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Edge weld symbols are most commonly associated with sheet metal or “gauge” material. This gauge is a system used in order to call out sheet metal similar to that of electricians and wire. This chart can range from the largest gauge of carbon steel at #7 which is a decimal of .1793” all the way to the smallest which is #28 at a decimal of .0149.” This system is much simpler than using a fraction for how small these numbers are. It is also important to know that there are specific charts for carbon steel, aluminum, stainless steel, brass, copper, and galvanized steel. The edge weld may include a weld size which will be shown to the left of the weld symbol. The weld size is a measurement of depth of fusion, not necessarily the width of the weld. This does not mean these dimensions couldn’t be the same. If there is not a size specified it will be up to the welder’s discretion. Single sided edge welds are used on edge joints, flanged butt joints, and flanged corner joints. If there is a double edge weld it will be used only with a flat edge joint. This is shown below: For edge welds a length can be associated with the symbol and it will be shown to the right of the weld symbol. If there is not a dimension shown to the right it will be full length of the part. There may be other indicators shown on a print of what weld length is required by using hatching or notes. Below shows an edge symbol with an 8” length as well as a detail view of a part to show specifically where two 2” welds will be located. In chapter 3 Fillet Welds there was a section on length and pitch. An edge weld can also be welded in this same manner. This will be shown to the right with length followed by a hyphen and then the pitch. This can also include a chain intermittent edge weld for an edge joint. This will be more common with thicker material when it is a lengthy weld. There may be a staggered intermittent edge weld as well. This is shown the same as a chain intermittent edge weld but the symbols will be offset. When the location for these welds are not obvious it will be called out on the blueprint. This may come from a note or detail drawing or even by using extension lines. Some edge welds will be including more than 2 members. In this case there will be only one arrow that points at the joint but encompasses all of the members. This will be more common with sheet metal. With an edge joint on a flanged butt joint or corner joint there could be the possibility of melt through. This is talked more in detail in Supplementary Symbols. When this symbol shows it is an indicator that the weld is by design supposed to burn through the back side of the material. This is quite common with sheet metal when the worry of burning a hole or something of the sort is a concern. Melt through may be left as simple as the symbol or it may include a size. This is shown to the left of the symbol and indicates how much penetration past the weld joint is required. This is referred to as melt-through. Another type of weld that is commonly seen with an edge weld is a flare bevel or flare v groove. This is because the opposite side of the edge is exactly that type of configuration. This may be called for on materials that adequate melt through cannot be achieved or an engineer’s request.

textbooks/workforce/Manufacturing/Interpretation_of_Metal_Fab_Drawings_(Moran)/1.10%3A_Edge_Weld_Symbols.txt

Type Process Designation Arc Welding Shielded Metal Arc Welding SMAW Gas Tungsten Arc Welding GTAW Gas Metal Arc Welding GMAW Gas Metal Arc Welding Pulsed GMAW-P Flux Cored Arc Welding Gas Shielded FCAW-G Flux Cored Arc Welding Self Shielded FCAW-S Submerged Arc Welding SAW Plasma Arc Welding PAW Electro slag Welding ESW Electro gas Welding EGW Gas Welding Oxyacetylene Welding OAW Brazing Torch Brazing TB Furnace Brazing FB Induction Brazing IB Cutting Oxyacetylene Cutting OFC-A Air Carbon Arc Cutting CAC-A Plasma Arc Cutting PAC Arc Cutting AC Gas Metal Arc Cutting GMAC Oxygen Cutting OC Gas Tungsten Arc Cutting GTAC There are a lot of processes in the welding industry, in order to streamline the call out of these there are letter designations for them. This designation is a letter callout and it commonly follows the first letter of the process name. For example Flux Cored Arc Welding is FCAW. When a process is specified it will be located in the tail of the welding symbol. This can be added to several other components on the welding symbol. Method The method by which the weld is applied may also be listed in the welding symbol. This will often be seen after a process with a hyphen. There are four different methods of applying a weld and the designation is the first two letters from the first word for the first three. Number Four comes from the first two letters of the hyphenated words. These methods vary depending on process and may not be applicable to all welding processes. Automatic WeldingAU Manual WeldingMA Mechanized WeldingME Semi-Automatic WeldingSA The above image shows a Gas Tungsten Arc Weld process using a Manual method. Also included in the tail could be a reference to a drawing number, a welding procedure (commonly called out as WP,) filler material, or any other pertinent information that may need to be communicated to the welder or fitter. Examples of this information: Drawing Number 5DWG5 Welding Procedure 6WP-6 Gas Tungsten Arc Welding – Manual ER70-s FillerGTAW-MA ER70-s 1.12: Pipe Symbols Pipe Drawings are much different from specific weld symbols but they do have a similar relationship from part to symbol. Some individuals will not see these in their line of work but it is important to be aware of them. As with weld symbols, pipe symbols are a reflection of what that part would look like in theory. For example if a 90 degree elbow is to be placed in service the drawing will reflect a 90 degree angle. There may be multiple symbols for one fitting or part depending on the fashion it is to be installed (Butt weld, Socket Weld, Threaded.) Below is a breakdown of almost every type of fitting and connection. Coordination System Symbols for Isometrics Note: Symbols are shown in black lines. Lighter lines show connected pipe, and are not parts of the symbols. Provided by: www.wermac.org. 1.13: Pipe Drawings Pipe drawings differ from common blueprints one would see in the construction or welding field. The drawings we often see in these fields would be orthographic views which may include top, front, right side, left side, bottom, and back views depending on what is needed to convey information. Pipe drawings are presented in an Isometric view (ISO.) This view is drawn in order to show a pictorial view of what is needed. Commonly these are drawn at a 30 degree angle from the horizontal plane. This can cause some distortion in dimensions so it is imperative that the correct dimensions are shown. The image below shows a orthographic view of a butt welded pipe with three sizes (A, B, C). • The A size is measured from the front to the center line of the elbow / pipe. • The B size is measured from centerline to centerline. • The C size is like the A size, measured from the front to the center line of the elbow / pipe. ORTHOGRAPHIC VIEW (DOUBLE LINE PRESENTATION) ISOMETRIC VIEW Isometric, Plan and Elevation Presentations of a Piping System The image below show the presentation used in drafting. The isometric view clearly show the piping arrangement, but the plan view fails to show the bypass loop and valve, and the supplementary elevation view is needed. Isometric views in more than one plane Below are some examples of isometric drawings. The auxiliary lines in the shape of a cube, ensure better visualization of the pipeline routing. Figure 1 shows a pipeline which runs through three planes. The pipe line begins and ends with a flange. Routing starting point X • pipe runs to the east • pipe runs up • pipe runs to the north • pipe runs to the west • pipe runs down Figure 2 is almost identical to the drawing above. A different perspective is shown, and the pipe that comes from above is longer. Because this pipe in isometric view, runs behind the other pipe, this must be indicated by a break in the line. Routing starting point X • pipe runs to the south • pipe runs up • pipe runs to the west • pipe runs to the north • pipe runs down Figure 3 shows a pipe that runs through three planes and in two planes it make a bow. Routing starting point X • pipe runs to the south • pipe runs up • pipe runs up and to the west • pipe runs up • pipe runs to the west • pipe runs to the north-west • pipe runs to the north Figure 4 shows a pipe that runs through three planes, from one plane to a opposite plane. Routing starting point X • pipe runs to the south • pipe runs up • pipe runs up and to the north-west • pipe runs to the north

textbooks/workforce/Manufacturing/Interpretation_of_Metal_Fab_Drawings_(Moran)/1.11%3A_Process_and_Method.txt

This chapter provides an overview that describes the basic types of hazards threatening the United States and provides definitions for some basic terms such as hazards, emergencies, and disasters. The chapter also provides a brief history of emergency management in the federal government and a general description of the current emergency management system—including the basic functions performed by local emergency managers. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the all-hazards approach and its implications for local emergency management. 01: Introduction to Emergency Management There are many ways to describe emergency management and the importance of the tasks emergency managers perform. Indeed, in some respects, it hardly seems necessary to explain the need for a profession whose purpose is saving lives and property in disasters. It is likely that, while many people recognize their communities are exposed to environmental threats requiring a systematic program of protection, only a few appreciate the magnitude and diversity of the threats. One can introduce the study of emergency management by noting losses from disasters—in the United States and the rest of the world—have been growing over the years and are likely to continue to grow (Berke, 1995; Mileti, 1999; Noji, 1997b). Losses can be measured in a variety of ways—with deaths, injuries, and property damage being the most common indexes. The 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake killed more than 6000 people and left another 30,000 injured. In the previous year, the Northridge, California, earthquake resulted in approximately \$33 billion in damages. These individual events are impressive enough, but the losses are even more dramatic when accumulated over time. Between 1989 and 1999, the average natural disaster loss in the US was \$1 billion each week (Mileti, 1999, p. 5). Furthermore, many costs must be absorbed by victims—whether households, businesses, or government agencies—because only about 17% of losses are insured. Spectacular as they are, these past losses pale in comparison to potential future losses. Major earthquakes in the greater Los Angeles area or in the midwestern New Madrid Seismic Zone, which are only a matter of time, could generate thousands of deaths, tens of thousands of injuries, and tens of billions of dollars in economic losses. Indeed, the daily news seems to suggest the world is plagued by an increasing number and variety of types of disasters, an impression that is certainly heightened by what seem to be frequent, very large scale natural disasters—including earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, volcanic eruptions, and wildfires—all over the globe. When we add to these events a wide range of severe storms, mudslides, lightning strikes, tornadoes, and other hazard agents affecting smaller numbers of people, one might conclude that natural disasters are increasing. Technological activities also initiate disasters. Hazardous materials are transported via road, rail, water, and air. When containment is breached, casualties, property loss, and environmental damage can all occur. Some technologies, such as nuclear power plants, pose seemingly exotic risks, whereas more commonplace technological processes such as metal plating operations use chemical agents that are very dangerous. Even the queen of American technology, the space program, has experienced disaster associated with system failures. Finally, we see terrorists operating on US soil—made forever visible by the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. At times, it seems as if humankind is living out the script of a Greek tragedy, with the natural environment exacting retribution for the exploitation it has suffered and an unforgiving modern technology inflicting a penalty commensurate with the benefits that it provides. Though such a perspective might make fine fiction—disaster movies are recurrent box office successes despite their many major scientific errors—it does not accurately portray events from a scientific and technological view. The natural environment is, of course, not “getting its revenge”. Geophysical, meteorological, and hydrologic processes are unfolding as they have for millennia, beginning long before humans occupied the earth and continuing to the present. Given the eons-long perspective of the natural environment, it would be very difficult to identify meaningful changes in event frequency for the short time period in which scientific records are available on geological, meteorological, and hydrological phenomena. Event frequency, from an emergency management perspective, is not really the issue. It is certainly true that, over the years, more people have been affected by natural disasters and losses are becoming progressively greater. The significant feature driving these observations, however, is the extent of human encroachment into hazard prone areas. With increasing population density and changing land use patterns, more people are exposed to natural hazards and consequently our accumulated human and economic losses are increasing. Much of this exposure is a matter of choice. Sometimes people choose hazardous places, building houses on picturesque cliffs, on mountain slopes, in floodplains, near beautiful volcanoes, or along seismic faults. Sometimes people choose hazardous building materials that fail under extreme environmental stresses—for example, unreinforced masonry construction in seismically active areas. Some exposure results from constrained choices; the cheap land or low rent in flood plains often attracts the poor. The point is that one need not precisely estimate event frequency to understand rising disaster losses in the United States. As Mileti (1999) writes in Disasters by Design, the increasing numbers of humans, our settlement patterns, the density with which we pack together, and our choices of location for homes, work, and recreation place more of us at risk and, when disasters occur, exact an increasing toll. The pattern observed among technological disasters is somewhat different. Certainly more people are affected by technological threats simply because there are more people, and we often make unfortunate choices (as was the case with natural hazards) about our proximity to known technological hazards. However, the nature of the threat from technological sources also appears to be changing. The potential for human loss from technological sources increases with the growth and change of existing technologies and with the development of new technologies. For example, risks are rising from the increasing quantity and variety of hazardous materials used in industry, as well as from energy technologies such as coal and nuclear power plants and liquefied natural gas facilities. Such facilities and the processes they use pose a variety of risks for both employees who work in the facilities and those who live in nearby neighborhoods. Furthermore, as technologies develop it is sometimes found that what was thought not to be hazardous a decade ago does, in fact, have deleterious effects upon health, safety, and the environment. Yet, unlike natural events, advancing technology often produces an improved capability to detect, monitor, control, and repair the release of hazardous materials into the environment. Ultimately, as technologies grow, diversify, and become increasingly integrated into human life, the associated risks also grow. Although terrorism has a long history (Sinclair, 2003), it has been a low priority that only recently become prominent on emergency managers’ lists of threats to their communities (Waugh, 2001). Recent events, especially the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, have made it obvious that the outcomes of at least some terrorist attacks can be considered disasters. Although some consider terrorism to be a hazard, this is not a very useful conceptualization. According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (1996a, p. PH2.11), the Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”. That is to say, terrorism is a strategy, not a hazard agent. Most of the technological hazard agents (chemical, radiological/nuclear, or explosive/flammable) that could threaten American communities in terrorist attacks can also occur by means of accidents. As Winslow (2001) notes, terrorists have typically used explosive agents, sometimes used chemical agents, and have the potential to use radiological or biological agents. Thus, although radiological materials have not yet been used in terrorist attacks, emergency managers should be prepared to respond to their deliberate or accidental release. Similarly, concern has been expressed about terrorist attacks using biological agents, but these can also occur naturally. Biological hazards are normally the concern of public health agencies, but emergency managers should be knowledgeable about them because terrorist attacks involving these agents will require coordination between the two types of agencies. It remains to be seen precisely how terrorism will be fitted into the lexicon of disaster research. Already, definitions of terrorism vary between the academic community and emergency managers (Buck, 1998). Nonetheless, emergency managers must address the consequences of terrorist attacks using the same basic approaches that are used in other emergencies and disasters. One major difference between most terrorist attacks and many other types of disasters such as floods and hurricanes is the uncertainty about the time, place, and magnitude of the event. Advance detection is a prerequisite for forewarning, but experience to date indicates detection accuracy is not high even for the timing of an attack, let alone the place, magnitude, and type (chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, explosive/flammable) of agent involved. At the present, emergency management efforts must focus on prompt detection once an incident has occurred, along with preparedness for a timely response and recovery. Even these strategies are complicated because it is so difficult to anticipate the competence of the terrorists. For example, the Aum Shinrikyo cult’s attempt to disperse the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway during 1995 underscored the importance of agent quality and diffusion effectiveness. Cult members carried bags of the liquid form of the agent onto subway cars and cut the containers as a means of initiating the release. Although Sarin is extremely lethal, the attack resulted in only twelve deaths and approximately 1,046 patients being admitted to hospitals (Reader, 2000). If the Sarin had been effectively aerosolized, the death and injury rates could have been phenomenal. Ultimately, whether terrorism and its consequences are increasing or not seems to be a matter of many factors that defy meaningful measurement at this time. Given the increasing toll from disasters arising from natural hazards, technological accidents, and terrorist attacks using technological agents, American society must decide whether the risks are “acceptable”. Moreover, given the limited amount of time and resources that can be devoted to risk management, decisions must be made about which risks to address (Lowrance, 1976). When individuals, organizations, or political jurisdictions reach consensus that a given risk is unacceptable, resources can be marshaled to reduce the risk to some level deemed more acceptable. Such resources can be used to attempt to eliminate the source of the danger, or, alternatively, change the way people relate to the source of danger. For example, building dams or channeling streams can eliminate the risk of seasonal floods (at least for a time). Alternatively, people and dwellings can be relocated outside the floodplain, or a warning and evacuation system could be devised to provide population protection (but generally not property) in times of acute flood threat. Emergency management is rooted in this process of identifying unacceptable risks, assessing vulnerabilities, and devising strategies for reducing unacceptable risks to more acceptable levels. Of course, emergency managers cannot perform all of these activities by themselves. However, as later chapters will show, they can act as “policy entrepreneurs” that propose strategies and mobilize community support for risk reduction. In general terms, emergency management is “the discipline and profession of applying science, technology, planning and management to deal with extreme events that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive damage to property, and disrupt community life” (Drabek, 1991a, p. xvii). Thus, emergency managers identify, anticipate, and respond to the risks of catastrophic events in order to reduce to more acceptable levels the probability of their occurrence or the magnitude and duration of their social impacts. In the United States, emergency management traditionally has been conceptualized as the job (if not the legal responsibility) of government—local, state and federal. Particularly since the middle of the 20th Century, private business organizations have taken an increasingly active interest in emergency management, especially as it relates to their own business continuity. Certainly as the 21st Century begins, emergency management is best conceived as relying on alliances among all levels of government and the broader private sector (including for-profit and nonprofit organizations with a wide range of missions). Many factors have contributed to the increasing salience of emergency management in American society. One important factor lies in changes in the principle of sovereign immunity at the state level in the last quarter of the 20th Century and the establishment of levels of tort liability for local and state governments (Pine, 1991). Although some levels of immunity persist, it is important that government liability can be established under state and federal law, particularly in cases where negligence (failure to plan where appropriate) can be contended successfully. Another factor promoting the importance and visibility of the emergency management is the professionalization of emergency managers. A recognition of the need for specialized training and development for emergency managers has led to the establishment of professional associations, the use of training certifications (e.g. technician certificates for hazardous materials and emergency medical expertise, and general certificates in incident management systems), and of professional credentialing processes such as the Certified Emergency Manager program promoted by the International Association of Emergency Managers. These developments have contributed to the growth of an organized body of specialists who understand how to appraise and cope with a range of environmental threats. Still a third factor is a growing sensitivity to hazards on the part of the public-at-large that is driven by media attention to periodic catastrophes associated with the forces of nature and technology. Finally, private businesses have become increasingly sensitive to the fact that disaster losses can have significant negative consequences on business plans and performance, sometimes forcing bankruptcy, closure, or the loss of significant market share (Lindell & Perry, 1998). With such significant potential consequences, vulnerability assessment and disaster preparedness have become both imbedded in business planning and thriving businesses in themselves. Collectively, these factors have generated a social environment in which governments' ethical and legal obligations to protect citizens, and private sector interest in self-protection, have attracted attention to emergency management.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/01%3A_Introduction_to_Emergency_Management/1.01%3A_Introduction.txt

Over the centuries, there have been four fundamental theories about disasters. These four theories have conceived of disasters as: · Acts of fate/acts of God, · Acts of nature, · Joint effects of nature and society, and · Social constructions. Acts of Fate/Acts of God For millennia, disasters were considered to arise from impersonal and uncontrollable forces—either from unfortunate alignments of stars and planets or as acts of God that were beyond human understanding. Both forms of this theory viewed a disaster as predetermined and, thus, completely beyond the victim’s control. A variation on this theory was that disasters were cosmic or divine retribution for human failings—personal disasters for personal failings and collective disasters for societal failings. Acts of Nature Over time, increased scientific knowledge led many people to substitute natural causes for supernatural ones. Thus, floods occurred because the large amount of rainfall from a severe storm exceeded the soil’s capacity to absorb it. The rapid runoff exceeded the river basin’s capacity, so the excess spilled over the river banks, flooded buildings, and drowned people and animals. Accordingly, the term natural disaster came to refer to “an outside attack upon social systems that ‘broke down’ in the face of such an assault from outside” (Quarantelli, 1998, p. 266). The resulting conception of man against nature has been especially potent as the driving force behind attempts to “tame” rivers by straightening their channels and building dams and levees. Interactive Effects of Nature and Society Still later, it was proposed that hazards arise from the interaction of a physical event system and a human use system. Thus, it takes both a hazardous physical event system and a vulnerable human use system to produce disasters. If either one is missing, disasters do not occur. According to Carr (1932, p. 211) Not every windstorm, earth-tremor, or rush of water is a catastrophe. [S]o long as the levees hold, there is no disaster. It is the collapse of the cultural protections that constitutes the disaster proper. According to this view, human societies adapt to the prevailing environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, wind speed, precipitation, seismic activity) at a given location. Unfortunately, they fail to anticipate the variation in those environmental conditions. Consequently, their adaptation to normal conditions usually is inadequate for extreme events—blizzards, heat waves, tornadoes, hurricanes, and floods. This perspective is perhaps best illustrated by earthquake damage and casualties. As earthquake engineers are fond of saying, earthquakes don’t kill people, collapsing buildings kill people. According to this view, people can avoid disasters if they stay out of seismically active locations or, if they do move there, they must build structures that resist the extreme environmental events that will eventually occur. Social Constructions Most recently, researchers have recognized that disasters are quite systematic in the types of people they harm, as well as the types of geographic locations and human use systems they strike. To the interactive effects theory’s concerns about hazard exposure at specific locations and physical vulnerability of specific structures, social construction theory calls attention to the social vulnerability of specific population segments. To say that hazard vulnerability is socially constructed does not mean people are vulnerable because they think the wrong thoughts—as most people would now categorize the belief that floods are caused by the alignment of the planets and stars. Rather, socially vulnerable population segments emerge because our psychological, demographic, economic, and political processes tend to produce them. Of course these processes have produced many good things. Many residents of the US, in particular, have good jobs, comfortable lives, and we have enjoyed one of the most democratic governments in the world. Nonetheless, all of these conditions have changed over time—life now is much improved from what it was a century ago and there are many ways in which it can be improved still further. Of particular concern to emergency managers should be the many ways in which our institutions can reduce the hazard vulnerability of those who have the least psychological resilience, social support, political power, and are the poorest economically. Theoretical Comparisons These theories have, in one sense, succeeded each other over time as scholars have found later theories to provide a better account of the data from their research. However, scientific acceptance is different from popular acceptance. Each of the four theories is currently believed by at least some members of society. Indeed, the most cynical version of the Acts of fate/acts of God theory uses it to avoid responsibility for actions that are substantially within human control. For example, representatives of the coal company that built a dam across Buffalo Creek West Virginia claimed the dam’s collapse was an “Act of God” because the dam was “incapable of holding the water God poured into it” (Erikson, 1976, p. 19). This was clearly a feeble attempt to avoid admitting the company negligently built a non-engineered dam from unstable materials, thus risking the lives of downstream residents to maintain company profits. Each community throughout the world probably has at least some believers in each theory. Because each theory has different implications for environmental hazard management, the prevalence of each theory has significant implications for policy at the local, state, national, and international levels.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/01%3A_Introduction_to_Emergency_Management/1.02%3A_Fundamental_Theories_of_Diaster.txt

Hazards, emergencies, and disasters afflicted human societies much longer than either the profession of emergency management or academic disaster research has existed. Thus, many vernacular terms have arisen that refer to the negative consequences of environmental events—accident, emergency, crisis, disaster, catastrophe, tragedy, and calamity, to name a few. Over the years, many of these terms have become embedded in the American vocabulary, often introduced through the mass media or literary usage. As such events have become the focus of academic study and professional emergency management, it has also become necessary to devise technical—as opposed to vernacular—meanings for them to communicate a standardized meaning for each of these terms. For the purposes of this introduction to emergency management, it is important to distinguish the meaning of three terms: hazards, disasters, and emergencies. Hazards The environment humans occupy consists of natural and technological components, each of which contains elements that pose a variety of risks to the human occupants and their property. These risks include both health and safety dangers for the occupants themselves and dangers to the physical or material culture created by the occupants. The risks arise from the intrusion of the human use system into natural and technological processes. The term hazard captures the notion that, to the extent that people co-exist with powerful natural and man-made processes, there is a non-zero probability that the natural variation in these processes will produce extreme events having very negative consequences (Burton, Kates & White, 1993; Cutter, 2001). The human danger posed by these hazards varies with the level of human intrusion and the knowledge and technology associated with the hazard (Lindell & Perry, 1992). Tsunami (seismic sea waves) hazard is nonexistent in Ames, Iowa, because human occupancy at that location is so far from the runup zones near the ocean shore, but tsunami hazard is very significant along the Pacific coast—especially the Hawaiian islands. Hazards are inherently probabilistic; they represent the potential for extreme environmental events to occur. Thus, hurricane hazard refers to the potential for hurricanes to affect a given location. Hurricane hazard does not describe the condition when a hurricane strikes a coastal community causing death, injury, and property destruction. Of course, to achieve long-term survival, humans must adjust to or accommodate both natural and man-made processes in some fashion. The classic definition of hazard adjustment focuses upon the modification of human behavior (broadly speaking, to include even settlement patterns) or the modification of environmental features to enable people to live in a given place (or with a given technology) under prevailing conditions (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Emergencies The term emergency is commonly used in two slightly different but closely related ways. The first usage of the term refers to an event involving a minor consequences for a community—perhaps a few casualties and a limited amount of property damage. In this sense, emergencies are events that are frequently experienced, relatively well understood, and can be managed successfully with local resources—sometimes with the resources of a single local government agency. Emergencies are the common occurrences we see uniformed responders managing—car crashes, ruptured natural gas pipelines, house fires, traumatic injuries, and cardiac crises. They are managed via (usually government, but sometimes private) organizations with specially trained, specially equipped personnel. One commonly associates emergencies with fire departments, police departments, and emergency medical services (EMS) organizations. These events are “routine” in the sense that they are well understood and, thus, elicit standardized response protocols and specialized equipment (Quarantelli, 1987). Nonetheless, it is important to understand each emergency can present unique elements; experts caution there is no such thing as a “routine” house fire. The belief that each new fire will be like all the previous ones has a high probability of producing firefighter deaths and injuries (Brunacini, 2002). The second usage of the term emergencies refers to the imminence of an event rather than the severity of its consequences. In this context, an emergency is a situation in which there is a higher than normal probability of an extreme event occurring. For example, a September hurricane approaching a coastal community creates an emergency because the probability of casualties and damage is much greater than it was in March before hurricane season began. The urgency of the situation requires attention and, at some point, action to minimize the impacts if the hurricane should strike. Unlike the previous usage of the term emergency, the event has not occurred but the consequences are not likely to be minor and routine methods of response are unlikely to be effective if the event does occur. Disaster The term disaster is reserved for the actual occurrence of events that produce casualties and damage at a level exceeding a community’s ability to cope. As Table $\ref(1) |) indicates, a disaster involves a very specific combination of event severity and time/probability. Unlike the uncertain time of impact associated with a hazard (whether or not the impact would exceed community resources), a disaster reflects the actuality of an event whose consequences exceed a community’s resources. Unlike imminent emergencies, the consequences have occurred; unlike routine emergencies having minor impacts, disasters involve severe consequences for the community. By extension, a catastrophe is an event that exceeds the resources of many local jurisdictions—in some cases crippling those jurisdictions’ emergency response capacity and disrupting the continuity of other local government operations. Hurricane Katrina’s destruction of the local emergency response agencies and disruption of other local government agencies in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama certainly qualifies for this designation. Prince’s (1920) study of an explosion in Halifax, Nova Scotia was the first modern piece of disaster research, but it was twelve years later that Carr (1932) made the first attempt at a formal definition of disaster. Presently, disaster is commonly defined as a nonroutine event in time and space, producing human, property, or environmental damage, whose remediation requires the use of resources from outside the directly affected community. This definition captures the two features that are minimally (and traditionally) cited as features of disasters: they are out of the ordinary events whose consequences are substantial enough to require that extra-community resources be marshaled to respond to and recover from the impact (Quarantelli, 1984; Perry, 1991; Tierney, Lindell & Perry, 2001). There are many different definitions of disaster present in the professional and academic literature, but most of them include the dimensions listed in this definition. In addition, some of the other definitions specify the mechanism that generates the event such as acts of God, social injustice, acts of nature, aspects of social organization, etc. As will be discussed later in this chapter, there are important distinctions to be made among different types of disasters and the ways in which emergency management strategies vary with the source of the disaster (Drabek, 1997). Whether one believes God, nature, social injustice, or purposeful encroachment produce disasters certainly affects the attitude we express toward victims. The academic community, in particular, is still debating the details of such distinctions and consensus about the specific details of different meanings is still developing (Quarantelli, 1998). However, in the profession of emergency management, the focus is typically on the assumption that disasters are caused by the overlap of human use systems with natural and technological processes and the charge is to minimize the negative consequences. At least on this applied level, emergency managers can operate on a concise definition of disasters, while remaining cognizant that the concept can be extended in a variety of ways and has myriad dimensions. Table \( 1$. Relationships Among Hazards, Emergencies, Disasters, and Catastrophes. Time/probability Uncertain Imminent Occurred Demand compared to community capacity Less than Hazard Emergency Emergency Greater than Hazard Emergency Disaster/catastrophe

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/01%3A_Introduction_to_Emergency_Management/1.03%3A_Hazards_Emergencies_Disasters_and_Catastrophes.txt

Most hazard/disaster researchers and emergency managers would probably agree that it presumes much to claim that an integrated emergency management system exists in the United States. Certainly this is so if by an integrated system one means a well-defined and clearly differentiated structure of components with mutually agreed upon roles interacting over time in a coordinated manner to achieve common goals (see Katz & Kahn, 1978, for a discussion of the systems perspective on organizations). However, there is a loosely-coupled collection of organizations that perform relatively differentiated roles in planning for, responding to, and recovering from disasters. Indeed, a basic understanding of the emergency management system and the demands that shape it has existed only since the late 1970s. Even this basic conception of emergency management continues to change and the rudiments of what may yet become an integrated system for managing emergencies continues to evolve. Clearly, even after the intense efforts to enhance the system after the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, much of what currently exists remains both fragmented and incomplete. In many respects, the old adage that “disasters are a local problem” seems as true now as it was thirty years ago (Perry, 1979). What is different today is the fact that there is a greater degree of consensus regarding how to assess and respond to the risks of natural and technological hazards. Concomitantly, there appears to be increasing agreement regarding the goals and structures by which federal, state, and local governments work with private organizations and the general public to develop an integrated emergency management system. By focusing upon an ideal emergency management system, the current state of the art, imperfect as it may be, can be described and placed into historical perspective. Since the primary aim here is to describe rather than evaluate, the purpose of the following section is to provide a picture of the organizations comprising the system as it has changed over time. To some extent, the discussion will include what might be with respect to an emergency management system as well as what is. Consequently, instances will be noted in which organizational links are tenuous at best and where functions assigned to agencies (particularly at the federal level) are minimally fulfilled or in some cases completely ignored. What follows, then, is an attempt to describe in a very short space what is really a very complex and extensive constellation of agencies, programs, and interrelationships. Although the limited space available here requires compressing and simplifying many complex issues, the next two sections will describe the history of emergency management organizations, followed by a discussion of the functions that comprise emergency management. A Brief History of Federal Emergency Management Since the founding of the United States, the responsibility for and the locus of emergency and disaster management has moved from one agency to another within the federal government (and the same is true for many state and local governments). Except for two pieces of legislation, however, very little systematic work was done that resembles modern emergency management until the 1930s. Drabek (1991b, p. 6) reports that the first national disaster management effort was the 1803 Fire Disaster Relief Act, which made funds available to help the city of Portsmouth and the state of New Hampshire recover from extensive fires. The next piece of legislation came 125 years later when the Lower Mississippi Flood Control Act of 1928 was passed as a means of responding to the lower Mississippi River flooding in 1927 (Platt, 1998, p.38). It is important to note that both of these pieces of early legislation followed a disaster and were aimed at supporting recovery because this is a pattern that has been continued to the present day. An emphasis on reconstruction after disaster has characterized emergency response efforts at the federal level even in the 21st Century. Federal disaster management, if we characterize it as concerted attempts to manage the negative consequences of natural forces, really began when President Franklin Roosevelt created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1933 and authorized it to make loans for repairing public buildings damaged by earthquakes (Drabek, 1991b). In addition, many New Deal social programs provided services and various types of financial aid to natural disaster victims. Aside from individual programs, the National Emergency Council operated within the White House between 1933 and 1939, primarily to cope with the Great Depression, but also to oversee natural disaster relief. The Flood Control Act of 1936 established the Army Corps of Engineers as an important agency in the management of American waterways. In 1939, when the worst part of the Great Depression had begun to subside, the National Emergency Council was moved to the Executive Office of the President and renamed the Office for Emergency Management. Natural disaster relief continued to be centered in this agency, which functioned as a crisis management team for national scale threats of various types. The beginning of World War II demanded the full attention of the Roosevelt administration in much the same way as the Depression had previously. In addition to its responsibilities for natural hazards, the Office for Emergency Management became the President’s agency for developing civil defense plans and addressing war-related emergencies on the home front. Many programs devised by the Office for Emergency Management were based in the Department of War, under the Office of Civil Defense (directed by Fiorello La Guardia). This office was abolished in 1945, leaving the Office for Emergency Management again as the principal federal emergency agency (Yoshpe, 1981, p.72). Following World War II, President Harry Truman initially resisted pressures to establish another civil defense agency, believing that civil defense should be the responsibility of the states (Perry, 1982). An Office of Civil Defense Planning was created in 1948 under the year-old Defense Department, and the Office for Emergency Management was again left to concentrate on natural disasters and other domestic emergencies. This separation of planning for civil defense versus natural and domestic disasters continued for nearly two years, but has reappeared over the decades with subsequent reorganizations of federal efforts. After the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in the summer of 1949, Truman relented and created the Federal Civil Defense Administration within the Executive Office of the President as a successor to the Office for Emergency Management. Responsibility for federal assistance in the case of major natural disasters became the responsibility of the Housing and Home Finance Administration. Legislation quickly followed with the passage of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (Blanchard, 1986, p. 2). It is noteworthy that this legislation continued to assign responsibility for civil defense and disasters to the states and attempted to spell out specific federal obligations. At the end of President Truman’s administration on January 16, 1953, Executive Order 10427 removed natural disaster relief responsibility from Housing and Home Finance and added it to FCDA (Yoshpe, 1981, p.166). This arrangement of functions and agencies persisted through both Eisenhower administrations, though the primary agency name changed first to the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization and then to the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization. The Office of Civil Defense Mobilization was the first emergency organization to be given independent agency status (in 1958) rather than being under another cabinet department or the White House. On the policy side, the Federal Civil Defense Act was amended in 1958 to make civil defense a joint responsibility of the federal government and state and local governments. This amendment also provided for federal matching of state and local government civil defense expenditures, which actually began to be funded in 1961 under the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Thus, the Kennedy era saw the first rapid expansion of civil defense agencies at the state and local level. President Kennedy again separated federal responsibility for domestic disasters and civil defense in 1961 when he created the Office of Emergency Planning (in the White House) and the Office of Civil Defense (in the Defense Department). Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, moved the OCD to the Department of the Army in 1964, signaling a reduction in importance (and funding) for this function. This general separation of functions was maintained until 1978, although the Office of Civil Defense became the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in 1972. Beginning with the creation of the Office of Emergency Preparedness under the Executive Office of the President in 1968, programs dealing with natural and technological hazards began to be reconstituted and parceled out among a variety of federal agencies. For example, the Federal Insurance Administration was established in 1968 as part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. In 1973, President Richard M. Nixon dismantled the Office of Emergency Preparedness and assigned responsibility for post-disaster relief and reconstruction to the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. General management and oversight of federal programs was assigned to the Office of Preparedness, which was moved to the General Services Administration and, in 1975, became the Federal Preparedness Agency. Throughout the 1970s, as new federal legislation or executive orders mandated federal government concern with different aspects of natural and man-made hazards, new programs were created within a variety of federal offices and agencies. These were included in the Department of Commerce’s National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program (1973) and the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration (1974). Following the 1972 havoc wreaked by Hurricane Agnes, the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 was passed granting individual and family assistance to disaster victims (administered through the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration). In the late 1970s, four major programs were established within the Executive Office of the President: Dam Safety Coordination, Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, Warning and Emergency Broadcast System, and Consequences Management in Terrorism. Other technological hazards programs also involved such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Departments of Energy and Transportation. This diffuse assignment of responsibilities for emergency management programs to a diverse set of federal agencies persisted through the late 1970s and, as time passed, created a growing concern in the executive branch and the Congress that federal programs for disaster management were too fragmented. Similar concerns by state and local governments became the focus of the National Governors’ Association (NGA) Disaster Project in the late 1970s. The project’s staff traced many state and local problems in emergency management back to federal administrative arrangements. They argued that federal fragmentation hampered effective preparedness planning and response, masked duplicate efforts, and made national preparedness a very expensive enterprise. The Director of the Federal Preparedness Agency, General Leslie W. Bray, acknowledged that when the emergency preparedness function was taken out of the Executive Office of the President and assigned sub-agency status, many people perceived that the function had been downgraded to a lower priority, and his job of coordinating became more complicated. The states argued that their job of responding to disasters was hampered by being forced to coordinate with so many federal agencies. In 1975, a study of these issues sponsored by the Joint Committee on Defense Production (1976, p. 27) concluded: The civil preparedness system as it exists today is fraught with problems that seriously hamper its effectiveness even in peacetime disasters. . . It is a system where literally dozens of agencies, often with duplicate, overlapping, and even conflicting responsibilities, interact. In addition to the administrative and structural difficulties, there was also concern the scope of the functions performed as part of emergency management was too narrow, too many resources were devoted to post-disaster response and recovery, and too few resources devoted to the disaster prevention. When the federal response to the nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile Island was severely criticized, calls for reorganization became very loud (Perry, 1982). Responding to these concerns in 1978, President Jimmy Carter initiated a process of reorganizing federal agencies charged with emergency planning, response, and recovery. This reorganization resulted in the creation, in 1979, of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), whose director reported directly to the President of the United States. Far from being an entirely new organization, FEMA was a consolidation of the major federal disaster agencies and programs. Most of FEMA’s administrative apparatus came from combining the three largest disaster agencies: the Federal Preparedness Agency, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, and Federal Disaster Assistance Administration. Thirteen separate hazard-relevant programs were moved to FEMA, including most of the programs and offices created in the 1970s (Drabek, 1991b). These moves gave FEMA responsibility for nearly all federal emergency programs of any size, including civil defense, warning dissemination for severe weather threats, hazard insurance, fire prevention and control, dam safety coordination, emergency broadcast and warning system, earthquake hazard reduction, terrorism, and technological hazards planning and response. Where FEMA did not absorb a program in its entirety, interagency agreements were developed giving FEMA coordinating responsibility. These agreements included such agencies as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Transportation (DOT), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). At least on paper, the Executive Order made FEMA the focal point for all federal efforts in emergency management. Although FEMA remained the designated federal lead agency in most cases, there were 12 other independent agencies with disaster responsibilities. The EPA is the largest of these agencies, but others included the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), NRC, Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). Because disaster related federal relief programs were so scattered through the government, many small programs remained in their home agencies. For example, the Emergency Hay and Grazing program allows federal officials to authorize the harvesting of hay for emergency feed from land assigned for conservation and environmental uses under the Conservation Reserve Program. This program is operated in the Farm Service Agency of the US Department of Agriculture. Ultimately, some emergency or disaster related programs remained in thirteen cabinet level departments, including Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation and Treasury. Certainly the creation of FEMA moved federal emergency management to a much more central position than it had ever been given previously, but it was not possible to completely consolidate all federal programs and offices within the new agency. The FEMA Director is appointed by the President of the United States and, until the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, was part of the cabinet. The organization has a regional structure composed of ten offices throughout the United States plus two larger area offices. Although by far the most comprehensive effort, the establishment of FEMA represented the third time that all federal disaster efforts and functions were combined; the first was the National Emergency Council (1933-1939), followed by the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization (1958-1961). The early history of FEMA was dominated by attempts to define its mission and organize its own bureaucracy. John Macy, the agency’s first director, was faced with organizational consolidation as a most pressing task: converting thirty separate nation-wide offices to 16 and eight Washington, D.C. offices to five (Macy, 1980). Ultimately, creating a single bureaucracy (with a \$630 million budget) from thirteen entrenched organizations proved to be a herculean task. The efforts to obtain an optimal structure for FEMA continued over the next two decades; later directors undertook major reorganizations of headquarters and FEMA’s mission, like its structure, continued to evolve. The early years of FEMA saw much significant legislation and activity. In 1979, the NGA Disaster Project published the first statement of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM, the notion that authorities should develop a capacity to manage all phases of all types of disasters), and the concept was subsequently adopted by both the NGA and FEMA. In 1980, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was amended to emphasize crisis relocation of population (evacuation of people from cities to areas less likely to be Soviet nuclear targets), signaling a fundamental change in US civil defense strategy. Also in 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (called the Superfund Law) was passed, precipitated by the 1978 dioxin contamination of Love Canal, New York (Rubin, Renda-Tanali & Cumming, 2006—www.disaster-timeline.com). In 1983, FEMA adopted the concept of Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS) as part of the strategy for achieving CEM (Blanchard, 1986; Drabek, 1985). The basic notion was to identify generic emergency functions—applicable across a variety of hazards—and develop modules to be used where and when appropriate. For example, population evacuation is a useful protective technique in the case of hurricanes, floods, nuclear power plant accidents, or a wartime attack (Perry, 1985). Similar generic utility exists is developing systems for population warning, interagency communication, victim sheltering, and other functions. Thus, in the early 1980s, FEMA was formed, shaped by organizational growing pains, and also shaped through the adoption of new philosophies of emergency management. While FEMA’s basic charge of developing a strategy and capability to manage all phases of all types of environmental hazards remained, the precise definitions of hazards, the basic conception of emergency management, and the organizational arrangements through which its mission should be accomplished continued to evolve through the end of the 20th Century. The end of the 1980s saw passage of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA Title III) in 1986 (Lindell & Perry, 2001) and President Ronald Reagan’s Presidential Policy Guidance (1987) that became the last gasp of nuclear attack related civil defense programs in the United States (Blanchard, 1986). Passage of the Robert Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 again boosted state and local emergency management efforts. The Stafford Act established federal cost sharing for planning and public assistance (family grants and housing). The 1990s opened with controversy for FEMA. In 1989, FEMA response to Hurricane Hugo was criticized as inept—a charge repeated in 1992 when Hurricane Andrew struck Florida. In 1993, flooding in the mid-western US caused more than 15 billion dollars in damage and resulted in six states receiving federal disaster declarations. President Clinton appointed James Lee Witt Director of FEMA in 1993, marking the only time a professional emergency manager held the post. Witt (1995) aggressively increased the federal emergency management emphasis on hazard mitigation and began a reorganization effort. Prior to this time, the federal emphasis had been largely upon emergency response and, to a lesser extent, short-term disaster recovery. Witt began the first real change in federal strategy since emergency management efforts had begun. By the close of the 1990s, FEMA’s organization reflected its critical functions. In 1997, there were seven directorates within FEMA: Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery, the Federal Insurance Administration, the United States Fire Administration, Information Technology Services, and Operations Support (Witt, 1997). As the 21st Century began, the overall emphasis of FEMA remained mitigation and both comprehensive emergency management and integrated emergency management systems remained concepts in force. The most recent epoch in American emergency management began on September 11, 2001, when the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon shocked Americans and challenged government disaster response capabilities. The attack initiated a comprehensive rethinking of “security”, “emergencies”, and the appropriate role of the federal government. During October, 2001, President George W. Bush used Executive Orders to create the Office of Homeland Security (appointing Governor Tom Ridge as Director) and the Office of Combating Terrorism (General Wayne Downing as Director). On October 29th, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 1 (HSPD-1), establishing the Homeland Security Council, chaired by the President. In June of 2002, President Bush submitted his proposal to Congress to establish a cabinet level Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was passed later that year. Since the establishment of DHS, the department’s mission has encompassed three goals: preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and recovering rapidly from terrorist attacks (Bush, 2002, p. 8). Although not reflected in the mission statement, DHS would also retain the all hazards responsibilities assigned to FEMA. As was the case in the establishment of FEMA over two decades earlier, DHS incorporated a variety of agencies and programs from many cabinet-level departments, including Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Interior, Justice, and Treasury. The US Secret Service reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security, as does the Coast Guard. The line agencies of DHS comprise four Directorates. The Border and Transportation Security Directorate incorporated the Customs Service from the Department of Treasury, Immigration and Naturalization Service from the Department of Justice, Federal Protective Service, the Transportation Security Agency from the Department of Transportation, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center from the Department of Treasury, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service from the Department of Agriculture, and Office of Domestic Preparedness from the Department of Justice. The Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate was built around FEMA and also included the Strategic National Stockpile and National Disaster Medical System of the Department of Health and Human Services, Nuclear Incident Response Team from the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice’s Domestic Emergency Support Teams, and the FBI National Domestic Preparedness Office. The Science and Technology Directorate incorporates the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Programs and the Environmental Measurements Laboratory from the Department of Energy, the National BW Defense Analysis Center from the Department of Defense, and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center from the Department of Agriculture. Finally, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate absorbed the Federal Computer Incident Response Center from the General Services Administration, the National Communications System from the Department of Defense, the National Infrastructure Protection center from the FBI, and the Energy Security and Assurance Program from the Department of Energy. Since 2001, the President has issued additional HSPDs defining the fundamental policies governing homeland security operations (www.dhs.gov/dhspublic). Thirteen HSPDs were issued through mid-2006. Recent documents have established the National Incident Management System (HSPD-5), the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSPD-3), the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (HSPD-6), and a common identification standard for all federal employees (HSPD-12). Other documents proposed strategies to combat weapons of mass destruction (HSPD-4), protect critical infrastructure (HSPD-7) and the agriculture and food system (HSPD-9), coordinate incident response (HSPD-8), and enhance protection from biohazards (HSPD-10). In addition, these documents have established policies for protecting international borders from illegal immigration (HSPD-2), promoting terrorist-related screening (HSPD-11), and securing maritime activities (HSPD-13). These developments make it clear that the President and the Congress consider homeland security to be much broader than emergency management. Incorporation of FEMA into DHS’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate seems to imply FEMA is responsible only for preparedness and response (and perhaps disaster recovery if this is viewed as an extension of the emergency response phase). Consistent with this line of reasoning, one can interpret the mission of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate and the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate in terms of incident prevention. This gives these directorates responsibilities analogous to what emergency managers call hazard mitigation. Even so, the DHS organization chart seems to indicate a significant loss in the priority given to mitigation of natural and accidental technological hazards.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/01%3A_Introduction_to_Emergency_Management/1.04%3A_The_Development_and_Tasks_of_the_Emergency_Management_System.txt

Before discussing the tasks that constitute emergency management, it is important to briefly ground the discussion in the process of accomplishing emergency management. There have been years of dialogue regarding “who really does emergency management”. Although the history just reviewed focuses largely on federal efforts, it is both accurate and appropriate to conceive of emergency management as a local endeavor to influence events with local consequences. This is in keeping with FEMA’s practice of attempting to make US emergency management a “bottom up” proposition. Of course, the job can be done optimally only with intergovernmental communication and cooperation that links local, state, and federal efforts. In some cases—for example, biological threats—the full resources of the federal government are needed to even begin the management process. Certainly in a major incident, external support (particularly state and federal) of many forms is made available to local jurisdictions. There is an inevitable time lag, however; currently the National Response Plan alerts local communities they must plan to operate without external help for approximately 72 hours after disaster impact. In addition, when external support does arrive, the response proceeds most efficiently and effectively if there is a strong, locally devised structure in place into which external resources can be integrated (Perry, 1985). Taking these realities into account, the tasks of emergency management can be discussed more effectively if there is a structure into which to fit the discussion. The Local Emergency Management System Figure $\ref{1}$ describes the elements of a local emergency management system with some of its intergovernmental connections. By reviewing the figure, one can place in context some of the tasks and the tools available for emergency management. This chart is not intended to capture all actors and processes but, rather, to indicate the critical elements in the emergency management system. Ultimately, of course, the processes and tasks described here take place at every level of government. The process of emergency management should be based on a careful hazard/vulnerability analysis (HVA) that identifies the hazards to which a community is exposed, estimates probabilities of event occurrence, and projects the likely consequences for different geographic areas, population segments, and economic sectors (Greenway, 1998; Ketchum & Whittaker, 1982). It is important to emphasize that HVA is not a static activity because hazards are not static. HVA is probably best conceptualized as a process that periodically reassesses the hazard environment so emergency managers can facilitate the challenging process of deciding which hazards are significant enough to require active management. This is a complex process that involves myriad considerations and input from a variety of actors; more detailed descriptions of this process are available in the work of Birkland (1997) and Prater and Lindell (2000). Figure $1$: Local Emergency Management System. Hazard management decisions are influenced by multiple considerations. There are statutory and administrative mandates to manage certain hazards. The available hazard data, derived from national sources such as FEMA’s Multi-Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1997) and supplemented by local sources such as Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), are also critical components of the decision process. In addition, decisions to manage hazards are determined by state and federal resources, local resources (including the jurisdiction’s budget), and the local resource allocation priorities. Once a decision has been made to actively manage one or more hazards, three processes are initiated concurrently. The first is a hazard management planning process that examines mitigation and preparedness strategies. That is, the community must consider whether it is possible to eliminate a risk or reduce it through some emergency management strategy. At the local level, these deliberations involve not just emergency managers but also departments of land use planning, building construction, engineering, public works, public health, and elected officials because mitigation and preparedness actions require significant commitments of resources to reduce community hazard vulnerability. At the same time, the process of judging hazard impact begins, using much of the same technical hazard data to create strategies and acquire resources for response and recovery when a disaster strikes. The local response usually centers on preparations for the mobilization of local emergency services (fire department, EMS, hazardous materials teams, police, transportation and public works departments, and emergency managers) under an agreed upon incident management system (Brunacini, 2001; Kramer & Bahme, 1992). Both response and recovery activities are organized in conjunction with support from external sources, particularly the state and federal government. The purpose of this planning process is to institutionalize emergency response as much as possible while looking at disaster recovery as another path to sustainability or disaster resilience (in addition to mitigation). The third process to be initiated is environmental monitoring for the hazards to be managed. Typically, such monitoring is coupled with a warning system whose activation initiates response actions when disaster impact is imminent. The quality of the warning system depends upon the state of technology associated with the hazards to which the community is exposed and could provide days (in the case of hurricanes or riverine flooding) or minutes (in the case of tornadoes) of forewarning (Sorensen, 2000). The nature of the warning system is also affected by jurisdictional mitigation, preparedness, and response plans. In many cases, hazard monitoring is beyond the technical and financial capability of most communities and assumed by federal agencies and programs. In such cases—tsunamis, for example—the results of the monitoring program are relayed to local jurisdictions. Furthermore, information regarding the state of the warning system (its ability to accurately forecast and detect hazards) is shared with hazard planning systems as a means of informing longer term risk management plans. The community planning process generates hazard management strategies that incorporate knowledge about hazards derived from many sources, including the scientific community and state and federal agencies. The resulting hazard management strategies can be categorized as hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery. As will be discussed in greater detail below, mitigation seeks to control the hazard source, prevent the hazard agent from striking developed areas, limiting development in hazard prone areas, or strengthening structures against the hazard agent. These community hazard management strategies must be individually implemented by households and businesses, or collectively implemented by government agencies acting on behalf of the entire community. The individual strategies only reduce the vulnerability of a single household or business. These generally involve simple measures to mitigate hazards by elevating structures above expected flood heights, developing household or business emergency response plans, and purchasing hazard insurance. The collective strategies are generally complex—and expensive—technological systems that protect entire communities. Thus, they mitigate hazards through community protection works such as dams and levees and prepare for hazard impacts through measures such as installing warning systems and expanding highways to facilitate rapid evacuation. Collective hazard adjustments are relatively popular because they permit continued development of hazard prone areas, yet do not impose any constraints on individual households or businesses. In addition, their cost is spread over the entire community and often buried in the overall budget. Indeed, the cost is often unknowingly subsidized by taxpayers in other communities. For this reason, these collective hazard adjustments are often called “technological fixes”. By contrast, individual hazard adjustments strategies require changes in households’ and businesses’ land use practices and building construction practices. Such changes require one of three types of motivational tactics—incentives, sanctions, or risk communication. Incentives provide extrinsic rewards for compliance with community policies. That is, they offer positive inducements that add to the inherent positive consequences of a hazard adjustment or offset the inherent negative consequences of that hazard adjustment. Incentives are used to provide immediate extrinsic rewards when the inherent rewards are delayed or when people must incur a short-term cost to obtain a long-term benefit. For example, incentives are used to encourage people to buy flood insurance by subsidizing the premiums. Sanctions provide extrinsic punishments for noncompliance with community policies. That is, they offer negative inducements that add to the inherent negative consequences of a hazard adjustment or offset the inherent positive consequences of that hazard adjustment. Sanctions are used to provide immediate extrinsic punishments when the inherent punishments are delayed or when people incur a short-term benefit that results in a long-term cost. For example, sanctions are used to prevent developers from building in hazard prone areas or using unsafe construction materials and methods. The establishment of incentives and sanctions involves using the political process to adopt a policy and the enforcement of incentives and sanctions requires an effective implementation program (Lindell & Perry, 2004). By contrast, risk communication seeks to change households’ and businesses’ practices for land use, building construction, and contents protection by pointing out the intrinsic consequences of their behavior. That is, risk communication explains specifically what are the personal risks associated with risk area occupancy and also the hazard adjustments that can be taken to reduce hazard vulnerability. With this overview, discussion can be turned to the four principal functions or phases of emergency management: hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery. Much of the development and systematization of this four-fold typology may be traced to the efforts of the NGA’s Emergency Management Project. As this group grappled with what it means to manage emergencies, it generated considerable discussion and some controversy within both the disaster research and emergency management communities. Since being adopted by FEMA, it is now widely accepted as an appropriate model for understanding the activities of emergency management. This scheme consolidates emergency activities into four discrete but interconnected categories distinguished by their time of occurrence in relation to disaster impact. Mitigation and preparedness activities are generally seen as taking place before the impact of any given disaster, whereas response and recovery activities are seen as post-impact measures. Hazard mitigation Hazard mitigation activities are directed toward eliminating the causes of a disaster, reducing the likelihood of its occurrence, or limiting the magnitude of its impacts if it does occur. Officially, FEMA defines mitigation as “any action of a long-term, permanent nature that reduces the actual or potential risk of loss of life or property from a hazardous event” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1998a, p. 9). This definition is somewhat ambiguous because it encompasses the development of forecast and warning systems, evacuation route systems, and other pre-impact actions that are designed to develop a capability for active response to an imminent threat. Thus, Lindell and Perry (2000) contended the defining characteristic of hazard mitigation was that it provides passive protection at the time of disaster impact, whereas emergency preparedness measures develop the capability to conduct an active response at the time of disaster impact. Since 1995, FEMA has emphasized mitigation as the most effective and cost-efficient strategy for dealing with hazards. Indeed, a recent study by the Multihazard Mitigation Council (2005) concluded investments in hazard mitigation return four dollars in losses averted for every dollar invested. The ways in which mitigation activities can reduce hazard losses can best be understood in terms of a model proposed by Burton, et al. (1993) that contends natural hazards arise from the interaction of natural event systems and human use systems. Thus, the potential human impact of an extreme natural event such as a flood, hurricane, or earthquake can be altered by modifying either the natural event system, or the human use system, or both. In the case of floods, for example, the natural event system can be modified by dams or levees that confine flood water. The human use system can be modified by land use practices that limit development of the flood plain or building construction practices that floodproof structures. Although the amount of control that can be exercised over natural event systems is often limited, technological hazards are inherently susceptible to such controls. Chemical, biological, radiological/nuclear, and explosive/flammable materials can all be produced, stored, and transported in ways that avoid adverse effects to plant workers, local residents and the public-at-large. However, this control can be lost, resulting in releases to the air, or to surface or ground water. It is possible to control the hazard agent by locating the system away from populated areas; designing it with diverse and redundant components or by operating it with smaller quantities of hazardous materials (known as hazmat), lower temperatures and pressures, safer operations and maintenance procedures, and more effective worker selection, training and supervision). Alternatively, one can control the human use system by preventing residential and commercial development—especially schools and hospitals—near hazardous facilities and major hazmat transportation routes. The choice of whether to mitigate technological hazards by controlling the hazard agent or the human use system depends upon political and economic decisions about the relative costs and benefits of these two types of control. Specific questions include who has control over the hazards, what degree of control is maintained, and what incentives there are for the maintenance of control. Attempts to mitigate natural hazards, or events over which there is little human control, involve controlling human activities in ways that minimize hazard exposure. Thus, land use practices restricting residential construction in floodplains are important mitigation measures against riverine floods. The Hazard Mitigation and Relocation Act of 1993, for example, allows FEMA to purchase homes and businesses in floodplains and remove these structures from harm’s way. Although moving entire communities involves considerable stress for all concerned, an intense and systematic management process—characterized especially by close coordination among federal, state, and local agencies—can produce successful protection of large numbers of citizens and break the repetitive cycle of “flood-rebuild-flood-rebuild” that is so costly to the nation’s taxpayers (Perry & Lindell, 1997b). Likewise, building code requirements are used to restrict construction to those designs that can better withstand the stresses of hurricane force winds or earthquake shocks. Disaster Preparedness Disaster preparedness activities are undertaken to protect human lives and property in conjunction with threats that cannot be controlled by means of mitigation measures or from which only partial protection is achieved. Thus, preparedness activities are based upon the premise that disaster impact will occur and that plans, procedures, and response resources must be established in advance. These are designed not only to support a timely and effective emergency response to the threat of imminent impact, but also to guide the process of disaster recovery. A jurisdiction’s disaster preparedness program needs to be defined in terms of · What agencies will participate in preparedness and the process by which they will plan, · What emergency response and disaster recovery actions are feasible for that community, · How the emergency response and disaster recovery organizations will function and what resources they require, and · How disaster preparedness will be established and maintained. Emergency managers can address the first of these questions—what agencies and what will be the process for developing disaster preparedness—by defining an emergency management organization. This requires identifying the emergency management stakeholders in the community and developing a collaborative structure within which they can work effectively. It also requires ensuring an adequate statutory basis for disaster preparedness and administrative support from senior elected and appointed officials. Emergency managers can address the second question—what are the feasible response and recovery actions—by means of analyses conducted to guide the development of major plan functions. These include, for example, evacuation analyses to assess the population of the risk areas, the number of vehicles that will be taken in evacuation, when people will leave, and what is the capacity of the evacuation route system. Emergency managers can address the third question—how will the response and recovery organizations function—in the emergency operations plan (EOP), the recovery operations plan (ROP), and their implementing procedures. These documents define which agencies are responsible for each of the functions that must be performed in the emergency response and disaster recovery phases. Some of the generic emergency response functions include emergency assessment, hazard operations, population protection, and incident management (Lindell & Perry, 1992, 1996b). While developing the plans and procedures, emergency managers also need to identify the resources required to implement them. Such resources include facilities (e.g., mobile command posts and emergency operations centers—EOCs), trained personnel (e.g., police, fire, and EMS), equipment (e.g., detection systems such as river gages and chemical sensors, siren systems, pagers, emergency vehicles, and radios), materials and supplies (e.g., traffic barricades, chemical detection kits, and self-contained breathing apparatus), and information (e.g., chemical inventories in hazmat facilities, congregate care facility locations and capacities, and local equipment inventories). Emergency managers can also address the fourth question—how disaster preparedness will be established and maintained—in EOP and ROP. Sections of these plans should define the methods and schedule for plan maintenance, training, drills, and exercises. Training should always be conducted for emergency responders in fire, police, and EMS. In addition, training is needed for personnel in special facilities such as hospitals, nursing homes, and schools. Emergency Response Emergency response activities are conducted during the time period that begins with the detection of the event and ends with the stabilization of the situation following impact. FEMA (1998b, p. 12) indicates the goal of emergency response is “to save lives and property by positioning emergency equipment and supplies; evacuating potential victims; providing food, water, shelter and medical care to those in need; and restoring critical public services”. In many cases, hazard monitoring systems ensure authorities are promptly alerted to disaster onset either by means of systematic forecasts (e.g., hurricanes) or prompt detection (e.g., flash floods detected by stream gages), so there is considerable forewarning and consequently a long period of time to activate the emergency response organization. In other cases, such as earthquakes, pre-impact prediction is usually not available, but prompt assessment of the impact area is feasible within a matter of minutes to hours and can quickly direct emergency response resources to the most severely affected areas. Some of the more visible response activities undertaken to limit the primary threat include securing the impact area, evacuating threatened areas, conducting search and rescue for the injured, providing emergency medical care, and sheltering evacuees and other victims. Operations mounted to counter secondary threats include fighting urban fires after earthquakes, identifying contaminated water supplies, or other public health threats following flooding, identifying contaminated wildlife or fish in connection with a toxic chemical spill, or preparing for flooding following glacier melt during a volcanic eruption. During the response stage, emergency managers must also continually assess damage and coordinate the arrival of converging equipment and supplies so they can be deployed promptly to those areas with the greatest need. Emergency response activities are usually accomplished through the efforts of diverse groups—some formally constituted, others volunteer—coordinated through an EOC. Usually, local emergency responders dominate the response period. These almost always include police, firefighters, and EMS personnel, and often include public works and transportation employees. Uncertainty and urgency—less prevalent in mitigation, preparedness, and recovery—are important features of the response period. In the world of disaster response, minutes of delay can cost lives and property, so speed is typically essential. However, speed of response must be balanced with good planning and intelligent assessment to avoid actions that are impulsive and possibly counterproductive. Finally, emergency response actions need to be coordinated with disaster recovery. That is, life and property are priorities, but response actions foreshadow recovery actions. For example, damage assessments are later used to support requests for Presidential Disaster Declarations and debris removal might be concentrated on roadways that are essential for restoring infrastructure. The emergency response phase ends when the situation is stabilized, which means that the risk of loss of life and property has returned to precrisis levels. Disaster Recovery Disaster recovery activities begin after disaster impact has been stabilized and extends until the community has been returned to its normal activities. In some cases, the recovery period may extend for a long period of time. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (1995a, p. XX) states “[r]ecovery refers to those non-emergency measures following disaster whose purpose is to return all systems, both formal and informal, to as normal as possible.” The immediate objective of recovery activities is to restore the physical infrastructure of the community—water, sewer, electric power, fuel (e.g., natural gas), telecommunication, and transportation—but the ultimate objective is to return the community’s quality of life to at least the same level as it was before the disaster. Recovery has been defined in terms of short-range (relief and rehabilitation) measures versus long-range (reconstruction) measures. Relief and rehabilitation activities usually include clearance of debris and restoration of access to the impact area, reestablishment of economic (commercial and industrial) activities, restoration of essential government or community services, and provision of an interim system for caring for victims—especially housing, clothing, and food. Reconstruction activities tend to be dominated by the rebuilding of major structures—buildings, roads, bridges, dams, and such—and by efforts to revitalize the area’s economic system. In some communities, leaders view the reconstruction phase as an opportunity to institute plans for change that existed before the disaster or to introduce mitigation measures into reconstruction that would constitute an improvement upon the community’s pre-impact state. Such an approach to reconstruction has been documented after the great Alaska earthquake of 1964 (Anderson, 1969a). After the eruption of Mt. Usu on the northern island of Hokkaido, Japan, local leaders convinced the central government to invest in a wide range of civic improvements aimed at enhancing the local area’s economic viability as a tourist center (Perry & Hirose, 1982). Finally, it should be noted that the bulk of the resources used in the recovery phase (particularly on reconstruction) are derived from extracommunity sources. In the United States, these sources include private organizations and state governments, but for the most part they come from the federal government. Furthermore, even after James Lee Witt began FEMA’s emphasis on hazard mitigation, most of the money and resources for emergency management continued to be consumed in the recovery phase. Evaluation of the Emergency Management System The preceding discussion has examined the four principal functions of the emergency management system—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In summary, two points should be reiterated here. First, although the distinctions among these four functions are fuzzy (i.e., the transition from one phase to the next is gradual rather than sharp), they are distinctly time phased. Mitigation and preparedness measures take place in advance of any specific disaster impact, whereas response takes place during and recovery occurs after disaster impact. Therefore, practical problems accompany the development of mitigation and preparedness strategies because they must usually be accomplished during periods of normal activity, when environmental threats are not imminent. Historical evidence indicates that it has been difficult to mount efforts to engage in these sorts of activities. Response and recovery take place within the context of a disaster impact—clearly unusual times—and benefit from the operation of an emergency social system as well as from the high level of community cohesiveness that usually emerges in the immediate aftermath (Lindell & Perry, 1992). The second point is that, in the past, far more resources and emphasis have been allocated to response and recovery activities than to mitigation and preparedness. This is consistent with a cycle, well known to disaster researchers and emergency management professionals, of citizen and governmental interest in disasters. Immediately after impact, the attention of both the public and community officials is riveted upon the physical devastation and social disruption. Considerable resources are made available for shelter, food, clothing, and financial aid to victims, as well as debris clearance and the physical restoration of critical facilities within the community. However, public attention declines significantly as time passes. Because considerable time is required to translate such concern into budget allocations and coherent programs, many preparedness measures—and to an even greater extent mitigation measures—have simply failed to be implemented. To a certain extent this differential emphasis has been a function of the difficulty citizens and political officials have in maintaining a high level of concern about disasters during times when they seem so remote. To do so requires that both citizens and leaders dwell upon negative events that may or may not occur sometime in the future—a task that is almost universally regarded as unpleasant and thus elicits procrastination. Perhaps equally important in the resource disparity, however, are the limitations posed by the technical state of knowledge regarding various hazards. The state of technology itself imposes limits on the types of mitigation and preparedness activities that can be undertaken. If the location of a potentially catastrophic event cannot be defined in advance, the feasible set of mitigation actions is severely limited. For example, tornado risk is essentially uniform within each local jurisdiction. so land use regulation would achieve little reduction in hazard vulnerability. Furthermore, in the absence of a technology of detection and highly accurate impact predictions, many preparedness measures are not feasible—such as evacuation from unreinforced masonry (e.g., brick) buildings immediately before an earthquake. Thus, in the past, it may have not been possible to devote resources anywhere other than to response and recovery. In the future, as more comprehensive forms of emergency management are implemented, the emphasis must shift toward the development of mitigation and preparedness measures within the limits of existing technology while pursuing research and development designed to advance the state of that technology.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/01%3A_Introduction_to_Emergency_Management/1.5%3A_Characterizing_Emergency_Management_Activities.txt

This overview of emergency management in the United States has included a discussion of the kinds of organizations that operate within the emergency management system, the different patterns of responsibility and interaction among the components of that system, and the general time phases of emergency management. The development of a perspective on emergency management requires consideration of at least two additional topics. The first of these deals with the evolution of prevailing federal conceptions of how hazards are managed—especially the underlying assumptions that define what goals are important and that determine the creation and structure of emergency organizations. The second topic concerns the way in which hazards are conceptualized—whether one focuses upon the event itself or upon the demands that events place upon social systems. Alternative Conceptions of Managing Hazards As one might infer from the history of emergency management organizations, there is a separation of emergency functions that has emerged and persisted over the years. With only a few exceptions, federal organizations charged with addressing wartime attacks have been different from those charged with concerns about natural disasters. This separation of functions has also been reflected in the research by social scientists on human performance in the face of disasters. Historically, this is one of the earliest and, in terms of research and theory, one of the most fundamental distinctions in emergency management and research. Hence civil defense issues have been isolated, particularly since the advent of nuclear weapons. Although nuclear (or other wartime) attack involved functions—warning, protective action, emergency medical care, search and rescue, communications, and sheltering—similar to those addressed in natural disasters, the two were treated separately and usually under the auspices of different agencies. Indeed, Drabek (1991b, p. 3) concluded “the two principal policy streams that have shaped emergency management in the United States [are] responses to natural disasters and civil defense programs”. This separation of emergency management systems appears to have spawned what has been called the philosophy of “dual use”, a term that was first used officially when President Nixon created the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in 1972 (Harris, 1975). At the federal level, this meant funding priority was given to research and planning that would be useful in coping with both natural disasters and nuclear attack. Perhaps the most persistent application of the dual use philosophy was found in the natural disaster research sponsored by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in the l970s. As part of contract fulfillment, researchers were required to include an appendix to reports describing how their results applied to the nuclear attack setting. Although the dual use philosophy implied basic comparability between natural and technological disasters, this had little impact on the way either emergency managers or researchers partitioned such events. Even under dual use, the comparability issue was addressed largely after the fact (in the case of research, after the data collection and analysis were completed). Conceptions of emergency management practice and disaster research continued to compartmentalize wartime threats and natural disasters. Of course, the compartmentalizing was not limited to this broad division; there was also a tendency to separate different types of natural disasters. Yoshpe (1881, p. 32) indicates that legislation sanctioned dual use by 1976: “[It was]…established as a matter of national policy that resources acquired and maintained under the Federal Civil Defense Act should be utilized to minimize the effects of natural disasters when they occurred.” Beginning with the classic study of the Halifax explosion (Prince, 1920), social scientists interested in disaster response sporadically studied events that were not products of the natural environment or wartime attacks. Although few in number, a 1961 catalog of disaster field studies compiled by the National Academy of Sciences listed 38 research studies on technological incidents (Disaster Research Group, 1961). By the mid-1960s, a third distinct body of research was developing with respect to technological threats. These studies generally reflected the body of research conducted in connection with natural disasters and wartime attack. At the federal level, President Nixon’s creation of the Environmental Protection Agency in 1970 (with a major emphasis on chemicals and chemical processes) solidified the concept of technological hazards as distinctly different phenomena. By the late 1960s, each type of hazard or disaster had begun to be treated differently by policymakers, federal agencies, emergency management practitioners, and researchers. The separations were not analytic but largely reflected differences in the threat agent. Thus, there were lines of research on hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, explosions, mine collapses, wartime attacks, and so on. These divisions were also reflected in public policy for dealing with disasters; different organizations focused on different threats. An important consequence of this approach was the concentration on the distinctiveness of disaster agents and events. The prevailing idea was that disaster agents differ qualitatively, rather than just quantitatively, and that each of these hazards required its own unique mode of understanding and management. This orientation was supported by the loosely coupled collection of federal agencies and programs that addressed emergencies through the 1960s and most of the 1970s. As public policy, difficulties began to arise with “dual use” as a philosophy and an organizational strategy. The difficulties became the basis for the beginning of a radical change in the way disasters were conceptualized. In retrospect, at least three forces guided the change in thinking. First, the persistence of “dual use” as a principle for justifying the support of disaster research by civil defense agencies pressed scientists to make explicit comparisons among disaster events. Such justification was based upon two rationales—generalizability and cost-effectiveness. The generalizability principle held that, in the absence of real war, natural disasters provided the next best approximation to study human disaster response. The cost-effectiveness rationale assumed that, by funding studies of one class of events, inferences could be made to other types of events at relatively small incremental cost—loosely described as “getting more knowledge for the research dollar”. The cost-effectiveness rationale was to ultimately play a significant role in subsequent changes in emergency management philosophy. It was clear, however, that “dual use” forced researchers to think about and conduct cross-disaster applications of various emergency functions—emergency assessment, hazard operations, population protection, and incident management. Without a conscious intention of doing so, these comparisons began to build an empirical body of evidence regarding dimensions along which events normally thought to be quite distinct could be compared. The second force that promoted changes in basic conceptions of emergency management was the rise of social scientific subdisciplines or specializations in disaster behavior. An important factor in this development was the growth of the Disaster Research Center (DRC—which was located first at The Ohio State University and later at the University of Delaware) under Quarantelli and Dynes beginning in 1963. This institution trained social scientists to study events caused by a diverse set of natural and technological hazard agents and complying with the dual use demands for comparisons with nuclear attack. These researchers focused not on the differences among disaster agents, but upon the social management of the consequences of disasters. They linked these diverse studies using a theoretical framework that was marked by the designation of a focal social system and discussions of generic management issues, such as the problems of resource mobilization, interactions of system components, and the interrelationships of the focal system with external systems. An early and important contribution of the DRC studies was to focus research and management attention upon the demands a crisis imposes upon a social system. These were conceptualized as agent-generated demands (i.e., tasks generated by a disaster as a function of impact—warning, search and rescue, emergency medical care) and response-generated demands (i.e., those tasks necessary to meet agent-generated demands—communication, resource mobilization). By focusing upon a disaster’s demands and not on the physical characteristics of the disaster agent itself, this line of research posed a significant challenge to both the theoretical and operational perspectives that differentiated events based on the agent involved. It is important to point out that DRC did not ignore the effects of different types of hazard agents; each agent was acknowledged to produce its own distinctive pattern of demands. Instead, DRC’s contribution lay in establishing a concern with social management of events within a systems perspective. This practice emphasized the problem of identifying and responding to different demands growing out of the crisis and set the stage for subsequent identification of generic or “common” management functions across disasters. The third force for change came well after DRC began its operation. This was the NGA’s emergency preparedness project. Primarily concerned with public policy associated with emergency management, these analysts focused first upon what they saw as the ineffective allocation of emergency management responsibilities among the federal agencies assigned to help states and localities cope with disasters. It was their contention that the presence of a bureaucratized and compartmentalized collection of federal disaster agencies made it difficult for lower levels of government to obtain necessary aid for both planning and recovery. Moreover, they emphasized the lack of cost effectiveness of the diverse constellation of federal programs and agencies. Another contribution of the NGA project was its perspective on disasters. As members of state government who were sensitive to the problems experienced by local governments, their view of disasters was less compartmentalized than that of their federal counterparts. States and localities had long been forced to plan for and respond to disasters without the benefit of a bureaucracy that had as many specialized agencies as that of the federal government. Among other reasons, their revenues simply could not support much specialization. The same people who were called upon to deal with floods also dealt with explosions, hurricanes, hazmat incidents, and tornadoes. Over the years, state and local emergency response personnel developed an approach based upon managing all types of disasters without regard to the precipitating agent. From a practical standpoint, their orientation meant that they focused on each disaster’s demands and sought to manage those, making specific procedures apply to as many types of events as feasible. In one sense, this produces an emphasis upon the idea of developing organizational systems to perform generic functions. For example, warning systems, emergency medical care systems, evacuation plans, damage assessment procedures, communication systems, and search and rescue plans may all be applicable to crises associated with floods, hurricanes, nuclear power plant accidents, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and others. Driven in part by economic need, the NGA project became strong advocates for an “all hazards” approach to emergency management—which they called comprehensive emergency management—and their efforts drew intellectual strength from the comparative research at the Disaster Research Center. Comprehensive Emergency Management Operating together, these forces gave rise to Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) as a basic conceptual approach to disasters and to managing emergencies. In 1979, NGA issued a Governor’s Guide to Comprehensive Emergency Management (National Governors’ Association, 1979) that provided an articulate statement of the philosophy and practice of CEM. The approach was further legitimated through its adoption and promotion by FEMA in 1981. In 1993, when the US Congress repealed the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, a provision (Title VI) was added to the Stafford Act requiring the federal government to adopt the all-hazards approach inherent in CEM. In summary, CEM refers to the development of a capacity for handling emergency tasks in all phases—mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery—in connection with all types of disaster agents by coordinating the efforts and resources of a wide variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and government agencies. CEM is distinguished from previous conceptualizations—particularly dual use—by two important characteristics. First, CEM emphasizes comprehensiveness with respect to the performance of all disaster relevant activities by dictating a concern for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. The second distinguishing feature of CEM is its concern with the management of all types of emergencies whether technological, natural, or willful (including state sponsored and terrorist attacks). This characteristic is an outgrowth of the idea that an emergency may be seen as a disruption of the normal operation of a social system. To the extent possible, one would like to minimize the likelihood and magnitude of system disruptions in the first place and minimize their duration by creating the potential for quickly stabilizing the system and subsequently restoring it to its normal activities following an unpreventable disruption. In this context, the cause of the disruption is less important than the nature and magnitude of its effects upon the social system. The only reason to distinguish among disrupting agents rests on the extent to which different agents impose distinctive demands on the system. For example, hurricanes can be distinguished as events that provide long periods of forewarning when compared with earthquakes. In developing a framework for managing all phases of all types of disasters, CEM can be seen as an attempt to integrate emergency management by developing a body of techniques effective for managing the responses to multiple disaster agents. CEM represents an extremely significant departure from historical views of emergency management that make sharp distinctions among hazard agents and claim (either explicitly or implicitly) that a unique strategy must be developed for managing each of them. Furthermore, aside from the intuitive appeal of a more parsimonious theoretical approach, cost conscious officials at all levels of government are attracted to the more efficient use of resources promised by a comprehensive approach to emergency management (Quarantelli, 1992). Once state and local governments began to adopt some variant of CEM, FEMA introduced the concept of Integrated Emergency Management Systems (IEMS) in 1983. The initial goal of IEMS was to facilitate the development of disaster management functions and (at the time it was introduced) to increase congressional support for a larger civil defense budget (Perry, 1985, p. 130). When pressed to distinguish IEMS from CEM, the principal reply was: “CEM is the long term objective, IEMS is the current implementation strategy” (Drabek, 1985, p. 85). It appears that the meaning of IEMS on a practical level derives from the term “integrated”—identifying the goal of addressing all hazards and consolidating emergency actions into a single office or organization within a jurisdiction. However, CEM remains the primary vision of disaster management in the US. Classifying Hazard Agents An emergency management vision that addresses all hazards must by necessity focus upon the concept of generic functions while acknowledging that special functions will be needed in the case of hazard agents that present unique or singular challenges. CEM implies a basic comparability across all types of disasters. Moving from emergency management to the academic study of disasters, one implication of comparability is that one should be able to distinguish hazard agents in terms of a common set of characteristics. A typology of hazard agents is a system for classifying them into categories within which the social management demands are similar. On a practical level, implementing CEM involves identifying generic emergency response functions and then specifying circumstances (tied to the impact of different disaster agents) under which they will need to be employed. If one could use such functions as key characteristics of disasters, then one could begin to develop meaningful taxonomies. There have been few attempts to make systematic comparisons of human response to different disaster agents. Indeed, there has been a tendency among researchers to avoid examining relationships among different disaster agents, partly on the assumption that each “type” of event was simply unique. For example, the matter of comparing natural with technological threats rarely appeared in the professional literature at all until the 1970s. In part, this condition reflects the state of disaster research. For many years disaster studies were very descriptive in nature (Gillespie & Perry, 1976). Hence, attention often focused upon the event itself—the hurricane or the earthquake—and upon descriptions of specific consequences for disaster victims. Therefore, the research literature provided illustrative accounts of earthquake victims crushed under rubble, fire victims plucked from rooftops, and hurricane victims drowned in the storm surge. In this context, researchers argued that different agents have different characteristics and impose different demands on the social system and as a result probably must be explained using different theories. A typology is actually a form of theory created through taxonomy or reasoning (Perry, 1989). Thus, human reactions to different disaster events were expected to be different. In one sense, it is entirely correct to consider each disaster agent, as well as each impact of each agent, to be different. Floods present obvious differences from earthquakes and, indeed, the eruption of the Mt. St. Helens volcano on March 27, 1980, was very different from its eruption on May 18, 1980. Such comments reflect an essentially phenotypic classification system, focusing upon the surface or visible properties of an event. Emergency managers and disaster researchers are not so much interested in classifying disasters in these terms, however, because their goals are associated primarily with the behavior of the affected social system. It is human response to the natural environment, technology, or other humans that produces the disasters of hurricanes, tornadoes, hazmat releases, or wartime attacks. Thus, the goal is to distinguish among social causes, reactions, and consequences, not necessarily to distinguish hurricanes from chemical plants. There has been an increased concern with the development of conceptual schemes for explaining human behavior in disasters. This theoretical concern directs one to identify characteristics of disasters that determine the nature and types of agent-generated and response-generated demands imposed upon stricken communities. This leads to the creation of a classification system that characterizes disasters, not in phenotypic terms, but in terms of features that will have an impact on the kinds of assessment, preventive/corrective, protective, or management actions that might be used in disaster response. To pursue such a goal, one might begin by choosing a given function—population warning, for example—and examine the ways in which performance of that activity varies across disaster events as a function of differing agent characteristics such as the amount of forewarning provided by detection and forecast systems. There has been much discussion and only limited consensus among academic disaster researchers regarding either definitions of disaster or classification schemes for distinguishing among different types of disasters. However, as Perry (1998) has pointed out, most definitions of disaster contain many common elements—disagreements among definers tend to lie in minor aspects of definition or in the logic that is used to develop a definition. From the standpoint of practicing emergency managers, such minor variations pose few operational difficulties. Most events that are characterized as disasters, whether they arise from natural forces, technology, or even deliberate attacks, fit most of the academic definitions of the term. As defined by Fritz (1961, p. 652), a disaster is any event: concentrated in time and space, in which a society or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of the society is prevented. From this classic definition (as well as from the definitions discussed previously in this chapter) one can surmise that disasters occur at a distinguishable time, are geographically circumscribed and that they disrupt social activity. Barton has proposed a similar definition, but chose to focus upon the social system itself, arguing that disasters exist “when many members of a social system fail to receive expected conditions of life from the system” (1969, p. 38). Both Fritz and Barton agree that any event that produces a significant change in the pattern of inputs and outputs for a given social system may be reasonably characterized as a disaster. The important point to be derived from these definitions is that events precipitated by a variety of hazard agents—floods, chemical spills, volcanoes, nuclear power plant accidents, terrorist attacks—all fit equally well into these definitions as disasters. At this level of abstraction, there is no compelling reason to differentiate among natural, technological, or other types of hazard agents. Given the breadth of most definitions of disasters, the analytic problem becomes one of determining the characteristics by which to distinguish among the events that do satisfy the definition. As noted earlier, such dimensions should not be restricted to physical characteristics of the hazard agent and its impact, but should also include attributes relevant to the effects of the event upon the social system and its consequences for management. Distinguishing disasters, accidents, and attacks There has been some discussion among researchers regarding the lines along which natural disasters, technological accidents, and willful attacks might be meaningfully distinguished. While there remains much disagreement in the research community about which dimensions are meaningful, it is possible to begin to identify dimensions from the research literature. Much of this work can be traced to the staff of the Disaster Research Center who attempted to draw parallels between natural disaster response and possible response to nuclear attack (particularly between 1963 and 1972; see Kreps, 1981). Barton (1969) developed a scheme for identifying distinguishing features of disasters that characterize the nature of social system stress. Barton’s system defined four basic dimensions—scope of impact, speed of onset, duration of impact, and social preparedness of the threatened community. These dimensions have been used by a number of researchers in developing classification schemes (Lindell & Perry, 1992) and can be briefly explained here. Scope of impact is usually defined as the absolute geographic area (e.g., in square miles) affected by a disaster but, as will be described in Chapter 5, it also can be defined in terms of the affected percentage of a jurisdiction’s area (geographic scope), population (demographic scope), or economic production (economic scope). Aside from sheer size, this dimension has implications for resource mobilization within the affected social system and for the availability of supporting resources that might be drawn from nearby communities or higher levels of government. Speed of onset refers to the interval of time between a physical event’s first manifestation of environmental cues until its impact on a social system. Speed of onset varies both by the inherent nature of the hazard agent and the level of technological sophistication of the detection system. For example, earthquakes have a very rapid onset (there are often no detectable environmental cues before the initial shock), whereas droughts have a very slow onset (some take years to develop). In other cases, the technology to forecast meteorological hazards such as hurricanes has developed considerably over the course of the past 50 years so events, such as hurricanes, that could at one time occur with little or no forewarning are now routinely monitored and forecast days in advance. Duration of impact refers to the time that elapses between initial onset and the point at which the threat to life and property has been stabilized. This can be a few minutes (short) in the case of a tornado, a few hours or days (moderate) in the case of riverine floods, persistent for years in the case of drought, or intermittent for years in the case of volcanoes. Finally, social preparedness is a dimension that attempts to capture the ability of the social system to anticipate the onset of an event, control its impact, or cope with its negative consequences. Obviously, this social preparedness dimension is precisely the objective of emergency management. Anderson (1969b) contributed another comparative dimension from his research on the functioning of civil defense offices (now more commonly called emergency management departments) during natural disasters and attempted to extrapolate to the nuclear attack environment. In developing his analysis, Anderson (1969b, p. 55) concluded that in spite of obvious differences between nuclear threats and natural disasters: [these differences] can be visualized as primarily ones of degree. With the exception of the specific form of secondary threat, i.e. radiation, and the probability that a wider geographic area will be involved, a nuclear [threat] would not create essentially different problems for community response. Anderson’s analysis introduced the issue of secondary impacts of disaster agents as an important defining feature. It should be remembered that virtually all hazards, whether natural or technological, accidentally or deliberately caused, entail some secondary impacts. Indeed, the secondary threat can be more devastating than the initial threat. Riverine floods tend to deposit debris and silt that persists long after the water has receded. Earthquakes often produce urban fires, and volcanic eruptions can melt glaciers or ignite forest fires. By assembling lists of distinguishing characteristics such as those discussed above, one can compare or classify an apparently widely differing (in terms of superficial features) range of disaster events. As an example of how such comparisons might work, Table 1-1 compares three disaster agents—riverine floods, volcanic eruptions, and nuclear power plant accidents—in terms of the five distinguishing characteristics. Table 1-1. Classification of Selected Hazard Agents. Hazard Agent Characteristic Riverine Flood Volcanic Eruption Nuclear Power Plant Accident Scope of impact Highly variable long, and narrow Highly variable broad area Highly variable broad area Speed of onset Rapid: flash flood Slow: main stem flood Rapid Variable Duration of impact Short Long Long Health threat Water inhalation Blast, burns ash inhalation Ingestion, inhalation, direct radiation Property threat Destruction Destruction Contamination Secondary threats Public health danger from water/sewer inundation Forest fires, glacial snowmelt Secondary contamination Predictability High Poor Variable ability to predict releases after accident onset It is interesting to note that, at this analytic level, volcanic eruptions and nuclear power plant accidents are similarly classified. Both threats involve variable scopes of impact that are potentially widespread. Usually, a volcanic eruption’s threats to human safety are limited to within a few miles of the crater. Life threatening levels of radiation exposure from a nuclear power plant accident is likely to be confined to the plant site or a few miles downwind from it (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1978). Under special conditions, however, either type of event might involve a considerably greater scope of impact. The May 18, 1980, eruption of Mt. St. Helens volcano spread a heavy layer of volcanic ash over a three state area and the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident spread radioactive material over an entire region. The speed of onset for volcanic eruptions and nuclear power plant accidents is likely to be rapid, although each of them has the potential for a significant degree of forewarning prior to the onset of a major event. These two events are also similar with respect to the duration of impact of the primary threat to human safety. In both cases, a volcanic eruption and a release of radioactive materials, the event could last from hours to days. Persistence of secondary impacts could, in each case, last for years, although the long-term health effects of volcanic ash are less significant than radiation. To the extent that volcanic eruptions continue in an eruptive sequence that lasts for years, the duration of impact can be said to be long. A nuclear power plant accident would be expected to be of moderate length although so few actual accidents have occurred that the empirical data are extremely limited. The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, which is more accurately labeled as an emergency than as a disaster, involved a danger period that lasted for about six days. However, the Chernobyl accident severely contaminated areas that are still uninhabitable two decades later. Both volcanic eruptions and nuclear power plant accidents generate secondary threats. The sheer number of secondary threats associated with volcanoes is quite large; ultimately they involve long-term threats to public health, to the stability of man-made structures, and to plants and animals in land and water ecosystems. The most probable secondary threat of a nuclear power plant accident is associated with the effects of residual radiation exposure arising from ground deposition and water contamination by radioactive materials. In addition to the potential exposure by way of external gamma radiation and inhalation of radioactive materials, there is the threat of exposure by means of ingestion of contaminated vegetation or animal products (meat or milk). Finally, the state of technology is such that neither volcanic eruptions nor nuclear power plant accidents can be forecast accurately far in advance. There is in both cases, however, a technology for detecting and monitoring events once they are in progress. In the case of some volcanoes, once an eruptive sequence has begun either seismic or geochemical cues can be used to make approximate forecasts of eruptive events. With nuclear power plants, monitoring instruments are designed to detect even minor aberrations early in order to facilitate the implementation of corrective action before more serious difficulties arise. Thus, although one might not be able to predict a power plant accident, instruments are designed to detect problems in their early stages before they can escalate to an atmospheric release of radioactive material. Riverine floods differ from the other two hazard agents primarily in terms of two characteristics. First, floods are frequently predictable, often days in advance. Second, speed of onset typically is gradual (by definition requiring a minimum of six hours to reach a flood crest, although more rapid onset can occur during flash floods in mountainous areas). Another general point of distinction is the frequency with which floods occur; they are the most common geophysical hazard in the United States (Perry, Lindell & Greene, 1981). Thus, from the standpoint of both emergency managers and the public, riverine floods are a familiar threat. Moreover, the duration of the primary flood impact is much shorter than a volcanic eruptive sequence or a nuclear power plant accident. Secondary impacts of floods include both public health threats and dangers to man-made structures, but in general the extent and duration of the effects of their secondary threats are less than either of the other two disaster agents. Finally, like a volcanic eruptive sequence or a nuclear power plant accident, the scope of impact of riverine floods is highly variable. Usually the scope of flood impacts is narrower than either of the other hazards, but there is a potential for widespread scope. The preceding discussion demonstrates that it is possible to classify diverse disaster agents in terms of an underlying set of dimensions and then to discuss the agents in terms of functional emergency management activities. Such dimensions could include the physical characteristics of the hazard agent and its impact, as well as attributes relevant to the effects of the event upon the social system and its consequences for management. The characteristics derived from the disaster research literature have provided a systematic set of attributes that could be used to examine and compare riverine floods, volcanic eruptions, and nuclear power plant accidents. As indicated above, the differences between classification schemes in the academic literature tend to rest on differences between researchers regarding exactly which dimensions and how many dimensions are optimal in creating the typology. The 21st Century has seen no more agreement than the 20th Century did, although there are two discernable trends in the literature. One trend, followed by only a few, involves attempts to elaborate on the analytic approach described here, adding or subtracting dimensions or otherwise changing the complexity of the approach (Kreps, 1989; Tobin & Montz, 1997). By far most disaster researchers have continued to ignore the issue of analytic typology and remained with some sort of phenotypic classification, most commonly with the classic categories of “natural disasters”, “technological accidents” and “willful attacks” (Cutter, 2001; Drabek, 1986). Without regard to the low level of consensus among researchers, analytic classification systems are more than an abstract intellectual exercise. They provide an opportunity to demonstrate how, by means of careful examination, one can begin to identify differences among disaster agents with respect to their demands upon the emergency response system. From the information listed in Table 1-1, an emergency manager might conclude that two protective measures might be used in all three events: population evacuation and the imposition of access controls to the threatened area. Because a volcanic eruption or a nuclear power plant accident could present a health threat resulting from inhalation of airborne materials (volcanic ash or radioactive gases and particulates, respectively), taking shelter indoors and using respiratory protection is feasible. Ad hoc measures for respiratory protection could be as simple as folding a wet towel and breathing through it. The importance of developing a comparative perspective structured by disaster agent characteristics lies in the prospect of identifying a profile of disaster demands that, in turn, define the functions that the emergency response organization must perform. Thus, classifying hazard agents with respect to defining characteristics allows emergency managers to better define the ways in which generic functions (e.g., emergency assessment, hazard operations, population protection, and incident management) should be implemented to achieve comprehensive emergency management. That is, the reason for identifying distinctive aspects of hazard agents is not to define each of them as “unique”, but rather to highlight the ways in which generic functions must be adapted to the needs of a particular type of emergency. By adopting this approach, emergency managers are better able to identify the range of hazard agents for which a particular emergency response action is appropriate or to identify the ways in which an emergency response action must be adapted to the constraints of a given hazard agent. For example, evacuation is an appropriate protective action in response to a wide range of hazards such as floods, hurricanes, and volcanic eruptions. However, authorities recommend sheltering in-place rather than evacuation during tornadoes because of the rapid onset and unpredictable track of the funnel cloud. In some cases, especially hazmat releases, the hazard agent’s speed of onset is so variable from one incident to another that there is no general rule regarding evacuation versus sheltering in-place. Moreover, evacuation was listed as a protective measure in nuclear power plant accidents and it was noted that the primary health threat to citizens in such events was radiation exposure. Research indicates that radiation hazard is feared as much or more than other natural and technological hazards (Lindell & Earle, 1983; Slovic, 1987). Assuming the conditions were appropriate for an evacuation warning, the emergency manager would be well advised of the possibility for a high level of spontaneous evacuation (people evacuating from areas that emergency managers consider to be safe). In turn, this alerts the emergency manager to a need for timely dissemination of information to the public about the characteristics of the impact and the potential personal consequences of exposure, thereby reassuring those who are not at risk that they are indeed safe. The Remaining Chapters

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This chapter will introduce the many actors in emergency management and examine some of the problems inherent in dealing with the complex emergency management policy process. The first section will address four basic issues. First, how is a “stakeholder” defined, especially in the context of emergency management? Second, who are the stakeholders emergency managers should be concerned about? Third, at what level in the system and by which different stakeholders are different types of emergency management decisions made? Fourth, how can emergency managers involve these stakeholders in the emergency management process? Last, what types and amounts of power do different stakeholder groups have and how do they influence the emergency management policy process? 2: Emergency Management Stakeholders Stakeholders are people who have, or think they have, a personal interest in the outcome of a policy. This interest motivates them to attempt to influence the development of that policy. In the early days of this country, only citizens with a sufficiently large “stake” in the nation’s welfare (as measured by property holdings) were allowed to vote. Now, all citizens are recognized as stakeholders insofar as all are affected by the decisions made by elected and appointed officials and, therefore, have the right to vote. Consequently, an emergency management stakeholder is an individual who is affected by the decisions made (or not made) by emergency managers and policymakers in his or her community. Since all citizens are likely to be affected by emergency management policies, this definition implies all citizens are emergency management stakeholders. Although this is true, it is not very helpful because stakeholders differ in the ways they are affected by emergency management policies and, even more important, they differ in the times at which they are affected and the magnitude of the impacts policy has on them. It is not enough, however, to say that everyone is potentially affected by disasters. Thus, this chapter will examine the different types of people who have an interest in the emergency management process, beginning at the simplest level of social organization. 2.2: Community Stakeholder Groups Community stakeholder groups can be divided into three different categories—social groups, economic groups, and political groups. In turn, each of these types of groups can be characterized by its horizontal and vertical linkages (Berke, Kartez & Wenger, 1993). Horizontal linkages are defined by the frequency and importance of contacts with other groups of the same type; vertical linkages consist of ties with larger groups. Each of the three types of groups will be discussed in the following sections. Social Groups It is sometimes said local government is the foundation for emergency management but, in fact, the basic organizational unit for emergency management is the household. Households adopt hazard adjustments (especially mitigation and preparedness measures), households evacuate, and households suffer economic losses. All households, no matter their size or level of resources, have an interest in the emergency management policies developed and implemented in their communities. The household is the primary living unit providing shelter from routine environmental conditions. Households’ actions affect their vulnerability to environmental hazards through their choice to live in more or less hazard-prone locations; to rent or buy residences that are more or less resistant to environmental extremes of wind, water, and ground-shaking; and whether or not to engage in pre-impact adjustments to limit their disaster vulnerability. As a group, households control a substantial amount of the social assets (buildings and their contents) at risk from environmental hazards, but this control is spread among a very large number of households, which makes it difficult to affect their policy choices. Although households typically attach a low priority to natural hazards, there is substantial variation, with some substantially more aware than others of the hazards they face. Households vary in their incentives to prepare for disasters and to adopt hazard mitigation. For example, property owners have more money at risk than tenants because they own the structures as well as the contents of these structures. Households also vary in their capacity to select and implement appropriate hazard adjustments because of differences in their financial resources, their knowledge of hazards and adjustments, and the decision processes they use to apply this knowledge. Other stakeholders such as the local and state governments have a modest degree of influence over households. Government agencies often provide hazard information and sometimes provide incentives for adopting hazard adjustments, but are rarely able to compel households to do anything about hazards. Just as citizens organize to better develop their understanding of issues and increase their power to present these views to the rest of the public, householders can organize as groups to develop emergency management policy in their neighborhoods. One of the most obvious gaps in the picture of stakeholders is the lack of a broad-based support group for individual householders, analogous to the Neighborhood Watch programs that exist across the country. In some communities, Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) are beginning to fill this role. CERTs may also be known as Neighborhood Emergency Response Teams, Neighborhood Emergency Assistance Teams, or other similar designations, but they share a common origin and many other characteristics (Simpson, 2001). CERTs are designed to train first responders at the neighborhood level and organize them in groups capable of providing basic emergency response services such as triage, first aid, urban search and rescue, fire suppression, and damage and casualty estimates at the block or neighborhood level. These groups are usually supported and trained by local emergency service agencies. As they become institutionalized, they can serve as a support group and interest aggregator for householders (for more information, see the FEMA Web site at training.fema.gov/emiweb/CERT/index.asp). As we move up the scale of social organization, there are private sector groups such as religious organizations and other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), nonprofit organizations (NPOs), community based organizations (CBOs), and businesses. All of these groups vary widely in size, level of organizational complexity, and amount of resources available. They also vary based on the functions they perform in society and, thus, varying levels of interest in local emergency management activities. Nonetheless, all are potential partners in formulating emergency management practices and policies. NGOs, NPOs, and CBOs can be important resources for emergency managers. Some have traditionally played key roles in specific phases of emergency management. For example, churches are often used as shelters during evacuations and frequently help provide recovery funding. They should be integrated into the early stages of response and recovery planning processes in order to ensure their resources are fully utilized without unnecessary duplication of effort and competition for access to disaster victims. Large scale NGOs organized at the national level also have historically played a role in emergency management. The Salvation Army is widely involved in response and recovery activities and organizations such as the United Way serve to channel local funds to those needing help during the recovery period. The American Red Cross, an affiliate of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, has an official role in this country as the provider of emergency shelter. Environmental organizations such as the Sierra Club (www.sierraclub.org) and the Worldwatch Institute (www.worldwatch.org) have not been very involved with local emergency management agencies, in spite of the conceptual overlap between environmental protection and hazard mitigation. This commonality of interests presents an opportunity for local emergency managers to forge alliances with environmental groups at the local level to foster sound land use practices, especially for the mitigation of floods through comprehensive watershed management. Environmental organizations have also published many books that are useful to emergency managers (e.g., Abramowitz, 2001a; Bullard, 1996; Flavin, 1994; Sierra Club, 2000). Economic Groups As households are the basic units in the hierarchy of social stakeholders, so too are businesses the fundamental units in the hierarchy of economic stakeholders. Businesses are important stakeholders because they are part of the societal institution that organizes the flow of goods and services. Destruction, damage, or even interruption of business activities can have significant adverse effects on the local economy and, in smaller countries, even on the regional or even national economy. Business owners control their resources in the same way as householders and, thus, can make the same sort of choices about how to react to hazards. Unlike households—which rarely exceed more than a half dozen persons in number—businesses range in size from small “mom and pops” that are the same size as families to large multinational corporations employing tens or even hundreds of thousands of people. Such businesses have varying levels of needs and resources to offer the emergency manager. Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to disruption following disasters, but are likely to be deeply embedded within the community and so are likely to respond favorably to appeals for assistance. Large corporations may have a large amount of resources in terms of personnel and even money, but local managers may have little discretion over how those resources can be used in the local emergency management process. An especially important type of business that is a stakeholder in emergency management is the public utility provider, whether privately or publicly owned. These include the providers of electricity, water, sewer services, solid waste management, and communications such as telephone, television, and Internet access. Such businesses have been active in emergency management because they are responsible for rapid restoration of basic services to all their customers. All other stakeholders depend on these important service providers to quickly restore all the vital services so business interruption is minimized, household functioning is restored, government functions during the critical period, and health care is not interrupted at a peak demand period. Businesses rarely react favorably to outside restrictions on their decisionmaking discretion, so it can be difficult to influence managers to adopt mitigation measures. Instead, like the rest of American society, business organizations have preferred to focus on response and recovery and, to a lesser extent, preparedness. Nonetheless, some active supporters of emergency management are beginning to emerge from the business community as the costs of disasters continue to rise. The insurance industry, in particular, has fostered a new emphasis on mitigation through organizations such as the Institute for Business and Home Safety (www.ibhs.org). Some real estate developers, bankers, home improvement retailers, and other businesses have also become active stakeholders in local emergency management. The most useful concept for increasing the business community’s interest in local emergency management has been business interruption. Once businesses realize the enormous potential costs of a failure in infrastructure systems, many began to take emergency preparedness very seriously. The key is to encourage businesses at the local level to understand the importance of their linkages to suppliers, customers, and employees as well as their dependence on a functioning infrastructure system (Lindell & Prater, 2003). If any of these relationships is disrupted by a disaster, businesses can suffer serious economic losses, even if their own facilities are undamaged. For example, employees who lose their housing might move away, customers might need to spend discretionary income on home repair, and suppliers might have their own difficulties with their physical plants, infrastructure, or supply chains. As business managers begin to understand the importance of this web of connections to the health of their businesses, they are likely to become more supportive of emergency management goals. This linkage was fostered by the “partnership model” that was promoted by FEMA’s Project Impact initiative that many cities began experimenting with during the 1990s. Project Impact’s model of involving the business community more directly in hazard mitigation and disaster preparedness met with great success in Tulsa and Seattle, as well as in other cities around the country. The suspension of federal funding has slowed the spread of the Project Impact model, but the success of this program makes it a valuable method for emergency managers to develop a more cooperative relationship with their local business communities. One particular set of businesses—the news media—is especially important to the success of emergency management programs because their coverage of all phases of emergency management can be an important way to educate the public about hazards that might strike the community, not just to inform them of an imminent disaster. The news media can provide vicarious experience for those who have not had direct experience with such events. One well documented problem is the news media’s tendency to perpetuate disaster myths rather than provide accurate information (Perry & Lindell, 1990). The news media are both consumers and creators of news. They consume “hard news” about environmental incidents and the responses to those incidents by describing the course of events and reporting the views of different stakeholders. They can also help to create “soft news” by describing the results of hazard/vulnerability analyses and the activities of planning organizations. This “soft news” can help to build support for emergency management even when there is no “hard news” about disasters, so emergency managers should get to know their local news media outlets and cultivate positive relationships with key personnel such as reporters, news anchors, editors, and producers. Political Groups Finally, there are various types of governmental stakeholders. Beginning at the base, we have the lowest level of organization, the municipality (i.e., town or city) and, just above this, the county. These jurisdictions have varying levels of power from one state to another because states differ in the powers that they grant to their political subdivisions. Much emergency management policy is set at the state level, and the federal government has traditionally been seen as a supporter to local and state efforts. The US Conference of Mayors (www.usmayors.org) and the National Governors’ Association (www.nga.org) have both taken lead roles in lobbying for increased attention to and funding for hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness at the national level (National Governors’ Association, 2001, 2002). In addition to the different levels of government, there are different agencies within each level of government. These agencies vary widely on the dimensions of size, organizational complexity, and amount of human, financial, and technical resources. Different governmental levels perform analogous and complementary roles, but agencies within each level of government differ in their functions. For example, at the local level of government, the agencies most involved with emergency management are the fire and police departments, which are the first agencies to respond to most emergencies. In many jurisdictions, the emergency management function is attached to one of these departments, but in larger communities it frequently is an independent agency. In some communities, there is a separate emergency medical services agency, but often this function is provided by the fire department working together with local hospitals and ambulance companies. Public works departments or engineering departments, transportation departments, and land use planning and community development departments are important stakeholders in the mitigation process, and also have responsibilities during response and recovery phases. Public health departments and housing departments also have important emergency management functions. Making matters even more complex, most members of these agencies belong to professional associations that lobby for disaster-relevant legislation. Regional and state-level stakeholder agencies include metropolitan planning organizations/councils of government, flood control districts, and coastal zone agencies, geological services agencies, and soil conservation agencies. The most important stakeholders are the state emergency management agencies, which vary widely in their levels of expertise, staffing, budgets, and other organizational resources. Nonetheless, these are the agencies that provide the major direction for local emergency managers, interact with state legislatures to provide the legal framework within which local emergency managers work, and serve to link local governments with FEMA regional offices. Academics specializing in specific hazards (e.g., seismologists, vulcanologists, meteorologists, toxicologists) and mitigation measures (land use planners, structural engineers, and architects) and hazard/disaster researchers (economists, geographers, political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists) form another important stakeholder group. They provide the basic scientific knowledge base on which sound emergency management policies and practices are built. There are several important research centers around the country, some of which are technically oriented and focus on one type of hazard (Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering, Mid America Earthquake Center, Pacific Earthquake Engineering Center, Earthquake Engineering Research Institute), others of which study all hazards and are multidisciplinary or focus on the social impacts of disasters (Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware, Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado, Hazard Reduction & Recovery Center at Texas A&M University, and International Hurricane Center at Florida International University). These academic institutions are supplemented by a growing group of consultants and providers of goods and services tailored to the needs of emergency management. At the national level, FEMA was until recently the lead agency for emergency management. With the signing of the Homeland Security Act (HS Act) in November of 2002, the United States undertook a significant restructuring of emergency management that is in its early stages. According to the HS Act, FEMA has been absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security, and its responsibilities fall to an Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response. Other under secretaries cover Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures; Border and Transportation Security; and Management. The Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response concentrates on preparedness and response in general, with particular attention to the Nuclear Incident Response Team, coordination, and development of improved communications systems. The Under Secretary is also responsible for aiding in recovery from “terrorist attacks and major disasters”. Mitigation is not mentioned in the authorizing legislation, but the analysis provided by the Executive Branch states that “the specification of primary responsibilities in this section does not detract from other important functions that will be transferred to the Department of Homeland Security…In all areas, the bill fully preserves the authority to carry out the functions of the FEMA, including support for community initiatives that promote homeland security, such as the Citizen Corps” (HS Act, p.7). As part of this restructuring mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-5, the Federal Response Plan has been replaced by the National Response Plan (NRP). The foundation for the NRP is the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS attempts to standardize terminology, standards, and procedures at the national level in order to maximize the effectiveness of response to the very largest disasters or Incidents of National Significance. The NRP and NIMS must be adopted by all federal departments and agencies and by state and local organizations by FY 2005. After this date, no federal preparedness assistance is to be provided to jurisdictions that have failed to adopt the NIMS. Private sector organizations are encouraged to develop emergency response plans that include information-sharing and incident-reporting protocols that fit in with local, state, and federal response plans. The NRP includes Planning Assumptions, Roles and Responsibilities, Concept of Operations, and Incident Management Actions as well as a complete set of Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes, Support Annexes, and Incident Annexes. These annexes lay out the responsibilities of various federal agencies in the NRP and are organized both by function and by incident type. The first of NIMS’s basic components is Command and Management—which includes the ICS for internal management during an incident, Multiagency Coordination Systems for defining operations of various agencies that respond through mutual aid agreements, and Public Information Systems for communicating critical information quickly and accurately to the public. The Preparedness component includes Planning, Training, Exercises; Personnel Qualification and Certification; Equipment Acquisition and Certification; Mutual Aid Agreements; and Publications Management. The third component is Resource Management, which defines standardized resource description, inventory, mobilization, dispatch, and tracking mechanisms. Finally, the Communications and Information Management component covers Incident Management Communications, Information Management, Supporting Technologies, and Ongoing Management and Maintenance.

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Emergency managers must familiarize themselves with the different types of stakeholders in their communities. The roles of stakeholders in the emergency management process can be understood by examining the levels at which different types of decisions are made. For example, decisions about the level of preparedness for each individual household are made at the household level, and emergency managers can support good mitigation and preparedness practices by undertaking public education efforts and enhancing local government support for organizations such as CERTs. Decisions about the level of attention and resources devoted to local emergency management are made by local government. Each emergency strikes a specific locality and so, in the United States, all emergency management is based on local government institutions and agencies. Agencies from outside the community, such as state emergency management agencies and FEMA, have a great deal of influence on local emergency management policies and practices. However, the emergency management process is fundamentally a local issue. Cities control their own emergency responders (primarily fire, police, EMS) and these groups must compete for resources with other local needs such as schools and roads. In the United States, land use practices such as zoning ordinances and building codes are also established at the local level, but state governments create the context within which local governments work. This legal authority means legislation covering the powers of the city and county governments originates at the state level. For example, some states require local jurisdictions to engage in land use planning whereas other states do not (Burby, 1998). Moreover, states vary in the degree to which they support local emergency managers with technical resources and monetary aid for specific needs. Notwithstanding the important contextual role played by the states, it is local governments that are empowered to control land use for the public good. Consequently, local governments make the decisions about specific land use controls as they undertake land use planning and zoning programs. In addition, local governments adopt building codes that establish requirements for hazard resistance, especially for wind and seismic hazards. Local government also makes decisions about levels of staffing and resources for local emergency responders (fire, police, EMS). Public works departments or their equivalents, transportation departments, water conservation districts, and other local or regional bodies make and implement policies that affect emergency management. In some cases, such as Harris County Texas where the city of Houston is located, regional emergency management has merged with the transportation and police to form joint EOC operations that integrate many functions. In addition to local governments, state governments have a number of important emergency management functions. For instance, in the case of a major disaster, a local government would request aid from its state emergency management agency (SEMA). In turn, the SEMA can call upon other state agencies, not least of which is the agency administering that state’s National Guard units. The latter are invaluable in many disasters because of their communication and transportation equipment, as well as their trained personnel. If a state believes it needs more resources than are available, it can request a Presidential Disaster Declaration in order to have access to federal assistance. Most, but not all, requests for Presidential Disaster Declaration are approved. Disapprovals occur when FEMA disagrees that local and state resources have been exceeded. Between the passage of the Stafford Act in 1988 and 1998, only about one-fourth of the requests for a Presidential Disaster Declaration were denied (Sylves, 1998). The federal government has attempted to implement an objective set of criteria for deciding whether to issue a Presidential Disaster Declaration, but the process still includes many subjective decision points, and political considerations have affected the declaration process.

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The first section of this chapter noted that stakeholders vary in the types and amounts of resources they bring to the emergency management process. One of the greatest differences is in the power different stakeholders have to influence others’ behavior and, thus, alter emergency management policy. More specifically, organizational theorists have described six types or bases of power—reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, referent, and information power (French & Raven, 1959, Raven, 1965). These different forms of power can be distinguished on the basis of social dependence and the need for surveillance to maintain the target’s desired behavior. The most familiar bases of power (reward and coercive) rest on the power holder’s ability to impose upon the target additional positive or negative consequences that are extrinsic to the action itself. These consequences may be tangible (money) or intangible (social acceptance). Both reward and coercive power are socially dependent because they require continuing surveillance to be effective. Such surveillance can make them very (sometimes prohibitively) costly to implement. Moreover, coercive power generally elicits hostility and often can be subverted by noncompliance and active deception. Indeed, it is the low likelihood of detection that causes people to violate the speed limit except when they see police cars. It also explains the failure of lower levels of government to implement mandates, such as NIMS compliance, imposed by higher levels of government. Legitimate, expert, and referent power bases are somewhat more attractive because they involve little surveillance. However, they are socially dependent in that they are specific to a given source. Legitimate power arises from one’s role relationship to another and can come from a formal social position (e.g., city mayor) or from an informal relationship derived from norms of reciprocity, equity, or helplessness. By contrast, expert power stems from an individual’s breadth and depth of knowledge in a particular domain (e.g., a physician). Referent power is based upon the target’s identification with (or desire to identify with) the power holder; the target uses the power holder as a reference point. According to Burnstein and Vinokur (1977), information power involves valid, novel, and relevant facts or arguments. Information power can be wielded either by introducing or withholding information (Mechanic, 1963). Informational influence is, in many respects, the most effective basis of power because it is socially independent. That is, once comprehended, it is internalized and its source becomes inconsequential. As a result, no surveillance is required to maintain the target’s desired behavior. However, information power does require acceptance of another’s statements only after an independent examination of their underlying rationale. Thus, exercising information power can be quite time consuming. The existence of these multiple bases of power should make it clear that power operates in the upward (i.e., households to local government to states to federal government) as well as in the downward direction. Thus, households and businesses can exert upward influence through lawsuits, boycotts, public ridicule, and voter pressure that allows them to actively resist other stakeholders’ actions. This balance of power is the consequence of the federal political structure of the United States coupled with a market economy which produces a complex policy environment that is fragmented vertically (between different levels of government) and horizontally (between the private and public sectors and, within the latter, among agencies within a given community). Figure $\ref{1}$, adapted from Lindell, et al. (1997), illustrates the relationships among stakeholders in emergency management. The core of the figure illustrates the conventional hierarchical relationships among federal, state, and local government, with solid arrows indicating the (downward) direction in which most power is exerted in the relationship. In addition, however, this figure shows the relationships of local government with neighborhoods/households and industries/businesses—who control most of the property at risk. It shows how information and influence flow from the bottom up as well as from the top down, and between groups of stakeholders. Relationships may be based on any of the six bases of power. In addition to the influence government has over neighborhoods/households and industries/businesses, these stakeholders are also affected by social influentials (e.g., knowledgeable peers), who are in turn influenced by social associations (e.g., environmental organizations). They are also affected by economic influentials who, in turn, are influenced by industry associations (e.g., bankers, and insurers). Finally, local government and businesses are influenced by hazards practitioners who, in turn, are influenced by their professional associations. All of these stakeholders interact with the governmental system to promote their preferred definitions of, and solutions to, problems (Stallings, 1995). Thus, this figure indicates emergency management policy is a much more complex process than government mandates “trickling down” from the federal government. Rather, emergency management involves a complex web of interlinked bi-directional power relationships among stakeholders with widely differing characteristics. In addition to these vertical linkages, there are horizontal linkages among stakeholders within a jurisdiction and from one jurisdiction to another (e.g., from one municipality to another). As later chapters will indicate, these vertical and horizontal linkages provide communities with the resilience to respond to and recover from disasters (Berke, et al., 1993). Figure $1$: Power Relationships Among Emergency Management Stakeholders. The predominant power base of a relationship might change over time, say from coercive power (e.g., mandates) to information power. The model also implies that stakeholders at the top of the diagram must mobilize the support of intermediate levels (especially local governmental agencies and elected officials) if anything is to be accomplished at the lower levels of the hierarchy. In the local government-households dyad, local government has more power. However, households do not lack power altogether. They can change local government through elections, subvert local policy through noncompliance, or appeal to higher authorities to change unpopular policies. Other policy dyads have similar dynamics, and other relationships, such as one between practitioners and state governments, can be hypothesized. The important point is that this is a complex, dynamic set of interlinked relationships that the emergency manager needs to understand.

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The basic policy process model, adapted from Anderson (1994), is presented in Table $\ref{T1}$. This model, which presents five stages through which policies move, can be thought of as a systems model with a feedback loop that runs from policy evaluation back to agenda setting. Of course, the actual policy process is neither linear nor as neatly divided into discrete stages as the model. However, for purposes of analysis, it is useful to consider the various stages in turn, recognizing that they may run concurrently and the process is often cyclical in nature as feedback from policy evaluation is absorbed in the process. Table $1 \label{T1}$: The Policy Process Model. Policy Terminology Stage 1: Agenda Setting Stage 2: Policy Formulation Stage 3: Policy Adoption Stage 4: Policy Implementation Stage 5: Policy Evaluation Definition of Policy Stage Establishing which problems will be considered by public officials Developing pertinent and acceptable proposed courses of action for dealing with a public problem Developing support for a specific proposal so that a policy can be legitimized or authorized Applying the policy by using government’s administrative machinery Determining whether the policy was effective and what adjustments are needed to achieve desired outcomes Typical objective Getting the government to consider action on a problem Generating alternative solutions to the problem Getting the government to accept a particular solution to the problem Applying the government’s policy to the problem Evaluating effectiveness and identifying improvements Agenda Setting The model begins consideration of the policy process with setting the policy agenda. Many of the most difficult problems an emergency manager will face involve getting the public and public officials to pay attention to hazards. It is common to hear people say that emergency management is of no interest to politicians until a disaster happens. At that point it is too late to do much beyond the most basic reactive response to urgent needs. The time to think about disasters is well before they occur, so a skillful, adaptive response can be planned and tested through drills and exercises. Thus, the emergency manager’s first task is to place hazards on the political agenda in his or her jurisdiction. There are at least three types of political agendas: the systemic, the governmental, and the institutional. The systemic agenda is the broadest; it refers to the set of policy issues that at any one time receive attention in the news media and so become a topic of conversation among the voters. The governmental agenda is the set of issues with which legislative bodies and executives are actually engaged at a particular time. The institutional agenda is the set of issues that various institutions are working on, and varies widely across organizations such as government agencies, business groups, local environmental groups, and the like. Agendas are unstable over time because public attention shifts from one issue to another as events occur, and the governmental and institutional agendas change as policymakers both respond to these shifts and attempt to shape them (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Although preparedness for emergency response and disaster recovery is usually less controversial than hazard mitigation, there are two reasons why local governments prefer to avoid any discussion of the potential for disasters in their communities. First, many local governments and business elites feel that calling attention to the potential for disasters in their community may discourage investment or tourism. Hazard mitigation is especially controversial because developers frequently believe land use and building construction restrictions will reduce or eliminate their profits. Second, there are many problems that arise on a daily basis, such as education and crime, that directly compete with emergency management for attention and resources. Every year a new class of kindergartners enters the public school system, but a disaster does not strike every year, and we cannot predict with certainty when it will strike. It is thus easy for local officials to push emergency management to the back burner and trust to luck rather than develop sound emergency management practices. There are various ways to get around this initial reluctance to place emergency management on the policy agenda. First, emergency managers can use the occurrence of a natural or technological disaster in another jurisdiction as a focusing event to draw public attention to the need for local disaster planning and hazard mitigation (Birkland, 1997; Lavell, 1994). The focus of public and official attention on a particular hazard for some period of time provides a window of opportunity for policy change (Kingdon, 1984). The problem for local emergency managers is to make use of this policy window while it is open, for it will not stay open forever. In fact, it is unknown how long such a policy window will stay open, or specifically what conditions will make it close. Nonetheless, Kingdon suggests policy windows sometimes close because of successful action on a problem or, alternatively, persistent failure to take any action. Alternatively, a policy window might close when another event occurs, shifting the systemic agenda on to other matters. A policy window might also close when key advocates for that policy leave, or are pushed out of, their positions in a policymaking body. Finally, policy windows might close if no possible course of action seems available. Given these constraints, we have hypothesized a distribution of stakeholder opinions on hazard mitigation over time, shown in Table $\ref{T2}$ below (adapted from Prater & Lindell, 2000). Beginning before the disaster, most people are indifferent or opposed to any attempts at addressing hazards. About six months after the disaster, about half might be in favor of some sort of action, but about half are still either neutral or opposed. Table $2 \label{T2}$: Hypothetical Changes in Stakeholder Opinions. Time (months) Strong Proponents Weak Proponents Neutrals Weak Opponents Strong opponents t - 6 5% 20% 50% 20% 5% t + 6 10% 40% 35% 10% 5% t + 18 5% 25% 50% 15% 5% Source: Prater and Lindell (2001). By 18 months after the disaster, opinion might have shifted back to nearly the same state as before, with only a slight erosion of the numbers opposed to action and a corresponding slight rise in the number in favor of hazard mitigation actions. This hypothesized distribution might or might not accurately reflect the situation regarding emergency management policy in any particular community, but the important point is that support for emergency management is likely to increase in the short run after a disaster, but will almost certainly decay before long. Because of the short amount of time available to effect policy change, individual actors must work in an aggressive, pro-active manner to set issues on the agenda and to keep them there. Such individuals are called policy entrepreneurs who act as advocates or champions for an issue. Policy entrepreneurs might be elected or appointed officials, local media personalities, educators, business owners, or interested citizens. Whoever they are, however, they will need three qualities in order to be successful. First, they need technical expertise in hazards, which can either be acquired through the traditional educational process or by self-education as the need arises. Second, they need to have or acquire the political expertise necessary for any successful policy change effort. Finally, they need a great deal of personal commitment because it is very difficult to enact any policy change, and it can sometimes take years to overcome opposition to new policies. Policy change is possible even if no single individual has all of these qualities because a group of individuals can be effective if they collectively have these traits. The resulting window of opportunity will not be open for long (Prater & Lindell, 2000), so local emergency managers can act as policy entrepreneurs if they are prepared with at least some data on the hazards to which the community is exposed and on the vulnerability of specific populations in the community. With these data in hand, the emergency manager can make a case that such an event could indeed “happen here.” Second, the emergency manager should have clear ideas about sound emergency management policies that are relevant to the local situation and could be presented quickly for adoption by the local city council or other legislative body. The emergency manager should act in an entrepreneurial manner rather than passively producing plans according to a prescribed template and assuming that the community will follow his or her lead when an event occurs. As in any policy debate, there are usually opposing interests that will be just as anxious to keep emergency management off the public agenda as emergency management professionals are to put it on (Bacharach & Baratz, 1962). This conflict of interests is especially true when it comes to emergency management policies. In some cases, there may be philosophical opposition to any governmental activity affecting private land use decisions. The property rights or “wise use” movement and the Supreme Court case of Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council are examples of this attitude in action (Platt, 1998). Emergency managers can play an important role in emergency management policy by supporting the hazard mitigation efforts of local planning and zoning commissions as they seek to expand the number of groups involved in the process. Since hazard mitigation, emergency response preparedness, and disaster recovery preparedness are meant to protect lives and property, it is possible to develop a strong coalition in favor of these practices when they are properly presented to the public. Such coalitions can be most effectively mobilized if issues are properly framed to maximize their appeal. The media have an important role in this process, particularly in the matter of issue framing—the words used to describe an issue. Issue framing can vary significantly depending on who is doing the talking. For many years, emergency management in the United States was framed in terms of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. In the 1980s and 1990s, a shift in framing from civil defense to comprehensive emergency management occurred, which promoted an increased emphasis on natural hazards and technological accidents. Currently, the federal government is reframing emergency management in terms of terrorism, coining the phrase homeland security to describe the new frame of reference. Another frame, used for discussing natural disasters, has been the term acts of God. This phrase implies a view of humanity as powerless victims of impersonal external forces and, thus, absolved from responsibility for avoiding disasters. The mass media are particularly prone to use this frame, showing pictures of suffering victims that reinforce the message. The rise of the sustainable development paradigm has fostered an increased acceptance of the idea that disasters are at least partly a result of vulnerability created by human choices and actions. This recognition of human responsibility, in turn, has raised the prominence of hazard mitigation on the governmental agenda. Scholars have noted that political issues might not be defined immediately as political problems. Rather, they can exist as conditions for some time before the existence of feasible coping strategies moves them into the realm of public discussion as problems that are amenable to solutions (Rochefort & Cobb, 1994). Thus, the first stakeholder to frame an issue can seize a significant political advantage, especially if he or she is successful in linking a proposed policy with widely shared public values. As an example, consider the “wise use” and “property rights” movements, which have mobilized opposition to the regulation of private property for the public good by framing the issue as one of “taking”. Those who support land use regulation as a means of promoting hazard mitigation can offset the takings definition by reframing the issue in terms of the linkage to an alternative value. Thus, proponents of hazard mitigation could frame the issue of land use regulation as one of balancing property rights and responsibilities. Indeed, as will be discussed in Chapter 8, this is precisely what the Association of State Floodplain Managers has done with its No Adverse Impacts Strategy. Policy Formulation Emergency management policy entrepreneurs must have a set of policy proposals on hand before they attempt to shape the agenda. If not, they run the risk that policy makers will find the issue too overwhelming and ignore it on the assumption that “there is nothing we can do anyway”. As the reframing of an issue from a condition into a problem becomes increasingly widespread, different stakeholders will propose solutions (Anderson, 1994; Kingdon, 1984). During this stage, many policy alternatives are likely to emerge. This makes policy formulation a critical stage in the process because it is a more technically demanding activity than agenda setting. Drafting legislation is crucial to the success of a policy because laws or regulations that are hastily drafted and poorly worded can have negative effects on the policy’s implementation and eventual effectiveness. The basis for any sound emergency management policy is a solid understanding of the community’s hazard exposure, its physical and social vulnerabilities, and its emergency management capabilities. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, hazard/vulnerability analysis provides a factual basis for policy formulation. Next, proposed policies must be developed with the local political context in mind. It is crucial to define clearly who are the targets of a policy (i.e., what types of households and businesses), what activities are to be regulated (e.g., land use practices and building construction practices), and what influence mechanisms are to be used (i.e., risk information, economic incentives, legal penalties, or a combination of these). With regard to the activities to be regulated, government has many alternatives. Land use policies can be used to avoid the construction of residential, commercial, or industrial structures in frequently flooded wetlands. Such wetlands serve important hazard mitigation functions by absorbing wave energy during hurricanes and retaining excess water during riverine floods. Alternatively, building construction policies can be used to ensure houses within floodplains are elevated, those near the coast have adequate wind resistance, and those near fault lines have seismic safety features. Moreover, emergency preparedness policies might be used to control lot sizes (thus limiting the population at risk in hazard-prone areas) or mandate the width of streets in subdivisions to provide access for emergency vehicles and egress for evacuees. To achieve the desired land use, building construction, and emergency preparedness objectives, governments can use hazard awareness campaigns to make households and businesses aware of the risks they face and of suitable hazard adjustments for reducing their vulnerability. Hazard adjustments include all pre-impact actions—hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and recovery preparedness (Burton, et al., 1993). Information campaigns relying on voluntary compliance tend to be politically acceptable, but few have been based upon contemporary scientific theories of social influence, and so these programs have had limited success to date (Lindell, et al., 1997). As will be discussed in Chapter 4, many hazard awareness programs provide very general information about physical hazards (e.g., what causes earthquakes) and sometimes describe what are the different hazard zones (in terms of either intensity, as is the case with hurricane risk areas, or frequency, as is the case with inland flood zones). However, few of them personalize the risk or describe appropriate hazard adjustments. Alternatively, governments can motivate the adoption of hazard-resistant land use and building construction practices by providing economic incentives such as low interest loans or tax credits. Of course, the money for such incentives must come from somewhere and cash-strapped local jurisdictions may not be able to provide it. Finally, governments can require hazard-resistant land-use and construction practices as a condition for construction permits. Of course, verification of compliance requires on-site inspections, and the problems with such inspections are extremely well known (Lindell et al., 1997). Specifically, local jurisdictions experiencing budget difficulties frequently cut back funding for building inspectors, so those who remain on the job must process higher inspection workloads. In turn, this requires them to spend less time inspecting construction projects, which increases the likelihood of contractors successfully evading building code requirements and thereby cutting their construction costs. More broadly, there is a significant degree of scholarly support for the idea that a combination of risk communication, land-use planning, building codes, and hazard insurance is an excellent way to address hazard vulnerability (Burby, 1998; Lindell & Perry, 2004) Whatever the combination selected, successful implementation requires the policy to be consistent with the community’s capacity (e.g., tax base, agency capabilities) and commitment (especially the community values articulated in issue framing). One important strategy in the policy formulation stage is to seek opportunities to work with other stakeholder groups to formulate policies that have a strong chance of being adopted and implemented. In most cases, this will involve working with weak proponents and neutrals to add features that will convert them into strong proponents. Sometimes, this will involve seeking out those who would normally be considered weak opponents—or even strong opponents—to craft a policy that they can accept. For example, this might mean working with developers and builders to formulate policies that allow them to develop less hazard prone areas, build on the less hazardous portions of their properties, or build structures that are more hazard resistant. Policy Adoption The policy adoption phase involves the mobilization of stakeholder groups to pressure the relevant level of government in order to ensure passage of the desired policy. An emergency manager should have a strategy for presenting the policy in the correct manner and at the right time so procedural issues do not derail policy adoption. It is important to have a policy officially adopted and on the books, for that is what gives it legal authority and allows for the institutionalization of a policy. When developing any public policy, care should be taken to include members of relevant stakeholder groups to ensure their interests are considered. Moreover, emergency managers should give special attention to the priorities of their department heads and the jurisdiction’s chief administrative officer. Inclusiveness is especially important in the case of hazard policies, because these policies often require a certain present investment (e.g., tax money allocated to first responder agency budgets) or a certain opportunity cost (e.g., a lucrative land development project foregone) in order to obtain an uncertain future benefit (reduced disaster losses). Moreover, these costs tend to be concentrated on a few stakeholders, whereas the benefits are widely distributed over the community as a whole. Consequently, those who expect an emergency management policy to affect them negatively have a more powerful incentive to mobilize than do those who expect to benefit. The typical stakeholder groups that should be considered at the local level are those that have been mentioned already—business leaders (developers, builders, Chamber of Commerce), elected officials, government agency staff, civic groups, church leaders, and neighborhood associations. All these groups have roles to play in providing for community hazard management. For example, business leaders might need to enhance their business plans to include business continuity planning to be used in case of disaster (Federal Emergency Management Agency, no date, c). Their cooperation with the community’s emergency management program can be facilitated by information about the losses they can avoid when disaster strikes. Considerations other than economics should be addressed as well. Agencies such as the public works department might be accustomed to dealing with hazards but feel threatened when the decisionmaking process is expanded to include meetings with neighborhood groups. As anonymous bureaucrats, they might not be accustomed to being held personally accountable for technical decisions and might equate citizen participation with needlessly looking for trouble. Conversely, some neighborhoods that are especially vulnerable to hazard impact might have a large proportion of lower income or ethnic minority residents who lack knowledge about the political system or even actively mistrust it. All of these concerns need to be balanced because any perceived unfairness in the policy or the way it was adopted is likely to cause problems in the implementation phase. Even after a policy has been developed, there are many veto points at which interests can block the adoption or implementation of policies they consider undesirable. Policy Implementation Adoption is not the end of the story. All policies must be implemented in order to be effective. Implementation is the stage most fraught with difficulties because opponents who have failed to block policy adoption often seek to undermine it as it is put into practice. The implementation stage of policy making is defined as those events and activities that occur after a policy is adopted and include the policy’s administration and its actual effects (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983). All policies are filtered through “street level bureaucrats”, those individuals who actually interact with the public (e.g., land use planners and building inspectors), so their enthusiastic support for policy goals and implementation methods is especially important. Implementation of emergency management policy depends substantially upon the nature of the governmental structure. In the United States, the government has a federal structure, so strong state and local governments can support or thwart the implementation of federal policy—whichever suits their purposes. Conversely, the federal government can either strengthen local emergency management processes by providing information or technical support or undermine local goals by failing to provide promised funding. If all stakeholders are included in the early stages of the policy process, it is more likely that the policy will be implemented in accordance with legislative intent. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1989) have developed a widely used model of policy implementation, highlighting specific variables and their interactions that produce varying levels of success. Three types of independent variables are included in this model, the first of which is the tractability of the problem, or how easy it is to solve. Emergency management involves complex problems. Consequently, overly simplistic policies can have unintended consequences, yet comprehensive policies are difficult to develop. As a result, hazard mitigation policies rank low on the tractability dimension and are difficult to implement. The second group of variables involves the ability of the statute to structure implementation. This is where statecraft and legislative skill are needed. One component of this concept is an adequate causal theory, which is a clear idea of how a particular emergency management policy will reduce casualties, damage, and losses. In the case of floods, dams are expected to protect people and property by confining excess river flow in reservoirs. The second component is a set of clear and internally consistent policy objectives. Using floods again as an example, conflicting objectives arise because dams are often intended to provide irrigation, electric power generation, and recreations functions (which favor full reservoirs) as well as flood control (which favors empty reservoirs). Moreover, policy clarity can be difficult to achieve because emergency management policy must be carefully crafted to achieve a balance between specificity and adaptability. Thus, on the one hand, clear directives are needed to produce results consistent with the intent of the policy. On the other hand, however, bureaucrats need the freedom to adapt the policy to the varied situations they encounter. The emergency management policy arena is especially prone to changes over time, so a significant amount of bureaucratic discretion probably will be necessary. Another important variable is the percentage of governmental resources allocated to emergency management, which is highly dependent on the fiscal resources available to the jurisdiction at the time of policy passage and on the importance of emergency management relative to other issues on the agenda. The third set of variables affecting implementation consists of nonstatutory factors, the first of which is the jurisdiction’s socioeconomic condition and the level of technology available to address the problem. These are constraints over which policymakers have little control in the short term. However, these constraints can be relaxed by means of investments in sustainable economic development (to enhance socioeconomic conditions) and technologies such as Geographic Information Systems (to enhance the level of technology), both of which are increasingly available to local governments. The second variable is one that carries over from previous stages of the policy process—the level of public support for emergency management policy. Public support tends to be cyclical, but it can be stabilized and even increased by persistent efforts to keep emergency management on the systemic agenda. Indeed, this affects the third and fourth factors—the attitudes and resources of constituency groups and support from the state or local government—both of which can be affected by coalition building activity. Finally implementing officials need to develop high levels of managerial and political skills to ensure successful implementation of emergency management policies. Mazmanian and Sabatier’s model provides an important basis for understanding policy implementation, but it neglects one factor that is critical to emergency management policy—the hierarchical relationships among federal, state, and local governments. This issue was the focus of May and Williams’ (1986) book, Disaster Policy Implementation, which examined shared governance among multiple levels of government. The authors described four modes of shared governance: limited regulatory, general regulatory, mobilization, and collaborative. These four modes are distinguished by the form of partnership (general or limited) and the form of activity (regulatory or programmatic) in which federal and state governments are involved. May and Williams found seismic safety was an exemplar of the collaborative mode, which is characterized by general partnership and programmatic activity. They observed that, even though federal involvement in earthquake mitigation began with the passage of the 1977 Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act (Public Law 95-124), few collaborative efforts to improve the states’ capacities for seismic risk reduction had been successful by the time of their study. According to May and Williams, problems in the shared governance of seismic safety arose at both ends of the partnership. At the federal level, technical expertise was in short supply and continuing personnel turnover hampered contacts with state agencies. Among the states, only California exercised initiative and showed a willingness to invest resources in the program. Problems arose between the federal government and the State of California mainly as a result of disputes over funding and control of projects. Another important aspect of emergency management policy is the effect of state mandates on local adoption and implementation of these policies. Previous research has examined the effect of mandate design on policy implementation (Goggin, et al. 1990; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975). Accordingly, May (1993) compared data from five states (California, North Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Washington) to discover the links between the design of hazards relevant aspects of land use mandates and the implementation of hazards mitigation policy. May’s analysis examined the effects of five independent variables: mandate facilitating features, mandate controls, mandate goal clarity, agency capacity, and agency commitment. Two of the state mandate variables had a significant positive impact on the level of state implementation. The first of these was mandate facilitating features, which is defined by characteristics meant to increase local government commitment and capacity to address mandate goals. The second state mandate variable was mandate controls, which are the tools state agencies can use to affect local government efforts. Contrary to the predictions of Mazmanian and Sabatier’s model, mandate goal clarity had no significant effect. It seemed to be sufficient for agency personnel to have a clear and consistent view of their duties, even if the statute was vague. The level of commitment by the state agency charged with implementing the mandate had a significant positive effect, whereas agency capacity did not, again failing to support Mazmanian and Sabatier’s emphasis on agency capacity. This might be because, if an agency is strongly committed to a goal, sufficient capacity will be allocated to meet that goal even if other programs must suffer. May’s research confirmed the importance of an adequate level of technical expertise, low turnover of personnel, agency commitment to hazards mitigation, and the existence of adequate facilitating features, and controls built into the mandate for the successful implementation of emergency management policy. Further analyses addressed the factors affecting mandate strength (May, 1994). The most important factors affecting the strength and style of state mandates for hazard mitigation were the presence of a moralistic state political culture, as opposed to an individualistic or traditionalistic political culture (Elazar, 1994), lawmakers’ perceptions of the seriousness of the hazard, and the political power of the target population. These results suggest it would be useful for local government officials to impress upon state legislators the importance of supporting their efforts at emergency management and for affected populations to organize in order to increase their political power. The stronger the commitment of the implementing agency to the goals of the policy, the more likely it is to devote the necessary resources to implementing the policy. The agency needs to have enough tools available, in the form of incentives and sanctions, to adequately implement the policy. If lawmakers are convinced of the seriousness of the problem, they are more likely to provide adequate authority and capacity to the implementing agency so it can properly enforce the policy. This is especially true if the target population has the power to resist the policy. Policy Evaluation Finally, as in any system, the policy process model provides for a feedback loop in which the policy is periodically evaluated and either improved or terminated. The most effective programs include provisions for such feedback in the language of the statute and are carefully structured to allow for clear evaluation. One prominent illustration of the lack of policy evaluation is Project Impact, a program that will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7. As successful as it might have been in mobilizing a constituency for community hazard mitigation, there was no systematic evaluation of its success in reducing disaster losses. Worse yet, one of the criteria for selection as a Project Impact community was a history of commitment to hazard mitigation. A demonstrated history of success in hazard mitigation would have made it very difficult to determine the success of a program intended to increase hazard mitigation efforts at the local level. This confusion of selection criteria and desired results made it difficult to disentangle how much of the improvement in hazard mitigation in Project Impact communities was due to the program, and how much would have occurred anyway, given the history of commitment to hazard mitigation in the community.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/2%3A_Emergency_Management_Stakeholders/2.5%3A_The_Emergency_Management_Policy_Process.txt

Emergency management is a necessary function of local governments that is supported by state and federal governments. Although it provides much needed assistance after disasters, good emergency management practices can raise opposition during other phases of the disaster cycle. Although it would seem that emergency management is an obvious public good, there are always some forces that resist any policy or set of policies. Emergency managers must identify the sources of this resistance in order to be effective in changing their communities’ priorities regarding emergency management. What features of emergency management can arouse opposition, and why? Disaster relief seldom arouses opposition because it is a distributive policy that benefits a “deserving” population and has no identifiable losers. It is thus difficult to oppose disaster relief without appearing to be uncaring and unsympathetic. Not all emergency management policies are distributive, however. Mitigation practices such as land use controls and building codes are examples of regulatory policy, which imposes restrictions and limits on behavior and often imposes associated costs. Such policies frequently generate conflict because there are obvious losers. For example, a prohibition against construction on barrier islands produces benefits that are broadly distributed across the entire community when it is protected from hurricane damage. However, these benefits seem speculative at the time the policy is adopted and, in any event, would probably involve a relatively small amount of money for each household protected by the policy. Thus, few of those who benefit are likely to fight for adoption of the policy. By contrast, the “losses” (i.e., the potential profits that would have otherwise been reaped, known as opportunity costs) are concentrated among a few influential individuals who are, thus, highly motivated to fight against adoption of the policy. This situation leads to an increase in conflict that emergency managers must learn to manage in order to ensure the adoption and implementation of effective mitigation policies. In order to develop an effective emergency management system, the local emergency manager must involve the relevant stakeholders in the process. Stakeholder involvement requires coordinating the various groups as emergency operations and recovery operations plans are drawn up and exercised, as well as during an event. Most of an emergency manager’s work should be conducted between disasters and behind the scenes, as he or she seeks to facilitate relationships among the stakeholders that will strengthen horizontal linkages within the community and vertical linkages of the community with outside resources in higher levels of government (Berke, et al., 1993). These strong linkages will improve the flow of information, services, and supplies during a disaster. Nonetheless, emergency managers should not work in silence or in isolation. Such a mode of operation produces inadequate plans that are not used during disasters. The only way to produce usable emergency operations and recovery operations plans is through consultation and cooperation with all the relevant agencies—taking their needs, resources, and missions into account. Similarly, good emergency management policies are produced through consultation. How is this to be done? One important way to involve stakeholders is to work with other government agencies. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs) can become valuable forums for input from other agencies on the emergency management process. Many of these were originally formed for the specific purpose of improving community right-to-know and preparedness for toxic chemical emergencies, but some have expanded their scope to address chemical emergency management and all of them can contribute to the management of other environmental hazards faced by their communities (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Such committees will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. Another important way to involve stakeholders is to work with citizens’ groups. Fostering citizen involvement requires emergency managers to initiate contacts throughout the community. Since it goes almost without saying that budget and staff constraints limit the extent to which such initiatives may be taken, the following paragraphs will sketch a few techniques that can be used with modest resource expenditures. To be successful, the process of community participation must be carefully organized and managed (Glass, 1979). Least likely to be effective would be to simply invite community residents to comment on local disaster plans in the absence of a structured program for presenting the plans and an orderly mechanism for evaluating and accommodating comments. When considering how to involve citizens in emergency planning, one must address four distinct tasks. First, affected residents must be notified that planning is underway and informed who is responsible for planning. In some cases, emergency managers can identify which residents will be affected by their functional relationship to a policy. For example, all homeowners in a watershed are relevant stakeholders for flood hazard management. Second, information must be provided to citizens that describes (as free from technical terminology as is reasonably achievable) the nature and severity of local hazards, the types of mitigation actions that are being taken to reduce these hazards, the assessment actions that are being taken to monitor the hazard, and the types of protective actions that can be implemented in an emergency. Educational contacts include hazard awareness programs intended to familiarize the public with the nature of the hazards to which the community is vulnerable and the basic provisions of the emergency plan. As a method of community involvement, educational contacts have the advantage of reaching large audiences at moderate cost, and the disadvantage of using essentially one-way communication. The emergency services officials get their message out but, except in rare circumstances, the audience cannot respond. Third, techniques for information exchange involve seeking feedback from citizens, especially about specific planning efforts and emergency management policies that might be used in the operations phase. Fourth, citizen feedback must be incorporated into the preparedness process through support-building in which one seeks to enhance the credibility of the plan (and of the planners and response personnel) in the eyes of the public. Achievement of these information exchange and support-building objectives requires two-way communication, especially direct personal contact. Specific Techniques for Community Involvement One very simple technique for obtaining feedback and support requires nothing more than for emergency management staff to “talk up” their work to friends, relatives and neighbors—describing community hazard vulnerability and emergency plans in general terms—and seeking informal reactions. Such grassroots interaction can, of course, be extremely limited in its access to ethnic groups and socioeconomic classes if there are no emergency planners that are members of these groups. In light of their negligible cost, however, the long run value of such exchanges should not be underestimated. A second technique for interacting with the public involves setting up a “hazard hotline” telephone number. This hotline need not be any more elaborate than advertising an office phone number and training existing staff to handle inquiries or using a recorded message. Citizens could be informed of the information line, perhaps via a mailed brochure, and staff could develop a procedure for promptly responding to questions. This type of phone-in arrangement is quite useful in that it serves to gather and disseminate information on a routine basis and has the potential to be expanded into a rumor control or warning confirmation line during times of disaster (Perry, 1982). Over the course of the year, one would not anticipate a large volume of inquiries. Such nonemergency calls probably would tax neither the ability of staff to respond nor the capability of telephone equipment to handle calls. A third technique for communicating with the public is to establish direct contact with citizens in the community. Such contact is often achieved by speaking at meetings of school, neighborhood, and community organizations. Neighborhood meetings can deal with very specific and timely topics; they can reach otherwise difficult to contact groups; and they provide both face-to-face contact and an opportunity for dialogue. For example, a community or neighborhood club might welcome a speaker who describes how to prepare for a hurricane at the start of the most vulnerable season. Emergency managers could explain to residents how warnings will be disseminated, when and how to shelter in-place, what roads will serve as evacuation routes, and what procedures will be used to secure evacuated areas. Such meetings also afford an opportunity to ask citizens if they have a family emergency plan that provides for what to do if the family is separated when an evacuation is initiated, where the family plans to seek refuge, what they will pack to take with them, what vehicles will be taken and what route will be followed. Other questions that can be asked include their willingness to use services provided by authorities, such as warning confirmation numbers, public transportation, willingness to use a family message center, concerns about looting, and willingness to participate in emergency response support activities such as citizen patrols. Discussions at this level of specificity can not only provide emergency managers with an assessment of what the members of their community think about such issues, but also stimulate citizen thought, discussion, and preparedness for emergency response. Once again, it is important to remember that neighborhood groups and community organizations tend to have fairly homogeneous memberships. In order to communicate with all segments of the community, one must make contacts with many different types of groups. Finally, sustained citizen involvement can be achieved by creating citizen advisory committees and citizen cadre opportunities. Advisory committees are usually small in size and attached to departments to provide general guidance, but they can be used for such specific topics as emergency planning. When an advisory committee is created, a significant commitment of time is usually required. At a minimum, officials must devise a schedule for periodic (monthly or bimonthly) meetings and an acceptable mechanism for soliciting information, evaluating it, and then either using it or explaining why it was not used. A properly administered citizen advisory committee can provide timely and accurate information on specific points of planning interest and can also mobilize strong support within the community. While citizen advisory committees tend to involve people in the administrative aspects of emergency planning, citizen cadre opportunities tend to involve volunteers in selected operational duties. Citizen cadres require some degree of training and usually function as auxiliary personnel acting in support of regular emergency personnel. Citizen cadres have been used to fill sandbags on flood levees, direct traffic, serve on search and rescue teams, provide security in evacuated areas, and help administer family locator services. Citizen cadres incorporate volunteers into the emergency response process in ways that are commensurate with the skills they bring to the emergency response organization. Such auxiliaries can be used to ease the tremendous demands placed on regular personnel during the emergency response phase. Moreover, appropriately trained volunteers are familiar with emergency procedures and the logic behind them. Such persons can build support within the community by explaining emergency procedures to others. In summary, the purposes of these techniques are to allow emergency authorities to better anticipate the reaction of their community in a disaster and to familiarize citizens with emergency response planning and operations. It might not be necessary or cost-effective to use all of these techniques in the same community. They are identified here as alternative programs from which to select the ones that best meet the emergency preparedness needs and budgetary constraints of a given community. Forming coalitions with groups interested in related issues can be a valuable strategy for an emergency manager. Emergency managers can join other groups to ensure the adoption of policies that perform multiple functions and, thus, have a larger base on which to build support for emergency management. For example, environmental groups are interested in preserving wetlands or riverine corridors for their aesthetic value and other reasons. These same lands can perform valuable hazard mitigation functions by absorbing the effects of floods or avoiding an increase in community vulnerability by keeping housing out of a floodplain. Emergency managers can be more effective in an increasingly competitive political climate if they work collaboratively with other groups to promote policies meeting the objectives of multiple stakeholder groups. Sources of State and Federal Assistance State and federal emergency management agencies are extremely valuable sources of assistance to local emergency managers. These agencies can provide technical guidance on hazard/vulnerability analyses, hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery. Of course, the types and quantities of state assistance vary from one state to another, so it is important for local emergency managers to contact their state emergency management agencies and to join their state emergency management associations to obtain information about the available resources. Emergency managers can also take advantage of resources from other states. In a disaster, they rely on the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC, see www.emacweb.org), which was established in 1996 by an act of Congress. Since then, EMAC has been joined by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. EMAC facilitates direct mutual aid from one state to another in response to any type of disaster. Because they are located closer to the impact area, these resources from neighboring states are likely to reach a stricken area faster than federal resources. Like other mutual aid agreements, EMAC provides for financial reimbursement, legal liability, and workers’ compensation for any injuries incurred during the disaster response. In addition, EMAC recognizes the credentials of out-of-state emergency responders. An EMAC operation begins when the governor a requesting state declares a state of emergency. An authorized representative who has the legal power to commit the requesting state’s funds asks for assistance from the EMAC National Coordination Group. This unit is the nationwide point of contact for activating EMAC in response to a declared emergency. An A-team deploys to the requesting state where it conducts a needs assessment, alerts EMAC members about these needs, and receives offers from assisting states that provide resources under the compact. The requesting state and the assisting state negotiate the availability and cost of requested resources and, after reaching agreement, dispatch the requested resources. To facilitate this process, each EMAC member state has a designated contact who is an expert on EMAC procedures. There also is an EMAC National Coordinating Team that can be activated by DHS/FEMA to coordinate federal response and recovery operations. This team deploys to the National Response Coordinating Center, located in Washington, D.C., so it can help to coordinate with any EMAC teams responding to the incident scene. The EMAC National Coordinating Team can be complemented by an EMAC Regional Coordinating Team, which mobilizes at a Regional Coordination Center to coordinate regional response and recovery operations. From there, the EMAC Regional Coordinating Team coordinates with any EMAC field units providing assistance at the incident scene. There is also an enormous amount of assistance available from federal agencies. Many types of technical and financial assistance are addressed throughout the remainder of this text, particularly the chapters on hazard/vulnerability analysis, hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery. There is an almost bewildering variety of technical support that the federal government makes available during disasters. The appendix to this chapter lists the emergency support functions (ESFs) into which federal emergency response activities are organized and the assignments of federal agencies to ESFs. 2.7: Case Study: The Politics of Hazard Mitigation St. Louis, Missouri lies in the New Madrid Fault Zone and most of its buildings are vulnerable unreinforced masonry structures. In 1976, the Department of Housing and Urban Development escalated the seismic standards for Federal Housing Authority and Veterans Administration loans in this region from the Building Officials and Code Administrators’ (BOCA) Basic Building Code to the more stringent Uniform Building Code (UBC) Zone II requirements (Drabek, Mushkatel & Kilijanek, 1983). Concerned about the effect on new construction, local developers, contractors and officials sought technical assistance in challenging the policy. HUD officials viewed local opposition as a threat to their entire policy, which they felt was more than adequately justified by the safety threat to local residents. However, technical experts attacked the scientific basis for HUD’s policy with the assertions that inclusion of St. Louis in Zone II was a cartographic error, the assumed 300-500 year return intervals were in error, and projected damage from a repeat of the 1811-1812 earthquakes was overestimated. The city lobbied the local HUD office to request that the HUD Secretary exempt St. Louis from the seismic requirements and asked its congressional delegation, the Home Builder’s Association, and public interest groups to support this request. By 1981, the BOCA I Code was used for all structures except multifamily housing rehabilitation projects, where the UBC Zone II requirements were applied. Even the impact of this requirement was minimal because it was enforced by the HUD regional office in Kansas City and the local HUD office in St. Louis, not by the city or county of St. Louis. Consequently, most engineers and developers contacted by Drabek and his colleagues were uncertain about which standards should be applied.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/2%3A_Emergency_Management_Stakeholders/2.6%3A_Involving_Stakeholders_in_Emergency_Management.txt

St. Louis, Missouri lies in the New Madrid Fault Zone and most of its buildings are vulnerable unreinforced masonry structures. In 1976, the Department of Housing and Urban Development escalated the seismic standards for Federal Housing Authority and Veterans Administration loans in this region from the Building Officials and Code Administrators’ (BOCA) Basic Building Code to the more stringent Uniform Building Code (UBC) Zone II requirements (Drabek, Mushkatel & Kilijanek, 1983). Concerned about the effect on new construction, local developers, contractors and officials sought technical assistance in challenging the policy. HUD officials viewed local opposition as a threat to their entire policy, which they felt was more than adequately justified by the safety threat to local residents. However, technical experts attacked the scientific basis for HUD’s policy with the assertions that inclusion of St. Louis in Zone II was a cartographic error, the assumed 300-500 year return intervals were in error, and projected damage from a repeat of the 1811-1812 earthquakes was overestimated. The city lobbied the local HUD office to request that the HUD Secretary exempt St. Louis from the seismic requirements and asked its congressional delegation, the Home Builder’s Association, and public interest groups to support this request. By 1981, the BOCA I Code was used for all structures except multifamily housing rehabilitation projects, where the UBC Zone II requirements were applied. Even the impact of this requirement was minimal because it was enforced by the HUD regional office in Kansas City and the local HUD office in St. Louis, not by the city or county of St. Louis. Consequently, most engineers and developers contacted by Drabek and his colleagues were uncertain about which standards should be applied. Appendix 2-A: Federal Agencies and Their Responsibilities Under the National Response Plan The NRP defines 15 emergency support functions (ESFs) that span the types of activities federal agencies can perform in response to an event that overwhelms the resources of local and state government. Table 9-5 lists the ESFs by number and name together with a brief description of the activities involved in each of them. Table 9-5. Emergency Support Functions. ESF # Function name Activities ESF #1 Transportation Provides transportation support including reporting damage, coordinating alternate transportation services, coordinating restoration, for air, water, road, rail, and pipeline ESF #2 Communications Provides alternate telecommunications support and assists in the restoration of infrastructure for telecommunications and information technology ESF #3 Public Works and Engineering Provides pre- and post-incident assessments of public works and infrastructure as well as engineering and construction management expertise ESF #4 Firefighting Provides for the detection and suppression of wildland, rural, and urban fires ESF #5 Emergency Management Provides for interagency planning and coordinated operations ESF #6 Mass Care, Housing and Human Services Provides sheltering and feeding of victims, short- and long-term housing, and support for victim counseling and benefits claims ESF #7 Resource Support Provides emergency facilities, equipment, materials and supplies, as well as contracting and transportation services ESF #8 Public Health and Medical Services Provides assessments of public health/medical needs, medical care personnel, and medical equipment and supplies ESF #9 Urban Search and Rescue Organizes, deploys, and supports teams to extricate trapped victims from collapsed buildings ESF #10 Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Detects, contains, and cleans up releases of oil and hazardous materials ESF #11 Agriculture and Natural Resources Provides nutritional assistance, controls animal and plant diseases, assures food safety and security, and protects natural and cultural resources and historic properties ESF #12 Energy Assesses energy system damage and its likely effects ESF #13 Public Safety and Security Provides force and critical infrastructure protection and technical assistance to state and local government ESF #14 Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation Provides financial and technical assistance to support the recovery of state and local governments, including mitigation actions to prevent disaster recurrence or limit its magnitude ESF #15 External Affairs Provides coordinated dissemination of information from federal agencies to the general public, the Congress, state and local governments and tribal authorities, and international governments In addition, the NRP assigns federal agencies three types of responsibilities within each ESF. The first role is that of coordinator, which is responsible for planning and coordinating the federal response in that function. The second role is primary agency, which is responsible for staffing the emergency response. The third role is support agency, which is responsible for providing personnel technical assistance as requested by the primary agencies. The remainder of this appendix lists each agency’s assigned ESF responsibilities. Department of Agriculture. USDA is the coordinator and shares the role of primary agency with the Department of the Interior (DOI) for ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources) and shares the role of primary agency for ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). USDA has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #12 (Energy), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Agriculture/Forest Service. USDA/FS is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #4 (Firefighting) and has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), and ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security). Department of Commerce. DOC shares the role of primary agency for ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation) and has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Defense. DOD has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Defense/US Army Corps of Engineers. DOD/USACE is the coordinator and shares the role of primary agency for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering). DOD/USACE has secondary responsibility for ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). Department of Education. ED has secondary responsibility for ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Energy. DOE is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #12 (Energy). DOE has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Health and Human Services. HHS is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services) and shares the role of primary agency on ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). HHS has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Homeland Security. DHS shares the roles as coordinator and primary agency for ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security) and coordinator for ESF #15 (External Affairs). DHS has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), and ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/EPR/FEMA is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #5 (Emergency Management). FEMA is the coordinator and shares the role of primary agency for ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services). FEMA is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue). FEMA is the coordinator and shares the role of primary agency for ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). FEMA is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #15 (External Affairs). FEMA has secondary responsibility for ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), and ESF #12 (Energy). Department of Homeland Security/Information Analysis and Protection/National Communications System. DHS/IAIP/NCS is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #2 (Communications). NCS has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Homeland Security/US Coast Guard. DHS/USCG shares the role as primary agency for ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response). USCG has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), and ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security). Department of Housing and Urban Development. HUD shares the role as primary agency for ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). HUD has secondary responsibility for ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Interior. DOI has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Justice. DOJ shares a role as coordinator and primary agency for ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security). DOJ has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Labor. DOL has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of State. DOS has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Transportation. DOT is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #1 (Transportation). DOT has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Treasury. TREAS shares a role as coordinator and primary agency for ESF # 14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation). TREAS has secondary responsibility for ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Department of Veterans Affairs. VA has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Central Intelligence Agency. CIA is a member of the Interagency Incident Management Group but has no responsibilities for ESFs. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA is the coordinator for ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response) and shares the role as primary agency. EPA has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Federal Communications Commission. FCC has secondary responsibility for ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). General Services Administration. GSA is the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #7 (Resource Support). GSA has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA has secondary responsibility for ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NRC has secondary responsibility for ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Office of Personnel Management. OPM has secondary responsibility for ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Small Business Administration. SBA has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #2 (Communications), ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #4 (Firefighting), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #7 (Resource Support), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), ESF #10 (Oil and Hazardous Materials Response), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Social Security Administration. SSA has secondary responsibility for ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). Tennessee Valley Authority. TVA has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #12 (Energy), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). US Agency for International Development. USAID has secondary responsibility for ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). US Postal Service. USPS has secondary responsibility for ESF #1 (Transportation), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #6 (Mass Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #13 (Public Safety and Security), and ESF #15 (External Affairs). White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. OSTP is a member of the Interagency Incident Management Group but has no responsibilities for ESFs. American Red Cross. ARC has secondary responsibility for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF #5 (Emergency Management), ESF #8 (Public Health and Medical Services), ESF #11 (Agriculture and Natural Resources), ESF #14 (Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation), and ESF #15 (External Affairs).

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/2%3A_Emergency_Management_Stakeholders/Appendix_2%3A_Federal_Agencies_and_Their_Responsibilities_Under_the_National_Response_Plan.txt

This chapter describes the activities needed to build effective emergency management organizations, beginning with the fundamentals of running a local emergency management agency. The most important concept in this chapter is the development of a local emergency management committee (LEMC) that establishes horizontal linkages among a local jurisdiction’s government agencies, NGOs, and private sector organizations relevant to emergency management. In addition, an LEMC can provide vertical linkages downward to households and businesses and upward to state and federal agencies. 3: Building and Effective Emergency Management Organization To build an effective emergency management organization, it is necessary to understand the relationships among some of the stakeholders that are involved. As noted in Figure 2-1, local government has downward vertical linkages with households and businesses, upward vertical linkages with state and federal agencies, and horizontal linkages with social and economic influentials and hazards practitioners. However, it also is important to understand the horizontal and vertical linkages within local government. Specifically, local emergency management agencies (LEMAs) typically have horizontal linkages with personnel in police, fire, emergency medical services, public works, and emergency management/homeland security departments. At the municipal level, all of these departments report to (i.e., have a vertical linkage with) their jurisdiction’s chief administrative officer (CAO), such as a mayor or city manager, who has direct supervisory authority over them. The CAO is responsible for ensuring these departments perform their assigned duties within the requirements of the law and accomplish these functions within the time and funds allocated to them. Accordingly, the CAO has the authority to hire, fire, allocate funds, and evaluate performance—a relationship represented in Figure 3-1 as a solid line. However, the CAO typically is not an expert in public safety, emergency medicine, or emergency management and, therefore, cannot provide these departments with guidance on how to perform their missions most effectively. Thus, city and county agencies frequently have vertical linkages with corresponding agencies at the state (and sometimes federal) level that provide technical, and sometimes financial, assistance. Because agencies at higher (state and federal) levels of government lack the legal authority to compel performance by the corresponding agencies at lower (county and city) levels, their relationship is sometimes represented as a “dotted line” relationship in organizational charts (see Figure 3-1). In turn, the agencies at the state level report to the governor in a line relationship just as the agencies at the local level report to their jurisdictions’ CAOs. The relationships among agencies at the county level are somewhat more complex for jurisdictions in which agency heads are directly elected by the voters rather than appointed by the local CAO. County sheriffs, in particular, can be quite protective of their autonomy, so they can be characterized as having just as much of a “dotted line” relationship with the Chair of the County Board of Supervisors as with the state police. Although it is not shown in Figure 3-1, the hierarchical relationship between the local and state levels also extends to the federal level, with the corresponding agencies represented at each level. In addition, however, emergency management organizations have two other “dotted line” relationships that should be noted. First, local emergency managers often establish memoranda of agreement (MOA) with peer agencies in neighboring jurisdictions to provide personnel and material support during emergencies. Second, emergency management agencies have close relationships with Local Emergency Management Committees (LEMCs), which is a generic term for formalized disaster planning networks that are used to increase coordination among emergency-relevant agencies within a given community. Figure \( 1 \): Relationships among local and state agencies Some of these LEMCs are established by legal mandate, as is the case for those required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (also known as the Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986—SARA Title III) to inform and prepare their communities for accidental releases of toxic chemicals. However, some emergency managers have established similar organizations without a specific legal mandate—calling them disaster preparedness committees, disaster planning committees, emergency management advisory committees, or some other similar name (Daines, 1991; Drabek, 1987, 1990). Some of these LEMCs have assumed responsibility for disaster recovery and hazard mitigation as well as preparedness and response, and some address all hazards to which their community is exposed, not just accidental releases of toxic chemicals. Although LEPCs established under SARA Title III are probably the most common of these emergency planning organizations and LEPCs have been the subject of more research than any other type of formalized planning network, the lessons learned from studies of LEPCs are likely to apply to all such organizations. Consequently, we will use the more generally applicable acronym LEMC throughout the remainder of this book.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/3%3A_Building_and_Effective_Emergency_Management_Organization/3.1%3A_Introduction.txt

Similarly, the generic term we will use in this book to refer to the community agency that is responsible for emergency management is the Local Emergency Management Agency (LEMA). In practice, the LEMA might be known as the Office of Civil Defense, Emergency Management, Emergency Services, Homeland Security, some combination of these names, or yet some other name. Moreover, the LEMA might be a separate department, a section of another department, or an individual attached to the chief administrative officer’s office. In many cities and counties, especially those with small populations or limited hazard vulnerability, the LEMA is staffed by a single individual, whose title, like the name of the LEMA, varies. Consequently, we will refer to this individual as the local emergency manager. In larger jurisdictions—especially those that are exposed to major hazards—the local emergency manager is likely to have multiperson staff. The emergency manager almost always reports directly to the jurisdiction’s CAO during emergencies, but frequently reports to the head of a major agency such as police or fire during normal operations. Local emergency managers vary in their employment status—full-time paid, part-time paid, or volunteer—again depending upon jurisdiction size (and, thus, its financial resources) and hazard vulnerability. In the past, local emergency managers have varied significantly in their training and experience, which frequently is associated with their jurisdictions’ resources and vulnerability; those jurisdictions that can afford to pay more tend to attract personnel with greater qualifications. Of course, this is not an invariant rule; there are many well-qualified and dedicated personnel in smaller jurisdictions. The Job Description A local emergency manager’s first task should be to understand the duties of his or her own position as defined by a job description (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1983). To whom does the incumbent (the person who serves as the local emergency manager) report, who reports to the incumbent, what is the specific function of the position, what duties for the position are specifically listed in the job description, and what are the specific qualifications (education, training, and experience) that are listed in the job description? If there currently is no job description or the one that exists is outdated, the emergency manager should draft a new job description and discuss it with her or his superior. LEMA Staffing Many LEMAs have administrative (clerk, secretary, or administrative assistant) or professional (emergency management analyst) staff that are paid part- or full-time. Such personnel need to have job descriptions specifying their titles, reporting lines, functions, duties, and qualifications. These personnel support the LEMA by receiving and tracking correspondence, drafting plans and procedures, maintaining databases, scheduling meetings, maintaining meeting minutes, and the like. In many cases, a LEMA’s budget is too small to support enough paid staff to perform all of these activities. Consequently, volunteers are enlisted by contacting community service organizations, clubs, Boy and Girl Scout troops, and others. These volunteers can be a valuable source of assistance in achieving the LEMA’s goals by performing tasks that are delegated by the local emergency manager. Indeed, some volunteers have valuable skills (e.g., computing, radio communications) the emergency manager lacks. Each of the LEMA staff members should be given a clear description of his or her duties. In addition, most jurisdictions require paid staff to be provided with periodic (at least annual) performance appraisals. These appraisals allow employees to assess their performance over the previous year and to set training and performance objectives for the year to come. Although rarely mandatory, regularly scheduled performance reviews for volunteers are valuable in guiding their development and enhancing their performance effectiveness. A jurisdiction’s human resources department can provide valuable guidance on its personnel policies. LEMA Program Plan Emergency managers need to develop program plans that systematically direct their efforts over the course of the year. FEMA (1983, 1993) has advised emergency managers to set annual goals in each of the major programmatic areas for which they are responsible—such as hazard and vulnerability analysis, hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, recovery preparedness, and community hazard education. Once these goals have been set, the local emergency manager should assess the LEMA’s ability to achieve these goals. This capability assessment is likely to identify satisfactory levels of capability in some areas but not in others. The emergency manager should document the capability shortfall and devise a multiyear development plan to reduce that shortfall. The limited funds available for emergency management make it a certainty that the shortfall cannot be eliminated within a single year, so this is the reason why a multiyear (typically five year) development plan is needed. Despite its long planning horizon, the multiyear development plan should identify specific annual milestones (measurable objective indicators) to determine if progress is being made at a satisfactory rate. LEMA Budget Preparation An organization’s budget lists the categories of anticipated expenditures and the amount that has been allocated to each category. The budget usually covers the jurisdiction’s fiscal year, which is a 12 month period that might or might not be the same as the calendar year (from January 1 to December 31). The budget is a financial plan that identifies the amount of money that has been allocated to each of its budget categories. Typical budget categories include routine continuing items such as staff salaries, office space, office equipment (e.g., copiers, computers, fax machines), telephone (local and long-distance), travel, and materials and supplies (e.g., paper, toner). The budget should anticipate the need to replace worn out or obsolete equipment or to purchase new equipment that will increase the LEMA’s capabilities. The budget also should contain a contingency fund that addresses the costs of resources that will be expended in a foreseeable emergency. The challenge for the emergency manager is to ensure the expenses do not exceed the budgeted amount. This is not difficult to do for the routine continuing items because, for example, staff salaries, office space, and local telephone service are fixed and materials and supplies are quite predictable from month to month. Repairs to office equipment can be unpredictable, but this can be managed by signing a service contract that establishes a fixed fee for routine preventive and corrective maintenance. Long-distance telephone and travel for training are somewhat less predictable but are discretionary, so these activities can be reduced if the expenses for other categories prove to be greater than expected. The amount to set aside in the contingency fund for emergency response is more difficult to estimate because the scope of an emergency (or even whether one occurs) is unpredictable. Nonetheless, past agency records or discussions with emergency managers in neighboring jurisdictions can provide some insight into the appropriate amount to request. When preparing a budget, it is essential to justify each of the budget items. Once again, records of previous years’ expenses are useful guides, but it is important to make adjustments for inflation (consult the jurisdiction’s budget office for guidance on the amount they allow) as well as making adjustments for changes in the program plan. Has a new chemical facility been opened? Are there new subdivisions that have been built in flood prone areas? As new needs arise that cannot be addressed with the resources provided by previous budgets, the emergency manager needs to request funding increases that will meet the new program requirements. The nature of these needs is typically documented in a budget narrative that accompanies the budget request. The budget and the accompanying narrative are submitted in written form and, in many cases, are presented orally as well. In the latter case, the use of presentation graphics can be a valuable method of explaining how each of the budget items contributes to the achievement of the program plan. Whatever the amounts turn out to be for the budget categories, it is essential that the emergency manager submit the new year’s budget in the format that is being used by his or her jurisdiction. The local budget office will provide assistance in this area. LEMA Funding Sources The local emergency manager’s most obvious source of funding is the head of the department in which the LEMA is administratively located or, if the LEMA is an independent agency, the jurisdiction’s CAO. It is important to recognize that other funding sources can provide valuable supplements as well. The federal government has a range of programs that provide financial assistance to local government. For example, Emergency Management Performance Grants require LEMAs to submit a statement of work and budget that makes the local jurisdiction eligible for matching funds (i.e., a 50/50 cost sharing). This program is administered through each state’s emergency management agency, which might impose its own requirements for funding. For example, Texas requires a LEMA to have an emergency management plan that meets a specified standard of quality and provides competitive awards based upon the quality of recent planning, training, and exercising activities. Continued financial support is contingent upon meeting performance and financial reporting requirements, as well as achieving the annual objectives specified in the initial proposal. Another example is the Hazardous Materials Assistance Program, which provides technical and financial assistance through the states to support oil and hazardous materials emergency planning and exercising. Applications are required to list the program objective, describe the means by which the objective will be achieved (including a list of specific activities and their duration) and the expected achievements of the project. LEMAs submit applications through their state emergency management agencies for review by the corresponding FEMA regional offices. There are also local sources that can be contacted for financial and in-kind assistance. Local industrial facilities such as nuclear power plants and chemical facilities might be contacted for financial contributions to defray the costs of emergency preparedness for their facilities. Truck and rail carriers might be contacted for training assistance. Commercial businesses such as large retail outlets might be able to provide in-kind contributions or make small financial contributions for community hazard awareness programs. LEMA Budget Management As the fiscal year progresses, expenses are automatically incurred for some items such as salaries, space, and local telephone use. Other expenses might require the emergency manager’s authorization (and possibly countersignature by a higher authority). These include purchase orders for equipment and supplies or travel vouchers for attendance at training courses or professional conferences. These records are forwarded to the jurisdiction’s accounting office where they are entered and charged against the appropriate accounts. In many jurisdictions, local emergency managers receive monthly program accounting, which refers to the recording of actual expenses and a comparison of these expenses to the corresponding budget amounts. A budget statement lists budget categories in rows and indicates, in one column, how much money was allocated to each category and, in another column, how much money has been spent to date in that category. If the budget was based upon accurate projections, monthly variances (deviations of actual expenditures from anticipated expenditures) will be small. If the monthly variances are large, corrective action will need to be taken. Unforeseen expenditures attributable to a major emergency often are the basis for a supplemental request to the LEMA’s parent department or directly to the CAO, but foreseeable items such as replacement of broken equipment are likely to receive an unfavorable review. Consequently, emergency managers must make mid-year adjustments in other categories. Unfortunately, training and travel are the categories that are commonly cut in such situations—which can produce a chronic training shortfall if budgeting problems are recurrent. Senior elected and appointed officials typically require periodic (e.g., monthly or quarterly) reports of progress on the program plan and budget. As is the case with the presentation of each year’s budget, presentation graphics can be a valuable method of explaining which milestones in the program plan have been achieved and how this compares to the level of progress expected to date. In addition, the emergency manager should explain what percentage of each budget line has been expended to date in comparison to the percentage of the year that has elapsed. For example, the emergency manager should find it easy to explain why 0% of the budget for computer replacement has been expended in the first three months (25%) of the year. However, it probably would be more difficult to say why 40% of the budget for salaries had been expended in that same period. In either case, the source of the variances and the anticipated method of adjustment must be explained.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/3%3A_Building_and_Effective_Emergency_Management_Organization/3.2%3A_The_Local_Emergency_Management_Agency.txt

There has been a significant amount of research conducted over the past 30 years that identifies many conditions influencing the effectiveness of LEMAs. This research will be described in greater detail in the following pages, but it can be summarized by the model depicted in Figure 3-2. This figure indicates that LEMA effectiveness—measured by such organizational outcomes as the quality, timeliness, and cost of hazard adjustments adopted and implemented by the community—is the most direct result of individual outcomes and the planning process. Outcomes for the individual members of the LEMA and LEMC include job satisfaction, organizational commitment, individual effort and attendance, and organizational citizenship behaviors. The planning process includes staffing/equipping, organizational structuring, team climate development, situational analysis, and strategic choice. In turn, the planning process is determined by the level of community support from officials, news media, and the public. The planning process is also affected by hazard experience, as measured by direct experience with disasters and by vicarious experiences that reveal potential impact of future disasters. Hazard experience also appears to have an indirect effect on the planning process via its effects on community support. It is important to recognize that even though the model as depicted in Figure 3-2 is static—that is, the arrows begin on the left and end on the right hand side of the figure—the actual process is dynamic because success tends to be a self-amplifying process in which high levels of individual and organizational outcomes produce increased levels of vicarious experience with disaster demands (through emergency training, drills, and exercises), community support, better staffing and organization, and more emergency planning resources. Hazard Exposure/Community Vulnerability Many studies have found the level of community hazard adjustment is increased by experiencing disaster impact—especially catastrophic impacts. Frequent, recent, and severe impacts make the community’s vulnerability to hazards easier to remember and more likely to stimulate action. In some cases, this leads to the development of a disaster subculture in which community residents adopt routinized patterns of disaster behavior (Wenger, 1978). When disasters are infrequent, long-removed in time, or have had minimally disruptive impacts, hazard vulnerability is likely to elicit little attention from households, organizations, or the community as a whole. However, the community’s exposure to environmental hazards can be made salient by vicarious experience that is gained by reading or hearing about other communities’ experiences with disasters. These can be gained through newspaper articles or television accounts or, most powerfully, through first-person accounts—especially if they come from peers (Lindell, 1994a). For example, a local fire chief is most likely to be influenced by other fire chiefs’ accounts of their experiences, a city manager is most likely to be influenced by another city manager, and so on. Figure $1$: A model of local emergency management effectiveness Hazard exposure can also be affected by salient cues such as the daily sight of the cooling towers of a nuclear power plant, the intricate maze of piping at a petrochemical plant, or the placards on railcars and trucks passing through town. Information from hazard and vulnerability analyses can also have an effect on the community, but this pallid statistical information is likely to have less of an effect than the vivid first-person accounts described above (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). As will be discussed in the next chapter, Risk Perception and Communication, the psychological impact of hazard/vulnerability analyses can be increased by linking data on hazard exposure to likely personal consequences. The importance of hazard exposure and vulnerability for emergency management is well supported by research. For example, Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick (1984) found emergency management network effectiveness to be greater in communities with recent disaster experience or, for those without recent experience, if there was consensus about the most salient hazard. Moreover, Adams, Burns, and Handwerk (1994) found that one-third of inactive LEMCs in a nationwide survey blamed lack of hazard vulnerability for their lack of progress. This accusation is likely to have some validity because Kartez and Lindell (1990) found that a greater degree of experience with disaster demands such as issuing evacuation orders, searching for mutual aid resources and responding to mass casualties is associated with organizational outcomes such as an increase in the number of good emergency preparedness practices (e.g., establishing citizen emergency information hotlines, establishing equipment rate and use agreements with contractors). Specifically, they found cities that were high in experience adopted 1.5 more preparedness practices than those that were low in experience. Similarly, Lindell and Meier (1994) and Lindell and Whitney (1995) found a previous history of evacuations was positively related to emergency planning effectiveness. Moreover, Lindell, et al. (1996) also found that a recent history of emergencies—as well as the number of hazardous facilities—both had modest but statistically significant positive correlations with LEMC effectiveness. Community Support Community support from senior elected and appointed officials, the news media, and the public is important because it affects the resources that are allocated to the LEMA and the LEMC. As noted earlier, many researchers have systematically documented what numerous emergency managers have personally experienced—emergency management is a low priority for the local elected and appointed officials who control budgets and staffing allocations (Labadie, 1984; Sutphen & Bott, 1990). As Kartez and Lindell (1990, p.13) quoted one police chief, My number one priority is getting the uniforms out in response to calls. The public judges me on that performance, not whether I’m planning for an earthquake that may never happen. If left alone, disaster planning would get even less attention from my office. It requires that the executive clearly make this a priority. The importance of community support for emergency management is supported by research. Adams and his colleagues (1994) found that two-thirds of the inactive LEMCs blamed community indifference and more than one-third blamed lack of funding for their lack of achievement. Other studies found community support (official resolutions, media coverage, and community group actions) was positively related to emergency planning effectiveness (Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Lindell, et al, 1996). For example, community information requests, media coverage, local support, and the backing of local officials all were strongly and significantly correlated with LEMC effectiveness. Community Resources Differences among jurisdictions in the effectiveness of their LEMAs and LEMCs can be attributed partially to variation in their communities’ resources. Kartez (1992) found inconsistent evidence for effects of jurisdictional size, wealth, growth rate, employment, minority concentration, and industry concentration on compliance with SARA Title III mandates. However, Adams, et al. (1994) reported compliance was significantly correlated with jurisdiction size, median household income, and percent of urban population, The conflict between these two studies probably is attributable to the fact that Adams found the strongest effects in the smallest, poorest, and most rural jurisdictions, which were underrepresented in one of Kartez’s (1992) samples, and altogether absent from his other sample. Nonetheless, the community support variables had stronger correlations with LEMC effectiveness than did any of the community resources variables. Lindell, et al. (1996) reported that jurisdictions’ populations, budgets, police staffing, and fire staffing have statistically significant, but small, influences on LEMC effectiveness Extra-community Resources Lindell and Meier (1994) found that emergency planning resources obtained from outside the community (guidance manuals, training courses, and computer resources) were positively related to emergency planning effectiveness. Lindell and Whitney’s (1995) study replicated many of these findings, but also found that emergency planning effectiveness was correlated most highly with membership in a statewide LEPC Association, and with state emergency planning resources. Later, Lindell, et al. (1996) reported access to such emergency planning materials as computer software, federal agency technical reports, state emergency planning agency technical support, and Chemical Manufacturers Association materials had a statistically significant and moderately large correlation with LEMC effectiveness. Also, frequency of external contact with federal regional offices, state agencies, and other LEMCs was strongly related to success. Technical materials provided through vertical diffusion by federal agencies (DOT, EPA, and FEMA) also have a positive impact on LEMC effectiveness, as does horizontal diffusion of emergency preparedness practices and resources obtained from private industry and neighboring jurisdictions. These resources can provide vicarious experience with disaster demands and demonstrate the effectiveness of specific innovations including plans, procedures and equipment (Kartez & Lindell, 1987). Staffing and Organization A number of studies have substantiated the impact of an LEMC’s staffing and organization on its effectiveness. For example, the International City Management Association (1981) identified a number of characteristics of effective emergency management organizations. These included defined roles for elected officials, a clear internal hierarchy, good interpersonal relationships, commitment to planning as a continuing activity, member and citizen motivation for involvement, coordination among participating agencies, and public/private cooperation. Caplow, et al. (1984) found emergency management network effectiveness was greater in communities with recent disaster experience or, for those without recent experience, if there was consensus about the most salient hazard. The more effective networks had members with more experience and a wider range of local contacts, had written plans and were familiar with them, had personal experience in managing routine natural hazards such as floods, and were more familiar with the policies and procedures of emergency-relevant state and federal agencies. Similarly, Lindell and Meier (1994) found the number of members, number of hours worked by paid staff, number of agencies represented on the LEMC, and organization into subcommittees were all positively related to emergency planning effectiveness. Lindell and Whitney (1995) found LEMC staffing and structure lacked a significant correlation with LEMC effectiveness, but was correlated with organizational climate, which did have a very strong impact on LEMC effectiveness. Lindell, et al. (1996) also found the total number of members and—more importantly—the average number of members attending meetings were significant. There also was a significant correlation between effectiveness and the number of agencies and organizations represented on the LEMC. Representation by elected officials and by citizens’ groups was the most important, whereas having representatives from the news media was least important for overall emergency planning effectiveness. Establishment of an organizational structure through subcommittees was significant, probably because this allows members to focus on specific tasks and thus avoid feeling overwhelmed by all the work that needs to be done. Planning Process The emergency planning process consists of five principal functions: planning activities, team climate development, situational analysis, resource acquisition, and strategic choice. Planning activities. Kartez and Lindell (1990) found superior planning practices involving key personnel from diverse departments in a participative and consensus-oriented process of horizontal integration—exemplified by such activities as interdepartmental task forces, interdepartmental training, and after-action critiques—had an even greater effect on the adoption of good emergency preparedness practices than did disaster experience. Specifically, cities that had a better planning process adopted 2.5 more preparedness practices than those that had a poorer planning process. Interestingly, as Table $ref{2}$ indicates, planning activities such as interdepartmental training, reviews with senior officials, and establishment of interdepartmental task forces had especially strong effects on the adoption of good emergency preparedness practices. By contrast, more routine activities such as procedure updates, plan updates, and reviews of mutual aid agreements had small effects. Table $2$: Effects of Planning Activities on Good Emergency Preparedness Practices. Largest difference Smallest difference Interdepartmental training Reviews with senior officials Interdepartmental task force Community disaster assistance council After action critiques Exercises Vulnerability analyses Meetings with TV/radio managers Procedure updates Plan updates Review mutual aid agreements with neighboring cities Source: Adapted from Kartez and Lindell (1990) Characteristics of meetings are important influences on organizational effectiveness. These include meeting frequency, formalizing member orientation, formalizing meetings through regular scheduling, advance circulation of written agendas, keeping written minutes, and formalizing overall activities by setting and monitoring progress toward annual goals(Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell, et al., 1996). These results indicate the effectiveness of an LEMC and its subcommittees can be increased if they conduct frequent meetings that help them to maintain steady progress and this will work if these meetings are regularly scheduled far enough in advance for members to avoid conflicts with their own calendars. If possible, LEMC meetings should be scheduled monthly on the same day of the week and time of day. The agenda for each meeting should be distributed in advance and written minutes should be kept of each meeting. These findings are consistent with more recent research, which shows effectiveness in disaster response is significantly determined by agencies breadth of prior coordination and the depth (both frequency and intensity) of prior contact (Drabek, 2003). In addition, these findings are consistent with research conducted by Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, Colignon, Banerjee, Murty, & Rogge, 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987). Specifically, these researchers documented a need to facilitate effective relations between organizations with full-time staff members and organizations with part-time staff and volunteers by scheduling meetings at times convenient for all staff (full-time, part-time, and voluntary). Such meetings should concentrate on common interests and be guided by agendas. Failure to meet these suggestions usually results in termination by neglect, not by direct confrontation over disparate values. Organizational climate development. Lindell and Whitney (1995) found emergency planning effectiveness was greatest in LEMCs that had positive organizational climates, which can be defined as “distinctive patterns of collective beliefs that are communicated to new group members through the socialization process and are further developed through members’ interaction with their physical and social environments” (Lindell & Brandt, 2000, p. 331). Organizational climate presumably affects LEMC effectiveness because it influences the degree to which members’ motivation is aroused, maintained, and directed toward group goals (Lindell & Whitney, 1995). Lindell and Brandt (2000) found that three dimensions of leadership climate (leader initiating structure, leader consideration, and leader communication), four dimensions of team climate (team coordination, team cohesion, team task orientation, and team pride), and one dimension of role climate (role clarity, but not role conflict or role overload) were strongly related to each other and can be defined as climate quality. Organizational climate is important because it is positively related to important individual outcomes such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, attendance, effort, turnover intentions, and organizational citizenship behaviors (performance beyond minimal requirements), as well as organizational outcomes such as product quality, timeliness, and cost. These latter variables were measured in the research studies by LEMC chair ratings and State Emergency Response Commission staff ratings of the organization’s performance. Climate quality is consistently related to support from elected officials—especially external guidance and recognition. Climate quality is also positively related to the organization of LEMCs into subcommittees, meeting formalization, and meeting frequency. However, climate quality is unrelated to LEMC size, which suggests that increasing the number of members can increase the range of knowledge and skills on the LEMC without impairing group performance. The research findings indicate that LEMC leaders can establish a positive leadership climate within the organization by being clear about what tasks are to be performed, as well as recognizing individual members’ strengths and weaknesses and being supportive of their needs. These two aspects of leader behavior, which are known as leader initiating structure and leader consideration, respectively, have long been recognized by organizational researchers (Stogdill, 1963). The importance of these dimensions in facilitating organizational effectiveness has been recently confirmed in LEMCs (Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Whitney & Lindell, 2000). In addition to a positive leadership climate, it also is important to foster a positive team climate. Specifically, team members must focus on the tasks to be performed rather than spending all of their time socializing (team task orientation). In addition, they must share information and coordinate individual efforts (team coordination). When these occur, members tend to trust each other and feel that they are included in all activities (cohesion), as well as believe their LEMC is one of the best (team pride). Moreover, LEMC leaders need to promote a positive role climate within the organization. Team members must understand what tasks are to be performed and how to perform them, which avoids the stress caused by role ambiguity. Leaders and members must agree on what tasks are to be performed, which avoids the stress caused by role conflict. Finally, members must have enough time to perform the tasks for which they are responsible, which avoids the stress caused by role overload (James & Sells, 1981; Jones & James, 1979). LEMC effectiveness is also enhanced when there is a positive job climate, which arises when members have enough independence to do their work however they choose as long as they deliver a quality product on time and within the resources available (personal autonomy). They also should be allowed to perform a “whole” piece of work that provides a meaningful contribution to the group product (task identity). Finally, members should be allowed to perform tasks that exercise a variety of significant skills (skill variety). The LEMC will function more effectively when it has a positive reward climate, which is characterized by members having opportunities to perform new and challenging tasks (member challenge), opportunities to work with other people (social contacts), and are told that other people appreciate their work (social recognition). When the leadership, team, role, job, and reward components of organizational climate are positive, there are positive outcomes at the individual and organizational levels. Specifically, there is higher member job satisfaction, attendance, effort, and citizenship behavior (working beyond minimum standards) and lower turnover intentions and actual turnover. These positive outcomes at the individual level also produce positive consequences at the organizational level in terms of greater organizational stability (due to decreased turnover) and greater productivity (due to greater effort). Situational analysis. Although this is recognized as an important issue in the strategic management of organizations (Thompson & Strickland, 1996), there appears to have been little or no research on the degree to which situational analysis contributes to the effectiveness of LEMAs and LEMCs. Important components of situational analysis include hazard exposure analysis, physical vulnerability analysis, social vulnerability analysis, evaluation of hazard adjustments, and capability analysis. As Chapter 5 will describe more fully, hazard exposure analysis identifies the natural and technological hazards to which the community is exposed and assesses the specific locations that would be affected by different intensities of impact (e.g., 50- and 100-year flood plains, areas prone to liquefaction from earthquakes); such analyses are frequently documented by maps of geographical risk areas. Physical vulnerability analysis assesses the community’s structures (residential, commercial, and industrial buildings) and infrastructure (fuel, electric power, water, sewer, telecommunications, and transportation) in terms of their ability to withstand the environmental forces predicted by the hazard exposure analyses. By contrast, social vulnerability analysis assesses the community’s demographic segments and economic sectors to identify differences in hazard exposure, occupancy of physically vulnerable structures, utilization of physically vulnerable infrastructure, and limited resources (psychological, social, economic, and political) for recovering from disaster impact. The systematic evaluation of hazard adjustments examines alternative hazard adjustments (hazard mitigation, disaster preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery) to assess their ability to avoid hazard impacts such as casualties and damage, to limit these impacts when disaster strikes, and to recovery rapidly after disaster. The evaluation of hazard adjustments also examines their resource requirements in terms of the time, effort, money, and organizational cooperation needed to adopt and implement them. The final component of situational analysis, capability assessment, determines whether households, businesses, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have the capacity (i.e., resources) and commitment (i.e., motivation) needed to adopt the available hazard adjustments. Resource acquisition. Resource acquisition refers to obtaining emergency planning staff, equipment, and information of many different types from a variety of sources. The principal source of emergency planning staff is the LEMA but, as will be discussed below, there are other local government agencies, private sector organizations, and NGOs that can be drawn upon to staff the LEMC. Similarly, the major type of emergency planning equipment—the microcomputer—is usually available at the LEMA but the types of high speed/high storage capacity computers needed for conducting hazard and vulnerability analyses are more frequently located and used in the Land Use Planning Department where Geographical Information Systems (GISs) are routinely used (Lindell, Sanderson & Hwang, 2002). The types of information include data about hazards and population segments at risk, as well as procedures for hazard/vulnerability analysis. Communities can obtain hazard data by accessing Web sites maintained by federal agencies such as the FEMA, USGS, and National Weather Service, as well as state hazard analysis web sites (Hwang, Sanderson & Lindell, 2002) or, for technological hazards, local industry (for fixed-site hazards) and rail or truck carriers (for transportation hazards). In addition, these organizations provide computer software, planning guidance manuals, and training courses that explain how to assess community vulnerability (e.g., FEMA’s HAZUS). Strategic choice. Organizational scientists generally agree there is no single best way to organize and this proposition has been supported by Drabek’s (1987, 1990) findings of significant variation in the strategies and structures utilized by individual emergency managers. Some successful emergency managers enthusiastically endorse strategies that are explicitly rejected by other equally successful managers. Further support for the contingency principle of organization is provided by Mulford, Klonglan, and Kopachevsky’s (1973) finding that strategy adoption was dependent upon contextual conditions in the community. Nonetheless, the available research indicates there are some structures and strategies that are likely to significantly improve the success of all LEMCs regardless of context—and especially without significant expense. Although this might seem surprising, it is consistent with previous studies showing that external constraints can be circumvented to some extent by a superior planning process that enhances horizontal linkages among agencies within a jurisdiction and with adjacent jurisdictions, downward vertical linkages to households and businesses, and upward vertical linkages to state and federal agencies (Kartez & Lindell, 1987, 1990). Indeed, it is precisely the purpose of an LEMC to establish this planning process. As Drabek (1987, 1990, 2003) has observed, disaster researchers have long been interested in the intergovernmental structures and interpersonal strategies adopted by emergency managers. For example, a multiyear research project conducted at Iowa State University found that communities in which local Civil Defense Directors had developed systemic linkages among local groups tended to be the most effective in achieving community preparedness (Klonglan, Beal, Bohlen, & Schafer, 1967). These findings were elaborated by Mulford, Klonglan, and Tweed (1973), who noted the importance of local emergency managers’ horizontal linkages with their colleagues in similar organizations throughout their states, and also their vertical linkages with local elected officials. Mulford, et al. (1973) identified six strategies used by effective emergency managers. These include a resource building strategy, which emphasizes the acquisition of human, technical, and capital resources needed for effective agency performance, and an emergency resource strategy, defined by securing the participation of emergency-relevant organizations in emergency planning and response. The elite representation strategy involves the placement of members of the focal organization (in this case, the LEMA) in positions or situations where it is possible to interact with influential members of other emergency-relevant organizations, and the constituency strategy consists of the establishment of a symbiotic relationship between two organizations whereby both benefit from cooperation. The cooptation strategy consists of absorbing key personnel, especially those from other organizations, into the focal organization’s formal structure as directors or advisors, while the audience strategy focuses upon educating community organizations and the public at large about the importance of community emergency preparedness. Mulford, Klonglan, and Kopachevsky (1973) noted strategy adoption was contingent upon environmental (jurisdictional size), organizational (funding level) and personal (Civil Defense Director training) characteristics. Some particularly important areas on which interorganizational coordination has focused include increased involvement of private organizations, local public services, elected officials and community leaders, and greater efforts to acquire external funding. (Klonglan, Mulford & Hay, 1973). Research conducted at the Disaster Research Center during the same time period found disaster planning requires emergency response organizations to recognize the ways in which community-wide disasters differ from routine emergencies that can be handled by a single agency (Dynes, Quarantelli, & Kreps, 1972). In addition, they encouraged local disaster planners to foster significant predisaster relationships among organizations that must respond to a disaster (Anderson, 1969b). Dynes and Quarantelli (1975) described differences in interorganizational orientation in terms of nine models including the maintenance (acquiring and maintaining human, material, and financial resources), disaster expert (developing knowledge and skill about hazard agents such as hurricanes and hazardous materials), and abstract planner (construction of contingency plans derived from generic planning principles) models. Other models include the military (developing a well-defined hierarchical organization), administrative staff (developing managerial knowledge and skill), and disaster simulation (focusing on the rehearsal of disaster plans through drills and exercises) models. Finally, there are the derived political power (acting as the representative of the jurisdiction’s CAO), interpersonal broker (establishing contacts among emergency-relevant organizations), and community educator (overcoming community indifference through hazard awareness programs) models. Table $\label{3}$ summarizes the research on emergency managers’ strategies in the following way. The first category of strategies is defined by LEMA organizational development, which involves the military and administrative staff models to address the development of clear roles and lines of authority, while the abstract planner model emphasizes the development of coordinated emergency response plans, and the disaster simulation model supports the importance of emergency exercises to test the organizational forms that have been developed. Another strategy involves the resource building strategy and the maintenance model to ensure the acquisition of resources—such as personnel, facilities (e.g., normal office space and emergency response facilities such as EOCs), equipment, materials and supplies, and especially money from local government funding— that will positively affect LEMA effectiveness. Moreover, analysis of the physical environment encompasses the disaster expert model, according to which success will be influenced by interagency coordination in the assessment hazard vulnerability and community resources. Finally, Table 3-2 makes it clear that most of the strategies emphasize management of the social environment. According to the researchers at Iowa State University and the Disaster Research Center, development of an LEMC is facilitated by securing the legitimacy from the CAO (derived political power model), establishing the collaboration among emergency-relevant organizations (emergency resource strategy and interpersonal broker model), and placing LEMA staff in positions to influence important others (the constituency, elite representation, and cooptation strategies). Finally, influence is magnified by engaging in outreach to community groups and news media (the audience strategy and community educator model). Table Emergency Management Development Strategies. Strategy Type Iowa State University Disaster Research Center Organizational development Administrative staff Military Abstract planner Disaster simulation Resource acquisition Resource building Maintenance Physical environment analysis and management Disaster expert Social environment analysis and management Emergency resource Elite representation Constituency Cooptation Audience Derived political power Interpersonal broker Community educator More recent studies have examined these ideas in further detail by studying the ways in which local emergency managers implement these strategies. Drabek (1987, 1990) integrated the findings of previous disaster researchers with theoretical principles derived from the broader organizational literature (e.g., Pennings, 1981; Osborne & Plastrik, 1998) to identify strategies and structures used by successful managers. Similarly, Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, et al., 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987) conducted an intensive study of a single disaster preparedness network that had not coalesced into a formally designated LEMC. In addition, Lindell and his colleagues (Lindell, 1994b; Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Lindell & Meier, 1994; Lindell & Whitney, 1995; Lindell, et al., 1996a, 1996b; Whitney & Lindell, 2000) reported a series of studies conducted on nearly 300 LEMCs in three Midwestern states. Drabek (1987, 1990) found the most effective of the local emergency managers he interviewed emphasized the development of constituency support by actively trying to increase the resource base of all local agencies—not just their own. To do this, they relied on committees and joint ventures to involve other community organizations. Consistent with the organizational development strategy, some of them attempted to manage conflict over controversial issues before they got out of control. In particular, they achieved more consensus with other community agencies on the mission of the LEMA. In a variation on the disaster expert strategy, some of them brought in outside experts. Drabek found that local emergency managers’ reliance on these strategies varied with community size. Successful directors in small communities used them less frequently than successful directors in large communities but more frequently than unsuccessful directors in either small or large communities. Successful directors had more frequent contacts and more formalized interagency agreements such as MOAs. Although all successful emergency managers gave considerable emphasis to coordination with other emergency-relevant agencies, they tended to give less emphasis to local businesses and (except in the smallest communities) to elected officials. In the studies conducted by Gillespie and his colleagues (Gillespie & Colignon, 1993; Gillespie, et al., 1993; Gillespie & Streeter, 1987), the researchers found a large proportion of the organizations relevant to disaster response were not linked to the preparedness network—which indicates some deficiencies in the local emergency managers’ strategies for social environment analysis and management. Gillespie and his colleagues expanded the utility of the research on social management strategies by noting interorganizational linkages consist of informal contacts, verbal agreements, and written agreements. In addition, they emphasized that the existence (or even the frequency) of interorganizational contacts does not measure the importance of the relationship (i.e., that needed information, services, or resources have been established or transferred). This argument points to a logical connection between social environment analysis/management and resource acquisition. That is, the low priority given to local emergency management often makes it impossible for LEMAs to purchase needed resources outright. Consequently, local emergency managers must build capacity by collaborating with other organizations that do have those resources or that have the influence to obtain the funding that will allow them to make those purchases. Of course, organizations are more likely to collaborate with the LEMA if there are compelling reasons for them to do so. Consistent with this notion, Gillespie and his colleagues found interorganizational linkages were initiated by awareness of potential disaster demands and by recognized needs for avoiding gaps in services or duplication of effort. Other reasons for collaboration included ensuring timely access to information, services, or resources; development of internal organizational response capability; and development of political influence to enhance organizational autonomy, security, and prestige. Gillespie and his colleagues also found interorganizational linkages are developed through active and personable individuals, but pre-existing personal and professional contacts are important, as well as routine interagency and interjurisdictional meetings, drills, and exercises. However, these linkages are impeded by geographical distance, lack of funds, lack of staff, incompatible professional perspectives and terminology, lack of trust in an organization or its representative, overconfidence in one’s own capability, and unequal rewards and costs of participation for those in different organizations. Individual Outcomes As noted earlier, individual outcomes include job satisfaction, organizational commitment, attachment behaviors (effort, attendance, and continued membership), and organizational citizenship behaviors. Some of these variables were studied by Whitney and Lindell (2000), who noted that research on motivational factors involved in staffing voluntary community organizations suggests people participate in these organizations when they perceive social and environmental problems within a community to which they are attached and find organizations they expect to be successful in mitigating these problems (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Florin & Wandersman, 1984). Such studies have found that participation in community groups is significantly related to three types of benefits (personal, social, and purposive) and their corresponding costs (Prestby, et al., 1990). Moreover, members’ sense of individual and collective self-efficacy, and thus their motivation to participate, is enhanced when these organizations are empowered by successfully influencing actions taken by the community. Other research has found that people often join and remain in a voluntary organization because they are attracted to its activities, and that volunteers are more likely than paid workers to have high intrinsic satisfaction (Pearce, 1983). These findings indicate volunteers’ experiences may differ from those of their compensated counterparts and suggests it is important to examine members’ organizational commitment. Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian defined this construct as “the strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular organization” (1974, p. 604) and characterized it as including: a) strong belief in, and acceptance of, the organization’s goals and values, b) willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization, and c) strong desire to maintain organizational membership. Meyer and Allen (1984) noted research on organizational commitment has examined two different types of commitment: affective and continuance. Affective commitment, which is seen in terms of an emotional orientation to the organization, is likely to be expressed in high levels of employee performance (Meyer, et al., 1989). By contrast, continuance commitment is conceptualized as an accumulation of “side bets”, which are anything of value individuals have invested in an organization that would be lost if they were to leave. Continuance commitment motivates employees to remain in the job but fails to elicit performance beyond minimum requirements. Organizational commitment is important in understanding LEMC effectiveness because it has been found to predict a variety of participation behaviors. In an analysis of over 200 articles pertaining to organizational commitment, Mathieu and Zajac (1990) concluded that organizational commitment has a weak but positive correlation with attendance, but it has very strong negative correlations with two turnover-related intentions: to search for job alternatives and to leave one’s job. Whitney and Lindell (2000) discovered LEMC members’ attachment behaviors (attendance, effort, and continued membership in the organization) were positively related to their affective commitment but not their continuance commitment. In turn, affective commitment was significantly influenced by effective LEMC leadership (the ability to structure team tasks, communicate clearly, and show consideration for team members) and the LEMC members’ job related self-efficacy (perceptions of their own competence) and role clarity (clear sense of direction in which to allocate one’s efforts). Other factors affecting commitment included members’ identification with an LEMC’s goals (perceived hazard vulnerability and perceived effectiveness of emergency planning) and perceived opportunity for reward (public recognition and personal skill development). The negative findings regarding continuance commitment do not mean that this variable is altogether irrelevant because the study assessed members’ commitment to the LEMC (which lacks the tangible rewards used to secure compliance commitment), not to their normal jobs (which can provide such rewards). Based on the research reviewed by Mathieu and Zajac (1990), one should expect compliance commitment to significantly predict performance on these other jobs. Organizational Outcomes Organizational outcomes such as the quality, timeliness, and cost of plans and procedures are the most direct results of individual outcomes and the planning process but there also are intermediate results that are indicative of organizational effectiveness. These include the production of hazard and vulnerability analyses, public information briefings, brochures, and Web sites. Lindell and Whitney (1995) and Lindell and Meier (1994) examined different indexes of LEMC effectiveness—chair judgments of effectiveness on six planning activities and submission of completed plans to the State Emergency Response Commission—and found these were significantly correlated, but nonetheless distinct. Later, Lindell, et al. (1996) examined LEMC effectiveness in terms of four criteria: chairs’ judgments of their LEMC’s quality of performance on 13 emergency planning activities, the percentage of vulnerable zones computed, the number of talks given by the LEMC to community groups, and whether the LEMC had conducted an emergency exercise. This study also found the level of LEMC performance varied significantly from one activity to another. Specifically, LEMCs were generally effective in collecting and filing hazard data, inventorying local emergency response resources, acquiring emergency communications equipment, and developing training for local emergency responders. By contrast, LEMCs were relatively ineffective in developing protective action guides, analyzing air infiltration rates for local structures, analyzing evacuation times for vulnerable areas, and promoting community toxic chemical hazard awareness. There are significant correlations between organizational and individual outcomes (Lindell & Brandt, 2000). This suggests increasing members’ job satisfaction, effort, attendance, and citizenship behaviors and reducing their turnover intentions will improve the organization’s performance. In addition, organizational outcomes had significant correlations with external contextual variables (such as community resources, emergency experience, and elected official support) and internal structural variables (such as LEMC size, subcommittee structure, meeting formalization, meeting frequency, role formalization, and computer technology). Finally, the organizational outcomes had significant correlations with organizational climate variables (such as leader, team, role, job, and reward characteristics). All of these correlations identify ways in which emergency managers can work with LEMC members to improve organizational performance. In particular, emergency managers’ knowledge of these relationships can serve as a basis for expert power in persuading other LEMC members to change the conditions within the organization.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/3%3A_Building_and_Effective_Emergency_Management_Organization/3.3%3A_Determinants_of_Emergency_Management_Effectiveness.txt

The previous section has described the factors that influence emergency planning effectiveness and later chapters will provide recommendations for the content of Emergency Operations Plans, Recovery Operations Plans, and Hazard Mitigation Plans as described by sources such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (1996b), Foster (1980), Daines (1991), Lindell and Perry (1992), and Schwab, et al. (1998). However, there is an important intermediate step that needs to be addresses—the process of plan development as it has been recommended by Daines (1991), Federal Emergency Management Agency (1996b), and Schwab, et al. (1998). The development of an emergency plan is a multistage process that encompasses nine steps. First, the local emergency manager establishes a preliminary planning schedule. Second, the CAO publishes a planning directive. Third, the local emergency manager facilitates the organization of the LEMC. Fourth, the local emergency manager works with LEMC members to assess disaster demands and capabilities. This leads to a designation of the organizations responsible for each component of the Emergency Operations Plan, Recovery Operations Plan, and Hazard Mitigation Plan and finalization of the schedule for plan completion. Fifth, LEMC members write the components of these plans. Sixth, LEMC members evaluate and revise the draft plans. Seventh, the local emergency manager distributes the draft plans to collaborating organizations and other jurisdictions for community review. Last, after the collaborating organizations and other jurisdictions have commented on the draft plans, the LEMC revises them and publishes them in final form. Each of these steps is addressed in more detail below. Establish a Preliminary Planning Schedule Table 3-3 shows an example of how the emergency manager should identify the principal tasks to be performed and the expected amount of time required to perform them. An experienced emergency manager will be able to generate accurate time estimates, but the LEMC members will need to review and approve them at a later date to confirm that the deadline for publication of the final plans is feasible. Table 3-3. Sample Preliminary Planning Schedule Time (months) 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Organize the LEMC [--] Assign responsibility for plan components [-----] Assess response requirements and capabilities [-----] Finalize planning schedule [--] Write plan components [-----------------------] Evaluate/revise the draft plan [---------] Obtain community review [--------] Revise/publish the final plan [----------] Disseminate a Planning Directive Local emergency managers coordinate rather than direct the efforts of other agencies, so they need some power base other than rewards and punishments to elicit cooperation. As noted in Chapter 2, French and Raven (1958; Raven, 1965) contend there are four bases of power in addition to reward and coercive power that can be used in organizations. These other bases of power are information, expert, referent, and legitimate power. Quite obviously, reward and coercive power refer to the ability to provide incentives for compliance and punishments for lack of compliance. Information power refers to specialized knowledge of the state of the social or physical environment, whereas expert power refers to specialized knowledge about the dynamics of the social or physical environment (and, thus an ability to predict—and perhaps control—elements of those environments). Referent power refers to influence that is determined by another’s liking or admiration for an individual and legitimate power is conferred when people believe that an individual has the right to expect compliance with his or her requests. Publication of a planning directive signed by the CAO confers legitimate power upon a local emergency manager by indicating that specific areas of authority have been delegated. This planning directive should be a written document that formalizes the CAO’s specific expectations about the emergency planning process. Thus, the planning directive should contain three sections, the first of which should state the purpose of the planning process, the legal authority under which it is being conducted, and the specific objectives that the planning process is expected to achieve. Second, the planning directive should describe the concept of the planning process, including a general description of the LEMC organization, the organizations that are expected to participate in plan development, and the local emergency manager’s authority as the CAO’s representative in this area. Last, the planning directive should address the procedure for plan approval and the anticipated deadline for publication of the final plan. Even though the planning directive is signed by the CAO, it is often drafted by the emergency manager. Organize the LEMC The emergency manager should request a representative from each of the governmental agencies, NGOs, and private sector organizations that have been designated in the planning directive as having significant emergency response capabilities or hazard vulnerabilities. The enumeration of all relevant organizations in the planning directive is especially important because public safety agencies such as police and fire are likely to participate in any event, but other local organizations are likely to participate only if directed by the CAO (Kartez & Lindell, 1990). A typical list of such organizations can be found in Table 3-4. Table 3-4. Organizations Typically Participating in LEMCs. Fire Local utilities (gas, electric power, telephone) Police Red Cross Emergency medical services Hospitals Public works Nursing homes Land use planning Schools Building construction News media Chief Administrative Officer’s office Environmental groups Public health Local industry Local elected officials Labor unions Members of these organizations should work part-time (a few hours a month) for the LEMC while continuing their jobs in their normal organizations. Once the LEMC has been established, the emergency manager should work with the members to select officers such as a Chair, Vice-Chair, Information Coordinator, and subcommittee chairs. As with other organizations, the Chair presides over meetings and represents the organization to senior elected and appointed government officials, the heads of private sector organizations within the jurisdiction, the news media, and the public. In addition, the LEMC Chair represents the LEMC to other jurisdictions and to state and federal agencies. The Vice-Chair performs these duties when the Chair is absent, but the Vice-Chair’s primary role is to take a more active role in the management of the internal affairs of the LEMC. The Secretary serves in a role that is not a clerical position but is instead responsible for ensuring meetings are scheduled and written minutes of the meeting are recorded. In addition, the Secretary is the principal point of contact for information about hazards and vulnerability, the planning process, and planning products. The Information Coordinator might even be the person who is responsible for monitoring the LEMC’s budget. LEMCs tend to be more effective when members are assigned to specific activities rather than having everyone contribute to all tasks. Thus all LEMCs should have subcommittees, but each one should determine for itself what is the most appropriate division of labor for its own situation. Most communities are likely to find it useful to have a Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee; a Planning, Training, and Exercising committee; a Recovery and Mitigation committee; a Public Education and Outreach committee; and an Executive committee. The Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee is responsible for identifying the hazards to which the community is exposed and the vulnerability of residential, commercial, and industrial structures and infrastructure (fuel, electric power, water, sewer, telecommunications, and transportation) to these hazards. In addition, the Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee should also identify any secondary hazards that could be caused by a primary disaster impact. These secondary hazards would include, for example, earthquake-initiated hazardous materials releases from chemical facilities and earthquake-initiated dam failures that cause flooding in low-lying areas. The Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee also should identify the locations of facilities such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and jails whose populations are vulnerable because of the limited mobility of their resident populations, as well as the locations of other facilities with vulnerable non-resident populations. A sample of such facilities is listed in Table 6-1. The initial task of the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee is to write the Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). This committee should also coordinate the identification of facilities and equipment that are needed for disaster response. A major focus here will be on a jurisdictional emergency operations center (EOC). In addition, the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee should develop a training program to enhance emergency responders’ capabilities. The Planning, Training, and Exercising committee only needs to develop training materials for disaster-related tasks that are not performed during normal operations or routine emergencies (both of which are addressed in departmental training). That is, they must develop training that provides an overview of disaster response and also enhances skills required for tasks that are infrequently performed, difficult, and critical to the success of the emergency response organization. They can either develop the necessary training materials for themselves or obtain them from other sources. Finally, the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee must test the implementability of the plan through drills and exercises. To accomplish these tasks, the Planning, Training, and Exercising committee should recruit representatives from the primary emergency response and public health agencies. The Recovery and Mitigation committee has the responsibility for developing a preimpact recovery plan that will facilitate a rapid restoration of the community to normal functioning after disaster. Recovery planning is often erroneously thought of as an activity that can be postponed until after a disaster strikes, but practitioners have argued that there are many recovery tasks that can (and should) be addressed during preimpact planning (Schwab, et al., 1998) and this contention has been supported by recent research (Wu & Lindell, 2004). In addition, the Recovery and Mitigation committee is responsible for identifying mitigation projects that will reduce the community’s vulnerability to environmental hazards. Some mitigation projects can probably be implemented before a disaster occurs, but others will need to be planned for implementation in conjunction with disaster recovery. To accomplish these functions, the Recovery and Mitigation committee should have representatives from public works, community development, land use planning, and building construction agencies. The Public Education and Outreach committee is responsible for risk communication with the news media and the public. Thus, its members should summarize the findings of the Hazard/Vulnerability Analysis committee that identify the community’s principal hazards and its most vulnerable locations and demographic groups. The Public Education and Outreach committee should also develop a description of the activities of the Planning, Training and Exercising committee and an explanation of how these will provide a capability for prompt and effective emergency response to the community’s hazards. Finally, the Public Education and Outreach committee should describe the activities of the Recovery and Mitigation Committee and an explanation of how these will provide a capability for prompt and effective emergency recovery from a disaster. Public Education and Outreach committee members should use this information about the community’s hazards and the hazard adjustments (preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation) that will protect the community to construct nontechnical summaries that can be understood by households and businesses throughout the community. The Public Education and Outreach committee should develop slides or other graphic presentations to support talks to community groups, as well as brochures to be distributed to households and businesses. The Executive committee is responsible for ensuring the LEMC sets specific, achievable objectives each year and accomplishes those objectives through an efficient expenditure of resources. Accordingly, the Executive committee will consist of the LEMC’s principal officers—Chair, Vice-Chair, Secretary, and subcommittee chairs. In addition to planning, organizing, directing, and monitoring the internal activities of the LEMC, the Executive committee needs to obtain the resources—especially the funds—to support the LEMC’s activities. Although most of the work of the LEMC is performed by personnel who are already being paid through their primary work organizations, there often are additional expenses for acquiring computer hardware and software, training materials, and travel for outside training. In addition, there are likely to be expenses for producing and printing public education brochures and other such materials. Sometimes government agencies or private organizations participating in the LEMC are willing to pay for some of these expenses from their budgets, but many times other sources of revenue such as filing fees from hazardous materials facilities are needed. A critical step in the process of organizing the LEMC is to conduct a planning orientation so the members of the LEMC will develop a common understanding of the process. In preparation for the planning orientation, local emergency managers should anticipate two very important obstacles to emergency planning (Daines, 1991). First, they should recognize that planning agencies lack emergency response experience. Second, they should be aware that emergency response agencies often lack disaster planning experience because they tend to rely on standard operating procedures and improvisation for minor emergencies. In addition, few—if any—LEMC members are likely to be aware of the planning resources available from state and federal agencies, as well as from other sources. Thus, the local emergency manager should introduce LEMC members to the basic tenets of the state’s Emergency Operations Plan, Disaster Recovery Plan, and Hazard Mitigation Plan, as well as provide copies of the state’s planning guidance in each of these areas. Similarly, the emergency manager should introduce LEMC members to the basic tenets of the National Response Plan, as well FEMA response, recovery, and mitigation programs and planning guidance. Assess Response Requirements and Capabilities Before beginning to write the EOP, Recovery Operations Plan, or Hazard Mitigation Plan, LEMC members need to identify the functions that need to be performed in a community-wide emergency. Information about the likely impact locations as well as the impact scope (area affected) and intensity will be produced by the hazard/vulnerability analyses. These analyses will also identify the residential, commercial, and industrial activities in the exposed locations, as well as locations that could produce secondary hazards (e.g., dam failures or chemical releases) or that have especially vulnerable populations (e.g., schools, hospital, nursing homes, jails). In addition, this assessment of response requirements needs to address the likely responses of households and businesses in disaster. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, there are widespread misconceptions—frequently labeled disaster myths—about the ways in which people respond to disasters. Though there is some small kernel of truth in these beliefs, the incidence of individually and socially maladaptive behavior is substantially exaggerated. According to Dynes (1972), households and businesses are the foundation of community emergency response and these organizations respond • In their normal forms to perform their normal tasks (existing organizations), • In their normal forms to perform new tasks (extending organizations), • In new forms to perform their normal tasks (expanding organizations), or • In new forms to perform new tasks (emerging organizations). In addition, community organizations link to form emergent multiorganizational networks (EMONs, Drabek, et al., 1981). Thus, the mission of the LEMC can be conceived as one of developing a planned multiorganizational network that can be adapted as needed to the demands of each incident involving emergency response and disaster recovery. In addition, representatives of the different agencies may have misconceptions about the capabilities of other agencies within their jurisdiction or of agencies at other levels (e.g., state and federal) of government. Consequently, the emergency manager needs to assist the LEMC in addressing these issues systematically so plans will be based upon realistic assumptions about what needs to be done and who will be able to do it (Dynes, et al., 1972). Write Plan Components As the previous discussion indicates, there will be three plans, the EOP, the Recovery Operations Plan, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan The emergency manager should work with the cognizant committees (especially the Planning, Training, and Exercising Committee and the Recovery and Mitigation Committee) to ensure they have the appropriate persons to draft the components (basic plan, annexes, and appendixes) of each plan. In addition, the emergency manager should provide guidance regarding the structure and content of the plans, as well as resources that committee members can use as they write the plan components. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (1996b) Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning is a useful source for the EOP (see also National Response Team, 1987, for hazardous materials planning and US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1980, for nuclear emergency planning) and Schwab, et al. (1998) provide guidance for the development of the Recovery Operations Plan, especially the integration of hazard mitigation into disaster recovery. In most cases, the emergency manager will draft the basic plan and the representatives of each organization will draft the annexes that pertain to their agencies. For example, the police will draft the EOP annex on law enforcement, whereas the land use planning department should write the Recovery Operations Plan annex on temporary housing. Each of the relevant committees—especially the Planning, Training and Exercising Committee and the Recovery and Mitigation Committee, and the LEMC as a whole—should set performance goals collaboratively to ensure that all members are committed to them. These goals should be challenging enough to motivate high levels of performance and should be specific enough that people can determine whether they are making progress in achieving the goals. Goal achievement should be formally evaluated regularly to determine if the planning schedule is being met and achievements should be discussed annually with the jurisdiction’s CAO. Evaluate/Revise the Draft Plans The emergency manager should ensure that all draft plans—the EOP, the Recovery Operations Plan, the Hazard Mitigation Plan, and relevant sections of the community’s comprehensive plan that contain sections affecting hazard mitigation—are reviewed by other committees within the LEMC to identify potential conflicts between agency task allocations and their resource capabilities, or conflicts between the provisions of one plan and another. Obtain Community Review Once the draft plans have been reviewed within the LEMC, the local emergency manager should release them for wider review throughout the community. Working in coordination with the Public Education and Outreach committee, the emergency manager should make copies available at libraries and other public facilities throughout the community so households and businesses can examine them in detail. Of course, it is essential that people be notified that the draft plans are available for review and comment. Thus, the Public Education and Outreach committee should make a major effort to meet with neighborhood groups (e.g., community councils, Parent-Teacher Associations) and service organizations (e.g., Rotary, Kiwanis, Chamber of Commerce) to summarize the hazard/vulnerability analysis process and its results, as well as the planning process and the general provisions of the draft plans for preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. People should be given an adequate amount of time to review the plans and provide comments. In addition, the emergency manager should ensure that at least one public meeting is held at which individuals and organizations from throughout the community can provide oral comments concerning the draft plans. Such comments should be transcribed and retained in the LEMC’s archives. Revise/Publish the Final Plans The local emergency manager should ensure that all input from the community review is forwarded to the appropriate committees so they can address any identified problems in the final versions of the EOP, the Recovery Operations Plan, and the Hazard Mitigation Plan. Wherever possible, it is useful to provide a document to accompany each final plan that categorizes the comments received and explains how they were incorporated into the plan or, if that is not possible, explains why specific comments could not be addressed. Once all changes have been made in the plan, it should be submitted to the CAO or local governing body for their approval. At this point, final approval is usually indicated by a page containing the signatures of the jurisdiction’s senior authorities. Copies of the final plans and accompanying documents should be forwarded to all government agencies and other participating organizations (e.g., American Red Cross) having designated roles in the plans. Additional copies of the final plans and accompanying documents should be deposited in the same locations as the draft plans so these documents will accessible to households and businesses throughout the jurisdiction.

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This chapter explains how people perceive the risks of environmental hazards and the actions they can take to protect themselves from those hazards. Addressing such perceptions is the most common way for emergency managers to change the behavior of those at risk from long-term threats or imminent impacts of disasters. This chapter describes the Protective Action Decision Model, which summarizes findings from studies of household response to disasters, and concludes with recommendations for risk communication during the continuing hazard phase, escalating crises, and emergency response. 4: Risk Perception and Communication Risk can be defined broadly as a condition in which there is a possibility that persons or property could experience adverse consequences. Some people, by virtue of their access to data or their specialized expertise in interpreting those data, have more information than others about the risk of a particular hazard and about ways in which that risk can be managed. These risk analysts have a responsibility to convey their assessments to decisionmakers who must determine what action to take in response to the risk that the analyst has characterized. These assessments typically define risk in terms of the likelihood that an event of a given magnitude will occur at a given location within a given time period and describe the expected consequences that the event will inflict on persons, property, and social functioning. The decisionmakers to whom the analysts communicate this information can be either the population at risk or emergency managers who are responsible for protecting the population at risk. In either case, the principal reason for risk communication is to initiate and direct protective action. Risk communication has become a common concept in recent decades—appearing in many contexts (infectious diseases, food additives, natural hazards, routine effluents, and technological accidents) and referring to many target groups (employees, households, minority groups, and legislators, to name only a few). The principal concern of this chapter will be events that, because of their rapid onset and the large amounts of energy or materials released, have the potential to cause significant numbers of casualties and substantial amounts of property damage unless timely and effective action is taken. Some of these extreme events originate in the natural environment and, thus, are known as natural hazards. Events involving the release of substantial amounts of energy (e.g., earthquakes) can cause immediate destruction of buildings and infrastructure, inflicting many casualties (deaths, injuries, and illnesses) and much disruption to social, economic, and political activities. In some cases, these effects are immediate, whereas in other cases they might take years to manifest themselves. In addition to hazards originating in the natural environment, there are also hazards that are transmitted through the natural environment. These include some, but not all, of what are commonly referred to as technological hazards. Some technological hazards can have a very rapid onset and have the potential for killing many people very quickly unless there is a prompt and effective emergency response. Others involve the cumulative effect of routine air- or water-borne releases from technological facilities or contamination of food and drugs. Many exposures to these hazards unfold over an extended period of time and the adverse health effects even more delayed—frequently producing low incidence rates of disease in the affected population. Regardless of the speed of onset or the persistence of the hazard, the same principles of risk communication are likely to apply. There is, however, a temporal distinction that is central to the organization of this chapter—the amount of time between the detection of the hazard and the onset of exposure. A risk communication effort addressing the imminent threat of an extreme event is referred to as a warning; it is intended to produce an appropriate emergency response. By contrast, a risk communication program addressing the long-term potential for such events to occur is often known as a hazard awareness program; such efforts are intended to produce long-term hazard adjustments. There are quite distinct research literatures on natural and technological hazards that have produced similar conclusions about warnings but have encountered an important difference in the case of hazard awareness programs. Natural hazards seem to arouse substantially less concern than technological hazards, so risk communication programs about the long-term threat of natural hazards generally have sought to increase public concern. By contrast, risk communication programs about the long-term threat of technological hazards have more frequently sought to decrease public concern. Research on technological risk perception has sought to explain why some hazards elicit more concern than others, and it appears the difference is due, at least in part, to such hazard characteristics as the voluntariness and controllability of hazard exposure and the degree of dread about its consequences (Slovic, 1987). Risk communication attempts to promote appropriate protective behavior by those to whom the information is directed; such hazard adjustments to long-term threats include modifying the hazard, modifying the hazard’s impact by preventing specific effects, moving to another location, changing the land use to reduce hazard vulnerability, sharing the loss, or bearing the loss (Burton, et al., 1993). Alternatively, one can think of such behavior changes as disaster responses to an imminent threat by such actions as evacuating, sheltering in-place, expedient respiratory protection, or food interdiction (Drabek, 1986; Mileti, Drabek & Haas, 1975). In general, this chapter will emphasize the communication of information to those who are actually at risk of exposure to a hazard, but also will recognize the need for communicating to those who think they are at risk of exposure to the hazard even if authorities do not share this belief. In the latter case, messages are sometimes needed to convince people they do not need to take protective actions because they will not be exposed to the hazard or because the actions being taken by authorities will be sufficient to protect them. Alternatively, such messages might be designed to convince people that hazard managers do not need to implement protective actions because the costs of responding outweigh the risk. Moreover, authorities are occasionally knowledgeable enough about citizens’ concerns that a one-way communication flow from them to citizens will produce results that are satisfactory to all concerned. In practice, however, authorities frequently need feedback from citizens and should expect such feedback whether or not they believe it is needed. For most environmental hazards, the risk communication process should be based upon a hazard analysis that identifies risk areas—the geographical locations in which the environmental extremes are expected to occur—and the mechanisms by which exposure can occur. The risk communication process also should be guided by a vulnerability analysis identifying the populations and property located in those risk areas. These analyses provide the basic data upon which messages can be formulated that describe the vulnerability of different population segments and the protective responses that are appropriate to reduce these risks. It is important to recognize that one cannot focus exclusively on a risk analyst’s definition of the situation to generate risk messages. Unfortunately, many well-intended attempts at risk communication are based on the assumption that risk area populations fail to implement analysts’ protective action recommendations because they are unaware of or misperceive the risk. Thus, analysts assume that disseminating scientific information about the hazard agent will motivate people to adopt their protective action recommendations. This assumption is correct in some cases, but it substantially oversimplifies the risk communication process because it ignores the roles of the information source, the channel by which the information is transmitted, and the individual differences among message receivers. In addition, this naive approach to risk communication also ignores the effects of impediments to information processing such as competing demands for attention, the use of cognitive heuristics (simplified rules of thumb for processing complex information), and conflicts of the new information with people’s existing beliefs (Yates, 1990). Finally, such an approach neglects the social structural (community) and cultural environments in which communication processes are immersed (Gudykunst, 1998). Instead, risk communication should be a process in which stakeholders share information about hazards affecting a community. The use of the term sharing is important because risk analysts and emergency managers must understand how different segments of the population at risk think about a hazard if they are to be effective in communicating with their audience. These population segments include businesses and households that are vulnerable to a specific hazard, as well as community and industry personnel who are responsible for managing a hazard in ways that reduce the risk to a level that is acceptable to the community. People’s attentiveness to risk communication varies across the four emergency management functions—hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, emergency response, and disaster recovery. Decades ago, Fritz (1968) observed most of the money and resources for emergency management are expended in connection with response and recovery activities. This is consistent with the cycle, noted in previous chapters, of significant citizen and government interest in disasters only during imminent threats and in the immediate aftermath of disasters. However, public attention declines significantly as time passes. Because considerable time is required to translate public concern into government budget allocations and coherent programs, many mitigation and preparedness programs have simply failed to be implemented (Birkland, 1997; Prater & Lindell, 2000).

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According to Lasswell (1948), all communication should be analyzed in terms of who (Source) says what (Message), via what medium (Channel), to whom (Receiver), and directed at what kind of change (Effect). This classical persuasion model, which is depicted in Figure 4-1, was further articulated by Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1953) and has remained the predominant conceptual approach in the field of communication, and especially research on persuasive communication (McGuire, 1969, 1985; O’Keefe, 1990). Research guided by this model has found sources are perceived primarily in terms of expertise and trustworthiness, but also by other characteristics such as status, likeability, and attractiveness. Similar to French and Raven’s (1959; Raven, 1964) definitions of expert and information power, a source’s expertise is defined by its information about a situation and knowledge about cause-and-effect relationships in the environment. By contrast, trustworthiness refers to a source’s willingness and ability to provide accurate information and take actions that protect the receiver without seeking hidden advantage for him- or herself. Figure 4-1. The Classical Persuasion Model. Messages vary in their content—especially their information about a hazard, its impact characteristics (e.g., magnitude, location, and time of impact), potential personal consequences (e.g., likelihood of casualties, property damage, and social disruption), alternative protective actions (e.g., evacuation, sheltering in-place), and the attributes of those protective actions (e.g., efficacy; safety; cost; and requirements for time and effort, knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, and cooperation from others). In addition, messages also vary in terms of their style (clarity, forcefulness, and speed of delivery, use of figurative or humorous language), inclusions and omissions (whether or not to include one’s own weak arguments, address opponents’ arguments, or to rely on implicit or explicit conclusions), ordering of message content, and amount of message material (McGuire, 1985). The information channels available for use by emergency managers include print media such as newspapers, magazines, and brochures; electronic media such as television, radio, telephone, and the Internet; and face-to-face interaction through personal conversations and public meetings. The distinctions among these information channels are important because they differ in the ways they accommodate the information processing activities of receivers. For example, orally presented information is ephemeral and will be lost unless otherwise recorded, whereas written information inherently provides a record that can be examined at a later time. Moreover, many types of risk information can be presented in either verbal (words), numeric (numbers), or graphic (pictures) format. Sometimes one mode of presentation is more effective for a particular type of information; for example, charts generally are more effective than tables of numbers in conveying trends. However, there are individual differences among receivers, so some presentation modes are more effective for some people but not others. For example, some people can understand verbal descriptions much more readily than graphs of data, whereas the reverse is true for others. Receivers differ in many respects, but the most important of these are psychological characteristics that have direct effects on the communication process. For example, receivers differ in their perceptions of source credibility, access to communication channels, prior beliefs about hazards and protective actions, ability to understand and remember message content, and access to resources needed to implement protective action (Lindell & Perry, 2004). The effects of a message on a receiver include attention, comprehension, acceptance, retention, and behavioral change. Indeed, researchers agree message effects should be characterized in terms of multiple stages, but the boundaries among these stages are not well defined, so differences exist among various researchers in their typologies (see McGuire, 1985 vs. Mileti & Peek, 2001) and some theorists have varied in their definitions of these stages over time (McGuire, 1969, 1985). Finally, feedback is an important component of the communication model because some attempts are unidirectional, whereas others are interactive. Unidirectional communications are appealing to many risk communicators because they appear to be less time consuming and sometimes this actually is the case. Frequently, however, interactive communication is needed for receivers to indicate they have not comprehended the message that was sent or to explain that the message sent by the source did not satisfy their information needs. The classical persuasion model makes it clear that risk communication is an activity with relatively clearly defined parameters regarding source, message, channel, and intended effect. In most cases, the source is an authority, the message describes an environmental hazard, and the intended effect is a change in receivers’ behavior. However, receiver characteristics have very important influences on each of the stages in the communication process. For example, the effect of a given information source is determined by receivers’ perceptions of that source and the effect of a given message is determined by receivers’ willingness to attend to and ability to comprehend and retain the information. Moreover the effect of a given channel is determined by receivers’ access to and preference for that channel and the amount of feedback depends upon receivers’ willingness and ability to provide it. Unfortunately, authorities often fail to recognize the importance of these factors and sometimes fail to design risk communication programs in accordance with the principles of effective communication even when these issues are recognized (Perry & Lindell, 1991). Some scholars have criticized the classical persuasion model as providing an incomplete representation of the risk communication process (Kasperson & Stallen, 1990). They contend the feedback loop in the model implies a dyadic relationship that is limited to contact with the original information source. However, extensive research shows people engage in information seeking activities that are directed to other sources as well. More generally, risk communication should be represented by a network in which multiple sources are linked to intermediate sources who receive information and relay it to the ultimate receivers (Figure 4-2). The original sources could be linked to few or many intermediates or could even be linked directly with some of the ultimate receivers. Similarly, the intermediates could be linked to few or many of the ultimate receivers and the ultimate receivers could be linked to each other. Another apparent limitation of the classical persuasion model is that receiver characteristics have pervasive effects on the other components of the model. For example, receivers’ demographic characteristics are correlated with access to sources and channels, as well as with message comprehension. Thus, receiver characteristics are of critical importance in determining the success of risk communication programs, but many of them are psychological in nature and, thus, not readily observed. Nonetheless, receivers’ demographic characteristics—such as sex, age, education, income, race, and ethnicity—are readily identifiable. Because some of these demographic characteristics are related to relevant psychological characteristics, they can provide some indication as to how receivers will respond.

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A review of theories on social influence, persuasion, behavioral decisionmaking, attitude-behavior relationships, protective action, and innovation processes reveals a wide variety of perspectives providing useful accounts of the ways in which risk communication can influence disaster response and hazard adjustment (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Although these theories overlap to some extent with the findings of research on hazards and disasters, all of them provide valuable insights that can extend our understanding of ways in which people respond to the threat of environmental hazards. The relevant elements of these complementary approaches have been integrated with the findings of disaster research to produce a model of the factors that influence individual’s adoption of protective actions against natural and technological hazards and disasters. This integrated model is the Protective Action Decision Model (PADM). Figure 4-2. Communication Network Model. According to Lindell and Perry (2004), the PADM is most directly based upon a long history of research on disasters that has been summarized by many authors (Barton, 1969; Drabek, 1986; Fritz 1961; Janis & Mann, 1977; Lindell & Perry, 1992; Mileti, et al., 1975; Mileti & Peek, 2001; Mileti & Sorensen, 1987; Perry,et al., 1981; Tierney, et al., 2001). This research has found sensory cues from the physical environment (especially sights and sounds, see Gruntfest, Downing & White, 1978) or socially transmitted information (e.g., disaster warnings) can each elicit a perception of threat that diverts the recipient’s attention from normal activities. Depending upon the perceived characteristics of the threat, those at risk will either resume normal activities, seek additional information, pursue problem focused actions to protect persons and property, or engage in emotion focused actions to reduce their immediate psychological distress. Which way an individual chooses to respond to the threat depends upon evaluations of both the threat and the available protective actions. The findings of previous disaster research can be combined with propositions drawn from the theories listed earlier in this chapter to express the PADM in terms of a flow chart that provides a graphic representation of the model (see Figure 4-3). The process of decisionmaking begins with environmental cues or risk communication messages that initiate a series of predecisional processes. In turn, these predecisional processes stimulate either a protective action decisionmaking process or an information seeking process. To proceed through the successive stages of either process, the individual must arrive at an affirmative answer to the questions posed. The dominant tendency is for environmental cues and risk communication messages to prompt protective action decisionmaking, but information seeking occurs when there is uncertainty about the answer to the critical question at a given stage in the protective action decisionmaking process. Once the question is resolved, processing proceeds to the next stage in the protective action decisionmaking process. Figure 4-3. Information Flow in the PADM. The model attempts to characterize the way people “typically” make decisions about adopting actions to protect against environmental hazards. The stages within the protective action decisionmaking process are sequential, as are those within the information seeking process. However, few people follow every step in the model in the exact sequence listed in Figure 4-3. For example, an extremely credible (or powerful) source might obtain immediate and unquestioning compliance with a directive to evacuate an area at risk—even if there were no explanation why evacuation was necessary or what alternative protective actions were feasible (Gladwin, Gladwin & Peacock, 2002). Such an order would, of course, be quite improbable in contemporary American society, but compliance with such an order would bypass all of the intermediate stages in the PADM. Other situations can be imagined in which some, but not all, decision stages would be bypassed. The important lesson is that—unless risk communicators have an extreme amount of credibility or power to compel compliance—the more stages in the PADM they neglect, the more ambiguity there is likely to be for message recipients. In turn, greater ambiguity is likely to lower compliance and cause warning recipients to spend more time in seeking and processing information rather than preparing for and implementing protective action. Indeed, ambiguity can initiate a repetitive cycle of decision processing and information seeking that postpones the initiation of protective action until it is too late to be completed before hazard onset. Predecisional Processes Both environmental cues and risk communication from other persons prompt three predecisional processes that are needed to bring information to conscious awareness. These are exposure to, attention to, and interpretation of environmental cues or—alternatively—reception of, attention to, and comprehension of socially transmitted information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Environmental cues and risk communications are somewhat independent of each other, so one household might only observe environmental cues, whereas another might receive only warnings. Still other households might have access to both environmental cues and warnings. Regardless of whether information comes from environmental cues or social warnings, all three pre-decisional processes are necessary. That is, information from the physical environment will not lead to the initiation of appropriate protective actions unless people are exposed to, heed, and accurately interpret the environmental cues. Similarly, information from the social environment will not lead to the initiation of appropriate protective actions unless people receive, heed, and comprehend the socially transmitted information. These predecisional processes are critical because some of those at risk who are exposed to environmental cues will heed this information, but others will not. Whether or not people heed the available information is determined by their expectations, competing attention demands, and the intrusiveness of the information. Specifically, expectations of threat are established when people have advance information that leads them to believe the potential exists for a significant environmental impact. For example, many people in tornado-prone areas know the months of the year in which there is a peak level of activity. Consequently, they check weather forecasts frequently and attend to environmental cues such as cloud formations. Competing demands are important because attention is limited, so absorption in one task will tend to prevent the processing of information associated with other tasks. Continuing with the example of tornadoes, people who are engaged in tasks that require intense concentration are less likely to notice gathering storm clouds and might not notice a warning even if they have a radio turned on. Of course, the perceptual intrusiveness of hazard information affects attention because it disrupts cognitive processing of the primary task at hand. Those who did not notice the gathering storm clouds, or even an approaching funnel cloud, are certain to notice the roar of the wind or will notice a warning if it is preceded by a loud signal from a radio or a nearby siren. Finally, interpretation of environmental cues is critical because this requires an understanding of the hazard. For example, some coastal residents have lost their lives because they did not understand that a sudden recession of water is the trough phase of a tsunami. The naïve reaction to receding water has frequently been to confuse it with a sudden low tide and to take advantage of an unexpected opportunity to collect stranded fish. Of course, those who have been properly trained recognize this as a sign of danger and immediately evacuate to high ground. The predecisional processes for warnings are similar to those of environmental cues. First, people must receive information from another person through a warning channel and attend to this information. Accordingly, the characteristics of the warning channel itself can have a significant impact on people’s reception and attention to warning message content. Once a warning has been received and heeded, some people will comprehend the available information, whereas others will not (what Turner, Nigg & Heller-Paz, 1986, call “hearing and understanding”). The comprehension of warning messages will depend upon whether the message is conveyed in words they understand. Quite obviously, warnings disseminated in English are unlikely to be understood by those who understand only Spanish. In addition, however, comprehension also affected by more subtle factors. A warning source cannot achieve comprehension of a warning message if it uses technical terms that have no meaning for those at risk. For example, phrases such as “hypocenter”, “Saffir-Simpson Category”, “oxidizer”, and “millirem” are specialized terms that will not be understood by all who hear them. Specialized terms cause confusion and distract people from processing the information in the rest of the message. If such terms must be used in warning messages, they should be explained—ideally before any emergencies arise. Decision Stages Once the three predecisional processes have been successfully completed, cognitive processing turns to the decision stages in the core of the model presented in Figure 4-3—risk identification, risk assessment, protective action search, protective action assessment, and protective action implementation. In addition, information seeking activities include information needs assessment, communication action assessment, and communication action implementation. Each of the decision stages in the PADM is discussed in detail below. Risk identification. According to the PADM, people’s decisions about how to respond to a hazard or disaster begin with risk identification, which can be interpreted as the initial step in what Lazarus and Folkman (1984) call primary appraisal. As noted earlier, this process can be initiated by the detection of environmental cues, but the most important sources of risk identification usually are warning messages from authorities, the news media, and peers such as friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers. Conversely, the first step emergency managers must take when promoting the adoption of hazard adjustments is to disseminate their message widely to attract the attention of those at risk and inform them of the potential for environmental extremes that could threaten their health, safety, and property. In both disaster response and hazard adjustment, those at risk must answer the basic question of risk identification, “Is there a real threat that I need to pay attention to?” (Anderson, 1969a; Janis & Mann, 1977; Mileti, 1975; Perry, 1979a). The importance of the resulting threat belief is supported by research showing individuals routinely try to maintain their definition of the environment as “normal” in the face of evidence that it is not (Drabek, 1986). Researchers have found a positive relationship between level of threat belief and disaster response across a wide range of disaster agents, including floods (Mileti, 1975; Perry, Lindell & Greene, 1981), volcanic eruptions (Perry & Greene, 1982; Perry & Hirose, 1991), hazardous materials emergencies (Lindell & Perry, 1992), hurricanes (Baker, 1991), earthquakes (Blanchard-Boehm, 1998), and nuclear power plant emergencies (Houts, Cleary & Hu, 1988; Perry, 1985). Risk assessment. The next step, risk assessment, refers to the process of determining the likely personal consequences that the disaster or hazard could cause (Otway, 1973; Perry, 1979a). Decades of research have shown the perception of personal risk—the individual’s expectation of personal exposure to death, injury, illness, or property damage—is a critical variable in explaining disaster response (Mileti & Sorensen, 1987). This process of assessing personal relevance, which Mileti and Sorensen (1987) refer to as the “personalization of risk”, has been recognized as an important factor by persuasion theorists as well as disaster researchers (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In the risk assessment stage, a positive response to the question, “Do I need to take protective action?” elicits protection motivation whether the risk involves a disaster response or long-term hazard adjustment (Fritz & Marks, 1954; Perry, 1983). Some of the factors associated with people’s personalization of risk include “the probability of the impending event occurring [and] the severity, to the individual, of such a development” (Withey, 1962, p. 104; see also Neuwirth, Dunwoody & Griffin, 2000 and Lindell & Perry, 2000 for reviews of relevant research). The immediacy of a threat is also important because warning recipients must understand that the message describes a threat whose likely consequences will occur in the very near future. Thus, immediacy is related to forewarning, which is the amount of time between the arrival of the warning (or personal detection of environmental cues) and disaster onset. For emergency managers, the amount of forewarning received from hazard detection agencies such as the National Weather Service and US Geological Survey affects their choice of message content, the channels feasible for delivery, and the number of times the warning can be repeated. For those at risk, the amount of forewarning received from emergency managers affects their sense of urgency to act. Other factors being equal, the likelihood of immediate disaster response increases as the amount of time until impact decreases. However, people tend to devote this additional time to other activities such as information seeking and expedient property protection when they believe there is more time before impact than the minimum necessary to implement protective action. Information seeking can ultimately increase compliance with recommended protective actions but does, inherently, delay it. Similarly, the amount of time risk area residents devote to expedient property protection also delays their initiation of personal protective action. In both cases, the delay in protective action might be dangerous because the time of disaster impact cannot be predicted with perfect accuracy. For many of the events studied by disaster researchers, warnings were issued when impact was imminent, thereby reducing the extent of these other activities. Ultimately, increasing the amount of forewarning changes the risk communication from a disaster warning to a hazard awareness message (Perry, et al., 1981; Nelson & Perry, 1991). Previous research has addressed people’s beliefs about other temporal dimensions of hazard impact, as well. The duration of impact, which refers to the length of time hazard impacts will persist, has been addressed principally in connection with studies of technological risk perception (Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, 1980; Lindell & Earle, 1983; Lindell & Barnes, 1986). For radiological and toxic chemical hazards, it appears many people are concerned that long-term contamination could prevent them from returning to their homes for a long period of time after a disaster (Lindell, 1994c). In general, research has shown simple measures of risk perception are positively correlated with disaster response (Drabek, 1999), but it also is important to qualify this finding with one further consideration. Specifically, the hazards most frequently studied by disaster researchers are ones whose principal physical impacts are property damage and traumatic injuries. In such cases, the exposure paths from the hazard agent through the environment to those at risk are relatively simple and well understood by the general public. Physical proximity to the hazard increases risk, so safety increases with distance from the point of impact. Indeed, Kunreuther, et al. (1978) reported proximity, along with certainty and severity, was an important threat characteristic influencing the purchase of hazard insurance. The correlations between risk perception and behavioral responses to that object might not be so high in cases where the exposure paths are more complex than those involved in simple proximity. For example, food contamination and infectious diseases both involve complex exposure paths that might be difficult for most people to understand. For example, some have found it difficult to understand why AIDS can be transmitted by infected needles but not by mosquito bites because the two types of exposure seem to be similar (both involve injection through the skin surface). Similar issues must be considered in examining hazards that have different types of impacts. For example, Perry and Montiel (1997) reported the magnitude of perceived risk was higher for threats affecting life safety and property than for those affecting property alone. Another issue concerns the definition and measurement of perceived risk. Some studies have used very global measures of risk, whereas others have used more specific measures. Early studies of evacuation compliance that defined risk in terms of three components—certainty, severity, and immediacy—of the threat have reported high positive correlations between risk perception and disaster response (Perry, et al., 1981). However, some researchers have applied these characteristics to the occurrence of a disaster, whereas others have applied them to personal hazard exposure, and still others have applied them to the consequences of that exposure. In some cases, there are essentially no differences among disaster impact, personal hazard exposure, and personal consequences. For example, people living close to a volcano might think the occurrence of a major eruption is highly likely to occur within the next year, their chance of severe exposure is high because they live so close to the volcano, and their chance of experiencing severe adverse health consequences within that time interval is high because the effects of blast and ash will be felt immediately. In other cases, the differences among disaster impact, personal hazard exposure, and personal consequences could be profound. For example, people living in the vicinity of a toxic chemical facility might think the occurrence of a major release to ground water is highly likely to occur within the next year, but also believe their chance of severe exposure within that time interval is low because they live upstream from the release point. Even if they thought the chances of personal exposure were high, they might believe their chance of experiencing severe adverse health consequences within that time interval is low because it would take many years to develop cancerous tumors. The differences among disaster impact, personal exposure, and personal consequences are important because a number of investigators have found many people have an unrealistic sense of optimism about their ability to avoid danger—in extreme cases, this results in a sense of total invulnerability. For example, data from Lindell and Prater (2000) indicate people’s perceptions that there is a significant probability of an earthquake in their community do not necessarily imply that they believe there is a high probability of being personally affected by that earthquake. Moreover, some studies have indicated perceptions of severity also can be quite complex. Research on earthquake hazard has revealed perceptions of severity to be multidimensional because people are concerned about death, injury, property damage, and disruption to work and daily activities (see Lindell & Perry, 2000, for a review). Other research on risk perceptions regarding radiological and toxic chemical hazards indicates people are also concerned about delayed health effects such as cancers and genetic effects (Lindell, 1994; Lindell & Barnes, 1986; Perry & Montiel, 1997). Protective action search. If a threat is judged to be real and some unacceptable level of personal risk exists, people turn to protective action search—which involves retrieving one or more feasible protective actions from memory or obtaining information about them from others. The relevant question in protective action search is “What can be done to achieve protection?” and its outcome is a decision set that identifies possible protective actions. The results of some studies (e.g., Jackson, 1977) suggest risk area residents’ first attempt to answer this question often involves a search for what can be done by someone else to protect them against the hazard. When there is insufficient time to find someone else to provide protection—as is usually the case during disasters—or when such a search is unsuccessful, households must rely on their own resources to achieve protection. In many instances, an individual’s own knowledge of the hazard will suggest what type of protection to seek (e.g., sheltering in the basement following a tornado warning). People are especially likely to recall actions they have taken on previous occasions if they have had personal experience with that hazard. Alternatively, they might consider actions they have taken in the course of their experience with similar hazards—recognizing, for example, the impact of a volcanic mudflow is similar to that of a flood and, thus, protective responses to flood are likely to be effective for a mudflow as well. Information about protective actions also can be received from a variety of external sources. Specifically, those in the risk area are likely to become aware of alternative protective actions by observing the behavior of others. This occurs, for example, when neighbors are seen packing cars in preparation for hurricane evacuation or employing contractors to reinforce their homes against earthquake shaking. People also are likely to consider actions with which they have had vicarious experience by reading or hearing about others’ actions in response to a hazard. Such vicarious experience is frequently transmitted by the news media and relayed by peers—friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers. Finally, people also are made aware of appropriate protective actions by means of disaster warnings and hazard awareness programs that carry protective action recommendations from authorities. Specifically, a well designed warning message will assist recipients in constructing a decision set by providing guidance in the form of one or more protective action recommendations (Mileti & Sorensen, 1988). Nonetheless, authorities should not assume warning recipients will implement the official protective action recommendation even if only one protective action is mentioned in the warning message. People will always be aware that continuing normal activities is an option and they might think of other alternatives by recalling such actions from memory or observing the actions of others. Protective action assessment. After people have established that at least one protective action is available, they pass from the protective action search stage to protective action assessment. This involves examining alternative actions, evaluating them in comparison to the consequences of continuing normal activities, and determining which of them is the most suitable response to the situation. At this point, the primary question is “What is the best method of protection?” and its outcome is an adaptive plan. As noted earlier, choice is an inherent aspect of emergencies because those at risk generally have at least two options—taking protective action or continuing normal activities. Comparing alternatives with respect to their attributes leads, in turn, to a balancing or trade-off of these attributes with respect to their relative importance to the decision maker. Under some conditions, those at risk can only take one action and, therefore, must make a choice among the alternatives. Evacuation maximizes the protection of personal safety, but abandons property to the action of the hazard agent or, as some evacuees have erroneously feared, to looters (Perry, et al., 1981; Lindell & Perry, 1990). On the other hand, emergency measures to protect property (e.g., sandbagging during floods) require the property owner to remain in a hazardous location. This problem also exists in the context of long-term hazard adjustment but is significantly reduced because households have time before disaster onset to carefully consider trade-offs among alternative protective actions and to implement multiple actions. Even when there is only a moderate amount of forewarning, households might be able to engage in a combination of actions. For example, if a flood has been forecast to arrive within a few hours, people could perform emergency floodproofing and elevate contents to higher floors to provide as much property protection as possible, yet evacuate family members before the floodwater reaches a dangerous level. When households assess the salient characteristics of alternative protective actions, they are likely to consider a set of characteristics that have been identified by previous research on disaster response and hazard adjustment. In reviews of disaster studies conducted since the 1940s, Fritz (1961), Sorensen and White (1980), Sims and Bauman, (1983), Drabek (1986), and Tierney, et al. (2001) have noted that a protective action is unlikely to be considered unless it is considered to be effective in reducing the negative consequences associated with disaster impact. Thus, efficacy, which is measured by the degree of reduction in vulnerability to the hazard, refers to success in protecting both persons and property (Cross, 1980; Kunreuther, et al., 1978). In some cases, such as sandbagging during floods, property protection is the specific objective of the protective action. In other cases, however, people consider the implications for property protection of actions whose principal goal is to protect persons. For example, many researchers have found that those who fail to comply with an evacuation recommendation do so because of concerns about protecting their property from looting. Research also suggests people evaluate protective actions in terms of their safety—that is, the risks that might be created by taking that protective action. For example, some research has reported that those who have not complied with recommendations to evacuate did so because they were concerned about the traffic accident risks involved. As a general rule, the traffic accident risks of evacuation appear to be no greater than those of normal driving (Lindell & Perry, 1992). However, it is important to recognize warning recipients’ behavior is determined by their beliefs about safety, not the historical evidence about safety. Thus, it is important for local authorities who want to increase compliance with evacuation recommendations to ensure people are aware that evacuation accident rates are low. Alternative protective actions also can be assessed in terms of their perceived time requirements for implementation, which are a function of the number and duration of the steps required to complete a given action. Evacuation is typically time consuming, requiring unification of the family, preparation for departure, selection of a safe destination and route of travel, and transit out of the risk area (Lindell & Perry, 1987; Lindell, Prater, Perry & Wu, 2002). By contrast, time requirements for in-place protection are small—requiring only that occupants shut off sources of outside air, such as doors, windows, chimney dampers, and forced air circulation systems for heating and cooling (Lindell & Perry, 1992). A major problem in large scale evacuations such as those for hurricanes is people’s underestimation of the amount of time needed to reach their destinations. Kang, Lindell and Prater (in press) found coastal residents have reasonably accurate expectations about the time requirements of familiar tasks under their control (e.g., packing bags and shuttering windows), but they substantially underestimate the amount of travel time needed to clear the risk area. The problem seems to be that they plan to take familiar routes to familiar destinations and assume it will take the usual amount of time to get there. Unfortunately, they fail to account for the fact that an evacuation might have ten times as much traffic on that route as they normally encounter, thus turning a two hour trip into a 20 hour trip. Perceivedimplementation barriers The perceived implementation barriers affecting protective action decisions arise from resource constraints precluding the selection of a preferred protective action, as well as obstacles that are expected to arise between the decision to take a protective action and the achievement of protection. In the former category, resource constraints include a lack of knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, or social cooperation required to achieve protection (Lindell & Prater, 2002). In the case of evacuation, this may include a lack of knowledge of a safe place to go and a safe route to travel. Related barriers include the lack of access to a personal vehicle (e.g., those who are routinely transit dependent or families in which one spouse has the only car during the workday) or lack of personal mobility due to physical handicaps. These were clearly factors affecting the alarming death toll in Hurricane Katrina. In some instances, the separation of family members will be considered to be an evacuation barrier. Until family members have been reunited or separated family members can establish communication contact and agree upon a place to meet, evacuation is unlikely to occur (Killian, 1952; Drabek & Boggs, 1968; Haas, Cochrane & Eddy, 1977). Of course, separation of family members is unlikely to be a significant problem during incidents, such as hurricanes, that have ample forewarning. Finally, a variety of researchers (Cross, 1980; Fritz, 1961; Kunreuther, et al., 1978; Sorensen & White, 1980) have reported the perceived cost of actions to protect personal safety is a consideration in protective actions decisions. Such costs include out-of-pocket expenses (gasoline, food, and lodging), opportunity costs (e.g., lost pay from workdays missed during evacuation), effort, personal sacrifice, and aesthetic cost (e.g., the unattractive appearance of houses that are elevated out of the flood plain). The high cost of protective action can lead people to delay its implementation until they are certain it is necessary. For example, many households delay hurricane evacuation because they want to avoid incurring evacuation expenses if possible. These averaged \$262 per household during the Hurricane Lili evacuation (Lindell, Prater, Lu, Arlikatti, Zhang & Kang, 2004). A significant impediment to the assessment of protective actions arises when none of the available alternatives dominates the others (i.e., is superior to the others on all of the evaluation attributes). For example, Lindell and Perry (1992) reported evacuation was rated higher than sheltering in-place and expedient respiratory protection in efficacy for protecting persons (a positive consequence). However, evacuation also was judged to be higher in its resource requirements for time, effort, skill, cost, and barriers to implementation (all negative consequences). This suggests people must sometimes make a difficult choice between the higher effectiveness of evacuation and its higher resource demands against the lower effectiveness of the alternative protective actions (sheltering in-place and expedient respiratory protection) and their lower resource demands. The importance of perceived attributes in the protective action assessment stage should alert risk communicators to the potential for differences between the judgments of experts and the public, especially in connection with protective actions that are not well known to those at risk. Sheltering in-place can substantially reduce toxic gas exposure to safe levels (Wilson, 1987, 1989), but its effectiveness does not seem to be recognized outside a relatively narrow circle of experts. Moreover, attempts to evacuate immediately prior to tornado impact, which are contrary to scientific recommendations (Glass, et al., 1980), are probably due to the recognition that sheltering in-place during the tornado does not guarantee survival. This observation also holds true for many victims of fires in high-rise buildings who have attempted unsuccessfully to evacuate when sheltering in their rooms would likely have saved their lives. The end result of protective action assessment is an adaptive plan, but people’s adaptive plans vary widely in their specificity, with some being only vague goals (e.g., “We’ll stay with my sister’s family”) and others begin extremely detailed. At minimum, a specific evacuation plan includes a destination, a route of travel, and a means of transportation. More detailed plans include a procedure for reuniting families if members are separated, advance contact to confirm the destination is available, consideration of alternative routes if the primary route is unsafe or too crowded, and alternative methods of transportation is the primary one is not available. Research has documented a tendency for those who lack a ready adaptive plan to experience more negative disaster outcomes (Quarantelli, 1960; Perry, 1979b; Drabek, 1986). A classic example in the literature on floods lies in the Hamilton, Taylor, and Rice (1955, p. 120) interview with the recipient of an evacuation warning that contained no information on safe evacuation routes or safe destinations: “We couldn't decide where to go... So we grabbed our children and were just starting to move outside...if it had just been ourselves, we might have taken out. But we didn't want to risk it with the children.” Protective action implementation. The fifth step, protective action implementation, occurs when all the previous questions about risk reduction have been answered satisfactorily. Specifically, those at risk have determined action should be taken, at least one available option is likely to be effective in achieving protection, and that option is logistically feasible. In general, the implementation of protective actions consumes resources people would prefer to allocate to other activities, so those at risk frequently delay implementation until they have determined that the immediacy of the threat justifies the disruption of normal activities. Thus, people often ask the question, “Does protective action need to be taken now?” The answer to this question, whose outcome is the threat response, is crucial because people sometimes postpone the implementation of protective action even when there is imminent danger. As noted earlier, recipients of hurricane warnings have often been found to endanger their safety because too many of them wait until the last minute to begin their evacuations. Unfortunately, they fail to recognize that adverse weather conditions and a high volume of traffic can significantly reduce the average speed of evacuating vehicles, thus running the risk that their evacuation will not be completed before the arrival of storm conditions (Baker, 1979, 1990, 1993; Dow & Cutter, 1998, 2002; Prater, Wenger & Grady, 2000). The problem of procrastination is even more severe in connection with long-term hazard adjustment than it is in disasters with ample forewarning because hazard awareness programs cannot specify even an approximate deadline by which action must be taken. For example, an earthquake prediction might indicate a 75% chance of a damaging earthquake within the next 20 years. Information needs assessment. At all stages of the protective action decision process, people who are responding to the threat of disaster must act on the basis the available information, even if it is insufficient for a confident appraisal of the threat or the available protective actions. However, when people think time is available, they cope with the lack of information by implementing three additional stages involving information search. The process of information search begins with an information needs assessment arising from an individual’s judgment that the available information is insufficient to justify proceeding further in the protective action decision process. The research literature indicates ambiguity at any point in the protective action decision process will tend to initiate information seeking, especially when the probability of disaster impact reaches a critical threshold. Thus, if any of the questions cannot be answered with an unequivocal yes or no, people will ask “What information do I need to answer my question?” so they can generate an identified information need. As is the case with a lack of information about a threat, information seeking can also resolve a lack of information about appropriate protective actions. In particular, additional information about alternative protective actions could make it clearer which action would be most appropriate for that situation. Such information seeking is frequently needed because, as noted earlier, those at risk are rarely aware of all of the alternatives available to them. Communication action assessment. Identification of a need for information does not necessarily suggest where the needed information can be obtained. Thus, the next question in the information seeking process is “Where and how can I obtain this information?” Addressing this question leads to information source selection and information channel selection, which constitute an information search plan. The sources from which information is sought are likely to differ depending upon stage of the protective action decision process that has generated the need for information. For example, uncertainty about risk identification and risk assessment can stimulate questions directed to officials and, more likely, the news media (see Lindell & Perry, 1992). The high level of reliance on the news media appears to be due to people’s desire to confirm the information they initially received in a warning message from one source by contacting a different source (Drabek, 1969). By contrast, uncertainties about protective action search, protective action assessment, and—especially—about protective action implementation are likely to prompt questions directed to peers. The sources sought are likely to be affected by the available channels, which in many disasters precludes the use of the telephone because circuits are so overloaded that it is impossible to obtain a dial tone for hours or even days. Further, attempts to reach authorities sometimes prove futile because emergency response agencies are busy handling other calls. Thus, people are often forced to rely on the mass media and peers even when they would prefer to contact authorities. This distinction between risk area residents’ preferred channels of information receipt and their actual channels of information receipt also can be seen in connection with long-term hazard adjustment. For example, Lindell and Perry (1992) reported residents of communities downstream from the Mt. St. Helens volcano revealed some significant disparities between their preferred and actual channels of information receipt in the years after the 1980 eruptions. However, there also were significant differences between the two communities of Toutle and Lexington in both their preferred and actual channels of information receipt. Unfortunately, the available research does not reveal any general principles of source and channel preference that can be assumed to apply across a broad range of communities. Communication action implementation. The final step in the information search process is communication action implementation, which provides decision information by answering the question, “Do I need the information now?” If the answer to this question is positive, that is, they are threatened by an imminent disaster, people will actively seek the needed information from the most appropriate source through the most appropriate channel. Drabek’s (1969; Drabek & Stephenson, 1971) research indicates people will go to great lengths, contacting many people over a period of minutes to hours, if the prospect of an imminent disaster needs to be confirmed. However, information seeking will be less frequent and less active if the location is specific but the time of impact is ambiguous. Perry, Lindell, and Greene (1982) reported many residents of the area around Mt. St. Helens monitored the radio four or more times a day after the initial ash and steam eruptions led authorities to believe increased activity might indicate an increased probability of a larger eruption. By contrast, the absence of locational specificity and time pressure inherent in a hazard awareness program provides little need for those at risk to obtain immediate answers, so they are likely to forego active information seeking in favor of passive monitoring of the situation. Unfortunately, the absence of a deadline for action means this passive monitoring is likely to continue until an imminent threat arises (as in the case of hurricanes and floods) or until a disaster strikes (as in the case of earthquakes). Communication action implementation can have one of three outcomes. If the query elicits a message that meets the information needs that initiated the search, then information seeking has been successful and the decision maker can return to the point in the protective action decision process that generated the information search. However, if the source is unavailable, the query produces no additional information, or the query produces no useful information at all, then information seeking is unsuccessful. The response to this situation is likely to depend upon an individual’s expectations for success in obtaining the desired information from another source or through another channel. Optimism regarding either of these is likely to motivate further information seeking. Pessimism regarding the success of obtaining the needed information is likely to force the decision maker to attempt a protective action decision on the basis of the information available. In summary, The PADM provides a framework that identifies the critical stages of information processing relevant to household adoption of protective actions and—for each stage—the activities performed, the typical question asked, and the outcome (see Table 4-1). If an individual cannot determine a satisfactory answer to the question posed at one of the decision stages, then progress toward implementation of a protective action is likely to be delayed and possibly even terminated. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about risk identification, then the decision maker is likely to return to normal activities. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about risk assessment, then the decision maker is likely to monitor the situation. If the process terminates due to a negative answer about the availability or acceptability of protective actions, then the decision maker is likely to enter a state of either denial or panic (Janis & Mann, 1977). Which of these emotion-focused coping strategies is used depends upon a person’s susceptibility to distraction, with the most distractible being inclined to denial and the least distractible being inclined to intense fear. Nonetheless, extensive research reveals a very low incidence of panic in disaster (Drabek, 1986). Table 4-1. Warning Stages and Actions. Stage Activity Question Outcome 1 Risk identification Is there a real threat that I need to pay attention to? Threat belief 2 Risk assessment Do I need to take protective action? Protection motivation 3 Protective action search What can be done to achieve protection? Decision set (alternative actions) 4 Protective action assessment and selection What is the best method of protection? Adaptive plan 5 Protective action implementation Does protective action need to be taken now? Threat response 6 Information needs assessment What information do I need to answer my question? Identified information need 7 Communication action assessment and selection Where and how can I obtain this information? Information search plan 8 Communication action implementation Do I need the information now? Decision information Source: Lindell & Perry (2004).

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/4%3A_Risk_Perception_and_Communication/4.3%3A_The_Protective_Action_Decision_Model.txt

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are theoretical and practical reasons for distinguishing between risk communication activities undertaken during the continuing hazard phase (which are directed toward long-term hazard adjustment) and those taken during an escalating crisis or emergency response (which are directed toward disaster response to avoid personal exposure or minimize personal consequences). The continuing hazard phase involves a stable probability (usually low) that a catastrophic incident will threaten public safety, property, and the environment. This phase is characterized principally by hazard mitigation and emergency preparedness activities, although preparedness for disaster recovery also should be undertaken at this time (Schwab, et al., 1997; Wu & Lindell, 2004). There are five basic functions that should be addressed in the continuing hazard phase. Table 4-2 identifies these as strategic analysis, operational analysis, resource mobilization, program development, and program implementation. These five functions and the tasks associated with them are listed in the table as if they form a simple linear sequence but, in fact, some tasks will be performed concurrently. In addition, the process will frequently be iterative. For example, some resource mobilization tasks might take place concurrently with the operational analysis, or tasks conducted during the operational analysis phase might be suspended temporarily in order to return to the strategic analysis and refine it. Strategic Analysis Task 1: Conduct a community hazard/vulnerability analysis. As will be discussed in Chapter 6, emergency managers need to understand the hazards to which their communities are exposed and the geographic areas at risk. Knowing the characteristics of the most significant hazards makes it possible to identify the most appropriate hazard adjustments. Identifying the geographic areas at greatest risk makes it possible to identify the most vulnerable population segments and types of businesses. In turn, this knowledge about vulnerable population segments and types of businesses provides information about how to target the risk communication program and also suggests which incentives and sanctions might be best suited to increasing hazard adjustment adoption (see Lindell & Perry, 2004, for a further discussion of the roles of risk communication, incentives, and sanctions). Table 4-2. Tasks for the Continuing Hazard Phase. Strategic analysis Conduct a community hazard/vulnerability analysis Analyze the community context Identify the community’s prevailing perceptions of the hazards and hazard adjustments Set appropriate goals for the risk communication program Operational analysis Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the community and its households/businesses Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and technological innovations Identify the available risk communication sources in the community Identify the available risk communication channels in the community Identify specific audience segments Resource mobilization Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials Enlist the participation of other government agencies Enlist the participation of nongovernmental (nonprofit) and private sector organizations Work with the mass media Work with neighborhood associations and service organizations Program development for all phases Staff, train, and exercise a crisis communications team Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communication flow in an escalating crisis and in emergency response Develop a comprehensive risk communication program Plan to make use of informal communication networks Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news media and the public Program implementation for the continuing hazard phase Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being planned or implemented Describe feasible household hazard adjustments Evaluate program effectiveness Source: Lindell & Perry (2004). Task 2: Analyze the community context. As noted in Chapter 3, the most comprehensive research on the practice of local environmental hazard management is that undertaken by Drabek (1987, 1990), whose careful analysis of the problem has identified many effective managerial strategies. In particular, he has emphasized the need for emergency managers to continually study their communities’ ethnic composition, communication channels, perceptions of authorities, levels of education, and income distribution. If environmental hazards are not high on the community’s priorities, as usually is the case (Rossi, Wright, Webber-Burdin, Peitras & Diggins, 1982), emergency managers need to begin with small programs, demonstrate their effectiveness, and build constituencies for environmental hazard management (Lindell, 1994b). In developing a risk communication program, emergency managers need to realistically assess the resources the community can afford to allocate to this activity, but should not limit their assessment to the resources of a single agency. Instead, they should explore the ways in which a variety of different organizations (e.g., LEMA, police department, fire department, watershed management authority, and public health department) might collaborate in developing a comprehensive program. As noted in Chapter 3, the LEMC provides an excellent framework within which to achieve this collaboration. Task 3: Identify the community’s prevailing perceptions of hazards and hazard adjustments. Of the many hazards that are prevalent in modern society, the ones that seem to produce the greatest conflict are those having a potential for inflicting significant harm on bystanders such as the residents of areas near technological facilities. The general public perceives the risks of nuclear power plants and chemical facilities as being greater than those of other technologies and natural hazards (Lindell & Earle, 1983; Slovic, 1987). In addition, they differ from technologists by considering what Hance, Chess, and Sandman (1988) call “outrage” dimensions, including a risk’s (un)naturalness, (un)familiarity, (lack of) understanding by science, (lack of) detectability, (un)trustworthiness of information sources, (lack of) controllability by those exposed, (lack of) voluntariness in exposure, (un)fairness in the distribution of risks and benefits, and dread. Thus, this line of research suggests residents of most communities are likely to consider the risks of technological facilities to be greater than those of natural hazards, even if the annual fatality rate is the same for the two types of hazards (Slovic, 1987). As noted earlier, technological hazards generate a level of risk perception exceeding what experts consider to be warranted, whereas natural hazards seem to elicit the opposite pattern. Emergency managers can begin to address this problem by explaining the community hazard/vulnerability analysis and their resulting assessments of risk area residents’ personal likelihood and consequences of disaster impact. A major impediment to effective risk communication is the difficulty in explaining small probabilities of occurrence and small numbers of expected casualties per year. This has led some experts to propose risk comparisons that list the annual death rate (Morrall, 1986), loss of life expectancy (Cohen & Lee, 1979), and the time to increase risk by one chance in a million (Crouch & Wilson, 1982). Unfortunately, these solutions seem to produce more problems than they solve (Covello, 1991). Specifically, such risk comparisons typically ignore the uncertainties in the estimates (which could differ significantly from one hazard to another). Moreover, by comparing hazards only in terms of casualties, these risk comparisons equate hazards having what many people consider to be very different types of consequences. The problem is compounded when the experts presume that if people “have voluntarily accepted” risks having higher fatality rates (often these are a lifestyle risks such as automobile driving), they also “should accept” another risk having a lower fatality rate (often this is the risk of a technological facility that someone is proposing to build and operate). Of course, this argument ignores the fact that the facility risk will be added to the lifestyle risk, not substituted for it, and that the facility risk often is estimated from analytical models whereas the lifestyle risk is computed actuarially from a very large database. Even local residents who cannot articulate these distinctions explicitly often seem to be aware of them implicitly and, thus, reject these arguments. Task 4: Set appropriate goals for the risk communication program. As indicated earlier, hazard awareness is an important first step in the process of hazard adjustment, so people need to be informed about the hazards to which their community is exposed. This could include information about physical science, engineering, public health, social science, and planning perspectives on environmental hazards. In addition, people need to be informed about the likelihood that events of different magnitudes will occur at their locations. In the case of hurricanes, emergency managers should ensure residents of coastal communities understand the basic atmospheric processes that cause hurricanes, the long-term probabilities of their community being struck by hurricanes in Saffir-Simpson Categories 1-5 over the next ten years, and the different types of threats caused by hurricanes (wind, tornadoes, storm surge, and inland flooding). However, it also is necessary to ensure local residents personalize the risk of casualties to themselves and their families, damage to their property, and disruption to daily activities such as work, school, and shopping. To help people personalize the risk, local emergency managers should provide detailed maps showing areas at risk from wind, storm surge, and inland flooding, as well as the vulnerability of different types of structures in the community to these threats. For example, hurricane vulnerability can be assessed by defining the areas that would be affected by hurricanes in Saffir-Simpson Categories 1-5 and displaying these risk areas on large-scale maps. Such maps should indicate streets, rivers, political boundaries, and other local landmarks that will help people to identify the risk areas in which their homes and workplaces are located. These maps could be supplemented by drawings of different types of structures (e.g., mobile homes, typical single family residences, and typical multifamily structures) showing the level of damage expected for each hurricane category. Such information needs to be developed and pretested thoroughly because recent studies have shown only one- to two-thirds of coastal residents can accurately identify their hurricane risk areas, even when shown a risk area map (Arlikatti, et al., in press; Zhang, Prater & Lindell, 2004). In addition, emergency managers must foster people’s sense of personal responsibility for self-protection to achieve high levels of household hazard adjustment adoption. Thus, it is important to remind local residents of the limits to what local government and industry can do in mitigating environmental hazards. Moreover, as the PADM indicates, risk communication programs should ensure people are aware of the available hazard adjustments and have accurate beliefs about the efficacy and resource requirements of these hazard adjustments. Indeed, there is theoretical and empirical support for the proposition that the probability of hazard adjustment adoption is higher if messages address attitudes toward the hazard adjustments themselves as well as addressing the hazard (Lindell & Whitney, 2000). That is, emergency managers should provide information about the personal consequences of hazard impact to arouse protection motivation but also identify feasible protective actions, describe the effectiveness of those actions, and help people to meet the resource requirements needed for implementation. Finally, the risk communication program should be structured as a progressive, long-term process but emergency managers should recognize that even the most scientifically sound and effectively implemented risk communication programs will not produce very high levels of household adoptions of hazard adjustments. A long-term perspective will not demonstrate immediate results, but it can put environmental hazards on the political agenda, which can reinforce the results achieved at the household level (Birkland, 1997; Prater & Lindell, 2000). Operational Analysis Task 1: Identify and assess feasible hazard adjustments for the community and its households/businesses. The purpose of this task is to address the problem that many people who know about their exposure to environmental hazards often don’t know what to do to reduce their vulnerability (Lindell & Perry, 2000). To identify feasible hazard adjustments, local emergency managers could access resources such as the American Red Cross web site at www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared, where they can find information about recommended household adjustments for a wide range of hazards. These can be evaluated in terms of resource requirements such as financial cost, time and effort, knowledge and skill, tools and equipment, and required cooperation with others. Task 2: Identify ways to provide incentives, sanctions, and technological innovations. Some hazard adjustments require a significant amount of household resources for implementation, so the level of adoption could be increased by supplementing risk communication with sanctions, incentives, or technological innovations. As noted in Chapter 1, sanctions are appealing because they avoid the obvious costs associated with incentives and have been shown to be effective in situations such as the use of seat belts in automobiles (Escobedo, Chorba & Remmington, 1992). However, sanctions are less useful than they might seem because they require constant monitoring for enforcement, even in the workplace (Lindell, 1994a). By contrast, the financial cost of a hazard adjustment can be reduced by providing incentives such as grants, loans at subsidized interest rates, or tax credits. An alternative incentive is for emergency managers to reduce resource requirements such as knowledge and skill by providing specific plans or checklists for hazard adjustment implementation. For example, providing plans for homeowners to bolt their houses to their foundations makes this hazard adjustment feasible for do-it-yourselfers with only a modest level of construction experience, but adding a community tool bank also makes this hazard adjustment feasible for those who lack the tools and equipment that are needed. Task 3: Identify the available risk communication sources in the community. As noted earlier, sources can be categorized as authorities (local, state, and federal government agencies, facility operators, and scientists), news media, (especially newspapers, television, and radio) and peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers). These sources are judged in terms of their credibility, which primarily comprises perceived expertise and trustworthiness, but these credibility perceptions are likely to vary depending upon whether a source is speaking about hazards or hazard adjustments. Within the latter category, sources are likely to be differentiated with respect to their credibility regarding disaster responses and long-term hazard adjustments and, within each of these categories, with respect to hazard adjustment efficacy and hazard adjustment resource requirements (Lindell, 1994c). The best risk information sources will be credible because of their expertise regarding multiple hazards and their trustworthiness to multiple community groups. Previous hazard research has documented that official sources are generally the most credible, and message recipients infer credibility from the source's credentials (e.g., job title and educational degrees), acceptance by other sources of known credibility, or previous history of job performance (Perry & Lindell, 1990b). Lindell and Perry (1992) found the degree of expertise attributed to different sources varies from one hazard to another and there is evidence that perceptions of source characteristics vary by gender, ethnicity, and other demographic characteristics (Nigg, 1982; Perry, 1987; Perry & Nelson, 1991). Source credibility has special implications among ethnic minorities, but most research on ethnicity has focused on Mexican Americans, African Americans, and Whites. The results of these studies indicate authorities (particularly firefighters and police) tend to be regarded as credible by the majority of all three ethnic groups, except under special circumstances (Lindell & Perry, 1992). African Americans and Whites tended to be more skeptical of the mass media than Mexican Americans. In general, Mexican Americans are more likely than African Americans or Whites to consider peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, or coworkers) to be the most credible sources. There is evidence, however, that the results vary by community, which appears to reflect historical differences in relationships between ethnic groups and authorities in these specific communities. The practical implication of these differences in source credibility is that each emergency manager must identify the patterns of credibility attribution in his or her own community. There is no substitute for knowing which minority groups live and work in the community, if they are geographically concentrated (and where), and how they view alternative sources of information about environmental hazards and hazard adjustments. Such information can be gained from census data, informants, and personal observation. Census data can be used to identify those census tracts having a greater than average percentage of ethnic minorities. These data can be supplemented by informants, who can describe the nature of credibility attributions among the ethnic groups located in those areas. It is particularly important to identify opinion leaders, who are individuals that are recognized as especially credible by particular ethnic groups, that might be recruited to participate as additional sources of risk information. In this regard, they play the role of social influentials, as was discussed in Chapter 2, and intermediate information sources, as represented in Figure 4-2. Finally, the best information comes from emergency managers’ active outreach programs employed over a long period of time—for example, speaking at meetings of neighborhood associations and civic organizations, and involving a diverse group of citizens in advisory committees. Not only does such community involvement provide emergency managers with information about citizens’ credibility attributions, but it also enhances authorities’ visibility, fosters dialogue, and facilitates citizens’ access to accurate risk information. Task 4: Identify the available risk communication channels in the community. The primary risk communication channels available in most communities are electronic media such as radio and television (and, increasingly, Web sites) and print media such as local newspapers and magazines. Other print media that have been used in hazard awareness programs include brochures, posters, newsletters, telephone book inserts, comic/coloring books, reports and scientific journal articles. Additional communication channels include informal face-to-face conversations (drop-in hours at local libraries and information booths at local events and shopping malls) and formal meetings with or without audiovisual presentations such as computer simulations, slide shows and films (Hance, et al., 1988; Mileti, Fitzpatrick & Farhar, 1990). Even though emergency managers have access to all of these channels in principle, access to some of them is limited in practice because their costs exceed agency budgets. To gain access to low-cost opportunities for publicity, emergency managers must establish contacts with local media personnel. In addition, collaboration with private sector organizations can sometimes yield financial contributions that can be used to pay for low cost items such as brochures and posters. Task 5: Identify specific audience segments. Emergency managers face a significant dilemma when designing their hazard awareness programs. On the one hand, most risk communication programs have assumed a very homogeneous “public” and have done little to tailor information materials to different groups. One obvious reason for this strategy is that it is easier and cheaper to provide a generic program; another reason is that existing research can barely provide a basis for what to say to the “typical” person, let alone guidance on how to tailor messages to specific demographic groups. On the other hand, individuals with different demographic characteristics are likely to have different interests and concerns, distinct motives for undertaking hazard adjustments, and varying media preferences, so different approaches must be used. A variety of sources have emphasized the importance of tailoring information to the characteristics of each audience segment (Expert Review Committee, 1987; Hance, et al., 1988; Nelson & Perry, 1991; Olson, Lagono & Scott, 1990). Accordingly, the design of these audience segmentation strategies should be based upon local assessments of receiver characteristics, which we have defined broadly in terms of geographic (e.g., recency and frequency of hazard experience, and proximity to the impact area) and demographic (e.g., age, sex, education, income, and ethnicity) attributes. Emergency managers should assess each audience segment’s channel access and channel preference to identify the types of media (e.g., radio) and, more specifically, the channels used (e.g., specific radio stations). Next, emergency managers need to ensure recipients heed and comprehend the messages, which can be facilitated by determining each population segment’s and business sector’s perceptions of different information sources to assess their credibility. Message comprehension can be improved if emergency managers determine whether there are any audience segments for whom there are language barriers. These are less likely to arise among more acculturated ethnic groups (except perhaps among Native Americans) or among ethnic groups whose socioeconomic status is similar to that of the majority population. However, language tends to be a very important issue for recent immigrants and for minority groups who either have resisted acculturation (which is most likely when there is a high level of ethnic identity) or who have experienced sufficient prejudice and discrimination to preclude acculturation. Thus, information about environmental hazards and hazard adjustments often needs to be presented in multilingual format, preferably across multiple channels. In jurisdictions with small minority populations, the number of channels will be quite limited—perhaps not including mass media at all—but the emergency managers who know their communities should be able to identify some (even informal) mechanisms of native language communication. Moreover, emergency managers should assess the information needs of each population segment to determine what message content should be transmitted to them. Specific questions include whether local residents have adequate information about the hazards to which they are vulnerable, appropriate hazard adjustments, and the efficacy and resource requirements of those hazard adjustments. Finally, emergency managers need to identify any audience segments that lack a sense of personal responsibility or self-efficacy for adopting hazard adjustments. Any groups that are low on these characteristics should be targeted for special attention during the implementation of the risk communication program. Resource Mobilization Task 1: Obtain the support of senior appointed and elected officials. The research literature from a wide range of settings indicates successful implementation of a new program in any type of organization needs the support of higher level management (Lindell, 1994b). In the public sector, obtaining the support of senior appointed and elected officials is an important step toward obtaining the participation of other government agencies, as well. Organizational support can be increased when middle managers recognize they must effectively “sell” the issues that they believe should have a high priority. This means emergency managers must successfully identify community hazard vulnerability as an important issue and propose hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and recovery preparedness as effective solutions. Task 2: Enlist the participation of other government agencies. No matter how supportive senior appointed and elected officials would like to be, they are almost certain to have few additional resources to allocate to environmental hazard management, let alone to environmental risk communication. Consequently, emergency managers should adopt an interorganizational approach, the first stage of which is to be certain each agency is aware of the risk communication programs being planned and implemented by other governmental (city, county, state and federal) agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and hazardous technological facilities. The second stage of this interorganizational approach is to develop a coalition that pools the resources of multiple agencies within local government (Drabek, 1990; Gillespie, et al., 1993; Lindell, et al., 1996a). To elicit the active support of other government agencies, emergency managers should identify ways in which collaboration can achieve the goals of both organizations. For example, emergency managers could work with the police to ensure that Block Watch (also known as Neighborhood Watch) groups are provided with information about environmental hazards. Task 3: Enlist the participation of nongovernmental and private sector organizations. Nongovernmental organizations such as the American Red Cross and religious organizations such as the Salvation Army are active in household emergency preparedness and, especially, disaster recovery. Some of these organizations routinely work with needy families and can identify the geographic areas in which there is a high concentration of population segments that are most likely to be vulnerable to disaster impact. These organizations can also help to identify methods of assisting households to prepare for emergencies, reduce the vulnerability of the structures in which they live, or to find safer places to which they can move. In addition, there are many disaster-relevant infrastructure organizations such as water, wastewater, fuel, and electric power utilities that can play a significant role in promoting the adoption of hazard adjustments. Most of these respond to more routine emergencies such as severe thunderstorms and winter storms, so they are aware of the demands that disasters can place on a community. In addition, these organizations routinely send bills to all of the residents of their service areas, a situation which provides emergency managers with an opportunity to disseminate notices about sources and channels for obtaining further information about hazards and hazard adjustments. Task 4. Work with the mass media. Collectively, the mass media comprise a variety of channels that routinely reach a large number of community residents. Consequently, a knowledge of media goals and operations, as well as familiarity with specific news media personnel, can set the stage for relationships in which information about environmental hazards adjustment can be disseminated. At the same time, the visibility and credibility of local environmental hazard management agencies can be enhanced. In particular, contact with reporters and editors can allow emergency managers access to channels with which citizens are familiar and routinely use for information. Cultivation of a cooperative relationship with the mass media through these mechanisms serves to diversify channels for the dissemination of risk information, as well as to increase the visibility of the environmental hazard management function in the community. Finally, reporters are often aware of their specialized audiences and tend to target them directly. This aspect of media coverage creates opportunities for emergency managers to target messages to specific audience segments defined by gender, age, ethnicity (and language groups), and socioeconomic status. It is important for emergency managers to recognize that, even though they consider environmental hazards to be a topic of vital concern for the community, reporters and editors will not automatically consider this information to be “newsworthy” during the continuing hazard phase. In order to increase the priority of this topic for the news media, many federal agencies such as the National Weather Service urge government officials to “declare” weeks for hazards such as tornadoes and hurricanes. Local emergency managers can take advantage of the publicity generated by these agencies to contact their local media. In addition, emergency managers can collaborate with the news media by working with them to develop the background materials reporters will need in an escalating crisis, emergency response, or disaster recovery. Thus, emergency managers need to anticipate what types of information reporters are likely to seek during these events and to prepare fact sheets and other “boilerplate” that can be used no matter what specific conditions occur during an emergency. Task 5: Work with neighborhood associations and civic organizations. Most communities have many neighborhood associations and civic organizations whose members participate when they perceive social and environmental problems in their community that they expect the organization to be successful in mitigating (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Florin & Wandersman, 1984). Such studies have found group members’ sense of individual and collective self-efficacy is enhanced when these organizations are empowered by successfully influencing actions taken by the community (Prestby, et al., 1990). As noted in Chapter 3, emergency managers can help the leaders of these groups to increase members’ organizational commitment by increasing leader initiating structure (explaining what tasks to perform and how to perform them), leader consideration (recognizing the needs and limitations of each person), and perceived reward opportunities, and by reducing role conflict (differing expectations regarding members’ duties). In addition, emergency managers can work with these organizations by providing them with opportunities to learn about environmental hazards and feasible adjustments to those hazards. Time is frequently available for this purpose during organizational meetings because most of these organizations meet regularly, but are not always able to fill their meeting agendas. Program Development Task 1. Staff and train a crisis communication team. One important principle of risk communication is to establish a crisis communication team as part of a broader emergency preparedness program (Churchill, 1997; Fink, 1986). The crisis communication team forms a critical link between technical experts and the population at risk, so it must be able to communicate effectively with both groups. In addition, the crisis communication team should be represented by a spokesperson who is technically competent to explain the situation clearly. As noted earlier, spokespersons will be perceived as credible if they have relevant credentials (e.g., job title and educational degrees), are accepted by other sources of known credibility, or have a demonstrated history of job performance that has enhanced their credibility (Lindell & Perry, 1992; Perry & Lindell, 1990). It also will be helpful if they receive training from public relations experts (Hance, et al., 1988). As is the case with any other emergency response organization, the crisis communication team should have written operating procedures to guide its activation and initial contacts with the news media. The crisis communication team’s procedures should include documentation of all emergency response related activities, especially an event log recording the information that was available and the criteria that were used to guide critical decisions such as those involving protective actions for the public. The crisis communication team should also prepare to monitor information being disseminated by the news media and should designate a rumor control center that will be staffed by operators who are frequently updated on the status of the incident and the response to it. The crisis communication team should recognize that reporters are taught to describe events in terms of stories that are framed by five questions—who, what, when, where, and why (Churchill, 1997). Specifically, they will want to know what happened and what were the specific causes of the event. Other questions include who was (or will be) affected—including casualties, property damage, and economic disruption—and what authorities have done (and will do) to respond to the situation. It frequently is difficult to answer one or more of these questions because information is lacking. In such cases, it is important for the spokesperson to avoid speculation (and especially premature blame), but rather to admit he or she does not know the answer and will find out as soon as possible. This should not be interpreted as a license to plead ignorance even when you are reasonably confident about your assessment of the situation. It is important to strike a balance between avoiding speculation and withholding information. When providing information to the news media, it is important to remember few reporters have scientific backgrounds, so technical details might not only be unnecessary but potentially confusing and thus counterproductive. To distinguish material that is informative from that which is useless or confusing requires advance preparation—especially advance contact with local reporters. This will not solve all problems; major crises such as the 911 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina draw reporters from around the country and even around the world. Reporters from national or international newspapers and television networks will not cover stories in exactly the same way as local reporters, but most of the important information needs will be common to all categories of reporters. Despite their limited knowledge about scientific and technological processes, reporters should be treated with respect because they have a difficult job to do. Specifically, they must translate complex scientific concepts in terms that can be understood by any reasonably intelligent and literate citizen. Thus, emergency managers who prepare briefing materials that facilitate this process will have a far better chance of getting their message to the public than those who continue to speak in technical jargon (McCallum & Anderson, 1991). Just as officials should translate warnings from English to minority languages in order to ensure the warning messages are transmitted correctly, agency officials also should translate their assessment of a situation from technical jargon to ordinary English to ensure this message is also transmitted correctly. It is important to provide reporters with the best available information when they face a deadline, even if that information is less reliable or current than one might prefer. Finally, the crisis communication plan and procedures should be evaluated using drills that test the crisis communication team alone and also by means of full scale exercises that test the integration of the crisis communication function into the overall emergency response organization. Each drill or exercise should be followed by a critique that evaluates the adequacy of the crisis communication plan and procedures, as well as the staffing, training, and materials used. Task 2: Establish procedures for maintaining an effective communication flow during an escalating crisis or emergency response. All organizations participating in the risk communication program should establish procedures for coordinating the information they disseminate during crises and emergencies. It is especially important to routinize the flow of information among these organizations to ensure each organization receives all the information it needs as promptly as possible. The types of information needed in an escalating crisis will depend upon the circumstances, but recommendations regarding the content of incident notifications can be found in guidance for chemical (National Response Team, 1987) and nuclear (US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1980) facilities, and are summarized in Table 4-3. It is advisable that this table be adopted as a template because it is based upon long experience with escalating crises and disaster responses. It is essential that facility operators and local emergency managers discuss their information capabilities and needs and agree in advance what information will be exchanged when the need arises. Task 3: Develop a comprehensive risk communication program. As noted earlier, McGuire’s (1985) system for analyzing message content can be defined in terms of the amount of material, speed of presentation, number of arguments, repetition, style, clarity, ordering, forcefulness, and extremity of the position advocated. Some of these characteristics can be measured objectively; for example, the amount of material can be measured in terms of the number of words, the speed of presentation can be measured in words per minute, and the number of arguments can be counted. Other characteristics are more ambiguous—repetition can be measured either in terms of the number of verbatim duplications of the message or the number of times an idea or argument is presented. Finally, characteristics such as the clarity and extremity of the arguments must be measured subjectively. As one might expect, there often are significant individual differences in receivers’ perceptions of the subjective message characteristics as well as in their reactions to all of these message characteristics. Table 4-3. Essential incident data. Date and time of report Name, affiliation, and telephone number of information source Location, type and current status of the incident • Derailment, containment failure, fire, explosion, liquid spill, gaseous release • Hazardous material name, physical properties (gas, liquid, solid), environmental cues (sights, sounds, smells), and potential health effects • Hazardous material release duration and quantity released • Casualties and damage already incurred Incident prognosis • Potential for fire or explosion at site • Potential for fire or explosion affecting residential, commercial, or industrial areas • Hazardous material quantity available for release and expected release duration • Locations and populations requiring protective action • Types of protective actions recommended: evacuation, sheltering in-place, expedient respiratory protection, interdiction of food/water Weather conditions (current and forecast wind speed and direction) Chronology of important events in the development of the incident Current status of response • Facility/shipper/carrier actions: assessment, preventive, corrective, population protective actions • Local/state/federal agency actions: assessment, preventive, corrective, population protective actions Source: Lindell & Perry (2004). At a somewhat broader level, Mileti and his colleagues (Mileti, et al., 1992; Mileti & Peek, 2000; Mileti & Sorensen, 1987) have defined warning message content in terms of information about the information source, the nature of the hazard, the impact location and time, guidance about recommended protective action, and frequency of repetition. Messages can be further characterized in terms of stylistic characteristics, which include message specificity (the level of information detail), consistency (compatibility of information within and between messages), and certainty (the stated or implied probability of an event’s occurrence, as well as sources’ apparent confidence in what they are saying). The stylistic characteristics also include clarity (simplicity of the words used in the message), accuracy (the degree to which a source’s statements are proven to be correct over time), sufficiency (adequacy of the amount of information provided—neither too much nor too little), and channel (electronic, print, face-to-face). In evaluating the suitability of message content, the primary concern is that it should take into account the protective action decision process that determines the adoption of household hazard adjustments. Although adjustment adoption intentions and actual adoption depend upon many additional variables, the four key message content factors are personal risk, personal responsibility for action (when this is necessary during the continuing hazard phase), guidance for protective action (including information about an action’s efficacy and resource requirements), and sources of further information. These factors should become important themes during risk communication and should be addressed in designing messages that are most likely to have an impact. There are several implications of the PADM for the construction of risk communication messages. First, information about hazards and hazard adjustments should be presented in a form that attracts attention and is easily understood and retained but, even then, it will require periodic repetition over time. Second, risk communication programs should address risk perception but should not over-emphasize it. Risk perception should be addressed because probabilities are difficult for most people to understand. In particular, the statement that “there is a 1% probability of a damaging earthquake within the next year” might have little impact on people’s behavior, but cumulating probabilities over time by making the mathematically equivalent statement that there is a 20% chance of an earthquake in the next twenty years does seem to make more of a difference in risk perception (Kunreuther, 2001). However, even communication programs that succeed in increasing the accuracy of people’s risk perceptions are of no consequence if risk area residents fail to act on these risk perceptions by adopting effective hazard adjustments. In the case of warnings, it is especially important to describe what the risk is, where it is going to happen, when it is going to happen, and what the effects will be (Mileti, 1993). Beyond this, however, detailed explanations of risk assessment processes and hazard agent dynamics might be unnecessary or even counterproductive if such information displaces a discussion of the other three issues—personal responsibility for action, guidance for protective action (including information about a hazard adjustment’s efficacy and resource requirements), and sources of further information (Mileti, 1993). Explicitly addressing personal responsibility for action is important because research suggests repeated officials statements regarding the need for households struck by earthquakes to be self sufficient for 72 hours have increased citizens’ sense of personal responsibility for self protection (Lindell & Perry, 2004). Thus, a frank acknowledgement of the limits to governmental assistance might be useful in other contexts as well. Moreover, self sufficiency is likely to increase when emergency managers describe the ways in which households can protect themselves, together with specific descriptions of the resource requirements to implement these hazard adjustments. In addition, emergency managers should work with NGOs in their communities to ensure households with low incomes and other disadvantages are able, as well as willing, to take personal responsibility for self protection. As noted earlier in this chapter, guidance for protective action during an emergency response often requires nothing more than stating what is the recommended protective action and when to implement it (e.g., evacuate now). In other cases, such as the continuing hazard phase, guidance would include information about a hazard adjustment’s efficacy and resource requirements (e.g., bolting water heaters to the foundation). Finally, sources for further information should be addressed because message recipients vary in so many ways that they might need individualized information. This might include information about their personal risk (for those who are on the edge of the risk area), alternative protective actions (e.g., sheltering in-place rather than evacuation for those whose health status is too fragile to be moved safely), or sources of assistance (e.g., for those who have no personal vehicle and have not been able to leave with friends, relatives, neighbors, or coworkers). In addressing the four critical risk communication issues, emergency managers should pay attention to message style factors such as achieving clarity by choosing simple, nontechnical language. The essential information is simple and can be communicated quickly by the broadcast media or in a small space by the print media. For additional detail or elaboration, people can be referred to another specific channel or source. Messages should be short enough to avoid losing receivers’ attention because of seemingly irrelevant details that induce boredom. Conversely, long messages presenting many details have the potential for overloading receivers with so much information they are unable to determine what is centrally important and what is peripheral. That is, the provision of too much information is probably as dysfunctional as the provision of insufficient information. Nonetheless, emergency managers should recognize what is “too long” will vary from one community to another and even from one situation to another. In regard to the latter, people’s attention spans for emergency management information will be relatively short during the continuing hazard phase, but can be expected to increase significantly during an emerging crisis or emergency response. In the latter case, lengthy messages should be repeated frequently to ensure that people can obtain the information they need if they fail to attend to it or comprehend it the first time they receive it. In all multiethnic communities, the production of brochures or other official written information should be multilingual. It is important to note, as Lindell and Perry (1992) indicate, that translations should be professionally executed to avoid complications arising from dialect variations within the same language group. Furthermore, when providing hazard information to non-English outlets, it is appropriate to provide it in both English and the target language to minimize information distortion that might be introduced if employees of a radio or television station, newspaper, or magazine provide a “freelance” translation of the English version. Task 4: Plan to make effective use of informal communication networks. It is important for emergency managers to recognize peer communication takes place during all phases—the continuing hazard phase, the escalating crisis phase, and the emergency response phase. They should plan to use these informal networks to increase the level of hazard adjustment adoption in their communities and to alert peers to dangerous situations. However, even the best intended friends, relatives, neighbors and coworkers might misunderstand a message in the first place or inadvertently distort it through selective recall. One strategy for reducing distortion is to disseminate information through a range of official sources and channels, creating what Mileti (1993, p. 148) calls a “supplemental barrage of information”. The idea is to provide many opportunities for citizens to hear official messages via several channels in the expectation that people will retain the common elements of these messages. Task 5: Establish procedures for obtaining feedback from the news media and the public. As Figure 4-1 indicates, feedback is a critical part of any communication process because it provides receivers with an opportunity to confirm they have comprehended the message, to reconcile inconsistencies within or between messages, or to obtain information that is not available in the messages they have received. Feedback is an inherent part of some communication channels such as informal face-to-face discussions. It is somewhat more limited in public hearings where public comment might be limited to a few minutes at the end of a meeting (indeed, avoiding feedback is often a major objective of such “hearings”) and, in any event, individual speakers are typically limited to 3-5 minutes apiece. This need for feedback is precisely the reason why many scholars recommend informal channels of communication (e.g., Committee on Risk Perception and Communication, 1989; Covello, 1987; Hance, et al, 1988). Thus, if community or agency procedures require public hearings, these should be supplemented by less formal procedures such as advisory panels and meetings with neighborhood associations and civic organizations. During emerging crises, there often is pressure to disseminate information more rapidly via electronic and print media, so opportunities for monitoring the degree of message distortion are somewhat limited. One effective strategy for performing this function is to monitor the news media by obtaining copies of local newspapers, listening to radio, and viewing television broadcasts. In addition, emergency managers can obtain feedback from citizens via rumor control centers with a telephone number or a Web site that has been publicized in advance. Program Implementation During the Continuing Hazard Phase Task 1: Build source credibility by increasing perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness. As noted previously, disaster researchers have found those who think they are at risk from environmental hazards seek information from the news media (print and broadcast) and peers (friends, relatives, neighbors, and coworkers), as well as from authorities (federal, state and local government). In order to ensure local authorities are considered to be the most credible source, they must take steps during the continuing hazard phase to enhance perceptions of their expertise and trustworthiness. Accordingly, the members of the crisis communication team should ensure its procedures are coordinated with all relevant agencies’ emergency operations plans. This coordination can be verified by using joint training, drills, and full-scale exercises to produce joint messages, messages that reference each other or, at least, messages that are consistent with each other. It also is important for personnel from each agency to develop a demonstrated history of effective job performance that enhances their credibility. In part, this experience can be gained during minor incidents such as severe storms and minor floods that cause localized damage and disruption of normal activities. However, credibility can also be enhanced by effective performance in public hearings or in meetings with advisory committees, neighborhood associations, and civic organizations. Of course, expertise is only one component of credibility; trustworthiness is also essential. According to Renn and Levine (1991), trust develops when messages are perceived to be accurate, objective, and complete. This can be expected when a source is fair, unbiased, complete, and accurate (Meyer, 1988; Trumbo & McComas, 2003). Similarly, Maeda and Miyahara (2003) contend that a trustworthy source is competent, open and honest, caring and concerned, and sympathetic. Accordingly, emergency managers are advised to earn a community’s trust by being competent, caring, honorable, and considering outrage factors when working with the public (Covello, McCallum & Pavlova, 1988; Hance, et al., 1988). It also is important to promote meaningful public involvement by involving the community in the continuing hazard phase (or early in the decision process of a new facility), avoiding secret meetings, and explaining the agency’s procedures (especially what constraints on public participation are imposed by law and agency policy). Emergency managers also should provide accurate information that is responsive to people’s requests. In this regard, it is important to recognize the difference between the information people think they need and the information experts think is needed. Emergency managers must learn to respond to both sets of information needs. Task 2: Use a variety of channels to disseminate hazard information. Information channels differ significantly with respect to the types of information most suited to them, so messages tend to be “channel-bound”. Radio, face-to-face conversations, and oral presentations are limited to verbal information, whereas television, print media, computer simulations, slide shows, and films can convey numeric and graphic information as well as verbal information. The fact that messages disseminated through different media inherently have different characteristics implies different channels could be selected to contribute to different stages of information processing. For example, radio or television “spots” might have their greatest impact in establishing initial hazard awareness (i.e., attracting attention to the problem) and maintaining its intrusiveness by means of frequent thought and discussion. By contrast, printed materials are most effective in providing the detailed information needed to establish a perception of threat and identifying suitable hazard adjustments. This function follows from their ability to be retained and re-read to enhance comprehension and memory for important information such as definitions and checklists. Still other channels include public meetings and interactive (listener or viewer call-in) broadcast programs, which provide opportunities for two-way communication that are effective for answering unresolved questions but have the disadvantage that communication is oral and thus less readily retained. The advantage of such interactive channels is that their use is likely to enhance the receiver's personalization of the message, but large public meetings are especially likely to elicit theatrical demonstrations of outrage rather than sincere questions. Thus, when agency policies or particular circumstances require large public meetings, Hance, et al. (1988) advocate considering the use of neutral moderators such as the League of Women Voters, structuring agendas so that public comment can be made before the end of the meeting (by which time most people have left), and breaking the meeting up into smaller working groups with specific topics to address. In addition to the channel boundedness of certain types of information (verbal, numeric, and graphic), environmental hazard mangers should recognize channel access is unevenly distributed in communities and can be compounded by variations in ethnicity and income. Typically, variation in resources and personal skills do not eliminate channel access altogether, but instead concentrate it on a narrower range of channels. Moreover, individual preferences also restrict the access each channel provides to different community groups, so cross-channel linkages might be required. If enough channels are used, emergency managers are likely to reach all members of a community that has even the most varied pattern of channel preferences. Task 3: Describe community or facility hazard adjustments being planned or implemented. In many communities, there are emergency management actions being planned or implemented by local government agencies or, in the case of some technological hazards, by hazardous facility operators. Local residents should be informed of any hazard mitigation actions being taken to reduce the probability of an incident so they will understand that their risk is being reduced. Of course, it is unlikely all of them will believe these measures will be wholly effective in protecting them and, indeed, emergency managers should acknowledge there is no mitigation action that can guarantee complete safety. That is, land use and building construction practices can reduce, but not eliminate, the threat of natural hazards. The same can be said about the use of land use practices and engineered safety features in connection with technological hazards. In addition, emergency managers should describe any emergency preparedness actions being taken to facilitate an active response to an incident and any recovery preparedness actions to support a rapid restoration of the community to normal patterns of social and economic functioning after an incident occurs. Task 4: Describe feasible household hazard adjustments. Even when hazard mitigation actions have been implemented to reduce the likelihood of incidents ranging from floods to accidental chemical releases, some local residents will not be satisfied that these actions will provide an adequate level of safety. In such cases, emergency managers should inform risk area residents of hazard adjustments they could take to protect themselves. For example, households can mitigate flood risk by adopting a variety of floodproofing measures (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1986), prepare for airborne releases of toxic chemicals by reducing air infiltration in their homes (Lindell & Perry, 1992), or drink bottled or boiled water in the event of groundwater contamination of local wells. In some cases, the most cost-effective (and, sometimes, the only available) hazard adjustments are those taken by households. For example, earthquakes cannot be prevented (as engineered safety features can prevent chemical releases) or controlled (as levees can control floods). Consequently, the most effective methods for reducing earthquake casualties and damage is by household hazard adjustments, such as bolting heavy items with a high center of gravity (e.g., refrigerators, water heaters) to the walls. In such cases, emergency managers should promote the adoption of the most feasible hazard adjustments by beginning with the ones that are most effective, most generally useful, and lowest in resource requirements. Task 5: Evaluate program effectiveness. It is important to evaluate the effectiveness of any risk communication program by measuring the degree to which it has achieved its objectives (Stallen, 1991). An evaluation of program effectiveness is the logical complement to the goal setting activity undertaken in the strategic analysis. Thus, emergency managers should determine how to measure the goals that they have set, how to collect the data needed, and how to decide if the data indicate the goals have been achieved. This comparison process can then serve as the basis for determining whether changes need to be made in the risk communication program. As this chapter has indicated many times, a primary goal of environmental risk communication should be to promote household adoption of hazard adjustments. Thus, the first step in the program evaluation will usually be to identify the hazard adjustments whose adoption the program is seeking to increase. The remaining steps will depend upon the resources available.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/4%3A_Risk_Perception_and_Communication/4.4%3A_Risk_Communication_During_the_Continuing_Hazard_Phase.txt

There is an important difference between a state of chronic hazard and an escalating crisis, but the time at which the transition takes place is rarely well defined. It helps to consider the definition of an escalating crisis—a situation in which there is a significantly increased probability of an incident occurring that will threaten the public’s health, safety, or property. Unfortunately, the problem is that the probability of occurrence is at least partially subjective. Thus, the determination of whether a crisis exists will also be subjective. As a practical matter, a crisis exists if authorities (including technological facility operators), or the news media, or a significant proportion of those in the community believe that there is an increased risk. Asserting that a crisis exists if any of these groups defines the situation as such follows from the basic principle that “perception is reality”. If the news media or local residents believe there is a crisis, then there is a crisis unless authorities can convince them otherwise. This might make it seem as if any abnormal situation will inevitably become an escalating crisis, but such is not necessarily the case. The crucial point is that authorities must be prepared to explain specifically why a situation is or is not a crisis. Classify the Situation Authorities can exert some control over other people’s definition of a situation by establishing specific criteria in advance of an incident that systematically define elevated conditions of threat. For example, the National Weather Service has established an emergency classification system that consists of watches and warnings, whereas the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1980) classifies an incident as an Unusual Event, an Alert, a Site Area Emergency, or a General Emergency. The number of categories in the emergency classification system should correspond to meaningful differences in the levels of response by local authorities (and facility personnel, in the case of technological facilities), but the number of categories is less important than that the fact that the emergency classification system has been established in advance, is defined as objectively as possible, and is agreed to by all responding organizations (Lindell & Perry, 1992). By establishing a set of objective indicators of environmental or plant conditions that are linked to specific response actions, authorities commit themselves in advance to take those actions under those conditions—a situation indicating decisions are being made on the basis of rational scientific considerations rather than the exigencies of the moment. Program Implementation During an Escalating Crisis or Emergency Response Once authorities have determined that environmental conditions have exceeded the criteria listed in the emergency classification system, they need to implement the predetermined response actions. Many of these actions will include further emergency assessment, property protection, population protection, and incident management. One of the most important incident management actions is risk communication, and this will consist of six tasks: • Activate the crisis communication team promptly, • Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive information , • Select the communication channels appropriate to the situation, • Maintain source credibility with the news media and the public, • Provide timely and accurate information to the news media and the public, and • Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques. Task 1: Activate the crisis communication team promptly. When the criteria in the emergency classification system have been exceeded, the crisis communication team should activate promptly and prepare to disseminate information even if it does not need to release that information immediately. Members of the team should contact all appropriate authorities and open all necessary communication links to ensure all sources of information and expertise are brought to bear on the situation. It is essential that all organizations be aware of the information being disseminated by other organizations so they can identify any disagreement and prepare appropriate explanations before they are contacted by the news media to explain the discrepancies. Emergency managers should review the information in press kits and any background materials they have prepared for briefing the news media in press conferences or community groups in public hearings. They should also contact personnel in their agencies who are peripherally related to the crisis (e.g., plant workers and clerical support staff) to brief them about the situation. Such personnel might otherwise have only incomplete or outdated information to provide about the situation if they are queried by the news media and peers. During the initial stages of an escalating crisis or emergency response, emergency managers should take care to review their communication objectives (Churchill, 1997). These objectives should become the criteria according to which all later press releases, press conferences, and public meetings are evaluated. In most environmental emergencies, the principal objectives will be to promote appropriate protective action by those whom the authorities believe to be in the most immediate danger and also to promote active monitoring of the situation by those who might later be determined to be at risk. The objectives should not be to prevent panic, which disaster researchers have found to be extremely rare (Drabek, 1986; Lindell & Perry, 1992). Nor should authorities ridicule what they consider to be unnecessary protective action by those who think they are at risk, as long as such actions do not impede the protection of those whom the authorities believe are at risk. It is especially important for authorities to avoid attempting to promote one protective action by criticizing another. For example, some misguided attempts have been made to promote sheltering in-place by asserting that people are exposing themselves to major traffic accident risks if they evacuate. Not only is this incorrect (the accident risks in evacuation appear to be no greater than those of normal driving; Lindell & Perry, 1992), but it is likely to lead those at risk to believe that there is nothing they can do to protect themselves. Task 2: Determine the appropriate time to release sensitive information. When emergency managers, but not others, can detect the subtle environmental cues that indicate the onset of an emergency, they must determine when to alert others of the danger. Thus, the crisis communication team needs to be guided by procedures that define when information is to be released, but there are no universal rules for determining when to release information because even experts disagree (Kasperson, 1987). On the one hand, early releases of information often are characterized by a significant degree of uncertainty, so there is a possibility that crisis conditions might never materialize or will be less severe than initially expected. Consequently, authorities frequently withhold information in order to avoid unnecessary disruption. The disadvantage of delaying the release of information is that this can be misinterpreted as a cover-up if the data are leaked (Hance, et al., 1988) and there are many ways in which such leaks can occur. It also is important to respond appropriately to reporters’ questions when they become aware that something important is happening. Statements of “no comment” are almost certain to be interpreted as meaning that authorities have important information that is being withheld. By contrast, early release of information tends to enhance the credibility of the information source and to increase a source’s control over the agenda. In particular, being the first to break bad news provides an opportunity to put the information into an appropriate context. In addition, controlling the timing of a press release can have a significant impact on the amount of attention it receives. A press release distributed on a slow news day might receive substantially more coverage in the news media than the same information released on a busy day or late on a Friday afternoon preceding a three day weekend. Task 3: Select the communication channels that are appropriate to the situation. One of the most significant differences between a continuing hazard and an escalating crisis is that the latter is “newsworthy”, so emergency managers will generally have little difficulty in obtaining the news media coverage they sought, usually unsuccessfully, during the continuing hazard phase. As always, news media coverage needs to be monitored to ensure reporters are accurately disseminating the information released by emergency managers, yet this procedure alone cannot ensure those at risk are receiving, heeding, and comprehending the information they need. Thus, emergency managers need to promote dialogue through two-way communication, preferably in small groups rather than massive public hearings. This will help them to understand public risk perceptions and explain risks more effectively (Hance, et al., 1988). Even though an escalating crisis or an emergency response will prompt the news media to seek information, emergency managers should not rely only on reporters’ requests for interviews to determine when and what information to disseminate. Instead, they should initiate communication with reporters through press releases and press conferences. Typically, press releases afford the most control over the agenda, whereas interviews provide the least control. Task 4: Maintain source credibility with the news media and the public. During an escalating crisis or emergency response, emergency managers should obtain timely and accurate data from within their own and other agencies and make their recommended actions consistent with the analyses. If the available data are incomplete, they should be honest about what is and is not known. A candid confession of ignorance might be uncomfortable at the time, but it is less dangerous to one’s credibility than making up an answer that is later found out to be incorrect. A related principle is that emergency managers should recognize the news media have many sources of information in addition to authorities. Consequently, it is important to respond to reporters when they need information for an imminent deadline because they will obtain the best information they can from whatever sources are available at the time that they need to file their stories (Churchill, 1997). Accordingly, it is often better to explain that data have been or are being collected, describe how they are being or will be analyzed, and indicate the date on which the results of the analyses will be released. Hance, et al. (1988) note that agencies should present some management options when the data reveal environmental problems, but practitioners differ in their beliefs about the balance between analyzing these options thoroughly and presenting tentative options that provide a starting point for input from the community. Trust is a major issue because there tends to be so little of it to begin with and what there is can be lost so easily. As Kasperson (1987) noted, trust in institutions has been decreasing for some time and television anchors tend to be among the few people other than independent scientists that are generally trusted. Television anchors are trusted because they are familiar, authoritative, and have developed a track record of accuracy over time. Frequently, those who must communicate information about environmental risks are stereotyped as representatives of their organizations and, unless the stereotype is positive at the outset, it can be difficult to build trust during a crisis. This is the reason why it is so important for emergency managers to forestall public stereotypes about their agencies, and thus themselves, by working with community groups on multiple environmental issues before crises arise and publicizing the accomplishments of their agencies in handling these problems. Task 5: Provide timely and accurate information about the hazard to the news media and the public. News releases should be no longer than two pages with simple short sentences in plain English (Churchill, 1997). They should contain a dateline (date and location of release), the organizational source (including point of contact) for the information, a summary lead that provides a one sentence abstract of the press release, the text of the press release, and a brief description of any attachments. These should be supplemented by fact sheets that contain basic background information appropriate to any incident. There should be attachments including information such as a biographical summary about the spokesperson and other pertinent details about the hazard and official responses. In deciding how to present risk information, it is important to assess the audience’s level of technical sophistication so the presentation can avoid being too technical for people to understand, yet not so simplistic the audience is insulted. In general, it is important to presume the average member of the audience is intelligent but uninformed about environmental risks. Thus, emergency managers should avoid acronyms and use ordinary English words rather than technical jargon to explain basic concepts. They also should anticipate the possibility of confrontational tactics by the news media or some members of the public. If confronted with differing interpretations from other experts, emergency managers should be prepared to calmly reiterate their own scientific qualifications, repeat the rationale for their own position on the dispute, and explain what they believe are the weaknesses in alternative positions. Emergency managers should be prepared to describe the process by which risks were assessed (including ways in which cautious estimates were used in different steps of the analysis), and what the risks are (in terms of quantities released, ambient concentrations, individual exposures via different pathways, probabilities of adverse effects, and expected levels of impact over different time periods). They also should be prepared to acknowledge uncertainties in hazard data and even be ready to acknowledge they don’t know the answer to a question when this is the case. However, they also should be prepared to state what will be done to obtain an answer to the question and when the answer will be forthcoming. Task 6: Evaluate performance through post-incident critiques. To improve their performance, organizations must learn from their experience. Thus, each incident in which emergency managers must disseminate risk information to the news media or the public should be followed by a thorough critique of performance (Lindell & Perry, 1992; National Response Team, 1987). All members of the crisis communication team should review the goals of the risk communication program, the event logs kept during the incident, and other available documentation to identify deficiencies in organizational performance. Experience in drills, exercises, and incidents has demonstrated the importance of focusing on the performance of the organization rather than the performance of individuals because this enhances a spirit of cooperation. Thus, each participant should be encouraged to follow up on any deficiencies by identifying the ways in which these can be corrected by improvements in plans, procedures, training, facilities, equipment, or materials and supplies. 4.6: Case Study: Risk Perception and Warning of the Mt. St. Helens Eruption In late March, 1980, Mt. St. Helens began a series of ash and steam eruptions that culminated six weeks later in a blast that ejected one cubic mile of material from the top of the mountain. Prior to the March eruptions, most residents of nearby communities were aware that Mt. St. Helens was a volcano and could name a specific threat that could affect their safety (Perry & Greene, 1983). The majority of those within about 20 miles of the volcano expressed concern about ashfall, whereas most of those in communities 30-40 miles away were concerned about mudflows and floods. The severity and immediacy of the volcano threat led people to search for information frequently—most of them sought information four times a day or more. The unfamiliarity of the threat led them to rely on the news media more than peers. Reliance on authorities was very high in communities closest to the volcano, but very low farther away. Similarly, residents of areas closest to the volcano thought they were more likely to evacuate and had made more preparations to evacuate. On the day of the May 18 eruption, most of those living close to the volcano (Toutle/Silverlake) were warned by authorities (48%) but almost as many were warned by peers (41%) and few were warned by the news media (11%). By contrast, most of those living farther away the volcano (Woodland) were warned by peers (59%) and equal proportions of the remainder were warned by authorities (21%) and the news media (20%). The initial response also differed by community. Toutle/Silverlake residents were most likely to prepare to evacuate (40%), but many took family oriented action (18%), sought to confirm the warning (19%), or continued normal routines (18%). Woodland residents were most likely to take family oriented action (41%), while others sought to confirm the warning (21%) or continued normal routines (29%) rather than prepare to evacuate (7%). Most residents of both communities sought warning confirmation, but those in Toutle/Silverlake were less likely to use the mass media (33% vs. 59% in Woodland) and more likely to contact peers and local authorities.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/4%3A_Risk_Perception_and_Communication/4.5%3A_Risk_Communication_During_an_Escalating_Crisis_or_Emergency_Response.txt

This chapter describes the principal environmental hazards that are of greatest concern to emergency managers in communities throughout the United States. Each of these hazards will be described in terms of the physical processes that generate them, the geographical areas that are most commonly at risk, the types of impacts and typical magnitude of hazard events, and hazard-specific issues of emergency response. 5: Principal Hazards in the United States Most of the hazards that concern emergency managers are environmental hazards, which are commonly classified as natural or technological. Natural hazards are extreme events that originate in the natural environment, whereas the technological hazards of concern to emergency managers originate in human controlled processes (e.g., factories, warehouses) but are transmitted through the air and water. The natural hazards are commonly categorized as meteorological, hydrological, or geophysical. The most important technological hazards are toxic chemicals, radiological and nuclear materials, flammable materials, and explosives. The list of natural and technological hazards that could occur in the United States is much larger than can be addressed here. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the hazard agents that most commonly confront local emergency managers. The first section addresses four meteorological hazards—severe storms (including blizzards), severe summer weather, tornadoes, and hurricanes. It also includes wildfires because these are significantly influenced by lack of rainfall. The second section describes three hydrological hazards—floods, storm surges, and tsunamis. The third section addresses geophysical hazards—volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, and landslides. The material in these three sections is drawn primarily from Alexander (1993), Bryant (1997), Ebert (1988), Federal Emergency Management Agency (1997), Hyndman and Hyndman (2005), Meyer (1977), Noji (1997), Scientific Assessment and Strategy Team (1994), and Smith (2001). The fourth section covers technological hazards, primarily toxic, flammable, explosive, and radiological materials. The material in these three sections is drawn primarily from Edwards (1994), FEMA (no date, a), Goetsch (1996), Kramer and Porch (1990), and Meyer (1977). The last section summarizes information on biological hazards. The material in this section is drawn primarily from World Health Organization (2004), World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization (2004), and Chin (2000). The chapter does not address emergencies caused by large, unexpected resource shortages, energy shortages being a prime example. Nor does it address slow onset disasters such as ozone depletion, greenhouse gas accumulation, deforestation, desertification, drought, loss of biodiversity, and chronic environmental pollution. For information on these long term hazards, see sources such as Kontratyev, Grigoryev and Varotsos (2002). test The principal meteorological hazards of concern to emergency managers are severe storms (including blizzards), severe summer weather, tornadoes, hurricanes, and wildfires. Severe Storms The National Weather Service (NWS) defines a severe storm as one whose wind speed exceeds 58 mph, that produces a tornado, or that releases hail with a 3/4 inch diameter or greater. The principal threats from these storms are lightning strikes, downbursts and microbursts, hail, and flash floods. Lightning strikes can cause casualties, but these tend to be few in number and widely dispersed so they are easily handled by local emergency medical services units. However, lightning strikes also can initiate wildfires that threaten entire communities—especially during droughts (see the discussion of wildfires below). Downbursts (up to 125 mph) and microbursts (up to 150 mph) are threats to aircraft as they take off or land. This creates a potential for mass casualty incidents. Large hail generally causes few casualties and the associated damage rarely causes significant social or economic disruption. The areas with the greatest thunderstorm hazard are in the desert southwest (northwest Arizona), the plains states (centered on Kansas) and the southeast (Florida), but only the latter two areas have high population densities. Severe winter storms pose a greater threat than those at other times of year because freezing temperatures produce substantial amounts of snow—whose volume exceeds that of an equivalent amount of rain by a factor of 7-10. A severe winter storm is classified as a blizzard if its wind speed exceeds 38 mph and its temperature is less than 21°F (degrees Fahrenheit). These conditions can produce significant wind chill effects on the human body. Table 5-1 shows increasing wind speed significantly accelerates the rate at which a low temperature causes frostbite. It is important to recognize that a temperature of 40°F and wind speed of 20 mph will not freeze water, even though the wind chill is 30°F. These storms can immobilize travel, isolate residents of remote areas, and deposit enormous loads of snow on buildings—collapsing the long-span roofs of gymnasiums, theaters, and arenas. In addition, the weight of ice deposits can bring down telephone and electric power lines. The hazard of winter storms is most pronounced in the northern tier of states from Minnesota to northern New England, but also can be extremely disruptive farther south where cities have less snow removal equipment. Table 5-1. Wind Chill Index. Wind Temperature (°F) 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 -5 -10 -15 -20 -25 -30 -35 -40 -45 Wind speed (mph) 5 36 31 25 19 13 7 1 -5 -11 -16 -22 -28 -34 -40 -46 -52 -57 -63 10 34 27 21 15 9 3 -4 -10 -16 -22 -28 -35 -41 -47 -53 -59 -66 -72 15 32 25 19 13 6 0 -7 -13 -19 -26 -32 -39 -45 -51 -58 -64 -71 -77 20 30 24 17 11 4 -2 -9 -15 -22 -29 -35 -42 -48 -55 -61 -68 -74 -81 25 29 23 16 9 3 -4 -11 -17 -24 -31 -37 -44 -51 -58 -64 -71 -78 -84 30 28 22 15 8 1 -5 -12 -19 -26 -33 -39 -46 -53 -60 -67 -73 -80 -87 35 28 21 14 7 0 -7 -14 -21 -27 -34 -41 -48 -55 -62 -69 -76 -82 -89 40 27 20 13 6 -1 -8 -15 -22 -29 -36 -43 -50 -57 -64 -71 -78 -84 -91 45 26 19 12 5 -2 -9 -16 -23 -30 -37 -44 -51 -58 -65 -72 -79 -86 -93 50 26 19 12 4 -3 -10 -17 -24 -31 -38 -45 -52 -60 -67 -74 -81 -88 -95 55 25 18 11 4 -3 -11 -18 -25 -32 -39 -46 -54 -61 -68 -75 -82 -89 -97 60 25 17 10 3 -4 -11 -19 -26 -33 -40 -48 -55 -62 -69 -76 -84 -91 -98 Source: National Weather Service <www.noaa.nws.gov> Note: Wind Chill Temperature is defined only for temperatures less than or equal to 50°F and wind speeds greater than 3 mph. Bright sunshine may increase the wind chill temperature by 10-18°F. Extreme Summer Weather Emergency managers should be concerned about extreme heat because this can be a silent killer within the community. The body responds to high heat by using evaporating sweat to cool itself. However, high humidity decreases the efficiency with which perspiration can discharge heat, so the body’s core (internal) temperature rises. When the heat gain exceeds the amount the body can remove, extreme core temperatures can cause a series of heat-related disorders. The least serious condition is heat cramp, which is characterized by mild fluid and electrolyte imbalances. Next in severity is heat syncope, which causes sudden loss of consciousness that disappears when the victim lies down. Heat exhaustion produces symptoms of weakness or dizziness and heat stroke is a condition in which the victim might be delirious or comatose. Unless treated effectively by rapid cooling, heat stroke can produce neurological damage and fatalities in about 15% of those affected. Temperature and humidity are combined into a heat index of apparent temperature the National Weather Service uses for weather advisories (see Table 5-2). Apparent temperatures of 80-90°F warrant caution because prolonged exposure and physical activity can cause fatigue. Extreme caution should be taken when apparent temperatures reach 90-105°F because prolonged exposure and physical activity can cause heat cramp and heat exhaustion. Danger exists when apparent temperatures reach 105-130°F because prolonged exposure and physical activity can cause heat stroke. Extreme danger exists when apparent temperatures exceed 130°F because heat stroke is imminent. Hazard maps show the most severely exposed areas are in the desert Southwest, Mississippi Valley, and Southeastern states. Demographic groups at greatest risk are outdoor laborers, the very old (particularly those over 75), the very young, and those who have chronic diseases. The problem can be especially severe in the inner cities where city buildings re-radiate sunlight (increasing the ambient temperature) and block the wind (decreasing evaporative cooling). Those who live in residences lacking air conditioning have the greatest exposure when they live in high crime areas where they might even be afraid to open the windows for fans. Table 5-2. Heat Index. Temperature (° F) 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Relative humidity (%) 40% 79 84 90 98 109 121 135 50% 80 86 94 105 118 133 60% 81 90 99 113 129 148 70% 82 92 105 122 142 80% 84 96 113 133 90% 85 101 121 Note: This chart is based upon shady, light wind conditions. Exposure to direct sunlight can increase the Heat Index as much as 15°F.)Source: National Weather Service < www.noaa.nws.gov> Heat Index Possible Heat Disorder 80°F - 90°F Caution: Fatigue possible with prolonged exposure and physical activity. 90°F - 105°F Extreme caution: Sunstroke, heat cramps and heat exhaustion possible. 105°F - 130°F Danger: Sunstroke, heat cramps, heat exhaustion likely; heat stroke possible. Greater than 130°F Extreme danger: Heat stroke highly likely with continued exposure. Tornadoes Tornadoes form when cold air from the north overrides a warmer air mass and the cold air descends because of its greater weight. The descending cold air is replaced by rising warm air, a process that initiates rotational flow inside the air mass. As the tornado forms, pressure drops inside the vortex and the wind speed increases. The resulting high wind speed can destroy buildings, vehicles, and large trees. The resulting debris becomes entrained in the wind field, which adds to the tornado’s destructive power. There are approximately 900 tornadoes each year in the United States, most of which strike Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Missouri, and Kansas. However, there is also significant vulnerability in the North Central states and the Southeast from Louisiana to Florida. Tornadoes are most common during the spring, with the months of April-June accounting for 50% of all tornadoes. There also is predictable diurnal variation, with the hours from 4:00-8:00 pm being the most frequent time of impact. Tornadoes have distinct directional tendencies as well, most frequently traveling toward the northeast (54%), east (22%), and southeast (11%). Only 8% travel north, 2% travel northwest, and 1% travel west, southwest, or south, respectively. There also is a tendency for tornadoes to follow low terrain (e.g., river valleys and to move in a steady path, although they sometimes times skip about—missing some structures and striking others. A tornado’s forward movement speed (i.e., the speed at which the funnel moves forward over the ground) can range 0-60 mph but usually is about 30 mph. Tornadoes can vary substantially in physical intensity and this attribute is characterized by the Fujita scale, which has a low end of F0 (maximum wind speed of 40 mph) and a high end of F5 (maximum wind speed of 315 mph). The Fujita scale has been criticized for neglecting the effects of construction quality, thus overestimating windspeeds for tornadoes that are F3 and higher. Discussion is underway to replace the existing Fujita scale with an Enhanced Fujita scale (for further information, see meted.ucar.edu/resource/wcm/html/230.htm for a powerpoint presentation. For discussion of this change, see www.wind.ttu.edu/F_Scale/default.htm). Only about one third of all tornadoes exceed F2 (111 mph). The impact area of a typical tornado is 4 miles (mi) in length but has been as much as 150 mi. The typical width is 300-400 yards (yd) but has been as much as 1 mi. It is important to recognize that 90% of the impact area is affected by a wind speed of less than 112 mph, so many structures in a stricken community will receive only moderate or minor damage. Only about 3% of tornadoes cause deaths and 50% of those deaths are residents of mobile homes—structures that are built substantially less sturdily than site-built homes. There has been an increased number of tornadoes reported during recent years, but this is due in part to improved radar and spotter networks. However, tornadoes have been observed in locations where they have not previously been seen, suggesting some long-term changes in climate are also involved. Detection is usually achieved by trained meteorologists observing characteristic clues on Doppler radar. Over the years, warning speed has been improved by NOAA Weather Radio, which provides timely and specific warnings. Those who do not receive a warning can assess their danger from a tornado’s distinct physical cues; dark, heavy cumulonimbus (thunderstorm squall line) clouds with intense lightning, hail and downpour of rain immediately to the left of the tornado path, and noise like a train or jet engine. The most appropriate protective action is to shelter in-place, which is universally recommended to be a specially constructed safe room (Federal Emergency Management Agency, no date, b). If a safe room is not available, building occupants should shelter in an interior room on the lowest floor. Mobile home residents should evacuate to community shelter and those who are outside should seek refuge in a low spot (e.g., a small ditch or depression) if in-place shelter is unavailable. Hurricanes A hurricane is the most severe type of tropical storm. The earliest stages of hurricane development are marked by thunderstorms that intensify through a series of stages (tropical wave, tropical disturbance, tropical depression, and tropical storm) that result in a sustained surface wind speed exceeding 74 mph. At this point, the storm becomes a hurricane that can intensify to any one of the five Saffir-Simpson categories (see Table 5-3). The nature of atmospheric processes is such that few of the minor storms escalate to a major hurricane. In the average year there are 100 tropical disturbances, 10 tropical storms, 6 hurricanes, and only 2 of these hurricanes strike the US coast. Hurricanes in Categories 3–5 account for 20% of landfalls, but over 80% of damage. Category 5 hurricanes are rare in the Atlantic (three during the 20th Century), but are more common in the Pacific. Tropical storms draw their energy from warm sea water, so they form only when there is an increase in sea surface temperature that exceeds 80°F. For most Atlantic hurricanes, this takes place in tropical water off the West African coast. These storms are generated when the surface water absorbs heat and evaporates, and the resulting water vapor rises to higher altitudes. When it condenses there, it releases rain and latent heat of evaporation. An easterly steering wind (which is named for its direction of origin, so an easterly wind blows from east to west) pushes these storms westward across the Atlantic. The hurricane season begins the first of June, reaches its peak during the month September, and then decreases through the end of November. Table 5-3. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Categories. Saffir/ Simpson Category Wind Speed (mph) Velocity Pressure (psf) Wind Effects 1 74 - 95 19.0 • Vegetation: some damage to foliage. • Street signs: minimal damage. • Mobile homes: some damage to unanchored structures. • Other buildings: little or no damage. 2 96 - 110 30.6 • Vegetation: much damage to foliage; some trees blown down. • Street signs: extensive damage to poorly constructed signs. • Mobile homes: major damage to unanchored structures. • Other buildings: some damage to roof materials, doors, and windows. 3 111 - 130 41.0 • Vegetation: major damage to foliage; large trees blown down. • Street signs: almost all poorly constructed signs blown away. • Mobile homes: destroyed. • Other buildings: some structural damage to small buildings. 4 131 - 155 57.2 • Street signs: all down. • Other buildings: extensive damage to roof materials, doors, and windows; many residential roof failures. 5 >155 81.3 • Other buildings: some complete building failures. Source: Adapted from National Hurricane Center < www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml> Hurricanes have a definite structure that is very important to understanding their effects. The hurricane eye is an area of calm 10-20 miles in radius that is surrounded by bands of high wind and rain that spiral inward to a ring around the eye, called the eyewall. The entire hurricane, which can be as much as 600 miles in diameter, rotates counterclockwise in the Northern Hemisphere. This produces a storm surge that is located in the right front quadrant relative to the storm track. Hurricanes have a forward movement speed that averages about 12 mph, but any given hurricane can be faster or slower than this. Indeed, each hurricane’s speed can vary over time and the storm can even stall at a given point for an extended period of time. Atlantic hurricanes tend to track toward the west and north, but can loop and change direction. Storm intensity weakens as it reaches the North Atlantic (because it derives less energy from the cooler water at high latitudes) or makes landfall (which cuts the storm off from its source of energy and adds the friction of interaction with the rough land surface). Hurricanes produce four specific threats—high wind, tornadoes, inland flooding (from intense rainfall), and storm surge. The strength of the wind can be seen in the third column of Table 5-3, which shows that the pressure of the wind on vegetation and structures is proportional to the square of the wind speed. That is, as the wind speed doubles from 80 mph in a Category 1 hurricane to 160 mph in a Category 5 hurricane, the velocity pressure quadruples from less than 20 pounds per square foot (psf) to over 80 psf. Damage from high wind (and the debris that is entrained in the wind field) is a function of a structure’s exposure. Wind exposure is highest in areas directly downwind from open water or fields. Upwind hills, woodlands, and tall buildings decrease exposure to the direct force of the wind but increase exposure to flying debris such as tree branches and building materials that have been torn from their sources. Storm clouds in the outer bands of a hurricane can sometimes produce tornadoes that are mostly small and short-lived. Hurricanes can also produce torrential rain at rates up to four inches/hour for short periods of time and one US hurricane produced 23 inches over 24 hours. Such downpours cause severe local ponding (water that fell and did not move) and inland flooding (water that fell elsewhere and flowed in). Both inland flooding and storm surge are discussed below under hydrological hazards. Hurricane disasters resulted in relatively few casualties in the US during the 20th Century. The worst hurricane disaster occurred in Galveston, Texas, in 1900 when over 6000 lives were lost in a community of about 18,000. However, coastal counties have experienced explosive population growth in recent decades, which creates the potential for another catastrophic loss of life—Hurricane Katrina being a notable example. Moreover, economic losses are increasing substantially over time. Inflation makes only a small contribution to the increase; most of the increase is due to increased population in vulnerable areas and increased wealth (per person) in those areas (Pielke & Landsea, 1998). There is extreme variation in losses by decade due to variability in the number of storms. For example, the two decades from 1950-1969 experienced 33 hurricanes whereas the equivalent period from 1970-1988 experienced only six hurricanes. Hurricanes are rapidly detected by satellite and continually monitored by specially equipped aircraft. Storm forecast models have been developed that have provided increasing accuracy in the prediction of the storm track. Nonetheless, there are forecast uncertainties about the eventual location of landfall, as well as the storm’s size, intensity, forward movement speed, and rainfall. One of the biggest problems is that the long time required to evacuate some urbanized areas (30 hours or more, see Lindell, Prater, Perry & Wu, 2002) requires warnings to be issued at a time when storm behavior remains uncertain. The strike probability data in Table 5-4 indicate many coastal jurisdictions must be warned to evacuate even though the storm will eventually miss them. Moreover, there is significant uncertainty about the wind speed and, thus, the inland distance that must be evacuated. Appropriate protective actions for hurricanes are well understood; within the storm surge/high wind field risk areas, shelter in-place is recommended only for elevated portions (i.e., above the wave crests) of reinforced concrete buildings having foundations anchored well below the scour line (the depth to which wave action erodes the soil on which the building rests). Authorities generally recommend that evacuation be completed before evacuation routes are flooded or high wind can overturn motor homes and other high profile vehicles. Outside storm surge risk areas, shelter in-place is suitable for most permanent buildings with solid construction, but debris sources should be controlled and permanent shutters should be installed on windows (or temporary shutters stored for quick installation). Evacuation is advisable for residents of mobile homes in high wind zones. Table 5-4. Uncertainties about Hurricane Conditions as a Function of Time before Landfall. Forecast period (hours) Absolute landfall error (nautical miles) Maximum probability Miss/Hit Ratio Average wind speed error (mph) 72 >200 10% 9 to 1 23 48 150 13-18% 7 to 1 18 36 100 20-25% 4 to 1 15 24 75 35-50% 2 to 1 12 12 50 60-80% 2/3 to 1 9 Source: Adapted from Emergency Management Institute/National Hurricane Center (no date) Wildfires All fires require the three elements of the fire triangle: fuel, which is any substance that will burn; oxygen that will combine with the fuel; and enough heat to ignite fuel (and sustain combustion if an external source is absent). The resulting combustion yields heat (sustaining the reaction) and combustion products such as toxic gases and unburned particles of fuel that are visible as smoke. Wildfires are distinguished mostly by their fuel. Wildland fires burn areas with nothing but natural vegetation for fuel, whereas interface fires burn into areas containing a mixture of natural vegetation and built structures. Firestorms are distinguished from other wildfires because they burn so intensely that they warrant a special category—in this case, they create their own local weather and are virtually impossible to extinguish. Wildfires can occur almost anywhere in the United States but are most common in the arid West where there are extensive stands of conifer trees and brush that serve as ready fuels. Once a fire starts, the three principal variables determining its severity are fuel, weather, and topography. Fuels differ in a number of characteristics that collectively define fuel type. These include the fuel’s ignition temperature (low is more dangerous), amount of moisture (dry is more dangerous), and the amount of energy (resinous wood is more dangerous). A given geographical area can be defined by its fuel loading, which is the quantity of vegetation in tons per acre, and fuel continuity, which refers to the proximity of individual elements of fuel. Horizontal proximity can be defined, for example, in terms of the distance between trees. Vertical proximity can be defined in terms of the distance between different levels of vegetation (e.g., grasses, brush, and tree branches). Weather affects fire behavior by wind speed and direction as well as temperature and humidity. Wind speed and direction have the most obvious effects on fire behavior, with strong wind pushing the fire front forward and carrying burning embers far in advance of the main front. High temperature and low humidity promote fires by decreasing fuel moisture, but these can vary during the day (cooling and humidifying at sunset) as well as over longer periods of time. Topography affects fire behavior by directing prevailing wind currents and the hot air produced by the fire. Canyons can accelerate the wind by funneling it through narrow openings. Steep slopes (greater than 10°) take advantage of a fuel’s location in the fire’s heated updraft, which allows the advancing fire front to dry nearby fuels through radiant heating and also provide a ready path for igniting these fuels. A fire’s forward movement speed doubles on a 10° slope and quadruples on a 20° slope. Wildland fires are a major problem in the US because an average of about 73,000 such fires per year burn over three million acres. Approximately 13% of these wildfires are caused by lightning, but people cause 24% of them accidentally and 26% of them deliberately. The greatest loss of life from a US wildfire occurred in the 1871 Peshtigo, Wisconsin wildfire that killed 2200 people (Gess & Lutz, 2002). More recently, the 1991 Oakland Hills California wildfire killed 25 people, injured 150, and damaged or destroyed over 3,000 homes. Major contributors to the severity of this wildland urban interface fire were the housing construction materials (predominantly wood siding and wood shingle roofs), vegetation planted immediately adjacent to the houses, and narrow winding roads that impeded access by fire fighting equipment. The US Forest Service maintains a Fire Danger Rating System that monitors changing weather and fuel conditions (e.g., fuel moisture content) throughout the summer fire season. Some of the fuel data are derived from satellite observations and the weather data come from hundreds of weather stations. Appropriate protective actions include evacuation out of the risk area, evacuating to a safe location (e.g., an open space such as a park or baseball field having well-watered grass that will not burn), and sheltering in-place within a fire-resistant structure (e.g., a concrete building with no nearby vegetation). 5.2: Meteorological Hazards Temperature(F) 80 85 90 95 100 105 110 Relative Humidity % 40% 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 50% 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 60% 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 70% 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 80% 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 90% 28 27 26 25 24 23 22

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/5%3A_Principal_Hazards_in_the_United_States/5.1%3A_Introduction.txt

The principal hydrological hazards of concern to environmental hazard managers are floods, storm surges, and tsunamis. Floods Flooding is a widespread problem in the United States that accounts for three-quarters of all Presidential Disaster Declarations. A flood is an event in which an abnormally large amount of water accumulates in areas where it is usually not found. Flooding is determined by a hydrological cycle in which precipitation falls from clouds in the form of rain and snow (see Figure 5-1). When it reaches the ground, the precipitation either infiltrates the soil or travels downhill in the form of surface runoff. Some of the water that infiltrates the soil is taken up by plant roots and transported to the leaves where it is transpired into the atmosphere. Another portion of the ground water gradually moves down to the water table and flows underground until reaching water bodies such as wetlands, rivers, lakes, or oceans. Surface runoff moves directly to surface storage in these water bodies. At that point, water evaporates from surface storage, returning to clouds in the atmosphere. Figure 5.1: The Hydrological Cycle There are seven different types of flooding that are widely recognized. Riverine (main stem) flooding occurs when surface runoff gradually rises to flood stage and overflows its banks. Flash flooding is defined by runoff reaching its peak in less than six hours. This usually occurs in hilly areas with steep slopes and sparse vegetation, but also occurs in urbanized areas with rapid runoff from impermeable surfaces such as streets, parking lots, and building roofs. Alluvial fan flooding occurs in deposits of soil and rock found at the foot of steep valley walls in arid Western regions. Ice/debris dam failures result when an accumulation of downstream material raises the water surface above the stream bank. Surface ponding/local drainage occurs when water accumulates in areas so flat that runoff cannot carry away the precipitation fast enough. Fluctuating lake levels can occur over short-term, seasonal, or multiyear periods, especially in lakes that have limited outlets or are entirely landlocked. Control structure (dam or levee) failure has many characteristics in common with flash flooding. Floods are measured either by discharge or stage. Discharge, which is defined as the volume of water per unit of time, is the unit used by hydrologists. Stage, which is the height of water above a defined level, is the unit needed by emergency managers because flood stage determines the level of casualties and damage. Discharge is converted to stage by means of a rating curve (see Figure 5-2). The horizontal axis shows discharge in cubic feet per second and the vertical axis shows stage in feet above flood stage. Note that high rates of discharge produce much higher stages in a valley than on a plain because the valley walls confine the water. Figure 5.2: Stage Rating Curve Flooding is affected by a number of factors. The first of these, precipitation, must be considered at a given point and also across the entire watershed (basin). The total precipitation at a point is equal to the duration of precipitation times its intensity (frequently measured in inches per hour). Total precipitation over a basin is equal to precipitation summed over all points in the surface area of the basin. The precipitation’s contribution to flooding is a function of temperature because rain (a liquid) is immediately available whereas snow (a solid) must first be melted by warm air or rain. Moreover, as indicated by Figure 5-3, the precipitation from a single storm might be deposited over two or more basins and the amount of rainfall in one basin might be quite different from that in the other basin. Consequently, there might be severe flooding in a town on one river (City A) and none at all in a town on another river (City B) even if the two towns received the same amount of rainfall from a storm. As the hydrological cycle makes clear, flooding is also affected by surface runoff, which is determined by terrain and soil cover. One important aspect of terrain is its slope, with runoff increasing as slope increases. In addition to slope steepness, slope length and orientation to prevailing wind (and, thus, the accumulation of rainfall and snowfall) and sun (and, thus, the accumulation of snow) are also important determinants of flooding. Figure 5.3: Map of the Distribution of Precipitation from a Storm Slope geometry is also an important consideration. Divergent slopes (e.g., hills and ridges) provide rapid runoff dispersion. By contrast, convergent slopes (e.g., valleys) provide runoff storage in puddles, potholes, and ponds. Mixed slopes have combinations of these, so slope mean (the average slope angle) and variance (the variability of slope angles) determine the amount of storage. A slope with a zero mean and high variance (a plain with many potholes) will provide a larger amount of storage than a slope with a zero mean and low variance (a featureless plain). Similarly, a slope with a positive mean and high variance (a slope with many potholes) will provide a larger amount of storage than a slope with a positive mean and low variance. Soil cover also affects flooding because dense low plant growth slows runoff and promotes infiltration. In areas with limited vegetation, surface permeability is a major determinant of flooding. Surface permeability increases with the proportion of organic matter content because this material absorbs water like a sponge. Permeability also is affected by surface texture (particle size and shape). Clay, stone, and concrete are very impermeable because particles are small and smooth, whereas gravel and sand are very permeable—especially when the particles are large and have irregular shapes that prevent them from compacting. Finally, surface permeability is affected by soil saturation because even permeable surfaces resist infiltration when soil pores (the spaces between soil particles that ordinarily are filled with air) become filled with water. Groundwater flows via local transport to streams at the foot of hill slopes and via remote transport through aquifers. Rapid in- and outflow through valley fill increases peak flows whereas very slow in- and outflow through upland areas maintains flows between rains. Evapotranspiration takes place via two mechanisms. First, there is direct evaporation to atmosphere from surface storage in rivers and lakes. Second, there is uptake from soil and subsequent transpiration by plants. Transpiration draws moisture from the soil into plants’ roots, up through the stem, and out through the leaves’ pores (similar to people sweating). The latter mechanism is generally much higher in summer than in winter due to increased heat and plant growth, but transpiration is negligible during periods of high precipitation. Stream channel flow is affected by channel wetting which infiltrates the stream banks (horizontally) until they are saturated as the water rises. In addition, there is seepage because porous channel bottoms allow water to infiltrate (vertically) into groundwater. Channel geometry also influences flow because a greater channel cross-section distributes the water over a greater area, as does the length of a reach (distinct section of river) because longer reaches provide greater water storage. High levels of discharge to downstream reaches can also affect flooding on upstream reaches because flooded downstream reaches slow flood transit by decreasing the river’s elevation drop. Flooding increases when upstream areas experience deforestation and overgrazing, which increase surface runoff to a moderate degree on shallow slopes and to a major degree on steep slopes as the soil erodes. The sediment is washed downstream where it can silt the channel and raise the elevation of the river bottom. These problems of agricultural development are aggravated by flood plain urbanization. Like other cities throughout the world, US cities have been located in flood plains because water was the most efficient means of transportation until the mid-1800s. Consequently, many cities were located at the head of navigation or at transshipment points between rivers. In addition, cities have been located in flood plains because level alluvial soil is very easy to excavate for building foundations. Finally, urban development takes place in flood plains because of the aesthetic attraction of water. People enjoy seeing lakes and rivers, and pay a premium for real estate that is located there. One consequence of urban development for flooding is that cities involve the replacement of vegetation with hardscape—impermeable surfaces such as building roofs, streets, and parking lots. This hardscape decreases soil infiltration, thus increasing the speed at which flood crests rise and fall. Another factor increasing flooding is intrusion into the flood plain by developers who fill intermittently flooded areas with soil to raise the elevation of the land. This decreases the channel cross-section, forcing the river to rise in other areas to compensate for the lost space. Flood risk areas in the US are generally defined by the 100-year flood—an event that is expected to have a 100-year recurrence interval and, thus, a 1% chance of occurrence in any given year. It is important to understand that these extreme events are essentially independent, so it is possible for a community to experience two 100-year floods in the same century. Indeed, it is possible to have them in the same year even though that would be a very improbable event. This statistical principle is misunderstood by many people who believe there can be only one 100-year flood per century. The belief that a 100-year flood occurring this year cannot be repeated for another 100 years (or at least nearly 100 years) is a very dangerous fallacy. Moreover, a 100-year flood is an arbitrary standard of safety that reflects a compromise between the goals of providing long-term safety and developing economically valuable land. A 50-, 200-, or even a 500-year standard could be used instead. Community adoption of a 50-year flood standard would provide more area for residential, commercial, and industrial development. However, the resulting encroachment into the flood plain would lead to more frequent damaging floods than would a 100-year flood standard. Alternatively, a community might use different standards for different types of structures. For example, it might restrict the 100-year floodplain to low intensity uses (e.g., parks), allow residential housing to be constructed within the 500-year floodplain, and restrict nursing homes, hospitals, and schools to areas outside the 500-year floodplain. Emergency response to floods is supported by prompt detection, which is local or regional in scope. This includes automated devices such as radar for assessing rainfall amounts at variable points in a watershed, rain gages for detecting rainfall amounts at predetermined points in a watershed, and stream gages for detecting water depth at predetermined points along a river. Detection also can be achieved by manual devices such as spotters for assessing rainfall amounts, water depth, or levee integrity at specific locations (planned before a flood or improvised during one). Once data on the quantity and distribution of precipitation have been collected, they are used to estimate discharge volumes over time from the runoff characteristics of a given watershed (e.g., soil permeability and surface steepness) at a given time (e.g., current soil saturation). Once discharge volume is estimated, it can be used together with downstream topography (e.g., mountain valley vs. plain) to predict downstream flood heights. Timely and specific warnings of floods are provided by commercial news media as well as NOAA Weather Radio. The most appropriate protective action for persons is to evacuate in a direction perpendicular to the river channel. Because flash floods in mountain canyons can travel faster than a motor vehicle, it is safest to climb the canyon wall rather than try to drive out. It also is important to avoid crossing running water. Just two feet of fast moving water can float a car and push it downstream with 1000 pounds of force. Storm Surge Storm surge is an elevated water level that exceeds the height of normal astronomical tides. It is most commonly associated with hurricanes, but also can be caused by extratropical cyclones (nor’easters). The height of a storm surge increases as atmospheric pressure decreases and a storm’s maximum wind speed increases. Storm surge is especially significant where coastal topography and bathymetry (submarine topography) have shallow slopes and the coast has a narrowing shoreline that funnels the rising water. These factors are magnified when the storm remains stationary through several tide cycles and the affected coast is defined by low-lying barrier islands whose beaches and dunes have been eroded either by human development or by recent storms. Storm surge—together with astronomical high tide, rainfall, river flow, and storm surf—floods and batters structures and scours areas beneath foundations as much as 4-6 feet below the normal grade level. At one time, storm surge was the primary source of casualties in all countries, but inland flooding is now the primary cause of hurricanes deaths in the US. However, surge is still is the primary source of casualties in developing countries such as Bangladesh. In these countries, population pressure pushes the poor to farm highly vulnerable areas and poverty limits the development of dikes and seawalls, warning systems, evacuation transportation systems, and vertical shelters (wind resistant structures that are elevated above flood level). Tsunamis Tsunamis are commonly referred to as “tidal” waves but they are, in fact, sea waves that are usually generated by earthquakes. In addition, tsunamis can be caused by volcanic eruptions or landslides that usually, but not always, occur undersea. Tsunamis are rare events because 15,000 earthquakes over the course of a century have generated only 124 tsunamis, a rate of less than 1% of all earthquakes and only 0.7 tsunamis per year. This low rate of tsunami generation is attributable to earthquake intensity; two-thirds of all Pacific tsunamis are generated by shallow earthquakes exceeding 7.5 in magnitude. Tsunamis can travel across thousands of miles of open ocean (e.g., from the Aleutians to Hawaii or from Chile to Japan) at speeds up to 400 mph in the open ocean, but they slow to 25 mph as they begin to break in shallow water and run up onto the land. Tsunamis are largely invisible in the open ocean because they are only 1-2 feet high. However, they have wave lengths up to 60 miles and periods as great as one hour. This contrasts significantly with ordinary ocean waves having wave heights up to 30 feet, wave lengths of about 500 feet, and periods of about 10 seconds. Tsunamis can have devastating effects in some of the places where they make landfall because the waves encounter bottom friction when the water depth is less than 1/20 of their wavelength. At this point, the bottom of the wave front slows and is overtaken by the rest of the wave, which must rise over it. For example, when a wave reaches a depth of 330 feet, its speed is reduced from 400 mph to 60 mph. Later, reaching a depth of 154 feet reduces its speed to 44 mph. This causes the next 650 feet of the wave to overtake the wave front in a single second. As the wave continues shoreward, each succeeding segment of the wave must rise above the previous segment because it can’t go down (water is not compressible) or back (the rest of the wave is pressing it forward). Because the wavelength is so long and wave speed is so fast, a large volume of water can pile up to a very great height—especially where the continental shelf is very narrow. It is important to note that the initial cue to tsunami arrival might be that the water level drops, rather than rises. Indeed, this was the case in the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. People’s failure to understand the significance of the receding water contributed to a death toll exceeding 200,000. An initial wave is created only if the seafloor rises suddenly, whereas an initial trough is created if the seafloor drops. In either case, the initial phase will be followed by the alternate phase (i.e., a wave is followed by a trough or vice-versa). Tsunamis threaten shorelines worldwide and have no known temporal (i.e., diurnal or seasonal) variation. If a tsunami is initiated locally (i.e., within a hundred miles), the potential for a tsunami can be detected by severe earthquake shaking. However, coastal residents’ only physical cue to a remotely initiated tsunami is wave arrival at coast, although the arrival of a trough (making it appear that the tide went out unexpectedly) should be recognized as a danger sign. International tsunami warning systems base their detection of remote tsunamis on seismic monitoring to detect major earthquakes and tidal gauges located throughout the Pacific basin to verify tsunami generation. Once tsunami generation has been confirmed, alerts can be transmitted throughout the Pacific basin. The need for prompt action can be inferred from tsunami’s forward movement speed; a tsunami generated 100 miles away from a coast can arrive in about 15 minutes. The physical magnitude of a tsunami is extremely impressive. Wave crests can arrive at 10-45 minute intervals for up to six hours and the highest wave, as much as 100 ft at the shoreline, can be anywhere in the wave train. The area flooded by a tsunami is known as the inundation zone, which equivalent to a 100-year floodplain or hurricane storm surge risk area. Because of the complexities in accounting for wave behavior and the characteristics of the offshore bathymetry and onshore topography, tsunami inundation zones must be calculated by competent analysts using sophisticated computer programs. The physical impacts include casualties caused by deaths from drowning and traumatic injuries from wave impact. Property damage is caused by the same mechanisms. Regarding protective measures, sheltering in-place in elevated structures can protect against surge. However, steel reinforced concrete structures on deep pilings are required to withstand wave battering and foundation scour. Consequently, evacuation to higher ground is the most effective method of population protection. Evacuation to a safe distance out of the runup zone is obviously difficult on low-lying coasts, but it also can be difficult where there are nearby hills if the primary evacuation route runs parallel to the coastline.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/5%3A_Principal_Hazards_in_the_United_States/5.3%3A_Hydrological_Hazards.txt

To properly understand geophysical hazards, it is important to recognize the earth’s three distinct geological components. The core consists of molten rock at the center of the earth, the crust is solid rock and other materials at the earth’s surface that vary in depth from four miles under the oceans to 40 miles in the Himalayas, and the mantle is an 1800 mile thick layer between the core and the crust. According to tectonic theory, the earth’s crust is defined by large plates that float on the mantle and move gradually in different directions over time. Tectonic plates can diverge, converge, or move laterally past each other. When they diverge, new material is generated from below the earth’s mantle, usually at mid-ocean ridges, that flows very slowly (at a rate of a few inches per year) away from the source. This process produces a gradual expansion of the plate toward an adjoining plate. Thus, one plate converges with another plate and the heavier material (a seafloor) is subducted under lighter material (a continent). In the US, this process is taking place in the Cascadian Zone along the Pacific coast of Washington, Oregon, and Northern California. Tectonic activity produces intermittent movement, which causes earthquakes and sometimes tsunamis. In addition, the subducted material travels to great depth within the earth where it is liquefied under intense heat and pressure. The resulting magma causes volcanic activity. Crustal plates also move laterally past each other as, for example, the North American plate is moving northward past the Pacific Plate along the San Andreas fault. Friction can lock the fault and increases strain until it is released suddenly in an earthquake; the longer the fault is locked, the more energy is stored until it is released. Finally, there is some intraplate activity such as the mid-ocean “hot spots” that have formed the Hawaiian Islands and mid-continental fault zones. One US example is the New Madrid Seismic Zone affecting Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas. These tectonic processes give rise to the most important geophysical hazards in the US—volcanic eruptions and earthquakes. However, landslides are another geophysical hazard that will also be addressed in this section. Volcanic Eruptions Volcanoes are formed when a column of magma (molten rock) rises from the earth’s mantle into a magma chamber and later erupts at the surface, where it is called lava. Successive eruptions, deposited in layers of lava or ash, build a mountain. Major eruptions create craters that are gradually replaced in dome-building eruptions. Cataclysmic eruptions create calderas that leave only a depression where the mountain once stood. US volcanoes (recently erupted) are located principally in Alaska (92) and Hawaii (21), as well as along the west coast of the 48 contiguous states (73): Oregon has 22, California has 20, and Washington has 8. Vulcanologists distinguish among 20 different types of volcanoes that vary in the type of ejected material, size, shape, and other characteristics, but the two most important types of volcanoes are shield volcanoes and stratovolcanoes. Shield volcanoes produce relatively gentle effusive eruptions of low-viscosity lava, resulting in shallow slopes and broad bases (e.g., Kilauea, Hawaii). Stratovolcanoes produce explosive eruptions of highly acidic lava, gas, and ash, resulting in steep slopes and narrow bases. One well known stratovolcano is Mt. St. Helens, Washington, which erupted spectacularly in 1980 (see Perry & Greene, 1983; Perry & Lindell, 1990). The principal threats from volcanoes include gases and tephra that are blasted into the air, pyroclastic flows that blast laterally from volcano flanks, and the heavier lava and lahars that generally travel downslope. Many gases are dangerous because they are heavier than air, so they accumulate in low-lying areas. Other than harmless water vapor (H2O), some gases are simple asphyxiants that are dangerous because they displace atmospheric oxygen (carbon dioxide, CO2; methane, CH4). There are also chemical asphyxiants (carbon monoxide, CO) that are dangerous because they prevent the oxygen that is breathed in from reaching the body’s tissues. In addition, there are corrosives (sulfur dioxide, SO2; hydrogen sulfide, H2S; hydrogen chloride, HCl; hydrogen fluoride, HF; and sulfuric acid, H2SO4) and radioactive gases (such as radon, Ra). Tephra consists of solid particles of rock ranging in size from talcum powder (“ash”) to boulders (“bombs”). Pyroclastic flows are hot gas and ash mixtures (up to 1600°F) discharged from the crater vent. Lahars are mudflows and floods, usually from glacier snowmelt, with varying concentrations of ash. The impacts of volcanic eruption tend to be strongly directional because ashfall and gases disperse downwind; pyroclastic flows follow blast direction and lava and lahars travel downslope through drainage basins. The forward movement speed of the hazard varies. Gas and tephra movements are determined by wind speed, usually less than 25 mph. Pyroclastic flows can move at over 100 mph. Lava typically moves at walking speed (5 mph) but can travel faster (35 mph) on steep slopes. Lahars move at the speed of water flow, usually less than 25 mph, but can exceed 50 mph in some instances. The physical magnitude of the hazard also differs for each specific threat. Inundation depths for ashfall and lahars can range up to tens of meters in depth. Lava flows and pyroclastic flows are so hot that any impact is considered to be unsurvivable. Similarly, the impact area also varies by threat. Tephra deposition depends on eruption magnitude, wind speed, and particle size, with traces of ash circling the globe. Lava flows, lahars, and pyroclastic flows follow localized drainage patterns, so safe locations can be found only a short distance from areas that are totally devastated. These considerations indicate volcano risk areas can be defined as listed in Table 5-5. Table 5-5. Volcano Risk Areas. Category Name Distance* Threats 1 Extreme 0-100 m High risk of heat, ash, lava, gases, rock falls, and projectiles 2 High 100-300 m High risk of projectiles 3 Medium 300-3000 m Medium risk of projectiles 4 Low 3 km – 10 km Low risk of projectiles 5 Safe > 10 km Minimal risk of projectiles * (In meters and kilometers; these distances do not include mudflows and floods that can travel up to 100 km or tsunamis that can travel thousands of km. Source: Adapted from < www.volcanodiscovery.com> The physical impacts of a volcanic eruption vary with the type of threat. Gases can cause deaths and injuries from inhalation, but pyroclastic flows are more dangerous because they can cause deaths and injuries from blast, thermal exposure, and inhalation of gas and ash. In addition, they also can cause property damage from blast, heat, and coverage by ash (even after it has cooled). Tephra causes property damage from excess roof loading, shorting of electric circuits, clogged air filters in vehicles, and abrasion of machinery. Deaths and injuries can be caused by bomb impact trauma, and health effects can result from ash inhalation (including fluoride poisoning of grazing animals). Lava causes property damage from excess heat and coverage by rock (when cooled). Deaths and injuries from thermal exposure to lava can occur, but are rare because it moves so slowly. Lahars can cause property damage from flooding and coverage by ash (when water drains off) and deaths from drowning. Tsunamis cause property damage from wave impact and water saturation, as well as deaths from drowning and traumatic injuries. In addition, volcanic eruptions can cause tsunamis and wildfires as secondary hazards. The threat of volcanic eruption can be detected by physical cues indicating rising magma. These include earthquake swarms, outgassing, ash and steam eruptions, and topological deformation (changes in slope, flank swelling). Appropriate protective measures include sweeping ash from building roofs and evacuating an area at least six miles in radius for a crater eruption and 12-18 miles in the direction of a flank/lateral eruption. People also should be evacuated from floodplains threatened by lahars. The principal problem in implementing evacuations is that there are substantial uncertainties in the timing (onset and duration) of eruptions, so people have sometimes been forced to stay away from their homes and businesses for months at a time. In some cases, the expected eruption never did materialize, causing severe conflict among physical scientists, local civil officials, and disrupted residents. Earthquakes When an earthquake occurs, energy is released at the hypocenter, which is a point deep within the earth. However, the location of an earthquake is usually identified by a point on the earth’s surface directly above the hypocenter known as the epicenter. Earthquake energy is carried by three different types of waves, P-waves, S-waves, and surface waves. P-waves, typically called primary waves but are more properly known as pressure waves, travel rapidly. By contrast, S-waves, typically called secondary waves but technically known as shear waves, travel more slowly but cause more damage. The third type, surface waves, includes Love waves and Rayleigh waves. These have very low frequency and are especially damaging to tall buildings. The physical magnitude of an earthquake is different from its intensity. Magnitude is measured on a logarithmic scale where a one-unit increase represents a 10-fold increase in seismic wave amplitude and a 30-fold increase in energy release from the source. Thus, a M8.0 earthquake releases 900 (30 x 30) times as much energy as a M6.0 earthquake. By contrast, intensity measures the impact at a given location and can be assessed either by behavioral effects or physical measurements. The behavioral effects of earthquakes are classified by the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale, which defines each category (see Table 5-6, column 1) in terms of its behavioral effects of earthquake motion on people, buildings, and objects in the physical environment (column 3). Physical measurements can be assessed in terms of average peak acceleration (column 4), which describe seismic forces in horizontal and vertical directions. This acceleration is measured either as the number of millimeters per second squared (mm/sec2) or as a multiple of the force of gravity (g = 9.8 meters/sec2) The impact of an earthquake at a given point is determined by a number of factors. First, intensity decreases with distance from the epicenter, with slow attenuation along the fault line and more rapid attenuation perpendicular to the fault line. In addition, soft soil transmits energy waves much more readily than bedrock, and basins (loose fill surrounded by rock) focus energy waves. Thus, isoseismal contours (lines of constant seismic energy) can be extremely irregular, depending on fault direction and soil characteristics. The complex interplay of these factors can be seen in Figure 5-4, which displays the isoseismal contours (lines of equal seismic intensity) for the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Within the impact area, the primary earthquake threats (mostly associated with plate boundaries) are ground shaking, surface faulting, and ground failure. Ground shaking creates lateral and upward motion in structures designed only for (downward) gravity loads. In addition, unreinforced structures respond poorly to tensile (upward stretching) and shear (lateral) forces, as do “soft-story” (e.g., buildings with pillars rather than walls on the ground floor) and asymmetric (e.g., L-shaped) structures. Moreover, high-rise buildings can demonstrate resonance, which is a tendency to sway in synchrony with the seismic waves, thus amplifying their effects. Surface faulting—cracks in the earth’s surface—is a widespread fear about earthquakes that actually is far less of a problem than popularly imagined. The vulnerability of buildings to surface faulting is easily avoided by zoning regulations that prevent building construction within 50 feet of a fault line. Unfortunately, zoning restrictions are infeasible for utility networks (water, wastewater, and fuel pipelines, electric power and communications lines, roads and railroads) that must cross the fault lines. Table 5-6. Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) Scale for Earthquakes. Category Intensity Type of Damage Max. acceleration (mm/sec-2) I Instrumental Detected only on seismographs < 10 II Feeble Some people feel it < 25 III Slight Felt by people resting; like a large truck rumbling by < 50 IV Moderate Felt by people walking; loose objects rattle on shelves < 100 V Slightly strong Sleepers awake; church bells ring < 250 VI Strong Trees sway; suspended objects swing; objects fall off shelves < 500 VII Very strong Mild alarm; walls crack; plaster falls < 1000 VIII Destructive Moving cars uncontrollable; chimneys fall and masonry fractures; poorly constructed buildings damaged < 2500 IX Ruinous Some houses collapse; ground cracks; pipes break open < 5000 X Disastrous Ground cracks profusely; many buildings destroyed; liquefaction and landslides widespread < 7500 XI Very Disastrous Most buildings and bridges collapse; roads, railways, pipes and cables destroyed; general triggering of other hazards < 9800 XII Catastrophic Total destruction; trees driven from ground; ground rises and falls in waves > 9800 Source: Adapted from Bryant (1991). Ground failure is defined by a loss of soil bearing strength and takes three different forms. Landsliding occurs when a marginally stable soil assumes a more natural angle of repose (a more detailed discussion is presented in the next section). Fissuring or differential settlement occurs when loose fill, which is very prone to compaction and consolidation, is located next to other soils that are less prone to this behavior. Finally, soil liquefaction is caused by loss of grain-to-grain support in saturated soils (e.g., where there is a high water table). Ground failure is a threat because building foundations need stable soil to support the rest of the structure. Even partial failure of the soil under the foundation can destroy a building by causing it to tilt at a dangerous angle. Earthquakes also can cause major secondary threats such as tsunamis, dam failures, hazardous materials releases, and building fires. Tsunamis were addressed earlier, but dam failures can occur if ground shaking causes earth or rock dams to rupture or the valley walls abutting the dam to fail. Hazardous materials releases can occur if ground shaking causes containment tanks or pipes to break. Fires are caused by broken fuel and electric power lines that provide the necessary fuel and ignition sources. In addition, fire spread is promoted when broken water lines prevent fire departments from extinguishing the initial blazes. As yet, there is no definitive evidence of physical cues that provide reliable forewarning of an imminent earthquake. Unusual animal behavior has been observed, but this has not proved to be a reliable indicator of an imminent earthquake. The Chinese successfully predicted an earthquake at Haicheng in 1975 and saved thousands of lives by evacuating the city. However, there was no forewarning of the 1976 earthquake at Tangchan. Currently, earth scientists are examining many potential predictors such as increased radon gas in wells, increased electrical conductivity and magnetic anomalies in soil, and topographic perturbations such as changes in ground elevation, slope, and location (“creep”). There were great expectations for short-term earthquake predictions 30 years ago, but seismologists currently give only probabilities of occurrence within long periods (5, 10, or 20 years). Figure 5-4. Isoseismal Contours for the Northridge Earthquake. Source: Adapted from Dewey, et al. (1994). Very short term forewarning of earthquakes can sometimes be initiated by detection of the relatively harmless P-waves that arrive from distant earthquakes a few seconds before the arrival of the damaging S-waves and surface waves. Currently, however, there is no method of advance detection and warning for local earthquakes because these are so close to the impact area that P-waves and S-waves arrive almost simultaneously. Protective measures can be best understood by the common observation that “earthquakes don’t kill people, falling buildings (especially unreinforced masonry buildings) kill people”. Thus, building occupants are advised to shelter in-place under sturdy furniture while the ground is shaking. Those who survive the collapse of their buildings typically attempt to rescue those survivors who remain trapped, but the success of this improvised response depends upon the type of building. Unreinforced masonry buildings are much more likely to collapse, but search and rescue from these structures can be relatively easy. By contrast, steel-reinforced concrete buildings are much less likely to collapse, but search and rescue is extremely difficult unless sophisticated equipment is available to well-trained urban search and rescue teams. Unfortunately, almost all victims will die by the time remote urban search and rescue (USAR) teams arrive because crush injuries usually kill within 24 hours. However, USAR teams take longer than this to mobilize and travel to the incident site. Another problem with earthquakes is that destruction of infrastructure (electric power, fuel, water, wastewater, and telecommunications) impairs emergency response. Consequently, households, businesses, and local governments must be self-sufficient for at least 72 hours until outside assistance can arrive. Landslides The term landslide is often used to refer generically to a number of different physical phenomena involving the downward displacement of rock or soil that moves because of gravitational forces. Slides occur because a failure surface is created by two distinct soil strata and the upper stratum is displaced downslope. Some slides are triggered by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. However, many are caused by heavy rainfall that saturates soil, increasing the weight of the upper surface and lubricating the failure surface. Debris flows have such a high water content distributed throughout the soil mass that they act like a viscous (thick) fluid. Lateral spreads involve the outward movement of material on the sides and downward movement of material on the top of a soil mass. Topples and falls involve rock masses that detach from steep slopes and either tilt or fall free to a lower surface. Slopes remain stable when shear stress is less than shear strength. Shear stress increases with the steepness of the slope and the weight placed on that slope. Shear strength depends upon the internal cohesion (interlocking or sticking) of soil particles and the internal friction of particles within a soil mass, which is reduced by soil saturation. Thus, landslides are most common in areas having steep slopes composed of susceptible soils types (i.e., ones with low internal cohesion) that are stratified (creating failure surfaces) and saturated with water. Slide probability is commonly increased by four different conditions. The first occurs when slopes have been cleared of vegetation, whereas the second occurs when excavations for houses and roads use the “cut and fill” method on unstable steep slopes. (This technique is used to create a level surface on a slope by cutting soil out of a section of hillside and using it to fill the area below this cut.) The third condition creating landslides occurs when the construction of many buildings and roads significantly increases the weight placed on the slope and the fourth condition occurs when construction of access roads removes support from the foot of the slope. Landslide risk areas can be mapped by conducting geological surveys to identify areas having slopes with distinct soil strata that are likely to separate when saturated or shaken. Visible cues of imminent slides can also be seen at the head and toe of a potential slide area, which can be monitored to determine whether to take protective actions. These include installing slope drainage systems or retaining walls, and temporarily evacuating or permanently relocating the population at risk.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Fundamentals_of_Emergency_Management/5%3A_Principal_Hazards_in_the_United_States/5.4%3A_Geophysical_Hazards.txt

Hazardous materials Hazardous materials (also known as hazmat) are regulated by a number of federal agencies including the US Department of Transportation, US Environmental Protection Agency, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the US Department of Labor. In addition, the US Coast Guard and Federal Emergency Management Agency of the US Department of Homeland Security have responsibilities for emergency response to hazmat incidents. Because these agencies have different responsibilities, they have correspondingly different definitions of hazmat. According to the Department of Transportation, hazmat is defined as substances that are “capable of posing unreasonable risk to health, safety, and property” (49CFR 171.8). Until the late 1980s, the location, identity, and quantity of hazmat throughout the United States was generally undocumented. However, Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act—SARA Title III (also known as the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act—EPCRA) of 1986 required those who produce, handle, or store amounts exceeding statutory threshold planning quantities of approximately 400 Extremely Hazardous Substances (EHSs) to notify local agencies, their State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), and the US EPA. Nonetheless, the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) lists 1.5 million chemical formulations with 63,000 of them hazardous. There are over 600,000 shipments of hazmat per day (100,000 of which are shipments of petroleum products). Fortunately, only a small proportion of these chemicals account for most of the number of shipments and the volume of materials shipped (see Table 5-7, adapted from Lindell & Perry, 1997a). These hazmat shipments result in an average of 280 liquid spills or gaseous releases per year, the vast majority of which occur in transport. Of these spills and releases, 81% take place on the highway and 15% are in rail transportation. These incidents cause approximately 11 deaths and 311 injuries per year. Table 5-7. Volume of production for top 12 EHSs, 1970–1994. Rank in top 50 Chemical name Year % increase 1970-1994 1970 1980 1990 1994 1 Sulfuric acid 29,525 44,157 44,337 44,599 51 8 Ammonia 13,824 19,653 17,003 17,965 30 10 Chlorine 9,764 11,421 11,809 12,098 24 13 Nitric acid 7,603 9,232 7,931 8,824 16 23 Formaldehyde 2,214 2,778 3,360 4,277 93 25 Ethylene oxide 1,933 2,810 2,678 3,391 75 31 Phenol 854 1,284 1,769 2,026 137 33 Butadiene 1,551 1,400 1,544 1,713 10 34 Propylene oxide 590 884 1,483 1,888 220 36 Acrylonitrile 520 915 1,338 1,543 197 37 Vinyl acetate 402 961 1,330 1,509 275 47 Aniline 199 330 495 632 218 Source: Adapted from Lindell and Perry (1997a). Emergency managers typically expect to find hazmat produced, stored, or used at fixed-site facilities such as petrochemical and manufacturing plants. However, such materials are also found in facilities as diverse as warehouses (e.g., agricultural fertilizers and pesticides), water treatment plants (chlorine is used to purify the water), and breweries (ammonia is used as a refrigerant). Hazmat is transported by a variety of modes—ship, barge, pipeline, rail, truck, and air. In general, the quantities of hazmat on ships, barges, and pipelines can be as large as those at many fixed site facilities, but quantities usually are smaller when transported by rail, smaller still when transported by truck, and smallest when transported by air. Small to moderate size releases of less hazardous materials at fixed site facilities are occupational hazards but often pose little risk to public health and safety because the risk area lies within the facility boundary lines. However, releases of this size during hazmat transportation are frequently a public hazard because passers-by can easily enter the risk area and become exposed. The amount that is actually released is often much smaller than the total quantity that is available in the container but prudence dictates that the planning process assume the plausible worst case of complete release within a short period of time (e.g., 10 minutes in the case of toxic gases, see US Environmental Protection Agency, 1987). In addition to the quantity of the hazmat released, the size of the risk area depends upon its chemical and physical properties. The US DOT groups hazmat into nine different classes—explosives, gases, flammable liquids, flammable solids, oxidizers and organic peroxides, toxic (poisonous) materials and infectious substances, radioactive materials, corrosive materials, and miscellaneous dangerous goods. Each of these hazmat classes is described in the remainder of this section. It is important to be aware that classification of a substance into one of these categories does not mean it cannot be a member of another class. For example, hydrogen sulfide is transported as a compressed gas that is both toxic and flammable. Explosives Explosives are chemical compounds or mixtures that undergo a very rapid chemical transformation (faster than the speed of sound) generating a release of large quantities of heat and gas. For example, one volume of nitroglycerin expands to 10,000 volumes when it explodes; it is this rapid increase in volume that creates the surge in pressure characteristic of a blast wave. Explosives vary in their sensitivity to heat and impact. Class A consists of high explosives that detonate (up to 4 mi/sec), producing overpressure, fire, and missile hazards. Class B consists of low explosives that deflagrate (approximately .17 mi/sec—about 4% as fast as a detonation) and cause fires and flying debris (usually referred to as missile hazards). Class C consists of low explosives that are fire hazards only. Explosives can cause casualties and property damage due to overpressure from atmospheric blast waves or missile hazards. Destructive effects from the quantities of explosives found in transportation can be felt as much as a mile or more away from the incident site. Compressed gases are divided into flammable and nonflammable gases. Nonflammable gases—such as carbon dioxide, helium, and nitrogen—are usually transported in small quantities. These are a significant hazard only if the cylinder valve is broken, causing the contents to escape rapidly through the opening and the container to become a missile hazard. Flammable gases (acetylene, hydrogen, methane) are missile and fire hazards. Rupture of gas containers can launch missiles up to a mile, so evacuation out to this distance is advised if there is a fire. Large quantities of flammable gases, such as railcars of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), are of significant concern because the released gas will travel downwind after release until it reaches an ignition source such as the pilot light in a water heater or the ignition system in a car. At distances of one-half mile or more, the gas cloud can erupt in a fireball that flashes back toward the release point. Emergency managers need to understand the community-wide hazards associated with fires arising from flammable gases. Consequently, this topic is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Flammable liquids Flammable liquids, which evolve flammable vapors at 80°F or less, pose a threat similar to flammable gases. A volatile liquid such as gasoline rapidly produces large quantities of vapor that can travel toward an ignition source and erupt in flame when it is reached. When a flammable liquid is spilled on land, there should be a downwind evacuation of at least 300 yards. A flammable liquid that floats downstream on water could be dangerous at even greater distances and one that is toxic requires special consideration (see the section on toxic chemicals, below). A fire involving a flammable liquid should stimulate consideration of an evacuation of 800 yards in all directions. Flammable solids Flammable solids self-ignite through friction, absorption of moisture, or spontaneous chemical changes such as residual heat from manufacturing. Flammable solids are somewhat less dangerous than flammable gases or liquids, because they do not disperse over wide areas as gases and liquids do. A large spill requires a downwind evacuation of 100 yards, but a fire should stimulate consideration of an evacuation of 800 yards in all directions. Oxidizers and organic peroxides Oxidizers and organic peroxides include halogens (e.g., chlorine and fluorine), peroxides (e.g., hydrogen peroxide and benzoyl peroxide), and hypochlorites. These chemicals destroy metals and organic substances and also enhance the ignition of combustibles (a spill of liquid oxygen can cause the ignition of asphalt roads on a hot summer day). Oxidizers and organic peroxides do not burn, but are hazardous because they promote combustion and some are shock sensitive. A large spill should prompt a downwind evacuation of 500 yards and a fire should initiate an evacuation of 800 yards in all directions. Toxic chemicals Toxic chemicals, which can have large impact areas, are classified in a number of ways. DOT Class 2 consists of nonflammable gases and Class 6 is defined as poisons. Class A includes gases and vapors, a small amount of which is an inhalation hazard, whereas Class B consists of liquids or solids that are ingestion or absorption hazards. Many of these chemicals are defined by SARA Title III/EPCRA as EHSs. Toxic materials are a major hazard because of the effects they can produce when inhaled into the lungs, ingested into the stomach by means of contaminated water or food, or absorbed through the skin by direct contact. Of these exposure pathways, inhalation hazard is typically the greatest concern because high concentrations achieved during acute exposure can kill in a matter of seconds. Nonetheless, prolonged ingestion can cause cancers in those who are exposed and also can cause genetic defects in their offspring. Moreover, chemical contamination of victims poses problems for volunteers and professionals providing first aid and transporting victims to hospitals. These chemicals vary substantially in their volatility and toxicity, so evacuation distances following a spill or fire must be determined from the Table of Protective Action Distances in the Emergency Response Guidebook (US Department of Transportation, 2000, see www.dot.gov). Emergency managers need to understand the community-wide hazards that could result from a toxic chemical release. Consequently, this topic is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Infectious substances Infectious substances have rarely been a significant threat to date because there are relatively few shipments of these substances, they usually are transported in small quantities, and they have restrictive requirements for packaging and marking. However, infectious substances have the potential to be used in terrorist attacks, so emergency managers should knowledgeable about them. This topic is discussed in greater detail in the section on biological hazards. Radioactive materials Radioactive materials are substances that undergo spontaneous decay, emitting ionizing radiation in the process. The types and quantities of materials transported in the US generally have very small impact areas. With the exception of nuclear power plants, for which planning is supported by state and federal agencies and electric utilities, releases of radioactive materials are likely to involve small quantities. Nonetheless, even a few grams of a lost radiographic source for industrial or medical X-rays can generate a high level of public concern. Here also, the recently recognized threat of terrorist attack from a “dirty bomb” that uses a conventional explosive to scatter radioactive material over a wide area deserves emergency managers’ attention because of the potential for long-term contamination of central business districts. A large spill should prompt a downwind evacuation of 100 yards and a fire should initiate an evacuation of 300 yards in all directions. Emergency managers need to understand the community-wide hazards that could arise from a release of radioactive materials. Consequently, this topic is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Corrosives Corrosives, which are substances that destroy living tissue at the point of contact, can be either acidic or alkaline. Examples of acids include hydrochloric acid (HCl) and sulfuric acid (H2SO4), whereas examples of alkaline substances (caustics) include sodium hydroxide (NaOH), potassium hydroxide (KOH), and ammonia (NH4). In addition to producing chemical burns of human and animal tissues, corrosives also degrade metals and plastics. The most frequently used and transported substances in this class are not highly volatile, so the geographical area affected by a spill is likely to be no greater than 100 yards unless the container is involved in a fire or the hazmat enters a waterway (e.g., via storm sewers). These chemicals vary substantially in volatility and toxicity, so evacuation distances following a spill or fire must be determined from the Table of Protective Action Distances in the Emergency Response Guidebook. Miscellaneous dangerous goods Miscellaneous dangerous goods, as the name of this category suggests, this class comprises a diverse set of materials such as air bags, certain vegetable oils, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and white asbestos. Materials in this category are low to moderate fire or health hazards to people within 10-25 yards. Fires Flammable materials support rapid oxidization that produces heat and affects biological systems by thermal radiation (burns). As noted earlier in the section on wildfires, combustion requires the three elements of the fire triangle: fuel, which is any substance that will burn; oxygen that will combine with the fuel; and enough heat to ignite the fuel. Combustion usually yields enough heat to sustain the combustion reaction, but it also produces combustion products that might be more dangerous than the heat. Combustion of simple hydrocarbons or alcohols as fuels generally yields carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, water vapor, and unburned vapors of the fuel as combustion products. More complex and heavier substances such as pesticides also yield carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, water vapor, and unburned vapors of the fuel. However, they also produce highly toxic chemicals. It can be very difficult to predict what will be the combustion products from a building fire (e.g., an agricultural warehouse) because the temperature of the fire is variable over time and from one location to another in the fire, and the chemicals reacting with each other often are variable over time and from one location to another in the fire. In understanding combustion, it is important to recognize an important distinction between gases and liquids. A gas is a substance that, at normal temperatures and pressures, will expand to fill the available volume in a space. By contrast, a liquid is a substance that, at normal temperatures and pressures, will spread to cover the available area on a surface. Any liquid contains some molecules that are in a gaseous state; this is called vapor. All liquids generate increasing amounts of vapor as the temperature increases and the pressure decreases. Conversely, at a given temperature and pressure, the amount of vapor in a liquid varies from one substance to another. There are three temperatures of each flammable liquid that are important because they determine the production of vapor. In turn, vapor generation is important because it is the vapor that burns, not the liquid. The three important temperatures of a liquid substance are its boiling point, flash point, and ignition temperature. The boiling point is the temperature of a liquid at which its vapor pressure is equal to atmospheric pressure. Vapor production is negligible when a fuel is below its boiling point but increases significantly once it exceeds this temperature. The flash point of a liquid is the temperature at which it gives off enough vapor to flash momentarily when ignited by a spark or flame. A liquid is defined as combustible if it has a flash point above 100°F. (e.g., kerosene) and flammable if it has a flash point below 100° F. (e.g., gasoline). The final temperature to understand is the ignition temperature, which is the minimum temperature at which a substance becomes so hot that its vapor will ignite even in the absence of an external spark or flame. Gases and vapors have flammable limits that are defined by the concentration (percent by volume in air) at which ignition can occur in open air or an explosion can occur in a confined space. The lower flammable/explosive limit (LFL/LEL) is the minimum concentration at which ignition will occur. Below that limit the fuel/air mixture is “too lean” to burn. The upper flammable/explosive limit (UFL/UEL) is the maximum concentration at which ignition will occur. Above that limit the fuel/air mixture is “too rich” to burn. When released from a source, a flammable gas or vapor disperses in an approximately circular pattern if there is no wind but in an approximately elliptical pattern in the normal situation in which the wind is blowing (see Figure 5-5). Figure 5.5: Flammable Plume The most dangerous flammable substances have a low ignition temperature, low LEL, and wide flammable range. Indeed, gasoline is widely used precisely because of these characteristics. It has a low flash point (–45 to –36°F), a low LFL (1.4-1.5%), and a reasonably wide range (6%). By contrast, peanut oil is useful in cooking because it has the opposite characteristics—a high flash point (540°F) and an undefined LFL because it does not vaporize. An important hazard of flammable liquids is a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE), which occurs when a container fails at the same time as the temperature of the contained liquid exceeds its boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure. BLEVEs involve flammable or combustible compressed gases that are not classified as “explosive substances”, but can produce fireballs as large as 1000 feet in diameter and launch shrapnel to distances up to one half mile from the source. Toxic Industrial Chemical Releases Toxic industrial chemical releases are of special concern to emergency managers because the airborne dispersion of these chemicals can produce lethal inhalation exposures at distances as great as 10 miles and sometimes even more. The spread of a toxic chemical release can be defined by a dispersion model that includes the hazmat’s chemical and physical characteristics, its release characteristics, the topographic conditions in the release area, and the meteorological conditions at the time of the release. The chemical and physical characteristics of the hazmat include its quantity (measured by the total weight of the hazmat released), volatility (as noted earlier, higher volatility means more chemical becomes airborne per unit of time), buoyancy (whether it tends to flow into low spots because it is heavier than air), and toxicity (the biological effect due to cumulative dose or peak concentration). It also includes the chemical’s physical state—whether it is a solid, liquid (remember, a substance above its boiling point is a vapor), or a gas at ambient temperature and pressure. In general, vapors and gases are major hazards because they are readily inhaled and this is the most rapid path into the body. Release characteristics are defined by the chemical’s temperature and pressure in relation to ambient conditions, its release rate (in pounds per minute), and the size (surface area) of the spilled pool if the substance is a liquid. Temperature and pressure are important because the rate at which the chemical disperses in the atmosphere increases when these parameters exceed ambient conditions. The release rate is important because it determines the concentration of the chemical in the atmosphere. Specifically, a higher release rate puts a larger volume of chemical into a given volume of air, thus increasing its concentration (where the latter is defined as the volume of chemical divided by the volume of air in which it is located). Topographical conditions relevant to liquid spills include the slope of the ground and the presence of depressions. As is the case with flooding, steep slopes allow a liquid to rapidly move away from the location of the spill. Both flat slopes and depressions decrease the size of a liquid pool which, in turn, affects the size of the pool’s surface area and reduces the rate at which vapor is generated from it. Thus, dikes are erected around chemical tanks to confine spills in case the tanks leak and hazmat responders build temporary dikes around spills for the same reason. Topographical characteristics also affect the dispersion of a chemical release in the atmosphere. Hills and valleys are land features that channel the wind direction and can increase wind speed at constriction points—for example, where a valley narrows and causes wind speed to increase due to a “funnel” effect. Forests and buildings are rough surfaces that increase turbulence in the wind field, causing greater vertical mixing. By contrast, large water bodies have very smooth surfaces that do not constrain wind direction and, because they provide no wind turbulence, allow a chemical release to maintain a high concentration at ground level where it is most dangerous to people nearby. The immediate meteorological conditions of concern during a hazmat release are wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability class. The effect of wind speed on atmospheric dispersion can be seen in Figure 5-6, which shows a release dispersing uniformly in all directions when there is no wind (Panel A). Thus, the plume isopleth (contour of constant chemical concentration) corresponding to the Level of Concern (LOC) for this chemical is a circle. The nearby town lies outside the vulnerable zone so its inhabitants would not need to take protective action. However, Panel B describes the situation in which there is a strong wind, so the plume isopleth corresponding to the LOC for this chemical takes the shape of an ellipse. In this case, the nearby town lies inside the vulnerable zone and would need to take protective action. Figure 5-6. Effects of Wind Speed on Plume Dispersion. As Table 5-8 indicates, the atmospheric stability class can vary from Class A through Class F. Class A, the most unstable condition, occurs during strong sunlight (e.g., midday) and light wind. This dilutes the released chemical by mixing it into a larger volume of air. Class F identifies the most stable atmospheric conditions, which take place during clear nighttime hours when there is a light wind. These conditions have very little vertical mixing, so the released chemical remains highly concentrated at ground level. Table 5-8. Atmospheric Stability Classes. Strength of sunlight Nighttime conditions Surface Wind Speed (mph) Strong Moderate Slight Overcast ³ 50% Overcast < 50% < 4.5 A A-B B - - 4.5-6.7 A-B B C E F 6.7-11.2 B B-C C D E 11.2-13.4 C C-D D D D >13.4 C D D D D A: Extremely Unstable Conditions B: Moderately Unstable Conditions C: Slightly Unstable Conditions D: Neutral Conditions (heavy overcast day or night) E: Slightly Stable Conditions F: Moderately Stable Conditions Source: Adapted from FEMA, DOT, EPA (no date, a). It is important to recognize that meteorological characteristics can sometimes remain stable for days at a time, but at other times can change from one hour to the next. Figure 5-7, adapted from McKenna (2000), displays the wind direction at each hour during the day of the accident at the Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear power plant in terms of the orientation of an arrow. Wind speed is indicated by the length of the arrow. The figure shows wind speed and direction changed repeatedly during the course of the accident, so any recommendation to evacuate the area downwind from the plant would have referred to different geographic areas at different times during the day. This would have made evacuation recommendations extremely problematic because the time required to evacuate these areas would have taken many hours. Consequently, the evacuation of one area would have still been in progress when the order to initiate an evacuation in a very different direction was initiated. Figure 5-7. Wind Rose from 3:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on the First Day of the TMI Accident. Source: Adapted from McKenna (2000). The ultimate concern in emergency management is the protection of the population at risk. The risk to this target population varies inversely with distance from the source of the release. Specifically, the concentration (C) of a hazardous material decreases with distance (d) according to the inverse square law (i.e., C = 1/d2). However, distance is not the only factor that should be of concern. In addition, the density of the population should be considered because a greater number of persons per unit area increases risk area population. Moreover, there might be differences in susceptibility within the risk area population because individuals differ in their dose-response relationships as a function of age (the youngest and oldest tend to be the most susceptible) and physical condition (those with compromised immune systems are the most susceptible). Toxic chemicals differ in their exposure pathways—inhalation, ingestion, and absorption. Inhalation is the means by which entry into the lungs is achieved. This is generally a major concern because toxic materials can pass rapidly through lungs to bloodstream and on to specific organs within minutes of the time that exposure begins. Ingestion is of less immediate concern because entry through the mouth into the digestive system (stomach and intestines) is a slower route into the bloodstream and on to specific organs. Depending on the chemical’s concentration and toxicity, ingestion exposures might be able to be tolerated for days or months. Authorities might choose to prevent ingestion exposures by withholding contaminated food from the market or recommending that those in the risk area drink boiled or bottled water. Absorption involves entry directly through the pores of the skin (or through the eyes), so it is more likely to be a concern for first responders than for local residents. Nonetheless, some chemicals can affect local populations in this way, as was the case with the release of methyl isocyanate during the accident in Bhopal, India, in 1984. The harmful effects of toxic chemicals are caused by alteration of cellular functions (cell damage or death), which can be either acute or chronic in nature. Acute effects occur during the time period from 0–48 hours. Irritants cause chemical burns (dehydration and exothermic reactions with cell tissue). Asphyxiants are of two types; simple asphyxiants such as carbon dioxide (CO2) displace oxygen (O2) within a confined space or are heavier than oxygen so they displace it in low-lying areas such as ditches. By contrast, chemical asphyxiants prevent the body from using the oxygen even if it is available in the atmosphere. For example, carbon monoxide (CO) combines with the hemoglobin in red blood cells more readily than does O2 so the CO prevents the body from obtaining the available O2 in the air. Anesthetics/narcotics depress the central nervous system and, in extreme cases, suppress autonomic responses such as breathing and heart function. Chronic, or long-term, effects can be general cell toxins, known as cytotoxins, or have organ specific toxic effects. In the latter case, the word toxin is preceded by a prefix referring to the specific system affected. Consequently, toxins affecting the circulatory system are called hemotoxins, those affecting the liver are hepatotoxins, those affecting the kidneys are nephrotoxins, and those affecting the nervous system referred to as neurotoxins. Other chronic effects of toxic chemicals are to cause cancers, so these chemicals are referred to as carcinogens. Mutagens cause mutations in those directly exposed, whereas teratogens cause mutations to the genetic material of those directly exposed and, thus, mutations in their offspring. The severity of any toxic effect is generally due to a chemical’s rate and extent of absorption into the bloodstream, its rate and extent of transformation into breakdown products, and its rate and extent of excretion of the chemical and its breakdown products from the body (i.e., the substances into which the chemical decomposes). Research on toxic chemicals has led to the development of dose limits. Some important concepts in defining dose limits are the LD-50, which is the dose (usually of a liquid or solid) that is lethal to half of those exposed, and the LC-50, which is the concentration (usually of a gas) that is lethal to half of those exposed. Based upon these dose levels, authoritative sources have devised dose limits that are administrative quantities that should not be exceeded. LOCs are values provided by EPA indicating the Level of Concern or “concentration of an EHS [Extremely Hazardous Substance] above which there may be serious irreversible health effects or death as a result of a single exposure for a relatively short period of time” (US Environmental Protection Agency, 1987, p. XX). IDLHs are values provided by NIOSH/OSHA indicating the concentration of a gas that is Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health for those exposed more than 30 minutes. TLVs are Threshold Limit Values, which are the amounts that the American Conference of Government Industrial Hygienists has determined that a healthy person can be exposed to 8–10 hours/day, 5 days/week throughout the work life without adverse effects. Weaponized Toxic Chemicals Although it seems plausible that a deliberate attack might use explosives to cause release toxic chemicals from a domestic source such as a chemical plant, rail car, or tank truck, it also is possible that a weaponized toxic agent might be used. Such agents were originally used by the military in battles dating back to World War I. Over the years, attention turned to increasingly toxic chemicals that, by their very nature, require smaller doses to achieve a significant effect (e.g., disability or death). One consequence of the more advanced toxic agents is that they can affect victims through absorption in secondary contamination. That is, chemical residues on a victim’s skin or clothing can affect those who handle that individual. Indeed, any object on which the chemical is deposited becomes an avenue of secondary contamination (World Health Organization, 2004). A list of the most likely weaponized toxic agents is presented in Table 5-9. Some of these agents are produced by biological processes (botulism, anthrax, and encephalitis) that affect victims through the production of toxins and, thus, are more properly considered to be chemical weapons (World Health Organization, 2004). Table 5-9. Weaponized Toxic Agents. Agent Example Tear gases/other sensory irritants Oleoresin capsicum (“pepper spray”) Choking agents (lung irritants) Phosgene Blood gases Hydrogen cyanide Vesicants (blister gases) Mustard gas Nerve gases O-Isopropyl Methylphosphonofluoridate (Sarin gas) Toxins Clostrinium botulinum (“botulism”) Bacteria and rickettsiae Bacillus anthracis (“anthrax”) Viruses Equine encephalitis Source: Adapted from World Health Organization (2004) A terrorist attack involving a toxic chemical agent might be detected initially by fire, police, or emergency medical services personnel responding to a report of a mass casualty incident. Likely symptoms include headache, nausea, breathing difficulty, convulsions, or sudden death—especially when these symptoms are displayed by a large number of people in the same place at the same time. In this case, the appropriate response will be the same as in any other hazardous materials incident. Specifically, there will be a need to control access to the incident site, decontaminate the victims as needed, and transport them for definitive medical care. In addition to the normal coordination with emergency medical services and hospital personnel, it is appropriate for emergency managers to be aware of the assistance that is available from local poison control centers. Other than that, the capabilities needed to respond effectively to an attack using toxic chemicals will be much the same as those needed for an industrial accident involving these materials (World Health Organization, 2004). Unfortunately, few communities—even those with a significant number of chemical facilities—have hospitals with the capability to handle mass casualties from toxic chemical exposure caused by either an industrial accident or a terrorist attack. In the event of a terrorist attack, emergency managers will need to deal with a consideration that is not encountered in most other incidents to which they respond. Specifically, the incident site will be considered a crime scene by law enforcement authorities. Consequently, emergency mangers must learn about the basic procedures these personnel will follow, including collecting evidence, maintaining a chain of custody over that evidence, and controlling access to the incident scene. This latter issue should be carefully coordinated to avoid a conflict between emergency management procedures for victim rescue and law enforcement procedures for crime scene security. Radiological Material Releases There are 123 nuclear power plants in the US, most of which are located in Northeast, Southeast, and Midwest. To understand the radiological hazards of these plants, it is necessary to understand the atomic fission reaction. The atoms of chemical elements consist of positively charged protons and neutrally charged neutrons in the atom’s nucleus, together with negatively charged electrons orbiting around the nucleus. Some unstable chemical elements undergo a process of spontaneous decay in which a single atom divides into two less massive atoms (known as fission products) while emitting energy in the form of heat and ionizing radiation. The ionizing radiation can take the form of alpha, beta, or gamma radiation. Alpha radiation can travel only a very short distance and is easily blocked by a sheet of paper but is dangerous when inhaled (e.g., Pu-plutonium). Beta radiation can travel a moderate distance but be blocked by a sheet of aluminum foil. Gamma radiation can travel a long distance and can be blocked only by very dense substances such as stone, concrete, and lead. Radioactive materials are used for a variety of purposes. Small quantities of some materials are used as sources of radiation for medical and industrial diagnostic purposes (e.g., imaging fractured bones and faulty welds). Large quantities of other radiological materials are used as sources of heat to produce the steam needed to drive electric generators at power plants. In these nuclear power plants, enriched uranium fuel fissions when struck by a free neutron (see Figure 5-8). The thermal energy released is used to heat water and, thus, produce steam. The free neutrons are used to continue a sustained chain reaction and the fission products are waste products that must eventually be disposed in a permanent repository. The fuel temperature is controlled by cooling water and the reaction rate is controlled by neutron absorbing rods. The amount of fission products increases with age, so the reactor is refueled by moving the fuel in stages toward the center of the reactor vessel. Spent fuel, which contains a significant amount of radioactive fission products and some uranium, is stored onsite until transfer to a repository. The nuclear fuel is located in the plant’s reactor coolant system (RCS), where it is contained in fuel pins that are welded shut and inserted into long rods that are integrated into assemblies. Cooling water is pumped into the reactor vessel where it circulates, picks up heat (and small amounts of radioactive fission products) from the fuel, and flows out of the reactor vessel. Figure 5-8. The Atomic Fission Reaction. There are two types of RCSs, Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) and Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). In PWRs, the core coolant water is pressurized (the pressurizer is a device used to control the pressure in the reactor vessel) to prevent it from boiling. The hot water passes through a heat exchanger (called the steam generator), gives up its heat, and returns to the reactor vessel, completing the primary coolant system. The water in the secondary coolant system is allowed to boil, producing steam in the steam generator. In BWRs, the core coolant water is allowed to boil, generating steam directly. The steam is delivered to the turbine, spinning it to make electricity. The RCS is located in a containment building (the turbine is in an adjacent building), which is constructed with thick walls of steel-reinforced concrete to withstand high internal pressures or external missile impact. However, it has many penetrations for water pipes, steam pipes and instrumentation and control cables. These penetrations are sealed during normal operations, but the seals could be damaged during an accident that allows radioactive material to escape from the containment building into the environment. During a severe accident involving irreversible loss of coolant, the fuel will first melt through the steel cladding, then melt through the RCS, and finally escape the containment building (probably through a basemat melt-through or steam explosion). This process could produce a release as soon as 45-90 minutes after core uncovery. If the core melts, the danger to offsite locations depends upon containment integrity. Early health effects are likely if there is early total containment failure and are possible if there is early major containment leakage. Otherwise, early health effects are unlikely. The problem is that containment failure might not be predictable (McKenna, 2001). A radioactive release would involve a mix of radionuclides (i.e., a variety of radioactive substances that vary in their atomic weight) and this mix is called the source term. The source term is defined by three classes of radionuclides—particulates, radioiodine, and noble gases. Particulates include uranium (U) and strontium (Sr), the latter of which is dangerous because it is chemically similar to calcium (Ca) and therefore tends to be deposited in bone marrow. Radioiodine (I-131) is dangerous because it substitutes for nonradioactive iodine in the thyroid and, thus, can cause thyroid cancer. Noble gases such as krypton (Kr) do not react chemically with anything, but are easily inhaled to produce radiation exposures while they remain in the lungs. The source term is also characterized by its volatility. As noted in connection with toxic chemicals, volatility is an important characteristic of a substance because higher volatility means more of the radionuclide becomes airborne per unit of time and stays airborne. The quantity of radioactivity released can be measured in terms of the number of pounds or kilograms, but this is not a very useful measure because two different source terms with the same mass might emit very different levels of radiation. Consequently, the amount of radioactivity (ionizing radiation) released is measured by the number of disintegrations per unit time (Curies). In fact, these disintegrations are what a Geiger counter measures. The amount of radioactivity is usually measured in curies of an individual radionuclide or class of radionuclides. Exposure pathways for radiological materials are similar to those of toxic chemicals. Breathing air that is contaminated with radioactive materials can cause inhalation exposure and eating food (e.g., unwashed local produce) or drinking liquids (e.g., water or milk) that is contaminated can cause ingestion exposure. Contamination also can enter the body through an open wound such as a compound fracture, laceration, or abrasion, but radiological materials do not cause absorption exposures because they do not pass through the skin. However, because radiological materials release energy, they can produce exposures via direct radiation (also known as “shine”) from a plume that is passing overhead. If the plume has a significant component of particulates, these might be deposited on the ground, vegetation, vehicles, or buildings and the direct radiation from the deposited particulates would produce a continuing exposure. In some cases, the small particles of deposited material could become resuspended and inhaled or ingested. In this connection, it is important to recognize the distinction between irradiation and contamination. Irradiation involves the transmission of energy to a target that absorbs it, whereas contamination occurs when radioactive particles are deposited in a location within the body where they provide continuing irradiation. Measuring radiation dose is somewhat more complicated than measuring doses of toxic chemicals. As noted earlier, a Curie is a measure of the activity of a radioactive source in atomic disintegrations/second, whereas a Roentgen is a measure of exposure to ionizing radiation. A rad is a measure of absorbed dose, and a rem (“Roentgen equivalent man”) is a measure of committed dose equivalent. The term committed refers to the fact that contamination by radioactive material on the skin or absorbed into the body will continue to administer a dose until it decays or is removed. The term equivalent refers to the fact that there are differences in the biological effects of alpha, beta, and gamma radiation. Weighting factors are used to make adjustments for the biological effects of the different types of radiation. However, for offsite emergency planning purposes, one rem is approximately equal to one rad. The health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation are defined as early fatalities, prodromal effects, and delayed effects. Early fatalities occur within a period of days or weeks and are readily interpreted as effects of radiation exposure. Early fatalities begin to appear at whole body absorbed doses of 140 rad (which is equal to 1.4 Gray, the new international scientific unit) but less than 5% of the population would be expected to die from such exposures. Approximately 50% of an exposed population would be expected to die from a whole body dose of 300 rad and 95% would be expected to die from a dose of 460 rad. Prodromal effects are early symptoms of more serious health effects (e.g., abnormal skin redness, loss of appetite, nausea, diarrhea, nonmalignant skin damage), whereas delayed effects are cancers that might take decades to manifest themselves and might only be associated with a particular exposure on a statistical basis. Genetic disorders do not reveal their effects until the next generation is born. Prodromal effects would be expected to manifest themselves in less than 2% of the population at a dose of 50 rad, whereas 50% would be expected to exhibit prodromal symptoms at 150 rad and 98% would be expected to show these symptoms at 250 rad. The delayed effects of radiation exposure can be seen in Table 5-10, which lists the number of fatal cancers, nonfatal cancers, and genetic disorders that can be expected as a function of the number of person-rem (that is, the number of persons exposed times the number of rems of exposure per person). The small numbers involved are indicated by the fact that the coefficients are presented in scientific notation (i.e., 2.8 E-4 = .00028). That is, 2.8 fatal cancers, 2.4 nonfatal cancers, and 1 genetic effect are expected if 10,000 people are each exposed to 1 rem of radiation to the whole body. Table 5-10. Average Risk of Delayed Effects (Per Person-Rem) Effect Whole Body Thyroid Skin Fatal Cancers 2.8 E-4 3.6 E-5 3.0 E-6 Nonfatal Cancers 2.4 E-4 3.2 E-4 3.0 E-4 Genetic Disorders 1.0E-4 It is important to be aware of the differential biological affinity of radionuclides for specific organs. Whole body radiation refers to the response of the “typical” cell to irradiation, reflecting the common components and structures all cells share. By contrast, the thyroid is sensitive to I-131 and bone marrow is sensitive to Sr-90. Organ differences in dose-response arise because rapidly dividing cells, found in the gut (damage causes diarrhea and vomiting) and hair follicles (damage causes hair loss), are especially susceptible. There also are individual differences in dose-response. For example, fetuses are extremely susceptible because all of their cells are dividing rapidly, and the same is generally true of preschool children. Unfortunately, recommendations for protective action by pregnant women are easily misinterpreted. The concern is for the health of the highly susceptible fetus, not that of the much less susceptible adult woman. Other population segments include those at risk of any environmental insult: the very old, the very young, and those with compromised immune systems. Population protective actions for radiological emergencies are based upon three fundamental attenuation factors—time, distance, and shielding. Evacuation reduces the amount of time exposed and increases distance from the source, whereas sheltering in-place can provide shielding if this is done within dense materials that absorb energy and are airtight. To determine when protective action should be initiated, the EPA has developed Early Phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs), which are specific criteria for initiating population protective action in radiological emergencies (Conklin & Edwards, 2001). Note that the whole body dose listed in Table 5-11 for initiating evacuation (1 rem) is only a small fraction of the exposure level that would be expected to produce prodromal effects in the most susceptible 2% of the general population. Table 5-11. EPA Protective Action Guides Organ EPA PAGsa (rem/Sv) Protective Actionb Whole body 1-5 (.01-.05) Evacuation Thyroid 25 (.25) Stable Iodine (KI) a Dose inhalation from and external exposure from plume and ground deposition. b Actions should be taken to avert PAG dose. * Evacuation is considered to be the most effective protective action for nuclear power plant accidents at American sites. Biological Hazards According to the World Health Organization (2004, p. 5), biological weapons are “those that achieve their intended target effects through the infectivity of disease-causing micro-organisms and other such entities including viruses, infectious nucleic acids, and prions”. Some biological agents produce toxins and, thus, are actually chemical weapons whose “chemical action on life processes [is] capable of causing death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm” (World Health Organization, 2004, p. 6). Emergency managers should recognize that most biological agents likely to be used in deliberate attacks on their communities also exist as natural hazards. They also could be released accidentally from fixed-site facilities (e.g., commercial or academic laboratories) or in transportation among those facilities. These biological agents exist at low levels of prevalence in human populations or, alternatively, in animal populations from which they can spread to human populations. Indeed, one quarter of the world’s deaths in 1998 were caused by infectious diseases. The major consequence of most biological agents is the magnification of their effects by infection, unlike chemical agents that generally experience dissipation over time and distance. Biological agents magnify their effects by multiplying within the target organisms, but chemical agents cannot do this. Biological agents can be dispersed by contaminating food or water to achieve exposure through ingestion. For example, a terrorist attack might attempt to introduce a plant or animal infection that would affect people through the food distribution system. However, this system is routinely monitored by the US Department of Agriculture and state departments of agriculture. In some cases, these agencies already receive support from state emergency management agencies when natural outbreaks occur. For example, collaborative relationships have been demonstrated in recent cases of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE—“mad cow” disease) and naturally occurring outbreaks of livestock anthrax. Alternatively, a biological agent can be used to create an aerosol cloud of liquid droplets or solid particles to achieve an inhalation hazard. The aerosol can be dispersed either in the open environment or through a building’s heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system, but the latter is likely to produce more casualties because the concentration of the biological agent will be greater. The effectiveness of the dispersion will depend on the hazard agent’s physical (particle size and weight) characteristics. Micrometeorological variation can produce corresponding variation in the dispersion of the hazard agent and, under certain conditions, extreme dilution or loss of its viability. Nonetheless, epidemic spread could compensate for poor initial dispersion. As is the case with some toxic chemical agents, biological agents can be very difficult to detect when symptoms do not appear until long after exposure occurs. The incubation period for biological agents is free of symptoms, so tourists or business travelers might travel a long way from the attack site before they become symptomatic. Consequently, infection with a contagious agent could cause secondary outbreaks that are caused by victims of the initial exposure transmitting the agent to people with whom they come into contact during their travels. Thus, infection can spread widely before local authorities are aware that an attack has even occurred. The dispersal of the victims at the time the symptoms are manifested and the similarity of these symptoms to those of routinely encountered diseases such as influenza could impede prompt recognition of an attack. The major problem here is that the symptoms of biological agents are frequently indistinguishable from common maladies such as colds and influenza. Consequently, the occurrence of a covert biological agent release is most likely to be identified by noting a significant increase in the incidence of such symptoms. This would either be achieved by health care providers in emergency rooms and clinics supplemented by the health surveillance system operated by the public health department. There is an emerging sensor technology for detecting many biological agents. These sensors can identify the presence of agents at a very early stage rather than awaiting the development of symptoms in human populations. However, they can only detect these agents at specific locations and, because of their expense, cannot currently be widely distributed. For the foreseeable future, their deployment is likely to be limited to the most critical facilities. Consequently, it is important for emergency managers to establish a working relationship with their local health departments. In turn, these will have established contacts with regional laboratories and state and federal public health agencies to provide assistance in identifying the agent, treating the victims, and decontaminating the incident site. Countermeasures for biological agents include isolation and quarantine. Isolation is the action taken to prevent those who are known to be ill with a contagious disease from infecting others. It typically is associated with special treatment to remedy the disease. By contrast, quarantine is used to prevent those who might have been exposed to a biological agent but do not currently exhibit symptoms. Thus, they might not become ill and, indeed, they might not even have the disease. However, it is critical to prevent them from infecting others. Thus, quarantine is somewhat similar to sheltering in-place from toxic chemical hazards. The difference is that people being quarantined are asked (or legally required) to remain indoors in order to protect others from themselves (because they are the hazard) rather than to protect themselves from an external hazard. Although there is extensive research on household compliance with evacuation warnings, the same cannot be said for isolation and quarantine. Nonetheless, it seems safe to say the level of compliance will be less than perfect, so emergency managers should try to assess local residents’ perceptions of these protective actions if the need to implement them arises. In addition, biological agents can be combated by vaccines that provide protection against specific agents and other therapeutic agents that seek to block the body’s reaction to the agent. Emergency managers will be particularly interested in the latter type of therapy because a generic therapeutic mechanism would be effective against a wide variety of biological agents, just as a wide-spectrum antibiotic is effective against a range of bacteria.

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“The safety of the people shall be the highest law." Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman philosopher born in 106 BC Overview Let’s face it, not many of us were born with the proverbial silver spoon in our mouths. We will at some point in our lives offer our minds, labor, knowledge and skills in exchange for some form of payment. The payment may be currency, acknowledgement, goods, services, etc. We may also volunteer or offer up our labor not seeking compensation but to support some higher purpose or call, to serve others, or just to learn more and improve our present and future circumstances. Humans were made for productivity. We were made to cultivate, to create, to teach and explore. We are workers and will fully utilize our faculties to survive. Work is something we all have in common! In this course you will explore not only your relationship or ideas regarding work, but also the history, politics, and dignity of work. Most importantly you will learn how to work safely. In learning the origins of what makes a workplace safe and why your workplaces are required to be safe, you will understand and develop the skills necessary for becoming a more engaged, responsible, and safe worker in the 21st century. But first the following will guide your understanding and then afterwards a bit of historical context! As a matter of organization all chapters will begin with an overview followed by chapter objective, learning outcome, key terms, and the title of the associated lecture. Chapter Objective: 1. Explore and view work and worker safety through a historical context; 2. Assess how you view and value work and worker safety. Learning Outcome: 1. Identify and understand the roots of social, economic, and environmental justice concerns in worker safety. Key Terms: COVID-19, Social Justice, Economic Justice, Environmental Justice, Work, Safety, Essential Workers, Union, Pandemic, COVID-19 Mini-Lecture: The History of Work Required Time: 1 hour; Independent Study and reflection 1 ½ hour. 00: Valuing Work Social Justice There are numerous definitions or descriptions of the term ‘social justice’ most centering on remedying inequities in the human experience. The definition presented in this discussion on the history of work in the US is a broader characterization intended to weave a narrative from events, conditions, and norms in our society that will ultimately associate it with worker safety. An article in Investopedia describes social justice as referring to “... a fair and equitable division of resources, opportunities, and privileges in society. Originally a religious concept, it has come to be conceptualized more loosely as the just organization of social institutions that deliver access to economic benefits. It is sometimes referred to as "distributive justice". 1, 2. An open forum viewpoint on the meaning of social justice describes it as " a political and philosophical theory which asserts that there are dimensions to the concept of justice beyond those embodied in the principles of civil or criminal law, economic supply and demand, or traditional moral frameworks. Social justice tends to focus more on just relations between groups within society as opposed to the justice of individual conduct or justice for individuals."  While somewhat disparate, the two perspectives suggest social justice focuses on just relationships and what is best for all. The US has not always had the best reputation for protecting workers from harm, valuing all work and even valuing all lives. During darker chapters in our history including our very origins work was exploitative and many workers were devalued. Prison camp forced labor and slavery are primary examples of worker exploitation that has existed in the US and throughout human civilization. Exploited workers have always been workers doing the necessary and mundane, grueling, exhaustive, and dangerous work in society. Ask yourselves, who wants to be the worker cleaning up or attending to human waste? Who wants to be the worker lugging ½ ton stone or picking cotton, even strawberries in 100F heat, or slaughtering livestock for consumption? Many work tasks are not glamorous and many of us would probably choose other means to provide for ourselves and families. Worker exploitation has often resulted in workers being exposed to hazards and dangerous working conditions that would lead to illness, injury, and death. When workers were plentiful and expendable this was considered acceptable for any number of reasons. Worker exploitation has also been about not receiving fair wages, fair treatment, safe working conditions, reasonable work schedules, health care and workers compensation. In many ways one could argue worker concerns have always been social concerns. Social in fact is defined as relating to human society, the welfare of humans as members of society. Productive work is social and integral to society. A Division of Workers The subject of forced labor or slave labor is only mentioned to shape the narrative of human civilizations relationship to work. Later in the discussion we will circle back to the legacy of slave labor in US work history. In fact it is not only in less modern times that work has been assigned a social hierarchy. This means that in more modern times, children of a certain age are not expected or required to be part of the labor force until they become adults and seniors typically do not have to work unto death unless they choose to do so or are forced out of the labor market for reasons associated with health and mental acuity. In more modern times the safety of youth and older workers is valued more than a perceived benefit of their contribution to the workforce. The U.S. Department of Labor is the sole federal agency that monitors child labor and enforces child labor laws. The most sweeping federal law that restricts the employment and abuse of children workers is the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Child labor provisions under FLSA are designed to protect the educational opportunities of youth and prohibit their employment in jobs that are detrimental to their health and safety. FLSA restricts the hours that youth younger than 16 years of age can work and lists hazardous occupations too dangerous for young workers to perform. Enforcement of the FLSA's child labor provisions is handled by the Department's Wage and Hour Division.(DOL-Child Labor) Prior to protections, from the period of the civil war through the 1930s children were an integral part of the US workforce. Many working in factories or family farms helped to fuel the US economy before and at the turn of the 20th Century. Young workers are still an integral part of the US workforce but with the protections introduced in the FLSA. California has a sizeable segment of teen workers in retail and food industries with resources available to help them understand the value they bring to the workforce.(youngworkers.org) Older workers gained some special protections with the creation of the Social Security Administration when the Social Security Act of 1935 was signed into law. The Act established a system of Federal old-age benefits, and enabled States to make more adequate provision for aged persons, blind persons, dependent and crippled children, maternal and child welfare, public health, and the administration of unemployment benefits. Social Security allows workers of a certain age to continue working beyond retirement or to retire, ceasing work of any kind. One of the most enduring social safety nets, social security attempts to value both the longevity of work and the worker. A Consequence of the Industrial Revolution Industrialization in the US brought about many challenges to the concept of work. Humans have always used tools to assist with work productivity but industrialization had an exponential effect on efficiency and output. Machines rapidly took the place of manual labor increasing production even as human control and interface was still necessary. Machines reduced the brawn necessary for some types of work but also increased the necessity and opportunity of work for women and children in factories that were often dirty, dangerous, requiring long hours of grueling effort. Workers were a commodity and their productive work fueled economic growth, population growth and sustained prosperity and wealth for the barons of industrialization. Yet, for a period of time the poor and working class were exploited and not cared for, did not truly see the results of their labors until losses of property and lives got the attention of the US populace and representatives of the Federal Government. The Monongah Mine Disaster and Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire, both workplace catastrophes, occurred within five years of each other. The mine disaster was the worst in US history. Occurring on Dec 6 1907 in Monongah, W. Va., an explosion attributed to a spark that ignited methane gas killed more than 350 men and boys, killing some instantly and trapping many who ultimately died from toxic gas poisoning. Public outcry led to the creation of the Bureau of Mines in 1910 by the Federal Government in response to this event and other similar catastrophes happening in the US and globally. Industrialization was actually fueled by the various coal mining operations needed to sustain the economic growth engine of energy and power production. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire occurred on March 25, 1911, in Manhattan, NY. 146 mostly women and young girls, were trapped when a fire broke out on the 10th floor of the building, many jumping to their deaths or burned alive because exit doors were locked from the outside. This was done to keep workers from taking too many breaks, to keep out potential union organizers, and to possibly cut down on employee theft. Many of the women and men who died in this tragedy and the mining incident were immigrants of Italian and Jewish ancestry. Prejudice and bigotry added to class and caste distinctions which devalued worker contributions during a period of great change and knowledge attainment. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire like the Monongah Mine Disaster resulted in the development of safety standards and government oversight. There was no criminal negligence attributed in either disaster although there was some civil liability in the Factory fire. Although these disasters fomented public outcry, which initiated many workplace safety initiatives, it did little to make work valued, equitable, and esteemed for all who labor for a living. Civil Rights When one thinks of civil rights, the plight of the descendants of slaves, African or Black Americans, racial discrimination in all areas of the human experience is what is most impressed on your mind. Lack of access because of race to most paths to wealth, health, education, and prosperity was an additional hardship for this group of poor and working class Americans. Awareness of these challenges become heightened during the civil rights movements beginning in the 1940s and continuing through the -70s. This amplified the importance of valuing all work and workers. The struggles of ethnic and racial minorities in the US have always been about inclusion, being treated fairly with dignity and respect, and being valued. Civil rights leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr, Cesar Chavez, Delores Huerta, and Yuri Kochiyama during their best moments promoted a better America and centered human rights, civil rights, and worker rights around the common denominator of the dignity of work, valuing all people and the part that plays in a united and prosperous America. MLK Jr. was in Memphis, Tennessee, after delivering his “I’ve been to the Mountaintop” speech in support of Black sanitation workers' right to unionize when he was assassinated. These workers were chronically underpaid and had such poor working conditions that two men in the month preceding King’s visit were crushed to death in a garbage compacting truck. Even our sanitation workers have the right to work in a safe, sanitary, and healthy work environment and we know that because of his efforts circumstances are much improved today. MLKs work in his last days is a shining reminder of work and worker dignity being a core component of social justice. Cesar Chavez was an advocate for the fair and safe treatment of agricultural and migrant workers. He and Delores Huerta pushed for the successful creation of farming labor unions that resulted in better wages, safer working and living conditions for migrant workers and their families. Their advocacy called for work stoppages or strikes that, while met with resistance, ultimately got the attention of consumers. Elevating the plight of workers who ensure an adequate supply of food is a fundamental social justice concern. When all work is valued, work is safe, and communities thrive. Yuri Kochiyama who spent several years of her adult life in US Japanese Internment camps began her civil rights activist career at a social justice protest surrounding the unfair treatment of minority workers advocating for decent jobs, decent work. She was an advocate for the fair treatment of all people spending a good portion of her life advocating for reparations for Japanese Americans interned during WWII. So why is she relevant to the history of work in the US? Prison labor is a part of the US workforce even today. There is a reckoning and recognition that must be addressed. All work and workers must be valued even those society has punished. A view of the history of work and in general the work performed by a confined US labor force requires thoughtful reflection by all. It is not enough or effective to just learn about workplace safety without some discussion of work in general and a mention of all workers in society. Women in the Workforce Women and girls typically are more than half the worlds’ population and this is equally true for their representation in the US. However women have not held court, prominence or preeminence where work is concerned. Women have often had the added challenges of caring for children and home and have gotten heightened attention when filling in during labor shortages typically caused by wars and other conflicts. But work and workplaces historically have not always been hospitable to women. Unfair practices in the payment of wages, career advancement, and other social norms that impede a woman’s progress are a unique set of social constructs in play with women at work. Progress has been slow but things are changing. Although women achieved the right to vote in 1920 some achievements in equity in the workplace did not come until decades later. The Women’s empowerment revolution, some of which coincided with the civil rights movement during the 60 and 70s brought the issue of gender disparities in work front and center to the history of work in the US. Gender bias was built into our institutions and even our nation’s founding documents and addressing this bias required what may have been viewed as extreme measures given the times. Women asserting their right to dress how they wished, look how they wished, work where they wished, was not always met with acceptance. As a result, women’s empowerment was hijacked and sexualized for a time, taking and sidelining an important social justice vision for equity and inclusion, gender parity in all spaces but primarily in the workplace. (see Equal Rights Amendment) The “Me Too” movement which precipitated an avalanche of social media self-identification with and discussion on, sexual harassment at work brought gender politics back to the forefront and a new generation of workers of all genders have pushed to finally make the issue of sexual harassment in workspaces a relic of the past. We must recognize characterizing hostile work environments present a metamorphosis in how we view work and relationships at work and understand women are not the only affected workers benefiting from a new understanding. Specifically, how we view and treat young workers, aging workers, immigrant workers, minority workers, and LGBQT workers in workplaces is filtered through what is considered a hostile work environment. Unwelcome attention, harassment, coercion, and bullying of any kind should no longer be tolerated. Abusive language and intimidating behaviors are kept in check by continuing education and training. Yes, education and training, a very important and critical component of our review of the history of work in the US, is the backbone of worker safety. We will pick up some of its relevance in the next section.

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Economic Justice Productive work creates and drives economies. Economies are about the efficient use of trade, capital, natural and human resources. The term ‘economic justice’ will be defined and described centering on the discussion of the history of work in the US and its association with worker safety. Investopedia defines ‘economic justice’ as a component of social justice and welfare economics. It is a set of moral and ethical principles for building economic institutions, where the ultimate goal is to create an opportunity for each person to establish a sufficient material foundation upon which to have a dignified, productive, and creative life. Much of the prior discussion has focused on human experiences and functions of society norms. The history of work in the US also includes government, commercial, and private institutions, regulatory and organizational structures. Most forms of government exists to provide order and to promote the common good. Recognizing commerce and commercial enterprise garnered most of the attention of lawmakers who afforded the most protection to business and industry, advocates for labor began making waves immediately after the American Civil War in 1864. As referenced from historical text, government oversight of labor practices was initiated…when William Sylvis, the most important labor leader of his day, advocated for the creation of a Department of Labor (DOL). He protested that existing government departments threw their protective arms around every enterprise fostering wealth, while no department had as its "sole object the care and protection of labor." He and his followers petitioned President Andrew Johnson for a Secretary of Labor, chosen from the ranks of workingmen, to be labor's voice in the Cabinet. It took nearly 50 years before an American President, Andrew Taft, signed a bill creating a cabinet level Department of Labor in 1913. The DOL established a bureau of labor statistics (BLS) to provide objective labor data not influenced by national politics. It took many more decades later for the BLS to not be influenced by social norms and today there is relative assurance that labor data is unbiased and accurate. The BLS provides important statistics on what is happening in workplaces such as pay and benefits, unemployment numbers, injury and illness data, employment projections, and productivity. So, why is the DOL relevant to a discussion on economic justice and its ties to worker safety? In addition to the BLS, the DOL has under its arm a number of agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the Office of Workers Compensation Programs (OWCP), the Office of Labor-Management Standards (OLMS), the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), and the Employment and Training Administration (ETA). Of course OSHA and MSHA are centered on worker health and safety, however the other agencies collectively provide for ensuring a skilled and trained workforce, an ethically managed workforce, and a fairly compensated workforce. Unions and Skilled Labor The history of work in the US would not be complete without mention of unions. Many who will review this textbook may, if not currently union members, join a union sometime in the future. Skilled labor professionals are the primary beneficiaries of labor unions with the first documented US trade union formed in 1794, the Federal Society of Journeymen Cordwainers (Shoemakers). So what exactly is a union? Investopedia states labor unions are associations of workers formed to protect workers' rights and advance their interests. Unions negotiate with employers through a process known as collective bargaining. The resulting union contract specifies workers’ pay, hours, benefits, and job health-and-safety policies. Modern union contracts also add provisions for education, training, and certification requirements as well as stipulations for adverse or disciplinary actions and probationary waiting periods for full union benefits. The first trade unions were no different from most early American institutions in their exclusionary, discriminatory practices and denial of membership to ethnic minorities, African Americans, Asian Americans, and women. The first trade unions did not value all workers. Groups excluded from the membership of unions supporting only Anglo-Saxon and Protestant males, formed their own unions. During the civil rights years unions saw some relaxation of exclusionary practices however even at peak union membership in the 1980s, minorities and women were still underrepresented in some of the largest trade unions. There is still work to do in this area and promoted by active recruitment of women and minorities. A number of the largest trade unions associated with skilled labor professionals include the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers Ironworkers (IW), International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART), United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada (UA), United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America International Union (UAW), United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (UBC), United Steelworkers (USW), International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM), and American Nurses Association (ANA). Labor unions not trade oriented include the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU), International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT), and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) just to name a few. These are fully funded and influential unions often joining together on the national stage supporting legislation that implements labor policy favorable to workers. Trade unions have played an important role in creating and elevating the economic status of the poor and working class to the middle class. Trade unions fight for safe working conditions and are responsible for helping to formulate many of the health and safety standards presented in this textbook. Unions continue to provide input and content for education requirements and training programs establishing trade certification and safety guidelines. Unions elevate the trades through apprenticeship programs supporting competitive living wages, bargaining for favorable retirement benefits, and advocating for superior medical benefits not often available to the average worker. Unions reduce wage inequality because they raise wages more for low- and middle-wage workers than for higher-wage workers, more for blue-collar than for white-collar workers, and more for workers who do not have a college degree. Strong unions set a pay standard that nonunion employers follow. Labor unions have been good for the trades and nonunion alike and crucial to economic justice despite exclusionary practices in the formative years. Community College and Trade Schools A persistent and equally effective means for economic justice is the community college and trade school. Community colleges and trade schools prepare workers with the education and training needed to enter the workforce as skilled laborers and excel in high paying and rewarding careers. The history of work in the US would not be complete without bringing attention to the alternative that low cost career and technical education programs have presented for improving living standards and skilled worker outcomes. Free, low cost, or subsidized training programs offer a good return on investment and are well suited for introducing students/workers to workplace safety standards and the methods for developing safe work practices and sustaining safe workplaces. Fair pay, living wages, education and training, safe and healthy working conditions are core tenets upon which to correlate economic justice to worker safety. So how are healthy working conditions established? What are the criteria for worker safety and health? We will discuss in the next section how our desire to protect the environment addresses these questions.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/00%3A_Valuing_Work/0.02%3A_Economic_Justice_is_Valuing_W.txt

Environmental Justice In 1962 the book titled “Silent Spring” by Rachel Carson was published, culminating years of research on the impact of indiscriminate application of pesticides for agricultural and commercial use. The birds were dying. Industrialization and commercialization had resulted in polluted and contaminated land and waters. Rachel’s writings are said to have sparked the global environmental movement. Eight years after her book was published, the Environmental Protection Act of 1970 was signed into law. As published by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Environmental justice (EJ) is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies. Fair treatment means no group of people should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from industrial, governmental and commercial operations or policies. The EPA created a number of environmental justice programs and has been working on various initiatives for more than 30 years. The basic charter of the EPA is to do research on important pollutants irrespective of the media in which they appear, and on the impact of these pollutants on the total environment. Many of the chemical pollutants which may also be hazardous materials, identified by the EPA as harmful to the environment are harmful to humans as well. The EPA lists and controls access to and use of toxic chemicals, with a fair number of these chemicals identified in the OSHA standard covering toxic substances. OSHA Occupational Chemical Database is a resource OSHA maintains that serves as a convenient reference for the occupational safety and health community. It compiles information from several government agencies and organizations. This database originally was developed by OSHA in cooperation with EPA. Limiting worker exposure to chemical or toxic substances is one of the primary goals of the OSHA Hazard communication program. Employers are required to inform employees of their exposures, the management of those exposures, and the consequences of those exposures. This program protects all workers in most industries, all regions and workplaces. Environmental justice also seeks to repair damage to communities most impacted by pollution and contamination caused by industrialization, dumping of toxic waste, and crumbling infrastructure. The EPA Brownfield’s program is one such EJ effort. The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfield’s Revitalization Act defines Brownfields as real property, the expansion, redevelopment or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant. They are called Brownfields in an effort to distinguish them from undeveloped, pristine land in areas outside of the city (often called Greenfields). When these Brownfields are located in underserved, disadvantaged, vulnerable communities, they not only further depress the community but can also be dangerous and harmful. OSHA provides resources for helping employers identify Brownfields hazards and offers solutions for mitigation through Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) education and training. Environmental justice correlates to worker safety through the diversity of skilled trades that are often needed in cleanup efforts. It correlates through sustainable practices of revitalization and renewal of harmed communities. Finally, in a more recent instance where workplace safety ties to all three justice concerns was shown to persist in ways that reveal we must never separate justice concerns from worker safety, we have the compounded and residual effects from the events of 9/11/2001. Emergency planning is a core element of workplace safety. Our existing building infrastructure, the codes and standards responsible for safe working spaces, are based primarily on catastrophic events in the history of work in the US. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire was one of the primary catalysts for new building and fire codes and the typical emergency planning exercises have historically focused on fire related events. 9/11 was a terrorist attack on US soil perpetrated by foreign nationals that permanently changed what we consider and view as a workplace emergency or catastrophic event. Airplanes with tons of jet fuel were used as weapons that resulted in massive explosions and fires that ultimately brought down and completely destroyed the Twin Towers of World Trade Center (WTC) in downtown Manhattan, NYC. It was a workplace emergency on steroids! It was a special kind of violence joined with a unique type of physical hazard that in today’s world must unfortunately be addressed in the workplace. The official review of the events of 9/11, as revealed in “The 911 Report”, made it very clear who bore the brunt of that tragic event. 2,152 individuals died at the WTC complex who were not (1) fire or police first responders, (2) security or fire safety personnel of the WTC or individual companies, (3) volunteer civilians who ran to the WTC after the planes' impact to help others, or (4) on the two planes that crashed into the Twin Towers. 2973 individuals lost their lives on that day and approximately 92% of that total, sadly, were simply doing a day’s work. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attack and workplace emergency, there was economic panic and social panic. There were unwarranted attacks on Muslim Americans in workplaces and public spaces. There were discriminatory attacks on Sikh Americans and anyone who was thought to resemble the terrorists. Land and air transportation was halted, ports of entry locked down. The small business sector, especially enterprises in the vicinity of the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan, suffered major losses. Almost 18,000 small businesses were shut down or destroyed.(Investopedia) Many of the emergency responders risking their lives to save the many workers at the WTC and others in or around what has since been called ‘ground zero’ have suffered from debilitating illness and disease resulting from the exposure to environmental toxins and silica released with the destruction of the towers. (see dangerous worksite) While the general view was an attack or emergency of 9/11 magnitude was not improbable it was not thought or conceived as a possibility for the majority of workplaces and therefore not anticipated. In its aftermath many publically vulnerable, sensitive or critical workplaces and supporting infrastructure needed immediate assessments for the protection of workers and the public at large. Workplace emergency planning got a face lift and was permanently altered to consider significant foreign terrorist attacks but to also consider domestic violence as well. Social Justice, Economic Justice, Environmental Justice. All are intricately woven into the fabric of workplace safety and when viewed critically are foundational to occupational safety and health. All show up throughout the history of work in the US. Workers are part of communities that are social, economic, and environmental networks and it is through collective work and safe work that we continue to build and press society forward. Reflection It has been said that when you know better you do better. 1. How does this review of justice issues in the history of work in the US prepare you to receive information on workplace safety standards and worker safety? 2. What is your mindset now? 3. What was it before?

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COVID-19 We were confronted with the history of work in the US, the social and economic justice implications for workplace safety during the 2020-22, COVID-19 Pandemic. While pandemics are not unique occurrences in history, this is the first having documented widespread impact on the US workforce and economy after the DOL/BLS and OSHA were created. The following will elaborate on what a pandemic is and how it is viewed from the perspective of worker safety. One definition by Wikipedia describes a pandemic as an epidemic of an infectious disease that has spread across a large region, for instance multiple continents or worldwide, affecting a substantial number of people. Consistent with what is shared by the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC), an influenza pandemic is a global outbreak of a new influenza A virus. Pandemics happen when new (novel) influenza A viruses emerge which are able to infect people easily and spread from person to person in an efficient and sustained way. The United States is NOT currently experiencing an influenza pandemic. There is an ongoing pandemic with a new coronavirus. The cold and flu seasons are examples of influenza cycles with predictable patterns that have temporary impacts on the workforce and healthcare systems that are manageable. This is likely the reason the influenza season is not referred to as a pandemic and may be considered endemic. COVID-19 is a new virus that has had severe and fatal, emerging, and in many cases unknown future impacts on health outcomes. COVID-19 distinguished itself as an occupational illness because of the burden it placed on the workforce and economy. That burden was revealed as a disconnection between public health efforts and worker health protections. The CDC addresses our current situation in part as an emergency planning issue…”Because we cannot predict how bad a future pandemic will be, advance planning is needed at the national, state and local level. Whether the planning is for a government entity, a business, school, community-based organization, or healthcare system, all planning efforts should take into consideration (sic) multiple scenarios of a pandemic (e.g. moderate, severe, or very severe) so that they can be ready to respond quickly and take the appropriate measures to continue daily operations.” As has been noted in this review of the history of work in the US, catastrophic events such as the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire, Monongah Mine Disaster, and 9/11 Terrorist attack shed light on the importance of emergency planning in protecting workers and the public at large. The Bureau of Labor Statistics keeps track of data relating to employment, unemployment, and other labor force characteristics. One of the more important statistics recorded are work related injury, illness, and fatalities. Of the three, occupational illness requires acquiring more detailed information and tracking. The pandemic created a special circumstance of occupational illness that resulted in broader impacts to workplace safety and the economy. Consider this fact, there are few places one can think of that are not workplaces. Where ever you have people, there are workers doing work. The CDC current population survey (CPS) has been modified indefinitely to include additional survey questions on the impact of COVID-19 on the US population. COVID-19 was a game changer for labor statistics revealing not only disparities in worker protections but going forward how these protections will be managed in a post COVID-19 world. Lastly COVID-19 introduced to our lexicon a new classification of workers. “Essential workers” or “Front Line workers”, “Key Workers”, are defined as a public-sector or private-sector employee who is considered to provide an essential service….These workers further designate what are considered essential businesses i.e. businesses and services that provide for continued public health, safety, transportation, childcare, and foodservice. Of these identified, 50% are represented in healthcare and foodservice, keeping in mind that a supply chain must be available to support these services. However despite being deemed essential, these workers, many who are often on lower pay scales and with minimal healthcare protections, were not adequately protected from the virus and suffered disproportionately with severe sickness and at times death. The pandemic exposed the gaps in worker protections all around in that many of the lowest paid workers were also the most likely to be laid off or furloughed during the height of the pandemic. Many were from disadvantaged and underserved communities. Many were racial and ethnic minorities. Social and economic justice issues are still very much a part of workplace safety. At this time of this writing the US has more than 50% of the population vaccinated for COVID-19. Getting to more than 90% however appears to be problematic as vaccinations and even wearing masks for the unvaccinated has become a political issue. What has gotten lost in the discussion is worker safety. The CDC guidance on wearing masks is simple. Respiratory droplets are minimized with face coverings. Vaccinations protect the most vulnerable to the disease when herd immunity is reached. Protecting the most vulnerable and essential workers will happen when all who can get vaccinated are and until that happens, all who are unvaccinated continue to take the precautions necessary for protecting all workers. Reflection Choose one of the justice issues discussed that impact workplace safety and reflect on your personal experience with COVID-19 and how filtering your experience through the lens of any one of the justice issues informs or changes how you feel about COVID-19 or related circumstances going forward. 0.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) 1. The Great Wall of China was constructed over a 30 year period. True or False 2. The Panama Canal was started by the French but completed by the US. True or False 3. Social justice is a ? and ? theory which asserts that there are dimensions to the concept of justice beyond those embodied in the principles of civil or criminal law, economic supply and demand, or traditional ? frameworks. 4. List and describe five trade unions. ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ 5. Which DOL agency documents information and provides resources on COVID-19? ________________________________________________

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• 1.1: History and Origins Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 • 1.2: OSHA Procedures OSHA has set procedures for conducting worksite inspections, assessing civil penalties for compliance violations, delegating employer and employee responsibilities, filing complaints, promoting changes and rulemaking, codifying requirements, recordkeeping and reporting. This section provides a brief detail of OSHA Protocols. • 1.3: OSHA Subparts List of General Industry and Construction Standards Subparts, paragraph numbering system, and recordkeeping and reporting requirements. • 1.A: Review Questions "Safety doesn't happen by accident." – Author Unknown Overview The Occupational Safety and Health Administration just celebrated 50 years! There are several generations of workers currently in the workplace. The oldest generation, the baby boomers (1946-1964) have had the longest tenure under an era of legislated workplace safety and generation Z (1997-2009) the shortest. For some of you in this very moment the realization that what you see manifested in the workplace with respect to safety, what you expect in the workplace regarding safety does not have a long history. So let that sink in. Prior to the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, workers’ were not guaranteed, nor had the right to expect safe working conditions in which to provide for self, family, and community. The act also created the OSHA research arm, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) currently part of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) which relies heavily on information farmed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which was also created immediately prior to the signing of the OSH Act. Collectively, these organizations have been responsible for ensuring the health and safety of the public at large for the past 50 years. As skilled workers you should understand how these organizations support overall worker safety and health setting the stage for sustaining the next 50 years of safe workplaces. In this chapter you will increase not only your awareness of the origins of occupational safety and health in the US but also gain a better understanding of how you as a skilled worker will contribute to safe working environments. Chapter Objective: 1. Understand when and how OSHA was established. 2. Review the OSHA Act, OSHA's Mission, Objectives and Administrative Protocols. 3. Discuss employee rights to a safe workplace. 4. Discuss employer responsibilities for ensuring safe workplaces. Learning Outcome: 1. Identify and understand both employer and employee responsibilities for keeping workplaces safe. 2. Describe structure, arrangement and order of OSHA Standards. Standard: 29CFR1910 OSHA Standards for General Industry, 29CRF1926 OSHA Standards for Construction Key Terms: ANSI, CDC, CFR, DOL, NIOSH, NRTL, OSHA, codify, consensus, proprietary, standards, subpart Mini-Lecture: Introduction to OSHA Required Time: 1 hour; Independent Study and reflection 1 ½ hour. Thumbnail: Children Workers circa 1920s, Library of Congress, www.loc.gov 01: Introduction to OSHA OSHA History In 1970, the United States Congress was confronted with some horrific statistics: Job-related accidents that year accounted for more than 14,000 worker deaths, nearly 2 million disabled workers, and 300,000 estimated new cases of occupational diseases. As a result of these statistics, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, signed by President Richard M. Nixon established among other things, The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The stated purpose of the OSHA Act is to provide "so far as possible, every working man and woman in the nation, safe and healthful working conditions." To meet this stated purpose, Congress imposed dual obligations on employers to comply with a general duty clause and a specific duty clause, The general duty clause requires each employer to furnish to each of his employees a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his/her employees, The specific duty clause requires the employer to comply with occupational safety and health standards issued by OSHA. Occupational Safety and Health Act What is covered? The OSH Act covers all employers and their employees in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and all territories under Federal Government jurisdiction. What is not covered? The OSH Act does not cover any State, political subdivision of a State, or the United States. In addition, self-employed persons, family operated farms and other jobsites covered by other federal agencies are not covered by the Act. State Plans States may choose to adopt their own OSHA plans. If they do so, they must guarantee employer and employee rights as does OSHA. This means the State plans must be at least as effective as Federal OSHA. State plans must be monitored and approved by Federal OSHA. Origin of OSHA standards Initially, the OSHA standards were taken from three sources: consensus standards, proprietary standards, and federal laws in effect when the Occupational Safety and Health Act became law. Consensus standards are developed by industry-wide standard-developing organizations and are discussed and substantially agreed upon through consensus by industry. OSHA has incorporated the standards of the two primary standards groups, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), into its set of standards. Proprietary standards are prepared by professional experts within specific industries, professional societies, and associations. The proprietary standards are determined by a straight membership vote, not by consensus. Incorporation by reference OSHA standards follow a model of providing design or performance criteria or obligations. Although OSHAs responsibility is to develop and promulgate safety standards the organization does not do this in a vacuum. Where OSHA is not the authority on matters of specific protocols that cover other federal agencies, specific industries, equipment, or type of work, they will rely on the expertise of organizations responsible for leading or developing courses of action. Recognizing the diversity and sheer number of design and performance measures covering all industries, OSHA does at its discretion completely incorporates by reference, i.e. simply referencing the title of a standard, bases document, etc in section 1910.6 Incorporation by Reference, without duplicating in its entirety the details of that reference. In some standards the details are the standard but when there is too much specific information referencing the standard is sufficient. The abbreviated text of the incorporation by reference standard states: The standards of agencies of the U.S. Government, and organizations which are not agencies of the U.S. Government which are incorporated by reference, have the same force and effect as other standards in this part. Only the mandatory provisions (i.e., provisions containing the word "shall" or other mandatory language) of standards incorporated by reference are adopted as standards under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Any changes in the standards incorporated by reference and an official historic file of such changes are available for inspection in the Docket Office at the national office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The standards listed in the section are incorporated by reference into the part with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register. To enforce any edition other than that specified in this section, OSHA must publish a document in the Federal Register and the material must be available to the public. Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs) Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories are defined by OSHA as organizations that provides third party quality assurance of equipment with safety performance characteristics or requirements. NRTLs are responsible for testing and examining of equipment and materials for workplace safety purposes to determine conformance with appropriate test standards or provide for experimental testing and examining of equipment and materials for workplace safety purposes to determine conformance with appropriate test standards or performance in a specified manner and under specified conditions. NRTL’s list or label or accept, equipment or materials in accordance with design and performance criteria. OSHA approves and certifies testing laboratories meet standards for ensuring testing protocols and procedures follow industry guidelines, test equipment is calibrated, testing staff is trained and knowledgeable in the performance of their duties. NRTL’s may inspect and monitor fabrication processes, factories of manufacturer’s that carry the listing and labeling markings and must maintain complete objectivity in the quality assurance process. NRTL’s are neither contracted by OSHA or the manufacturers whose equipment is being tested. Standards by Application Standards are sometimes referred to as being either "horizontal or "vertical" in their application. Most standards are horizontal or "general," which means they apply to any employer in any industry. Standards relating to fire protection, working surfaces and first aid are examples of horizontal standards. Some standards, though, are relevant only to a particular industry, and are called vertical or "particular" standards. Examples are standards applying to the longshoring industry or the construction industry, and to the special industries covered in Subpart R of Part 1910. Employer variances Employers may seek a variance from any standard or regulation promulgated by OSHA. Variances are issued if the employer cannot fully comply with the regulations for some reason, or if they can prove that their methods of operation are at least as effective as those required by OSHA. There are two types of variances: temporary and permanent. A temporary variance may be granted for the period of time needed to achieve compliance or for one year, whichever is shorter. Permanent variances are granted to employers who demonstrate that their procedures are as effective as OSHA's.

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OSHA Procedures OSHA has set procedures for conducting worksite inspections, assessing civil penalties for compliance violations, delegating employer and employee responsibilities, filing complaints, promoting changes and rulemaking, codifying requirements, recordkeeping and reporting. OSHA Inspections To enforce its standards, OSHA has the authority to conduct inspections. Every place of employment covered by OSHA is subject to inspection. OSHA has the authority to enter without delay, at reasonable times, to inspect and investigate any place of employment. Inspections are conducted without advance notice. If an employee refuses to admit an OSHA compliance officer, OSHA will pursue legal actions, such as obtaining a search warrant. Inspection priorities Because of the vast amount of jobsites and the shortage of OSHA compliance personnel, OSHA has inspection priorities. The first priority is for imminent danger conditions. These are situations where there is reasonable certainty that a danger exists which can be expected to cause or is causing serious physical harm or death. The second priority is given to jobsite catastrophes and fatalities. The third priority is given to investigating employee complaints and the last priority is for programmed high-hazard inspections. OSHA also includes as part of the last priority, follow-up visits for compliance with abatement and mitigation of citations. Inspection procedures When an inspection occurs, OSHA has a set of procedures it follows. After the OSHA inspector shows his or her credentials and announces the inspection, an Opening Conference is held with the employer to explain the purpose of the visit, the scope of the inspection and the standards that apply. An employer representative and an employee representative are permitted to attend the conference and participate in the inspection. The Inspection Tour is the second step of the inspection. The OSHA officer and accompanying representatives proceed through the jobsite on the inspection. OSHA compliance officers are permitted to question employees during the tour and they will point out unsafe or unhealthy working conditions observed. The last step of the visit is the Closing Conference. The OSHA officer will discuss what was observed during the inspection and indicate all apparent violations for which a citation may be issued. The employer is told of his/her appeal rights. No discussion of any proposed fines should occur at the conference. The OSHA area director is responsible for that determination only after having received a full report. Penalty schedule OSHA has established a penalty schedule based on the severity of the violation. Violations that are not likely to affect health and safety are classified as Other Than Serious and are subject to a proposed penalty of up to \$13,653 for each violation. Violations where there is a probability that death or serious physical harm could occur are classified as Serious. A mandatory fine of \$13,653 for each penalty is proposed. Willful violations occur when the employer intentionally and knowingly permits a hazardous condition to exist or makes no reasonable effort to abate such a hazard. Penalties of up to \$136,532 per violation are proposed for willful violations. OSHA also has fines for Repeat violations (\$136,532) and Failure to Correct Prior Violations (\$13,653). Employer Responsibilities All employers have the primary responsibility to meet the provisions of the general duty clause, section 5(a)(1), by providing their employees a workplace that is free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to their employees. Employers must also comply with any standards, rules and regulations issued by OSHA. Employers must examine the workplace to make sure that all workplace conditions conform to the applicable standards. Employers must provide to their employees all of the necessary training required by OSHA standards. Employee Responsibilities While OSHA does not cite employees, employees have the responsibility to comply with all OSHA standards and all rules, regulations and orders issued by the OSHA Act. Every employee should follow the safety and health rules and regulations and wear appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) where so required. Employees should report any job related injury or illness to the employer immediately. Employees’ Rights Employees should always exercise their rights under the OSHA Act in a responsible manner. If an employee is exercising these or any other OSHA rights, the employer is not permitted to discriminate against that worker in any way, such as through firing, demotion, taking away benefits, transferring the worker to an undesirable job or shift, or threatening or harassing the worker. Workers who believe that they have been punished or discriminated against for exercising their safety and health rights must contact the nearest OSHA office within 30 days of the time they learn of the alleged discrimination. A union representative can file a complaint on behalf of the worker. The worker does not have to complete any forms. If necessary, OSHA will pursue legal action against the employer and the employee does not have to pay any legal fees. OSHA has a 24-Hour Emergency Service Hotline for those who want to contact OSHA about life-threatening workplace hazards or serious health emergencies. 1-(800)-321-OSHA. Development of OSHA regulations OSHA regulations can be developed by OSHA itself, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, state and local governments, nationally-recognized standards-producing organizations, employer or labor representatives or any other interested persons.

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OSHA Subparts Chapter XVII of Title 29 Department of Labor section of the code of federal regulations (CFR) is designated for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. In this textbook we will discuss two parts under Chapter XVII, Part 1910 is the standard for Occupational Safety and Health Standards for General Industry, and Part 1926 is the standard for Occupational Safety and Health Standards, commonly known as the "Construction Industry Standards." Under each part, major blocks of information are broken down into Subparts. The major Subparts in the 1910 Standard includes: • Subpart A - General • Subpart B – Adoption and Extension of Federal Standards • Subpart C – reserved • Subpart D – Walking-Working Surfaces • Subpart E – Means of Egress • Subpart F – Powered Platforms, Manlifts • Subpart G – Occupational Health and Environmental Control • Subpart H – Hazardous Materials • Subpart I – Personal Protective Equipment • Subpart J- General Environmental Controls • Subpart K- Medical and First Aid • Subpart L – Fire Protection • Subpart M – Compressed Gas and Compressed Air Equipment • Subpart N- Materials handling and Storage • Subpart O- Machinery and Machine Guarding • Subpart P – Hand and Portable Power Tools • Subpart Q- Welding, Cutting, and Brazing • Subpart R – Special Industries • Subpart S – Electrical • Subpart T – Commercial Diving Operations • Subpart U- COVID-19 Emergency Temporary Standard • Subpart Z – Toxic and Hazardous Substances The major Subparts in the 1926 Standard includes: • Subpart A - General • Subpart B - General Interpretation’s • Subpart C - General Safety and Health Provisions • Subpart D - Occupational Health and Environmental Controls • Subpart E - Personal Protective and Life Saving Equipment • Subpart F - Fire Protection and Prevention • Subpart G - Signs, Signals and Barricades • Subpart H - Materials Handling, Storage, Use and Disposal • Subpart I - Tools - Hand and Power • Subpart J - Welding and Cutting • Subpart K – Electrical • Subpart L – Scaffolds • Subpart M – Fall Protection • Subpart N - Helicopters, Hoists, Elevators and Conveyors • Subpart 0 - Motor Vehicles, Mechanized Equipment and Marine Operations • Subpart P - Excavations • Subpart Q - Concrete and Masonry Construction • Subpart R - Steel Erection • Subpart S - Underground Construction, Caissons, Cofferdams and Compressed Air • Subpart T - Demolition • Subpart U - Blasting and Use of Explosives • Subpart V - Power Transmission and Distribution • Subpart W - Rollover Protective Structures; Overhead Protection • Subpart X – Stairways and Ladders • Subpart Y – Diving • Subpart Z – Toxic and Hazardous Substances • Subpart CC - Cranes and Derricks in Construction Each Subpart may be further divided into more detailed sections, such as the following example from the construction standard: Subpart D Occupational Health and Environmental Controls Table Subpart D Sections 1926.50 Medical Services and First Aid. 1926.51 Sanitation. 1926.52 Occupational Noise Exposure. 1926.53 Ionizing Radiation. 1926.54 Non-ionizing Radiation. 1926.55 Gases, Vapors, Fumes Dusts and Mists. 1926.56 Illumination. 1926.57 Ventilation. 1926.58 Asbestos, Tremolite, Anthophyllite and Actinolite. 1926.59 Hazard Communication. Paragraph Numbering System Using section 59 of the 1926 standard, let's examine the structure and workings of the numbering system. 29 CFR 1926.59(h)(2)(ii) Employee training shall include at least the physical and health hazards of the chemicals in the work area. Description of Paragraph Numbering System Title Code of Federal Regulations Part Section 29 CFR 1926 .59 The first number 29 represents the title. Next we have CFR, which represents the Code of Federal Regulations. Next we have 1926, which is Part 1926. Next is the section number, in this case Section 59 for hazard communication. If the number were 150, you would relate it to fire protection. Section 451 relates to scaffolding. The next division is the paragraph. As you can see, the first tier of paragraphs beneath the section level will be numbered in parentheses (a), (b), (c), (d), etc. as will all further designations. If you only had three major paragraphs of information under a section, they would be numbered 59(a), 59(b), 59(c). The next level of numbering involves the use of Arabic numbers in parentheses. As illustrated, if there were three paragraphs of information between subheadings (a) and (b), they would be numbered (a)(l), (a)(2), and (a)(3). The next level uses the lowercase Roman numeral. An example would be between paragraphs (2) and (3); If there were five paragraphs of information pertaining to Arabic (2) they would be numbered (2)(i), (2)(ii), (2)(iii), (2)(iv), and (2)(v). Most Frequently Cited Standards OSHA statistics are updated annually. Use the following link Frequently Cited OSHA Standards to search for your industry. Enter “submit” for list of NAICS codes then enter the sector code. Use the following links to view annual report of OSHA’s most frequently cited standards for 2021: Required Recordkeeping A major responsibility of OSHA involves recordkeeping and reporting. Employers of 11 or more employees must maintain occupational and injury records as they occur. Some employers, such as those in retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, and service industries are not subject to a records request from OSHA. Recordkeeping and reporting are one of the primary tools used to obtain statistical data on workplace accidents and is an effective tool for employer trending of safety related incidents at worksites. Accidents Any on-the-job accident that results in the death of an employee, or the hospitalization of three or more employees, must be reported to the nearest OSHA office within 8 hours. These recordkeeping and recording statistics are maintained on a calendar year basis. OSHA requires that an annual log, (OSHA 300 Log) be kept and posted at each establishment. 1.A: Review Questions Complete as directed: Query \(1\) 1. OSHA will permit variances from their standards under specialize circumstances. The two types of variances OSHA issues are________ and ________. 2. OSHA has established a penalty schedule for employer violations. The severity of the fine depends upon the severity of the violation. Penalties of up to \$________ per violation can be proposed for willful violations. 3. OSHA recordkeeping requirements specify that any on the job accidents that result in the death of________or more employees or the hospitalization of________or more employees must be reported to the nearest OSHA office within ________ hours. 4. What are the three most frequently cited serious OSHA violations for the construction industry? General Industry? a. b. c. d. e. f. Multiple Choice: 5. Which of the following would receive OSHA's top priority in terms of inspection: a. ________Catastrophes b. ________ Fatalities c. ________ Employee complaints d. ________Imminent danger conditions 6. Employers may take which of the following actions against employees who file a complaint with OSHA: a. ________Demotion b. ________ Take away benefits c. ________ Firing d. ________Transferring to another job e. ________Employers are not permitted to discriminate against workers with any of the above. True or False: (Mark Correct Answer) 7. T or F Employers must provide the employees all the necessary training required by the OSHA standards. 8. T or F States may choose to adopt their own OSHA plans provided they ensure that the state plans are as effective as Federal OSHA. 9. T or F All employees have the responsibility to comply with all OSHA regulations. Employees who don't comply with the OSHA regulations will be cited by OSHA. 10. T or F OSHA may codify safety requirements from any standard or organization they choose.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/01%3A_Introduction_to_OSHA/1.03%3A_OSHA_Subparts.txt

“Teaching the world to be careful is a constructive service worthy of God’s great gift of life to man." U.S. Supreme Court Justice Harold H. Burton (1946) Overview Most individuals beginning work for the first time do not give much thought to the typical “amenities” of the workplace. Adequate lighting, sanitation, and air quality for example are expected in most societies with fully developed infrastructures. Most if not all indoor facilities are designed for emergency egress and have capacity limits. If you walk into an establishment and trip or fall, cut or injure yourself you can expect first aid. We expect the workplace to not be scary or treacherous. We expect it to be safe. General safety and health provisions are for every workplace. While not ‘home’ workplaces are where many of us will spend a good deal of our wake hours, must provide for basic human comforts and just as importantly be prepared for the unanticipated incident. Chapter Objective: 1. Review the requirements of the Construction Standard Subpart C. 2. Compare Subpart C to related General Industry Standards. 3. Discuss the responsibilities of the employer for training employees on general safety and health provisions. 4. Define and understand the role of a "competent person." Learning Outcome: 1. Recognize and identify good housekeeping practices for any worksite. 2. Recognize and identify key safety and health protocols for any worksite. Standards: 1926.21 Safety Training and Education, 1926.23-First aid and medical attention, 1926.24-Fire protection and prevention, 1926.25-Housekeeping, 1926.26-Illumination, 1926.27-Sanitation, 1926.28-Personal Protective Equipment, 1926.29-Acceptable Certifications, 1926.31-Incorporation by reference, 1926.32-Definitions, 1926.33-Access to Employee exposure and Medical Records, 1926.34-Means of egress, 1926.35-Emergency action plans Key Terms: ANSI, NFPA, ASME, SAE, ASTM, NRTL, approved, authorized person, designated person, qualified, employee, employer, hazardous substance Mini-Lecture: Every work place Topic Required Time: 45 min; Independent Study and reflection 1 hour. Thumbnail: OSHA Job Safety poster, OSHA.gov 02: General Safety and Health Provisions Background 1926 Subpart C contains general safety and health provisions for such topics as first aid, fire protection, and personal protective equipment. More detailed information on these topics is covered in separate subparts. These identical provisions are also specific subparts in the General Industry Standard. Under the provisions of Subpart C, every employer must ensure that their employees do not work in situations or under conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous or dangerous to their safety or health. Employers must ensure that any tool, machine or equipment that an employee must use is in good working condition and only those employees qualified by training or experience are allowed to operate such equipment. Training The employer shall instruct each employee in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the regulations applicable to his work environment to control or eliminate any hazards or other exposure to illness or injury. Poisons, caustics, and other harmful substances Employees required to handle or use poisons, caustics, and other harmful substances shall be instructed regarding safe handling and use, and be made aware of the potential hazards, personal hygiene, and personal protective measures required. Flammable liquids, gases, or toxic materials Employees required to handle or use flammable liquids, gases, or toxic materials shall be instructed in the safe handling and use of these materials and made aware of the specific requirements contained in Subparts D, F, and other applicable subparts of this part. Confined or enclosed spaces All employees required to enter into confined or enclosed spaces shall be instructed as to the nature of the hazards involved, the necessary precautions to be taken, and in the use of protective and emergency equipment required. The employer shall comply with any specific regulations that apply to work in dangerous or potentially dangerous areas. For the purposes of this section, "confined or enclosed space," means any space having a limited means of egress which is subject to the accumulation of toxic or flammable contaminants or has an oxygen deficient atmosphere. Confined or enclosed spaces include, but are not limited to, storage tanks, process vessels, bins, boilers, ventilation or exhaust ducts, sewers, underground utility vaults, tunnels, pipelines, and open top spaces more than 4 feet in depth such as pits, tubs, vaults, and vessels. First Aid and Medical Attention First aid services and provisions for medical care shall be made available by the employer for all employees covered by these regulations. Regulations prescribing specific requirements for first aid, medical attention, and emergency facilities are contained in Subpart D. Fire Protection and Prevention The employer shall be responsible for the development and maintenance of an effective fire protection and prevention program at the job site throughout all phases of the construction, repair, alteration, or demolition work. The employer shall ensure the availability of the fire protection and suppression equipment required by Subpart F. Housekeeping During the course of construction, alteration, or repairs, forms and scrap lumber with protruding nails, and all other debris, shall be kept cleared from work areas, passageways, and stairs, in and around buildings or other structures. Combustible scrap and debris shall be removed at regular intervals during the course of construction. Safe means shall be provided to facilitate such removal. Containers shall be provided for the collection and separation of waste, trash, oily and used rags, and other refuse. Containers used for garbage and other oily, flammable, or hazardous wastes, such as caustics, acids, harmful dusts, etc. shall be equipped with covers. Garbage and other waste shall be disposed of at frequent and regular intervals. Illumination Construction areas, aisles, stairs, ramps, runways, corridors, offices, shops, and storage areas where work is in progress shall be lighted with either natural or artificial illumination. The minimum illumination requirements for work areas are contained in Subpart D. Sanitation Worksites must be kept in a clean and sanitary condition. Sanitary is generally defined by OSHA as being simply being a condition conducive to health. Maintaining sanitary conditions is not just about housekeeping. It includes ensuring levels of cleanliness that prevent the harboring of disease carry pests, biological hazards such as microbes, viruses, molds, and hygiene facilities such as restrooms and equivalents, potable water, rest and lunch areas, efficient disposal of waste. Personal Protective Equipment The employer is responsible for requiring the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment in all operations where there is exposure to hazardous conditions or where this part indicates the need for using such equipment to reduce the hazards to the employees. Regulations governing the use, selection, and maintenance of personal protective and lifesaving equipment are described under Subpart E of this part.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/02%3A_General_Safety_and_Health_Provisions/2.01%3A_Intro.txt

OSHAs Competent Person Section 1926.32 defines a "competent person" as one who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them. Keep in mind that the requirements of a competent person are different from standard to standard. A person can be a competent person for the purposes of Subpart P, Excavations, but not for Subpart N, Cranes. The other critical component of the definition is that the competent person must be capable of taking "prompt corrective measures" to eliminate any hazards. If the person has the knowledge, but not the authority to correct, they cannot be the competent person. Acceptable Certifications Some critical facility or plant equipment designed in accordance with engineering design and fabrication standards are required to have certifications that ensure worker safety. Pressure vessels Current and valid certification by an insurance company or regulatory authority shall be deemed as acceptable evidence of safe installation, inspection, and testing of pressure vessels provided by the employer. Boilers Boilers provided by the employer shall be deemed to be in compliance with the requirements of this part when evidence of current and valid certification by an insurance company or regulatory authority attesting to the safe installation, inspection, and testing is presented. Other requirements Regulations prescribing specific requirements for other types of pressure vessels and similar equipment are contained in Subparts F and O of this part. Incorporation by reference See discussion in chapter 1. 2.03: Emplo Employer Exposure and Medical Records Access The medical record for each employee shall be preserved and maintained for at least the duration of employment, plus thirty (30) years, except that the following types of records need not be retained for any specified period: 1. Health insurance claims. 2. First aid records (not including medical histories) of one-time treatment. 3. The medical records of employees who have worked for less than one year. Each employee exposure record shall be preserved and maintained for at least thirty (30) years, except that: 1. Background data to environmental (workplace) monitoring or measuring, such as laboratory reports and worksheets, need only be retained for one (1) year. 2. Safety data sheets. 3. Biological monitoring results designated as exposure records by specific occupational safety and health standards shall be preserved and maintained as required by the specific standard. Access to records Whenever an employee or designated representative requests access to a record, the employer shall assure that access is provided in a reasonable time, place, and manner. If the employer cannot reasonably provide access to the record within fifteen (15) working days, the employer shall within the fifteen (15) working days apprise the employee or designated representative requesting the record of the reason for the delay and the earliest date when the record can be made available. Copies of records Whenever an employee or designated representative requests a copy of a record, the employer shall assure that either 1. a copy of the record is provided without cost to the employee or representative; 2. the necessary mechanical copying facilities (e.g., photocopying) are made available without cost to the employee or representative for copying the record; or 3. the record is loaned to the employee or representative for a reasonable time to enable a copy to be made. Written consent required Each employer shall, upon request, assure the access of each employee to employee medical records of which the employee is the subject, except when the information contained in the records could be detrimental to the employee's health, such as a specific diagnosis of a terminal illness or a psychiatric condition. In such cases the information will be released to a designated representative by written consent only. Each employer shall, upon request, assure the access of each employee and designated representative to each analysis using exposure or medical records concerning the employee's working conditions or workplace. Upon an employee's first entering into employment, and at least annually thereafter, each employer shall inform current employees covered by this section of the following: 1. The existence, location, and availability of any records covered by this section. 2. The person responsible for maintaining and providing access to records. 3. Each employee's rights of access to these records. Succession of records Whenever an employer is ceasing to do business, the employer shall transfer all records subject to this section to the successor employer. The successor employer shall receive and maintain these records.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/02%3A_General_Safety_and_Health_Provisions/2.02%3A_Compe.txt

Means of Egress Exits shall be so arranged and maintained in every building or structure, as to provide free and unobstructed egress from all parts of the building or structure at all times when it is occupied. No lock or fastening to prevent free escape from the inside of any building shall be installed except in mental, penal, or corrective institutions where supervisory personnel are continually on duty and effective provisions are made to remove occupants in case of fire or other emergency. Exits shall be marked by a readily visible sign. Access to exits shall be marked by readily visible signs in all cases where the exit or way to reach it is not immediately visible to the occupants. Means of egress shall be continually maintained free of all obstructions or impediments to full instant use in the case of fire or other emergency. Emergency Actions Plans Any emergency action plan required by a particular OSHA standard shall be in writing and shall cover those designated actions employers and employees must take to ensure employee safety from fire and other emergencies. Elements of the plan The following elements, at a minimum, shall be included in the plan: 1. Emergency escape procedures and emergency escape route assignments. 2. Procedures to be followed by employees who remain to operate critical plant operations before they evacuate. 3. Procedures to account for all employees after emergency evacuation have been completed. 4. Rescue and medical duties for those employees who are to perform them. 5. The preferred means of reporting fires and other emergencies. 6. Names or regular job titles of persons or departments who can be contacted for further information or explanation of duties under the plan. Employee alarm system The employer shall establish an employee alarm system and if the employee alarm system is used for alerting fire brigade members, or for other purposes, a distinctive signal for each purpose shall be used. Planning The employer shall establish in the emergency action plan the types of evacuation to be used in emergency circumstances. Before implementing the emergency action plan, the employer shall designate and train a sufficient number of persons to assist in the safe and orderly emergency evacuation of employees. The employer shall review the plan with each employee covered by the plan at the following times: 1. Initially when the plan is developed. 2. Whenever the employee s responsibilities or designated actions under the plan change. 3. Whenever the plan is changed. Communication of plan The employer shall review with each employee upon initial assignment those parts of the plan, which the employee must know to protect the employee in the event of an emergency. The written plan shall be kept at the workplace and made available for employee review. For those employers with 10 or fewer employees, the plan may be communicated orally to employees and the employer need not maintain a written plan. Select Definitions Act: Section 107 of the Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, commonly known as the Construction Safety Act (86 Stat. 96; 40 U.S.C. 333). ANSI: American National Standards Institute. ASME: American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM: American Society of Testing and Materials Approved: Sanctioned, endorsed, accredited, certified, or accepted as satisfactory by a duly constituted and nationally recognized authority or agency. Authorized person: A person approved or assigned by the employer to perform a specific type of duty or duties or to be at a specific location or locations at the jobsite. Administration: The Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Competent person: One who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards in the surroundings or working conditions which are unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous to employees, and who has authorization to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them. Construction work: For purposes of this section, "Construction work" means work for construction, alteration, and/or repair, including painting and decorating. Defect: Any characteristic or condition, which tends to weaken or reduce the strength of the tool, object, or structure of which it is a part. Designated person: "Authorized person" as defined in paragraph (d) of this section. Employee: Every laborer or mechanic under the Act regardless of the contractual relationship which may be alleged to exist between the laborer and mechanic and the contractor or subcontractor who engaged him. "Laborer and mechanic" are not defined in the Act, but the identical terms are used in the Davis-Bacon Act (40 U.S.C. 276a), which provides for minimum wage protection on Federal and federally assisted construction contracts. The use of the same term in a statute which often applies concurrently with section 107 of the Act has considerable presidential value in ascertaining the meaning of "laborer and mechanic" as used in the Act. "Laborer" generally means one who performs manual labor or who labors at an occupation requiring physical strength; "mechanic" generally means a worker skilled with tools. See 18 Comp. Gen. 341. Employer: Contractor or subcontractor within the meaning of the Act and of this part. Hazardous substance: A substance which, by reason of being explosive, flammable, poisonous, corrosive, oxidizing, irritating, or otherwise harmful, is likely to cause death or injury. NFPA: National Fire Protection Association 2.A: Review Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Under the provisions of Subpart C, every employer must ensure that each employee does not work under conditions which are ________ ,________ or otherwise dangerous to their safety or health. 2. Employees required to handle or use poisons, caustics, and other harmful substances shall be________regarding the safe handling and use, and be made aware of the potential hazards, personal hygiene, and personal protective measures required. 3. True or False...Employers who are only performing demolition work are not responsible for the development and maintenance of a fire protection and prevention program at the job site. 4. Combustible scrap and debris shall be removed at regular ________ during the course of construction. 5. Which of the following construction areas are required to be lit with either natural or artificial lighting during construction periods? a. Aisles b. Ramps c. Runways d. Storage areas e. All of the above 6. In general, the medical record for each employee shall be preserved and maintained for at least the duration of employment plus________years. a. 5 b. 10 c. 20 d. 30 7. Means of­­­­­­________shall be continually maintained free of all obstructions or impediments to full instant use in the case of fire or other emergency. 8. The employer shall establish in the emergency action plan the types of________to be used in emergency circumstances. 9. For the purposes of Subpart C, Define a "confined space."

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/02%3A_General_Safety_and_Health_Provisions/2.04%3A_Means.txt

“A prudent man foresees the difficulties ahead and prepares for them; the simpleton goes blindly on and suffers the consequences.” Proverbs 22:3 Overview You have probably heard the euphemism “There is a method to the madness” used to describe when there is hidden or buried in a process, procedure, scheme or set of instructions a logical order to “how” an objective is achieved or a goal met. Sometimes there may even be a bit of chaos apparent when there are varied and diverse instructions or ways of interpreting those instructions. When discussing method there are always questions as to “why” or to “what extent” something must be done a certain way or even at all. This chapter will begin with discussing a standard that is really the overarching theme of workplace safety, “Hazard Communication”. Because at the end of the day keeping people safe through implementation of OSHA’s core mission of identifying and eliminating workplace hazards is really about how well information is communicated and understood. This chapter will also connect elements of hazard communication to “Industrial Hygiene”, the “science” and “method” of keeping workplaces safe. When we know the reason behind the “why” , "what", and "how", acceptance is easier. Chapter Objective: 1. Review and understand the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard. 2. Define the core elements of Industrial Hygiene. 3. Discuss the “science” of health and safety. 4. Identify health hazards associated with many types of chemicals. 5. Define and discuss PPE. Learning Outcome: 1. Recognize and cite the five categories of occupational hazards. 2. Recognize and understand the Hierarchy of Controls. Standards: 1910.1200 and 1926.59-Hazard Communication Key Terms: Communication, Industrial Hygiene, Hazards, Controls, PPE, SDS Mini-Lecture: Industrial Hygiene, Hazard Communication Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Hierarchy of Controls Pyramid, OSHA.gov 03: Occupational Health and Environmental Controls Occupational Health and Environmental Controls 1926 Subpart D Occupational Health and Environmental Controls focuses on health hazards and our exposures. It addresses the physical environments in which we may work and establishes standards required for ensuring physical conditions such as sanitation, illumination, ventilation, and noise levels are acceptable for human occupants. It focuses on both physical hazards and chemical hazards. In this chapter we will focus on describing the basis for how chemical health hazards are measured, monitored, and controlled. Construction workers are exposed daily to thousands of chemicals that are brought onto the jobsite for all types of uses. Workers in other industries such as refineries or power plants or manufacturing facilities are exposed to chemicals as part of processes that exceed threshold levels. Exposure to many of these chemicals can lead to serious health hazards for the exposed worker. The OSHA Hazard Communication Standard was written to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals produced or imported into this country are evaluated and that information regarding any health hazards be transmitted to employers and their employees. The Hazard Communication Standard provides for three primary means to get information about health hazards into the hands of employers and their employees. The first means is through the use of appropriate labels and other forms of warning. The second is by the use of Safety Data Sheets (SDS). The third is by employee training. General The Hazard Communication standard requires that chemical manufacturers and importers evaluate their chemicals and determine if they are hazardous. Elements of a Hazard Communication Program Employers shall develop, implement and maintain, at each workplace, a written Hazard Communication Program consisting of at least the following elements: 1. Labels and other forms of warning. 2. Safety Data Sheets. 3. Employee training and information. 4. List of known hazardous chemicals at the workplace. 5. Methods used to inform employees of hazards. Multi-employer workplaces On multi-employer workplaces, employers who produce, use, or store hazardous chemicals at the workplace must ensure that the information about these chemicals, in the form of SDS, is available for their employees and any other employees who may be exposed to these chemicals. Labels and Other Forms of Warning Labels are required to follow the new globally harmonized system(GHS) and parties have the following responsibilities. Chemical manufacturer, importer, or distributor responsibilities The chemical manufacturer, importer, or distributor must ensure that each hazardous chemical is labeled, tagged, or marked with the following information before it enters the workplace: 1. Identity of the hazardous chemical. 2. Appropriate hazardous warnings. 3. Name and address of chemical manufacturer, importer or other responsible party. Employer responsibility Once the hazardous chemical enters the workplace it is the responsibility of the employer to ensure that each container is marked or labeled with the following information: 1. Identity of the hazardous chemical. 2. Appropriate hazardous warnings such as words, pictures, symbols, or a combination of all three. Portable containers For portable containers which are used to transfer hazardous chemicals from one labeled container to the point of use, the containers need not be labeled. Label requirements The employer must ensure that the labels, and any other forms of warning, are written in English and are prominently displayed on the container or readily available in the work area throughout each work shift. 3.A Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. The purpose of the Hazard Communication Standard was to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals produced or imported into this country be evaluated and that information regarding any health hazards be transmitted to employers and their employees. a. ________ True b.________False 2. Name the three means that the Hazard Communication standard uses to get information about health hazards into the hands of employers and their employees. a. ________ b. ________ c. ________ 3. Employers shall develop, implement and maintain at each workplace, a written Hazard Communication Program consisting of which of the following elements: a. ________ Labels and other forms of warning. b. ________ Safety Data Sheets. c. ________ Employee training and information. d. ________ List of known hazardous chemicals at the workplace. e. ________ Methods used to inform employees of hazards. f. ________ All of the above. 4. OSHA requires that employers provide employees with effective training on the hazardous chemicals in their workplaces within 6 months of their initial assignment, and whenever new hazardous materials are introduced into the workplace. a. ________ True b.________False 5. The chemical manufacturer, importer, or distributor must ensure that each hazardous chemical is labeled, tagged or marked with which of the following before it enters the workplace: a. ________ Identity of the hazardous chemical. b. ________Appropriate hazardous warnings. c. ________ Name and address of chemical manufacturer importer or other responsible party. d. ________All of the above. 6. For portable containers which are used to transfer hazardous chemicals from one labeled container to the point of use, the containers need not be labeled. a. ________ True b.________False 7. Chemical manufacturers and importers of hazardous chemicals must develop an SDS for each hazardous chemical they produce or import into this country. a. ________ True b.________False 8. The employer must maintain in the workplace SDSs for each of the hazardous chemicals on site. SDSs must be________ during each work shift, to employees when they are in their work area. 9. If employees are required to travel between workplaces during a shift, SDSs are permitted to be kept at the primary workplace facility. a. ________ True b.________False 10. Among other items, the training for hazard communication requires that all employees be trained in the physical & health hazards associated with the chemicals in their work areas. a.________True b.________False 11. List the primary elements and order the Hierarchy of Controls.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/03%3A_Occupational_Health_and_Environmental_Controls/3.0.txt

“If you think in terms of a year, plant a seed; if in terms of ten years, plant trees; if in terms of 100 years, teach the people.” - Confucious Overview Our health is important, period. Humans no matter where they live have much better health outcomes from what was typical 500, 200, or even 100 years ago. We study and research natural elements in our physical world, our environment, and the health impacts resulting from immediate and long term exposures to those elements. This continuous study and education on health hazards is actually part of our educational infrastructure. This inclusion in the educational infrastructure is seen and felt. For example, “Over the last 200 years, U.S. life expectancy has more than doubled to almost 80 years (78.8 in 2015), with vast improvements in health and quality of life. However, while most people imagine medical advancements to be the reason for this increase, the largest gain in life expectancy occurred between 1880 and 1920 due to public health improvements such as control of infectious diseases, more abundant and safer foods, cleaner water, and other nonmedical social improvements.”(Life Expectancy) In this chapter you will connect some of what you learned about natural hazards in our physical world in both K-12 education, and the general education requirements of your secondary institutions to occupational health. Health hazards include those associated with biological and physical hazards. Take a moment to reflect on courses you may have taken in high school or college such as health science or life science, biology, physics, and chemistry as you review environmental health standards broadly, and specifically those encountered in general industry and construction work. Chapter Objective 1. Determine the medical and first aid service required for construction sites in 1926 Subpart D. 2. Identify workplace sanitation requirements under 1926 Subpart D 3. Review requirements for occupational noise exposure, heat, non ionizing radiation, ventilation, and minimum illumination. 4. Review and understand the dangers of construction related health hazards such as silica, asbestos, cadmium, and lead. 5. Discuss typical PPE requirements for construction health hazards. 6. Decide if a construction site is covered by the Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response Standard and what training is required to work on such sites. Learning Outcome 1. Recognize and describe physical health hazards and methods for controlling those hazards. 2. Recognize and understand the requirements for preventing unsanitary, unhealthful, and unsafe and hazardous conditions on construction sites. 3. Identify provisions for the availability of medical facilities and HAZMAT Operations. Standards: 1926 Subpart D, 1926.62 Lead, 1926.65(1910.120) HAZWOP, 1926.1101 Asbestos, 1926.1127 Cadmium, 1926.1153 Respirable Crystalline Silica, 1926 Subpart E and 1910 Subpart I Personal Protective Equipment Key Terms HAZMAT,Decibel, First Aid, Foot-Candle, Laser, Potable, Respirable, Vector Mini-Lecture: Physical Health Hazards and PPE Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Road Work, attribution, Stux Pixabay 04: Health Hazards Subpart D Subpart D, of the 1926 OSHA standards covers occupational health and environmental controls for construction sites. The subpart consists of 15 individual standards. Several of these, such as Hazard Communication and Process Safety Management, are discussed in chapter 3. This lesson will focus on eight of the individual construction standards that address workplace safety and health, and include a general discussion of PPE 1910 Subpart I. Medical Services and First Aid Employers must render first aid to an employee in medical distress as a result of an accident or other condition. The following are specific employer responsibilities for rendering aid. Availability of medical personnel The employer shall ensure the availability of medical personnel for advice and consultation on matters of occupational health. Provisions shall be made prior to commencement of the project for prompt medical attention in case of serious injury. In the absence of an infirmary, clinic, hospital, or physician, that is reasonably accessible, in terms of time and distance to the worksite, and which is available for the treatment of injured employees, a person who has a valid certificate in first-aid training from the U. S. Bureau of Mines, the American Red Cross, or equivalent training that can be verified by documented evidence shall be available at the worksite to render first aid. First aid supplies First aid supplies approved by the consulting physician shall be easily accessible when required. The first-aid kit shall consist of materials approved by the consulting physician in a weatherproof container with individual sealed packages for each type of item. The contents of the first-aid kit shall be checked by the employer before being sent out on each job and at least weekly on each job to ensure that the expended items are replaced. Corrosive materials Where the eyes or body of any person may be exposed to injurious corrosive materials, suitable facilities for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body shall be provided within the work area for immediate emergency use. Sanitation Sanitation primarily focuses on controlling biological hazards through the availability of designated rest areas, eating areas, and restrooms and hygiene facilities. Potable water An adequate supply of potable water shall be provided in all places of employment. Portable containers used to dispense drinking water shall be capable of being tightly closed, and equipped with a tap. Water shall not be dipped from containers. Any container used to distribute drinking water shall be clearly marked as to the nature of its contents and not used for any other purpose. The common drinking cup is prohibited. Where single service cups (to be used but once) are supplied, both a sanitary container for the unused cups and a receptacle for disposing of the used cups shall be provided. Toilets Toilets shall be provided at construction sites according to the number of employees on the site. For 20 or less employees one toilet is required. For more than 20 employees, one toilet seat and one urinal per 40 workers is required. For 200 or more employees, one toilet seat and one urinal per 50 workers. Under temporary field conditions, provisions shall be made to assure not less than one toilet facility is available each for men and women. Employers must provide at least the minimum number of toilet facilities, in toilet rooms separate for each sex. Rodent and insect control (VECTORS) Every enclosed workplace shall be so constructed, equipped, and maintained, so far as reasonably practicable, as to prevent the entrance or harborage of potentially disease carrying rodents, insects, and other vermin. A continuing and effective extermination program shall be instituted where their presence is detected. 4.02: Occupational Exposures Occupational Noise Exposure Sound levels When employees are subjected to sound levels exceeding those listed in Table D-2, feasible administrative or engineering controls shall be utilized. If such controls fail to reduce sound levels measure in decibels (dBA) within the levels of the table, personal protective equipment as required in Subpart E, shall be provided and used to reduce sound levels within the levels of the table. Tabe D-2 - Permissible Noise Exposures Permissible Noise Exposure Duration per day(hours) Sound Level dBA slow response 8 90 6 92 4 95 3 97 2 100 1 ½ 102 1 105 ½ 110 ¼ or less 115 In all cases where the sound levels exceed the values shown in Table D-2, a continuing effective hearing conservation program shall be administered. When the daily noise exposure is composed of two or more periods of noise exposure of different levels, their combined effect should be considered, rather than the individual effect of each. Exposure to impulsive or impact noise should not exceed 140 dB peak sound pressure level. Non-ionizing Radiation Qualified and trained employees Only qualified and trained employees shall be assigned to install, adjust and operate laser equipment. Proof of qualification for the laser equipment operator shall be available and in the possession of the operator at all times. Exposure level for eye protection Employees, when working in areas in which a potential exposure to direct or reflected laser light greater than 0.005 Watts (5 milliwatts) exists, shall be provided with anti-laser eye protection devices as specified in Subpart E of this part. Warning signs Areas in which lasers are used shall be posted with standard laser warning placards. Beam shutters or caps Beam shutters or caps shall be utilized, or the laser turned off, when laser transmission is not actually required. When the laser is left unattended for a substantial period of time such as during lunch hour, overnight, or at change of shifts, the laser shall be turned off. The laser beam shall not be directed at employees. Environmental (weather) conditions When it is raining or snowing, or when there is dust or fog in the air, the operation of laser systems shall be prohibited where practicable; in any event, employees shall be kept out of range of the area of source and target during such weather conditions. Employee exposure limits Laser equipment shall bear a label to indicate maximum output. Employees shall not be exposed to light intensities above: 1. Direct staring: 1 micro-watt per square centimeter; 2. Incidental observing: 1 milli-watt per square centimeter; 3. Diffused reflected light: 2½ watts per square centimeter. 4. A laser unit in operation should be set up above the heads of the employees, when possible. Employees shall not be exposed to microwave power densities in excess of 10 milli-watts per square centimeter.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/04%3A_Health_Hazards/4.01%3A_Introduction_to_Health_Haza.txt

General Section 1926.62 applies to all construction work where an employee may be occupationally exposed to lead. All construction work excluded from coverage in the general industry standard for lead by 29 CFR 1910.1025(a)(2) is covered by this standard. Construction work is defined as work for construction, alteration and/or repair, including painting and decorating. It includes but is not limited to the following: 1. Demolition or salvage of structures where lead or materials containing lead are present; 2. Removal or encapsulation of materials containing lead; 3. New construction, alteration, repair, or renovation of structures, substrates, or portions thereof, that contain lead, or materials containing lead; 4. Installation of products containing lead; 5. Lead contamination/emergency cleanup; 6. Transportation, disposal, storage, or containment of lead or materials containing lead on the site or location, at which construction activities are performed, and 7. Maintenance operations associated with the construction activities described in this paragraph. Exposure to lead When lead is absorbed into the body in certain doses it becomes toxic. Lead can be absorbed into the body by inhalation and ingestion. Inhalation of airborne lead is the most common source of occupational lead absorption. For this reason employers shall assure that no employee is exposed to lead at concentrations greater than fifty micrograms per cubic meter of air (50 ug/m3} averaged over an 8-hour period. Action level The action level (AL) is the level at which an employer must begin certain compliance activities. For lead, the action level, without regard to the use of respirators, is an airborne concentration of lead of 30 micrograms per cubic meter of air (30 ug/m3) calculated as an 8- hour time-weighted average (TWA). Respirator factor of exposure When respirators are used to limit employee exposure, employee exposure may be considered to be at the level provided by the protection factor of the respirator for those periods the respirator is worn. Those periods may be averaged with exposure levels during periods when respirators are not worn to determine the employee's daily TWA exposure. Employer responsibility Each employer who has a workplace or operation covered by this standard shall initially determine if any employee may be exposed to lead at or above the action level. Written record Where a determination is made that no employee is exposed to airborne concentrations of lead at or above the action level, the employer shall make a written record of such determination. Monitoring If the initial determination or subsequent determination reveals employee exposure to be at or above the action level, but at or below the permissible exposure limit PEL, the employer shall perform monitoring in accordance with this paragraph at least every 6 months. The employer shall continue monitoring at the required frequency until at least two consecutive measurements, taken at least 7 days apart, are below the action level at which time the employer may discontinue monitoring for that employee until there is a change of equipment, process, control, personnel or a new task has been initiated. Changes in workplace Whenever there has been a change of equipment, process, control personnel or a new task has been initiated that may result in additional employees being exposed to lead at or above the action level or may result in employees already exposed at or above the action level being exposed above the PEL, the employer shall conduct additional monitoring. Employee notification Within 5 working days after completion of the exposure assessment the employer shall notify each employee in writing of the results, which represent that employee's exposure level. Whenever the results indicate that the representative employee exposure without regard to respirators, is at or above the PEL the employer shall include in the written notice a statement that the employees exposure was at or above that level and a description of the corrective action taken or to be taken to reduce exposure to below that level. Respirator use requirements Where the use of respirators is required under this section the employer shall provide, at no cost to the employee, and assure the use of respirators, which comply, with the requirements of this paragraph. Respirators shall be used in the following circumstances: 1. Whenever an employee s exposure to lead exceeds the PEL; 2. In work situations in which engineering controls and work practices are not sufficient to reduce exposures to or below the PEL; 3. Whenever an employee requests a respirator; and 4. An interim protection for employees performing lead assessments. Employee exposure above the PEL Where an employee is exposed to lead above the PEL without regard to the use of respirators, where employees are exposed to lead compounds which may cause skin or eye irritation (e.g. Lead arsenate, Lead oxide), and as interim protection for employees performing lead assessment tasks, the employer shall provide appropriate protective work clothing and equipment at no cost to the employee and assure that the employee uses them to prevent contamination of the employee and the employee's garments. Medical surveillance The employer shall make available initial medical surveillance to employees occupationally exposed on any day to lead at or above the action level. Initial medical surveillance consists of biological monitoring in the form of blood sampling and analysis for lead and zinc protoporphyrin levels. Employer communication The employer shall communicate information concerning lead hazards according to the requirements of OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard for the construction industry, 29 CFR 1926.59, including but not limited to the requirements concerning warning signs and labels, material safety data sheets (SDS), and employee information and training. Exposure to Asbestos Asbestos is the name given to a group of naturally occurring minerals that are resistant to heat and corrosion. Asbestos has been used in products, such as insulation for pipes (steam lines for example), floor tiles, building materials, and in vehicle brakes and clutches. Asbestos includes the mineral fibers chrysotile, amosite, crocidolite, tremolite, anthophyllite, actinolite and any of these materials that have been chemically treated or altered. Heavy exposures tend to occur in the construction industry and in ship repair, particularly during the removal of asbestos materials due to renovation, repairs, or demolition. Workers are also likely to be exposed during the manufacture of asbestos products (such as textiles, friction products, insulation, and other building materials) and during automotive brake and clutch repair work. Hazards and Health Effects Asbestos is well recognized as a health hazard and its use is now highly regulated by both OSHA and EPA. Worker exposures to asbestos hazards are addressed in specific OSHA standards for the construction industry, general industry and shipyard employment sectors. These standards reduce the risk to workers by requiring that employers provide personal exposure monitoring to assess the risk and hazard awareness training for operations where there is any potential exposure to asbestos. Airborne levels of asbestos are never to exceed legal worker exposure limits. There is no "safe" level of asbestos exposure for any type of asbestos fiber. Breathing asbestos fibers can cause a buildup of scar-like tissue in the lungs called asbestosis and result in loss of lung function that often progresses to disability and death. Asbestos also causes cancer of the lung and other diseases such as Mesothelioma of the pleura which is a fatal malignant tumor of the membrane lining the cavity of the lung or stomach. Medical surveillance Medical surveillance guidance is provided in the following appendix to the OSHA Standards: 29 CFR 1926.1101 - Appendix D, Medical questionnaires; Mandatory 29 CFR 1910.1001 - Appendix D. Medical questionnaires; Mandatory Controlling Exposure Controlling the exposure to asbestos can be done through engineering controls, administrative actions, and personal protective equipment (PPE). Engineering controls include such things as isolating the source and using ventilation systems. Administrative actions include limiting the workers exposure time and providing showers. Personal protective equipment includes wearing the proper respiratory protection and clothing. Exposure to Crystalline Silica Crystalline silica is a common mineral found in the earth's crust. Materials like sand, stone, concrete, and mortar contain crystalline silica. It is also used to make products such as glass, pottery, ceramics, bricks, and artificial stone. Respirable crystalline silica – very small particles at least 100 times smaller than ordinary sand you might find on beaches and playgrounds – is created when cutting, sawing, grinding, drilling, and crushing stone, rock, concrete, brick, block, and mortar. Activities such as abrasive blasting with sand; sawing brick or concrete; sanding or drilling into concrete walls; grinding mortar; manufacturing brick, concrete blocks, stone countertops, or ceramic products; and cutting or crushing stone result in worker exposures to respirable crystalline silica dust. Industrial sand used in certain operations, such as foundry work and hydraulic fracturing (fracking), is also a source of respirable crystalline silica exposure. About 2.3 million people in the U.S. are exposed to silica at work. Hazards and Health Effects Workers who inhale these very small crystalline silica particles are at increased risk of developing serious silica-related diseases, including: • Silicosis, an incurable lung disease that can lead to disability and death; • Lung cancer; • Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); and • Kidney disease. To protect workers exposed to respirable crystalline silica, OSHA has issued two respirable crystalline silica standards: one for construction, and the other for general industry and maritime. OSHA's Respirable Crystalline Silica standard for construction requires employers to limit worker exposures to respirable crystalline silica and to take other steps to protect workers. Controlling Exposure The standard provides flexible alternatives, which OSHA expects will be especially useful for small employers. Employers can either use the control methods laid out in Table 1 of the construction standard, or they can measure workers' exposure to silica and independently decide which dust controls work best to limit exposures to the PEL in their workplaces. Regardless of which exposure control method is used, all construction employers covered by the standard are required to: • Establish and implement a written exposure control plan that identifies tasks that involve exposure and methods used to protect workers, including procedures to restrict access to work areas where high exposures may occur. • Designate a competent person to implement the written exposure control plan. • Restrict housekeeping practices that expose workers to silica where feasible alternatives are available. • Offer medical exams-including chest X-rays and lung function tests-every three years for workers who are required by the standard to wear a respirator for 30 or more days per year. • Train workers on work operations that result in silica exposure and ways to limit exposure. • Keep records of exposure measurements, objective data, and medical exams. Construction employers must comply with all requirements of the standard by September 23, 2017, except requirements for laboratory evaluation of exposure samples, which begin on June 23, 2018. Permissible Exposure Levels (PEL) 1910.1053(c) and 1926.1153 (d)(1) establish a PEL of 50 μg/m³ as an 8-hour TWA. Employers must ensure that no employee is exposed to an airborne concentration of respirable crystalline silica above that PEL. • An action level of 25 μg/m³ is also established for both standards 1910.1053(b) and 1926.1153(b) Employers that have fully and properly implemented the engineering controls, work practices, and respiratory protection for each employee performing a task listed in Table 1 of the construction standard 1926.1153(c) do not need to comply with the requirements of 1926.1153 (d), including the PEL. Medical Surveillance Employers must comply with the medical surveillance requirements in Appendix B of 1926.1153. Exposure to Cadmium Cadmium (Cd) is a soft, malleable, bluish white metal found in zinc ores, and to a much lesser extent, in the cadmium mineral greenockite. Most of the cadmium produced today is obtained from zinc byproducts and recovered from spent nickel-cadmium batteries. First discovered in Germany in 1817, cadmium found early use as a pigment because of its ability to produce brilliant yellow, orange, and red colors. Cadmium became an important metal in the production of nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd) rechargeable batteries and as a sacrificial corrosion-protection coating for iron and steel. Common industrial uses for cadmium today are in batteries, alloys, coatings (electroplating), solar cells, plastic stabilizers, and pigments. Worker exposure to cadmium can occur in all industry sectors but mostly in manufacturing and construction. Workers may be exposed during smelting and refining of metals, and manufacturing batteries, plastics, coatings, and solar panels. Hazards and Health Effects Occupational exposure to cadmium can lead to a variety of adverse health effects including cancer. Acute inhalation exposure (high levels over a short period of time) to cadmium can result in flu-like symptoms (chills, fever, and muscle pain) and can damage the lungs. Chronic exposure (low level over an extended period of time) can result in kidney, bone and lung disease. Controlling Exposure Workers can be exposed to cadmium by breathing in dusts, fumes, or mists containing cadmium. Cadmium or cadmium compounds can also get on the skin, contaminate clothing or food, and be ingested (which is also one of the routes of exposure). The most effective way to prevent exposure to a hazardous metal such as cadmium is through elimination or substitution. Permissible Exposure Level The employer shall assure that no employee is exposed to an airborne concentration of cadmium in excess of five micrograms per cubic meter of air (5 µg/m3), calculated as an eight-hour time-weighted average exposure (TWA) Action level (AL) is defined as an airborne concentration of cadmium of 2.5 micrograms per cubic meter of air (2.5 µg/m3), calculated as an 8-hour time-weighted average (TWA) Medical Surveillance The employer shall institute a medical surveillance program for all employees who are or may be exposed at or above the action level and all employees who perform the following tasks, operations or jobs: Electrical grounding with cadmium welding; cutting, brazing, burning, grinding or welding on surfaces that were painted with cadmium-containing paints; electrical work using cadmium-coated conduit; use of cadmium containing paints; cutting and welding cadmium-plated steel; brazing or welding with cadmium alloys; fusing of reinforced steel by cadmium welding; maintaining or retrofitting cadmium-coated equipment; and, wrecking and demolition where cadmium is present. A medical surveillance program may not be required provided the employer meets certain conditions of limiting employee exposure.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/04%3A_Health_Hazards/4.03%3A_Lead_and_other_Elements.txt

Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) General Unless the employer can demonstrate that the operation does not involve employee exposure or the reasonable possibility for employee exposure to safety or health hazards, the Hazwoper Standard covers: 1. Clean-up operations required by a governmental body, whether Federal, state, local, or other, involving hazardous substances that are conducted at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites (including, but not limited to, the EPA's National Priority Site List (NPL), state priority site lists, sites recommended for the EPA NPL, and initial 2. Investigations of government identified sites which are conducted before the presence or absence of hazardous substances has been ascertained); 3. Corrective actions involving clean-up operations at sites covered by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) as amended (42 U. C. 6901 et seq. 4. Voluntary clean-up operations at sites recognized by federal, state, local, or other governmental bodies as uncontrolled hazardous waste sites; 5. Operations involving hazardous wastes that are conducted at treatment, storage, and disposal (TSD) facilities regulated by 40 CFR parts 264 and 265 pursuant to RCRA; or by agencies under agreement with U.P.A. to implement RCRA regulations; and 6. Emergency response operations for releases of, or substantial threats of releases of, hazardous substances without regard to the location of the hazard. Applicable requirements All requirements of part 1910 and part 1926 of title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations apply pursuant to their terms to hazardous waste and emergency response operations whether covered by this section or not. If there is a conflict or overlap, the provision more protective of employee safety and health shall apply. Safety and Health Program Employers shall develop and implement a written safety and health program for their employees involved in hazardous waste operations. The program shall be designed to identify, evaluate, and control safety and health hazards, and provide for emergency response for hazardous waste operations. Communications with employees Any information concerning the chemical, physical, and toxicological properties of each substance known or expected to be present on site that is available to the employer and relevant to the duties an employee is expected to perform shall be made available to the affected employees prior to the commencement of their work activities. The employer may utilize information developed for the hazard communication standard for this purpose. Communications with contractors and sub-contractors An employer who retains contractor or sub-contractor services for work in hazardous waste operations shall inform those contractors sub-contractors, or their representatives of the site emergency response procedures and any potential fire, explosion, health, safety or other hazards of the hazardous waste operation that have been identified by the employer, including those identified in the employer's information program. Availability of safety and health program The written safety and health program shall be made available to any contractor or subcontractor or their representative who will be involved with the hazardous waste operation; to employees; to employee designated representatives; to OSHA personnel, and to personnel of other Federal state, or local agencies with regulatory authority over the site. Training All employees working on site (such as, but not limited to, equipment operators, general laborers and others) exposed to hazardous substances health hazards, or safety hazards and their supervisors and management responsible for the site shall receive training meeting the requirements of 1926.65 (e) before they are permitted to engage in hazardous waste operations that could expose them to hazardous substances, safety, or health hazards, and they shall receive review training as specified in this section. Employees shall not be permitted to participate in or supervise field activities until they have been trained to a level required by their job function and responsibility. General site workers (such as equipment operators, general laborers and supervisory personnel) engaged in hazardous substance removal or other activities which expose or potentially expose workers to hazardous substances and health hazards shall receive a minimum of 40 hours of instruction off the site, and a minimum of three days actual field experience under the direct supervision of a trained, experienced supervisor. Workers on site only occasionally Workers on site only occasionally for a specific limited task (such as, but not limited to, ground water monitoring, land surveying, or geo-physical surveying) and who are unlikely to be exposed over permissible exposure limits and published exposure limits shall receive a minimum of 24 hours of instruction off site, and the minimum of one day actual field experience under the direct supervision of a trained, experienced supervisor. Workers regularly on site Workers regularly on site who work in areas which have been monitored and fully characterized indicating that exposures are under permissible exposure limits and published exposure limits where respirators are not necessary, and the characterization indicates that there are no health hazards or the possibility of an emergency developing, shall receive a minimum of 24 hours of instruction off site and the minimum of one day actual field experience under the direct supervision of a trained experienced supervisor. On-site management and supervisors On-site management and supervisors directly responsible for, or who supervise employees engaged in, hazardous waste operations shall receive 40 hours initial training, and three days of supervised field experience (the training may be reduced to 24 hours and one day if the only area of their responsibility is employees covered by paragraphs (e)(3)(ii) and (e)(3)(iii)) and at least eight additional hours of specialized training at the time of job assignment on such topics as, but not limited to the employer's safety and health program and the associated employee training program, personal protective equipment program, spill containment program, and health hazard monitoring procedure and techniques. Authorized workers Work at any hazardous waste site is strictly monitored. Only employees who have received adequate training as detailed above are permitted to work on such sites. The Hazmat Standard is a multi-faceted complex standard and has only been covered briefly in this section. If you are working for an employer who performs work on these types of sites be sure that you receive the proper training before beginning work on the site.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/04%3A_Health_Hazards/4.04%3A_HAZMAT.txt

Ventilation General Whenever hazardous substances such as dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, or gases exist or are produced in the course of construction work, their concentrations shall not exceed the Threshold Limit Values (TLVs) of airborne contaminants for construction specified in 1926.55(a). When ventilation is used as an engineering control method, the system shall be installed and operated according to the requirements of this section. System design Local exhaust ventilation shall be designed to prevent dispersion into the air of dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, and gases in concentrations causing harmful exposure. Such exhaust systems shall be designed so that dusts fumes, mists, vapors, or gases are not drawn through the work area of employees. System requirements Exhaust fans, jets, ducts, hoods, separators, and all necessary appurtenances, including refuse receptacles, shall be so designed, constructed, maintained and operated as to ensure the required protection by maintaining a volume and velocity of exhaust air sufficient to gather dusts, fumes, vapors, or gases from said equipment or process, and to convey them to suitable points of safe disposal, thereby preventing their dispersion in harmful quantities into the atmosphere where employees work. System operation The exhaust system shall be in operation continually during all operations, which it is designed to serve. If the employee remains in the contaminated zone, the system shall continue to operate after the cessation of said operations, the length of time to depend upon the individual circumstances and effectiveness of the general ventilation system. According to the best medical opinion, dust capable of causing disability is of microscopic size, tending to remain for hours in suspension in still air, so it is essential that the exhaust system be continued in operation for a time after the work process or equipment served by the same shall have ceased, in order to ensure the removal of the harmful elements to the required extent. For the same reason, employees wearing respiratory equipment should not remove same immediately until the atmosphere clear. Other environments The 1926.57 Ventilation Standard also contains specific provisions for ventilation in and around abrasive blasting locations, grinding, polishing and buffing operations and spray finishing operations. These requirements should be reviewed if these types of operations are to be performed on the construction site. Heat Every year, dozens of workers die and thousands more become ill while working in extreme heat or humid conditions. There are a range of heat illnesses and they can affect anyone, regardless of age or physical condition. Employers are responsible for providing workplaces free of known safety hazards. This includes protecting workers from extreme heat. An employer with workers exposed to high temperatures should establish a complete heat illness prevention program to include: • Providing workers with water, rest, shade if outdoors, cooling areas indoors. • Allowing new or returning workers to gradually increase workloads and take more frequent breaks as they acclimatize, or build a tolerance for working in the heat. • Planning for emergencies and training workers on heat illness prevention. • Monitoring workers for signs of heat illness. NIOSH has also introduced an Heat Safety Tool App that can be downloaded on smart devices which provides immediate guidance based on environmental conditions. Illumination Construction areas, ramps, runways, corridors, offices, shops, and storage areas shall be lighted to not less than the minimum illumination intensities listed in Table D-3 while any work is in progress: Table D-3 – Minimum Illumination Intensities in Foot-Candles Minimum Illumination Intensities Foot-Candles Area of Operation 5 General construction area lighting. 3 General construction areas, concrete placement, excavation and waste areas, access ways, active storage areas, loading platforms, refueling, and field maintenance areas. 5 Indoors: warehouses, corridors, hallways, and exit ways. 5 Tunnels, shafts, and general underground work areas: (Exception: minimum of 10 foot-candies is required at tunnel and shaft heading during drilling, mucking, and scaling. Bureau of Mines approved cap lights shall be acceptable for use in the tunnel heading) 10 General construction plant and shops (e.g., batch plants, screening plants, mechanical and electrical equipment rooms, carpenter shops, rigging lofts and active storerooms, mess halls, and indoor toilets and workrooms.) 30 First aid stations, infirmaries, and offices. Other areas or operations not covered in the table above, refer to the American National Standard All. 1965, R1970, Practice for Industrial Lighting, for recommended values of illumination.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/04%3A_Health_Hazards/4.05%3A_Environment.txt

What is Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)? PPE is the last line of defense in the hierarchy of controls. As previously discussed there are some hazards, physical and chemical, that workers are exposed to despite efforts to either eliminate, substitute, engineer, or work practice control the danger away. The correct application, design, and issuance of the PPE are the employer’s responsibility. The correct wear, care, and use of the required PPE is the employee responsibility. PPE is a generic term. There are types of PPE designed to protect parts of the human body exposed to hazards and hazardous environments. The typical areas needing protection and the type of PPE are shown below: Table of Typical PPE Table of PPE Body Part Protection Image Head Hard Hat, Helmet Hands Gloves Feet Steel Toe Boots Eyes-Sight Goggles, Glasses Ears-Hearing Ear Plugs, Earmuffs Nose, Mouth Respirator, face mask Face Face Shield Body Coveralls, High Visibility Vest PPE shall only be specified for use after a job hazard analysis(JHA) or job safety analysis(JSA) has been completed. The PPE shown above are “typical” and not specific for any task. The JHA and site assessment will determine what PPE is necessary, when it is necessary, and why it is necessary. 4.A: Chapter 4 Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) 1. When an infirmary, clinic, hospital, or physician, is not reasonably accessible in terms of time and distance to the worksite, for the treatment of injured employees, what other option is permitted? 2. Common drinking cups are permitted for jobsite water coolers provided a means to rinse the cup after each use is provided. a. ________ True b.________ False 3. When employees are subjected to sound levels exceeding________dBA for 8 hours, feasible administrative or engineering controls shall be utilized to protect against hearing loss. 4. Only ________and trained employees shall be assigned to install, adjust, and operate laser equipment. 5. Whenever hazardous substances such as dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, or gases exist or are produced in the course of construction work their concentrations shall not exceed the________of airborne contaminants for construction. 6. New construction, alteration, repair, or renovation of structures, substrates, or portions thereof, that contain Lead, or materials containing Lead are not covered by the Lead in construction standard. a. ________ True b.________False 7. The Lead standard protects workers from the hazards associated with Lead by assuring that no employee is exposed to lead at concentrations greater than ________ micrograms per cubic meter of air, averaged over an________ -hour period. 8. Toilets shall be provided at construction sites according to the number of employees on the site. For 20 or less employees ________ toilet is required. a.________1 b.________2 c.________3 d.________4 9. The requirements of part 1910 and part 1926 of Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations apply pursuant to their terms to Hazardous Waste and Emergency Response Operations only if they are specifically mentioned in the Hazwopper Standard. a. ________ True b.________False General site workers engaged in hazardous substance removal or other activities which expose or potentially expose workers to hazardous substances and health hazards shall receive a minimum of hours of instruction off the site, and a minimum of _ days actual field experience under the direct supervision of a trained, experienced supervisor.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/04%3A_Health_Hazards/4.06%3A_Personal_Protective_Equipme.txt

“Anyone who believes they have common sense has simply forgotten who taught them what they know.” -Allen D. Quilley Overview Fires fall in the category of both natural and man induced hazards and have therefore been considered as a natural catastrophe or emergency. Fire is perhaps the most frightening and dangerous hazard humans have historically encountered, so much so that fire prevention and protection is embedded in our public and workplace safety infrastructure. The devastation that an all consuming out of control fire can produce is why there is the discipline of Fire Science. Fire science is the study of all aspects of fire, from fire behavior to fire investigation. Many of those seeking to become a firefighter or obtain a career in fire prevention, protection, or safety might pursue a degree in fire science. Fires are workplace emergencies and require specific fire prevention controls in the workplace. They are standalone hazards with specific safety standards but must also be considered in emergency planning. Every employer must consider all potential workplace emergencies and have in place either an oral or written plan to address those emergencies. Chapter Objective: 1. Review the science of fire and the different classes of fire. 2. Identify the need for and the proper selection of portable fire fighting equipment. 3. Identify the primary elements for fire prevention and control measures. 4. Identify the primary elements of an emergency action plan (EAP). 5. Describe the natural and human induced workplace emergencies. 6. Describe the purpose and objective of an emergency plan. Learning Outcome: 1. Select the proper type of containers for storage and handling of combustible and flammable liquids on the job. 2. List the necessary steps for effective fire prevention on construction jobsites. 3. Draft a simple EAP. Standards: 1926 Subpart F-Fire Protection and Prevention, 1910 Subpart E-Exit Routes and Emergency Planning, 1910 Subpart L-Fire Protection Key Terms: Combustible, flammable, emergency, explosive, extinguisher, tetrahedron Mini-Lecture: Emergency Planning Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. 05: Fire Protection and Prevention Fire Each year approximately 5,000 people lose their lives as the result of fire. OSHA estimates that nearly 10% of those deaths can be attributed to workplace fires. Subpart F of the 1926 Construction Standards is designed to protect workers from the hazards associated with fires in the workplace, but specifically for construction sites and construction work. Subpart F contains requirements for workplace firefighting equipment, fire exits, workplace fire emergency and prevention plans, employee training and the proper handling and storage of flammable and combustible liquids. Subpart E and Subpart L of the General Industry Standard focus on emergency egress and emergency planning while also providing National Fire Protection Association(NFPA) requirements embedded in building and safety code. As a result construction, maritime, and agriculture are excluded from the requirements of this standard. The Science of Fire - Fire Types General The classic fire triangle has been used for years to represent the three elements necessary for the occurrence of a fire: Heat, Fuel and Oxygen. Recently, a fire tetrahedron, a four-sided figure, has replaced the triangle (see Figure 5.1.1). The fourth side is chemical reaction and represents a chemical chain reaction that occurs in the burning of flammable or combustible liquids and flammable gases. Each of the sides represents one of four ways to extinguish a fire. Removing the heat from the fire, such as by adding water or other chemicals can extinguish the fire. Somewhat more difficult is removing the fuel from the fire, such as for liquid storage tank fires. The oxygen can be removed from the fire by smothering the fire and the chemical reaction of the fire can be interrupted, stopping the growth of the fire. Fire classification Fires are classified as Class A, B, C, D and K fires. Class A Fires Class A fires occur in ordinary materials, such as, wood, paper and rags. The use of water or water-based solutions is most successful in extinguishing these types of fires. Class B Fires Class B fires occur in the vapor-air mixture over the surface of flammable liquids, such as, gasoline, oil, grease and paint thinners. The most successful way to extinguish these fires is by limiting the oxygen or interrupting the chemical chain reaction. Solid streams of water are likely to spread the fire, but in some cases a water fog nozzle with a fine mist may prove effective. Generally, dry, multi-purpose chemicals or foams are used to extinguish these fires. Class C Fires Class C fires occur in or near electrical equipment. Non-conducting agents, such as dry- chemical, carbon dioxide and halogenated extinguishing agents are commonly used to extinguish Class C fires. Foam or streams of water should not be used because they are good conductors. Class D Fires There is also a Class D fire, but these fires are not frequently encountered in construction. These fires occur in combustible metals, such as magnesium, titanium, sodium, etc. Specialized techniques and equipment must be used to control and extinguish these types of fires. Normal extinguishing agents should not be used because they may increase the intensity of the fire. Class K Fires Class K fires involve vegetable oils, animal oils, or fats in cooking appliances. Extinguishers with a K rating are designed to extinguish fires involving vegetable oils, animal oils, or fats utilized in commercial cooking appliances. Portable fire extinguishers Firefighting equipment, such as portable fire extinguishers, shall be suitable for the Class of fire in which it is to be used. Class A fire extinguishers are identifiable by a triangle which contains the letter "A" and if colored, by the color green. Class B fire extinguishers are identifiable by a square which contains the letter "B" and if colored, by the color red. Class C fire extinguishers are identifiable by a circle which contains the letter "C" and if colored, by the color blue. Fire Protection Employer responsibility The employer shall be responsible for the development of a fire protection program to be followed throughout all phases of the construction and demolition work. In addition, the employer shall provide for the firefighting equipment as specified in this subpart. As fire hazards occur, there shall be no delay in providing the necessary equipment. As warranted by the project, the employer shall provide a trained and equipped firefighting organization (Fire Brigade) to assure adequate protection to life. Firefighting equipment accessibility Access to all available firefighting equipment shall be maintained at all times. All firefighting equipment, provided by the employer, shall be conspicuously located. All firefighting equipment shall be periodically inspected and maintained in operating condition. Defective equipment shall be immediately replaced. Water supply A temporary or permanent water supply, of sufficient volume, duration, and pressure, required to properly operate the firefighting equipment shall be made available as soon as combustible materials accumulate. Where underground water mains are to be provided, they shall be installed, completed, and made available for use as soon as practicable. Site fire extinguisher requirements A fire extinguisher, rated not less than 2A, shall be provided for each 3,000 square feet of the protected building area, or major fraction thereof. Travel distance from any point of the protected area to the nearest fire extinguisher shall not exceed 100 feet. One 55-gallon open drum of water with two fire pails may be substituted for a fire extinguisher having a 2A rating. One or more fire extinguishers, rated not less than 2A, shall be provided on each floor. In multistory buildings, at least one fire extinguisher shall be located adjacent to the stairway. Extinguishers and water drums, subject to freezing, shall be protected from freezing. Fire extinguisher ratings Fire extinguisher ratings refer to the relative effectiveness of the fire extinguisher to one gallon of water. A 2A fire extinguisher is therefore twice as effective as one gallon of water or as effective as two gallons of water on an ordinary combustible materials fire (Class A fire). A 1/2-inch diameter garden-type hose line, not to exceed 100 feet in length and equipped with a nozzle, may be substituted for a 2A-rated fire extinguisher, provided it is capable of discharging a minimum of five gallons per minute with a minimum hose stream range of 30 feet horizontally. The garden-type hose lines shall be mounted on conventional racks or reels. The number and location of hose racks or reels shall be such that at least one hose stream can be applied to all points in the area. Capacity of extinguishers shall be in accordance with ANSI/UL711,”Rating and Fire Testing of Extinguishers”. Flammable or combustible liquids A fire extinguisher, rated not less than 10B, shall be provided within 50 feet of wherever more than 5 gallons of flammable or combustible liquids or 5 pounds of flammable gas are being used on the jobsite. This requirement does not apply to the integral fuel tanks of motor vehicles. Inspection and maintenance Portable fire extinguishers shall be inspected periodically and maintained in good working condition. The employer shall assure that portable fire extinguishers are maintained in a fully charged and operable condition and kept in their designated places at all times except during use. The employer shall assure that portable fire extinguishers are subjected to an annual maintenance check. Stored pressure extinguishers do not require an internal examination. The employer shall record the annual maintenance date and retain this record for one year after the last entry or the life of the shell, whichever is less. Fire extinguishers equipment approval Fire extinguishers, which have been listed or approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, shall be used to meet the requirements of Subpart F. Training Where the employer has provided portable fire extinguishers for employee use in the workplace, the employer shall also provide an educational program to familiarize employees with the general principles of fire extinguisher use and the hazards involved with incipient stage firefighting. Training shall occur upon initial employment and at least annually thereafter. Demolition or alterations During demolition or alterations, existing automatic sprinkler installations shall be retained in service as long as reasonable. The operation of sprinkler control valves shall be permitted only by properly authorized persons. Modification of sprinkler systems to permit alterations or additional demolition should be expedited so that the automatic protection may be returned to service as quickly as possible. Sprinkler control valves shall be checked daily at close of work to ascertain that the protection is in service. Emergency notification An alarm system, e.g., telephone system, siren, etc., shall be established by the employer whereby employees on the site and the local fire department can be alerted for an emergency. The alarm code and reporting instructions shall be conspicuously posted at phones and at employee entrances. Fire Prevention General Smoking shall be prohibited at, or in, the vicinity of operations, which constitute a fire hazard, and shall be conspicuously posted: "No Smoking or Open Flame." Portable fire extinguishing equipment Portable fire extinguishing equipment, suitable for the fire hazard involved shall be provided at convenient, conspicuously accessible locations in the yard area. Portable fire extinguishers, rated not less than 2A, shall be placed so that maximum travel distance to the nearest unit shall not exceed 100 feet. Materials stored outdoors Combustible materials installed in open yard storage areas shall be piled with due regard to the stability of piles and in no case higher than 20 feet. Method of piling shall be solid wherever possible and in orderly and regular piles. No combustible material shall be stored outdoors within 10 feet of a building or structure. Materials stored indoors Storage in indoor areas shall not obstruct, or adversely affect, means of exit. All materials shall be stored, handled, and piled with due regard to their fire characteristics. Incompatible materials, which may create a fire hazard, shall be segregated by a barrier having a fire resistance of at least one hour. Material stored indoors shall be piled to minimize the spread of fire internally and to permit convenient access for firefighting. Stable piling shall be maintained at all times. Aisle space shall be maintained to safely accommodate the widest vehicle that may be used within the building for firefighting purposes. A clearance of 24 inches shall be maintained around the path of travel of fire doors unless a barricade is provided, in which case no clearance is needed. Material shall not be stored within 36 inches of a fire door opening. Clearance shall be maintained around lights and heating units to prevent ignition of combustible materials. Clearance of at least 36 inches shall be maintained between the top level of the stored material and the sprinkler deflectors. Flammable and Combustible Liquids General Only approved containers and portable tanks shall be used for storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids. Approved metal safety cans shall be used for the handling and use of flammable liquids in quantities greater than one gallon, except that this shall not apply to those flammable liquid materials, which are highly viscous (extremely hard to pour), which may be used and handled in original shipping containers. For quantities of one gallon or less, only the original container or approved metal safety cans shall be used for storage, use, and handling of flammable liquids. Storage No more than 25 gallons of flammable or combustible liquids shall be stored in a room outside of an approved storage cabinet. Electrical wiring and equipment located in inside storage rooms shall be approved for Class 1, Division 1, Hazardous Locations. Flammable or combustible liquids shall not be stored in areas used for exits, stairways, or normally used for the safe passage of people. Materials which will react with water and create a fire hazard shall not be stored in the same room with flammable or combustible liquids. In locations where flammable vapors may be present, precautions shall be taken to prevent ignition by eliminating or controlling sources of ignition. Sources of ignition may include open flames, lightning, smoking, cutting and welding, hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, electrical, and mechanical), spontaneous ignition, chemical and physical-chemical reactions, and radiant heat. Equipment in classified (Class I, Class II, Class III) hazardous locations must also be suitable for those locations and not permit the ignition of vapors, gases, or combustible dusts. Fire Protection and Prevention – Definitions Approved for the purpose of this subpart: Equipment that has been listed or approved by a nationally recognized testing laboratory (NRTL) such as Factory Mutual Engineering Corp., or Underwriters' Laboratories, Inc. or Federal agencies such as Bureau of Mines, or U.S. Coast Guard, which issues approvals for such equipment. Combustible liquids: Any liquid having a flash point at or above 140° F (60°C), and below 200° F (93.4°C). Flammable liquids: Any liquid having a flash point below 140° F. and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 pounds per square inch (absolute) at 100° F. Flash point: The temperature at which it gives off vapor sufficient to form an ignitable mixture with the air near the surface of the liquid or within the vessel used as determined by appropriate test procedure and apparatus. Ignition temperature: The minimum temperature required to initiate or cause self-sustained combustion. The ignition temperature of some common materials is listed below: Ignition temperatures for some materials Material Ignition Temperature Newspaper 446°F Cotton Batton 450°F Gasoline 500° - 850°F Sawdust 400° - 500°F Lower explosive limit (LEL): The minimum concentration of vapor in air or oxygen below which propagation of flame does not occur on contact with a source of ignition. Safety can: An approved closed container, of not more than 5 gallons capacity, having a flash-arresting screen, spring-closing lid and spout cover and so designed that it will safely relieve internal pressure when subjected to fire exposure. Plastic containers can be used provided they are "approved." Upper explosive limit (UEL): The maximum concentration in air or oxygen below which propagation of flame does not occur on contact with a source of ignition. Electrical Bonding: The practice of intentionally electrically connecting all exposed metal items not designed to carry electricity in a room or building as protection from electric shock and to protect against static charge build up. Electrical Grounding: To ensure that persons in the area are not exposed to dangerous, electric-shock voltage. To provide current-carrying capability that can accept ground-fault current without creating a fire or explosive hazard.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/05%3A_Fire_Protection_and_Prevention/5.01%3A_Introductio.txt

Emergency Action Plans An emergency action plan (EAP) is a written document(may be communicated orally if less than 10 employees) required by OSHA standards. [29 CFR 1910.38(a)] The purpose of an EAP is to facilitate and organize employer and employee actions during workplace emergencies. The primary goal of the plan is to get employees away (evacuate or isolate) from the emergency event or condition. Well developed emergency plans and proper employee training (such that employees understand their roles and responsibilities within the plan) will result in fewer and less severe employee injuries and less structural damage to the facility during emergencies. A poorly prepared plan, likely will lead to a disorganized evacuation or emergency response, resulting in confusion, injury, and property damage. Fight or Flee A fire is the most common type of emergency for which small businesses must plan. Evacuation plans that designate or require some or all of the employees to fight fires with portable fire extinguishers increase the level of complexity of the plan and the level of training that must be provided employees. Fire, Rescue, or Medical Services In an emergency most of us are quickly moved away from the hazardous environments created during emergency situations. However there usually remains a group of dedicated and well-trained professional emergency responders and medical service personnel which may be tasked with containing and mitigating these incidents, rescuing individuals at-risk, and providing medical assistance to the injured. Sheltering in Place There are some emergencies where evacuation is not the safest action for employees. When chemical, biological, or radiological contaminants are released into the environment in such a quantity and/or proximity to a place of business it is usually safer to remain indoors rather than to evacuate employees. Sheltering in place may also be the safest action when the emergency involves criminal activity, domestic violence or terrorist activity. Primary Elements of the Plan An emergency plan must contain at a minimum the following elements: 1. Procedures for reporting a fire or other emergency; 2. Procedures for emergency evacuation, including type of evacuation and exit route assignments 3. Procedures to be followed by employees who remain to operate critical plant operations before they evacuate; 4. Procedures to account for all employees after evacuation; 5. Procedures to be followed by employees performing rescue or medical duties; 6. The name or job title of every employee who may be contacted by employees who need more information about the plan or an explanation of their duties under the plan. The EAP must describe the covered emergencies and include external contact and resource information. The plan must also discuss the requirements of any emergency alert or alarm system, frequency of system testing, training requirements, and is subject to annual review. Typical emergencies include Fire, Earthquake, Severe Weather, Chemical and Biological Releases, Explosions, Violence, Civil Disturbance, Medical. 5.A: Chapter 5 Re Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Which of the following fire classifications would best describe a fire which occurs in the vapor-air mixture over the surface of flammable liquids, such as, gasoline, oil grease and paint thinners? a. ________ Class A b.________ Class B c.________ Class C d.________Class D 2. Which of the following colors would be used to identify a Class C portable fire extinguisher? a. ________ black b.________ red c.________ blue d.________ green 3. Travel distance from any point of the protected area to the nearest fire extinguisher shall not exceed? a.________ 25ft b.________50ft c.________ 75ft d.________100ft 4. One or more fire extinguishers, rated not less than________shall be provided on each floor. In multistory buildings, at least________fire extinguisher shall be located adjacent to stairway. 5. Combustible materials installed in open yard storage areas shall be piled with due regard to the stability of piles and in no case higher than________feet. a.________ 7 b.________ 10 c.________ 20 d.________ 25 6. No combustible material shall be stored outdoors within feet of a building or structure. a.________ 5 b.________ 10 c.________ 15 d.________ 20 7. Clearance of at least__________ inches shall be maintained between the top level of the stored material and the sprinkler deflectors. a.________12 b.________ 24 c.________ 36 d.________48 8. No more than________gallons of flammable or combustible liquids shall be stored in a room unless it is contained in an approved storage cabinet. a.________ 5 b.________ 10 c.________ 20 d.________ 25 9. "Flammable liquids” means any liquid having a flash point below________°F and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 pounds per square inch (absolute) at 100° F. a.________ 100 b.________ 140 c.________ 150 d.________ 200 10. The________of the liquid means the temperature at which it gives off vapor sufficient to form an ignitable mixture with the air near the surface of the liquid or within the vessel used as determined by appropriate test procedure and apparatus. 11.List typical emergencies that shall be covered under an EAP.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/05%3A_Fire_Protection_and_Prevention/5.02%3A_Emergency_A.txt

“Working safely may get old, but so do those who practice it.” – Author Unknown Overview Handling materials (material, supplies, stock) is perhaps one activity that all workers will do at some point in a day’s work. No matter the industry, workers are required to access, move, transport, and store items necessary for accomplishing a task. Most workers with the exception of those who may have a physical impairment are expected to lift or carry at least 20 lbs. In the construction trades many workers are expected to manually lift or manage more than 50 lbs. When materials are too large, heavy, or bulky to manage then material handling equipment is used to assist workers with moving and managing those materials. Equipment such as forklifts, pallet jacks, hoists, and cranes provide additional lifting power. When mechanical equipment is used to handle materials there are additional considerations. Safe work practices and procedures are added to the requirements for safe operation of the handling equipment, and for ensuring the equipment is operable. When materials are handled, moved, and stored it is not only important to make sure they are delivered in tact but also to ensure the area or environment where materials are stored is maintained in a clean and orderly condition. This chapter will focus on the equipment necessary for safely handling materials and connect materials handling to storage and housekeeping practices at any worksite. Chapter Objective: 1. Understand the Importance of Proper Material Storage and Good Housekeeping Practices on Work Sites. 2. Apply the Requirements for Using and Inspecting Rigging Equipment for Material Handling on Work Sites. 3. Understand the Requirements of 1926 Subpart H Materials Handling, Storage, Use & Disposal and 1910 Subpart N Materials Handling and Storage. Learning Outcome: 1. Correctly apply the hierarchy of controls to rigging hazards. 2. Explain the common practices in material handling storage and fire prevention methods. Standards: 1926 Subpart H-Materials Handling Storage, Use, and Disposal, 1910 Subpart N-Materials Handling and Storage, 1926 Subpart F Fire Protection and Prevention Key Terms: Rigging, Slings, Splice,Synthetic Mini-Lecture: Forklift Safety, Rigging Safety Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Powered Industrial Trucks, en.Wikipedia.com, public domain 06: Materials Handling Storage Use and Disposal Handling Materials Handling of jobsite materials is a core function on all construction sites as well as in fulfillment centers, warehouse and distribution facilities. Yet, improper procedures and unsafe practices which often lead to accidents and injury are quite common. Good housekeeping practices frequently ignored are just as important to materials handling safety as using the right PPE. The following standards for materials handling contain practices and procedures that not only reduce the risk of accident and injury, but also damaged materials and exposure to financial loss. General requirements for storage OSHA requires that all materials used on the jobsite shall be properly stored. Materials stored in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked or otherwise secured to prevent sliding, falling or collapse. Great care must be used in storage areas to ensure that maximum safe loads are not exceeded. Maximum safe load limits for floors must be posted in all buildings and structures in the appropriate storage areas. The safe limits must be listed in pounds per square foot, for all floors except those located on grade. Material Storage Location Material stored inside of buildings under construction shall not be placed within six ft. of any hoist way or inside floor opening. Such material shall also be kept at least 10 ft. from an exterior wall, which does not extend above the top of the material stored. Fall Protection Fall protection must be provided for all employees required to work in silos, hoppers, tanks, and similar locations where materials are stored. Materials that are not compatible shall be segregated in storage. Bagged Material Bagged materials shall be stored so that the bags are stacked by stepping back the layers and cross-keying the bags at least every 10 bags high. Scaffolds and Runways Unless the materials are for immediate use, they shall not be stored on scaffolds or runways. Bricks and Masonry Brick stacks shall not be more than seven feet in height. Where loose brick stacks exceed four feet, they must be tapered back two inches for every foot of height above four ft. When masonry blocks are stored in stacks higher than six feet, the stacks shall be tapered back one-half block per tier above the six ft. level. Lumber When lumber is stored all of the following conditions shall be followed: 1. All nails shall first be removed. 2. It must be stacked on level and solidly supported sills. 3. It must be stable and self-supporting. 4. The piles must not exceed 20 ft., provided the lumber to be handled manually, does not exceed 16 ft. Steel materials Structural steel, poles, pipe, bar stock, and other cylindrical materials shall be stacked and blocked so as to prevent spilling or tilting. Such items are permitted to be stored by means of racks. Housekeeping Storage areas must be kept clear. Accumulation of materials that may cause tripping, fire, explosion or pest harborage hazard in the storage area is not permitted. Aisles and passageways must be kept clear to provide for ready access and safe movement of material handling equipment or employees. Fire Prevention General Smoking shall be prohibited at, or in, the vicinity of operations, which constitute a fire hazard, and shall be conspicuously posted: "No Smoking or Open Flame." Portable fire extinguishing equipment Portable fire extinguishing equipment, suitable for the fire hazard involved shall be provided at convenient, conspicuously accessible locations in the yard area. Portable fire extinguishers, rated not less than 2A, shall be placed so that maximum travel distance to the nearest unit shall not exceed 100 feet. Materials stored outdoors Combustible materials installed in open yard storage areas shall be piled with due regard to the stability of piles and in no case higher than 20 feet. Method of piling shall be solid wherever possible and in orderly and regular piles. No combustible material shall be stored outdoors within 10 feet of a building or structure. Materials stored indoors Storage in indoor areas shall not obstruct, or adversely affect, means of exit. All materials shall be stored, handled, and piled with due regard to their fire characteristics. Incompatible materials, which may create a fire hazard, shall be segregated by a barrier having a fire resistance of at least one hour. Material stored indoors shall be piled to minimize the spread of fire internally and to permit convenient access for firefighting. Stable piling shall be maintained at all times. Aisle space shall be maintained to safely accommodate the widest vehicle that may be used within the building for firefighting purposes. A clearance of 24 inches shall be maintained around the path of travel of fire doors unless a barricade is provided, in which case no clearance is needed. Material shall not be stored within 36 inches of a fire door opening. Clearance shall be maintained around lights and heating units to prevent ignition of combustible materials. Clearance of at least 36 inches shall be maintained between the top level of the stored material and the sprinkler deflectors. Flammable and Combustible Liquids General Only approved containers and portable tanks shall be used for storage and handling of flammable and combustible liquids. Approved metal safety cans shall be used for the handling and use of flammable liquids in quantities greater than one gallon, except that this shall not apply to those flammable liquid materials, which are highly viscous (extremely hard to pour), which may be used and handled in original shipping containers. For quantities of one gallon or less, only the original container or approved metal safety cans shall be used for storage, use, and handling of flammable liquids. Storage No more than 25 gallons of flammable or combustible liquids shall be stored in a room outside of an approved storage cabinet. Electrical wiring and equipment located in inside storage rooms shall be approved for Class 1, Division 1, Hazardous Locations. Flammable or combustible liquids shall not be stored in areas used for exits, stairways, or normally used for the safe passage of people. Materials which will react with water and create a fire hazard shall not be stored in the same room with flammable or combustible liquids. In locations where flammable vapors may be present, precautions shall be taken to prevent ignition by eliminating or controlling sources of ignition. Sources of ignition may include open flames, lightning, smoking, cutting and welding, hot surfaces, frictional heat, sparks (static, electrical, and mechanical), spontaneous ignition, chemical and physical-chemical reactions, and radiant heat. Equipment in classified (Class I, Class II, Class III) hazardous locations must also be suitable for those locations and not permit the ignition of vapors, gases, or combustible dusts.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/06%3A_Materials_Handling_Storage_Use_and_Disposal/6.01%3.txt

Rigging Equipment for Material Handling General The requirements contained in Subpart H apply to rigging equipment used in conjunction with other material handling equipment for the movement of material by hoisting. Inspection Rigging equipment for material handling shall be inspected prior to use on each shift and as necessary during its use to ensure that it is safe. Defective rigging equipment shall not be used. Load considerations Rigging equipment shall not be used for loads rated in excess of the equipment’s safe working load. Safe working loads are listed in Tables H-l through H-20 in Subpart H. If the type of installation requires that special hooks, grabs, clamps, etc. must be used, they shall be marked to indicate their maximum safe working loads and they shall be proof-tested prior to their use to 125% of their rated load. Types of slings Slings used for hoisting shall be made from alloy steel chain, wire rope metal mesh, natural or synthetic fiber rope, and synthetic web. Each day before use, the slings shall be inspected for damage or defects by a competent person. Alloy Steel Chains Marking Welded alloy steel chains must be marked with a permanent identifiable tag stating size, grade, rated capacity and manufacturer. Capacity Hooks, rings, links and other attachments used with alloy steel chains shall have a rated capacity at least equal to that of the chain. Types not permitted Shop or job made hooks, links, fasteners, etc., formed from bolts, rods etc., shall not be used. Inspection Alloy steel chains shall be inspected on a regular basis. The frequency of the inspection is determined by the frequency of the use, severity of the conditions of use, the nature of the lifts being made, and previous experience with the use of the chains. Wire Ropes Rated capacity The safe working loads of wire ropes shall be determined from Tables H-3 through H-14 of Subpart H. For sizes, classifications, and grades which are not included in the Tables, the safe working load recommended by the manufacturer shall be followed provided a safety factor of not less than five is maintained. Work techniques Protruding ends of strands in wire rope shall be covered or blunted. Wire rope shall not be secured by knots, except on haul back lines and scrapers. Hands or fingers shall not be placed between the sling and its load while the sling is being tightened around the load. A sling shall not be pulled from under a load when the load is resting on the sling. Natural Rope and Synthetic Fiber Eye splices Eye splices in manila rope shall contain at least three full tucks, and short splices shall contain at least six full tucks, three on each side of the centerline of the splice. Eye splices in synthetic fiber rope shall contain at least four full tucks and short splices shall contain at least eight full tucks, four on each side of the centerline of the splice. For all eye splices, the eye shall be large enough to provide for an angle not greater than 60 degrees at the splice when the eye is placed over the load or support. Work conditions Natural and synthetic fiber rope slings shall be permitted when used in a temperature range of minus 20 degrees F to plus 180 degrees F, without decreasing the working load limit, unless the sling is wet and frozen. Wet and frozen slings must be used in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations. Splicing Knots shall not be used in lieu of splices. Clamps for splicing fiber ropes shall not be used unless the clamps are designed specifically for such use. Removal from service Natural and synthetic rope slings shall be immediately removed from service if any of the following conditions exist: 1. Abnormal wear. 2. Powdered fiber between strands. 3. Broken or cut fibers. 4. Variations in the size or roundness of strands. 5. Discoloration or rotting. 6. Distortion of hardware in the sling. Synthetic Webbing Marking When synthetic web slings are used, the employer must mark or code each sling to show all of the following: 1. Name or trademark of manufacturer. 2. Rated capacities for the type of hitch. 3. Type of material. Rated capacity The rated capacity of synthetic web slings shall not be exceeded. Synthetic webbing shall be of uniform thickness and width and selvage edges shall not be split from the webbings width. Fittings Fittings for synthetic web slings shall have a minimum breaking strength equal to that of the sling.-Fittings shall be free of all sharp edges that might damage the webbing. Attachment Stitching is the only permissible method for attaching end fittings to the webbing and to form eyes in the webbing. Work environments Nylon web slings shall not be used where fumes, vapors, sprays, mists or liquids of acids or phenolics are present. Polyester and polypropylene web slings shall not be used where fumes vapors, sprays, mists, or liquids of caustics are present. Removal from Service Synthetic web slings shall be immediately removed from service if any of the following conditions exist: 1. Acid or caustic burns. 2. Melting or charring of any part of the sling surface. 3. Broken or worn stitches. 4. Snags, punctures, tears or cuts. 5. Distortion of fittings. Shackles and Hooks Loading considerations Table H-19 of Subpart H is used to determine the safe working loads of the various sizes of shackles. Higher safe working loads may be permitted where recommended by the manufacturer for specific use provided that a safety factor of not less than five is maintained. Manufacturer's recommendations The manufacturer's recommendations shall be followed in determining the safe working loads of the various sizes and types of hooks. Hooks for which no manufacturer's data is available, shall be tested to twice the intended safe working load before they are first put into use. Disposal of Waste Material Chute requirement Whenever materials are dropped more than 20 ft. to any point lying outside the exterior walls of the building, a chute constructed of wood or equivalent materials shall be used. Dropped through holes in floors When debris is dropped through holes in the floor without the use of chutes, the area onto which the material is dropped shall be completely protected with barricades not less than 42 inches high and not less than six ft. back from the projected edge of the opening above. Signs warning of the hazard of falling materials shall be posted at each level. Combustible materials All scrap lumber, waste material, and rubbish shall be removed from the immediate work area as work progresses. Solvent waste and oily rags etc., shall be stored in fire resistant containers until removed from the job. 6.A: Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Maximum safe load limit for floors must be posted in all buildings and structures and in the appropriate storage areas. The safe limits must be listed in________ for all floors except those located on grade. 2. Materials stored inside of buildings under construction shall not be placed within________ feet of any hoist way or inside floor openings. Such materials shall also be kept at least________ feet from an exterior wall which does not extend above the top of the material stored. 3. Unless materials are for immediate use, materials shall not be stored on________ or________. 4. When masonry blocks are stored in stacks higher than________ feet, the stacks shall be tapered back one-half tier above this level. 5.________ and________ must be kept clear to provide for ready access and safe movement of material handling equipment or employees. 6. Rigging equipment for material handling shall be________ prior to use on each shift and as necessary during its use to ensure that it is safe. Defective rigging equipment shall not be used. 7. If the type of installation requires that special hooks, grabs, clamps, etc. must be used, they shall be marked to indicate their maximum safe working loads and they shall be proof-tested prior to their use to________ of their rated load. 8. ________ is the only permissible method for attaching end fittings to synthetic webbing and to form eyes in the webbing. Multiple Choice: 9. When lumber is stored, which of the following conditions shall be followed: a. ________ All nails shall first be removed. b. ________ It must be stacked on level and solidly supported sills. c. ________ It must be stable and self-supporting. d. ________ The piles must not exceed 20 feet provided the lumber to be handled manually, does not exceed 16 feet. e. ________ All of the above. True or False: 10. T or F Materials stored in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked or otherwise secured to prevent sliding, falling or collapse.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/06%3A_Materials_Handling_Storage_Use_and_Disposal/6.02%3.txt

"Safety is something that happens between your ears, not something you hold in your hands." – Jeff Cooper Overview In Chapter 0 Valuing Work we explored the history of work highlighting how work was done throughout history, some of the tools, equipment and materials used. Tools and equipment allow us to increase our efficiency and output. They help us protect our limbs and even vital organs. However tools and equipment used incorrectly, can quickly become a hazard and reverse any efficiency gained from their use. Most of us have used hand tools of some sort; a pair of scissors, a box cutter, a screwdriver. It is important to note however that any physical device that we operate or handle in the course of performing a task can be considered a tool or piece of equipment requiring special consideration for safe use. In this chapter we will discuss the standards for hand and power tool safety but also address how we extend the substance of these standards to equipment in general. Chapter Objective: 1. Recognize the hazards associated with the use of hand and power tools. 2. Determine what personal protective equipment (PPE) is required when using hand and power tools. 3. Understand the machine guarding methods used to protect employees from the hazards associated with the use of machinery. 4. Identify OSHA requirements for proper and improper use of hand and power tools. Learning Outcome: 1. Correctly apply the hierarchy of controls to standards for tool and equipment safety. 2. Identify which tier of the hierarchy of controls machine guards represent. Standards: 1926 Subpart I-Hand and Power Tools, 1910 Subpart O-Machinery and Machine Guarding, 1926 Subpart K Electrical Key Terms: Guards, hydraulic, machines, pneumatic, powder actuated Mini-Lecture: Tool and Equipment Safety Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Hand Tools, attribution, Pixabay 07: Hand and Power Tools Tools and Equipment Hand and power tools are an integral part of work performance in the construction industry. Because workers who use hand and power tools are exposed to hazards, they must be trained in the safe use of each tool they are required to use. They also must be trained to understand the associated hazards and how to take necessary precautions. Note A significant requirement of working with tools is that workers must maintain all hand tools, power tools, and similar equipment in a safe condition, whether such equipment is furnished by the employer or the employee. Hazards Associated with the Use of Hand and Power Tools Understanding the hazards Hazards are the conditions related to tools or equipment that could cause a worker to be injured. Hazards are associated with such factors as energy sources, including the rotating or reciprocating elements of tools and equipment, electric or pneumatic energy, and user's misuse of equipment. Hazards are not related to the user's business, such as the construction business. Hazards are present in any business. Minimizing exposure to hazards Thinking about the hazard and how the worker can be exposed, and then modifying the mechanism by which the exposure occurs can minimize exposure to hazards. For example, flying parts and pieces can result from using grinders and side grinders. Wearing appropriately rated face shields and appropriate clothing provides some protection from the momentum of flying parts and pieces. Insuring that tools are appropriately selected by the ratings of specific parts (such as grinding wheel and saw blade ratings), performing physical inspections, using and maintaining necessary guards, and making sure the operator has been appropriately trained to help minimize exposure to hazards. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) PPE should always be selected based on the hazard. For instance, face shields and eye protection that are used to protect from possible flying parts and pieces must be rated to provide the necessary protection from impact. In some instances, wearing PPE might not be appropriate, such as wearing gloves when using a drill press. However, in other instances, wearing gloves can protect from abrasions and cuts. Understanding how to select appropriate PPE for the task is important and part of the job hazard analysis. OSHA Requirements Subpart I of OSHA 29 CFR 1926, Construction Standards, contains safety requirements for hand tools, power-operated tools, abrasive wheels and tools, and some other specialized tools, such as jacks, air receivers, woodworking tools, and power transmission apparatus. To provide a higher degree of safety, OSHA 29 CFR 1926.300 incorporates some of the general requirements of 29 CFR 1910, Subpart 0, Machinery and Machine Guarding, to help protect workers from hazards. The hazards arise from use of the equipment, not from the classification of work. Requirements for tools and machines that require guarding When working with tools, employers must make sure that the tools are appropriately guarded, as follows: • Ensure that power-operated tools that are designed to accommodate guards are equipped with such guards before use. • Ensure that all belts, gears, shafts, pulleys, sprockets, spindles, drums, fly wheels, chains, or other reciprocating, rotating, or moving parts of equipment are guarded if such parts are exposed to contact by employees, or if they otherwise create a hazard. "Point of operation" refers to the area on a machine where work actually is performed upon the material being processed. The following are examples of machines and tools that usually require point of operation guarding: • Guillotine cutters • Shears • Alligator shears • Powered presses • Milling machines • Power saws • Jointers • Portable power tools • Forming rolls and calendars • Provide one or more methods of machine guarding to protect the operator and other employees in the machine area from hazards such as those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips, or sparks. Note Examples of guarding methods are barrier guards, two-hand tripping devices, and electronic safety devices. • · Guard all points of operation of machines whose operation exposes an employee to injury. Note The guarding device shall conform with all applicable standards or in the absence of specific applicable standards, shall be designed and constructed to prevent the operator from having any part of his or her body in the danger zone during the operating cycle. • Ensure that special hand tools used to place and remove material permit easy handling of material without the operator placing a hand in the danger zone. Ensure that such tools are not used in lieu of other guarding required by this section and that they can be used only to supplement protection provided. • Guard the blades of fans when the periphery of the blades is less than 7ft. (2.128m) above the floor or working level. Ensure that the fan guard does not have openings larger than 0.5 inch (1.27 cm). General requirements The following requirements are general rules that must be followed for safe operation of tools and equipment: • Ensure that machines designed for a fixed location are anchored securely to prevent them from walking or moving. • Provide specific PPE necessary to protect employees using hand and power tools from the hazards of falling, flying, abrasive, and splashing objects and also from harmful dusts, fumes, mists, vapors, or gases. All PPE shall meet the requirements and be maintained according to OSHA 29 CFR 1926 Subparts D and E. • Use the following tools only with a positive "on-off' control: hand-held powered platen sanders, grinders with wheels 2-inch diameter or less, routers, planers, laminate trimmers, nibblers, shears, scroll saws, and jigsaws with blade shanks ¼-inch wide or less. • Ensure that all of the following tools are equipped with a momentary contact "on- off control: all hand-held powered drills; tappers; fastener drivers; horizontal, vertical, and angle grinders with wheels greater than 2 inches in diameter; disc sanders; belt sanders; reciprocating saws; saber saws; and other similar operating powered tools. Such equipment also may have a lock-on control, provided that turnoff can be accomplished by a single motion of the same finger or fingers that turn it on. • Ensure that all other hand-held powered tools, such as circular saws, chain saws, and percussion tools without positive accessory holding means are equipped with a constant pressure switch that will shut off the power when the pressure is released. Hand tools The greatest hazards posed by hand tools result from misuse and improper maintenance. Employers must not issue or permit the use of unsafe hand tools. The employer is responsible for the safe condition of the tools and equipment used by the employees, but the employees are responsible for using and maintaining the tools properly. These requirements must be followed for use of hand tools: • Do not use wrenches, including adjustable, pipe, end and socket wrenches, when the jaws are sprung to the point that slippage occurs. • Keep impact tools, such as drift pins, wedges, and chisels, free of mushroomed heads. • Keep the wooden handles of tools free of splinters or cracks and ensure that they are kept tight in the tool. • Wear appropriate PPE, such as safety goggles and gloves, due to the hazards that might be encountered while using portable tools. • Keep knives and scissors sharp. Dull tools can be more hazardous than sharp ones.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/07%3A_Hand_and_Power_Tools/7.01%3A_Introduction_to_Hand_.txt

Power-Operated Hand Tools Electric power-operated tools must be either of the approved double-insulated type or grounded in accordance with OSHA 29 CFR 1926, Subpart K. "Approved" means accepted, certified, listed, labeled, or otherwise determined to be safe by a qualified testing laboratory. In addition, these requirements must be followed for use of power-operated hand tools: • Do not permit the use of electric cords for hoisting or lowering tools. • Remove all damaged portable electric tools from use and tag them "Do Not Use." • Secure hose or whip pneumatic power tools by some positive means to prevent the tool from becoming accidentally disconnected. • Securely install and maintain safety clips or retainers on pneumatic impact (percussion) tools to keep attachments from being accidentally expelled. • Ensure that all pneumatically driven nailers, staplers, and other similar equipment that are provided with automatic fastener feeds (that operate at more than 100 psi pressure at the tool) have safety devices on the muzzle to prevent the tool from ejecting fasteners unless the muzzle is in contact with the work surface. • Do not allow compressed air to be used for cleaning purposes except where reduced to less than 30 psi and then only with effective chip guarding and PPE that meets the requirements of 29 CFR 1926 Subpart E. The 30 psi requirement does not apply for concrete form, mill scale, and similar cleaning purposes. • Do not exceed the manufacturer's safe operating pressure for hoses, pipes, valves, filters, and other fittings. • Do not permit the use of hoses for hoisting or lowering tools. • Ensure that all hoses exceeding ½-inch inside diameter have a safety device at the source of supply or branch line to reduce pressure in case of hose failure. • Equip airless spray guns of the type that atomize paints and fluids at high pressures (1,000lbs or more per sq. in.) with automatic or visible manual safety devices to prevent pulling of the trigger and releasing paint or fluid until the safety • device is manually released, or, provide a diffuser nut that will prevent high pressure, high velocity release while the nozzle tip is removed as well as a nozzle tip guard, or other equivalent protection, that will prevent the tip from corning into contact with the operator. • Equip abrasive blast cleaning nozzles with an operating valve that must be held open manually. Provide a support on which the nozzle can be mounted when it is not in use. • turn off all fuel-powered tools while refueling, servicing, or maintaining them. Transport, handle, and store fuel in accordance with 29 CFR 1926, Subpart F. • Apply applicable requirements, as outlined in 29 CFR 1926, Subparts D and E, for concentrations of toxic gases and use of PPE when using fuel-powered tools in enclosed spaces. Powder-actuated tools These requirements must be followed for use of powder-actuated tools: • Allow only workers who have been trained in the operation of the particular tool in use to operate a powder-operated tool. • Test the tool daily before loading, in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations, to ensure that safety devices are in proper working condition. • Remove from service immediately any tool not in proper working order or that develops a defect during use, and do not use it again until it is repaired. • Ensure that all PPE is in accordance with 29 CFR 1926, Subpart E. • Do not load tools until just prior to the intended firing time. Never point either loaded or empty tools at any person. Keep hands clear of the open barrel end. Never leave loaded tools unattended. • Do not drive fasteners into hard or brittle materials including, but not limited to, the following: • cast iron • glazed tile • surface-hardened steel • glass block • live rock • face brick • hollow tile • Avoid driving pins or fasteners into materials that are easily penetrated unless such materials are backed by a substance that will prevent the pin or fastener from passing completely through and creating a flying missile hazard on the other side. Never drive a fastener into a spalled area caused by an unsatisfactory fastening. • Do not use tools in an explosive or flammable atmosphere. Always use tools with the correct shield, guard, or attachment recommended by the manufacturer. Abrasive wheels and tools These requirements must be followed for use of abrasive wheels and tools: • Ensure that all grinding machines are supplied with sufficient power to maintain the spindle speed at safe levels under all conditions of normal operation. • Ensure that all grinding machines are equipped with safety guards that cover the spindle end, nut, and flange projections, that the safety guard is mounted to maintain proper alignment with the wheel, and that the strength of the fastenings exceeds the strength of the guard. • Provide safety guards (protection hoods) for floor-stand and bench-mounted abrasive wheels used for external grinding. Ensure that the maximum angular exposure of the grinding wheel periphery and sides is not more than 90 degrees, except that when work requires contact with the wheel below the horizontal plane of the spindle where the angular exposure must not exceed 125 degrees. In either case, ensure that the exposure does not begin more than 65 degrees above the horizontal plane of the spindle. The safety guards must be strong enough to withstand the effect of a bursting wheel, and work rests that are rigidly supported and readily adjustable must be provided for floor- and bench-mounted grinders. Work rests must be kept at a distance not more than 1/8 inch from the surface of the wheel. • Inspect closely and ring-test all abrasive wheels before mounting to ensure that they are free from cracks and defects. • Ensure that grinding wheels fit freely and are not forced on the spindle. Tighten the spindle nut only enough to hold the wheel in place. Protect all workers using abrasive wheels with eye protection equipment in accordance with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926, Subpart E, unless adequate eye protection is afforded by eye shields that are permanently attached to the bench or floor stand. Jacks and Hydraulic Tools These requirements must be followed for use of jacks and hydraulic tools: • Mark the manufacturers rated capacity legibly on all jacks and ensure that the capacity is not exceeded. • Make sure that all jacks have a positive stop to prevent over travel. • Make sure that the base of the jack is blocked or cribbed when it needs a firm foundation. Place a wood block between the cap and the load if a possibility of slippage of the metal cap of the jack exists. • Crib, block, or otherwise secure the load immediately after it has been raised. • Supply hydraulic jacks exposed to freezing temperatures with adequate antifreeze liquid. • Lubricate all jacks at regular intervals. • Inspect each jack thoroughly at times depending upon the service conditions. Inspect no less frequently that the following intervals: • For constant or intermittent use at one locality, once every six months • For jacks sent out of shop for special work, when sent out and when returned • For a jack subjected to abnormal load or shock, immediately before and immediately thereafter • Tag jacks that are out of order and ensure that they are not used until rep 7.A: Chapter 7 Review Quest Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. When________ -________tools are designed to accommodate guards, they shall be equipped with such guards when in use. 2. The point of operation of machines whose operation exposes a worker to injury shall be________. 3. One or more methods of machine guarding shall be provided to protect the operator and other workers in the machine area from hazards such as those created by point of operation, ingoing nip points, rotating parts, flying chips, and sparks. Name three methods of providing machine guarding. a. ________ b. ________ c. ________ 4. Only employees who have been________in the operation of the particular tool in use shall be allowed to operate a powder-actuated tool. 5. All abrasive wheels must be closely inspected and________before mounting to ensure that they are free from cracks or defects. Multiple Choice: 6. What kind of power tools must be secured to the hose or whip by some positive means to prevent the tool from becoming accidentally disconnected? a. Electric b. Pneumatic c. Power-actuated d. Abrasive 7. Pneumatically driven nailers, staplers, and other similar equipment provided with automatic fastener feed that operate at more than________psi pressure at the tool must have a safety device on the muzzle to prevent the tool from ejecting fasteners, unless the muzzle is in contact with the work surface. a. 50 b. 100 c. 150 d. 200 8. Compressed air shall not be used for cleaning purposes except where reduced to less than________and then only with effective chip guarding and PPE that meets the requirements of 29 CFR 1926 Subpart E. a. 10 psi b. 15 psi c. 20 psi d. 30 psi 9. Jacks shall be thoroughly inspected at intervals depending upon the service conditions. For constant or intermittent use at one locality, the inspection interval is every________. a. 1 month b. 3 months c. 6 months d. 12 months True or False: 10. T or F All employees using abrasive wheels must be protected by eye protection equipment in accordance with the requirements of 29 CFR 1926 Subpart E, except when adequate eye protection is afforded by eye shields that are permanently attached to the bench or floor stand.

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“The real enemy of safety is not non-compliance but non-thinking” - Dr. Rob Long Overview Welding is a specialized and skilled trade. Welders learn metallurgy, the science of the properties of metals, production and purification, as well as learning about the intense heat combining/forging metals for many purposes. When you combine intense heat with the chemical and physical properties of metals you produce not only health hazards from vaporized metals but also physical hazards of heat and radiation. Many of you reading this resource are not planning on becoming welders and the safety protocols presented here are focused on hazard awareness. Those who will ultimately choose welding as a career will have much more safety training than presented in this chapter. It is important to pay close attention to the supporting activities associated with welding, primarily focused on hazardous materials, fuel and energy, fire protection and prevention, shielding and ventilation as the focus in these areas protect workers in a welding environment. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine the proper manner to transport, move, place and store compressed gas cylinders. 2. Identify the components of gas welding and cutting units and the proper use and maintenance of these components. 3. Review the requirements for arc welding and cutting on construction sites. 4. Understand the safety concerns and health hazards when welding and cutting on the job. Learning Outcome: 1. Correctly apply the hierarchy of controls to welding and cutting activities. 2. Identify hazardous materials associated with welding and cutting. Standards: 1926 Subpart J Welding and Cutting, 1926 Subpart CC Confined Spaces in Construction, 1910 Subpart H Hazardous Materials, 1910 Subpart M Compressed Gas and Compressed Air Equipment, 1910 Subpart Z Toxic and Hazardous Substances Key Terms: Arc, Compressed Gas, confined space, coupling, fuel gas, manifold, torch Mini-Lecture: Welding Safety, Hazardous Materials Topic Required Time: 1 hr; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Water Welders, Pixabay, royalty free 08: Welding and Cutting Welding in Construction Welding and cutting on construction sites is a common task which is often performed by several different trades. OSHA investigations into accidents related to welding and cutting discovered that the most frequent accidents resulted from the ignition of fumes/vapors or other explosive materials in the vicinity of the welding or cutting operation. These types of fire related accidents may be attributed to improper material handling and storage. Another hazard that workers encounter is the long-term effects of welding and cutting. These effects include damage to the eyes, lungs, and skin. Other hazards include falls from elevations, electrocutions, caught between, and explosions as welding activity can occur during all phases of construction. To address these safety issues Subpart J of the 1926 OSHA standards covers welding and cutting requirements for construction sites. This subpart includes requirements for gas welding and cutting, Arc welding and cutting, fire prevention, ventilation and health concerns when heating treated metals. Welding produces toxic vapors and fumes such as beryllium, chromium, and fuel gases for welding are considered hazardous materials. Because the production of toxic vapors during welding may create confined space conditions or if the welding activity is occurring in a confined space it is important to ensure proper ventilation and when appropriate air supplied respirators. Gas Welding and Cutting General When transporting, moving, and storing compressed gas cylinders, valve protection caps shall be in place and secured. When cylinders are hoisted, they shall be secured on a cradle, sling board or pallet. They shall not be hoisted or transported by means of magnets or choker slings. A suitable cylinder truck, chain, or other steadying device shall be used to keep cylinders from being knocked over while in use. Transporting When cylinders are transported by powered vehicles, they shall be secured in a vertical position. Moving Unless cylinders are firmly secured on a special carrier intended for this purpose, regulators shall be removed and valve protection caps put in place before cylinders are moved. Compressed gas cylinders shall be secured in an upright position at all times except, if necessary, for short periods of time while cylinders are actually being hoisted or carried. This is the most frequently cited welding and cutting violation. Cylinders shall be moved by tilting and rolling them on their bottom edges. They shall not be intentionally dropped, struck, or permitted to strike each other violently. Valve protection caps shall not be used for lifting cylinders from one vertical position to another. Bars shall not be used under valves or valve protection caps to pry cylinders loose when frozen. Warm, not boiling, water shall be used to thaw cylinders loose. Storage When work is finished, when cylinders are empty, or when cylinders are moved at any time, the cylinder valve shall be closed. Oxygen cylinders in storage shall be separated from fuel- gas cylinders or combustible materials (especially oil or grease), a minimum distance of 20 feet (6.1 m) or by a noncombustible barrier at least 5 feet (1.5 m) high having a fire- resistance rating of at least one-half hour. Inside of buildings, cylinders shall be stored in a well-protected well-ventilated, dry location, at least 20 feet (6.1 m) from highly combustible materials such as oil or excelsior. Cylinders should be stored in definitely assigned places away from elevators, stairs, or gangways. Assigned storage places shall be located where cylinders will not be knocked over or damaged by passing or falling objects, or subject to tampering by unauthorized persons. Cylinders shall not be kept in unventilated enclosures such as lockers and cupboards. Cylinder Placement Cylinders shall be kept far enough away from the actual welding or cutting operation so that sparks, hot slag, or flame will not reach them. When this is impractical, fire resistant shields shall be provided. Cylinders shall be placed where they cannot become part of an electrical circuit. Electrodes shall not be struck against a cylinder to strike an arc. Fuel gas cylinders shall be placed with valve end up whenever they are in use. They shall not be placed in a location where they would be subject to open flame, hot metal, or other sources of artificial heat. Cylinders containing oxygen or acetylene or other fuel gas shall not be taken into confined spaces. Cylinders, whether full or empty, shall not be used as rollers or supports. No damaged or defective cylinder shall be used. Use of Fuel Gas Training Employers shall instruct employees in the safe use of fuel gas, as follows: 1. Before a regulator is connected to a cylinder valve, the valve shall be opened slightly and closed immediately. (This action is generally termed "cracking" and is intended to clear the valve of dust or dirt that might otherwise enter the regulator.) The person cracking the valve shall stand to one side of the outlet, not in front of it. The valve of a fuel gas cylinder shall not be cracked where the gas would reach welding work, sparks, flame, or other possible sources of ignition. 2. The cylinder valve shall always be opened slowly to prevent damage to the regulator. For quick closing, valves on fuel gas cylinders shall not be opened more than 1 ½ turns. When a special wrench is required, it shall be left in position on the stem of the valve while the cylinder is in use so that the fuel gas flow can be shut off quickly in case of an emergency. In the case of manifolded or coupled cylinders, at least one such wrench shall always be available for immediate use. Nothing shall be placed on top of a fuel gas cylinder when in use, which may damage the safety device or interfere with the quick closing of the valve. 3. Fuel gas shall not be released from cylinders through torches or other devices, which are equipped with shutoff valves without reducing the pressure through a suitable regulator, attached to the cylinder valve or manifold. 4. Before a regulator is removed from a cylinder valve, the cylinder valve shall always be closed and the gas released from the regulator. 5. If, when the valve on a fuel gas cylinder is opened, and a leak is found around the valve stem, the valve shall be closed and the gland nut tightened. If this action does not stop the leak, the use of the cylinder shall be discontinued, and it shall be properly tagged and removed from the work area. In the event that fuel gas should leak from the cylinder valve, rather than from the valve stem, and the gas cannot be shut off, the cylinder shall be properly tagged and removed from the work area. If a regulator attached to a cylinder valve will effectively stop a leak through the valve seat, the cylinder need not be removed from the work area. 6. If a leak should develop at a fuse plug or other safety device, the cylinder shall be removed from the work area. Fuel Gas and Oxygen Manifold Marking Fuel gas and oxygen manifolds shall bear the name of the substance they contain in letters at least 1-inch high which shall be either painted on the manifold or on a sign permanently attached to it. Location Fuel gas and oxygen manifolds shall be placed in safe, well ventilated, and accessible locations. They shall not be located within enclosed spaces. Connections Manifold hose connections, including both ends of the supply hose that lead to the manifold, shall be such that the hose cannot be interchanged between fuel gas and oxygen manifolds and supply header connections. Adapters shall not be used to permit the interchange of hose. Hose connections shall be kept free of grease and oil. Storage When not in use, manifold and header hose connections shall be capped. Nothing shall be placed on top of a manifold, when in use, which will damage the manifold or interfere with the quick closing of the valves. Fuel Hoses Identification Fuel gas hoses and oxygen hoses shall be easily distinguishable from each other. The contrast may be made by different colors or by surface characteristics readily distinguishable by the sense of touch. Oxygen and fuel gas hoses shall not be interchangeable. A single hose having more than one gas passage shall not be used. Maintenance, inspection, and testing All hoses in use, carrying acetylene, oxygen, natural or manufactured fuel gas, or any gas or substance which may ignite or enter into combustion or be in any way harmful to employees, shall be inspected at the beginning of each working shift. Defective hoses shall be removed from service. Hose which has been subject to flashback, or which shows evidence of severe wear or damage, shall be tested to twice the normal pressure to which it is subject, but in no case less than 300 psi. Defective hose, or hose in doubtful condition, shall not be used. When parallel sections of oxygen and fuel gas hose are taped together, not more than 4 inches out of 12 inches shall be covered by tape. Couplings Hose couplings shall be of the type that cannot be unlocked or disconnected by means of a straight pull without rotary motion. Boxes used for the storage of gas hose shall be ventilated. Hoses, cables, and other equipment shall be kept clear of passageways, ladders and stairs. Torches Clogged torch tip openings shall be cleaned with suitable cleaning wires drills, or other devices designed for such purpose. Torches in use shall be inspected at the beginning of each working shift for leaking shutoff valves, hose couplings, and tip connections. Defective torches shall not be used. Torches shall be lighted by friction lighters or other approved devices, and not by matches or from hot work. Oil and grease hazards Oxygen cylinders and fittings shall be kept away from oil or grease. Cylinders, cylinder caps and valves, couplings, regulators, hose, and apparatus shall be kept free from oil or greasy substances and shall not be handled with oily hands or gloves. Oxygen shall not be directed at oily surfaces, greasy clothes, or within a fuel oil or other storage tank or vessel. Arc Welding and Cutting Manual Electrode Holders Only manual electrode holders which are specifically designed for arc welding and cutting, and are of a capacity capable of safely handling the maximum rated current required by the electrodes, shall be used. Any current-carrying parts passing through the portion of the holder, which the arc welder or cutter grips in his hand, and the outer surfaces of the jaws of the holder, shall be fully insulated against the maximum voltage, encountered to ground. Welding cables and connectors All arc welding and cutting cables shall be of the completely insulated flexible type, capable of handling the maximum current requirements of the work in progress, taking into account the duty cycle under which the arc welder or cutter is working. Use cable free from repair or splices for a minimum distance of 10 feet from the cable end to which the electrode holder is connected, except that cables with standard insulated connectors or with splices whose insulating quality is equal to that of the cable are permitted. When it becomes necessary to connect or splice lengths of cable one to another, substantial insulated connectors of a capacity at least equivalent to that of the cable shall be used. If connections are effected by means of cable lugs, they shall be securely fastened together to give good electrical contact and the exposed metal parts of the lugs shall be completely insulated. Cables in need of repair shall not be used. When a cable, other than those with acceptable splices, becomes worn to the extent of exposing bare conductors, the portion thus exposed shall be protected by means of rubber and friction tape or other equivalent insulation. Ground returns and machine grounding A ground return cable shall have a safe current carrying capacity equal to or exceeding the specified maximum output capacity of the arc welding or cutting unit, which it services. When a single ground return cable services more than one unit, it’s safe current-carrying capacity shall equal or exceed the total specified maximum output capacities of all the units, which it services. Pipelines containing gases or flammable liquids, or conduits containing electrical circuits, shall not be used as a ground return. When a structure or pipeline is employed as a ground return circuit, it shall be determined that the required electrical contact exists at all joints. The generation of an arc, sparks, or heat at any point shall cause rejection of the structures as a ground circuit. When a structure or pipeline is continuously employed as a ground return circuit, all joints shall be bonded, and periodic inspections shall be conducted to ensure that no condition of electrolysis or fire hazard exists by virtue of such use. The frames of all arc welding and cutting machines shall be grounded either through a third wire in the cable containing the circuit conductor or through a separate wire which is grounded at the source of the current. Grounding circuits, other than by means of the structure, shall be checked to ensure that the circuit between the ground and the grounded power conductor has resistance low enough to permit sufficient current to flow to cause the fuse or circuit breaker to interrupt the current. All ground connections shall be inspected to ensure that they are mechanically strong and electrically adequate for the required current. Training Employers shall instruct employees in the safe means of arc welding and cutting as follows: 1. When electrode holders are to be left unattended, the electrodes shall be removed and the holders shall be so placed or protected that they cannot make electrical contact with employees or conducting objects. 2. Hot electrode holders shall not be dipped in water; to do so may expose the arc welder or cutter to electric shock. 3. When the arc welder or cutter has occasion to leave his work or to stop work for any appreciable length of time, or when the arc welding or cutting machine is to be moved, the power supply switch to the equipment shall be opened. 4. Any faulty or defective equipment shall be reported to the supervisor. Shielding Whenever practicable, all arc welding and cutting operations shall be shielded by noncombustible or flameproof screens which will protect employees and other persons working in the vicinity from the direct rays of the arc.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/08%3A_Welding_and_Cutting/8.01%3A_Introduction_to_Weldin.txt

Fire hazards When practical, objects to be welded, cut, or heated shall be moved to a designated safe location or, if the objects to be welded, cut, or heated cannot be readily moved, all movable fire hazards in the vicinity shall be taken to a safe place, or otherwise protected. If the object to be welded, cut, or heated cannot be moved and if all the fire hazards cannot be removed, positive means shall be taken to confine the heat, sparks, and slag, and to protect the immovable fire hazards from them. No welding, cutting, or heating shall be done where the application of flammable paints or the presence of other flammable compounds, or heavy dust concentrations creates a hazard. Fire extinguishing equipment Suitable fire extinguishing equipment shall be immediately available in the work area and shall be maintained in a state of readiness for instant use. When the welding, cutting, or heating operation is such that normal fire prevention precautions are not sufficient, additional personnel shall be assigned to guard against fire while the actual welding, cutting, or heating operation is being performed, and for a sufficient period of time after completion of the work to ensure that no possibility of fire exists. Such personnel shall be instructed as to the specific anticipated fire hazards and how the firefighting equipment provided is to be used. When welding, cutting, or heating is performed on walls, floors, and ceilings, since direct penetration of sparks or heat transfer may introduce a fire hazard to an adjacent area, the same precautions shall be taken on the opposite side as are taken on the side on which the welding is being performed. Confined Space For the elimination of possible fire in enclosed spaces as a result of gas escaping through leaking or improperly closed torch valves, the gas supply to the torch shall be positively shut off at some point outside the enclosed space whenever the torch is not to be used or whenever the torch is left unattended for a substantial period of time, such as during the lunch period. Overnight and at the change of shifts, the torch and hose shall be removed from the confined space. Open-end fuel gas and oxygen hoses shall be immediately removed from enclosed spaces when they are disconnected from the torch or other gas- consuming device. Containers Except when the contents are being removed or transferred, drums, pails and other containers, which contain or have contained flammable liquids, shall be kept closed. Empty containers shall be removed to a safe area separate from hot work operations or open flames. Drums, containers, or hollow structures which have contained toxic or flammable substances shall, before welding, cutting, or heating is undertaken on them, either be filled with water or thoroughly cleaned of such substances and ventilated and tested. Before heat is applied to a drum, container, or hollow structure, a vent or opening shall be provided for the release of any built-up pressure during the application of heat. Ventilation and Protection in Welding, Cutting and Heating Mechanical ventilation Either general mechanical or local exhaust ventilation shall be provided whenever welding, cutting, or heating is performed in a confined space. Mechanical ventilation shall meet the following requirements: 1. Mechanical ventilation shall consist of either general mechanical ventilation systems or local exhaust systems. 2. General mechanical ventilation shall be of sufficient capacity and so arranged as to produce the number of air changes necessary to maintain welding fumes and smoke within safe limits, as defined in Subpart D. 3. Local exhaust ventilation shall consist of freely movable hoods intended to be placed by the welder or burner as close as practicable to the work. This system shall be of sufficient capacity and so arranged as to remove fumes and smoke at the source and keep the concentration of them in the breathing zone within safe limits as defined in Subpart D. 4. Contaminated air exhausted from a working space shall be discharged into the open air or otherwise clear of the source of intake air. 5. All air replacing that withdrawn shall be clean and breathable. 6. Oxygen shall not be used for ventilation purposes, comfort cooling, blowing dust from clothing, or for cleaning the work area. Confined Spaces General or local exhaust ventilation is not required when sufficient ventilation cannot be obtained without blocking the means of access to the confined space. In these cases, employees in the confined space shall be protected by air line respirators in accordance with the requirements of Subpart E, and an employee on the outside of such a confined space shall be assigned to maintain communication with those working within it and to aid them in an emergency. When a welder must enter a confined space through a manhole or other small opening, means shall be provided for quickly removing him in case of emergency. When safety belts and lifelines are used for this purpose they shall be attached to the welder's body so that his body cannot be jammed in a small exit opening. An attendant with a pre-planned rescue procedure shall be stationed outside to observe the welder at all times and be capable of putting rescue operations into effect. Materials of toxic significance Welding, cutting, or heating in any enclosed spaces involving the following metals shall be performed with either general mechanical or local exhaust ventilation: 1. Zinc-bearing base or filler metals or metals coated with zinc-bearing materials. 2. Lead base metals. 3. Cadmium-bearing filler materials. 4. Chromium-bearing metals or metals coated with chromium-bearing materials. Welding, cutting, or heating in any enclosed spaces involving the following metals shall be performed with local exhaust ventilation or employees shall be protected by air line respirators in accordance with the requirements of Subpart E of this part: 1. Metals containing Lead or metals coated with Lead-bearing materials. 2. Cadmium-bearing or cadmium-coated base metals. 3. Metals coated with mercury-bearing metals. 4. Beryllium-containing base or filler metals. Because of its high toxicity, work involving beryllium shall be done with both local exhaust ventilation and air line respirators. Employees performing such operations in the open air shall be protected by filter-type respirators in accordance with the requirements of Subpart E except that employees performing such operations on beryllium-containing base or filler metals shall be protected by air line respirators in accordance with the requirements of Subpart E. Other employees exposed to the same atmosphere as the welders or burners shall be protected in the same manner as the welder or burner. General Provisions for Welding, Cutting and Heating Welding, cutting, and heating, which does not involve confined spaces, or materials which might present a toxic hazard, may normally be done without mechanical ventilation or respiratory protective equipment, but where, because of unusual physical or atmospheric conditions, an unsafe accumulation of contaminants exists, suitable mechanical ventilation or respiratory protective equipment shall be provided. Employees performing any type of welding, cutting, or heating shall be protected by suitable eye protective equipment in accordance with the requirements of Subpart E. Welding, Cutting and Heating of Preservative Coatings Before welding, cutting, or heating is commenced on any surface covered by a preservative coating whose flammability is not known, a test shall be made by a competent person to determine its flammability. Preservative coatings shall be considered to be highly flammable when scrapings burn with extreme rapidity. Precautions shall be taken to prevent ignition of highly flammable hardened preservative coatings. When coatings are determined to be highly flammable, they shall be stripped from the area to be heated to prevent ignition. In enclosed spaces, all surfaces covered with toxic preservatives shall be stripped of all toxic coatings for a distance of at least 4 inches from the area of heat application, or the employees shall be protected by air line respirators, meeting the requirements of Subpart E of this part. In the open air, employees shall be protected by a respirator, in accordance with requirements of Subpart E. The preservative coatings shall be removed a sufficient distance from the area to be heated to ensure that the temperature of the unstripped metal will not be appreciably raised. Artificial cooling of the metal surrounding the heating area may be used to limit the size of the area required to be cleaned. 8.A: Chapter 8 Review Questi Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Compressed gas cylinders shall be secured in an________position at all times except, if necessary, for short periods of time while cylinders are actually being hoisted or carried. 2. Cylinders containing oxygen or acetylene or other fuel gas shall not be taken into________ ________. 3. What is the correct procedure to follow if the valve on a fuel gas cylinder is opened and a leak around the valve stem is discovered? 4. Whenever practicable, all arc welding and cutting operations shall be________ by noncombustible or flameproof screens which will protect employees and other persons working in the vicinity from the direct rays of the arc. 5. When the welding, cutting, or heating operation is such that normal fire prevention precautions are not sufficient, additional________ shall be assigned to guard against fire while the actual welding, cutting, or heating operation is being performed and for a sufficient period of time after completion of the work to ensure that no possibility of fire exists. 6. Before welding, cutting, or heating is commenced on any surface covered by a preservative coating whose flammability is not known, a test shall be made by a________ ________ to determine its flammability. Multiple Choice: 7. Which of the following is or are an acceptable means for hoisting compressed gas cylinders: a. magnets b. cradles c. sling board d. pallet e. choker slings 8. Oxygen cylinders in storage shall be separated from fuel-gas cylinders or combustible materials (especially oil or grease), a minimum distance of________feet (6.1 m) or by a noncombustible barrier at least 5 feet (1.5m) high having a fire-resistance rating of at least one-half hour. a. 5 b. 10 c. 15 d. 20 True or False: (Circle the Correct Answer) 9. T or F Welding, cutting, and heating, which does not involve confined spaces, or materials, which might present a toxic hazard, may normally be done without mechanical ventilation or respiratory protective equipment. General: 10. What precautions must be followed when a welder must enter a confined space through a manhole or other small opening?

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/08%3A_Welding_and_Cutting/8.02%3A_Fire_Prevention.txt

“For safety is not a gadget but a state of mind.” – Eleanor Everet Overview Electrical safety is perhaps one of the areas in which engineering controls, work practice controls, and PPE together establish the sole objective of separating people from electricity. Electrical workers develop the knowledge and skills to ensure safe installation of electrical components and equipment, maintain electrical equipment, and even to operate electrical equipment. That same knowledge and skill is responsibly applied for the protection of themselves, other workers and the public at large. The electrician or qualified electrical worker serves as an engineering control. The correct application of skill based training, while adhering to national electric code requirements and safe work practices effectively eliminate electrical hazards. Chapter Objective: 1. Review the installation requirements for electrical systems as covered by Subpart K and the NEC. 2. Identify Safe Work Practices Required by OSHA. 3. Understand the Requirements for GFCI Protection. 4. Understand the Requirements for Electrical Lockout/Tagout. Learning Outcome: 1. Correlate the functions of machine guarding and electrical safeguarding. 2. Identify the engineering controls in electrical safety standards and equipment. Standards: 1926 Subpart K-Electrical, 1910 Subpart S-Electrical, 1926 Subpart K Electrical Key Terms: Approved, AEGCP, Approach distance, listed, gfci, qualified, safety related Mini-Lecture: Electrical Hazards, Electrical Safety Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Photo by Markus Spiske on Unsplash 09: Electrical Safety Working Safely with Electricity As a worker, you have a vested interest in working safely around electricity. It has a direct effect on how you perform your job tasks. The safe installation, maintenance, and operation of electrical equipment are essential for a safe workplace. Studies by OSHA have consistently shown that electrical accidents are a leading contributor to worker injuries and fatalities. Electrical shock is one of the four leading causes of death in construction with electrocutions accounting on average for 3% of the worker fatalities annually. Subpart K of the Construction Standards and Subpart S of the General Industry standards contain the requirements for electrical safety. Subpart K for construction is broken down into four major areas: Installation Safety Requirements, Safety-related Work Practices, Safety related Maintenance and Environmental Considerations and Safety requirements for Special Equipment. Subpart S of the general industry standards contains requirements for electric utilization systems, wiring design and protection, wiring methods, components, and equipment for general use, specific purpose equipment and installations, hazardous (classified) locations, and special systems. Applicable Regulations OSHA Subpart K contains the installation requirements, safety-related work practices, safety- related maintenance and environmental considerations, and safety requirements for special equipment. In addition, Section 1926.499 contains the definitions that are applicable to this part. There are also other related requirements for users, such as the National Electrical Code for installation requirements. Subpart K of the construction standard does not cover installations used for the generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy, including related communications, metering, control, and transformation installations. Installation Safety Requirements The scope of installation safety requirements applies to both electrical equipment and installations used to provide electrical power and light at the jobsite. The requirements apply to both temporary and permanent installations used on the jobsite, but not to pre-existing permanent installations. Equipment approval Subpart K of the Construction Standard requires, as does the National Electrical Code, that all electrical conductors and equipment be approved. The difference between the two is the way in which they define "approved". The NEC defines approved as being "acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.” OSHA defines approved as being listed by a national recognized testing laboratory. This is an important distinction. Installation provisions Installations provisions include: Identification of Disconnecting Means, Working Clearances, Entrance and Access to Workspace, Wiring Design and Protection, Wiring Methods and Equipment, Special Equipment Hazardous Locations, and Special systems. GFCI and Assured grounding program One area in which OSHA requirements differ from the NEC is ground-fault protection for personnel. OSHA standards still permit the use of an Assured Equipment Grounding Conductor Program to protect personnel on jobsites. Since 1996, the NEC has strictly limited the use of the AEGCP to receptacles other than 15 or 20-amp, 125-volt. Even though both strategies are approved, GFCI protection has an excellent performance record with less monitoring requirements. GFCI protection is required for all 125, 15 or 20-amp receptacles on construction jobsites, no matter where the power is taken from. GFCI protection protects employees against electrical shocks by continually monitoring the amount of current going to equipment and the amount that returns. When there is a difference of approximately 5mA the GFCI opens the circuit in as little as 1/40 of a second. GFCI protection, where so required, can be provided by individual GFCI protected receptacles, receptacles fed through other GFCI type receptacles, receptacles protected by a GFCI circuit breaker, or cord sets incorporating listed GFCI protection.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/09%3A_Electrical_Safety/9.01%3A_Introduction_to_Electric.txt

Safety-Related Work Practices Working on live parts Only qualified persons may work on electrical circuits or parts of equipment that have not been de-energized. Such persons shall be capable of working safely on energized circuits and shall be familiar with the proper use of special equipment PPE and insulating tools and materials. Guarding Barriers or other means of guarding shall be provided to ensure that workspace for electrical equipment is not used for passageways during the time energized parts are exposed. Fuses Where fuses are installed or removed with one or both terminals energized, only special tools insulated for the voltage shall be used. Approach distances Approach distances are the minimum distance that a person and the longest conductive object he or she may contact cannot come in contact with. Approach distances for overhead electrical lines are determined by the voltage of the lines and the qualifications of the persons working near the lines. Approach distances for unqualified persons are: • For voltages to ground of 50 kV and below - 10 feet • For voltages to ground over 50 kV - 10 feet plus 4 inches for every 10 kV over 50 kV. • For qualified persons the following approach distances are required: Overhead Power line Clearances Voltage Level Clearance Distance For voltages 300V and less Avoid Contact For Voltages over 300V but not over 750V 1 ft. 0 in. For Voltages over 750V but not over 2 kV 1 ft. 6 in. For Voltages over 2 kV but not over 15 kV 2 ft. 0 in. For Voltages over 15 kV but not over 37 kV 3 ft. 0 in. For Voltages over 37 kV but not over 87. 5 kV 3 ft. 6 in. For Voltages over 87. 5 kV but not over 121 kV 4 ft. 0 in For Voltages over 121 kV but not over 140 kV 4 ft. 6 in. Working near overhead lines Any vehicle or mechanical equipment capable of having parts of its structure elevated near overhead lines shall maintain a minimum working clearance of 10 feet. If the lines operate at a voltage to ground above 50 kV, the distance shall be increased 4 inches for every 10 kV over that voltage. If insulating barriers are installed to prevent contact with the lines, the clearances may be reduced to a distance which is within the working dimensions of the barrier, if the barriers are rated for voltage of the line and the barriers are not part of or an attachment to the vehicle or raised structure. Flexible cords Flexible cords connected to equipment shall not be used for raising or lowering the equipment. Extension cords shall not be fastened with staples, hung from nails, or suspended by wire. Re-energizing circuits After a circuit is de-energized by a circuit protective device, the circuit may not be manually re-energized until it has been determined that the equipment and circuit can be safely energized. Illumination Employees may not enter spaces containing exposed energized parts unless illumination is provided, which permits the employee to work safely. Confined or enclosed space Where employees work in a confined or enclosed space, such as a manhole that contains exposed energized parts, the employer shall provide and the employee shall use protective shields, protective barriers, or insulating material as necessary to avoid inadvertent contact with these parts. Portable ladders Portable ladders shall have non conductive side rails if they are used where the employee or the ladder could contact exposed energized parts. Conductive articles Conductive articles, such as jewelry and clothing, shall not be worn if they might contact exposed energized parts. Such articles may be worn if they are rendered nonconductive by covering, wrapping or other insulating means. This practice is not recommended. Lockout Tagout General When employees are exposed to contact with parts of fixed electric equipment or circuits which have been de-energized, the circuits shall be locked or tagged. Tagging Controls that are to be deactivated during the course of work on energized equipment or circuits shall be tagged. Disconnecting circuits The circuits and equipment to be worked on shall be disconnected from all electric energy sources. Control circuit devices, such as pushbuttons selector switches, and interlocks may not be used as the sole means for de-energizing circuits or equipment. Stored energy Stored electrical energy which might endanger personnel shall be released. Capacitors shall be discharged and high-capacitance elements shall be short-circuited and grounded if the energy might endanger personnel. Rendered inoperative Circuits shall be rendered inoperative and a tag placed at each point where the equipment or circuit could be energized. The best way to accomplish this is to use a lock and tag on each disconnecting means used to de-energize the equipment and circuits to be worked on. The lock shall prevent the operation of the disconnecting means unless undue force or tools are used. The tags shall contain a statement prohibiting operation of the disconnecting means and removal of the tag. Tags only Tags can only be applied if the equipment is not capable of being locked out or if the employer can demonstrate that the tagging procedure will be at least as effective as the use of a lock. When tags are used without locks, at least one additional safety measure, such as opening an extra disconnecting switch, must be taken to assure a level of safety, which is equivalent to that of the locks. Operating equipment Prior to beginning work on circuits or equipment that have been tagged or locked out; a qualified person shall operate the equipment operating controls to verify that the equipment is definitely de-energized. In addition a qualified person shall use test equipment to test the circuit elements and electrical parts to which the employees will be exposed to verify that the equipment is definitely de-energized. Re-energizing equipment When equipment that has been locked or tagged out is ready to be reenergized, a qualified person shall conduct tests and visual inspections to verify that all tools, equipment, electrical jumpers or grounds have been removed and the equipment or circuits can be safely re-energized. Removal of a lock or tag Tag or lock removal shall only be done by the employee who applied it. If that employee is absent from the workplace, the tag or lock can be removed only after the employer ensures that the employee who applied the tag or lock is not at the jobsite. The employee is aware that the lock or tag has been removed before he or she resumes work, and there is a visual determination that all employees are clear of the circuits and equipment. Safety-Related Maintenance and Environmental Considerations Equipment considerations The employer shall ensure that all wiring and equipment in hazardous locations shall be maintained in a dust-tight, dust-ignition proof, or explosion-proof condition, as appropriate. Environmental considerations Unless identified for the use in the operating environment, no conductors or equipment shall be installed in damp or wet locations that are exposed to gases, fumes, vapors, which may have a deteriorating effect or excessive temperature. Metal raceways, cable armor, boxes, cable sheathing, cabinets, elbows couplings, fittings, supports and support hardware shall be constructed of materials that are appropriate for the environment in which they are to be installed. Safety Requirements for Special Equipment Unsealed batteries shall be located in enclosures with outside vents or in well ventilated rooms and shall be arranged so as to prevent the escape of fumes, gases, or electrolyte spray into other areas. 9.A: Chapter 9 Review Question Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. The approach distance, for unqualified persons, for circuits operating at 50 kV and below is________ft. 2. ________ or other means of guarding shall be provided to ensure that workspace for electrical equipment is not used for passageways during the time energized parts are exposed. 3. The requirements for electrical safety are contained in Subpart________ of the Construction Standards and Subpart ________of the General Industry Standards. 4. Portable ladders shall have________ side rails if they are used where the employee or the ladder could contact exposed energized parts. 5. No conductors or equipment shall be installed in a wet or damp location, where exposed to gases, fumes, or vapors that may have deteriorating effect, or where exposed to excessive temperature unless it is________for such conditions. Multiple Choice: 6. When GFCI protection is used, it can be accomplished by the use of which of the following: a. ________ Individual GFCI type receptacles. b. ________ Receptacles fed through other GFCI type receptacles. c. ________ Receptacles protected with a GFCI type circuit breakers. d. ________ Cords sets incorporating listed GFCI protection. e. ________ Any of the above. True or False: (Circle the Correct Answer) 7. T or F Electrical shock is one of the four leading causes of death in the construction industry with electrocutions accounting for 17% of the worker fatalities. 8. T or F Flexible cords connected to equipment shall not be used for raising or lowering the equipment. 9. T or F Tags are permitted in lieu of lockout, only if the equipment is not capable of being locked out or if the employer can demonstrate that the tagging procedure will be as effective as the use of the lock. 10. T or F Control circuit devices, such as pushbutton selector switches, may be used as the sole means for de-energizing circuits or equipment.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/09%3A_Electrical_Safety/9.02%3A_Safety-Related_Work_Prac.txt

“At the end of the day, the goals are simple: safety and security.” – Jodi Rell Overview Scaffolds are temporary structures used to support a work crew and materials to aid in the construction, maintenance and repair of buildings, bridges and all other man-made structures. Scaffolds are widely used on site to get access to heights and areas that would be otherwise difficult to reach. One of the primary differences between a scaffold system and ladders is that the scaffold allows for focused (performance work) attention to a task with both hands on the task, with materials readily accessible. Ladders typically used for access restrict a workers ability to work with some fall risk with both hands on the task. There are many types of scaffolds and there is archeological evidence showing scaffolds were used in antiquity i.e. Great Wall of China. There are five main types of scaffolding used worldwide today. These are tube and coupler (fitting) components, prefabricated modular systems, H-frame / facade modular system scaffolds, timber scaffolds and bamboo scaffolds (particularly in China and India). No matter the type of scaffold, proper construction by competent and trained individuals is paramount. Scaffolds are engineered structures and safety equipment and must meet safety standards for construction and use. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine the Proper Type of Scaffolding for the Job. 2. Identify the purpose of Guardrails, Toeboards, Braces, Planks Platforms and Cleats. 3. Understand the Requirements of Subpart L- Scaffolding. 4. Understand the Application of OSHA Requirements for Scaffolding on Construction Sites. Learning Outcome: 1. Identify safety protocols for accessing a scaffold. 2. Describe the role of the scaffold competent person. Standards: 1926 Subpart l-Scaffolds, 1910 Subpart D Walking-Working Surfaces, 1910 Subpart F Powered Platforms, Man lifts, Vehicle-Mounted Work Platforms Key Terms: banding, cross-bracing, competent person, platform, registered professional engineer, suspension Mini-Lecture: Scaffold Safety Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Scaffold, Pixabay 10: Scaffold Safety Introduction Construction workers are often required to climb and work on scaffolding. Many times, workers are required to construct the scaffolding they are going to work on while in other areas the scaffolding will be constructed for them. Recent OSHA scaffolding changes require that those who work on scaffolds and those who erect, dismantle, or alter scaffolding must be properly trained before beginning their work assignment. General Requirements Applicability Subpart L applies to all scaffolds used in workplaces. It does not apply to crane or derrick suspended personnel platforms, which are covered by 1926.550(g). In addition, the criteria for aerial lifts are set out exclusively in 1926.453. Load requirements In general, each scaffold and scaffold component shall be capable of supporting, without failure, its own weight and at least 4 times the maximum intended load applied or transmitted to it. Scaffolds shall be designed by a qualified person and shall be constructed and loaded in accordance with that design. Planking or Decking Each platform on all working levels of scaffolds shall be fully planked or decked between the front uprights and the guardrail supports as follows: 1. Each platform unit (e.g., scaffold plank, fabricated plank, fabricated deck, or fabricated platform) shall be installed so that the space between adjacent units and the space between the platform and the uprights is no more than one inch wide, except where the employer can demonstrate that a wider space is necessary (for example, to fit around uprights when side brackets are used to extend the width of the platform).Where the employer makes such a demonstration, the platform shall be planked or decked as fully as possible and the remaining open space between the platform and the uprights shall not exceed nine inches. 2. The requirement to provide full planking or decking does not apply to platforms used solely as walkways or solely by employees performing scaffold erection or dismantling. In these situations, only the planking that the employer establishes is necessary to provide safe working conditions is required. Platform and Walkway Width In general, each scaffold platform and walkway shall be at least 18 inches wide. However, ladder jack scaffold, top plate bracket scaffold roof bracket scaffold, and pump jack scaffold shall be at least 12 inches wide. Where scaffolds must be used in areas that the employer can demonstrate are so narrow that platforms and walkways cannot be at least 18 inches wide, such platforms and walkways shall be as wide as feasible, and employees on those platforms and walkways shall be protected from fall hazards by the use of guardrails and/or personal fall arrest systems. Platform requirements The front edge of all platforms shall not be more than 14 inches from the face of the work, unless guardrail systems are erected along the front edge and/or personal fall arrest systems are used. Each end of a platform, unless cleated or otherwise restrained by hooks or equivalent means, shall extend over the centerline of its support at least 6 inches. Each end of a platform 10 feet or less in length shall not extend over its support more than 12 inches unless the platform is designed and installed so that the cantilevered portion of the platform is able to support employees and/or materials without tipping, or has guardrails which block employee access to the cantilevered end. Each platform greater than 10 feet in length shall not extend over its support more than 18 inches unless it is designed and installed so that the cantilevered portion of the platform is able to support employees without tipping, or has guardrails which block employee access to the cantilevered end. On scaffolds where scaffold planks are abutted to create a long platform, each abutted end shall rest on a separate support surface. This provision does not preclude the use of common support members such as "T" sections, to support abutting planks, or hook on platforms designed to rest on common supports. On scaffolds where platforms are overlapped to create a long platform, the overlap shall occur only over supports, and shall not be less than 12 inches unless the platforms are nailed together or otherwise restrained to prevent movement. At all points of a scaffold where the platform changes direction, such as turning a corner, any platform that rests on a bearer at an angle other than a right angle shall be laid first, and platforms which rest at right angles over the same bearer shall be laid second, on top of the first platform. Platform finishes Wood platforms shall not be covered with opaque finishes, except that platform edges may be covered or marked for identification. Platforms may be coated periodically with wood preservatives, fire-retardant finishes, and slip-resistant finishes; however, the coating may not obscure the top or bottom wood. Component compatibility Scaffold components manufactured by different manufacturers shall not be intermixed unless the components fit together without force and the scaffold's structural integrity is maintained by the user. Scaffold Access for all Employees Means of Access When scaffold platforms are more than 2 feet above or below a point of access, portable ladders, hook-on ladders, attachable ladders, stair towers (scaffold stairways/towers), stairway-type ladders (such as ladder stands), ramps, walkways, integral prefabricated scaffold access or direct access from another scaffold, structure, personnel hoist, or similar surface shall be used. Cross braces shall not be used as a means of access. Positioning Hook-on and attachable ladders shall be positioned so that their bottom rung is not more than 24 inches above the scaffold supporting level. When hook-on and attachable ladders are used on a supported scaffold more than 35 feet high, they shall have rest platforms at 35 foot maximum vertical intervals. Effective Date Effective September 1997, employees erecting or dismantling supported scaffolds shall be provided with a safe means of access where the provision of safe access is feasible and does not create a greater hazard. The employer shall have a competent person determine whether it is feasible or would pose a greater hazard to provide, and have employees use a safe means of access. This determination shall be based on site conditions and the type of scaffold being erected or dismantled. Hook-on or attachable ladders shall be installed as soon as scaffold erection has progressed to a point that permits safe installation and use. End Frames When erecting or dismantling tubular welded frame scaffolds, (end) frames, with horizontal members that are parallel, level and are not more than 22 inches apart vertically may be used as climbing devices for access, provided they are erected in a manner that creates a usable ladder and provides good handhold and foot space. Cross braces on tubular welded frame scaffolds shall not be used as a means of access or egress. Visible Defects Scaffolds and scaffold components shall be inspected for visible defects by a competent person before each work shift, and after any occurrence, which could affect a scaffold's structural integrity. Any part of a scaffold damaged or weakened such that its strength is significantly weakened shall be immediately repaired or replaced, braced, or removed from service until repaired. Moving Scaffolds shall not be moved horizontally while employees are on them unless they have been designed by a registered professional engineer specifically for such movement or, for mobile scaffolds, where the provisions of 1926.452(w) are followed. Clearance Scaffolds shall not be erected, used, dismantled, altered, or moved such that they or any conductive material handled on them might come closer to exposed and energized power lines as follows: Insulated Lines Overhead Power line Clearances Voltage Minimum Distance Alternatives Less than 300V 3 ft (0.9m) ************ *300 Volts to 50kV 10 ft (3.1m) ************ More than 50kV 10 ft (3.1m) plus 0.4 inches (1.0cm) for each 1kv over 50kV 2 times the length of the line insulator, but never less than 10ft (3.1 m) Uninsulated Lines Overhead Power line Clearances Voltage Minimum Distance Alternatives Less than 50kV 10 ft (3.1 m) ************ More than 50kV 10 ft (3.1 m) plus 0.4 inches (1.0 cm) for each 1kv over 50kV 2 times the length of the line insulator, but never less than 10ft (3.1 m) Note Scaffolds and materials may be closer to power lines than specified above where such clearance is necessary for performance of work, and only after the utility company, or electrical system operator, has been notified of the need to work closer and the utility company, or electrical system operator has de-energized the lines, relocated the lines, or installed protective coverings to prevent accidental contact with the lines. Moving, dismantling, or altering Scaffolds shall be erected, moved, dismantled, or altered only under the supervision and direction of a competent person qualified in scaffold erection, moving, dismantling or alteration. Such activities shall be performed only by experienced and trained employees selected for such work by the competent person. Slipping hazards Employees shall be prohibited from working on scaffolds covered with snow, ice, or other slippery material except as necessary for removal of such materials. Inclement Weather Work on or from scaffolds is prohibited during storms or high winds unless a competent person has determined that it is safe for employees to be on the scaffold and those employees are protected by a personal fall arrest system or wind screens. Wind screens shall not be used unless the scaffold is secured against the anticipated wind forces imposed. Work level height Makeshift devices, such as, but not limited to, boxes and barrels, shall not be used on top of scaffold platforms to increase the working level height of employees. Ladders shall not be used on scaffolds to increase the working level height of employees, except on large area scaffolds. Note "Large area scaffold" means a pole scaffold, tube and coupler scaffold, systems scaffold, or fabricated frame scaffold erected over substantially the entire work area. For example: a scaffold erected over the entire floor area of a room.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/10%3A_Scaffold_Safety/10.01%3A_Introduction_to_Scaffold_.txt

Scaffold Fall Protection General In general, each employee on a scaffold more than 10 feet above a lower level shall be protected from falling to the lower level. The types of fall protection to be provided to the employees depend on the type of scaffold used. The fall protection requirements for employees installing suspension scaffold support systems on floors, roofs, and other elevated surfaces are set forth in Subpart M. Effective Date Effective September 1997, the employer shall have a competent person determine the feasibility and safety of providing fall protection for employees erecting or dismantling supported scaffolds. Employers are required to provide fall protection for employees erecting or dismantling supported scaffolds where the installation and use of such protection is feasible and does not create a greater hazard. Personal Fall Arrest Systems In addition to meeting the requirements of 1926.502(d), personal fall arrest systems used on scaffolds shall be attached by lanyard to a vertical lifeline, horizontal lifeline, or scaffold structural member. Vertical lifelines shall not be used when overhead components, such as overhead protection or additional platform levels, are part of a single-point or two-point adjustable suspension scaffold. Guardrail Systems Guardrail systems installed to meet the requirements of this section shall comply with the following provisions: 1. Guardrail systems shall be installed along all open sides and ends of platforms. Guardrail systems shall be installed before the scaffold is released for use by employees other than erection/dismantling crews. 2. The top edge height of Toprails or equivalent member on supported scaffolds manufactured or placed in service after January, 2000 shall be installed between 38 inches and 45 inches above the platform surface. The top edge height on supported scaffolds manufactured and placed in service before January 2000, and on all suspended scaffolds where both a guardrail and a personal fall arrest system are required shall be between 36 inches and 45 inches. When conditions warrant, the height of the top edge may exceed the 45 inch height, provided the guardrail system meets all other criteria. 3. When Midrails, screens, mesh, intermediate vertical members solid panels, or equivalent structural members are used, they shall be installed between the top edge of the guardrail system and the scaffold platform. 4. When Midrails are used, they shall be installed at a height approximately midway between the top edge of the guardrail system and the platform surface. 5. When screens and mesh are used, they shall extend from the top edge of the guardrail system to the scaffold platform, and along the entire opening between the supports. 6. When intermediate members (such as balusters or additional rails) are used, they shall not be more than 19 inches apart. 7. Each top rail or equivalent member of a guardrail system shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, a force applied in any downward or horizontal direction at any point along its top edge of at least 100 pounds for guardrail systems installed on single-point adjustable suspension scaffolds or two-point adjustable suspension scaffolds, and at least 200 pounds for guardrail systems installed on all other scaffolds. 8. Midrails, screens, mesh, intermediate vertical members, solid panels, and equivalent structural members of a guardrail system shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, a force applied in any downward or horizontal direction at any point along the mid rail or other member of at least 75 pounds for guardrail systems with a minimum 100 pound Toprail capacity, and at least 150 pounds for guardrail systems with a minimum 200 pound Toprail capacity. 9. Guardrails shall be surfaced to prevent injury to an employee from punctures or lacerations, and to prevent snagging of clothing. 10. The ends of all rails shall not overhang the terminal posts except when such overhang does not constitute a projection hazard to employees. 11. Steel or plastic banding shall not be used as a Toprail or Midrail. 12. Manila or plastic (or other synthetic) rope being used for Toprails or Midrails shall be inspected by a competent person as frequently as necessary to ensure that it continues to meet the necessary strength requirements. 13. Crossbracing is acceptable in place of a Midrail when the crossing point of two braces is between 20 inches and 30 inches above the work platform or as a Toprail when the crossing point of two braces is between 38 inches and 48 inches above the work platform. The end points at each upright shall be no more than 48 inches apart. Falling object protection In addition to wearing hard hats each employee on a scaffold shall be provided with additional protection from falling hand tools, debris, and other small objects through the installation of toeboards, screens, or guardrail systems, or through the erection of debris nets, catch platforms, or canopy structures that contain or deflect the falling objects. When the falling objects are too large, heavy or massive to be contained or deflected by any of the above-listed measures, the employer shall place such potential falling objects away from the edge of the surface from which they could fall and shall secure those materials as necessary to prevent their falling. Falling object provisions Where there is a danger of tools, materials, or equipment falling from a scaffold and striking employees below, the following provisions apply: 1. The area below the scaffold to which objects can fall shall be barricaded, and employees shall not be permitted to enter the hazard area; or 2. A toeboard shall be erected along the edge of platforms more than 10 feet above lower levels for a distance sufficient to protect employees below, except on float (ship) scaffolds where an edging of 3/4 x 1-1/2 inch wood or equivalent may be used in lieu of toeboards; 3. Where tools, materials, or equipment are piled to a height higher than the top edge of the toeboard, paneling or screening extending from the toeboard or platform to the top of the guardrail shall be erected for a distance sufficient to protect employees below; or 4. A guardrail system shall be installed with openings small enough to prevent passage of potential falling objects; or 5. A canopy structure, debris net, or catch platform strong enough to withstand the impact forces of the potential falling objects shall be erected over the employees below. Toeboards Where used, toeboards shall be: 1. Capable of withstanding, without failure, a force of at least 50 pounds applied in any downward or horizontal direction at any point along the toeboard; and 2. At least three and one-half inches high from the top edge of the toeboard to the level of the walking/working surface. Toeboards shall be securely fastened in place at the outermost edge of the platform and have not more than 1/4 inch clearance above the walking/working surface. Toeboards shall be solid or with openings not over one inch in the greatest dimension. Fabricated Frame Scaffolds (Tubular Welded Frame Scaffolds) Moving Platforms When moving platforms to the next level, the existing platform shall be left undisturbed until the new end frames have been set in place and braced, prior to receiving the new platforms. Securing Frames and panels shall be braced by cross, horizontal, or diagonal braces, or combination thereof, which secure vertical members together laterally. The cross braces shall be of such length as will automatically square and align vertical members so that the erected scaffold is always plumb, level, and square. All brace connections shall be secured. Frames and panels shall be joined together vertically by coupling or stacking pins or equivalent means. Where uplift can occur which would displace scaffold end frames or panels, the frames or panels shall be locked together vertically by pins or equivalent means. Scaffolds over 125 feet (38. 0 m) in height above their base plates shall be designed by a registered professional engineer, and shall be constructed and loaded in accordance with such design.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/10%3A_Scaffold_Safety/10.02%3A_Scaffold_Fall_Protection.txt

Aerial Lifts Types Aerial lifts include the following types of vehicle-mounted aerial devices used to elevate personnel to job-sites above ground: • Extendable boom platforms • Aerial ladders • Articulating boom platforms • Vertical towers • A combination of any such devices. Employee positioning Employees shall always stand firmly on the floor of the basket, and shall not sit or climb on the edge of the basket or use planks, ladders, or other devices for a work position. Restraint Systems Belting off to an adjacent pole, structure, or equipment while working from an aerial lift shall not be permitted. A body belt shall be worn and a lanyard attached to the boom or basket when working from an aerial lift. Note: As of January, 1998, subpart M of this part (1926.502(d)) provides that body belts are not acceptable as part of a personal fall arrest system. The use of a body belt in a tethering system or in a restraint system is acceptable and is regulated under 1926.502(e). Load Capacity Boom and basket load limits specified by the manufacturer shall not be exceeded. An aerial lift truck shall not be moved when the boom is elevated in a working position with men in the basket, except for equipment which is specifically designed for this type of operation. Controls Articulating boom and extensible boom platforms, primarily designed as personnel carriers, shall have both platform (upper) and lower controls. Upper controls shall be in or beside the platform within easy reach of the operator. Lower controls shall provide for overriding the upper controls. Controls shall be plainly marked as to their function. Lower level controls shall not be operated unless permission has been obtained from the employee in the lift, except in case of emergency. Training Requirements Hazard training The employer shall have each employee who performs work while on a scaffold trained by a person qualified in the subject matter to recognize the hazards associated with the type of scaffold being used and to understand the procedures to control or minimize those hazards. The training shall include the following areas, as applicable: 1. The nature of any electrical hazards, fall hazards and falling object hazards in the work area; 2. The correct procedures for dealing with electrical hazards and for erecting, maintaining, and disassembling the fall protection systems and falling object protection systems being used; 3. The proper use of the scaffold, and the proper handling of materials on the scaffold; 4. The maximum intended load and the load-carrying capacities of the scaffolds used; and 5. Any other pertinent requirements of this subpart. Training Topics The employer shall have each employee who is involved in erecting, disassembling, moving, operating, repairing, maintaining, or inspecting a scaffold trained by a competent person to recognize any hazards associated with the work in question. The training shall include the following topics, as applicable: 1. The nature of scaffold hazards; 2. The correct procedures for erecting, disassembling, moving, operating, repairing, inspecting, and maintaining the type of scaffold in question; 3. The design criteria, maximum intended load-carrying capacity and intended use of the scaffold; 4. Any other pertinent requirements of this subpart. Retraining When the employer has reason to believe that an employee lacks the skill or understanding needed for safe work involving the erection, use or dismantling of scaffolds, the employer shall retrain each such employee so that the requisite proficiency is regained. 10.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. In general, each scaffold and scaffold component shall be capable supporting, without failure, its own weight and at least times the maximum intended load applied or transmitted to it. 2. In general, each platform on all working levels of scaffolds shall be or decked between the front uprights in the guardrail supports. 3. The front edge of all platforms shall not be more than ________ inches from the face of the work, unless guardrail systems are erected along the front edge and/or personal fall arrest systems are used. 4. Each platform greater than 10 feet in length shall not extend over its support more than ________inches, unless it is designed and installed so that the cantilevered portion of the platform is able to support employees without tipping, or has guardrails which block employee access to the cantilevered end. 5. Scaffold components manufactured by different manufactures shall not be________ unless the components fit together without force and the scaffold's structural integrity is maintained by the user. 6. Guardrail systems shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, a force of at least________ pounds (890 N) applied within________inches (5.1 cm) of the top edge, in any outward or downward direction, at any point along the top edge. 7. Cross braces on tubular Weldon frame scaffold________ be used as a means of access or egress. 8. Only ________person(s) shall operate an aerial lift. 9. In addition to wearing________ each employee on a scaffold shall be provided with additional protection from falling hand tools, debris, and other small objects through the installation of toeboards, screens, or guardrail systems, or through the erection of debris nets, catch platforms, or canopy structures that contain or deflect the falling objects. 10. Scaffolds shall be erected, moved, dismantled, or altered only under the supervision and direction of a________ qualified in scaffold erection, moving, dismantling or alteration. Such activity shall be performed only by experienced and trained employees selected for such work by the competent person.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/10%3A_Scaffold_Safety/10.03%3A_Aerial_Lifts.txt

“Do not think because an accident hasn’t happened to you that it can’t happen.” – Safety saying, early 1900’s Overview Slips, trips, and Falls account for 20% of all accidents, injuries, and fatalities in the workplace and up to 37% in construction environments. There is probably no one who has escaped a stumble, slip, or trip whether at work or play. Walking and working surfaces must be in conditions that do not contribute to falls. Elevated working surfaces which include rooftops, scaffolds, elevated platforms, and even ladders must meet the same standards for cleanliness, evenness, and capacity. The first duty is to prevent a fall from occurring at all. The discussion that follows focuses on protecting workers if a fall should occur and describing the options for managing fall hazards. Chapter Objective: 1. Understand the Purpose of Fall Protection. 2. Determine the Proper use of Floor Coverings to Prevent Falls. 3. Be Aware of when Fall Protection is required. 4. Apply the Provisions of the Fall Protection Standard. 5. Discuss the Various Systems and Practices for Meeting the Fall Protection Standard. Learning Outcome: 1. Apply the hierarchy of controls to fall prevention methods. 2. Describe the requirements for training and certification under Subpart M. Standards: 1926 Subpart M-Fall Protection, 1910 Subpart D Walking-Working Surfaces, 1910 Subpart F Powered Platforms, Man lifts, Vehicle-Mounted Work Platforms Key Terms: Anchorage, Controlled Access Zones, Fall positioning device, Leading Edge, PFA Mini-Lecture: Fall Hazards, Fall Protection Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Falling, Pixabay free license 11: Fall Protection Introduction Falls are the leading cause of worker fatalities in all industries but especially in the construction industry. OSHA's Fall Protection standard became effective on February 1995. The major parts of the Fall Protection standard are; Scope & Application, Duty to have Fall Protection, Fall Protection System Criteria and Practices, and Training Requirements. An employer’s responsibility is to first prevent falls from occurring at all, Maintaining work surfaces in good condition and providing physical supports for access to higher elevations and physical barriers along drop offs and leading edges is the primary method for controlling falls and preventing deaths. Applicable Regulations The requirements of Subpart M, Fall Protection, apply to the construction industry. The provisions of Subpart M do not apply to employees who are making an inspection, investigation, or assessment of workplace conditions either before work begins or after work has been completed. However if these efforts are focused and laborious then fall protection should be considered. Fall Protection requirements for employees working on scaffolds are included in Subpart L. Employees working on stairways and ladders are covered by Subpart X. Requirements for employees engaged in the construction of electric transmission and distribution lines are contained in Subpart V. Duty to Have Fall Protection The Fall Protection standard sets up a uniform threshold height of six feet for determining when fall protection is required. The following activities require fall protection: 1. Leading Edges - Where employees are constructing a leading edge six feet or more above lower levels. 2. Walking/Working surfaces - Locations six feet or more above a lower level where the leading edge is under construction but the employee is not engaged in the leading edge work. 3. Hoist Areas - Employees working in a hoist area six feet or more above a lower level. 4. Holes - Employees shall be protected against falls through holes, including skylights, more than six feet above a lower level. 5. Form work and Reinforcing Steel - Employees on the face of formwork or reinforcing steel where the height is six feet or more above lower levels. 6. Ramps & Runways - Employees working on ramps or runways more than six feet above a lower level. 7. Excavations - Employees on the edge of an excavation six feet or more in depth. 8. Dangerous Equipment - Employees working less than six feet above dangerous equipment. 9. Overhead Bricklaying - Employees performing overhand bricklaying work more than six feet above lower levels. 10. Roofing work on low-slope roofs. 11. Steep Roofs. 12. Precast Concrete Erection. 13. Residential Construction. 14. Wall openings - Employees working on, at, above, or near wall openings where the outside bottom edge of the wall openings is six feet or more above lower levels. 15. Other walking/working surfaces not covered above. 16. Several of the activities contain an exception that permits the employees to work without fall protection when the employer can demonstrate that fall protection is infeasible or creates a greater hazard by its use. Falling Objects Employers must also provide protection for employees who are exposed to falling objects, Exposed employees must wear a hard hat and one of the following three measures must be implemented: 1. Use toe boards, screen, or guardrail systems to prevent the objects from falling. 2. Use a canopy structure and keep objects far enough from the edge so they cannot accidentally be pushed over the edge. 3. Use a barricade system to prevent employees from entering areas where objects may fall. Covers When covers are used to provide protection against holes in floors, roofs, and other working/walking surfaces, they shall meet the following criteria: 1. Covers must be secured when installed so as to prevent displacement by the wind, equipment or employees. 2. All covers shall be marked with the word "HOLE" or “COVER" or they shall be color coded to provide warning of the hazard. 3. Covers installed in roadways or aisles shall be capable of supporting, without failure, at least twice the maximum axle load of the largest vehicle expected to cross over the cover. 4. All other covers shall be capable of supporting, without failure, at least twice the weight of employees, equipment and materials that may be imposed upon the cover at any one time. Fall Protection System Criteria and Practices Guardrail Systems Definition A barrier erected to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. Requirements Where guardrail systems are used to meet the requirement of fall protection the guardrail system shall comply with all of the following provisions: 1. The top edge of the rail height shall be 42", plus or minus three inches. 2. Midrails, screens, mesh, vertical members or equivalent shall be installed between the top edge of the rail and the working surface unless a parapet wall of at least 21" is present. If vertical members are used they must not exceed 19" center to center spacing. If mesh is used it shall extend from the top rail to the working surface. 3. Guardrails must be capable of withstanding a 200Ib. downward & outward force applied within two inches from the top rail at any point along the top edge. 4. When the 200Ib. force is applied the top rail shall not be deflected to a height of less than 39" above the working surface. 5. Midrails, screen mesh, vertical members, panels, etc., shall be capable of withstanding a 150Ib. force applied in any downward or outward direction. 6. Guardrail surfaces shall be free from any materials or rough edges that may cause punctures or lacerations or snagging of clothing. 7. The ends of the top rails and Midrails shall not overhang the terminal posts, unless the projection does not create a hazard. 8. Top rails shall not be constructed of steel or plastic banding. 9. The minimum diameter or thickness for top rails and Midrails is 1/4". If wire rope is used for the top rail it must be flagged at intervals not exceeding six feet with a high- visibility material. 10. Guardrail systems at holes shall be erected on all unprotected sides or edges of the hole. Safety Net Systems Definition A system which utilizes a drop-tested net placed below the working surface to provide fall protection for employees. Requirements Where safety net systems are used to meet the requirement of fall protection the safety net system shall comply with all of the following provisions: 1. Safety systems must be installed as close as practicable to the working surface. In no case shall the net be installed more than 30' below such level. 2. Safety nets must be installed so that they have sufficient clearance to prevent contact with structures below. 3. Safety nets shall be drop tested at the jobsite after the initial installation and before being used as a fall protection system. Safety nets must be retested after being relocated after major repair and at six-month intervals, if in one place. 4. Drop tests shall consist of a 400Ib, bag of sand being dropped into the net from the highest surface at which employees will be working but in no case less than 42" above that level. 5. Defective nets shall not be used. Safety nets shall be inspected at least once a week for wear, damage, or other deterioration. 6. Materials, scrap pieces, equipment and tools which have fallen into the net must be removed as soon as possible and at least before the next work shift. The maximum size of safety net openings shall not exceed 36sq. inches. Individual openings shall not exceed six inches on any side.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/11%3A_Fall_Protection/11.01%3A_Introduction_to_Fall_Prot.txt

Personal Fall Arrest Systems Definition A system which consists of an anchorage connectors, body belt, or body harness, and may include a lanyard deceleration device, lifeline, or combination of the above, used by an employee to arrest falls. Requirements Where personal fall arrest systems are used to meet the requirement of fall protection the personal fall arrest system shall comply with all of the following provisions: 1. Effective January, 1998, body belts are not permitted as part of a personal fall arrest system. Body belts will be permitted for the purpose of a positioning device only. 2. Personal fall arrest systems must be inspected prior to each use for damage and wear. Defective components must be replaced. 3. D-rings and snaphooks must have a minimum tensile strength of 5,000Ibs. 4. Effective January, 1998, only locking type snaphooks shall be used. Snaphooks must be compatible with the member to which they are connected unless they are of the locking type. 5. Lanyards and vertical lifelines shall have a minimum breaking strength of 5,000Ibs. Ropes and straps or webbing used in lanyards shall be made of synthetic fibers. 6. Anchorages used for personal fall arrest systems shall be independent of those used to support platforms. Anchorage points shall be capable of supporting at least 5,000Ibs. 7. The attachment point of the body belt must be located in the center of the wearer's back. The attachment point for a body harness shall be located in the center of the wearer's back near shoulder level or above the wearer's head. 8. Body belts, harnesses and other components of a personal fall arrest system shall not be used to hoist materials. 9. Personal fall arrest systems shall not be attached to guardrail systems. Positioning Device System Definition A system which utilize a body belt or body harness rigged in a manner which permits the employee to be supported on an elevated vertical surface, such as a wall, and work with both hands free. Requirements If positioning device systems are used they shall comply with all of the following provisions: 1. The total length of a worker's free fall cannot exceed two feet. 2. Position device anchorage points must be capable of supporting twice the potential impact load of an employee's fall or 3,000Ibs, whichever is greater. 3. All of the components for positioning device systems, such as, snaphooks, D-rings, etc., must meet the same criteria as those for personal fall arrest systems. 4. Positioning device systems must be inspected prior to each use for wear, damage or other deterioration. Warning Line System Definition A form of barrier erected on a roof to warn employees that they are approaching an unprotected roof side or edge and which designates an area in which roofing work may take place without the use of guardrails, safety nets, or fall arrest systems. Requirements If warning line systems are used, they shall comply with all of the following provisions: 1. The warning line system must be erected around all sides of the roof work area. 2. The warning lines shall be erected at least six feet from the roof edge when no mechanical equipment is being used. If mechanical equipment is being used, the warning lines must be erected at least six feet from the parallel roof edge and 10' from the perpendicular roof edge to the direction in which the mechanical equipment operates. 3. Warning lines shall consist of ropes, wires or chains. The lines shall be installed so that its lowest point is at least 34" from the working surface and no greater than 39" from the working surface. 4. Warning lines shall be flagged at intervals not exceeding six feet with a high- visibility material. 5. Warning lines shall be supported by stanchions and attached in such a manner so that pulling on one section of the line between stanchions will not result in slack being taken up in the adjacent section before the stanchion tips over. Safety Monitoring Systems Definition A Safety Monitoring System is a safety system in which a competent person is responsible for recognizing and warning employees of fall hazards. Requirements If safety monitoring systems are used they shall comply with all of the following provisions: 1. If no other fall protection system has been implemented, the employer must use a safety monitoring system. The employer shall appoint a competent person to monitor the safety of the workers. 2. The competent person must have knowledge in fall hazard recognition, and must be capable of warning workers of fall hazard dangers and in detecting unsafe work practices. 3. The competent person must operate from the same working surface on which the employees work so he/she can be seen. 4. The competent person has to be close enough to the workers that he/she can communicate orally with the workers. The competent person can have no other duties which distract from the monitoring function. 5. Mechanical equipment shall not be used or stored in areas where safety monitor systems are being used to monitor employees engaged in roofing operations. 11.03: Controlling access Controlled Access Zones Definition A Controlled Access Zone is an area in which certain work, such as overhead bricklaying, may take place without the use of a guardrail system, personal fall arrest system or safety net system. The access to the area where the work is performed is strictly controlled. Requirements If controlled access zones are used they must meet all of the following conditions: 1. When a controlled access zone is in place the area must be defined by control lines or any other means to restrict access. 2. Control lines shall consist of ropes, wires, tapes, or the equivalent. 3. Each control line must be marked at six feet intervals with a high visibility material. Training Requirements Employers must provide fall protection training for every employee who might be exposed to fall hazards. The training must include recognition of fall hazards and steps to minimize the hazards. The following areas must be covered in the fall protection training: 1. The nature of fall hazards in the work area. 2. The correct procedures for installing, maintaining, disassembling and inspecting fall protection systems. 3. The use and operation of controlled access zones and guardrail, personal fall arrest, safety net, warning line and safety monitoring systems. 4. The role of each employee in a safety monitoring system. 5. The limitations of mechanical equipment used during the performance of roofing work. 6. The correct procedures for equipment and material handling and storage and the erection of overhead protection. 7. The employee's role in fall protection plans. 11.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Employees working along, at, above or near wall openings where the outside bottom edge of the wall openings is­­­ ­­­­­­­­­­feet or more above lower levels must have fall protection provided. 2. The Fall Protection Standard sets up a uniform threshold of ________ feet for determining when fall protection is required. 3. The top height of the guardrail shall be________inches, plus or as a minus 3 inches. 4. Safety net systems must be installed as close as practical to the working surface and in no case more than ________ feet below such level. 5. Where no mechanical equipment is being used, warning lines must be located at least________ feet from the roof edge. 6. Guardrails must be capable the standing a ________ pound downward force applied within ________inches of the top rail at any point along the top edge. 7. Covers for floor openings must be marked with the word ________or ________or shall be color-coded to provide warning of the hazard. 8. The attachment point for a body harness, used for fall protection, shall be located where? True or False: (Circle the Correct Answer) 1. Several types of activities covered by the standard can be performed without fall protection provided the employer can demonstrate the fall protection is infeasible or creates a great hazard by its use. T or F 2. If no other fall protection system has been implemented the employer must have a safety monitoring system. T of F

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/11%3A_Fall_Protection/11.02%3A_Personal_Fall_Arrest_Syst.txt

“You don’t need to know the whole alphabet of Safety. The A, B, C of it will save you if you follow it: Always Be Careful.” – Colorado School of Mines Magazine Overview Cranes and hoists continue the discussion on materials handling. As equipment goes, they are the heavy lifters and very versatile. Cranes are typically used to lift loads that are critical for some important application, expensive, and needing to be placed in unique or hard to reach locations. Hoists like cranes can be mobile or fixed. There are hoists that lift people although mostly today they are often referred to as aerial or man lifts. Much of the focus on crane safety targets equipment inspection and maintenance. Crane operators must also be qualified having received extensive training and certification of competency. Crane operators are competent persons. Together the material rigger and crane operator bear the ultimate responsibility for a safe lift. Lastly, a special type of crane, the derrick, is often associated with oil drilling on land and in the ocean. They typically resemble a tripod with the lift or hoist mechanism in the center of the equipment. Many of the standards discussed in this chapter apply to both crane and derrick although the focus will be on cranes in construction environments. Chapter Objective: 1. Identify the acceptable approach distances for cranes and derricks working in the vicinity of electrical transmission and distribution. 2. Review the requirements for the hoisting of personnel platforms from cranes or derricks. 3. Discuss the various systems and practices that ensure crane, hoist, and aerial lift safety. Learning Outcome: 1. Describe the proper implementation of safety requirements for cranes and derricks under 1926.550 2. Describe conformance requirements of Subpart N for aerial lifts used to elevate personnel to jobsites above-ground. 3. Summarize the major safety concerns for material and personnel hoists and jobsite elevators. Standards: 1926 Subpart CC-Cranes and Derricks in Construction, 1926 Subpart N Helicopters, Hoists, Elevators, and Conveyors, 1910 Subpart F Powered Platforms, Man lifts, Vehicle-Mounted Work Platforms, 1910 Subpart N Materials Handling and Storage Key Terms: Clearance, gauge, proof test, sling, tag line Mini-Lecture: Crane Safety Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Tower Cranes, Pixabay, Free License 12: Crane and Hoists Safety Cranes in Construction The use of cranes on construction sites is becoming more and more prevalent. All types and sizes of cranes are constructed today to meet the many different needs of the construction industry. Overall, these cranes have an excellent safety record on the job. Unfortunately, due to the nature of the work they perform, when there is an accident, fatalities often occur and the extent and cost of the damage to the equipment and the construction site can be extensive. The purpose of this discussion will be to review some basics of crane safety that can help personnel at construction sites determine what hazards could exist as a result of the use of the crane. It is not the intent of this review to prepare anyone to perform inspections of cranes to determine their working condition. That task can take years of experience and should only be performed by competent persons who have been properly trained. Applicable Regulations Subpart N, contains seven separate standards related to the use of cranes, derricks, hoists, elevators and conveyors. The standards which are most closely related to construction work will be covered in this lesson. Cranes and Derricks - General Provisions Specifications and limitations The employer shall comply with the manufacturer's specifications and limitations applicable to the operation of any and all cranes and derricks. Where manufacturer's specifications are not available, the limitations assigned to the equipment shall be based on the determinations of a qualified engineer competent in this field and such determinations will be appropriately documented and recorded. Attachments used with cranes shall not exceed the capacity, rating, or scope recommended by the manufacturer. Rated capacities Rated load capacities, and recommended operating speeds, special hazard warnings or instructions, shall be conspicuously posted on all equipment. Instructions or warnings shall be visible to the operator while he is at his control station. Hand Signals Hand signals to crane and derrick operators shall be those prescribed by the applicable ANSI standard for the type of crane in use. An illustration of the signals shall be posted at the job site. Inspection of machinery The employer shall designate a competent person who shall inspect all machinery and equipment prior to each use, and during use, to make sure it is in safe operating condition. Any deficiencies shall be repaired, or defective parts replaced, before continued use. A thorough annual inspection of the hoisting machinery shall be made by a competent person, or by a government or private agency recognized by the U. S. Department of Labor. The employer shall maintain a record of the dates and results of inspections for each hoisting machine and piece of equipment. Guarding Belts, gears, shafts, pulleys, sprockets, spindles, drums, fly wheels, chains, or other reciprocating, rotating, or other moving parts or equipment shall be guarded if such parts are exposed to contact by employees, or otherwise create a hazard. Swing Radius Accessible areas within the swing radius of the rear of the rotating superstructure of the crane, either permanently or temporarily mounted shall be barricaded in such a manner as to prevent an employee from being struck or crushed by the crane. Equipment exhaust Whenever internal combustion engine powered equipment emits exhausts in enclosed spaces, tests shall be made and recorded to see that employees are not exposed to unsafe concentrations of toxic gases or oxygen deficient atmospheres. Fire Protection An accessible fire extinguisher of 5BC rating, or higher, shall be available at all operator stations or cabs of equipment. All employees shall be kept clear of loads about to be lifted and of suspended loads. Cranes and Derricks - Working Clearances Working in proximity to energized electrical lines Except where electrical distribution and transmission lines have been de-energized and visibly grounded at point of work or where insulating barriers, and are not a part of or an attachment to the equipment or machinery, and have been erected to prevent physical contact with the lines, equipment or machines shall be operated proximate to power lines only in accordance with the following: 1. For lines rated 50kV or below, minimum clearance between the lines and any part of the crane or load shall be 10 feet. 2. For lines rated over 50kV, minimum clearance between the lines and any part of the crane or load shall be 10 feet plus 0.4 inch for each 1kV over 50kV, or twice the length of the line insulator, but never less than 10 feet. 3. In transit with no load and boom lowered, the equipment clearance shall be a minimum of 4 feet for voltages less than 50kV, and 10 feet for voltages over 50kV, up to and including 345kV, and 16 feet for voltages up to and including 750kV. Designated person A person shall be designated to observe clearance of the equipment and give timely warning for all operations when it is difficult for the operator to maintain the desired clearance by visual means. Cage-type boom guards, insulating links, or proximity warning devices may be used on cranes, but the use of such devices shall not alter the requirements of any other regulation of this part even if such device is required by law or regulation. Overhead Wire Any overhead wire shall be considered to be an energized line unless and until the person owning such line or the electrical utility authorities indicate that it is not an energized line and it has been visibly grounded. Transmitter Towers Prior to work near transmitter towers where an electrical charge can be induced in the equipment or materials being handled, the transmitter shall be de-energized or tests shall be made to determine if electrical charge is induced on the crane. The following precautions shall be taken when necessary to dissipate induced voltages: 1. The equipment shall be provided with an electrical ground directly to the upper rotating structure supporting the boom; and 2. Ground jumper cables shall be attached to materials being handled by boom equipment when electrical charge is induced while working near energized transmitters. Crews shall be provided with nonconductive poles having large alligator clips or other similar protection to attach the ground cable to the load. 3. Combustible and flammable materials shall be removed from the immediate area prior to operations. Equipment modifications No modifications or additions, which affect the capacity or safe operation of the equipment, shall be made by the employer without the manufacturer's written approval. If such modifications or changes are made, the capacity, operation, and maintenance instruction plates, tags or decals, shall be changed accordingly. In no case shall the original safety factor of the equipment be reduced. Crane or Derrick Suspended Personnel Platforms General requirements The use of a crane or derrick to hoist employees on a personnel platform is prohibited, except when the erection, use, and dismantling of conventional means of reaching the worksite, such as a personnel hoist, ladder, stairway, aerial lift, elevating work platform or scaffold, would be more hazardous, or is not possible because of structural design or worksite conditions. Hoisting of personnel Hoisting of the personnel platform shall be performed in a slow, controlled cautious manner with no sudden movements of the crane or derrick, or the platform. Load lines Load lines shall be capable of supporting, without failure, at least seven times the maximum intended load, except that where rotation resistant rope is used, the lines shall be capable of supporting without failure, at least ten times the maximum intended load. Brakes and locking devices Load and boom hoist drum brakes, swing brakes, and locking devices such as pawls or dogs shall be engaged when the occupied personnel platform is in a stationary position. Crane leveling The crane shall be uniformly level within one percent of level grade and located on firm footing. Cranes equipped with outriggers shall have them all fully deployed following manufacturer's specifications, insofar as applicable, when hoisting employees. Load capacity The total weight of the loaded personnel platform and related rigging shall not exceed 50 percent of the rated capacity for the radius and configuration of the crane or derrick. Live Booms The use of machines having live booms (booms in which lowering is controlled by a brake without aid from other devices which slow the lowering speeds) is prohibited. Positive acting device A positive acting device shall be used which prevents contact between the load block or overhaul ball and the boom tip (anti-two-blocking device), or a system shall be used which deactivates the hoisting action before damage occurs in the event of a two-blocking situation (two-block damage prevention feature). Lowering of hoist The load line hoist drum shall have a system or device on the power train other than the load hoist brake, which regulates the lowering rate of speed of the hoist mechanism (controlled load lowering). Free fall is prohibited.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/12%3A_Crane_and_Hoists_Safety/12.01%3A_Introduction_to_C.txt

Personnel Platforms Design criteria The personnel platform and suspension system shall be designed by a qualified engineer or a qualified person competent in structural design. The suspension system shall be designed to minimize tipping of the platform due to movement of employees occupying the platform. The personnel platform itself, except the guardrail system and personnel fall arrest system anchorages, shall be capable of supporting, without failure, its own weight and at least five times the maximum intended load. Criteria for guardrail systems and personal fall arrest system anchorages are contained in Subpart M, Fall Protection. Platform specifications Guardrails Each personnel platform shall be equipped with a guardrail system which meets the requirements of Subpart M, and shall be enclosed at least from the toeboard to mid-rail with either solid construction or expanded metal having openings no greater than ½ inch. A grab rail shall be installed inside the entire perimeter of the personnel platform. Access gates Access gates, if installed, shall not swing outward during hoisting. Access gates, including sliding or folding gates, shall be equipped with a restraining device to prevent accidental opening. Headroom shall be provided which allows employees to stand upright in the platform. Protection from falling objects In addition to the use of hard hats, employees shall be protected by overhead protection on the personnel platform when employees are exposed to falling objects. Rough edges All rough edges exposed to contact by employees shall be surfaced or smoothed in order to prevent injury to employees from punctures or lacerations. Welding All welding of the personnel platform and its components shall be performed by a qualified welder familiar with the weld grades, types, and material specified in the platform design. Platform marking The personnel platform shall be conspicuously posted with a plate or other permanent marking which indicates the weight of the platform, and its rated load capacity or maximum intended load. Load capacity The personnel platform shall not be loaded in excess of its rated load capacity. When a personnel platform does not have a rated load capacity, then the personnel platform shall not be loaded in excess of its maximum intended load. Number of employees The number of employees occupying the personnel platform shall not exceed the number required for the work being performed. Platform use Personnel platforms shall be used only for employees, their tools and the materials necessary to do their work, and shall not be used to hoist only materials or tools when not hoisting personnel. Securing of materials and tools Materials and tools for use during a personnel lift shall be secured to prevent displacement. Materials and tools for use during a personnel lift shall be evenly distributed within the confines of the platform while the platform is suspended. Personnel Platforms - Rigging Wire Rope When a wire rope bridle is used to connect the personnel platform to the load line, each bridle leg shall be connected to a master link or shackle in such a manner to ensure that the load is evenly divided among the bridle legs. Hooks Hooks on overhaul ball assemblies, lower load blocks, or other attachment assemblies shall be of a type that can be closed and locked, eliminating the hook throat opening. Alternatively, an alloy anchor type shackle with a bolt, nut and retaining pin may be used. Component rating Wire rope, shackles, rings, master links, and other rigging hardware must be capable of supporting, without failure, at least five times the maximum intended load applied or transmitted to that component. Where rotation resistant rope is used, the slings shall be capable of supporting without failure at least ten times the maximum intended load. All eyes in wire rope slings shall be fabricated with thimbles. Bridles Bridles and associated rigging for attaching the personnel platform to the hoist line shall be used only for the platform and the necessary employees, their tools and the materials necessary to do their work and shall not be used for any other purpose when not hoisting personnel. Trial Lift A trial lift with the unoccupied personnel platform loaded at least to the anticipated lift weight shall be made from ground level, or any other location where employees will enter the platform to each location at which the personnel platform is to be hoisted and positioned. This trial lift shall be performed immediately prior to placing personnel on the platform. The operator shall determine that all systems, controls and safety devices are activated and functioning properly; that no interferences exist, and that all configurations necessary to reach those work locations will allow the operator to remain under the 50 percent limit of the hoist's rated capacity. Materials and tools to be used during the actual lift can be loaded in the platform for the trial lift. A single trial lift may be performed at one time for all locations that are to be reached from a single set up position. The trial lift shall be repeated prior to hoisting employees whenever the crane or derrick is moved and set up in a new location or returned to a previously used location. Additionally, the trial lift shall be repeated when the lift route is changed unless the operator determines that the route change is not significant (i.e. the route change would not affect the safety of hoisted employees. After the trial lift, and just prior to hoisting personnel, the platform shall be hoisted a few inches and inspected to ensure that it is secure and properly balanced. Employees shall not be hoisted unless the following conditions are determined to exist: 1. Hoist ropes shall be free of kinks. 2. Multiple part lines shall not be twisted around each other. 3. The primary attachment shall be centered over the platform. 4. The hoisting system shall be inspected if the load rope is slack to ensure all ropes are properly stated on drums and in sheaves. Visual inspection A visual inspection of the crane or derrick, rigging, personnel platform, and the crane or derrick base support, or ground, shall be conducted by a competent person immediately after the trial lift to determine whether the testing has exposed any defect or produced any adverse effect upon any component or structure. Any defects found during inspections which create a safety hazard shall be corrected before hoisting personnel. Proof tested At each job site, prior to hoisting employees on the personnel platform, and after any repair or modification, the platform and rigging shall be proof tested to 125 percent of the platform's rated capacity by holding it in a suspended position for five minutes with the test load evenly distributed on the platform (this may be done concurrently with the trial lift). After proof testing, a competent person shall inspect the platform and rigging. Any deficiencies found shall be corrected and another proof test shall be conducted. Personnel hoisting shall not be conducted until the proof testing requirements are satisfied. Safe Work Practices General rules Employees shall keep all parts of the body inside the platform during raising, lowering, and positioning. This provision does not apply to an occupant of the platform performing the duties of a signal person. Before employees exit or enter a hoisted personnel platform that is not landed, the platform shall be secured to the structure where the work is to be performed, unless securing to the structure creates an unsafe situation. Tag lines shall be used unless their use creates an unsafe condition. The crane or derrick operator shall remain at the controls at all times when the crane engine is running and the platform is occupied. Hoisting of employees Hoisting of employees shall be promptly discontinued upon indication of any dangerous weather conditions or other impending danger. Employees being hoisted shall remain in continuous sight of and in direct communication with the operator or signal person. In those situations where direct visual contact with the operator is not possible, and the use of a signal person would create a greater hazard for the person, direct communication alone such as by radio may be used. Body belt/harness system Except over water, employees occupying the personnel platform shall use a body belt/harness system with lanyard appropriately attached to the lower load block or overhaul ball, or to a structural member within the personnel platform capable of supporting a fall impact for employees using the anchorage. When working over water, life preservers shall be worn and ring buoys and a lifesaving skiff shall be immediately available. See 1926.106. Hoisting of employees No lifts shall be made on another of the crane's or derrick’s loadlines while personnel are suspended on a platform. Hoisting of employees while the crane is traveling is prohibited, except for portal, tower and locomotive cranes, or where the employer demonstrates that there is no less hazardous way to perform the work. Required meeting A meeting attended by the crane or derrick operator, signal persons (if necessary for the lift), employees to be lifted, and the person responsible for the task to be performed shall be held to review the appropriate requirements of this section and the procedures to be followed. This meeting shall be held prior to the trial lift at each new work location, and shall be repeated for any employees newly assigned to the operation.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/12%3A_Crane_and_Hoists_Safety/12.02%3A_Personnel_Platfor.txt

Helicopters General Helicopters are becoming more widely used on construction sites today for lifting and rigging purposes. Helicopters have long been in use for setting electrical transmission towers as well. OSHA regulations require that helicopter cranes comply with any applicable regulations of the Federal Aviation Administration. Briefing Prior to each day's operation, a briefing shall be conducted. This briefing shall set forth the plan of operation for the pilot and ground personnel. Slings and tag lines Load shall be properly slung. Tag lines shall be of a length that will not permit their being drawn up into rotors. Pressed sleeve, swedged eyes, or equivalent means shall be used for all freely suspended loads to prevent hand splices from spinning open or cable clamps from loosening. Cargo Hooks All electrically operated cargo hooks shall have the electrical activating device so designed and installed as to prevent inadvertent operation. In addition, these cargo hooks shall be equipped with an emergency mechanical control for releasing the load. The hooks shall be tested prior to each day’s operation to determine that the release functions properly, both electrically and mechanically. Personal Protective Equipment Personal protective equipment for employees receiving the load shall consist of complete eye protection and hard hats secured by chinstraps. Loose-fitting clothing likely to flap in the downwash, and thus be snagged on hoist line, shall not be worn. Loose gear and objects Every practical precaution shall be taken to provide for the protection of the employees from flying objects in the rotor downwash. All loose gear within 100 feet of the place of lifting the load, depositing the load, and all other areas susceptible to rotor downwash shall be secured or removed. Housekeeping Good housekeeping shall be maintained in all helicopter loading and unloading areas. Operator responsibility The helicopter operator shall be responsible for size, weight, and manner in which loads are connected to the helicopter. If, for any reason, the helicopter operator believes the lift cannot be made safely, the lift shall not be made. Hooking and unhooking loads When employees are required to perform work under hovering craft, a safe means of access shall be provided for employees to reach the hoist line hook and engage or disengage cargo slings. Employees shall not perform work under hovering craft except when necessary to hook or unhook loads. Static charge Static charge on the suspended load shall be dissipated with a grounding device before ground personnel touch the suspended load, or protective rubber gloves shall be worn by all ground personnel touching the suspended load. Weight limitations The weight of an external load shall not exceed the manufacturer's rating. Hoist wires or other gear, except for pulling lines or conductors that are allowed to "payout" from a container or roll off a reel, shall not be attached to any fixed ground structure, or allowed to foul on any fixed structure. Visibility When visibility is reduced by dust or other conditions, ground personnel shall exercise special caution to keep clear of main and stabilizing rotors. Precautions shall also be taken by the employer to eliminate as far as practical reduced visibility. Signal Systems Signal systems between aircrew and ground personnel shall be understood and checked in advance of hoisting the load. This applies to either radio or hand signal systems. Approach distance No unauthorized person shall be allowed to approach within 50 feet of the helicopter when the rotor blades are turning. Approaching helicopter Whenever approaching or leaving a helicopter with blades rotating, all employees shall remain in full view of the pilot and keep in a crouched position. Employees shall avoid the area from the cockpit or cabin rearward unless authorized by the helicopter operator to work there. Personnel Sufficient ground personnel shall be provided when required for safe helicopter loading and unloading operations. Communications There shall be constant reliable communication between the pilot and a designated employee of the ground crew who acts as a signalman during the period of loading and unloading. This signalman shall be distinctly recognizable from other ground personnel. Fires Open fires shall not be permitted in an area that could result in such fires being spread by the rotor downwash

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/12%3A_Crane_and_Hoists_Safety/12.03%3A_Helicoptors.txt

Material Hoists, Personnel Hoists and Elevators General requirements The employer shall comply with the manufacturer's specifications and limitations applicable to the operation of all hoists and elevators. Where manufacturer's specifications are not available, the limitations assigned to the equipment shall be based on the determinations of a professional engineer competent in the field. Rated load capacities, recommended operating speeds, and special hazard warnings or instructions shall be posted on cars and platforms. The use of endless belt-type manlifts on construction shall be prohibited. Material Hoists Operating rules Operating rules shall be established and posted at the operator's station of the hoist. Such rules shall include signal system and allowable line speed for various loads. Rules and notices shall be posted on the car frame or crosshead in a conspicuous location, including the statement "No Riders Allowed." No person shall be allowed to ride on material hoists except for the purposes of inspection and maintenance. Hoistway entrances All entrances of the hoistways shall be protected by substantial gates or bars, which shall guard the full width of the landing entrance. All hoistway entrance bars and gates shall be painted with diagonal contrasting colors such as black and yellow stripes. Overhead protection Overhead protective covering of two inch planking, 3/4-inch plywood, or other solid material of equivalent strength, shall be provided on the top of every material hoist cage or platform. Hoist towers Hoist towers may be used with or without an enclosure on all sides. However, whichever alternative is chosen, the following applicable conditions shall be met: 1. When a hoist tower is enclosed, it shall be enclosed on all sides for its entire height with a screen enclosure of 1/2-inch mesh, No. 18 U.S. gauge wire or equivalent, except for landing access. 2. When a hoist tower is not enclosed, the hoist platform or car shall be totally enclosed (caged) on all sides for the full height between the floor and the overhead protective covering with 1/2-inch mesh of No. 14 U. S. gauge wire or equivalent. The hoist platform enclosure shall include the required gates for loading and unloading. A six foot high enclosure shall be provided on the unused sides of the hoist tower at ground level. 3. Car arresting devices shall be installed to function in case of rope failure. All material hoist towers shall be designed by a licensed professional engineer. Personnel Hoists Outside hoist towers Hoist towers outside the structure shall be enclosed for the full height on the side or sides used for entrance and exit to the structure. At the lowest landing, the enclosure on the sides not used for exit or entrance to the structure shall be enclosed to a height of at least 10 feet. Other sides of the tower adjacent to floors or scaffold platforms shall be enclosed to a height of 10 feet above the level of such floors or scaffolds. Inside Hoist towers Towers inside of structures shall be enclosed on all four sides throughout the full height. Towers shall be anchored to the structure at intervals not exceeding 25 feet. In addition to tie-ins, a series of guys shall be installed. Where tie-ins are not practical, the tower shall be anchored by means of guys made of wire rope at least one-half inch in diameter, securely fastened to anchorage to ensure stability. Personnel hoist requirements Hoistway doors or gates shall be not less than six feet six inches high and shall be provided with mechanical locks which cannot be operated from the landing side, and shall be accessible only to persons on the car. Cars shall be permanently enclosed on all sides and the top, except sides used for entrance and exit, which have car gates or doors. A door or gate shall be provided at each entrance to the car, which shall protect the full width and height of the car entrance opening. Overhead protective covering of two inch planking, 3/4- inch plywood or other solid material or equivalent strength shall be provided on the top of every personnel hoist. Doors or gates shall be provided with electric contacts, which do not allow movement of the hoist when door or gate is open. An emergency stop switch shall be provided in the car and marked "Stop." Data plate Cars shall be provided with a capacity and data plate secured in a conspicuous place on the car or crosshead. Inspection Following assembly and erection of hoists and before being put in service an inspection and test of all functions and safety devices shall be made under the supervision of a competent person. A similar inspection and test is required following major alteration of an existing installation. All hoists shall be inspected and tested at not more than three month intervals. The employer shall prepare a certification record which includes the date the inspection and test of all functions and safety devices was performed; the signature of the person who performed the inspection and test; and a serial number, or other identifier, for the hoist that was inspected and tested. The most recent certification record shall be maintained on file. Specifications All personnel hoists used by employees shall be constructed of materials and components, which meet the specifications for materials, construction safety devices, assembly, and structural integrity as stated in the American National Standard A 10.4-1963, Safety Requirements for Workmen Hoists. Hoist tower that is not enclosed When a hoist tower is not enclosed, the hoist platform or car shall be totally enclosed (caged) on all sides for the full height between the floor and the overhead protective covering with 3/4-inch mesh of No. 14 U. S. gauge wire or equivalent. The hoist platform enclosure shall include the required gates for loading and unloading. These hoists shall be inspected and maintained on a weekly basis. Whenever the hoisting equipment is exposed to winds exceeding 35 miles per hour it shall be inspected and put in operable condition before reuse. 12.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Where manufacturer s specifications are not available, the crane lift limitations assigned to the equipment shall be based on the determinations of a________ ________ competent in this field and such determinations will be appropriately documented and recorded. 2. The employer shall designate a________ who shall inspect all machinery and equipment prior to each use, and during use, to make sure it is in safe operating condition. 3. Accessible areas within the swing radius of the rear of the rotating superstructure of the crane either permanently or temporarily mounted shall be ________ in such a manner as to prevent an employee from being struck or crushed by the crane. 4. An accessible ________of 5BC rating, or higher, shall be available at all operations or cabs of equipment. 5. Following assembly and erection of hoists, and before being put in service, an inspection and test of all functions and safety devices shall be made under the supervision of a ________. A similar inspection and test is required following major alteration of an existing installation. All hoists shall be inspected and tested at not more than________month intervals. 6. A________shall be worn and a lanyard attached to the boom or basket when working from an aerial lift. Multiple Choice: 1. For energized transmission and distribution lines rated 50kV or below, minimum clearance between the lines and any part of the crane or load shall be________ feet. a. 3 b. 5 c. 10 d. 15 2. When crane or derrick personnel platforms are used, they shall be capable of supporting, without failure, their own weight and at least________ times the maximum intended load. a. 2 b. 3 c. 4 d. 5 3. Hoist towers outside the structure shall be enclosed for the full height on the side or sides used for entrance and exit to the structure. At the lowest landing, the enclosure on the sides not used for exit or entrance to the structure shall be enclosed to a height of at least________ feet. a. 4 b. 8 c. 10 d. 12 General: 1. Describe the minimum personal protective equipment required by OSHA for employees receiving the load lifted by a helicopter.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/12%3A_Crane_and_Hoists_Safety/12.04%3A_Material_Hoists_a.txt

“Prepare and prevent, don’t repair and repent.” – Author Unknown Overview Safety requirements for motor vehicles in general are prescribed by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) and referenced by the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). The mission of the NHTSA is to "Save lives, prevent injuries, reduce vehicle-related crashes", and is a unit under the Department of Transportation (DOT). This chapter recognizes the overlap in federal jurisdiction as it relates to ‘work’ performed on US Highways and specifically as it relates to specialized vehicles performing construction activities. The primary objective of the standards associated with motor vehicles is to ensure vehicle safety when in operation but also when not. Safety standards associated with traffic control specifically relating to construction on our highway system but also applicable to controls of vehicle traffic on construction sites are outlined in the standard Signs, Signals, and Barricades. These standards are based on those from the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) for streets and highways. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine the safety requirements for motor vehicles and mechanized equipment on construction sites. 2. Review the general safety requirements for earthmoving and excavation equipment. 3. Identify the acceptable sign and barricade construction requirements listed in Subpart G. Learning Outcome: 1. Describe the safety requirements of equipment covered under Subpart O. 2. Apply the hierarchy controls to the requirements of Subpart G. Standards: 1926 Subpart O-Motor Vehicles, Mechanized Equipment, Marine Operations, Subpart G Signs, Signals, Barricades Key Terms: Operable, bulldozer, cribbed, dump body, end loader, flagmen Mini-Lecture: Signs, Signals, Barricades Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Buldozers, Attribution MemoryCatcher, Pixabay 13: Motor Vehicles and Mechanized Equipment Introduction Subpart O of the 1926 OSHA Construction Standards contains general safety requirements for motor vehicles and mechanized equipment that are commonly used on all types of construction sites by all trades, including their construction and use. Subpart 0 also contains requirements for lifting and hauling equipment, which is not covered by Subpart N. Signs, signals, and barricades Subpart G contains the requirements for the construction of signs, signals and barricades. Included in this subpart are color code and lettering restrictions for signs and requirements for flagmen engaged in signaling operations. Mechanized Equipment - General All equipment left unattended at night, adjacent to a highway in normal use, or adjacent to construction areas where work is in progress, shall have appropriate lights or reflectors, or barricades equipped with appropriate lights or reflectors, to identify the location of the equipment. Inflating, mounting, or dismounting tires A safety tire rack, cage, or equivalent protection shall be provided and used when inflating, mounting, or dismounting tires installed on split rims or rims equipped with locking rings or similar devices. Working under or between heavy machinery Heavy machinery, equipment, or parts thereof, which are suspended or held aloft by use of slings, hoists, or jacks shall be substantially blocked or cribbed to prevent falling or shifting before employees are permitted to work under or between them. Bulldozer and scraper blades, end-loader buckets, dump bodies, and similar equipment, shall be either fully lowered or blocked when being repaired or when not in use. All controls shall be in a neutral position, with the motors stopped and brakes set, unless work being performed requires otherwise. Parking brake use Whenever the equipment is parked, the parking brake shall be set. Equipment parked on inclines shall have the wheels chocked and the parking brake set. Working Space Clearance All equipment covered by this subpart shall comply with the workspace clearance requirements of 1926. 550(a)(15) when working or being moved in the vicinity of power lines or energized transmitters. Motor Vehicles Applicable regulations Motor vehicles as covered by this part are those vehicles that operate within an off-highway jobsite not open to public traffic. The requirements of this section do not apply to equipment for which rules are prescribed in 1926.602. Brake requirements All vehicles shall have a service brake system, an emergency brake system, and a parking brake system. These systems may use common components, and shall be maintained in operable condition. Visibility conditions Whenever visibility conditions warrant additional light, all vehicles, or combinations of vehicles, in use shall be equipped with at least two headlights and two tail lights in operable condition. Brake lights All vehicles, or combination of vehicles, shall have brake lights in operable condition regardless of light conditions. Audible warning systems All vehicles shall be equipped with an adequate audible warning device at the operator's station and in an operable condition. Obstructed view No employer shall use any motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear unless: 1. The vehicle has a reverse signal alarm audible above the surrounding noise level, or; 2. The vehicle is backed up only when an observer signals that it is safe to do so. Vehicles with cabs All vehicles with cabs shall be equipped with windshields and powered wipers. Cracked and broken glass shall be replaced. Vehicles operating in areas or under conditions that cause fogging or frosting of the windshields shall be equipped with operable defogging or defrosting devices. Tools and material Tools and material shall be secured to prevent movement when transported in the same compartment with employees. Vehicles used to transport employees Vehicles used to transport employees shall have seats firmly secured and adequate for the number of employees to be carried. Trucks with dump bodies Trucks with dump bodies shall be equipped with positive means of support permanently attached and capable of being locked in position to prevent accidental lowering of the body while maintenance or inspection work is being done. Operating levers Operating levers controlling hoisting or dumping devices on haulage bodies shall be equipped with a latch or other device which will prevent accidental starting or tripping of the mechanism. Trip handles for tailgates of dump trucks shall be arranged while dumping, so the operator will be in the clear. Effective date All rubber-tired motor vehicle equipment manufactured on or after May, 1972 shall be equipped with fenders. Mud flaps Mud flaps may be used in lieu of fenders whenever motor vehicle equipment is not designed for fenders. Vehicle inspection All vehicles in use shall be checked at the beginning of each shift to assure that the following parts, equipment, and accessories are in safe operating condition and free of apparent damage that could cause failure while in use: service brakes, including trailer brake connections; parking system (hand brake); emergency stopping system (brakes); tires; horn; steering mechanism; coupling devices; seat belts; operating controls; and safety devices. All defects shall be corrected before the vehicle is placed in service. These requirements also apply to equipment such as lights reflectors, windshield wipers, defrosters, fire extinguishers, etc., where such equipment is necessary.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/13%3A_Motor_Vehicles_and_Mechanized_Equipment/13.01%3A_I.txt

Material Handling Equipment Applicable equipment These rules apply to the following types of earthmoving equipment: scrapers, loaders, crawler or wheel tractors, bulldozers, off-highway trucks graders, agricultural and industrial tractors, and similar equipment. Seat Belts Seat belts shall be provided on all equipment covered by this section, unless the equipment is designed only for stand-up operation. Employer responsibility No employer shall move, or cause to be moved, construction equipment or vehicles upon any access roadway or grade unless the access roadway or grade is constructed and maintained to accommodate safely the movement of the equipment and vehicles involved. Service brake All earthmoving equipment shall have a service braking system capable of stopping and holding the equipment fully loaded. Pneumatic-tired earth-moving haulage equipment Pneumatic-tired earth-moving haulage equipment (trucks, scrapers tractors, and trailing units) whose maximum speed exceeds 15 miles per hour shall be equipped with fenders on all wheels. Bi-directional machines horn requirements All bi-directional machines, such as rollers, compactors, front-end loaders bulldozers, and similar equipment, shall be equipped with a horn distinguishable from the surrounding noise level, which shall be operated as needed when the machine is moving in either direction. The horn shall be maintained in an operative condition. Obstructed view No employer shall permit earthmoving or compacting equipment, which has an obstructed view to the rear, to be used in reverse gear unless the equipment has in operation a reverse signal alarm distinguishable from the surrounding noise level or an employee signals that it is safe to do so. This is the most frequently cited violation of Subpart O. Equipment guarding Scissor points on all front-end loaders, which constitute a hazard to the operator during normal operation, shall be guarded. Lifting and Hauling Equipment (Other than equipment covered under Subpart N) Lift trucks, stackers, etc., shall have the rated capacity clearly posted on the vehicle so as to be clearly visible to the operator. When auxiliary removable counterweights are provided by the manufacturer, corresponding alternate rated capacities also shall be clearly shown on the vehicle. These ratings shall not be exceeded. Modifications or additions to equipment No modifications or additions, which affect the capacity or safe operation of the equipment, shall be made without the manufacturer's written approval. If such modifications or changes are made, the capacity, operation, and maintenance instruction plates, tags, or decals shall be changed accordingly. In no case shall the original safety factor of the equipment be reduced. Lifting a load by two or more trucks working in unison If a load is lifted by two or more trucks working in unison, the proportion of the total load carried by anyone truck shall not exceed its capacity. Steering or spinner knobs Steering or spinner knobs shall not be attached to the steering wheel unless the steering mechanism is of a type that prevents road reactions from causing the steering handwheel to spin. The steering knob shall be mounted within the periphery of the wheel. Unauthorized personnel Unauthorized personnel shall not be permitted to ride on powered industrial trucks. A safe place to ride shall be provided where riding of trucks is authorized. Lifting personnel Whenever a truck is equipped with vertical only or vertical and horizontal controls elevatable with the lifting carriage or forks for lifting personnel, the following additional precautions shall be taken for the protection of personnel being elevated: 1. Use of a safety platform firmly secured to the lifting carriage and/or forks. 2. Means shall be provided whereby personnel on the platform can shut off power to the truck. Such protection from falling objects as indicated necessary by the operating conditions shall be provided.

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Signs, Signals and Barricades General Signs and symbols shall be visible at all times when work is being performed, and shall be removed or covered promptly when the hazards no longer exist. Danger signs Danger signs shall be used only where an immediate hazard exists. Danger signs shall have red as the predominating color for the upper panel; black outline on the borders; and a white lower panel for additional sign wording. Caution signs Caution signs shall be used only to warn against potential hazards or to caution against unsafe practices. Caution signs shall have yellow as the predominating color; black upper panel and borders: yellow lettering of "caution" on the black panel; and the lower yellow panel for additional sign wording. Black lettering shall be used for additional wording. Exit signs Exit signs, when required, shall be lettered in legible red letters, not less than six inches high, on a white field and the principal stroke of the letters shall be at least three-fourths inch in width. Safety instruction signs Safety instruction signs, when used, shall be white with a green upper panel with white letters to convey the principal message. Any additional wording on the sign shall be black letters on the white background. Directional signs, other than automotive traffic signs, shall be white with a black panel and a white directional symbol. Any additional wording on the sign shall be black letters on the white background. Construction areas shall be posted with legible traffic signs at points of hazard. Accident prevention tags Accident prevention tags shall be used as a temporary means of warning employees of an existing hazard, such as defective tools, equipment, etc. They shall not be used in place of, or as a substitute for, accident prevention signs. Signaling Operations General When operations are such that signs, signals, and barricades do not provide the necessary protection on, or adjacent to a highway or street, flagmen or other appropriate traffic controls shall be provided. Applicable standards Signaling directions by flagmen shall conform to American National Standards Institute 06.1- 1971, Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. Hand signaling Hand signaling by flagmen shall be by use of red flags at least 18 inches square or sign paddles and red lights in periods of darkness. Flagmen required equipment Flagmen shall be provided with and shall wear a red or orange warning garment while flagging. Warning garments worn at night shall be reflectorized material. Definitions Definitions for the purpose of Subpart G are as follows: Barricade: An obstruction to deter the passage of persons or vehicles. Signs: The warnings of hazard, temporarily or permanently affixed or placed, at locations where hazards exist. Signals: Moving signs, provided by workers, such as flagmen, or by devices, such as flashing lights, to warn of possible or existing hazards. Tags: Temporary signs, usually attached to a piece of equipment or part of a structure, to warn of existing or immediate hazards. MUTCD: Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways 13.A: Re Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Heavy machinery, equipment, or parts thereof which are suspended or held aloft by use of slings, hoists, or jacks shall be substantially ________or________ to prevent falling or shifting before employees are permitted to work under or between them. 2. Equipment parked on inclines shall have the wheels________and the parking brake set. 3. All vehicles shall be equipped with an adequate________ warning device at the operator's station and in an operable condition. 4. Motor vehicle equipment having an obstructed view to the rear is not permitted to use reverse gear unless one of two conditions exists. List the two conditions: a. ________ b. ________ 5. Trucks with dump bodies shall be equipped with positive means of support, permanently attached, and capable of being ________in position to prevent accidental lowering of the body while maintenance or inspection work is being done. 6. No________ or________ which affect the capacity or safe operation of lifting or hauling equipment shall be made without the manufacturer's written approval. 7. ________ or ________shall not be attached to the steering wheel unless the steering mechanism is of a type that prevents road reactions from causing the steering handwheel to spin. 8. Flagmen shall be provided with and shall wear a ________or ________ warning garment while flagging. Warning garments worn at night shall be of________ material. Multiple Choice: (Circle the correct answer) 9. Caution signs shall have yellow as the predominating color and shall be used only to warn against _________ hazards or to caution against unsafe practices. a. safety b. potential c. life d. immediate 10. Danger signs shall have red as the predominating color for the upper panel and shall be used only where a(n) ________ hazard exists. a. safety b. potential c. life d. immediate

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“Safety isn’t expensive, it’s priceless.” – Author Unknown Overview Most construction starts with ground preparation and grading. Excavations are man made depressions and removal of soil and considered a part of ground preparation. A special type of excavation, the trench, a deep and narrow excavation is often needed for placement of underground utilities, electrical cables and pipe for water mains and gas lines. The removal of large amounts of soil that leaves a trench vulnerable to cave in is what makes them extremely hazardous. A cubic meter of soil can weigh as much as a small vehicle and without proper trench protection will crush, suffocate and trap a worker if the sides of trench walls fail. This chapter will discuss the importance of various protective systems needed to keep workers safe when performing excavation work and especially while working in trenches. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine how to Identify Soil Types. 2. Identify the Hazards Associated with Excavations & Trenching. 3. Understand the Responsibilities of the Competent Person. 4. Select the Proper Method of Protection for Workers in Excavations. 5. Properly Prepare for Excavation Work. Learning Outcome: 1. List the five most critical excavations hazards. 2. Apply the hierarchy of controls to Subpart P. Standards: 1926 Subpart P-Excavations Key Terms: Cohesive, fissure, shoring, surface encumbrance, unconfined compressive strength Mini-Lecture: Excavations Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Chinese transcontinental railroad workers, public domain 14: Excavations Introduction Construction workers are frequently called upon to work within excavations and trenches. OSHA studies have confirmed that excavation and trenching work is some of the most dangerous construction work performed. In fact, despite enhanced efforts by OSHA, the fatality rate for excavation work is nearly twice that of regular construction. By Definition, an excavation is any man-made cut, cavity, trench or depression in the earth formed by earth removal. Trenches, on the other hand, are narrow excavations made below the surface of the ground. Generally, the depth of a trench is greater than the width, but the width of a trench is not greater than 15 feet. General OSHA defines a competent person as one who is capable of identifying existing and predictable hazards and who has the authority to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate them. One of the most important factors in reducing worker fatalities and injuries related to excavations and trenching is proper planning prior to the start of the job. The following factors need to be considered before starting the excavation: Surface Encumbrances, Underground Utilities, Access & Egress, Hazardous Atmospheres, Water Accumulation, Inspections, and Fall Protection. Surface Encumbrances Surface encumbrances are anything that is located on the ground in the area of the excavation that may get in the way or create a hazard for those working in the excavation or trench. Examples of these encumbrances are street signs, traffic signals, lighting standards, trees sidewalks, etc. OSHA requires that all surface encumbrances that might pose a hazard shall be removed or supported to safeguard employees. Another consideration when planning for surface encumbrances is the proximity of trenching and excavation work to adjacent structures. Subpart P requires that adequate means, such as shoring, supporting, bracing, etc., be taken when the stability of adjacent structures is endangered by excavation operations. Underground Utilities Planning the work In addition to the surface encumbrances, planning must consider those things under the earth that may be disturbed during the excavation. Utility installations are the most common and the most dangerous item to consider before beginning an excavation. Most states have a "Call Before you Dig" law and OSHA requires that the location of sewer telephone, electric, gas and other utility service installations must be determined prior to the opening of an excavation. State or local ordinances usually determine the appropriate response time for utilities to identify their lines or piping. If the utility is unable to locate the line within 24 hours or whatever the period of time that state or local ordinances provide for, excavations can begin provided suitable detection equipment is used. Keep in mind that the locations marked by the utilities are estimated locations only. Hand holes should be dug first to determine the exact location of the lines or piping. Access and Egress Means of exit and entry A means of exit and entry from a trench excavation shall be provided for trench excavations four ft. or more in depth. Ladders, stairways or ramps are permitted means of exit and entry and they must be installed such that any worker does not have to travel more than 25 ft. in a lateral direction to reach the exit. Ramp design If ramps are going to be used for employee access and egress, they must be designed by a competent person. If the ramps are going to be used for access and egress of equipment, they shall be designed by a competent person qualified in structural design and the ramp must be constructed in accordance with the design. Hazardous Atmospheres One of the most frequently overlooked hazards in excavation and trenching work is hazardous atmospheres. Subpart P requires that where oxygen levels of less than 19.5 % are present or where such oxygen deficient conditions could reasonably be expected to exist, the atmosphere in the excavation or trench shall be tested prior to employees entering any excavations, deeper than four ft. Trenching in areas like landfills and other areas where hazardous substances are stored, are examples of the types of location that will require testing. Protection from Loose Rock or Soil All materials removed from a trench or excavation must be kept back at least two ft. from the edge of the excavation or trench or by the use of retaining devices sufficient to keep materials and equipment from falling or rolling into the excavation. Inspection Daily inspection of trenches and excavations shall be made by a competent person to ensure that there will not be any cave-ins, failures of protective systems, or hazardous atmospheres. Water Accumulation One of the most important factors in maintaining the integrity of a trench or excavation is the control of water in and around the excavation. The presence of water in a trench or excavation heightens the possibility of wall failure and threatens the safety of every worker in the excavation. OSHA requirements in Subpart P that are related to water accumulation are as follows: 1. Employees shall not work in excavations in which there is an accumulation of water or water is accumulating, unless adequate precautions have been taken. In general, adequate protection would mean special support or shield systems, water removal systems and life safety systems such as body harness and lifelines. 2. If water removal equipment is used, the status of the removal shall be monitored by a competent person to ensure proper operation. 3. When the location of the excavation is such that it interferes with the natural drainage of surface water, diversion dikes ditches or other means shall be employed to prevent surface water from entering the excavation.

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Inspections Daily inspections One of the most important responsibilities that the designated competent person has for excavation operation is the daily inspection of the excavation, including adjacent areas and structures, protective systems, hazardous atmospheres and personal protective equipment. Inspections are required to be made prior to the start of work and throughout the entire work shift. It is important to remember that conditions in and around trenches can change quickly. Subpart P requires for example, that excavations be re-inspected after every rain storm or other hazard increasing occurrence. The competent person has the responsibility for the day-to-day operations in and around the excavation. If he/she determines that a hazard exists or the potential for a hazard exists he/she must take immediate corrective action. Fall Protection Walkways and guardrails Fall protection can also be an important part of the excavation plan. OSHA requires that walkways be provided when employees or equipment cross over excavations. If the walkways are over six ft. above the lower level, they shall be equipped with guardrails. Barriers Subpart P also requires that barriers or other means of physical protection be provided around all remotely located excavations. In addition, all wells, pits, shafts, etc., shall be covered. Temporary openings shall be back-filled immediately upon completion of the assigned operation. Analysis of hazards and protective system Prior to beginning the excavation, a determination will need to be made regarding the types of protective systems that will be used to protect the employees who must work in and around the excavations. OSHA regulations require that each employee in the excavation must be protected against cave-ins by one of the following types of protective systems: Sloping, Benching, Shielding or other Support Systems. Sloping Sloping is a protective system that protects employees within excavations and trenches by excavating the sides of the trench or excavation to form sides that slope away from the excavation so as to protect against cave-ins. The required angle of the slope depends upon several factors. First and foremost are the soil types. Generally speaking, the more cohesive the soil, the greater the angle of the slope permitted. The general rule for slope angle is not steeper than one and one-half horizontal to one vertical. This results in an angle of about 34 degrees. There are however options for sloping at greater angles when a determination has been made by a competent person that the soil type will permit the additional slope. Appendix B, of Subpart P provides alternates configurations for sloping systems. Benching Benching is a method used to provide protection for employees working in and around excavations. Benching means the sides of the excavation are excavated so as to form one or a series of horizontal levels or steps usually with vertical or near-vertical surfaces between the levels. The permissible benching configurations are provided in Appendix B, of Subpart P and once again generally depend upon the soil classification. Benching is generally permitted in cohesive soil types only. Shielding Shielding is a protective system that employs shields or structures, which are capable of withstanding the force imposed on it by cave-ins and still protect the employees within the shield. By design, shields can be permanent structures or they can be portable and be moved along as the work progresses. Shields used in trenches are usually called trench shields or trench boxes. Shields are permitted to be either pre-manufactured or job-built in accordance with tabulated data or a registered professional engineer design. The design of shielding systems shall be done in accordance with one of the following: The Appendices A, C, and D, to Subpart P Manufacturers' Tabulated Data, Other Tabulated Data, or a Registered Professional Engineer's Design. Shield systems shall not be subjected to loads exceeding those for which the system was designed. Employees are not permitted in shields when they are being installed removed or moved vertically. When shields are used in trenching excavations, the excavation of the earth is permitted to a level not greater than two ft. below the bottom of the shield only if the shield is designed to resist the forces calculated for the full depth of the trench, and there is no indication, while the trench is open, of a possible loss of soil from behind or below the bottom of the shield. Support Systems Support systems are a means of protection for employees working in excavations that utilize a structure such as underpinning, bracing or shoring. Such support systems provide support to an adjacent structure, underground installation, or the sides of an excavation. Shoring is a support system that utilizes a structure such as metal, hydraulic, mechanical or timber shoring system that supports the sides of an excavation to prevent cave-ins. The members of the support system shall be securely connected together to prevent sliding, failing, kickouts, or other predictable failure. Support systems shall be installed in a manner that protects the worker from cave-ins, structural collapse or from being struck by members of the support system. Removal of support systems shall begin at, and progress from, the bottom of the excavation. Backfilling shall begin with the removal of the support system from the excavation.

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Soil Classifications OSHA 1926 Subpart “P” Appendix A Stable Rock Stable rock is defined as a natural mineral matter that can be excavated with vertical sides and remain intact while exposed. Type "A" Type A soil is cohesive soil with the following characteristics: 1. An unconfined compressive strength of 1.5 tons per sq. ft. or greater. 2. Soils like clay, silty clay, sandy clay, clay loam and in some cases silty clay loam and sandy clay loam are classified as Type A. 3. Cemented soils such as caliche and hardpan are classified as Type A soils. 4. Soils cannot be classified as Type A if any of the following conditions exist: 5. The soil is fissured. 6. The soil is subject to vibration from heavy traffic, pile driving or other similar effects. 7. The soil has been previously disturbed. 8. The soil is part of a sloped, layered system where the layers dip into the excavation on a slope of four horizontal to one vertical or greater. 9. The material is subject to other factors that would require it to be classified as a less stable material. Type "B" Type B soil is cohesive soil with the following characteristics: 1. Unconfined compressive strength greater than 0.5 tsf but less than 1.5 tsf. 2. Granular cohesion less soils like angular gravel, silt, silt loam, and in some cases silty clay loam and sandy clay loam are classified as Type B soils. 3. Soils would be classified as Type B if any of the following conditions exist: 4. Previously disturbed soils except those which would otherwise be classified as Type C soil. 5. Soil that meets the unconfined compressive strength or cementation requirements for Type A soil, but is fissured or subject to vibration. 6. Dry rock that is not stable. 7. The soil is part of a sloped, layered system where the layers dip into the excavation on a slope of four horizontal to one vertical, but only if the material would otherwise be classified as Type B soil. Type "C" Type C soil is cohesive soil with the following characteristics: 1. An unconfined compressive strength of 0.5 tsf or less. 2. Type C soils are granular soils including gravel, sand and loamy soil. 3. Submerged soil or soil from which water is freely seeping. 4. Submerged rock that is not stable. 5. The soil is part of a sloped, layered system where the layers dip into the excavation on a slope of four horizontal to one vertical or steeper. Soil Site Analysis Each soil and rock deposit shall be analyzed and classified by a competent person as one of the four types identified above, Stable Rock, or Type A, B, or C. The competent person shall use at least one visual test and one manual test to perform the soil deposit analysis. Visual tests are done by observing samples of the soil that are excavated and samples taken from the sides of the excavation. Appendix A, of Subpart P, lists the appropriate procedures for performing visual tests. Manual tests are performed to determine the quality and type of the soil deposit. Some of the most common manual tests are: Plasticity, Dry Strength, Thumb Penetration and the Drying test. Appendix A, of Subpart P, lists the appropriate procedures for performing manual tests. 14.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. Trenches are narrow excavations may below the surface of the ground. Generally, the depth of light trench is greater than the width, but the width of the trench is not greater than________feet. 2. A means of exit or entry from a trench excavation shall be provided for trench excavation for________feet or more depth. 3. A________ is one who is capable of identifying existing in predictable hazards and who has the authority to take prompt corrective measures to eliminate. 4. Ladders, stairways or ramps are permitted means of exit and entry and they must be installed so that any worker does not have to travel more than________feet in a lateral direction to reach the exit. 5. Subpart P requires that where oxygen levels of less than________% are present or where such oxygen deficient conditions could reasonably be expected to exist, the atmosphere in the excavation or trench shall be tested prior to employees entering any excavation deeper than four feet. 6. The designated________ for an excavation operation does a daily inspection of the excavation, including adjacent areas and structures, protective systems, hazardous atmospheres and personal protective equipment. Multiple Choice: (Circle the Correct Letter) 7. Soil cannot be classified as type A, if which of the following conditions exists: a. The soil is fissured. b. The soil is subject to vibration from heavy traffic, pile driving or other similar effects. c. The soil has been previously disturbed. d. Any of the above. True or False: (Circle the Correct Answer) 8. T or F The locations marked by the utilities are estimated location only. Hand holes should be dug first to determine the exact location of the lines or piping. 9. T or F The fatality rate for excavation work is nearly twice that of regular construction. 10. T or F Employees shall not work in excavations in which there is an accumulation of water or water is accumulating, unless adequate precautions have been taken.

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"Obedience is the mother of success and is wedded to safety." – Aeschylus Overview Concrete and masonry work is specialized work requiring materials handling considerations and use of cutting tools. Some of the materials used also expose workers to health hazards such as silica dust from mortars and grout. Setting precast concrete and formwork requires the use of cranes, hoists and special forklifts. The potential for struck by, crushed, or caught in hazards are considerable when working with concrete and masonry. This chapter will focus on standards that control these hazards. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine safe work practices for employees required to work on jobsites where masonry and concrete operations are in effect. 2. Identify the hazards associated with masonry and concrete operations. 3. Review OSHA Subpart Q requirements for the use of equipment and tools related to masonry and concrete operations. 4. Understand safety requirements for precast concrete, slip form, lift-slab, and cast-in- place concrete construction. Learning Outcome: 1. Apply the hierarchy of controls to standards addressing concrete and masonry work. 2. Describe key terminology for concrete and masonry work. Standards: 1926 Subpart Q-Fall Concrete and Masonry Key Terms: Formwork, impalement, precast concrete, shoring, silica Mini-Lecture: Fall Hazards, Fall Protection Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Construction worker and concrete truck, Attribution Bridgesward, Pixabay 15: Concrete and Masonry Introduction OSHA Subpart Q, Concrete and Masonry Construction, contains performance oriented requirements designed to help protect all construction workers from the hazards associated with concrete and masonry construction operations at construction, demolition, alteration or repair worksites. Subpart Q is divided into seven sections. The first section defines the scope and application of Subpart Q. The second section deals with general provisions applicable to the entire subpart. The third section deals with specific requirements for tools and equipment used in concrete and masonry operations. Sections four thru six cover specific concrete operations and the last section covers masonry construction. Subpart Q - Scope & Application Subpart Q sets forth requirements to protect all construction employees from the hazards associated with concrete and masonry construction operations performed in workplaces covered under 29 CFR Part 1926. In addition to the requirements in Subpart Q, other relevant provisions in Parts 1910 and 1926 apply to concrete and masonry construction operations. Definitions In addition to the definitions set forth in 1926.32, the following definitions apply to this subpart: Bull float: A tool used to spread out and smooth concrete. Formwork: The total system of support for freshly placed or partially cured concrete, including the mold or sheeting (form) that is in contact with the concrete as well as all supporting members including shores, reshores hardware, braces, and related hardware. Lift slab: A method of concrete construction in which floor, and roof slabs are cast on or at ground level and, using jacks, lifted into position. Limited access zone: An area alongside a masonry wall, which is under construction, and which is clearly demarcated to limit access by employees. Precast concrete: Concrete members (such as walls, panels, slabs, columns, and beams), which have been formed, cast, and cured prior to final placement in a structure. Reshoring: The construction operation in which shoring equipment (also called reshores or reshoring equipment) is placed, as the original forms and shores are removed, in order to support partially cured concrete and construction loads. Shore: A supporting member that resists a compressive force imposed by a load. Vertical slip forms: Forms which are jacked vertically during the placement of concrete. Jacking operation: The task of lifting a slab (or group of slabs vertically from one location to another (e.g., from the casting location to a temporary (parked) location, or to its final location in the structure), during the construction of a building/structure where the lift- slab process is being used. General Requirements Construction Loads No construction loads shall be placed on a concrete structure or portion of a concrete structure unless the employer determines, based on information received from a person who is qualified in structural design, that the structure or portion of the structure is capable of supporting the loads. Protruding reinforcing steel All protruding reinforcing steel, onto and into which employees could fall shall be guarded to eliminate the hazard of impalement. OSHA has determined that protruding reinforcing steel, at any length, is a hazard and must be guarded. This is the most frequently cited Subpart Q violation. Employee positioning No employee (except those essential to the post-tensioning operations) shall be permitted to be behind the jack during tensioning operations. Signs and barriers shall be erected to limit employee access to the post-tensioning area during tensioning operations. Concrete buckets No employee shall be permitted to ride concrete buckets. No employee shall be permitted to work under concrete buckets while buckets are being elevated or lowered into position. To the extent practical, elevated concrete buckets shall be routed so that no employee, or the fewest number of employees, is exposed to the hazards associated with falling concrete buckets. Protective equipment No employee shall be permitted to apply a cement, sand, and water mixture through a pneumatic hose unless the employee is wearing protective head and face equipment. Equipment and Tools Troweling machines Powered and rotating type concrete troweling machines that are manually guided shall be equipped with a control switch that will automatically shut off the power whenever the hands of the operator are removed from the equipment handles. Concrete buggies Concrete buggy handles shall not extend beyond the wheels on either side of the buggy. Concrete pumping stations Concrete pumping systems using discharge pipes shall be provided with pipe supports designed for 100 percent overload. Compressed air hoses used on concrete pumping system shall be provided with positive fail-safe joint connectors to prevent separation of sections when pressurized. Concrete buckets Concrete buckets equipped with hydraulic or pneumatic gates shall have positive safety latches or similar safety devices installed to prevent premature or accidental dumping. Concrete buckets shall be designed to prevent concrete from hanging up on top and/or on the sides of the buckets. Bull floats When bull float handles are used where they might contact energized electrical conductors, they shall be constructed of nonconductive material or insulated with a nonconductive sheath whose electrical and mechanical characteristics provide the equivalent protection of a handle constructed of nonconductive material. Masonry saws Masonry saws shall be guarded with a semicircular enclosure over the blade. A method for retaining blade fragments shall be incorporated in the design of the semicircular enclosure. Maintenance and repair No employee shall be permitted to perform maintenance or repair activity on equipment (such as compressors, mixers, screens or pumps used for concrete and masonry construction activities) where the inadvertent operation of the equipment could occur and cause injury, unless all potentially hazardous energy sources have been locked out and tagged. Tags shall read "Do Not Start" or similar language to indicate that the equipment is not to be operated.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/15%3A_Concrete_and_Masonry/15.01%3A_Introduction_to_Conc.txt

Cast-in-Place Concrete General Formwork shall be designed, fabricated, erected, supported, braced and maintained so that it will be capable of supporting without failure all vertical and lateral loads that may reasonably be anticipated to be applied to the formwork. Drawings or plans Drawings or plans, including all revisions, for the jack layout, formwork (including shoring equipment), working decks, and scaffolds, shall be available at the jobsite. Shoring and Reshoring General All shoring equipment (including equipment used in reshoring operations) shall be inspected prior to erection to determine that the equipment meets the requirements specified in the formwork drawings. Shoring equipment found to be damaged, such that its strength is reduced to a point where it is not capable of supporting all vertical and lateral loads, which are reasonably expected to be present, shall not be used for shoring. Shoring equipment Erected shoring equipment shall be inspected immediately prior to, during, and immediately after concrete placement. Shoring equipment that is found to be damaged or weakened after erection, such that its strength is significantly reduced, shall be immediately reinforced. Sills The sills for shoring shall be sound, rigid, and capable of carrying the maximum intended load. Single post shores Whenever single post shores are used one on top of another (tiered), the employer shall comply with the following specific requirements in addition to the general requirements for formwork: 1. The design of the shoring shall be prepared by a qualified designer and the erected shoring shall be inspected by an engineer qualified in structural design. 2. The single post shores shall be vertically aligned. 3. The single post shores shall be spliced to prevent misalignment. 4. The single post shores shall be adequately braced in two mutually perpendicular directions at the splice level. Each tier shall also be diagonally braced in the same two directions. Reshoring Reshoring shall be erected, as the original forms and shores are removed whenever the concrete is required to support loads in excess of its capacity. Vertical Slip Forms The steel rods or pipes on which jacks climb, or by which vertical slip forms are lifted shall be: 1. Specifically designed for that purpose; and 2. Adequately braced where not encased in concrete. Design Forms shall be designed to prevent excessive distortion of the structure during the jacking operation. Scaffold and work platforms All vertical slip forms shall be provided with scaffolds or work platforms where employees are required to work or pass. Jack ratings Jacks and vertical supports shall be positioned in such a manner that the loads do not exceed the rated capacity of the jacks. The jacks or other lifting devices shall be provided with mechanical dogs or other automatic holding devices to support the slip forms whenever failure of the power supply or lifting mechanism occurs. Form structure The form structure shall be maintained within all design tolerances specified for plumbness during the jacking operation. The predetermined safe rate of lift shall not be exceeded. Reinforcing Steel Support Reinforcing steel for walls, piers, columns, and similar vertical structures shall be adequately supported to prevent overturning and to prevent collapse. Wire mesh Employers shall take measures to prevent unrolled wire mesh from recoiling. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, securing each end of the roll or turning over the roll. Removal of Formwork General Forms and shores (except those used for slabs on grade and slip forms) shall not be removed until the employer determines that the concrete has gained sufficient strength to support its weight and superimposed loads. Such determination shall be based on compliance with one of the following: 1. The plans and specifications stipulate conditions for removal of forms and shores, and such conditions have been followed. 2. The concrete has been properly tested with an appropriate ASTM standard test method designed to indicate the concrete compressive strength, and the test results indicate that the concrete has gained sufficient strength to support its weight and superimposed loads. Removing reshoring Reshoring shall not be removed until the concrete being supported has attained adequate strength to support its weight and all loads in place upon it. Precast Concrete Supporting Precast concrete wall units, structural framing, and tilt-up wall panels shall be adequately supported to prevent overturning and to prevent collapse until permanent connections are completed. Lifting inserts Lifting inserts which are embedded or otherwise attached to tilt-up precast concrete members shall be capable of supporting at least two times the maximum intended load applied or transmitted to them. Lifting inserts which are embedded or otherwise attached to precast concrete members, other than the tilt-up members, shall be capable of supporting at least four times the maximum intended load applied or transmitted to them. Lifting hardware Lifting hardware shall be capable of supporting at least five times the maximum intended load applied transmitted to the lifting hardware. Employee positioning No employee shall be permitted under precast concrete members being lifted or tilted into position, except those employees required for the erection of those members.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/15%3A_Concrete_and_Masonry/15.02%3A_Cast_in_Place_Concre.txt

Lift-Slab Operations Design Lift-slab operations shall be designed and planned by a registered professional engineer who has experience in lift-slab construction. Such plans and designs shall be implemented by the employer and shall include detailed instructions and sketches indicating the prescribed method of erection. These plans and designs shall also include provisions for ensuring lateral stability of the building/structure during construction. Jacks/lifting units Jacks/lifting units shall be marked to indicate their rated capacity as established by the manufacturer. Jacks/lifting units shall not be loaded beyond their rated capacity as established by the manufacturer. Jacks/lifting units shall be designed and installed so that they will neither lift nor continue to lift when they are loaded in excess of their rated capacity. Jacks/lifting units shall have a safety device installed which will cause the jacks/lifting units to support the load in any position in the event any jacklifting unit malfunctions or loses its lifting ability. Jacking equipment Jacking equipment shall be capable of supporting at least two and one-half times the load being lifted during jacking operations and the equipment shall not be overloaded. For the purpose of this provision, jacking equipment includes any load bearing component, which is used to carry out the lifting operation(s). Such equipment includes, but is not limited to the following: threaded rods, lifting attachments, lifting nuts, hook-up collars, T -caps, shearheads, columns, and footings. Jacking operations Jacking operations shall be synchronized in such a manner to ensure even and uniform lifting of the slab. During lifting, all points at which the slab is supported shall be kept within ½ inch of that needed to maintain the slab in a level position. If leveling is automatically controlled, a device shall be installed that will stop the operation when the ½ inch tolerance level is exceeded or where there is a malfunction in the jacking (lifting) system. If leveling is maintained by manual controls, such controls shall be located in a central location and attended by a competent person while lifting is in progress. In addition to meeting the definition of "competent person" the competent person must be experienced in the lifting operation and with the lifting equipment being used. The maximum number of manually controlled jacks/lifting units on one slab shall be limited to a number that will permit the operator to maintain the slab level within specified tolerances of paragraph (g) of this section, but in no case shall that number exceed fourteen. Employee positioning No employee, except those essential to the jacking operation, shall be permitted in the building/structure while any jacking operation is taking place unless the building/structure has been reinforced sufficiently to ensure its integrity during erection. The phrase "reinforced sufficiently to ensure its integrity" used in this paragraph means that a registered professional engineer, independent of the engineer who designed and planned the lifting operation, has determined from the plans that if there is a loss of support at any jack location, that loss will be confined to that location and the structure as a whole will remain stable. Under no circumstances, shall any employee who is not essential to the jacking operation be permitted immediately beneath a slab while it is being lifted. Masonry Construction General A limited access zone shall be established whenever a masonry wall is being constructed. The limited access zone shall conform to the following: 1. The limited access zone shall be established prior to the start of construction of the wall. 2. The limited access zone shall be equal to the height of the wall to be constructed plus four feet, and shall run the entire length of the wall. 3. The limited access zone shall be established on the side of the wall, which will be unscaffolded. 4. The limited access zone shall be restricted to entry by employees actively engaged in constructing the wall. No other employees shall be permitted to enter the zone. 5. The limited access zone shall remain in place until the wall is adequately supported to prevent overturning and to prevent collapse unless the height of the wall is over eight feet, in which case, the limited access zone shall remain in place until the permanent supporting elements of the structure are in place. Bracing All masonry walls over eight feet in height shall be adequately braced to prevent overturning and to prevent collapse unless the wall is adequately supported so that it will not overturn or collapse. The bracing shall remain in place until permanent supporting elements of the structure are in place. 15.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. ________ means the total system of support for freshly placed or partially cured concrete including the mold or sheeting (form) that is in contact with the concrete as well as all supporting members including shores, reshores hardware, braces, and related hardware. 2. All protruding reinforcing steel, onto and into which employees could fall, shall be ________ to eliminate the hazard of impalement. 3. No employee shall be permitted to apply a cement, sand, and water mixture through a pneumatic hose unless the employee is wearing protective ________ and ________ equipment. 4. Concrete buckets equipped with hydraulic or pneumatic gates shall have ________ safety latches or similar safety devices installed to prevent premature or accidental dumping. 5. Bull float handles used where they might contact energized electrical conductors shall be constructed of________material or insulated with a nonconductive sheath whose electrical and mechanical characteristics provide the equivalent protection of a handle constructed of nonconductive material. 6. All vertical slip forms shall be provided with ________or work________ where employees are required to work or pass. 7. No employee shall be permitted________ precast concrete members being lifted or tilted into position except those employees required for the erection of those members. Multiple Choice: (Circle the Correct Answer) 1. All masonry walls over________feet in height shall be adequately braced to prevent overturning and to prevent collapse unless the wall is adequately supported so that it will not overturn of collapse. The bracing shall remain in place until permanent supporting elements of the structure are in place. a. six b. eight c. ten d. twelve 2. Lifting inserts which are embedded or otherwise attached to tilt-up precast concrete members shall be capable of supporting at least________times the maximum intended load applied or transmitted to them. a. two b. three c. four d. five 3. Shoring equipment that is found to be damaged or weakened after erection, such that its strength is significantly reduced, shall be immediately ________. a. destroyed b. discarded c. reinforced d. identified

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/15%3A_Concrete_and_Masonry/15.03%3A_Lift-Slab_Operations.txt

“Carefulness costs you nothing. Carelessness may cost you your life.” – Safety saying, early 1900s Overview Slips, trips, and Falls account for 20% of all accidents, injuries, and fatalities in the workplace and over 35% in the construction industry. In chapter 11 the focus was on fall hazards that must be managed when work must occur on elevated surfaces. In this chapter the focus will be on the structural design standards for stairways and also the design and performance characteristics of ladders. Ladders are portable and very important to construction activities. Falls may occur from ladders and it is important to ensure this special category of safety equipment is up to the task. Chapter Objective: 1. Identify the Do's & Don'ts of Ladder Safety. 2. Understand the Requirements of Subpart X-Ladders & Stairways. 3. Understand the Construction Requirements for Temporary Ladders & Stairways. Learning Outcome: 1. Apply the hierarchy of controls to ladder safety standards. 2. Determine how to select the proper ladder for the job. Standards: 1926 Subpart X-Stairways and Ladders Key Terms: Double-Cleated Ladder, Pan Stairs, Rungs Mini-Lecture: Ladder Safety Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Fixed Ladder, attribution Bluesnap, Pixabay 16: Stairways and Ladders Introduction Ladders are one of the most frequently used tools on the jobsite. Unfortunately, they are also one of the most abused and mistreated. Some of the most serious accidents that electrical workers have involve falls from six foot ladders. Accident studies show there are several factors that are common to most ladder accidents. Standing on the top step of a ladder, or standing above the maximum permitted height are frequently cited as factors in ladder accidents. Overreaching on the ladder is another commonly cited contributor to ladder accidents. Another common factor in ladder accidents is the use of the wrong ladder for the job. Using ladders with conductive side rails or using a step-ladder as a straight ladder are two good examples of ladder misapplication. General Requirements A stairway or ladder, for personnel access, shall be provided whenever there is a break in elevation of 19 inches or more. Stairways and ladders are not required where a ramp, sloped embankment, runway, or personnel hoist is provided. Spiral stairways are not permitted for employees on construction sites unless they are part of the structure on which the construction work is being performed. A double-cleated ladder or two or more separate ladders shall be provided when ladders are the only means of access or exit from a working area for 25 or more employees or when a ladder is used for simultaneous two-way traffic. Each building or structure shall have at least one point of access between levels and that point shall be kept clear to permit free passage of employees. Stairways Installation Requirements Temporary stairways shall be equipped with landings of not less than 30 inches in the direction of travel and extend at least 22 inches in width at every 12 feet, or less, of vertical rise. Stairways shall be installed between 30 degrees and 50 degrees from horizontal. Riser height and tread depth shall be within 1/4" of uniform heights and depths in any stairway system. Where doors or gates open directly on a stairway, the swing of the door or gate shall not reduce the effective width of the platform to less than 20 inches. Pan stairs Stairways with pan stairs, where the treads and/or landings are not filled, shall not be used for foot traffic unless the treads and/or landings are temporarily fitted with wood or other material to the top edge of each pan. Requirements for stairways rising more than 30 inches Stairways having four or more risers or rising more than 30 inches shall be equipped with the following: 1. At least one handrail. 2. One vertical barrier along the unprotected sides to prevent employees from falling to lower levels. Construction requirements Construction of stairways shall also meet the following requirements: 1. The height of the stairrails shall not be less than 36 inches from the upper surface of the stairrail system to the surface of the tread, in line with the face of the riser at the forward edge of the tread. 2. Midrails, when used, shall be installed midway between the top edge of the stairrail and the stairway steps. 3. If Midrails are not used then screens, mesh or intermediate vertical members shall be provided between the top of the stairrail and the stairway steps. 4. When screens or mesh are used, they shall extend from the top rail of the stairway to the stairway step. 5. When intermediate vertical members are used they shall not be more than 19 inches apart. 6. Handrails and the top rails of stairrails shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, a force of at least 200 pounds, applied within two inches of any point along the top edge. 7. The height of handrails shall not be more than 37 inches nor less than 30 inches from the upper surface of the handrail to the surface or the tread. 8. Stairrail systems and handrails shall not be constructed with surfaces that can cause lacerations or puncture, nor shall their ends constitute a projection hazard. 9. Handrails, not part of the permanent structure, shall have a minimum clearance of three inches between the handrail and the walls or other objects. Ladders Ladders shall be constructed in accordance with the following requirements: 1. Self-supporting and portable ladders shall be designed to handle four times the maximum intended load. Fixed ladders shall be capable of handling at least two loads of 250 pounds each, concentrated between any two consecutive attachments, plus any anticipated loads. Steps or rungs shall be capable of handling at least 250 pounds, applied in the middle of the step or rung. 2. Rungs, cleats and steps of portable and fixed ladders shall be spaced at not less 10 inches and not more than 14 inches apart. 3. The rungs and steps of fixed metal ladders shall be corrugated, knurled, dimpled, coated with skid resistant material or otherwise treated to minimize slippage. 4. In general, when two or more separate ladders are used to reach an elevated work area, the ladders shall be offset with a platform or landings between ladders. 5. Except for use in elevator pits, the minimum perpendicular clearance between fixed ladder rungs or steps and any objects behind the ladder, shall be seven inches. 6. Where the total length of the climb is equal to or greater than 24 feet, the ladder shall be equipped with one of the following: • Ladder safety device. • Self-retracting lifelines with rest platforms at intervals not exceeding 150 feet. • A cage or well, and multiple ladder sections, each section of which is offset from adjacent sections, with landing platforms at intervals not exceeding 50 feet. Ladder Use All ladders, including job-made ladders, shall be used in accordance with the following requirements: 1. If portable ladders are used to gain access to upper floors, the ladder siderails shall extend at least three feet above the upper landing surface. If the ladders length does not permit such an extension, then the ladder must be secured at the top to a rigid support and a grabrail or other grasping device shall be provided. 2. Ladders shall not be loaded beyond the maximum load and shall not be used for other than the purpose for which they were designed. 3. Non-self-supporting ladders shall be used at an angle such that the horizontal distance from the top of the support to the foot of the ladder is approximately one quarter of the working length of the ladder. 4. Ladders shall only be used on stable and level surfaces unless secured to prevent accidental displacement. 5. Ladders shall be so located that they are protected from displacement by workplace activities. If ladders are placed in such locations, like stairways and doorways, they shall be secured to prevent accidental displacement or a barricade shall be erected. 6. The areas around the top and bottom of ladders shall be kept clear. 7. Ladders, shall not be moved, shifted or extended while occupied. "Walking" ladders to a different location is not permitted. 8. Ladders used where the worker could be exposed to energized electrical equipment, shall be equipped with nonconductive siderails. 9. The top or top step of a step ladder shall not be used as a step. Training Employer responsibilities The employer shall provide a training program for each employee to learn proper usage of ladders and stairways, as necessary. The program shall enable each employee to recognize hazards related to ladders and stairways, and the employer shall conduct training that includes the procedures to be followed to minimize these hazards. Employee training The employer shall ensure that each employee has been trained by a competent person in the following areas, as applicable: • The nature of the fall hazards in the work area. • The correct procedure for erecting, maintaining, and disassembling the fall protection systems to be used. • The proper construction, use, placement, and care in handling of all stairways and ladders. • The maximum intended load-carrying capacities of the ladders used. • The standards contained in Subpart X. Retraining Retraining shall be provided for each employee as necessary so that the employee maintains the understanding and knowledge acquired through compliance with this section. 16.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the Blanks: 1. A stairway or ladder, for personal access, shall be provided whenever there is a break in elevation of________ inches or more. 2. ________ stairways are not permitted for employees on construction sites unless they are part of the structure on which the construction work is being performed. 3. A________ ladder, or two or more separate ladders shall be provided when ladders are the only means of access or exit from a working area for 25 or more employees or when a ladder is used for simultaneous two-way traffic. 4. Each building or structure shall have at least________point of access between levels and the point shall be kept clear to permit free passage of employees. 5. Temporary stairways shall be equipped with landings of not less than________ inches in the direction of travel and extend at least 22 inches in width at every 12 foot of vertical rise. 6. The construction of stairways shall be such that the height of the stair rails shall not be less than________inches from the upper surface of the stand rail system to the surface of the tread, in line with the face of the riser at the forward and of the tread. 7. Handrails and the top rails of stair rails shall be capable of withstanding, without failure, a force of at least________pound, applied within ________inches of any point along the top edge. 8. Self-supporting and portable ladders shall be designed to handle________ times the maximum intended load. Fixed ladder shall be capable of handling at least two loads of pounds each, concentrated between any two consecutive attachments, plus any anticipated loads. 9. The height of handrails shall not be more than ________inches or less than________inches from the upper surface of the handrail to the surface of the tread. True or False: (Circle the Correct Answer) 10. T or F Stairways with pan stairs, where the tread and/or landings are not fill-in, shall not be used for foot traffic, unless the tread and/or landings are temporarily fitted with wood or other materials to the top edge of the each pan.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/16%3A_Stairways_and_Ladders/16.01%3A_Introduction_to_Sta.txt

“The danger which is least expected soonest comes to us.” – Voltaire Overview Some of the most hazardous environments workers may encounter are the atmospheres of confined spaces. Workers caught in confined spaces often never even knew what hit them. Oxygen deficient and toxic atmospheres can quickly overcome workers. It is important to recognize the physical characteristics of a confined space as well as recognizing when work impacting air quality in poorly ventilated spaces produces confined space conditions. This chapter will identify the many examples of confined spaces and the hazards that must be managed when working in or near them. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine how to Identify Confined Spaces. 2. Identify the Hazards Associated with Confined Spaces. 3. Understand the Responsibilities of the Entrant, Attendant and Entry Supervisor. 4. Determine the Proper Procedures for Entering and Working in a Confined Space. Learning Outcome: 1. Understand the conditions of a permit required confined space. 2. Identify the control measures on a confined space permit. Standards: 1926 Subpart AA Confined Spaces in Construction, 1910.145 Permit Required Confined Spaces Key Terms: Attendant, engulfment, entrapment, entrant, hot work permit Mini-Lecture: Confined Spaces Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Brewery-Vats-Tychy-Company-Free-Image-Vat-Beer-Sil-3459.jpg 17: Confined Spaces Introduction Confined Spaces are encountered on many types of jobsites. OSHA defines a confined space as one that has limited or restricted means of entry or exit, is large enough for an employee to enter and perform work, and is not designed for continuous employee occupancy. OSHA also classifies permit-required confined spaces. The spaces meet the definition of a confined space as above, but have one or more of the following: 1. The potential to contain hazardous atmospheres. 2. Contains materials that have the potential to engulf the entrant. 3. Has an internal configuration with inwardly converging walls or floors that slope downward. 4. Contains other recognized serious safety or health hazards. Examples of Confined Spaces Examples of confined spaces include silos, vats, hoppers, utility vaults, tanks, sewers, pipes, access shafts, truck or rail tank cars, aircraft wings, boilers, manholes, manure pits and storage bins. Ditches and trenches may also be a confined space when access or egress is limited, as well as attic and subfloor crawl spaces or other spaces subject to the accumulation of hazardous atmospheres. Permit-Required Written Program If employers have permit-required confined spaces that employees will enter, then they must develop a written PERMIT SPACE program. In addition, if contractors are hired by the employer, they must be made aware of permit spaces and permit space entry requirements, any identified hazards, and precautions or procedures to be followed when in or near permit spaces. Required components Some of the required components of the written permit space program that the employer must ensure are carried out are: 1. Identify & evaluate permit space hazards. 2. Test conditions in the Confined space before entry begins and monitor the space during entry. 3. Perform appropriate atmospheric testing for oxygen combustible gases or vapors, and toxic gases or vapors. 4. Means to prevent unauthorized entrance into confined spaces. 5. Means to verify acceptable entry conditions. 6. Identify employee job duties. 7. Provide the required PPE for entrants. 8. Ensure at least one attendant is stationed outside the confined space at all times. 9. Implement proper procedures for summoning rescue and emergency services. Permit system requirements An important part of a confined space program is a workable system for issuing confined space entry permits. The permit system must provide means for: 1. Issuance of a permit, signed by the entry supervisor and verifying that pre-entry preparations have been completed and that the space is safe to enter. The duration of the permit must not exceed the time required to complete the work. 2. Use of permits that contain the atmospheric test results, tester's initials, name and signature of entry supervisor, name of permit space to be entered, names of entrant, attendant and supervisor, purpose of entry, control measures, such as lockout/tagout that need to be taken, name & phone number of rescue services, date and duration of entry, acceptable entry conditions, communication procedures, additional permits required, such as: hot work, special equipment or procedures required, and any other information needed to ensure employee safety. Training and Education Employer requirements Employers must ensure that all workers who are required to work in confined spaces be adequately trained. Training must occur before the initial assignment, if job duties change, if there is a change in the permit space program, or when the employee shows deficiencies in his or her job performance. Rescue team member training Training is also required for rescue team members, including CPR and first-aid training. Upon completion of training, employees must receive a certificate of training containing the employee’s name, the name of the trainer, and the date of the training. Job Duties Authorized Entrant The authorized entrant is the employee who is permitted to enter the permit-required confined space. The entrant's duties are as follows: 1. Know the space hazards including the signs of exposure. 2. Use the required and appropriate PPE. 3. Maintain communication with authorized attendant. 4. Exit from permit space as soon as ordered by attendant and when signs or symptoms of exposure exist. 5. Alert the attendant when a prohibited condition exists. Authorized Attendants The attendant is the employee who stands by, at the entrance to the confined space, while an entrant is inside. The attendant's duties are as follows: 1. Remain outside the space during the entry unless relieved by another authorized attendant. 2. Perform non-entry rescue when necessary. 3. Know existing and potential space hazards. 4. Maintain communication with authorized entrant. 5. Order evacuation of space when a prohibited condition exists or when worker shows signs of exposure. 6. Summon rescue and emergency services when necessary. 7. Ensure that unauthorized personnel do not enter spaces. 8. Inform authorized entrants and entry supervisor of entry by unauthorized persons. 9. Perform no other duties that interfere with the attendant's primary duties. Entry Supervisor The entry supervisor is the person who takes the responsibility of implementing the procedures of the confined space program. The responsibilities of the entry supervisor are to 1. Know the space hazards and the signs or symptoms of exposure. 2. Verify that the required emergency plans, permits tests and procedures have been followed before allowing entry. 3. Terminate entry and cancel permits when entry is complete or the entry conditions change. 4. Ensure unauthorized entrants are promptly removed. 5. Ensure that entry procedures remain consistent with the entry permit and that acceptable entry conditions are maintained. Emergencies The last part of the standard contains provisions for the summoning of rescue squads or emergency services in the event that there is a problem during the entry. The standard requires that: 1. The rescue squad be trained in the proper use of PPE and rescue equipment and be properly equipped to perform the rescue. 2. All rescuers must be trained in first-aid and CPR and at least one rescue team member must be currently certified as such. The rescue team must practice rescue exercises annually under actual rescue conditions. 3. Entrants who must enter a permit space must wear a chest or full body harness with a retrieval line attached to the center of the back near the shoulder level, or above their heads. Wristlets may be used where the use of a chest or body harness is infeasible or creates a greater hazard. 4. The other end of the retrieval line must be connected to a mechanical device or a fixed point outside the permit space. If the space contains a vertical depth of five feet or more, a mechanical device must be available to retrieve personnel. 5. SDS sheets, for the substances in the confined space(s), must be available to the medical facility treating the exposed entrant. 17.A: Review Questions-Confined Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Multiple Choice: (Circle Correct Letter) 1. Which of the following conditions is or are necessary to have an OSHA defined confined space: a. Limited or restricted means of entry or exit. b. Large enough for an employee to enter and perform work. c. Not designed for continuous employee occupancy. d. All of the above. e. None of the above. 2. Permit-Required Confined Spaces are confined spaces with which of the following: a. The potential to contain hazardous atmospheres. b. Contains materials that have the potential to engulf the entrant. c. Has an internal configuration with inwardly converging walls or floors that slope downward d. Contains other recognized serious safety or health hazards, e. (a.) and (d.) only, f. Anyone of the above. 3. Employers must ensure that all workers who are required to work in confined spaces be adequately trained. Training must occur: a. Before the initial assignment. b. If job duties change. c. There is a change in the permit space program. d. When the employee shows deficiencies in his or her job performance. e. If any of the above occur. f. If all of the above have occurred. True or False: (Circle the Correct Answer) 4. T or F One of the primary responsibilities for the confined space entrant is to use the required and appropriate PPE. 5. T or F The attendant is the employee who stands by, at the entrance to the confined space, while an entrant is inside. The attendant’s primary duty is to perform an entry rescue whenever the entrant needs assistance. 6. T or F The attendant is not permitted perform any other jobs that may interfere with their primary duties. General: 7. One of the________ responsibilities is to ensure that entry procedures remain consistent with the entry permit and that acceptable entry conditions are maintained. 8. All confined space rescuers must be trained in________ and ________ and at least one rescue team member is currently certified as such. 9. Entrants who must enter a permit space must wear a ________ or________ ________harness with a retrieval line attached to the center of the back near the shoulder level or above their heads. 10. If the permit space contains a vertical depth of________ft. or more, a mechanical device must be available to retrieve personnel. 11________for the substances in the confined spaces must be available to the medical facility treating the exposed entrant.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/17%3A_Confined_Spaces/17.01%3A_Introduction_to_Confined_.txt

"Your employees learn by example. If they don't see you practicing good safety habits, they won't think safety is important." – Electrical Construction & Maintenance Overview OSHA places much emphasis on equipment safety. Workers are safe when the tools and equipment they use to perform a task are in good working order or operable. Worker safety is therefore wedded to equipment safety. Routine and repetitive maintenance of equipment is a core safety function and an essential workplace practice. Workers whose responsibility it is to repair and maintain equipment, machines, must work safely and be protected during equipment servicing. It is while equipment is being serviced that machine guards are removed and safety interlocks disabled when workers are the most exposed to operating points and power transmission devices. It is imperative that all energy sources that control the affected equipment be isolated and prevented from being energized. Lockout/Tagout is a hybrid in the hierarchy of controls having elements of both engineering and work practice controls. It is a critical program that must be activated where ever workers service equipment. Chapter Objective: 1. Determine the Scope and Application of Standard 1910.147. 2. Identify the elements of an effective Lockout/Tagout program. 3. Review the employee role and responsibilities in an effective Lockout/Tagout program. Learning Outcome: 1. Apply hierarchy of controls to lockout/tagout standard. 2. Select the elements of the 1910.147 standard that can be used to meet the 1926 Lockout/Tagout standard requirements. Standards: Subpart K 1926.417 Lockout and Tagout of Circuits, 1910.147 Control of Hazardous Energy Key Terms: Hazardous Energy, key blocks, self-locking fasteners, wedge Mini-Lecture: Lockout/Tagout and Machine Guarding Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Lock out tag, Pixabay free license 18: Lock out Tag out Introduction Since OSHA's formation in the 1970's they have adopted various lockout/tagout related provisions from existing national consensus standards and other Federal standards, which were developed for specific types of equipment or industries. In 1990 a new standard 1910.147 Control of Hazardous Energy (Lockout/Tagout) went into effect. This standard seeks to safeguard employees from the unexpected startup of machinery or equipment or release of hazardous energy while performing service or maintenance work. Application to construction The provisions of 1910.147 standard, while not mandatory for construction, provide a good foundation for safe lockout/tagout procedures no matter where the maintenance operation occurs. The OSHA 1910.147 standard is intended to be used when electrical supply lines are being de-energized for the purpose of performing maintenance type operations. While a comprehensive lockout/tagout standard does not exist for construction there are components of some standards that require this protection. These lockout/tagout provisions will also be reviewed in this lesson. Scope and Application The Lockout/Tagout standard covers the servicing and maintenance of machines and equipment in which the "unexpected" energizing or startup of the machines or equipment, or release of stored energy could cause injury to employees. The standard establishes minimum performance requirements for the control of such hazardous energy. This standard does not cover the following: 1. Construction, agriculture and maritime employment; 2. Installations under the exclusive control of electric utilities for the purpose of power generation, transmission and distribution including related equipment for communication or metering; and 3. Exposure to electrical hazards from work on, near, or with conductors or equipment in electric utilization installations, which is covered by Subpart S. 4. Oil and gas well drilling and servicing. Normal production operations Normal production operations are not covered by this standard (See Subpart 0 of this Part). Servicing and/or maintenance which takes place during normal production operations is covered by this standard only if: 1. An employee is required to remove or bypass a guard or other safety device; or 2. An employee is required to place any part of his or her body into an area on a machine or piece of equipment where work is actually performed upon the material being processed (point of operation) or where an associated danger zone exists during a machine operating cycle. Minor tool changes and adjustments Minor tool changes and adjustments, and other minor servicing activities which take place during normal production operations, are not covered by this standard if they are routine, repetitive, and integral to the use of the equipment for production, provided that the work is performed using alternative measures which provide effective protection. Application of standard This standard does not apply to the following: 1. Work on cord and plug connected electric equipment for which exposure to the hazards of unexpected energizing or startup of the equipment is controlled by the unplugging of the equipment from the energy source and by the plug being under the exclusive control of the employee performing the servicing or maintenance. 2. Hot tap operations involving transmission and distribution systems for substances such as gas, steam, water or petroleum products when they are performed on pressurized pipelines, provided that the employer demonstrates that- • continuity of service is essential; • shutdown of the system is impractical; and • documented procedures are followed, and special equipment is used which will provide proven effective protection for employees. Definitions The following definitions are applicable to the lockout/tagout standard: Affected employee: An employee whose job requires him/her to operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him/her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is being performed. Authorized employee: A person who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when that employee’s duties include performing servicing or maintenance covered under this section. Capable of being locked out: An energy isolating device is capable of being locked out if it has a hasp or other means of attachment to which, or through which, a lock can be affixed, or it has a locking mechanism built into it. Other energy isolating devices are capable of being locked out, if lockout can be achieved without the need to dismantle, rebuild, or replace the energy isolating device or permanently alter its energy control capability. Energized: Connected to an energy source or containing residual or stored energy. Energy isolating device: A mechanical device that physically prevents the transmission or release or energy, including but not limited to the following: A manually operated electrical circuit breaker, a disconnect switch, a manually operated switch by which the conductors of a circuit can be disconnected from all ungrounded supply conductors and, in addition no pole can be operated independently; a line valve; a block; and any similar device used to block or isolate energy. Push buttons, selector switches and other control circuit type devices are not energy isolating devices. Energy source: Any source of electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, thermal, or other energy. Hot tap: A procedure used in the repair maintenance and services activities which involves welding on a piece of equipment (pipelines vessels or tanks) under pressure, in order to install connections or appurtenances, it is commonly used to replace or add sections of pipeline without the interruption of service for air, gas, water, steam, and petrochemical distribution systems. Lockout: The placement of a lockout device on an energy isolating device, in accordance with an established procedure, ensuring that the energy isolating device and the equipment being controlled cannot be operated until the lockout device is removed. Lockout device: A device that utilizes a positive means such as a lock, either key or combination type, to hold an energy isolating device in the safe position and prevent the energizing of a machine or equipment. Included are blank flanges and bolted slip blinds. Normal production operations: The utilization of a machine or equipment to perform its intended production function. Servicing and/or maintenance: Workplace activities such as constructing, installing, setting up, adjusting, inspecting, modifying, and maintaining and/or servicing machines or equipment. These activities include lubrication, cleaning or unjamming of machines or equipment and making adjustments or tool changes, where the employee may be exposed to the unexpected energizing or startup of the equipment or release of hazardous energy. Setting up: Any work performed to prepare a machine or equipment to perform its normal production operation. Tagout: The placement of a tagout device on an energy isolating device, in accordance with an established procedure, to indicate that the energy isolating device and the equipment being controlled may not be operated until the tagout device is removed. Tagout device: A prominent warning device, such as a tag and a means of attachment, which can be securely fastened to an energy isolating device in accordance with an established procedure, to indicate that the energy isolating device and the equipment being controlled may not be operated until the tag out device is removed. Energy Control Program General The employer shall establish a program consisting of energy control procedures, employee training and periodic inspections to ensure that before any employee performs any servicing or maintenance on a machine or equipment where the unexpected energizing, startup or release of stored energy could occur and cause injury, the machine or equipment shall be isolated from the energy source and rendered inoperative. Not capable of being locked out If an energy isolating device is not capable of being locked out, the employer s energy control program shall utilize a tagout system. Capable of being locked out If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked out, the employer energy control program shall utilize lockout, unless the employer can demonstrate that the utilization of a tagout system will provide full employee protection. Effective date After January 1990, whenever replacement or major repair, renovation or modification of a machine or equipment is performed, and whenever new machines or equipment are installed, energy isolating devices for such machine or equipment shall be designed to accept a lockout device. Tag out device use When a tagout device is used on an energy isolating device which is capable of being locked out, the tagout device shall be attached at the same location that the lockout device would have been attached, and the employer shall demonstrate that the tagout program will provide a level of safety equivalent to that obtained by using a lockout program. Full employee protection In demonstrating that a level of safety is achieved in the tag out program which is equivalent to the level of safety obtained by using a lockout program, the employer shall demonstrate full compliance with all tagout-related provisions of this standard together with such additional elements as are necessary to provide the equivalent safety available from the use of a lockout device. Additional means to be considered as part of the demonstration of full employee protection shall include the implementation of additional safety measures such as the removal of an isolating circuit element, blocking of a controlling switch, opening of an extra disconnecting device, or the removal of a valve handle to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent energizing.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/18%3A_Lock_out_Tag_out/18.01%3A_Introduction_to_Lock_out.txt

Energy Control Procedure General Procedures shall be developed, documented and utilized for the control of potentially hazardous energy when employees are engaged in the activities covered by this section. Procedure requirements The procedures shall clearly and specifically outline the scope, purpose, authorization, rules, and techniques to be utilized for the control of hazardous energy, and the means to enforce compliance. Protective Materials and Hardware General Locks, tags, chains, wedges, key blocks, adapter pins, self-locking fasteners, or other hardware shall be provided by the employer for isolating, securing or blocking of machines or equipment from energy sources. Lockout and tagout device requirements Lockout devices and tagout devices shall be singularly identified; shall be the only device(s) used for controlling energy; shall not be used for other purposes; and shall meet the following requirements: Durable: 1. Lockout and tagout devices shall be capable of withstanding the environment to which they are exposed for the maximum period of time that exposure is expected. 2. Tagout devices shall be constructed and printed so that exposure to weather conditions or wet and damp locations will not cause the tag to deteriorate or the message on the tag to become illegible. 3. Tags shall not deteriorate when used in corrosive environments such as areas where acid and alkali chemicals are handled and stored. Standardized: Lockout and tagout devices shall be standardized within the facility in at least one of the following criteria: Color; shape; or size; and additionally, in the case of tagout devices, print and format shall be standardized. Substantial: 1. Lockout devices shall be substantial enough to prevent removal without the use of excessive force or unusual techniques, such as with the use of bolt cutters or other metal cutting tools. 2. Tagout devices, including their means of attachment, shall be substantial enough to prevent inadvertent or accidental removal. Tagout device attachment means shall be of a non-reusable type, attachable by hand, self-locking, and non-releasable with a minimum unlocking strength of no less than 50 pounds and having the general design and basic characteristics of being at least equivalent to a one-piece all environment- tolerant nylon cable tie. Identifiable: Lockout devices and tag out devices shall indicate the identity of the employee applying the device(s). Tagout device warnings Tagout devices shall warn against hazardous conditions if the machine or equipment is energized and shall include a legend such as the following: "Do Not Start. Do Not Open. Do Not Close. Do Not Energize. Do Not Operate." Inspection of procedure The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy control procedure at least annually to ensure that the procedure and the requirements of this standard are being followed. The periodic inspection shall 1. be performed by an authorized employee other than the one(s) utilizing the energy control procedure being inspected. 2. be conducted to correct any deviations or inadequacies identified. 3. where lockout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized employee, of that employee s responsibilities under the energy control procedure being inspected. 4. where tagout is used for energy control, the periodic inspection shall include a review, between the inspector and each authorized and affected employee, of that employees responsibilities under the energy control procedure being inspected, and the limitations of tags. 5. be certified by the employer. The certification shall identify the machine or equipment on which the energy control procedure was being utilized, the date of the inspection, the employees included in the inspection, and the person performing the inspection. Training and Communication Training The employer shall provide training to ensure that the purpose and function of the energy control program are understood by employees and that the knowledge and skills required for the safe application, usage, and removal of the energy controls are acquired by employees. The training shall include the following: 1. Each authorized employee shall receive training in the recognition of applicable hazardous energy sources, the type and magnitude of the energy available in the workplace, and the methods and means necessary for energy isolation and control. 2. Each affected employee shall be instructed in the purpose and use of the energy control procedure. 3. All other employees whose work operations are or may be in an area where energy control procedures may be utilized, shall be instructed about the procedure, and about the prohibition relating to attempts to restart or re-energize machines or equipment which are locked out or tagged out. Tagout system training When tagout systems are used, employees shall also be trained in the following limitations of tags: 1. Tags are essentially warning devices affixed to energy isolating devices, and do not provide the physical restraint on those devices that is provided by a lock. 2. When a tag is attached to an energy isolating means, it is not to be removed without authorization of the authorized person responsible for it, and it is never to be bypassed, ignored, or otherwise defeated 3. Tags must be legible and understandable by all authorized employees, affected employees, and all other employees whose work operations are or may be in the area, in order to be effective. 4. Tags and their means of attachment must be made of materials which will withstand the environmental conditions encountered in the workplace. 5. Tags may evoke a false sense of security, and their meaning needs to be understood as part of the overall energy control program. 6. Tags must be securely attached to energy isolating devices so that they cannot be inadvertently or accidentally detached during use. Retraining Retraining shall be provided for all authorized and affected employees whenever there is a change in their job assignments, a change of or to machines, equipment or processes that present a new hazard, or when there is a change in the energy control procedures. Additional retraining shall also be conducted whenever the periodic inspection, required by the standard, reveals, or whenever the employer has reason to believe that there are deviations from or inadequacies in the employee's knowledge or use of the energy control procedures.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/18%3A_Lock_out_Tag_out/18.02%3A_Energy_Control_Procedure.txt

Energy Isolation Lockout or tagout shall be performed only by the authorized employees who are performing the servicing or maintenance. Affected employees Affected employees shall be notified by the employer or authorized employee of the application and removal of lockout devices or tagout devices. Notification shall be given before the controls are applied, and after they are removed from the machine or equipment. Elements of the procedure The established procedures for the application of energy control (the lockout or tagout procedures) shall cover the following elements and actions and shall be done in the following sequence: 1. Preparation for shutdown. Before an authorized or affected employee turns off a machine or equipment, the authorized employee shall have knowledge of the type and magnitude of the energy, the hazards of the energy to be controlled, and the method or means to control the energy. 2. Machine or equipment shutdown. The machine or equipment shall be turned off or shut down using the procedures established for the machine or equipment. An orderly shutdown must be utilized to avoid any additional or increased hazard(s) to employees as a result of the equipment stoppage. 3. Machine or equipment isolation. All energy isolating devices that are needed to control the energy to the machine or equipment shall be physically located and operated in such a manner as to isolate the machine or equipment from the energy source(s). 4. Lockout or tagout device application. A Lockout or tagout device shall be affixed to each energy isolating device by an authorized employee. Lockout devices, where used, shall be affixed in a manner to that will hold the energy isolating devices in a "safe" or "off" position. Tagout devices, where used, shall be affixed in such a manner as will clearly indicate that the operation or movement of energy isolating devices from the "safe" or "off" position is prohibited. Where tagout devices are used with energy isolating devices designed with the capability of being locked, the tag attachment shall be fastened at the same point at which the lock would have been attached. Where a tag cannot be affixed directly to the energy isolating device, the tag shall be located as close as safely possible to the device, in a position that will be immediately obvious to anyone attempting to operate the device. 5. Stored energy. Following the application of logout or tagout devices to energy isolating devices, all potentially hazardous stored or residual energy shall be relieved, disconnected restrained, and otherwise rendered safe. If there is a possibility of reaccumulation of stored energy to a hazardous level, verification of isolation shall be continued until the servicing or maintenance is completed, or until the possibility of such accumulation no longer exists. 6. Verification of isolation. Prior to starting work on machines or equipment that have been locked out or tagged out; the authorized employee shall verify that isolation and de-energization of the machine or equipment have been accomplished. Release From Lockout or Tagout Before lockout or tagout devices are removed and energy is restored to the machine or equipment, procedures shall be followed and actions taken by the authorized employee(s) to ensure the following: 1. The machine or equipment. The work area shall be inspected to ensure that nonessential items have been removed and to ensure that machine or equipment components are operationally intact. 2. Employees. The work area shall be checked to ensure that all employees have been safely positioned or removed. Before lockout or tagout devices are removed and before machines or equipment are energized, affected employees shall be notified that the lockout or tagout devices have been removed. After lockout or tagout devices have been removed and before a machine or equipment is started, affected employees shall be notified that the lockout or tagout device(s) have been removed. 3. Lockout or tagout devices removal. Each lockout or tagout device shall be removed from each energy isolating device by the employee who applied the device. When the authorized employee who applied the lockout or tagout device is not available to remove it, that device may be removed under the direction of the employer, provided that specific procedures and training for such removal have been developed, documented and incorporated into the employer’s energy control program. The employer shall demonstrate that the specific procedure shall include at least the following elements: • Verification by the employer that the authorized employee who applied the device is not at the facility: • Making all reasonable efforts to contact the authorized employee to inform him/her that his/her lockout or tagout device has been removed; and • Ensuring that the authorized employee has this knowledge before he/she resumes work at that facility. Outside Personnel (Contractors, etc.) Communication Whenever outside servicing personnel are to be engaged in activities covered by the scope and application of this standard, the on-site employer and the outside employer shall inform each other of their respective lockout or tag out procedures. The on-site employer shall ensure that his/her employees understand and comply with the restrictions and prohibitions of the outside employer energy control program. Group Lockout or Tagout When servicing and/or maintenance is performed by a crew, craft department or other group, they shall utilize a procedure which affords the employees a level of protection equivalent to that provided by the implementation of a personal lockout or tagout device. Requirements Group lockout or tagout devices shall be used in accordance with the energy control procedures covered above. They shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, the following specific requirements: 1. Primary responsibility is vested in an authorized employee for a set number of employees working under the protection of a group lockout or tagout device (such as an operations lock); 2. Provision for the authorized employee to ascertain the exposure status of individual group members with regard to the lockout or tagout of the machine or equipment and; 3. When more than one crew, craft, department, etc. is involved assignment of overall job-associated lockout or tagged control responsibility to an authorized employee designated to coordinate affected work forces and ensure continuity of protection; and 4. Each authorized employee shall affix a personal lockout or tagout device to the group lockout device, group lockbox, or comparable mechanism when he or she begins work, and shall remove those devices when he or she stops working on the machine or equipment being serviced or maintained. Shift or Personnel Changes Specific procedures shall be utilized during shift or personnel changes to ensure the continuity of lockout or tagout protection, including provision for the orderly transfer of lockout or tagout device protection between off-going and oncoming employees, to minimize exposure to hazards from the unexpected energizing or startup of the machine or equipment, or the release of stored energy. 18.A: Review Questions Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Multiple Choice: (Circle the Correct Answer) 1. A person who locks out or tags out machines or equipment in order to perform servicing or maintenance on that machine or equipment would be classified as a(n)________ for the purposes of the lockout/tagout standard. a. Affected person b. Authorized person c. Competent person d. Qualified person 2. An employee whose job requires him/her to operate or use a machine or equipment on which servicing or maintenance is being performed under lockout or tagout, or whose job requires him/her to work in an area in which such servicing or maintenance is being performed would be classified as an________ for the purposes of the lockout/tagout standard. a. Affected person b. Authorized person c. Competent person d. Qualified person 3. Lockout and tagout devices shall be standardized within the facility by at least one of the following criteria: a. Color b. Shape c. Size d. Any of the above 4. The employer shall conduct a periodic inspection of the energy control procedure at least________to ensure that the procedure and the requirements of this standard are being followed. a. Daily b. Weekly c. Monthly d. Annually Fill in the Blanks: 5. ________ shall be provided for all authorized and affected employees whenever there is a change in their job assignments, a change in machines equipment or processes that present a new hazard, or when there is a change in the energy control procedures. 6. Prior to starting work on machines or equipment that have been locked out or tagged out, the authorized employee shall________ that isolation and deenergization of the machine or equipment have been accomplished. 7. If an energy isolating device is capable of being locked out, the employer s energy control program shall utilize lockout, unless the employer can demonstrate that the utilization of a________system will provide full employee protection. 8. ________ shall be developed, documented and utilized for the control of potentially hazardous energy when employees are engaged in the activities covered by this section. 9. Lockout and tagout devices shall be capable of withstanding the ________to which they are exposed for the maximum period of time that exposure is expected. 10. Tagout device attachment means shall be of a non-reusable type attachable by hand self-locking, and non-releasable with minimum unlocking strength of no less than ________pounds and having the general design and basic characteristics of being at least equivalent to a one-piece all environment-tolerant nylon cable tie.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/18%3A_Lock_out_Tag_out/18.03%3A_Energy_Isolation.txt

“An incident is just the tip of the iceberg, a sign of a much larger problem below the surface.” – Don Brown Overview Walking and working surfaces are many and vary widely. Yet the walking-working surfaces standard is sparse on specific safety requirements for every type of surface and existing direction is rather generic. This does not mean however that the safety standards are not comprehensive. The standard simply states upfront that: All places of employment, passageways, storerooms, service rooms, and walking-working surfaces are kept in a clean, orderly, and sanitary condition. This simple premise speaks volumes. Slips, trips, and falls are one of the leading causes of workplace incidents, accidents, and fatalities. Working surfaces should not be the cause of these and every employer must understand what clean, orderly, and sanitary looks like for their specific environments. The working-walking surfaces standard has within its scope safety requirements on ladders, stairways, scaffolds, and dock boards specifically, but must apply to every surface a worker is expected to perform work. Chapter Objective: 1. Understand the scope of the walking-working surfaces standard. 2. Discuss fall prevention methods. 3. Discuss fall protection methods. Learning Outcome: 1. Apply housekeeping best practices for maintaining walking-working surfaces. 2. Understand and apply best fall prevention and protection methods for the job. Standards: 1910 Subpart D Walking-Working Surfaces, 1910 Subpart F Powered Platforms, Man lifts, Vehicle Mounted Work Platforms Key Terms: Arrest, deceleration, guardrails, mid-rail, step bolt, travel restraint Mini-Lecture: Walking-Working Surfaces Required Time: 1 hour; Independent Study and reflection 1 ½ hour. Thumbnail: Scissorlift, attribution Jahudleston, Pixabay 19: Walking and Working Surfaces Introduction Workers in many diverse general industry workplaces are exposed to walking-working surface hazards that can result in slips, trips, falls and other injuries or fatalities. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, slips, trips, and falls are a leading cause of workplace fatalities and injuries in general industry, which indicates that workers regularly encounter these hazards. In January 2017 OSHA finalized rulemaking that increased safety expectations for all surfaces, including but not limited to, floors, ladders, stairways, runways, dock boards, roofs, scaffolds, and elevated work surfaces and walkways. Within the new rules there were changes to safety requirements for fixed ladder standards, rope descent systems, fall protections systems, and training. The intent of the changes was to reduce the risk of falls by any means or cause. The best interpretation is that the surface shall not contribute to a fall and that protection be used to minimize serious injury. General Requirements The following general requirements for surface conditions and working surfaces to include ladders and rope descent systems cover traditional surfaces such as floors, subfloors, grounds, platforms, and even flat surfaces such as rooftops. Employers must consider all surfaces that employees occupy for the purposes of performing work to meet requirements for cleanliness, physical condition, load capacity, and maintenance. The standards detailed are not a comprehensive list for each surface type but rather a representation of selected minimum expectations. A. Surface conditions. The employer must ensure: 1. All places of employment, passageways, storerooms, service rooms, and walking-working surfaces are kept in a clean, orderly, and sanitary condition. 2. The floor of each workroom is maintained in a clean and, to the extent feasible, in a dry condition. When wet processes are used, drainage must be maintained and, to the extent feasible, dry standing places, such as false floors, platforms, and mats must be provided. 3. Walking-working surfaces are maintained free of hazards such as sharp or protruding objects, loose boards, corrosion, leaks, spills, snow, and ice. B. Loads. The employer must ensure that each walking-working surface can support the maximum intended load for that surface. C. Access and egress. The employer must provide, and ensure each employee uses, a safe means of access and egress to and from walking-working surfaces. D. Inspection, maintenance, and repair. The employer must ensure: 1. Walking-working surfaces are inspected, regularly and as necessary, and maintained in a safe condition; 2. Hazardous conditions on walking working surfaces are corrected or repaired before an employee uses the walking-working surface again. If the correction or repair cannot be made immediately, the hazard must be guarded to prevent employees from using the walking-working surface until the hazard is corrected or repaired; and 3. When any correction or repair involves the structural integrity of the walking-working surface, a qualified person performs or supervises the correction or repair. Ladders E. General requirements for all ladders. The employer must ensure: • Ladder rungs, steps, and cleats are parallel, level, and uniformly spaced when the ladder is in position for use; • Ladder rungs, steps, and cleats are spaced not less than 10 inches (25 cm) and not more than 14 inches (36 cm) apart, as measured between the centerlines of the rungs, cleats, and steps, except that: • Ladder rungs and steps in elevator shafts must be spaced not less than 6 inches (15 cm) apart and not more than 16.5 inches (42 cm) apart, as measured along the ladder side rails; and • Fixed ladder rungs and steps on telecommunication towers must be spaced not more than 18 inches (46 cm) apart, measured between the centerlines of the rungs or steps; • Steps on stepstools are spaced not less than 8 inches (20 cm) apart and not more than 12 inches (30 cm) apart, as measured between the centerlines of the steps. • Stepstools have a minimum clear width of 10.5 inches (26.7 cm); • Wooden ladders are not coated with any material that may obscure structural defects; • Metal ladders are made with corrosion-resistant material or protected against corrosion; • Ladder surfaces are free of puncture and laceration hazards; • Ladders are used only for the purposes for which they were designed; • Ladders are inspected before initial use in each work shift, and more frequently as necessary, to identify any visible defects that could cause employee injury; • Any ladder with structural or other defects is immediately tagged "Dangerous: Do Not Use" or with similar language in accordance with § 1910.145 and removed from service until repaired in accordance with § 1910.22(d), or replaced; • Each employee faces the ladder when climbing up or down it; • Each employee uses at least one hand to grasp the ladder when climbing up and down it; and • No employee carries any object or load that could cause the employee to lose balance and fall while climbing up or down the ladder. Step Bolts F. Step bolts. The employer must ensure: • Each step bolt installed on or after January 17, 2017 in an environment where corrosion may occur is constructed of, or coated with, material that protects against corrosion; • Each step bolt is designed, constructed, and maintained to prevent the employee's foot from slipping off the end of the step bolt; • Step bolts are uniformly spaced at a vertical distance of not less than 12 inches (30 cm) and not more than 18 inches (46 cm) apart, measured center to center (see Figure D-6 of this section). The spacing from the entry and exit surface to the first step bolt may differ from the spacing between the other step bolts; • Each step bolt has a minimum clear width of 4.5 inches (11 cm); • The minimum perpendicular distance between the centerline of each step bolt to the nearest permanent object in back of the step bolt is 7 inches (18 cm). When the employer demonstrates that an obstruction cannot be avoided, the distance must be at least 4.5 inches (11 cm); • Each step bolt installed before January 17, 2017 is capable of supporting its maximum intended load; • Each step bolt installed on or after January 17, 2017 is capable of supporting at least four times its maximum intended load; • Each step bolt is inspected at the start of the workshift and maintained in accordance with § 1910.22; and • Any step bolt that is bent more than 15 degrees from the perpendicular in any direction is removed and replaced with a step bolt that meets the requirements of this section before an employee uses it.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/19%3A_Walking_and_Working_Surfaces/19.01%3A_Introduction.txt

Stairways G. The employer must ensure: • Handrails, stair rail systems, and guardrail systems are provided in accordance with § 1910.28; • Vertical clearance above any stair tread to any overhead obstruction is at least 6 feet, 8 inches (203 cm), as measured from the leading edge of the tread. Spiral stairs must meet the vertical clearance requirements in paragraph (d)(3) of this section. • Stairs have uniform riser heights and tread depths between landings; • Stairway landings and platforms are at least the width of the stair and at least 30 inches (76 cm) in depth, as measured in the direction of travel; • When a door or a gate opens directly on a stairway, a platform is provided, and the swing of the door or gate does not reduce the platform's effective usable depth to: • Less than 20 inches (51 cm) for platforms installed before January 17, 2017; and • Less than 22 inches (56 cm) for platforms installed on or after January 17, 2017 (see Figure D-7 of this section); • Each stair can support at least five times the normal anticipated live load, but never less than a concentrated load of 1,000 pounds (454 kg) applied at any point; • Standard stairs are used to provide access from one walking-working surface to another when operations necessitate regular and routine travel between levels, including access to operating platforms for equipment. Winding stairways may be used on tanks and similar round structures when the diameter of the tank or structure is at least 5 feet (1.5 m). Dockboards The employer must ensure: • Dockboards are capable of supporting the maximum intended load in accordance with § 1910.22(b); • Dockboards put into initial service on or after January 17, 2017 are designed, constructed, and maintained to prevent transfer vehicles from running off the dockboard edge; • Portable dockboards are secured by anchoring them in place or using equipment or devices that prevent the dockboard from moving out of a safe position. • Measures, such as wheel chocks or sand shoes, are used to prevent the transport vehicle (e.g. a truck, semitrailer, trailer, or rail car) on which a dockboard is placed, from moving while employees are on the dockboard; and • Portable dockboards are equipped with handholds or other means to permit safe handling of dockboards. Rope Descent Systems Before any rope descent system is used, the building owner must inform the employer, in writing that the building owner has identified, tested, certified, and maintained each anchorage so it is capable of supporting at least 5,000 pounds (2,268 kg), in any direction, for each employee attached. The information must be based on an annual inspection by a qualified person and certification of each anchorage by a qualified person, as necessary, and at least every 10 years. No rope descent system is used for heights greater than 300 feet (91 m) above grade unless the employer demonstrates that it is not feasible to access such heights by any other means or that those means pose a greater hazard than using a rope descent system; The rope descent system is used in accordance with instructions, warnings, and design limitations set by the manufacturer or under the direction of a qualified person; Each employee who uses the rope descent system is trained in accordance with § 1910.30; The rope descent system is inspected at the start of each workshift that it is to be used. The employer must ensure damaged or defective equipment is removed from service immediately and replaced. No employee uses a rope descent system when hazardous weather conditions, such as storms or gusty or excessive wind, are present; Equipment, such as tools, squeegees, or buckets, is secured by a tool lanyard or similar method to prevent it from falling; and The ropes of each rope descent system are protected from exposure to open flames, hot work, corrosive chemicals, and other destructive conditions. Training Before any employee is exposed to a fall hazard, the employer must provide training for each employee who uses personal fall protection systems or who is required to be trained as specified elsewhere in this subpart. Employers must ensure employees are trained in the requirements of this paragraph on or before May 17, 2017. The employer must ensure that each employee is trained by a qualified person. The employer must train each employee in at least the following topics: 1. The nature of the fall hazards in the work area and how to recognize them; 2. The procedures to be followed to minimize those hazards; 3. The correct procedures for installing, inspecting, operating, maintaining, and disassembling the personal fall protection systems that the employee uses; and 4. The correct use of personal fall protection systems and equipment specified in paragraph (a)(1) of this section, including, but not limited to, proper hook-up, anchoring, and tie-off techniques, and methods of equipment inspection and storage, as specified by the manufacturer. 5. Equipment hazards. The employer must train each employee on or before May 17, 2017 in the proper care, inspection, storage, and use of equipment covered by this subpart before an employee uses the equipment. 19.A: Review Questi Complete as directed. Query \(1\) Fill in the blanks: 1. The floor of each workroom is maintained in a ________ and, to the extent possible, in a ________ condition. 2. Hazardous conditions on walking working surfaces are ________ or ________ before an employee uses the walking-working surface again. If the correction or repair cannot be made ________, the hazard must be guarded to prevent employees from using the walking-working surface until the hazard is corrected or repaired. 3. Wooden ladders are not ________ with any material that may obscure structural defects. 4. No employee ________ any object or load that could cause the employee to lose ________ and fall while climbing up or down the ladder. 5. Any step bolt that is bent more than 15 degrees from the ________ in any direction is removed and replaced with a step bolt that meets the requirements of this section before an employee uses it. 6. The ________ ________ system is used in accordance with instructions, warnings, and design limitations set by the manufacturer or under the direction of a qualified person. 7. Equipment, such as tools, ________, or buckets, is secured by a tool ________ or similar method to prevent it from falling. 8. Training on fall protection systems must include: a. ________Fall hazard recognition b. ________Rope descent systems c. ________Portable dock boards d. ________Equipment hazards e. ________Correct use and storage

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/19%3A_Walking_and_Working_Surfaces/19.02%3A_Stairways.txt

“The first question which the priest and the Levite asked was: 'If I stop to help this man, what will happen to me?' But...the good Samaritan reversed the question: 'If I do not stop to help this man, what will happen to him?” ― Martin Luther King Jr. Overview In the prior chapters we have looked at specific standards that address specific workplace hazards. However it is not sufficient for employers to just train employees on workplace hazards and the associated safety standards, there must be a systematic, consistent approach to keeping workplaces safe. OSHA requires employers to implement safety and health programs. The operative word is “programs”. This simply means there must be a documented or written, logical and consistent process that raises employee awareness of occupational health and safety hazards and the associated standards necessary for keeping workplaces safe. Chapter Objective: 1. Discuss best practices for establishing an effective health and safety program. 2. Identify typical health and safety programs required in most workplaces. Learning Outcome: 1. Describe the goals and benefits of an effective safety and health program. Standards: General Duty Section 5(a)(1) Key Terms: Compliance, IIPP, regulatory, plan, practices, program, programmatic, sustainable Mini-Lecture: Safety and Health Programs Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Brain and chip, Pixabay free license 20: Safety and Health Programs Programs A program as defined by Merriman-Webster is a plan or system under which action may be taken toward a goal. It further defines programs to include applications and types that speak to documenting or outlining the details or arrangement of activity. The intent being that what is being communicated in a program can be duplicated and shared with consistency to all receiving the information. The main goal of safety and health programs is to prevent workplace injuries, illnesses, and deaths, as well as the suffering and financial hardship these events can cause for workers, their families, and employers. An effective program uses a proactive approach to managing workplace safety and health. Traditional programs are often reactive –that is, problems are addressed only after a worker is injured or becomes sick, a new standard or regulation is published, or an outside inspection finds a problem that must be fixed. Programs implementing practices for finding and fixing hazards before they may result in injury or illness are far more effective for achieving health and safety goals. Documenting and highlighting the program approach is a best practice. Best Practices It is important to understand that simply complying with safety standards is not evidence that a safety and health program exists. Employers may often be in compliance simply because of institutional requirements for operating a business enterprise in certain jurisdictions. While compliance with standards is an objective, goals for health and safety should be higher. An overarching theme that goes beyond regulatory compliance should be to create a framework for identifying and controlling hazards, ensuring participation and communication, and achieving both safety and health and other organizational goals. When starting or developing a health and safety program which may address existing workplace standards begin with a basic outline and simple goals and build from there. The focus should be on achieving goals, monitoring performance, and evaluating outcomes. When the focus is on goals or desired outcomes the workplace can achieve higher levels of safety and health. OSHA suggests that employers implement recommended practices establishing effective programs for not only better worker health outcomes but other benefits as well. A few of those benefits include: • Improved compliance with laws and regulations; • Reduced operational costs, including significant reductions in workers' compensation premiums; • More engaged workers; • Enhanced social connectedness and responsibility for meeting environmental and sustainability goals; • Increased productivity and enhanced business operations; So what is the model for establishing and effective safety and health program? OSHA suggests employers follow these recommended best practices: 1. Set Safety and Health as a Top Priority Always set safety and health as the top priority. Tell workers that making sure they finish the day and go home safely is the best way to do business. Assure them of the employer’s responsibility to work with them to find and fix any hazards that could injure them or make them sick. 2. Lead By Example Employers must practice safe behaviors and make safety part of the daily conversations with workers. 3. Implement a Reporting System Develop and communicate a simple procedure for workers to report any injuries, illnesses, incidents (including near misses/close calls), hazards, or safety and health concerns without fear of retaliation. Include an option for reporting hazards or concerns anonymously. 4. Provide Training Train workers on how to identify and control hazards using, for example, OSHA’s Hazard Identification Training Tool. 5. Conduct Inspections Inspect the workplace with workers and ask them to identify any activity, piece of equipment, or material that concerns them. Use checklists, such as those included in OSHA’s Small Business Handbook, to help identify problems. 6. Collect Hazard Control Ideas Ask workers for ideas on improvements and follow up on their suggestions. Provide them time during work hours, if necessary, to research solutions. 7. Implement Hazard Controls Assign workers the task of choosing, implementing, and evaluating the solutions they come up with. 8. Address Emergencies Identify foreseeable emergency scenarios and develop instructions on what to do in each case. Meet to discuss these procedures and post them in a visible location in the workplace. 9. Seek Input on Workplace Changes Before making significant changes to the workplace, work organization, equipment, or materials, consult with workers to identify potential safety or health issues. 10. Make Improvements Set aside a regular time to discuss safety and health issues, with the goal of identifying ways to improve the program. The above practices can be implemented at any time, in any place. They can weave together existing policy and procedure based on maintaining compliance with standards for emergency planning, electrical safety, machine guarding, and personal protective equipment. The objective is to evaluate existing safety compliance measures against the best practices to create a programmatic approach to safety. Stand Alone Safety and Health Programs There are some standards that currently exist as programs with prescriptive requirements and mechanisms for continuous evaluation and monitoring. They include: 1. Hazard Communication 2. Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 3. Confined Space Entry 4. Lock out/Tag out 5. Hearing Conservation 6. Bloodborne Pathogens Other standards that may or may not exist as programs in some workplaces and work sites, but should, are: 1. Respiratory Protection 2. Fall Protection 3. Electrical Safety 4. Personal Protective Equipment 5. Safety Training and Education 6. Record Keeping and Reporting Programs that may exist without specific standards to align with or result from application of the general duty clause include: 1. Drug testing 2. Sexual Harassment 3. Ergonomic Safety 4. Employee Assistance 5. Automotive Repair Shop Safety It is important to note that all of the above in some cases may exist as part of an overall injury and illness prevention program or plan (IIPP), typical and required in the state of California, that may be detailed enough to allow for measurement of effectiveness or merely exist as line items on worksite safety plans. 20.A: Review Question Complete as directed. Query \(1\) True or False: (Circle Letter) 1. Compliance is the most important thing when implementing safety and health program best practices. T or F 2. Implementing hazards controls is a basic tenet of industrial hygiene. T or F 3. Strong management leadership is the highest priority for implementing effective programs. T or F 4. Reduced operating cost is not a benefit of an effective safety and health program. T or F 5. Employers need not engage workers when implementing safety and health programs. T or F 6. Programs must be written to be effective. T or F 7. The most effective safety and health programs are both documented and assessed. T or F 8. Setting clear goals for worker safety and health is necessary for an effective program. T or F 9. The Hazard Communication Program can exist as a standalone health and safety program. T or F 10. Traditional programs are proactive, nipping problems in the bud before they happen. T of F.

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“We must never forget that the highest appreciation is not to utter words, but to live by them." – Former U.S. President John F. Kennedy Overview Anyone who has ever been under the management or supervision of someone who did not care about the individual, did not care about getting the job done right(effectiveness), or did not care about doing the right thing(compliance), would if given the choice, work for someone else. We instinctively know that care and concern is central to thriving. We see how the effects of a lack of concern for the well being of others show up in all walks of life. When communities are neglected there is poverty, crime, stunted growth, and hopelessness. When workplaces are neglected there are inefficient and ineffective work processes, unsafe and unsanitary working conditions, no motivation, accidents and injuries. And yet we sometimes also believe that if we manage better, control better we can make things better. Managing Safety and Health is definitely about effective management and control of workplace safety. However, if there is no credibility, integrity, no care and concern in the management approach, if workers do not “see” evidence that worker safety and health is a priority, those same workers will be less likely to make safety a priority as well. They won’t see their value as workers or see themselves as the most important stakeholder in worker safety and workplace safety. Managing safety and health is about setting and establishing the correct tone. In this chapter, eight core elements will demonstrate how “care and concern” is essential to driving compliance with safety and health standards and programs. Chapter Objective: 1. Discuss seven guiding principles for managing safety and health. 2. Discuss current workplace safety issues and concerns requiring effective safety leadership. Learning Outcome: 1. Apply practices for effective safety leadership. Standards: Top most frequently cited standards Key Terms: Credibility, integrity, leadership, management, mitigate, plan, principled, stewardship, strategy Mini-Lecture: Safety Leadership Topic Required Time: 2 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 1 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: Foundations of Safety Leadership, www.cpwr.com free to use 21: Managing Safety and Health Managing Safety Merriman and Oxford dictionaries describe or define ‘management’ as the process of dealing with or controlling things or people. Wiki offers ‘Management’ as being the administration of an organization. On the other hand ‘managing’ is defined as both having authority or supervisory control and being successful at doing or dealing with something, especially if difficult. Implied in the description of both terms is success or goals met. But neither term suggests or implies how or what drives the management or managing activities, the guiding principle. Neither term describes the character or characteristics of the individual doing the managing or the organization under management. In the last chapter, safety and health programs, emphasis was placed on best practices for creating and implementing safety and health programs. What was not discussed was what drives or is behind the best practice, i.e. what makes it a best practice and why take that action at all. Core Elements For Managing Safety and Health Managing safety and health requires effective planning, short and long term strategy. It also requires goals and outcomes to be clear and SMART-specific and measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound (timely). Hence a short and long term strategy that implements the plan for achieving safety and health objectives, creating effective safety and health programs, and managing safety and health should adhere to management best practices for efficiency but also be about care and concern for the workplace and its workers. Several leadership principles that take on care and concern are revealed in different aspects of the core elements that shape safety and health programs. The first, Principled Centered Leadership as described by Stephen Covey, focuses less on what a leader or manager does in an organizational setting but more on what that person brings to the organization. It states in part: “Principled-Centered Leadership is premised on the belief that effective people (managers) sic, are guided both in everyday living and in work relationships by universal principles or “natural laws”, whereas ineffective people(managers) sic, tend to place their energies on finding situation-specific behavioral paths to success as they are confronted by an evolving set of challenges.” This principle speaks to universal or natural laws that are self-evident, such as those of wisdom, fairness, self-awareness, courage, personal strength, and the will to act. Employers and managers who adhere to or serve these natural laws are by far the best with whom to work. The second principle is that which is rooted in the character of a manager or leader. Credibility as outlined by James M. Kouzes and Barry C Posner in the book titled the same, establishes that ‘honesty’ is essential to leadership. The “Credibility” titled book also calls out six leadership disciplines. Three of the six mentioned here, affirming shared value, serving a purpose, and developing capacity, can be seen in all eight of the core elements of managing safety and health. Another management principle as outlined in the writings of Peter Block states that rather than being leaders managers become stewards. Specifically, he states that “traditionally leadership meant that managers are somehow responsible for their subordinates who look to the leader for guidance, direction, reward, evaluation, and protection. A manager and an organization committed to stewardship operate in a very different way. Stewardship is predicated on the idea that people in communities and in organizations are willing to choose service over self-interest. Stewardship means empowering people to be accountable for their own actions rather than asking them to be dependent on managers.” Empowering people to accountability is simply engaging them in the processes and outcomes. Finally, the final distinguishing characteristic or principle of management as revealed in the core elements is that of the “One Minute Manager” as authored by Kenneth Blanchard and Spencer Johnson. The book focuses on management effectiveness. The book weaves a story of a young worker trying to determine which manager type produces more fruit. The type that is more focused on profit or the type that is focused on people. The worker ultimately decides that an effective manager is one who manages so that both the organization and the people involved benefit (win). This is achieved through setting one minute goals, giving one minute praise, and providing one minute critiques or assessments when needed. Effective management does not have to take a lot of time and energy but it does have to focus the time and energy spent to achieve quality of engagement. The following core elements for managing safety and health are central to any strategy, process, or protocol for reducing accidents and injury in the workplace. These elements are also central to boosting moral, engagement, and stewardship. All are necessary for sustainable organizations. All reflect the management principles above. Management Leadership • Top management demonstrates its commitment to continuous improvement in safety and health, communicates that commitment to workers, and sets program expectations and responsibilities. • Managers at all levels make safety and health a core organizational value, establish safety and health goals and objectives, provide adequate resources and support for the program, and set a good example. Worker Participation • Workers and their representatives are involved in all aspects of the program—including setting goals, identifying and reporting hazards, investigating incidents, and tracking progress. • All workers, including contractors and temporary workers, understand their roles and responsibilities under the program and what they need to do to effectively carry them out. • Workers are encouraged and have means to communicate openly with management and to report safety and health concerns without fear of retaliation. • Any potential barriers or obstacles to worker participation in the program (for example, language, lack of information, or disincentives) are removed or addressed. Hazard Identification and Assessment • Procedures are put in place to continually identify workplace hazards and evaluate risks. • Safety and health hazards from routine, non-routine, and emergency situations are identified and assessed. • An initial assessment of existing hazards, exposures, and control measures is followed by periodic inspections and reassessments, to identify new hazards. • Any incidents are investigated with the goal of identifying the root causes. • Identified hazards are prioritized for control. Hazard Prevention and Control • Employers and workers cooperate to identify and select methods for eliminating, preventing, or controlling workplace hazards. • Controls are selected according to a hierarchy that uses engineering solutions first, followed by safe work practices, administrative controls, and finally personal protective equipment (PPE). • A plan is developed to ensure that controls are implemented, interim protection is provided, progress is tracked, and the effectiveness of controls is verified. Education and Training • All workers are trained to understand how the program works and how to carry out the responsibilities assigned to them under the program. • Employers, managers, and supervisors receive training on safety concepts and their responsibility for protecting workers’ rights and responding to workers’ reports and concerns. • All workers are trained to recognize workplace hazards and to understand the control measures that have been implemented. Program Evaluation and Improvement • Control measures are periodically evaluated for effectiveness. • Processes are established to monitor program performance, verify program implementation, and identify program shortcomings and opportunities for improvement. • Necessary actions are taken to improve the program and overall safety and health performance. Communication and Coordination for Host Employers, Contractors, and Staffing Agencies • Host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies commit to providing the same level of safety and health protection to all employees. • Host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies communicate the hazards present at the worksite and the hazards that work of contract workers may create on site. • Host employers establish specifications and qualifications for contractors and staffing agencies. • Before beginning work, host employers, contractors, and staffing agencies coordinate on work planning and scheduling to identify and resolve any conflicts that could affect safety or health.

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Managing Safety and Health Employers have a general duty under section 5(a)(1) to furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees. This clause is a stop gap measure to ensure all employers understand that regardless of whether a specific standard exists to address a specific hazard, any known condition, situation, or place known to present a hazardous or unsafe environment for workers must be controlled. Employees are also expected per section 5(b) to comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this Act. Several health and safety programs advantaged by the general duty clause are random drug testing/pre-employment drug screening, sexual harassment prevention training and education, and ergonomic safety. Random drug testing and screening Many workers experience pre-employment drug screening when their work involves transportation, operating crucial or hazardous equipment, or when working in certain public health and safety organizations. Random drug screening often occurs in workplaces that must ensure ongoing safety of employees operating equipment and when there is a significant public safety interest. Employers will often do post incident drug testing permissible under § 1904.35(b)(1)(iv) In general the types of drug testing authorized include: • Random drug testing. • Drug testing unrelated to the reporting of a work-related injury or illness. • Drug testing under a state workers’ compensation law. • Drug testing under other federal law, such as a U.S. Department of Transportation rule. • Drug testing to evaluate the root cause of a workplace incident that harmed or could have harmed employees. If the employer chooses to use drug testing to investigate the incident, the employer should test all employees whose conduct could have contributed to the incident, not just employees who reported injuries. Sexual Harassment and Bullying Hostile work environment is a phrase associated with workplace sexual harassment and bullying. Every workplace is susceptible to challenging power dynamics and cultures of disrespect. Increasingly workers are representative of every demographic; young, old, every race and ethnicity, socio-economic class, varied genders, and varied cultures. Employers must anticipate that with a diversity of workers with diverse backgrounds there will be the potential for misunderstandings, miscommunications, and even distrust. Preparing for these challenges requires employers to acknowledge their general duty to create a safety culture where every employee is not only physically safe but feels safe as well. Employers and employees consistent with the OSHA general duty clause are equally responsible for advancing policies and work practices that center on treating all workers with dignity and respect, establishing cultural norms for the workplace that all agree upon. This is often and best achieved by safety and training programs focusing on acceptable workplace interpersonal behaviors and boundaries of propriety. Controlling unacceptable behaviors through education and training gives workers the skills and tools to manage interpersonal relationships in the workplace and reduces the risk of creating hostile work environments. Ergonomic Safety Musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) affect the muscles, nerves, blood vessels, ligaments and tendons. Workers in many different industries and occupations can be exposed to risk factors at work, such as lifting heavy items, bending, reaching overhead, pushing and pulling heavy loads, working in awkward body postures and performing the same or similar tasks repetitively. Employers have a general duty to recognize risk factors that increase a workers risk of injury. Work-related MSDs can be prevented. Ergonomics --- fitting a job to a person --- helps lessen muscle fatigue, increases productivity and reduces the number and severity of work-related MSDs. An ergonomic safety program reduces time away from work or restricted work activity and has been shown to be effective in reducing the risk of developing MSDs in high-risk industries as diverse as construction, food processing, firefighting, office jobs, healthcare, transportation and warehousing. Effectively managing ergonomic safety programs means you must have strong commitment by management to set clear expectations and goals. Workers must be involved in identifying the hazards and risk factors, assessing and controlling the work environment and assisting with providing solutions. OSHA encourages education and training on MSDs and prevention methods as well as recognizing when to report possible injury. OSHA stipulates an ergonomic evaluation and process uses the principles of a safety and health program to address MSD hazards. Such a process should be viewed as an ongoing function that is incorporated into the daily operations, rather than as an individual project or one time job hazard assessment. Employee Assistance Programs (EAP) The Federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) describes Employee Assistance Programs as a voluntary, work-based program that offers free and confidential assessments, short-term counseling, referrals, and follow-up services to employees who have personal and/or work-related problems. EAPs address a broad and complex body of issues affecting mental and emotional well-being, such as alcohol and other substance abuse, stress, grief, family problems, and psychological disorders. EAPs are active in helping organizations prevent and cope with workplace violence, trauma, and other emergency response situations. Employers have a general duty to anticipate and recognize that psycho-social hazards are often hidden from view. Similar to expectations for reducing the risk of hostile work environments through education and training, EAPs address the contributors to behaviors that may result from external stresses that can result in causing employees harm in the workplace. Managing safety and health with voluntary intervention programs that address psycho-social hazards endorses the industrial hygiene principle of prevention, through intervention. EAP along with education and training are engineering controls that prepare workers to address a broad spectrum of hazards in the workplace. 21.A: Chapter 21 Revi Complete as directed. Query \(1\) True or False: (Circle Letter) 1. Safety and health goals must be SMART. T or F 2. Managing hazards controls is a basic tenet of industrial hygiene. T or F 3. Strong management leadership is demonstrates concern for worker safety. T or F 4. Principled Leadership is only concerned with self. T or F 5. Managers should only tell employees what they want to hear. T or F 6. Effective stewardship means you control or are in charge of everything. T or F 7. One minute praise is only effective if it is honest and sincere. T or F 8. Random drug testing keeps work places safe. T or F 9. Repetitive motion is a risk factor for work in any industry. T or F 10. An EAP can be an effective tool for managing workplace violence. T of F.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/21%3A_Managing_Safety_and_Health/21.02%3A_Programs.txt

“Safety brings first-aid to the uninjured.” – F.S. Hughes Overview Employers are required to maintain workplaces in a safe and sanitary condition. While maintaining an accident free workplace is ideal there will be occasions that do not require employees to receive immediate medical attention by a medical professional onsite or be transported offsite to an emergency facility. The employer or designee must be able to render first-aid and make available to employees first-aid kits including guidance for when to access and render first-aid. Employers are required to log on the OSHA 300 form injuries occurring in the workplace including those requiring first-aid. There are also industries such as healthcare where workers are exposed to hazards that require continuous medical monitoring if an exposure is acute, such as when a needle stick exposes the healthcare worker to blood or equivalents. Finally, medical monitoring of workers is required when they are continuously exposed to physical, chemical, and biological hazards. OSHA expects employers to swiftly respond to an employee injury or exposure no matter the severity. Hazardous Materials and Waste cleanup may also include bio hazards such as blood and human/animal waste. Emergency responders, healthcare workers, and even workers who are part of housekeeping and maintenance can be exposed to biohazards. This chapter will review employer requirements for rendering care, protecting workers from harm, and the duty to provide medical attention after exposure events. Chapter Objective: 1. Discuss employer responsibility for providing first-aid to employees. 2. Identify some injuries requiring first-aid. 3. Discuss employer responsibilities under Bloodborne pathogen standard. Learning Outcome: 1. Distinguish first-aid, medical treatment, medical monitoring reporting requirements. Standards: 1910.151 Subpart K Medical Services and first-aid,1910.1020 Access to employee exposure and medical records, 1910.1030 Bloodborne Pathogens, 1926.50 Subpart D Medical Services and first-aid Key Terms: Bloodborne Pathogen, first aid, hepatitis, HIV, medical treatment, surveillance Mini-Lecture: first-aid Topic Required Time: 1 hrs; Independent Study and reflection 3/4 hour. Thumbnail: First-aid Kit and Supplies, attribution Stevepb, Pixabay 22: Medical First-aid and Bloodborne Pathogens A duty of care Every workplace and therefore every employer must render first aid to an injured employee. Depending on the severity of the injury, i.e. if the employer's emergency plan is activated, then the duty of care is to get the employee to an emergency facility as soon as possible. When the workplace is a construction site or some distance away from an urgent care or hospital emergency room the employer must have the capacity to provide immediate first aid commensurate with the injury and then proceed if necessary to offsite care for medical treatment. The employer must ensure the availability of medical personnel for advice and consultation no matter the work location. General Prior to a project or construction start provisions shall be made as part of the emergency action plan to address serious injury occurring at the worksite. In the absence of an infirmary, clinic, hospital, or physician, that is reasonably accessible in terms of time and distance to the worksite, which is available for the treatment of injured employees, a person who has a valid certificate in first-aid training from the U.S. Bureau of Mines, the American Red Cross, or equivalent training that can be verified by documentary evidence, shall be available at the worksite to render first aid. First-aid First aid supplies are required to be easily accessible under paragraph Sec. 1926.50(d)(1). An example of the minimal contents of a generic first aid kit is described in American National Standard (ANSI) Z308.1-1978 "Minimum Requirements for Industrial Unit-Type First-aid Kits". The contents of the kit listed in the ANSI standard should be adequate for small work sites. When larger operations or multiple operations are being conducted at the same location, employers should determine the need for additional first aid kits at the worksite, additional types of first aid equipment and supplies and additional quantities and types of supplies and equipment in the first aid kits. If it is reasonably anticipated employees will be exposed to blood or other potentially infectious materials (OPIM) while using first-aid supplies, employers shall provide personal protective equipment (PPE). Appropriate PPE includes gloves, gowns, face shields, masks and eye protection. Rendering Aid The employer or designee when rendering aid to an injured worker shall adhere to the following: 1. First aid supplies shall be easily accessible when required. 2. The contents of the first aid kit shall be placed in a weatherproof container with individual sealed packages for each type of item, and shall be checked by the employer before being sent out on each job and at least weekly on each job to ensure that the expended items are replaced. 3. Proper equipment for prompt transportation of the injured person to a physician or hospital, or a communication system for contacting necessary ambulance service, shall be provided. 4. In areas where 911 emergency dispatch services are not available, the telephone numbers of the physicians, hospitals, or ambulances shall be conspicuously posted. 5. In areas where 911 emergency dispatch services are available and an employer uses a communication system for contacting necessary emergency-medical service, the employer must: • Ensure that the communication system is effective in contacting the emergency-medical service; and • When using a communication system in an area that does not automatically supply the caller's latitude and longitude information to the 911 emergency dispatcher, the employer must post in a conspicuous location at the worksite either: 1. The latitude and longitude of the worksite; or 2. Other location-identification information that communicates effectively to employees the location of the worksite. 3. Where the eyes or body of any person may be exposed to injurious corrosive materials, suitable facilities for quick drenching or flushing of the eyes and body shall be provided within the work area for immediate emergency use. First Aid vs 911 Part 1904 Recordkeeping distinguishes “first aid” from emergency or urgent care “medical treatment” by a medical professional for the purposes of recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Each employee is granted the right to have access to employer injury and illness records. Employers must keep records of employee injuries via OSHA 300 Log but not all injuries are reportable to OSHA. The following are defined as first aid injuries for the purposes of distinguishing OSHA 300A reporting requirements: • Using a non-prescription medication at nonprescription strength (for medications available in both prescription and non-prescription form, a recommendation by a physician or other licensed health care professional to use a non-prescription medication at prescription strength is considered medical treatment for recordkeeping purposes); • Administering tetanus immunizations (other immunizations, such as Hepatitis B vaccine or rabies vaccine, are considered medical treatment); • Cleaning, flushing or soaking wounds on the surface of the skin; • Using wound coverings such as bandages, Band-Aids™, gauze pads, etc.; or using butterfly bandages or Steri-Strips™ (other wound closing devices such as sutures, staples, etc., are considered medical treatment); • Using hot or cold therapy; • Using any non-rigid means of support, such as elastic bandages, wraps, non-rigid back belts, etc. (devices with rigid stays or other systems designed to immobilize parts of the body are considered medical treatment for recordkeeping purposes); • Using temporary immobilization devices while transporting an accident victim (e.g., splints, slings, neck collars, back boards, etc.). • Drilling of a fingernail or toenail to relieve pressure, or draining fluid from a blister; • Using eye patches; • Removing foreign bodies from the eye using only irrigation or a cotton swab; • Removing splinters or foreign material from areas other than the eye by irrigation, tweezers, cotton swabs or other simple means; • Using finger guards; • Using massages (physical therapy or chiropractic treatment are considered medical treatment for recordkeeping purposes); or • Drinking fluids for relief of heat stress. "Medical treatment" means the management and care of a patient to combat disease or disorder. It does not include diagnostic procedures or counseling outside of those required by medical monitoring under the bloodborne pathogen standard or exposures to toxic substances. Bloodborne Pathogens Bloodborne pathogens are infectious microorganisms in human blood or other potentially infectious materials (OPIM) that can cause disease in humans. These pathogens include, but are not limited to, hepatitis B (HBV), hepatitis C (HCV) and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Workers routinely (through occupational exposure) exposed to needles and sharps, broken glass or other mechanisms which expose them to bodily fluids are the most at risk. In order to reduce or eliminate the hazards of occupational exposure to bloodborne pathogens, an employer must implement an exposure control plan (ECP) for the worksite with details on employee protection measures. The plan must also describe how an employer will use engineering and work practice controls, personal protective clothing and equipment, employee training, medical surveillance, hepatitis B vaccinations, and other provisions as required by OSHA's Bloodborne Pathogens Standard. Although not all industries or employers are required to implement an ECP, OSHA’s general duty clause (Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act) will be used, where appropriate, to protect employees from bloodborne hazards in construction, longshoring, marine terminals and agriculture. Employees who are trained as first responders in any organization are covered under the Bloodborne Pathogen Standard. Any employee exposed to blood or OPIM must have the hepatitis vaccine made available to them as soon as possible but in no event later than 24 hours after the exposure incident. If an exposure incident as defined in the standard has taken place, other post-exposure follow-up procedures must be initiated immediately, as per the requirements of the standard. In general the ECP must contain the following: • The exposure determination which identifies job classifications with occupational exposure and tasks and procedures where there is occupational exposure and that are performed by employees in job classifications in which some employees have occupational exposure. • The procedures for evaluating the circumstances surrounding exposure incidents; • A schedule of how other provisions of the standard are implemented, including methods of compliance, HIV and HBV research laboratories and production facilities requirements, hepatitis B vaccination and post-exposure evaluation and follow-up, communication of hazards to employees, and recordkeeping; • Methods of compliance include: 1. Universal Precautions; 2. Engineering and work practice controls, e.g., safer medical devices, sharps disposal containers, hand hygiene; 3. Personal protective equipment; 4. Housekeeping, including decontamination procedures and removal of regulated waste. • Documentation of: 1. the annual consideration and implementation of appropriate commercially available and effective safer medical devices designed to eliminate or minimize occupational exposure, and 2. the solicitation of non-managerial healthcare workers (who are responsible for direct patient care and are potentially exposed to injuries from contaminated sharps) in the identification, evaluation, and selection of effective engineering and work practice controls. 22.02%3 Medical Surveillance If a worker is exposed to blood or OPIM the employer must implement protection protocols: • Following an exposure incident, employers are required to document, at a minimum, the route(s) of exposure, and the circumstances under which the exposure incident occurred. To be useful, the documentation must contain sufficient detail about the incident. • Record incident on the OSHA 300 log if punctured or cut and if not penetrated but exposed(splash) and illness occurs • Make hepatitis vaccines available free of charge to employees. Employees may refuse vaccine. • Test employee blood for presence of disease • Require and provide for post-exposure counseling be given to employees following an exposure incident. Counseling concerning infection status, including results and interpretation of all tests, will assist the employee in understanding the potential risk of infection and in making decisions regarding the protection of personal contacts. Regulated Waste The Bloodborne Pathogens Standard uses the term, "regulated waste," to refer to the following categories of waste which require special handling: (1) liquid or semi-liquid blood or OPIM; (2) items contaminated with blood or OPIM and which would release these substances in a liquid or semi-liquid state if compressed; (3) items that are caked with dried blood or OPIM and are capable of releasing these materials during handling; (4) contaminated sharps; and (5) pathological and microbiological wastes containing blood or OPIM. Although not considered an emergency operation some elements of the HAZWOPER Standard 1910.120 can be followed when workers are exposed to blood and infectious materials during regulated waste cleanup operations. 22.A: Complete as directed. Query \(1\) True or False: (Circle Letter) 1. Employers are required to render first aid to injured employees. T or F 2. Rendering first aid includes providing for emergency services and response. T or F 3. Only small employers are required to have first aid kits. T or F 4. If employees are exposed to caustics or hazardous materials emergency wash stations must be available. T or F 5. Setting a broken bone is considered first aid. T or F 6. Applying a cold or hot compress is considered medical treatment. T or F 7. An ECP is required of all employers. T or F 8. Employees exposed to OPIM must wear PPE. T or F 9. If an employee refuses hepatitis vaccine the employer does not have to medically monitor the employee. T or F 10. Exposed employees must receive post exposure counseling. T of F.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_A_Practical_Guide_for_Understanding_Safety_and_Health_Programs_for_Skilled_Labor_Professionals/22%3A_Medical_First-aid_and_Bloodborne_Pathogens/22.01%3.txt

IT'S YOUR TURN CHAPTER 2 ACTIVITIES/WORKBOOK Thumbnail: OSHA Logo, OSHA.gov 01: Introduction to Occupational Safety and Health It's Your Turn New World of Work (NWOW) Assessment: What kind of worker are you? How do you view worker safety? Self Awareness As we begin our exploration of work it is only fitting that you reflect on your experiences and perspectives of and with work. One of your first activities was to introduce yourself and share some of your background. This next activity is one designed to have you get a better understanding of why you may have certain views on work and worker safety, being ever mindful of who you are. The Keirsey assessment is one of many types of personality profiles that seek to place individuals in groups with specific traits that may align with career paths or competencies. It is therefore reasonable that personality traits may also shape how you will view and approach safety in the workplace. Access the Keirsey Assessment here  or the 16personalities assessment and record your results. If you use the 16personalities assessment you will need to contrast your results with slides 6 and 17 below to determine which quadrant you belong. You may also just speak to your attribute without associating with it with the Keirsey temperament. Reflect on your assessment by choosing one of the self image attributes (slide 17) of the Keirsey Overview sharing how that attribute would make you a safer worker. Provide detail, minimum one paragraph. Using the Four Keirsey Temperaments The Four Keirsey Temperaments Guardian ESTJ, ISTJ, ESFJ, ISFJ • dependable, helpful, and hard-working. • loyal mates, responsible parents, and stabilizing leaders. • dutiful, cautious, humble • focused on credentials and traditions. • concerned citizens who trust authority, join groups, seek security, prize gratitude, and dream of meting out justice. Artisan ESFP, ISFP, ESTP, ISTP • fun-loving, optimistic, realistic • focused on the here and now. • unconventional, bold, and spontaneous. • make playful mates, creative parents, and troubleshooting leaders. • excitable, trust their impulses, want to make a splash, seek stimulation, prize freedom, and dream of mastering action skills. Idealist ENFJ, INFJ, ENFP, INFP • enthusiastic, they trust their intuition, yearn for romance • seek their true self, prize meaningful relationships • dream of attaining wisdom. • loving, kindhearted, and authentic. • giving, trusting, spiritual, focused on personal journeys and human potentials. • intense mates, nurturing parents, and inspirational leaders. Rational ENTJ, INTJ, ENTP, INTP • pragmatic, skeptical, self-contained • focused on problem-solving and systems analysis. • ingenious, independent, strong willed. • make reasonable mates, individualizing parents, strategic leaders. • even-tempered, trust logic, yearn for achievement, seek knowledge, prize technology • dream of understanding how the world works. Seeing yourself in the Four Temperaments Self Image of the Four Temperaments Artisan Guardian Idealist Rational Self Confidence Adaptability Respectability Authenticity Willpower Self Esteem Action Reliability Empathy Ingenuity Self Respect Audacity Service Benevolence Autonomy NWOW-Do you value all workers? Social Diversity Respecting and valuing differences is a basic tenet for the future of work. How you view yourself and co-workers shapes your perspective on who matters and what matters in a work setting. When there are differences in who matters, there will be challenges to keeping all workers safe. The following personal reflection activities are designed to encourage you to value differences to ensure all workers matter. Gender and Ethnicity Use the the following excerpts from the NWOW social diversity lesson 1 to complete the questionnaire and class discussion at the end of the lesson. Attributes of Social Diversity Awareness • Respectful of differences in others’ backgrounds and beliefs in local communities and the world at large. • Values diversity in the workplace, including gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and age. Understands these differences can actually improve products, services, or work processes. Understanding Sex and Gender Sex vs Gender Sex Characteristics Gender Characteristics Biological sex refers to the biological and physiological differences between men and women. Gender combines several elements: chromosomes (X or Y), anatomy, hormone levels, psychology, and culture. Best identified through DNA, the clearest division between a male human and a female human is the type of chromosomes they carry. “Gendering” refers to the psycho-social division of labor in a society; not to the biological and physiological differences between men and women. A female human carries two X chromosomes while a male human carries one X chromosome and one Y chromosome. (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2008) Gendering patterns begin early to develop particular skills, beliefs, and attitudes in young “men” vs. young “women” But, there are cases where an XY embryo fails to develop male anatomy and is identified as female at birth, while an XX embryo can develop male anatomy and is identified as as male at birth. (National Geographic, 2016) Gendering varies dramatically across cultures. The degree of gender differentiation in a country is highly dependent on its national culture. Self-identifying one’s gender, and a rejection of the traditional him/her categories, can be both a social and political statement Gendering in the Workplace • There are still inequalities that exist in modern work environments for the types of jobs considered more appropriate for men and women. • Can you name some examples of types of work where you feel there is a stereotype of it being a “male” job or a “female” job? • There are also inequalities in pay scales for men and women occupying the same positions. • The 2017 Economic Justice Report showed a 20% wage gap between men and women in the United States. It estimated that based on the rate of pay from 1960-2015, women are not projected to reach pay equity until 2059. • This pay gap increases for both women and men of color. Understanding Race and Ethnicity Race vs. Ethnicity Race Ethnicity Sorts people into ethnic groups according to perceived physical and behavioral human characteristics Allows people to self-identify with groupings of people on the basis of presumed (and usually claimed) commonalities including language, history, nation or region of origin, customs, ways of being, religion, names, physical appearance, and/or genealogy or ancestry Associates differential value, power, and privilege with these characteristics and establishes a social status ranking among the different groups Can be a source of meaning, action, and identity Emerges (a) when groups are perceived to pose a threat (political, economic, or cultural) to each other’s world view or way of life; and/or (b) to justify the denigration and exploitation (past, current, or future) of, and prejudice toward, other groups Confers a sense of belonging, pride, and motivation So, defining someone by “race” is not only an outdated category, but it is based upon a history of exclusion and prejudice When asking about background, ask what a person self-identifies as their ethnicity, not their race Class Activity Having open discussions and striving to understand others from their own perspective, not from yours, is the first step in Social/Diversity Awareness. What is your global literacy quotient? Take the Quiz. The passing score averages 30% Next answer the following questions: 1. What is your self-identified ethnicity? 2. Have you ever felt you were defined by gender and/or race, and what impact did this have on you? 3. How do discussions of what makes us different help expand the idea of what is “normal”? 4. Is it important to include physical/cognitive impairments and workforce generation in the conversation of what is "normal" in Social Diversity? Remember, you want to avoid situations like this: Diversity Awareness Transcript

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/01%3A_Introduction_to_Occupational_Safety_and_Health/1.01%3A_Reflection-Introduction_to_Occupational_Safety_and_Health.txt

Recordkeeping and reporting case study/exercise: Fill out forms OSHA 301, 300, 300A Using the following cases complete OSHA recordkeeping and reporting forms. On 2/6/18, Jane R (clerical assistant) reached to pull a box off a file cabinet and reported she felt a big twinge in her back. She immediately sat down and after 10 minutes complained that she could not get up without excruciating pain. Her supervisor Bob called 911 and she was taken to emergency. She returned to work three days later with a back brace and using a walker. On 3/5/18, Randy S (warehouse worker) was opening a box of supplies with a cardboard cutter and accidently sliced his forefinger on his dominant hand. There was lots of bleeding but first aid was administered and the wound cleaned and bandaged. He finished the work day. Two days later Randy went to an acute care center because his finger was throbbing and swollen. He was given antibiotics and his hand was immobilized. He was off work one day but returned. His hand was immobilized for 7 days. On 6/20/18, Sarah P (HR Supervisor) slipped and fell as she was coming up the stairs entering her office building. She was returning from a working lunch at another office location. She fractured her right ankle, was taken to emergency room by a co-worker, treated and told to stay off ankle for three weeks. On 10/8/18 Larry G (IT specialist) bumped his head on his desk as he was reaching under it to check his network cable for his computer. There was a slight break in his skin. He was treated with first aid (clean and bandage) and given ibuprofen. He finished his work day. On 11/20/18 Raymond L (maintenance worker) complained of feeling light headed, nauseated and lethargic after repairing a service water heater. He was sweating profusely and passed out after about 5 min. He was rushed to ER and within 24 hours had passed away. Cause of death was congestive heart failure and complications from heat stroke. Seven Common Accident Causes: Reflection Consider this statistic: 80 out of every 100 accidents are the fault of the person involved in the incident. Unsafe Acts cause four times as many accidents & injuries as unsafe conditions. Accidents occur for many reasons. Management can be linked to many incidents, through improper new-hire orientation, task training, or equipment training. Supervisor accountability of in place safety processes can also be linked to incidents. In most industries people tend to look for “things” to blame when an accident happens, because it’s easier than looking for “root causes,” such as those listed below. Consider these underlying accident causes, and ask yourself if you have been guilty of any of these attitudes or behaviors. Were you lucky and got away without injury? Maybe next time your luck may be on vacation. • Taking Shortcuts: Every day we make decisions we hope will make the job faster and more efficient. But do time savers ever risk your own safety, or that of other crew members? Short cuts that reduce your safety on the job are not shortcuts, but an increased chance for injury. • Being Over Confident: Confidence is a good thing. Overconfidence is too much of a good thing. “It’ll never happen to me” is an attitude that can lead to improper procedures, tools, or methods on the job. Any of these can lead to injury. • Starting a Task with Incomplete Instructions: To do the job safely and right the first time you need complete information. Have you ever been sent to do a job, having been given only a part of the job’s instructions? Don’t be shy about asking for explanations about work procedures and safety precautions. It isn’t dumb to ask questions; it’s dumb not to. • Poor Housekeeping: When clients, managers or safety professionals walk through your work site, housekeeping is an accurate indicator of everyone’s attitude about quality, production and safety. Poor housekeeping creates hazards of all types. A well-maintained area sets a standard for others to follow. Good housekeeping involves both pride and safety. • Ignoring Safety Procedures: Purposely failing to observe safety procedures can endanger you and your co-workers. You are being paid to follow the company safety policies—not to make your own rules. Being casual” about safety can lead to a casualty! • Mental Distractions from Work: Having a bad day at home and worrying about it at work is a hazardous combination. Dropping your ‘mental’ guard can pull your focus away from safe work procedures. You can also be distracted when you’re busy working and a friend comes by to talk while you are trying to work. Don’t become a statistic because you took your eyes off the machine “just for a minute.” • Failure to Pre-Plan the Work: There is a lot of talk today about Job Hazard Analysis. JHA’s are an effective way to figure out the smartest ways to work safely and effectively. Being hasty in starting a task or not thinking through the process can put you in harm’s way. Instead, Plan Your Work and then Work Your Plan! Search Most Frequently (MFC) Cited Standards: Search for your employer Use OSHAs query tool to check your industry or employer record on safety. Share your results with a peer. Locate the standard and discuss what might be similar in your work environment. Frequently cited OSHA Standards Practice filing a Complaint Reflect on a personal workplace experience where you now believe a condition or environment was not safe. Draft an initial complaint using the OSHA complaint form. At the conclusion of the lecture discussion on general safety and health provisions revisit the complaint and make any revisions for a final submission to OSHA. Answer the following questions as you discuss with your peers: 1. What changed? 2. How did the "Every Work Place" lecture inform your statements 3. Did you identify the hazards? 4. Did you reference any standards? NWOW-Adaptability and Facing Challenges-Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 The workplace is changing. The BLS reports an average worker today will change jobs and even occupations an average of 7-10 times over the course of their career. Temporary workers and those working as independent contractors will command a larger share of the US workforce. This will not only be challenging as the workforce diversifies but it will pose unique challenges to maintaining a fully trained and informed workforce in the area of occupational health and safety. Every workplace is unique. Employers must never assume that an employee's long list of previous employers and prior work experience will fully prepare them for the new job or task that worker may be assuming. Workers must be careful to recognize that previously acquired safety habits may be insufficient for a new work environment. Workers must be adaptable to changes in the workplace which not only includes when, where, and what work is performed but also how work is performed and by whom. Adaptability is about attitude and flexibility, so is working safe. Adaptability Lesson 1: Adaptability 21st Century Employability Skills Understanding your transferable skills, the ones you can take with you no matter what work you do, will help you adapt to the changing workforce requirements. Watch the following introduction video and complete the activities that follow: Introduction Video: Curriculum Introduction Transcript NWOW has identified essential skills for employability in the 21st Century. You have already been introduced to skills 9 and 10 below in the workbook activities on valuing work. In this next activity you will explore the trait and skill of adaptability and view through the lens of its impact on working safe. 1. Adaptability 2. Analysis/Solution Mindset 3. Collaboration 4. Communication 5. Digital Fluency 6. Empathy 7. Entrepreneurial Mindset 8. Resilience 9. Self-Awareness 10. Social/Diversity Awareness Complete activities on slides 12, 13, 14, 15 Adaptability Lesson 1. Activity and questions from slides 12, 14, and 15 are repeated below along with the video from Slide 13. View video after completing activity in slide 12. Adaptability in the Workplace: What Not To Do Adaptability-What not to do! Transcript Activity and questions from Slide 12 1. Find a partner, someone that you don’t already know in the class.​ 2. Introduce yourselves. Why are you taking this class and what to do you hope to learn?​ 3. Share real life examples of the 21st Century Workforce, such as​: • Someone you know who has been downsized due to changes in technology​. • Someone you know who works as a freelancer​. • Someone you know who works virtually​. • What you have been told about work and what is different​. Activity and video discussion questions Slide 14 1. The tone of the video is exaggerated, but have you ever worked on a project or had a co-worker who wasn’t adaptable? ​ 2. Why is it sometimes difficult to deal with change and be adaptable?​ 3. What are some possible outcomes if you aren’t adaptable? ​ 4. How can a lack of adaptability affect safety in the workplace?​ Activity and questions Slide 15 1. Find a partner, someone that you don’t already know in the class.​ 2. Introduce yourselves. Work together to answer the question: With the trends in the modern workforce, what traits does a person need to have to show they are adaptable? (How do you avoid “What Not to Do” responses to change.)​ 3. Share your examples and ideas with the class adding how adaptability increases your ability and desire to work safe.​ Adaptability Lesson 2: Facing Challenges In Adaptability lesson 2 you will address the following characteristics of adaptability: 1. Considers a variety of viewpoints and suggestions to get the job done. 2. Can handle normal amounts of stress, use feedback in a positive way, and learn from things that go wrong. View slides 3, 4, 5 of the Facing Challenges Lesson 2 and discuss questions with your peers. Questions from slide 3 are repeated below along with videos shown on slide 4 and the final questions to consider from slide 5. Activity and questions Slide 3 1. What are some examples in your life where you have found yourself faced with a challenge and you needed to adapt or change your approach? ​ 2. Think about a work experience or personal experience where you felt unsafe. How did you react?​ 3. Did you get input from others, and if so, how did this help? Video clips Slide 4 Video 1: Life Happens Transcript Video 2: New Technology Transcript Video Discussion Questions Slide 5 1. Which is the best option and why? 2. Can you think of an even better way to handle the situation? 3. Dealing with stress or stressful changes can be another aspect of adaptability. What are some healthy ways of dealing with stress related to school, projects, or work? 4. Make a list of tips and post it in the class discussion board! 1.03: Reflection Resources-Introduction to Occupation Safety and Health New World of Work Resources 1. Self Awareness Lesson 2 2. Keirsey Career Worksheet 3. Student Core Worksheet 4. Social Diversity Awareness Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 5. Adaptability Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 6. Collaboration Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 7. Analysis-Solution Mindset Lesson 1 8. Empathy Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 9. Global Literacy Quiz 10. 16 Personalities Test 11. Keirsey Temperment

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/01%3A_Introduction_to_Occupational_Safety_and_Health/1.02%3A_Activities-Introduction_to_OSHA.txt

IT'S YOUR TURN Thumbnail: en.Wikipedia.org, CC-BY-SA.3.0 02: Industrial Hygiene Reflection: Identify industrial hygiene controls and practices in your workplace. Use one condition or situation to critique. Do you believe it is effective? Why? If not what should be done to improve? Video-Hazard Communication View the following videos referenced in the lecture outline on Industrial Hygiene to complete the Mapping Terms activity. Video-Your right to know! (This is an external resource not available in this e-book) Video-GHS of Hazard Communication Transcript Video- The Right thing to Do! Transcript Mapping Terms: Working in groups find industrial hygiene terms/terminology in a SDS. You will find many of the terms in Chapter 3 Occupational Health and Environmental Controls. Discuss why a specific term shows up in a specific section. Critique the effectiveness of this activity for gaining understanding of the purpose of the SDS. Case study: Fatality or Catastrophe (Categorizing Hazards) Review California FACE Report #09CA004. In your discussion group, discuss what psycho-social hazards may have been present that worsened the HAZCOM failures? Mini-Lecture Industrial Hygiene 2.02: Chapter 3 Key Terms and Standards-Industrial Hygiene Flash Cards-Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Hazard Categories Physical Hazards Physical hazards are the most widely recognized hazards and include contact with equipment or other objects, working at heights, and slipping. This category also includes noise, vibration, temperature, electricity, atmospheric conditions, and radiation. Canadian Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) practitioners have also included the design of work and the workplace as physical hazards, suggesting it is important to attend to the ergonomic effects of work. OSHA address ergonomic workplace hazards in terms of the injury as musculoskeletal disorders(MSDs). In this context ergonomic hazards will be defined as physiological hazards as it combines both physical workplace design and the use of the body within the design to describe these hazards. When identifying and classifying physical hazards it is important to remember not just the "physics" of the characteristics but also how we "see" the hazard. Physical hazards also sometimes hide in plain sight. Often a hazard is so pervasive or workers’ behaviors to avoid the hazard are so routinized that the hazard is rendered almost invisible. For example, workers in a kitchen may use a dishtowel when opening an oven door to prevent the hot handle from burning them. Habitually turning a dishtowel into PPE prevents the injury and renders the hazard invisible. When identifying physical hazards, it is important to adopt the outlook of someone new to the workplace to bring back into view any hazards that have become invisible over time. Chemical Hazards Chemicals are everywhere in the modern workplace, from printer toner to engine exhaust to sink cleaners. While most chemical exposures do not cause ill effects, some certainly do. As we saw in Chapter 3, chemical hazards cause harm to human tissue or interfere with normal physiological functioning when they enter our bodies. Some chemicals irritate our tissue while others poison our systems or organs. Chemicals can asphyxiate us or negatively affect the functioning of our central nervous systems. Chemicals can also cause our immune systems to overreact, change our DNA, cause cancer, or damage a fetus. There are four routes of entry by which chemicals can get into a worker’s body, the most common being through respiration (i.e., breathing in contaminated air) and absorption through the skin. Chemicals can also enter our bodies through ingestion (i.e., we can eat them—usually accidentally) and through cuts in our skin. Our bodies excrete some chemicals in our sweat, exhaled breath, urine, or feces, while retaining other substances. Our bodies metabolize some chemicals into other substances, which may be more or less toxic than the original substance. Chemical hazards have varying levels of toxicity (i.e., ability to cause injury). Toxicity can be local or systemic. Local toxicity is a reaction at the point of contact. For example, you might experience a burn on the skin of your fingers after handling spicy peppers in a restaurant kitchen. Systemic toxicity occurs at a point in the body other than the point of contact. Allergic reactions after prolonged exposure to latex would be an example of systemic toxicity (see Note 2.2.1). Another example might be organ damage following skin absorption of a pesticide while picking fruit. Note 2.2.1 Contact dermititis among food service workers Many food service workers cope with a chronic rash on their hands. This dermatitis is caused by exposures to chemical substances such as cleaners and food products as well as by frequent handwashing—all of which can irritate a worker’s skin. Workers can develop severe itching, burning, flaking, cracking, blistering, and bleeding of their hands. Over time, repeated exposures to chemical substances can also make workers allergic to those chemicals. Allergic reactions mean workers can develop symptoms on other parts of the body. Other factors appear to play a role in food service workers’ propensity to develop dermatitis. Extreme temperatures (such as hot dishwater and serving dishes as well as cold freezers), mechanical trauma (such as friction, pressure, abrasions, and lacerations) and biological agents (such as bacteria on meat and vegetables) are common food service hazards. Each of these hazards can increase the likelihood of workers developing dermatitis. Some food service workers wear latex gloves as a form of PPE in order to reduce their contact with chemical substances. Latex gloves are also widely used by health care workers. Ironically, latex gloves themselves contain multiple chemicals (called rubber accelerators). These chemicals have allergenic properties and may contribute to the skin damage that gives rise to dermatitis. Workers can also become allergic to the latex gloves themselves, an allergy that can subsequently be triggered by household, recreational, medical, and clothing items. Proper skin care combined with eliminating or reducing exposures to the chemical, physical, and biological hazards of food service is likely to be more effective in reducing the incidence of dermatitis. As was also discussed in Chapter 3, controlling chemical hazards begins by identifying worker tasks and environmental factors associated with the location. Subsequently, we must identify and list each chemical a worker is exposed to and the route(s) of entry for that chemical. The potential hazard posed by each exposure and the risk of exposure should be determined along with control strategies. Control strategies used should follow the hierarchy of controls, beginning with elimination (e.g., using non-chemical processes) and substitution (e.g., using a less hazardous chemical), then progressing to engineering controls (e.g., physically isolating workers from the chemical). Biological Hazards As we saw in Chapter 4, biological hazards are organisms or the products of organisms (e.g., tissue, blood, feces) that harm human health. There are three types of organisms that give rise to biological hazards: • Bacteria are microscopic organisms that live in soil, water, organic matter, or the bodies of plants and animals. For example, the E. coli bacterium lives in human and animal digestive tracts and some strains can cause food poisoning, infections, or kidney failure when ingested. • Viruses are a group of pathogens that cause diseases such as influenza (the “flu”) when they enter our bodies. • Fungi are plants that lack chlorophyll, including mushrooms, yeast, and mold (sic). Many fungi contain toxin or produce toxic substances. For example, stachybotrys chartarum (black mold (sic)) produces toxins called mycotoxins that cause nausea, fatigue, respiratory and skin problems, and organ damage when the toxic spores are inhaled. Insect stings and bites, poisonous plants and animals, and allergens are also biological hazards. Like chemical hazards, biological hazards can enter our bodies via respiration, skin absorption, ingestion, and skin penetration and can cause both acute and chronic health effects. Our bodies do have mechanisms by which to cope with some biological hazards. For example, our respiratory system has five layers of defence to prevent harmful particles from entering our body, beginning with the hair-like projections (cilia) on the cells that line our airways (which filter out particles) and ending with cells (macrophages) in the air sacs (alveoli) of our lungs that trap and route impurities into the lymphatic system for disposal. Organisms that enter our body are also subject to attack by our immune system. Yet these mechanisms are not effective against every biological hazard or every exposure. Like all workplace hazards, control strategies for biological hazards should follow the hierarchy of controls. Historically, the provision of adequate washing and toilet facilities was an engineering control that significantly reduced worker exposure to many biological hazards. Recent technological improvements, such as automatically flushing toilets and automatic taps, soap dispensers, and towel dispensers, have further limited workers’ contact with bacteria in washrooms. As noted in Box 2.2.2, providing workers with vaccinations is an administrative control that can reduce worker susceptibility to viruses. Mandatory vaccinations are, however, controversial. Public health officials in Alberta, Canada have been attempting to increase the rate of annual vaccination for influenza among health-care workers (HCP) (which sits at about 55%) and are considering mandatory vaccinations. In the US overall, 81.1% of HCP reported receiving influenza vaccination during the 2018–19 season, similar to reported coverage in the previous four influenza seasons (5). As in past seasons, the highest coverage (97.7%) was among HCP with workplace vaccination requirements and the lowest (42.1%) among those working in settings where vaccination was not required, promoted, or offered on-site. In Canada and the US, healthcare workers who do not receive a flu shot must wear a mask when interacting with patients. Note 2.2.2 Communicable diseases, immunization, and childcare workers Public immunization programs during the latter half of the 20th century—focused specifically on vaccinating school children—have largely eliminated diseases such as polio and smallpox. While primarily aimed at controlling disease in the broader population, vaccination programs have also reduced occupational exposures to biological hazards among health-care and child-care workers. A since-discredited 1998 study that linked autism to the MMR (mumps, measles, and rubella) vaccine has contributed to declining vaccination rates in Canada and the United States. Fewer immunized children means that child-care workers—95% of whom are female—are increasingly exposed to biological hazards that can cause diseases, such as hepatitis B and measles. Indeed, child-care workers face many biological hazards in the course of their daily work. Respiratory infections—spread through the air—are commonplace among children, as are measles, chicken pox, and whooping cough. Intestinal infections can be spread through contact with feces during diapering or through inadequate hand washing. And skin infections (such as ring worm) and infestations (such as lice) can be transmitted through direct contact. Following a 2014 outbreak of measles in Disneyland linked to unvaccinated children, the State of California made vaccination of school-aged children mandatory. The state has since enacted further legislation requiring child-care workers to be vaccinated against measles, whooping cough, and influenza. Mandatory worker vaccination (which is controversial) helps to control some of the biological hazards faced by child-care workers. Other administrative controls include environmental monitoring and sanitization protocols, such as ensuring that there are adequate facilities for diapering and toileting and physically separating these areas from food preparation and eating areas. The interaction of public health campaigns (such as immunization) with workplace OHS demonstrates the need for OHS practitioners to be mindful of health issues beyond the workplace. In Chapter 8 (workbook), we’ll examine the issue of pandemic planning in emergency planning. Pandemics are caused by the widespread outbreak of a new strain of a virus that spreads quickly (due to a lack of immunity) and for which there is no immediately available vaccination. While they are relatively rare, the workplace impact of a pandemic could be severe and many employers have developed plans for coping with such an event. Pyschological (Pyscho-social) Hazards Psycho-social hazards are the social and psychological factors that negatively affect worker health and safety. Psycho-social hazards can be hard to isolate in the workplace because they reside in the dynamics of human interactions and within the internal world of an individual’s psyche. Yet it is increasingly recognized that social and psychological aspects of work have real and measurable effects on workers’ health. Harassment, bullying, and violence are examples of psycho-social hazards. Other forms include stress, fatigue, and overwork. Even the absence of social interaction, in the form of working alone, produces its own hazards. Much of the challenge is recognizing that these hazards pose real threats to workers’ health. A worker experiencing domestic violence or a worker with two or more jobs, or a worker in an environment in which they are racialized minority may conceal or appear to not be under any stress giving the false impression that all is well. These examples exhibit varying forms of stress. There are four types of stressors: • Acute stressors are time-specific events of high intensity and short duration that occur infrequently, such as a performance review, a car accident, or unexpected encounter. • Episodic (or daily) stressors may be similar to acute stressors but occur more frequently, have a longer duration, and may be of lower intensity. Making repeated requests of a worker to work overtime is an example of an episodic stressor. • Chronic stressors are stressors that persist over a sustained period of time, and include job insecurity, work overload, or lack of control. • Catastrophic stressors are a subset of acute stressors but differ in their intensity, threatening life, safety, or property. Robbery and physical assault are examples of catastrophic stressors. And stress often leads to fatigue. Fatigue is the state of feeling tired, weary, or sleepy caused by insufficient sleep, prolonged mental or physical work, or extended periods of stress or anxiety. Acute, or short-term, fatigue can be caused by failure to get adequate sleep in the period before a work shift and is resolved quickly through appropriate sleep. Chronic fatigue can be the result of a prolonged period of sleep deficit and may require more involved treatment. Chronic fatigue syndrome is an ongoing, severe feeling of tiredness not relieved by sleep. The causes of chronic fatigue syndrome are unknown. While lack of sleep is the primary cause of fatigue, it can be enhanced by other factors, including drug or alcohol use, high temperatures, boring or monotonous work, loud noise, dim lighting, extended shifts, or rotating shifts. As with other conditions, workers have differing sensitivity to fatigue. Fatigue can also make workers more susceptible to stress and illness. Fatigue is a legitimate health and safety concern because workers who are experiencing fatigue are more likely to be involved in workplace incidents. Lack of alertness and reduced decision-making capacity can have negative effects on safety. Research has shown that fatigue can impair judgment in a manner similar to alcohol. Note 2.2.3 Responses to harmful work environments When a worker experiences any OHS hazard, including harassment, bullying, or a toxic workplace, the worker can respond in a range of ways. In examining individual behaviour in response to deteriorating conditions, Albert Hirschman first developed the notion that people respond either through exit or voice, and the choice is determined by attitudes toward the situation. Others later added to Hirschman’s theory by positing two other options, patience (sometimes referred to as loyalty) and neglect: • Exit: The worker decides to get away from the undesired situation, either by quitting the employer or transferring to another location or job within the same employer. • Voice: The worker decides to speak up in an attempt to change the situation. Voice can take a number of forms, including attempting to repair the situation directly, lodging a complaint, filing a grievance or, less constructively, retaliating with their own inappropriate behaviour. • Patience: The worker decides to do nothing in the hopes that the situation will eventually improve. Workers adopt a patience approach when their loyalty to the organization or the cost of exiting is greater than the price of experiencing the negative situation. • Neglect: The worker does nothing, based on the belief that the situation will not change or might grow worse. The worker might try to avoid the source of the situation but will generally take no action to change the situation. Workers choose this option when the costs of exiting are too high and their relationship to the organization is sufficiently damaged to prevent either voice or patience. Workers may adopt different strategies when confronted with bullying behaviour or may cycle through the various options. For example, a group of workers facing a co-worker who undermines them in meetings, makes false claims about their work performance, and verbally attacks them may react in different ways. Those workers who are not very invested in the workplace (e.g., they are new or they feel they have options elsewhere) may simply start looking for a new job. Other workers may at first choose patience (in the hope the worker’s behaviour will change) and then move to voicing their concerns (e.g., filing a complaint or by socially excluding the bully). If the issue remains unresolved, some workers (e.g., those close to retirement) may choose neglect while others will move to exit the workplace. Recognizing that workers might respond in four different ways to the same negative situation reminds us that there is no single “sign” of a poor workplace environment. Employers interested in preventing harassment and bullying must be careful to observe the myriad ways in which workers react to deteriorating situations. There are several ways to address harassment and bullying in the workplace. First, an employer should (and, in some jurisdictions, must) develop policies regarding harassment in the workplace. The administrative controls should outline acceptable and unacceptable behaviours and actions, indicate employer and worker responsibilities, and create a process for investigating and resolving complaints. Any investigation must proceed in a manner that is transparent, fair to both parties, and as confidential as is possible. Investigations should also identify the root cause of the incident and how to prevent similar incidents in the future. Workplace policies are important, but they are only as effective as the degree of their implementation and enforcement. Effective policy implementation requires the employer to train all workers, including managers, on how to prevent and address harassment. Training for managers is particularly important. It can help managers spot possible harassment and teach them the difference between legitimate management discretion and bullying management techniques. Training workers around respectful interactions and cultural sensitivity can help distinguish between legitimate interpersonal conflict and bullying and harassment. Finally, research shows that the leading indicator of workplace bullying and harassment is the organization’s climate. In workplaces where workers feel unsafe, incidents of bullying and harassment are more frequent. Conversely, creating a safe and respectful climate increases workers’ sense of safety and lowers the negative consequences of bullying and harassment. Creating a safe workplace climate is a multi-levelled process, requiring a high degree of commitment to respectful interactions, clear communication, transparent management, and individual and collective accountability. Ergonomic (Physiological) Hazards Injury that results from external physical stresses on the body produced by working environments that allow for awkward postures, repetitive motions, heavy lifting, bending and pushing, overreaching are characterized as ergonomic or physiological hazards. The hazard is in 'how" the body is used when it is performing work, activity, or task and the 'way' the work is done that results in soft tissue musculoskeletal disorders. Ideally, ergonomics starts with job design. Job Design comprises the decisions employers make about what tasks will be performed by workers and how that work will be performed. Job design includes establishing the physical dimensions of work. This includes the size and location of the workspace, and what furniture, tools, and equipment will be used, as well as the temperature or lighting of the workspace. Job design also determines the nature of the tasks, including their complexity, pace, and duration and how individual tasks and jobs relate to one another. Finally, job design often includes making decisions and assumptions about the characteristics of the workers who will perform the work, including their height, weight, sex, and other physical and mental abilities. The decisions made during job design can have significant effects on workers’ health and safety. Poor work design has negative effects on worker health. For example, if you have ever worked at a job where, at the end of the day, your eyes hurt (due to poor lighting) or your back was sore (because of standing on a cement floor), you have experienced ill health caused by poor ergonomics. A core principle of ergonomics is “fit the job to the worker, not the worker to the job.” More specifically, ergonomics seeks to ensure that the design of work matches the anatomical, physiological, and psychological needs of the worker. Yet some ergonomic hazards are easier to “see” than others. For example, back pain from heavy lifting is easier to identify than fatigue to due poor shift rotation design. The broad acceptance of lifting as hazardous and requiring control shows that the relationship between the hazard and the injury is both direct and well accepted. By contrast, there are many factors contributing to worker fatigue. This makes it difficult to definitively prove that shift rotation is an important factor in worker fatigue. The aspects of ergonomics that have been more readily adopted are the design of tools, equipment, and workspaces. For example, we have seen an increase in more appropriately designed keyboards, work stations, retail scanners, and other equipment. There has also been greater attention paid to minimizing manual lifting and handling of loads. Buildings are being built with better climate and air-quality control. Employers have been more reluctant to address other ergonomic issues because the required changes affect the work process or may impede management’s ability to direct work. For example, providing a better-designed chair to prevent spinal deterioration is easier and cheaper than altering the work flow to reduce the mechanical forces exerted on workers’ spines by twisting to reach objects. This reluctance to address some ergonomic hazards echoes employers’ preference for PPE over engineering and administrative changes. A common health effect of poor ergonomic design is repetitive strain injury (RSI). RSIs (which are sometimes called cumulative trauma disorders) are injuries to muscles, nerves, tendons, or bones caused by repetitive movement, forceful exertions and overuse, vibration, and sustained or awkward positions. RSIs frequently occur in the hands, wrists, and arms but can also afflict legs and other key joints. Carpal tunnel syndrome, frozen shoulder, trigger finger, tendonitis, bursitis, and (more recently) Blackberry thumb are all examples of RSIs. Any task that requires either the same movement over and over again or puts the body in an awkward position can lead to RSIs, especially if repeated over a long period of time. RSIs have only gained acceptance as the outcome of workplace hazards over the past 20 years. They were first acknowledged in factories with workers on assembly lines. Even today workers in some occupations, such as retail clerks, typists, and restaurant servers (notably occupations dominated by women), still have greater difficulty having RSI claims accepted. Among the reasons for the slow acceptance of RSIs is the murky causality of the disease: did you get it from keyboarding at work or playing squash on your own time? RSIs may also worsen even after the hazardous tasks are eliminated and can appear as a result of work not normally associated with repetition. There has been inadequate epidemiological research into the full range of factors that lead to RSIs. Hazard Communication Standard 1910.1200(a) Purpose. 1910.1200(a)(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that the hazards of all chemicals produced or imported are classified, and that information concerning the classified hazards is transmitted to employers and employees. The requirements of this section are intended to be consistent with the provisions of the United Nations Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), Revision 3. The transmittal of information is to be accomplished by means of comprehensive hazard communication programs, which are to include container labeling and other forms of warning, safety data sheets and employee training. 1910.1200(b) Scope and application. 1910.1200(b)(1) This section requires chemical manufacturers or importers to classify the hazards of chemicals which they produce or import, and all employers to provide information to their employees about the hazardous chemicals to which they are exposed, by means of a hazard communication program, labels and other forms of warning, safety data sheets, and information and training. In addition, this section requires distributors to transmit the required information to employers. (Employers who do not produce or import chemicals need only focus on those parts of this rule that deal with establishing a workplace program and communicating information to their workers.)

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IT'S YOUR TURN Thumbnail: https://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Asbestos 03: PPE and Health Hazards Reflection: Compare the Sciences Do an internet search on "Life Science" and "Health Science" and compare the two branches of study. Which do you believe would have more influence on your understanding of occupational health and safety and contributes more to the science and principles of industrial hygiene? Why? What did you recall from your studies in prior classes from grammar school through college that suddenly made sense after learning about some occupational health hazards? PPE Exercise: Specify PPE Design a task or job for a given set of PPE, then specify! Use the groupings of PPE below, choose one group list and then use the resource links to find the image, SKU, model, and price for the PPE specifically required for your task. When coming up with your task or job make sure you completely describe the work that is to be done, where it is being done, and include the environmental conditions as well. • Air Purifying Respirator-Particulate, PFA (Harness), Coveralls, Hearing Protection (Earmuffs and Plugs), Gloves, Safety Shoes, Eye Protection-Googles, Face Shield, Hardhat • Air Purifying Respirator - GAS/VOC, Coveralls, Gloves, Safety Shoes, Eye Protection-Safety Glasses, Face Shield • Heavy Cotton Pants and Shirt(Flame Retardant and Heat Resistant), Face Mask, Gloves, Eye Protection Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Heavy Leather Boots • Hardhat, Eye Protection-Safety Glasses, Hearing Protection, Steel Toe Boots, Gloves, HI-Visibility Vest, PFA, Dust Mask, Face Shield. • Air Supplying Respirator, Coveralls, Rubber Boots, Safety Glasses, Knee Pads, Rubber Gloves • Lifting Belt, Hard Hat, Steel Toe Boots, Eye Protection-Safety Glasses, Gloves, HI-Visibility Vest, Dust Mask • Air Purifying Respirator, Gloves, Eye Protection, Knee Pads, Coveralls with Cap and Booties • Earmuffs, Gloves, Safety Glasses, Slip Resistant Shoes/Boots, HI-Visibility Vest or Jacket, Liftbelt • Bump Cap, Safety Glasses, Gloves, Slip Resistant Shoes/Boots, HI-Visibility Vest or Jacket, Safety Harness/PFA, Ear Protection, Dust Mask • PVC OR Vinyl Coveralls/Suit/Cap/Booties/Gloves, Boots, Air Supplying Respirator PPE Presentation: Research PPE and Present to the Class Assignment Name: PPE demonstration/presentation to the class. Purpose: Identify and explain aspects of OSHA’s Health and Safety Programs such as the PPE Program. Skills: The purpose of this assignment is to help you practice the following skills that are essential to your success in this course / in school / in this field / in professional life beyond school: 1. Understand and relate the primary elements of a PPE program. 2. Apply knowledge of health and safety topics by demonstrating what is needed or required. 3. Teach and instruct others. Knowledge: This assignment will also help you to become familiar with the following important content knowledge in this discipline: 1. Industrial Hygiene 2. Environmental Controls 3. Hazard Analysis Your Assignment/Task: Research a type of PPE and demonstrate/present to the class based on PPE program requirements the correct use and care, and when or under what circumstances use would be necessary. Criteria for Success: A great effort will reflect your understanding of the topics we cover in class and their relationship to what is required for the effective use of PPE. A good presentation will choose a scenario, or show hands on(actual ppe) and will address the following: • When it is necessary • What kind is necessary • How to properly put it on, adjust, wear and take it off • The limitations of the equipment • Proper care, maintenance, useful life, and disposal of the equipment 3.02: Key Terms and Definitions-PPE and Health Hazards Flash Cards-Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook

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First Things First Every workplace and therefore every employer must render first aid to an injured employee. Depending on the severity of the injury, i.e. if the employer emergency plan is activated, then the duty of care is to get the employee to an emergency facility as soon as possible. When the workplace is a construction site or some distance away from an urgent care or hospital emergency room the employer must have the capacity to provide immediate first aid commensurate to the injury and then proceed if necessary to offsite care for medical treatment. The employer must ensure the availability of medical personnel for advice and consultation no matter the work location. Construction job site accidents and injuries as a result of tool and equipment failure and/or incorrect use are common. Cuts and punctures from sharp objects, contusions from blunt objects or impacts, burns from open flame torches and hot pipes, splashing of chemicals or debris to the eyes, and electrical shock are just a few of the common injuries associated with construction and maintenance trades. As construction and maintenance work offer the potential for many types of traumatic and life threatening injuries, workers in skilled trades should be aware of the hazards and be prepared to respond in the event of an injury. Since many construction and maintenance industry tasks may be performed by a single person, often isolated from others, it is recommended that construction industry workers receive First Aid and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 10 or 30 Hour Safety Training. Training enables industry trades-persons to better assess workplace hazards and respond to them appropriately, whether an incident involves oneself, a coworker, or others on the job site. In person, hands-on First Aid/CPR training can be found through local health and welfare organizations, educational institutions (credit or non-credit), and medical providers. OSHA in person courses can be found at local educational institutions (credit or non-credit), and in online formats through various educational institutions and commercial providers. The First Aid Kit First aid supplies are required to be easily accessible under paragraph Sec. 1926.50 (d)(1). An example of the minimal contents of a generic first aid kit is described in American National Standard (ANSI) Z308.1-1978 "Minimum Requirements for Industrial Unit-Type First-aid Kits". The contents of the kit listed in the ANSI standard should be adequate for small work sites. When larger operations or multiple operations are being conducted at the same location, employers should determine the need for additional first aid kits at the worksite, additional types of first aid equipment and supplies and additional quantities and types of supplies and equipment in the first aid kits. If it is reasonably anticipated employees will be exposed to blood or other potentially infectious materials (OPIM) while using first-aid supplies, employers shall provide personal protective equipment (PPE). Appropriate PPE includes gloves, gowns, face shields, masks and eye protection. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) What is personal protective equipment? Personal protective equipment, commonly referred to as "PPE", is equipment worn to minimize exposure to hazards that cause serious workplace injuries and illnesses. These injuries and illnesses may result from contact with chemical, radiological, physical, electrical, mechanical, or other workplace hazards. Personal protective equipment may include items such as gloves, safety glasses and shoes, earplugs or muffs, hard hats, respirators, or coveralls, vests and full body suits. What can be done to ensure proper use of personal protective equipment? All personal protective equipment should be safely designed and constructed, and should be maintained in a clean and reliable fashion. It should fit comfortably, encouraging worker use. If the personal protective equipment does not fit properly, it can make the difference between being safely covered or dangerously exposed. When engineering, work practice, and administrative controls are not feasible or do not provide sufficient protection, employers must provide personal protective equipment to their workers and ensure its proper use. Employers are also required to train each worker required to use personal protective equipment to know: • When it is necessary • What kind is necessary • How to properly put it on, adjust, wear and take it off • The limitations of the equipment • Proper care, maintenance, useful life, and disposal of the equipment If PPE is to be used, a PPE program should be implemented. This program should address the hazards present; the selection, maintenance, and use of PPE; the training of employees; and monitoring of the program to ensure its ongoing effectiveness.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/03%3A_PPE_and_Health_Hazards/3.03%3A_First_Aid_and_Personal_Protective_Equipment.txt

Protecting Your Eyes Employees can be exposed to a large number of hazards that pose danger to their eyes and face. OSHA requires employers to ensure that employees have appropriate eye or face protection if they are exposed to eye or face hazards from flying particles, molten metal, liquid chemicals, acids or caustic liquids, chemical gases or vapors, potentially infected material or potentially harmful light radiation. OSHA suggests that eye protection be routinely considered for use by carpenters, electricians, machinists, mechanics, millwrights, plumbers and pipefitters, sheet metal employees and tinsmiths, assemblers, sanders, grinding machine operators, sawyers, welders, laborers, chemical process operators and handlers, and timber cutting and logging workers. Employers of employees in other job categories should decide whether there is a need for eye and face PPE through a hazard assessment. Examples of potential eye or face injuries include: • Dust, dirt, metal or wood chips entering the eye from activities such as chipping, grinding, sawing, hammering, the use of power tools or even strong wind forces. • Chemical splashes from corrosive substances, hot liquids, solvents or other hazardous solutions. • Objects swinging into the eye or face, such as tree limbs, chains, tools or ropes. • Radiant energy from welding, harmful rays from the use of lasers or other radiant light (as well as heat, glare, sparks, splash and flying particles). Many occupational eye injuries occur because employees are not wearing any eye protection while others result from wearing improper or poorly fitting eye protection. Employers must be sure that their employees wear appropriate eye and face protection and that the selected form of protection is appropriate to the work being performed and properly fits each employee exposed to the hazard. Types of Eye Protection Selecting the most suitable eye and face protection for employees should take into consideration the following elements: • Ability to protect against specific workplace hazards. • Should fit properly and be reasonably comfortable to wear. • Should provide unrestricted vision and movement. • Should be durable and cleanable. • Should allow unrestricted functioning of any other required PPE. The eye and face protection selected for employee use must clearly identify the manufacturer. Any new eye and face protective devices must comply with ANSI Z87.1-1989 or be at least as effective as this standard requires. Any equipment purchased before this requirement took effect on July 5, 1994, must comply with the earlier ANSI Standard (ANSI Z87.1-1968) or be shown to be equally effective. See the eye protection selection guide for the most recent standard (ANSI Z87.1-2015). An employer may choose to provide one pair of protective eyewear for each position rather than individual eyewear for each employee. If this is done, the employer must make sure that employees disinfect shared protective eyewear after each use. Protective eyewear with corrective lenses may only be used by the employee for whom the corrective prescription was issued and may not be shared among employees. Some of the most common types of eye and face protection include the following examples: An interactive or media element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: eye and face protection

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/03%3A_PPE_and_Health_Hazards/3.04%3A_Eye_and_Face_Protection.txt

Protecting Your Hearing Some types of hearing protection include: • Single-use Earplugs – Single-use earplugs are made of waxed cotton, foam, silicone rubber or fiberglass wool. They are self-forming and, when properly inserted, they work as well as most molded earplugs. • Molded Earplugs – Pre-formed or molded earplugs must be individually fitted by a professional and can be disposable or reusable. Reusable plugs should be cleaned after each use. • Earmuffs – Require a perfect seal around the ear. Glasses, facial hair, long hair or facial movements such as chewing may reduce the protective value of earmuffs. Note: Audio headphones and earbuds are not approved devices for hearing protection. Determining the need to provide hearing protection for employees can be challenging. Employee exposure to excessive noise depends upon a number of factors, including: • The loudness of the noise as measured in decibels (dB). • The duration of each employee’s exposure to the noise. • Whether employees move between work areas with different noise levels. • Whether noise is generated from one or multiple sources. Generally, the louder the noise, the shorter the exposure time before hearing protection is required. For instance, employees may be exposed to a noise level of 90 dB for 8 hours per day (unless they experience a Standard Threshold Shift) before hearing protection is required. On the other hand, if the noise level reaches 115 dB hearing protection is required if the anticipated exposure exceeds 15 minutes. Common hearing injuries associated with noise levels in the construction and maintenance industry include both temporary and permanent partial to total hearing loss, and tinnitus (ringing in the ear). For a more detailed discussion of the requirements for a comprehensive hearing conservation program, see OSHA Publication 3074 (2002), “Hearing Conservation” or refer to the OSHA standard at 29 CFR 1910.95, Occupational Noise Exposure, section (c). Table 5, below, shows the permissible noise exposures that require hearing protection for employees exposed to occupational noise at specific decibel levels for specific time periods. Noises are considered continuous if the interval between occurrences of the maximum noise level is one second or less. Noises not meeting this definition are considered impact or impulse noises (loud momentary explosions of sound) and exposures to this type of noise must not exceed 140 dB. Examples of situations or tools that may result in impact or impulse noises are powder-actuated nail guns, a punch press or drop hammers. If engineering and work practice controls do not lower employee exposure to workplace noise to acceptable levels, employees must wear appropriate hearing protection. It is important to understand that hearing protectors reduce only the amount of noise that gets through to the ears. The amount of this reduction is referred to as attenuation, which differs according to the type of hearing protection used and how well it fits. Hearing protectors worn by employees must reduce an employee’s noise exposure to within the acceptable limits noted in Table 5. Refer to Appendix B of 29 CFR 1910.95, Occupational Noise Exposure, for detailed information on methods to estimate the attenuation effectiveness of hearing protectors based on the device’s noise reduction rating (NRR). Manufacturers of hearing protection devices must display the device’s NRR on the product packaging. If employees are exposed to occupational noise at or above 85 dB averaged over an eight-hour period, the employer is required to institute a hearing conservation program that includes regular testing of employees’ hearing by qualified professionals. Refer to 29 CFR 1910.95(c) for a description of the requirements for a hearing conservation program. Hearing Protection Self-Check Query \(1\) The interactive or media element is excluded from the print version of the text. You can view it online here: Hearing Protection

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Protecting Your Head Protecting employees from potential head injuries is a key element of any safety program. A head injury can impair an employee for life or it can be fatal. Wearing a safety helmet or hard hat is one of the easiest ways to protect an employee’s head from injury. Hard hats can protect employees from impact and penetration hazards as well as from electrical shock and burn hazards. Employers must ensure that their employees wear head protection if any of the following apply: • Objects might fall from above and strike them on the head; • They might bump their heads against fixed objects, such as exposed pipes or beams; or • There is a possibility of accidental head contact with electrical hazards. Some examples of occupations in which employees should be required to wear head protection include construction workers, carpenters, electricians, linemen, plumbers and pipefitters, timber and log cutters, welders, among many others. Whenever there is a danger of objects falling from above, such as working below others who are using tools or working under a conveyor belt, head protection must be worn. Hard hats must be worn with the bill forward to protect employees properly. In general, protective helmets or hard hats should do the following: • Resist penetration by objects. • Absorb the shock of a blow. • Be water-resistant and slow burning. • Have clear instructions explaining proper adjustment and replacement of the suspension and headband. Hard hats must have a hard outer shell and a shock-absorbing lining that incorporates a headband and straps that suspend the shell from 1 to 1 1/4 inches (2.54 cm to 3.18 cm) away from the head. This type of design provides shock absorption during anti-impact and ventilation during normal wear. Protective headgear must meet ANSI Standard Z89.1-1986 (Protective Headgear for Industrial Workers) or provide an equivalent level of protection. Helmets purchased before July 5, 1994 must comply with the earlier ANSI Standard (Z89.1-1969) or provide equivalent protection. Bump Hats vs. Hard Hats There are two common classes of protective headgear known as “bump hats” and “hard hats”. Bump Hats are designed for use in areas with low head clearance and are recommended for areas where protection is needed from head bumps and lacerations. When the risk of falling or flying objects are present then an ANSI approved Hard Hat is required instead. There are many types of hard hats available in the marketplace today and it is essential to check the type of hard hat employees are using. Each hat should bear a label inside the shell that lists the manufacturer, the ANSI designation and the class of the hat. This information should be compared against working conditions to ensure proper protection against potential workplace hazards with a requirement for employees to wear the hard hat at all times. It is important for employers to understand all potential hazards when making this selection, including electrical hazards. This can be done through a comprehensive hazard analysis and an awareness of the different types of protective headgear available. Hard hats are divided into three industrial classes: Class A hard hats provide impact and penetration resistance along with limited voltage protection (up to 2,200 volts). Class B hard hats provide the highest level of protection against electrical hazards, with high-voltage shock and burn protection (up to 20,000 volts). They also provide protection from impact and penetration hazards by flying/falling objects. Class C hard hats provide lightweight comfort and impact protection but offer no protection from electrical hazards. Size and Care Considerations Head protection that is either too large or too small is inappropriate for use, even if it meets all other requirements. Protective headgear must fit appropriately on the body and for the head size of each individual. Most protective headgear comes in a variety of sizes with adjustable headbands to ensure a proper fit (many adjust in 1/8-inch increments). A proper fit should allow sufficient clearance between the shell and the suspension system for ventilation and distribution of an impact. The hat should not bind, slip, fall off or irritate the skin. Some protective headgear allows for the use of various accessories to help employees deal with changing environmental conditions, such as slots for earmuffs, safety glasses, face shields and mounted lights. Optional brims may provide additional protection from the sun and some hats have channels that guide rainwater away from the face. Protective headgear accessories must not compromise the safety elements of the equipment. Periodic cleaning and inspection will extend the useful life of protective headgear. A daily inspection of the hard hat shell, suspension system and other accessories for holes, cracks, tears or other damage that might compromise the protective value of the hat is essential. Paints, paint thinners and some cleaning agents can weaken the shells of hard hats and may eliminate electrical resistance. Consult the helmet manufacturer for information on the effects of paint and cleaning materials on their hard hats. Never drill holes, paint or apply labels to protective headgear as this may reduce the integrity of the protection. Do not store protective headgear in direct sunlight, such as on the rear window shelf of a car, since sunlight and extreme heat can damage them. Hard hats with any of the following defects should be removed from service and replaced: • Perforation, cracking, or deformity of the brim or shell; • Indication of exposure of the brim or shell to heat, chemicals or ultraviolet light and other radiation (in addition to a loss of surface gloss, such signs include chalking or flaking). Always replace a hard hat if it sustains an impact, even if damage is not noticeable. Suspension systems are offered as replacement parts and should be replaced when damaged or when excessive wear is noticed. It is not necessary to replace the entire hard hat when deterioration or tears of the suspension systems are noticed.

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Protecting Your Hands If a workplace hazard assessment reveals that employees face potential injury to hands and arms that cannot be eliminated through engineering and work practice controls, employers must ensure that employees wear appropriate protection. Potential hazards include skin absorption of harmful substances, chemical or thermal burns, electrical dangers, bruises, abrasions, cuts, punctures, fractures and amputations. Protective equipment includes gloves, finger guards and arm coverings or elbow-length gloves. Employers should explore all possible engineering and work practice controls to eliminate hazards and use PPE to provide additional protection against hazards that cannot be completely eliminated through other means. For example, machine guards may eliminate a hazard. Installing a barrier to prevent employees from placing their hands at the point of contact between a table saw blade and the item being cut is another method. Types of Protective Gloves • Palm • Mechanic’s • Latex • Vinyl • Nitrile • Chemical There are many types of gloves available today to protect against a wide variety of hazards. The nature of the hazard and the operation involved will affect the selection of gloves. The variety of potential occupational hand injuries makes selecting the right pair of gloves challenging. It is essential that employees use gloves specifically designed for the hazards and tasks found in their workplace because gloves designed for one function may not protect against a different function even though they may appear to be an appropriate protective device. The following are examples of some factors that may influence the selection of protective gloves for a workplace. • Type of chemicals handled. • Nature of contact (total immersion, splash, etc.). • Duration of contact. • Area requiring protection (hand only, forearm, arm). • Grip requirements (dry, wet, oily). • Thermal protection. • Size and comfort. • Abrasion/resistance requirements. Gloves made from a wide variety of materials are designed for many types of workplace hazards. In general, gloves fall into four groups: • Gloves made of leather, canvas or metal mesh; • Fabric and coated fabric gloves; • Chemical- and liquid-resistant gloves; • Insulating rubber gloves (See 29 CFR 1910.137 and the following section on electrical protective equipment for detailed requirements on the selection, use and care of insulating rubber gloves). Query \(1\) Query \(1\) This interactive or media element is excluded from the print version of the text. You can view it online here: hand protection Glove Selection Included in the interactive media link above is a table from the U.S. Department of Energy (Occupational Safety and Health Technical Reference Manual) which rates various gloves as being protective against specific chemicals and will help you select the most appropriate gloves to protect your employees. The ratings are abbreviated as follows: VG: Very Good; G: Good; F: Fair; P: Poor (not recommended). Chemicals marked with an asterisk (*) are for limited service. Care of Protective Gloves Protective gloves should be inspected before each use to ensure that they are not torn, punctured or made ineffective in any way. A visual inspection will help detect cuts or tears but a more thorough inspection by filling the gloves with water and tightly rolling the cuff towards the fingers will help reveal any pinhole leaks. Gloves that are discolored or stiff may also indicate deficiencies caused by excessive use or degradation from chemical exposure. Any gloves with impaired protective ability should be discarded and replaced. Reuse of chemical-resistant gloves should be evaluated carefully, taking into consideration the absorptive qualities of the gloves. A decision to reuse chemically-exposed gloves should take into consideration the toxicity of the chemicals involved and factors such as duration of exposure, storage and temperature.

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Using Respiratory Protection The information in this section will provide basic information to workers and employers who may find themselves using respiratory protection for the first time. The guidance provides information on what respirators are, how they work, and what is needed for a respirator to provide protection. For additional information see: Safety and Health Topics/Respiratory Protection What is a respirator? A respirator is a device that protects you from inhaling dangerous substances, such as chemicals and infectious particles. Respirators are among the most important pieces of protective equipment for working in hazardous environments. Selecting the right respirator requires an assessment of all the workplace operations, processes or environments that may create a respiratory hazard. The identity of the hazard and its airborne concentrations need to be determined before choosing a respirator. This assessment should be done by experienced safety personnel or by an industrial hygienist. There are several different types of respirators, as described below. How do respirators work? Respirators work by either filtering particles from the air, chemically cleaning (purifying) the air, or supplying clean air from an outside source. Particulate Respirators Particulate respirators are the simplest, least expensive, and least protective of the respirator types available. These respirators only protect against particles (e.g., dust). They do not protect against chemicals, gases, or vapors, and are intended only for low hazard levels. The commonly known “N-95” filtering face piece respirator or “dust mask” is one type of particulate respirator, often used in hospitals to protect against infectious agents. Particulate respirators are “air purifying respirators” because they clean particles out of the air as you breathe. Particulate respirators: • Filter out dusts, fumes and mists. • Are usually disposable dust masks or respirators with disposable filters. • Must be replaced when they become discolored, damaged, or clogged. Examples: filtering face piece or elastomeric respirator. Chemical Cartridge/Gas Mask Respirator Gas masks are also known as “air-purifying respirators” because they filter or clean chemical gases out of the air as you breathe. This respirator includes a facepiece or mask, and a cartridge or canister. Straps secure the face piece to the head. The cartridge may also have a filter to remove particles. Gas masks are effective only if used with the correct replaceable cartridge or filter (these terms are often used interchangeably) for a particular biological or chemical substance. Selecting the proper filter can be a complicated process, but is aided through color-coding based on the substance being filtered. There are cartridges available that protect against more than one hazard, but there is no “all-in-one” cartridge that protects against all substances. You may even require more than one cartridge to protect against multiple hazards. It is important to know what hazards you will face in order to be certain you are choosing the right filters/cartridges. There are nine classes of particulate filters which are broken down into three series: N, R, and P. Each series (N, R, and P) is available at three efficiency levels: 95%, 99%, and 99.97%. The N series filter is used in environments free of oil mists. The R series filters can be exposed to oil mists, but should only be worn for one work shift. The P filter can be exposed to oil mists for longer than one work shift. An interactive feature has been omitted from this version of the document.  See link below for content. Respiratory Protection Powered Air-Purifying Respirator (PAPR) Powered air-purifying respirators use a fan to draw air through the filter to the user. They are easier to breathe through; however, they need a fully charged battery to work properly. They use the same type of filters/cartridges as other air-purifying respirators. It is important to know what the hazard is, and how much of it is in the air, in order to select the proper filters/cartridges. Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) is the respirator commonly used by firefighters. These use their own air tank to supply clean air, so you don’t need to worry about filters. They also protect against higher concentrations of dangerous chemicals. However, they are very heavy (30 pounds or more), and require very special training on how to use and to maintain them. Also, the air tanks typically last an hour or less depending upon their rating and your breathing rate (how hard you are breathing). Provide clean air from a portable air tank when the air around you is simply too dangerous to breathe. All of these respirators (except for the “dust masks” or filtering face pieces) are available in either half-mask or full-face pieces. Frequently Asked Questions (Respirators) An interactive or media element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: Respirator Considerations: Questions to consider regarding any respirator you are considering purchasing: • What protection (which chemicals and particles, and at what levels) does the respirator provide? • Is there more than one size? • Which size should I use? • How do I know if the gas mask or respirator will fit? • What type of training do I need? • Are there any special maintenance or storage conditions? • Will I be able to talk while wearing the respirator? • Does the hood restrict vision or head movement in any way? • Can I carry the device in the trunk of my automobile? • Is a training respirator available? Additional Information For more information on OSHA’s rules and requirements related to respiratory protection, visit OSHA’s website at www.osha.gov/SLTC/respiratoryprotection/index.html. This is one in a series of informational fact sheets highlighting OSHA programs, policies or standards. It does not impose any new compliance requirements. For a comprehensive list of compliance requirements of OSHA standards or regulation, refer to Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations. This information will be made available to sensory-impaired individuals upon request. The voice phone is (202) 693-1999; teletypewriter (TTY) number: (877) 889-5627. For more complete information: OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration U.S. Department of Labor www.osha.gov (800) 321-OSHA

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Footwear Employees who face possible foot or leg injuries from falling or rolling objects or from crushing or penetrating materials should wear protective footwear. Also, employees whose work involves exposure to hot substances or corrosive or poisonous materials must have protective gear to cover exposed body parts, including legs and feet. If an employee’s feet may be exposed to electrical hazards, non-conductive footwear should be worn. On the other hand, workplace exposure to static electricity may necessitate the use of conductive footwear. An interactive or media element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: Foot Protection Examples of situations in which an employee should wear foot and/or leg protection include: • When heavy objects such as barrels or tools might roll onto or fall on the employee’s feet; • Working with sharp objects such as nails or spikes that could pierce the soles or uppers of ordinary shoes; • Exposure to molten metal that might splash on feet or legs; • Working on or around hot, wet or slippery surfaces; and • Working when electrical hazards are present. Safety footwear must meet ANSI minimum compression and impact performance standards in ANSI Z41-1991 (American National Standard for Personal Protection-Protective Footwear) or provide equivalent protection. Footwear purchased before July 5, 1994, must meet or provide equivalent protection to the earlier ANSI Standard (ANSI Z41.1-1967). All ANSI approved footwear has a protective toe and offers impact and compression protection. But the type and amount of protection is not always the same. Different footwear protects in different ways. Check the product’s labeling or consult the manufacturer to make sure the footwear will protect the user from the hazards they face. Foot and leg protection choices include the following: • Leggings protect the lower legs and feet from heat hazards such as molten metal or welding sparks. Safety snaps allow leggings to be removed quickly. • Metatarsal guards protect the instep area from impact and compression. Made of aluminum, steel, fiber or plastic, these guards may be strapped to the outside of shoes. • Toe guards fit over the toes of regular shoes to protect the toes from impact and compression hazards. They may be made of steel, aluminum or plastic. • Combination foot and shin guards protect the lower legs and feet, and may be used in combination with toe guards when greater protection is needed. • Safety shoes have impact-resistant toes and heat-resistant soles that protect the feet against hot work surfaces common in roofing, paving and hot metal industries. The metal insoles of some safety shoes protect against puncture wounds. Safety shoes may also be designed to be electrically conductive to prevent the buildup of static electricity in areas with the potential for explosive atmospheres or nonconductive to protect employees from workplace electrical hazards. Special Purpose Shoes Electrically conductive shoes provide protection against the buildup of static electricity. Employees working in explosive and hazardous locations such as explosives manufacturing facilities or grain elevators must wear conductive shoes to reduce the risk of static electricity buildup on the body that could produce a spark and cause an explosion or fire. Foot powder should not be used in conjunction with protective conductive footwear because it provides insulation, reducing the conductive ability of the shoes. Silk, wool and nylon socks can produce static electricity and should not be worn with conductive footwear. Conductive shoes must be removed when the task requiring their use is completed. Note: Employees exposed to electrical hazards must never wear conductive shoes. Electrical hazard, safety-toe shoes are nonconductive and will prevent the wearers’ feet from completing an electrical circuit to the ground. These shoes can protect against open circuits of up to 600 volts in dry conditions and should be used in conjunction with other insulating equipment and additional precautions to reduce the risk of an employee becoming a path for hazardous electrical energy. The insulating protection of electrical hazard, safety-toe shoes may be compromised if the shoes become wet, the soles are worn through, metal particles become embedded in the sole or heel, or employees touch conductive, grounded items. Note: Nonconductive footwear must not be used in explosive or hazardous locations. Care of Protective Footwear As with all protective equipment, safety footwear should be inspected prior to each use. Shoes and leggings should be checked for wear and tear at reasonable intervals. This includes looking for cracks or holes, separation of materials, broken buckles or laces. The soles of shoes should be checked for pieces of metal or other embedded items that could present electrical or tripping hazards. Employees should follow the manufacturers’ recommendations for cleaning and maintenance of protective footwear. 3.B: PPE Exercise - PPE and Health Hazards Research Assignment The following activity is intended as a research assignment.  Students are required to either print the assignment and hand in or answer the questions as part of a online Learning Management System (LMS) activity.  Some directions apply to handwritten responses.  If a screen reader is used for accessibility this assignment is duplicated in the LMS. Part 1 Answer the following questions from: 29 CFR 1926 Subpart E - "Personal Protective Equipment and Life Saving Equipment' (Use the CFR 1926 book Subpart E to answer questions 1-8) 1. What section addresses "Occupational foot protection?"___________ 2. What section addresses "Eye and face protection?"____________ 3. What section addresses "Safety belts, lifelines, and lanyards?"_____________ List the CFR section number that is being violated in each of the following: 4. Using cotton balls for hearing protection.______________ 5. Using a safety belt lanyard made of 1/2" nylon with a length that allows a fall of no more than 6 feet and has a nominal breaking strength of 3400 pounds.______________ Circle True or False: 6. Where employees provide their own protective equipment, the employee shall be responsible to assure its adequacy, including proper maintenance, and sanitation of such equipment. a. True b. False 7. According to table E-l, a number 3 type eye protection device is one of the recommended protectors for protection against flying metal chips from machining operations. a. True b. False 8. Helmets for the head protection of employees exposed to high voltage electrical shock and burns shall meet the specifications contained in American National Standards Institute, Z87.1-1968. a. True b. False Part 2 Answer questions 9-23 from: OSHA 3151-12R 2003 - "Personal Protective Equipment" (Using a computer, this document can be found at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3151.pdf ) 1. In general, employers are responsible for performing a"______" " _____ " of the workplace to identify and control physical and health hazards. List the ANSI document numbers for the following PPE: 2. Eye and Face Protection:______________ 3. Head Protection:______________ 4. Foot Protection:______________ Training Employees in the Proper Use of PPE - Employers are required to train each employee who must use PPE. Employees must be trained to know at least the following: 13._________________ 14._________________ 15._________________ 16._________________ 17._________________ 18. According to Table 2, if you are performing shielded arc-welding using 1/4" diameter electrodes, you should have eye protection on with a shade number rating of ________. 19. Hard hats are divided into_____industrial classes. Class _____hard hats provide lightweight comfort and impact protection but offer no protection from electrical hazards. Name three factors that may influence the selection of protective gloves needed for a workplace hazard: 20. _______________ 21. _______________ 22. _______________ 23. If a noise level reaches 115 dB hearing protection is required if the anticipated exposure exceeds______minutes.

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Thumbnail: Samson and Goliath Cranes, en.Wikipedia.com CC BY 04: Materials Handling Reflection-How do you handle materials? What is your experience with manual material handling? What training or guidance has your employer provided if any? Search on methods for correct lifting techniques for manual material handling and compare to your training. Share similarities and differences. Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Standard Mapping-Hierarchy of Controls Engineering and Work Practice Controls for Rigging Safety Standards to reference, but there may be others! Definition: Rigging is the proper and safe securing of loads for handling, movement, by material handling equipment such as cranes and hoists. Activity: Understanding the difference! Cite rigging regulations that prevent or mitigate the lifting hazards below and identify them as elimination, substitution, engineering or work practice controls: Lifting Hazards • Unsecure Loads • Damaged equipment • Heavy Loads • Abnormal or heavy wear of slings • Irregular shaped loads • Ground activity • Unqualified riggers Case Study In your discussion group, identify all forklift operator errors that contributed to the worker fatality in the case below. What and where were the potential struck by and caught in hazards? Recognizing hindsight is 20/20, what procedural failures do you recognize from the seven common accident causes list in chapter 1? Provide one recommendation that could prevent a similar incident. Warehouse Checker Crushed Under a 4,000 Pound Crate Falling From a Forklift Truck New Jersey FACE 96-NJ-062 On April 26, 1996, a 25-year-old warehouse checker was critically injured after being crushed under a crate falling from a forklift truck. The incident occurred in a large warehouse as the victim was assisting a forklift operator in loading a 3,900 pound crate of plate glass onto a trailer. The crate, which measured 84 inches long by 71 inches high by 16 inches wide, was loosely set on the forks and leaning against the mast of the forklift. The victim stood to the side of the crate as the forklift drove towards the trailer and then stepped in front of the crate as it entered the truck. When the forklift passed over the docking plate, the unsecured crate was jostled and fell onto the victim. The victim was severely injured and died the next day. Investigation Details The incident occurred on Friday, April 26 in the export section of the warehouse. At about 4:30 p.m., a forklift operator was instructed by his foreman to load a trailer that was parked at the loading dock. As with all the forklift operators at the facility, the operator was a trained and certified driver who was assigned the same machine each day. He drove his 8,800 pound sit-down rider forklift (lifting capacity 5,000 pounds) to a large crate of plate glass that was leaning against a pole in the warehouse. The crate was unusually heavy for its size, weighing about 3,900 pounds and measuring 84 inches long by 71 inches high by 16 inches wide. The operator positioned his forklift under the crate (which was built to be moved on its narrow side) and moved it to the staging area. The forklift operator then packed foam around the crate to cushion it during shipping and raised the crate back up on the forks. Although the crate was leaning against the mast of the lift, it was unstable and moved back and forth slightly. At this time the forklift operator saw the victim walking by and asked for his help. The victim had arrived for work at 5:00 p.m., coming in early so he could work some overtime before his usual shift started at seven. He had not yet been assigned to checking when the forklift operator asked him to help stabilize the crate on the lift. With the victim walking on the left side of the lift, the crate was moved to within 30 feet of the loading dock. The operator continued to move the lift very slowly until he was about 15 feet from the trailer, at which time the victim moved in front of the forklift. They continued until they were about five feet from the trailer when the forklift operator stopped the lift. He could not see the victim and asked if he was OK, to which he replied that he was “good, come on.” The operator again started to move the lift slowly towards a portable docking plate that bridged the gap between the dock and trailer. The forklift operator did not see the victim as the lift went down the dip created by the docking plate. This dip was enough to destabilize the crate, which fell forward off the lift and onto the victim. The operator immediately yelled for help and was assisted by several other employees who unsuccessfully tried to lift the crate off of the victim’s chest. They quickly moved a forklift into place and raised a corner of the crate, creating enough room to pull out the victim. At this time the victim was alert and was heard joking with the rescuers. The police and EMS arrived and transported the victim to the local trauma center where he was admitted to the intensive care unit with severe crushing injuries. He died of his injuries the next day at 6:23 p.m., almost 24 hours after the incident. The victim was a 25-year-old male warehouse checker who had worked for the company for five years. He was hired as a “legman”, a laborer who unloaded shipping containers. He was promoted to forklift operator after passing the certification program. He was later promoted to checker and was responsible for verifying the condition and contents of the shipping containers. It was noted that the victim had been trained and retrained on forklift operations on three separate occasions. Reflection Aerial Lifts vs Personnel Lifts? Conduct a search on Aerial Lift, Personnel Hoist, Personnel Lift. Describe what you find either by copy and paste of pictures or written descriptions of equipment. What are your observations? Why do you believe they (Aerial Lifts) are associated with cranes? Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case Study In your discussion group, identify the crane operator errors and the rigger/rigging errors. Which competent person do you believe was most at fault or bore the most responsibility? Why? Which type of hazard resulted in the worker death, "struck by" or "caught in between/crushed by? In your opinion, what other contributing causes or safety issues are revealed in the summary? Commercial Roofer Died When Struck by a Falling Load of Palletized Roofing Material Michigan Case Report: 09MI049 Summary In the summer of 2009, a 48-year-old male commercial roofer, working on a roof, died when a load of shrink-wrapped roofing material, weighing approximately 1,900 pounds fell 20-30 feet from a 40-inch by 50-inch wooden pallet being transported overhead by a tower crane. The decedent’s supervisor, who was the roof man (signal person) for the lift, was working in another area of the roof clearing space for the pallet of rolled roofing material to be placed. The rigger placed a ratchet strap around the roofing bundle, and then “basket-rigged” the wooden pallet with two slings, both of which were 28-foot long, 2-inch wide polyester slings. The slings were connected to a ½-inch by 19-foot 2-inch leg spreader equipped with 10-inch hooks and a master ring that was connected to the crane’s hook. The slings were placed through the fork lift sleeves of the pallet. The rolls of roofing material were not secured to the pallet. The rigger indicated the load was ready to be hoisted to the roof. As the rigger observed the load being raised, he did not note any load instability or imbalance. The crane operator lifted the load approximately 20-30 feet above roof level, and then began to transport the load to the placement area. This involved swinging the load over the area where the decedent and his coworkers had been assigned to work by the supervisor. The crane operator noticed the roofing rolls were beginning to fall from the pallet. The crane operator yelled out a warning to the workers. The rolls of roofing material fell from the pallet and struck the decedent. The coworkers called for emergency response, unhooked the ratchet strap, and removed the roofing materials from the decedent. Emergency response provided care, and the decedent was transported to a local hospital where he was declared dead.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/04%3A_Materials_Handling/4.01%3A_Activities_Chapter_6_and_12-Materials_Handling.txt

IT’S YOUR TURN CHAPTER 16- ACTIVITIES/WORKBOOK Thumbnail: Image attribution Pixabay.com-bridgesward 05: Construction Safety Reflection: What tools and equipment do you use to do your work? Were you trained on it's correct use? What type of physical hazard is present when using the tool or equipment? How do you manage or control the hazard? Consider guidance referenced in Tool and Shop Safety. Flash Cards: Definitions and Key Terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Standard Mapping-Applying hierarchy of controls to tool and equipment standards in operating instructions and procedures Standard Sections of interest Review link to power tools and their associated specifications and if there is a link/pdf to operating instructions that as well. Look at clues from the specifications to determine what standards might be applicable regarding safe operation of the tools below and: • List(code and what it says) them along with the potential hazard the regulation would address. • Also note if you believe it is an engineering control or a work practice control. See Hierarchy of Controls. • What PPE is most likely required? Case Study-Fatality The case below addresses a concern with the increased usage of rental equipment by individuals who have not had formal training on the proper and safe use of the equipment. In your discussion groups, identify the safety and health program failures that led to the worker fatality. This incident occurred at a private residence. How might the worksite have contributed to incident? How did the employer business practice contribute the fatality? A Laborer Dies When He is Pulled into a Tree Stump Grinder Case Report: 18CA002 SUMMARY A laborer working for a landscaping company died when he was pulled into a tree stump grinder. The victim was helping the landscaping company owner (stump grinder operator) guide the machine by pulling on a rope tied around his waist and attached to the stump grinder. The rope caught in the stump grinder’s grinding wheel and pulled the victim into its rotating motion. Investigation On April 9, 2018, at approximately 11:30 a.m., a 66-year-old Hispanic male laborer suffered fatal injuries while assisting a landscaping company owner who was operating a stump grinder. The employer of the victim was a family-owned and operated landscaping company that has been in business for over 20 years. According to the owner, he was the sole employee of the business. The employer occasionally hired the victim to help him with landscaping jobs. The employer spoke Spanish as his primary language, but also spoke and understood English. The victim was was a relative of the owner and had been working sporadically with him for about six months The landscaping company did not have a written safety or Injury and Illness Prevention Program (IIPP) or any other safety documentation required by law. Neither the owner nor the victim had received formal training on the operation of stump grinders. Previously, they were provided with brief general instructions about stump grinder operation from the tool rental companies, but no specific instructions were given in this incident. The company owner was not trained in first aid or CPR. The incident scene was a private residence located on a short cul-de-sac street. The residence was a two-story home with an attached garage. The tree involved in this incident was an approximately 50-foot sycamore in the front yard of the residence. Sycamore trees can grow to a height of 40 to 100 feet with a spread of 40 to 70 feet at maturity. Sycamores are often divided near the ground into a massive trunk with an aggressive root system that can be difficult to remove. On the day of the incident, the owner and the victim attached a rope to an eye hook on the disc guard of the stump grinder (Exhibit 2) to help lower the machine below ground level to grind the stump and roots. The rope was not removed from the machine. The victim tied the rope around his waist, then pulled and leaned backward to help maneuver the grinding wheel while the owner was operating the stump grinder. A neighbor from across the street stated the victim was standing near the edge of the stump cavity. As the grinder was operating, the rope likely became slack and then caught around the grinding wheel, pulling the victim headfirst into the rotating disc. Stump Grinder A stump grinder is a power tool that removes tree stumps by means of a rotating grinding wheel with carbon steel teeth that chips away the wood. Stump grinders can be the size of a lawn mower or as large as a truck. Most accomplish their task by means of a high-speed disk cutter wheel with fixed carbon steel teeth that grinds the stump and roots into small chips. The grinding wheel movements are controlled by hydraulic cylinders that push the wheel laterally, and up and down, through the stump. Stump grinding is generally performed by a trained arborist or landscaper, but the machine may be rented by anyone from tool rental companies. The manufacturer’s instruction manual warns against allowing additional workers within 75 feet while grinding. There are various types of stump grinders, some of which are larger and could have better reached the stump and roots involved in this incident. If a stump grinder needs to be used to reach the roots below ground, a thorough job assessment should be performed to determine the proper machine that can reach the roots from above. Mini-Lecture Tool and Equipment Safety Reflection: What are the physics of electricity and electrical circuit parameters? Which parameters are the primary focus of electrical safeguarding? Take a look at the label on the power supply for your laptop or other electronic device and list all safety certifications/symbols. Choose one of the OSHA Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs)and provide details on its likely purpose for the device. Flash Cards: Definitions and Key Terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Standard Mapping-Applying hierarchy of controls to electrical equipment and procedures Portable fuel powered electric generators are increasingly used as back up power in homes and in commercial applications. However this equipment is also used on construction worksites by general and subcontractors. In this activity you will map construction safety standards to specific safety warnings and procedures for a portable generator. Choose 10 items from page 3 ( Important Safety Instructions) of the Ryobi Generator Safety Instructions and 10 items from page 4 (Specific Safety Rules) that map to the standards below and choose the standard section i.e. 1926.404 Wiring Design and Protection that the warning/procedure/rule is most likely associated with: Table 1 Standard Subpart Safety Procedure (pg 3)-Standard Section Safety Rule(pg 4)-Standard Section Example-1926 Subpart C-General Safety Wipe spilled fuel from the unit-1926.24 Save these instructions-1926.20 Section 5(a)(1)-General Duty 1926 Subpart C-General Safety and Health 1926 Subpart D-Occupational Health 1926 Subpart E-Personal Protective Equipment 1926 Subpart F-Fire Protection and Prevention 1926 Subpart G-Signs, Signals, Barricades 1926 Subpart H-Materials Handling 1926 Subpart I-Tools-Hand and Power 1926 Subpart K-Electrical 1926 Subpart AA-Confined Spaces in Construction Case study-fatality Discuss in your group the specifics of the case below. Find three 29CFR1926 Subpart K standards not followed that appear to have contributed to this incident. Where on the hierarchy of controls are those standards? Discuss and debate how you would classify skills and training for electricians on the hierarchy of controls. City Electric Maintenance Worker Electrocuted While Installing Lines for Security Cameras – Ohio NIOSH FACE Report 2019-01 July 29, 2021 SUMMARY On June 17, 2019, a 48-year-old city electric maintenance worker was electrocuted, while installing lines for security cameras along a residential area cul-de-sac. The electric maintenance worker arrived at the city workshop at 7 am and was instructed to install approximately 2,000 feet of triplex service wire on the light poles along a residential street for police surveillance cameras. The electric maintenance worker arrived at the work site at 10:24 am, with 2,000 feet of triplex service wire on a roll and placed the boom truck under light pole #1. He proceeded to install the triplex service wire on the first light pole connecting to light pole #2. According to a GPS tracker in the elevated bucket truck, the electric maintenance worker turned the elevated bucket truck around and drove up the street to position the truck in front of a newly placed camera pole. The 1,300 volt electric power lines running to the housing development were adjacent to the newly placed camera pole and beyond these lines were 3-phase 7,200 volt power lines. The electric maintenance worker got in the basket and raised it to approximately 28 feet. He began pulling some triplex service wire and installing it on the security pole. It is believed the worker did not realize his proximity to the power lines while performing this task and contacted his right shoulder with the energized power line. At 1:32 pm 911 was contacted because a residential home had experienced flickering lights and heard a loud noise. At the scene, the responders from the fire department found a truck with a raised basket in the air and a hard hat on the street. Once the fire department ladder truck was raised above the basket, the responders saw the electric maintenance worker laying on the floor of the basket. There was indication that a power line had arced, burnt through, and landed on the ground. The electric maintenance worker had signs of electrical burns on his right shoulder, hand, and clothing. He was pronounced dead on the scene at 2:28 pm. Mini-Lecture-Electrical Safety Reflection: Scaffold vs Ladder Create a list of activities or tasks that would require a ladder and scaffold, identify hazards and hazard categories associated with both types of safety equipment. Which piece of equipment requires more mental focus and effort during its use, in your opinion? Which leaves a worker more susceptible to mental and physical fatigue? Flash Cards: Definitions and Key Terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case study- Scaffold fatality In your groups discuss the specifics of the case below. Identify the safety and health program failures. What specific scaffold safety standards were not followed? How are the social justice concerns discussed in Chapter 0 relevant to the incident below? What cultural issues may have played a part in the worker's death. Lastly, in many local, county, and state jurisdictions anyone performing construction type contract labor must be licensed to do so. How may a contractor license contribute to safer working conditions. SUMMARY California FACE Report #11CA002 A day laborer fell approximately 12 feet off a scaffold at a private residence. The victim was applying a stone and stucco façade to the exterior of the home when the incident occurred. The victim was hired by the homeowner’s gardener from a street corner to perform the work. The victim rented, assembled, and was working from the scaffold when the incident occurred. The scaffold was erected without guardrails and the walk board was not secured. The victim was not wearing any type of fall protection. Investigation On Wednesday, January 12, 2011, at approximately 3:00 p.m., a 40-year-old Hispanic day laborer who worked as a construction worker died when he fell from a scaffold approximately 12 feet to the ground below. He was born in Mexico and completed nine years of education. The victim spoke only Spanish. The gardener who hired him also spoke Spanish, but the homeowner did not. The victim had worked in the Los Angeles area for the past five years. There was no documentation available to determine the victim’s experience or training in masonry. There was also no documentation available to determine the victim’s qualifications, training, or experience working with scaffolds. The site of the incident was a private residence. The home owner had asked his gardener if he knew anyone who could reface the exterior of his home with a stone and stucco facade. The gardener hired the victim from a street corner to perform the work. The victim rented a scaffold from a local home improvement store and used it to access the exterior of the house. The victim rented five-foot scaffold frame sections, diagonal braces (two for each section), a walk board, and a side and end panel that were to be used as guard rails on the top section of the scaffold. The victim erected the scaffold but it was leveled using improper methods. The walk board was not properly secured, and the guard rails on the top portion were not attached. He then used the scaffold to gain access to the upper portions of the home’s exterior wall. The victim was working alone off the scaffold walk board, approximately 12 feet above ground level and was not wearing any fall protection devices. The victim worked for two days performing the job. On the third day, he continued applying the stucco and stone façade. At one point, the victim reached for a cell phone that was being handed to him by the homeowner’s gardener. The walk board shifted and he fell off the scaffold to the ground below. Mini-Lecture-Scaffold Safety Reflection: Have you slipped, tripped or fallen lately? Analyze your last misstep, slip, trip or outright fall. What were the surface conditions? What shoes were you wearing? What were you thinking about right before? Which condition or cause was most responsible for the misstep? How could it have been prevented? Flash Cards-Definitions and Key Terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case study- FAT/CAT Fall scenario development Choose a fall fatality from the FAT/CAT. Create a plausible pre-fall scenario, precursor to the fall that may have realistically contributed to the fatality. What type of fall prevention methods would have prevented the death. Mini-Lecture-Fall Hazards, Fall Protection Reflection Aerial Lifts vs Personnel Lifts? Conduct a search on Aerial Lift, Personnel Hoist, Personnel Lift. Describe what you find either by copy and paste of pictures or written descriptions of equipment. What are your observations? Why might they be associated with cranes? Flash Cards-Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case Study-Fatality In your discussion group, identify the crane operator errors and the rigger/rigging errors. Which competent person do you believe was most at fault or bore the most responsibility? Which type of hazard resulted in the worker death, "struck by" or "caught in between/crushed by? In your opinion, what other issues are revealed in the summary? Commercial Roofer Died When Struck by a Falling Load of Palletized Roofing Material Michigan Case Report: 09MI049 Summary In the summer of 2009, a 48-year-old male commercial roofer, working on a roof, died when a load of shrink-wrapped roofing material, weighing approximately 1,900 pounds fell 20-30 feet from a 40-inch by 50-inch wooden pallet being transported overhead by a tower crane. The decedent’s supervisor, who was the roof man (signal person) for the lift, was working in another area of the roof clearing space for the pallet of rolled roofing material to be placed. The rigger placed a ratchet strap around the roofing bundle, and then “basket-rigged” the wooden pallet with two slings, both of which were 28-foot long, 2-inch wide polyester slings. The slings were connected to a ½-inch by 19-foot 2-inch leg spreader equipped with 10-inch hooks and a master ring that was connected to the crane’s hook. The slings were placed through the fork lift sleeves of the pallet. The rolls of roofing material were not secured to the pallet. The rigger indicated the load was ready to be hoisted to the roof. As the rigger observed the load being raised, he did not note any load instability or imbalance. The crane operator lifted the load approximately 20-30 feet above roof level, and then began to transport the load to the placement area. This involved swinging the load over the area where the decedent and his coworkers had been assigned to work by the supervisor. The crane operator noticed the roofing rolls were beginning to fall from the pallet. The crane operator yelled out a warning to the workers. The rolls of roofing material fell from the pallet and struck the decedent. The coworkers called for emergency response, unhooked the ratchet strap, and removed the roofing materials from the decedent. Emergency response provided care, and the decedent was transported to a local hospital where he was declared dead. Mini-Lecture Crane Safety Reflection: How is your driving record in construction road work zones? Approximately 609 workers in road work zones were killed between 2011-2015. Share your observations and personal experiences from traveling through road work zones. How aware do you feel workers in those zones are of their surroundings? Flash Cards: Definitions and key terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Video Traffic Control Traffic Control Safety Transcript Utililty Safety in Workzones Transcript Traffic Control Devices Transcript Case study-Traffic Control The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) is incorporated by reference in the OSHA standards. In your discussion groups, identify any deficiencies you see in the control of the work zone where the fatality occurred. How could the flagger have been better protected? Flagger Dies after being Struck by a Pickup Truck in a Highway Work Zone New York Case Report 04NY012 Summary On February 20th, 2004 a 47 year-old male flagger, who was employed by a temporary employment service agency, was struck by a pickup truck driven by a traveling motorist in a highway work zone. At the time of the incident, the victim and another flagger were directing traffic on a state highway for a tree service crew that was trimming branches to clear the power lines that belonged to a local utility company. On the morning of the incident, the crew had closed two lanes of a three-lane highway and had left only one southbound driving lane open to all traffic, both northbound and southbound. Warning signs were placed ahead of the work zone at each end. The victim, who wore a reflective vest and a hard hat, was directing the southbound traffic with a “Stop/Slow” sign at the north end of the work zone. At approximately 9:05 a.m., a black pickup truck suddenly pulled out of the southbound traffic into the passing lane and accelerated to approximately 60 miles per hour (mph) into the work zone. The victim was struck by the vehicle and thrown in the air by the impact. He landed on the northbound shoulder approximately 30 feet from the collision point. The emergency squad and the New York State Police (NYSP) arrived at the incident site within minutes. The victim was transported by helicopter to a hospital trauma center where he died thirteen days after the incident from the injuries sustained in the collision. The driver of the pickup truck was arrested for multiple traffic violations. The victim completed a flagger training course provided by the National Safety Council through the temporary employment service agency and became a certified flagger in January of 2004. According to the employment agency representative, the agency discussed general flagging safety with the flaggers, while worksite host employers at each specific site were responsible for site-specific safety. The employment agency issued the following personal protective equipment to the flaggers: ANSI certified reflective vests and hard hats. Details of Investigation The incident occurred on a major state highway that runs south to north from New York City to the New York State border with Canada. A local utility company contracted a tree service firm to trim branches and cut brush along the power lines adjacent to the highway. Two flaggers were hired from a temporary employment agency to direct traffic at the work site. The section where the tree trimming was taking place was a three-lane highway with one northbound and two southbound lanes. A double yellow line demarcated the northbound and southbound lanes. There was a solid white line on both sides of the highway and a dashed white line delineating the two southbound lanes. The roadway curved toward the east at both ends of the work zone. The speed limit in the area of the incident was 50 mph. At the time of the incident, the victim was standing at the north end of the work zone in the closed southbound passing lane behind a line of traffic cones. He was directing the flow of the southbound traffic with a “Stop/Slow” sign. The victim communicated visually with the other flagger at the south end of the work zone. At approximately 9:05 a.m., the southbound traffic was slowly approaching the work zone. According to the traveling motorists who witnessed the incident, a black Ford F350 Super Duty Pickup truck suddenly pulled out of the traffic into the closed passing lane. The vehicle passed several vehicles that had slowed down in the open driving lane, and accelerated into the work zone. The victim ran towards the northbound lane to avoid the rapidly approaching vehicle. According to the NYSP collision reconstruction report, the pickup truck began braking at this point and then swerved into the northbound lane and struck the victim. The victim was thrown in the air by the impact and landed on the northbound shoulder approximately 30 feet from the collision point. The victim was taken to a hospital trauma center where he died on March 4th from the injuries sustained in the collision. Mini-Lecture-Signs, Signals, Barricades Reflection:Excavation Hazards All construction focus 4 hazards are present when excavation activities are underway. Choose one of the top five excavation hazards (cave-ins, water accumulation, underground utilities, falls, heavy equipment operations) and propose a focus 4 (falls, electrocution, struck by, caught in between/crushed by) safety protocol for addressing that hazard during excavation work. Flash Cards: Definitions and key terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case study- Excavation fatalities Activity Reference the handout for the case studies 13, 22, 31, 61 and cite 3 relevant regulations from the excavation standards that should have been followed in order to prevent the accidental death or injury in the case. Cite 2 other standards from another construction safety subpart that would have also been a factor in preventing the fatality. Mini-Lecture-Excavations Reflection: Ladder setup? Have you ever setup and used a A-frame ladder or extension ladder? What was the reason? Recognizing that ladders are safety equipment and either used for access to higher level only, or access to higher level to perform a task, if you were to access the ladder to perform a task, what might that be? How does the requirement to maintain 3 points of contact and staying centered on the ladder impact your ability to do the task? Flash Cards: Definitions and key terms This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case study- Ladder Inspection After watching the following Video-Ladder Safety 101, use the Cal/OSHA Ladder inspection guidelines to inspect a personal ladder or employer's ladder. Compare your inspection results with your discussion group members. What did you learn in performing the inspection? Identify two inspection requirements that are engineering controls and two that would be categorized as a work practice control. Ladder Safety 101 Transcript Cal/OSHA Ladder Inspection Guidance Mini-Lecture-Ladder Safety

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/05%3A_Construction_Safety/5.01%3A_Activities_Chapters_7_9_10_11_12_13_14_16-Construction_Safety.txt

Ladder Safety Falls from portable ladders (step, straight, combination and extension) are one of the leading causes of occupational fatalities and injuries. According to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) ladder safety guidelines, following these safety rules can keep you from becoming a statistic: • Read and follow all labels/markings on the ladder. • Avoid electrical hazards! – Look for overhead power lines before handling a ladder. Avoid using a metal ladder near power lines or exposed energized electrical equipment. • Always inspect the ladder prior to using it. If the ladder is damaged, it must be removed from service and tagged until repaired or discarded. • Always maintain a 3-point (two hands and a foot, or two feet and a hand) contact on the ladder when climbing. Keep your body near the middle of the step and always face the ladder while climbing (see diagram below). • Only use ladders and appropriate accessories (ladder levelers, jacks or hooks) for their designed purposes. • Ladders must be free of any slippery material on the rungs, steps or feet. • Do not use a self-supporting ladder (e.g., step ladder) as a single ladder or in a partially closed position. • Do not use the top step/rung of a ladder as a step/rung unless it was designed for that purpose. • Use a ladder only on a stable and level surface, unless it has been secured (top or bottom) to prevent displacement. • Do not place a ladder on boxes, barrels or other unstable bases to obtain additional height. • Do not move or shift a ladder while a person or equipment is on the ladder. • An extension or straight ladder used to access an elevated surface must extend at least 3 feet above the point of support (see diagram below). Do not stand on the three top rungs of a straight, single or extension ladder. • The proper angle for setting up a ladder is to place its base a quarter of the working length of the ladder from the wall or other vertical surface (see diagram below). • A ladder placed in any location where it can be displaced by other work activities must be secured to prevent displacement or a barricade must be erected to keep traffic away from the ladder. • Be sure that all locks on an extension ladder are properly engaged. • Do not exceed the maximum load rating of a ladder. Be aware of the ladder’s load rating and of the weight it is supporting, including the weight of any tools or equipment. Safety Harness Individuals performing tasks at elevations of six (6) feet or higher should be protected by and specifically trained in the use of an appropriate fall arrest system. Employers are responsible to ensure training for employees that are required by OSHA regulations to use these lifesaving systems. For detailed fall protection requirements and safety guidelines, refer to the OSHA Technical Manual, Section V: Chapter 4 Fall Protection in Construction. An interactive or media element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: Ladder Safety and Fall Protection Transcript Transcript Transcript

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/05%3A_Construction_Safety/5.B%3A_Ladder_Safety_and_Fall_Protection.txt

Thumbnail: OSHA at 50 Logo, OSHA.gov 06: Managing Safety and Health Reflection: Cite safety and health programs at your place of employment. Give one example of a safety and health program from your place of employment. In your opinion, What's working? What’s missing or not working? Referencing slides 3 and 4 of the NWOW-Collaboration Lesson 1 and the video below, answer the following questions: 1. Have you ever had an experience similar to this? 2. Have you ever felt unsure of how to form a team or how you fit in with an existing team? 3. What is the difference between a team and a group? 4. What impact do you feel collaboration has on the effectiveness of the safety and health program you cited from your workplace? Watch Video Transcript Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Video – Association of General Contractors-COVID-19 response Watch the short video below and reference slides 5, 6, 7 of NWOW Collaboration Lesson 1. Considering Tuckman's model of team development(1965) which stage did the AGC of California excel based on what was shown in the video? Which of the 10 best practices for establishing an effective safety and health program would you cite as most responsible for their success in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and maintaining continuity of work for contractors? Watch Video Transcript Case study - evaluate existing standards using safety and health crosswalk Working in discussion groups, choose a safety program/standard identified in the Safety and Health Cross-Walk to Existing Standards with fewer than three associated best practices and brainstorm for one missing practice, potential improvements and new standards to fill the gap. Reference the hierarchy of controls as you consider the best practices. Once your effort is complete, Reference slide 8 of NWOW Collaboration Lesson 1 and answer the questions in bullets 2 and 3. Slide 8 is repeated below: • Think about a time when you worked in a team: It could be a project through school, in a work based learning experience like an internship, or at a previous job. • Consider, when you enter a new workplace the existing employees have to “re-form” to incorporate you into the team. How might the “storming” stage not reflect accurately a new worker experience? How might the “storming” stage promote a safer workplace? How might it do just the opposite? • Provide some examples of the different stages you experienced in becoming part of a team, either at work or in school. Choose the stage you believe most critical to a safe workplace. Why? Mini-Lecture-Safety and Health Programs Reflection: What does effective management look like to you? Speculate on what leadership element maybe missing with 2020 OSHA most frequently cited standards for Construction? Review the NWOW-Analysis-Solution Mindset Lesson 1 and Collaboration Lesson 2. Next view the following video clips and discuss the option you feel is the best example of re-framing a problem to get at a desired solution and answer the following question: 1. What leadership qualities are demonstrated within the peer to peer relationships? 2. Why is what is demonstrated relevant to worker safety. Video Problem Solving Transcript Video Collaboration Transcript Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Video - Motivational Leadership Denzel and putting first things first! Transcript Steve and Love Transcript Case study - Legal Cannabis How would you manage recreational use cannabis in the workplace or firearms for personal safety? Reflect on Managing Safety and Health Principles as you use hierarchy of controls to draft 10 policy statements. Next think deeply regarding the primary motivations driving the policy statements you drafted and share one guiding principle in the motivational videos above that gives you the confidence to manage difficult social issues in the workplace. Mini-Lecture-Safety Leadership Reflection: What is contained in your first aid kit? Review NWOW-Empathy Lesson 1 and Lesson 2 excerpts from the slides that follow the video. All of us at some point in our lives will suffer from an illness or injury, or accident. Many of us will have family or loved ones who will suffer from a work related disability. Increasingly many more of us will have a close acquaintance in the workplace who is experiencing some psycho-social trauma. If you are currently employed take a look at your employer first aid kit. What is in it? As you watch the following video reflect on your present or past employer's policies for rendering aid to a downed co-worker. What protocols have your employer communicated? Use the empathy assessment to score yourself on your empathy quotient. Why is having empathy critical for responding to a worker experiencing trauma from an accident or injury? Video-No mouth to mouth necessary Transcript Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Transcript Case study - Medical Hazmat HAZMAT is the acronym for hazardous materials. OSHA has standards that specifically address the preparation and training of those workers who are responsible for responding to HAZMAT spills, accidents, or as part of required clean up and disposal of hazardous materials where generated. In healthcare settings and for organizations that attend to scenes or environments where human remains and potentially infectious materials are present protocols similar to HAZWOPER must be followed. Review important excerpts below from slides in the NWOW Empathy Lesson 1 and Lesson 2, then watch the video below paying careful attention to what is said regarding coping with what is "seen" at a "scene". Complete the empathy assessment and watch the second video below. As a group discuss psycho-social hazards associated with medical hazmat and answer the following: 1. What is your take on how having empathy affects the worker and the work. 2. Are you a giver, taker, or matcher? What does it reveal about how you have operated in the workplace? 3. How can "takers" negatively affect safety in the workplace? 4. How does having empathy make you a safer worker? 5. How might having empathy affect your understanding of safety standards? 6. Which of the positive "giver" results from slide 6 excerpt below correlate to the core elements of an effective safety and health program? Video-Crime Scene Cleanup Transcript Video-What makes a Successful Giver in the Workplace Transcript Empathy Lesson 1 - Listening Primary Attributes (Traits) of Empathy Knows the difference between empathy (putting yourself in someone else’s shoes) versus sympathy (feeling sorry for/ understanding what someone is going through) and knows when to use one approach or the other Connects with others by being a good listener, asking questions to help understand what the other person is feeling, being honest, and mirroring positive nonverbal communication to build trust. Sympathy vs Empathy Sympathy is your ability to care about or be sorry about another person's state of being. It is a conceptual understanding of what someone else is going through. Empathy is your ability to truly understand and share the feelings of another person. It is a personalized understanding of what someone else is feeling. What is Empathy in the workplace? • Empathy is the ability to understand and feel what someone else is feeling, to walk in someone else’s shoes. • So, empathy in the workplace is important to understand coworkers’ and customers’ needs and to learn to fit in with the work culture.​ • Recent scientific research explains empathy. Video NOVA Mirror Neurons Transcript • Another aspect of empathy is the ability to listen attentively, which means:​ 1. You don’t interrupt in the middle of someone’s sentence, but instead let them finish a complete thought before commenting.​ 2. When you do comment, it is to ask clarifying questions to check for understanding, such as “It sounds like you think/feel that… Have I understood you correctly?”​ 3. At this point you can expand the conversation, but it is always with the intent of letting the other person convey a message to you, it is not for you to dominate the conversation.​ Empathy Lesson 2 - Give, Take, Match Primary Attributes of Empathy-Relationships Develops good relationships with people from different backgrounds and cultures by showing they are respected and valued When working with clients or customers, makes decisions based on client or customer needs and points of view, and asks how satisfied they are with the outcome Types of Interaction in the Workplace Takers Givers Matchers Take from others, often without reciprocating Empathetic & generous Try to go for an even Give and Take Look to advance their own interests/goals Givers are the worst performers & best performers If they ask for a favor, they plan to reciprocate Look for others to complete their tasks. Depends on how they manage their giving If you ask for a favor, you should plan to reciprocate Slide 6 The positive results of Givers include: • Increased profits for a business/organization • Innovation • Greater productivity, quality improvement • Efficiency in teams, more collaboration • Higher customer satisfaction ratings • Lower employee turnover rates Mini-Lecture-First Aid

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/06%3A_Managing_Safety_and_Health/6.01%3A_Activities_Chapters_202122-Managing_Safety_and_Health.txt

Thumbnail: Image courtesy Manfacturing Technolog, Norco College 07: Industrial Safety and Manufacturing Reflection: What tools and equipment do you use to do your work? What are the primary energy sources? Describe one safety protocol and the hazard it addresses. Flash Cards - Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Reflection:What tools, equipment, or machines have you operated that have guards? Describe the primary method for guarding, i.e physical, sensing, interlock? View the video below and complete the following : List the 5 Big Mistakes in Machine Guarding and refer to the seven common accident causes to associate one mistake with one cause. Share your thoughts on how the method of guarding impacts the potential for injury. Video-Big 5 Mistakes Transcript Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Video Lockout/Tagout Safety, machine guarding Name one big machine guarding mistake of the 5 shown in the video 5 big machine guarding mistakes that can be associated with not following lock out tag out procedures. Explain. Video-Panduit-LOTO Transcript Video-Big 5 Mistakes Transcript Video-Machine Guarding Transcript Video-Safe Work Manitoba Transcript Video-Laser Guarding No voice-No transcript Case study - fatality In your discussion groups view the amalgamation of video below and carefully note if the critical corrective actions are engineering or workplace controls. Discuss how electrical safety, LOTO, machine guarding, welding and confined spaces may often be considered together in a job hazard analysis. Osha Cases on Electrical Safety, LOTO, Machine Guarding, Welding, and Confined Spaces Video-Welder electrocuted Transcript Video-LOTO Transcript LOTO-Mechanical Systems Transcript Video-Machine Guarding Transcript Video-Confined Space Fire Transcript Transcript General Lab Safety Procedures CNC Machines Reflection: Recalling lab safety The following is an excerpt from Wikipedia: Numerical control (also computer numerical control, and commonly called CNC) is the automated control of machining tools (such as drills, lathes, mills and 3D printers) by means of a computer. A CNC machine processes a piece of material (metal, plastic, wood, ceramic, or composite) to meet specifications by following a coded programmed instruction and without a manual operator directly controlling the machining operation. Since any particular component might require the use of a number of different tools – drills, saws, etc. – modern machines often combine multiple tools into a single "cell". In other installations, a number of different machines are used with an external controller and human or robotic operators that move the component from machine to machine. View the series of videos on milling machines and identify three or more machine safety standards discussed in the safety protocols. How does understanding the safety standard help you understand machining or the process in general? Query \(1\) How to turn the machine on.wmv (1).mp4 Transcript Video - Safety for the Milling Machine Part 1 Query \(1\) Safety for the milling machine part 1 (1).mp4 Transcript Part 2 Query \(1\) Safety for the milling machine part 2 (1).mp4 Transcript Part 3 Query \(1\) Safety for the milling machine part 3 (1).mp4 Transcript Part 4 Query \(1\) Safety for the milling machine part 4 (1).mp4 Transcript Part 5 Query \(1\) Safety for the milling machine part 5 (1).mp4 Transcript Part 6 Query \(1\) Safety for the milling machine part 6 (1).mp4 Transcript Lab Safety Automation Reflection - Industrial Safety and Automation At the core of automation is programmable logic controls (PLCs) and smart logic (Robotics) machines designed to assist humans for efficient work. Most safety features are designed into the machines however those machines share working surfaces and spaces with people. Human-machine interface (HMI) has both ergonomic and physical safety components. View the video below on Amazon's Smart Warehouse and critique operations from your knowledge and understanding of Working and Walking Surfaces, and review of Machine and Robot Safety pages 8-11 (sections 2.1.1-2.1.5) What are good safety practices and what might be an accident waiting to happen? What safety standards seem to be in effect? Transcript Transcript Reflection: Can you identify a confined space? Review the examples of confined spaces and consider your present working environment. What similarities do you recognize? What are the physical conditions and what hazards might be present. Flash Cards: Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Video-WorkSafeBC Transcript Case study - Confined Space Fatality In the follow case study several contributing factors to the fatallity were identified and many recommendations to prevent future occurrences. 3 of 5 contributing factors are listed below. In your discussion groups review the specifics of the case, noting your observations and then craft your own recommendations, minimum 6. After you are firm in your recommendations, view the actual recommendations from the case and see how many you duplicated. • Work being performed inside of an energized machine that was not treated as a confined space • Lockout/tagout (LOTO) procedures were not applied • Failure to stop work despite an apparent machine malfunction. Maintenance Mechanic Crushed Working Inside of a Vertical Storage Machine, Oregon Oregon Case Report: 17OR022 Release Date: June 2019 Summary On July 12, 2017, a 49-year-old Certified Field Technician was killed after he climbed into a mechanical vertical storage unit to facilitate repairs. He had a new, inexperienced employee with him on the day of the incident; the Technician was training the new employee (Trainee) to perform routine preventive and/or scheduled maintenance (PM and/or SM). They completed one PM in the morning on a vertical storage machine. Work on a second machine was started after lunch at approximately 12:45 pm. A roller used to support a carrier tray fell out, and the Technician could not reinstall it from outside the machine. A carrier was removed to provide space for him to enter the unit. He climbed inside, to lie on a carrier below the removed one. As the trainee cycled the machine to put the Technician in a position to access and reinstall the roller, the machine malfunctioned. The Technician asked the trainee to make another input to the controls. The machine advanced the Technician over the top of the vertical storage unit, which had very limited space. This action crushed the Technician, leaving him on the sealed side, opposite the side where he started. Pry bars were used to extricate the Technician but resuscitation attempts failed. Background The two equipment technicians (one Certified, one a Trainee with no prior experience on this machine) arrived at the work site to perform preventive and/or scheduled maintenance (PM/SM) on two vertical storage units at a manufacturing facility. The units were owned by the host/contracting company and were used to maximize storage space while also enabling rapid retrieval of materials. In this type of machine, a series of numbered storage carriers are located on a vertical carousel, and a control panel is used to select the desired carrier number. The machine rotates in the most efficient direction and delivers the requested carrier to the opening. A light curtain is relied upon at the opening to stop operation if parts are sticking out, or if the operator breaks the opening space with any body parts. See the diagram on the next page for an example. The two workers had successfully performed a PM/SM on a different vertical storage unit that morning. That work was performed outside of the machine. After the lunch break, they went to the second unit, which was older than the first (built in 1998) but operated in a similar fashion and used for the same purpose. During maintenance, the experienced Certified Field Technician entered the machine by removing a carrier to make space for him to lie down on another carrier to investigate a “squeak.” The machine was energized, and the Trainee used the machine’s control panel to advance carrier numbers, thus moving the Technician inside of the machine. The Technician found excessive grease and was moved up and back to the opening twice without incident to clean the chain and related parts. Each time during this task the Trainee was able to move him up and back down by selecting the next carrier number; sequentially, and one at a time. This was done to ensure the machine moved as desired, and was thought to be the only way to ensure the employee did not move over the top or under the bottom of the unit to the other side. The potential for other types of movement in the machine with different control panel inputs was possible. The software used to rotate the carriers was designed to move to the selected one in the shortest distance to the opening. This typically doesn’t matter with storage material stored inside the carriers, but with the limited clearance and a worker inside of the machine, this feature was likely recognized as a critical hazard by the Certified Field Technician. In addition to the ability to move carriers with electrical power, the machine possessed a hand crank that could be used to rotate the carousel manually while the machine was de-energized. This alternative procedure would have allowed the unit to have been de-energized and LOTO procedures used. The employee could be moved as needed by the hand crank. Reflection: Critiquing your working surface Describe the type of surface you work on. What is the condition? Is it hard or soft surface? Indoors or outdoors? Elevated or below ground level. Which of the seven common accident causes is crucial for avoiding slips, trips, and falls on your working surface. Share the working and walking surfaces standard having the most impact at your place of employment or campus. Flash Cards - Key Terms and Definitions This interactive feature not available in print version of this workbook Case study - Slips, trips, falls A Stagehand Falls from the Ceiling of an Amphitheater-California FACE Report #12CA005 In your discussion groups review the fall fatality case above and identify as many of the seven common accident causes in the incident as you can. Be specific as you explain why.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/07%3A_Industrial_Safety_and_Manufacturing/7.02%3A_Activities_Chapters_7891718_and_19-Industrial_Safety-Manufacturing.txt

Tools are such a common part of our lives that it is difficult to remember that they may pose hazards. Tragically, a serious incident can occur before steps are taken to identify and avoid or eliminate tool-related hazards. Five basic safety rules can help prevent hazards associated with the use of hand and power tools: • Keep all tools in good condition with regular maintenance. • Use the right tool for the job. • Examine each tool for damage before use and do not use damaged tools. • Operate tools according to the manufacturers’ instructions. • Provide and properly use appropriate personal protective equipment. Tool Safety Video An interactive or media element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: See Tool shop safety video Hand Tool Safety Hand tools are tools that are powered manually and include anything from axes to wrenches. The greatest hazards posed by hand tools result from misuse and improper maintenance. Some examples include the following: • If a chisel is used as a screwdriver, the tip of the chisel may break and fly off, hitting the user or other employees. • If a wooden handle on a tool, such as a hammer or an axe, is loose, splintered, or cracked, the head of the tool may fly off and strike the user or other employees. • If the jaws of a wrench are sprung, the wrench might slip. • If impact tools such as chisels, wedges, or drift pins have mushroomed heads, the heads might shatter on impact, sending sharp fragments flying toward the user or other employees. Guidance on hand tool use: • Wear safety glasses when striking objects with tools or the potential for breakage, chips, dust or any other hazard exists. • Tap fasteners such as nails to start. • Remove free hand to avoid impact to hand and fingers before striking fastener with force. • Do not cut towards yourself with sharp tools. • Avoid storing sharp tools with sensitive tools and equipment. • Be cautious of wrenches and tools slipping from fasteners to avoid hand injuries and loss of balance. • Use insulated tools when working with energized circuits. • Do not operate power tools with cut or frayed power cords, or inoperable or missing safety guards or devices. • Never carry sharp tools in your pockets. Power Tool Safety Employees using electric tools must be aware of several dangers. Among the most serious hazards are electrical burns and shocks. Electrical shocks, which can lead to injuries such as heart failure and burns, are among the major hazards associated with electric-powered tools. Under certain conditions, even a small amount of electric current can result in fibrillation of the heart and death. An electric shock also can cause the user to fall off a ladder or other elevated work surface and be injured due to the fall. To protect the user from shock and burns, electric tools must have a three-wire cord with a ground and be plugged into a grounded receptacle, be double insulated, or be powered by a low-voltage isolation transformer. Three-wire cords contain two current-carrying conductors and a grounding conductor. Any time an adapter is used to accommodate a two-hole receptacle, the adapter wire must be attached to a known ground. The third prong must never be removed from the plug. Double-insulated tools are available that provide protection against electrical shock without third-wire grounding. On double-insulated tools, an internal layer of protective insulation completely isolates the external housing of the tool. The following general practices should be followed when using electric tools: • Wear appropriate eye and hearing protection. • Read manual and operate electric tools within their design limitations. • Ensure tool is in the off position prior to connecting to outlet. • Use gloves and appropriate safety footwear when using electric tools. • Always use a GFCI protected device for outside and damp location power tool use. • Do not use electric tools in damp or wet locations unless they are approved for that purpose. • Do not use portable power tools which have cords that are cut, frayed, or separated from the tool housing. Such cords should be repaired before continued use. • Keep work areas well lighted when operating electric tools. • Ensure that cords from electric tools do not present a tripping hazard. • Never place power cords over shoulders or around neck. • Secure long hair and loose clothing prior to power tool use. • Allow the tool to do the work. Never force or apply excessive pressure to the tool. • Maintain sure footing and well balanced stance. Additional practices for storage, transportation and maintenance: • Unplug or remove batteries from power tools before changing accessories. • Keep tools and equipment well maintained, i.e. blades sharp, cords well maintained, guards in good working order, etc. Store electric tools in a dry place when not in use. • Do not carry tools by the power cord. • Make sure that long extension cords are sufficiently large in size to carry the current (amps) necessary for the tools being used. Sufficiently large wire size in cords will help avoid large voltage drop and tool burn-out. An interactive or media element has been excluded from this version of the text. You can view it online here: See self check quiz Refer to Tool Choices and Application for safety related to specific hand and power tools.

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/07%3A_Industrial_Safety_and_Manufacturing/7.B%3A_Tool_and_Shop_Safety.txt

Hazards, Hazard Recognition, Hazard Categories Machine operations expose workers to both physical hazards and physiological (ergonomic hazards). Using the Safety Precautions for Milling Machines and after viewing the video below on ergonomic safety, identify precautions that may reduce risk for ergonomic injury. Are the precautions identified sufficient? Can you provide additional precautions? Video: Ergonomic Awareness-Dr. Ergo Transcript Performance Standards and Design Standards Some safety standards are performance driven in nature, meaning an action or activity is performed to achieve the safety objective or required protection. Other standards are design standards, meaning the safety function or requirement is assured by some design specification or feature in a system or equipment. Referencing the Safety Precautions for Milling Machines, distinguish 'performance' precautions and 'design' precautions. Standard Mapping Map the ten referenced standards for machine presses to a physical hazard and then categorize as either design or performance. Mechanical power press guarding and construction, general- 1910.217(b)(1) Hazards to personnel associated with broken or falling machine components. Machine components shall be designed, secured, or covered to minimize hazards caused by breakage, or loosening and falling or release of mechanical energy (i.e. broken springs). 1910.217(b)(4)(i) The pedal mechanism shall be protected to prevent unintended operation from falling or moving objects or by accidental stepping onto the pedal. 1910.217(b)(7)(v)(a) Each hand control shall be protected against unintended operation and arranged by design, construction, and/or separation so that the concurrent use of both hands is required to trip the press. 1910.217(b)(8)(i) A main power disconnect switch capable of being locked only in the Off position shall be provided with every power press control system. 1910.217(b)(11) Hydraulic equipment. The maximum anticipated working pressures in any hydraulic system on a mechanical power press shall not exceed the safe working pressure rating of any component used in that system. 1910.217(c)(3)(iv)(b) Attachments shall be adjusted to prevent the operator from reaching into the point of operation or to withdraw the operator's hands from the point of operation before the dies close. 1910.217(c)(4) Hand feeding tools. Hand feeding tools are intended for placing and removing materials in and from the press. Hand feeding tools are not a point of operation guard or protection device and shall not be used in lieu of the "guards" or devices required in this section. 1910.217(d)(1)(i) Use dies and operating methods designed to control or eliminate hazards to operating personnel, and 1910.217(d)(1)(ii) furnish and enforce the use of hand tools for freeing and removing stuck work or scrap pieces from the die, so that no employee need reach into the point of operation for such purposes. 1910.217(e)(1)(i)(A) Conduct periodic and regular inspections of each power press to ensure that all of its parts, auxiliary equipment, and safeguards, including the clutch/brake mechanism, anti-repeat feature, and single-stroke mechanism, are in a safe operating condition and adjustment; 1910.217(e)(1)(ii)(A) Inspect and test each press on a regular basis at least once a week to determine the condition of the clutch/brake mechanism, anti-repeat feature, and single-stroke mechanism Standard Mapping - Robotics Lab Safety There is no subpart in the OSHA safety standards that specifically calls out robotics or automation safety. However OSHA does provide guidance on Robotics Safety. Robots are machines that handle materials and manufacture parts and materials. Sections 2.1.1-2.1.5 of the FANUC Handling Tool Operations Manual are repeated below. Map each safety warning, procedure, or protocol to the standard most likely the bases for the direction. Keep in mind that OSHA's incorporation by reference of design standards and general duty clause taken together require employers to follow safety guidelines and protocols offered by the design standards and the manufacturer. For any general duty rule also add why you believe the precaution falls under general duty. A safe workcell is essential to protect people and equipment. Observe the following guidelines to ensure that the workcell is set up safely. These suggestions are intended to supplement and not replace existing federal, state, and local laws, regulations, and guidelines that pertain to safety. • Sponsor your personnel for training in approved FANUC Robotics training course(s) related to your application. Never permit untrained personnel to operate the robots. • Install a lockout device that uses an access code to prevent unauthorized persons from operating the robot. • Arrange the workcell so the operator faces the workcell and can see what is going on inside the cell. Clearly identify the work envelope of each robot in the system with floor markings, signs, and special barriers. The work envelope is the area defined by the maximum motion range of the robot, including any tooling attached to the wrist flange that extend this range • Position all controllers outside the robot work envelope. • Mount an adequate number of EMERGENCY STOP buttons or switches within easy reach of the operator and at critical points inside and around the outside of the workcell. flashing lights and/or audible warning devices that activate whenever the robot is operating, that is, whenever power is applied to the servo drive system. Audible warning devices shall exceed the ambient noise level at the end-use application • Wherever possible, install safety fences to protect against unauthorized entry by personnel into the work envelope • Install special guarding that prevents the operator from reaching into restricted areas of the work envelope • Use presence or proximity sensing devices such as light curtains, mats, and capacitance and vision systems to enhance safety • Periodically check the safety joints or safety clutches that can be optionally installed between the robot wrist flange and tooling. If the tooling strikes an object, these devices dislodge, remove power from the system, and help to minimize damage to the tooling and robot • Make sure all external devices are properly filtered, grounded, shielded, and suppressed to prevent hazardous motion due to the effects of electro-magnetic interference (EMI), radio frequency interference (RFI), and electro-static discharge (ESD) • Make provisions for power lockout/tagout at the controller • Eliminate pinch points. Pinch points are areas where personnel could get trapped between a moving robot and other equipment • Provide enough room inside the workcell to permit personnel to teach the robot and perform maintenance safely • Know the path that can be used to escape from a moving robot; make sure the escape path is never blocked Standard Mapping Table Standard Mapping Table OSHA SUBPART FANUC SAFETY PROTOCOL 1910 SUBPART D 1910 SUBPART E 1910 SUBPART J 1910 SUBPART O 1910 SUBPART S GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE

textbooks/workforce/Safety_and_Emergency_Management/Workplace_Safety_for_US_Workers_-_Workbook/07%3A_Industrial_Safety_and_Manufacturing/7.C%3A_Lab_Safety_-_Industrial_Safety_and_Manufacturing.txt