instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 56
241k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
175k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static inline struct inode *orphan_list_entry(struct list_head *l)
{
return &list_entry(l, struct ext3_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
}
Commit Message: ext3: Fix format string issues
ext3_msg() takes the printk prefix as the second parameter and the
format string as the third parameter. Two callers of ext3_msg omit the
prefix and pass the format string as the second parameter and the first
parameter to the format string as the third parameter. In both cases
this string comes from an arbitrary source. Which means the string may
contain format string characters, which will
lead to undefined and potentially harmful behavior.
The issue was introduced in commit 4cf46b67eb("ext3: Unify log messages
in ext3") and is fixed by this patch.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 32,958 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void EBMLHeader::Init() {
m_version = 1;
m_readVersion = 1;
m_maxIdLength = 4;
m_maxSizeLength = 8;
if (m_docType) {
delete[] m_docType;
m_docType = NULL;
}
m_docTypeVersion = 1;
m_docTypeReadVersion = 1;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: netdutils::Status XfrmController::flushInterfaces() {
const auto& ifaces = InterfaceController::getIfaceNames();
RETURN_IF_NOT_OK(ifaces);
const String8 ifPrefix8 = String8(INetd::IPSEC_INTERFACE_PREFIX().string());
for (const std::string& iface : ifaces.value()) {
int status = 0;
if (!iface.compare(0, ifPrefix8.length(), ifPrefix8.c_str()) &&
(status = removeVirtualTunnelInterface(iface)) < 0) {
ALOGE("Failed to delete ipsec tunnel %s.", iface.c_str());
return netdutils::statusFromErrno(status, "Failed to remove ipsec tunnel.");
}
}
return netdutils::status::ok;
}
Commit Message: Set optlen for UDP-encap check in XfrmController
When setting the socket owner for an encap socket XfrmController will
first attempt to verify that the socket has the UDP-encap socket option
set. When doing so it would pass in an uninitialized optlen parameter
which could cause the call to not modify the option value if the optlen
happened to be too short. So for example if the stack happened to
contain a zero where optlen was located the check would fail and the
socket owner would not be changed.
Fix this by setting optlen to the size of the option value parameter.
Test: run cts -m CtsNetTestCases
BUG: 111650288
Change-Id: I57b6e9dba09c1acda71e3ec2084652e961667bd9
(cherry picked from commit fc42a105147310bd680952d4b71fe32974bd8506)
CWE ID: CWE-909 | 0 | 162,707 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnJavaScriptExecuteRequest(
const base::string16& jscript,
int id,
bool notify_result) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_tracing", "OnJavaScriptExecuteRequest",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_THREAD);
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(v8::Isolate::GetCurrent());
v8::Local<v8::Value> result =
frame_->executeScriptAndReturnValue(WebScriptSource(jscript));
HandleJavascriptExecutionResult(jscript, id, notify_result, result);
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 123,163 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: point_set (mpi_point_t d, mpi_point_t s)
{
mpi_set (d->x, s->x);
mpi_set (d->y, s->y);
mpi_set (d->z, s->z);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 13,072 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetVertexAttribiv(GLuint index,
GLenum pname,
GLint* params) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetVertexAttribiv(" << index
<< ", " << GLES2Util::GetStringVertexAttribute(pname)
<< ", " << static_cast<const void*>(params) << ")");
uint32_t value = 0;
if (vertex_array_object_manager_->GetVertexAttrib(index, pname, &value)) {
*params = static_cast<GLint>(value);
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetVertexAttribiv");
typedef cmds::GetVertexAttribiv::Result Result;
auto result = GetResultAs<Result>();
if (!result) {
return;
}
result->SetNumResults(0);
helper_->GetVertexAttribiv(index, pname, GetResultShmId(), result.offset());
WaitForCmd();
result->CopyResult(params);
GPU_CLIENT_LOG_CODE_BLOCK({
for (int32_t i = 0; i < result->GetNumResults(); ++i) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" " << i << ": " << result->GetData()[i]);
}
});
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,054 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __exit vmx_exit(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
synchronize_rcu();
#endif
kvm_exit();
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 42,745 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: IW_IMPL(void) iw_set_dither_type(struct iw_context *ctx, int channeltype, int f, int s)
{
if(channeltype>=0 && channeltype<IW_NUM_CHANNELTYPES) {
ctx->ditherfamily_by_channeltype[channeltype] = f;
ctx->dithersubtype_by_channeltype[channeltype] = s;
}
switch(channeltype) {
case IW_CHANNELTYPE_ALL:
ctx->ditherfamily_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_ALPHA] = f;
ctx->dithersubtype_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_ALPHA] = s;
case IW_CHANNELTYPE_NONALPHA:
ctx->ditherfamily_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_RED] = f;
ctx->dithersubtype_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_RED] = s;
ctx->ditherfamily_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_GREEN] = f;
ctx->dithersubtype_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_GREEN] = s;
ctx->ditherfamily_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_BLUE] = f;
ctx->dithersubtype_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_BLUE] = s;
ctx->ditherfamily_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_GRAY] = f;
ctx->dithersubtype_by_channeltype[IW_CHANNELTYPE_GRAY] = s;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 64,989 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: const KURL& DocumentLoader::unreachableURL() const
{
return m_substituteData.failingURL();
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 105,766 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: oparray_find(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
long i;
ref *ep;
for (i = 0; (ep = ref_stack_index(&e_stack, i)) != 0; ++i) {
if (r_is_estack_mark(ep) &&
(ep->value.opproc == oparray_cleanup ||
ep->value.opproc == oparray_no_cleanup)
)
return ep;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-388 | 0 | 2,879 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLFormElement::CopyNonAttributePropertiesFromElement(
const Element& source) {
was_demoted_ = static_cast<const HTMLFormElement&>(source).was_demoted_;
HTMLElement::CopyNonAttributePropertiesFromElement(source);
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 152,211 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void option_export_pack_edges(const char *edges)
{
if (pack_edges)
fclose(pack_edges);
pack_edges = fopen(edges, "a");
if (!pack_edges)
die_errno("Cannot open '%s'", edges);
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 55,098 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: crypto_check_cert_eku(krb5_context context,
pkinit_plg_crypto_context plgctx,
pkinit_req_crypto_context reqctx,
pkinit_identity_crypto_context idctx,
int checking_kdc_cert,
int allow_secondary_usage,
int *valid_eku)
{
char buf[DN_BUF_LEN];
int found_eku = 0;
krb5_error_code retval = EINVAL;
int i;
*valid_eku = 0;
if (reqctx->received_cert == NULL)
goto cleanup;
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(reqctx->received_cert),
buf, sizeof(buf));
pkiDebug("%s: looking for EKUs in cert = %s\n", __FUNCTION__, buf);
if ((i = X509_get_ext_by_NID(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_ext_key_usage, -1)) >= 0) {
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert, NID_ext_key_usage,
NULL, NULL);
if (extusage) {
pkiDebug("%s: found eku info in the cert\n", __FUNCTION__);
for (i = 0; found_eku == 0 && i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *tmp_oid;
tmp_oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i);
pkiDebug("%s: checking eku %d of %d, allow_secondary = %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, i+1, sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage),
allow_secondary_usage);
if (checking_kdc_cert) {
if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPKdc) == 0)
|| (allow_secondary_usage
&& OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_kp_serverAuth) == 0))
found_eku = 1;
} else {
if ((OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_pkinit_KPClientAuth) == 0)
|| (allow_secondary_usage
&& OBJ_cmp(tmp_oid, plgctx->id_ms_kp_sc_logon) == 0))
found_eku = 1;
}
}
}
EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free(extusage);
if (found_eku) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage = NULL;
pkiDebug("%s: found acceptable EKU, checking for digitalSignature\n", __FUNCTION__);
/* check that digitalSignature KeyUsage is present */
X509_check_ca(reqctx->received_cert);
if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(reqctx->received_cert,
NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
if (!ku_reject(reqctx->received_cert,
X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
pkiDebug("%s: found digitalSignature KU\n",
__FUNCTION__);
*valid_eku = 1;
} else
pkiDebug("%s: didn't find digitalSignature KU\n",
__FUNCTION__);
}
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
}
}
retval = 0;
cleanup:
pkiDebug("%s: returning retval %d, valid_eku %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, retval, *valid_eku);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: PKINIT null pointer deref [CVE-2013-1415]
Don't dereference a null pointer when cleaning up.
The KDC plugin for PKINIT can dereference a null pointer when a
malformed packet causes processing to terminate early, leading to
a crash of the KDC process. An attacker would need to have a valid
PKINIT certificate or have observed a successful PKINIT authentication,
or an unauthenticated attacker could execute the attack if anonymous
PKINIT is enabled.
CVSSv2 vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:P/RL:O/RC:C
This is a minimal commit for pullup; style fixes in a followup.
[kaduk@mit.edu: reformat and edit commit message]
(cherry picked from commit c773d3c775e9b2d88bcdff5f8a8ba88d7ec4e8ed)
ticket: 7570
version_fixed: 1.11.1
status: resolved
CWE ID: | 0 | 33,628 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ZEND_API void* ZEND_FASTCALL _emalloc_huge(size_t size)
{
ZEND_MM_CUSTOM_ALLOCATOR(size);
return zend_mm_alloc_huge(AG(mm_heap), size);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72742 - memory allocator fails to realloc small block to large one
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 50,152 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: rescaled_large_exists() const {
return rescaled_large_exists_;
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 128,101 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::OnDidDownloadImage(
int id,
int http_status_code,
const GURL& image_url,
int requested_size,
const std::vector<SkBitmap>& bitmaps) {
ImageDownloadMap::iterator iter = image_download_map_.find(id);
if (iter == image_download_map_.end()) {
return;
}
if (!iter->second.is_null()) {
iter->second.Run(id, http_status_code, image_url, requested_size, bitmaps);
}
image_download_map_.erase(id);
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 111,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: status_t Camera3Device::tearDown(int streamId) {
ATRACE_CALL();
ALOGV("%s: Camera %d: Tearing down stream %d", __FUNCTION__, mId, streamId);
Mutex::Autolock il(mInterfaceLock);
Mutex::Autolock l(mLock);
if (mHal3Device->common.version < CAMERA_DEVICE_API_VERSION_3_2) {
ALOGE("%s: Unable to tear down streams on device HAL v%x",
__FUNCTION__, mHal3Device->common.version);
return NO_INIT;
}
sp<Camera3StreamInterface> stream;
ssize_t outputStreamIdx = mOutputStreams.indexOfKey(streamId);
if (outputStreamIdx == NAME_NOT_FOUND) {
CLOGE("Stream %d does not exist", streamId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
stream = mOutputStreams.editValueAt(outputStreamIdx);
if (stream->hasOutstandingBuffers() || mRequestThread->isStreamPending(stream)) {
CLOGE("Stream %d is a target of a in-progress request", streamId);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
return stream->tearDown();
}
Commit Message: Camera3Device: Validate template ID
Validate template ID before creating a default request.
Bug: 26866110
Bug: 27568958
Change-Id: Ifda457024f1d5c2b1382f189c1a8d5fda852d30d
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 161,106 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::LoadSourceFromAttribute() {
load_state_ = kLoadingFromSrcAttr;
const AtomicString& src_value = FastGetAttribute(srcAttr);
if (src_value.IsEmpty()) {
BLINK_MEDIA_LOG << "LoadSourceFromAttribute(" << (void*)this
<< "), empty 'src'";
MediaLoadingFailed(WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError,
BuildElementErrorMessage("Empty src attribute"));
return;
}
KURL media_url = GetDocument().CompleteURL(src_value);
if (!IsSafeToLoadURL(media_url, kComplain)) {
MediaLoadingFailed(
WebMediaPlayer::kNetworkStateFormatError,
BuildElementErrorMessage("Media load rejected by URL safety check"));
return;
}
LoadResource(WebMediaPlayerSource(WebURL(media_url)), String());
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 144,565 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: lzh_make_huffman_table(struct huffman *hf)
{
uint16_t *tbl;
const unsigned char *bitlen;
int bitptn[17], weight[17];
int i, maxbits = 0, ptn, tbl_size, w;
int diffbits, len_avail;
/*
* Initialize bit patterns.
*/
ptn = 0;
for (i = 1, w = 1 << 15; i <= 16; i++, w >>= 1) {
bitptn[i] = ptn;
weight[i] = w;
if (hf->freq[i]) {
ptn += hf->freq[i] * w;
maxbits = i;
}
}
if (ptn != 0x10000 || maxbits > hf->tbl_bits)
return (0);/* Invalid */
hf->max_bits = maxbits;
/*
* Cut out extra bits which we won't house in the table.
* This preparation reduces the same calculation in the for-loop
* making the table.
*/
if (maxbits < 16) {
int ebits = 16 - maxbits;
for (i = 1; i <= maxbits; i++) {
bitptn[i] >>= ebits;
weight[i] >>= ebits;
}
}
if (maxbits > HTBL_BITS) {
unsigned htbl_max;
uint16_t *p;
diffbits = maxbits - HTBL_BITS;
for (i = 1; i <= HTBL_BITS; i++) {
bitptn[i] >>= diffbits;
weight[i] >>= diffbits;
}
htbl_max = bitptn[HTBL_BITS] +
weight[HTBL_BITS] * hf->freq[HTBL_BITS];
p = &(hf->tbl[htbl_max]);
while (p < &hf->tbl[1U<<HTBL_BITS])
*p++ = 0;
} else
diffbits = 0;
hf->shift_bits = diffbits;
/*
* Make the table.
*/
tbl_size = 1 << HTBL_BITS;
tbl = hf->tbl;
bitlen = hf->bitlen;
len_avail = hf->len_avail;
hf->tree_used = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len_avail; i++) {
uint16_t *p;
int len, cnt;
uint16_t bit;
int extlen;
struct htree_t *ht;
if (bitlen[i] == 0)
continue;
/* Get a bit pattern */
len = bitlen[i];
ptn = bitptn[len];
cnt = weight[len];
if (len <= HTBL_BITS) {
/* Calculate next bit pattern */
if ((bitptn[len] = ptn + cnt) > tbl_size)
return (0);/* Invalid */
/* Update the table */
p = &(tbl[ptn]);
if (cnt > 7) {
uint16_t *pc;
cnt -= 8;
pc = &p[cnt];
pc[0] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[1] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[2] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[3] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[4] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[5] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[6] = (uint16_t)i;
pc[7] = (uint16_t)i;
if (cnt > 7) {
cnt -= 8;
memcpy(&p[cnt], pc,
8 * sizeof(uint16_t));
pc = &p[cnt];
while (cnt > 15) {
cnt -= 16;
memcpy(&p[cnt], pc,
16 * sizeof(uint16_t));
}
}
if (cnt)
memcpy(p, pc, cnt * sizeof(uint16_t));
} else {
while (cnt > 1) {
p[--cnt] = (uint16_t)i;
p[--cnt] = (uint16_t)i;
}
if (cnt)
p[--cnt] = (uint16_t)i;
}
continue;
}
/*
* A bit length is too big to be housed to a direct table,
* so we use a tree model for its extra bits.
*/
bitptn[len] = ptn + cnt;
bit = 1U << (diffbits -1);
extlen = len - HTBL_BITS;
p = &(tbl[ptn >> diffbits]);
if (*p == 0) {
*p = len_avail + hf->tree_used;
ht = &(hf->tree[hf->tree_used++]);
if (hf->tree_used > hf->tree_avail)
return (0);/* Invalid */
ht->left = 0;
ht->right = 0;
} else {
if (*p < len_avail ||
*p >= (len_avail + hf->tree_used))
return (0);/* Invalid */
ht = &(hf->tree[*p - len_avail]);
}
while (--extlen > 0) {
if (ptn & bit) {
if (ht->left < len_avail) {
ht->left = len_avail + hf->tree_used;
ht = &(hf->tree[hf->tree_used++]);
if (hf->tree_used > hf->tree_avail)
return (0);/* Invalid */
ht->left = 0;
ht->right = 0;
} else {
ht = &(hf->tree[ht->left - len_avail]);
}
} else {
if (ht->right < len_avail) {
ht->right = len_avail + hf->tree_used;
ht = &(hf->tree[hf->tree_used++]);
if (hf->tree_used > hf->tree_avail)
return (0);/* Invalid */
ht->left = 0;
ht->right = 0;
} else {
ht = &(hf->tree[ht->right - len_avail]);
}
}
bit >>= 1;
}
if (ptn & bit) {
if (ht->left != 0)
return (0);/* Invalid */
ht->left = (uint16_t)i;
} else {
if (ht->right != 0)
return (0);/* Invalid */
ht->right = (uint16_t)i;
}
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Fail with negative lha->compsize in lha_read_file_header_1()
Fixes a heap buffer overflow reported in Secunia SA74169
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 68,650 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void process_bin_update(conn *c) {
char *key;
int nkey;
int vlen;
item *it;
protocol_binary_request_set* req = binary_get_request(c);
assert(c != NULL);
key = binary_get_key(c);
nkey = c->binary_header.request.keylen;
/* fix byteorder in the request */
req->message.body.flags = ntohl(req->message.body.flags);
req->message.body.expiration = ntohl(req->message.body.expiration);
vlen = c->binary_header.request.bodylen - (nkey + c->binary_header.request.extlen);
if (settings.verbose > 1) {
int ii;
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_ADD) {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d ADD ", c->sfd);
} else if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET) {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d SET ", c->sfd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "<%d REPLACE ", c->sfd);
}
for (ii = 0; ii < nkey; ++ii) {
fprintf(stderr, "%c", key[ii]);
}
fprintf(stderr, " Value len is %d", vlen);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
if (settings.detail_enabled) {
stats_prefix_record_set(key, nkey);
}
it = item_alloc(key, nkey, req->message.body.flags,
realtime(req->message.body.expiration), vlen+2);
if (it == 0) {
if (! item_size_ok(nkey, req->message.body.flags, vlen + 2)) {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_E2BIG, vlen);
} else {
write_bin_error(c, PROTOCOL_BINARY_RESPONSE_ENOMEM, vlen);
}
/* Avoid stale data persisting in cache because we failed alloc.
* Unacceptable for SET. Anywhere else too? */
if (c->cmd == PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET) {
it = item_get(key, nkey);
if (it) {
item_unlink(it);
item_remove(it);
}
}
/* swallow the data line */
c->write_and_go = conn_swallow;
return;
}
ITEM_set_cas(it, c->binary_header.request.cas);
switch (c->cmd) {
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_ADD:
c->cmd = NREAD_ADD;
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_SET:
c->cmd = NREAD_SET;
break;
case PROTOCOL_BINARY_CMD_REPLACE:
c->cmd = NREAD_REPLACE;
break;
default:
assert(0);
}
if (ITEM_get_cas(it) != 0) {
c->cmd = NREAD_CAS;
}
c->item = it;
c->ritem = ITEM_data(it);
c->rlbytes = vlen;
conn_set_state(c, conn_nread);
c->substate = bin_read_set_value;
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 18,270 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool PropertyAddedOrRemoved() const { return property_added_or_removed_; }
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID: | 0 | 125,454 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderViewImpl::EvaluateScript(const string16& frame_xpath,
const string16& jscript,
int id,
bool notify_result) {
v8::HandleScope handle_scope;
v8::Handle<v8::Value> result;
WebFrame* web_frame = GetChildFrame(frame_xpath);
if (web_frame)
result = web_frame->executeScriptAndReturnValue(WebScriptSource(jscript));
if (notify_result) {
base::ListValue list;
if (!result.IsEmpty() && web_frame) {
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = web_frame->mainWorldScriptContext();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context);
V8ValueConverterImpl converter;
converter.SetDateAllowed(true);
converter.SetRegExpAllowed(true);
base::Value* result_value = converter.FromV8Value(result, context);
list.Set(0, result_value ? result_value : base::Value::CreateNullValue());
} else {
list.Set(0, base::Value::CreateNullValue());
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_ScriptEvalResponse(routing_id_, id, list));
}
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 115,505 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void BrowserPluginGuest::Terminate() {
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("BrowserPlugin.Guest.Terminate"));
base::ProcessHandle process_handle =
web_contents()->GetRenderProcessHost()->GetHandle();
base::KillProcess(process_handle, RESULT_CODE_KILLED, false);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,427 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err paen_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_Err e;
FDPartitionEntryBox *ptr = (FDPartitionEntryBox *)s;
if (ptr->blocks_and_symbols) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *)ptr->blocks_and_symbols);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->blocks_and_symbols->size;
}
if (ptr->FEC_symbol_locations) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->FEC_symbol_locations);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->FEC_symbol_locations->size;
}
if (ptr->File_symbol_locations) {
e = gf_isom_box_size((GF_Box *) ptr->File_symbol_locations);
if (e) return e;
ptr->size += ptr->File_symbol_locations->size;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,309 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: RestartTestJob(URLRequest* request, NetworkDelegate* network_delegate)
: URLRequestTestJob(request, network_delegate, true) {}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 102,268 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: cff_parse_multiple_master( CFF_Parser parser )
{
CFF_FontRecDict dict = (CFF_FontRecDict)parser->object;
FT_Error error;
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_LEVEL_TRACE
/* beautify tracing message */
if ( ft_trace_levels[FT_COMPONENT] < 4 )
FT_TRACE1(( "Multiple Master CFFs not supported yet,"
" handling first master design only\n" ));
else
FT_TRACE1(( " (not supported yet,"
" handling first master design only)\n" ));
#endif
error = FT_ERR( Stack_Underflow );
/* currently, we handle only the first argument */
if ( parser->top >= parser->stack + 5 )
{
FT_Long num_designs = cff_parse_num( parser, parser->stack );
if ( num_designs > 16 || num_designs < 2 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cff_parse_multiple_master:"
" Invalid number of designs\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
else
{
dict->num_designs = (FT_UShort)num_designs;
dict->num_axes = (FT_UShort)( parser->top - parser->stack - 4 );
parser->num_designs = dict->num_designs;
parser->num_axes = dict->num_axes;
error = FT_Err_Ok;
}
}
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 13,245 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::MaybeGenerateCrashReport(
base::TerminationStatus status) {
if (!last_committed_url_.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS())
return;
if (!frame_tree_node_->IsMainFrame() && !IsCrossProcessSubframe())
return;
std::string reason;
switch (status) {
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_ABNORMAL_TERMINATION:
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_CRASHED:
break;
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_OOM:
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_PROCESS_WAS_KILLED_BY_OOM:
#endif
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
case base::TERMINATION_STATUS_OOM_PROTECTED:
#endif
reason = "oom";
break;
default:
return;
}
auto body = base::DictionaryValue();
if (!reason.empty())
body.SetString("reason", reason);
GetProcess()->GetStoragePartition()->GetNetworkContext()->QueueReport(
"crash" /* type */, "default" /* group */, last_committed_url_,
base::nullopt, std::move(body));
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 153,107 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry **pce;
zval *obj;
zval *tmp;
TSRMLS_FETCH();
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_STRING) || !strcmp(name, EL_NUMBER) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_BOOLEAN) || !strcmp(name, EL_NULL) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_ARRAY) || !strcmp(name, EL_STRUCT) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_RECORDSET) || !strcmp(name, EL_BINARY) ||
!strcmp(name, EL_DATETIME)) {
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent1);
if (!ent1->data) {
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(name, EL_BINARY)) {
int new_len=0;
unsigned char *new_str;
new_str = php_base64_decode(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data), &new_len);
STR_FREE(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data));
if (new_str) {
Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data) = new_str;
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) = new_len;
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(ent1->data);
}
}
/* Call __wakeup() method on the object. */
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zval *fname, *retval = NULL;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(fname);
ZVAL_STRING(fname, "__wakeup", 1);
call_user_function_ex(NULL, &ent1->data, fname, &retval, 0, 0, 0, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(fname);
FREE_ZVAL(fname);
if (retval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
if (stack->top > 1) {
stack->top--;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void**)&ent2);
/* if non-existent field */
if (ent2->type == ST_FIELD && ent2->data == NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
efree(ent1);
return;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY || Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
target_hash = HASH_OF(ent2->data);
if (ent1->varname) {
if (!strcmp(ent1->varname, PHP_CLASS_NAME_VAR) &&
Z_TYPE_P(ent1->data) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data) &&
ent2->type == ST_STRUCT && Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_bool incomplete_class = 0;
zend_str_tolower(Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
if (zend_hash_find(EG(class_table), Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data),
Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data)+1, (void **) &pce)==FAILURE) {
incomplete_class = 1;
pce = &PHP_IC_ENTRY;
}
/* Initialize target object */
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(obj);
object_init_ex(obj, *pce);
/* Merge current hashtable with object's default properties */
zend_hash_merge(Z_OBJPROP_P(obj),
Z_ARRVAL_P(ent2->data),
(void (*)(void *)) zval_add_ref,
(void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), 0);
if (incomplete_class) {
php_store_class_name(obj, Z_STRVAL_P(ent1->data), Z_STRLEN_P(ent1->data));
}
/* Clean up old array entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent2->data);
/* Set stack entry to point to the newly created object */
ent2->data = obj;
/* Clean up class name var entry */
zval_ptr_dtor(&ent1->data);
} else if (Z_TYPE_P(ent2->data) == IS_OBJECT) {
zend_class_entry *old_scope = EG(scope);
EG(scope) = Z_OBJCE_P(ent2->data);
Z_DELREF_P(ent1->data);
add_property_zval(ent2->data, ent1->varname, ent1->data);
EG(scope) = old_scope;
} else {
zend_symtable_update(target_hash, ent1->varname, strlen(ent1->varname)+1, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
efree(ent1->varname);
} else {
zend_hash_next_index_insert(target_hash, &ent1->data, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
}
efree(ent1);
} else {
stack->done = 1;
}
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_VAR) && stack->varname) {
efree(stack->varname);
stack->varname = NULL;
} else if (!strcmp(name, EL_FIELD)) {
st_entry *ent;
wddx_stack_top(stack, (void **)&ent);
efree(ent);
stack->top--;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 1 | 166,949 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void write_data_page(struct dnode_of_data *dn, struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
struct f2fs_summary sum;
struct node_info ni;
f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dn->data_blkaddr == NULL_ADDR);
get_node_info(sbi, dn->nid, &ni);
set_summary(&sum, dn->nid, dn->ofs_in_node, ni.version);
do_write_page(&sum, fio);
f2fs_update_data_blkaddr(dn, fio->new_blkaddr);
f2fs_update_iostat(sbi, fio->io_type, F2FS_BLKSIZE);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 86,034 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 166,584 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: CCITTFaxStream::CCITTFaxStream(Stream *strA, int encodingA, GBool endOfLineA,
GBool byteAlignA, int columnsA, int rowsA,
GBool endOfBlockA, GBool blackA):
FilterStream(strA) {
encoding = encodingA;
endOfLine = endOfLineA;
byteAlign = byteAlignA;
columns = columnsA;
if (columns < 1) {
columns = 1;
} else if (columns > INT_MAX - 2) {
columns = INT_MAX - 2;
}
rows = rowsA;
endOfBlock = endOfBlockA;
black = blackA;
codingLine = (int *)gmallocn_checkoverflow(columns + 1, sizeof(int));
refLine = (int *)gmallocn_checkoverflow(columns + 2, sizeof(int));
if (codingLine != NULL && refLine != NULL) {
eof = gFalse;
codingLine[0] = columns;
} else {
eof = gTrue;
}
row = 0;
nextLine2D = encoding < 0;
inputBits = 0;
a0i = 0;
outputBits = 0;
buf = EOF;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 3,895 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: raptor_libxml_validation_error(void* user_data, const char *msg, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, msg);
raptor_libxml_error_common(user_data, msg, args,
xml_validation_error_prefix, 1);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2012-0037
Enforce entity loading policy in raptor_libxml_resolveEntity
and raptor_libxml_getEntity by checking for file URIs and network URIs.
Add RAPTOR_OPTION_LOAD_EXTERNAL_ENTITIES / loadExternalEntities for
turning on loading of XML external entity loading, disabled by default.
This affects all the parsers that use SAX2: rdfxml, rss-tag-soup (and
aliases) and rdfa.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 21,979 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void PromiseAttributeAttributeSetter(
v8::Local<v8::Value> v8_value, const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
v8::Isolate* isolate = info.GetIsolate();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(isolate);
v8::Local<v8::Object> holder = info.Holder();
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(holder);
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(holder);
ScriptPromise cpp_value = ScriptPromise::Cast(ScriptState::Current(info.GetIsolate()), v8_value);
impl->setPromiseAttribute(cpp_value);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID: | 0 | 135,026 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void LayoutBlockFlow::layoutBlockChild(LayoutBox& child, MarginInfo& marginInfo, LayoutUnit& previousFloatLogicalBottom)
{
LayoutBlockFlow* childLayoutBlockFlow = child.isLayoutBlockFlow() ? toLayoutBlockFlow(&child) : nullptr;
LayoutUnit oldPosMarginBefore = maxPositiveMarginBefore();
LayoutUnit oldNegMarginBefore = maxNegativeMarginBefore();
child.computeAndSetBlockDirectionMargins(this);
LayoutUnit estimateWithoutPagination;
LayoutUnit logicalTopEstimate = estimateLogicalTopPosition(child, marginInfo, estimateWithoutPagination);
LayoutRect oldRect = child.frameRect();
bool childNeededLayout = positionAndLayoutOnceIfNeeded(child, logicalTopEstimate, previousFloatLogicalBottom);
bool atBeforeSideOfBlock = marginInfo.atBeforeSideOfBlock();
bool childIsSelfCollapsing = child.isSelfCollapsingBlock();
bool childDiscardMarginBefore = mustDiscardMarginBeforeForChild(child);
bool childDiscardMarginAfter = mustDiscardMarginAfterForChild(child);
LayoutUnit logicalTopBeforeClear = collapseMargins(child, marginInfo, childIsSelfCollapsing, childDiscardMarginBefore, childDiscardMarginAfter);
bool childDiscardMargin = childDiscardMarginBefore || childDiscardMarginAfter;
LayoutUnit newLogicalTop = clearFloatsIfNeeded(child, marginInfo, oldPosMarginBefore, oldNegMarginBefore, logicalTopBeforeClear, childIsSelfCollapsing, childDiscardMargin);
bool paginated = view()->layoutState()->isPaginated();
if (paginated) {
if (estimateWithoutPagination != newLogicalTop) {
positionAndLayoutOnceIfNeeded(child, newLogicalTop, previousFloatLogicalBottom);
}
newLogicalTop = adjustBlockChildForPagination(newLogicalTop, child, atBeforeSideOfBlock && logicalTopBeforeClear == newLogicalTop);
}
if (newLogicalTop != logicalTopEstimate
|| child.needsLayout()
|| (paginated && childLayoutBlockFlow && childLayoutBlockFlow->shouldBreakAtLineToAvoidWidow())) {
positionAndLayoutOnceIfNeeded(child, newLogicalTop, previousFloatLogicalBottom);
}
if (!marginInfo.canCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild() && !childIsSelfCollapsing)
marginInfo.setCanCollapseMarginAfterWithLastChild(true);
if (marginInfo.atBeforeSideOfBlock() && !childIsSelfCollapsing)
marginInfo.setAtBeforeSideOfBlock(false);
determineLogicalLeftPositionForChild(child);
LayoutSize childOffset = child.location() - oldRect.location();
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + logicalHeightForChild(child));
if (mustSeparateMarginAfterForChild(child)) {
setLogicalHeight(logicalHeight() + marginAfterForChild(child));
marginInfo.clearMargin();
}
if (childLayoutBlockFlow)
addOverhangingFloats(childLayoutBlockFlow, !childNeededLayout);
if (!selfNeedsLayout() && (childOffset.width() || childOffset.height()))
child.invalidatePaintForOverhangingFloats(true);
if (paginated) {
LayoutUnit newHeight = applyAfterBreak(child, logicalHeight(), marginInfo);
if (newHeight != size().height())
setLogicalHeight(newHeight);
}
if (child.isLayoutMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder()) {
positionSpannerDescendant(toLayoutMultiColumnSpannerPlaceholder(child));
}
}
Commit Message: Consistently check if a block can handle pagination strut propagation.
https://codereview.chromium.org/1360753002 got it right for inline child
layout, but did nothing for block child layout.
BUG=329421
R=jchaffraix@chromium.org,leviw@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1387553002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#352429}
CWE ID: CWE-22 | 0 | 123,004 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void p4_pmu_enable_all(int added)
{
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc = &__get_cpu_var(cpu_hw_events);
int idx;
for (idx = 0; idx < x86_pmu.num_counters; idx++) {
struct perf_event *event = cpuc->events[idx];
if (!test_bit(idx, cpuc->active_mask))
continue;
p4_pmu_enable_event(event);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 25,859 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void netlink_mm_close(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct file *file = vma->vm_file;
struct socket *sock = file->private_data;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (sk)
atomic_dec(&nlk_sk(sk)->mapped);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,538 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int nfs4_wait_for_completion_rpc_task(struct rpc_task *task)
{
int ret;
ret = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 22,916 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int _check_var(pam_handle_t *pamh, VAR *var)
{
/*
* Examine the variable and determine what action to take.
* Returns DEFINE_VAR, UNDEFINE_VAR depending on action to take
* or a PAM_* error code if passed back from other routines
*
* if no DEFAULT provided, the empty string is assumed
* if no OVERRIDE provided, the empty string is assumed
* if DEFAULT= and OVERRIDE evaluates to the empty string,
* this variable should be undefined
* if DEFAULT="" and OVERRIDE evaluates to the empty string,
* this variable should be defined with no value
* if OVERRIDE=value and value turns into the empty string, DEFAULT is used
*
* If DEFINE_VAR is to be returned, the correct value to define will
* be pointed to by var->value
*/
int retval;
D(("Called."));
/*
* First thing to do is to expand any arguments, but only
* if they are not the special quote values (cause expand_arg
* changes memory).
*/
if (var->defval && ("e != var->defval) &&
((retval = _expand_arg(pamh, &(var->defval))) != PAM_SUCCESS)) {
return retval;
}
if (var->override && ("e != var->override) &&
((retval = _expand_arg(pamh, &(var->override))) != PAM_SUCCESS)) {
return retval;
}
/* Now its easy */
if (var->override && *(var->override) && "e != var->override) {
/* if there is a non-empty string in var->override, we use it */
D(("OVERRIDE variable <%s> being used: <%s>", var->name, var->override));
var->value = var->override;
retval = DEFINE_VAR;
} else {
var->value = var->defval;
if ("e == var->defval) {
/*
* This means that the empty string was given for defval value
* which indicates that a variable should be defined with no value
*/
*var->defval = '\0';
D(("An empty variable: <%s>", var->name));
retval = DEFINE_VAR;
} else if (var->defval) {
D(("DEFAULT variable <%s> being used: <%s>", var->name, var->defval));
retval = DEFINE_VAR;
} else {
D(("UNDEFINE variable <%s>", var->name));
retval = UNDEFINE_VAR;
}
}
D(("Exit."));
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | 0 | 6,413 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Tab* TabStrip::FindTabHitByPoint(const gfx::Point& point) {
for (int i = 0; i < tab_count(); ++i) {
Tab* tab = tab_at(i);
if (!IsPointInTab(tab, point))
continue;
Tab* next_tab = i < (tab_count() - 1) ? tab_at(i + 1) : nullptr;
if (next_tab &&
(next_tab->IsActive() ||
(next_tab->IsSelected() && !tab->IsSelected())) &&
IsPointInTab(next_tab, point))
return next_tab;
return tab;
}
for (const auto& index_and_tabs : tabs_closing_map_) {
for (Tab* tab : index_and_tabs.second) {
if (IsPointInTab(tab, point))
return tab;
}
}
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 140,693 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator::StopOnError(
media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::Error error) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (client_)
client_->NotifyError(error);
client_ = NULL;
if (state_ != kUninitialized) {
Invalidate();
}
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 106,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static Image *ReadCMYKImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*canvas_image,
*image;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
QuantumInfo
*quantum_info;
QuantumType
quantum_type;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
if ((image->columns == 0) || (image->rows == 0))
ThrowReaderException(OptionError,"MustSpecifyImageSize");
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
if (image_info->interlace != PartitionInterlace)
{
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
}
/*
Create virtual canvas to support cropping (i.e. image.cmyk[100x100+10+20]).
*/
canvas_image=CloneImage(image,image->extract_info.width,1,MagickFalse,
exception);
(void) SetImageVirtualPixelMethod(canvas_image,BlackVirtualPixelMethod);
quantum_info=AcquireQuantumInfo(image_info,canvas_image);
if (quantum_info == (QuantumInfo *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
pixels=GetQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum_type=CMYKQuantum;
if (LocaleCompare(image_info->magick,"CMYKA") == 0)
{
quantum_type=CMYKAQuantum;
image->matte=MagickTrue;
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
while (image->scene < image_info->scene)
{
/*
Skip to next image.
*/
image->scene++;
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
break;
}
}
count=0;
length=0;
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Read pixels to virtual canvas image then push to image.
*/
if ((image_info->ping != MagickFalse) && (image_info->number_scenes != 0))
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace);
switch (image_info->interlace)
{
case NoInterlace:
default:
{
/*
No interlacing: CMYKCMYKCMYKCMYKCMYKCMYK...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,quantum_type);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
SetPixelBlack(indexes+x,GetPixelBlack(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
break;
}
case LineInterlace:
{
static QuantumType
quantum_types[5] =
{
CyanQuantum,
MagentaQuantum,
YellowQuantum,
BlackQuantum,
OpacityQuantum
};
/*
Line interlacing: CCC...MMM...YYY...KKK...CCC...MMM...YYY...KKK...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,CyanQuantum);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
for (i=0; i < (image->matte != MagickFalse ? 5 : 4); i++)
{
quantum_type=quantum_types[i];
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,quantum_type,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,
0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
switch (quantum_type)
{
case CyanQuantum:
{
SetPixelCyan(q,GetPixelCyan(p));
break;
}
case MagentaQuantum:
{
SetPixelMagenta(q,GetPixelMagenta(p));
break;
}
case YellowQuantum:
{
SetPixelYellow(q,GetPixelYellow(p));
break;
}
case BlackQuantum:
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,GetPixelIndex(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
break;
}
case OpacityQuantum:
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
break;
}
default:
break;
}
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
break;
}
case PlaneInterlace:
{
/*
Plane interlacing: CCCCCC...MMMMMM...YYYYYY...KKKKKK...
*/
if (scene == 0)
{
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,CyanQuantum);
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,GetPixelIndex(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,AlphaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,
canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,6,6);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
case PartitionInterlace:
{
/*
Partition interlacing: CCCCCC..., MMMMMM..., YYYYYY..., KKKKKK...
*/
AppendImageFormat("C",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (DiscardBlobBytes(image,image->offset) == MagickFalse)
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,CyanQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,CyanQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,GetPixelRed(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,1,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("M",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,MagentaQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,MagentaQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelGreen(q,GetPixelGreen(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,2,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("Y",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,YellowQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelBlue(q,GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("K",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,BlackQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const IndexPacket
*restrict canvas_indexes;
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register IndexPacket
*restrict indexes;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,BlackQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,0,
canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
canvas_indexes=GetVirtualIndexQueue(canvas_image);
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,GetPixelIndex(
canvas_indexes+image->extract_info.x+x));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,3,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (image->matte != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
AppendImageFormat("A",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
canvas_image=DestroyImageList(canvas_image);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=GetQuantumExtent(canvas_image,quantum_info,AlphaQuantum);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) scene; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
if (ReadBlob(image,length,pixels) != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->extract_info.height; y++)
{
register const PixelPacket
*restrict p;
register PixelPacket
*restrict q;
register ssize_t
x;
if (count != (ssize_t) length)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile",image->filename);
break;
}
q=GetAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,0,0,canvas_image->columns,1,
exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
length=ImportQuantumPixels(canvas_image,(CacheView *) NULL,
quantum_info,YellowQuantum,pixels,exception);
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(canvas_image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (((y-image->extract_info.y) >= 0) &&
((y-image->extract_info.y) < (ssize_t) image->rows))
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(canvas_image,canvas_image->extract_info.x,
0,canvas_image->columns,1,exception);
q=GetAuthenticPixels(image,0,y-image->extract_info.y,
image->columns,1,exception);
if ((p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL) ||
(q == (PixelPacket *) NULL))
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelOpacity(q,GetPixelOpacity(p));
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
count=ReadBlob(image,length,pixels);
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,4,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,5,5);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
}
}
SetQuantumImageType(image,quantum_type);
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
if (count == (ssize_t) length)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
scene++;
} while (count == (ssize_t) length);
quantum_info=DestroyQuantumInfo(quantum_info);
InheritException(&image->exception,&canvas_image->exception);
canvas_image=DestroyImage(canvas_image);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 168,553 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GF_Err ohdr_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_OMADRMCommonHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_OMADRMCommonHeaderBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "OMADRMCommonHeaderBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "EncryptionMethod=\"%d\" PaddingScheme=\"%d\" PlaintextLength=\""LLD"\" ",
ptr->EncryptionMethod, ptr->PaddingScheme, ptr->PlaintextLength);
if (ptr->RightsIssuerURL) fprintf(trace, "RightsIssuerURL=\"%s\" ", ptr->RightsIssuerURL);
if (ptr->ContentID) fprintf(trace, "ContentID=\"%s\" ", ptr->ContentID);
if (ptr->TextualHeaders) {
u32 i, offset;
char *start = ptr->TextualHeaders;
fprintf(trace, "TextualHeaders=\"");
i=offset=0;
while (i<ptr->TextualHeadersLen) {
if (start[i]==0) {
fprintf(trace, "%s ", start+offset);
offset=i+1;
}
i++;
}
fprintf(trace, "%s\" ", start+offset);
}
fprintf(trace, ">\n");
gf_isom_box_dump_done("OMADRMCommonHeaderBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,810 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void __unhash_process(struct task_struct *p)
{
nr_threads--;
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (thread_group_leader(p)) {
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PGID);
detach_pid(p, PIDTYPE_SID);
list_del_rcu(&p->tasks);
__get_cpu_var(process_counts)--;
}
list_del_rcu(&p->thread_group);
list_del_init(&p->sibling);
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,096 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: GDataRootDirectory::GDataRootDirectory()
: ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(GDataDirectory(NULL, this)),
fake_search_directory_(new GDataDirectory(NULL, NULL)),
largest_changestamp_(0), serialized_size_(0) {
title_ = kGDataRootDirectory;
SetFileNameFromTitle();
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 1 | 170,777 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void pdf_destroy(struct pdf_doc *pdf)
{
if (pdf) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < flexarray_size(&pdf->objects); i++)
pdf_object_destroy(pdf_get_object(pdf, i));
flexarray_clear(&pdf->objects);
free(pdf);
}
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 83,007 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int rle_patch_file_size(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx,size_t rlesize)
{
iw_byte buf[4];
size_t fileheader_size;
int ret;
if(!wctx->iodescr->seek_fn) {
iw_set_error(wctx->ctx,"Writing compressed BMP requires a seek function");
return 0;
}
if(wctx->include_file_header) {
ret=(*wctx->iodescr->seek_fn)(wctx->ctx,wctx->iodescr,2,SEEK_SET);
if(!ret) return 0;
iw_set_ui32le(buf,(unsigned int)(14+wctx->header_size+wctx->bitfields_size+wctx->palsize+rlesize));
iwbmp_write(wctx,buf,4);
fileheader_size = 14;
}
else {
fileheader_size = 0;
}
ret=(*wctx->iodescr->seek_fn)(wctx->ctx,wctx->iodescr,fileheader_size+20,SEEK_SET);
if(!ret) return 0;
iw_set_ui32le(buf,(unsigned int)rlesize);
iwbmp_write(wctx,buf,4);
(*wctx->iodescr->seek_fn)(wctx->ctx,wctx->iodescr,0,SEEK_END);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 64,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::~ExtensionDevToolsClientHost() {
if (infobar_delegate_) {
infobar_delegate_->ClearClientHost();
TabContentsWrapper* wrapper =
TabContentsWrapper::GetCurrentWrapperForContents(web_contents_);
InfoBarTabHelper* helper = wrapper->infobar_tab_helper();
if (helper)
helper->RemoveInfoBar(infobar_delegate_);
}
AttachedClientHosts::GetInstance()->Remove(this);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 108,256 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void Location::setHostname(LocalDOMWindow* current_window,
LocalDOMWindow* entered_window,
const String& hostname,
ExceptionState& exception_state) {
KURL url = GetDocument()->Url();
url.SetHost(hostname);
SetLocation(url.GetString(), current_window, entered_window,
&exception_state);
}
Commit Message: Check the source browsing context's CSP in Location::SetLocation prior to dispatching a navigation to a `javascript:` URL.
Makes `javascript:` navigations via window.location.href compliant with
https://html.spec.whatwg.org/#navigate, which states that the source
browsing context must be checked (rather than the current browsing
context).
Bug: 909865
Change-Id: Id6aef6eef56865e164816c67eb9fe07ea1cb1b4e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1359823
Reviewed-by: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrew Comminos <acomminos@fb.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#614451}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 152,599 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: clear_fifo_list ()
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,289 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int au1200fb_fb_setcolreg(unsigned regno, unsigned red, unsigned green,
unsigned blue, unsigned transp, struct fb_info *fbi)
{
volatile u32 *palette = lcd->palette;
u32 value;
if (regno > (AU1200_LCD_NBR_PALETTE_ENTRIES - 1))
return -EINVAL;
if (fbi->var.grayscale) {
/* Convert color to grayscale */
red = green = blue =
(19595 * red + 38470 * green + 7471 * blue) >> 16;
}
if (fbi->fix.visual == FB_VISUAL_TRUECOLOR) {
/* Place color in the pseudopalette */
if (regno > 16)
return -EINVAL;
palette = (u32*) fbi->pseudo_palette;
red >>= (16 - fbi->var.red.length);
green >>= (16 - fbi->var.green.length);
blue >>= (16 - fbi->var.blue.length);
value = (red << fbi->var.red.offset) |
(green << fbi->var.green.offset)|
(blue << fbi->var.blue.offset);
value &= 0xFFFF;
} else if (1 /*FIX!!! panel_is_active(fbdev->panel)*/) {
/* COLOR TFT PALLETTIZED (use RGB 565) */
value = (red & 0xF800)|((green >> 5) &
0x07E0)|((blue >> 11) & 0x001F);
value &= 0xFFFF;
} else if (0 /*panel_is_color(fbdev->panel)*/) {
/* COLOR STN MODE */
value = 0x1234;
value &= 0xFFF;
} else {
/* MONOCHROME MODE */
value = (green >> 12) & 0x000F;
value &= 0xF;
}
palette[regno] = value;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a few incorrectly checked [io_]remap_pfn_range() calls
Nico Golde reports a few straggling uses of [io_]remap_pfn_range() that
really should use the vm_iomap_memory() helper. This trivially converts
two of them to the helper, and comments about why the third one really
needs to continue to use remap_pfn_range(), and adds the missing size
check.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 28,346 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int get_implied_cluster_alloc(struct super_block *sb,
struct ext4_map_blocks *map,
struct ext4_extent *ex,
struct ext4_ext_path *path)
{
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(sb);
ext4_lblk_t c_offset = map->m_lblk & (sbi->s_cluster_ratio-1);
ext4_lblk_t ex_cluster_start, ex_cluster_end;
ext4_lblk_t rr_cluster_start;
ext4_lblk_t ee_block = le32_to_cpu(ex->ee_block);
ext4_fsblk_t ee_start = ext4_ext_pblock(ex);
unsigned short ee_len = ext4_ext_get_actual_len(ex);
/* The extent passed in that we are trying to match */
ex_cluster_start = EXT4_B2C(sbi, ee_block);
ex_cluster_end = EXT4_B2C(sbi, ee_block + ee_len - 1);
/* The requested region passed into ext4_map_blocks() */
rr_cluster_start = EXT4_B2C(sbi, map->m_lblk);
if ((rr_cluster_start == ex_cluster_end) ||
(rr_cluster_start == ex_cluster_start)) {
if (rr_cluster_start == ex_cluster_end)
ee_start += ee_len - 1;
map->m_pblk = (ee_start & ~(sbi->s_cluster_ratio - 1)) +
c_offset;
map->m_len = min(map->m_len,
(unsigned) sbi->s_cluster_ratio - c_offset);
/*
* Check for and handle this case:
*
* |--------- cluster # N-------------|
* |------- extent ----|
* |--- requested region ---|
* |===========|
*/
if (map->m_lblk < ee_block)
map->m_len = min(map->m_len, ee_block - map->m_lblk);
/*
* Check for the case where there is already another allocated
* block to the right of 'ex' but before the end of the cluster.
*
* |------------- cluster # N-------------|
* |----- ex -----| |---- ex_right ----|
* |------ requested region ------|
* |================|
*/
if (map->m_lblk > ee_block) {
ext4_lblk_t next = ext4_ext_next_allocated_block(path);
map->m_len = min(map->m_len, next - map->m_lblk);
}
trace_ext4_get_implied_cluster_alloc_exit(sb, map, 1);
return 1;
}
trace_ext4_get_implied_cluster_alloc_exit(sb, map, 0);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ext4: race-condition protection for ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio
We assumed that at the time we call ext4_convert_unwritten_extents_endio()
extent in question is fully inside [map.m_lblk, map->m_len] because
it was already split during submission. But this may not be true due to
a race between writeback vs fallocate.
If extent in question is larger than requested we will split it again.
Special precautions should being done if zeroout required because
[map.m_lblk, map->m_len] already contains valid data.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Monakhov <dmonakhov@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 18,605 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: bool bio_attempt_back_merge(struct request_queue *q, struct request *req,
struct bio *bio)
{
const int ff = bio->bi_opf & REQ_FAILFAST_MASK;
if (!ll_back_merge_fn(q, req, bio))
return false;
trace_block_bio_backmerge(q, req, bio);
if ((req->cmd_flags & REQ_FAILFAST_MASK) != ff)
blk_rq_set_mixed_merge(req);
req->biotail->bi_next = bio;
req->biotail = bio;
req->__data_len += bio->bi_iter.bi_size;
req->ioprio = ioprio_best(req->ioprio, bio_prio(bio));
blk_account_io_start(req, false);
return true;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 91,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int UDPSocketWin::SetMulticastLoopbackMode(bool loopback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
if (is_connected())
return ERR_SOCKET_IS_CONNECTED;
if (loopback)
socket_options_ |= SOCKET_OPTION_MULTICAST_LOOP;
else
socket_options_ &= ~SOCKET_OPTION_MULTICAST_LOOP;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Map posix error codes in bind better, and fix one windows mapping.
r=wtc
BUG=330233
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/101193008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@242224 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 113,461 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int mxf_read_primer_pack(void *arg, AVIOContext *pb, int tag, int size, UID uid, int64_t klv_offset)
{
MXFContext *mxf = arg;
int item_num = avio_rb32(pb);
int item_len = avio_rb32(pb);
if (item_len != 18) {
avpriv_request_sample(pb, "Primer pack item length %d", item_len);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if (item_num > 65536 || item_num < 0) {
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "item_num %d is too large\n", item_num);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (mxf->local_tags)
av_log(mxf->fc, AV_LOG_VERBOSE, "Multiple primer packs\n");
av_free(mxf->local_tags);
mxf->local_tags_count = 0;
mxf->local_tags = av_calloc(item_num, item_len);
if (!mxf->local_tags)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
mxf->local_tags_count = item_num;
avio_read(pb, mxf->local_tags, item_num*item_len);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix av_log context
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: mxf-crash-1c2e59bf07a34675bfb3ada5e1ec22fa9f38f923
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 74,846 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: std::string GetRawNondefaultId() {
std::string id;
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&AudioOutputAuthorizationHandlerTest::GetRawNondefaultIdOnIOThread,
base::Unretained(this), base::Unretained(&id)));
SyncWithAllThreads();
return id;
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID: | 0 | 128,167 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSwapOut(
int proxy_routing_id,
bool is_loading,
const FrameReplicationState& replicated_frame_state) {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation,rail", "RenderFrameImpl::OnSwapOut",
"id", routing_id_);
SendUpdateState();
CHECK_NE(proxy_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
RenderFrameProxy* proxy = RenderFrameProxy::CreateProxyToReplaceFrame(
this, proxy_routing_id, replicated_frame_state.scope);
if (is_main_frame_) {
render_view_->GetWidget()->SetIsFrozen(true);
}
RenderViewImpl* render_view = render_view_;
bool is_main_frame = is_main_frame_;
int routing_id = GetRoutingID();
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner =
GetTaskRunner(blink::TaskType::kPostedMessage);
bool success = frame_->Swap(proxy->web_frame());
if (is_main_frame) {
DCHECK(success);
CHECK(!render_view->main_render_frame_);
}
if (!success) {
proxy->FrameDetached(blink::WebRemoteFrameClient::DetachType::kSwap);
return;
}
if (is_loading)
proxy->OnDidStartLoading();
proxy->SetReplicatedState(replicated_frame_state);
auto send_swapout_ack = base::BindOnce(
[](int routing_id, bool is_main_frame) {
RenderThread::Get()->Send(new FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK(routing_id));
},
routing_id, is_main_frame);
task_runner->PostTask(FROM_HERE, std::move(send_swapout_ack));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: long SimpleBlock::Parse() { return m_block.Parse(m_pCluster); }
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 160,832 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigatorImpl::DidNavigate(
RenderFrameHostImpl* render_frame_host,
const FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params& params,
std::unique_ptr<NavigationHandleImpl> navigation_handle) {
FrameTree* frame_tree = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->frame_tree();
bool oopifs_possible = SiteIsolationPolicy::AreCrossProcessFramesPossible();
bool is_navigation_within_page = controller_->IsURLInPageNavigation(
params.url, params.origin, params.was_within_same_document,
render_frame_host);
if (is_navigation_within_page &&
render_frame_host !=
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()
->render_manager()
->current_frame_host()) {
bad_message::ReceivedBadMessage(render_frame_host->GetProcess(),
bad_message::NI_IN_PAGE_NAVIGATION);
is_navigation_within_page = false;
}
if (ui::PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition)) {
if (delegate_) {
if (delegate_->CanOverscrollContent()) {
if (!params.was_within_same_document)
controller_->TakeScreenshot();
}
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePreCommit(is_navigation_within_page);
}
if (!oopifs_possible)
frame_tree->root()->render_manager()->DidNavigateFrame(
render_frame_host, params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser);
}
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetCurrentOrigin(
params.origin, params.has_potentially_trustworthy_unique_origin);
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetInsecureRequestPolicy(
params.insecure_request_policy);
if (!is_navigation_within_page) {
render_frame_host->ResetContentSecurityPolicies();
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->ResetCspHeaders();
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->ResetFeaturePolicyHeader();
}
if (oopifs_possible) {
FrameTreeNode* frame = render_frame_host->frame_tree_node();
frame->render_manager()->DidNavigateFrame(
render_frame_host, params.gesture == NavigationGestureUser);
}
SiteInstanceImpl* site_instance = render_frame_host->GetSiteInstance();
if (!site_instance->HasSite() && ShouldAssignSiteForURL(params.url) &&
!params.url_is_unreachable) {
site_instance->SetSite(params.url);
}
if (ui::PageTransitionIsMainFrame(params.transition) && delegate_)
delegate_->SetMainFrameMimeType(params.contents_mime_type);
int old_entry_count = controller_->GetEntryCount();
LoadCommittedDetails details;
bool did_navigate = controller_->RendererDidNavigate(
render_frame_host, params, &details, is_navigation_within_page,
navigation_handle.get());
if (old_entry_count != controller_->GetEntryCount() ||
details.previous_entry_index !=
controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex()) {
frame_tree->root()->render_manager()->SendPageMessage(
new PageMsg_SetHistoryOffsetAndLength(
MSG_ROUTING_NONE, controller_->GetLastCommittedEntryIndex(),
controller_->GetEntryCount()),
site_instance);
}
render_frame_host->frame_tree_node()->SetCurrentURL(params.url);
render_frame_host->SetLastCommittedOrigin(params.origin);
if (!params.url_is_unreachable)
render_frame_host->set_last_successful_url(params.url);
if (did_navigate && !is_navigation_within_page)
render_frame_host->ResetFeaturePolicy();
if (details.type != NAVIGATION_TYPE_NAV_IGNORE && delegate_) {
DCHECK_EQ(!render_frame_host->GetParent(),
did_navigate ? details.is_main_frame : false);
navigation_handle->DidCommitNavigation(params, did_navigate,
details.did_replace_entry,
details.previous_url, details.type,
render_frame_host);
navigation_handle.reset();
}
if (!did_navigate)
return; // No navigation happened.
RecordNavigationMetrics(details, params, site_instance);
if (delegate_) {
if (details.is_main_frame) {
delegate_->DidNavigateMainFramePostCommit(render_frame_host,
details, params);
}
delegate_->DidNavigateAnyFramePostCommit(
render_frame_host, details, params);
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 1 | 171,963 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: is_read_comp_null (gnutls_session_t session)
{
record_parameters_st *record_params;
_gnutls_epoch_get (session, EPOCH_READ_CURRENT, &record_params);
if (record_params->compression_algorithm == GNUTLS_COMP_NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 11,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void dm_sync_table(struct mapped_device *md)
{
synchronize_srcu(&md->io_barrier);
synchronize_rcu_expedited();
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 85,939 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: pdf_dict_getp(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, const char *keys)
{
char buf[256];
char *k, *e;
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_DICT(obj))
return NULL;
if (strlen(keys)+1 > 256)
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "path too long");
strcpy(buf, keys);
e = buf;
while (*e && obj)
{
k = e;
while (*e != '/' && *e != '\0')
e++;
if (*e == '/')
{
*e = '\0';
e++;
}
obj = pdf_dict_gets(ctx, obj, k);
}
return obj;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 13,889 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int kvm_emulate_wbinvd_noskip(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
if (!need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu))
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
if (kvm_x86_ops->has_wbinvd_exit()) {
int cpu = get_cpu();
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
smp_call_function_many(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask,
wbinvd_ipi, NULL, 1);
put_cpu();
cpumask_clear(vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
} else
wbinvd();
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 57,725 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void NavigateNamedFrame(const ToRenderFrameHost& caller_frame,
const GURL& url,
const std::string& name) {
EXPECT_EQ(true, EvalJs(caller_frame,
JsReplace("!!window.open($1, $2)", url, name)));
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | 0 | 143,863 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void llcp_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
{
struct nfc_llcp_sock *llcp_sock = nfc_llcp_sock(sk);
pr_debug("%p\n", sk);
if (sk->sk_state == LLCP_CONNECTED)
nfc_put_device(llcp_sock->dev);
skb_queue_purge(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
nfc_llcp_sock_free(llcp_sock);
if (!sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)) {
pr_err("Freeing alive NFC LLCP socket %p\n", sk);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: NFC: llcp: fix info leaks via msg_name in llcp_sock_recvmsg()
The code in llcp_sock_recvmsg() does not initialize all the members of
struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp when filling the sockaddr info. Nor does it
initialize the padding bytes of the structure inserted by the compiler
for alignment.
Also, if the socket is in state LLCP_CLOSED or is shutting down during
receive the msg_namelen member is not updated to 0 while otherwise
returning with 0, i.e. "success". The msg_namelen update is also
missing for stream and seqpacket sockets which don't fill the sockaddr
info.
Both issues lead to the fact that the code will leak uninitialized
kernel stack bytes in net/socket.c.
Fix the first issue by initializing the memory used for sockaddr info
with memset(0). Fix the second one by setting msg_namelen to 0 early.
It will be updated later if we're going to fill the msg_name member.
Cc: Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org>
Cc: Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,486 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int x509_get_ns_cert_type( unsigned char **p,
const unsigned char *end,
unsigned char *ns_cert_type)
{
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_bitstring bs = { 0, 0, NULL };
if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bitstring( p, end, &bs ) ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + ret );
if( bs.len != 1 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS +
MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH );
/* Get actual bitstring */
*ns_cert_type = *bs.p;
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: Improve behaviour on fatal errors
If we didn't walk the whole chain, then there may be any kind of errors in the
part of the chain we didn't check, so setting all flags looks like the safe
thing to do.
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 61,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: resp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
int ret_len = 0, length_cur = length;
if(!bp || length <= 0)
return;
ND_PRINT((ndo, ": RESP"));
while (length_cur > 0) {
/*
* This block supports redis pipelining.
* For example, multiple operations can be pipelined within the same string:
* "*2\r\n\$4\r\nINCR\r\n\$1\r\nz\r\n*2\r\n\$4\r\nINCR\r\n\$1\r\nz\r\n*2\r\n\$4\r\nINCR\r\n\$1\r\nz\r\n"
* or
* "PING\r\nPING\r\nPING\r\n"
* In order to handle this case, we must try and parse 'bp' until
* 'length' bytes have been processed or we reach a trunc condition.
*/
ret_len = resp_parse(ndo, bp, length_cur);
TEST_RET_LEN_NORETURN(ret_len);
bp += ret_len;
length_cur -= ret_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 62,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int fpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset,
unsigned int pos, unsigned int count,
const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_VSX
u64 buf[33];
int i;
flush_fp_to_thread(target);
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
buf[i] = target->thread.TS_FPR(i);
buf[32] = target->thread.fp_state.fpscr;
/* copy to local buffer then write that out */
i = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, buf, 0, -1);
if (i)
return i;
for (i = 0; i < 32 ; i++)
target->thread.TS_FPR(i) = buf[i];
target->thread.fp_state.fpscr = buf[32];
return 0;
#else
BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetof(struct thread_fp_state, fpscr) !=
offsetof(struct thread_fp_state, fpr[32]));
flush_fp_to_thread(target);
return user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf,
&target->thread.fp_state, 0, -1);
#endif
}
Commit Message: powerpc/tm: Flush TM only if CPU has TM feature
Commit cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
added code to access TM SPRs in flush_tmregs_to_thread(). However
flush_tmregs_to_thread() does not check if TM feature is available on
CPU before trying to access TM SPRs in order to copy live state to
thread structures. flush_tmregs_to_thread() is indeed guarded by
CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM but it might be the case that kernel
was compiled with CONFIG_PPC_TRANSACTIONAL_MEM enabled and ran on
a CPU without TM feature available, thus rendering the execution
of TM instructions that are treated by the CPU as illegal instructions.
The fix is just to add proper checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread()
if CPU has the TM feature before accessing any TM-specific resource,
returning immediately if TM is no available on the CPU. Adding
that checking in flush_tmregs_to_thread() instead of in places
where it is called, like in vsr_get() and vsr_set(), is better because
avoids the same problem cropping up elsewhere.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+
Fixes: cd63f3c ("powerpc/tm: Fix saving of TM SPRs in core dump")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Romero <gromero@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Cyril Bur <cyrilbur@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 84,784 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static enum test_return cache_destructor_test(void)
{
cache_t *cache = cache_create("test", sizeof(uint32_t), sizeof(char*),
NULL, cache_destructor);
assert(cache != NULL);
char *ptr = cache_alloc(cache);
cache_free(cache, ptr);
cache_destroy(cache);
return (ptr == destruct_data) ? TEST_PASS : TEST_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 94,224 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: Ins_SLOOP( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
if ( args[0] < 0 )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Bad_Argument );
else
exc->GS.loop = args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 10,672 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void ChildThread::AcceptConnection(
const mojo::String& service_name,
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle message_pipe) {
NOTREACHED();
}
Commit Message: [FileAPI] Clean up WebFileSystemImpl before Blink shutdown
WebFileSystemImpl should not outlive V8 instance, since it may have references to V8.
This CL ensures it deleted before Blink shutdown.
BUG=369525
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/270633009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@269345 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 121,292 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void conn_worker_readd(conn *c) {
c->ev_flags = EV_READ | EV_PERSIST;
event_set(&c->event, c->sfd, c->ev_flags, event_handler, (void *)c);
event_base_set(c->thread->base, &c->event);
c->state = conn_new_cmd;
if (event_add(&c->event, 0) == -1) {
perror("event_add");
}
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 75,169 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: dns_run_resolution(struct dns_resolution *resolution)
{
struct dns_resolvers *resolvers = resolution->resolvers;
int query_id, i;
/* Avoid sending requests for resolutions that don't yet have an
* hostname, ie resolutions linked to servers that do not yet have an
* fqdn */
if (!resolution->hostname_dn)
return 0;
/* Check if a resolution has already been started for this server return
* directly to avoid resolution pill up. */
if (resolution->step != RSLV_STEP_NONE)
return 0;
/* Generates a new query id. We try at most 100 times to find a free
* query id */
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
query_id = dns_rnd16();
if (!eb32_lookup(&resolvers->query_ids, query_id))
break;
query_id = -1;
}
if (query_id == -1) {
send_log(NULL, LOG_NOTICE,
"could not generate a query id for %s, in resolvers %s.\n",
resolution->hostname_dn, resolvers->id);
return -1;
}
/* Update resolution parameters */
resolution->query_id = query_id;
resolution->qid.key = query_id;
resolution->step = RSLV_STEP_RUNNING;
resolution->query_type = resolution->prefered_query_type;
resolution->try = resolvers->resolve_retries;
eb32_insert(&resolvers->query_ids, &resolution->qid);
/* Send the DNS query */
resolution->try -= 1;
dns_send_query(resolution);
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | 0 | 710 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int handle_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
u32 vect_info;
enum emulation_result er;
vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
if (is_machine_check(intr_info))
return handle_machine_check(vcpu);
if ((intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR)
return 1; /* already handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
if (is_no_device(intr_info)) {
vmx_fpu_activate(vcpu);
return 1;
}
if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info)) {
if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
er = emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_TRAP_UD);
if (er != EMULATE_DONE)
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
error_code = 0;
if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
/*
* The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
* MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
* See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
*/
if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
!(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
return 0;
}
if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
/* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
BUG_ON(enable_ept);
cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
trace_kvm_page_fault(cr2, error_code);
if (kvm_event_needs_reinjection(vcpu))
kvm_mmu_unprotect_page_virt(vcpu, cr2);
return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, cr2, error_code, NULL, 0);
}
ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
switch (ex_no) {
case AC_VECTOR:
kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
return 1;
case DB_VECTOR:
dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
(KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~15;
vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
if (!(dr6 & ~DR6_RESERVED)) /* icebp */
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
/* fall through */
case BP_VECTOR:
/*
* Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
* user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
* #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
*/
vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
break;
default:
kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm:vmx: more complete state update on APICv on/off
The function to update APICv on/off state (in particular, to deactivate
it when enabling Hyper-V SynIC) is incomplete: it doesn't adjust
APICv-related fields among secondary processor-based VM-execution
controls. As a result, Windows 2012 guests get stuck when SynIC-based
auto-EOI interrupt intersected with e.g. an IPI in the guest.
In addition, the MSR intercept bitmap isn't updated every time "virtualize
x2APIC mode" is toggled. This path can only be triggered by a malicious
guest, because Windows didn't use x2APIC but rather their own synthetic
APIC access MSRs; however a guest running in a SynIC-enabled VM could
switch to x2APIC and thus obtain direct access to host APIC MSRs
(CVE-2016-4440).
The patch fixes those omissions.
Signed-off-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reported-by: Yang Zhang <yang.zhang.wz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,312 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static unsigned compute_avg_bitrate(MOVTrack *track)
{
uint64_t size = 0;
int i;
if (!track->track_duration)
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < track->entry; i++)
size += track->cluster[i].size;
return size * 8 * track->timescale / track->track_duration;
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 79,282 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::SetUpMojoIfNeeded() {
if (registry_.get())
return;
associated_registry_ = std::make_unique<AssociatedInterfaceRegistryImpl>();
registry_ = std::make_unique<service_manager::BinderRegistry>();
auto make_binding = [](RenderFrameHostImpl* impl,
mojom::FrameHostAssociatedRequest request) {
impl->frame_host_associated_binding_.Bind(std::move(request));
};
static_cast<blink::AssociatedInterfaceRegistry*>(associated_registry_.get())
->AddInterface(base::Bind(make_binding, base::Unretained(this)));
RegisterMojoInterfaces();
mojom::FrameFactoryPtr frame_factory;
BindInterface(GetProcess(), &frame_factory);
frame_factory->CreateFrame(routing_id_, MakeRequest(&frame_));
service_manager::mojom::InterfaceProviderPtr remote_interfaces;
frame_->GetInterfaceProvider(mojo::MakeRequest(&remote_interfaces));
remote_interfaces_.reset(new service_manager::InterfaceProvider);
remote_interfaces_->Bind(std::move(remote_interfaces));
remote_interfaces_->GetInterface(&frame_input_handler_);
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 156,008 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: AcpiNsBuildInternalName (
ACPI_NAMESTRING_INFO *Info)
{
UINT32 NumSegments = Info->NumSegments;
char *InternalName = Info->InternalName;
const char *ExternalName = Info->NextExternalChar;
char *Result = NULL;
UINT32 i;
ACPI_FUNCTION_TRACE (NsBuildInternalName);
/* Setup the correct prefixes, counts, and pointers */
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
InternalName[0] = AML_ROOT_PREFIX;
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[1];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[1] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[2];
}
else
{
InternalName[1] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[2] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[3];
}
}
else
{
/*
* Not fully qualified.
* Handle Carats first, then append the name segments
*/
i = 0;
if (Info->NumCarats)
{
for (i = 0; i < Info->NumCarats; i++)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_PARENT_PREFIX;
}
}
if (NumSegments <= 1)
{
Result = &InternalName[i];
}
else if (NumSegments == 2)
{
InternalName[i] = AML_DUAL_NAME_PREFIX;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1];
}
else
{
InternalName[i] = AML_MULTI_NAME_PREFIX_OP;
InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+1] = (char) NumSegments;
Result = &InternalName[(ACPI_SIZE) i+2];
}
}
/* Build the name (minus path separators) */
for (; NumSegments; NumSegments--)
{
for (i = 0; i < ACPI_NAME_SIZE; i++)
{
if (ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) ||
(*ExternalName == 0))
{
/* Pad the segment with underscore(s) if segment is short */
Result[i] = '_';
}
else
{
/* Convert the character to uppercase and save it */
Result[i] = (char) toupper ((int) *ExternalName);
ExternalName++;
}
}
/* Now we must have a path separator, or the pathname is bad */
if (!ACPI_IS_PATH_SEPARATOR (*ExternalName) &&
(*ExternalName != 0))
{
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_BAD_PATHNAME);
}
/* Move on the next segment */
ExternalName++;
Result += ACPI_NAME_SIZE;
}
/* Terminate the string */
*Result = 0;
if (Info->FullyQualified)
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (abs) \"\\%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
else
{
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT ((ACPI_DB_EXEC, "Returning [%p] (rel) \"%s\"\n",
InternalName, InternalName));
}
return_ACPI_STATUS (AE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Namespace: fix operand cache leak
I found some ACPI operand cache leaks in ACPI early abort cases.
Boot log of ACPI operand cache leak is as follows:
>[ 0.174332] ACPI: Added _OSI(Module Device)
>[ 0.175504] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Device)
>[ 0.176010] ACPI: Added _OSI(3.0 _SCP Extensions)
>[ 0.177032] ACPI: Added _OSI(Processor Aggregator Device)
>[ 0.178284] ACPI: SCI (IRQ16705) allocation failed
>[ 0.179352] ACPI Exception: AE_NOT_ACQUIRED, Unable to install
System Control Interrupt handler (20160930/evevent-131)
>[ 0.180008] ACPI: Unable to start the ACPI Interpreter
>[ 0.181125] ACPI Error: Could not remove SCI handler
(20160930/evmisc-281)
>[ 0.184068] kmem_cache_destroy Acpi-Operand: Slab cache still has
objects
>[ 0.185358] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.10.0-rc3 #2
>[ 0.186820] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS
VirtualBox 12/01/2006
>[ 0.188000] Call Trace:
>[ 0.188000] ? dump_stack+0x5c/0x7d
>[ 0.188000] ? kmem_cache_destroy+0x224/0x230
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_sleep_proc_init+0x22/0x22
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_os_delete_cache+0xa/0xd
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_ut_delete_caches+0x3f/0x7b
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_terminate+0x5/0xf
>[ 0.188000] ? acpi_init+0x288/0x32e
>[ 0.188000] ? __class_create+0x4c/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? video_setup+0x7a/0x7a
>[ 0.188000] ? do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x1b0
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init_freeable+0x194/0x21a
>[ 0.188000] ? rest_init+0x80/0x80
>[ 0.188000] ? kernel_init+0xa/0x100
>[ 0.188000] ? ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
When early abort is occurred due to invalid ACPI information, Linux kernel
terminates ACPI by calling AcpiTerminate() function. The function calls
AcpiNsTerminate() function to delete namespace data and ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList).
But the deletion code in AcpiNsTerminate() function is wrapped in
ACPI_EXEC_APP definition, therefore the code is only executed when the
definition exists. If the define doesn't exist, ACPI operand cache
(AcpiGbl_ModuleCodeList) is leaked, and stack dump is shown in kernel log.
This causes a security threat because the old kernel (<= 4.9) shows memory
locations of kernel functions in stack dump, therefore kernel ASLR can be
neutralized.
To fix ACPI operand leak for enhancing security, I made a patch which
removes the ACPI_EXEC_APP define in AcpiNsTerminate() function for
executing the deletion code unconditionally.
Signed-off-by: Seunghun Han <kkamagui@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lv Zheng <lv.zheng@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-755 | 0 | 95,287 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static struct kobject *floppy_find(dev_t dev, int *part, void *data)
{
int drive = (*part & 3) | ((*part & 0x80) >> 5);
if (drive >= N_DRIVE || !floppy_available(drive))
return NULL;
if (((*part >> 2) & 0x1f) >= ARRAY_SIZE(floppy_type))
return NULL;
*part = 0;
return get_disk_and_module(disks[drive]);
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | 0 | 88,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: validate_event(struct pmu_hw_events *hw_events,
struct perf_event *event)
{
struct arm_pmu *armpmu = to_arm_pmu(event->pmu);
struct hw_perf_event fake_event = event->hw;
struct pmu *leader_pmu = event->group_leader->pmu;
if (is_software_event(event))
return 1;
if (event->pmu != leader_pmu || event->state < PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF)
return 1;
if (event->state == PERF_EVENT_STATE_OFF && !event->attr.enable_on_exec)
return 1;
return armpmu->get_event_idx(hw_events, &fake_event) >= 0;
}
Commit Message: arm64: perf: reject groups spanning multiple HW PMUs
The perf core implicitly rejects events spanning multiple HW PMUs, as in
these cases the event->ctx will differ. However this validation is
performed after pmu::event_init() is called in perf_init_event(), and
thus pmu::event_init() may be called with a group leader from a
different HW PMU.
The ARM64 PMU driver does not take this fact into account, and when
validating groups assumes that it can call to_arm_pmu(event->pmu) for
any HW event. When the event in question is from another HW PMU this is
wrong, and results in dereferencing garbage.
This patch updates the ARM64 PMU driver to first test for and reject
events from other PMUs, moving the to_arm_pmu and related logic after
this test. Fixes a crash triggered by perf_fuzzer on Linux-4.0-rc2, with
a CCI PMU present:
Bad mode in Synchronous Abort handler detected, code 0x86000006 -- IABT (current EL)
CPU: 0 PID: 1371 Comm: perf_fuzzer Not tainted 3.19.0+ #249
Hardware name: V2F-1XV7 Cortex-A53x2 SMM (DT)
task: ffffffc07c73a280 ti: ffffffc07b0a0000 task.ti: ffffffc07b0a0000
PC is at 0x0
LR is at validate_event+0x90/0xa8
pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffffffc000090228>] pstate: 00000145
sp : ffffffc07b0a3ba0
[< (null)>] (null)
[<ffffffc0000907d8>] armpmu_event_init+0x174/0x3cc
[<ffffffc00015d870>] perf_try_init_event+0x34/0x70
[<ffffffc000164094>] perf_init_event+0xe0/0x10c
[<ffffffc000164348>] perf_event_alloc+0x288/0x358
[<ffffffc000164c5c>] SyS_perf_event_open+0x464/0x98c
Code: bad PC value
Also cleans up the code to use the arm_pmu only when we know
that we are dealing with an arm pmu event.
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Ziljstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K. Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 1 | 167,467 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: char** lxc_va_arg_list_to_argv(va_list ap, size_t skip, int do_strdup)
{
va_list ap2;
size_t count = 1 + skip;
char **result;
/* first determine size of argument list, we don't want to reallocate
* constantly...
*/
va_copy(ap2, ap);
while (1) {
char* arg = va_arg(ap2, char*);
if (!arg)
break;
count++;
}
va_end(ap2);
result = calloc(count, sizeof(char*));
if (!result)
return NULL;
count = skip;
while (1) {
char* arg = va_arg(ap, char*);
if (!arg)
break;
arg = do_strdup ? strdup(arg) : arg;
if (!arg)
goto oom;
result[count++] = arg;
}
/* calloc has already set last element to NULL*/
return result;
oom:
free(result);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 44,697 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void FinishParseMediaMetadata(
metadata::MediaMetadataParser* /* parser */,
const extensions::api::media_galleries::MediaMetadata& metadata,
const std::vector<metadata::AttachedImage>& attached_images) {
Send(new ChromeUtilityHostMsg_ParseMediaMetadata_Finished(
true, *metadata.ToValue(), attached_images));
ReleaseProcessIfNeeded();
}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID: | 0 | 123,768 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void SyncTest::ReadPasswordFile() {
CommandLine* cl = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
password_file_ = cl->GetSwitchValuePath(switches::kPasswordFileForTest);
if (password_file_.empty())
LOG(FATAL) << "Can't run live server test without specifying --"
<< switches::kPasswordFileForTest << "=<filename>";
std::string file_contents;
file_util::ReadFileToString(password_file_, &file_contents);
ASSERT_NE(file_contents, "") << "Password file \""
<< password_file_.value() << "\" does not exist.";
std::vector<std::string> tokens;
std::string delimiters = "\r\n";
Tokenize(file_contents, delimiters, &tokens);
ASSERT_EQ(2U, tokens.size()) << "Password file \""
<< password_file_.value()
<< "\" must contain exactly two lines of text.";
username_ = tokens[0];
password_ = tokens[1];
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 105,050 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static void bpf_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
enum bpf_type type;
truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
clear_inode(inode);
if (!bpf_inode_type(inode, &type))
bpf_any_put(inode->i_private, type);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | 0 | 53,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: parse_RESUBMIT(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts,
enum ofputil_protocol *usable_protocols OVS_UNUSED)
{
struct ofpact_resubmit *resubmit;
char *in_port_s, *table_s;
resubmit = ofpact_put_RESUBMIT(ofpacts);
in_port_s = strsep(&arg, ",");
if (in_port_s && in_port_s[0]) {
if (!ofputil_port_from_string(in_port_s, &resubmit->in_port)) {
return xasprintf("%s: resubmit to unknown port", in_port_s);
}
} else {
resubmit->in_port = OFPP_IN_PORT;
}
table_s = strsep(&arg, ",");
if (table_s && table_s[0]) {
uint32_t table_id = 0;
char *error;
error = str_to_u32(table_s, &table_id);
if (error) {
return error;
}
resubmit->table_id = table_id;
} else {
resubmit->table_id = 255;
}
if (resubmit->in_port == OFPP_IN_PORT && resubmit->table_id == 255) {
return xstrdup("at least one \"in_port\" or \"table\" must be "
"specified on resubmit");
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 77,063 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: nfs_enable_share_one(const char *sharepath, const char *host,
const char *security, const char *access, void *pcookie)
{
int rc;
char *linuxhost, *hostpath, *opts;
const char *linux_opts = (const char *)pcookie;
char *argv[6];
/* exportfs -i -o sec=XX,rX,<opts> <host>:<sharepath> */
rc = get_linux_hostspec(host, &linuxhost);
if (rc < 0)
exit(1);
hostpath = malloc(strlen(linuxhost) + 1 + strlen(sharepath) + 1);
if (hostpath == NULL) {
free(linuxhost);
exit(1);
}
sprintf(hostpath, "%s:%s", linuxhost, sharepath);
free(linuxhost);
if (linux_opts == NULL)
linux_opts = "";
opts = malloc(4 + strlen(security) + 4 + strlen(linux_opts) + 1);
if (opts == NULL)
exit(1);
sprintf(opts, "sec=%s,%s,%s", security, access, linux_opts);
#ifdef DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "sharing %s with opts %s\n", hostpath, opts);
#endif
argv[0] = "/usr/sbin/exportfs";
argv[1] = "-i";
argv[2] = "-o";
argv[3] = opts;
argv[4] = hostpath;
argv[5] = NULL;
rc = libzfs_run_process(argv[0], argv, 0);
free(hostpath);
free(opts);
if (rc < 0)
return (SA_SYSTEM_ERR);
else
return (SA_OK);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 96,293 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static EAS_RESULT Parse_rgnh (SDLS_SYNTHESIZER_DATA *pDLSData, EAS_I32 pos, S_DLS_REGION *pRgn)
{
EAS_RESULT result;
EAS_U16 lowKey;
EAS_U16 highKey;
EAS_U16 lowVel;
EAS_U16 highVel;
EAS_U16 optionFlags;
EAS_U16 keyGroup;
/* seek to start of chunk */
if ((result = EAS_HWFileSeek(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, pos)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get the key range */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &lowKey, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &highKey, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* check the range */
if (lowKey > 127)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS rgnh: Low key out of range [%u]\n", lowKey); */ }
lowKey = 127;
}
if (highKey > 127)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS rgnh: High key out of range [%u]\n", lowKey); */ }
highKey = 127;
}
/* get the velocity range */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &lowVel, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &highVel, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* check the range */
if (lowVel > 127)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS rgnh: Low velocity out of range [%u]\n", lowVel); */ }
lowVel = 127;
}
if (highVel > 127)
{
{ /* dpp: EAS_ReportEx(_EAS_SEVERITY_WARNING, "DLS rgnh: High velocity out of range [%u]\n", highVel); */ }
highVel = 127;
}
/* get the option flags */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &optionFlags, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* get the key group */
if ((result = EAS_HWGetWord(pDLSData->hwInstData, pDLSData->fileHandle, &keyGroup, EAS_FALSE)) != EAS_SUCCESS)
return result;
/* save the key range and key group */
pRgn->wtRegion.region.rangeLow = (EAS_U8) lowKey;
pRgn->wtRegion.region.rangeHigh = (EAS_U8) highKey;
/*lint -e{734} keyGroup will always be from 0-15 */
pRgn->wtRegion.region.keyGroupAndFlags = keyGroup << 8;
pRgn->velLow = (EAS_U8) lowVel;
pRgn->velHigh = (EAS_U8) highVel;
if (optionFlags & F_RGN_OPTION_SELFNONEXCLUSIVE)
pRgn->wtRegion.region.keyGroupAndFlags |= REGION_FLAG_NON_SELF_EXCLUSIVE;
return EAS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DLS parser: fix wave pool size check.
Bug: 21132860.
Change-Id: I8ae872ea2cc2e8fec5fa0b7815f0b6b31ce744ff
(cherry picked from commit 2d7f8e1be2241e48458f5d3cab5e90be2b07c699)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 157,527 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: void acct_clear_integrals(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
tsk->acct_stimexpd = 0;
tsk->acct_rss_mem1 = 0;
tsk->acct_vm_mem1 = 0;
}
Commit Message: [PATCH] xacct_add_tsk: fix pure theoretical ->mm use-after-free
Paranoid fix. The task can free its ->mm after the 'if (p->mm)' check.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Shailabh Nagar <nagar@watson.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Jay Lan <jlan@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 19,348 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static noinline int mmc_ioctl_dvd_auth(struct cdrom_device_info *cdi,
void __user *arg)
{
int ret;
dvd_authinfo ai;
if (!CDROM_CAN(CDC_DVD))
return -ENOSYS;
cd_dbg(CD_DO_IOCTL, "entering DVD_AUTH\n");
if (copy_from_user(&ai, (dvd_authinfo __user *)arg, sizeof(ai)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = dvd_do_auth(cdi, &ai);
if (ret)
return ret;
if (copy_to_user((dvd_authinfo __user *)arg, &ai, sizeof(ai)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: cdrom: fix improper type cast, which can leat to information leak.
There is another cast from unsigned long to int which causes
a bounds check to fail with specially crafted input. The value is
then used as an index in the slot array in cdrom_slot_status().
This issue is similar to CVE-2018-16658 and CVE-2018-10940.
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 76,304 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: jpc_ms_t *jpc_getms(jas_stream_t *in, jpc_cstate_t *cstate)
{
jpc_ms_t *ms;
jpc_mstabent_t *mstabent;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
if (!(ms = jpc_ms_create(0))) {
return 0;
}
/* Get the marker type. */
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &ms->id) || ms->id < JPC_MS_MIN ||
ms->id > JPC_MS_MAX) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
mstabent = jpc_mstab_lookup(ms->id);
ms->ops = &mstabent->ops;
/* Get the marker segment length and parameters if present. */
/* Note: It is tacitly assumed that a marker segment cannot have
parameters unless it has a length field. That is, there cannot
be a parameters field without a length field and vice versa. */
if (JPC_MS_HASPARMS(ms->id)) {
/* Get the length of the marker segment. */
if (jpc_getuint16(in, &ms->len) || ms->len < 3) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
/* Calculate the length of the marker segment parameters. */
ms->len -= 2;
/* Create and prepare a temporary memory stream from which to
read the marker segment parameters. */
/* Note: This approach provides a simple way of ensuring that
we never read beyond the end of the marker segment (even if
the marker segment length is errantly set too small). */
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, ms->len) ||
jas_stream_seek(tmpstream, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
return 0;
}
/* Get the marker segment parameters. */
if ((*ms->ops->getparms)(ms, cstate, tmpstream)) {
ms->ops = 0;
jpc_ms_destroy(ms);
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
return 0;
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() > 0) {
jpc_ms_dump(ms, stderr);
}
if (JAS_CAST(ulong, jas_stream_tell(tmpstream)) != ms->len) {
jas_eprintf("warning: trailing garbage in marker segment (%ld bytes)\n",
ms->len - jas_stream_tell(tmpstream));
}
/* Close the temporary stream. */
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
} else {
/* There are no marker segment parameters. */
ms->len = 0;
if (jas_getdbglevel() > 0) {
jpc_ms_dump(ms, stderr);
}
}
/* Update the code stream state information based on the type of
marker segment read. */
/* Note: This is a bit of a hack, but I'm not going to define another
type of virtual function for this one special case. */
if (ms->id == JPC_MS_SIZ) {
cstate->numcomps = ms->parms.siz.numcomps;
}
return ms;
}
Commit Message: Added some missing sanity checks on the data in a SIZ marker segment.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 72,983 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: static int open_pack_bitmap_1(struct packed_git *packfile)
{
int fd;
struct stat st;
char *idx_name;
if (open_pack_index(packfile))
return -1;
idx_name = pack_bitmap_filename(packfile);
fd = git_open_noatime(idx_name);
free(idx_name);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
if (fstat(fd, &st)) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if (bitmap_git.pack) {
warning("ignoring extra bitmap file: %s", packfile->pack_name);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
bitmap_git.pack = packfile;
bitmap_git.map_size = xsize_t(st.st_size);
bitmap_git.map = xmmap(NULL, bitmap_git.map_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
bitmap_git.map_pos = 0;
close(fd);
if (load_bitmap_header(&bitmap_git) < 0) {
munmap(bitmap_git.map, bitmap_git.map_size);
bitmap_git.map = NULL;
bitmap_git.map_size = 0;
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 54,934 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: int _yr_scan_verify_literal_match(
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
YR_AC_MATCH* ac_match,
uint8_t* data,
size_t data_size,
size_t data_base,
size_t offset)
{
int flags = 0;
int forward_matches = 0;
CALLBACK_ARGS callback_args;
YR_STRING* string = ac_match->string;
if (STRING_FITS_IN_ATOM(string))
{
forward_matches = ac_match->backtrack;
}
else if (STRING_IS_NO_CASE(string))
{
if (STRING_IS_ASCII(string))
{
forward_matches = _yr_scan_icompare(
data + offset,
data_size - offset,
string->string,
string->length);
}
if (STRING_IS_WIDE(string) && forward_matches == 0)
{
forward_matches = _yr_scan_wicompare(
data + offset,
data_size - offset,
string->string,
string->length);
}
}
else
{
if (STRING_IS_ASCII(string))
{
forward_matches = _yr_scan_compare(
data + offset,
data_size - offset,
string->string,
string->length);
}
if (STRING_IS_WIDE(string) && forward_matches == 0)
{
forward_matches = _yr_scan_wcompare(
data + offset,
data_size - offset,
string->string,
string->length);
}
}
if (forward_matches == 0)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (forward_matches == string->length * 2)
flags |= RE_FLAGS_WIDE;
if (STRING_IS_NO_CASE(string))
flags |= RE_FLAGS_NO_CASE;
callback_args.context = context;
callback_args.string = string;
callback_args.data = data;
callback_args.data_size = data_size;
callback_args.data_base = data_base;
callback_args.forward_matches = forward_matches;
callback_args.full_word = STRING_IS_FULL_WORD(string);
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_match_callback(
data + offset, 0, flags, &callback_args));
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 64,590 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. | Code: SSL *php_SSL_new_from_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, php_stream *stream TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
zval **val = NULL;
char *cafile = NULL;
char *capath = NULL;
char *certfile = NULL;
char *cipherlist = NULL;
int ok = 1;
ERR_clear_error();
/* look at context options in the stream and set appropriate verification flags */
if (GET_VER_OPT("verify_peer") && zval_is_true(*val)) {
/* turn on verification callback */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, verify_callback);
/* CA stuff */
GET_VER_OPT_STRING("cafile", cafile);
GET_VER_OPT_STRING("capath", capath);
if (cafile || capath) {
if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, cafile, capath)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to set verify locations `%s' `%s'", cafile, capath);
return NULL;
}
}
if (GET_VER_OPT("verify_depth")) {
convert_to_long_ex(val);
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, Z_LVAL_PP(val));
}
} else {
SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
}
/* callback for the passphrase (for localcert) */
if (GET_VER_OPT("passphrase")) {
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, stream);
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
}
GET_VER_OPT_STRING("ciphers", cipherlist);
if (!cipherlist) {
cipherlist = "DEFAULT";
}
if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, cipherlist) != 1) {
return NULL;
}
GET_VER_OPT_STRING("local_cert", certfile);
if (certfile) {
char resolved_path_buff[MAXPATHLEN];
const char * private_key = NULL;
if (VCWD_REALPATH(certfile, resolved_path_buff)) {
/* a certificate to use for authentication */
if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, resolved_path_buff) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to set local cert chain file `%s'; Check that your cafile/capath settings include details of your certificate and its issuer", certfile);
return NULL;
}
GET_VER_OPT_STRING("local_pk", private_key);
if (private_key) {
char resolved_path_buff_pk[MAXPATHLEN];
if (VCWD_REALPATH(private_key, resolved_path_buff_pk)) {
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, resolved_path_buff_pk, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to set private key file `%s'", resolved_path_buff_pk);
return NULL;
}
}
} else {
if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, resolved_path_buff, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to set private key file `%s'", resolved_path_buff);
return NULL;
}
}
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10001001L
do {
/* Unnecessary as of OpenSSLv1.0.1 (will segfault if used with >= 10001001 ) */
X509 *cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
SSL *tmpssl = SSL_new(ctx);
cert = SSL_get_certificate(tmpssl);
if (cert) {
key = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(key, SSL_get_privatekey(tmpssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
SSL_free(tmpssl);
} while (0);
#endif
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Private key does not match certificate!");
}
}
}
if (ok) {
SSL *ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
if (ssl) {
/* map SSL => stream */
SSL_set_ex_data(ssl, ssl_stream_data_index, stream);
}
return ssl;
}
return NULL;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 14,231 |
Subsets and Splits