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4,239,199 | 9,433,450 | 2011-01-31 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_38 | now has no choice but to remain in the program in order to prevent a collapse of its medical system | ”); California, supra, 104 F.3d at 1086 (rejecting coercion theory argument based on the claim that while the state joined Medicaid voluntarily, it had grown to depend on federal funds and “ |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_22 | in some circumstances, the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ | In most circumstances, as here, judgments about the merits of a grant’s size in relation to the attached conditions are best left to the political branches of the state and federal governments, as they go through the contractual motions of offer and acceptance of the federal funds.
4. Violation of other constitutional provisions
The fourth requirement courts must assess in evaluating spending clause legislation is whether any other provision of the Constitution acts as an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 2793. The Court described the contours of this requirement in Dole, explaining that
the ‘independent constitutional bar’ limitation on the spending power is not, as petitioner suggests, a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve directly. Instead, we think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the Congress’ broad spending power.
Id. at 210-11, 107 S.Ct. 2793. Although defendants argue separately that the act itself violates the Tenth Amendment and the First Amendment’s establishment clause, they do not contend that compliance with the act induces Wisconsin to engage in unconstitutional activity. Accordingly, the act does not violate the independent constitutional bar limitation on the spending power. Coercion vs. encouragement
Finally, the Supreme Court has noted that “in some circumstances, the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion. |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_31 | to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible. | Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 2793 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937)). In Dole, the Court held that the potential reduction of federal highway funds by a mere five percent was plainly insufficient to rise to the level of coercion. Citing Steward, the Court observed that “to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_6 | the coercion theory is unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application | See, e.g., Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202 (“ |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_24 | to the extent that there is any viability left in the coercion theory, it is not reflected in the facts of this record | See, e.g., Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202 (“the coercion theory is unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application”); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir.1997) (“ |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_34 | the coercion theory remains viable in this circuit, and federal statutes that threaten the loss of an entire block of federal funds upon a relatively minor failing by a state are constitutionally suspect | ”); but see West Virginia v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 289 F.3d 281, 291 (4th Cir.2002) (“ |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_15 | [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. |
Regardless of the current health of the coercion theory, there is no plausible coercion argument in this case. Defendants acknowledge that the approximately $15 million in federal funds it accepted in 2001 made up less than two percent of the Department of Corrections budget. The potential loss of this fraction of the department’s overall budget does not impermissi-bly coerce Wisconsin into complying with the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. It would effectively eviscerate Congress’s spending clause power to hold that such a small grant could coerce a sovereign state. It would also offend the sovereign dignity of the state of Wisconsin, casting it as little more than a fiscally impoverished dependent of the federal government.
For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act is a constitutionally valid exercise of Congress’s spending power.
B. Commerce Clause
In addition to applying to programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance, the act applies when a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a prisoner affects interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(2). Because I have found that the act is a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power, I need not consider whether the act is a valid exercise of congressional authority under the commerce clause as well. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment provides that “ |
11,440,338 | 9,433,450 | 2002-08-28 | United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin | Charles v. Verhagen | Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (2002) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_28 | If a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant. | New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). The Dole requirements place limits on the exercise of Congress’s Article I spending power. Id. at 168, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“ |
9,107,512 | 9,433,450 | 2003-06-06 | United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia | Bane v. Virginia Department of Corrections | Bane v. Virginia Department of Corrections, 267 F. Supp. 2d 514 (2003) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_0 | attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds | The Supreme Court has interpreted this broad grant of power to give Congress the ability to “ |
9,089,107 | 9,433,450 | 2003-10-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | Doe v. Nebraska | Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593 (2003) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_39 | not merely in theory but in fact, | 235 F.3d at 1082. In this case, the defendants contend that coercion is readily apparent because the federal funding component for NDSS’s budget, both on an appropriation and on an actual basis, was no less than sixty per cent, between 1990 to 1995 and amounted to $557 million in 1995 alone. 483 U.S. 203, 211-12, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (noting that “ |
9,089,107 | 9,433,450 | 2003-10-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit | Doe v. Nebraska | Doe v. Nebraska, 345 F.3d 593 (2003) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_32 | no decision from any court finding a conditional grant to be impermissibly coercive | 483 U.S. 203, 211-12, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987) (noting that “not merely in theory but in fact,” states decide whether to enact laws setting a higher minimum drinking age in exchange for federal highway funds). We are not aware of, nor did the defendants direct us to, any decision supporting their contention that the level and amount of funding at issue here constitutes impermissible coercion. As noted previously, we have found no coercion where a similarly large amount of federal money was at stake. Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1082. See Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1051 (9th Cir.2002) (citing Jim C. with approval in § 504 case), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105, 123 S.Ct. 871, 154 L.Ed.2d 775 (2003); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.) (holding that conditioning of $131.2 million in federal funds on Kansas’s acceptance of certain federal requirements does not constitute impermissible coercion), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035, 121 S.Ct. 623, 148 L.Ed.2d 533 (2000); see also West Virginia v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 289 (4th Cir.2002) (observing that there has been “ |
21,432 | 9,433,450 | 2006-01-25 | United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia | Madison v. Riter | Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645 (2006) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_22 | so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion. | Congress must state all conditions on the receipt of federal funds “unambiguously” so as to “enabl[e] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation”; (3) conditions attached to federal grants must be related “to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs”; and (4) conditions on federal funding must not violate any other constitutional provision. The Dole court then identified a fifth concern, that federal financial inducements must not be “ |
21,432 | 9,433,450 | 2006-01-25 | United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia | Madison v. Riter | Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645 (2006) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_6 | [T]he coercion theory is unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application | Therefore, the use of RLUIPA funding conditions to encourage states to provide inmates’ religious exer cise more protection than that mandated under the First Amendment is clearly related to the furtherance of federal interests.
Finally, courts have consistently found RLUIPA to be “reasonably calculated to address” the federal government’s interests in not subsidizing programs that infringe on religious practices and in promoting rehabilitation of state prisoners by protecting them religious liberty. Cutter III, 423 F.3d at 586; Benning, 391 F.3d at 1307-08; Charles, 348 F.3d at 609; Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067. For the reasons stated, this court also finds RLUIPA sufficiently related to federal interests to fall within the third Dole restriction.
4. RLUIPA does not violate independent constitutional principles.
As herein discussed, the court concludes that no other constitutional principle bars the funding conditions in RLUIPA. Thus, the statute satisfies the fourth Dole limitation.
5. RLUIPA conditions are not coercive.
Defendants state that for the 2005 fiscal year, the Department of Corrections received approximately $11,275,358 in federal funds, an amount representing 1.3% of the total VDOC budget of $848,228,630. The record includes no evidence that the VDOC uses federal monies to fund inmates’ religious programs or accommodations. Based on these facts, defendants assert that the RLUIPA funding conditions are impermissibly coercive in -violation of the fifth Dole factor because they require the VDOC to adopt a particular prison religious accommodation policy, a relatively minor interest, or forego 100 percent of federal funds that would otherwise be received for all correctional purposes.
The Supreme Court has not defined the point at which a federal funding condition becomes coercive. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 2793. See, e.g., Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir.2000) (“ |
21,432 | 9,433,450 | 2006-01-25 | United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia | Madison v. Riter | Madison v. Riter, 411 F. Supp. 2d 645 (2006) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_15 | [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. | The Fourth Circuit characterized this claim as “a variant of the Commonwealth’s many federalism-based or residual power contentions,” Madison, 355 F.3d at 322, and remanded it for consideration as such. Thus, this court will address defendants’ sovereignty concerns, in turn, under the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment.
1.
The Tenth Amendment provides that “ |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_20 | further payments will not be made to the State (or, in [HHS’s] discretion ... payments will be limited to categories under or parts of the State plan not affected by such failure), until [HHS] is satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure to comply. | ” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)).
Under the Act, the Medicaid program selves as a cornerstone for expanded health care coverage. As explained above in Section 11(H), the Act expands Medicaid eligibility and provides significant Medicaid subsidies to the impoverished. As a result of the Act’s Medicaid expansion, an estimated 9 million of the 50 million uninsured will be covered for health care by 2014 (and 16 million by 2016 and 17 million by 2021).
The federal government will pay 100% of the fees associated with the increased Medicaid eligibility and subsidies beginning in 2014 and until 2016; that percentage will then drop gradually each year until reaching 90% in 2020. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(l). The federal government will not cover administrative expenses associated with implementing the new Medicaid policies. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396c, a state whose plan does not comply with the requirements under § 1396a will be notified by HHS of its noncompliance, and “further payments will not be made to the State (or, in [HHS’s] discretion... payments will be limited to categories under or parts of the State plan not affected by such failure), until [HHS] is satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure to comply. |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_6 | unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application | ” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1202 (observing that the theory is “ |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_24 | to the extent that there is any viability left in the coercion theory, it is not reflected in the facts of this record | ” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1202 (observing that the theory is “unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application”); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir.1997) (noting in a Medicaid expansion case that “ |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_8 | The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial judgments regarding a state’s financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state governments. | ” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1202 (observing that the theory is “unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application”); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir.1997) (noting in a Medicaid expansion case that “to the extent that there is any viability left in the coercion theory, it is not reflected in the facts of this record”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir.1989) (“ |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_5 | The courts are not suited to evaluating whether the states are faced here with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice---- We therefore follow the lead of other courts that have explicitly declined to enter this thicket when similar funding conditions have been at issue. | ”); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C.Cir.1981) (“The courts are not suited to evaluating whether the states are faced here with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice---- |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_3 | all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs | The states will only have to pay incidental administrative costs associated with the expansion until 2016; after which, they will bear an increasing percentage of the cost, capping at 10% in 2020. Id. § 1396d(y)(l). If states bear little of the cost of expansion, the idea that states are being coerced into spending money in an ever-growing program seems to us to be “more rhetoric than fact.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 2798.
Third, states have plenty of notice— nearly four years from the date the bill was signed into law — to decide whether they will continue to participate in Medicaid by adopting the expansions or not. This gives states the opportunity to develop new budgets (indeed, Congress allocated the cost of the entire expansion to the federal government initially, with the cost slowly shifting to the states over a period of six years) to deal with the expansion, or to develop a replacement program in their own states if they decide to do so. Fourth, like our sister circuits, we cannot ignore the fact that the states have the power to tax and raise revenue, and therefore can create and fund programs of their own if they do not like Congress’s terms. See Pace, 403 F.3d at 278; Jersey City Pub. Schs., 341 F.3d at 243-44.
Finally, we note that while the state plaintiffs vociferously argue that states who choose not to participate in the expansion will lose all of their Medicaid funding, nothing in the Medicaid Act states that this is a foregone conclusion. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; see also West Virginia v. HHS, 289 F.3d at 291-92; Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 2798 (finding no coercion when “ |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_30 | the law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its problems | 42 U.S.C. § 1396c; see also West Virginia v. HHS, 289 F.3d at 291-92; Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 2798 (finding no coercion when “all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specified highway grant programs”).
Taken together, these factors convince us that the Medicaid-participating states have a real choice — not just in theory but in fact — to participate in the Act’s Medicaid expansion. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211, 107 S.Ct. at 2798. See Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 590, 57 S.Ct. at 892 (noting that in the absence of undue influence, “ |
3,739,389 | 9,433,450 | 2011-08-12 | United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. Attorney General v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (2011) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_22 | the size of the federal inducement. | The Supreme Court made clear that the required relationship is between the conditions imposed and "the federal interest in particular national projects or programs,” Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 2796 (quotation marks omitted) — that is, "the purpose of federal spending.” The state plaintiffs mistakenly assert that the required relationship is between the conditions imposed and " |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_7 | [e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed. But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect. | Succeeding case law recognized that “[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory. |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_35 | to individuals as well as States | These “extensive new benefits,” the plaintiffs contend, will “impose immediate and expensive requirements on the States that will continue to increase,” see PI. Mem. at 55-56, and “burden[] the States’ ability to procure goods and services and to carry out governmental functions,” see Am. Compl. ¶ 90. The employer mandate allegedly exceeds Article I of the Constitution and also runs afoul of state sovereignty in violation of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Regardless of whether the employer mandate will be costly and burdensome to the states in their capacity as large employers (which at this stage of the case is assumed to be true), it is a “generally applicable” law that reaches both public and private employers alike. Although a law of general applicability, as opposed to one directed only at the states, is not per se Constitutional, it is a factor that the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal have consistently found to be significant. In the landmark case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., the Supreme Court held that a city’s transit authority (SAMTA) was bound by the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”). During the course of its decision, the Court stated:
[W]e need go no further than to state that we perceive nothing in the overtime and minimum-wage requirements of the FLSA, as applied to SAMTA, that is destructive of state sovereignty or violative of any constitutional provision.
469 U.S. 528, 554, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985); see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151, 120 S.Ct. 666, 145 L.Ed.2d 587 (2000) (generally applicable law upheld that regulated the entire “universe of entities” in the market, both in the public and private realm, and applied “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_22 | in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ | See generally South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-10, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987). Rather, their claim is based principally on a single sentence near the end of Dole, where the Supreme Court speculated that “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion. |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_13 | conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties. | Id. at 211, 107 S.Ct. 2793. For that statement, the Court relied upon an earlier decision, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 57 S.Ct. 883, 81 L.Ed. 1279 (1937), which likewise speculated that there may be a point at which Congressional pressure turns into impermissible coercion. Justice Cardozo cau tioned that any spending measure (in that case, in the form of a tax rebate) “conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_6 | unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application. | The Court has never employed the theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts have been similarly reluctant to use it”; the theory is “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_29 | The coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party.... The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial judgments regarding a state’s financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly suspect as a method for resolving disputes between federal and state governments. | ”); Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir.1989) (“The coercion theory has been much discussed but infrequently applied in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party.... |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_5 | are not suited to evaluating whether states are faced here with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice. Even a rough assessment of the degree of temptation would require extensive and complex factual inquiries on a state-by-state basis. We therefore follow the lead of other courts that have explicitly declined to enter this thicket when similar funding conditions have been at issue. | ”); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 413-14 (D.C.Cir.1981) (pre-Dole) (coercion argument rejected because courts “are not suited to evaluating whether states are faced here with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice. |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_38 | it now has no choice but to remain in the program in order to prevent a collapse of its medical system. |
Perhaps the case most analogous to this one is California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.1997), where California challenged the Medicaid program, in pertinent part, because it conditioned the receipt of federal matching funds on the provision of emergency medical services to illegal aliens. California objected to having to spend that money and argued, like plaintiffs here, that it was being coerced into doing so because, while its initial decision to participate in Medicaid was voluntary, “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_21 | is not viewed with such suspicion. |
The Fourth Circuit appears to be the one circuit where the coercion theory has been considered and “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_33 | strong doubts about the viability of the coercion theory | Notwithstanding that the theory may be available in the Fourth Circuit, West Virginia acknowledged that because of “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_17 | somewhat amorphous and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter rules of application | Notwithstanding that the theory may be available in the Fourth Circuit, West Virginia acknowledged that because of “strong doubts about the viability of the coercion theory”; in light of the fact that it is “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_32 | no decision from any court finding a conditional grant to be impermissibly coercive. | Notwithstanding that the theory may be available in the Fourth Circuit, West Virginia acknowledged that because of “strong doubts about the viability of the coercion theory”; in light of the fact that it is “somewhat amorphous and cannot easily be reduced to a neat set of black-letter rules of application”; and given the “difficulties associated with [its] application,” there is “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_9 | most courts faced with the question have effectively abandoned any real effort to apply the coercion theory | Therefore, “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_26 | raises political questions that cannot be resolved by the courts. | Therefore, “most courts faced with the question have effectively abandoned any real effort to apply the coercion theory” after finding, in essence, that it “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_4 | [n]othing in the case suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can ever be applied with the fitness to the relations between state and nation. | See id. at 288-90. All this to say, if the coercion theory stands at all, it stands on extremely “wobbly legs.” See Skinner, supra, 884 F.2d at 454.
In light of the foregoing, the current status of the law provides very little support for the plaintiffs’ coercion theory argument. In Steward Machine Co., supra, the Supreme Court held that there was no coercion because “ |
4,037,491 | 9,433,450 | 2010-10-14 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services | Florida ex rel. McCollum v. United States Department of Health & Human Services, 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (2010) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_18 | the location of the point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be inducement, would be a question of degree, at times, perhaps, of fact, | Nevertheless, while the law does not provide much support for the plaintiffs’ argument, it does not preclude it either (at least not in this circuit).
Further, I cannot ignore that, based on the allegations in the complaint, the plaintiffs are in an extremely difficult situation. They either accept the sweeping changes to Medicaid (which they contend will explode their state budgets), or they withdraw from the system entirely (which they allege could leave millions of their poorest and neediest citizens without any medical coverage). The plaintiffs have argued that this is tantamount to no choice at all, which can perhaps be inferred from the fact that Congress does not really anticipate that the states will (or could) drop out of the Medicaid program. To be sure, since the Act seeks to reduce costs, reduce uncompensated care, and reduce the number of uninsured, it would make little sense for Congress to expect that objecting states would opt out of Medicaid and leave millions of the country’s poorest citizens without medical coverage, and thus make each of those stated problems significantly worse.
In addition, if the state plaintiffs make the decision to opt out of Medicaid, federal funds taken from their citizens via taxation that used to flow back into the states from Washington, D.C., would instead be diverted to the states that have agreed to continue participating in the program.
If the Supreme Court meant what it said in Dole and Steward Machine Co. (and I must presume that it did), there is a line somewhere between mere pressure and impermissible coercion. Because the Eleventh Circuit (unlike the other circuits) has apparently not directly addressed and foreclosed this argument, and because, in any event, “ |
3,771,775 | 9,433,450 | 2009-09-21 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa | United States ex rel. Hixson v. Health Management Systems, Inc. | United States ex rel. Hixson v. Health Management Systems, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (2009) | 2002-05-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services | West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281 (2002) | 9433450_1 | If a state elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it must submit a Medicaid plan to HHS for approval. If the plan is approved by HHS, the state is then entitled to reimbursement from the federal government of a certain percentage of the costs of providing medical care to eligible individuals — the | Relators' Brief in Support of Resistance to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 19-20.
3
. Relators also argue that Defendants contradict themselves by arguing on the one hand that they follow Iowa law, and on the other hand that the critical elements necessary to infer fraud were publicly disclosed. There is no contradiction here. The apparent contradiction stems from the fact that relators' theory of fraud liability here is rather novel, and requires the ten-step process outlined above, making the inference of fraud rather attenuated, and not obvious. Therefore, it is possible that Defendants follow Iowa law, and that the critical elements necessary to infer fraud, on relators' novel theory — namely, all ten paragraphs above — were publicly disclosed.
4
. In violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A).
5
. In violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B).
6
. In violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C). See also West Virginia v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 289 F.3d 281, 284 (4th Cir.2002) ("If a state elects to participate in the Medicaid program, it must submit a Medicaid plan to HHS for approval. |
153,220 | 9,435,945 | 2002-06-20 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | Yates v. Motivation Industrial Equipment Ltd. | Yates v. Motivation Industrial Equipment Ltd., 38 F. App'x 174 (2002) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_25 | arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with a forum. | The district court found that Motivation conceded that Yates’ claim arose out of or related to Motivation’s activities in North Carolina. (J.A. 508). This finding was erroneous. Motivation merely conceded that the injury to Yates’ decedent occurred in North Carolina.
In Motivation's supplemental brief in support of its motion to dismiss, Motivation stated:
[I]n Honeycutt, this Court discussed the two tests set forth by the Supreme Court in determining whether defendant’s contact satisfied the requirements of due process for the Court to assert jurisdiction and for the Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of jurisdiction. If a cause of action did not arise in or is unrelated to the defendant's activity in the forum state, then the appropriate standard is the continuous and systematic test set forth in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984) (i.e., general jurisdiction). If the cause of action either arose in or is related to the defendant’s activities in the forum state, the lesser burden of showing the defendant purposely [sic] directed its activities toward the forum state applies. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed. 528 (1985). (i.e., specific jurisdiction).
In this case, since the injury to the Plaintiffs Decedent occurred in North Carolina, the prima facie burden the Plaintiff needs to establish is that the Defendant purposely [sic] directed its activities toward the forum state, (emphasis added).
Defendant’s Supp. Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, 6.
As evidenced above, Motivation relied on Honeycutt v. Tour Carriage, Inc., 997 F.Supp. 694, 704 (W.D.N.C.1996). In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court explained that a state exercises specific jurisdiction in a suit “ |
153,220 | 9,435,945 | 2002-06-20 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit | Yates v. Motivation Industrial Equipment Ltd. | Yates v. Motivation Industrial Equipment Ltd., 38 F. App'x 174 (2002) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_40 | the cause of action formally 'arise from’ defendant’s contacts with the forum; rather, this criterion requires only 'that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-state activities.' | In Helicopteros, the Supreme Court explained that a state exercises specific jurisdiction in a suit “arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with a forum." 466 U.S. at 414, n. 8. (emphasis added). It did not state that specific jurisdiction is conferred in cases simply because an injury occurs in that state, which is perhaps how Honeycutt could be read.
After citing Honeycutt, Motivation merely stated that because Thomas Yates’ injury occurred in North Carolina, Yates needed to establish purposeful availment, i.e., specific jurisdictional analysis was proper. It never conceded that the cause of action arose out of its contacts with North Carolina. Whether the district court found a concession because it misread Motivation’s statement, or because it accepted Motivation's (and Honeycutt's) misapplication of the law, we are not bound by the misreading or the misapplication.
6
. In determining whether a claim arises out of forum-related activities, circuits have applied different tests. For example, the Ninth Circuit applies a "but for” test, where courts consider whether a plaintiff's claims would have arisen but for the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit does not require that " |
9,282,406 | 9,435,945 | 2004-01-15 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky | Lexmark International, Inc. v. Laserland, Inc. | Lexmark International, Inc. v. Laserland, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 913 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_40 | arising out of’ requirement “does not require that the cause of action formally ‘arise from’ defendant’s contacts with the forum; rather, this criterion requires only ‘that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-state activities.’ | Columbia Pictures at 289. Although Lexmark correctly quotes this case, the Court declines to find jurisdiction based solely on Defendant’s alleged patent infringement. Plaintiff sets forth no evidence regarding Defendant’s willfulness. Further, even, in the Columbia Pictures case, the court did not actually base its finding of personal jurisdiction solely on the willful copyright infringement argument. The Court in Columbia Pictures found that the defendant had numerous contract-related contacts with the forum state sufficient to satisfy the purposeful availment requirement.
Although the Court does not find that Plaintiffs willful infringement argument will satisfy the purposeful availment requirement, the other factors lead this Court to find that Defendant Laserland did purposeful avail itself of the privileges of doing business in Kentucky. The combination of Defendant’s offers to sell it products, its actual sales into Kentucky, and its interactive website constitute purposeful availment in the due process analysis.
2. Arising From Defendant’s Contacts
Plaintiff Lexmark claims that its patent infringement claim arises from La-serland’s sales and offers to sell the accused property to Kentucky residents on its website. Lexmark also claims that it suffers an economic injury in Kentucky due to Laserland’s infringement. On the other hand, Defendant Laserland points out that only two sales of the OpWheel were ever made to Kentucky residents. Laserland believes those two sales are de minimus and thus cannot give rise to personal jurisdiction.
The “arising out of’ requirement “does not require that the cause of action formally ‘arise from’ defendant’s contacts with the forum; rather, this criterion requires only ‘that the cause of action, of whatever type, have a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-state activities. |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_25 | a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. | Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Random,” “fortuitous,” or “attenuated” activity is not a constitutionally adequate basis for jurisdiction. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984).
The Supreme Court distinguishes between “general” jurisdiction and “specific” jurisdiction, either one of which is an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, 473 n. 15, 105 S.Ct. 2174 (1985); see also Conti v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 981 (6th Cir.1992) (noting that a distinction between general and specific jurisdiction exists for the purpose of due process analysis). A federal court has general jurisdiction when the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are “substantial” and “continuous and systematic,” so that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action does not relate to the defendant’s contacts with the state. Specific jurisdiction exists when “ |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_32 | the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state; |
Using the relevant Supreme Court precedents, in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968), this Court established a three-part test for determining whether, consistent with due process, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction: (1) “ |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_55 | the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there; |
Using the relevant Supreme Court precedents, in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968), this Court established a three-part test for determining whether, consistent with due process, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction: (1) “the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state;” (2) “ |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_22 | the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. |
Using the relevant Supreme Court precedents, in Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968), this Court established a three-part test for determining whether, consistent with due process, a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction: (1) “the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state;” (2) “the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there;” and (3) “ |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_32 | the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. |
During 1992, the year in which New Track owned and operated Old Track’s business but had not yet moved it entirely to San Antonio, New Track had five significant contacts with Ohio. First, although New Track was formed under Nevada law, most of New Track’s tangible property was in Ohio. Second, New Track secured Ohio telephone service and registered with various Ohio agencies as an Ohio employer. Third, whatever the contractual relationship between the parties, Youn purchased hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of bowling balls from New Track by sending orders to New Track’s Ohio offices. Fourth, Youn negotiated the “Volcano” agreement with Cardinale while Cardinale remained based in Ohio. Finally, the trade relationship (including transactions related to the Volcano agreement and the alleged initial written contract) prospered in Ohio during 1992. Plaintiffs contend these contacts are sufficient for the district court to have assumed specific personal jurisdiction.
New Track responds by arguing that it maintained only a temporary office in Ohio, its Ohio office did virtually no business with anyone in 1992 other than Plaintiffs, and neither CKH nor Choi (the sole owner of CKH) had an office in Ohio.
The parties do not dispute that Ohio courts have the statutory authority to assume jurisdiction over this case. This means the only question is whether Ohio courts could do so consistent with the federal Constitution. See Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1115; Welsh, 631 F.2d at 439; In-Flight Devices, 466 F.2d at 224.
Specific jurisdiction exists because New Track’s contacts meet the Southern Machine test with respect to both the exclusive distributorship agreement and the Volcano agreement. Initially, “ |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_22 | the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. |
Finally, “ |
2,160,910 | 9,435,945 | 2003-03-24 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Youn v. Track, Inc. | Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_57 | the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief. | In Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, the Supreme Court determined whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction over the defendant was reasonable by balancing “ |
1,007,118 | 9,435,945 | 2003-02-03 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Mast v. Imco Recycling of Ohio, Inc. | Mast v. Imco Recycling of Ohio, Inc., 58 F. App'x 116 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_14 | consistently focused on whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state so as not to offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ | Morris, 201 F.3d at 793.
In addition, as with her sexual harassment claim, even if Plaintiffs allegations of retaliatory harassment were sufficient, IMCO Ohio has raised the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense and took prompt action to address the situation.
III.
Personal Jurisdiction Over IMCO Recycling, Inc.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s decision to dismiss IMCO Recycling, Inc., the parent company of her employer IMCO Ohio, for lack of personal jurisdiction in Ohio. When evaluating personal jurisdiction under Ohio’s long-arm statute, this court has “consistently focused on whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state so as not to offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. |
1,007,118 | 9,435,945 | 2003-02-03 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Mast v. Imco Recycling of Ohio, Inc. | Mast v. Imco Recycling of Ohio, Inc., 58 F. App'x 116 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_4 | General jurisdiction is proper only where ‘a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir.2002).
In analyzing the due process boundaries of personal jurisdiction, courts have distinguished between “general” and “specific” jurisdiction. “ |
9,252,871 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-30 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4 | Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4, 310 F. Supp. 2d 981 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_47 | need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. | Ocwen services the loans under provisions of the Sale and Servicing Agreement, which afford the Servicer the “ ‘full power and authority, acting alone, to do any and all things in connection with such servicing and administration which the Servicer may deem necessary or desirable’ ” and direct the Servicer “ ‘to collect all payments called for under the terms and provisions of each Home Loan.’ ” (Id. ¶ 23.) Ocwen remits all payments collected on these notes to USBNA in Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 28.)
III. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits dismissal of a claim for lack of jurisdiction over the person. ' The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Absent an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “ |
9,252,871 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-30 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4 | Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4, 310 F. Supp. 2d 981 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_49 | the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of [the] factual allegations as true. | In considering a motion to dismiss, “ |
9,252,871 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-30 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4 | Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Owner Trust 1998-4, 310 F. Supp. 2d 981 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_4 | a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. | Id. (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Personal jurisdiction may be either specific or general, depending on the nature of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
General jurisdiction arises when “ |
9,244,388 | 9,435,945 | 2004-04-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell | TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_15 | a bad faith intent to profit from that mark ... registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that ... is identical or confusingly similar to that mark. | 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4). We conclude that, under the statute’s language, Maxwell’s use must be commercial to fall under the anti-dilution provision. Under ACPA, the owner of a mark can recover against a person who, acting with “a bad faith intent to profit from that mark... registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that... is identical or confusingly similar to that mark. |
9,244,388 | 9,435,945 | 2004-04-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit | TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell | TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_34 | [defendant’s] ‘business’ is to register trademarks as domain names and then sell them to the rightful trademark owners | Id. (quoting Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F.Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D.Ill.1996)). This Court has provided a similar definition, determining in Gallo that the defendant’s business of selling domain names containing marks satisfied the commercial use requirement. See also Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir.1998) (“ |
692,067 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-31 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Jeffrey Chain, L.P. v. Tropodyne Corp. | Jeffrey Chain, L.P. v. Tropodyne Corp., 93 F. App'x 880 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_6 | [generally speaking, the key question in cases where a plaintiff alleges trademark infringement and unfair competition is whether the defendant’s actions create a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the parties’ goods or services. | ” Id. at 1188 (emphasis added). In order to defeat summary judgment on its counterclaim, Tropodyne was required to raise a genuine issue of fact as to
(1) whether their use of the trademark was without the registered owner’s consent, or (2) whether their unauthorized use was likely to cause confusion in the marketplace as to the origin or sponsorship of the product.
Id. at 1188-1189 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(l)(a), 1125(a)). We noted that “ |
692,067 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-31 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Jeffrey Chain, L.P. v. Tropodyne Corp. | Jeffrey Chain, L.P. v. Tropodyne Corp., 93 F. App'x 880 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_31 | fail unless the defendants actually used [the plaintiffs] trademark in a prohibited manner. | ” However, where the allegations arise out of the defendant’s alleged use of the plaintiff’s trademark rather than out of any other actions that might have misled the public, the plaintiffs claims of trademark infringement and unfair competition “ |
1,387,210 | 9,435,945 | 2005-02-08 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App'x 675 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_4 | contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. | Schlichtmann defended himself against this suit, and established a website, “www.truthaboutcadle.com,” to inform others of what he believed were the unlawful activities of Cadle in Massachusetts, where Schlichtmann resides. Schlichtmann also took initial steps toward starting a class action suit against Cadle, joining with other victims of what he believed were Cadle’s unlawful business practices. Schlichtmann informed Massachusetts state regulators about Cadle’s practices, and the State’s Banking Commissioner issued a “Cease and Desist Order,” mandating that Cadle stop unlicensed and unauthorized collection activity in Massachusetts.
In response to Schlichtmann’s efforts, Cadle initiated another lawsuit against Schlichtmann, alleging state law claims of defamation and violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Schlichtmann moved to dismiss the case for.lack of personal jurisdiction, among other things. Cadle argued that the court had jurisdiction over Schlichtmann based on his website, statements he made to the Business Journal Online, a demand letter he sent to Cadle in Ohio, and statements he allegedly made to a local television station in Youngstown, Ohio. The district court granted Schlichtmann’s motion and dismissed the case. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir.2000). If the district court, as was the case below, did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, this Court must review the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id.
B. Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). Personal jurisdiction exists in two forms: “general” or “specific.” General jurisdiction exists over a defendant when his “ |
1,387,210 | 9,435,945 | 2005-02-08 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App'x 675 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_38 | Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state | Ohio’s long-arm statute includes: “Transacting any business in this state”; “ |
1,387,210 | 9,435,945 | 2005-02-08 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App'x 675 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_2 | a website that is accessible to anyone over the Internet is insufficient to justify general jurisdiction, | ” Ohio Rev.Code § 2307.382(A)(1), (3), and (6). This Court has acknowledged that Ohio’s long-arm statute does not reach to the full limits of the federal constitution. Bird, 289 F.3d at 871.
1. We have held that the operation of “ |
1,387,210 | 9,435,945 | 2005-02-08 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann | Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 F. App'x 675 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_36 | operation of an Internet website can constitute the purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in a forum state ... if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the state. | ” Bird, 289 F.3d at 874.
However, the operation of a website may justify specific jurisdiction, if it satisfies the three factors set forth in Southern Machine, namely, if the operation of the website constitutes purposeful availment, is the basis of the cause of action against the defendant, and jurisdiction over the defendant is reasonable. There is strand of law which holds that whether a court can assert specific personal jurisdiction over a website owner depends on how interactive the website is with the people in the forum state. There is another relevant strand of law dealing with whether the court can assert personal jurisdiction over defamatory publications which reach into the forum state.
The “operation of an Internet website can constitute the purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in a forum state... if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the state. |
9,217,928 | 9,435,945 | 2004-07-13 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | Fisher v. Blackmore | Fisher v. Blackmore, 325 F. Supp. 2d 810 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_47 | need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. | Alan Fisher (“Plaintiff’), a Michigan citizen and a member of Tantara New England, brings this suit against Allen Blackmore (“Defendant”), a citizen of Massachusetts and an alleged member of Tantara New England. Plaintiff claims that Defendant, as a member of Tantara New England, plans to divert the customers and good will acquired by Tantára New England to another entity for Defendant’s own personal benefit. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant breached the fiduciary duty owed to Tantara New England and Plaintiff, and fraudulently induced Plaintiff to invest in the company. Defendant denies his membership in Tantara New England and any wrongdoing. In the present motion, Defendant seeks dismissal of this action claiming that he has not had sufficient contacts with Michigan to be subject to the jurisdiction of a court in Michigan. This action was' removed from the Circuit Court for the County of Wayne on January 8, 2004. The Court notes that subject matter jurisdiction is proper based upon diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff, as the party seeking to assert personal jurisdiction, bears the burden of demonstrating that such jurisdiction exists. MCNIC Oil & Gas Co. v. IBEX Resources Co., 23 F.Supp.2d 729, 732 (E.D.Mich.1998) (Gadola, J.). The standard for determining whether jurisdiction exists depends upon whether the Court holds an evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional issue. Consequently, Plaintiff “ |
9,217,928 | 9,435,945 | 2004-07-13 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | Fisher v. Blackmore | Fisher v. Blackmore, 325 F. Supp. 2d 810 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_24 | not [to] consider facts proffered by the defendant that conflict with those offered by the plaintiff, and [to] construe the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. | ” When an evidentiary hearing is not conducted, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has directed the courts “ |
9,217,928 | 9,435,945 | 2004-07-13 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | Fisher v. Blackmore | Fisher v. Blackmore, 325 F. Supp. 2d 810 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_32 | the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state, | McGill, 300 F.Supp.2d at 505 (Gadola, J.); See also Youn, 324 F.3d at 418.
The Sixth Circuit has established a three-part test for determining whether a court may exercise limited jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) “ |
9,217,928 | 9,435,945 | 2004-07-13 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | Fisher v. Blackmore | Fisher v. Blackmore, 325 F. Supp. 2d 810 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_55 | the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there, |
The Sixth Circuit has established a three-part test for determining whether a court may exercise limited jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) “the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state,” (2) “ |
9,217,928 | 9,435,945 | 2004-07-13 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan | Fisher v. Blackmore | Fisher v. Blackmore, 325 F. Supp. 2d 810 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_22 | the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. |
The Sixth Circuit has established a three-part test for determining whether a court may exercise limited jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) “the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state,” (2) “the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there,” and (3) “ |
9,214,877 | 9,435,945 | 2004-07-22 | United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri | Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. U-Haul International, Inc. | Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. v. U-Haul International, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_13 | Personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific, depending upon the nature of the contacts that the defendant has with the forum state. | A party may anticipate being haled into court in a particular jurisdiction if it “purposefully directed” its activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that “arise out of or relate to” those activities. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (citations omitted). The relevant contacts with the forum state must be more than random, fortuitous or attenuated.
“ |
1,286,763 | 9,435,945 | 2003-11-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co. | Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co., 95 F. App'x 726 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_1 | [wjhere a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction over a case stems from the existence of a federal question, personal jurisdiction over a defendant exists ‘if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] state’s long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant ] due process. | Moreover, we have stated that “ |
1,286,763 | 9,435,945 | 2003-11-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co. | Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co., 95 F. App'x 726 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_14 | on whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state so as to not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ | Even though we realize that Ohio’s long-arm statute does not extend to the constitutional limits of the Due Process Clause, we focus nevertheless “on whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state so as to not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. |
1,286,763 | 9,435,945 | 2003-11-07 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co. | Flynn v. Greg Anthony Construction Co., 95 F. App'x 726 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_23 | unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. | Instead of granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs’ failure to establish a prima facie showing of corporate veilpiercing or alter-ego relationships, the D.C. District Court should have transferred the case, thereby making the establishment of a prima facie case unnecessary to ensure personal jurisdiction over the Defendants.
In the present case, it is clear that the Plaintiffs made a mistake when they filed in the D.C. District Court as opposed to the Southern District of Ohio. Transferring the case is in keeping with the ultimate goal of allowing cases to be decided on their substantive merits, as opposed to being decided on procedural grounds. See Goldlawr, Inc., 369 U.S. at 466-67, 82 S.Ct. 913. Transfer also furthers the interest of justice because the relevant activities and contacts appear predominantly in the Southern District of Ohio. Moreover, because the D.C. District Court chose to transfer the claims against Greg Anthony Construction, the alternate course of requiring Plaintiffs to start over by refiling their case against the dismissed Defendants in the Southern District of Ohio serves no useful purpose.
We recognize that once the case is remanded to the Southern District of Ohio, Defendants will likely file a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is different from the standard in a 12(b)(2) motion, and thus the Southern District of Ohio would have to conduct a separate inquiry as opposed to relying on the D.C. District Court’s analysis of a prima facie case. When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and construe all factual allegations as true. Although we are not confronted with a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal and therefore do not need to reach this question, the Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the Defendants should be sufficient “ |
9,274,071 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-16 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc. | Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 873 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_47 | need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. | Plaintiff alleges that (1) BSG’s acquisition of Arnold’s created an illegal vertical merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2004); (2) BSG’s distribution of the Redken product line, through its acquisition of Arnold’s, created an illegal horizontal merger under § 7 of the Clayton Act; (3) BSG’s requirement of the product agreement constituted unlawful restraint of trade under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004); (4) BSG’s requirement of the product agreement constituted monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); and (5) the product agreement is evidence of express collusion in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
On December 19, 2003, Defendant filed this motion to dismiss. Defendant argues that (1) it did not maintain the minimum contacts with the United States necessary to subject it to either general or specific personal jurisdiction in this Court, (2) Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and (3) Plaintiff did not serve Defendant in compliance with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“Hague Convention”).
On January 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed a response to all four of the motions to dismiss, in which it referred to the arguments in its previously filed motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff based its only argument regarding jurisdiction over Defendant on the interrelationship among the various corporate defendants in this case.
On February 9, 2004, Defendant, in conjunction with L’Oréal USA and Redken, submitted a reply brief, reasserting its position and requesting that the Court deny Plaintiffs summary judgment motion.
III. Personal Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits dismissal of a claim for lack of jurisdiction over the person. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Absent an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “ |
9,274,071 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-16 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc. | Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 873 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_49 | the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of [the] factual allegations as true. | ” In considering a motion to dismiss, “ |
9,274,071 | 9,435,945 | 2004-03-16 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc. | Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 873 (2004) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_44 | does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. | ” Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 153 (6th Cir.1997).
Where a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction depends on the existence of a federal question, personal jurisdiction over the defendant generally exists if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the forum state’s long-arm statute, and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant due process. Bird, 289 F.3d at 871; Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir.1994). In Tennessee, the long-arm statute extends the personal jurisdiction of Tennessee courts to the limits of the Due Process Clause. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-2-214(a)(6) (2004).
Consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant so long as that defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction “ |
1,226,866 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-04 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A. | Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A., 145 F. App'x 109 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_14 | ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ | ”
In evaluating whether personal jurisdiction is constitutional under Ohio’s long-arm statute, the test is whether there are sufficient minimum contacts between the nonresident defendant and the forum state so as not to offend “ ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. |
1,226,866 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-04 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A. | Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A., 145 F. App'x 109 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_40 | a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-state activities. | See Lanier v. Am. Bd. of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 910 (6th Cir.1988) (stating that “prior negotiations, contemplated future consequences, the terms of the contract, and the actual course of dealings need be addressed to evaluate, in a ‘highly realistic’ way, the intended future consequences that are the real object of the business transaction”). In short, Scotts has demonstrated facts sufficient to support a finding that both Aventis and Star-Link purposefully directed activities at a resident of Ohio that caused consequences in the forum state and that they therefore should have reasonably foreseen that they could be haled into an Ohio court as a result.
Under the second Southern Machine factor, the cause of action must arise out of Defendants’ activities in the forum. A cause of action can be of whatever type, as long as it has “ |
1,226,866 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-04 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A. | Scotts Co. v. Aventis S.A., 145 F. App'x 109 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_33 | lenient standard ... applies when evaluating the ‘arising from’ criterion. | ” We have also stated that a “lenient standard... applies when evaluating the ‘arising from’ criterion. |
8,935,547 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-24 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc. | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_55 | the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state; Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there; Third, the acts by the defendant must have been a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant fundamentally fair. | ” Trintec Industries, Inc., 395 F.3d at 1279.
Ohio courts have created a three-part test for determining whether a court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. First, “ |
8,935,547 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-24 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc. | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_38 | derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered | NCR Corporation, located in Dayton, Ohio, alleges loss of licensing fees to which it was entitled for PC Connection, Ine.’s use of NCR’s patented processes. Doc. 11. Thus, PC Connection, Inc.’s alleged use of NCR’s patented processes in Ohio contravenes Section (3) of the Ohio long-arm statute, and creates specific personal jurisdiction over the PC Connection, Inc.
2. Section (4) of the Ohio long-arm statute authorizes specific personal jurisdiction over PC Connection, Inc.
The Court has specific personal jurisdiction over PC Connection, Inc. under Section (4) of the Ohio long-arm statute, because PC Connection, Inc.’s allegedly tortious activities outside Ohio caused injury to NCR Corporation in Ohio. In addition, the acts of PC Connection, Inc. induced NCR Corporation to bring the causes of action against PC Connection, Inc.
In order to meet the criteria under Section (4) of the Ohio long-arm statute, PC Connection, Inc. must satisfy one of three subparts: (i) “regularly does or solicits business” in Ohio, (ii) engages in a “persistent course of conduct” in Ohio, or (iii) derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered’ in Ohio. Id.
PC Connection, Inc., through its subsidiary companies, owns and operates interactive Web sites through which goods are regularly sold to Ohio customers and Ohio sales taxes is collected from Ohio customers, in satisfaction of subpart (i) “regularly doing or soliciting business” in Ohio. (Ricci Decl. ¶¶ 5-8.)
PC Connection, Inc. regularly delivers products and accepts returns for products sold through its Web sites from a distribution center in Ohio, owned by a PC Connection, Inc. subsidiary, satisfying subpart (ii) engaging in “persistent course of conduct.”
The third subpart (iii) “ |
8,935,547 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-24 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc. | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_57 | the burden on the defendant, the interest of the forum state, the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief, and the interest of other states in securing the most efficient resolution of controversies. | ’ ” Bath & Body Works v. Wal-Mart Stores, No. C-22-99-1190, 2000 WL 1810478, at *5, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20168, at *19 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 12, 2000). It can be readily inferred that PC Connection, Inc. derives revenue from its sales in Ohio. (Wilkins Decl. ¶¶ 5-8); Docs. 11-10, 11-11, 11-13. PC Connection, Inc., or its subsidiary companies, delivers products to Ohio residents, collects Ohio sales tax on items that it sells, and files a condensed consolidated balance sheet of PC Connection, Inc. and its subsidiary companies. Id.
Through application of Section (4) of the Ohio long-arm statute, it is clear that this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over PC Connection, Inc., as each subpart is satisfied.
c. PC Connection, Inc.’s contacts created a substantial connection with Ohio such to make the exercise of jurisdiction over PC Connection, Inc. fundamentally fair.
As NCR Corporation has satisfied the first two parts of the three-part specific personal jurisdiction test, this Court may assume that subjecting PC Connection, Inc. to the jurisdiction in Ohio would be fundamentally fair. MacDonald, 143 F.Supp.2d at 926. Normally, a court must consider several factors in order to determine if assertion of jurisdiction would be fundamentally fair. A court may look to “ |
8,935,547 | 9,435,945 | 2005-08-24 | United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc. | NCR Corp. v. PC Connection, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_36 | interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the state | In re Telec-ironies Pacing Sys. Inc., 953 F.Supp. at 919-920 (where the court found personal jurisdiction over parent where parent and subsidiary shared common officers); Lyman Steel Corp. v. Ferrostaal Metals Corp., 747 F.Supp. 389, 398 (N.D.Ohio 1990) (where the court found “personal jurisdiction over parent where subsidiaries shared common employees and officers”).
B. Federal Due Process
For purposes of compliance with federal due process when analyzing personal jurisdiction, this Court must determine: First, whether the defendant purposefully directed its activities at the residents of the forum; Second, whether the claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and Third, (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair. 3D Systems, Inc., 160 F.3d at 1373, citing Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545-46 (Fed.Cir.1996).
According to these requirements, the Court has the authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over PC Connection, Inc. See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that operation of web site can constitute purposeful availment if it is “ |
1,280,449 | 9,435,945 | 2005-11-10 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Intera Corp. v. Henderson | Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_4 | contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. | If the district court, as in the instant action, did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we must review the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, without considering the “controverting” assertions of the Defendants. Id.
B. Dismissal for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs do not challenge the determinations the district court made with respect to its lack of personal jurisdiction over Nano-Tex. The district court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Nano-Tex because Plaintiffs: (1) did not allege facts intimating that Nano-Tex has any “apparent” contacts with Tennessee; (2) failed to establish that Nano-Tex is the alter-ego of Henderson and Englar such that the company has no personality separate from Henderson and Englar; (3) failed to establish that Nano-Tex exercised any control over its parent company, Burlington Industries; and (4) provided no evidence that Nano-Tex and Burlington Industries are not separate entities. Intera Corp. v. Henderson, No. 3:03-0755, slip op. at 19-21 (M.D.Tenn. May 26, 2004). Because Plaintiffs failed to raise any issues as to the district court’s jurisdictional findings regarding Nano-Tex, they have abandoned the issue of whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over the company. Sommer v. Davis, 317 F.3d 686, 691 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that an issue is abandoned if a party does not present any argument respecting the issue in his brief).
1. “General” v. “Specific” Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id.; Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir.1991). Personal jurisdiction may be either “general” or “specific.” General jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s “ |
1,280,449 | 9,435,945 | 2005-11-10 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Intera Corp. v. Henderson | Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_14 | ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’ are not offended. | In the present action, the district court held that although Plaintiffs have not conceded that the court lacks general jurisdiction over Defendants, they predicated their prima facie case of personal jurisdiction on specific jurisdiction. Intera Corp., No. 3:03-0755, at 10. Plaintiffs do not challenge this finding on appeal. Therefore, we limit our personal jurisdiction analysis to a discussion of specific jurisdiction.
An exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper where the claims in the case arise from or are related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state. Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 149 (6th Cir.1997). In Southern Machine Company v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., we promulgated a three-prong test that not only guides the determination of whether specific jurisdiction exists, but also protects the due process rights of a defendant. S. Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381 (6th Cir.1968). The Southern Machine test provides:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.
Id.
2. Tennessee’s Long-Arm Stattite
In a diversity action, the law of the forum state dictates whether personal jurisdiction exists, subject to constitutional limitations. Calphalon Corp., 228 F.3d at 721; Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir.1994). A court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is appropriate only if it meets the state’s long-arm statute and constitutional due process requirements. Furthermore, the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process when the defendant has sufficient minimal contacts such that “ |
1,280,449 | 9,435,945 | 2005-11-10 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Intera Corp. v. Henderson | Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_38 | any tortious act or omission within this state | Tennessee’s long-arm statute pertains to: “the transaction of any business within the state”; “ |
1,280,449 | 9,435,945 | 2005-11-10 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Intera Corp. v. Henderson | Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_27 | when the operative facts of the controversy arise from the defendant’s contacts with the state. | See Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1072 (6th Cir.1993) (holding that “this court does not normally address issues raised for the first time on appeal”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Plaintiffs also proffer letter correspondence between James E. Klopman, Intera Corporation’s Vice President of Marketing, and Defendant Henderson, in which Henderson expressed his gratitude to Klopman for sending a knit shirt to him. Yet, Henderson did not send the letter to or from Tennessee. Finally, Plaintiffs do not allege that Henderson and Englar made telephone calls, or sent facsimiles to Tennessee which “form the bases” for the action pending before this Court. Neal, 270 F.3d at 332.
Jp. Arising From
We have held that the “arising from” prong of the Southern Machine test is satisfied “ |
1,280,449 | 9,435,945 | 2005-11-10 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Intera Corp. v. Henderson | Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605 (2005) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_22 | the acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. | Neal, 270 F.3d at 333.
In this case, Plaintiffs have presented no facts suggesting that Defendants Henderson and Englar have had contact with Tennessee either in a personal or an official capacity as corporate officers. Even accepting as true Plaintiffs’ contention that the implementation of the license agreement between Intera and Burlington Woven required Burlington Industries’ officers and representatives to have “substantial and regular” contact with Intera, Plaintiffs do not assert facts tending to show that Henderson and Englar had such contact with Intera in Tennessee.
Thus, the district court did not err when it concluded that Plaintiffs have not satisfied prong two, the “arising from” requirement of the Southern Machine test.
5. Reasonableness
If prongs one and two of Southern Machine test are satisfied, then there is an inference that the reasonableness prong is satisfied as well. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir.1988)).
The third prong of the Southern Machine test mandates that “ |
9,058,793 | 9,435,945 | 2003-10-09 | United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire | Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-on-Bleu, Inc. | Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-on-Bleu, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 105 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_21 | any word, term, name, symbol, or device, ... likely to cause confusion | Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Aastar Mortgage Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir.1996); see also I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir.1998); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1996). See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir.2002); compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining unfair competition as use of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device,... likely to cause confusion”) with 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (defining trademark infringement as “use... of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-orable imitation of a registered mark... likely to cause confusion”) (emphasis added). |
9,058,793 | 9,435,945 | 2003-10-09 | United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire | Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-on-Bleu, Inc. | Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Caught-on-Bleu, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 105 (2003) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_52 | use ... of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-orable imitation of a registered mark ... likely to cause confusion | See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir.2002); compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining unfair competition as use of “any word, term, name, symbol, or device,... likely to cause confusion”) with 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (defining trademark infringement as “use... of any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or col-orable imitation of a registered mark... likely to cause confusion”) (emphasis added). |
3,871,520 | 9,435,945 | 2007-09-11 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Feild v. Graffagnino | Feild v. Graffagnino, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (2007) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_47 | need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. | ” (ComplV 13.) Plaintiff was granted summary judgment in the Samples Litigation in January, 2005. (ComplV 14.)
On January 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the Circuit Court of Tennessee, Shelby County, against, inter alia, Graffagnino and Defendants, which Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed. Plaintiff filed the present suit against Defendants and co-defendant, Graffagnino, on August 3,2006. (Compl.1115.)
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. RULE 12(b)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits dismissal of a claim for lack of jurisdiction over the person. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Absent an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “ |
3,871,520 | 9,435,945 | 2007-09-11 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Feild v. Graffagnino | Feild v. Graffagnino, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (2007) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_49 | the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of [the] factual allegations as true. | ”
In considering a motion to dismiss, “ |
3,871,520 | 9,435,945 | 2007-09-11 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Feild v. Graffagnino | Feild v. Graffagnino, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (2007) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_4 | General jurisdiction is proper only where ‘a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state.’ | “General jurisdiction is proper only where ‘a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. |
4,057,637 | 9,435,945 | 2007-03-27 | United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio | Mid-West Materials, Inc. v. Tougher Industries, Inc. | Mid-West Materials, Inc. v. Tougher Industries, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 2d 726 (2007) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_14 | traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. | Kentucky Oaks Mall Company v. Mitchell’s Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 559 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ohio 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975, 111 S.Ct. 1619, 113 L.Ed.2d 717 (1991).
Mid-West presents evidence that Tougher has been a customer of the plaintiff for more than eighteen years. (Jane Lewis Affidavit). Mid-West identifies the bulk of the orders from Tougher, for steel coils, coming through James Morris, Tougher’s purchasing agent. Id. Mr. Morris made several visits to Mid-West’s facilities in Perry, Ohio to evaluate the operations and learn of the plaintiffs industrial capacities. Id. Mid-West notes that all purchase orders from Tougher were accepted through its Perry, Ohio warehouse, and performed and shipped from that location to Tougher’s facility in Albany, New York. Id. (See also Exhibits M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T). Mid-West further identifies Jim Hunt, Tougher’s new purchasing agent, as placing additional orders for steel from Mid-West which were delivered from the Perry, Ohio warehouse to Tougher in Albany, New York. Id. (Exhibits U, U-l, V, W, X, Y).
Based upon these factual allegations, Tougher had dealings with Mid-West in Ohio. Tougher is therefore subject to personal jurisdiction under the “transacting-any-business” provision of Ohio’s long-arm statute.
B. Due Process Analysis
Having determined that personal jurisdiction over Tougher exists under the “transacting-any-business” provision of Ohio’s long-arm statute, the Court next considers whether exercising either general or specific personal jurisdiction over Tougher comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Mid-West does not argue that the Court has general jurisdiction over Tougher.
The Court’s central inquiry is whether minimum contacts are satisfied so as not to offend “ |
3,414,263 | 9,435,945 | 2009-03-10 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP | Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991 (2009) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_47 | need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. | ”); North Shore Gas Company v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 648-49 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that, where a corporation assumed the cost of representation for its wholly-owned subsidiary, the two companies’ interests, motives, and ability to defend were “virtually identical” and thus the suit need not be dismissed for failure to join the corporation); Gwartz v. Jefferson Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 23 F.3d 1426, 1429-30 (8th Cir.1994) (concluding that absent party’s ability to protect its interest was not impaired where interests were adequately represented by existing party); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 877 F.2d 132, 135-36 (1st Cir.1989) (holding that a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary’s “virtually identical interests” permitted the corporation to adequately represent the subsidiary, and that, therefore, the subsidiary was not a necessary party). Similarly, the interests of Bramlett and Defendants are virtually identical (if not completely identical), and there is nothing to suggest that Bramlett’s interests will not be adequately represented by Defendants. Indeed, Defendants’ selection of Bramlett to be their lead counsel in this case and his willingness to represent the three firms strongly suggest that his interests are aligned with those of his law firm clients. Therefore, the Court concludes that Bramlett is not a necessary party under Rule 19(a), and need not be joined as a party in the present litigation.
C. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Under Rule 12(b)(2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) authorizes dismissal of a claim for' lack of jurisdiction over the person. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Absent an evidentiary hearing on the issue of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff “ |
3,414,263 | 9,435,945 | 2009-03-10 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP | Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991 (2009) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_49 | the court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of [the] factual allegations as true. | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 887 (6th Cir.2002)). A prima facie showing of jurisdiction may be established based upon the plaintiffs presentation of specific facts, by affidavit or otherwise. In considering a motion to dismiss, “ |
3,414,263 | 9,435,945 | 2009-03-10 | United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee | Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP | Glassman, Edwards, Wade & Wyatt, P.C. v. Wolf Haldenstein Adler Freeman & Herz, LLP, 601 F. Supp. 2d 991 (2009) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_4 | a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state. | Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 826 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). Personal jurisdiction may be either specific or general, depending on the nature of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
General jurisdiction arises when “ |
4,256,301 | 9,435,945 | 2014-04-15 | United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874 (2014) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_1 | ‘if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] state’s long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant ] due process.’ | ”
When sitting in federal question jurisdiction, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant “ ‘if the defendant is amenable to service of process under the [forum] state’s long-arm statute and if the exercise of personal jurisdiction would not deny the defendant ] due process. |
4,256,301 | 9,435,945 | 2014-04-15 | United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874 (2014) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_47 | need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. | ” Miller v. AXA Winterthur Ins. Co., 694 F.3d 675, 679 n. 1 (6th Cir.2012) (citing Green v. Wilson, 455 Mich. 342, 565 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1997)).
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction. When such a motion is decided without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff “ |
4,256,301 | 9,435,945 | 2014-04-15 | United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874 (2014) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_24 | in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. | ” The evidence before the court must be viewed “ |
4,256,301 | 9,435,945 | 2014-04-15 | United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874 (2014) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_14 | traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice | Dawson v. Pepin, 1:99-CV-316, 2001 WL 822346, at *5 (W.D.Mich. Mar. 29, 2001) (Quist, J.) (citing ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F.Supp.2d 323, 332-33 (D.S.C.1999); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.Supp.2d 104, 112 (D.Conn.1998)). Here, the relevant evidence from the Court’s perspective is not whether this particular sale was actually consummated, but rather the undisputed characteristics of Defendant’s website. The Court holds, therefore, that to allow a defendant to escape personal jurisdiction in a particular forum simply because its interactive website redirects customers to a third-party vendor’s site to complete a sale would undermine the “ |
4,256,301 | 9,435,945 | 2014-04-15 | United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC | Mor-Dall Enterprises, Inc. v. Dark Horse Distillery, LLC, 16 F. Supp. 3d 874 (2014) | 2002-05-21 | United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit | Bird v. Parsons | Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (2002) | 9435945_29 | violations of federal trademark law are analogous to tort cases. | Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124, and such that Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in Michigan.
(b) Colder Effects Test
Plaintiff argues that in addition to Defendant’s interactive website, Defendant has also purposefully availed itself of the privilege of acting in Michigan under the Colder effects test. This Court agrees. The Colder effects test allows a plaintiff to “enhance” the contacts a defendant has with a forum by demonstrating that the defendant intentionally directed its tor-tious conduct toward plaintiffs in the forum. Carrier Corp. v. Outokumpu Oyj, 673 F.3d 430, 451 (6th Cir.2012); Air Prods. & Controls, Inc., 503 F.3d at 552-53; Colder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89, 104 S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (holding that personal jurisdiction was proper in California over two Florida defendants who published an allegedly defamatory article about a California resident). Contacts with the forum, in the context of purposeful availment, are “enhanced” when (1) the defendants acted intentionally, (2) the defendants’ action was expressly aimed at the State of Michigan, and (3) the brunt of the injuries were felt in Michigan. Thomas v. Barrett, No. 1:12-CV-74, 2012 WL 2952188, at *2 (W.D.Mich. July 19, 2012) (Bell, J.) (citing Audi AG & Volkswagon of Am., Inc. v. D'Amato, 341 F.Supp.2d 734, 746 (E.D.Mich.2004)).
Here, Plaintiffs claims are for trademark infringement and unfair competition. As the Sixth Circuit has long recognized, “ |