tersebut. [6] Plaintif di dalam saman pemulanya telah memohon relif-relif bersifat deklarasi tetapi beliau tidak langsung meletakkan perihal perkara berkenaan dengan undang-undang yang beliau bersandar bagi mendapatkan perintah-perintah deklarasi tersebut. Namun, penelitian Mahkamah ini kepada relif pertama yang hendak dipohon oleh Plaintif sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar tanah pada masa lelongan awam dijalankan, sebenarnya adalah untuk mencabar keputusan Defendan di dalam perlaksanaan tugasnya di dalam proses lelongan awam pada 14.5.2015 dan cuba mendapatkan perintah Mahkamah ini untuk mengenepikan atau membatalkan lelongan awam tersebut. [7] Di dalam hal ini, Plaintif sebenarnya telah cuba mendapatkan relif deklarasi dengan pemfailan saman pemula apabila remedi yang terbuka kepadanya atau remedi yang sedia ada kepadanya telah tidak terbuka lagi kepadanya. Mahkamah berkata begini kerana sekiranya Plaintif telah terkilan terhadap lelongan awam yang dijalankan oleh Defendan tersebut, remedi yang disediakan di bawah Kanun Tanah Negara adalah merayu ke Mahkamah Tinggi atas keputusan Defendan yang mengeluarkan perintah jualan termasuk 10 lelongan awam yang dijalankan pada 14.5.2015 tersebut menurut sekyen 418 KTN. Bagi mendapatkan relif menurut seksyen 418 KTN tersebut, Plaintif tidak boleh hanya membawa tindakan terhadap Defendan sahaja kerana Public Bank Berhad sebagai pemegang gadaian hartanah tersebut adalah pihak yang berkepentingan terhadap perintah jualan dan lelongan awam hartanah tersebut mestilah dijadikan sebagai pihak untuk mempertahankan hak statutori mereka ke atas hartanah tersebut. [8] Dalam keadaan ini, Plaintif perlulah memfailkan permohonan terhadap Public Bank Berhad di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur bagi mendapat kebenaran Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur untuk memulakan tindakan undang-undang terhadap Public Bank Berhad. [9] Permohonan Plaintif melalui Saman Pemula 24-564-05/2015 di hadapan Mahkamah ini telah gagal. Plaintif telah juga gagal di dalam rayuannya apabila Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak rayuan Plaintif terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini pada 27.10.2015. [10] Di samping itu, Mahkamah ini perlu menegaskan juga bahawa Plaintif mengelak daripada memfailkan rayuan di bawah seksyen 418 11 KTN sekali lagi kerana tahu bahawa tempoh had masa pastinya tidak memihak kepadanya. [11] Seksyen 418 KTN jelas memperuntukkan berikut: 418. Appeals to the Court (1) Any person or body aggrieved by any decision under this Act of the State Director, the Registrar or any Land Administrator may, at any time within the period of three months beginning with the date on which it was communicated to him, appeal therefrom to the Court. (2) Any such appeal shall be made in accordance with the provisions of any written law for the time being in force relating to civil procedure; and the Court shall make such order thereon as it considers just. (3) In this section “decision” includes any act, omission, refusal, direction or order. [12] Apa yang jelas rayuan di bawah seksyen 418 KTN ini hendaklah dibuat dalam tempoh tiga bulan dari perintah dikeluarkan atau disampaikan kepada orang yang terkilan. Memandangkan lelongan awam tersebut telah dijalankan pada 14.5.2015 adalah ekoran perintah jualan bertarikh 12.3.2015, tempoh masa untuk Plaintif memfailkan rayuan di bawah seksyen 418 KTN ini telahpun lama luput. 12 [13] Di dalam hal ini, Plaintif telah tidak berjaya di dalam percubaannya yang pertama pada Saman Pemula 24-564-05/2015 dan tempoh tiga bulan merayu telah lama luput tempohnya. Kini Plaintif cuba menyalahgunakan proses mahkamah dengan cuba mendapatkan relif berbentuk deklarasi pula di mana remedi undang-undang ini adalah tidak terbuka kepadanya. [14] Undang-undang adalah jelas dan jitu bahawa apabila di bawah satu undang-undang statut telah memperuntukan remedi yang sedia ada dan terbuka bagi orang-orang yang terkilan atas perintah yang dikeluarkan menurut statut tersebut, maka satu remedi deklarasi tidaklah terbuka kepada orang-orang itu. [15] Kedudukan undang-undang mengenai perkara ini adalah jelas dengan merujuk kepada kes-kes berikut: i. Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd v Cecil Abraham (Executor of the Estate of Loo Cheng Ghee) [1998] 4 MLJ 651: “It is beyond dispute that the remedy of declaration is discretionary in nature. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 reads as follows: 13 Any person entitled to any legal character, to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to the character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, the plaintiff need not in that suit ask for any further relief: Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration or title, omits to do so. Explanation — A trustee of property is a 'person interested to deny' a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and for whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee.' (Emphasis added.) Although s 41 is not a complete code upon the subject of declaratory decrees (Attorney General of Hong Kong v Zauyah Wan Chik & Ors and another appeal [1995] 2 MLJ 620) and the power to make a declaration is almost unlimited (Hanson v Radcliffe Urban District Council [1922] 2 Ch 490 at p 507 per Lord Sterndale MR), yet, the remedy of declaration may be refused upon settled principles. Thus, generally speaking, the court will not grant a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41).” ii. Hakim K.C Vohrah (YA pada ketika itu) di dalam kes Lokmanal Hakim Ramli & Ors v. Hj. Ismail Ishak & Ors [1992] 2 CLJ (Rep) 795, di dalam memutuskan di dalam perkara-pekara 14 pesaka kecil yang di bawah bidang kuasa Pentadbir Pesaka dan terdapatnya peruntukan rayuan di bawah seksyen 29(1) Akta Pembahagian Pesaka Kecil 1955 telah menyatakan berikut di muka surat 798 dan 798: “In this case the matters complained of relate to a small estate which under the Act are within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Collector; the plaintiffs should under s.29(1) of the Act have appealed against both orders of the Collector made on 22 February 1987, the order made under s.13 relating to the distribution of the property and the other order made under s. 14 relating to the colleteral dispute. I am not unmindful of the Supreme Court case of Development and Commercial Bank Bhd. v. Land Administrator, Wilayah Persekutuan [1991] 2 MLJ 181 on the availability of the remedy available to him to redress a grievance he has against a decision or order of an authority constituted under a statute. The Plaintiffs in this case are indeed applying, inter alia, for a declaration that the defendants had renounced their beneficial share in the property of deceased Ishak and for a consequential order to set aside the Collector’s order of distribution. However, all the plaintiffs being aggrieved parties within the meaning of 2. 29(1) of the Act they had a right of appeal and they should have appeal and they should have appealed under s. 29(1) and the remedy of declaration is not open to them.” 15 iii. Di dalam Manggai v Government of Sarawak & Anor [1970] 2 MLJ 41, Mahkamah Persekutuan di muka surat 44 telah memutuskan antara lain seperti yang berikut: “It is well settled law that the court will not make a declaratory judgment where an adequate alternative remedy is available (see Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd edition, volume 22, page 749, paragraph 1611). To quote but a few authorities in support of that proposition, Lord Herschell said in Barraclough v Brown: "It was argued for the appellant that, even if not entitled to recover the expenses by action in the High Court, he was, at all events, entitled to come to that court for a declaration that on the true interpretation of the statute he had a right to recover them. It might be enough to say that no such case was made by the appellant's claim. But, apart from this, I think it would be very mischievous to hold that when a party is compelled by statute to resort to an inferior court he can come first to the High Court to have his right to recover – the very matter relegated to the inferior court – determined. Such a proposition was not supported by authority, and is, I think, unsound in principle." In Pasmore v The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council Earl of Halsbury L.C. said: "… The principle that where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form of remedy than that given by the statute, is one which is very familiar and which runs through the law." 16 In the more recent case of Wilkinson v Barking Corporation Asquith L.J. said: "… It is undoubtedly good law that where a statute creates a right and, in plain language, gives a specific remedy or appoints a specific tribunal for its enforcement, a party seeking to enforce the right must resort to that remedy or that tribunal, and not to others." iv. Hakim Hepworth di dalam kes Chop Chuah Seong Joo v. Teh Chooi Nai & Ors. (1963) 29 M.L.J. 96, di muka surat 100 telah menyatakan: “In the present case the plaintiffs were not without a remedy. They were specifically given a right of appeal on a point of law by section 11 of the 1956 Ordinance. They have suffered no injustice because they have only themselves to blame for not pursuing the appeal. In my opinion section 11 of the 1956 Ordinance provides for an aggrieved party an entirely adequate alternative remedy and accordingly this is not a case in which a claim to a declaration should be entertained.” [16] Di dalam kes ini, Plaintif juga telah memohon perintah deklarasi bahawa beliau adalah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut sedangkan pada lelongan awam yang dijalankan pada 14..5.2015, hartanah tersebut telah berjaya dibida oleh seorang bernama Lee ZiXin yang telah membayar penuh harga belian dan melalui No. 17 Perserahan 10614/2015 bertarikh 16.12.2015, Lee ZiXin kini adalah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Hak dan kepentingan Lee ZiXin sebagai tuanpunya berdaftar dan pembeli suci hati hartanah perlulah dipelihara dan Plaintif tidak boleh sewenang-wenangnya memohon deklarasi seperti yang dipohonnya di dalam Kandungan 1. Permohonan Plaintif ini adalah jelas suatu penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang yang tidak boleh dibenarkan oleh Mahkamah ini, [17] Atas alasan-alasan di atas sahaja, permohonan Plaintif ini semestinya gagal dan saman pemula Plaintif di dalam Kandungan 1 hendaklah ditolak. Justeru itu, Kandungan 1 Plaintif dengan ini ditolak kos sebanyak RM5000.00. .................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 22 haribulan November 2016 18 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Munir & Co. Encik Munir Abdullah Peguamcara Defendan - Kamar Penasihat Undang-Undang Negeri Selangor Puan Nurhamimah Binti Amrah

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-380-04/2016

PLAINTIF Khuah Teck Seng DEFENDAN Siti Ruz Adiba Binti Abdul Karim

22/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH A,LAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO.: BA-24-380-04/2016 Dalam perkara mengenai tanah yang dipegang di bawah No. Hakmilik PM 505, Lot 64699, Bandar Selayang, Taman Selayang Utama, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor. Dan Dalam Perkara Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 11.06.2013 di antara Ahmad bin Kamaruddin, Chooi Pue Yeng dan Khuah Teck Seng Dan Dalam Perkara Seksyen 327 dan Seksyen 329 Akta Kanun Tanah Negara ANTARA KHUAH TECK SENG ...PLAINTIF DAN SITI RUZ ADIBA BINTI ABDUL KARIM ...DEFENDAN 2 ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Permohonan Kandungan 1, 24 & 15) A. PENGENALAN [1] Di hadapan Mahkamah ini terdapat terdapat tiga (3) permohonan yang telah difailkan oleh pihak Plaintif dan Defendan untuk pertimbangan dan penentuan Mahkamah ini. Ketiga-tiga permohonan tersebut adalah: i. Saman Pemula (Kandungan 1) - Permohonan Plaintif menurut seksyen 327 Kanun Tanah Negara (KTN) untuk membatalkan kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan dan seksyen 329 KTN untuk gantirugi atas kemasukan salah kaveat (compensation for wrongful caveats, and limitation on repeated applications). ii. Kandungan 24 - Permohonan Plaintif di bawah Aturan 41 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) untuk menerima masuk Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif sebagai afidavit yang sah. 3 iii. Kandungan 15 - Permohonan Defendan untuk penangguhan sementara prosiding sehingga penyelesaian guaman sivil BA-22NCVC-175-03/2016. [2] Plaintif (Khuah Teck Seng, KP: 791214-14-5883) di dalam kes ini adalah seorang individu yang juga seorang ahli perniagaan. Plaintif telah membeli sebuah rumah kepunyaan pasangan suami isteri Chooi Pue Yeng (nama Islamnya Nur Agnes bt Abdullah, No. K/P: 771021-10-5326) dan Ahmad bin Kamaruddin (No. K/P: 680812-08- 6623) yang mempunyai alamat di No. 17, Jalan SU 40, Taman Selayang Utama, 68100 Batu Caves, Selangor yang dipegang di bawah hakmilik PM 505, Lot 64699, Bandar Selayang, Taman Selayang Utama, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (selepas ini dikenali sebagai “hartanah tersebut”) pada 11.6.2013. [3] Defendan (Siti Ruz Adiba binti Abdul Karim, KP: 931006-14-5872) pula adalah wanita ketiga yang dikahwini oleh Ahmad bin Kamaruddin. 4 B. LATAR BELAKANG KES [4] Latar belakang kes yang membawa kepada ketiga-tiga permohonan tersebut adalah seperti berikut: 4.1 Hartanah tersebut sebelum pembeliannya oleh Plaintif adalah kepunyaan bersama Chooi Pue Yeng (Chooi) dan Ahmad bin Kamaruddin (Ahmad) yang masing-masing memegang setengah (1/2) bahagian daripada hartanah tersebut. Semasa Plaintif membeli hartanah tersebut, segala urusan pembelian dan penjualan di pihak tuanpunya bersama (Chooi dan Ahmad) telah dikendalikan oleh Chooi di mana Chooi telah diberikan kuasa oleh Ahmad untuk mewakili dirinya dalam segala urusan dan hal ehwal hartanah tersebut melalui satu Surat Kuasa Wakil yang ditandatangani oleh Ahmad bertarikh 5.2.2008 {Eksibit “KTS 2”, Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif (Kandungan 2)}. (Surat Kuasa Wakil tersebut). 5 4.2 Surat Kuasa Wakil tersebut telah didaftarkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak melalui No. Perserahan 32/2008 pada 22.2.2008. 4.3 Melalui suatu Offer To Purchase bertarikh 31.3.2013 (Eksibit “KTS 3”, Kandungan 2) Plaintif telah memberi persetujuannya kepada Chooi untuk membeli hartanah tersebut pada harga belian yang telah dipersetujui oleh kedua-dua pihak iaitu pada harga RM700,000.00. 4.4 Kemudian daripada itu, satu perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut telah dimasuki di antara Plaintif dan Chooi pada 11.6.2013 (Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut - Ekshibit- “KTS 1”, Kandungan 2). 4.5 Firma peguamcara yang menguruskan sepenuhnya urusan penjualan dan pembelian hartanah tersebut bagi pihak Plaintif adalah Tetuan B K Soong & Ng. 6 4.6 Bagi membiayai pembelian hartanah tersebut, Plaintif telah memperolehi pinjaman perumahan daripada Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad. {Facility Agreement bertarikh 3.1.2014 ditandakan sebagai “ekshibit- KTS 5” (Kandungan 2)}. 4.7 Pembayaran penuh harga belian hartanah tersebut telahpun dijelaskan oleh Plaintif apabila Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad melepaskan bayaran terakhir pada 27.3.2014. (Surat Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad ditandakan sebagai “ekshibit- KTS 4”, Kandungan 2) 4.8 Hartanah tersebut sehingga pemfailan Saman Pemula ini masih belum dapat dipindahmilik kepada Plaintif kerana Plaintif telah terpaksa berdepan dengan halangan-halangan yang ditimbulkan oleh Ahmad dan ahli keluarganya. Justeru, satu Surat Kuasa Wakil telah ditandatangani oleh Chooi bagi faedah Plaintif telah didaftarkan di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur dan Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak pada 20.8.2014. 7 4.9 Seperti yang dinyatakan tadi, Plaintif sehingga kini masih tidak dapat melaksanakan proses pindah milik hartanah tersebut kepadanya kerana Plaintif telah terpaksa memulakan beberapa tindakan undang-undang di Mahkamah Tinggi atas tindakan ahli-ahli keluarga Ahmad yang telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke hartanah tersebut. Begitu juga dengan Chooi yang telah terpaksa memfailkan beberapa Notis di dalam Borang 19C KTN (Borang Cadangan Pemotongan Kaveat Persendirian) untuk membatalkan kaveat-kaveat persendirian dimasukkan oleh Ahmad dan ahli keluarganya. i. Ahmad telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut pada 10.1.2014 melalui Perserahan No. 1658/2014. Notis Borang 19C telah disampaikan kepada Ahmad pada 14/05/2014 didaftarkan pada 30 April 2014 jam 11:38:36 pagi. Kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Ahmad kemudiannya telah dibatalkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak. 8 ii. Ahmad sekali lagi telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian pada bulan 14.5.2014 dan kemudian sekali lagi Notis Borang 19C telah disampaikan pada 19/08/2014 kepada Ahmad dan didaftarkan pada 12 Ogos 2014 jam 11:54:24 pagi. Kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Ahmad ini juga kemudiannya telah dibatalkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak. iii. Zainab binti Omar Bakis (Zainab) isteri pertama Ahmad telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian (No Pers 2582/2014) ke atas hartanah tersebut pada 14.7.2014 dan kemudiannya telah dibatalkan oleh Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak. Di dalam Borang 19B Zainab bertarikh 14.7.2014, alasan Zainab di dalam memasukkan kaveat persendiriannya ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah seperti berikut: “SAYA ADALAH ISTERI PERTAMA DAN MASIH LAGI MENJADI ISTERI KEPADA AHMAD BIN 9 KAMARUDDIN. HAK RUMAH TERSEBUT ADALAH SAYA. RUMAH LOT PM 505 LOT 64699. SAYA TINGGAL DI RUMAH TERSEBUT DAN ANAK JUGA.” iv. Pada pada 22.8.2014, anak lelaki Ahmad bernama Masyar pula telah memasukkan kaveat persendirian No. Perserahan 2902/2014 ke atas hartanah tersebut atas alasan bahawa sebagai anak kepada Ahmad yang memegang setengah bahagian hartanah tersebut, maka beliau mempunyai kepentingan benefisial terhadap hartanah tersebut. Di dalam Borang 19Bnya Masyar telah mengemukakan alasan yang berikut: “SAYA ANAK KEPADA AHMAD BIN KAMARUDDIN TIDAK BERSETUJU MANA-MANA PIHAK MENJUAL ATAU PINDAH HAK MILIK TANAH LOT 64699 PM 505 KERANA AYAH SAYA AHMAD BIN KAMARUDDIN TIDAK BERSETUJU DI PINDAH HAK MILIK ATAU DIJUAL. TUJUAN SAYA UNTUK MEMASUKKAN 10 KAVEAT INI BAGI MENJAGA KEPENTINGAN BAPA SAYA.” Untuk membatalkan kaveat yang dimasukkan oleh Masyar tersebut, Plaintif telah memfailkan Saman Pemula No. 24-295-03/2015 di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam terhadap Masyar Bin Ahmad. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, YA Akhtar Tahir telah membenarkan permohonan Plaintif dan telah memerintahkan kaveat Masyar dibatalkan. 4.10 Perlu Mahkamah ini nyatakan di sini bahawa di hadapan YA Akhtar Tahir, Masyar yang telah cuba mempertahankan tindakannya memasukkan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut telah membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut: i. beliau, ibunya Zainab dan bapanya tinggal dan mendiami hartanah tersebut dan bapanya dan Chooi telah bercerai. Namun, isu harta sepencarian Ahmad dan Chooi masih belum diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah 11 Alam. Sebagai anak Ahmad, beliau mempunyai kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut. ii. Surat Kuasa Wakil bertarikh 22.2.2008 adalah surat kuasa palsu dan bapanya tidak ada pengetahuan tentang penjualan hartanah tersebut kepad Plaintif. iii. harga jualan hartanah tersebut pada RM700,000.00 adalah di bawah harga pasaran semasa. [5] Di hadapan Mahkamah ini pula, Defendan yang mendakwa sebagai isteri Ahmad telah juga memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut pada 11.11.2015 dan kaveat persendirian Defendan telah didaftarkan oleh Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak di bawah No. Perserahan: 3598/2015. [6] Kaveat-kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan dan ahli keluarga Ahmad telah menyebabkan dokumen perserahan bagi pendaftaran pindahmilik hartanah yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif ditolak oleh Pejabat Tanah Daerah Gombak. 12 [7] Bagi membatalkan kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan ke atas hartanah tersebut pada 11.11.2015, Plaintif telah memfailkan Kandungan 1 ini. [8] Defendan telah menentang permohonan Plaintif dengan memfailkan Afidavit Balasan Defendan yang diikrarkan oleh Siti Ruz Adiba binti Abdul Karim pada 16.6.2016 dan juga difailkan pada 16.6.2016. [9] Sebelum penentuan dibuat ke atas Kandungan 1, Defendan telah membangkitkan bantahannya ke atas Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif yang telah diserahkan kepadanya sehingga membawa kepada pemfailan Kandungan 24 oleh Plaintif. C. PERMOHONAN DI DALAM KANDUNGAN 24 [10] Sebelum perbicaraan Kandungan 1 ditetapkan di hadapan hakim, kes ini telah ditetapkan untuk pengurusan kes di hadapan Timbalan/ Penolong Kanan Pendaftar bagi urusan-urusan pemfailan kertas kausa. Pada 17.6.2016, apabila kes dipanggil di hadapan Puan Sazlinidayu (Timbalan Pendaftar) (TP) terdapat dua peguam hadir 13 mewakili Defendan iaitu Goh Chi Han dan Mohd Rizal. TP telah membangkitkan terdapatnya kekeliruan di dalam lantikan peguamcara Defendan kerana Defendan telah melantik dua firma peguam yang berbeza untuk mewakilinya yang mana kehadiran yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan di dalam Memorandum Kehadiran bertarikh 3.6.2016 telah dimasukkan oleh Tetuan Riza, Yusoff & Partners. Di dalam Afidavit Balasan Defendan yang dikrarkan pada oleh Siti Ruz Adiba pada 16.6.2016 yang menentang permohonan Plaintif, firma peguamcara yang memfailkan afidavit tersebut tertera nama Tetuan Riza, Yusoff & Partners. Namun, pada 7.6.2016, Tetuan Goh Chin Han telah memfailkan pula Notis Perlantikannya sebagai peguamcara Defendan. [11] Oleh itu, TP telah meminta Defendan membuat pengesahan peguamcara yang mana satu sebenarnya yang mewakili Defendan. Pada tarikh tersebut juga salah seorang peguam Defendan telah membangkitkan bantahan di atas afidavit sokongan Plaintif yang diserahkan kepada Defendan atas alasan kandungan dokumen- dokumen tidak jelas/tidak lengkap kerana terdapat helaian yang 14 tercicir (missing). Peguam Plaintif telah berjanji membetulkan keadaan tersebut. [12] Atas bantahan tersebut, Plaintif telah mengemukakan lampiran- lampiran yang tercicir di dalam Afidavit Sokongannya kepada peguamcara Defendan. Walaubagaimanapun, melalui surat bertarikh 29.6.2016, peguam Defendan (Tetuan Riza, Yusoff & Partners) telah mengemukakan bantahan kepada peguam Plaintif bahawa Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif yang telah diserahkan kepada Defendan tidak mempunyai tarikh tandatangan dan pengikraran oleh Plaintif di hadapan Pesuruhjaya Sumpah bernama Mohd Irwan bin Mohd. Radzi. [13] Peguam Plaintif dengan itu telah menyemak semula afidavit sokongan Plaintif yang ada di dalam simpanan mereka dan mendapati di dalam afidavit sokongan simpanan tersebut tarikh pengikraran dan Plaintif menandatangani afidavit tersebut di hadapan Pesuruhjaya Sumpah adalah pada 5.4.2016. 15 [14] Peguam Plaintif seterusnya telah memfailkan Afidavit Tambahan Mohd Irwan bin Mohd Radzi yang diikrarkan pada 30.6.2016 (Kandungan 10) yang membuat pengesahan bahawa memang sebenarnya Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif telah ditandatangani oleh Plaintif di hadapannya pada 5.4.2016. “2. Saya adalah Pesuruhjaya Sumpah yang telah menyaksikan tandatangan Khuah Teck Seng di atas Afidavit Sokongan tersebut yang telah ditandatangani pada 5.4.2016 seperti tarikh-tarikh yang dinyatakan dalam Ekshibit-Ekshibit Afidavit Sokongan tersebut. 3. Saya dengan sesungguhnya menyatakan bahawa saya telah tercicir untuk meletakkan cop tarikh pada Afidavit Sokongan tersebut di mana ini adalah satu kesilapan perkeranian.” [15] Berhubungan dengan perkara ini juga, Plaintif telah memfailkan Kandungan 24 memohon Mahkamah ini menerima masuk afidavit sokongan Plaintif sebagai suatu afidavit yang sah di bawah Aturan 41 Kaedah 4 KKM 2012. 16 [16] Defendan telah membantah permohonan Plaintif ini dengan menghujahkan bahawa afidavit sokongan Plaintif adalah defektif dan cacat. Oleh itu ianya tidak boleh digunakan bagi menyokong permohonan Plaintif. [17] Aturan 41 Kaedah 4 KKM 2012 memperuntukkan berikut: Penggunaan afidavit cacat (A.41, k. 4) 4. Suatu afidavit boleh, dengan kebenaran Mahkamah, difailkan atau digunakan sebagai keterangan walaupun apa-apa ketidakteraturan dalam borangnya. [18] Di dalam perkara ini juga, Mahkamah perlu menekankan di sini bahawa penelitian kepada Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif yang telah difailkan di Mahkamah ini iaitu di Kandungan 2, mendapati bahawa Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif tersebut telah ditandatangani dan diikrarkan oleh Plaintif di hadapan Pesuruhjaya Sumpah Mohd Irwan bin Mohd. Radzi (Mohd Irwan) pada 5.4.2016. [19] Oleh itu fakta yang tidak boleh dinafikan adalah bahawa Afidavit Sokongan Plaintif di hadapan Mahkamah ini adalah satu afidavit yang telah ditandatangani dan diikrarkan oleh Plaintif di hadapan seorang 17 Pesuruhjaya Sumpah bernama Mohd Irwan bin Mohd. Radzi pada 5.4.2016. [20] Mohd Irwan di dalam afidavitnya juga telah mengesahkan bahawa Plaintif sememangnya telah menandatangani afidavit sokongannya di hadapan beliau pada 5.4.2016 cuma salinan yang diserahkan kepada Defendan telah tercicir akan tarikhnya dan adalah satu kesilapan perkeranian “clerical mistake”. [21] Di dalam hal ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini menurut undang-undang, afidavit sokongan Plaintif ini tidak ada kecacatannya kerana afidavit sokongan yang telah difailkan oleh Plaintif di Mahkamah adalah afidavit yang telah ditandatangan dan diikrarkan Plaintif di hadapan pesuruhjaya sumpah pada tarikh 5.4.2016. Dalam erti kata lain, penandatanganan dan pengikraran di hadapan pesuruhjaya sumpah berlaku pada hari yang ditarikhkan pada afidavit sokongan tersebut yakni 5.4.2016. [22] Namun, apa yang berlaku di dalam kes ini salinan afidavit sokongan Plaintif yang telah diserahkan kepada Defendan tidak tertera 18 tarikhnya. Jadi persoalannya adakah di dalam keadaan ini Defendan boleh mengatakan bahawa afidavit sokongan tersebut adalah satu afidavit yang defektif dan tidak sah serta tidak boleh digunakan untuk menyokong permohonan Plaintif. Sedangkan salinan Mahkamah adalah salinan yang bertarikh, begitu juga salinan simpanan Plaintif. Tambahan lagi di dalam kes ini Mohd Irwan sendiri telah mengesahkan bahawa tarikh Plaintif menandatangani dan mengikrarkan deposisinya di hadapan beliau adalah pada 5.4.2016. [23] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa apa yang penting di sini adalah melihat dan menentukan samada dengan ketinggalan / ketiadaan tarikh itu, adakah Defendan telah dimudaratkan atau telah diprasangkakan atau diprejudiskan? [24] Mahkamah ini tidak nampak apakah kemudaratan atau prasangka yang ditimbulkan kepada Defendan dengan ketinggalan tarikh pada tandatangan dan pengikraran pada salinan yang telah diserahkan kepadanya. Walhal peguam Defendan atau Defendan sendiri tidakpun perasan atau menyedari akan ketiadaan/ketinggalan tarikh tersebut sehinggalah pada 29.6.2016 apabila bantahan mengenainya 19 dibuat di dalam surat peguamcara Defendan bertarikh 29.6.2016 tersebut. [25] Mahkamah ini perlu menegaskan bahawa lebih kurang dua minggu sebelum tarikh 29.6.2016 ini, Defendan telahpun memfailkan afidavit balasannya yang diikrarkan dan difailkan pada 16.6.2016 bagi menentang permohonan Plaintif. Adalah menjadi pandangan Mahkamah bahawa pada masa pendeposan afidavit balasan ini, Defendan telah mendeposkan afidavit balasannya dengan anggapan/ seolah-olah bahawa afidavit sokongan Plaintif bertarikh. Mahkamah berpandangan begitu kerana tiada bantahan mengenai ketiadaan tarikh ini telah ditimbulkan oleh Defendan di dalam afidavit balasannya kerana Defendan sendiri tidak menyedari akan ketinggalan tarikh tersebut. Kini, adalah tidak terbuka kepada Defendan untuk mengatakan bahawa tinggalan tarikh itu telah memudaratkannya atau menimbulkan prejudis kepadanya. [26] Dengan pemfailan afidavit balasan Defendan di dalam Kandungan 7 tersebut pada 16.6.2016, Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan hujahan 20 peguam Plaintif bahawa Defendan tidaklah diprejudiskan dalam mana-mana cara juapun apabila telah diserahkan dengan afidavit sokongan Plaintif yang tidak diletakkan tarikh. [27] Maka adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa tiada kecacatan yang ditimbul yang boleh mengakibatkan afidavit sokongan Plaintif itu menjadi defektif atau tidak sah. [28] Kalaupun wujud ketidakaturan, ketidakaturan ini dengan mudah dapat dipulihkan oleh Mahkamah ini dengan kuasa yang ada padanya di bawah Aturan 1A KKM 2012. (Sila rujuk: i. Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 47; ii. Maria binti Yusof v Abdullah Bin Gendak [2015] MLJU 714; iii. Metrojaya Bhd & Anor v BTC Clothier Sdn Bhd & Anor [1996] 5 MLJ 45). [29] Di samping itu, atas alasan-alasan di atas Mahkamah ini juga boleh menerima kemasukan afidavit sokongan Plaintif sebagai keterangan menurut Aturan 41 Kaedah 4 KKM 2012. 21 Keputusan Mahkamah [30] Mahkamah ini dengan ini membenarkan permohonan Plaintif di dalam Kandungan 24. Mahkamah memerintahkan juga bahawa tiada perintah mengenai kos bagi permohonan ini. D. PERMOHONAN DI DALAM KANDUNGAN 15 [31] Defendan di dalam Kandungan 15 nya memohon Mahkamah ini agar menggantung atau menangguhkan prosiding ini sementara menunggu penyelesaian kes Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam No. Guaman: BA-22NCVC-175-03/2016 dilupuskan atau diselesaikan. [32] Menurut Defendan, tindakan sivil BA-22NCVC-175-03/2016 ini telah dimulakan oleh Ahmad terhadap bekas isterinya Chooi bagi mendapatkan relif deklarasi bahawa Surat Kuasa Wakil bertarikh 5.2.2008 adalah palsu dan tidak sah dan Chooi diperintahkan untuk menghentikan dengan segera sebarang urusan jual beli hartanah tersebut. 22 [33] Adalah dihujahkan bagi pihak Defendan bahawa penangguhan sementara tindakan ini adalah perlu kerana guaman BA-22NCVC- 175-03/2016 ini akan mempunyai kesan secara langsung dan/atau akan menentusahkan hak dan/atau lokus Plaintif untuk memfailkan dan/atau meneruskan tindakan beliau di dalam Saman Pemula di hadapan Mahkamah ini. [34] Prinsip undang-undang berhubung dengan perlaksanaan budi bicara mahkamah samada untuk membenarkan atau menolak sesuatu permohonan untuk penggantungan prosiding telah diperuntukan dalam pelbagai otoriti. Pertimbangan utama yang perlu dipertimbangkan dan ditekankan oleh mahkamah di dalam perlaksanaan kuasa budi bicaranya samada membenarkan atau tidak sesuatu permohonan untuk penangguhan prosiding adalah samada wujud keadaan-keadaan khas. Adalah juga menjadi undang-undang bahawa prinsip yang terpakai di dalam sesuatu permohonan penggantungan perlaksanaan adalah terpakai sama bagi permohonan untuk penggantungan prosiding. (Sila lihat kes Re Hj Abdul Malik Khan; Ex P Bank Bumiputra Bhd [2006] 8 CLJ 534). 23 [35] Di dalam kes Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86, Raja Azlan Shah, H (Tuanku pada waktu itu) telah mendefinisikan keadaan-keadaan khas seperti berikut: “Special circumstances, as the phrase implies, must be circumstances as distinguished from ordinary circumstances. It must be something exceptional in character, something that exceeds or excels in some way that which is usual or common”. [36] Walau bagaimanapun, apa yang membentuk dan merangkumi keadaan-keadaan khas adalah berbeza antara satu kes dengan satu kes yang lain kerana ianya bergantung kepada fakta-fakta kes. Beban bagi membuktikan wujudnya keadaan-keadaan khas untuk menjustifikasikan penggantungan penangguhan prosiding adalah terletak di bahu Pemohon. (Sila lihat Kosma Palma Oil Mills Sdn Bhd & Ors Koperasi Serbausaha Makmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 257.) [37] Hakim Mahkamah Rayuan, Zawawi Bin Salleh dalam kes Jagdish Singh a/l Banta Singh v Outlet Rank (M) Sdn Bhd [2013] 3 CLJ 47 di dalam menekankan perlaksanaan kuasa budi bicara mahkamah tanpa batasan di dalam membenarkan penangguhan atau 24 penggantungan prosiding telah menggariskan beberapa pertimbangan-pertimbangan yang telah diambil kira oleh mahkamah yang membentuk keadaan-keadaan khas sebagai panduan. Memetik Mahkamah Rayuan dalam muka surat 221 adalah seperti berikut: “...Now, what factors or principles will, and should, guide the courts in applications for a stay of an order granted by a court. These factors or principles have been reiterated in very many of cases decided by our courts. The factors or principles so enumerated are in exhaustive, and not all of them are application to every case. Each has its own peculiar principle. Some of the principles to be considered in the motions may be stated as follows; a) the courts have an unimpeded discretion to grant or refuse stay. In this, like in all other instances of discretion, the court is bound to exercise that discretion both judicially as well as judiciously and not erratically (see Serangoon Garden Estate Ltd v Ang Keng [1953] 1 MLJ 116; Leong Poh Shee v Ng Kat Chong [1966] 1 MLJ 86; b) an unsuccessful party applying for a stay must show “special circumstances”. What will constitute “special circumstances” will no doubt vary from case to case. The fact that an appeal would be rendered nugatory if stay was refused is the most common one (see Kosma Palma Oil Mill Sdn Bhd & Ors v Koperasi Serbausaha Markmur Bhd [2004] 1 MLJ 25 257; [2003] 4 CLJ 1 and Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd; Ling Beng Sung v Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd &Ors (No.2) [1976] 1 MLJ 131). The application is not granted as matter of routine and it is not an automatic or mechanical relief slavishly followed after filing an appeal. In every matter or suit before a court of law, whether in its original or appellate stage of proceedings, the court will consider the competing rights of both parties including the applicant and respondent to justice; (c) there is a need to preserve the res or preservation of the subject matter of litigation. The courts have an obligation to protect the res for the purpose of ensuring that the appeal, if successful, will not be rendered nugatory (see Erinford Properties Ltd v Cheshire County Counsil [1974] 2 WLR 749). But where it is shown by affidavit evidence, say by the respondent that the res will not be destroyed or there is in fact no res, an application may not be granted. (d) where an application is an abuse of the court process, then the stay of proceedings will not be granted. A typical example of abuse of court process is where a suit is duplicated or where a party employs improper and perverse procedure to obtain an advantage undeservedly; (e) it is important to stress that initiation of a suit in a court of law demands the suit will be heard expeditiously and completed without any inhibition midway. Therefore where an application for stay of proceedings is intended to merely stop or suspend the proceedings, it will be refused. Some applications, on seeing the weakness of their client’s case, would resort to 26 application for stay and thereby waste the time of the other party and the court. The party simply cannot resort to the interlocutory of stay proceedings on having the slightest disagreement with any ruling of a trial judge. Courts are enjoined not a encourage such unwholesome practice; and (f) an application for stay of proceedings must come with clean hands because what he is asking is an equitable relief. Equity will not assist the unclean. That is why the court has to look into the antecedents of the parties”. [38] Di dalam kes ini, Defendan sebagai isteri kepada Ahmad telah memohon Mahkamah ini untuk menangguh atau menggantung prosiding yang dimulakan Plaintif di Mahkamah sehingga penyelesaian atau pelupusan tindakan Guaman No. BA-22NCVC- 175-03/2016 yang dimulakan oleh Ahmad terhadap Chooi. Mahkamah ini menyatakan bahawa Guaman No. BA-22NCVC-175- 03/2016 yang dimulakan oleh Ahmad adalah sangat jelas tiada kaitan langsung dengan Defendan. Pertamanya, Defendan bukanlah tuanpunya berdaftar hartanah tersebut. Kedua, perhubungan Defendan sebagai isteri Ahmad tidak mewujudkan apa-apa kepentingan Defendan ke atas hartanah tersebut. Tindakan Ahmad di 27 dalam guaman BA-22NCVC-175-03/2016 terhadap bekas isterinya Chooi tidak ada sebarang kaitan dengan Plaintif yang telah membeli hartanah tersebut melalui suatu transaksi yang sah di sisi di sisi undang-undang yang di dalam erti kata lain Plaintif adalah seorang pembeli bona fide hartanah tersebut. [39] Justeru, sekiranya Defendan sendiri tidak mempunyai kaitan dengan guaman BA-22NCVC-175-03/2016 tersebut, maka mungkin timbul persoalan keadaan-keadaan istimewa bagi penangguhan sementara prosiding ini. Permohonan Defendan itu juga merupakan suatu penyalahgunaan proses mahkamah (abuse of the court process). Keputusan Mahkamah [40] Atas alasan-alasan di atas, permohonan Defendan di dalam Kandungan 15 ini langsung tidak mempunyai merit, justeru Mahkamah ini menolak Kandungan 15 dengan kos sebanyak RM3000.00 kepada Plaintif. E. PERMOHONAN DI DALAM KANDUNGAN 1 28 [41] Di dalam percubaan Defendan mempertahankan kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkannya, Defendan telah membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut: i. beliau adalah isteri kepada Ahmad yang memegang ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut dan juga sedang mendiami hartanah tersebut bersama Ahmad, maka beliau mempunyai kepentingan benefisial ke atas hartanah tersebut yang melayakkan beliau untuk memasukkan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut bagi menjaga kepentiingan dirinya sendiri dan pihak suaminya. ii. Ahmad dan Chooi walaupun telah bercerai tetapi isu harta sepencarian di antara Ahmad dan Chooi masih belum diputuskan di Mahkamah Tinggi Syariah Shah Alam. iii. penjualan hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif adalah di luar pengetahuan Ahmad dan Ahmad tidak pernah bersetuju untuk menjual hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif pada harga RM700,000-00 yang mana adalah rendah dan di bawah harga pasaran semasa. 29 iv. Ahmad tidak pernah menandatangan Surat Kuasa Wakil bertarikh 5.2.2008 tersebut dan surat kuasa wakil tersebut adalah surat kuasa wakil palsu. v. Ahmad telah mengambil tindakan undang-undang terhadap Chooi dengan pemfailan Guaman No: BA-22NCVC-175- 03/2016 dan Ahmad juga telah memfailkan satu permohonan untuk mendapatkan satu perintah injunksi interim terhadap Chooi umtuk menghalang Chooi daripada meneruskan proses penjualan dan pindah milik hartanah tersebut. [42] Mahkamah ini perlu menegaskan di sini bahawa alasan-alasan Defendan di atas kecuali alasan (v) adalah alasan-alasan yang sama yang telah digunakan oleh Masyar di dalam mempertahankan kemasukan kaveatnya. Apa yang berbeza adalah perhubungan mereka dengan Ahmad di mana Mashyar adalah anak lelaki Ahmad, manakala Defendan adalah isteri Ahmad. 30 [43] Mahkamah ini juga telah meneliti Borang 19B Kanun Tanah Negara Defendan di dalam memasukkan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut, Di dalam Borang 19B tersebut, Defendan telah mengemukakan alasan-alasan berikut: Alasan-alasan tuntutan kami atas kepentingan itu ialah:- Saya isteri kepada AHMAD BIN KAMARUDDIN (NO. K/P: 680812-08-6623) sebagai pemilik ½) bahagian hartanah ke atas PM 505 Lot 64699, Bandar Selayang Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor. Dan untuk menjaga hak kepentingan saya dan suami saya hartanah tersebut, di sini saya memohon supaya suatu kaveat persendirian dimasukkan untuk mengikat tanah yang diperihalkan dalam jadual di bawah hartanah PM505 Lot 64699, Bandar Selayang, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor. Hartanah tersebut ini adalah untuk suami-isteri sekeluarga. F. Samada Defendan mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut [44] Prinsip undang-undang berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat adalah jelas. Di dalam sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Mahkamah hendaklah menentu dan mempertimbangkan persoalan-persoalan berikut: 31 i. samada pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. ii. samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan. iii. samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan. iv. samada terdapat keadaan istimewa di pihak pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah. [45] Di dalam perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat, Majlis Privy di dalam kes Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 telah memutuskan berikut: “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence 32 presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.” [46] Di dalam kes Kho Ah Soon V Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah sekali lagi menekankan berkenaan prinsip undang-undang di dalam pembatalan kaveat di mana Peh Swee Chin, HMP telah menyatakan di muka surat 184 seperti berikut: “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated 33 by Lord Diplock, the serious question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. [47] Di dalam perkara ini juga, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719 telah menggariskan ujian-ujian yang harus digunapakai di dalam menentukan dan menimbangkan sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat di mana mukasurat 724, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan berikut: “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary one. At first stage, the court will examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat to see whether they show a caveatable interest. Once the court is satisfied that the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim disclosed a serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the court must decide where the balance of convenience” [48] Di dalam kes ini adalah jelas bahawa Plaintif telah membeli hartanah tersebut daripada Chooi dan Ahmad (yang telah memberikan kuasa kepada Chooi untuk mewakilinya di dalam segala perkara / hal 34 berhubung hartanah tersebut), tuanpunya bersama hartanah tersebut melalui perjanjian jualbeli bertarikh 11.6.2013. Sebagai pembeli, Plaintif telah melaksanakan segala tanggungjawab atau obligasinya sebagai pembeli dengan membuat pembayaran penuh harga belian hartanah tersebut. Malangnya, Plaintif tidak dapat melaksanakan transaksi pindah milik hartanah kepadanya kerana telah wujud kaveat-kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh Ahmad dan ahli keluarganya. [49] Defendan telah cuba menggugat kepentingan dan hak Plaintif ke atas hartanah tersebut dengan memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut bersandarkan alasan-alasan yang tidak bermerit, tidak boleh dipertegakkan atau dipertahankan langsung. Mahkamah berkata begini atas alasan-alasan berikut: i. Defendan bukanlah tuanpunya hartanah tersebut. Tuanpunya ½ bahagian hartanah tersebut sebelum penjualannya kepada Plaintif adalah Ahmad, suami Defendan. Percubaan Ahmad untuk memasukkan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut pun tidak 35 berjaya apatah lagi Defendan yang tidak ada kena-mengena / tidak ada kaitan langsung dengan hartanah tersebut. ii. Alasan Defendan yang mengatakan beliau sebagai isteri kepada Ahmad di mana menurut undang-undang Islam Ahmad adalah bertanggungan sebagai suami untuk menyediakan tempat tinggal kepadanya dan telah tinggal di hartanah tersebut bersama Ahmad sejak berkahwin justeru mengujudkan hak benefisialnya ke atas hartanah tersebut adalah tidak berasas langsung. Tanggungan Ahmad sebagai suami di sisi undang- undang Islam untuk menyediakan isteri (Defendan) tempat tinggal dengan Defendan yang tidak ada kaitan dengan hartanah tersebut, tidak memberikan Defendan suatu kepentingan benefisial kepada Defendan. Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Defendan tidak langsung mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan yang boleh dikaveatkan (caveatable interest) ke atas hartanah tersebut’ [49] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini, bahawa Defendan adalah tidak berhak di sisi undang-undang untuk mencabar pelupusan 36 hartanah tersebut kepada Plaintif, apatah lagi, Defendan adalah bukanlah pihak-pihak kepada perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 11.6.2013. [50] Tindakan Defendan dan ahli keluarga Ahmad sangat memprejudiskan Plaintif sebagai pembeli bona fide hartanah tersebut. [51] Mahkamah ini juga perlu menyatakan di sini bahawa Defendan telah juga menggunakan alasan bahawa di dalam guaman sivil BA- 22NCVC-175-03/2016 terdapat satu permohonan untuk injunksi interim menghalang Chooi daripada meneruskan proses penjualan dan pindah milik hartanah tersebut, namun permohonan Ahmad tersebut telah ditolak dengan kos pada 18.7.2016. [52] Tindakan Defendan sebegini adalah satu penyalahgunaan proses undang-undang dan pejabat tanah dan semestinya tidak boleh dibenarkan. Tambahan lagi, Plaintif di dalam kes ini telahpun mendapatkan kebenaran dan kelulusan Pihak Berkuasa Negeri untuk pindahmilik dan gadaian ke atas hartanah tersebut masing-masing pada 23.10.2013 dan 24.10.2013. 37 [53] Atas alasan-alasan di atas Defendan sememangnya tidak mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut. Di dalam keadaan ini, apabila Defendan gagal melepasi ujian peringkat pertama iaitu membuktikan bahawa beliau mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut, maka peringkat-peringkat seterusnya samada terdapat pendedahan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan, samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan ataupun samada terdapat keadaan istimewa untuk pengekalan status quo menjadi tidak relevan lagi. Keputusan Mahkamah [54] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas Mahkamah ini membenarkan Kandungan 1 Pemohon dan dengan ini mengeluarkan perintah- perintah berikut: a) Bahawa Mahkamah membatalkan kaveat persendirian di bawah No. Perserahan 3598/2015 yang dimasukkan oleh Defendan, Siti Ruz Adiba Binti Abdul Karim pada 11.11.2015 ke atas hartanah di bawah hakmilik No. PM 505, Lot 64699 Bandar Selayang, Taman Selayang 38 Utama, Daerah Gombak, Negeri Selangor (selepas ini dikenali sebagai hartanah tersebut). b) Bahawa Defendan dan/atau mana-mana wakilnya dan/atau mana- mana pihak dihalang daripada memasukkan sebarang kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut bermula daripada tarikh saman pemula ini difailkan; c) Bahawa Defendan dan/atau mana-mana wakilnya dan/atau mana- mana pihak yang telah memasukkan sebarang kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut selepas daripada tarikh saman pemula ini difailkam hendaklah terbatal secara serta-merta; d) Bahawa Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak, Selangor mengambil segala tindakan dan langkah yang perlu bagi membatalkan pendaftaran Kaveat tersebut di atas tanah tersebut; e) Bahawa Mahkamah membenarkan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak, Selangor mengambil segala tindakan yang perlu bagi memproses pindahmilik kepada Plaintif sebagai pembeli bona fide; f) Bahawa Mahkamah membenarkan Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Gombak, Selangor mendaftarkan pindahmilik secara terus tanpa perlu 39 memohon untuk mendapatkan semula kebenaran pindah milik dan gadaian “state consent” selepas 23.10.2013 sekali lagi; g) Bahawa Defendan hendaklah membayar segala kerugian-kerugian yang ditanggung oleh Plaintif yang akan ditaksirkan oleh Penolong Kanan Pendaftar akibat kemasukan kaveat Defendan ke atas hartanah tersebut. h) Defendan membayar kos tindakan sebanyak RM10,000.00 kepada Plaintif. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 22 haribulan November 2016 40 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Tho Ng & Partners Tho Yin Fatt Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Goh Chin Han Goh Chin Han

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-808-08/2016

PLAINTIF Central Spectrum (M) Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN

21/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=a35bdb06-eb58-4e14-bf70-1aa64fdbed22&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: BA-24-808-08/2016 Dalam perkara Perjanjian Jual Beli bertarikh 17/04/2015 di antara Central Spectrum (M) Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 183136-D) dan Polygold Beverages Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 767725-W); Dan Dalam perkara MahkamahTinggi Malaya di Shah Alam Guaman No. BA-22NCVC-65-02/2016 di antara Tho Mei Poh berniaga atas nama Forest Properties (No. Pendaftaran: E(3) 1637) dan Central Spectrum (M) Sdn Bhd No. Syarikat: 183136-D); Dan Dalam perkara Mahkamah Sesyen di Shah Alam Guaman No. BA- B52NCVC-193-06/2016 di antara Hon Kum Yong berniaga atas 2 nama First Industrial (No. Pendaftaran Perniagaan: 000857840-P) dan Central Spectrum (M) Sdn Bhd (No. Syarikat: 1831316-D); Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 7, Aturan 57 dan Aturan 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah, 2012 BETWEEN CENTRAL SPECTRUM (M) SDN BHD (Company No. 183136-D) ...PLAINTIFF AND 1. THO MEI POH T/a FOREST PROPERTIES (Registration No. E(3) 1637) 2. HON KUM YOONG (NRIC No. 600108-08-6301) Sole proprietor carrying business in the name and style of FIRST INDUSTRIAL (Registration No. 00857840-P) …DEFENDANTS 3 GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (ENCLOSURE 1) A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] This an application filed under Order 57 Rule 1 of the Rules of High Court 2012 (“ROC”). The Plaintiff in the present Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) is simply applying for a transfer of another case the Plaintiff has with the 2nd Defendant instituted in the Shah Alam Sessions Court Suit No. BA-B52NCVC-193-06/2016 (“Sessions Court case”) to the High Court of Shah Alam to be heard together with another case the Plaintiff has with the 1st Defendant instituted in the Shah Alam High Court Suit No. 22NCVC-65-02/2016 (“High Court Suit”) under Order 4 of the ROC. [2] Central Spectrum (M) Sdn Bhd (“Plaintiff”) previously was the registered owner of 8 lots of industrial land (“Lands”). The Plaintiff has appointed two separate agents to sell off the Plaintiff’s lands. Both appointments were made at separate times and vide separate documents. Tho Mei Poh (Forest properties) (“1st Defendant”) as well as Hon Kum Yoong (First Industrial) (“2nd Defendant”) were the agents separately appointed by the Plaintiff 4 to sell off the Plaintiff’s Lands. It is undisputed that the 1st Defendant was appointed as the Plaintiff’s ad hoc agent vide a letter dated 23.5.2015 (“1st Contract”) while the 2nd Defendant was appointed as the Plaintiff’s ad hoc agent vide a letter dated 26.11.2014 (“2nd Contract”). It remains undisputed that the Lands were subsequently sold to Polygold Beverages Sdn Bhd (previously known as Etika Beverages Sdn Bhd) (“Purchaser”). Both the 1st and 2nd Defendants claim agency fees for the successful sale and purchase of the Plaintiff’s Lands to the Purchaser. [3] The entire basis of the Plaintiff’s present case is that the Plaintiff should not be found to be liable to two separate agency fees for one single transaction. However this Court must emphasise that, such a supposition is void of any legal authority and is a substantive matter that should not be determined in the present Originating Summons and as such cannot be the basis of the Plaintiff’s case. Having two agency fees for one single transaction is not altogether peculiar if it may be proven that the sale and purchase agreement is a culmination of two agents’ works. The 1st Defendant and the 2nd Defendant might have their own set of facts of contribution that had led to the successful sale and purchase of 5 the Plaintiff’s Lands. It is not necessarily double claiming. As long as it can be proven that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have indeed performed their duties as agents leading up to the sale and purchase, then the Plaintiff is inevitably liable to pay both of the Defendants’ agency fees. If that is to be the case, then the Plaintiff has itself to blame to subject itself to appoint two agents who both have performed their end of the bargain under their respective contracts. B. WHETHER THERE ARE REASONS TO CONSOLIDATE OR TO TRY THE SESSIONS COURT CASE AND THE HIGH COURT CASE TOGETHER [4] This Court has earlier highlighted that it is not altogether preposterous for the Plaintiff to be liable to pay two separate agency fees for one single transaction so long as it is proven that both the 1st and 2nd Defendants have duly performed their respective contracts. Thus, the Plaintiff cannot stake its case on the underlying notion that a vendor cannot be subjected to numerous agency fees for one single transaction. There is no such general rule and the Plaintiff has not at all furnished any 6 precedents or authorities to persuade this Court to agree to the same. [5] Thus the remainder of the Plaintiff’s contention is that the cases should be heard together in view of avoiding duplicity of proceedings on the ground that the same facts, evidence, and witnesses would have to be called and furnished in two separate proceedings. It is the Plaintiff’s contention that the present Application is made bona fide in efforts to save time and costs. Nonetheless, this Court hesitates nothing to dismiss this contention brought forth by the Plaintiff. The present Application has nothing to do with saving costs and time and instead has everything to do with the Plaintiff attempting to eschew away from the possibility of having to pay both the agents that it has appointed (being the 1st and 2nd Defendants) for their work done. [6] The only common feature or fact between the High Court Case and the Sessions Court case is just the subject matter involved (being the Lands) and Purchaser involved in the sale. All other facts revolving the appointment of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the causes of action, the introduction of the Purchaser to the Plaintiff, the terms under the appointments, as well as the persons involved 7 in the performance of the two separate contracts are altogether distinct and different. [7] The Plaintiff largely relies in Order 4 rule 1 of the ROC in contending that the two cases arise out of the same or series of transaction (in reference to the sale and purchase) or that the two cases share the same questions of law or facts. [8] Now, this Court must highlight that the Plaintiff has too conveniently made an isolated application of the provision only to the fact of the sale and purchase of the lands. This is the sole ‘transaction’ that the Plaintiff strenuously submits to this Court. However, this Court must highlight that the transaction involved in the two cases is not just limited to the sale and purchase of the Plaintiff’s lands but also the transaction between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, as well as the transaction between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant that had led to the contractual relations and liabilities between the parties under their respective contracts. What transpired between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant is of no concern to the 2nd Defendant and vice versa. The Defendants themselves are not privy to whatever contracts each Defendants has with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff cannot look at the sale and 8 purchase transaction in isolation only to the conclusion of the sale of the lands. The transaction spans from the separate facts of the separate appointments of the 1st and 2nd Defendants as the Plaintiff’s agents, the separate terms of the 1st and 2nd Contracts, obligations and liabilities of between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant and between the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant, the separate and distinct performance of the 1st and 2nd Defendants under the separate contracts, and ultimately the conclusion of the sale and purchase of the land. It is patently clear here, besides the common conclusion of the sale and purchase of the land, every other fact to the transaction are altogether distinct and irrelevant of each other. The 1st Defendant’s performance under its contract with the Plaintiff does not affect or deter the 2nd Defendant’s performance under its separate contract with the Plaintiff and vice versa. [9] The 1st and 2nd Defendant’s rights to be paid do not solely depend on the transaction of the sale and purchase but also depend on each agent’s respective performance under the different contracts. The series of transaction is completely different between the 1st Defendant’s cause of action and performance under the 1st Contract with the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant’s cause of action 9 and performance under the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff. There are two separate contracts, different set of terms and obligations, separate facts of the performance of the respective contracts, and separate causes of action which gave rise to the 1st and 2nd Defendant’s separate rights to claim against the Plaintiff. [10] Owing to the disparity as alluded above, the questions of fact or law in the two suits also differ. The relevant question of law in the High Court Case would revolve around the 1st Defendant’s appointment as the Plaintiff’s agents and the terms governing the 1st Contract which the 2nd Defendant is not privy to and is irrelevant to the 2nd Defendant. The relevant question fact in the High Court Case would revolve around the 1st Defendant’s performance under the 1st Contract it entered with the Plaintiff, which does not concern the 2nd Defendant at all. The differences would apply vice versa in the Sessions Court case. Whatever that was agreed and performed between the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff is of no relevance to the 1st Defendant. If it so happens that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have played their respective part in performing their respective contracts, then the Plaintiff would inevitably be liable to pay both the 1st and 2nd Defendants for their joint-contribution (in 10 performance of each separate contracts) leading to the conclusion of the sale and purchase of the lands. [11] There is no risk of financial hardship, injustice or prejudice to the Plaintiff if the Plaintiff is found to be liable to pay both the Defendants. It is more probable than not that the Plaintiff is caught in its own rash pursuit to conclude the sale with the least amount of costs. It is undisputed that the 2nd Defendant had offered its services at half the price (RM610,253.38) as compared to the 1st Defendant’s fees (RM1,220,506.75). [12] Allegedly the facts go as far as that the 1st Defendant had introduced the Purchaser to the Plaintiff. Instead of following through with the Purchaser upon the 1st Defendant’s introduction, the Plaintiff instead side-stepped the 1st Defendant’s introduction and attempted to sell off the land at half the agency fees through the 2nd Defendant to the Purchaser’s own subsidiary/ related company (Pok Brothers Sdn Bhd). It was even admitted by the Plaintiff that the deal with Pok Brothers Sdn Bhd ultimately had led to the conclusion of the sale not with Pok Brothers Sdn Bhd, but with the Purchaser (which was introduced by the 1st Defendant). Understanding these facts would reveal the underlying reason 11 behind the Plaintiff’s predicament of possibly having to pay two different agency fees for one single sale of lands. [13] Having the above in mind, it is patently clear that the facts regarding the performance of the 1st and 2nd Defendants of each respective contract are utterly different and is irrelevant of each other. The High Court would be dealing with the 1st Defendant’s performance of the 1st Contract with the Plaintiff (which is irrelevant to the 2nd Defendant) and the Sessions Court would be dealing with the 2nd Defendant’s performance of the 2nd Contract with the Plaintiff (which is irrelevant to the 1st Defendant). Consequently, the witness and evidence relevant to the two cases is different from one another, further disproving the Plaintiff’s contention that having the cases heard together would save time and costs. [14] This Court is guided by the case of Ng Joo Soon @ Nga Ju Soon v Devechem Holdings (M) Sdn Bhd & 9 Ors Suit No. D1-26-68- 2008 in which the High Court had held that: “The whole rationale behind consolidation is to benefit everyone concerned by saving time and costs, and avoiding duplicity; be it of witnesses, counsel or the court. In this case 12 the two proceedings separately progressed… without affecting one another.” [15] Applying the same principle enunciated in the precedent above, it is vividly clear that it is altogether unjustifiable to have the two cases consolidated or tried together as the two cases do not affect one another and that there is no risk of duplicity of witness, counsel or the Court. [16] It has also already been decided that the mere sharing of common subject matter (lands) is not sufficient ground to have two different cases consolidated or tried together within the ambit of Order 4 rule 1 of the ROC. (see Mayban Trustee Bhd v Amalan Tepat Sdn Bhd & Anor [2006] 5 CLJ 43) [17] This Court draws further guidance to Amelia Tee J’s recent decision in the case of Asia Pacific Higher Learning Sdn Bhd v Eagle One Investment Ltd [2016] 1 LNS 234. This Court is minded that the facts of this case differ from the present case in that the Court there dealt with the application for consolidation of two separate cases for defamation. Nonetheless the principle 13 applied in this case remains valuable and relevant to the present case. Amelia Tee J had decided the following: “The 6th Defendant further states that the alleged libel in Guaman 8 is based on the complaint of the plaintiff against the publication of only one article whereas that in Guaman 7 was based on the complaint of an individual named Wan Mazlan bin Mohamed Woojdy against 4 articles… … The Court is well aware of the factors to be borne in mind when considering an application for transfer and consolidation. In this case, the Court is not convinced that with different plaintiffs in the two suits and with different alleged defamatory statements, the two suits could be easily consolidated and heard together”” [18] The relevant principle here is that, since the two suits arose from different sets of defamatory statements, then the two suits accordingly arose from different causes of action based on different statements. Similarly so in the present case the different 14 Plaintiff, being the 1st and 2nd Defendant based their claim on different contracts separately entered into with the Plaintiff. Thus, the 1st and 2nd Defendant’s case arose from different causes of action. Therefore, there are no reasons for the two cases to be consolidated and heard together. [19] Thus it is clear that the High Court case and the Sessions Court case do not share the same questions of law or facts, and same or series of transaction. This Court accordingly finds that the Plaintiff’s application to have the two cases to be either consolidated or to be tried at the same time is entirely baseless. [20] Consequently, it is not necessary to deliberate on whether or not the Sessions Court case should be transferred to be tried by the same High Court under Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC as there are no reasons that the two cases be heard together by the same Court to begin with. Not only that, none of the grounds (which remain unproven) contended by the Defendant fall within the considerations stipulated under Order 57 rule 1(4) of the ROC. In fact, the Plaintiff has not at all submitted on the applicability of Order 57 rule 1 of the ROC to the present case in its submission. 15 [21] Thus, having all of the above in mind, this Court finds that there is no reason to transfer the Sessions Court Case to the High Court to be heard together with the High Court Case. C. COURT’S DECISION [22] In view of all of the findings above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has ultimately failed to prove its case. [23] This Court accordingly dismisses the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons with costs of RM 5000.00 to the 1st Defendant. [24] This Court also orders that there will be no order as to costs in respect of the 2nd Defendant as the 2nd Defendant did not file any affidavit to oppose the Plaintiff’s application and as a matter of fact when this case was called up for case management before the Senior Assistant Registrar (SAR) on the 8.8.2016, the counsel for the Plaintiff who was also mentioning on behalf of the 2nd Defendant’s solicitor had informed the SAR that the 2nd Defendant has no objection to the Plaintiff’s application. 16 ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 21st of November 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Wong Lu Peen & Tunku Alina Andrew Teh Sara Anthony For the Defendants - Messrs Sanjeev Kumar Sanjeev Kumar Rasiah

Tika 2.6.0

WA-22C-31-05/2016

PLAINTIF Hamidah Fazilah Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia (UTHM)

21/11/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=62469ac1-41d1-40ec-b761-77601139a960&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) SUIT NO: WA-22C-31-05/2016 BETWEEN HAMIDAH FAZILAH SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (Company No: 461022-V) AND UNIVERSITI TUN HUSSEIN ONN MALAYSIA (UTHM) ... DEFENDANT JUDGMENT OF Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG [1] The Plaintiff is a Contractor appointed by the Defendant under a Design and Build Contract with respect to the construction and completion of a Multipurpose Hall in Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia at Batu Pahat, Johor Darul Takzim. The Contract dated 3 May 2011 is based on the PWD Form DB (Rev.2007). 2 [2] The Contract Sum was for RM30,550,000.00. The Revised Contract Sum was RM37,580,900.12 after taking into account Additional Works and Provisional Sum. The Plaintiff had made various Interim Progress Claims No.1 to 13 and these had been paid by the Defendant. [3] The present action by the Plaintiff is for the sum of RM22,677,356.87 for Additional Works. The Defendant's stand as stated in their Affidavit is that these Additional Works fell within the scope of the Design and Build Contract and so are not payable. The Defendant further contended that there was a delay of one year in the completion of the Works and so they are entitled to LAD claim of RM5,300.00 per day and with 141 days of delay the total amount of LAD is RM747,300.00. The Defendant further stated in their Affidavit that a sum of RM36,932,461.79 had been paid as at 12 October 2011. Prayers [4] There were initially several prayers in Enclosure 6 filed by the Defendant. These included a prayer for striking out the Statement of Claim pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19 (a), (b) and (d) of the Rules of Court 2012 (“ROC 2012”) as well as a prayer for an order to strike out certain paragraphs in the Statement of Claim filed herein. 3 [5] There was also prayer (c) which is the Defendant's application for stay of the Court proceedings under Section 10 (1) of the Arbitration Act 2005 pending reference of the dispute that has arisen to arbitration. [6] At the hearing of Enclosure 6, learned counsel for the Defendant had withdrawn all the other prayers other than prayer (c) and so these other prayers were struck out. [7] Thus Enclosure 6 is confined only to the prayer for stay of the Court proceedings pending reference to arbitration under section 10 Arbitration Act 2005. Principles [8] Section 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005 provides as follow: "10. Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court (1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed 4 (2) The Court, in granting a stay proceeding pursuant to subsection (1), may impose any conditions as it deems fit" (emphasis added) [9] Therefore, if the Defendant that is being brought to Court, has not taken any other steps in the Court proceedings, the Court shall grant a stay of the proceedings, as an Arbitration Agreement is a term of the Contract and the Court would give effect to it. [10] The exception is when the said Agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, then the Court would not grant a stay of the proceedings and the parties in such an instance would have to proceed with litigation in Court. Whether the Defendant in this case had taken further steps in the proceedings such as to disentitle them to apply for a stay [11] The Plaintiff complained that the Defendant had through their solicitors on 7 June 2016 written to the Plaintiff's solicitors requesting for further and better particulars of paragraphs 70-74 of the Plaintiff's Statement of Claim. See Exhibit HS -2 in Enclosure 8. This, the Plaintiff submitted is "taking any other steps in the proceedings" disentitling them under section 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005 for an order for stay. 5 [12] The Federal Court of Sanwell Corp v Trans Resources Sdn Bhd & Anor [2002] 2 MLJ 625, decided under the Arbitration Act 1952 was cited as authority for this proposition. At page 631 it was held as follow: “At this juncture, we note the existence of one salient fact in Usahabina which was mentioned in passing by the learned JC, but unfortunately not properly appreciated by him. It is this fact. In that case, the defendant who had entered an unconditional appearance failed to file his defence within the time limited for doing so. He had requested for, and the plaintiff had agreed to, an extension of one week to file the defence. Pausing here for a moment, what the defendant did was clearly a step in the proceedings within the meaning of s 6 of the Act by requesting an extension of time to file the defence, clearly indicating an intention to deliver a statement of defence, thus abandoning the right to arbitration. ... While the learned JC correctly noted that in substance, the application of the defendant was primarily to have the judgment set aside and consequently for the case to be stayed pending reference to arbitration or, alternatively, for leave to be allowed to file his 6 defence and other relevant documents, the learned JC erred in failing to take into account that the defendant had gone a step further than the entry of an unconditional appearance in that, as hereinbefore mentioned, he had requested an extension of time to file his statement of defence. The defendant’s belated attempt to resort to arbitration was an afterthought after judgment in default had been entered against him." (emphasis added) [13] Furthermore, the Federal Court in determining the issue in relation to “taking step in proceeding” explained at page 634 as follow: “The words underlined do not appear in the Malaysian Act. Under the English Act, it is very clear that the first step of entering an appearance is not included in the phrase ‘other steps in the proceedings’. The time frame prescribed for applying to the court for a stay of the proceedings is ‘at any time after appearance’ but before ‘delivering any pleadings’ or ‘before taking any other steps in the proceedings’. If the applicant has taken his first step in the proceedings by entering an appearance, that step is a permissible step that is not considered to be a step in the proceedings that would bar an application for stay. However, if the applicant has 7 subsequently delivered any pleadings, or taken any other step in the proceedings which indicates his election to allow the action to proceed in the court, the applicant will be considered to have abandoned his right to seek recourse to arbitration and would be barred from applying for a stay of the proceedings. Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed, Reissue) para 627, at pp 347-348, explains the situation: “The applicant must have taken no step in the proceedings after acknowledgment of service. A step in the proceedings is an act which both invokes the jurisdiction of the court and which demonstrates the applicant’s election to allow the action to proceed. An applicant may take what would otherwise be a step if he makes it clear that the act is done without prejudice to his right to apply for a stay. Steps in the proceedings have been held to include: the filing of an affidavit in opposition to a summons for summary judgment, service of defence, and an application to the courts for leave to serve interrogatories, or for a stay pending the giving of security for costs or for an extension of time for serving a defence, 8 or for an order for discovery, or for an order for further and better particulars.” (emphasis added) [14] I think the context of the letter asking for further and better particulars must be looked into to ascertain if the Defendant had evinced a clear and unequivocal intention to abandon arbitration and to elect for litigation to resolve the dispute that had arisen. [15] Paragraph 2 of the said letter started off by the solicitors for the Defendant categorically stating that the action filed by the Plaintiff in the High Court is inconsistent with the intention of the parties under Clause 67 of the Contract to proceed with arbitration to resolve all matters, disputes and differences arising out of or in connection with the Contract. The whole of Clause 67 was then set out. [16] Paragraph 3 of the said letter reiterates that the reference should be to arbitration as agreed by the parties to the Contract. [17] The last paragraph in paragraph 6 ended with the note that their client, the Defendant, shall apply for a stay of the proceedings pending reference to arbitration pursuant to Clause 67 of the Contract and that the Defence be filed after the disposal of the application for stay. 9 [18] In such a context, it can hardly be said that the request for further and better particulars of certain paragraphs of the statement of claim that the Contract had been signed under coercion and duress, is a further step in the proceedings when all that the Defendant wanted is to understand the claim better. The Defendant's solicitors in their said letter expressed their bewilderment at this allegation because it was not stated who in the Defendant had been guilty of coercion and duress here and the particulars of the coercion and duress. Furthermore Progress Claims No 5 to 13 had been paid by the Defendant and that at no material time had there been any allegation of coercion and duress. Certificate of Practical Completion had also been issued in August 2012 and there was not the slighted suggestion of coercion and duress until the filing of this action in Court. The Defendant's solicitors stated that the further and better particulars are needed to help the Defendant prepare their Defence. This is to be differentiated from filing a Defence as even when the claim should be referred to arbitration, the Defendant would still need to prepare its Defence. [19] The request for further and better particulars is generally made because before an application is made to Court for an order that those particulars be given, the applicant must show that he has written by letter 10 for the particulars he requires or else the Court may refuse to make the order unless the Court is of the opinion that there were insufficient reasons for an application by letter not having been made. See O 18 r 12 (6) ROC 2012. [20] What is more important was that there was no prayers for an order for better and further particulars to be furnished by the Plaintiff and that all the other prayers in the single application filed had been withdrawn with the exception of the prayer (c) for the proceedings to be stayed pending reference to arbitration. At most the request for further and better particulars in the whole context of the said letter is only an act preparatory to taking a further step in the proceedings and not a further step in the proceedings. [21] In Life Plaza Sdn Bhd v Pasukhas Construction Sdn Bhd [2012] MLJU 176, Justice Amelia Tee Abdullah J held that the defendant's action there in serving a Notice to Produce Documents mentioned in the pleadings as well as a letter asking for further and better particulars are no doubt "other actions" as stated by the Federal Court in Sanwell Corporation (supra) but that they are not positive steps that amount to an 11 unequivocal intention to proceed with the suit and hence they do not amount to having taken positive steps in the proceedings. [22] In CLS Power System Sdn Bhd v Sara Timur Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 0298, Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) held that the defendant's Notice to Produce Documents referred to in Pleadings issued pursuant to O 24 r 10 ROC 2012 without any qualification or reservation is a further step in the proceedings that would disqualify them from getting a stay of the proceedings. [23] In our present case the letter requesting for better and further particulars was qualified with the clear intention expressed in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 6 to proceed with arbitration and that a stay for this purposes will be applied for. [24] The New Zealand case of Pathak v Tourism Transport Ltd [2002] 3 NZLR 681 is often cited as authority for the proposition that a request for further and better particulars is a step in the proceedings. The plaintiff there had filed proceedings in court seeking interim relief with reference to an arbitration agreement. After the application for the interim relief had been settled, the plaintiff applied for a stay of the court proceedings and an order to refer to dispute to arbitration. 12 [25] However upon a closer reading of the case, it would be obvious that the High Court there, was influenced by the fact of multiple actions being taken by the plaintiff/applicant, that included not just seeking further and better particulars of the defence but also providing further particulars of their statement of claim, verifying List of Documents, filing a memorandum setting out a summary of plaintiff's claim, attending directions conference before the Master and also inspecting documents contained in the defendant's List of Documents. It was in that context that the High Court held that there was delay in applying for stay and that significant steps have been taken in the proceedings such that the plaintiff is said to have elected to submit the dispute to the Court. [26] In the present case, the Plaintiff could not be said to be in doubt as to the true intention of the Defendant which was expressly stated as proceeding with arbitration in resolving the disputes and that the Defendant could not be said to have elected to proceed with litigation and to have waived their rights to proceed with arbitration. There must be a significant step taken in the proceedings in Court to signal a shift of intention to forgo arbitration for litigation; to abandon arbitration and to accept the submission to the jurisdiction of the Court that the Plaintiff had initiated. 13 [27] In the light of the new regime introduced by the UNCITRAL Model Law and which principles are incorporated into the Arbitration Act 2005, parties should be given every encouragement and facility to go for arbitration as they have agreed in the arbitration agreement and absent a clear intention to abandon that altogether, the Court should hold the parties to their bargain in keeping with the parties' expressed intention. [28] It must also be said in passing that there is no impediment to the Arbitrator deciding on the issue of the validity of the arbitration agreement even though the Plaintiff had raised coercion and duress in the execution of the Contract containing the arbitration agreement. Section 18(1) Arbitration Act 2005 provides that the Arbitrator may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. Learned counsel for the Defendant referred to the case of Chin Keat Seng v Lee Yoke Yam & Ors [2009] 1 LNS 1799, where a similar approach was taken when there were allegations of invalidity of the arbitration agreement. 14 Whether the matter, dispute or difference is the subject matter of the of the Arbitration Agreement [29] In ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 633 at page 643, Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) emphasized the mandatory language in which section 10(1) is couched with respect to a stay of court proceedings when there is a valid arbitration clause: “[26] It will be appreciated that the language in sub-s 10(1) is couched in mandatory terms with the use of the word ‘shall’. Where the terms of sub-s 10(1) are met, the court is obliged to stay court proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration. The only exception to this is provided within sub-s 10(1) itself and that is where the court finds the “agreement to be null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.” [30] This palpable paradigm shift towards upholding the bargain of the parties to arbitration and the readiness of the Courts to grant a stay of proceedings with the advent of the Arbitration Act 2005 have been alluded to in a number of cases. In CMS Energy Sdn Bhd v Poscon Corp [2008] 6 MLJ 561 at page 569 it was observed as follows: 15 “[18] In my view if s 10 and s 18 of the Act are read together there is no unmistakable intention of the Legislature that the court should lean towards arbitration proceedings. Under s 10-(1) of the Act, the Court shall stay all proceedings before it in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, and refer the parties to arbitration unless the court is satisfied as to any of the condition in para (a) or (b) of the section as shown above. And in this case none of the condition is applicable.” [31] In Rightmove Sdn Bhd v YWP Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 7 MLJ 687 at page 693 it was highlighted as follows: “[14] Thus, from a reading of s 10(1) of the Act in its current form and the case authorities referred to above, it appears to me that the conditions requisite to the granting of stay of proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement are: (i) the current proceedings are in respect of a matter which is the subject of the arbitration agreement and (ii) the applicant has not taken any other steps in the proceedings. Once these are met, the court is mandatorily required to refer the parties to arbitration unless the plaintiff can 16 show that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed...." (emphasis added) [32] Whilst under the old Arbitration Act 1952 the word used was "may", under the new Arbitration Act 2005 the word used is now "shall", signifying a clear shift towards referring such a matter to arbitration and indeed making it mandatory as opposed to the old Arbitration Act 1952 where the discretion is reposed with the Court on whether or not to grant stay. This was once again highlighted in the Federal Court case of Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd v Etiqa Takaful Bhd [2016] 5 MLJ 417 as follows: "[31] Prior to the 2005 Act, the applicable law was the Arbitration Act 1952 (‘the 1952 Act’). The issue of stay of proceedings in the 1952 Act was dealt with under s 6 thereof which reads: 6 If any party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming through or under him commences any legal proceedings against any other party to the arbitration, or any person claiming through or under him, in respect of any matter agreed to be referred to arbitration, any party to the legal proceedings may, before taking any other steps in the proceedings, apply to the court to stay the proceedings, and the court, if satisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter 17 should not be referred in accordance with the arbitration agreement, and that the applicant was at the time when the proceedings were commenced and still remains ready and willing to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration, may make an order staying the proceedings. [32] The clear effect of the present s 10(1) of the 2005 Act is to render a stay mandatory if the court finds that all the relevant requirements have been fulfilled; while under s 6 of the repealed 1952 Act, the court had a discretion whether to order a stay or otherwise." (emphasis added) [33] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff referred to the decision of Justice Mary Lim J (now JCA) in ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v Putrajaya Holdings Sdn Bhd [2014] 10 MLJ 633, where she had succinctly explained the jurisdictional issue in relation to the arbitration agreement as follow: “[36] Subsection 10 (1) requires the court to first and foremost examine whether the ‘proceedings’ in court today are ‘brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement’. If the proceedings are indeed brought in respect of a matter which the 18 parties have agreed should be resolved by arbitration, then the court is obliged to stay these proceedings and ‘refer the parties to arbitration’. ... [38] As to whether the proceedings in court are in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement; that depends on what is the ambit of the arbitration agreement. But, even before that, it must first be recognized that it is the plaintiffs’ claim before the court and not what the defendant’s response or defence is to that claim which bears the brunt of scrutiny." [34] Her Ladyship had emphasized the need to analyze the arbitration agreement in order to determine the jurisdictional issue. In the above cited case, the Defendant application for stay pursuant to Section 10 of the Arbitration Act 2005 was allowed based on the context of the arbitration agreement in that particular case. The relevant clause in that case read as follow: “[40] It is not in dispute that the arbitration agreement is to be found in cl 63 of the first contract which provides: 19 63.1(a) If any dispute or difference shall arise between the Employer and the Contractor, either during the performance or after completion of the Design or the Works, or after the termination of the Contractor’s employment, or breach of this Contract, as to: ... [41] The parties have agreed under cl 63 to refer ‘any dispute or difference’ which arises between the parties to arbitration. Such dispute or difference may arise either during the performance or after completion of the design or the works, or after the termination of the contractor’s employment, or breach of this contract. The dispute may be on (a) the construction of this contract; (b) any matter or thing of whatever nature arising under this contract; or (c) the withholding by the ER of any certificate to which the contractor may claim to be entitled.” (emphasis added) [35] The Arbitration Clause in the said Contract in Clause 67 must now be looked at in its entirety as much debate has been raised regarding its application to the present claim of the Plaintiff: 20 “67.1 If any dispute or difference shall arise between the Government and the Contractor out of in connection with the contract, then the parties shall refer such matter, dispute or difference to the officer named in the Appendix 1 for the decision. 67.2 The decision of the officer named in Appendix 1 shall be in writing and shall subject to clause 67.4, be binding on the parties until the completion of the Works and shall forthwith be given effect to by the Contractor who shall proceed with the Works with all due diligence whether or not notice of dissatisfaction is given by him. 67.3 If the parties: (a) Fail to receive a decision from the officer named in Appendix 1 within forty-five (45) days after being requested to do so, or (b) Are dissatisfied with any decision of the officer named in Appendix 1 then such dispute or difference shall be referred to arbitration within forty-five days to an arbitrator to be agreed between the 21 parties and failing such an agreement to be appointed by the Director of the Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur on the application of either party hereto. Such arbitration shall be heard at the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration and shall be conducted in accordance with rules for arbitration of the Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration using the facilities and the system available at the Centre. 67.4 Such reference, except on any difference or dispute under clause 66 shall not be commenced until after the completion or alleged completion of the Works or determination or alleged determination of the Contractor’s employment under this Contract, or abandonment of the Works, unless with the written consent of the Government and the Contractor. 67.5 In the event that such consent has been obtained in accordance with clause 67.4, the reference of any matter, dispute or difference to the arbitration pursuant to this clause and/or the continuance of any arbitration proceeding consequent thereto shall in no way operate as a waiver of the obligations of the 22 parties to perform their respective obligations under this Contract. 67.6 In the arbitration proceedings conducted pursuant to clause 67.3, the parties may make any counter claim in relation to any dispute or difference arising from the Contract. 67.7 The arbitrator shall have power to review and revise any certificate, opinion, decision, requisition or notice and to determine all matters in dispute which shall be submitted to him, and of which notice and to determine all matters in dispute which shall be submitted to him, and of which notice shall have given in accordance with clause 67.3 aforesaid, in the same manner as if no such certificate, opinion, decision, requisition or notice had been given. 67.8 Upon every or any such reference the cost such incidental to the reference and award shall be in the discretion of the Arbitrator who may determine the amount thereof, or direct the amount to be taxed as between solicitor and client or as between party and party and shall direct by whom and to whom and in what manner the same be borne, awarded and paid. 23 67.9 The award of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding on the parties. 67.10 In the event of the death of the Arbitrator or his unwillingness or inability to act, then the Government and the Contractor upon agreement shall appoint another person to act as the arbitrator, and in the event the Government and the Contractor fail to agree on appointment of an arbitrator, an arbitrator shall be appointed by the Director of the Regional Centre for Arbitration in Kuala Lumpur. 67.11 In the clause, “reference” shall be deemed to be reference within the meaning of the Arbitration Act 2005. 67.12 The arbitration shall be governed by the Arbitration Act 2005 and the laws of Malaysia.” (emphasis added) [36] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff then submitted that the ambit of the arbitration clause in the said Contract Document is that it is only confined to the dispute during, and before the completion of the Works and not after the completion of the Works. He argued that it does not expressly state that the dispute after the completion of the Works should be referred to the Arbitration unlike the arbitration clause in the case of ZAQ Construction Sdn Bhd cited above. 24 [37] Learned counsel further argued that since Clause 67.2 expressly provides that the decision of the officer shall be binding on the parties until the completion of the Works and shall forthwith be given effect to by the Contractor who shall proceed with the Works with all due diligence whether or not notice of dissatisfaction is given by him, it would suggest that parties did not intend any disputes arising after the completion of the Works to be referred to arbitration. [38] That is an unduly restrictive and rigid interpretation of Clause 67.0 on Arbitration taken as a whole. When the general agreement in Clause 67.1 and 67.3 is worded widely and expansively to cover any dispute or difference arising between the parties out of or in connection with the contract that shall be referred to arbitration, there is no reasonable and cogent excuse to then limit the dispute and difference to that which arises before the completion of the Works. To do so would do violence to the language used and indeed would be totally misconceived. [39] The reason why there are many sub clauses focusing on what would happen in the event of a reference to arbitration for a matter, dispute or difference that has arisen during the carrying out of the Works is to ensure that the Works are not delayed and will be carried through to completion. In 25 other words a reference to arbitration would not have the effect of putting the Works on hold and indeed the arbitration should not commence until the completion of the Works so that the parties may focus on completing the Works. Meanwhile under Clause 67.2, the decision of the officer is binding on the parties. [40] I see no good reason to strain the language of the Arbitration Agreement in Clause 67.1 to unnaturally limit the dispute or difference or matter to one arising during the Works and not after the completion of the Works. [41] In fact a holistic reading of Clause 67.4. and the word “Such reference” at the beginning of the said Clause (which refer to the obligation of parties to the refer the dispute to arbitration) would suggest that the really effective way of resolving all matters, disputes and difference can only commence after the completion of the Works, indicating that there is nothing strange and indeed everything sensible for all the disputes finalized after the completion of Works to be referred to arbitration. [42] Clause 67.1 indicates that the obligation of the parties to resolve the issue between them, by referring the dispute to the Officer named in Appendix 1 i.e. the Vice Chancellor of the Defendant. Subsequently, 26 Clause 67.2 indicates that the decision of the said Vice Chancellor shall be binding, and the Plaintiff is obligated to proceed with the Works with all due diligence. Section 67.3 indicates the steps that need to be taken should the parties be dissatisfied with the decision of the Vice Chancellor. [43] In the present claim initiated by the Plaintiff against the Defendant here, the claim was in relation to the variation of the work done amounting to RM22,677,356.87. It was with respect to variation works done during the stage after commencement of the Works and before completion of the Works. As the Defendant's contention is that the so-called variation work is within the scope of work in the Original Contract Documents, this Court is satisfied that the dispute is with respect to the matter arising before the completion of the Works. Therefore even if one were to interpret the Arbitration Agreement narrowly, I would still say that the Arbitration Agreement applies to such a matter, dispute or difference that had arisen before the completion of the Works. [44] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff then submitted that there is just a refusal of the Defendant to pay and so there is no dispute that needs to be referred to arbitration. To say that is to miss the point altogether. The Defendant is stating that what the Plaintiff is claiming under variation works 27 done is in reality within the scope of the Original Contract and thus within the Original Contract Sum as the Contract is a "Design and Build" Contract. It is very clear that a dispute has arisen between the parties with respect to whether the variation work was within the terms of the Original Contract or a variation within the terms of the Contract. That is a matter for the Arbitrator to decide in accordance with the terms of arbitration that the parties have agreed under the Arbitration Agreement. [45] It must be noted that there was also a further amendment made to section 10 Arbitration Act 2005 such that whilst previously the Court has to determine if there was a genuine dispute to be referred to arbitration, now the test is just whether or not there is a matter within the scope of the Arbitration Agreement that is to be referred to arbitration. [46] Thus in KNM Process Systems Sdn Bhd v Mission Biofuels Sdn Bhd [2012] MLJU 839; [2013] 1 CLJ 993 it was highlighted this significant difference leaning towards upholding an arbitration agreement and correspondingly a stay of court proceedings would ordinarily be granted: "[16] It is also evident with the amendment that it is now mandatory on the court to grant stay where the matter before it is the subject of an arbitration agreement unless the arbitration agreement is, in the 28 words of the statute, ‘null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed’. [17] It is no longer possible to argue that in respect of the controversy between the parties there is no ‘dispute’ with regard to the matter to be referred to arbitration, which is a test which invites unnecessary ambiguity and requires the court to determine whether there is a ‘dispute’ between the parties not dissimilar to the function performed by the court in determining whether there is a triable issue in a summary judgment application. The test is now simpler test of whether the matter before the court is the subject of an arbitration agreement or otherwise. To decide on the simpler test, if will become a matter of construction of the relevant arbitration agreement, where it exists.” (emphasis added) [47] In the Press Metal Sarawak Sdn Bhd's case (supra) the Federal Court explained as follows: [28] The present s 10(1) of the 2005 Act (as amended vide Act A1395 which came into force on 1 July 2011 (the 2011 Amendment)) reads: 10(1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, 29 where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. [29] Prior to the 2011 Amendment, s 10(1) provided as follows: 10 Arbitration agreement and substantive claim before court (1) A court before which proceedings are brought in respect of a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall, where a party makes an application before taking any other steps in the proceedings, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds — (a) that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed; or (b) that there is in fact no dispute between the parties with regard to the matters to be referred. [30] Paragraph (b) of s 10(1) was completely repealed by the 2011 Amendment. Previously, there must be in existence a dispute between the parties with regard to the matter to be referred, 30 before a court is empowered to make an order under s 10(1). With the deletion of para (b) the only remaining exception under the present s 10(1) is that the arbitration agreement between the parties is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. ..... [33] What the court needs to consider in determining whether to grant a stay order under the present s 10(1) (after the 2011 Amendment) is whether there is in existence a binding arbitration agreement or clause between the parties, which agreement is not null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. The court is no longer required to delve into the details of the dispute or difference (see TNB Fuel Services Sdn Bhd). In fact the question as to whether there is a dispute in existence or not is no longer a requirement to be considered in granting a stay under s 10(1). It is an issue to be decided by the arbitral tribunal." (emphasis added) [48] Learned counsel referred to ELF Petroleum SE Asia Pte Ltd v Winelf Petroleum Sdn Bhd [1986] 1 MLJ 177 at page 179, wherein it was held as follows: 31 “In my judgment what we have is a mere refusal to pay upon a claim which had been admitted as being owing to the plaintiffs. There is nothing to be settled by arbitration. On a true construction or clause XIV only claims which are bona fide disputes or are bona fide controversies, that call for settlement by arbitration. Where a claim is admitted it does not call for a settlement by arbitration. All that is called for is for payment of the admitted amount which can be by an action in the Courts as has been done in the instant case.” [49] The above case can be easily distinguished because in that case there was an admission on the claim. In our present case there is no admission. At any rate the issue of whether or not there is a dispute is now a matter for the arbitral tribunal to decide as the Federal Court has authoritatively held in Press Metal Sarawak's case (supra). The case of ELF Petroleum (supra) decided as it was under the old section 6 of the Arbitration Act 1952 is no longer applicable under the new Model Law regime introduced by the Arbitration Act 2005 with the decision of the Federal Court in Press Metal Sarawak's case (supra). 32 Whether Clause 70.0 on Governing Law and the Submission to the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Courts of Malaysia would negate the Arbitration Agreement altogether [50] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the parties by agreeing to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Malaysia would be deemed to have abandoned arbitration altogether in favour of litigation. Clause 70.0 is reproduced below: “70.0 LAW GOVERNING THIS CONTRACT 70.1. This Contract shall be governed by and construed according to the law of Malaysia and the parties irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Malaysia. 70.2 The Contractor bind himself to acknowledge and accept as final in all respects within the country of domicile of the Contractor or elsewhere, any decision or award of an Arbitrator or judgment in any court of Malaysia in relation to any dispute between the parties under this Contract. 70.3 This clause shall apply in all respects in case any such decision award or judgment is to be enforced in the courts 33 of the country of domicile of the Contractor or elsewhere in any manner....." (emphasis added) [51] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff drew this Court's attention to the Court of Appeal's case of Lembaga Pelabuhan Kelang v Kuala Dimensi Sdn Bhd & Anor Appeal [2010] 9 CLJ 532, when dealing with the issue of existence of the arbitration clause and the clause in relation to the submission to court jurisdiction, stated as follows: “[29] By cl. 11.1 i.e., the arbitration clause, the parties herein have agreed, first, to resolve any dispute or difference between them arising out of or in connection with DA1. If that attempt fails, they may then refer the dispute or difference to arbitration. The arbitration clause is however subject to the variations and modification in DA1. Clause 2.3 of DA2 provides that in the event of any conflict in the interpretation of the terms of DA1 and DA2, the interpretation of the terms of DA2 shall prevail. This brings me to the first limb of cl. 2.4 of DA2 which sets out the application of the laws of Malaysia as the governing law for the purpose of construction. More importantly, by the second limb of cl. 2.4, the parties have expressly agreed to “submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Malaysia in all 34 matters connected with the obligation and liabilities of the parties under” DA2. Under DA3 cls. 4.3 and 4.4, the parties have expressly agreed and incorporated identical provisions as in DA2 cls. 2.3 and 2.4. I am of the view that “the submission to court jurisdiction clauses” in the subsequent supplemental agreements had taken a completely new dimension. I have no doubt that the parties have reaffirmed their express predominant agreement to submit to the court’s jurisdiction and have effectively abandoned arbitration. Upon reading all these clauses conjunctively, I hold that there is a conflict in the interpretation of cl. 11.1 in DA1 i.e. the “arbitration clause” and “the submission to the court jurisdiction clauses” in cls. 2.4 and 4.4 in DA2 and DA3 respectively. They contradict each other because effect could not be given to enable these clauses to function harmoniously. They operate like discordant music in a chorus of legal expressions. It is simply impossible to have a concurrent and combined situation of arbitration and litigation. It is either arbitration or litigation. [30] In addition, unlike the peremptory word “shall”, the permissive word “may” used in the arbitration clause i.e., cl. 11.1 of DA1 is capable of readily abandoning the discretion to refer to arbitration, 35 and opting for litigation instead, as expressed and contractually agreed by the parties in the supplemental agreements DA2 and DA3 via “the submission to court jurisdiction clauses” that “the parties hereto hereby submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Malaysia in all matters connected with the obligation and liabilities of the parties under this supplemental agreement.” This construction is further strengthened when the parties have contractually agreed that the principal agreement DA1 including the word “may” in the arbitration clause shall be read subject to “the submission to court jurisdiction clauses” in the supplemental agreements which shall prevail. The irresistible conclusion is that while it is true the parties had originally intended to have the discretion to refer their disputes to arbitration, that discretion has been subsequently displaced, compromised or abandoned when they have expressly submitted to the jurisdiction of the court i.e. to litigate all matters connected with the obligation and liabilities of the parties under DA2 and DA3 to which DA1 is subject. The High Court actions are therefore within the jurisdiction of our High Court.” 36 [52] Whereas in the case of Lembaga Pelabuhan Kelang (supra), the arbitration clause was in one agreement and the "submission to the jurisdiction of the court" in another agreement, in the present case, both clauses are in the same contract document. Clearly the parties could not have intended Clause 70.1 to be read to oust arbitration as the parties have once again expressly referred to an "award of an Arbitrator" in Clause 70.2 and about enforcement of an award in Clause 70.3. [53] I find no contradiction between the applicability of the Arbitration Clause in the said Contract Document in Clause 67.0 and the Clause 70.0 in relation to the submission of parties to the jurisdiction of the High Court. [54] As we are all aware, when it comes to certain reliefs in aid of arbitration and more so when it comes to setting aside and enforcement of an arbitral award, the parties seeking such reliefs would still have to come to the relevant Court for assistance. To avoid bickering over what law to apply and which court to apply for such reliefs, parties have addressed this issue at the outset in governing law clause. As both the parties are incorporated in Malaysia and carrying out their business here and as the Project is here, it makes every sense for the laws of Malaysia to apply. Parties have agreed to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Courts of 37 Malaysia where there is a need to come to the Malaysian Courts to apply for interim measures such as an injunction for instance under section 11 Arbitration Act 2005 or for setting aside the Award under section 37 or to refer a question of law under section 42 or under section 38 for enforcement of the arbitral award. [55] Section 11 Arbitration Act 2005 reads as follows: "11. Arbitration Agreement and Interim Measures by High Court 1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings, apply to a High Court for any interim measure and the High Court may make the following orders for: a) security for costs; b) discovery of documents and interrogatories; c) giving of evidence by affidavit; d) appointment of a receiver; e) securing the amount in dispute, whether by way of arrest of property or bail or other security pursuant to the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court; [Am. Act A1395:s.5] 38 f) the preservation, interim custody or sale of any property which is the subject-matter of the dispute; g) ensuring that any award which may be made in the arbitral proceedings is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of assets by a party; and h) an interim injunction or any other interim measure." (emphasis added) [56] Where a harmonious interpretation is possible in an apparent contradiction at first reading, that interpretation is to be preferred lest the baby is thrown out together with the water in the bath tub. It must not be forgotten that such clauses are present in almost all standard form contracts and here we are dealing with the PWD Form DB Contract. I cannot read Clause 70.0 here as reflecting the intention of the parties to abandon arbitration altogether after having addressed their mind on the procedure to be followed before a reference to arbitration is made and when arbitration can be commenced as well as the consequences of proceeding with arbitration and the obligations of the parties set out in 11 sub clauses in Clause 67.0. 39 [57] This is clearly a case where a holistic and harmonious approach is to be followed, giving effect to the clear intention of the parties to resolve all matters arising out of or in connection with the Contract to arbitration. At the same time parties affirm that where they have to approach the Court to aid and assist them in the instances set out above, they would then submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Malaysian Courts. Pronouncement For the all the reasons given above, I was constrained to grant a stay of the current court proceedings pursuant to an application under section 10(1) Arbitration Act 2005 pending reference to arbitration. I also granted costs of RM5,000.00 to the Defendant/Applicant and allocatur to be paid before extracting the order for costs. Dated: 21 November 2016. Sgd Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Malaya 40 For the Plaintiff : Abd Shukor Bin Tokachil (Messrs Shukor & Associates) For the Defendant : Mohaji B. Selamat (Messrs Mohaji Hazury & Ismail) Date of decision: 19 July 2016

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24NCVC-138-07/2016

PLAINTIF ALWEE ALYWIN BIN AZLIM DEFENDAN MUHAMMAD SHAHHID BIN MOHD TOHA

17/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=351833b1-bff6-4263-bfae-c3c96e82cbf6&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24NCVC-138-07/2016 Dalam perkara Aturan 3, Kaedah 5 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012; Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 55, Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7, Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 Dan Dalam perkara bidangkuasa sedia ada Mahkamah yang Mulia ini ANTARA ALWEE ALYWIN BIN AZLIM … PLAINTIF 2 DAN MUHAMMAD SHAHHID BIN MOHD TOHA … DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1) A. PENGENALAN [1] Pada 5.7.2016, Plaintif (Alwee Alywin bin Azlim) telah memfailkan Saman Pemula di dalam Kandungan 1 ini untuk memohon daripada Mahkamah ini satu perintah perlanjutan masa untuk memfailkan Notis Rayuan bagi merayu terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen Shah Alam (keputusan HMS) di dalam Guaman No. A53KJ- 643-09/2014 (Guaman 643) yang diberikan pada 18.1.2016. [2] Guaman 643 ini adalah berhubung dengan tindakan sivil yang difailkan oleh Defendan (Muhammmad Shahhid bin Mohd Toha) atas kemalangan yang yang berlaku pada 23.7.2012 di Subang Jaya (jalan menghala ke Subang Jaya) di antara motorsikal-motorsikal 3 ditunggang oleh Plaintif dan Defendan sehingga melibatkan kecederaan kepada Defendan. [3] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (HMS) telah memutuskan bahawa Plaintif (yang merupakan Defendan di dalam Guaman 643 adalah bertanggungan 80% di atas kemalangan yang berlaku tersebut dan atas kadar tanggungan 100%, HMS kemudiannya memerintahkan dan mengawad Defendan seperti berikut: a. Gantirugi Am 1. Loss of consciousness RM5,000.00 2. Head injury with punctuae heamorrhage RM40,000.00 3. Lung contusion with pneumothorax RM6,000.00 4. C1 - C2 cervical spine subluxation RM27,000.00 5. Multiple facial bone fracture RM12,000.00 6. Soft tissue injuries RM3,500.00 7. Close right galeazzi fracture RM13,000.00 8. Multiple scars and multiple laceration RM8,000.00 9. Muscle wasting RM1,500.00 4 Faedah 5%bagi gantirugi am dari tarikh serahan saman sehingga tarikh keputusan. b. Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif wang gantirugi khas kerosakan pakaian dan barangan peribadi berjumlah RM100.00 (Ringgit Malaysia : Satu Ratus) sahaja dengan faedah 2.5% setahun dari tarikh serahan saman sehingga tarikh penghakiman sahaja dan; c. Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif wang gantirugi khas perbelanjaan keluarga Plaintif untuk melawat serta perbelanjaan untuk rawatan susulan berjumlah RM1,500.00 (Ringgit Malaysia : Satu Ribu Lima Ratus) sahaja dengan faedah 2.5% setahun dari tarikh serahan saman sehingga tarikh penghakiman sahaja dan; d. Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif wang gantirugi khas berjumlah RM2,914.00 (Ringgit Malaysia : Dua Ribu Sembilan Ratus Empat Belas) sahaja dengan faedah 2.5% setahun dari tarikh serahan saman sehingga tarikh penghakiman sahaja dan: e. Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif wang gantirugi kos pembedahan masa hadapan berjumlah RM2,250.00 Ringgit Malaysia : Dua Ribu Dua Ratus Lima Puluh) sahaja dan tanpa faedah; 5 f. Defendan hendaklah membayar kepada Plaintif faedah sebanyak 5% setahun ke atas keseluruhan jumlah penghakiman dari tarikh penghakiman sehingga penyelesaian dan; g. Atas persetujuan dan permintaan Plaintif keseluruhan jumlah penghakiman dibayar kedalam akaun pelanggan Tetuan G. Dorai & Co., h. Defendan juga hendaklah membayar kepada peguamcara Plaintif kos sebanyak RM14,606.00 (Ringgit Malaysia : Empat Belas Ribu Enam Ratus Enam) sahaja. Bertarikh pada 18 Januari 2016 [4] Mahkamah ini telah membicarakan Kandungan 1 Plaintif pada 17.11.2016 dan pada hari yang sama Mahkamah ini telah menolak Kandungan 1 Plaintif dengan kos sebanyak RM2000.00 kepada Defendan. [5] Plaintif yang tidak berpuas hati terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini telah memfailkan Notis Rayuannya pada 17.11.2016 merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. 6 [6] Sebelum Mahkamah ini memberikan alasan-alasan penolakan permohonan Plaintif tersebut, Mahkamah ini perlu menyatakan alasan kenapa alasan penghakiman di dalam kes ini tidak disediakan pada awal-awal lagi. [7] Di dalam Kandungan 1, Plaintif telah cuba mendapatkan perlanjutan masa daripada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk memfailkan Notis Rayuannya untuk merayu terhadap keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bertarikh 18.1.2016 tersebut. [8] Berdasarkan keputusan Mahkamah Sesyen, keseluruhan jumlah penghakiman yang perlu dibayar Plaintif kepada Defendan adalah berjumlah tidak sampai RM 130,000.00. Oleh yang demikian nilai perkara di dalam kes ini adalah sememangnya kurang daripada RM250,0000.00. [9] Seksyen 68(1) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (AMK 1964) memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 68. Non-appealable matters 7 (1) No appeal shall be brought to the [Court of Appeal] in any of the following cases: [(a) when the amount or value of the subject-matter of the claim (exclusive of interest) is less than [two hundred and fifty] thousand ringgit, except with the leave of the [Court of Appeal]…;] [10] Di dalam kes ini walaupun permohonan di hadapan Mahkamah adalah satu permohonan lanjutan masa, namun nilai perkara yang hendak dirayu oleh Plaintif adalah kurang daripada RM250,000.00, Justeru, Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa peruntukan Seksyen 68 AMK 1964 adalah terpakai. [11] Bagi membolehkan Plaintif merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah ini, satu permohonan kebenaran perlu dibuat oleh Plaintif terlebih dahulu. [12] Sehubungan itu juga, apabila notis rayuan ini dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah ini, Mahkamah ini telah mengarahkan Penolong Kanan Pendaftar untuk menulis surat kepada Mahkamah Rayuan untuk 8 memaklumkan bahawa Mahkamah ini tidak akan menyediakan alasan penghakimannya kerana nilai perkara yang hendak dirayu oleh Plaintif adalah kurang daripada RM250,000.00. [13] Sehingga kini, tiada rekod menunjukkan kebenaran merayu telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. [14] Namun, Mahkamah ini telah menerima surat-surat peguamcara Plaintif memohon alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini atas alasan ianya diperlukan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan. Menurut peguam Plaintif, beliau telah hadir beberapa kali untuk pengurusan kes bagi notis rayuannya di hadapan Penolong Kanan / Timbalan Pendaftar Mahkamah Rayuan (PKP/TP MR) dan telah dikatakan bahawa Mahkamah Rayuan memerlukan alasan penghakiman Mahkamah ini. [15] Oleh itu alasan penghakiman kes ini kini disediakan oleh Mahkamah ini. B. ALASAN-ALASAN PLAINTIF MEMOHON PERLANJUTAN MASA 9 [16] Permohonan Plaintif untuk memohon satu perintah pelanjutan masa bagi memfailkan notis rayuan merayu terhadap keputusan HMS telah disokong oleh Afidavit Sokongan yang diikrarkan oleh Vinod a/l R. Kamalanathan pada 1.7.2016 peguamcara dan peguambela yang beramal di Tetuan Vinod Kamalanathan & Associates yang beralamat di Suite 501, 5th Floor, Loke Yew Building, 4 Jalan Mahkamah Persekutuan, 50050 Kuala Lumpur. [17] Di dalam afidavit sokongan tersebut, peguam Plaintif telah menyatakan bahawa mereka telahpun menghantar surat bertarikh 26.1.2016 kepada anakguam mengenai keputusan Mahkamah tersebut untuk mendapatkan arahan selanjutnya. Menurutnya lagi oleh kerana terdapat percanggahan komunikasi yang tidak disengajakan, anakguamnya telah hanya memberi arahan untuk memfailkan Notis Rayuan setelah tempoh 14 hari untuk memfailkan notis rayuan tamat/luput. [18] Plaintif telah menyatakan seterusnya bahawa walaupun mereka mengetahui tempoh masa untuk memfaikan notis rayuan telahpun tamat semasa arahan diterima daripada anak guam untuk merayu, 10 mereka (peguam Plaintif) telah kemudiannya telah memfailkan notis permohonan untuk perlanjutan masa di Mahkamah Sesyen pada 21.3.2016. [19] Namun apabila permohonan mereka dipanggil untuk perbicaraan pada 4.4.2016 di hadapan Mahkamah Sesyen, peguam Plaintif Cik Tamilrasi A/P Rajindran telah dimaklumkan bahawa permohonan perlanjutan masa hendaklah difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi. [20] Peguam Plaintif kononnya mendakwa selepas pemakluman oleh Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa permohonan perlanjutan masa hendaklah difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi, peguam telah pergi ke Pejabat Pendaftaran Mahkamah Tinggi pada 7.4.2016 untuk mendapatkan kepastian mengenai perkara tersebut. Namun, peguam Plaintif tidak mendapat kepastian kerana kakitangan pejabat pendaftaran dikatakan memberi jawapan mereka tidak pasti. [21] Peguam Plaintif kemudiannya telah memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah Tinggi pada 4.5.2016 tetapi permohonannya telah ditolak oleh kakitangan Mahkamah Tinggi. 11 [22] Peguam Plaintif sekali lagi telah mengarahkan kakitangan despatch nya untuk memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah Rendah pada tarikh yang sama tetapi kemudiannya juga telah ditolak pada 11.5.2016. [23] Plaintif sekali lagi memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah Tinggi pada 12.5.2016 namun juga ditolak atas alasan bahawa kami perlu memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah Tinggi melalui suatu Saman Pemula. [24] Oleh sebab itu, Saman Pemula ini telah hanya difailkan pada 5.7.2016 selepas lebih kurang tujuh (7) bulan dari dari keputusan Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen (18.1.2016). C. BANTAHAN DEFENDAN [25] Defendan telah membantah permohonan Plaintif dan telah memfailkan afidavit jawapan. Di dalam membantah permohonan Plaintif, Defendan telah membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut: 12 i. Anakguam Plaintif adalah syarikat insurans yang berpengalaman dan seharusnya arif mengenai tempoh untuk memfailkan rayuan iaitu 14 hari daripada tarikh keputusan. Di dalam kes ini, semasa arahan diberi, tempoh masa memfailkan notis rayuan telahpun luput. ii. Afidavit sokongan permohonan Plaintif adalah defektif kerana ia seharusnya diikrarkan oleh anakguam Plaintif dan bukannya oleh peguamcara. ii. Keputusan Mahkamah telah dikeluarkan pada 18.1.2016 dan telah hampir lapan (8) bulan berlalu dan tempoh lapan (8) adalah satu tempoh kelewatan yang melampau. iv. Tidak ada penjelasan yang munasabah telah dikemukakan oleh Plaintif berkenaan dengan kelewatan . D. UNDANG-UNDANG 13 [26] Aturan 55 kaedah 2 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 (KKM 2012) jelas memperuntukkan bahawa semua rayuan ke Mahkamah Tinggi hendaklah dengan cara pendengaran semula dan hendaklah dibawa dengan memberikan suatu notis rayuan dalam empat belas hari dari tarikh keputusan itu dirayu. [27] Di dalam kes ini, peguam Plaintif sememangnya mengakui bahawa arahan anak guam untuk merayu telah diterima diluar tempoh 14 hari untuk memfailkan notis rayuan. Justeru bagi membolehkan satu rayuan dibuat, Plaintif perlu mendapatkan satu perintah perlanjutan masa daripada Mahkamah Tinggi. [28] Prinsip undang-undang berhubung dengan perlaksanaan budi bicara mahkamah samada untuk membenarkan satu perlanjutan masa telah diputuskan di dalam pelbagai otoriti. (Sila lihat i. Ratnam v. Cumarasamy & Anor [1964] 3 All ER 933. ii. Ong Guan Teck & Ors v. Hijjas [1982] 1 MLJ 105. iii. Punca Klasik Sdn Bhd v. Seok Kim Leow [1996] 5 MLJ 241. iv. Gan Hay 14 Chong v Siow Kian Yuh & Anor [1975] 1 MLJ 41. v. Cheah Teong Tat v Ho Gee Seng & Ors [1974] 1 MLJ 31.) [29] Pertimbangan utama yang perlu dipertimbangkan dan ditekankan oleh mahkamah di dalam perlaksanaan kuasa budi bicaranya adalah samada terdapatnya alasan-alasan yang munasabah di atas kelewatan ataupun samada kelewatan tersebut dapat dijustifikasikan. [30] Di dalam kes Abdul Rahim Ponniah bin Abdullah -v- Kulim Intensive Driving Centre Sdn. Bhd. [2000] 6 MLJ 584, Hakim Alauddin (YA ketika itu) telah memutuskan antara lain bahawa: “…In exercising the discretion, the following factors will be considered (1) whether the delay caused by the defendant company unjustified or unreasonable (2) what are the reasons for the delay (3) whether the defence raised by the defendant company had any merits; and (4) will the plaintiff prejudiced in any way should the application be granted.” 15 E. ANALISIS DAN DAPATAN MAHKAMAH [31] Di dalam kes ini apa yang jelas, semasa anak guam Plaintif memberi arahan untuk memfailkan rayuan, tempoh masa 14 hari untuk memfailkan rayuan yang diperuntukkan di bawah Aturan 55 kaedah 2 KKM 2102 telahpun luput. [32] Sudahlah tempoh masa14 hari itu luput, peguam Plaintif pula telah mengambil masa lebih kurang satu bulan setengah untuk memfailkan permohonan untuk perlanjutan masa di mahkamah yang salah pada 21.3.2013. Peguam Plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan perlanjutan masanya bukan di Mahkamah Tinggi tetapi di Mahkamah Sesyen di mana keputusan diberi. [33] Di dalam kes ini, peguam Plaintif sememangnya telah khilaf apabila memfailkan permohonan perlanjutan masanya di Mahkamah Sesyen. Walhal, undang-undang adalah jelas bahawa menurut Perenggan 8, Jadual (Seksyen 25(2) Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman (AMK 1964), Bidang kuasa Tambahan telah memperuntukkan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk membenarkan perlanjutan 16 masa di dalam keadaan di mana apabila tempoh masa telah ditetapkan oleh undang-undang untuk bertindak atau memfailkan sebarang prosiding. Seksyen 25 AMK 1964 memperuntukkan bahawa:- “25 Powers of High Court (1) Without prejudice to the generality of Article 121 of the Constitution the High Court shall in the exercise of its jurisdiction have all the powers which were vested in it immediately prior to Malaysia Day and such other power as may be vested in it by any written law in force within its local jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) the High Court shall have the additional powers set out in the Schedule: Provided that all such powers shall be exercised in accordance with any written law or rules of court relating to the same.” Perenggan 8, Jadual (Seksyen 25(2) AMK 1964, Bidang kuasa Tambahan pula memperuntukkan: “8. Time 17 Power to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any application therefor be not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed: Provided that this provision shall be without prejudice to any written law relating to limitation.” [34] Di dalam kes ini, sudahlah peguam Plaintif khilaf Mahkamah di dalam memfailkan permohonannya, dan apabila dimaklumkan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa permohonan sepatutnya difailkan di Mahkamah, Plaintif telah cuba mendapat kepastian daripada Pejabat Pendaftaran Mahkamah Tinggi. Walhal sebagai seorang peguam sepatutnya peguam lebih arif mengenai undang-undang prosedur daripada kakitangan Mahkamah. Tetapi di dalam kes ini, peguam Plaintif telah meletakkan kesalahan kepada kakitangan Pejabat Pendaftaran Mahkamah Tinggi yang dikatakan tidak dapat memberi kepastian kepadanya di mahkamah mana sepatutnya permohonan perlanjutan masa mesti difailkan. [35] Plaintif kemudian telah memfailkan permohonan di Mahkamah Tinggi pada 4.5.2016 dan menyatakan permohonannya telah ditolak. 18 [36] Mahkamah ini telah meneliti permohonan Plaintif yang ditolak pada 4.5.2016 tersebut. Penelitian Mahkamah ini kepada pemfailan dokumen oleh peguam Plaintif, Filing Reference Number: FIL 1605040176, Mahkamah ini telah mendapati bahawa peguam Plaintif telah memfailkan permohonan perlanjutan masa ini dengan memfailkan Notis Permohonan di atas nombor pendaftaran Mahkamah Sesyen dengan bayaran praceipi RM20.00. Di dokumen pemfailan yang telah ditolak terdapat nota yang berbunyi berkut: Note: Filing payment need to be made before/by 09/05/2016. Kindly make the payment before/by the said date. Expired & unpaid filing will not be entertained and user will need to re-file. [37] Sebarang permohonan untuk perlanjutan masa untuk memfailkan notis rayuan hendaklah difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi melalui Saman Pemula dengan bayaran praceipe RM160.00 dan bukannya melalui notis permohonan dengan bayaran praceipi RM20.00. [38] Kesilapan yang sama telah dibuat oleh Plaintif bagi pemfailan dokumen yang ditolak pada 11.5.2016. 19 [39] Mod yang betul dan bayaran praceipe yang betul hanya berjaya dilaksanakan oleh Plaintif pada 5.7.2016. [40] Di dalam kes ini adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini, Plaintif telah meletakkan kesalahan kelewatan memfailkan permohonan ke atas kakitangan Mahkamah yang kononnya tidak memberikan pengesahan di mahkamah mana permohonan hendaklah difailkan dan di atas penolakan-penolakan dokumen-dokumen oleh mahkamah. [41] Pertamanya, kegagalan kakitangan Pejabat Pendaftaran Mahkamah Tinggi memberi pengesahan di mahkamah mana permohonan perlanjutan masa difailkan bukanlah alasan yang boleh diterima Mahkamah ini, Seperti dinyatakan awal tadi, sebagai peguam. peguam Plaintif sepatut lebih arif dan tidak jahil mengenai prosidur undang-undang dan bukannya bergantung kepada kakitangan mahkamah. 20 [42] Kedua, dokumen-dokumen yang dua kali ditolak tersebut juga disebabkan kejahilan peguam berhubung dengan mod permohonan dan jumlah bayaran yang sepatutnya dibayar. Peguam Plaintif sebagai peguam pihak insurans semestinya tahu bahawa permohonan perlanjutan sebegini hendaklah difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi melalui Saman Pemula dengan bayaran praceipi sebanyak RM160.00 dan bukannya difailkan di Mahkamah Sesyen dengan notis permohonan dengan bayaran praceipi RM 20.00. [43] Kelewatan di dalam kes ini menjadi lebih teruk kerana peguam Plaintif sendiri yang jahil mengenai undang-undang prosidur. [44] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah bahawa kelewatan selama lebih kurang tujuh (7) bulan ini bukanlah kesalahan sesiapa tetapi kesalahan peguam Plaintif sendiri atas kejahilannya. (Sila lihat: Sinnathamby & Anor v. Lee Chooi Ying [1987] 1 CLJ 157; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 336; Brijkishore & Anor v. Lee Chooi Ying [1987] 1 MLJ 110). 21 [45] Undang-undang adalah jelas bahawa kejahilan/kesilapan/kekhilafan peguam bukanlah suatu alasan yang boleh diterima atau menjadikan alasan tersebut sebagai alasan yang munasabah atau kelewatan yang boleh dijustifikasikan. [46] Di samping itu, keputusan yang hendak dirayu Plaintif adalah keputusan HMS di dalam satu kes kemalangan jalan raya. HMS telah memutuskan liabiliti (tanggungan) Plaintif pada kadar 80% dan awad-awad yang diberikan kepada berdasarkan keterangan- keterangan saksi dan dokumentar yang ada dihadapannya. Tiada merit rayuan telah dibangkitkan oleh Plaintif bagi merayu terhadap keputusan HMS tersebut. [47] Berdasarkan alasan-alasan di atas, Mahkamah ini menolak permohonan Plaintif di dalam Kandungan 1 dengan kos sebanyak RM2000.00 kepada Defendan. 22 t.t. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam (Saman Pemula) Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 17hb November 2016 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Vinod Kamalanathan & Associates Encik Vinod Kamalanathan Peguam Defendan - Tetuan G. Dorai & Co. Encik Khairul Aiman

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-46-06/2016 & WA-24C-28-05/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Gazzriz Sdn Bhd 2. ) Hasrat Gemilang Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Hasrat Gemilang Sdn Bhd 2. ) Gazzriz Sdn Bhd

14/11/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=cda40b0a-a28f-438a-a368-40b119706720&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-46-06/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication between Hasrat Gemilang Sdn Bhd as Claimant and Gazzriz Sdn Bhd as Respondent (Adjudication Reference No.: KLRCA/D/ ADJ-0180-2015) AND In the matter of Adjudicator’s Decision dated 7 March 2016 by Mr. Devandran A/L Subramaniam AND In the matter of Sections 12, 15, 16, 24 and 32 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 and Rule 4 of Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Rules 2014 AND In the matter of Order 7 and Order 92 Rule 4, Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN 2 GAZZRIZ SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 841700-U) ... PLAINTIFF AND HASRAT GEMILANG SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 524480-X) … DEFENDANT (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-28-05/2016 In the matter of an Adjudicator’s Decision dated 7 March 2016 under Section 12 (2) Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act (CIPAA) 2012 AND In the matter of Section 28 of the CIPAA AND In the matter of Order 7, Rule 2 Rules of Court 2012 AND 3 In the matter of Order 92, Rule 4, Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN HASRAT GEMILANG SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 524480-X) ... PLAINTIFF AND GAZZRIZ SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 841700-U) … DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] The successful Claimant, Hasrat Gemilang Sdn Bhd ("Hasrat Gemilang") in an adjudication had filed an Originating Summons as the Plaintiff here, to enforce the Adjudicator's Decision by way of Originating Summons No: WA-24C-28-05/2016 dated 19 May 2016 to enforce the Adjudication Decision under Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”). The Respondent in the Adjudication is Gazzriz Sdn Bhd, the Defendant in the said OS for enforcement. 4 [2] The Respondent, Gazzriz, had also sought to set aside the said Decision under Section 15(b), (c) and (d) CIPAA vide Originating Summons WA-24C-46-06/2016 dated 23 July 2016 wherein they are the Plaintiff and Hasrat Gemilang the Defendant. [3] For the avoidance of confusion, the parties shall be referred to by their designations in the Adjudication as the Claimant or Hasrat Gemilang and the Respondent or Gazzriz. [4] By consent of the parties and for expediency the two Originating Summonses were heard together. Project [5] By a Letter of Award dated 21 July 2010 ("the Contract") the Claimant was appointed by the Respondent as their subcontractor to construct and complete construction works in a project known as “Cadangan Membina dan Menyiapkan Sebuah Bangunan Servis Apartment 21 Tingkat yang Mengandungi 251 Unit Servis Apartment, 4 Tingkat Tempat Letak Kereta, Dewan Serbaguna dan 1 Unit Kedai Pejabat 2 Tingkat Di Atas Lot 20148 dan 879 Daerah Kubang Kerian, Jajahan Kota Bharu, Bandar Kota Bharu, Kelantan Darul Naim" ("the Project"). 5 [6] The Contract was subject to the terms of the Pertubuhan Arkitek Malaysia (PAM) Contract 2006 (Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contracts 2006) (with Quantities). The Claimant's claim was for Interim Payment Certificate No. 25 and No. 26 pursuant to PAM Contract 2006 (Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contracts 2006). [7] The consideration is the sum of RM29,828,500.00 with a completion period of 24 months. The date for completion was 7 August 2012, extendable by the provisions of extension of time in the Contract. [8] In the said Contract, the project architect is Shah Architect of 4355-A 1st Floor, Jalan Pengkalan Chepa, 15400 Kota Bharu and the Project Quantity Surveyor is AS2 Consult SB of 11B Jalan Cecawi 6/19A, Seksyen 6, Kota Damansara, 47810 Petaling Jaya. [9] The Architect issued the Certificate of Practical Completion Ref SA/KB/14/1073/HG-2916 on 20 March 2014, certifying the works has reached practical completion on 17 March 2014. [10] The Quantity Surveyor had on 4 March 2014 conveyed to the Architect vide letter ref AS2/1004/GEN/LET/10/SASB/026, the Interim Payment Certificate No 25 showing the amount due to the contractor of RM242,891.59 for work done up to 13 January 2014. 6 [11] The Quantity Surveyor had on 19 June 2014 conveyed to the Architect vide letter ref AS2/1004/GEN/LET/10/SASB/027, the Interim Payment Certificate No 26 showing the amount due to the contractor of RM1,299,033.58 for work done up to 4 June 2014. [12] No payments were made by the Respondent with respect to Interim Payment Certificate No. 25 and Interim Payment Certificate No. 26 although it was approved on 6 March 2014 and 7 July 2014 respectively. [13] On 15 October 2015, the Claimant served the Payment Claim on the Defendant by A.R. Registered Post on 16 October 2015, claiming the sums due under the 2 Interim Payment Certificates. The Respondent did not reply by filing a Payment Response. On 28 October 2015, the Claimant served the Notice of Adjudication on the Respondent by A.R Registered Post on 3 November 2015. [14] Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration (KLRCA) appointed an Adjudicator to adjudicate the claim as the parties could not agree on a common Adjudicator between themselves. Claimant served the adjudication claim to the KLRCA and Adjudicator together to the Respondent’s solicitor on 25 December 2015 but there was no reply from the Respondent. 7 [15] The Adjudicator had also informed the Respondent through their solicitors that he did not receive the Adjudication Response from the Respondent. [16] The Claimant thereafter requested for instructions from the Adjudicator as to whether the Adjudicator intended to call for any meetings or hearing or parties to file written submissions before any decision was made but the Adjudicator stated that it was unnecessary as he could make a decision based on the documents received. All instruction and communication between the parties were made through email as agreed upon by the parties. No objections were raised by either party to this mode of hearing. [17] Adjudication Decision was given on 7 March 2016 based on the Payment Claims together with interest and costs as follows: a) The sum of RM242,891.59 being the amount certified in the Interim Payment No. 25; b) The sum of RM1,299,033.58 being the amount Certified in the Interim Payment No. 26; c) Interest at the rate of 7.60% from 06/04/2014 until 16/7/2014 and thereafter at the rate of 7.85% being the Maybank Base Rate plus 8 1.0% calculated from 17 July 2014 on the sum if RM242,891.59 till date of realization; d) Interest at the rate of 7.85% plus 1.0% on the sum of RM1,299,033.58 from 7 August 2014 till the date of realization; e) Cost to follow event pursuant to Section 18 (1) of the CIPAA in the amount of RM40,000.00 which shall also include the Adjudication fees and expense in the amount of RM30,384.42; f) Further it is ordered that the adjudicated amount as stated above plus interest and costs shall be paid by the Respondent to the Claimant within twenty one (21) working days from the date of this decision pursuant to Section 12 (5) of the CIPAA 2012. [18] The decision was served to all parties by letter dated 7 March 2016. As no payments were made by the Respondent even after period for payment expired on 6 April 2016, the Claimant filed this application for enforcement of the Adjudication Decision. It was only after the Claimant had served the Originating Summons for Enforcement of the Adjudication Decision that the Respondent filed the Originating Summons to set aside the Adjudication Decision. 9 Problem [19] The Respondent claimed that they did not agree to the appointment of Adjudicator and to the Adjudication. [20] The Respondent contended that no formal valid contract based on Pertubuhan Arkitek Malaysia (PAM) Contract 2006 (Agreement and Conditions of PAM Contracts 2006) tendered by the Claimant during the Adjudication was ever executed by them. The Respondent further contended that fresh evidence adduced would show that the Contract Sum had been reduced considerably and that the amount owing after taking into consideration some reduction in scope of works and some amounts paid direct to some contractors would be only RM603,981.32 and not the amount of RM242,891.59 granted by the Adjudicator under Interim Payment Certificate No 25 and the sum of RM1,299,033.58 under Interim Payment Certificate No 26. The Respondent contended that there has been a serious breach of natural justice in arriving at the Decision that the learned Adjudicator did. [21] The Respondent also contended that the said Adjudicator has not met the standard and criteria set by the KLRCA as a qualified Adjudicator 10 and as such the Decision of the Adjudicator is null and void and of no effect. [22] The Respondent did not file any Payment Response. Neither did they file any Adjudication Response. Prayers [23] The Respondent Gazzriz had prayed for the following: (a) that the Adjudication Decision of Mr. Devandran A/L Subramaniam dated 7 March 2016 be stayed pending the final determination of this application; (b) a declaration that the Adjudication Decision is null and void because the Adjudicator did not meet the competency standard and criteria of an Adjudicator set by Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre of Arbitration ("KLRCA") pursuant to Section 32 of CIPAA and Regulation 4 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Regulations 2014 (“CIPAA Regulations”); (c) an order that the Adjudication Decision be set aside on the ground that: (i) it was given in excess of the Adjudicator’s Jurisdiction; 11 (ii) and/or in breach of the rules of natural justice during the adjudication proceedings; (iii) and/or in connection with the making the Adjudication Decision; (iv) a fresh evidence shows that the amount due to Defendant is only RM603,981.32 instead of Adjudication Decision is RM1,541,925.17. [24] The Respondent relied on the following grounds to set aside the Adjudication Decision that: (a) There was a breach of natural justice in that: i. The decision was made based on non-existence of Contract Agreement ii. A fresh evidence shows that the decision is wrong. (b) The said Adjudicator does not possess the experience and qualification and is therefore incompetent. Principles [25] An Adjudication Decision may only be set aside under the very limited grounds provided for under section 15 CIPAA. Section 15 CIPAA provides that an Adjudication Decision may be set aside as follows: 12 “15. An aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds: (a) the adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery; (b) there has been a denial of natural justice; (c) the adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or (d) the adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction.” [26] The Respondent sought to set aside the Adjudication Decision under paragraph 15 (b), (c) and (d) of CIPAA 2012. As authority learned counsel for the Respondent referred to: (a) ACFM Engineering & Construction v Esstar Vision Sdn Bhd & Another [2015] 1 LNS 756 and (b) WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Other Case [2015] 1 LNS 1236. [27] The Adjudicator Decision was given on Interim Certificate No. 25 and No. 26. The Respondent contended that fresh evidence showed that this Certificate No. 25 and No. 26 had been superseded by the Penultimate Certificate. The Respondent argued that the Penultimate Certificate clearly 13 showed that there are changes in amount of claim under Interim Certificate No. 25 and No. 26 from RM1,541,925.17 to RM603,981.32 on the following grounds as mentioned in the exhibit: (a) We have omitted payment to nominated subcontractor which the developers have paid directly; (b) We have made changes to the piling works due to the receipt of the piling records which have changes in the size and number of piles; (c) For the valuation works we have recalculated the cost base upon the architect instruction issued. (d) We have allowed the previous payment amount based upon client’s advice. [28] The Respondent contended that the Adjudicator Decision of 7 March 2016 Interim Certificate No. 25 and No. 26 is against natural justice and in breach of natural justice as the actual amount due to the Claimant are as follows: Original contract sum : RM29,828,500.00 Total Nett Addition/Omission : RM 5,976,423.32 14 New Contract Sum : RM23,852,076.68 Value of work done and Other payable amount : RM23,852,076.68 Deduct previous payment : RM23,248,095.36 Nett current work done value : RM 603,981.32 Recommended payment RM603,981.32 [29] The Respondent argued that the new contract sum is only RM23,852,076.68 whereby the Original Contract sum is RM29,828,500.00. [30] The Respondent further argued that the Adjudicator never and did not have the opportunity to consider these changes of contract sum. [31] The Respondent has totally misconceived the ground of natural justice in its attempt to set aside the Adjudication Decision. To begin with, even if there be some truth in the Respondent's assertion that the amount owing to the Claimant should be a very much less amount of RM 603,981.32, that so-called error of the Adjudicator cannot be attributed to a breach of natural justice. To be clear, these so-called fresh evidence was not before the Adjudicator. Surely the Adjudicator cannot reopen the 15 Adjudication Proceeding after the delivery of his Adjudication Decision and neither would this Court at this stage of setting aside the Adjudication Decision under the limited grounds of section 15 CIPAA allow the so-called fresh evidence to be admitted. There is simply no room for that altogether as this application is not an appeal. [32] The requirements of natural justice is that both sides must be heard before a tribunal hands down its decision. Here the Adjudicator had the opportunity to hear the Claimant's claim as set out in the Payment Claim and the evidence in support as set out in the supporting documents to the Adjudication Claim. [33] The Respondent, for reasons best known to them, did not file a Payment Response nor an Adjudication Response. Surely the Adjudicator cannot be faulted for considering the Claimant's evidence in support of its claim and in the absence of evidence to rebut the Claimant's claim, to find on the balance of probabilities in favour of the Claimant. [34] It is clearly not a case of the Adjudicator refusing to hear the Respondent but that there was nothing forthcoming and filed by them and nothing to contradict the Claimant's claim. The Adjudicator was thus entitled to come to the decision that he did and it would be an abuse of the 16 Court's process to now say that there had been a breach of natural justice just because the Adjudicator decided in favour of the Claimant based on the documents submitted. [35] This is not a case of an Adjudication Decision given in default as it were, but one arrived at after the Adjudicator had perused the documents filed by the Claimant and was satisfied in the absence of rebuttal evidence to the contrary by the Respondent, the Claimant had proved their payment claim. The Respondent's dissatisfaction with the weight of evidence given by the Adjudicator in the absence of documents to the contrary submitted by the Respondent is not a matter that this Court can intervene and much less interfere since it has nothing to do with natural justice and certainly not a ground countenanced under section 15 CIPAA; this being not an appeal. [36] This was how the Adjudicator expressed how he had arrived at his Decision in the absence of any Payment Response and Adjudication Response filed by the Respondent: “Upon perusing the relevant documents submitted in the Adjudication Claim by the Claimant Solicitors and since the Respondent have not served the Payment Response nor Adjudication Response, I am of the opinion that the claimant had succeeded in proving their claim 17 and hence I hereby allow their claim as stated in their Adjudication Claim with interest as provided in clause 30.07 of the Agreement and Conditions of their Contract and also costs.” [37] Learned counsel for the Respondent then mounted the argument that the Adjudicator had referred to a non-existent document as clause 30.07 of the Agreement was the PAM Contract 2006 which the parties have not signed. This, he contended, was a breach of natural justice, as the said PAM Contract 2006 is not a valid contract as the parties have not signed it. [38] Section 2 CIPAA provides that it shall apply to every construction contract made in writing relating to construction work. KLRCA has issued a Guideline on the meaning of "construction contract made in writing". This Guideline, though not binding on the Courts, would be a useful guide nevertheless in areas where some may see a doubt and this Court would be at liberty to adopt and endorse it if it makes statutory sense and further the purpose of CIPAA. The Guideline is reproduced below: "The Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) came into operation on 15 April 2014. Section 2 of the Act provides that statutory adjudication regime shall apply to construction contracts made in writing.” 18 [39] However, no definition or further elaboration is provided in the Act as to what ‘construction contract made in writing’ means. [40] Given the fact that there are various means by which a construction contract may be made, a clear guideline on the meaning of a ‘construction contract made in writing’ will ensure that parties to a construction contract are guided as to whether or not payment disputes arising under their contract can be referred to adjudication under the Act. Further, it will eliminate the need for the adjudicator who may not be legally trained to grapple with the complexity of the issue of whether a construction contract is in writing. [41] As such the KLRCA is of the view that it would be expedient and/or necessary to provide clear guidance and definition as to what the phrase ‘construction contract made in writing’ mean, for giving full effect and the better carrying out of the provisions of the Act. [42] The KLRCA adopts the following definition of a ‘construction contract in writing’: ‘Construction Contract In Writing’ (1) There is a contract in writing:- 19 (a) if the contract is made in writing (whether or not it is signed by the parties); (b) if the contract is made by exchange of communications in writing; or (c) if the contract is evidenced in writing. (2) Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms which are in writing, they make a contract in writing. (3) A contract is evidenced in writing if a contract made otherwise than in writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the authority of the parties to the contract. The KLRCA Guideline on Construction Contract in Writing shall apply to all adjudication cases commenced under CIPAA. A copy of the KLRCA Guideline can be found at: www.klrca.org.my Dated 28th day of April, 2014. Sgd Professor Datuk Sundra Rajoo Director of KLRCA" (emphasis added) 20 [43] As can be seen the PAM Contract 2006 need not have been executed by the parties so long as parties in the Letter of Award which is in writing and executed by the parties have referred to the PAM Contract 2006 in writing and agreed to be bound by it. [44] The Respondent further contended that the Adjudicator is in breach of natural justice when he failed to decide that only Letter of Award dated 21 July 2010 is valid and applicable for both parties. [45] It cannot be overstated that the unsuccessful party in an Adjudication must not simply raise the ground of breach of natural justice in setting aside an Adjudication Award just because that party now disagrees with the interpretation of law or finding of facts based on the evidence or both. The ground of breach of natural justice should not be used as a backdoor way to set aside an Adjudication Decision made after both parties have been given the opportunity to submit their Payment Claim and Payment Response and followed by Adjudication Claim and Adjudication Response and if need be an Adjudication Reply after that. A Respondent who does not avail itself of the opportunity to file the Payment Response and Adjudication Response cannot be heard to shout and scream that there had been a breach of natural justice. It is singularly devoid of merits and will not be entertained by the Courts. 21 [46] I recall the Singapore case of Am Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National Golf and Country Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260, and the dicta Judith Prakash J, in a context not dissimilar to ours: “23. There are two rules of natural justice: the first is that a man should not be the judge in his own cause and the second is that the judge or Adjudicator or other arbiter must hear both side of the dispute. The second rule is often referred to by its Latin tag, audi alteram partem. Laguna’s submission, while not specifically identifying which rule of natural justice had been breached, appeared to refer to the second one. 24. Laguna submitted that the Adjudicator had failed to comply with the rules of natural justice in that in coming to the Adjudication Determination, he had failed to take into consideration and/or give proper weight to materials tendered by AMA which showed a discrepancy in AMA’s claim, in particular, its claim that the Concept Design had been approved. Its submissions went into the evidence in order to establish the alleged discrepancy and it then argued that if the Adjudicator had given proper consideration and weight to such discrepancy and had taken into consideration the relevant evidence 22 tendered by the parties, he would have held that all payment claim made by AMA had been made prematurely. 25. Although the paragraph above contains only a brief summary of Laguna’s contentions, it can be gathered from such summary that what Laguna was complaining about was not really a failure on the part of the Adjudicator to hear both sides of the dispute but a failure on his part to decide the dispute as Laguna considered it should be decided. The audi alteram partem rule required the Adjudicator to receive both parties submissions and consider them; it did not require him to decide the dispute in accordance with Laguna’s submissions. It was clear from the Adjudication Determination that the Adjudicator had conducted the adjudication in accordance with the principles of natural justice: he had called an adjudication conference at which both parties were able to make their submissions, an opportunity which Laguna had availed itself of. Thereafter, as the Adjudication Determination itself made plain, the Adjudicator gave consideration to all points raised and he then came to certain conclusions for which he gave his reasons. However dissatisfied Laguna may be with those decisions, it cannot ask for the Adjudication Determination to be 23 set aside because it considers the decisions to be against the weight of the evidence. 26. The principles of natural justice are concerned with the provision of a fair hearing to contending parties. They do not mandate any particular result. As long as the parties have been given a fair hearing, the decision cannot be set aside for failure to comply with natural justice. A party who is dissatisfied with the decision on its merits cannot use the principles of natural justice to have the decision set aside...” (emphasis added) [47] That 'error' if there be will have to be corrected at Arbitration or Litigation as the Adjudication Decision is only of interim finality and will be overtaken by the fully final Arbitral Award or Litigation Judgment. However to this day the Respondent has not proceeded with any Arbitration or Litigation to correct the so-called error or wrong decision. [48] I would like to echo what was said by Justice Ravinthiran Paramuguru J. in Bina Puri Construction Sdn Bhd v Hing Nyit Enterprise Sdn Bhd [2015] MLJU 941, as follows: “[9] ... In the premises, the criticism of the Adjudication Decision by the applicant must clearly point to a breach of natural justice or a 24 jurisdictional error in the adjudication process. Otherwise, the instant proceeding would be converted to a full blown appeal or a rehearing of the adjudication process. ... As I said earlier, section 15 does not envisage that the decision of the Adjudication can be reviewed on its merits. Therefore, it is immaterial if the Adjudicator had erred in his finding of facts.” [49] Learned counsel for the Claimant had also referred to the following cases: a) UDA Holdings Bhd v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor and another case [2015] 11 MLJ 499; b) Subang Skypark Sdn Bhd v Arcradius Sdn Bhd [2015] 11 MLJ 818; and c) Mudajaya Corp v Leighton Contractors (M) Sdn Bhd [2015] 10 MLJ 745. [50] An Adjudicator's finding of facts are not reviewable in a section 15 CIPAA application to set aside the Adjudication Decision, more so when no 25 Payment Response and no Adjudication Response have been filed at all. Any attempt to introduce fresh evidence must fail in limine. Whether the Adjudication Decision is null and void on ground that the Adjudicator has not met the competency standard and criteria set by the KLRCA [51] The Respondent has prayed for a declaration that the Adjudication Decision of the learned Adjudicator is null and void be caused the Adjudicator did not meet the competency standard and criteria of an Adjudicator as set by the KLRCA pursuant to section 32 of CIPAA and Regulation 4 of the CIPAA Regulations. [52] Under section 4 CIPAA an "Adjudicator" means an individual appointed to adjudicate a dispute under CIPAA. The appointing authority under CIPAA for an Adjudicator under section 21 CIPAA is the Director of the KLRCA unless the parties can agree between themselves within 10 working days from the service of the Notice of Adjudication by the Claimant. [53] Here the Claimant had served the Notice of Adjudication dated 28 October 2015 on the Respondent by way of A R Registered Post on 3 November 2015. In the said Notice of Adjudication the Claimant had 26 proposed to the Respondent that an Adjudicator be appointed by the Director of the KLRCA pursuant to section 21(a) CIPAA to determine the dispute. [54] The Claimant further stated that if they do not receive any response from the Claimant by 4 November 2015 then the Claimant shall proceed to request the Director of KLRCA to appoint an Adjudicator. This is in line with the procedure under section 21(b) CIPAA and the Director of the KLRCA had appointed Devandran A/L Subramaniam as the Adjudicator, following the procedure in section 23(1) CIPAA. [55] The Respondent said they did not agree to the appointment of the said Adjudicator. It must be stated here that it was precisely because the parties could not agree on the common appointment of an Adjudicator that an independent body, the KLRCA as prescribed under CIPAA, was called upon to make the appointment. [56] If the Respondent has serious objection to the appointment of the said Adjudicator on ground of competency, they must then make their objection immediately. It would be too late to object on ground of competency once the Adjudication Decision has been delivered unless the facts affecting his competency was only discovered later and could not be 27 discovered with reasonable due diligence before the Decision was delivered. [57] Delay in raising this objection and raising it for the first time after the Decision has been given smacks of bad faith on the part of the Respondent who is scrabbling the bottom of the barrel to raise every possible ground to set aside the Decision not in its favour. That simply would not do. [58] Under subsection 32 (2) of CIPAA 2012 and Regulation 4 (a) of CIPAA Regulations 2014, the competency standard and criteria of an Adjudicator is that an Adjudicator must have had at least 7 years of working experience in the building and construction industry in Malaysia or any other fields recognized by KLRCA. Regulation 4 reads as follows: 4. Competency standard and criteria of adjudicator The competency standard and criteria of an adjudicator are as follows: a) the adjudicator has working experience of at least seven years in the building and construction industry in Malaysia or any other fields recognized by the KLRCA; b) the adjudicator is a holder of a Certificate in Adjudication from an institution recognized by the Minister; 28 c) the adjudicator is not an undischarged bankrupt; and d) the adjudicator has not been convicted of any criminal offence within or outside Malaysia. [59] The Respondent submitted that the Adjudicator’s qualifications and working experience are as follows: (a) Adjudicator obtained a Degree in Law LLB (Hons) and Certificate of Legal Practice CLP Malaya; (b) No working experience in the building and construction industry in Malaysia; (c) Or any other field recognized by KLRCA. [60] Learned counsel for the Respondent then concluded that the said Adjudicator has not met the competency standard prescribed under CIPAA and the CIPAA Regulations. [61] The parties admits that the said Adjudicator is a practicing lawyer with over 20 years experience. He is selected by the KLRCA from its panel of Adjudicators. He would have gone through the relevant training and examination conducted by the KLRCA before being empaneled as a certified Adjudicator by the KLRCA. The minister in charged has reposed a 29 considerable measure of discretion on the KLRCA to determine what the other relevant fields of experience would be if it is not a case of having at least 7 years experience in the building and construction industry in Malaysia. Legal experience would be highly and directly relevant as an Adjudication would require a fair bit of legal interpretation of the relevant terms of various contractual documents. [62] In this particular case it involves a rather straight forward reading and understanding of the relevant terms of when payments certified would become due under the Contract and there was no Defence in the nature of a Payment Response filed which would require a detailed study of the intricacies of a construction contract with its technical details in engineering. Even if it would require such an understanding, an Adjudicator has the powers under section 25(e) CIPAA to appoint independent experts to inquire and report on specific matters with the consent of the parties. [63] For the Respondent to seriously mount this challenge, it must allude to clear evidence that the said Adjudicator does not have the said professional qualification that he is said to have, or that he does not have the proper certification as an Adjudicator by the KLRCA, or that he is an undischarged bankrupt or that he has committed a criminal offence within or outside Malaysia. Absent that, the Respondent's attempt to declare the 30 Adjudication Decision as null and void arising from what is alleged to be a failure to meet the competency standard and criteria set by the KLRCA, is clearly spurious and bereft of merits altogether. [64] I would follow the approach taken by Mary Lim J (now JCA) in WRP Asia Pacific Sdn Bhd v NS Bluescope Lysaght Malaysia Sdn Bhd & Other Case [2015] 1 LNS 1236 where a similar objection was raised on the competency of the Adjudicator: "[68] However, Parliament recognised that other fields may be equally competent. The discretion is left to the best judgment of KLRCA. It would seem that KLRCA has not published or made public, again through the Government Gazette, which or what other fields are recognised. A publication in the Government Gazette makes good sense and certainly the better practice; and it should be the preferred option. [69] Be that as it may, in an email dated 10.6.2015, KLRCA informed WRP that pursuant to regulation 4 of the CIPAA Regulations 2014, the Adjudicator "has fulfilled the competency standard and criteria of an Adjudicator". KLRCA further advised WRP that the "Adjudicator has working experience of at least seven years in the building and 31 construction industry in Malaysia or any other fields recognised by the KLRCA" and it provided WRP with attachments 1 and 2 for this purpose. [70] Attachment 1 contains the Adjudicator's resume while Attachment 2 contains KLRCA's application form together with the relevant certificates. KLRCA also informed WRP that the Adjudicator "is a holder of a Certificate in Adjudication from an institution recognised by the Minister. In Attachment 3 is the Adjudicator's Certificate of Adjudication issued by KLRCA. Attachment 4 containing Form 6 as given by the Adjudicator to the parties on 9.6.2015. [71] With KLRCA's reply, which this Court accepts, KLRCA must be taken to have seen fit to recognise this Adjudicator's working experience in what must be "other fields". Although it is not immediately apparent what that working experience may be, or whether a person with the qualifications such as that held by this Adjudicator is enough, this Adjudicator has nevertheless attended the requisite course and training; and is a holder of a Certificate of Adjudication from KLRCA [presumably KLRCA is currently the only institution recognised by the Minister]. In that sense, this Adjudicator is said to have met the 32 competency standard and criteria to be an Adjudicator under CIPAA 2012. [72] KLRCA thinks so and it says so such that it has included the Adjudicator's name in the register; and has seen fit to appoint him as Adjudicator. That being the case, the Court accepts that the Adjudicator in question has indeed met the standards and criteria set by KLRCA. This ground of complaint is therefore not acceptable." (emphasis added) Pronouncement [65] I had accordingly made an order dismissing the Respondent's application to set aside the Adjudication Decision with costs of RM10,000.00. Correspondingly l had allowed the Claimant's application with costs of RM5,000.00 to enforce the Adjudication Decision made under Section 28 of the CIPAA which reads: “Enforcement of adjudication decision as judgment: 1) A party may enforce an adjudication decision by applying to the High Court for an order to enforce the adjudication decision as if it is a judgment or order of the High Court. 33 2) The High Court may make an order in respect of the adjudication decision either wholly or partly and may make an order in respect of interest on the adjudicated amount payable. [66] Allocatur to be paid before extracting order of costs Dated: 14 November 2016. - Sgd - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For Plaintiff in WA-24C-28-05/2016 : Rizal Zulkeply For Defendant in WA-24C-46-06/2016 (Messrs Rizal & Co) For Plaintiff in WA-24C-46-06/2016 : Ab Wahab Che Kob For Defendant in WA-24C-28-05/2016 : (Messrs Kamarudin, Wee & Co) Date of Decision: 1 August 2016

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-1017-09/2016

PLAINTIF Chia Chin Yuan DEFENDAN Mutaya @ Muthiah A/L Sinapan

04/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=5e8e6902-c03f-48b4-a047-27b395db467c&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN. MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO. : BA-24-1017-09/2016 Dalam perkara mengenai Perjanjian Jual Beli berkenaan hartanah yang dipegang dibawah GM 2310, Lot 195, Mukim Sepang, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor DAN Dalam perkara mengenai Kaveat Persendirian yang bertarikh 11.9.2015 dengan Nombor Perserahan 158812015 yang didaftarkan pada 14.9.2015 DAN Dalam perkara mengenai Aturan- Aturan dan 28 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 DAN 2 Dalam perkara mengenai Seksyen 326(1)(B) dan 326(2) Kanun Tanah Negara, 1965 ANTARA CHIA CHIN YUAN ... PLAINTIF DAN MUTAYA @ MUTHIAH A/L SINAPAN ... DEFENDAN ALASAN PENGHAKIMAN (Kandungan 1 –Perlanjutan tempoh kaveat) [1] Plaintif di dalam Saman Pemulanya (Kandungan 1) memohon perintah-perintah berikut: (a) bahawa tempoh masa dua bulan di dalam Notis menurut Borang 19C Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 bertarikh 15.8.2016 berkenaan dengan Kaveat Persendirian yang didaftarkan di bawah Perserahan Nombor 1588/2015 dilanjutkan tempohnya 3 sehingga pelupusan muktamad kes sivil antara Plaintif dan Defendan yang akan difailkan oleh Plaintif; (b) bahawa Pendaftar/ Pentadbir Tanah Pejabat Sepang mengendorskan atas hakmilik pendaftaran perlanjutan tempoh masa Kaveat Persendirian yang didaftarkan di bawah Perserahan Nombor 1588/2015 menurut perintah ini. [2] Latar belakang kes yang membawa Plaintif memfailkan Kandungan 1 adalah seperti berikut: 2.1 Plaintif (Chia Chin Yuan, No. K/P: 830903-10-5499) adalah merupakan salah seorang pengarah sebuah syarikat bernama Sin Yek Century Sdn Bhd. 2.2 Defendan (Mutaya @ Muthiah A/L Sinapan) pula adalah pentadbir harta pusaka A. Sinnappan @ Sinnappen s/o Appayee @ Sinnappan s/o Appayee (Si Mati). Si Mati adalah tuanpunya berdaftar sebidang tanah yang dipegang di bawah 4 GM 2310, Lot 195, Mukim Sepang, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor (selepas ini dirujuk sebagai "hartanah tersebut"). 2.3 Plaintif telah bersetuju untuk membeli dan Defendan telah bersetuju untuk menjual hartanah tersebut pada harga RM2,381,250.00. 2.4 Atas persetujuan tersebut, pada 19.8.2015 Plaintif telah membayar kepada Defendan sebanyak RM47,640.00 sebagai bayaran deposit. 2.5 Plaintif telah mengarahkan peguamcaranya Tetuan Zakiah Hassan & Associates (Tetuan Zakiah Hassan) memuktamadkan transaksi dengan penandatanganan perjanjian jual beli. Melalui surat bertarikh 29.7.2015, Tetuan Zakiah Hassan telah meminta kepada peguamcara Defendan iaitu Tetuan G. Ram, Rozetta & Associates (Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta) untuk mengemukakan kepada mereka dokumen- dokumen dan butir-butir bagi membolehkan mereka menyediakan perjanjian jual beli bagi hartanah tersebut. Pada 5 keesokan harinya (30.7.2015) pula, Tetuan Zakiah Hassan telah menghantar emel kepada Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta memaklumkan bahawa Plaintif telah mendepositkan wang sebanyak RM230,000,00 kepada mereka sebagai stakeholder dan sekali lagi memohon dokumen-dokumen yang diperlukan bagi penyediaan perjanjian jual beli hartanah tersebut. {Salinan surat bertarikh 29.7.2015 dan emel bertarikh 30.7.2015 - Ekshibit “CCY-1”, Afidavit Sokongan (Kandungan 3)}. 2.6. Namun, atas nasihat jururunding penasihat cukai Plaintif, Plaintif telah mengarahkan peguamcaranya menggantikan nama beliau sebagai pembeli kepada Syarikat Sin Yek Century Sdn Bhd. 2.7 Melalui emel bertarikh 21.8.2015, Tetuan Zakiah Hassan telah mengemukakan kepada Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta deraf perjanjian jual beli bagi ulasan mereka. (Salinan deraf perjanjian jual beli dan emel bertarikh 21.8.2015 - ekshibit "CCY-2", Kandungan 3). 6 2.8. Namun, melalui emel bertarikh 9.9.2015 yang membalas emel Tetuan Zakiah Hassan bertarikh 21.8.2015 tersebut, Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta memaklumkan bahawa Defendan telahpun mengarahkan pihaknya untuk menamatkan perjanjian jual beli terdahulu yang dimasukki oleh Defendan dengan pihak yang lain. Di samping makluman tersebut, Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta juga telah meminta Plaintif mengemukakan bayaran 8% harga belian bersama wang penyelesaian berjumlah RM200,000.00 dengan kadar yang segera. (Kindly let us have the payment of 8% together with the settlement sum of RM200,000.00 on an urgent basis) (Salinan emel bertarikh 9.9.2015 - Ekshibit "CCY”, Kandungan 2). 2.9 Tetuan Zakiah Hassan melalui emelnya bertarikh 10.9.2015 yang membalas emel Tetuan G. Ram, Rozetta bertarikh 9.9.2015 tersebut telah memaklumkan bahawa Plaintif akan membayar baki deposit sebanyak RM200,000.00 semasa menandatangani perjanjian jual beli. Pada 10.9.2015. Tetuan Zakiah Hassan telah juga menghantar emel kepada Tetuan G. Ram, Rozetta meminta peguamcara Defendan itu 7 mengemukakan komen/ulasan di atas deraf perjanjian jual beli yang telah dikemukakan kepada mereka pada 21.8.2015 dan 9.9.2015 (Salinan emel bertarikh 9.9.2015 dan 10.9.2016 - Ekshibit “CCY4”, Kandungan 3). 2.10 Tetuan Zakiah Hassan melalui emel bertarikh 11.9.2015 telah memohon Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta untuk mengemukakan kepadanya bukti dokumentari bahawa perjanjian jual beli yang terdahulu telah dibatalkan, di samping memohon pengesahan samada kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkan oleh seorang bernama Angamah a/p Sinnapan telah dibatalkan atau tidak, (Salinan emel bertarikh 11.9.2015 - Ekshibit “GCY-5", Kandungan 3). 2.11 Apabila Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta masih belum mengemukakan apa-apa balasan di atas deraf perjanjian jual beli yang telah mengemukakan, Plaintif telah memasukkan satu kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut melalui Borang 19B Kanun Tanah Negara 1965 pada 11.9.2015 bagi menjaga kepentingannya ke atas hartanah tersebut. (Salinan surat 8 peguamcara Plaintif bertarikh 11.9.2015 Borang 19B bertarikh 11.9.2015 - Ekshibit "CCY-6”, Kandungan 3). 2.12 Melalui emel bertarikh 14.9.2015, Tetuan Zakiah Hassan sekali lagi telah memohon daripada peguamcara Defendan untuk bukti pembatalan perjanjian jual beli terdahulu yang telah dimasukkan di antara Defendan dengan Pihak Ketiga. 2.13 Namun, pada tarikh yang sama sebagai balasan kepada emel bertarikh 14.9.2015 tersebut, Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta telah memaklumkan bahawa Defendan telah mengarahkan supaya memaklumkan bahawa Defendan menamatkan perjanjian jual beli bertarikh 19.5.2015.menurut klausa 2.1.4 Perjanjian tersebut. (Salinan-salinan emel bertarikh 14.9.2015 - Ekshibit "CCY-7", Kandungan 3). 2.14 Selepas daripada itu terdapat beberapa komunikasi melalui surat-menyurat/emel di antara peguamcara baru Plaintif Tetuan Feei Feisal & Partner (menggantikan Tetuan Zakiah Hassan) 9 dan Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta berhubung dengan transaksi hartanah tersebut. 2.15 Melalui surat bertarikh 14.1.2016, Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta telah memaklumkan kepada Plaintif bahawa Defendan tidak berada dalam keadaan untuk memasuki Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan Plaintif dan memberitahu Plaintif untuk mengambil semula deposit yang telah dibayar daripada Defendan. (Salinan surat bertarikh 14.1.2016 - Ekshibit “CCY-9”, Kandungan 3). 2.16 Selepas berbalas surat-menyurat/emel di antara Tetuan Feei Feisal & Partner dan Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta, Tetuan Feei Feisal & Partner telah melalui surat bertarikh 14.10.2016 kepada Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta memaklumkan bahawa Plaintif akan memulakan tindakan undang-undang terhadap Defendan untuk menguatkuasakan haknya berhubung hartanah tersebut; 2.17 Plaintif telah menerima Suatu Notis Berkenaan dengan Cadangan Hendak Memotong Kaveatnya bertarikh 15.8.2016 daripada Pejabat Tanah Daerah Sepang Selangor. 10 2.18 Sing Yek Century Sdn Bhd telahpun memulakan tindakan guaman Sivil No. WA-22NCVC-622-09/2016 terhadap Defendan untuk kemungkiran Defendan untuk melaksanakan obligasinya di bawah kontrak tersebut dan memohon perintah bagi pelaksanaan spesifik ("specific performance") perjanjian jualbeli hartanah tersebut. [3] Berdasarkan pengataan-pengataan di atas dengan bersandarkan komunikasi-komunikasi melalui surat-menyurat dan emel di antara peguamcaranya dan peguamcara Defendan, Plaintif telah mendakwa bahawa telah wujud atau telah terhasil satu perjanjian yang sah di antara Plaintif dan Defendan dan Defendan hendaklah melaksanakan perjanjian tersebut. Adalah menjadi dakwaan Plaintif juga bahawa Plaintif berhak membuat pembayaran penuh harga belian dan dengan pembayaran tersebut, Plaintif adalah berhak kepada hartanah tersebut. Atas dakwaan tersebutlah, guaman Sivil No. WA- 22NCVC-622-09/2016 telah difailkan terhadap Defendan bagi mendapatkan perintah mengarahkan Defendan untuk melaksanakan perjanjian tersebut. 11 [4] Justeru, adalah menjadi dakwaan Plaintif bahawa beliau mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut dan bagi menjamin kepentingannya dilindungi, kaveat persendirian yang dimasukkannya perlulah dikekalkan/dilanjutkan sehingga guaman sivilnya terhadap Defendan didengar dan diputuskan. . [5] Defendan telah menentang permohonan Plaintif ini dengan membangkitkan alasan-alasan berikut: i. Guaman yang difailkan oleh syarikat Sin Yek Century Sdn Bhd terhadap Defendan telah difailkan di Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur adalah tindakan yang tidak bermerit kerana guaman itu sepatutnya difailkan di Shah Alam kerana hartanah tersebut itu adalah terletak di Negeri Selangor. ii. terdapat beberapa kaveat telah didaftarkan di atas hartanah tersebut, maka ia adalah mustahil unfuk menandatangani suatu Perjanjian Jual Beli dan menjual tanah tersebut tanpa apa-apa bebanan atau halangan kepada Plaintif. 12 iii. Peguamcara Defendan, Tetuan G. Ram Rozetta telah memaklumkan kepada Tetuan Feei Feisal & Partner melalui surat bertarikh 14-01- 2016 bahawa Defendan tidak berada dalam kedudukan untuk memasukkan suatu Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan Plaintif. iv. Plaintif telah menyedari bahawa wujudnya suatu Perjanjian Jual Beli dengan pihak Ketiga dan peguamcaranya Plaintif memerlukan bukti daripada Defendan yang Perjanjian Jual Beli tersebut telah dibatalkan oleh Defendan. v. tiada perjanjian wujud antara Plaintif dan Defendan kerana penandatanganan satu perjanjian Jual Beli adalah mustahil dilaksanakan kerana Perjanjian Jual Beli Defendan Defendan dengan pihak Ketiga masih wujud. Plaintif sebenarnya hanya hendak merosakkan transaksi Defendan dengan pihak Ketiga. vi. tidak ada apa-apa perjanjian yang ditandatangani antara Plaintif dengan Defendan kerana Plaintif hanya telah membayar wang pendahuluan sahaja dan Plaintif telah tidak mengambil apa-apa langkah untuk melaksanakan Perjanjian Jual Beli dari mula-mula lagi. 13 vii. Plaintif/ Sing Yek Century Sdn Bhd tidak mempunyai keupayaan untuk membeli hartanah tersebut Isu Intitulment [6] Defendan telah juga membangkitkan isu intitulment yang tertera pada Saman Pemula Plaintif di mana Defendan telah menghujahkan bahawa intitulment yang tertera pada Saman Pemula Plaintif adalah defektif dan tidak tepat kerana tidak terdapat apa-apa Perjanjian Jual Beli antara Plaintif dan beliau. Menurut Defendan lagi intitulment tersebut adalah palsu dan mengelirukan. [7] Mahkamah ini adalah berpandangan bahawa isu intitulment yang dibangkitkan Defendan adalah tidak bermerit, remeh temeh dan sesuatu yang khilaf faham (misconceived). Bagi Mahkamah ini, intitulment yang tertera pada Saman Pemula adalah bertujuan menerangkan perihal perkara yang terlibat di dalam permohonan Plaintif. Di dalam membawa perkara kes dan relif-relif yang dipohonnya, Plaintif telah merujuk kepada hal perkara hartanah ynag menjadi asas permohonannya dan undang-undang yang mana Plaintif berpaut. Samada wujud atau tidak perjanjian di antara Plaintif 14 dan Defendan adalah perkara pertikaian pihak-pihak yang akan ditentukan oleh Mahkamah berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan yang dikemukakan oleh pihak-pihak. Oleh itu pada peringkat ini adalah tidak terbuka untuk Defendan untuk mengatakan bahawa intitulment pada Saman Pemula Plaintif adalah salah dan defektif kerana tidak ada perjanjian jual beli di antara pihaknya dan Plaintif. Samada Plaintif mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat ke atas hartanah- tersebut sehingga pemutusan dan penyelesaian guaman sivil WA- 22NCVC-622-09/2016 yang difailkannya terhadap Defendan. [8] Di dalam perkara kepentingan berkaveat dan peruntukan seksyen 323 KTN, Mahkamah ini suka merujuk kepada perenggan B-D, muka surat 755 alasan penghakiman Gopal Sri Ram, HMR di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719. Di muka surat 755 ini, YA Gopal Sri Ram telah menerangkan ruang lingkup kepentingan berkaveat yang diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 323 dengan menyatakan berikut: “CAVEATABLE INTEREST 15 To paraphrase s 323(1)(a) of the Code, a private caveat may be entered at the distance of any person or body who claims either: (1) the title to land; or (2) any registrable interest in land. The parameters of caveatability under s 323(1)(a) are therefore circumscribed by these words: ’title’ and ‘registrable interest’. It is only one who makes a claim to either of these in land may enter a private caveat. Although the words ‘title’ and ‘registrable interest’ are not defined by the Code, their meaning may be gathered from the scheme of the Code and from indefeasibility provision, namely, s 340(1). The latter points to a bifurcation between title (the equivalent of the English fee simple) and registrable interests, that it, leases, charges and easements.” [9] Undang-undang mengenai perlanjutan tempoh kaveat ataupun permohonan untuk pembatalannya adalah jelas dan jitu. Di dalam sesuatu permohonan untuk melanjutkan atau membatalkan kaveat, Mahkamah hendaklah menentu dan mempertimbangkan persoalan- persoalan berikut: i. samada pengkaveat mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. 16 ii. samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan. iii. samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan. iv. samada terdapat keadaan istimewa di pihak pemohon yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah. [10] Di dalam perkara ini juga, Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng [1995] 1 MLJ 719 telah menggariskan ujian-ujian yang harus digunapakai di dalam menentukan dan menimbangkan sesuatu permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat di mana muka.surat 724, Mahkamah Rayuan telah menyatakan berikut : “In considering an application for the removal of a caveat, the procedure to be adopted should be a simple and summary one. At first stage, the court will examine the grounds expressed in the application for the caveat to see whether they show a caveatable interest. Once the court is satisfied that 17 the caveator’s claim amounts in law to a caveatable interest, it must then go on to consider whether the claim disclosed a serious question meriting a trial. After these two stages have been crossed, the court must decide where the balance of convenience” [11] Di dalam perkara berkaitan permohonan untuk membatalkan kaveat juga, Majlis Privy di dalam kes Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212 telah memutuskan berikut: “This is the nature of the onus that lies upon the caveator in an application by the caveatee under section 327 for removal of a caveat; he must first satisfy the court that on the evidence presented to it his claim to an interest in the property does raise a serious question to be tried; and having done so he must go on to show that on the balance of convenience it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action, by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land to some third party.” [12] Di dalam kes Kho Ah Soon V Duniaga Sdn Bhd [1996] 2 MLJ 181, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah sekali lagi menekankan berkenaan prinsip undang-undang di dalam pembatalan kaveat di mana Peh Swee Chin, HMP telah menyatakan di muka surat 184 seperti berikut: 18 “It is settled that in a matter of removal of a caveat as between a caveator and caveatee, as in the instant appeal, the onus is on the caveator to satisfy the Court that his evidence does raise a serious question to be tried as regards his claim to an interest in the land in question, and having done so he must show that, on a balance of convenience, it would be better to maintain the status quo until the trial of the action by preventing the caveatee from disposing of his land, as laid down by Lord Diplock in Eng Mee Yong & Ors v V Letchumanan [1979] 2 MLJ 212, and by analogy indirectly to American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 as indicated by Lord Diplock, the serious question for trial referred to above could mean a question not being vexatious or frivolous”. Alasan i: [13] Defendan telah membangkitkan mengenai bidang kuasa tempatan Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur di dalam pemfailan guaman sivil (WA-22NCVC-622-09/2016) oleh Plaintif / Sin Yek Century Sdn Bhd di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur sedangkan hartanah tersebut terletak di Sepang, Selangor dengan mendakwa pemfailan guaman sivil tersebut di Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur telah menjadikan tindakan Plaintif / Sin Yek Century tersebut sebagai suatu tindakan yang tidak bermerit. 19 [14] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa dakwaan Defendan tersebut adalah tidak berasas dan tidak bermerit kerana guaman WA- 22NCVC-622-09/2016 bukanlah satu litigasi di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Samada Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk membicarakan tuntutan Sin Yek Sdn Bhd sedangkan hartanah tersebut terletak di Selangor perlulah dibangkitkan di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur untuk penentuan. Isu bidangkuasa Mahkamah Tinggi Kuala Lumpur berhubung guaman WA-22NCVC-622-09/2016 bukanlah satu alasan bagi menafikan hak Plaintif memohon relif-relif yang dipohon di dalam Kandungan 1 di hadapan Mahkamah ini. Apa yang perlu dibuktikan oleh Plaintif adalah samada beliau adalah termasuk sebagai orang atau badan yang menuntut sama ada hakmilik kepada tanah atau apa-apa kepentingan yang boleh didaftarkan di dalam tanah menurut seksyen s 323 (1)(a) Kanun Tanah Negara atau dalam erti kata lain mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut. Isu samada Plaintif mempunyai kepentingan berkaveat terhadap hartanah tersebut dan samada kepentingan berkaveat tersebut menimbulkan atau mendedahkan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan 20 akan ditentukan bersekali dengan alasan-alasan ii, iii, iv, v dan v yang dibangkitkan oleh Defendan [15] Di dalam Borang 19B Kanun Tanah Negara, Plaintif telah memasukkan kaveat ke atas hartanah tersebut dengan mengemukakan alasan-alasan berikut: a) Saya telah bersetuju untuk membeli sebuah tanah yang terletak dibawah Hakmilik Individu GM 2310, Lot 195, Mukim Sepang, Daerah Sepang dan Negeri Selangor mempunyai keluasan 1.6061 hectares yang beralamat di Lot 195, Mukim Sepang, Daerah Sepang, Negeri Selangor (kemudian dari ini disebut “Hartanah”) di antara CHIA CHIN YUAN (NO. K/P: 830903-40-5499) dikenali sebagai “Pembeli”) dan NAGAMAH A/P NAGAPPAN (NO. K/P: 1501461) dan MUTAYA @MUTHIAH A/L SINAPAN (NO. K/P: 480311-10-5105) (kedua-duanya adalah Pentadbir Harta Pesaka) (dikenali sebagai “Penjual”). b) Saya juga telah membuat bayaran deposit kepada Penjual melalui cek PBB No. 735428 bertarikh 19hb Ogos 2015 sebanyak RM47, 640.00 ke atas nama MUTAYA @ MUTHIAH A/L SINAPAN serta telah diakui terima oleh kedua-dua Penjual tersebut. 21 c) Sementara menantikan proses pindahmilik dari Penjual di sempurnakan, saya ingin memasukkan kaveat persendirian ke atas hartanah tersebut untuk menjamin kepentingan saya di dalam Hartanah tersebut. [16] Berdasarkan keterangan-keterangan dokumentar yang dikemukakan di hadapan Mahkamah ini, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini bahawa Plaintif telah memuaskan hati Mahkamah bahawa Plaintif mempunyai hak kontraktual yang berkait atau berhubung dengan hartanah tersebut, ianya membangkitkan suatu kepentingan boleh daftar atau dalam erti kata lain Plaintif telah membangkitkan satu hak atau kepentingan yang boleh dikaveatkan. [17] Di dalam hal ini, Mahkamah ini suka merujuk kepada prinsip yang telah digariskan Hakim Buhagiar di dalam satu keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan di dalam kes In Chin Cheng Hong & Hameed & Ors [1954] MLJ 169. [18] Prinsip yang diutarakan oleh Hakim Buhagiar ini telah telah dirujuk juga Hakim Gopal Sri Ram di dalam kes Luggage Distributors apabila Y A telah merujuk kepada penghakiman Hakim Gill di dalam 22 kes Inter-Continental Mining Co Sdn Bhd v Societe Des Etains De Bayas Tudjuh [1974]1 MLJ 145 di mana rujukan telah di buat kepada muka surat 170 alasan penghakiman Hakim Buhagiar yang menyatakan: “This agreement is non-staturory and non-registrable instrument; such instruments do not create an estate or interest, legal or equitable, in the land but create a contractual right, a personal right of action; it passes no actual interest in the land that can be called an equitable estate in the ordinary sense, but an equitable interest of a contractual nature under the instrument consisting of a right to be registered as the owner of the interest purported to be conferred by the instrument (vide Hogg, Registration of Titles to Land at p 116). As Lord Dunedin stated in Haji Abdul Rahman v Mohamed Hassan [1917] AC 209: ‘The agreement is valueless as a transfer or burdening instrument, but it is good as a contract.’ This contractual right may be sufficient to give a person an ‘interest’ in the land for the purposes of protection by restrictibe entry in the register; the claim to an interest in land arising out of the contract is sufficient to make it caveatable interest and to support a caveat (In re Registration of Caveat (1908) Innes 114). The whole system of caveats is founded on the principle that they exist for the protection of alleged as well as proved interests and of interests that have not yet become actual interest in land, but a caveat, being in the nature 23 of statutory injunction, does not in itself make a claim or right either better or worse.’ Applying the principles enunciated in the above cases to the facts of the present case it would seem clear that if the agreement is in substance a sublease, though not in the required statutory form, equity will treat it as an agreement for a sublease and specifically enforce it, in which case the appellants have a right in equity to a registrable interest in the land, so that they are entitled to lodge a caveat under s 323(1)(a) of the National Land Code. (Emphasis added).” (Penekanan oleh Mahkamah ini). [19] Adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini juga bahawa daripada pengataan-pengataan, rentetan komunikasi kedua-dua peguamcara pihak-pihak Plaintif dan Defendan dan keterangan dokumentar yang telah dikemukakan telah menjurus kepada pendedahan atau pembangkitan isu-isu serius untuk dibicarakan yang antara-lain: i. samada berdasarkan tindak-tanduk pihak-pihak terhasil atau wujud satu perjanjian yang muktamad dan sah di antara pihak- pihak yang boleh dikuatkuasakan oleh Plaintif terhadap Defendan; 24 ii. samada penandatanganan perjanjian adalah menjadi mustahil dan membolehkan pembatalannya oleh Defendan; iii. samada pembatalan perjanjian dengan pihak ketiga oleh Defendan adalah merupakan pra-syarat perjanjian. iii. Samada imbangan keselesaaan memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan iv. Samada terdapat keadaan istimewa yang melayakkan status quo diganggu/diubah (Kedua-dua isu (ii i) dan (iv) adalah ditentukan bersekali ) [20] Imbangan keselesaaan sememangnya memihak bahawa kaveat tersebut dikekalkan sehingga perlupusan tindakan sivil WA-22NCVC-622-09/2016 yang difailkan Plaintif terhadap Defendan dan keadaan ini adalah suatu keadaan istimewa untuk pengekalan status quo yakni kaveat yang dimasukkan oleh Plaintif hendaklah kekal sehingga penyelesaian kes WA-22NCVC-622-09/2016 tersebut. 25 [21] Bersandarkan alasan-alasan di atas, adalah menjadi dapatan Mahkamah ini Plaintif mempunyai tuntutan hakmilik yang boleh dikaveat atau kepentingan yang boleh didaftar di bawah seksyen 323(1)(a) atau (b) Kanun Tanah Negara. Justeru, permohonan Plaintif untuk perlanjutan tempoh kaveat yang dimasukkannya ke atas hartanah tersebut sehingga penyelesaian tindakan sivil WA- 22NCVC-622-09/2016 adalah dibenarkan dengan kos sebanyak RM 3000.00. ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Pesuruhjaya Kehakiman Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Bertarikh 04 haribulan November 2016 26 Peguam Plaintif - Tetuan Nathan R. Rajasurian Ashok K. Raman Peguam Defendan - Tetuan Devadason & Devadason Rabindran Devadason

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24FC-572-04/2016

PLAINTIF Affin Bank Berhad DEFENDAN Koa Geok Heong

03/11/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=f141e767-5b70-4dd0-9d6c-7fc99579614e&Inline=true

1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN SAMAN PEMULA NO: BA-24FC-572-04/2016 Dalam perkara Seksyen 256 Kanun Tanah Negara 1965. Dan Dalam perkara Aturan 83 Kaedah- Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 2012. Dan Dalam perkara mengenai gadaian ke atas hartanah yang di pegang di bawah H.S.(D) 52765, PT. No. 40914, Mukim Bandar Baru Bangi, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan melalui Perserahan Kaveat Pemegang Lien No. 5794112000 yang didaftarkan di Pejabat Pendaftar Hakmilik Selangor pada 18.12.2000 2 BETWEEN AFFIN BANK BERHAD (No. 25046-T) …PLAINTIF AND KOA GEOK HEONG ...DEFENDAN [NO. KP : 650112-10-7318/A 0105519] GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Foreclosure – Enclosure 1) A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] The present Application before this Court is a run of the mill foreclosure action initiated by the Plaintiff-bank against its loan defaulter (Defendant-debtor). Basically, the Plaintiff-bank here is seeking for an order for sale of a property owned by the Defendant-debtor of which a lien holder’s caveat was registered in its favour as security for a loan facility granted to the Defendant- debtor. [2] The entire defence raised by the Defendant-debtor to deny the Plaintiff’s right to enforce its security by applying for an order for sale of the property was premised on the validity of the Notice of 3 Demand which was grounded on erroneous misstatement of trite principles of law. Apart from the obvious or blatant misstatement of laws, the Defendant-debtor also had the audacity to raise issues which were far beyond or not included in his affidavits in opposing the Plaintiff-bank’s application. [3] The facts of the case are verily simple. Affin Bank Berhad (“Plaintiff”) is the undisputed judgment-creditor of Koa Geok Heong (“Defendant”) who is the undisputed judgment-debtor owing vast sums of monies to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff had offered and the Defendant had accepted a term loan facility to the amount of RM666,000.00 under an Offer Letter dated 10.10.2000 (“Offer Letter”). The salient terms of the Offer Letter are as follows: i. The Defendant shall pay 180 monthly instalments of RM6,480.00; and ii. In any event of default, which includes failure to pay the instalments, either the principle amount or the interest, the Plaintiff reserves all rights to recall and cancel the term loan facility at any time without having to give reasons. 4 [4] Consequent to the Offer Letter, the parties have entered into a Facility Agreement in which the material terms of the Facility Agreement are as follows: “Section 15.23 LAW …the service of any writ or summons or any legal process in respect of any such action or proceeding may be effected on the Borrower or the Bank by forwarding a copy of the writ or summons, statement of claim or other legal process by prepaid registered post to their respective address for the time being. … Section 15.30 NOTICES (4) Deemed delivery (a) Any notice or demand or certificate or request or communication to the Borrower shall be deemed to have been sufficiently or effectively given or made or delivered when delivered personally or left at any of the 5 Borrower’s address stated in this Section above or posted to the Borrower by ordinary mail or otherwise with postage prepaid and addressed to the Borrower at any of the Borrower’s address stated in this Section above… [5] The Defendant had also furnished its own property held under title HS(D) 52765, PT No 40914, Mukim Bandar Baru Bangi, Daerah Ulu Langat, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Property”) as security in lien for the term loan facility. Following the depositing of the title by the Defendant as registered owner of the Property, a lien- holder’s caveat was lodged under Presentation No. 57941/2000 on 16.12.2000 in favour of the Plaintiff. [6] The factum of the Defendant’s indebtedness is undisputed. The Defendant’s indebtedness in this case is clearly proven and admitted on two levels. Firstly, the Defendant’s indebtedness was already proven upon the Plaintiff successfully obtaining a judgment against the Defendant deeming the Defendant to be a judgment- debtor on 6.9.2006 (“Judgment of 2006”). Despite a judgment had been entered against the Defendant since September 2006 which is more than a full 10 years ago, the Defendant has yet to 6 comply with the said judgment of 2006. The Defendant has in fact chose to remain as delinquent debtor and continuously in full disrespect, failed to honour both the judgment and its liabilities even until the date of this Judgment. [7] Even after more than 10 years of blatant failure to honour his obligations, the Defendant still had the audacity to seek defence, devising facades in misstatement of the laws and the contract in his attempts to deny the ends of justice. [8] Secondly, the factum of indebtedness is proven and admitted upon the Plaintiff issuing a Notice of Demand in Form 16D (Form 16D) of the National Land Code (NLC) dated 14.12.2015 (in view of enforcing the lien) for the outstanding amount of RM252,756.93. This Court must emphasise here that the Defendant did not dispute the receipt of the Form 16D which was sent to the Defendant by registered post on 8.12.2015 to three different addresses namely: POS MALAYSIA BERHAD -------------------- KIRIMAN BANYAK BARANG-BARANG BERDAFTAR ---------------------- 7 Nama Pengirim:TETUAN HISHAM SOBRI & KADIR Alamat: Level 20, Menara MARA, 232 Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, 50100 Kuala Lumpur No No Pendaftaran Nama dan alamat Penerima Bayaran Pos termasuk bayaran Pendaftaran RM Sen Berat jika lebih 1kg Kilogram 1. RD51 607 189 5MY KOA GEOK HEONG No. 35A, Jalan Chan Chin Mooi 53200 Kuala Lumpur 2. RD51 607 190 5MY KOA GEOK HEONG No. 46, Jalan P/16 Selaman Industrial Park Section 10 43650 Bandar Baru Bangi Selangor Darul Ehsan 3. RD51 607 191 5MY KOA GEOK HEONG Wisma NLP 47-1, Jalan SP 2/2 Seksyen 2 43300 Seri Kembangan Selangor Darul Ehsan However, upon receipt of the Form 16D, the Defendant had done nothing to dispute the sum claimed in the Notice of Demand. In fact, the Defendant had not even responded with a single reply to the Notice of Demand. If indeed the Defendant was adamant that 8 the amount claimed was incorrect or excessive, the Defendant should have retorted of the same complaint upon receiving the Notice of Demand and not simply sat idly by until the Plaintiff follows through with the enforcement of the lien. [9] The Defendant’s conduct in this case is basically is a conduct of a typical delinquent debtor where he had sat on his own alleged rights and wasted time just to further frustrate the Plaintiff as well as the ends of justice. Unsurprisingly, the delinquent Defendant had purposely failed to remedy the default and also failed to comply with the Demand within 30 days of the Notice of Demand. [10] It is this act of default (against the Notice of Demand) as well as the whole decade of the Defendant’s delinquent failure to pay that becomes the Plaintiff’s basis of applying for the sale of the Property. B. WHETHER THE PRESENT ENFORCEMENT OF THE LIEN IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 9 [11] The Defendant had contended that the present enforcement of the lien by the Plaintiff was a repetition of two other previous failed bankruptcy proceedings initiated by the Plaintiff against the Defendant. It was argued on behalf of the Defendant that the Plaintiff’s application here is entirely founded on identical and same questions which were already determined by the Court when the 1st Bankruptcy Notice was set aside. In other words, the Defendant sought to deny the Plaintiff’s right for an order for sale by contending that the Plaintiff’s application is barred by res judicata. [12] This Court must emphasise this Court’s disdain upon the Defendant’s audacity to contend res judicata between bankruptcy actions and foreclosure action. This is utterly a blatant and inconceivable misstatement of the law by the Defendant. This Court must state here that the previous enforcement proceeding commenced by the Plaintiff namely the two bankruptcy proceedings were set aside merely because of a technicality (of an alleged incorrect amount claimed under the bankruptcy notice). Those bankruptcy proceedings and the present enforcement action by way of foreclosure are totally and distinctively separate enforcement proceedings. There is no feasible way in law or even 10 in logic that such action in personam to the debt in bankruptcy proceedings and an action in rem to the Property in the present enforcement proceedings would be caught under the principle of res judicata. It is astounding to this Court that the Defendant would dare to contend such misconceived notion against trite principles in law. [13] Furthermore, a simple reading of the Defendant’s Afidavit Jawapan Defendan (Enclosure 3) in opposing the Plaintiff’s application would reveal that the Defendant even went as far to aver that upon the judgment of 6.9.2006, anything at all with regards to the covenant for the term loan facility and the securities with it cannot at all be brought forth into Court and shall be barred by res judicata. It is as though the Defendant is totally misinformed in law or the Defendant is expecting to take the parties and this Court for a fool. For the sake of clarity to understand this erroneous supposition, the relevant excerpt of the Defendant’s affidavit is reproduced here: (b) Walau bagaimanapun, Plaintif tidak lagi berhak untuk menuntut atas terma-terma Surat Tawaran atau apa- apa perjanjian pinjaman yang berkenaan tersebut 11 memandangkan Mahkamah Tinggi di Kuala Lumpur telah memberi penghakiman (Guaman No D7-22-1091- 2006) ke atas tuntutan Plaintif berdasarkan Surat Tawaran tersebut dan/atau perjanjian pinjaman yang berkenaan pada 6.9.2006) [14] It is bare basic of legal practice to appreciate that an action for judgment sum and an action in execution of the judgment sum is totally and utterly different from one another. And of course, the same debt, the same basis of debt, the same document proving debt, the same agreements, and the same covenants would be reproduced and relied unto in the subsequent action in enforcement. How is it even remotely logical that the judgment for the judgment sum is a catalyst to deem all subsequent actions in enforcement barred by res judicata? Such contention is preposterous. [15] First and foremost, this Court has the utmost duty to correct and clarify another mystifying misstatement of the law brought forth by the Defendant regarding the position of a lien-holder and a lien- holder’s rights to enforce the lien under the same provisions of the Land Code regarding charges. It is trite that the position of a lien- 12 holder is akin to the position of a chargee and an action for enforcement of lien would rely on the same provisions of an enforcement of charge. [16] The Defendant however had the audacity to challenge the validity of the entire enforcement action, on the erroneous supposition that the provisions regarding order for sale in the National Land Code, only applies to charges and not lien. And this is contended so in the erroneous reading of the law in that Section 254(1) of the National Land Code, reads that a Notice of Demand in Form 16D can only be issued in the case of a “charge”. Erroneously then, the provision can only apply in cases of a charge since charge had been defined in Section 5 of the Code to be “registered charge”. [17] This Court cannot emphasise enough how preposterous this supposition is. As much as the learned counsel of the Defendant ought to seek the best interest of its client, a blatant misstatement of the law is inexcusable. As it correctly stands, the entire provision of the Order for Sale in the National Land Code is encapsulated in “Chapter 3” aptly bearing the heading which reads “REMEDIES OF CHARGEES: SALE”. Every single provision from Sections 253 to 259 refers to charges. Nonetheless, it is already trite law 13 that lien-holder’s remedies also fall within Chapter 3 of the National Land Code, and a lien-holder may apply for an order for sale, the same manner a chargee may under the same provisions of the National Land Code. This Court is guided by the landmark decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (formerly known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd) v Selangor Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2010] 3 MLJ 43 which had held that: “[18] A lien is said to be similar to an equitable mortgage where the lien-holder retains the issue document of title together with the duplicate of the registered lease or a copy of the issue document of title issued under s 343(3) of the NLC. And in such a situation, the interest secured would be akin to that of a co- proprietor. The deposit of the issue document of title must have been made with the intention that the deposited document would serve as a security for the loan and that the loan must not be a registered charge but rather an unregistered interest recognised by the NLC. It is at this point of time that the lien creates 14 what is known as an 'equitable' interest in the land or lease and that would legally give the lien-holder the right to enter a lien-holder's caveat which would definitely trigger a statutory interest. …. [21] According to s 343 of the NLC, a lien can be created over an alienated land or even over a registered lease or even in an undivided share in an alienated land. And the best remedy available to the lien-holder would be, firstly, to obtain a judgment debt under O 42 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for the amount due and, secondly, to apply to the court for an order for sale of the land or the registered lease pursuant to the provisions of ss 257–259 of the NLC.” [18] Now having in mind the position of the Plaintiff as lien-holder is akin to a chargee, this Court moves on to correct and clarify yet another one of the Defendant’s misstatement in law which is the erroneous supposition that the Plaintiff’s action in enforcement is barred by res judicata from the judgment of 2006 as well as the previous bankruptcy proceedings. It is reiterated here that the 15 Plaintiff’s action in rem to foreclose the Property is a distinct and separate from an action in personam for the debt in the bankruptcy proceedings and the judgment of 2006. This Court is guided by the decision of the High Court in the case of Bank Utama (Malaysia) Berhad v Saujana Pertiwi Sdn Bhd [2003] 7 MLRH 243: “The Plaintiff further contended that even though the 3 actions arose from the granting of the same Overdraft facility but each of the actions taken was based on different documents by different parties and concerning different issues. In support of its contention the Plaintiff referred to the case of Co-operative Central Bank Bhd. v. Belaka Suria Sdn. Bhd. [1991] 2 CLJ 453 (Rep); [1991] 3 CLJ 2131; [1991] 3 MLJ 43, where the learned Judge ruled:- "In principle, a chargee has a right to institute an action for recovery of the debt and also a right to assert the power of sale on the incumbered property, the 2 actions are not the same." After having considered this matter carefully, I agreed fully with the contention by the Counsel for the Plaintiff. The 16 decision of the Federal Court case of Low Lee Lian v. Ban Hin Lee Bank Bhd. [1997] 2 CLJ 36; [1977] 1 MLJ 77 which states:- "Now, it is trite that a chargee/creditor may pursue any or all remedies to recover monies lent by him. He may enforce his statutory charge against the chargor by way of proceedings in under S. 256 of the Code. He may sue the principal debtor (who may or may not be the chargor) upon the personal covenant contained in any loan agreement that was entered into between the parties. He may proceed against the surety who has guaranteed the loan. And he may sue all these courses simultaneously, contemporaneously or successively." (emphasis added). [19] Therein, having the above in mind it is this Court’s finding that the present enforcement action by the Plaintiff is definitely not barred by res judicata. 17 C. WHETHER THE NOTICE OF DEMAND IS A VALID DEMAND TO INSTITUTE THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE LIEN [20] The first contention against the validity of the Notice of Demand (Form 16D) had already been debunked in the previous section of this Judgment. The Defendant cannot simply deem the Notice of Demand to be invalid merely on the false supposition that a lien cannot fall within the ambit of provisions pertaining to chargee’s remedies for an order for sale. Indeed it has been a trite principle in law that a lien-holder may seek the same remedy for an order for sale as a chargee in reliance of the same provisions as a chargee would have relied upon in the National Land Code 1965. Thus, this Court dismisses this misguided contention by the Defendant. [21] Secondly, in sheer desperation to poke holes in the Plaintiff’s case, the Defendant attempted to invalidate the Form 16D on the contention of a supposed prejudice as he was miraculously confused by the date of the granting of facility that was stated in the Notice of Demand. The simple typographical error in the Form 16D is just that instead of the date of the Offer Letter being 10.10.2000, the Form 16D reads 14.10.2000. This is yet another 18 exasperating obstacle put forth by the Defendant that is altogether void of any substance. There is no room for prejudice or confusion at all here. The Plaintiff had ever granted only one term loan facility to the Defendant to the amount of RM666,000.00. And the same RM666,000.00 was written on the Form 16D, Also the Defendant has had the knowledge that the Plaintiff is pursuing to have these debts recovered since the judgment of 2006 and that judgment, as well as the two (2) bankruptcy proceedings all refer to the same Offer Letter of 10.10.2000. Although there is a typographical error here, it is vividly clear that no confusion would set whatsoever as it would be verily clear in the Defendant’s mind that the Plaintiff is enforcing its rights to recover its debts and enforcing the lien in relation to the one and only Offer Letter that is dated 10.10.2000. [22] There is far greater justice to serve as compared to the immaterial typographical error in the Notice of Demand. In fact there is far greater injustice if this Court were to invalidate the Notice of Demand in Form 16D allowing the Defendant to prolong his spree of delinquent non-compliance to the Judgment of 2006 as well as the Offer Letter and the Facility Agreement. It is well within this Court’s inherent power under Order 92 rule 4 of the Rules of Court 2012 to prevent injustice and abuse of the process of the 19 Court, to overlook this immaterial and non-prejudicial typographical error contended by the Defendant. [23] Thirdly and lastly, the Defendant contended that the amount claimed under the Form 16D is incorrect as it failed to take into consideration certain number of payments made by the Defendant towards the debt. And in attempting to prove the alleged error, the Defendant had exhibited numerous however incoherent, unexplained documents, which includes unexplained current account statements, corporate current account statements, cheque deposit advice slips from the cheque deposit machine, and in fact, payment vouchers drawn up by the Defendant which were never signed to be received by the Plaintiff. [24] This Court has taken pains to scrutinise these loose documents without any indications as to its relevance to prove the Defendant’s contention of unaccounted payments. None of these documents indicate any sort of payment was ever deposited or received into the Defendant’s account with the Plaintiff. In fact, the extent of incoherence is so blatant that the Defendant even exhibited cheque deposit advice slips in which are advice slips printed upon mere depositing of cheques at the machine. This slip not at all can 20 be made as proof of cheque clearance or payment made. Even the fine print of the cheque deposit advice reads that the cheque deposited “will be processed” and had not yet been processed. [25] The fact that the Defendant cannot exhibit any consequent proof of this cheque’s clearance is further proof of the Defendant’s inability to substantiate its contention of payments. By and large none of the documents exhibited bear any proof that any of the payments made or monies paid out were deposited into the Defendant’s account with the Plaintiff. All the account statements only show the movements of monies of inconsistent amounts but none of the accounts show that the monies moved were in fact paid to the Defendant’s account with the Plaintiff or received by the Plaintiff. [26] Now, how is it logically and legally incumbent upon the Plaintiff to make such deductions, when the Defendant himself utterly fails to prove any of these payments ever made it into the Defendant’s account with the Plaintiff? The answer is that it is not logically and legally incumbent for the Plaintiff to account for these payments. It must be highlighted that the Defendant merely tabulate alleged payments made with utterly loose reference to exhibits in his affidavit. There was no analysis of any depths regarding the 21 exhibits’ relevance in proving the alleged payments by the Defendant. [27] On the same issue of the amount claimed, if indeed the amount claimed under the Form 16D is incorrect, then the Defendant should have disputed the amount outright upon receipt of the Notice of Demand (Form 16D). Instead, the Defendant chose to do absolutely nothing and sat idly by. And this utter absence of response or retort is a clear admission of the amount by the Defendant. The Defendant cannot now at the final hour dispute the amount when all the while upon receiving the Notice of Demand, the Defendant had done nothing to challenge the amount. [28] This Court refers to the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and 22 cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another : he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [29] This Court further to the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the case of Amalgamated Investment which had held the following: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by 23 acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [30] Thus, the Defendant here cannot be allowed to take both stances in admitting and denying the amount. When the Defendant had admitted the amount (by not challenging the amount stated in the Notice of Demand) the Defendant cannot subsequently go against his own admission. 24 [31] Thus, upon the foregoing deliberation, it is this Court’s finding that the Notice of Demand remains valid, subsisting and enforceable against the Defendant. D. WHETHER THE SERVICE OF THE ORIGINATING SUMMONS AND NOTICE OF DEMAND ARE VALID [32] In further detestable attempt to confuse this Court, the Defendant had contended a number of plain misconceived readings of the documents binding the parties in the present Originating Summons. [33] Firstly, the Defendant had the audacity to attempt to separate and sever the Facility Agreement from the present action by the Plaintiff. Rather peculiarly, again the Defendant opted to contradict its own stance. On one hand, the Defendant contended that the Plaintiff’s enforcement action ought to be barred by res judicata for relying on the Offer Letter and Facility Agreement determined in the judgment of 2006, and on another hand now, the Defendant sought to demarcate and differentiate the present Enforcement Action to be different from the Facility Agreement. Now this is verily confusing and it is utterly telling of the Defendant’s own 25 confusion with its own defence. Nonetheless, the real reflection of the fact and law is that the present enforcement action in rem here also refers to the same Offer Letter and Facility Agreement. It remains undisputed that the lien-holder’s caveat was lodged in view of the Offer Letter and the Facility Agreement to secure the term loan facility granted by the Plaintiff under the Offer Letter and the Facility Agreement. Thus, the Offer Letter, the Facility Agreement, and the lien-holder’s caveat are inextricably connected and the same documents may be referred to in separate actions in rem against the Property and in personam against the covenants. What is contended by the Defendant is immensely ridiculous. It goes without saying and common sense would dictate that any action for enforcement of lien would refer to a supposed default of the repayment of debts from facilities which were granted under a covenant (and the covenants in the present case would be the Offer Letter and the Facility Agreement). It is absurd that the Defendant supposes that the present enforcement action would not involve the Facility Agreement. Again this is sheer basic understanding of the law that the Defendant attempts to distort in the face of this Court. 26 [34] Secondly, apart from the brazen and absurd attempt to sever the terms of the Facility Agreement from the present Originating Summons, This Court must express its disdain on the misleading, partial, selective, and isolated reading of the Facility agreement. The Defendant deliberately cited (in isolation) Section 15.23 of the Facility Agreement which stipulates that the parties subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court of Malaysia and deems that upon the parties subjecting themselves to the jurisdiction, then the manner of service must be upon the manner and method of that jurisdiction, being the Rules of Court 2012. However, this malevolent isolated reading of the section deliberately leaves out the fact that the manner and method of service had already been prescribed in the same Section 15.23 of the same Facility agreement. If the parties had intended that the mode of service must be AR registered service, then the parties would have reflected the same in the agreement. If the parties omitted the mention of the requirement of the AR registered service (when it is common knowledge that this AR registered post is in existence and available) it must have been the intent of both parties that an AR registered post is not required. Sections 15.23 and 15.30 are reproduced here for convenience: 27 Section 15.23 LAW …the service of any writ or summons or any legal process in respect of any such action or proceeding may be effected on the Borrower or the Bank by forwarding a copy of the writ or summons, statement of claim or other legal process by prepaid registered post to their respective address for the time being. … Section 15.30 NOTICES (4) Deemed delivery (a) Any notice or demand or certificate or request or communication to the Borrower shall be deemed to have been sufficiently or effectively given or made or delivered when delivered personally or left at any of the Borrower’s address stated in this Section above or posted to the Borrower by ordinary mail or otherwise with postage prepaid and addressed to 28 the Borrower at any of the Borrower’s address stated in this Section above… [35] This Court is stunned by the Defendant’s deliberate omission to refer to the clear terms of the deeming provision is section 15.30 of the Facility Agreement above. [36] Even without the deeming provision, section 15.23 of the Facility Agreement already stated that any service of legal process can be made by prepaid registered post. [37] This Court is also dumbfounded by the Defendant’s deliberate omission of Section 15.32 of the same Facility Agreement which stipulates that the terms of the Facility Agreement shall be in addition and not in derogation of the Offer Letter deeming the Facility Agreement’s terms to apply together with the Offer Letter. The Section clearly reads: “The terms and conditions herein stated shall be in addition to and not in derogation of… any terms and conditions that may be specified in any Letter of Offer from time to time.” 29 [38] Section 15.23 alone or even with Section 15.30 have already provided an alternative mode of service to displace the general rule of service of originating process under Order 10 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court 2012. Considering that Order 10 rule 3 of the Rules of Court 2012 allows alternative modes of service in the performance of contract, thus the mode of service stipulated under the Facility Agreement shall apply. [39] It is the responsibility of this Court to respect and uphold the party’s autonomy to contract. Thus, it is this Court’s responsibility to give effect to the terms agreed by the parties in the Facility Agreement. Section 15.23 already stipulates that the service of any legal process may be made by prepaid registered post (not AR registered post) and Section 15.32 already stipulates that the terms of the Facility Agreement shall apply together with or in addition of the Offer Letter. [40] Thus, it is only appropriate that this Court to give effect to these sections and find that the Plaintiff’s service of the Originating Summons and Notice of Demand via prepaid registered post, indeed valid in law. 30 E. WHETHER THERE IS CAUSE TO THE CONTRARY AGAINST THE ORDER FOR SALE [41] The landmark case of Low Lee Lian v Ban Hin Lee Bank Sdn Bhd [1997] 2 CLJ 36 in reference to Section 256(3) of the National Land Code 1965 have provided three instances where cause to the contrary may be shown: i. When a case is proven by the chargor that the case falls within any of the exceptions of doctrine of indefeasibility under Section 340 of the National Land Code 1965; ii. When the chargor is able demonstrate the chargee has failed to meet the conditions precedent for the making of an application for an order for sale; and iii. When the charger is able to demonstrate that the grant of an order for sale would contradict some rule of equity 31 [42] The Defendant had staked their defence to prove that the Plaintiff has failed to meet conditions precedent and or has contradicted some rules of equity for supposedly employing the wrong mode of service, and allegedly claiming the wrong amount of debt under an invalid notice of demand. All these allegations however fall entirely flat and remain utterly unproven by the Defendant. Therefore, it is this Court’s finding that the Defendant has ultimately and clearly failed to demonstrate or prove any cause to the contrary. F. COURT’S DECISION [43] In view of all of the findings above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiff has successfully proven its case. This Court also dismisses the Defendant’s Defence. This Court hereby grants order-in-terms to the Plaintiff’s Originating Summons. [44] This Court also orders that the Defendant to pay the Plaintiff a sum of RM 8000.00 in costs. 32 ..................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 3rd of November 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Hisham Sobri & Kadir Mohd Rosly Khady Mohd Ayub Khan Aliff Ridhwan Mohd Yusof For the Defendant - Messrs YH Teh & Quek Au Yong Wai Nyan

Tika 2.6.0

WA-24C-39-06/2016 & WA-24C-47-06/2016

PLAINTIF 1. ) Martego Sdn Bhd 2. ) Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. ) Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd 2. ) Martego Sdn Bhd

01/11/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=925c5a87-533b-40e9-b675-eb347333bd7c&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-39-06/2016 In the matter of Section 15(b) and (d) and Section 16(1)(a) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) And In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 14.4.2016 in respect of adjudication proceedings between Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd (Company No: 934713-T) and Martego Sdn Bhd (Company No: 194048-W) by Adjudicator Ir. Lai Sze Ching (“the Adjudication Decision”) And In the matter of Order 7 and 28 and Order 92 Rule 4 Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN MARTEGO SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 194048-W) ... PLAINTIFF AND ARKITEK MEOR & CHEW SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 934713-T) … DEFENDANT 2 (heard together with) IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA AT KUALA LUMPUR IN THE STATE OF WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN, MALAYSIA (CIVIL DIVISION) ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO: WA-24C-47-06/2016 In the matter of an Adjudication Decision dated 14.4.2016 in respect of adjudication proceedings between Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd (Company No: 934713-T) and Martego Sdn Bhd (Company No: 194048-W) by Adjudicator Ir. Lai Sze Ching (“the Adjudication Decision”) And In the matter of Section 28 of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”) And In the matter of Order 7 rule 2, Order 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 BETWEEN ARKITEK MEOR & CHEW SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 934713-T) ... PLAINTIFF 3 AND MARTEGO SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 194048-W) … DEFENDANT THE JUDGMENT OF YA LEE SWEE SENG [1] This case deals with the interesting question as to whether, an architect rendering architectural services with respect to a construction project, may claim under adjudication his fees outstanding from his client, the owner of the project. [2] Martego Sdn Bhd (“Martego”) is the Plaintiff in the Setting Aside Application (OS 39) of an Adjudication Decision delivered on 14 April 2016 and the Defendant in the Enforcement Application (OS 47). Arkitek Meor & Chew Sdn Bhd (“ARMC”) is the Defendant in OS 39 and the Plaintiff in OS 47. ARMC is the successful Claimant in the adjudication and Martego is the Respondent and they shall be referred to as such in these 2 OS and sometimes by their respective company names. [3] Martego had also, on 10 June 2016, filed an application for stay ("Stay Application") of the Adjudication Decision pursuant to Section 4 16(1)(a) of the Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Act 2012 (“CIPAA”). [4] The Stay Application had become academic, as ARMC’s solicitor had, at the case management on 16 March 2016, placed on record that a winding-up notice and/or petition shall not be served on Martego unless and until a prior 5-day notice is given to Martego. No such notice had been issued to Martego evincing no intention on the part of ARMC to proceed with winding up before the hearing of both OS fixed to be heard together [5] Martego accepts that ARMC’s application for enforcement in OS 47 shall follow consequently in the event Martego’s setting aside application in OS 39 is dismissed. Project [6] Martego had engaged ARMC as the Project Architect for the proposed development on Lots 849, 851, 690 and PT78, Section 57, Changkat Perak, Off Lorong Perak, Kuala Lumpur (the “Project”) comprising the following: (a) Three high-rise blocks (Tower 1, 2 and 3), 43 storeys high, with 832 residential units and 2 storeys of recreational facilities, on top of a 5 podium with 5 storeys of car-parking areas, 1 storey of car-parking basement and ancillary M&E spaces. (b) one high-rise block (Tower 4), 19 storeys high, with 46 residential units and 2 storeys of recreational facilities, on top of a podium with 4 storeys of car-parking areas and ancillary M&E spaces. [7] Martego issued a letter of appointment (ref MSB/ECA/LOA/c1) dated 22 August 2014 (the “Contract”), which was duly accepted by ARMC. ARMC commenced work under the Contract but its Contract was terminated by Plaintiff on or about 7 August 2015. ARMC accepted the termination on 10 August 2015. Problem [8] The dispute is on ARMC’s claim for its fees and remuneration for architectural consultancy services rendered as an architectural consultancy practice. [9] The Claimant ARMC had claimed the amount of RM599,500.00 being the balance of their professional fees. The Adjudicator did not grant ARMC the whole of the sum claimed. The Adjudicator determined that ARMC’s total entitlement (RM631,228.00) less the amounts already paid over by Martego (RM372,678.00) prior to the commencement of Adjudication was 6 the balance sum of RM258,550.00 due and owing from Martego to ARMC, exclusive of pre and post-award interest and costs. Prayers [10] The grounds for Martego’s application for setting aside is two-fold; first it is on the ground that the Adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in delivering the Adjudication Decision and secondly, there has been a denial of natural justice in the Adjudicator’s failure to hold a hearing despite numerous requests from Martego. Principles [11] Section 15 of CIPAA states that an aggrieved party may apply to the High Court to set aside an adjudication decision on one or more of the following grounds: (a) The adjudication decision was improperly procured through fraud or bribery; (b) There has been a denial of natural justice; (c) The Adjudicator has not acted independently or impartially; or (d) The Adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction. (emphasis added) 7 Whether the contract between the Architect and its client Martego for the payment of fees for architectural consultancy services rendered is a 'construction contract' under CIPAA. [12] The above determination is important because if the said contract is a ‘construction contract' then the payment claim for outstanding fees for services rendered under a construction contract would be claimable by way of Adjudication. CIPAA applies to every construction contract made in writing as provided for under section 2. [13] Under section 4 of CIPAA a "Construction contract" means a construction work contract or a construction consultancy contract. Further "Payment" means a payment for work done or services rendered under the express terms of a construction contract. Therefore a "payment claim" may be with respect to a "construction consultancy contract". [14] The appointment of ARMC as Martego’s Project Architect was by way of Martego’s Letter of Appointment dated 22 August 2014 (“Contract”). Under paragraph 3(b) of the Contract, ARMC’s scope of services was for ‘contract administration’ and the scope of work thereunder includes, but is not limited to, recommending the list of contractors and sub-contractors 8 for tender and issuing Progress Claim Certificates to the contractors upon consultation with Martego. [15] The ambit of both a construction work contract and a construction consultancy contract are expansively defined. The definition of ‘construction consultancy contract’ is relevant and it means: “... a contract to carry out consultancy services in relation to construction work and includes planning and feasibility study, architectural work, engineering, surveying, exterior and interior decoration landscaping and project management services.” (emphasis added) [16] It is important to note that the Federal Court had, in Lembaga Pembangunan Industri Pembinaan Malaysia v Konsortium JGC & Ors [2015] 6 MLJ 612 the opportunity to interpret the phrase ‘construction works’ in Section 2 of the Construction Industry Development Board Act 1994 (Act 520). The definition of ‘construction works’ in Act 520 was laid out in paragraph [59] of the Federal Court Judgment. [17] Sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition of ‘construction works’ in Act 520 are identical to sub-paragraphs (a) to (e) of the definition of ‘construction work’ in CIPAA, save for the addition of the word ‘oil’ in sub- 9 paragraph (d) of Act 520 which is absent from the definition in CIPAA. In interpreting the word ‘includes’ which is present in the definition, the Federal Court held: “[62] Having perused s 2 of the Act and the facts of this case, we have instead placed our reliance on the word ‘includes’, rather than alluding to the principle of ‘noscitur a sociis’. The word includes is generally used to enlarge words or phrases in a statute, as in the current Act, with those words or phrases together with those they should include, understood to have their natural meaning ... Edgar Joseph Jr in Public Prosecutor v Hun Peng Khai & Ors [1984] 2 MLJ 318 at p 324 had occasion to remark that the word ‘includes’ is a word of extension and not of definition. Evans J in Loke Yung Hong v Ng See See (F) and 3 Others (1948) 14 MLJ 123 at page 128 opined: ... one using the word ‘include’ indicates an extension of the ordinary meaning which may be attached to the word.” (emphasis added) [18] It may be gleaned from the Federal Court judgment that ‘architectural work’ is not meant to be read as a definition of ‘construction consultancy 10 contract’ under CIPAA. Rather, it is an extension of the phrase ‘construction consultancy contract’. [19] Miss Tanya Gomez further submitted that the phrase ‘construction consultancy contract’ must be construed conjunctively rather than disjunctively as the operative phrase used is ‘... and includes ...’ (emphasis added). If a disjunctive interpretation was intended, the work ‘or’ would have been used in place of ‘and’ (see Public Prosecutor v Datuk Tan Cheng Swee & Ors [1979] 1 MLJ 166 at 179, Federal Court and Mary Colete John v South East Asia Insurance Bhd [2010] 6 MLJ 733 at 745, Federal Court. [20] She then submitted that the phrase ‘architectural work’ therefore cannot be read in isolation and that a contractor under a ‘construction consultancy contract’ must meet the requirements of the definition in Section 4 and must: (a) carry out consultancy services in relation to construction work; and (b) also carry out planning, feasibility study, architectural work, engineering, surveying, exterior and interior decoration, landscaping and project management services collectively. 11 [21] She argued that since it is ARMC’s position that it has carried out ‘architectural work’ only, its Contract with Martego would fall short of the requirements for a ‘construction consultancy contract’. [22] Her stand is that a 'construction consultancy contract' would encompass design and build contracts where a contractor would be employed by the client to carry out works which would be all-encompassing and would include planning and feasibility study, architectural work, engineering, surveying, exterior and interior decoration, landscaping and project management services within the dictates of the definition in Section 2. She was at pains to stress that it would not apply to a conventional contract such as the Contract between Martego and ARMC which was a contract purely for architectural consultancy services. [23] With the greatest of respect, I find such an interpretation to be unduly straining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used in the definition of 'construction consultancy contract'; skewing and slanting it to support one's stand that it cannot be a construction consultancy contract that has only one single element of architectural work or even perhaps a bit of project management work since what has been contracted included contract administration. To me a 'construction consultancy contract' would cover and include a contract to carry out consultancy services in relation to 12 construction work and includes planning and feasibility study, architectural work, engineering, surveying, exterior and interior decoration, landscaping and project management services. If Parliament had wanted it to be confined to only a 'design and build contract' they could have said so in clear terms and the industry understands what a 'design and build contract' is. [24] These various components after the word "includes" can be present alone or in combination with the other services rendered such that the party engaged in such a contract may be providing just architectural works, just engineering services, just surveying services, just exterior and interior decoration services, just landscaping services or just project management services or a combination of these services. [25] In Tunku Yaacob Holdings v Pentadbir Tanah Kedah & Ors [2016] 1 MLJ 200, Ramli Ali FCJ in delivering the majority decision held: “[30]... On the presumption that the Legislature does nothing in vain, the court must endeavour to give significance to every word of the law legislated and it is presumed that if a word of phrase appears in a legislation, it was put there for a purpose and must not be disregarded ...” 13 [26] His Lordship went on further to explain that the court must give effect to language of a legislation that is clear and explicit: “[32] Where the language of a legislation is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequence, for in that case, the words of the legislation speak of the intention of the Legislature. If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, the court is bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, and not to limit those plain words by other considerations ...” [27] The use of the word "includes" in definitions is a device designed to give the definition an expansive meaning and not an exhaustive one; the matters stated therein are more by way of examples leaving the scope and ambit of it rather open ended within that broad definition. In Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Tekali Prospecting Sdn Bhd [2002] 2 MLJ 707 at page 714, per Gopal Sri Ram JCA (later FCJ) observed as follows: “Particular emphasis is to be placed upon the world ‘includes’ in this definition. On settled principles of statutory interpretation, it is clear where an Act of Parliament employs the expression ‘includes’ to define some other word or expression the intention is to leave the meaning of the expression open ended ...” 14 [28] If at all, the design and build contracts envisioned by Parliament, would be inclusive and not exhaustive. In other words the definition of "construction consultancy contract" would well cover a "design and build" contract but it is not confined to that. It covers the professional services of an architect as well as engineers and surveyors. [29] I agree with Mr Siva Sankaran for ARMC that to narrowly confine “includes” to a "design and build" contract would be contrary to section 17A of the Interpretation Act 1948 and 1967. Section 17A states, “A construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act (whether that purpose or object is expressly stated in the Act or not) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote the purpose or object ...” [30] The important thing is that these works and services must be integral to the construction consultancy contract and not incidental thereto. For example if a lawyer advises on a construction contract, his legal fees is not claimable under CIPAA as it is not only not provided for in the inclusive definition but also not integral to construction consultancy contract but only incidental thereto. Likewise, finance and accounting services in relation to construction consultancy contract. 15 [31] The Indian Supreme Court in SK Gupta and Another v KP Jain and another [1979] AIR 734, SC has this helpful passage: “25. ... Where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, wherever that word is used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires. But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bears its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning. At any rate, such expansive definition should be so construed as not cutting down the enacting provisions of an Act unless the phrase is absolutely clear in having the opposite effect ... The frame of any definition more often than not is capable of being made flexible but the precision and certainty in law requires that it should not be made loose and kept tight as far as possible.” (emphasis added) [32] Learned counsel for Martego then, in what appears to be a stumbling upon the missing key that would clarify all doubts said that in section 4, the term ‘contract administrator’ is defined as: 16 “... an architect, engineer, superintending officer or other person howsoever designated who administers a construction contract”. (emphasis added) [33] According to her, this definition of ‘contract administrator’ offers the one and only mention of the work ‘architect’ in CIPAA and the definition accords with clause 3(b) of the Contract which defines ARMC’s scope of work to include contract administration. [34] She highlighted that the definition of ‘contract administrator’ also encompasses one other relevant professional in the construction industry, namely engineers who, like architects, are required to administer and manage construction contracts which they enter into with contractors and sub-contractors. [35] She then pointed out that the phrase ‘contract administrator’ is used only once in CIPAA, in Section 25(m) which states that: “The adjudicator shall have the powers to – ... (m) Review and revise any certificate issued or to be issued pursuant to a construction work contract, decision, instruction, opinion 17 or valuation of the parties or contract administrator relevant to the dispute.” [36] According to her, it is imperative to note that section 25(m) makes a distinction between ‘parties’ to the adjudication proceedings and ‘contract administrator’. From the use of the disjunctive ‘or’, it therefore becomes glaring that there is an obvious separation of the group of people referred to as ‘parties’ which are parties to a construction contract and by extension, to the adjudication proceedings. [37] She then submitted that the mere fact that legislature has seen it fit to define a ‘contract administrator’ exclusively and to specifically mention architects, is evidence of its intention to exclude architects from availing themselves of the adjudication proceedings under CIPAA, especially in light of the fact that there is a specific legislation in the form of the Architects Act. [38] Again I must be pardoned for not being able to appreciate this finer argument of learned counsel for Martego. The fact that an Architect is singled out as an example of a 'contract administrator' surely cannot mean that the legislature must have minded to exclude him from being able to make his claim. Would an engineer be excluded from making his claim for 18 services rendered just because he is more likely to be a contract administrator? The definition of a 'contract administrator' has no bearing whatsoever to the unraveling of the meaning of a 'construction consultancy contract'. [39] ARMC's scope of services as expressly stated in the Contract can be found in Clause 3 and states: “The fees proposed shall embrace architectural services for detailed design, tender and construction drawings submission, and contract management and shall include submission of amendments as may be required by the Owner, Authorities or for other reasons therefrom: (a) Detailed Design Development ... (b) Contract Administration ... (ii) To recommend the List of Contractors and Sub-Contractors for Tenders; (iii) To award the Contract on the Client’s behalf (c) Others ...” (emphasis added) 19 [40] Under Section 2 of Architects Act 1967, “architectural consultancy services” means the provision of architectural consultancy advice and services pertaining to all or any of the following: (a) Submission of plans or drawings to any person or local authority in Malaysia; (b) Conceptualization, research and development of any design for the built environment; (c) Any survey, preparation of reports including environmental impact assessment reports, or investigation relating to the built environment; (d) Project programming, construction and manufacturing programming, and product design; (e) Planning and development services including interior design, financial advisory services, project management, contract administration and landscaping; (f) Preparation of feasibility studies and cost estimates; (g) Preparation of plans and other means of presentation; (h) All services in compliance with statutory requirements; 20 (i) Any other activities relating to the creation, preservation and enhancement of the built environment. [41] The fact that there is the component of "contract administration" in the overall architectural services rendered, does not turn the contract into one of pure contract administration but that it remains very much a contract for architectural consultancy services which comes within the meaning of "construction consultancy contract." It is integral to the construction work as there is no work that could be carried out without the drawings of the Architect concerned, no matter how rudimentary. Here the construction works are with respect to the construction of 3 blocks of high-rise residential units together with recreational facilities and car parks. [42] I would hold that the Adjudicator has the jurisdiction to adjudicate the payment claim of the Architect premised as it is on services provided under a construction consultancy contract. [43] To allow an Architect to claim for his fees under a scheme of statutory adjudication is not inherently on innately incompatible with Adjudication. Much would depend on the scope of Adjudication as may be provided for in the specific legislation governing Adjudication. Learned counsel for both 21 parties have kindly referred the Court's attention to similar definitions in other jurisdictions by way of comparison. [44] The Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2004 (“the Singapore Act”) does not define ‘construction consultancy contract’. However the term ‘construction contract’ is defined under the Singapore Act to include the supply of services which is also defined to include professional engineering services, or architectural, design, surveying or quantity surveying services, in relation to construction work. Thus an architect, engineer and surveyor can claim for their fees under Adjudication in the Singapore Act. The definition of “services” is that it means – (a) the conduct of feasibility studies, planning services, the submission of applications or other documents to any relevant authority, site supervision services, professional engineering services, or architectural, design, surveying or quantity surveying services, in relation to construction work; [45] In Victoria, Australia, the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2002 (“the Victorian Act”) does not define ‘construction consultancy contract’ or ‘contract administrator’. The purpose of the Victorian Act has been expressly stated in Section 1 to “provide for 22 entitlements to progress payments for persons who carry out construction work or who supply related goods and services under construction contracts” (emphasis added). [46] ‘Related goods and services’ is defined under Section 6 of the Victorian Act to include architectural, design, surveying or quantity surveying services in relation to construction work. So an architect would have no problem claiming his fees under Adjudication in Victoria. [47] Likewise in New South Wales, there is the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (“the NSW Act”). The purpose of the NSW Act is expressly stated in Section 3 and covers ‘any person who undertakes to carry out construction work (or who undertakes to supply related goods and services) under a construction contract’. ‘Related goods and services’ has a similar definition to the Victorian Act. [48] In Queensland, the Building and Construction Industry Payment Act 2004 (“the Queensland Act”) is similar to the Victorian Act and the NSW Act where the definition of "related goods and services" is concerned. [49] Western Australia is even more explicit in including architectural services but excludes accounting, financial and legal services. Under Section 3 of Construction Contracts Act 2004, ("the Western Australia Act") 23 “construction contract” means a contract or other agreement, whether in writing or not, under which a person (the “contractor”) has one or more of these obligations – (a) To carry out construction work; (b) To supply to the site where construction work is being carried out any goods that are related to construction work by virtue of section 5(1); (c) To provide, on or off the site where construction work is being carried out, professional services that are related to the construction work by virtue of section 5(2); (d) To provide, on the site where construction work is being carried, on- site services that are related to the construction work by virtue of section 5(3)(b). [50] Under Section 5(2) of the Act, professional services are related to construction work if they are – (a) Services that are provided by a profession and that relate directly to construction work or to assessing its feasibility (whether or not it proceeds) – 24 (i) including surveying, planning, costing, testing, architectural, design, plan drafting, engineering, quantity surveying, and project management services; but (ii) not including accounting, financial or legal services; or (b) Services that are provided by a profession that are prescribed by the regulations to be professional services related to construction work for the purpose of this Act. [51] In UK, section 104 of the UK Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996, ("the UK Act") construction contracts are defined as: (1) In this Part a “construction contract” means an agreement with a person for any of the following – a. the carrying out of construction operations; b. arranging for the carrying out of construction operations by others, whether under sub-contract to him or otherwise; c. providing his own labour, or the labour of others, for the carrying out of construction operations. 25 (2) Reference in this Part to a construction contract include an agreement – a. to do architectural, design or surveying work, or b. to provide advice on building, engineering, interior or exterior decoration or on the laying-out of landscape, in relation to construction operations. [52] In Ireland, as defined under Section 1 of the Construction Contracts Act 2013, “construction contract” mean (subject to subsection (2) and section 2) an agreement (whether or not in writing) between an executing party and another party, where the executing party is engaged for any one or more of the following activities: (a) Carrying out construction operations by the executing party; (b) Arranging for the carrying out of construction operations by one or more other persons, whether under subcontract to the executing party or otherwise; (c) Providing the executing party’s own labour, or the labour of others, for the carrying out of construction operations. 26 [53] Subsection (2) of the Act stated that construction contract includes an agreement, in relation to construction operations, to do work or provide services ancillary to the construction contract such as – (a) Architectural, design, archaeological or surveying work, (b) Engineering or project management services, or (c) Advice on building, engineering, interior or exterior decoration or on the laying-out of landscape. [54] It is thus clear that our definition of "construction consultancy contract" that seeks to include the claim for architectural consultancy fees under our scheme of Statutory Adjudication is not inconsistent with that of more matured jurisdictions that have allowed it and though there are differences in the definitions in the different jurisdictions, the same intention can be gathered from the inclusive definitions used. Whether a firm of Architects may claim its professional fees in an Adjudication under CIPAA with respect to consultancy services rendered in a construction contract [55] Learned counsel for Martego, Miss Tanya Lopez, submitted that under the Architects Act 1967 and the Architects Rules 1996 ("the Rules"), 27 there are specific procedure provided for the resolution of disputes concerning an architect's fees through arbitration and so Parliament must have intended that dispute resolution through arbitration to prevail over other modes of dispute resolution such as a resort to adjudication. She argued that as professional architects, ARMC is bound by the Architects Act 1967 and the Rules. [56] She further submitted that in interpreting statutes, it must be borne at the forefront of our minds that regard must be had to the purpose in which the statute was enacted. This purposive approach was broadly set out in Section 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 (“Interpretation Act”). [57] The Preamble to the Architects Act stipulates that the Act is "to provide for the registration of architects and bodies corporate providing architectural consultancy services and matters connected therewith." [58] The Rules were enacted pursuant to Section 35 of Architects Act and bind ARMC with equal force as if it is the Act itself, as a regulation validly made under an Act must be regarded as though it were itself an enactment (See Datin Azizah v Dewan Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur & Ors and Another Appeal [1992] 2 MLJ 393 at pp. 398-399, Supreme Court). 28 [59] It was also submitted that the Architects Act and the Rules were enacted to: (a) govern the registration of architects; and (b) set out the conditions of engagement and govern the relationships between a professional architect and his client, as is observed from the Third Schedule of the Rules. [60] Both the Architects Act and the Rules envisage situations where disputes may arise between a professional architect and his client by the provision of specific dispute resolution mechanisms. She highlighted as follows: (a) Section 7A(1)(b) of Architects Act: which essentially states that recovery of an architect’s fee, charge, remuneration or other form of consideration for architectural consultancy services is to be done by a claim filed in court: “(1) An Architect shall not, unless registered as a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a body corporate and has been issued with a certificate of registration – 29 (b) recover in any court any fee, charge, remuneration or other form of consideration for architectural consultancy services rendered as an architectural consultancy practice.” (b) Sub-Rule 23, Third Schedule, Part One of the Rules: which gives the professional architect and his client the option of referring their dispute to mediation, although an initial reference to mediation is not a condition precedent for the parties to refer their dispute to arbitration in accordance with Sub-Rule 24; (c) Sub-Rule 24, Third Schedule, Part One of the Rules: which essentially states that disputes between a professional architect and his client which require settlement shall be by way of arbitration. Further, in the event the professional architect and his client are unable to appoint an arbitrator, either party may submit a written request to the President of the Board of Architects Malaysia (BAM) to appoint a person to serve as an arbitrator: “24. (1) In the event of any dispute between the Professional Architect and the client, whether arising during or after the rendering of architectural consultancy services under the Memorandum of Agreement, either party shall give a notice in writing to the other 30 party informing him of the matter in dispute and requiring its settlement. (2) The Professional Architect and the client shall appoint an arbitrator within fourteen days from the date of the notice. (3) If the Professional Architect and the client fail to appoint an arbitrator within fourteen days from the date of the notice, either party may submit a written request to the President of the Board to appoint a person to serve as an arbitrator, but whose award shall be final and binding on both the Professional Architect and the client." (emphasis added) [61] Ms Tanya then turned her attention to CIPAA. She said that from the Preamble, it may be gleaned that CIPAA is an act of general application to facilitate regular and timely payment and to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry. [62] She cited the case of UDA Holdings Bhd v Bisraya Construction Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 CLJ 527, where the High Court examined the intention of Parliament in enacting CIPAA by reference to the long title of the Act and went on to hold as follows: 31 “[92] As stated in the long title of the Act, ... Each of these objectives relate to or is connected with payment; be it to facilitate regular and timely payment; provide speedy dispute resolution through adjudication which we have seen is also about payment; or to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry. This long title of the Act confirms and reaffirms the observation that the Court had earlier made, that the Act is, in essence and in reality legislation dealing with a very niche aspect of the construction industry. It only deals with payment which generally arise in the course of executing the relevant works or as the works progress; and how to secure that payment. Even the last general objective which is frequently seen in long titles; that the Act provides for “connected and incidental matters” must necessarily be understood to refer to the earlier intent or objectives that relate to payment.” (emphasis added) [63] She said from the extract of the judgment above that one thing is made evidently clear – CIPAA is an act to facilitate recovery of payment. [64] This Court agrees that the parameters for CIPAA’s application and non-application have been expressly set out in Section 2 and 3 32 respectively. CIPAA would apply to every “construction contract” for as long as the contract is made in writing. [65] The intention of Parliament in enacting CIPAA was the subject of some judicial discussion in UDA Holdings Bhd v Bisaraya Construction Sdn Bhd (supra). Learned counsel Miss Tanya highlighted the following where this Court held, inter alia, that: (a) paragraph [136] – adjudication is a dispute resolution mechanism; (b) paragraph [3] and [84] – the KLRCA is the body cloaked with authority to administer matters related to adjudication under CIPAA; (c) paragraph [80] – the adjudication process starts with a payment claim issued pursuant to Section 5, by a party who claims to be an ‘unpaid party’ to a non-paying party pursuant to a construction contract; (d) paragraph [88] – the definitions found in Section 4 are “unusually definitive and exhaustive in their defines as opposed to the practice of drafting general or non-exhaustive definitions”. To this end, the court went one step further to state: “[89] This definitive, exclusive as opposed to inclusive, and exhaustive style of defining and interpreting terms found in this Act 33 must not be overlooked. It is the view of the Court that this clues one in to some considerable degree as to the operation and intention of the Act. From these definitions and the provisions within which they appear, it may be deduced that the terms have a particular and peculiar but limited meaning and understanding. That these meanings operate within the confines of the Act and no other...” (emphasis added) [66] She submitted that the juxtaposition of the CIPAA and the Architects Act would immediately raise the following concerns. [67] First, adjudication under CIPAA is a means of dispute resolution which ARMC had availed itself to in contravention of the mandatory dispute resolution mechanism by arbitration provided under the Rules. [68] Secondly, from a reading of the definition provision under Section 4 and the parameters of CIPAA’s application in Section 2, it is made abundantly clear that CIPAA only applies to ‘construction contracts’ and not contracts between a professional architect and his client which falls under the purview of the Architects Act read together with the Rules. [69] Thirdly, the appointment of an adjudicator under CIPAA falls within the jurisdiction of KLRCA whereas the appointment of an arbitrator under 34 the Architects Act read together with the rules vests with the President of the BAM. [70] She pointed out that Martego’s application for setting aside the Adjudication Decision is premised on the differences which arise between the application of CIPAA and the Architects Act. She sought to persuade the Court that Martego’s position and one which is supported by established canons of statutory interpretation that the dispute is one which falls squarely within the confines of the Architect Act and not CIPAA. [71] Notwithstanding the jurisdictional objection raised by Martego, the Adjudicator proceeded with the adjudication proceedings and delivered his Adjudication Decision pursuant to Section 27(3) of CIPAA which was a procedure that the Adjudicator was free to follow as Parliament had expressly allowed him to. [72] Martego had first advanced this jurisdictional objection in its Adjudication Response dated 4 February 2016. Under CIPAA a jurisdictional objection may be raised at any time after commencement of Adjudication even until the hearing of the Setting Aside Application for section 15 clearly allows for the setting aside of an Adjudication Decision on ground of excess of jurisdiction. I do not think that by serving a payment 35 response without raising the issue of jurisdiction, Martego had waived its right to object to the Adjudicator’s jurisdiction. Surely unless both parties have expressly agreed in writing to extend the jurisdiction of the Adjudicator under section 27(2), the question of jurisdiction could still be raised at the setting aside stage. It was raised when Martego filed its Adjudication Response. [73] In Cowlin Construction Limited v CFW Architects [2002] EWHC 2914 the English Court took the view that objections to jurisdictions must be taken early failing which the party raising it late must be taken as having waived it altogether. Whilst that may be true of the position in the UK, here in Malaysia we have our section 27(3) CIPAA which allows the Adjudicator to continue to conclusion once a point of jurisdiction is raised, envisaging that the law allows the issue of jurisdiction to be taken up even at the setting aside stage. [74] Learned counsel for Martego said that one should apply the rule of construction expressed by the latin maxim generalibus specialia non derogant makes it trite that where there are 2 provisions of written law, one general and the other specific, the specific legislation or the special provision in the specific legislation will exclude the operation of the general 36 legislation. She referred to a plethora of case law which supports this position as can be seen in: (a) Luggage Distributors (M) Sdn Bhd v Tan Hor Teng & Anor [1995] 1 MLJ 719 where Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as his Lordship then was) at page 758 – 759 in delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal held: “It lies in the rule of construction expressed in the maxim generalibus specialia non derogant. Where there are two provisions of written law, one general and the other specific, then, whether or not these two provisions are to be found in the same or different statutes, the special or specific provision excludes the operation of the general provision.” (b) Folin & Brothers Sdn Bhd v Wong Foh Ling & Wong Swee Lin & Ors [2001] 2 MLJ 23 where Justice Abdul Malik Ishak J (later JCA) had, in reliance on the Court of Appeal decision in Luggage Distributors (supra), held that the specific provision in the Rules of the High Court 1980 must necessarily take precedence over the general provision in the same legislation; and 37 (c) Hariram a/l Jayaram & Ors v Sentul Raya Sdn Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 22 where Justice Abdul Malik Ishak J (later JCA) held at page 41 that the maxim generalibus specialia non derogant is of “universal application and it is very efficacious”. In reliance on the latin maxim, His Lordship held that the specific provision in the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 which were enacted pursuant to the Housing Developers (Control and Licensing) Act 1966 must take precedence over the Contracts Act 1950: “Likewise here, the sale and purchase agreements made in accordance with Schedule ‘H’ to the Housing Regulations which were in turn made under the Housing Act must take precedence over the Contracts Act 1950. Being a specific piece of social legislation enacted solely to protect house buyers from unscrupulous developers, the standard sale and purchase agreements signed by the plaintiffs must take precedence over the Contracts Act 1950 and must be given effect accordingly.” [75] She then applied the latin maxim to the present facts and concluded that ARMC cannot avail itself of the adjudication process under the general legislation of CIPAA when the industry-specific Architects Act makes it mandatory for disputes between a professional architect and his client to be 38 resolved by way of arbitration. The Architect Act must prevail over CIPAA which is of general application to the ‘construction industry’. [76] I agree that the dispute resolution mechanism under CIPAA is by way of Adjudication and the statutory requirement for dispute resolution under the Architects Act is by way of Arbitration. I must also state that there is nothing strange in this difference as statutory Adjudication came into being only with the coming into force of CIPAA on 10 April 2014 and that there is no need to see Adjudication and Arbitration to be mutually exclusive of each other as Adjudication would only yield a decision of temporary finality and it is only with Arbitration or Litigation that one gets a final and binding decision. The whole scheme of statutory Adjudication was never intended to be set in opposition to Arbitration or Litigation. Adjudication operates independently on a separate track and indeed a fast track and it will not run into collision with Arbitration or Litigation simply because its track is different. Before there was Adjudication, there were already Arbitration and Litigation. After the introduction of Adjudication, both Arbitration and Litigation will still continue except that now there is an additional dispute resolution mechanism of temporary finality that can be embarked upon before or concurrently with Arbitration or Litigation as the case may be. Thus one need not have to choose in an "either or" approach between 39 Adjudication and Arbitration but one can proceed in a "both and" approach in resolving a dispute on an architect's claim against his client for his professional fees. Adjudication under CIPAA was never designed to be in conflict with Arbitration and Litigation and so its process may be activated at any time when there is a valid payment claim under a construction contract. Premised on that proper perspective, the question of which would prevail over the other does not arise at all. [77] There is thus no place nor purpose for Martego to apply the principle of construction of Generalibus specialia non derogant simply because this is not a case where one procedure has to be preferred over another for in the first place it was not pitted against the other. [78] At any rate where Adjudication is concerned, CIPAA is certainly a special piece of legislation that would in that sense prevail over the Architects Act which deals generally with matters pertaining to Architects. To compare the Architects Act to CIPAA and to conclude that the Architects Act is a special and more specific piece of legislation would be to compare apple with orange and to conclude that apple is more special a fruit to orange! That would be quite uncalled for. 40 [79] Learned counsel for Martego also referred to Akitek Tenggara Sdn Bhd v Mid Valley City Sdn Bhd [2007] 5 MLJ 697, where the Federal Court was called upon to determine, inter alia, the proper forum for resolution of disputes between an architect and his client. [80] His Lordship Augustine Paul FCJ held: “[34] It is clear that LAM is only empowered to hear and determine disputes relating to professional conduct. The section gives no power to LAM to hear disputes between an architect and his client. Specific provision has been made for the resolution of such disputes. It is contained in r 21 of the Fourth Schedule to the Architects Rules 1973 as amended in 1986 (‘r 21’). It reads as follows: In the event of any dispute between the Architect and the client, whether arising during or after the rendering of services under the agreement, either party shall give notice in writing to the other party informing him of the matter in dispute and requiring its settlement. The parties shall then appoint an Arbitrator but if they fail to do so within 14 days of the date of the notice, either party may submit a written request to the President of the Board of Architects to appoint a person to serve as an Arbitrator, whose 41 award shall be final and binding on both the Architect and the client. [35] As the dispute in this case in one that relates to the agreement between an architect and his client with regard to services rendered it has nothing to do with the professional conduct of the architect. The procedure laid down by law to be followed in respect of the dispute in this case is therefore as in r. 21” (emphasis added) [81] She pointed out that the Architects Rules 1973 which was referred to by the Federal Court in Akitek Tenggara (supra) has since been repealed by the Architects Rules 1996. However, rule 21 of the repealed rules continues to be given the force of law by virtue of Sub-Rule 24 of the Third Schedule of the Architects Rules 1996. [82] Again I have no problem with the pronouncement of the law there. It was before the introduction of Adjudication under CIPAA and it was not a case where the Court had stated that the procedure for dispute resolution on fees is that of Arbitration as opposed to Adjudication. [83] She further argued that the statutory right to Adjudication under CIPAA cannot override the statutory requirement to refer to Arbitration under the Architects Act. Here again, we are not pitting one legislation 42 against another as if the two are in conflict against each other. There is no conflict here but a complementarity that can only lead to the convergence of a final resolution on a claim where an architect's fees is concerned. [84] I agree with Mr Siva for ARMC that section 7A of the Architects Act and Rule 24 of the Rules are not the only mechanism to resolve disputes on architect fees. CIPAA acknowledge the fact that the other dispute resolution process can be launched simultaneously. This is clearly provided for in section 37 (1) as follows: “A dispute in respect of payment under construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court.” [85] Martego could have commenced Arbitration proceedings concurrently with Adjudication pursuant to Section 37(1) of CIPAA. Whilst it is true the use of the word ‘shall’ in Sub-Rule 24(1) of the Architects Rules makes it unequivocal that the parties refer their dispute on Architect's fees to Arbitration as opposed to Litigation, that does not mean that Architects cannot avail themselves of a subsequent mode of dispute resolution mechanism introduced later albeit of temporary finality in Adjudication. [86] I agree that in the light of the express intent of Sub-Rule 24 of the Architects Rules which; (a) directs the professional architect and his client 43 to refer the dispute to arbitration; and (b) vests the power of appointment of an arbitrator with the President of the BAM in the absence of consensus between the parties; and (c) directs that the decision of the arbitrator is final and binding on the professional architect and his client, ARMC is obliged to settle the dispute by way of Arbitration as opposed to Litigation only in cases where Adjudication was not introduced yet. [87] After the introduction of statutory Adjudication under CIPAA, the Architects would have an additional mode of dispute resolution though it is only through arbitration that the parties would arrive at an award that is final and binding. [88] To accede to Martego's argument would mean that where there is an arbitration clause in a construction contract which is no different from an arbitration clause provided for in the Architects Act, then there can be no adjudication of a payment claim under CIPAA. That can only lead to a disastrous situation for almost all standard form construction contract would have an arbitration clause and surely that cannot mean that as Arbitration is the agreed mode of dispute resolution then Adjudication cannot apply at all. 44 [89] Statutory Adjudication does not require the agreement of the parties to commence the process and prevails over any contractual agreements to the contrary between the parties. Statutory Adjudication stand alone and aloof of all other alternative modes of dispute resolution like Arbitration or Litigation. In Ranhill E&C Sdn Bhd v Tioxide (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 1435 the High Court held at paragraph [40] of the judgment that: “... the right to refer to adjudication is a statutory right the (sic) cannot be rendered meaningless by reason of a good contractual promise to arbitrate” (emphasis added) [90] Therefore by way of letter dated 13 November 2015, Martego’s solicitors was entitled to issue a Notice of Arbitration to ARMC where they had proposed and sought ARMC’s agreement to their choice for Arbitrator. ARMC was equally entitled to issue its payment claim on the same day, 13 November 2015. [91] Miss Tanya Lopez submitted her client's intention to commence Arbitration was abandoned after ARMC issued its payment claim. She said it would not have made economical sense for Martego to carry on with the Arbitration in light of the Adjudication (despite Martego’s jurisdictional challenge) as pursuant to Section 27(3) of CIPAA, it was within the 45 Adjudicator’s discretion to complete the adjudication proceedings, and in fact his discretion was exercised in that manner. [92] She further submitted that it was not Martego which was making a claim for its fees or remuneration, rather, it was ARMC. As such, it would have been entirely up to ARMC to commence the necessary proceedings for recovery of its remuneration for as long as such proceedings were compliant with the law. If that be the case, then it is not for Martego to complain now that the Adjudication Decision is not in its favour. [93] In all this debate we must not forget Parliament’s intention in enacting CIPAA is to provide a mechanism for speedy dispute resolution through adjudication, to provide remedies for the recovery of payment in the construction industry and to provide for connected and incidental matters. The object and purpose of CIPAA is to provide a solution to payment problems that stifles cash flow in the construction industry. [94] Martego's claim that CIPAA has no application to the dispute as the parties had made specific contractual arrangements for dispute resolution under Clause 7 of the Contract is totally misplaced. It would lead down the dangerous road of giving tacit consent to the parties contracting out of 46 CIPAA which can only have the effect of thwarting the purpose of CIPAA altogether. [95] Martego is still at liberty to pursue with Arbitration to correct what it deems to be a wrong decision arrived at by the Adjudicator. Whether there has been a breach of natural justice when the Adjudicator decided to proceed with the Adjudication without an oral hearing [96] Martego’s second ground in support of its application for setting aside is that it has been denied an opportunity to be heard, despite indicating in 3 separate documents that an oral hearing is necessary: (a) the Adjudication Response dated 4 February 2016; (b) Martego’s solicitors’ email dated 19 February 2016; and (c) Martego’s solicitors’ email dated 12 April 2016. [97] Learned counsel for Martego explained that the request for a hearing was to allow Martego an opportunity to ventilate the disputes of fact through the calling of witnesses, without prejudice to Martego’s position that the Adjudicator did not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute at the outset. 47 [98] ARMC’s claim included the full 35% under the Contract in respect of services which it rendered for Tower 1. Before commencement of adjudication, Martego had already paid ARMC approximately 15% of the fees payable for Tower 1. To be entitled to the full 35% under the Contract, ARMC would have had to show that they had in fact prepared tender drawings. [99] Martego's counsel submitted that there was conflicting evidence from various parties on whether tender drawings for Tower 1 were in fact prepared. While ARMC was firm in its position that tender drawings were submitted, Martego exerted that the drawings submitted lack sufficient detail to form part of tender documentation. [100] To determine whether or not ARMC did in fact prepare and submit tender drawings, Miss Tanya submitted that the evidence of Martego’s Quantity Surveyor, Mr. Phoon Peng Kong (“QS”) and one Encik Zainal Mohd Daud, the former managing director of Martego, would be crucial. [101] The Adjudicator had, in the Adjudication Decision, acknowledged the conflicting positions taken by ARMC and Martego on the issue. The Adjudicator then relied on a letter dated 12 February 2016 by Encik Zainal where he had confirmed that Martego had “acknowledged receipt of the 48 complete tender set” to bind Martego that it had in fact received a complete set of tender documents, although with some missing details. [102] Martego had urged the Adjudicator to view the letter dated 12 February 2016 with circumspect for various reasons which the Adjudicator did not agree with. It was said that the letter was issued by the former managing director of Martego to support ARMC’s claim. It was submitted by Martego that the letter dated 12 February 2016 was not a contemporaneous document and the necessary inference is that it was prepared solely to boost ARMC’s claim in the Adjudication. [103] In such situations, learned counsel for Martego submitted that it becomes incumbent upon an adjudicator to hold a hearing to test the weight which ought to be given to the letter dated 12 February 2016 and the circumstances which led Encik Zainal to issue the said letter and perhaps even decide if the said letter ought to be disregarded as evidence altogether. She further argued that the probability of concealed material facts being disclosed and discovered is higher during cross examination of a witness as opposed to a mere reading of documentary evidence by the Adjudicator. 49 [104] It can be said here that if the letter of 12 February 2016 from the former Managing Director of Martego was not a contemporaneous document, then the same could be said of the QS's letter of 30 March 2016. In the said letter the QS had raised the point that some of the drawings submitted were lacking in details. [105] Learned counsel for Martego submitted that the oral evidence from the QS, representatives of ARMC and Encik Zainal, would have answered once and for all the question on ARMC’s entitlement for its claim on Tower 1. [106] The Adjudicator decided that ARMC was not entitled to the full 35% of its claim and made a deduction of 20% from ARMC’s 35% entitlement: “197. The Claimant’s entitlement for the fee for Tower 1 is RM856,334.00 x 0.35 x 0.80 = RM239,773.00” [107] The amount awarded in respect of Tower 1 is significantly higher (more than 81%) than the amount which Martego had already paid ARMC in respect of Tower 1 which is RM44,957.60. [108] She said that the Adjudicator’s refusal to hold a hearing despite Martego’s insistence for a right to be heard in the instant case was a 50 material breach which is of considerable importance to the outcome of the Adjudication Decision. [109] She concluded that, even if the Adjudicator did not want to hold an oral hearing, the Adjudicator ought to have invited parties to appoint independent quantity surveyors to suggest the percentage of deduction which ought to have been made in the event the whole of the 35% claim was not allowed. [110] I agree with Mr Siva for the Architect ARMC that the Adjudicator had carefully considered the request for an oral hearing and had given his reasons for rejecting the request at paragraph 95 to 102 of the Adjudication Decision: "95. On 19/02/2016, the Respondent requested for a hearing to be conducted “so that the parties can properly ventilate the issues of fact that are in dispute, namely, the precise works that were carried out as well as the amount paid for the said works”. 96. I have rejected their request as the above issue can be decided by documents alone. 51 97. Then on 12/04/2016, 6 days before the mandatory dateline to deliver the Adjudication Decision, the Respondent applied for an hearing, citing the same reason. 98. As the objective of adjudication under CIPAA is to provide a speedy resolution of payment dispute, any such oral hearing will only be conducted when there is a need to do so. 99. During the adjudication proceeding, the Parties are given ample opportunities to submit documents, make submissions and reply to submission. 100. As I do not see any need of an oral hearing for this dispute and pursuant to Section 25(a) of CIPAA, I rejected their request for an oral hearing. 101. Therefore pursuant to Section 25(a) of CIPAA, I have decided to conduct the adjudication proceeding by submission of document only and there will be no oral hearing. 102. I have issued following Orders For Directions with respect to the conduct of the adjudication proceeding: 52 (a) Order For Direction No 1 – orders were issued on following issues: i. Confirmation of the appointment as the Adjudicator; ii. Legislative jurisdiction (CIPAA) and Rules governing the Adjudication (Construction Industry Payment and Adjudication Regulations 2014); iii. Confidentiality; iv. Communication protocol; v. Mode of service of documents; vi Submission of costs. (b) Order For Direction No 2 – orders on following issues: i. The request by the Respondent for the extension of time of one month to serve the Adjudication Response was not accepted; ii. The statutory limit of 10 working days shall be adhered to strictly. (c) Order For Direction No 3 – orders on the following: i. No case management conference will be held; 53 ii. Further submission from the Parties on the relevancy of the Architect (Scale of Minimum Fees) Rules 2010 in relation to this dispute; iii. Pursuant to Section 25 of CIPAA, the Parties are instructed to submit further particulars; iv. The Claimant shall provide a list of architectural drawings submitted to the Respondent pursuant to the application by the Respondent for an order of discovery. (d) Order For Direction No 4: i. The Parties may make submissions in reply in respect of the submissions made by the other party pursuant to Order For Direction No. 3. (e) Order For Direction No. 5: i. The Parties are instructed to submit final written submission on the dispute." (emphasis added) [111] Martego is basically dissatisfied with the Adjudicator's decision in awarding the sum claimed by ARMC in respect of Tower 1, less a deduction of 20% (amounting to RM239,773.00). It is a decision that the 54 Adjudicator is entitled to arrive at based on the weight that he would attach to the letter of the previous Managing Director of ARMC taken together with the letter of the QS. The Adjudicator did not grant ARMC the whole of its claim but only 80% of it, based on the extent of the work completed with respect to the drawings submitted. When I consider the relevant reasons given by the Adjudicator, I have to conclude that it is a finding of fact based on the documentary evidence before him and not a case where there had been a breach of natural justice in arriving at the decision that he did. [112] He considered the evidence in the documents submitted by both parties and after reading the submissions of both parties, he arrived at his decision. The party aggrieved by his decision cannot elevate the rejection of their request for an oral hearing to a breach of natural justice on the assumption that had he heard the witnesses orally, he would have come to a different decision. That would be going into the sufficiency of the evidence and the weight to be attached to it and to indirectly set aside the decision on ground of the failure to properly appreciate the evidence before him. That is not a ground countenanced under section 15 CIPAA and this is not an appeal. [113] Mr Siva for ARMC had referred to the Singapore case of Am Associates (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Laguna National Golf and Country 55 Club Ltd [2009] SGHC 260, where Judith Prakash J, in a similar context, made this cautionary note: “23. There are two rules of natural justice: the first is that a man should not be the judge in his own cause and the second is that the judge or Adjudicator or other arbiter must hear both side of the dispute. The second rule is often referred to by its Latin tag, audi alteram partem. Laguna’s submission, while not specifically identifying which rule of natural justice had been breached, appeared to refer to the second one. 24. Laguna submitted that the Adjudicator had failed to comply with the rules of natural justice in that in coming to the Adjudication Determination, he had failed to take into consideration and/or give proper weight to materials tendered by AMA which showed a discrepancy in AMA’s claim, in particular, its claim that the Concept Design had been approved. Its submissions went into the evidence in order to establish the alleged discrepancy and it then argued that if the Adjudicator had given proper consideration and weight to such discrepancy and had taken into consideration the relevant evidence tendered by the parties, he would have held that all payment claim made by AMA had been made prematurely. 56 25. Although the paragraph above contains only a brief summary of Laguna’s contentions, it can be gathered from such summary that what Laguna was complaining about was not really a failure on the part of the Adjudicator to hear both sides of the dispute but a failure on his part to decide the dispute as Laguna considered it should be decided. The audi alteram partem rule required the Adjudicator to receive both parties submissions and consider them; it did not require him to decide the dispute in accordance with Laguna’s submissions. It was clear from the Adjudication Determination that the Adjudicator had conducted the adjudication in accordance with the principles of natural justice: he had called an adjudication conference at which both parties were able to make their submissions, an opportunity which Laguna had availed itself of. Thereafter, as the Adjudication Determination itself made plain, the Adjudicator gave consideration to all points raised and he then came to certain conclusions for which he gave his reasons. However dissatisfied Laguna may be with those decisions, it cannot ask for the Adjudication Determination to be set aside because it considers the decisions to be against the weight of the evidence. 57 26. The principles of natural justice are concerned with the provision of a fair hearing to contending parties. They do not mandate any particular result. As long as the parties have been given a fair hearing, the decision cannot be set aside for failure to comply with natural justice. A party who is dissatisfied with the decision on its merits cannot use the principles of natural justice to have the decision set aside...” (emphasis added) [114] The Adjudicator had given his reasons for accepting the evidence of Encik Zainal the previous managing director at paragraphs 175 and 176 of the Adjudication Decision: "175. However the Respondent submits that the above statement has to be viewed with circumspect for the following reasons: (a) The letter was issued for this adjudication proceeding and is not a contemporaneous document. (b) The statement has not been tested in cross-examination. (c) He does not have any experience in building and construction and his specialization is in hotel management and tourism. 58 176. With due respect, I do not agree with the submission by the Respondent for following reasons: (a) His statement serves as a witness of facts. (b) The weight of the evidence will be taken with the view that the witness is not cross-examined. In any case all witnesses in this proceeding including the Respondent, are also not cross-examined. (c) He is employed by the Respondent as the Managing Director, who is a key man of the company. The Respondent must be satisfied of his competency on construction and property development when engaging him for such an important post." 177. On the other hand, the Claimant in their submission pursuant to Order for Direction No.4 admitted that some information are missing such as sanitary ware, fittings and ironmongery and whereby tender could still be called by providing for Prime Cost item for these missing items." (emphasis added) 59 [115] The Adjudicator highlighted the fact that Martego's initial position was that “no tender documents ever existed” (Para 164). This position changed in Martego's Adjudication Response when it admitted the Tender documents were submitted but lacked detail. [116] The Adjudicator concluded with a finding of fact that: "180 Accordingly, I determine that the Respondent did receive a set of tender drawings for Tower 1, albeit with some missing details." [117] Learned counsel for Martego submitted that the Adjudicator’s decision which he arrived at without the benefit of a hearing is arbitrary and without basis. For example, no explanation was given as to the reason why only 20% was deducted from the 35% claimed. She castigated the adjudicator's action as one where he had gone on a frolic of his own to determine a rate for deduction without any basis whatsoever. [118] She further submitted that the Adjudicator may not know the extent of the incompleteness of the tender drawings submitted by ARMC in order to assess the appropriate deductions to be made without the benefit of oral evidence. [119] I have difficulty accepting that submission of Martego. A reading of paragraphs 190 to 196 of the Adjudication Decision would show the 60 meticulousness of the Adjudicator and his method in arriving at his decision of granting only 20% of the 35% payable under the Contract for Tower 1: "190. From clause 154 above, since the Architect (Scale of Minimum Fees) Rules 2010 is not part of the Contract, the term of payment shall be governed by the contractual provision, i.e. 35% shall be payable upon completion of tender drawings. 191. As the missing details are only amounting to breach of warranty and not condition, the Claimant is entitled to be paid for the work done, albeit a deduction for the defective work has to be made. 192. In this case, I hold that a deduction of 10% from the fees due for Tower 1 is to be made for the missing details. 193. In addition it is a normal practice that the tender drawings are prepared either after the approval of the Building Plans or concurrently when the Building Plans are submitted for approval. 194. Therefore the approval of the Building Plan should be considered as part of the scope of work in order to satisfy the term on "upon completion of tender drawings". 61 195. As the Claimant did not complete the phase of Building Plans approval, a further deduction of 10% will be applied to the fees under Tower 1. 196. Therefore total deduction from the fees entitlement is 20%." [120] As can be clearly seen, this is not just a finding of fact based on the evidence before the Adjudicator, the Adjudicator had set out his reasons for arriving at his decision and this Court cannot see how that decision arrived at after considering the documents and submissions filed can be said to be a breach of natural justice. [121] In ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Visions Sdn Bhd & Anor [2015] 1 LNS 756, Mary Lim J (now JCA) states that: “[53] I agree. It is not simply any breach or denial which will forestall the enforceability of the adjudication decision or be a ground for setting aside that decision. The breach must be “either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant”; it must be material”.(emphasis added) [122] Mary Lim J (JCA) further stated that “[46] ... what would be required is at the very least, a statement of the adjudicator’s reasons for the decision reached. Brevity is not a reason for complaint. The reasons may be 62 succinct; enough or sufficient to show that the adjudicator has dealt with the very issues remitted to him and what his conclusions are on those issues. The reasons may be wrong on the facts or even the law but I do not believe that is enough cause to interfere. The Courts must exercise considerable restraint when invited to set aside an adjudication decision reached in very exacting circumstances and conditions. So much so that I believe it will only be in the rare and extreme circumstances that the reasons, brief or otherwise is found wanting.” [123] By no stretch of the imagination or ingenuity can it be said that the Adjudicator has committed a breach of natural justice merely because he does not decide the dispute in accordance with the preferred manner advocated by one of the parties or refused to assign the weight to the evidence as expected by a party. [124] In Ranhill E&C (supra), the High Court held that: “[82]... It is not simply any breach or denial which will forestall the enforceability of the adjudication decision or be a ground for setting aside the decision. The breach must be “either decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome and not peripheral or irrelevant”, it must be material.” 63 [125] Further at paragraph [92] it was held that in order for there to have been a denial of natural justice by the Adjudicator, Tioxide (the defendant) had to show, inter alia: “(a) that the adjudicator has failed to bring to the attention of the parties a point or issue which they ought to have been given the opportunity to comment upon if decisive or of considerable potential importance to the outcome of the resolution; (b) that the adjudicator has gone off on a frolic of his own, ie. deciding a case based on a factual or legal basis which has not been argued or put forward by either side; (c) that the adjudicator has decided on an issue or issues outside his jurisdiction ...” [126] The dicta of Chadwick LJ in Carrillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1358, is a useful reminder in maintaining a proper appreciation and perspective of the statutory adjudication process introduced in many a jurisdiction: 64 "[85] The objective which underlies the Act and the statutory scheme requires the courts to respect and enforce the Adjudicator’s decision unless it is plain that the question which he has decided was not the question referred to him or the manner in which he has gone about his task is obviously unfair. It should be only in rare circumstances that the courts will interfere with the decision of an Adjudicator. the courts should give no encouragement to the approach adopted by DML in the present case; which is contrary to DML’s outline submissions, to which we have referred in para 66 of this judgment) may, indeed, aptly be described as “simply scrabbling around to find some argument, however tenuous, to resist payment.” [86] It is only too easy in a complex case for a party who is dissatisfied with the decision of an Adjudicator to comb through the Adjudicator’s reasons and identify points upon which to present a challenge under the labels “excess of jurisdiction” or “breach of natural justice”. It must be kept in mind that the majority of Adjudicators are not chosen for their expertise as lawyers. Their skills are as likely (if not more likely) to lie in other disciplines. The task of the Adjudicator is not to act as arbitrator or judge. The time 65 constraints within which he is expected to operate are proof of that. The task of the Adjudicator is to find an interim solution which meets the needs of the case. Parliament may be taken to have recognised that, in the absence of an interim solution, the contractor (or sub- contractor) or his sub-contractors will be driven into insolvency through a wrongful withholding of payments properly due. The statutory scheme provides a means of meeting the legitimate cashflow requirements of contractors and their sub-contractors. The need to have the “right” answer has been subordinated to the need to have an answer quickly. The scheme was not enacted in order to provide definitive answers to complex questions. Indeed, it may be open to doubt whether Parliament contemplated that disputes involving difficult questions of law would be referred to adjudication under the statutory scheme; or whether such disputes are suitable for adjudication under the scheme. We have every sympathy for an Adjudicator faced with the need to reach a decision in a case like the present. [87] In short, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the proper course for the party who is unsuccessful in an adjudication under the scheme must be to pay the amount that he has been 66 ordered to pay by the Adjudicator. If he does not accept the Adjudicator’s decision as correct (whether on the facts or in law), he can take legal or arbitration proceedings in order to establish the true position. To seek to challenge the Adjudicator’s decision on the ground that he has exceeded his jurisdiction or breached the rules of natural justice (save in the plainest cases) is likely to lead to a substantial waste of time and expense – as, we suspect, the costs incurred in the present case will demonstrate only too clearly. (emphasis added) [127] The same ethos has been espoused in ACFM Engineering & Construction Sdn Bhd v Esstar Visions Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 756. In Foster Wheeler E&C Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Arkema Thiochemicals Sdn Bhd [2015] 1 LNS 632, Mary Lim J (now JCA) held that: “[29] As for the argument on multi-tiered dispute resolution mechanisms, it will be difficult to say that the Courts do not subscribe to the general encouragement and promotion practised by other Courts in other jurisdictions advocating alternative dispute resolution. The Malaysian law journals are replete with case authorities sounding the same refrain. Consensual alternatives on dispute resolutions 67 particularly in commercial disputes instead of cutting a direct route to the Courts and engaging in adversarial litigation are always good values to adopt and support; it is not just in the public interest but for the public good as the Courts’ valuable time and resources can then be freed up to deal with the other problems that beset human life. But, that is looking at alternative dispute resolutions in isolation and not in the context of adjudication. Insofar as these mechanisms are concerned, CIPAA 2012 has made provisions for their inter- relation or interfacing. When it comes to taking all these alternatives, including referring the subject matter, dispute, difference or claim to arbitration or the Court, CIPAA 2012 recognises that both of these alternatives may be launched concurrently. That is clearly provided in subsection 37(1) which provides: (1) A dispute in respect of payment under a construction contract may be referred concurrently to adjudication, arbitration or the court. This may also be inferred from section 13 which provides that the adjudication decision is binding unless- 68 (a) it is set aside by the High Court on any of the grounds referred to in section 15; (b) the subject matter of the decision is settled by a written agreement between the parties; or (c) the dispute is finally decided by arbitration or the Court." (emphasis added) Pronouncement [128] I am confident that an expansive reading must be given to the definition section where the purpose of the CIPAA is concerned to ensure that the benefits of it would flow downwards to all who have hitherto been affected by the culture of delayed payments in construction contracts. [129] I have no difficulty in holding that an architect's fees is claimable under Adjudication under CIPAA. I am more than satisfied that there has been no breach of natural justice in the mode of hearing that the Adjudicator had decided to follow which was by way of "documents and submissions only" hearing without the need to call witnesses. [130] Martego’s application was thus dismissed with costs of RM10,000.00 to be paid by Martego and correspondingly ARMC's application to enforce 69 the Adjudication Decision was allowed with costs of RM5,000.00 to be paid by Martego to ARMC. [131] Allocatur to be paid before extraction of order of costs. Dated: 1 November 2016. - signed - Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court Kuala Lumpur For the Plaintiff in the Setting Aside OS WA-24C-39-06/2016 : Ms Tanya Lopez (Messrs Shook Lin & Bok) For the Defendant in the Enforcement OS WA-24C-47-06/2016 : For the Plaintiff in the Enforcement OS WA-24C-47-06/2016 : Siva Sankaran and Chow Yu Jiin For the Defendant in the (Messrs Tan Swee Im, Siva Setting Aside OS WA-24C-39-06/2016 : & Partners) Date of Decision: 29 July 2016

Tika 2.6.0

WA-12BC-2-03/2016

PLAINTIF Tanjung Teras Sdn Bhd PEMOHON 1. Mayland Development Sdn Bhd; 2. Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd DEFENDAN 1. Mayland Development Sdn Bhd; 2. Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd RESPONDEN Tanjung Teras Sdn Bhd

28/10/2016

YA DATO' LEE SWEE SENG

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=2a4e4878-6e05-4871-9264-d4e57425dff3&Inline=true

DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN RAYUAN DAN KUASA-KUASA KHAS) RAYUAN SIVIL NO: WA-12BC-2-03/2016 BETWEEN 1. MAYLAND DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 182623-M) 2. MALAYSIA LAND PROPERTIES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 334713-X) ... APPELLANTS AND TANJUNG TERAS SDN BHD … RESPONDENT (NO. SYARIKAT: 263410-D) DALAM MAHKAMAH SESYEN DI KUALA LUMPUR (BAHAGIAN SIVIL) GUAMAN NO. B52C-9-06/2015 BETWEEN TANJUNG TERAS SDN BHD ... PLAINTIFF (COMPANY NO : 263410-D) AND 1. MAYLAND DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 182623-M) 2. MALAYSIA LAND PROPERTIES SDN BHD (COMPANY NO: 334713-X) ... DEFENDANTS 2 THE JUDGMENT OF YA DATO‘ LEE SWEE SENG [1] The concept and creation of limited liability companies have been touted as a major breakthrough for business and commerce. The enterprising spirit is allowed to soar and hopefully succeed and should failure be one's lot in a business venture, then the risk is contained within the company concerned, its shareholders and directors being shielded from bankruptcy as what is owing by the company would remain the debt of the company and not that of its shareholders and directors. [2] That has been the position of the law since the watershed case of the House of Lords' decision in Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22. With the passage of time, an exception has been allowed where fraud is being perpetrated through the facade of the company to avoid one's legal obligations or liabilities. [3] This case, coming before me on appeal from the decision of the Sessions Court, addresses the issue once again in the context of a debt owing by a Main Contractor to the Plaintiff as a subcontractor where the Plaintiff alleged that the Main Contractor and the Developer/Landowner together with the two Defendants here, operated as a single group 3 enterprise or a single economic unit such that when there is fraud in the submission of the Defendants' Proof of Debt in a creditors' voluntary winding-up exercise of the Main Contractor, then the corporate veil of the Main Contractor should be lifted and the Court should find the Defendants to be jointly and severally liable. Parties [4] The parties must now be introduced for the personae dramatist here and their inter-relationship with one another must be appreciated if one were to attempt to attach the liability of one to all. [5] The Plaintiff is the subcontractor appointed by the Main Contractor Vistanet (M) Sdn Bhd ("Vistanet") for the balance of the works with respect to the construction of apartment units in a high-rise development at Jalan Munshi Abdullah ("Munshi Abdullah Project"). It is not denied that the Letter of Acceptance dated 2 May 2005 for the subcontract works was issued by Vistanet to the Plaintiff. The Developer/Landowner is Mayland Boulevard Sdn Bhd ("Mayland Boulevard"). The Directors and Shareholders of Vistanet are different from those of Mayland Boulevard. There is no contract signed between the Plaintiff and Mayland Boulevard though there were some direct payments from Mayland Boulevard to the Plaintiff for 4 work done, which Vistanet said was at their request and at any rate, not uncommon in the construction industry. [6] The Defendants here are Mayland Development Sdn Bhd (“D1”) and Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd ("D2"). D1 is a subsidiary of D2. Contractually there is no relationship between the Defendants here and the Plaintiff or for that matter Vistanet though the Defendants were prepared to admit that the Defendants and Mayland Boulevard are companies, loosely regarded as part of the conglomerate of Mayland Group of Companies though Mayland Boulevard is not listed as a member of the Group in D2's audited financial statements whilst some other subsidiaries of D2 are. Problem [7] The Project having been completed, the contract sum was mutually agreed between the Plaintiff and Vistanet to be revised to RM15,151,621.48 in the settlement of final accounts in 2012. All in an aggregate sum of RM 14,715,935.53 had been paid by Vistanet to the Plaintiff. There was thus a balance of RM435,685.95 (less than 3% of the final revised contract sum) which was not paid and so the Plaintiff sued for it and obtained summary judgment in the High Court on 30 July 2012. Vistanet's appeal was subsequently withdrawn. 5 [8] The Plaintiff then proceeded to serve a s 218 Notice under the Companies Act 1965 dated 30 August 2012 on Vistanet. Before a Winding- up Petition could be presented, Vistanet served a Notice of Creditors' Meeting dated 6 November 2012 under section 260(1) Companies Act 1965 calling for a meeting of creditors to approve a creditors' voluntary winding-up of Vistanet. In the list of creditors that was attached to the Notice, it was revealed that Vistanet had debts owing to various creditors to the tune of RM 52,010,513.00. [9] The Plaintiff attended the creditors meeting on 6 November 2012 together with other creditors and voted in favour of the winding-up of Vistanet. It transpires later that D1 and D2 had both filed Proof of Debt with the liquidator appointed for the liquidation of Vistanet for the sum of RM19,280,000.00 and RM16,041,322.00 respectively. [10] At the creditors’ meeting that was held on 30 November 2012, Chong Chuan Long of Messrs CL Chong & Co was appointed as the Liquidator of Vistanet. [11] The Plaintiff concluded that based on the size of the debt purportedly owing by Vistanet to the Defendants to the tune of RM35,321,322.00, the Defendants have acted fraudulently to deprive the Plaintiff of any payment 6 from Vistanet. The Plaintiff contended that fraud was perpetrated when Vistanet called for a creditors' meeting for the passing of a resolution to wind-up the company and when the Defendants filed in their purported Proof of Debt. Prayers [12] The Plaintiff decided to commence an action against the Defendants to recover the judgment with interest and costs that they had obtained against Vistanet. They set out a series of facts and circumstances that they said would justify the view that the Defendants together with Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet operated as a single group enterprise or a single economic unit and that the veil of incorporated must be lifted to show that Vistanet had been fraudulently used by the Defendants in the Mayland Group of Companies to avoid its contractual obligations to pay. [13] The Learned Session’s Court Judge ("SCJ") on 25 February 2016, after a full trial, gave the Plaintiff judgment against both the Defendants for the sum of RM548,241.25 together with interest and costs of RM25,000.00. This sum is made up of the judgment sum that the Plaintiff had earlier obtained against Vistanet together with interests. 7 [14] Against that decision the Defendants have appealed to this Court. The parties shall be referred to as Plaintiff and Defendants as they appeared in the Sessions Court. Principles Whether the principle of res judicata applies to prevent the Plaintiff from suing the Defendants for the same debt after it had obtained summary judgment against Vistanet in a separate suit [15] The fact that the Defendants are different in this suit compared to the previous High Court suit where summary judgment had been obtained by the Plaintiff against Vistanet, does not necessarily mean that res judicata would not apply. Different parties in the previous High Court suit and the present High Court suit would not necessarily displace the bar pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. The doctrine extends not only to the parties in the action but also to their privies, namely persons who share a common interest in the subject matter of the litigation in question. Here the Defendants have privy of interests in that they are said to share a common interest in the subject matter of the litigation namely the debt owing by Vistanet to the Plaintiff. 8 [16] This is illustrated in the case of Dato Sivananthan Shanmugam v. Artisan Fokus Sdn Bhd [2015] 2 CLJ 1062 where the Court of Appeal held: “[21] A pertinent question which may inevitably be asked is whether there is any limit which should be put on the application of the doctrine of issue estoppel. We raise this question because, contrary to the above requirement that the parties to the judicial decision are the same persons as to the parties to the proceedings in which the issue estoppel is raised, the parties in this appeal are completely different from the parties in the HTF suit. [22] Having said that, we digress at this point from the above question to consider the nature of the claims in, and circumstances leading to the HTF suit and the present action and thus the plea of res judicata and estoppel. We will return later to the above question. The HTF suit according to the respondent, is a cheque action based on the Bills of Exchange Act 1955. The claim arose when the cheque dated 30 December 2011, issued for the sum of RM2.3 million to HTF by Cosmotine was dishonoured. The present claim by the respondent against the appellant, on the other hand, was also for the recovery of the said sum but premised on the breach of contract when the 9 appellant and KAH were alleged to have breached the agreement. Clearly the two actions were based on two different causes of action. However, upon careful study of the statement of defence of Cosmotine in the HTF suit and the affidavits in relation to HTF's application to enter summary judgment in respect of the HTF's suit, we have no hesitation in holding that the facts in that case and in the present appeal are identical. Thus in whatever forms the two claims are made or described, be it the cheque action or for the breach of contract, the claims are not fundamentally different as it arose from the agreement where the sum of RM2.3 million was purportedly to have been paid by HTF to Cosmotine, pursuant to the agreement for the purpose which we have dealt at the beginning of our judgment and when the JV agreement failed to materialise, HTF presented the cheque to the bank for payment but was dishonoured. Since the demand for the refund was not met by Cosmotine, HTF commenced the action against Cosmotine while the respondent commenced the action against the appellant and KAH. Both suits claimed for the same amount of money to be paid by Cosmotine in the HTF suit and the appellant and KAH in the present action. It is manifestly clear 10 therefore, that both cases arose from the same set of facts, background, issues and circumstances while the reliefs claimed are consequent to the agreement. On the contrary, we do not detect any real or glaring difference in both cases. There is indeed a mutual or privity of interest between the appellant and Cosmotine in both civil suits. Furthermore, both cases involved same witnesses and same set of documents. [23] Now reverting to the question we raised above, it is important to ask whether it is an inflexible rule that the parties to the judicial decision must be the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised. Before stating our answer to this question consideration of the local and foreign authorities is necessary. [24] In North West Water Ltd v. Binnie & Partners (a firm), supra, three defendants namely the consultant engineers, the water authority and the contractors were sued for negligence but only the consultant engineers were wholly found to be negligent. In subsequent separate proceedings where the water authority issued proceedings against the consultant engineers based on contract and 11 negligence to recover damages, the court stated that consideration of the authorities reveal two schools of thought on the issue of the limits which should be put on the application of the doctrine of estoppel. One approach was called the broad one which held that the true test of an issue estoppel was whether for all practical purposes the party seeking to put forward some issue had already had that issue determined against him by a court of competent jurisdiction, even if the parties to the two actions were different. The conflicting approach was to confine issue estoppel to that species of estoppel per rem judicatam that may arise in civil actions between the same parties or their privies. Drake J in preferring the broader approach to a plea of issue estoppel said: In my judgment, this broader approach to a plea of issue estoppel is to be preferred. I find it unreal to hold that the issues raised in two actions arising from identical facts are different solely because the parties are different or because the duty of care owed to different persons is in law different. However, I at once stress my use of the word 'solely'. I think that great caution must be exercised before shutting out a party from putting forward his case on the grounds of issue estoppel or abuse of 12 process. Before doing so the court should be quite satisfied that there is no real or practical difference between the issues to be litigated in the new action and that already decided, and the evidence which may properly be called on those issues in the new action." (emphasis added) [17] Mr Teo Boon Hing, PW 2, a director of the Plaintiff, testified that he knew about the relationship between the Defendants here and Vistanet when the Plaintiff sued Vistanet but did not think anything was amiss until the proof of debt was filed by the Defendants here in the voluntary creditors' winding up of Vistanet. [18] However estoppel by election would operate in that the Plaintiff had elected to commence action against Vistanet which culminated in a summary judgment. The Plaintiff then proceeded to lodge it's Proof of Debt and participated in the meeting of creditors on 3 November 2012 and voted in favour of the winding up of Vistanet and the appointment of the Liquidator. There has been an election by conduct on the part of the Plaintiff. [19] The Plaintiff cannot now be allowed to take the benefit under the summary judgment and use it against the Defendants here. 13 [20] If the Plaintiff had sued Vistanet together with the Defendants, it would be clear that it would not be a case fit for summary judgment as the Plaintiff would have to allege fraud against all the Defendants in order to lift the corporate veil and to impose liability on all the Defendants. [21] However the Plaintiff's argument seems to be that it is only alleging fraud with respect to the acts of the Defendants after the Defendants filed their Proof of Debt. If that be the case then the action of the Defendants until the filing of their Proof of Debt are not relevant. However the learned SCJ had referred quite copiously to the conduct of the Defendants before the filing of their Proof of Debt. [22] The validity or otherwise of the Proof of Debt filed is within the purview of the Liquidator and there is nothing for the Court to intervene in or interfere with until the matter is brought to the Court. Even if the Proof of Debt has been rejected, it has not been shown how Vistanet with only RM211.43 left in its accounts when the Liquidator was appointed, could be said to have been used by the Defendants to defraud creditors especially the Plaintiff. [23] What is even more material is how a combined debt of RM35 million filed by the Defendants, if rejected, could affect the balance RM16 million 14 debt owing by Vistanet to its other creditors such that there would be no dividends declared at the end of the winding up exercise. [24] Be that as it may, I had rather decide this case based on the merits of the case rather than on the application of the doctrine of res judicata in the event that the Plaintiff may have a valid claim on merits against the current Defendants. Whether the separate personalities of companies has been used by the Defendants to help Vistanet fraudulently evade its liability to pay the Plaintiff [25] The Plaintiff states that there are arrangements and/or a relationship between the related companies which are Vistanet, Mayland Boulevard and the Defendants herein and the conduct and/or arrangement negates the separation of legal personality. The learned SCJ had agreed with that proposition and had lifted the corporate veil to make the Defendants liable to the Plaintiff for the debt of Vistanet on account of the fact that Vistanet was effectively evading its contractual obligation to pay the balance debt owing to the Plaintiff. [26] The learned SCJ appeared to have been persuaded by the Plaintiff that Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard together with the Defendants, at all 15 material times, when dealing with the Plaintiff, have operated as a single group enterprise or a single economic unit with clear evidence of functional integrality. Her reasons for agreeing with that proposition are set out below: (a) In several projects involving Vistanet, it was evident that high ranking employees of the Defendants, Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard work in one group enterprise with inter relating responsibilities within the group enterprise and have dealt with the Plaintiff as one group enterprise. (b) Mr Low Gay Teck (GT Low), in his capacity as managing director of the D2 has been the signatory to the cheques of Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard in respect of payments that are due to the Plaintiff. Summary of the details are as follows: (i) Payment Vouchers issued by Vistanet to the Plaintiff together with a copy of Alliance Bank Cheque which was signed by GT Low; (ii) Payment made by Vistanet to the Plaintiff via Alliance Bank Cheque which was signed by GT Low; (iii) Payment made by Mayland Boulevard to the Plaintiff which was signed by GT Low; 16 (iv) Mayland Boulevard's documents stating that the payment was made on behalf of Vistanet ; (c) Mayland Boulevard has made payment to the Plaintiff by way of cheques signed by GT Low, the payments of which were done on behalf of Vistanet. (d) Correspondences issued by Messrs Andrew Davis, acting for Vistanet, to the Plaintiff in respect of this dispute (the Munshi Abdullah Project), were copied to the client as “Vistanet c/o Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd (D2); (e) Site meetings for the Munshi Abdullah Project were attended by Yeoh Teng Tatt (TT Yeoh), Tan Swee Lee and SY Loh as common representatives of both Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet. Incidentally, TT Yeoh is also the group project director of D2; (f) Letters from the Plaintiff to Vistanet were issued or copied to GT Low; (g) The Plaintiff has made claims on the Munshi Abdullah Project on expenses incurred by them which was done by issuing debit notes directly to Mayland Boulevard and had thereafter received payments from Mayland Boulevard, payments of which were made for Vistanet. 17 (h) GT Low has issued letters in his capacity as managing director of D2 to the Architect of the Munshi Abdullah Project informing of the change of key personnel who at all material times are the common representatives of both Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet. The letterhead that was used is that of the Mayland Boulevard. (i) Kevin Thong, has issued letters on the Munshi Abdullah Project in his capacity as the new project engineer of the Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet. (j) The Plaintiff has also in the past been involved as the contractor for the group enterprise in a project known as “Cadangan Pembangunan 5 Block Pangsapuri Kos Sederhana 22-26 Tingkat (1220 Unit), 5 Blok Tempat Letak Kereta 4-6 Tingkat Serta Kemudahan Penduduk Di atas Lot 16988, Jalan Kuching, Mukim Batu, Wilayah Persekutuan, Kuala Lumpur Untuk Tetuan Mayland Development Sdn Bhd. (Jalan Kuching, Mukim Batu Project). (k) Kevin Thong has represented himself as project manager for Vistanet and D1 in the Jalan Kuching, Mukim Batu Project. 18 (l) TT Yeoh has represented himself as group project director of D1; (m) Eva Hui has represented herself executive director of “Mayland Group of Companies” thereby recognizing the fact that the Defendants, Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard operate as one group enterprise. (n) Chow Tai Hing (Chow TH), Kevin Thong and Kenneth Chan have represented themselves as project managers of both D1 and Vistanet for the Jalan Kuching Project. (o) The group enterprise at all material operated from the same business address at 12th Floor, Menara Multi-Purpose, Capital Square, No 8 Jalan Munshi Abdullah, 50100 Kuala Lumpur. [27] The Plaintiff states that the facts irresistibly show that there are signs of separate personalities of the Defendants, Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard being used to enable the companies and in particular Vistanet to evade their contractual obligations or duty. [28] The Plaintiff states that the facts give rise to a situation where the notional separateness of the companies can be disregarded and the corporate veil of incorporation be pierced or lifted and an order be given 19 that the Defendants be found liable to pay for the debts that are owing by Vistanet to the Plaintiff. [29] The Plaintiff further states that it is apparent that, by the failure and/or refusal of the Defendants to respond to the queries made by the Liquidator to provide documentation to justify their status as creditors of Vistanet, the exercise undertaken by Vistanet in the pretext of a voluntary winding up appears to be actuated by fraud. This is further evident by the fact that directing minds of Vistanet are common to the Defendants. [30] The Plaintiff states that there exist special circumstances justifying the lifting of the veil of incorporation of the Defendants in order to make them responsible to pay for the debts that are due and owing by Vistanet to the Plaintiff. The Statement of Defence filed by the Defendants is essentially premised on 2 grounds, that there is no privity of contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendants or between the Defendants and Vistanet for the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff the debts of Vistanet. Secondly, that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendants is unsustainable on grounds of the doctrine of res judicata. By way of amendment to the original pleadings, the Defendants have further pleaded that there is an arrangement between D1 and 20 Vistanet in respect of the Jalan Kuching Mukim Batu project and between Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet in respect of the Munshi Abdullah project in which there was an understanding whereby Vistanet was permitted to use the workers and facilities of Mayland Boulevard and the Mayland Group of companies. This arrangement further extended to allowing Yeo Chun Sing and GT Low to be signatories to the cheques of Vistanet. [31] The Liquidator appointed was called as a witness (PW1) for the Plaintiff. Following queries by creditors he had, by letter dated 2 January 2013, replied stating that Vistanet is not related to the Defendants, premised on the ground that they have no common shareholders or directors. [32] One Mr G T Low who is a Director of D1 and the Managing Director of D2 was also a Director of Mayland Boulevard at the material time. However the shareholders of Mayland are different from the shareholders of the Defendants. He was a signatory of cheques in Vistanet but there were also other signatories. The learned SCJ considered it rather odd for one who is not a director or shareholder of Vistanet to be made a cheque signatory. The explanation given by Mr G T Low is not totally devoid of merits. Besides the Jalan Munshi Abdullah Project, there were 2 other 21 apartment projects developed by the Defendants where Vistanet was also the Main Contractor. One was on a piece of land in Jalan Kucing owned by D1 as the developer/owner and another by owned by D2 in Jalan Hartamas. I can accept as not being unreasonable for Mayland Boulevard to want to ensure that there are no delayed payments from Vistanet to its subcontractors from progress claims paid by Mayland Boulevard to Vistanet for work done especially when the other signatories of Vistanet's cheques are not around to sign. It can fairly be said that Mayland Boulevard by this method would have some control over the payment out to third parties by Vistanet and so would the Defendants with respect to the other 2 Projects. [33] When the same Main Contractor has been awarded 3 Projects, there is justifiably a concern that the Main Contractor should not fail. In some cases the developer/owner might want to exact a condition that before further payments are made to it, the Main Contractor should show proof of payments having been made to the subcontractor for the simple reason that if the subcontractor stops work for non-payment then the whole Project would be delayed with a possible LAD kicking in once the Completion Date is up. It is also not uncommon in a lot of standard form construction contracts to have a clause for the developer/owner to pay direct to the 22 subcontractors in the event of the Main Contractor failing to pay the subcontractors. [34] To buffer possible losses, most developers would also exact a performance bond or banker's guarantee from the Main Contractor of about 10% of the value of the contract sum. Here there was no evidence adduced that there was such a performance bond or banker's guarantee. [35] At any rate the Plaintiff was aware of this arrangement where the signing of cheque for payment to the Plaintiff was concerned for the Plaintiff had not complained of any late payments and in fact the Plaintiff had been regularly paid for 97% of the contract sum for the Jalan Munshi Abdullah Project. [36] If an award of a main contract involves the Main Contractor agreeing to such a term with the developer/employer, then that arrangement by itself should not be construed as an instrument of fraud on creditors. It would only be fraud on creditors generally and the Plaintiff in particular if it can be shown that payments were made to companies related to the Defendants or Mayland Boulevard, leaving creditors like the Plaintiff high and dry. No evidence has been led in this direction. 23 [37] I would not read too much into this method of control which can only be exercised by consent of the board of Vistanet. The board may also change its mandate to the Bank and remove Mr G T Low as signatory if it wanted to. [38] I must point out at this stage that even in cases of subsidiaries or wholly-owned subsidiaries, it is for the holding company to nominate its directors to be directors of these subsidiaries. In the case of housing development it is not uncommon to award the main contract to one of its subsidiaries, even an wholly-owned subsidiary and they will in turn appoint subcontractors to do the work. [39] Again with respect to developers/owners of landed assets, it is not unusual for these companies to be part of a group of companies, but each having a separate legal entity to manage and contain risk when it comes to a risky business like development. A public listed company for instance may own different plots of land in the name of its subsidiaries that it may develop. In the event that the development project fails, the losses are contained within the company and it would not affect the holding or parent company in the group. A development may fail because of many reasons: poor sales, main contractors or subcontractors delay in completing their 24 works or stop work or even absconded because of lack of financial resources, costs overrun, increase in price of construction materials or shortage in construction materials, late delivery claims from purchasers and the like. Investors in public listed companies or even unlisted public companies would be anxious if every development project would subject the holding or parent company to the maximum risk of the project having failed and the resulting conflagration engulfing the holding or parent company and the other companies in the Group so to speak. In fact that would not be prudent on the part of the holding or parent company. [40] Third parties who deal with these companies would know of the risk involved and some who have no appetite for risk might want a corporate guarantee from the holding or parent company or its listed entity. It cuts equally both ways in that a main contractor or subcontractor who runs short of cash may have problem hiring enough workers to complete the works and may suffer an LAD claim by the developer/owner and if they have no assets to execute on, the developer/owner would be left with the alternative of winding up the company. Little wonder that in a lot of cases a Banker's Guarantee or Performance Bond of about 10% of the contract sum is exacted of the main contractor or subcontractor as the case may be. 25 [41] The fact that a company cannot pay its creditors at the end of the day, does not mean that fraud has been perpetrated. During bad times many a contractor has been pushed beyond the edge of the financial precipice because of cash flow problem and not a few developers too. The number of abandoned projects in housing development is testimony to the trials and tribulations of the development and construction industry in Malaysia. [42] What the creditor like the Plaintiff here needs to show is that what Vistanet has received for work done, it has not pay its subcontractors like the Plaintiff but instead it has paid others or even its own directors or related and associate companies for dubious services rendered in a scheme to defraud creditors. Here the Plaintiff has not produced an iota of evidence in that direction. [43] Having put the problem of non-payment in the construction industry in perspective, I must then consider the factors that had influenced the learned SCJ to come to the conclusion that she did in that the Defendants should then be made to pay the debts of Vistanet to its creditor the Plaintiff here, bearing in mind that the Defendants are not the developer/owner of 26 the Project but one Mayland Boulevard, which at best is only a company in the Mayland Group of Companies. [44] Sharing of premises and even human resources and management and administrative resources are not uncommon for companies within the Group. Wholly-owned subsidiaries do that on a regular basis as part of costs-sharing and optimizing and streamlining of resources. These factors taken together cannot make the other members of the Group liable for the debt a company in the Group that failed. Otherwise the concept of limited liability with incorporation will be lost altogether and the whole concept of a company being a separate entity from its shareholders and directors would have to be completely overhauled. In The Albazero [1977] AC 774 at 807, CA, Roskill LJ described it as a fundamental principle of English law 'long established and now unchallenged by judicial decision....that each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities so that the rights of one company in a group cannot be exercised by another company in that group even though the ultimate benefit of the exercise of those rights would ensure beneficially to the same person or corporate body." 27 [45] Robert Golf LJ in Bank of Tokyo Ltd v Karoon [1987] AC 45 at 64 cautioned the modern approach in these words: "Counsel suggested beguilingly that it would be technical for us to distinguish between parent company and subsidiary in this context; economically, he said, they were one. But we are concerned not with economics but with law. The distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot be abridged." [46] It is only when these companies in a Group so-called are used as a vehicle to perpetrate fraud that the law will allow the veil of incorporation to be lifted and make the parties responsible liable for payment. Short of that the debt of that company, in this case Vistanet, remains that of Vistanet alone. Once a liquidator has been appointed in a creditors' winding-up, the Liquidator is empowered under the law to investigate if fraud has been perpetrated on any creditors and whether there has been fraudulent preference or trading by the company concerned. If there is sufficient evidence he would pursue action against those responsible. [47] The learned SCJ appeared to be troubled by the fact that there was little in terms of useful information that the Liquidator could extract from the Defendants here with respect to the Proof of Debt filed by both the 28 Defendants. The questions raised by the Plaintiff's solicitors are valid questions with respect to how the massive debts have arisen. There was a letter dated 2 January 2013 from Messrs George Varughese, the then solicitors for the Plaintiff, to the Liquidator requesting for information on the following: “ Further to the questions at the Creditors’ Meeting by Tanjung Teras in respect of the existence of related companies of Vistanet as creditors namely Mayland Development Sdn Bhd and Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd, kindly confirm on the following: (1) It was confirmed that the Company had no business activities for the year 2011 and 2012. Therefore, how is it possible for there to be a substantial increase of Trade Creditors from RM17 million as of 31st December 2011 to RM52 million as of 6th November 2012? (2) Incidentally, the 2 largest Trade Creditors reflected in the List of Creditors are Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd (RM16,041,322.00) and Mayland Development Sdn Bhd (RM19,280,000.00). 29 (3) Since Vistanet are the contractors for both Malaysia Land Properties (D2) and Mayland Development (D1) in respect of construction works, how is it possible for both these companies to be reflected as trade creditors instead of trade debtors? (4) What is the exact nature of the purported debts of Vistanet to both Malaysia Land Properties and Mayland Development? We trust that your due diligence exercise and investigation of the company will provide us the answers on the above on an urgent basis.” [48] At the postponed creditors’ meeting of Vistanet held on 15 March 2013, the Liquidator, giving evidence on behalf of the Plaintiff as PW 1, informed that the sums claimed by D1 and D2 are in respect of liquidated ascertained damages (LAD) claims. The Liquidator agreed to furnish the copies of journal entries on how the LAD claims by D1 and D2 are justified. As a follow up to issues raised at this meeting, Messrs Ramakrishnan & Associates, the current solicitors of the Plaintiff, by letter dated 1 April 2013, wrote to the Liquidator requesting amongst others the journal entries on the computation of LAD claims made by D1 and D2. The Liquidator replied by letter dated 3 April 2013. Essentially, the Liquidator lamented 30 that he was not getting the cooperation of the directors to hand over the company records and therefore he has not been able to submit a report to the relevant authorities. The Liquidator further informed that the directors have been served with a notice under Form 33 (Companies Act 1965) [49] By letter dated 27 May 2013, the Liquidator wrote to D1 requesting for the following: “I refer to the above matter and a copy of your proof of debt which I received on 29th November 2012. Please be informed that I require further evidence to substantiate your claim of RM19,280,000 against the Company. To that end, kindly furnish me the following documents within fourteen (14) days from the date of this letter: i. The letter of offer dated 31st May 2004 between Mayland Development Sdn Bhd and the Company regarding the construction and completion of works at Lot 26643, Jalan Kuching, Mukim Batu Dalam, Kuala Lumpur. ii. Documentary evidence proving the delay in completion of the abovementioned works and; 31 iii. Any other related documents or records which may be used to substantiate your claim. “ [50] From the above query it can be surmised that Vistanet was involved in another development project with D1 in Jalan Kucing ("the Jalan Kucing Project"). [51] There was also another development project between Vistanet and D2 in Jalan Hartamas ("the Jalan Hartamas Project") and so the Liquidator by his letter dated 27 May 2013, wrote to D2 asking for the following: “I refer to the above matter and a copy of your proof of debt which I received on 29th November 2012. Please be informed that I require further evidence to substantiate your claim of RM16, 041,322 against the Company. To that end, kindly furnish me the following documents within fourteen (14) days from the date of this letter: i. The letter of offer dated 31st May 2004 between Malaysia Land Properties Sdn Bhd and the Company regarding the construction and completion of works at Lot 48626 (Fasa 2) Plaza Damas, Jalan Hartamas, Mukim Batu, Kuala Lumpur. 32 ii. Documentary evidence proving the delay in completion of the abovementioned works and; iii. Any other related documents or records which may be used to substantiate your claim.” [52] Both the Defendants did not reply to the above queries. It was open to the Liquidator to reject the Proof of Debts filed if he is not satisfied that there are sufficient documents substantiating the claim. Any creditor or contributory dissatisfied with his decision may appeal to the High Court. Appeal against decision of liquidator under s 279 Companies Act 1965 which provides as follows: "Any person aggrieved by any act or decision of the liquidator may apply to the Court which may confirm, reverse or modify the act or decision complained of and make such order as it thinks just." [53] Can the Sessions Court then conclude that there has been fraud on the Plaintiff based on the fact that there is some evidence to show that Vistanet, Mayland Boulevard and the Defendants have held themselves out as operating within the same Group of Companies and that now Vistanet cannot pay its balance debt to the Plaintiff? 33 [54] With respect, I do not think so. The matter of the validity of the alleged debts which the Defendants say Vistanet owe them is a matter that is now before the Liquidator. Assuming for a moment that these 2 amounts which add up to RM35,321,322.00 are rejected, there is still the sum of RM16,689,191.00 owing to other creditors. [55] If these debts are accepted by the Liquidator, it becomes plain obvious that Vistanet is still not able to pay its Creditors, including the Plaintiff to whom it owes the judgment sum of RM435,685.95 for there was only hardly a sum of RM211.43 in its account at the time of the resolution to windup Vistanet. The same result would be arrived at even if the debts of the other creditors are rejected for there was hardly any cash in Vistanet's account. It must not be forgotten that all the Creditors present at the Creditors' Meeting voted in favour of the winding up of Vistanet. The Plaintiff themselves admitted that they would in any event have proceeded with the Court's compulsory winding up of Vistanet had there not been a Creditors' Voluntary Winding Up set afoot. [56] What is sorely lacking in terms of evidence is how Vistanet has conducted its affairs such that it had mounting debts which it was not able to pay and had to suffer a winding up. The burden lies with the Plaintiff to 34 show this for he who alleges must prove and it is the Plaintiff that alleges fraud and a scheme put in place to help Vistanet evade its contractual obligations. [57] It is not unknown for companies in the construction industry especially contractors to have huge debts owing by it and at the same time to have equally if more huge debts owing to it. Cash flow is always a critical problem for downliners in the construction industry and in the absence of evidence from the Plaintiff showing that there was fraud or fraudulent collusion between Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard together with the Defendants, this Court cannot willy nilly lift the corporate veil just because all creditors must justly be paid. [58] The Plaintiff had chosen to sue the Defendants separately from Vistanet apparently on the ground that there was no fraud all along the business relationship even though the Plaintiff admitted that they knew about this close business relationship involving the sharing of offices, the use of common key staff to represent the various parties at meetings, the signing of cheques of Vistanet by a common person who is a director of both Mayland Boulevard and the Defendants. Indeed Vistanet had paid for 35 all the works done by the Plaintiff save for the balance 3% of the contract sum when it went into financial distress. [59] The Plaintiff said it decided to sue only after realizing that the Defendants have put in a proof of debt to the combined sum of RM35 million. The Plaintiff concluded that there must be a massive manipulation and massaging of accounts by the Defendants such that Vistanet is left to sink into liquidation and creditors are left with uncollectible debts. [60] One must then ask, how was the accounts manipulated to make Vistanet, as it were, judgment proof? There is not a shred of evidence before the Court. [61] The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show fraud. There is no discovery done with respect to producing cogent evidence before the Court that monies in Vistanet's account had been siphoned off by the Defendants for payment of dubious debts. It is not difficult for the Plaintiff to obtain discovery of documents in the hands of a third party, Vistanet, in this case the bank statements for the relevant period to show how the accounts have been operated fraudulently. Was it a case where Vistanet had made preferential payments to certain creditors perhaps linked to the Defendants? Was it a case where Vistanet had paid their own directors 36 hefty emoluments? Was it a case of dissipation of assets to make itself judgment-proof? Was it a case where its business failed because it could not collect debts owing to it on time? Was it a case where it had failed to carry out the works on time such that LAD claims were imposed by the developer/owner who in turn had a contractual obligation to deliver the apartments on time to purchasers on the pain of having to compensate purchasers for damages for late delivery under the standard Schedule Sale and Purchase Agreement under Schedule H of the Housing Development (Control and Licensing) Regulations 1989 [62] The learned SCJ cannot conclude that there is fraud on the part of the Defendants merely because they have not responded with documents to substantiate their LAD claims against Vistanet. The burden of proof is still with the Plaintiff to show how fraud has been perpetrated on it. [63] In the absence of that, the Liquidator must be allowed to come to his considered decision whether to reject the proof of debt and if in his investigation into the conduct of its activities there is a prima facie case of fraud or fraudulent trading under section 304 Companies Act 1965, then he is at liberty to pursue on behalf of Vistanet to recover back monies wrongly taken out and to sue for monies owing to it by its debtors. 37 [64] That is the process that is prescribed for under the Companies Act 1965 when a company goes into liquidation. In that sense all is not lost because the vehicle of limited liability through incorporation under the Companies Act is not a license to avoid liability through fraudulent means. While the law recognizes that companies may fail and be wound-up in as much as an individual may be made a bankrupt, that is certainly no excuse for avoiding liability by stashing the monies elsewhere so that its fruits may still be enjoyed by the owners of the company. [65] Absent a clear evidence of fraud or fraudulent trading, creditors like the Plaintiff would have to wait for the Liquidator to do his investigative and forensic accounting work in the liquidation exercise. To allow a creditor to have a shortcut in making other companies in the Group liable for the debt of one of its separate entity would be to overhaul the limited liability of companies which are separate entity from its shareholders and other entities in the Group. [66] Here there is no suggestion that the Defendants have represented that they would be liable for the debts of Vistanet. Neither have the Defendants given any corporate undertaking or guarantee that it would be responsible for the debt of Vistanet. 38 [67] The other equally important principle that would be seriously violated is that only parties to a contract may sue each other. If the Plaintiff should fail, Vistanet would just have to contend with winding up the Plaintiff unless fraud has been shown on the part of the Plaintiff or its directors and/or shareholders. In the absence of that Vistanet cannot go any further unless it has obtained a personal guarantee from the Plaintiff's directors or perhaps a Bankers' Guarantee in which instance it may call on the BG. Much less can the Defendants here sue the Plaintiff or its directors as not only is there no privity of contract, there is the hurdle of separate legal entities such that even, as here, both Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard had gone into liquidation, there is nothing that the Defendants could do, except to let the loss lies where it falls. Whether in all the circumstances of the case, the corporate veil of Vistanet ought to be lifted to make the Defendants liable to the Plaintiff for the debt of Vistanet [68] I must begin at the beginning with the introduction of the concept of Separate Legal Personality, and with the dicta in the seminal case of the House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 at page 51, as follows: 39 “… The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent and in the manner provided by the Act...” [69] This principle was reaffirmed by the Privy Council’s decision in Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12; it is trite law that although an individual may have been the controller of the Company in fact, in law they were distinct persons. [70] In the Straits Settlement this principle of separate legal personality has come to be applied in Katz v Yap Boon Seng [1902-03] 6 SSLR 18 (Court of Appeal, Straits Settlement) which held as follows: “The defendant guaranteed to A, B, C and D, trading as Katz Brothers, the faithful service of a cashier. The partners and others incorporated as Katz Borthers Ltd. It was held that the Company was not a person carrying on the business within the meaning of 40 the guarantee, and that the defendant was released from liability under it.” [71] With the passage of time this principle in Saloman v Saloman & Co Ltd (supra) has been tested in the context and crucible of corporate structures often designed to contain exposure to risk especially in projects of heavy capital investment. The Courts have in various instances have been called upon to examine, the relationship between related corporate entities and to find some conduct that negates separation of legal personality. Court's in our jurisdiction and others have expressed these inroads and exceptions to the concept of separate legal entities in different ways: single group enterprise, single economic unit and functional integrality. The exceptions seem to be narrowly restricted to cases where there are some egregious elements of fraud on creditors to a more expansive exception of evading contractual obligations. Whether a case falls within one of these exceptions would be facts-centric in that each case must be decided upon its particular and peculiar facts bearing in mind the general rule. [72] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff cited the case of Sunrise Sdn Bhd v First Profile (M) Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 CLJ 529 (FC). The brief facts of the 41 case involved an agreement that was signed by the Appellant with the holding company in which the Appellant will acquire the shares of the subsidiary. The subsidiary owned a piece of land which is subject to a development order. The holding company tried to terminate the agreement. The Appellant then filed an action for anticipatory breach of contract and for an injunction against the holding company. The subsidiary was subsequently added as a party but the injunction did not cover them. The court held that the fundamental attribute of a corporate personality is that a corporation is a legal entity distinct from its members be they individuals or corporate bodies. In cases where there are signs of separate personalities of companies being used to enable persons to evade their contractual obligations or duties, the court will disregard the notional separateness of the companies. Peeping behind the veil is to enable the courts to obtain information on certain features of a company i.e. its composition, the type of company – holding/subsidiary, proportion of shareholding and control. [73] However, in that case the uncontroverted evidence shows that the holding company controlled and managed the subsidiary fully owned by it. Therefore, the composition, type, shareholding and control of the subsidiary stood in front of the veil, and there was no need to lift the veil to unveil 42 them. Therefore, the injunction was granted against the controller and manager. [74] One must not lose sight of the main issue as framed by the Federal Court which was whether an interlocutory injunction could be issued against the holding company in respect of land in the name of its wholly- owned subsidiary. In cases of a wholly-owned subsidiary, its directors are the nominees of the holding company. They are the managers and controllers as in the directing mind and will of the subsidiary. The subject matter of the sale of shares agreement between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent holding company was the land in question owned by the 1st Respondent's wholly-owned subsidiary, the 2nd Respondent. The cause of action of the Appellant was against the 1st Respondent for breach of contract and the subject matter of the contract were the shares of the wholly-owned subsidiary that owned the land. There is no contract between the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent and thus an injunction against the 2nd Respondent would not be possible as the Plaintiff has no contract with the 2nd Respondent and hence no cause of action in contract. Clearly in such a case the 1st Respondent must not be allowed to evade its contractual obligations in the sale of shares agreement and an injunction ought to be issued. 43 [75] It was in that context that that his Lordship Chong Siew Fah CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) opined as follows at pages 539-540: "On the authorities cited above, it is clearly permissible in law to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining the actual controller and manager behind a company (as opposed to the company itself) from evading the contractual obligations or duties undertaken by the company. The fact that the company under control has not been restrained is, in itself, not a necessary bar from granting the relief against the controller and manager behind it. In the instant case under appeal, there was the letter of the holding company dated 13 April 1993 to the plaintiff enclosing the deposit and part payment and purporting to terminate the agreement; there was the uncontroverted evidence that the main assets of the subsidiary are the four pieces of land, and that the directors of the subsidiary were the nominees of holding company which wholly owned and was in complete control of the subsidiary; there was also a singular lack of evidence dispelling the not totally unwarranted fear of the plaintiff that the holding company, being in complete control of the subsidiary, might dispose of the landed property. In the light of all the above evidence and circumstances and applying the principles in American Cyanamid Co. 44 v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] AC 396, we are of the view that there existed serious questions to be tried and that the balance of convenience lies in favour maintaining the status quo of the situation until the trial of the action." [76] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff then cited the case of Hotel Jaya Puri Bhd v National Union Of Hotel, Bar & Restaurant Workers [1980] 1 MLJ 109. In that case, the undisputed facts show that the hotel and restaurant were inter dependent. There was functional integrality and unity of establishment between the hotel and the restaurant. Functionally, the hotel and the restaurant are in fact one integral whole and management wise they also constitute a single unit. Dato Kularajah who is MD for both the hotel and the restaurant “had ultimate authority over the employees working for the restaurant”. There are number of senior officers such as secretary, personal manager and assistant manager who were common both to the hotel and restaurant. [77] The court held that the veil of incorporation will be lifted when the justice of the case so demands. The courts are coming to recognize the essential unity of a group enterprise rather than the separate legal entity of 45 each company within the group. His Lordship Salleh Abbas FJ (as he then was) observed as follows at p 112: "It is clear therefore that the approach taken by the President of Industrial Court is not without any legal support when he placed an emphasis on the essential unity of group enterprise which in this case consists of the Hotel and the Restaurant, especially when Datuk N.A. Kularajah who is the Managing Director of the Hotel was also the Managing Director and later a Director of the Restaurant and had the ultimate authority over the employees. Thus, the practice of treating the employees of the Restaurant as being separate from the employees of the Hotel such as the Union having been told that they were so, their salaries, their E.P.F. and SOCSO contributions being paid by the Restaurant, does not detract from the fact that the employees in question were in fact working in one group enterprise. In my judgment, by giving recognition to this fact, the President did not cause any violence to the sanctity of the principle of separate entity established in Salomon v Salomon & Co [1897] AC 22 but rather gave effect to the reality of the Hotel and the Restaurant as being in one enterprise. I find nothing unreasonable in the finding of the President by by-passing this 46 principle. He did no more than to comply with the wishes of the Legislature that in the making of an award substantial merits of the case, the public interest and any matters which are necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute are among the factors which should be taken into consideration by the court. In my view, the finding by the President is in no way against the principle of separate entity and I am therefore not prepared to interfere with the award on this account." [78] His Lordship made reference to the following facts as held by the Industrial Court when it decided not to disturb its findings that the workers were workers of the Hotel at pages 111-112: "(1) The Hotel and the Restaurant were inter-dependent; (2) There was a functional integrality and unity of establishment between the Hotel and the Restaurant. In other words, functionally the Hotel and the Restaurant are in fact one integral whole and management-wise they also constitute a single unit. Dato' N.A. Kularajah who is the Managing Director for both the Hotel and the Restaurant, although later he became only the Director of the Hotel, "had the ultimate authority over the employees working for the Restaurant". 47 (3) A number of senior officers such as the Secretary, Personnel Manager and Assistant Manager were common both to the Hotel and the Restaurant. (4) 32 employees whose letters of appointment are those in Bundles A and B were appointed by the Hotel although 8 employees whose letters of appointment are in Bundle C were appointed by the Restaurant. Thus taking all these findings into consideration, the President said: — "in the light of all the above, the court concludes that in the peculiar circumstances of this dispute the Hotel is the employer of the workers in question." (emphasis added) [79] It is not uncommon for senior officers in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary like the Restaurant above to be also serving under the parent company, the Hotel in that case. Moreover when there were letters of appointment from the Hotel to the employees that was a contract between the Hotel and the employees. Further in the Industrial Relations context, the Industrial Court is enjoined to decide on a dispute having regard to equity and good conscience and the substantial justice of the case. 48 [80] Learned counsel for the Plaintiff further referred to the case of Epic Quest Sdn Bhd v Sheila Elenor De Costa [2011] 8 CLJ 518 (COA). In that case, Shiela, a lawyer exercised a lien over documents that belonged to her clients, Epic Quest. Epic Quest was part of the Titijaya Group of companies and Shiela had rendered services to the group in particular Titijaya (M) Sdn Bhd, Prestine Valley Sdn Bhd and Titijaya Hotel Sdn Bhd. There were unpaid bills in respect of the 3 companies and Shiela proceeded to obtain judgment against the 3 companies. She then exercised her lien over the documents of Epic Quest on which she did not have a judgment. The Court held that it is not open to the Courts to disregard the corporate veil purely on the ground that it is in the interest of justice to do so. Something more must be shown such as special circumstances which would include cases where there is either actual fraud at common law or some inequitable or unconscionable conduct amounting to fraud in equity. [81] Based on the evidence, the court held that the plaintiff had laid sufficient evidential foundation to support the contention that special circumstances had existed for lifting the corporate veil of the Appellant and the 3 companies at the Titijaya Group of companies. Having themselves ignored the fact that they operated as one group enterprise when dealing 49 with the Respondent, the Appellant could not be allowed to insist on their separate corporate personality to defeat the Respondent’s general lien whereby it would be inequitable or unconscionable to do so. The corporate veil could not be used as an instrument to evade a contractual obligation. Unconscionable or inequitable conduct amounts to fraud in equity. [82] In that case, the evidential trail revealed that the deponents of all affidavits were filed by one Bay Nut Soo – “Setiausaha syarikat Titijaya Group of companies. It also revealed that SP Lim was a director of almost every one of them or through companies controlled by him or by close family of business associate. Further, instructions from one company came from another. There was use of letterheads by Titijaya in respect of bills issued to Epic Quest. Existence of a letter from Titijaya (M) Sdn Bhd stating that Titijaya had made payment for bills issued to Logic Marine. The payment of legal charges for Sheila being paid by the group companies. It was in that context that the Court of Appeal held that: "[9] From what is set out above it was evident to us that when dealing with the respondent, the Titijaya Group of Companies including the appellants and SP Lim had deliberately ignored the separate corporate personalities of the companies, and operated as one group enterprise. The payment of the respondent's legal charges 50 also reflected this where it can be seen that when the respondent rendered her charges to a company within the group, the respondent's charges would be paid by any one of the Titijaya Group of Companies even though the paying company did not directly receive the respondent's services. Having themselves ignored it when dealing with her, the appellants cannot now be allowed to insist on their separate corporate personality to defeat the respondent's general lien. In Sunrise Sdn Bhd v First Profile (M) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 CLJ 529 Chong Siew Fai (CJ Sabah & Sarawak) said that the corporate veil cannot be used as an instrument to evade a contractual obligation. [83] The case of Atlas Maritime Co Sa v Avalon Maritime Ltd; The Coral Rose (No 1) [1991] 4 ALL ER 769 was also referred to in support of the proposition that the notional separateness of companies should be disregarded. In this case, the Defendant who was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Swiss company purchased a damaged vessel and made repairs to it by using funds advanced to it by its parent company. The Defendant sold the vessel to the Plaintiff and later canceled the sale. The Plaintiff filed an action seeking a declaration that there was a valid oral contract and damages for wrongful repudiation of contract and mareva 51 injunction. The Defendant sold the vessel to a 3rd party and transferred the proceeds of the sale and less the amount which was subject to the injunction to the parent company. The Defendant applied for a discharge of the injunction to enable it to transfer the frozen funds to the parent company “as a business debt owing to its creditors “. [84] The court refused to discharge the injunction. The reasons are succinctly summarized in the headnotes: "(2) The court would not exercise its discretion to vary or discharge a Mareva injunction to enable the party enjoined to repay a loan to a creditor out of frozen assets where, having regard to the nature of the relationship between the two parties and the nature of the debt itself, it was clear that the party subject to the injunction was a wholly- owned subsidiary of the creditor and that repayment of the loan was not repayment in the ordinary course of business or a payment to trade creditors in the ordinary way but repayment of loan or trading capital which would effect an evasion of the purpose underlying Mareva relief by placing assets which would otherwise be available to satisfy a judgment in favour of the plaintiff out of the plaintiff's reach. On the facts it was clear that, looking behind the corporate veil, the creditor was the ultimate parent 52 of the defendant company as to 100% of the ownership, that the sum owed to the parent company was not a debt incurred in the course of ordinary routine trading but represented funds advanced to the defendant as trading capital and that the defendant was seeking by the proposed repayment to take action designed to ensure that subsequent orders of the court were rendered less effective than would otherwise be the case or desired to use assets frozen by the injunction merely to evade its underlying purpose. It followed that the variation sought by the defendant company would be refused and that its appeal would therefore be dismissed (see p 775 e, p, 776 c, d h, j, p 777 a, e to p 778 a, p 779 j, p 780 c to j and p 781 b c, post); dicta of Danckwerts LJ in Merchandise Transport Ltd v British Transport Commission [1961] 3 All ER 495 at 518 and of Robert Goff J in Iraqi Ministry of Defence v Arcepey Shipping Co SA (Gillespie Bros & Co Ltd intervening), The Angel Bell [1980] 1 All ER 480 at 487 applied."(emphasis added) [85] Having considered the above cases and how they can be distinguished on their particular and peculiar facts, I must now consider whether there is evidential foundation and sufficient justification to pierce the corporate veil of the Mayland Group of Companies for the purpose of 53 treating the property of the principal company as the property of its subsidiaries, related companies or vice versa. The following cases were also referred to on the need for evidential foundation: - Law Kam Loy v Boltex Sdn Bhd [2005] 3 CLJ 355 (COA) - Solid Investment Ltd v Alcatel-Lucent (M) Sdn Bhd (Previously Known As Alcatel Network System (M) Sdn Bhd) [2014] 3 MLJ 785 (FC) [86] It is vital to reproduce paragraph 34 of the Amended Statement of Claim (p 53 of Record of Appeal (Part A&B)): “The Plaintiff further states that it is apparent that, by the failure and/or refusal of the 1st and 2nd Defendants to respond to the queries made by the liquidator to provide documentation to justify their status as creditors of Vistanet, the exercise undertaken by Vistanet in the pretext of a voluntary winding up appears to be actuated by fraud. This is further evident by the fact that directing minds of Vistanet are common to the Defendants. [87] The cross-examination of the Plaintiff's Director (SP2) at pp 87A-88A of Record of Appeal (Part A & B) is pertinent and is reproduced below: 54 “PD: Now, you were saying just now and also in your witness statement where you said that these 4 companies, when I say 4 companies, I’m referring to the two defendants, Mayland Boulevard as well as Vistanet. You said that these 4 companies operated as a one group enterprise. That’s what you said? SP2: Yes. PD: If I may just refer to your WS at Q&A 27 at page 11, your answer to question 27, meaning item (a) all the way until paragraph (o) at page 15. So these are your justification to show that these companies had work as one single group enterprise, right? SP2: Yes. PD: Wouldn’t you agree with me that you were aware of all this situation as stated at WS item 27(a) until 27(o) way before hand? SP2: Yes. PD: When Tanjung Teras first commenced the suit against Vistanet in 2012, at that point of time you were already aware of all these? SP2: Yes. 55 PD: And to you at that time when you are aware of it, you thought that there is nothing wrong, it’s okay? SP2: Yes. PD: And it is only when Vistanet has been wound up and then the first meeting of creditors, it was only at that point of time you thought that the two defendants have committed some fraud to prevent Vistanet from claiming the Judgment sum. Is that what you are saying? SP2: Yes. PD: So if at all the fraud that took place, would have taken place at the time in relation to the voluntarily winding up of Vistanet, that’s what you are saying, am I right? SP2: Yes. PD: So, again to sum up all what you have said just now, all the answers at Q&A 27 (a) until (o). To you, these are not the improper conduct, the improper conduct came in when you realized or suspect that two defendants had something to do with the voluntarily winding up of Vistanet. Am I right to say that? SP2: Yes. 56 PD: Your allegation of fraud in respect of the voluntarily winding up of Vistanet, that to you, is evidenced by the fact that the two defendants did not respond to the liquidator’s request to substantiate the proof of debt, correct? SP2: Yes. PD: By virtue of that failure you said that these two defendants, they are behind the voluntarily winding up of Vistanet and hence they prevented Vistanet from paying money according to the summary judgment, that’s what you are saying? SP2: Yes.” (emphasis added) [88] I agree with learned counsel for the Defendants that in essence, the Plaintiff’s contention is that the corporate veil ought to be lifted because the Defendants had fraudulently caused Vistanet to be wound up to frustrate the Summary Judgment obtained by the Plaintiff against Vistanet. [89] As such, the fact in issue is – “Whether the Defendants had fraudulently caused Vistanet to be wound up to frustrate the Summary Judgment obtained by the Plaintiff against Vistanet” (“Fact In Issue”). 57 [90] I further agree that the most appropriate way to resolve the Fact In Issue is by way of an application pursuant to section 274 of the Companies Act 1965, and not by filing the present action. Section 274 reads: Application to Court to have questions determined or powers exercised. (1) The liquidator or any contributory or creditor may apply to the Court— (a) to determine any question arising in the winding up of a company; or (b) to exercise all or any of the powers which the Court might exercise if the company were being wound up by the Court. (2) The Court, if satisfied that the determination of the question or the exercise of power will be just and beneficial, may accede wholly or partially to any such application on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit or may make such other order on the application as it thinks just."(emphasis added) [91] Teo Boon Hing (PW2), who is the director of the Plaintiff, was the other witness for the Plaintiff. The Defendants led evidence through 3 witnesses, Andrew Raj Davis (DW1), who was the lawyer acting for 58 Vistanet, Low Gay Teck (GT Low) (DW2), who is the director of the Defendants and Syed Atitila Aidid (DW3), who is the group legal manager of the Mayland Group of companies. [92] PW2's evidence is that Mr GT Low (DW2) signed the cheques of Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard in his capacity as Managing Director of D2 in respect of payments that were due to the Plaintiff. As PW2 was a Director of Mayland Boulevard there was no need to assert or assume that he was a signatory of Mayland Boulevard's cheques by virtue of he being the Managing Director of D2. The fact that he was a Director of Mayland Boulevard would qualify him to be a signatory of the cheques of Mayland Boulevard if the shareholders or the Board of Directors of Mayland Boulevard would authorise him to be a signatory. [93] So too with Mr GT Low being a signatory of the cheques of Vistanet. There was nothing to suggest that he had signed the cheques of Vistanet in his capacity as Managing Director of D2. Any banks would be foolhardy to accept a "outsider" as a signatory of the cheques of a company without the resolution of the board of the company authorizing the "outsider" to sign the cheques of the company concerned. 59 [94] At any rate with respect to the 3 cheques of Vistanet, it was signed by Mr GT Low and one Mr Yeo Chun Sing of Vistanet (see pp 244-246 of Record of Appeal Part C Volume 1/4). If there had not been a mutual understanding or arrangement supported by a resolution from Vistanet to the bank concerned, the bank would not have honored the cheques. As explained by Mr G T Low as DW2 the mutual understanding and arrangement was so that when the other authorized signatories of Vistanet were not around to sign, the payments would not be delayed as hopefully there would be one signatory of Vistanet around. PW2 also clarified that it was the employees of Vistanet who were the ones who prepared the cheques and payment vouchers and that there were many other cheques that were signed by the employees of Vistanet (see Q&A 11 to 14 of DWS2(i) - p 148 of Record of Appeal (Part A&B). In fact, under cross- examination, PW2 conceded that apart from these 3 cheques signed by DW2, there were other cheques which were signed solely by the employees of Vistanet. [95] In respect of Mayland Boulevard's cheques in favour of the Plaintiff (see pp 247-250, 252-258 and 260 of Record of Appeal (Part C - Volume 1/4), Mr G T Low DW 2 explained that he signed the cheques at the requests of Vistanet and the Plaintiff whereby Mayland Boulevard made the 60 cheque payments on behalf of Vistanet to the Plaintiff. This is evidenced from Mayland Boulevard's payments advice at pp 249, 250, 252, 253 and 255 of Record of Appeal (Part C - Volume 1/4). This of course is not uncommon in the construction industry and in fact some developers/employers would do this at the direct request of the subcontractors to the developer/employer for if the subcontractors are not paid, it would be difficult for them to continue to work. In fact most standard form construction contracts would have such a clause as well. [96] Taken as a whole the evidence adduced cannot be worse than a case where the main contractor is a wholly owned subsidiary of the developer/employer where it has complete control over the subsidiary. That by itself does not make it liable for the debts of its wholly owned subsidiary. I would also consider in the same light the fact that site meeting for the Munshi Abdullah Project was attended by TT Yeoh, Tan Swee Lee and SY Loh as common representatives of both Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet. It was also argued that Mr G T Low in his capacity as director of Mayland Boulevard had informed the architect of the project of the change of key personnel who were the common representatives of Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet and signed off the letter on behalf of D2. I am prepared to accept that Mayland Boulevard is a member of the Mayland Group of 61 Companies and there is nothing wrong and not uncommon for a developer/owner to engage its subsidiary or associate company to be its Main Contractor. [97] The Plaintiff argued that another senior personnel of the group, Chow Tai Hing, has signed off letters for Vistanet by using D1's name. Even legal letters from the lawyer acting for Vistanet, Messrs Andrew Davis have been attentioned to D2. The explanation given by DW1 Mr Andrew Davis was that the person instructing him, Siew Chee Keong directed him to attention the letters to D2. This was purportedly due to past incidences where the documents and correspondences have gone missing or unattended to when it was sent to Vistanet’s address at Plaza Damas. However, Siew Chee Keong did not testify in the trial and no reasons were given for his absence. Further, none of the letters that were purportedly sent by Messrs Andrew Davies to Vistanet at their Plaza Damas address was produced. In cross examination, DW1 admitted that he has also been instructed in the past to act for D2 and the instructions were given by one SK Han and Syed (DW3) who are the legal managers of the Mayland Group of Companies. 62 [98] Assuming for a moment that Vistanet is part of the Mayland Group of Companies, the evidence adduced at the trial does not lay the foundation for the piercing of the corporate veil of Vistanet. [99] As for the sharing of premises, Mr GT Low further stated that Vistanet was allowed to operate from the Group’s business premises at Capital Square in the Munshi Abdullah project because the project site was an earshot from Capital Square and therefore was practical. I would not read too much into this arrangement of sharing of same premises as even in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary, this factor is not significant; what more of Vistanet which is not a wholly owned subsidiary. [100] The Plaintiff’s director, Mr Teo Boon Hing (PW2) gave evidence stating that he had personal knowledge of all the dealings the Plaintiff had with the Mayland Group of Companies, including the Defendants, Mayland Boulevard and Vistanet. He testified that Mr GT Low (DW2) had an integral role in the negotiations at the tender stage in all the contracts involving the Plaintiff with the Mayland Group of companies. Essentially, he stated that when dealing with Vistanet, all dealings were done by the Group of companies. That is not uncommon too as in cases of nominated 63 subcontractors, the developer/employer might want a say in the choice and contract sum of the subcontract. [101] Then there was the question of claims for LAD that Vistanet had delayed completing projects that were awarded to them by the Defendants. Both DW2 and DW3 said that they did not receive the faxed request from the Liquidator PW1. The Plaintiff expressed bewilderment as to how is it possible for Vistanet to be responsible for lengthy delays in the completion of the projects resulting in huge LAD claims (241 days delay – Vistanet vis- a-vis D1 – page 512 Appeal Record; 655 days delay – Vistanet vis-à-vis D2 – page 517 Appeal Record). Whether or not these are genuine LAD claims can be easily ascertained by the Liquidator from the documents that have to be submitted to him such as the Certificate of Non Completion and Extension of Time if any given by the Architect. The Liquidator would be at liberty to reject the Proof of Debt if it is unsubstantiated. [102] The Plaintiff submitted that the Defendants should have pursued with these LAD claims as the Letters of Demand were issued in 2007 and 2009, long before Vistanet was wound up. Much would also depend on whether the Defendants can successfully recover from Vistanet if they were to pursue with litigation. 64 [103] The Plaintiff also argued that DW2 was unsure as to whether the debt owing by Vistanet to the Defendants are reflected in the financial statements of the Defendants. The Liquidator on the other hand confirmed that such a debt was not reflected in the financial statements of Vistanet. All that can be concluded is that Vistanet did not accept the debt or disputed the claim by the Defendants for LAD against them. [104] Even if these Proofs of Debt are rejected, I cannot see how fraud has been perpetrated on the Plaintiff. There is still the sum of RM16,689,191.00 owing to other creditors. There was no evidence adduced as to how the Proofs of Debt that the Plaintiff said ought to have rejected, is related to the scheme of disabling Vistanet from the Plaintiff's claim, if there was such a scheme to begin with. [105] Therefore, with the greatest of respect, I cannot say that there has been a manipulation of the corporate structure of Vistanet by the Defendants. Neither could I agree with the conclusion reached by the Plaintiff that it can be reasonably drawn from the facts that Vistanet was a mere façade concealing the true facts and that the alter ego of Vistanet is without doubt both the Defendants as part of the Mayland Group of companies. 65 [106] The Plaintiff further highlighted that Mayland Boulevard was allowed to be wound up in respect of a small debt of RM40,000.00 in circumstances where no provisions were made to collect debts that were owing to the said company. The documents show that there were uncollected debts that were owing to Mayland Boulevard by Hayworth Holdings, who incidentally is a shareholder of Mayland Boulevard to the tune of RM2.1 million and by Vistanet, to the tune of RM1.15 million. However, compelling evidence show that Mayland Boulevard had contingent liabilities in respect of LAD claims from purchasers for sums more than RM9 million. [107] If that be so, then it does not quite matter if Mayland Boulevard was wound up for a debt of RM40,000.00 or by purchasers to the combined tune of RM9 million which is much more than what is owing to it by its debtors. There is nothing to show a pattern that both these companies, Vistanet and Mayland Boulevard, assuming they are controlled by the Defendants, were allowed to be dissolved without having settled debts owing to creditors. While we do not know of other creditors, we do know that Vistanet has settled its debts to the Plaintiff save for the balance sum of about RM500,000.00 which represents about 3% of the contract sum. 66 [108] Vistanet only had a meagre sum of RM211.43 in its account and no business activity at the point of winding up. No attempts were made to show that monies were channeled out of Vistanet to frustrate the Summary Judgment obtained by the Plaintiff against Vistanet. [109] Even by applying the standard of proof on the balance of probabilities in proving fraud in civil cases, this Court finds that it has not been proved on the balance of probabilities. See Sinnayah & Sons V Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ 1 (FC). [110] Based on the evidence that had unfolded in the trial, there was nothing that pointed to the Defendants being actuated by fraud or that there was any cogent evidence of the manipulation of the corporate structures of the companies in the Group. [111] At the risk of stating the obvious, the burden of proof for fraud rested solely on the Plaintiff. Section 101 of the Evidence Act 1950 provides as follows: “(1) Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability, dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. 67 (2) When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.” [112] Further section 103 of the Evidence Act 1950 reads: “The burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.” [113] When dealing with the standard of proof for fraud in civil claims, the Federal Court in Sinnaiyah & Sons Sdn Bhd v Damai Setia Sdn Bhd [2015] 5 MLJ 1 said that ‘burden of proof’ – “relates to the burden or obligation of proving a fact on the party who asserts the existence of any fact in issue and wishes the court to believe in its existence: ss 102 – 103 of the Evidence Act (‘the Act’). The burden of proof of a party never shifts.” (emphasis added) [114] During cross-examination, Vistanet’s Liquidator conceded that the winding up exercise had complied with the law. He also confirmed that up until his appointment he never knew of the Defendants and their key personnels. It was not as if the Defendants as creditors of Vistanet had arranged for a friendly Liquidator to carry out the voluntary liquidation 68 exercise to make sure that no action may be taken by the Liquidator against the Defendants. [115] As the Plaintiff's stand is that there was fraud when the Defendants filed their Proofs of Debt, the Defendants submitted that even if it was proven that the Defendants are not the creditors of Vistanet, the Plaintiff still cannot satisfy the test for lifting the corporate veil. With that I agree. [116] Recently, the Supreme Court in Prest v Prest [2013] 4 All ER 673 decided that the doctrine permitting the court to pierce the corporate veil, should be given its quietus. Lord Sumption giving the first judgment first acknowledged that such doctrine must be limited to cases where there was a “relevant wrongdoing”. He acknowledged the difficulty in identifying what is a “relevant wrongdoing”. He then examined the various cases based on two distinct principles, namely the “concealment” principle and the “evasion” principle where the former does not involve piercing the corporate veil as opposed to the latter. Finally he concluded with the following formulation – “[35] I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law which applied when a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he 69 deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company’s separate legal personality.” (emphasis added) [117] Even in an earlier case involving tortious liability in Adams and others v Cape Industries Plc and another [1991] 1 All ER 929, the English Court of Appeal had debunked the concept of linking a single economic unit to liability of the parent company for the debt of its subsidiaries. Lord Slade LJ said at page 1016 as follows: "The 'single economic unit' argument There is no general principle that all companies in a group of companies are to be regarded as one. On the contrary, the fundamental principle is that 'each company in a group of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate legal rights and liabilities'. ..." [118] Further at pp 1019-1020 it was clarified as follows: 70 "Mr Morison described the theme of all these cases as being that where legal technicalities would produce injustice in cases involving members of a group of companies, such technicalities should not be allowed to prevail. We do not think that the cases relied on go nearly so far as this. As Sir Godfray Le Quesne submitted, save in cases which turn on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court is not free to disregard the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, [1895–9] All ER Rep 33 merely because it considers that justice so requires. Our law, for better or worse, recognises the creation of subsidiary companies, which though in one sense the creatures of their parent companies, will nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities. In deciding whether a company is present in a foreign country by a subsidiary, which is itself present in that country, the court is entitled, indeed bound, to investigate the relationship between the parent and the subsidiary. In particular, that relationship may be relevant in determining whether the subsidiary was acting as the parent's agent and, if so, on what terms. In Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd v 71 Lewellin (Inspector of Taxes) [1957] 1 All ER 561, [1957] 1 WLR 464 (which was referred to by Scott J) the House of Lords upheld an assessment to tax on the footing that, on the facts, the business both of the parent and subsidiary were carried on by the subsidiary as agent for the parent. However, there is no presumption of any such agency. There is no presumption that the subsidiary is the parent company's alter ego. Scott J refused an invitation to infer that there existed an agency agreement between Cape and NAAC comparable to that which had previously existed between Cape and Capasco (see p 971, ante) and that refusal is not challenged on this appeal. If a company chooses to arrange the affairs of its group in such a way that the business carried on in a particular foreign country is the business of its subsidiary and not its own, it is, in our judgment, entitled to do so. Neither in this class of case nor in any other class of case is it open to this court to disregard the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd merely because it considers it just so to do." (emphasis added) [119] On lifting the corporate veil Slade LJ observed as follows: "...Whether or not such a course deserves moral approval, there was nothing illegal as such in Cape arranging its affairs (whether by 72 the use of subsidiaries or otherwise) so as to attract the minimum publicity to its involvement in the sale of Cape asbestos in the United States. As to condition (iii), we do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled to lift the corporate veil as against a defendant company which is the member of a corporate group merely because the corporate structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of the group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of that liability) will fall on another member of the group rather than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inherent in our corporate law. Mr Morison urged on us that the purpose of the operation was in substance that Cape would have the practical benefit of the group's asbestos trade in the United States without the risks of tortious liability. This may be so. However, in our judgment, Cape was in law entitled to organise the group's affairs in that manner and (save in the case of AMC to which special considerations apply) to expect that the court would apply the principle of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 [1895–9] All ER Rep 33 in the ordinary way." (emphasis added) 73 [120] I agree with learned counsel for the Defendants that applying the formulation, the issue of interposing a company under the Defendants’ control does not arise because the Defendants were not under any existing legal obligation or liability or subject to any existing legal restriction to the Plaintiff in the first instance. Such existing legal obligation or liability or legal restriction was strictly between the Plaintiff and Vistanet. [121] No discussion on this subject of lifting the corporate veil of subsidiaries or companies in the same Group would be complete without considering the case of Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Irham Niaga Sdn Bhd & Anor [W]-02(NCC)(W)-2339-10/2012. The Irham Niaga's case followed the principles laid down in Adams and others v Cape Industries Plc and another (supra). The Court of Appeal, after examining the authorities, held that: 1. the corporate veil could be lifted in exceptional circumstances; and 2. those exceptional circumstances must involve: (a) actual or equitable fraud and (b) the use of the company whose corporate veil was to be lifted as the means to conceal the true facts behind the facade of the company." 74 [122] The facts in the above case were that Tenaga Nasional Berhad's (TNB) wholly owned subsidiary TNBT entered into various agreements with the respondents for the storage or certain equipment belonging to TNB which TNBT was supposed to manage. A dispute arose and TNBT terminated the agreements. Thereafter TNB and TNBT commenced a court action against the respondents. As there was an arbitration clause the respondents managed to obtain a stay of proceedings and referred the matter to arbitration. TNB was excluded from the arbitration. The respondents were successful in the arbitration and proceeded to register the award in the High Court. The respondents then found out that TNB had declared to the stock exchange and financial analysts that the arbitral award would not affect its financial performance because TNBT was a dormant company. Consequently the respondents commenced an action against TNB for the payment of the arbitral award now registered as a judgment of the court. [123] Just as the Plaintiff here, the respondents in Irham Niaga pleaded that TNB and TNBT operated as "one economic unit and there was functional integrality". It further contended that TNB was the controlling and directing mind, the alter ego of and the party who has control of TNBT and 75 as such the veil of incorporation must in the interest of justice be lifted to hold TNBT liable for the unpaid arbitral award. [124] The respondents there adduced facts that were more reprehensible that the facts in this case: 1. The set-up of TNBT was designed so that there would be total control by TNB; 2. The Managing Director of TNBT was the Vice President of TNB, sitting at the same desk, in the same premises; 3. TNBT had no funds of its own and was dependent on TNB; 4. TNBT operated from within TNB's building; and 5. TNBT did not have its own employees. [125] TNB on the other hand contended that: 1. TNBT operated as a subsidiary with duties and functions of its own and had an entity separate from TNB; 2. The sharing of employees and resources such as audit and legal services of TNB by TNBT was a common feature or conglomerates; 3. TNBT's lack of own funds was known to the respondent as the financial records of TNBT had shown that it operated on the basis 76 of reimbursable operating costs from TNB, but evidence showed that payments to the respondents were made by TNBT itself, not TNB and this indicates the separation between TNBT and TNB and 4. While there were instances when the Managing Director of TNBT signed off letters using his designation as TNB, he had explained this sufficiently. [126] The Court of Appeal, upon a careful examination of the evidence, allowed TNB's appeal and held that there was no fraud and that there was no basis for the corporate veil of TNBT to be lifted. It observed as follows: "[49] In our considered view, the evidence was crystal clear that TNBT, which was formed long before the Agreements were entered into, was not formed as a means to conceal the true facts in order to avoid contractual liability. The Plaintiff's knew very well the true nature of TNBT and the mode of operations." [127] Learned counsel for the Defendants, Mr Simon Hong, has helpfully set out the similarities/dissimilarities between Irham Niaga's case and the present case as follows: 77 Irham’s case Present Action 1. TNBT was formed long before the agreements were entered with Irham. Similarity Vistanet was formed (1998) long before the agreement (2005) were entered with the Plaintiff. 2. From the outset, Irham knew that they were entering into the agreements with TNBT and not TNB. Similarity From the outset, the Plaintiff knew that they were entering into the agreement with Vistanet and not the Defendants. 3. TNBT shared TNB’s employees, resources and premises, and Irham knew the true nature of TNBT and its mode of operations. Similarity The Defendants, Boulevard and Vistanet shared resources and premises, and the Plaintiff knew the true nature of Vistanet and its mode of operations. 4. There was a danger that TNBT could be wound up and being a company with no assets of its own, TNBT would be in no position to make any payment to Irham or any other creditor. Similarity The Plaintiff had served a section 218 Notice on Vistanet. There was a danger that Vistanet could be wound up and given that Vistanet only had RM200 in its account, Vistanet would be in no position to pay the Plaintiff or any other creditor. 78 [128] The Court of Appeal had refused to lift the corporate veil and by the same force of argument, with the dissimilarities (as stated in items (4) to (8) in the table above), a fortiori, there is no basis for the corporate veil to be lifted in this instant case. 5. TNBT was TNB’s wholly owned subsidiary. Dissimilarity The Defendants and Vistanet do not have common directors and shareholders. 6. There were instances when the Managing Director of TNBT signed off letters using his designation at TNB. Dissimilarity GT Low never signed off Vistanet’s letters. 7. TNBT did not have its own employees. Dissimilarity Vistanet had its own employees. 8. TNBT had no funds of its own and was dependent on TNB. Payments were made from TNBT to Irham using the funds from TNB. Dissimilarity The Defendants never paid the Plaintiff for the Munshi Abdullah Project. All payments were made to the Plaintiff by Vistanet and Boulevard, which is not uncommon. 9. TNB had resolved to deal with the legal, contractual and financial commitments to third parties upon collapsing back but failed to take steps in this direction. Dissimilarity The Defendants had no such resolution. 79 [129] The sum obtained by the respondents in the arbitral award was for RM106,888,499.33 in favour of the first respondent and RM6,102, 922.50 in favour of the second respondent. [130] Whilst the respondents in Irham Niaga's case have not been paid at all for the arbitral award, the Plaintiff had received payment in the aggregate sum of RM14,715,935.53 out of a final revised contract sum of RM15,151,621.48. Prior to the commencement of the High Court Action, Vistanet owed the Plaintiff RM435,685.95 (less than 3% of the final revised contract sum). If indeed Vistanet was formed or used as a tool to avoid contractual liability, the Plaintiff would not have received more than 97% of the payment claims. Just like Irham Niaga's case, Vistanet was formed (in 1998) long before it entered into the contract with the Plaintiff (in 2005), and the Plaintiff knew very well the true nature of Vistanet and its mode of operations. [131] The factors itemized by the learned SCJ from (a) to (o) had already been known by PW 2 when the Plaintiff took against Vistanet. PW2 by his own admission stated that fraud took place during the voluntary winding up of Vistanet when the Defendants could not substantiate how the Defendants were combined creditors of Vistanet to the tune of RM35 80 million. PW2 stated that the Defendants are behind the voluntary winding up of Vistanet and that they acted fraudulently in disabling Vistanet from making payment under the summary judgment. Even if the proofs of debt were to be a sham, there is still no connection between this and the inability of Vistanet to pay its debts to the Plaintiff as there is still a sum of about RM16 million owing to other creditors with a balance of about RM211.43 left in its account at the time when the Liquidator was appointed. If there is fraud that has been perpetrated, it is perpetrated against the Inland Revenue Board ("IRB") for which it will have to be answerable to the IRB. [132] I am conscious of the fact that an appellate court should not interfere with findings of facts of a trial Judge. Here I have taken the findings of facts as they are and I have for the reasons given above, arrived at a different conclusion based on a proper judicial appreciation of the evidence as adduced at the trial. Appellate intervention of this nature is permitted to correct wrong conclusions arrived at or wrong inferences made from the findings of facts of the trial Judge based on the Supreme Court decision in Sundram v Arujunan & Anor [1994] 3 MLJ 361 at p 373 where it was observed as follows: By way of postlude, we must add a final point regarding this part of the case lest we be accused of an oversight. We recognise, as we 81 must, that a Court of Appeal will naturally be reluctant to interfere with a finding of fact by the trial judge who has had the inestimable advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, 'their candour or their partisanship, and all the incidental elements so difficult to describe which make up the atmosphere of an actual trial' (per Lord Macmillan in Watt v Thomas [1947] AC 484 at pp 490–491; [1947] 1 All ER 582 at p 590). But, having said that, we would draw attention to the familiar principle that there is a distinction between the finding of a specific fact and the finding of a fact which is really an inference drawn from the facts specifically found. In the latter case — and the present case is such a case — the appellate court will be far more ready to reverse his decision founded as it is on inferences drawn from admitted or undisputed facts (see Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] AC 370; [1955] 1 All ER 326; [1955] 2 WLR 418). [133] See also the Court of Appeal case of Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Tuck Seng & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 MLJ 97 which was affirmed by the Federal Court. It was held that a decision arrived at without judicial appreciation of the evidence before it runs the risk of the decision being set aside on appeal. 82 Pronouncement [134] I am more than satisfied that the Plaintiff had not proved fraud on the part of the Defendants to justify the lifting of the corporate veil and to make the Defendants liable for the debt of Vistanet. Neither has the Plaintiff proved that the corporate structure of the Defendants here have been used as a means to help Vistanet evade its contractual liability. [135] I had therefore allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Sessions Court. [136] I also ordered costs below of RM25,000.00 to the Defendants/Appellants here and costs of this appeal of RM15,000.00 to the Defendants/Appellants. Allocatur to be paid before the extraction of the order of costs. Dated: 28 October 2016. Y.A. LEE SWEE SENG Judge Construction Court High Court Malaya 83 For the Appellants/Defendants: Mr Simon Hong (Messrs Donny & Hong) For the Respondent/Plaintiff : Mr S Ramesh (Messrs Ramakrishnan & Associates) Date of decision: 28 June 2016

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24NCVC-102-04/2016

PLAINTIF 1. Thye Seng & Company Sdn. Bhd. 2. Nirwana Juara Sdn. Bhd. 3. Sian Aid Credit Development Sdn. Bhd. 4. Uni-Fortune Sdn. Bhd. 5. Lanyang Industrials Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN 1. Universal Trustee (Malaysia) Berhad 2. Gula Perak Berhad (In Liquidation) 3. CIMB Bank Berhad

25/10/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=08c32011-f591-4b88-88b3-94962ed4ed03&Inline=true

1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MALAYA IN SHAH ALAM IN THE STATE OF SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN ORIGINATING SUMMONS NO.: BA-24NCVC-102-04/2016 In the matter of Charge Presentation No. 18153/2003 registered on 2.4.2003; And In the matter of Order 15 Rule 16 and Order 28 of the Rules of Court 2012 And In the matter of Section 340 of the National Land Code 1965. BETWEEN 1. THYE SENG & COMPANY SDN BHD (Company No. 3368-T) 2. NIRWANA JUARA SDN BHD (Company No. 349883-A) 3. SIAN AID CREDIT DEVELOPMENT SDN BHD (Company No. 43375-V) 4. UNI-FORTUNE SDN BHD (Company No. 172358-U) 2 5. LANYANG INDUSTRIALS SDN BHD (Company No. 12646-A) … PLAINTIFFS AND 1. UNIVERSAL TRUSTEE (MALAYSIA) BERHAD (Company No. 17540-D) 2. GULA PERAK BERHAD (IN LIQUIDATION) (Company No. 8104-X) 3. CIMB BANK BERHAD (Company No. 13491-P) … DEFENDANTS GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) A. PRELIMINARY [1] The present Originating Summons is yet another addition to the many series of intervention and challenge by parties in relation to the Gula Perak turmoil. [2] Before this Court, all the Plaintiffs ( i.Thye Seng & Company Sdn Bhd, ii. Nirwana Juara Sdn Bhd, iii Sian Aid Credit Development Sdn Bhd & iv, Uni-Fortune Sdn Bhd - “Plaintiffs”) are third parties who, after for so long in time sat on their supposed rights, now suddenly have a change of hearts when the same rights ignored ran the risk of being defeated. 3 [3] The Plaintiffs, by their Originating Summons (Enclosure 1) dated 29.4. 2016 sought from this Court the following orders: 1. Satu deklarasi bahawa Defendan Pertama tidak mempunyai apa- apa kepentingan terhadap lot-lot industri yang berikut yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif-Plaintif:- (i) Lot 237, Lot 223 dan Lot 264 yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif Pertama; (ii) Lot 253 dan Lot 254 yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif Ke-2; (iii) Lot 255 ke Lot 262 yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif Ke-3; (iv) Lot 277 ke Lot 281 yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif Ke-4; dan (v) Lot 282 ke Lot 288 yang dimiliki oleh Plaintif Ke-5. (secara kolektifnya dirujuk sebagai “25 Unit tersebut”) 2. Satu deklarasi bahawa Defendan Pertama telah melanggar dan/atau memungkiri akujanji yang telah diberikan olehnya melalui surat bertarikh 25.8.2004 bahawa Defendan Pertama sama sekali tidak mempunyai apa-apa kepentingan terhadap 25 Unit tersebut dan tidak akan memasukkan 25 Unit tersebut dalam sekiranya prosiding perampasan tanah dimulakan terhadap Lot 24 dan Lot 458 (“Penolakan dan Akujanji”); 3. Satu deklarasi bahawa Defendan Pertama tidak berhak untuk melelongkan Lot 23 dan Lot 458 dan/atau menguatkuasakan satu 4 gadaian melalui Perserahan No.: 18153/2003 yang telah didaftarkan pada 2.4.2003 (“Gadaian”) tanpa mengemukakan Penolakan dan Akujanji dan/atau mengecualikan 25 Unit tersebut daripada tindakan gadaian; 4. Satu deklarasi bahawa Gadaian dan/atau mana-mana kepentingan dan hak-hak yang diberikan kepada Defendan Pertama berdasarkan Gadaian bukan tidak boleh disangkal di dalam maksud Seksyen 340(2) Kanun Tanah Negara 1965; 5. Satu deklarasi bahawa Gadaian tersebut adalah oleh itu, cacat, terbatal dan/atau tidak sah; 6. Kos permohonan ini akan ditanggung oleh Defendan Pertama; dan 7. Apa-apa relif selanjutnya atau lain yang dianggap sesuai dan wajar oleh Mahkamah yang mulia ini untuk diberikan. [4] The Defendants in this Originating Summons are namely; i. Universal Trustee (Malaysia) Berhad - the 1st Defendant, ii. Gula Perak Berhad (In Liquidation) - the 2nd Defendant and iii. CIMB Bank Berhad - the 3rd Defendant. 5 [5] It is to be noted that pending the hearing and disposal of their Enclosure 1, the Plaintiffs had also filed an interlocutory application in Enclosure 4, applying for an interim injunction to restrain the 1st Defendant from proceeding with its foreclosure proceedings namely to injunct the 1st Defendant from conducting the auction. [6] However, when Enclosure 4 was called for hearing on 20.6.2016, the parties had informed this Court that the 1st Defendant had given an undertaking not to file any Summons for Direction in respect of the two lots until the disposal of Enclosure 1. Thus, on the premise of the 1st Defendant’s undertaking, the Plaintiffs had then withdrew its Enclosure 4. [7] On the same date, the Plaintiffs had also withdrawn its claim against the 3rd Defendant (CIMB Bank Berhad). Accordingly, this Court had made these orders: i. that the Plaintiffs’ Enclosure 4 is struck out and the costs of striking out Enclosure 4 with costs being costs in the cause. ii that the Plaintiffs’ claim against the 3rd Defendant be struck out with no order as to costs. [8] Now, what remains before this Court is the Plaintiffs’ action against the 1st and 2nd Defendants. 6 B. BACKGROUND FACTS [9] The facts is simply that the 2nd Defendant debtor {Gula Perak Berhad (In Liquidation)} defaulting on facilities granted by the 1st Defendant Universal Trustee (Malaysia) Berhad - the creditor) which are secured by the 2nd Defendant’s properties, now faces a myriad of foreclosure actions on all of the securities furnished by the 2nd Defendant. [10] The security relevant to the present case is a charge which was created at least 12 years before the foreclosure was commenced. And after all these long years, the Plaintiffs had never challenge the validity of the charge. But now, i.e 12 years later the Plaintiffs plead to this Court that the charge ought to be deemed invalid for want of rights or interests. The Plaintiffs’ case here is an utterly desperate attempts to mould whatever law within convenience and bend the law to fit the Plaintiffs’ case with blatant disregard of time- celebrated principles in law and flagrant ignorance to the Plaintiffs’ own acts which are self-defeating their own rights. [11] The 2nd Defendant (“GPB”) is the debtor in liquidation. The 1st Defendant (“UTB”) is the creditor exercising its rights to foreclose 7 the securities charged by GPB which is inclusive of Geran 29953, Lot 24, Mukim Batang Berjuntai, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Lot 24”) as well as Geran 32993 Lot 458, Mukim Batang Berjuntai, Daerah Kuala Selangor, Negeri Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Lot 458”) (collectively referred to as “the Lots”) [12] The Lots were charged to UTB under Presentation No. 18153/20013 registered in 2.4.2003 (“Charge”) to secure facilities of Redeemable Convertible Secured Notes for the benefit of GPB. The factum of default by GPB is undisputed and as at 22.4.2008, GPB owed a whopping sum of RM324,472,214.14. Hence, UTB acting well within its rights as a chargee sought to enforce the charge to recover the amounts failed to be repaid by the debtor GPB. [13] 12 years have passed since the inception of the Charge and at least 6 years after the declaration of default, UTB has successfully obtained an Order for Sale on 17.3.2014 and has since applied for a Summons for Direction without any intervention of third parties claiming interests for the Lots. Upon the Summons for Direction, the Lots were set for auction to be sold separately on 29.9.2015. However, other third parties namely Chai Kim Fah, Precitrade (M) 8 Sdn Bhd and Mirage Point (M) Sdn Bhd have applied to intervene and challenge the foreclosure. However it is pertinent to note here that the intervention has since been held by the High Court to be wrongful and that these third parties have no rights to intervene. The appeal against this decision was later withdrawn by the third parties. [14] Upon filing for fresh Summons for Direction, Lot 24 was set to be auctioned off on 5.5.2016, while Lot 458 was set for auction on 21.6.2016. Again, in an unremarkable attempt to challenge the auction, the Plaintiffs in the present case right at the last minute just 2 days before the auction of Lot 24, filed a Notice of Application to injunct UTB from conducting the auction. [15] The basis of the injunction was that allegedly, the Lots have been agreed by GPB to be sold off to the Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers for value of the Lots. The Plaintiffs staked their claim in reliance of a supposed Letter of Disclaimer (“Disclaimer”) by the previous chargee of the Lots, Aseam Bankers Malaysia Berhad (“AMB”) dated 15.9.1999 (in which AMB had disclaimed the Lots from the charge) as well as Sale and Purchase Agreement (“SPAs”) between GPB and the Plaintiffs. 9 [16] This Disclaimer is the core essence of the Plaintiffs’ case. It is on this Disclaimer that the Plaintiffs contend that: a. UTB has no indefeasible rights over the Lots b. UTB has wrongfully/negligently agreed to the charge without excluding the Lots c. UTB has misrepresented or fraudulently misrepresented the facts to the Court in concealing the alleged Disclaimer and purchase of the Lots in UTB’s application for OFS as well as SFD. d. UTB has obtained the OFS vide void/insufficient instrument and thus, in breach of the law. C. WHETHER UTB HAS INDEFEASIBLE RIGHTS AS CHARGEE [17] This Court makes no hesitation to find that the charge to UTB is a valid and enforceable charge notwithstanding the sale to the Plaintiffs as well as the Disclaimer by AMB. And this finding is grounded on a plethora of reasons, clearly justifying the existence of UTB’s rights as chargee and the validity of the Charge. 10 Whether Plaintiffs’ rights as alleged bona fide purchaser supersede UTB’s registered rights and indefeasible interest as registered chargee of the Lots [18] From the outset, just the mere clash of the Plaintiffs’ rights with UTB is sufficiently telling that the Plaintiffs have no recourse to challenge UTB’s right in rem registered in the titles of the Lots. In essence, it is unnecessary for this Court to go deep into the substance since the Plaintiffs’ case would ultimately fail to overcome this preliminary hurdle. [19] It is a trite and time-celebrated principle in law that the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value cannot supersede the indefeasible rights of a chargee unless there is proof of a scheme or collusion between the chargee and chargor to defeat the interest of the bona fide purchaser for value. And the Federal Court in the case of James Edward Buxton & Anor v Supreme Finance (M) Bhd [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 129 had gone as far to decide that the indefeasible rights of the chargee remains untouched even if the chargor’s conduct was plainly unconscionable or deceitful. 11 [20] And this is exactly the facts in the present case. It is clear from the Plaintiffs’ cause papers that the Plaintiffs never averred any allegation or facts forming any evidence of collusion or scheme. In fact not even a single spec of evidence was exhibited to this Court to prove that UTB knew of the sale and disclaimer at the time the Charge was created or at the time the OFS and SFD was applied for. All that was afforded was plain conjectures and barren assumptions. [21] The Federal Court in the case above had held that: “The issue as to the rights of an innocent purchaser for value, with or without notice of the charge as against a registered chargee has been considered by the Courts and is now settled law. … ... the interest of a registered chargee is indefeasible by s. 340(1) of the Code unless it is made defeasible by s. 340(2) 12 The indefeasibility of the chargee's interest is not affected by the chargor's conduct, however unconscionable or deceitful it may be, unless it can be shown that there was collusion between the Chargor and the chargee to defeat the interest of a third party. The interest of a bona fide purchaser for value cannot prevail over that of a registered chargee.” [22] Thus, the Plaintiffs’ case falls flat just against this general principle that the Plaintiffs’ rights (as bona fide purchaser for value) does not trump over UTB’s rights as registered chargees especially considering the total absence of any averments of any fact or contention of any collusion, scheme, or conspiracy between UTB and GPB. Whether there is fraud or misrepresentation by UTB in its application for OFS and SFD as well as the creation of the Charge [23] It is astounding to note that the Plaintiffs in their most tenuous contention to prove misrepresentation have utterly failed to exhibit even a single evidence to corroborate its averments. It is incredibly perplexing that the Plaintiffs would outright contend of such 13 malicious conduct without any evidence to prove so. All that the Plaintiffs have furnished are the Disclaimer and the SPA of the Lots between GPB and the Plaintiffs. There is no proof at all of any communication between UTB and GPB regarding the Disclaimer and SPA. There is no proof at all that GPB had informed UTB of the Disclaimer and the SPA. There is a total absence of any proof that UTB has any knowledge of the sale and Disclaimer at the time the Charge was created and at the time the OFS and SFD were applied for. [24] If there is any misrepresentation or fraud here, it is GPB’s own failure to inform, or deceit in concealing the fact of the sale and Disclaimer from UTB. And it is reiterated here that the chargor’s deceit however unconscionable does not affect or defeat the indefeasible rights of a registered chargee. [25] Not only that, the Plaintiffs themselves have failed to take reasonable steps to make their interest in the Lots known to the world. The Plaintiffs sat on their rights and failed to put any notice in the form of caveats on the titles to the Lots of their alleged interests. Thus, even if the Defendant were to take reasonable steps to ascertain the status of the Lots in making the proper 14 searches, the Disclaimer as well as the sale would still not be discovered or realised by UTB. [26] Accordingly, it is not incumbent upon UTB to go so deep beyond the titles to ascertain third party interests that may lie beyond the titles. The Plaintiffs’ rights were not affixed in the register. And it is sufficient for UTB to satisfy itself on the legitimacy of the creation of the Charge by looking at the title. Thus, upon UTB’s satisfaction, the Plaintiffs cannot now fault UTB for going against the same rights that the Plaintiffs themselves did not even bother to safeguard. [27] Valuable guidance can be found in the case of Lai Soon Cheong v Kien Loong Housing Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1993] 2 CLJ 199 where the Court had held the following: “I am not aware of any law which provides that before a chargee can accept a charge on lands…the said chargee must ensure that no sale of the subdivided lots has yet been carried out or that no sale and purchase agreement has been executed by the chargor” 15 [28] Echoing the same sentiment is the Federal Court’s decision in Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Berhad v Time Engineering Berhad [1996] 2 CLJ 561: “We should add, that in law, there is no requirement that prior to the creation of a charge over land…, a charge is under an obligation to ascertain that the lots have been sold or that they are not subject of sale and purchase agreements executed by a chargor as vendor” [29] The same principle has been recently reiterated in the case of Leong @ Chan Soon Guan v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 1 LNS 1013 where the Court had held that: “… the law does not require the 3rd Defendant to go behind the "curtain" to make any enquiries as suggested by the Plaintiff to ascertain any subsisting third party interest on the Land. The Plaintiff is the architect of his own misfortune by his failure to lodge the caveat immediately after he had executed the SPAs. The Plaintiff ought to have lodged caveats on the Master Title and subsequently on the individual Document of 16 Titles at the earliest opportune time to protect his interest. After all, the Plaintiff was represented by solicitors at all times during the SPA transaction. It is now too late in the day to blame the 3rd Defendant for the predicament that he finds himself in.” [30] UTB relied on the representation of GPB. And this reliance is made clear in the Charge annexure that GPB as chargor shoulders the duty of full disclosure and representation under Clause 21.01 (1) of the Annexure. And GPB never mentioned anything about the sale or the Disclaimer to UTB. There were no evidence at all to indicate that even the slightest notice of the sale or Disclaimer ever been given by GPB to UTB. And again, it was not incumbent upon UTB to find out what was not reasonable for the Defendant to find out. How could the UTB be expected to be aware of something he was not a party or privy to? [31] The Disclaimer was issued some 15 years ago (in 1999) before the foreclosure action, and was never in the business of the Defendant to know or be aware of it. Even if UTB exerted extreme efforts to ensure the legitimacy of the creation of the Charge, UTB would not have known of the Disclaimer or the sale as the 17 Disclaimer and the sale were only within the private knowledge of GPB and the Plaintiffs. It is utterly preposterous to expect UTB to realize or find something, when the Defendant does not even reasonably know what to look for. [32] Thus, it is apparent herein that the Plaintiffs have utterly failed to prove any of the vitiating factors to indefeasibility under Section 340(2) of the National Land Code. There was no proven fraud or misrepresentation. [33] It is also opportune at this juncture to address the Plaintiffs’ total failure of lodging caveats. Although in general, the failure to lodge caveat would not necessarily affect the rights of a bona fide purchaser for value, however, the general principle would pave way to different rules and exception when placed against the backdrop of certain facts of a case. And in the present case, the facts is that the rights of the Plaintiffs in personam in the sale with GPB clashes with the rights in rem of UTB, as registered chargee of the Lots. In such specific facts that the interest of a bona fide purchaser for value is put against the rights of a registered chargee, it is already settled law that the rights of the bona fide purchaser for value does not defeat the rights of a registered 18 chargee (see James Edward Buxton & Anor v Supreme Finance (M) Bhd [1992] 1 CLJ (Rep) 129). It is also already settled law in the foregoing circumstances that the bona fide purchaser’s failure to lodge caveats is the purchaser’s own self- inflicted predicament and thus, it is far too late in time for the Plaintiffs to blame UTB as registered chargees for ignoring or overlooking the Plaintiffs’ alleged rights upon the Lots. The Plaintiffs sat on their rights and never bothered to register their rights to be reflected on the titles. They never lodged caveats even. Thus, when UTB satisfies itself from the titles that there were no 3rd party interests attached to the Lots, then the Plaintiffs cannot fault UTB for going against the same rights the Plainttiffs sat on and ignored (see Leong @ Chan Soon Guan v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 1 LNS 1013) [34] Thus, upon the foregoing deliberation, it is this Court’s finding that the Charge remains a valid charge and indeed UTB reserves indefeasible rights over the lots as lawful registered chargee of the Lots. Whether there are void instruments or breach of any statutory provision 19 [35] Somehow, upon picking issues and provisions which were not averred to or were never the Plaintiffs’ basis of their case, the Plaintiffs contend that since the Charge was void, then the creation of the Charge as well as the granting of the OFS as well as SFD were brought forth vide void or insufficient instrument and breach of statutory provision. [36] The Plaintiffs’ case goes along the line of arguing that the instruments used to obtain the OFS and SFD such as Form 16 of the National Land Code, are void instruments as it has included the Lots which were disclaimed and supposedly should not be put under the OFS. However, this Court finds no credence to this contention as it has already been found earlier that UTB indeed has indefeasible rights as chargee over the Lots and has acted well within their rights to enforce the valid Charge. [37] Not only that, it is perplexing that over the years the Plaintiffs have never challenged the validity of the Charge and only began to challenge the same about 11 years after the Charge was created. The learned counsel for the UTB has afforded an explanation which is more probable than not to be true. It is interesting to note 20 that the terms of the sale between GPB and the Plaintiffs have express stipulation of GPB’s rights to put the Lots as security during the continuance of the SPAs. The SPAs includes the following term: “The Vendor (GPB in the present case) shall be entitled during the continuance of the provisions of this Agreement to charge or encumber the said Property to any bank, financial institution or corporation… for purposes of securing any credit facilities…” [38] The Plaintiffs in entering into the SPAs admit, agree, and even acknowledge the validity of a charge created over the Lots even during the continuance of the SPAs. GPB’s act in charging the Lots to UTB is an act well within the line of the SPAs. Thus, this Court cannot allow the Plaintiffs to go against their own promise and status quo. [39] Valuable guidance can be drawn from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: 21 “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another : he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [40] This Court also refers to the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the case of Amalgamated Investment which reads: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: 22 The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” 23 [41] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that there is no such void or insufficient instrument to render UTB’s rights defeasible under Section 340(2) of the National Land Code. [42] As against the Plaintiffs’ fallible contention on a supposed statutory breach under Sections 241(3) and 301 of the National Land Code, this Court is inclined to agree with the learned counsel for UTB that the Plaintiffs are ultimately unclear on what statutory provision that the Charge, OFS or SFD had breached. To this Court’s best understanding, the Plaintiffs’ contention here is a continuation to their contention on the use of void or insufficient instrument due to the alleged absence of interest of UTB to remain as chargee over the Lots. It is the Plaintiffs’ contention consequent to the use of alleged void instruments that the OFS and SFD was applied and granted in contradiction of statutory provision of the National Land Code. However, it is reiterated here that this Court has already found that there is no absence of interest or defeasibility of UTB’s rights over the Lots, and that there is no such void or insufficient instruments. Therefore, this Court finds that the Charge, the OFS as well as the SFD are not in any breach of any law or statutory provision. 24 Whether Negligence is a ground to challenge the validity of the Charge and whether UTB was negligent [43] As rightfully pointed out by the learned counsel for UTB, mere negligence firstly, does not constitute a fraud. (see Borneo Housing; Lian Keow Sdn Bhd (In Liquidation) & Anor v Oversease Credit Finance (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors -1988] 2 MLJ 449) [44] Furthermore, mere negligence does not defeat the registered interest of a chargee. Similar facts was discussed by the Court in the case of Zainal Abidin Mohamed v ROslan Abdul Aziz & Anor [2003] 7 CLJ where the plaintiff there contended that the chargee was negligent in accepting a charge as security for loan facilities without prior inspection if there were any encumbrances on the property. The Court there then held that: “The court is of the view that the NLC is a comprehensive code, and the indefeasibility of title or interest can only be attacked to the extent permitted by the NLC. If a party fails to bring his claim within the statutory exceptions, he cannot impeach the indefeasibility of a registered interest. The 25 plaintiff has not cited any authority to support the contention that a duly registered charge can be set aside simply on the basis of the chargee's negligence.” … … and the court holds that negligence in or of itself is not a ground for setting aside a charge.” [45] And even assuming that this Court accepts that negligence may affect the Charge’s validity (which this Court does not), there are no evidence to indicate that UTB was at all negligent. This Court reiterates the finding above and on the principle upheld in the cases of Lai Soon Cheong v Kien Loong Housing Development Sdn Bhd & Anor [1993] 2 CLJ 199, Leong @ Chan Soon Guan v Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd & Ors [2013] 1 LNS 1013 and Borneo Housing Mortgage Finance Berhad v Time Engineering Berhad [1996] 2 CLJ 561 that UTB was never under any duty to ascertain if the Lots were sold off to any third parties before agreeing to the Charge. Not only that, since the Plaintiffs have never bothered to have their interest reflected in the title and failed to lodge caveats, it is clear that even if UTB went 26 the extra mile to conduct searches on the Lots, the Disclaimer and the sale would not have reached the knowledge of UTB. Thus, it is this Court’s further finding that negligence is not a ground to challenge the Charge. This Court also finds that the Plaintiffs have utterly failed to prove any negligence on the part of UTB. [46] Thus, on all of the aforementioned deliberation, it is this Court’s finding that UTB reserves indefeasible rights over the land and that UTB has acted well within the rights as chargee to foreclose the Lots. It is also this Court’s finding that the Disclaimer and the sale have no bearing at all against UTB’s indefeasible rights as registered chargee. It is also this Court’s finding that the Charge remains as a valid enforceable charge. D. WHETHER UTB’s OWN DISCLAIMER DEFEATS UTB’s INDEFEASIBLE RIGHTS AS CHARGEE [47] As a show of good faith and prudence, upon having knowledge of the alleged Disclaimer and sale, UTB has issued its own Letter of Disclaimer (“UTB Disclaimer”) alongside other numerous acts which shows UTB’s utter good faith in applying for the OFS and 27 SFD. It is on this Letter of UTB Disclaimer, the Plaintiffs also contend that the Charge was invalid. [48] However, it has already been previously decided that even when the chargee itself (and not the third party purchasers) applies to set aside an OFS and auction of land due to similar existence of letters disclaiming interest on properties (in view of purchases by third parties), the mistake of including the said properties disclaimed cannot defeat the indefeasible rights of the chargee over the properties although the chargee itself is ready to abandon its indefeasible rights. It was very recently decided by the Court of Appeal in the case of Rohaya Ali Haidar v Ambank (M) Bhd [2016] 4 CLJ 563 that: “We find that the respondent having made a mistake in not addressing the interest of this earlier purchasers and the letters of disclaimers that the respondent has issued cannot now come to court to set aside the order for sale so as to protect their own shortcomings. These purchasers rights (if any) are against the respondent (if at all) based on the letters of disclaimers that the respondent has issued. That certainly cannot constitute a basis to 28 defeat the registered interest of the appellant under s. 340(1) of the NLC. [49] Although the Court of Appeal case above slightly differs in facts in that the OFS there had reached the stage that the properties have been auctioned off to new buyers, the difference does not detract from the principle that the interest of the registered chargee remains indefeasible against earlier third party purchasers even when the chargee sought to absolve its own indefeasible rights unless there are any evidence of collusion, or scheme of fraud between the chargor and chargee to defeat the third party purchaser’s rights. A simple mistake, oversight, or even negligence does not necessarily fall within the exceptions under Section 340 (2) of the National Land Code to defeat the indefeasible rights of a chargee under Section 340(1) of the National Land Code particularly when the mistake, oversight or negligence, pertains to the indefeasible rights of a chargee (which ultimately will prevail against the interest of bona fide third party purchasers for value). [50] Especially in the present case, the inclusion of the Lots is based on the enforcement of the Charge by UTB as chargee (although against the rights of the Plaintiffs as alleged bona fide purchaser 29 for value). The Law affords such protection for chargees unless it can be proven that the chargee colluded with the chargor to deprive the rights of the third party bona fide purchasers. Especially in the present case, UTB relies on GPB’s sole responsibility for full disclosure and representation on the state of the Lots. Such mistake, oversight or negligence does not invalidate the Charge. And since the Charge remains a valid charge, UTB reserves all the rights to enforce the Charge and foreclose the Lots. Following UTB’s rights to enforce the Charge on the Lots, the instruments leading to the foreclosure of the Lots also remain valid and sufficient as they remain within the rights of UTB to include the Lots in the instruments leading to the foreclosure. E. COURT’S DECISION [51] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiffs have utterly failed to prove their cases. [52] It is also this Court’s decision that if there is any recourse available for the Plaintiffs, it is an action in personam against GPB under the SPAs and not at all in rem against UTB’s registered chargee. (see 30 Bachan Sing v Mahinder Kaur & Ors [1956] 1 MLJ 97 ; Tan Shiang Hong v Tan Lee Choon & Anor [1985] 2 MLJ 369) [53] Thereto, this Court dismisses the Plaintiffs’ present Originating Summon. On the issue of costs [54] The parties had informed this Court that the costs of the application had been agreed by parties at RM20,000.00. Hence, this Court hereby orders that the Plaintiffs is to pay the 1st Defendant a sum of RM20,000.00 in costs. t.t. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 25th October, 2016 31 For the Plaintiffs - Messrs Dee, Netto, Fatimah & Ng Alex Anton Netto For the First Defendant - Messrs Skrine & Co S. Ramesh P.Y. Kam For the Second Defendant - Messrs Adnan Sundra & Low Iris Tang

Tika 2.6.0

29NCC-3770-10/2015

PERAYU Berkenaan: Mazlan bin Aliman (No. K/P: 660717-01-5909) ...Perayu/Penghutang Penghakiman RESPONDEN Ex-Parte: Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan ...Responden/Pemiutang Penghakiman

24/10/2016

YA DATO' DR. CHOO KAH SING

https://efs.kehakiman.gov.my/EFSWeb/DocDownloader.aspx?DocumentID=3fe6527d-8040-4fef-8231-e64e8c572724&Inline=true

Page 1 of 9 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI JOHOR BAHRU DALAM NEGERI JOHOR DARUL TAKZIM, MALAYSIA DALAM PERKARA KEBANKRAPAN NO: 29NCC-3770-10/2015 Berkenaan: MAZLAN BIN ALIMAN (No. K/P: 660717-01-5909) …Perayu/PenghutangPenghakiman Ex-Parte: LEMBAGA KEMAJUAN TANAH PERSEKUTUAN …Responden/PemiutangPenghakiman DECISION (Encl. 25 – Notis Rayuan Kepada Hakim Dalam Kamar) CHOO KAH SING Judicial Commissioner High Court Johore Bharu Date: 24.10.2016 Page 2 of 9 Introduction [1] The judgment debtor, Mazlan Bin Aliman (hereinafter referred to as ‘JD’), filed an appeal to a Judge in Chambers dated 13.9.2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘encl. 25’) against the decisions of the Senior Assistant Registrar (SAR) in regard to two applications filed by the JD which were dismissed by the SAR. [2] In the first application (hereinafter referred to as ‘encl. 5’), the JD sought to set aside the Bankruptcy Notice issued by Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan (FELDA) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘JC’). [3] In the second application (hereinafter referred to as ‘encl. 17’), the JD sought to set aside the Creditor’s Petition filed by the JC. [4] On 6.9.2016, the SAR dismissed both the JD’s applications and awarded costs of RM500.00 each to the JC. The JD was not satisfied with the decisions of the SAR and filed an appeal to a Judge in Chambers (encl. 25) pursuant to Order 56 of the Rules of Court 2012. [5] The appeal came before me. On 19.10.2016, I dismissed the JD’s appeal. The JD was not satisfied with the decision and filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal. This Decision serves as the reasons for my decision. The reasons are set down as below. Brief Background Facts [6] The JC brought a defamation suit against the JD in a civil suit No. S-21-191-2009. The parties had gone through a full trial. On 29.5.2015, Page 3 of 9 the trial court held in favour of the JC and awarded damages of RM500,000.00 to be paid by the JD to the JC (hereinafter referred to as the ‘judgment’). The JD was not satisfied with the decision of the trial court and has filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal via Civil Appeal No. W-02(NCVC)(W)-1116-07/2015 against the decision of the trial court. [7] The JD’s appeal (main suit - civil suit No. S-21-191-2009/Civil Appeal No. W-02(NCVC)(W)-1116-07/2015) was still pending at the Court of Appeal when encl. 25 was heard before this Court. [8] While the main suit was pending appeal at the Court of Appeal, the JD did not satisfy the judgment debt. As such, the JC took out a bankruptcy action against the JD. A Bankruptcy Notice dated 27.10.2015 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BN’) was issued by the JC against the JD to claim for a sum of RM671,202.74 as at 27.10.2015. [9] The BN was served on the JD on 15.11.2015. The JD did not satisfy the amount claimed in the BN. Instead, on 10.1.2016, the JD filed encl. 5 to set aside the BN. [10] On 17.4.2016, the JD also filed encl. 17 to set aside the Creditor’s Petition dated 18.12.2015 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CP’). [11] On 6.9.2016, the SAR dismissed both the encls. 5 and 17. Enclosure 5 – Setting Aside the Bankruptcy Notice [12] The learned counsel for the JD submitted that the judgment dated 29.5.2015 was not a final judgment. The learned counsel for the JD urged this Court to refer to a High Court decision in Re Udos ak Riging, Page 4 of 9 ex p Seabanc Kredit Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 383, wherein the High Court held, inter alia, that a default judgment is not a final judgment because it is not decided on the merits. The High Court also held that ‘any judgment not given on merit is liable to be set aside on application and does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties’. [13] Upon perusal of the judgment of Abdul Kadir Sulaiman J. (as his Lordship then was), it was observed that the proposition laid down in Re Udos ak Riging could not be applied to the present case. The facts in Re Udos ak Riging were distinguishable from the present case. [14] In the present case, the parties had gone through a full trial. Evidence was led in the trial, and the trial judge had considered the evidence and the arguments which were put forward by the parties. Hence, the judgment of the trial judge was based on merits as opposed to the facts in Re Udos ak Riging where the judgment obtained therein was a judgment in default. In the present case, the judgment by the trial court is indeed a final judgment as it has finally disposed the rights of the parties. [15] This Court was of the view that the learned counsel for the JD’s reliance on the case of Re Udos ak Riging to support the application in encl. 5 was misconceived. Enclosure 17 – Opposing the filing of the Creditor’s Petition [16] The gist of the learned counsel’s argument for the JD was that the filing of the Creditor’s Petition dated 18.12.2015 by the JC was pre- mature. Page 5 of 9 [17] The learned counsel for the JD submitted that the JD had filed his application (encl. 5) to set aside the BN on 10.1.2016; and the application was only decided and disposed on 6.9.2016 (approximately 9 months later). The learned counsel for the JD also submitted that the JC could file its CP only after the encl.5 has been disposed which was after 6.9.2016. Hence, the filing of the CP was pre-mature, the learned counsel for the JD argued. [18] The learned counsel for the JD urged this Court to refer to the Supreme Court case of Datuk Lim Kheng Kim v Malayan Banking Bhd [1993] 2 MLJ 298. The learned counsel for the JD referred, in particular, the following passage in the judgment of Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ (as his Lordship then was) at p. 305, wherein it states as follows: “In passing, we wish to emphasize that, contrary to what had been expressed in Soh Bok Yew, if a bankruptcy petition is to be founded on an act of bankruptcy based on a failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice, it is self-evident that such a petition can only be filed after the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice is heard and dismissed.” [19] In reply to the submission of the JD’s counsel, the learned counsel for the JC submitted that pursuant to s.5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the JC has to file the CP within 6 months from the date the JD committed the act of bankrupt. Section 5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 states as follows: Page 6 of 9 (1) A creditor shall not be entitled to present a bankruptcy petition against a debtor unless- (a)...;and (b)...; and (c) the act of bankruptcy on which the petition is grounded has occurred within six months before the presentation of the petition; and (d).... [20] The act of bankruptcy was committed within 6 months before the CP was filed on 18.12.2015. The BN was served on the JD on 15.11.2015, and the JD had failed to satisfy the judgment debt within seven days after service of the BN, therefore, the JD had committed an act of bankrupt after the seventh day upon receipt of the BN (see s.3(1)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967). In law, the JC was entitled to file the CP pursuant to s.5(1)(c) read together with s.3(1)(i) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, the learned counsel for the JC argued. [21] The learned counsel for the JC referred this Court to a High Court decision in Re Gan Eng San; ex p HSBC Bank Malaysia Bhd [2011] 3 CLJ 409, wherein Mah Weng Kwai J. (as his Lordship then was) held at p. 416 as follows: “As the act of bankruptcy was committed by the JD on 23 September 2008, the filing of the CP on 12 March 2009 that is, three months before the disposal of the summons in chambers to set aside the BN was heard Page 7 of 9 by the SAR on 23 June 2009 is valid. The CP filed on 12 March 2009 was properly filed within six months from the act of bankruptcy committed on 23 September 2008. In light of the chronology of events, the hearing of the CP on 14 June 2010 and the grant of the AO/RO by the SAR were therefore not premature.” [22] In the present case, the act of bankrupt was committed after the seventh day of the service of the BN on 15.11.2015, and the CP was filed on 18.12.2015. The act of bankruptcy was committed well within 6 months before the CP was filed, in compliance with s. s.5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967. In law, the filing of the CP could not be said as pre-mature(see Re Lee Guan Par; ex-p Hotel Universal Sdn Bhd [2009] 7 MLJ 427). [23] The CP was not heard when encl. 5, i.e. the application to set aside the BN, was dismissed by the SAR on 6.9.2016. Further, the CP was also not heard on 19.10.2016 when this Court dismissed the JD’s appeals to a Judge in Chambers relating to his two applications (encls. 5 and 17). [24] This Court was of the considered view that the filing of encl. 5 would not operate as a stay nor would it prevent the JC from filing the CP. The right of the JC to file the CP is accorded by the law pursuant to s.5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967. There is nothing to prevent the JC from filing the CP pending the disposal of an application to set aside the BN. Page 8 of 9 [25] This Court was also of the considered view that it is prudent practice for the hearing of the CP (during which the Court decides whether to grant RO/AO) to proceed only after the application to set aside the BN has been disposed of. In this instant case, the CP was not heard before the disposal of encl. 5. The right of the JD to challenge the BN was not compromised. The filing of the CP could not be said as pre- mature nor could it be said to have jeopardized the hearing of the application to set aside the BN. [26] Based on the above reasoning, this Court was of the considered view that the JC could file the CP at the time it was filed and it was not pre-mature as argued by the learned counsel for the JD. With greatest respect to the passing remark of the Supreme Court in Datuk Lim Kheng Kim that ‘a petition can only be filed after the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice is heard and dismissed,’ this observation, if it is strictly followed, it would place a JC in a tight spot. On the one hand, the JC has to comply with s.5(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy Act 1967, and on the other hand the hearing or disposal of the application to set aside a BN could take place very much later in time. Conclusion [27] Based on the above reasoning, this Court dismissed the JD’s encl. 5 and 17 in the Notice to Appeal to Judge in Chambers (encl. 25) and awarded costs of RM2,000.00 to be paid by the JD to the JC. -Signed- ……………………………………… (CHOO KAH SING) Judicial Commissioner High Court, Johore Bharu Page 9 of 9 JD’s Counsel : Hassan Karim Tetuan Hassan Karim & Co. JC’s Counsel : Wan Azmir B. Wan Majid Tetuan Hafarizam Wan & Aisha Mubarak

Tika 2.6.0

BA-24-316-03/2016

PLAINTIF 1. Tung Beng Lee 2. Milan Star Sdn. Bhd. DEFENDAN 1. Aminuddin Bin Ghazali 2. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang

24/10/2016

YA DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR

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1 DALAM MAHKAMAH TINGGI MALAYA DI SHAH ALAM DALAM NEGERI SELANGOR DARUL EHSAN, MALAYSIA SAMAN PEMULA NO.: BA-24-316-03/2016 Dalam Perkara Penghakiman Persetujuan bertarikh 12.9.2013 di Guaman No.: 22-765-2010; Dan Dalam Perkara Penghakiman bertarikh 15.1.2016 di Guaman Sivil No.; 22NCVC-75-02/2014; Dan Dalam Perkara No. Perserahan: 2304/2009 Kaveat Persendirian atas tanah yang dimasuki oleh AMG Industries (M) Sdn Bhd bertarikh 18.6.2009; Dan Dalam Perkara No Perserahan: 1431/2009 Kaveat Pendaftar atas Tanah pada 22.4.2009 dan No. Perserahan: 2240/2010 Kaveat Pendaftar atas Tanah pada 26.5.2010; Dan 2 Dalam Perkara Seksyen 321, 327, 329 dan 417 Kanun Tanah Negara, 1965 (Akta 56); Dan Dalam Perkara Aturan 7 dan Aturan 92 Kaedah 4 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah 2012 ANTARA 1. TUNG BENG LEE (NO. K/P: 580613-10-6531) 2. MILAN STAR SDN BHD (NO SYARIKAT: 661810-X) … PLAINTIF-PLAINTIF DAN 1. AMINUDDIN BIN GHAZALI (NO. K/P: 661215-08-5629) 2. PENTADBIR TANAH DAERAH KLANG … DEFENDAN - DEFENDAN GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT (Enclosure 1) 3 A. BACKGROUND FACTS [1] By this Originating Summons (Enclosure 1), the Plaintiffs primarily sought from this Court for an order that the Settlement Agreement or Consent Judgment dated 12.9.2013 (in Civil Suit No. 22-765- 2010) (“Consent Judgment”) which was recorded between the 2nd Plaintiff as well as the 1st Defendant in a previous suit be enforced against the 1st Defendant. [2] The Plaintiffs’ Enclosure 1 basically seeks for the following reliefs: “’ 1. That after the Plaintiffs pay the sum of RM1,282,030.14 (as at 12.3.2016 only) to Mr. Aminuddin’s solicitors pursuant to the consent judgment dated 12.9.2013 and court order dated 15.1.2016, Mr. Aminuddin be ordered:- a. To sign the transfer form and all relevant documents to effect the transfer of a property held under GM 4512 Lot 2646 Mukim Kapar Daerah Kelang (the said property) from Mr. Aminuddin to Milan Star within 14 days from the date of order; b. To release the original title of the said property, transfer form and all relevant documents as stated in paragraph 4 (a) to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors to register Milan Star as registered proprietor of the said property within 14 days from the date of order; c. To remove the private caveat presentation No. 2304/2009 lodged by AMG Industries (M) Sdn Bhd and all private caveat lodged by Mr. Aminuddin and/or his agents and/or his servants and/or his representatives; and d. Mr. Aminuddin’s solicitors do release the said sum to Mr. Aminuddin after Milan Star is registered as registered proprietor under the said property; 2. If Mr. Aminuddin fails to comply with paragraph (a) above and/or fails to execute the transfer form to transfer the said property to Milan Star, the registrar do execute the transfer form and all relevant documents to transfer the said property to Milan Star; 3. That Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Klang (the 2nd Defendant do register Milan Star as the registered proprietor of the said property and issue the original title under the name of Milan Star and to remove all caveats lodged on the said property; 5 4. That Mr. Aminuddin and/or his agents and/or his servants and/or his tenant do deliver vacant possession of the said property to Milan Star within 14 days from the service of the order; 5. In the event that Mr. Aminuddin fails to comply with paragraph (4) above, Mr. Aminuddin do pay rental of the said property until the date of deliver vacant possession; 6. Cost to be paid by Mr. Aminuddin. 7. Any other relief as this Honourable court thinks just. [3] Under the Consent Judgment dated 12.9.2013, the 1st Defendant had agreed or admitted to the validity of a sale and purchase agreement whereby the 1st Defendant had agreed to sell his property held under GM 4512 Lot 2646 Mukim Kapar Daerah Klang (“the Property”) to the 2nd Plaintiff. Having admitted to the validity of the sale and purchase agreement, Aminuddin Bin Ghazali (“1st Defendant”) suddenly had a change of heart and employed every feasible devises possible to hinder the enforcement of his own consented Consent Judgment, apart from completely failing to conform to the clear terms of the Consent Judgment. The 1st Defendant’s unscrupulous acts to defeat the 6 Consent Judgment includes the 1st Defendant’s endeavour into another civil suit (Civil Suit No 22NCVC-75-02/2014) (“2nd Suit”) seeking for declaratory reliefs to nullify the Consent Judgment as well as the Sale and Purchase Agreement. [4] Unsurprisingly, the 2nd Suit was dismissed, rightfully so, and the High Court granted leave to the 2nd Plaintiff for a consequential order to execute the Consent Judgment with costs of RM50,000.00 payable to the 2nd Plaintiff. [5] Apart from the fallible 2nd Suit, the 1st Defendant had gone as far as to lodge police reports complaining of a supposed misrepresentation or fraud and/or forgery. Consequently, pending investigations, a Registrar’s caveat was lodged onto the title of the Property. However, the police report has returned findings negating any suspicion of fraud or forgery, and the Police had advised that the Registrar’s caveat be removed. B. WHETHER THE SALE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT AS WELL AS THE CONSENT JUDGMENT REMAINS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE 1ST DEFENDANT 7 [6] The factum of the 1st Defendant’s non-compliance of the consent judgment is largely undisputed. It has already been admitted by the 1st Defendant that he has no interest at all to comply with the consent judgment. It was admitted so, on the ill-founded supposition that it is well within the 1st Defendant’s rights not to comply with the Consent Judgment due to the Police Investigation as well as lodging of Registrar’s caveat upon the land (which were mechanisms triggered by the 1st Defendant’s own wrongful acts to defeat its own admissions and agreement to the Consent Judgment). [7] A simple appreciation of the 1st Defendant’s case would unravel the total and utter absence of any case whatsoever. The 1st Defendant, upon not only signing the sale and purchase agreement as well as the instrument of transfer in Form 14A on his own volition, but also admitting to the validity of the sale and purchase agreement, have the audacity during the 2nd Suit and now in the present originating summons, contend that he was misrepresented of the nature of the sale and purchase agreement. It was contended that the 1st Defendant allegedly was a victim of manipulation in that he had signed the documents inclusive of the sale and purchase agreement under the guise of a guarantee for a 8 personal loan. Nonetheless, not a single shred of evidence were ever tendered or exhibited into Court to prove this alleged manipulation or misrepresentation. Even the Police found that there are no elements of fraud and forgery upon concluding their investigation. The Police had written to the Klang District Land Office vide a letter dated 19.4.2010 that: “Kertas siasatan bersabit kes ini telahpun dirujuk kepada pejabat YA TPR Selangor dan berdasarkan hasil siasatan yang dijalankan kes ini telah NFA kerana didapati tiada unsur penipuan dan pemalsuan tandatangan pada Borang 14A… Oleh kerana siasatan telah selesai, pihak polis sudah tidak perlukan lagi kaveat pendaftar tersebut untuk tujuan penyiasatan polis. [8] The nature of manipulation and misrepresentation itself (apart from the sheer absence of evidence) is too great a misrepresentation to be even remotely probable. The 1st Defendant had gone as far to sign the instrument transfer in Form 14A itself. A quick reading of the instrument form would reasonably reveal that the document is not any form or document for a personal loan and in fact an instrument to transfer land. 9 Whether the 1st Defendant’s defence is barred by Res Judicata [9] It is altogether clear that the Defence afforded by the 1st Defendant in the present originating summons, is the exact mirroring replica of the 1st Defendant’s case in the 2nd Suit which had already been determined not by mere technicality, but the finality of the case’s merits. The same issues were alleged and contended in the 2nd Suit. Even as early as the 2nd Suit the 1st Defendant had failed to answer to its blatant refusal and failure to comply with the Consent Judgment. The same issue of manipulation and misrepresentation was also fallibly contended by the 1st Defendant in the 2nd Suit. The validity of all documents inclusive of the sale and purchase agreement, the Consent Judgment, and the instrument of transfer (duly signed by the 1st Defendant) were also determined to be valid and enforceable by the Court in the 2nd Suit. Even the 1st Defendant’s frivolous conduct of lodging the Police Report and causing the registrar’s caveat to be lodged was determined by the Court in the 2nd Suit. The Notes of Proceedings which were exhibited in the Affidavits clearly shows that these issues have been brought to the attention and deliberation of the Court in the 2nd Suit. And it is pertinent to note that the 1st Defendant in his oral testimony has admitted outright that he has no interest at all to 10 comply with the Consent Judgment, and in fact admitted to the failure to comply with the Consent Judgment. [10] And here the 1st Defendant stands yet again before this Court, to contend the same fanciful tale of woe that none of the previous Courts have ever bought. This Court is guided by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Kawal teliti Sdn Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 189 which had been astutely summarised by the Court of Appeal in the case of Chemfert Sdn Bhd & Anor v Lim Hua [2010] 5 MLJ 228: “(a) Res judicata simply means a matter adjudged, and its significance lies in its effect of creating an estoppel per rem judicatum. (b) When a matter between two parties has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties and their privies are not permitted to litigate once more the res judicata, because the judgment becomes the truth between such parties who should accept it as the truth — res judicata pro veritate accipitur. 11 (c) The public policy of the law is that it is in the public interest that there should be finality in litigation — interest rei publicae ut sit finis litium. (d) It is only just that no one ought to be vexed twice for the same cause of action — nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.” [11] Following these excerpts, it is within the public interest and public policy to not allow the 1st Defendant to raise the same defeated issues and cause of action to vex the Plaintiffs twice (in fact in the present case, for the third time around). The Consent Judgment, and the Judgment in the 2nd Suit becomes the truth and the 1st Defendant should accept is as the truth. [12] With regard to the breadth of the maxim’s application, the Court of Appeal stated the following: “(g) The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion 12 and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence might have brought forward at the time: per Wigram VC in Henderson v Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100 at p 115; the 'point' should actually include causes of action, or all causes of action which one of the two parties has against the other, based on, or substantially on the same facts or issues, and not just all issues of law or of fact that are in dispute between the parties. (h) One of the exceptional special cases is the effect of a default judgment in subsequent proceedings between the same parties because a default judgment is different from a final judgment on the merits.” [13] Here the Court of Appeal discussed the types of res judicata which are cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel. In the simplest iteration, cause of action estoppel is simply an estoppel against the re-litigation of a cause of action for a remedy which has already been litigated and finally determined by the Court. Issue estoppel 13 is simply an estoppel of the re-litigation or a repeated contention of issue(s) which have already been put to the Court for determination, as well issue(s) which are so clearly at the core of the determination of the subject matter which could have been raised in the previous action. And the Court of Appeal had held that the applicable position in the Malaysian jurisdiction is that issue estoppel applies not only to issues which have been put to the Court for determination but also to issues that could have been put to the Court: “(q) Res judicata for this purpose is therefore not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them…” [14] Applying the above principles in the present case, it is clear that the 1st Defendant’s case not only re-litigates the same causes of action which were defeated in the 2nd Suit, the Defendant’s case also gives rise to the same issues and facts which were already 14 put forth to the Court for determination in the 2nd Suit. It is this Court’s finding herein that it is patently clear that the 1st Defendant’s defence in its entirety is barred by res judicata. The 1st Defendant has admitted to the validity of the sale and purchase as well as the Consent Judgment [15] It is actually sufficient for this Court to end its deliberation of the Defendant’s after finding that his case is utterly barred by res judicata. However, merely for the sake of completion, and to further unravel the 1st Defendant’s utter absence of case so that he does not further delay the ends of justice, this Court will endeavor to determine the validity of the sale and purchase (and its documents) as well as the Consent Judgment that the 1st Defendant freely, with his own consent and out of his own volition entered into. [16] Firstly, it is trite law that a party should not be allowed to take two contradicting stances at, blowing hot in one breath and cold in another. Similarly so in the present case, in one breath the 1st Defendant had admitted, acknowledged and agreed to the validity of the sale and purchase and its terms by entering into the 15 Consent Judgment on the enforcement of the same sale and purchase. In another breath now, the 1st Defendant denies the validity of the Consent Judgment as well as the sale and purchase of the Property. Parties cannot be allowed to twist about their stance willy-nilly. Similarly, when the 1st Defendant had already admitted to the status quo that the sale and purchase agreement is valid and enforceable, it would be unjust for this Court to allow him to make a u-turn and defeat his own admission. [17] This Court draws guidance from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of Cheah Theam Kheang v City Centre Sdn Bhd & Other Appeals (2012) 2 CLJ 16 which had held that: “In other words of Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Express Newspapers Plc v News (UK) Ltd and Others (1990) 3 All ER 376 at pp. 383 to 384: There is a principle of law of general application that it is not possible to approbate and reprobate. That means you are not allowed to blow hot and cold in the attitude that you adopt. A man cannot adopt two inconsistent attitude towards another : he must elect between them and, having elected to adopt one stance, 16 cannot thereafter be permitted to go back and adopt an inconsistent stance.” [18] This Court refers to the decision of the Federal Court in the case of Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331 where the Federal Court referred to Lord Denning’s decision in the case of Amalgamated Investment which had held the following: “The width of the doctrine has been summed up by Lord Denning in the Amalgamated Investment case (at p 122) as follows: The doctrine of estoppel is one of the most flexible and useful in the armoury of the law. But it has become overloaded with case. That is why I have not gone through them all in this judgment. It has evolved during the last 150 years in a sequence of separate developments: proprietary estoppel, estoppel by representation of fact, estoppel by acquiescence, and promissory estoppel. At the same time, it has been sought to be limited by a series of maxims: estoppel is only a rule of evidence, estoppel cannot give rise to a cause of action, estoppel cannot do away with the need 17 for consideration, and so forth. All these can now be seen to merge into one general principle shorn of limitations. When the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of an underlying assumption either of fact or of law – whether due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference – on which they have conducted the dealings between them – neither of them will be allowed to go back on the assumption when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so.” [19] Secondly, this Court must emphasise the sanctity of and sacrosanct nature of an order which was entered into by the Court upon the parties’ consent. A Consent Judgment is a final and binding determination of a litigation that should not, in any manner, be taken lightly. Abdul Malik Ishak J (as he then was) has decided in the case of Phua Beng Chooi @ Koh Kim Kee v Koh Heng Jin @ Koh Heng Leong [2007] 2 MLJ 458 that: “Court orders consented to by the parties with the benefit of legal advice will no longer be obeyed willy-nilly and be sacrosanct but will be disputed and challenged with impunity 18 for the most frivolous reasons. The sanctity of the consent order here must be preserved at all costs. … I must reiterate that the consent order has been perfected and this court is functus officio and it has no inherent power to vary or set aside a perfected order save and except for clerical slips.” [20] So much so, that the preservation and conformity of a consent judgment even goes as far as having the Courts granting consequential orders to give effect to the consent order. It was further held in Phua Beng Chooi that: “In order to give efficacy to the consent order I must make certain consequential orders. I have to direct the senior assistant registrar to do certain things like what other judges before me have done. Thus, in Kok Ek Chooi v Chea Soon Neoh & Anor [1982] 1 MLJ219, the late Arulandom J, directed the senior assistant registrar to execute the necessary transfer of the undivided shares to the land.” 19 [21] Very recently, the same sentiment was reiterated. In fact, the Court has gone as far as to find that a failure or refusal to conform or abide by the consent judgment leads to and causes “extreme hardship, mental stress and losses to the Plaintiffs” with high probability of prejudice against a Plaintiff. (see Karpayah @ Karrupiah Ramasamy & Anor V. My Home Budget Hotel Sdn Bhd [2016] 1 LNS 283) [22] Thus, the sanctity of and sacrosanct nature of the Consent Judgment in the present case should also be preserved. There are no reasons at all furnished to this Court to abandon the preservation of the Consent Judgment. [23] Herein, having the foregoing deliberation in mind, it is this Court’s finding that the Consent Judgment, the sale and purchase agreement together with all its relevant documents signed by the 1st Defendant remains valid, subsisting and enforceable against the 1st Defendant. C. THE 1ST DEFENDANT HAD CONTINUOUSLY REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSENT JUDGMENT 20 [24] Upon finding that the Consent Judgment remains valid and enforceable, it is pertinent to appreciate the terms of the Consent Judgment. The salient terms of the Consent Judgment are as follows: i. The 1st Defendant shall return the consideration already paid by the 2nd Plaintiff to the amount of RM1,031,780.05 within three months from 12.9.2013; ii. In case the 1st Defendant fails to make the above payment within time, the 2nd Plaintiff shall have the right to purchase the Property by paying 50% of the net worth value within one month (after deducting interest of 10% per annum on RM1,031,780.05); iii. Both the 1st Defendant and 2nd Plaintiff shall agree that the value of the Property shall be determined by calculating the average value from 2 valuation reports (whereby each party obtains 1 valuation report) within 2 weeks from the date of the Consent Judgment; 21 iv. The 1st Defendant shall ensure that the private caveat presentation No. 2304/2009 is removed by AMG Industries (M) Sdn Bhd; v. The 1st Defendant shall ensure that the Property is free from any private caveats within 7 days after the 2nd Plaintiff makes the payment in paragraph (ii); vi. The 1st Defendant shall deposit the executed form to remove the private caveat with his solicitors within 1 month from 12.9.2013; vii. The 1st Defendant’s solicitors can only release the sum paid by the 2nd Plaintiff in paragraph (ii) after the 2nd Plaintiff is successfully registered as proprietor of the Property; and viii. The 1st Defendant shall pay RM20,000 as costs to the 2nd Plaintiff’s benefit. [25] Astoundingly, the 1st Defendant had not only failed, but outright refused to comply with the terms of the Consent Judgment that he 22 himself earlier had admitted and accepted. Against the 1st Defendant’s obligation to make the payment as well as obtaining a valuation report, the 1st Defendant had admitted the following in its oral testimony during the 2nd Suit: P/Def: Now, dalam lain perkataan tuan setuju tuan telah memungkiri fasal A dan B perjanjian persetujuan ini. A dari segi tidak membayar dalam tempoh 3 bulan B dari segi tidak mendapat atau memperolehi laporan penilaian dalam tempoh sebulan. Setuju dengan saya kalau saya katakan tuan telah memungkiri berdasarkan perintah? YA: Memungkiri perintah ya? P/Def: Yes. [26] In blatant consistency, the 1st Defendant also fails to conform to ALL of the terms agreed under the Consent Judgment. The 1st Defendant even has the audacity to admit that he has no interest at all to adhere to the Consent Judgment which he had admitted and agreed to: 23 P/Def: Pada hari ini adakah awak masih ingin mengikuti perintah ini? SP1: Tidak P/Def: Tak ingin. Walaupun perintah ini telah pun dipersetujui dan dimeteraikan di Mahkamah. Setuju? SP1: Setuju. P/Def: Dan awak tidak ingin mengiktirafkan perintah ini. Setuju? SP1: Ya. P/Def: Walaupun tuan sendiri telah memasuki perintah tersebut? SP1: Ya. [27] This Court cannot condone this brazen act of breaches by the 1st Defendant. Even the one and only lame excuse afforded by the 1st Defendant on its refusal to adhere to the Consent judgment is self- 24 contradictory. On one hand the 1st Defendant contends that he has no interest at all to adhere to the Consent Judgment’s terms, and on the other hand, the 1st Defendant contends that his hands are tied to do anything since the Registrar had lodged a Registrar’s caveat upon the land and the police was investigating the matter. This so-called obstacles were the 1st Defendant’s own doing and the 1st Defendant cannot seek defence or refuge from his own audacious acts of breach. All the while the 1st Defendant fails to deliver vacant possession of the Property and proprietorship of the Property, the 1st Defendant had admitted to collecting rents of RM28,000.00 per month from the Property, which most likely would explain the 1st Defendant’s brazen refusal to adhere to the Consent Judgment. [28] Apart from the 1st Defendant’s malicious act of attempting to defeat the Consent Judgment, had the Registrar been informed of the falsity of the 1st Defendant’s allegations of fraud and manipulation, the Registrar would have not exercised its discretion to lodge the Registrar’s caveat under Section 321 of the National Land Code. Accordingly, the Registrar would have on its own motion under Section 321(3)(a) of the same section would have cancelled the caveat. Thus, the Registrar’s caveat ought to be cancelled and 25 removed by this Court. (see Lim Ah Hun v Pendaftar Hakmilik Tanah Pulau Pinang & Anor [1990] 3 MLJ 34) [29] In the meantime, it remains proven with concrete evidences that the 2nd Plaintiff has diligently adhered to the terms of the Consent Judgment. The 2nd Plaintiff has properly obtained a valuation by the firm Raine and Horne within time which had already been tendered during the 2nd Suit. The firm Raine and Horne has valued the Property to the value of RM4.2 million which the same value had been admitted by the 1st Defendant in his evidence. Upon the 1st Defendant’s failure to pay the amount according to the Consent Judgment, the Plaintiff had deposited the amount according to the Consent Judgment to its own solicitors (to be released to the 1st Defendant’s solicitors upon the 1st Defendant’s undertaking to ensure that the Property is free from any and all encumbrances and that the 1st Defendant deliver vacant possession of the Property as well as properly transfer ownership of the Property to the 2nd Plaintiff). The 2nd Plaintiff’s depositing of monies were duly informed to the 1st Defendant’s solicitors (with no reply by the 1st Defendant or the 1st Defendant’s solicitors) by the issuance of the 2nd Plaintiff’s letter dated 27.1.2016 by the 2nd Plaintiff to the 1st Defendant’s solicitors. Thus, even if there was a failure to deposit 26 the monies to the 1st Defendant’s solicitors, the failure was brought upon by the 1st Defendant’s own failure to respond to the 2nd Plaintiff’s willingness and readiness to have the monies deposited to the 1st Defendant’s solicitors. [30] Thus, it is this Court’s finding that the 1st Defendant had all times inexcusably breached the terms of the Consent Judgment. D. COURT’S DECISION [31] In view of all of the findings and deliberations above, it is this Court’s decision that the Plaintiffs have successfully proven their cases. This Court also dismisses the 1st Defendant’s Defence. [32] In order to give efficacy to the execution of the Consent Judgment, this Court further makes the following consequential orders: i. The 2nd Defendant shall remove and cancel all caveats and/or any encumbrances on the Property held under GM 4512 Lot 2646 Mukim Kapar Daerah Klang inclusive of/ but not limited to the caveats under: 27 a. Private Caveat presentation No. 2304/2009 lodged by AMG Industries (M) Sdn Bhd; b. Private Caveat presentation No. 3365/2015 lodged by Rosnah Bun Mustafah (1st Defendant’s wife);and c. Registrar’s Caveat presentation No. 2895/2016 ii. It is also equally incumbent and obligatory for the 1st Defendant to cause and ensure all of the caveats lodged onto the Property to be removed and that the Property be free from any encumbrances. Thus, the 1st Defendant is ordered to prepare and execute all the documentation and rele`vant instruments to cause all of the caveats lodged onto the property to be removed and the Property be free from any encumbrances; iii. The 2nd Defendant shall cause the Property held under GM 4512 Lot 2646 Mukim Kapar Daerah Klang be properly transferred into the 2nd Plaintiff’s registered ownership; 28 iv. The 1st Defendant in the common direction to cause the Property to be properly transferred into the 2nd Plaintiff’s registered ownership, shall sign, and execute all relevant documents and instruments to ensure that the Property be transferred into the 2nd Plaintiff’s registered ownership; v. The 1st Defendant shall deliver vacant possession of the Property to the 2nd Defendant; vi. The 1st Defendant shall also pay the 2nd Plaintiff an amount of RM28,000.00 for each month (being monthly rents collected by the 1st Defendant on the Property) that the 1st Defendant has failed to deliver vacant possession from 27.1.2016 (being the date of the 2nd Plaintiff’s payment (on top of the consideration already paid by the 2nd Plaintiff) for the purchase of the Property under the Consent Judgment) until the date of delivery of vacant possession; and vii. This Court also orders that the 2nd Plaintiff’s payment for the purchase of the Property which had already been deposited to the 2nd Plaintiff’s solicitors be deducted and reduced as 29 per paragraph 17 of the 2nd Plaintiff’s Affidavit in Support dated 11.3.2016, taking into account the following: a. 1st Defendant’s own admission of the Property’s value to be RM4.2 million; b. deduction of interests of 10% per annum on RM1,031,780.05 (being the consideration already paid by the 2nd Plaintiff), from 12.12.2013 (being the date of the 1st Defendant’s failure to return the consideration paid by the 2nd Plaintiff within time under the Consent Judgment) until the date of delivery of vacant possession as well as registered ownership of the Property to the 2nd Plaintiff; and c. deduction of costs awarded to the 2nd Plaintiff in the action for the Consent Judgment (RM20,000.00) as well as the 2nd Suit (RM50,000.00) 30 On the issue of costs [33] This Court hereby orders the 1st Defendant to pay the Plaintiffs a sum of RM 5000.00 in costs. ...................................................... (DATUK AZIMAH BINTI OMAR) Judicial Commissioner High Court Shah Alam Selangor Darul Ehsan Dated the 24th October 2016 For the Plaintiff - Messrs Krishna Dallumah, Manian & Indran Krishna Dallumah KH Yong For the Defendants - Messrs Amir Ruhana & Khairuddin Atuffah bin Said

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